

**Titles in The Formation and Development of Academic Disciplines in
Twentieth-Century China Series**

*Learning to Emulate the Wise: The Genesis of Chinese Philosophy as an
Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China*

Edited by John Makeham

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Learning to Emulate the Wise:

The Genesis of Chinese Philosophy as an
Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China

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The Chinese University Press

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No matter whether in ancient times or modern, nor East or West, when the culture of a people reaches a certain level, then without exception the culture of that people will have a type of philosophy.

—Wang Guowei (1906)

Every philosophical system has its special spirit, its unique appearance; each age, each people, has its philosophy.

—Feng Youlan (1931)

Any cultural system has its own philosophy, otherwise it does not constitute a cultural system. Accordingly, if one acknowledges China's cultural system, then one naturally acknowledges Chinese philosophy.

—Mou Zongsan (1963)

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—JM

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About the Series

The Formation and Development of Academic Disciplines in Twentieth-Century China

John Makeham, Series Editor

The series is the principal outcome of three annual workshops held in Canberra, Beijing and Hong Kong between 2007 and 2009 on the topic of “the Formation and Development of Academic Disciplines in Twentieth-Century China.” Our aim in these workshops was to construct a historically informed multidisciplinary framework to examine the complex processes by which traditional Chinese knowledge systems and indigenous grammars of knowledge construction interacted with Western paradigms to shape the formation and development of modern academic disciplines in China. The modern disciplines were formed as intellectuals sought new roles for themselves in the context of dramatic political change. New institutions—above all academic (schools, universities) and media (newspapers, book publishing)—provided the social basis for much work on specialized disciplines from the late Qing through the Republican period. The mutual interaction of traditional Chinese and modern Western knowledge paradigms and institutional practices shaped the formation and development of modern academic disciplines in China.

Modern scholarship remains largely silent about how different domains of traditional knowledge practice responded to common challenges and the consequences of this for subsequent disciplinary developments. To what extent were new knowledge systems viewed as tools in the recovery of tradition rather than its abandonment? What were the thematics, conversations, controversies, and dominant modes of argument across these domains as they responded to the new challenges? To what extent and under what conditions did practitioners of traditional forms of learning concede authority to Western knowledge paradigms?

Specifically, we have sought to understand and analyze how traditional forms of Chinese scholarship were adapted to new knowledge paradigms; to identify the role played by indigenous “grammars” (inherited problematics and standards of rational justification) in shaping the formation of academic disciplines, and the concrete forms in which these grammars interacted with Western paradigms and concepts; to demonstrate how indigenous grammars of knowledge construction, and their ongoing complex interaction with Western paradigms, decisively influenced the formation and development of individual academic disciplines; and to examine the significance of the growing trend toward the indigenization (*bentuhua*) of knowledge systems and how it relates to broader contemporary concerns about the indigenization of knowledge in many social science and humanities disciplines.

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Chapter 5

Hu Shi and the Search for System

John Makeham

Where can we find a congenial stock with which we may organically link the thought-systems of Modern Europe and America, so that we may further build up our own science and philosophy on the new foundation of an internal assimilation of the old and the new?

—Hu Shi (1922)¹

This chapter argues that intellectual historian Hu Shi 胡適 (1891–1962) presented pre-Qin masters (zi 子) writings as the foundational texts of Chinese philosophy in his *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China* and *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang* [An outline of the history of Chinese philosophy]. I show how Hu creatively appropriated John Dewey's concept of "genetic method" and used it to give a central place to "logic" in the historical development of Chinese philosophy. By placing philosophers and schools of thought in an historical narrative, Hu sought to use "historical method" to reveal the unfolding course of this inner logic over time: the system of Chinese philosophy. I identify the connection between Hu's own "logical method" and Dewey's genetic method and Wilhelm Windelband's views on the goals of writing a history of philosophy; and draw attention to the role that the "history of Chinese philosophy" genre played in articulating Hu's vision of Chinese philosophy, and twentieth-century notions of "Chinese philosophy" more generally.

In chapters 2 and 3 I argued that over the course of the first decade of the twentieth century, the confluence of three factors—the revival of interest in Masters Studies (諸子學), the impact of Meiji scholarship on the evaluation of Chinese philosophy, and the re-introduction of Yogācāra philosophy in China—contributed to logic's (論理學, 名學, 名辯學) being

regarded as a necessary precondition for the existence of “Chinese philosophy.”² Intriguingly, regardless of whether scholars at the time (Chinese and Japanese) acknowledged or denied the existence of China’s own early traditions of logic, the ensuing discourse played a vital role in shaping the nascent form of Chinese philosophy as an academic discipline. It is little wonder Hu Shi’s watershed 1919 publication *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang* 中國哲學史大綱 [An outline of the history of Chinese philosophy]—based on his 1917 Columbia University PhD dissertation, *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China*—devoted large sections to topics such as Confucius’ rectification of names, Mohist disputation, Hui Shi, and Gongsun Long, as well as Xunzi’s theories about names, *mingxue* 名學 (or logic as Hu regarded it).³

Hu Shi’s intellectual development was, of course, profoundly influenced by his dissertation supervisor and teacher, pragmatist philosopher John Dewey (1859–1952), on the matter of logic. He relates, for example, that when he took Dewey’s class on “Schools of Logic,” “it inspired me to decide upon ‘The Evolutionary History of Chinese Philosophical Method’ as my dissertation topic.” Moreover, even before taking Dewey’s class, “I had already read his writings, one of which was called ‘The Various Stages of Logical Thought.’ ... In the essay Dewey maintained that the process of thinking for both humankind and individuals has to proceed through four stages.” The second stage “has to be founded upon a fondness for disputation and the practice of open discussion, and then this will lead to thinking consistent with logic. This point greatly stimulated my interest because in Chinese we refer to logical thinking as *bian* 辯 (disputation).”⁴ The young Hu Shi also had a special fondness for the pre-Qin masters because “it seems as if the future of Chinese philosophy will depend greatly on the revival of those early philosophical schools.... The sort of soil suited to the transplantation of the most outstanding results from Western philosophy and science can be found among these schools.”⁵

Particularly noteworthy is that Hu also specifically praised Zhang Binglin 章炳麟 (Taiyan 太炎) (1869–1936) for his contributions to the revival of Masters Studies:

In modern times, scholars such as Sun Yirang 孫詒讓 (1848–1908) and Zhang Binglin poured all of their energies into developing Masters Studies. Hence, nowadays, Masters Studies—which formerly was an appendage to classical studies—has actually become a specialist field of learning.... Only with Zhang Taiyan did Masters Studies develop in a systematic fashion, quite independent of the Masters Studies used merely for textual collation

and the glossing of old terms and phrases [in Qing evidential and textual scholarship].⁶

Clearly, Hu had been inspired by Zhang in regard to Masters Studies. One obvious example is that just as Zhang Taiyan did not use the term *mingjia* to refer to the School of Names represented by Gongsun Long and Hui Shi, but used it more generally to refer to works on logic such as *Mozi* and *Xunzi*, Hu Shi made the following comments in his 1918 essay “Hui Shi, Gongsun Long de zhexue” 惠施、公孫龍的哲學 [The philosophy of Hui Shi and Gongsun Long]:

In ancient times there never was a School of Names (名家). Irrespective of to which school of philosophy one might refer, they all had a basic scholarly method. This method is the “science of names” (*mingxue* 名學 [luoji 邏輯] [JM: this is Hu’s own gloss]) of that particular school.... Because each school had a science of names (名學), there was no “School of Names.” Nevertheless, research on the science of names produced by the later Mohists was a little more profound than that produced by other schools, that is all.⁷

It follows that Hu would similarly have been well aware of the new field of early Chinese logic that had been opened up by Zhang and other late-Qing scholars. The major innovation taken by Hu was to draw upon this newfound interest in logic and its connection with Masters Studies as the basis for writing a history of Chinese philosophy.

1. Histories of Chinese Philosophy before Hu Shi

For much of the twentieth century the writing of histories of Chinese philosophy and the ongoing elaboration, refinement, and re-telling of those histories were instrumental in defining and sustaining the development of the discipline of Chinese philosophy. Crucially, particular aspects of traditional thought and scholarship became identified as exemplifying Chinese philosophy. There was a precedent for this in nineteenth-century Germany, where, it has been argued, “the history of philosophy was indeed part of philosophy—philosophy understood as an academic discipline.... To know the history of philosophy in detail was seen as a prerequisite for philosophizing. This was a widespread belief in the 19th century.”⁸ The significance of this is suggestive, given Hu’s debt to German philosopher Wilhelm Windelband’s (1848–1915) *A History of Philosophy with Especial Reference to the Formation and Development of its Problems and Conceptions* (discussed below).

Hu Shi made a seminal contribution to the writing of histories of Chinese philosophy in China. He was not, however, the first scholar to do so. As already noted, quite a few histories of Chinese philosophy written by Japanese scholars at the turn of the nineteenth century provided models for Chinese scholars. In addition, two Chinese scholars had already produced the first Chinese histories of Chinese philosophy: Xie Wuliang's 謝無量 (1884–1964) *Zhongguo zhhexueshi* 中國哲學史 [History of Chinese philosophy]; and Chen Fuchen's 陳黻宸 (1859–1917) *Zhuzi zhexue* 諸子哲學 [Philosophy of the [pre-Qin] Masters] (1914, manuscript) and *Zhongguo zhhexueshi* 中國哲學史 [History of Chinese philosophy] (1916, manuscript).

Xie Wuliang, who had studied in Japan in 1903 and 1904, was working as an editor with the publishing house Zhonghua shuju 中華書局 when he published *Zhongguo zhhexueshi*, the first general history of Chinese philosophy written by a Chinese scholar in 1916. In the preface, Xie acknowledged the achievements earlier scholars had made to the genre of the history of Chinese philosophy: "When it comes to writing a book describing the origin and development of a single school of thought (學派), none is more precise than Zhu Xi's *Yi-Luo yuanyuan lu* 伊洛淵源錄 [Records of the Yi-Luo school]. When it comes to writing a book that draws together the schools of thought in a single dynasty, none is more detailed than Huang Zongxi's 黃宗羲 (1610–1695) *Song-Yuan ru xue'an* 宋元儒學案 [Case studies of Song and Yuan *ru*] and *Ming ru xue'an* 明儒學案 [Case studies of Ming *ru*]. The stylistic layout of each is also close to what today we call histories of philosophy."

Unlike these compilations, however, Xie set himself the goal of writing the first general history (that is, one not restricted to a single dynasty or a single period such as the pre-Qin period or the Han period) of Chinese philosophy, spanning individual thinkers and schools from Confucius until the Qing dynasty.⁹ The next such general history, Zhong Tai's 鍾泰 (1888–1979) *Zhongguo zhhexueshi* 中國哲學史, was not published until 1929. (Hu Shi's *Zhongguo zhhexueshi* is not a general history, despite the title.) Japanese scholars had already produced a number of general histories of Chinese philosophy. Their model for the writing of general histories was provided by nineteenth-century publications by German scholars such as Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann (1761–1819), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), Heinrich Ritter (1791–1869), Albert Schweigler (1819–1857), Albert Stöckl (1823–1895), and Wilhelm Windelband, among others. Xie also included a discussion of the genesis of

Chinese philosophy in the high antiquity of the sage kings and cultural heroes. In these respects the book resembles some of the Japanese histories of Chinese philosophy already published, as does the periodization scheme adopted as the broad framework: Ancient (上古), Medieval (中古), and Early Modern (近世). From the 1880s Meiji historians had begun to write national histories for both China and Japan, many of which were translated and adopted for use in China as textbooks. In this process the model of the general history came to displace that of the dynastic history.¹⁰ Zhang Taiyan's early views (1900) on revising the way national histories were compiled rejected the dynastic approach in favor of a four-part periodization: Age of Uncultivated Simplicity (樸略時代), Age of Humanism (人文時代), Age of Full Development (發達時代), and Age of Decline (衰微時代). Similarly in his 1901 "Zhongguoshi xulun" 中國史敍論 [Prolegomena to a history of China], Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929) adopted a tripartite division: Age of Antiquity (上世), Medieval Age (中世), and Modern Age (近世).¹¹ Hu Shi's *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang* also subscribed to a tripartite periodization for the history of Chinese philosophy: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern. The ancient period extended from the time of Laozi to that of Han Fei. He also referred to this period as the Age of Masters' Philosophy.¹²

Xie outlined the task of writing a history of philosophy as follows: "to describe the broad trend of changes in philosophy since its beginning; to discuss individuals in the context of their times; to select key doctrines; to examine differences and similarities in thought; and to adopt the genre of historical biography." This approach combines the narrative form of intellectual history, historical biography, and analysis of concepts. Although Xie stated that he selected the key doctrines of the individuals and schools included in the volume and described those doctrines using the methods of classification employed in modern philosophy—metaphysics, epistemology and ethics—his lack of familiarity with Western philosophy quite possibly contributed to the book's failure to generate much interest among his contemporaries. This lack of familiarity with the content and scope of Western philosophy is evident in the following comments: "In ancient times, it was *daoshu* 道術 (methods of the way) that always constituted the learning of men of education and the gentleman. [So long as] one was up to the task of learning, then the way would be found therein. When ancient officials lost [responsibility for learning], then learning became scattered [amongst the people] and came to be called *ruxue*, *daoxue* and *lixue*. The Buddhists call it *yixue* 義學; in

the West it is called *zhexue*. The actual referent in each case is the same.”¹³

Chen Fuchen was appointed professor of history at Peking University in 1913, and in the following year he started teaching a course called “Masters Philosophy” (*zhuzi zhexue* 諸子哲學). In 1915 he began offering “The History of Chinese Philosophy” (*Zhongguo zhexueshi* 中國哲學史). (As continued to be the practice, students in the Division of Letters could take a range of courses offered by other departments.) Lecture notes based on each course are preserved in Chen’s collected writings. The course on Masters Philosophy is significant because it confirms that the writings of the pre-Qin masters were classed as philosophy at Peking University no later than 1913, two years after the establishment of the University and one year before the establishment of the Philosophy Department (*Zhexue men* 哲學門). In fact, Masters Studies courses had been taught at the Imperial University (*Jingshi daxuetang* 京師大學堂), the forerunner of Peking University, since at least 1902. According to a publication compiled by students who graduated from the Philosophy Department of Peking University in 1925, courses “related to philosophy” were taught in the teacher’s college part of the university (the forerunner of Peking Normal University): ethics, education, psychology, interpersonal morals, biology, and Zhou-Qin masters.¹⁴

The first point to note about Chen’s *Zhongguo zhexueshi* is that its coverage barely steps out of the prehistoric era: it starts with cultural hero Fuxi 伏羲 and finishes with the legendary Jiang Taigong 姜太公.¹⁵ The second point is that Chen clearly privileged *ru* teachings over Masters texts. In the preface, after having also commented on the importance of *daoshu* in early Chinese philosophy, he concluded: “The methods of the *ru* provide the ultimate model. When Zhuangzi discussed the learning of the eleven lineages beginning with Mo Di and Qin Huali, he did not list Confucius and Mencius. This is because the *daoshu* proceeded from the *rujia*.”¹⁶ After he died in 1916, the History of Chinese Philosophy course at Peking University was taken over by historian Chen Hanzhang 陳漢章 (1863–1938), and then by intellectual historian Ma Xulun 馬敘倫 (1885–1970). When Hu Shi took up his position in the Philosophy Department in 1917, he joined Chen and Ma in teaching the course.¹⁷

2. *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang*

In the preface to Hu’s *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang*, President of Peking

University Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 (1868–1940) identified four distinguishing features of the book:

1. It gave extensive attention to verifying authorship and textual authenticity.
2. It began the history of early Chinese philosophical thought with Laozi and Confucius rather than with the sage kings of antiquity.
3. It placed the various masters on an equal footing rather than giving preferential treatment to one group or sub-group.
4. It provided systematic accounts of the schools and their development over an extended period.¹⁸

According to intellectual historian Yu Yingshi 余英時: “In regard to these four points, of course Hu had been influenced by Western history of philosophy, but at the same time [Hu’s approach] was compatible with the inner development (內在發展) of evidential learning. If there are only external influences and no internal basis [for a change in intellectual orientation or paradigm], then it can only be called a ‘conquest’ and not a ‘revolution.’”¹⁹ Yu proceeds to draw particular attention to the second and third points, identifying them as bearing the hallmarks of a truly revolutionary approach to historiography. He identifies them as the inevitable products of the unfolding of the “inner logic” and “inner development” of Qing-dynasty evidential learning.²⁰

Hu’s own recollection suggests a more complex situation:

Dewey’s analysis of systematic thought helped me to understand the basic steps of ordinary scientific research. He also helped me [to understand] Chinese classical learning (古典學術) of the past several thousand years—in particular of the past three hundred years—as well as the methods of Chinese historians, such as *kaojuxue* 考據學 and *kaozhengxue* 考證學. In English, I translate these traditional methods of research as “evidential investigation” (the investigation of evidence), that is, evidence-based investigation. Something should not be believed if it lacks verification. At that time very few people (indeed, no-one) had thought of the methodological points in common shared by modern scientific methods and China’s ancient evidential investigation. I was the first person to talk about this. I was able to do this because of what I had learned from the theory in the relevant parts of Dewey’s thought.²¹

This does not, of course, mean that Hu was not influenced by developments closer to home, particularly the revival of Masters Studies.²² As with his predecessors in China, Hu also identified logic as a distinguishing feature of classical Chinese philosophy, arguing that Chinese

philosophy had developed various logical methods that had been overlooked. He also emphasized the role of ordered structure and system. Thus in the preface to his 1917 dissertation, *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China* (Chinese translation 1919), he wrote: "The most important ... task in a work of this kind is, of course, the interpretation and construction or re-construction of the philosophical systems."²³ As discussed in chapter 2 of this volume, this dual emphasis on logic and on providing ordered, systematic accounts of thought and schools of thought had its origins in Japanese scholarship of the late Meiji period.

3. Genetic Method

The model for Hu's system came via Dewey's pragmatism, which Hu regarded as a method and not a theory, the spirit of which was "experimentalism" (實驗主義). According to Hu, experimentalism consists of two methods: the laboratory method and the genetic method. The laboratory method eschews certainties and absolute truths and is characterized by the ongoing replacement of old hypotheses with new ones. The genetic method studies how and why something came about, in order to understand what it is. I believe that Hu's "revolutionary" contribution actually lies in his idiosyncratic interpretation of Dewey's "genetic method" (or as applied to history, "historical method"). Dewey had credited Darwin's theory of the origin of the species as freeing-up a new logic—one no longer constrained by a teleology or by immutable or absolute truths—that could be applied to morality and values. In particular, he understood this "new logic" to refer to "process" and "enabling conditions" *rather than cause and effect*. He referred to this new logic as the "genetic method": "The genetic method, whether used in experimental or historical science, does not 'derive' or 'deduce' a consequent from an antecedent, in the sense of resolving it or dissolving it, into what has gone before.... The antecedent is of worth because it defines one term of the process of becoming; the consequent because it defines the other term. Both are strictly subordinated to the process to which they gave terms, limits."²⁴

Hu Shi maintained that "the consequence of applying the evolutionary perspective to philosophy is the production of a type of 'historical method.'" He glossed historical method as *zusun de fangfa* 祖孫的方法 (the method of grandfather-grandson; presumably a rendering of Dewey's "genetic method"), stating that "Dewey never regarded an institution or a

doctrine as something autonomous; he always regarded it as a segment, one end of which is its enabling cause and the other end of which is the effect that it brought about. At one end is its grandfather; at the other end is its grandson. Once both ends have been grasped, then it will never run away again!"²⁵ The opening sentence of the first substantive paragraph in Hu's *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang* states:

Generally, a particular theory does not just fall out of the sky. If we are able to study it carefully, we will certainly be able to find that the theory has had many antecedent causes and many subsequent effects. For example, in an essay, the theory is simply one part of the essay. That part certainly does not arise and depart without leaving traces. For sure there will be a relationship of receiving and opening up, of inheriting what has preceded and ushering in what is to follow. If the causes of the theory are not understood, then its true import cannot be understood. If the effects of the theory are not understood, then its place in history cannot be understood.²⁶

Later he stated: "I have always sought to find the cause and effect of every single thing and institution rather than regard them as autonomous things lacking any trace of where they have come from or where they go to. This attitude is the historical attitude.... The historical attitude is an important element in pragmatism."²⁷

Whereas for Dewey, the genetic or historical method was concerned with identifying "process" and the conditions/circumstances under which something comes into existence, Hu's (mis-)understanding of Dewey's notion of genetic method²⁸ led him to conceive of historical change as involving isolatable chains of causes and effects. The following remarks are from Hu's 1919 clarion call to "re-organize the national heritage" (整理國故):

In regard to old learning and thought, I have only one positive proposal and that is to "reorganize the nation's past." Re-organizing consists of finding an ordered sequence within disarray; of finding causes and effects within complete disorder; of finding real meanings within rubbish and nonsense; of finding true values within arbitrariness and superstition.... Therefore, the first step is to organize a logical sequence. Because very few of the former scholars who studied the ancient books had held the outlook of historical evolution [the genetic theory of history], they were not particular about origins and learning and the causal relations of thought. Therefore, the second step is to find out how all learning and thought arose, and after arising, what influences and results it had.²⁹

In other words, Hu Shi assumed not only that history is a matter of evolutionary progression, or historical development, but also that there is a logical sequence, a causal relationship, between one historical event and another. Importantly, he applied this thinking to his understanding of the history (and internal dynamics) of Chinese philosophy, distinguishing two threads (*xiansuo* 線索): external (外的) and internal (內的). "External threads" refers to social, political and other contextual factors; "internal threads" refers to "a kind of method, a philosophical method, the foreign name of which is logic." He maintained that "logic" here refers to something broader in compass than *mingxue* 名學 or *lunlixue* 論理學. "External threads simply undergo change, whereas no matter how many changes an internal thread experiences, it can never move from a definite path [of development]." ³⁰ Elsewhere he explains: "The particular perspective adopted in this book seeks to grasp the logical method (名學方法) (logical method [邏輯方法], that is, the method of thought) of each philosopher or each school of thought. I take this to be the central topic of the history of philosophy."³¹

What was this fixed path of development, this inner logic, which Hu identified with the application of his logical method to Chinese philosophy? His most succinct account is provided in his 1921 essay on the topic of the "threads" in Chinese philosophy where he presents Laozi and Confucius as marking the beginnings of Chinese philosophy. Whereas Laozi was strongly opposed to all forms of social institutions, Confucius maintained that social institutions could and should be improved. "After Chinese philosophy experienced the appearance of these two systems (系統), its inner thread (內在)—its method—continued to change but not move beyond [the parameters delineated by] these two types."³² Hu does not deny that context also has a bearing on this inner thread, but this inner thread has its own integrity:

Thought necessarily develops according to context: as context changes, so too must thought change. In all cases, if a particular method cannot adapt to new demands, then new methods will develop. Some of these methods will adjust to the various former methods in order to adapt to the new demands. If one is able to identify the changes in method, then one will be able to grasp the thread of thought. Thought "inherits what has gone before and opens up what is to come"—it has a definite thread and does not fluctuate erratically, in a completely undisciplined fashion.³³

Central to the inner thread of traditional Chinese philosophy is the concept of names (名), with one parameter being marked by Laozi's method of "no names" (無名), the other by Confucius' rectification of names (正名). The Mohists' attention to names and actualities (名實) occupied a position in between. Hu proceeded to apply his method to identify Ji Kang 嵇康 (223–262), Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (1139–1192), Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529), and Tan Sitong 譚嗣同 (1865–1898) as all inclining to the "no names" persuasion, and Mencius, Xunzi, and Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (179–104 B.C.) as inclining to the pro-names persuasion. "The internal thread consisted of these two great systems (系統).... The two schools of Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang controlled thought for over nine hundred years, and during this period there were seventy or eighty different interpretations of *ge wu* 格物. In reality, however, this was still in the orthodox tradition of the 'name and actuality' [internal thread of discourse. The two positions] differed only in a change of their direction: should *ge wu* be inwardly focused or outwardly focused?"³⁴ In other words, the thread of traditional Chinese philosophical thought was bound by the parameters of name and actuality discourse which was animated by a dialectical tension between philosophers who argued that names had a social role to play and those who disagreed.

The genetic method inspired Hu to trace Chinese philosophy to its origins, to find a "congenial stock" to match Chinese and Western thought systems. In *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China* he claims that the *ge wu* 格物 (reaching out to things; extending knowledge; rectification of thoughts) and *zhi liangzhi* 至良知 (extension of pure knowing; extension of innate knowledge of the good) methods of the *Great Learning* functioned as the de facto logical method for the past one thousand years and that as a consequence early material had been overlooked or misunderstood, resulting in "modern" (since the tenth century) Chinese philosophy's having become narrowly focused on issues surrounding conflicting interpretations of *ge wu* in the *Great Learning*: the approach associated with Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) concerning the steady and sequential accumulation of knowledge through the investigation of things versus the approach associated with Wang Yangming concerning the intuitive grasp of knowledge through inner reflection:

The new schools of the Sung and Ming rejuvenated the long-dead Confucianism by reading into it two logical methods that never belonged to it.... [viz.] the theory of investigating into the reason in everything

for the purpose of extending one's knowledge to the utmost, which is the method of the Sung School; and the theory of intuitive knowledge, which is the method of the School of Wang Yang-ming.... I believe that the revival of the non-Confucian schools is absolutely necessary because it is in these schools that we may hope to find the congenial soil in which to transplant the best products of occidental philosophy and science.... The emphasis on experience as against dogmatism and rationalism, the highly developed scientific method in all its phases of operation, and the historical or evolutionary view of truth and morality—these which I consider as the most important contributions of modern philosophy in the Western world—can all find their remote but highly developed precursors in those great non-Confucian schools of the fifth, fourth, and third centuries B.C.³⁵

Hu devoted particular attention to the period he refers to as the age of logic, featuring Confucius' rectification of names: "The problem of Confucianism ... was one of establishing an ideal world, a world of universals, of ideal relations, for the real world to imitate and approximate"; the *Book of Change* (in which he identifies the 64 hexagrams as early words/names and links them with Confucius' rectification of names); Mozi who emphasized actualities (實) and not just names; the Neo-Mohists (including Gongsun Long and Hui Shi) and inductive logic (something that did not develop in the West until Bacon) and paradoxes; Zhuangzi and Hui Shi: "Chuang-tzu's philosophy of evolution ... resulted in a fatalistic conception of progress and in a logical theory which denies all distinctions and thereby all reality of knowledge"; and Xunzi: "It was against this philosophy [of Zhuangzi] that Hsun Tze [Xunzi] seems to have directed his attack in his attempt to rescue philosophy from skepticism."³⁶

Thus rather than privileging a small, select group of masters or one or two schools (家) of thought as representative of early Chinese philosophy, Hu's "logical method" enabled him to incorporate a broad spectrum of pre-Qin masters as foundational in the early flourishing of Chinese philosophy. With Hu Shi, the transformation from masters to philosophers was complete. The key for Hu was being able to identify the "inner logic" revealed by the "logical method" of each philosopher or school of thought, central to which was the concept of *ming* 名 (names/terms). And by placing these philosophers and schools of thought in an historical narrative, the "historical method" (genetic method) was able to reveal the unfolding course of this inner logic over time: the system of

Chinese philosophy. That is why Hu made the task of writing a history of Chinese philosophy his most pressing goal.

No matter what we study we must set about by attending to its historical aspects. If we study philosophy or literature, we must first study the history of philosophy and the history of literature. Politics is the same. If we study social institutions, we must first study the history of changes in those institutions, looking for the relationship between cause and effect, for what is crucial in regards to what comes first and what comes after. It requires us to find system (系統) in literature, philosophy, and politics where there is no system.³⁷

The mantra of system and systematization also dominates a 1920 proposal to establish a National Studies Institute at Peking University. Although the author of the proposal is not attributed, Hu Shi seems a highly likely candidate. Having made the argument that the key rationale for putting traditional scholarship in order was to avoid the disdain of Westerners, who found China's traditional scholarship to be chaotic and disordered, the author writes:

Only after the various venerable gentlemen of the Qianlong [1736–1795] and Jiaqing [1796–1820] periods appeared did the old form of scholarship begin somewhat to gain order and system (條理系統).... These gentlemen were able to apply themselves to matters of nomenclature and glossing old terms, yet even so, a great many paths to normative principles remained overgrown and uncleared. Thus today if we want to expound and propagate our country's own scholarship, it is even more crucial that the paths to it be first put in order.... Putting this scholarship in order consists in using scientific method to analyze the doctrines of people in former times so that the boundaries separating them from one another are clearly distinguished, and their systems (系統) [of thought] are not compromised.³⁸

In his preface to Hu Shi's *Zhongguo zhexue dagang*, Cai Yuanpei identified two difficulties in preparing a history of ancient Chinese philosophy:

The first is the problem of materials. With books from the Zhou period, authentic and forged texts are mixed together. Even with authentic texts, incorrect or simplified characters are common. If it were not for the efforts of Qing "Han Learning," then the materials that we have would have many mistakes. The second is a problem of form (形式). Ancient Chinese scholarly works were never compiled as systematic records. If we want to compile them systematically, there is nothing we can rely on to do so in the writings of the

ancients, so we have to rely on the histories of philosophy by Westerners. Hence, without having studied the history of Western philosophy, an appropriate form cannot be constructed.³⁹

For Hu, system is not only an object of research but is also central to the methodology informing that research. In the Reading Guide (導言) prefacing *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang*, Hu outlines the steps involved in writing a reliable (可靠) history of Chinese philosophy. Having emphasized the fundamental importance of textual criticism and acknowledging the advances made in Qing-dynasty evidential scholarship, he explains that the historian's task is to interconnect (貫串) the philosophical doctrines and theories of individual schools such that those doctrines and theories become ordered and have system (有條理有系統). Only when this has been achieved can the following three sequential goals be achieved: clarifying change (明變), seeking causes (求因), and setting forth an evaluation (評判). Clarifying change is concerned with tracing the historical transmission of theories and the influences between schools, so as to identify the "thread of intellectual change" over time.⁴⁰ Seeking causes aims to uncover the causes leading to the rise, decline, and transformation of individual schools. Finally, in setting forth an evaluation, the aim is to make a judgement about the theories of a particular school on the basis of the outcomes and influences generated by its doctrines and theories.⁴¹

Hu's "historical method" was, however, not inspired solely by Dewey's "genetic method." The very first title listed in the bibliography of Hu's Reading Guide to *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang*—German philosopher Wilhelm Windelband's *A History of Philosophy with Especial Reference to the Formation and Development of its Problems and Conceptions*—provides an important clue to this. In the Introduction to his *History*, Windelband identified three tasks for the history of philosophy:

- (1) To establish with precision what may be derived from the available sources as to the circumstances in life, the mental development, and the doctrines of individual philosophers; (2) from these facts to reconstruct the genetic process in such a way that in the case of every philosopher we may understand how his doctrines depend in part upon those of his predecessors, in part upon the general ideas of his time, and in part upon his own nature and the course of his education; (3) from the consideration of the whole to estimate what value for the total result of the history of philosophy belongs to the theories thus established and explained as regards their origin.

Windelband further stipulated that "To establish its facts the history of philosophy must proceed to a careful and comprehensive examination of the sources."⁴² The similarities with Hu's approach are unmistakable.

4. Philosophy and Genre

Chinese scholars continued to write new histories of Chinese philosophy during the 1920s and 1930s.⁴³ Indeed, the writing of histories of "Chinese philosophy" and the continued elaboration and re-telling of those histories has sustained the discipline known as "*Zhongguo zhexue*." The modern Chinese concept of *zhexue* has been defined through an ongoing process of selective historical recovery and discovery in which various aspects of traditional scholarship have been identified as exemplifying Chinese philosophy. Now while this can often be seen as having led to the disciplinary conflation of Chinese philosophy and the history of Chinese philosophy, we should also bear in mind the important role that genre plays in philosophical discourse.

As an illustration, consider the impact of genre in Neo-Confucian philosophy. Hilde De Weerd has pointed out that the recorded conversation (語錄) genre enabled Neo-Confucian teachers in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries to draw together "passages and ideas from the entire classical corpus in order to explain Neo-Confucian concepts and beliefs," enabling themselves to become the locus of authority. This contrasts with the genre of the traditional interlinear commentary where "authority is primarily vested in the classical text as it is." When the recorded conversations genre reached its apogee in the thirteenth century with the publication of various versions of Zhu Xi's recorded conversations, this confronted Zhu's first- and second-generation disciples with two basic questions: "how to transmit Neo-Confucian philosophy after the passing of the core masters, and, how to preserve the personal voice and interaction that had become emblematic of Learning of the Way philosophizing." This situation led to the development of new genres of texts: lexicons of Neo-Confucian terms and the notebook. The exemplar of the lexicon, Chen Chun's 陳淳 (1159–1223) *Beixi ziyi* 北溪字義 [The correct meaning of terms], is characterized by an arrangement in which the entries were designed to be read "as connected elements in a coherent moral philosophy and as steps in a program of learning that joined understanding and moral action."⁴⁴

Zhen Dexiu's 真德秀 (1178–1235) *Xishan xiansheng Zhen Wenzhong gong dushuji* 西山先生真文忠公讀書記 [Reading notes], in which cases (*an* 案) were used to construct argument, may also have influenced the subsequent development of the case genre. In her introduction to a recent collection of studies of the case genre as developed in China, Charlotte Furth maintains that in the late Ming, when the Cheng-Zhu Learning of the Way (道學) tradition was splintering into factions “the very idea of a single doctrinal line of transmission from antiquity via the Song to the present Ming-era masters was increasingly hard to maintain.... The genre of the case (*an*, *xue'an*) encouraged a different way of doing philosophy. It accommodated debate among partisans who had to back their positions with evidence and who could rely on no transcendent or unquestioned authority of sagely transmission to fall back on.”⁴⁵

The subject of Hung-lam Chu's chapter in the same volume on case studies is the sub-genre of *xue'an* 學案—which Chu translates as “Confucian case learning.” Drawing upon the tradition of recording a master's words and deeds, late-Ming *xue'an* presented this material not as canon or history but as evidence, “and the body of the text on him called for the reader's evaluative judgment (verdict) of the case put together by the author-compiler.”⁴⁶ Focusing in particular on Huang Zongxi's *Ming ru xue'an* 明儒學案 [Case studies of Ming Ru], Chu argues that rather than promoting a particular notion of orthodoxy or a hierarchy of competing doctrines and schools, the aim of the work was to provide students with a set of dossiers on the many different modes of learning practiced by Ming *ru*, leaving it up to the student to contemplate these cases for their own edification and guidance just as the Chan Buddhist contemplated “public cases.” This may be so, but we should not underestimate the role that Huang (and his fellow compilers) had in determining who should be represented in the collection—as Chu himself notes, Li Zhi 李贄 (1527–1602) is conspicuously absent—and which selections from their writings should be included. Julia Ching, for example, argues in the introduction to her translation of *Ming ru xue'an* (1987), that Huang organized his work around two central figures—Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周 (1578–1645) and Wang Yangming—allowing Huang to advance his own views indirectly.⁴⁷

So too, the genre of the “the history of Chinese philosophy” was an innovation with its own philosophical import. In China, the mature exemplar of this genre is Feng Youlan's 馮友蘭 celebrated and hugely popular *Zhongguo zhhexueshi* 中國哲學史 [A History of Chinese Philosophy; 1934 (English translation, 1937)]. (Hu's *Zhongguo zhhexueshi dagang*

was only the first part of an anticipated general history which was never realized. It covers only the period of the masters.) Feng's *Zhongguo zhexueshi*, and its later iterations, decisively shaped subsequent understanding of Chinese philosophy. Like Hu, Feng wrote his histories of Chinese philosophy to introduce system where none was apparent. Writing at the very end of his life, Feng opined that the single most important contribution of Hu's *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang* was to have provided Chinese philosophy with a "formal system." "At that time, the method of conducting academic research on the history of Chinese philosophy followed that of Huang Zongxi's *Song-Yuan ru xue'an*. Because Chinese philosophy does not have a formal system, the first task of the historian of Chinese philosophy is to re-organize (整理) the actual system of the thought of individual philosophers."⁴⁸ Feng was also impressed with another "formal" aspect of Hu's presentation, one which, like the "history of Chinese philosophy" genre, greatly facilitated the locus of authority to shift to the narrator. Brian Moloughney provides the following account of Feng Youlan's reaction to the publication of Hu Shi's *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang*:

Whereas in the past writers had expressed their thoughts through commentaries on the classics, and it was those classical texts that featured prominently while the author's own words were presented in smaller characters, with Hu Shi's book his own words dominated: "They were printed in large characters going all the way up to the top of the page, while his quotations of ancient authors were indented and in smaller characters". In other words, this reversed what Feng Youlan believed to be the normal order of things.... [He saw] it as a significant departure from past practice.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, as with Hu, Feng did not believe that Chinese philosophy was in fact devoid of its own inherent system. To this end, he had long distinguished "formal" (形式) system and "real" (實質) system. Identifying this real system, however, requires a particular sort of perspicacity:

The fact is that Chinese philosophers were accustomed to express themselves in the form of aphorisms, apothegms, or allusions, and illustrations.... Aphorisms, allusions, and illustrations are thus not articulate enough. Their insufficiency in articulateness is compensated for, however, by their suggestiveness. Articulateness and suggestiveness are, of course, incompatible.... These sayings and writings of the Chinese philosophers are so inarticulate that their suggestiveness is almost boundless.... According

to Taoism, the Tao (the Way) cannot be told, but only suggested. So when words are used, it is the suggestiveness of the words, and not their fixed denotations or connotations, that reveals the Tao.⁵⁰

It was precisely their ability to articulate the suggestiveness of those sayings and writings in the systematic format of a “history” that allowed intellectual historians like Feng Youlan and Hu Shi to promote their particular visions of the “inner logic” of “Chinese philosophy.” And in doing so, they helped secure a fundamental role for the “history of Chinese philosophy” genre in prescribing “Chinese philosophy’s” lineaments and trajectories.

Notes

- 1 Hu Shih (Hu Shi), *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China*, second edition (1922; New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corporation, 1968), p. 7.
- 2 For the role played by the educational curriculum and school textbooks in securing for logic a place on China's intellectual map in the early years of the twentieth century, see Joachim Kurtz, *The Discovery of Chinese Logic: The Genealogy of an Invented Tradition* (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming), pre-copy-edited manuscript, chapter 5.
- 3 *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang* was completed in 1918 and published in 1919. Within two months it was republished. By 1922 it had been republished 8 times and by 1930, fifteen times.
- 4 Hu Shi, *Hu Shi koushu zizhuan* 胡適口述自傳 [Hu Shi's oral autobiography], in *Hu Shi wenji* 胡適文集 [Collected writings of Hu Shi], Vol. 1, edited by Ouyang Zhesheng 歐陽哲生 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1998), pp. 263, 264, 265.
- 5 Hu Shi, "Xian-Qin zhexueshi daolun" 先秦哲學史導論 [An introduction to Pre-Qin philosophy], in *Hu Shi quanji* 胡適全集 [Complete works of Hu Shi], Vol. 5 (Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 2003), p. 12.
- 6 Hu Shi, *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang*, in *Hu Shi xueshu wenji: Zhongguo zhexueshi* 胡適學術文集: 中國哲學史 [Collected essays of Hu Shi's scholarship: History of Chinese philosophy], edited by Jiang Yihua 姜義華, Vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1998), pp. 13, 27.
- 7 In *Hu Shi quanji*, Vol. 5, pp. 324, 325. This same view is repeated in *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang*, p. 130.
- 8 Ulrich Johannes Schneider, "Teaching the History of Philosophy in 19th-Century Germany," in *Teaching New Histories of Philosophy: Proceedings of a Conference*, edited by J. B. Schneewind, pp. 279, 283. Philosophy Documentation Center, <<http://www.pdcnet.org/tnhp.html>>, accessed 4 February 2009. Schneider further notes (p. 281): "The canon of subjects regularly taught within the discipline of philosophy would have been incomplete without lecture courses on the history of philosophy and seminar courses on individual philosophers or single philosophical texts. These two 'historical' courses taken together accounted for 10 percent of all of the philosophy courses of all 19 German universities at about 1810. At the end of the 19th century, they accounted for 50 percent of all courses."
- 9 Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光, "Daotong, xipu yu lishi: Guanyu Zhongguo sixiangshi mailuo de lai yuan yu queli" 道統·系譜與歷史—關於中國思想史脈絡的來源與確立 [Succession of the way, genealogy, and history: The origins and establishment of the thread of Chinese intellectual history], *Wenshizhe* 文史哲 294.2 (2006), p. 50 has commented on what he terms a "succession of the way" (道統) narrative model's informing the basic structure of Xie's *History*. First, Xie's account of the pre-Qin period adheres to the orthodox portrayal

of a Confucius-Zisi-Mencius lineage, in which Ziyong, Zixia 子夏, and Zizhang 子長 are effectively ignored. Second, his coverage of the Tang period focuses principally on Han Yu 韓愈 (768–824) and Li Ao 李翱 (722–841) as forerunners of Neo-Confucianism. Third, Xie's treatment of Song developments uncritically replicates traditional works such as Zhu Xi's *Yi-Luo yuanyuan lu* and Song-Yuan *Ru xue'an* in portraying Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–1073), Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1077), the two Chengs [Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107) and Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085)], Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), and Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (1139–1193) as the representative protagonists of Song philosophy.

- 10 See for example, Li Xiaoqian 李孝遷, "Qingji Zhinashi, Dongyangshi jiaokeshu jieyi chutan" 清季支那史・東洋史教科書介譯初探 [An initial exploration into the translation of history textbooks of China and Asia from Japan], *Shixue yuekan* 史學月刊 9 (2003), pp. 101–110.
- 11 See Liu Longxin 劉龍心, *Xueshu yu zhidu: Xueke tizhi yu xiandai Zhongguo shixue de jianli* 學術與制度—學科體制與現代中國史學的建立 [Scholarship and institutions: The disciplinary system and establishment of modern Chinese historiography] (Taipei: Yuanliu chubanshe, 2002), pp. 107, 108. She further notes that textbooks used in schools (學堂) of the day mostly adopted similar periodization schemes.
- 12 Hu Shi, *Zhongguo zhhexueshi dagang*, preface, p. 12.
- 13 Xie Wuliang, *Zhongguo zhhexueshi* (Taipei: Taiwan Zhonghua shuju, 1967), pp. 2, 1. In his *Zhuzixue lüeshuo* 諸子學略說 [A brief account of Masters Studies] (1906), Zhang Taiyan relates that each of the various pre-Qin schools had some insight into the whole that is the *dao*. In *Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji* 章太炎政論選集 [Selection of Zhang Taiyan's essays on politics], Vol. 1, edited by Tang Zhijun 湯治鈞 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977), pp. 285–306. This view had already been expressed in the writings of Zhang Xuecheng 章學誠 (1738–1801), where he said that the masters each grasped one aspect of the *daoti* which they then developed into their school's doctrine. See his *Wenshi tongyi jiaozhu* 文史通義校注 [Comprehensive studies in literature and history, collated and annotated] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), pp. 60, 166. The classic statement of this sentiment is in the "Tian xia" 天下 chapter of *Zhuangzi*. See Wang Shumin 王叔岷, *Zhuangzi jiaozhu* 莊子校注 [Collated and annotated edition of *Zhuangzi*], Vol. 3 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1988), p. 1298.
- 14 *Haitian ji* 海天集, edited by Yang Lian 楊廉 (Shanghai: Beixin shuju, 1926), p. 5. The same year, an Advanced College (高等學堂) was also established. It functioned as a preparatory college for entry into tertiary education. Among its courses were ethics, classical studies, Masters Studies, and logic (名學). See *Beijing daxue zhhexuexi shigao* 北京大學哲學系史稿 [Draft history of the Philosophy Department of Beijing University], edited by Yang Lihua 楊立華 (Beijing: Philosophy Department of Beijing University internal publication, 2004), p. 89.

- 15 Historian Gu Jiegang 顧頡剛 (1893–1980) recalled that when he was a student in Chen's class, Chen began the course with Fuxi and got no further than the "Hong Fan" 洪範 [Great Plan] chapter of *Shangshu*. See *Gushi bian* 古史辨 [Disputing ancient history], Vol. 1 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1982), preface, p. 36.
- 16 *Chen Fuchen ji* 陳馥宸集 [Collected writings of Chen Fuchen], edited by Chen Depu 陳德溥 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1995), p. 415.
- 17 *Beijing daxue zhexuexi shigao*, 5.
- 18 Cai Yuanpei, "Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang xu" 中國哲學史大綱序, in Hu Shi, *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang*, 2.
- 19 Yu Yingshi, *Chongxun Hu Shi licheng: Hu Shi shengping yu sixiang zai renshi* 重尋胡適歷程——胡適生平與思想再認識 [Retracing Hu Shi's path: Hu Shi's life and thought examined anew] (Taipei: Lianjing, 2004), p. 241.
- 20 The urge to provide Hu with a ready-made, native intellectual lineage is not new. In his 1918 preface (p. 1) to *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang*, Cai Yuanpei claimed: "Hu was born into the Hu clan of Jixi 績溪 which has been transmitting Han Learning for several generations, and so he is endowed with the genetic character of that tradition." These remarks, coming from the then President of Peking University and a leading scholar in his own right, no doubt enhanced the native scholarly credentials of the young returnee, but they are in fact incorrect. Curiously, at the time Hu did not point out that Cai's claim about his provenance was mistaken.
- 21 Hu Shi, "Hu Shi de zizhuan" 胡適的自傳 [Hu Shi's autobiography] in *Hu Shi zhexue sixiang ziliao xuan* 胡適哲學思想資料選 [Selected materials on Hu Shi's philosophical thought], edited by Ge Maochun 葛懋春 and Li Xingzhi 李興芝, Vol. 2 (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1981), p. 109.
- 22 See for example the comments in his preface to *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang*, pp. 13–14.
- 23 Hu Shih, *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China*, p. 2.
- 24 John Dewey, "The Evolutionary Method As Applied to Morality: 1. Its Scientific Necessity," *Philosophical Review* 11 (1902), pp. 115–116.
- 25 Hu Shi, "Duwei xiansheng yu Zhongguo" 杜威先生與中國 [Mr. Dewey and China] (1921), in *Hu Shi wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 280.
- 26 Hu Shi, *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang*, p. 30.
- 27 Hu Shi "Wenti yu zhuyi" 問題與主義 [Problems and ideology], in *Hu Shi wencun* 胡適文存 [Hu Shi's extant writings], *Minguo congshu, di yi bian* 民國叢書, 第一編 edition, Vol. 93 (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1989), juan 2, pp. 196–197.
- 28 In an insightful discussion of Hu Shi's appropriation of Dewey's genetic method—from which I have benefited—intellectual historian Nakajima Takahiro 中島隆博 points out that Dewey's use of the terms "antecedents" and "consequents" in the context of his "genetic method" is not as unequivocal as it might be, as the former concept can be construed as giving rise to the latter, hence implying a causal relationship. See Nakajima Takahiro,

- “Chūgoku tetsugakushi’ no keifugaku: John Dewey no hasseiteki hōhō to Ko Teki” ‘中国哲学史’の系譜学—ジョン・デューイの發生的方法と胡適 [The genealogy of “The History of Chinese Philosophy”: John Dewey’s genetic method and Hu Shi], *Chūgoku tetsugaku kenkyū* 中学哲学研究 19 (June 2003), p. 58. An English version of this essay, “Pragmatism and Modern Chinese Philosophy: The ‘Genetic Method’ of John Dewey and Hu Shi” is included in Nakajima’s *The Chinese Turn in Philosophy* (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy, 2007). The content of the English version is substantially different in places from that of the Japanese version.
- 29 Hu Shi, “Xin sichao de yiyi” 新思潮的意義 [The significance of the new intellectual tide], in *Hu Shi wencun*, juan 4, p. 162.
- 30 Hu Shi, “Zhongguo zhexue de xiansuo” 中國哲學的線索 [The thread of Chinese philosophy] (1921), in *Hu Shi xueshu wenji: Zhongguo zhexueshi*, Vol. 1, p. 522.
- 31 Hu Shi, preface to the Taipei edition of *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang* (renamed *Zhongguo gudai zhexueshi* 中國古代哲學史 [History of ancient Chinese philosophy]), *Hu Shi xueshu wenji: Zhongguo zhexueshi*, Vol. 1, p. 5.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 523.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p. 526.
- 34 *Ibid.*, pp. 524–525, 526.
- 35 Hu Shih, *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China*, pp. 7, 8, 9.
- 36 *Ibid.*, pp. 150–151.
- 37 Hu Shi, “Yanjiu guogu de fangfa” 研究國故的方法 [The method to research the national heritage], in *Hu Shi yanjiang lu* 胡適演講錄 [A record of Hu Shi’s speeches and lectures], Vol. 3 (Taipei: Yuanliu chuban gongsi, 1988), p. 13.
- 38 “Guoli Beijing daxue yanjiusuo zhengli guoxue jihuashu” 國立北京大學研究所整理國學計劃書 [Plan by the National Peking University Graduate Institute to re-organize national learning], in *Beijing daxue rikan* 北京大學日刊 [Peking university daily], 9 October 1920, pp. 2, 3.
- 39 Cai Yuanpei, *Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang*, preface, p. 1.
- 40 As Brian Moloughney and Peter Zarrow note:
 ... in the early 1920s Hu Shi initiated a program to “put in order the nation’s past” (*zhengli guogu* 整理國故), a proposal that was taken up with enthusiasm by many younger historians. This involved organising the vast body of historical material handed down from the past into logical sequences so that the causal relationships that led to the production of these materials were made evident.
- See their introductory essay, “Making History Modern: The Transformation of Chinese Historiography, 1895–1937,” in *Transforming History: The Making of a Modern Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China*, edited by Brian Moloughney and Peter Zarrow (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2011).
- 41 Hu Shi, *Zhongguo zhexue dagang*, pp. 10, 27–29.
- 42 Wilhelm Windelband, *A History of Philosophy with Especial Reference to the*

Formation and Development of its Problems and Conceptions, translated by James Hayden Tufts, second revised edition (New York: Macmillan, 1901), Introduction p. 15. It might be noted that James Hayden Tufts (1862–1942) had been a colleague of John Dewey at the University of Michigan in the 1880s and again at the University of Chicago in the 1890s; in 1908 they co-authored *Ethics*.

- 43 Lu Maode 陸懋德, *Zhou-Qin zhhexueshi* 周秦哲學史 [History of philosophy from the Zhou to Qin periods] (1923); Zhong Tai 鍾泰, *Zhongguo zhhexueshi* 中國哲學史 [History of Chinese philosophy] (1929); Feng Youlan 馮友蘭, *Zhongguo zhhexueshi* 中國哲學史 [A history of Chinese philosophy] (1934); Yao Shunqin 姚舜欽, *Qin-Han zhhexueshi* 秦漢哲學史 [History of philosophy during the Qin and Han periods] (1936); and Jiang Weiqiao 蔣維喬 and Yang Daying 楊大膺, eds., *Zhongguo zhhexueshi gangyao* 中國哲學史綱要 [Outline of the history of Chinese philosophy] (1934); and Fan Shoukang 范壽康, *Zhongguo zhhexueshi tonglun* 中國哲學史通論 [Comprehensive account of the history of Chinese philosophy] (1936).
- 44 Hilde De Weerd, "Neo-Confucian Philosophy and Genre: The Philosophical Writings of Chen Chun and Zhen Dexiu," in *Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy*, edited by John Makeham (New York: Springer, 2010), pp. 224, 226, 228–229.
- 45 Charlotte Furth, "Introduction" to *Thinking with Cases: Specialist Knowledge in Chinese Cultural History*, edited by Charlotte Furth, Judith Zeitlin, and Ping-chen Hsiung (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007), p. 16.
- 46 Chu Hung-lam, "Confucian 'Case Learning': The Genre of Xue'an Writings," in *Thinking with Cases*, pp. 255–256.
- 47 Julia Ching, "Introduction," in Huang Tsung-hsi (Huang Zongxi), *The Records of Ming Scholars*, translated by Julia Ching in collaboration with Zhao-ying Fang (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1987), p. 9.
- 48 Feng Youlan, *Zhongguo xiandai zhhexueshi* 中國現代哲學史 [A history of modern Chinese philosophy] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1999/1992), p. 4.
- 49 See his "Derivations, Intertextuality and Authority: Narrative and the Problem of Historical Coherence," *East Asian History* 23 (2002), p. 138.
- 50 Feng Youlan, *Zhongguo xiandai zhhexueshi*, p. 12.