The Emergence of Environmental Migration and Displacement Management 'Best Practices' in the Pacific

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Abstract

Despite the growing challenge of environmental migration and displacement, the international community has yet to establish a global governance framework. But solutions are emerging in the Pacific. This thesis adopts the follow policy methodology to trace the emergence of 'best practices' in the issue area. By interviewing and observing policy elites operating across nine policy domains and three policy scales, it identified three regulatory approaches to environmental mobility: humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation. This research project seeks to explain variations in the extent to which these 'models' have become institutionally embedded in the Pacific.

This thesis argues that regional policy variations can be explained by activating events, institutional landscape, mobilising strategies, and local conditions. It makes four key contributions to geographical scholarship on policy mobilities and environmental migration and displacement governance. First, the notion of policy assemblage lifecycle demonstrates that pre-existing development-friendly approaches spread quickly and successfully across the region while new humanitarian solutions have moved slowly. This suggests that policy adoption decisions have little to do with policy 'effectiveness.' Second, the concept of activating events shows that different types of events galvanised actors in different ways to shape multilevel environmental mobility policies. Third, the regional dimension explicates that while external actors initiated the policymaking processes, Pacific organisations and governments created conducive conditions for embracing certain approaches. Finally, interagency cooperation on the issue area across multiple sites and scales is beginning to establish environmental mobility governance.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ..... **II**

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..... **III**

LIST OF FIGURES ..... **VIII**

LIST OF TABLES ..... **IX**

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..... **X**

STATEMENT OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP ..... **XV**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..... **XVI**

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION **1**

1.1 Overview 1

1.2 Background 1

1.3 Research Propositions, Objectives, and Questions 6

1.4 Significance 7

1.5 Terminology and Scope 10

1.6 Thesis Structure 12

CHAPTER 2: POLICY MOBILITIES FRAMEWORK **16**

2.1 Introduction 16

2.2 Policy Movement 16

2.3 Policy Assemblages 18

2.3.1 Policy Assemblage Lifecycle *21*

2.4 Policy Mobilities and Mutations 22

2.5 Activating Events 23

2.6 Institutional Landscape 25

2.7 Mobilising Strategies 27

2.8 Local Conditions 30

2.9 Chapter Summary 32

CHAPTER 3: FOLLOW POLICY METHODOLOGY **33**

3.1 Introduction 33

3.2 Critical Realist Epistemology 33

3.3 Distended Case Study Research Design 35

3.3.1 Immersion in the Environmental Migration and Displacement Policymaking Space *36*
3.3.2 Study Population *36*
3.4 Data Collection and Analysis Procedures 38
3.4.1 Document Analysis *38*
3.4.2 Participant Observations *39*
3.4.3 Semi-Structured Interviews *40*
3.4.4 Retroductive Data Analysis *42*
3.5 Ethical Considerations and Positionality 44
3.5.1 Ethical Considerations *44*
3.5.2 Positionality *46*
3.6 Limitations 47
3.7 Chapter Summary 48
CHAPTER 4: ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT MANAGEMENT ASSEMBLAGE 51
4.1 Introduction 51
4.2 Pessimism and Optimism Debates 51
4.2.1 The Pessimistic Narrative: Displacement as a Security Threat *54*
4.2.2 The Optimistic Narrative: Migration as an Adaptation Strategy *55*
4.3 Policy Responses to Environmental Migration and Displacement: Following Emerging Approaches 56
4.3.1 Humanitarian Protection Measures *57*
4.3.2 Labour Migration Policies *65*
4.3.3 Planned Relocation Guidelines *71*
4.4 Chapter Summary 77
CHAPTER 5: ACTIVATING EVENTS 79
5.1 Introduction 79
5.2 Perceived Environmental/Climate Refugee Crisis 80
5.3 Knowledge Jolts 85
5.4 Political Events 90
5.4.1 Global Critical Junctures *90*
5.4.2 Regional Critical Junctures *97*
5.5 Real Environmental Migration and Displacement Shocks 99
5.5.1 Internal Displacement and Planned Relocations *99*

5.5.2 Environmental Shocks, Refugee Crises, and Labour Migration.....105
5.5.3 Climate Asylum Claims and Humanitarian Protection.....107
5.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY..... 109
CHAPTER 6: THE INSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE 115
6.1 INTRODUCTION..... 115
6.2 HUMAN MOBILITY OPTIMISTS..... 116
6.2.1 The Primary Optimists.....116
6.2.2 Boundary Spanning Optimists.....125
6.2.3 Planned Relocation Advocates.....128
6.2.4 Labour Migration Supporters.....133
6.2.5 Humanitarian Protectionists.....138
6.3 ENVIRONMENTAL MOBILITY STRUCTURES..... 141
6.3.1 TfD Establishment.....141
6.3.2 Cross-Institutional Linkages.....144
6.3.3 An Emerging Regional Consultancy Industry.....146
6.3.4 Technical Working Group and Joint Working Group.....148
6.3.5 Political Coalition or Support.....150
6.3.6 National Interagency Committees.....153
6.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY..... 154
CHAPTERS 7-9: AN OVERVIEW OF MOBILISING STRATEGIES 159
CHAPTER 7: MOBILISING STRATEGY 1 – ISSUE-MAKING 161
7.1 INTRODUCTION..... 161
7.2 DELINKING ENVIRONMENTAL/ CLIMATE REFUGEE DISCOURSE..... 161
7.3 REFRAMING THE PROBLEM: FROM REFUGEE MOVEMENTS TO FORCED MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT..... 163
7.4 POLICY ALTERNATIVE 1: FROM RESETTLEMENT TO PLANNED RELOCATION 166
7.5 POLICY ALTERNATIVE 2: LABOUR MIGRATION AS AN ADAPTATION, RESILIENCE-BUILDING, AND SURVIVAL STRATEGY..... 169
7.6 POLICY ALTERNATIVE 3: FROM REFUGEE PROTECTION TO HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION 173
7.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY..... 175
CHAPTER 8: MOBILISING STRATEGY 2 – ENTREPRENEURIALISM....177
8.1 INTRODUCTION..... 177
8.2 A TRANSNATIONAL POLICY ASSEMBLY LINE..... 177

8.2.1 Global Expert Sites: Formulating the Solutions *178*
8.2.2 Global Expert-Cum-Policy Institution: The Nansen Initiative *181*
8.2.3 Global Policy Agoras: Selling 'Best Practices' *182*
8.2.4 An Evolving Regional Policy Line: Temporary Centres *186*
8.2.5 National Policy Arenas *190*
8.3 MULTI-INITIATIVES ON ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT 192
8.3.1 Global Initiatives as Channels for Knowledge Enhancement *192*
8.3.2 Regional Initiatives as Pipelines for Policy Development *195*
8.3.3 Institutional Survival and Discreet Coercion *199*
8.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 202
CHAPTER 9: MOBILISING STRATEGY 3 - ANCHORING 203
9.1 INTRODUCTION 203
9.2 POLITICAL LOBBYING AND COACHING 203
9.3 TECHNICAL SUBMISSIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL, DEVELOPMENT, AND SECURITY BODIES 207
9.4 DRAFTING SOFT HUMAN MOBILITY NORMS 211
9.5 EXPERT FEEDBACK ON AND EMBRACING DEVELOPMENT-FRIENDLY 'MODELS' 220
9.6 FINANCIAL AND GOVERNANCE GAINS 225
9.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 227
CONCLUSION OF MOBILISING STRATEGIES 228
CHAPTER 10: LOCAL CONDITIONS 236
10.1 INTRODUCTION 236
10.2 HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS 237
10.2.1 Planned Relocation Precedents *237*
10.2.2 Labour Migration Precedents *245*
10.3 FEAR OF LOSS 254
10.4 INSTITUTIONAL BOTTLENECKS 256
10.4.1 Internal Organisational Silos *256*
10.4.2 Policy Fatigue and Inter-Organisational Tensions *260*
10.4.3 Absent Institutional Infrastructure and Champions *261*
10.4.4 Restrictive Programme Designs and Conflicting Norms *263*
10.5 BROAD TERMINOLOGY AND UNSUBSTANTIATED ISSUE LINKAGES 267
10.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 270
CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION 276

11.1 INTRODUCTION 276
11.2 RESEARCH FINDINGS 278
11.2.1 Q1: What constitutes the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage? 278
11.2.2 Q2: How are key activating events mobilising policy actors to conform to certain 'models'? 280
11.2.3 Q3: Who are the key actors and what channels do they use to enable or constrain the flow of environmental mobility 'best practices'? 284
11.2.4 Q4: What sociocultural and political strategies (im)mobilise development-friendly and humanitarian approaches? 287
11.2.5 Q5: How do local conditions influence the adoption, adaptation and localisation of development-friendly and humanitarian 'best practices' to produce distinct environmental migration and displacement policies in the Pacific? 291
11.3 IMPLICATIONS 294
11.4 CONTRIBUTIONS 299
11.5 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 301

REFERENCES 304

APPENDICES 377
APPENDIX A: LIST OF DOCUMENTS 377
APPENDIX B: LIST OF EVENTS 401
APPENDIX C: LIST OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 413
APPENDIX D: SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 425
APPENDIX E: APPROVALS 427

List of Figures

Figure 3.1: Study Population. 37

Figure 3.2: Analysis Matrix. 44

Figure 4.1: Summary of Environmental Migration and Displacement Management Scholarship.....53

Figure 5.1: The World Wildlife Fund's Montage of Climate Refugees (Robie, 2017). 85

Figure 5.2: IPCC Experts Presenting the Special Report on Climate Change and Land to Member States in Geneva, Switzerland (Author, 2019). 90

Figure 5.3: The Impact of the 16th COP to UNFCCC on Global Environmental Migration and Displacement Governance (Author, 2019). 94

Figure 5.4: The Evacuation from Amabe to Santo Island, Vanuatu (VRC, 2017). ...104

Figure 6.1: TfD Composition and Institutional Approaches (UNFCCC, 2024).....144

Figure 6.2: JWG Facilitating Consultations on the Regional Framework on Climate Mobility in Suva, Fiji (PCCMHS Programme, 2021). 150

Figure 8.1: Human Mobility Optimists' Pavilions during the 27th COP to UNFCCC in Sharm-El Sheikh, Egypt (Author, 2022).....183

Figure 9.1: States Negotiating TfD's Recommendations at the 24th COP to UNFCCC in Katowice, Poland (top left), and WIM's Santiago Network and Loss and Damage Fund at 27th COP to UNFCCC in Sharm-El Sheikh, Egypt (Author, 2018, 2022). 204

Figure 9.2: Multi-Scalar and Cross-Jurisdictional Modelling of Planned Relocation. 224

Figure 9.3: Vertical Modelling of Labour Migration.....225

List of Tables

Table 5.1: The Impact of Different Activating Events in Mobilising and Institutionalising the Environmental Migration and Displacement Management Assemblage. 113

Table 6.1: National Institutional Landscape for Planned Relocation in the Pacific. .132

Table 6.2: National Institutional Landscape for Labour Migration in the Pacific. 137

Table 6.3: National Institutional Landscape for Humanitarian Protection in the Pacific. 140

Table 6.4: The Impact of Institutional Landscape in Mobilising and Standardising the Environmental Migration and Displacement Management Assemblage.....150

Table 9.1: The Impact of Mobilising Strategies on the Institutionalisation of the Environmental Migration and Displacement Management Assemblage.....234

Table 10.1: Historical Precedents of Planned Relocation in the Pacific.....236

Table 10.2: Historical Precedents of Labour Migration in the Pacific. 245

Table 10.3: The Impact of Local Conditions in Mobilising and Institutionalising the Environmental Migration and Displacement Management Assemblage.....274

List of Abbreviations

AGCCHM	Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility
ANU	Australian National University
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
BDAP	Boe Declaration Action Plan
BfW	Bread for the World
CAT	Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CANCC	Coalition of Low-lying Atoll Nations on Climate Change
Cartagena Declaration	Cartagena Declaration on Refugees
CCEMA	Climate Change, Environment and Migration Alliance
CCICD	Fiji's Climate Change and International Cooperation Division
COP	Conference of Parties
EACH-FOR	Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios
EU	European Union
FCOSS	Fiji Council of Social Services
FRDP	Framework on Resilient Development for the Pacific
GCM	Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
GFMD	Global Forum on Migration and Development
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
GMG	Global Migration Group
GPDRR	Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction

GPHMCCC	Global Programme on Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change
Guiding Principles	Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICCCAD	International Centre for Climate Change and Development
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICMC	International Catholic Migration Commission
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICMW	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IRCRCM	International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IOM-GMDAC	International Organisation for Migration, Global Migration Data Analysis Centre
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISIM	Institute for the Study of International Migration
IRR Model	Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction Model
JWG	Joint-Working Group on the Regional Framework

KANI	Kiribati-Australia Nursing Initiative
KNOMAD	Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development
MFAT	New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MECLEP	Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy
Montevideo Convention	Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States
Nansen Protection Agenda	Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change
NAWPP	North Australia Worker Pilot Programme
New York Declaration	New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OAU Convention	Organisation of African Unity Convention on Refugees
OHCHR	Officer to the High Commissioner on Human Rights
PAC	Pacific Access Category
PACER-Plus	Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Cooperation Plus
PCC	Pacific Conference of Churches
PCCM	Pacific Climate Change and Migration
PCCMHS	Pacific Climate Change, Migration and Human Security
PDD	Platform on Disaster Displacement
Peninsula Principles	Peninsula Principles on Climate-Displacement
PEV	Pacific Engagement Visa
PIANGO	Pacific Islands Association of Non-Governmental Organisations
PICAN	Pacific Islands Climate Action Network

PIDC	Pacific Immigration Development Community
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum
PIFS	Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
PLS	Pacific Labour Scheme
PLMAM	Pacific Labour Mobility Annual Meeting
Planned Relocation Guidance	Guidance on Protecting People From Disasters and Environmental Change Through Planned Relocation
Planned Relocation Toolbox	Toolbox for Protecting People from Disasters and Environmental Change through Planned Relocations
PRFCM	Pacific Regional Framework Climate Mobility
PRDD	Pacific Response to Disaster Displacement
PRP	Pacific Resilience Partnership
PSWP	Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot
RCPs	Regional Consultative Processes
Refugee Convention	Refugee Convention to the Status of Refugees
Refugee Protocol	Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
RSE Scheme	Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
Sendai Framework	Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction
SLP	Sky's the Limit Programme
SPREP	Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme
SPC	The Pacific Community
SQS	Samoan Quota Scheme
Statelessness Convention	Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness

SWP	Seasonal Worker Programme
TfD	Taskforce on Displacement
Transformative Mobilities	Transformative Human Mobilities in a Changing Climate
TWG-HM	Technical Working Group on Human Mobility
USP PACE-SD	University of the South Pacific, Pacific Centre for Environment and Sustainable Development
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDRR	United Nations Disaster Risk Reduction
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNTFHS	UN Trust Fund for Human Security
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNU-EHS	United Nations University, Institute for Environment and Human Security
WiAG	Words into Action Guidelines
WIM	Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage

Statement of Original Authorship

The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made.

Signature: 

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Overview

The Pacific is emerging as a laboratory for environmental mobility management 'models.' International organisations and professional experts are endorsing regional policy responses, touting them as innovative and amendable solutions across the world. However, there is limited knowledge on what policies are spreading successfully, and how and why this is happening. This thesis addresses this knowledge gap by asking: what explains variations in the level of institutionalisation of environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' in the Pacific? It postulates that policy convergences and divergences can be attributed to activating events, institutional landscape, mobilising strategies, and local conditions.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 offers a background, describing the context and problem under investigation. Section 1.3 presents the research propositions, objectives, and questions. Section 1.4 discusses the significance of the project. Finally, Section 1.5 outlines the thesis structure.

1.2 Background

In addressing the UN Security Council (UNSC) on the peace and security implications of rising seas, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said,

> "Rising seas are sinking futures … Rising sea levels and other climate impacts are already *forcing relocations* in Fiji, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, and elsewhere. Flooding and coastal erosion in West Africa are damaging infrastructure and communities … In North Africa, saltwater intrusion is contaminating land and freshwater resources … A hotter planet is melting glaciers and ice sheets … As the glaciers recede, the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra rivers will shrink. Rising sea levels combined with deep saltwater intrusion will make parts of their deltas *uninhabitable*. We see similar threats in the Mekong Delta and beyond. The consequences of this are unthinkable. Low-lying communities and entire communities could disappear forever. We could witness the *mass exodus* of entire populations on a biblical scale …" (UNGA, 2023, emphasis added).

Environmental stressors are making areas uninhabitable and compelling affected communities to move within and across borders. In 2022, disasters displaced 32.6 million people internally, and 84 percent of refugees and asylum seekers came from climate-vulnerable states (IDMC, 2023; UNHCR, 2023). The IEP (2020) estimates that 1,200,000,000 people will flee their homes by 2050.

The international community has heard countless environmental migration and displacement stories. Sudden-onset events displace many households. The 2023 earthquakes displaced 27 million Turks and Syrians while the 2022 Hunga-Tonga-Hunga-Ha'apai volcanic eruption displaced 3,000 Tongans (UNESCAP, 2023). The 2022 Cyclone Ida made 14,000 Louisiana residents homeless whereas the 2020 hurricanes forced Hondurans, Guatemalans, and Mexicans towards the USA (Holcombe et al., 2021; McAllister, 2024). The 2019 flooding compelled Grantham families to resettle while the 2019 Cyclone Ida was estimated to displace approximately 12,600-14,900 Mozambicans (Mester et al., 2023; Piggott-McKellar & Vella, 2023). Slow-onset events are motivating Pacific communities to relocate and migrate away from their ancestral homes. Denimanu, Narikoso, Vunidogoloa, and Vunisavisavi communities and the Waciwaci District School moved inland due to frequent coastal flooding (Bower & Weerasinghe, 2021; Charan et al., 2018; McMichael, Katonivualiku, et al., 2019). Carteret Islanders are gradually moving to mainland Bougainville due to coastal erosion and freshwater salinisation (Edwards, 2013; Rakova, 2012, 2014). The Kiribati government purportedly purchased land in Fiji for migration (Hermann & Kempf, 2017). I-Kiribati families and Tuvaluan seasonal workers are seeking permanent residency in New Zealand through the Pacific Access Category (PAC) (Anote Tong, interview, 14.04.2023; Bedford et al., 2010). They also are applying for humanitarian visas in Australia and New Zealand (Howes & Sharman, 2022a; McAdam, 2015). According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), such stories will become more common (Cissé et al., 2022).

So, how is the international community responding to this pressing challenge of environmental mobility? Bangladesh, Fiji, Maldives, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and humanitarian lawyers long lobbied for extending the 1951 Refugee Convention to so-called 'climate refugees,' or establishing a new protection treaty (AWG-LCA 3, 2008; Biermann & Boas, 2008, 2010; McAdam, 2011; UNGA, 2016a, 2018, 2019). The former Refugees Higher Commissioner also advocated for a global guiding framework to protect people falling outside the formal refugee system (Guterres, 2008, 2011b; UNHCR, 2011a). Despite these calls, world leaders have yet

to establish a coherent global framework for environmental mobility governance (Wilkinson, 2016).

Nevertheless, a range of solutions are circulating in parallel governance domains. In 2010, world leaders accepted labour migration and planned relocation as climate adaptation strategies as reflected in the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF, 2010). In 2015, they recognised both policies as anticipatory and resilience-building measures in the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction (Sendai Framework) (Sendai Framework, 2015). These solutions were amalgamated with a range of humanitarian measures to form the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change (Nansen Protection Agenda) (Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015). In 2018, the international community embraced humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation as viable solutions for managing environmental mobility by endorsing the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (Migration Compact) (GCM, 2019). International organisations and professional experts propose building on these existing instruments and institutions to govern environmental migration and displacement (Foresight Report, 2011; Kalin & Weerasinghe, 2017; McAdam, 2009). They suggest amending, expanding, and aligning existing policies, and formulating new policies to avert, minimise, and address environmental mobility risks (ILO, 2016; IOM, 2018a; PDD, 2018). They also suggest adopting development-friendly and humanitarian 'best practices' for regulating environmental migration and displacement.

Similarly, a variety of policy responses are emerging in and around the regions. The Pacific has integrated development-friendly and humanitarian approaches into regional frameworks. The Framework for Resilient Development (FRDP) calls on states to protect communities vulnerable to environmental displacement risks through targeted labour migration and planned relocation schemes (FRDP, 2016). The Boe Declaration and Action Plan (BDAP) calls for improved coordination in delivering humanitarian assistance and disrupting irregular migration, which is anticipated to increase in the context of climate change (BDAP, 2019). The 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent recommends countries to protect the human rights of Pacific Islanders moving in response to environmental stressors (Pacific 2050 Strategy, 2022). The recent Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility (PRFCM) encourages members to formulate regional planned relocation guidelines, coordinate on establishing safe migration pathways, and harmonise and expand humanitarian admission and stay policies (PRFCM, 2023).

Pacific governments are at the forefront of experimenting with and contextualising development-friendly and humanitarian approaches to produce a distinct set of environmental migration and displacement management policies. High-island countries such as Fiji, the Carteret Islands, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu have developed planned relocation guidelines to manage internal environmental displacement that focus on human rights-based and livelihood-based approaches (GoF, 2018a, GoSI, 2022, GoV, 2018; Tulele Peisa, n.d.). Low-lying nations such as Kiribati, Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu formulated migration with dignity policies, focusing on the combination of labour migration, permanent residency, and upskilling (PIFS Regional Security Advisor, interview, 20.02.2020; Simalua Enele, interview, 27.11.2020). In addition, Fiji, Kiribati, and Tuvalu's labour export strategies recognise climate change as a mobility driver while Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu's policies recognise the cultural preservation, resilience-building, and disaster recovery potential of labour migration (GoF, 2018b; GoK, 2015; GoT, 2015b; GoPNG, n.d.; GoV, 2019). Tonga formulated a standalone migration policy, acknowledging the importance of diaspora engagement in disaster response (GoT, 2020b). Although destination countries are exploring various policy options – Fiji and Vanuatu have offered residents of atoll nations refuge while New Zealand is considering a standalone humanitarian visa for environmentally displaced persons – they are also relying on existing mobility channels to manage the phenomenon (Field Notes, 26.11.2019; Yogesh Karan, interview, 07.12.2018). For example, New Zealand granted permanent residency to a Tuvaluan family on humanitarian grounds while Australia announced a special mobility pathway for Tuvaluans (McAdam, 2015, 2023). At the same time, Tuvalu is preparing a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution to establish a legally binding instrument to protect environmentally displaced persons (UNGA, 2016a, 2018, 2019).

These Pacific approaches are increasingly linked to policies and processes beyond the region. International organisations are endorsing regional policy responses, touting them in other parts of the world as amendable or innovative 'models' for regulating environmental migration and displacement. For example, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and other human rights experts labelled Fiji's planned relocation guidelines as monumental, holistic, commendable 'good practice' (Bina Desai, interview, 07.06.2019; GP20 Initiative, 2020; Mariam Traore Chazalnoel, interview, 06.12.2018; Nina Birkeland, interview, 05.07.2019). The Australian National University (ANU), IOM, Oxfam Vanuatu, Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS), and other displacement professionals labelled Vanuatu's displacement

policy as a progressive and successful blueprint for the Pacific (Elizabeth Ferris, interview, 23.07.2019; Huckstep & Clemens, 2023; Sabira Coelho, interview, 26.09.2019; Scott Hook, interview, 01.11.2019; Siobhan McDonnell, Melbourne, 12.04.2019). Bedford Consulting, Development Policy Centre, International Labour Organisation, and World Bank specialists labelled New Zealand's Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme and Pacific Access Category (PAC) as successful 'models,' and claimed Australia's Seasonal Employer Programme (SWP) and Pacific Labour Scheme (PLS) have the potential to achieve a similar status (Bedford et al., 2017; Bishop, 2018; Gibson & McKenzie, 2014b; Hill et al., 2018). Specifically, they suggest amending, expanding, and aligning temporary and permanent labour programmes to accommodate Pacific communities vulnerable to environmental displacement risks (Campbell & Warrick, 2014; Koser, 2012). I-Kiribati experts argue the Seafaring scheme and the Kiribati-Australia Nursing Initiative (KANI) are successful, robust, and effective 'best practices' that can be tweaked to establish dignified environmental migration channels (Akka Rimon, interview, 30.11.2022; Anote Tong, interview, 14.04.2023; Borovnik, 2006, 2009). ILO (2024) and UNESCAP (2018) have also listed Kiribati and Tuvalu's labour migration policies as 'good practices' in the database.

Importantly, Pacific governments are learning from each other how to manage environmental mobility. For instance, the Solomon Islands drew inspiration from Fiji's guidelines and Vanuatu's policy (Rebecca Monson, interview, 19.05.2023). Australia is looking at regional experiences to shape the managed retreat policy while New Zealand is observing policy developments in politically similar jurisdictions. Australia emulated the PAC 'model' to shape its Pacific Engagement Visa (PEV) and the special mobility pathway (Howes, 2023b; Love, 2023).

The recursive mobilities of development-friendly and humanitarian approaches to environmental migration and displacement management have not previously been studied. This is critical for two reasons. First, as multilateral institutions and Pacific states observe and learn from each other's efforts and experiences, their approaches are beginning to converge and diverge in interesting ways. Consequently, discussions of 'good practices' and 'models' are beginning to emerge. Second, these emerging 'best practices' predate global frameworks linked to environmental mobility, were developed to address different problems and were produced in a relatively short period. For these reasons, it is vital to question their origins, formulation, and viability. This research project adopts a geographical perspective to examine

how and why these policy patterns emerged. It focuses on the horizontal and vertical flow of three responses to managing environmental mobility: humanitarian protection measures, labour migration policies, and planned relocation guidelines.

1.3 Research Propositions, Objectives, and Questions

Against this background, the overarching research question is: what explains variations in the level of institutionalisation of environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' in the Pacific?

The project is guided by five propositions that were formulated using the human geography literature on policy mobilities, and political science and sociology literature on focusing events and institutionalism:

1. Policies are assemblages of subjects, objects, and spaces that embody ideologies, norms, rules, and practices.

2. Activating events reveal regulatory gaps, mobilising agents to shape multilevel policies.

3. Institutional landscape constitutes diverse actors who are organised into structures that ideologically and socially condition them to move certain 'models.'

4. Mobilising strategies recursively make, disseminate, and anchor policies.

5. Local conditions mutate, morph, and transform global 'models' into distinct policies.

These propositions underlie five objectives:

1. Describe the actors, documents, and sites constituting the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage.

2. Examine key events that mobilise agents to conform to certain 'models.'

3. Map the institutional context within which development-friendly and humanitarian approaches are embedded as 'best practices.'

4. Analyse the mobilising strategies used by actors to make, disseminate, and anchor certain approaches.

5. Study the local conditions that enable the adoption, adaptation, and localisation of 'models,' resulting in distinct environmental mobility management policies in the Pacific.

These objectives will be addressed by answering the following questions:

1. What constitutes an environmental migration and displacement management assemblage?

2. How are key activating events mobilising policy actors to conform to certain 'models'?

3. Who are the key actors and what channels do they use to enable or constrain the flow of environmental mobility 'best practices'?

4. What sociocultural and political strategies (im)mobilise development-friendly and humanitarian approaches?

5. How do local conditions influence the adoption, adaptation, and localisation of development-friendly and humanitarian 'best practices' to produce distinct environmental migration and displacement policies in the Pacific?

1.4 Significance

Researching the geographical spread of development-friendly and humanitarian approaches to environmental migration and displacement management in the Pacific is significant for three reasons. First, the project is personally important. Having grown up in Fiji and New Zealand, I have first-hand witnessed the aftermath of tropical cyclones and earthquakes. During the summer of 2008/2009, I saw Tropical Cyclone Gene drown the entire township of Ba and destroy the livelihoods of Fijian farmers. Three years later, I was one of many Fijians in Wellington who mobilised to help my community back in the islands recover from Tropical Cyclone Evan. The following year, Wellington was hit by an earthquake that sent the city into a state of panic – public transportation temporarily halted and when it started back up again, I was one of thousands of Wellingtonians who rushed to get home to my loved ones. These experiences affirmed the increasing intensity and frequency of environmental disasters, and their potential to create forced mobility risks in the Pacific. Minimising such risks requires policies that facilitate safe, regular, and orderly population movements in a manner that protects the human rights of affected persons, restores their livelihoods, and upholds their dignity.

Second, the project is critical for policy conversations on regulating environmental migration and displacement in the Pacific. As alluded to above, Pacific leaders recently endorsed the regional framework on climate mobility that promotes using the combination of development-friendly and humanitarian approaches to manage the phenomenon (McAdam, 2022; PRFCM, 2023). Although Pacific states have formulated standalone planned relocation guidelines and migration with dignity policies or integrated environmental stressors into existing labour migration strategies, "these are exceptions, not the rule" (Scott Hook, interview, 01.11.2019). Put differently, environmental mobility management policies are still in their "infancy" (Hoffman et al., 2023; Martin, 2010b, p. 409; Thomas & Benjamin, 2018). The policies that do exist remain unimplemented, yet international organisations and professional experts are hyping them as 'good practices,' 'models,' and 'successes.' This raises questions about their origins, production, and viability.

Third, the project adds to academic debates on the mobility of environmental migration and displacement policies. A burgeoning body of geographical research focuses on the mobility of neoliberal workfare policies (Brenner et al., 2010; Peck, 2002; Peck & Theodore, 2000), bike-share strategies (Wood, 2020), business district models (Cook & Ward, 2012; McCann & Ward, 2010, 2013), climate change adaptation projects (Webber, 2015), creative industries (Prince, 2010, 2012, 2014), education policies (Ball, 2016; Ball et al., 2017), harm reduction policies (Longhurst & McCann, 2016), local market regulations (van Eck et al., 2022), Olympic and Commonwealth games (Cook & Ward, 2011), pandemic management approaches (Morais, 2023), and urban metering infrastructure (Lovell, 2016). A smattering of human mobility scholarship also examines the flow of migration regulations, including international student migration initiatives (Geddie, 2015), remittances-to-development agenda (Bakker, 2015), the diffusion of immigration policies (Bedford & Spoonley, 2014), and diaspora engagement institutions (Délano, 2014; Gamlen, 2014a, 2019; Gamlen et al., 2017). Relatedly, this scholarship is empirically biased towards the mobility of 'successful' policies, overlooking the flow of 'failed' innovations (Jacobs, 2012; Lovell, 2019). Some scholars acknowledge that policies consist of negative lessons, bad practices, tensions, and absences, attributing the failures to the local context (Lovell, 2016; McCann, 2012; McCann & Ward, 2015; Peck & Theodore, 2015; Webber, 2015; Wood, 2020). However, despite the pressing challenge of environmental migration and displacement management, little is known about what regulations exist, how they move across spaces, and why they produce patterns of policy convergence and divergence.

Additionally, existing environmental mobility governance studies focus on the global institutional landscape, demonstrating the role of a small group of global actors in mobilising migration and relocation policies in the climate change domain (Brenn, 2015; Hall, 2011, 2016; Hantscher, 2015; Ionesco & Chazalnoel, 2015; Nash, 2019; Rosenow-Williams, 2015a, 2015b; Simonelli, 2016). A disproportionately significant body of scholarship captures the regional dynamics of environmental migration and displacement in the Pacific (Dun et al., 2022; Farbotko, Kitara, et al., 2022; Thornton et al., 2020), and policymakers' efforts to regulate the phenomenon (Farbotko et al., 2018; McAdam, 2022, 2023; McMichael et al., 2018; PCCMHS Programme, 2021). Yet, little is known about how regional actors and conditions mobilise certain approaches.

Furthermore, existing public policy and migration research focuses on one big event, illustrating that certain disasters, crises, and shocks reveal regulatory gaps *and* open windows of opportunity for actors to shape policy agendas (Birkland, 1998; Gamlen, 2019; Haas, 2015; Halliday, 2017; Manyena, 2013; Mintrom et al., 2020; Tanner et al., 2019). Pacific leaders often cite similar sudden and drastic occurrences in their speeches (Anote Tong, Melbourne, 22.10.2018; Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, interview, 04.11.2019). Migration researchers postulate that climate change heightens pre-existing vulnerabilities, compelling households to move (Black et al., 2013; Campbell, 2010; Gioli et al., 2016; Hugo, 1996). Nevertheless, it is unclear how different types of events shape Pacific policymakers' decisions to conform to some environmental mobility policy 'models' but not others.

To address these gaps, this research project follows three emerging environmental mobility management 'best practices' – humanitarian protection measures, labour migration policies, and planned relocation guidelines – across nine policy domains and three scales to understand policy variations in the Pacific. The project speaks to policy elites, asking them what policies they are adopting and why. In doing so, the project shows that Pacific governments are conforming to development-friendly approaches, which can be attributed to the institutional landscape and mobilising strategies. However, they are producing distinct environmental migration and displacement policies, which are shaped by activating events and local conditions.

This thesis makes four key contributions to policy and academic debates. First, the concept of *activating events* offers an expanded analytical framework to examine how different types of occurrences mobilise diverse actors in different ways to affect policy change. Second, the

concept of *policy assemblage lifecycle* offers an analytical tool to examine policy stickiness – that is, why some policies appear immobile or arrive late. Third, the project adds a *regional dimension* to the policy mobilities scholarship, showing that regional actors and conditions shape the institutionalisation of environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices.' Finally, the project offers one of the first accounts of how *interagency cooperation* orchestrated the emerging environmental mobility governance.

1.5 Terminology and Scope

The section provides a brief note on the terminology and scope. The research project draws on three bodies of (im)mobilities scholarship to explain variations in the level of institutionalisation of environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' in the Pacific. The strands are policy mobilities, human mobility and climate mobilities. The notion of 'mobility as a practice' is central to their arguments (Cresswell & Merriman, 2011). The act of moving entails an element of choice within specific constraints. It produces and reproduces spaces that comprise certain ways of thinking and acting. These ideologies and routines enable or constrain mobility and the flow direction of things (e.g. ideas, people or objects). How things move shapes the identity of subjects (e.g., individuals and organisations). These personalities are not only constructed but also inhabited, contested and manipulated through practice. Importantly, the act of *stillness* and *stuckness* is intricately embedded in the act of moving (Cresswell, 2012). Moving entails temporary or extended moments of waiting, resting and stagnation in certain places. Similarly, stillness entails moments of micro-travelling whereby smaller components of things move short distances, which are not often seen when the focus is on the larger entity and long distances. In this sense, immobility and mobility share a dialectical relationship – they depend on each other to operate (Adey, 2009). In sum, (im)mobilities shape ideologies, practices and identities across space and time, and vice versa.

The use of '(im)mobility' varies between the strands. Policy mobility scholars use it as a theoretical framework to study the un/successful spread of 'best practices' across scales, sites and time (see Chapter 2). Human mobility scholars employ the term to describe different types of population movements (see Chapter 7). Acknowledging that it is a component of the broader human mobility research, climate mobility scholars adopt '(im)mobilities' to capture diverse movements driven by sudden- and slow-onset events, including short-term displacement, long-distance migration, rural-urban drift, circular mobility, and staying in

place (Boas et al., 2022). However, climate change adaption and disaster risk reduction experts use ‘human mobility’ to refer to migration (i.e., voluntary movements), displacement (i.e., forced movements) and planned relocation (AGCCHM, 2014a). The research project uses the term ***(im)mobility*** to explain the successful or unsuccessful spread of environmental migration and displacement management policies in the Pacific. It uses ***environmental mobility*** to describe population movements driven by climate change, disasters and environmental degradation. Akin to the language used in climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction policymaking space, the project uses ***displacement, planned relocation*** and ***migration*** to differentiate between the three types of human mobility.

In addition, the research project examines two approaches to managing environmental mobility: development-friendly and humanitarian. The former includes labour migration policies and planned relocation guidelines. As elucidated in Chapter 4, some experts claim that well-managed and planned human mobility can build communities' adaptive capacities and resilience to withstand the detrimental impacts of environmental stressors while fostering sustainable development (Kagan, 2016; Hugo, 2012; Barnette & Webber, 2010). Labour migration programmes generate economic, social and environmental benefits, which can aid with disaster response and recovery and livelihood diversification thereby reducing dependency on the land (De Moore, 2011; Le De et al., 2015; Rinke, 2011). Contrastingly, planned relocation schemes can help people move out of harm’s way. It is worth noting that the solution has roots in humanitarian response and development practice, explaining its extra-local salience (see Chapters 7-9). However, in the climate change context, experts suggest facilitating planned relocation schemes as a development project to restore and improve the lives of affected households, including those of host communities (Fitzpatrick, 2013; GoV, 2018; McAdam & Ferris, 2015). Humanitarian approaches include a wide range of solutions that aim to protect the human rights of people moving across borders in response to environmental stressors. This includes protections awarded to refugees, stateless persons and other displaced persons under the principle of non-refoulement, and a standalone safeguard for individuals displaced by climate change.

The research project focuses on ***measures for regulating human mobility, not immobility*** in response to environmental stressors. To reiterate, it follows three emerging environmental mobility management ‘best practices’: planned relocation, labour migration and humanitarian protection. During the data-collection phase, voluntary immobility began to emerge as an alternative community-led solution, especially in the Pacific (Farbotko & McMichael, 2019;

Yee et al., 2021). Some households perceive choosing to stay in place as an adaptation, resilience-building and protection strategy, resisting external narratives of climate displacement risk (Farbotko, 2022; Robins et al., 2024). Nevertheless, research participants did not perceive immobility as a policy response and/or 'best practice' despite acknowledging that some communities did not want to move away from their ancestral homelands. In addition, the limitations of a doctoral study restricted the scope of the project: examining a fourth community-led approach would have required more time and resources because it was not part of the environmental mobility policymaking discourse. For these reasons, the research project did not examine immobility as a 'best practice' even though it is a powerful narrative in the Pacific.

1.6 Thesis Structure

This thesis is divided into eleven chapters. Chapter 2 presents the *Policy Mobilities Framework* that the project uses to explain variations in the level of institutionalisation of environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' in the Pacific. It conceptualises policies as assemblages of subjects, objects, and spaces that embody ideologies, norms, rules, and practices. Policies move in an ad hoc and non-linear fashion, mutating in ways that only elusively resemble the original 'model.' Activating events mobilise agents to shape multilevel policy agendas. The institutional landscapes comprise diverse actors who are organised in structures that ideologically and socially condition them to move certain approaches. Mobilising strategies recursively make, disseminate, and anchor solutions. Local conditions transform global 'models' into distinct domestic strategies. These ideas shape the conceptual foundations of the seven empirical chapters.

Chapter 3 outlines the *Follow Policy Methodology*, defined as literally shadowing actors across policymaking sites and tracing discourses in documents (Peck & Theodore, 2010a, 2012). It adopts a critical realist epistemology and distended case study research design to understand the emergence of three emerging environmental mobility 'best practices': humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation. It employs a combination of document analysis, participant observations, and semi-structured interviews to identify factors that explain policy variations. It uses a retroductive approach to triangulate and analyse 75 interview transcripts, 202 documents, and 401 field observations gathered from interning with two organisations and attending 83 events. The chapter concludes by addressing ethical considerations, researcher positionality, and methodological limitations.

Chapter 4 draws on primarily existing scholarship to describe the *Environmental Migration and Displacement Management Assemblage*. It constitutes three policy assemblages (i.e., humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation), which are bound by the logic of optimism. Each policy assemblage comprises specific actors, documents, and sites that are held together by distinct rationalities and reinforced by certain events. Yet, many actors mobilised their policy preferences across the same venues. Optimists disseminated their solutions across the environment, human mobility, human rights, and security venues through publications, technical submissions, and speaking engagements. Consequently, development-friendly approaches gained extra-local salience as environmental mobility 'models' albeit such labels jar with undesirable outcomes, lack of community engagement and ownership, and non-implementation. Contrastingly, humanitarian approaches have yet to gain international traction as a viable approach.

Chapter 5 examines the role of *Activating Events* in mobilising agents to conform to certain environmental migration and displacement management 'models.' It argues that a series of different events galvanised optimists in different ways. The perceived environmental/climate refugee crisis prompted them to research the environment-human mobility nexus. Knowledge jolts compelled them to engage in the climate science-making process. Political events motivated them to refashion humanitarian approaches and institutionalise development-friendly solutions. Real shocks revealed regulatory gaps and the workability of existing approaches, leading to variations in policy adoption. In sum, the chapter uses activating events to show some temporalities of policy mobilities (Jacobs, 2012; Morais, 2023).

Chapter 6 describes the *Institutional Landscape*, specifically the actors and channels enabling or constraining the flow of environmental mobility 'best practices.' It argues that optimists were embedded in multiple structures that ideologically and socially conditioned them to mobilise certain approaches (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haas, 1992; Schofer et al., 2012; Scott, 2008). Optimists exercised individual agency in deciding if, when, and to what extent they should engage in the issue area. They published knowledge materials, partnered on multi-initiatives, and established separate institutions. Nevertheless, policy and issue structures were critical for standardising certain approaches in the Pacific. These structures varied in logical coherence, density, and political support. In sum, the chapter highlights the emergence of some optimists as lead agencies, and the formation, disbandment, and evolution of institutional structures.

Chapters 7-9 focus on *Mobilising Strategies* that recursively make, disseminate, and anchor development-friendly and humanitarian approaches across sites and scales. Chapter 7 explores the first strategy, *Issue-making*. It argues that optimists strategically constructed the three policy assemblages, framing and linking them to interlocking environmental, development, human rights, and security issues (Benford & Snow, 2000; Betts, 2009; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). As off-the-shelf 'models,' relocation and migration were quickly repackaged into environmental mobility regulations using existing instruments and programmes, Pacific migration culture, historical practices, and disputable research findings. Contrastingly, humanitarian protection was slowly assembled into a solution using legally binding instruments and ad hoc state responses from Africa and Latin America.

Chapter 8 discusses the second strategy, *Entrepreneurialism*. It postulates that optimists circulated the whole assemblage through space-creation/shopping albeit with varying success (Downie, 2022a; Mavrikou et al., 2022; Meijerink & Huitema, 2010). By doing so, they established a transnational policy assembly line in which localities concurrently served as policy production, dissemination, adoption, and translation centres. Optimists used multi-initiatives to standardise development-friendly approaches in the Pacific. These initiatives also served individual interests – organisations secured resources and legitimacy for their survival while donor states discreetly coerced Pacific governments to curb unwanted population movements.

Chapter 9 explains the third strategy, *Anchoring* (Beeson & Stone, 2013; Stone, 2019). It contends that optimists integrated parts of the environmental mobility assemblage into different domains by lobbying and coaching states, making technical submissions to decision-making bodies, drafting soft norms, and providing expert feedback on domestic strategies. This led to recursive modelling of development-friendly approaches thereby validating pre-existing ideas of how to regulate the phenomenon. It also established institutional footholds of the emerging environmental migration and displacement governance. In sum, chapters 7-9 demonstrate institutional work and the recursive mobilities of policies (Green et al., 2017; Halliday, 2009; Lawrence et al., 2011; Shaffer & Halliday, 2021).

Chapter 10 explains how *Local Conditions* morph and transform global 'best practices' into distinct environmental migration and displacement policies in the Pacific. While historical precedents and the fear of loss facilitated the quick adoption of development-friendly approaches, they were merged with local learnings and cultures to formulate different

strategies. A combination of institutional bottlenecks, unsettled terminology, and unsubstantiated issue-linkages delayed the regional uptake of labour migration and humanitarian protection for managing cross-border movements. In sum, the chapter illustrates policy mutations and immobilities (Freeman, 2012; Jacobs, 2012; Lovell, 2016; Peck & Theodore, 2001, 2015).

Chapter 11 concludes the thesis by emphasising that variations in the level of institutionalisation of environmental mobility 'best practices' are a result of activating events, institutional landscape, mobilising strategies, and local conditions. This suggests that policy 'effectiveness' did not shape policy decisions in the Pacific. Additionally, international organisations are orchestrating the environmental migration and displacement governance, reinforcing power imbalances and perpetuating a fast-policymaking and slow-implementation culture in the region. Furthermore, the issue area is reconfiguring the Pacific's identity as a region and innovator, which is nevertheless fragmented and fragile. The chapter ends by discussing the project's empirical and theoretical contributions and reflecting on future research directions.

Chapter 2: Policy Mobilities Framework

2.1 Introduction

The chapter discusses the Policy Mobilities Framework, which this research utilises to explain variations in the level of institutionalisation of environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' in the Pacific. This thesis adopts a geographical perspective of policy movement that focuses on the notions of assemblages, mobilities, and mutation (McCann & Ward, 2013; Peck & Theodore, 2015; Prince, 2013). It also draws on assemblages, governance, institutionalism, and public policy theories stemming from other disciplines to explain how and why humanitarian protection measures, labour migration programmes, and planned relocation guidelines move in the way they do.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 argues that policy diffusion and transfer scholarship offer useful insights into policy variations but are limited by unclear definitions and terminologies, implicit assumptions, and single scalar focus. Policy mobilities literature can address some of these limitations. Section 2.3 discusses the notion of *policy assemblages*. It conceptualises policies as assemblages of disparate subjects, objects, and spaces that embody ideologies, rules, and practices. Section 2.4 focuses on *policy mobilities and mutation*, arguing that as assemblages move in an ad hoc and non-linear fashion across sites and scales, they transform in ways that only elusively resemble the original 'model.' Section 2.5 highlights that *activating events* destabilise policy assemblages by revealing regulatory gaps that mobilise agents in different ways to shape multi-level policy processes. Section 2.6 stresses that the *institutional landscape* constitutes diverse actors who are organised into multi-scalar and multi-sited structures that ideologically and socially condition them to move certain policies. Section 2.7 argues that *mobilising strategies* recursively make, disseminate, and momentarily anchor assemblages. Section 2.8 contends *that local conditions* (e.g., cultural, economic, environmental, institutional, and political factors) morph global 'models' into distinct approaches. Finally, Section 2.9 concludes with a chapter summary.

2.2 Policy Movement

The geographical perspective of policy movement differs from political science and international relations disciplines, which focus on policy diffusion and transfer (Benson & Jordan, 2011; Temenos & McCann, 2013a). Policy diffusion and transfer scholarship are useful

in several ways. First, it explains the role of diverse institutions and professional experts in moving policies (Stone, 2004, 2008, 2012). Second, it identifies mechanisms enabling and constraining global to national and cross-jurisdictional policy flows (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, 2000; Gilardi et al., 2021; Gilardi & Wasserfallen, 2019; Marsh & Sharman, 2009; Rose, 1991). Finally, it captures some local conditions that shape policy adoption, translation, and implementation (Benson & Jordan, 2011; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Dolowitz, 2006; Shipan & Volden, 2012). Thus, policy diffusion and transfer literature offer useful conceptual foundations for understanding policy convergences and divergences.

However, orthodox diffusion and transfer scholarship have several different limitations (Blatter et al., 2022; Gilardi & Wasserfallen, 2019; Peck & Theodore, 2015; Temenos & McCann, 2013a). Diffusion scholars do not define policy content and effectiveness due to a dichotomised understanding of policy outcomes – governments adopt or reject 'models' (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Stone, 2012). They offer limited explanations of how internal determinants impact the policymaking process because their studies primarily focus on the impact of external structural forces on policy subsystems and policy adoption (Gilardi et al., 2021; Marsh & Sharman, 2009). Importantly, scholars overlook diffusion dynamics in developing countries because they assume developing countries will mimic developed countries' behaviour (Marsh & Sharman, 2009).

In contrast, transfer scholars have yet to formulate language that accurately captures dynamic policy flows reflected in their studies. The term 'transfer' suggests "a literal importation of fully formed and off-the-shelf policies" (McCann & Ward, 2013b, p. 7) and "connotes a very flat and straightforward process" (Peck & Theodore, 2001, p. 449). Importantly, they do not explicitly discuss the role of scalar and spatial dynamics in moving policies (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2012; Newburn et al., 2018). This is not to say that policy transfer research does not acknowledge these factors. Some studies show that transnational advocacy networks and international organisations create conducive conditions to facilitate multidirectional policy movements in multi-scalar settings (Stone, 2004, 2008; True & Mintrom, 2001). However, the tradition primarily examines "*inter*-national structures … or acknowledges inter-local circulations" within a single context (McCann & Ward, 2012, 2013, p. 7), failing to capture that policy regimes are interconnected, and actors relationally construct scales (McCann, 2011; Temenos & McCann, 2013b).

The geographical literature on policy mobilities addresses some of these limitations. Geographers conceptualise policies as assemblages of subjects, objects, and spaces that embody rules, practices, and values. Their thick vocabulary describes how policy assemblages recursively mutate as they mobilise across sites and between scales. In addition, drawing inspiration from institutional, governance, and policy movement scholarship, they identify four factors that enable and constrain policy flows: activating events, institutional landscape, mobilising strategies, and local conditions. Together, these factors explain policy convergences and divergences.

2.3 Policy Assemblages

Geographers conceptualise policies as assemblages, which are characterised by multiplicity, relationality, indeterminacy, and emergence (Anderson & McFarlane, 2011; Marcus & Saka, 2006; McCann & Ward, 2011; Prince, 2013, 2014). Even though assemblages have multiple definitions[1], this research describes them as a collection of material and expressive components (Allen, 2011; Anderson et al., 2012; Collier & Ong, 2008; Savage, 2020). Material components are physical tangible entities, including actors, documents, money, networks, and sites (Ball et al., 2017; Cresswell, 2010a, 2010b; Lea et al., 2022). Expressive components are intangible ideas, rules, practices, and values (McFarlane, 2009). Each component is an assemblage and therefore is "one part of a whole" (DeLanda, 2006, p. 251; Prince, 2010). Put differently, it is part of a larger assemblage and comprises smaller assemblages. Each assemblage has spatial and temporal properties reflecting specific rationalities and assumptions (DeLanda, 2016; McFarlane, 2009; Shore & Wright, 2011). These logics do not co-exist smoothly. Instead, their co-existence creates tension and friction, thereby recursively making each assemblage (Allen, 2011).

Certain types of relations bind disparate material and expressive components. They come together in a "rhizomatic" fashion (DeLanda, 2016, p. 2) in fixed and fleeting policymaking

[1] An assemblage can be a descriptor or noun, referring to a group of different elements. It can be a concept or verb, referring to the labour of assembling. It can be an ethos, referring to researchers experimenting with methods and practices to understand diversity. It can be a site where the phenomenon is recursively fashioned. Some of these conceptualisations are mutually exclusive. Although there is no correct way of using the term, some definitions are incompatible. For example, assemblage as a descriptor places the analytical focus on the form, leaving a thin description of the phenomenon rather than an explanation of how and why it occurred (Allen, 2011; Anderson et al., 2012; Savage, 2020). This thesis recognises this disadvantage yet uses the term 'assemblage' to describe a policy because it provides a frame to capture a collection of 'things' constituting the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage.

centres such as conferences, headquarters, meetings, parliamentary sittings, secretariats, seminars, stakeholder dialogues, symposiums, parliamentary sittings, and workshops (Bassett & Shandas, 2010; Ball, 2016; Cook & Ward, 2012, Lavee & Cohen, 2019; Robinson, 2015). In these sites, policy actors learn, compare, translate, and educate each other about successful and failed programmes (Longhurst & McCann, 2016; Lovell, 2016, 2019; Prince 2010; Temenos & McCann, 2013b). They also lobby, coach, and sometimes coerce states to adopt certain policies. In doing so, policy actors establish and strengthen relations, connecting geographically distant policymaking sites (Crivello, 2015; Peck & Theodore, 2012; van Eck et al., 2023). These relations take two forms. The first form is external relations, which are strategic links between parts and wholes that give assemblages their shape (DeLanda, 2006; Savage, 2020). They are contingently obligatory because the components exist independent of the links and their intrinsic properties cannot explain how the links hold together an assemblage (Anderson et al., 2012). This autonomy allows components to detach from an assemblage and be plugged into another assemblage in which their interactions are different (DeLanda, 2006; Woods et al., 2021). The second form is internal relations – or socio-technical networks – which assign identities, responsibilities, and meanings to assemblages (DeLanda, 2016; Prince, 2014). They are logically necessary because they rationalise interactions between disparate components; that is, what is happening, how, and why. Together, these relations diffuse agency across multiple sources, thereby decentralising power (Anderson & McFarlane, 2011; Briassoulis, 2019; Wilshusen, 2019). This does not mean power is evenly distributed or it can be extended outwards, but there is potential for resistance, which is critical for disrupting and reorganising an assemblage (Allen, 2011; Savage, 2020).

Assemblages appear as a systematic or at least describable collective 'thing' (i.e., policy, institution, or regime) but never fully cohere (Anderson & McFarlane, 2011; Prince, 2010). The "contingent, uneasy and unstable" relations preserve the blurry edges and open-ended nature of assemblages, allowing them to take new forms or find new capacities (Collier & Ong, 2008, p. 12; Prince, 2017). However, processes of territorialisation and coding – which I refer to as institutionalisation – determine the level of coherence (Collier, 2006; McFarlane & Anderson, 2011; Woods et al., 2021). Territorialisation concerns structural coherence, whereby policy actors establish boundaries, structures, and relationships to facilitate conformity (DeLanda, 2016). Coding concerns logical coherence, whereby policy actors engage in technocratic practices of naming, classifying, mapping, evaluating, and quantifying each component (Prince, 2016). Collectively, these processes exemplify the identity, rules,

behaviour, and habit of assemblages (DeLanda, 2006). Despite efforts to stabilise assemblages, critical events deterritorialise and decode policies by inducing ideological and political shifts (DeLanda, 2006, 2016; Halliday, 2017; Kingdon, 2011; Peck & Theodore, 2001). Woods et al. (2021) explain variations in assemblage coherence in terms of boundary porosity, strength of ties, homogeneity, and standards. They contend that territorialised and coded assemblages have firm edges, intensive internal ties, strong homogeneity, regulations, and rituals. In contrast, deterritorialised and decoded assemblages have porous borders, greater heterogeneity, and limited controls. These variations in structural and logical coherence affect policy mobilities and mutations (discussed in Section 2.4).

Assemblage scholarship has two gaps. First, assemblage scholars downplay the importance of internal relations to emphasise the idea that assemblages are relational, indeterminate, and emergent configurations (DeLanda, 2006, 2016). Put differently, they seem to primarily focus on instability and incoherence. Hence, little is known about how and why some assemblages can withstand disruptive events and remain intact for longer periods than others. Although Briassoulis (2015, 2019) suggests certain critical components ensure assemblages survive, it is unclear what they are. Second, assemblage scholars have yet to theorise the process of de/stabilising assemblages. DeLanda (2016) and Woods et al. (2021) contend assemblages encompass a structure of space possibilities, representing the past, present, and future forms that they have taken or can take. The structure consists of tipping points. Once assemblages reach a threshold, they may dissolve and transform into new forms (see Briassoulis, 2015, 2019). However, the systematic process of policy assemblage mobilities and reconfigurations is unclear.

To address these gaps, the project draws on institutional, governance, and policy theories. Organisations as the critical material components establish internal relations – which I refer to as structures – to stabilise assemblages (DeLanda, 2016; Greenwood et al., 2017; Scott, 2008). Additionally, assemblages' long-term survival depends on their flexibility, namely whether expressive components quickly adapt to external changes (Barnett & Finnemore, 2012; Downie, 2022a; Meyer & Rowan, 1997). Furthermore, policy assemblages have a lifecycle. They emerge as a distinct form, mobilise across diverse landscapes, temporarily institutionalise as a 'model,' and mutate into a new form with a different identity and role before settling in a new location.

2.3.1 Policy Assemblage Lifecycle

The policy assemblage lifecycle builds on Acharya's (2004) norm localisation idea, DeLanda's (2006, 2016) notions of de/coding and de/territorialisation, Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) norm lifecycle, and Peck and Theodore's (2010a) policy process. Each theory offers insights into what moves policies and how they become 'best practices.' However, they provide insufficient explanations about the role of situational and scalar dynamics in institutionalising certain ideas as 'models.' This is because they focus on one scale, either policy convergence or divergence, and a specific process. Hence, this thesis combines theories to explain what happens to policy assemblages as they move between sites and scales.

The policy assemblage lifecycle comprises five stages: development (emergence), dissemination, adoption (institutionalisation), adaptation and localisation (mutation), and implementation (settling). In the development stage, heterogeneous components are codified and territorialised into a policy assemblage. Organisations bring together professionals to construct a collective logic on the problem and solution. In the dissemination stage, the assemblage travels across sites and scales. Organisations professionalise the expressive components (i.e., ideologies, rules, and practices) by offering training and circulating knowledge materials. They also shame or praise state behaviour and use sanctions or incentives to make governments conform. Similarly, professionals use entrepreneurial tactics to persuade others to embrace their policy preferences. In these ways, a policy assemblage enrols followers and gains a taken-for-granted quality. It is in this stage that the process of norm localisation begins. Each site constitutes specific rationalities that shape its conventions and procedures. When a new assemblage arrives at a site, it faces resistance, followed by acceptance, modification, and universalisation (see Section 2.8). In the adoption stage, a policy assemblage temporarily institutionalises into a 'model.' Organisations anchor their ideas in normative instruments, policies, and systems through their consultants and making technical submissions to decision-making bodies. Pressures to conform, the desire to preserve or improve their international standing, activating events, ambiguous goals or new technologies motivate states to replicate parts or the whole assemblage. In the adaptation and localisation stage, the policy assemblage mutates. Policymakers pick and choose components from the 'model,' amalgamating them with local values, customs, and rituals to produce a distinct policy that elusively resembles the original form. In this sense, the policy is a combination of international and local ways of identifying, thinking, and acting. In the implementation stage, the policy

assemblage momentarily settles. As street-level bureaucrats execute the policy, they draw lessons that sometimes shape a place-based best or bad practice (i.e., what you should or should not do).

This lifecycle does not suggest that policy assemblages mobilise in a linear and straightforward fashion. Instead, it demonstrates that the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage moves in certain ways that institutionalise some components as 'best practices' but not others.

2.4 Policy Mobilities and Mutations

Geographers argue that policies rarely arrive in new locations in their original forms precisely because assemblages fail to cohere (Peck & Theodore, 2010a). The interaction between macro-forces and local conditions mutates, morphs, and transforms these policy assemblages before they can be pinned down (Freeman, 2012; Peck & Theodore, 2001, 2015; Stone, 2012). Rather than travelling as compact bundles or packages, policies move in bits and pieces whereby some components stick to places while others continue to travel (Peck & Theodore, 2010a; Webber, 2015). During this process, policies are unpacked and repacked, and hence only elusively resemble the 'original model' – if such a thing can be said to exist (Clarke, 2012; McCann, 2017; McCann & Ward, 2011; Wright, 2011). Put differently, as they move across and into new contexts and settings, policies "acquire a life of their own" (Shore & Wright, 2011, p. 3) and refashion the institutional landscape (Cresswell & Merriman, 2011; Gulson et al., 2017; Prince, 2012b).

Policy assemblages move recursively across sites (horizontally) and between scales (vertically) (Block-Lieb & Halliday, 2017; Halliday, 2009; Freeman, 2012; Peck, 2011). They travel across multiple domains, including climate change, development, disasters, human rights, migration, refugees, and security. They shift between multiple levels, including global, regional, sub-regional, national, and local. They flow in different directions, including top-down, bottom-up, middle-up, and middle-down. At each site and scale, policy actors engage in multiple venues, realigning accepted solutions to prevailing ideologies, rituals, and conditions. Sometimes policies bypass certain sites and scales, reflecting resistance or unviable environments. For example, political unwillingness at the regional level may urge actors to mobilise their policy preferences at the national level, resulting in an exclusion of certain voices. In this sense, policies go through multiple rounds of mutations and transformations, connecting some actors

and places while excluding others before arriving at their destinations. Geographers have developed a thick vocabulary to describe such dynamic movements and their impact on policy assemblages and institutional landscapes. They use metaphors such as fluid space (Law & Mol, 2001; Prince, 2012a; Urry, 2000), moorings and places of in-betweenness (Cresswell & Merriman, 2011; Sheller & Urry, 2006), becoming (Adey, 2009), reverberations (Freeman, 2012), arriving at (Robinson, 2015), and careering (Craggs & Neate, 2017).

Policy assemblages move through the cycle in a non-successive and ad hoc manner, either rapidly completing or bypassing certain stages. Peck (2002) and Peck and Theodore (2010b) describe this phenomenon as fast policymaking. Each component and several assemblages are simultaneously constructed and mobilised at a given time but may be in different stages of the cycle. Sometimes policies appear stuck, affecting how and when they arrive at the destination. For example, policymakers may temporarily shelve or refashion a solution in response to changes in local conditions. Stickiness impacts how fast and long policies take to complete the cycle. Geographers are not interested in measuring the rate of policy movement but in mapping the policy terrain and explaining why and how policies travel the way they do (Peck & Theodore, 2015).

2.5 Activating Events

Activating events reveal regulatory gaps, mobilising agents in different ways to shape multi-level policy processes. Policy scholarship labels these critical events as focusing or precipitating events (Block-Lieb & Halliday, 2017; Kingdon, 2011), epistemological uncertainties, shocks, or crises (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haas, 1992; Gamlen, 2014), and social turbulence (Fligstein, 2001). They can be perceived or real, geographically or symbolically proximate, and sudden or recurring. They are policy windows, defined as "opportunities for action on given initiatives" (Kingdon, 2011, p. 166). Put differently, these events create openings for actors to set policy agendas. An event in one domain can spill over into another, inducing similar or different policy changes in an adjacent domain (Farley et al., 2007; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Pralle, 2009).

There are three types of activating events. Focusing or precipitating events are man-made or natural disasters, defined as sudden and rare occurrences that visibly devastate a geographical area or community (e.g., earthquakes, floods, genocide, hurricanes, infrastructural collapse, genocide, pandemics, unprecedented refugee movements, and volcanic eruptions) (Birkland,

1998; Forster & Heinzel, 2021; Garcés-Mascareñas & Gebhardt, 2020; Halliday, 2009; Manyena, 2013; Meo et al., 2004). They also include less graphic occurrences, such as political or institutional changes, court rulings setting a precedent for alternative policy action, and international conferences where governments meet to renegotiate norms (Kingdon, 2011; Mintrom, 2006). Epistemological uncertainties, shocks, or crises are complex technical challenges (e.g., 9/11, the climate refugee crisis, and mixed population movements) (Adler & Haas, 1992; Gamlen, 2019). Social turbulence (e.g., presence of multiple epistemic communities) heightens ideological differences, threatening the cohesion of professional networks (Fligstein, 2001). Collectively, these events spotlight policy failures, create a demand for new knowledge, prompt a renegotiation of shared ideologies, and create openings for policy alternatives.

These critical events mobilise actors in diverse ways. They sometimes galvanise the media to raise public awareness (Meo et al., 2004; Prater & Lindell, 2000). Media outlets use metaphors, synecdoche, anecdotes, symbols, soundbites, alarmist statistics, and sensationalist headlines to dramatise the impact of a disaster and government response (Farley et al., 2007). These dramatic portrayals undermine existing rationalities, jolting experts to intensely debate, refine, and form a new consensus on the issue area (Birkland, 1998; Fligstein, 2001; Haas, 1992). They develop measurement indicators, categories for affected persons, and 'best practices,' and collect data establishing causality (Gamlen, 2014; Haas, 2015). Some decision-makers use expert information to model their behaviour on what is deemed appropriate while others use it to boost or salvage their reputation by initiating an inquiry on policy failures (Boin et al., 2009; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

However, most activating events are short-lived, unpredictable, and insufficient by themselves to affect institutional or policy change (Birkland & Schwaeble, 2019; Eckersley & Lakoma, 2022; Kingdon, 2011; Solecki & Michaels, 1994). Professionals must be able to identify and manipulate such events. They must have pre-packaged policy proposals comprising clear issue linkages, policy feasibility assessments, and a communication strategy to enrol followers (Boin et al., 2009; Goyal, 2014; Pralle, 2009; Prater & Lindell, 2000). When policy windows open, they must use sociocultural and political tactics to push their proposals onto policy agendas (see Section 2.7). Policy windows close quickly and unexpectedly for several reasons. Leaders believe the problem is addressed, fail to get the desired results, do not deem it a priority, or deliberately ignore the issue (Manyena, 2013). The events are too fleeting and unnoticeable

(Beeson & Stone, 2013; Kingdon, 2011). The solutions are financially, ideologically, and politically unviable – that is, they do not align with the local conditions (Bassett & Shandas, 2010; Hurlimann et al., 2018; Prince, 2010). This may suggest that agenda-setting and policy institutionalisation require multiple or ongoing events.

2.6 Institutional Landscape

The institutional landscape mobilises and mutates policy assemblages. It comprises diverse agents who refine problem and solution conceptualisations, package these ideas into knowledge products, circulate them during events, and help governments formulate policies (Cook & Ward, 2011, 2012; Haas, 2015; Gamlen, 2019). Institutional and policy scholarship describes these actors as agentic others (Meyer, 2010), boosters or entrepreneurs (Bradley, 2017; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1988; Kingdon, 2011; McCann, 2013; Mintrom, 1997; Wooten & Hoffman, 2017), consultants (Prince, 2012b, 2014), non-state intermediaries (Stone, 2008), policy gurus (Wood, 2016), and travelling or middling technocrats (Larner & Laurie, 2010; Roy, 2012). These professionals possess distinct characteristics: they have intellectual, social, and political capital, hold senior positions, are willing to take risks, and portray themselves as disinterested actors providing neutral advice (Gunn, 2017; Lavee & Cohen, 2019; Mintrom & Luetjens, 2017). Often residing in academic or research institutes, consultancy firms, foreign bureaucracies, international organisations, philanthropic agencies, and think tanks, these experts occupy transnational structures in different capacities, thereby giving them disproportionate influence in shaping multi-level policies (Prince, 2010; Scott, 2008; Wooten & Hoffman, 2017).

Domestic actors are critical for creating conducive local conditions for policies to arrive and settle at the destination (Peck, 2002). Political champions, entrepreneurs, and leaders provide energy and impulse in the policy adoption stage (Eckersley & Lakoma, 2022; Goyal et al., 2020). Policymakers adapt and localise foreign 'models,' creating a distinct policy. Street-level bureaucrats as trusted and purportedly non-political actors implement the policies (Bassett & Shandas, 2010; Lavee & Cohen, 2019; Prince, 2010). The receptivity of particular policies across ministries, unions, community-based organisations, and the general public is achieved through reference scapes (i.e., place-branded policies), pilot projects, and comparative studies or technologies (i.e., benchmarks, indicators or rankings) (Bedford & Spoonely, 2014; McCann & Ward, 2013, 2012; McFadgen, 2019; Meijerink & Huitema, 2010). Domestic actors

strategically deploy place-branded policies, lessons, and labels to frame problems and convince others to endorse certain solutions.

These structures ideologically and socially condition professionals to move policy assemblages (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haas, 1992; Gamlen, 2014a; Peck, 2011; Schofer et al., 2012; Scott, 2008). Institutional, governance, and policy scholarship labels them as fields (Fligstein, 2001), epistemic communities (Gamlen, 2014a; Haas, 1992), advocacy coalitions (Mintrom & Norman, 2009), policy circuits, chains, networks (Ball, 2016; Peck, 2011), and webs (Roy, 2012). Structures can be broadly defined as a group of interdependent actors that share cultural values, interests, and interactive systems (Greenwood et al., 2017; Scott, 2017). Each structure comprises multiple beliefs, practices, rules, technologies, and resources. It also comprises multiple logics, which not only overcomes siloed thinking but also causes ideological tensions. The latter prompts members of a structure to debate, refine, and establish new consensus on the issue and policy solutions (Bahadur & Tanner, 2014; Wooten & Hoffman, 2017). Embedded structures are bound together by a meta-logic that acts as a blueprint, dominant script, template, or rationalised myth on how to identify, think, and act (Finnemore, 1996; Lawrence et al., 2011; Meyer, 2010; Meyer & Jepperson, 2000; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In this sense, structures are the internal relations that make disparate components logically cohere into a policy assemblage. Once established, the structures function as channels, conduits, conveyor belts, missionaries, and pipelines for spreading policies (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Cochrane & Ward, 2011, 2012; Haas & Alder, 1992). Their level of density, coordination, and cohesiveness shapes members' ability to set policy agendas (Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Solecki & Michaels, 1994). As explained earlier, structures are not fixed – they can dissolve or find new capacities in different sites.

There are three types of structures, each critical in different stages of the policy assemblage lifecycle. Epistemic communities are a group of experts with a common understanding of the problem, a methodology for validating data, and a set of workable solutions (Gamlen, 2014a, 2019; Haas, 1992, 2015). They establish the criteria for quantifying the issue, classifying affected persons, and evaluating policy outcomes (Prince, 2010, 2012a, 2016). International organisations and governments recognise their expertise, granting an authoritative claim to their expertise (Haas, 1992). Therefore, epistemic communities are sources of knowledge production. Advocacy coalitions are a group of senior officials who share a belief system and exhibit high levels of coordination (Mintrom, 1997; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Mintrom &

Vergari, 1996). They elevate issues and pressure organisations to conform to certain 'models.' To do so, they organise demonstrations, letter-writing campaigns, and door-to-door canvassing, testify in parliamentary committees, sign petitions, and provide policy feedback (Lavee & Cohen, 2019; Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Prater & Lindell, 2000; Stone, 2004; Tanner et al., 2019; True & Mintrom, 2001). Thus, advocacy coalitions can be perceived as policy promoters. Policy networks comprise policymakers and other professionals with compatible interests and goals (Braun, 2009; Tang et al., 2020). They are characterised by diplomacy, trust, and shared resources. They appear in the form of working groups and steering committees spearheading policy processes, including identifying goals, developing strategies, and assigning responsibilities, funding, and timelines (Bassett & Shandas, 2010). For this reason, policy networks function as adoption, adaptation, and localisation structures. In sum, professionals embedded in multi-scalar and multi-sited structures develop, tailor, and implement policy prescriptions that are "ideologically anointed and sanctioned" (Peck & Theodore, 2010a, p. 171) and politically palatable (Adler & Haas, 1992). In doing so, the policies enrol followers and gain extra-local salience, granting them 'best practice' or 'model' status.

2.7 Mobilising Strategies

Actors use three sociocultural and political strategies to mobilise policy assemblages: issue-making, entrepreneurialism, and anchoring. Each strategy comprises multiple mundane micro-practices. Although specific practices may be apparent in certain stages of the lifecycle, actors use them simultaneously.

Issue-making is the strategic reconfiguration of problems, solutions, identities, and contexts (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). This is achieved through issue framing and linking. Framing is the process of renaming, reinterpreting, and dramatising issues to mobilise collective action (Betts & Orchard, 2014; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Keck & Sikkink, 1999). Benford and Snow (2000) classify the three framing tasks as diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. Diagnostic framing concerns problem identification and blame attribution. Actors construct cognitive frames grounded in moral arguments, reflect existing policy failures and looming crises, and delineate the boundaries between good and evil (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Pralle, 2009). Prognostic framing concerns policy formulation, whereby professionals develop a "plan of attack" alternative to the status quo (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 616). Motivational framing concerns group consensus. Actors use distinct images, language, and symbols to expand and manipulate frames in a way that captures diverse expert views and public sentiment (Reimer

& Saerbeck, 2017; Snow et al., 1986). This strategy arranges and rearranges issues and policies, altering their meanings that help enrol unlikely allies as followers. Although social movements usually use framing, policy experts are increasingly utilising it to raise awareness and move their ideas (see Mintrom, 2019; Mintrom & Luetjens, 2017).

Linking is the process of connecting disparate issues to persuade actors to address a problem based on their interest in another, also known as cross-issue persuasion or strategic bandwagoning (Betts, 2009; Dolan, 2021; Hall, 2016; Jinnah, 2011; Poast, 2013). Haas (1980) classifies the three persuasion strategies as substantive, tactical, and fragmented issue-linkages. Substantive issue-linkage is real or perceived causality between issue areas (Betts, 2010a). Professionals establish and validate issue-linkages using imprecise estimates, historical practices, anecdotal evidence, and research. This allows organisations to rationalise their mandate expansions, engage in emerging issue areas, and institutionalise their policy preferences (Betts & Pilath, 2017; Hall, 2015). Tactical issue-linkage is conditionality or side-payments (i.e., financial or material concessions) combining issue areas (Poast, 2013). Actors use this nexus to coax and coerce institutions to follow accepted 'models.' Fragmented issue-linkage is akin to motivational framing. Professionals develop a shared goal to overcome doubts about cause and effect, thereby preserving their collective bargaining power (Haas, 1980). These issue-linkages are mutually reinforcing as causal knowledge marshals actors into a structure to shape governments' interests and enable change (Betts, 2008).

Entrepreneurialism[2] is the dissemination of issue-frames and issue-linkages across transnational policy spaces (i.e., forums, marketplaces, or an agora, defined as a collection of policy sites) (Stone, 2008). Transnational policy spaces constitute fixed and fleeting sites, where professionals sell their 'models' to policymakers searching for solutions and build trust and rapport to enrol new followers (Gunn, 2017; Lavee & Cohen, 2019; Mintrom, 2013; Mintrom et al., 2020; Shpaizman et al., 2016). Each venue has its membership, funding mechanisms, mandates, rules, and vocabulary (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991; March & Olsen, 2011b). These differences offer opportunities and costs for mobilising policies. Multiple domains covering the same issue can cause competition but also break silos, build synergies, and foster collaboration (Farley et al., 2007; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Murphy & Kellow,

[2] Entrepreneurialism entails processes of issue-making, disseminating, and anchoring. However, this thesis uses Mintrom's (1997) earlier conceptualisation of policy entrepreneurs as policy promoters to argue that issue-frames and issue-linkages need to be disseminated before they can be remade and anchored in new spaces.

2013; Pralle, 2009). The latter is achieved through space-shopping, space-creation, and learning and teaching.

Space-shopping is the process of strategically exploiting sites to advance policy goals (Betts, 2010b; Downie, 2022a; Meijerink, 2008; Shpaizman et al., 2016). Actors either move an issue to a parallel domain with different priorities or create strategic inconsistencies whereby new norms undermine existing ones in another venue (Betts, 2009, 2010b; Lu et al., 2020). By doing so, they can tap into new resources, overcome institutional inertia, negotiation deadlocks, and exclusion from policy processes, and build alliances necessary for mobilising policy packages (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991; Meijerink & Huitema, 2010; Murphy & Kellow, 2013; Pralle, 2009). Contrastingly, space-creation is the process of constructing new sites for knowledge exchange, policy refinement, and fostering cooperation (Fatonie, 2020; Meijerink & Huitema, 2010). Although actors frequently use space-creation to mobilise policy assemblages, the practice is understudied – a gap this thesis will address (Murphy & Kellow, 2013).

Learning and teaching are social processes involving diverse initiatives and activities. Organisations commission multi-million-dollar, multi-partner, and multi-country initiatives, including pilots, experiments, comparative studies, and policy formulation (Bedford & Spoonely, 2014; Crivello, 2015; Haas, 1992, 2015). They offer professional courses on capacity-building, set up 'good practice' databases, and publish knowledge products such as articles, blogs, guidelines, handbooks, reports rulebooks, and training manuals (Larner, 2007; Tanner et al., 2019). They sponsor and participate in knowledge-sharing and policy processes (Bassett & Shandas, 2010; Lavee & Cohen, 2019). Importantly, professionals engage in policy tourism whereby they visit places to observe and learn about the implementation and consequences of purported 'models' (Cook & Ward, 2012; Levenda, 2019; McCann & Ward, 2012; Temenos & McCann, 2013b). Visit-led tourism draws actors to sites of policy implementation whereas event-led tourism brings them together in a place to share their experiences (Baker & McGuirk, 2019; Tang et al., 2020). The physical proximity allows professionals to escape the demands of regular work, develop associational bonds, and verify information, while hosts offer authoritative testimonies about policy effectiveness, assurance that the strategies align with international norms, referrals to useful colleagues, and in situ lobbying opportunities (Baker & McGuirk, 2019; Cook & Ward, 2011, 2012; Gonzales, 2011). Nevertheless, policy tourism is a power-laden process since the organisers carefully regulate

the visiting delegation's tours, ensuring they see some sites but not others (González, 2011; Temenos & McCann, 2013b).

Anchoring is embedding issue-frames and issue-linkages into existing institutional rules, which is also known as political persuasion, strategising, and scheming (Beeson & Stone, 2013; Reimer & Saerbeck, 2017; Stone, 2019) Political patronage is critical for solutions to be policy-relevant or accepted as a 'model' (Stone, 2017). Put simply, governments and cabinet ministers must endorse them. This means actors must coax policymakers, which may entail creating consultancy industries to spread 'models' and making technical submissions to decision-making bodies (Blaustein et al., 2020; Gamlen, 2019; Nash, 2019). Most organisations claim not to use anchoring whereas governments argue they do not have a role in negotiations. Yet, anchoring is a key aspect of orchestration, defined as organisations enlisting intermediaries by providing material and ideational support to encourage states to govern certain issue areas (Hale & Roger, 2014). It is an indirect and soft governance approach because organisations act through intermediaries but have no control over them (Abbott et al., 2012). Thus, anchoring is a political strategy for integrating policy preferences within normative instruments and institutional cultures.

2.8 Local Conditions

Local conditions mutate, morph, and transform policy assemblages before they arrive and settle in new contexts (Levenda, 2019; McCann & Ward, 2013; Prater & Lindell, 2000; Prince, 2010). Geographical, ideological, and political proximity enables policy convergence – governments with shared interests and systems adopt similar policies (Stone, 2017). The convergence may be apparent from policy rationale and structure. However, each location comprises distinct beliefs, practices, and traditions, producing some policy divergences. The differences may be apparent from policy content (e.g., size of quotas and number of target countries) and institutional landscape.

More specifically, institutional, political, cultural, economic, and environmental conditions vary (Crivello, 2015; Lovell, 2019; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Peck & Theodore, 2015; Webber, 2015). Institutions have specific designs, cultures, and routines that are embedded in historical experiences and rationalities (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Haas, 2015; Mintrom & Luetjens, 2017). Political parties and interest groups often have competing priorities and promote different approaches (Beeson & Stone, 2013; Reimer & Saerbeck, 2017; Wood, 2016).

Religious, ethnic, and social groups order societies in distinct ways, which may contradict international 'best practices.' Volatile market conditions and variations in environmental vulnerability affect regulations (Bassett & Shandas, 2010; Levenda, 2019; Peck & Theodore, 2002). Thus, local conditions shape the technical, financial, and political feasibility of policy 'models' (Hurlimann et al., 2018).

Local conditions are not temporally fixed, impacting the mobility of foreign *and* local 'best practices.' Local activating events can induce ideological and policy shifts (Gamlen, 2019; Haas, 1992; Halliday, 2009; Kingdon, 2011). Political cycles or ministerial reshuffles can impede internal entrepreneurs' efforts to institutionalise certain 'models' (Bassett & Shandas, 2010; Botterill, 2013; Tanner et al., 2019). Although new information is critical for policy adoption, the rate at which it travels and settles varies between sites due to rigid institutional boundaries (March & Olsen, 2011b). Environmental conditions change quickly, adversely impacting the viability of once accepted response. Thus, shifts in local conditions can mutate or immobilise foreign and domestic regulatory 'models.'

Awareness of changing local conditions affects policy success and failure (Lovell, 2016; Reimer & Saerbeck, 2017). McConnell (2010) loosely defines policy success as achieving the overarching goals, attracting little criticism and almost universal support. Policy failure is the opposite. Levenda (2019) and Mintrom and Luetjens (2017) claim policy failures can be minimised through pilot projects, inter-country learnings, and context-specific knowledge, which provide information about local institutional language, culture, politics, and processes. However, policy effectiveness is not directly transferable as the internal determinants (i.e., present culture, space, and time) shape policy outcomes in unexpected ways (Marsh & McConnell, 2010). For this reason, geographers argue that policy failures are present in sites of successes: the former cannot exist without the latter because actors must frame a policy as ineffective before they present an alternative that purportedly worked somewhere else (Lovell, 2019; McCann & Ward, 2015). Put differently, actors use activating events and issue-making strategies to portray some policies as successful 'models' and others as bad practices. In this sense, awareness of changing local conditions is critical for generating *perceived* policy successes and failures.

Localisation is the process of resisting, borrowing, indigenising, and modifying accepted 'models' into new formats that reflect local settings (Stone, 2017; Tanner et al., 2019). Acharya (2004) divides it into four stages: pre-localisation, local initiative, adaptation, and amplification

and universalisation. In the pre-localisation stage, actors resist and contest foreign ideas by questioning their purpose, applicability, and impact on local norms. In the local initiative stage, political champions use reference-scapes, experiments, and comparative studies to demonstrate the local relevance and convince others to endorse the 'model.' In the adaptation stage, policymakers unpack the global assemblage, graft some components into local regulations, and prune those not aligning with the existing normative system. In the amplification and universalisation stage, international organisations and professionals recognise the local influences in the original 'model,' heralding the policy as place-based best or bad practices. By doing so, they elevate domestic actors' beliefs, profiles, and prestige. Akin to the policy assemblage lifecycle, localisation rarely occurs in a linear process. Instead, it follows an ad hoc and disrupted process, involving diverse transnational actors and sites that create tension and friction. Hence, some policies arrive fully localised in a context while others remain stuck in some stages for extended periods, thereby producing policy variations.

2.9 Chapter Summary

The chapter outlines the Policy Mobilities Framework, which this thesis utilises to explain variations in the level of institutionalisation of environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' in the Pacific. The framework conceptualises policies as assemblages comprising disparate subjects, objects, and spaces that embody ideologies, norms, rules, and practices. As policies move in ad hoc and non-linear fashion across sites and scales, they mutate in ways that only elusively resemble the original 'model.' Activating events destabilise assemblages by revealing regulatory gaps, which mobilise agents in different ways to shape multi-level policy processes. The institutional landscape constitutes diverse actors who are organised into multi-scalar and multi-sited structures that ideologically and socially condition them to move certain policies. Mobilising strategies recursively make, disseminate, and momentarily anchor assemblages. Local conditions morph global 'models' into distinct approaches.

Chapter 3: Follow Policy Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The chapter presents the follow policy methodology to investigate variations in the level of institutionalisation in environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' in the Pacific. Follow methodology is defined as tracing processes, practices, discourses, and networks that connect actors, norms, sites, and scales (Peck & Theodore, 2010a). It has three components. First, structures that enable or constrain policy flows. Second, actors that recursively construct, mutate, and transform policies in different sites (Robinson, 2015). Third, the case is an extension of the broader sociocultural and political problem, process, or practice (Burawoy, 1998; Peck & Theodore, 2015). In practical terms, the methodology entails literally shadowing actors by being present in policymaking centres, and figuratively tracing the discourse in the documents.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 briefly explains the critical realist epistemology in which the structural and agential processes (im)mobilise policies. Section 3.3 discusses the distended case study research design that provides the transnational reach and local depth critical for understanding why certain policies move the way and in the directions they do. Section 3.4 describes the data collection and analysis procedures. This thesis uses a combination of document analysis, participant observations, and semi-structured interviews to interrogate, probe, and ascertain factors explaining policy variations. It employs a retroductive approach to data analysis whereby all evidence is triangulated, examined, and matched against five hypotheses to confirm or reject and revise the Policy Mobilities Theory. Section 3.5 attends to ethical considerations and details how my positionality shaped the research. Section 3.6 elucidates the limitations of the study, specifically the exclusion of some voices, policy implementation, and effectiveness. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes with a chapter summary.

3.2 Critical Realist Epistemology

This thesis aims to understand variations in the level of institutionalisation in environmental mobility 'best practices' in the Pacific. These 'best practices' are planned relocation, labour migration, and humanitarian protection. They are products of:

- Global and regional discourses on climate adaptation, development, disaster risk reduction, human mobility, human rights, and security, in addition to existing international rules, norms and practices, and multi-level work of institutions.

- The actions and decisions of and relationships between policy actors, including intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies, professional experts, and policymakers.

- The institutional features of contexts where policy actors operate.

- The economic, environmental, political, and sociocultural conditions of individual states.

This thesis adopts a critical realist perspective to explain how structure and agency interact to shape environmental migration and displacement policies in the Pacific. Critical realism asserts a 'real' social world exists independent of our knowledge, perceptions, theories, and constructions (Easton, 2010). A complete understanding of reality is impossible because all knowledge is partial, incomplete, limited, and fallible (McEvoy & Richards, 2006; Wynn Jr & Williams, 2012). However, we can get close to reality by "selecting and forming theories using the rational judgment of social events" (Fletcher, 2017, p. 187). Put differently, a theory helps identify causal processes shaping the phenomenon under investigation. This entails using multiple data collection methods whereby each method provides new information that forms part of the jigsaw puzzle (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Gamlen & McIntyre, 2018).

To understand policy convergences and divergences, it is necessary to examine the causal processes shaping the reality of policy actors in their settings. This is encapsulated in the critical realist formula, namely causal processes + context = outcome (Pawson et al., 2005; Pawson & Manzano-Santella, 2012). Here, the causal process is the *mobility* of environmental mobility 'best practices.' The context is the *institutional landscape* in which actors operate and the *local conditions* of a country. The outcome is *policy variations* in the Pacific. This research draws on the formula to explain how structural and agential processes operate in different contexts to produce distinct policy outcomes.

Structural processes refer to interactions between different elements that produce observable outcomes. In this thesis, a policy comprises a structured sociocultural entity constituting a "set of internally related objects and practices" (Easton, 2010, p. 790). The objects and practices

interact in different ways, producing causal powers and liabilities that enable or constrain the flow of environmental mobility 'best practices' (De Haas, 2010). Consequently, some aspects of the 'models' are reproduced while others are mutated or momentarily abandoned (Wynn Jr & Williams, 2012). The operation and effects of structural processes can be observed through the work of policy actors and their shared discourses, ideologies, assumptions, and meanings (Fletcher, 2017). These "cultural and ideational powers promote and legitimate" some approaches as 'best practices' for the issue area but not others (Isofides, 2011, p. 11).

Agential processes refer to actors reflecting on their positions, devising strategies, and taking action to achieve their desired outcomes (Bakewell, 2010). It is a relational property as policy actors exert control over the knowledge material, platforms, and channels they use to mobilise environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices.' Agential causal powers include sensations, beliefs, desires, reasons, and decisions (Isofides, 2011; McEvoy & Richards, 2006). This thesis focuses on the meanings, beliefs, and motives of policy actors since the formation of collective logic is a social event that produces the phenomenon (Fletcher, 2017).

3.3 Distended Case Study Research Design

This thesis adopts a distended case study research design (DCSR) to examine factors producing patterns of policy convergences and divergences (Peck & Theodore, 2010a, 2012, 2015). This entails figuratively and literally following policy actors and documents mobilising three sets of environmental migration and displacement management assemblages (planned relocation, labour migration, and humanitarian protection) across various sites (Ball, 2016; McCann & Ward, 2013). DCSR draws from extended case methods and multi-sited ethnography (Burawoy, 1998; Marcus, 1995). DCSR is appropriate for this research for three reasons. First, it allowed me to employ a judicious combination of ethnographic tools to probe, interrogate, and triangulate issues on how multi-scalar institutional structures operate, 'models' are reconstructed, and policies are adapted to new contexts (Peck & Theodore, 2015). Second, it provided transnational reach and local depth, whereby following fixed and fleeting policymaking centres offered insights into "institutional and geographical variations, as well as tensions and tears in policymaking consensus" (Peck & Theodore, 2015, p. 37). Third, it supported the reconstruction of theories whereby I selected cases that disrupted the notion of smooth and frictionless policy adoption, adaptation, and localisation (Peck & Theodore, 2012). Each policy assemblage comprises power interests, successes, and failures, which become

apparent through their mutation (Jacobs, 2012, Lovell, 2016; McCann & Ward, 2015). In this way, the thesis questions the basic premises, assumptions, and foundations of development-friendly and humanitarian 'best practices' as solutions for regulating environmental migration and displacement in the Pacific.

3.3.1 Immersion in the Environmental Migration and Displacement Policymaking Space

Following policies required immersion or 'being present' in the policymaking space. I identified the environmental migration and displacement policymaking space by reviewing grey literature and attending events. I gained access to it by interning with two organisations active in the issue area (see Section 3.4). The space comprises interconnected transnational policy networks that enable actors and documents to travel between climate change, development, disaster risk reduction, human mobility, human rights, and security domains. It also consists of smaller circuits that mobilise various policies, some of which have gained institutional foothold while others have not (e.g., evacuation, immigration points system, migration with dignity, refugee protection, seasonal worker programmes, and so forth). The makeup and operation of these circuits are discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

3.3.2 Study Population

Since an increasing number of observations is an important principle for quantitative and qualitative research designs within critical realist studies, the research project recruited 75 participants through purposive and snowball sampling (Creswell, 2014; King et al., 1994). I reviewed grey literature, specifically Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) and Nansen Initiative reports, to identify nodal actors, and asked participants whether they knew experts who would be interested in speaking with me on the topic (Creswell, 2013; Hennink et al., 2011). As shown in Figure 3.1, participants were grouped into six categories: government officials, intergovernmental organisation (IGO) intermediaries, non-governmental organisation (NGO) advocates, academics and researchers, independent experts, and other professionals. These actors are the dominant players in the environmental migration and displacement policymaking space and so warranted direct engagement. Although based at different institutions, they are part of multiple structures and wear several hats, fulfilling multiple roles (Scott, 2008). All participants were recruited from environment, human mobility, and human rights events (see Appendix B). My participants, internship supervisors, and I organised introductory meetings with experts around these events and they

were followed up with an email, telephone, or Skype/Zoom call. I also used email, phone, and videoconferencing referrals to recruit participants who were not initially on the list.

Figure 3.1: Study Population.



The primary recruitment method was emailing leading experts identified from grey literature. Research participants facilitated hard-to-reach experts through virtual introductions, redirecting my interview requests, and allowing me to use their names whilst getting in touch with potential participants (Herod, 1999). IGO, NGO, and donor agencies' senior management connected me to former and current employees, consultants, and researchers working on environmental mobility governance (Field Notes, 07.06.2019, 12.09.2019). Consultants shared contact information of policymakers and colleagues and permitted me to use their names when seeking interviews (Field Notes, 10.08.2019, 27.11.2019). Ministers connected me to their technical staff who facilitated introductions with appropriate agencies. In these ways, I obtained insights from a diverse group of policy actors who would have otherwise ignored my interview requests.

Although I sent a total of 140 emails to experts and policymakers (excluding follow-ups), many were unavailable or could not participate in my research (discussed further in Section 3.6). In addition, studying a transnational policymaking culture hindered data saturation as the environmental migration and displacement management space constitutes diverse actors with different experiences, perspectives, and stories (Iosifides, 2011). For example, even though many participants described the same activating events and institutional structures, their issue and policy framings varied significantly, thereby revealing tears in policymaking consensus. Relatedly, environmental migration and displacement management is a fast-policymaking space. Ideologies on why and how humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation can regulate the phenomenon are shifting rapidly. This is evident in Chapters 5 to 10.

3.4 Data Collection and Analysis Procedures

This thesis adopts a combination of document analysis, participant observations, and semi-structured elite interviews to examine policy variations in environmental migration and displacement management in the Pacific. I collected data from December 2018 to June 2023[3] albeit the majority of it was gathered in 2019. The thesis captured policy developments after June 2023 using grey literature: these included the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility finalisation, the launch of Fiji's Standard Procedures on Planned Relocation, and developments on New Zealand's Managed Retreat Policy, the Pacific Engagement Visa, the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Treaty, and Family Accompaniment for Pacific labour migrants in Australia. All data collection and review of new scholarship ceased in December 2023 as I was finalising the thesis for submission. My main sites of data collection were Australia (Brisbane, Canberra, Melbourne, and Sydney), Egypt (Sharm-El Sheikh), Fiji (Suva), New Zealand (Wellington), Poland (Katowice), and Switzerland (Geneva). The research employs a retroductive approach to data analysis, thereby developing a converging line of inquiry.

3.4.1 Document Analysis

Document analysis is utilised to gather insights into the grand narratives, supporting stories, reference-scapes, and metaphors policy actors use to mobilise development-friendly and humanitarian 'best practices' to regulate the phenomenon (Ball et al., 2017; McCann, 2017). It entailed collecting, collating, and reviewing multi-level policy frameworks, guidelines, toolkits, handbooks, reports, background and working papers, policy and programme briefs, statements, and media articles. As shown in Appendix A, I analysed a total of 202 documents: 34 global instruments, five regional frameworks, 120 national laws and policies[4], and 43 statements. I used key terms derived from the literature (e.g., climate refugees, displacement, migration, relocation/resettlement, protection, and so forth) to retrieve documents from IGO, NGO, government, and media online databases. Additionally, informants shared draft policies, initiative proposals, outcome reports, terms of reference, and workplans. I was permitted to use

[3] I took a leave of absence from my doctoral studies between August 2020 to August 2021 due to the pandemic and related health issues.

[4] Pacific governments are formulating standalone environmental migration and displacement policies. However, language on environmental stressors, relocation, migration, and displacement is also integrated into climate change, development, disaster risk reduction, employment, humanitarian, labour migration, land tenure, and security policies. Language on humanitarian protection is integrated into immigration laws. Hence, these laws and policies warranted closer examination.

this information in my thesis as long as informants remained anonymous and sensitive material (e.g., funding allocation) was not published. Information on multi-initiative funding was retrieved from publicly available sources. Furthermore, my internship supervisors provided access to country statements, draft resolutions, organisational reports, and updated policies. An analysis of these documents provided insights into the overarching ideologies shaping the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage and place-based 'models.'

3.4.2 Participant Observations

Participant observations are utilised to contextualise the interviews. This involved taking part in and documenting the daily rituals, interactions, events, and physical environments that shape policy actors' experiences, routines, and culture (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2011; Hennink et al., 2011; Schensul & LeCompte, 2012). I collected 401 participant observations by interning with two organisations and attending 83 face-to-face and virtual events[5] (see Appendix B). From the 83 events, only 14 required state or United Nations (UN) membership. The participant observations focused on the key actors, channels, venues, and micro strategies (Ball et al., 2017; Keele, 2018). The observations also included information about how actors interact with each other, how policy domains are interlinked, and conversations with experts on challenges with regulating environmental migration and displacement (e.g., competing perspectives and difficult forums). Put differently, the observations focused on who was present in which forums, asking what questions, and promoting which solutions. Beyond this, I had 28 entries on methodological difficulties and my changing positionality impacted the data collection process.

Participant observations were obtained in two ways. First, I interned with the Fiji Mission in Geneva from 15th May to 15th August 2019 and the United Nations Office for the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) in Fiji from 27th August to 13th December 2019. My primary supervisor arranged the Geneva internship in December 2018 through his professional connection with the former Ambassador Nazhat Shameem Khan. In 2019, Fiji was the Vice Chair of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and Platform for Disaster Displacement (PDD), Co-Chair of the Fifth Internal Displacement Dialogue, and Chair of the support group for the United Nations Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR). This internship

[5] For information gathered before the official data collection period, I obtained permission from the event organisers and panel members to use their recordings and presentation slides.

provided access to global closed-door events and insights into political work performed by organisations.

In contrast, I arranged the Fiji internship in December 2018 through my professional connection with Human Rights Officer Robert Vaughan who was working on the Pacific Climate Change, Migration, and Human Security (PCCMHS) programme. In 2019, the OHCHR was an implementing partner in the PCCMHS programme and needed someone to establish the Joint Working Group on Climate Mobility and adapt messages from the International Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers (ICMW) to the environmental migration context. This internship offered an institutional perspective in terms of standard setting, policy dissemination, conflicting logic, and organisational frictions.

Second, I attended global and regional meetings as a former Monash University and current ANU doctoral candidate. Both universities endorsed and financed my participation in climate change conferences and environmental mobility meetings as civil society and party representatives. Specifically, Monash University's Richard John Bryant Estate Award and ANU's Climate Alumni Leadership Award financed my attendance in 2018 and 2023. These conferences revealed how actors marketised and institutionalised policy prescriptions and the internal dynamics of negotiations.

3.4.3 Semi-Structured Interviews

Semi-structured interviews are used to understand policy actors' subjective perspectives and tacit experiences in shaping, transferring, and standardising environmental migration and displacement policies. This involved eliciting information on their mundane micro-practices and probing the meanings and interpretations they attach to specific performances (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005). In short, interviews asked policy experts what they were doing and why. I used walk-along and elite interviews. The former entailed getting out and about with junior and middling policy experts, whereas the latter entailed taking a learner position whereby senior professionals steered the direction of the interview (Gillham, 2000; Wood, 2016). The interviews comprised closed- and open-ended questions, which maintained the focus of conversation, allowed me to probe, prompt, and rephrase questions participants did not understand, and offered us an opportunity to reflect on the questions and responses (Creswell, 2014; Gillham, 2000; Schensul & LeCompte, 2012).

As illustrated in Appendix C, I interviewed 75 policy actors. The participants represented 21 international institutions, six regional agencies, one local organisation, and six governments, while 12 of them spoke in their independent expert capacities. Wherever possible, I interviewed multiple experts from the same institution to enhance data reliability (Gamlen & McIntyre, 2018). Most interviews were face-to-face and lasted between 35 to 90 minutes. They were conducted in experts' homes and offices, restaurants, and parks. While two interviews had two participants, each expert provided separate responses to the questions. I interviewed hard-to-reach experts via email, telephone, and Skype: one was via email, one was over the phone, eight were on Skype audio, and 15 were via Skype video (Holt, 2010; Irvine, 2011; Irvine et al., 2013; Stephens, 2007). I encouraged participants to turn on their videos during virtual calls to minimise misinterpretations, but this was not always possible due to bad weather conditions and a patchy internet connection.

The interview schedule comprised six questions, covering the following topics (see Appendix D): expert's background (institutional structure), understanding of environment-population movement nexus (ideology), knowledge of existing policies (place-based 'models'), institutional objectives and role in the issue area (micro-practices), and strengths and weaknesses of certain approaches (local conditions). My primary supervisor and peers reviewed the schedule, and I piloted the questions at the 2018 climate conference. The pilot revealed terminological variations – different actors used different terms to describe the phenomenon, and sometimes the three policies examined in the project. Moving forward, I used publicly available organisational documents to tweak the questions and shared the schedule with participants before our meeting to determine whether they could participate in the study, seek clarifications, and think through their responses. These methods increased participation rates.

Most interviews were recorded on two devices, an audio recorder and my phone. For the three unrecorded interviews, participants permitted me to make notes and use their views on regulating the issue area but two of them did not consent to direct attribution. In addition, the interviews were transcribed by me, two independent transcribers, and an international transcribing service. The latter two signed confidentiality agreements, prohibiting personal use of the data and from sharing material with colleagues. They received detailed instructions on formatting and symbols to indicate foreign words, long pauses, and recording inaudibility. They did not transcribe interviews verbatim – filler words were removed, and I modified some

statements to enhance clarity (e.g., long-running sentences and redundant words). I reviewed all transcripts to ensure they captured key phrases and to remove off-record content. The interviews offered insights into how macro forces and micro conditions produce variations in the level of institutionalisation of environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' in the Pacific.

3.4.4 Retroductive Data Analysis

This research adopts a retroductive approach to data analysis in which the researcher "moves back by asking what must be true to make an event possible" (Easton, 2010, p. 123). I asked questions to determine what factors mobilised development-friendly and humanitarian 'best practices' to produce variations in environmental migration and displacement management across the Pacific. The analysis process was iterative, whereby I reorganised and recoded the data several times to form a coherent narrative. Nonetheless, the analysis process can be categorised into three key stages. First, each data source was analysed separately. A review of 202 documents determined the extent to which environmental stressors were recognised as human mobility triggers, and development-friendly and humanitarian 'best practices' were institutionalised as viable environmental mobility solutions. It also revealed place-based 'models' from the Pacific. An examination of 401 participant observations uncovered the key policy actors, channels and venues, institutional work, and ruptures in ideological conformity. An analysis of 75 interview transcripts shed light on activating events prompting organisations to engage in the issue area, reference-scapes, and mundane sociocultural and political practices. In this way, I identified emerging themes.

Second, all the data was uploaded, coded, and triangulated in QRS NVivo. I relabelled all the data using name, organisation or location, and date (e.g., Michelle Leighton, ILO, 21.08.2019 or Anote's Ark, Melbourne, 15.10.2018). I used the emerging themes to create codes and entered them as low-level nodes[6] in the software. These were later regrouped under high-level nodes. Humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation were the high-level nodes whereas organisations, channels, norms, discourses, weaknesses, and strengths were low-level nodes. I triangulated the evidence through the coding process to develop a holistic explanation of the phenomenon (Creswell, 2013; Creswell & Miller, 2000). The reformatting unearthed the interlinkages and disconnections between the policy assemblages. The

[6] Nodes are containers for storing thematically similar information.

documents, observations, and interviews revealed the geography and history of each assemblage, specifically how it travelled and mutated into distinct policies.

Third, the evidence was matched against the five main hypotheses of the Policy Mobilities Theory. To reiterate, they are:

- Policies are assemblages constituting subjects, objects, and spaces that embody ideologies, norms, rules, and practices.
- Activating events destabilise assemblages by revealing regulatory gaps, which mobilises agents in different ways to shape policies.
- The institutional landscape constitutes diverse actors who are organised into structures that ideologically and socially condition them to move certain 'models'.
- Mobilising strategies recursively make, disseminate, and anchor policies.
- Local conditions mutate, morph, and transform global 'models' into distinct approaches.

To do so, I developed an analysis matrix (see Figure 3.2). As shown in Figure 3.2, it comprises four factors (activating events, institutional landscape, mobilising strategies, and local conditions) that explain policy variations across three scales (global, regional, and national). It is important to note that because assemblage did not affect the institutionalisation process, it was not listed as an enabling/constraining factor. I used a colour coding system to indicate the variations: green signifies strong impact, yellow is medium impact, and red is no impact. I began by applying the matrix to each factor. For example, the matrix in Chapter 5 shows how different types of activating events impacted the institutionalisation of each policy assemblage across different scales. Then I combined findings from all matrices to explain how and why some environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' were institutionalised in the Pacific but not others. By doing so, I was able to confirm or reject and revise the Policy Mobilities Framework by elucidating what happened and why.

Figure 3.2: Analysis Matrix.

Policy Response	Scale	Activating Events	Institutional Landscape	Mobilising Strategies	Local Conditions
Planned Relocation	Global				
	Regional				
	National				
Labour Migration	Global				
	Regional				
	National				
Humanitarian Protection	Global				
	Regional				
	National				

3.5 Ethical Considerations and Positionality

3.5.1 Ethical Considerations

The research project received ethics approval from the Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee on 14th November 2018 (Appendix E1). I did not need a new or additional approval from ANU's Research Ethics Office. I also did not need research permits for several reasons. The study focuses on mobile policy actors, not susceptible communities residing in fixed locations. Egypt and Poland convened climate conferences, which are fleeting sites, and I temporarily lived and worked in Switzerland. I also reside in Australia, and am a New Zealand Permanent resident, and a Fijian national. Nevertheless, I applied for a permit in Fiji to ensure the Climate Change and International Cooperation Division (CCICD) supported the research (Appendix E2). I also signed a confidentiality agreement with the Fiji Mission to keep sensitive information about its business confidential. These documents ensured participants were protected, that I did not breach cultural protocols, and increased participation rates.

In line with the ethics guidelines, my project did not harm participants (Creswell, 2014). Many participants did not need organisational authorisation to engage in the study because they were independent experts or held senior positions. The few middling and junior professionals received clearance from senior management. I also took precautionary safety measures, including removing off-record information and statements that could threaten their careers or reputations from interview transcripts, de-identifying conversations noted in field journals, and using publicly available documents to support controversial claims.

Additionally, I obtained written and verbal consent from participants wherever possible. This ensured they were informed about the risks and benefits of engaging in the project and maintained their autonomy in deciding the level of attribution and whether to be audio-recorded (Murphy & Dingwall, 2001; Piper & Simons, 2005). As shown in Appendix C, some participants only gave verbal consent because they had time limitations (i.e., they were in the middle of negotiations or official travel). Some Pacific officials granted implied consent by saying, "I wouldn't be speaking with you if I didn't consent to participate in your research", which suggests Western ways of obtaining consent do not align with the Pacific (Field Notes, 04.11.2019; 26.11.2019). I addressed this issue by explaining the importance of explicit consent, especially in ensuring I do not breach ethical protocols.

Furthermore, I maintained confidentiality to the extent possible. Complete confidentiality was impossible because the project investigates emerging policies and the work of a relatively small group of actors, who are well-known (Iphofen, 2011). Nevertheless, I advised participants that off-record information would not be shared with individuals not present at the interview, but the supervision team would have access to the data once confidential material is removed (Hennink et al., 2011). I stressed that the data was not being collected on behalf of the Fiji Mission or OHCHR, and consulted my seniors on which information I could and could not use in my thesis to ensure I upheld the confidentiality agreements. I also gave participants the choice of partial or complete attribution (i.e., name, job title, or institution). As demonstrated in Appendix C, I attributed the views of seven experts to their organisations, three to their job titles, and 65 to their names. They all agreed to have their information listed in the appendices. My research findings will be disseminated in the form of a dissertation, book, and journal articles (Iphofen, 2011). CCICD and the University of the South Pacific (USP) requested a summary report while IOM and PDD offered to publish my articles.

3.5.2 Positionality

Several aspects of my positionality affected data collection and analysis. Positionality refers to the "different aspects of our identity in terms of race, class, gender, castes, sexuality and other attributes that are markers of relational position in society" (Chacko, 2004, p. 52). These markers categorise us as insiders or outsiders. However, we rarely fit into this dichotomy as our identities are relational and situational (Berger, 2013; Bourke, 2014; Yeo & Dopson, 2018). Thus, we occupy a space of in-betweenness (Hopkins, 2007).

My Fijian heritage, roots in New Zealand, and personal connections in the Pacific categorised me as an insider, which provided several advantages. First, I had greater access to informal knowledge and information on regional events on environmental migration and displacement. Second, I avoided lengthy processes in obtaining research permits, from paying high research fees and applying for travel visas. Third, my family – namely, Devishna, Lakshman, and Raneel Mudaliar, and Sunita Narayan – shared the contact details of European Union staff, Fijian leaders, and New Zealand officials. Fourth, my Pacific identity enabled easy communication with Pacific policy elites at a personal level (Holloway & Biley, 2011). This was achieved by reciting my lineage in Fiji (i.e., my birthplace, where my grandparents lived, and where my family currently lives). Fifth, being a Fijian working on environmental migration and displacement management partly facilitated field access. Experts based in Australia, Switzerland, and the United States were eager to speak with me because I was perceived as a researcher who understood the urgent need to address environmental adversities faced by the Pacific. Nevertheless, a researcher's insider status may prevent them from maintaining a value-neutral position and critically examining the evidence. To minimise my biases from contaminating the data, I documented my interview impressions and participant observations in three field journals, which were kept separately from information shared by participants (Greene, 2014).

My limited engagement in environmental mobility, geography training, and Australian affiliations sometimes categorised me as an outsider, which had several disadvantages. First, I was not initially a member of the policymaking community studied in the research project. However, my primary supervisor's networks facilitated access to some policy actors, specifically the Nansen Initiative, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). My former associate supervisor endorsed my attendance at the 24th Conference of Parties to the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP to UNFCCC), thereby allowing me to connect with professionals working in the issue area. Second, I do not have a legal human rights background. Fiji Mission and OHCHR take a legal approach to environmental mobility (i.e., applying international human rights laws to the issue area). My seniors were initially unsure how my training would contribute to the UNHRC and capacity-building efforts in the Pacific. However, they capitalised on my emerging expertise in environmental migration and displacement management. I researched and drafted country briefs, concept notes, and speaking points, and represented the institutions at various events. My seniors also offered extensive guidance during the internships. They explained the human rights logic in the context of environmental displacement, the IPCC, and UNHRC processes, and provided note-taking templates for informal negotiations and other learning material. Third, being a Monash University and ANU doctoral researcher created confusion about my identity. Some experts based in Fiji assumed I was Australian and refused to speak to me. To overcome this issue, I took the advice of local researchers by arranging introductory meetings before sending interview requests and emphasising my Fijian identity in all written communication.

3.6 Limitations

This research has at least three significant limitations. First, it does not incorporate the voices of all policy actors. Experts influential in the early stages (1990-2006) were inaccessible because they no longer worked for the agency or had passed away. Some Pacific officials could not participate in the study due to competing priorities, disengagement from the issue area, and limited understanding of how they could contribute to it. For example, I-Kiribati officials circulated the new administration's position on no migration, a New Zealand official recently changed jobs, and a Tuvaluan official was preoccupied with disaster response (Field Notes, 13.05.2019, 22.10.2019, 03.01.2020; Kosi Latu, interview, 26.11.2019). Communities and traditional leaders are not represented in the study because a large body of literature sufficiently captures their perspectives, which I use throughout the thesis. This is not to say that more research on community experiences is not needed. However, little is known about how policy elites conform to certain 'models' for managing environmental migration and displacement management in the Pacific – a gap this research project seeks to address.

Second, it does not offer comprehensive insights into policy translation and implementation processes. Humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation have distinct geographies and histories. They originate from a different policy domain, are shaped by

different logics, and date back to at least the colonial era. However, standalone environmental migration and displacement management policies began emerging in 2016; an exception is Australia and New Zealand's labour migration programmes, which were introduced in the early 2000s. Policymakers are still translating the ideas into local norms, and many of the recent policies are unimplemented due to capacity and resource constraints.

Third, it does not assess the effectiveness of environmental mobility policies. A small body of scholarship employs econometrics, the sustainable livelihoods approach, and the impoverishment risks and reconstruction model to examine the development and protection implications of labour migration programmes and planned relocation schemes (Bower et al., 2023; Gibson & McKenzie, 2014a; Nunns et al., 2020). This information is critical for evidence-based policymaking. However, the purpose of this study is to explain factors other than policy effectiveness that led to the spread and uptake of certain policy ideas as purported 'models.' It critiques the assumption that they are accepted as 'best practices' because they are effective. It does so by showing that the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage co-constitute policy successes and failures (McCann & Ward, 2015).

3.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter presents the follow policy methodology to investigate variations in the level of institutionalisation of environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' in the Pacific. It shadows actors across multiple sites and traces discourses in numerous documents that mobilise three sets of policy assemblages: humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation. A critical realist epistemology demonstrates how structural (objects and practices) and agential (decisions and rationality) processes interact to produce distinct policies in the Pacific. DCSR design is appropriate for studying this fast-policymaking culture for three reasons. First, it allows the researcher to use different methods to understand how multi-scalar institutional structures operate and how 'models' are constructed and adapted to different contexts. Second, it provides transnational reach and local depth to understand variations, tears, and tensions in policymaking consensus. Third, it supports theoretical reconstruction whereby the case study selection demonstrates that policy adoption and translation are not frictionless.

This thesis employs document analysis, participant observations, and semi-structured interviews to study environmental migration and displacement policy mobilities. I reviewed

202 global, regional, national, and organisational conventions, frameworks, guiding principles, handbooks, laws, and policies to identify dominant discourses and reference-scapes. I interned with two organisations active in the policymaking arena – Fiji Mission and OHCHR – and attended 83 in-person and virtual events, leading to 401 participant observations. These observations focused on key actors, channels, venues, micro-practices, expert interactions, domain interlinkages, and observable tensions. I interviewed 75 policy actors from government agencies, IGOs, NGOs, academic and research institutes, and independent experts. The interviews focused on identifying institutional ideology, membership, roles, internal changes, place-based 'models,' and benefits and challenges associated with specific approaches. The data was transcribed, coded, and triangulated using QRS NVivo and analysed using a retroductive approach. This was achieved by matching the data against the five hypotheses of the Policy Mobilities Theory. Where the data matched the hypothesis, the theory was argued to hold. Where it did not, I revised the theory by elucidating what happened and why.

This research follows ethical guidelines. I obtained ethics approval from Monash University, a research permit from CCICD, and signed a confidentiality agreement with Fiji Mission. To minimise reputational harm and maintain confidentiality, I obtained informed consent, removed off-record information, offered partial attribution, and limited data accessibility to the supervision team after removing sensitive material. I also informed participants that I was not conducting the study on behalf of the Fiji Mission and OHCHR. In addition, my positionality affected data collection and analysis in many ways. My Fijian heritage, roots in New Zealand, and personal connections in the Pacific minimised lengthy processes, facilitated access to hard-to-reach government officials, and enabled easy communication. To minimise my biases from contaminating the data, I documented my impressions in three journals. My limited engagement in environmental mobility, geography training, and Australian affiliations initially hindered field access. However, my primary supervisor's networks, conference attendance, emerging expertise and guidance from my internship seniors, and advice from local researchers improved field access.

The project has three significant limitations. First, it does not incorporate all policy actors' voices due to unavailability. Second, it does not provide a comprehensive explanation of policy translation and implementation because Pacific policymakers have recently formulated standalone environmental migration and displacement strategies and are yet to implement them. Finally, it does not assess policy effectiveness because the purpose of the study is to

examine other factors that shape the uptake of ‘models.’ Instead, I critique the assumption that they are accepted as ‘best practices’ because they are effective.

Chapter 4: Environmental Migration and Displacement Management Assemblage

4.1 Introduction

This chapter draws on primarily existing scholarship to describe the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage. Assemblages comprise material and expressive components bound together by external and internal relations. Material components are tangible entities such as actors, documents and sites, while expressive components are intangible ideas, norms, rules and practices (Ball et al., 2017; Cresswell, 2010a, 2010b; Lea et al., 2022; McFarlane, 2009). External relations give assemblages their shape whereas internal relations are responsible for meaning-making and assigning identities (DeLanda, 2006, 2016; Prince, 2014; Savage, 2020). Assemblages are made to appear as a systematic entity but never fully cohere. Their blurry and open-ended edges allow assemblages to take new forms or find new capacities (Prince, 2017). However, the processes of territorialisation and coding – what I refer to as institutionalisation - determine their level of coherence. The former concerns structural coherence achieved by establishing boundaries and structures, whereas the latter concerns internal coherence achieved through technocratic practices (Collier, 2006; McFarlane & Anderson, 2011; Prince, 2016; Woods et al., 2021). Certain events can maintain or disrupt the coherence of assemblages (DeLanda, 2006, 2016; Halliday, 2017; Kingdon, 2011; Peck & Theodore, 2001).

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 briefly discusses ways in which pessimistic and optimistic narratives shape approaches to environmental mobility. Section 4.3 describes the three emerging regulatory assemblages (i.e., their constitutive elements), which are humanitarian protection measures, labour migration policies, and planned relocation guidelines. It also discusses how their status as ‘best practices’ does not sit well with reality. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes with a chapter summary.

4.2 Pessimism and Optimism Debates

The Pacific is highly susceptible to environmental stressors, defined as climate change, disasters, and degradation. The long-term risks to coastal flooding and temperature rise are projected to increase at 1.5 degrees Celsius, limiting adaptation opportunities and heightening

irreversible loss and damage (IPCC, 2018). Environmental stressors interact with socioeconomic, political, and demographic factors in intricate and complex ways to exacerbate pre-existing vulnerabilities (Back et al., 2013; Hugo, 1996). They threaten land, livelihood, and habitat security and can reverse development, thereby increasing the probability of displacement, migration, and/or relocation (Campbell, 2010; Gioli et al., 2016; Nansen Initiative, 2015). Pacific governments and international organisations are preparing by formulating standalone policies and amending and expanding existing initiatives to regulate the phenomenon.

Scholarship and policymaking on the environment and human mobility nexus have swung back and forth between pessimism (1985-2007) and optimism (2008-present). Pessimists view the nexus as a vicious cycle because displacement enhances resource-based conflict, which threatens national security (Myers, 2002; Reuvney, 2007). Optimists view it as a virtuous cycle as migration increases adaptive capacities, builds resilience, fosters development, and safeguards human security (Bardsley & Hugo, 2010; Black et al., 2011). The pessimism and optimism date ranges are loose historical groupings, which indicate periods when the ideologies shaped policy discourse. They are not definitive categories as pessimism persists, especially in the environmental mobility context. Nevertheless, optimism is prevalent in recent global, regional and national policy dialogues whereby governments and experts see voluntary human mobility as a strategy for averting, minimising and addressing the effects of environmental stressors. How this optimism has shaped multi-scalar and multi-sited environmental mobility governance is demonstrated in Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. This section unpacks how pessimistic and optimistic scholarly discourse are shaping policy responses to environmental migration and displacement management, which is illustrated in (see Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: Summary of Environmental Migration and Displacement Management Scholarship.



4.2.1 The Pessimistic Narrative: Displacement as a Security Threat

Pessimists argue that abrupt, uncontrollable, and mass environmental displacement will increase competition and violent conflicts over scarce resources, resulting in humanitarian emergencies (Bettini, 2014; Reuvney, 2007). Environmental stressors diminish essential resources such as food, water, and land, which *forces* people to abandon their homes. Many of them seek refuge internally or internationally, adding to the refugee and displaced persons population. Displaced persons increase the risk of violence by encroaching on the territory of resource-constrained communities (Norda°s & Gleditsch, 2007). Pessimists use sensationalist imagery of catastrophes, disappearing islands, submerged skyscrapers, and other crises to stress the inevitability of mass displacement and refugee crises (Bettini, 2013; McNamara & Gibson, 2009). They claim that environmental disasters will displace millions: figures range from 50,000,000 to 1,000,000,000 (Baird et al., 2007; Black, 2001; Jacobson, 1988). Environmentally displaced persons are portrayed as security threats, which reinforces broader anti-immigrant sentiments in some Global North countries (Rasan-Cooper et al., 2015).

Both sensationalist language and alarmist figures appeared in earlier IPCC, UNEP, IOM, UNHCR reports, and the media (Betts & Pilath, 2017; Hartmann, 2010; McNamara & Gibson, 2009). These reports depicted environmental stressors as a *national* security threat (Brown et al., 2007). In particular, UNEP's Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment in Sudan linked the Darfur crisis to environmental factors, which provided an impetus to discuss environmental displacement in the UNSC (Biermann & Boas, 2008; UNEP, 2007). To avoid a repetition of the Darfur crisis, security actors suggested enhancing border protection and military preparedness (Reuvney, 2007). In contrast, some humanitarian actors and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) proposed providing humanitarian protection and compensation to people displaced by environmental stressors (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015; Thomas & Benjamin, 2018).

The pessimistic narrative prompted a call for further research to better understand the environment and human mobility nexus. Yet, the new research criticised the pessimistic narrative for its mono-causality, for creating the problematic 'environmental refugee' category, and for homogenising environmental displacement experiences and opportunities (Gemenne et al., 2014). Environmental stressors are triggers rather than sole causes of displacement (Kalin & Weerasinghe, 2017). Additionally, households often have multilayered coping strategies, comprising *in-situ* and *ex-situ* measures (Bardsley & Hugo, 2010; Hugo, 2012). Relatedly,

migration is a highly capital-selective process, as it is often only individuals with human, financial, social, and cultural assets who can afford to escape (Adger & Adams, 2013). Moreover, environmental stressors predominantly trigger *internal* displacement (Martin, 2010a). A small proportion of individuals crossing international borders tend to migrate to neighbouring countries (Ammer et al., 2014). Furthermore, the environmental refugee category ignores individuals' agency and autonomy, lacks legal basis, and can devalue protection given to conventional refugees (Boncour & Burson, 2010; Farbotko & Lazarus, 2012). This new research was catalytic in shifting the pendulum towards an optimistic view of the environment and human mobility nexus.

4.2.2 The Optimistic Narrative: Migration as an Adaptation Strategy

Optimists argue that environmental stressors threaten *human* security, inducing some households to migrate (Bettini, 2014; Gemenne et al., 2014). They stress that migration is a well-established adaptation strategy for agricultural communities (Hau'ofa, 1993; Tacoli, 2009). It is a "low-cost and low-regret approach" (Barnett & O'Neill, 2012, p. 10) to reducing environmental risks through income, network, and skill diversification (Barnett & Webber, 2010; Bettini & Gioli, 2016). Families collectively decide that one or more individuals should migrate, secure employment, and send home remittances (Castles & Miller, 2009). Migration and remittances serve multiple purposes. First, remittances are used for crop and business diversification, and to recover from extreme weather events (Kagan, 2016). Second, migration allows communities to establish, expand, and strengthen social networks. In the Pacific, the migration culture has established transnational corporations of kin (Bertram, 1986; Bertram & Watters, 1985). This institution ensures the durability and sustainability of remittances and assistance from diaspora communities after environmental shocks such as Tropical Cyclones Pam and Evan (Bailey & Shiu, 2016; Hugo, 2012; Le De, Gaillard, & Friesen, 2015). Third, circular or temporary migration, in particular, allows migrants to return home with advanced and new skills, which may help develop adaptation strategies (Dun & Klocker, 2017). Fourth, migration reduces population pressure on the environment and the number of people exposed to environmental stressors (Barnett, 2012). Thus, optimists stress that migration is a proactive risk-diversification strategy and should be part of an integrated approach to addressing environmental stressors (Campbell, 2010; Warner, 2010).

However, for migration to be recognised as an adaptation strategy, it needs to be voluntary, preventive, and anticipatory (Fornale & Kagan, 2017). Optimists problematise *forced,*

ungoverned, and *ad hoc* migration, arguing that it creates conflict between host and migrant communities that compels individuals to settle in areas more vulnerable and exposed to environmental risks (ADB, 2011, 2012; Betts & Pilath, 2017). They suggest *planning* and *managing* voluntary migration to create a triple-win situation, where migrants, states of origin, and destinations all benefit (Bettini, 2014; Gemenne & Blocher, 2017). This means developing appropriate policies that emphasise the role of planning dignified, safe, and orderly migration in enhancing adaptive capacities, building resilience, fostering development, and protecting human rights (Hugo, 2012; IOM, 2014). Optimists recommend amending and expanding existing migration channels or developing new pathways within the region. They also suggest mainstreaming environmental migration into national development and adaptation strategies (GMG, 2011; Nansen Initiative, 2013, 2015). The latter de-pathologises environmental mobility, making the issue less contentious and the solutions more politically palatable (Bettini & Gioli, 2016; Betts & Pilath, 2017). Cushioning environmental migration into the highly optimistic debates on migration and development has been a crucial strategy for those seeking policy solutions.

4.3 Policy Responses to Environmental Migration and Displacement: Following Emerging Approaches

In 2010, the UNFCCC recognised environmental disasters as a cause and consequence of population movement. The Cancun Adaptation Framework called for parties to adopt measures to enhance understanding, coordination, and cooperation regarding environmental displacement, migration, and planned relocation (CAF, 2010). This set the momentum for identifying policy solutions, 'best practices,' and 'models' (Kalin, 2015; McAdam, 2014). Currently, three emerging policy approaches are circulating within the environmental migration and displacement policy space: humanitarian protection measures, labour migration policies, and planned relocation guidelines (IOM, 2014, 2016; McAdam, 2011, 2012). These responses are endorsed and promulgated by international norms, including the Nansen Protection Agenda (Sendai Framework, Migration Compact, FRDP, and PRFCM.

This section describes the constitutive components of the environmental mobility management assemblage. Section 4.3.1 examines humanitarian protection measures, followed by labour migration programmes in Section 4.3.2, and planned relocation guidelines in Section 4.3.3.

4.3.1 Humanitarian Protection Measures

Humanitarian protection is a broad policy response for safeguarding the human rights of international environmentally displaced persons. It comprises refugee, statelessness, and complementary protection, and a standalone protection framework. This suite of solutions emerged from the so-called 'environmental refugees' discourse (discussed further below); however, each response applies to different contexts. This section briefly discusses these four types of protection measures.

An 'environmental refugee' is sometimes defined – contentiously – as a person forced to flee their home due to marked environmental disruptions that jeopardise their existence or quality of life (Bates, 2002; El-Hinnawi, 1985). The term emerged from the pessimistic narrative; however, optimists employ it to highlight the devastating impacts of greenhouse gas emissions on population movements. The notion of environmental refugees was reinforced by specific events that occurred in SIDS. For example, the Australian Greens Party proposed a Climate Refugees Amendment Bill (PoA, 2007; Ash & Campbell, 2016); the Maldives proposed an amendment to the 1951 Refugees Convention that would extend UNHCR's mandate to 'environmental refugees' (Biermann & Boas, 2008); and a small number of I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan families unsuccessfully applied for asylum in New Zealand on the grounds that environmental stressors will adversely impact their livelihoods if forced to return home (McAdam, 2015; McAdam et al., 2016). These events galvanised migration and displacement experts to examine the applicability of the 1951 Convention to environmental displacement.

The application of the legal term 'refugee' to environmentally displaced persons has always been contentious. The legal definition of a refugee is someone "unable or unwilling to return home due to the well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership to a particular social group, or political opinion" (Refugee Convention & Protocol, 2010, p. 3). To qualify for international protection, individuals displaced by environmental stressors would need to satisfy the element of persecution for reasons listed in the definition, demonstrate they are disproportionately affected, prove the origin governments' unwillingness to provide protection, and identify the persecutor (Chirala, 2013; McAdam, 2015; Warren, 2016). Environmental stressors violate human rights and may cause economic and political persecution (Corendea, 2016). However, it is difficult to demonstrate that environmental displacement is directly caused by human actions (Gemenne et al., 2014; Thomas & Benjamin, 2018). Additionally, environmental stressors are indiscriminate and do not differentiate on the

account of race, religion, nationality, membership to a group or political opinion (IOM, 2014). Moreover, due to a lack of political clout and resources to shape multilateral policies, developing countries have adopted measures to protect communities from environmental stressors and prevent displacement (Barnett, 2017; Farbotko et al., 2018). Furthermore, by applying for asylum, individuals seek assistance from the perpetrator, namely the international community. Although UNHCR offered to coordinate protection responses for environmentally displaced people, member states resisted the idea due to concerns related to its mandate, internal issues, operational capacity, exit strategies, and state sovereignty (Kalin, 2015; McAdam, 2014). Relatedly, an amendment to the refugee regime was thought to offer wealthy states an opportunity to renegotiate their way out of existing international obligations concerning conventional refugees, for example by treating them as economic migrants (Boncour & Burson, 2010; McNamara 2007; Warren, 2016). Therefore, because the international definition of a refugee is narrow and inflexible, it cannot currently protect people displaced by environmental stressors (Berringer, 2013; McNamara, 2007).

However, UNHCR experts recommend using the Cartagena Declaration and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention to develop regional refugee conventions that may begin to address this gap in the international humanitarian protection framework for environmentally displaced persons (Isabelle Michal, interview, 11.12.2018; Sanjula Weerasinghe, interview, 29.07.2019). These regional conventions contain liberal definitions of a refugee (Höing & Razzaque, 2011). They explicitly recognise events *seriously disturbing public order* and *natural and human-made disasters* as causes of displacement (Cartagena Declaration, 1984; OAU Convention, 1969). Regional refugee conventions are not silver bullets because they were not intended for permanent environmental displacement, only apply to specific regions, and member states are reluctant to apply them to climate change contexts (Warren, 2016). While some countries may be open to developing a regional refugee convention, Pacific governments resist the environmental refugee category because it normalises their potential loss of territory and sovereignty, suggesting mass displacement is inevitable (Barnett, 2017; McAdam, 2011). This may encourage developed states to continue business as usual and hinder mitigation efforts (McNamara & Gibson, 2009). Hence, some Pacific governments have a principled, but pessimistic attitude towards environmental displacement (Mortruex & Barnett, 2009).

Perhaps for these reasons, the extension of the 1951 Convention to environmentally displaced people and the development of a regional refugee convention are not widely endorsed as policy

solutions for environmental displacement management in the Pacific or beyond. McAdam (2011) notes that definitions (such as that of 'refugee') are powerful bureaucratic labels, delineating rights and obligations, and reinforcing ethical claims to protection and assistance. However, there is no agreed definition of *environmental* refugees (Fatima et al., 2014). Although El-Hinnawi's (1985) definition is the premise for emerging definitions, it is exceedingly broad. Relatedly, the causal link justifying the notion of environmental refugees is simplistic and heavily debated. Based on neo-Malthusian assumptions and global prognoses, early studies concluded that environmental stressors cause refugee crises (Castles, 2002). However, more nuanced studies show that environmental stressors cause different types of population movements (Adger et al., 2015; Black, 2001).

Consequently, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the Global Migration Group (GMG) actively discourage the use of the term 'environmental refugee' (GMG, 2011; IASC, 2008, 2009). IOM, UNHCR, OHCHR, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (IFRC) stress that this category has no legal basis, because the 1951 Convention does not recognise environmental factors as a cause for granting refugee status (IFRC, 2009; IOM, 2014; UNHCR, 2009, 2011; UNHRC, 2009a). They further state that it is a misleading term and can create confusion about legal entitlements. IOM, UNHCR, OHCHR, and IFRC submit language proposals, working papers, reports, and publications to and make interventions during the COP to UNFCCC, UNHRC, UNSC, and the UN Refugees and Migrants Forum (UNRMF) that emphasise extending the 1951 Convention to people displaced by environmental stressors is not a viable solution.

At the same time, some professional experts propose creating a standalone normative framework for people seeking refuge in neighbouring countries from climate change and disaster adversities (Gemenne & Brücker, 2015). They claim the existing humanitarian regime is insufficient as it is under considerable strain and extending it to environmentally displaced persons will create moral dilemmas, tensions, and trade-offs. For this reason, a legally binding norm is necessary. This is exemplified by the Pacific's advocacy efforts. For example, the Coalition of Low-Lying Atoll Nations and Climate Change (CANCC) has voiced concerns about the protection gap (GoT, 2015a). Fiji, Tuvalu, and the Solomon Islands have called for a separate instrument, arguing rapid sea-level rise will make land uninhabitable, thereby forcibly displacing communities across borders (Nazhat Shameem Khan, interview, 26.07.2019; UNGA, 2016a, 2016b). Tuvalu is putting forward a resolution at UNGA to formulate this

framework (Simalua Enele, interview, 27.11.2020; Timothy Westbury, 07.10.2019; UNGA, 2018a, 2019).

Professional experts have different ideas about the foundation of a standalone normative framework. Biermann and Boas (2008, 2010, 2017) propose creating a Protocol on the Recognition, Protection, and Resettlement of Climate Refugees to the UNFCCC that incorporates mechanisms for collective relocation and resettlement to third countries, international financial assistance, and burden-sharing. Docherty and Gianni (2009) call for a similar framework but stress that it should guarantee human rights protections and humanitarian aid and set up implementing institutions (e.g., funding, coordinating, and expert bodies). Falstrom (2002) suggests establishing a Convention on the Protection of Environmentally Displaced Persons under the 1985 Convention Against Torture (CAT) that extends temporary protection to affected individuals and requires countries to address the root cause of displacement. Prieur (2010) advocates drafting a Convention on the International Status of Environmentally Displaced Persons that ensures the rights of people forced to flee sudden-onset events and organises their reception and return. They further recommend establishing the World Agency for Environmentally Displaced Persons to oversee the implementation of the Convention. They disagree on whether the framework should be grounded in international human rights, humanitarian, refugee or environmental law (or a combination). Professional experts disseminate the idea of a standalone normative framework through publications and submissions to the COP to UNFCCC and UNGA.

However, formulating a separate framework is time-consuming, and more importantly, countries lack the political will to globalise environmental displacement governance (Atle Solberg, interview, 08.12.2018; McAdam, 2010; Gemenne & Brücker, 2015). Even if they do, the framework will be at the "lowest common denominator and may suffer from the lack of implementation and enforcement" (McAdam, 2012, p. 7). Given that it will be based on international environmental and/or human rights laws, certain countries will have to take responsibility for causing environmental displacement (Williams, 2008). This is unlikely as such responsibilities have significant socio-economic and political implications. Hence, many optimists do not endorse the idea of a standalone normative framework. However, they do recommend exploring alternative protection mechanisms.

One protection alternative is statelessness conventions. A 'stateless person' is legally defined as an individual "who is not considered a national by any state under the operation of its law"

(Statelessness Persons' Status Convention, 2014, p. 6). The climate change and statelessness nexus also emerged from pessimistic debates but was employed by well-intentioned advocates to accentuate that sea-level rise may completely inundate some island states, rendering them uninhabitable (McAdam, 2011; Warner, 2011). This was partially supported by several events that occurred in SIDS. For example, the Maldives considered purchasing land in Australia or India, and building an artificial island (Dolla, 2015); Kiribati considered land reclamation and bought land in Fiji for purportedly cross-border relocation (Anote Tong, interview, 14.04.2023; Farbotko et al., 2018); Fiji offered refuge to I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans fleeing climate change adversities (Yogesh Karan, interview; 07.12.2018); and finally, the Tuvaluan government is digitising the nation (Apinelu Eselealofa, Canberra, 29.02.2022). The sinking islands' narrative is further reinforced by Pacific leaders' advocacy. For instance, PIFS' former Secretary-Generals, Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and Tuvalu stressed that rising sea levels threaten countries, cultures, people, and their way of life at the UNGA (UNGA, 1997, 2018a); the Marshall Islands lobbied for securing national sovereignty in the context of climate change at UNSC (Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019); and Fiji noted the government will be confronted with the issue of statelessness arising from climate displacement during UNHCR's Executive Committee Meeting (GoF, 2019). These events mobilised displacement experts to examine the applicability of the 1954 Status of Stateless Persons and 1961 Reduction of Statelessness Conventions.

Some optimists claim that the 'stateless persons' label may extend to environmentally displaced individuals. If island states cease to exist, their citizenship will cease and the affected population will receive a de facto 'stateless persons' status (Boncour & Burson, 20010; UNHCR et al., 2009). They will maintain their nationality but live outside of their birth countries and not have access to government services (Massey, 2010). Destination countries must ensure access to naturalisation processes, prohibit citizenship revocation, and provide stateless persons with the same privileges as citizens (Stateless Persons' Status Convention, 2014; Statelessness Reduction Convention, 2014). Origin nations have various options for securing citizenship for their people, all of which entail surrendering their sovereignty: they can purchase land from large countries, cede land and ocean to them, or become compact states with them (Blaxland, 2020; Colton, 2018; Park, 2011; Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019).

The 'stateless persons' category calls into question national sovereignty (Birk & Rasmusen, 2014; McAdam, 2012). While there are diverse interpretations of state, the existing instrument

on statehood defines a state as a "*territory* inhabited by a *permanent population* under the control of an *effective government*" (IOM, 2016a, p. 216; UNHCR et al., 2009, p. 1, emphasis added). That is, a small population must reside on the territory and governments must be able to participate in international relations. Hypothetically, if a country loses territory and population to sea-level rise, current practice indicates that the international community will continue to recognise it as a state since there is no mechanism to ascertain it no longer exists (McAdam, 2012). However, there is no precedent of a state ceasing to exist (UNHCR et al., 2009). Scientific evidence highlights many areas will become uninhabitable before they are completely inundated (Mycoo et al., 2022). Some Pacific leaders are unwilling to discuss pathways for addressing statelessness because suggestions on ceding land and ocean are understood as neo-colonialism (Enele Sopoaga, virtual event, 19.10.2020). Meanwhile, Pacific activists are resisting 'sinking islands' and statelessness narratives by holding high-emitting countries accountable for their actions (George Nacawa, interview, 06.12.2019; McNamara & Farbotko, 2017). Consequently, statelessness conventions have yet to be explored in the Pacific.

Nevertheless, the IASC (2008, 2009) cautiously encourages considering statelessness protection for environmentally displaced individuals. UNHCR (2009, p. 5) notes that in the event a government operates externally due to loss of territory and is unable to uphold its citizens' right to return home and obtain a passport, "statelessness considerations would arise". To prevent statelessness, it claims susceptible states can explore ceding land, joining another country, and providing dual citizenship (UNHCR et al., 2009). Similarly, IOM (2014) documents it may prevent children of environmentally displaced persons from becoming stateless and protect the rights of citizens whose homelands have disappeared. Through joint submissions and publications to COP to UNFCCC and PIFS Sub-Committee on Regional Security, UNHCR and IOM have propagated ideas on protecting Pacific islanders using the statelessness conventions.

Another alternative is complementary protection. It is grounded in international human rights law that supplements international refugee protection (McAdam, 2011). Human mobility optimists argue complementary protection upholds the principle of non-refoulement that prohibits national authorities from sending people to places where their life or freedom is in danger, including disaster-stricken and climate change-impacted areas (Kalin & Weerasinghe, 2017; McAdam & Limon, 2015; UNHRC 2018). This discourse was strengthened by events occurring in destination countries, the UNHRC, and the Pacific. For example, New Zealand

granted a Tuvaluan family permanent residency on humanitarian grounds and began exploring a new humanitarian visa for people displaced by environmental stressors (GoNZ, 2018; Nathan Ross, interview, 22.01.2020); Germany considered the Nansen Climate Passport proposal (Sabine Mininnger, interview, 13.12.2018; WBGU, 2018); the UK was encouraged to establish an Environmental Resilience Visa Scheme and a Natural Disaster Visa Scheme to provide short and long-term protection to individuals vulnerable to environmental displacement (Christie-Miller et al., 2023); the Senator for Massachusetts planned to reintroduce legislation to aid cross-border environmentally-displaced persons (USSM, 2021); the Human Rights Committee ruled that in the absence of robust national and international action, environmental stressors will trigger non-refoulement obligations (PCCMHS Programme, 2020; ICCPR, 2020); and Pacific governments are in the midst of developing a regional framework on climate mobility that seeks to protect the human rights of environmentally displaced persons by respecting the principle of non-refoulement and exploring opportunities for admission and stay (McAdam, 2022; PRFCM, 2023). These occurrences prompted displacement experts to further investigate the feasibility of complementary protection.

Complementary protection is sometimes contentiously applied to environmental displacement contexts. Underpinning the measure is the non-refoulement principle, also enshrined in international refugee law. The 1967 Refugee Protocol prohibits states from returning refugees to areas where lives may be threatened on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group or political opinion (Refugee Convention & Protocol, 2010). Because it discriminates based on the cause (i.e., applicants must provide evidence of persecution), the 1967 Refugee Protocol is not a viable option (McAdam et al., 2016). The 1984 CAT, the 2007 Convention Against Enforced Disappearance, and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) prevent authorities from sending vulnerable individuals to places where they would encounter torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or arbitrary deprivation of life (CAED, 2010; CAT, 1984; ICCPR, 1966). The international human rights "courts recognise that destitution or dire humanitarian conditions can amount to inhuman or degrading treatment, especially cumulatively" (McAdam et al., 2016, p. 36). From this perspective, states must uphold the principle of non-refoulement concerning all persons, including environmentally displaced persons (albeit the group is not explicitly mentioned in the documents). Current state practices are extensive. For instance, Sweden's and Finland's immigration laws grant residency to people who could not return home due to environmental disasters (Martin, 2010b); the UK, Switzerland, and Canada temporarily stopped deportation to

states affected by the 2004 tsunami (Bradley & Cohen, 2013); Brazil granted humanitarian visas and later permanent residency to Haitians fleeing the 2010 earthquake (Ionesco et al., 2017); the US granted temporary protection to victims of the 1997 Montserrat volcanic eruption (Cantor, 2015); and Malawi and Zimbabwe offer temporary refuge to Mozambicans fleeing frequent river flooding (Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019). However, such practices are ad hoc, unpredictable, at the discretion of destination states, and grant temporary protection (Bradley & Cohen, 2013; McAdam, 2011).

Complementary protection is difficult to extend to environmentally displaced persons because the slow-onset events do not put people in imminent danger, and if they do, it is difficult to substantiate (McAdam et al., 2016; Simonelli, 2016). This can be exemplified by the Tuvalu versus New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal case where a Tuvaluan family requested complementary protection in New Zealand based on climate change adversities. The appeal articulated a dynamic approach to treatment, but the evidence did not meet the conditions of the 1984 CAT and the 1954 ICCPR. The evidence failed to demonstrate that the Tuvaluan government discriminated when distributing humanitarian relief or arbitrarily denied foreign assistance and the family was at risk of arbitrary deprivation of life or being subjected to cruel treatment (NZIPT, 2014). The Tuvaluan family was granted permanent residency because of their familial connections and obligations, not climate change (McAdam, 2015). Hence, some scholars perceive complementary protection as a potentially unfeasible solution for residents of the atoll nations who may not be able to go back home following repeated disasters (McAdam, 2012; McAdam & Limon, 2015).

The IASC (2008), Nansen Initiative (Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015), and Taskforce on Displacement (TfD) suggest extending the principle of non-refoulement to environmentally displaced persons. According to OHCHR & PDD (2018, p. 22), this requires “an evolution in the understanding and interpretation of protection”. UNHCR, IOM, and PDD provide a suite of policy responses, including temporary admission and stay arrangements, and special humanitarian visas (IOM, 2018b; Kalin & Weerasinghe, 2017; PDD, 2018; UNHCR, 2018). They disseminate these messages by making submissions and publications to COP to UNFCCC, UNHRC, the UNRMF, and PIFS Sub-Committee on Regional Security.

4.3.2 Labour Migration Policies

Human mobility optimists depict migrants as adaptive agents (McNamara, 2006). Their first policy solution focuses on amending, expanding, and developing regular labour migration pathways (ILO, 2018; IOM, 2018a; PDD, 2018; Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019). Optimists claim labour migration has been proven to create a triple-win situation, where everyone benefits (Gemenne & Blocher, 2017). In destination countries, it addresses labour shortages, enhances cultural diversification, and enables knowledge transfer. In origin countries, labour migration increases capital investments and income-generating activities, supports recovery after extreme weather events, and contributes to adaptation projects. For migrants themselves, it diversifies household resources and improves their socio-economic status. In this view, everyone wins from well-managed labour migration (Appiah et al., 2017; Campbell & Warrick, 2014; Gamlen, 2010, Gamlen, 2014b; Bedford et al., 2017; Voigt-Graf, 2022).

The IOM, ILO, and European Commission experts endorsed Colombia and Spain's temporary and circular labour migration programme as a model for *destination countries* to manage environmental migration (Castles & Ozuk, 2014; Fornale & Kagan, 2017; Mayer, 2011). They argue that the programme has provided Colombians affected by environmental disasters (e.g., volcanic eruptions, landslides, and flooding) with opportunities to work temporarily in Spanish fruit farms and send home remittances. The remittances reduce households' reliance on agriculture, thereby allowing the land to replenish, and migrants return home with advanced skills necessary for establishing or expanding small businesses (De Moore, 2011; Rinke, 2011). The programme is listed in ILO's 'good practice' database and circulated as a solution for environmental migration management through publications in the Atlas for Environmental Migration, policy briefs for IOM, and background papers for the Nansen Initiative (IOM, 2014; Ionesco et al., 2017).

Similarly, professional experts suggest amending and expanding New Zealand and Australia's seasonal labour migration programmes to manage environmental migration from the Pacific. New Zealand's RSE scheme is touted as a 'model' around the world because it has arguably achieved its primary goal, which is to foster development by addressing labour shortages in the horticulture, viticulture, and agriculture industries, improving workers' living standards back home, and contributing to regional economic development, integration, and stability (Gibson & McKenzie, 2014a; Luthria & Malaulau, 2013; Ramasamy et al., 2008; Winters, 2016). The

sustainable supply of Pacific workers has expanded the viticulture and horticulture industries by 30 per cent over the last decade (Nunns et al., 2019). Remittances have increased household incomes, improving living standards and children's school attendance to some extent, and enabling asset accumulation and savings (Gibson & McKenzie, 2014b). The scheme also provides social protection: "It's a good practice in the sense that they provide equal opportunities in terms of employment conditions, which we don't always see in temporary labour migration schemes … Equal treatment in access[ing] health insurances and social security – that is a principle other [countries] could apply …" (ILO Representative 2, interview, 17.07.2019). Based on a similar model, New Zealand launched the Pacific Trades Partnership Initiative, which builds on the successes of the 2016 Canterbury Reconstruction Pilot that recruited skilled carpenters for temporary employment in the construction industry (ILO, 2019). The Initiative is expanding to other sectors experiencing labour shortages New Zealand will soon introduce a Fisheries Pilot, targeting marine graduates from atoll states to work on its fishing vessels (Simalua Enele, interview, 27.11.2020). Despite these recent innovations, only the RSE scheme is widely recommended for countries seeking to develop seasonal labour migration programmes, and endorsed by experts from the World Bank, IOM, ILO, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Fabling, 2013; Winters, 2016).

Australia's SWP draws heavily from the RSE scheme (JSCM, 2016; Stephen Howes, Canberra, 29.09.2022). Although the initial pilot failed to gain the same enthusiasm from employers and employees as the RSE scheme, it has morphed into a programme larger in scale and scope (Reed et al., 2011). The SWP also seeks to foster development but has experienced low participation rates from employers and workers (Ash & Campbell, 2016). Curtain et al. (2016) say this is a result of inadequate promotion, illicit access by backpackers and illegal workers, and a bad reputation that has become self-reinforcing. Some experts argue that SWP is a successful programme because it gives Pacific workers access to healthcare and social services, and households funds to establish small businesses, strengthen residential structures, and finance children's education (Bailey & Kautoke-Holani, 2018; Ball, 2010; JSCM, 2016; ILO Representative 2, interview, 17.07.2019). Nevertheless, it remains unpopular amongst some international experts for the reasons discussed above (Hill et al., 2018; Voigt-Graf, 2022). Based on a similar structure, Australia recently introduced PLS that recruits low- and semi-skilled workers for the hospitality, tourism, healthcare, aged-care, and non-seasonal industries

for three years (Fornale & Kagan, 2017; ILO, 2019). Some scholars claim the PLS is a failure due to low uptake by Pacific workers while others maintain it has the potential to become a 'best practice' (see Clarke, 2019; Hill et al., 2018; Howes & Lawton, 2019). The RSE and SWP's success in filling labour gaps prompted the Cook Islands to consider establishing bilateral labour migration arrangements with Kiribati and Tuvalu (Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019).

Notwithstanding these differences, professional experts postulate that these seasonal labour migration programmes can be amended to manage regional environmental migration, as they already target workers from Pacific Island countries that are acutely affected by environmental stressors (Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019; Sabira Coelho, Sydney, 31.10.2018). The financial, human, and social capital builds resilience against extreme weather events, aids recovery from disasters, and reduces the risk of displacement (McAdam & Pryke, 2020). In this way, Pacific seasonal workers will be integrated into the destination countries' labour markets, cultures, and ways of life, thereby easing their transition to permanent residency (Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019). In addition, professional experts make three arguments specific to the RSE scheme. First, it is already shaped by environmental factors. While not explicitly written in the document, workers are recruited from areas experiencing significant environmental stressors (Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019). Second, it is flexible. During Tropical Cyclone Pam, the authorities made visa concessions for Ni-Vanuatu workers from affected areas (i.e., visa extensions and waivers), allowing some to return home for disaster recovery while others stayed back to provide financial assistance (Bailey & Shiu, 2016; PCCMHS Programme, 2022). Tropical Cyclone Evan mobilised the Samoan diaspora to provide monetary support to relatives to access emergency goods and services such as food, water, and healthcare (Le De, Gaillard, & Friesen, 2015). Third, it has proven to generate triple wins with the biggest benefactor being Pacific workers, who have used remittances to build robust houses, install solar panels, purchase water tanks, and shift away from kerosene ovens (Fabling, 2013; Nunns et al., 2020). Such programmes are circulated as a solution for environmental migration management through journal publications, articles for the Lowy Institute and Development Centre Blog, reports for IOM, ILO, European Commission, UNESCAP, Nansen Initiative, and PDD, presentations at the International Metropolis Conference, and submissions to COP to UNFCCC, the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), and UNRMF (Bedford et al., 2017; Campbell & Warrick, 2014; Dun et al., 2018; Fabling, 2013; Koser, 2012; Thornton et al., 2021; Voigt-Graf, 2022).

These seasonal migration schemes by themselves are unfeasible for managing environmental migration from some Pacific states because they facilitate *temporary* movements. Since parts of atoll nations are likely to become uninhabitable, the residents will require permanent migration pathways (Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015). Consequently, some professional experts suggest aligning seasonal migration schemes with permanent residency programmes (Bedford & Bedford, 2010). New Zealand's PAC is regarded as a 'successful' and well-designed programme (Ash & Campbell, 2016; Curtain et al., 2016; Howes, 2015; McAdam & Pryke, 2020). The ballot system fosters development by building diaspora communities and prevents cherry-picking highly skilled individuals by targeting low to medium-skilled individuals. It has a fixed quota for 75 families per atoll nation, and stringent criteria that positively select working-age applicants with a job offer that pays NZD30-40,000 and funds to support their migration (Burson & Bedford, 2013). The programme has helped establish Tongan, Fijian, Tuvaluan, and I-Kiribati diaspora in New Zealand whose members send remittances to improve their non-migrating relatives' quality of life, assist with disaster recovery, and finance *in situ* adaptation measures (Rae Bainteiti, interview, 13.10.2020; Simalua Enele, interview, 27.11.2020). For these reasons, professional experts encourage increasing the quota for atoll states and creating a separate section within the allocation for individuals experiencing significant environmental stress (Burson & Bedford, 2013; Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019; Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019; Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019). Australia will launch the Pacific Engagement Visa (PEV) in September 2023, modelled on the PAC (Curtain & Howes, 2022). It seeks to build a diaspora by facilitating the permanent immigration of 3000 Pacific and Timor-Leste families. Professional experts are divided on how PEV spaces should be allocated: some argue it should be granted based on diaspora size while others claim it should be awarded based on vulnerability to environmental stressors and displacement (Akka Rimon, Canberra, 29.09.2022; Stephen Howes, Canberra, 29.09.2022). These permanent residency schemes are disseminated as a viable solution for managing environmental migration from atoll nations through journal articles, blogs for the Development Policy Centre Blog and the Interpreter, reports for the Kaldor Centre, IOM, Nansen Initiative, World Bank, and United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), and presentations during the State of the Pacific Conference (Burson & Bedford, 2013; Curtain et al., 2016; Farbotko, 2020; Pryke & McAdam, 2020; Voigt-Graf & Kagan, 2017).

The Migration Compact notes that regular labour migration is a safe way for *sending countries* to manage environmental migration (GCM, 2019). The concept of regular labour migration emphasises the significance of protecting migrant workers' human rights to maximise the development benefits of existing schemes, which can help with disaster recovery and climate adaptation (Farbotko et al., 2018; ILO, 2018, 2019). In practical terms, this means providing workers with pre-departure training, establishing grievance mechanisms, assigning liaison officers to resolve employer-worker disputes, engaging with the diaspora to prevent workers from absconding, and instituting complementary programmes (e.g., financial literacy or setting up microenterprises) (see ILO, 2011; Mudaliar & Voigt-Graf, 2022). These protection mechanisms are included in seven Pacific Island countries' labour-exporting policies: Kiribati, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Samoa, and Vanuatu. Besides Tonga and Vanuatu, these countries explicitly recognise climate change, disasters, or damage as a driver of labour migration (GoF, 2018; GoK, 2015; GoS, 2019; GoSI, 2018, 2019; GoT, 2015b). Kiribati perceives overseas employment as a survival strategy while Samoa, Vanuatu, and Fiji acknowledge the disaster recovery potential of remittances (GoF, 2018; GoK, 2015; GoS, 2019; GoV, 2019). Vanuatu and Tonga are purportedly looking to incorporate a clause in seasonal worker contracts that encourages investment in *in situ* adaptation initiatives (UNESCAP, 2020a, 2020b). Kiribati and Tuvalu's labour-exporting policies are listed as 'good practices' in ILO's database, partly because they incorporate measures for safeguarding the human rights of migrant workers.

Despite these variances, international organisations concerned with environmental migration governance argue regularising labour migration can provide critical resources to vulnerable households to build resilience against environmental stressors (ILO, 2017; IOM, 2014; UNESCAP, 2018). Recent reports highlight Pacific seasonal workers face exploitation, abuse, and deteriorating working conditions in destination countries. Some migrants work long hours; are underpaid, unfairly terminated, intimidated by employers, and accommodated in expensive but poor-quality housing; and have inadequate access to food, healthcare, and pastoral care (see Dziedzic et al., 2021; ILO, 2019; Mudaliar & Voigt-Graf, 2022). Professional experts claim changes in environmental conditions will aggravate these human rights violations: environmental stressors will heighten the risk of injuries, pre-existing gender inequalities, and duration away from families (Westbury, 2022). To prevent such issues from arising, they recommend strengthening the institutional capacities of origin countries to protect migrant workers. This message is conveyed through journal articles, policy briefs, and reports for ILO,

IOM, OHCHR, and UNESCAP, and joint submissions to COP to UNFCCC, UNFMR, and the International Migration Review process.

At the same time, the Nansen Protection Agenda notes that facilitating migration with dignity is a positive way for *sending countries* to manage environmental migration (Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015). The notion of migration with dignity highlights the importance of providing upskilling opportunities and establishing diaspora communities, especially for communities confronted with substantial loss of territory (Allgood & McNamara, 2017; Voigt-Graf & Kagan, 2017). In practical terms, this means aligning temporary migration programmes with permanent residency and upskilling schemes. Labour-exporting policies in the Pacific recognise these migration pathways. Low- and semi-skilled people can only obtain permanent residency through PAC and PEV. These programmes alone will not suffice in managing environmental migration as Pacific populations are projected to grow rapidly and the demand for permanent residency visas already exceeds their supply (Anote Tong, Melbourne, 22.10.2018; Curtain & Howes, 2022; Bedford & Bedford, 2010). Hence, youths are encouraged to invest in higher education. Although domestic upskilling opportunities are available in all countries, uptake is slow because their qualifications are not always internationally recognised, and employment prospects are limited. To address this issue, Pacific governments are collaborating with stakeholders to explore various upskilling schemes. Kiribati partnered with Australia to pilot-test a nursing initiative that built on the positive lessons of its seafaring scheme (Anote Tong, interview, 14.04.2023). The seafaring scheme – a programme tailored to Kiribati and Tuvalu's development needs – is perceived as a "successful, robust and effective model" because all graduates received employment in German shipping companies, Japanese tuna factories, and Norwegian cruise liners following their training and their remittances contributed towards household and community development (Akka Rimon, interview, 30.11.2022; Bornovik, 2006, 2009). Tuvalu secured 160 international scholarships and launched the Sky's Limit Programme (SLP) to offer loans for Tuvaluans to pursue tertiary education from regional institutions (GoT, 2015b; Pedro, 2015). The Marshall Islands is developing a separate Migration with Dignity policy (PIFS Regional Security Advisor, interview, 20.02.2020; Simon Bradshaw, interview, 04.06.2019). The Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu, and Samoa are working with tertiary institutions to develop courses that address labour shortages in traditional destination countries (GoF, 2018; GoS, 2021; GoSI, 2018). These upskilling schemes allow individuals to obtain internationally recognised qualifications, which increases their probability of securing employment abroad, forming a diaspora community, and facilitating future migration from

Pacific nations (Fornale & Kagan, 2017). However, they are susceptible to international shocks (e.g., global financial crises) and expensive to operate; skills recognition does not always ensure employment; and a focus on addressing international labour shortages may create a void in the domestic supply of workers (i.e., brain drain or brain gain but skills are not locally relevant) (GoK, 2015a; GoT, 2015b; Shaw et al., 2014; Voigt-Graf & Kagan, 2017). Yet, Kiribati and Tuvalu's labour-exporting policies include specific upskilling programmes that facilitate access to international labour markets, and they are listed as 'good practices' in ILO's database and UNESCAP's reports, contributing to discussions on the Migration Compact (ILO, 2024; UNESCAP, 2015, 2018). More importantly, Kiribati, Oxfam Australia, and Pacific Islands Climate Action Network (PICAN) disseminated the notion of migration with dignity at IOM Council Sessions, Nansen Initiative Regional Consultation, International Metropolis Conference, the UNGA, and various events hosted in Australia (see Appendix B) (Genevieve Jiva, interview, 21.11.2019; GoK, 2015b; IOM, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d; Nansen Initiative, 2013; Richards & Bradshaw, 2017; Simon Bradshaw, interview, 04.06.2019; UNGA, 2014, 2015).

In this way, UN agencies and professional experts endorse labour migration policies as 'good practices' for managing environmental migration in the Pacific (Koser, 2017). The Colombian, New Zealand, Australian, I-Kiribati, and Tuvaluan labour migration programmes are increasingly portrayed as place-based 'models.' However, this label jars with the fact that they are temporary schemes that restrict workers' rights and their ability to transition to permanent residency (Castles & Ozuk, 2014; Ruhs, 2006; Ruhs & Martin, 2008). Permanent residency pathways are limited and investment in higher education continues to be low (Fornale & Kagan, 2017). Moreover, not everyone with tertiary qualifications migrates or chooses to stay abroad because migration is a highly selective process, Pacific people have close attachments to their customary land, and sometimes community obligations compel them to return home (Adger & Adams, 2013; Barnett & Webber, 2010). Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, these labour migration programmes were not designed for environmental migration management but to foster development.

4.3.3 Planned Relocation Guidelines

Human mobility optimists' second policy solution focuses on improving the use of planned relocation as a preventive or durable measure (McAdam et al., 2016; Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015; UNDRR, 2019). Optimists contend that, while it is a measure of last resort,

planned relocation reduces the exposure of vulnerable people and their assets to environmental stressors (UNHCR et al., 2014; Jha et al., 2010). In addition, it safeguards essential human rights such as the right to land, culture, and self-determination (Pascoe, 2015). Further, planned relocations can be beneficial for everyone. Both host and resettling communities gain from development packages, including water and sanitation utilities, infrastructure, healthcare and education facilities, and increased employment opportunities (Fitzpatrick, 2013). Thus, optimists maintain that planned relocation reduces exposure to environmental stressors, safeguards human rights, and enhances development prospects.

Before discussing the planned relocation assemblage, it is critical to differentiate between relocation and resettlement. Scholars and policymakers use both terms interchangeably even though they involve different processes (Edwards, 2013). Relocation is the process of physically moving people, which can be forced or voluntary, large or small scale (McAdam & Ferris, 2015). Resettlement is an additional component that entails helping relocated people to restore, and if possible, improve, socio-economic conditions (OCHA, 1998; Jha et al., 2010). This difference is instrumental in shaping organisations' responsibilities towards people on the move: relocation does not necessitate implementing agencies to replace houses, assets, livelihoods, land, maintain community cohesion, and re-establish affected households' living standards. However, in the Pacific, the process of relocation encompasses resettlement.

The IASC, Nansen Initiative, and TfD experts suggest drawing inspiration and 'lessons' from three sources to manage *internal* environmental displacement (EACH-FOR, 2009; Brookings Institution et al, 2015; UNCHR et al., 2017). First is the OCHA's Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Guiding Principles) – the post-displacement phase provides safeguards for people forced to resettle elsewhere by natural and human-made events (Atle Solberg, interview, 08.12.2018; Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019). They include creating conditions for voluntary resettlement; allowing internally displaced persons (IDPs) to participate in the entire process; giving them access to public services; helping IDPs recover their lost possessions and properties; and granting international agencies access to IDPs for resettlement assistance (OHCA, 1998). The Guiding Principles were deemed successful not because of implementation, but widespread endorsement. They were incorporated in humanitarian and development agencies' institutional policies; referenced in the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), UNSC, and UNHRC resolutions; and previous UN Secretary Generals

called governments to observe them when addressing internal displacement (Cohen, 2004, 2007; Kalin, 2006).

Second, is humanitarian organisations' guidelines on protecting people resettled following sudden-onset disasters, specifically flooding, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions (Ferris, 2012; Sanjula Weerasinghe, interview, 29.07.2019). In addition to the Guiding Principles, humanitarian practitioners developed the Guidelines on Human Rights Protection in Situations of Natural Disasters and the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs (Cecilia Jiminez-Damary, interview, 09.08.2019). They emphasise informed consent, proximity to infrastructure, employment, and cultural establishments, and appropriate compensation for lost assets (see IASC, 2008; IASC Framework, 2010; IASC Operational Guidelines, 2011). Humanitarian agencies have limited experience in facilitating post-disaster resettlements, but examples of ad hoc government practices in Colombia, Guatemala, Turkey, and the Middle East illustrate their moderate success (Ferris, 2012; Oliver-Smith, 1991). Their moderate success was attributed to employment opportunities in the service and mining sectors; maintenance of community cohesion by replicating the old village and house design; and space for expanding houses in the new site (Displacement Solutions, 2015; Oliver-Smith, 1991). In addition, historical cross-border relocations from parts of present-day Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji and the Solomon Islands are – problematically – perceived as 'successful schemes,' especially when assessed against the impoverishment, risks, and reconstruction model (Connell & Tabucanon, 2015; Tabe, 2019, p. 8). This is because colonial authorities had sufficient capital, the land was uninhabited, affected communities were consulted, social governance systems were replicated in the new location, and circular migration allowed resettled households to maintain their cultural identity (see Bedford, 1968; Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017; McAdam, 2014). However, these cross-border relocations occurred among British colonies, not sovereign nations, which enabled an easy relocation process (Ferris et al., 2011).

Third, is the World Bank's Involuntary Resettlement Guidelines and expertise with development-induced resettlements (Elizabeth Ferris, interview, 23.07.2019). Experts argue the World Bank successfully resettled communities affected by development schemes in China, India, and the Philippines (Ferris, 2011; Mathur, 2015). The success of these resettlements was attributed to significant lead times (allowing extensive consultations with multiple stakeholders) and the participation of host as well as resettled communities (Cernea, 1996); top-level commitment (Wilmsen & Webber, 2015); resettlement along important transport routes

and with flexible livelihood programmes (De Sherbinin et al., 2011; World Bank, 2001); entire communities were relocated to nearby sites (Mathur, 2015); and its policy emphasised exploring alternative project designs to avert and minimise displacement (Kalin, 2008). However, the World Bank projects, and policy aimed to resettle communities impeding dam construction, mining, and infrastructure development, not to reduce vulnerabilities to environmental stressors.

Existing resettlement practices were combined with existing norms for reducing displacement risks and protecting displaced persons to produce new global 'models' on climate change-induced planned relocation (Erica Bower, interview, 10.12.2019; Scott Leckie, interview, 07.08.2019). The Peninsula Principles on Climate-Displacement (Peninsula Principles), and the Guidance and Toolbox for Protecting People from Disasters and Environmental Change through Planned Relocations (Guidance and Toolbox) concretised existing humanitarian and development principles on facilitating resettlements (Brookings Institution et al., 2015; Displacement Solutions, 2013; UNHCR et al., 2017). They incorporate specific ideologies, checklists, and 'best practices' on, for example, community consultation, land identification, compensation, and monitoring and evaluation.

The Carteret Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands' relocation guidelines draw heavily from these humanitarian and development norms, rules, and practices (see GoF, 2018, 2023; GoSI, 2022; GoV, 2018; Tulele Peisa, n.d.). However, they differ in three ways. First, because numerous organisations are involved in various phases of the relocation, they ensure livelihood programmes maintain traditional ways of life (e.g., providing pineapple tops, establishing fishponds, and setting up a mini food rainforest and connecting harvesters to international markets) (Boege & Rakova, 2019; McNamara & Des Combes, 2015). Second, instead of financially contributing to their own relocation, community members provide labour for house construction (Tronquet, 2015). Governments have established trust funds while local organisations have partnered with international non-governmental agencies to finance the move. Third, resettling communities perform appreciation ceremonies and participate in sociocultural events organised by their host communities to reinforce existing and foster new relationships (Ursula Rakova, Brisbane, 25.05.2018). Finally, in development projects, governments identify and acquire suitable land. However, over 80 per cent of the land is communally owned in the Pacific. Customary laws and kinship determine land rights (i.e., use of, boundaries of, and validity of transaction over land) (Gharbaoui & Blocher, 2016). Pacific

leaders avoid using customary land for relocations because compulsory acquisition is not a common practice (Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, interview, 04.11.2019); it is difficult to identify traditional owners (Fitzpatrick, 2013); and trading of traditional land has historically been a source of tension (Barnett, 2012; McDonnell, 2021). Hence, they use traditional dialogue and negotiation strategies, and where possible encourage communities to identify suitable sites within customary or freehold land (Charan et al., 2018; Gharbaoui & Blocher, 2016). This may entail purchasing unused land, intermarriages, and encouraging people in situations of protracted displacement to accept their temporary residence as their home (i.e., the second home approach) (Barnabas Bago, interview, 14.11.2022; McDonnell, 2021; MCCAMGEEDM Representative, interview 28.03.2019; Ursula Rakova, Brisbane, 25.05.2018).

These local/national planned relocation guidelines vary slightly in content. Fiji endorses a regional approach. The guidelines note a regional approach may be necessary given the high probability of potential international movements and the need to integrate foreigners (see GoF, 2018, p. 9). Yet, officials insist they "assume citizenship" and hence, refer to internal relocation (Field Notes, 10.08.2019; Nazhat Shameem Khan, interview, 26.07.2019). The second home approach is a community practice only evident in the Carteret Islands, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. However, it is not incorporated in their planned relocation guidelines because the approach is specific to one community in all countries. New Zealand's managed retreat policy will look different to those from the Pacific because it has a different land-use law (GoNZ, 2022; Nathan Ross, interview, 22.01.2020).

Nevertheless, they are emerging as place-based 'models.' IOM, IDMC, NRC, PDD, and UNHCR experts labelled Fiji's planned relocation guidelines as a monumental, well-written, holistic, and commendable document (Atle Solberg, interview, 09.12.2019; Bina Desai, interview, 07.06.2019; Erica Bower, interview, 10.12.2018; GP20 Initiative, 2020; Mariam Traore Chazalnoel, interview, 06.12.2018; Nina Birkeland, interview, 05.07.2019). The Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights (HR) of IDPs referred to them as a 'good practice' (Cecelia Jiminez-Darmary, interview, 09.08.2019). It is the first national policy on facilitating planned relocation in response to environmental stressors, is closely aligned with international protection and development norms, and was arguably developed in a relatively consultative process. Some professionals claim relocations in Fiji occurred in "a relatively well-managed manner" due to extensive planning, adequate funding, and community engagement (Huckstep & Clemens, 2023, p. 103). At the same time, ANU, IOM, Oxfam Vanuatu, PDD, and PIFS

professionals labelled Vanuatu's policy as a progressive, successful, and good national approach that can be a potential blueprint for the region (Elizabeth Ferris, interview, 23.07.2019; Huckstep & Clemens, 2023; Sabira Coelho, interview, 26.09.2019; Scott Hook, interview, 01.11.2019; Siobhan McDonnell, Melbourne, 12.04.2019; Willy Missack, interview, 16.05.2019). It recognises disasters as both natural *and* anthropogenic phenomena and arguably reduces forced evictions. The Solomon Islands' planned relocation guidelines draw inspiration from the Fijian and Ni-Vanuatu policies: the former inspired the structure (specifically the various stages and obligations of relevant agencies), whereas the latter shaped the importance of traditional knowledge and minimising forced evictions through the relocation process (Rebecca Monson, interview, 19.05.2023). Some experts argue the Lilisiana and Choiseul relocation schemes in the Solomon Islands could serve as 'models' for the rest of the Pacific (see Burkett, 2015; Monson & Foukona, 2014). Despite attempts to promulgate the Carteret Integrated Relocation Programme as a 'model' by Tulele Peisa, it has not fully received this status (Bronen, 2014; Rakova, 2012; Ursula Rakova, Brisbane, 25.05.2018). Australia is reviewing Pacific schemes and guidelines for guidance in developing its national relocation strategy while New Zealand is looking at Australia and the US for guidance in drafting a managed retreat policy (Field Notes, 30.05.2023; GoNZ, 2022; Nathan Ross, interview, 22.01.2020). The Carteret Islands, Fiji, and Vanuatu's guidelines and the Solomon Islands' schemes are circulated as 'models' through journal articles, background papers, submissions, and proposals to COP to UNFCCC, PIFS Sub-Committee on Regional Security, and UNHRC, and during the Fifth Internal Displacement Dialogue, High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, regional stakeholder meetings, and various other events (see Appendix B) (Burkett, 2015; Edwards, 2013; IOM, 2018b; Monson & Foukona, 2014; PCCMHS Programme, 2019; PDD, 2019).

Thus, UN agencies, regional organisations, and research institutes often endorse planned relocation as a solution for internal environmental displacement management in the Pacific. More specifically, Guiding Principles, World Bank projects, Peninsula Principles, Toolbox on Planned Relocations, and the Carteret Islands, Fiji, and Vanuatu's national policies as well as Solomon Islands' schemes are portrayed as 'models.' However, many governments have yet to implement the Guiding Principles because ongoing crises prevent them from meeting their obligations towards internally displaced persons (Orchard, 2010). State practice indicates post-disaster resettlements are difficult due to the lack of comprehensive planning and funding (Arenas & Oliver-Smith, 2017; Chun, 2015), intergenerational effects (Sanjula Weerasinghe,

interview, 29.07.2019), and increased dependency on international and government assistance (EACH-FOR, 2009). Additionally, resettled families return to risk-prone areas due to tensions with host communities and attachments to ancestral land (Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017; Dun, 2011). Internationally resettled communities had imperfect information about their new homes and faced ongoing challenges associated with their identity, access to traditional farming and fishing grounds, and insecurity over land titles (FCOSS Representative, interview, 19.11.2019; Ferris, 2011; McAdam, 2014; Tammy Tabe, virtual, 21.01.2021). The World Bank's projects are criticised for a range of reasons, including forcibly resettling communities (Connell, 2013); homogenising individual needs and capacities (UNHCR et al., 2014); lowering living standards by moving communities away from their main sources of income and inducing some households to take loans to partially fund their relocation (Chun, 2015); insufficiently compensating resettled households (Cernea, 1997; Cernea & Mundial, 1993; van Ackern, 2015; Wilmsen et al., 2011); and inadequately monitoring and evaluating livelihood projects (Tilt et al., 2009).

Contrastingly, Fiji and Vanuatu's guidelines omit information about land acquirement and development packages, which is crucial for restoring displaced persons' livelihoods (McDonnell, 2021). They purportedly lack community ownership because they were developed in a non-consultative manner: geographically distant communities and some international experts were not consulted during the policy formulation process (Gabor Sasvari, interview, 17.10.2019; Frances Namoumou, interview, 31.10.2019; Genevieve Jiva, interview, 21.11.2019; CCID Representative, interview, 12.04.2019). The Carteret Islands' programme is not endorsed by the Papua New Guinea government. Further, the Carteret Islands, Fiji, and Vanuatu's planned relocation guidelines adopt different scalar approaches. Fiji adopts a regional approach based on regional norms, but there is currently no regional policy on cross-border migration. Vanuatu employs a national approach while the Carteret Islands uses a local approach.

4.4 Chapter Summary

The chapter described the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage using largely existing scholarship. It showed that the assemblage is a "patchwork" of numerous international organisations, instruments, and venues that are held together by the logic of optimism (Betts & Lainz, 2017; OHCHR Representative, interview, 06.08.2019; Warner, 2010). It is made up of three smaller policy assemblages: humanitarian protection

measures, labour migration policies, and planned relocation guidelines. Each assemblage constituted specific actors, documents, and sites bound by a distinct rationale and reinforced by certain events, but their level of coherence varied. Humanitarian protection appears highly incoherent because optimists disagree significantly on measures to address the protection gap. Labour migration seems semi-coherent because optimists accept that the benefits of existing programmes can build adaptive capacities and resilience but have different ideas about how they can be amended, expanded and aligned to manage the phenomenon. Planned relocation appears highly coherent because optimists already accepted it as an internal displacement management 'model.' These variations in coherence give the environmental mobility assemblage a complex logic, which can only be understood by studying its constitutive elements.

In addition, it showed that to varying extents in different policy sites and scales, international organisations and professional experts are increasingly endorsing humanitarian protection, labour migration and planned relocation as viable strategies for managing environmental mobility. Some Pacific governments have chosen to adopt these recommendations to produce distinct policies. Meanwhile, other authorities have chosen not to join the bandwagon, avoiding or resisting pressures to conform to these emerging 'models.' This behaviour jars with the fact that they were *not* designed to manage environmental mobility, have had undesirable outcomes, and new policies lacked community engagement and have yet to be implemented, which begs questions about their origins, production and viability.

The preceding chapters follow the mobility and institutionalisation of parts and whole of the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage. By doing so, they explain how and why some of its elements are emerging as 'models' but not others.

Chapter 5: Activating Events

5.1 Introduction

The chapter argues that key activating events mobilised optimists to conform to certain environmental migration and displacement management 'models.' Activating events are windows of opportunity that destabilise, refashion, remobilise, and re-institutionalise policy assemblages (Deng, 2004; Kingdon, 2011). Put differently, they raise awareness of deficiencies in the status quo, prompt research on the phenomenon, and propel a search for alternative policy options. Activating events can be perceived or actual, geographically or symbolically proximate, and sudden or recurring. An event in one policy domain can induce similar changes in another (Farely et al., 2007; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Pralle, 2009). They prompt different actors into action in different ways. An event galvanises media outlets to use figures of speech, sensationalist headlines, alarmist figures, and dramatic images to amplify the issue. In turn, professional experts intensely debate, refine, and re-establish ideological consensus on the phenomenon and produce new 'scientific' knowledge on policy alternatives (Birkland, 1998; Farely et al., 2007; Fligstein, 2001; Gamlen, 2014a; Haas, 2015). Institutional entrepreneurs and policymakers use the latter to model their ways of thinking and acting and boost or salvage their reputation (Boin et al., 2009; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, such occurrences cannot affect policy change by themselves because they are short-lived (Eckersley & Lakoma, 2022). Relevant actors must be able to identify, manipulate, and exploit them. Before the policy opening, actors must develop a simple explanation of the phenomenon in addition to easily modifiable policy proposals and strategies to spread and normalise their ideas (Pralle, 2009; Prater & Lindell, 2000). By doing so, they maximise the short event by disseminating and anchoring policy preferences. Sometimes, recurring or multiple events are required to standardise certain types of solutions into 'best practices,' especially if the domain has impermeable institutional boundaries.

Activating events *momentarily* provide insights into the coherence and institutionalisation of assemblages. In a particular time-space, an event reveals the ideological and political acceptance of new rules and practices. In a different time-space, it shows the disintegration of the same assemblage, reconstruction of a new form that elusively resembles the original 'model,' and re-standardisation of it as a norm for a different issue area. In this way, policy assemblages are in a constant state of making.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 explains the creation, dissemination, and impact of the perceived environmental/climate refugee crisis on knowledge and policy production at the global level. Section 5.3 discusses the role of knowledge jolts in enabling and constraining the flow of humanitarian approaches and ideologically sanctioning development-friendly solutions at the global level. It also describes ways in which the outputs of recent knowledge jolts guided policy processes in the Pacific. Section 5.4 elucidates how optimists capitalised on political events to institutionalise either whole or parts of the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage. Section 5.5 focuses on the effect of real shocks on the spread, consideration, and adoption of planned relocation schemes, labour migration programmes, and humanitarian protection measures across the Pacific. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes the chapter by highlighting that a series of activating events revealed moments in un/successfully de/constructing, (im)mobilising, and to varying levels de/institutionalising the three emerging 'best practices' that constitute the environmental mobility management assemblage.

5.2 Perceived Environmental/Climate Refugee Crisis

The perceived environmental/climate refugee crisis shaped global knowledge production. It caused an ideological shock, mobilising human mobility optimists to better understand the environment-population movement nexus, and identify policy alternatives. The environmental/climate refugee discourse emanates from Malthusian arguments (see Castles, 2002; Doran, 2011; McNamara, 2006; Saunders, 2000): rapid population growth will deplete the resource base, leading to food shortages and poverty. Expanding food production will destroy the environment, causing competition for scarce resources, instability, and population displacements. Thus, environmental refugee movements are the result of unsustainable practices. Environmental agencies and experts recycled these Malthusian arguments, ultimately paving the way for the emergence of the perceived climate refugee crisis. This section describes how the environmental refugee crisis was revived, reconstructed, and remobilised into the so-called climate refugee crisis, compelling optimists to engage in intense debates, refine their ideas, and re-establish consensus on environmental migration and displacement. Despite the long history of the environmental refugee crisis discourse, the section focuses on developments from the 1980s onwards because this is when Pacific stakeholders began engaging in the issue area.

In the 1980s, environmental agencies and experts remobilised the environmental refugee crisis to semi-anchor refugee movements in the environment-development nexus. The nexus focuses on how unsustainable practices degrade the land and how environmental stressors hinder development. In the nexus, forced population movements are a cause of the former and a consequence of the latter. The mass internal environmental displacement caused by political and technological disasters in Europe shaped the perceived crisis. The Soviet Union's collapse and the Chernobyl disaster internally displaced 116,000 people, igniting fears amongst Norwegian authorities that it would spill over into their territory, causing regional stability and reversing progress (Meybatyan, 2014). NRC's Nina Birkeland (interview, 05.05.2019) shared, "At the time, the Soviet Union was collapsing. Norway has borders with it. They both had big nuclear power plants [and] big nuclear-run military and naval bases. In the late 1980s, Norway was very concerned a lot of people would flee the former Soviet Union because of technological disasters". The fear of mass refugee movements galvanised the environment community to research the causal relationship between environmental stressors and refugee movements.

The UNEP-commissioned study established causality, defined the environmental refugee category, and used anecdotes to substantiate the crisis, albeit unsuccessfully. El-Hinnawi (1985) argued natural disasters and land degradation adversely impacted quality of life or threatened survival, compelling people to flee their homes. However, their practices created environmental, socioeconomic, and cultural problems thereby causing conflict in countries of refuge. He labelled affected persons as environmental refugees, a broad category encompassing individuals displaced temporarily or permanently within or across borders by natural or anthropogenic phenomena, and who have emigrated for better livelihoods. Put differently, the category constituted recognised refugees, international migrants, and IDPs, albeit each has a distinct definition (Westing, 1992). Anecdotes from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Latin America highlighted the number of people affected by environmental stressors, not forced to leave their homes. The study raised awareness of the environmental refugee crisis, but the extent of the phenomenon was unclear.

Consequently, environmental experts used alarmist displacement statistics ranging from 1 to 50 million to substantiate the crisis. UNEP calculated that 50 million people could be displaced by environmental stressors while the World Watch Institute estimated it to be 10 million (Jacobson, 1988; Tolba, 1989). The Word Commission on Environment and Development noted that 10 million Africans fled their homes in response to famine whereas 1 million Haitians sought

refuge in neighbouring countries due to environmental degradation in the 1980s (WCED, 1987). The sources of these figures and the methodology used to calculate them were unclear. Nevertheless, the figures mobilised the international media to promulgate the environmental refugee crisis discourse. The St Petersburg Times (1988, cited in McNamara, 2006) used sensationalist and emotive language to frame displaced persons as victims of nature, including disasters. In this way, environmental agencies, experts, and media conflated the role of environmental factors in motivating refugee movements.

However, the crisis helped semi-anchor refugee movements onto the environment-development agenda. The fear of mass displacement, anecdotes, alarmist statistics, and sensationalist headlines depicted the environmental refugee crisis as one of the pressing security issues of the 20th century that required development-friendly solutions. The famous Our Common Future report noted,

> "Poverty, injustice, environmental degradation and conflict interact in complex and potent ways. One manifestation of growing concern to the international community is the phenomenon of environmental refugees. The immediate cause of any mass movement of refugees may appear to be political upheaval and military violence. But the underlying causes often include the deterioration of the natural resource base and its capacity to support the population" (WCED, 1987, p. 187).

At the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, world leaders agreed to formulate drought preparedness and relief schemes, including self-help strategies to minimise the flow of environmental refugee movements and thus contain it within discrete regions (UNCED, 1992). Refugee movements failed to find institutional purchase in the development domain but featured in programmes on combatting desertification and drought. The programmes crystallised into rules for addressing environmental degradation under Principle 12 of the 1992 Rio Declaration (UNGA, 1992). The Declaration also gave birth to the UNFCCC, UNDRR, and United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) – as discussed throughout the thesis, the climate change and disaster risk reduction domains have been instrumental in semi-institutionalising the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage.

The environmental refugee crisis morphed into the *climate* refugee crisis Since the 1990s, environmental scientists – including climate change experts – frequently recycled the discourse

to raise awareness about the implications of uncontrollable fossil fuel consumption. Experts did not redefine the category but produced more alarming displacement estimates ranging from 50,000,000 to 1,000,000,000. Myers (1993, 2002) and Myers and Kent (1995) created a simplistic causal relationship between climate change and cross-border displacement, arguing that sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and droughts could displace between 150 and 200 million people by 2050. By doing so, "he set up a big debate and a super powerful narrative about climate refugees" (Koko Warner, interview, 22.08.2019). The IPCC endorsed the notion of a climate refugee crisis (discussed further below), which was picked up and circulated by non-governmental organisations, Pacific leaders, and media outlets (Brown, 2008; IPCC, 1992, 1996). Christian Aid, Earth Justice Foundation, Friends of Earth, and Global Humanitarian Forum published reports, recycling alarmist statistics to further bolster the discourse of mass climate displacement (Baird et al., 2007; EJF, 2009; FoE, 2005; GHF, 2009; IFRC, 2001). As depicted in Figure 5.1, some organisations such as the World Wildlife Fund used the 'climate refugee' label to promote their efforts in addressing the so-called crisis, further disseminating the discourse. Pacific leaders dispersed the island submersion narrative that fuelled the so-called crisis. For instance, the President of Palau said, "When oceans rise, islands are in peril … Some islands will simply suffer catastrophic damage. The rapid submersion of our island masses will cause untold grief for our nation …" (UNGA, 1997, p. 6-7). The Solomon Islands mentioned anthropogenic sea-level rise has "claimed" five islands and severely eroded six others while Papua New Guinea labelled its people as "climate refugees" (UNGA, 2016a, p. 13; 2016b, p. 20). Media outlets sensationalised the vulnerabilities of Pacific Island countries: they described the atoll nations of Kiribati, Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu as sinking or disappearing islands and labelled Carteret Islanders, the Teitiota family, a Tuvaluan household, and the Tegua community as the world's first climate refugees (Klafehn, 2016; McAdam, 2015; McNamara, 2007; Rakova, 2012; Roy, 2019; Ursula Rakova, Brisbane, 25.05.2018). In this way, an externally conceived crisis arrived in the Pacific.

The spread of the climate refugee crisis had three implications. First, it raised awareness of the environmental migration and displacement issue but mobilised refugee protection as the only viable solution. The latter created "moral panic in the Western world" (John Campbell, interview, 30.10.2019). Authorities feared environmental stressors would open floodgates, compelling them to accept a new category of displaced persons, which would have significant financial, political, and social consequences. Second, the crisis revealed a knowledge gap. The wide-ranging estimates of the phenomenon "meant that we had no idea" how climate change

impacted population movements and how both interacted to create new or exacerbate existing vulnerabilities, especially since the debate was disconnected from ground realities (Ezekiel Simperingham, interview, 12.08.2019). Third and relatedly, it exposed a protection void – restrictive border controls limit legal avenues for people displaced by environmental pressures. NRC's Nina Birkeland (interview, 05.07.2019) explained:

> "As it became more difficult in many countries to get asylum, it became clear people have different avenues … For example, North Kenya had people coming from Somalia, who had moved mostly [due to] conflict but also droughts and floods. These people had different avenues for the future. Because if it's for conflict, you have the right to refugee status and resettlement whereas if you're classified as a flood [then there are no protections]. And as there are more restrictions on people's movements, this pops up. In the past, a lot of this wasn't visible because people could migrate easily. So, there wasn't a clear understanding of forced and voluntary migration."

This posed questions about affected persons' legal entitlements, specifically: "are we dealing with a new type of refugee? Are we dealing with people who have always moved but never described them this way? Who exactly are we talking about because we don't have migration categories or visas to account for these people? So, how do we even know who we mean?" (Jane McAdam, interview, 06.05.2019). The perceived climate refugee crisis prompted human mobility optimists to research the relationship between environmental stressors and population movements and identify policy alternatives (see Chapters 6, 7, and 8).

Figure 5.1: The World Wildlife Fund's Montage of Climate Refugees (Robie, 2017).



5.3 Knowledge Jolts

Knowledge jolts guided policy production, dissemination, and adoption at all levels. They ideologically and politically sanctioned certain policies as appropriate for regulating environmental migration and displacement. The IPCC is the leading scientific authority on climate adaptation and mitigation. It does not generate new climate science, but collates, reviews, and summarises existing research as assessments and special reports. As illustrated in Figure 5.2, the IPCC experts share the documents with member states, which are reviewed, deliberated upon and revised before publication. Because the reports are negotiated and most

vulnerable states are not always present in the room, the IPCC has been criticised for downplaying the gravity of the situation (Field Notes, 02.08.2019). Nevertheless, the IPCC reports act as technical ammunition that jolt professional experts and policymakers into action in different ways. The early documents catastrophised environmental migration and displacement, prompting optimists to engage in the process of science-making through which they shaped certain approaches for managing the phenomenon. They shifted the human mobility discourse from a crisis to an opportunity, which jolted Pacific organisations and policymakers into action. They used IPCC reports to advocate greater climate ambition and rationalise regional and domestic policy developments. This section elucidates how IPCC reports helped immobilise refugee protection and institutionalise planned relocation and labour migration as 'effective practices' in the Pacific. As alluded to above, early IPCC reports promulgated the environmental/climate refugee crisis. Despite recognising that other factors interact with climate change to induce population movements, the first assessment report noted that shoreline erosion, coastal inundation, and droughts may displace "millions, and retreat could create "refugee problems" (IPCC, 1992, p. 103-135). Interestingly, large-scale resettlement was also framed as a problem because it causes psychological and social strains, thereby adversely impacting the health of displaced populations. However, these statements "went a little unnoticed for a long time" by optimists (Ezekiel Simperingham, interview, 12.08.2019). The second IPCC report adopted Myers' conceptualisation of the phenomenon, stating that climate change will produce an additional 150 million environmental refugees, which will trigger ethnic and international conflicts (IPCC, 1996). Drawing from the World Bank's experiences, it depicted resettlement schemes as a national adaptation strategy. This seemed to grab the attention of some optimists: IOM, RPG, and UNHCR (UNHCR et al., 1996) co-convened an International Symposium in Geneva to understand the intricate relationship between environmental stressors and population movements. At the event, the environmental refugee discourse was immobilised, mass migration was problematised, and resettlement was appropriated as a solution for international displacement. The third IPCC report sustained the discourse on environmental refugees heightening violence and instability, claiming that New Zealand may have to admit displaced Pacific Islanders. IPCC (2001) abandoned the alarmist statistics, contorted labour migration into 'forced relocation for employment' as a benefit of global warming and called for greater research on environmental migration and displacement, including its effects on origin and destination communities. The early reports endorsed relocation schemes as an avenue for building adaptive capacities. However, IPCC's securitisation of the issue prompted migration experts to produce knowledge that critically

examined its use of the environmental/climate refugee crisis discourse and crude calculations and reframed environmental stressors as one driver of population movements (Black, 2001; Castles, 2002; Jane McAdam, interview, 06.05.2019; Tacoli, 2009).

By the fourth report, the IPCC abandoned the environmental/climate refugee crisis discourse. This is because optimists began feeding their research findings into the climate science-making processes – they published in peer-reviewed journals that experts use to formulate adaptation solutions (Koko Warner, interview, 02.08.2019). Drawing from an emerging body of scholarship, it framed international seasonal migration as a well-known livelihood adaptation strategy whereby remittances aid environmentally stressed households in purchasing basic goods (IPCC, 2007). The frame was substantiated using resettlement examples from Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu, and the Solomon Islands. By blurring the boundaries between labour migration and planned relocation, the IPCC validated both as adaptation solutions. This helped optimists to remove climate refugee discourse (discussed below) from the climate adaptation agenda and recontextualise the development-friendly approaches as alternative feasible solutions (Koko Warner, interview, 02.08.2019). The latter also found an empirical foothold in the sixth report (Cissé et al., 2022).

The recent assessment and special reports depict displacement and forced migration as emerging risks: the unfettered rise in temperature will force people to leave their homes, causing uncontrolled population growth in some areas that could heighten competition over scarce resources and frontline services, weaken social cohesion, and instigate ethnic tensions (Cissé et al., 2022; IPCC, 2018, 2019a,). IPCC has continued to promote development-friendly approaches but does not blur the distinction between the two solutions as a result of improved data sources and acknowledges their shortcomings and implementation challenges. This is because optimists are members of the climate change institutional structure, directly shaping the problem and solutions. For example, Francois Gemenne helped prepare the Sixth Assessment Report; Koko Warner drafted the 2019 Special Report on Climate Change and Land; and the Pacific Centre for Environment and Sustainable Development's Tammy Tabe contributed to the 2019 Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere (Elisabeth Holland, interview, 21.11.2019; Field Notes, 02.08.2019; Cissé et al., 2022). In this way, optimists elevated the dire consequences of environmental displacement and provided solutions they deemed appropriate for managing the phenomenon in certain contexts (i.e., planned relocation and labour migration).

Pacific actors used the IPCC reports in several ways. First, leaders from atoll nations used them to lobby for greater climate ambition by pressuring Western states to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and assist vulnerable communities. At the 24th COP to UNFCCC in Katowice, the Maldives delegate waved the 2018 Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 Degrees, preaching that "if you invest in people to adapt, we can stop the [climate] migration" (Field Notes, 05.12.2018). The representative from the Federated States of Micronesia claimed, "according to the 5th Assessment Report, human-caused climate change is leading to sea-level rise, more frequent and more intense typhoons and severe droughts. A small increase in sea level would be a catastrophe for the atolls of Micronesia" (UNGA, 2014, p. 11). The Tuvalu delegate said, "as already established by IPCC unless the global community steps up its actions to significantly lower greenhouse gas emissions, SIDS like Tuvalu will disappear completely within the next 30 to 50 years – disappear completely" (UNGA, 2018a, p. 24; UNGA, 2019). The impact of such global efforts on climate ambition is unclear but it shaped the global migration agenda.

Second, Pacific organisations employed the reports to rationalise preparing for a high-mobility future. The 2019 IPCC's Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere guided the formulation of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent (Pacific 2050 Strategy, 2022). It aims to secure Pacific Islanders' future by ensuring they can remain in their ancestral homelands as long as possible. Put differently, relocation and migration are only measures of last resort. However, the 2019 Special Report highlighted atoll nations will lose sovereign space, and thus the idea of not moving is becoming less plausible. Pacific leaders responded by asking PIFS to develop the 2050 Strategy, including building scenario models. PIFS' Timothy Bryar (interview, 17.10.2019) explained at length that:

> "The leaders agreed this year [2019] that they want to develop a 2050 strategy in the context of security and the future. The ideal is having people stay in the Ocean continent that's prosperous and healthy but in the context of the IPCC report, it's becoming less plausible by the day unless some pretty drastic measures are put in place … The leaders asked us to build scenarios. To be provocative, the best-case scenario is becoming less plausible while more plausible is the Greg Colton and Kevin Rudd scenarios. Colton raises the point that perhaps Tuvalu and Kiribati now need to consider becoming Compact States in Australia like Northern Countries. Rudd said, 'What are you doing government? Sea-level rise is a real issue in the Pacific. We should give them citizenship and in return take

> their economic exclusive zones.' [The latter] caused much distaste amongst Pacific Island Countries. However, to be provocative, those two scenarios will become more plausible the less we deal with climate change. I see our future scenarios revolving around dependency and vulnerability … And we shouldn't shy away from it. I think the Cook Islands' Deputy Prime Minister said in New York, 'We're hoping for the best but planning for 1.5 degree future. We're currently on track for 3 degrees, so what's the best future we can hope for?' … After I read the IPCC report, I emailed the top two bosses immediately and said, 'Our 2050 thinking may need to include a 5/10-year plan because at 1.5 degrees all the coral will die and that's our best-case scenario. If we want to have our best chance, we need to do something pretty urgent on climate mitigation.' … In the 2050 Strategy, I see climate migration becoming increasingly important. I think it'll eventually become its own priority ..."

At the time of data collection, the 2050 Strategy was in the planning stage. Hence, it is unclear how the human mobility language appeared in the text. Nevertheless, it promotes anchoring the protection of Pacific Islanders who have been displaced or relocated and are migrating in response to environmental stressors in global and regional protocols (Pacific 2050 Strategy, 2022). Optimists tapped into this window of opportunity to formulate a regional framework on climate mobility. It seeks to operationalise the 2050 Strategy by providing a pathway to deliver on the 2050 Strategy's enhanced resilience and wellbeing goal (see PRFCM, 2022, 2023).

Third, Pacific policymakers validated domestic action using climate science. For Kiribati, the Fourth Assessment Report demonstrated the international community was not concerned about the I-Kiribati people's survival and future (Anote Tong, Melbourne, 22.10.2018). Consequently, the previous administration began exploring alternative initiatives such as land reclamation and external migration pathways. For Fiji, IPCC-endorsed definitions shaped the relocation guidelines. The IPCC reframed relocation as a measure of last resort – that is, "it starts if adaptation fails" – and does not recognise certain groups as vulnerable (Cosmin Corendea, interview, 10.08.2019). Hence, the guidelines portray resettlement as a displacement prevention strategy and do not list lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex persons as vulnerable, albeit the Standard Operating Procedures acknowledge them as key stakeholders (GoF, 2018, 2023). Therefore, Pacific policymakers quickly revived, revised, and recontextualised existing development-friendly approaches to regulate environmental migration and displacement by grounding their decisions in climate science.

Figure 5.2: IPCC Experts Presenting the Special Report on Climate Change and Land to Member States in Geneva, Switzerland (Author, 2019).

5.4 Political Events

International conferences, consultations, and meetings influenced global and regional policy adoption. They are pre-determined occurrences where world leaders congregate to negotiate new or reinforce existing rules, procedures, and practices, and non-state actors form new identities. Put differently, international organisations, professional experts, and policymakers know when and where political events will occur and what their overarching agenda is. This information helps them devise a plan for anchoring their pet projects on the agenda (elaborated in Chapters 6 and 7). Tapping into these policy windows often requires political support. Global political events prompted optimists to construct, transfer, and standardise the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage while regional occurrences instituted different development-friendly approaches as effective measures across the Pacific. This section unpacks how certain political events institutionalised development-friendly and/or humanitarian assemblages, paving the way for the emergence of a governance form.

5.4.1 Global Critical Junctures

Numerous global political events served as critical junctures for the formation, mobility, and institutionalisation of the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage.

The 2006 Meeting on Protecting and Resettling Climate Refugees in Male mobilised the notion of amending, expanding, and extending conventional refugee protection to *all* individuals displaced by climate change (Biermann & Boas, 2008). The Maldives, a low-lying state witnessing climate adversities akin to Pacific atoll nations, proposed to broaden the definition of environmental refugee to include IDPs because national authorities cannot always protect and assist those forced to flee their homes but who remain in the country (Docherty & Giannini, 2009; Duygulu, 2011). The limitations of the existing refugee protection assemblage, political infeasibility, and implementation challenges prompted a small group of professional experts to suggest the formation of a standalone framework (Biermann & Boas, 2010, 2017; Falstrom, 2002; Prieur, 2010). As explained in Chapter 4, they were divided on whether it should be grounded in one or multiple extant international binding norms and on the need for a separate institution for its implementation. In addition, their policy preference did not align with the dominant view of using development-friendly approaches to manage the phenomenon. Nonetheless, the mobility of refugee protection and a standalone protection framework elevated the need for multilateral cooperation on environmental migration and displacement management (Duygulu, 2011; McNamara, 2006).

The 14th COP to UNFCCC in Poznan compelled optimists to halt the institutionalisation of climate refugee protection. In 2008, the international community was debating the rules for climate change governance. Bangladesh capitalised on the opportunity – it placed climate refugees onto the agenda, proposing to "offer financial compensation to climate change victims and *refugees*" (AWG-LCA 3, 2008, p. 9, emphasis added; AWG-LCA 6, 2009; NRC, 2009). The primary data does not explain Bangladesh's motivations for setting the agenda, but it may be attributable to three factors. First, government representatives participated in the 2006 Meeting, exposing them to the notion of climate refugee protection (Biermann & Boas, 2008). Second, coastal communities are highly susceptible to internal climate displacement risks (Saleemul Huq, interview, 15.07.2019). Third, the state hosts Rohingya refugees who reside in disaster-prone zones and whose unsustainable livelihood practices are aggravating environmental degradation (Ezekiel Simperingham, interview, 12.08.2019; Shahidul Haque, Geneva, 14.05.2019). The 'climate refugee' language shocked the US: the representative baulked at including 'climate refugees' in the negotiating text, prompting the decision-making body to search for an alternate wording (Warner, 2011). Optimists quickly offered 'displacement' to describe the problem and 'relocation' and 'migration' for solutions (IASC, 2009). By doing so, they avoided strategic inconsistencies (Lu et al., 2020): institutionalising

climate refugee protection in the UNFCCC could threaten the highly fragile refugee protection assemblage as Western states would be able to negotiate their way out of existing burden-sharing commitments.

The 16th COP to UNFCCC in Cancun pushed optimists to anchor development-friendly solutions onto the climate change agenda. In 2010, world leaders were finalising the adaptation rulebook. The senior management of human mobility institutions collectively agreed governments must formulate strategies for regulating the pressing issue of environment-induced population movements. University of Bern's Walter Kalin (interview, 24.07.2019) shared:

> "During the time, as a Representative of the Secretary General on IDPs, I was working with IOM's William Swing and UNHCR's Antonio Guterres. We thought that displacement and migration in the context of climate change and disasters would become more important and that governments negotiating climate change agreements should be aware of the topic and should integrate it into their work. That's why we made submissions to the UNFCCC, and we were on panels at the COPs."

The technical submissions, panel discussions, and corridor conversations conveyed three interrelated messages: the environmental/climate refugee category has no legal basis; resettlement and labour migration can improve the adaptive capacities of affected communities; and there is a need for better understanding of the scale, scope, and nature of the phenomenon (Guterres, 2009; IASC, 2008, 2009; IOM et al., 2009; Kalin, 2009; Swing, 2009; UNHCR, 2008, 2009). Hall (2016 p. 40) claims that optimists "drafted the text of paragraph 14(f) [of the Cancun Adaptation Framework". However, a small group of states retained the issue on the agenda and institutionalised planned relocation and migration as climate displacement management norms. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) proposed language on the "need for initiatives to prepare communities for relocation" (AWG-LCA 8, 2009, p. 19) while Bolivia offered wording on the need to establish an international mechanism to facilitate the relocation of displaced persons (AWG-LCA 10, 2010). The technical body adopted Ghana's framing that read as "measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation related to national, regional and international climate change-induced displacement, migration and planned relocation" (AWG-LCA 10, 2010, p. 43). The framing threatened the process of standardisation: it implied establishing new obligations to manage cross-border movements, which developed states would have promptly negotiated out of the text. As a result, it was

revised to “measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation about climate change-induced displacement, migration and planned relocation” at all levels (CAF, 2010, p. 5). In this way, development-friendly solutions became embedded in the 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework.

The 2010 Cancun Adaptation was central to the semi-standardisation of the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage (see Figure 5.3). It signified the international recognition of the issue, enabling collaboration between traditional and non-traditional actors: “this was the first time, the international community recognised human mobility as an issue linked to climate change but also unpacked the statement from IPCC in the 1990s. It’s not just migration – it’s a typology, migration, displacement and relocation. It invited cooperation and information sharing on how to address those impacts” (Ezekiel Simperingham, interview, 12.08.2019). More specifically, optimists banded together to form policy structures, researching each type of population movement and reconstructing some into workable solutions while others into problems. Thus, the Framework was the first institutional base for the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage.

Figure 5.3: The Impact of the 16th COP to UNFCCC on Global Environmental Migration and Displacement Governance (Author, 2019).

The 2011 Ministerial Meeting in Geneva generated small but sufficient political impetus to establish an institution dedicated to the issue area. The landmark occasion commemorated the anniversaries of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1961 Statelessness Convention. UNHCR capitalised on the opportunity by placing the issue of legal protection void for persons internationally displaced by ecological disruptions onto the event's agenda (Erica Bower, interview, 10.12.2018). The senior management argued the agency was not looking to expand its responsibilities, revise international refugee protection, and create a new legal instrument but was seeking innovative ideas, approaches, collaborations, and partnerships to preserve the human rights of communities susceptible to statelessness (Guterres, 2008, 2009, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). Yet, the Meeting's background paper questioned the need for a "global guiding framework or instrument" for the protection of people falling outside of the refugee system (UNHCR, 2011a, p. 4). Some staff members and governments perceived the issue to be outside of the organisation's mandate, and thus the act as a way of broadening its mandate (Hall, 2013,

2015; Kalin, 2015; McAdam, 2014). As a compromise, Norway and Switzerland pledged to cooperate with interested state and non-state actors to develop a coherent and consistent approach to understand and address the protection needs of individuals forced to flee their homelands in response to environmental stressors (Jane McAdam, interview, 06.05.2019; UNHCR, 2011b). This led to the establishment of the Nansen Initiative/PDD, the institutional home for environmental migration and displacement where development-friendly assemblages were deterritorialised and birthed the humanitarian assemblage.

The period from 2015 to 2018 was instrumental in institutionalising development-friendly assemblages and for the emergence of the humanitarian assemblage in domains beyond climate change. The international community was renegotiating the regulatory procedures and practices for three issue areas – climate change, disaster risk reduction, and migration and refugee movements. In discussing institutional changes, Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat (interview, 25.01.2019) revealed the Nansen Initiative took advantage of the policy windows to ground some of their policy preferences institutionally:

> "I think what changed was the addition of framing and feeding into other international [policy] processes. The idea wasn't initially there … We had something to contribute. We're states. States are there [negotiating the agreements] and can do that [feed policy messages]. You don't miss these opportunities ... Imagine you're a state leading the [policy] process on displacement, climate change and disasters. At the same time, you're participating in the negotiations on the Sendai Framework. Wouldn't it seem strange not to address the issue in that aspect of your work … [and] why would you wait until then [the next negotiations] when you could make sure your issues are addressed now? For me, it's a new opportunity …"

The Nansen Initiative facilitated Regional Consultative Processes and commissioned research to identify existing regulatory practices. The information was amalgamated, standardised, and packaged into the Nansen Protection Agenda (2015) that promotes formulating planned relocation guidelines, labour migration policies, and humanitarian protection measures to manage environmental migration and displacement whilst fostering development and safeguarding the human rights of affected persons. As soon as policy windows opened, members of the Nansen Initiative's Steering and Advisory Committees were galvanised to reframe, disseminate, and anchor the policy messages onto the environment and human mobility agendas.

In the environment domain, optimists focused on integrating development-friendly solutions in the two agendas. At the 21st COP to UNFCCC in Paris, the international community was finalising an agreement to combat climate change and adapt to its impacts. Leading up to the event, optimists not only shared their policy preferences with the Warsaw International Mechanism but lobbied world leaders to create a formal expert structure on climate displacement and a coordination mechanism to assist affected persons (AGCCHM, 2014c, 2014d, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c; GoK, 2013; Senior Researcher, interview, 21.06.2019; PIFS, 2016; Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019). While the event did not further institutionalise the emerging 'best practices,' it did culminate in the creation of the Taskforce on Displacement, constituting specialists who endorse development-friendly and humanitarian approaches (Paris Agreement, 2015; UNFCCC, 2016). Similar ideas were circulated during the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai, where governments were concluding the blueprint for minimising risks and loss of lives, livelihoods, assets, and communities. With the support of their member states, optimists successfully anchored anticipatory planned relocation and migrant engagement in disaster response and recovery efforts as strategies for preventing displacement risks in the Sendai Framework (2015). The Framework provided the second institutional base for the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage.

In the human mobility domain, optimists focused on pinning environmental stressors on the two agendas. In 2016, the UNGA convened the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants in New York, where states gathered to establish a humane and coordinated approach to managing large population movements. Fiji supported optimists to anchor climate change, disasters, and degradation as drivers of forced movements into the 2016 New York Declaration, creating an opportunity for non-traditional actors, especially from the Pacific, to engage in an arena where their voices were absent until recently. This expanded the scope of the Declaration from governing labour migration and refugee movements to various types of human mobility, providing an opening for optimists to place additional solutions on the migration and refugee agendas, namely resettlement schemes, temporary migration programmes, upskilling initiatives, humanitarian visas, regional refugee protection, temporary safeguards, and stay arrangements (GCM, 2018; GCR, 2018b). In 2018, they succeeded in standardising development-friendly and humanitarian approaches into environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' since world leaders endorsed the Compacts on Migration and Refugees in Marrakesh. The Compacts became the third institutional base for the assemblage.

5.4.2 Regional Critical Junctures

A handful of political events were critical junctures for (im)mobilising and institutionalising development-friendly assemblages in the Pacific. As early as the 1980s, Pacific organisations and leaders recognised that environmental displacement was going to be a pressing challenge for the region: 'ecological refugee' movements, forced migration, and relocation will strain urban infrastructure, threaten traditional land tenure and ownership practices, and exacerbate squatting (SPC, 1989). During this period, they used 'displacement,' 'migration,' and 'relocation' synonymously to describe the *problem*, presenting sustainable environmental management as a solution. Four events reframed voluntary population movements into sub-regional *solutions* for environmental migration and displacement.

The 2004 Pacific Conference of Churches' Consultation on Climate Change in Tarawa and the 2009 Church Leaders Meeting on Resettlement in Nadi transformed cross-border resettlement schemes into a *community norm* for managing international environmental displacement. I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans voiced concern that environmental stressors were threatening their human security (Frances Namoumou, interview, 31.10.2019). Shortly afterwards, the Pacific Conference of Churches' youth members released a statement calling on highly industrialised countries to facilitate the relocation of affected communities (PCC, 2004). This culminated in faith leaders demanding regional actors to establish an instrument and national authorities to prepare for dignified resettlements (PCC, 2009). Thus, the planned relocation was *spiritually validated* as a communal response to international environmental displacement. The endorsement by churches is critical for policy adoption and implementation at the community level across the Pacific, for reasons discussed in Chapters 6 and 8. However, the 2008 Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting in Alofi solidified it into a *regional standard*. Pacific leaders collectively recognised relocation as a measure of last resort, which was captured in the Niue Declaration on Climate Change: it encouraged development partners to "increase technical and financial support for climate change action on adaptation, mitigation and if necessary, relocation…" (PIFS, 2008). The framing reflected regional experiences and was adopted by optimists to retain the solution on the global climate agenda. The Declaration politically sanctioned planned relocation as a 'best practice' albeit with caution.

In contrast, one event temporarily institutionalised labour migration programmes into a *sub-regional* environmental migration management solution. At the 2015 Coalition of Low-lying Atoll Nations on Climate Change's High-Level Dialogue on Climate-Induced Migration in

Tarawa, leaders called for partnerships to prepare their people for dignified migration. They invited new allies to help formulate innovative labour migration initiatives (GoT, 2015a). The event standardised it into a norm for the issue area, which was picked up by optimists in attendance (Sabira Coelho, interview, 26.09.2019). The following year, UNESCAP partnered with PIFS to convene the Regional Meeting on Climate Change Migration and Displacement in the Pacific. Pacific policymakers met in Suva to discuss regional priorities related to the issue, including developing a mechanism to assist and protect affected persons and building community resilience through labour migration programmes (UN & PIFS, 2016). However, they did not exhibit a collective willingness to fully regionalise either priority at the time for three reasons: the leadership changed in atoll nations, regional agencies worried linking two institutionally disparate issue areas would create confusion, and doing so would entail relinquishing sovereign decision-making rights and assuming additional socioeconomic burdens (Cosmin Corendea, interview, 10.08.2019; Simalua Enele, interview, 27.11.2021; Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019). Thus, diverging from global policy developments, the year 2016 marked the temporary immobility of labour migration programmes and the failure to institutionalise the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage into a regional governance form in the Pacific.

Optimists identified an alternative policy window to anchor development-friendly approaches, which was the 47th Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting in Pohnpei. In 2016, Pacific policymakers were finalising rules on fostering development whilst adapting to and building resilience against environmental stressors. They perceived all environment-induced population movements, including displacement, rural-urban migration, and forced relocation as a development challenge (Hay & Pratt, 2013). The Nansen Initiative and IOM reconceptualised and reintegrated planned relocation schemes and labour migration programmes as avenues for safeguarding the human rights of communities vulnerable to environmental displacement (Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat, interview, 25.01.2019; Sabira Coelho, interview, 26.09.2019). They mutated development-friendly approaches into protection solutions, giving each policy assemblage a new label that loosely aligned with regional ideologies (see Stamnes, 2016). In this way, optimists standardised the emerging humanitarian-development nexus as both solutions were encapsulated in the FRDP. The Framework was the first and strongest institutional anchor for an aspect of the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage, which paved the way for the recently endorsed PRFCM (2023).

5.5 Real Environmental Migration and Displacement Shocks

Real shocks shaped national policy adoption and to a lesser extent, adaptation. The impacts of environmental disasters and human mobility events revealed regulatory gaps, prompting different actors to search for pre-packaged solutions and recontextualise them to the issue area and across the Pacific. Optimists perceived recurring environmental migration and displacement shocks as windows into the future; that is, what could be expected if temperatures and sea levels continue to rise. Professional experts responded by emphasising the applicability and/or flexibility of extant global instruments while policymakers initiated national policy processes. This section explains how certain real shocks mobilised and began to institutionalise development-friendly and humanitarian approaches as environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices.'

5.5.1 Internal Displacement and Planned Relocations

Multiple global and local events remobilised planned relocation as a 'best practice' for managing internal environmental displacement across the Pacific and beyond. International experts leveraged two disasters in Asia to demonstrate the applicability of the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the 2010 IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs in environmental displacement situations. The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami impelled the UN General Secretary's Representative on the Human Rights of IDPs to focus on the protection needs of those fleeing their homes in response to environmental stressors – "I was appointed to be a Representative of the UN General Secretary for the Human Rights of IDPs in 2004. We had the Indian Ocean Tsunami, [which] was when I started to look at the protection of disaster displaced persons" (Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019). The Tsunami displaced 1.7 million people across South and East Asia, revealing disasters raise protection concerns akin to violent conflict (Inderfurth et al., 2005; OHCHR, 2004). The international community's response was unprecedented, rapidly mobilising to facilitate search and rescue activities, to provide basic humanitarian assistance (i.e., food, water, medicine, and shelter), and to identify and bury the dead. However, relief and rehabilitation efforts seldom focused on IDPs' situation: they continued to live in sub-standard temporary shelters and emergency relief camps; did not have access to basic information, education, and healthcare services; encountered discrimination in aid distribution; and did not participate in decision-making processes (Fletcher et al., 2005; Kothari & Kalin, 2005). In other words, issues such as forced relocation, lost documentation and assets, and restitution were largely ignored in post-disaster recovery and reconstruction

efforts. The event had two outcomes. First, the UNSG concluded that the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement offered safeguards to all IDPs irrespective of the root cause (UNGA, 2005). Second, the Representative not only visited the tsunami-stricken region but also Honduras, New Orleans, Mozambique, and Madagascar to assess the human rights situation of environmentally displaced persons (Schmalz, 2015). The findings strengthened the UN Secretary General's argument and shaped four recommendations: collect data on internal environmental displacement and develop tools to better monitor the needs of affected persons; invest resources in disaster reduction and prevention, including in resettlement schemes; consult communities and ensure they meaningfully participate in the relocation process; and consider the specific vulnerabilities of marginalised groups in disaster displacement planning (UNHRC, 2009b).

The 2013 Typhoon Haiyan sustained global efforts in contextualising international internal displacement norms to disaster situations. Rather than simply promulgating human rights protection, the event prompted optimists to focus on durable solutions, including development-friendly approaches. The Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs Cecilia Jiminez-Darmary (interview, 09.08.2019) shared:

> "The Haiyan Typhoon that hit the Philippines in 2013 really got me interested in disaster displacement. At that time, my work focused on IDPs in armed conflict and violence … I was the Director of the IDP project at the Philippines Commission of Human Rights … But because of that particular experience, we had to naturally shift our attention to the human rights implications of the Typhoon, which displaced millions of people. I was on the site just a week after and it was so horrendous that I said, 'Oh my god! This shouldn't happen again!' … Fishermen displaced by the Typhoon couldn't fish because they weren't allowed in the sea while there was a potential of a big tsunami. Their livelihood was gone … It's not just the humanitarian aspect, it's the long-lasting sustainability of livelihood … [Even] until now, there remain challenges in terms of durable solutions for the leftover IDPs …"

The Typhoon displaced over four million individuals, pushing them to seek refuge with relatives and in evacuation centres, informal settlements, and tent cities (Yonetani et al., 2014). The Filipino authorities responded by formulating a relocation plan that entailed constructing bunkhouses as temporary accommodation while they built permanent houses in relocation sites. However, IDPs in protracted situations and those who were resettled experienced difficulties in

accessing basic services (i.e., food, potable water, healthcare services, and primary education) and information to participate in the relocation process meaningfully. They also struggled to find alternative livelihood opportunities and faced heightened tenure insecurity (Sherwood et al., 2015; Tran & Bermudez, 2022). The Special Rapporteur and other experts suggested drawing from the 1998 Guiding Principles and the 2010 IASC Framework to formulate domestic IDP protection legislation and relocation policies (Cecilia Jiminez-Darmary, interview, 09.08.2019; Sherwood et al., 2015; Tran & Bermudez, 2022).

Local resettlement shocks prompted policymakers to adopt and adapt planned relocation in high island countries. Traditionally, Island governments have not facilitated relocation schemes. Community leaders negotiated access to land and fishing grounds amongst themselves. However, certain relocation events revealed governments are responsible for managing internal environmental displacement, protecting affected persons, and re-establishing their livelihoods. In the Carteret Islands, relocation failures and heightened environmental vulnerabilities led to the creation of Tulele Peisa and its 20-step Carteret Integrated Relocation Programme. Rapid population growth, king tides, storms, and droughts have depleted natural resources, thereby threatening food and habitat security (Rakova, 2012, 2014). The Autonomous Bougainville Government's efforts to resettle Carteret Islanders on the mainland have thus failed. Under the 1982 Atolls Resettlement Scheme, it attempted to move 40 households in Kuveria. But only 15 families relocated, most of whom returned home as a result of limited livelihood opportunities and the Bougainville crisis (Edwards, 2013; O'Collins, 1990; UNDP, 2016). The government tried to move another 12 households in Buka. However, they fled back to the Carteret Islands due to land disputes, in-fighting among resettlers, failure to integrate newcomers into the host community, and withdrawal of government support (Boege, 2013; Boege & Rakova, 2019). These relocation failures and increased risk of environmental displacement mobilised the Council of Elders to establish Tulele Peisa, a non-governmental organisation that promotes "community self-reliance, environmental awareness and sustainability and cultural survival" in its relocation work (Edwards, 2013; Pascoe, 2015; UNDP, 2016, p. 6; Ursula Rakova, Brisbane, 25.05.2018). In 2007, Tulele Peisa developed a programme to resettle approximately 1700 individuals in mainland Bougainville (see Boege & Rakova, 2019; Rakova, 2012, 2014).

Vunidogoloa's[7] request for relocation assistance nudged Fijian policymakers to devise a community vulnerability assessment and set of resettlement guidelines. Although the community's relocation concerns date back 35 years and moved from higher ground to the coast for unknown reasons, it officially reached out to the Ministry of iTaukei Affairs for assistance in 2007 (Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat, interview, 25.01.2019; Robyn-Ann Mani, interview, 26.07.2019; Tronquet, 2015). Shortly after the request, ambiguous relocation figures emerged, creating confusion, uncertainty, and panic among officials and chiefs. ITaukei Affairs Board's Alisi Rabukawaqa (interview, 11.12.2019) attributed the statistics to a closed-door meeting:

> "At the beginning, there was a lot of misinformation about vulnerable communities. The numbers kept changing. Everyone was asking each other, 'Where are these numbers coming from?' And there was no absolute answer … We had a workshop with all the Roka Tuis … on climate change and one of them said, 'Why are we talking about this? You already asked us how many communities we thought were vulnerable and we gave you answers.' … From what I understand, one of our international donors wanted to know how many communities needed assistance. They asked the Roka Tuis … who gave an answer … If you look back, it wasn't responsible to have a conversation like that …"

The ambiguous relocation statistics revealed the need for tools to evaluate a community's susceptibility to environmental risks. This prompted the iTaukei Affairs Board to design the Integrated Vulnerability Assessment, which was later refined by the Climate Change and International Cooperation Division and used to identify 43 communities needing immediate relocation and 800 exposed to slow-onset events (Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, interview, 04.11.2019; Eferemo Kubunavanua, interview, 16.12.2019). This figure is widely cited in official speeches; however, minor discrepancies in relocation figures are evident in journal articles (Gharbaoui & Blocher, 2016; McNamara & Des Combes, 2015; Tronquet, 2015). In addition, the 2012 National Summit on Building Resilience to Climate Change held in Labasa exposed a gap in climate regulations. Officials realised resettlement was going to be a pressing issue for Fiji in the not-too-distant future (Ministry of Economy Representative, interview, 29.03.2019). However, because it was not part of the national climate change policy, there was a lack of funding mechanisms, proper vulnerability assessments, and community awareness on how to seek assistance (SPC, 2012). This partly set in motion the search for local guidance on

[7] A village in Viti Levu, Fiji.

facilitating resettlement schemes. In response to whether the iTaukei Affairs Board participated in the policy process, Alisi Rabukawaqa (interview, 11.12.2019) said:

> "The conversation came up when they started working on the relocation guidelines – 2012, I think. [But,] the conversation had been [happening] within the Fijian government for a few years … I remember they came to us, asking if we had any relocation guidelines. And everyone said, 'Yes, we do.' But we didn't really … Relocation is a part of iTaukei culture… It is within the iTaukei Affairs Act (Cap 120). The traditional process is if we're going to move, we need the mataqali's[8] permission. The iTaukei Land Trust and Affairs Board can facilitate the [land] leases … And we ensure there are good water sources [and] places to plant [and the site is] accessible … That's all we had … It needed to be fleshed out because it was no longer just about iTaukei communities. The more complicated conversation was for non-indigenous communities in rural, peri-urban and urban areas – where would these people move and if on indigenous land, how would that work?"

Traditional guidelines and approaches were insufficient in regulating non-indigenous relocations. Perhaps for this reason, the Fijian government reached out to an international organisation for technical assistance.

The Ambae volcanic eruption compelled Ni-Vanuatu policymakers to establish local rules on minimising displacement risks and protecting affected persons. Extreme weather events forced masses of people out of their homes. For example, the 2015 Tropical Cyclone Pam triggered 65,000 displacements while the 2020 Tropical Cyclone caused 80,000 (Cazabat et al., 2023). Yet, the "government didn't see a need for it until the eruption" (Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019). Oxfam Vanuatu's Willy Missack (interview, 16.05.2019) commented:

> "A recent example of sudden-onset disaster is 11,000 people that moved out from Ambae Island to Myro and Santo … When we had a massive relocation from Ambae to Santo, we realised we didn't have specific guidelines or policies to protect displaced people. This is where the displacement policy came into the story, and we started looking at it."

Figure 5.4 illustrates Ambaean families evacuating to Santo Island following the volcanic eruption. It is unclear from the primary data what specifically about this event triggered the search for policy solutions. It is plausible that affected households were in situations of

[8] The land-owning unit.

protracted displacement – they could not return home after the eruption because volcanic ash and acid rain destroyed shelter and livelihoods and adversely impacted their health, or they were displaced multiple times as a result of ongoing volcanic activity. Another likely explanation is that displaced persons resettled on certain outer islands in an ad hoc fashion, putting pressure on scarce natural resources, infrastructure, and services, thereby heightening social tensions. In both contexts, the government would need a policy to facilitate schemes relocating people away from vulnerable areas.

Figure 5.4: The Evacuation from Ambae to Santo Island, Vanuatu (VRC, 2017).

Similarly, the financial implications of two resettlement events jolted New Zealand policymakers to develop a managed retreat framework. The 2005 heavy rainfall triggered debris flow, devastating 27 houses, 87 properties, and parts of the Matata Township in the Bay of Plenty (Turner, 2023). Affected families received a relocation package amounting to approximately NZD15 million – the government would purchase damaged or at-risk properties and financially contribute towards moving costs, legal fees, and mortgage breaks (Adam et al., 2023; Whakatane District Council, 2023). A review of the Matata relocation revealed gaps in the national framework, regulatory mechanisms, and implementation support, which ultimately led to policy learning across New Zealand (Hanna et al., 2018). Contrastingly, the 2010/11 earthquake red-zoned 80,000 properties, forcing 20,0000 residents to sell their houses to the government for demolition and relocate elsewhere in Canterbury (Boston, 2023; Peart et al.,

2023). The cost of property buyouts was estimated at NZD1,700,000,000 (Adam et al., 2023). Rather than exposing gaps in policy, a review of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority highlighted the need to clarify its role following disasters and assess governance arrangements after each phase of the recovery process (OAG, 2017). The lead agency rationalised financial costs to policy and governance voids: "in the absence of a managed retreat framework, there is a significant risk that, as climate change and population growth exacerbate our exposure to hazards, the expectations of central government *bailouts will continue to increase*" (GoNZ, 2022b, p. 2, emphasis added). Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade's Nathan Ross (interview, 22.01.2020) unpacked this point:

> "We haven't moved anybody yet because they're still in discussions on how it will work [and] who's responsible for what part … For instance, a national policy question might be what's the split between public and private costs? What's the role of local versus central government? If you're dealing with a 100-year-old property and no one had a clue that climate change was going to be a risk, then maybe there's a public good in helping people who had no sense of it. Other people might have built their homes two years ago on the beachfront and now they're expecting the local government to build them a seawall – maybe it should be their responsibility … There are also questions about when and where you invest public funds. If it's going to cost you NZD50 million to build a seawall to protect what's behind it, which is worth billions of dollars of assets, then it's easily justifiable. But if it's a park, then it's a different kettle of fish. We have to develop a framework for how to think about all this."

5.5.2 Environmental Shocks, Refugee Crises, and Labour Migration

Several interrelated events semi-institutionalised labour migration into a 'good practice' for managing international environmental migration in some parts of the Pacific. An ongoing environmental shock compelled policymakers from atoll nations to develop migration with dignity policies. Climate change is threatening livelihood and habitat security in atoll nations – sea-level rise and droughts are salinising freshwater lenses, lowering crop productivity and supply of fish stock, introducing new diseases, and eroding territorial and maritime boundaries (IPCC, 2019b; Michelle Leighton, interview, 21.08.2019). It is also increasing the frequency and intensity of environmental shocks, testing the effectiveness and adaptability of Pacific institutions and policies (Nazhat Shameem Khan, interview, 26.07.2019). Kiribati's former President Anote Tong (Melbourne, 22.10.2018; GoK, 2021; North, 2015) reflected on the

devastation left behind by climate-aggravated 2015 Tropical Cyclone Pam, including internal displacement and islet submergence:

> "A wind of 20km/hr is a big storm [for us] … We don't get cyclones. We create and send them down to our friends in Fiji and Vanuatu. In 2015, that one came back to us. All the islands of Tuvalu were flooded. There was a big island [in Tuvalu]. By the time the storm had gone, the island was gone. Our Southern islands were flooded. On the other islands, it damaged a lot of food crops and freshwater lenses."

Part of the challenge is geography: because Kiribati, Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu are only a few metres above sea level, cyclone-induced king tides inundate and erode islands. There is very little higher ground for evacuation and relocation. Recurring cyclones are eroding community resilience, depleting resources critical for recovery, and reversing development gains. Consequently, atoll nations are stepping up their advocacy for greater climate ambition and more recently, permanent migration solutions. For example, Marshallese policymakers are promoting dignified migration while Tuvalu's leader is calling for a global settlement to protect their human rights and facilitate cross-border relocation (GoMI, 2020; GoT, 2022).

Sudden-onset disasters motivated destination countries to explore revising temporary migration programmes to build adaptive capacities in high island states. Extreme weather events revealed the flexibility of seasonal worker programmes (Bailey, 2019; Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019). The 2015 Tropical Cyclone Pam also devastated high island states, especially Vanuatu, where 65,000 people were left homeless (Bolo et al., 2021; IFRC, 2015). The 2059 Ni-Vanuatu RSE workers could not connect with their families. New Zealand authorities responded by making visa concessions for existing workers from affected areas, which entailed extending visas and waiving visa fees (Bailey & Shiu, 2016). Employers arranged for workers to receive technical training on strengthening houses (Bailey, 2019). Similarly, the 2016 Tropical Cyclone "wiped out one-third of the economy in 36 hours" and displaced 62,000 Fijians (Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, interview, 04.11.2019; IDMC, 2020). Fijian RSE workers lost communication with affected relatives, causing worry and confusion. Again, the New Zealand government relaxed visa restrictions for those wanting to help with disaster recovery (Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019). These shocks stirred a conversation among Australian and New Zealand policymakers on refining labour migration programmes to enhance in situ adaptation in high island states (JSCM, 2016; Nathan Ross, interview, 22.01.2020).

Exogenous refugee crises reinforced ideas on how labour migration can minimise international environmental displacement from low-lying nations. The European refugee crisis highlighted that unregulated and disorderly population movements can overwhelm institutions and services in host countries, causing tension. Hence, it is critical to plan for regular and voluntary migration whereby people are given a choice on when, where, and how they move. Kiribati's former President Anote Tong (Melbourne, 22.10.2018) explained:

> "The humanitarian crisis in North Africa occurred because of denial. We didn't acknowledge [and] plan for it. So, we have these extremely undignified movements of people … I was on a cruise with a lot of elderly German couples. I asked them, 'How do you feel about what's going on with the mass movement of people?' They said, 'Germany's tolerance is being tested … If it had been done in a way where people knew the language [and] culture, there would be harmony …' [So, migration with dignity] is the rejection of the idea that we'll become refugees. We'll have to move in 20 years, so let's plan for it, prepare our people [and] upskill them, so wherever they go, they'll be good neighbours, the margin of misunderstanding will be narrow … [and] they live in harmony with the communities that host them."

The crisis helped the previous I-Kiribati administration rationalise its migration with dignity policy that has a strong focus on aligning temporary worker programmes with upskilling schemes and permanent residency visas (Allgood & McNamara, 2017; Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015; Voigt-Graf & Kagan, 2017).

5.5.3 Climate Asylum Claims and Humanitarian Protection

Two interrelated legal proceedings compelled optimists and policymakers to explore alternative measures to protect the human rights of Pacific Islanders internationally displaced by environmental stressors. In 2012, an I-Kiribati family applied for climate asylum in New Zealand. The primary appellant, Ioane Teitiota, claimed sea-level rise and associated degradation would force people to flee Kiribati in the not-too-distant future (NZIPT, 2013; NZSC, 2015). To corroborate this claim, the Immigration and Protection Tribunal invited an expert to share his research findings on the livelihood implications of climate change (Corcoran, 2016). John Corcoran (interview, 12.12.2019) shared:

> "Bruce Burson was the judge when they heard [Teitiota's] case, where I presented my findings. He wanted to know some of the problems he [Teitota] will face if he goes back

> … He asked me, 'Will he die if he returns to Kiribati?' I said, 'No. He has family that he can go back to. He might not die but might face problems [such as] children getting sick. The children were born here [in New Zealand, so they would need to] get used to the water and environment. But they will continue to survive there.'"

Despite acknowledging that environmental pressures threatened human security, the Tribunal rejected Teitiota's asylum claim for three reasons. First, the case was based on a moral argument, which is as a high-emitting state, New Zealand should protect individuals displaced by climate change (Richard Bedford, virtual event, 10.02.2021). Second, the notion of climate refugees did not meet the legal definition of a refugee – the 1951 Refugee Convention does not recognise environmental stressors as a reason for the fear of persecution (McAdam, 2020). Third, the evidence did not support claims of serious imminent harm upon return and the government's failure to protect citizens from environmental adversities (NZSC, 2015). An additional factor that purportedly affected the outcome was the family's irregular status, as both adults overstayed their work visas (John Corcoran, interview, 12.12.2019). Nevertheless, the "Tribunal accepted in principle that environmental degradation, whether associated with climate change or not, may in certain circumstances trigger a state's protection obligations under the Refugee Convention or human rights law" (McAdam, 2015, p. 138). Put simply, deteriorating environmental conditions could provide a basis for humanitarian protection. This ruling led to a flurry of research and policy activity: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared New Zealand's action plan on climate-induced displacement and migration in the Pacific, which shaped a research project on climate (im)mobilities (GoNZ, 2018, 2019, 2021). Its findings will supposedly shape New Zealand's approach to the phenomenon, including humanitarian visas.

The Teitiota family lodged a complaint to the UN Human Rights Committee in 2015 that mobilised non-refoulement under human rights law as a potential protection mechanism. The Committee is a body of independent experts monitoring the implementation of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The appellant argued New Zealand would violate his family's right to life if they were deported to Kiribati (McAdam, 2020). He accused the Tribunal of not considering the rapidly deteriorating living conditions in Kiribati when assessing their asylum claim: sea-level rise contaminated freshwater supplies and eroded habitable land, causing violent disputes and endangering their lives (ICCPR, 2020). This was substantiated by IPCC reports. While the Committee accepted that rapid sea-level rise would render Kiribati uninhabitable, the evidence yet again failed to establish the imminent or

likely risk of arbitrary deprivation upon return (McAdam, 2020). As a result, it concluded that the Tribunal's judicial proceedings were indiscriminate and free of error. More importantly, it decided that in the absence of robust national and international action, climate adversities would trigger non-refoulement obligations (Bergova, 2021; ICCPR, 2020). This decision was lauded as a landmark because it effectively "placed states on notice around what their obligations are under international human rights law" (Amnesty International, 2020; Jane McAdam, virtual event, 21.01.2021). It is worth noting that before this decision, humanitarian protectionists were already exploring the applicability of complementary standards in the context of international environmental displacement (for example, see Burson et al., 2018; Kalin & Schrepfer, 2012; McAdam, 2011). However, the Committee's ruling ideologically sanctioned it as an appropriate and feasible safeguard mechanism, helping professional experts to slowly mobilise the discourse in the Pacific (see Chapter 6).

5.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter argues that activating events mobilised optimists to conform to certain environmental migration and displacement management 'models.' As shown in Table 5.1, a series of key events institutionalised development-friendly approaches as issue 'best practices' across multiple scales and sites. Certain global and national events marshalled specific humanitarian measures as a viable regulatory response.

Optimists responded to each event in various ways. The perceived environmental/climate refugee crisis caused an ideological shock, motivating optimists to better understand the environment-population movement nexus and find alternative policy options. Well-intentioned environmental scientists, NGOs, media outlets, and Pacific leaders recycled the real environmental refugee crisis to raise awareness about the implications of unfettered fossil fuel consumption. They used alarmist displacement statistics, sensationalist headlines, distressing images of disaster-stricken Pacific communities, and the island submersion narrative to reconstruct it into the climate refugee crisis. The perceived crisis generated a fear of mass climate asylum claims and revealed information and protection gaps, resulting in global knowledge and policy production.

Knowledge jolts mobilised development-friendly assemblages. The IPCC initially validated the environmental/climate refugee crisis: climate experts argued environmental adversities will displace millions of people, igniting ethnic tensions, conflict, and political instability.

Resettlement schemes can minimise large-scale displacement and help build adaptive capacities. In response, optimists published findings that showed environmental factors are only one driver of population movements and portrayed migration as a sustainable solution. Because they fed these messages into the climate science-making process, the IPCC abandoned the security discourse. Climate experts endorsed development-friendly approaches by blurring the conceptual distinction between labour migration and planned relocation using case studies of the latter to substantiate claims on the former's adaptive potential. More recently, optimists joined the climate change institutional structure to directly shape adaptation solutions. Consequently, the IPCC's special reports distinguish between migration and resettlement and note the benefits and challenges of each policy response. Thus, initial IPCC reports jolted human mobility specialists into knowledge and policy production while more recent documents ideologically sanctioned development-friendly solutions as environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices.'

The outcomes of each knowledge jolt guided policy action at multiple levels. Leaders of atoll nations used the IPCC reports to advocate for greater climate action. PIFS used them to rationalise planning for a high-mobility future in which migration and relocation are envisaged as measures of last resort. I-Kiribati and Fijian policymakers used climate science to formulate labour migration and planned relocation strategies. In this way, Pacific actors rationalised adopting development-friendly assemblages.

Political events institutionalised either whole or aspects of the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage. The impact of global policy windows on the assemblage can be divided into three phases. In the first phase, climate change and displacement events marshalled development-friendly approaches into effective adaptation strategies to halt the standardisation of refugee protection as the only feasible policy option. In the second phase, the refugees and stateless persons meeting established a separate institution for the protection of people displaced by environmental stressors outside of the UN system. In the third phase, environmental conferences institutionalised development-friendly solutions while human mobility summits standardised environmental stressors, thereby enfolding non-traditional perspectives and broadening the scope of succeeding soft norms. The concluding adaptation, disaster risk reduction, migration, and refugee instruments sustained knowledge production and heightened policy developments. But more importantly, they are institutional anchors for the

environmental migration and displacement management assemblage that is paving the way for a new governance form.

At the regional level, a handful of political events mobilised development-friendly assemblages in different parts of the Pacific. Until the 2000s, Pacific policymakers perceived all population movements as a consequence of unsustainable resource management. However, faith-led and regional leaders' meetings on climate change morphed, transformed, and spiritually and politically sanctioned cross-border relocation as a regional norm for regulating international environmental displacement. The atoll's climate migration dialogue institutionalised labour migration into a sub-regional environmental migration management solution. Efforts to regionalise labour migration were futile due to evolving local conditions. However, the leaders' meeting on the environment-development nexus created an opening for optimists to morph development-friendly approaches into protection solutions and pin them onto the FRDP – the first and strongest regional institutional foothold for an aspect of the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage.

Real environmental migration and displacement shocks prompted optimists to mobilise pre-existing norms and Pacific policymakers to consider or adopt the most suitable policy package. Two exogenous environmental shocks revealed the applicability of existing internal displacement instruments. Multiple endogenous resettlement events motivated high island countries and community-based organisations to formulate planned relocation guidelines. In addition to worsening environmental conditions, failed government-assisted resettlement programmes, requests for state support to move upland, large-scale protracted displacement, and the financial implications of resettling communities highlighted the importance of domestic strategies in facilitating safe, orderly, and well-planned relocations. Both endogenous environmental and exogenous refugee shocks compelled atoll nations to formulate and destination countries to revise existing labour migration policies. Climate-aggravated Tropical Cyclones Pam and Winston revealed the importance of permanent migration solutions; a national plan to facilitate dignified and well-managed migration; and revising seasonal migration programmes for building adaptive capacities, particularly in high island countries. However, the European response to the refugee crisis provided critical lessons in preparing people for voluntary and regular migration that entails providing upskilling, employment, and permanent residency opportunities. Contrastingly, two legal proceedings encouraged New Zealand and optimists to explore humanitarian protection in the context of environmental

displacement. Teitiota's climate asylum claim and complaint to the UN Human Rights Committee highlighted that environmental stressors could trigger state obligations under international refugee or human rights laws.

Table 5.1: The Impact of Different Activating Events in Mobilising and Institutionalising the Environmental Migration and Displacement Management Assemblage.

Policy Response	Scale	Activating Events			
		Perceived Environmental/Climate Refugee Crisis	**Knowledge Jolts**	**Political Events**	**Real Environmental Migration and Displacement Shocks**
Planned Relocation	Global	No impact	IPCC 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Assessment Reports	14th COP to UNFCCC, 16th COP to UNFCCC, 3rd UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, and 2016 UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants	2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and 2013 Typhoon Haiyan
	Regional	No impact	IPCC Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere	2004 Pacific Conference Churches' Consultation on Climate Change, 2009 Church Leaders Meeting on Resettlement, 2008 Pacific Islands Forum Leaders' Meeting, and 2016 Pacific Islands Forum Leaders' Meeting	No impact
	National	No impact	IPCC definitions	No impact	Relocation failures in the Carteret Islands, 2007 Vunidogoloa relocation in Fiji, 2017 Ambae volcanic eruption in Vanuatu and 2005 Matata relocation and 2010/2011 Christchurch earthquakes in New Zealand
Labour Migration	Global	No impact	IPCC 4th and 6th Assessment Reports	14th COP to UNFCCC, 16th COP to UNFCCC, 3rd UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, and 2016 UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants	No impact

	Regional	No impact	IPCC Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere	2015 CANCC's High-Level Dialogue on Climate-Induced Migration, 2016 Regional Meeting on Climate Change Migration and Displacement in the Pacific, and 2016 Pacific Islands Forum Leaders' Meeting	No impact
	National	No impact	IPCC 4th Assessment Report	No impact	2015 Tropical Cyclone Pam, 2016 Tropical Cyclone Winston, and European refugee crisis
Humanitarian Protection	Global	Alarmist statistics, island submersion narrative, and sensationalist headlines	IPCC 1st, 2nd and 3rd Assessment Reports	2006 Meeting on Protecting and Resettling Climate Refugees, 14th COP to UNFCCC, 2011 Ministerial Meeting, and 2016 UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants	2015 Teitiota's UNHRC complaint
	Regional	No impact	No impact	No impact	No impact
	National	No impact	No impact	No impact	2012 Teitiota's climate asylum claim

Chapter 6: The Institutional Landscape

6.1 Introduction

This chapter argues that the institutional landscape enables or constrains the flow of environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices.' The landscape constitutes actors who organise into transnational structures to mobilise and institutionalise their policy preferences. Each structure constitutes rules, practices, resources, and multiple logics, which are reconciled through intense debates (Fligstein, 2001; Wooten & Hoofman, 2017). The structures ideologically and socially condition professional experts (advocates, consultants, gurus, and middling technocrats) to identify, think, and act in particular ways (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haas, 1992; Schofer et al., 2012). They are given templates constituting problem and solution conceptualisations, reference-scapes, metrics, and data collection tools (Finnemore, 1996; Lawrence et al., 2011; Meyer & Jepperson, 2000). These ideas and means are packaged into knowledge and policy products, which are disseminated in different sites. In keeping with the assemblage, structures may evolve and find new capacities or completely disband once the overarching goal is achieved. As this chapter explains, structures act as knowledge- and policy-transmitting channels, which domestic actors (champions or internal entrepreneurs) leverage to create conducive local conditions for accepting, revising, and implementing certain policies (Peck, 2002). They use place-branded policies, pilot lessons, and comparative study findings to strategically frame a problem and adopt particular solutions (McCann & Ward, 2012, 2013; McFadgen, 2019; Meijerink & Huitema, 2010). In doing so, they enrol followers and gain extra-local salience, granting these policy solutions 'best practice' or 'model' status.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 charts organisations constituting the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage. Here, I refer to them as human mobility optimists because they promote relocation and migration as viable strategies for coping with environmental adversities and humanitarian protection to safeguard the rights of internationally displaced persons. They organise themselves into policy structures, producing knowledge on preferred solutions, lobbying world leaders to integrate them into global agendas, providing technical advice on national strategies and assisting in implementing them. Section 6.3 maps issue structures, which I discuss as environmental mobility structures because they elevate the problem and provide a range of solutions. They achieve this by

explaining the nexus, conditions under which each policy may apply, and advocating to integrate human mobility into environment agendas and vice versa. Finally, Section 6.4 concludes with a chapter summary.

6.2 Human Mobility Optimists

As discussed in Chapter 4, human mobility optimists are professional experts and organisations that perceive the relationship between environment and population movements as a virtuous cycle. They advocate a combination of development-friendly and humanitarian 'best practices.' In practical terms, this means developing standalone policies, and amending, expanding, and aligning existing schemes. Some experts and institutions promote all three solutions whereas others endorse only one. For this reason, I divide human mobility optimists into three sub-categories: planned relocation advocates, labour migration supporters, and humanitarian protectionists. This section begins by mapping primary and boundary-spanning optimists followed by actors that advocate particular policy solutions.

6.2.1 The Primary Optimists

A small group of international organisations orchestrates the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage. They include the United Nations University - Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), IOM, UNHCR, the Nansen Initiative/PDD, the World Bank, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (IRCRCM), NRC/IDMC, and Bread for the World (BfW). Although they promote development-friendly and humanitarian 'best practices,' their logic, terminologies, and approaches vary.

UNU-EHS was the leading research institution on environmental mobility in the early 2000s. It rationalised well-managed human mobility as a risk diversification and adaptation strategy. The institute long researched the environment-population movement nexus, and its impact on policies (i.e., how environmental factors induce or hinder population movements and how they impact communities). The perceived environmental/climate refugee crisis prompted its involvement in global policy dialogues on environmental mobility governance (Koko Warner, interview, 22.08.2019). Under the leadership of Koko Warner, UNU-EHS partnered with other universities to implement the European Commission's Environmental Change and Forced Migration (EACH-FOR) project, resulting in publications portraying environmental mobility as a multi-causal phenomenon and migration as a strategy for diversifying household incomes and building adaptive capacities (Dun, 2011; EACH-FOR, 2009; Shen & Gemenne, 2011;

Warner et al., 2008). UNU-EHS co-established an institutional structure to integrate human mobility in the global climate change agenda, organised research seminars, and led the research component of two multi-initiatives on the issue area (Senior Researcher, interview, 26.06.2019; Koko Warner, interview, 22.08.2019; CCEMA, N.D., 2010; IOM & UNFPA, 2007). The latter shaped multi-level policy discussions and some labour-exporting policies in the Pacific (see Chapters 8 and 9). Recently, UNU-EHS created a separate team to work on environmental mobility. Therefore, UNU-EHS can be thought of as an early knowledge entrepreneur.

Contrastingly, IOM is emerging as the leading operational organisation in facilitating environmental migration. It is mandated to facilitate all forms of migration (Mariam Traore Chazalnoel, interview, 06.12.2018), broadly defined as the forced or voluntary movement of people within or across borders for short- or long-term (Bradley, 2020; IOM, 2019a). Bradley (2017, p. 100) describes it as a "jack-of-all-trades", as exemplified by its quick operational expansion in environmental migration. IOM's engagement in the issue area was shaped by the IPCC's first report and Hurricane Mitch (Dina Ionesco, Geneva, 19-20.08.2019). The IPCC (1992) reported that mass climate migration could cause disruptions and social instability in some countries. Hurricane Mitch, which devastated Central America, highlighted the extent of the problem and people fleeing to neighbouring countries were not eligible for refugee protection (Nansen Initiative, 2013). These events enhanced intra-organisational awareness of the environment and migration linkage (Ionesco & Chazalnoel, 2015).

IOM discreetly increased its activities in environmental migration management from 2000 to 2015 (Hall, 2016). It rationalised migration as an adaptation strategy (Brown, 2008; Hugo, 2008; IOM, 2014). It helped create an informal policy network, facilitated expert forums, supported research, made joint submissions to shape global climate change dialogues, and became a co-lead for managing and coordinating camps for IDPs, particularly supporting those fleeing environmental stressors (UNHCR et al., 1996; IOM & UNFPA, 2007). Through these avenues, IOM demonstrated that it has knowledge and experience in environmental migration.

Additionally, the senior management sensitised reluctant state members to environmental migration. For example, the former Director General William Lacy-Swing placed the issue on the agenda for IOM's Council, Finance, and Programme Meetings while the former Head of Research Frank Laczko prepared a discussion note on environmental migration management solutions (IOM, 2007, 2009, 2013; Susanne Melde, interview, 29.08.2019). IOM enrolled new Pacific followers by participating in Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) on the issue area.

Its staff participated in regional meetings to assess the scope for developing regulations and the extent of policy progress, and international negotiations to encourage Pacific nations to join IOM. These efforts helped IOM rationalise formally expanding its mandate to include environmental migration.

In 2015, IOM set up the Migration, Environment and Climate Change (MECC) Division. The Division seeks to minimise displacement through in situ development work, protect people on the move through assistance, and regularise migration as an adaptation and resilience-building strategy. Following this, IOM increased its field presence across the Pacific to shape regional and national policies – it re/opened and expanded offices in Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu, and recruited specialists for offices in the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau (Sabira Coelho, interview, 26.09.2019). It produced knowledge products such as a training manual comprising 'best practices' for managing environmental migration, the migration, environment, and climate change policy brief series, and an atlas on environmental migration (Ionesco et al., 2017; IOM, 2016a, 2018a, 2019b). It helped create institutional structures to shape policies. It partnered with UN and regional agencies to implement five regional initiatives (Chapter 8), launched a programme for Kiribati and Tuvalu on facilitating labour migration for climate adaptation, and developed displacement and migration policies and profiles in Fiji, Vanuatu, the Marshall Islands, and Tonga (GoF & IOM, 2020; GoT, 2020b; PIFS Regional Security Advisor, interview, 20.02.2020; Willy Missack, interview, 16.05.2019). Such heightened presence in the Pacific contributed to IOM becoming an UN-related agency[9] and building its reputation as the leading operational organisation on environmental migration management.

UNHCR has an international protection mandate. The statute narrowly limits its work to people fleeing their homes in response to political tensions or who have lost their citizenship. UNHCR's engagement in internal displacement *and* environmental issue areas was shaped by Western fears of regional instability. The end of the Cold War created fears that displacement would spill over international borders, overwhelming neighbouring states and igniting regional wars (Cohen, 2004). Likewise, anthropogenic change generated panic that sea-level rise would lead to mass displacement, flooding the Western world with refugees (John Campbell,

[9] For discussion on IOM's evolution as a UN-related agency, see Bradley (2020, 2021).

interview, 30.10.2019). These events propelled conversations on expanding UNHCR's mandate to include individuals displaced internally *and* by environmental stressors.

Initially, UNHCR's activities focused on clarifying when it could assist with both issue areas. It formulated criteria for intervening in IDP situations that were directly linked to its mandate: staff would only assist them if refugees returned to areas of IDP presence, internal and international displacement was triggered by the same cause, and internal displacement could lead to international displacement (Phuong, 2002; UNHCR, 1993). It became the lead for protecting and sheltering IDPs, and co-lead for coordinating and managing camps. In terms of internal environmental displacement, UNCHR's engagement depended on accessibility to affected populations, funding, and the presence of other UN agencies (Isabelle Michal, interview, 11.12.2018). It rationalised international environmental displacement as environmental stressors triggering conflict and forcing people to seek refuge in neighbouring countries (Guterres, 2008). In such nexus situations, refugee protection may apply. It also provided legal analysis on the feasibility of existing protection mechanisms and planned relocation, which was disseminated through the new issues in the refugee research series (Castles, 2002; Black, 2001) and the legal and protection research series (Ferris, 2012; McAdam, 2011; Park, 2011; Warner, 2011). These studies delinked refugee protection from environmental displacement, which was conveyed through joint submissions to the climate adaptation policymaking body. UNHCR also engaged in various expert events and provided operational assistance during disaster situations (Johnstone, 2008; Westing, 1992). These efforts outlined the boundaries of UNHCR's work on the issue area and revealed an international protection vacuum for people forced to seek international refuge from environmental stressors.

UNHCR has attempted to address the protection void since 2010. The senior management attempted to extend its mandate to include environmentally displaced persons. The former High Commissioner Antonio Guterres repeatedly called for new guiding principles to address environment-forced migration, but to no avail (Guterres, 2009, 2011a, 2011b; UNHCR, 2011a). The previous Senior Advisor to the International Protection Division Jose Riera advocated UNHCR's engagement in the issue area by demonstrating the environment, conflict, and protection linkage and providing guidance on the application of existing protection mechanisms in such situations (Francois Gemenne, interview, 18.11.2022; Riera, 2013). Rather than establishing a separate section, the International Protection Division integrated

environmental displacement into its existing work programme. It convened expert roundtables on forced migration and planned relocation, commissioned studies on nexus situations and 'good practices' for protecting vulnerable communities, developed knowledge products such as the Guiding Principles and Toolbox on Planned Relocation, and joined institutional structures to support global policy developments (Erica Bower, interview, 10.12.2018; Isabelle Michal, interview, 11.12.2018; Sanjula Weerasinghe, interview, 29.07.2019). Recently, UNHCR appointed a Special Advisor on Climate Action and developed a Strategic Framework for Climate Action, both of which helped to semi-formalise environmental displacement within the agency (UNHCR, 2021). This expansion is yet to translate into regional action as its engagement is limited to knowledge sharing and policy advice for the PRFCM (Field Notes, 28.03.2019, 21.01.2021; UNHCR, 2020b). These efforts helped UNHCR semi-institutionalise its *normative* engagement in global environmental displacement governance.

The Nansen Initiative originates from an impasse between UNHCR and member states on addressing the protection gap for international environmentally displaced persons (Kalin, 2015; McAdam, 2014). To overcome it, Norway and Switzerland pledged to work with actors interested in understanding cross-border environmental displacement at the sub-regional level, identifying 'best practices' and building consensus on ways of safeguarding affected people (UNHCR, 2011b). A small group of professionals marshalled political and institutional support for its establishment. They were Finland's Matti Nummelin, Norway's Johan Meyer, Switzerland's Isabelle Truedsson, IOM's Dina Ionesco, and UNHCR's Jose Riera (Francois Gemenne, interview, 18.11.2022; Koko Warner, interview, 02.08.2019; Nina Birkeland, interview, 05.07.2019). However, the process was guided by Walter Kalin, the Envoy to the Chair and Vice Chair (Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat, interview, 25.01.2019; Jane McAdam, interview, 06.05.2019). He understood the Nansen Initiative's goal, the political climate, and ways in which the objective could be achieved, and built trust among diverse government officials (Field Notes, 17.05.2019).

The Nansen Initiative was formed in 2012 as a bottom-up state-led process to develop a set of key principles for protecting people displaced internationally by environmental stressors (McAdam, 2014). It focused on building political consensus at the regional level as governments expressed unwillingness to globalise international environmental displacement governance (Atle Solberg, interview, 08.12.2018). This was achieved by commissioning research on current protection, migration, and relocation arrangements, facilitating government

and civil society consultations – beginning with the Pacific – to understand challenges faced by communities and gather 'good practices,' and convening expert meetings to formulate the Toolbox on Planned Relocation (Bedford & Burson, 2013; Fitzpatrick, 2013; Gero, 2013; Nansen Initiative, 2013; UNHCR et al., 2014). All of this information culminated in the 2015 Global Protection Agenda (Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015).

From 2012 to 2015, the Nansen Initiative evolved significantly (Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat, interview, 25.01.2019; Jane McAdam, interview, 06.05.2019). While Pacific officials recognise the interlinkages between slow- and sudden-onset disasters, other governments are averse to climate change and hence do not engage in certain policy dialogues. The secretariat removed climate change from its name, thereby increasing political engagement. Additionally, it formed a dense network of professional experts from development, humanitarian, and environmental backgrounds, appointed regional advisors to build national capacities on the issue area, and provided feedback on regional and domestic strategies. They acted as intermediaries, conveying and aligning international and regional norms. Furthermore, even though shaping international policy dialogues was not part of its goal, professional experts worked with states to frame and anchor messages on human mobility into climate change, disasters, and migration policy agendas. The structural and functional expansion of the Nansen Initiative contributed to its global recognition as the leading *normative forum* for discussing international environmental displacement governance.

In 2016, Germany launched the Nansen Initiative's successor, the PDD. It oversees the implementation of the Global Protection Agenda. In practical terms, this means supporting countries to understand, develop, and refine policies to protect environmentally displaced persons by drawing on the "existing body of practice" that includes humanitarian protection measures, labour migration programmes, and planned relocation schemes (Atle Solberg, interview, 08.12.2018; Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019). PDD has gradually expanded from 2019 to 2022. The secretariat has recruited new staff, formed a group of friends for political and institutional backing, refined its expert network to only include recognised professionals in the issue area, and partnered on three multi-initiatives in the Pacific (Bower & Weerasinghe, 2021; Burson et al., 2021; EU et al., n.d.; PCCMHS Programme, 2019; PDD & Norad, 2022). This development indicates that PDD may emerge as the leading *normative organisation* for governing global environmental displacement.

In contrast to the PDD, the World Bank is a leading operational agency for facilitating development-friendly 'best practices.' It rationalises different types of human mobility in different ways. Planned relocation is understood as a preventive, recovery, and/or development strategy that can be used to minimise displacement risks, rebuild following sudden-onset disasters, and improve livelihoods. As alluded to in Chapter 4, it has an internal policy on involuntary resettlements that stresses planned relocation should be a measure of last resort, and loan-requesting governments must identify the number of displaced persons, and formulate a plan for their resettlement (Cernea, 1988; Ferris, 2011, 2012; Warner et al., 2013; World Bank, 2001; Zaman, 1996).

The World Bank's approach is guided by the IRR model that highlights the importance of minimising landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of access to common property resources, and community disarticulation by facilitating resettlement schemes as development projects (Cernea, 2004; Ferris et al., 2011). Its expertise shaped the Internal Guiding Principles, the Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, and OECD's resettlement policies, a handbook on post-disaster reconstruction, and a guide on resettlement (Correa, 2011; Deng, 1993; Downing, 2002; Ferris, 2011; Jha et al., 2010). From this perspective, the World Bank had extensive expertise in facilitating internal relocations before it became a salient response for regulating internal environmental displacement.

In addition, World Bank experts perceive well-planned labour migration as a development and adaptation strategy. They argue remittances help create local employment opportunities, build social networks, improve school attendance, and withstand shocks (Barnett & Webber, 2010; McKenzie & Gibson, 2010). In the context of the Pacific, they suggest aligning temporary and permanent schemes to build resilience and migrate with dignity (Curtain et al., 2016). These experts helped formulate and monitor the RSE, SWP, and Samoa's labour-exporting policy (Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019). They disseminate New Zealand's scheme as a 'best practice' for fostering development and highlight the amenability of existing programmes to address emerging issues such as work exploitation (Gibson & McKenzie, 2014a; Luthria, 2008; Luthria & Malaulau, 2013; Winters, 2016). Thus, the World Bank possessed knowledge of labour migration management before it became an accepted way of facilitating environmental migration.

In 2014, the World Bank's KNOMAD established a thematic working group on environmental change and migration. Georgetown University's Susan Martin was influential in raising KNOMAD leadership's awareness of the issue area, eventually becoming the Vice Chair of the working group (Elizabeth Ferris, interview, 23.07.2019). The working group prepared policy briefs promoting labour migration and planned relocation as viable solutions for managing environmental migration and displacement, which shaped global migration and refugee frameworks and the planned relocation toolbox (Fornale & Kagan, 2017; UNHCR et al., 2017; Bergmann & Martin, 2018; Martin et al., 2018; Wheeler, 2014). The World Bank's recent reports recognise that Pacific governments are responding to increasing internal climate migration by formulating distinct policies (Clement et al., 2021; Rigaud et al., 2018). Because it offers limited operational support in the Pacific and elsewhere for regulating the issue, the World Bank can be classified as a knowledge producer.

In a different vein, IRCRCM has a humanitarian mandate. It has always worked on human mobility issues, initially targeting victims of conflict-induced displacement and then extending its services to other groups needing humanitarian assistance and protection. IRCRCM integrated environmental risks into its existing work programme, which focuses on the entire human mobility cycle and includes the prevention of conditions leading to displacement, assistance and protection, and environmental sustainability (IRCRCM, 2020).

During data collection, only the International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC) Climate Centre and IFRC actively participated in environmental migration and displacement policymaking. The ICRC rationalised the Climate Centre's creation by arguing that environmental stressors create new and heighten existing humanitarian needs. Its operations focus on producing research detailing different types of environmental risks and their impacts on humanitarian work (Maarten van Aalst, interview, 22.08.2019). This information shaped ICRC's recent efforts to support victims of nexus situations and is used to help governments and communities understand and effectively manage environmental risks to prevent displacement (Climate Centre, 2021). The IFRC's engagement in the issue area is rationalised by the notion that "people move for different reasons, at different times and have different needs based on the migration status, dislocation from the community [and] absence of a legal protection framework" (Ezekiel Simperingham, interview, 12.08.2019). It is building the capacity of national societies to address environmental displacement by formulating local guidance on planned relocation, a programme on protecting people on the move, and a

migration strategy (IFRC, 2017, 2021a, 2021b). It is amplifying their voices in global climate change, disaster risk reduction, and migration dialogues by showcasing early action 'best practices,' and challenges in assisting seasonal workers and people displaced by environmental stressors (Field Notes, 26-28.03.2019; IFRC, 2018). For this reason, IFRC is recognised as an instrumental stakeholder in implementing the Migration and Refugee Compacts (GCM, 2019; GCR, 2018a). IFRC is also a co-lead for providing shelter to people displaced by humanitarian disasters. Thus, while IRCRCM collectively does not advocate human mobility, it appears that the IFRC is emerging as an operational agency, extending protection to individuals moving in response to environmental stressors.

Similarly, NRC provides humanitarian assistance and protection to displaced persons (Nina Birkeland, interview, 05.07.2019). It rationalises environmental displacement as a humanitarian issue, requiring protection mechanisms for individuals fleeing across borders. NRC houses IDMC, which was initially tasked with monitoring forced population movements triggered by violence. However, IDMC expanded its research work by claiming the Internal Guiding Principles recognised environmental disasters as a cause of internal displacement and responding to international organisations' doubts about the environmental/climate refugee crisis (Bina Desai, interview, 07.06.2019; Michelle Yonetani, interview, 28.06.2019).

In 2004, IDMC partnered with the UN Office of Humanitarian Coordination and Assistance (UNOCHA) to develop global figures on internal environmental displacement, which was used to demonstrate causality and knowledge, normative and operational gaps, and advocate the inclusion of displacement and protection concerns in global climate adaptation policy (IASC, 2008; NRC, 2009; OCHA & IDMC, 2009). From 2010 onwards, NRC/IDMC published a study spotlighting the plight of Pacific Islanders' international displacement and the need for a regional protection framework; formulated internal displacement risk profiles for Fiji, the Marshall Islands, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu; and launched a regional initiative on the issue area (Bolo et al., 2021a, 2021b, 2021c; Bolo et al., 2022; Brenn, 2015; Field Notes, 27.03.2019, 16.05.2019, 17.11.2022; IDMC, 2018, 2019; Petz & Ginnetti, 2013). These knowledge products shaped global and regional environmental and human mobility norms. Thus, NRC provides advocacy support while IDMC produces evidence that is widely used for internal environmental displacement policymaking.

BfW's work focuses on poverty alleviation but advocates protection and compensation for international environmentally displaced persons (Sabine Minninger, interview 13.12.2018). Its

involvement in environmental mobility governance processes stemmed from Pacific members' (e.g., PCC, Tulele Peisa, and Tuvalu Climate Action Network) concerns that climate change heightens livelihood insecurity and displacement. Its briefing papers, submissions, and presentations called for the international community to establish a standalone human rights-based protocol, financial reparations for displaced communities, expand regular migration pathways, and facilitate resettlements as a preventative strategy (BfW, 2012; Braun, 2023; Field Notes, 11.12.2018; Hirsch, 2019; Shamsuddoha, 2015). BfW recently funded the Cogea relocation in Fiji (discussed further in the next section) (FCOSS, 2023). Thus, BfW provides advocacy and financial support for environmental mobility management.

6.2.2 Boundary Spanning Optimists

Another set of international agencies sits at the intersection of optimistic and pessimistic views on the environment and human mobility nexus. Some of them refrain from promoting certain solutions, but, when they do, it is to support primary optimists, strengthening the environmental mobility coalition. Others assist people on the move because it is tangentially related to their mandates and that of their members. They include OHCHR, UNEP, PIFS, and the Pacific Islands Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (PIANGO).

OHCHR is the leading human rights agency. It rationalises human mobility as an "imperfect" adaption and resilience-building solution because people forcibly move (OHCHR Representative, interview, 06.08.2019). Its work in environmental migration and displacement is fragmented. A series of events in the 1970s shaped the ICMW, a mandate for the Special Rapporteur on Migrants, and the Committee on Migrant Workers: Idi Amin expelled Uganda's minority Asian population; the economic recession heightened irregular migration and thus migrant worker abuse and exploitation; and developing countries perceived ILO's migrant worker protections as biased towards developed nations (Desmond, 2015). Fears of conflict-induced displacement spilling over to developed nations and threatening regional instability influenced the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the mandate for the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs (Cohen, 2004, 2007; Nina Birkeland, interview, 05.07.2019).

The mandate holders began exploring the human rights implications of internal environmental displacement following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and 2013 Typhoon Haiyan (Cecelia Jiminez-Darmary, interview, 09.08.2019; Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019). The Maldives

placed environmental stressors on the UNHRC agenda, calling for panel discussions and reports on the human rights implications of environmental stressors. This led to the establishment of the mandate for the Special Rapporteur on HR and Environment (OHCHR, 2012) . However, Bangladesh and the Philippines called for a separate Special Rapporteur on HR and Climate Change because they were of the view that the Council should have a stronger voice in the 2015 Paris Agreement negotiations (OHCHR, 2008). Fiji and the Marshall Islands not only maintained the issue on the agenda but also elevated the problem of environmental displacement across different human rights and forced migration platforms (Field Notes, 06.06.2019; Robyn-Ann Mani, interview, 26.07.2019). These efforts ultimately culminated in a separate Special Rapporteur mandate on HR and Climate Change.

Despite internal fragmentation, OHCHR and the independent experts have increased their engagement in the issue area since 2018. They postulate environmental stressors threaten fundamental human rights, including the right to movement, self-determination, life, and development (IPCC, 2019a; Robert Vaughan, interview, 08.12.2018; OHCHR, 2018b). Some Special Rapporteurs lauded Fiji's relocation efforts and banded together to issue joint statements leading up to climate change conferences (Cecelia Jiminez-Darmary, interview, 09.08.2019; OHCHR, 2018b, 2021). OHCHR also supported the global migration negotiations by publishing guidance, reports, and key messages on protecting migrants in vulnerable situations, admission and stay, and migration with dignity as a measure of last resort (UNHRC, 2017, 2018; OHCHR, 2011, 2018a; OHCHR & GMG, 2018; OHCHR & PDD, 2018). In the Pacific, it is part of a regional programme that developed a human rights-based climate mobility framework (Hosking, 2017). The issue also appears to be an avenue for the regional office to gain recognition from headquarters and increase its presence in the Pacific (Field Notes, 30.09.2019). Because of its expertise in protecting vulnerable migrants, OHCHR engages in regional policy dialogues and consultations on environmental migration and displacement (PCCMHS Programme, 2019, 2021). In the absence of UNHCR, OHCHR assists internationally displaced persons finding themselves in the Pacific. Thus, although it does not explicitly promote migration and relocation as coping strategies, OHCHR is beginning to work on environmental mobility governance.

UNEP is mandated to work on all environment-related issues. It promotes sustainable environmental management as a resilience-building and displacement-averting strategy (Solheim & Swing, 2018). From 1980 to 2010, UNEP's engagement with environmental

migration and displacement policymaking processes was periodic. It participated in events and commissioned studies introducing the environmental refugee category, highlighting the environment and conflict nexus and demonstrating the ecological impacts of refugee movements (El-Hinnawi, 1985; UNEP, 2007; UNHCR et al., 1996). It also helped to establish an institutional structure to mobilise and anchor human mobility solutions onto the global adaptation agenda (CCEMA, n.d.; PDD, 2018). In 2018, UNEP expanded its disaster and conflict resilience programmes and intensified policy advocacy in the issue area, claiming environmental stressors were absent from humanitarian response plans and global migration debates (UNEP Representative, interview, 09.01.2019). Since then, it has published reports on the role of the environmental migration community in reducing displacement risks by facilitating resettlements (GoS et al., 2021; UNEP, 2017). Yet, its regional presence in regulating environmental migration and displacement is limited.

PIFS has a peace, security, and development policy mandate. Climate change is perceived as the single greatest threat to the region and human mobility is rationalised as one way of protecting Pacific peoples from displacement and improving their livelihoods (BDAP, 2018; FRDP, 2016; Pacific 2050 Strategy, 2022). Although environmental mobility concerns were recognised in 2008 (PIFS, 2008), its engagement in governance matters has been sporadic and gradual. From 2014 and 2016, it was a partner in a regional project on the climate and migration nexus, convened a regional expert forum and policy dialogue on the issue area, and shared planned relocation 'good practices' and displacement challenges with the global climate change policymaking body (PIFS, 2016; PIFS & UN, 2016). At the time of data collection, Pacific governments were reluctant to discuss regional environmental migration and displacement regulation: Tuvalu was adamant that its people would not migrate while others were preoccupied with competing priorities (Andrew McElroy, interview, 02.12.2019; Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019). However, it appears that recent IPCC reports and outsider efforts galvanised political will and institutional interest to consider a regional regulatory framework.

At present, PIFS's activities on environmental mobility are divided into three work streams. Each stream is associated with particular logic, frameworks, and forums. The logic of 'labour migration for economic development' guides the regional mobility stream. It is encapsulated in the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations Plus's (PACER-Plus) contentious Labour Mobility Arrangement that calls for the formulation of a regional labour mobility

framework and is promoted at the Pacific Labour Mobility Annual Meeting (PLMAM). The climate resilience stream is guided by the 'labour migration and planned relocation for humanitarian protection' logic. It is enshrined in the FRDP and endorsed by members of the Pacific Resilience Partnership (discussed further below). The conflict prevention stream is guided by the 'displacement as a human security threat' logic whereby efforts focus on minimising environmental displacement to maintain regional human security (PIFS Regional Security Advisor, interview, 20.02.2020; Scott Hook, interview, 01.11.2019; Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019). Under this workstream, Pacific leaders endorsed the PRFCM (McAdam, 2022). In addition, PIFS is a non-implementing partner on two regional initiatives and recently facilitated an expert webinar on internal displacement and a side event at the 27th COP to UNFCCC on the regional framework (Field Notes, 11.02.2021, 16.11.2022). Although PIFS does not actively promote human mobility solutions and its policy work on environmental migration and displacement is fragmented, it is gradually evolving as the premier normative institution on the issue area.

PIANGO is a regional civil society network that advocates the notion of migration with dignity. It began engaging in environmental mobility governance processes after Fiji offered to relocate I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans susceptible to environmental displacement and upon hearing concerns of previously relocated communities. In 2018, it launched a national project on preparing Kiribati for the move by instituting appropriate legislation, upskilling, and providing development packages (FCOSS Representative, interview, 19.11.2019). Its submissions called for global action on the dignified resettlement of environmentally displaced persons, integrating rights and dignity into all migration schemes, and commencing dialogues on a regional protection framework (Pacificwin, 2018; PIANGO, 2015, 2016, 2018; PIANGO et al., 2017). PIANGO joined with PICAN and Oxfam Australia to champion dignified migration. Consequently, "traces" of the idea are evident in the global migration norm and the regional instrument (Simon Bradshaw, interview, 04.06.2019).

6.2.3 Planned Relocation Advocates

Planned relocation advocates promote resettlement schemes as a 'model' for managing internal environmental displacement, protecting human rights, and enhancing development prospects. They are organised in a dense network that has a transnational reach. They provide normative guidance, knowledge products, financial resources, and operational assistance. In addition to

the ten organisations categorised as primary and boundary optimists,[10] the structure includes nine other agencies. They are the Brookings Institution, Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM), Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Displacement Solutions, the Pacific Conference of Churches (PCC), Fiji Council of Social Services (FCOSS), the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), and national environment institutions.

The Brookings Institution emerged as a knowledge producer on internal displacement in the 1990s. It advocates using resettlement schemes to minimise internal movements and protect IDPs. Its Internal Displacement Project revealed IDPs are susceptible to human rights violations akin to refugees but remain within national borders and hence, require state protection (Cohen & Deng, 1998). This finding shaped the mandate of the Special Rapporteur for IDPs, the Internal Guiding Principles, and institutional policies on involuntary resettlement (Bode, 2014; Deng, 2004). The increasing internal environmental displacement cases and acceptance of planned relocation as an adaptation strategy prompted some experts to explore the climate-resettlement nexus and the applicability of the Guiding Principles in such contexts (Elizabeth Ferris, interview, 23.07.2019; Kalin, 2008; Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019).

More recently, ISIM emerged as a knowledge entrepreneur on planned relocation in the context of environmental stressors. The Institute's leadership engaged in environmental mobility research and governance processes (see Martin, 2010a, 2010b; Warner et al., 2013). However, its focus on planned relocation originates from the MacArthur Foundation-financed project on the causes, consequences, and responses to humanitarian crises and migration (Sanjula Weerasinghe, interview, 29.07.2019). It began building a separate portfolio on planned relocation when Brookings Institution experts joined the ISIM. This transfer seems to have fostered a partnership between the institutes, allowing them to shape ideologies, norms, and practices on facilitating planned relocation as an anticipatory protection strategy.

From 2008 to 2022, the Brookings Institution and ISIM experts increased efforts to regulate planned relocation. They published books, journal articles, blogs, commentaries, conference papers, and reports clarifying the notion of planned relocation, demonstrating its feasibility in

[10] They include UNU-EHS, IOM, UNHCR, Nansen Initiative/PDD, IRCRCM, NRC/IDMC, the World Bank, PIFS, OHCHR, and BfW.

high-island contexts, highlighting the importance of ensuring it protects and improves the livelihoods of affected communities, and sharing 'good practices,' including those from the Pacific (Bower & Weerasinghe, 2021; Brookings-LSE, 2014; Ferris, 2011, 2015; Ferris et al., 2011; McAdam & Ferris, 2015; Nansen Initiative, 2014; Petz, 2015a, 2015b). They also helped draft global human mobility frameworks and planned relocation norms (Brookings Institution et al., 2015; UNHCR et al., 2017). Further, they provided feedback on national internal displacement and planned relocation guidelines in the Pacific and the USA (Elizabeth Ferris, interview, 23.07.2019; Nazhat Shameem Khan, interview, 26.07.2019).

GIZ aspires to be a "world-leading technical advisory agency" on human mobility issues (Gabor Sasvari, interview, 17.10.2019). It sporadically participates in multi-level environmental migration and displacement governance processes: it chaired the Nansen Initiative, commissioned studies on planned relocations and existing regulatory gaps, and disseminated Pacific resettlement 'good practices' (Bower & Weerasinghe, 2021; Lennartz et al., 2021; Mokhnacheva, 2022; Weerasinghe & Bower, 2021). In the Pacific, GIZ's efforts focus on regulating planned relocation. It partnered with the European Union on the Adapting to Climate Change and Sustainable Energy programme, and New Zealand on the Global Programme on Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change (GPHMCCC), which funded four community relocations in Fiji and two domestic guidelines (see Chapter 8) (Adrian Nicolae, interview, 02.10.2019; GIZ, 2019; Ministry of Economy Representative, interview, 29.03.2019). Although it is part of regional policy networks, GIZ appears to be primarily a financial entrepreneur for planned relocation in the Pacific.

Displacement Solutions focuses on finding land-based solutions for climate-displaced persons, which includes promoting planned relocation as a durable solution for minimising forced evictions. It was set up in 2006 to raise the international community's awareness of environmental displacement and enhance NGO engagement in the issue area (Scott Leckie, interview, 07.08.2019). It organised speaking tours for Tulele Peisa to share the Carteret Islanders' resettlement efforts, convened international meetings on relocations, and produced reports and a reader focusing on climate displacement, housing, land, and property rights (Displacement Solutions, 2008, 2009; Displacement Solutions & UNHCR, 2008; Leckie, 2009, 2013; Rakova, 2012). Importantly, it drew from Pacific islanders' displacement and resettlement experiences and existing normative instruments to develop the Peninsula Principles (Scott Leckie, interview, 07.08.2019). They shaped the global planned relocation

toolbox and Fiji's national guidelines. This suggests that Displacement Solutions' role expanded from advocating for planned relocation to producing knowledge and setting norms.

PCC, a member of the World Council of Churches and made up of 27 churches, provides pastoral care and spiritual support to relocating households. Its environmental resettlement efforts partly emerged from community concerns expressed to faith leaders about the implications of the changing environment. It was also informed by the Vunidogoloa relocation in Fiji. The government approached PCC for assistance upon realising the community needed reassurance on whether their decision was "right, safe, a[nd] just for all … if God will allow them to relocate" and help in addressing issues around identity and culture (Frances Namoumou, interview, 31.10.2019). From 2004 to 2010, PCC raised international awareness of environmental displacement and relocation: faith leaders called for industrialised countries to relocate and compensate affected persons, urged regional organisations to formulate a normative resettlement framework, and encouraged governments to find relocation options to minimise displacement risks (PCC, 2004, 2009). Once planned relocation was anchored in the international climate adaptation framework, PCC efforts shifted towards shaping regional policy dialogues, helping implement regional initiatives, and providing feedback on national strategies, training, and post-relocation support (Field Notes, 26.03.2019, 03.12.2020; Frances Namoumou, interview, 31.10.2019; Nansen Initiative, 2013). Thus, PCC has emerged as an implementing agency.

FCOSS is a community-based organisation with links to regional networks that recently began facilitating planned relocations. Conversations from district council meetings put environmental relocation on its radar but activities were limited to attending workshops (FCOSS Representative, interview, 19.11.2019). BfW had funding for a civil society-led loss and damage project, which was granted to FCOSS to help facilitate the Cogea relocation in partnership with the community (Naidu, 2023; Vakasukawaqa, 2023). Its approach is guided by the 'do no harm principle' and informed by the negative experiences of Tukaraki and Vunidogoloa relocations (Field Notes, 01.03.2023). The Cogea relocation will be used to assess the applicability of and revise Fiji's guidelines and Standard Operating Procedures (FCOSS, 2023).

SPC and SPREP are concerned with regional environmental protection and development. Although they do not have mandates on human mobility, both agencies have assisted with relocation schemes. SPC collaborated with GIZ to facilitate relocations in Fiji. It mapped new

village sites and advised on ground stability, water sources, and safety (Colin Tukuitonga, interview, 15.11.2019). Similarly, SPREP provided technical advice for the Tegua resettlement in Vanuatu by conducting vulnerability assessments, consultations on the appropriateness of the site, and post-relocation monitoring (Kosi Latu, interview, 28.03.2019; Nakalevu & Phillips, 2007). It also temporarily housed the Nansen Initiative's Regional Advisor and partners with international organisations to shape climate change policies (Field Notes, 08.12.2018; Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat, interview, 25.1.2019; Nansen Initiative, 2013). However, SPC and SPREP only engage in these processes upon government requests.

Pacific Island countries integrated planned relocation into existing national environment systems (see Table 6.1). The environment (including climate change and disaster), ministries, and divisions formulated will help implement the guidelines. The latter entails providing information on sea-level projections, conducting vulnerability assessments, building the capacity of implementing agencies, securing funding, and identifying and registering new sites. At present, only Fiji has a fully established system for facilitating planned relocation. It has a national relocation and displacement task force and trust fund, and assigned responsibilities to government agencies (GoF, 2018, 2021, 2023).

Although environment institutions aid in the relocation process, it is led by different government agencies, which reflects the local conditions (see Chapter 10). In Fiji, the Ministry of Rural and Maritime Development and Disaster Management is responsible for all resettlements except for those in informal settlements, which is led by the Ministry of Housing (GoF, 2023; Mohammed Maqbool, interview, 09.12.2019). In the Solomon Islands, the Ministry of Lands, Housing, and Survey facilitates the process, but the provincial government coordinates it (Barnab Bagos, interview, 15.11.2022; GoSI, 2022). It is unclear whether a different agency will manage relocations in New Zealand, but the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management is anticipated to play a role (see GoNZ, 2019a). In contrast, Tulele Peisa, a community-based organisation, is managing the resettlement of the Carteret Islands (Tulele Peisa, n.d.). Despite these institutional differences, planned relocation is accepted as a norm for managing internal environmental displacement because it is integrated into the practices of environment agencies.

Table 6.1: National Institutional Landscape for Planned Relocation in the Pacific.

Country	Key National Agencies	Primary Responsibilities

Australia	Department of Climate Change, Energy, Environment, and Water	Policy development
Fiji	Climate Change Division, Office of the Prime Minister Ministry of Rural and Maritime Development and Disaster Management Ministry of Housing Fijian Taskforce on Relocation and Displacement Technical Working Group	Policy development Lead on relocations Co-lead on urban relocations Coordinates relocation process Implements the Standard Operating Procedures
New Zealand	Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Ministry of Civil Defences and Emergency Management	Policy development Policy development
Papua New Guinea	Autonomous Bougainville Government Manam Resettlement Authority Tulele Peisa	Lead on Carterets relocation to Kuveria and Buka Island Lead on Manam relocation Policy development and lead on Carterets relocation to Tinputz
Samoa	Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Ministry of Lands	Policy development and lead on community integration, including relocations Acquiring land
Solomon Islands	Ministry of Environment, Climate Change, Disaster Management, and Meteorology Ministry of Lands, Housing, and Survey National and Provincial Climate and Risk Resilience Committees	Policy development Lead on relocations Coordinates and manages environmental programmes
Tonga	Ministry of Infrastructure	Policy development
Vanuatu	Interministerial Committee Ministry of Climate Change Adaptation, Meteorology, Geohazards, Energy, Environment, and Disaster Management National Advisory Board on Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction	Implementation support Lead on relocations Policy development

6.2.4 Labour Migration Supporters

Labour migration supporters endorse amending, expanding, and aligning labour migration programmes to build adaptive capacities and resilience and foster development. They mobilised into a semi-dense network that predominantly guides knowledge development and multi-level policy processes. This analysis identified 11 agencies that can be classified as

labour migration supporters. In addition to the seven agencies characterised as primary and boundary-spanning optimists[11], they include ILO, UNESCAP Pacific Office, Oxfam Australia, and the Pacific Islands Climate Action Network (PICAN). However, labour migration supporters are yet to influence national labour systems.

ILO works on all employment issues. The Labour Migration Branch was set up to regulate temporary programmes to maximise benefits and minimise risks of overseas work. It encourages governments to ratify and adhere to human rights-based labour migration norms (e.g., 1949 Migration for Employment Convention, 1975 Migrant Workers Convention, and 2006 Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration), provide pre-departure training, establish grievance mechanisms, and offer financial, literacy, and reintegration support (Harsdorff et al., 2011). In 2013, ILO constituents urged the agency to prioritise and mainstream climate change in all aspects of its work, and Michelle Leighton – who had expertise in and connections with actors working on environmental mobility governance – joined the Branch (ILO Representative 2, interview, 17.07.2019; Michelle Leighton, interview, 21.08.2019). Instead of establishing a separate division, the Branch integrated environmental stressors into its existing mandate. It claimed climate change and disasters threatened job opportunities and livelihoods. Safe, orderly, and regular labour migration can alleviate environmental pressures (ILO, 2016; ILO Representative 1, interview, 29.03.2019; Kagan et al., 2017).

This logic was translated into regional activities. From 2012 to 2023, the ILO Pacific Office's efforts were geared toward regulating labour migration in the region (Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019). It partnered on two initiatives that initiated conversations with Pacific governments on reforming labour legislations and enhancing the benefits of labour migration, leading to two labour-exporting policies and knowledge products such as a compendium on existing laws and institutional arrangement, guidance on collecting labour migration statistics, reviews on existing schemes, and briefs on climate migration (Duncan & Voigt-Graf, 2010; GoK, 2015a; GoT, 2015a; ILO, 2010a, 2010b ; Kagan & Campbell, 2015; Mudaliar & Voigt-Graf, 2021; Bedford et al., 2014; Voigt-Graf, 2022). These findings shaped international climate mobility dialogues (ILO, 2018; PCCMHS Programme, 2019; PIFS & UN, 2016). The projects were envisaged to "slowly, year by year and step by step convince countries to consider ratifying the conventions", but uptake remains low in the Pacific (ILO Representative 1,

[11] They include UNU-EHS, IOM, Nansen Initiative/PDD, the World Bank, PIFS, OHCHR, and PIANGO.

29.03.2019). Perhaps, by integrating environmental stressors into its existing mandate, ILO envisaged spreading its original mission of regulating labour migration in the Pacific.

UNESCAP is mandated to work on development issues. At the headquarters level, environmental migration governance is divided into the environment and social development work programmes. The latter includes facilitating regional intergovernmental dialogues on global migration governance and supporting states to prepare for the follow-up process (UNESCAP, 2015, 2018, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). While the headquarters recognises labour migration as an avenue for building resilience, environmental migration governance is only tangentially related to its social development mandate. However, it is a critical area of work for the Pacific Office. In 2011, it recognised an institutional vacuum that prompted conversations with the ILO Pacific Office on climate change and labour migration interlinkages. UNESCAP Pacific Office's Timothy Westbury (interview, 07.10.2019) shared, "it was always an issue, but as far as the UN was concerned, albeit taking it on board now, nobody was working on it". From 2014 to 2023, it was part of two regional initiatives and used the findings to shape global climate change norms and nurture sub-regional dialogues on the protection of people displaced by environmental stressors (Field Notes, 03.10.2019, 09.12.2019; PCCMHS Programme, 2019, 2021; PCCM Project, 2014; PIFS & UN, 2016;). It should be noted that the Pacific Office initially promoted labour migration as an adaptation strategy but has since shifted focus towards other policy responses, which may be influenced by new knowledge and partners. Thus, the UNESCAP Pacific Office is predominantly a norm mediator in the region.

Oxfam Australia is concerned with poverty alleviation, including addressing the environmental crisis. In 2016, it evolved from a north-led, top-down service delivery organisation to a south-led, bottom-up policy advocacy agency. Consequently, its members shape institutional priorities. Oxfam Pacific – a member of PICAN – introduced the notion of migration with dignity, which shifted Oxfam Australia's approach to minimising environmental displacement (Simon Bradshaw, interview, 04.06.2019). It now promotes upskilling, expanding regular migration channels, and compensating environmentally displaced communities through reports, submissions, and presentations (Jacobs et al., 2021; Johnston et al., 2021; Maclellan & Meads, 2016; Oxfam Aotearoa & Oxfam Australia, 2015; Richards & Bradshaw 2017; Simon Bradshaw, Sydney, 30.10.2018). These findings shaped global climate change and migration

norms (Simon Bradshaw, interview, 04.06.2019). Beyond this, Oxfam Australia's involvement in environmental migration management is limited.

Similarly, PICAN urges governments to formulate policies for minimising environmental displacement that are grounded in local experiences (Genevieve Jiva, interview, 21.11.2019). It is connected to the International Climate Action Network and made up of local networks that include smaller agencies, government officials, and political champions (e.g., Anote Tong and Pepetua Latasi) (Field Notes, 08.11.2022). The exposure to advocates of migration with dignity appeared to influence its policy messages and submission calling for a Pacific Climate Treaty that considers solutions for international environmental displacement (PICAN, 2016). PICAN recently started using the term "climate-forced migration", reflecting the views of frontline communities in Kiribati and Tuvalu who do not wish to emigrate (Genevieve Jiva, interview, 21.11.2019). This reframing may indicate ideological tensions between IGOs that strongly advocate labour migration as a resilient adaptation strategy and regional NGOs that stress climate change forces people to move (i.e., it is not their choice).

Pacific Island countries have established elaborate national systems to regulate labour migration (see Table 6.2). Origin governments created ministries and departments or units to oversee the implementation of their policies, which includes preparing a work-ready pool of labourers, making visa arrangements, and granting licenses to labour-hire companies. Destination governments also set up institutions to execute their programmes. They grant visas, ensure employers fulfil their obligations, monitor wages and working conditions, and provide pre-departure, reintegration, and other basic training.

Although environmental migration thinking shaped some labour migration programmes, it is not an integral component of national labour systems in the Pacific (Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019). Their mandate is restricted to employment issues. While climate change and disasters are perceived as threats to employment and livelihood security, labour officers are preoccupied with creating green jobs. Most of them are yet to realise that the benefits of labour migration can heighten adaptive capacities or build resilience. This is because environment-related issues are seen as the responsibilities of environment agencies. As a result, regional meetings on environmental migration are primarily attended by climate change and disaster management officers (Field Notes, 26-28.03.2019; Nansen Initiative, 2013). Even when they do recognise the link, agencies have competing priorities. This may

indicate that the design, mandate, and priorities hinder national labour institutions from adopting the 'labour migration as an adaptation or resilience-building strategy' logic.

Table 6.2: National Institutional Landscape for Labour Migration in the Pacific.

Country	Key National Agencies	Primary Responsibilities
Australia	Department of Education, Skills, and Employment Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Immigration, Citizenship, and Multicultural Affairs, Department of Home Affairs Pacific Labour Facility Griffith University	Used to manage the seasonal programmes Manages all temporary programmes Grants visas Supports implementation of all temporary programmes Recruitment for the Kiribati-Australia Nursing Initiative
Fiji	Ministry of Employment, Productivity, and Industrial Relations National Employment Centre	Policy development Oversees temporary programmes
Kiribati	Kiribati International Oversea Seaman's Union Kiribati School of Nursing Ministry of Health and Medical Services Overseas Employment Unit, Ministry of Employment and Human Resources South Pacific Marine Services	Co-lead on seafaring scheme Recruitment for the Kiribati-Australia Nursing Initiative Managed the Kiribati-Australia Nursing Initiative Oversees all programmes, except seafaring scheme Co-lead on seafaring scheme
Nauru	Labour Mobility Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	Oversees temporary programmes
New Zealand	Ministry of Immigration, Business, and Employment Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	Administers all programmes Policy development
Papua New Guinea	Labour Mobility Unit, Department of Treasury	Oversees temporary programmes
Samoa	Samoa Diaspora Relations Unit, Ministry of Prime Minister and Cabinet Seasonal Employment Unit, Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Labour	Diaspora engagement Oversees temporary programmes
Solomon Islands	Labour Mobility Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade	Oversees temporary programmes
Tonga	Labour Sending Unit, Ministry of Internal Affairs	Oversees temporary programmes

Tuvalu	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, Tourism, Environment, and Labour Pre-Service Department, Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport Tuvaluan Overseas Seafarers' Union	Oversees all programmes, except seafaring scheme Manages the Sky is the Limit Programme Lead on seafaring scheme
Vanuatu	Department of Labour and Employment Services	Oversees temporary programmes

6.2.5 Humanitarian Protectionists

Humanitarian protectionists endorse using refugee, statelessness, and complementary measures to safeguard the human rights of international environmentally displaced persons. They formed a loose network to primarily assess the applicability of existing protection measures. They have yet to shape domestic immigration systems. In addition to the seven primary and boundary-spanning optimists,[12] two other organisations promote humanitarian 'best practices.' They are the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) and the Pacific Immigration Development Community (PIDC).

ICMC is mandated to work on refugee and human trafficking issues. Leading up to the adoption of the global migration norm, its members identified protection for environmentally displaced persons as a priority area. During data collection, its efforts were limited to policy advocacy: it convened events where environmental displacement and statelessness were raised as the leading 21st century issues for low-lying nations (ICMC, 2018, 2020; Stephane Jaquemet, interview, 12.08.2019). Recently, ICMC expanded its research activities on the humanitarian needs of people forced to flee their homes by climate change (ICMC, 2022). Despite this, it seems the ICMC is yet to actively engage in environmental displacement governance processes.

PIDC is the leading regional immigration agency and the primary focal point for environmental displacement matters (PIDC, 2019). From 2010 to 2019, it sporadically engaged in the issue area. PIDC shaped multi-level policy dialogues on governing international migration by producing knowledge products on the role of immigration officials in delivering humanitarian assistance in disaster-stricken communities, and by participating in forums on facilitating cross-border relocations and protecting internationally displaced persons using immigration

[12] They include IOM, UNHCR, the Nansen Initiative/PDD, IRCRCM, NRC/IDMC, BfW, and PIANGO.

law (Field Notes, 26.03.2019; PIDC & IFRC, 2010; PIDC, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2017, 2018; Vakasukawaqa, 2018). It purportedly provides policy advice on par with global migration norms (PIFS Regional Security Advisor, interview, 20.02.2020). Recently, PIDC banded together with other regional agencies to tackle transnational organised crime, including human trafficking, which is argued to increase in response to climate change (see APSC, 2022). Perhaps for this reason, PIDC is beginning to advocate for humanitarian 'best practices' rather than development-friendly approaches.

Pacific countries have established systems to regulate immigration (see Table 6.3). Immigration ministries and departments are tasked with renewing passports and issuing citizenship, permits, and visas. Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu are signatories to the refugee conventions while Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, and New Zealand signed the statelessness agreements. Although these global instruments are not ratified, protection measures are part of domestic immigration legislation and systems (GoA, 2020; GoF, 2016; GoK, 2019; GoNZ, 2009; GoSI, 2012; GoV, 2010-2018). However, only Australia and New Zealand have set up tribunals to assess humanitarian cases. In contrast, the immigration laws in Samoa, the Marshall Islands, Tonga, and Tuvalu do not extend protection to displaced persons (GoS, 2020; GoMI, 2012; GoT, 2020a; GoT, 2008).

The immigration systems do not recognise environmental stressors as a cause of international protection. This can be partly attributed to limited knowledge of how national immigration law can protect people displaced across borders by sudden and slow-onset disasters. PDD's Atle Solberg (interview, 08.12.2018) relayed an encounter with immigration officials in the Pacific:

> "We've worked with the PIDC and it's very poorly developed. Migration law, in general, is very poorly developed in these countries. So, I think you can expect these [environmental stressors] to not be included… If you bring migration directors together, they have blank faces staring at you. What was very promising was that at the last conference [in 2018], PIDC had climate change and migration [as a theme]. So, our envoy, Professor Kalin was invited. But what message we got from that meeting was that we have a long way to go from here…"

New Zealand has assessed two cases where the appellants sought protection on environmental grounds. The Tuvaluan family was granted residency on humanitarian grounds while the I-Kiribati family was denied refugee protection (see Chapter 5).

Table 6.3: National Institutional Landscape for Humanitarian Protection in the Pacific.

Country	Key National Agencies	Primary Responsibilities
Australia	Immigration, Citizenship, and Multicultural Affairs, Department of Home Affairs	Implements immigration laws, including granting humanitarian protection
Fiji	Fiji Immigration Department, Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration	Implements immigration laws, including granting humanitarian protection
Kiribati	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration	Implements immigration laws, including granting humanitarian protection
New Zealand	Immigration New Zealand, Ministry of Immigration, Business, and Employment Immigration and Protection Tribunal, Ministry of Justice	Implements immigration laws, including granting humanitarian protection Assesses appeals
Nauru	Immigration Division, Department of Justice and Border Control	Implements immigration laws, including granting humanitarian protection
Papua New Guinea	Papua New Guinea Immigration and Citizenship Authority	Implements immigration laws, including granting humanitarian protection
Samoa	Samoa Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	Implements immigration laws
Solomon Islands	Immigration Division, Ministry of Commerce, Industry, Labour, and Immigration	Implements immigration laws, including granting humanitarian protection
Tonga	Immigration and General Services, Division of Customs and Trade, Ministry of Revenue and Customs	Implements immigration laws
Tuvalu	Immigration Department, Ministry of Justice, Communication, and Foreign Affairs	Implements immigration laws
Vanuatu	Department of Immigration and Passport Services	Implements immigration laws, including granting humanitarian protection

Taken together, these actors mobilised the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage. They demonstrated clear agency by deciding if and when to engage in the issue area, linking and framing issues in particular ways, processes of internal restructuring, and knowledge and policy production. However, forming a collective logic was critical for organising into policy structures that serve as channels and pipelines for peddling 'best practices.' Planned relocation advocates agreed resettlement schemes can protect

communities and restore livelihoods if they are well-planned, which enabled them to organise in a high-density structure. Labour migration supporters accepted that existing programmes could build adaptive capacities and resilience if they are well-managed, amended to target vulnerable groups, and aligned to facilitate permanent residency. However, national labour systems do not align with this logic. This enabled supporters to form a medium-density structure. Humanitarian protectionists agreed international environmentally displaced persons need to be protected but disagreed on which humanitarian measure is best suited – refugee, statelessness, complementary or a standalone instrument. However, national immigration systems do not align with this logic. Through these policy structures, optimists mobilise ideas on planned relocation, labour migration, and humanitarian protection.

6.3 Environmental Mobility Structures

As alluded to in Chapter 4, issue structures mobilise the entire environmental migration and displacement management assemblage. Optimists join existing or create new structures, which are shaped by a particular problem and solution logic – namely, what is the relationship between environmental stressors and human mobility, and what suite of policies can regulate it? These structures function as pipelines for instituting policies. This section briefly describes the multi-level issue structures that are de/institutionalising humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation as environmental mobility 'best practices.'

6.3.1 TfD Establishment

From 2007 to 2015, optimists organised into several informal structures to temporarily immobilise refugee protection and mobilise planned relocation and labour migration. This section briefly describes the evolution of these structures that culminated in the TfD.

The IASC was established as a humanitarian coordination structure made up of 18 UN and NGOs to assist and protect IDPs. It adopts a cluster approach to addressing crises, defined as the sectoral division of humanitarian responsibilities. Some human mobility optimists lead specific clusters: IFRC leads the shelter clusters, UNHCR leads the protection clusters, and IOM co-leads the camp coordination and management cluster. In 2008, the ICRC's Climate Centre found that the global climate change negotiations neglected the humanitarian implications of the phenomenon – a gap that could be addressed by the IASC (Hall, 2016). The IASC formed a taskforce on climate change to coordinate members' advocacy activities during COPs to UNFCCC. Within the taskforce, IOM, UNHCR, OCHA, Special Rapporteur on the

Human Rights of IDPs, and NRC banded together to create an informal working group on migration and displacement. They lobbied outside and inside the negotiating rooms to avoid using terms such as environmental/climate refugees, to address the protection gap for internationally displaced persons, and to integrate planned relocation and labour migration into the adaptation work programme (IASC, 2008, 2010; RSG on the HR of IDPs, 2008).

The Climate Change, Environment, and Migration Alliance (CCEMA) was set up in 2009 to incorporate human mobility into the environment, development, and humanitarian agendas and vice versa (IOM, 2008, 2009). The Alliance was made up of agencies that had institutional access to global policymaking arenas, namely IOM, Munich Re Foundation, UNEP, UNHCR, OCHA, and UNU-EHS. Its academic experts were tasked with building a knowledge base on environmental migration and displacement. They were encouraged to identify success stories and examine the viability of resettlement and migration in managing displacement (CCEMA, n.d., 2010). This research provided evidence to anchor development-friendly solutions in the climate adaptation agenda and sustain interest in the issue area after they were incorporated into the text (Warner, 2011).

In 2013, a small group of actors organised themselves as an informal Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility (AGCCHM) (Nash, 2019). Because they were members of the Nansen Initiative/PDD's Advisory Committee (discussed further below), these optimists advocated integrating development-friendly and humanitarian 'best practices' for managing displacement in the global climate change agenda. Following the endorsement of displacement as a loss and damage issue in 2012, the AGCCHM (2013) called on states to recognise the need for further research on durable solutions and legal protection for communities permanently displaced from their homelands. However, they only agreed to establish the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) to oversee research work on the issue area (UNFCCC, 2014a).

During data collection for this research, the Executive Committee comprised Australian, New Zealand, and Tuvaluan representatives who purportedly elevated the concerns of the Pacific, including issues on the loss of culture, land, and sovereignty (Nathan Ross, interview, 22.01.2021; Nazhat Shameem Khan, interview, 26.07.2019). The AGCCHM then aligned development-friendly 'best practices' to the adaptation work programme by urging governments to include planned relocation and labour migration in their national adaptation plans. It helped facilitate consultations and workshops to disseminate research findings,

evidence, lessons learned, and tools on how development-friendly approaches can enhance resilience and reduce the vulnerability of affected communities (AGCCHM, 2014a, 2014c). It recommended establishing a separate expert group to advise the WIM on the needs of and solutions for environmentally vulnerable communities, and an international displacement coordination mechanism to assist displaced persons by providing emergency relief and compensation (AGCCHM, 2014b, 2014d). Yet again, states only approved WIM's workplan on expanding displacement knowledge (UNFCCC, 2014b).

Leading up to the Paris Agreement, the AGCCHM advocated similar messages but also spotlighted reducing cross-border displacement risks (AGCCHM, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). Parties requested the WIM to establish a taskforce for developing recommendations on averting, minimising, and addressing displacement (UNFCCC, 2016). In shaping the WIM's workplan on human mobility, the AGCCHM (2016) urged states to use planned relocation and labour migration as displacement prevention and minimisation strategies and integrate effective protection practices into existing normative instruments rather than calling for a new binding convention.

The TfD was institutionalised by WIM in 2016. It is composed of 7 constituents, each involving specific actors who provide distinct perspectives and expertise on regulating displacement, as shown in Figure 6.1. Rather than dissolving previous institutional structures, the AGCCHM was subsumed into the TfD. Hence, the TfD's message on human mobility has not changed drastically. It continues to promote development-friendly and humanitarian approaches to manage displacement (IOM, 2018a, 2018b; PDD, 2018; UNHCR, 2018). The most obvious change in its messaging is the emphasis on enhancing synergies between different policy processes, the applicability of refugee protection in nexus situations, and the need for new humanitarian protection solutions for regions without any instruments (IDMC, 2018). The TfD's workplan was extended in 2022 to build national capacity on displacement management, develop guidance on accessing funds and integrating displacement into national climate policy processes, and disseminate knowledge products on the issue area (UNFCCC, 2023).

Figure 6.1: TfD Composition and Institutional Approaches (UNFCCC, 2024).



6.3.2 Cross-Institutional Linkages

The TfD members are part of other institutional structures that have shaped global migration management, disaster risk reduction, and humanitarian protection norms. According to IOM's Mariam Traore Chazalnoel (interview, 06.12.2018), "the same migration or mobility [experts] are working with parties in different policy discussions, so you will hear language that sounds similar". For example, the GMG comprises human mobility optimists identified above, namely ILO, IOM, OHCHR, UNEP, UNHCR, and the World Bank. Although it did not officially engage in climate change policy conversations until after the adoption of the 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework, a GMG expert Graeme Hugo actively participated in knowledge exchange platforms (Koko Warner, interview, 02.08.2019; Martin, 2010b). He theorised environmental mobility along a continuum, centralising choice, duration, and distance (Hugo, 1996, 2012). He refashioned GMG's 'migration as development' discourse into 'migration as an adaptation strategy,' which featured in the climate adaptation agenda (Bardsley & Hugo, 2010). At the same time, TfD's recommendations on using development-friendly and humanitarian measures to regulate environmental migration were shared with GMG members.

Consequently, the global migration norm not only recognises environmental stressors as a cause of population movements but also endorses labour migration, planned relocation, and humanitarian visas as viable regulatory measures (Atle Solberg, interview, 08.12.2018; Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat, interview, 25.01.2019; Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019). The GMG was expanded and relabelled as the UN Migration Network to support the implementation of the migration compact.

The channel through which language on human mobility permeated the disaster risk reduction norm is unclear; however, it reflects ideas promulgated by optimists. The Sendai Framework calls on states to develop policies for relocating human settlements away from areas prone to environmental risks and to work with migrants in responding to disasters (Sendai Framework, 2015). Its Words into Action Guidelines (WiAG), a "recipe book" for implementing the norm, was drafted by TfD members, namely IOM, NRC/IDMC, PDD, and UNHCR (Nina Birkeland, Geneva, 16.05.2019; UNDRR, 2019). Hence, they depict resettlement as a protection strategy and migration as a resilience-building approach.

However, the most influential institutional structure has been the Nansen Initiative/PDD's Advisory Committee, which was formed to find viable protection solutions for international environmentally displaced persons in 2012 (Atle Solberg, interview, 08.12.2018). It is made up of independent experts based at institutions that promote human mobility solutions who are from diverse backgrounds, including disaster risk reduction, climate adaptation, migration management, humanitarian response, and development.[13] They are divided into four working groups, each focusing on specific issue areas: data and knowledge, migration and refugees, disaster risk reduction, and climate change.

The Committee conducts field studies, develops policy tools and other knowledge products, provides technical advice on norms, and acts as a resource for people during consultations or workshops. It endorses development-friendly approaches as 'effective practices' for managing environmental displacement risks in origin countries. But it also promotes humanitarian protection measures: it urges destination countries to grant temporary admission and stay to environmentally displaced persons through special category visas, visa waivers, and free movement arrangements (Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015). These ideas are enshrined in the

[13] The majority of human mobility optimists identified in the previous section are members of the Advisory Committee. They include the Brookings Institution, Displacement Solutions, ICMC, ILO, IOM, IRCRCM, ISIM, OHCHR, NRC/IDMC, PIFS, SPREP, UNEP, UNHCR, and UNU-EHS.

Nansen Protection Agenda and used by TfD, GMG, and the working group for WiAG to shape global environmental mobility processes (Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat, interview, 25.01.2019; PDD, 2017a; Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019).

Thus, optimists are members of multiple global issue structures, enabling a horizontal spread of policy ideas. The TfD, WiAG working group, Advisory Committee, and UN Migration Network successfully mobilised development-friendly 'best practices.' However, it was primarily via the efforts of the Advisory Committee that protectionists revised and marshalled humanitarian measures to protect international environmentally displaced persons.

6.3.3 An Emerging Regional Consultancy Industry

A consultancy industry is critical for formulating and disseminating policies. Although international institutions based in Bonn, Geneva, Washington, D.C., and to a lesser extent Suva provide technical guidance on regulating environmental mobility, optimists are setting up a consultancy industry in the Pacific. It originates from UN concerns about limited ownership of regulatory strategies: governments are reluctant to own them because they are developed elsewhere, defeating the notion of 'for the Pacific, led by the Pacific' (Field Notes, 26.08.2019). The regional consultancy comprises professional experts housed by or affiliated with institutions primarily in Australia, Fiji, and New Zealand. They research, develop, and transfer knowledge products and place-based 'models' between multiple sites.

Some academics based at Australian universities (e.g., Canberra, Griffith, Melbourne, and Queensland) have been influential in spreading planned relocation and labour migration as 'best practices' for managing environmental mobility. They optimistically frame these approaches as a way of adapting to environmental adversities and fostering national development (Farbotko et al., 2018). Their publications highlight the importance of integrating environmental stressors into mobility policies, expanding people's choice to move, participation in the process, and skills development (e.g., Barnett & McMichael, 2018; Dun et al., 2018; Dun et al., 2022; Dun et al., 2023; McMichael et al., 2019).

Experts based at three institutions specifically promote planned relocation as a regulatory strategy for managing internal environmental displacement in large island states. The Toda Peace Institute's specialists published policy briefs stressing the importance of planning for resettlements, including minimising disruptions and losses that will ensue and urging developed countries to learn from Pacific experiences (Boege & Rakova, 2019; Campbell,

2019; Ristroph, 2023a; Tabe, 2020). The University of South Pacific's (USP) Pacific Centre for Environment and Sustainable Development (PACE-SD) specialists' findings on facilitating resettlements featured in IPCC's Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (IPCC, 2019; Elisabeth Holland, interview, 21.11.2019). A PACE-SD affiliate, Cosmin Corendea (interview, 10.08.2019; UNHCR et al., 2017) helped institutionalise planned relocation as a norm for internal environmental displacement governance: he ensured Fiji's guidelines aligned to international norms and anchored the relocation experiences onto the global Planned Relocation Toolbox. He was approached by Vanuatu authorities to develop a standalone resettlement policy because he had the "cookie-cutter" (Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019). Sustineo in Australia hired Rebecca Monson (interview, 19.05.2023) and Matthew Allen to draft the Solomon Islands' national guidelines. These findings suggest that planned relocation institutions' efforts focus on enhancing global knowledge and establishing national systems to facilitate internal population movements.

Experts based at three think tanks promote labour migration as a regulatory strategy for managing international environmental migration from the Pacific. The Development Policy Centre and Lowy Institute's specialists are instrumental in shaping Australia's approach: their policy briefs and blogs urge the government to expand SWP and PLS, invest in upskilling initiatives in Pacific nations, and ensure the PEV allocation considers the unique circumstances of atoll nations (Akka Rimon, interview, 30.11.2022; Curtain & Dornan, 2019; Koser, 2012; McAdam & Pryke, 2020). The Centre's consultants helped Pacific states in formulating their labour-exporting policies – Carmen Voigt-Graf, Richard Curtain, and Matthew Dornan drafted Kiribati, Vanuatu, and Samoa's policies (GoK, 2015a; GoV, 2019; Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019).

Similarly, Bedford Consulting is influential in shaping New Zealand's approach: the consultants' journal articles, reports, and presentations emphasise expanding and aligning the RSE scheme with PAC to ensure workers can transition to permanent residency and include a sub-category for people susceptible to climate adversities (Bedford & Bedford, 2010; Fabling, 2013; Campbell & Warrick, 2014; John Campbell, interview, 30.10.2019; Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019). The consultants drafted Tuvalu's labour-exporting policy. Further, their mapping of voluntary migration architecture informed regional normative dialogues, and study on the impact of the RSE scheme led to its re-evaluation (Burson & Bedford, 2013; GoT, 2015b; Nunns et al., 2020). Although Bedford Consulting's focus has been labour migration,

it recently produced a report advocating two protection measures, namely special category visas and explicit provisions in immigration legislation for extending temporary visas during disasters (Burson et al., 2021). Therefore, labour migration experts' efforts are directed towards reshaping the views and approaches of destination countries because they developed and are implementing the programmes.

Experts at the Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law in Australia promote humanitarian 'best practices' for protecting people displaced internationally by environmental stressors. Their publications spotlight the novelty and complexities of cross-border relocations from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji; explain the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal's decision to reject Ioane Teitioa's climate refugee claim; assess the applicability of refugee, statelessness, and human rights protection to environmental displacement contexts; and urge Australia to introduce protection mechanisms for temporary admission and stay (Boncour & Burson, 2010; McAdam, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2020, 2022; McAdam et al., 2016; McAdam & Limon, 2015, McAdam & Pryke, 2020). Jane McAdam's work was particularly influential in shaping the Nansen Initiative's Protection Agenda and helping UNHCR clarify its role in regulating the issue area (Erica Bower, interview, 10.12.2019; Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, 2017; Jane McAdam, interview, 05.04.2019; UNHCR, 2017). She recently led a group of experts to draft the PRFCM that endorses humanitarian approaches (Betty Barkha, Canberra, 29-30.09.2022; McAdam, 2022). Thus, much of the Kaldor Centre's work focuses on addressing the normative and institutional gap in international protection; however, it is beginning to guide policy developments in the Pacific.

6.3.4 Technical Working Group and Joint Working Group

Regional institutional structures are crucial for adapting and localising international norms. Two embedded regional structures are instituting planned relocation, labour migration, and humanitarian protection as solutions for managing environmental mobility in the Pacific. The Pacific Resilience Partnership (PRP) Taskforce was established in 2019 to oversee the implementation of the FRDP. Its Support Unit is based at PIFS. Although it comprises fifteen constituencies (i.e., states, private sector, academia, civil society, and UN), government engagement has been low due to competing priorities and limited visibility of its successes (Andrew McElroy, interview, 02.12.2019). Under the auspices of the PRP is a Technical Working Group on Human Mobility (TWG-HM) that is led by the IOM and supported by GIZ, IDMC, IFRC, and PDD. It coordinates, provides expertise, and strengthens efforts to address

environmental migration and displacement in the region, which includes documenting new policies and pertinent case studies (PRP, n.d., 2019). The creation of the group purportedly indicates the "urgency of the issue and the importance of fostering regional engagement" (PCCMHS Programme, 2020, p. 13).

In 2020, the TWG-HM participated in regional consultation on internal displacement where Pacific governments shared challenges, lessons, and 'effective practices' for managing internal displacement with representatives of the High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement (PRP, 2020; virtual event, 11.02.2021). This resulted in the global recognition of Fiji's guidelines as 'good practice.' It also published research briefs primarily on land tenure complications, financing avenues, traditional knowledge use, and implications for women and disabled persons in facilitating planned relocations (Fitzpatrick, 2022; Fong, 2022; Ristroph, 2023b; Thornton, 2022). As depicted in Figure 6.2, it facilitated a regional policy dialogue on the climate mobility framework that led to the formation of a Joint Working Group (JWG) to guide the drafting process (PCCMHS Programme, 2021). The group is made up of ILO, IOM, Kaldor Centre, OHCHR, PIFS, PDD, and UNESCAP. It is because of these actors that the forthcoming regional framework lists planned relocation as an anticipatory and remedial measure, migration as an adaptation strategy, and humanitarian protection as an approach to enhancing human security in the region.

The embeddedness and makeup of the structures affect the regional institutionalisation of certain solutions. The JWG works with the TWG-HM, which is under the auspices of the PRP Taskforce, indicating some regional institutional support for using development-friendly and humanitarian approaches to regulate the phenomenon in the Pacific. In addition, international agencies enable a two-way flow of norms and practices – they brought international rules to the Pacific and elevated Fiji's planned relocation guidelines as a 'model.'

Figure 6.2: JWG Facilitating Consultations on the Regional Framework on Climate Mobility in Suva, Fiji (PCCMHS Programme, 2021).

6.3.5 Political Coalition or Support

A political coalition or support is important for instituting certain practices. Both help elevate issues, anchor them onto multi-level agendas, and shape national approaches. Political champions provide energy and impulse in the advocacy and planning stages. Policymakers do the legwork leading up to the finalisation of the policy – they collate lessons from past initiatives and review national legislation to draft policies or contextualise foreign norms. Street-level bureaucrats operationalise the regulatory strategies.

Pacific leaders elevated the issue of environmental displacement in climate change, development, human rights, and security forums, sometimes unintentionally. Since the 1990s, they have been warning the international community that rapid climate change will submerge islands and destroy homes, resulting in mass displacement. It will ignite conflict over land use and ownership, further destabilising fragile communities. In some instances, Pacific leaders highlighted that they were already experiencing such consequences: Kiribati is planning for dignified migration, Fiji is relocating communities inland, Papua New Guinea already has climate refugees, and Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands will be one of the first countries to cease to exist (Aiyaz Sayed Khaiyum, interview, 04.11.2019; Field Notes, 24.05.2019; GoF, 2019

Nazhat Shameen Khan, interview, 13.08.2019; UNGA, 1997, 2016a, 2018a). This 'doom' framing not only shaped Pacific Small Island Developing States' advocacy to increase global ambition for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, but also mobilised international agencies into exploring the environment and human mobility nexus.

Local church leaders and policymakers produced favourable conditions for the adoption of planned relocation as a highly viable solution for managing internal environmental displacement, especially in large high island states. Fijian churches and CCICD staff identified the policy gap, developed tools to assess displacement risks, and drafted the planned relocation guidelines (Alisi Rabukawaqa, interview, 11.12.2019; GoF, 2015; Ministry of Economy Representative, interview, 29.03.2019). Manasa Katonivualiku used lessons from past relocations to prepare the guidelines before the government reached out to a consultant. Similarly, the Solomon Islands' church leaders and Environment, Climate Change, and Disaster Management Ministry convened community consultations on when, where, and how they will move before engaging international experts (Rebecca Monson, interview, 19.05.2019). Political leaders raised awareness of their place-based 'models.' Fiji's Prime Minister, Permanent Representative to UN Organisations in Geneva, and CCICD staff shared relocation experiences, lessons, and institutional developments with international agencies and governments (Field Notes, 13.12.2018; 17.06.2019; PCCMHS Programme, 2019). Vanuatu's Director of Climate Change espoused its second home approach during a regional meeting (Field Notes, 27.03.2019). This indicates greater political endorsement within *and* amongst larger high island states for using planned relocation schemes for managing internal environmental displacement.

The Coalition of Low-lying Atoll Nations on Climate Change (CANCC) was established to amplify the concerns of atoll states, including international environmental displacement. Under Kiribati's leadership, it called on the international community to facilitate dignified migration and plan for cross-border displacement (GoT, 2015a). However, a change in leadership shifted the priority. Now, under Marshall Islands' leadership, the coalition is advocating in situ adaptation and resilience building to offer people a choice not to leave their homelands (ADB, 2019). In addition, CANCC's interests are fragmented. The Maldives focuses on the human rights of affected communities while Tuvalu is concerned with statehood and sovereignty (Simalua Enele, interview, 27.11.2020). Furthermore, its members suffer cognitive dissonance because the collective rhetoric does not align with their actions. Although it is promoting

immobility, Tuvalu is digitising the nation to maintain its statehood and preparing a resolution on protecting the rights of environmentally displaced persons (Simon Kofe, Sharm El-Sheikh, 16.011.2022; UNGA, 2018a, 2019). Thus, CANCC emerged as a strong advocate for labour migration, but changes in leadership, diverging interests, and cognitive dissonance weakened its collective support for the solution, thereby impeding its international transfer.

Nevertheless, former Kiribati and Tuvalu leaders created favourable conditions for the development and adoption of labour migration to regulate environmental migration from atoll states. Kiribati's Anote Tong (interview, 14.04.2023; Melbourne, 22.10.2023) visited the I-Kiribati diaspora in the Solomon Islands and learnt from Germans about the impacts of migration on culture and destination countries. He operationalised migration with dignity by partnering with the Australian government to launch the KANI in 2007. Further, he disseminated the distinct approach at international events on development, climate change, and migration (IOM, 2017d; GoK, 2013, 2015a; UNGA, 2014). Tuvalu's Bikenibeu Paeniu lobbied to include environmental stressors in the national labour-exporting policy while Enele Sopoaga set up the Sky's the Limit Programme (SLP) (Simon Bradshaw, interview, 04.06.2019; Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019). The Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Trade, Tourism, Environment, and Labour, Temate Melitiana, provided contextual knowledge that shaped the viability of grand ideas on facilitating dignified labour migration.

Richard Bedford (interview, 04.05.2019) shared that the Permanent Secretary rejected his idea of establishing a training facility in Kioa to upskill Tuvaluans for seasonal work in New Zealand and cultivate crops to export back to Tuvalu because the island was owned by the people of Vaitupu, not the government:

> "I went to talk to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry whom we had to write the policy. He just said, 'There must be no reference in the Tuvalu labour migration document to Kioa.' I said, 'Well, that seems a bit strange' but he was adamant. This had to be approved by the government, so if the Permanent Secretary was going to say that – he was the man who had to take it to the cabinet, it wasn't going to go through. We had to remove all that fancy thinking about what you might be able to do. He could see that I was pretty unhappy about it. He said, 'You've been to Tuvalu, but you know little about our background and culture. The island of Vaitupu owns Kioa. This is not Tuvalu's island. This is Vaitupu's island. You must never conflate something that belongs to one island with the country.'"

However, I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan church leaders block domestic conversations on international environmental migration. They refer to the covenant, arguing that God will not allow a situation to arise where his people are forced to leave their homes (Anote Tong, Melbourne, 15.10.2019; John Campbell, interview, 30.10.2019). This view has been shaping community and civil society perspectives on immobility. Kiribati and Tuvalu leaders were therefore instrumental in producing conditions for the cabinet endorsement of national labour migration policies. Kiribati explicitly labelled its distinct approach as a way of managing environmental migration whereas Tuvalu refrained from doing so. Further, churches are reluctant to endorse ex-situ strategies. This reaffirms that there is limited support amongst and within atoll nations for using labour migration to adapt and build resilience against environmental stressors.

Interestingly, Fiji and Tuvalu are championing the PRFCM to protect international environmentally displaced persons. UNESCAP's Timothy Westbury (interview, 07.10.2019) explained:

> "There are some governments that want to do something more ambitious and have a legally binding framework. We talked about this with [Fiji's] Ambassador Khan… She was saying, 'Okay, we're serious about having some of the populations from Kiribati. We need some sort of legally binding framework to identify what sort of rights these people need to have and what the issue is.'"

Nazhat Shameem Khan and Simon Kofe chaired regional consultations and recently presented the draft framework to Pacific leaders for negotiation (Field Notes, 18.11.2019; PCCMHS Programme, 2020, 2021). Tuvalu recently launched its Future Now Project and Foreign Policy, which emphasises maintaining statehood and protecting people crossing borders (Field Notes, 16.11.2022; GoT, n.d., 2020c, 2021). This may suggest international agencies are working with friendly states to create a political appetite for regional protection mechanisms. Nevertheless, support for humanitarian solutions remains weak.

6.3.6 National Interagency Committees

National interagency committees aid in the adoption, adaptation, and localisation of policies. They enable government agencies to realise issue linkages and foster a culture of working together to holistically address them. Environment ministries have adopted a whole-of-society approach to relocation. As shown in Table 6.4, they have set up taskforces comprising

directors, provincial authorities, chiefs, and communities to facilitate community resettlements. In contrast, labour and immigration institutions work in siloes.

Speaking of labour ministries, ILO's Michelle Leighton (interview, 21.08.2019) explained that their participation requires a change in bureaucratic culture:

> "[Environmental migration] is a multidimensional issue, looking at environment, labour, and migration. These are three different agencies or more… They need to come together but that's a challenge because there aren't interagency working groups around climate-related migration… because there isn't a history or culture for it. An Environment Ministry can't formally adopt a migration, let alone a labour migration policy and the Foreign Affairs Office may not have the environmental information about who is migrating from a particular community. So, you need to bring them all together."

International agencies attempted to raise awareness of how environmental stressors are linked to their mandates through regional meetings. For instance, the 2019 Launch and Stakeholder Meeting for two regional initiatives on environmental mobility in Suva was mainly attended by representatives from the environment, foreign affairs or mission offices (Field Notes, 26-28.03.2019).

Similarly, the 2018 PIDC Annual Conference on Migration and Climate Change revealed that immigration directors lacked awareness of how the existing legislation could protect people displaced by environmental stressors (Atle Solberg, interview, 08.12.2018). Despite these external efforts, labour and immigration institutions are yet to realise the interlinkages. Even when they do realise them, political cycles and government reshuffles impede their institutionalisation. For example, Kiribati stopped espousing migration with dignity following the 2016 election. It appears that the failure to recognise interlinkages and changes in administration impeded the creation of a whole-of-society culture, thereby hindering the institutionalisation of labour migration and humanitarian protection as solutions for regulating environmental mobility in the Pacific.

6.4 Chapter Summary

This chapter argues that the institutional landscape enabled or constrained the flow of environmental mobility 'best practices.' It shows that the institutional landscape is overcrowded and fragmented, comprising multiple actors and structures. Each organisation

rationalised the environment and human mobility linkage differently to carve a niche for itself. In some instances, external shocks, requests from constituents, and leadership interests prompted internal bureaucratic changes, resulting in an expansion of mandates, the creation of separate divisions and dedicated positions, and the launch of multi-initiatives. In others, they simply elevated member concerns. Despite demonstrating individual agency in deciding if, when, and how to engage in the issue area, the actors organised themselves into multi-scalar structures. To do so, they formed a collective logic about the policy and problem (see Chapter 7 for logic formation).

This chapter demonstrates that the density and nature of institutional structures mobilised policy ideas. As illustrated in Table 6.4, high-density policy structures mobilised development-friendly approaches as environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices.' Planned relocation advocates collectively agreed that resettlement schemes can protect communities and restore livelihoods if they are well-planned. This logic shaped a highly dense structure of advocates who are based at 19 organisations that have transnational reach. They are policy producers, promoters, adopters, and implementers. Labour migration supporters accepted that existing programmes could build adaptive capacities and resilience if they are well-managed, amended to target vulnerable groups, and aligned to facilitate permanent residency. This rationality shaped a medium-density structure of supporters who are based at 11 agencies that have some influence on domestic policymaking processes. They are IGOs, NGOs, and some regional agencies that primarily promote labour migration as a viable environmental migration strategy. Humanitarian protectionists agreed international environmentally displaced persons need to be protected but disagreed on which humanitarian measure is best suited – refugee, statelessness, complementary, or a standalone instrument. This logic shaped a weak structure of protectionists, comprising knowledge and norm entrepreneurs, who currently have minimal national reach. The high density of the planned relocation advocates facilitated the quick mobilisation of resettlement as an environmental displacement management 'model.' The medium density of labour migration supporters slowly spread existing temporary and permanent programmes as an environmental migration management solution. The low density of humanitarian protectionists constrained the flow of their measures, especially at the national level.

However, the shared problem logic shaped issue structures, which are beginning to mobilise certain humanitarian measures as a viable regulatory response for cross-border movements.

The TfD problematises displacement and forced migration, advocating the use of both development-friendly and humanitarian 'best practices.' Its UN and NGO members are affiliated with other global structures, enabling a cross-fertilisation of ideas. Hence, global migration, protection, and disaster risk reduction norms reflect TfD's policy preferences. Optimists established a regional consultancy industry comprising TWG-HM and JWG that regionalised both approaches.

Fiji and Tuvalu championed the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility, albeit political support for each solution is fragmented. Governments, church leaders, and chiefs collectively supported using resettlement schemes to reduce displacement risks, which is evident through the establishment of interagency committees in which all actors assist in moving people. Only atoll governments supported using existing labour migration schemes to manage environmental migration. However, the political champion lost power in 2016, leading to an abandonment of the solution. While Fiji and New Zealand are exploring humanitarian protection measures for international environmentally displaced persons, immigration officials do not actively engage in the conversations. Thus, political backing and national structures facilitated the institutionalisation of planned relocation as a 'model' for managing internal environmental displacement. The disruption in national support partly institutionalised labour migration as a 'good practice' for regulating international environmental migration. The lack of national support failed to institutionalise humanitarian protection.

Table 6.4: The Impact of Institutional Landscape in Mobilising and Standardising the Environmental Migration and Displacement Management Assemblage.

		Institutional Landscape	
Policy Response	**Scale**	**Institutional Actors**	**Institutional Structures**
Planned Relocation	Global	13 actors: BfW, Brookings Institution, Displacement Solutions, GIZ, IOM, IRCRCM, ISIM, Nansen Initiative/PDD, NRC/IDMC, OHCHR, the World Bank, UNU-EHS, and UNHCR	GMG/UN Migration Network, Nansen Initiative/PDD Advisory Committee, and TfD
	Regional	4 actors: PCC, PIFS, SPC, and SPREP	Consultancy industry: Australian universities, PACE-SD, Sustineo, and Toda Institute TWG-HM and JWG on the Regional Framework Political coalition for regional framework: Tuvalu and Fiji
	National	2 actors: FCOSS and environment ministries/departments Political champions: Fiji's Frank Bainimarama and Nazhat Shameem Khan and Vanuatu's representative	Political coalition: Pacific leaders, church, and local staff Interagency relocation taskforces/committee
Labour Migration	Global	6 actors: ILO, IOM, Nansen Initiative/PDD, OHCHR, the World Bank, and UNU-EHS	GMG/UN Migration Network, Nansen Initiative/PDD Advisory Committee, and TfD
	Regional	5 actors: Oxfam Australia, PIANGO, PICAN, PIFS, and UNESCAP Pacific Office	Consultancy industry: Australian universities, Bedford Consulting, Development Policy Centre, and Lowy Institute TWG-HM and JWG on the Regional Framework Political coalition for regional framework: Tuvalu and Fiji
	National	None	Temporary political champions: Kiribati's Anote Tong and Tuvalu's Enele Sopoaga

Humanitarian Protection	Global	7 Actors: BfW, IOM, ICMC, IRCRCM, Nansen Initiative/PDD, NRC/IDMC, and UNHCR	GMG/UN Migration Network, Nansen Initiative/PDD Advisory Committee, and TfD
	Regional	2 Actors: PIANGO and PIDC, albeit not very active in the space	Consultancy industry: Kaldor Centre TWG-HM and JWG on the Regional Framework Political coalition for regional framework: Tuvalu and Fiji
	National	None	None

Chapters 7-9: An Overview of Mobilising Strategies

The next three chapters all contribute to explaining different aspects of mobilising strategies. Together, they argue that policy actors use a range of key strategies to mobilise and institutionalise development-friendly and humanitarian 'best practices' for regulating environmental migration and displacement.

These mobilising strategies consist of three sociocultural and political practices: issue-making, entrepreneurialism, and anchoring. Policy actors strategically frame and link problems to develop viable solutions for addressing them. They also diffuse issue frames, linkages, and policy preferences through space creation/shopping and multi-initiatives. They further integrate issues and policy ideas into various agendas through political coaching, technical submissions, drafting soft norms, and external validation. The different combinations of these sociocultural and political practices enabled and/or constrained the flow of planned relocation, labour migration, and humanitarian protection in varied ways.

Again, this argument is made across three chapters. The first chapter, Chapter 7, discusses processes of *issue-making*. It elucidates the recursive and iterative making, unmaking, and remaking of the environmental mobility management assemblage. Optimists linked environmental stressors to forced population movements and then to the three core policy responses studied in this thesis: planned relocation, labour mobility, and humanitarian protection. Each linkage was substantiated and reframed in different ways, reflecting the nature of the nexus, the malleability of each solution, and the ease at which the policies (im)mobilised.

Chapter 8 discusses how *entrepreneurialism* contributed to mobilising strategies. It describes two practices that serve different purposes. The first practice is creating and shopping for spaces to establish a transnational assembly line for manufacturing, marketing, and standardising certain policies. The second practice is using multi-initiatives to formalise specific approaches, ensure some optimists' institutional survival, and contain new forms of population movements within the Pacific.

Chapter 9 explains how development-friendly and humanitarian approaches were *anchored* in in multiple policy agendas at different levels. Through political coaching and lobbying, the

solutions arrived in institutionally impermeable domains of human rights and security and remained on environmental and development agendas. The penholder role institutionalised environmental stressors in human mobility norms while expert feedback internally validated pre-existing ideas on regulating the phenomenon. By doing so, optimists accessed new funding streams and began orchestrating environmental migration and displacement governance.

Chapter 7: Mobilising Strategy 1 – Issue-Making

7.1 Introduction

This chapter shows how human mobility optimists used framing and linking to construct problems and solutions strategically. They demonstrated that environmental stressors caused forced migration and displacement through diagnostic framing. This was achieved by substantively delinking the environmental/climate refugee discourse and broadening the issue. Through prognostic framing, they unpacked and repacked planned relocation, labour migration, and humanitarian protection as 'best practices' for regulating the phenomenon. Substantive linkage was commonly used to demonstrate the causality between the issue and emerging 'models.' However, experts advocating planned relocation also used normative linkage, tying it to pre-existing normative instruments. Those supporting labour migration adopted programmatic linkage, whereby temporary and permanent programmes were amended, expanded, and aligned to manage environmental migration, especially from atoll nations.

This chapter explains the strategic construction of environmental migration and displacement and the iterative and recursive formation of three emerging 'best practices.' Section 7.2 discusses the delinkage of the environmental/climate refugee discourse and Section 7.3 explores the reframing and broadening of the issue. Sections 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6 present three 'best practice' policy alternatives. Finally, Section 7.7 concludes with a chapter summary.

7.2 Delinking Environmental/ Climate Refugee Discourse

Chapters 4 and 5 elaborate that the environmental/climate refugee discourse is politically contentious. It is based on a mono-causal and linear understanding of how environmental stressors impact population movements. It also calls on governments to revise the 1951 Refugee Convention or create a standalone international protection instrument. Hence, human mobility optimists temporarily delinked environmental stressors from refugee movements. This was achieved in three ways.

First, human mobility optimists established a substantive delinkage by researching the environment and human mobility nexus, which revealed that climate change is a threat multiplier. It interacts with socioeconomic, demographic, and governance challenges to

heighten existing vulnerabilities, compelling people to leave their homes (Kalin & Weerasinghe, 2017; Koko Warner, virtual event, 07.10.2020). For this reason, it is challenging to attribute refugee movements to climate adversities. In addition, the findings showed that most people move internally in response to environmental pressures, not across borders (Martin, 2010a). Individuals crossing international borders use regular migration pathways or seek asylum in neighbouring countries (Ammer et al., 2014). Put differently, international environmental migration and displacement occur within sub/regions. Relatedly, when households face livelihood pressures, they send a member overseas or to urban centres to work and send back remittances. This means only a small proportion of people seek refuge elsewhere. Thus, the scale of the cross-border displacement problem is relatively small.

Second, optimists established a normative delinkage by providing a legal analysis of the applicability of the 1951 Refugee Convention to environmental displacement situations. To make their asylum claim credible, appellants must satisfy the element of persecution for the reasons listed in the Convention, demonstrate they are disproportionately affected, prove their governments are unwilling to offer protection, and identify the persecutor (Chirala, 2013; McAdam, 2015; Warren, 2016). However, it is difficult to attribute refugee movements to climate change and show environmental stressors discriminate based on race, religion, nationality, and membership in a social or political group (Gemenne et al., 2014; IOM, 2014; Thomas & Benjamin, 2018). Additionally, Pacific governments are not turning against their people – leaders are seeking compensation for displaced persons, funding to relocate communities, and negotiating an expansion of regular migration pathways (Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019). Furthermore, the perpetrator and protector are both the international community. In short, the 1951 Refugee Convention is inapplicable to environmental displacement contexts because it focuses on the causes rather than the effects.

Third, optimists assessed the political palatability of revising the 1951 Refugee Convention or creating a new standalone protection instrument. The environmental/climate refugee discourse fuelled fears in the Western World that they would be forced to admit people under a new sub/category. This was aggravated by the European media portrayal of Syrian and Afghan refugees flooding cities and misusing services and nationalists using them as scapegoats to serve other agendas (Mariam Traore Chazalnoel, interview, 06.12.2018; Simon Bradshaw, interview, 04.06.2019; Stephane Jaquemet, interview, 12.08.2019). These fears shaped toxic debates about immigration and asylum, leading to restrictive policies. Experts worried that a

new instrument would place a further burden on developing countries that host most refugees and amendments to the refugee regime would allow countries to negotiate their way out of existing obligations towards conventional refugees, thereby stripping them of their entitlements (Erica Bower, interview, 10.12.2018; Francois Gemmene, virtual, 07.10.2020; Isabelle Michal, interview, 11.12.2018). Thus, human mobility optimists found that there was "no political appetite to do anything [extra]" (Jane McAdam, interview, 06.05.2019)

In this way, human mobility optimists rationalised temporarily delinking the climate refugee discourse. However, they had to provide an alternative conceptualisation of the problem and solutions to ensure that environment-induced human mobility remained on multi-level agendas. Hence, they introduced the notion of forced migration and displacement and shifted the focus towards development-friendly 'best practices' that have proven to achieve their primary objectives of moving people out of the way whilst improving their livelihoods.

7.3 Reframing the Problem: From Refugee Movements to Forced Migration and Displacement

Human mobility optimists reframed the issue in several ways. First, they reconceptualised the phenomenon as falling along a continuum. They expanded Hugo's (1996, 2012) theorisation of population movements as a matter of choice by adding the dimensions of geography and duration (Koko Warner, interview, 02.08.2019). The environmental migration and displacement continuum constitutes three dimensions: choice (voluntary or forced), geography (internal or international), and duration (temporary or permanent) (Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015; Warner et al., 2013). The different combinations of these dimensions produce different types of population movements, including planned relocation, migration, and displacement.

Optimists packaged diverse population movements under the broader term 'human mobility' (Isabelle Michal, interview, 11.12.2018). According to Nash (2019), policymakers lacked an in-depth understanding of planned relocation, migration, and displacement, misusing the terms in their advocacy campaigns. As discussed in Chapter 6, Pacific leaders frequently use the 'doomed' frame to advocate for climate action. By doing so, they sometimes portrayed migration and resettlement as the problem. For example, in their address to the UNGA, the President of Palau said, "when oceans rise, islands are in peril … Some islands will simply suffer more catastrophic damage … Homes will be destroyed. People will have to *relocate*. Our way of life will be gone" (UNGA, 1997, p. 6, emphasis added).

This depiction does not mean they do not understand the terms. Instead, it reflects the specific concerns of the region whereby conversations on permanently moving away from ancestral homelands are embroiled in contention about land tenure, identity, culture, and spirituality. However, framing relocation and migration as the problem contradicts the dominant frame in which displacement is illustrated as the problem while planned relocation and migration are framed as strategies for managing the phenomenon. It diminishes their risk minimisation and prevention potential. It also ignores the fact they are traditional strategies for moving away from humanitarian and development harms (discussed in Chapter 8). Hence, human mobility optimists grouped planned relocation, migration, and displacement under the umbrella term of 'human mobility.'

Second, mobility optimists theorised environmental migration and displacement as a cycle, constituting three stages: pre-, during, and post-population movements (Cosmin Corendea, interview, 10.08.2019; Mariam Traore Chazalnoel, interview, 06.12.2018; PDD, 2018). Each phase describes the degree of environmental degradation and change, specific community needs, and set of viable policy responses (Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015; Walter Kalin, virtual event, 07.10.2020). In the first stage, environmental stressors adversely impact livelihood security by salinising freshwater lenses and altering rainfall patterns and ocean currents, thereby reducing yield production and seafood catch. Subsistence households temporarily "relocate from their traditional workplaces" to diversify income streams while national authorities invest in in-situ adaptation and risk reduction measures to withstand the environmental adversities (ILO Representative 1, interview, 19.03.2019). During this time, governments, communities, and households consider, plan, and prepare to move. In the second stage, environmental stressors affect habitat security whereby coastal inundation, landslides, volcanic eruptions, and extreme weather events compel people to permanently leave their homes. In the context of low-lying atoll nations, this entails sea-level rise eroding land and maritime jurisdictions, threatening their habitability and national sovereignty (IPCC, 2019b). At this point, communities and households decide to find safety elsewhere while governments establish mechanisms to facilitate their movement, re-establish livelihoods, and assist and protect them during the process. In the third stage, environmental stressors impact land security whereby sudden and slow-onset events cause irreparable harm, impeding their return to areas of origin. Here, efforts are directed towards integration, monitoring, and maintaining ties to origin locations.

Third, mobility optimists reframed the problem as disaster displacement. Although alternative discourses such as environmental migration and climate migration were critical for raising awareness of the issue in different policy domains, human mobility optimists found them conceptually problematic. The term 'migration' captures forced and voluntary movements but "does not say what makes it forced" (Walter Kalin, interview, 07.10.2020), whereas the term 'climate' is "too narrow", dismissing that population movements are multicausal (Atle Solberg, interview, 08.12.2018). They introduced the notion of disaster displacement, defined as "situations where people are forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of disasters or to avoid the impact of immediate or foreseeable natural hazard" (Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015, p. 17).

This discourse has three unique features: it demonstrates a clear causality between environmental stressors and forced population movements; indicates that human vulnerability, exposure, and capacity are critical for responding to the phenomenon; and emphasises the effects rather than causes (Jane McAdam, interview, 06.05.2019; Sanjula Weerasinghe, interview, 29.07.2019). Hence, policymakers perceive it as a "tangible, measurable and simplistic" phenomenon (Dave Zervaas, interview, 19.06.2019). These features were critical for depoliticising the issue and prompting governments to engage in policy dialogues and foster partnerships with non-traditional actors to address the needs of people at risk of disaster displacement.

Finally, optimists problematised the human rights and humanitarian framing of displacement (Bina Desai, interview, 07.06.2019). This frame depicts affected persons as lacking choice and facing inhumane conditions, which offers a narrow set of solutions that focus on heightened border security and only protecting people on the move. It also provides a narrow stream of funding that is targeted toward ad hoc, immediate response (Monique Pairat, Geneva, 24.04.2019). The frame ignores development-friendly measures critical for preventing and minimising displacement, which requires long-term investment. Hence, displacement was reframed as a human security issue – environmental stressors induce people to leave their homes, which can thwart socioeconomic gains and destabilise communities. The human security frame calls on governments to employ empowerment- *and* protection-oriented approaches to managing the issue (Westbury, 2022). The shift in problem framing was important for identifying policy alternatives and anchoring displacement onto different agendas.

7.4 Policy Alternative 1: From Resettlement to Planned Relocation

The first policy alternative resulting from the above approach was resettlement. Planned relocation advocates initially framed internal displacement as a human rights issue by emphasising the specific vulnerability of affected persons. They are susceptible to forced resettlement and conscription, arbitrary detention, sexual assault, being trapped in conflict zones, impoverishment, and social disintegration (Cernea, 1990, 1996; Cohen & Deng, 1998). In the context of conflict, governments often perceive them as state enemies because they are affiliated with rebel, political, religious, cultural or social groups and thus deny them state protection and assistance. In the context of development projects, governments perceive displacement as necessary for realising their socioeconomic rights (Kalin, 2008). Nevertheless, the problem frame called for a solution, especially for IDPs who cannot return home. Planned relocation advocates linked internal displacement to resettlement by arguing that it can be a durable solution if such schemes protect the human rights of affected persons and are carried out as development projects. More specifically, IDPs must participate in the planning process, be able to engage in public affairs without discrimination, have access to public services, and receive state assistance in recovering lost possessions and re-establishing livelihoods (Cernea, 1988; OCHA, 1998).

Advocates substantively linked resettlement to internal environmental displacement. They established causality between environmental stressors and internal displacement by arguing that rapid sea-level rise, tsunamis, environmental pollution, landslides, and riverbank erosions displaced people for extended periods (EACH-FOR, 2009; OHCHR, 2004; Warner, 2010). They experienced similar human rights violations and impoverishment risks as those forced to move in response to conflicts and development projects. This was substantiated using historical case studies that show African, Asian, and Pacific policymakers and communities traditionally used resettlement schemes to move away from environmental harm. The Special Rapporteur on the HR of IDPs discovered that the victims of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami experienced issues related to enforced relocation, lost documentation, and asset restitution (UNGA, 2005). The IPCC (2007) found I-Kiribati, Carteret Islanders, Tuvaluans, and Solomon Islanders relocating inland and upland, which had severe sociocultural and human rights implications. A group of international researchers found Chinese, Mozambican, and Vietnamese policymakers using different policies to regulate the phenomenon: China adopted land-for-land and rural-to-urban strategies; Mozambique incorporated resettlement into its rural development policy; and

Vietnam formulated a separate Living with Floods policy (Dun, 2011; Heming et al., 2001; Warner et al., 2008). These policies failed to engage affected persons, provide employment opportunities and adequate resources, sufficiently compensate households and identify suitable land, thereby adversely impacting the relocating communities. Yet, the case studies revealed that resettlement schemes could prevent internal environmental displacement.

Advocates refashioned the internal environmental displacement and resettlement linkage to align with dominant discourses in disaster risk reduction and climate change policy domains. In the context of disaster risk reduction, resettlement was framed as a protection strategy – governments are responsible for protecting their citizens and assets, which entails preventing displacement risks using a combination of physical measures and resettlement schemes (UNGA, 2005; WCDR, 2005). In the context of climate change, resettlement was framed as an adaption strategy – carefully planned and participatory schemes that protect human rights and foster development can enhance the adaptive capacities of affected communities (Franck, 2014). This solution frame was not supported by evidence. Instead, the IPCC blurred the conceptual distinction between migration and resettlement by using examples of the latter to substantiate the notion of migration as an adaptation strategy. It is partly for this reason that resettlement and relocation appeared in the climate adaptation negotiating text.

However, resettlement/relocation has diverse interpretations and a stigma of bad practice. Policymakers and practitioners from different fields used different terms to describe different aspects of the process: humanitarians used resettlement to refer to the practice of transferring and settling refugees in third countries; developmentalists used relocation to refer to the process of physically moving people and resettlement to describe the practice of restoring and improving livelihoods; and climate change experts used relocation to refer to the process of moving away from areas susceptible to climate adversities (Ferris, 2012; McAdam & Ferris, 2015; UNHCR et al., 2014). In addition, resettlement schemes are associated with "bad practices" (Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat, interview, 25.01.2019). Affected communities experienced adverse intergenerational effects because of poor planning, resource shortages, cultural barriers, and the lack of participation, compensation, and employment opportunities (Arenas & Oliver-Smith, 2017; Chun, 2015; Guadagno, 2016; Sanjula Weerasinghe, interview, 29.07.2019).

For resettlement/relocation to be accepted as a norm for managing internal environmental displacement, advocates had to overcome these challenges. This was achieved by drawing on

negative lessons, whereby they acknowledged the workability of the schemes but learned what not to do from past experiences. ISIM's Elizabeth Ferris (interview, 23.07.2019) said, "success begins with looking at some of the negative examples. You find out what didn't work by reading the evaluations [and] you find examples of where there were [for instance] good consultations and try to work out how that happened". In other words, they worked backwards, identifying and refining aspects deemed ineffective. In addition to this, the advocates convened the 2011 and 2014 expert meetings in Bellagio and Sanremo to build consensus on terminology. Elizabeth Ferris (interview, 23.07.2019) continued to explain:

"The World Bank wanted to use the term 'resettlement' whereas the Cancun decision referred to 'planned relocation.' We had to convene an international meeting with legal experts from different fields – migration, human rights, humanitarian, and development – to agree on the terminology … We spent a lot of time fleshing that out. We had very general language initially, and the more you dug into it, the more complicated it became. Who are the people affected by this? It isn't just those who move, but the communities where they move to …"

Ultimately, they settled with the term 'planned relocation,' defining it as a process of people moving or being assisted to move away from at-risk places of residence, settling in a new location and rebuilding their lives (Ferris & Weerasinghe, 2020; Brookings Institution et al., 2015). The definition is deliberately broad – it not only captures the diverse interpretations of relocation but also acts as a binding definition for experts working on the solution.

Despite arriving at a common understanding of planned relocation as a solution, many Pacific organisations and policymakers continue to perceive resettlement as a problem. Tuvalu's Enele Sopoaga (virtual event, 19.10.2020) said, "people have asked me, 'Have you considered the question of relocation?' No, there is no Plan B". Similarly, 350 Pacific's George Nacewa (interview, 06.12.2019) shared that the organisation refrains from promoting migration – and relocation – as solutions because "we hold our culture and identity dear to our hearts … If you leave the birthplace of your ancestors and traditional culture, you lose a bit of yourself …" Yet, Tuvalu and the 350 Pacific supports the PRFCM that endorses planned relocation as a viable solution. Advocates used past examples, specifically of the cross-border Banaban and Vaitupuan relocations to Fiji, to convince reluctant Pacific actors that relocation is a traditional protection strategy (Field Notes, 08.11.2022). They also used political tactics to enrol regional followers. In this way, planned relocation as an environmental displacement management strategy arrived in the Pacific.

7.5 Policy Alternative 2: Labour Migration as an Adaptation, Resilience-Building, and Survival Strategy

The second policy alternative was labour migration. The labour migration supporters framed voluntary population movements as a development issue by arguing that well-managed programmes generate triple wins. Destination countries gain from increased productivity levels and cultural diversification; origin countries benefit from job creation and investments; and migrants diversify household incomes, thereby increasing resilience to withstand economic shocks. This claim was substantiated using the outcomes of the KANI, Australia's SWP, and New Zealand's RSE scheme: I-Kiribati completed their qualifications; Tongan and Ni-Vanuatu seasonal workers benefited from higher wages, savings, and subjective well-being; and the employers gained from a "stable and productive workforce" (Gibson & McKenzie, 2014b, p. 25; Gibson & Bailey, 2021; Shaw et al., 2014).

Supporters attempted to substantively link labour migration to adaptation. Drawing from the New Economics of Labour Migration theory, they argued that remittances, new ideas, and diaspora communities can help households cope with climate adversities (Caroline Zickgraf, virtual event, 16.09.2020). Existing migration pathways allow a small group of individuals to work overseas while others remain behind. This relieves population pressure and allows the land to fallow, minimises dependency on natural resources, overcomes the fear of losing ancestral lands, grants affected persons the power to decide when and where to migrate, allows destination and origin governments to prepare for the gradual relocation of atoll communities, and creates diaspora communities that can champion new emigrants, help immigration authorities understand their sociocultural practices, and shape integration policies (Akka Rimon, Canberra, 29.09.2022; FCOSS Representative, interview, 19.11.2019; PCCMHS Programme, 2019; Michelle Leighton, interview, 21.08.2019; Rae Bainteiti, interview, 13.10.2020).

Their claims were partly substantiated using anecdotal evidence from Africa, Asia, and the Pacific: women used the remittances to invest in education and access healthcare; returning workers brought expertise useful for in situ adaptation measures; and diaspora communities financed small business ventures and the construction of seawalls, effectively navigated international bureaucracy to access funding, assisted in disaster recovery efforts, and connected youths with climate champions (ILO Representative 2, interview, 17.07.2019; John Corcoran, interview, 12.12.2019; Mariam Traore Chazalnoel, interview, 06.12.2018; Timothy Westbury,

interview, 07.10.2019). A small body of research also demonstrated that the Pacific diaspora is instrumental in disaster recovery: Fijians, Ni-Vanuatu, Nukefeatu community members, Tongans, and Samoans residing in rim countries remit more of their wages following sudden-onset events and fundraise and collect in-kind donations to send back home (Bailey & Shiu, 2016; Le De, Gaillard, & Friesen, et al., 2015; Rae Bainteiti, interview, 13.10.2020; Simalua Enele, interview, 27.12.2019; Vivekananthan & Connors, 2019). The recipient households use the funds to reconstruct robust homes to withstand disasters, install solar panels, and renovate community buildings that often serve as evacuation centres (Fabling, 2013; Farbotko, Kitara, et al., 2022; Bedford, Bedford, et al., 2020). This anecdotal evidence supported the labour migration-disaster recovery linkage, not the labour migration-adaptation linkage.

Supporters linked labour migration to historical practices. They argued migration is not new (Francois Gemenne, interview, 18.11.2022). In the Pacific, "it is pervasive, based on historical precedents, part of everyday experience perceived as legitimate … [and] an integral part of life" (Connell, 2009, p. 161). Yet again, historical examples showed that Pacific Islanders worked overseas on disaster-related temporary visas to build a resource base necessary for recovering from sudden-onset events. For instance, Fijians went to work in New Zealand after Tropical Cyclone David in 1975 (John Campbell, interview, 31.10.2019; Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019). While such case studies highlighted that labour migration is a traditional recovery strategy, they failed to substantiate its adaptive potential.

Supporters reframed labour migration as a resilience-building strategy. They argued that its benefits allow households to remain on their ancestral lands as long as it is ecologically possible. They can use remittances to construct seawalls and finance relocations and skills to cultivate resilient crops (Dun et al., 2022). University of Melbourne's Celia McMichael (virtual event, 21.01.2021, emphasis added) shared research findings on Pacific workers' motivations for engaging in Australia's SWP:

> "We've been talking to Solomon Islanders' who've come to Australia through SWP. *No one is saying they're accessing the programme to adapt to climate change.* It's almost the reverse. It's not a pathway away from the Pacific but having an income source … means people are investing at home. So, you have even more reasons to protect and not leave. You're investing in education, housing, wells [and] water and sanitation. It's more reason for wanting to belong and stay in the Pacific Islands."

But supporters from atoll nations framed it as a survival strategy. Existing programmes are "lifelines" since communities do not have higher ground for internal relocation and there is no international protection mechanism for international environmentally displaced persons (Akka Rimon, interview, 30.11.2022). Despite the different framings, there is "no empirical link[age] at the moment" between labour migration, adaptation, resilience, and survival (Timothy Westbury, interview, 07.10.2019). Yet, because the IPCC blurred the conceptual distinction between relocation and migration, the latter is globally accepted as an adaptation norm.

Nevertheless, labour migration supporters depicted existing 'models' as workable strategies. Seasonal programmes already target individuals susceptible to environmental adversities. Although environmental factors are not explicitly written in the RSE scheme, employers recruit workers from rural communities with subsistence livelihoods who lack opportunities to earn cash. "As the scheme developed, environmental factors became very present because most people come to work in New Zealand during the hurricane [or tropical cyclone] season" (Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019). In addition, it is an agile and flexible scheme and hence can be adapted to manage environmental migration. As detailed in Chapter 5, the New Zealand government made visa concessions for Ni-Vanuatu affected by Tropical Cyclone Pam that entailed extending visas for existing workers and waiving visa fees for new labourers (Bailey & Shiu, 2016). Similarly, permanent residency programmes have already allocated quotas for highly vulnerable nations. The PAC has allocated 75 spaces to Kiribati and Tuvalu (John Campbell, interview, 30.10.2019). Its Australian replica, the PEV, will arguably provide a larger quota to atoll states because they have yet to establish diaspora communities and are at risk of uninhabitability (Akka Rimon & Stephen Howes, Canberra, 29.09.2022).

Experts suggested programmatic linkage to regulate environmental migration and displacement (Burson & Bedford, 2013; Curtain & Dornan, 2019; Curtain et al., 2016). They postulated that by amending, expanding, and linking 'models,' high-emitting nations can achieve their moral obligations and foreign policy goals such as those related to development support and climate adaptation (Sabira Coelho, Sydney, 21.10.2018). In speaking about New Zealand's labour migration programmes, Richard Bedford (interview, 04.05.2019) explained at length how this might work in practice:

> "If your employer has brought you back, they like your contribution. You could say to the employer, 'How about giving me a full-time job?' And the employer [may] say, 'Yes, I'll give you a full-time job … and support you as a migrant for residence … as long as you stay close to my orchard and don't hive off to Auckland.' What I think would make sense in countries like Kiribati, Tuvalu and possibly, Tonga, is to have larger PAC quotas and sections within the allocation. One of those sections might be for long-term RSE workers who want to transition to residence because there is no pathway other than standard immigration policy. And the other [section] could be for people who are experiencing environmental stress."

The idea is that temporary schemes enable repeat migration, allowing Pacific workers to learn about and integrate into destination countries' labour markets, ways of life, and cultures (Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019). This knowledge can aid families in applying for permanent residency. New Zealand authorities are exploring how individual programmes can be improved and readjusted to build social networks for gradual relocation and address environmental challenges in the region (GoNZ, 2018, 2019b, 2021; Nathan Ross, interview, 22.01.2020).

Political champions and entrepreneurs recommended linking labour migration to upskilling programmes to manage mobility from atoll states. I-Kiribati experts argued that investment in internationally recognised education can facilitate dignified migration whereby people choose when, where, and how they move (Akka Rimon, interview, 30.11.2022; Anote Tong, interview, 14.04.2023). Dignified migration is rooted in the Dhaka Principles (see IHRB, 2011). However, it was adapted and localised in two ways: it was embedded within the I-Kiribati culture of self-sufficiency (i.e., migration is a traditional strategy) and framed as a long-term proactive strategy (i.e., people will be able to migrate in the future) (Genevieve Jiva, interview, 21.11.2019; Simon Bradshaw, interview, 04.06.2019). The idea resonated with community members because it moved away from the fear that I-Kiribati will become dependents on host communities (Anote Tong, Melbourne, 11.10.2018; John Corcoran, interview, 12.12.2019; Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019). It resonated with international organisations – namely, IOM, PICAN, PDD, and Oxfam Australia – because the 'model' conveyed to governments that vulnerable communities need regular migration pathways, not social and financial support (Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat, interview, 25.01.2019; IOM, 2017d; Nansen Protection Agenda,

2015; Richards & Bradshaw, 2017). In this way, I-Kiribati experts mobilised the notion of migration with dignity.

Despite global efforts to establish consensus on labour migration's adaptive and resilience-building potential, Pacific organisations are reluctant to endorse the linkage. PICAN recently reconceptualised the notion of migration with dignity as climate-forced migration while PIF members do not have a unified position (Genevieve Jiva, interview, 21.11.2019; PIFS Climate Resilience Secretariat Coordinator, interview, 20.02.2020; PIFS Regional Security Advisor, interview, 20.02.2020; Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019). Yet, Pacific policymakers are in the process of developing a regional climate mobility framework that frames labour migration as an adaptation strategy. This indicates the importance of temporal factors and ideological contention (see Chapter 10).

7.6 Policy Alternative 3: From Refugee Protection to Humanitarian Protection

The third policy alternative was humanitarian protection. Protectionists framed environmental mobility as a humanitarian issue by postulating that environmentally displaced persons are not protected by international law (Kolmannskog & Trebbi, 2010; McAdam et al., 2016; Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015). They do not qualify for refugee status and there is no political appetite to revise the 1951 Refugee Convention and negotiate a new global instrument. Rather than reinventing the wheel, humanitarian protectionists revived, revised, and linked existing normative measures to safeguard the rights of affected persons.

They revived and re-substantiated the environment-conflict linkage. Environmental stressors create competition over finite natural resources, triggering violence and conflict, thereby compelling people to seek international refuge (Weerasinghe, 2018). The nexus originated from early development discourse that portrayed environment-induced conflict and displacement as a threat to sustainable development. This was empirically validated by African and European events. The 1970s African crisis was framed as an "environmental problem" that caused drought, famine, desertification, overpopulation, environmental refugees, political instability, and widespread poverty (WCED, 1987, p. 109). The Soviet Union and the Chernobyl nuclear disaster displaced millions, generating fears that it would spill over to neighbouring states and destabilise the region (Nina Birkeland, interview, 05.07.2019). These events helped protectionists lobby world leaders to design development initiatives for drought-prone areas to avert 'environmental refugee' movements (UNCED, 1992). During this time,

international efforts focused on preventing environmental displacement and delinking environmental stressors from refugee movements, not safeguarding the human rights of affected persons.

Gradually and covertly, protectionists found evidence to revitalise the environmental/climate refugee discourse. The 2007 Darfur Conflict and the 2011 Arab Awakening were arguably precipitated by resource scarcity – the changing climate reduced the availability of and accessibility to freshwater and land, igniting communal conflict and prompting people to flee their homes (Femia & Werrell, 2013; Guterres, 2011c; UNEP, 2007). These case studies reiterated that while conflict triggered cross-border displacement, its root cause was environmental factors. In addition, governments granted protection to individuals escaping environmental stressors under regional refugee instruments. The Kenyan and Ethiopian authorities used the OAU Convention to grant refugee protection to Somalians fleeing the 2011 drought, famine, and conflict while the Brazilian and the Dominican Republic governments granted Haitians fleeing the 2010 earthquake with humanitarian visas under the Cartagena Declaration (Fagen, 2013; McAdam & Weerasinghe, 2020; Thomaz, 2013). This evidence highlighted that:

> "You should not be saying these people are *not* refugees simply by drought because events seriously disturbing public order already existed. Just because there is a drought doesn't mean it stopped existing because there was conflict anyway … There is certainly an argument at the intersection of those issues [environmental stressors and conflict] for saying, 'They are seriously disturbing public order, [and] we should be looking at more deeply at assisting states to apply it [regional refugee instruments]' because they are already applying it. We are not taking advantage of that" (Sanjula Weerasinghe, interview, 29.07.2019, emphasis added).

Put differently, regional instruments apply in nexus situations because of their liberal refugee definitions (Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, 2017). Despite this emerging evidence, protection continues to be granted temporarily in exceptional circumstances and on an ad hoc basis (Kalin & Weerasinghe, 2017). Further, the political will to extend regional refugee protection to international environmentally displaced persons is limited (Chanelle Taoi, virtual event, 21.01.2022).

Protectionists claim the 1951 Refugee Convention can apply to environment-conflict displacement under three conditions. First, national authorities discriminate against or deprioritise a specific vulnerable group when distributing relief aid (Isabelle Michal, interview, 11.12.2018). Second, ancestral lands are deliberately destroyed to persecute a particular community and/or the government fails to establish appropriate measures to avert and minimise environmental adversities (UNHCR, 2020a). Third, conventional refugees residing in camps are displaced by environmental stressors (Atle Solberg, interview, 08.12.2018). However, the claim for using international refugee protection to manage international environmental displacement remains unsubstantiated, especially in the Pacific.

Recently, protectionist humanitarian experts proposed an alternative form of protection enshrined in international human rights law, namely complementary measures. In some instances, it is "morally and practically" unethical ((Atle Solberg, interview, 08.12.2018) for states to return individuals to environmentally fragile areas, where they are at risk of dying or cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment (Kalin & Weerasinghe, 2017; McAdam, 2020). This claim was empirically validated by drawing from historical ad hoc state practices, which included introducing special category visas and expediting visa processes: Italian, Latin American, Mozambican, and the US authorities granted and extended protection to Haitians, Malawians, Spanish, and Zimbabweans who fled across borders in response to extreme weather events, earthquakes, regular river flooding, and volcanic eruptions (David Cantor, virtual event, 10.02.2021; Koko Warner, interview, 22.08.2019; Martin, 2010; Stephane Jaquemet, interview, 12.08.2019; Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019). Despite empirically substantiating the environment-displacement-protection linkage, the solution is problematic because it assumes affected individuals can return home after the event subsides. Put differently, complementary protection is often granted temporarily. Even though the linkage is unsubstantiated in the Pacific context, the PRFCM portrays humanitarian visas as a viable protection strategy, signalling the importance of political work (see Chapter 9).

7.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter demonstrates how human mobility optimists used framing and linking tactics to strategically construct problems concerning environmental migration and displacement and devise solutions. First, the chapter shows how mobility optimists used 'diagnostic framing' to posit a causal link between environmental stress and forced migration. They did so by de-linking issues of environmental or climate mobility from 'refugee' discourse and broadening

their focus to cover a fuller spectrum of mobility responses. Second, the chapter demonstrates how mobility optimists used ‘prognostic framing’ to unpackage and repackage three specific policy alternatives to address this broader range of mobility types. These policy alternatives comprise planned relocation, labour migration, and humanitarian protection, which various mobility optimists have construed as ‘best practices’ for regulating environmental mobility and displacement. Third, the chapter indicates how optimists used ‘substantive linkage’ to posit a causal link between environmental mobility and emerging ‘models’ of policy response.

This chapter also reveals how different groups of mobility optimists used issue-linking as a strategy to mobilise at least three main types of policy response to environmental migration and displacement. Advocates of planned relocation linked this policy alternative to existing normative instruments. In contrast, supporters of labour migration as a policy response tended to link environmental mobility and displacement issues to temporary and permanent programmes, which they then argued should be amended, expanded, and aligned to manage environmental migration, especially from atoll nations.

Chapter 8: Mobilising Strategy 2 – Entrepreneurialism

8.1 Introduction

The current chapter discusses the strategy of entrepreneurialism. Human mobility optimists engaged in two entrepreneurial activities to construct and circulate issue linkages, frames, and policy preferences. The first activity was creating and shopping for policy spaces to construct the problem and solutions, exchange knowledge, and build political consensus on the issue area. By doing so, they established a multi-scalar and multi-sited assembly line. The second activity was using multi-initiatives to mobilise and institutionalise certain policies into environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices.' By doing so, some optimists guaranteed their institutional survival while donor states discretely coerced Pacific nations to regulate the phenomenon, thereby ensuring new forms of population movements do not spill over and cause mayhem in the Western world. This chapter elucidates the dis/circulation and normalisation of environmental migration and displacement (i.e., the problem) and development-friendly and humanitarian approaches (i.e., solutions). Section 8.2 examines the transnational policy assembly line and Section 8.3 explores multi-initiatives on environmental migration and displacement. Finally, Section 8.4 concludes with a chapter summary.

8.2 A Transnational Policy Assembly Line

Human mobility optimists created a transnational policy assembly line spanning vast geographies that brought together professional experts and temporally situated ideologies on regulating environmental migration and displacement. They identified, exploited, and created spaces functioning as policy production, dissemination, and adoption centres. Some of these sites were fixed but most were fleeting. Different actors used them for different reasons: international institutions built expert consensus, refined, promulgated, and anchored their issue de/linkages and policy preferences; regional organisations shared community stories and emerging regional initiatives; and Pacific policymakers launched national regulatory strategies as place-based 'models.' Information flowed in multiple directions in these spaces, enabling simultaneous policy teaching and learning.

However, the mobility of the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage constitutes specific temporalities: planned relocation, labour migration, and humanitarian protection were mobilised at different points in time in each site. The period from 1990 to 2009 was characterised by policy siloes and slow policy mobility. International institutions were convening fleeting events in Europe to formulate the issue linkages, frames, and policies while regional organisations were lobbying for relocation compensation and Pacific policymakers were developing their domestic strategies. Multi-sectoral and transnational policy dialogues in the issue area appeared non-existent. The period from 2010 to 2023 was characterised by rapid horizontal and vertical policy mobilities and greater policy synergies. International institutions forged partnerships to convene events in predominantly Europe, the US, *and* the Pacific to devise and sell feasible technical solutions and enhance political commitment to establish environmental migration and displacement governance. Cross-domain and cross-scalar policy conversations intensified, producing conducive conditions for global and regional policy action. Although the temporal dynamics are captured in this section, it focuses on elucidating the spatial spread of the three emerging 'best practices.'

8.2.1 Global Expert Sites: Formulating the Solutions

Human mobility optimists convened conferences, seminars, and symposiums to understand the environment-population movement nexus and identify solutions and place-based 'models.' More specifically, they delinked environmental stressors from refugee protection and linked the issue to planned relocation and labour migration. The 1992 Conference on Migration and Environment held in Nylon was instrumental in building consensus on the environmental/climate refugee delinkage. Experts and policymakers agreed it was an inappropriate label for describing persons displaced internationally by environmental stressors and UNHCR's narrow mandate inhibited it from assisting and protecting this new group of individuals; these messages were also reiterated in other forums (Westing, 1992). They not only called for greater research on this highly complex but important issue but also encouraged other organisations to take institutional responsibility and develop new governance instruments (IOM & RPG, 1992 cited in Black, 2001). Thus, the conference temporarily immobilised the spread of environmental/climate refugee discourse.

The 1996 Symposium on Environmentally-Induced Population Displacements and Environmental Impacts Resulting from Mass Migration held in Chavannes-de-Bogis was critical for mobilising resettlement as a viable strategy to avert and minimise environmental

displacement. Experts recommended governments formulate domestic relocation policies that include compulsory environmental impact assessments, equitable assistance, and income-generative activities (UNHCR et al., 1996). Additionally, it grounded the labour migration-adaptation linkage in historical practices. Specialists shared that Pakistanis used existing labour migration pathways to withstand frequent flooding and cope with the adverse ecological impacts of development projects (UNHCR et al., 1996). Moreover, it encouraged international organisations to share successful practices, improve communication to collectively regulate the issue, and band together to elevate the issue across UN platforms (Lohrmann, 1996). Therefore, the symposium presented relocation schemes and labour migration as traditional approaches for regulating environmental migration and displacement.

The 2007 Seminar on Migration and Environment held in Bangkok mobilised *place-based* relocation and labour migration 'models.' The Chinese and Mongolian resettlement schemes were effective because authorities provided affected families with integration grants or cash, housing, and irrigated land and seeds that allowed them to re-establish their livelihoods (IOM & UNFPA, 2007). The Turkey-Germany and Mauritius-Canada circular migration programmes were touted as a pathway for economic diversification and relieving humanitarian burdens following disasters (IOM & UNFPA, 2007). Similarly, at the 2008 Workshop on Developing a Global Research Agenda for Migration and Environment held in Munich, Costa Rica's Arenal Hydroelectric Project was lauded as a success because the community participated in the decision-making process and the scheme restored and improved their standards of living (Oliver-Smith, 2008). Apart from this, experts proposed two alternative approaches to establishing causality between environmental stressors and labour migration: the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach prioritises household responses and strategies in response to shocks, whereas the New Economics of Labour Migration Theory assesses motivations for migrating (Kniveton et al., 2008). This may suggest that experts accepted that relocation schemes can manage environmental displacement but were not fully convinced of the causal relationship between environmental stressors and labour migration programmes.

From 2010 onwards, optimists created expert venues to strengthen group ideologies and formalise certain solutions to 'best practices.' The 2011 Expert Roundtable on Climate Change and Displacement in Bellagio reinforced the group ideology. Experts collectively endorsed planned relocation and labour migration as solutions for managing the phenomenon by arguing that "pre-emptive migration is a rational adaptation response" and planned relocation schemes

must be carried out in accordance with the 1998 Guiding Principles (UNHCR, 2011b, p. 9). They also agreed that international human rights law offers complementary protection, but there is a pressing need for a global guiding instrument to protect international environmentally displaced persons (UNHCR, 2011b).

At the 2014-2017 expert events held in Sanremo, Washington D.C., and Bellagio, specialists framed planned relocation as a global norm for managing internal environmental displacement. They drew inspiration from Pacific case studies – namely Banaba, Carteret, Fijian, Ni-Vanuatu, and Vaitupuan resettlements – to define planned relocation (see Chapter 7) (Elizabeth Ferris, interview, 23.07.2019; UNHCR et al, 2014). In addition, they "hashed out what the guidance would look like – we already had a draft" (Sanjuala Weerasinghe, interview, 29.07.2019; UNHCR et al., 2014). The Planned Relocation Guidance was based on the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and development practices, comprising ideas on facilitating resettlement schemes (Brookings Institution et al., 2015). However, it was deemed inadequate. UNHCR's Erica Bower (interview, 10.12.2019) said:

> "In 2017, it was clear that that guidance was insufficient. We needed to bring these human rights principles down from the sky and into concrete terms. UNHCR, Georgetown University, and IOM together with the World Bank and UNU-EHS – although they were secondary partners – put together the toolbox. It has checklists, best practices about participation and consultation, monitoring and evaluation, and what the right to land looks like in these contexts, and that's another model for what types of questions governments should ask themselves as they are undergoing relocations."

The Planned Relocation Toolbox also spotlights Fiji's guidelines and the Solomon Islands' financial support for a particular scheme (UNHCR et al., 2017). The former can be attributed to the consultant's efforts, who facilitated a two-way flow of ideas through his affiliations with the Fijian government, GIZ, and IOM (Cosmin Corendea, interview, 10.08.2019).

It should be noted that only planned relocation was institutionalised as a 'best practice' for internal environmental displacement during this period. This is because the problem structure shapes actor responsibility. If the phenomenon is internal, governments are responsible for the welfare and safety of their citizens. But if they are unable or unwilling to fulfil these responsibilities, leaders must request and accept international assistance (Cohen, 2010; Gemenne & Brücker, 2015). In contrast, cross-border environmental movements require

bilateral or multilateral cooperation. Leaders must recognise the issue linkage and be willing to explore arrangements that enable regular migration and offer protection.

8.2.2 Global Expert-Cum-Policy Institution: The Nansen Initiative

UNCHR created an alternative expert-cum-policy institution focusing on international environmental migration and displacement that came to be known as the Nansen Initiative. It exploited existing protection and security venues to establish a standalone protection instrument for international environmental displacement and thus, expand its mandate. It helped design the government-led Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century in Oslo. The Chief offered technical expertise in "assisting with identifying scenarios in which such arrangements would be activated and developing procedures and standards of treatment for affected populations" (Guterres, 2011a). However, the event concluded with a set of principles encouraging states to work with UNHCR to develop a guiding instrument to protect individuals displaced by *sudden-onset disasters* (Kalin, 2015; McAdam, 2012; NRC, 2011).

At UNHCR's 52nd Standing Committee Session in Geneva, the organisation put forward IASC's proposal for it to coordinate the protection responses in disaster displacement situations. Member states expressed concerns about "state sovereignty, mandate implications, resources and capacity, disengagement" (UNGA, 2011, p. 7) and the novelty of the issue area, thereby postponing their decision on its mandate expansion (Hall, 2013). Nevertheless, UNHCR bid to link environmental displacement to security.

During the UNSC Briefing on New Challenges to International Peace and Security and Conflict Prevention in New York, the Chief stressed that climate change is heightening poverty and food insecurity, conflict and violence, frequency and intensity of disasters, and statelessness. For these reasons, it is morally imperative to formulate and adopt a set of principles protecting those forced to leave their countries due to environmental events and who do not qualify for international refugee status (Guterres, 2011c). The issue of a standalone international protection instrument was posed as a discussion question for the 2011 Ministerial Meeting in Geneva (Guterres, 2011c; UNHCR, 2011b). Yet again, member states exhibited scant political will, voicing reservations about "[state] sovereignty, competing priorities and the organisation's leading role in the process" (Kalin, 2015, p. 49).

Because of these failed attempts, Norway and Switzerland took the issue outside of the UN. They jointly pledged to cooperate with interested countries to better understand cross-border environmental displacement at regional and sub-regional levels, identify 'best practices,' and develop consensus on ways to protect and assist affected persons (Erica Bower, interview, 10.12.2018; Hall, 2015; Jane McAdam, interview, 06.05.2019; Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019; UNHCR, 2011b). This led to the creation of the Nansen Initiative, which operated akin to an organisation but was a site for building political and technical consensus on the protection of international environmentally displaced persons (see Chapter 6) (Kalin, 2015). NRC's Nina Birkeland (interview, 05.07.2019) said:

> "If you put that issue to the UN, it stays but doesn't necessarily get results. The thinking behind the Nansen Initiative and PDD was getting states to take the lead on this issue within an expert forum … Having states leading it, the chance of getting a change is much bigger … But they need to be supported by those with technical expertise."

The Nansen Initiative "piloted" regional consultative processes on environmental mobility in Africa, Asia, the Americas, and the Pacific (Sabira Coelho, interview, 26.09.2019). The sites enabled a two-way vertical flow of policy information and cross-sectoral mobility of policy ideas. International organisations and experts learnt about different problem conceptualisations and 'successful' initiatives. Regional practitioners and policymakers acquired information about international norms applicable to their contexts and cross-jurisdictional 'models.' All the information was amalgamated and fed into different global policymaking processes (Atle Solberg, interview, 08.12.2018).

8.2.3 Global Policy Agoras: Selling 'Best Practices'

Human mobility optimists exploited existing policy marketplaces to strategically disseminate the issue de/linkages, launch policies, and enrol new followers. The traditional policy dissemination site is climate change conferences. At COP15 in Copenhagen, members of IASC and CCEMA organised a high-level side event, where leaders reiterated institutional positions and support: UNHCR's Antonio Guterres (2009) offered to facilitate dialogue on identifying new modalities for international cooperation on protecting and assisting cross-border environmentally displaced persons; IOM's William Swing (2009) urged world leaders to consider including migration in the new climate adaptation treaty; and the Special Rapporteur on the HR of IDPS Walter Kalin (2009) stressed the applicability of the 1998 Guiding

Principles on Internal Displacement to disaster situations. The spread of the three emerging environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' in the climate change domain accelerated in 2018. International institutions and experts organised "little get-togethers with delegates", observed meetings, and spoke to leaders in the corridors about their interest in specific aspects of the issue area (Koko Warner, interview, 02.08.2019). In addition, they set up pavilions to showcase their work, host events, and network with government officials (see Figure 8.1). For example, 350 Pacific shared the relocation experiences of Vunisavisavi at COP23 in Bonn; Fiji launched its planned relocation guidelines and the TfD presented recommendations on averting, minimising, and addressing displacement using all three solutions at COP24 in Katowice; and the Joint Working Group on the Regional Climate Mobility Framework showcased their progress and optimists convened 50 side events during COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh (Field Notes, 13.12.2018; 15.11.2022; George Nacewa, interview, 06.12.2019; Representative of Fiji's Climate Change Division, interview, 29.03.2019).

Figure 8.1: Human Mobility Optimists' Pavilions during the 27th COP to UNFCCC in Sharm-El Sheikh, Egypt (Author, 2022).

A related environmental arena is the disaster risk reduction platform. Fiji and Vanuatu shared their domestic relocation and displacement strategies during the Regional Workshop on Disaster Risk Reduction in Bohl (PDD, 2018b). NRC, PDD, and UNDRR launched the Words into Action Guidelines on Disaster Displacement that present planned relocation and migration as anticipatory and protection strategies during the Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction in Geneva (Field Notes, 16.05.2019). These efforts contributed to elevating and anchoring the three emerging 'best practices' in environmental agendas, spilling over into four other policy domains.

The first and relatively unexplored domain is development. Pacific leaders have primarily utilised the UNGA in New York to raise awareness of their efforts in managing environmental migration and displacement. Kiribati shared the multi-pronged strategy for fostering development and ensuring its people's survival, including its migration with dignity policy, during the 69th and 70th sessions (UNGA, 2014, 2015). Tuvalu shared its intentions to table a resolution on protecting people displaced by climate change, which Vanuatu supported, and Fiji mentioned it is relocating communities away from rising sea levels at the 71st and 73rd sessions (UNGA, 2016a, 2018b). Beyond this, international organisations and experts' engagement in this development arena is limited.

The second recently discovered domain is migration. Until 2010, the GFMD seldom discussed the issue of environmental migration and displacement governance (Martin, 2010b). The GMG (2011, p. 2) issued a statement following the adoption of the adaptation treaty, recommending governments "to recognise migration as an adaptation strategy to environmental risks and to make migration as an option available to the most vulnerable". It hosted a Roundtable Assessing the Relevance and Impact of Climate Change on Migration and Development in Puerto Vallarta, where specialists expressed challenges in facilitating relocation schemes, portrayed international temporary and circular labour migration programmes as an adaptation strategy, and stressed the importance of establishing an institutional protection framework (GFMD, 2010a, 2010b). At a side event during the 11th Summit Meeting in Marrakesh on addressing the needs of people moving in response to environmental stressors in the Migration Compact, IOM, PDD, and UNHCR endorsed planned relocation, labour migration, and humanitarian visas as migration management strategies (GFMD, 2018; Kalin, 2018). Since adopting the global migration framework, only labour migration, diaspora engagement, and complementary protection measures are promulgated as environmental migration and

displacement management 'best practices' at the GFMD (see GFMD, 2020, 2023). This could be because the forum focuses on international population movements and world leaders are reluctant to discuss the logistics of facilitating cross-border relocation schemes.

The third emerging domain is human rights. SIDS are at the forefront of disseminating the environmental displacement and protection linkage in the UNHRC (Field Notes, 06.06.2019; Robyn-Ann Mani, interview, 26.07.2019). For instance, Tuvalu's Enele Sopoaga said the "Council should be mandated … to develop a binding instrument on the issue of displacement and climate refugees" (OHCHR, 2015b) while Kiribati's Anote Tong raised the issue of political unwillingness to discuss migration with dignity in the absence of global climate action at a full-day Panel Discussion on Human Rights and Climate Change (OHCHR, 2015a). Fiji shared its relocation experiences whereas the Marshall Islands expressed that its lack of land for coastal retreat violates fundamental human rights and dignity during the 41st session (Field Notes, 24.06.2019). Specialists exploited a panel discussion on international environmental displacement leading up to the adoption of the global migration framework. During the 37th session, the Deputy High Commissioner labelled affected persons as "human rights-deprived migrants" and noted that knowledge gaps impede the applicability of human rights protection to their situations (Gilmore, 2017). Nevertheless, PDD's Envoy advocated complementary measures while others called on governments to establish durable legal status for individuals seeking asylum in response to environmental stressors (UNHRC, 2017). The High Commissioner further encouraged state authorities to integrate displaced persons into host communities, regularise their legal status, and formulate regional protection instruments, drawing from widely accepted ICCPR and ICESCR (UNHRC, 2018). However, UNHRC has impermeable boundaries, delaying the standardisation of humanitarian protection as an environmental displacement 'best practice' (see Chapter 10).

The final but perhaps most difficult domain is security. Humanitarian experts and SIDS attempted to elevate the issue of environmental mobility at the UNSC in New York. Although it has yet to convene a standalone debate on environmental displacement, the issue is interwoven in Open Debates and Council Briefings. For example, PDD's Envoy postulated that harmonising existing ad hoc environmental migration and displacement practices (e.g., planned relocation, migration, humanitarian visas, and temporary protection) at regional levels can minimise the phenomenon's adverse impacts on international peace and security during the Debate on Security Implications of Climate Change: Sea-Level Rise (PDD, 2017b; SCR,

2021). UNHCR's Chief stated that environment-conflict displacement aggravated development, security, and governance challenges in Africa and Europe and recommended strengthening peace-building efforts and addressing humanitarian funding gaps at the 2022 Council Briefing (Grandi, 2022). Tuvalu stressed that accelerated sea-level rise could heighten sociopolitical tensions and ignite low-level violence, forcing millions into displacement, whereas Fiji mentioned its internal community relocation projects and its offer to provide refuge to atoll nations during the Debate on the Impacts of Climate-Related Disasters on International Peace and Security (UNSC, 2017, 2019, 2021).

These efforts contributed towards the establishment of an Informal Expert Group on Climate Security comprising a Pacific specialist. Its Climate-Fragility Risk Brief in the Pacific recognises environmental migration and displacement as a matter of national security and stability, whereby resettlement from the Carteret Islands to Bougainville posed a danger of violent outbreaks (Pasisi, 2019). The Group also publicises the outcomes of a multi-initiative that frames such human mobility-induced conflict as an unintended consequence of environmental stressors (discussed further below). More importantly, these knowledge products assist the Group of Friends on Climate and Security and the Climate Security Mechanism to advocate for greater Council engagement on environmental issues and integrate the climate security lens into the UN's prevention, peacebuilding, and adaptation work programmes (SCR, 2022). Nonetheless, UNSC has impermeable boundaries, delaying the institutionalisation of humanitarian protection as an environmental displacement 'best practice' (see Chapter 10).

8.2.4 An Evolving Regional Policy Line: Temporary Centres

The PIF is the premier political arena for addressing environmental migration and displacement governance. However, Pacific leaders' views on the issue diverge. For this reason, international institutions and entrepreneurs started to establish an emerging regional assembly line constituting largely fleeting policy production, dissemination, and adoption centres. In these sites, they refined and adapted the environmental migration and displacement assemblage to local contexts, raised awareness of three emerging 'best practices,' garnered state interests, and built momentum for establishing a regional normative instrument.

As elucidated in Chapter 5, faith organisations convened two events where planned relocation was institutionalised into a community norm for managing environmental displacement. The

2004 Pacific Churches' Consultation on Climate Change in Tarawa portrayed resettlement as a potential solution (PCC, 2004). The 2009 Church Leaders' Meeting on Resettlement in Nadi reinforced planned relocation as a community model for internal environmental displacement management (PCC, 2009). NGOs arranged meetings in Australia to circulate relocation and migration policies. Displacement Solutions organised speaking tours for Tulele Peisa to raise awareness of the Carteret Islands relocation programme and gather resources (Scott Leckie, interview, 07.08.2019). It convened the Bougainville Resettlement Initiative Meeting in Canberra, where Tulele Peisa shared its relocation plan and the logistics of facilitating internal movements, including the high demand for resettlement and the need to secure USD5.300,000 and 1,500 hectares of land (Displacement Solutions, 2008). Likewise, a host of Australian institutions – Pacific diaspora communities, universities, film festival organisers, and faith groups – arranged four in-person and virtual events, where I-Kiribati entrepreneurs preached about migration with dignity policy (see Appendix B).

UN agencies created semi-permanent policy production centres in Suva to mobilise the environmental migration and displacement assemblage. IOM, ILO, OHCHR, and UNESCAP have set up offices at Kadavu House and Dolphin Plaza, where they convene initiative meetings. Here, the PCCMHS programme – which was drafted in Bangkok – was contextualised to the needs and interests of Pacific communities and policymakers. The tailored messages were packaged into short policy briefs for use during country missions. Regional optimists also engaged in heated debates about the composition of the Joint Working Group on the Regional Framework and mandate-related matters (Field Notes, 26.08.2019, 03.10.2019, 06.11.2019).

UN agencies also sponsored sub/regional dialogues on environmental migration and displacement governance that acted as policy adoption centres. ILO, UNDP, and UNESCAP supported CANCC's High-Level Dialogue on Climate-Induced Migration in Tarawa, which temporarily sub-regionalised the notion of migration with dignity (GoT, 2015a; Hosking, 2017). UNESCAP and PIFS co-convened the Regional Meeting on Climate Change and Migration in Suva, which had three outcomes: PIFS retreated from the environmental mobility policymaking space and labour migration supporters failed to "push" environmental stressors on the PLMAM agenda, but the meeting motivated UN agencies to promote labour migration as a resilience-building strategy and establish a regional environmental mobility mechanism

(Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019; Timothy Westbury, interview, 07.10.2019; UN & PIFS, 2016).

The Nansen Initiative/PDD tapped into and created forums to learn about emerging regional responses and spread humanitarian solutions. The Nansen Initiative's first consultation, titled Human Mobility, Natural Disasters and Climate Change in the Pacific, took place in Rarotonga. The event brought together 70 Pacific organisations and policymakers to share stories, experiences, practices, and policies: SPREP promulgated successes of the Tegua resettlement; Fiji shared the draft relocation guidelines; and Kiribati presented the migration with dignity policy (Nansen Initiative, 2013). The event shaped the institution's approach to regulating cross-border environmental migration and displacement. An independent expert, Hannah Entwisle Chapusiat (interview, 25.01.2019) explained at length how Pacific ideologies and responses shaped the Protection Agenda:

> "The first one was in the Pacific and that shaped how we moved ahead. Pacific states wanted to talk about preventing disaster displacement saying, 'We don't want to be climate refugees.' So, the Protection Agenda quickly started to look at how you can avoid displacement – how can you avoid situations where people are forced to flee their homes? Then, we started to look at what are the alternatives; what are the ways to avoid it if people still must move; how can they do so voluntarily … how can they move in a regular and orderly way where people's rights are respected and how can they move with dignity? That's where we took from Kiribati's migration with dignity idea…"

PDD shared humanitarian approaches during PIDC's Annual Conference on Climate Change and Migration in Nadi. Immigration officials expressed the gravity of international environmental displacement and the need for policies for facilitating cross-border relocation schemes from atoll nations to Fiji (Vakasukawaqa, 2018). This highlighted that Pacific authorities were unaware of how immigration and citizenship laws could protect environmentally displaced persons (Atle Solberg, interview, 08.12.2018). Thus, Pacific policymakers require support in realising the environment-displacement-protection linkage.

IGOs have begun to co-host back-to-back regional events that also serve as policy dissemination sites. Piggybacking on meetings helps foster institutional collaboration, reduces travel time, and increases policy engagement, thereby increasing the efficient use of finite resources and accelerating political momentum on regional action (Nathan Ross, interview,

22.01.2020). UN agencies, PDD, and IDMC hosted two consecutive events in Suva to promulgate development-friendly solutions and garner state interest in two multi-initiatives – the PCCMHS programme and the Pacific Response to Disaster Displacement (PRDD) project. During the PCCMHS programme launch, optimists stressed labour migration programmes and planned relocation schemes can manage environmental mobility (PCCMHS Programme, 2019). IOM reminded participants that communities and households adopt different mobility strategies – some relocate internally while others migrate overseas. ILO presented labour migration as a risk reduction and livelihood diversification strategy. OHCHR emphasised the applicability of ICESCR, ICMW, and ICCPR to environmental migration and displacement contexts. Pacific policymakers shared 'good practices' and regulatory developments. Fiji explained learnings from the Waciwaci school district and Narikoso relocations will inform the Standard Operating Procedures. Vanuatu hyped its second home approach. Tonga shared its work-in-progress Sustainable Development and Migration policy. New Zealand mentioned its Action Plan for Climate-related Migration and Displacement from the Pacific. Other officials welcomed policy support: Kiribati voiced the need for policies to regulate internal displacement and relocations while the Solomon Islands stressed that the regional framework must be tailored to address the context-specific needs of each state. At the PRDD project stakeholder meeting, PDD raised the protection gap while IDMC presented a probabilistic disaster displacement risk model to inform regulatory action (Field Notes, 27.03.2019). Pacific governments welcomed the project, claiming it aligns with national interests and existing policies and will provide 'best practices,' help raise community awareness, and contribute to ongoing initiatives (Field Notes, 28.03.2019).

These consecutive events impacted the mobility of solutions in different ways. Planned relocation acquired a taken-for-granted status among Pacific policymakers, who expressed an interest in formulating domestic guidelines. In contrast, international organisations failed to propagate labour migration as an environmental migration management strategy, which should have immobilised it but did not. This is because they cushioned labour migration within development discourse and associated the narrative with the outputs of an earlier project that led to policy development in atoll nations. Humanitarian protection in its entirety did not receive political buy-in, but Pacific policymakers were open to discussing it further.

8.2.5 National Policy Arenas

Pacific policymakers created national policy arenas to learn, teach, and formulate domestic strategies. I-Kiribati officials visited Pacific communities in Auckland, the Gilbertese community in Gizo, and the Pope, through which they obtained three learnings that informed the migration with dignity policy (Anote Tong, Melbourne, 15.10.2018, 22.10.2018). First, migrants resided in slum areas and were treated as second-class citizens in destination countries. Second, migrants may lose some aspects of their culture, but they enrich the host community's culture. Third, the highest church leader endorsed his strategy of preparing I-Kiribati youths to upskill and migrate, appeasing staunchly religious individuals. Anote Tong also lobbied the Australian leader to establish a programme that addresses development and environmental challenges in Kiribati. He (interview, 14.04.2023) shared at length how KANI came about:

> "I challenged John Howard in 2005 during a retreat. [I said,] 'John, I know you're bringing 30 to 40,000 people from Asia every year. Why don't you bring our people?' He said, 'But they're trained.' I said, 'Train our people.' The Australia-Pacific Training College programme was announced by John Howard in 2006 at the Forum meeting in Nadi … and I didn't [get it]. I accosted John Howard – I wrote to him, and he gave me something that none of my other colleagues knew about. It was the KANI. I think it was a consolation prize because I wrote to him saying, 'We need this because all of the colleges were in the South Pacific and none in the North Pacific. You should understand that we don't have the resources. Our resources are our people. You could've located one centre in the North Pacific.' Then, I visited John in late 2006 in Sydney – he invited other leaders too but I was the only one there. He jumped up and hugged me! I didn't even raise it but it's one of those things where your presence and everything you do is talking loudly. I went there to follow up on my communications. Shortly after that, we had the Kiribati-Australia Nursing Initiative."

Thus, labour migration was constructed as an environmental migration management 'best practice' through multiple site visitations, bilateral meetings, and email communications.

Likewise, Fiji facilitated policy tourism following the Vunidogoloa and Tukaraki relocations, providing international optimists with an opportunity to learn about place-based 'models.' Independent expert Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat (interview, 25.01.2019) shared:

> "I visited the first village that relocated in Fiji … I learnt that it's so context-specific … It worked there but I don't think it can work in other places because, for example, they moved on their land. The government didn't have to identify alternative land, negotiate between landowners and do exchanges. That system is based on the community saying they want to relocate [i.e., choice] and have resources to do so … They don't have that in most places in the world. So, for me, that's a very unique situation … That would be hard to replicate in the US … The other thing that struck me about Fiji's relocation processes is about drivers, whether it is climate change [or] disasters – what's the real cause? I think it's worth exploring why we talk about disaster displacement, not climate displacement – it's on purpose because saying something is climate-related is hard ... The village told me they originally hadn't lived by the water because it was unsafe. They lived uphill and moved down …"

Rather than providing testimony or referral on the effectiveness of these relocation schemes, the site visitations highlighted that they may not be replicable in different contexts because the local conditions vary and originate from concerns other than climate change. Pacific authorities often use resettlement schemes to regulate internal movements caused by other factors such as land lease expirations, deforestation, geophysical hazards, poor urban planning, and population pressures (Adrian Nicolae, interview, 02.10.2019; Barnabas Bago, interview, 14.11.2022). This raises questions about why existing solutions are framed and mobilised in specific ways. Nonetheless, Vunidogoloa's relocation is circulated as a place-based 'model'.

Apart from the policy spaces discussed above, optimists have established and exploited other fleeting sites to mobilise policies (see Appendix B). For example, experts promoted labour migration programmes as a win-win-win solution for managing international environmental migration at the International Metropolis in Sydney (Sabira Coelho, Sydney, 31.10.2018) and during its Pacific Webinar on Climate Change Impacts on Migration (Richard Bedford, virtual event, 09.09.2021). PDD supported the Law and Climate Migration Workshop in Melbourne, where specialists touted Vanuatu's policy as a 'model' (Siobhan McDonnell, Melbourne, 12.04.2019). OHCHR hosted the Geneva Forum on Climate Change at the UNHRC, where IOM mentioned existing environmental, development, human mobility, and protection normative instruments can help govern environmental migration and displacement (Ileana Sinziana Puscas, Geneva, 06.06.2019). These sites unmade and remade each policy response to reflect the ideologies, values, and practices of experts present at the venues.

8.3 Multi-Initiatives on Environmental Migration and Displacement

Since 2007, international organisations have implemented 13 multi-thousand/million-dollar,[14] multi-partner, and multi-country initiatives with a Pacific country as a case study or regional focus. They were funded by the Australian Research Council, Commonwealth Foundation, European Union (EU), GIZ, MacArthur Foundation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), Multi-Partner Trust Fund, Norway Agency for Development Cooperation, UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), and UN Peacebuilding Trust Fund. They ascertained a causal relationship between environmental stressors and population movements and highlighted the gravity of uncontrolled mobility. The knowledge was packaged into project briefs, training manuals, and reports, which were used to pressure states into developing regulations and governance on the issue area at multiple levels. This section demonstrates how these multi-initiatives mobilised some solutions but not others, producing variations in environmental migration and displacement management across the region.

8.3.1 Global Initiatives as Channels for Knowledge Enhancement

From 2007 to 2014, global multi-initiatives functioned as channels for knowledge enhancement, addressing gaps in understanding by establishing the causality between environmental stressors and different forms of human mobility and assessing the magnitude of the phenomenon. The 2007 EACH-FOR project immobilised the environmental/climate refugee delinkage and depicted resettlement and labour migration as viable solutions. Led by UNU-EHS, the EUR853,000 project employed a risk minimisation approach to understand the causality and develop plausible scenarios for forced environmental migration (EC, 2012). Koko Warner (interview, 22.08.2019) explained how it shaped the research methodology:

> "With my risk management background, I saw the impacts of climate change and extreme weather events as risks. I thought why would people, like why would they take insurance? That's because they don't know what's going to happen. So, they look for measures but also hedge a bit. That was one of our hypotheses: Why would people move, do they move, when do they move [and] is it only in response or do, they anticipate it? If the latter, then is it like an anti-risk management strategy? There was an economist, Oded [Stark] working on the [new] economics labour migration [theory] just down the street at ZEF in Bonn. He

[14] The data on initiative value was extracted from secondary sources available online, not information accessible to the researcher through their internships.

was taking a risk perspective as well and came to talk to us. [He was saying], rather than where can I maximise my income, it was about where I could minimise my risks. [And] that was very compelling. He had an impact on our research and methodology."

The project found that decisions to move away were shaped by complex and interacting factors, one of which was environmental stressors. Hence, it is "mostly inappropriate" to use the environmental/climate refugee label, and it should be replaced with "more accurate" categories such as environmental migrants and displacees (EACH-FOR, 2009). Governments employed resettlement schemes to minimise the risk of environment- and development-induced displacement (Dun, 2011; Warner, 2010). However, community experiences were negative due to the lack of participation, insufficient compensation, delays in construction, limited cultural integration and livelihood opportunities, and unsuitable land (Warner et al., 2008). Yet because resettlement schemes moved people out of harm's way, the researchers suggested these schemes could be better planned to minimise internal environmental displacement risks. In addition, international seasonal migration reduces a household's vulnerability to environmental stressors by offering an alternative source of income (EACH-FOR, 2009). Although Tuvaluans perceived New Zealand as a home for future generations, the PAC is not a policy for facilitating international environmental migration (Shen & Gemenne, 2011). Nevertheless, the researchers recommended not curbing migration as it is a traditional coping strategy and doing so could adversely impact livelihood security and economic development. These findings were reframed and fed into global climate change processes.

The 2013 Migration, Environment, and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy (MECLEP) project mobilised relocation and migration as adaptation strategies. Led by IOM, the EUR1,900,000 project assessed the adaptive potential of different types of population movements to inform policy processes (IOM, n.d.). The project found that relocation, migration, and displacement "can help adaptation but also undermine it" (Susanne Melde, interview, 28.08.2019). Relocation schemes moved communities out of harm's way but also exposed them to new vulnerabilities such as unsustainable livelihoods. For example, some resettled Vietnamese households spent their earnings travelling between their place of work and residence and Papua New Guinean households did not have trade links with host communities, which created social tensions. In addition, the benefits of labour migration diversified household incomes, enabled skills transfer, and improved access to healthcare and education, thereby reducing poverty and building adaptive capacities. At the same time,

migrant-sending families lived in houses susceptible to disasters and were discriminated against, which undermined adaptation. In Papua New Guinea, planned relocation is an adaptation measure of last resort but the Carteret and Manam schemes revealed challenges such as the lack of government assistance, inadequate livelihood measures, conflict over land, and loss of community cohesion (Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017; Naser, 2015). Labour migration is a traditional strategy for relieving environmental stressors, but it is not reflected in policies (Connell, 2016; Connell & Lutkehaus, 2016; Naser, 2015). Despite the shortcomings of planned relocation and labour migration, the researchers recommended governments integrate both solutions as adaptation strategies in climate change policies (Melde & Laczko, 2017). The MECLEP project findings shaped IOM's Migration, Environment and Climate Change Training Manual, and led to an initial policy dialogue with Papua New Guinean authorities – "we did do some initial country profiles and a case study of the Manam Island and had initial policy discussions. There was some interest from the PNG government to continue that" (Sabira Coelho, interview, 26.09.2019).

The 2014 Humanitarian Crises and Migration project semi-mobilised planned relocation, labour migration, and humanitarian measures as protection strategies. Led by ISIM, the USD970,000 project captured the motivations, impacts, and approaches to managing complex humanitarian crises (MacArthur Foundation, 2023). Independent expert Sanjula Weerasinghe (interview, 29.07.2019) shared:

> "We managed to get some funding from the MacArthur Foundation to look at different types of complex humanitarian crises. We looked at conflict situations and the intersections of conflict, climate, and disasters … It draws a little bit from the Cancun Adaptation Framework. It talks about what are the different forms of migratory movements, what displacement embodies, and a little about planned relocations …"

The project found that governments offered protection to individuals fleeing across borders in response to environmental stressors and conflict using regional refugee instruments, temporary measures, and humanitarian visas, but on an ad hoc basis. Foreigners trapped in crises lacked access to humanitarian services and protection. Community-based organisations are planning to relocate climate-affected households, but such schemes violate socioeconomic and cultural rights, and the lack of institutional support delays their efforts. Researchers' views on the issue of governing complex humanitarian crises were fragmented: some suggested consolidating existing norms and practices to protect all displaced persons (Betts, 2014; Oliver-Smith &

Sherbinin, 2014) while others recommended establishing standalone guiding principles on resettlement and amending existing laws to reference the rights of displaced persons (Bronen, 2014; Koser, 2014). The project findings contributed towards the formulation of the planned relocation guidance and toolbox and are being used to remobilise humanitarian protection in certain geographical contexts.

8.3.2 Regional Initiatives as Pipelines for Policy Development

From 2014 onwards, regional multi-initiatives served as pipelines for policy development, recruiting consultants to draft regional and national strategies to regulate environmental migration and displacement.[15] The 2014 Pacific Climate Change and Migration (PCCM) project primarily mobilised labour migration as an adaptation-cum-protection strategy. Implemented by ILO, UNESCAP, and UNDP, the project attempted to establish the labour migration-adaptation causality and guided regional and national policy processes to safeguard communities at risk of environmental displacement. The findings revealed Fijian, I-Kiribati, and Tuvaluan households' decisions to emigrate were partly shaped by environmental factors, but many lacked the resources to do so. The evidence was inconclusive and thus failed to substantiate the labour migration-protection-adaptation linkage. Yet, the researchers recommended gathering data to show the positive correlation between remittances and adaptive capacities; expanding existing temporary labour migration programmes; providing international upskilling opportunities; and engaging with diaspora communities to facilitate permanent migration (Campbell & Warrick, 2014; Senior Researcher, interview, 26.06.2019; Milan et al., 2016; Oakes et al., 2016). The PCCM project findings shaped global climate change processes, regional dialogue on climate-induced migration, Kiribati and Tuvalu's labour migration policies, and knowledge products such as a Guide on Labour Migration Statistics, a Compendium on Labour Migration Legislation and Institutional Arrangements, and a Report on Climate Change and Migration Issues (Kagan & Campbell, 2015; Bedford et al., 2014; Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019; Timothy Westbury, interview, 07.10.2019).

[15] Only the PCCM project and GPHMCCC programme facilitated policy development in Fiji, Kiribati, and Tuvalu. National policy processes in other Pacific Island Countries were financed by different organisations, not initiatives. For example, IOM's Development Fund financed Tonga's migration and development policy, Marshall Islands' migration with dignity policy, and Vanuatu's displacement policy while the World Bank financed Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu's labour migration policies.

The 2018 Strengthening the Inclusion of I-Kiribati Civic Voices in Migration and Climate Change Policies project attempted to mobilise relocation as a solution for regulating international environmental displacement. Implemented by PIANGO and its Kiribati counterpart, the GBP200,000 project aimed to shape national policies by facilitating consultations to identify community needs and priorities and build the capacity of civil society organisations to provide advocacy training (Commonwealth Foundation, 2023). The FCOSS Representative (interview, 19.11.2019) explained at length the origins of the project:

> "Two years ago [in 2017], PIANGO [was] working on a regional project … which was to be tied to the Global Compact on Migration. It focused on Kiribati … It was about preparing communities for migration – the community that would migrate and the receiving community … The lessons learnt from the project would be shared with PIANGO affiliates, particularly Fiji because it mentioned many times that it would help avail land for communities displaced due to climate change … It's important to prepare receiving communities … so there's no pushback because in Rabi Island [in Fiji] the Banabans disputed with traditional qoliqoli owners [about fishing rights] … and they wanted to be part of traditional indigenous structures [not multi-ethnic structures] … I remember when we were putting together the project proposal, I said, 'Look, let's prepare them with policies, laws, and skills.' Because if communities will be displaced, Fiji being the climate champion will have to prepare for them."

The results of the project are not publicly available. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that they shaped Kiribati's policies because the government refutes the notion of cross-border environmental resettlements.

The 2019 GPHMCCC institutionalised planned relocation as a risk prevention strategy. Led by GIZ, the EUR10,000,000 programme promoted development-oriented management of environmental mobility (Nölting, 2020). The factsheets depicted Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu as leaders in integrating relocation, rights of IDPs and international migration in existing regulatory measures, spotlighted regional efforts to establish governance in the issue area, and meekly mobilised the environment-labour migration linkage (GIZ, 2019, 2020). However, the research findings revealed the countries had limited capacity to manage environmental migration and displacement. They suggested developing standalone policies in the issue area, expanding existing labour migration programmes, and improving access to international upskilling schemes (Vinke et al., 2020). Yet, the programme only institutionalised

planned relocation in Fiji by financing its national guidelines and taskforce and facilitating the Narikoso and Waciwaci district school resettlements (Gabor Sasvari, interview, 17.10.2019; GIZ, 2019, 2020; Nölting, 2020).

The 2019 PCCMHS programme is attempting to regionalise planned relocation and labour migration as protection, development, and resilience-building strategies. Implemented by ILO, IOM, OHCHR, and UNESCAP – and supported by PDD and PIFS – the USD5,308, 945 programme sought to empower and safeguard the human rights of communities displaced and migrating in response to environmental stressors (PCCMHS Programme, 2019; UNTFHS, 2018). As a follow-up to the PCCM project, it initially focused solely on labour migration, aiming to establish a "regional framework for well-managed labour migration as an opportunity for sustainable development and climate adaptation", assist Kiribati and Tuvalu to implement their strategies, and assess the effectiveness of Australia and New Zealand's programmes (ILO Representative 1, interview, 29.03.2019; UNTFHS, 2022, p. 4). Although it was broadened to include planned relocation, the UN activities focused primarily on labour migration because the GPHMCCC programme was supporting Pacific governments to institutionalise planned relocation (Field Notes, 11.10.2019; Timothy Westbury, interview, 07.10.2019; PCCMHS Programme, 2021). The PCCMHS policy briefs offered insights into ways in which resettlement schemes and regular migration pathways create challenges but also offer opportunities to empower and protect susceptible communities. Proper planning and adoption of human rights and development-based approaches can enhance the effectiveness of relocation as an internal environmental displacement strategy (PCCMHS Programme, 2020). Labour migration has proven to reduce environmental pressures, remittances can serve as an alternative source of climate finance, diaspora communities provide humanitarian assistance during disasters, work-related skills are useful for local farming initiatives, and financial literacy training can assist with managing wages (Mudaliar & Voigt-Graf, 2021; Thornton et al., 2021; Voigt-Graf, 2022). These insights informed UN agencies' efforts to institutionalise both solutions: they are financing and facilitating regional policy dialogues on creating a framework to govern climate mobility (PCCMHS Programme, 2020, 2021; PRFCM, 2023).

Led by a consortium of Australian researchers, the AUD386,000 project titled Transformative Human Mobilities in a Changing Climate (Transformative Mobilities) disseminated planned relocation and labour migration as development, adaptation, and resilience-building strategies (ARC, 2019; Farbotko et al., 2018). The results revealed that planned relocation is recognised

and embraced as an adaptive measure of last resort by international organisations, governments, and communities (McMichael et al., 2019). But it runs the risk of heightening socioeconomic and cultural vulnerabilities, serving alternative agendas, and shifting donor priorities from initiatives better aligned with community needs and preferences. In short, "planned relocation in the name of climate adaptation is at risk of becoming a self-legitimising tool of population and territory control" (Farbotko, Dun, et al., 2022, p. 703). Hence, the researchers recommended governments ensure affected communities can exercise their agency in the relocation planning and implementation processes and consider voluntary immobility in policy processes. The benefits of labour migration can build social resilience: the wages and skills can be used to address environmental challenges by climate-proofing houses, relocating away from risks, experimenting with crop varieties, and diversifying livelihoods (Celia McMichael, virtual event, 21.01.2021; Dun et al., 2022; Dun et al., 2023). But existing programmes may prove to be maladaptive if migrants and households face environmental stressors in addition to socioemotional issues such as poor mental health, family separation, culture shock, and homesickness (Farbotko, Kitara, et al., 2022). The Transformative Mobilities project supports the PCCMHS programme, informing the PRFCM and Australia's approach to temporary migration (CCDMRG, 2021; Sabira Coelho, interview, 26.09.2019).

The 2019 PRDD project mobilised planned relocation as a risk reduction strategy. Implemented by IDMC, IOM, and PDD, the EUR3,200,000 project produced risk profiles and assessments to inform domestic policy processes and support National Disaster Management Offices (Field Notes, 27.03.2019; EU et al., n.d.). The project found Fijian, Marshallese, Solomons, Tongan, and Ni-Vanuatu governments perceived relocation as a long-term option for adapting to environmental stressors and minimising the risk of protracted displacement (Bolo et al., 2021a, 2021b, 2021c, 2021d; Bolo et al., 2022). It is unclear whether the findings informed policy processes at the regional and national levels.

The 2020 Climate Security in the Pacific project is slowly mobilising planned relocation and labour migration as 'best practices' in the issue area. Led by IOM and UNDP, the USD3,200,000 project seeks to understand the security implications of climate change in Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu (UNPBF, 2020; UNDP et al., 2022). It treats population movements as "unintended consequences" of environmental instability and fragility (PIFS Regional Security Advisor, interview, 20.02.2020). Environmental pressures aggravate tensions between host and migrant communities, international criminal activities, human

smuggling, drug trafficking, and displacement (UNPBF, 2020). The traditional land tenure system, contraction of maritime boundaries, and repeated disasters will amplify existing vulnerabilities, reverse development gains, and increase the risk of conflict, testing national capacities for violence prevention and peacebuilding. The project findings were recently bundled into the Pacific Climate Security Assessment Guide, emphasising the following: remittances increase climate resilience by accessing building better materials and purchasing secure land; internal community relocations require extensive consultations, choice, and proximity to customary land; and international relocations are complex processes requiring "deep thinking, strong inclusive processes and procedures … and clarification of statehood and sovereignty" to minimise conflicts (UNDP & PIFS, 2023, p. 29). The Guide suggested identifying climate, conflict, and culturally sensitive displacement and relocation 'models' to avoid maladaptation and further researching security implications of environmental mobility (UNDP & PIFS, 2023). This information shaped regional policy processes, and the climate security pilot initiatives were shared with the global Climate Expert Security Network to inform the UNSC dialogues.

In addition to the aforementioned initiatives, optimists have announced new multi-initiatives on the issue area. PDD is implementing the Project to Avert, Minimise and Address Disaster Displacement that seeks to enhance knowledge and guide response mechanisms (PDD & NORAD, 2022). BfW gave FCOSS FJD3,000,000 for Cogea community relocation (Naidu, 2023). ILO and IOM are implementing a USD1,850,000 Labour Mobility for Sustainable Development and Climate Resilience in the Pacific project that seeks to improve governance in the issue area, including providing pre-employment, pre-departure, and reintegration information, tools and mechanisms for migrant workers, their families, governments, recruitment agencies, and employers (ILO et al., 2022; MPTF, 2022, 2023).

8.3.3 Institutional Survival and Discreet Coercion

Multi-initiatives are critical for institutional survival. UN agencies fostered partnerships to gain organisational legitimacy and recognition and maximise their capacities to spread their missions across the Pacific. IOM's UN-related status can be partly attributed to the issue of environmental migration and displacement: Pacific nations joined the institution in 2014, resulting in the re/opening of country offices and two multi-initiatives in the issue area. This helped IOM convince member states that it has the operational capacity to address new and crosscutting migration challenges. OHCHR joined the PCCMHS programme to harness

expertise and resources to circulate its original human rights protection message and integrate it into the regional climate mobility instrument (Field Notes, 14.10.2019; Robert Vaughan, interview, 08.12.2018). ILO utilised the PCCM project to regulate labour migration in a manner that protected the human rights of migrant workers and fostered development by formulating policies for Kiribati and Tuvalu (Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019).

Some UN agencies also depend on funding from countries whose behaviour they are seeking to regulate. IOM is highly "projectised" – most of the staff work on initiatives because it does not have a large core budget (Robert Vaughan, interview, 08.12.2018; Sabira Coelho, interview, 26.09.2019; Susanne Melde, interview, 29.08.2019). Although ILO has a well-endowed regular budget, it receives extra funding, and its allocation is informed by donor priorities. ILO representative 2 (interview, 17.07.2019) shared:

> "[Who are the] donors depend on regional geography. We got a lot of money from Australia to work on labour migration in Asia, [and] from Canada and Europe [to work] in Africa … There have been instances where we've proposed activities on climate and migration that weren't included in the final project because they weren't seen as a donor priority. It's a bit of a negotiation process – we can propose but not everything is always accepted."

International organisations use "donor menus" to negotiate divergent interests whereby wealthy states are presented with a list of initiatives that they can choose to finance (Gamlen, 2019, p. 218). This allows them to "generate revenue, shape multi-level policy agendas and retain a measure of the independent, disinterested-advisor function that sustains organisational legitimacy" (Gamlen, 2019, p. 219). Thus, multi-initiatives on environmental migration and displacement are sometimes underpinned by hidden institutional agendas and motivations.

Relatedly, donor states are encouraging organisations to synergise with each other, not work in silos and reinvent the wheel. They are "privileging multi-partner proposals – I haven't seen a project beyond a million dollars on environmental migration go to one agency" (Mariam Traore Chazalnoel, interview, 06.12.2018). This is because there are no dedicated funds for the issue area; earmarked development and humanitarian funding is shrinking rapidly; the administrators of environmental funds are yet to fully acknowledge the linkages between environmental stressors, development, and population movements; and the newly established Loss and Damage Fund is contentious as it finances initiatives that seek to minimise forced

displacement, not voluntary migration (Field Notes, 19.06.2019, 16.11.2022; Nazhat Shameem Khan, interview, 13.08.2019). Rather than competing for scarce resources, international organisations are joining forces to tap into alternative human security and peacebuilding funds to finance nexus initiatives, thereby ensuring their survival.

The multi-initiatives are characterised by unequal power dynamics. Donor states appear to have used them to discreetly coerce implementing agencies and developing nations to curb new forms of population movements by addressing the root causes. This was achieved in two ways. The first is through development assistance, peacekeeping services, and political cooperation. The EU Pacific Office's Adrian Nicolae (interview, 02.10.2019) explained at length:

> "Migration is a big policy priority for the EU. The 2015/16 refugee crisis, where massive amounts of asylum seekers tried to reach Europe one way or another, mostly coming from Syria … detailed the failures of control of external borders [and] asylum policy. But, there is an acknowledgement that the EU is very vulnerable to migration pressures from unstable countries, conflict areas, and very difficult environmental conditions – [for example] you have the Middle East and the Sahel – which put hundreds of millions of people at risk of being displaced or forced to migrate. And a lot of them will seek to go [to the] EU. This is shaping external action … [in terms of] diplomatic relations, security cooperation [and] development cooperation. [It is] trying to work with countries to address the root causes of migration, improve legal migration options if there are any, [on] human rights [and] conflict issues. [This is] to reduce the driving factors behind potential displacement and migration pressures. Climate change has become another main policy priority. For the Pacific, it's to form political policy cooperation … but that goes into mitigation, resilience, and adaptation, where migration is part of the adaptation strategies or tools …"

The second is to mobilise pre-existing regulatory 'models.' New Zealand broadened the scope of two existing programmes by providing more funding. At the time of data collection, MFAT was in discussions with IOM and GIZ about expanding the PCCMHS programme and GPHMCCC project – "the scope is they have x amount of dollars to do x amount of things and we're thinking if we give you x + y, what else could you do? … If we were to give an extra dollar, could you do another five countries?" (Nathan Ross, interview, 22.01.2020). It recently channelled resources into both initiatives, which are informing regional approaches to environmental migration and displacement management. For this reason, they are regionalising and nationalising planned relocation and labour migration as viable solutions, not humanitarian

protection. These efforts to curtail environmental migration and displacement are underpinned by broader concerns around internationalising migration governance and creating new migration channels or categories. Historically, migration management has been a domestic issue whereby national authorities determine how to regulate their territorial borders (Atle Solberg, interview, 08.12.2018). Now, "rich countries are worried they will be forced to admit people under a [new] specific category … They're also not completely stupid – they know something needs to be done and it's a matter of global stability. [Because of] the political sensitivities, they say let's use what tools we have like temporary protection visa … [and] labour migration schemes …" (Mariam Traore Chazalnoel, interview, 06.12.2018). Thus, multi-initiatives are one way for donor states to exercise control over their borders and determine the policy responses that acquire the 'best practice' status in the issue area.

8.4 Chapter Summary

This chapter argues that entrepreneurialism spread the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage. It shows that two entrepreneurial activities mobilised development-friendly solutions. First, optimists created and/or shopped for policy spaces and venues where they could share knowledge and form consensus on the key problems and solutions concerning environmental mobility and displacement. This involved the establishment of what I refer to as a 'transnational policy assembly line.' Second, they used multi-initiatives to mobilise and institutionalise their preferred policy options as 'best practices.' This served the interests of optimists by attracting the resources and legitimacy needed for organisational survival and growth. It also served the interests of donor states, who were thus able to corral Pacific nations into addressing a problem that they feared might otherwise lead to unwanted Pacific migration at their doorsteps.

Chapter 9: Mobilising Strategy 3 - Anchoring

9.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the final mobilising strategy, called anchoring. It argues that anchoring enables or constrains the institutionalisation of environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices.' Optimists anchored the emerging 'best practices' into adjacent policy agendas and environmental stressors into human mobility agendas to further institutionalise them. This entailed four strategies of political scheming and manipulation (Beeson & Stone, 2013; Stone, 2019). First, they lobbied vocal and well-respected leaders to politically champion the issue, developed language proposals, and drafted scripts for high-level events (Section 9.2). Second, they made technical submissions to relevant bodies, comprising a clear definition of the problem, solutions, and institutional support that echo the language proposals and scripts (Section 9.3). Third, they drafted norms on migration and displacement, integrating environmental stressors and thereby broadening their scope (Section 9.4). Fourth, they internally validated policies prepared by consultants who are members of the same institutional structures and thus are ideologically and socially conditioned to mobilise certain 'models' (Section 9.5). The process of anchoring in the environment and to a lesser extent development policy domains created substantial political momentum in the human mobility, human rights, and security arenas, resulting in the semi-institutionalisation of a multi-level but fragmented environmental and displacement governance with associated financial and governance gains (Section 9.6). This chapter discusses how each practice affected the (im)mobility of planned relocation, labour migration, and humanitarian protection. Finally, Section 9.7 concludes with a chapter summary.

9.2 Political Lobbying and Coaching

Optimists lobbied and coached members to integrate and maintain the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage in multi-level and across policy agendas. This was achieved in several ways. First, optimists identified friendly or like-minded states that were interested in the issue area and made courtesy calls to the missions and ministries, persuading them to champion it at global and regional levels. For instance, the Nansen Initiative's regional advisor spoke with government officials, continuing conversations on international environmental displacement that led to the addition of planned relocation and labour migration in the FRDP (Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat, interview, 25.01.2019; FRDP, 2016). IOM and

UNESCAP met with the Fijian Ambassador to garner her support for the regional climate mobility framework in 2017 and she subsequently joined the PCCMHS programme's technical working group as a champion for addressing voids in legal protection for environmentally displaced persons (PCCMHS Programme, 2020; Timothy Westbury, interview, 07.10.2019). PDD has a Steering Committee that actively advocates solutions to prevent displacement and protect affected persons. Political leadership was critical for lobbying non-compliant states to endorse certain solutions. This occurred behind closed doors, in negotiation rooms and private meetings inaccessible to observers. In these spaces, champions fostered relationships with negotiators, sensitised them to the issue area, made compromises, and reached a consensus on the language of final texts (see Figure 9.1).

Figure 9.1: States Negotiating TfD's Recommendations at the 24th COP to UNFCCC in Katowice, Poland (top left), and WIM's Santiago Network and Loss and Damage Fund at 27th COP to UNFCCC in Sharm-El Sheikh, Egypt (Author, 2018, 2022).

Second, optimists drafted scripts for political leaders for some high-level events to steer the conversation and mobilise certain emerging solutions. IDMC and IOM prepared a detailed script for the 5th Internal Displacement Dialogue, providing a list of questions on mitigating

the adverse impacts of internal environmental displacement and linking the issue area to relocation strategies (Field Notes, 16.06.2019). Fiji took this opportunity to share that its relocation guidelines align with international norms. For example, the Fijian government adopted a whole-of-society approach to facilitating the resettlement of Vunidologoa and voiced the need to factor displacement into climate change policies and for more resources. Thus, it appears that the event organisers pre-empted states to realise the linkage.

Third, optimists identified a policy window, acquired information about the space (e.g., vocabulary, norms, rules, mechanisms, structures, and actors) and readapted messages to better align with its institutional conditions through a process known as framing and feeding (Kalin, 2015). Bern University's Walter Kalin (interview, 24.07.2019) explained this process in the context of the 2015 Sendai Framework:

> "We knew there was a conference on disaster risk reduction in Sendai. We looked at the Hyogo Framework and the zero draft. We didn't see anything about people who have to move … Our group of states and the Steering Committee sat together and thought about whether we could insert paragraphs on human mobility. We developed language proposals and some of them were taken up by the facilitators. [The next] draft had a lot of square brackets … Then the negotiations started and our states – Bangladesh, the Philippines, Norway and Switzerland – led the negotiations. You don't get everything, but you get some … That's framing and feeding. You need to know what you exactly want in [a particular] context."

A collective goal tailored to an institutional context was important for political engagement. The environmental migration and displacement management assemblage conveyed a unified and ideologically sanctioned conceptualisation of the problem and solutions to champions. This meta-logic aligned with their interests and needs, which in turn shaped the language proposals.

Institutional entrepreneurs use political lobbying and coaching to shape normative instruments because they cannot engage in political negotiations. They can sometimes place issues on policy agendas through their technical roles but cannot ascertain the negotiation outcomes. In addressing the question of why international organisations do not engage in negotiations at the UNHRC, Fiji's Nazhat Shameem Khan (interview, 13.08.2019) said:

> "They don't because they're not member states … They represent the Secretariat but the actual decision-making process in those organisations are on member states and the

> Human Rights Council has the same member states. In the context of negotiations in the Council, member states go first. UN agencies don't have any right to negotiate text. Having said that, often the zero draft of a resolution has input from them. So, the core group identifies experts in a UN agency and gets them to look at it. So, they have input, but they can't determine where the resolution is going to end up … [That is,] there is no role for them in the negotiations other than to assist member states behind the scenes."

Political champions placed and maintained environmental mobility on global environmental, development, human rights, and migration agendas. For instance, Bangladesh placed compensation for climate victims and refugees on the climate adaptation agenda (AWG-LCA 3, 2008; NRC, 2009). The US concerns over the refugee language led to AOSIS, Bolivia, and Ghana proposing the planned relocation, migration, and displacement typology, which was institutionalised in the 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework (AWG-LCA 8, 2009; AWG-LCA 10, 2010; Warner, 2011).

Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 6, SIDS placed environmental mobility on the UNHRC agenda. The Maldives' calls led to the creation of a Special Rapporteur on HR and Environment (OHCHR, 2012). Bangladesh, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, and the Philippines called for a separate Special Rapporteur on HR and Climate Change (OHCHR, 2008; OHCHR Representative, interview, 06.08.2019). Pacific states also placed displacement on the agenda, culminating in the 2022 climate change mandate that covers issues of international environmental mobility.

Moreover, the UN Secretary General's Office leveraged Fiji's interest to include environmental stressors in the 2016 New York Declaration (Elizabeth Ferris, interview, 23.07.2019). Subsequently, Pacific, SIDS, and African states carried forward the language on environmental stressors during the Migration Compact negotiations, saying "in every session that this is one of the most important things we want to see in the agreement. We want a separate paragraph" (Mariam Traore Chazalnoel, interview, 06.12.2018). Consequently, the 2018 Compact was broadened to include environmental migration and displacement as well as the three emerging solutions.

Furthermore, Tuvalu is preparing a UNGA Resolution to Protect the Rights of Climate Displaced Persons (OHCHR Representative, interview, 06.08.2019; Timothy Westbury,

interview, 07.10.2019; UNGA, 2016a, 2018b, 2019). Tuvalu's Simalua Enele (interview, 27.11.2020) explained the purpose of the Resolution is to address the legal protection gap:

> "The reason for the resolution is that in the event we were to lose our land or move out, we won't lose our rights as Tuvaluans; [that is,] our right to education [and] to be known as Tuvaluans. That is linked to negotiations going on the Law of the Sea [regarding] baselines. What happens if the [territorial] borders go underwater? Our EEZ economic exclusive zones] would shrink, it's all linked to Tuvaluans not losing our sovereignty … That's why our leaders and negotiators in the UNFCCC are always pushing the issue of loss and damage … Sometimes people find it very controversial, but we view it as we're giving up on ourselves. We have to make sure a Tuvaluan can have the right to leave or live in their country. They shouldn't be forced … [And] let's be real, what country will allow 10,000 people to come in and live there? Will our rights be the same? What if we have to migrate tomorrow? We won't be normal citizens. We would be like refugees, but we don't want to live like that. We don't want to be considered refugees. We would lose our culture and everything … That's where the resolution comes in."

The idea of a standalone protection framework is not promoted by all optimists. As explained in Chapter 4, a group of experts endorse establishing an instrument that is grounded in international environmental, human rights, humanitarian, and/or refugee norms (Biermann & Boas, 2008, 2010, 2017; Docherty & Gianni, 2009; Falstrom, 2002; Prieur, 2010). There is insufficient evidence showing they provided technical support to Tuvalu in drafting the UNGA Resolution. The optimists studied in the project advocate existing solutions because there is no political appetite for new protection categories or instruments (Atle Solberg, interview, 08.12.2018; Isabelle Michal, interview, 11.12.2018). Perhaps ideological misalignment and political unpalatability are inhibiting humanitarian protection from finding institutional purchase in UNGA.

9.3 Technical Submissions to Environmental, Development, and Security Bodies

Optimists (im)mobilised aspects of the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage by repackaging it into technical submissions for environmental, development, and security domains. In particular, planned relocation and labour migration are mobilised as global and regional norms for regulating the issue area, not humanitarian

protection. The impact of their submissions to climate change decision-making bodies can be divided into three phases.

Before 2010, their submissions propagated the environmental/climate refugee delinkage and relocation- and migration-adaptation linkages (IASC, 2008, 2009; IOM et al., 2009; UNHCR, 2008, 2009). Optimists made a four-fold argument. First, environmental/climate refugees did not qualify for international refugee protection and amending the instrument would weaken safeguards for conventional refugees. Hence, governments should explore alternative protection mechanisms such as those enshrined in regional and international human rights instruments. Second, the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement applied to internal environmental displacement situations, but countries needed to share relocation and resettlement 'good practices.' Third, policymakers should consider the role of migration in building adaptive capacities by enhancing its development benefits in origin countries. Fourth, the scale, scope, and nature of the issue were poorly understood and thus warranted further research. The final message was incorporated in several versions of the negotiating text and reflected in the 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework (AWG-LCA 7, 2009; AWG-LCA 8, 2009; AWG-LCA 10, 2010; CAF, 2010; Warner, 2011). The first phase enabled normative embedding and linkage: the human rights norm on internal displacement was discreetly woven into the global instrument, thereby increasing its uptake in the climate domain, while the migration-adaptation linkage signified the de-securitisation of international population movements.

During the second phase (2011-2015), optimists elevated 'effective practices,' partly shifting the focus from adaptation to loss and damage.[16] Loss and damage refer to the irreparable harms caused by environmental changes that have not or cannot be avoided through mitigation and adaptation efforts (van der Geest & Warner, 2015). It requires a multi-layered solution: insurance to address environmental and livelihood risks; rehabilitation and compensation to address progressive adverse impacts of loss and damage; and risk management tools and strategies (Roberts & Huq, 2015). According to optimists, displacement from the loss of habitability is a loss and damage issue that requires durable solutions and legal protection mechanisms (AGCCHM, 2013; UNFCCC, 2013). Although voluntary planned relocation and migration minimised displacement-induced losses and damages, the former can be harmful in

[16] See Nash (2019) for discussions on the adaptation and loss and damage nexus and the evolution of human mobility as a loss and damage issue.

some contexts, resulting in the erosion of connection to place, culture, and heritage in addition to traditional and community resources (Farbotko et al., 2018). However, only resettlement was reframed as an adaptation measure of last resort. The idea of regulating environmental migration and displacement using development-friendly approaches was supported by global and regional examples: multi-level institutional structures and multi-initiatives circulated Kiribati's migration with dignity policy, seasonal migration programmes, and lessons from Ontong Java, the Carteret Islands, and Vunidogoloa relocation schemes (GoK, 2013; Senior Researcher, interview, 21.06.2019; PIFS, 2016; Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019; UNFCCC, 2012). Optimists recommended the WIM establish an expert group to provide advice on the needs of and solutions for environmentally displaced persons and an international climate displacement coordination mechanism for providing emergency relief and compensation to affected people (AGCCHM, 2014c, 2014d, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). In 2015, world leaders agreed to create the TfD to formulate recommendations on averting, minimising, and addressing the phenomenon (Paris Agreement, 2015; UNFCCC, 2016). The second phase enabled the semi-institutionalisation of displacement.

In the third phase (2016-2018), optimists accelerated the mobility of the three emerging 'best practices' in the climate domain whilst demonstrating synergies with other policy arenas. Their submissions reiterated the knowledge, normative, and funding gaps associated with the protection of cross-border environmentally displaced persons, and endorsed planned relocation, labour migration, and regional humanitarian protection measures (AGCCHM, 2016; IOM, 2016b; IOM et al., 2016; PDD & UNHCR, 2016; UNHCR, 2015). This accompanied the Nansen Protection Agenda; journal articles and reports sharing practices, tools, institutional expertise, and opportunities for policy synergies; and Pacific civil society declarations and approaches that stressed concerns associated with forced relocations and the logistics of facilitating resettlement schemes (IDMC, 2018; IOM, 2018a, 2018b; McAdam, 2011; McAdam et al., 2016; McAdam & Limon, 2015; PCC, 2016; PDD, 2018; Tulele Peisa, 2016; UNHCR, 2018). The submissions shaped the TfD's recommendations, urging governments to use planned relocation and migration as risk minimisation strategies and granting, expediting or waiving visas and introducing non-refoulement policies as protection measures (IOM & PDD, Katowice, 08.12.2018; TfD, 2018; UNFCCC, 2018). The third phase failed to institutionalise the three solutions but initiated their transfer and integration in adjacent governance domains.

At present, optimists are trying to further anchor displacement into the loss and damage institution to perhaps access the newly established funding mechanism. It will finance initiatives to avert, minimise, and address displacement risks (UNFCCC, 2023). Emerging conversations are beginning to unveil ideological tensions between TfD members – some experts fear framing migration as a loss and damage issue will re-securitise and restrict voluntary population movements while others claim it can be a strategy for reducing forced displacement (Field Notes, 16.11.2022). This has yet to affect the mobility of environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices.'

Optimists made similar submissions to the disaster risk reduction decision-making bodies. The 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action promoted in situ disaster management solutions such as constructing thicker walls, stronger roofs, and higher dams, rather than ex-situ minimisation and prevention approaches such as planned relocation and migration (Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019). Consequently, regional and domestic disaster management policies rarely acknowledged displacement as a consequence of environmental stressors (e.g., RFA, 2005). The Nansen Initiative, IOM, and UNHCR's submissions led to the inclusion of displacement in the 2015 Sendai Framework (Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat, interview, 25.01.2019). It called on governments and local organisations to protect the human rights of affected persons, prevent displacement using planned relocation, and engage migrants in disaster response and recovery efforts (Sendai Framework, 2015). Aspects of this recommendation were translated into national policy action. For example, Fiji, New Zealand, Samoa, and Tuvalu endorsed resettlement as a pre-emptive strategy whereas Papua New Guinea urged the inclusion of migrants in disaster risk reduction activities (GoF, 2018b; GoNZ, 2019a; GoPNG, 2017, GoS, 2017; UNDRR, 2023). As part of the mid-term review of the Sendai Framework, optimists re-emphasised that anticipatory planned relocation schemes and the benefits of circular migration programmes can build resilience against disasters and manage displacement risks (IOM, 2022). They labelled Fiji and Vanuatu's relocation and displacement guidelines as "noteworthy examples" and urged governments to update disaster management policies with provisions on forced population movements and implement them (IOM, 2022; PDD, 2022, p. 3). The extent to which optimists shaped the Sendai Framework and disaster management policies is unclear because submission documents are publicly unavailable. Nonetheless, their efforts led to planned relocation quickly institutionalising as a 'model' for preventing internal displacement risks in the disaster domain.

Optimists also made submissions to regional organisations facilitating development and security policy processes. The UN and IOM are permanent forum observers, enabling them to engage with Pacific partners and leaders during regional forum meetings. In 2010, the environmental and development agencies – namely, PIFS, SPC, SPREP, UNDP, UNDRR, and USP – initiated the process of formulating the FRDP, a set of voluntary guidelines on addressing climate change and disasters to foster development (PIFS Climate Resilience Secretariat Coordinator interview, 20.02.2020; Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019). The Nansen Initiative's regional advisor based at SPREP and IOM provided inputs, reframing and feeding planned relocation and labour migration as strategies for protecting communities vulnerable to environmental displacement (FRDP, 2016; Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat, interview, 25.01.2019; Sabira Coelho, interview, 26.09.2019). Without their engagement, the development-friendly strategies would not have made it into the FRDP because the issue of population movements is not a mandated area of work for the majority of facilitating agencies and was not deemed a priority for all leaders.

In 2018, Pacific leaders endorsed a new security declaration, the BDAP. There is insufficient evidence showing optimists fed the issue of environmental migration and displacement management into the process. However, IOM and UNESCAP were present during the 49th Forum Meeting, where the leaders reaffirmed that "climate change is the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and well-being of Pacific peoples" and adopted an expanded definition of security that includes freedom from displacement risks and stressors disrupting daily lives (BDAP, 2019, p. 6; PIFS, 2018). The following year, PIFS prepared the Action Plan that prioritised climate change, human security, and transnational organised crime, including irregular migration and human smuggling. It was developed in consultation with regional organisations with mandates that cover aspects of the environmental migration and displacement governance such as SPC, SPREP, PIDC, and USP (PIFS, 2019). The Action Plan does not explicitly link climate change and transnational organised crime nor promote humanitarian protection measures. Nevertheless, it is being used by optimists to demonstrate that multi-initiatives are aligned with regional priorities (see Chapter 8).

9.4 Drafting Soft Human Mobility Norms

Optimists served as penholders in delegated policy arenas, enabling the mobility and institutionalisation of their policy preferences. This is a technical-cum-political process whereby experts draft the norms, which are negotiated by states somewhat differently, quickly

culminating in their acknowledgement and/or endorsement. Soft norms are non-binding, which means they do not impose new obligations on member states. Instead, they reinforce existing commitments, which in turn facilitates the rapid mobility of existing policies.

In the late 1990s, the UNHRC appointed a Special Rapporteur on the HR of IDPs to establish a protection framework. A review of existing international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee instruments provided substantial safeguards for IDPs. However, it revealed gaps regarding the right to access protection and assistance, personal documentation, and compensation (Orchard, 2010). The rules were spread across multiple instruments, inaccessible to affected persons, and inadequately implemented (Deng, 2004). A new convention was unfeasible: the issue of IDP protection was politically sensitive and renegotiations would have been time-consuming and weakened existing obligations (Cohen, 2004). Consequently, the Special Rapporteur established a soft law built on pre-existing protection norms, comprising clarifications of how they applied to IDP situations. This was known as the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. At their core was the notion of sovereignty as responsibility, which means that governments are responsible for the welfare and safety of their citizens, but they must accept assistance from the international community if they are unable or unwilling to fulfil their obligations (Cohen, 2010). While the Guiding Principles provided a "positive interpretation" of the concept, it made them politically contentious; hence, governments were requested to only recognise them (Deng, 2004, p. 25; Kalin, 2006). In addition, they conceptualised displacement into three phases – pre, during, and post. For the post-displacement phase, planned relocation was framed as a durable solution. National authorities were called on to create conducive conditions for IDPs to voluntarily resettle elsewhere, fully participate in the planning and management process, and recover lost possessions (OCHA, 1998). Although the Guiding Principles were widely cited in institutional policies and resolutions, they lacked implementation (Cohen, 2004, 2007; Kalin, 2006; Orchard, 2010). Nevertheless, they institutionalised planned relocation as an IDP protection measure.

In mid-2013, Displacement Solutions penned the Peninsula Principles on Climate Displacement Within States, a blueprint for governments developing domestic strategies to address the needs and protect the human rights of affected persons. It replicated the core ideas of the 1998 Guiding Principles and combined them with the relocation experiences of Carteret Islanders, Fijians, I-Kiribati, Solomon Islanders, and Tuvaluans (Scott Leckie, interview,

07.08.2019). By doing so, Displacement Solutions contextualised the notion of planned relocation as a durable solution for *climate-induced internal displacement*. The Principles' novelty can be attributed to suggestions on identifying and securing suitable land, including establishing criteria to determine the viability of relocation sites, a National Climate Land Bank, and land acquisition and compensation processes (Peninsula Principles, 2013). They were initially adopted by professional experts but have gained some state and non-state followers over the last five years. Displacement Solutions' Scott Leckie (interview, 07.08.2019) commented:

> "They have proven quite effective in several states and at the UN level in terms of guiding policy. International, regional, and national work carried out on climate displacement has been at least in part influenced by and sometimes modelled on the Peninsula Principles. They are now sitting at the HRC in Geneva … We translated them into eight languages, printed tens of thousands of copies, and mentioned them in scores and scores of international, regional, and national meetings. They're widely known. They're increasingly used by communities in Fiji and Bangladesh … The UN Climate Envoy Mary Robinson referred explicitly to them as the leading document in this area."

While it may be true that the Peninsula Principles are globally recognised, they only shaped Fiji's relocation guidelines. This may indicate limited regional awareness of their existence or that optimists are promulgating the 1998 Guiding Principles. Nonetheless, the Peninsula Principles recontextualised planned relocation, aiding its institutionalisation as a norm for internal environmental displacement.

During the same period, the Nansen Initiative drafted an Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change. The "holy grail document" is a toolbox comprising development-friendly and humanitarian approaches (Erica Bower, interview, 10.12.2018). It is a "testament" of political willingness to govern environmental migration and displacement (Jane McAdam, interview, 06.05.2019). The Secretariat compiled 'effective practices' emerging from regional consultations into outcome documents, which were amalgamated, revised, and condensed into a short, concise, and succinct text that resonated with stakeholders who engaged in the process. Independent expert Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat (interview, 25.01.2019) explained at length the process:

> "The outcome documents were cleared by states. The Nansen Initiative didn't draft them on our own. We wrote them during the meetings, and they were cleared line-by-line. We would give drafts to state representatives – each state nominated a representative for the drafting committee. They reviewed the drafts and gave us feedback; we revised it, and they cleared it before it was approved. Going back to the Protection Agenda, I went back to the conclusions of each regional consultation and tried to incorporate them. Professor Kalin, Atle Solberg, and I spent days thinking about how to make it coherent, structure the document … and reflect the specificities of different regions. We wanted a document where each region could say, 'Yeah, that resonates with our experience. We can see that [happening]. Oh, that's interesting. We hadn't thought about that.' We ended up having a huge document – no one's going to read a document that big, and it was very dense and heavy … We divided it into the Protection Agenda and the Annex with all the evidence … We shared our first draft of the Protection Agenda with states for feedback, and we got line-by-line edits. We also shared it with the committee members, and we got line-by-line edits. My job as the editor was to bind everyone's comments and weave them all in. Then, we sent it again for review. So, it incorporates state experiences and latest research [at the time]."

For this reason, the Nansen Protection Agenda lists the three solutions as 'effective practices' (Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015; Nansen Initiative, 2015). Planned relocation is framed as a measure of last resort, reflecting Pacific resettlement experiences and protection challenges. The Agenda recommends facilitating schemes as development projects whilst protecting the human rights of affected communities. Migration with dignity is portrayed as a coping strategy, echoing the I-Kiribati approach to managing the phenomenon. The Agenda suggests reviewing existing migration quotas, adopting national quotas, introducing seasonal worker programmes, and providing upskilling opportunities. International displacement is depicted as a humanitarian, human rights, and security issue, requiring a mix of protection measures. Capturing African and Latin American regulatory practices, the Agenda advises governments to consider introducing special category visas, granting asylum under regional refugee and international human rights laws, and expediting other visa processes. The Nansen Protection Agenda was endorsed by 109 countries,[17] indicating that governments broadly agreed on the

[17] Including Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Samoa, Tuvalu, and New Zealand (Nansen Initiative, 2015). It was also supported by Displacement Solutions, IFRC, ILO, NRC, SPREP, and UNU-EHS.

solutions but were not burdened by new obligations. It was widely disseminated, forming optimists' technical submissions to predominantly global bodies constructing the rules and practices of environmental, development, human mobility, and security domains.

From 2015 to 2018, optimists crafted global human mobility governance, comprising the 2016 New York Declaration, and the 2018 Migration and Refugee Compacts. The penholders and key implementing agencies of the Compacts are IOM and UNHCR. In these documents, the level at which environmental stressors are institutionalised varies. The Declaration, a political commitment to establish governance on migration and refugee movements, commits to addressing the drivers of population movements by "combatting environmental degradation and ensuring effective responses to natural disasters and the adverse impacts of climate change" (New York Declaration, 2016, p. 9). It was a highly expert-driven process and hence required little political support at the drafting stage. Instead, the ideological and interest alignment led to the inclusion of environmental stressors in the document. ISIM's Elizabeth Ferris (interview, 23.07.2019) shared:

> "I worked at the UNSG's Office in the lead-up to the New York Summit in September 2016 and drafting the report was an interesting process. I was interested in getting environmental and climate change issues into the draft. We talked to eight governments and there was only one that mentioned it. It was Fiji. I was able to use that one leverage to get at least a mention in the New York Declaration."

The inclusion of environmental stressors in the Declaration provided an opportunity for non-traditional actors to engage in the GFMD and human mobility negotiations. They include Pacific civil society, governments, and intergovernmental organisations. Until recently, they rarely engaged in the issue area. UNESCAP and IFRC convened regional meetings, inviting stakeholders from Asia and Oceania to share experiences, 'good practices,' and challenges in regulating migration. However, the GFMD's institutional set-up (i.e., steering group, the troika, and roundtables) is dominated by Asian and Latin American countries, which could be partly attributed to the size of their migrant populations (see Nicolas & Agunias, 2014). Rae Bainteiti (interview, 13.10.2020) said, "they [the organisers] put Asia in the discussion, so they feel they have the Pacific. It's not really [the case]. Every region is unique. They've been telling us to attend the GCM conference and you'll see one islander representing the whole of the Pacific". This may mean states with slightly different concerns did not have a voice in GFMD. Therefore, the Pacific was initially excluded from the governance-forming process. But PDD's

efforts to frame and feed environmental stressors into the Migration Compact strengthened and elevated the Pacific's stance in the forum: "the Pacific's position was strengthened by PDD's position because it has expertise [on environmental migration and displacement]. It shows how important the PDD was in the negotiations on the Global Compact" (Nazhat Shameem Khan, interview, 13.08.2019). It used information from the Pacific consultation to shape the technical submissions, and the Envoy's interventions echoed those of Pacific policymakers during the negotiations.

The Declaration and Migration Compact's strong language on environmental stressors can be attributed to three factors. First, optimists leveraged the political momentum created in climate change, disaster risk reduction, and disaster displacement domains for political action in the human mobility domain. They "directly link to UNFCCC. They [technical experts] learnt from what the UNFCCC had done, used a similar conceptualisation of what needs to be done [and] formally acknowledged the principles of the Paris Agreement … They all feed into one another because the UNFCCC was the strongest and earliest" (Mariam Traore Chazalnoel, interview, 06.12.2018). Second, some Pacific states wanted rules and regulations on managing environmental migration and displacement. Fiji "put out an olive leaf" to citizens of atoll nations at risk of being permanently displaced by slow-onset events and thus saw the negotiations on global migration management as "a wonderful opportunity for rules to be set in stone for the first time" (Nazhat Shameem Khan, interview, 13.08.2019; Yogesh Karan, interview, 07.12.2018). The Marshall Islands and Papua New Guinea advocated for environmental stressors to be included in both instruments (GoMI 2018; GoPNG, 2018). Likewise, Tuvalu was eager to have a "framework to develop a comprehensive regime" (GoT, 2018, p. 2). Third, optimists used findings from multi-initiatives to substantiate the environmental migration linkage, enabling its anchorage in the Compact. According to PDD's Atle Solberg (interview, 09.12.2019), "we succeeded in getting the point across that if you want to have a Global Compact on Migration, you need to move away from this notion that people only move for economic reasons. You need to look at the broader spectrum". At the same time, PIANGO, PICAN, PIDC, and Oxfam Australia "tagged teams", "knock[ing] on doors" to convince states to retain the language on environmental stressors and endorse the Compact (FCOSS Representative, interview, 19.11.2019; Genevieve Jiva, interview, 21.11.2019; Simon Bradshaw, interview, 04.06.2019; Stephane Jaquemet, interview, 12.08.2019).

The Refugee Compact was also an expert-driven process but not devoid of political sensitivities. As explained earlier in this chapter, the notion of environmental/climate refugees is politically contentious. Tuvalu and Papua New Guinea attempted to anchor the issue of the lack of international protection for environmentally displaced persons (UNGA, 2016a, 2016b). The draft recognised climate change as a threat multiplier and raised the need to expand UNHCR's capacity to protect and assist vulnerable populations. However, Western states feared anchoring environmental stressors in the Refugee Compact would create a new category, resulting in weaker border controls, significant financial implications, and mission creep (Michelle Yonetani, interview, 28.06.2019). More importantly, climate change scepticism, dependency on donor funding, and other pressing issues prevented UNHCR from lobbying them to maintain environmental stressors in the Compact. NRC's Nina Birkeland (interview, 05.07.2019) explained at length that:

> "The biggest donor of UNHCR is the US. You had Trump as the President and climate change didn't exist. Everyone thinks we pushed for it [climate change] in the final [text] because they kept throwing off climate change. It wasn't at the core – it was never a big thing. To me, that was a political thing, not a technical thing. If it was developed purely by technical people, it would've been there. This was a political process [even though] people might say it wasn't. It was put through the [UN] General Assembly. UNHCR was the penholder, but it knows very well who pays them. There were maybe issues they felt that were more important to fight for than to get this into the Refugee Compact [such as] the pressure on the Refugee Convention and refugee status. They thought we need to at least uphold this and then climate change is important. Having the US constantly take out climate change, what would you do if they paid half your bill? In a meeting they had with NGOs and friendly states in the last rounds, we said, 'Why don't you just say climate?' They did and it went through. The Compact has a reference to climate. It's not very strong but it's in there."

Consequently, the final text does not discuss mandate expansion and includes a watered-down statement on environmental stressors – "while not in themselves causes of refugee movements, *climate*, environmental degradation and natural disasters increasingly interact with refugee movements" (GCR, 2018a, p. 4, emphasis added).

The inclusion of environmental stressors in the Compacts began to institutionalise the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage. The Declaration only

mobilised labour migration and refugee protection,[18] two pre-existing issue areas imbued with political sensitivities (see Betts, 2009; Gamlen, 2019). However, anchoring environmental stressors onto the migration and refugee agendas created an opportunity to include alternative policy preferences, broadening the scope of the Compacts. Readapting messages from the Nansen Protection Agenda, Sendai Framework, and TfD recommendations, optimists made submissions to the penholders that advocated the inclusion of planned relocation, labour migration, special category visas, regional refugee protection, and temporary safeguards and stay arrangements in the Compacts (Atle Solberg, interview 08.12.2018; Ezekiel Simperingham, interview, 12.08.2019; Isabelle Michal, interview, 11.12.2018; Mariam Traore Chazalnoel, interview, 06.12.2019). PDD, PIANGO, and Oxfam Australia fed the notion of migration with dignity into the process while Fiji maintained resettlement on the migration agenda (FCOSS Representative, interview, 19.11.2019; Richards & Bradshaw, 2017; Simon Bradshaw, interview, 04.06.2019). Hence, the language remained the same between the drafts but the framing changed: planned relocation, labour migration, and humanitarian visas were reframed from forced migration minimisation to regular migration management solutions (GCM, 2019, 2018b). Even though the principle of non-refoulement is grounded in international human rights law, the Migration Compact does not mention it because negotiating states argued that it is a refugee term (Nina Birkeland, interview, 05.07.2019).

In contrast, the refugee agenda broadened the set of humanitarian protection measures applicable in disaster contexts. UNHCR borrowed from the Nansen Protection Agenda to expand the Compact by including regional refugee instruments, temporary protection, and humanitarian stay arrangements as viable strategies for safeguarding the human rights of individuals displaced by *climate change* (GCR, 2018b). Due to the reasons mentioned earlier, these responses were promptly reframed as protection measures for those fleeing *disasters* (GCR, 2018a). This framing assumes international environmental displacement is a temporary phenomenon, requiring a temporary solution; that is, affected persons will be able to return home after sudden-onset events subside. It does not take into consideration ways in which variations in vulnerability to environmental stressors determine people's return to their homeland. Yet, the presence of humanitarian protection measures validated UNHCR's engagement in nexus situations, leading to a gradual expansion of its mandate.

[18] Refugee protection included complementary measures, temporary stay arrangements, and resettlement to third countries.

Optimists did not envisage the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage to take an institutional foothold in the human mobility domain. They strategised and advocated the inclusion of environmental stressors and the emerging 'best practices' in both Compacts but were surprised by the outcomes. University Bern's Walter Kalin (interview, 24.07.2019) said, "we surprised ourselves how far we got, especially with the Global Compact on Migration. We never thought we'd get that much". This is because climate change, migration, and refugee movements are politically contentious issues. Bringing them together in a nexus could have halted and even reversed the political momentum created around establishing global human mobility governance. Political support seems to have enabled the cross-institutionalisation of planned relocation, labour migration, and humanitarian protection, providing impetus for the rise of the nascent environmental migration and displacement governance.

Optimists are shaping the regional climate mobility governance in the Pacific – an endeavour initiated by UNESCAP and PIFS in 2016, financially supported by the PCCMHS programme and the Climate Security project, developed under the guidance of Forum Official's Sub-Committee on Regional Security, and politically championed by Tuvalu and Fiji. At the time of data collection, institutional entrepreneurs were uncertain about the political feasibility and nature of a normative instrument. Kiribati and Tuvalu were unwilling to engage in policy dialogues on the matter while technical experts were unsure whether it would take the form of an approach or framework (Sabira Coelho, interview, 26.09.2019; Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019). However, UNESCAP's Timothy Westbury (interview, 07.10.2019) envisaged it as "a two-tier thing. We have an overall thing, where it'd be easy for countries to agree but be bold in terms of talking about what protection gaps and measures need to be put in place; [that is,] policy and legal measures aligned with international law, UNFCCC [and] loss and damage … but it wouldn't be legally binding. That would help countries developing their approaches, whether they're bilateral or sub-regional". On par with this view, Kaldor Centre's experts drafted a non-binding framework that initially aimed to plan for and manage climate mobility using planned relocation schemes, labour migration programmes, and humanitarian protection measures (PRFCM, 2022). Each solution is framed differently. Planned relocation is portrayed as an anticipatory strategy for averting displacement and a remedial measure for disaster recovery. Labour migration is depicted as a way to build adaptive capacities to environmental stressors and enhance human security. Humanitarian approaches, specifically special purpose visas, visa waivers, cross-border resettlement schemes, granting stay on compassionate

grounds, and regularising legal status are framed as protection solutions. However, the recent draft has omitted humanitarian visas, visa waivers, and granting admission and stay on compassionate grounds, which may indicate divergent political views on the issue of cross-border displacement (PRFCM, 2023). This suggests that the regional climate mobility governance is being bound together by diverse discourses that are embedded in multi-level and cross-institutional norms, rules, and practices (see PCCMHS Programme, n.d.).

9.5 Expert Feedback on and Embracing Development-Friendly 'Models'

Professional optimists provided feedback on national strategies and accepted Pacific 'models' endorsing development-friendly approaches, internally validating preconceived notions on how to regulate environmental migration and displacement. On the one hand, they provided value-neutral advice on policies drafted by consultants who orbit the same institutional structure, borrowing, mixing and matching, and translating existing principles to a specific geography. Cosmin Corendea (interview, 10.08.2019), a specialist who previously worked with IOM, UNHCR, and UNU-EHS, prepared Fiji's planned relocation guidelines. Fijian policymakers circulated them widely for expert feedback: the Climate Change and International Cooperation Division convened national workshops and bilateral meetings with IOM, PDD, UNHCR, and professional experts based at ISIM while the Geneva Mission "ensure[d] Walter Kalin took a look at it … [because] he was the drafter of the [1998] Guiding Principles [on Internal Displacement]. So, he is the expert" (CCICD Representative, interview, 29.03.2019; Elizabeth Ferris, interview, 23.07.2018; Nazhat Shameem Khan, interview, 26.07.2019). Specialist advice was taken for granted for two reasons. First, the political recognition of their expertise in planned relocation granted it an authoritative claim. Second, their shared ideology on facilitating resettlement schemes to avert internal environmental displacement risks minimised scrutiny, resulting in the quick adoption of feedback (i.e., it must be true because experts have similar views). Hence, the guidelines closely align with normative instruments and reflect international practices.

However, internal validation excluded actor voices and different knowledge systems. Fijian policymakers and the consultant circulated the draft to individuals they deemed to be experts on planned relocation, many of whom were based in Geneva, Suva, and Washington D.C. As a result, communities susceptible to internal environmental displacement that already possess traditional knowledge on facilitating resettlements did not engage in the policy development

phase (McNamara & Des Combes, 2015). PCC's Frances Namoumou (interview, 31.10.2019) shared:

> "It [the policy development process] lacked community engagement. [The] Cakaudrove province has Vunisavisavi, Vunidogoloa, Vatukaca, and Tumaloa [villages] that are partially or fully relocated. We had our consultation last year. We brought the headmen from the three villages and one representative from the provincial office. We asked them, 'Have you seen the planned relocation guidelines?' They were unaware – even the representative from the provincial office who is part of the government. This means that the consultations were only happening in Suva and weren't being taken down to the community level. The guidelines are only circulating in Suva, not in the communities. I don't think they have even seen the guidelines. There's disengagement at the policy and implementation levels."

Other NGOs and experts who drafted earlier iterations of the guidelines echoed similar sentiments (FCOSS Representative, interview, 19.11.2019; Field Notes, 08.10.2019; Genevieve Jiva, interview, 21.11.2019). More importantly, Fijians questioning the consultative processes in public forums were promptly silenced by resource persons (Field Notes, 08.10.2019). For this reason, the guidelines lack "broad community ownership" (Simon Bradshaw, interview, 04.06.2019). However, the omission of community voices positively impacted the Standard Operating Procedures' formulation process: the government consulted a more diverse group of actors based in Fiji for a longer period.

Likewise, Vanuatu's displacement policy was developed in an exclusive process. The document notes "wide-ranging consultations" at national, provincial, and local levels (GoV, 2018, p. 8, emphasis added; Sabira Coelho, interview, 26.09.2019). According to Oxfam Vanuatu's Willy Missack (interview, 16.05.2019):

> "The displacement policy was developed by the IOM. Most of the examples were experiences that they shared about displacements in countries such as Yemen. They drew from these experiences but tried to contextualise it to Vanuatu … The process was very inclusive because we worked closely with the government and IOM … [but] one of the challenges was incorporating all the views of the community. That was so stressful, trying to get everyone together at once and discuss how can we develop the policy …"

However, some optimists were excluded from the policy process. In responding to whether GIZ was involved with Vanuatu's displacement policy, Gabor Sasvari (interview, 17.10.2019) said "unfortunately not. We weren't even consulted, which is usually the [process], although we would've liked to have gotten a bit more [involved]". There are several plausible explanations. First, the government prioritised internal consultations because IOM fed international expertise into the process. Second, institutional perspectives on facilitating planned relocation schemes varied. Cosmin Corendea (interview, 10.08.2019) mentioned, "the pre, in, and post [stages] came from an IOM study done last year. I was proposing it just to make it a little bit more structured and clearer for policy implementers … I tested it with IOM first and they didn't like it. Then I did it with Fiji and they embraced it …" Fiji's guidelines replicate the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement that focus on stages of population movements while Vanuatu's policy mirrors the 2017 Toolbox on Planned Relocation that prioritises systemic interventions. Third, at the time of data collection, international organisations were increasing their presence in the region by opening country offices and implementing multi-initiatives. This momentarily created mandate duplication, resulting in competition, suspicion, and omission from policy initiatives. The exclusion of certain experts from the policy development process may imply limited cross-jurisdictional exchange and learning; that is, penholders did not draw lessons from Fiji and Vanuatu's successes and failures to guide domestic policy processes.

Nonetheless, internal validation is beginning to shape Fiji's relocation guidelines and Vanuatu's displacement policy as place-based 'models.' As described in Chapter 4, some professional experts who commented on the former are lauding them as a monumental, well-written, holistic, and commendable document, and 'good practice' (Atle Solberg, interview, 09.12.2019; Erica Bower, interview, 10.12.2018; Farbotko, 2020; GP20 Initiative, 2020; Mariam Traore Chazalnoel, interview, 06.12.2018; Nina Birkeland, interview, 05.07.2019). Others are touting the latter as a progressive, successful, and good national approach that can be a potential blueprint for the region (Elizabeth Ferris, interview, 23.07.2019; Farbotko, 2020; GP20 Initiative, 2020; Huckstep & Clemens, 2023; Sabira Coelho, interview, 26.09.2019; Scott Hook, interview, 01.11.2019; Siobhan McDonnell, Melbourne, 12.04.2019; Willy Missack, interview, 16.05.2019). These labels are not indicative of policy outcomes but an acceptance of government lip-service. For instance, IDMC commended the Fijian government on setting up an institutional system on facilitating resettlement schemes in a relatively consultative manner but the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs' request for a

country visit to assess IDP participation in the policymaking process was denied (Bina Desai, interview, 07.06.2019; Cecilia Jimines-Darmary, interview, 09.08.2019).

Yet, Fijian and N-Vanuatu strategies are recursively modelled as exemplars: global norms on resettlement and internal displacement were adapted and localised, resulting in context-specific policies that were remobilised as a reference-scape. Fiji's consultant translated the 1998 Guiding Principles, 2013 Peninsula Principles, and 2017 Toolbox to fit the local milieu and incorporated ideas from the national guidelines into the 2017 Toolbox (Cosmin Corendea, interview, 10.08.2019; GoF, 2018b). For Vanuatu's strategy, IOM extracted and recontextualised ideas from a host of global norms, namely the 1998 Guiding Principles, 2004 World Bank's policy, 2013 IASC Framework, 2015 Protection Agenda, 2015 Guidance, and 2017 Toolbox (GoV, 2018). The Solomon Islands' consultant drew inspiration from both strategies to draft the national resettlement policy (Rebecca Monson, interview, 19.05.2023). Australia's experts are reviewing Fiji's guidelines while New Zealand policymakers are looking to Australia (Field Notes, 30.05.2023; Nathan Ross, interview, 22.01.2020). In this way, multi-scalar and cross-jurisdictional modelling recycled and sanctioned planned relocation as a norm for managing internal environmental displacement (see Figure 9.2).

Figure 9.2: Multi-Scalar and Cross-Jurisdictional Modelling of Planned Relocation.



In Figure 9.2, global instruments on internal displacement and planned relocation are shaded blue, the regional framework is shaded green, and national strategies are shaded yellow. The direction of the arrow indicates the flow of ideas. For example, the 1998 Guiding Principles shaped Fiji and Vanuatu's strategies while Fiji's guidelines shaped the 2017 Planned Relocation Toolbox.

On the other hand, professional experts embraced Pacific reference-scapes to validate predetermined ideas of managing the phenomenon. As discussed in Section 8.2 in Chapter 8, as part of establishing a policy assembly line, the Nansen Initiative and Oxfam Australia drew inspiration from Kiribati's migration with dignity policy to highlight the forced nature of the phenomenon and explore alternative solutions facilitating voluntary population movements (Hannah Entwisle Chapusiat, interview, 25.01.2019; Simon Bradshaw, Sydney, 30.10.2019). For IOM (2016a, 2017d), it endorses the agency's approach to climate change; that is, it is an example of facilitating migration to adapt to environmental adversities. Because Kiribati's policy sanctioned existing practices, various components (e.g., upskilling, worker and permanent residency schemes) made their way into global climate change and human mobility governance. Oxfam Australia's Simon Bradshaw (interview, 04.06.2019) explained:

> "I don't think the phrase [migration with dignity] appear in either, but the core elements of the idea can be seen in fingerprints on the work of UNFCCC's taskforce … [In terms of] the Global Compact on Migration, there are some elements that could be seen as aligning with the idea of migration with dignity, but it might not be quite so obvious …"

Kiribati's policy was not modelled as a norm across jurisdictions in the Pacific. Instead, it was held up as an exemplar by experts with transnational reach in global arenas, guiding global policy processes. Therefore, bottom-up vertical modelling conveyed labour migration as a norm for managing international environmental movements (see Figure 9.3).

Figure 9.3: Vertical Modelling of Labour Migration.



In Figure 9.3, Global instruments on internal displacement and planned relocation are shaded blue and national strategies are shaded yellow. The direction of the arrow indicates the flow of ideas.

9.6 Financial and Governance Gains

Institutional entrepreneurs used anchorage for financial and governance benefits. As discussed above, organisations depend on funding for their survival, which is secured through multi-initiatives and by integrating their mandated issue areas into policies. Initially, development-friendly 'models' were linked to climate adaptation. The linkage did not provide access to global climate finance as donor agencies failed to realise the synergy between the issue areas (Nazhat Shameem Khan, interview, 13.08.2019). Hence, optimists continue to advocate planned relocation and migration as adaptation strategies. Independent expert Koko Warner (interview, 02.08.2019) explained why the adaptation framing is important:

> "People may move in different patterns and different regions. So, [we need to] have a conversation about what that could be like. What are the acceptable terms? We can cast them under adaptation – we have rooms to talk about adaptation, institutions set up to fund adaptation and vocabulary. So, there is this infrastructure for adaptation to make things happen and have structured conversations."

However, the adaptation linkage prompted optimists to circulate and fasten their policy preferences in adjacent policy domains, enrolling more political followers and accessing different pots of UN funding. For example, the Nansen Initiative and IOM reframed planned relocation and labour migration as protection strategies, which were integrated into the FRDP (FRDP, 2016; Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat, interview, 25.01.2019; Sabira Coelho, interview, 26.09.2019). This anchorage acted as a political impetus for the PCCMHS programme. The multi-initiative adopted the protection *and* development framing, which met the criteria for the UNTFHS. Similarly, even though optimists did not actively shape the regional security framework, they harnessed the pillar on climate security and transnational crime to frame displacement as an unintended consequence of environmental stressors that could trigger regional instability but could be minimised through nexus solutions (BDAP, 2018; PIFS Regional Security Advisor, interview, 20.02.2020; UNPBF, 2020). The protection and development framing aided IOM, PIFS, and UNDP to not only persuade Pacific leaders to explore displacement issues but also access the UN Peacebuilding Trust Fund for the Climate Security project.

Besides financial gains, organisations based in Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and the US are eager to internationalise environmental migration and displacement governance. Wealthy nations fear new obligations and regional human mobility dynamics vary significantly, thereby impeding the formulation of a standalone global governance instrument (Atle Solberg, interview, 09.12.2019; Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019). Hence, their efforts have been directed towards regionalising environmental migration and displacement governance through Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs). RCPs have acted as channels for multi-dimensional and multi-directional policy flow. The Nansen Initiative piloted RCPs in the Pacific on environmental migration and displacement whereby governments, civil society actors, and experts exchanged knowledge, successful schemes (e.g., Vunidogoloa and Tegua resettlements), and emerging policy responses (e.g., Kiribati's migration with dignity policy and Fiji's planned relocation guidelines) (Jane McAdam, interview, 06.05.2019; Nansen

Initiative, 2013; Sabira Coelho, interview, 26.09.2019). UNESCAP and PIFS facilitated the next RCP under the auspices of the PCCM project that created momentum for a regional protection framework but revealed divergent political views on the labour migration-adaptation linkage (Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019; Timothy Westbury, interview, 07.10.2019). Now, IOM and PIFS are collaborating with PDD and other UN agencies to establish a regional instrument on climate mobility. The outcomes of the first two RCPs shaped global migration and refugee governance by informing the Nansen Protection Agenda (which was disseminated across multiple domains) and its 'effective practices,' which were integrated into global instruments, ultimately creating the impetus for world leaders to establish soft migration governance. It is also making way for the fragmented but better synergised and embedded environmental migration and displacement governance.

9.7 Chapter Summary

Anchoring is a type of mobilising strategy that human mobility optimists have employed to institutionalise policy agendas regarding environmental mobility and displacement as 'models' and 'best practices.' Anchoring entails four different approaches to mobilisation (Beeson & Stone, 2013; Stone, 2019). First, it involves lobbying vocal and well-respected leaders to politically champion the issue, develop language proposals, and draft scripts for high-level events. Second, it involves making technical submissions to relevant bodies, which articulate clear definitions of problems, solutions, and institutional supports in ways that echo the language proposals and scripts. Third, it involves drafting norms on migration and displacement with a broad enough scope to include environmental mobility. Fourth, anchoring involves internally validated policies prepared by consultants who are members of the same institutional structures and thus are ideologically and socially conditioned to mobilise certain 'models.' Anchoring has taken place in the issue areas of environment and to a lesser extent development. In these areas it has mobilised significant effort to address issues of human mobility, human rights, and security. This has resulted in partial institutionalisation of fragmented, multi-level governance arrangements for environmental migration and displacement.

Conclusion of Mobilising Strategies

The last three chapters have illustrated a key process through which the vertical and horizontal (im)mobility of environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' has

produced variances in their level of institutionalisation (see Table 9.1). Collectively, these chapters argue that sociocultural and political strategies have quickly reproduced, disseminated, and established development-friendly approaches as viable solutions for regulating environmental mobility and displacement across multiple scales and sites. The same practices initially immobilised refugee protection and have recently begun to refashion and remobilise this as a suite of humanitarian measures in certain places.

Human mobility optimists have made, unmade, and remade the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage recursively and iteratively through linking and framing. To amplify the implications of uncontrolled fossil fuel consumption, environmental stressors were linked to refugee movements, creating the perceived environmental/climate refugee crisis. The discourse was substantively delinked using legal analysis of the 1951 Refugee Convention and research on drivers and types of population movements. Through diagnostic framing, it was reconceptualised as a forced environmental migration and displacement cycle comprising three stages, which broadened the list of regulatory responses available to national and local authorities for managing the phenomenon.

The three regulatory and governance solutions to environmental mobility and displacement examined in this project were strategically constructed, building on pre-existing normative instruments, ad hoc strategies, and historical practices to enable their multi-scalar and multi-sited spread. Planned relocation, as an off-the-shelf policy, was characterised by strong normative and substantive linkages. The 1998 Guiding Principles depicted resettlement as a durable solution for managing internal environmental displacement, protecting affected persons, and fostering development. Geographically diverse case studies corroborated this normative linkage but also revealed bad practices in facilitating such schemes. Consequently, resettlement was rebranded into planned relocation. Because it was already accepted as a protection-development norm, planned relocation was quickly reframed as an adaptive measure of last resort, displacement risk aversion/minimisation strategy, protection measure, and migration pathway.

Labour migration, also an off-the-shelf policy, was characterised by weak programmatic and substantive linkages. Existing temporary and permanent programmes already target communities susceptible to environmental adversities but need to be amended, expanded, and better aligned to manage international environmental migration. The regional culture of migration and traditional strategy of using remittances to improve livelihoods and recover from

disasters semi-validated this programmatic linkage. Because it was accepted as a development norm, labour migration was quickly refashioned as an adaptation, resilience-building, risk minimisation, protection, and survival strategy. However, because each frame raised questions about its feasibility, particularly for atoll nations, the discourse was continuously reproduced. Humanitarian protection was a by-product of prognostic framing and substantive linkage. Refugee protection was broadened to include a set of measures, including regional asylum options, special category visas, and visa waivers. Historical and present-day ad hoc responses from Africa, the Americas, and Europe confirmed this prognostic frame but also revealed their temporariness and that adoption is shaped by local conditions. Hence, each solution has maintained a humanitarian frame. Thus, human mobility optimists packed, unpacked, and repacked existing development-friendly approaches as environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' in the Pacific.

Additionally, human mobility optimists undertook two entrepreneurial activities for marshalling the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage. The first activity was creating and shopping for policy spaces that culminated in the emergence of a semi-fixed multi-scalar and multi-sited assembly line. Fleeting expert venues taking the form of seminars, workshops, and symposiums – held in Bangkok, Bellagio, Nylon, Sanremo, and Washington D.C. – posed as global nodes for policy learning and production. Experts banded together to gain knowledge about foreign place-based 'models'; to rationalise the environmental refugee delinkage; and to frame planned relocation and labour migration as viable responses. However, the Geneva-based Nansen Initiative (and PDD) emerged as the fixed global policy centre for manufacturing both development-friendly and humanitarian solutions for managing environmental migration and displacement in 2012. Fleeting policy arenas, specifically COPs to UNFCCC, GPDRR, and UNGA – hosted in Bonn, Copenhagen, Geneva, Katowice, New York, and Sharm El-Sheikh – served as global nodes for policy teaching, dissemination, and adoption. Entrepreneurs set up high-level side events, meetings, and pavilions to showcase their work, offer institutional support, network with leaders, and launch innovative policies. They successfully spread the environmental refugee delinkage and development-friendly approaches in these venues. More recently, the GFMD, UNHRC and UNSC – convened in Geneva, Marrakesh, New York, and Puerto Vallarta – materialised into new policy marketplaces: all three solutions circulated in the migration forum whereas only planned relocation and humanitarian protection pervaded the institutional boundaries of human rights and security arenas.

Contrastingly, the regional component comprised fleeting sites, serving as *temporary* policy production, dissemination, and adoption nodes for development-friendly approaches. The Suva-based Pacific Island Forum and Apia-based PIDC mobilised them as viable regulatory strategies but are not institutions dedicated to the issue area. Instead, Suva-based UN regional offices functioned as semi-permanent policy production centres, where experts intensely debated and refined both solutions. Consultative and awareness-raising events convened in Canberra, Nadi, Rarotonga, Tarawa, and Suva acted as policy dissemination and adoption arenas. Regional experts shared relocation and migration 'models' from the Carteret Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, and Vanuatu while international specialists circulated existing applicable norms, enabling knowledge exchange and cross-adoption of policy ideas. Faith-based events institutionalised planned relocation as a community norm for averting and minimising environmental displacement. On the contrary, the national component constituted fixed sites that acted as sources of inspiration. Policy actors facilitated and engaged in policy tourism to learn about reference-scapes and formulate regulatory strategies. I-Kiribati policymakers used learnings from their travels to Auckland, Gizo, and Rome to develop their migration with dignity policy. The Fijian government arranged for optimists to visit Vunidgoloa and Tukaraki, gathering knowledge about facilitating relocation schemes.

The second activity was using multi-initiatives to mobilise and institutionalise the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage, which ensured optimists' survival and enabled donor states to discreetly coerce Pacific Island Countries to regulate the phenomenon in a certain way. Since 2007, optimists have conducted 13 multi-initiatives with a country case study from the Pacific or regional focus. Each initiative was framed differently, reflecting the temporal evolution of the discourse. The global initiatives served as channels for enhancing knowledge, specifically on how environmental stressors drive different types of population movements, the magnitude of the issue, and existing regulatory practices. Three projects circulated planned relocation and labour migration as risk minimisation, adaptation, and protection strategies while only one disseminated humanitarian protection as a viable measure to safeguard the rights of people displaced across borders by environmental stressors. In contrast, ten regional multi-initiatives functioned as pipelines for policy development, moving and normalising development-friendly solutions as 'best practices' for the issue area. Six projects mobilised resettlement schemes as an avenue for averting, minimising, and addressing internal environmental displacement whereas one portrayed them as a solution for managing international forced movements. Six projects also ferried temporary worker

programmes as a way for communities to adapt to, build resilience against, and protect communities affected by environmental stressors whilst fostering sustainable development. However, the GPHMCCC programme institutionalised planned relocation into a pre-emptive approach in Fiji while the PCCM project formalised labour migration into a development *and* survival strategy in Kiribati and employment pathway in Tuvalu. The PCCMHS programme is shaping all three solutions into effective regulatory strategies for the issue area, albeit numerous initiatives are contributing to the process. Therefore, human mobility optimists undertook entrepreneurial activities to construct, market, and standardise development-friendly approaches as environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' in the Pacific.

Furthermore, human mobility optimists anchored components of the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage into adjacent agendas to access emerging funds and establish a governance form in the Pacific. This was achieved in four ways. First, they identified, lobbied (i.e., courtesy visits, missions, and meetings), and coached (i.e., preparing language proposals and drafting scripts) well-respected and vocal leaders to act as political champions, raising awareness of the issue, promulgating the emerging 'best practices' and ensuring they remain on policy agendas, particularly in domains restricting expert participation. With the support of African, Asian, and Latin American states, Pacific leaders advocated incorporating development-friendly solutions in the 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework and environmental stressors in human mobility instruments and placed environmental displacement on the UNHRC agenda. Fijian and Tuvaluan officials provided political impetus for the PRFCM that promotes planned relocation schemes, labour migration programmes, *and* humanitarian protection measures as viable regulatory strategies. The former is touting its guidelines as a 'good practice' at high-level institutional events while the latter is preparing to table a UNGA resolution to protect the human rights of people internationally displaced by environmental stressors.

Second, optimists revised and repackaged their policy messages into technical submissions for environmental, development, and security bodies. Submissions to UNFCCC and UNDRR mobilised and institutionalised development-friendly approaches as strategies for adapting to climate adversities, preventing and minimising displacement, and recovering from sudden-onset disasters. Proposals to PIF reframed them as protection pathways for communities susceptible to environmental displacement and may have contributed to the standardisation of

irregular migration and trafficking as human security issues. The latter seemed to be a window of opportunity for mobilising humanitarian protection measures in the Pacific, which is yet to be fully realised.

Third, they drafted the soft rules to govern human mobility, integrating environmental stressors as drivers of various forms of population movements and broadening the scope and applicability of each instrument. The 1998 Guiding Principles and 2013 Peninsula Principles recognised that climate change and disasters forced individuals to flee their homes but remain in their country of origin. Both sets of principles institutionalised planned relocation as a durable measure for managing internal environmental displacement. Similarly, the 2015 Protection Agenda, 2016 New York Declaration, and 2018 Migration Compact recognised sudden- and slow-onset stressors triggered internal and cross-border movements. This provided an opportunity to build policy synergies: it shifted away from a "silonic" focus on cross-border disaster displacement, labour migration, and refugee protection to interconnections between the issue areas, expanding the scope of each instrument to include a range of development-friendly *and* humanitarian approaches (Ayiaz Sayed-Khaiyium, interview, 04.11.2019). More importantly, it enabled Pacific policymakers, intergovernmental agencies, and civil society, who are traditionally absent from the domain, to engage in the formation of global human mobility governance. Because of the political sensitivities surrounding refugee movements and climate change, the 2018 GRC only standardised a suite of safeguards for disaster situations. These global institutional developments are somewhat informing the rise of environmental migration and displacement governance in the Pacific. It is rationalising planned relocation schemes, labour migration programmes, and certain humanitarian protection measures as strategies for anticipating, preparing for, and responding to climate adversities, including migration and displacement.

Fourth, recognised experts provided feedback on national strategies and embraced Pacific 'models,' internally validating their ideas on how to regulate environmental migration and displacement. The consultants who drafted Fiji's relocation guidelines and Vanuatu's displacement policy orbit the same institutional structure, translating existing principles to each context and remobilising them as reference-scapes. However, internal validation excluded actor voices, resulting in a lack of ownership of the relocation guidelines in Fiji and mild ideological tensions between actors working on the issue area in the Pacific. Although their experts did not shape Kiribati's migration with dignity policy, IOM, Nansen Initiative, and

Oxfam Australia endorsed preconceived notions of minimising displacement and adapting to climate adversities through voluntary pathways. Ideologically aligned members lauded these as ‘effective practices’ and ‘blueprints’ drawing inspiration for policy development elsewhere. In this way, planned relocation and labour migration were recursively modelled as norms for managing internal environmental displacement and international environmental migration. In sum, despite efforts to institutionalise humanitarian protection, human mobility optimists only anchored development-friendly approaches as environmental migration and displacement management ‘best practices’ in the Pacific.

Table 9.1: The Impact of Mobilising Strategies on the Institutionalisation of the Environmental Migration and Displacement Management Assemblage.

Policy Response	**Scale**	**Mobilising Strategies**		
Planned Relocation		**Issue-making**	**Entrepreneurialism**	**Anchoring**
	Global	Adaptation, development, displacement risk aversion/minimisation, human rights protection, and migration management	Fleeting expert venues, COPs to UNFCCC, GFMD, GPDRR, UNHRC, Nansen Initiative/PDD, UNGA, and UNSC 3 global environmental mobility multi-initiatives	1998 Guiding Principles, 2010 CaF, 2013 Peninsula Principles, 2015 Protection Agenda, 2015 Sendai Framework, 2016 New York Declaration, and 2018 GCM
	Regional	Protection (through anchoring)	Fleeting expert venues, PIF/PIDC annual meetings, regional consultations/stakeholder meetings on environmental mobility 7 regional environmental mobility multi-initiatives	2016 FRDP and 2023 PRFCM
	National	Adaptation and displacement risk aversion/minimisation	Limited information: Vunidogoloa and Tukaraki visitations	Planned relocation guidelines or displacement policy
Labour Migration	Global	Adaptation, development, and migration management	Fleeting expert venues, COPs to UNFCCC, GFMD, UNHRC, Nansen Initiative/PDD, and UNGA 3 global environmental mobility multi-initiatives	2010 CaF, 2015 Protection Agenda, 2015 Sendai Framework, 2016 New York Declaration, and 2018 GCM

	Regional	Protection and resilience-building	Fleeting expert venues, PIF/PIDC annual meetings, and regional consultations/stakeholder meetings on environmental mobility 6 regional environmental mobility multi-initiatives	2016 FRDP and 2023 PRFCM
	National	Development, employment, and survival	Limited information: Auckland, Gizo, and Rome visitations	Labour migration policies
Humanitarian Protection	Global	Protection and resilience-building	Fleeting expert venues, COPs to UNFCCC, GFMD, UNHRC, Nansen Initiative/PDD, and UNSC 1 global environmental mobility multi-initiative	2015 Protection Agenda, 2016 New York Declaration, 2018 GCM, and 2018 GCR
	Regional	Complementary and refugee protection, and standalone protection mechanism (through anchoring	No Impact	2018/19 Boe Declaration and Action Plan and 2023 PRFCM
	National	No Impact	No Impact	National security strategies

Chapter 10: Local Conditions

10.1 Introduction

This chapter argues that local conditions shape the adoption, adaptation, and localisation of certain 'best practices,' producing distinct environmental migration and displacement management policies across the Pacific. Localisation is a recursive process of resisting, morphing, indigenising, and standardising policies before they settle in a new site (Levenda, 2019; McCann & Ward, 2013; Prince, 2010; Tanner et al., 2019). Local conditions produce policy variations. Geographically, ideologically, and politically proximate jurisdictions produce similar policies (Stone, 2017). But because each place has specific beliefs, rituals, and rules, internal entrepreneurs translate policies before they are endorsed. The final product is often a mutation of foreign ideas and local practices. Additionally, local conditions evolve. Economic, environmental, political, and institutional circumstances may change unexpectedly (Bassett & Shandas, 2010; Botterill, 2013; Gamlen, 2019; Kingdon, 2011). These factors interact in complex ways to affect policy adoption, translation, *or* abandonment. Furthermore, although 'failures' are present in sites of 'successes', local conditions determine their perceived feasibility and extra-local salience (Lovell, 2016; McCann & Ward, 2015).

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 10.2 explains the role of historical precedents in shaping the quick adoption of development-friendly solutions at the regional level. Section 10.3 discusses how the fear of loss translated labour migration into migration with dignity and mobilised the idea of formulating a separate international protection framework for environmentally displaced persons at the national level. Section 10.4 focuses on institutional bottlenecks impeding the adoption of labour migration and humanitarian protection assemblages at multiple levels. These bottlenecks are shaped by organisational competition, economics, politics, and to a lesser extent variable environmental vulnerabilities. Section 10.5 elucidates the impact of broad terminologies and unsubstantiated issue linkages in semi-mobilising labour migration and immobilising humanitarian protection as environmental migration and displacement management policies at the regional level. Finally, Section 10.6 concludes by highlighting that although most Pacific governments adopted development-friendly solutions, the policies diverged from the original models.

10.2 Historical Precedents

Historical precedents demonstrate the cultural acceptability and workability of policies but also reveal regulatory limitations. The Pacific has a culture of relocation and migration: communities relocated to minimise displacement risks while individuals migrated to relieve population pressures and recover from disasters (Barnett & McMichael, 2018; Connell, 2006; Campbell & Warrick, 2014). This culture enabled policy learning but also produced variations in the institutionalisation of development-friendly solutions. This section maps the geography of planned relocation and labour migration precedents in the Pacific to explain how they produced conducive conditions for multi-level policy adoption and translation.

10.2.1 Planned Relocation Precedents

As shown in Table 10.1, the Pacific has historical precedents for using planned relocation schemes to minimise and manage environmental displacement risks. Resettlement success was attributed to community leadership (Campbell, 2022; Gharbaoui & Blocher, 2018), legalised land arrangements (Gharbaoui, 2020), meaningful consultation and active participation (Anisi, 2020; Thornton, 2009), community cohesion (Cagilaba, 2005), livelihood restoration (McMicheal et al., 2019), adequate funding and government support (Albert et al., 2018; Benintende, 2021), and post-relocation evaluation and monitoring. Failure was attributed to the exclusion of marginalised groups in decision-making processes (Piggot-McKellar et al., 2019), erosion of customary practices due to intermarriages (Larson, 1977; Monson, 2010), heightened risk of displacement because families resettle in disaster-prone areas (Bolo et al., 2021; Nunn & Campbell, 2020; Warrick, 2011), land and fishing rights contested by younger generations (FCOSS Representative, interview, 19.11.2014; Fitzpatrick & Monson, 2022), direct transfer of local 'models' (i.e., between communities) (Donner, 2015; Tabe, 2019, 2020), and poor national leadership (Connell & Lutkehaus, 2016; Naser, 2015). The historical precedents highlighted the community acceptance and workability of relocation schemes, minimising policy resistance. They also revealed areas of improvement, enabling policy adaptation and localisation.

However, because high-island countries lacked expertise to develop national planned relocation guidelines, they engaged in different methods of policy learning. Fiji engaged in *policy experimentation* by piloting the state-led Vunidogoloa relocation scheme. Some planned relocation advocates said the scheme has an "exemplary dimension" as it considers

sociocultural, economic, and housing factors (Charan et al., 2018; Tronquet, 2015, p. 122). Others raised that women were not consulted, and houses did not have kitchens (Moore, 2022; Piggot-McKellar et al., 2019). Nevertheless, the government combined Vunidogoloa lessons with international instruments to formulate domestic guidelines and merged them with Narikoso, Tukaraki, Waciwaci school district, and Walia learnings to develop the standard operating procedures (CCICD Representative, interview, 29.03.2019; GoF, 2018b, 2023; McNamara & Des Combes, 2015). In this way, Fiji indigenised planned relocation.

Tulele Peisa drew on *local negative lessons*. As elaborated in Chapter 5, the state-led Kuveria and Buka Island schemes failed to resettle Carteret Islanders. Relocated families returned home as a result of limited livelihood opportunities, community segregation, land disputes, lack of government support, and the civil war (Boege & Rakova, 2019; Edwards, 2013; Sithole, 2015). Tulele Peisa designed a 20-step programme to relocate Carteret Islanders again, which emphasises community preparation and ongoing integration support (Rakova, 2014; Ursula Rakova, Brisbane, 25.05.2018). The programme comprises indigenised notions of sensitising relocating and host villages, such as facilitating speaking tours, cultural exchanges and intermarriages, and providing upskilling opportunities as well as counselling support (Pascoe, 2015). While the Carteret leaders claim it is a "model", the provincial and national authorities are yet to endorse the programme (Edwards, 2013, p. 78; Rakova, 2012, p. 387).

The Papua New Guinea government may engage in *local policy learning* as it aims to develop domestic relocation guidelines (see ABG, 2023; GoPNG, 2017, 2021). The unsuccessful Manam resettlement scheme left behind potentially useful institutional infrastructures. The Authority and Taskforce were established to relocate Manam Islanders but failed to do so due to poor leadership, complex land issues, and alleged corruption (Connell & Lutkehaus, 2016; Fitzpatrick, 2013; GoPNG, 2016; Naser, 2015). Rather than reinventing the wheel, policymakers can merge ideas from the Carterets programme and institutional structures from the Manam scheme: community sensitisation practices can aid with navigating land complexities while the Authority and Taskforce can be strengthened as well as scaled up.

The Solomon Islands engaged in *cross-jurisdictional* and local policy learning. The consultant drew ideas from Fiji's relocation guidelines and Vanuatu's displacement policy, specifically how to structure the document and divide responsibilities based on pre, during, and post-relocation (Rebecca Monson, interview, 19.05.2023). The government also drew ideas from five local resettlements. The Walande scheme is heralded as a "success" because families are

content, and the village is well-maintained. (Rebecca Monson, interview, 19.05.2023). It epitomises planned and orderly relocation whereby the houses are in neat straight lines and highlights that "traditional ways of organising resettlements work" (Boege, 2023, p. 13). The Gilbertese, Koa Hill, Lisiliana, and Ngongasila schemes offered insights into the complex interplay of land laws, customs and possessions, community leadership, the inclusion of marginalised groups, and challenges specific to ethnic minorities (Fitzpatrick & Monson, 2022; Monson, 2010; Monson & Foukona, 2014). The policymakers merged international relocation norms with cross-jurisdictional learnings and local practices to formulate an indigenised set of planned relocation guidelines (Barnabas Bago, interview, 14.11.2022; GoSI, 2022; Rebecca Monson, interview, 19.05.2023).

Vanuatu may also engage in local policy learning. The displacement policy portrays planned relocation as a pre-emptive strategy and a measure of last resort (GoV, 2018). The government is developing a standalone development- and protection-oriented planned relocation policy (Dawn, 2022; Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019). It could draw lessons from the Lateau resettlement scheme and the Maewo Second Home Project. Planned relocation advocates claim the Lateau scheme was "efficacious" and "success[ful]" (Nunn & Campbell, 2020, p. 9) because families have adapted to the new environment and "developed holistically as a community" (Ballu et al., 2011; Nakalevu & Phillips, 2007, p. 8). Ni-Vanuatu policymakers and experts claim the second home approach is a "very good example" of customary practice whereby traditional chiefs adopt displaced families with whom they share ancestral affiliations (MCCADMGEEDM Representative, interview, 16.05.2019; Willy Missack, interview, 16.05.2019). Leading up to the Ambae earthquake, the government attempted to institutionalise the approach by setting up the Maewo Second Home Project. The project promised protection, development opportunities, and land security (Rovins et al., 2020; VNDMO, 2018a, 2018b). However, the 3,000 people who took part in the project lived in tents, exposing them to extreme weather events (Bolo et al., 2021; Rovins et al., 2020). As a result, the government restored programmes and services in Ambae, allowing families to return home. It still asserts that Maewo can be a safe and secure place for Ambaens seeking temporary residence during disasters or a permanent home for those wishing to move away from environmental risks (VNDMO, 2018b). These Ni-Vanuatu precedents did not shape the domestic displacement policy because little was known about them.

Advocates drew upon these precedents to globalise and regionalise planned relocation as an environmental displacement management strategy in two ways. The Brookings Institution, GIZ, IOM, ISIM, Nansen Initiative/PDD, PCC, UNDRR, and UNHCR specialists institutionalised resettlement as an *internal* displacement norm (Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015; OCHA, 1998). Vunidogoloa's experiences of moving burial grounds and the prolonged process of identifying suitable relocation sites universalised notions of cultural preservation and land acquisition (Brookings Institution et al., 2015; UNHCR et al., 2017). The Carterets' community sensitisation practices reinforced the idea of community preparation (Peninsula Principles, 2013; Nansen Initiative, 2014). The Manam conflict over land reiterated the importance of securing suitable land while the Taro expansion[19] cost amplified the notion of adequate funding (UNHCR et al., 2017).

Second, GIZ, IOM, Kaldor Centre, OHCHR Pacific Office, PIFS, PDD, and UNESCAP Pacific Office specialists institutionalised resettlement as an *international* displacement norm using the Banaban and Vaitupuan experiences (GCM, 2019; Nansen Initiative, 2014; PRFCM, 2023). The Banaba scheme is a "negative case": families forcibly moved to Rabi Island, where they struggled to re-establish livelihoods because they had limited supplies and understanding of the new environment (Ferris, 2011, 2012, p. 23; McAdam, 2014; Rae Bainteiti, interview, 13.10.2020). However, the Fijian authorities helped transfer traditional governance systems, allowing them to preserve their customs. The Vaitupu scheme is a "success" because it was carefully designed as an insurance policy: a small group of families moved to Kioa Island and promptly re-created their livelihoods (Bedford, 1968, p. 49; McAdam, 2014). Despite purchasing the land in Fiji, Banaban and Vaitupuan's land titles and rights to fishing grounds are contested (FCOSS Representative, interview, 19.11.2019). The specialists amplified calls to "devise planned relocation options in cases where adaptation in or return to the country of origin is not possible" (GCM, 2019, p. 12). They regionalised using planned relocation as a measure of last resort, and ideas on preserving sociocultural ties, religious practices, community cohesion, re-creating traditional governance, and accessing natural assets (PRFCM, 2023).

[19] Architects and scholars use the term 'relocation' or 'resettlement' to describe the process of moving Taro Islanders to mainland Choiseul in the Solomon Islands (Albert et al., 2018; Benintende, 2021; Bower & Weerasinghe, 2021). However, government officials use the term 'expansion' because only some agencies and businesses will move (Barnabas Bago, interview, 14.11.20222).

Table 10.1: Historical Precedents of Planned Relocation in the Pacific.

Country	Origin	Destination	Year	Motivations
Australia	Grantham, Lockeyer Valley	Grantham	2011-2013	Riverine flooding
Fiji	Biausevu	Busudale, within land boundaries and Koroinalagi, the neighbouring village	1940 &1983	Riverine flooding and tropical cyclones
	Cogea	Within land boundaries	2022	Tropical cyclone
	Denimanu	Korovou	2012	Coastal flooding and erosion, landslides, rising sea levels, and tropical cyclones
	Fletcher Road	Walia City	-	Squatting
	Nadawa	Walia City	-	Squatting on state mangroves
	Namuka-i-Lau	Walia City	-	Squatting
	Narikoso	Beyond land boundaries	Ongoing	Rising sea levels and coastal erosion
	Qaliqali	Naikeleyaga, within land boundaries	1936	Tropical cyclone
	Solodamu	Natuma, beyond land boundaries	1970	Flooding and coastal erosion
	Tukuraki	Within land boundaries	2012-2016	Landslide
	Tumaloa	Within land boundaries	-	Rising sea levels and coastal erosion
	Vatukaca	Within land boundaries	-	Rising sea levels and coastal erosion
	Vatulele	Within land boundaries	2016	Rising sea levels and coastal erosion
	Vunidogoloa	Kenani, within land boundaries	2006-2014	Coastal flooding and erosion, tidal inundation, and saltwater intrusion

	Vunisavisavi	Within land boundaries	2015	Coastal flooding and erosion, king tides, and rising sea levels
	Waciwaci School District	-	Ongoing	Coastal erosion and inundation
Kiribati	Banaba	Rabi Island, Fiji	1945	Environmental degradation caused by phosphate mining
	Manra	Titiana, Solomon Islands	1955	Droughts
	Nikumaroro	Wagina, Solomon Islands	1963	Overpopulation and land shortages
	Orona	Wagina, Solomon Islands	1963	Overpopulation and land shortages
	Southern I-Kiribati	Kiritimati Island	Ongoing	Overpopulation
	Southern I-Kiribati	Line and Phoenix Islands	1930s	Droughts
New Zealand	Christchurch	-	-	Earthquake
	Matata	-	2022	Heavy rainfall, flooding, and debris flow
	Waitakere	-	2002	Development project
	Carteret Islands	Hanahan	1960s	Overpopulation
	Carteret Islands	Kuveria	1982	Rising sea levels cause coastal erosion and groundwater salinisation
	Carteret Islands	Karoola, Buka Island	1997 & 2012	Rising sea levels cause coastal erosion and groundwater salinisation
	Carteret Islands	Tinputz, Bougainville Island	2009	Rising sea levels cause coastal erosion and groundwater salinisation
	Manam Island	Andarum, Madang Province	2011	Volcanic eruption

Samoa	Upolu	-	2009	Tsunami
Solomon Islands	Koa Hill, Honiara	-	2014	Flash flooding
	Lilisiana	Bethany	1990s	High tides, inundation, and tropical cyclone
	Mondo	Keigold	2007	Earthquakes, soil erosion, strong winds, and tsunami
	Nuatambu	Southeastern Choiseul Province	2007-2016	Rising sea levels
	Nusa Hope	Neighbouring islands and mainland New Georgia	1997	Rising sea levels, tsunamis, king tides, overpopulation, and land shortages
	Nupani	Tinakula and Vanikoro Islands, Temotu Province	1963, 1971 & 2014	Rising sea levels and coastal erosion
	Ontong Java	Central, Guadalcanal, Makira-Ulawa, and Malaita Provinces	-	Droughts, flooding, saltwater intrusion, and tropical cyclones
	Taro Island	Mainland Choiseul Province	Ongoing	Rising sea levels and tsunami risk
	Tikopia	Central, Guadalcanal, Makira-Ulawa, and Malaita Provinces	-	Hurricanes, overpopulation, and resource scarcity
	Walande	Tete Land, Malaita Province	1986 & 2009	Tropical cyclones and high tides
Tonga	Angha Island	Eua Island	1946	Volcanic eruption
	Hihifo District, Lifuka Island	-	2006	Earthquake
	Niutoputapu Island	-	2009	Earthquake and tsunami
	Ha’apai Island	-	2014	Tropical cyclone
Tuvalu	Vaitupu	Kioa, Fiji	1947	Anticipated overpopulation

	Funafuti	Outer Islands	2021	Pandemic
Vanuatu	Lateau, Tegua Island	Lirak, Tegua Island	2004	Rising sea levels and coastal inundation
	Ambae	Maewo	2017	Volcanic eruption

10.2.2 Labour Migration Precedents

As demonstrated in Table 10.2, the Pacific has historical precedents for using labour migration programmes to generate triple wins and achieve foreign policy objectives. As Chapters 4 and 7 elaborated, labour migration supporters argue that well-managed programmes help destination countries fulfil their international obligations to address the impacts of climate change (Sabira Coelho, Sydney, 31.10.2018). The outlet relieves pressures on the land while remittances and new skills aid in situ adaptation, disaster recovery, and internal relocations (Dun et al., 2022; Rae Bainteiti, interview, 13.10.2020; Simalua Enele, interview, 27.11.2020). This allows Pacific communities to remain on their land as long as feasible (Celia McMichael, virtual event, 21.01.2021).

Destination countries had conducive institutional conditions to adopt temporary labour import programmes as a development strategy. New Zealand was the first mover in this space, piloting a series of country-specific schemes between 1967 and 1976 (Bedford, 2013; De Bres & Campbell, 1975; Levick, 1988). Employers recruited labourers from rural villages experiencing environmental stress to work in the agricultural, construction, land-clearing, manufacturing, and meat-processing sectors (John Campbell, interview, 30.10.2019; Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019). In 1977, the government amalgamated the schemes into the single South Pacific Work Permit, standardising the length of stay, reimbursement of travel costs, and allowing employers to nominate workers for jobs. However, I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan workers overstayed, Samoans and Tongans used alternative pathways (e.g., the permanent residency quotas and informal networks), and Fiji was suspended from the schemes following the 1987 coups (Bedford, 2013; Stahl & Appleyard, 2007). As a result, the government abandoned the programme in 2001.

The 1960s programmes and South Pacific Work Permit left an institutional footprint. Several events between 2004 and 2007 created political impetus for New Zealand to introduce a new temporary labour scheme. Pacific leaders and the agriculture industry were calling for greater labour market access and reliable labour supply (Bedford, 2013; Hao'uli , 2013). The World Bank released a report suggesting Australia and New Zealand explore a seasonal labour programme to improve the well-being of Pacific communities and ease worker shortages in the agricultural sector (Luthria et al., 2006; Bedford et al., 2007). A New Zealand delegation participated in the UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development that emphasised triple wins and the need to strengthen cooperation (UNGA, 2006). Drawing on

earlier experiences, New Zealand policymakers developed the Seasonal Work Permit Pilot to address the immediate labour needs by recruiting workers already in New Zealand from visa-waiver countries for nine months (Ramasamy et al., 2008). Following its success, the government launched the infamous RSE scheme (Cunliffe, 2006; Bedford, 2013; Luthria, 2008). Diverging from earlier programmes, the RSE recruited workers from nine Pacific countries and instituted stringent rules about entries, length of stay, and family accompaniment.[20]

The RSE is touted as a successful model for several reasons (Gibson & McKenzie, 2014a). First, it is a pro-poor policy – employers recruit workers from rural villages who lack access to cash income and are assessed on their intentions to contribute to their homelands (Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019). Second, it epitomises interagency cooperation – the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry of Social Development, and Fruition Horticulture work collectively to manage, promote, and deliver the scheme (Ramasamy et al., 2008; Underhill et al., 2017). Third, it treats and offers opportunities to migrant and local workers alike, specifically in terms of working conditions, social security, and healthcare services (ILO Representative 2, interview, 17.07.2019). Fourth, recruitment is employer-driven – rather than the government facilitating connections, farmers will establish relationships with workers (Bedford, 2013; Hao'uli, 2013). Finally, it "has achieved what it has set out to do" – New Zealand's agricultural industry has a stable supply of labour while Pacific countries and workers have benefitted financially (Winters, 2016, p. 12). Nevertheless, RSE received criticism for its employers neglecting pastoral care obligations and threatening and exploiting workers (Bailey, 2019; Nunns et al., 2020; GoNZ, 2023).

Australia emulated the RSE because the development gains outweighed the costs. Despite academic, industrial, and political pressures to open Australia's labour market to Pacific workers, the Howard government resisted calls to pilot a seasonal labour programme because of its antipathy toward cheap foreign labour, bias towards highly skilled permanent migration,

[20] The kick-start countries were Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu, which was gradually extended to Fiji, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. The scheme was initially capped at 5,000, which increased to 8,000 in 2009 and is now sitting at 19,000. The caps are adjusted based on labour demand and supply. RSE is a single-entry visa that allows workers to stay for seven months – except for I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan labourers who can stay for nine months – and does not permit families to accompany workers, albeit these rules are under review (see GoNZ, 2023).

and fear of overstaying (MaclelLan & Mares, 2006; Bedford et al., 2007). When the Rudd government came into power, Australia began "closely monitor[ing] New Zealand's [RSE] experiences" (Doyle & Howes, 2015, p. 5). Copying the RSE design, the government introduced the Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot (PSWP) (Underhill et al., 2017). The PSWP varied from RSE in two ways: employers were not consulted and approved labour-hire companies facilitated the recruitment process (Ball, 2010; Curtain et al., 2018). The PSWP did not achieve the same level of success as RSE: employer and worker uptake rates were low because the programme was limited in scope, inflexible, and poorly advertised in participating countries, hiring costs were high, and the aggregate labour demand was low – because farmers had access to other workers (Curtain et al., 2016; Doyle & Howes, 2015). Yet, evaluations found the programme was highly relevant to the regional development context and achieved the objective of addressing domestic labour shortages (Raetz & Kaleb, 2013; Reed et al., 2011). Hence, Australian policymakers rearranged institutional practices from PSWP into a new scheme larger in scale and scope, the SWP[21] (Ball, 2015).

Some labour migration supporters label SWP as a success and 'good practice' (Bishop, 2018; Hill et al., 2018; ILO, 2024). It has enhanced economic development prospects: Pacific workers have increased productivity levels in select Australian industries and used remittances to purchase building materials, everyday consumables and land, pay for school fees, establish business ventures, and fulfil cultural obligations (Bailey & Kautoke-Holani, 2018; Gibson & Bailey, 2021; JSCM, 2016). SWP also offers equal opportunities to international and domestic workers (ILO Representative 2, interview, 17.07.2019). However, Pacific Islanders have absconded in response to poor living and working conditions, female participation rates remain low, and pre-departure and remittance sending costs are high (Bailey, 2020; Howes, 2022; ILO, 2019; Mudaliar & Voigt-Graf, 2021; World Bank, 2018).

The SWP created viable institutional conditions to introduce a new programme addressing skilled unemployment in the Pacific (Bishop, 2018; Payne, 2018). The Pacific has a young and literate population with limited economic prospects. Australia and New Zealand have been "slow in making allowances for this skillset" (PIFS Regional Security Advisor, interview, 20.02.2020). Nevertheless, Kiribati and Tuvalu lobbied Australia for a skilled migration

[21] The programme recruits individuals aged 21 or older from ten countries (Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Timor Leste, Tuvalu, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu) to work in agriculture, aquaculture, and accommodation industries for nine months. It is uncapped and does not permit families to accompany workers. However, it is a multi-entry visa.

pathway, which led to the Australian Agency for International Development to commission the Microstates Futures Study that examined the role of temporary migration in facilitating development in atoll nations (Bedford et al., 2017; Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019). This also presented an opportunity to relieve labour shortages in non-seasonal sectors and develop Northern Australia (Cash et al., 2016). Drawing inspiration from SWP, Australian policymakers formulated the Northern Australia Worker Pilot Programme (NAWPP)[22] (Bishop, 2018; GoA, 2015). The NAWWP differed from SWP: it recruited largely women with post-secondary qualifications to work in the hospitality and tourism sectors (Hill et al., 2018). The pilot did not operate for five years and was not independently evaluated. Yet, NAWPP was labelled a success because it reduced staff turnover, and enabled women to complete their qualifications and support their children and businesses in the islands (Bishop, 2018; GoA, 2017; Jarvis, 2018). Consequently, the government repackaged it into a multi-year and multi-sector programme, the PLS[23](Payne, 2018).

Some labour migration supporters argue the PLS has the potential to be successful while others initially labeled it a failure because of low participation rates and family separation (Clarke, 2018; Hill et al., 2018; Howes, 2018; ILO, 2019). Since 2020, participation rates increased – especially for women, household economic gains have increased, and the scheme has provided "workers with exposure" and "transferable skills" critical for sustaining the local economy (Doan et al., 2023; Howes & Lawton, 2019; Simalua Enele, 27.11.2020). However, it was recently criticised for exploiting workers and draining high-mobility countries, namely Fiji, Samoa, and Vanuatu, of semi-skilled and experienced workers (see Section 10.4 on institutional bottlenecks) (Curtain & Howes, 2022a, 2022b).

Destination countries also had conducive institutional conditions to adopt permanent labour import programmes as a strategy for achieving foreign policy objectives. New Zealand was yet again the first mover in this space, introducing the Samoan Quota Scheme (SQS). It originates from the 1962 Treaty of Friendship – a "living proof of the special [historical] relationship"

[22] It recruited 250 individuals from Kiribati and Tuvalu to work in Northern Australia. While Nauru was part of the kick-start group, it did not participate in the programme due to criticisms of hosting refugees on behalf of Australia.

[23] The scheme recruits individuals aged 21 or over from nine countries (Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu) to work in aged-care, aquaculture, forestry, hospitality, meat processing, non-seasonal agriculture, and tourism industries. It is a multi-year (up to four years) and multi-entry visa that is uncapped and permits families to join the workers.

between both countries – that encouraged extensive family migration (Kerslake, 2010, p. 46). The government adopted a ballot system, granting 1,100[24] Samoans permanent residency in New Zealand per year (Bedford, 1994). To apply, the applicants must meet the criteria (i.e., be 18-45 years old, have English language skills, good health and character, and a formal job offer that meets the minimum income threshold[25]) and receive an invitation to apply for permanent residency (Stahl & Appleyard, 2007). Even though the number of visa approvals has fluctuated[26], the SQS has facilitated chain migration thereby establishing a prominent Samoan diaspora in New Zealand (Doan et al., 2023). The diaspora assists new migrants to adjust to host communities and supports relatives back in the islands, especially during crises (Kerslake, 2010; Le De, Gaillard, & Friesen, 2015; Le De, Gaillard, & Friesen et al., 2015).

The SQS instituted the policy practice of maintaining historical relations through permanent residency pathways. To formalise New Zealand's special ties with Fiji, Kiribati, Tonga, and Tuvalu, policymakers formulated the PAC (Goff et al., 2001; Bedford et al., 2007). The PAC differed from SQS primarily in terms of the label, target countries, and quota allocations.[27] Importantly, the quotas are determined using population size (Bedford, 2008). The PAC had several teething problems, including fraudulent and unsustainable job offers, incomplete applicant information, and poor health or language skills (Stahl & Appleyard, 2007). The PAC is perceived as a "successful" programme – it has strengthened the Pacific diaspora, improved development prospects in origin countries, and purportedly does not cherry-pick the best and brightest (Ash & Campbell, 2016, p. 65; Doan et al., 2023; McAdam & Pryke, 2020, p. 17). However, the scheme is oversubscribed and not limited to a specific skill level, which contributes to brain drain (see Section 10.4 on institutional bottlenecks).

Australia emulated the PAC and SQS in response to several events. Development Policy Centre experts lobbied for permanent migration pathways to minimise temporariness, enable diaspora formation, and relieve population pressure in environmentally vulnerable nations (Akka Rimon, Canberra, 29.09.2022; Bedford et al., 2017; Curtain et al., 2022; Howes, 2015, 2023a). Pacific leaders called on Australia to deepen connections and enable easier intra-regional

[24] Following the 2020 pandemic, the quota increased to 1,650.

[25] The threshold has increased from NZD28,888 in 2006 to NZD51,743.80.

[26] The global financial crises and shifts in domestic immigration policies affected visa approvals (see Stahl & Appleyard, 2007).

[27] Following the 2020 pandemic, the quotas increased to 150 per atoll nation and 500 per high-island state.

movement (Wong et al., 2023). China's regional presence has heightened geopolitical tensions (Hawkins, 2023). Since PAC and SQS have a "wholly positive regional reputation", Australian policymakers borrowed their designs to develop the PEV (Love, 2023; Stephen Howes, Canberra, 29.09.2023). In particular, they adopted the ballot system because the Pacific perceives it as a "fair" and "transparent" process and using a different approach would have raised suspicion (Prasad, 2023; Howes, 2023b; Howes & Sharman, 2023). The PEV varies from New Zealand schemes in terms of target countries, size, skill level, and method for quota allocation – 12 eligible countries, 3,000 spaces, lower-skilled workers, and quotas will be determined based on population and diaspora size, existing migration opportunities, expected demand, and leaders' views (GoA, 2023; Parkinson et al., 2023).

Contrastingly, atoll nations had favourable institutional conditions for adopting labour export policies to facilitate migration with dignity. Kiribati was the first mover in this space, capitalising on the Seafaring Scheme to provide youths with internationally accredited training and overseas employment. The government set up the Marine Training Centre (MTC), which offers catering, deck operations, engineering, fisheries, and stewarding qualifications. I-Kiribati seafarers can work on foreign merchant, fishing, and cruise ships for 18 months. However, the 2007 global financial crisis and industry restructuring, the 2020 pandemic, and competition from cheaper workers have reduced the demand for I-Kiribati seafarers (GoK, 2015a; Voigt-Graf & Kagan, 2017; Voigt-Graf, 2022). The Seafaring Scheme separated families, causing alcoholism, health issues, and marriage dissolutions (Boronvik, 2005). Nonetheless, the benefits improved living standards, and Kiribati has been lauded for offering the "most well-developed, respected and successful marine training programme in the region" (Bedford et al., 2014, p. 11-12; Boronvik, 2006, 2009).

The Seafaring Scheme instituted the notion of migration with dignity. Faced with high youth unemployment and limited in situ adaptation options, I-Kiribati policymakers borrowed the idea of overseas upskilling and employment to co-produce the KANI (GoA, 2006; GoK, 2013 2015a, 2015b; UNGA, 2014, 2015). The KANI differed from the Seafaring Scheme in three ways: it involved the Australian government, the nursing sector, and an international education provider. High-performing I-Kiribati youths received post-secondary qualifications from Griffith University, and many found employment in Australia. Hence, Shaw et al. (2014, p. 11) referred to KANI as a "unique, bold and innovative model for doing development". Although it was discontinued due to high implementation costs, the notion of dignified migration shaped

Kiribati's Labour Migration Policy (Anote Tong, interview, 14.04.2023; Doyle, 2014; Farbotko et al., 2018).

Tuvalu introduced a similar programme but focused on local upskilling opportunities. In 2013, the government launched the SLP, a loan mechanism to finance higher education (Pedro, 2015). According to Tuvalu's Simalua Enele (interview, 27.11.2020), SLP contributes to climate adaptation because "education is one way you can address climate change. It will help you adapt by migrating or staying and helping save Tuvalu". Information on programme outcomes is publicly unavailable and therefore it is difficult to ascertain whether it has increased adaptive capacities in participating households.

Supporters drew upon these precedents to globalise labour migration as an environmental migration strategy. The Bedford Consulting, Development Policy Centre, Kaldor Centre, ILO, IOM, Lowy Institute, Nansen Initiative/ PDD, and UNESCAP experts argue that RSE and PAC are viable solutions for destination countries to manage environmental migration because they already target vulnerable populations, relieve population pressures, and the benefits of these programmes build adaptive capacities and resilience (Burson & Bedford, 2013; McAdam & Pryke, 2020; PCCMHS Programme, 2021; Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019). They also claim KANI is a feasible way for origin countries to regulate environmental migration as internationally accredited training and employment opportunities help youths to prepare for when they decide to emigrate permanently (Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat, interview, 25.01.2019; Sabira Coelho, interview, 26.09.2019; Voigt-Graf & Kagan, 2017). At the global level, supporters borrowed these ideas to amplify calls to develop temporary work and permanent residency schemes that prioritise vulnerable communities and provide upskilling opportunities for them to compete for skilled employment (GCM, 2019; IOM, 2016a; Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015). However, at the regional level, they were only able to anchor the idea of Pacific countries "considering" labour migration as a protection and adaptation measure (explained in preceding sections) (FRDP, 2016; PRFCM, 2023, p. 6).

Table 10.2: Historical Precedents of Labour Migration in the Pacific.

Country	Programme	Year	Motivations
Australia	North Australia Worker Pilot Programme	2015	Development (semi-skilled labour shortages)
	Pacific Australia Labour Mobility Scheme	2022	Development (unskilled and semi-skilled labour shortages)
	Pacific Engagement Visa	Ongoing	Strengthening ties with the Pacific
	Pacific Labour Scheme	2018	Development (semi-skilled labour shortages)
	Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot	2008	Development (unskilled labour shortages)
	Seasonal Worker Programme	2012	Development (unskilled labour shortages)
Kiribati	Seafaring Scheme	1968	Development (upskilling and employment)
	Kiribati-Australia Nursing Initiative	2006	Development and environment
Melanesia	Melanesian Spearhead Skills Movement	2012	Development (high skilled labour shortages)
New Zealand	Canterbury Reconstruction Pilot	2016	Development (semi-skilled labour shortages)
	Fiji Temporary Employment Certificate	1967	Development (unskilled labour shortages) but has environment logic
	Fiji Rural Work Permit	1969	Development (unskilled labour shortages) but has environment logic
	Fiji Urban Work Permit	1976-1977	Development (unskilled labour shortages) but has environment logic
	Fisheries Pilot	-	Development (semi-skilled labour shortages)
	Hutt Valley Scheme	1971	Development (unskilled labour shortages) but has environment logic
	New Zealand Methodist Church Scheme	1974	Development (unskilled labour shortages) but has environment logic

	New Zealand Roman Church Scheme	1974	Development (unskilled labour shortages) but has environment logic
	Pacific Access Category	2002	Strengthening ties with the Pacific
	Pacific Trades Partnership Initiative	2016	Development (semi-skilled labour shortages)
	Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme	2007	Development (unskilled labour shortages) but has environment logic
	Samoan Quota Scheme		Strengthening ties with Samoa
	South Pacific Work Scheme	1977	Development (unskilled labour shortages) but has environment logic
	Tonga Work Permit	1976-1977	Development (unskilled labour shortages) but has environment logic
	Western Samoa Work Permit	1976-1977	Development (unskilled labour shortages) but has environment logic
	Sky’s the Limit Programme	2014	Development and environment

10.3 Fear of Loss

Pacific communities at risk of permanent migration and displacement fear the loss of their identity, culture, and sovereignty: land and ocean shape cultural values, spiritual connections, and livelihoods. The land has distinct histories, "chants or songs", and embodied traditions (Kathy Jetil-Kijner, virtual event, 19.10.2020). People are deeply connected to their ancestral land, a relationship encapsulated in the term *vanua* in Fiji, *fanua* in Samoa, *fenua* in Tuvalu, and *whenua* in New Zealand (Farbotko et al., 2018; Gharbaoui & Blocher, 2018; Oakes, 2019). Each island has traditional governance systems, overseeing community issues such as relocations, disaster response, and development. The ocean connects islands, enabling interactions in a discrete space where identities and relationships are negotiated and reconstructed (Tammy Tabe, virtual event, 21.01.2021). These relationships and ways of acting are institutionalised. For example, Tuvaluan identity documents state island affiliations and require proof of community contribution. The Fijian government recently reinstated the Great Council of Chiefs, overseeing iTaukei affairs.

Cross-border movements threaten Pacific Islanders' sense of being in three ways. First, destination countries expect new immigrants to "assimilate" and "act like them", which sometimes means forgoing certain sociocultural customs (John Campbell, interview, 30.10.2019). Second, traditional governance cannot be transplanted in a new location. The Pacific diaspora has recreated systems mirroring the traditional setting, but core decisions are made in origin countries. Tuvalu's Simalua Enele (interview, 27.11.2020) explained:

"We have a Falekaupule system[28] … A Tuvaluan life is considered of working and community obligations … If we move to Australia or Fiji, where will we have those obligations? You're talking about taking an entire civilisation from 2000 years of tradition, putting it in the middle of nowhere and expecting it to thrive. We'll be lost and not end up being Tuvaluan ... A lot of decisions are [still] made in the traditional setting."

Third, coastal erosion and resulting depopulation raise sovereignty questions. According to the Montevideo Convention (1993), a nation-state must have a permanent population, government, defined territory, and the capacity to engage in international relations. In atoll nations, climate change is contracting territorial boundaries, compelling households to consider permanent

[28] The traditional assembly of elders. They gather to resolve pressing local issues.

emigration. Initially, Australian policy elites suggested Kiribati and Tuvalu become compact states or exchange Australian citizenship for their economic exclusive zones (Blaxland, 2020). These ideas ignited fears of neo-colonialism. Tuvalu's Opposition Party Leader Enele Sopoaga (virtual event, 19.10.2020) said, "let's talk about Small Islands States being absorbed by Australia, which was made by a former Prime Minister. This is unacceptable! We'll never be colonised again or treated as neo-colonial subjects. We achieved our independence. We will remain on our territory and maintain our sovereignty and cultural identity forever".

The helpless victim narrative heightens the fear of loss. The international media and researchers use vivid images to portray Pacific Islanders as "climate refugees in waiting" (McNamara & Gibson, 2009, p. 482; Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015). For instance, the BCC filmed a climate change documentary in Tuvalu showing "spring tides flying over roads [and] flooding pig pens", despite being told it is a common occurrence (Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019). This is because "it's more exciting to say the islands will submerge, and people will mass migrate" (Anote Tong, virtual event, 19.10.2020). The images show the "human face" of climate adversities (McMichael et al., 2018, p. 300) but also imply Pacific Islanders will become "humanitarian caseloads" (Walter Kalin, interview, 04.06.2019), "parasites", and a "burden" on destination countries (John Corcoran, interview, 12.12.2019). The refugee term has a lot of "baggage" (Simon Bradshaw, interview, 04.06.2019): refugees are perceived as illegal entrants, misusing social security and welfare provisions, and threatening the security of host communities (Anote Tong, Melbourne, 22.10.2018). Hence, they are often ill-treated, and blamed for pre-existing problems such as vandalism, housing crisis, and terrorism. In addition, the refugee term also creates a sense of dependency. Pacific Islanders are "expected to be self-sufficient": men must be able to support their households and hence rely on natural resources, migration, and education to improve their living standards (John Corcoran, interview, 12.12.2019). However, refugees need financial and sociocultural assistance to rebuild their lives in a new place. Becoming a 'refugee' generates a fear of losing their self-sufficiency, especially among Pacific men.

Pacific communities use religion to cope with the fear of loss. The Christian doctrine of Noah's Ark rationalises the causes and implications of environmental adversities. Some Pacific Islanders believe climate change is a punishment for the immoral behaviour of Western nations (Bertana, 2020). Although they face the brunt of these actions, the covenant will protect them from rising sea levels (Mortreux & Barnett, 2009; Shen & Binns, 2012). This "quaint but

pervasive idea" (Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019) is facilitating voluntary immobility, especially in Kiribati and Tuvalu (Anote Tong, Melbourne, 15.10.2019; Oakes, 2019). Other Pacific Islanders believe a rereading of the doctrine can justify the adoption of alternatives. The act of experts suggesting relocation and migration as a "sign from God" indicates that if well-planned, communities can lead a better life in a new place (Frances Namoumou, interview, 31.10.2019). This emerging view challenges the dominant belief system and has only shaped community relocation decisions in Fiji.

The fear of loss impacted policy adoption in atoll nations in several different ways. The rejection of the 'climate refugee' label immobilised refugee protection as a strategy for safeguarding the human rights of environmentally displaced persons. Instead, the Kiribati government merged ideas of self-sufficiency and labour migration to formulate its notion of migration with dignity (John Corcoran, interview, 12.12.2019). The Pope endorsed the policy, enabling community acceptance and engagement (Anote Tong, 15.10.2018). Contrastingly, the Tuvaluan government began exploring humanitarian protection measures. It initiated the process of establishing an international protection framework, digitised government services, and secured maritime borders to maintain its statehood and recently agreed to a special mobility pathway (GoT, 2020c, n.d.; McAdam, 2023; Simalua Enele, interview, 27.11.2020; UNGA, 2018a, 2019).

10.4 Institutional Bottlenecks

Institutional bottlenecks offer insights into boundary permeability, defined as the ability of formal organisations, norms, and venues to change established ideologies, routines, and habits in response to new shocks and information. Regional agencies, policies, and forums dedicated to cross-border population movements recognise issue linkages, but environmental stressors are absent from the agendas. This section discusses why language on adaptation and resilience is absent from labour migration programmes and why standalone humanitarian protection measures are non-existent in the Pacific.

10.4.1 Internal Organisational Silos

Environmental migration and displacement is a cross-cutting regulation issue that requires multi-scalar and multi-sectoral cooperation and collaboration. Despite recent efforts to build synergies, internal silos persist in organisations and venues. Senior management and member

states do not perceive environmental migration and displacement as a priority, and different institutional logic shapes policy venues.

Donor agencies have different funding streams for development, environment, and humanitarian activities (Koko Warner, interview, 22.08.2019). The Green Climate Fund separates development and environment activities. SIDS have been saying, "they're the same thing. How can we develop our countries without factoring that our seawalls are eroding, villages are being displaced … [and] when there's a hurricane, so much of our GDP goes? This is part of our development journey" (Nazhat Shameem Khan, interview, 13.08.2019). Regional donors separate activities between development and humanitarian funding. The EU Pacific Office, GIZ, IOM, and MFAT fund relocation and migration activities as development projects, but protection work as humanitarian initiatives. The long-term development funding contributed to the formulation of Fiji and Solomon Islands' planned relocation guidelines, Vanuatu's displacement policy, and a review of Australia and New Zealand's seasonal migration programmes. However, limited short-term funding immobilised humanitarian protection measures in the Pacific.

Some UN and Pacific bureaus' work on environmental migration and displacement is fragmented, limited or unrecognised. As Chapter 6 discussed, PIFS retreated from the policy space because it was not recognised as a political and hence an institutional priority (Scott Hook, interview, 01.11.2019; Timothy Westbury, interview, 17.10.2019). Currently, its activities are divided into climate change and resilience, conflict prevention, and labour mobility workstreams. Similarly, OHCHR's work on climate change falls within the development pillar while population movements fall within the non-discrimination pillar (OHCHR Representative, interview, 06.08.2019). The UNESCAP Pacific Office struggled to elevate the issue internally because the "Bangkok Office doesn't have a very good understanding of what's going on here – the architecture and priorities of the Pacific. It's almost like a patronising and ignorant view of the Pacific's needs" (Timothy Westbury, interview, 07.10.2019). In these agencies, the senior management had different interests and limited awareness of member states' priorities, resources, and capabilities. Consequently, they did not accept labour migration and humanitarian protection as environmental migration and displacement management norms until recently.

The UNHRC and UNSC dialogues on environment-induced population movements are superficial. As Chapter 8 elaborated, the Councils are convening discussions on human rights

and security implications of the phenomenon while the Human Rights Committee ruled that environmental stressors will trigger non-refoulement obligations in the absence of climate action. However, powerful member states, namely China, India, and Russia, are reluctant to discuss climate change issues in both arenas because it often leads to conversations on common but differentiated responsibilities and compensation (Robyn-Ann Mani, interview, 26.07.2019). They claim that the UNFCCC is the appropriate venue to discuss such matters (Nazhat Shameem Khan, interview, 13.08.2019; SRC, 2021, 2022). In addition, the UNHRC's human rights logic grants states an equal opportunity to raise concerns because each state has equal voting power. For this reason, it is a "difficult" forum – states "finger point", blame, and shame those not mitigating their greenhouse gas emissions, failing to provide regular migration pathways, and not protecting displaced persons (Field Notes, 26.06.2019; Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019). The Council also has "no teeth" to hold states accountable for their injustices, including repatriating displaced persons (Field Notes, 22.07.2019). As a result, the environment-displacement-protection linkage is not strong in the UNHRC and UNSC.

Environmental migration has remained off the PLMAM agenda. PLMAM is an "operational and practical" forum mandated to foster regional cooperation on labour migration (Timothy Bryar interview, 17.10.2019). Its activities are shaped by the development logic – temporary labour programmes can maximise economic benefits (PPIU, 2024). As Chapter 5 elucidated, efforts to anchor environmental stressors on the PLMAM agenda have been futile. PIFS Timothy Bryar (interview, 17.10.2019) attributes this failure to minor variations in logic:

> "It [climate change] has never been a major issue [at the PLMAM]. They're two different issues. We have labour migration schemes with Australia and New Zealand, which are about economic and skill development. It's not linked to climate change. When people talk about climate change and human mobility, they normally mean people must permanently move. The schemes with Australia and New Zealand are about temporary movement – you work, send money, and go back. So, the link with climate change isn't strong … If we addressed it under the labour migration programme, it would create confusion because it has different objectives and mechanisms. Sometimes when there is one word in common and you try to link things, it creates confusion."

PLMAM members understand labour migration and environmental migration as separate issues. Although the latter is also shaped by the development logic, it requires *permanent* labour programmes. In addition, linking environmental stressors to labour migration creates

confusion, which may hinder regional cooperation on an already complex and contentious issue, thereby undermining the purpose of the PLMAM. Hence, labour migration failed to institutionalise into an environmental migration management 'best practice' in this regional venue.

Governments sometimes *strategically* ignore the environment-population movement linkage. Pacific policymakers have "competing priorities and scarce resources" (Andrew McElroy, interview, 02.12.2019). Priorities such as domestic abuse, graduate unemployment, and non-communicable diseases "aren't necessarily compatible" with notions of adaptation, population movements, and resilience (Senior Researcher, interview, 21.06.2019). For instance, studies show negative health outcomes of migration: the departure of medical professionals reduces the quality of healthcare services in the origin countries (Connell, 2004, 2010), new migrants face "diseases of modernisation" (Fitzpatrick-Nietschmann, 1983, p. 851), and remittances increase dependency on imported food items with low nutritional value (Savage et al., 2020). Hence, Tuvalu did not want to "muddy" climate change with disasters and population movements in the FRDP (Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019).

Some Pacific policymakers experience "cognitive dissonance" when advocating climate resilience despite knowing their populations are highly susceptible to environmental displacement (Senior Researcher, interview, 21.06.2019). Kiribati, Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu lobbied for the Loss and Damage Fund and are securing finance for coastal protection, infrastructure, and land reclamation projects (Field Notes, 12.11.2022, 17.11.2022). Tuvalu is also tabling a resolution on protecting environmentally displaced persons (UNGA, 2016a, 2018a). At the same time, Tropical Cyclone Pam consumed a Tuvaluan islet, and the Marshall Islands lost 1.5 acres of land to encroaching seas (Anote Tong, Melbourne, 22.10.2018; Field Notes, 08.11.2022; Cissé et al., 2022). Families are moving internally and participating in existing programmes (Milan et al., 2016; Oakes et al., 2016). This cognitive dissonance shaped Tuvalu's decision to remove climate change language from the Labour Migration Policy. Simalua Enele (interview, 27.11.2020) explained:

> "I was told from above to stop the [Labour Migration] policy because it contradicts what we're saying at the UNFCCC. The Climate Change Department was mad at us. They came to my office and said, 'Can you please not publish it?' … The Prime Minister [also] said, 'We're not saying this.' We had to take many things out because it would affect the [UNGA] resolution. We're telling people that we don't want to be displaced but [also]

telling them we're going to migrate because of climate change. If I were a donor, why would I give you money for coastal protection and save Tuvalu when you're going to migrate?"

10.4.2 Policy Fatigue and Inter-Organisational Tensions

An overcrowded institutional landscape initially caused low-level inter-organisational tensions and duplication of multi-initiatives, which heightened policy fatigue. As Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrated, approximately 40 actors are trying to establish environmental migration and displacement governance in the Pacific. The main mechanism for doing so has been multi-initiatives. Each agency designed a standalone initiative, which they sometimes used to gain legitimacy as the leading authority on the issue area or make their presence felt in the region (e.g., IOM and OHCHR) (PIFS Climate Resilience Secretariat Coordinator, interview, 20.02.2020).

The multi-initiatives are similar in design and objectives. The GPHMCCC, PCCMHS, and PRDD programmes used different conceptual lenses and focused on different types of movements. However, they aimed to develop a regional framework, review existing schemes, formulate standalone domestic policies, build government capacities, and gather community perspectives and 'good practices.' This duplication caused policy fatigue. Governments are already overburdened by existing policies, most of which are unimplemented due to scarce resources (PIFS Regional Security Advisor, interview, 20.02.2020). For example, the GIZ, IOM, and World Bank-financed planned relocation guidelines and labour migration policies have not yet been operationalised.

In addition, some initiatives did not reflect shifts in Pacific realities, were not endorsed by other organisations, and implementing partners encroached on each other's mandates. The PCCMHS programme is an example of this. The previous Kiribati administration's migration with dignity policy shaped its objective to promote labour migration as an adaptation strategy (Sabira Coelho, interview, 29.09.2019). At the programme launch, the current administration ignored the objective and only welcomed labour migration's development benefits (Field Notes, 26.03.2019). The OHCHR Pacific Office and UNESCAP Pacific Office "had a bit of a fight" over who would lead the TWG-HM – the former has a human rights mandate while the latter has political leverage (Timothy Westbury, interview, 07.10.2019). Both were critical for establishing an institutional structure to draft the PRFCM. IOM assigned itself tasks on

seasonal programmes and workers' rights, resulting in the ILO Pacific Office and OHCHR Pacific Office reiterating their mandates and responsibilities (Field Notes, 17.08.2019). The UN Resident Coordinator did not understand how the PCCMHS programme could synergise with its Pacific Climate Security project (Timothy Westbury, interview, 07.10.2019). Such low-level inter-organisational tensions posed the risk of agencies driving their mandates into regional policy processes (PIFS Climate Resilience Secretariat Coordinator, interview, 20.02.2020).

Human mobility optimists banded together to cooperate on the issue area. ILO and IOM partnered on labour migration governance while GIZ, IOM, and PDD signed an agreement on environmental migration and displacement governance (Gabor Sasvari, interview, 17.10.2019; Piper & Foley, 2021). PIFS adopted the role of coordinator, managing various partner activities. Greater cooperation helped institutionalise the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage in the Pacific in 2023.

10.4.3 Absent Institutional Infrastructure and Champions

Institutional infrastructure and champions promulgating the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage are absent in the Pacific. Dedicated organisations and venues on the issue area are critical for affecting state behaviour in terms of facilitating cooperation and overseeing policy processes. So far, PIDC and PIFS have facilitated policy dialogues in existing forums (e.g., the 2018 PIDC Annual Meeting) or fleeting arenas (e.g., the 2016 Regional Meeting on Climate Change and Migration). Integrating the issue into existing infrastructure has started to disintegrate siloed thinking and acting, but "everyone's business can be no one's business" (Dina Ionesco, virtual event, 09.12.2020). This means that ministries recognise their role in managing environmental migration and displacement but assume another department will take the lead, thereby delaying policy implementation.

Similarly, no regional organisations and venues mobilise humanitarian protection measures as environmental displacement management 'best practices.' Chapter 6 discussed that in the absence of UNHCR, the OHCHR Pacific Office supports asylum seekers. However, resource and capacity constraints mean its assistance is limited to offering communication services and redirecting them to NGOs. Despite the scope to increase PIDC's engagement in the issue area, its activities focus on addressing human trafficking and irregular migration. At the same time, destination and origin states are unwilling to develop safeguards for environmentally displaced

Pacific Islanders. Kiribati and Tuvalu have yet to accept Fiji and Vanuatu's relocation offers (Simalua Enele, interview, 27.11.2020; Yogesh Karan, interview, 07.12.2018). Even though Australia and New Zealand are considering special humanitarian pathways, they prefer to assist atoll nations by keeping communities where they are (GoA, 2023; Nathan Ross, interview, 22.01.2020; Smith & McNamara, 2015). A dedicated institutional infrastructure could enable dialogues on environmental displacement management.

In addition, the Pacific lost labour migration and humanitarian protection champions to national elections. Chapter 6 depicted previous Kiribati and Tuvalu leaders as internal entrepreneurs, who sensitised ministries and communities to policies regulating cross-border movements. However, political shifts ousted them from power. In Tuvalu, "island loyalties" shape policy endorsements (Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019). Because kin affiliations are critical for garnering political support, leaders' views must resonate with community perspectives. Between 2010 and 2016, the Noah's Ark doctrine was prevalent among the elderly (Mortreux & Barnett, 2009; Oakes, 2019). The former leaders – Willy Telavi and Enele Sopoaga – did not overtly espouse migration. However, under Willy Telavi's leadership, Tuvalu formulated a climate change policy that called for an international framework to resettle and recognise Tuvalu as a sovereign state within another country and a special environmental migration arrangement (GoT, 2012; Smith & McNamara, 2015). Under Enele Sopoaga's leadership, it began preparing the international protection framework and created the SLP (UNGA, 2016a, 2018a, 2019). Perhaps because their actions did not align with community views at the time, both leaders were ousted.

Similarly, former President Anote Tong was ousted during the 2015/2016 elections. He was accused of being "too outward-focused": he used science to stress the inevitable cross-border relocation of I-Kiribati people and championed the notion of migration with dignity across various international forums (Kosi Latu, interview, 26.11.2019; Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019; Timothy Westbury, interview 07.10.2019). Current President Taneti Maamau discredited him by saying, "hey, the former President says you'll have to move. We're here to make sure you can stay where you are …" (Simon Bradshaw, interview, 04.06.2019). Adopting a faith-based approach, he promised to foster economic growth and in situ adaptation through an expansion of the fishing and tourism industries and land reclamation. Elements of dignified migration are encapsulated in the Labour Migration Policy, which is still in effect, but labour migration is perceived as a pathway for decent employment (Farbotko et al., 2018; GoK, 2016).

10.4.4 Restrictive Programme Designs and Conflicting Norms

The labour migration programmes are not designed to manage environmental migration in the Pacific. The temporary programmes target workers from rural areas with limited access to cash income and operate during the cyclone season, whereas the permanent programmes have allocated spaces for I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan residents (Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019). Diaspora engagement and complementary initiatives can augment adaptive capacities and resilience.

However, economic development logic shapes the programmes. Australian and New Zealand policymakers used a cost-benefit analysis to determine the value of each programme. This analysis entailed assessing the local workforce, labour demand (i.e., how many migrants and at what skill levels), and the costs of transplanting Pacific workers (Michelle Leighton, interview, 21.08.2019). Economic development logic leads to highly regulated programmes in terms of desirable migrant characteristics, duration of stay, family accompaniment, and working rights. Consequently, workers and destination and origin countries face new challenges, making the programmes "unsustainable" for environmental migration management (ILO Representative 2, interview, 17.07.2019; Timothy Bryar, interview, 17.10.2019).

The temporary programmes are restrictive in many ways. First, they are biased towards able-bodied men (Sabira Coelho, Sydney, 31.10.2018; Timothy Westbury, interview, 07.10.2019). Australia and New Zealand have strategies to improve the inclusion of marginalised groups and women's participation has increased in recent years (Bedford, 2013; Bedford & Bedford, 2023). However, employers and hire companies need individuals who can perform manual labour (Ash & Campbell, 2016; Bedford, Nunns, et al., 2020; Curtain & Howes, 2022b). Village chiefs prefer to send men for overseas work while women stay back, fulfilling sociocultural obligations such as looking after the gardens and livestock (Bailey, 2019). Factors such as women's safety working overseas in men-dominated teams, limited access to information, and complex recruitment procedures also hinder their participation (Ball et al., 2015; Petrou et al., 2023). Thus, women and disabled persons are the most vulnerable to environmental stressors but have limited access to temporary programmes (Fong, 2022).

Second, the programmes target unskilled and semi-skilled workers who are susceptible to abuse, exploitation, and mistreatment. Recent reports revealed Pacific workers' poor living

and working conditions: they were treated as slaves, underpaid and unfairly terminated, worked long hours, did not have access to food and medical care, lived in cramped quarters, and received death threats from employers (Dziedzic et al., 2021; Hermant, 2020; ILO, 2019; Mudaliar & Voigt-Graf, 2022; Tamer, 2022). Deteriorating environmental conditions can aggravate such situations whereby lower productivity and remittances compel Pacific Islanders to work longer hours (Voigt-Graf, 2022).

Third, the programmes do not allow family accompaniment. The Australian and New Zealand governments "want labour – people power for their industries [and] people working" not dependents and the elderly (Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019). Workers are separated from their partners and children, causing homesickness, excessive alcohol consumption, and marriage dissolutions. Their absence alters gender dynamics, whereby women assume traditionally male-dominated responsibilities, and creates gaps in community support that adversely impact disaster response efforts (Bedford, Bedford, et al., 2020; Voigt-Graf, 2022). In response to pressure from Development Policy Centre experts to allow immediate family members to join long-term SWP and PLS workers, Australia will pilot the family accompaniment visa in 2024 (Howes & Sharman, 2022b).

Fourth, the programmes are expensive. Employers cover upfront accommodation and transportation costs, which are deducted from workers' weekly wages (Ball, 2010). I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan workers face higher costs because they have to travel through Nadi or Brisbane to reach their place of employment (John Corcoran, interview 12.12.2019; Simalua Enele interview, 21.11.2020). John Campbell (interview, 30.10.2019) claimed, "people migrating because of climate change should be compensated … [If] I left my village because I could no longer have a sustainable livelihood, surely some of the flying and accommodation costs should be covered". The international community established the Loss and Damage Fund at the 28th COP to UNFCCC that may cover displacement, relocation, and migration costs (UNFCCC, 2023). However, the fund's purpose is to avert, minimise, and address forced movements. Framing labour migration as a loss and damage issue may restrict regular and voluntary movements.

Finally, the programmes have a "forced dimension" and variable benefits (Richard Bedford, interview, 04.05.2019). The RSE and SWP operate for nine months while PLS runs for four years. The RSE is a single-entry visa while SWP and PLS permit multiple entries. Although programmes allow for repeat migration, all workers must return home before applying for

new visas. Remittances fluctuate in response to rising living costs in destination countries, job changes, family expansions, intermarriages, and younger generations no longer feeling obliged to support relatives in the islands (Campbell, 2023; John Campbell, interview, 30.10.2019). I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans may not be able to return home, and remittances may not prevent uninhabitability.

The temporary programmes cause detrimental brain gain. The Australian and New Zealand governments offer upskilling opportunities through Add-on Skills Training and the Vakamesina initiative (Bedford, Nunns, et al., 2020; SWP, 2021). Labour migration supporters stressed returning workers gain skills – including time management, grafting, spacing, netting, and packing – useful for fostering development and building resilience (Dun et al., 2018; Dun et al., 2022). Pacific policymakers claimed these skills are not always transferable. Simalua Enele (interview, 27.11.2020) said, "if you're coming here [to New Zealand] to pick apples and oranges, you can't use those skills in Tuvalu because we don't have apples, only coconuts … If they come back, they'll be idle". Non-transferable skills heighten unemployability, minimising returnees' ability to gather resources to withstand the impacts of environmental stressors.

Additionally, unregulated recruitment practices cause brain drain (John Corcoran, interview, 12.12.2019; McNamara, 2015; Sabira Coelho, Sydney, 31.10.2018). Labour migration supporters "rubbished" claims of the programmes cherry-picking the best and brightest and leaving behind those with lower education levels to govern the country (Anote Tong, interview, 14.04.2023; Rimon, 2022). They argued that unskilled and semi-skilled youths are migrating, who would have otherwise been unemployed. Fijian, Samoan, and Ni-Vanuatu policymakers expressed frustrations about the programmes depleting their skilled workforce. Employers and hiring companies use social networks to recruit trusted and recommended workers, who may not necessarily be unskilled (Burgess & Voloder, 2022; Curtain, 2022b; Melesia, 2023). Brain drain threatens to convert the Pacific into an upskilling outpost whereby financial resources are lost to maintaining training facilities and educating new cohorts. This can debilitate the resilience capacity of some sectors and countries.

Furthermore, vulnerability to environmental stressors varies across the Pacific (PIFS Regional Security Advisor, interview, 20.02.2020). Although all states are projected to reach their adaptation limits by 2100 or sooner, atoll nations are at a higher risk of displacement (Cissé et al., 2022). Higher-island states have habitable land and can use remittances to finance

internal community relocations (Dun et al., 2022). Low-lying countries have limited higher ground – most of the territory is only a few metres above sea level and frequent king tides inundate villages, eroding community resilience and inducing households to permanently migrate (Campbell, 2022).

Similarly, the permanent programmes are restrictive by design. The PAC is misquoted as a 'model' for addressing environmental vulnerabilities or a protection measure (Adger & Barnett, 2005; Tabucanon, 2012; White House, 2021). John Campbell (interview, 30.10.2019) attributes this to New Zealand's former leader, Helen Clarke:

> "She said, 'We do have a policy for climate change migration.' She was talking about the PAC. She very quickly rescinded that statement. She only ever said it once and I think her officials told her, 'No, no, no' because once you open that door then the number of people who want to come into the country using that as a rationale would increase."

The PAC is not a humanitarian visa (Shen & Gemenne, 2011). It has small quotas, and the demand exceeds supply (Akka Rimon, interview, 30.11.2022; Curtain & Howes, 2022c). It operates on a ballot system and entry requires a job offer, meaning vulnerable families may not be invited to apply for permanent residency.

Diaspora engagement and complementary initiatives also have limitations. The diaspora communities' composition and internal dynamics affect how they mobilise during disasters and perceive investment at home in terms of in situ adaptation. Rae Bainteiti (interview, 13.10.2020) explained, "I know Fijians are very proactive – when there is a disaster, they do a lot of appealing and donate back … They have strong associations [linked to] different provinces. When they live elsewhere, they maintain those associations and connect to those in Fiji". This may suggest that diaspora assistance is directed to certain provinces while non-migrant or ethnic families wait for government aid. Financial literacy training can help households make informed decisions about expenditure but "remittances are private money, and it's recipients' prerogative to use it as they wish" (ILO Representative 2, interview, 17.07.2019).

Likewise, international humanitarian and human rights laws may be at odds with traditional laws. Fiji and Vanuatu offered refuge to I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans fleeing climate adversities (Farbotko et al., 2018; Field Notes, 26.11.2019; Yogesh Karan, interview, 07.12.2018).

International refugee and human rights laws prioritise individuals, granting them special entitlements for re-establishing their livelihoods in destination countries. Fijian and Ni-Vanuatu laws prioritise the indigenous community, whereby they instituted a Council of Chiefs and legal mechanisms to safeguard their right to land and fishing areas. Kinship determines ownership of land and fishing areas – neither can be bought or sold. Governments will have to negotiate access with traditional owners before resettling I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans. Yet, history shows past agreements are contested and curtail the rights of the ethnic or indigenous population. In Fiji, Banabans are in dispute with owners of fishing grounds while Indians faced displacement following lease expiration (Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, interview, 04.11.2019; FCOSS Representative, interview, 19.11.2019). In New Zealand, the government aims to uphold Pacific communities' right to self-determination and sovereignty but has yet to consult the Māori on how environmental resettlement will affect the Treaty of Waitangi (Nathan Ross, interview, 22.10.2020).

10.5 Broad Terminology and Unsubstantiated Issue Linkages

Human mobility optimists formulated broad terminologies to capture the various descriptions of environmental migration and displacement. Professional experts and Pacific policymakers use diverse terms, each reflecting specific rationalities and assumptions about the type of movement and viable policy responses. UNFCCC uses the three institutionalised typologies in which planned relocation and migration are portrayed as solutions for addressing displacement (CAF, 2010). IDMC, NRC, PDD, and UNDRR use disaster displacement to emphasise that individuals exposed or vulnerable to hazards involuntarily leave their homes (Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015; Sendai Framework, 2015; UNDRR, 2019). PICAN, USP PaCE-SD, and Pacific policymakers use climate displacement to stress anthropogenic change is forcing Pacific Islanders off their ancestral homelands, and they should be compensated for their losses and damages (Elisabeth Holland, interview, 21.11.2019; Genevieve Jiva, interview, 21.11.2019; Nazhat Shameem Khan, interview, 26.07.2019).

Optimists formulated two all-encompassing terms to capture this terminological diversity and simplify a complex phenomenon. IOM (2007) introduced environmental migration, defined as people moving within or across borders in response to slow- or sudden-onset events either temporarily or permanently. However, the phrase migration is perceived as a voluntary movement and "depoliticises causes of displacement" (Gemenne, 2023, p. 188), thereby allowing countries to rationalise restrictive policies (Geddes et al., 2012). The Nansen Initiative

and TfD offered human mobility as an alternative umbrella term, which streamlines the three institutionalised typologies (Isabelle Michal, interview, 11.12.2018; Koko Warner, interview, 02.08.2019).

However, all-encompassing concepts unravel at the national level, sometimes stalling policy processes and leading to unexpected outcomes. IOM Fiji's Sabira Coelho (interview, 26.09.2019) shared the challenge of explaining such terms to Tongan officials:

> "It [environmental migration] can be so broad. I described it a few weeks ago when I was in Tonga. Colleagues around the table said, 'Woah, that's everything.' I'm sitting there saying, 'That's [environmental] migration.' The challenge is how to put a box around what you're talking about and be very specific in the interventions you want."

Broad concepts do not always align with ministerial mandates. Mandates vary significantly in terms of logic, definitions, and responsibilities. Arriving at a common context-specific definition that resonates with all ministries is time-consuming. However, the combination of broad definitions with narrow mandates can produce unexpected policy outcomes. In Tonga, aspects of environmental migration were enveloped in a standalone Sustainable Development and Migration Policy, which seeks to integrate the issue into existing strategies and maximise the benefits of diaspora communities for disaster response and recovery (GoT, 2020b).

At the same time, issue linkages are unsubstantiated. Labour migration supporters do not have strong evidence validating the environment-migration-adaptation (or resilience) linkage (ILO Representative 2, 17.07.2019; Timothy Westbury, interview, 07.10.2019). According to a senior researcher (interview, 26.06.2019), "it's difficult to test movement related to the environment, and whether the movement has positive outcomes for various sectors of the society". Environmental migration and displacement is a multi-causal phenomenon and experts lack methods and models for establishing the correlation (Black et al., 2011; Geddes et al., 2012). Relatedly, information on migrant worker characteristics, migration pathways, and how climate displacement affects employment is limited (ILO Representative 2, interview, 17.07.2019; Michelle Leighton, interview, 21.08.2019). Such information is instrumental in identifying households without access to labour migration programmes that need government assistance, especially during disasters. It also enables destination and origin countries to have a "balanced and responsible" policy conversation (Michelle Leighton, interview, 21.08.2019).

Additionally, Pacific Islanders perceive labour migration as a development strategy, not a way of adapting and building resilience. According to SPREP's Kosi Latu (interview, 26.11.2019), "I don't think people going to Australia and New Zealand on the labour migration do it as a form of adaptation … In the first instance, it's about improving their economic opportunities and families' livelihoods". Development, adaptation, and resilience have similar theoretical underpinnings in that actors' access to resources shapes their capacity to withstand environmental stressors (Dodman et al., 2009; Cissé et al., 2022; McDonnell, 2019). However, tipping points vary. The environment has a physical tipping point, defined as irreversible changes to the ecosystem (e.g., salinisation of soil and freshwater lenses). Communities have social tipping points, defined as permanent alterations in social systems (Juhola et al., 2022; Milkoreit, 2023). While labour migration provides money and skills to adjust household thresholds, the environment may reach its limits sooner and displace families (McLeman, 2018; Zickgraf, 2021). In this context, labour migration may not be perceived as an adaptation or resilience-building solution.

Furthermore, existing data that validates the migration-adaptation (or resilience) linkage primarily focuses on migrant workers' aspirations and experiences. A body of research shows Pacific workers invest in the islands to build socioeconomic resilience with the view of remaining in their ancestral homelands (Bailey, 2019, 2023; Dun et al., 2022; Dun et al., 2018; Farbotko, Kitara, et al., 2022). While this is true, it is unclear whether non-migrant family members have the same goals. Relatedly, it appears these studies "blindly apply the New Economics of Labour Migration Theory", sometimes conflating development outcomes of temporary programmes with adaptation and resilience that rarely considers vulnerability variations (Caroline Zickgraf, virtual event, 16.09.2020). Consequently, it is unclear how power conflicts and remittances impact household social tipping points.

Similarly, humanitarian protectionists lack evidence substantiating the environment-statelessness-protection linkage. Some experts assume low-lying states will submerge or become uninhabitable, rendering their populations stateless (Erica Bower, interview, 10.12.2019; IPCC, 2007; John Corcoran, interview, 12.12.2019; Kosi Latu, interview, 26.11.2019; McAdam, 2012; Park, 2011; UNHCR et al., 2009). Yet, the notion of statelessness is not supported by the geography of atoll states and the natural processes of island formation. Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Tokelau, and Tuvalu have higher land, albeit it is unsuitable for relocations: Banaba is 87 metres, Likiep is 10 metres, Common Ridge is 65 metres, Na

Taulaga is 5 metres, and Niulakita is 4.6 metres above sea level. A small body of research found some territories were expanding – for example, Tuvalu's land area has grown since 1971 (Duvat, 2019; Holdaway et al., 2021; Kench et al., 2018). Thus, it is unlikely the territory will fully disappear.

Since the environment-migration-adaptation (or resilience) linkage is unsubstantiated, most labour export policies do not explicitly mention environmental stressors and the adaptive or resilience-building potential of labour migration.[29] The unsubstantiated environment-statelessness-protection linkage immobilised humanitarian solutions in the Pacific.

10.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter argues that local conditions shaped the adoption, adaptation, and localisation of certain 'best practices,' producing distinct environmental migration and displacement management policies across the Pacific. It shows that governments endorsed development-friendly approaches. High-island countries – Fiji, Carteret Islands, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu – formulated planned relocation guidelines. Some governments partially integrated the issue into labour export policies: Fiji, Kiribati, and Tuvalu's policies mentioned climate change as a driver of labour migration while Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu's policies briefly noted the cultural preservation, resilience-building, and recovery potential of labour migration. Others omitted the issue from labour import programmes or formulated standalone policies. Australia and New Zealand's programmes prioritise generating triple wins and achieving foreign policy goals, not environmental migration. Tonga developed a separate migration policy that recognises the importance of diaspora engagement. Kiribati co-produced the KANI, and its elements of overseas upskilling and employment were incorporated into the Labour Migration Policy. Contrastingly, only Tuvalu adopted humanitarian approaches, specifically establishing a legally binding international protection mechanism for environmentally displaced persons.

As shown in Table 10.3, four local factors explain these variations in the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage. First, historical precedents of planned

[29] Fiji, Kiribati, and Tuvalu's policies mention climate change drives labour migration. Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu's policies mention labour migration builds community resilience, aids with disaster recovery, and is important for cultural survival. The partial recognition of the environment-migration-adaptation (or resilience) linkage can be attributed to activating events and fear of loss.

relocation and labour migration exemplified the regional mobility culture. Although Pacific communities traditionally used resettlement to manage displacement risks, the lack of expertise meant that policymakers had to engage in different methods of policy learning. Fiji experimented with the state-led Vunidogoloa scheme. The Carterets drew lessons from the failed Buka and Kuveria initiatives. The Solomon Islands observed policy developments in Fiji and Vanuatu, and the Gilbertese, Koa Hill, Lisiliana, Ngongasila, and Walande relocations. Vanuatu can learn from the Lateau resettlement and the Maewo Second Home Project. While Pacific households used labour migration to cope with environment-induced economic shocks, the institutional conditions reflected a development logic. The success of past initiatives shaped New Zealand's RSE and PAC. Their positive outcomes induced Australia to emulate both programmes – the government replicated, piloted, and adjusted the designs to introduce the SWP, PLS, and PEV. Likewise, Kiribati had favourable policy conditions to adopt migration with dignity whereby the Seafaring Scheme shaped the KANI, and the notion of international upskilling and employment featured in the Labour Migration Policy. In sum, the culture of movement revealed that communities and households ideologically sanctioned development-friendly solutions, thereby facilitating their quick adoption.

Second, the fear of loss demonstrated the need for permanent migration pathways and protection mechanisms. Pacific Islanders' identity, culture, and sovereignty are tied to the land and ocean. The idea of permanently moving away from their home and becoming 'climate refugees' or helpless victims generates a fear of losing their sense of being. This includes abandoning cultural practices, place-based traditional governance systems, self-sufficiency, and compromising sovereignty. The rejection of the 'climate refugee' or helpless victim narrative immobilised refugee protection as a strategy for safeguarding the human rights of environmentally displaced persons in the Pacific. Kiribati adapted labour migration programmes and the local culture of self-sufficiency to formulate the notion of migration with dignity. Tuvalu began exploring humanitarian protection measures, including the international legally binding protection framework for environmentally displaced persons and the special mobility pathway. In sum, the fear of loss facilitated the quick translation of labour migration and humanitarian protection at the national level.

Third, institutional bottlenecks highlighted actors, venues, and policies have impermeable boundaries. Many organisations and venues have internal silos. Donors, member states, and senior management either do not or strategically ignore linkages between environmental

stressors, human mobility, and their mandates. This shaped superficial dialogues at the UNHRC and UNSC, kept the issue off the PLMAM agenda, and diluted the climate language in Tuvalu's Labour Migration Policy. Additionally, the overcrowded institutional landscape caused low-level inter-organisational tensions and duplication of multi-initiatives. Organisations encroached on mandates and ignored project synergies, posing a risk of pushing mandates into regional processes. Multi-initiative duplication caused policy fatigue whereby policy objectives overburdened governments that already lacked the capacity and resources to implement existing strategies. Moreover, the absence of champions and institutional infrastructure threatens the operationalisation of the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage. I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan internal entrepreneurs were ousted following the elections, leading to the abandonment of migration with dignity and the protection mechanism. The lack of dedicated institutions can stall bilateral dialogues on finding solutions for Pacific Islanders moving in response to environmental stressors. Furthermore, the restrictive designs of programmes and conflicting norms make them unconducive to the situation of I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans facing permanent environmental displacement risks. The temporary work programmes are restrictive in terms of migrant characteristics, duration of stay, family accompaniment, and working rights. They are causing detrimental brain gain and brain drain in Pacific countries, depleting their ability to build resilience. The permanent schemes have small quotas and operate as a ballot system, meaning the most vulnerable may never be invited to apply for permanent residency. International humanitarian and human rights laws may contradict traditional laws: the former grants individuals special entitlements to re-establish their livelihoods in destination countries while the latter safeguards the human rights of indigenous communities. In sum, institutional bottlenecks revealed that competition, economics, environmental vulnerabilities, and politics immobilised labour migration and humanitarian protection at multiple levels.

Finally, broad terminology and unsubstantiated linkages exemplified mutation of and resistance to policies regulating cross-border movements. Optimists introduced all-encompassing terms of environmental migration and human mobility that did not align with ministerial mandates. They refined and grafted these foreign concepts into local norms, constructing a similar-yet-different policy. In formulating Tonga's Sustainable Development and Migration Policy, policymakers abandoned the terms environment and labour from the title albeit the document explicitly notes the disaster rehabilitation potential of diasporas. In addition, the environment-migration-adaptation (or resilience) nexus is unsubstantiated.

Knowledge producers lack research methodologies and projection models. Pacific Islanders perceive the programmes as a development strategy, not a way of coping with environmental adversities. Existing data is biased towards migrant workers' aspirations and experiences and sometimes blindly applies migration theories to explain the linkage. Similarly, the environment-statelessness-protection linkage is unsubstantiated. Atoll nations have land higher than three metres but are unsuitable for internal relocations, and some territories have grown through the natural island formation processes. In sum, broad terminology and unsubstantiated issue linkages semi-mobilised labour migration but halted the spread of humanitarian protection at global and regional levels.

Table 10.3: The Impact of Local Conditions in Mobilising and Institutionalising the Environmental Migration and Displacement Management Assemblage.

Policy Response	Scale	Local Conditions			
		Historical Precedents	**Fear of Loss**	**Institutional Bottlenecks**	**Broad Terminology and Unsubstantiated Issue Linkages**
Planned Relocation	Global	Banaba, Carterets, Manam, Taro Vaitupu, and Vunidogoloa schemes	No impact	No impact	No impact
	Regional	Banaba and Vaitupu schemes	No impact	No impact	No impact
	National	Fiji: Vunidogoloa, Narikoso, Tukaraki, Waciwac District School, and Walia schemes Carteret Islands: Buka and Kuveria schemes Solomon Islands: Gilbertese, Koa Hill, Lisiliana, Nagongasila, Walande schemes, and Fiji and Vanuatu's guidelines Vanuatu: Lateau and Maewo Second Home Project	No impact	No impact	No impact
Labour Migration	Global	KANI, RSE, and PAC programmes	No impact	No impact	Unsubstantiated environment-migration-adaptation (or resilience) linkage
	Regional	No impact	No impact	Absent champions (Anote Tong and Enele Sopoaga), internal silos,	Unsubstantiated environment-migration-adaptation (or resilience) linkage

				inter-organisational tensions, and restrictive programme designs	
	National	KANI, Seafaring, and SLP programmes	Fear of losing identity and culture	Absent champions (Anote Tong and Enele Sopoaga), Internal silos, policy fatigue, and restrictive programme designs	Environmental migration
Humanitarian Protection	Global	No impact	Fear of losing sovereignty	No impact	No impact
	Regional	No impact	No impact	Absent institutional infrastructure and champions (Willy Telavi and Enele Sopoaga)	Unsubstantiated environment-statelessness-protection linkage
	National	No impact	No impact	Conflicting norms	No impact

Chapter 11: Conclusion

11.1 Introduction

How is the international community responding to environmental migration and displacement? World leaders have yet to establish a legally binding protection framework for people fleeing their homes in response to environmental stressors. IGO, NGO, and other specialists suggest governments amend existing measures or formulate standalone policies. In particular, they are circulating humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation as viable environmental mobility solutions. Some Pacific governments adopted these recommendations while others resisted conforming to them. For instance, Carteret Islands, Fiji, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu have developed planned relocation guidelines to facilitate internal movements as an anticipatory measure of last resort (GoF, 2018b; GoSI, 2022; GoV, 2018; Tuele Peisa, n.d.). Australia and New Zealand are considering amending existing labour migration programmes to effectively target environmentally susceptible countries. Kiribati and Tuvalu's labour migration policies promote upskilling and employment whereas Tonga's migration policy endorses diaspora engagement for resilience-building and disaster recovery (GoK, 2015; GoT, 2015b; GoT, 2020b). Australia introduced a special mobility pathway for Tuvaluans that could potentially provide a humanitarian avenue (McAdam, 2023). Tuvalu is tabling a UNGA Resolution on formulating a standalone protection framework for international environmentally displaced persons (UNGA, 2016a, 2018b, 2019).

Professional experts are touting some of these policies as environmental migration and displacement management 'models' and 'best practices.' For example, IDMC, IOM, NRC, and human rights experts labelled Fiji's guidelines as a monumental, holistic, and commendable 'good practice.' IOM, Oxfam Vanuatu, PIFS, and displacement professionals labelled Vanuatu's displacement policy as a progressive and successful blueprint for the Pacific. The Development Policy Centre, ILO, and the World Bank labelled New Zealand's RSE and PAC schemes as successful models and claimed Australia's SWP has the potential to achieve similar status. I-Kiribati specialists argue the Seafaring scheme and KANI are successful, robust, and effective 'best practices.' Further, ILO and UNESCAP listed Kiribati and Tuvalu's labour migration policies as 'good practices.'

This thesis aimed to explain these policy convergences and divergences. It asked: what factors explain variations in the level of institutionalisation of environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' in the Pacific? It does so by addressing five research sub-questions, which are:

1. What constitutes the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage?

2. How are key activating events mobilising policy actors to conform to certain 'models'?

3. Who are the key actors and what channels do they use to enable or constrain the flow of environmental mobility 'best practices'?

4. What sociocultural and political strategies (im)mobilise development-friendly and humanitarian approaches?

5. How do local conditions influence the adoption, adaptation, and localisation of development-friendly and humanitarian 'best practices' to produce distinct environmental migration and displacement policies in the Pacific?

This thesis argued that four factors enabled and constrained the flow of development-friendly and humanitarian 'best practices': activating events, institutional landscape, mobilising strategies, and local conditions.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 11.2 summarises the research findings, addressing each of the five research sub-questions. Section 11.3 discusses the research implications, specifically variations in the level of policy institutionalisation, the emergence of environmental mobility governance, and the reconfiguration of the Pacific identity. Section 11.4 elucidates how the findings contribute to scholarships on assemblages, governance, policy entrepreneurship, and policy mobilities. Finally, Section 11.5 outlines future research directions.

11.2 Research Findings

11.2.1 Q1: What constitutes the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage?

Chapter 4 described the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage. It constituted three policy assemblages: humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation. Each assemblage comprised certain actors, documents, and sites, which were bound together by specific development and humanitarian logic. The humanitarian protection assemblage constituted refugee, statelessness, complementary, and standalone safeguard measures. It was bound by the notion that international law failed to protect environmentally displaced persons, but actors disagreed on suitable measures to address the protection gap. They agreed the 1951 Refugee Convention did not apply to the situation. Some professional experts suggested formulating a standalone framework grounded in the 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework and 1985 CAT. UNHCR recommended using the 1984 Cartagena Declaration and 1964 OAU Convention to formulate regional protection instruments because they explicitly recognise events seriously disturbing public disorder and disasters as displacement triggers. IOM and UNHCR recommended using the Statelessness Convention, including purchasing or ceding land to larger states, becoming compact states or offering dual citizenship. IOM, Nansen Initiative/PDD, OHCHR, and UNHCR recommended using complementary protection under human rights law, including the 1985 CAT, 1985 ICCPR, and 2007 CAED, to safeguard people fleeing across borders in response to environmental adversities. These experts joined the IASC, GMG, and TfD to disseminate humanitarian protection during COP to UNFCCC, PIFS Sub-Committee on Region Security, UNGA, UNHRC, UNRMF, and UNSC events.

The labour migration assemblage constituted temporary work, upskilling, and permanent residency programmes. It was bound together by the notion that triple-wins build adaptive capacities and household resilience. The destination country logic emphasised that amending and expanding existing regional ‘models’ can help manage environmental migration, especially from atoll nations. Bedford Consulting, Development Policy Centre, ILO, IOM, Kaldor Centre, Lowy Institute, Nansen Initiative/PDD, OECD, the World Bank, UNESCAP, UNICEF, and UNCTAD hyped New Zealand’s RSE and PAC programmes as successful ‘models’ because they achieved their primary goal of fostering development, offering equal opportunities to migrant and domestic workers alike, and establishing a Pacific diaspora. ANU

and Development Policy Centre specialists claimed Australia's SWP and PLS have the potential of becoming 'models' because their benefits can also improve livelihoods. These experts argued that the original temporary worker 'model' – the RSE scheme – was shaped by environmental logic, has proven to be flexible during disasters, and already targets rural workers from Pacific countries facing acute environmental vulnerabilities. The permanent residency scheme has allocated spaces to atoll nations with limited emigration pathways. Hence, they recommended amending and expanding these existing regional 'models' to manage environmental migration. Contrastingly, the sending country logic stressed regulating labour migration practices and aligning existing programmes with upskilling schemes to facilitate dignified migration. ILO, IOM, OHCHR, and UNESCAP recommended strengthening institutional capacities to protect migrant workers and maximise the adaptive benefits of the programmes. ANU researchers, I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan policymakers, ILO, IOM, Nansen Initiative/PDD, Oxfam Australia, PICAN, and UNESCAP labelled the KANI, Seafaring Scheme, and SLP as innovative successful 'models' because they provide international training and employment opportunities critical for accumulating resources to migrate with dignity. These experts joined the IASC, GMG, TfD, TWG-HM, and JWG to disseminate labour migration during COPs to UNFCCC, GFMD, IOM Council, International Metropolis, Nansen Regional Consultation, PIFS Sub-Committee on Region Security, UNGA, UNHRC, and UNRMF events.

The planned relocation assemblage constituted a singular approach, which was to use resettlement schemes as an anticipatory or durable measure of last resort. It was bound by the notion that relocation can reduce exposure to internal environmental displacement risks if it is well-planned, facilitated as development projects, and protects the human rights of affected communities. IASC, Nansen Initiative/PDD, and TfD experts suggested drawing inspiration from four instruments: the 1998 Guiding Principles, 2011 Guidelines on Human Rights Protection in Situations of Natural Disasters, the IASC's 2010 Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, and the World Bank's 2001 Involuntary Resettlement Guidelines. ANU researchers, IOM, NRC/IDMC, Oxfam Vanuatu, PDD, PIFS, Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs, and UNHCR heralded policies from the Pacific as 'best or good practices': Fiji's planned relocation guidelines were touted as a monumental document developed in a consultative manner; Vanuatu's displacement policy was labelled as a successful regional blueprint; and the Carteret Islands' relocation programme could be a national 'model.' These experts joined the TfD, WiAG working group, TWG-HM, and JWG

to disseminate planned relocation to COPs to UNFCCC, IDMC-IOM Internal Displacement Dialogue, High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, and PIFS Sub-Committee on Regional Security events.

In sum, the chapter highlighted that the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage is *fragmented*. It comprises three smaller policy assemblages: humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation (DeLanda, 2016; Prince, 2010). The constitutive elements of each assemblage are bound together by logics of optimism (Scott, 2008). Yet, many of the same actors used the same structures to mobilise their policy preferences across the same sites. This suggests that competing elements co-exist in the assemblage albeit the relationship is fraught with friction and tension. The co-existence addresses Marcus and Saka's (2006, p. 103) criticism that "assemblages have no essence". As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the co-existence gave the environmental mobility management assemblage a complex logic, which could only be understood by unpacking each policy assemblage.

11.2.2 Q2: How are key activating events mobilising policy actors to conform to certain 'models'?

Chapter 5 discussed the role of key events in mobilising optimists to conform to certain environmental migration and displacement management 'models.' It showed that a series of events enabled the flow and standardisation of development-friendly approaches as issue 'best practices' across multiple sites and scales. At the same time, certain global and national events prompted optimists to marshal humanitarian approaches as a viable regulatory response.

The perceived environmental/climate refugee crisis mobilised human mobility optimists to look for policy alternatives. Environmental scientists, NGOs, media outlets, and Pacific leaders reconstructed the real environmental refugee crisis into a climate refugee crisis. To do so, they used alarmist displacement statistics, sensationalist headlines, distressing images of disaster-stricken Pacific communities, and the island submergence narrative. The IPCC's initial assessment reports ideologically sanctioned the notion of climate refugees. This prompted IOM, RPG, and UNHCR to co-convene an International Symposium where experts agreed to explore the environment and population movement nexus and immobilise the climate refugee discourse via research. However, SIDS politically sanctioned refugee protection as a feasible solution for international environmentally displaced persons during the 2006 Meeting on

Protecting and Resettling Climate Refugees. Bangladesh placed compensation for climate refugees on the climate change agenda during the 14th COP to UNFCCC, further cementing the idea. This generated fear in the Western world that the recognition of climate refugees would open the floodgates. Optimists worried that strategic inconsistencies would threaten the already weak refugee protection regime. Consequently, they offered alternate wording – displacement to describe the problem and relocation and migration for solutions. This climate change conference temporarily immobilised refugee protection.

The Ministerial Meeting created the Nansen Initiative that conceived and mobilised the humanitarian protection assemblage. The refusal of the Teitiota family's climate asylum claim immobilised refugee protection in the Pacific. However, the Tribunal's acknowledgement that environmental stressors could trigger protection obligations under refugee and human rights laws prompted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prepare a climate mobility action plan, alluding to humanitarian visas. The Human Rights Committee's ruling on the Teitiota family's complaint ideologically sanctioned non-refoulement as a protection measure for international environmentally displaced persons. The Teitiota case seemingly shaped the Nansen Initiative/PDD's technical submissions to and political work during the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants. With the support of Pacific leaders, optimists pinned environmental stressors on the human mobility agenda, culminating in the Migration and Refugee Compacts standardising humanitarian protection.

Primarily regional and national events mobilised supporters to institutionalise labour migration as an international environmental migration management 'model.' They contributed to the climate science-making processes by publishing their research in peer-reviewed journals and joining the climate change institutional structure. Consequently, IPCC's later assessments and special reports ideologically sanctioned labour migration as an adaptation strategy. The former I-Kiribati administration used the Fourth Assessment Report to rationalise its migration with dignity approach, arguing the science shows that the international community does not care about the I-Kiribati people's survival and future. At the 14th COP to UNFCCC, supports presented migration as an alternative to refugee protection while they partnered with AOSIS, Bolivia, and Ghana to globalise it as a displacement management solution during the 16th COP to UNFCCC.

The 2015 climate-aggravated disasters and European refugee crises heightened Kiribati and the Marshall Islands' calls for permanent migration pathways. Tropical Cyclones Pam and

Winston demonstrated the flexibility of the RSE scheme, stirring conversations among Australian and New Zealand policymakers about amending existing temporary worker programmes to regulate environmental migration from Pacific countries. The CANCC's High-Level Dialogue on Climate-Induced Migration sub-regionalised migration with dignity as atoll leaders called partners to prepare their people and formulate innovative labour migration programmes, inducing ILO, IOM, and UNESCAP to prepare the PCCMHS programme. The Nansen Initiative and IOM capitalised on the 47th PIF Leaders Meeting by morphing and regionalising labour migration as a protection strategy. Labour migration supporters worked to globalise migrants as key stakeholders in building disaster resilience during the 3rd UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction and acknowledge the environment-migration linkage during the UNGA Summit for Refugees and Migrants.

The Regional Meeting on Climate Change and Migration temporarily de-regionalised labour migration by Pacific governments, resulting in PIFS retreating from the environmental migration and displacement management space. However, the IPCC's Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere motivated its re-engagement, which it used to rationalise the inclusion of anchoring migrant protection in global and regional protocols in the 2050 Pacific Strategy. The JWG capitalised on this policy window by formulating a PRFCM that recognises the adaptive potential of labour migration.

Multi-scalar events mobilised advocates to standardise planned relocation as an internal environmental displacement management 'model.' The IPCC sanctioned resettlement as an adaptation strategy while IOM, RPG, and UNHCR validated it as an international displacement management solution during the International Symposium. The Indian Ocean tsunami induced the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs to assess the applicability of the 1998 Guiding Principles in environmental displacement situations. The Consultation on Climate Change and Church Leaders' Meeting on Resettlement prompted faith leaders to spiritually sanction relocation as a community norm for regulating cross-border displacement while Pacific leaders politically endorsed it during the 39th PIF Leaders Meeting. At the 14th COP to UNFCCC, advocates presented planned relocation as an alternative to refugee protection while they partnered with AOSIS, Bolivia, and Ghana to globalise it as an internal environmental displacement management solution during the 16th COP to UNFCCC. Typhoon Haiyan sustained global efforts in contextualising international norms to forced movement contexts. The Nansen Initiative and IOM mobilised during the 47th PIF Meeting to transform

resettlement into a protection strategy. Alongside other advocates, they also globalised planned relocation as an anticipatory approach during the 3rd UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, which they later institutionalised as a migration management approach in the Migration Compact.

Pacific organisations and governments conformed to planned relocation for different reasons. The failure of state-led schemes led Tulele Peisa to formulate its 20-step Carteret Islands' Integrated Relocation Programme. Vunidogoloa's relocation request, ambiguous figures, and a regulatory gap in the climate change policy led Fijian policymakers to develop national relocation guidelines. They used the IPCC-endorsed definition of vulnerable groups and framing of resettlement as an anticipatory measure of last resort. The Ambae volcanic eruption prompted Ni-Vanuatu officials to design a displacement policy while the financial implications of disaster-induced Matata and Canterbury relocations motivated New Zealand policymakers to consider a managed retreat policy.

In sum, a series of key activating events from 1992 to 2019 mobilised optimists to conform to certain environmental migration and displacement management 'models.' Policy scholars argue most events are unpredictable and short-lived (Birkland & Schweable, 2019; Boin et al., 2009; Pralle, 2009). However, Chapter 5 showed that most activating events were predictable. The perceived crisis signalled what could happen, the knowledge jolts were by-products of existing science, political events were scheduled in advance, and some real shocks reaffirmed existing decisions. Put simply, optimists had prior knowledge of most activating events, allowing them to tailor their policy preferences according to specific agendas. In addition, policy research tends to focus on a small number of events that occur in specific sites or scales, limiting explanations of how they impact policymaking processes (Birkland & Schweable, 2019; Kingdon, 2011; Mintrom et al., 2020). The chapter demonstrated that different types of events served different purposes, mobilising optimists in different ways. The perceived crisis mobilised optimists to research the phenomenon. Knowledge jolts encouraged them to join the climate change institutional structure and shape the climate science-making process. Political events motivated them to temporarily immobilise refugee protection, refashion it into a suite of humanitarian approaches, and quickly institutionalise development-friendly solutions. Real shocks revealed regulatory gaps, inducing Pacific policymakers to adhere to certain 'models.' Furthermore, assemblage scholars note that events expose assemblages and shape discourses but seldom explain their direct impacts on policy in/coherence (DeLanda, 2016; Merry, 2006;

Nail, 2017). An analysis of multiple activating events revealed the concurrent de/stabilisation of assemblages. Optimists capitalised on several windows of opportunity to temporarily stabilise humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation assemblages until these ideas were reflected in formal norms, rules, and practices. By doing so, they simultaneously constructed, maintained, and disrupted the coherence of the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage.

11.2.3 Q3: Who are the key actors and what channels do they use to enable or constrain the flow of environmental mobility 'best practices'?

Chapter 6 mapped the key actors and channels used to enable or constrain the flow of environmental mobility 'best practices.' It showed that logically coherent and dense policy structures mobilised development-friendly approaches as 'models.' At the same time, politically imbued issue structures are beginning to marshal humanitarian measures as viable responses.

It argued that the institutional landscape constituted diverse optimists who were embedded in multi-scalar and multi-sited structures that ideologically and socially conditioned them to move certain policies (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haas, 1992; Schofer et al., 2012; Scott, 2008). Each organisation exercised agency in rationalising if, when, and how it engaged in the issue area. External shocks, constituency requests, and leaders' interests resulted in mandate expansions, separate divisions or dedicated positions, multi-initiatives, and advocacy support. However, they rationalised the environment and population movement linkage differently, leading to diverse vocabulary and solutions. This diversity necessitated structures that acted as templates for identifying, thinking, and acting. Put differently, structures embodied collective logics that bound actors together to achieve their shared goal of mobilising humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation as environmental migration and displacement management norms.

Optimists organised themselves into policy structures (i.e., members have a common understanding of how, when, where, and under what conditions the solution will work) that varied in logical coherence and density (Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Wooten & Hoffman, 2017). Planned relocation advocates accepted that resettlement schemes can protect communities susceptible to environmental displacement risks and restore livelihoods if the schemes are well-planned, facilitated as development projects, and engage affected households throughout the

entire process. This logic shaped a high-density structure, enabling the transnational and cross-domain flow of planned relocation as a norm for managing internal environmental displacement. Labour migration supporters agreed that the development benefits of existing programmes can enhance adaptative capacities and resilience if well-managed but disagreed on how they can be amended to achieve this goal. Destination country experts argue that the temporary programmes can be aligned with permanent residency schemes to effectively target vulnerable groups while origin country experts claim upskilling initiatives are critical for facilitating dignified migration. This rationality shaped a medium-density structure, temporarily facilitating the vertical and horizontal flow of labour migration as an international environmental migration management norm. Humanitarian protectionists agreed that international law was insufficient in safeguarding the human rights of international environmentally displaced persons but disagreed on which measure is best suited (i.e., refugee, statelessness, complementary or a standalone instrument). This logic shaped a low-density structure with limited access to domestic policymaking processes.

In addition, optimists organised into issue structures that enabled the flow of problem-solution packages (i.e., the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage as a whole). At the global level, they joined the Nansen Initiative/PDD's Advisory Committee that problematised environmental stressors displacing communities and advocated for both development-friendly and humanitarian approaches. Its members constitute the TfD, a formal expert structure tasked with finding appropriate solutions to avert, minimise, and address displacement caused by climate change. Although TfD mobilised planned relocation and labour migration as viable responses to the issue area, its UN and NGO affiliates occupied other global structures such as the WiAG working group and GMG/UN Migration Network, partly explaining the cross-fertilisation of the development-friendly assemblage. Ties with global problem structures allowed optimists to anchor their policy preferences into multi-sectoral policy agendas, namely global climate change, disaster risk reduction, migration, and protection frameworks.

Optimists created regional structures that varied in the level of political support (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). The consultancy industry comprised experts from firms, institutes, think tanks, and universities based in Australia, Fiji, and New Zealand, who were also members of the TWG-HM and JWG. The consultancy industry, TWG-HM, and JWG circulated humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation as viable regulatory options through

knowledge materials (e.g., blogs, data collection guides, and programme or policy briefs), and virtual events (e.g., webinars and workshops). The JWG was imbued with political authority whereby Fiji and Tuvalu's leadership led to the regionalisation of the whole environmental mobility assemblage – the PRFCM recognises development-friendly *and* humanitarian protection approaches as norms. However, political coalitions and domestic structures produced variations in the level of institutionalisation of each solution at the national level. Fijian church leaders, policymakers, and street-level bureaucrats created conducive conditions to nationalise planned relocation. They integrated the issue of internal displacement in environment institutions and established interagency taskforces to implement the guidelines. CANCC provided the political impulse to temporarily sub-regionalise labour migration. I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan policymakers set up labour export institutions but failed to integrate environmental stressors into their mandates and create domestic structures to operationalise labour migration as an adaptation (or resilience-building) strategy. Although Fiji and New Zealand are exploring humanitarian measures, immigration officials have yet to actively engage in environmental displacement conversations.

In sum, the chapter addressed a gap in migration scholarship on agency cooperation, specifically on the role of large organisations in creating conditions for managing environmental mobility (Oakes et al., 2023). It showed that the institutional landscape is overcrowded. Global IGOs and NGOs are carving a niche for themselves, duplicating initiatives that have created some low-level tensions. However, it seems that IOM, PDD, PIFS, and to a lesser extent UNHCR are emerging as leading normative and operational agencies in the issue area. They are coordinating other actors into structures, attempting to form a unified logic for regulating environmental migration and displacement. The chapter also provided some insights into structure formation, disbandment, and re-emergence (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Primary optimists banded together to establish informal issue structures such as IASC, CCEMA, and AGCCHM to advocate for human mobility solutions. Rather than dissolving, members joined the formal TfD and found capacities in adjacent and regional structures to orchestrate the emerging environmental mobility governance. In this sense, policy structures are embedded within issue structures, granting optimists technical and political power to convey their policy preferences.

11.2.4 Q4: What sociocultural and political strategies (im)mobilise development-friendly and humanitarian approaches?

Chapters 7, 8, and 9 explained the three key sociocultural and political practices – issue-making, entrepreneurialism, and anchoring – utilised to mobilise development-friendly and humanitarian approaches to managing environmental migration and displacement. Collectively, they showed that optimists recursively made, disseminated, and anchored labour migration and planned relocation. They used the same practices to temporarily immobilise refugee protection and refashion it as part of a suite of humanitarian protection measures.

Chapter 7 demonstrated that optimists recursively made the environmental mobility assemblage through framing and linking. Optimists substantively *delinked* the climate refugee nexus via legal analysis of the 1951 Refugee Convention and research on environmental mobility that debunked myths about mass climate refugee movements, "de-pathologising" (Bettini & Gioli, 2016, p. 178) and "depoliticising" the issue (Kovras, 2012, p. 100). They used diagnostic framing to reconceptualise the problem as an environmental migration and displacement cycle, broadening the list of viable regulatory measures (Benford & Snow, 2000). They "strategically constructed" development-friendly approaches as issue-specific 'models' using existing normative instruments, programmes, and historical practices (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 888).

Advocates established strong normative and substantive linkages to form the planned relocation assemblages. The Guiding Principles and Involuntary Resettlement Policy portrayed resettlement as a durable internal displacement management solution, which was corroborated by geographically diverse case studies. But because the term resettlement connoted bad or 'forced' practices, they rebranded it as planned relocation. Supporters only established weak programmatic and substantive linkages to form the labour migration assemblage. RSE, SWP, PLS, PAC, and upcoming PEV already targeted vulnerable communities, which was partially validated by the regional mobility culture and household tradition of using the development benefits of these programmes to recover from disasters. KANI facilitated dignified migration, allowing I-Kiribati to upskill and choose when they migrate. Hence, supporters argued existing temporary labour, permanent residency, and upskilling programmes worked but needed to be amended, expanded, and aligned to effectively manage international environmental migration. The development-friendly approaches were recursively reframed as an adaptation,

anticipatory/risk minimisation, resilience-building, protection, and migration management strategy.

In contrast, protectionists used prognostic framing to make the humanitarian assemblage (Benford & Snow, 2000). They illustrated the applicability of regional refugee norms and complementary measures to environmental displacement contexts using ad hoc responses from African, American, and European authorities. These practices exemplified the temporariness of protection measures and hence were only framed as a migration and climate mobility management approach.

Chapter 8 showed that optimists disseminated the environmental mobility management assemblage using two entrepreneurial tactics, namely space-creation/shopping and multi-initiatives. Optimists created environmental migration and displacement spaces to develop 'best practices' (Fatonie, 2020; Mavrikou et al., 2022; Meijernk & Huitema, 2010). They convened fleeting expert venues to rationalise the climate refugee delinkage, present labour migration and planned relocation as policy alternatives, and identify development-friendly reference-scapes. They engaged in policy tourism (Baker & McGuirk, 2019; Cook & Ward, 2011, 2012; Gonzales, 2011). I-Kiribati policymakers visited their communities in Auckland and Gizo, and the Pope in Rome to develop the migration with dignity 'model.' Fijian policymakers organised tours of Tukaraki and Vunidogoloa, where professionals learned about 'successful' relocation schemes. They lobbied for a separate environmental mobility institution, leading to the establishment of the Nansen Initiative/PDD. They *sponsored* regional consultations, expert workshops, stakeholder meetings, speaking tours, and church events to demonstrate the applicability of existing normative instruments, temporarily sanction labour migration and planned relocation as viable strategies for the issue area, and mobilise Carteret Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, and Vanuatu's policies (Bassett & Shandas, 2010; Lavee & Cohen, 2019). They set up regional offices to contextualise and tailor the development-friendly assemblage to address different countries' needs. Put differently, optimists created formal spaces to debate, refine, and circulate development-friendly 'models.'

Optimists also shopped for existing policy spaces to institutionalise environmental mobility management 'best practices' (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991; Betts, 2010b; Pralle, 2009; Shpaizman et al., 2016). In these spaces, they observed, learned, compared, and persuaded others to conform to their policy preferences. They exploited UNFCCC and UNDRR by organising side events, pavilions, and meetings to showcase institutional work, network with

leaders, and launch development-friendly policies. They recently manipulated GFMD, UNGA, UNHRC, and UNSC, circulating the whole environmental mobility management assemblage in the general assembly and anchoring it in the migration forum. However, they only spread humanitarian protection and planned relocation in the human rights and security domains. They also tapped into regional forums such as the CANCC High-Level Dialogue, PIDC Annual Meetings, and PIF Leaders Meetings that regionalised labour migration and planned relocation as environmental mobility norms. Thus, optimists shopped for existing global and regional policy spaces to standardise development-friendly 'models.'

Optimists used multi-initiatives to ferry labour migration and planned relocation as viable environmental mobility solutions in the Pacific (Adler & Haas, 1992; Bedford & Spoonely, 2014; Crivello, 2015; Haas, 1992, 2015). Since 2007, they have implemented 13 initiatives with a Pacific case study or regional focus. Each initiative adopted different frames, including adaptation, development, human security, and risk minimisation. The global initiatives conveyed the environment-human mobility logic, the magnitude of the phenomenon, and existing regulatory practices. The regional initiatives institutionalised development-friendly approaches. The GPHMCCC financed Fiji's planned relocation guidelines, the PCCM project funded Kiribati and Tuvalu's labour migration policies, and the PCCMHS programme recently sponsored the regional framework that formalised the whole environmental mobility management assemblage.

Chapter 9 revealed that optimists anchored parts of or the whole environmental mobility management assemblage in adjacent policy agendas (Beeson & Stone, 2013; Reimer & Saerbeck, 2017; Stone, 2017, 2019). They coached Pacific leaders to raise awareness of the issue area and champion ideologically sanctioned 'models' during the UNFCCC, UNDRR, UNHRC, PIF, New York Declaration, and Migration Compact negotiations. They repackaged development-friendly approaches as technical submissions to global environmental decision-making bodies and regional development and security steering bodies. Consequently, the Cancun Adaptation Framework, Sendai Framework, and FRDP recognise labour migration and planned relocation as environmental migration and displacement management norms.

Optimists also drafted soft human mobility norms. They repackaged planned relocation as the Guiding and Peninsula Principles and bundled the whole environmental mobility management assemblage as the Nansen Protection Agenda. They integrated environmental stressors into the New York Declaration, creating opportunities for Pacific leaders and organisations who have

traditionally been absent from global human mobility governance conversations to shape the discourse. By doing so, they broadened the scope of migration and refugee compacts. Their experts prepared the regional framework. Hence, the Migration Compact and PRFCM institutionalised the whole assemblage while the Refugee Compact standardised a suite of humanitarian protection measures.

Optimists further provided feedback on Fiji's planned relocation guidelines and Vanuatu's displacement policy but also embraced Kiribati's migration with dignity policy, heralding them as environmental mobility management 'models.' In this way, they internally validated their ideas of how to regulate the phenomenon and identified issue-specific 'best practices.'

In sum, Chapters 7, 8, and 9 demonstrated "institutional work" involved in mobilising the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage (Greenwood et al., 2017, p. 11; Lawrence et al., 2011). Recursive issue-making created the development-humanitarian-security nexus (Fanning & Fullwood-Thomas, 2019; Stamnes, 2016). Forced environmental mobility threatens development and can emerge into a humanitarian crisis impeding national security (UNDP & PIFS, 2023). To capture these compounding effects, environmental mobility was reframed as a human security issue (Westbury, 2022). This framing necessitated a combination of livelihood, protection, and peace-building solutions (IASC, 2020). Interestingly, rather than collectively using these solutions, Pacific policymakers initially mutated labour migration and planned relocation into protection strategies (see FRDP, 2016). Recently, they refashioned development-humanitarian solutions to minimise security risks posed by forced environmental mobility (see PRFCM, 2023). This suggests that the peace-building component of the nexus failed to mobilise in the Pacific, perhaps because violent conflict is not yet a trigger for international displacement in the region.

Additionally, the space creation/shopping strategy established a transnational assembly line, constituting fixed and fleeting sites that concurrently acted as policy production, dissemination, adoption, and translation centres (Peck & Theodore, 2015). Many of these venues are situated in places of political power, sometimes implying unidirectional policy flows – that is, a top-down or north-to-south imposition of global assemblages. However, the findings show that policies moved dynamically in the assembly line whereby optimists and Pacific policymakers engaged in dynamic knowledge exchanges. This is not to say that policy flows are not impacted by power-laden processes (Peck & Theodore, 2010B), but Pacific experts were not passive

receivers of international ‘models.’ They actively unzipped and reformatted the ‘models,’ producing diverse policies that were remobilised as environmental mobility reference-scapes.

Moreover, multi-initiatives ensured institutional survival and facilitated discreet coercion. IOM, ILO, and OHCHR used the programmes to enrol government followers, gain organisational legitimacy, elevate regional presence, spread their original missions, and foster alliances with other agencies to access multi-partner funding streams (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Downie, 2022b). Donor states used the projects to resist new obligations. The EU restricted environmental mobility in developing nations by focusing on its root causes. New Zealand steered Pacific countries to conform to already accepted ‘models’ of regulating population movements – that is, labour migration and planned relocation, not humanitarian protection.

Furthermore, anchoring allowed optimists to achieve shared financial and governance goals (Downie, 2022). Pinning the environmental mobility management assemblage provided access to funding to initiate national policy development processes. Relatedly, anchoring began the orchestration of environmental mobility governance (Abbott et al., 2012; Downie, 2022a; Hale & Roger, 2014). Using RCPs, optimists formed a consensus on how to regulate the phenomenon, which initially shaped global migration governance followed by the unexpected emergence of environmental mobility governance.

11.2.5 Q5: How do local conditions influence the adoption, adaptation and localisation of development-friendly and humanitarian ‘best practices’ to produce distinct environmental migration and displacement policies in the Pacific?

Chapter 10 discussed ways in which local conditions shaped the adoption, adaptation, and localisation of development-friendly and humanitarian ‘best practices’ into distinct environmental migration and displacement management policies across the Pacific. It showed that historical precedents and the fear of loss influenced the widespread acceptance of labour migration and planned relocation. At the same time, institutional bottlenecks, unsettled terminology, and unsubstantiated issue-linkages influenced the abandonment of humanitarian protection and labour migration.

Historical precedents exemplified regional mobility culture and the workability of development-friendly ‘best practices’ (Connell, 2010). Resettlement is a traditional internal environmental displacement management approach. High-island policymakers experimented,

drew negative lessons from past schemes, and learned from neighbouring countries to amalgamate local practices on community sensitisation, cultural preservation, and land acquisition with ideas from different planned relocation norms (e.g., Guiding Principles, Peninsula Principles or the Toolbox), producing distinct guidelines in the Carteret Islands, Fiji, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. Contrastingly, labour migration is an accepted development and foreign policy strategy. Based on the perceived success of programmes from elsewhere (i.e., a different time and place), destination policymakers emulated temporary worker programmes and permanent residency schemes. They tweaked the designs slightly, reflecting differences in eligible countries, quota sizes, target skill levels, and recruitment procedures, thereby producing somewhat mutated labour import programmes in Australia and New Zealand. To varying extents, labour migration is sanctioned as a resilience-building or survival pathway in low-lying nations. Atoll policymakers drew on a local 'model' to fashion labour export policies that promote upskilling and employment. Thus, historical precedents minimised resistance to development-friendly 'best practices' at community and national levels. Importantly, optimists recognised the unique local features of planned relocation guidelines and labour migration programmes, touting some of them as environmental mobility reference-scapes.

Fear of loss produced further policy variations. Pacific nations at risk of permanent international environmental displacement fear losing their identity, culture, and sovereignty, which are intricately tied to the land and ocean. The rejection of the helpless victim narrative and Noah's Ark doctrine immobilised refugee protection. Tuvalu began exploring a standalone international protection framework for environmentally displaced persons and the special mobility pathway. Kiribati grafted its local culture of self-sufficiency into labour migration to form KANI.

Institutional bottlenecks disrupted the regional mobility of cross-border solutions. Internal silos and strategic ignorance of the environment-human mobility linkage kept the issue off UNHRC, UNSC, and PLMAM agendas, and diluted the climate language in Tuvalu's labour migration policy. The overcrowded regional landscape temporarily caused low-level tension regarding mandates, and multi-initiative duplication threatened to cause policy fatigue among Pacific policymakers who are stuck in the fast-policymaking culture. The ousting of atoll champions immobilised migration with dignity nationally and the international protection mechanism globally while the lack of a dedicated environmental mobility infrastructure (i.e., venue or

institution) could stall the operationalisation of the whole assemblage. The labour import programmes are not designed to manage environmental migration: the temporary worker programmes are restrictive in terms of migrant characteristics, duration of stay, family accompaniment, and working rights, while permanent residency schemes have small quota sizes and operate as a ballot system. Further, international refugee and human rights laws may clash with customary laws: the former grants displaced persons special entitlements to re-establish their livelihoods in destination countries, while the latter safeguards the rights of indigenous communities.

Likewise, unsettled terminology and unsubstantiated issue-linkages led to the abandonment of humanitarian protection and labour migration assemblages. All-encompassing environmental migration and human mobility terms caused ideological tensions, resulting in a separate migration policy in Tonga. The environment-migration-adaptation (or resilience-building) nexus is unsubstantiated: researchers lack methodologies and projection 'models,' communities perceive migration as primarily a way of improving livelihoods, and existing data are biased towards migrants' aspirations and experiences. Similarly, the environment-statelessness-protection linkage is not supported by atoll nations' geography and natural processes of island formation.

In sum, the chapter showed that local conditions mutated the environmental migration and displacement management assemblage in diverse ways, producing distinct policies across the region. Pacific policy response "decoupled" in two ways (Meyer, 1997, p. 154, 2010, p. 13; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). First, policymakers adopted different 'models.' High-island nations - namely the Carteret Islands, Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu - conformed to planned relocation, adopting it as a strategy for averting, minimising and addressing internal environmental displacement risks. Australia and New Zealand are following suit. Even though most states conformed to labour migration, only six (i.e., Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu and Vanuatu) integrated climate change or resilience into their labour export policies while one (i.e., Tonga) produced a separate migration policy. Although the environmental logic shaped the labour import programmes, traditional destination countries (i.e., Australia and New Zealand) have so far resisted expert pressures to amend them to manage environmental migration. The Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, French Polynesia, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue and Tokelau have yet to conform to these development-friendly approaches. Despite Tuvalu tabling the UNGA resolution on

developing a framework for the protection of climate-displaced persons and the adoption of the PRFCM that encourages governments to explore opportunities for humanitarian admission and stay, Pacific Island Countries have not conformed to humanitarian protection.

Second, policymakers adapted and localised the policies, elusively resembling the original 'models.' Carteret Islands, Fiji, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu's planned relocation guidelines have distinct features in terms of structural design, traditional approaches, and underlying global norms. Kiribati, Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu mutated labour migration into migration with dignity policies, which were further modified in terms of the type of upskilling (i.e., international or domestic). Australia replicated New Zealand's temporary work and permanent residency 'models' with differences in quota size, eligible countries, target skill levels, and 'successes.' Consequently, the environmental mobility policies exhibited a "glocal identity" (Peck & Theodore, 2015, p. 225) but the prominence of regional and local features shaped Fiji, Kiribati, and Vanuatu's approaches as place-based 'models' for the issue area (Acharya, 2004; Robinson, 2015).

Additionally, the chapter demonstrated the importance of "temporalities" for creating un/conducive local conditions to mobilise policies (Morais, 2023, p. 6). Because regional conditions changed rapidly in the Pacific, once accepted approaches were later rejected and then re-embraced. This was evident with labour migration: it was promoted as a viable environmental migration management strategy from 2006 to 2016, abandoned in 2017, and is now re-emerging as a feasible policy option. Therefore, shifts in regional conditions affect the political palatability of particular solutions. Furthermore, the findings revealed that successes and failures "co-exist uneasily" in policy assemblages (Allen, 2011, p. 154). This was evident with the development-friendly assemblage: some experts labelled certain local resettlement and migration schemes as 'best practices' while others critically highlighted their shortcomings. The ideological tension influenced Pacific policymakers' perception of labour migration programmes and may have consequences for the implementation of planned relocation guidelines.

11.3 Implications

The research findings have three implications. First, development-friendly approaches and humanitarian approaches institutionalised as environmental mobility management 'best practices' in the Pacific at different rates. To reiterate, this thesis does not aim to measure the

rate of institutionalisation but to examine the factors that produce variations in the level of institutionalisation. To do so, the research analyses how and why humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation mobilised across sites, scales, and the lifecycle (see Chapter 2).

Planned relocation is *fully institutionalised* as an internal environmental displacement management 'model' in high-island Pacific countries and beyond. It moved quickly across policy domains, scales, and the lifecycle, compressing the time for research, design, and adoption. Knowledge jolts, political events, and real shocks activated advocates into a high-density policy structure to form coherent logic on how well-planned resettlement schemes can minimise displacement risks if they are facilitated as a development project and protect the human rights of affected communities. Advocates joined multiple issue structures saturated with political power and transnational reach, granting them access to domestic policy processes. Rather than reinventing the wheel, advocates used existing normative instruments and geographically diverse experiences to reframe, disseminate, and pin the planned relocation assemblage across the environment, development, general assembly, human mobility, human rights, and security domains. Local resettlement precedents shaped high-island policymakers' prompt adoption and gradual translation of planned relocation, culminating in some guidelines emerging as place-based exemplars. In this sense, the planned relocation assemblage mobilised across multiple sites, scales, and the lifecycle largely intact and easily because advocates, policymakers, and communities already accepted it as a norm for all forms of internal displacement.

Labour migration is *partially institutionalised* as an international environmental migration management 'good practice' in some Pacific nations and beyond. It initially mobilised quickly across policy sites, levels, and the lifecycle but decelerated in 2016. Knowledge jolts and political events activated supporters into a medium-density policy structure to form a semi-coherent logic on how the benefits of well-managed labour migration programmes can build adaptive capacities and resilience if they are amended, expanded, and better aligned. Supporters joined several issue structures to move labour migration vertically and horizontally. They used existing programmes, regional mobility culture, and household practice of using remittances for disaster recovery to make, spread, and integrate the labour migration assemblage across the environment, development, general assembly, human mobility, human rights, and security sites. Although it has settled in the Pacific, governments rationalised labour migration's

adoption in different ways. Destination countries accepted it as a development and foreign policy strategy because of local temporary worker and permanent residency 'best practices.' Atoll nations endorsed it as a migration with dignity strategy because of the sub-regional 'model' and fear of loss. This logical diversity created regional institutional bottlenecks, slowing the flow of labour migration. Importantly, because the environment-migration-adaptation (or resilience-building) linkage is partially unsubstantiated, the labour migration assemblage travelled in bits and pieces. The development component moved smoothly while the adaptation and resilience-building elements appeared stuck in the regional development and security domains, and adoption stage of the lifecycle for an extended period. Consequently, supporters reassembled, localised, and recirculated it across the region, culminating in the widespread adoption of labour migration. Overall, labour migration programmes converge because of the development logic, not the environment logic.

Humanitarian protection *failed to institutionalise* as an international environmental displacement solution in the Pacific. It mobilised slowly across policy domains, levels, and the lifecycle. The perceived environmental/climate refugee crisis, knowledge jolts, political events, and relocation shock activated protectionists into a low-density policy structure to form an incoherent logic on how a suite of humanitarian measures (i.e., complementary, refugee, standalone, and statelessness protection) can safeguard environmentally displaced persons. Protectionists joined a few issue structures to ferry humanitarian measures globally and regionally. They used ad hoc practices outside the region and the applicability of existing international protection instruments to construct and circulate the humanitarian protection assemblage in climate change, human rights, and security sites and loosely anchor it in the human mobility domain. Tuvalu is peddling a standalone international protection mechanism due to the fear of loss. However, only the complementary measures aspect of the humanitarian protection assemblage recently settled in the Pacific. Fiji and New Zealand are exploring special category visas while Australia announced a special mobility pathway for Tuvaluans. Yet, its regional uptake remains low due to institutional bottlenecks such as the absence of dedicated infrastructure and champions, and conflicting norms. Crucially, individual components of the humanitarian protection assemblage are unsubstantiated, hindering the structural coherence of the individual component and the whole assemblage. Resultantly, it moved across spaces in an incoherent and disorderly manner. The refugee, statelessness, and standalone protection elements are stuck in the global human mobility domain while complementary measures journeyed to the region. Nevertheless, it too is trapped in the regional

security domain, and adoption stage of the lifecycle. This stickiness requires protectionists to recontextualise complementary measures before Pacific governments embrace the solution.

In sum, development-friendly approaches spread the fastest across the Pacific albeit humanitarian approaches are emerging as a viable policy response. Rather than policy effectiveness, the combination of activating events, institutional landscape, mobilising strategies, and local conditions shaped Pacific policymakers' decisions to embrace certain 'models' (McCann, 2011; Peck & Theodore, 2015; Prince, 2010; Stone, 2012). This is not to say policy effectiveness is insignificant, as it is one of the local factors that guides decision-making processes.

Second, the dynamic flows of development-friendly and humanitarian approaches are establishing environmental mobility governance. Their constitutive components have found institutional footholds across policy domains and levels. Labour migration and planned relocation are firmly anchored in environmental, development, human rights, and human mobility institutions and norms. Humanitarian protection is pinned onto disaster displacement, migration, refugees, and to a lesser extent security institutions and norms. In this sense, the emerging environmental mobility governance is at "an ad hoc stage of development" (Berringer, 2013, p. 247) and "fragmented" (Kalin & Weearsinghe, 2017, p. 6) but also embedded and interconnected to parallel governance spaces (Acharya, 2004; Betts, 2009). The embeddedness allows actors to withstand shocks for extended periods. The interconnectivity is overcoming siloed thinking and acting by synergising approaches, mandates, and funding streams to address environment mobility (Mariam Traore Chazalnoel, interview, 06.12.2018). This is shaping the "ambitious" but distinct conceptualisation of the development-humanitarian-security nexus in the Pacific (Leider & Roxin, 2023; Weishaupt, 2020, p. 15). Regional humanitarian, development, and security actors are collaborating to understand how environmental mobility threatens the human security of Pacific peoples, and how development-friendly and humanitarian approaches can minimise such risks (UNDP & PIFS, 2016).

Nevertheless, the emerging environmental mobility governance poses risks. It is reinforcing power imbalances. Power flows through the material and expressive components of an assemblage but in "disjunctive and uneven ways" (Allen, 2011; Savage, 2020, p. 328). Largely IGOs based in Geneva and Suva decide how to regulate the phenomenon by mobilising ideologically sanctioned policy 'models.' This is not to say that Pacific policymakers and NGOs do not have a role in shaping policy outcomes; however, IGOs often present a small list

of policy prescriptions for them to choose from. In addition, it is reinforcing the fast-policymaking and slow-implementation culture across the Pacific (PIFS Regional Security Advisor, interview, 20.02.2020). Multi-initiative duplication is creating policy fatigue. Optimists are financing policies without taking into consideration that governments have yet to implement labour export strategies and planned relocation guidelines formulated almost a decade ago because of limited capacity and resources. Failure to implement policies can tarnish the region's international reputation, lead to business-as-usual, and leave the problem unaddressed.

Third, the environmental mobility issue is reconfiguring the Pacific identity as a region and innovator. The international system recognises the Pacific as part of Asia, problematically amalgamating diverse challenges and voices and offering one-size-fits-all solutions. However, environmental mobility has created a window for the Pacific to construct a distinct identity within the UN. Optimists, media outlets, and some leaders depict Pacific communities as the face of climate displacement during international events and in artwork and publications. They are often portrayed as helpless victims and climate refugees in waiting, producing a counter-narrative on resilience and withstanding pressures to move. The OCHA Under-Secretary, OHCHR Deputy High Commissioner, UNHRC President, and UNSG visited the Pacific to understand the impacts of environmental stressors. At the same time, professional experts paint Pacific governments as environmental mobility management innovators. They lauded Fiji, Kiribati, and Vanuatu's policies as place-based exemplars and the FRDP and PRFCM for being the first in the world. In addition, some Pacific countries secured key international positions, elevating their presence and engagement in the global environment, human mobility, and human rights policy dialogues. Collectively, Kiribati, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, and Tonga held positions at the International Seabed Authority Council, PDD, UNGA, UNHRC, and UN Women. Similarly, Fiji and Tuvalu hosted the COP to UNFCCC and the UNSG. The victim-but-leader portrayal is raising the Pacific's international profile as a separate region and site of innovation – that is, Pacific Islanders are vulnerable to environmental mobility risks but at the forefront of planning to avert, minimise, and address them.

However, the regional identity is fragmented (Lawson, 2016). Pacific nations vary in vulnerabilities and approaches to regulating environmental mobility, which can be loosely categorised into sub-regional groupings. Melanesian countries embraced planned relocation

schemes and temporary worker programmes because they have higher ground. Micronesian countries endorsed permanent residency pathways, upskilling schemes, and international protection because they are low-lying. These variations created resistance to the PRFCM, resulting in weak commitments to labour migration and humanitarian protection (PRFCM, 2023). Perhaps the sub-regional level is better suited for building consensus on the issue of cross-border environmental mobility, which can help navigate politics during regional agenda-setting moments.

11.4 Contributions

This thesis makes empirical and theoretical contributions to the literature on policy mobilities and environmental migration and displacement governance. This thesis presents new and hard-to-access empirical data on environmental mobility management through an examination of three policy case studies: humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation. It was carried out in six countries (Australia, Egypt, Fiji, New Zealand, Poland, and Switzerland), involving 75 policy experts from consultancy firms, community-based organisations, governments, international institutions, regional agencies, think tanks, and universities. It covered 202 global normative instruments, regional frameworks, national policies, and government statements. It involved 401 detailed field note entries gathered from interning with the Fiji Mission in Geneva and OHCHR in Fiji and attending 83 events that included conferences, programme and steering group meetings, roundtable discussions, seminars, and workshops on environmental mobility. Thus, this thesis presents a rich body of qualitative evidence to explain how and why certain environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' are institutionalising in the Pacific.

This thesis also makes four theoretical contributions. First, the notion of *activating events* captures ways in which different events mobilise actors in varying ways. Existing studies focus on 'big important events' in prompting policy action (Cook & Ward, 2011; Gamlen, 2014a, 2019; Halliday, 2017; McCann, 2013; Merry, 2006). By doing so, they offer thin descriptions of how policy actors recognise and utilise different events to move and institutionalise their ideas (Haas, 2015; Mintrom et al., 2020). For this reason, Birkland and Schwaeble (2019, p. 17) contend that the concept of events is significantly "underdeveloped". The findings in Chapter 5 expand this concept by demonstrating that macro and micro, perceived and real, and sudden and recurring phenomena all mobilise actors but in diverse ways. Tick-tick-boom occurrences such as disasters, environmental displacements, and refugee crises were critical

for optimists and Pacific policymakers to observe policy un/workability and identify regulatory gaps. These occurrences motivated them to produce knowledge materials and adopt certain approaches. However, routinised events such as conferences, IPCC report launches, and meetings were important for disseminating and anchoring their policy prescriptions across multiple domains – that is, optimists created new and tapped into existing policy windows to ideologically sanction policies, thereby increasing their political palatability. These events were critical for moving and standardising specific approaches as norms. Thus, the notion of activating events offers an expanded analytical framework to understand how different occurrences mobilise actors to shape policies at different stages of the lifecycle.

Second, the concept of *policy assemblage lifecycle* explains why some policies appear immobile and stuck, but not others. Jacobs (2012) and Lovell (2019) contend that policy mobilities scholarship is empirically biased towards successful and present policies, overlooking failed and absent 'models.' To address this gap, this thesis analysed why refugee protection failed to gain traction in the Pacific. The findings confirmed that the institutional landscape, sociocultural and political strategies, and local conditions shaped non-adoptions (Lovell, 2016; Webber, 2015; Wood, 2020). Importantly, they highlighted that immobility is temporary and situated, and often leads to policy mutation. Optimists remobilised refugee protection by refashioning it as part of a suite of humanitarian measures. The Pacific only recently regionalised one aspect of the humanitarian protection assemblage. However, because refugee protection is regionalising in other parts of the world, it is globally accepted as a viable solution. This may suggest that refugee protection is momentarily stuck at the adoption stage of the lifecycle in the global human mobility domain. In this sense, the concept of policy assemblage offers an analytical framework to examine what happens to policies at each stage, making them appear immobile.

Third, this thesis adds a *regional dimension* to the policy mobilities scholarship. Existing research focuses on glocal, inter-local, and international policy flows (Gamlen, 2019; McCann, 2013; Peck & Theodore, 2015; Prince, 2010; van Eck et al., 2023). Consequently, it dismisses the role of regional conditions in building or disrupting political consensus instrumental for institutionalising policies. Chapters 9 and 10 demonstrated that conducive regional conditions translated global 'best practices' into distinct environmental mobility strategies and standardised national policies as place-based 'models.' Pacific policymakers accepted development-friendly and humanitarian approaches during the PIF Leaders Meetings.

Optimists embraced Kiribati, Fiji, and Vanuatu's policies as reference-scapes at regional consultations and programme stakeholder meetings. In addition, they cooperated on RCPs that culminated in the world's first regional environmental mobility governance. Thus, the regional scale offers insights into how policies are standardised and translated, affecting state behaviour and reflecting national ideologies.

Fourth, this thesis provides one of the first accounts of *interagency cooperation* on environmental migration and displacement. A burgeoning body of organisational scholarship discusses the role of the AGCCHM, IASC, ICRCM, IOM, NRC, the Nansen Initiative/PDD, TfD, and UNHCR in shaping environmental mobility debates and global policy agendas (Brenn, 2015; Hall, 2011, 2016; Hantscher, 2015; Ionesco & Chazalnoel, 2015; Nash, 2019; Rosenow-Williams, 2015a, 2015b). However, these studies omit how regional agencies, academic institutions, think tanks, and consultancy firms influence policymaking processes. They also provide thin explanations of how international organisations collaborate to create conducive conditions for managing environmental mobility (Oakes et al., 2023). Chapter 6 mapped regional actors engaging in the issue area, showing that PIFS is emerging as a leading normative agency while experts embedded within the regional consultancy industry drafted planned relocation guidelines and labour migration policies. Chapters 7 to 9 illustrated that optimists collectively constructed, spread, and integrated development-friendly and humanitarian approaches into global and regional frameworks. The interagency cooperation orchestrated the emerging environmental migration and displacement governance.

11.5 Future Research Directions

This thesis explained variations in the level of institutionalisation of environmental migration and displacement management 'best practices' in the Pacific. It argued that activating events, institutional landscape, mobilising strategies, and local conditions enabled or constrained the flow of humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation. The findings contributed to different bodies of literature, notably the geography scholarship on policy mobilities and environmental migration and displacement governance. Nevertheless, the project was vast as it covered three policy case studies, three scales, nine policy domains, and most of the Pacific region. Given the limitations of a doctoral study, it was not possible to capture and discuss all dynamics. Hence, the thesis concludes by briefly reflecting on three future research directions.

First, the time and temporalities of policy mobilities remain understudied (Morais, 2023). Geographers have conceptualised policy temporalities as rhythms and speed, offering useful insights into why some policies appear more mobile than others (Cresswell, 2010a; Peck & Theodore, 2015). Although this thesis focused on the spatialities of environmental mobility management 'best practices,' it presented activating events as moments when optimists de/stabilised humanitarian protection, labour migration, and planned relocation assemblages. It also attempted to apply the policy assemblage lifecycle to explain the quick adoption of development-friendly approaches and the slow arrival of humanitarian measures in the Pacific. The concepts of activating events and the policy assemblage lifecycle offer alternative analytical frameworks to explain the temporal dimensions of successful and failed policy flows. Nevertheless, they need to be refined and applied to wider contexts.

Second, evacuations as an environmental displacement management norm remain unexplored. Disaster risk reduction and forced migration scholarship discuss evacuations as a way of moving people out of harm's way (Kalin & Schrepfer, 2012; McAdam & Weerasinghe, 2020; Nansen Protection Agenda, 2015; Sendai Framework, 2015). Depending on how and why governments employ evacuations, they can have diverse outcomes (e.g., minimised or enhanced displacement risks). Consequently, optimists are careful in labelling evacuations as 'good practice.' However, since they are widely employed, evacuations may be a useful case study for exploring policy success and decoupling from a bottom-up perspective.

Third, the emerging environmental mobility governance cannot be understood by examining policy dynamics in one region. This thesis demonstrated that the Pacific has accepted development-friendly approaches to regulating population movements induced by environmental stressors. However, events and institutional reports suggest that parts of Africa and Latin America are embracing humanitarian approaches to manage the phenomenon, which is partly driven by a significantly different regional institutional landscape and policy processes (IOM, 2021; Francis, 2021; Méndez, n.d.). Importantly, some experts who participated in this research hyped Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Mozambique's use of humanitarian visas for managing environmentally displaced persons (Atle Solberg, interview, 08.12.2018; Sanjula Weerasinghe, interview, 29.07.2019; Walter Kalin, interview, 24.07.2019). This highlights that African and Latin American states provided the political impetus to anchor humanitarian protection in Migration and Refugee Compacts. Thus, analysing the mobility of

different policies in other regions can provide valuable insights into the orchestration of global environmental migration and displacement governance.

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Appendices

Appendix A: List of Documents

Appendix A1: Global and Regional Documents

Year	Title	Organisations	Source
1949	Migration for Employment Convention	ILO	https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:55:0::NO::P55_TYPE,P55_LANG,P55_DOCUMENT,P55_NODE:CON,en,C097,/Document
1951	Refugee Convention to the Status of Refugees	UNHCR	https://www.unhcr.org/ph/wp-content/uploads/sites/28/2017/03/3.3-1967-Protocol-relating-to-the-status-of-refugees.pdf
1954	Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons	UNHCR	https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content/uploads/1954-Convention-relating-to-the-Status-of-Stateless-Persons_ENG.pdf
1961	Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness	UNHCR	https://www.unhcr.org/au/media/convention-reduction-statelessness
1966	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	OHCHR	https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-economic-social-and-cultural-rights
1966	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	OHCHR	https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights

Year	Title	Organisations	Source
1967	Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees	UNHCR	https://www.unhcr.org/ph/wp-content/uploads/sites/28/2017/03/3.3-1967-Protocol-relating-to-the-status-of-refugees.pdf
1969	Organisation of African Unity Convention on Refugees	Organisation of African Unity	https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36400-treaty-0005_-_oau_convention_governing_the_specific_aspects_of_refugee_problems_in_africa_e.pdf
1975	Migrant Workers Convention	ILO	https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::p12100_instrument_id:312288
1984	Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat or Punishment	OHCHR	https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-against-torture-and-other-cruel-inhuman-or-degrading
1984	Cartagena Declaration on Refugees	Organisation of American States	https://www.oas.org/dil/1984_cartagena_declaration_on_refugees.pdf
1990	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families	OHCHR	https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-protection-rights-all-migrant-workers
1992	Rio Declaration on Environment and Development	UNGA	https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_CONF.151_26_Vol.I_Declaration.pdf
1993	Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States	Organisations of American States	https://www.ilsa.org/Jessup/Jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf
1998	Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement	UNOCHA	https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/199808-training-OCHA-guiding-principles-Eng2.pdf
2001	Involuntary Resettlement Guidelines	World Bank	https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/206671468782373680/pdf/301180v110PAPE1ettlement0sourcebook.pdf

Year	Title	Organisations	Source
2007	International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance	OHCHR	https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/ch_iv_16.pdf
2008/ 2011	Guidelines on Human Rights in Situations of Natural Disaster	IASC	https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/sites/default/files/migrated/2021-03/Human%20Rights%20and%20Natural%20Disasters-%20Operational%20Guidelines%20and%20Field%20Manual%20on%20Human%20Rights%20Protection%20in%20Situations%20of%20Natural%20Disasters.pdf
2010	Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons	IASC	https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/sites/default/files/migrated/2021-03/IASC%20Framework%20on%20Durable%20Solutions%20for%20Internally%20Displaced%20Persons%2C%20April%202010.pdf
2010	Cancun Adaptation Framework	UNFCCC	https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf
2013	Peninsula Principles on Climate Displacement Within States	Displacement Solutions	https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/groups_committees/loss_and_damage_executive_committee/application/pdf/peninsula_principles.pdf
2015	Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change	Nansen Initiative	https://disasterdisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/PROTECTION-AGENDA-VOLUME-1.pdf
2015	Guidance on Protecting People From Disasters and Environmental Change Through Planned Relocation	Brookings Institution, Georgetown University and UNHCR	https://www.refworld.org/docid/596f15284.html
2015	Paris Agreement	UNFCCC	https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/parisagreement_publication.pdf
2015	Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction	UNDRR	https://www.preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf

Year	Title	Organisations	Source
2016	Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific	SPC, SPREP, PIFS, UNDP, UNDRR and USP	https://www.resilientpacific.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/FRDP_2016_Resilient_Dev_pacific_0.pdf
2016	Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster	IOM	https://micicinitiative.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1426/files/documents/micic_guidelines_english_web_13_09_2016.pdf
2016	Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Training Manual (Facilitators Guide)	IOM	https://publications.iom.int/books/migration-environment-and-climate-change-training-manual-facilitators-guide#:~:text=(Facilitator's%20Guide).-,The%20Migration%2C%20Environment%20and%20Climate%20Change%3A%20Training%20Manual%20(Facilitators,how%20to%20integrate%20human%20mobility
2016	New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants	UNGA	https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/our_work/ODG/GCM/NY_Declaration.pdf
2017	Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Cooperation (PACER) Plus	PIFS	https://www.forumsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/PACER-Plus-Text.pdf
2017	Toolbox: Planning Relocations to Protect People from Disasters and Environmental Change	UNHCR, Georgetown University and IOM	https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/toolbox-planning-relocations-protect-people-disasters-and-environmental-change
2018/ 2019	Boe Declaration and Action Plan on Regional Security	PIFS	https://www.forumsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/BOE-document-Action-Plan.pdf
2018	Taskforce on Displacement's Recommendations on Averting, Minimising and Addressing Displacement	UNFCCC	https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/10a1.pdf#page=[40]
2018	Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration	IOM	https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N18/451/99/PDF/N1845199.pdf?OpenElement
2018	Global Compact on Refugees	UNHCR	https://www.unhcr.org/au/media/global-compact-refugees-booklet

Year	Title	Organisations	Source
2019	Words into Action Guidelines for Disaster Displacement	UNDRR	https://disasterdisplacement.org/portfolio-item/wiadd/
2022	2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent	PIFS	https://www.forumsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/PIFS-2050-Strategy-Blue-Pacific-Continent-WEB-5Aug2022.pdf
2023	Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility	PIFS	https://www.forumsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Annex-C-Pacific-Regional-Framework-on-Climate-Mobility-1.pdf

Appendix A2: National Documents

Country	Date	Title	Agencies	Source
Australia	1958	Migration Act 1958	Department of Home Affairs	https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=52de3d284
	2006	Kiribati-Australia Nursing Initiative	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade	https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/kiribati-nursing-design-doc.pdf
	2007	Migration (Climate Refugees) Amendment Bill	Australian Green Party	https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/s585_ems_49155f6d-da9e-49a5-b349-a3cb56ac1e08/upload_pdf/07141em.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf
	2012	Seasonal Worker Programme (*see Pacific Australia Labour Mobility Scheme*)	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade	See: https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement/pacific-labour-mobility and www.palmscheme.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-08/implemntation_arrangement_5_november_2018.pdf
	2013	Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia's National Security	Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet	https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/167267/Australia%20A%20Strategy%20for%20National%20Securit.pdf

Country	Date	Title	Agencies	Source
	2017	Draft Planned or Managed Retreat Guidelines	Government of Western Australia, Department of Planning, Lands and Heritage	https://consultation.dplh.wa.gov.au/policy/draft-planned-or-managed-retreat-guidelines/supporting_documents/Draft_Planned_or_Managed_Retreat_Guidelines.pdf
	2018	National Disaster Risk Reduction Framework	Department of Home Affairs	https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/emergency/files/national-disaster-risk-reduction-framework.pdf
	2018	Northern Australia Worker Programme (*see Pacific Australia Labour Mobility Scheme*)	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade	See: https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/news/Pages/labour-mobility-and-the-northern-australia-worker-pilot-program, https://gsp.cgdev.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CGD-Legal-Pathways-Database_Northern-Australia-Worker-Pilot-Program-NAWPP.pdf and https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/nawp-whitepapersummary.pdf
	2019	Climate Change Action Strategy	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade	https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/climate-change-action-strategy.pdf
	2021	Australian Government Civil Maritime Security Strategy	Department of Home Affairs	https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/nat-security/files/australian-government-civil-maritime-security-strategy.pdf
	2021	National Climate Resilience and Adaptation Strategy	Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment	https://www.agriculture.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/national-climate-resilience-and-adaptation-strategy.pdf
	2022	Australian Disaster Recovery Framework	National Emergency Management Agency	https://nema.gov.au/sites/default/files/inline-files/Australian%20Disaster%20Recovery%20Framework%20V3_0.pdf
	2022	Pacific Australia Labour Mobility Scheme	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade	See: https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement/pacific-labour-mobility and https://www.palmscheme.gov.au/
	2023	Pacific Engagement Visa	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade	https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/people-connections/people-connections-in-the-pacific/pacific-engagement-visa

Country	Date	Title	Agencies	Source
	2023	Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade	https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/australia-tuvalu-falepili-union-treaty
Cook Islands	2010	National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management 2009-2015	Office of the Prime Minister	https://www.preventionweb.net/files/21869_17857finalnapdocument200920155b15d1.pdf
	2016	Te Kavaeinga Nui: National Sustainable Development Plan	Central Policy and Planning Office	https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cobp-coo-2017-2019-ld-01.pdf
	2018	Climate Change Policy 2018-2028	Climate Change Office	https://climatechange.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Cook-Islands-Climate-Change-Policy-2018-2028.pdf
	2018	Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in the Cook Islands 2018-2023	Emergency Management Cook Islands	https://emci-site.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Cook_Islands_SREM_2018_final.pdf
	2022	Te Kaveinga Tupu'anga iti Tangata: Cook Islands Population Policy 2022-2032	Central Policy and Planning Office	https://www.pmoffice.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/CI-Pop-Pol-highres-digital.pdf
	2023	Cook Islands Immigration Regulations 2023	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration	https://mfai.gov.ck/sites/default/files/2023-06/CI%20Immigration%20Regulations%202023%20%2818042023%29.pdf
Fiji	1944	ITaukei Affairs Act	Ministry of iTaukei Affairs	See: https://laws.gov.fj/Acts/DisplayAct/3252# or http://www.paclii.org/fj/legis/consol_act/faa117/
	1998	Natural Disaster Management Act 1998	National Disaster Management Office	https://www.ndmo.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/NDMO_ACT-1.pdf
	2003	Immigration Act 2003	Immigration Department	https://www.investinfiji.today/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Fiji-Immigration-Act-2003.pdf

Country	Date	Title	Agencies	Source
	2017	5-Year and 20-Year National Development Plan	Ministry of Economy	https://www.fiji.gov.fj/getattachment/15b0ba03-825e-47f7-bf69-094ad33004dd/5-Year-20-Year-NATIONAL-DEVELOPMENT-PLAN.aspx
	2017	National Humanitarian Policy for Disaster Risk Management	Ministry of Rural and Maritime Development and National Disaster Management	https://www.ndmo.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/National-Humanitarian-Policy.pdf
	2018	National Climate Change Policy 2018-2030	Ministry of Economy, Climate Change and International Cooperation Division	https://fijiclimatechangeportal.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/FIJI-NCCP-2018-2030_0.pdf
	2018	National Disaster Risk Reduction Policy 2018-2030	Ministry of Disaster Management and Meteorological Services	https://wrd.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2021-12/FIJI_NDRR%20Policy.pdf
	2018	National Employment Policy 2018	Ministry of Employment, Productivity and Industrial Relations	https://www.employment.gov.fj/resources/nec/NationalEmploymentPolicy2018.pdf
	2018	Planned Relocation Guidelines: A Framework to Undertake Climate Change-Related Relocation	Ministry of Economy, Climate Change and International Cooperation Division	https://fijiclimatechangeportal.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Planned-Relocation-Guidelines_Fiji.pdf
	2019	Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund Act 21	Parliament of the Republic of Fiji	https://www.parliament.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Bill-21—Climate-Relocation-of-Communities-Trust-Fund.pdf
	2019	Displacement Guidelines in the Context of Climate Change	Ministry of Economy, Climate Change and International Cooperation Division	https://fijiclimatechangeportal.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Displacement-Guidelines-Jan-2020.pdf
	2021	Climate Change Act 2021	Parliament of Fiji	https://fijiclimatechangeportal.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/20210927_161640.pdf

Country	Date	Title	Agencies	Source
	2023	Standard Operating Procedures for Planned Relocation in the Republic of Fiji	Office of the Prime Minister	https://fijiclimatechangeportal.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Standard-Operating-Procedures-for-Planned-Relocation-in-the-Republic-of-Fiji-1.pdf
Kiribati	2013	National Framework for Climate Change and Climate Change Adaptation	Office of Te Beretitenti	https://www.president.gov.ki/presidentgovki/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/National-Framework-for-Climate-Change-Climate-Change-Adaptation.pdf
	2012	National Disaster Risk Management Plan	National Disaster Risk Management Office	https://www.president.gov.ki/presidentgovki/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/National-Disaster-Risk-Management-Plan-Part-1-2012.pdf
	2015	Kiribati National Labour Migration Policy	Ministry of Labour and Human Resource Development	https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Kiribati%20National%20Labour%20Migration%20Policy.pdf
	2016	Kiribati 20-Year Vision 2016-2036	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development	https://www.mfed.gov.ki/sites/default/files/KIRIBATI%2020-YEAR%20VISION%202016-2036%20.pdf
	2019	Kiribati Climate Change Policy	Office of Te Beretitenti	https://www.president.gov.ki/presidentgovki/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Kiribati-Climate-Change-Policy.pdf
	2019	Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Act	Office of Te Beretitenti	https://www.parliament.gov.ki/sites/default/files/2021-04/DRMCC%20Act%202019.pdf
	2019	Kiribati Immigration Act 2019	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration	https://www.mfa.gov.ki/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Kiribati-Immigration-Act-2019.pdf
Nauru	2014	Immigration Act 2014	Immigration Division, Department of Justice and Border Control	http://ronlaw.gov.nr/nauru_lpms/files/acts/da3dd40c56e3444c0f58b7ac9d2a4f04.pdf
Marshall Islands	2006	Immigration Act 2006	Immigration Division	https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/6059d97c4.pdf
	2011	National Climate Change Policy Framework	Climate Change Directorate, Ministry of Environment	https://rmi-data.sprep.org/system/files/CCPOLICYFEB12011.pdf

Country	Date	Title	Agencies	Source
			Oceanic Division and Coastal Division, Marshall Islands Marine Resources Authority	
	2018	Tile Til Eo: 2050 Climate Strategy	Climate Change Directorate, Ministry of Environment	https://policy.asiapacificenergy.org/sites/default/files/2050%20Climate%20Strategy-%20Lighting%20the%20Way%20%28EN%29.pdf
	2020	Adaptation Communication	Climate Change Directorate, Ministry of Environment	https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/RMI-AdaptationCommunication_Dec2020.pdf
	2020	National Strategic Plan 2020-2030	Economic Policy, Planning and Statistics Office, Office of the President	https://www.theprif.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/Marshall%20Islands%20National%20Strategic%20Plan%202020%20to%202030.pdf
New Caledonia	2021 and 2022	Defence and Climate: France is Committed	Ministry of Armed Forces	https://www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/ministere-armees/Presentation%20Climate%20ans%20defence%20strategy.pdf
New Zealand	2002	Pacific Access Category	Immigration New Zealand, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment	https://www.immigration.govt.nz/new-zealand-visas/visas/visa/pacific-access-category-resident-visa
	2007	Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme	Immigration New Zealand, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment	See: https://www.mbie.govt.nz/immigration-and-tourism/immigration/recognised-seasonal-employer-policy-review/ or https://www.immigration.govt.nz/new-zealand-visas/visas/visa/recognised-seasonal-employer-limited-visa
	2009	Immigration Act 2009	Immigration New Zealand, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment	https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2009/0051/latest/DLM1440303.html
	2015	Immigration Amendment Act 2015	Immigration New Zealand, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment	https://legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2015/0048/latest/DLM5655018.html

Country	Date	Title	Agencies	Source
	2018	New Zealand's Pacific and Development Climate Action Plan 2019-2022	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	Pacific-and-Development-Climate-Change-Action-Plan-2019-22.pdf (mfat.govt.nz)
	2018	Pacific Climate Change-Related Displacement and Migration: A New Zealand Action Plan	Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2018-05/apo-nid213946.pdf
	2018	The Climate Crisis: Defence Readiness and Responsibilities	Ministry of Defence	https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/66cfc96a20/Climate-Change-and-Security-2018.pdf
	2018	The Pacific Reset	Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/OIA/R-R-The-Pacific-reset-The-First-Year.PDF
	2019	National Disaster Resilience Strategy	Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management	https://www.civildefence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/documents/publications/ndrs/National-Disaster-Resilience-Strategy-10-April-2019.pdf
	2022	Adapt and Thrive: Building a Climate-Resilient New Zealand	Ministry of Environment	https://environment.govt.nz/assets/publications/climate-change/MFE-AoG-20664-GF-National-Adaptation-Plan-2022-WEB.pdf
	2022	Managed Retreat: Approval to Consult on Options	Office of the Minister of Climate Change, Ministry of Environment	https://environment.govt.nz/assets/publications/cab-paper-managed-retreat-approval-to-consult-on-options.pdf
Papua New Guinea	1978	Migration Act 1978	Papua New Guinea Immigration and Citizenship Authority	http://www.paclii.org/pg/legis/consol_act/ma1978118.pdf
	2013	The Defence White Paper 2013	Papua New Guinea Defence Organisation	https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/131220-PNG-Defence-White-Paper.pdf
	2015	National Refugee Policy	Papua New Guinea Immigration and Citizenship Authority	See: https://ica.gov.pg/refugees/national-refugee-policy

Country	Date	Title	Agencies	Source
	2016	Manam Resettlement Authority Act 2016	N/A	https://www.parliament.gov.pg/uploads/acts/16A_02.pdf
	2017	National Disaster Risk Reduction Framework 2017-2030	National Disaster Centre	https://www.preventionweb.net/files/64804_pngndrrffinalviewsmall.pdf
	2021	Climate Change (Management) (Amendment) Act 2021	Climate Change and Development Authority	https://www.parliament.gov.pg/uploads/acts/21A_25.pdf
	2023	Bougainville Long Term Vision 2052	Autonomous Bougainville Government	https://abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/Bougainville_Vision_2052_final.pdf
	N.D.	Carterets Integrated Relocation Programme	Tulele Peisa (community-based organisation)	https://i.unu.edu/media/ourworld.unu.edu-en/article/828/carterets-integrated-relocation-program-proposal1.pdf
	N.D.	Papua New Guinea National Labour Mobility Policy	Department of Treasury	https://8a6ce8e4-f33c-4f8e-88c6-0bd2f8959442.filesusr.com/ugd/33c07b_62c24704c4e944ea8d9fbd0e1c26c75a.pdf?index=true
Samoa	1964	Taking of Land Act 1964	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment	https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/sam35510.pdf
	1965	Alienation of Customary Land	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment	https://www.mnre.gov.ws/mnre-redesign/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Alienation-of-Customary-Land-Act-1965.pdf
	2004	Immigration Act 2004	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/6061f50c4.pdf
	2007	Disaster and Emergency Management Act	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment	https://samoa-data.sprep.org/system/files/Disaster-and-Emergency-Management-Act-2007.pdf
	2010	Land Acquisition and Resettlement Framework (*a sub-project under the*	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment and Ministry	See: https://lta.gov.ws/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/4.-Land-Acquisition-and-Resettlement-Framework.pdf and

Country	Date	Title	Agencies	Source
		Samoa Post-Tsunami Reconstruction Project)	of Works, Transport and Infrastructure	https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/247341468296953458/pdf/RP13170V20P1260Box391418B00PUBLIC0.pdf
	2017	National Disaster Management Plan 2017-2020	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment	https://www.mnre.gov.ws/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Samoa-national-disaster-management-plan-2017-2020-final-web.pdf
	2018	Community Integrated Management Plan: Aoama'a East District, Upolu	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment	See: https://samoa-data.sprep.org/dataset/community-integrated-management-plans
	2018	Community Integrated Management Plan: Vaimauga East District, Upolu	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment	See: https://samoa-data.sprep.org/dataset/community-integrated-management-plans
	2019	Labour and Employment Export Programme: Strategic Plan	Ministry of Commerce, Industries and Labour	Publicly Unavailable
	2019	Labour Migration Policy	Ministry of Commerce, Industries and Labour	Publicly Unavailable
	2020	Immigration Act 2020	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	https://www.palemene.ws/PDFfiles/Immigration%20Act%202020%20-%20Eng_English.pdf
	2020	Samoa Climate Change Policy	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment	https://www.mnre.gov.ws/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Samoa-Climate-Change-Policy-2020-2030.pdf
	2021	Samoa 2040: Transforming Samoa to a Higher Growth Path	Economic Policy and Planning Division, Ministry of Finance	https://www.mof.gov.ws/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Samoa-2040-Final.pdf
Solomon Islands	2007	Resettlement Framework (*a sub-project under the Solomon Islands Emergency Assistance Project*)	Ministry of Infrastructure Development	https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents//41105-sol-rf.pdf
	2008	National Adaptation Programmes of Action	Ministry of Environment, Climate Change, Disaster Management and Meteorology	https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/slb01.pdf

Country	Date	Title	Agencies	Source
	2012	Immigration Bill 2011	Ministry of Commerce, Industry, Labour and Immigration	https://www.parliament.gov.sb/sites/default/files/legislation/9th%20Parliament/Bills/2012/Immigration%20Bill%202011.pdf
	2012	National Climate Change Policy 2012-2017	Ministry of Environment, Climate Change, Disaster Management and Meteorology	https://www.sprep.org/attachments/Climate_Change/SI_Climate_Change_Policy.pdf
	2016	National Development Strategy 2016-2035: Improving the Social and Economic Livelihoods of all Solomon Islanders	Ministry of Development Planning and Aid Coordination	https://solomonislands-data.sprep.org/system/files/National%20Development%20Strategy.pdf
	2018	Context and Rationale for the Solomon Islands Labour Mobility Strategy	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade	Publicly Unavailable
	2018	National Disaster Management Plan	Ministry of Environment, Climate Change, Disaster Management and Meteorology	https://www.rcrc-resilience-southeastasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/National-Disaster-Management-Plan-2018.pdf
	2018	Solomon Islands Labour Mobility Strategy	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade	See: http://www.mfaet.gov.sb/external-trade/labour-mobility.html
	2022	Planned Relocation Guidelines	Ministry of Environment, Climate Change, Disaster Management and Meteorology and Ministry of Lands	https://roasiapacific.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl671/files/documents/2023-03/Solomon%20Islands%20Planned%20Relocation%20Guidelines.pdf
Tonga	2015	Tonga Strategic Development Framework 2015-2025	Ministry of Finance and National Planning	https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cobp-ton-2017-2019-ld-03.pdf
	2016	Tonga Climate Change Policy: A Resilient Tonga by 2035	Department of Climate Change, Ministry of Meteorology, Energy, Information, Disaster Management, Environment,	https://climatechange.gov.to/wp/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Department-Climate-Change-Policy-2016-1.pdf

Country	Date	Title	Agencies	Source
			Climate Change and Communications	
	2017	Resettlement Policy Framework (*a sub-project under the Cyclone Reconstruction and Climate Resilience Project*)	Ministry of Infrastructure	https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/858101496036058172/pdf/SFG3388-REVISED-RP-P150113-Box405291B-PUBLIC-Disclosed-7-26-2017.pdf
	2018	Joint National Action Plan 2 on Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management	Department of Climate Change, Ministry of Meteorology, Energy, Information, Disaster Management, Environment, Climate Change and Communications	https://www.preventionweb.net/files/60141_tongajnap2final.pdf
	2020	Immigration Act 2020 Revised Edition	Immigration Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	https://ago.gov.to/cms/images/LEGISLATION/PRINCIPAL/1969/1969-0016/ImmigrationAct_3.pdf
	2020	Migration and Sustainable Development Policy	Immigration Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	https://crisisresponse.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1481/files/appeal/documents/Tonga%20Migration%20and%20Sustainable%20Development%20Policy.pdf
	2021	Strategic Roadmap for Emergency and Disaster Risk Management 2021-2023	National Emergency Management Office, Ministry of Meteorology, Energy, Information, Disaster Management, Environment, Climate Change and Communications	https://crisisresponse.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1481/files/appeal/documents/Tonga%20Strategic%20Emergency%20and%20Disaster%20Risk%20Management%20Roadmap%20%282021%20-%202023%29.pdf
	2023	Labour Mobility Supply Management Strategy	Ministry of Trade and Economic Development	https://www.mted.gov.to/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/FINAL_Final-TLMSMS_23-March-20231.pdf

Country	Date	Title	Agencies	Source
Tuvalu	2008	Immigration Act 2008 Revised Edition	Department of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Communication and Foreign Affairs	https://tuvalu-legislation.tv/cms/images/LEGISLATION/PRINCIPAL/1968/1968-0010/ImmigrationAct_1.pdf
	2008	National Disaster Management Act 2008 Revised Edition	National Disaster Management Office, Office of the Prime Minister	https://tuvalu-legislation.tv/cms/images/LEGISLATION/PRINCIPAL/2007/2007-0010/NationalDisasterManagementAct_1.pdf
	2012	National Strategic Action Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management 2012-2016	Department of Environment	See: https://tuvalu-data.sprep.org/index.php/dataset/national-action-plan-climate-change-disaster-risk-management
	2012	Te Kaniva: Tuvalu Climate Change Policy	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, Tourism, Environment and Labour	https://www.pacificclimatechange.net/sites/default/files/documents/TCCP%20Te%20Kaniva%20English%20final%20web%20new.pdf
	2015	Sky is the Limit Programme	Pre-Service Department, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport	Publicly Unavailable
	2015	Climate Change and Disaster Survival Fund Act 2015	Climate Change Department, Ministry of Finance	https://tuvalu-legislation.tv/cms/images/LEGISLATION/PRINCIPAL/2015/2015-0011/ClimateChangeandDisasterSurvivalFundAct2015_1.pdf
	2015	National Labour Migration Policy	Department of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Communication and Foreign Affairs	https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Tuvalu%20National%20Migration%20Labour%20Policy.pdf
	2016	Te Kakeega III: National Strategy for Sustainable Development 2016-2020	Ministry of Finance	https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cobp-tuv-2017-2019-ld-02.pdf

Country	Date	Title	Agencies	Source
	2019	Draft Resolution on Providing Legal Protection for Persons Displaced by the Impacts of Climate Change	Permanent Mission of Tuvalu to the United Nations	See: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3814616?ln=en
	2020	Te Sikulagi: Tuvalu Foreign Policy	Department of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Communication and Foreign Affairs	See: https://dfa.gov.tv/index.php/foreign-policy/
	2020	National Adaptation Plan Framework	Climate Change Department, Ministry of Finance	https://www.tuvaluclimatechange.gov.tv/sites/default/files/documents/FINAL_TuvaluNAP.pdf
	2021	Te Vaka Fenua o Tuvalu: National Climate Change Policy 2021-2030	Climate Change Department, Ministry of Finance	https://www.tuvaluclimatechange.gov.tv/sites/default/files/documents/Climate%20Change%20Policy_FINAl_0.pdf
Vanuatu	2007	Seasonal Employment Act No. 23 of 2007	Department of Labour and Employment Services, Ministry of Internal Affairs	https://vcci.vu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Seasonal_Employment_Act_No23_2007.pdf
	2016	Vanuatu 2030: The People's Plan	Department of Strategic Policy, Planning and Aid Coordination	https://www.gov.vu/images/publications/Vanuatu2030-EN-FINAL-sf.pdf
	2016	Vanuatu Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Policy 2016-2030	Ministry of Climate Change and Adaptation, Meteorology, Geo-Hazards, Energy, Environment and Disaster Management	https://www.nab.vu/sites/default/files/nab/documents/30/10/2015%20-%2011%3A20/vanuatu_cc_drr_policy_minus_att4v4.pdf
	2017	Immigration Act No. 17 of 2010	Department of Immigration and Passport Services	https://www.pidcsec.org/UserFiles/PidcSec/File/Vanuatu-Immigration-Act-no17-of-2010.pdf
	2018	Immigration (Amendment) Act No. 16 of 2018	Department of Immigration and Passport Services	Publicly Unavailable

Country	Date	Title	Agencies	Source
	2018	National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement	Ministry of Climate Change, Adaptation, Meteorology, Geo-Hazards, Energy, Environment and Disaster Management	https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/press_release/file/iom-vanuatu-policy-climate-change-disaster-induced-displacement-2018.pdf
	2019	National Labour Mobility Policy	Department of External Trade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and External Trade and Department of Labour and Employment Services, Ministry of Internal Affairs	Publicly Unavailable
	2019	National Land Subdivision Policy	Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources	https://www.nab.vu/sites/default/files/documents/Vanuatu_Subdivision_Policy_English_April__2019.pdf
	2021	National Security Strategy: Secure and Resilient	Ministry of Internal Affairs	https://www.gov.vu/images/publications/Vanuatu_National_Security_Strategy.pdf
	2022	Vanuatu Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Policy, Implementation Plan (Phase 1) 2022-2026	Ministry of Climate Change and Adaptation	https://www.nab.vu/document/national-ccdrr-policy-implementation-plan-2022-2026-phase-1

Appendix A3: Statements

Country, Experts and Organisations	Year	Event	Place	Source	Notes
Federated States of Micronesia	2018	11th Plenary Meeting at the 73rd Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N18/300/73/PDF/N1830073.pdf?OpenElement	

Country, Experts and Organisations	Year	Event	Place	Source	Notes
Fiji	2018	12th Plenary Meeting at the 73rd Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N18/301/04/PDF/N1830104.pdf?OpenElement	
	2019	High-Level Segment on Statelessness at 70th Session of UNHCR's Executive Committee Meeting	Geneva, Switzerland	https://www.unhcr.org/au/media/statement-fiji-1	
	2019	UN Security Council Open Debate on Addressing the Impact of Climate-Related Disasters on International Peace and Security	New York, USA	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NqgnJUA_e0Q	Planned Relocation Guidelines
	2020	71st Session of UNHCR's Executive Committee Meeting	Virtual Event	https://www.unhcr.org/au/media/fiji	Planned Relocation and Displacement Guidelines
IOM Director-General, William Lacy Swing	2009	Side Event on Climate Adaptation Continuum, Migration and Displacement: Copenhagen and Beyond at 15th Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC	Copenhagen, Denmark	https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/env_degradation/speakingpts_swing.pdf	
Kiribati	2013	19th Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC	Warsaw, Poland	https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/statements/application/pdf/cop19_hls_kiribati.pdf	Migration with Dignity Policy
	2014	13th Plenary Meeting at the 69th Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	See: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/782589?ln=ar	Migration with Dignity Policy
	2015	27th Plenary Meeting at the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	See: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/814433?ln=ar	Migration with Dignity Policy

Country, Experts and Organisations	Year	Event	Place	Source	Notes
	2015	106th IOM Council Session	Geneva, Switzerland	https://governingbodies.iom.int/system/files/en/council/106/Kiribati%20-%20Statement%20new%20Member%2C%20106th%20Council.pdf	
	2021	Pacific Regional Consultation on Internal Displacement	Virtual Event	https://www.forumsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/KIRIBATIPacconsultation.pdf	
Marshall Islands	2014	13th Plenary Meeting at the 69th Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	See: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/782589?ln=ar	
	2018	International Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration	Marrakesh, Morocco	https://www.un.org/en/conf/migration/assets/pdf/GCM-Statements/MARSHALL-ISLANDS.pdf	
	2019	11th Plenary Meeting at the 74th Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/296/08/PDF/N1929608.pdf?OpenElement	
New Zealand	2018	International Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration	Marrakesh, Morocco	https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Statement_New%20Zealand_3%28a%29.PDF	
NRCSG, Elisabeth Ramusson	2009	High-Level Side Event on Migration and Displacement at 15th Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC	Copenhagen, Denmark	https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/env_degradation/pres_rasmusson.pdf	
Palau	1997	10th Plenary Meeting at the 19th Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	See: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/244809?ln=es	

Country, Experts and Organisations	Year	Event	Place	Source	Notes
Papua New Guinea	2016	4th Plenary Meeting at the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/289/82/PDF/N1628982.pdf?OpenElement	
	2018	International Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration	Marrakesh, Morocco	https://www.un.org/en/conf/migration/assets/pdf/GCM-Statements/papuanewguinea.pdf	
PIDC	2018	International Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration	Marrakesh, Morocco	https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Statement_PIDC_3%28b%29%20-%20not%20delivered.PDF	
PIFS	1997	10th Plenary Meeting at the 19th Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	See: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/244809?ln=es	
RSG on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Walter Kalin	2009	High-Level Side Event on Migration and Displacement at 15th Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC	Copenhagen, Denmark	https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/env_degradation/statement_kaelin.pdf	
Samoa	2018	12th Plenary Meeting at the 73rd Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N18/301/04/PDF/N1830104.pdf?OpenElement	
Solomon Islands	2016	18th Plenary Meeting at the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	See: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/848125?ln=en	
	2018	9th Plenary Meeting at the 73rd Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N18/301/10/PDF/N1830110.pdf?OpenElement	

Country, Experts and Organisations	Year	Event	Place	Source	Notes
	2019	9th Plenary Meeting at the 74th Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/294/61/PDF/N1929461.pdf?OpenElement	
Tuvalu	2014	Special Session of the United Nationals General Assembly on International Commission on Population Development	New York, USA	https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/events/pdf/other/4/country/tuvalu.pdf	Sky is the Limit, Student Education Loan Fund
	2015	60th Session of the UN CEDAW Expert Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women	Geneva, Switzerland	https://rmozone.com/snapshots/2016/05/docs/INT_CEDAW_STA_TUV_19642-00.pdf	Sky is the Limit, Student Education Loan Fund
	2016	4th Plenary Meeting at the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/289/82/PDF/N1628982.pdf?OpenElement	
	2016	19th Plenary Meeting at the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/296/79/PDF/N1629679.pdf?OpenElement	
	2018	11th Plenary Meeting at the 73rd Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N18/300/73/PDF/N1830073.pdf?OpenElement	
	2018	International Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration	Marrakesh, Morocco	https://www.un.org/en/conf/migration/assets/pdf/GCM-Statements/tuvalu.pdf	
	2019	11th Plenary Meeting at the 74th Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/296/08/PDF/N1929608.pdf?OpenElement	

Country, Experts and Organisations	Year	Event	Place	Source	Notes
UNHCR, Antonio Guterres	2009	High-Level Side Event on Migration and Displacement at 15th Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC	Copenhagen, Denmark	https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/env_degradation/statement_guterres.pdf	
	2011	Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement	Olso, Norway	https://www.unhcr.org/au/publications/nansen-conference-climate-change-and-displacement-statement-antonio-guterres-united	
	2011	UN Security Council Briefing on Maintenance of International Peache and Security: New Challenges to International Peace and Security and Conflict Prevention	New York, USA	https://www.unhcr.org/au/publications/statement-mr-antonio-guterres-united-nations-high-commissioner-refugees-united-2	
	2011	Opening Statement, Intergovernmental Meeting at Ministerial Level to Mark the 60th Anniversary of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 50th Anniversary of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness	Geneva, Switzerland	https://www.unhcr.org/au/publications/intergovernmental-meeting-ministerial-level-mark-60th-anniversary-1951-convention	
	2011	Closing Statement, Intergovernmental Meeting at Ministerial Level to Mark the 60th Anniversary of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 50th Anniversary of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness	Geneva, Switzerland	https://www.unhcr.org/au/publications/unhcr-intergovernmental-meeting-ministerial-level-closing-remarks-united-nations-high	

Country, Experts and Organisations	Year	Event	Place	Source	Notes
UNDHCR, Craig Johnstone	2008	Planning for the Inevitable, the Humanitarian Consequences of Climate Change	Copenhagen, Denmark	https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/49256c492.pdf	
UNSG, Kofi Annan	2006	High-Level Dialogue of the United General Assembly on International Migration and Development	New York, USA	https://www.un.org/migration/sg-speech.html	
Vanuatu	1997	10th Plenary Meeting at the 19th Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	See: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/244809?ln=es	
	2016	19th Plenary Meeting at the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/296/79/PDF/N1629679.pdf?OpenElement	
	2018	12th Plenary Meeting at the 73rd Session of the UN General Assembly	New York, USA	https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N18/301/04/PDF/N1830104.pdf?OpenElement	

Appendix B: List of Events

Date	Description	Type of Event	Place	Public or Private	Relevant Professionals and/or Organisations
25.05.2018	Where Do We Go? Displacement and relocation challenges of climate change for communities in the Pacific	Conference	Brisbane, Australia	Public	Anote Tong (I-Kiribati Activist)
22.10.2018	Views from the Climate Frontline: An Evening with Anote Tong	Conversation	Melbourne, Australia	Public	Anote Tong (I-Kiribati Activist)
15.10.2018	Environmental Film Festival Australia: Anote's Ark	Documentary Screening	Melbourne, Australia	Public	Anote Tong (I-Kiribati Activist)
30.10.2018	Global Migration: Who benefits and who loses?	International Metropolis Conference	Sydney, Australia	Public	Ian Goldin (Oxford Martin School) and Sharan Burrows (International Trade Union Confederation)
30.10.2018	Protection Policies and Processes	International Metropolis Conference	Syndey, Australia	Public	Petra Playfair (Playfair Visa and Migration Services)
30.10.2018	Displacement and Migration in the Context of Climate Change	International Metropolis Conference	Sydney, Australia	Public	Simon Bradshaw (Oxfam Australia)
31.10.2018	In Conversation with Stephen Castles	International Metropolis Conference	Sydney, Australia	Public	Jane McAdam (University of New South Wales, Kaldor Centre) and Stephen Castles (University of Sydney)
31.10.2018	New Sights in Refugee and Migrant Research and Practice	International Metropolis Conference	Sydney, Australia	Public	Sabira Coelho (IOM)

Date	Description	Type of Event	Place	Public or Private	Relevant Professionals and/or Organisations
01.11.2018	Forced Displacement: In Search of Fairer Protections and Community Resilience	International Metropolis Conference	Sydney, Australia	Public	Brooke Wilmsen (La Trobe University, School of Humanities and Social Sciences), Daniel Fitzpatrick (Monash University, Faculty of Law) and Susanna Price (Australian National University, School of Culture, History and Language)
04.12.2018	Disaster Displacement	Side Event at the 24th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Katowice, Poland	Public	Atle Solberg (PDD), Isabelle Michal (UNHCR), IDMC Representative, Mariam Traore Chazalnoel (IOM) and Robert Vaughan (OHCHR)
04.12.2018	Climate-Forced Displacement	Side Event at the 24th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Katowice, Poland	Public	Harjeet Singh (Action Aid), Robin Bronen (Alaska Institute for Justice) and Salote Soqo (Unitarian Universalist Service Committee)
05.12.2018	Warsaw International Mechanism's Taskforce on Displacement	Informal-Informal Negotiations	Katowice, Poland	Private	N/A
06.12.2018	Warsaw International Mechanism's Taskforce on Displacement	Informal-Informal Negotiations	Katowice, Poland	Private	N/A
06.12.2018	Warsaw International Mechanism's Taskforce on Displacement	Side Event at the 24th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Katowice, Poland	Public	Dina Ionesco (IOM), Robin Bronen (Alaska Institute for Justice) and Salote Soqo (Unitarian Universalist Service Committee)
07.12.2018	Warsaw International Mechanism's Taskforce on Displacement	Informal-Informal Negotiations	Katowice, Poland	Private	N/A

Date	Description	Type of Event	Place	Public or Private	Relevant Professionals and/or Organisations
08.12.2018	Displacement Related to the Adverse Impacts of Climate Change	Side Event at the 24th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Katowice, Poland	Public	
08.12.2018	Oceans, Adaptation and Population Displacement	Side Event at the 24th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Katowice, Poland	Public	Atle Solberg (PDD), Dina Ionesco (IOM) and Espen Ronneberg (SPREP)
10.12.2018	Climate Change, Migration and Displacement	Side Event at the 24th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Katowice, Poland	Public	Erica Bower (UN Women), Koko Warner (UNFCCC) and Simon Bradshaw (Oxfam Australia)
11.12.2018	Climate-Induced Migration in South Asia	Side Event at the 24th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Katowice, Poland	Public	Harjeet Singh (Action Aid) and Sabine Minninger (BfW)
11.12.2018	Taking Stock and Next Steps	Side Event at the 24th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Katowice, Poland	Public	Koko Warner (UNFCCC), Mariam Traore Chazalnoel (IOM), ILO Representative, Lena Brenn (NRC), Nicole Anschell (PDD), Robert Oakes (UNU-EHS) and Robert Vaughan (OHCHR)
26.03.2019	Enhancing Protection and Empowerment of Migrants and Communities affected by Climate Change and Disasters in the Pacific	Programme Launch	Suva, Fiji	Private	Atle Solberg and Alisi Pulini Vosalevu (PDD), Bruce Burson, Elena Gerasimova (ILO), Gabor Sasvari (GIZ), Ioane Alama (PIDC), Justin Ginnetti (IDMC), Olivia Dunn, Robert Vaughan (OHCHR), Sabira Coelho (IOM), Sanjeshni Kumar (UNESCAP), Scott Hook (PIFS), Sneh Lata (Fiji Red Cross) and UNHCR Representative

Date	Description	Type of Event	Place	Public or Private	Relevant Professionals and/or Organisations
27-28.03.2019	Understanding and Enhancing Preparedness and Response to Risks of Disaster Displacement in the Pacific	Stakeholder Meeting	Suva, Fiji	Private	Atle Solberg and Alisi Pulini Vosalevu (PDD), Bruce Burson and Sabira Coelho (IOM)
12.04.2019	Law and Climate Migration	Workshop	Melbourne, Australia	Private	Daniel Fitzpatrick (Monash University, Faculty of Law), Jane McAdam (University of New South Wale, Kaldor Centre), Patrick Nunn (University of Sunshine Coast), Siobhan McDonnell (Australian National University, Crawford School of Public Policy) and Tammy Tabe (USP, PACE-SD)
14.05.2019	Forced Displacement: Missing Issue in Migration Discourse	Seminar	Geneva, Switzerland	Public	Atle Solberg (PDD), Bina Desai (IDMC), Jamie Munn (NRC) and Shahidul Haque (Government of Bangladesh)
15.05.2019	Faces of Disaster Displacement	Side Event at the Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction	Geneva, Switzerland	Public	Atle Solberg (PDD)
16.05.2019	Words into Action: Disaster Displacement	Side Event at the Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction	Geneva, Switzerland	Public	Atle Solberg and Walter Kalin (PDD), Daria Mokhnacheva (IOM), Kirsi Madi (UNDRR) and Nina Birkeland (NRC)
16.05.2019	Launch of Three Words into Action Guidelines	Side Event at the Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction	Geneva, Switzerland	Public	Atle Solberg and Walter Kalin (PDD), Daria Mokhnacheva (IOM), David Zervaas (UNDRR), IDMC Representative and Nina Birkeland (NRC)
06.06.2019	Geneva Forum on Climate Change at the Human Rights Council	Forum	Geneva, Switzerland	Private	Benjamin Schacter and Peggy Hicks (OHCHR), Ileana Sinziana Puscas (IOM), Nazhat Shameem Khan (Government of Fiji), Representatives

Date	Description	Type of Event	Place	Public or Private	Relevant Professionals and/or Organisations
					from Bangladesh, the Maldives and the Philippines and UNFCCC Representative
17.06.2019	IDMC-IOM Fifth Internal Displacement Dialogue	Breakfast Meeting	Geneva, Switzerland	Private	Alexandra Bilak and Bina Desai (IDMC), Mohammed Abdiker (IOM) and Nazhat Shameem Khan (Fiji)
19.06.2019	IOM Standing Committee Meeting on Programme and Finance	Meeting	Geneva, Switzerland	Private	Dina Ionesco (IOM)
25.06.2019	Addressing Internal Displacement Associated with Disasters and Conflicts: Planning for the Long Haul	Side Event at the 41st Session of the Human Rights Council	Geneva, Switzerland	Private	Cecilia Jimenez-Damary (Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs)
26.06.2019	PDD Steering Committee Meeting	Meeting	Geneva, Switzerland	Private	Atle Solberg and Walter Kalin (PDD), Dina Ionesco (IOM) and Vueti May (Government of Fiji)
11.07.2019	Resolution on the Human Rights of IDPs	Informal Consultation	Geneva, Switzerland	Public	Cecilia Jimenez-Damary (Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs)
12.07.2019	Resolution on the Human Rights and Climate Change	Informal Consultation	Geneva, Switzerland	Public	N/A
08.08.2019	IPCC Special Report on Land and Climate Change	Report Launch	Geneva, Switzerland	Public	Koko Warner (UNFCCC) and PDD Representative
26.08.2019	Pacific Climate Change, Migration and Human Security Programme Meeting	Internal Meeting	Suva, Fiji	Private	Alisi Pulini Vosalevu (PDD), Elena Gerasimova (ILO), Robert Vaughan (OHCHR), Sabira Coelho (IOM) and Timothy Westbury (UNESCAP)

Date	Description	Type of Event	Place	Public or Private	Relevant Professionals and/or Organisations
27.08.2019	Terms of Reference for Technical Advisory Group on Human Mobility	Briefing	Suva, Fiji	Private	Chitra Massey (OHCHR)
06.09.2019	Adaptation in Small States: Research Themes and Gaps	Seminar	Suva, Fiji	Public	Tony Weir (USP, PACE-SD)
26.09.2019	Climate Change and Human Rights: RRRT and OHCHR Meeting	Informal Meeting	Suva, Fij	Private	Robert Vaughan and Thomas Hunecke (OHCHR)
01.10.2019	Outcome Group 6 Meeting on Integrating and Mainstreaming Human Rights	Meeting	Suva, Fij	Private	Elena Gerasimova (ILO), Sabira Coelho (IOM) and Robert Vaughan and Thomas Hunecke (OHCHR)
03.10.2019	Pacific Climate Change, Migration and Human Security Programme Meeting	Internal Meeting	Suva, Fiji	Private	Alisi Pulini Vosalevu (PDD), Elena Gerasimova (ILO), Robert Vaughan (OHCHR), Sabira Coelho (IOM) and Timothy Westbury (UNESCAP)
07.10.2019	Climate Mobility: International and Domestic Policy Dimensions	Seminar	Suva, Fiji	Public	Cosmin Corendea (O.P. Jindal Global University and USP, PACE-SD) and Gabor Sasvari (GIZ)
25.10.2019	Initial Selection of Members for Technical Advisory Group on Human Mobility	Internal Meeting	Sigatoka, Fiji	Private	Chitra Massey (OHCHR)
06.11.2019	Pacific Climate Change, Migration and Human Security Programme Meeting	Briefing	Suva, Fiji	Private	Alisi Pulini Vosalevu (PDD), Elena Gerasimova (ILO), Robert Vaughan (OHCHR), Sabira Coelho (IOM) and Timothy Westbury (UNESCAP)
13.11.2019	United Nations Country Team Meeting	Internal Meeting	Suva, Fiji	Private	Regional Representatives from ILO, IOM, OHCHR, UNESCAP, UNDRR and UNRCO

Date	Description	Type of Event	Place	Public or Private	Relevant Professionals and/or Organisations
22.11.2019	Roundtable Discussion on Disaster Displacement	Roundtable Discussion	Suva, Fiji	Private	Joseph Foukona (USP, PACE-SD), Matthew Scott (Raoul Wallenberg Institute), Nacanieli Bolo (IDMC), Robert Vaughan (OHCHR) and Sabira Coelho (IOM)
26.11.2019	Pacific Climate Change, Migration and Human Security Programme Meeting	Internal Meeting	Suva, Fiji	Private	Alisi Pulini Vosalevu (PDD), Mavis Yuen (ILO), Robert Vaughan (OHCHR), Sabira Coelho (IOM) and Timothy Westbury (UNESCAP)
09.12.2019	Planning for the Technical Advisory Group on Human Mobility and Senior Officials Meetings	Internal Meeting	Suva, Fiji	Private	Releshni Karan (OHCHR) and Timothy Westbury (UNESCAP)
19.08.2020	Roundtable Discussion with H.E Luke Daunivalu	Roundtable Discussion	Virtual Event	Public	Luke Daunivalu (Government of Fiji)
16.09.2020	Is Climate Change Migration a Self-fulfilling Prophecy? Interdisciplinary Dialogues on Migration-and-Environment Nexus	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Caroline Zickgraf (University of Liege, Hugo Observatory), Mine Isler (Lund University, Centre for Sustainability Studies) and Ilan Kelman (University College London)
07.10.2020	Conceptualising Policy: Do Climate Refugees or Environmental Migrants Really Exist?	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Francois Gemenne (University of Liege, Hugo Observatory), Koko Warner (UNFCCC) and Walter Kalin (PDD)
19.10.2020	Climate Change Challenges to the Sovereignty to of Our Pacific Atoll Nations	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Anote Tong (I-Kiribati Activist), Enele Sopoaga (Tuvaluan Activist) and Kathy Jetnil-Kijiner (Marshallese Activist)
13.11.2020	Data and Knowledge on Human Mobility in the Context of Natural Hazards	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Caroline Zickgraf (University of Liege, Hugo Observatory) and Kanta Kumari Riguad (World Bank)

Date	Description	Type of Event	Place	Public or Private	Relevant Professionals and/or Organisations
03.12.2020	Internal Displacement, Resilience, Recovery and Solutions	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Frances Namoumou (PCC), Lucille Apis-Overhoff (Federated States of Micronesia Representative), Mark Stege (Marshall Islands Representative) and Tammy Tabe (USP, PACE-SD)
09.12.2020	Global Policy Debates, Mobility and Natural Hazards	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Andrew Harper (UNHCR), Dina Ionesco (IOM), Ezekiel Simperingham (IFRC) and Mirzan Khan (ICCCAD)
21.01.2021	Re-examining Displacement in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change: A Pacific Perspective	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Celia McMichael (University of Melbourne), Chanelle Taoi (UNHCR), Jane McAdam (University of New South Wales, Kaldor Centre) and Tammy Tabe (USP, PACE-SD)
21.01.2021	Evidence to Impacts: Addressing Data and Knowledge Gap on Internal Displacement in the Pacific	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Jessie Connell (IOM), Semiti Temo (IFRC) and Joseph Faukona (University of Hawaii)
04.02.2021	Commemoration of the 5th Anniversary of the Endorsement of the Nansen Initiative Protection Agenda and the Adoption of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Antonio Vitronio (IOM), Filippo Frandi (UNHCR), Government of Fiji Representative, Mami Mizutori (UNDRR) and Ovais Sarmad (UNFCCC)
04.02.2021	Technical Panel on Paris Agreement	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Dina Ionesco, Kanta Kumari Riguad (World Bank), Maarten van Aalst (ICRC, Climate Centre), Russell Miles (TfD) and Saleemul Huq (ICCCAD)
10.02.2021	Legal Responses to Cross-Border Environmental Mobility	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Atle Solberg (PDD), David Cantor (Refugee Law Initiative), Jane McAdam (University of New South Wales, Kaldor Centre) and Richard

Date	Description	Type of Event	Place	Public or Private	Relevant Professionals and/or Organisations
					Bedford (Waikato University and Auckland University of Technology)
11.02.2021	Pacific Regional Consultation on Internal Displacement	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Representatives from Fiji, Cook Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Tuvalu and Vanuatu, Technical Advisory Group on Human Mobility members and Walter Kalin (PDD)
12.05.2021	Scope, Scale and Pace: Recognising Climate Mobilities in the Pacific	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Jane McAdam (University of New South Wales, Kaldor Centre), Moneka De Oro (Micronesia Climate Change Alliance and Siliga Tala), Pelenise Alofa (KiriCAN)
01.06.2021	Human Mobility and Climate-Related Processes	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Ileana Sinziana Puscas (IOM)
02.06.2021	To Stay or To Go? Frontline Stories of Climate Mobility in the Pacific	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Broderick Menkeb (Government of Marshall Islands), Charles Enoka and Rae Bainteiti (Kiribati Aotearoa Diaspora Directorate Charitable Trust)
04.08.2021	Land, Law & Te Tiriti o Waitangi: Climate Mobility to Aotearoa New Zealand	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Vaeluaga Iosefa (Tuvalu Community Leader) and Johnnie Freeland (Maori Community Leader)
09.09.2021	Climate Change Impacts on Migration	Metropolis Asia-Pacific, Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Rihard Bedford (Waikato University and Auckland University of Technology) and Vijay Naidu (USP)
20.10.2021	Does the Data on Climate and Disaster Displacement Add Up?	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Andrea Milan (IOM-GMDAC), Kira Vinke (PIK Postdam), Taitala Maula (Samoa Red Cross) and Vincent Anzellini (IDMC)

Date	Description	Type of Event	Place	Public or Private	Relevant Professionals and/or Organisations
13.09.2022	Climate Action: What are Pacific Island Nations Hoping for From Australia?	Canberra, Australia	Seminar	Public	Akka Rimon (Australian National University, Department of Pacific Affairs), Anote Tong (I-Kiribati Activist) and Siobhan McDonnell (Australian National University, Crawford School of Public Policy)
29-30.09.2022	State of the Pacific	Canberra, Australia	Conference	Public	Akka Rimon (Australian National University, Department of Pacific Affairs), Apinelu Eseleaofa (Government of Tuvalu), Betty Barkha (Monash University), George Carter (Australian National University, Department of Pacific Affairs), Henry Ivarature (Australian National University, Pacific Security College), Kristina Fidall, Meima Motusaga (Government of Samoa), Stephen Howes (Australian National University, Crawford School of Public Policy) and Tanya Pouwhare (New Zealand Ethical Employers)
04.10.2022	Pacific Climate Justice Summit: Climate Mobility Science, Policy and Action	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Betty Barkha (Monash University), Patricia Mallam (SPREP) and Sabira Coelho (IOM),
18.10.2022	Regional Climate Mobility Framework	Webinar	Virtual Event	Public	Betty Barkha (Monash University) and Jane McAdam (University of New South Wales, Kaldor Centre)
08.11.2022	Kioa Declaration	Side Event at the 27th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt	Public	Mahendra Kumar, Maina Talia and Sivendra Michael

Date	Description	Type of Event	Place	Public or Private	Relevant Professionals and/or Organisations
09.11.2022	One UN: Vulnerability, Climate Change and Human Mobility	Side Event at the 27th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt	Public	Andrew Harper (UNHCR), Antonio Vitorino (IOM), European Union Representative and Tina Stege (Government of Marshall Islands)
09.11.2022	Just Transition: Ensuring Decent Work and Quality Jobs are Tools for Climate Policy and Implementation	Side Event at the 27th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt	Public	Ian Fry (Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Climate Change)
10.11.2022	Warsaw International Mechanism Executive Committee Meeting	Meeting at the 27th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt	Private	Manuel Marques Pereira (IOM)
11.11.2022	Advancing Rights-Based Protection for Climate Migrants	Side Event at the 27th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt	Public	Atle Solberg and Walter Kalin (PDD), Representatives from Bangladesh and GIZ, Robert Oakes (UNU-EHS) and Sabine Minninger (BfW)
12.11.2022	Loss and Damage and Climate Justice	Side Event at the 27th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt	Public	Andrew Harper (UNHCR) and Representatives from Bangladesh, Niger, Sudan, Uganda and Yemen
12.11.2022	Santiago Network Meeting	Meeting at the 27th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt	Private	Atle Solberg (PDD) and Michelle Yonetani (UNHCR)

Date	Description	Type of Event	Place	Public or Private	Relevant Professionals and/or Organisations
13.11.2022	Strengthening Action on Climate Change and Human Mobility	Side Event at the 27th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt	Public	Kasya Natby (TfD) and Koko Warner (UNFCCC), Michelle Leighton (ILO), Mirzan Khan (ICCCAD), and Rae Baintieti (Pacific Youth Coalition)
16.11.2022	Addressing Displacement and Migration in the Context of Climate Change	Side Event at the 27th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt	Public	Atle Solberg (PDD), Koko Warner (UNFCCC), Representatives from Bangladesh Action Aid, European Union and Guatemala and Ugochi Daniels (IOM)
16.11.2022	Regional Approaches to Climate Mobility	Side Event at the 27th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt	Public	Atle Solberg (PDD), Henry Puna (PIFS), Representative from UNESCAP, Satyendra Prasad (Government of Fiji), Simon Kofe (Government of Tuvalu) and Ugochi Daniels (IOM)
17.11.2022	Human mobility, disaster displacement and loss and damage	Side Event at the 27th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt	Public	Atle Solberg (PDD), Francois Gemenne (University of Liege, Hugo Observatory), Harjeet Singh (Action Aid), Makareta Waqavonovono and Representatives from Bangladesh and NRC
17.11.2022	Santiago Network Meeting	Meeting at the 27th Conference of Parties to UNFCCC	Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt	Private	Atle Solberg (PDD) and Michelle Yonetani (UNHCR)

Appendix C: List of Research Participants

Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Date	Interview Type	Consent Type	Attribution	Notes
Adrian Nicolae	European Union, Pacific Office	Team Leader Climate Change, Energy and Circular Economy	Fiji	02.10.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name & Title	
Akka Rimon	Australian National University, Department of Pacific Affairs	Doctoral Candidate	Australia	30.11.2022	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Akosita Tu'ihalamaka-Polota	Ministry of Internal Affairs	Head of Seasonal Employment Division	Tonga	02.09.2021	Email Correspondence	Written	Name, Title & Organisation	
Alisi Rabukawaqa	iTaukei Affairs Board	Conservation Officer	Fiji	11.12.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal- Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	Spoke in former capacity
Andrew McElroy	UNDRR, Pacific Office	Sub-regional Coordinator	Fiji	02.12.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Anote Tong	Government of Kiribati	Former President	Kiribati	14.04.2023	Face-to-face	Verbal - Recorded	Name	Spoke in former capacity

Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Date	Interview Type	Consent Type	Attribution	Notes
Atle Solberg	PDD	Head of the Coordination Unit	Switzerland	08.12.2018	Face-to-face	Verbal - Recorded	Name	
Ayiaz Sayed-Khayium	Ministry of Economy, Civil Service, Communications and Climate Change	Minister	Fiji	04.11.2019	Face-to-face	Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Barnabas Bago	Ministry of Environment, Climate Change, Disaster Management and Meteorology	National Coordinator Programme	Solomon Islands	14.11.2022	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Benjamin Schachter	OHCHR	Associate Human Rights Officer	Switzerland	06.08.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Organisation	
Bina Desai	IDMC	Head of Policy and Research	Switzerland	07.06.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Cecilia Jimenez-Damary	United Nations Human Rights Council Special Procedures	Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of IDPs	Switzerland	09.08.2019 and 14.08.2019	Skype	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name & Title	Interviewed twice

Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Date	Interview Type	Consent Type	Attribution	Notes
Colin Tukuitonga	SPC	Director General	Fiji	15.11.2019	Skype	Verbal-Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Cosmin Corendea	O.P. Jindal Global University	Associate Professor of Environmental and Refugee Law	India	10.08.2019	Skype	Verbal - Recorded	Name	
Dave Zervaas	UNDRR	Programme Management Officer	Switzerland	19.06.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Eferemo Kubunavanua	Taukei Affairs Board and iTaukei Land Trust Board	Conservation Officer	Fiji	16.12.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	Spoke in former capacity
Elena Gerasimova	ILO, Pacific Office	Specialist in Decent Work and International Labour Standards	Fiji	29.03.2019	Face-to-face	Verbal - Recorded	Organisation	
Elisabeth Holland	USP, PACE-SD	Professor of Ocean and Climate Change	Fiji	21.11.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	

Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Date	Interview Type	Consent Type	Attribution	Notes
Elizabeth Ferris	ISIM	Research Professor	USA	23.07.2019	Skype	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Erica Bower	UNHCR	Associate Specialist for Climate Change and Disaster Displacement	Switzerland	10.12.2018	Face-to-face	Verbal - Recorded	Name	Spoke in former capacity
Ezekiel Simperingham	IFRC	Global Lead on Migration and Displacement	Switzerland	12.08.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Frances Namoumou	PCC	Programmes Coordinator and Ecumenical Animator for Stewardship and Climate Change	Fiji	31.10.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name & Organisation	
Francois Gemenne	University of Liege, Hugo Observatory	Director	Belgium	18.11.2022	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Gabor Sasvari	GIZ	Pacific Regional Coordinator	Fiji	17.10.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal- Recorded	Name & Organisation	

Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Date	Interview Type	Consent Type	Attribution	Notes
Genevieve Jiva	PICAN	Pacific Regional Coordinator	Fiji	21.11.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal- Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
George Nacewa	350 Pacific	Organiser	Fiji	06.12.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat		Independent Expert		25.01.2019	Skype	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name	
Hieke Lautenschlager	ILO	Technical Officer	Switzerland	17.07.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Organisation	
Inia Seruiratu	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Security	Minister	Fiji	31.01.2020	Skype	Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Irene Prasad	Ministry of Economy, Climate Change and International Cooperation Division	In-Country Coordinator for EU-GIZ ACSE Project	Fiji	29.03.2019	Face-to-face	Verbal - Recorded	Organisation	
Isabelle Michal	UNHCR	Policy Officer on Climate Change and Disaster Displacement	Switzerland	11.12.2018	Face-to-face	Verbal - Recorded	Name	

Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Date	Interview Type	Consent Type	Attribution	Notes
Jane McAdam	University of New South Wales, Kaldor Centre	Scientia Professor of Law and Director of Kaldor Centre	Australia	06.05.2019	Skype	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name	Spoke in the capacity of an Independent Expert
John Campbell		Independent Expert	Australia	30.10.2019	Skype	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name	
John Corcoran		Independent Expert	New Zealand	12.12.2019	Skype	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name	
Jone Usmate	Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport, Disaster Management and Meteorological Services	Minister	Fiji	16.12.2019	Face-to-face	Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Keith Hornby	Ministry of Housing	Policy Advisor	Fiji	09.12.2019	Face-to-face	Off-record		
Koko Warner	UNFCCC	Manager of Impacts, Vulnerability and Risks and Adaptation Programme	Germany	02.08.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name	Spoke in the capacity of an Independent Expert
Kosi Latu	SPREP	Director General	Samoa	26.11.2019	Telephone	Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	

Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Date	Interview Type	Consent Type	Attribution	Notes
Leone Saumaki	FCOSS	Project Manager	Fiji	01.03.2023	Skype	Off-record		
Maarten van Aalst	ICRC	Director of Climate Centre	Switzerland	22.08.2019	Skype	Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Mahendra Reddy	Ministry of Agriculture, Waterways and Environment	Minister	Fiji	02.01.2020	Face-to-face	Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Manuel Marques Pereira	IOM	Head of Migration, Environment and Climate Change Division	Switzerland	15.11.2022	Face-to-face	Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Mariam Traore Chazalnoel	IOM	Thematic Specialist on Migration, Environment and Climate Change	USA	06.12.2018	Face-to-face	Verbal - Recorded	Name	
Marika Palosaari	UNEP, Europe Office	Regional Programme Coordinator	Switzerland	09.01.2019	Skype	Verbal - Recorded	Organisation	
Michelle Leighton	ILO	Chief of the Labour Migration Branch	Switzerland	21.08.2019	Face-to-face	Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	

Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Date	Interview Type	Consent Type	Attribution	Notes
Michelle Yonetani		Independent Expert	Switzerland	28.06.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name	
Mike Waiwai	Ministry of Climate Change Adaptation, Meteorology, Geohazards, Environment, Energy and Disaster Management	Director of Climate Change	Vanuatu	28.03.2019	Face-to-face	Verbal - Recorded	Organisation	
Mohammed Maqbool	Ministry of Housing	Director	Fiji	09.12.2019	Face-to-face	Written - email	Name, Title & Organisation	
Nathan Ross	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade	Lead Adviser on Climate Change and Environment	New Zealand	22.01.2020	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Nazhat Shameem Khan	Fiji's Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office in Geneva	Permanent Representative	Switzerland	26.07.2019 and 13.08.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	Interviewed twice
Nina Birkeland	NRC	Senior Advisor on Disaster Displacement and Climate Change	Switzerland	05.07.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Rae Bainteiti	Kiribati Aotearoa Diaspora	Social Service Manager	New Zealand	13.10.2020	Skype	Verbal - Recorded	Name	

Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Date	Interview Type	Consent Type	Attribution	Notes
	Directorate Charitable Trust							
Rebecca Monson	Australian National University, College of Law	Professor of Law	Australia	19.05.2023	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Richard Bedford	University of Waikato and Auckland University of Technology	Emeritus Professor of Population Geography	New Zealand	04.05.2019	Skype	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name	
Robyn-Ann Elizabeth Mani	Fiji's Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office in Geneva	Second Secretary	Switzerland	26.07.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Robert Oakes	UNU-EHS	Senior Researcher	Germany	21.06.2019	Skype	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Title	
Robert Vaughan	OHCHR, Pacific Office	Human Rights Officer	Fiji	08.12.2018	Face-to-face	Verbal - Recorded	Name	
Sabine Mininnger	BfW	Policy Advisor on Climate Change	Germany	13.12.2018	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name	
Sabira Coelho	International Organisation for Migration	Manager for the Pacific Climate Change, Migration and	Fiji	26.09.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name & Title	

Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Date	Interview Type	Consent Type	Attribution	Notes
		Human Security Programme						
Saleemul Huq	ICCCAD	Director	Bangladesh	15.07.2019	Skype	Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Sanjula Weerasinghe		Independent Expert	Switzerland	29.07.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name	
Scott Hook	PIFS	Economic Infrastructure Adviser and Team Leader of Resilience	Fiji	01.11.2019	Skype	Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Scott Leckie	Displacement Solutions	Director	Australia	07.08.2019	Skype	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	Spoke in former capacity
Simalua Jacinta Enele	Tuvalu's High Commission to New Zealand	First Secretary	New Zealand	27.11.2020	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name	
Simon Bradshaw	Oxfam Australia	Climate Change Advocacy Lead	Australia	04.06.2019	Skype	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Stephane Jaquemet	ICMC	Director of Policy	Switzerland	12.08.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name, Title & Organisation	
Susanne Melde	IOM-GMDAC	Senior Researcher	Germany	29.08.2019	Skype	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name & Organisation	

Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Date	Interview Type	Consent Type	Attribution	Notes
Teea Tira	PIFS	Climate Resilience Secretariat Coordinator	Fiji	20.02.2020	Skype	Verbal - Recorded	Title & Organisation	
Timothy Bryar	PIFS	Senior Adviser on Conflict Prevention	Fiji	17.10.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name	
Timothy Westbury	UNESCAP, Pacific Office	Deputy Head and Senior Sustainable Development Officer	Fiji	07.10.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name & Title	
Vani Catanasiga	FCOSS	Executive Director	Fiji	19.11.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Organisation	
Viliame Wilikilagi	PIFS	Regional Security Advisor	Fiji	20.02.2020	Skype	Verbal - Recorded	Title & Organisation	
Walter Kalin	University of Bern	Emeritus Professor on International and Constitutional Law	Switzerland	24.07.2019	Face-to-face	Written & Verbal - Recorded	Name & Title	
Willy Missack	Oxfam Vanuatu	Coordinator of the Vanuatu	Vanuatu	16.05.2019	Skype	Verbal - Recorded	Name	

Name	Organisation	Position	Location	Date	Interview Type	Consent Type	Attribution	Notes
		Humanitarian Team						
Yogesh Karan	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Immigration and Sugar Industry and Office of the Prime Minister	Permanent Secretary	Fiji	07.12.2018	Face-to-face	Verbal - Recorded	Name	

Appendix D: Sample Interview Questions

1. What are your thoughts on the state of environmental migration policies in the Pacific?
2. Does your institution/organisation aim to develop environmental migration policies?
3. Why is your institution/organisation seeking to develop environmental migration policies?
4. To your knowledge, what types of environmental migration policies exist?
5. Where has your institution/organisation learned about these environmental migration policies?
6. What are the key objectives/goals of your institution? Have these goals changed over recent years? If so, how and why? How are these objectives decided/influenced?
7. In your opinion, what are some strengths and weaknesses of existing environmental migration policies? What are some challenges to developing environmental migration policies?

Example: ILO Interview Questions

1. What are your thoughts on the state of environmental migration policies in the Pacific?
2. What are the key objectives of ILO? Have these changed recently? If so, how and why? How are these objectives decided or influence?
3. How did ILO get involved environmental change and migration discussions?
4. Does ILO aim to develop environmental migration policies? Why or why not?
5. To your knowledge, what types of policies exist that might be portrayed or perceived as potential solution to environmental migration?
6. Where has ILO learned about these policies?
7. What do you think are some of the challenges in developing environmental migration policies?

8. In your opinion, what are some strengths and weaknesses of existing environmental migration policies? What are some challenges to developing environmental migration policies?

Labour migration policies: Kiribati & Tuvalu

- How were these policies developed?
- Are there any examples or case studies that were used to develop these policies?
- Why do the policies focus on temporary labour migration, establishing diaspora communities and student migration? Where did you learn about these 'programmes'?
- Do you think the labour migration policies are feasible solutions to environmental migration?

Appendix E: Approvals

Appendix E1: Ethics Approval

MONASH University

Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee

Approval Certificate

This is to certify that the project below was considered by the Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee. The Committee was satisfied that the proposal meets the requirements of the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research* and has granted approval.

Project ID: 14645
Project Title: Searching for environmental migration policies in the Pacific
Chief Investigator: Assoc Professor Alan Gamlen
Approval Date: 14/11/2018
Expiry Date: 14/11/2023

Terms of approval - failure to comply with the terms below is in breach of your approval and the *Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research*.

1. The Chief Investigator is responsible for ensuring that permission letters are obtained, if relevant, before any data collection can occur at the specified organisation.
2. Approval is only valid whilst you hold a position at Monash University.
3. It is responsibility of the Chief Investigator to ensure that all investigators are aware of the terms of approval and to ensure the project is conducted as approved by MUHREC.
4. You should notify MUHREC immediately of any serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants or unforeseen events affecting the ethical acceptability of the project.
5. The Explanatory Statement must be on Monash letterhead and the Monash University complaints clause must include your project number.
6. Amendments to approved projects including changes to personnel must not commence without written approval from MUHREC.
7. Annual Report - continued approval of this project is dependent on the submission of an Annual Report.
8. Final Report - should be provided at the conclusion of the project. MUHREC should be notified if the project is discontinued before the expected completion date.
9. Monitoring - project may be subject to an audit or any other form of monitoring by MUHREC at any time.
10. Retention and storage of data - The Chief Investigator is responsible for the storage and retention of the original data pertaining to the project for a minimum period of five years.

Kind Regards,

Professor Nip Thomson

Chair, MUHREC

CC: Assoc Professor Megan Farrelly, Ms Lakshmin Mudaliar

List of approved documents:

Document Type	File Name	Date	Version
Consent Form	Consent Form Middling and Junior Policy Actors	31/10/2018	1st
Consent Form	consent forms Senior Policy Actors, Academics and Researchers	31/10/2018	1st
Supporting Documentation	sample interview questions draft 1	31/10/2018	1st
Explanatory Statement	Explanatory Statement middling and junior policy actors	31/10/2018	1st
Explanatory Statement	Explanatory Statement Senior Policy actors	31/10/2018	1st
Supporting Documentation	Invitation to participate in interview	07/11/2018	1st

Appendix E2: CCICD Research Permit

MINISTRY OF ECONOMY

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29 October, 2019

To whom it may concern

Support for research undertaken by Ms. Lakshmin Mudaliar

1. This letter serves to indicate the support of the Climate Change & International Cooperation Division under the Ministry of Economy, towards research undertaken by Ms. Lakshmin Mudaliar of the Monash University.

2. Ms. Mudaliar will be assessing the emergence of best practices in the management of climate-induced human mobility in the Pacific with a specific focus on the role of policy actors in shaping, standardising and transferring climate change-migration policies.

3. We believe that the information gathered and made available by Ms. Lakshmin will be useful for the Fijian Government, especially in providing the necessary data that would assist in the climate-induced human mobility related work at national level.

4. Ms. Mudaliar has assured that any research undertaken will be governed by the Monash University human research ethics and findings will be made available to the Fijian Government.

5. Ms. Mudaliar will also be submitting a report to the Ministry of Economy on the findings of the research within 30 days of completion, and will share the final thesis when it becomes available.

6. For any additional queries regarding this support letter, please contact the undersigned or Mr. Shivanal Kumar on shivanal.kumar@economy.gov.fj.

Thank you.

Yours sincerely

Nilesh Prakash
Head of Climate Change & International Cooperation Division