UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT AND THE LOGICS OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER FORMATION

A Critical Analysis of Recent Theories of Order Formation within the Modern Western States-System

by

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This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except when due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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ABSTRACT

The thesis provides a critical, comparative analysis of some important, recent theoretical approaches to the study of international relations in terms of their distinctive explanations of the process of order formation characterising the modern western states-system. Drawing upon the critical resources offered by Ashley's typology of different knowledge-constitutive interests orienting different forms of theoretical inquiry, the thesis distinguishes the contrasting conceptions of this modern process of international order formation presented in the work of representative thinkers of the Neo-Realist, Rationalist and Critical theoretical perspectives, noting the different methodological approaches informing these models. At the same time, the thesis provides a critical assessment of these different theories in terms of their relative adequacy as a means for understanding the general nature and significance of this modern process of order formation considered, in broadest terms, as the expression of the uneven development of power between modern states. A central aim of the thesis argument in this context, is to indicate how the elaboration of this critical comparative analysis raises the possibility for the development of a more sophisticated theoretical model - a synthetic perspective which draws upon the valuable insights provided by the Neo-Realist, Rationalist and Critical approaches as the basis for the articulation of a more adequate understanding of the nature and implications of the process of order formation within the modern western international system.

INTRODUCTION

Since the time of Thucydides the question of what are the appropriate principles which should govern states' actions in their external relations and, consequent upon this, what type of order may be said to be possible between states has assumed a privileged position in the western tradition of thinking about international relations. Moreover, from the outset this issue has given rise to quite diverse and often conflicting responses in accordance with the more basic understandings of the nature of international relations informing the successive traditions of theoretical speculation on the subject.[1] In Thucydides' own Melian Dialogue[2], for example, we find articulated two radically opposed views of the limits of cooperative relations between states reflected in the respective positions of the Athenians and the Melians. Thus, the Athenians, in emphasising the necessitous nature of international relations as a sphere wherein self interest forms the basic motive of political action, offer a minimalist account of the possibilities for states' cooperation. Here the standard of justice governing the behaviour of states is seen to be dependent upon "the equality of power to compel and ... in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept"[3]. Contrasting with this position is the view of the Melians for whom the relations between states are seen to be subject to the normative standards of a community transcending individual states' interests and encompassing the totality of humankind. The proper foundation of

interstate relations is identified by them with those higher, universal principles of justice pertaining "to the general good of mankind ... [based on considerations of] fair play and just dealing."[4]

Significantly, contemporary scholars have pointed to a similar divergence of attitudes in the writings of those modern thinkers addressing themselves to this central question of the normative limits to the process of international order formation dictated by the qualitative nature of international relations as a sphere of political action. In this context Clark has differentiated between the opposing attitudes of Kant and Rousseau as representative of a much broader cleavage characterising modern thought on this subject manifested in the so-called traditions of optimism and despair.[5] For those thinkers included within the tradition of despair epitomised by the work of Rousseau, the sphere of international relations is understood as an unchanging, anarchical realm characterised by conditions of necessitous action which rigidly constrain the type of political relations possible between states. In a manner not dissimilar to that presented in the arguments of the Athenians the nature of cooperative relations between states is here seen to be rigidly delimited by the objective laws associated with the operation of an anarchical system of political action in which the dictates of states' self interest predominate. Here then, we encounter a strictly limited conception of the process of international order formation circumscribed by the recurring, necessitous constraints arising from a condition of international politics in which life is best characterised in Hobbesean terms as nasty, brutish and short.[6]

Opposed to this general attitude of despair Clark identifies those thinkers who, following Kant, may be said to fall broadly within the purview of the tradition of optimism. According to Clark these thinkers are united, first and foremost, by the more expansive conception of the potential for cooperation between states they offer - a conception based upon their shared view of the sphere of international relations as a condition facilitative of change and progress. Where the attitude of despair involves a denial of the possibility for the qualitative transformation of relations between states, the attitude of optimism, when applied to international politics, "reflects a faith that progressive change is possible."[7] More particularly, this progressivist perspective entails a view of international relations as subject to the influence of ethical principles transcending the interests of particular states which potentially bind all humans as rational beings. As such these normative principles are seen to constitute the informing basis for the ongoing transformation of the anarchical structures of order existing between states, offering the foundation for the establishment of extended forms of human cooperation beyond the more limited dictates of states' self interest. Accordingly, for those subscribing to this tradition the attitude of optimism characterisitically engenders a concern with the prospective transformation of the relations between states and the extension of the nature of international order in accordance with these higher, universal norms.

Locating itself within the broader tradition of speculation noted here, the present thesis is concerned to examine the way this central question of the nature and limits of international order formation has

been treated of within the works of certain important recent aspects of international relations theory. As we shall see, the theoretical perspectives examined in this work are characterised by their common concern with this issue as it relates to the particular milieu of the modern western states-system. Moreover, like the diverse perspectives associated with the broader theoretical tradition which precedes them, these different theoretical approaches present contrasting views of the nature and limits of order formation within the specific context of this modern states-system. They manifest their own distinctive attitudes of relative optimism or despair in accordance with their views as to whether that system is akin to one of amoral anarchy, in which cooperation can only be based upon the dictates of self interest or, alternatively, a condition susceptible to higher forms of interaction facilitating progressively more extensive forms of cooperation. Proceeding according to these fundamental assumptions about the qualitative nature of international relations as a sphere of political action each of these broad perspectives offers its own distinctive interpretation of the nature and limits of order formation between states within the modern western system of states.

In elucidating the major features of these different theoretical perspectives it is the aim of the present work to attempt to provide some general answers to the question of how we are to understand the process of order formation within the modern western international system and to try and reach some tentative conclusions as to the qualitative limits of that general process. In isolating this as the broad focus of the thesis then, it is not my intention to offer an

historical analysis of the 'actual' processes of order formation occurring within the modern states-system.[8] Rather, the approach adopted here is primarily theoretical in nature. Taking each of these different perspectives in turn, the thesis attempts to establish their effectiveness as a means for understanding the nature and implications of this modern process of international order formation. More particularly, by critically comparing the explanations provided in these different theoretical perspectives the attempt will be made to determine what they have to offer of value for the development of a general theoretical explanation of the nature of, and the limitations upon the formation of order within the modern western states-system.

As with other central concepts of political discourse the concept of order is a notoriously ambiguous and vigorously contested one.[9] Not surprisingly, therefore, when applied to the more specific study of international politics this notion encompasses a range of different, potentially conflicting connotations.[10] In using this term in the present work in relation to the process of order formation within the modern western international system what I want to signify, in very broad terms, is the idea of a pattern of activity embracing the constituent entities of a system or society which is directed to securing certain basic ends or goals. These goals may vary, but they are all ultimately connected with a more general end which is here identified as the reproduction of those regulative structures facilitating relatively stable relations between states within a condition of political anarchy. Adopting this very broad definition as our guide we can isolate as the main concern of those theories of

international order formation examined below to explain the basic processes whereby such a pattern of activity is brought about and maintained between states within the modern western international system. Within the paramaters of the broad definition presented here, these theoretical perspectives incorporate very different views both of the type of order or pattern of activity produced by these processes and of the character of the order-producing forces themselves. Moreover, these accounts extend in most, though not all, cases to the provision of an explanation of the general reproduction of such patterns of activity between states. Accordingly, an important function of our comparative analysis will be to try to establish what is meant, in practical terms, by the different theorists when talking about 'order' and the process of order formation between modern states and, further, whether it is possible to distil from these different conceptions a single theoretical conception possessing a superior explanatory power.

In taking as its concern this process of order formation within the 'modern' western international system the thesis covers a very broad historical scope ranging from the initial emergence of this system in the breakdown of feudal society and extending to its contemporary historical expression as a system of nation states which is globally encompassing. This historical generality of the thesis is dictated by the scope of the theories which form its central focus. As we shall see, the different theoretical explanations of order formation examined below constitute very general models potentially embracing the modern international system in totom. Moreover, despite their major disparities, we can identify certain other features which they share in

common concerning the character of the process of order formation within this modern western international system. Insofar as these define the general problematic of the thesis they require some initial consideration before we can proceed to outline the criteria which will govern our proposed comparative analysis.

In the first place the theories considered in this thesis all share the view that the formation of order in the international sphere occurs in a context of political anarchy - a political condition sui generis distinguished by the absence of a central government exercising sovereign authority over the constituent states. The key notion here then, is that of the absence of government. As we shall see, this general notion of international relations as 'anarchical' in nature is given markedly different content by the theorists examined. However, the view of the international system as a condition of political 'anarchy' is linked, in turn, with a second common feature of these different theoretical perspectives which relates to the nature of the power relations between states and their implications for the general process of international order formation. This is the idea of the uneven nature of the distribution and development of power within this anarchical sphere as a central factor shaping the process of order construction among states.

More specifically, it will be my concern to show that each of these different theories assumes, in more or less explicit terms, a view of order formation within this anarchical system as, in most basic terms, a product of the uneven distribution of power between its constitutive,

sovereign members. This theme is given substantive expression in the focal idea accepted by them all that the central source of order within this otherwise 'governmentless' sphere derives from the actions of the 'great' or most powerful of states. It is these great powers which are responsible for the imposition of regulative structures producing order between states. Further, each perspective assumes, again in more or less explicit terms, that the transformation of these regulative systems of international order is an integral product of the uneven development of power within the international system. In elaborating their particular explanations of the modern process of international order formation the various theoretical perspectives examined below offer significantly divergent understandings of the form assumed by the uneven dissemination and development of power between states, the character of such power and the manner in which it is exercised by preponderant states in the construction of regulative systems of order at the international level.

Acknowledging these common assumptions underpinning the various theories of international order formation, the following work will critically compare the very different conceptions of this process presented in these recently developed theoretical perspectives. This will be the task of the first three sections of the thesis, each of which is devoted to an examination of the major explanations of international order formation presented in the works of representative theorists of the Neo-Realist, Rationalist and Critical approaches to international relations theory. The comparative analysis outlined in these sections will provide the basis for the concluding part of the thesis which is concerned to develop the outlines of a synthetic

theoretical perspective. In this context it will be my concern to examine the possibility of establishing a single theoretical approach which draws together the different theories of order formation considered in the first three sections. The guiding assumption here is that each of the theories examined illuminates different aspects of what is, in essence, a single historical process. Proceeding on this basic assumption the comparative analysis presented in the body of the thesis forms a prelude to a more holistic approach in the last part which examines how the different dimensions of order formation, examined for formal purposes in separation in parts one to three, might be interrelated within a more unified, historical account of the nature of order formation within a modern anarchical states-system characterised by the uneven distribution and development of power.

In elaborating this comparative analysis I shall draw on the resources provided by the concept of general cognitive or knowledge-constitutive interests orienting different forms of theoretical investigation which has recently been applied to the study of international relations theory by Richard Ashley.[11] According to Ashley these general knowledge-constitutive interests informing theoretical inquiry operate to shape the general type of theory constructed. They engender a particular orientation in the theorist's approach to his subject matter which is manifested at a number of levels: firstly, in the mode of inquiry adopted, secondly in the knowledge claims advanced concerning the nature of the object of study drawn from that enquiry and, lastly, in the perceived utility or purpose of such knowledge for the more general problem of the reproduction of international order. Implicit in this

notion of prior knowledge-constitutive interests informing theoretical inquiry is Ashley's view that there is no objective, value-free standpoint of intellectual inquiry. Rather, every theoretical model involves an implicit normative element shaping the understanding of the object under study. Furthermore, it is his contention that these different cognitive interests and the theories they engender may be organised in a hierarchical schema in accordance with their relative adequacy as explanations of the nature of order formation within the international system which ultimately forms their common object of concern.[12]

In his work Ashley distinguishes three such types of knowledge-constitutive or cognitive interest orienting theoretical inquiry, namely the technical, the practical and the emancipatory interest. Moreover, each of these different types of cognitive interest, in shaping the nature of theoretical analysis, leads the theorist to a qualitatively distinct understanding of the nature of the international system and the forms of co-operation engendering order between states. In so doing, each leads to a very different conclusion as to the way such order is to be effectively maintained between states. Thus, in the case of those theories oriented by the technical interest, the purpose of inquiry is to accumulate "information regarding universal [causal] laws and their operation that can expand powers of technical control over an objectified environment."[13] The international system is understood here then, as an objective sphere of natural power processes in which order is produced through the extension of technical control over the operation of such power. Moreover, the purpose of theoretical knowledge

is to facilitate this technical-rational end through the elucidation of those objective laws governing the operation of that system.

By contrast, in those theories oriented by a practical interest this technical, objectified perspective is replaced by a mode of inquiry concerned with acquiring knowledge of the conditions facilitating the establishment of a consensus among actors within a framework of socio-cultural understanding derived from tradition. In terms of this practical interest then, the international system is conceived of as a form of social community in which order is engendered as a result of the development of forms of inter-subjective understanding between the members of the community. Moreover, as Ashley notes, the purpose of such practically oriented theory, in acquiring knowledge of this socio-cultural sphere of human action, is not that of enabling an enhanced capacity to control one's object environment but, rather, to "undertake interpretations that make possible the [successful] orientation of action within a common tradition."[14] The primary interest of theories informed by this practical interest therefore, is to elucidate the inter-subjective, consensually endorsed norms, rights and meanings whose observance by the members of the community ensures the reproduction of international social order.

Contrasting with both of these interests is a third, reflective, emancipatory theory-orienting interest. According to Ashley, this type of interest assumes a more general character than the first two, potentially embracing the concerns of both within its own parameters. In addressing itself to the process of international order formation this

emancipatory theory-orienting interest is distinguished by its concern with the acquisition of knowledge of international society defined as a historically constituted totality of structures and practices. Moreover, in terms of this broad historical focus the purpose of such theory in deriving knowledge of this historically constituted totality is not limited to a concern with the extension of technical control over an objectified environment nor with the preservation of conditions of consensus between socialised subjects. Rather, its purpose, which is seen to ultimately incorporate the concerns of the other two, is that of acquiring knowledge of the nature of the humanly constituted practices and structures broadly defining the limits of human cooperation within this international society and the historical possibilities raised by a reflective consciousness of their contingent, historical character for the historical extension of human autonomy within the international sphere. The principal interest of the approach noted here then, is to elucidate the various "unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination and conditions of distorted communication and understanding that deny humans the capacity to make their future through full will and consciousness."[15] Thus, the emancipatory interest engenders an approach to international order formation viewed essentially in terms of a concern with the transformative possibilities opened up by the former for the extension of human autonomy understood as the historical elaboration of the human capacity for self determination.

These respective knowledge-constitutive interests informing theoretical inquiry give rise then, to qualitatively distinct understandings of the substantive nature of the process of international order formation in

terms of the nature of the sphere of action in which such order is produced, the forces accounting for its production and the limitations of such structures of cooperation. Moreover, as was noted above, Ashley contends that they, and the theories which they engender, may be ordered in a hierarchical schema according to the adequacy of their explanations of the nature of this process of order formation within the modern international system which is ultimately their common object of inquiry. Adopting this critical comparative model in the present work, I shall use the schema of qualitatively distinct knowledge-constitutive interests as a heuristic guide for classifying the representative theorists of the different schools of thought considered in the body of the thesis.[16] Examining the distinctive theoretical understandings of international order formation emerging from these different Neo-Realist, Rationalist and Critical perspectives, this comparative analysis indicates the broad knowledge-constitutive interest informing each of them. At the same time, it indicates how these distinct interests receive expression in substantive terms in their contrasting explanations of the general process of order formation arising within the modern international system.

As we shall see, these differences are reflected in a number of aspects of their theoretical constructs. In most general terms, they receive expression in their broad paradigmatic understandings of the anarchical international sphere forming the context of order formation. Thus, the technical interest informing Neo-Realist approaches entails an objectivistic understanding of the international system as a quasi-natural sphere characterized by unregulated power relations between

general units of power. Alternatively, the practical interest informing Rationalist theory entails a socio-cultural, interpretative understanding of international relations conceived as a society of states predicated upon culturally constituted social relations between sovereign subjects. Within the Critical theory perspective, by contrast, this societal paradigm is rearticulated, international society here assuming the form of an historically evolving set of structures and practices expressing the articulation of the reflective human capacity for conscious self determination.

Secondly, and more specifically, these differences are apparent in the different accounts of the agents responsible for producing international order, namely sovereign states, and in the type of international order engendered by them within this international system. Consideration is directed here to the differently defined nature of those order-bearing structures introduced by the great powers within the condition of international anarchy as the regulators of relations between states including, for example, the technical forms of control manifested in the balance of power and structures of hegemonic domination stressed by Neo-Realist theorists; the cultural structures of legitimate order highlighted by Rationalist theory; and the hegemonic systems of world order emphasised by Critical theory. Consideration is also given here to the differing conceptions of the qualitative nature of the pattern of orderly interaction engendered at the international level by these order constitutive structures expressing the power of preponderant states. These range from Neo-Realist accounts of international order understood purely as facilitating relations of self preservation or systemic

survival (Waltz) or the securing of relations advancing material and political self interest (Gilpin), to those Rationalist conceptions of international order involving forms of ethical-cultural co-operation expressing conceptions of moral-political legitimacy and Critical theoretical conceptions of international order as the historical expression of the creative powers of a self-determining human species.

Analysing the Neo-Realist, Rationalist and Critical approaches in terms of this critical comparative perspective I shall attempt to classify these theoretical accounts of international order formation into lower and higher conceptions in terms of their relatively more sophisticated explanatory capacity. Examining the representatives of each broad perspective in turn I will argue that the categories of the successive paradigms offer increasingly more sophisticated means for understanding the nature of the process of order formation within the modern international system.[17] In developing this hierarchy of theoretical approaches it will be argued that it is not possible to rigidly differentiate between these different theoretical perspectives. Rather, I intend to show that, far from being mutually exclusive, each of these perspectives contains unelaborated assumptions which, when their implications are fully articulated, provide points of linkage from one perspective to another.

Accordingly, in critically comparing these theoretical perspectives, the thesis argument moves in dialectical fashion through the different conceptions of international order formation suggesting how their particular limitations require the modification and elaboration of their

particular explanations of this process in ways illuminated by the insights of other perspectives, in this manner progressively building towards a synthetic perspective on the process of order formation within the modern states system which is more fully articulated in Part Four. Rather than offering an eclectic combination of elements drawn from fundamentally incompatible paradigms then, my aim will be to indicate how the synthetic conception of international order formation presented in Part Four actually evolves from, and builds upon the logic of the critical analysis presented in the first three sections. The movement of the thesis towards our concluding synthesis aims, in this way, to facilitate a progressive elaboration of, and qualitative transformation in, the nature of our theoretical understanding of the modern international system. More particularly, in Part Four we shall be led to sketch the broad outlines of a reflective, historical understanding of the nature of western international society and the process of order formation accompanying its historical development - a theoretical perspective which recognizes this process of order formation as the complex historical product of conscious creative human activity.

Notes

1. See Thucydides, History Of The Peloponnesian War, (Transl. R. Warner), Middlesex, 1972. For some important works which provide broad overviews of the treatment of this question within the western tradition of philosophical thought see F. Parkinson, The Philosophy of International Relations: A Study in the history of Thought, London, 1977; A. Linklater, Men And Citizens In The Theory Of International Relations, London, 1982; and Forsyth et al, The Theory Of International Relations, Selected Texts From Gentili To Trietschke, London, 1970.

2. Thucydides, Op. Cit., pp.400-408

3. Ibid., p.402

4. Loc. Cit.

5. I. Clark, Reform And Resistance in the International Order, Cambridge, U.K., 1980. These general attitudes relate broadly to the Realist and Idealist traditions of international relations theory. For some studies of these contrasting approaches as they are reflected in aspects of twentieth century international thought see E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-39, London, 1978 and K. J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory, Boston, Mass., 1985.

6. For an account of the main thinkers within this tradition see F. Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'etat and its Place in Modern History, London, 1962.

7. Clark, Op. Cit., p.21. For a detailed analysis of the thinkers included within this tradition see F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States, Cmbridge, U.K. 1978.

8. Such an approach arguably begs an important methodological question raised in the following pages, namely whether such a factual analysis is not inevitably informed by prior interests orienting historical inquiry.

9. This theme of the essentially contested nature of the major concepts of political discourse is elaborated in greater detail in W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts", in Max Black (ed.), The Importance of Language, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1962, pp121-46, and William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, (2nd ed.), Oxford 1983, Ch.1.

10 See, for example, the explication of the contrasting conceptions of order informing various strands of modern international thought outlined in R.D. McKinlay & R. Little, Global Problems and World Order, London, 1986. See also the careful analysis of the different meanings of this term presented by Hedley Bull in The Anarchical

Society, London, 1977.

11. R.K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, 1982, pp204-236. The notion of cognitive interests is one which Ashley derives from the work of the German social theorist, Jurgen Habermas. See J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, (Transl. J. Schapiro), London, 1971. For a critique of Habermas's schema see Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, New York, 1978. In his article Ashley uses this idea of knowledge-constitutive interests to distinguish different tendencies within the Realist school of international thought.

12. The rejection of such an objective perspective raises the problem of where Ashley himself stands, methodologically speaking, in relation to these theory orienting interests. In fact, as we shall see below, he argues the case for a higher, reflective theoretical interest which encompasses within itself the normative interests of the technical and practical versions.

13. Ashley, Op. Cit., p.210. Ashley identifies this interest with the methodological approach of the positivistic sciences applied to international relations by representative strands of Realist theory.

14. Ibid., p211. This interest is equated with the methodological approach adopted by the philosophers of the hermeneutic tradition. For some representative texts by philosophers associated with this general philosophical perspective see the essays by Gadamer and Ricouer in K. Barnes (ed.), After Philosophy: End or Transformation, Cambridge, Massachussets, 1987

15. Ashley, Op. Cit., p.227. The reflective interest outlined here is identified by Ashley with the tradition of German Critical theory represented in the writings of the members of the Frankfurt school and particularly the work of Habermas. On the general nature of this Critical approach associated with the Frankfurt School see M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: a History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, London, 1974.

16. The essentially heuristic nature of my use of these interests needs to be stressed here. Thus the argument of the thesis does not require that the theorists considered actually follow such knowledge-constitutive interests in developing their perspectives. Rather, the former are introduced here primarily as formal classificatory categories providing a valuable aid in illuminating the broad assumptions and distinctive characteristics differentiating the various theoretical perspectives examined.

17. For some recent works which also invoke this notion of a hierarchy of knowledge-constitutive interests in support of their arguments for the development of a more sophisticated critical perspective see M. Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-paradigm Debate", Millenium, Vol.16, No.2, 1987, pp.231-250, and
A. Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations, London, 1990.

PART ONE

NEO-REALISM, THE TECHNICAL INTEREST AND THE PARADIGM OF INTERNATIONAL NATURE

Introduction

Our comparative analysis of recent theories of international order formation begins with a consideration of two representative theories drawn from the Neo-Realist school of international thought, namely those of Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin. As we shall see below, these perspectives are informed by a technical interest in the modern process of international order formation in the sense defined in the introduction to this work. In terms of this common technical interest these theories are principally concerned with establishing theoretical knowledge of the international system understood as a quasi-natural condition of political anarchy. Moreover, in accordance with this naturalistic paradigm each of these theories offers an account of the constitution of international order as the product of the operation of those major structures of technical-rational control which engender a degree of stability within what is a basically antagonistic, asocial sphere of political action. The primary concern of these theories then, is with those technical, regulative structures imposed by the most powerful of its members upon this quasi-natural international sphere as the basic means whereby the basic condition of political anarchy is brought under control and a system of relatively stable relations between states is secured.

At the same time, although sharing this broad technical interest in the process of international order formation defined in such quasi-natural terms, these theories focus on quite different types of structures of

technical control as the basic agency regulating relations between modern states. Thus, in the case of Kenneth Waltz's systems theory examined in Chapter One the primary source of international order is identified with the constraining effects of the balance of power. Attention is directed here to the different forms of power balance produced by the great powers within the modern international system in response to the anarchical power relations generated by the structural condition of political anarchy delimiting inter-state relations. Exhibiting a more historically-oriented technical perspective, Gilpin's theory focusses, by contrast, on the role of successive structures of hegemonic domination as the principal regulator of the quasi-natural power relations existing between modern states. In both cases, however, their common theory-orienting interest engenders a view of such knowledge of the technical structures of international order formation as serving a strictly limited purpose; namely that of determining the relative effectiveness of the different examples of such technical control in reproducing orderly relations between states.

Examining these two theories in this first section of the thesis I shall outline their different explanations of the technical process of international order formation engendered by the great powers within the modern international system. In doing so I shall argue that they raise certain important, general themes which are of central significance for the broader concerns of this thesis. However, I will also be concerned to indicate some basic tensions implicit in their general accounts of this process. These tensions, I suggest, ultimately reflect the important limitations of their more general, mutually informing,

naturalistic paradigm of international relations, and the technical interest from which the latter is derived, as a theoretical basis for understanding the modern process of international order formation. Critically analysing the major elements of the theories articulated in the work of Waltz and Gilpin, I will attempt to show how these limitations of the Neo-Realist technical perspective point the way to a more adequate, societal approach to the explanation of the process of order formation within modern western international society.

Chapter One

Waltz's Systems' Theory of International Order Formation

The writings of Kenneth Waltz have been at the forefront of recent efforts to revise and reconstruct the Realist conception of international politics forming the dominant theoretical perspective on international relations since the second world war, from within. Along with other so-called 'Neo-Realists' Waltz has sought to reformulate the basic categories of Realist thought in an attempt to overcome certain apparent weaknesses of the orthodox perspective with the aim of producing a more robust theory capable of resisting the recent challenges to the Realist position emerging from other schools of thought.' In this chapter I consider the systems theory of international politics resulting from this process of theoretical reformulation which Waltz proposes as a superior conceptual model for understanding the general nature of international politics and the distinctive account of international order formation which he derives from the former.

After an initial consideration of the distinctive methodological assumptions underpinning Waltz's technical approach I shall proceed to examine his account of the constitutive structure of the international political system. Outlining its major defining features I attempt to show how this systems approach leads Waltz to a view of international politics as, in its most basic form, a 'quasi-natural' political system in which the constraints imposed by the underlying structure of

international politics restrict the units of the system to certain essential forms of activity while precluding the possibility of their developing other, non-necessitous types of cooperative relations. The analysis of the basic structural components of this 'quasi-natural' international system will lead us directly to our main concern with Waltz's account of the technical process of international order formation within the modern international system expressed in the operation of the regulative mechanisms of the balance of power. Here I examine his description of the different types of power balance imposed by the great powers upon the modern anarchical political system and Waltz's critical assessment of their relative efficacy in maintaining stable relations between states at the international level. Having done this we shall consider certain criticisms of Waltz's systems theory which raise serious questions concerning its adequacy as a means for understanding the processes accounting for order formation within the modern states system.

I Descriptive versus Explanatory Theories: The Virtues of a Systems Approach to International Politics

Although anticipated in his earlier works, Waltz's system's theory is presented in its clearest and most developed form in his most recent book, Theory of International Politics.[2] At the beginning of this work Waltz defines as one of his main aims "to construct a theory of international politics that remedies the defects of present theories"[3]. Accordingly, in seeking to properly grasp the distinctiveness of his

system's theory it will be helpful to initially consider the nature of those methodological and substantive deficiencies identified by Waltz in existing theories and the manner in which his own systems approach seeks to transcend their limitations. This brief analysis will provide the essential background knowledge required for an understanding of his more general conception of the anarchical structure of the international system which represents the seminal feature of his thought and the defining element in his account of the technical nature of the process of international order formation operating within the modern states-system.

Central to Waltz's critique of traditional international relations theories is his attack upon their 'reductionist' character. What he refers to here is the perceived tendency of such theories to limit their attention to one partial dimension of international politics and to seek the explanation of all international outcomes in terms of the processes occuring within this dimension. Thus Waltz observes that "with a reductionist approach the whole is understood by knowing the attributes and interactions of its parts."[4] In particular, it is national decisions and forms of action which are of overwhelming importance for the theorists adopting this reductionist approach. The focus of their attention in seeking to establish general, theoretical explanations of international politics is the level of historical process and the temporal relations between individual political units. It is this tendency to focus exclusively on 'unit level' interaction, to the exclusion of what he identifies as the larger, pre-determining dimension of the international political structure which Waltz identifies as the

major shortcoming of such theories and the source of their limitations as models for grasping the essential nature of international political relations.

Waltz traces the roots of this reductionist theoretical approach directly to the general type of methodology used by these theorists, namely the descriptive method. The aim of this descriptive method, he notes, is to establish predictive laws based on observable correlations between individual units or objects. In terms of this approach theories are defined as collections or sets of laws pertaining to the behaviour of particular types of phenomenon. Moreover, according to this inductivist perspective "truth is won and explanation achieved through the accumulation of more and more data and the examination of more and more cases."[5] According to Waltz, however, this type of theory is unable to provide objective theoretical knowledge of the subject under study. Based as it is on a highly contingent approach to the acquisition of knowledge derived from the accumulation of examples of ever greater empirical correlations, descriptive theory is incapable of providing any account of the deeper causes underlying and shaping the contingent, observable connections of objects which constitute its primary focus. Accordingly, the latter can offer us no explanation of the necessary connections explaining these constant correlations. Theoretical knowledge of this sort, Waltz maintains, can only be provided by an explanatory, or systems, approach which takes account of the deeper structure underlying the observable level of unit level interactions. We shall have more to say about this systems approach shortly. But first let us consider more closely the specific limitations arising from the

application of this descriptive methodological approach to international politics.

As the preceding comments suggest, the most serious of these shortcomings for Waltz concerns the limited explanatory power deriving from the reductionist character of this methodological approach when applied to international politics. The preoccupation of those theories adopting this approach to the study of international politics with observable connections between individual units within the international system provides a highly limited, contingent form of knowledge. For such theories try to "explain international outcomes through elements and combinations of elements located at national or subnational levels. That internal forces produce external outcomes is the claim of such theory ... The international system, if conceived at all, is taken to be merely an outcome."[6] However, according to Waltz, this descriptive approach is ultimately unable to provide general knowledge concerning the nature of the international system because the lawlike statements it generates are based purely upon the accumulation of observable instances of contingent interactions between individual states. Thus he observes that "if the actions [of states] are the main concern [of theory] then we are forced back to the descriptive level and from simple descriptions no valid generalization can logically be drawn. We can say what we see but we can't know what it means."[7]

According to Waltz then, it is not possible to adequately grasp the character of the international political system simply by focussing on the dimension of unit level interaction. Most importantly, such

descriptive analysis is ultimately incapable of explaining the manifest continuities and repetitive features characterising the behaviour of states in international politics despite constant change in the nature of those individual units which constitute the international system. A particular example of this problem is identified in the economic explanations of nineteenth century European imperialist expansion presented in the writings of Hobson and Lenin which, like contemporary international political theories, are seen as focussing upon the level of units and their temporal interactions in developing their analyses. Here Waltz notes that, "Hobson's theory, taken as a general one, is a theory about the workings of national economies... From a knowledge of how capitalist economies work Hobson believed he could infer the external behaviour of capitalist states."[8] But, while this approach might explain, at least in part, the phenomenon of ninteenth century European imperialism, Waltz notes that it is unable to account for imperialism as a general phenomenon occurring throughout the history of the international system.

Similarly, considering the phenomenon of war, Waltz observes how "many different sorts of organizations fight wars, whether ... tribes, empires, [or] nations ...[But even] if an indicated condition seems to have caused a given war, one must wonder what accounts for the repetition of wars even as their causes vary."[9] The same sort of problem is identified in current international political theories with similar consequences for their relative explanatory power. According to Waltz the different approaches of theorists such as Stanley Hoffman and Richard Rosecrance offer only a highly contingent theory of foreign

policy, not a qualitative theory of international politics. Despite their claims to provide a sophisticated explanation of international politics Waltz maintains that the common tendency of these theories is to invoke the level of states' historical interactions to explain all outcomes and continuities. The upshot is the failure on their part to account for those repetitive features characterising international politics which is inevitably attendant upon this reductionist method.

For Waltz then, this "repeated failure of attempts to explain international relations ... through examination of interacting units strongly signals the need for a systems approach."[10] As defined by him systems theory is differentiated by its over arching, all-embracing explanatory character. What distinguishes it, first and foremost, is its concern to provide an account of the general context within which unit-level interactions occur. In specific terms, this type of theory aims to describe the underlying organizational principles which represent the principal source of those recurring features characterizing the contingent, historical relations between states. According to Waltz such explanatory theories "do not only define terms and specify the functions which can be performed [by the units considered]. They [also] indicate ... what the structure of a realm of inquiry may be."[11] In developing such general explanations, systems theory proceeds in a formal, deductive fashion. To establish the formal structure defining a particular system the theorist must abstract the former from the attributes and relations of its constituent units. The systemic model generated in this formal fashion may then be used as the basis for explaining and predicting those outcomes unexplained by the descriptive

approach noted above.[12] Waltz's own systems theory, predicated upon this type of methodological approach takes, as its central aim, to provide theoretical knowledge of the underlying features defining the structure of the international political system. Its specific concern is to delineate the underlying structural dimension of international politics which constrains everyday unit-level interactions among states, thereby engendering certain forms of 'necessary' action within the sphere of international politics. It is to Waltz's account of the elements of this systemic structure of international politics that I now turn.

II The Anarchical Structure of the International System: Constitutive Elements

In elaborating his account of the underlying, anarchical structure of the international system postulated by the explanatory theoretical method sketched above, Waltz stresses the importance of strictly separating the former from the historical dimension of unit-level interaction between states. "To claim to be following a systems approach ... requires one to show how system and unit levels can be distinctly defined. Failure to mark and preserve the distinction between structure, on the one hand, and units and processes on the other, makes it impossible to disentangle causes of different sorts and to distinguish between causes and effects."[13] In fact, as we shall see below, within Waltz's perspective this structural dimension represents an abstract, apriori level of the international system which determines, but is itself unaffected by, the temporal relations between states.

According to Waltz "the concept of structure is based on the idea that units differently juxtaposed ... behave differently and, in interacting, produce different outcomes."[14] In order to establish the nature of a system's structure one must ignore how its units relate to each other and concentrates on how they stand in relation to one another. This formal element of the organization of the units of the system imposes a set of distinct, constraining conditions upon all states which shape their political behaviour. In this manner the "structure of the system acts as a constraining and disposing force and, because it does so, systems theories [are able to] explain and predict continuity within the system."[15] Our analysis of the major constitutive elements of the anarchical structure of the international system as defined by Waltz will pay particular attention to his account of the way the former engender a quasi-'natural' system of relations between states which imposes basic limitations upon the nature of their political behaviour. It is these constraints which are identified as the main factor delimiting the type of order formation that may be expected to arise among the constituent sovereign units within the international system. For they ensure that only one particular form of order can emerge within the international system - a technical-rational type of order characterised by the imposition of forms of technical control over the, otherwise anarchic, relations between states.

Waltz identifies three main defining aspects of the international political structure which produce constraining effects upon the unit level behaviour of states within the international political system. At the most general level of theoretical abstraction is the anarchical

principle by which states are organized or stand in relation to each other. The other elements of the international structure, considered below, are presented as articulations of this primary organizational principle. In attempting to clarify the character of this anarchical organizing principle Waltz draws a direct contrast between it and the hierarchical principle governing the organisation of domestic political systems. Within the domestic political system, he notes, the individual parts stand in relations of super and subordination. Here political actors are formally differentiated according to their relative degrees of authority. Moreover, the differentiated nature of domestic political authority is accompanied by the specification of the particular functions of each unit within the larger system. According to Waltz, this hierarchically organized domestic political structure facilitates the development of relations of dependence between these units. In this condition, where "some are entitled to command and some to obey"[16] the necessary conditions of security exist for the development of a division of labour among the constitutive units as the basis of its centralized operational system.

By contrast, the international political system, structured in accordance with the principle of anarchy, is characterized by a decentralized organization of political power. Here each state is related as "formally the equal of the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey... In the absence of agents with system-wide authority formal relations of super- and subordination fail to develop."[17] According to Waltz the principal effect of this anarchical ordering of units at the international level is that all

states are constrained to a basic concern with self-help as the precondition for survival. Given the decentralized, anarchical character of international politics the concern for survival becomes the basis of action where the security of states is not assured. "To achieve their objectives and maintain their security, units in a condition of anarchy ... must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves. Self help is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order."[18]

This overiding preoccupation with individual survival and the logic of self-help associated with it impose fundamental limitations upon the possibilities for unit-level cooperation within the international system. "In any self-help system, units worry about their survival and the worry conditions their behaviour."[19] The nature of this conditioning becomes apparent in Waltz's explanation of the second feature of the international structure, namely the differentiation of units according to the nature of their functions. In this respect the distinguishing feature of international politics is identified as the 'sameness' in the character of states as functional units. Where "national politics manifests a division of labour wherein differentiated units perform specified functions... international politics consists of like units duplicating one another's activities."[20]. The reason for this functional uniformity is quite simple. Within the decentralized international system the absence of political security and the consequent necessity for self-help ensure that all states reproduce certain basic functions to ensure their survival. Thus, despite major variations of size, wealth and power, states "perform, or try to perform tasks, most of which are

common to all of them ... Each state has its agencies for making, executing and interpreting laws and regulations, for raising revenue and defending itself."[21] At the same time, the insecurity attendant on the structural condition of anarchy also limits states' preparedness to engage in highly developed modes of interdependence or cooperation with their counterparts. For, to partake in such cooperative associations with other states may prejudice one's own chances for survival, either by contributing to the increase in power of a potential enemy or by weakening one's capacity for self defence owing to overdependence on other states in a system governed primarily by the principle of self-help. In this way the general condition of insecurity engendered by the anarchical international structure and the accompanying uncertainty about others' future intentions and actions works against states' cooperation.

Seemingly then, the outcome of these structurally imposed constraints upon cooperation between states is a political condition where "each country is constrained to take care of itself, [while] no one can take care of the system."[22] Despite these restrictions, however, Waltz notes that a minimal form of cooperation between the units of the system does arise and it does so as a result of the very concern for security which precludes over dependence of the type noted above. For, given the competitive nature of international politics, states will seek, at a minimum, to ensure their survival and at maximum, to achieve a position of international domination as the means to ensuring their security in a condition of international anarchy. According to Waltz there are basically two ways of achieving this end - either internally, by

increasing one's economic and military strength, or externally, by building alliances with other states. In the second case it is the dictates of self-help which themselves lead to the development of cooperative relationships between states, albeit of a highly contingent and transitory nature. Through the external practice of alignment and realignment states seek to "strengthen and enlarge ... [their] own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one"[23] thereby enhancing their own security. To isolate oneself from this process is to minimize one's defensive capabilities vis a vis other states and to leave oneself vulnerable to the insecurities flowing from this in a condition of political anarchy. Thus for Waltz "a self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves or do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers ... Fear of such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend towards the creation of balances of power."[24] The formation of strategic alliances constituting such balances of power is, therefore, an imperative dictated by the anarchical structure of the system itself.

The consideration of this phenomenon of alliance formation and power balancing brings us, finally, to the third aspect of the international political structure posited by Waltz. The element referred to here is the distribution, and specifically the uneven distribution, of capabilities between the units of the international system. Constituting the central feature of Waltz's more specific account of the technical process of international order formation, this aspect of the system's structure is of particular concern to us. According to Waltz, although "capabilities are attributes of units, the distribution of capabilities

is ... a system wide concept."[25] Moreover, the formation of international balances of power regulating relations between states presupposes the prior, assymetrical distribution of such capabilities among the units of the system. Although identical in their formal functions then, Waltz observes that states are distinguished by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing those similar tasks. Herein lies the key to an understanding of the possibility for the creation of some degree of stable order within the structural condition of international anarchy. Possessing, as they do, the greatest capabilities to perform these functions, it is the major powers of the system which find themselves in the position of being able to engage in the formation and management of system wide power balances which provide a degree of stability at the international level.

Demonstrating the logic behind this process Waltz introduces an analogy drawn from economic theory concerning the operation of the market under conditions of perfect competition as opposed to an oligopolistic situation. In a condition of perfect economic competition, he notes, small individual producers are equally dominated by the market and unable to exert any direct influence over its general operation. Because of the predominance of market forces beyond their control these producers consider only how to plan and conduct their own operations, remaining vulnerable to the overall trends of the market. They are subject to the 'tyranny of small decisions', the collective outcome of the multiplicity of individual decisions made within the economic system. In an oligopolistic situation, by contrast, the size of the dominant, large firms enables them to influence both the market and one

another. Under these circumstances, and especially because the market does not uniquely determine outcomes, "all are impelled to watch their competitors and to try to manipulate the market."[26] According to Waltz a similar process operates in the production of order within the anarchical international system.

Here, smaller states, owing to their limited capabilities, are predominantly constrained to the immediate concern with self preservation imposed by the anarchical structure of the international system. Their scope for acting in the international sphere is sharply limited by the onerous burden of providing for their basic political survival in a system over which they can exercise little influence. By contrast, the great powers, with their far greater power capabilities, are able to provide for their own immediate security needs while simultaneously retaining sufficient capabilities to act on a wider stage and impose forms of regulation on the system more generally. Given this measure of self-sufficiency deriving from the possession of great power capabilities, such states can insulate themselves by muting the effects of adverse external movements, thus enabling them to direct their surplus capacities to broader concerns. Accordingly, great powers are "like major corporations ... at once limited by their situations and able to act to affect them. Further, they have to react to the actions of ... [other great powers] whose actions may be changed by the reaction."[27]

The superior capabilities of these great powers then, confer upon them the role of managing the international system by engaging in system-wide

power balancing activities. "Great tasks can be accomplished only by agents of great capability. That is why states, and especially major ones, are called on to do what is necessary for the world's survival."[28] The relatively concentrated nature of power within the international system gives to the small number of states at the top a larger interest in exercising power and a greater ability to do so. Accordingly, in Waltz's systemic view of things,the great powers represent the strategic or technical managers responsible for introducing a degree of stability and order into the quasi-natural, anarchical system. Such order is produced by the imposition of countervailing checks upon the otherwise unconstrained exercise of international political power through the operation of the regulative structure of the balance of power. In this respect "to interdict the use of force by the threat of force, to oppose force with force ... [represents] the most important means of control in [international] security matters. With a highly unequal distribution of world power, some states, by manipulating the threat of force, are able to moderate others' use of force internationally."[29]

A further implication of this third dimension of the system's structure for the process of international order formation outlined here relates to the possibility for fundamental change in the international balance of power and the structure of international order which it implies. Insofar as the source of international order within a particular system is the assymetrical distribution of capabilities between its sovereign units, any fundamental change in the overall distribution of capabilities between states necessarily produces a transformation in the structure of the system itself. According to Waltz such radical change

in the overall distribution of capabilities among the system's units is expressed, in practical terms, by an expansion or contraction in the number of powers involved in the management of the system. This type of change in the relative distribution of unit capabilities is particularly significant insofar as it brings with it a general transformation in the manner and relative effectiveness with which the affairs of the whole system are organized.

Thus Waltz notes that the emergence of different distributions of unit capabilities, insofar as they produce different numbers of great powers, "mark the transition from one [anarchical] system to another because the opportunities offered for balancing through combining with others vary in ways that change expected outcomes."[30] The variations produced by such changes in the number of great powers managing the system are expressed, first and foremost in the different forms of technical control facilitated by the different forms of international power balancing to which they give rise. Moreover, as we will see below, these different types of technical-rational control over the condition of international anarchy involve highly divergent implications for the relative stability of relations between states. In turning now to examine Waltz's conception of the technical process of order formation as it is manifested within the modern western international system we will give special attention to his views concerning the relative effectiveness of the different types of power balancing accounting for the reproduction of stable order between modern states.

III Bipolar versus Multipolar Balances and the Technical Production of Order within the Modern States-System

Having considered the major aspects of Waltz's systems theory of international politics in general terms we can now turn to our central concern with his account of the nature of order formation within the modern international system. Expanding upon his basic view of international order formation as the product of the uneven distribution of power within the international system, Waltz identifies two major types of international order which have characterised the history of the modern states-system corresponding to two very different structural forms of the distribution of power capabilities among modern states. These he identifies as the multipolar system existing prior to the second world war, and the bipolar system characterizing the current postwar phase of international history. Waltz's theoretical account of order formation within the modern states-system is, in essence, a comparative analysis of these two types of international power balancing and their relative efficacy as forms of technical rational control generating order out of the condition of international anarchy. Moreover, in comparing these two forms he argues strongly in favour of the bipolar system as the most effective mechanism for securing technical control over the international system as the basis for the reproduction of a stable system of relations between states. Accordingly, in examining his account of order formation within the modern international system we shall pay particular attention to Waltz's reasons for preferring the former, bi-polar, internal form of power

balancing as opposed to what he describes as the external mode associated with the multipolar balance of power.

In Theory of International Politics Waltz observes that "in all of modern history the structure of international politics has changed but once. We have only two [modern] systems to observe."[31] What distinguishes these two systems primarily is the structurally different distribution of capabilities they involve. The first of these, characterised by a relatively diffuse distribution of power capabilities among a multiplicity of great powers, existed in Europe prior to nineteen forty five. The second system, characterising the contemporary global order, is one in which the distribution of capabilities is highly concentrated in favour of two great powers possessing greatly superior capacities relative to other states. Waltz's main concern in analyzing these two types of modern anarchical structure is to highlight the different types of technical control over international political relations to which they have given rise and the relative degrees of stability which they have generated within the multipolar and bipolar systems respectively. It should be noted that these modern systems of order formation are offered by Waltz, simultaneously, as typological models from which to draw general conclusions concerning expected outcomes wherever multipolar or bipolar systems are operative. Accordingly, Waltz's thought moves constantly between the historically particular and the general in analyzing these modern forms.

The focus of Waltz's comparison of these two modern systems of international order formation are the different external and internal

modes of power balancing characterizing the multipolar and bipolar systems respectively. Within the pre-nineteen forty five system, Waltz argues, the politics of power and the production of order turned primarily on the diplomacy by which inter-state alliances were made, maintained and disrupted. This was basically because of the more diffuse distribution of capabilities within that system which enabled a multiplicity of great powers to actively participate in the process of balancing at the international level. The condition of multi-polarity thereby created was disinguished by a high degree of flexibility in the relations between the major states which involved major ramifications for the stability of the balance of power. Contrasting this situation with a bipolar world where temporary imbalances in the distribution of power can be righted by the internal efforts of the two preponderant powers, Waltz notes that "with more than two [great powers], shifts in alignment provide an additional means of adjustment, adding flexibility to the system."[33] It was this ability of states to constantly shift alignments which is traditionally seen by scholars as the great strength of European multipolar politics and the central element in the maintenance of international stability, particularly in ninteenth century Europe.

Taking up this argument Waltz notes two interrelated, positive implications of this flexible mode of power balancing for the stability of the European states-system traditionally emphasised by students of international relations. The first of these is the argument that the more diffuse systemic distribution of capabilities, by producing flexibility in alliances, "keeps relationships of friendship and enmity

fluid and makes everyone's estimate of the present and future relation of forces uncertain."[34] Such uncertainty is identified as generating a healthy caution in the foreign policy of the great powers and, as such, operated as a major deterrent to aggressive action on the part of any individual state. In addition to the indirect deterrent effect produced by this general condition of uncertainty, this mode of external balancing also provided a more direct check on the unconstrained flow of anarchical forces through the direct combination of states to counter the potential thrust of aggressor powers. The constant changes in alliances facilitated by this flexible system of external power balancing created a system of countervailing forces working, more or less successfully at different times, to check the hegemonic tendencies of any particular great power. In this manner the mode of balancing deriving from the multi-polar structure gave rise to a mode of technical regulation of the 'quasi-natural' power processes of the international system which brought with it a significant degree of order and stability. Such stability within this system was dependent upon a highly dynamic form of regulation of interstate relations by the great powers characterized by a continual state of relational flux. It was through the operation of this system, when functioning effectively, that any systemic imbalances were righted and potentially destabilizing tendencies kept in check.

According to Waltz, however, this external form of power balancing involves some major weaknesses which severely limit its effectiveness as a technical means for producing order at the international level, particularly when compared with the alternative bi-polar form.

Moreover, it is the traditionally argued virtues of diplomatic flexibility distinguishing this system which he identifies as constituting its primary weakness. This is because of the inherent fragility of the external system of balancing and the major destabilizing effects entailed by the former for the international order produced by this regulative mechanism. Thus Waltz notes that, within the multipolar system there are "too many [powers] to enable anyone to see for sure what is happening and too few to make what is happening a matter of indifference."[35]. The ultimate consequence of this inherent fragility of the multi-polar system is to significantly undermine the degree of strategic control which the mechanism of balancing is able to generate over power relations within the states-system. Elaborating upon this theme Waltz identifies a number of specific problems for the maintenance of international order deriving from this external, multipolar system of power balancing.

Firstly, there is the problem of the high level of insecurity and distrust in alliances. Here Waltz argues that the flexibility of diplomatic alliances in such a multipolar system effectively precludes the possibility of states drawing clear and fixed lines between allies and adversaries. Furthermore, there is the ever-present threat of defection by an ally which may prove fatal to its partners. "Uncertainties about who threatens whom, about who will oppose whom, and about who will gain or lose from the actions of other states accelerate as the number of [major] states increases."[36] Given this fact none of the major powers can afford to ignore the activities of other states in the system. All must be sensitive to the changing state of alliances and

its implications for their own security owing to the relatively high degree of military interdependence associated with the system of external balancing. At the same time, this preoccupation with securing alliances has the effect of limiting the policies which a state can pursue within the international sphere. Waltz's basic point here is that alliance strategies are always the product of compromise since the strategic interests of allies and their notions of how to secure them are never identical. The relative freedom of major powers within a multipolar system to make decisions is accordingly restricted. In connection with this point, Waltz argues that it is more likely in these circumstances that states' own interests would become less well defined as they seek to accommodate the interests of potential or existing allies. Thus he concludes that, in "balance of power old style [i.e. pre-1945 multi-polar] flexibility of alignment made for rigidity of strategy or the limitation of freedom of decision."[37]

A further problem arising from this external mode of power balancing relates to the assessment of relative capabilities of units within the multi-polar system. Here Waltz argues that, given the level of reliance of states on alliances with others within a multipolar system and the constantly shifting character of such alliances, attempts to assess the relative strength of opposing nations within the international system become particularly difficult. As a result states may easily misjudge the relative strength of their own and opposing coalitions. "Rather than making states properly cautious and forwarding the chances of peace, [such] uncertainty and miscalculation causes wars."[38] In Waltz's view then, the general condition of systemic uncertainty and the inherent

fragility associated with the external mode of power balancing characterising the multi-polar system of European international politics generated a system of order where dangers were diffused, responsibilities unclear and definitions of vital interests unclear. Under these circumstances the effectiveness of the technical balancing mechanism in checking the development of major imbalances within the international system was significantly compromised. The limited effectiveness of the regulative force of power balancing ensured that the degree of international stability produced by it was considerably diminished.

In marked contrast with the former is the internal system of international power balancing characterising the current bipolar international order. This system, Waltz maintains, is, in all the essential points noted above, superior to the preceding multipolar one. The key to its greater effectiveness lies in the superior capacity it offers for technical control of international power relations because of the immensely preponderant capabilities possessed by the two major powers whose exclusive role it is to manage the system. Specifically, Waltz observes that this concentration of the greatest capabilities in these two major powers produces a system of power balancing whereby the former balance each other by internal, rather than external, means, relying primarily upon their own capabilities rather than on the support of their allies. In Waltz's view this internal mode of balancing provides far greater efficiency in the technical regulation of the anarchical international system because of the greater freedom from political dependence which the preponderance of the two great powers

confers upon them. Immensely superior capabilities ensure that the degree of their reliance upon other states is very low, a fact which involves major consequences for the efficacy of power balancing and order formation within the contemporary bipolar system.

Foremost among these for Waltz is the high degree of autonomy it confers upon the great powers in their efforts to carry out their international management role. "In a bipolar world, alliance leaders make their strategies according to their own calculations of interest. Strategies can be defined to cope more with the adversary and less to satisfy one's allies."[39] In particular, the major powers do not need to worry excessively about changes in alliance by lesser states. "The gross inequality between the two superpowers and the members of their respective alliances makes any realignment of the latter fairly insignificant."[40] As a result of this greater autonomy then, the complications and uncertainties associated with reliance upon other states in external forms of balancing are largely absent. At the same time, the greater capabilities and higher degree of self dependence of the two major powers allow potential threats to stability to be more easily identified and defined. Whereas "in the great power politics of multi-polar worlds, who is a danger to whom and who can be expected to deal with threats and problems are matters of uncertainty ... in the great power politics of bi-polar worlds who is a danger to whom is never in doubt."[41] Furthermore, this enormous superiority of the superpowers and the relative insignificance of lesser states enable a far more effective definition of their respective strategic interests while also expanding their freedom to act on those interests within the

international sphere. Both are relatively free to formulate and carry out long-range policies according to their own interests as they need not accede to the demands of third parties.

The consequent diminution in the degree of confusion and uncertainty associated with the operation of the internal bipolar form of balancing thus makes it easier for the dominant powers to clarify their respective interests and, thereby, to negotiate with each other to secure those interests. "Because they eliminate the difficult business of choosing, the smallest of groups manages its affairs most easily ... On matters of ultimate importance each can only deal with the other. No appeal can be made to third parties."[42] According to Waltz this general clarity in diplomatic relations is further sharpened because of the tendency of the bipolar structure to encourage a system wide interest on the part of the two dominant states. "Their worries about each other cause their concerns to encompass the globe. For the United States and the Soviet Union regional problems are part of their global concerns. Each of them takes a system-wide view."[43] Insofar as any loss for one power within the system is a gain for its opponent it is likely that they will respond promptly to unsettling events within the system.

According to Waltz then, self dependence of parties, clarity of dangers and certainty about who has to face them are the central characteristics of the internal form of balancing characterising the contemporary bipolar system. It is these features, when taken in combination, which account for the more reliable character of power balancing within this system. The exceptional clarity provided by the contemporary bipolar

distribution of unit capabilities with respect to the assessment of relative strategic strengths and in the definition of the broad strategic interests of the opposing enemy make this internal mode of balancing a far more reliable and precise mode of technical control than previous multi-polar forms of power balancing. In particular, these features of its operation reduce the possibility of the major powers misjudging their relative capabilities thus leading to war. Furthermore, by limiting the degree of confusion and maximizing the level of certainty in the relations between the great powers, the internal bipolar mode of power balancing makes the development of imbalances between them less likely as each can quickly discern and respond to variations in the strength of their opposing number. For Waltz the overall outcome of these features of the bipolar system of balancing is a technical mode of strategic control displaying a superior level of effective regulation of the quasi-natural, anarchical, processes of the international system

This is not to imply that the bipolar system does not have its own problems and limitations. On the contrary, as was the case with the multi-polar system, the major virtues of this particular type of anarchical structure also constitute the source of its particular shortcomings, the most significant of these being the difficulties arising from over management of the system. Thus Waltz notes that "the clarity with which dangers and duties are defined in a bipolar world easily leads the country that identifies its own security with the maintenance of world order to overreact."[44] Insofar as the major burden of managing the system rests with two powers and, to the extent that

their system-wide interests are well delineated, the pressures imposed upon them are extreme. Within a system dominated by two dominant powers "few changes in the world at large or within each other's national realm are likely to be thought irrelevant. Competition becomes more comprehensive as well as more widely extended. Not just military preparation, but also economic growth and technological development become matters of intense and constant concern."[45] Accordingly, the contemporary bipolar system is one characterised by a high sensitivity to change and, more often than not, a high state of tension between the balancing states. Minor disputes may well assume a far greater significance than their indigenous character would warrant. Indeed, within the contemporary system "bipolarity encourages the United States and the Soviet Union to turn unwanted events into crises...Since world war two the United States has responded expensively in distant places to wayward events that could hardly affect anyone's fate outside the region."[46]

Where miscalculation by major powers is the major threat to stability in the multipolar system then, it is overreaction brought on by the acuteness of the system of power balancing which is the major threat posed in the contemporary bipolar system. Such overreaction has the potential to lead the major powers to rash behaviour which threatens to undermine the stability of the international system as a whole. Neverthless, Waltz maintains that this problem does not negate the superiority of the internal, bipolar system of power balancing as a mechanism for generating international order. For even here the internal mode of power balancing ensures that the potential destabilisation

arising from such overmanagement is much less serious than that deriving from the misjudgements associated with the multipolar system. The greater precision and efficiency of bipolar balancing ensures that any dispute may be identified, defined and dealt with quickly. Attention to crises is more rapid as the incentives to securing a diplomatic settlement are more clearly apparent. Thus, in comparing their relative shortcomings, Waltz is led to affirm the superiority of the contemporary bipolar international order and its internal form of balancing in engendering stability within the international system. The respective characteristics of these types of technical regulation of international anarchy mean that "miscalculation [in the multipolar system] is more likely to permit the unfolding of a series of events that finally threatens a change in the balance and brings the powers to war. Overreaction [in the bipolar system] is the lesser evil."[47]

IV Critiscisms of Waltz's Systems Theory

Having considered the main features of Waltz's technical conception of international order formation I want now to offer some major critiscisms of his system's theory as a theoretical model for understanding the process of order formation within the modern states-system. In doing so I will not dwell upon his specific arguments concerning the relative merits of multipolar as opposed to bipolar forms of power balancing. Rather, I want to concentrate upon some more general problems associated with this theoretical perspective. The most important of these concerns the nature of his understanding of the anarchical structure of the

international system and, in particular, his tendency to reify this structure as a dimension of international politics capable of being analyzed and understood in abstraction from the level of historical process. As we have seen, it is this reification of the system's structure which largely explains his quasi-naturalistic view of the nature of political relations within the international sphere. In presenting various critiscisms of this aspect of Waltz's systems theory below I shall seek to show how the tensions implicit in his own systemic account of international order formation indicate that the maintenance of such a rigid distinction between the structural and the historical levels of this process is ultimately untenable. Furthermore, I will argue that the acknowledgement of their integral connection in the process of order formation among modern states raises the need for a more generative, historical understanding of the nature of this process than Waltz's work provides.

As we saw above, the central imperative of Waltz's methodological approach is to clearly separate the structural level of the international system from the unit level interactions between states. This represents the necessary precondition for determining the nature of those recurring structural features explaining the anarchical character of international politics and the particular type of order formation characterising that condition of political anarchy. However, a central problem arising from this isolation of the system's structure concerns the inadequacies in Waltz's account of transformations in the anarchical international structure itself. This problem arises at two levels of Waltz's analysis. On the broadest level it is reflected in his inability

to account for the fundamental historical transformation responsible for creating the very anarchical international structure which Waltz identifies as the basic conditioning factor in the modern process of international order formation. Secondly, it is evident in his inadequate account of the specific nature of change in the forms of international order occuring within the modern international system. Let us consider each of these limitations in more detail.

First, then, the broader question of systems' transformation and the nature of the anarchical structure conditioning modern order formation. Within Waltz's systems perspective the anarchical structure of the modern states system is not identified as, in any way, distinctive in form. Rather, as we have seen above, his explanatory, systems approach leads Waltz to a formal deduction of the properties of this anarchical structure which are simultaneously presented as universal in their application, potentially characterising all systems distinguished by a plurality of sovereign political actors. However, as Ruggie has argued, this formal derivation of the modern structure of international anarchy specifically precludes Waltz from grasping its qualitatively distinctive historical character in contrast with those political systems preceding it.[48] More specifically, Waltz's formal, systems theory "provides no means by which to account for, or even to describe, the most important contextual change in international politics in this millenium: the shift from the medieval to the modern international system"[49] and the radical change in the nature of political authority accompanying this change. The source of this major inadequacy Ruggie locates in Waltz's misunderstanding of the second dimension of the international system's

structure, namely the level of the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions.

According to Ruggie this element of the differentiation of unit functions is not to be interpreted, as Waltz does, in terms of functional differences between units but, rather, in terms of the type of separateness characterising the units of the system. He contends that "the modern [international] system is distinguished from the medieval, not by 'sameness' or 'differences' of units, but by the principles on the basis of which the constituent units are separated from one another. If anarchy tells us that the political system is a segmental realm, differentiation tells us on what basis the segmentation is determined."[50] From this perspective then, the essential factor distinguishing the medieval and modern anarchical systems is the general type of political authority characterizing the units of each system which, in turn, determines the nature of their mutual separateness. These respective defining types of political authority Ruggie identifies as the heteronomous medieval form and the autonomous, sovereign modern form. Citing the work of Strayer and Munro, he notes that, within the medieval system, the distinction between internal and external political realms separated by clearly established boundaries was only very weakly developed. In fact, the medieval system of political order typically involved a "patchwork of overlapping and incomplete rights of government ... in which 'different juridicial instances were geographically interwoven and stratified and plural allegiances [and] assymetrical suzerainities ... abounded"[51]

Accordingly, while this system was anarchical, the form of segmental, territorial rule accounting for the character of the broader condition of anarchy entailed a heteronomous organization of territorial rights and claims. The medieval form of political rule involved juridicial allegiances which were geographically interconnected. Adding further to this complex, segmented political system were common inclusive bodies of law, religion and custom which embraced the political units but which "posed no threat to ... [their] integrity ... because the units viewed themselves as municipal embodiments of a universal community."[52] In contrast with this heteronomous, medieval type of political authority, Ruggie notes that the modern form of political power is defined by the institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive territories. In the modern international system "the institutional framework of sovereignty differentiates units in terms of juridicially mutually exclusive and morally self-entailed domains."[53] Here the character of political rule is autonomous or sovereign and the extent of sovereign rule is delimited by clearly defined political and geographical boundaries.

As Ruggie's work indicates then, the fundamentally distinct forms of medieval and modern political authority have given rise to highly distinctive modes of separateness between the political units of the respective international systems. To talk of international anarchy within the medieval and the modern international systems is, thus, to talk of qualitatively different forms of anarchy which produce quite divergent forms of political relations within those respective conditions of anarchy. Thus, the medieval international system, based on

a more porous and flexible principle of separateness, allowed for the integration of diverse territories within an overarching system of imperial, political order. By contrast, within a modern states-system predicated upon clearly defined and mutually exclusive principles of political separateness it is the mechanism of power balancing that operates to produce a degree of order among formally sovereign, independent political units.

Of particular interest to us in Ruggie's work is his account of the principal cause of this decisive historical transformation to the modern anarchical principle of organistion defining the political separation of states within the international sphere. Drawing on a central theme of Durkheim's thought, he argues that the emergence of the modern sovereign form of political rule was the consequence of the effects of a growth in the dynamic density of European society. The term dynamic density here refers to the "quantity, velocity and diversity of transactions which go on within society which profoundly affect the conditions of collective existence."[54] It was the effects of this historical increase in the dynamic social density of European society, principally manifested in the transformation of its basic socio-economic structure, which Ruggie identifies as accounting for the change in the general type of political authority defining modern states and, by implication, the form of sovereign separateness characterizing the modern international system. In advancing this argument Ruggie points to the integral connection between the domestic form of property rights and the nature of the political authority characterizing political units. Particular historical types of domestic socio-economic formation, he notes, can be

expected to correspond with distinct forms of political-legal jurisdiction within the state and, by implication, different types of political segmentation between states within the same system. "From the vantage point of ... domestic and international systems private property rights and sovereignty may be viewed as being analogous concepts ... [as] they differentiate among units in terms of possession of self and exclusion of others."[55]

Developing upon this theme Ruggie contends that the historical change in the dynamic density of European society produced a profound transformation in the basic social structure of property rights shaping the form of political authority within the political communities of these international systems. "Just as the medieval state represents a fusion of its particular forms of [feudal] property and [political] authority, so does the modern. The chief characteristic of the modern concept of private property is the right to exclude others from the possession of an object. And the chief characteristic of modern [political] authority is its totalization, the integration into one public realm of parcelized and private authority. The age in which Absolutist public authority was imposed was simultaneously the age in which absolute private property was progressively consolidated."[56] It was this change in the internal nature of political authority within the modern state, itself a product of the restructuring of the state/society relationship, which ultimately gave rise to a distinctive, external structural condition of political segmentation between states based on the mutually exclusive principle of sovereign separateness.[57]

These arguments advanced by Ruggie are important because of the way they illuminate, in most general terms, the limitations in the explanatory power of Waltz's technical conception of international order formation associated with his reification of the anarchical structure of the modern international system. For, while the delineation of structure may be an important element of a theory of international politics, Ruggie's arguments suggest that too rigid a separation of structure and historical process is made only at great cost. Indeed, what they suggest is that historical processes and the dynamic changes they engender are of crucial importance in understanding the anarchical character of the structuring of political space between modern states which limits the process of order formation occuring between them. The specific form of anarchy and the functional 'sameness' of the international system's units which Waltz's theory tends to portray as an unchanging, invariable systemic component, is here shown to be a relatively recent, historically generated phenomenon. Waltz's failure to examine the dynamic relationship between the structural and historical levels of international politics prevents him from recognising the character of the modern anarchical, international system as a distinctive historical phenomenon having its origins in the transformative processes associated with the historical dynamics of unit-level practice.

By drawing too rigid a distinction between the dimensions of its anarchical structure and the unit-level historical processes occurring within that condition of anarchy then, Waltz's systems theory effectively precludes any account of the qualitatively differentiated nature of the modern international system. Cut off from the historical

processes it shapes and which, in turn shape it, this structural dimension takes on a naturalistic, objective character and the constraints flowing from it are conceived in highly naturalistic and invariable terms. Accordingly, international political existence is depicted as an invariable condition of necessity, a struggle for survival governed by the unchanging dictates of a 'quasi-natural' structure of international anarchy. As a result, Waltz's systems theory is unable to adequately explain the distinctive forces accounting for the development of, and the formation of order within, the modern international system, nor to grasp the possibilities for the qualitative transformation of its anarchical structure which they may engender.

This brings us to my second criticism of Waltz's conception of international order formation which concerns his account of the specific nature of order formation between states within the modern international system. The main problem which arises here is the failure of Waltz's theory to provide a satisfactory explanation of the changes in the character of international order occurring within this system itself, changes which are actually posited by Waltz's own theory. The nature of this problem is most clearly revealed when we examine more closely his account of the third element of the international system's structure, namely the distribution of capabilities among the units of the system. As we saw above, for Waltz the formation of order within the modern international system presupposes the existence of an assymetrical distribution of capabilities among the system's units. The fact that some states possess relatively superior capabilities to others confers upon them both the ability and the incentive to engage in processes of

power balancing which impose a degree of stability upon the anarchical system as a whole. Furthermore, as we saw from Waltz's comparison of the modern multipolar and bipolar systems, change from one form of anarchical order to another within the modern international system is the direct outcome of major shifts in the relative distribution of capabilities among the system's units which either increase or decrease the number of states capable of participating in the balancing process, thereby transforming the outcomes produced by the balancing mechanism.

Implicit in Waltz's theory then, is the idea that broad historical changes in the distribution of capabilities, and, specifically, in the relative uneveness of the distribution of unit capabilities, produce different structures of international anarchy at different stages of modern history. In this context he notes that "the economic, military and other capabilities of nations cannot be sectored and separately weighed ... Their rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence."[58] But within his own systems theory we are provided with little explanation of the general historical forces accounting for such major changes in these relative capabilities of the system's units which allow some of them to achieve hegemonic status within the international system at particular historical moments as the prerequisite for engaging in the formation and management of international balances of power. Instead, Waltz merely takes such change as a historical given, excluding any theoretical explanation of the former as beyond the scope of a properly structural theory.

Here again we confront the inherent difficulties arising from Waltz's reification of the international system's structure which prevent him from grasping the complexities involved in the modern process of international order formation. For, such a historical analysis is arguably indispensible to an understanding of variations in the uneven distribution of states' capabilities (the third dimension of Waltz's systemic structure) which form a major determinant of the type and quality of order formation occurring within the modern international system. At the same time, such an historical analysis introduces factors for consideration which are not easily reconciled with Waltz's technical-rational conception of the modern process of order formation. Particularly significant in this respect is the influence, noted by various commentators, of cultural factors in explaining the relative effectiveness of the different forms of power balancing identified by Waltz as responsible for engendering political order in the different historical phases of the modern states-system.

Thus, in the case of the European states system of the nineteenth century arguably one of the major factors explaining the effectiveness of the multipolar balance of power in maintaining relative peace between states was the common acknowledgement by the great powers of cultural norms of collective responsibility for the reproduction of international order mutually constraining their behaviour.[59] Viewed on a more general level, another crucial factor affecting the stability of the different historical forms of power balance within the modern-states system has been the impact of changes in the nature of the war-making capabilities of modern states produced by processes of scientific change and

technological innovation, themselves a reflection of broader processes of cultural transformation.[60] The acknowledgement of such significant cultural influences affecting the modern process of international order formation clearly raises major problems for Waltz's Neo-Realist, naturalistic paradigm of modern international relations and its conception of states as mere units of power capabilities. Indeed, as we can see from the preceding analysis, the articulation of the assumptions implicit in Waltz's own account of this process of international order formation raises implications which suggest the need for a more historically-oriented, generative theory as the condition for an effective understanding of that process.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have sought to highlight the basic features and the important limitations of Waltz's technically-oriented systems theory of international order formation. This theory is particularly valuable, I would argue, for the way it highlights the limitations of a purely descriptive, or empirical explanation of the modern process of international order formation. Above all, what it indicates is the need for an adequate theoretical explanation of the latter process to take account of the effects of the modern international system's overall anarchical structure as a dominant force constraining the possibilities for action open to states, thereby shaping the broad character of order formation at the international level. This is an aspect which cannot be accounted for by adopting a purely empirical analysis of international

politics. At the same time Waltz's theory also indicates the importance of the uneven nature of the development and distribution of power between states as a crucial factor influencing the production of such systems of international order.

However, as the preceding critique indicates, it is necessary to locate this structural dimension within its proper historical context and to consider the way this anarchical structure, and the constraints which it imposes on states' behaviour, have varied in response to the transformative effects of dynamic interactions between the political units of the modern states-system. In simple terms, a generative theory of this sort must manifest a sensitivity to the way the modern anarchical structure of international politics is itself formed and transformed by the effects of historical relations among states including phenomena such as war, diplomatic relations and changes in the relative political and economic capabilities of states. Acknowledging the historical uniqueness of the modern condition of international anarchy, such a theory needs to consider the dynamic relationship between these mutually affecting aspects of the international system and the way it produces distinctive types of anarchical order at particular stages of its history.

The upshot of our preceding critical analysis then, is not that we should reject outright Waltz's systems theory as unhelpful in the formulation of such a generative, historical perspective on the modern process of international order formation. Rather, as I seek to show in the following chapters, it is possible to elaborate the bases of such a

theory by reformulating and, in the process, transforming the main elements of Waltz's systems perspective so as to provide a more satisfactory understanding of the diverse factors accounting for the process of order formation within the modern international system. As I shall seek to demonstrate in chapter two, it is by thus drawing out the implications contained in Waltz's own theory and, in this way reformulating his systems perspective, that we begin to move beyond the minimalist, technical-rational conception of international order formation deriving from the Neo-Realist, naturalistic understanding of the character of modern international relations. With these points in mind I will now proceed to a consideration of the Neo-Realist, technical conception of international order formation presented in the work of Robert Gilpin. In doing so, I shall pay particular attention to the way Gilpin's theory of international order formation elaborates upon Waltz's important, though underdeveloped, idea of the assymetrical, synchronic distribution, and the uneven historical diffusion, of the capabilities of states as the decisive factor in the formation and transformation of systems of political order within the modern international system.

Notes

1. For the broader dimensions of this recent movement to reconstruct the traditional Realist approach see Robert O. Keohane Neorealism and its Critics, New York, 1986, and the collection of articles presented in International Organisation, Vol. 38, No.2, Spring, 1984.

2. K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Massachusetts, U.S.A., 1979. Waltz's systems theory represents an elaboration of the third image of the causes of war presented in his earlier work, Man, the State and War, New York, 1959. All references to Waltz in the present chapter refer to Theory of International Politics unless otherwise stated.

3. Ibid., p.1

4. Ibid., pp.18-19

5. Ibid., p.4

6. Ibid., p.60. For some critical responses to Waltz's work which include replies to his critiscisms of their own perspectives see Morton A. Kaplan, Towards Professionalism in International Theory: Macrosystem Analysis, New York, 1979, S. Hoffman, "Review of Theory of International Relations by Kenneth N. Waltz", American Political Science Review, Vol.71, 1977, pp.1635-36, and Richard Rosecrance, "International Theory Revisited", International Organisation, Vol.35, No.4, 1981, pp. 691-713.

7. Theory of International Politics, Ibid., p.65

8. Ibid., pp.60-61

9. Ibid., p.67

10. Ibid., p.68

11. Loc. Cit.

12. It is important to stress this formal, deductive methodology used by Waltz in establishing the anarchical structure of the international system and the pragmatic nature of its validation. According to him explanatory theory is validated essentially by its greater or lesser effectiveness in enabling us to predict international outcomes and, thereby, to impose technical control over international political processes. See Waltz, Ibid., Ch.1.

13. Ibid., p.78

14. Ibid., p.81

15 Ibid., p.69.

16. Ibid., p.88. For his account of the different variants of this hierarchical principle defining domestic politics within the American and British political systems and their effects upon foreign policy formulation see Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience, Boston, 1967

17. Theory of International Politics, p.88. In articulating this distinction between the hierarchical and anarchical principles of organisation characterising the structure of domestic and international politics respectively, Waltz draws on Durkheim's typology of the organic and mechanical forms of social solidarity characterising primitive and modern societies. See E. Durkheim, The Division of Labour In Society, Transl. G. Simpson, London, 1933, for this social typology.

18. Ibid., p.111

19. Ibid., p.105

20. Ibid., p.97

21. Ibid., pp.95-96

22. Ibid., p.109

23. Ibid., p.118

24. Ibid., p.116

25. Ibid., p.98

26. Ibid., p.134

27. Loc. Cit. This does not mean that these states will always choose to act in this way. Rather, Waltz suggests that they can be generally expected to act in this way as the necessary means to maintain and enhance their power and security within a condition of anarchy.

28. Ibid., p.109

29 Ibid., p.209

30. Ibid., p.163

31. Loc. Cit.

32. Ibid., p.163

33. Ibid., p.168

34. Loc. Cit.

35. Ibid., p.169

36. Ibid., p.165

37. Ibid., p.169

38. Loc. Cit.

39. Ibid., p.170

40. Ibid., p.169

41. Ibid., p.170

42. Ibid., pp.173-74

43. Ibid., p.190

44. Ibid., pp.206-207

45. Ibid., p.172

46. Loc. Cit.

47. Loc. Cit. Some critiscisms of Waltz's account of the nature and effectiveness of these different historical modes of power balancing will be presented as part of the following critique of his broader theoretical perspective.

48. John Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neo-Realist Synthesis", in R. O. Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and its Critiques, pp.131-157

49. Ibid., p.141. For Waltz's response to this critiscism and his reassertion of his argument concerning the need for a theory of international politics to rigidly distinguish between unit-level processes and the system's structure see Waltz, "A Response To My Critics", in Neo-Realism And Its Critics, pp.322-345 and his most recent comments in "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", Journal of International Affairs, Vol.44, no.1, 1990, pp21-38.

50. Ibid., p.142.

51. Loc. Cit. For a complementary account of this complex character of medieval political authority see Carolly Erickson, The Medieval Vision: Essays in History and Perception, New York, 1976, Ch.5.

52. Ruggie, Op. Cit., p.143

53. Ibid., p.147

54. Ibid., p.148

55. Ibid., p.145

56. Ibid., p.143

57. This theme of the integral relationship between change in the domestic form of political power, engendered by the transformation of state/society relations, and the transformation in the broader structure of inter-state relations will assume increasing importance as the argument of the thesis develops.

58. Waltz, Op. Cit. p131.

59. On this aspect of the operation of the nineteenth century balance of power see F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace Ch.10. The important views of Hedley Bull and Martin Wight on this cultural dimension of great power responsibility and the normative aspect of power balancing are elaborated in detail in Section Two.

60. Arguably the most significant aspect of such processes of technological change for the modern process of international order formation have been the destablising effects upon the operation of balances of power produced by the arms races which the former have engendered. Important in this context also are the changes in the qualitative nature of war arising from the different types of countervailing force informing successive historical balances of power. On these general themes see William H. Mcneill, The Pursuit Of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since A.D. 1000, Oxford, 1982 and M. Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima, Cambridge, 1981.

Chapter Two

Gilpin and the Historical Reproduction of Hegemonic Orders of International Stability

The Neo-realist conception of modern international order formation developed by Robert Gilpin offers a dynamic, transformational view of this process which would appear, on first appraisal, to overcome many of the deficiencies identified in Waltz's structurally oriented perspective in chapter one. Indeed, it will be a major concern of this chapter to determine just how far Gilpin's historicised Neo-Realist perspective actually does transcend the shortcomings associated with Waltz's approach. As we shall see below, Gilpin's theory is wide ranging, presenting an historical account of the processes of international order formation embracing, not only the modern international system, but also the international systems of premodern times. In this chapter I will first outline the general themes which underlie this sweeping historical conception of international order formation. Here I give attention to Gilpin's account of the general drive to international dominance engendered among states by the transhistorical condition of international anarchy. Consideration is also given to the systemic process of uneven development which constrains states' opportunities to develop those structures of international dominance which he identifies as the principal source of stable order at the international level.

My focus then shifts to the historical level and Gilpin's account of the historical manifestation of these general processes of order formation within the modern international system in the specific form of the cyclical production of hegemonic systems of international stability. In the remaining part of the chapter I will offer a critical assessment of this conception of international order formation, my primary aim being to highlight some of the more significant problems associated with Gilpin's technical-rational approach to the understanding of the nature of international behaviour and historical change in the modern states-system. Here I shall argue that Gilpin's theory either ignores or understates the significance of some crucial dimensions of the modern process of international order formation which, when taken into account, pose major problems for the Neo-realist, naturalistic conception of international relations upon which his theory is predicated. As we shall see, this critique ultimately suggests the need to move beyond the limited categories of Neo-Realism to a more sophisticated historical view of international order formation within the modern states-system.

I International Anarchy and The Historical Logic of Order Formation Between States

In War and Change In World Politics, Gilpin contends that "the history of ... [the] international system is that of the rise and decline of the empires and dominant states that during their periods of reign over international affairs have given order and stability to the system."[1] Viewed in most general terms Gilpin's work represents an attempt to

outline both the perrenial conditions and the historically specific forces explaining this dynamic, transhistorical process of the formation and reformation of such systems of international order. Before examining his distinctive account of the modern process of international order formation, therefore, we shall need to give some consideration to Gilpin's views concerning the nature of those transhistorical forces which delimit the process of order formation in every epoch.[2] This will provide the essential background against which his more specific conception of the nature of order formation within the modern states-system may be understood.

Gilpin identifies two major factors affecting the process of order formation within the international sphere in any historical period. These are, firstly, the role of states as political actors and, secondly, the constraining influence of the structure of the international system. Like Waltz, he emphasises the importance of the overriding structure of the international system as a central force shaping the ordering process between states. However, in elaborating his distinctive historical perspective Gilpin supplements his views on the influence of the system's structure with an account of the autonomous role of states as rational political actors. In doing so he draws directly on the resources of rational choice theory. More particularly, Gilpin appropriates, as the informing model for his own theory, the latter's account of social interaction as an anomic, potentially anarchical condition wherein individuals, as independent, rational actors, are motivated by an exclusive interest in securing their rationally defined goals by the most efficient and effective means. In

terms of this rational choice model of political action, the special concern of the theorist is to explain how it is possible for forms of collective action to emerge among such self-oriented actors which make possible the production of those public goods required by all individuals if they are to be able to successfully realise their own rational ends. The types of public goods referred to here include such basic values as social services and, most notably, those institutional structures enforcing public order.[3]

Translating this rational choice model to the situation of states in the international system, Gilpin proceeds to define the former as rational actors whose political actions are governed by a calculative interest in manipulating international political processes to secure their rationally defined goals. Thus he notes that these political actors "enter social relations and create social structures in order to advance particular sets of political, economic or other types of interests."[4] However, once established these structures impose their own autonomous constraints upon the actions of states in pursuing their rationally defined goals. "Once in place, the international system itself has a reciprocal influence on state behaviour; it affects the ways in which individuals, groups and states seek to acheive their goals. The international system thus provides a set of constraints and opportunities within which ... states seek to advance their interests."[5] These different, systemically defined constraints upon, and opportunities for, significant political action within the international sphere are manifested most clearly in the effects upon states' behaviour deriving from the structural condition of anarchy which Gilpin presents

as a basic defining characteristic of international relations in all historical periods.

As was the case with Waltz, the crucial factor identified here constraining states' behaviour is the inherent insecurity associated with the anarchical structure of the system wherein states must act. Within this state of anarchy "each group ... is concerned about being attacked or dominated by other groups... [and] therefore strives to enhance its own security by acquiring more and more power for itself."[6] The anarchical structure of the system then, dictates a preoccupation among its constituent units with a specific form of action. Citing the views of Cohen, Gilpin concurs that, given the lack of security and the inherent rivalry and competition produced by the anarchical structure of the international system, "the survival of any one unit is ... [ultimately determined by] the range of strategies open to it... The state with only one strategic option can never feel truly secure: if that strategy fails the state will ... [most likely] be absorbed by others ... or be compelled to abandon certain of its core national values...The rational solution is to broaden its range of options - to maximize its power position, since power sets the limits to the choice of strategy"[7] and, hence, to the possibilities for states' survival.

According to Gilpin then, the perrenial condition of international anarchy generates an inherent tendency among states to expand their power in order to enhance their material capabilities and their consequent capacity for political survival. Moreover, a primary means by which states seek to enhance their power and thereby attain the rational

goal of security is through the extension of their control over the international system. This is because of the enormous benefits which such control potentially confers on those exercising it. The material and political advantages deriving from such systemic control can be used to enhance the state's power and, thereby, to ensure its security within the sphere of international anarchy. More particularly, by attaining dominance over the international system in this way a given state is able to organise the system's operations to suit its own interests and needs. In the process of doing so, Gilpin notes, it also introduces those basic structures of systemic regulation (i.e. those public goods) providing the necessary preconditions for orderly relations among the members of the anarchical international system understood as a single, collective unit.

However, this inherent drive by political units to secure a position of international dominance and the ability of any particular state to successfully achieve such dominance, is itself delimited by another systemically determined process. For, according to Gilpin, the "structure of the system [which generates this drive to international dominance, also]... imposes a cost on any behaviour that seeks to change the international status quo."[8] The specific form of this opportunity cost associated with such attempts to attain dominance within the international sphere is identified as the cost involved in waging system-wide war. Before it can succeed in its goal, any potential aspirant to international dominance must first overcome the existing dominant power and the institutionalised system of power relations which support its dominant position. It is in this context that we encounter a

further crucial effect of the anarchical structure constraining states' actions. For the degree of this opportunity cost involved in challenging the status quo, and therefore the likelihood of change in the international system at any particular historical juncture, is intextricably linked with the relative nature of power within that system.

This relativity of international power identified by Gilpin involves two main aspects. On the one hand it refers to the unequal distribution of power between states at any given time which is responsible for the development of synchronic systems of hegemonic order. On a second level it refers to the process of the uneven diffusion of power between the units of the system over time. It is on this second aspect that I want to focus for the moment. For, a central contention of Gilpin's work is that power within the international system is constantly diffusing and, further, that this diffusion of power always assumes an assymetrical character. Indeed, because of the absence of any overriding sovereign authority capable of regulating the exercise of power between states, the international power relation is necessarily a zero sum game. The loss of power by any particular state inevitably entails an increase in the power of others and, consequent upon this, an increase in the potential threat posed by these other members of the system to its security. Thus, according to Gilpin, "because power is a relative matter the rise or decline of one state by definition entails the decline or rise of another."[9]

It is this inherent relativity characterising international power relations and the uneven nature of the historical diffusion of power associated with it which is identified as the primary determinant of change within the international system. "The critical significance of the differential growth of power among states is that it alters the cost of changing the international system and, therefore, the incentives for ... [seeking such change.] As the power of a state increases, the relative cost of changing the system and of achieving the state's goals decreases and vice versa.[10] Accordingly, Gilpin notes that states will seek to change the existing international order where they believe the distribution of political power is weighted in their favour. A logical implication of this argument is that only the most powerful states are likely to be in the position to change the system as "a more powerful state can afford to pay a higher cost than a weaker one"[11] in seeking to secure international dominance. Thus, the possibilities for attaining dominant influence over the system are invariably restricted to the most powerful states of the system possessing the greatest capabilities.

The fundamental point about the relative nature of the historical diffusion of international power for Gilpin then, is its transformative effect upon the relative capabilities of states and, consequently, upon their capacity to act and assert their dominance at the international level. By increasing the power of particular states relative to others, these shifts in the distribution of international power reduce the cost involved in attempts to transform the system, thereby encouraging the efforts of those advantaged states to create a new international order serving their own needs and interests. Thus we arrive at the pivotal

feature of Gilpin's historical theory of international order formation, namely his notion of the historical law of the uneven development of power within the international system and the cyclical formation of international orders which this generates. According to this law, "as the power of a group increases that group or state will be tempted to try to increase its control over its environment. In order to increase its own security, it will try to expand its political, economic and territorial control; it will try to change the international system in accordance with its particular set of interests."[12]. In terms of this general transformative process noted here then, the overriding concern of states in their external relations is identified as that of constantly measuring and assessing their relative power capabilities as the principal determinant of their capacity to impose their dominance over, and to manipulate the international system to serve their own interests. In this respect the differential growth of power among states forms the catalyst stimulating an ongoing, cyclical process of change involving the historical formation and reformation of structures of international order.

For Gilpin then, the history of international relations is characterised by the recurrent formation and transformation of such structures of domination by preponderant states which engender systems of order within an otherwise anarchical international system. Moreover, despite the fact of constant historical change in the nature of the relations between states, the attempts by different political units at different historical times to institute new orders of international dominance are seen as inevitably governed by an invariable, rationalistic logic of

self interested action and the calculative considerations it engenders. Moreover, given his basic conception of the perrenial nature of international relations as a quasi-natural sphere of political anarchy, Gilpin discerns little possibility for the emergence of any alternative, more sociable mode of behaviour between states. The anarchical structure of international relations and the condition of political insecurity to which it gives rise ensures that actions at this level are inevitably governed by an instrumentalist, calculative interest in self preservation as the rationale determining states' behaviour and the process of order formation occurring between them. Let us now turn to consider Gilpin's historical account of this process of the rise and decline of such technical systems of international order as they develop in response to the law of the uneven development of power between states.

II The Emergence of the Modern Cycle of Hegemonic Order Formation

For Gilpin the broad developmental process described above is universal in its operation. "From the earliest civilizations states and empires have sought to expand and extend their dominion over their neighbours ... However, the precise mechanisms they have employed have differed."[13] He identifies two major types of systemic dominance and corresponding modes of international stability produced by this transhistorical process of uneven development. These are the premodern imperialist, and the modern hegemonic forms. Before turning to the modern international system I want to briefly outline Gilpin's account of the factors which

are responsible for the breakdown of the former, premodern system of international order formation and which have produced the distinctive anarchical condition giving rise to the modern cycle of hegemonic order formation which is our major concern.

According to Gilpin "the predominant form of political organization before the modern era was the empire... World politics [during this period] was characterised by the rise and decline of powerful empires, each of which in turn unified and ordered its respective international system."[14] The prominence of this imperialist mode of order formation in the premodern world is largely explained by the predominantly agrarian character of the socio-economic systems of premodern communities. In this context Gilpin observes that a "fundamental feature of the era of empires was the relatively static nature of wealth ... [Given the prevalence of this agrarian social formation] the growth in the wealth and power of the nation was primarily a function of its control over territory that could generate an economic surplus."[15] Under these circumstances the ability of a premodern state to expand its power and impose its dominance over the international system was dependent upon the amount of territory and, thus, the size of the economic surplus it commanded. "The greater the territorial extent of an empire and its political control, the greater the taxable surplus and the greater the power of the empire."[16] Consequently, the primary goal of great powers in the premodern period was to build up systems of political dominance involving direct political control over other communities.[17]

According to Gilpin the cyclical formation of such imperialistic systems, generated by the uneven development of international power, formed the major source of stable order in the premodern world. However, this premodern cycle of empires was ultimately broken as a result of profound changes in international political and socio-economic structures. The outcome of these epochal historical transformations was the emergence of a new, anarchical western international system involving a fundamentally different mode of international order formation. Three central factors are identified as responsible for this transformation of the nature of the international system. Most significant in political terms was the triumph of the political organisation of the nation state. As Gilpin observes, "in the modern world the nation-state has eclipsed every other type of political actor."[18] The principal reason for the success of this new type of political organisation he identifies as its unique ability to combine large geographical size, essential for material growth and development, with intense loyalty from its subjects. In achieving this crucial compromise the nation-state has been able to overcome the basic limitations of such earlier political forms as the multi-national empire, which commanded great power but could not generate the sustained allegiance of its subjects, and the city-state, which commanded strong allegiance but possessed limited political and economic power because of its small geographical size. Through its ability to maintain and enforce its sovereign control over an extensive geographical area and population the modern nation state has been able to utilise its internal resources to great effect. In particular, through its "taxation and conscription policies the modern state has [acquired] the capacity to mobilize the

services and wealth of its citizenry to advance its power and interests."[19]

This transformation in the character of the political units of the international system has developed in close association with a profound reconstitution of their internal socio-economic systems. Here Gilpin stresses the breakthrough to economic growth facilitated by the industrial revolution. The primary effect of the process of industrialisation was to greatly enhance the state's capacity for economic growth and development. Where earlier, preindustrial, agrarian societies were severely limited in their potential for economic growth, the rise of the modern industrial mode of production has enabled the emergence of a sustained form of development allowing the state to expand its capabilities in a variety of areas. In particular, "the advent of modern industry ... [enhanced] the direct relationship between wealth and power. [In the modern world] economic wealth and military power ... [have become] increasingly synonomous."[20] With the development of an industrial economy then, western nation-states have become more able to generate within their own borders the resources necessary for the provision of those capabilities crucial to their survival and security.

The third major transformative influence within the modern international system noted by Gilpin was the historical creation of a modern world economy. This crucial development was the outcome of the progressive historical extension of the market economy, originating initially in Western Europe, on a global scale. Indeed, with the diffusion of the

market economy and its associated system of property rights and a monetarised form of economic exchange throughout the world the former "became an increasingly important nexus of international relations. As a consequence of these developments the position of a state in the world market (the so-called international division of labour) became a principal determinant ... of its status in the international system."[21] As a result the benefits to be derived from dominant influence over the operation of the new international economic system increasingly came to exceed those rewards offered by the former imperial system of territiorial domination.

Thus, according to Gilpin, within the new international environment created by the combined impact of these profound political and economic changes the tendency of dominant states to expand as their power grew underwent a profound transformation. The dominance of the uniquely cohesive political unit of the nation state, balancing scale and loyalty and incorporating a dynamic system of economic production, has had the effect of creating a new form of international anarchy. Within this anarchical system of separate sovereign states Gilpin notes that the costs involved in attempting to impose direct imperial control over the international system have become prohibitive while, at the same time, the emergence of a modern world market has meant that the achievement of international dominance no longer requires such direct territorial control. The same end can now be acheived through the extension of influence over the international sphere. Thus, as a result of these distinctive features of the modern international system,"expansion by means of the world market economy and extension of political influence

have largely displaced empire and territorial expansion as the means of acquiring wealth"[22] and, hence, as the means of attaining greater security within the international sphere. It has been the practical creation of such systems of hegemonic influence which have constituted the central feature of the process of order formation between states within the modern condition of international anarchy.

III The Cyclical Formation of Orders of Hegemonic Stability within the Modern States-System

As a consequence of the developments noted above then, "first in the European system and then on a global scale successive political and economic hegemonies have supplanted the pattern of successive empires as the fundamental ordering principle of international relations."[23] In turning now to examine Gilpin's account of this modern process of hegemonic order formation we will direct our attention again to those two, interrelated dimensions of the relativity of international power mentioned earlier in this chapter as the major, structurally defined forces shaping the international ordering process. To recapitulate, these are the uneven distribution of international power and its translation into formal, synchronic structures of international dominance in specific historical periods and, secondly, the uneven diffusion of power between states which engenders the historical transformation and ongoing reproduction of such systems of dominance within the international system. Considering these two interrelated aspects of international power as they operate to shape the process of

order formation within the modern states system we shall be especially concerned to delineate those common features which Gilpin identifies as characterising the different historical structures of hegemonic dominance produced by the uneven distribution of power among states. At the same time, we shall give close attention to the nature of those major historical forces engendering the uneven development of power between these states as the primary factor accounting for the historical transformation of such synchronic, hegemonic orders.

In developing his analysis of the modern process of international order formation Gilpin begins with the general assumption that "the international system is in a state of equilibrium if the more powerful states in the system are satisfied with the existing territorial, political and economic arrangements ... [An] equilibrium condition is one in which no powerful state ... believes that a change in the system would yield additional benefits commensurate with the anticipated costs of bringing about change in the system."[24] Where such a historical state of equilibrium has developed the preponderant state is able to translate its superior capabilities into a formal set of hegemonic structures of international dominance serving its own needs and interests. Furthermore, as we shall see below, it is the historical tension emerging between this formal, hegemonic superstructure created by such dominant states and the constantly changing distribution of international power upon which such superstructures are predicated, which provides the dynamic source of change in these synchronic systems of hegemonic order. Before considering this transformative process,

however, let us consider more closely the formal structures of domination underpinning these modern systems of hegemonic stability.

According to Gilpin the actual possession and overt exercise of superior power has not been the decisive factor in the operation and maintenance of these different modern systems of hegemonic dominance once established. Clearly, the threat of the use of force is an ever present reality able to be used by a superior state in extreme cases. However, in circumstances where a state of equilibrium has been established between states it is the translation of this overt power into forms of international influence which Gilpin identifies as the most important factor in the maintenance of hegemonic dominance by a preponderant power. This central element of hegemonic influence is identified by Gilpin as synonomous with the prestige attaching to the great power's preponderant position in the larger international system. Thus he notes that "prestige, rather than power, is the everyday currency of international relations, much as authority is the central ordering feature of domestic society."[25] In its broadest sense prestige implies a reputation for power derived from success in war. For the most significant effect of such military success is to "reinforce the perceptions of other states with respect to ... [the dominant state's superior] capacities and willingness ... [to use those capacities] to deter or compel other states to acheive its objectives."[26]

On the basis of this common wariness of, and respect for, its superior power the dominant state is able to develop a more general system of international dominance involving the creation of practical forms of

political and socio-economic influence. The structures of hegemonic influence thus constituted represent the basic means by which dominant states have established formal systems of stable order within the modern condition of international anarchy - systems of order which have enhanced their own strategic and material interests. More particularly, according to Gilpin the structures of dominance engendered by such hegemonic powers have served to engender a condition of general consensus among the other states of the system to the dominant state's position of international leadership, in the process securing the legitimacy of the hegemon's rule. At the same time, the maintenance of this 'right to rule', has itself been dependent upon the hegemon's continued capacity to reproduce this set of formal structures of practical influence at the international level.

What is the specific nature of these general structures of hegemonic dominance which Gilpin identifies as the practical source of order among states within the international system? The most important of these forms of hegemonic influence are the different types of political leadership exercised by the dominant power. As noted above, such political leadership ultimately derives from the hegemon's ability to enforce its will on other states. In this respect "the treaties that define the international status quo and provide the constitution of the established order have authority in that they reflect this reality."[27] In this manner military prestige is translated into forms of political-legal influence manifested in the legal arrangements developed between the hegemon and other states. Complementing this influence over the operation of the international political-legal system is the important

factor of socio-economic leadership. Gilpin notes that the "rule of the dominant power is frequently accepted because it provides certain public goods such as a beneficial economic order."[28] By accepting the international leadership of their more powerful counterpart, co-operative states are able to take advantage of the considerable material benefits deriving from relations with an economically more powerful, industrialised nation.[29] Finally, and of much less significance for Gilpin, is the ideological influence exercised by the hegemonic state within the international sphere. Thus he notes that "prestige, like authority, has a moral basis ... Every dominant state promotes a religion or ideology that justifies its domination of other states in the system."[30] Accordingly, the maintenance of systemic dominance of the hegemonic state involves the dissemination of a set of cultural values which serve to provide a cohering, integrative influence within the more general system of international hegemonic order.

These, then, are the general characteristics shared in common by the more specific historical systems of hegemonic order which have resulted from the uneven distribution of power among states at different stages in the history of the modern states system. It is through the creation of such political, economic and ideological systems of dominant influence that the successive preponderant powers of France, Britain and the United States have been able to assert their control over the operation of the modern anarchical international system as the precondition for ensuring the ongoing expansion of their own power and the reinforcement of their material and strategic-political well being. Moreover, the operation of these hegemonic structures of international

dominance embodying the superior capabilities of these hegemonic states, have given rise to structures of order providing relatively stable relations between states, first within the European system and, in more recent times, on a global level.

But what, according to Gilpin, are the major historical forces which have been responsible for undermining such synchronic systems of hegemonic stability, thereby engendering the cyclical production of new hegemonies in their place? Here he stresses the importance of the historical phenomenon of economic transformation affecting the major states of the modern international system. In particular, it is the continually changing capacity of these states to accumulate large economic surpluses which represents the key factor explaining the more general transformation of the hegemonic structures of international dominance outlined above. The growth and decline of the power of states and their corresponding capacity to expand their influence over the external environment has been fundamentally constrained by this underlying economic process. In this respect Gilpin observes that, as the economic "power of a state increases it seeks to extend its territorial control, its political influence and/or its domination of the international economy."[31] In practical terms the rise and decline of successive modern systems of hegemonic stability has been an integral product of this more basic process of economic transformation of state power and Gilpin's account of the modern historical cycle of hegemonies is primarily an explication of the particular historical forces which have altered the relative economic capabilities of major states as the

principle determinant of such hegemonic order formation. Accordingly, these forces require our close consideration here.

Most important among the elements explaining this transformation of the relative economic capacities of modern states' has been the effect of the cycle of technological innovation occurring within the modern international system engendered by industrial capitalism. The tendency for the centre of economic initiative and dynamic industrial growth to shift to different regions of the system over time is, according to Gilpin, a basic and inherent feature of the operation of the modern capitalist mode of production. In accordance with this process the "most important technical and organisational innovations which underlie the evolution of the capitalist world economy tend to cluster in time and space. Major advances in industrial methods and technological products have constituted a discontinuous process, characterised by sudden clusterings or jumps ...[and] the emergence of successive dominant cores"[32] or technologically advanced states. By its very nature this shift in technological initiative has tended to be from the most advanced to the less developed units of the system. Moreover, this cyclical process of technological innovation has provided a major impetus to the growth in the relative strength of less powerful states by generating increased levels of production and greater economic surpluses for their development.[33] According to Gilpin the creation of economies of scale which such technological innovation facilitates has enabled these states to develop their domestic socio-economic infrastructures and to gradually expand their political and economic capabilities. On the basis of this expanded internal growth such states

could then look towards extending their influence within the wider international system.

Corresponding with and further stimulating this process of capital accumulation deriving from the cycle of technical innovation are the benefits to less advanced states arising from the 'advantages of backwardness'. Here Gilpin refers to the ability of less developed states within the international system to absorb and apply the technology inevitably diffused from the existing hegemonic state in order to accelerate their own economic development. Here he notes that, by adopting the technological forms of the leading, hegemonic nation, these rising states are able to literally skip stages of economic growth, effectively telescoping those developmental stages through which the hegemon has had to pass in establishing its position of international dominance. Thus, "the imitators, who have lower standards of living and less wasteful habits, can use the imported technology more efficiently...[They] can adopt the most advanced and most thoroughly proven techniques whereas ... costs and vested interests deter the more advanced economy from substituting the very latest techniques for obsolescent techniques."[34] Their relatively underdeveloped condition thus becomes an important advantage to these rising states in seeking to extend their domestic capabilities and thereby enhance their potential capacity to attain greater influence over political and economic processes at the international level.

At the same time, Gilpin notes that this process of the rise of newly powerful states as potential challengers to the mantle of international

leadership has proceeded in tandem with the simultaneous decline of the capabilities of the existing hegemon. Given the strains associated with the maintenance of hegemonic dominance and the effects of the law of diminishing returns characterising the process of economic growth the latter must, sooner or later, reach the limits of its own economic and political expansion. Moreover, once reaching this stage the hegemon encounters great difficulty in arresting the decline in its capacity to maintain the structures of hegemonic dominance it has created. "A declining society experiences a vicious cycle of decay and immobility much as a rising society enjoys a virtuous cycle of growth and expansion ... Once caught up in this cycle it is difficult for the society to break out."[35] It is in this context of hegemonic decline that the relative nature of the development of power within the modern states system becomes particularly apparent. For the relative decline in the power of the existing hegemonic state is itself the outcome of its loss of economic leadership within the international system, a deficit arising directly from the shift in the centre of technological innovation to more peripheral states who are able to use the resulting technical advantages to enhance their power as potential challengers to the hegemon's position. "At best states can only slow the diffusion of technology underlying their military or economic power; they cannot prevent it, especially today in a world in which technology rests on easily accessible scientific knowledge."[36] In accordance with this process Gilpin notes that the hegemon's power begins to erode. Its capacity to create economies of scale and to generate economic surpluses underpinning its preponderant power progressively declines. The hegemon finds it increasingly difficult to stay ahead of its rising competitors.

The problems posed by this process of economic decline for the hegemon's position in the system are further compounded by the financial burdens involved in maintaining those structures of hegemonic dominance outlined above. Here Gilpin notes that "increases in the number and strength of rival, challenging powers force the dominant state to expend more resources to maintain its superior military or political position."[37] Also significant in this respect are the increasing costs associated with the maintenance of spheres of strategic-political influence and the political allegiance of client states. In particular, it is often necessary for the hegemon to compensate for the 'free rider' problem - the situation where client states are increasingly unprepared to share the costs of maintaining military alliances. Thus Gilpin observes how, "because the dominant power will defend the status quo in its own interest, lesser states have little incentive to pay their 'fair share' of ... protection costs."[38] The hegemonic power is therefore burdened with the greater part of the cost of maintaining the hegemonic order.

As a consequence of the developments noted here then, the relative capabilities of the hegemonic state are progressively and profoundly altered. The gradual erosion of the hegemon's power due to the factors outlined above progressively undermines its capacity to maintain its control over the international system. As the "power base on which ... [its] governance of the system ultimately rests [is] eroded ... [the] disjuncture among the components of the international system creates challenges for the dominant state and opportunities for the rising states in the system."[39] The continuation of this decline of its power ultimately creates a disparity between the hegemon's formal role of

governing the system and maintaining the formal structures of hegemonic influence on which its dominance is predicated, and its practical capacity to sustain that role. At the same time the increasing power of those rising states within the system confers upon them both the capabilities and the incentive to assume this hegemonic, ordering role. In effect the "international balance of power among the actors ... underlying the international system ... [of order] evolves more rapidly than the other components of the system, particularly the hierarchy of prestige and the rules of the system [i.e. the formal superstructure of hegemonic dominance] ... It is ... [this] differential rate of change between the international distribution of power and the other components of the system that produces a disjuncture ... that, if unresolved, causes a change in the system."[40]

The inevitable outcome of this increasing contradiction between the declining power base of the existing hegemonic state and the practical requirements involved in maintaining the formal superstructure of the wider hegemonic system of international order is a hegemonic war in which one or more of the rising states seeks to translate their preponderant power into a new, formal system of hegemonic dominance replacing that of the existing, now exhausted hegemon. According to Gilpin, such hegemonic wars, brought on by these fundamental changes in the underlying configuration of international power, ultimately result in the construction of new formal systems of hegemonic influence reflecting the new distribution of international power and serving the interests and needs of a new hegemonic state.

As a result of such transformative processes, outlined in very general terms here, Gilpin notes that there has occured a process of uneven development in the power of states which has engendered the successive formation of modern systems of hegemonic order at the international level. The dynamic historical forces of uneven development have produced an historical cycle of hegemonic order formation expressed, first within Europe in the form of French dominance under Napoleon and in the ascendancy of Britain in the nineteenth century, and later, within the global states system, in the hegemonic dominance of the United States. More particularly, in the gradual erosion of the hegemonic structures of the Pax Britannica and the subsequent emergence of the Pax Americana of the contemporary, postwar era Gilpin discerns the most recent manifestation of the transformative effects arising from the operation of the perrenial law of uneven development examined above. For Gilpin, as we have seen this ongoing, assymetrical process of international development constitutes the central stimulus to the cyclical formation of systems of hegemonic order within the modern international sphere.[41] Moreover, even in the case of the contemporary international order this process of uneven development is identified as operating to erode the economic and political structures of postwar hegemonic stability created by the preponderant power of the United states. Thus the "law of uneven growth continues to redistribute power, ... undermining the status quo established by the last hegemonic struggle. Disequilibrium replaces equilibrium and the world moves towards a new round of hegemonic conflict. It has always been thus and always will be, until men either destroy themselves or learn to develop an effective mechanism of peaceful change."[42]

IV Critiscisms of Gilpin's Historical Theory of Hegemonic Order Formation.

Arguably the most important feature of the theory of international order formation outlined above for the broader concerns of this work is the way in which it historicises the basic categories of the Neo-Realist perspective presented in the work of Waltz. In this respect Gilpin's theory constitutes an ambitious attempt to theorise the dynamic interrelationship between those temporal, unit-level processes of political, economic and military activity characterising relations between modern states and the more general effects of the constraining anarchical structure as they mutually function to generate ongoing change in the forms of modern international order. In contrast with Waltz's approach, these two dimensions of international relations are integrated by Gilpin into a single historical account of international order formation manifest in the cyclical development of systems of hegemonic stability - a process engendered by the actions of states in response to the uneven development of power within the modern international system. While the anarchical structure is still conceived as a major constraining force upon international action and the type of order produced at the international level, Gilpin's theory points to the way in which that anarchical structure undergoes transformation in response to the historical activities of its constitutive political units. Through his elaboration of this distinctive dimension of the influence of states as rational actors within the international system the general process of order formation is redefined in dynamic, historical terms.

In developing this historical approach Gilpin arguably provides some important insights into the historical forces explaining change in those structures of international domination engendering order in the modern states-system. Moreover, his theory suggests that such international order formation is not purely limited to ensuring basic political survival, as Waltz's work posits, but also reflects the concern of states with securing other, material interests and benefits through the creation of structures of hegemonic consensus at the international level. In highlighting this latter aspect of the process of order formation between states Gilpin's account of the formation of systems of hegemonic influence introduces a theme which will become increasingly significant in later sections of this thesis. This is the concept of international consensus and, specifically, the idea of modern international order formation as a process involving the construction of forms of legitimate, consensual order binding states in cooperative relations at the international level. In terms of the points noted here Gilpin's theory may be seen to represent an important advance on that of Waltz considered in the preceding chapter.

However, as I intend to illustrate below, Gilpin's attempt to historicise the Neo-Realist perspective involves certain major shortcomings and ommissions which significantly limit its explanatory power as an account of the modern process of international order formation. Moreover, his emphasis upon the historical reproduction of legitimate structures of hegemonic stability between modern states raises important considerations which suggest the qualitative limitations of his technical-rational approach as an effective mode for

understanding the process of international order formation within the modern international system. In elaborating these critiscisms I want to begin by considering more closely Gilpin's account of those constitutive forces accounting for the institutionalisation of modes of hegemonic stability at the international level. Our analysis of the deficiencies of this aspect of his work will enable us to discern the significant shortcomings of the general methodology underlying Gilpin's broader historical perspective. At the same time, it will allow us to highlight the important substantive limitations of his account of the general process of international order formation as it is engendered by the uneven development of power within the modern system of states.

As we have seen above, in explaining the historical constitution of modern systems of hegemonic order Gilpin stresses the technical-rational nature of this constitutive process. Here the primary consideration motivating states' behaviour is identified as the concern to maximise their power as the means to securing their rationally defined goals. The logic governing international order formation is an essentially calculative one in terms of which each state constantly seeks to ascertain its relative power capabilities and the possibilities for the extension of practical control over the international system arising from historical shifts in the distribution of international power. The subsequent attempts by a particular state to establish its dominance over the system are essentially a "response to developments that increase its relative power or decrease the costs of modifying political arrangements ... [These efforts] continue until an equilibrium is reached between the costs and benefits of further change."[43] It is this

invariable, technical-rational logic which represents the principal motivating factor in the genesis of hegemonic orders within the modern international system. This technical-rational logic has its origins, in turn, in the deeper motivating force of national self interest inherent to the natural condition of international anarchy. At the international level, Gilpin maintains, the "purposes and natures of social institutions [i.e. states] are determined principally by [their] self interest and relative power."[44]

The main problem with this explanation of international order formation lies in its narrow understanding of the nature of states and the considerations motivating their actions at the international level. More specifically, I want to argue here that the process of international order formation does not merely involve the extension of technical control over an international condition of natural, objective power processses as Gilpin contends. Rather, there are important cultural motivations to be taken into account. In order to grasp the importance of this cultural dimension we need to consider more closely the implications of Gilpin's idea of the generation of international consensus as the practical basis of modern systems of hegemonic order. As the central element in the everyday operation of systems of hegemonic stability the phenomenon of consensus is given a strictly limited formulation by Gilpin. While acknowledging that the "position of the dominant power may be supported by ideological, religious or other values common to a set of states"[45] Gilpin focusses mainly on the more tangible material and political sources of such consensus formation implicit in the cohering effects of perceived and actual political and

economic advantages deriving from acceptance of the hegemon's dominance. In doing so, he fails to go further and consider exactly what is involved in the cultural dimension of hegemonic order formation. As we shall see below, however, a more adequate treatment of this cultural dimension of international order formation raises considerations which actually bring into question the validity of Gilpin's own technical-rational understanding of this historical process.

In elaborating this cultural dimension of international order formation I want to draw on the notion of national perceptions and their role in shaping the international behaviour of states developed in the work of Rosen and Jones.[46] A major concern of Rosen and Jones's work is to examine how the international behaviour of states is influenced by concepts, values, and ideologies originating from the domestic, cultural order within the state. In opposition to the tendency of traditional theory to rigidly differentiate between the domestic and international levels of political life it is their contention that, "to a considerable degree, the foreign actions of states are continuations of essentially domestic processes and demands ... International perceptions cannot be separated from the broader [domestic] value base that gives rise to them."[47] On this view then, a state's external behaviour is integrally linked with the cultural forms characterising its internal social and political life. National actors always view the international system through a perceptive grid which presupposes specific values and cultural preconceptions shaping their understanding of international affairs and their relations with other states. According to this argument the international sphere cannot be understood, as Gilpin would

have us believe, as a sphere of behaviour governed solely by rational considerations of technical control in view of the perceived relativities of international power. Rather, such international power processes are always interpreted by states from particular, pre-formed cultural perspectives which exercise a major influence upon the way they conduct their international affairs.

In order to grasp the implications of this cultural dimension of national perceptions for the formation of consensual systems of international order let us consider the example of the postwar rise of America to hegemonic dominance within the international system. Here Rosen and Jones stress the important influence of the deeply engrained democratic tradition emerging from the historical process of American national, cultural formation in shaping its postwar international behaviour. This democratic tradition, they note, has its roots in the earliest history of the nation and the founding fathers' attempts to build a society of religious tolerance free from the tyranny and repression of the old European society. Moreover, this democratic ethos has been reinforced over time becoming part of the national political psyche. With America's emergence from its pre-war isolationism and its establishment as a major actor in international politics this internal democratic tradition began to exercise an increasingly powerful influence over American foreign policy perceptions. According to Rosen and Jones the domestic, democratic ethos translated at the international level into a national perception of the nation's role as the champion of democracy within the wider world. In line with this perception successive postwar American political administrations have viewed their

role as principally that of defending western democratic political systems against the threat of political tyranny represented by the expansion of international communism.[48]

According to this argument then, the cultural values and preconceptions characterising the American cultural and political system were an important factor explaining the emergence, in the postwar period, of a national perception and a corresponding foreign policy, one of whose principal aims was to create a world in America's own ideal democratic image. This point is reinforced in the writings of historical commentators on this period. Thus Ambrose has argued that "America's rise to globalism was by no means mindless, just as it was not exclusively a reaction to the communist challenge or a response to economic needs...[In the postwar years] Americans had a sense of power, of bigness, of destiny ... [They] wanted to bring the blessings of democracy, capitalism and stability to everyone ... The whole world, in their view, should be a reflection of the United States."[49] The postwar construction of the Pax Americana was shaped, to a considerable degree then, by this national perception of America's mission within the international system. The development of a postwar order of hegemonic international alliances was guided, to a significant extent, by an ideological interest in preserving and extending this internal democratic model of cultural organisation globally as the basis for the attainment of freedom by other countries. Moreover, the extension of such hegemonic forms of cultural influence, in association with the more tangible political and economic aspects of hegemony, can be seen to have

provided an important cohering, integrative force serving to reinforce and consolidate the American hegemonic system in later decades.[50]

The influence of the element of national, cultural perceptions, evident in this example of the postwar American hegemonic order, is arguably informative for the modern process of international order formation more generally. Indeed, as we shall see in chapter three, the universalisation of dominant states' cultural value systems has played a crucial role in the creation of coherent systems of consensual international order through the provision of those discursive rules of communicative interaction and political co-operation forming the indispensible framework for the operation of more general, legitimate structures of international order. The concern of powerful states to create a world in their own cultural image has arguably been an important factor in the construction of those institutional forms providing a degree of stability in the relations between states at different stages in the development of the international system. In this way such dominant powers have provided, not only the political and socio-economic bases, but also the cultural or normative principles of consensus upon which relatively stable interstate relations have been predicated and reproduced historically.

In pointing to this broader understanding of the culturally constituted character of the modern process of international order formation, we need also to note a second crucial dimension of this process which is largely ignored by Gilpin, namely the formation of those structures of order focussed around the mechanism of the balance of power emphasised

in Waltz's work. In this context a striking limitation of Gilpin's theory is its neglect of those phases in the uneven development of power within modern international history where no one state has been able to acquire hegemonic dominance over the international system and where, consequently, structures of legitimate order have arisen as a result of the combined action of a number of powerful states. Indeed, the acknowledgement of this dimension of the evolution of the modern states system suggests that the process of hegemonic order formation described by Gilpin constitutes the exception rather than the norm in modern western history.[51] Nor does his work give adequate consideration to the historical role of such strategic balances of power in constraining the development of those systems of hegemonic domination emphasised in his own theory through the deployment of countervailing military force by those states threatened by the ambitions of a would-be hegemon.

Thus, it would appear that an account of the historical constitution of legitimate structures of order between modern states cannot be limited, as Gilpin's work does, to an analysis of the historical formation of structures of hegemonic stability within a system of sovereign states defined in narrow terms as rational actors. In order to acquire a more adequate understanding of the historical process of order formation occuring within the modern western states-system attention needs to be given to the way the culturally located process of uneven international development emphasised in his own work has, more often than not, engendered situations in which the relative commensurability of the power of a few large states has received expression in the formation of international balances of power regulating the behaviour of multiple

sovereign actors. Moreover, it must consider the manner in which the operation of such multi-actor structures of international order have themselves been influenced by the broader cultural context of international political action. In particular, as was indicated in our earlier critique of Waltz's theory, it needs to take account of the way such ordering structures have been predicated upon culturally engendered principles of consensus among the great powers, the historical operation of which has played a major role in the reproduction of stable interstate relations at different stages in the history of the western states-system.

Conclusions

Arguably the major insight arising from the foregoing analysis of Gilpin's work is that a theory concerned with the historical development of modern systems of international order must assume a much broader focus than is evident in the theory of hegemonic stability elaborated by Gilpin. In particular, it must take cognisance of more than the political and socio-economic processes stressed in the theory of hegemonic order formation developed by Gilpin. While these are important factors in this general process, such a theory needs also to take account of the wider context within which structures of consensual order between states arise. In particular, it must consider the complex nature of states as international actors and the way the more powerful among them have, at different historical moments, engendered normative systems of international dominance conferring legitimacy upon more general

systems of international order. At the same time such a theoretical perspective needs to examine the way the ongoing dynamic of the transformation of these systems of consensual order engendered by the process of the uneven development of power within the international system has engendered very different normative systems of order, including among them those hegemonic structures of international dominance stressed by Gilpin and the multi-polar balances of power noted above, as the basis of order production at different stages of the development of the modern states-system.

However, as I have sought to indicate in this chapter, the articulation of such an approach requires a theoretical model of a very different nature to that embraced by Gilpin. For, as we have seen, Gilpin's historical perspective, derived from rational choice theory, effectively reifies the logic shaping the behaviour of states. By separating the 'rational' motivations guiding states' actions from the historical process of political and cultural change occurring within the international system Gilpin is led to a highly naturalistic view of modern international relations and a technical model of the process of order formation which is unable to accommodate the insights raised by his own historical approach. Instead we are offered a limited view of modern international history as a recurrent cycle of the construction of technical structures of hegemonic dominance within an objective condition of international political anarchy. The result is a historical theory of international order formation considerably lacking in explanatory power.

Notes

1. R. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, U.K., 1981, p.42

2. These broad themes are elaborated principally in War and Change in World Politics. The particular focus of Gilpin's work has rested upon the more specific processes of hegemonic order formation operating within the modern states-system. See especially, R. Gilpin, US Power and the Multi-National Corporation: The Political Economy of Direct Foreign Investment, New York, 1975, and R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton, 1987.

3. For some representative accounts of the main themes of rational choice theory which give particular attention to the central problem of the production of public goods see M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, New York, 1968, and M. Laver, The Politics Of Private Desires: The Guide To The Politics of Rational Choice, Middlesex, 1981. For an approach to the construction of a theory of international politics based on an extended, Pareto-ian model of rational choice theory see S.D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest, Princeton, 1978.

4. War and Change in World Politics, p.9

5. Ibid., p.26

6. Ibid., p.94

7. Ibid., p.87

8. The different historical types of such systemic control are considered in detail below.

9. Ibid., p.95

10. Ibid., p.158

11. Ibid., p.95

12. Loc. Cit.

13. Ibid., pp.94-95

14. Ibid., pp.107-8

15. Ibid., p.111

16. Ibid., p.112

17. Loc. Cit.

18. The specific factors engendering this cycle of empires are summarised by Gilpin in Ibid., p.115. Significant here is Ruggie's point, noted in chapter one, concerning the weakly developed form of sovereign authority in the pre-modern period facilitating the formation of such multi-national empires. For his views on this issue see also P. Anderson, Passages From Antiquity to Feudalism, London, 1974, Part 1.

19. Ibid., p.116

20 Ibid., p.122

21. Ibid., p.124. The process described here by Gilpin corresponds very closely to Ruggie's account of the increase in dynamic density noted in chapter one.

22. Ibid., p.132. A major account of the historical development of this international division of labour is that found in Wallerstein's study of the historical emergence of the modern capitalist world economy. See especially I. Wallerstein, The Modern World System Vol.1, New York, 1974.

23. Ibid., p.138

24. Ibid., p.144

25. Ibid., p.11

26. Ibid., p.31

27. Loc. Cit.

28. Ibid., p.34

29. For some accounts of the different political and economic structures of hegemonic cooperation and their role in the reproduction of international order at different stages in the history of the modern states-system see S.D. Krasner, International Regimes, London, 1984. More detailed accounts of the structures generated by the postwar American hegemonic state are presented in F. Block, The Origin of International Economic Disorder, California, 1977, and R.O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, 1984.

30. War and Change in World Politics, p.30

31. Ibid., p.106

32. Gilpin, US Power and the Multi-National Corporation, p.67. The primary examples of this cycle of technological innovation noted by Gilpin are the technological breakthroughs in Britain associated with the industrial revolution and the managerial and technological advances underlying the growth of the American economy in the first part of this century.

33. Gilpin derives this notion of technological innovation from the work of Schumpeter and his account of modern capitalism as a system of creative destruction. See J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York, 1962.

34. War and Change in World Politics, pp.178-79. For some earlier accounts of this process of uneven economic development within Marxist literature upon which Gilpin himself draws, S. Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formation of Peripheral Capitalism, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976, and A. Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade, New York, 1972.

35. Ibid., pp.189-190. Gilpin points to a number of methods whereby modern hegemonic powers have sought to halt this process of decline. These have included strategic retrenchment from imperial commitments and, alternately, increased commitment to bolster the hegemonic order. But such measures ultimately only serve to delay the inevitable process of decline. See Ibid., pp.187-197.

36. Ibid., p.177

37. Ibid., p.169

38. Loc. Cit..

39. Ibid., p.186

40. Ibid., p.48

41. For his more specific account of the different modern phases of this cyclical process as they have been expressed in the Pax Britannica and the Pax Americana see Gilpin, US Power and the Multi-National Corporation.

42. War and Change in World Politics, p.210

43. Ibid., Preface xi-xii

44. Ibid., Preface xi

45. Ibid., p.34

46. S.J. Jones & W.S. Rosen, The Logic of International Relations, (4th ed.), Boston, 1974.

47. Ibid., Preface, xiv

48. Ibid., pp.58-67. This important element of national perceptions and their effects upon international behaviour is not developed at great length by Rosen and Jones. Neverthless, as we shall see below, their arguments raise issues which are of fundamental importance for the broader concerns of this work.

49. Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, Middlesex, 1983, p.45. For some alternative interpretations of these cultural dimensions of the development of the American hegemony which stress the expansionary ideology implicit in the democratic program of the New Deal see F. Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, New York, 1974, and R.W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order, New York, 1987.

50. At the same time, to acknowledge this important cultural dimension of international order formation does not require that one must subscribe to a form of cultural determinism. But nor can this cultural dimension be reduced to a simple reflection of economic and political processes as Gilpin's work would suggest. For a survey of the conflicting views on the causes of American postwar expansionism as expressed in the debate over the origins of the cold war see S. Hoffman, "Revisionism Revisited", in L.H. Miller & R. W. Preussen (eds.), Reflections on the Cold War, Philadelphia, 1974, pp.5-27

51. For a major account of the different phases of the historical evolution of the balance of power in modern European history see Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: The Politics of Power in Europe 1494-1945, London, 1963.

PART ONE CONCLUSION

In the previous chapters we have identified some important themes arising from the Neorealist technical approach to the explanation of modern international order formation for the elaboration of our more general theoretical perspective. Arguably the most important of these is the point, advanced by both Waltz and Gilpin, concerning the way such order formation is shaped by the influence of the anarchical structure of the international system and the relative nature of the distribution and historical diffusion of power therein which it engenders. At the same time, I have indicated how the tensions within their general approaches raise the need for a more sophisticated theoretical perspective which is able to incorporate these important insights within a more adequate account of the nature of order formation within the modern states-system. In particular, I have sought to show how the implications involved in Gilpin's attempt to historicise Waltz's formal conception of international order formation in terms of the mutually conditioning influences of the anarchical structure of this system and the relative nature of the distribution of power arising from the actions of states leads us beyond the technical-rational interest informing the Neorealist perspective.

The modified perspective suggested by the foregoing critique of Neorealist thought involves the transcendence of the latter's highly objectivised, naturalistic understanding of international relations and

its technical conception of the order constitutive process between modern states understood as mere units of power capabilities. More particularly, I have argued that the problems associated with this paradigm, deriving from its informing, technical interest, indicate the need for the development of a different, socio-cultural understanding of modern international relations and the process of order formation among states. In this respect, our modified theoretical perspective would need to adopt a more interpretative approach to these phenomena. While incorporating Gilpin's insights concerning the central role of the uneven development of power as the dynamic agency engendering consensual systems of order at the international level, the reformulated theoretical perspective suggested here needs to grasp the complex nature of this historical process and the diverse cultural forces contributing to the historical constitution of the former.

With these considerations in mind we shall turn in Section Two to consider certain representative theorists of the Rationalist school of international relations theory. Examining the distinctive societal paradigm informing their work, we shall consider whether this Rationalist perspective is able to provide a more adequate understanding of the historical process of order formation between modern states than is offered by the Neorealist paradigm.

PART TWO

RATIONALISM, THE PRACTICAL INTEREST AND THE SOCIETAL PARADIGM

Introduction

In this second part of the thesis I will examine the general model of international order formation presented within the Rationalist school of international relations theory. In doing so my main concern will be to consider the potential offered by this particular theoretical perspective for the development of a more sophisticated understanding of the modern international system and the process of order formation occuring therein which incorporates the points of value raised by the limited NeoRealist approach examined in Section One. As we shall see the Rationalist perspective examined here represents a major paradigmatic shift in international political theory. For, what it offers is a basic redefinition of the nature of the object studied by such theory and of the methodology considered appropriate for establishing an understanding of that subject matter.

As I indicate in more detail in chapter three this basic paradigm shift derives from the highly distinctive knowledge-constitutive interest which informs the theoretical approach of Rationalist theory and which gives definitive shape to the conception of modern international order formation articulated in the writings of those theorists encompassed by this theoretical perspective. This I define as the practical cognitive interest. In accordance with this practical cognitive interest in international order formation the Rationalist perspective offers a distinctive socio-cultural conception of the nature of modern international relations and of the central ordering processes operating

within the international system. Here the focus of attention is directed to the process of international order formation understood as the constitution of systems of regulative socio-political relations between states and to the major historical forces contributing to the maintenance and transformation of such systems of social order.

This Rationalist conception of international order formation will be examined in detail in chapters three and four. Chapter three outlines the basic features of the societal model as it is articulated in the writings of Hedley Bull and Martin Wight and its application by those theorists to the modern European states-system. It then considers Wight's account of the historical process of legitimate order formation characterising this European international society in the absolutist and nationalist periods respectively, focussing on the different principles of international legitimacy defininig this process of societal order formation in these historical periods. Elaborating upon this theme in chapter four, I consider the accounts presented in the writings of Bull and others of the historical expansion of this European international society in more recent times and the corresponding extension of the nationalist principle of international legitimacy as the legitimating basis of this expansionary process and the formal discursive foundation of an evolving global international society. In this context, we shall examine Bull's account of the major problems confronting the historical reproduction of stable order within this expanded international society resulting from its incorporation of new nations advancing demands for substantive equality with their more developed sovereign counterparts. Moreover, we shall see how these problems bring into focus certain

significant limitations of the Rationalist perspective which suggest the need for a more critical approach to the reproduction of legitimate order within this modern international society than is provided by the Rationalist perspective.

Chapter Three

Elements of the Societal Model of International Order Formation

As noted in the preceding pages, the theoretical approach of the Rationalist thinkers examined below reflects a distinctive theory-orienting interest which I have defined as the Practical interest. In proceeding to outline the societal model of international order formation as it is elaborated in the writings of the two major representatives of the Rationalist school of international relations theory, namely Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, I will begin by examining this distinctive knowledge-constitutive interest which informs their work. This will lead us directly to a consideration of the general features of the Rationalist account of international relations as a distinctive sphere of social interaction and its associated view of the modern European states-system as a specific historical example of this anarchical form of society. Examining Bull's account of the principal institutions defining the interaction of states within this modern international society we shall see how the former have engendered a distinctive process of social order formation between them.

Elaborating upon this theme in the second part of the chapter, I will consider Martin Wight's account of the historical reproduction of those principles of international legitimacy which he identifies as providing the broad discursive framework for the development of particular systems of social order at different stages in the history of modern European

international society. Particular attention is given here to Wight's views concerning the way these broad regulative principles of legitimacy have been transformed within modern European history in line with historical changes in the sovereign character of the states constituting this international society. This analysis will form the background to our examination, in chapter four, of Bull's account of the historical expansion of European international society in more recent times and the problems arising from this process for the reproduction of legitimate order within an emerging global international society.

I The Practical Interest and the Socio-Cultural Conception of International Order Formation

As we saw in part one, for Neorealism international relations is understood as an objectified sphere of anarchical power processes where states are conceived of in the most minimal terms as units of power capabilities. Within this objectified sphere the behaviour of states is governed by the dictates of an unchanging logic of necessituous action - a logic integrally connected with the perennial nature of international politics as the condition of competitive power politics par excellence. In contrast with this approach, the practical interest informing the Rationalist perspective engenders a view of the international system as a distinctive sphere of social interaction. According to this perspective the condition of international anarchy is not to be understood as a quasi-naturalistic condition of inevitably clashing and competing power units. Rather, it is an historically evolving, socially

constituted sphere of political action - a meaningful realm of social interaction between political subjects circumscribed by historically developed traditions and discursive cultural practices.[1] Moreover, the analysis of this sphere of political activity and the process of order formation occuring within it is seen to require a very different methodological approach to that adopted by Neorealists. In accordance with the practical cognitive interest informing this Rationalist perspective the primary concern of theoretical analysis for both Wight and Bull is understood as that of comprehending this sphere of social meaning and the complex, culturally constituted forms of social understanding and political interaction underpinning the formation and transformation of structures of order among states.

Thus, where Neorealism's principal concern is to describe modes of technical control engendering relatively stable order within an objectified international system, the emphasis in Rationalist thought is upon interpreting those historically constituted forms of socio-cultural relations developed between states which form the indispensible framework within which the practical structures of order formation between these states are able to emerge. In this respect, as Martin Wight notes, "international society ... can be properly described only in historical and sociological depth. It is the habitual discourse of independent communities beginning in the Christendom of western Europe and gradually extending throughout the world."[2] More particularly, this practical, interpretative orientation leads Rationalist theory to an examination of the way such discursive socio-political practices operate to constrain the behaviour of states by engendering among them a

recognition of, and conformity with, general principles of political interaction providing the basis for orderly relations between these states in any given historical period. Accordingly, such theory seeks to delineate the distinctive nature of these historically evolved forms of social interaction between states and the corresponding rules and regulations which are seen to regulate their substantive, political, power relations. At the same time, it is also concerned to examine the way such regulative systems of socio-political practice between states undergo historical change and the implications of such social change for the nature and reproduction of legitimate social order within modern international society.

In addition to this, and in accordance with its more hermeneutical, interpretative approach to the study of international relations, the practical interest guiding Rationalist theory engenders a quite distinctive attitude to the general function or purpose of theoretical analysis. Specifically, neither Wight or Bull entertain the possibility of adopting an overtly critical standpoint in relation to the study of international society. Neither of them accepts the possibility of establishing some form of independent criteria or normative measure which might provide the basis for a critical evaluation of the different types of international social order examined in their work in terms of their greater or lesser effectiveness in producing order between states (a tendency which we have seen to characterise the technical-rational perspective of Waltz and which we will witness again in our analysis of Cox's Critical theory in Part Three). Rather, the primary aim of this methodological approach is to acquire an empathetic understanding of the

nature of the societal structures underpinning the relations between the sovereign subjects of international society at any particular moment of its historical development. The essential function of theoretical enquiry for Rationalism is to comprehend and delineate the distinctive socio-political relations which have operated as the cohering force integrating the sovereign members of the international system into a larger societal totality in any historical period.

In view of this distinctive theory-orienting interest, the attempt to introduce an overtly critical standpoint by invoking some higher 'objective' standard of judgement is seen to involve an over-simplified understanding of the nature of theoretical inquiry which threatens to obscure the complexities of international relations and to hinder the goal of attaining an effective understanding of the particular, culturally formed socio-political practices which underpin the process of order formation within different international societies. Accordingly, implicit in the practical methodological approach of Wight and Bull is a view of the superior value of a detached or passive scholarly approach to the object of study as free as possible from externally imposed value judgments. Hence, in rejecting such overtly critical approaches it is Bull's basic contention that "for a moral justification of the study of International Relations we need not look beyond inquiry itself which has its own morality and saps the strength of political causes of all kinds, good and bad."[3] The emphasis here then, lies upon interpreting and clarifying, in a critically detached manner, the different historical forms of socio-political interaction and co-operation shaping order formation within international society.

It is through the adoption of this critically detached approach to the analysis of international order formation that the theorist is best able to elucidate the nature of those norms whose observance by the sovereign members of international society facilitates the reproduction of social consensus and the maintenance of coherent, ordered relations between states.[4]

II The Elements of the Societal Paradigm of European International Order Formation

Having clarified these basic methodological orientations of Rationalist theory we can now proceed to examine the substantive features of the societal model of European international order formation which flow from this methodological approach. The basic elements of this societal account of international relations are elaborated most clearly in the context of Hedley Bull's critique of the naturalistic account of international relations identified with traditional international relations theory. I shall briefly consider this critique of traditional international relations theory by way of introducing the main substantive elements of the Rationalist societal model of modern international order formation which Bull opposes to the former.

According to Bull the Realist conception of international relations as a natural condition of political anarchy has its roots in the idea of the domestic analogy. The origins of this notion he traces to English political thought and, in particular, to Hobbes's account of the

fictional state of nature which precedes the formation of civil society. According to Hobbes this hypothetical pre-societal state of nature presents a human condition of unconstrained interaction between atomistic individuals characterised by the absence of any overiding, regulative legal or moral rules governing men's actions. Given the absence of a common regulative, sovereign authority which could legislate and enforce common rules upon them,the individuals inhabiting this state of nature exist in a condition of endemic conflict - a state of war in which life is nasty, short and brutish. Moreover, in developing this theme, Hobbes draws a direct analogy between this pre-societal 'anarchical' state and the condition of relations between states at the international level.

In taking up this Hobbesean conception of the state of nature as its model for understanding international relations, Bull maintains, traditional Realist international theory considers that "states or sovereign princes, like individual men who live without government, are in a state of nature which is a state of war."[5] Two basic conclusions are drawn from this agonistic depiction of the nature of modern international relations. Firstly, as was the case with individuals within Hobbes' fictional state of nature, the absence of a superior sovereign authority in the international sphere is seen to preclude the possibility of social co-operation at the international level. This major deficiency engenders a condition of necessary or forced behaviour where competition and conflict predominate and moral principles can have no purchase on political actions. Within this inhospitable, asocial environment "states do not form any kind of society; ... [Moreover] if

they were to do so it could only be by subordinating themselves to a common authority."[6] Here we encounter the second assumption concerning international political affairs drawn from the domestic analogy. This is the belief that the production of social order within the international system requires nothing less than the "total transcendence of the states-system and the reproduction of institutions of domestic society on a universal scale."[7] The forms of life characterising the spheres of society and international anarchy are, from this standpoint, deemed to be mutually exclusive modes of existence.[8]

In elaborating the main elements of his own conception of international order formation Bull systematically critiscises these principal Realist assumptions concerning the anomic, agonistic character of international relations defined as a 'state of nature' and the rigid differentiation between domestic society and international nature associated with the former. Indeed, it is Bull's contention that the absence of an absolute sovereign authority within the international system does not inevitably entail a state of governmentlessness in the sense of a total lack of any form of social cohesion or regulation in relations between states and the consequent predominance of a state of war.[9] While lacking an overiding sovereign power capable of providing centralised regulation of inter-state relations equivalent to that operating within the state, Bull argues that international politics nonethless displays its own distinctive system of social rules and institutions which regulate the character of interactions between states and engender systems of international order in different historical periods.

What then, are the factors which make possible the emergence of this societal condition among states and some degree of social order at the international level? In outlining the major forces explaining the formation of social order within the modern international system Bull focusses on two central factors. Firstly, operating at the deepest level is the influence of a common, cohering civilisational culture facilitating the historical emergence of this anarchical international society. Secondly, and most importantly, Bull points to the actions of states themselves as the central political actors of international society and the principal institutional agents engendering forms of co-operative social interaction among themselves on the basis of this pre-exisiting, homogeneous civilisational heritage. Of special significance here is the development by these states of discursive regulative practices and international ordering institutions incorporating the normative principles of social interaction engendered by such practices. Let us consider these two aspects of international order formation more closely.

According to Bull an important pre-condition for the emergence of any international society is the existence of a shared cultural tradition embracing all the states of a system. He notes that "a common feature of ... [international societies] is that they are all founded on a common culture or civilisation or at least some of the elements of such a civilisation: a common language, a common religion, a common ethical code, a common aesthetic tradition."[10] Such a common civilisational background Bull notes as a characteristic of all the major international societies in human history including those of classical Greece and the

Chinese states-system during the period of the Warring states. A society of states is likely to arise only where such a pre-existing cultural heritage of common values is apparent and exercises a relatively strong influence over the behaviour of the states incorporated therein. Elaborating upon this point Bull distinguishes between what he defines as the societal, as opposed to those systemic forms of international civilisation. Thus international systems, he argues, manifest a low level of cultural commonality in the nature of the relations between their constituent units. Within this type of international civilisation the level of interaction between states is such as to make the actions of each a significant element in the calculations of the other "without them being conscious of common interests or values, conceiving themselves bound by a common set of rules or co-operating in the working of common institutions."[11] By contrast, international societies, distinguished by the existence of a shared cultural heritage influencing the actions of its members, facilitate the formation of just such societal practices.

The significance of this shared cultural background stressed by Bull as the common foundation of international societies lies then, in its role as the main factor engendering an embryonic sense of social community and mutual understanding among the territorially discrete political units of such societies. It is through the medium of shared cultural prejudices that more substantial modes of socio-political cooperation are able to develop. Assuming this common cultural milieu and a corresponding, relatively highly developed degree of cultural commonality there exists the facilitative basis for the development of forms of

intensive social interaction between the political units of an international civilisation. Thus common cultural traditions, "on the one hand ... make for easier communication and closer awareness and understanding between one state and another ... [thereby facilitating the definition of common rules and the evolution of common institutions.] On the other hand they may reinforce the sense of common interests that impels states to accept [these] common rules and institutions."[12]

In the specific case of European international society it is the latter's historical roots in the preceding civilisation of Medieval Christendom which has provided the common historical tradition facilitating the evolution and consolidation of this society. Commenting on the origins of the European society of states in the disintegration of this single community of Christendom, Bull observes that "throughout its history modern European international society has been conscious of the memory of the theoretical imperium of Pope and Emperor and the actual imperium of Rome."[13] Despite their own manifestly distinct patterns of historical evolution, the common antecedents of early modern European states in this universalistic civilizational order meant that they shared certain deeply rooted traditions and assumptions. Moreover, in the process of developing their own autonomous, secular, sovereign identities they have drawn upon these commonly shared ideas, attitudes and assumptions including a common legal heritage deriving from Roman law, a common scientific world view originating in Greek civilisation and a common ethical perspective deriving from the religious tradition of Christianity. Insofar as these have formed the

prior matrix of shared cultural meaning such traditions have exercised a profound influence upon the development of European international society. For they have provided the grounds for the development of a system of mutual understanding between the independent political entities of this society based on practices of mutually acknowledgement of their separate sovereign identities.

As a result of the cohering, integrative influence of this pre-existing civilisational heritage of common cultural traditions then, Bull notes that there have developed the substantive socio-political forms which represent the practical source of order formation within European international society. Most importantly, this pre-existing framework of cultural tradition has helped to facilitate the development and consolidation of the substantive political institutions of modern international society. Here we need to focus on states themselves as the primary agents of social order formation within this international society and the forms of cooperative interaction developed by them. According to Bull, the common civilisational background shared by these states has provided the basic preconditions for the evolution of a community of mutually acknowledging political-legal identities, a group of moral-political sovereign subjects possessing certain "duties and rights attaching to ... [them] as members of international society."[14] It was the emergence of this community of states and the mutual recognition of their status as right possessing, sovereign political actors within the international sphere which has been crucial to the modern process of international order formation.

In considering Bull's account of the role of these states as the principal agents in the formation of international social order it is important to emphasise here a feature of Rationalist theory which radically distinguishes it from the Neo-Realist perspective. This is the distinctive Rationalist conception of the nature of the state as the basic political actor in modern international society. According to Rationalist theorists like Bull and Wight states cannot be reduced, in either their internal or external behaviour, simply to objective units of power capabilities as was the case with the Neo-Realist theorists considered in Part One. Within this Rationalist, societal perspective the state is understood in more complex terms as a legal-political subject having its origins within broader cultural processes of civilisational formation. As we saw above, these major international actors have evolved historically as ethico-political subjects possessing political rights and incuring obligations as part of a wider political society of sovereign political personalities.'[15] Indeed, the establishment of the sovereignty of the state and its legal-political identity as an autonomous political entity has been inseparable from its formal recognition by the other sovereign members of the international system.

According to Bull it is this fact of the moral-political subjectivity of states (albeit an artificial historical, cultural construct) which is the main factor explaining the practical historical creation of forms of social order within modern international society. Acknowledging the legal-political identity of their counterparts, states have formally recognised their position as members of a larger international political

community. Moreover, in accordance with this mutual acknowledgment of their reciprocal duties and obligations as members of this political community, states have been prepared to co-operate in the establishment and management of those regulative socio-political practices upon which specific structures of international social order have been predicated. The mutual recognition of the reciprocal rights and obligations inhering in states as sovereign powers then, has provided the general context for the elaboration of political-legal relations and associated institutional practices shaping the political interactions between these political actors. Let us now consider the specific elements of international social order arising out of this inter-subjective process of co-operation between modern sovereign states.

At the most basic level Bull argues that the emergence of this mutually acknowledging community of sovereign political subjects has involved the identification by these political subjects of certain basic, shared interests forming the minimal goals to be pursued in common as members of international society. He observes that the "maintenance of order ... [within] international society has as its starting point the development among states of common interests in elementary goals of social life."[16] Within modern European international society states have come to accept a number of such elementary goals as appropriate ends to pursue and have co-operated in the management of the institutional structures through which those ends have been realised. Most important among these has been the concern for the preservation of international society itself. Thus Bull notes that, "whatever the divisions between them, modern states have been united in the belief that they are the

principal actors in world politics and the chief bearers of rights and duties within it. The society of states has sought to ensure that it will remain the prevailing form of universal political organisation, in fact and in right."[17] Deriving from this overiding common purpose are the other basic interests shared by states, most notably those of the maintenance of the external sovereignty of individual states and the goal of the limitation of violence in external state relations.[18]

Complementing this process of the identification of the elementary goals of social life held in common by the sovereign subjects of international society has been the corresponding development of rules prescribing the type of behaviour sustaining these goals and the institutions which have helped to give these rules effect within international society. According to Bull "if states today form an international society this is because, recognising certain common interests and ... values, they regard themselves as bound by certain rules in their dealings with one another. At the same time they cooperate in the working of institutions such as the forms of procedures of international law, the machinery of diplomacy ... and the customs and conventions of war."[19] Here again it is states themselves which have been responsible for articulating these social rules and managing the international institutions through which they are translated into practice. The "enforcement of [these rules of co-existence] in the absence of a central authority is carried out by states ... States undertake the function of making the rules or legislating ... [They] communicate the rules through their official words ...[They] legitimise the rules ... by employing their powers of propaganda to mobilise support for them in world politics as a whole...

[They] undertake the task of changing or adapting operational, moral and legal rules to changing circumstances"[20] and they also 'protect' these rules through diplomacy and war. Among the most important of these rules of co-existence Bull notes those defining the legitimate use of violence and the rules covering the formation and maintenance of agreements between states.[21]

These rules of co-existence, together with the mutually accepted goals underlying them, have provided the criterion for the operation of the substantive ordering institutions of international society. Moreover, as we shall see below, such regulative rules have assumed quite different forms in accordance with their incorporation within different discursive systems of international legitimacy informing the reproduction of social order within modern European international society. But before considering these different historical systems of international legitimacy we need to give some consideration to the major institutions constituted and managed by states within modern international society in accordance with the rules of co-existence noted above. Of these the most important for Bull is the balance of power and the role of the great powers in managing that balancing mechanism. This is the case, he maintains, because it has been the practice of preserving a balance of power between states within European international society which has constituted the central factor ensuring the historical maintenance of the society itself. The balance of power has secured this end both by preventing this society from being "transformed by conquest into a universal empire ... [and by providing] the conditions in which other institutions on which international order depends ... have been able to

operate."[22] In doing so, however, the nature of the balance of power has itself undergone transformation along with the historical development of European international society more generally.

Thus, according to Bull, the idea of using countervailing force as the basis for maintaining order between states has varied in character, assuming at different times more socially limited and, alternatively, more sophisticated forms. Emerging initially as a purely fortuitous, unconscious response by states to aggressor powers, the balance of power later developed into an institution consciously contrived by the members of European international society to secure their common interests - a form most significantly expressed in the highly developed system of the nineteenth century concert of European powers. The development of the institution of the balance of power and the obligations attaching to the great powers managing such balances reflects the influence of those duties and obligations between states which Bull identifies as the hallmark of international society. According to him the idea that the preservation of the balance of power throughout the international system as a whole should be the common goal of all states "implies that each state should not only frustrate the threatened preponderance of others but should recognise the responsibility not to upset the balance itself: it implies self-restraint as well as the restraint of others."[23] This self-restraint has been integrally connected with the recognition and observance by the most powerful states of the obligations and responsibilities associated with great power. Moreover, Bull argues that these obligations have traditionally extended to encompass the mutual

recognition of their independent spheres of influence and their role in preserving order within these spheres.

It is the operation of this central institution of the balance of power which has provided the relatively stable conditions within which the other ordering institutions of European international society, notably international law and diplomacy, have been able to function. With respect to international law Bull observes "that there are rules which states ... regard as binding on one another there can be no doubt. It is by virtue of this fact that we may speak of the existence of an international society."[24] Moreover, in emphasising their contribution to international order formation Bull is especially concerned to distinguish the distinctive binding nature of these rules forming the body of customary international law. In contrast with the compulsorily binding character of municipal law existing within the state, backed by the authority of the sovereign, the efficacy of international law derives from a number of unique factors. Thus "states obey international law in part because of habit or inertia; they are, as it were, programmed to operate within the framework of established principles."[25] On a more deliberative, calculative level conformity with the law may be the result of actual or threatened coercion or, alternately, of states' perceptions of the practical benefits associated with following such law. Whatever the motivations explaining its practical efficacy, in terms of the broader process of the production of international order this institutional body of law developed between states has served to delineate and clarify the body of customary rules of co-existence among states. It has also helped to mobilise compliance with these rules by

states by channeling states' actions in the direction of compliance with agreements, specifying "what the nature of an agreement is ... and ... [solemnising agreements] in such a way as to create an expectation of performance."[26]

Integrally connected with international law has been the development of the practice of international diplomacy. Through the development of a professional body of diplomats and a system of resident embassies, an institutionalised form of social discourse facilitating regular communication between the sovereign actors of international society has been created - a system which itself pressuposes the acknowledgement of those moral-legal rights and obligations between states noted above. Bull notes that this diplomatic system has contributed to the broader process of order formation between states in a number of ways. Most importantly, it has provided the medium through which the agreements between states forming the source of the rules of international law have been negotiated. Such agreements are possible "only if the interests of the parties overlap at some point and if the parties are able to perceive that overlap. The art of the diplomatist is to determine ... this area of overlapping interests ... and to bring the parties to an awareness of it."[27] Besides this important function of identifying and clarifying the mutual interests of states, diplomatic intercourse has also served to maintain the system of international order produced by the operation of the balance of power by minimising the destabilising effects arising from disagreement between the sovereign members of international society. In this context the legal conventions of diplomatic relations have often provided a peaceful alternative to the

resort to violence and the disruption of the existing international order as a means of resolving differences arising between states.

Lastly, Bull points to war, understood as a system of organised violence between states, and the rules governing the waging of such war as an important institution contributing to the maintenance of social order within modern international society. In doing so he immediately notes the paradoxical nature of war as both a force for order and as a source of disorder within international society. The "rules and institutions which international society has evolved reflect ... [this] tension between the perception of war as a threat to international society which must be contained and ... as an instrumentality which international society can exploit to acheive its purposes."[28] In its former, disruptive aspect war has clearly had a negative effect upon the constitution and maintenance of social order within international society. But even here, Bull argues, the waging of war has been circumscribed by rules whereby the society of states has sought to modify its destructiveness.[29] In its latter aspect, however, war has, in different ways, served a positive order maintaining function where the resources of diplomacy have failed to resolve major differences between states. At such times, Bull notes, war has been invoked as a "means of enforcement of international law"[30] both in the context of war waged in self-defence by states whose rights of territorial sovereignty have been violated and where war has been waged by third parties on behalf of a victim of territorial violation. At the same time war has been important in maintaining the central institution of the balance of power within European international society. "At least from the beginning of the

eighteenth century [international society] has seen in war a means of preserving the balance of power."[31] Indeed, insofar as it has contributed to the maintenance of such a balance in different periods through the frustration of the imperialistic ambitions of a preponderant power, the use of war has performed a decisive role in the very maintenance of international society itself.

III The Constitution of Legitimate Social Orders within Modern European International Society - From Dynastic to Nationalist Society

The modern system of international relations, as it is articulated here then, presents a picture of the development of an international society of sovereign subjects whose practical reproduction has been predicated upon the operation of the major institutional forms noted above. The mutual acknowledgement of the rights and obligations pertaining to the political subjects constituting this society, understood as sovereign legal personalities, has formed the basis of the development of those international socio-political practices and institutional forms of co-operative action which have functioned to regulate the relations between states and to engender distinctive forms of societal order within this anarchical society. At the same time, however, Bull notes that the particular form of social order and the nature of the rules and institutions shaping the latter within this modern anarchical society have not always remained the same. In fact the character of social order within the European society of states has varied historically, most notably in the periods of the Absolutist and nationalist periods.

In the remaining section of this chapter I want to consider the historical process of the formation and transformation of these systems of social order constraining the relations between European states in these different periods as they are outlined in the work of Martin Wight. In doing so I will focus on Wight's account of the principles of international legitimacy informing the ordering institutions which have regulated states' external relations in these periods and, specifically, his account of the historical transition from the dynastic to the modern nationalist system of legitimate international order. As we shall see in chapter four, this process forms the prelude to the expansion of European international society in the later nineteenth century and the subsequent universalisation of the nationalist principle of international legitimacy as the basis of an emerging global states-system.

In his essay "International legitimacy"[32] Wight examines the different types of discursive legitimating principles which have operated within modern European international society to define and validate the regulative systems of social order at different periods of its history. Distinguishing the notion of legitimacy from international law on the one side, and ideology or international doctrine on the other, Wight defines the former as "the collective judgement of international society about rightful membership of the family of nations; how sovereignty may be transferred within that society and how state succession is to be regulated"[33] These legitimating principles represent then, the broad regulative norms which have defined rightful membership of, and appropriate behaviour within, modern international society at particular

phases in its historical development. As such they form the primary determinant of the modes by which states may legitimately exercise their power in their interrelations within the international system. These different historical principles of international legitimacy outlined by Wight have circumscribed the broad discursive rule systems defining legitimate societal relations between states, thereby delimiting the type of social order operating between them at any given stage in the history of modern European international society.

In describing the historical formation of these general legitimating principles Wight emphasises the integral relationship between the nature of the dominant legal-political, sovereign personality defining the political subjectivity of states in any period and the corresponding character of the external system of legitimacy regulating relations between those states within international society. These broad legitimating principles originate on the boundary which divides, but, on this view, also connects domestic and international society. They mark "the region of approximation between domestic and international politics"[34] insofar as their historical formation is the result of the externalisation of the dominant internal sovereign personality of any age. It is this dominant, mutually acknowledged sovereign identity characterising the states of international society in any historical period and the moral concepts attaching to it which are projected into the realm of external state relations to form the paradigmatic discursive structure of international legitimacy. The legitimating principles thus engendered represent "principles that prevail within a majority of states that form international society as well as between

them."[35] According to Wight it is the great powers of each period which play the central role in the constitution of these legitimating discourses through the universalisation of their sovereign identities. In each historical period these discourses have given rise to regulative, discursive rules circumscribing the operation of international ordering institutions and defining what is accepted as legitimate behaviour in the relations between states.

At the same time, Wight notes that historical changes in the dominant sovereign character of states has been the catalyst for the transformation of these broad legitimating principles and, hence, of the forms of international social order operating between states. The breakdown of an existing principle of international legitimacy resulting from the erosion of the dominant, system-wide form of state sovereignty, he argues, brings with it the collapse of the very fabric of international society predicated upon the former. With the erosion of the broad, discursive system of legitimate rights and obligations governing international relations the coherence of international society itself dissolves as divergent perspectives come into conflict. "A doctrinal fracture or schism in the states-system [of this type] undermines the tacit understanding that every member of the states-system, in claiming sovereignty and political independence for itself, acknowledges the same claim by every other member. .. In these circumstances the regular working of the states-system is deranged. And there is thus introduced within the system the assumptions and attitudes of holy war and heretics or political opponents are assimilated to barbarians."[36] It is only with the establishment of a new dominant form

of sovereignty involving a new system of legitimating rules of international behaviour that societal order is ultimately re-established.

In the history of modern European international society Wight identifies two major legitimating principles which have informed the process of societal order formation between states. These are, first, the dynastic, prescriptive principle of the Absolutist period and, second, the popular, Nationalist principle emerging since the beginning of the nineteenth century. I shall consider each of these in turn. Within pre-nineteenth century Absolutist international society Wight notes that legitimate interstate relations were defined by a dynastic principle of legitimacy concerned with the status and claims of rulers. Here the dominant Absolutist form of sovereign authority, vested in the legal personality of the monarch, was based upon an internal, hierarchical political structure in which the prescriptive rights of the royal dynasty assumed primacy. This translated, at the international level, into a system of political action in which legitimate behaviour was defined as that which conformed with the norms of dynastic, prescriptive authority. Within the Absolutist states-system "prescriptive rights were sacrosanct and power politics were conducted in a litigious and not an ... ideological idiom."[37] The "dynastic principle of legitimacy was rooted in custom"[38], the focal point of this prescriptive, customary system of inter-societal relations being the royal, dynastic families and relations between Christian monarchs as the legal-political subjects of international society. It was from the legal discourse of familial

relations between ruling monarchs that the legitimating rules of international social order and behaviour in this period were derived.[39]

According to Wight then, the dynastic principle gave rise to a 'dynastic idiom' of international politics. The distribution of political power and the process of the constitution of international order was shaped by the political-legal discursive system of hereditary rights and marital relations associated with this dynastic idiom of inter-societal relations. In this international social system "alliances were consolidated by dynastic marriages. Reversals of alliances were marked by matrimonial disengagements. Territorial aggrandisement was justified by dynastic claims. Foreign revolutions were fomented by cultivating dynastic pretenders."[40] Within the international community of dynastic families the pursuit of power by its dominant members and the formation of balances of power among them was articulated through the medium of claims and counter claims to rightful succession to disputed territories. Great powers sought to achieve international political dominance by asserting their purported dynastic claims (or defending the hereditary rights of others families) to contested territories, and by enforcing those claims through military force.[41] The regulative institutions of power balancing within the Absolutist system were constituted and reinforced through the construction of political alliances invariably consummated by marriages between dynastic families as the legitimate form for consolidating political relations between the subjects of international society.

At the same time, Wight notes that the prescriptive, dynastic principle served to engender societal order by imposing significant constraints upon both the internal transformation and the external expansion of international society. The dominance of a prescriptive, customary form of legitimacy helped to minimise the level of internal opposition to the regulative social principles of Absolutist international order by introducing a high degree of obedience to the monarchy. At the same time a major limitation upon the external expansion and historical transformation of this society derived from the Christian character of its legitimating principle. Here Wight notes that "Dynastic legitimacy was limited to Christendom, insofar as marriage between a Christian and a non-Christian required that the infidel party be converted to Christianity."[42] The possibility for the expansion of European Absolutist international society and its legitimate, dynastic forms of international order here confronted a major ideological constraint having its ultimate origins in that prior Christian civilisational matrix from which it evolved historically.

According to Wight this prescriptive principle of international legitimacy and the dynastic mode of international order formation it engendered were progressively eroded during the nineteenth century, ultimately being replaced by a new, non-prescriptive, contractual principle. The origins of this epochal transformation in the form of international legitimacy he discerns in the transformative effects upon the dominant sovereign personality of European states resulting from the French revolution and its aftermath. The central effect of the revolution, consequent upon the widespread disemmination of its

universalistic, nationalistic ideals in the Napoleonic period, was to produce a major shift in the locus of political sovereignty within European international society from the monarch and the royal court to the person of the state embodied in the nation. Thus, within European international society the "sovereignty of the individual prince [gradually] passed into the sovereignty of the nation he ruled."[43] The consequent breakdown of the monarchical form of legal sovereignty and the disintegration of the prescriptive system of international legitimacy predicated upon it formed the prelude to the emergence of a very different system of legitimate relations between European states from the later ninteenth century - one based upon the new idea of the sovereign state as a self determining national political subject.

According to Wight then, "since 1789 national self determination has replaced prescription as the doctrine of international legitimacy".[44] The basis of this new legitimating societal discourse was a distinctive conception of state sovereignty based on the notion of a contract between the people, or nation, and government. In terms of this new principle, the formal source of sovereign authority now derived from "the claims and consent of the governed."[45] Moreover, this new sovereign principle of popular legitimacy undermined "and at length ... [abolished] prescription ... [For, according to this principle] all that is not popularly based is illegitimate."[46] Translated to the external sphere of international society this new, dominant principle of sovereign state subjectivity introduced a profoundly different discursive system of international legitimacy among European states based on the non-prescriptive, universal values of national self

determination. For, inherent in this new principle was the formal "doctrine of the equality of all states ... [and the idea that] all states recognize the right of all other states to equal treatment in law and in ceremony."[47]

It is this new, universal, non-prescriptive principle of international legitimacy which, Wight observes, ultimately came to define the formal-legal relations of states in the post-nineteenth century era. Furthermore, where the prescriptive character of the preceding dynastic principle of legitimacy served to inhibit the earlier transformation and expansion of the legitimate forms of European international society, this new, non-prescriptive, universalistic principle proved to be far more dynamic, socially inclusive and outwardly directed in nature. Although originating in, and first transforming European international society, the universalistic values which this new principle of international legitimacy involved were to provide the central ideological motivation for the historical expansion of international society beyond Europe and for the formation of an incipient global society of states in the twentieth century dominated by the west.

In chapter four I shall turn to consider the account of the historical expansion of these forms of European international society on a global scale in the late nineteenth and twentieth century as presented in recent Rationalist thought. In particular we shall examine Bull's account of the way this expansionary process has entailed the extension of the national principle of international legitimacy and its universalistic values as the legitimating basis of an evolving global

society of states. As we shall see, Bull's account of this process raises important problems for the Rationalist societal model of international order formation. In fact, it is in this context that we can begin to discern the need for a more critical approach to the analysis of the formation of order within modern western international society than that provided by the practical interest orienting Rationalist thought- one concerned with the possibilities for the practical extension of the universal values underlying the nationalist principle of international legitimacy as the precondition for the production of a stable global international society.

Notes

1. This concept of the political subjectivity of states is further elaborated later in this chapter.

2. M. Wight, "Western Values in International Relations", in H. Butterfield & M. Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, London, 1966, p.96.

3. H. Bull, "International Relations as an Academic Pursuit", Australian Outlook, Vol.26, No.3, 1972, p.265. The origins of this detached, practical orientation in the works of Wight and Bull are complex in nature. Bull has noted the important influence of his Christian pacifism and his study of international law upon the formation of Wight's perspective in his introduction to Wight, Systems of States, Leicester, 1977. Apart from the influence of Wight's work, Bull's own cautious, practical orientation reflects the influence, at the methodological level, of the philosophical realism of John Anderson and, more generally, the Grotian conception of international society. On the importance of Andersonian realism and its acritical implications for Bull's method see Jim George, "International Relations and the Positivist-Empiricist Theory of Knowledge; Implications for the Australian Discipline", in R. Higgot (ed.), New Directions In International Relations: Australian Perspectives, Canberra, 1988. On the Grotian influence in Bull's work see H. Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Society", in Butterfield & Wight, Op. Cit, pp.51-73, and R.J. Vincent, "Hedley Bull and Order in International Relations", Millenium, Vol.17, No.2, 1988, pp.195-213.

4. The essentially conservative function of theoretical knowledge entailed in this practical orientation and the limited role of such knowledge as that of clarifying and, hence, propogating the societal norms and practices grounding established international orders is apparent in Bull's arguments supporting the contemporary structure of international society in opposition to those alternative models of possible world order examined in Part Three of The Anarchical Society. Here the practical interest leads to an emphasis upon the primacy of the value of social order, understood as the preservation of the status quo, over the value of social justice.

5. Bull, Ibid., p.46. Hobbes's account of the state of nature is presented in Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (ed. C.B. McPherson), Middlesex, 1968.

6. Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.46.

7. Ibid., p.35. For an alternative account of these extreme polarities informing the Realist attitude to international change in terms of either a pluralistic condition of political anarchy or the total subordination of states to a single sovereign authority see R.B.J. Walker, "Realism, Change and International Political Theory", International Studies Quarterly, Vol.31, No.1, 1987, pp.65-87.

8. The similarities between this account of international politics and the Neo-Realist model considered in Part One are obvious. For Bull's broader views on the different Realist, Rationalist and Revolutionist strands of modern international theory drawn from the typology elaborated by Wight see H. Bull, "Martin Wight and the theory of international relations", British Journal of International Studies, Vol.2, No.2, 1976, pp.101-116

9. In this context Wight also notes that "the absence of common government ... is indeed ... the feature in which international politics differs from domestic politics. But if anarchy means complete disorder it is not a true description of international relations. There is cooperation in international affairs as well as conflict." M. Wight, Power Politics, Middlesex, 1986, p.105.

10. The Anarchical Society, p.16

11. Ibid., p.14

12. Ibid., p.16

13. Ibid., p.37

14. Ibid., p.39

15. For Wight's definition of states as powers see Power Politics, Ch. 1. Although adopting this more sophisticated conception of the state as an historically constituted sovereign subject, a major deficiency of the Rationalist approach examined below is its failure to explore the broader implications of this extended model. As we shall see, neither Bull or Wight examine, in systematic terms, the complex historical forces accounting for the formation and reproduction of these sovereign states as the central agents of international order formation. Neverthless, I shall argue in chapter four that the implications of their own societal model of order formation raise the need for such a systemic analysis. For a critique of the Rationalist school in terms of its 'metaphysical' conception of the state see Roy E. Davies, "The English school of international relations: a case for closure", Review of International Studies, Vol.7, No.4, 1981, pp.1-13.

16. The Anarchical Society, p.67

17. Ibid., p.16

18. These rules are outlined in detail in chapter three of The Anarchical Society. Bull notes that these common ends pursued by states are not always reconcilable. Thus, in some cases the larger goal of the preservation of international society requires the sacrifice of the right to sovereign independence of particular states. See his comments in Ibid., pp.16-17.

19. Ibid., p.13

20. Ibid., p.72

21. For Bull's extended account of these rules see Ibid., pp.68-69.

22. Ibid., pp.106-7

23. Ibid., p.106

24. Ibid., p.129

25. Ibid., p.139

26. Ibid., p.143

27. Ibid., p.170. For some detailed accounts of these traditional functions of diplomacy within international society see H. Nicolson, Diplomacy, London, 1958, and A. Watson, Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States, London, 1982. A recent ambituous attempt to redefine and extend the traditional understanding of diplomacy in terms of the cultural practices involved in the mediation of historical forms of estrangement between human communities is presented in J. Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Estrangement, Oxford, 1987.

28. Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.188.

29. See ibid., Ch.8 for Bull's account of the evolution of these rules of war within European international society. More detailed accounts of these rules and associated practices which have served historically to limit the severity of warfare between states can be found in I. Clark, Limited Nuclear War: Political Theory and War Conventions, Oxford, 1982, and G. Rumble, The Politics of Nuclear Defence: A Comprehensive Introduction, Oxford, 1985, Ch.8-9.

30. Ibid., p.189

31. Loc. Cit.

32. "International Legitimacy", in M. Wight, Systems of States, pp.153-173. See also Wight's treatment of this general theme in terms of the effects of international revolutions on the evolution of western international society in Power Politics, Ch. 4.

33. "International Legitimacy", p.153

34. Loc. Cit.

35. Loc. Cit. This concept of international legitimacy bears a striking resemblance to Ruggie's idea of principle's of sovereign separateness outlined in chapter one.

36. Ibid., p.36

37. Ibid., p.159

38. Ibid., p.163

39. Commenting on this period Max Beloff has noted that "this system ... presupposed as its foundation the hereditary rights of monarchs and was thus still bound up with all the contingencies of individual life. In such circumstances the political map of the western world was tributary to the accidents of family relationships." M. Beloff, The Age of Absolutism, London, 1958, p.22. For an analysis of the forms of French courtly society under Louis XIV as a primary expression of the domestic operation of this dynastic principle of legitimacy see Norbert Elias, The Court Society, (Transl. E. Jephcott), Oxford 1983

40. Systems of States, p.154

41. A good historical account of the operation of this dynastic social system is presented in D. McKay & H. M. Scott, The Rise of The Great Powers 1648-1815, London, 1983.

42. Systems of States, pp.155-56. At the same time, however, this major obstacle to membership of Absolutist international society did not preclude the formation of short-term tactical alliances with such 'infidel' states as occurred, for example, between France and the Ottoman empire in the sixteenth century. See Wight, Ibid., p.121

43. Ibid., p.153

44. Ibid., p.141

45. Ibid., p.153. For the lineages of this new concept of sovereignty in modern European political thought see Ernest Barker, (ed. & intro.), The Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume Rousseau, Oxford, 1971

46. Ibid., p.163

47. Ibid., p.136

Chapter Four

The Reproduction of Legitimate Social Order Within an Emergent Global International Society

In The Anarchical Society Hedley Bull notes that "since the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century there has arisen for the first time a single political system that is genuinely global. Order on a global scale has ceased to be simply the sum of the various political systems that produce order on a local scale; it is also the product of what may be called a world-wide system."[1] The major factor explaining the emergence of this world political system has been the "expansion of the European states system all over the globe and its transformation into a states system of global dimensions."[2] In the present chapter I will consider the accounts presented by Bull and Watson of this epochal transformation of European international society into a global society as a result of the universalisation of the forms of European international society examined in chapter three. More particularly, I will consider their accounts of the different phases of the formation of legitimate political order within this emerging global society. Beginning with the processes whereby European states established their political dominance over this global society through the imposition of an imperial system of domination over non-western communities I then consider their explanations of the subsequent decline of this European imperial order with the emergence of non-European communities from

colonial subordination to formal sovereign political independence within an embryonic global society of nation states.

Focussing on this latter development in the second part of the chapter I examine Bull's views on the major problems confronting the reproduction of legitimate international order within this newly emergent global society of nation states as manifested in the revolt against western dominance by the recently liberated, third world nations. My principal concern here will be with Bull's arguments concerning the need for the creation of a more just and equitable, global political order as the precondition for the reproduction of a stable, legitimate international society which satisfies the demands of these third world states' for justice. Considering the views of Bull on this issue, as well as arguments against his perception of the proper response by western states to this 'revolt against the west', I will suggest that the issues they raise suggest the need for a different theoretical approach to modern international order formation - one which takes theory beyond the detached, practical interest orienting Rationalist theory.

I The Expansion of International Society and the Creation of European World Hegemony

The expansion of European international society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries forms part of a much longer historical process of European exploration in the non-European world extending as far back as the voyages of Christopher Columbus and the discovery of the

new world by the Spanish.[3] However, it is the Rationalist account of the phase of European expansion beginning in the later nineteenth century which is of primary concern to us here. For it is in this period, according to Bull and Watson, that European states began to undertake a conscious and, in many cases, co-operative policy of imposing their political dominance over the non-European world. This involved the practical extension of the institutional forms of European international society to non-European territories as the basis of a global political hegemony. In tracing the nature and forms of the development of this system of hegemonic political dominance we need to keep in mind the principle of legitimacy noted at the end of chapter three as forming the dominant legitimating principle of European international society from the later ninteenth century. For, according to Bull and Watson, it is this nationalist principle and the institutional forms and political practices associated with it which were to be universalised through the expansionary activities of European states. These European cultural forms represented a primary factor shaping the character of the global political hegemony which these states constructed in the name of the introduction of political civilisation to the 'backward' communities they encountered in the non-European world.

In looking outward to the non-European world during the nineteenth century, Adam Watson notes, European states became "increasingly convinced of the superiority of their capacities ... and also of their institutions and moral values...In their eyes modern civilisation was synonomous with European ways and standards which it was their duty and interest to spread in order to make the world a better and safer

place."[4] In accordance with this belief in their manifest cultural superiority European states began actively to extend their political dominance and, with it, western civilisational forms to the non-European world.[5] The major powers of European society "became involved in imposing their administration and civilisation on almost all of Asia and Africa. They did so ... usually in the interests of what they called order and security ... [In this process] the non-European states ... were expected and induced to conform to the rules and institutions of European international society. [Moreover] in carrying out this expansion the great powers recognised the same need to curb their rivalries and act in concert as in Europe itself."[6] As a result of this expansionary process there had emerged, by the turn of the present century, a global states-system, the chief pillars of this system of dominance being the European colonial powers. Moreover, Bull observes that the dominance of these European powers was expressed "not only in their superior economic and military power and in their commanding intellectual and cultural authority, but also in the rules and institutions of international society. This society was still seen as an association of mainly European and Christian states to which outside political communities could be admitted only if and when they met the criteria for membership laid down by the founding members."[7]

Thus a key element informing the development of this system of global political dominance was the fact of the extension, along with other economic and military forms of dominance, of the 'civilised' political standards of European international society, and particularly the concepts and practices attaching to the western idea of sovereign

personality, as the basis of legitimate political relations within this emerging, global international society. More particularly, in extending their political influence to non-European territories in the later ninteenth century European states sought to reproduce on a global scale the forms of international relations to which they were accustomed in Europe. To this end, Bull notes that they "insisted on criteria of admission to membership of international society [for non-European societies] ... [Furthermore] they used these criteria to acquire special priveleges for themselves"[8] within this expanded society. In this way the colonial powers sought to shape their political relations with non-European communities in accordance with the legitimate standards governing their mutual relations within European international society. As we shall see shortly, this process of the reproduction of European international societal forms within a wider global system was far from a simple process. Ultimately it would entail the forcible imposition of European political institutions and practices on, often strongly resistant, non-European communities.

Those criteria referred to by Bull which were invoked by European states as the determinant of rightful entry to this expanded international society derived directly from the political standards implicit in the popular principle of international legitimacy which we have seen increasingly to have defined legitimate societal relations amongst the states of European international society in the later nineteenth century. As noted in chapter three, the main feature of this principle of legitimacy was its identification of the nation-state as the central legal personality of international society. According to the former,

rightful membership of international society and formal acceptance as an equal participant within the larger international political community depended upon the existence of a formally independent, sovereign national government acknowledging the reciprocal rights and duties existing between itself and its fellow sovereign counterparts making up the larger society of sovereign states. Moreover, legitimate forms of political behaviour within international society were equated with those diplomatic and other political practices reflecting a recognition of the formal equality of the sovereign political bodies of this society.

It is this principle of international legitimacy and its associated standards of acceptable behaviour and rightful membership of international society which, Bull notes, were applied by European imperial powers as the formal political-legal system regulating their relations with non-European countries. In line with these discursive standards of international political intercourse, the acceptance of any non-European political community as a fully fledged political subject of the expanded European international society was identified as conditional upon the existence in that political community of appropriate forms of political organisation, their acceptance of European diplomatic practices and, in connection with this, the recognition of the reciprocal rights and obligations associated with membership of the political community of sovereign states. The possibility for the entry of these non-western communities into the European 'political club' then, required their first attaining the political standards of 'civilisation' laid down by the dominant European powers. The application of these standards of legitimacy formed the

guiding discursive basis for the construction of a complex system of political dominance by western nations over this new global society.

According to Bull the primary medium through which these criteria of legitimate membership received practical expression was in the form of the application of the doctrines of European international law. Indeed, those legal principles shaping the political relations between European and non-European communities in the later ninteenth century represented the practical embodiment of the standards of the European principle of popular legitimacy outlined above. Arguably the most important of these was the doctrine of constitutive recognition applied by European states to their relations with non-European states. As Brownlie has noted, in terms of this doctrine of constitutive recognition "legal subjective personality ... depended upon recognition by the European states ... and recognition ... [of] statehood became a more important concept and was associated with political thinking about nations."[9] More particularly, Bull observes that "by the early twentieth century international legal doctrine came to insist that political entities were entitled to recognition as sovereign states only if they met certain formal criteria of statehood e.g. that there be a government, a territory, a population and a capacity to enter into international relations or fulfil international obligations."[10] As we shall see, when applied to those communities beyond Europe these legal requirements necessary for the attainment of constitutive recognition as a subject of international society helped to facilitate the establishment of a complex and extensive system of political dominance by the European powers.

In accordance with the criteria of membership embodied in this doctrine then, the non-European societies coming under European political influence were considered eligible for acceptance into international society only where their political institutions and behaviour approximated to the political forms of 'civilised' community as defined in European terms. However, Bull notes that, as they were encountered by the expanding European states of the later ninteenth century, non-western societies "did in fact differ radically in their capacity to conduct the new forms of international relations and the tests devised by the Europeans recognised that this was so."[11] Accordingly, in applying the criteria of rightful membership of international society to the non-European communities which they encountered in Asia and Africa, the European powers proceeded to create a hegemonic system of political relations in which different communities were classified and treated in different ways in accordance with the degree to which they were considered to approximate these European standards. Thus Bull notes the significant "gradations of independence recognized by the European powers in the extra-European world, the spectrum of positions intermediate between full sovereignty and the status of a colony - there could be seen alongside the concept of a society of equally sovereign states concepts of international relations as relations between suzerains and vassals. Nor did this situation change basically in the years between the first world war and the second."[12]

Bull distinguishes two broad categories of non-European community created by the application of these hegemonic standards to non-European societies corresponding to European states' perceptions of their

relative capacity to fulfil the criteria required for the attainment of political subjectivity. In the first place there were those traditional Asian communities such as Japan and China which possessed highly developed political institutions and diplomatic systems of their own. While these countries retained formal independence in their relations with western nations, in practice they were reduced to the status of inferior subjects by means of externally imposed regulations on their political behaviour. In cases like these, European states sought to impose western political forms upon such communities by indirect means and primarily through the imposition of unequal treaties stipulating the adoption of western political practices. Through these means the attempt was made to force these communities to change their existing institutional structures and to accept western political concepts and practices which would qualify them for constitutive recognition as full sovereign members of international society.

This process proved more difficult for some states than others depending on their degree of openess to western forms. Thus in the case of China, where European and oriental standards of civilisation came into sharp conflict, this process was achieved only through major coercion from western states. For, as Gong notes, "tradition dictated that China deal with the Europeans not in accordance with the developing European philosophy that states ... interact as sovereign equals but rather in accordance with the Confucian patterns and principles which demanded that all from near and far acknowledge China's [hegemonic] standard of civilisation."[13] Only after considerable coercion was China brought to abandon its traditional political practices and perceptions of cultural

dominance and to accept the western political norms and institutions which would entitle her to membership of international society. Thus, "beginning with the Nianking and Tientsin treaties, the imposition of what gradually became formalised as a Western standard of 'civilisation' forced China to open its ports, to trade on Western terms and to conduct its relations with the west according to international law and Western diplomatic practices."[14]

In the development of political relations between the European powers and 'non-statist' societies such as those encountered in Africa the case was markedly different. Here political relations with mainly tribal communities were adjusted to European states' perceptions of their essentially limited progression towards the condition of sovereign political subjectivity and their consequent inability to assume the obligations of autonomous international political actors within the international system. As communities unable to satisfy the criteria of sovereign subjectivity defined according to the European standard, these communities were denied constitutive recognition and the corresponding rights connected with internal and external sovereignty. In accordance with their view of these communities as non-persons (i.e. as societies incapable of participating as legal members of international society) European states assumed direct control over their territories, imposing their own political institutions and cultural forms on the indigenous peoples.

Thus Bull observes how, during the process of the partitioning of Africa, the "doctrine of constitutive recognition was invoked by

European powers to show that African rulers did not have the rights of sovereign states."[15] Consequently, in establishing their respective spheres of influence within the African continent the colonial powers proceeded on the assumption that these communities were to be subject to European tutelage as the necessary precondition for them to achieve the degree of political maturity essential for fully fledged membership of international society. In accepting their obligation, according to the partition agreement signed by the European powers, to ensure the establishment of authority in the regions they occupied, these European states acknowledged a "common commitment to 'preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of their moral and material well being'."[16] In this respect, Bull notes that the European partition of Africa included as one of its guiding principles the idea that "colonial powers had international obligations to act as trustees for the welfare and advancement of dependent peoples."[17]

With the establishment of these different patterns of hegemonic political relations between the European imperial powers and non-European communities then, there emerged a global system of legitimate, international order dominated by Western states and governed by European political concepts and practices. As Bull observes, by the time of the first world war "European society had ceased to be exclusively European and had become universal in its membership. The European powers along with the United States held a dominant position. The greater part of Asia, Africa, and Oceania comprised colonial dependencies: the universal international society was one of states, but not everywhere one of peoples or nations."[18] It is to the processes whereby this global system

of hegemonic order was transformed into a complete society of nation states in which non-European communities attained full, legal, sovereign status, and the ramifications of this development for the maintenance of legitimate international order, that we must now turn.

II The Breakdown of the Western Hegemonic Order and the Emergence of a Global Society of States

According to Bull the legitimate system of global international order produced by European political dominance outlined above reached its peak by 1900. "At the turn of the century the dominance of European or Western powers expressed a sense of self-assurance, both about the durability of their position in international society and about its moral purpose ... In non-Western societies also the ascendancy of the West was still widely regarded as a fact of nature rather than as something that could be changed. The spiritual or psychological supremacy of the West was at its highest point."[19] The subsequent history of the twentieth century is the story of the decline of this European dominated international order and the rise of a post-European, global society of states in which new, non-western nations have increasingly come to challenge the traditionally dominant position of Western states. In this section we will focus on Bull's account of this process of European hegemonic decline and the emergence of this new, global society of nation-states resulting from the revolt of Asian and African peoples against the Western colonial powers. At the same time, we shall consider the subsequent attempts of these new nations to

break down the traditional forms of dominance exercised by Western nations through the advancement of demands for the restructuring of international society. Here I shall concentrate on Bull's account of the problems posed for the production of a stable, legitimate order within this universal international society arising from the efforts by these new states to actualise their claims for equality.

Bull notes a number of factors responsible for the breakdown of European structures of imperial dominance in the first half of this century. Most notable among these were the inverse processes of the internal decline of the European states themselves, manifested in "the weakening of the will on the part of the western powers to maintain their position of dominance"[20] and, secondly, the corresponding rise to political self consciousness of those non-European societies formerly subordinated to the hegemonic political influence of European states in the pre-war period. With respect to the internal decline of the European powers, the effects of the first and second world wars were particularly significant in engendering both the material and spiritual weakening of the imperial powers. Thus a major effect of the First World War was the loss by the Western powers of "much of the self assurance that had been so central a feature of their ability to maintain the old order... [At the same time they] became committed to a principle of national self determination contradictory of the legitimacy of colonial rule."[21] In effect the First World War created a crisis of confidence within European society which operated to undermine the faith of European states in the moral and cultural values of European civilisation upon which the strength and resolve of European imperial dominance had been predicated. This

weakening of the moral foundations of European imperialism is reflected, at one level, in the new 'diplomacy of peoples' emerging in the postwar period with its espousal of the right of all peoples to national self determination, a development which would itself represent an important stimulus to future colonial liberation movements.

If the first world war witnessed a major erosion of the moral and spiritual resolve underlying western European international dominance, the Second World War was to finally undermine the material capacity and economic incentive of European states to maintain their positions of international political dominance. According to Bull the draining effects of the Second World War "left the European imperial powers too weak to maintain old kinds of dominance ... At the same time it came to be questioned whether colonial dependencies were a source of material gain."[22] The outcome of the dual forces of imperial decline noted here was a progressive weakening of western European states and with it, a diminishing of their capacity and, in some cases, the political will to maintain imperial dominance over their colonial territories. This internal decline of the material and cultural bases of imperial dominance on the part of the traditional European colonial powers was inseparable from the concurrent process of political mobilisation of non-European peoples in the task of attaining formal political independence from their Western imperial masters.

In this context Bull notes that "the old European dominated international order ... did not collapse simply by accident ... The struggle of subject peoples played an essential role in this, even

though it was only one factor."[23] Underlying this struggle was a crucial spiritual awakening of these subjugated peoples manifested in a growing perception that the old colonial order was "no longer a fact of nature but ... something that could be changed [and] that, by mobilising themselves to this end they could indeed change it ... [thereby] abandoning a passive for a politically active role in world affairs."[24] Particularly important in the growth of these movements of political liberation by which many of these colonial peoples sought political autonomy were the cultural influences introduced by the western imperialist powers. As Watson points out, the introduction of Western forms of political organisation and the subsequent "assimilation of western ideas like freedom of speech, the rule of impersonal law, independence, nationalism, democracy and Marxism prepared the way for the drive by [native] elites towards separate and independent statehood in this century."[25] It was the appropriation of such western political ideas by indigenous groups which was to form a major stimulus behind local movements directed to the attainment of political independence from their imperial masters. Most significant in this respect were the aspirations of the leaders of such movements to sovereign nation statehood, the absence of which, we have seen above, provided the formal justification for European political domination of these non-European communities through the denial of constitutive recognition to them. Thus Bull observes that the "great instrument these peoples have used to advance their purposes has been the state: they began by capturing control of states and then used them ... domestically to build nationhood, to establish control of their economies, to combat local vestiges of external dominance."[26]

The rise of non-western communities and their struggle for political independence from western imperial dominance thus assumed the form of a struggle for the status of sovereign political subjectivity denied to these peoples under the colonial system of European imperial dominance. The liberation struggles of these communities were essentially struggles for the attainment of those characteristics conferring the status of sovereign personality upon previously disenfranchised communities and, thereby, recognition as rightful political subjects of international society. Understood in these terms the "process by which Asian and African political communities did come to enter into such reciprocal relations and to enjoy full rights as members of international society was inseparable from domestic processes of social and political reform which narrowed the differences between them and the political communities of the West and contributed to the process of convergence."[27] According to Bull the emergence of these new nations represented the "working out within Asian, African and Latin American countries of historical processes that are not unique to them but are universal: the emergence of sovereign states, the rise of national consciousness on a mass scale the adaptation of society to modern science and technology, the development of a modern economy"[28]

As a consequence of these dual processes of the decline of the European imperial powers and the success of colonial liberation movements a new global international society has come into existence since the Second World War, a universal international society of nation states incorporating diverse national political and cultural communities. Moreover, according to Bull this expanded western society of states

replacing the old imperialist system of legitimate international order has been characterised by a growing disagreement between its older constituents and those newly incorporated, non-European states - a disagreement which represents a potential source of major international instability. For, having acquired the formal, political status of political equality within this society of states, these new third world nations have sought to use their political-legal status in the attempt to overcome other, persisting forms of western dominance as the condition for equality with their Western counterparts. Let us now consider Bull's account of this central contemporary phase of the revolt against the west and the problems it is seen to pose for the reproduction of legitimate order within the contemporary society of states.

III Third World Demands for Justice and the Reproduction of Legitimate Order Within Global International Society

According to Bull the recent entry of a plethora of new nations into western international society consequent upon the process of decolonisation noted above, has been the catalyst for the development of a renewed challenge to the position of Western states within this society. The principal form which this challenge has assumed has been the assertion of third world demands for the radical reshaping of international society in accordance with principles of distributive justice. Moreover, insofar as this challenge threatens the traditionally dominant position of western states and the structures of international

order created by them, Bull argues that this revolt against the west represents a major problem which must be addressed if the threat of international instability and disorder is to be avoided. What then, is the specific nature of this postwar revolt against the west?

"By the revolt against the west I mean the struggle of non-European or non-Western states ... to challenge the dominant position of the Western nations in the international system. In the post-1945 world this struggle has found expression in three conditions: the Afro-Asian movement ... the Non-aligned Movement ... and the group of 77, the caucus of less developed countries ... which collectively are what is commonly understood by the term Third World."[29] While the organisational nature of this revolt is diffuse and its specific target has differed at different stages of its development, its unifying core, according to Bull, is a common demand by its protagonists for justice and equality with the Western nations of international society. "The alliance of Asian, African and Latin American states and the movement that we call the third world has a specific purpose: that of challenging the Western dominance against which all of them in one way or another have historic grievances."[30]

Having achieved national self determination and formal, sovereign recognition as rightful members of the international system, third world states are now seeking equality with Western nations in a range of areas in which they have traditionally been treated as 'inferior'. Their political liberation has become the basis for the attempt by these nations to attain equality with the west in more general terms through

their demands for the transformation of the inequitable structure of international society. Moreover, in pursuing these demands for the transformation of the structure of international society these third world nations have consciously drawn on western values. In fact, "all of these demands [for economic, political, racial and cultural equality] take Western moral premises as their point of departure."[31] Most important here have been their attempts to redefine the notion of justice implicit in the principle of sovereign constitutive recognition defining rightful membership of international society. Taking up the traditional, limited concept of reciprocal justice understood as the mutually acknowledged right of self help adhering to all states by virtue of their sovereign status, these new nations have sought to radicalise its formal content.

The new concept of distributive justice espoused by third world states thus involves a major extension of the traditional, reciprocal version inherent in the popular principle of political legitimacy forming the basis of societal relations within the newly emerging global international society. In particular, the former advances a much broader conception of the equality of states as the sovereign, moral subjects of international society and, consequently, of the nature of legitimate behaviour in the relations between those states through which that moral equality is given practical expression. As we saw in our analysis of the doctrine of sovereign constitutive recognition informing the earlier expansion of European international society, the traditional, reciprocal notion of justice involves a pluralistic conception of international society which focusses on the autonomous rights of individual nation

states defined as discrete sovereign subjects of that society. According to this notion, states, as formally equal sovereign subjects, are formally obliged to acknowledge those basic reciprocal, obligations and rights existing between them, one of the most important of these being the right of self-help, or free exercise of their sovereign power.

The new notion of distributive justice advanced by third world nations, by contrast, involves a solidary, communal conception of international society which is predicated upon a concern with the realisation of substantive, as well as formal, legal equality among sovereign states. Thus, according to Bull, where reciprocal justice is "justice negotiated by the [individual] members of society on the basis of an exchange of rights or benefits ... distributive justice is justice allocated by society as a whole to its members according to some principles of distribution."[82] In advancing this solidary principle of distributive justice the primary emphasis of third world states rests upon the major disparity between the legitimating 'ideological' standard of formal, sovereign equality and the actual conditions of substantive inequality (political, economic etc) existing between the sovereign subjects constituting the global international community and the actions considered necessary to overcome this disparity. The application of the communal, distributive concept of justice to international relations, in this context, gives rise to a new, extended notion of obligation between states; a mutual obligation to overcome the gap between the formal legitimating ideal and the practical reality of inter-societal relations. Legitimate international behaviour is here radically redefined in terms of the concerted forms of action required to create

the social conditions enabling the attainment of substantive equality for all the members of international society.

Thus the contemporary revolt against the west focussed on by Bull involves a radical reinterpretation of the very principles upon which the legitimacy of post-ninteenth century Western international order has been based. Moreover it is all the more significant in that it is phrased in the normative discourse of western society and advanced through the legitimate institutional political channels of international society rather than through revolutionary challenges to that system from outside. According to Bull the "demands of Asian, African and Latin American states and peoples are demands for justice in this sense - for the removal of discrimination, unequal or unfair treatment of certain states, nations and ethnic groups."[33] In advancing this new idea of justice their aim is to secure a collective commitment from Western states to the restructuring of the global international society according to the principles of redistributive justice in order to correct the imbalances and forms of discrimination traditionally existing between Western and non-Western states on a number of levels. Through their concerted efforts within those international organisations constituting the major fora of diplomatic relations between the sovereign subjects of this new global international society these nations have sought to influence political thinking within the society of states and to turn the general climate of opinion within the west in favour of their demands for distributive justice.

Bull notes a number of different types of proportionate or distributive justice which these new nations have sought. Most prominent among these has been the demand for economic justice in terms of the more equitable distribution of the world's resources. During the last few decades, Bull notes, there has emerged "a widespread perception of the world as divided into 'developed' and [exploited] 'underdeveloped' countries and widespread recognition of the obligation of the former to extend aid and non-reciprocal trade preferences to the latter."[34] In line with the pervasive perceptions of third world economic backwardness as principally the product of past Western exploitation the less developed states have advanced proposals for the redistribution of the world's wealth as a matter of moral right.[35] For their part western nations have challenged some of the basic assumptions upon which this supposed moral right is predicated. In particular, they have challenged the view that "the wealth of the advanced industrial countries ... in the past derived significantly from exploitation of non-western countries rather than having been generated by the scientific and industrial revolutions within the Western countries themselves; that the relative backwardness of Third World countries is a consequence of colonial or neo-colonial exploitation rather than other causes [internal to these communities, and] that the economic life of Third World countries was on balance harmed rather than enhanced by the impact ... of the international economy during the colonial period."[36]

Secondly, third world and western states have clashed over the demand by the former for racial justice or equality in the form of the abolition of discrimination against non-white peoples on the basis of colour. In

this context Bull notes that "the old European-dominated international order was associated with the priveleged position of the white race ... Non-white peoples everywhere suffered the stigma of inferior status whether as minority communities within white states, like the American blacks; as majority communities ruled by minorities of whites, like the Indians during the British Raj; or as independent states dominated externally by white powers, like China."[37] This claim for racial justice is closely linked with third world demands for justice in cultural terms - in matters of the spirit of the mind. On this issue third world nations have "asserted a right of cultural liberation and issued a protest against the intellectual or cultural ascendancy of the west which they profess to see as no less a threat to them than its political and economic ascendancy."[38] Here again, however, Western states have responded to such demands by pointing to major inconsistencies in the position of the protagonists of this restructuring of international society. In particular, they have pointed to the fact that third world states' "efforts to achieve equality of rights between whites and non-whites ... have seldom been matched by any comparable attention to other forms of racial or ethnic oppression ... [within the third world including] the oppression of Asian minorities in Africa or Chinese minorities in South East Asia."[39]

Underlying all these claims by third world states for justice, however, and perhaps most significant of all in this debate over the demand for the restructuring of contemporary international society, is the implicit demand for the redistribution of international political power which it involves. For central to the collective experience of the Third world

countries and the hopes they have of changing their position Bull discerns "the feeling of being vulnerable and dependent. They know they can escape from this situation only by making themselves stronger in relation to their adversaries."[40] The challenge to western dominance articulated in these different claims for justice then, is inseparable from a more general demand by these states for greater power as the basis for the establishment of their substantive independence and the attainment of equality in practice. Herein lies the nub of the dispute between third world states and the dominant western nations over the demands for the restructuring of international society. For, as Bull notes, Western states are aware that "as third world countries grow stronger in relation to western countries, the latter will become relatively weaker."[41] Hence, in acquiescing to third world demands, Western nations see themselves participating in a process whose likely outcome will be their own decline, or, at the very least, the reduction of their capacity to ensure their own security within an anarchical international society. This apparent tension between third world claims for justice and the realities of power relations within international society will be of central concern to us as we move to examine Bull's views of the implications of this debate over the restructuring of international society for the reproduction of contemporary international order.

IV Justice, Legitimacy and the Reproduction of International Order

What conclusions does Bull draw from this analysis of the recent revolt against western dominance for the broader problem of the historical reproduction of legitimate, consensual order within the contemporary global society of states? In fact, it is Bull's contention that the proper response of Western states is to accept and accommodate third world demands for justice. "The challenge presented to the Western countries is one that they have to deal with in its own terms... [It] requires the Western countries to make adjustments that are unwelcome, ... to abandon privileges in the international order they once enjoyed."[42] His reasons for adopting this position centre around Bull's views concerning the integral relationship between the values of international order and justice and his resulting perception of the deleterious effects upon contemporary international society which are the likely consequence of the failure of western states to respond positively to third world demands.

We may best illuminate the nature of Bull's arguments on this issue by comparing his approach with that found in the writings of a Realist theorist like Robert Tucker.[43] In addressing his attention to the phenomenon of the revolt against the west Tucker also focusses on the central connection between the maintenance of international order and the actualisation of forms of international justice. But his treatment of this relationship differs radically from Bull's. Concerning the question of how the west should respond to this 'new egalitarianism' espoused by third world states, Tucker critiscises those who see in this

development the beginnings of the formation of a qualitatively different type of global international order. Rather, he stresses the need to locate such third world demands within their proper context as part of the perennial struggle for power between states as actors within a competitive condition of international political anarchy. In asserting this Realist view Tucker, at the same time, emphasises the point that the "hierarchical character of this [anarchical] society is the indispensible condition for ... [international] order."[44] Within this competitive condition of political anarchy, he maintains, it is only the inequitable distribution of power between states which has enabled the reproduction of a minimal degree of order by allowing the more powerful states to transcend the necessitous concern for national security, thereby enabling them to introduce the basic regulative structures providing a minimum of international order.

Applying this Realist perspective to the demands for justice by third world states Tucker stresses the point that this "challenge to the global status quo ... is a challenge made by states on behalf of states ... The new egalitarianism is little more than a refurbished version of the old realpolitik version of equality [i.e. the equal right to self-help]. As such there is no reason for seeing in it the necessary precursor of a growing equality of states."[45] For Tucker then, third world demands for distributive justice are properly seen as little more than the ideological instrument by which non-Western states seek to enhance their own individual power positions within the existing international system. This new egalitarianism challenges, "not the essential structure of the international system but the distribution of

wealth and power within that system."[46] As such, its acceptance by western nations would not produce a qualitative transformation of the present international system towards a more equitable and peaceful society of states but would merely entail their own decline and the ultimate substitution of non-Western nations as the dominant powers within a reformulated, inegalitarian international power structure.

While not transforming the existing inequitable structure of international order then, the accommodation of such demands does represent a serious threat to the stability of the existing order. For, insofar as the existence of inequality between states is the inescapable foundation of a minimal degree of stability within the condition of political anarchy, Tucker maintains that the acquiescence to such demands for the creation of a more egalitarian international system threatens to create major instability among states. The erosion of the power of the dominant Western states entailed by the acceptance of such demands "must lead to a ... decline of the old order even while no new order has been firmly established. For the beneficiaries of the old order will no longer be willing to enforce the order of the past, while the challengers of the old order will remain ... incapable of creating a new order ... As long as ... [this] disjunction is not resolved it threatens to lead to chaos."[47] Accordingly, western states should not acknowledge these general demands for justice from third world nations. The avoidance of the potential disorder resulting either from total acceptance or complete rejection of third world claims to justice lies instead, in "the gradual co-option of the principal Southern beneficiaries of a reformed system,"[48] and the granting of what they

really covet, namely political power. This response Tucker identifies as most conducive to the maintenance of international order by undermining the unity of the third world coalition which is the principal threat to the former.[49]

Tucker's work provides some important insights into aspects of the revolt against the west which are arguably understated in Bull's writings as a result of his practical, cultural orientation to the process of order formation. Most significant here is Bull's over playing of the unity of third world states and, closely related to this, his understatement of the disparity between the formal principles of distributive justice used to justify their demands and the less altruistic motivations underlying such demands. As we have seen above, this latter disparity is one which is also understated in Bull's account of the motivations underlying the actions of imperialist powers in the era of European expansion. However, in addressing the problem of the revolt against the west Bull's work is arguably concerned with a much deeper historical issue of which the above mentioned phenomena represent only the most visible symptom. This is the general problem of the reproduction of consensual order within a western international society which is already undergoing radical historical transformation as a result of the incorporation of new nations and cultures within it.

This larger concern of his later writings receives expression in Bull's account of the connection between the problem of securing international justice and reproducing stable international order within a global society of nation states. For, as mentioned above, it is his central

argument that the maintenance of order within this, now global, international society is ultimately inseparable from the realisation of international justice. While acknowledging the practical difficulties associated with the move from the present inequitable international order to a more equitable one, in his later writings Bull neverthless maintains that "the requirements of order and of justice in international relations are in practice the same ... e.g. the measures that are necessary to achieve justice for the peoples of the third world are the same measures that will maximise the prospects of international order or stability, at least in the long run."[50] In contrast with Tucker then, Bull maintains that the normative claims for justice by third world nations cannot be reduced purely to an ideology supporting narrow self interest. Rather, they have a distinctive significance for international social order which transcends considerations of pure power politics. This distinctive dimension concerns the dynamics of the reproduction of the legitimacy of contemporary international society as a fundamental condition of the overall integration and stability of that society.

It is here that his societal perspective on the historical decline of the old European system of international legitimacy and the rise of a new, ideologically divided global society of states outlined above becomes crucial. Where Tucker effectively advocates the reinforcement of the structures of the old international society, Bull's argument is that, within the contemporary global society of states, the legitimating structures and principles of the old Western dominated international order are no longer justifiable as a basis for engendering societal

integration. The decline of the traditional western international order and the historical forces engendering the revolt against the west have produced a transformation in the qualitative nature of inter-societal relations in which the old legitimating values have been challenged and radically reinterpreted. Once taken as the natural determinant of acceptable or legitimate political behaviour within international society, the old western values have now been delegitimised and no longer provide an effective standard for engendering co-operative, stable political relations amongst the sovereign subjects of this anarchical society.

Accordingly, the problem which arises for Bull is that of how the sovereign subjects of this new, post-Western international society are to reconstruct a system of international legitimacy which might form the basis for the long term integration of its members in a stable system of order; an international order in which the new, non-Western nations, together with the older western states, possess the material capabilities and political willingness to co-operate in undertaking the obligations and responsibilities required for the maintenance of stable international relations. In this context Bull maintains that "the western peoples who created the global international system of today have a supreme interest in sustaining a viable international order that will endure into the next century. It is not credible that such an order can be sustained unless the states of the Third World, representing as they do the great majority of states and the greater part of the world's population, believe themselves to have a stake in it."[51]

In terms of this concern with the production of the legitimacy of international order then, it is Bull's argument that the development of a stable political order within this contemporary global international society requires that the western states respond positively to the demands of third world states for its restructuring in a more just, equitable form. "The overiding interest of the western countries is to seek to accommodate the demands of Third World countries for change ... from considerations of international order."[52] The successful integration of third world states into the larger, global international society will be possible only if these claims for justice are recognised and accommodated. Moreover, this is the appropriate response of Western states insofar as it entails the "righting of what Western peoples themselves can now recognise as historic injustices."[53] However, Bull's support for the reconstruction of international society involves a deeper dimension transcending this specific concern for the redress of third world grievances. While the demands for justice by third world states form the major catalyst, it is his view that the process of the creation of such a legitimate, global international order ultimately requires the acceptance by all the members of this community of principles of legitimacy which advance the interests of an emerging community of mankind associated with the contemporary incorporation of the world within a single international political system.

In terms of this broader consideration the outcome of the dialogue between third world and western states over the restructuring of international society is not conceived of as a one-sided process of reform solely on the part of the latter. To have any chance of success

this dialogue must be one of mutual learning between all participants in which both third world and western states come to moderate their actions in accordance with their recognition of a higher common good.[54] Thus Bull observes that, in accepting the challenge of restructuring international society, our "conception of justice needs to take account of our emerging sense of a world common good...[Moreover] measures ... to advance the world common good take us beyond the sense of solidarity or common interests among governments that underlies the international society of states which is rooted in the desire to preserve states. The world common good to which I refer is the common interest not of states, but of the human species in maintaining itself."[55] Taken to its logical conclusion then, the creation of this legitimate, global international order would involve the radical reformation of the moral and political attitudes of sovereign states. The historical process of the construction of a new, legitimate international order is one which should encompass, but also transcend the particular interests of individual states or groups of states. It is ultimately inseparable from the achievement of an international society where states come to recognise an obligation to a moral community of mankind extending beyond existing statecentric obligations.

In advancing these arguments Bull is well aware of the practical constraints upon this process of restructuring arising from the anarchical structure of international society and the concern of states for their own security. In particular, he acknowledges the difficulties besetting the pursuit of distributive justice resulting from the absence of an international authority capable of acting as a distributor.

"Whereas in domestic society the government has the power to impose a particular distribution of rights or benefits ... in international society there is no world government to carry out this role."[56] In acknowledging this fact Bull excludes the possibility for the future emergence of a world government of this type. His is a much more modest perspective, one predicated upon the belief, deriving from his societal conception of international relations, in the capacity of states to reach consensus on the conditions necessary for the historical reproduction of international social order. Accordingly, in taking up the challenge posed by the revolt against the west Bull notes that "the need is for particular states to seek as wide a consensus as possible and, on this basis, to act as local agents of a world common good."[57]

V A Critique of The Rationalist Societal Model

The Rationalist conception of modern international order formation examined above presents themes which are of central importance for the broader theoretical concerns of this work. In most general terms this perspective highlights the historical specifity of the modern western states-system as an historically evolved, distinctive form of society. In articulating this distinctive societal perspective the Rationalist approach indicates the deep formative origins of this international society in the cultural milieu deriving from the preceding European Feudal society. Moreover, the work of Bull and Wight illuminates the distinctive character of those societal structures which have evolved as the substantive basis of order formation between sovereign states within

the modern western society of states. Emphasising the nature of these states as historically constituted sovereign communities, they indicate the manner in which the relations between these communities have been shaped by the historical construction of socio-political rules and institutional practices regulating the behaviour of these sovereign subjectivities.

In terms of this societal model the Rationalist perspective provides us with a radically different, and arguably more sophisticated understanding of the nature of international order formation than the quasi-natural, technical one presented in Neo-Realist theory. Not least important here is the manner in which it exposes the inherent limitations of the qualitative distinction drawn by Neo-Realist theory between the ordered nature of political life within the state and the quasi-naturalistic, asocial condition of political anarchy existing between states. More specifically, by focussing on the processes involved in the historical formation and reproduction of systems of legitimate, consensual order within western international society, this approach directs our attention to the important interrelations between those internal changes in sovereign state subjectivities and the external processes explaining legitimate order formation between modern states. At the same time, we have seen how the Rationalist perspective illuminates some of the distinctive problems involved in the reproduction of such historical systems of legitimate order arising from the historical transformation of the sovereign structure of modern states engendered by the uneven development of international power. Especially significant here is the way in which changes in the dominant

form of sovereign authority characterising different historical phases of western international society engender challenges to the existing structures of international political domination engendering relatively stable interstate relations. As the work of Bull and Wight indicates, these historical processes have played a major part in the creation and subsequent transformation of structures of legitimate order among modern states in three broad historical phases - firstly in the European, Absolutist phase; secondly in the expansionist, imperialist phase and, more recently, in the contemporary global phase where the prevailing nationalist principle of constitutive recognition has been radicalised as the basis of demands for the further extension of the qualitative character of legitimate order between contemporary nation states.

However, despite providing this more sophisticated paradigmatic understanding of the nature of modern international order formation, the Rationalist perspective arguably involves some important shortcomings which limit its effectiveness as an explanation of the process of legitimate order formation within modern western international society. Moreover, these limitations may be seen to stem directly from the practical cognitive interest orienting the Rationalist approach to the study of international society. In terms of the critique advanced here, a particularly important implication of this practical theory-orienting interest for the Rationalist conception of international order formation concerns the limited understanding of the nature of the state and the social relations between sovereign states which it engenders. For, to the extent that this practical interest induces a critically detached concern with the cultural, legal-political dimensions of international

order formation, the state tends to be presented in largely undifferentiated terms as a unitary sovereign subject interacting with other sovereign subjectivities within a historical condition of social anarchy. Admittedly, consideration is given, particularly in the work of Martin Wight, to the connections between changes in the political-legal form of sovereign subjectivity characterising powerful states and the formation of structures of legitimate order between them. However, as we have seen above, the Rationalist approach provides little substantive analysis of the broader historical forces contributing to the formation and practical transformation of these sovereign states and their role in shaping the historical reproduction of systems of legitimate order at the international level.

By circumscribing the understanding of the nature of the state in this manner then, the practical interest orienting Rationalist theory engenders a narrowly defined understanding of the processes accounting for the reproduction of legitimate order within modern international society. More particularly, as Fitzpatrick points out, "by taking the state as the unproblematic starting point of its analysis, this school effectively rules out any systematic analysis of the state and of the multiple intersections between 'international' and 'domestic' conflicts [and processes] which define ... the problem of the state"[58a] and the larger historical practice of order formation between states. In this respect the focus of Rationalist theory on the discursive processes operating between such 'unproblematic', unitary sovereign political communities precludes any detailed consideration of the role of those historical influences deriving from the military-strategic and socio-

economic dimensions of international social practice influencing the historical reproduction of legitimate order within modern international society. In particular, it leads to a neglect of those processes of historical change in the material and strategic structures of state power, examined earlier in Gilpin's thought, and their influence upon the relative capabilities of states to significantly influence the order constitutive processes occurring within the wider international society.[53] Although such an extended societal perspective is potentially opened up by the Rationalist perspective's acknowledgement of the historically constituted nature of modern states and its sensitivity to the relationship between internal processes of sovereign state formation and the external development of legitimate systems of order between states, this potential is left largely undeveloped because of the limiting focus of its practical knowledge-constitutive interest.

Taking this a step further, it can be argued that the necessity for an extended societal perspective of this sort is actually raised by the historical analyses of modern international order formation presented by Rationalist theorists themselves. This becomes especially apparent when we consider the implications arising from Bull's account of the problems confronting the historical reproduction of legitimate order within the contemporary global society of states and his views on the nature of, and the appropriate response by western states to, the grievances of third world nations. As we have seen, the basic concern of Bull's later work is with the problems confronting the reproduction of legitimate order within an emergent global society of nation states. Moreover, in addressing himself to this issue Bull isolates the problem of third

world demands for justice as a crucial factor requiring attention. In doing so he identifies the diverse forms of international inequality characterising contemporary global society which need to be redressed as the precondition for the future reproduction of stable, legitimate order within this emergent global society.

Elaborating upon this central theme Bull is led to argue the case for the practical institutionalisation of principles of distributive justice as the most effective basis for the long term reproduction of legitimate order within this global anarchical society. In this context he articulates views which appear to go beyond the more limited Rationalist categories and assumptions which informed his earlier writings. More specifically, his analysis of the circumstances affecting the reproduction of order within contemporary international society leads him to adopt a position which would appear to entail the abandonment of the passive, critically detached attitude of those earlier works and gives rise to a commitment to a positive interest in the prospects for human emancipation within this society through the actualisation of principles of international social justice. Moreover, in advancing this positive argument for the practical advancement of principles of distributive justice within contemporary international society, Bull also considers the different social structures which would require practical transformation as the precondition for the institutionalisation of these principles of distributive justice. In doing so, he implicitly extends the focus of the societal conception of international order formation to a consideration of the diverse forms of uneven development (economic, cultural, political) between the states of

this society and the way they have engendered complex structures of international domination forming the basis of legitimate order formation within modern international society.

We can see here then, how the implications arising from the application of the Rationalist societal perspective to the contemporary global society of states implicitly (though not necessarily explicitly in Bull's own thought) takes us beyond the critically detached and substantively limited practical interest which I have identified as characterising Rationalist theory. In effect Bull's concern with the possibilities for the practical realisation of international justice directs our attention beyond the generalised Rationalist notion of international order as a construct of unitary sovereign states, to the complex historical logics by which the different structures of international domination regulating contemporary interstate relations have been historically reproduced through human historical practice. At the same time it raises the central question of how such human historical practices can be reoriented in order to facilitate the historical transformation of those same structures of international inequality as major constraints upon the actualisation of a more emancipated, self determining system of human social relations within an evolving western international society.

Arguably then, the implications arising from the Rationalist analysis of the reproduction of legitimate order between contemporary states presented in Bull's later writings suggests the need for a movement beyond the categories of Rationalist thought and its limited conception

of the unitary sovereign state as the basic agent of international order formation. More specifically, it suggests that these processes must be relocated within a theoretical perspective which recognises the latter as the expression of historical practices of human self determination - practices which may be consciously reoriented to enable the further extension of the posibilities for human emancipation within international society in the future. For the reasons suggested in the present critique the full articulation of the implications of this broader, societal conception of international order formation would not appear possible within the Rationalist paradigm itself. Rather, an extended account of international order formation capable of accommodating this broader conception of societal order formation arguably requires a major reformulation of the societal model deriving from Rationalism's practical cognitive interest.

NOTES

1. Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.20

2. Ibid., p.21

3. For Watson's account of the earlier phases of the expansion of European states see H. Bull & A. Watson (eds.) The Expansion Of International Society, Oxford, 1985, pp.13-32

4. Ibid., p.27

5. The reasons for the expansion of European international society in this period are the subject of considerable controversy, different commentators variously emphasising the primacy of economic, military-strategic and political factors. For some surveys of these differing explanations see Harrison M. Wright (ed.), The New Imperialism, Analysis of Late-Eighteenth Century Expansion, Massachusetts, 1961; D.K. Fieldhouse, Economics And Empire 1830-1914, London, 1984, and A. Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism, Ch. 4. In line with their practical theory-orienting interest, the principal focus of the Rationalist theorists considered here is upon the cultural, legal-political dimensions of this process.

6. Bull & Watson, The Expansion of International Society, p.27

7. Ibid., p.218.

8. Ibid., p125. This assumption that European states consciously sought to reproduce the forms of European international society within the non-European world assumes a commonality of purpose and level of motivation which is rendered doubtful by a close analysis of the practice of imperialist expansion. In fact, the diffusion of the normative forms of European international society would appear more often to have been an indirect result of more basic aggrandising impulses of the European powers. Apart from the works of Wright and Fieldhouse cited above see also on this point J. Joll, Europe Since 1870, Middlesex, 1976, Ch.4

9. Bull & Watson, The Expansion of International Society, p.362. For a more detailed account of the diffusion of this universalistic standard of civilisation and its articulation within the new positivist system of international law see G. Gong, The Standard Of Civilisation In International Society, London, 1984

10. Ibid., pp.122-23

11. Ibid., p.125

12. Ibid., p.126. Here again the process of European expansion is presented in highly formalised, normative terms in line with the practical orientation of Rationalist theory towards the cultural, legal-political dimensions of international order formation. As I

shall argue below, this approach ultimately produces a one-sided account of the forces engendering this broad historical process.

13. Ibid., p.174

14. Ibid., pp.176-77

15 Ibid., p.113

16. Ibid., p.110. This account of the actions of European imperialist powers in the non-European world manifests a strongly Anglo-centric bias. Bull's account arguably underplays the different motivations of the imperialist powers and the distinctive features of their particular imperialist policies. At the same time, little attention is given to the autonomous forces affecting imperialist practices arising within the colonial territories themselves. On this latter point see Fieldhouse, Economics And Empire. On the differences between French and English imperialist policies see Joll, Europe Since 1870.

17 Bull, The Expansion Of International Society, p.110. Bull acknowledges that this principle was often abused and that there was widespread exploitation of the native populations. However, this is not seen as detracting from the broader historical importance of the principle.

18. Ibid., p.125

19. Ibid., p.219

20. Ibid., p.244

21 H. Bull, Justice In International Relations, Waterloo, 1983, pp.27-28. For an account of the general aspects of this cultural crisis within postwar European society see G. Barraclough, An Introduction To Contemporary History, Middlesex, 1967, Ch.8

22. The Expansion Of International Society, p.224. Here again the important differences in the policies of the colonial powers need to be stressed. Thus, while some states, like Britain relinquished their imperial territories soon after World War Two, others like France sought to held on to their possessions in the face of strong local opposition. For a useful survey of this process see Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics since 1945, (4th Editn.), London, 1982, Part 5.

23. Justice In International Relations, p.24

24. The Expansion Of International Society, p.224

25. Ibid., pp.31-32. For a more detailed account of this phenomenon see R. Emerson, From Empire To Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples, Boston, 1970.

26. The Expansion Of International Society, p.224

27. Ibid., p.122

28. Justice In International Relations, p.23

29. Ibid., p.19

30. Ibid., p.2

31. Ibid., p.3

32. Ibid., p.14

33. Ibid., p.2

34. Loc. Cit..

35 This movement received practical expression in the formation of the group of 77 third world nations within the United Nations in the nineteen seventies and their attempts to win agreement from western states for their plan to create a new international economic order. On this movement see J. N. Bhagwati, The New International Economic Order: The North-South Debate, Cambridge, Mass., 1977. The impact of the debt crisis on third world states and the decline in the stability of the international economic system since that time have effectively removed this program from the international agenda. For an account of these more recent developments in the international politicial economy see R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton, 1987.

36 Justice In International Relations, p.9

37 Ibid., p.3

38. Ibid., p.5

39. Ibid., p.8

40. Ibid., p.10

41. Loc. Cit

42. Ibid., p.32

43 Robert W. Tucker, The Inequality Of Nations, New York, 1977

44. Ibid., p.178

45. Ibid., p.69

46. Loc. Cit

47. Ibid., pp.93-94

48. Ibid., p.185

49 Here Tucker's argument raises a central problem which will be considered again in the conclusion to this work, namely the major constraints upon the actualisation of such an extended legitimate international order posed by states' concerns for their strategic-political security.

50. Justice In International Relations, p.18

51. Ibid., pp.32-33

52. Ibid., p.32

53. Loc. Cit.

54. Bull's argument here seems to be that third world states, in acknowledging this higher interest, must also moderate their extreme demands for political and economic autonomy if a stable, durable system of order is to be realised within this global society. For an account of some of the problems confronting the achievement of such a condition of international consensus posed by the highly diverse cultural and political interests which would need to be accommodated therein see Adda B. Bozeman, The Future Of Law in a Multicultural World, Princeton, 1974.

55. Justic In International Relations, p.14

56. Loc. Cit.

57. Loc. Cit.

58. John Fitzpatrick, "The Anglo-American School of International Relations: The Tyranny of A-Historical Culturalism", Australian Outlook, Vol.41, no.1, 1987, p.51. Fitzpatrick's critiscism is directed against both Rationalist and Neo-Realist conceptions of the state. For an alternative critique directed specifically against the 'metaphysical' nature of the Rationalist conception of the modern society of states see Roy E. Davies, "The British school of international relations: a case for closure", Op. Cit.

59. As we have seen, this one dimensional character of the Rationalist conception of international order formation is reflected in the analysis of all the different phases of the expansion of European international society outlined above. Thus, little detailed consideration is given to the strategic-military or economic dimensions of European imperialist expansion, nor to the complex processes of uneven development leading to the breakdown of British imperial dominance and its substitution by American hegemonic power in the post World War Two period.

PART TWO CONCLUSION

In the preceding section I have sought to indicate the valuable insights into the nature of order formation within the modern international system provided by the Rationalist societal model. At the same time, however, we have identified certain basic limitations of this model which point to the need for the development of an extended explanation of the historical factors accounting for the reproduction of legitimate order between modern states. The reformulated societal perspective suggested here arguably needs to expand upon Rationalism's recognition of the historically constituted nature of those societal structures engendering order within modern international society. At the same time, however, it must adopt a more systemic approach to this process which examines the way the uneven development of the different forms of strategic-political, socio-economic and cultural power between states has facilitated the establishment by the more powerful among them of complex structures of domination supporting systems of legitimate order at the international level. In doing so, I suggest, this reformulated theoretical perspective would effectively take us beyond the reified societal categories of Rationalist theory noted above, to an acknowledgement of these order constitutive structures as the complex expression of broader processes of human historical development within the modern western society of states.

More particularly, such a critically engaged societal perspective would focus on the way the broad process of uneven international development noted here has engendered the practical transformation of the different modern structures of legitimate order between states and the possibilities raised by such historical transformations for the institutionalisation of those normative values most effectively facilitating the integration of states within a stable, harmonious legitimate international order. While this revised societal model suggested by our preceding critique thus leads us beyond the limits of the self understanding of the Rationalist perspective and its practical orienting interest, I have sought to suggest that the development of this extended theoretical model does not necessarily involve a rejection of, or radical break with, the concerns of the latter. Rather, I have sought to show how it emerges, in some important respects, as an elaboration of the implications of the Rationalists' own distinctive concern with the logics of the reproduction of western international society understood in terms of the ongoing formation of legitimate systems of international order.

When viewed in this manner the articulation of the practical interest in elucidating and clarifying the nature of those societal structures regulating relations between modern states can be seen to point the way to a more sophisticated understanding of modern international society and the historical process of order formation occuring therein. In turning, in Section Three, to examine Cox's Critical theory of international relations, I shall explore the resources which this

theoretical approach offers for the reformulation of the societal perspective in accordance with the major themes outlined above.

PART THREE

CRITICAL THEORY, THE EMANCIPATORY INTEREST AND THE WORLD ORDER PARADIGM

Introduction

Our preceding analysis of the Rationalist account of order formation within the modern society of states indicated the need for the development of an extended societal perpsective if we are to acquire a more adequate understanding of the nature of this historical process. In particular, it was suggested that the development of such a theory requires a major reconstruction of the basic categories informing Rationalism's societal perspective to allow the movement beyond its critically detached, one-sided explanatory approach. In this third part of the thesis I consider a theoretical model which would appear to offer an extended perspective of this sort. I focus on the account of modern international order formation presented in the theoretical and historical writings of Robert Cox. The importance of Cox's work for our broader project lies in its distinctive approach to the analysis of this modern process of international order formation understood as the historical production of hegemonic world orders. As we shall see below, the substantive object of this perspective includes, but is not reducible to, the dimension of political relations between sovereign states which forms the central concern of the Neo-Realist and Rationalist theories already examined in this work. For, the structures of world order which constitute Cox's central focus potentially embrace not only the political and strategic, but also the socio-economic and cultural forces accounting for the historical production of legitimate order at the international level.

Moreover, in contrast with the Neo-Realist and Rationalist paradigms examined above, this account of the modern processes of world order formation is guided by a knowledge-constitutive interest of a reflective, emancipatory nature. Specifically, the orientation of theoretical inquiry arising from this reflective interest is towards the historical transformation of such structures of world orders and the potential created by the latter for human emancipation. In this respect, as we shall see below, Cox's Critical theory takes as its principal concern the task of demystifying the nature of these historically generated, legitimate structures of world order, in the process illuminating their historically contingent nature and examining the constraints they impose upon the further, practical extension of human self determination within modern international society. Central to Cox's critical perspective then, is an overt normative interest in the potential for the extension of human freedom implicit in the historical reproduction of hegemonic world orders understood as the complex expression of the historical development of disinctively human creative capacities.

In chapter five I shall outline the basic elements of Cox's conception of this process of modern international order formation. First elaborating the nature of the critical, reflective interest informing this theory, I then proceed to examine his holistic account of the general structure of such world orders and the different, relatively autonomous forces which operate to produce the socially integrated hegemonic structures underpinning their practical operation within modern international society. At the same time, we shall consider his

account of the sources of the transformation of these world orders and the overiding emancipatory considerations to which the analysis of this transformative process gives rise.

Having considered these basic elements of Cox's Critical perspective I proceed in chapter six to examine his practical application of this perspective to modern international society. Here I focus on the two major historical examples of this process of world order formation outlined in his historical account of the movement from the nineteenth century Pax Britannica to the contemporary Pax Americana. Particular attention is given here to Cox's account of the problems confronting the reproduction of the contemporary world order and, in particular, the possibilities which he discerns in the current historical phase for the movement towards a new legitimate world order involving a more equitable, emancipated form of international relations. At the same time, I note certain problems with his broader theory which raise significant difficulties for Cox's attempt to realise his claim to provide a holistic account of the historical processes accounting for the reproduction of order within modern international society.

Chapter Five

Elements of the Critical Theory of World Order Formation

In undertaking the project of constructing a critical conception of international order formation Cox's work involves a conscious attempt to go beyond the preoccupations of traditional international relations theory and what he identifies as its limited, reified, statecentric categories in order to develop a more adequate and comprehensive theory.[1] As noted above, the basic cognitive interest orienting this radical departure from the concerns of traditional international relations theory is a reflective, emancipatory one - an interest which engenders an understanding of international order formation which is in marked contrast to those we have seen to characterise the theoretical perspectives considered so far in this thesis. In outlining the distinctive elements of this critical theory of modern international order formation in this chapter I shall begin by considering the nature of this reflective, emancipatory interest arising from Cox's critique of the problem solving perspective which he identifies with traditional international relations theory. This will provide the essential background to our analysis of those general transformative processes identified by Cox as the basic agent in the historical reproduction of those hegemonic structures of world order which he identifies as the central feature of the modern process of international order formation.

I Critical Versus Problem Solving Theory: The Sources of the Reflective, Emancipatory Interest

In outlining the main methodological features of his critical theoretical approach to international relations Cox observes that "theory is always for someone, for some purpose. All theories have a perspective."[2] Moreover, it his contention that "to each such perspective the enveloping world raises a number of issues; the pressures of social reality present themselves to [theoretical] consciousness as problems."[3] In terms of this prior, informing perspective or worldview then, any theoretical approach engenders a particular problematic, an "historically-conditioned awareness of certain problems and issues"[4] characterising the wider world which constitutes the broad focus of theory. It is these problems or issues which form the basic concern of theoretical analysis and in accordance with which its purpose is defined. In stressing this perspectival nature of theory Cox is also concerned to argue that, depending upon its particular problematic, different theories are informed by very different objectives or purposes in analysing the object world. In advancing this argument he distinguishes two very general types of theory characterised by very different perspectives and correspondingly distinct purposes. These include, firstly, those theories guided by an immediate, problem solving purpose in analysing the object world and, secondly, those manifesting a more critical, reflective approach involving a transformative, emancipatory purpose in confronting social reality. A brief analysis of the differences between these two approaches, comparable in each case to the methodologies of traditional

and critical international relations theory for Cox, will enable us to grasp the distinctiveness of the methodological approach orienting his own theoretical account of international order formation.

First then, problem solving theory. According to Cox the focus of problem solving theory tends to be sharply delimited in both its understanding of the objective reality which constitutes its theoretical concern and in the practical purpose informing the analysis of that social reality. More particularly, the orientation of problem solving theory tends to engender an essentially ahistorical, pragmatic problematic. The primary purpose of theory is understood here as that of providing a guide to "help solve problems posed within the terms of the particular perspective which was the point of departure."[5] In doing so Cox argues that this perspective invariably "takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised as the given framework of action."[6] In line with this 'unreflective' attitude to the existing social and political order, the general aim of problem solving theory is to "make the [existing] relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble."[7] Moreover, insofar as it accepts uncritically the given reality inherent in a particular theoretical perspective and the particular problems defined by the former, this type of theory also tends to focus on highly specific areas of activity, analysing specialised problems within those particular spheres. Thus, according to Cox, the focus of problem solving theory is inevitably "fragmented ... [into] a multiplicity of spheres or aspects of action each of which assumes a certain stability in the other

spheres ... when confronting a problem arising within its own."[8] Since the general pattern of institutions and relationships is not called into question but its constancy merely assumed, particular problems can be considered in relation to specific areas of social or political activity in a temporally fixed manner.

Problem solving theory is distinguished then, by an ahistorical approach to the analysis of the objective world of social reality and by a predominant concern with the resolution of specialised problems arising within a fixed social and political framework. In this respect the "strength of the problem solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or perameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination."[9] By allowing the formulation of general statements of laws or regularities characterising political behaviour within these strictly defined areas this approach attempts to draw precise conclusions about the best means by which political behaviour may be regulated to produce stable order in its specialised sphere of interest. At a deeper level, however, Cox observes that this aspiration to theoretical exactitude and scientific precision represents the great weakness of problem solving theory since the social and political order is not fixed in the way the problem solving perspective assumes, but is subject to constant change. Thus, in assuming, as the necessary basis of its specialised analyses, the permanence of general institutions and power relations which are subject, in practice, to continual challenge and transformation, problem solving theory is led to a false view of the 'objectivity' of its laws

and predictions. As a consequence of this, it is constantly in danger of degenerating into an ideological justification for contingent historical structures and practices of domination supporting the status quo.

The second, critical theoretical perspective differs from this problem solving approach in virtually every respect. Beginning at the most basic, methodological level Cox notes that critical theory is "reflective upon the process of theorising itself ... [seeking] to become clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorising and its relation to other perspectives ...[and thereby] opening up the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective."[10] Critical theory is concerned then, with establishing the most adequate method for understanding the sphere of action which is the common object of inquiry for itself and traditional theory. At the same time, the critical theorists assumes a reflective attitude to the object world which is opened up to it by the theoretical mode of enquiry. Thus Cox notes that "critical theory ... stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about... [It] does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they may be in the process of changing."[11] Inherent in this reflective theoretical approach to understanding social reality is an accute sensitivity to history and the historical nature of the existing social world as a contingent historical product. In this respect critical theory is also "theory of history in the sense of being concerned not just with the past but with a .... [continuous] process of historical change."[12]

In accordance with this basic historical orientation the critical perspective cannot be satisified with the acceptance of static, ahistorical categories of theoretical analysis. Rather, Cox notes that the process of theorising necessarily involves a "continual confrontation of concepts with the reality they are supposed to represent and their adjustment to this reality as it continually changes."[13]. Thus critical theory is inevitably led beyond the temporally bounded focus of traditional problem solving theory. In contrast with the latter's preoccupation with the resolution of particular problems of order production within a fixed, objective social reality, critical theory brings into question the totality of the social order as an historically produced, contingent object of theoretical analysis. "Critical theory ... does not take institutions and social power relations for granted but calls them into question ... It is directed to the social and political complex as a whole ... and seeks to understand the processes of change in which both parts and whole are involved."[14]

In embracing this holistic historical perspective then, the purpose of critical theory is not limited to a concern with the practical adjustment or management of problems arising within the existing socio-political system. Rather, when viewed from this broader historical problematic, the overiding purpose of the study of the existing social world is redefined as that of establishing the potential for its general transformation as an historically limited expression of a more general historical process of human self determination. Integral to this larger emancipatory concern with systemic transformation is the dialectical

conception of history associated with the critical perspective. By contrast with the problem solving approach and its underlying 'ceterus paribus' assumption, this critical, reflective perspective emphasises the way in which the dynamic processes of historical change continually engender forces for social transformation at any given stage of history providing the impetus for the practical rearticulation of existing structures of social and political order. Understood in these transformative terms, the centre of interest for theory is redirected to the prospects for the historical construction of new social orders opened up by these dynamic historical forces. As Cox points out, "at the level of real history, dialectic is the potential for alternative forms of development arising from the confrontation of opposed social forces in any concrete historical situation."[15]

It is from this understanding of the dynamic, historical nature of social reality that the overt emancipatory purpose of critical theory arises. In seeking to construct a more self conscious and comprehensive theoretical understanding of the nature of the social world than is provided by problem solving theory, the reflective interest guiding this theoretical approach "allows for a normative choice in favour of a social and political order different from the prevailing order, but it limits the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world."[16] Moreover, it is the historical knowledge of the origins and nature of the existing socio-political order and the dynamic transformative social forces at work therein facilitated by this reflective theoretical attitude which provides the basis upon which an assessment can be made of the possibilities for the

emergence of such a reconstituted social system offering the potential for the extension of human freedom.

Inherent in the critical perspective, therefore, is a problematic whose defining focus is the broad concern with the practical problems confronting the historical formation of a reconstituted social world - a condition in which traditional forms of domination constraining the social interaction and creative co-operation of human beings, generally accepted as an inevitable, incontrovertible fact of life by the problem solving approach, might be overcome through the introduction of more self determining forms of social organisation. Accordingly, critical theory contains an "element of utopianism ... but its utopianism is constrained by a comprehension of historical processes."[17] Let us now consider how Cox attempts to reconstruct the traditional theoretical approach to the study of international relations through the application of this critical theoretical perspective.

II The Reflective, Emancipatory Interest and the Historical Reproduction of Hegemonic World Orders

In isolating these two general perspectives as the basic models orienting the various approaches to the study of international relations, Cox proceeds to argue the case for the adoption of the latter, critical type as the most adequate method for understanding the modern international system and the nature of order formation occuring therein. Opposing the assumptions of this critical theoretical

perspective to what he discerns as the predominant problem solving orientation of traditional theories of international relations, he develops a critique of the latter which provides the point of departure for the construction of his own, expanded, critical theory of international order formation.

Thus, the principal deficiency of traditional international relations theory according to Cox has been its unquestioning acceptance of an anarchical, statecentric conception of international relations as the given, unchanging object for analysis by international relations theorists. Addressing himself specifically to postwar Neo-Realist theory, Cox notes that the former has "tended to adopt the fixed, ahistorical view of the framework for action characteristic of problem-solving theory."[18] The practitioners of this type of theory have been able to maintain this fixed, ahistorical perspective by postulating an unchanging substrata or set of underlying substances considered fundamental to the system of international relations in any historical period. These basic, perennial substances on which the problem solving perspective is predicated Cox identifies as "the [unchanging] nature of man, understood in terms of Augustinian original sin or the Hobbesean perpetual and restless desire for power ..., the nature of states ... [defined in terms of] their fixation with a particular conception of national interest ... as a guide to their actions; and the nature of the states-system which places rational constraints upon the unbridled pursuit of power."[19]

In adopting this fixed, non-historical perspective and its reified categories these theorists have also incorporated the other major features of problem-solving theory into their research. Most notably, they have tended to adopt a fragmented approach to the analysis of international relations, a tendency manifested in a preoccupation with specialised areas or themes of contemporary international politics and the particular problems confronting the reproduction of order within specific spheres of the existing system. The focus here is on the resolution of immediate problems threatening stability within the international system. Given its uncritical acceptance of this non-historical model of international relations as a repetitive and unchanging system of anarchical political relations between sovereign states, the broader problem of system's transformation does not arise for traditional international theory. Rather, the essential concern lies in ensuring the smooth functioning of the exisiting international political order in light of its unchanging, inescapable character as an anarchical condition of necessary political action.

Thus, according to Cox, this ahistorical, statecentric conception of the nature of international relations and its particularised, problem-solving approach have hindered the development of a more sophisticated, historical understanding of the nature of order formation within the modern international system. Viewing the international system as a basically unchanging sphere of anarchical political relations between discrete political units, the former has consequently failed to provide any analysis of the diverse historical forces accounting for the constitution of order within the modern international system. "Having

arrived at this view of ... [the nature of international politics in terms of] underlying substances, history [for this perspective] becomes ... a quarry providing materials with which to illustrate variations on always recurrent themes. The mode of thought ceases to be historical even though the materials used are derived from history ... Moreover, this mode of reasoning dictates that, with respect to essentials, the future will always be like that of the past."[20]

In this way then, the reified categories associated with the problem-solving orientation of traditional theory have directly the opposite effect insofar as they encourage a strictly limited view of the type of behaviour possible in the sphere of international relations. From this standpoint the "notion of substance at the level of human nature is presented as a rationality ... common to the competing actors [within the international sphere] ... This idea of a common rationality reinforces the non-historical mode of thinking. Other modes of thought are to be castigated as inapt."[21] In this way the problem solving perspective performs an important normative role within the international system. Serving, as it does, to deter any substantial theoretical analysis of the dynamic processes of historical change operating within the international system and their implications for the possible qualitative transformation of that system, it thereby helps to reinforce the system of power relations supporting the status quo. Within the paramaters of this theoretical perspective any analysis of the possibilities raised by the transformative processes of history for moving beyond the current system to a different type of international

order transcending the condition of political anarchy is specifically excluded.

Invoking his critical approach in opposition to this reified problem-solving perspective, Cox proceeds to elaborate a radically different, historical problematic focussing on the processes involved in the formation of modern hegemonic world orders. Pivotal to this critical perspective is his rejection of those essential substances forming the underlying basis of traditional international relations theory noted above. Citing the work of Vico, Cox notes that "one cannot ... properly abstract man and the state from history so as to define their substances or essences as prior to history."[22] The nature of these elements is not fixed but is itself a product of a more general historical process of conscious human creativity. States themselves, as the central agents of international order formation, are contingent products of complex social forces which themselves represent particular, historically evolved expressions of conscious human creative activity. It is the complex processes engendered by these contingent, historically formed state structures which Cox identifies as the constitutive source of those larger, holistic structures regulating behaviour within modern international society - namely the successive hegemonic structures of world order.

Expanding upon this theme Cox contends that a "proper study of human affairs should be able to reveal both the coherence of minds and institutions characteristic of different ages and the process whereby one such coherent pattern - which we can call an historical structure -

succeeds another."[23] It is with the explanation of this complex historical process of the reproduction of such general structures of world order that a critical theory of international relations is principally concerned. As historically constituted systems regulating human action at the international level, the latter represent the practical expression of the conscious creative capacities of human agents. Moreover, the historical reproduction of these general structures of world order produced by the combined effects of different forms of hegemonic domination is identified by Cox as the basic medium facilitating the ongoing transformation of those specifically human creative powers. Rather than forming static and unchanging substances as traditional international theory suggests, the structures of the international system undergo a process of evolution giving practical expression to the powers of conscious self determination intrinsic to those human agents engendering them.

In addressing itself to the historical constitution and transformation of these holistic, hegemonic structures of world order then, the critical approach to international relations is governed by an interest of an explicitly normative nature. For, insofar as this historical process is considered to manifest the "continual remaking of human nature and the creation of new patterns of social relations which change the rules of the game"[24], critical theory is inevitably concerned with the possibilities for the reshaping of international society presented by this dynamic process in a manner which facilitates the eradication of those constraints traditionally imposed upon human interaction by the modern system of international relations. In going beyond the

ahistorical assumptions and limited preoccupations of traditional theory, this critical approach to international order formation focusses upon those "conflicts which arise within ... [existing world orders] and open the possibility for ... [their historical] transformation."[25]. Its primary theory-orienting interest lies in ascertaining the potential generated by such conflicts for the extension of the human capacity for conscious creative interaction and development within the social totality which is the modern society of states.

III The Integrative Forces of World Order Formation

As it is presented in Cox's work then, a critical theoretical approach to the understanding of international order formation involves the analysis of the reproduction of modern structures of world order and the complex historical forces engendering them as they reflect the articulation of broader processes of human self determination. In most general terms, these modern world orders represent "the particular configuration of forces which successively define the problematic of war or peace for the ensemble of states."[26] Moreover, Cox notes that "a principle distinction between structures of world order lies in whether or not the order is hegemonic, ... [such a hegemonic order involving] dominance of a particular kind where the dominant state creates an order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent."[27] It is this latter, hegemonic type of world order, as distinct from those world orders based around international balances of power, which form the central focus of Cox's work. The former represent dynamic structures formed through the historical interaction and contingent combination of "basic processes at

work in the development of social forces and forms of state and in the structure of the global economy."[28] Moreover, as the central constraining forms regulating the possibilities for, and nature of, international behaviour, these ordering structures are subject to constant historical transformation, manifesting different characterisitics at different periods in the history of the modern international system.

Despite these significant historical variations, however, Cox discerns certain common features characterising the historical formation and operation of these modern international ordering structures. Thus, a central factor in the rise of such structures of world order from the temporal flux of modern history has been the effect of the phenomenon of hegemony and the hegemonic state in the construction of integrated systems of dominance at the international level. This idea of hegemony represents the key feature informing Cox's extended view of the nature of the modern state as the central agent in the formation of world orders. In terms of this extended conception Cox specifically rejects the traditional view of the state associated with problem-solving theory, as a unitary, monolithic political actor guided in its external actions by a clearly defined conception of its own national interest. In contrast with this unproblematic, unitary model, which we have also seen to characterise, in varying forms, the perspectives of the Neo-Realist and Rationalist theorists, Cox offers a more complex account of the state as an historical synthesis of diverse historical forces which is motivated in its external actions by complex, relatively-autonomous forces and interests.

In elaborating this expanded conception of the state Cox draws on the work of the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci. According to Gramsci the political state should not be seen as an independent arbiter among the plural interest groups of domestic society (the liberal perspective) nor as a simple reflection of class interests (the vulgar Marxist view).[29] Instead, he defines the state as a relatively-autonomous unifying force whose broad function is to ensure the effective operation of a domestic, capitalist productive system and preserve the long term interests of the dominant bourgeois class which ultimately controls this mode of production. The principal means whereby the state achieves this end is through the integration of potentially conflicting social classes within a broader, sovereign, socio-political system. Moreover, it is the hegemonic institutions engendered by the political state within civil society which Gramsci identifies as the primary mechanisms whereby the competing class interests of civil society are unified in this single, consensual social structure of co-operative action. Through the construction and management of these hegemonic structures, including such institutions as the press, churches and schools, the political state disseminates those ideological and material forms of class domination which serve to pacify and unify subordinate classes. In this way the apparatus of hegemony operates as the integrative force which "brings the interests of the leading class into harmony with those of subordinate classes and incorporates these other interests into an ideology expressed in universal terms"[30] thus securing the unity of a socially and economically differentiated capitalist society.

Cox adopts this Gramscian conception of the state, defined as a complex hegemonic structure of state-civil society relations integrated through the cohering effects of the political state, as the basic element of his own critical theory. But, in doing so he radically extends Gramsci's account of this process of hegemonic order formation. Within his own theoretical perspective these processes of hegemonic order formation, presented by Gramsci as internal to the state, are identified as having their parallel in the historical formation of hegemonic world orders within the international sphere. By translating the Gramscian conception of hegemonic state formation to the analysis of the transformation of relations between states in this manner, Cox seeks to transcend the limited focus of traditional, statecentric theory upon the political interactions between unitary sovereign states and to provide a more sophisticated understanding of the development of modern systems of international order. Here this traditional perspective is replaced by a concern with the reproduction of those multiple structures of international hegemonic domination arising from the historical universalisation of the internal state/civil society complexes of successive, dominant capitalist states.

In accordance with this expanded conception of hegemonic order formation then, Cox stresses the need for theory to examine "state-society complexes as the constituent entities of world order and for exploring the particular historical forms taken by these complexes"[31] as the basic determinant of the production of structures of world order in any particular historical period. For, according to Cox, it is the historical emergence of new, powerful states containing revolutionary new modes of

production and accompanying domestic systems of hegemonic, political and socio-economic relations, which provides the catalyst for the construction of new regulative structures of international domination within international society. In this respect a world hegemony is "in its beginnings an outward expansion of the internal (national) hegemony established by a dominant social class. [With this development] the economic and social institutions, the culture, the technology associated with this national hegemony become a pattern for emulation abroad."[32] With the subsequent internationalisation of its mode of production and the hegemonic, political and cultural institutions associated with it, a new world order comes into being.

When properly understood, therefore, the hegemonic structure of any particular world order is ultimately founded, "not only upon the regulation of inter-state conflict but also upon a globally conceived civil society i.e. a mode of production of global extent linking the social classes of the countries encompassed by it."[33] Moreover, like its domestic counterparts, the central feature distinguishing such hegemonic world orders from international orders based purely on political coercion is its consensual character. To become hegemonic a state has to "found and protect a world order which ... [is] universal in conception i.e. not an order in which one state directly exploits others but an order which most other states ... find compatible with their interests."[34] The political fragment of the sovereign state constitutes the central agent facilitating the articulation of the multiple economic, political and cultural forces underpinning the reproduction of this hegemonic, consensual structure of world order. By facilitating

the externalisation of those inter-related, relatively-autonomous forces of domestic hegemonic dominance, the political state forms the medium for the articulation of specific regulative structures, structures "functioning in accordance with general principles that ... ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state ... and leading social classes but at the same time offer some measure or prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful"[35] states incorporated within the world order.

Cox identifies a number of hegemonic forces which, by means of their internationalisation, enable the hegemon to engender the acquiescence of other states and their ruling classes to the former's dominant position, thereby facilitating the creation of an integrated, consensual system of world order. Within an emergent historical structure of world order Cox notes three such forces which interact to produce such an hegemonic system, namely material capabilities, ideas and institutions. As an essentially contingent structure of international order, the former is the result of the integrative and regulative effects produced by these three relatively-autonomous forces. Moroever, the configuration of hegemonic forces which they constitute does not represent a rigidly deterministic structure shaping behaviour within the international system. Instead, this complex historical structure "imposes pressures and constraints. Individuals and groups may move with the pressures or resist and oppose them, but they cannot ignore them."[36] The manner of the operation of these forces is not a simple unilinear one but a complementary process of complex interaction through which the general, regulative structure of world order is established and reinforced.

Of the material capabilities which contribute to the establishment of a hegemonic world order Cox emphasises accumulated resources and technological capacities. These represent productive and destructive potentials. "In their dynamic form these exist as technological and organisational capabilities and in their accumulated forms as natural resources which technology can transform, stocks of equipment (e.g. industries and armaments) and the wealth which these command."[37] Complementing these material capabilities are the integrative potentials embodied in ideological resources or systems of ideas. Here Cox distinguishes between what he defines as intersubjective meanings and collective images. Intersubjective meanings are those general, shared notions of the nature of international political relations which orient states' behaviour. These include, for example, notions of national sovereignty and the rules of diplomatic procedure. However, of more immediate importance for the construction of world orders is the role of collective images. These he identifies as "views as to both the nature and the legitimacy of prevailing power relations, the meanings of justice and the public good and so forth."[38] It is these collective images which provide the major resource through which the hegemonic state seeks to engender the ideological commitment of other states to its dominant position as a crucial factor in the maintenance of a coherent, integrated structure of world order operating in its interests.

These material and ideological resources available to the hegemonic state form the crucial elements which historically converge as the constitutive basis of world order formation. Such convergence occurs

through their incorporation in those hegemonic institutions which regulate the multiple political, economic and ideological interactions between states at the international level. Thus Cox notes that these institutions represent "particular amalgams of ideas and material capabilities"[39]. It is the combination of the latter in these institutional structures of hegemonic influence which enables a dominant state to instantiate and perpetuate its particular regulative system of world order. In practice these hegemonic institutions "reflect the power relations prevailing at their point of origin and tend ... to encourage collective images consistent with these power relations."[40] To the extent that world hegemony is "expressed in [these] universal norms ... and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries",[41] they have formed the core of successive modern world orders understood as consensual, cooperative and, therefore, legitimate structures of international dominance.

This aspect of the legitimacy of the hegemonic institutional structures is particularly important for Cox. For, by virtue of their legitimate status these institutions "provide ways of dealing with internal conflicts so as to minimise the use of force ... There is an enforcement potential in the material power relations underlying any structure in that the strong can clobber the weak if they think it necessary. But force will not have to be used in order to ensure the dominance of the strong ... [if] the weak accept the prevailing power relations as legitimate."[42] The likelihood of lesser states doing so is largely dependent upon the dominant state's preparedness to interpret its

position of international domination as hegemonic and not merely dictatorial, in the process expressing its leadership in terms of "universal or general interests rather than just as serving ... [its] own particular interests. Institutions ... become the anchor for such a hegemonic strategy since they lend themselves both to the representations of diverse interests and to the universalisation of policy."[43] By both disemminating and managing the operation of the hegemonic rules and regulations of international behaviour in different spheres of a particular world order and, in the process, distributing the benefits flowing from acquiescence to the system of hegemonic domination constructed by the dominant state, these institutions thus play a pivotal role in engendering orderly relations at the international level.

IV The Dialectics of World Order Formation and the Emancipatory Purpose of Critical Theory

For Cox then, modern hegemonic world orders represent the expression of contingent historical forces which, when crystallised by a dominant capitalist state in a set of hegemonic institutions, engender legitimate structures of domination facilitating the emergence of cooperative relations between states. Such world orders are distinguished by the fact that they rest, not merely on the overt threat of political coercion, but on the consent of the other states subject to the hegemon's dominance, secured by means of material incentives and the inculcation of an ideological commitment on their part to the

preservation of that order. Moreover, the effective operation of any particular hegemonic, world order and, thus, the reproduction of a stable condition of orderly relations at the international level is ultimately dependent upon the hegemon's capacity to maintain the practical legitimacy of this system of domination in its diverse material, political and ideological dimensions.

In accordance with his critical, historical perspective however, Cox stresses that such structures of world order, are contingent, transitory creations. As such they are always subject to challenge and inevitably undergo transformation. "One must beware of allowing a focus on [hegemonic] institutions to obscure either changes in the relationship of material forces or the emergence of ideological challenges to an erstwhile prevailing order. Institutions may ... [become] out of phase with these other aspects of reality and their efficacy as a means of regulating conflict [and their integrative, regulative function] is thereby undermined"[44] More particularly, the continuity of such structures of hegemonic world order ultimately rests upon the ability of the hegemon to preserve the perception of the universal nature of its hegemonic institutions as mechanisms serving the general interests of its members in the face of inevitable challenges to its dominant position. Where it is unable to maintain this perception and to preserve the legitimacy of its position, the functional character and ideological integrity of the institutional forms and practices of hegemonic influence which form the basis of its dominance are likely to breakdown and the potential for the continued reproduction of the existing world order is thrown into question. In these circumstances the

possibility for the emergence of a new hegemonic world order arises. It is in this dynamic transformative process that critical theory's concern for human emancipation comes to the fore.

The essentially dialectical nature of the historical process of world order formation is crucial in this context. Cox argues that the analysis of historical structures of world order is always directed to the consideration of what are always limited totalities. Thus any given hegemonic structure under consideration does not represent the whole world but rather a particular sphere of human activity in its historically located totality. Given this inherently limited nature of such holistic world orders a critical analysis of international order formation necessarily proceeds by "juxtaposing and connecting historical structures in related spheres of action. Dialectic is introduced by ... [studying] the historical situation to which ... [the world order] relates and ... looking for the emergence of rival structures expressing alternative possibilities of development."[45] Where such opposing historical forces emerge, as Cox argues is inevitable given the partial nature of any particular world order, the contingent structure of dominance formed by the convergence of the different forces of hegemony may fragment and ultimately breakdown under the pressure of opposition, thereby opening up the space for the emergence of a new hegemonic world order in its place. In this respect, the breakdown of an existing order and the potential for the development of a new hegemonic structure are determined by the practical historical forces generated by the dialectical, historical forces operating within the existing ordering structure.

Easily the most important of these transformative forces for Cox is the fact of change in the basic structures of social production within the existing world order. Thus he notes that "a significant structural change in world order is ... likely to be traceable to some fundamental change in social relations and in the national political orders which correspond to national structures of social relations."[46] The emergence of a new socio-economic system of production, most often originating at the periphery of the existing order where the influence of the hegemonic state is less pervasive, forms the catalyst for larger processes of international transformation. For such "changes in the organisation of production generate new social forces which, in turn, generate changes in the structure of states; and the generalisation of changes in the structure of states alters the problematic of world order."[47] More particularly, where such basic changes arise, new ideological images of world order are also likely to emerge in opposition to the dominant, legitimating ideology providing the existing order with its cohering, integrative force. The resulting clash of rival collective images provides "evidence of the potential for alternative paths of development [within the existing world order] and raises questions as to the possible material and the institutional basis for the emergence of an alternative structure."[48] The more basic changes in the nature of productive relations become especially important then, when they are connected with an alternative collective image, or universal ideology of world order. From the convergence of these new material and ideological forces the resources arise providing the basis upon which can be constructed a new legitimate hegemonic world order.

Thus, for Cox, the possibility for the creation of new, legitimate, hegemonic world orders expressing different manifestations of conscious human creativity arises directly from the dialectical tensions engendered by the processes of ongoing change within the existing world order. Viewed from this dialectical perspective the critical analysis of the formation of hegemonic world orders, represented as the conjunction of material power, ideology and institutions, appears to "lend itself to a cyclical theory of history; the three dimensions fitting together in certain times and places and coming apart in others."[49] Moreover, when viewed from this broader historical perspective, the acquisition of a theoretical understanding of the nature of any individual world order forms only part of a larger, more fundamental project. For, in explaining the origins, growth and demise of such modern world orders in terms of the dialectical interrelationships of the three levels of their hegemonic structures, critical theory is simultaneously involved in an analysis of the practical articulation of conscious human creative powers expressed in the concrete forms of modern world orders.

Thus the analysis of the dialectical formation and transformation of such orders simultaneously involves an exploration of the degree to which this process of conscious human self determination has been advanced historically and the potential opened up by these transformative historical processes for its further extension through the rearticulation of the ordering structures of international society in more emancipated forms. The overriding concern of a critical theory of world order formation ultimately lies, therefore, in ascertaining the possibilities offered by this dialectical, transformative process for

the practical extension of human freedom through the remaking of the basic structure of human relations within the international system in a radically different image. In chapter six I will proceed to analyse Cox's account of the practical historical construction of the major forms of world order arising within modern international society and their contribution to the emancipatory process noted here. In doing so it will be my concern to offer a critical assessment of his theoretical perspective and, in particular, to determine the extent to which it actually realises Cox's claim to provide a holistic account of the historical processes explaining the reproduction of legitimate order within this modern international society.

Notes

1. Cox's work represents only one example of a much larger body of critical theory emerging in the last few years which takes as its common concern to challenge the basic assumptions and informing categories of what he defines as the problem-solving approach to the analysis of international relations. For some works which take a more radical approach to this critical project see R.J.B. Walker, One World, Many Worlds: Struggles For A Just World Peace, Colorado, 1988,and J. Der Derian & M. Schapiro (eds), International/Intertextual Relations, Boundaries of Knowledge and Practice in World Politics, Massachusets, 1988. Insofar as these more radical approaches have yet to produce a substantive theory of international order formation which might form the focus of critical theoretical analysis they are not considered in this work.

2. Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", Millenium, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1982, p.128

3. Loc. Cit.

4. Loc. Cit.

5. Loc. Cit.

6. Loc. Cit.

7. Ibid., p.129

8. Loc. Cit.

9. Ibid., p.128

10. Loc. Cit.

11. Ibid., p.129

12. Loc. Cit.

13. Ibid., p.134

14. Ibid., p.129

15. Ibid., p.134

16. Ibid., p.130

17. Loc. Cit.

18. Ibid., p.132

19. Ibid., p.131

20. Ibid., p.130

21. Ibid., pp.131-132

22. Ibid., p.133

23. Loc. Cit.

24. Ibid., p.134

25. Ibid., p.135

26. Ibid., p.138

27. R.W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order, p7.

28. "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.130

29. Gramsci's theory of hegemony is elaborated in A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (ed. & Transl. Q. Hoare & G. N. Smith), New York, 1980 and A. Gramsci, The Modern Prince And Other Writings, (Transl. L. Marks), New York, 1965

30. R. W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method", Millenium, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1982, p.168.

31. "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.134

32. "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations", p.171

33. Loc. Cit. As we shall see in chapter six, this preoccupation with such hegemonic order formation defined in terms of the universalisation of the internal forms of capitalist states raises major problems for Cox's attempts to provide a holistic account of the forces explaining order formation within modern international society.

34. Loc. Cit.

35. Production, Power and World Order, p.7

36. "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.135

37. Ibid., p.136

38. Loc. Cit.

39. Ibid., p.137

40. Loc. Cit.

41. "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations", p.172 In fact, as we shall see in chapter six, only one hegemonic world order has involved highly formalised hegemonic institutions of this type,

namely the American neoliberal order.

42. "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.137

43. Loc. Cit.

44. Loc. Cit.

45. Loc. Cit.

46. "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations", p.173

47. Loc. Cit.

48. "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.136

49. Ibid., p.141

Chapter Six

The Reproduction of Hegemonic World Orders within Modern Western International Society

In the preceding chapter we saw how Cox has sought to redefine the basic categories of international relations theory in an attempt to formulate a more dynamic, extended theory of international order formation which overcomes the perceived weaknesses associated with traditional theory. In order to clearly grasp the distinctive nature of this theoretical approach Cox's conception of world order formation was elaborated there in highly generalised terms. However, as he himself observes, the specific nature of the particular structures of world order operating within modern international society cannot bé derived purely from "some abstract model but [emerges] from a study of the [particular] historical situation to which they relate."[1] We shall now consider this practical historical process of hegemonic world order formation as it has unfolded in response to the uneven development of power within modern international society. In doing so we shall be principally concerned with Cox's account of the way relatively stable orders have been historically reproduced within this international society through the effects of the legitimate hegemonic structures constituted successively by the British and American capitalist states.

I will begin by outlining Cox's account of the main features of the hegemonic world order associated with the Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century and the specific domestic and international structures upon which the latter was predicated. At the same time we shall note the dialectical forces which Cox identifies as engendering the breakdown of this hegemonic structure and the consequent emergence of a new non-hegemonic world order in the later-nineteenth century characterised by competition between rival imperialist states. As we shall see, the subsequent phase of European rivalry forms the historical prelude to the emergence of a new, global world order in the post World War Two period based upon the hegemonic dominance of the United States. In proceeding to examine the basic constitutive structures of this second modern hegemonic world order we shall also consider Cox's arguments concerning the current decline of this postwar hegemonic system and the potential which this present transformative phase opens up for the creation of a new legitimate world order in the future facilitating the extension of human emancipation at the international level. Finally, having articulated this Critical historical conception of modern international order formation we shall examine certain problems associated with Cox's approach arising from his preoccupation with the socio-economic dimensions of world order formation. These problems, I shall argue, suggest the need to open up the categories of this Critical perspective to take account of other dimensions of the historical constitution of order between modern states if the critical paradigm is to realise its ambitious theoretical claims.

I The Rise and Fall of the British Liberal World Order

As we saw in the previous chapter, at the centre of Cox's theoretical account of world order formation is his conception of the composite, hegemonic state as the central agent in the historical construction of international hegemonic structures which integrate the sovereign units of international society into a complex system of co-operative, consensual order in any given historical period. In this respect the emergence of a new world order is the direct outcome of a major change in the distribution of international power brought on by a "decisive shift in ... [the] relative economic-productive powers"[2] of states. Where a major change of this sort occurs the historical conditions are created for the emergence of a newly powerful hegemonic, capitalist state capable of engendering a system of hegemonic relations at the international level constitutive of world order. Cox identifies two major states which have formed the focus of hegemonic systems of world order in modern international society.

The first hegemonic world order identified by Cox is that which developed as a result of the expansion of the British state in the aftermath of the revolutionary wars following the French Revolution. The emergence of this British world order was integrally linked with the redistribution of international power associated with the failure of the French attempt to secure European hegemony. According to Cox the defeat of Napoleonic France and the peace settlement which followed resulted in the establishment of an international system in which the British state was able to exercise predominant influence. More particularly, "British

victory opened the way for the [internal] consolidation of bourgeois hegemony at home and its expansion to found a liberal world order abroad."[3] The material foundations for this development lay in the internal growth and consolidation of the new productive system of capitalist manufacture engendered by the industrial revolution in Britian - a system which gave England the advantage over the other states of Europe in terms of productive capacity and economic power. In this respect Cox observes that the "Pax Britannica was based both on the ascendancy of manufacturing capitalism in the international exchange economy, of which Britain was the centre, and on the social and ideological power ... of the class which drew its wealth from manufacturing."[4] Specifically, the rise of the British state to international economic ascendancy was predicated upon the formation of a new internal, hegemonic system of political and economic relations articulated around the socio-economic power of the bourgeois class which provided the material bases for Britain's global expansion. Let us consider the processes by which this new hegemonic bloc was consolidated within the British state.

This new hegemonic bloc upon which the liberal world order was built took the form of a re-articulation of state-civil society relations based around a coalition of the traditional aristocratic ruling class and the bourgeois middle class newly empowered by the rise of the capitalist system of manufacture. The distinguishing feature of the hegemonic state arising from this coalition was the formal separation of the political and economic spheres which it entailed. According to Cox the new bourgeoisie "did not need to directly control ... [the state.]

Its social power became the premiss of state politics."[5] In this respect the aristocratic governing class came to recognise that Britain's world power was dependent on its commerce and manufacturing and "was therefore prepared to govern in such a way as to allow the bourgeois economy to flourish and expand. [At the same time] the middle class was ... politically mobilised to specify and demand policies in its interests and to take control of municipal governments in its particular areas of implementation."6

In these circumstances then, the principal role of the political fragment of the new hegemonic bloc became that of creating the domestic economic and political conditions facilitating the efficient operation of the dynamic bourgeois free market economy. To this end successive governments introduced a series of socio-economic and political reforms which transformed the domestic structure of political and socio-economic life. Most notable among these were those reforms affecting the economic sphere, including the repeal of discriminatory trade practices associated with the Corn Laws, the Navigation Act and the reform of the poor law. Through these reforms the protective apparatus of earlier mercantilist policy obstructing the operation of the free market was removed and the conditions were established for the consolidation of a nationwide free market in labour and goods which had begun to emerge with the earlier effects of the industrial revolution. Cox also notes that government legislation operated to provide the broader social conditions for the efficient functioning of the free market, ensuring the soundness of money by the imposition of the gold standard and creating centralised administrative and policing systems essential for

the regulation of social life within the liberal state. At the same time, the political reforms of the 1830s which enfranchised the increasingly powerful bourgeois middle class further consolidated the new, domestic hegemonic bloc.[7]

The general effect of the development of this new hegemonic bloc was to produce the internal conditions facilitating the rapid growth of manufacturing industry and the financial power upon which the external expansion of the British state was predicated. It was the internal dynamics of this liberal, free trade system of capitalist production unleashed by the new hegemonic bloc of capitalist and political forces which formed the central dynamic behind the universalisation of the internal system of British hegemonic order. Thus Cox observes that the "liberal world order was the creation of an expansionist society ... Expansionism took the form of trade, emigration and capital investment. The movement was aided and abetted by state actions."[8] Moreover, the laissez-faire character of this internal capitalist system of social production dictated the specific form of the hegemonic world order created by the expansionary forces of the British state. Hence British forces of commercial expansion had no interest in establishing formal structures of direct imperial domination. The liberal imperialism of this phase was "largely indifferent as to whether or not peripheral countries were formally independent or under the political-administrative control of a colonial power, provided that the rules of the international economy were observed."[9] Given Britain's maritime dominance and its considerable advantage over other European states in industrial development, it was in the interests of British capitalism to

maintain free, open international markets, a situation advocated by the liberal, free trade ideology of the age.

Cox notes that the role of British sea power was a central factor in the building of this liberal world order and in the ongoing reproduction of British hegemonic dominance on both the political and economic levels. At the geo-political level British sea power enabled the English to create a favourable political situation on the European continent through its maintenance of a stable balance of power which prevented the emergence of any potential continental hegemon and, thereby, any potential challenger to British world power. That balance could be preserved as long as the continental powers remained of roughly equal strength. Accordingly, Britain practiced a "policy of presence in Europe but one designed to preserve the balance of power, not to dominate politically."[10] By using its political influence and strategic power Britain was able, with remarkable success, to maintain the status quo in Europe up until the latter part of the nineteenth century. According to Cox this policy of maintaining a strategic balance on the continent involved a number of important implications for the pursuit of wider British hegemonic interests. Firstly, it enabled Britain to preserve its domestic security against any likely European threat and by relatively cheap means. By the same token, it left British commercial interests free to concentrate on the accumulation of their economic power and to extend and consolidate British control over markets within the world economy.

This brings us to the second and most important dimension of British world order formation, namely the construction of a liberal world economy consequent upon the universalisation of the hegemonic structures of the domestic system of free trade noted above. British sea power was important here again in underwriting the dissemination of English capitalist productive relations and the associated free market ideology on a global scale. In this context Cox notes that the "liberal world order, like the liberal state, posited a separation of politics from economics, together with a fundamental compatability between them... The responsibility of the state ... was to ensure the conditions for this open world economy while refraining from interfering with the operations of ... [its] economic agents."[11] But, while the construction of this liberal world order was underwritten by the threat of coercive power, Cox stresses that the essence of this order was not overt domination but the creation of a hegemonic system of co-operative relations between its major centres. The logics of the liberal, hegemonic system of social production themselves encouraged a non-restrictive, unregulated form of world order as the condition for it to flourish. Accordingly, in the British capitalists' pursuit of global markets for their manufactured goods and raw materials to supply the needs of industry, formal empire mattered less than freedom of commercial access to all countries. "In commercial matters ... [Britain] sought openess for all countries, not special advantages for Britain ... In an open trading world it was clear that Britain's industrial and financial lead gave her a decisive advantage over all other powers."[12]

Given the logics of the internal, capitalist productive system and its manifest naval and economic superiority then, the interest of the British hegemonic state lay in breaking down the constraints upon international trade and opening up the non-European regions of the world to the dynamics of liberal free trade. In penetrating regions of the non-European world the hegemonic forces of the British state sought to transform local economic and political structures to facilitate their incorporation within the liberal world economy. Here Cox notes that the colonial state "developed its capacity to protect the growth of the liberal economy through a mix of coercion, tax policy and property law... [It] also mobilised finance for investment in transport and communications facilities. Thus, the functions of the liberal state were exported ... to the penetrated countries."[13] Integral to this process was the establishment of a global system of linkages between local elites in peripheral regions and the bourgeois interests of the British hegemonic state. "In ... countries from the Mediteranean through Asia and Latin America local bourgeoisies acted as agents and intermediaries for capital from the expansive centres. European economic penetration was encouraged and protected by local authoritarian regimes as well as welcomed by these comprador groups."[14]

In pursuing such policies the agents of British economic hegemony were able to justify their actions in terms of liberal ideologies which presented these international arrangements as serving the general interest of those regions incorporated into the liberal world order. Hence Cox notes that, once institutionalised, the "norms of liberal economics (free trade, the gold standard, free movement of capital and

persons) gained widespread acceptance with the spread of British prestige, providing a universalistic ideology which represented these norms as the basis of a [natural] harmony of interests."[15] Not least important in engendering acquiesence to the introduction of the regulative structures of British world order were the benefits which such cooperation could bring to local elites. As Cox observes, "British naval power enforced mercantile access and financial contracts ... but most frequently coercion was not necessary. States were glad to have access to British capital and technology... and were ready to adopt the rules and practices of the liberal order as their own guidelines."[16]

In this manner the interlinking structures of the hegemonic liberal world order were put into place. By the mid-ninteenth century the political and economic agents of the British state had constructed a world order which reproduced the internal hegemonic forms of the latter on a global level. According to Cox this liberal system was "a hierarchical order. Britain was its centre: the principal trading nation, principal source of capital for the rest of the world, principal enforcer of market rules, and preserver of the military balance."[17] In the absence of more substantive hegemonic international institutions resulting from the formal separation of the economic and political spheres, it was the financial centre of London which constituted the focus of this legitimate world order. The expansive capitalism of the mid-nineteenth century British state brought most of the world into the exchange relations of an international economy centred in London. The latter assumed the role of its "administrator and regulator according to

[universal, liberal, free trade] rules, with British sea power remaining in the background as potential enforcer."[18]

Neverthless, Cox identifies the historical forces of uneven development emerging within this world order which would lead to the breakdown of British hegemony and its informal, constitutive liberal structures, giving rise to a new non-hegemonic system which was to dominate international relations from the late ninteenth century through the first half of the twentieth century. We shall briefly consider these disintegrative forces and the non-hegemonic world order engendered by them before proceeding to Cox's account of the rise of the American neoliberal hegemony.

II The Breakdown of the Liberal World Order and the Transition to the Neoliberal American Order

Central to the demise of the liberal world order outlined above were the changes engendered within it by the uneven development of the power of European states stimulated by the expansion of the forms of industrial production originating within British society itself. The primary expression of this process of uneven development was the emergence of a unified German state as a major rival to Britain within the European international system. More particularly, it was the growth and expansion of German power which was to be the major catalyst in the breakdown of the nineteenth century European balance of power, predicated upon British dominance, which had been so important to the

preservation of the liberal world order. According to Cox the conditions for this challenge to the European status quo were engendered, in large degree, by the operation of the Liberal world order itself which provided the facilitating conditions for the emergence of a radically new type of hegemonic state structure within Europe. Two factors were important here. The first of these was the creation by this liberal hegemonic order of the facilitating conditions for the emergence of new national forms of political community in Europe. Hence Cox notes that "Britain's manipulation of the European balance of power secured a permissive environment for Western European countries to adopt liberal reforms without risk from old regime restoration powers."[19] Secondly, and most importantly, the spread of the forms of bourgeois capitalist production originating in British society formed the catalyst for the internal formation of new, dominant hegemonic blocs within the major European states which would first challenge, and ultimately supersede the British liberal state structure. According to Cox this "spread of industrialisation and the mobilisation of social classes it brought about not only changed the nature of states but also altered the international configuration of state power as new rivals overtook Britain's lead."[20] Let us consider this point more closely.

The new hegemonic state structure arising out of the transformative effects of industrialisation upon European society was one predicated upon a very different relationship between the political state and civil society to that underpinning the British hegemonic state. Within this newly emergent hegemonic bloc the central liberal principle of the formal separation of economic and political spheres exercised little

influence. Continental European states like Germany mobilised a major new social force in the form of the emerging industrial labour force which was now incorporated within the hegemonic bloc of the state. Moreover, the role of the political state was here extended to include active intervention in the socio-economic system in order to implement the (minimum) social policies and welfare reforms required to maintain the allegiance of the workers to the nation state. This new internal hegemonic bloc created a dynamic basis for the development of sovereign power in the form of the unified energies of the integrated nation state. Moreover, it also gave rise to powerful expansionist tendencies. Thus Cox notes that the "incorporation of the industrial workers, the new social force called into existence by manufacturing capitalism, into the nation ... brought the factor of domestic welfare ... into the realm of foreign policy. The claims of welfare competed with the exigencies of liberal internationalism within the management of states; while the former gained ground as protectionism, the new imperialism and ultimately the end of the gold standard marked the long decline of liberal internationalism."[21]

The impact of the formation of this new hegemonic structure upon domestic relations of social production underlies the shift in the distribution of power within European international society in the late nineteenth century which was to transform European international relations and, in the process, to reshape the structure of international order. According to Cox, the incorporation of industrial workers within the hegemonic bloc of western states from the late-ninteenth century "accentuated the movement of these states towards economic nationalism

and imperialism (a new form of state), which brought about a fragmentation of the world economy and a more conflictual phase of international relations (a new structure of world order)."[22] The dynamic, expansionary forces unleashed by the new hegemonic bloc within the nation state ultimately engendered a new European world order of imperialist rivalries characterising later nineteenth and early twentieth century European international relations, displacing the old free trade system of the liberal world order. This breakdown of the liberal world order was aided by the contradictions emerging within the structures of the British hegemonic state itself. Here the self-regulating market generated forces which "by undermining the traditional social fabric and leaving many people vulnerable to unemployment and starvation, provoked a reaction of social defence."[23] The ultimate outcome of these internal class tensions generated by the shortcomings of the operation of the free market economy would be the gradual breakdown of the liberal hegemonic bloc and the eventual construction of a new, national welfare state within Britain itself. At the same time, Cox notes that the hierarchy of the world economy generated inequalities that became more entrenched, thereby discrediting the ideology of formal equality of market relationships argued by liberal free market ideologists. Such contradictions would be exploited by the major non-European challenger to British economic dominance in the pacific region in the form of the rising, rival maritime power of the United States.

As a result of these debilitating contradictions within its internal and external hegemonic structures and in the face of the rising power of its contintental rivals, British hegemonic power "declined relatively, losing

its undisputed supremacy at sea, first with the German challenge and then with the rise of US power; Economic liberalism foundered with the rise of protectionism, the new imperialism and ultimately the end of the gold standard."[24] Thus the latter part of the nineteenth century saw the rise of a new, non-consensual world order based upon competitive, imperialist relations of territorial domination rather than legitimate forms of hegemonic cooperation. "As ... the material predominance of the British economy and the appeal of the hegemonic [liberal] ideology weakened the hegemonic world order of the mid-Nineteenth century gave place to a non-hegemonic configuration of rival power blocs."[25] During this period, therefore, there occured a fundamental transformation in the structure of world order at the three crucial levels of the distribution of power, the nature of the dominant ideology informing the system of world order and in the consequent nature of the conduct of European international relations. While the new hegemonic, national bloc underpinning this competititive, non-hegemonic world order would undergo a number of major reformulations leading to relatively more aggressive regimes (including the moderate corporate state and the extreme Fascist variations of this corporatist model), the basic competitive tendencies of this new hegemonic formation would perpetuate the rivalries in European international relations, ultimately resulting in the historical decline of Europe as the historical focus of world order formation.

Thus the historical phase beginning with these changes of the later nineteenth century saw the "decomposition of one fully formed structure that coherently linked world political economy, forms of state and production relations, and the emergence of the elements of a new

structure in process of formation in which all these elements were to become transformed."[26] Out of the contradictions associated with the system of rival European imperialisms and the two world wars engendered by this non-hegemonic European world order would emerge a new postwar system of legitimate world order. It is to Cox's account of the nature of this new legitimate ordering structure that we must now turn.

III The Emergence of the American Neo-Liberal World Order

The political struggles arising within the European international system consequent upon the breakdown of British hegemonic dominance and the associated decline of the European balance of power represented a long, drawn out process of European decline reaching its nadir in the material and spiritual exhaustion of the major European states at the end of the Second World War. In turning now to examine the Cox's account of the second modern hegemonic structure of world order arising from that process of decline we shall discover some significant similarities between it and the British system which preceded it. But we shall also see how the American world order differs significantly from the latter in important respects, not least because of the distinctive nature of the hegemonic structure of the American state engendering this order - a structure which was itself influenced by the political changes in the general form of the state associated with the preceding period of rival imperialisms in Europe.

In explaining the origins and development of the contemporary American world order Cox gives special attention to the internal changes within American society in the inter-war period which, he argues, generated the dynamism underlying the expansion of the postwar American state. Of central importance here was the formation of a new internal hegemonic bloc engendered by the domestic changes associated with the reforms of the New Deal Administration. Like the British political state of the nineteenth century, the New Deal administration is identified by Cox as the agent responsible for establishing the preconditions for the transformation of the internal system of social production which was to drive the process of American expansion in the postwar period. The legislative program of Roosevelt's presidential administration was instrumental in creating a new neoliberal, corporatist hegemonic bloc which removed major pre-existing constraints upon the effective operation of the domestic economic system and opened the way to the rapid development of the domestic capitalist system of production. Especially important here was the action of government in institutionalising the social relations of bipartism which transformed the previous system of production relations.

In this respect the "1930s New Deal administration of Franklin Roosevelt was the turning point for bipartism in the United States ... The government placed the weight of legality behind the union movement and ... collective bargaining as the manner of settling disputes and it protected union organisers against harassment by employers. A new, [powerful] union movement ... became part of the political coalition put together by the Roosevelt Democrats."[27] Under this new system of

bipartism the state's role, "though fundamental, ... [was] limited. ... [It sought] to bring about a balance of forces in industry between workers and employers and to ensure that peaceful means were used for the settlement of industrial disputes."[28] At the same time the Roosevelt administration introduced a wide range of measures to aid business and to provide relief to workers suffering from the effects of the depression. In accordance with the ideas of social justice associated with the New Deal program, welfare provisions were also introduced to provide for those individuals excluded from the benefits of the free market.

The overall effect of these various reforms within the American socio-economic system, Cox notes, was the establishment of a new neoliberal hegemonic structure which represented a significant variation on the corporatist state structures of the period of rival imperialisms in Europe. In terms of the operation of this domestic hegemonic structure the American political state, like its British liberal predecessor, observed the formal distinction between the spheres of the political and economic. Avoiding the extremes of state intervention characterising Fascist state corporatism, the American political state acted to facilitate the emergence of a national free enterprise system of capitalist production based on an institutionalised system of labour-management relations. This hegemonic corporatist structure had the effect of engendering a more efficient system of domestic production by directing the management of production relations into formal channels. At the same time, the material and ideological bases for the development of a popular commitment to national development were established through

the culturally integrative effects of those social welfare initiatives noted above and the disemmination of notions of social justice consequent upon the extension of Federal authority over national life under the New Deal.

It was this new domestic hegemonic bloc emerging from the New Deal era which would form the substantive basis upon which the postwar American world order was articulated. The impetus to increased production provided by the formalisation of capitalist productive relations and the injection of government aid to the economy associated with the construction of this new hegemonic bloc enabled America's recovery from the depression and provided the stimulus for the dynamic economic growth underlying the American war effort, as well as its postwar global expansion. Indeed, Cox argues that this new hegemonic state was inherently expansive in nature. By virtue of its reconstituted internal structure the neo-liberal American, capitalist state was one which sought to "facilitate adaptation rather than to protect existing positions."[29] The creation of an institutionalised system of capitalist productive relations within this neoliberal hegemonic bloc facilitated the growth of American industries which would later become the agents of multi-national expansion in the postwar era. While thus creating the socio-economic bases for American hegemonic expansionism, the New Deal era also provided the ideological rationale for the former. Here Cox observes that the "growth indicators of material power during the inter-war period were insufficient predictors of a new hegemony. It was necessary that US leaders should come to see themselves in ideological terms as the necessary garauntors of the new world order. The Roosevelt

era made this transition including both the conscious rejection of the old hegemony ... and the gradual incorporation of New Deal principles into the ideological basis of the new world order. There followed US initiatives to create the institutions to administer that order"[30] and to universalise the principles underlying the New Deal through the creation of those hegemonic structures considered further below.

According to Cox then, the new, postwar world order was "founded by a country in which social hegemony had been established ... and in which that hegemony was sufficiently expansive to project itself on a world scale."[31] The formation of this new world order presupposed a shift in the relative distribution of international power which involved, not only the development of a reconstructed American capitalist state, but also the corresponding decline in the power of the major states of the European international system. Moreover, it was the effects of that process of European decline upon American perspectives and policies which provided the immediate catalyst for the establishment of the postwar American world order. The expansionist impetus implicit in the restructured neoliberal capitalist state was formally unleashed as a result of America's entry into the struggle against the axis powers and through its subsequent role in the rebuilding of Western European states and the construction of an anti-Soviet, western strategic alliance. Thus, the "power configuration of the [new] Pax Americana ... [took] the form of alliances (all hanging on US power) created in order to contain the Soviet Union. The institutionalisation of this power configuration created the conditions for the unfolding of a global economic system

within which the United States played a very similar role to that of Britain in the nineteenth century system."[32]

What, then, were the main agencies through which American hegemonic dominance was institutionalised in postwar western international society and a new neoliberal system of legitimate world order constituted? Cox identifies two major agents in the construction of this world order corresponding to the dual processes of the universalisation of American hegemonic structures. The first of these, and the most important in engendering the cooperative, consensual nature of the new world order, was the internationalisation of the forms of the political state. The internal changes in the American political state initiated under the New Deal administration,in the form of the concentration of strategic political and administrative affairs in the political executive, were to decisively influence the formation of the American world order. According to Cox, the internationalisation of the American hegemonic state entailed the universalisation of these centralised administrative organisations and the consequent transformation of the political structures of those states incorporated within this hegemonic order. The expansion of these constitutive political forces of American hegemony compelled "the emergence in the countries of more advanced capitalist development of a neo-liberal form of state attuned to the [international] hegemonic order and in the peripheral economies of forms of states geared to the linking of these peripheral zones to the world economy."[33] It was this reorientation of the internal structures of those states incorporated in the new world order which produced an

international political environment conducive to the effective functioning of the global, neo-liberal system of capitalist production

The primary expression of this process is identified by Cox in the formation of the transnational institutional structures which have served to co-ordinate the economic relations of western states in the postwar world. On a formal level these include the international institutions of the world economy, most notably the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In their role as the distributors of capital and finance to needy states, these institutions have provided the main "mechanisms to supervise the application of the system's norms ... [by making] financial assistance and other benefits of the system conditional upon reasonable evidence of intent to live up to the norms."[34] Such assistance has been made available to those observing and implementing the norms of the neoliberal world economy while being withheld from those non-compliant states. Through such practices, Cox argues, these institutions have provided a combination of rewards and penalties aimed at inducing conformity to the free-trade norms of the neoliberal system. Connected with, and complementing the operation of these formal institutions of hegemonic dominance, is the informal system of policy harmonisation developed between fragments of the American political state and their counterparts in the political, administrative structures of other states.

The main function of this informal network of relations has been to facilitate the coordination of an internationalised policy process for the regulation of economic relations within the neoliberal world order.

In this process "the central agencies of these states -prime ministerial and presidential offices, foreign offices, treasuries, central banks- interact with each other ... through more ad hoc multi-lateral forums including economic summit conferences; sometimes in complex bilateral relationships. U.S. agencies have a dominant but not necessarily determining role; they are determining only when they can rally a broad measure of support on specific issues."[35] Through this transnational network of international connections involving the coordination of segments of states in an international process of policy formation, the national policies and actions of the states incorporated within the world order are adjusted to the logics and requirements of the neoliberal free trade system. In this way the "new hegemonic order [is] held in place by a configuration of different forms of state whose common feature ... [is] the role each ... [plays] in adjusting national economic policies to the dynamics of the world economy ... [Moreover the ideology informing this order] represents the highest interest of all countries as being to facilitate the expansion of the world economy and to avoid restrictive national measures of economic policy that would be in contradiction in the long run with world-level expansion."[36]

By facilitating such consultative processes these formal and informal institutions of hegemonic dominance have operated as the central agency engendering and reinforcing the general consent of western states to the operation of the American hegemonic system. Through these institutional channels an integrated structure has been able to develop in which the "notion of [international] obligation moved beyond a few basic commitments ... to a general recognition that measures of national

economic policy affect other countries and that such consequences should be taken into account before national policies are adopted ... Adjustments were thus perceived as responding to the needs of the system as a whole and not to the will of the dominant countries."[37] This political dimension has been crucial in establishing and reinforcing the legitimacy of the neoliberal world order at the international level. The multi-lateral framework has formed "a power structure in which the components sought to maintain consensus through bargaining and one in which the bargaining units were bureaucratic fragments of states. The power behind the negotiation [i.e the dominant American state] was tacitly taken into account by the parties."[38] Moreover, Cox notes the development around these international institutions of a new transnational managerial class sharing its own common culture and distinctive interests reinforcing the institutions of American hegemony. "The culture specific to this class is generically American and has been spread transnationally, ... homogenizing the outlook and behaviour of members of the globally dominant group in a way that distinguishes them from the differentiated cultures of national elite groups."[39]

This brings us to the second agency of American world order formation, namely the internationalisation of American economic structures in the postwar period through the expansion of the major corporations of the American neoliberal economy and their rearticulation as multi-national economic actors. Although initially seeking only sources of raw materials, Cox notes that these corporations proceeded to develop into complex transnational productive organisations producing primarily for the world market and using their transnational organisational structure

to exploit international market variations in order to maximise their profits. "Transnational production organisations take advantage of the differences between the factor endowments of different countries, especially differences in labour costs. They internalise these differences, making use of of them to minimise overall production costs. ... Accumulation takes place through a hierarchy of modes of social relations of production linked with transnational production organisations."[40]

Despite the decentralised, transnational nature of their operations, then, these multi-national corporations have been able to maintain their control over the production process and the crucial technologies on which its success is based through the practice of direct investment. In this respect the "essential feature of [multi-national practices of] direct investment is possession, not of money, but of knowledge - in the form of technology ... The financial arrangements for direct investment may vary greatly, but all are subordinated to this crucial factor of technical control ... [Local enterprises] become suppliers of elements to a globally organised production process planned and controlled by the source of the technology."[41] At the same time, Cox notes that the transnational nature of the operations of these corporations is directly dependent upon, and facilitated by, the hegemonic political structures noted above which encourage policies conducive to this form of economic activity. Aided by the dominance of the neoliberal free trade ideology disseminated by these institutions, such multi-national enterprises have been able to develop highly flexible productive organisations enabling them to minimise their vulnerability to state imposed economic

restrictions and to maximise their economic returns. The outcome of this process, Cox notes, has been the progressive rearticulation of international producive relations into a transnational system of capitalist production in which a few giant American corporations have attained dominant control over the operation of the global economic system.

As a result of these different internationalising processes outlined above and the consequent universalisation of the forms of the neoliberal hegemonic state, a regulated, legitimate system of world order has been established within the western international system in the postwar period subject to American dominance. According to Cox the influence of these American hegemonic forces in the postwar period has "led the Western European countries and Japan towards a world economy with free access to raw materials, free movement of goods, capital and technology; and the elimination of discrimination in economic relations."[42] In much the same fashion as the expanding English state of the nineteenth century, the operation of this open, free trade system has ultimately served the interests of the hegemonic elements of the dominant American state. But, at the same time, Cox stresses the point that this neoliberal world order was essentially a hegemonic one insofar as it secured, in varying degrees, the general interest of its constituent members. "Pax Americana was hegemonic. It commanded a wide measure of consent among states outside the Soviet sphere and was able to provide sufficient benefits to associated and subordinate elements to maintain their acquiesence."[43] In so doing it has also created a condition of relatively stable order within the western international system which

has facilitated an unprecedented level of economic growth and prosperity.

However, despite its evident success, Cox observes that the forces engendering the breakdown of this hegemonic system of legitimate world order have already begun to emerge and are active within the contemporary world economy. Before proceeding to my critique of Cox's theory I want to consider his account of the factors engendering this disintegrative process and his views concerning the possibilities for the historical construction of a new, legitimate, emancipated world order arising out of that process.

IV Contradictions in the Neoliberal World Order and the Prospects for a Non-hegemonic, Emancipated World order

According to Cox the postwar structure of world order outlined above, which has regulated the western international system in the postwar decades, has, since the early nineteen seventies, been undergoing progressive decline as a result of the ongoing uneven development of power at the international level. In line with this process the postwar system "has become more decentralised and power more diffused, a diffusion that is more pronounced in the economic ... realm. To this diffusion of power corresponds a loss of hegemony in the sense of a consensual norms based system."[44] The first signal of the current system's decline was the world economic crisis beginning in the early 1970s and given its clearest expression in the progressive breakdown of

the general consensus upon which the operation of the neoliberal hegemonic institutional structures were predicated. Viewed in broader terms, however, Cox argues that the main source of this crisis of the neoliberal world order lies in the inherent contradictions associated with the development of the structures of the neoliberal order. For, this order, "based ... on a corporate social contract, on state administered welfare and on an internationalising of production and ... the state, regulated by international finance, created through these very practices the conditions of its undoing."[45] In briefly analysing these major contradictions of the neoliberal order I shall focus on Cox's views concerning the possible alternative world orders which may emerge from the apparent decline of the present one.

A major factor in the decline of this postwar world order has been the fragmentation of the neoliberal hegemonic bloc upon which the former was founded, a development arising largely as a response to a growing fiscal crisis within the neoliberal state. According to Cox the social contract underlying the corporatist structure of the neoliberal state contained an inherent inflationary bias. "Wage increases agreed between big corporate employers and trade unions were passed on to the public in price increases... [At the same time] the state's expenses tended to rise both because of welfare state transfer payments and because of the higher wages secured by increasing numbers of state employees ... Cost push inflation was supplemented by state deficit financing."[46] The subsequent decline in investment and the fiscal crises brought on by these inflationary tendencies have seen the progressive disintegration of the social contract on which the neoliberal hegemonic bloc was based

and the development of a legitimation crisis within the state. "As growth stagnates, the costs of social policies rise and the tax base on which to finance them diminishes... There is strong pressure from capital to cut back on legitimacy by reducing expenditures and rolling back real wages, thereby denouncing the social-democratic compromise worked out among capital, labor and governments during the postwar economic boom."[47] In this situation, Cox observes, government has been forced increasingly into an alliance with capital in opposition to labour in an attempt to reduce production costs and increase productivity in a condition of declining production.

This internal fragmentation of the Neo-liberal hegemonic bloc has been exaccerbated by the destabilising effects of the internationalisation of the state and production which have formed the major vehicle of the construction of the postwar world order. The major problem arising here is the division introduced by this process between the interests of national and international segments of capital. According to Cox "the economic crisis following 1974 brought out the conflict of interests between the nationally and internationally oriented capitalist interests."[48] This conflict has manifested itself at the level of class formation and in debates over economic policy and the distribution of capital. Thus the internationalisation of production has produced a transnational managerial class which is principally oriented to producing for the world market. Insofar as it possesses its own strategy and institutions of collective action, this class is a class in itself and for itself whose internationalising interests are in marked contrast with that of the domestic, national element of capitalism. In

this respect "national capitalists are to be distinguished from the transnational class. The natural reflex of national capital faced with the challenge of international production is protectionism. It is torn between the desire to use the state as a bulwark of an independent national economy and the opportunity of filling niches left by international production.[49] Apart from this basic division between sectors of the national economy, further division is identified by Cox in the ranks of industrial workers within the neoliberal hegemonic bloc. Here also the influence of the multinational corporation has introduced tensions amongst industrial workers within the state employed by national and international capital respectively.

This postwar internationalisation of American forms of production has therefore produced contradictory tendencies within the hegemonic bloc of the American state and its counterpart states which represent the practical expression of a declining neoliberal world order in the last two decades. Moreover, the problems to which the contradictions outlined here have given rise within the neoliberal world order are epitomised in the general decline in the centralised management of the world economy as the unified hegemonic bloc on which it is based gradually disintegrates. Here Cox points to the progressive reduction of the efficacy of the legitimating institutions coordinating the American world order which we examined above. Particularly important in this change has been the decline in the regulative role of the International Monetary Fund and the increasingly dominant role of private banks in lending money to, among others, third world debtor states. (a practice creating the conditions for the emergence of the debt crisis of the

1980s). "The relative enlargement of the private, nonstate character of international financial management during the 1970s may be seen as an effect of weakening hegemony. Private international credit expanded for lack of any agreement on how the official intergovernmental structures in the system could be reformed"[50] in light of the erosion of the regulative power of the American hegemonic institutions noted above.

Corresponding to this process has been the breakdown of the neoliberal free trade consensus which supported the operation of hegemonic institutions like the GATT system and the corresponding growth of neomercantilist tendencies among the states incorporated within the neoliberal world order. For Cox these mercantilist tendencies, reflected in the increasing prevalence of restrictive, partial trade practices and the negotiation of special bi-lateral economic agreements between states, are themselves a reflection of a more general growth in economic competition between the major western national economies consequent upon the recovery of those national economies from the effects of the war. The consequent diffusion of economic power and the increasingly competitive nature of the world political economy "puts pressure on states to adopt an offensive strategy in world markets. Through such offensive strategies states would lead and assist national industries to conquer market positions. At the same time internal pressures come from interests disfavored by competition to adopt a defensive strategy of protection and withdrawal from world competition."[51]

These various contradictions emerging within the world economy represent the unravelling of the legitimate, consensual system of world order

constructed by the American state in the initial postwar period. According to Cox the current historical phase is one characterised by a "weakening of global hegemony tending towards a permissive world order in which it would be difficult for a dominant power or group of dominant powers to enforce conformity to its norms."[52] But, while posing major problems for the operation of the existing neoliberal world order, Cox discerns in this most recent phase of uneven international development the possibility for the historical construction of a more emancipated, solidary type of world order - one ultimately based upon the transformed capitalist productive relations engendered by the transnational character of the current economic world order. Specifically, the potential implicit in this internationalised system of production raises the possibility for the movement beyond the present necessitous system of relations of social production where human productive activity is limited to the production of material or physical needs, to a world order incorporating emancipatory relations of social production. Hence Cox's observation that "through all history the task of physical reproduction - the making of what is necessary for biological survival and for the nourishment of political power - has absorbed the greater part of human effort. Now an era dawns when most of this effort can be done by machines with relatively little human effort. A vast reserve of potential human effort thereby becomes available that could be devoted to social reproduction and development - the building and running of institutions and patterning of social relations"[53] in accordance with an extended principle of legitimacy which would free the species from the dictates of 'physical reproduction' and allow the realisation of higher, solidary forms of social community.

Elaborating upon this emancipatry interest, Cox seeks to ascertain the prospects for the future emergence of a counter-hegemonic force capable of realising the emancipatory potentials implicit in the productive structures of the contemporary, destabilised world order. His basic assumption here is that the "social forces generated by [these] changing production processes are the starting point for thinking about possible futures. These forces may combine in different configurations."[54] Working on this assumption Cox advances certain hypothetical propositions as to the likely character of a future world order predicated upon different interpretations of the outcome of the contradictory forces affecting the current world order. Three potential configurations are identified suggesting three different types of future world order. These include a "reconstruction of hegemony [based on the continuing internationalisation of production] with a broadening of political management [of the world economy], ... increased fragmentation of the world economy around big-power centred economic spheres [i.e. the triumph of the mercantilist response to the internationalisation of production]; and [thirdly] the possible assertion of a Third World counterhegemony [based on the unification of potential revolutionary forces generated by the internationalisation of production] with the concerted demand for the New International Economic Order as a forerunner."[55]

Of these possibilities it is in the latter development that Cox discerns the best prospects for the development of a new, emancipated, legitimate world order. Thus he argues that "the prolonged crisis in the world economy ... is propitious for some developments which could lead to

counter-hegemonic challenge. In the core countries those policies which cut into transfer payments ... and generate high unemployment open the prospects of a broad alliance of the disadvantaged against the sectors of capital and labour which find common ground in the monopoly-liberal world order ... In peripheral countries, some states are vulnerable to revolutionary action, as events from Iran to Central America suggest."[56] However, in noting these different sources of potential counter hegemony Cox also acknowledges that "an effective political organisation ... would be required in order to rally the new working classes generated by international production and [to] build a bridge to peasants and urban marginals."[57] The formation of such an organisation would require a long historical process involving the building of new national hegemonic blocs, based around these disadvantaged groups, as the foundation for the historical formation of international structures of legitimate world order incorporating productive relations of emancipatory practice. Moreover, the obstacles to the emergence of such a counter-hegemonic structure are, he acknowledges, extremely formidable, thus suggesting only very limited prospects for the emergence of a more emancipated world order in the foreseeable future.

V A Critique of Cox's Paradigm of World Order Formation

Cox's Critical theory of world order formation raises considerations of foremost importance for the larger concerns of this thesis. As I shall argue in the concluding section, this critical, historical paradigm provides some of the basic categories upon which a more sophisticated,

synthetic theory of the formation of international order may be elaborated - a theory which overcomes some of the major substantive and methodological shortcomings of the Neo-Realist and Rationalist perspectives outlined earlier. Particularly significant in this respect is its acknowledgement of the need for an adequate theory of international order formation to provide a holistic, historical account of legitimate order formation within modern international society which encompasses the major, dynamic forces accounting for the historical reproduction of these orders. At the same time, Cox's critical perspective is important for the way it takes us beyond the limited preoccupation of traditional theory with the question of order formation defined as the minimal concern with how to prevent war and maintain peace between nations existing in a recurring state of anarchy. Eschewing the restricted, problem-solving perspective informing this traditional approach, the essential concern of theory is here rearticulated in broader, expanded terms as the analysis of the possibilities presented by the transformative processes of uneven international development for the practical advancement of human emancipation conceived as the historical articulation of the human potential for conscious self determination.

Thus we have noted the preoccupation of this holistic, critical perspective with those basic contradictions engendered within specific structures of world order by the uneven development of power within modern international society and the dynamic logics of world order transformation associated with the former. It is these developmental logics which Cox identifies as opening up the possibility for the

historical transition of modern international society from those more limited historical world orders based on material productive relations of social necessity to a potential, future world order predicated upon principles of legitimacy facilitating emancipatory relations of social production. In this way Cox's Critical theory can be seen to take up the basic theme of legitimate international order formation raised by the Rationalist perspective examined in Part Two. But, in doing so, Cox's work provides an understanding of the deeper sources and wider, normative implications of this process insofar as it locates the formation of modern, legitimate international orders within the context of the historically evolving domestic power structures which underpin them.

In terms of this more sophisticated theoretical understanding then, it is the particular virtue of this critical paradigm that it avoids the ahistorical tendencies associated with the reified conceptions of modern international relations which characterise, in different forms, both the Neo-Realist and Rationalist perspectives. In opposition to these latter approaches which tend to present the international system as a sphere of political relations conducted between discrete, unitary sovereign states, Cox's approach seeks to provide an understanding of the historically constituted nature of such states and of those order constitutive structures engendered by the former within modern international society conceived as the historical expression of more basic processes of human self determination. In doing so he highlights the complex nature of the state, as the primary unit of modern international society, as an historically evolving, composite construct

whose domestic stability and international power is largely predicated upon the formation of coherent hegemonic blocs between its more powerful political and economic groups.

In this context we have seen how Cox's theory illuminates the central link between the historical formation of such internally coherent hegemonic state structures within the most powerful states of any given period and the role of the composite elements of these hegemonic blocs in the constitution of historical structures underpinning particular hegemonic systems of world order. In doing so Cox's approach indicates some of the complex historical logics (economic, political cultural) involved in the historical reproduction of legitimate systems of order at the international level and, in particular, the importance of normative structures in the formation and successful reproduction of such legitimate orders. It is his critical, reflective account of this complex historical process of the constitution and transformation of legitimate systems of international order in response to the rise and expansion of hegemonic state structures which potentially forms the most valuable contribution of Cox's theoretical paradigm to the synthetic conception of international order formation elaborated in Part Four. As I seek to show there, the categories of this critical model offer the potential bases for the development of a more sophisticated, comprehensive Critical theory of the historical logics of order formation within modern international society.

However, while arguing the more sophisticated character of this critical theoretical paradigm, it is important to note some major shortcomings of

the account of international order formation resulting from Cox's practical application of the theoretical categories of this critical model. These limitations are all the more important in that they impinge directly upon the credibility of this perspective's claims to provide a superior explanation of the process of modern international order formation insofar as it offers a holistic analysis of the major order constitutive forces shaping that process. For, despite his ambitious attempts to account for the major, relatively-autonomous forces influencing the development of order between modern states, we shall see that Cox's theory either neglects, or underplays some crucial aspects of this process which need to be addressed by a Critical theory concerned to establish the prospects for, and constraints upon, the extension of human emancipation within modern international society. Let us consider this problem more closely.

As we have seen above, in elaborating his historical account of world order formation Cox gives particular emphasis to the uneven development of power between states as it is manifested in the rise and fall of hegemonic, capitalist systems. While acknowledging the role of the political dimension of state power in the formation and expansion of such hegemonic systems, the focus of Cox's analysis rests upon social production and the dynamic tendencies of internal, hegemonic structures of capitalist productive systems as the pivotal factor providing the universalising impetus underlying specific historical phases of world order formation. Moreover, the central function of the hegemonic political and economic institutions produced by this universalising impetus is to facilitate a legitimate system of consensual cooperation

amongst the hegemonic fragments of states allowing the unrestricted operation of such universalised capitalist productive structures. This is not to suggest that Cox ignores the role of other historical forces at the level of the political state and international relations and their influence on the historical formation of world orders. However, in Cox's own analysis of this historical process these latter dimensions are ultimately subordinated to his central concern with the formation of hegemonic capitalist states and the logics of order formation associated with their location within an international capitalist economy. Consequently, there is little attempt made to explain the independent logics of international order formation engendered within these other spheres and their relationship with the order-constitutive processes outlined by Cox.

The central problem which arises for Cox's holistic perspective here then, is that this preoccupation with the uneven development of the socio-economic power of states and the capitalist dynamics of hegemonic order formation leads him to underplay the significance of the developmental processes arising from the geo-political location of modern states - their historical existence within an evolving international society distinguished by relations of political 'anarchy' or governmentless, as well as economic forms of activity. As one commentator addressing himself to this problem has observed, "thus far the debate about hegemony ... from more critical theorists in the neo-Gramscian mould has focussed upon the production and distribution of power in the international political economy. Of major concern has been the role of transnational capital and international regimes. To the

extent that questions of military strategy and war have been treated ... it has been the neo-Gramscians who appear to have abdicated the issue to the traditionalists."[58] Here we confront again a central theme raised in my earlier critical account of Waltz's Neo-Realist conception of international order formation. This concerns the uneven historical development and distribution of the forms of strategic-military power among modern states and the problems involved in the historical reproduction of political order between such states given their ever present concern with ensuring their strategic security within an 'anarchical' international, political society. Of particular note here are the processes by which modern states have attempted to overcome the strategic dilemmas presented by their common existence within an anarchical political system characterised by the unequal distribution of strategic capabilities between states through the historical formation of balances of power and hegemonic orders of strategic cooperation.

We can illustrate the problems to which this underestimation of the importance of the strategic-political dimension gives rise for Cox's holistic theory of international order formation by examining some of the deficiencies associated with his account of the different modern phases of hegemonic world order formation. One major problem which arises in this context is Cox's failure to account for the significant differences in the nature and extent of these different historical examples of hegemonic world order, most notably between the Pax Britannica and the Pax Americana. In particular, he fails to adequately explain the fact that the British state of the nineteenth century clearly lacked the unquestioned strategic and political superiority and

consequent influence over western international society which the American state has been able to exercise in the second half of the twentieth century. Thus, as Kennedy notes, Britain's gross national product, unlike that of the United States in the period immediately after the Second World War, was never the largest in the world in the decades after eighteen fifteen. Moreover, the industrial power of Britain during this period was "not organised ... to give the state swift access to military hardware and manpower ... The size of the British economy in the world was not reflected in the country's fighting power."[59] This appears to have been a consequence of both limited material capabilities and the ideological proclivities of the liberal, British hegemonic bloc. "Not only did the mid-Victorians show ever less enthusiasm for military interventions in Europe ... but they reasoned that the equilibrium between the continental great powers ... made any full-scale commitment on Britain's part unecessary."[60]

According to this argument then, Britain possessed neither the material capabilities or the ideological commitment required to dominate European international society in the period after eighteen fifteen. The British phase of hegemonic dominance was severly limited, true hegemony being restricted to the extra-European territories of the imperial economic system. Considered at the geo-political level of European international politics Britain represented only one of a number of significant powers of relatively commensurable strategic capabilities whose relative equality gave rise to a system of strategic balancing as the source of order within European international society.[61] Moreover, its limited influence, as merely one among many great powers within the European

international system, meant that the continental European states were left largely free to develop along their own independent paths during the nineteenth century rather than being limited to the adoption of the neoliberal economic and political model provided by the British state.[62]

British extra-European hegemony in the nineteenth century would appear to have operated then, in tandem with, rather than as the regulator of, the European political power balance. This contrasts markedly with the situation in the hegemonic system of the post World War two era. Thus, as Gilpin points out, "in terms of absolute power the United States in 1945 greatly surpassed the rest of the world. In addition to her vast industrial capacity, the US virtually monopolised or controlled the ... sources of power in the modern world... She alone had the atomic bomb ... American factories produced over 50 percent of the world's output and America held approximately 50 percent of the world's monetary reserves."[63] It was this enormous superiority in all the major forms of state power which has enabled the United States to impose its will upon the western political system and to exercise an undisputed leadership over western international society for most of the second half of the twentieth century.

The important point to emphasise here is that, when the geo-political dimension of international behaviour and uneven international development is taken into account, the ability of any major state to attain undisputed hegemonic dominance over international society appears to be essentially limited and the historical exception. It was only the enormous preponderance of the United States resulting from its greatly

superior strategic and economic capabilities at the end of World War Two which enabled it to attain undisputed dominance over both the economic and political dimensions of western international society. By contrast, the case of Britain and its relationship with the continental powers in the nineteenth century is arguably more indicative of the general historical pattern of western international relations - namely, a political condition in which a number of great powers possess relatively commensurable power and between whom legitimate order has been engendered through the ongoing historical construction of strategic balances of power. It is only in infrequent phases of modern international history that the uneven development of power between states has given rise to a sovereign state whose extreme preponderance in both economic and strategic-political capabilities has enabled it to attain, for limited periods of time, a preponderant position over the other states of the system. Most commonly, such historical attempts by states to attain hegemonic dominance have been countered by the concerted strategic-military power of those other great powers within the international system whose interests were threatened by the rise of a single preponderant power. Within the broader context of the evolution of the international political system then, the process of legitimate order formation is more accurately seen in terms of an historical oscillation between conditions of relative commensurability in the capacities of the great powers reflected in the operation of balances of power between preponderant states, and alternative phases where individual states, through the attainment of superior power, have initiated more or less successful attempts to secure hegemonic dominance

over the society of states in response to the uneven historical development of power therein.

Notes

1. "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.137

2. Cox, Production, Power and World Order, p.212

3. Ibid., p.150. On the implications of the postwar settlement arising out of the Vienna Congress for the redistribution of power among the major European states see Hinsley, Power and The Pursuit of Peace, and Clark, Reform and Resistance in the International Order.

4. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.141. For an interesting account of the early historical conditions facilitating the development of this English economic ascendancy see I. Wallerstein, The Modern World System, Vol.I.

5. "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.141

6. Cox, Production, Power and World Order, p.148. As we shall see, this principle of the formal separation of politics and economics also characterises the American Neoliberal world order.

7. For Cox's analysis of these and other major reforms introduced by the British political state see ibid., pp.130-35. Following Heckscher, he notes that the previous Mercantilist policies had, in fact, paved the way for the formation of an integrated, national market by breaking down internal barriers to trade.

8. Cox, Production, Power and World Order, p.144

9. Ibid., p.142

10. Ibid., p.127. As I shall suggest later in this chapter, this account arguably overestimates the extent of British influence over the European states-system in the nineteenth century. While dominant in the non-European world, Britain would appear to have formed only one of a combination of European powers responsible for the reproduction of legitimate order within Europe itself. As will be argued in my following critique, this historical oversight is indicative of a broader limitation of Cox's work arising from his under-estimation of the importance of geo-political forces in the reproduction of legitimate structures of international order. For a more traditional account of the nineteenth century European states-system see G.A. Craig & A.L. George, Force and Statecraft, New York, 1983.

11. Production, Power and World Order, p.127.

12. Ibid., p.125. For a detailed account of the historical extension of British dominance within the non-European world during this period see John Bowle, The Imperial Achievement: The Rise and Transformation of the British Empire, Middlesex, 1974.

13. Production, Power and World Order, p.146.

14. Loc. Cit. This theme of the integrative role of elite formation between the ruling classes of the hegemonic core and peripheral regions has been explored in depth in the literature on dependency theory. See, for example, A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York, 1969.

15. "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.140

16. Production, Power and World Order, p.146

17. Ibid., pp.144-45

18. "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.140

19. Production, Power and World Order, p.148. In fact, liberal forms of political order arguably emerged only very slowly on the European continent. As I shall argue in my conclusion, a much more important influence on the development of continental states in the nineteenth century was the ideological force of nationalism disseminated by the French revolutionary forces.

20. "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.142

21. Loc. Cit. Of course, Cox does not contend that this new form of hegemonic bloc emerged everywhere in Western Europe at the same time or in exactly the same form. Rather, it was a progressive process stimulated by the manifest success of those states first adopting the national hegemonic state form.

22. Ibid., p.138

23. Production, Power and World Order, p.147

24 "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.140

25. Ibid., p.142

26 Production, Power and World Order, p.150

27. Ibid., p.68

28. Loc. Cit. For an argument concerning the significance of the earlier phase of American industrial development occuring immediately before the first world war as the historical path-breaker for this later New Deal structure see G. Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916, New York, 1963.

29. Production, Power and World Order, p.220

30. "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.141. The emergence of this new, universalistic ideology was all the more important for the way it helped to reverse America's traditional, deeply rooted policy

of isolation in respect to European international affairs. For an analysis of the historical lineages of this traditional isolationist attitude see F. Gilbert, To The Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy, Princeton, NJ, 1970.

31. Production, Power and World Order, p.226

32. "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.140. Cox notes that "the Marshall Plan represented the principal instrumentality through which America projected its political and economic power as the means of reshaping the world order." Production, Power and World Order, p.140. It should be noted in this context, as with the Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century, that Cox gives little attention to the historical logics associated with the formation of strategic military order between states. This major ommission in his work will be subjected to criticism later in this chapter.

33. Production, Power and World Order, p.212.

34 Ibid., p255. For a more detailed account of the formation and historical operation of these hegemonic institutions see F. Block, The Origins of International Economic Disorder.

35. Production, Power and World Order, p.259

36. Ibid., p.217

37. Ibid., p.256

38. Loc. Cit.

39. Ibid., p.359

40. Ibid., p.245

41. "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.147

42. Production, Power and World Order, p.216

43. "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.144

44. Production, Power and World Order, p.299

45. Ibid., p.400

46. Ibid., p.275

47. Ibid., p.282. For an extended account of this emergent legitimation crisis affecting the hegemonic structures of western states see J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, (Transl. T. McCarthy), Boston, 1975. Cox notes a number of different responses to this breakdown of the postwar neoliberal hegemonic bloc including what he calls the 'hyper-liberalism', anticipated in the Reagan and Thatcher governments, and the less confrontational, state-capitalist models

operating in Japan and West Germany. On this point see Ibid., pp.285-98.

48 Production, Power and World Order, p.361

49. "Social Forces, States and World Orders" p.148

50. Production, Power and World Order, p.302

51. Ibid., p.304

52. Ibid., p.394

53. Ibid., p.401

54. "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p.149

55. "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations", p.171

56. Ibid., p.174. In his most recent writings Cox has given more emphasis to the role of middle powers as the potential source of the realisation of a more just world order in the post-coldwar era of declining superpowers. On this point see Robert W. Cox, "Middlepowermanship, Japan and future world order", International Journal, Vol.44, 1989, pp.822-862.

57. "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations", p.174

58. Bradley S. Klein, "Hegemony and strategic culture: American power projection and alliance defence politics", Review of International Studies, 1988, p.135

59. P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, London, 1988, p.152

60. Ibid., p.153

61. For more detailed historical accounts of the operation of the European balance of power in the nineteenth century see R. Albrecht-Carie, The Concert Of Europe, New York, 1968, and A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery In Europe 1848-1918, Oxford, 1971.

62. Thus, for example, the Germans pursued Mercantilist policies as the basis of their economic development during the nineteenth century in sharp contrast with the British laissez-faire model. On this point see J.M. McManners, Lectures On European History 1788-1914: Men, Machines and Freedom, Oxford, 1974.

63. R. Gilpin, US Power and the Multi-National Corporation, pp.104-5

PART THREE CONCLUSION

The preceding critique of Cox's account of the modern process of world order formation is important for the way it highlights certain major deficiencies of the latter as an explanation of modern international order formation, especially as expressed in his neglect of the historical logics associated with the uneven development of the strategic-political power of states as a major influence upon this process. If its claim to provide a holistic account of the modern process of international order formation and of the major possibilities for the extension of human emancipation implicit in that process is to be realised, Cox's Critical theory clearly needs to be broadened and his account of the historical reproduction of hegemonic world orders relocated as part of these wider practices associated with the uneven development of power between modern states. In particular, in terms of this reformulated critical perspective much greater attention needs to be given to the manner in which the expansionist tendencies of powerful states and their capacity to establish and reproduce structures of dominant influence at the international level have been historically constrained by the effects of the combination of the strategic-military forces of other major states of this international society.

Can the issues raised by our preceding critique be encompassed within the Critical paradigm of international order formation elaborated by Cox, or do they raise considerations which are ultimately too difficult

for a theory oriented by a cognitive interest in human emancipation? It is my contention that they can be so incorporated within this Critical perspective and, in concluding this section of the thesis, I want to indicate the way in which the former can be extended to facilitate this. Here we need to focus on the potentials implicit in Cox's neo-Gramscian conception of the relationship between the construction of those hegemonic blocs operating within sovereign states, and the reproduction of legitimate order between those states. It was argued in chapter three that a major virtue of Cox's Gramscian model of hegemonic order formation is that it admits an account of the relatively autonomous role of the political state in the historical construction and dialectical transformation of structures of order at the international level. Despite this fact, however, we have seen that Cox's application of the theoretical categories of this hegemonic model offers little explanation of the historical development of those major forms of strategic-military and political power exercised by the state as crucial forces shaping order formation within international society. Neverthless, it is arguable that Cox's conception of the relatively autonomous role of the political state within the broader process of hegemonic state formation contains the resources to accommodate such an explanation. In indicating how this is possible I wil draw upon certain ideas presented in the work of the neo-Marxist historian, Theda Skocpol.

In her major work, States and Social Revolutions,[1] Skocpol's primary concern is to provide an extended account of the complex forces engendering the major political revolutions of modern European history. What is of particular interest for us is the way Skocpol's account of

the causes of these revolutions and the associated breakdown of legitimate state structures and the formation of new political orders in their place leads her to emphasise the importance of the geo-political location of the state and its impact upon the historical process of hegemonic bloc formation. Thus, according to Skocpol, the nature of the internal process of hegemonic bloc formation is a highly complex one which is greatly influenced by the relatively autonomous organisational structures and practices of the political state. Within the context of the larger, historically evolving hegemonic bloc shaping the state's overall power, the political institutions of executive authority are conditioned, but not rigidly limited by, their dependence upon the logics and interests of socio-economic forces. This relatively-autonomous determining role of the political fragment of the sovereign state derives primarily from its strategic location at the intersection of a number of power processes which together explain the overall power of the state. More particularly, in critiscising the limitations of Marxist economistic accounts of the nature of the state, Skocpol emphasises that "we should not forget that states also exist in determinant geopolitical environments, in interaction with other ... states. An existing economy and class structure condition and influence a ... [given state's character and its capacity to act internally and externally.] But so too do geopolitical environments create tasks and opportunities for states and place limits on their capacities to cope with either external or internal tasks or crises."[2]

According to Skocpol then, the political state's "involvement in an international network of states is a basis for potential autonomy of

action over and against groups and economic arrangements within its jurisdiction."[3] In terms of this dimension of its practice the political executive of the state must develop and reproduce "a set of administrative, policing and military organisations"[4] which contribute to the preservation of its territorial integrity through the practical accumulation and organisation of forms of coercive power enabling the defence of its borders and the development of diplomatic practices facilitating political relations with its sovereign counterparts. In accordance with this extended understanding then, Skocpol concludes that the political state is "fundamentally Janus-faced with an intrinsically dual anchorage in class divided socio-economic structures and an international system of states. If our aim is to understand the breakdown and building up of state organisations ... we must focus on the points of intersection between international conditions and pressures ... and class structured economies and organised political interests."[5]

This more complex conception of the nature of hegemonic state formation provides some crucial insights for our concern with reconstructing Cox's critical model of international order formation to provide a holistic understanding of international order formation of the sort envisaged by him. Arguably Skocpol's account of the relatively-autonomous role of the political state as the mediator between domestic hegemonic bloc formation and the pressures associated with its location within the international system offers the means whereby the deficiencies in Cox's own elaboration of this Critical paradigm may be remedied. By allowing the extension of the categories of the latter to encompass the

strategic-political relations between states, this extended Critical perspective suggests the way to the development of a more comprehensive understanding of the historical processes involved in the ongoing construction of structures of legitimate order within modern international society. By invoking this more complex conception of hegemonic state formation the possibility arises of accounting for the different historical forces and inter-connecting logics of uneven development engendering the reproduction of legitimate order between states in modern history understood, in broadest terms, as the practical expression of processes of conscious human development.

In proceeding, in the concluding section of this thesis, to present the broad outlines of a synthetic theoretical account of the historical process of order formation within modern western international society, I shall draw directly upon this extended Critical perspective sketched above. In doing so it will be my concern to indicate how this synthetic perspective might effectively incorporate the major points of value arising from the various theoretical paradigms examined in the body of this thesis. Insofar as it is able to do this the general theory proposed here may be expected to provide a more effective understanding of this historical process of legitimate order formation and its implications for the Critical, reflective interest in the practical possibilities for the extension of human emancipation within this modern, anarchical international society.

Notes

1. T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: a Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China, Cambridge, England, 1987.

2. Ibid., p.30

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p.29

5. p.32. For an aternative approach to the reconstruction of Marxist theory which also emphasises the importance of this geo-political location of the state as an element inadequately addressed in traditional Marxist thought see Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence: A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Vol.2, Cambridge, UK, 1985.

PART FOUR

Uneven Development and The Logics of Legitimate Order Formation within Modern Western International Society: Towards a Critical, Emancipatory Perspective

CONCLUSION

In the preceding pages we have seen how the different Neo-Realist, Rationalist and Critical theoretical perspectives incorporate very different paradigmatic understandings of the nature of modern international relations. Moreover, we have seen how these understandings are shaped by very different types of theory-orienting interests, interests which give rise to qualitatively different interpretations of the basic character of the process of international order formation emerging in response to the uneven development of power within this modern international sphere. At the same time, I have sought to show how the particular approaches adopted by the different theories considered above manifest inherent tensions and contradictions whose resolution presumes the introduction of alternative theoretical categories presupposing a qualitatively different understanding of this modern process of international order formation. Proceeding in this manner we have undertaken a complex theoretical progression from the more limited explanatory categories of Neo-Realist theory to the increasingly more sophisticated conceptions of the nature of international order formation elaborated in the Rationalist and Critical approaches examined in sections two and three.

In terms of this theoretical progression presented in the preceding chapters, we have identified two broad theoretical paradigms which involve very different conceptualisations of the nature of the international sphere and the process of order formation occurring within

it, namely the naturalistic and the societal paradigms. Thus in section one we saw how the theories of Waltz and Gilpin were guided by a technical interest in international order formation occurring within a quasi-natural condition of anarchical power relations. Furthermore, in delineating this model of international relations the central role of the theorist was seen as that of ascertaining the nature of those regulative, technical mechanisms and practices whereby order is most effectively reproduced within this quasi-natural anarchical sphere. At the same time, we noted how these theories incorporate assumptions which are ultimately incapable of being adequately accomodated within their own naturalistic paradigm. Rather, the full elaboration of the assumptions implicit in the respective theories of Waltz and Gilpin was seen to require the adoption of the superior categories of a different theoretical paradigm involving a distinctive, societal understanding of the condition of international anarchy and of the nature of the historical processes producing order within that anarchical condition. In terms of this societal paradigm, the central focus of theoretical analysis is radically redefined, being understood, not in terms of the problems involved in producing the most efficient form of technical control over quasi-natural power relations among states, but, rather, as the interest in the historical dimensions of the historical construction of systems of legitimate order within an historically evolving society of sovereign communities.

Examining this societal conception as it is presented first in the work of Rationalist theorists, we noted the way the latter illuminate the socio-cultural dimensions of the process of legitimate order formation

between states within modern international society. However, we also encountered some important shortcomings of the methodological and substantive dimensions of the Rationalist conception of this societal process of legitimate order formation which, it was argued, were ultimately attributable to the limited, practical interest orienting this theoretical perspective. As we saw in Part Two, at the methodological level this practical interest entails a view of the possibility of the theorist assuming a neutral position in relation to the historical reality he seeks to explain. In this context, it was indicated how the practical interest informing Rationalist theory engenders a one-sided, critically detached explanation of the substantive nature of the order constitutive process within international society in which the cultural structures engendering legitimate societal order between sovereign states are abstracted from other important dimensions of international order formation. Consequently, it was argued that the Rationalist approach is unable to provide a systematic account of the relationship between the development of these broad normative structures of international society at different stages of modern history and the more specific forms of international domination engendered by major powers as the basis of the reproduction of legitimate, stable systems of order within this historically evolving international society.

Developing on this theme in Part Three I identified a higher expression of the societal paradigm of international order formation in Cox's critical theory of world order formation. In contrast with both the Neo-Realist and Rationalist approaches, Cox's Critical perspective

emphasises the historically located nature of the theorist's activity in interpreting the nature of the modern process of international order formation as the reflective articulation of complex historical practices of conscious human creative action. Moreover, in accordance with this more sophisticated notion of the critical engagement of the theorist with the historical subject under consideration, the concern of this Critical theory was identified as the development of a reflective understanding of the nature of international order formation as an historically contingent, constantly evolving expression of the historical process of human self determination. Moreover, in contrast with the one dimensional approach evident in Rationalist thought, Cox's Critical theory is concerned to explain the reproduction of order between modern states from a holistic historical perspective. As we have seen, for Cox the adoption of this integral, holistic, historical perspective is essential to the development of a proper understanding of the dynamic historical nature of legitimate order formation between modern states and the possibilities raised by the latter for the transcendence of those historical relations of social necessity operating between states and the further extension of human self determination within modern international society.

In articulating this reflective, critical societal paradigm, I have argued, Cox's theoretical perspective provides a more sophisticated understanding of the nature and implications of the modern process of international order formation as one entailing, not merely the extension of technical control over natural power processes, nor solely the establishment of systems of consensus and social cooperation between the

sovereign members of international society, but as a complex process involving the qualitative historical transformation of the nature of modern international society. At the same time, we noted some basic deficiencies with Cox's substantive application of this critical model of international order formation prejudicing its claim to provide a holistic account of the major forces contributing to the process of legitimate order formation and their implications for the historical extension of human emancipation. In doing so I indicated a way in which Cox's critical paradigm might be further elaborated in order to incorporate an account of these forces unsatisfactorily treated of in his own work. Thus it was suggested in the conclusion to Section Three that, by incorporating an account of those geo-politcal and strategic dimensions of international relations highlighted by the Rationalist and Neo-Realist theories considered in Parts One and Two, this extended critical perspective potentially provides the most sophisticated interpretative framework from which to grasp the complex nature and significance of the process of order formation within modern western international society.

It is to the elaboration of this tentative, synthetic critical account of modern international order formation that I now turn. Drawing on the insights offered by the different perspectives examined above, the synthetic theory outlined here aims to indicate the broad dimensions of a more comprehensive understanding of the reproduction of legitimate order within modern western international society opened up by the reflective, emancipatory theoretical perspective underlying Cox's work - a theory informed by a basic interest in the way the historical

transformation of modern structures of legitimate international order has facilitated the progressive extension of human self determination within that society.

II

In elaborating this reformulated critical perspective I shall begin by reintroducing a basic distinction between different types of international civilisation and the nature of order formation characterising them noted in our analysis of the work of Hedley Bull in chapter three. As we saw in Section Two, it is Bull's contention that international civilisations can be distinguished historically in terms of the degree of cultural integratedness, or what I shall call here the level of sociability, characterising the relations between their constituent political entities. In elaborating this point Bull differentiates directly between the type of interstate relations existing within international SYSTEMS and international SOCIETIES respectively. In the case of international systems, characterised by a low level of sociability and a high degree of 'systemic' behaviour, the interaction between constituent members is sufficient to make the actions of each a necessary element in the calculations of the other "without them being conscious of common interests or values, conceiving themselves bound by a common set of rules or cooperating in the working of common institutions."[1] The qualitative nature of states' interrelations is here very low even though contact may be frequent.

By comparison, the political communities incorporated within an international society, in which the element of sociability is more predominant, exhibit a considerable degree of cultural commonality. Here states' relations are predicated upon shared traditions and cultural preconceptions deriving from a common cultural heritage. This culturally grounded nature of the relations between its constitutive members ensures that the process of order formation within an international society assumes a very different character to the alternative, systemic type mentioned above. More specifically, in pursuing their particular interests within the international sphere the actions and claims of states composing an international society are always articulated in terms of shared, historically preconstituted cultural categories and preconceptions which translate, in practical, historical terms into formal institutional structures of social interaction. By virtue of the more socially intensive character of their relations based on this high degree of cultural commonality then, the interactions of these political communities are inevitably mediated through common institutional forms which represent the practical articulation of their shared cultural heritage and which confer a degree of legitimacy upon the relations between them.

Hence, in referring to the particular historical example of the Greek city-states, Bull notes the important role of the common Hellenic cultural heritage of antique Greek civilisation associated with the dominant political organisation of the Polis as a major factor shaping the conduct of relations between the Greek city-states. This common cultural heritage, expressed in a number of central cultural

institutions based around the common political form of the polis, operated to mediate the relations between Greek city-states, in the process differentiating this international society from other civilisations with which it came into contact. In this respect, as Bull notes, "Persia was perceived by the Greeks as a barbarian power ... [because] it did not share the common values of the Greeks, expressed in the Greek language, the Pan-Hellenic games or consultation of the Delphic oracle; it was not subject to the rules which required Greek city-states to limit their conflicts with one another; and it was not a participant in the amphictyonae in which institutional cooperation among the Greek states took place, or in the diplomatic institutions of the proxenoi."[2] Stable relations among the Greek city-states depended, to a significant degree then, upon the common recognition and observance of these social rules and regulations and participation in the common social institutions which provided a degree of unity and legitimacy in their mutual relations which was absent from their interactions with other, non-Hellenic communities. The reproduction of these socio-cultural institutions was a central factor in the ongoing reproduction of the Greek society of states itself.

It is this notion of relative degrees of international sociability which forms the central thematic of the extended critical theory of modern international order formation broadly outlined here. More particularly, it is contended here that modern western international society can be distinguished from other international civilisations as one manifesting a relatively high degree of sociability between its constitutive political entities. Furthermore, it will be my concern to argue that it

is possible to discern a historical evolution in the general form of international sociability characterising the relations of this international society - an historical evolution which represents the central expression of that emancipatory process of human self determination within modern western international society which constitutes the primary orienting interest of our extended critical theory.[3] Moreover, as I shall argue in more detail below, the central medium through which this evolutionary process has occured has been via the ongoing construction and transformation of structures of legitimate international order in response to the effects of the uneven development of power between sovereign states. In accordance with this general theme the central concern of our reformulated critical account of international order formation may be defined as that of articulating the broad dimensions of this historical evolution in the form of sociability characterising interstate relations within modern western international society to qualitatively higher levels.

The relatively highly developed character of its societal relations noted here derives, at the most basic level, from the historical fact of the origins of modern western international society within the cultural matrix of the preceding civilisational formation of medieval Europe. As Bull notes, the central political outcome of the historical breakdown of this feudal, Christian civilisation was the gradual emergence of a new society of formally autonomous political communities within western Europe in place of the indeterminate, interconnecting political communities of the preceding feudal order. The historical establishment of this new society of states was not a sudden development but the

outcome of a long and complex historical process engendered by a diversity of historical forces.[4] However, the most important point for our concerns is that, as a result of these historical processes, there emerged in Western Europe after the fifteenth century a society of states which, by virtue of the influence of a common cultural heritage, incorporated a distinctive type of political authority forming the basis of social interaction between its constituent members. The central characteristic distinguishing this newly emergent international society was the new exclusive form of sovereign authority upon which it was predicated, a form of sovereignty very different from the feudal type preceding it. Thus, as Ruggie notes, the preceding medieval civilisation was based around a heteronomous, diffuse form of political authority involving crosscutting, transcommunal linkages between municipal political units which were formally integrated through the tenuous institutional forms and practices of the Roman Catholic church and the political structures of the Holy Roman Empire.

By contrast with this porous, loosely differentiated form of sovereign identity circumscribing the relations of feudal political communities[5], the newly emergent European international society was predicated upon the establishment of political communities advancing exclusive claims to territorial authority, claims expressed in the assertion of sovereign legal and political autonomy against the universal authority of the Roman Catholic church as well as the fragmentary claims of internal social groups. Moreover, the emergence of this new, exclusive form of political sovereignty was, from the outset, associated with the development of domestic hegemonic blocs which sought to establish

integrated, unified, communities within specific territorial spheres.[6] It is these historically formed, legally and territorially distinct sovereign communities asserting political claims to sovereign autonomy which represented the constitutive entities of the new societal system of relations forming the basis of an emerging modern western international society. As a result of their common acceptance and cultivation of the legal-political forms of the new type of sovereign political authority there arose among these communities a formal, mutual acknowledgment of each other's legally autonomous sovereign status. It was this historically evolved practice of their common constitutive recognition as formally sovereign, independent states which facilitated the establishment of a set of social institutions of international co-operation between them.

In effect then, the new form of sovereign authority established by these embryonic states provided the historical conditions for the development of a new type of international sociability between them. For, what this mutual form of sovereign authority engendered was a highly distinctive type of normative community involving a sophisticated system of formal political obligations attaching to states as sovereign members of this broader international community. As a consequence of the emergence of this new form of sovereign authority and the societal practice of common constitutive recognition associated with it the relations between the sovereign political communities co-existing within this modern international society have, from the beginning, assumed a distinctive character. For they have been mediated through distinctive socio-cultural structures, including, most notably, an evolving body of

international law and the associated tradition of diplomatic relations and the regulative practices involved in the reproduction of the balance of power. Thus, as one commentator on this historical process has noted, the "contraction of the Feudal pyramid [of political authority] into the new centralised monarchies of Renaissance Europe produced for the first time a formalised system of inter-state pressure and exchange with the establishment of the novel institutions of reciprocal fixed embassies abroad, permanent chancelleries for foreign relations and secret diplomatic communications ... shielded by the new concept of extra-territoriality."[7] Such institutional practices gave practical expression to the new mode of international sociability predicated upon the distinctive, morally extensive principle of sovereign authority defining these emergent states. At the same time, however, this new form of sovereign authority also produced a highly decentralised structure of political power within this new international society - an anarchical political structure which has posed the problem of the historical reproduction of orderly societal relations between modern states in a highly distinctive form.

For the latter has meant that the relations between these states has had to be pursued within an historical condition of social necessity. This necessitous character of their societal relations has followed from the common need of these states to provide for their own security and well being within international society in the absence of any single, overriding sovereign body or universally integrative authority capable of imposing a single system of regulative behaviour upon them all. In these historical circumstances modern states have retained a primary

interest in pursuing actions within international society directed to ensuring their own historical reproduction. But, while the development of their external societal relations has been constrained by this general condition of social necessity, the point to be emphasised here is that this condition of necessitous action is not, in any sense, a natural or invariable condition. Far from remaining the same throughout modern history, the character of these necessitous interstate relations within western international society and the structures of interstate order emerging therein represent historically and culturally evolving phenomena. More particularly, as I have suggested above, the nature of these societal relations has undergone a process of historical evolution, an evolution integrally connected with the historical transformation of the sovereign character of the states constituting this international society. Through the practical historical formation and subsequent reconstitution of the structures of legitimate order operating between these states, the dominant form of state sovereignty, and with it, the normative principle of constitutive recognition shaping the formal relations of those states have been progressively transformed. It is this transformative process which, I want to suggest here, provides the clearest expression of the general historical extension of human self determination within modern western international society which forms the central interest of our critical theory.

In addressing itself to this historically evolving, anarchical western society of states then, the reformulated critical theory proposed here may be seen to incorporate two main, interrelated concerns which

together define its general, emancipatory theory-orienting interest. The first of these concerns is to delineate the major historical forces explaining the creation and historical transformation of the structures of legitimate order arising between states within this evolving anarchical society and to explicate the nature of those different structures of legitimate order thus constituted. The second, more encompassing concern of this theory would be to highlight the manner in which this historical process of international order formation has provided the stimulus for the transformation of the qualitative nature of those societal relations of necessity characterising the interaction of states at different phases in the history of modern western international society. In terms of its overriding emancipatory interest, this theory would aim to indicate the way in which this ongoing process of international order formation has led to the reconstitution of the principle of sovereign constitutive recognition forming the normative basis of societal relations between modern states, resulting in its progressive rearticulation in more developed forms. In doing so it would seek to demonstrate how this process has opened up the possibility for the further transformation of the general form of international sociability characterising relations among these states. It is in this way that the historical process of legitimate order formation at the international level may be seen to have facilitated the introduction of more self determining modes of societal interaction transcending the basic relations of social necessity characterising earlier phases in the history of western international society. In this development, I would argue, we can discern the practical expression of the evolution of the nature of human moral community within modern international society

which represents the central expression of the process of human self determination forming the focus of our critical, emancipatory perspective.[8]

What, then, are the major historical forces which this extended critical theory needs to focus upon in explaining the development and ongoing transformation of the historical structures of order between western states giving rise to the progressive rearticulation of international societal relations suggested here? At the broadest level it is the condition of inter-state competition engendered by the decentralised, anarchical structure of this society which has been responsible for the practical formation and subsequent transformation of the different historical systems of international order. However, as our foregoing analysis has illustrated, this condition of international competition does not constitute an invariable power struggle between states conceived as undifferentiated units of power capabilities of the type suggested by Neo-Realist theory. Rather, drawing on the more complex understanding implicit in the work of Wight and more explicitly developed in the critical approaches of Cox and Skocpol, our theory would acknowledge the nature of this competitive process as a struggle between composite, historically constituted and constantly evolving sovereign communities - a process arising in response to the uneven development of power within modern international society which has engendered the historical reproduction of structures of legitimate order between these sovereign communities.

More specifically, our critical perspective would draw upon the extended conception of hegemonic state formation elaborated in the work of Theda Skocpol and broadly outlined in chapter six. Especially important here are the insights which Skocpol's work provides into the complex character of hegemonic bloc formation within the sovereign state as a process affected by both internal and external socio-economic and strategic-political forces and, in this connection, her account of the central role of the institutional structures of the political fragment of the state in mediating these domestic and international dimensions of its historical existence. As we have seen, it is this relatively autonomous political fragment which is identified by Skocpol as the central agent mediating those domestic and international dimensions of the life of the state affecting its ongoing historical reproduction. Rather than representing a mere reflection of more basic socio-economic forces, as Cox's work sometimes suggests, the political structure of the state is here acknowledged as an agent operating in a relatively autonomous manner within the larger hegemonic bloc constituting the totality of the sovereign state, following interests and logics specific to its own political function as the central coordinating agency in the reproduction of the sovereign community as a whole. In particular, it is the political executive and the institutional structures of legitimate political authority associated with it which have played the central historical role in the coordination of those different spheres of domestic social practice (socio-economic, cultural, coercive etc.) within an integrated hegemonic structure providing the bases of the power of the state as a distinctive, historically constituted sovereign community. Furthermore, as the practical mediator of these internal

processes of hegemonic bloc formation, the political fragment of the state has traditionally borne the responsibility for ensuring the reproduction of this sovereign community in the face of the pressures arising from its location within the larger geo-political sphere of an anarchical international society.

What Skocpol's work offers for our extended critical theory then, is an account of the way the political executive of the state has operated in a relatively autonomous manner in the sphere of international relations in pursuing those distinctive political ends relating to its pivotal role in the reproduction of the historically constituted totality of the sovereign community. Through its appropriation and deployment of the resources (both material and cultural) deriving from the broader domestic hegemonic bloc whose legitimate sovereign interests it claims to represent within the international sphere, the political executive of the state has operated to establish the strategic-military power structures essential to the advancement of those legitimate sovereign interests at the international level and to counter the threats to the ongoing historical reproduction of the sovereign state arising within the larger society of states.[9] At the same time, through its engagement in diplomatic relations with the other political states of this society in accordance with the historically evolved practice of sovereign constitutive recognition noted above, the relatively autonomous political institutions of the hegemonic state have formed the central agency in the creation of those structures of legitimate international order emerging at different stages in the history of modern international society. Historically, it is only the most powerful of

these states in any given period which have possessed the capabilities to significantly influence this general process of international order formation. Moreover, the ability to exercise such significant influence has been conditional upon the successful creation and maintenance of an internally coherent, sovereign hegemonic bloc providing the material and cultural resources for the continued growth and external projection of sovereign state power.

Invoking this extended conception of the nature of the sovereign state and hegemonic state formation within the broader geo-political context of an historically evolving, anarchical international society, it becomes possible to reconstruct Cox's Critical historical perspective to provide a more adequate theoretical account of the modern process of international order formation and the potential for the extension of human self determination engendered by that process. Within this reconstructed perspective our Critical theory would be concerned to indicate the way in which the competition between western states, understood as historically evolving, composite hegemonic blocs, has resulted in the historical formation and transformation of structures of legitimate order between them. More specifically, it would consider how the changes in the relative power of these dominant sovereign states, produced by the effects of competitive pressures at the domestic and international levels, have given rise to transformative processes within western international society engendering a movement from historical phases characterised by multi-actor structures of legitimate international order predicated upon the regulative mechanism of the balance of power, to historical periods in which particular states have

sought, more or less successfully, to transcend the constraints imposed by this multi-actor, anarchical society of states through the imposition of their hegemonic dominance over that international society as a whole. In doing so it would seek to show how the uneven development of international power has given rise to the progressive transformation and reconstitution of the normative principle of sovereign constitutive recognition informing societal relations within western international society.

In terms of the extended Critical perspective sketched here it is possible to identify two major, interrelated aspects of the uneven development of international power responsible for the transformation of such legitimate systems of international order and, along with them, the nature of the societal relations characterising this international society. The first of these is the historical transformation of those domestic hegemonic blocs which have provided the dynamic basis of the internal accumulation and external projection of sovereign power by the major states of western international society. More particularly, the extended Critical theory proposed here would need to consider the way pressures at both the domestic and international level have produced changes in the hegemonic structures of existing states (or stimulated the development of new, unified sovereign states) with the effect of increasing their relative power within the international sphere, thus giving rise to more or less successful attempts to impose their political dominance over international society. By seeking, in this way, to extend their control over the operation of the political and economic power processes at the international level through the imposition of

their own domestic, hegemonic structures as the model for international society as a whole, such states have sought to transcend the constraints of the existing multi-actor structure and to enhance the prospects for their own historical reproduction.

Considered from the perspective of our critical interest in the historical transformation of international society, attention would be given to the long term implications of such attempts to establish hegemonic dominance for the general restructuring of interstate relations. In this respect the practical attempts of particular states to impose forms of hegemonic domination upon western international society can be seen to have contributed to the long term rearticulation of these societal relations through the diffusion of the cultural forms of the preponderant, expansionist power. Thus it has been the effects of the dissemination of such hegemonic cultural forms which can be seen to have provided the historical stimulus to the long term transformation of the domestic structures of other sovereign states and the subsequent creation of new sovereign hegemonic blocs within international society based upon adaptations of that hegemonic model. Moreover, it is the historical instantiation and external expression of these reconstituted sovereign hegemonic blocs which has provided the dynamic agency behind the transcendence of existing historical structures of international order and the formation of new, extended forms of societal relations between modern states expressed in the emergence of new systems of legitimate international order. As I shall indicate further below, the transformative impact of such expansionist practices upon the nature of modern international societal relations is exemplified in the effects of

the dissemination of the hegemonic forms of the revolutionary French state and the industrialised capitalist mode of production underpinning the nineteenth century British imperialist state.

At the same time, viewed from the short term historical perspective, our Critical theory would need to indicate the reasons for the transient nature of such international structures of hegemonic dominance established by these expansionist powers. Especially important here is Cox's point, noted in chapter five, concerning the essentially limited nature of such hegemonic systems as inevitably partial totalities within a larger, international society of plural sovereign states and the potential for the development of countervailing forces facilitated by their limited, partial nature. This leads us to the second important historical expression of the uneven development of power within international society explaining the transformation of the structures of legitimate international order, namely the changes in the relative distribution of power between states produced by the historically shifting strategic alliances between the great powers of this modern anarchical society. Consideration would need to be given here to the way the attempts at the imposition of hegemonic domination over international society by any single state have ultimately provoked counter structures of strategic alliances. It is through the formation of such counter structures that those states threatened by an expansionist power have combined their strategic-political capabilities to readjust the imbalance in the distribution of international power engendered by the processes of hegemonic bloc transformation noted above. Through such relatively autonomous strategic practices the

political fragments of threatened states have sought to overcome the preponderance of any one sovereign power and to ultimately re-establish a new multi-actor structure of international order based upon the reassertion of the strategic balance of power.

It is the effects of the uneven development of power between major states engendered, most notably, by the dual processes indicated here, which our Critical theory would focus upon in seeking to explain the historical construction and subsequent transformation of the different systems of legitimate international order at different stages in the history of western international society. Examining this ongoing process of legitimate order formation engendered by the uneven development of power between the major states of this society, this Critical theory would be concerned to indicate the way in which the former has resulted in the historical transformation of the condition of social necessity characterising modern western international society. More specifically, it would seek to show how the general process of international order formation has provided the dynamic impetus for the expansion of this society beyond its original, geographically and socially limited context within western Europe and its consequent historical transformation into a contemporary global society of sovereign states incorporating a new nationalistic principle of sovereign constitutive recognition as the normative basis of societal relations. At the same time, this critical theory would seek to highlight the way this new principle of sovereign constitutive recognition has introduced the potential for the establishment of a still higher, solidary form of international sociability among contemporary nation states transcending the

pluralistic forms developed thus far. In doing so it would attempt to assess the practical possibilities for the further, practical articulation and institutionalisation of this extended form of sociability as the basis of a new, more emancipated system of legitimate international order within contemporary international society.

III

A detailed account of this transformative historical process is clearly beyond the limits of the present thesis whose primary aim has been to indicate the broad features of the more comprehensive, Critical theory of international order formation sketched above. Here I can only present the most general of outlines of this reconstructed historical perspective which attempts to indicate the most important phases in the historical transformation of western international society and the evolution of the forms of international sociability characterising the different stages of its historical development.[10] Thus, beginning with the society of Absolutist states whose emergence from the breakdown of feudal society I have briefly sketched above, attention would be initially directed to the limited form of international sociability informing the latter which was integrally associated with the operation of the dynastic principle of sovereign constitutive recognition. Here the sovereign state was one in which hegemonic bloc formation was focussed around the political authority of the dynastic, monarchical family as the articulator of the sovereign power of the state and as the legitimate representative of its sovereign interests within

international society. The relatively autonomous executive structure centred around the institution of the monarchy played a central role in the reproduction of the Absolutist state through its mediation of the development of the structures of the domestic hegemonic bloc and the external pressures arising from the state's location within a system of necessitous inter-societal relations articulated around the formation and reconstitution of international balances of power.

Within this Absolutist society of states, where sovereign authority was centred in the institutional personality and prescriptive rights of the monarchy, the political and economic dimensions of hegemonic bloc formation constituted inseparable aspects of the augmentation of the political authority of the dynasty as the legitimating focus of the sovereign community. Moreover, this dynastic form of legitimate, sovereign authority was expressed at the level of interstate relations in the limited doctrine of the Reason of State as the guiding normative principle informing the practice of sovereign constitutive recognition between Absolutist states. In this context, as Mckay and Scott note, "the doctrine of raison d'etat ... was simply the argument of necessity as the basis for the political [and economic] conduct of states. Self-interest was ... the dominant motive behind foreign policy ... Force was the essential, if unspoken element in international relations ... Rulers and statesmen strove ceaselessly to increase the power, and therefore the wealth of their state."[11]

This normatively limited character of the dynastic principle informing inter-societal relations was reflected then, in a system of interaction

between Absolutist states characterised by a ruthless competition for economic and political power. Indeed, as Morse notes, the dynastic principle involved a "built in bellicosity in interstate relations"[12] in terms of which the overriding aim of foreign policy was understood as that of maximising one's share of the limited resources of international society. Accordingly, within this Absolutist society of states political and economic relations emerged characterised by extreme necessity based on the egoistic pursuit of power by dynastic regimes. Within the sphere of economic relations it was mercantilist policies which predominated. As Morse points out, the "inseparability of economic and political factors built into the domestic economy under mercantilism also characterised foreign policy. In both spheres the principal aim was to augment the power of the sovereign."[13] At the same time, as Wight's work indicates, these aggrandising tendencies of states in the more specifically political sphere of international relations received articulation in the political machinations over the legitimate rights of rulers to hereditary succession. Accordingly, it was the diplomatic intrigues and military struggles between Absolutist states arising over this issue of the legitimacy of dynastic succession which represented a central determining factor in the reproduction of legitimate order within this multi-actor, international society through the continual transformation and readjustment of the relative balance of power between sovereign states which it engendered.

Taking this Absolutist society of states as its point of departure the Critical theory sketched here would seek to indicate how the ongoing process of international order formation engendered by the uneven

development of power between states has resulted in the progressive movement beyond the normatively limited, dynastic form of international sociability and the highly necessitous process of legitimate order formation engendered by it. More particularly, it would be concerned to show how the ongoing reproduction of systems of legitimate order between western states has led to the reconstruction of the prescriptive, dynastic principle of sovereign constitutive recognition informing this early system of international sociability, in the process giving rise to a more universalistic, nationalistic principle of sovereign constitutive recognition as the normative basis of societal relations within contemporary global international society. The historical factors explaining this evolutionary process are highly complex. However, arguably the single most important historical event initiating this transformative process was the radical challenge to the dynastic structure of Absolutist international society arising from the French Revolution.

The primary interest of this historical event for our Critical theory lies in the way it initiated a major restructuring of the dynastic hegemonic bloc forming the basis of French state power. Particularly important here was the impact of the new, popular, nationalistic ideal of sovereign authority advanced in association with the more general challenge to the structures of the ancien regime represented by the revolutionary movement. In fact, as I shall argue below, it was this popular conception of sovereign legitimacy which would provide the basic model for future exercises in hegemonic state formation shaping the ongoing historical transformation of the societal structure of western

international society. In this respect, the principal effect of the revolution in France was to displace the locus of sovereign state authority from its traditional centre in the institution of the monarchy to the state defined as the representative of the nation and the expression of the popular, national will. As Skocpol notes, "a single legitimating theme ran through all the phases [of the revolution]; an identification of executive functions with the implementation of the people's will."[14]

It was this epochal change in the sovereign structure of the French state introduced by the revolution which was to underpin French imperialist expansion under Napoleon. In the words of Brunn, "the energies of the French people, released, intensified and coordinated [by the influence of the revolutionary ideals of popular sovereignty and the later effects of the Napoleonic reforms] gave them an immense advantage over their disorganised and backward neighbours."[15] The change in the relative distribution of international power created by this development was to be a central factor in the successful extension of French dominance over the continent and in generating the radical changes in the structure of Absolutist international society following from this. The emergence of the nation at arms and the organisational effects of the new bureaucratic structures of the French state meant that its relative power within international society was greatly increased. In particular, the mobilisation of the French people through national conscription provided the basis for the successful assertion of French hegemonic ambitions in continental Europe under the leadership of

Napoleon with the consequent expansion of France's political influence and the diffusion of its revolutionary political ideas.[16]

Outlining the nature of the continental system of hegemonic dominance briefly established by Napoleon on the power basis provided by the revolutionary transformation of the hegemonic structure of the French state, our Critical theory would then need to consider how this challenge to the multi-actor structure of Absolutist international society was ultimately checked by the formation of the grand alliance and the combination of the concerted power of the opposing European states against Napoleon. In doing so it would indicate how this alliance, in countering French preponderance, provided the foundations for the subsequent establishment of a new multi-actor structure of legitimate international order within nineteenth century European international society organised around the principles of the Vienna settlement - an order which reflected the common interest of the great powers in the suppression of the revolutionary forces unleashed by the French revoution. In doing so it would indicate how their mutual interest in securing this end created the preconditions for the rearticulation of the institution of the balance of power responsible for regulating the relations between dynastic states in the pre-Revolutionary period. Thus, within this new system of international order we see the common acknowledgement by the great powers of certain collective norms of responsibility constraining their actions within international society, norms which received expression in the practice of diplomatic consultation on matters of common concern as the accepted condition for the preservation of international order.[17]

However, while providing the basis of a new system of legitimate order between the great European powers in the first half of the nineteenth century, this attempt to reconstruct the old dynastic international society around the new multi-actor system of legitimate order would encounter major new forces contributing to its ultimate demise in the long term. In this respect, the diffusion of the revolutionary nationalist ideals throughout western Europe consequent upon the period of French hegemonic domination arguably marks a decisive moment in the historical transformation of the general form of international sociability characterising relations between the states of modern western international society. For, as Wight observes, the dissemination of such nationalist ideals operated to produce a major schism within this society in the nineteenth century expressed most clearly in the conflict between the competing dynastic and popular conceptions of sovereign legitimacy. This conflict between traditional political regimes predicated upon the dynastic principle of sovereign authority and those emerging social movements advancing demands for the new popular, nationalistic form of sovereign government may be seen as the expression of a major crisis of legitimacy within modern European international society, a crisis whose effects would ultimately extend well beyond the geographical limits of Europe to engender transformative processes in the non-European world. However, the instabilities created by this legitimation crisis within European international society itself operated to aggravate already existing differences between the major powers participating in the management of the nineteenth century system of legitimate international order.[18] In effect then, the seeds of the decay of the restored multi-actor structure of legitimate order based

around the ninteenth century balance of power were already planted by the transformative effects of the earlier period of French hegemony. It was the impact of these fragmentary forces, combined with the destabilising effects upon European society of the dissemination of the new forms of industrial capitalism, which would ultimately lead to the progressive breakdown of that order in the later ninteenth century.

The increasing influence of this popular model of national sovereignty during the nineteenth century, combined with the diffusion of the forms of industrial power first introduced in Britain are identified here then, as the major factors explaining the progressive erosion of the traditional dynastic principle of legitimacy informing the Absolutist system of societal relations.[13] In circumstances where Britain, as the dominant industrial power in European international society, directed its energies principally to the establishment of an overseas empire in the non-European world and did not seek to impose direct hegemonic leadership over the other European states, continental European countries were not constrained to follow the British liberal model and could draw upon these influences in following their own independent paths of development. In these circumstances the diffusion and adaptation of the ideas of national sovereignty and the forms of British industrial capitalism stimulated the development of new forms of hegemonic bloc formation on the continent which would culminate in the further historical transformation of European international society in the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The most notable expression of this process of change was the emergence of the new, unified nation-states of Italy and Germany in the second half of the

nineteenth century.[20] In the case of the formation of the new German state, for example, the concern for the development of an internal, protected economic market through the formation of a single customs union provided a major early impetus to later national unification. Moreover this policy of economic protectionism formed a major component in the later efforts to consolidate and expand the economic and military power of the new unified German state as a major rival to Britain within later nineteenth century international society.

Acknowledging this major rearticulation of the configuration of states within European international society, our Critical theory would emphasise the crucial new phase in the uneven development of international power to which it gave rise. In doing so it would stress the renewed drive to international competition between these states engendered by the former which would finally result in the destruction of the nineteenth century system of legitimate order structured around the balance of power. In this context, as Cox notes, "the spread of industrialisation [and nationalist ideas] and the mobilisation of social classes it brought about not only changed the nature of states but also altered the international configuration of state power as new rivals overtook Britain's lead. Protectionism ... [was adopted by these newly industrialising nations] as the means of building economic power comparable to Britain's."[21] This renewed inter-state rivalry created by the new phase of hegemonic bloc formation and the uneven development of international power associated with it received practical expression in a new climate of aggressive competition between the major European states reflected in two interrelated developments of the later

nineteenth century. The first of these was the race for empire engaged in by European states. Here we see the incorporation of non-western regions into an imperial system of European domination which would provide the basis for practices of nation-building and the stimulus for the development of nationalist movements in these regions culminating in the emergence of a multiplicity of new nation-states into international society with the advent of decolonisation in the twentieth century.[22]

In the more immediate historical context however, this political and economic competition between European states in the peripheral regions was arguably only a reflection of that more basic change in the character of relations within European international society reflected in the development of what Van Evera has called the new 'cult of the offensive' and the escalation in the development of the capabilities and tactical strategies for fighting war which that offensive outlook entailed.[23] More particularly, our Critical theory would need to consider how the shift in the relative distribution of international power engendered by the new phase of national hegemonic bloc formation confirmed the ultimate historical breakdown of the nineteenth century structure of legitimate international order and, with it, the Absolutist, dynastic form of international society which it supported, by creating the social and political bases for the assertion of German hegemonic ambitions.[24] Viewed from the longer term historical perspective it was the debilitating effects of the two world wars directed to checking the successive attempts by this newly unified German nation to establish hegemonic dominance over European international society in the first half of the twentieth century, which

would ultimately lead to the loss of the position of ascendancy traditionally held by European states within western international society and see the emergence of a new, post-European, global society of nation-states dominated by the United States.

Within this broad historical context, attention would need to be given to the temporary success of the alliance of those powers (including the United States) opposed to German expansionism in World War One, in countering this preponderant power within Europe produced by the effects of German national unification. But, at the same time, our theory would also consider the subsequent inability of those states to rectify the existing fundamental imbalance in the distribution of international power within European international society as a result of their failure to re-establish an effective new structure of legitimate international order after the war on the basis of the institutions of the League of Nations. More particularly, it would be concerned to highlight the way this failure advanced the broader process of the historical decline of European international society by ensuring the breakdown of the tenuous interwar structure of political and economic order, in the process facilitating the re-emergence of a new, expansionist German state predicated upon a sovereign hegemonic bloc incorporating the protectionist economic policies and militaristic ideological and institutional forms of National Socialism.[25] In terms of our critical interest in the historical transformation of western international society, the central point of interest arising here concerns the manner in which the subsequent struggle to counter the expansionist power of Germany resulted in the ultimate decline of the old European states as

the central agents of order construction in western international society while, at the same time, creating the historical impetus for the movement to a new global western society of nation states in the postwar era dominated by the major non-European member of the allied alliance; the United States.

This practical decline, and final supersession of the traditional, European-centred society of states as the focus of international societal formation was manifested in two crucial developments expressing the uneven development of international power generated by the events of the first half of the twentieth century. The first of these was the rise to ascendancy of the United States as the constitutive agent of a new system of legitimate order within western international society. In this respect the historical decline of the European powers in this period was counterposed by the enormous growth of American power in the first half of the twentieth century. It is this preponderant power of the newly ascendent American hegemonic state which would form the basis for the projection of United States influence within postwar western international society, thereby enabling America to take over the role traditionally assumed by European states as the dominant order constitutive agent. More specifically, as Cox notes, the postwar emergence of America as the preeminent actor within western international society was manifested in the formation of a new structure of legitimate, hegemonic international order in which the "power configuration of the pax americana ... [took] the form of alliances (all hinging on US power) created in order to contain the Soviet Union. The stabilisation of this [strategic-political] power configuration created

the conditions for the unfolding of a global economy"[26] both of which have been built around American hegemonic leadership.

Thus the postwar period saw the emergence of a new structure of legitimate hegemonic order in western international society forming one part of a larger bipolar world dominated by two superpowers whose spheres of influence were based upon the dissemination of two very different forms of economic and political organisation as the basis of their legitimacy. Co-extensive with the development of this new legitimate, hegemonic system of international order progressively embedded by the polarising effects of the global bi-polar struggle between America and the Soviet Union, there also occurred the entry of those new nation states of the non-European regions of the world into this nascent global society. The breakup of European colonial territories, accelerated by the postwar decline of the European colonial powers, was the signal for the emergence of a multiplicity of new nation states claiming sovereign membership of western international society. As a consequence of this process of decolonisation the postwar period has seen the progressive diffusion of the nationalist form of political sovereignty and, with it, the effective universalisation of a new nationalist principle as the basis of the societal practice of constitutive recognition between western states.

In accordance with these interrelated, transformative processes emerging from the redistribution of international power engendered by the period of European conflict and decline, the character of western international society has radically changed. Within the increasingly globalised,

postwar international society the formal nature of the condition of international sociability has been profoundly transformed. Where previously societal relations were based upon the normatively limited, prescriptive principle of Reason of State associated with the interaction of political dynasties as the legitimate focus of sovereign community, the practice of sovereign constitutive recognition has now been redefined in much broader ethico-political terms. Within this contemporary global international society the normative relations between states have been reconstituted around a common acknowledgement of the formal, universal rights and obligations existing between political states as formally equal representatives of sovereign national communities forming the larger society of nation-states. Moreover, this nationalistic principle of sovereign constitutive recognition has received practical expression through the establishment of the United Nations, the institution to which all nation-states are formally admitted on the basis of the practice of sovereign constitutive recognition between these states as formally equal national communities.[27]

In focussing its attention upon this emergent global western society of nation states the extended Critical theory outlined here would be concerned to identify the major problems confronting the continued historical reproduction of the hegemonic system of legitimate order which underpins it. In particular, taking up the main theme of Bull's later writings, it would examine the apparent tension which has emerged within this legitimate order as a result of the sense, on the part of its less advantaged members, of the increasing disparity between its

formal principle of international sociability and the effects of the practical operation of its legitimate structures of hegemonic order. For, as the later work of Hedley Bull indicates, despite the attainment of formal political autonomy in the period of decolonisation, these new nations have remained subject to major substantive forms of inequality consequent upon the perpetuation of relations of dependence on their former European masters in the post-colonial period. Most important in this context has been the perception by these states of a growing disparity between the formal equality of the sovereign communities constituting this society implied by the nationalistic principle underpinning the practice of sovereign constitutive recognition, and the manifest inequality of states within this global society produced by the uneven distribution of its material benefits resulting from the operation of those post-colonial ordering structures principally tailored to the interests of the American hegemonic state and other advanced, industrialised nations.

In accordance with this perception of the inequitable nature of the hegemonic structures of this postwar international order, there has arisen amongst those less advantaged nations a counter-hegemonic movement aimed at securing the restructuring of the former. More particularly, this reformist movement has given practical expression to its grievances by advancing a challenge to the legitimacy of the present international order through the radical reinterpretation of the nationalist principle informing the international practice of sovereign constitutive recognition. By introducing a more extensive principle of justice as the proposed basis of international societal relations they

have sought to advance their formal demands for the restructuring of the existing international order, a process culminating in the demands for a New International Economic Order in the ninteen seventies. Here, the traditional, pluralistic liberal principle of justice underlying the practice of sovereign constitutive recognition and defining the formal rights and obligations of states as sovereign members of international society has been radically reinterpreted. Rejecting this traditionally accepted understanding of international justice, these states have sought to extend the concept beyond the notion of the equal right of nations to political self determination to encompass a qualitatively higher notion of distributive justice which asserts the right of all the states of this society to substantive equality in political, economic and cultural terms.[28]

As our analysis of the later thought of Hedley Bull has indicated, the principal motive underlying this challenge to the orthodox interpretation of the nationalist principle of sovereign constitutive recognition have been the concerns of third world nations to advance their particular interests within the larger western society of states. Moreover, developments within the western international political economy in more recent times have resulted in the effective marginalisation of such claims by third world states for the major restructuring of the existing international order. However, as Bull suggests, this challenge to the existing legitimate order may be seen to involve a deeper significance for our general theoretical interest in the ongoing historical transformation of the form of sociability grounding states' relations within contemporary western international

society. For, what this redefinition of the nationalist principle of sovereign constitutive recognition offers is an indication of the manner in which the form of international sociability characterising contemporary international social relations might be further elaborated in a more emancipatory form in the future.

Of central importance here is the extended solidary conception of international sociability which underpins this radicalised nationalist principle of sovereign constitutive recognition implicit in the third world's challenge to western dominance. As Bull's later work indicates, this principle is one which entails a conception of normative social community transcending the traditional pluralistic understanding of the society of states. In opposition to this traditional conception of international society as an association of autonomous, right-possessing, sovereign entities representing the highest expression of human community and owing obligations solely to one another, this radicalised principle entails a conception of international society in which the form of international sociability encompasses obligations to a qualitatively higher normative community defined in solidary terms. The higher community referred to here, extending beyond the limits of separate sovereign nation states, is that wider moral community of the species and the common world good associated with the latter.

In accordance with its basic emancipatory interest, the reformulated Critical theory outlined here would be concerned to assess the possibilities for the advancement of this qualitatively higher form of international sociability as the practical basis of legitimate order

formation within contemporary international society. Examining the ongoing process of the uneven development of power at the international level, our Critical theory would consider the potential which this process opens up for the historical transformation of the structures of the existing hegemonic system of legitimate order in accordance with the extended principle of constitutive recognition mentioned above. At the same time, in accordance with Cox's own dictum, this critical perspective would need to take account of the formidable constraints upon the actualisation of this extended form of international sociability arising from the necessituous nature of existing international relations and the operation of those structures of international domination already engendered by the uneven distribution of power between contemporary nation states.[29]

Particularly important in this context would be the transformative effects upon the postwar structure of international relations produced by the relative decline of the two superpowers in more recent times as the central expression of the contemporary phase of uneven international development. Thus, in the case of western international society which has been our primary concern in this work, consideration would be given to the erosion of the postwar structures of international legitimacy consequent upon the decline of American dominance in recent decades and the rise of other states to challenge its economic preeminence.[30] Insofar as this latter development has introduced a greater degree of instability and uncertainty into the western international political economy and produced a general reduction in the high levels of economic growth characterising the earlier phase of undisputed American

leadership we can discern an increasing preoccupation amongst industrialised western states with the maintenance of their own economic well being, thus limiting the scope for the emergence of more solidary forms of societal relations within the international sphere. Compounding this problem is the recent weakening of the position of third world states, formerly the main protaganists seeking the restructuring of the international order, resulting from the development of massive third world debt and the deleterious effects upon the social structures of those countries engendered by the latter.

In addition to these recent developments within western international society, our Critical theory would also need to consider the consequences of the current changes in postwar relations between the superpowers for this broader process of societal evolution. Most significant here is the current transformation affecting the bipolar structure of postwar international relations produced by the decline in the power of the Soviet Union. In this context, the collapse of the rigid postwar divisions accompanying the application of the spirit of Soviet 'New Thinking' to its external relations and the subsequent breakup of its extended empire, would appear to have brought with it a significant shift away from traditional, entrenched confrontational attitudes, thus facilitating a new climate of compromise and cooperation between the superpowers.[31] At the same time, the breakdown of the Soviet empire and the current movement of, not only Eastern European countries but also the Soviet Union itself, towards more liberalised economic and political structures suggests a new tendency towards the convergence of states, the emphasis now being upon the introduction of

pluralistic systems of government and free market economies. As a result of these tendencies we now appear to be witnessing the incorporation of the different regions of the world, as never before, within a single international community transcending the earlier postwar territorial and ideological divisions.[32]

Clearly these recent changes involve major implications for the continuing viability of the traditional order-constitutive structures of postwar western international relations. While their ultimate ramifications for the future shape and stability of international society remain uncertain, what these changes do indicate in unambiguous terms is that the nature of postwar international relations is already in the throes of major transformation and that the legitimate structures underpinning the postwar western system of legitimate order are undergoing a profound, though uncertain rearticulation. To this extent they pose the issue of the prospects for the reproduction of a future, stable and durable system of international order in stark, practical terms. From the standpoint of the Critical theoretical perspective sketched here, this highly fluid contemporary situation arising from the current redrawing of the landscape of postwar international relations and, in particular, the incipient movement towards a more integrated global international community engendered by the rapprochement of the superpowers, may be seen to offer significant opportunities for the further advancement of the emancipatory interest in the extension of the qualitative form of sociability at the international level.

Hence, in examining these developments flowing from the latest phase in the uneven development of international power, our Critical theory would be concerned to establish the possibilities raised by this freeing-up of the rigid postwar structures of international relations for the further extension of the process of conscious human self determination within international society in accordance with the extended, solidary conception of social community implicit in the nationalist principle of constitutive recognition.[33] More particularly, it would aim to identify and advance those historical forces engendered by the present processes of international change which might facilitate the practical extension of conscious human control over the forms of power underpinning the operation of those order-constitutive structures within the contemporary global society of states as the precondition for their rearticulation in a new structure of legitimate order - one capable of addressing the complex, interrelated problems which now endanger the reproduction of this international society understood, not just as a pluralistic community of discrete sovereign states, but as a single solidary community of humanity sharing a common interest in the maintenance of the basic conditions required for its continued existence.

Perhaps the most important development giving rise to these pressing problems now threatening the reproduction of this larger community including, but ultimately transcending the historically contingent boundaries of separate sovereign states, is the increasingly universal diiffusion, along with the other forms of western international civilisation, of industrialised modes of production as the material basis of the reproduction of the hegemonic structures of contemporary

nation states. Among the major dilemmas posed by this development is the problem of how we are to ensure the continued reproduction of a sustainable international society in ecological terms while states continue to maintain and increase their levels of economic growth to satisfy their material and security needs as members of a larger, competitive, anarchical society. This issue is itself closely linked with the current problems confronting the reproduction of a stable international economic system posed by the increasing competition for markets between industrialised western states reflected in recently emerging mercantilist practices. Also important here are the potentially destabilising effects arising from the necessity for third world countries to repay massive foreign debts and the complexities which this situation involves for the reproduction of a fair and equitable, but, at the same time, sustainable system of economic relations between states.[34] Finally, there are the formidable problems involved in the reproduction of strategic-military order in the post-cold war period in the face of the breakdown of the old strategic blocs and practices and the ongoing proliferation of advanced weapons systems created by modern military-industrial complexes. Arguably the most pressing concern here is the need for the development of new, more solidary forms of strategic cooperation capable of addressing the threats posed to the reproduction of international order by the growing number of states possessing potentially catastrophic nuclear capabilities.[35]

In acknowledging the highly complex, interconnected nature of these problems associated with the reproduction of contemporary international society, our Critical theory would be concerned to highlight the need

for the development of extended, solidary forms of international cooperation as the condition for their effective management - modes of cooperation which go beyond the qualitative limits of the contemporary, pluralistic form of international sociability associated with the normative social practices characterising contemporary international society. Viewed in these terms, the emancipatory interest informing our Critical theory would be one which advocates the advancement of modes of political practice aimed at creating a future type of legitimate international order radically different from those of the past which offers the possibility for the progressive actualisation of the solidary form of international community noted above.[36] In moving beyond the limitations of those dynastic and nationalist systems in which the practice of sovereign constitutive recognition has given primacy to the obligations owed to partial, separate sovereign communities, the international order engendered by these forms of practice would be one incorporating a more emancipated form of international sociability involving the acknowledgement by its constituent units of extended obligations to the overriding community of humankind understood as a single species. Moreover, the acknowledgement of this extended form of obligation would receive practical expression through the development of forms of cooperation directed to securing and further advancing what Bull has defined as the world common good associated with this higher community.

Clearly the progress towards this more emancipated form of legitimate international order faces formidable constraints engendered by the continuing, necessituous nature of the relations between states within

contemporary international society. Accordingly, the establishment of a solidary system of legitimate international order of this sort through the institutionalisation of the extended principle of constitutive recognition outlined above is not to be understood as, in any sense, an imminent or inevitable outcome of current historical processes. Rather, this Critical theory would acknowledge the contemporary phase of societal transformation as only part, although arguably a most crucial phase, of the broader historical process of the reproduction of international order sketched in this chapter. In doing so it would emphasise the dependence of the realisation of this emancipatory interest upon the further practical articulation of those conscious powers of human self determination underpinning the broader historical evolution of modern international society which we have noted in the preceding pages.

Viewed from this broad, evolutionary perspective, the interest dictated by our Critical theory in the realisation of this qualitatively superior, emancipatory system of international order would need to be tempered by the awareness of the complex, historically conditioned nature of current movements towards the further reconstruction of the existing international order. But, at the same time, our theory would also reflect the extent to which that evolutionary process has advanced thus far. When understood in these pragmatic, historical terms, the commitment to the realisation of this emancipatory end cannot be rejected as the misdirected pursuit of a purely abstract, idealistic postulate. Rather, as I have sought to indicate in this work, it is an inescapable consequence of the acceptance of the more sophisticated

critical conception of international order formation presented above - a perspective which draws upon the insights of the more limited explanations of this process examined in the body of this thesis while, at the same time, transcending their methodological and substantive limitations which preclude the acknowledgement of the nature of modern international order formation as the complex, ongoing expression of the historical practice of conscious human self determination.

Notes

1. Bull, The Anarchical Society, p.14. As the argument here suggests, the distinction between system and society is a formal, rather than a strictly historical one. Thus Bull acknowledges that every international civilisation presupposes some degree of sociability. However, this is not always sufficient to enable the establishment of those more intensive practices binding states in a substantial social system. I have introduced the notion of relative degrees of international sociability in the following argument as a clearer way of expressing Bull's point.

2. Ibid., pp 14-15. For an extended account of these social institutions operating among the Greek city states see M. Wight, Systems of States, Ch.2.

3. The scope of the present thesis does not allow an analysis of earlier historical phases in this historical process associated with the evolution of forms of sociability in earlier western civilisations. For some historical works which offer general overviews of the historical periods which come within the dimensions of the broader historical process alluded to here see A. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History, Princeton, 1960, M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Vol.1, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 1986, and F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, (2nd edn.), Cambridge, United Kingdom, 1986.

4. Apart from the explanations of this general process examined in the preceding theoretical perspectives there is a wide literature dealing with the different influences explaining the early formation of western international society. On the transition from the feudal to the European capitalist mode of production see F. Braudel, Civilization And Capitalism 15th-18th Century: Vol III The Perspective of the World, (Transl. S. Reynolds), London, 1984. On the more specific aspect of the formation of the Absolutist society of states see P. Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, London, 1974; C. Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton, 1975; O. Hintze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, (ed. F. Gilbert), New York, 1975, and F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, Ch.5.

5. On the question of whether or not these medieval political communities can actually be described as sovereign in any real sense see G. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity", Neo-Realism And Its Critics, p143. For some different views on the specific date of the emergence of modern western international society see Wight, Systems of States, Ch.1, and Morse, Modernisation And The Transformation Of International Relations, Ch.2

6. On the importance of the revival of Roman law in this early process of hegemonic bloc formation see P. Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, Ch.1. For some specific case studies see O. Ranum

(ed.), National Consciousness, History and Political Culture in Early-Modern Europe, Baltimore, 1975. Cox identifies the central impetus to such early hegemonic block formation in the attempts to control the peasant unrest of the fourteenth century. Mann, in contrast, identifies the catalyst for this process in the internecine wars between feudal lords which engendered processes of early taxation and the formation of bureaucratic state structures. See Cox, Production, Power and World Order Ch.5. and Mann, The Sources of Social Power Vol.1, Ch.13.

7. Anderson, Op. Cit., p.38. In this connection see the account of the historical origins of these institutional forms of European international society in the earlier practices of the Italian city-states presented in G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy Middlesex, 1955

8. For some accounts of the specific effects of this historical evolution of the form of international sociability between states in engendering new international norms for the regulation of military practice see Bull, The Anarchical Society, Part 2, and Janice Thomson, "State Practices, International Norms and the Decline of Mercenarism", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, no. 1, March, 1990

9. On this central dimension of the mediatory role of the political fragment in the reproduction of the sovereign state see Tilly (ed), The Formation of National States In Western Europe, and M. Mann, The Sources Of Social Power, Vol.1, Ch.13.

10. The tentative nature of this historical outline must be stressed here. A more substantial and comprehensive treatment of this historical development would require a separate work. For some alternative texts which present general historical overviews of the broad historical period sketched here from an uneven development perspective see Mckay and Scott, The Rise Of The Great Powers, George Modelski, "Dependency Reversal in the Modern States-System: A Long Cycle Perspective", in C.F. Doran (et al.) (eds.), North/South Perspectives: Studies of Dependency Reversal, New York, 1983, Ch.2, and P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of The Great Powers.

11. McKay & Scott, Op. Cit. pp 210-11.

12. E. Morse, Modernisation and the Transformation of International Relations, New York, 1976, p.211.

13. Ibid., p.29.

14. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, p.200.

15. G. Brunn, Europe and the French Imperium, 1799-1814, New York, 1975, p.351

16. Noting the effects of the Levee en masse on French military power Mckay and Scott observe that the "immense numerical superiority and

... patriotism [of the French Revolutionary armies] carried almost all before them. The new found ardour was reflected in the more aggressive mobile tactics which could be employed. Total victory was the object, ferocity part of the means to achieve it." The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p287.

17. On the nature and development of the mechanisms of the Concert of Europe forming the basis of this new legitimate international order see Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, and R. Albrecht-Carrie, The Concert Of Europe, 1815-1914, New York, 1968.

18. For an analysis of the tensions existing between the aims of those conservative and more liberal members of the Concert see Hinsley, Power and The Pursuit of Peace, Ch. 10 and C. Holdbraad, The Concert of Europe: An Essay in German and British Philosophy, New York, 1971.

19 For an account of the diffusion of these dual influences and their destabilising effects upon the structure of legitimate order operating within Europe after 1815 see E.J. Hobsbawn, The Age Of Revolution, 1789-1848, London, 1962.

20. Of course such national unification assumed the form of unification from the top down, rather than, as popular nationalist ideology envisaged, from the bottom up. For the deleterious effects of this elitist form of national unification on the political development of Germany in particular, see G. Lichtheim, Europe In The Twentieth Century, London, 1974.

21. R. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders", p142

22. Apart from the account of this process by Bull and Watson presented in Ch.4, see the analysis in R. Emerson, From Empire To Nation.

23. See S. Van Evera, "The Cult of the offensive and the Origins of World War One", International Security, Vol. 9, No 1, 1984, pp.58-107. For a detailed account of the uneven development of power between European states in this period engendering the new phase of offensive activity see Kennedy, The Rise And Fall Of The Great Powers, Ch. 5.

24. Barraclough traces the origins of such hegemonic aspirations to the concerns of later nineteenth century German military strategists to establish Germany as one of an emerging concert of world powers. See G. Barraclough, An Introduction To Contemporary History, ch.4.

25. The relationship between the different historical factors leading to the breakdown of the interwar structure of peace is highly complex and cannot be treated in detail here. For a valuable account of this period as the struggle between those satisfied states and those alternative, revisionist states disatisfied with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles see E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939, London, 1984. On the historical origins and nature of the new German, National Socialist hegemonic bloc and the expansionist

ideology informing it see G. Craig, Germany, 1866-1945, and J. Weiss, The Fascist Tradition: Radical Right-Wing Extremism In Modern Europe, New York, 1967.

26. R. Cox, "Social forces, States and World Orders", p.140.

27. For some works which stress the negative implications for the reproduction of international order arising from the entry of the new, non-western nations into international society due to their unstable internal political systems and revisionist attitudes to the exiting international order, see P. Lyons, "New States and International Order", A. James (ed.), The Bases of International Order, London, 1973, pp.24-59, and W.V. Obrien, (ed.), The New Nations in International Law and Diplomacy, London: Stevens & Sons, 1965. As noted further below, the Critical theory outlined here would be concerned to identify the prospects for the historical reconstruction of the legitimate hegemonic blocs within such states as an important precondition for the future realisation of the extended, solidary form of international sociability implicit in this new nationalist principle of international legitimacy.

28. Of course the reactions of post-colonial, non-European states to such western dominance have been complex and cannot be totally encompassed by the movement for a New International Economic Order. For an assessment of these different responses and, in particular, of the more extreme rejections of western cultural dominance see D.C. Gordon, Images of the West: Third World Perspectives, Savage, USA, 1989.

29. As the later work of Hedley Bull suggests, the successful historical transformation of the form of international sociability underpinning the contemporary international order would also require the practical transformation of the major inequities existing within third world states engendered by repressive indigenous political regimes in accordance with the acknowledgement of the higher form of sociability implicit in the extended nationalist principle of sovereign recognition.

30. Such changes are most clearly reflected in the revival of the economies of Japan and western European states and the recent emergence of new mercantilist tendencies amongst the more equal economic powers of the United States, Japan and West Germany. As well as Cox's account of this process outlined in chapter six see A. Buchan, The End of The Postwar Era, London, 1974, R. Gilpin, The Political Economy Of International Relations and M. Davis, "From Fordism to Reaganism: The Crisis of American hegemony in the 1980s, R. Bush et. al. (eds.), The World Order: Socialist Perspectives, Cambridge, Eng., 1987

31. For some differing interpretations of the implications of this recent change in superpower relations for future world order see the essays in M. Kaldor, (et al.) (eds.), The New Detente: Rethinking East-West Relations, London, 1989, and Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History", The National Interest, no.16 Summer, 1989,

pp.3-18. On the principles underlying the 'New Thinking' associated with Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev and its emphasis upon the need to address the common interests of humankind transcending states' ideological differences see M. Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking For Our Country and the World, New York, 1987, Ch. 3.

32. It is important to stress here the complex nature of the current changes in superpower relations and the uncertain implications they involve for the future reproduction of international order. It may well be the case that the integrative potentials opened up by the latter will be overwhelmed by the tensions and conflicts associated with the contemporary processes of international transformation. Such tensions are reflected in the revival of nationalist sentiment in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and in the instabilities associated with the reduced influence of the superpowers over antagonistic states in the Middle East.

33. The implications of the recent transformation of postwar international relations noted here arguably raise the need to extend the scope of this Critical theory to examine the possibilities for the extension of this higher, solidary form of international sociability on a truly global dimension rather than merely within the contemporary western society of states which has been our primary concern.

34. For some recent accounts of the complex relationship between these problems, the potential instabilities to which they may give rise within contemporary international society and the need for extended forms of societal cooperation to manage them see J. Mcneill, "The Greening of International Relations", International Journal, Vol. No.1, 1989-90, pp.1-35, S. George, A Fate Worse Than Debt, New York, 1988, and R.A. Falk, This Endangered Planet, Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival, New York, 1972.

35. On the problems posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons within the postwar society of states see H. Bull, The Control of the Arms Race, London, 1961.

36. For some accounts of the potential social forces engendered by these current processes of international change and the possibilities they offer for the advancement of this emancipatory interest see, for example R.B.J. Walker, One World/Many Worlds and Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, Ch.11.

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