

NATIONALISM AND REGIONALISM IN A COLONIAL CONTEXT

MINAHASA IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES

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A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
of the Australian National University


February 1992

Except where otherwise acknowledged, this thesis is my own
unaided work.

DEHenley

David E. F. Henley

To my parents



Nicolaas Graafland's nineteenth century school map of
Minahasa

(See page 110)

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Leiden

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the process of researching and writing this thesis I have accumulated very many debts, both personal and intellectual.

My supervisor in the Department of Human Geography was Harold Brookfield. He made the whole project possible, supported it through thick and thin, and supplied many important criticisms and suggestions along the way. Tony Reid, of the Department of Pacific and Southeast Asian History, and Jim Fox, of the Department of Anthropology, were also my supervisors and teachers. They gave most generously of their valuable time and expertise, and this thesis would not have been possible without them.

The same is true of Mieke Schouten, who was willing to share her great knowledge of Minahasan history and society with a newcomer to the field. Mieke's meticulous bibliographic work also saved me a great deal of thankless preparatory research. In Indonesia, I am grateful above all to Bert Supit, an acute commentator on his own culture, to his fellow Minahasa experts Frans Watuseke, Adri Lapien and Fendy Parengkuan, and to Leo and Stien Supit, who showed me Minahasa itself.

Numerous other people provided vital help and information at various stages. They include Jaap Erkelens, Radin Fernando, Jaap Gerungan, Harry Kawilarang, Campbell MacKnight, Eddy Mambu, Tina Mambu, Paula Manginsela, Eddy Masinambouw, George Miller, Jimmy Monintja, Emilia Pangalila-Ratulangie, Chris Penders, Anderias Rondo, Jim Sneddon, August Supit,

Frits and Emma Velberg, Samin Radjik Nur, Professor G.M.A. Ingkiwirang, and the late Paul Tiendas.

Chris and Sue Beebe repeatedly provided a welcome retreat from the stresses of Jakarta. In Holland, Ingrid Dillo, Menno and Jeanne Hekker, Sita van Bemmelen and Jan de Vries provided hospitality and excellent conversation. Willy Groot patiently taught me much of my Dutch. In Canberra, Ian and Ratna Chalmers and Peter Rimmer were a constant support, Twang Peck Yang and Jan Nibbering constant sources of arcane knowledge and intellectual stimulation. Greg Accaioli, Christine Boulan, Jane Drakard, Penny Graham, Christine Helliwell, Ruurtje Laarhoven, Alison Murray, Michael Reilly, Esther Velthoen, Michael Vischer and many others provided companionship and inspiration. Elizabeth Lawrence showed great good humour in putting up with the many nuisances which I caused. Mike and Jean Bourke were an enormous help in many ways, not least when it came to proof reading. In Brisbane, Bob Elson and Larry Crissman were also kind enough to help out with the preparation of the thesis. Back in Canberra, Nigel Duffey finalised the maps and Ria van de Zandt solved a last minute printing problem.

The study was financed mainly by an Australian National University PhD scholarship. The Indonesian Institute of Sciences supported my application for an Indonesian research visa. I am also indebted to the library staff of the Royal Institute for Linguistics and Anthropology in Leiden, and

the Menzies Library of the Australian National University,
for their expert assistance.

ABSTRACT

The "regional nationalisms" of early twentieth century Indonesia are often portrayed either as mere components of the Indonesian nationalist movement or as expressions of "primordial" ethnic sentiments. Minahasa, however, displayed a local nationalism which was neither. Minahasan nationalism was an autonomous development conditioned by many of the same modernising processes which generated its Indonesian counterpart, but operating on a smaller scale, and beginning at an earlier date.

The territorial framework for Minahasan nationalism was created in the seventeenth century, when an area in North Celebes was isolated by colonial boundaries from its political and cultural environment. In the nineteenth century, the population of this territory underwent a dramatic social transformation as a result of intensified Dutch rule, compulsory coffee cultivation, Christian missionary activity, and Western education. It was in this period that Minahasa, meaning united, became the usual name for the area. Unity was implicit in the commonality of the colonial experience, and inherent in the centralised institutions created in the territory by the Dutch. The mission also promoted unity as an explicit social ideal, associating it both with Christian brotherhood and with an idealisation of Minahasa's precolonial past.


Cultural Westernisation, together with intermarriage between Minahasans and Europeans, created a 'mestizo' society more

reminiscent of the Philippines than of most parts of the Netherlands Indies. As in the Philippines, however, nationalist reaction against colonial policies and prejudices also began comparatively early. Before the turn of the century, Minahasan government and church personnel were already using the colonial press to denounce the behaviour of their European superiors, and doing so in the name of the Minahasan people.


This tradition of protest was continued after 1909 by the political party *Perserikatan Minahasa*. The relationship between Minahasan nationalists and the colonial government, however, was usually characterised by bargaining and negotiation rather than confrontation. One reason for this was that 'loyal opposition' often proved effective. The *Minahasaraad*, a uniquely democratic regional council created in 1919, demonstrated the feasibility of progressive emancipation under Dutch guidance. Another reason was that Minahasans had become a subaltern elite of office workers and soldiers throughout the Netherlands Indies, with a corresponding stake in the colonial order. Even so, neither *Perserikatan Minahasa* nor its successor *Persatuan Minahasa* regarded colonial rule as desirable or permanent.

The relationship between Minahasan and Indonesian nationalisms was complex. Few educated Minahasans, by 1942, denied that they were Indonesians or that their political future lay with Indonesia as a whole. On the other hand, the specifically Minahasan nationalism inherited from the previous century also remained strong. Factors sustaining

it included the *Minahasaraad*, the Minahasan churches which appeared in 1933 and 1934, and the Minahasan experience as a sometimes unpopular minority among Indonesians. Minahasan intellectuals therefore tended to envisage an independent Indonesian commonwealth in which each ethno-national group or *bangsa*, including *bangsa Minahasa*, would retain political autonomy within a federal framework.




Map 1: Southeast Asia, showing the Dutch East Indies and the residency of Manado in 1941.




Map 2

North Celebes, showing places mentioned in the text.



Map 3

Minahasa, showing places mentioned in the text.



Map 4

Approximate distribution of languages in Minahasa, 1894.

Source: *Taalkaart van de Minahassa* by J.L.A. Brandes, in the collection of the Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Amsterdam.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Much of the modern literature on Indonesia has been coloured by the pervasive but elusive idea of the nation. Even writers on precolonial Indonesia have sometimes been influenced by this concept, applying it to indigenous polities and ethnic groups. Both Reid and Sjamsuddin, for example, have described precolonial Aceh as a nation.¹ Resink has written extensively on "nationality" and "international relations" in nineteenth century Indonesia.²

Some authors have also seen contemporary Indonesia as a multinational phenomenon. Bachtiar, defining nations as "ethnic societal communities", argues that "there are many old nations in Indonesia".³ The geographer Missen agrees that "in a sense, Indonesia is still a collection of local nations".⁴ Multiple nations are conspicuously absent, however, from studies of the period in which Indonesians began to define their own nationhood in nationalist writings and movements.⁵ Nobody asks whether early political associations like *Pasundan* and *Sarekat Ambon* indicated the awakening of Sundanese or Ambonese nations. Sometimes such organisations have been described in ethnic terms -

1. Reid 1969: 250; Sjamsuddin 1985: 39.

2. Resink 1968.

3. Bachtiar 1974: 7.

4. Missen 1972: 89.

5. An exception is Bouman (1949: 31), who is prepared to recognise a Minangkabau *natie* in the "cultural-historical" sense.

Blumberger, for instance, treats them as "modern movements of a racial or ethnic nature".⁶ Alternatively, they have attracted regional terminologies. Pluvier deals with them under the rubric of "regional particularism".⁷ O'Malley describes them as "particularist organisations" relying upon "regional bases" and "dwelling upon local interests".⁸ Others have discussed them in terms of straightforward "regionalism".⁹ At most, they are represented as "local nationalisms" or "regional nationalisms", with the implication of subordination to the genuine 'national nationalism'.¹⁰

Indeed, if such movements are allowed any greater dignity, it is usually because they have been subsumed within the grander story of Indonesian nationalism. This tendency is epitomised by the fact that Nagazumi's authoritative work on the early years of *Budi Utomo* is entitled *The dawn of Indonesian nationalism*.¹¹ *Budi Utomo*, as Nagazumi himself shows, was an explicitly Javanese organisation which appeared before the idea of an Indonesian nation had even been mooted. Despite some initial ambiguity in ethnic and geographic identification, its leaders consistently refused

6. Blumberger 1931: 17. See also Ricklefs' *History of modern Indonesia* (1981: 159).

7. Pluvier 1953: 79.

8. O'Malley 1980: 610.

9. For instance, Pringgodigdo (1964: 14) and Klooster (1985: 32).

10. For instance, Blumberger (1931: 41), Pluvier (1953: 15), Castles (1972: 279) and Bouman (1949: 31).

11. Nagazumi 1972.

to extend the scope of the group to embrace *tanah sabrang*, the lands overseas.¹² At one point, even Nagazumi is obliged to describe its official standpoint as "Javanese nationalism".¹³ And as Reid has shown, an explicit, exclusive Javanese nationalism was indeed current among many Javanese intellectuals in the years before 1920. It reached a considerable degree of elaboration as a rejection both of Dutch cultural dominance and of the artificial political framework created by the colonial state.¹⁴

In effect, one particular nationalist orthodoxy, that of unitary Indonesian nationhood, has dominated the historiography of the "national awakening" in Indonesia. The concept of an Indonesian nation - although it did not at first bear that name - was undeniably an increasingly influential one from about 1912 onward. Nevertheless, Nagazumi's conflation of 'nationalism in Indonesia' with 'Indonesian nationalism' represents a widespread problem in existing historiography. Combined with uncritical use of the terminology of nation and region, it has often prevented us from attempting to understand the "regional nationalisms"

12. Insofar as some of its early members wished "to prepare the way for the harmonious development of the land and people of the Netherlands Indies", *Budi Utomo* did indeed see some glimmers of Indonesian nationalism (Nagazumi 1972: 41). But this does not reflect the spirit of the organisation over the period covered by Nagazumi (1908-1918). *Budi Utomo* came to include Madura, Bali and Lombok within its definition of Java, but the idea of a further extension was always rejected (Nagazumi 1972: 38, 53-54, 89, 116-117; Reid 1979: 283). The principle of a unified Indonesian nation was not officially accepted by *Budi Utomo* until 1931 (Pluvier 1953: 79).

13. Nagazumi 1972: 54.

14. Reid 1979: 282-286.

of the early twentieth century in their own terms. In subsequent chapters I will show how one such movement was more national than regional, and represented the culmination, as much as the beginning, of a process of nation formation.

What makes such an assertion appear peculiar is not the credibility of the unitarian national history - Majapahit and all - written by Indonesian nationalists during and after the war years.¹⁵ In large measure, it is the influence of an often unacknowledged conceptual framework determined by the reality of today's Indonesian national state. This reality has a strong teleological effect upon our views of colonial, and even precolonial, history. The geographical terminology of modern Indonesia has been a complementary source of anachronism, and a third difficulty stems from the moral momentum of the established national orthodoxy. All three problems are worth discussing, for they illustrate the interest and significance of the study of nationalism and regionalism under colonial conditions.

HISTORICAL TELEOLOGY

The successful struggle for political independence from 1945 to 1949 was fought, at least as far as its leaders were concerned, in the name of a unified Indonesian nation. Historians are attentive to victory, and it is hard to

15. Sanusi Pane's *Sejarah Indonesia* (1943) is regarded as the origin of this genre, although the ideas which it assembles were already current before the war (Reid 1979: 281, 289-292).

believe that if this particular victory had not transpired, the tiny Indonesian nationalist parties of the period from 1927 to 1942 would subsequently have attracted so much scholarly attention. The present, of course, must grow out of the past. The national revolution built upon tendencies latent in the prewar Netherlands Indies, and it would be perverse to deny its retrospective value in the interpretation of what preceded it, or indeed to deny that a chain of connected events links the foundation of *Budi Utomo* with the declaration of independence. But events are always interconnected, and the question for the student of prewar Indonesia is whether this particular chain really reflects the temper of the intervening years.¹⁶

"Indonesia before 1942", Reid has written, "was less clearly or consciously a nation than most colonies".¹⁷ It is perhaps unnecessary here to reiterate the low level of political mobilisation in the late colonial Indies.¹⁸ State pressure, direct and indirect, helped restrict the membership of radical parties, and the socially marginal character of most nationalist groups is widely acknowledged. Less well known, however, is the extent to which the organisations expressing local identities, interests, and causes were the most successful mobilisers. The largest

16. Benda (1966: 589-591) is one of the few writers who seriously ponders this question.

17. Reid 1986: 196.

18. A survey by an Indonesian lawyer in 1940 estimated the total number of "politically and socially conscious Indonesians" at around 200,000, or one in every 300 inhabitants of the colony (Van der Wal 1964-1965 II: 594).

political organisation of the 1930s was the Yogyakarta party *Pakempalan Kawulo Ngayogyakarta*, while the Sundanese group *Pasundan* took joint third position.¹⁹ Noting that these parties were stronger, not weaker, for their local preoccupations, O'Malley has urged that such groups "must begin to be appreciated for what they were, spokesmen and formulators of valid alternative viewpoints, instead of stunted offshoots of a dominant nationalist movement".²⁰ Also poorly appreciated in the existing literature is the fact that even among people who can legitimately be described as nationalists, the ideological convergence upon Indonesian nationalism - upon the idea of an Indonesian nation - was sometimes a hesitant, ambivalent and even inconclusive process. It is such a process which, as experienced by one particular group, I will describe in the following chapters.

There is also a deeper level at which the unambiguous outcome of the unitarian nationalist struggle has tended to obscure its essentially contingent nature. The literature on nationalism in Indonesia is permeated by the assumption that the boundaries of the colonial state as a whole define the only national frontiers appropriate to an anticolonial movement. That this is not a universal law of political motion is easily demonstrated by a glance at the other giant state in colonial Southeast Asia, French Indochina, where scholars, again partly for teleological reasons, have

19. O'Malley 1978: 113; Van der Wal 1964-1965 II: 593-594.

20. O'Malley 1980: 610.

generally made precisely the opposite assumption. Vietnam began to formulate its modern national identity at roughly the same time as Java. Like Java, it was only one part of a much wider territory unified by European rule and encompassing a wide variety of ethnic groups. Formally speaking, French Indochina was a federal rather than a unitary colony, but its administration was highly centralised in Hanoi. Vietnam, moreover, did not constitute a single element in this structure, but sprawled across three of the five federal states. Anderson has shown that Vietnam, like Java, found itself in early competition with a broader Indochinese ideal current among young *indigènes* whose primary frame of reference was provided by colonial rather than native institutions.²¹ But Indochina, unlike Indonesia, proved ephemeral. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have become dramatically separate nations, and Indochina is regarded, in the words of one historian, as "an utterly anomalous entity that owed its existence only to French fiat".²² The anticolonial credentials of Vietnam, a region of Indochina, are even less in doubt than are those of the Indonesian nation. There is a splendid irony in the contrast between Nagazumi's disapproving account of the "failure" of Budi Utomo to embrace the whole of the Indies, and Cook's comment, equally well-intentioned, that talk of an autonomous united Indochina among members of the

21. Anderson 1983: 113-120.

22. Herz 1958: 70.

Constitutionalist Party in colonial Cochinchina "raises suspicions about their understanding of nationalism".²³

This contrast, of course, is not entirely a product of retrospective judgements. The Indochinese ideal had already become more French than Indochinese by the time the Constitutionlists proclaimed it, whereas in the Dutch colony a broad distinction between conservative cultural nationalism, based upon individual ethnicities, and progressive political nationalism, orientated toward the overcapping state, was already perceived in some quarters before 1920.²⁴ Nevertheless, the dichotomy was not as clear-cut in colonial Indonesia as subsequent accounts have implied. As my case study will show, the configuration of administrative and representative institutions sometimes meant that politics acted to reinforce identities and loyalties connected with cultural units.

The Indochina comparison also has a certain counterfactual value in that it raises the important question of why developments in Indonesia took a different course from that which, in the end, produced an unambiguously multinational response to colonial rule in Indochina. The following chapters will illustrate some of the factors which determine whether a group adopts an exclusive national identity of its own, or, instead, accepts regional status within a wider nation.

23. Nagazumi 1972: 117; Cook 1977: 125.

24. Nagazumi 1972: 54; Reid 1979: 282. Bouman (1949: 10) uses the terms *volksnationalisme* and *staatsnationalisme* to differentiate the two.

LANGUAGE, GEOGRAPHY AND ANACHRONISM

The fact that Indonesia is both a taxonomic device and a political phenomenon creates problems in historiography. "The Dutch", according to Ricklefs' standard *History of modern Indonesia*, "did not create Indonesia, but they did define its territorial extent".²⁵ Yet the colonial boundaries ultimately determined not just Indonesia's "territorial extent", but the much more essential question of who was Indonesian, and who was not. In the nineteenth century, Filipinos and even Malagasies were often regarded as Indonesians by European ethnologists.²⁶ Conversely, Bataks or Balinese had no more notion of being Indonesian themselves than did Tagalogs or Merinas. Today, both the analytic category and the subjective identity coincide more or less with the political entity.²⁷ The resulting conflation of meanings, however, is often prejudicial to our views of the past because it imbues historical accounts with

25. Ricklefs 1981: 138.

26. The term Indonesia was coined by two English scholars in 1850 as "a shorter synonym for the Indian Islands or the Indian Archipelago", including the Philippines. Dutch writers sometimes excluded the Philippines (though not the other non-Dutch parts of the archipelago) when using the word in a geographical sense, but "Indonesians" always included a much wider range of culturally related peoples (Avé 1989).

27. This convergence is more recent than is sometimes assumed. In July 1945, when the Japanese allowed the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee to vote on the boundaries of the future state, only a minority of members were in favour of an Indonesia defined by the Dutch East Indies. Most also wanted to include the Malay peninsula, northern Borneo and the eastern half of New Guinea, while a small group wanted the former British territories but not West New Guinea (Yamin 1959: 214).

a sense of continuity and inevitability. Applied both to the geographic zone and to the nation, Indonesia tends to appear both cause and effect. Take, for example, part of Zainu'ddin's account of the relationship between Indonesian nationalism and the colonial state.

As Dutch administration welded Indonesia into one centrally governed administrative unit, the people of Indonesia, particularly the small group of educated upper class Indonesians, became more aware of their basic similarities. (28)

Despite the cautious phrasing, the fact that Indonesia is an *a priori* category means that, between the lines, the colonial interlude merely provides the nation with an opportunity to discover itself. Any sense of contingency is lost.

Teleological narrative is perhaps most dangerous when it is least anachronistic. If we speak of "nineteenth century Indonesians", we are usually aware of using a more or less abstract convention. But in the period of nationalism, convention tends to become entangled with interpretation, so that the continuing multiplicity of powerful identities other than Indonesia is obscured. One such identity, and its relationship to the Indonesian idea, will be explored in the following chapters.

THE POWER OF THE NATIONAL IDEA

Nations and nationalism have dominated the history of Europe and the New World for more than two centuries, and the idea of the nation as the fundamental unit of political

organisation is almost instinctive for most Westerners. Nation, moreover, is not a neutral term. It carries strong positive connotations of legitimacy, patriotism, and even glory. This sometimes makes us eager to discern nations in traditional societies and polities which resist foreign conquest - such as nineteenth century Aceh. On the other hand, it is also another factor predisposing us to use modern nations as the basis for our interpretation of the past.

Not surprisingly, the impulse to make moral judgements in the Indonesian case is strongest among writers close in time and spirit to the revolutionary movement. It is evident, for instance, in Kahin's statement that the role of Indonesian nationalism was to prevent local currents of opposition from "dissipating themselves singly in the sands of their own isolated parochialism".²⁹ Pluvier also makes a sharp moralistic distinction between "those parties which represented a pure regional chauvinism" and "those groups which worked locally, but aimed for the elevation of Indonesia as a whole".³⁰ This attitude is closely associated with the conviction that the local parties were supported by "the policy of divide and rule, which a numerically small ruling group is compelled to follow if it is to maintain its power over a population of millions".³¹

29. Kahin 1952: 37. The process therefore involved the "integration" of a single nationalism whose beginnings "cannot be precisely or even roughly dated" (Kahin 1952: 39, 41).

30. Pluvier 1953: 15.

31. Pluvier 1953: 15.

The *divide et impera* charge is part of the Indonesian nationalist orthodoxy, and derives credibility from the encirclement of the infant Indonesian Republic by Dutch-sponsored federal states between 1946 and 1949.³² In later chapters I will consider to what extent, in one local context, such judgments are anachronistic for the period before 1942.

Moral assumptions about nationhood have also influenced students of independent Indonesia. The whole of the "national integration" genre falls into this category.³³ By their very nature, studies of this type confirm the nationalist belief that the nation, however arbitrarily or recently defined, embodies a higher good than any individual community which it contains, however old or established. National loyalty - patriotism - is thus constructive and progressive, while any less expansive loyalty which competes with it is regressive and destructive. It is partly the uncritical projection of this distinction into a time when nationality was still a matter for debate which distorts our perceptions of nationalism and regionalism in the colonial period.

In an influential 1963 paper, Geertz lends theoretical dignity to the moral distinction which governments draw between regionalism and nationalism by identifying the

32. Even here, however, there is room for debate. Yong Mun Cheong (1982: 1) believes that the federal policy was more a matter of expedience than strategy.

33. Examples include the studies by Geertz (1963), Liddle (1970) and Drake (1989).

former with "primordial attachments" - kinship, race, language, religion and custom - and the latter with "civil sentiments", including "a demand for progress, for a rising standard of living, more effective political order, greater social justice".³⁴ In this view, the nation is, in effect, defined by the state. Smith has written that such an argument "would, if carried through consistently, make nonsense of most standard histories of the subject".³⁵ Not only would the German, Italian and eastern European nationalist movements fail to qualify as such, but the credentials of all anticolonial nationalisms would be seriously questioned. The Indonesian state is itself partly the product of a racial conflict between brown and white which in Geertz's terms can only be called "primordial". Moreover, Indonesia has consistently struggled to express its identity as far as possible in primordial terms - *tumpah darah, tanah air, ibu pertiwi* - and to reinterpret local traditions as part of a stylised national culture of "unity in diversity". Indonesian nationalism has indeed been about progress, prosperity and justice, but its leaders have also understood that *Blut und Boden*, far from being exclusive to retrograde regionalisms, are the very stuff of effective nation-building.

We are faced here with two alternative ideals of nationhood, both equally charged with moral and emotional power, but drawing it from radically different sources. One, very

34. Geertz 1963: 108, 112-113.

35. Smith 1971: 177.

American, stresses citizenship and the state, and is based upon an ideology of human equality and individual liberty. The other, with its roots in the Old World, emphasises community, culture and descent, and attempts to tap the sources of loyalty and legitimacy which Geertz describes as primordial. These models of the nation I will term civic and ethnic respectively.³⁶ To understand why such divergent concepts are combined in a single word, we must briefly examine the historical development of the national idea.

NATION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WORD

The Latin noun *natio* indicates a group of people distinguished by some commonality of birth, and originally it most often meant a foreign ethnic community inhabiting a particular quarter of a Roman city.³⁷ In quite recent times its derivatives were sometimes used in a very broad classificatory sense. Goethe described the female sex as a nation, and Spenser even wrote of a "nation of birds".³⁸ The most widespread meaning, however, remained one of common ethnic or geographic origin, particularly in reference to foreign minorities of traders, students or political delegates, but also for cultural groups in their own

36. Smith (1986: 209) uses "civic-territorial" and "ethnic-genealogical", but since all nations are territorial and most ethnicity implicitly genealogical, a simpler terminology will suffice.

37. Zernatto 1944: 352. A *natio* was larger than a family but smaller than a *gens* or "people".

38. Zernatto 1944: 353.

homelands.³⁹ After the decisive collapse of the institutions of Christian universalism in the seventeenth century, a polycentric system of territorial states came increasingly to provide the fundamental frame of social reference in Western Europe. In some territorially compact states, particularly England and France, the nation now came to mean the social group associated with the government, or even the totality of its subjects.⁴⁰ The advent of political nationalism in the form of the American and French revolutions accelerated this shift in meaning. Neither of these movements included a significant ethnic or cultural component in their ideologies.⁴¹ In both cases, the nation was understood simply as an arbitrarily bounded field of individuals within which a new political system, in principle universal, was to be established for the common good. This is the origin of the civic concept of the nation, which for more than half a century exerted such an influence that the old ethnic connotations of the term were virtually forgotten.⁴²

39. Zernatto 1944: 353-361; Hobsbawm 1989: 16-17.

40. The former usage may explain why the word once had the subsidiary meaning of aristocracy, elite or social "estate" (Zernatto 1944: 361-363; Seton-Watson 1977: 8; Hobsbawm 1989: 17). On the other hand, this meaning may also be related to an assumption of distinct aristocratic descent or ethnicity.

41. The extent to which the French revolution anticipated the ethnocentric aspect of nineteenth century nationalism is still debated. But while revolutionary France certainly insisted upon cultural standardisation, there was no question of culture defining Frenchness (Kamenka 1975: 10; Hobsbawm 1989: 21-22).

42. Hobsbawm 1989: 18.

From around the middle of the nineteenth century, however, another type of nationalism became a force in Europe. German and Italian nationalists and their imitators saw the nation not as a political innovation but as an historic community, defined by a variety of purportedly objective criteria of which the foremost was language. The object of this nationalism was not to create a new nation, but to "awaken" an old one and secure for it the same political privileges already enjoyed by others, beginning with a modern sovereign state. The ethnic idea of nationhood was making a comeback, but in political form, and although nationality now regained its ethnic connotations, it was never to lose its political ones.

The success of German and Italian unification confirmed the "nation-state" as the paradigmatic political unit for the following century, but also obscured the difference between the two existing concepts of nationhood. Two circumstances made it possible to believe that the nation was now an unproblematic phenomenon. First, there was the dual nature of the new breed of nationalism, which professed both the universalistic, progressive social and political ideals of the American and French pioneers, and the parochial, nostalgic desire to reawaken an ancient *Volksgeist*. Secondly, there was the fact that nation-states shaped by the earlier civic model - including Britain as well as France and the USA - often seemed to show enough cultural uniformity to be in approximate accord with the ethnic model too, albeit more as a result than as a cause of the experience of statehood. By the late nineteenth century the

nation already seemed such a concrete and self-evident concept that its contradictions went all but unnoticed.

THEORISING THE NATION

The modern critique of the national idea is often said to begin with Renan's famous 1882 lecture *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*⁴³ Renan observed that the objective criteria most often suggested for determining the existence of a nation - common race, common language, common religion, common interests, and "natural frontiers" - showed little consistent correlation either with each other or with the boundaries of even the most established nations. On the other hand, he also perceived that no definition proceeding from the state rather than the people could do justice to the corporate, popular, emotional quality which distinguished the nations of his time from the dynastic and absolutist polities of the past. His solution was to make the people as a whole the practical arbiters of nationhood as well as its theoretical foundation. The nation, in the last analysis, was an artefact of will, a "great solidarity". At its root lay neither politics nor culture, but simply "*le desir de vivre ensemble*".⁴⁴

As a nationalist himself, Renan exaggerated the voluntary aspect of nationality when he compared the nation to "*un plebiscite de tous les jours*", and risked just the kind of

43. Renan 1947 [1882]. John Stuart Mill (1861: 294-304) anticipates some of Renan's relativism on this question, but his discussion is shorter and less critical.

44. Renan 1947 [1882]: 903, 904.

reification which he was trying to avoid when he called it "*une âme, un principe spirituel*".⁴⁵ Nevertheless, he had the candour to face issues ignored or avoided by many later writers, and the imagination to see that the two models of nationhood, once prised apart, could be recombined on the basis of their subjective rather than objective qualities.

It was to be a long time before these insights were fully appreciated. International politics increasingly ratified an objective ethnic definition of the nation. The repartition of eastern Europe in 1919 confirmed the idea that nationality could be determined by inspection rather than referendum, and in particular that the distribution of languages was often sufficient to identify, by what was ironically called the "principle of national self-determination", the legitimate boundaries of states. In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that while important early writers like Hayes and Kohn go to great lengths to demonstrate the modernity of nationalism as a political phenomenon, they also refer unselfconsciously to "national groups", "nationalities" and even "nations" of the pre-nationalist era.⁴⁶ Where such expressions are elucidated, it is in an indiscriminate mixture of objective and subjective terms:

In general, however, "nationality" is far less ambiguous than "nation" and is most commonly and can be most properly used to designate a group of people who speak either the same language or closely related dialects, who cherish common historical

45. Renan 1947 [1882]: 903, 904.

46. For instance: Hayes 1926: 247; Kohn 1948: 9.

traditions, and who constitute or think they constitute a distinct cultural society.(47)

The first influential attempt to apply sociology to the study of nations, Deutsch's 1953 *Nationalism and social communications*, came down strongly on the objectivist side.⁴⁸ Drawing upon American functionalist sociology and an embryonic body of systems theory, Deutsch tried to define the nation rigorously by using criteria based upon intensity of internal communication as well as commonality of culture and territory.

Classical Marxism offers no consistent theory of the nation. The Communist Manifesto repeats the old confusion of the nation with the state as it emerged from the bourgeois revolution.⁴⁹ Engels even subscribed at one point to the opposite stereotype, describing nations as the "natural" manifestations in the modern era of pre-existing linguistic "nationalities".⁵⁰ In general, however, early Marxists stressed the "superstructural" and historically contingent

47. Hayes 1926: 5. "Nationality" was first used in this sense in the nineteenth century to refer to the 'stateless nations' of central Europe (Hayes 1926: 4; Seton-Watson 1977: 4).

48. Deutsch 1953.

49. "The bourgeoisie...has agglomerated population, centralised means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralisation. Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments and systems of taxation, became lumped together into one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class interest, one frontier, and one customs tariff" (Marx & Engels 1983 [1848]: 19-20).

50. Engels 1979 [1884]: 465. Stalin (1936) endorsed and developed this model of ethnoregional "nationalities" catalysed into ethnopolitical nations by the transition from feudalism to capitalism.

character of nations, and repudiated nationalism as a species of "false consciousness".⁵¹ So Marxist writers, at least, might have been expected to produce an assault upon the dominant idea of nations as concrete historical actors. Instead, whether out of faith in the ultimate transience of nationalism or out of perplexity at its enduring strength, they remained largely aloof from the subject.⁵² One exception was Otto Bauer, who concluded by reifying the nation himself as "the aggregate of people bound into a community of character by a community of fate".⁵³ After the institutional recognition of nationality differences within the infant USSR, such views appeared less than heretical. The liberal Left has shown the same tendency to take the rhetoric of nationalism at face value, partly because of its instinctive support for nationalist movements, which intensified as nationalism became the prerogative first of anticolonial and then of "minority" struggles.

Ironically, then, it was left to the conservative scholars Kedourie and Gellner to complete the theoretical attack on the objective, primordial nation which Renan had begun.⁵⁴ Their approach is well characterised by Gellner's

51. This orthodoxy is summarised by Connor (1984: 10).

52. Marxism's inability to predict or explain the persistent strength of nationalism, even among proletarians, has repeatedly been described as one of its greatest historical failures. See, for example, Nairn (1977: 329) and Gellner (1964: 172).

53. Bauer in 1924, quoted by Stalin (1936: 10).

54. Kedourie 1966; Kedourie 1970; Gellner 1964: 147-178; Gellner 1983. Their precursors here include Emerson, who uses a voluntaristic definition of the nation similar to Renan's (Emerson 1960: 102).

provocative statement that "nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist".⁵⁵ Both Kedourie and Gellner argue that in the premodern, agrarian world, cultural groups only rarely became units of social solidarity or political allegiance. Dynastic, religious and bureaucratic empires typically encompassed a wide variety of folk cultures to which little or no political significance adhered. Moreover, linguistic and cultural differentiation between rulers and subjects, castes and estates, elites and masses, was normal, accepted, even functional.

For Kedourie, the sudden popularity of inventing nations in the nineteenth century is explained by the dissemination of the nationalist ideology itself, by which he understands the ethnic version. Coursing through the European dynastic empires and out into the Asian and African colonies, the contagious idea that each culture has a natural right to political autonomy was seized upon by dissatisfied groups from many folk cultures. These groups then set about redefining - and reorganising - their cultures as political communities. Gellner's model is less purely cerebral, portraying the invention of nations as an indirect outcome of modernisation. A modern economy demands an educated, competitive and flexible labour force, and places a high value on communication. Under these conditions the selection of an official state language acquires special political significance, for it affects social mobility. In

55. Gellner 1964: 168.

a modernising plural society, a linguistic group is therefore likely to reinterpret its culture as nationality, making it the basis of a nationalist struggle in order to establish its own language as the dominant one.

For both Kedourie and Gellner the nation itself, as a "great solidarity" in Renan's sense, is initially an idea rather than a reality. It is conceived by a small, usually urban, minority who extrapolate their own situation to an unwitting peasantry. Moreover, it does not necessarily have to become a reality in order to secure its immediate political goals. Very large numbers of people have certainly been indifferent to, and even ignorant of, successful struggles for national independence waged ostensibly on their behalf.

Such anomalies have led Anderson to characterise nations as "imagined communities".⁵⁶ The great, territorially bounded comradeship of the nation is in fact imaginary in two respects. First, in the simple sense that the individual who is part of it will never meet or interact directly with more than a fraction of its members. Secondly, only in an ideal case will all of its putative members even imagine that they belong to the same nation. Anticolonial nationalists often know that their real task is to enlarge the national community as much as mobilise it. Anderson admits that most, if not all, communities are actually imaginary in these terms.⁵⁷ Despite the salutary value of the tautology in the national case, I will use the adjective

56. Anderson 1983.

57. Anderson 1983: 15.

'perceived' rather than 'imagined' in order to avoid sterile theoretical debate about the definition of a community.

The main thrust of recent theory has been to emphasise the modernity as well as the subjective quality of nations. Smith, however, has attempted to reestablish the continuity between prenatal and national communities while taking on board much of the recent critique of the nation as a construct.⁵⁸ He concedes that the modern nation, with its ideal of uniform citizenship and its aspiration to collective sovereignty, is restricted to the era of nationalism as a political ideology. Some nations, however, represent groups which already displayed both communal consciousness and solidarity in the prenatal era. Smith refers to such groups using the French term *ethnie*. An *ethnie* is no more a primordial phenomenon than the nation, and neither does its self-awareness flow inevitably from its objective cultural identity. Its solidarity is attributed primarily to *mythomoteurs* - complexes of legends and symbols which provide each *ethnie* with its "constitutive political myth".⁵⁹ The most important and effective of these *mythomoteurs* are religious. Religious beliefs equate particular ethnic traits with membership of a community of the faithful, a divinely privileged group wider than the immediate social world of any of its individual members. Smith's *ethnie* might be characterised as a premodern equivalent of Anderson's "imagined" nation.

58. Smith 1986.

59. Smith 1986: 58.

To banish nations to the domain of the imagination is not to deny their historical importance. Very many people - and key historical actors in particular - have believed in them and acted accordingly. The absolute origins of such beliefs are discussed below. But whatever their source they tend, once acted upon, to be self-sustaining. The more numerous and visible the institutions dedicated to and embodying the idea of a nation - be they political parties, liberation fronts, flags, borders, armies, parliaments or television stations - the more pervasive and convincing that idea becomes.

Writing on the nation is still diverse, and there are still those, especially on the Marxist Left, who cling to ethnic and objectivist definitions.⁶⁰ But the field as a whole has undergone a sort of relativistic revolution in which the 'Newtonian' vision of a world of discrete nationalities, each launched by the impetus of modernity onto a predictable trajectory of nationalism toward transformation into nation-states, has been displaced. Each nation is now seen as logically and historically contingent. The old view was not an exact description, but a model imposed upon the world by people - or rather, some people - who made their own nations. Not, certainly, under conditions of their own choosing, but not under conditions determined by the identity of their ancestors either.

60. For instance, Amin (1980: 19).

GENERIC PROPERTIES OF NATIONS

Severing the nation from the actualities of geography and culture has the effect of predicating it upon the subjective phenomenon of nationalism. This is, of course, a tautology, but nationalists often do at least identify themselves as such, and it is reasonable to ask what the authors of an "imagined community" see as its essential characteristics. Smith, in an early work, extracted an "abstracted ideal-type of the nationalist ideal of the nation" from the vast corpus of nationalist literature.

The nation is a large, vertically-integrated and territorially mobile group featuring common citizenship rights and collective sentiment together with one (or more) common characteristic(s) which differentiate its members from those of similar groups with whom they stand in relations of alliance or conflict. (61)

This definition is instructive, but its latitude reflects the fact that nationalists tend to be interested in specifics rather than generics, and high ideals rather than pedestrian definitions. Those ideals are really much closer to the generic essence of the nation than is any statement about vertical integration, common characteristics or group differentiation.

Nations, for their believers, always have a sacrosanct quality. The national community is a fellowship, a brotherhood, a comradeship, more than the chance association of the neighbourhood or the pragmatic solidarity of the interest group. It is, to a greater or lesser extent, a

61. Smith 1971: 175.

moral community.⁶² The nation makes a moral demand for unity and solidarity across classes and other internal divisions. Emerson calls it "the largest community which, when the chips are down, effectively commands men's loyalties, overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those which cut across it".⁶³

The felt emotional imperative demanding such loyalty is usually referred to as patriotism. As the attachment of individuals to groups identified as their "own", patriotism may well be universal.⁶⁴ The very fact that the nation is perceived as a community rather than a society, something in which a person belongs rather than merely participates, allows it to tap the universal reservoir of patriotic instinct. Patriotism, however, has no natural affinity for nations, which must compete with other types of community - religious, ethnic, village, class, caste, guild, party and so forth - in the struggle to harness it.

Nations may attain sanctification in a more literal way through identification with religious symbols, practices and communities. Religious communities prefigured the modern Israeli and Russian nations, and religious differentiation

62. This phrase is borrowed from Symmons-Symonolewicz (1970: 55).

63. Emerson 1960: 95-96. This passage was not intended as a definition of the nation, though many, including Geertz (1963: 107-108), have misinterpreted it as such.

64. Doob (1964: 6) identifies patriotism as primordial, nationalism as one of its historical expressions. Ardrey (1966: 269-275) portrays patriotism as one side of a universal psychological equation demanding amity among "us", enmity towards "them".

has been of great importance to nationalist movements from Ireland to India. Twentieth century writers have been inclined to see nations as substitutes for, rather than expressions of, existing faiths. "Society", writes Gellner, "can and does worship itself or its own culture directly and not, as Durkheim taught, through the opaque medium of religion".⁶⁵ While explicit veneration of the *Volksgeist* has been rare, nationalism has often performed psychological and social functions comparable to those of religion. A nation's religious character is evident in its prescription of public rituals, its provision of a sense of continuity beyond the lifespan of the individual, and its demand for personal faith and sacrifice.⁶⁶

Nations may also derive their moral authority from association with the modern secular ideals of progress, democracy and independence. The nebulous idea of progress combines improvement of collective material welfare with faith in the perfectability of human institutions and the desirability of continual change. Democracy is an inherent component of the civic nationalism pioneered by the French and American revolutionaries. To the extent that ethnic nationalism insists upon a government which embodies the character and aspirations of the *Volk*, it too is in principle democratic, however undemocratic some of its historical manifestations may have been in practice. The ideal of national sovereignty or independence, finally,

65. Gellner 1983: 142.

66. Apter 1963; Hayes 1960.

accords with the democratic quality of the nation, and defines the central issue upon which the ultimate success or failure of nationalist movements is usually judged.

This demand for political independence, however, is not always absolute. Nationalists may sometimes accept dependence upon an external power because they believe it to be in the best interests of their own nation. The Scottish nation, for instance, is a reality for far more Scots than would wish Scotland a sovereign state. Catalonia and Quebec are, for many people, comparable stateless nations, willing to compromise on the sovereignty issue. Hungarian nationalists accepted limited autonomy for almost half a century until the Austro-Hungarian empire was dismembered by external forces. Even in more conventional cases like Germany and India, the demand for sovereignty was a relatively late development in the evolution of the nation as a moral community, and formed only part of a wider struggle for greater autonomy and acknowledgement in cultural and economic as well as political spheres. The ideal of independence is broader than that of sovereignty, and to date the birth of a nation from the beginning of its campaign for a national state as such is often to misrepresent the process.

I have argued that what nations mean to nationalists is much more illuminating than what nationalists mean by nations. Nevertheless, one common feature of all nationalist imaginings deserves consideration here, the more so because it does not figure in Smith's compendious definition. This

is territorial boundedness. The nation is distinguished from other large imagined communities with similar moral and affective attributes - a religious diaspora, for instance, or an international proletariat - by the fact that its boundaries are, in the last instance, spatial rather than social. While nationalism is often rooted in ethnic conflict, it always reinterprets ethnicity in geographic terms, so that the opponent becomes a foreigner. Indonesians saw Java-born *Indiërs* as Dutch, Indian Moslems redefined themselves as Pakistanis. In part, this affinity for territory involves an articulation of nationalism with primordial sentiments of attachment to home places.⁶⁷ It also has to do with the link forged between people and territory by the territorial administrative techniques typical of modern states. The operation of this factor will be illustrated in Chapter 2.

THE ORIGINS OF NATIONS: FIVE MODELS

Nations originate in the imagination of nationalists, and acquire substance only to the extent that others are persuaded of their existence. Ideas, however, are always conditioned by their social environment, and numerous studies have sought to reveal the social origins of

67. This is not evidence for the primordial character of nations. As Kohn (1948: 8) puts it: "This love of the homeland, which is regarded as the heart of patriotism, is not a 'natural' phenomenon, but an artificial product of historical and intellectual development. The homeland which a man 'naturally' loves is his native valley or city, a small territory well known in all its concrete details, abounding in personal memories, a place in which his life was generally lived throughout its whole span".

nationalism. Five broad themes can be distinguished in the consequent welter of explicit and implicit theories. Although seldom intended as complete or exclusive explanations, these are presented here as discrete models for the sake of clarity.

According to what I will call the ethnic model, the central idea of nationhood is an ethnic community of a type which has existed throughout history. There are two common versions of this theory. In the first, the prototypical community is primordial, in the sense that it is based upon assumed kinship. For the sociobiologist Van den Berghe, it therefore elicits an instinctive loyalty inspired by the biological imperative of kin selection.⁶⁸ Common descent may be a fiction, but it must be a credible fiction in order to make the national idea viable. Too high a degree of racial or cultural heterogeneity will make it impossible to harness the kin instinct. The sociobiological theory behind this reasoning may be contentious, but nationalism certainly employs the language of kinship and exploits myths of common origin and shared blood where available. In Smith's more sophisticated account of the link between ethnicity and nationalism, the *ethnie* is less an imagined kin category than an imagined community delineated by a "myth-symbol complex". Often religious in nature, this *mythomoteur* specifies an ethnic homeland and prescribes a degree of

68. Van den Berghe 1981: 15-36, 61-67.

solidarity within the community. An *ethnie* therefore lends itself to interpretation as a territorial nation.⁶⁹

Smith also writes that any civic nation without an inherited ethnic *mythomoteur* is ultimately forced to invent one in order to sustain an internal sense of community.⁷⁰ The ethnic theory of nationalism overlaps here with explanations which stress change above continuity. What I will call the transformation model interprets the national community as a psychological and institutional substitute for old frames of reference destroyed by modernity - the small agricultural community, the hierarchical polity, and the traditional religious system. Again there are two versions of the account. One begins with the personal crisis of the individual deprived of identity, security and responsibility by alienation from traditional society.⁷¹ The other revolves around the deeper loss of certitude, immortality, and community of faith.⁷² In either case, the nation offers a new identity, a new duty, a new faith, and a new form of immortality. The comradeship of fellow nationalists lends substance to the imagined national community.

The transformation theory says nothing about how the boundaries of the new community are defined. This is the concern of what I will call the communication model. The

69. Smith 1986.

70. Smith 1986: 144-149, 212.

71. See Mannoni (1950: 136) and the discussion by Breuilly (1982: 28-35).

72. Prefigured in some ways by Hayes (1960), this version is most highly developed by Anderson (1983: 17-40).

communicative dimension of nationhood fell into scholarly neglect after criticism of the classic 1953 work by Deutsch, who seemed to exaggerate the link between interaction and solidarity.⁷³ Propinquity is not fraternity. "The railways", Kautsky once remarked, "are the greatest breeder of national hatreds".⁷⁴ Anderson, however, recognises that certain types of communication fields do provide prototypes for nations, less by virtue of the real transactions which they involve than because they generate illusions of community. The quintessential example is the collectivity defined by the circulation of a newspaper. However small the actual circulation, the nature of the medium itself implies that the people defined by its linguistic and geographic catchment share a common experience and fate. It is as a publishing domain rather than as an *ethnie* that a language group is a potential nation, and what Anderson calls "print-capitalism" is therefore a precondition for nationalism.⁷⁵ The geography of the imagined community is also influenced in an analagous way by state institutions, particularly educational systems. By concentrating individuals from diverse parts of an extensive territory at central institutions, and by representing that territory to them cartographically in the classroom, education may

73. For a succinct critique of Deutschian communication theory, see Breuilly (1982: 20).

74. Karl Kautsky in 1886, quoted in Smith (1979: 163).

75. Anderson 1983: 41-49.

predispose students to translate their own tiny multiethnic fraternity onto the map as a nation.⁷⁶

In the foregoing models, the imagined community suggests itself, as it were, from within. However, since most nation-states have resulted not from the unification of local fragments but from the fragmentation of imperial units, externalities clearly merit attention. What I will call the reactive model portrays nationalism as a response to social or economic inequality. The nation is the self-image of a disadvantaged group resolved to improve its position, whether through self-help or through conflict. In most cases the group is distinguished by ethnic criteria, physiognomic or cultural. But the reactive model differs from the ethnic one in that the sense of community is a product of external circumstances rather than an inherent characteristic. The anticolonial nationalisms of Latin America, for instance, had virtually no ethnic dimension, yet metropolitan prejudice against colonial-born *Americanos* still contributed to the rise of national consciousness there.⁷⁷

Inequality may also sustain a sense of nationhood among a privileged group. Shared pride and vulnerability are conducive to solidarity, and any suspicion that participation in the wider society is unnecessary or burdensome may lead to separatism among such a group. The emergence of a conventional reactive nationalism directed

76. Anderson 1983: 104-123.

77. Anderson 1983: 58-60.

against the group will have a similar effect.⁷⁸ A nation, however, is above all a moral community, and a privileged minority is unlikely to believe in itself as a moral cause unless factors other than defence of privilege are involved.⁷⁹

Reactive nationalism leads more naturally than other types to political action. What I will call the political model highlights the political uses of the imagined nation and the political aspects of nationalism as an ideology. The key to this model is once more that a nation is a construct, even when an institutionalised one. Its champions cannot "represent" it, although they may hold a mandate from a greater or lesser number of people who also believe in the same construct. As a political tool, the nation has two broad applications, legitimation and mobilisation. In the age of the nation-state, nationalism has often afforded politicians a degree of automatic legitimacy in the eyes of imperial rulers as well as indigenous followers. As a means of mobilising support for political goals defined by elites, its strength lies in its intrinsic populism, its emphasis upon the pursuit of material progress, and its moral, rather than merely practical, injunction to unity.

78. This was the case for the German political elite in the Habsburg empire, whose own nationalism was stimulated by that of hostile Czechs (Kann 1950 I: 56-57).

79. Basque nationalism, for instance, has been accentuated by the idea that Basque industry subsidises Castilian backwardness, but unless it also had deeper roots it would be a tactical regionalism rather than a moral nationalism (Blasco 1974: 366).

Not all types of elite, however, can make instrumental use of nationalist ideas. As a horizontal, uniform, inclusive community, the nation is an essentially egalitarian concept, antithetical to vertical, particularistic and personal loyalties. In modern European history it is closely connected with the idea of popular sovereignty. Locke and Rousseau proclaimed that the state must be controlled by the people; nations were answers to the inevitable question of which people. There were civic and ethnic solutions, but either way, there was no way back to feudal or absolutist rule legitimated by religious or dynastic tradition. In Asia too, nationalism has often been the weapon of new intellectual and bourgeois groups against entrenched traditional elites. The latter cannot use the same weapon without conceding their own obsolescence.

In modern times, sovereignty, popular or otherwise, is territorial. The reasons for this are complex, and form the subject of a considerable literature.⁸⁰ Broadly speaking, they have to do with the rational and impersonal nature of the modern state, and some of them will be illustrated empirically in the following chapter. According to the political interpretation of nationalism, the territoriality of nations is explained by the territoriality of states. Political independence, or even limited autonomy, is possible only on a territorial basis. An aspiring nation may take time to find such a basis, particularly if it is of the reactive type and originates as a social stratum rather

80. See, in particular, the work of Gottman (1973: 44-52) and Sack (1983).

than a geographically compact group. Greek nationalists, for instance, thought initially of appropriating the Ottoman empire at its centre and recreating Byzantium.⁸¹ Ultimately, however, they claimed a national homeland of their own, as have Jews (Israelis) and Indian Moslems (Pakistanis) since.

NATIONALISM AND REGIONALISM

If nations are perceived territorial communities imbued with a range of social ideals, not every such community is a nation. Some recognise higher national communities of which they themselves are only component regions. The academic literature on regionalism is much younger and less rich than that dealing with nationalism, but it shows a similar trend toward anthropocentric, subjective interpretations. In the 1960s, many writers assumed that regionalism was simply a dependent characteristic of regions - a region being "a homogeneous area with physical and cultural characteristics distinct from those of neighboring areas".⁸² In the 1980s, however, it was recognised that region is to regionalism as nation is to nationalism.

The region, internally unified, externally bounded and sanctified by the transcendent value of an enduring common culture, is a modern artificialist construct. As such it is of a piece with the

81. Gellner 1983: 106.

82. Vance 1968: 377. Stein (1967: 42) even ridicules the Tamil regionalist who cannot specify what objective geographical variables define his region: "If that question cannot be answered clearly, the speaker is not talking about a region; it may only be a scratch on his mind". Such scratches, however, tend to mark history more deeply than the distributions of dialects or housebuilding styles.

concept of the nation-state which is likewise unified, bounded and sanctified. (83)

Regionalism, whether as a form of patriotism or as a political phenomenon, is distinguished from nationalism by its less absolute quality. Regions are relative categories, nations much more their own measure. Regionalists demand equity rather than self-sufficiency, autonomy rather than freedom. People may march for their region, but they are unlikely to be willing to die for it. If they seem to be, they are probably calling it a nation: Euzkadi rather than the Basque provinces, *Bangsa Moro* rather than the Muslim southern Philippines. Such metamorphoses demonstrate the essential continuity between regional and national identities as well as the threshold between them.

Region - *landstreek* or *gebied* in Dutch, *daerah* in modern Indonesian - is an uninspiring word in any language, and indeed, strong subnational communities tend to be envisaged primarily in ethnic or religious rather than geographic terms. Nevertheless, it is valuable to distinguish those which have a territorial basis from those which do not, for only the former have the potential to reject any overcapping community and become - or remain - nations in their own right. We are familiar with this phenomenon in the context of independent states, but less so with its implications under colonial conditions. Biafra and Eritrea, not Peru, Vietnam or even Pakistan, have brought home the fact that one person's region is another's nation. While recent regionalist and secessionist movements have been intensively

83. Heesterman 1986: 89.

studied, centrifugal tendencies under colonial rule have been almost forgotten.⁸⁴

Some broad reasons for this neglect - teleology, anachronism and moral bias - have already been suggested. However, there are also technical obstacles to the study of the relationship between region and nation under colonial conditions. One is that where the state makes no pretence to be a nation-state, there is no fixed criterion by which to judge the threshold between regionalism and nationalism. This means that only very close attention to the writings and debates of the period concerned can reveal the changing relationship between the various imagined communities which coexist within a colonial territory. This will be my task in the following chapters.

Another difficulty is linguistic. To predicate nation and region upon nationalism and regionalism would seem to place a heavy burden of evidence upon the vocabulary used by the group concerned. But we have seen how even the European nation has drifted in meaning from ethnicity via statehood to an ambiguous amalgam of both. The language groups of the Philippines were *naciones* for early Spanish friars, the Makasarese a nation to seventeenth century English traders.⁸⁵ The problems multiply when the terminology is not European but its usage is influenced by European

84. Partial exceptions include the work of Kasfir (1971) on Bugandan "cultural sub-nationalism" in British Uganda and Heesterman (1986: 85-91) on Maharashtrian nationalism in British India.

85. Combes 1667: 24; Gervaise 1971 [1701]: 62, 76.

concepts. The Malay word *bangsa*, for instance, has undergone a semantic drift which closely parallels that of *natio* and its derivatives. Formerly a very flexible classifier with a special affinity for human genealogical and ethnic units, *bangsa* has acquired the primary meaning of nation, complete with political connotations.⁸⁶ *Bangsa Jawa* and *bangsa Ambon* are no more - individual ethnicities within Indonesia are now *sukubangsa*, and such once standard expressions as *bangsa perempuan* (the female sex) and *bangsa Islam* (Muslims) have also become curiosities.⁸⁷ In Indonesia this transformation was much more rapid than in Europe, but there were nevertheless several decades in which old, new and intermediate usages coexisted. What a given writer of this period means by *bangsa* can only be determined contextually. In quotations, I will therefore leave this and other ambiguous collective nouns untranslated.

A final problem is that of selecting a geographic study area. Having rejected the conventional frame of reference provided by modern national frontiers, we are obliged to choose another. In order to demonstrate the corrective value of the enterprise, however, it is necessary to select

86. *Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia* 1988: 76-77. *Bangsa* comes from a Sanskrit word combining the meanings of lineage, race, family, stock, nobility, dynasty, multitude and assemblage, apparently on the basis of a single metaphor, the structure and growth of a type of bamboo (Monier-Williams 1899: 910). Bamboo also has an important symbolic role in many Indonesian cultures - see, for instance, Barnes (1974: 229-233, 305-307).

87. Nevertheless, a book on "*bangsa Batak*" was published under state auspices as late as 1960, while a 1988 dictionary of Indonesian continues to list sex, type, and aristocratic lineage as secondary meanings of *bangsa* (Harahap 1960; *Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia* 1988: 76-77).

one which is no more a neutral geographical expression than is modern Indonesia. And by concentrating upon a smaller area defined by a powerful perceived community of its own, we inevitably risk exchanging one teleology for another. This danger can be minimised by careful avoidance of anachronism and by maximal use of internal sources where they are available. But even if the moving platform of such a perceived community has its disadvantages as an historiographic vantage point, it still offers its own view of its relationship - if any - to Indonesia, rather than the view sideways from Batavia or backwards from Jakarta.

THE CASE STUDY: MINAHASA

That teleology has not entirely been avoided is betrayed by the fact that as a geographical term, Minahasa is probably less than half a century older than Indonesia. As a perceived community, its lead was somewhat greater; nevertheless, it crystallised as the result of an historical process, changed continuously in nature, and always coexisted in the minds of its members with a range of narrower and wider communities from kindred groups to Christendom. The study which follows is substantially about the making of Minahasa, and it will be impossible at times not to treat Minahasa as if it were a fixed benchmark rather than a moving target. On the other hand, I will also be concerned with the contingent, sometimes arbitrary nature of the processes by which it was delimited, and with the ways in which it was sometimes predicated upon other communities with other boundaries.

The enduring strength of Minahasa as an ethnic and regional identity in modern Indonesia is well known. Indeed, internal unity is probably a more conscious ideal among Minahasans than among any other regional group.⁸⁸ At a superficial level, the reasons for this seem obvious - a strong belief in common descent, a nostalgic attachment to a single homeland, and the sometimes awkward position of a Christian, Westernised minority in an overwhelmingly Muslim country. I will argue, however, that these are all symptoms rather than causes. Today's stereotypes exaggerate both the primordial aspects of the identity and the extent to which it has been shaped by its external Indonesian environment. In fact, Minahasa as a perceived community is essentially a modern phenomenon produced by many of the same forces which have shaped the Indonesian one. But it evolved along its own lines, parallel to, more than as an integral part of, the Indonesian nation.

The complex nature of the Minahasan identity is well illustrated by the contradictory images which surround it. On the one hand, the Indonesian credentials - a hard fought anticolonial war, a respectable crop of heroes of Indonesian nationalism, an integral contribution to the final independence struggle.⁸⁹ On the other hand, still not

88. See, for instance, Lundstrom-Burghoorn (1981: 44, 53).

89. The war is the Tondano War of 1808-1809. The most prominent heroes are G.S.S.J. Ratulangie and R.W. Mongisidi. The contribution to revolution was primarily that of the Minahasan militia unit KRIS. For celebrations of Minahasa's place in the Indonesian nation, see Patang (1976) and Torar (1985).

wholly submerged, an equally uncompromising myth of Dutchness - Minahasa as the "twelfth province" of the Greater Netherlands, a lonely outpost of Western culture and Christianity, a bastion of loyalty to the colonial power.⁹⁰ And somewhere in between, the key to understanding both, are ideas and images which emanate from Minahasa itself: unity and equality, a tribal democracy, martial valour, knowledge and civilisation, church spires among palm trees, a lush landscape of great volcanoes, a pagan war dance, a hunting owl.⁹¹

But to dwell too long upon the myths, before beginning with the history, would defeat the purpose of the exercise. The following chapters represent a thematic account of the development of perceived communities as experienced by Minahasans during the colonial period. Chapter 2 sets the precolonial scene and traces the territorial differentiation of Minahasa from neighbouring areas. Chapter 3 describes the emergence of Minahasa as a self-contained, self-aware community during the nineteenth century. Chapter 4 deals with the ways in which the increasing integration of Minahasa into wider social systems affected its ethnic and geographical world-view. Chapter 5 examines the emergence of political nationalism among Minahasans, and Chapter 6 the

90. The old loyalist stereotype is outlined by Resink (1968: 15) and Godée Molsbergen (1928: iii).

91. The dance is the *cakalele* or *mahasasau*, still performed on many public occasions. The owl is the *wara' wengi* or *manguni*, a central figure in old Minahasan mythology and a recurrent symbol of Minahasan identity.

ways in which this nationalism intersected and interacted with developments elsewhere in the Netherlands Indies.

The practical objectives are twofold. Firstly, to describe and explain the evolution of national identity among Minahasans. Secondly, to assess to what extent their perceived national community was exclusive, and to what extent it also included members of non-Minahasan groups. The five models of nationalism defined above are brought to bear as appropriate in order to make sense of the processes at work. A final chapter summarises the conclusions drawn, suggests some implications for the study of Indonesia in the late colonial period, and briefly traces the continuing effect of the developments described upon Minahasan history after 1942.

CHAPTER 2: MINAHASA AS A TERRITORIAL UNIT

This chapter shows how the delimitation of Minahasa as a colonial territory laid the foundations for nationalism by defining the home country and the foreigner, by bringing about political unification, and by creating a new kind of relationship between people and land. In order to appreciate these and subsequent developments, it is first necessary to construct an approximate picture of conditions in precolonial North Celebes.¹

PRECOLONIAL NORTH CELEBES: CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the human geography of North Celebes still featured the relatively even Austronesian cultural surface which had already become a dim substratum elsewhere in island Southeast Asia. Indian influence had been negligible even in comparison with parts of the Philippines. There were no conspicuous Hindu religious accretions, no Indic scripts, and very few Indian linguistic borrowings.² Islam seems to have reached certain aristocratic groups via Ternate in the 1560s, but would not become an important part of folk culture until the late nineteenth century.³ Contact with Spanish and Portuguese

1. The places mentioned in this chapter are shown on Maps 2 and 3.

2. Gonda (1973: 112) notes that the abundance of Sanskrit in Tagalog and Bisayan "contrasts strikingly with their scarcity in the idioms of North Celebes".

3. A raja in Bolaang had recently been converted to Islam when a Portuguese missionary visited him in 1563 (Wessels

traders and explorers began in the 1520s, and several Jesuit missionaries visited the area from 1563 onward, but only on the island of Siau was a European presence at all sustained in the sixteenth century.⁴

The languages of the northern arm of Celebes and its archipelagic continuation, the Sangir and Talaud islands, all belong to the West Malayo-Polynesian branch of the Austronesian family.⁵ Those east of Buol are now classified into three broad groups, termed Gorontalic, Minahasan, and Sangiric, but the similarities and borrowings between them are so extensive that a definitive classification has not been possible until recently.⁶ All have strong affinities with the languages of the Philippines.

In the seventeenth century the area supported a sparse but fairly even population living by farming, hunting and

1933: 373). Indigenous tradition places the introduction of Islam to Limboto in 1562 (Bastiaans 1938: 231). Gorontalo was almost the only area where a continuous Islamic tradition was established, yet even there strict adherence was still restricted to the aristocracy in 1870 (Riedel 1870: 98).

4. Castaways from the second Spanish Pacific expedition spent the years 1526-1528 in the Sangir archipelago, and apparently also on the mainland (De la Costa 1958: 7-11). Subsequent European contact was sporadic until the evangelical missions from Portuguese Ternate described by Wessels (1933). Siau established political relations with the Portuguese in the 1560s and with Spanish Manila in 1593 (Wessels 1933: 377-378, 392-393).

5. Blust 1987: 30-31.

6. Sneddon 1978, 1984; Sneddon & Usup 1986. One illustration of the classificatory difficulties is that the Mongondow language, always associated with Minahasa in prewar publications, has now been identified as Gorontalic (Adriani & Kruijt 1912-1914 III: 347; *Atlas van Tropisch Nederland* 1938: 9b (map by S.J. Esser); Sneddon & Usup 1986: 410).

fishing.⁷ In the highlands around Lake Tondano near the tip of the peninsula, fertile volcanic soils and a rudimentary type of wet rice agriculture made possible a relatively high population density, perhaps eight persons per square kilometre in 1679.⁸ The Sangir islands, particularly Siau, were also unusually populous.⁹ In general, however, land was in abundant supply. Most cultivation took place on temporary dry fields cleared from the ubiquitous rain forest for one or two seasons.¹⁰ Wild sago was an important food in many places, and the forest was everywhere a source of game and useful vegetable products. For coastal and lakeside communities fishing was also important, and one group, the sea nomads or Bajau, were almost wholly specialised in the collection of marine products.¹¹

7. The information which follows is based where possible on published 16th and 17th century material, and otherwise upon the earliest relevant sources or recent reconstructions. Unless otherwise specified, the order of geographic reference is from southwest (Gorontalo) to northeast (Sangir).

8. Estimate by Wigboldus (1987: 72) on the basis of a 1679 Dutch survey reproduced by Godée Molsbergen (1928: 60). Ricefields irrigated by the annual flooding of Lake Tondano are mentioned in a 17th century account (Godée Molsbergen 1928: 64) and described by Jansen (1861: 233).

9. Valentijn 1724-1726 I part 2: 60. A Jesuit mission report suggests that Siau was barely able to feed its own population in the 1580s (Wessels 1933: 386). Tammes (1940) presents a concise historical demography of areas east of Gorontalo since the 17th century.

10. Riedel 1870: 140-141; Wilken & Schwarz 1867a: 364-366; Edeling 1919 [1875]: 48; Brillman 1938: 42-43.

11. A classic seventeenth century description of the north Celebes Bajau is reproduced by Godée Molsbergen (1928: 70-75).

Apart from the boat-dwelling Bajau, all peoples of northern Celebes lived in defensive wooden stilt-houses containing several nuclear families.¹² Like other Southeast Asians, all chewed betel, gambled on cockfights, and played music on metal gongs. All produced handwoven textiles for practical and ceremonial purposes, although bark cloth was also in use in some areas.¹³ All seem to have possessed some metalworking skills.¹⁴ There was considerable circulation of goods within the region. Uplanders, for instance, bartered foodstuffs and forest products for salt manufactured by coastal groups.¹⁵ Iron, weapons, cloth and ornamental goods were also imported from further afield.¹⁶

All indigenous cultures of northern Celebes featured ancestor worship, shamanism and complex ritual systems connected with agriculture and the promotion of fertility.¹⁷ All placed a strong emphasis upon divination, particularly on the basis of bird calls and animal behaviour. All were pervaded by a leitmotif of duality and complementary

12. Riedel 1870: 127-128; Wilken & Schwarz 1867a: 331-332; Padtbrugge 1866 [1679]: 321-322; Steller 1866: 30.

13. Riedel 1870: 91; Wilken & Schwarz 1867a: 326; Padtbrugge 1866 [1679]: 325-327; Brilman 1938: 46.

14. Riedel 1870: 93; Wilken & Schwarz 1867a: 374; Padtbrugge 1866 [1679]: 325; Brilman 1938: 38.

15. Riedel 1869: 509; Graafland 1898 II: 131.

16. Padtbrugge (1866 [1679]: 325) mentions that Chinese pans were melted down for iron. There were Indian *patola* cloths in Siau in the 1580s (Wessels 1933: 390). Sulu swords and New Guinea bird feathers also seem to have been imported (Palm 1961: 61, 67).

17. Standard published descriptions - Riedel 1870: 127-149; Wilken & Schwarz 1867b: 255-275; Tauchmann 1968; Brilman 1938: 65-93.

opposition. This found expression in oral poetry and ritual practices, and sometimes also in bicephalic political systems.¹⁸

At the same time, all of these cultures incorporated an equally Austronesian concern for human hierarchy. Status differences between individuals were regulated by tradition and expressed in material wealth, clothing and ornamentation. Strong social sanctions prevented the acquisition and display of material attributes of rank by those who did not meet certain criteria of entitlement.¹⁹ Such criteria included ancient or illustrious descent, age, bravery, leadership skills, eloquence, ritual knowledge, and the performance or sponsorship of ritual acts.

The relative emphasis within this range of criteria varied from area to area. In the Gorontalo region, where the twin kingdoms of Limboto and Gorontalo had acquired a considerable degree of institutional stability by the late seventeenth century, the principle of descent dominated and a clearly defined hereditary aristocracy was present, complete with strong internal gradations.²⁰ Hereditary stratification also prevailed in the Sangir archipelago and

18. Schwarz (1907 II: 482-483) and Steller (1913: 69-71) give examples of dyadic oral verse from Minahasa and Sangir respectively. The influence of dyadic thought upon political organisation in Gorontalo and Limboto is described by Bastiaans (1938, 1939).

19. Riedel 1870: 132-133; Padtbrugge 1866 [1679]: 318; Palm 1961: 65; Steller 1866: 25.

20. Francis 1856-1859 III: 290-292; Von Rosenberg 1865: 19-20; Riedel 1870: 65-66.

parts of the north coast of the peninsula.²¹ In the hinterland of Manado, and probably also in Mongondow, the social hierarchy was more open and competitive.²² Here individuals of low birth could improve their status by success in agriculture and headhunting, by attaching themselves to influential patrons, by acquiring dependants of their own, and by accumulating enough resources to hold potlach-like feasts of merit.²³ However, the contrast between the rigid and competitive systems, as a nineteenth century writer would note, was never absolute.

Although anyone may be chosen to exercise power among the Alfurs of Minahasa, they are certainly not indifferent to whether an individual belongs to the *pahangaranan* (from *ngaran*, name or repute), the *ahakai um banua* (elite of the village), the *suruh ne pahangaranan* (nobility in general), or to the *ata* (slaves) or *suruh ne ata* (descendants of slaves). (24)

Despite the relative egalitarianism of some groups, both slavery and inherited status were ubiquitous institutions in North Celebes.²⁵

21. Miete 1938: 357-358; Notosoesanto 1933: 405-406.

22. Mongondow was eventually incorporated into the Bolaang kingdom with its six levels of hereditary stratification, but in the late 17th century this process was not yet complete (Godée Molsbergen 1928: 76).

23. Ritually formalised dependency relationships between adults are discussed by Adam (1925b: 469-477). The merit function of certain costly sacrificial ceremonies is discussed by Tauchmann (1968: 215-226).

24. Riedel 1872a: 565.

25. The Tontemboan made slaves of both debtors and war captives (Graafland 1898 I: 421-422; Schwarz 1908: 29, 83). In the Tonsea area, slave blood remained a stigma 70 years after the official abolition of slavery (Tendeloo 1892: 366-367).

Striking as they are from an analytic viewpoint, the mutual similarities linking the cultures of precolonial northern Celebes are very much in the eye of the taxonomist. From the inside, and indeed also for the European visitors who first described the area, the picture was one of dramatic fragmentation. One aspect of this fragmentation was that linguistic variation over space, though gradual, was very continuous. A given group might make sense of the languages of its immediate neighbours, but was unlikely to understand those spoken only a little farther afield. At least 18 distinct languages were spoken between Buol and Mindanao.²⁶ As in other parts of island southeast Asia, Malay was already something of a maritime lingua franca here in the seventeenth century.²⁷ Some indigenous languages, notably Gorontalo, may have performed comparable roles at a more local level.²⁸ Knowledge of these bridging idioms was, however, restricted.²⁹ The linguistic disunity reflected a high degree of political fragmentation.

26. Wurm & Hattori 1981: 43 (map by J.N. Sneddon).

27. Padtbrugge 1867 [1677]: 158, 173, 177; Stokman 1931: 529.

28. Tumenggung Sis, Ulaen, Tandi, Ingkiwirang & Rondonuwu [1978]: 17.

29. A Malay letter, for instance, had to be translated for the benefit of Limboto court officials in 1677 (Padtbrugge 1867 [1677]: 151). Spanish missionaries in Manado found knowledge of the local languages an absolute necessity (Stokman 1931: 555).

PRECOLONIAL NORTH CELEBES: POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

Valentijn described the northern arm of Celebes in the late seventeenth century as "a multitude of villages and petty kingdoms".³⁰ The political units which made up this complex pattern ranged from tribal to state-like forms. At one end of the spectrum there were compact and relatively autonomous communities based upon kinship and common descent. Indigenous tradition suggests that this form of social organisation was once universal in northern Celebes.³¹ In Gorontalo such tribal communities were called *linula*, in the Manado area *walak*, and in Sangir and Talaud *balage*.³²

In essence, all of these were probably bilateral kindred groups reminiscent of the stereotypical Philippine *barangay*.³³ Although early Dutch accounts often refer to them as *dorpen* or villages, many encompassed more than one settlement. Substantially endogamous and led by a single chief, each was internally uniform in language, tradition and customary law. Even so, it was in tribal zones that the scope for both competition and conflict within each community was greatest. A seventeenth century eyewitness account of tribesmen in the Manado area depicts a

30. Valentijn 1724-1726 I(2): 4.

31. Bastiaans 1939: 28-60; Wilken & Schwarz 1867a: 312-315.

32. Haga 1931: 187; Adriani 1910.

33. Scott 1982: 101-102. Sources for the following synopsis include: for the *linula*, Von Rosenberg (1865: 16-17), Haga (1931: 187-188), and Bastiaans (1939: 28); for the *walak*, Riedel (1872a: 516-526), Adam (1925a: 391-396) and Supit (1986: 43-69); for the *balage*, Adriani (1910: 129) and Miete (1938: 356); for equivalent units in Mongondow, Wilken & Schwarz (1867a: 312-314).

corporatism born more out of rivalry and fear than out of any organic solidarity.

After the chiefs have conferred and discussed a matter the peasants and commoners do so in their turn, and no decision is made except by majority verdict. Once a consensus is reached they will uphold the decision against any counterargument, even to their own detriment. Capital punishment is not properly regulated by public procedures. The friends of a murder victim attempt to deal with the murderer themselves, and the murderer's friends then seek revenge in turn, and so on. Such feuds sometimes become so violent that they wipe out whole families. (34)

Other sources confirm that headhunting sometimes occurred within the kindred unit as well as against external enemies.³⁵

Tribal communities often stood in some relation to external potentates whom they knew as *datu*, *kolano* or *raja* and whom the Europeans called kings.³⁶ In the seventeenth century, Bolaang, Amurang and Manado were centres from which royal influence penetrated the eastern tribal hinterland of the peninsula. The nature and strength of this influence is always difficult to reconstruct and probably varied widely. Violence and the threat of violence sometimes played a part, as stories of early Bolaang military conquests on the Mongondow plateau suggest.³⁷ But when Dutch missionaries reconnoitred this same area in 1866, they reported that "slavish respect for the king's person is combined in

34. Padtbrugge 1866 [1679]: 314.

35. Graafland 1898 I: 407; Godée Molsbergen 1928: 178.

36. Wilken & Schwarz 1867a: 311. *Datu* is a widely distributed Austronesian term, *kolano* is from Ternate, and *raja* is Indic.

37. Wilken & Schwarz 1867a: 299; Dunnebier 1949: 227.

Bolaang-Mongondow with indifference to his commands".³⁸ The raja evoked awe rather than obedience, and his authority was more mystical and symbolic than practical or military. Here and elsewhere, the royal line was credited with miraculous or divine origins as well as hereditary wisdom, cunning and strength.³⁹

In his own immediate domain, however, the power of a monarch was more concrete. Here the relatively corporate tribal organisation of the uplands gave way to a pattern of personal dependency with feudal overtones. In the Sangir archipelago the latter pattern was universal in the seventeenth century, and villagers were identified as followers of a particular raja rather than members of a *balage*.⁴⁰ On the peninsula, a similar situation probably prevailed in the coastal enclaves of Buol, Kaidipang, Bolang Itang, Bolaang and Manado, all royal centres according to seventeenth century accounts.⁴¹ Further west, Limboto and Gorontalo represented a more complex and extensive type of kingdom in which a large number of *linula* chiefdoms were incorporated into a centralised state structure surmounted by a dual monarchy.⁴² Like the powerful Sangirese kingdom of Siau, both Limboto and Gorontalo sometimes acted as

38. Wilken & Schwarz 1867a: 332.

39. Riedel 1870: 114, 120; Bastiaans 1939: 29; Dunnebier 1949: 221-223; Elias [1973]: 63.

40. Valentijn 1724-1726 I(2): 37-62.

41. Padtbrugge 1867 [1677]; Godée Molsbergen 1928: 21, 39-42.

42. Bastiaans (1939) gives a systematic account of this structure for Gorotalo.

predatory rather than patrimonial powers.⁴³ As predators, they reached far outside their own hinterlands to extract slaves and tribute from coastal communities by means of conquest and intimidation.⁴⁴

Tribute was also a feature of more stable vassal relationships. European sources from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century mention rice, tobacco, pottery, turtleshell, gold and slaves as customary forms of tribute to *raja* in the area.⁴⁵ Conversely, the *raja* also controlled the supply and distribution of foreign goods, particularly textiles, among their people. While some simply taxed visiting or resident traders, others acted as monopolistic middlemen themselves, using part of their tribute income to purchase imported goods.⁴⁶ Control over the export of valuable products and the import of scarce and prestigious foreign items was probably an important aspect of royal authority.

The kingdoms of northern Celebes were part of a loose cosmopolitan network held together by alliance and blood as well as trade and navigation. The first European known to have visited Manado recorded that the *raja* of Siau happened to be there at the time as a visitor, and that the *raja* of

43. Under Spanish tutelage Siau became a regional military power and a rival of Ternate itself in the mid seventeenth century (Padtbrugge 1867 [1677]: 187-188).

44. Padtbrugge 1867 [1677]: 152, 157-158, 166.

45. Padtbrugge 1867 [1677]: 155, 165; Von Rosenberg 1865: 25; Riedel 1869: 518; Graafland 1898 I: 77.

46. Padtbrugge 1867 [1677]: 164-165; Wilken & Schwarz 1867a: 296, 375; Godée Molsbergen 1928: 24; Steller 1866: 37.

Manado had a son who ruled in Bolaang.⁴⁷ This son, moreover, was said to count Buol, some 300 kilometres further west, among his dependencies.⁴⁸ In the early seventeenth century parts of Sangir and Talaud had close connections with Mindanao, while Gorontalo was under strong enough Moluccan influence to borrow a large part of its political nomenclature from Ternate.⁴⁹ The people of the cosmopolitan coastlands often referred to the tributary or independent tribesmen of the peninsular interior as Alfurs. This term, also in use in the Moluccas and the Philippines, implied isolation and barbarism.⁵⁰

Once more, the objective contrasts between the Alfurese and maritime peoples should not be overstressed. *Raja* frequently went to war against each other, and headhunting, sanctioned and indeed prescribed by ritual, took place in monarchic and coastal as well as tribal and upland areas.⁵¹ The Alfurese tribal communities, for their part, not only maintained external relations with coastal *raja* but were also linked with each other by shifting alliances and by more stable conceptual and ritual systems, some of which

47. The European was Jesuit priest Diogo de Magelhaes, whose visit in 1563 is described by Wessels (1933: 372-373).

48. Wessels 1933: 380.

49. Laarhoven-Casiño 1985: 136, 173, 285; Francis 1856-1859 III: 290, 314. The parallels between Gorontalo and Ternate in terms of state structure appear to have resulted from imitation rather than conquest (Bastiaans 1938: 240-242).

50. The origin of this word is obscure. According to one source it comes from a Halmahera word meaning wilderness (*Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië* 1917-1921 I: 30).

51. Bastiaans 1938: 228; Brilman 1938: 80, 85.

will be examined in the following chapter. The network of coastal kingdoms presents a picture of fluid but conflictive integration, the Alfurese domain one of mitigated fragmentation.

ATERRITORIALITY IN PRECOLONIAL NORTH CELEBES

In precolonial times the societies of this area were seldom organised on a territorial basis. For the coastal *raja* it was manpower, not territory, which defined the extent of the realm. This is strikingly illustrated by Valentijn's description of one of the Nanusa islands, outliers of the Talaud group, in the late seventeenth century.

This island of Nusa has three villages, Nunusa, Liang and Bakasa. The first belongs partly to the king of Tabukan, partly to the king of Taruna, and partly to the king of Manganitu, all of whom live on the island of Sangir. These three kings have 300, 70 and 30 able-bodied men respectively in Nunusa. The second village, with 80 able-bodied men and at least 200 inhabitants, stands entirely under the supremacy of the king of Tabukan. The third village, which has about 100 inhabitants and can supply some 30 able-bodied men, is under the authority of a *gugugu* or vizier of the king of Tabukan called David Panjalang. (52)

There are 100 kilometres of sea between Sangir and the Nanusa islands. The lord-bondsman pattern of political organisation left little room for any territorial logic, especially since war often caused allegiances to switch and fluctuate rapidly.⁵³

52. Valentijn 1724-1726 I(2): 37.

53. Some such conquests and reorientations in the 17th century are described by Padtbrugge (1867 [1677]: 126-127).

A complementary phenomenon was the footloose, migratory behaviour of a substantial part of the population. Practiced seafarers in an underexploited environment, many coastal and island people were accustomed to repeated local migration.

Houses were formerly constructed from very light materials. Only a fraction of the available land was cultivated, and then only with annual crops. Rights to particular pieces of land were not highly valued under these conditions. Whole villages sometimes used to move to new locations.⁽⁵⁴⁾

The peripatetic tendency was epitomised by the *raja* themselves. Royal authority resided in the person of the monarch rather than in his country or capital, and *raja*, perhaps partly because of their commercial role, seem to have spent much time on the move.⁵⁵ This habit caused European visitors considerable confusion. In late seventeenth century Dutch reports, the same man is variously referred to as the king of Manado, the king of Amurang and the king of Bolaang.⁵⁶ This *raja*, who plays an important part in the coming story, maintained residences and wives or concubines at all three places.⁵⁷

The royal polities had no boundaries, and even the point toponyms which *raja* listed when asked to define their domains were often more ethnic than geographic in nature.

54. Brillman 1938: 27.

55. This is implied by early sources and confirmed for 19th century Sangir by Steller (1866: 36-37). The nominal capital settlements were frequently moved themselves (Wilken & Schwarz 1867c: 6-7; Van Wouden 1941: 360).

56. Padtbrugge 1867 [1677]: 132.

57. Wilken & Schwarz 1867a: 300; Dunnebier 1949: 244.

At some time in the seventeenth century, for instance, a group of people migrated from the island now known as Manado Tua - Old Manado - to the adjacent mainland.⁵⁸ "They brought the name Manado with them", observed a Dutch writer in 1679, "since because of the prevailing changeability of residence, it is customary here that a people gives its name to a land rather than vice versa".⁵⁹

Among the upland Alfurs the situation was different. Here migration was associated with the fission of old communities and the colonisation of frontier areas rather than the wholesale movement of existing settlements.⁶⁰ Tribal groups were strongly localised and often took their names from features of the home landscape - hills, springs, rivers, plants.⁶¹ On the other hand, the available evidence also suggests that although fixed geographic centres figured strongly in group identity, bounded territory on a large scale only became important where there was real competition for resources.

Cultivated land was meticulously partitioned among individual and collective users within a single community, and strips of nearby forest or single trees were often

58. Graafland 1868: 391-393.

59. Padtbrugge 1866 [1679]: 307.

60. Riedel (1862), Jasper (1916) and Domsdorff (1937) recount this process of expansion and dispersion for the Minahasa area. Rivalry within a village or *walak* seems to have been the most common cause of fission.

61. Wilken & Schwarz (1867a: 312-313) and Riedel (1872a: 553-556) give examples.

reserved for future use by means of prohibitory symbols.⁶² But boundaries between separate communities existed only where population pressure and competition for forest resources made them necessary. By 1825, for instance, the *walak* in the populous highlands south of Manado had acquired territorial boundaries, but those in the still sparsely populated Tonsea region at the tip of the peninsula had not.⁶³ Although both place and direction seem to have been important themes in their culture, the Alfurs shared with their maritime neighbours a certain indifference to territory.

COLONIAL TERRITORIALITY:

THE LANDSTREEK VAN MANADO AND THE DUTCH

On 10 January 1679 a treaty was concluded in Manado between "the entire community of the *landstreek van Manado*, or the northernmost part of Celebes", and Robert Padtbrugge, VOC governor of the Moluccas.⁶⁴

In response to their humble joint request, the honourable Company guarantees the village chiefs of Aris, Klabat, Bantik, Upper Klabat, Kakaskasen, Tomohon, Tombariri, Sarongsong, Lower Tongkimbut, Upper Tongkimbut, Rumoong, Tombasian, Langoan, Kakas, Remboken, Tompasso, Tondano, Tonsea, Manado, Tonsawang, and Pasan (the last acting also for Ratahan and Ponosakan), all now gathered here for consultation, that as long as they remain loyal to the death to the Company, it will never abandon them

62. Schwarz 1908: 106, 465.

63. Riedel 1872a: 538. Boundaryless political arrangements on land are also reported for Buol (Van Wouden 1941: 334) and Gorontalo (Riedel 1870: 47).

64. Reproduced by Godée Molsbergen (1928: 55).

or allow the king of Bolaang to regain dominion over these regions and peoples. (65)

At the time, this was only one in a series of agreements signed by the VOC with various North Celebes rulers in the wake of the 1667 treaty by which the defeated kingdom of Makasar surrendered a tenuous claim to the area.⁶⁶ But because the relationship which it formalised was one of unique and growing intensity, the Manado treaty was destined to become an historic document while those involving Gorontalo, Limboto, Siau and Sangir faded into oblivion.⁶⁷ With the establishment in 1679 of a Dutch domain around Manado, and the exclusion of the peripatetic Bolaang-Amurang-Manado *raja*, the colonial territory which would become Minahasa was formally excised from its precolonial, aterritorial environment. The origin of this special relationship, however, lies earlier in the seventeenth century.

Manado was inducted into early colonial history primarily by the ability of its hinterland to produce a large surplus of rice. The first Dutch ship loaded rice in Manado in 1608,

65. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 55. Toponym spellings have been modernised. The two Tongkimbutis probably represent Sonder and Kawangkoan respectively (Supit 1986: 97). Aris was a settlement just outside Manado. Tombasian, Tombariri and Rumoong were Tontemboan *walak* in the Amurang area. According to Tammes (1940: 191), Klabat corresponds to modern Paniki Bawah and Paniki Atas, while Upper Klabat was in the area around Likupang. The remaining places and groups are marked as such on Map 3.

66. Stapel 1922: 243. Makasar played an intermittent and more or less predatory role in north Celebes, extracting tribute as far north as Sangir in the 1630s and menacing the area again in the 1650s and 1660s (Wessels 1935: 32, 111; Godée Molsbergen 1928: 17, 26).

67. The latter treaties are summarised by Alders ([1955]: 83-88).

and in 1627 the king of Spain approved the construction of a stronghold there on the basis of the large rice tribute anticipated.⁶⁸ The Spaniards also had an evangelical interest in Celebes, but in the main it was the need to feed large garrisons in the less bountiful Moluccas which made the northern tip of Celebes an arena of colonial rivalry.

Direct European intervention was a threat to the *raja* who aspired to dominate the Alfurs of the highlands above Manado. Although initial Spanish contact was with the king, the Spaniards gradually learned to bypass him and collect tribute directly from the tribesmen.⁶⁹ In 1643 the *raja* appealed to the VOC in Ternate for help, and a Dutch military expedition arrived in the following year.⁷⁰ The Castilians had ensconced themselves in several fortified upland villages and burned the royal residence at Manado, forcing the king south to Bolaang.⁷¹ Contrary to his own claims, however, the *raja* turned out to command too little active support among the Alfurs to make the joint campaign a success.⁷² It is significant that he had forbidden those

68. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 14; Blair & Robertson 1903-1909 XXII: 146.

69. Riedel 1872c: 196; Godée Molsbergen 1928: 14; Stokman 1931: 551; Wessels 1935: 83-87.

70. *Dagh-Register* 1902 [1644]: 116.

71. *Dagh-Register* 1902 [1644]: 116.

72. Three quarters of all the Alfurese communities north of Bolaang were apparently involved with the Spaniards (*Dagh-Register* 1902 [1644]: 118).

Alfurs still under his influence to sell any rice or other food directly to the Dutch forces.⁷³

In 1655 the VOC resolved to return to Manado in greater strength and build a fort.⁷⁴ Five years later the Spaniards were permanently expelled from mainland north Celebes, and the Dutch had the area to themselves.⁷⁵ At first the VOC appears to have regarded a firm alliance with the raja, Loloda Mokoagow, as essential to its position.⁷⁶ Rice, turtleshell and other commodities were obtained through his agency, and resistance by the lake-dwellers who had been closest to the Spaniards was suppressed with his help.⁷⁷ Later, however, relations with the king deteriorated and the Dutch adopted the Spanish practice of obtaining rice exclusively from the Alfurs who grew it.⁷⁸

This development prompted a further decline in the raja's prestige. The proven military superiority of the VOC, and the fact that the Dutch paid relatively well for rice

73. *Dagh-Register* 1902 [1644]: 118.

74. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 15.

75. Apart from some limited evangelical activity in Bolang Itang, directed from a Spanish post on Siau which was not lost to the Dutch until 1677 (Padtbrugge 1867 [1677]: 122-145).

76. Loloda Mokoagow reigned until 1693 or 1694 and is the first of the Bolaang-Amurang-Manado dynasty whose name appears in published European records (Dunnebier 1949: 235-245).

77. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 18, 23-24.

78. At odds with the head of the VOC garrison, the king fled Manado during the Makasar War in anticipation of a Dutch defeat. After 1667 he repented, but many of his followers were now transferring their allegiance to the VOC (Godée Molsbergen 1928: 25-29).

deliveries using desirable trade textiles, made a strong impression upon the Alfurs.⁷⁹ The violence with which Loloda seems to have responded to signs of disloyalty also did not help his cause.⁸⁰ After 1655 he had reestablished footholds in Manado and Amurang, but with the treaty of 1679 the VOC aimed to eliminate all remaining traces of his influence in the *landstreek van Manado*.

It quickly became clear that such a policy would have to be rigorously enforced. On the southern margin of the territory, the sizeable communities of Tonsawang, Ratahan, Pasan and Ponosakan continued to render tribute to Bolaang and were reduced to obedience only by a punitive expedition in which some of their local enemies took part alongside Dutch forces.⁸¹ In a later treaty it is noted that these four groups are in the special position of having been "defeated by the Company's arms".⁸² The Bantik people in the immediate neighbourhood of Manado, while they could not afford open disobedience to the Dutch, continued to send tribute to Bolaang in secret until as late as 1850.⁸³

79. The VOC deliberately raised the price which it paid for Manado rice in order to win over former followers of the raja (Godée Molsbergen 1928: 29).

80. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 55.

81. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 61, 79-81. A crude set of population estimates for 1644 makes Tonsawang, with some 3,000 able-bodied men, the largest place in the *landstreek*. Ponosakan, with 1,000, was also as large as any of the more northerly groups (*Dagh-Register* 1902 [1644]: 118).

82. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 142.

83. Graafland 1898 I: 77; Godée Molsbergen 1928: 57.

The other "villages" or tribal groups listed in the 1679 treaty were clearly less attached to the *raja*. In the Amurang area there was violent antipathy toward him.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, there are indications that even here the aura of royal authority was not entirely dissipated. According to the preamble to the treaty, the assembled chiefs felt it necessary to claim "that they have never abandoned their king, but rather that he has abandoned them and sought to do them all possible harm and injury".⁸⁵ Years later, when Loloda Mokoagow died, craftsmen from the Dutch zone apparently travelled south to fashion his grave.⁸⁶

Wary of any such continued intercourse between their territory and what they perceived as the domain of Bolaang, the Dutch strove to establish a clear boundary in place of the broad no man's land between Amurang and Ponosakan which had separated the two zones at the time of the treaty.⁸⁷ In 1694 the VOC engineered an agreement between Bolaang and the chiefs of the *landstreek van Manado* by which the Poigar river, 35 kilometres southwest of Amurang, became the definitive frontier.⁸⁸ In the following year Loloda's

84. De Clercq 1870: 522; Godée Molsbergen 1928: 76.

85. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 55. It is unlikely that this declaration was made to satisfy the Dutch, who had already taken under their wing many deserters of the king (Godée Molsbergen 1928: 29).

86. Wilken & Schwarz 1867a: 304; Wilken & Schwarz 1867c: 241.

87. Padtbrugge reported in 1682 that the "Manadonese highlanders" forbade the king of Bolaang to establish settlements here "for fear of getting the yoke back on their necks" (Godée Molsbergen 1928: 76).

88. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 103.

successor formally agreed never to collect rice from Alfurs north of this boundary.⁸⁹ From now on, all such rice was to be Manado rice, destined for the warehouse of the Company.

The problem, however, was not over for the VOC. In the early years of the eighteenth century, dissatisfaction in the Dutch area led many inhabitants to seek refuge under Bolaang. Encouraged by this development, the Bolaang rulers repeatedly restated their old claims in the north and attempted to reestablish a presence at Amurang.⁹⁰ In 1748 the incumbent *raja* was arrested and deported for extending his frontiers and admitting foreigners into his kingdom.⁹¹ In 1756 a new and rigorous border agreement was signed between the VOC and Bolaang, this time without the participation of the Manado chiefs.

The domain, jurisdiction and territory of Bolaang shall not extend further in the direction of Manado than the line between Poigar, Pontak and Buyat. The peoples of Mongondow and Bolaang shall not under normal circumstances venture across this line, and nor shall Manadonese Alfurs cross it in the opposite direction. Tonsawang, Ponosakan and Amurang will thus remain an inalienable part of the Manadonese lands. A Mongondow Alfur wishing to cross the boundary for sufficiently good reason may do so only with written permission from the Company's representative in Manado. (92)

89. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 113.

90. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 96, 100, 102-103; Dunnebier 1949: 246-249.

91. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 117.

92. Reproduced by Godée Molsbergen (1928: 119-120).

The Dutch would never quite succeed in making the seal hermetic.⁹³ Nevertheless, the boundary which they created ultimately came to separate two distinct countries where formerly there had been amorphous fluidity. In the south, where the *raja* gradually consolidated their authority over the Alfurs of the Mongondow interior, there emerged what was known in the nineteenth and early twentieth century as the kingdom of Bolaang-Mongondow.⁹⁴ In the north, on the other hand, it was the Dutch themselves who provided a unifying political framework for the Alfurs, and in doing so made it possible for the *landstreek van Manado* to become a country called Minahasa.

POLITICAL UNITY IN THE DUTCH ZONE: MINAHASA

The name Minahasa means united, become one.⁹⁵ The unity to which it alludes has most often been attributed to an ancient alliance against Bolaang-Mongondow. Oral tradition as committed to paper in the nineteenth century suggests that despite multiple blood ties between Minahasan groups and the Bolaang dynasty, united and violent opposition to the *raja* did occur among a large section of the Alfur

93. By 1866 more than 700 northerners were living south of the border, and movement was still going on (Wilken & Schwarz 1867a: 304, Wilken & Schwarz 1867c: 13).

94. In 1682 only a fraction of the Mongondow Alfurs were reported to be "fully obedient" to Bolaang (Godée Molsbergen 1928: 76). The relationship at this time was probably not very different from that which had formerly prevailed further north.

95. In this form the word is Tombulu, but it has close cognates - Minaesa, Nimahasa, Nimaesa - in the other languages of Minahasa (Schwarz 1908: 46; Watuseke 1958: 25).

population even before the arrival of the Spanish.⁹⁶ From Dutch records, however, it is also known that the last and decisive battle against Bolaang happened in 1693, when "the united parties" of the Alfurs defeated an attack by Loloda Mokoagow at Tompaso.⁹⁷ If this and other seventeenth century events fertilised the tradition of a common struggle against Bolaang, then the folk memory of Minahasan unity is not necessarily older than the European political circumscription of the *landstreek van Manado*.

Even if a common rejection of the military and commercial ambitions of the coastal *raja* did generate some external semblance of unity among the Alfurs of the *landstreek*, internal unity was a different matter. A Spanish account published in 1663 describes the "Provincia de Manados" as a land of "parties, conflicts and feuds".⁹⁸ The Dutch in turn saw themselves as engineering, rather than simply exploiting, unity among their new Alfurese subjects.

They fight with each other over nothing, and war, once ignited, spreads through all the villages like a bush fire. Each man chooses sides according to his own notions or interests, or simply with a view to obtaining heads, even those of old men and women or innocent children. When such a fire breaks out we immediately send some of our own people, preferably those with knowledge of the local customs and languages, to douse it. Because the Company's judgement is regarded here as oracular, even serious conflicts can be resolved by our mediation. (99)

96. Riedel 1862: 48-49: Wilken & Schwarz 1867a: 305-307.

97. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 88-89.

98. Colin 1904 [1663]: 111.

99. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 63-64. Reproduced from a 1682 memoir by Robert Padtbrugge.

In playing this role of quasi-supernatural mediator in disputes between the Alfurs, it is possible that the Company had inherited a former royal function which the *raja*, in the changed political circumstances, now seemed unfit to perform.

Rivalry between individuals and communities was a key element in the culture of the Alfurs. Yet early Dutch observers also saw that rivalry itself, under certain conditions, provided the basis for a tense kind of unity.

They are extremely jealous of each other, and none among them can do anything out of the ordinary without incurring the hostility of the whole land. They are also very stubborn and will not retreat one step from a decision which they have made among themselves, even if it is unfair, unreasonable, wicked, and entirely contrary to their own interests.(100)

Spanish missionaries too had complained that no village in the uplands would accept Christianity unless its neighbours all did likewise.¹⁰¹ By supplying a fixed external framework to hold the rivalries of the Alfurs in balance, the Europeans helped realise the uniting potential of such mutual distrust.

Spanish soldiers and missionaries had arranged gatherings involving many Alfur chiefs, and this practice was continued by the VOC.¹⁰² Regular convocation of all prominent chiefs in the territory for the purpose of joint negotiation with the Dutch gradually lent a stronger experienced reality to

100. Padtbrugge 1866 [1679]: 310.

101. Stokman 1931: 533, 535.

102. Stokman 1931: 533, 535; Padtbrugge 1867 [1677]: 118-120; Godée Molsbergen 1928: 124.

the *landstreek van Manado*.¹⁰³ When the word Minahasa first appears in Dutch records in 1789, it refers not to the territory, nor even to its population as a whole, but to the *landraad* or council of chiefs convened to receive Dutch instructions and resolve internal disputes.¹⁰⁴ Not until 1822 is there any hard evidence that the term is being used in a geographic or ethnic sense.¹⁰⁵ When the shift in meaning did occur, however, it was immediately to the colonial *landstreek van Manado* that the name Minahasa was applied.

The process of political unification was not unilinear, and developments were conditioned by the nature of indigenous society as well as by colonial priorities. Although happy enough to sidestep the *raja* when it became clear that his assistance was unnecessary to their commercial project, in later times the Dutch periodically became vexed by the political fragmentation of the uplands and sought a new centralised form of native administration to make their own task easier.

Then it would only be necessary to reach an agreement with one chief whenever we had to deal with these people, or they had to perform some service for the Company. At present, the situation is that even in the most insignificant case we must be content to beg and implore until all 20 village

103. Attendance at such gatherings became a contractual obligation for the chiefs in 1790 (Godée Molsbergen 1928: 142).

104. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 135, 137, 139.

105. Reinwardt 1858: 583. Mangindaan (1873: 368) suggests that the shift in meaning was completed in around 1808 or 1809.

chiefs, with the same number of different opinions, arrive at a single sentiment.(106)

On three occasions the Dutch made brief attempts to invest particular Alfurese chiefs with special powers over their neighbours.¹⁰⁷ In all cases the results were disastrous. Assured of external support, the appointed leaders behaved as despots. Their worst caprices were reserved for traditional enemies, who responded with violence or flight and resented the Company's favouritism. Most Dutch officials, however, learnt the lesson that no indigenous authority above the level of the individual tribal community or *walak* was likely to be stable in the *landstreek van Manado*. If stability was to be maintained, the Company itself would have to hold the balance between the *walak*.

Peace was important to the Dutch for more than ethical reasons, for conflict tended to stem the flow of rice to the Company warehouse in Manado.¹⁰⁸ The major supplementary treaties concluded between the VOC and the chiefs of the *landstreek* in 1699 and 1790 feature strong injunctions against headhunting and wars of vengeance.¹⁰⁹ Murderers were to be turned over to the Dutch for judgement. But although arrests and banishments became more common toward the end of the eighteenth century, the Company was not

106. From a 1744 memoir, reproduced by Godée Molsbergen (1928: 114).

107. Three favoured chiefs were licenced to judge and fine their compatriots from the last years of the 17th century until 1710. A single chief was granted similar powers between 1739 and 1743, and another at the end of the century (Godée Molsbergen 1928: 90, 96-102, 104, 114-115, 124, 195).

108. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 125, 137.

109. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 91, 143.

usually in a strong enough logistic position to enforce peace by military means. In the main, its role remained one of mediation through the medium of the *landraad*. In 1789, for instance, the Dutch Resident persuaded every *walak* to contribute some men for a joint garrison to prevent bloodshed between two opposed villages.¹¹⁰ Such efforts were not always successful in the short term, for violence was still a fundamental part of the cultural scene. Nevertheless, because the Company learned to treat all the rival *walak* impartially, it exerted a strong unifying influence in the long term.¹¹¹

The fragility of any unity achieved outside the framework of foreign mediation was dramatically demonstrated when some Minahasans attempted to throw off Dutch authority in 1808. Embittered by a clumsy attempt to enlist 2,000 Alfurs to assist in the defence of Java against an expected British attack, the majority of the chiefs initially elected at an independent gathering in Tondano to suspend all relations with Manado.¹¹² When the Dutch went to war against the rebels, however, most *walak* not only deserted the Tondano

110. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 135.

111. One indication of the Company's authority is an oral tradition attributing the creation of Sonder as an independent *walak* to a Dutch pronouncement (Schwarz 1907 II: 211-214).

112. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 163-169; Supit 1986: 154-198; Mambu 1986.

instigators but fought actively against them on the colonial side in what became known as the Tondano War.¹¹³

FROM MEDIATION TO ADMINISTRATION:

MINAHASA AS A TERRITORIAL STATE

After the British interregnum, which in Minahasa lasted from 1810 to 1817, Dutch intervention in the internal affairs of the *walak* began to intensify rapidly. The initial reason for this was economic. Throughout the eighteenth century, the economic role of the *landstreek van Manado* remained the one for which the Dutch had first cherished it - "granary of Ternate", supplier of food for Company stations in the Moluccas.¹¹⁴ At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, it was discovered that conditions in the uplands were also ideal for the production of high quality coffee for the European market.¹¹⁵ In 1822 the purchase and export of coffee was declared a government monopoly in Minahasa and its cultivation was made compulsory for all villagers.¹¹⁶

The rigour of the system anticipated that of the *cultuurstelsel* soon to be established in Java. Payment - first in textiles, later in cash - was at a rate well below

113. Mangindaan 1873: 368; Graafland 1898 I: 420; Godée Molsbergen 1928: 168-169. Tondano was captured in August 1809 after a long siege.

114. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 97, 105-106, 121, 141, 147, 173.

115. Coffee was introduced to Minahasa in 1796 and spread quite extensively as a commercial crop before it was appropriated by the state (Graafland 1898 I: 185).

116. Graafland 1898 I: 185-186. Cultivation was organised at village level. Production varied widely from year to year, but coffee completely superseded rice as the staple export.

that obtainable on the free market. In the previous century considerable private commerce had existed alongside that of the Company.¹¹⁷ Now, however, economic isolation became almost complete. Colonial officials even monopolised the retail business, restricting Chinese traders to Manado.¹¹⁸ With the construction in 1852 of coffee warehouses in the uplands, Minahasans no longer brought produce to the coast even for compulsory trade.¹¹⁹

Besides enhancing Minahasa's isolation from its immediate environment, compulsory coffee cultivation also made necessary - and economical - an unprecedented level of colonial surveillance and control. Official *koffieopzieners* supervised the planting and delivery of the crop, and stakes were erected in the coffee gardens for the physical punishment of those reluctant to work.¹²⁰ Numerous roads for efficient transport of the product were also built using compulsory *herendienst*, or *corvée* labour. Colonial compulsion also contributed to the elimination of tribal warfare, and the last headhunt in Minahasa was reported in 1862.¹²¹

117. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 122.

118. Riedel 1872a: 558.

119. Graafland 1898 I: 517.

120. Graafland 1898 I: 186.

121. 'Iets over het bijgeloof in de Minahassa' 1870: 5. The cultural transformation discussed in the following chapter was also central to this development, but contemporaries were explicit that fear was a factor (Graafland 1898 I: 408).

Initially, one important means of control was the further restriction of individual mobility. In 1825 a Dutch ordinance rendered the *walak* a more thoroughly closed community than it had ever been in independent times.¹²²

The crossing over of people from one *walak* to another has caused much unpleasantness between the chiefs and much detriment to public order. In almost all cases I have found that those who leave their villages and *walak* either owe debts, or are unwilling to work, or are enticed over by others. For these reasons I have completely forbidden movement between the *walak*.⁽¹²³⁾

After 1864 this regulation was gradually relaxed, and by the turn of the century a government pass was necessary only when travelling outside Minahasa.¹²⁴ Nevertheless, the closure of the *walak* reflected a broader and more permanent development in which a new territorial order was imposed upon Minahasan society. Europeans had referred to the *walak* as "districts" as early as 1803, and after 1817 the changes wrought by European government made territory more and more intrinsic to their nature.¹²⁵

This change was closely associated with the progressive incorporation of *walak* leadership into the colonial state.

122. Disputes within the *walak* and the capture of slaves in war both led to movements between *walak* under precolonial conditions (Padtbrugge 1866 [1677]: 315). Exogamous marriage, although certainly rare, may also have been possible if a high enough bride price was offered ('Statistieke aantekeningen over de residentie Menado' 1840: 121; Riedel 1872a: 480).

123. Quoted by Riedel (1872a: 480-481).

124. Edeling 1919 [1875]: 77; *Tjahaja Sijang*, 7 April 1899. Government approval continued to be necessary after 1864 for permanent migration between *walak*, however (Edeling 1919 [1875]: 17).

125. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 158.

The coercion necessary to enforce the coffee monopoly was applied mainly by the Minahasan chiefs themselves. Their cooptation was a complex process involving material gain, enhancement of status, external support against rivals within the *walak*, and the increasing Dutch cultural hegemony which will be discussed in the following chapter.¹²⁶ The chiefs received a fixed percentage of the total payment for coffee and rice produced within their districts, and after 1851 a local money tax.¹²⁷ Labour services for the chiefs were also regulated by the government. In 1858 the ranks and functions of all native officials down to the level of village chief were standardised.¹²⁸ In 1859 ceremonial *payung* like those used by Javanese regents were issued as tokens of an authority now derived not from the *walak* but from the colonial government.¹²⁹ In 1881 the district chiefs became salaried civil servants, and Minahasa a true colonial polity.¹³⁰

In the eighteenth century the *walak* chiefs had been leaders and representatives of self-defining human communities. By the end of the nineteenth, they had become administrators of

126. This process of bureaucratisation is the subject of a dissertation by Schouten (1978).

127. Schouten 1978: 48-49. Compulsory rice deliveries were replaced in 1851 by a head tax.

128. Riedel 1872a: 561.

129. Graafland 1898 II: 253-264.

130. Schouten 1987: 124.

geographic territories.¹³¹ One factor in this territorialisation process was demographic growth. A rapid rise in population density, stimulated by peace and smallpox inoculation, increased the need for clear boundaries by making land disputes a more common cause of friction between the *walak*.¹³²

Table 2.1: Population of Minahasa, 1825-1930.(133)

<u>1825</u>	73,000	<u>1860</u>	94,540	<u>1894</u>	162,576
<u>1840</u>	84,000	<u>1870</u>	108,356	<u>1920</u>	241,909
<u>1854</u>	87,637	<u>1873</u>	111,968	<u>1930</u>	307,767

Under colonial pressure, however, territory also acquired a bureaucratic logic of its own. When the first attempt to establish definitive district boundaries was made in the 1860s, the jigsaw was cut approximately in accordance with the existing distribution of *walak*.¹³⁴ The surveyors, however, had discovered enclaves and exclaves in the pattern of *walak* which impaired the efficiency of administration and *herendienst* execution. In 1882 the most dramatic of these were abolished by government fiat and their inhabitants

131. Even the *kumarua* or vice chief of each *walak* was allotted his own administrative subdistrict (Graafland 1898: 68).

132. Smallpox inoculation was introduced in 1822 after a disastrous epidemic (Graafland 1898 I: 86).

133. Figures collected from a wide range of sources by Tammes (1940: 190). The earlier ones are probably underestimates.

134. Edeling 1919 [1875]: 15.

redesignated as members of contiguous districts.¹³⁵ From 1871 onward some of the smallest *walak* were amalgamated in an effort to standardise the size of the districts. In 1908 one district was dismembered between three of its neighbours. By the end of the same year only six of the original 26 *walak* were still in existence as districts.¹³⁶ The cumulative effect was the dissolution of the precolonial political units and the emergence of Minahasa as a whole as the definitive administrative territory.

That there was an aesthetic as well as a practical aspect to the colonial concern with uniformity and spatial order is illustrated by the uniform plan upon which the villages of Minahasa were rebuilt under government supervision after a major earthquake in 1845.¹³⁷ "When one has seen one", it was said, "one has seen them all".¹³⁸

The streets in the villages are straight, and the main ones quite broad as a rule. Besides the main street, which runs through the centre of the village and emerges onto the square, there are parallel and perpendicular streets in a gridiron pattern. Along the streetsides are neat hedges of roses, bluebells, *bunga burung* or *belontas*, according to the taste of the chief or sometimes the villagers themselves, which does lend some variety. The ground, finally, is divided into house plots, each with a neat little

135. Graafland (1898 I: 58) called the original situation "ridiculous", and Adam (1925a: 394) referred to the reform as "a rather drastic but very beneficial measure".

136. Adam 1925a: 393-394.

137. Graafland 1898 I: 514. This aesthetic probably owed something to the developing art of cartography. The first complete map of Minahasa seems to have been available in 1821 (Reinwardt 1858: 581).

138. Graafland 1898 I: 266.

white and blue house half hidden in the foliage cultivated on the plot or *kintal*.⁽¹³⁹⁾

The same author described the precolonial agglomerations of multiple household dwellings as "chaotic and dispersed settlements which passed for villages".¹⁴⁰

After 1881, district chiefs could be transferred anywhere in Minahasa, regardless of their personal connections or their *walak* of origin.¹⁴¹ Impersonality was a fundamental characteristic of the new political system. Ethnicity and community membership ceased to mediate the relationship between Minahasans and the government. Only residence within the administrative territory was significant, and the bureaucratic regime was averse to exceptions. The changing attitude to religious differences is illustrative here. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Christians in the *landstreek van Manado*, including converts among the Alfurs, had been treated as a separate category of the population. On the coast they formed "*burger*" settlements exempt from *herendienst*, and at Tondano in the uplands the Christians were regarded as a separate *walak* with a chief of their own.¹⁴² But when the government ordered a

139. Graafland 1898 I: 267.

140. Graafland 1898 I: 514. Of secondary political importance in the precolonial period, the village (*wanua*, *ro'ong*) became a key administrative unit in the 19th century, acquiring powers such as land allocation previously held by the *walak* (Brouwer 1936: 33-36; Scouten 1987b: 90).

141. Schouten 1987: 124.

142. The *burgers* were a mixed group descended partly from freed slaves brought from elsewhere by the VOC, but their numbers were boosted in the eighteenth century by baptised Alfurs (Brouwer 1936: 113; Edeling 1919 [1875]: 87). Besides Tondano, the Bantik group was also divided into "Bantik Kristen" and "Bantik Alifuru" (Supit 1986: 161-162).

codification of Minahasan customary law in 1901, every attempt was made to uncover a common set of precepts for pagans and Christians alike.¹⁴³ A district chief of the young generation agreed that legal differentiation on the basis of religion was no longer acceptable and that any change would have to be implemented on a Minahasan basis.

It is surely not feasible, and would be contrary to all principles of good administration, to grant a certain category of the population a legal status from which other people of the same land and race, and equally good and worthy, are excluded only because they are not Christians.(144)

The contradiction between this principle of equality before the law and the privileged position of Europeans in colonial society was to inform the political nationalism discussed in Chapter 5. This was the case everywhere in the Dutch Indies, but Minahasa was unusual in that the contradiction was already clear before the Dutch Indies had taken territorial shape. Minahasa in 1901 was an island of established colonial rule in an archipelago of substantially independent peoples.

MINAHASA AS A COLONIAL ISLAND

Although Minahasa was not formally pronounced a directly ruled territory until 1870, the pace of its bureaucratic transformation in the nineteenth century equalled that of Java.¹⁴⁵ The contrast with neighbouring parts of Celebes

143. Carpentier Alting 1902-1903 I: 152. The last burger privileges were abolished in 1929 (Brouwer [1936]: 113-114).

144. Waworuntu 1902: 45.

145. Van Kesteren 1893: 37-41; Schouten 1978: 101. Administration of justice at the district level was

was dramatic. Outside Minahasa, Dutch influence in the area was tenuous. In the middle of the eighteenth century the Dutch had outposts as far afield as Tomini and Parigi in the Gulf of Tomini, but toward the end of the century most of these were abandoned as the VOC slid into bankruptcy.¹⁴⁶ In 1800 Minahasa was an isolated agrarian stronghold like parts of the Spanish Visayas, protected against the depredations of Muslim slave raiders from Mindanao and Sulu by a system of coastal forts.¹⁴⁷

Close relations with the surrounding rulers were gradually reestablished in the nineteenth century, but only in Gorontalo and Limboto, jointly declared a directly ruled territory in 1889, was there a direct attack on royal institutions.¹⁴⁸ The kingdoms in Sangir, Bolaang-Mongondow and the neck of the peninsula became "self-governing territories" - *zelfbesturende landschappen* - and were not subject to strong bureaucratising and territorialising pressures until the twentieth century.¹⁴⁹ Compulsory cultivation also remained restricted to Minahasa.¹⁵⁰ In

considered government business as early as 1825 (Van Kesteren 1893: 41).

146. Jellesma 1903: 222.

147. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 130-134, 156.

148. Haga 1931: 194-196. The greater size, lesser economic significance and lower cultural tractability of Gorontalo meant that direct colonial rule there was never as intensive as in Minahasa.

149. Dutch *controleurs* arrived in Sangir in 1882, but their influence was limited (Brilman 1938: 60).

150. A beginning was also made in Gorontalo, but unsuitable conditions and difficulties of administering the system via the *rajas* led to its rapid abandonment (Francis 1856-1859 III: 355-356; Reinwardt 1858: 511-512).

Mongondow, no attempt was made to separate the Alfurs, whom the Dutch had considered annexing to the *landstreek van Manado* in the seventeenth century, from Bolaang.¹⁵¹ Instead, the royal capital itself was ultimately moved in 1901 from the coast to a new central location in the uplands.¹⁵² The Minahasan pattern of direct colonial rule in an inland area was not repeated until the conquest of the highlands of northern central Celebes in 1905.¹⁵³ An English visitor gave a splendidly Victorian description of the political situation of Celebes in 1885.

It is true that the Dutch flag flies in name over the whole island, but the only parts which are really governed by the Dutch are a small region round Makasar in the south, Minahasa in the north, and the district of Gorontalo in the Bay of Tomini. These parts are, however, as nothing compared with the wide acres of land still covered with virgin forest and calling no one master but the untutored savage. (154)

The feeling of being an outpost of order and civilisation surrounded by barbarous but promising frontiers was to shape the Minahasan response both to colonial rule and to Indonesian nationalism.

A larger administrative unit covering the whole of northern Celebes did gradually coalesce around Manado. In 1821 the Residency of Manado was synonymous with Minahasa, but in

151. Padtbrugge noted in 1682 that the Mongondow Alfurs would be "very easy to conquer" (Godée Molsbergen 1928: 77). Their remoteness from Manado and proximity to the approved residence of the *raja* probably influenced the decision not to do so.

152. Manus, Parengkuan, Sigarlaki & Pangkey [1979]: 63.

153. Adriani & Kruyt 1950-1951 I: 157.

154. Hickson 1889: 3-4.

1824 Gorontalo was added and by 1924 Manado was the capital - at least in name - of half the island.¹⁵⁵ Conversely, Manado was not the absolute centre of the Minahasan political world. Until 1864, for instance, appointments of Minahasan district heads had to be approved by the Governor of the Moluccas in Ambon.¹⁵⁶ Thereafter there was still Batavia, distant capital of the whole Dutch empire in the east, more than a week from Manado by steamer.¹⁵⁷ But in the nineteenth century most Minahasans saw their homeland not as a remote outstation of Batavia but as a discrete Dutch colony in its own right. When Minahasan chiefs undertook their first modern political action in 1877, petitions were sent to the Hague as well as Batavia.¹⁵⁸

By isolating the area which would become Minahasa from its precolonial environment, and by first regulating and then transforming the political institutions of its inhabitants, colonial intervention ultimately created a qualitatively new entity at the tip of North Celebes - a large, bounded political unit defined with respect to territory rather than people. Within this new territorial and institutional

155. Reinwardt 1858: 581, 583; 'Statistieke aantekeningen over de residentie Menado' 1840: 146-147; Tideman 1926: 30. The southern boundary of the residency, repeatedly redefined, was uncertain in the nineteenth century (Francis 1856-1859 I: 276).

156. Schouten 1978: 46.

157. This already represented an enormous effective contraction of the Indies. It had taken Padtbrugge the same length of time to reach Manado from the nearby north Moluccas in 1677 (Padtbrugge 1866 [1677]: 112-115).

158. 'Een request uit de Minahassa aan de Tweede Kamer' 1879. See Chapter 5 for details.

field, the nation-building processes associated with modernity - those addressed by the transformation, communication, reactive and political models outlined in the previous chapter - could all come into play. Before examining how they did so, however, the relevance of the other model, which associates nationalism with premodern ethnicity, must also be considered.

We have seen that in its initial stages, the circumscription of the *landstreek van Manado* took the form of a territorial redefinition of an existing contrast between kingdom and tribal domain. The exclusion of royal influence severed an already attenuated relationship, and the institution of a *landraad* for the tribal chiefs was dictated more by necessity than by strategy. From the Dutch point of view, a collection of warring Alfurese tribes became, under colonial guidance, a unified people called Minahasans. But Alfur is an exonym, and we have not considered what these particular Alfurs called themselves and each other. The following chapter begins with an attempt to establish whether the uplanders of the *landstreek van Manado* already constituted an *ethnie* in precolonial times despite their apparent disunity. This might be the case if their concept of unity was different from the political one entertained by the Dutch.

CHAPTER 3: MINAHASA AS A PERCEIVED COMMUNITY

This chapter deals with some of the processes by which Minahasans came to perceive themselves as members of a single community within the territorial boundaries established by the Dutch. It begins by assessing whether the roots of a Minahasan consciousness can be found in the precolonial culture of the area, as predicted by the ethnic model of nationality. Subsequent developments are then described in terms derived from the transformation and communication models.

PRECOLONIAL ETHNICITY

If unity is measured in terms of peace and political solidarity, then there was little of it in precolonial times among the people of what became Minahasa. As we have seen, even Dutch power was not sufficient to enforce lasting peace until the nineteenth century. In 1825 the Dutch recognised no fewer than 27 separate *walak* within Minahasa, all mutually independent and each subject directly to colonial authority.¹

Nor did Minahasa represent a cultural unit in any simple sense. At least eight distinct languages, for instance, were spoken within its 4,800 square kilometre area.² The four

1. Riedel 1872a: 459. Several of the 27 were no more than single settlements outside the Dutch fort in Manado, however.

2. The approximate distribution of the language groups in Minahasa is shown in Map 4.

largest in terms of numbers of speakers - Tontemboan, Tombulu, Tonsea and Tondano - are all closely related, but still not mutually comprehensible without practice. Tonsawang is a more distantly related member of the same group.³ The Bantik and Ratahan languages, on the other hand, resemble Sangirese, while Ponosakan, in the southeastern corner of Minahasa, belongs linguistically with Mongondow and Gorontalo.⁴

Local dialects within the larger languages of Minahasa complicate the picture still further, and in many cases the conventional language boundaries, as indicated on Map 4, are more or less arbitrary.⁵

All this, however, does not preclude the possibility that Minahasa was already perceived as a single entity at some more abstract level despite the political and linguistic fragmentation. The ethnic interpretation of nationality offers two possible foundations for such conceptual unity - kinship, real or imagined, and religion, or rather the ethnic *mythomoteurs* often embedded in religion.

In Minahasa, the warlike character of the society and the associated tradition of *walak* endogamy tended to prevent the formation of geographically extensive kin networks. The bilateral descent system may also have played a part here.

3. Sneddon 1978: 9.

4. Sneddon 1981.

5. Danie (1987) shows that linguistic variation in the north of Minahasa is much more continuous than previous accounts have suggested.

Other stateless and violent societies in Southeast Asia, notably the Batak of Sumatra, have unilineal kinship systems which tie individuals into wide and enduring regional networks on the basis of clan identity.⁶ Minahasa, however, had no such clearly bounded descent groups to provide permanent links between dispersed individuals.⁷ The limits of the *walak*, identified by a loose combination of genealogical, geographical and political factors, constituted the individual's social horizon for most purposes.

On the other hand, the *walak* as groups did have some idea of their collective histories in relation to each other. Most were the product of fission from other *walak* in the past, and the sequence of divisions and migrations, together with the names of the leaders involved, were often remembered from generation to generation.⁸ This provided a conceptual bond between neighbouring *walak* even when they were feuding with one another. At least one large language group, the Tombulu, perceived itself as an approximate genealogical

6. See, for instance, Castles (1975: 68).

7. The fact that descent could be traced through either male or female lines (Graafland 1898 I: 213-214) made kin orientations flexible in the event of political changes. A good comparison is probably with the Philippine Ilongot described by Rosaldo (1980).

8. Riedel (1862), Jasper (1916) and Domsdorff (1937) all give short histories of most or all of the *walak* adapted from oral sources. Common reasons for *walak* fission included internal conflict, personal ambition, and possibly population pressure.

unit and identified an original mother settlement to which all of its component walak could be traced.⁹

There is also considerable evidence that three of the language groups, Tontemboan, Tombulu and Tonsea, were aware of sharing with each other a common origin. All three were associated with the same mythical pair of ancestors, Lumimu'ut and To'ar, usually portrayed as a mother and her miraculously conceived son.¹⁰ The descendants of this incestuous couple had split up into the three language groups at a place called Tu'ur in Tana' - Stem of the Land - in the Tontemboan area.¹¹

According to tradition, this division had involved differentiation in religion as well as language. At Tu'ur in Tana', the newly formed Tontemboan, Tombulu and Tonsea groups were each assigned slightly different rules for the practice of their rituals or *poso*.¹² The differences were understood as complementary and necessary in a cosmic sense. One Dutch account from the nineteenth century describes a major ceremony in which ritual specialists from all three

9. Graafland 1898 II: 201; Riedel 1862: 17.

10. For the classic version of the story of To'ar and Lumimu'ut, see Graafland (1898 I: 210-213).

11. Tu'ur in Tana' is usually identified with Pinawetengan, near Kawangkoan (Graafland 1898 I: 80, 212; Jasper 1916: 262). Other sources, however, place it in the mountains of the far south, where Lumimu'ut is supposed to have lived before the division (Riedel 1862: 6). Probably the term was in more general usage, for the Tombulu also seem to have had their own Stem of the Land (Graafland 1898 I: 216).

12. Jasper 1916: 262-263, 285; Riedel 1862: 15-16. Jasper (1916: 262) states that another name for Tu'ur in Tana' was Siniwoan in Posan, which he translates as the "Establishment of the Religion".

groups had to take part, each playing a different predetermined role.¹³

The relationship between the Tontemboan and the Tombulu appears to have been conceived as one of sexual duality, with the former categorically female and the latter male.¹⁴ Tombulu priests, for instance, were men, whereas their Tontemboan counterparts were women.¹⁵ An alternative name for the Tontemboan, Tongkimbut, means People of the Vagina.¹⁶ The Tontemboan area, containing as it does the "stem" or origin of the country, probably corresponds to the "female centre" found in other parts of traditional Indonesia.¹⁷ The Tonsea, whose name indicates deviation or wrongdoing, may also have counterparts in maverick groups elsewhere which fall outside the main binary categories.¹⁸

13. De Clerq 1870. The date of this account is surprisingly late, well into the period of Christianisation, but the title makes it clear that what is being described is a vanished practice.

14. Later Dutch stereotypes of "sturdy, strong" Tombulu and "docile, weak" Tontemboan (Graafland 1898 I: 324-325) are probably unconscious reflections of this indigenous system of classification.

15. Tauchmann 1968: 154. There were some exceptions in both cases, but the general principle is confirmed by the fact that Tontemboan *walian* were associated with a female deity, Tombulu *walian* with a male one.

16. Schwarz 1908: 153. Schwarz dismisses this as a term of abuse used by the Tombulu, but it appears even in VOC treaties from the 17th century (Godée Molsbergen 1928: 55, 93).

17. See, for instance, Fox (1982) on Wehale in Timor.

18. Graafland (1898 II: 287-288) stereotypes the Tonsea as frivolous jokers.

In practical as well as symbolic terms, religious organisation transcended the *walak* in a way political organisation did not. The senior ritual experts or *walian* were part of an extensive network which was substantially independent of *walak* leadership.¹⁹ The Tombulu and Tonsea language groups each had a recognised ritual centre with attendant specialists.²⁰ The *walian* in each language zone are also reported to have used one of the other languages, rather than their own, for ritual purposes.²¹

Together, the Tontemboan, Tombulu and Tonsea language groups do therefore seem to represent an ethnic unit defined both by a common perceived origin and by involvement in a single religious system. However, two qualifications are necessary here. First, many different and often contradictory oral histories were found among the various *walak*, and some of the myths of origin in circulation did not mention To'ar and Lumimu'ut at all.²² As we shall see, the published versions were mostly recorded by people with an interest in standardising a particular version of Minahasan folk history.

19. Tauchmann 1968: 150-151, 172-174.

20. Graafland 1898 I: 201; II: 278.

21. Tauchmann 1968: 180. Schwarz (1907 III: 141) claims that Tombulu alone was the "literary language" of Minahasa, but his experience was in the Tontemboan districts.

22. For instance, one of the stories reproduced by Schwarz in his collection of Tontemboan texts (1907 II: 408-410). Tauchmann, in his general survey of Minahasan religion (1968: 47-49) distinguishes a second origin motif, quite separate from the one in which Lumimu'ut is the first human being, and attributes it rather precipitously to a different wave of immigration.

Then there is the question of whether the relationships described above add up to a "perceived community" in the sense outlined in the first chapter. In religious terms the emphasis was not upon unity, but upon systematic and necessary diversity.²³ The guiding metaphor for common belonging, meanwhile, was not the bounded horizontal field of ethnicity, but the open vertical tree of descent. The Tontemboan expression for "foreigner", for instance, literally means "person of a different seed", and the word *walak* has the connotation of "branch".²⁴ Strikingly, there seem to have been no abstract terms for larger units like language groups, nor any word, abstract or specific, for the "tree" as a whole. The later name of Minahasa indicates a former diversity now united, not an ancestral unity now diversified.²⁵

Finally, it should be remembered that the precolonial Minahasan *ethnie*, as defined by the three core language groups, only makes up part of what is now Minahasa. In 1872 the groups which it excluded, including the numerous Tondano, comprised 32 percent of the population.

23. It is rather telling in this regard that the three core peoples were thought to remain separate from each other even in the afterlife (De Clerq 1870: 547).

24. Schwarz 1908: 530, 573.

25. This is confirmed both by the etymology of the word and by its history (Schwarz 1908: 46; Supit 1986: 141-142; Watuseke 1958).

Table 3.1: Populations of the Minahasan language groups in 1872. (26)

<u>Outsider groups</u>		<u>Core groups</u>	
Tondano	24,864	Tontemboan	35,226
Ratahan	3,959	Tombulu	22,581
Tonsawang	3,021	Tonsea	17,134
Bantik	3,009	Core subtotal	<u>74,941</u>
Ponosakan	746		
Outsider subtotal	<u>35,599</u>	<u>Minahasa total</u>	<u>110,540</u>

It is true that the peripheral groups had adopted elements of core culture and mythology. Stories about Lumimu'ut and To'ar, for example, were also known in Bantik and Ratahan.²⁷ Nevertheless, such groups continued to be regarded as outsiders. The Tondano, for instance, were known as late immigrants who had been permitted to settle beside the lake of the same name only as "slaves of the Tonsea".²⁸ Conversely, cultural exchanges also occurred across the borders of Minahasa, especially with Bolaang-Mongondow.²⁹

To summarise, precolonial Minahasa possessed neither a unitary cultural tradition nor a single folk memory. Certainly there was no explicit concept of Minahasa as a

26. From a Dutch administrative document dated 1873, quoted by Mieke Schouten (private communication).

27. Spreeuwenberg 1845-1846 III: 25-28; Schwarz 1907 II: 376-377. Neither figure, judging by published surveys (Dunnebier 1953; Adriani 1894), appears in the mythology of the groups outside Minahasa to which Bantik and Ratahan are linguistically related.

28. Graafland 1898 I: 78-79.

29. Ten Hove (1895: 227) describes a Bantik ritual specialist whose skills were in demand both among other Minahasan groups and in the neighbouring kingdom.

bounded category of people. On the other hand, the Tontemboan, Tombulu and Tonsea language groups did constitute what might be identified as the core of an *ethnie*. The people of this core were divided in linguistic, religious and political respects, but they nevertheless understood their mutual differences in common cultural terms. They also exerted considerable cultural influence upon the outsider groups.

With the dubious benefit of hindsight, it is therefore tempting to conclude that a sense of unity was latent in the precolonial period, and that the explicitly perceived community of later times was built upon an ancient foundation. One twentieth century authority even asserts that precolonial Minahasa was already a "nation" united by a single *Volksreligion*, despite local "anomalies".³⁰ Such an argument, however, smacks of teleology. In reality, there is no reason to assume that if the colonial history of the area had been different, the tripartite *ethnie* could not have been dismembered, or else dissolved into some much wider entity. As it happened, however, the dramatic changes which overtook the area in the nineteenth century acted both to unify Minahasa and to enhance its differentiation from the outside world. At the same time, deliberate efforts were made to exploit some aspects of the old ethnic heritage in order to create a new kind of community.

30. Tauchmann 1968: 46, 185-188.

THE END OF THE OLD ORDER

European contact had already made a significant impact upon Minahasan society prior to the nineteenth century. Besides the political developments described in the previous chapter, there had also been economic and cultural changes. The introduction of maize, for instance, had boosted the productivity of agriculture.³¹ Trade, though substantially monopolised by the VOC, had increased in volume.³² Dutch Protestant preachers had even made Minahasan converts.³³ Including the Christian *burgers* - mostly descendants of freed slaves shipped in from elsewhere in the service of the Company - there were more than 4,000 Minahasan Christians in 1821.³⁴

On the other hand, the extent of these changes should not be overestimated either. Almost all of the Christians, for instance, lived in coastal settlements near the Dutch forts.³⁵ The interior remained overwhelmingly pagan.³⁶ Although trade was considerable, it was not monetised.

31. Wigboldus 1987: 79-83. The adoption of maize as an additional food source probably made it possible to export more rice.

32. In 1677, the VOC exported 227 packloads of unhusked rice from Manado to Ternate; in 1800, one Tonsea walak alone delivered 300 packloads to the government (Godée Molsbergen 1928: 75, 158).

33. Gunning 1924: 453.

34. 1516 Christian *burgers* and 2532 others out of a reported 56,236 inhabitants (Reinwardt 1858: 583). Reinwardt's total population figure, however, is probably too low.

35. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 158.

36. With the exception of a few Christians in Tondano (Godée Molsbergen 1928: 161).

Textiles, especially luxury cloths imported by the Dutch and used by Minahasans for ritual purposes, remained the usual medium of exchange.³⁷ In 1825 there were still only three regular markets in Minahasa, of which the only one in the interior was restricted to barter trade.³⁸

All in all, Minahasa in the early nineteenth century was still pagan enough, self-sufficient enough, and politically decentralised enough to be called tribal. Yet by the end of the same century, Minahasans had clearly become peasants rather than tribespeople. In the space of 75 years they were virtually all Christianised, integrated into the international money economy, and subjected to the most intensive colonial administration anywhere in the Dutch Indies. The pace and extent of change in this period were unprecedented.

The old order was destroyed by complementary political, economic and ideological pressures. On the political front, the *walak* leaders were absorbed into the colonial bureaucracy, which rewarded them not only with material perquisites but also with a degree of job security unknown to their predecessors. As *walak* chiefs and their families came to form a closed hereditary elite, marrying only among themselves, opportunities for social mobility diminished.³⁹

37. 'Statistieke aantekeningen over de residentie Menado' 1840: 144. Adam (1925b: 445) notes the use of textiles as bridewealth; De Clerq (1870: 548) and Schwarz (1907 II: 199) mention other ritual uses.

38. Riedel 1872a: 546.

39. Schouten 1978: 63-65.

One result was that traditional ways of acquiring prestige, including the hosting of *foso* ceremonies accompanied by lavish sacrifices and feasting, became increasingly irrelevant.

The *foso* also came under more direct attack from the administration because of the amount of potential working time which they consumed. In 1856 the authoritarian Resident A.J.F. Jansen banned a particular type of *foso* lasting nine days and thereby triggered a mass abandonment of traditional religion in the Tonsea area.⁴⁰ The abolition of slavery and headhunting represented comparable attacks on the old cultural system.⁴¹

Another trauma was the compulsory replanning and sometimes relocation of villages, which interfered with ritual sites and orientations.⁴² A major earthquake in 1845 provided the opportunity by destroying many existing houses.⁴³ Interpreted as an event of cosmic significance, it probably also contributed to the doubt and confusion which made such interference easier.⁴⁴ Later in the century the government

40. Graafland 1898 II: 279-283.

41. Debt slavery was made illegal in 1822, and chattel slavery in 1859 (Graafland 1898 I: 86, 90). The last recorded headhunt happened in 1862 ('Iets over het bijgeloof in de Minahasa' 1870: 5).

42. Graafland 1898 I: 514-516; Grundemann 1873: 109. In precolonial times each settlement or *wanua* had been defined above all by its ceremonial centre, marked by sacred stones or *tumotowa* (Schwarz 1907 II: 186-189). The compass orientation of the houses was also prescribed by custom.

43. Graafland 1898 I: 514.

44. This is suggested by Graafland's account of the reaction to the earthquake (1898 I: 506-507).

took over a wide range of social functions previously exercised from within the *walak*, including ratification of marriages and jurisdiction over uncultivated land.⁴⁵

The system of compulsory coffee cultivation introduced in 1822 had a dramatic impact upon almost every aspect of Minahasan life. Combined with other types of *corvée* labour, most importantly the construction of roads for transporting the coffee harvest, it came to demand up to 120 days of work per year from some households.⁴⁶ This enormous labour burden interfered with ritual activities and with the traditional agricultural cycle, to which a great deal of Minahasan tribal religion was closely related.⁴⁷ The spread of irrigated ricefields in some districts, prompted by a combination of population pressure and government intervention, may have had a similar disruptive effect upon the culture complex.⁴⁸

While coffee cultivation diverted labour from other activities, the burden was offset to some extent by the cash payments which growers received for their coffee.⁴⁹ The

45. In 1861 and 1877 respectively (Van Bemmelen 1987: 185; Graafland 1898 I: 93).

46. Estimates of the average burden in the late 19th century range from 80 to 120 days per household per year (Graafland 1898 II: 249; Schouten 1987: 121).

47. See, for instance, Schwarz (1907 II: 246-268).

48. *Sawah*, however, did not become widespread until the end of the century (Van Geuns 1906: 81).

49. Textiles were replaced by cash as the means of payment in 1825 (Godée Molsbergen 1928: 135). In the best years, more than 200,000 guilders were paid out (Graafland 1898 II: 242).

money economy received another stimulus with the introduction of a head tax in 1851.⁵⁰ The wider social and cultural implications of the resulting monetisation are difficult to assess. It does not seem to have led to the development of an indigenous capitalist class, nor, at least in the nineteenth century, to a widespread debt problem or a disappearance of traditional labour exchange. However, it did probably have a positive effect upon the demand for imported manufactures, and hence, in combination with the involuntary diversion of labour into coffee and *corvée*, a negative effect upon local handicraft industries.⁵¹ Certainly the market economy had developed a momentum of its own by the end of the century. In 1896, Minahasa boasted five permanent and 32 frequent periodic markets.⁵²

Two things must have been evident to many Minahasans in this period. Firstly, that they were experiencing a transformation in the conditions of their lives which was beyond their control as individuals and which called most of their collective social and religious assumptions into question. Their old wisdom was able neither to explain nor to prevent this transformation. Secondly, that the presence

50. Graafland 1898 I: 164. This monetary tax replaced tribute in rice and palm fibre. Apart from the coffee payments, Minahasans also obtained cash by working as carters and day labourers, and by selling rice (Graafland 1898 I: 165, 337; II: 242, 248).

51. For instance, the extinction of old weaving skills (Graafland 1898 I: 351-352). Other handicrafts, however, seem to have flourished in the late 19th century - sewing, cartbuilding, even blacksmithing (Graafland 1898 I: 339, 341-342).

52. Graafland 1898 II: 242.

of the Dutch was central to what was happening. This is the context in which the remarkable spread of Christianity among Minahasans during the nineteenth century must be understood.

CHRISTIANITY AND UNITY

The Christianisation of upland Minahasa began with the arrival of two missionaries from the Dutch Missionary Society - *Nederlandsch Zendeling Genootschap*, or NZG - in 1831.⁵³ One, J.F. Riedel, established himself at Tondano town, where he quickly started to make converts.⁵⁴ His colleague, J.G. Schwarz, chose Langoan in the Tontemboan language area. Progress here was slower, but a major wave of conversions began in 1843.⁵⁵ Meanwhile another missionary had arrived for Tomohon in the Tombulu zone, and over the following years the number was steadily increased. By 1864 a stable formation of ten mission posts had been reached, strategically distributed over the whole country.⁵⁶

The number of Minahasan Christians grew accordingly. In 1847 there were just under 11,000 converts out of an estimated population of 93,000.⁵⁷ Between 1856 and 1859 the Christianised zone was extended dramatically to the north

53. Three other NZG missionaries had already worked in Minahasa between 1822 and 1831, but only as official ministers salaried by the government and responsible primarily for the existing Christian congregations on the coast (Van 't Hof 1951-1952 III: 331).

54. Grundemann 1873.

55. Gunning 1924: 457.

56. Gunning 1924: 455.

57. Carpentier Alting 1902 I: 7.

with the mass conversion of most of the Tonsea language speakers.⁵⁸ By 1880 some 80,000 Minahasans - more than three quarters of the population - were baptised.⁵⁹ The Tondano area was thoroughly Christian, and all other major language groups substantially so. Only the peripheral Ponosakan and Bantik peoples remained pagan. The Bantik finally entered the fold in 1891.⁶⁰ By the turn of the century, Minahasa was overwhelmingly a Christian country.⁶¹

It is probably simplistic, as well as condescending both to the religion and to the converts, to explain any episode of religious conversion in purely secular terms. Nevertheless, it can hardly be coincidence that the rapid Christianisation of Minahasa ran parallel to the other dramatic changes described above. Evangelism was only the ideological front of a much broader attack upon the old social and cultural order, and its success reflected the effectiveness of the political and economic assaults as well as the persuasiveness of its own ideas.

Even so, there were some respects in which that appeal reflected cultural continuities as well as discontinuities. Traditional culture and religion, for instance, involved an admiration for strength and power - hence, in part, the

58. Gunning 1924: 474.

59. Graafland 1880b: 394-395.

60. Gunning 1924: 502.

61. In 1902 there were 4,030 pagans and 7,972 Muslims in Minahasa, out of a total population of almost 180,000. Of the Muslims, only 800 or so were indigenous Minahasans, the remainder immigrants (Carpentier Alting 1902-1903 I: 132-145).

ritual significance of headhunting.⁶² The Dutch were incontrovertibly strong and powerful, so it was natural to conclude that their religion must be particularly efficacious. Precolonial religion was also very concerned with social prestige. This was reflected in the dual function of many *foso* as feasts of merit as well as religious ceremonies.⁶³ Once it was established that the Dutch - largely because of their power - were prestigious, then the imitation of their religious practices also became a matter of prestige. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, such imitation also extended to many other aspects of Western culture besides Christianity.

Finally, the missionary endeavour also benefited from the endemic rivalry which had kept precolonial Minahasa in a permanent state of conflict and political instability. According to one missionary, the lightning conversion of the Tonsea in 1856 had much to do with the fact that "their pride would not allow them to fall behind the neighbouring Tondano".⁶⁴ At the local level, individuals vied to have their children instructed by the missionaries, villages to build their own mission schools and churches.⁶⁵ Nor was there any shortage of trainees for jobs as native teachers and assistants. Mission employment was one of the few

62. Schwarz 1907 II: 186-188; Schouten 1988: 117; Tauchmann 1968: 188-196.

63. Tauchmann 1968: 215-226.

64. Graafland 1898 II: 282.

65. Graafland 1898 I: 520; II: 332; Gunning 1924: 480; Van Nes 1925: 503.

avenues of social mobility still open after the monopolisation of political leadership by an emergent aristocratic class.⁶⁶

Considering the contribution made by individual and collective rivalries to the Christianisation of Minahasa, it is ironic that one of the principal objectives of the missionaries themselves was precisely to stamp such rivalries out. Tribal warfare, with its headhunting and bloody rituals, was their main concern in the early years. Riedel is said to have risked his life on one occasion by coming between rival warriors in order to prevent a battle.⁶⁷ The abolition of such conflict became almost a gauge of Christianity's progress.⁶⁸ Peace, however, was not the only issue here. The NZG was also intent on generating a lasting sense of unity among all Minahasans. Its aim was a united Christian community in which, in the words of the missionary Nicolaas Graafland, "all divisions and feuds shall be dissolved into one brotherhood".⁶⁹

As the principal architect of the mission school system in Minahasa, Graafland did more than any other individual to

66. The careerist attitudes of many mission schoolteachers were sometimes the despair of the missionaries. "Their office is just another job", lamented Graafland on one occasion, "to have a name or a title and earn a living" (Graafland 1869: 382).

67. Grundemann 1873: 230.

68. A later religious writer listed "burial of the tribal feuds" and "unity of the people" (*volkseenheid*) among the great achievements of the mission in its 19th century heyday (De Vreede 1935: 340).

69. Graafland 1898 I: 326.

promote this ideal of unity. His teachers and his textbooks impressed it upon two generations of Minahasan children.⁷⁰ The techniques used were not limited to reiteration of the biblical injunction to "love thy neighbour". Graafland also made a calculated attempt to harness the elements of unity which he detected in traditional society and culture. In a schoolbook published in 1863, for example, he presented a simplified version of Minahasan folk history in which the common origin of the various *walak* was emphasised and the significance of the subsequent division played down.

As a result of this division each fragment went its own way in many respects, and differences appeared between them. Even so, it is still obvious that they were all united at one time. Although there are differences in the ways people work their gardens and plant their crops, for instance, everybody follows the same general pattern. The same applies to language. Although the various languages are mutually incomprehensible upon first hearing, they can be understood with practice. There are also religious differences, particularly regarding sacred legends and *poso* ceremonies, but none of these differences is profound. Upon closer inspection there is really only one religion, since each tribe also knows the legends and *poso* of the others. All differences in religion are in any case disappearing as people convert to Christianity, and will ultimately vanish altogether. The Christian religion will eliminate all divisions, and all Minahasans shall truly become brothers. (71)

Disunity among Minahasans is portrayed here as temporary and superficial. Minahasa was united in the beginning, and retains a latent unity even in its present state. In the near future it will be restored to wholeness by Christianity.

70. Graafland arrived in Minahasa in 1850 and lived there almost continuously until his death in 1898 (Graafland 1898 II: LXXI).

71. Graafland 1863: 23-24.

Because of the large size of the Tondano language group, and perhaps also because it included the first and most pious Christians, the missionaries sought to incorporate Tondano into the same framework of unity as the rest.⁷² As we have seen, the Tondano speakers traditionally fell outside the tripartite ethnic core.⁷³ Indeed, their exclusion from the old ritual system may well help to explain their enthusiasm for Christianity. Graafland, however, now portrayed them in his teaching material as one of not three but four "true" Minahasan peoples, equal in seniority to the Tontemboan, Tombulu and Tonsea.⁷⁴

In one old version of the story about the division at Tu'ur in Tana', the land of Minahasa had indeed been divided into four quadrants. The Tontemboan took the southwest, the Tombulu the northwest, and the Tonsea the northeast, in rough correspondence with their actual distributions today. But as Graafland himself acknowledged in a book intended for Dutch rather than Minahasan readers, the fourth group in the traditional scheme was not the Tondano but the mysterious "Tou'tumaratas".⁷⁵ No such language group or *walak* exists. Tumaratas, traditionally the first settlement of the

72. Graafland described Tondano Christianity as a "blessing for the rest of Minahasa" and a "promise of what all Minahasa can become" (1880b: 406; 1898 II: 234).

73. As late as 1860, intermarriage with the Tondano was still regarded by the Tonsea as dishonourable (Graafland 1898 I: 79).

74. Graafland 1863: 22.

75. Graafland 1898 I: 212-213.

Tontemboan, is a place near Tu'ur in Tana'.⁷⁶ The fourfold pattern is most likely a purely formal one, reflecting a cultural fascination with compass direction and quadripartite structures.⁷⁷ The fourth quadrant was effectively empty, and this probably facilitated the symbolic assimilation of Tondano to the whole. That left only Bantik, Ratahan and Ponosakan, together about ten percent of the population, outside the formation as "stranger" groups.

Another piece of folklore appropriated by the NZG was the legend of To'ar and Lumimu'ut, a standardised version of which was taught in mission schools until well into the twentieth century.⁷⁸ Here too, an interest in unification is evident. It is impossible to know how many people actually regarded themselves as direct descendants of the incestuous couple in precolonial times, but as late as 1894 a Tontemboan man recited a personal genealogy which began with a quite different pair of apical ancestors.⁷⁹ The NZG, however, taught that all Minahasans, even former slaves and their children, were ultimately descended from To'ar and Lumimu'ut.

76. Waworuntu 1894: 87; Domsdorff 1937: 346.

77. Schwarz (1907 II: 375) notes that the compass axes were more important referents than left and right in everyday life, and their religious significance is also implied in many of his texts.

78. Supit 1986: 15, 19-22.

79. Schwarz 1907 II: 388, 408-410.

As the cultural and religious context of the old multiplex historical traditions was dissolved away, the simplified one propagated by the mission won more and more ground. An outline history of precolonial Minahasa based upon an account by a walak chief and published in 1916 reiterates that the founders of Tondano were latecomers from overseas, but then makes a clumsy attempt to reconcile this with the official story by explaining that they were really Minahasans whose forebears had accidentally been swept out to sea and washed up on an island.⁸⁰ Nowadays the standardised version is the only one most people know, even in Tondano. Its essence is that Lumimu'ut was the ancestral mother of all Minahasans, whom she divided into four groups, each with its own language and territory: Tontemboan, Tombulu, Tonsea and Tondano.⁸¹ Minahasa is a single community with a single past.

The missionaries could not have popularised this idea, and could not have converted Minahasa to Christianity in the first place, without the dense network of social institutions which they gradually set up around themselves after their arrival. Only 31 European missionaries were involved in the whole process, and Schwarz alone baptised more than 13,000 people.⁸² The next section describes the explicitly Minahasan institutions which the NZG created to make such feats possible, together with the often

80. Jasper 1916: 266.

81. Hekker 1988: 65-66.

82. Graafland 1898 II: LXXXI-LXXXII; Grundemann 1873: 247. The missionary count is taken up to 1895.

complementary organisations established by the secular colonial authorities. It then explains how such institutions not only functioned to transmit the message of unity to Minahasans, but also, by their very nature, became engines of unification in their own right.

MINAHASA AS A COMMUNICATION COMMUNITY

The mission schools were the most important agents of cultural unification in nineteenth century Minahasa. Graafland called them "the principal means by which the missionaries encompassed the whole population within the same spiritual and social development".⁸³ For many years the school was more or less inseparable from the church - in fact, they usually shared the same premises and the personnel.⁸⁴ Through its schools, the mission moulded Minahasan minds at their most impressionable stage of development. Children influenced by their Christian teachers were then often partly responsible for converting their own parents.⁸⁵

In the early years, schools were established by individual missionaries on a local basis.⁸⁶ The teachers were usually Minahasans brought up partly in missionary homes as

83. Graafland 1898 I: 523.

84. Graafland 1898 I: 526; Kroeskamp 1974: 122; Van Nes 1925: 503.

85. Linemann 1859: 308.

86. Not that this ad hoc system was ineffective: Schwarz alone had 15 schools and 1,300 pupils under his supervision by his death in 1849 (Kruijf 1894: 312).

something between house servants and adopted sons.⁸⁷ The schools in each area therefore bore the particular stamp both of the local missionary and of the local ethnicity. In 1851, however, Graafland began to reorganise mission education on a unified basis by establishing a central teacher training college.⁸⁸ A decade later standard textbooks were in use at all of the village schools, and by 1870 the whole system had been substantially unified.⁸⁹

At the same time the number of NZG schools continued to grow, from 50 in 1842 to 140 in 1881.⁹⁰ It has been estimated that almost all Minahasan boys between six and fourteen years old, and more than half of the girls in the same age bracket, were registered pupils in 1870, although regular attendance was less universal.⁹¹ Minahasa at that time had the most comprehensive school system in the Dutch East Indies, and probably one of the finest in Asia.

Most village schoolteachers doubled up as local lay preachers.⁹² In 1847, however, the NZG lightened their

87. These were known as *murid*, or "pupils". Their female counterparts, who often became their wives, were called *anak piara* or adoptive children. Some missionary households included eight or ten such Minahasan children (Bettink 1897: 107).

88. Initially at Sonder in the Tontemboan area, then at Tanawangko on the Tombulu coast, and finally at Tomohon (Kroeskamp 1974: 147; Taulu 1976: 5). The college started to deliver trained teachers in 1857 (Kroeskamp 1974: 210).

89. Kroeskamp 1974: 167, 247.

90. 'Algemeene Statistiek betreffende het schoolwezen in de Menahasse van Menado' 1857; Kroeskamp 1974: 263.

91. Kroeskamp 1974: 129.

92. Graafland 1898 I: 526.

workload by appointing the first of a new corps of Minahasan "assistant missionaries" or *hulpzendelingen*.⁹³ These had no educational responsibilities, and formed an intermediate stratum of the evangelical apparatus between the European missionaries and the schoolteachers.⁹⁴ In 1868 their training, like that of the teachers, was centralised with the foundation of a special college for the purpose.⁹⁵ The missionaries, meanwhile, began to coordinate their own activities more closely by forming a Minahasa Mission Association in 1848.⁹⁶

The usual language of both church and school was Malay.⁹⁷ Although many missionaries were theoretically in favour of using Minahasan languages in school and church, Malay was almost inevitably the practical choice.⁹⁸ It was easier for the Minahasans to learn than Dutch, and also easier for the Dutch to learn than the Minahasan languages. It was already the language of commerce in Manado and the official language of administration throughout the Dutch East Indies.⁹⁹ Malay was probably also understood by at least some Minahasans

93. De Vreede 1935: 331.

94. Their numbers rose to eight in 1868, 31 in 1880 and 58 in 1891 (Watuseke 1985: 21; Gunning 1924: 510; Kruijf 1894: 438).

95. Van 't Hof 1951-1952 IV: 126.

96. Gunning 1924: 469; Kruijf 1894: 405.

97. Most of the educational literature was also in Malay (Kroeskamp 1974: 161-162, 167-178, 214-222).

98. For an overview of the debate, see Kroeskamp (1974: 123-127). Some missionaries also argued for Dutch as a medium.

99. Hoffman 1979.

even before the nineteenth century.¹⁰⁰ Finally, there was the problem of linguistic diversity and rivalry within Minahasa.

Because of the antagonism between the tribes, many Minahasans refuse to be addressed in a Minahasan language other than their own. Malay, on the other hand, they accept; indeed, they are eager to learn it. The government also encourages knowledge of Malay, and government officials use it regularly. (101)

As a prestige language, Malay appealed to all Minahasans as no single native tongue could have done. Spoken as a second language, it gave the country a new linguistic unity. As I shall show in Chapter 6, however, missionary ideas about the importance of the indigenous languages survived to inspire Minahasan cultural nationalism in the twentieth century.

Minahasa, then, was being homogenised as well as transformed. Or as Graafland more eloquently put it:

Christianity and the new civilisation have brought much change and improvement. The uniformity of content, means and goals with which they are promoted is gradually eliminating the characteristic internal differences: in religious practices, because in Christianity they are one and undivided; in customs, because they come to be controlled by the same rules of truth and beauty; in virtues, which are refined and cultivated everywhere; and in languages, which are gradually replaced by Malay. (102)

Cultural unification as such would not have helped Minahasa to become a perceived community if Minahasans had not been

100. Malay was certainly the language of official communications with the VOC, even for uplanders. A Malay contract with Tondano chiefs, for instance, is reproduced by Mangindaan (1873: 373-377). Nevertheless, knowledge of Malay was not widespread in Tondano when Riedel arrived there in 1831 (Grundemann 1873: 181).

101. Gunning 1924: 505.

102. Graafland 1898 I: 326.

aware that it was taking place. The schools and churches, however, fostered that awareness too. Besides preaching the ideal of Minahasan unity devised by Graafland and his colleagues, they also plugged the villages in to a real emerging Minahasan society.

The schoolmasters and preachers were men who had once left their home villages and *walak*, albeit only for a few years, to study in one of the training colleges. There they had worked alongside students from other districts, whom they came to identify as fellow Minahasans. They were all Christians, spoke Malay, and bore the imprint of their missionary education, including the belief in a single Minahasan people. All of these attributes they endeavoured to pass on to their classes and congregations.

Vicariously, then, the Minahasan community was also experienced by every schoolchild. Certain aspects of the curriculum were deliberately designed to accentuate this experience. The geography of Minahasa, for instance, was the only geography taught in the NZG village schools.¹⁰³ For this purpose Graafland supplied not only a reader listing every village in the land, but also an instructional wall map.¹⁰⁴ Benedict Anderson has noted how schoolroom maps helped crystallise other "imagined communities" in

103. Kroeskamp 1974: 175-176, 214, 222, 288. The teacher training school, however, also taught world and Netherlands Indies geography.

104. The reader is listed in my bibliography under "Graafland, N., 1863", and was reprinted in 1867. A photograph of the map is included at the beginning of this thesis.

colonial Southeast Asia by giving them each a sharp territorial image.¹⁰⁵ For thousands of nineteenth century Minahasan children, that image was Minahasa.

Even more Andersonian, if the term may be permitted, was the integrating role of the NZG newspaper, *Tjahaja Sijang*. The Light of Day, as its Malay name can be translated, was yet another brainchild of Nicolaas Graafland. Printed at the the mission's own press in Tanawangko, on the coast southwest of Manado, it first appeared as a pilot issue in 1868 and became a regular monthly periodical in the following year. By 1876 there were 363 subscribers, most of them teachers, assistant missionaries, and district chiefs.¹⁰⁶ This modest figure, however, conceals a much wider real audience.¹⁰⁷ Copies were widely lent and borrowed, and in many villages people also gathered to hear the schoolmaster read articles out loud.¹⁰⁸

Despite, or rather because of, its mission origins, *Tjahaja Sijang* was a self-consciously Minahasan institution. Every number, for instance, bore the subtitle "Newspaper for Minahasa". For Minahasa, and also increasingly by Minahasa, since a growing proportion of the contents was supplied by

105. Anderson 1983: 111.

106. 'Aanwijzingen en herinneringen' 1876: 61.

107. Considering that an annual subscription cost four guilders - almost as much as the head tax - the circulation was hardly shameful (Graafland 1898 I: 89; II: 392).

108. Graafland 1898 II: 392.

native writers.¹⁰⁹ And although the paper also featured articles on international topics and events, its primary focus was Minahasa. Through *Tjahaja Sijang*, the idea of Minahasa came to mean something even to people whose actual circle of social contacts was still much smaller. In the Newspaper for Minahasa, all Minahasan news was home news.

Not all of the unifying forces at work in this period proceeded from the NZG. The secular administrators, consciously and unconsciously, also played a part. We saw above that the government contributed to the popularisation of the Malay language. In the previous chapter, the unification of the native administration was also described. As the chiefly families became an aristocratic class, they had little option but to intermarry with each other in order to maintain their status.¹¹⁰ This created a truly Minahasan elite transcending district boundaries.¹¹¹

Besides district chiefs (*hukum besar* or *hukum mayor*) and deputy chiefs (*hukum kedua*), members of this élite also became clerks, supervisors for the coffee gardens and warehouses, and *jaksa* or public prosecutors.¹¹² In 1865 the

109. Lopian (1979: 915-920) gives an overview of the changing content of *Tjahaja Sijang*. Transferred to Minahasan editorship between 1918 and 1920, the paper was still being published in 1925.

110. Schouten (1978: 64), for instance, presents a single kinship diagram linking the heads of six different districts in the second half of the 19th century.

111. When the chiefs became salaried civil servants in 1881, they were even liable to be transferred between districts (Schouten 1987: 124).

112. Schouten (1978: 50-53) lists the main classes of native government official other than district chiefs. The lower

government followed the mission example by providing a centralised education for its Minahasan officials. The *Hoofdenschool* or School for Chiefs, established at Tondano, represented its students as the pinnacle of Minahasan society.¹¹³

Toward the end of the century the government also became deeply involved in ordinary village education. Financial difficulties within the NZG, combined with a change in state education policy, led the government to take charge of 37 mission schools and establish 25 new state schools in 1882.¹¹⁴ The mission also retained many schools, however. By the end of the century their number had climbed back to what it had been on the eve of the transfer.¹¹⁵ The two systems were quite distinct, but in many ways continuity was preserved. Graafland, for instance, was appointed a government schools inspector in 1883.¹¹⁶ And both systems remained equally Minahasan: only a handful of the native teachers in the country in 1910 were not themselves Minahasans.¹¹⁷

positions were frequently stepping stones to a chief's job (Gent 1923: 84, 85, 86, 88).

113. Kroeskamp 1974: 227-232.

114. Gunning 1924: 508; Kroeskamp 1974: 263. A number of schools established by the government earlier in the century had gradually come under indirect NZG control (Graafland 1898 I: 397, 401). After 1873, however, state and mission teacher training were separated (Kroeskamp 1974: 259-260).

115. Gunning 1924: 508.

116. Graafland 1898 II: LXXI.

117. Viersen [1910]: 32.

By suppressing tribal warfare and by building a fine network of roads throughout the country, the government also helped to weld Minahasa into a communication community in the most literal sense.¹¹⁸ Especially after the relaxation of restrictions upon individual movement in 1864, travel within Minahasa became both easy and safe.¹¹⁹ Increasing private trade, as well as the compulsory coffee deliveries, also made it more necessary.

Finally, government institutions promoted the same ideas about Minahasan unity as their mission counterparts. Like the NZG schools, the government schools taught Minahasan geography as a discrete subject.¹²⁰ The *Hoofdenschool* also took out several subscriptions to *Tjahaja Sijang*.¹²¹ Another teaching aid was a booklet by J.G.F. Riedel - a government official and a son of the pioneer missionary J.F. Riedel - on the history of Minahasa up to the coming of the Dutch.¹²² Although more complex than the version usually taught by the NZG, this too was an attempt to weave the

118. The basic road network was planned and built between 1853 and 1859, and gradually improved thereafter (Graafland 1898 I: 179-180). Minahasa had a total road length of 1,264 km by 1932 (Van Aken 1932: 135).

119. Even before the relaxation there were regular "free days" for visiting the markets (Graafland 1898 II: 296).

120. Graafland 1898 II: 411. A copy of the map used in the state schools is in the collection of the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde in Leiden. A textbook came after the turn of the century (Viersen [1903]).

121. Kroeskamp 1974: 229.

122. Riedel 1862. J.G.F. Riedel was born in Tondano in 1832. Following education in Europe he worked as a colonial civil servant in Minahasa and elsewhere (*Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië* 1917-1921 III: 602).

disparate strands of folk history into a single Minahasan thread - or, as the author himself put it, "to pick out the fruits from among the flowers" of oral tradition.¹²³ It opened with the following short verse:

*Ingatlah bagimu
Pujikan termasa
Hormat nama jadimu
Tanah Minahasa*

Or, loosely translated from the stilted Malay, "Remember and revere the honour of your name, land of Minahasa". This is more than an appeal for unity. It is an exhortation to patriotism.

THE BEGINNINGS OF MINAHASAN NATIONALISM

Some of the reasons why Europeans were interested in promoting Minahasan unity, and even patriotism, were pragmatic. The Dutch had already tried unsuccessfully to engineer some unity in the area in VOC times. One polity, provided of course that it remained loyal, would have been easier to control than a multitude. We have also noted that the ideal of unity accorded with Christian sentiments in general: "Let love grow between Minahasans", as the title of an early *Tjahaja Sijang* article straightforwardly put it.¹²⁴ This, however, does not explain why it had to be Minahasan unity, nor why some missionaries showed such interest in a pagan past which had to be seriously misrepresented before it was of much value as a unifying force.

123. Riedel 1862: 4.

124. *Tjahaja Sijang*, 9 October 1869.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, many of the Europeans in Minahasa genuinely idealised the old tribal society. Riedel junior, for instance, described the ancestral Minahasans as "true children of nature" and portrayed their way of life in idyllic terms.

In former days, the free Alfurs of North Celebes believed that the only necessity of life was to enjoy all earthly things in freedom and independence, and to see their will respected by the other members of the tribe. (125)

Whereas the first generation of missionaries in Minahasa had tended to dismiss native religion as idolatry, Graafland and his contemporaries preferred to discern in it "glimmers of the eternal light".¹²⁶ Graafland was also convinced that this light had burned more brightly in the distant past, and that the mission had found Minahasa in a state of spiritual decay.¹²⁷

These ideas reflect both the influence of Rousseau and an anxiety about cultural Westernisation which will be discussed in the next chapter. They also relate to a further dimension of European attitudes to Minahasa. Partly because of European assumptions about nations and nationality, the mission really believed that Minahasa was a single *land en volk* - land and people - with a valuable

125. Riedel 1872c: 157.

126. Graafland 1898 I: 220, 240. Other missionaries wrote that the belief in a supreme being was already present, if disguised, in Minahasan religion (Van 't Hof 1951-1952 IV: 119).

127. Graafland 1898 I: 251-253. Graafland attributed this decay to the greed of the *walian*.

history and culture of its own.¹²⁸ Although the noun *natie* had acquired too many political connotations by this time to be applied to Minahasa, Graafland wrote quite unselfconsciously about *nationaal* dances, crafts, dress and character traits.¹²⁹ He also composed a patriotic song for Minahasan schoolchildren which was still popular half a century later:

<i>Minahasa yang tercinta</i>	Beloved Minahasa
<i>Dengar kidung hatiku.</i>	Hear my heart's song
<i>Karena untungmu kuminta</i>	For your good fortune
<i>Limpah berkat pada Hu.</i>	I ask God's great blessing.
<i>Mana dapat jauh dan rapat</i>	Where is there a lovelier,
<i>Tanah lebih elok trang?</i>	More tranquil land?
<i>Tagal itu sabagitu</i>	Because there is none,
<i>Beta cinta engkau grang.</i> (130)	I love you with passion.

The NZG believed that it was not creating Minahasa, but recreating it in a new Christian form. "The rebirth of a *volk*" was how one missionary described the process.¹³¹

From the beginning, the ultimate goal of the mission in Minahasa was to make itself redundant by leading that *volk* to the point of religious autonomy (*zelfstandigheid*).¹³² This could only be realised once Christianity became a *volkszaak*, a thing of the people.¹³³ Graafland himself

128. *Volk* has the dual meaning of people and nation in Dutch.

129. Graafland 1898 I: 134, 227, 342, 346, 370; II: 199. The context makes it clear that he is referring to specifically Minahasan, not broadly native, nationality. See also Grundemann (1877: 244).

130. Lyrics reproduced in *Tjahaja Sijang*, 1 October 1921.

131. Quoted by De Vreede (1935: 340).

132. 'De Opleiding der gemeenten in de Minahasa tot meerdere *zelfstandigheid*' 1867: 83; Tendeloo 1867: 187.

133. Graafland 1880: 405.

became increasingly pessimistic about the prospects for such autonomy, but others did not lose sight of the ideal.¹³⁴ Tondano missionary H. Rooker spoke out in 1890 for the creation of an independent Minahasan church, "not a church which can easily ossify, a dead object, but a living, active church, building and perfecting itself from within".¹³⁵

The mission, then, not only promoted the idea of Minahasa as a moral community sanctioned by religion, but also provided the beginnings of an emancipatory ideal, albeit not yet in political terms. A third element in the classic constellation of nationalist ideas, that of secular progress, was disseminated mainly by the government. Resident Jansen spelled out what it meant to a meeting of district chiefs as early as 1859:

In former times the people of Minahasa lived in the woods, and their houses were like animal pens. Now, however, they have neat, clean villages which fill all travellers with amazement. Where once high mountains and thick forests made travel difficult or impossible, now there are broad straight roads on which people can easily travel the whole land in search of a living. The forests have been transformed into profitable coffee gardens. Everywhere there is plenty of food, provided the fields are properly cultivated and there are no natural disasters. You now wear the same clothes as Europeans, while your subjects and their families, who used to go naked, are also properly dressed. Minahasa now grows crops which command high prices on the market and bring great profits to you and your subjects. (136)

134. Graafland 1898 II: 172.

135. Quoted by Van 't Hof (1951-1952 IV: 123). Rooker had worked in Tondano since 1854, so this was no outburst of youthful idealism.

136. *Tjahaja Sijang*, 15 July 1870. Also reproduced by Panawuot ([1926]: 58).

The missionaries were more interested in spiritual enlightenment than in material progress, but had no complaint with Jansen's analysis.¹³⁷

The pages of *Tjahaja Sijang* show that by the last decade of the century, Minahasans themselves were learning to speak the same language.

I hope that the name of Minahasa will remain powerful for our children and our children's children. The benefits of the unity to which it refers are now plain to see. All we Minahasans, both government and people, are united in a fine endeavour. United in the cause of better roads, houses and businesses for our profit and pleasure as Minahasans. And united above all in the quest for knowledge to guide us in this life and the next. (138)

Minahasa is repeatedly extolled as a paragon of both civilisation and virtue.¹³⁹ In 1900 the phrase *tanah air*, fatherland, makes its first appearance.¹⁴⁰ Minahasan contributors also begin to show positive interest in their own languages and precolonial culture, a development which will be examined in Chapter 6.¹⁴¹

The most popular aspect of the Minahasan idea, however, was the ideal of unity. Because Minahasa literally means unity,

137. Missionaries were involved in the introduction of the new houses (Graafland 1898 I: 275; Kruijf 1894: 333). They also cooperated with the government to establish a public savings bank in 1896 (Graafland 1898 II: 243-247).

138. F. Makelew in *Tjahaja Sijang*, 6 September 1895.

139. *Tjahaja Sijang*, 6 June 1895, 6 July 1895, 22 May 1897.

140. *Tjahaja Sijang*, 8 March 1900.

141. *Tjahaja Sijang*, 7 April 1890, 7 January 1895, 6 July 1895.

the word itself acquired an almost talismanic quality.¹⁴² Part of the attraction of unity was that like most ideals, it was strongly counterfactual. The harmonious Minahasan brotherhood envisaged by the NZG never became a reality. Indeed, it was too utopian to be realised in any society, least of all a highly competitive one like Minahasa.

Have you ever watched the election of a village chief? Have you seen how people quarrel over land and livestock? Have you heard how families have been divided as a result of people changing their religion? No, Minahasa is no longer united. Its good name is being soiled. (143).

Minahasa's new religious unity began to erode almost as soon as it was established. In 1886, to the horror of the Protestant missionaries, the Catholic church set up an outpost in Manado. By 1902 it had a mission station and 800 converts - from Protestantism - at Tomohon in the interior.¹⁴⁴

The advance of Catholicism was later to slow considerably, and Minahasa remained an overwhelmingly Protestant land.¹⁴⁵ In its early days, however, it provoked alarm among Minahasan as well as Dutch Protestants. In 1898, a local writer in *Tjahaja Sijang* appealed for loyalty to Protestantism in the name of Minahasa and the Minahasan ancestors.

142. One writer in 1884 even rebuked his countrymen for using the word in vain (*Tjahaja Sijang*, 12 June 1884). Makalew, mentioned above, uses it seven times as a crosshead (*Tjahaja Sijang*, 6 September 1895).

143. *Tjahaja Sijang*, 8 April 1896.

144. Jellesma 1903: 158-166.

145. In 1930 only 5.7 percent of the population was Catholic (*Volkstelling 1933-1936 V: 91*).

All you who love the honour of your land and people should use your judgement and do your duty to your country and to your ancestors, who named this land of ours Minahasa, meaning Unity. Why do some of you no longer wish to be united in the true faith? Why are others clearing the way for that deviant religion, even when they are reluctant to embrace it themselves? Do not deceive yourselves and your brothers! Will you be happy when your honourable name of Unity becomes Duality? What will our ancestors say? (146)

This passage illustrates the success of the NZG in linking reverence for the ancestors with the idea of a Minahasan nation, and also with Protestantism.¹⁴⁷ On the other hand, the implicit assumption that Catholic converts are still susceptible to patriotic appeals shows that Protestantism is not an essential part of Minahasan nationality. Even Catholic Minahasans are still Minahasans. Minahasa is an ascriptive identity, not an elective one.

The NZG, of course, had ensured this itself by propagating a territorial and genealogical definition of Minahasa rather than a cultural or religious one. As we saw in Chapter 2, the state had also begun to treat Minahasans as an undifferentiated category in legal terms. And of course, a third factor making it possible for Minahasan nationalism to outgrow the NZG was the existence of a Minahasan communication community. Minahasa was not just a missionary idea which happened to appeal to Minahasans; it was also the

146. "Justus, a son of Minahasa" in *Tjahaja Sijang*, 22 August 1898.

147. The author gets around the fact that the ancestors were not Protestants by having them cry out from their graves: "On the day of judgment we will condemn you, our children, for if the light of the gospel had shone as brightly in our time as in yours, we would surely have heeded it!" (*Tjahaja Sijang*, 22 August 1898).

partly unintended consequence of a set of real institutions which defined its territorial scope and boundaries. The idea and the institutional framework reinforced each other.

The Minahasans who wrote in *Tjahaja Sijang* themselves were mostly members of a dual elite of government and mission officials for whom Minahasa was a more or less immediate social reality. In 1895 the core of this elite consisted approximately of 40 district chiefs and deputy chiefs, 40 clerks, 30 coffee officials, 60 assistant missionaries, and the staff of 80 government and 120 mission schools.¹⁴⁸ Even if immediate families and pensioned or unemployed officials are included, it cannot have comprised more than one in thirty of the 164,000 Minahasans.¹⁴⁹ In this, however, Minahasa was no different from other nations in the making. Equally important is that through the elite, and especially through the schoolteachers, a much larger number of Minahasans were learning to perceive Minahasa as a single community.

No specifically Minahasan organisations were actually created by Minahasans until the twentieth century. But when nationalist organisations did appear, they were inspired by the ideals and the sense of community already established in

148. District officials: Graafland 1898 I: 61-62. Clerks: Graafland 1898 I: 61; Stakman 1893: 12. Coffee officials: Graafland 1898 I: 537. Assistant missionaries: Kruijf 1894: 438. Schools: Kruijf 1894: 383; Kroeskamp 1974: 263. Government schools tended to employ more than one teacher (Graafland 1898 I: 440; II: 126).

149. A case could be made, however, for including 80 policemen and 340 village chiefs in this category too (Graafland 1898 I: 124; Viersen [1903]: 14).

the nineteenth century. The political consequences of this continuity will be examined in Chapters 5 and 6.

CHAPTER 4: MINAHASA AS A SOCIAL CATEGORY

This chapter examines how perceptions of inequality between Minahasans and foreigners helped define the Minahasan community by giving it vertical extent within a superordinate social hierarchy. As predicted by the reactive model of nationalism, this strengthened the identity and solidarity of the group. The process of definition took longer in this vertical dimension than in the horizontal one, however, because of the community's strong ability to assimilate European elements.

IMITATION AND MISCEGNATION: THE MAKING OF A MESTIZO SOCIETY

The achievement of European cultural as well as political hegemony over Minahasa in the nineteenth century set the scene for a marked social convergence between foreign and indigenous groups. This was manifest not only in extensive cultural imitation of Europeans by Minahasans, but also in the extent to which aliens felt able to integrate themselves into the emerging Minahasan community. The surprise which both developments evoked from European visitors is well illustrated in an account of a meeting between Governor General A.J. Duymaer van Twist and the Minahasan chiefs in 1855.

It was remarkable how extraordinarily well these chiefs expressed themselves in their speeches to His Excellency. Most of them did so in High Malay; one, however, the mayor of Kema, Pelenkahu, a pupil of the teacher Dircks, spoke very fluent Dutch and gave an excellent address. I had already met this mayor during my previous visit to the area, and it was certainly a strange experience to hear this Alfur

speak perfect Dutch while his wife, a daughter of the missionary Riedel and therefore of European blood, speaks not a single word of Dutch and understands very little.(1)

Few Minahasans, of course, could hope to marry a missionary's daughter. Nor, in 1855, did many yet have the opportunity to learn Dutch. Nevertheless, the foundations appeared to be laid for a mestizo society in which miscegnation, a common way of life and a common ideal of Christian civilisation would render any correlation between race and status incidental.

Minahasans had been intermarrying with Europeans since Spanish times.² Of the 600 legally defined Europeans in Minahasa in 1854, only about ten percent were of pure extraction.³ Indo-Europeans were found in the interior as well as in Manado town.⁴ There were marriages between Eurasian women and Minahasan men as well as vice versa.⁵ The first two NZG missionaries, moreover, both had Eurasian wives.⁶ Schwarz's half-Minahasan spouse played an important

1. Quarles van Ufford 1856: 53.

2. Riedel (1872b: 196) attributes European physical traits in prominent Tondano families to intermarriage with Spaniards in the seventeenth century.

3. Reinwardt 1858: 583. In 1821, Reinwardt (1858: 583) had apparently counted only 13 'real' Europeans in the whole of Minahasa.

4. Quarles van Ufford 1856: 20. Fewer than 300 lived in Manado district, which itself was much wider than Manado town.

5. Van Kol 1903: 268. One renowned case was that of the Minahasan *jaksa* A.B. Kalengkongan, married to a woman of English descent in the 1850s (Schouten 1978: 64). Graafland (1898 II: 335) described this as "just one indication of the ease with which Minahasans unite with Eurasians".

6. Schwarz married the Eurasian daughter of a local government *opziener*; Riedel arrived with a Eurasian wife

role as interpreter in the early stages of conversion among the Tontemboan.⁷

In the cultural sphere, visitors were struck by the eagerness with which Minahasans seemed to adopt not only the immediate concomitants of Christianity, such as marriage and naming practices, but also European dress and etiquette. When the English naturalist A.R. Wallace dined at the house of the Tomohon district chief in 1859, he was surprised to find his dinner served "on good china, with finger-glasses and fine napkins, and abundance of good claret and beer". The chief himself "was dressed in a suit of black with patent-leather shoes, and really looked comfortable and almost gentlemanly in them".⁸ Such complete imitation was possible only for the very wealthy, but it represented an increasingly universal ideal, and even commoners took to wearing European dress whenever their activities and incomes permitted.⁹

That the cultural transformation of the time extended to such externalities is hardly surprising. The missionaries themselves made it clear that certain European domestic and public proprieties were inseparable from Christian behaviour, and the system whereby they adopted children of

from Ambon ('Leven en werkzaamheden van J.G. Schwarz, den zendeling van Langowang' 1860-1863 II: 10; Grundemann 1873: 50, 245, 246). G. Hellendoorn, Protestant minister in Manado from 1827 to 1839, was also married to an Ambonese (Graafland 1898 I: 590).

7. 'Leven en werkzaamheden van J.G. Schwarz, den zendeling van Langowang' 1860-1863 II: 10.

8. Wallace 1986 [1869]: 253.

9. Edeling 1919 [1875]: 75.

prominent families into their own households as servants and pupils was intended to create an influential cadre of Minahasans familiar with the principles of "a Christian, civilised family life".¹⁰ At least in terms of dress, however, imitation of Europe had begun much earlier. Reliefs on stone burial containers from the eighteenth century show figures dressed almost entirely in European fashion.¹¹ An indigenous cultural dynamic which associated alien products with power and status was possibly at work here. Even before European contact, for instance, it appears that prominent people wore imported textiles while commoners used bark cloth.¹² Nevertheless, the cultural transformation was ultimately real, and provided common ground upon which Minahasans could meet both with each other and with foreigners who shared some of the same new cultural assumptions.

Such foreigners included Chinese as well as Europeans. There had been Chinese traders and craftsmen in Manado since at least the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1842, the majority were reported to be "married to Alfurese women or descendants of such".¹³ By the turn of the century it was *peranakan* Chinese, born in Minahasa from Minahasan mothers, who set the tone of the Chinese community.

10. Bettink 1897: 114.

11. Palm 1961: 65-67.

12. Palm 1961: 65.

13. Spreeuwenberg 1845-1846 II: 42.

In 1905, when an article criticising the relative economic privilege of the Chinese appeared in the local press, one *peranakan* was able to accuse the Minahasan author of calumny against his own kin.

Does he not know that almost all Chinese in Minahasa are blood relatives of his own *bangsa*? And the blood of the so-called Chinese in Amurang, Manado, Kema, Tondano and such places is three quarters Minahasan. Is it right that they should have to suffer for the foreign quarter? Almost all Chinese in Minahasa were born here and intend to die here. (14)

The racial intimacy which made this situation possible was based substantially upon common cultural ground. Although few were Christians, the Manado Chinese spoke Malay and sometimes Dutch, sent their children to Dutch schools, and built their houses in the Indo-European style also favoured by Minahasans.¹⁵ In the early twentieth century there were Chinese who, at least in the view of some Minahasans, lived "entirely according to Minahasan customs".¹⁶ Statistics from the Netherlands Indies census of 1920 show that an unusually high proportion of the Chinese in the residency of Manado used the Malay language at home.

14. *Tjahaja Sijang*, 15 December 1905.

15. Graafland 1898 I: 104, 108.

16. Ratulangie 1914: 39.

Table 4.1: Language of daily use among the Chinese of the Netherlands Indies, 1920. (17)

	Percent Chinese speakers	Percent Malay speakers	Percent local language speakers
Manado residency	17.7	72.6	9.6
All outer islands	89.6	7.2	3.3
Java and Madura	30.1	51.1	18.7
Netherlands Indies	61.4	28.0	10.6

In 1940 a local writer could still observe that "blood ties and common interests have led the Chinese here to associate closely with the indigenous population and adopt much of its way of life".¹⁸ In terms of cuisine and dress, the Chinese even contributed a little to that common lifestyle themselves.¹⁹

The emerging mestizo culture was more often named after Manado than Minahasa, although the Minahasans who identified most strongly with it tended to use the two terms interchangeably. It was as if the Eurasian town had expanded to encompass the Minahasan countryside, and indeed, the excellent road network and the dynamic nature of village society did make possible a remarkable convergence of urban and rural lifestyles.

17. Figures calculated by Coppel (1973: 153, 158-159) from the 1920 census of the Netherlands Indies.

18. *Mangoeni*, 17 February 1940.

19. Chinese shirts became a standard item of male clothing, Chinese dishes a familiar part of Minahasan cookery (Graafland 1898 I: 168; *Mangoeni*, 17 February 1940).

In the twentieth century, this development was also facilitated by a fair degree of prosperity in the countryside. The compulsory cultivation of coffee was finally abolished in 1899, whereupon this unpopular crop promptly disappeared from the Minahasan scene. Its place as staple economic product was taken by copra, which by 1926 constituted some 90 percent of Minahasa's exports by value.²⁰ Although encouraged by the government, coconut cultivation was voluntary.²¹ It was also much less arduous than coffee growing. High world prices for copra in the first three decades of the twentieth century brought conspicuous prosperity to coconut farmers in the parts of Minahasa best suited to the crop, particularly Tonsea.²² Other areas were less favoured, but there was little absolute poverty. Mendicancy, for instance, was almost unknown.²³ Comparative income tax statistics for 1927 give some idea of the relative prosperity of Minahasa, even though they lump it with the rather less prosperous region of Gorontalo.

20. Tideman 1926: 116. The average figures for Manado residency as a whole were 44.3 percent over the decade 1900-1909, 76.0 percent for 1910-1919, 87.0 percent for 1920-1929, and 71.3 percent for 1930-1938 (Jansen 1989: 72). Other exports included rattan - mostly from outside Minahasa - and some coffee.

21. Dirkzwager 1912: 1166.

22. 'Copra in de Minahassa' 1932 III: 712; MR 779X/1920.

23. *Tjahaja Sijang*, 1 December 1903.

Table 4.2: Percentage of the native population of some regions in various income tax categories, 1927.(24)

	Not assessed (annual incomes below f.120)	Assessed for incomes between f.120 and f.300	Assessed for incomes above f.300
Minahasa and Gorontalo	79.1	18.4	2.5
West Sumatra	76.4	16.7	6.9
Bali and Lombok	94.3	5.5	0.2
Java and Madura	97.1	2.8	0.1

These figures reflect variations in the accuracy of income assessment as well as variations in prosperity, but they do indicate that Minahasans were mostly much better off than the Javanese, and probably comparable in real income to the Minangkabau of West Sumatra.²⁵ One factor here was a relatively fortunate pattern of land ownership and access in Minahasa. There are no statistics to demonstrate this for the colonial period, but some figures from the Indonesian agricultural census of 1963 are indicative.

24. Income tax figures for the directly ruled (*rechtstreeks bestuurd*) parts of the outer islands in 1927 appear in *Verslag van den Belastingdruk op de inlandsche bevolking in de buitengewesten* (1929: 31) and for Java and Madura in the *Koloniaal Verslag* for 1929 (appendix S, table IIIb). Population estimates for 1927 were obtained from the *Statistisch jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch-Indië* (1929: 12-19). The population of the Javanese princely states, to which the tax statistics do not apply, was excluded. With the help of the 1930 census (*Volkstelling 1933-1936* V: 122), a correction was made for the fact that the 1927 population data lump Minahasa with Bolaang-Mongondow. Minahasa in 1927 had a native population of approximately 265,927, Gorontalo 137,684.

25. The tax was levied on total income, not just money income. Tax collectors tried to estimate the monetary equivalent of production for subsistence and barter. Inevitably, the results were often fairly arbitrary (*Verslag van den belastingdruk op de inlandsche bevolking in de buitengewesten* 1929: 22).

Table 4.3: Farm size and number in relation to population for some regions in 1963. (26)

	Average size of peasant farms (hectares)	Ratio of total population to total number of farms
Minahasa	1.74	6.78
South Sulawesi	0.97	9.01
West Sumatra	0.85	6.45
Central Java	0.69	6.55
Indonesia	1.05	7.10

Despite a fairly average population to farm ratio, then, Minahasan peasant farms were large by Indonesian standards.²⁷ Foreign plantation enterprise showed little interest in Minahasa at any point, so the copra industry remained an indigenous preserve and no coolie class emerged.²⁸

The fact that Minahasa became a backwater for colonial commerce spared Manado any great influx of "totok" or metropolitan Europeans from Holland and enabled the town to preserve its mestizo character.²⁹ The Minahasan politician

26. Calculated from *Sensus pertanian 1963, Publikasi ke 1* ([1964]: 1, 8, 11, 17) and *Sensus penduduk 1961, Serie S.P.-1* ([1963]: 10-13). The population of municipalities (*kotapraja*) was excluded from the calculation.

27. This is partly a function of farm type. Coconut - and, by 1963, clove - gardens tend to be more extensive than irrigated rice farms. Nevertheless, it does show that land was in less short supply in Minahasa than in other regions.

28. Tideman 1926: 116. In 1939, copra in Minahasa remained "the industry of the little man" (*Manado Bulletin*, 6 October 1939).

29. The number of legally defined Europeans in Manado rose from 524 in 1894 to 1,392 in 1930, a proportional increase

G.S.S.J. Ratulangie emphasised in 1930 that ethnic relations in Manado differed strongly from those prevailing in Java:

Europeans, Indo-Chinese and Minahasans live in the same neighbourhoods and have almost the same lifestyle. The three groups intermarry extensively and are dissolving into one another. The Indo-Europeans and Manadonese in particular can be said to have fused into a single social group, and feel themselves to be simply Manadonese. (30)

This cosmopolitanism was also reflected in the influential local media. Of the two leading newspapers published from Manado in the years around 1930, one was edited by a Eurasian and the other was originally the organ of a Chinese society.³¹

A fresh ingredient in the melting pot was Japanese. Japanese entrepreneurs first arrived in the early years of the century, and by 1941 there were probably more Japanese in Minahasa than there were *totok* Dutch.³² The few coconut plantations belonged to them, as did some import and retail concerns and a large fish processing plant. Numbers of Japanese immigrants followed the established example by marrying Minahasans.³³

well behind that for the Dutch Indies as a whole (Graafland 1898 I: 115; *Volkstelling* 1933-1936 V: 135; Furnivall 1939: 347).

30. In *Fikiran*, 26 April 1930.

31. *Fikiran*, with a circulation of 1,500 in 1927, was edited by a retired Eurasian soldier, J.C. Weijdemuller (*Fikiran*, 10 September 1927). *Keng Hwa Poo*, also in Malay and almost as widely read among Minahasans, began as the organ of a Chinese youth group called *Tjen Liang Hwee* (*Tjahaja Sijang*, 15 October 1921).

32. More than 400 Japanese lived in a colony built around the packing plant at Bitung, over 100 more in Manado town, and some others elsewhere (*Nationale Commentaren*, 3 May 1938; Van Rhijn 1941: 154).

33. *Nationale Commentaren*, 3 May 1938.

A 1954 survey comparing the Indo-European communities in West Java and Minahasa confirmed the relatively assimilative character of Minahasan society. Of the 800 or so Eurasians in Minahasa, only 20 or 25 families had chosen to retain Dutch citizenship.³⁴

Both Minahasans and Indo-Europeans repeatedly assured me that Indo-Europeans in Minahasa feel Minahasan and are recognised as such by Minahasans themselves. "If Indo-Europeans born in Minahasa arrive in Java for study or work", people say, "they prefer to associate with Minahasans rather than with the Indo-Europeans there". (35)

The cosmopolitan atmosphere was heightened by the fact that almost half of the Minahasa Eurasians bore non-Dutch surnames, inherited from mestizo Portuguese *burgers*, English visitors of the British interregnum, German sailors and Belgian soldiers of the colonial army.³⁶ Even the Protestant mission in Minahasa had taken some time to acquire a distinctively Dutch accent; the first six NZG missionaries, for instance, were all Germans.³⁷

The ethnic Dutchness of the colonial administration in Minahasa was also remarkably muted. White government officials never numbered more than a dozen, for a population which, by 1930, stood at over 300,000.³⁸ After 1926, when the Dutch *controleurs* at Tondano and Amurang were withdrawn, none was based outside the town of Manado. The government

34. Allard 1955: 30-31.

35. Allard 1955: 32.

36. Allard 1955: 31.

37. Van Rhijn 1851: 298; Graafland 1898 I: 272; II: LXXXII.

38. *Volkstelling* 1933-1936 V: XI.

offices, and those of the town and regional councils created in 1919, were staffed almost entirely by local personnel.³⁹ In exceptional cases, Minahasans could even aspire to the few top positions customarily reserved for whites. From 1920 to 1926 the post of Residency Secretary, technically reserved for a Leiden graduate, was filled by P.F.L. Sigar, a Minahasan and a former clerk.⁴⁰ In 1934 another Minahasan, A.B. Andu, was appointed deputy mayor of Manado.⁴¹

The extent to which racial inequality in the Dutch Indies was maintained by the colony's plural legal system is sometimes exaggerated. After a spate of legal reforms between 1918 and 1920, and the unification of civil service pay scales in 1925, European legal status as such conferred few important privileges.⁴² It was, moreover, fairly easy for socially mobile Minahasans to obtain legal *gelijkstelling* or "equalisation" by application.⁴³ Many did so for social or business reasons or, as government

39. Brouwer 1936: 90. Even in the 19th century it had already been customary to give Minahasans clerical positions which would have been reserved for Europeans or Eurasians elsewhere (Stakman 1893: 12).

40. *Tjahaja Sijang*, 15 June 1920; *Regeeringsalmanak voor Nederlandsch-Indië* 1921-1927.

41. *Fikiran*, 19 July 1934.

42. *Verslag van de commissie tot bestudeering van staatsrechtelijke hervormingen* 1944 II: 52-54. Taxation and criminal law were both standardised for all groups, although Europeans retained separate courts and trial procedures.

43. *Gelijkstelling* of Minahasans was already occurring in the 19th century (Graafland 1898 I: 115). District chiefs, moreover, had automatic access to European courts (*Tjahaja Sijang*, 15 July 1875).

employees, in order to claim European leave. In 1941, one quarter of Manado's "Europeans" were *gelijkgestelden*.⁴⁴

Sociologists concerned with colonial societies have distinguished between those colonies in which European and native populations formed distinct strata, and those in which racial stratification was continuous, with extensive socialisation and intermarriage within a hierarchy dominated by Europeans or European creoles.⁴⁵ The latter pattern is usually associated with colonies of Spain and Portugal, but it also corresponds to Minahasa under Dutch rule. Although not entirely spared the hardening of racial boundaries which affected most of the Dutch Indies in the twentieth century, colonial society in Minahasa retained its fluid, mestizo character throughout the Dutch period. Racial stratification was real, and generated a real political and cultural reaction, but that reaction was always muted to some extent by the fact that the hierarchy was continuous and - sometimes - permeable.

THE LIMITS TO ASSIMILATION

The unprecedented cultural transformation in nineteenth century Minahasa encouraged some Dutch observers to formulate an explicit ideology of assimilation not associated with Netherlands imperialism before or since.

44. Van Rhijn 1941: 154. Van Rhijn's figure of 386 *gelijkgestelden* includes 118 Chinese but excludes the local Japanese, all of whom were honorary Europeans by virtue of an ordinance of 1899.

45. Hoetnik 1974: 36-37.

The government official P. Bleeker, who visited Minahasa in 1855, argued that cultural convergence was desirable as a guarantee of political loyalty.

The more we identify the people of our colonies with ourselves, so that they learn to see themselves as Netherlanders rather than subjects of Dutch rule, the more our strength in the Indies shall increase, our small fatherland shall grow in power and prestige, and the grounds for insurrection or resistance to foreign rule shall be eliminated. In Minahasa, the basis for rebellion and resistance has already been destroyed. Identity of dress, behaviour and religion has brought the Alfur very close to us, and us very close to the Alfur. (46)

In the idea of a civilising mission, others found a more altruistic justification for the kind of intensive economic and cultural colonialism pursued in Minahasa. The prominent Indies scholar P.J. Veth saw a direct parallel between Dutch and classical imperialism here.

We have brought civilisation to Minahasa in well nigh the same way as the Romans brought it to our Germanic forefathers. In both cases the seed fell upon fertile soil, and there is no reason to believe that the results will be less permanent in the one case than in the other. (47)

Governor General C.F. Pahud, admiring the neat villages on a tour of Minahasa in 1860, is said to have cried rapturously: "What a land! What civilisation!".⁴⁸

Yet even for Minahasans, there were limits to assimilation. It is often said that while colonial Europeans may have wanted natives to assimilate in theory, they were seldom

46. Quoted in 'Van welke taal moeten de zendelingen in de Molukken en in de Menahasse zich bij de verkondiging des evangelies bedienen?' (1858-1859 III: 42).

47. In his notes to the Dutch translation of A.R. Wallace's *The Malay Archipelago* (1870 I: 464).

48. Graafland 1898 I: 522.

willing to see them do so in practice. Beyond a certain point, imitation tends to appear impertinent and threatening. It can also be a source of disillusionment, whether because the replica is inaccurate or because, in certain respects, it is too accurate. Civilisation, like religious conversion, is an ideal easily shattered when European vices as well as virtues become objects of imitation. Late nineteenth century travellers still tended to portray Minahasa as a model colony, but in the twentieth century came a rising note of contempt for the vanity and indolence which visitors perceived in the streets and dance halls of Manado.⁴⁹ Fashion and vice, rather than Christian piety, seemed to be the most visible cultural borrowings.

Christianity has given them too high an opinion of themselves; they have attracted too much general attention, and have now become spoiled children whose false culture consists of imitating the habits, customs and lifestyles of the Europeans, including those least worthy of imitation. (50)

From the Dutch themselves, such criticism also involved an admission of guilt: "We have made them what they are now; we have bastardised the natural, the native in them".⁵¹

This change of attitude affected the resident European community too. In 1926, Resident J. Tideman reported

49. In 1885 S.J. Hickson, like A.R. Wallace before him, was almost entirely positive regarding the achievements of the Dutch civilising mission in Minahasa (Hickson 1889: 205-237; Wallace 1886 [1869]: 261-264). The later accounts by Van Kol (1903: 231-329), De Kat Angelino (1917) and Elout (1930: 80-90) tell a very different story.

50. Van Kol 1903: 296. A socialist member of the Dutch lower house, H. Van Kol visited Minahasa in 1902.

51. Van Kol 1903: 296.

increasing tension between the local intelligentsia and the small number of *totok* Europeans.

The Europeans who make their living in these parts, and come into contact with the indigenous population, have nothing but positive feelings for the real villager, the simple farmer who causes them no unpleasantness. Their judgement of the more sophisticated native is different. They see expressions of greater insight and knowledge as a sort of insolence, an undesirable attitude. (52)

Those Minahasans who lived in contact with white society inevitably felt a tension between such attitudes and their own continuing urge to become more European. That some of them were successful in overcoming the social barriers and joining the very elite of colonial society, even taking Dutch wives, seemed to sharpen rather than obviate the dilemma for the rest.⁵³ Few Minahasans seriously lost pride in their affinity with European culture, yet haughty *évolués* were publically criticised, and *gelijkstelling* eventually became something of a social stigma even outside radical circles.⁵⁴

The fact that many Eurasians also faced prejudice from whites made it easier for them too to join the Minahasan community once its open character was established. Even at the end of the colonial period, the clearest social divide

52. Tideman 1926: 26.

53. P. Laoh, A.A. Maramis, R. Tumbelaka and G.S.S.J. Ratulangie were among the prominent Minahasans who married Dutch women in the colonial period.

54. Criticism of *évolués* appears, for instance, in *Tjahaja Sijang*, 3 March and 27 August 1924. R. Tumbelaka, a Minahasan doctor, wrote that Minahasans underwent *gelijkstelling* "only as a last resort, for the sake of some social advantages or, as *ambtenaar*, to be entitled to European leave" ('Algemeen verslag speciaal over de Minahassa', 10 April 1946, in ASB I 1/2/21/7).

in Manado was not between racial or cultural groups, but between *trekkers* and *blijvers* - those whose permanent home was in the Indies, and those who intended to return or retire to Europe.⁵⁵ In a sense, Minahasa in its Manadonese guise was a compromise between Westernisation and nativism, a place where one could legitimately be Europeanised without pretending to be European.

Not everybody was pleased with the increasing conflation of Minahasa and Manado. For the missionaries, Manado and its polyglot population were anathema, a source of moral pollution and "negative civilisation" for the real Minahasans.⁵⁶ Even to live in its neighbourhood was to be exposed to such temptations as gambling and prostitution - "the closer to Rome, the more wicked the people", as Graafland put it.⁵⁷ The NZG saw Minahasa in terms of an ideal of Christian purity - indeed, in the beginning Minahasa was little more than such an ideal.⁵⁸ Minahasan nationality was supposed to embody and protect such purity, and the missionaries were appalled when their flock, partly in recognition of an increasingly obvious pecking order

55. This point was made by the *Manado Bulletin*, 5 December 1939.

56. In ethnic terms, Manado was only half Minahasan. Besides the largest European and Chinese communities in the area, it also contained a diversity of local immigrants, particularly from Sangir and Gorontalo (*Volkstelling* 1933-1936 V: 32-33).

57. Graafland 1898 II: 349.

58. It is symptomatic of this attitude that the early missionaries preferred to work on the *tabula rasa* of the pagan highlands rather than among the "*naam-Christenen*" or "Christians in name" of the coastal communities (Grundemann 1873: 168).

among the Europeans, began to take Manado society as their model.

Who introduced the European clothing and European household goods which have spread to a ridiculous degree? Not the missionaries, but others. We know only too well that with the retention of nationality, much simplicity is preserved; that every ill-afforded luxury ruins a people; that a balance between mental and material progress is the best safeguard against excesses. (59)

A certain tension between the ideal of a brotherhood of native Christians and the ideal of a Westernised, cosmopolitan community persisted into the twentieth century, and its implications for the debates over Minahasan identity will be examined in Chapter 7.

As we have seen, it was a paradox of the mission endeavour in Minahasa that although the missionaries were the earliest and most important source of cultural Westernisation, they expressed an admiration for native virtue.

I myself always believe that the ordinary villager, educated at a good native school and not too self-important or too European to attend church and bible readings faithfully, is much more truly civilised than those who strike a civilised pose by dressing like Europeans and speaking Dutch. (60)

There was a genuine concern here for the spiritual welfare of the community, but also an interest in maintaining the authority of the missionaries themselves. Some, for instance, believed that the Minahasan should not be taught Dutch because this would "put him on a par with the European, flatter his vanity, and stimulate his

59. Graafland 1898 II: 199. Also typical was Graafland's opinion that mass immigration of Europeans to Minahasa "would be a source of moral decay for the population" (Graafland 1898 I: 309).

60. Schippers 1892: 430.

arrogance".⁶¹ Most missionaries in the field had limited faith in Minahasan abilities, and were loath to delegate responsibility where they felt the necessary independence of thought and conscience was lacking.⁶²

Under these circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that the earliest published expression of national sentiment by a Minahasan comes from a disillusioned mission employee. This was L. Mangindaan, the first Minahasan ever to receive education in Holland. A pupil of one of the pioneer missionaries, Mangindaan initially found his way to Europe as a seaman. Then in 1854 he gained the support of some NZG associates in Amsterdam for his ambition to become a missionary himself.⁶³ But although he obtained a Dutch teaching qualification, neither the NZG leaders in Rotterdam nor the missionaries in Minahasa were prepared to see him trained for ordination.⁶⁴ Mangindaan returned to his homeland and worked for four years as an assistant missionary in Manado before resigning to become a government schoolteacher.⁶⁵ In 1873 he published a Dutch language piece entitled "Old Tondano" in a scholarly colonial journal.⁶⁶ In this article Mangindaan portrays the Tondano War of 1808 and 1809, during which several *walak* fought on

61. H. Rooker in 1856, quoted by Schouten (1978: 63).

62. See, for instance, Graafland (1898 II: 171-172).

63. Kruijf 1894: 390.

64. Kruijf 1894: 392.

65. Kruijf 1894: 391.

66. Mangindaan 1873.

the Dutch side, in terms of "a popular desire for liberation" and in a framework of loyalty and treachery to Minahasa.⁶⁷

The Tondanese fought bravely and shot well. To their disloyal countrymen they were magnanimous, giving warning when they were about to shoot by yelling "Kumuru e Minahasa!" (Duck, Minahasans!) from the fortifications. The foreigners, naturally, could not understand, and were often the only ones hit. Not without grounds do many claim that it was at that time that the people of this land adopted the common name of Minahasans. (68)

Previous published accounts had always associated the word Minahasa with an ancient alliance against Bolaang-Mongondow. Simultaneously inspired and alienated by the mission, Mangindaan was now taking the ideal of Minahasan unity sponsored by the Dutch and turning it - at least figuratively - against them.

It is perhaps unnecessary to wax too cerebral about the reactive element in the genesis of Minahasan nationalism. Despite its nuances, nineteenth century Minahasa was ultimately a colonial society in which a European *Staatsvolk*, however few in number, ruled with considerable severity over an indigenous population. Even when regarded as natural and legitimate, such a situation could not but affect the identity of those Minahasans who formed the link between the two groups, including administrative chiefs as well as mission teachers. A.L. Waworuntu, a retired Minahasan chief, gave the following testimony in 1918.

I have learned from experience that we natives are inferior beings in the eyes of a great many European

67. Mangindaan 1873: 367.

68. Mangindaan 1873: 368.

officials - officials, I should emphasise, of the Residency of Manado, not those of the higher government. I have suffered humiliation and contempt both as one of the foremost heads in Minahasa, and later after my honourable discharge. (69)

In 1891, Waworuntu had submitted to the governor general a petition of protest against alleged misgovernment by the Dutch authorities in Minahasa. The petition was signed "in the name of the Minahasan volk, to which I am proud to belong".⁷⁰

The context of this nationalism, and its further political development in the twentieth century, will be examined in the next chapter. Here I will only note that although the processes involved - including direct exposure to both the ideals and the injustices of colonial rule - paralleled those which ultimately affected most parts of the Dutch Indies, they set in unusually early, and occurred in the context of a Minahasan community which was already idealised and bounded. Another important development, however, involved the extension of that community into the world beyond its boundaries.

AMBITION AND MIGRATION: THE MAKING OF A SUBALTERN ELITE

Both government and mission propaganda in nineteenth century Minahasa emphasised that Minahasans, thanks to Christianity and European tutelage, had achieved a certain superiority over their foreign neighbours. In his address to the Minahasan chiefs in 1859, Resident A.J.F. Jansen illustrated

69. From a speech in the *Volksraad* on 20 June 1918 (*Handelingen Volksraad* 1918: 206).

70. Reproduced by Stakman (1893: 113).

the benefits of colonial rule with reference to the foreign present as well as the Minahasan past. While the nearby kingdoms languished in the same poverty and ignorance as two centuries earlier, Minahasa had become "a model of order and contentment which must indisputably be envied by the chiefs and subjects of other lands".⁷¹ In the introduction to his 1863 geography textbook, Graafland assured Minahasan schoolchildren that their condition was "more elevated and illustrious" than that of neighbouring peoples.⁷² Some Europeans even credited Minahasans with special innate qualities. "In Minahasa", wrote A.R. Wallace, "the natural docility and intelligence of the race have made their progress rapid".⁷³

In this way it was established that the Minahasan status category had a native floor at least as solid as its European ceiling. As long as Minahasa remained a substantially isolated society, the pride which this knowledge imparted remained a relatively unimportant aspect of Minahasan identity. But when the cocoon of isolation began to break down, the latent sense of Minahasan superiority became an active force maintaining the distinctiveness and solidarity of the group in a multiethnic environment.

71. Reproduced by Panawuot ([1926]: 58).

72. Graafland 1863: 5.

73. Wallace 1986 [1869]: 263. The government official Francis (1856-1859 III: 310-311) and the NZG inspector Van Rhijn (1851: 279) offer similar opinions.

The rapid expansion of Western education in Minahasa generated skills which an agrarian society could not use and expectations which it could not satisfy. Colonial rule altered the standards by which individual prestige was measured in a highly competitive society, and the very success of the school as a popular institution had much to do with the rise of white collar and bureaucratic employment as a mark of social status. What Europeans saw as an instrument of social progress, Minahasans tended to perceive as an means of personal betterment. Yet the practical scope for such betterment in Minahasa was limited. While education might be an asset in the competition for positions of authority in the village, the higher government posts were monopolised by an increasingly closed elite of chiefly families, and only a fraction of those who completed village schooling could hope to train as local teachers.

By 1875 many missionaries felt that education had become more of a threat to the ideal of a simple, pious, contented agrarian community than a means of realising it. But a belated attempt to redirect the mission curriculum toward "simple, elementary, popular education" was overtaken by the expansion of state education in 1882.⁷⁴ The *sekolah pangkat*, as Minahasans called the government schools - *pangkat* meaning rank or position - confirmed the popular assumption that the main purpose of education was not to prepare for a life as a peasant, but to avoid one.⁷⁵

74. Graafland 1880a: 250. The transformation in mission school policy is outlined by Kroeskamp (1974: 191-194).

75. Kruijf 1894: 383.

Voluntary unemployment among Minahasans who could not find desirable positions after leaving school was already common toward the end of the nineteenth century.⁷⁶ It would have become chronic had not many other parts of the Indies had precisely the opposite problem: a serious shortage of literate, numerate native manpower.

Because early state involvement in popular education was concentrated in parts of the Indies where schools had already been established, Minahasa retained the formidable comparative advantage in education which it had built up as the foremost mission field. In 1899, for instance, it boasted 74 of the 539 government schools in the Netherlands Indies.⁷⁷

A combination of institutional momentum, private enterprise, political pressure and competition between religious denominations ensured that the advantage was sustained into the twentieth century. In 1930, the residency of Manado still recorded the highest proportional rates of school attendance anywhere in Indonesia.⁷⁸ The literacy statistics collected for the 1930 census are also telling. Even combined with the considerably less educated population of neighbouring Bolaang-Mongondow, Minahasa had a higher

76. Graafland 1898 I: 536-537; II: 99-100, 182.

77. Gunning 1924: 508-509; *Jaarcijfers uitgegeven door de Centrale Commissie voor de Statistiek* 1902: 22.

78. *Hollandsch-Inlandsch Onderwijs Commissie* 1930: 51-54. In Manado residency 8.33 percent of the total population was at primary school, compared to 3.44 percent for the outer islands as a whole and 2.93 percent in Java and Madura.

literacy rate than any other area of comparable demographic size in Indonesia.

Table 4.4: Native literacy in some regions of the Netherlands Indies, 1930.(79)

	Total native population	Percent literate
Minahasa and Bolaang-Mongondow	365,204	38.97
Lampung	351,378	26.90
South Moluccas	389,325	21.34
West Sumatra	1,887,866	9.62
Java and Madura	40,891,093	5.48
Netherlands Indies	59,139,067	6.44

Unfortunately, the way in which the census information was collected and presented precludes reconstruction of a single native literacy figure for Minahasa alone. We do know, however, that 45.05 percent of the total population of rural Minahasa, outside the towns of Manado and Tondano where the majority of the resident Chinese and Europeans lived, were literate.⁸⁰ For adult males and adult females, the figures were approximately 69 percent and 53 percent respectively.⁸¹ Dutch language literacy levels in Minahasa, while low in

79. *Volkstelling* 1933-1936 V: 122, 124, 206, 208; VIII: 110-111. The relatively high figure for Lampung is explained by the persistence there of an old Indic script with a role in indigenous social life.

80. Calculated from the 1930 *Volkstelling* (1933-1936 V: 89-90, 122, 135, 141-142). Excluding the towns of Manado and Tondano, the total population of Minahasa was 265,214. Of these, only 5,008 were Europeans, *gelijkgestelden*, or foreign orientals.

81. Estimated using the sex and generational ratios for Minahasa and Bolaang-Mongondow combined (*Volkstelling* 1933-1936 V: 190).

absolute terms, were also exceptional by Indonesian standards.⁸² The figures continued to improve after 1930, and by 1949 almost all adult Minahasans were assumed to be literate.⁸³

The result of these dramatic regional differences in educational level was a sustained exodus of Minahasans seeking employment and prestige abroad, where appropriate opportunities existed both in government service and in private enterprise. In 1866 there were already Minahasans among the superintendents of the compulsory cultivations in Java, and plantation and mining companies were beginning to recruit clerical and supervisory personnel direct from Manado.⁸⁴ The demand for Minahasan skills was greatly increased by the growth of European private enterprise in the liberal era after 1870, and the expansion of Dutch rule into peripheral parts of the Indies after 1890. Minahasans appeared everywhere as overseers, policemen, clerks and teachers. Despite its own misgivings, the NZG confirmed the trend by recruiting Minahasans as evangelical assistants for the new mission fields of the Karo Batak lands of Sumatra, Sawu in the Lesser Sundas, and Central Celebes.⁸⁵

82. 2.30 percent of the native population of Minahasa and Bolaang-Mongondow combined in 1930 (*Volkstelling* 1933-1936 V: 206).

83. *Komit  Ketatanegaraan Minahasa* [1949]: 8.

84. *Tendeloo* 1867: 211-212.

85. *Tjahaja Sijang*, 22 December 1890 and 7 January 1895; Brouwer 1951: 75.

In the early twentieth century, shipping, railway and oil companies became favourite employers. Minahasan journalists also helped develop the Malay press in Java.⁸⁶ By the 1922 Minahasans were so ubiquitous that emigration was said to be "in their blood".⁸⁷ At the census of 1930, one in every eight Minahasans was outside the homeland.

Table 4.5: Numbers of Minahasans in different parts of the Netherlands Indies, 1930.(88)

Minahasa	246,489	Borneo	2,144
Manado residency, excluding Minahasa	8,458	Lesser Sundas	695
South Celebes	1,823	Moluccas	2,161
Sumatra	4,417	Java and Madura	15,412
		Total	<u>281,599</u>

Almost half of the expatriates, moreover, were born overseas.⁸⁹ Minahasa had become a diaspora as wide as the Netherlands Indies.

Minahasans in Dutch service abroad were still natives, but their Western education, being more useful, was usually better appreciated by their European superiors. In private enterprise, expatriate Minahasans often received the same

86. Ratulangie 1913: 10; Pramudya Ananta Tur 1982: 26-28. Java newspapers edited by Minahasans included *Kabar Perniagaan* (from 1903) and *Djawa Tengah* (from 1913).

87. Logemann 1922: 179.

88. *Volkstelling* 1933-1936 V: 22. The figure for the Lesser Sundas includes Bali and Lombok. According to one source, the number of Minahasan civilians in Java had climbed to 20,000 by 1940 (*Nationale Commentaren*, 2 March 1940).

89. *Volkstelling* 1933-1936 V: 49.

pay as Indo-Europeans.⁹⁰ They also found themselves in positions of authority over members of other native groups, so that existing prejudices toward such groups were reinforced.⁹¹ Not surprisingly, then, it was usually in a tone of self-congratulation that Minahasans compared their own progress to that of other Indonesians.

Yes, Minahasans are simply good for everything. Which land in the Indies is without its Minahasan community now? Wherever people still live in darkness, Minahasans are at work as teachers, administrative assistants, Salvation Army officers and much else. We Minahasans, and unquestionably also the government, are full of appreciation for the achievements of these countrymen of ours, for the way they have laboured alongside Europeans to bring progress to some of the more backward peoples of this archipelago. (92)

MINAHASA AND CELEBES: A SUBALTERN COLONIALISM

Perhaps the most poignant manifestation of Minahasa's ambivalent position in the colonial order was a certain expansionist element in Minahasan nationalism. Confident in and dependent upon the colonial civilising project as a whole, yet at the same time proud of their own identity and perhaps conscious of the obstacles to their own assimilation, some Minahasans attempted to resolve the contradiction by formulating a lesser colonial project of their own.

90. Dirkzwager 1912: 1162.

91. At home, the arrival of several thousand Sangirese migrants to perform manual labour for Minahasan copra producers reinforced the trend (Van Aken 1932: 108).

92. "W.B.L." in *Tjahaja Sijang*, 1 December 1920.

The geography of this subaltern colonialism was a product of the colonial fixation with islands, and had been prefigured in Dutch thought. In 1880 the later "ethical" politician C.T. van Deventer suggested that spatial proximity and racial affinity designated Minahasans as the natural pioneers of civilisation in the wild parts of Celebes.⁹³ Minahasan leaders ultimately came to see the colonisation of Celebes not only as a civilising mission, but also as an opportunity to become an assimilating rather than an assimilated people.

It was the most important Minahasan political figure of the twentieth century, G.S.S.J. Ratulangie, who, as a student in the Netherlands, first formalised the idea of remaking Celebes in the image of Minahasa.⁹⁴ In speeches and articles from 1914 onward, Ratulangie called for an organised *pénétration pacifique* of Celebes by Minahasans.⁹⁵ With government support, the constant stream of emigrants from Minahasa could be concentrated upon the home island and used to create in Celebes "a single people with one common culture and one common interest".⁹⁶ But whereas Van Deventer had regarded Minahasans primarily as instruments of

93. Quoted by Colenbrander & Stokvis (1916: 388).

94. G.S.S.J. Ratulangie (1890-1949) came from a chiefly family in Tondano. Between 1908 and 1919 he studied in Europe. He later played an important part in the Indonesian national revolution, and was posthumously recognised as an official Indonesian national hero (Pondaag [1966]). More about his prewar activities will be said in the following chapters.

95. Ratulangie 1914; Ratulangie & Laoh 1917: 476-477; Ratulangie 1920: 126.

96. Ratulangie 1914: 44.

the Dutch civilising mission in Celebes, Ratulangie wanted to see them take control of the project themselves.

Consider the many Minahasans already performing pioneer work in Celebes on behalf of the government and the mission. According to our information they are equal to their task. How much finer their achievements will surely be if they are guided solely by a great national idea. It is possible to find an institutional form for the kind of entity which we have in mind. We envisage complete assimilation of north and central Celebes to Minahasa.(97)

Waves of colonists would move southward "to transplant the Minahasa-idea into new worlds" - it would be "a national mission".⁹⁸

Ratulangie claimed in 1914 that such an ideal was already shared by prominent Minahasans both in the homeland and in Java.⁹⁹ By 1916 it had been embraced by the principal Minahasan political group, *Perserikatan Minahasa*.¹⁰⁰ Although never explicitly promoted by the Dutch authorities, Minahasan colonialism in North and Central Celebes became a reality to the extent that by 1930 more than 8,000 Minahasans were living in parts of Manado residency other than their homeland.¹⁰¹ Most were teachers or government employees of various kinds, and some became powerful advisers to the rulers of the small *zelfbesturende*

97. Ratulangie 1920: 126.

98. Ratulangie 1920: 126.

99. Ratulangie 1914: 31.

100. The story of *Perserikatan Minahasa* will be outlined in the next chapter.

101. *Volkstelling* 1933-1936 V: 22.

landschappen.¹⁰² A few Minahasans even ruled such territories themselves as "acting raja".¹⁰³

Yet the expansion of Minahasa ultimately did more to harden ethnic boundaries than to erase them. One problem was that the *Belanda Manado*, or "Manadonese Dutchmen", as Minahasans were known elsewhere in Celebes, were liable to become the immediate target of any local hostility to the colonial government. Another was that civilisation and assimilation, even as ideals, involved an offensive element of condescension.

Despite the view of some ethnographers that Minahasans are people of a higher order than the other inhabitants of Celebes, I do not believe that the mental capacities of our coinsulars are so divergent from ours that they cannot be taught what we have been able to learn. (104)

No less than when expressed by Europeans, such attitudes among Minahasans invited hostile reaction. When a Minahasan remarked at a public meeting in 1929 that "even the Gorontalese" yearned for progress, there was anger among the insulted group.¹⁰⁵ While some Dutch-educated Gorontalese admired Minahasa as a model of progress, few showed any

102. Logemann 1922: 165; Broeder 1936: 1008.

103. Minahasan administrators were acting as rulers of the Talaud and Siau *landschappen* in 1941 (Van Rhijn 1941: 237-241). P.F. Parengkuan in Siau had been doing so since 1936; when succession problems occurred among the indigenous nobility, the Dutch were only too pleased to install a Minahasan bureaucrat for the time being (Elias [1973]: 121-122).

104. Ratulangie 1914: 43.

105. *Fikiran*, 29 September 1929.

enthusiasm to become Minahasans themselves.¹⁰⁶ And even for the Westernising intelligentsia, Minahasa was not the only model. Gorontalo's first modern social organisation, *Sinar Budi*, was inspired by the Javanese *Budi Utomo*.¹⁰⁷

The most obvious obstacle to a Minahasan unification of Celebes was, however, Islam. Christianity in Celebes was effectively limited to Minahasa and the northern islands, together with a minority in Bolaang-Mongondow and scattered outposts in the centre and east.¹⁰⁸ In the early nineteenth century most of the island had been pagan, with Islam strong only on the southwestern peninsula.¹⁰⁹ Just as Christian conversion was accelerating in the north, however, Islam began a forward movement of its own which has been sustained ever since.

The introduction of Islam to Bolaang-Mongondow by Bugis and Arab traders in the 1830s, and its rapid consolidation in Gorontalo after 1870, set limits to Minahasan cultural

106. A Gorontaloese statement of gratitude for Minahasan tutelage appears in *Tjahaja Sijang*, 15 August 1920. There is, however, no ambiguity in ethnic demarcation. Gorontalo and Minahasa are treated as two discrete *bangsa*.

107. Manus, Parengkuan, Sigarlaki & Pangkey [1979]: 88. *Sinar Budi* was formed in 1912.

108. Missionary efforts in the highlands of South Celebes did not begin to bear substantial fruit until 1931 (Bigalke 1981: 226).

109. Islam also had a foothold in many other areas - indeed, in Gorontalo it was older than in Makasar. Outside the Bugis and Makasar lands, however, Islam tended to remain an aristocratic prerogative as well as a highly syncretic affair. Riedel (1870: 98) wrote of Gorontalo: "The teachings of Muhammad are closely followed only by the chiefs and the nobility. The people as a whole are unconvinced."

imperialism even in the immediate neighbourhood.¹¹⁰ Some Minahasans might distinguish between Christianity and progress, but being Minahasan was still closely associated with the former. The religious antithesis was sharpened in the twentieth century by the arrival of *Sarekat Islam*, the great folk movement which linked Islamic revival with anticolonialism.¹¹¹ In 1919, Gorontalo had the second largest *Sarekat Islam* branch in the outer islands.¹¹² By 1923, when *Sarekat Islam* staged a "National Celebes Congress" in Manado itself, the ideal of insular unity had been appropriated by the Islamic movement.

When Minahasan nationalist leaders held a "Celebes Congress" of their own in 1928, they were harangued for their arrogance by a visitor from Bolaang Mongondow.

Mr. Manoppo strongly criticised the decision to call the event a Celebes Congress when it was really only a Minahasa Congress. He regarded this as bad form because it gave the impression that Minahasa sought to dominate the whole of Celebes. Indeed, no other *bangsa* was even represented at the congress.⁽¹¹³⁾

Minahasa as a perceived community had been created and bounded by a unique historical experience, and its distinctiveness was axiomatic. In the end, the chimeric ideal of a Minahasan Celebes probably did owe more to a yearning for *Lebensraum* than to a serious desire to redraw the boundaries of Minahasa.

110. Wilken & Schwarz 1867b: 267-278; Van Hoeffell 1891: 31.

111. Founded in Java in 1912, *Sarekat Islam* reached Makasar in 1914, Donggala in 1916 and Gorontalo in 1917 (Korver 1982: 231; V 28/7/1922/N8X).

112. MR 999X/1923.

113. *Fikiran*, 23 June 1928.

Within the administrative residency of Manado, some diffuse sense of common identity did nevertheless develop across religious and ethnic divisions. One reason for this was the centripetal effect of colonial educational institutions. Between 1865 and 1915, for instance, sons of chiefs from all over the residency studied together at the *Hoofdenschool* in Tondano. The multiethnic character of this school was expressed in its "Welcome Song".¹¹⁴

<i>Welkom binnen deze muren</i>	Welcome here within these walls
<i>Zoons van hoofden uit dit land</i>	Sons of chieftains of this land
<i>Welkom Gorontalo's zonen</i>	Welcome Gorontalo's sons
<i>Kind'ren van het Sangir strand.</i>	Children of the Sangir strand.

The relatively open, elastic quality of the category *orang Manado* - as opposed to *orang Minahasa* - also made possible some psychological convergence among the diverse peoples of north Celebes, rather as it facilitated racial harmony in Minahasa itself. The elasticity was not infinite, for a visible degree of Westernisation - in lifestyle and manners if not necessarily in religion or language - remained an important part of being Manadonese. But a willingness to acculturate to this degree could be useful as well as convivial, particularly outside the residency where *orang Manado* enjoyed some automatic prestige in Dutch eyes.¹¹⁵

It is perhaps significant that the most obvious cultural marker of the *orang Manado* as a group, the peculiar form of the Malay language known as Manado Malay, has no special

114. Lyrics from E.J.J.W.A. Supit, Gorontalo, 24 August 1988.

115. Sangirese, for instance, called themselves Manadonese when in Java (V 27/12/1921/A14X).

connection with Minahasa. Derived from a Moluccan trade dialect and still rich in Ternate vocabulary, Manado Malay has borrowed remarkably little from the Minahasan languages which it is still in the process of displacing.¹¹⁶ Except in church, Manado Malay has also completely supplanted the more standard Malay once taught by the missionaries.¹¹⁷ In this respect, Minahasa seems to have been absorbed by its cultural environment rather than vice versa.

MINAHASAN PRIVILEGE UNDER THREAT: LEVELLING FROM ABOVE

In the middle of the nineteenth century, Minahasa was regarded as the most important Dutch possession east of Java, and perhaps even the most important in the outer islands.¹¹⁸ Yet by 1922, one Minahasan could describe it as a "forgotten corner" of the Indies.¹¹⁹ Although the enormous territorial and economic expansion of the colony over the intervening decades allowed Minahasans to become an elite outside their homeland, in the long term it also implied a threat to their privileged status.

There was a time when, apart from Minahasa and a tiny area around Makasar, we did not concern ourselves with Celebes at all. The rest of the island was simply left to its own devices.

116. On Manado Malay, see Watuseke & Watuseke-Politton (1981).

117. The NZG initially promoted a form similar to that used by the VOC for diplomatic purposes, converting to Riau Malay toward the end of the 19th century (Graafland 1898 I: 541; Watuseke & Watuseke-Politton 1981: 324-325). Graafland (1898 I: 539) regarded the Manado dialect as a "bastardisation" of Malay.

118. Francis 1856-1859 III: 278; Padtbrugge 1866: 304.

119. Marchand 1922: 545.

Extraordinary effort was lavished upon Minahasa without concern for equity with other areas; schools were built and salaries fixed as if there was nothing else in the Indies besides that one region. (120)

Having unified the archipelago as a territorial state, the colonial government began to be concerned with levelling its uneven social surface. Practical considerations played a part here, as it was sometimes cheaper in the long run to train local personnel than to import Minahasans. But this high-handed egalitarianism was also inspired by a further development of the spirit of rational, impersonal administration which had helped to unify Minahasa itself.

Except where European privileges were concerned, the absolutist colonial state of the twentieth century was opposed in principle to the kind of ethnic favouritism which had often served imperial purposes in the past. When Minahasan chiefs pressed at the turn of the century for inclusion of all Minahasans in the European category for civil law purposes, part of the government's reply was that "legal *gelijkstelling* with Europeans naturally could not be limited to particular parts of the Netherlands Indies".¹²¹ The same principle informed Dutch attacks upon racist explanations for Minahasan achievements.

Many among the Ambonese and Minahasans themselves have a tendency to attribute their mental superiority to superior racial qualities. This interpretation is, I believe, in conflict with the historical facts. It also does nothing to further

120. From a colonial budget statement for 1912, quoted in 'De onderwijs-reorganisatie in de Minahassa' (1912: 60).

121. From a ministerial statement reproduced by Carpentier-Alting (1902-1903 I: iii). The original request is stated in 'Rapport over de 'adat kabiasaan' (1911 [1896]: 110-112), and by Waworuntu (1902: 49).

brotherly cooperation with the other native inhabitants of the Indies, nor indeed to promote the self-knowledge which Ambonese and Minahasans so badly need.(122)

The change in attitude was often more strongly manifest in rhetoric than in action, for Minahasa's educational lead was, as I have noted, retained. Nevertheless, some concrete implications were felt. By 1936, for instance, it was official policy to dispense with Minahasan technical, clerical and advisory personnel in the native states of Celebes as soon as suitably qualified local people became available.¹²³ Moreover, relative educational advantages were no guarantee of security once white collar unemployment became a universal problem. By 1938, many Minahasan expatriates were aware that the emergence of a *klerkenproletariaat* elsewhere in the archipelago might ultimately throw them back upon their own resources.

How many unemployed intellectuals wander the island of Java now? Already a thousand times as many as in Celebes, yet more appear every year. Where will they find work? Although we as children of Celebes are also inhabitants of Netherlands India, I feel that we are all just passengers in Java, exiles who must eventually return to our own *tanah air*.(124)

The realisation that Minahasa's days of unquestioned privilege were numbered had an influence upon its political attitude to the colonial government, as discussed in the following chapter.

122. Kerckamp 1918: 403.

123. Broeder 1936: 1008. The Protestant mission in central Celebes had begun substituting local teachers for Minahasans as early as 1916 (Brouwer 1951: 124).

124. *Fikiran*, 15 October 1938.

The most striking illustration of how the experience of becoming a subaltern elite affected Minahasan identity, and also how the threat to that elite status stimulated Minahasan nationalism, is provided by a different category of expatriates. A substantial minority of emigrants from Minahasa left not as clerks or teachers, but as soldiers. The tradition of military service began in 1829, when some 800 Minahasans were enlisted to help crush the rebel prince Diponegoro in the last stages of the Java War.¹²⁵ After 1850, Minahasa supplied the majority of the native Christian contingent of the Netherlands Indies Army known as the "Ambonese".¹²⁶ Together with a smaller number of Sangir islanders, the Minahasan part of this group was officially referred to as "Manadonese". Attracted by an enlistment premium and the promise of a state pension, recruits were often drawn from the poorer parts of Minahasa.¹²⁷ A survival of traditional respect for the warrior may also have played a role here.

Recruitment accelerated with the escalation of the Aceh war, and at the beginning of the twentieth century Minahasans also fought in the campaigns to establish Dutch authority in Jambi, South Celebes, Flores and New Guinea.¹²⁸

125. Waworuntu 1918: 652; Van Gent 1923: 10-11.

126. Bosscher 1880: 229.

127. MR 779X/1920; Schouten [1986]: 2. The shame of *corvée* labour, from which soldiers were exempted for life, is also regularly mentioned as a factor ('De exodus van Minahassers' 1918: 665; Marcus 1919: 417).

128. Van Gent 1923.

Table 4.6: Ethnic composition of the Netherlands Indies Army, 1880-1936.(129)

	<u>1880</u>	<u>1900</u>	<u>1920</u>	<u>1936</u>
Manadonese	725	1,951	5,930	5,130
Ambonese proper	461	2,030	3,721	4,052
Other natives	14,952	19,015	20,884	16,146
Europeans	17,011	15,109	7,880	7,751
Total strength	33,149	38,105	38,415	33,079

In addition to the soldiers, other Minahasans - about 2,000 of them in 1916 - served with the *gewapende politie* or armed police.¹³⁰

Institutionalised racial discrimination reached its apogee in the army, and the intermediate status of the Manadonese between European and Muslim native was regulated with military precision. Everything from food to promotion was affected. On the one hand, the Minahasans were hailed as a martial elite - one Dutch officer called them "one of the finest military races in the world".¹³¹ Consequently they tended to view the ordinary native soldier, usually Javanese, with contempt. A report published in 1925 recommended segregation of the Manadonese troops from other ethnicities on the grounds that "a certain arrogance among them can lead to fights".¹³² On the other hand, their own fondest aspiration, to be treated "*seperti orang Belanda*" -

129. *Koloniaal Verslag* 1881 Bijlage B: 4-7; 1901 Bijlage B: 4; 1921 Bijlage C: 5; *Indisch Verslag* 1937: 391.

130. Ratulangie & Laoh 1917: 472.

131. V 15/5/1918/64.

132. Balner 1925: 164.

like Dutchmen - was frustrated.¹³³ At the same time, rivalry with the Moluccans prevented the "Ambonese" category from becoming a real focus of identity.¹³⁴ The net result was an involution of loyalty and an ambiguous and explosive *esprit de corps* within the Minahasan units.

Those who threaten to stain the military reputation of the Manadoese by slovenliness and suchlike are corrected by their compatriots, and not always gently. According to reports, people are less closed in Minahasa itself. But our Minahasan troops always give me the impression that they could form a danger, that they will preserve and extend their privileges at all costs, and that all their toasts to Her Majesty the Queen, the House of Orange and the tricolour are drunk upon the express condition that they remain Her Majesty's privileged Christian subjects - a position to which, in military respects, they have every claim.(135)

As predicted, the abolition of Minahasan military privileges in 1920 caused outrage among those affected, and came as a rude reminder of the real political situation. "I hope this meeting will understand my meaning if I say that we Minahasans are almost like part of *bangsa Indo*, the Indo-European group", said Ratulangie to a gathering of Minahasan soldiers in 1922. "But if we have anything to do with the government, we are immediately just natives".¹³⁶ By that time the soldiery had passed through a phase of intense politicisation which will be described in the following chapter.

133. Marcus 1919: 417.

134. Opposition to categorisation as "Ambonese" was an important political issue among Minahasan soldiers in 1919 (Marcus 1919: 417).

135. From a 1917 report by a former division commander, in V 15/5/1918/64.

136. Reported in V 20/5/1924/R6X.

I have shown that despite the "Manadonese" common ground between Minahasan and European, an element of reaction against European privilege and prejudice contributed to the sense of Minahasan community almost from its inception. But the pride which Minahasans soon derived from their own relative privilege over others was just as powerful an integrating factor. Having something in common to lose proved as effective a stimulus to unity as having something in common to gain. Of course, such sentiments sat uneasily with the ideal of Christian brotherhood upon which the original unity of Minahasa had been built. The crux would come when alternative ideals of unity were proposed by outsiders.

CHAPTER 5: MINAHASA AS A POLITICAL CAUSE

This chapter describes the development of modern political activity among Minahasans, and shows how it both reflected and enhanced the emerging Minahasan nationalism. Minahasan political life in the late colonial period was influenced by the national idea developed in the nineteenth century and by the racial stratification inherent in the colonial system. Because of the blurred character of the racial divide in Minahasa, however, and more importantly because Minahasans derived real and perceived benefits from colonial rule, Minahasan political nationalism tended to take cooperative rather than confrontational forms. Combined with a cultivated stereotype of loyalty to the Dutch crown, this lack of confrontation has often obscured the existence of Minahasan nationalism. But loyalism and nationalism were not mutually exclusive in Minahasa. For a long time, in fact, they were two sides of the same coin. This complementarity had to do with the reciprocal, contractual nature of the colonial relationship as it was perceived by Minahasans.

THE TWELFTH PROVINCE

On 10 January 1929, Minahasa celebrated 250 years of "alliance" with the Dutch.¹ Hundreds of officials from all districts, together with bands, dance groups and boy scout

1. The programme of events for the day is reproduced in *Fikiran*, 5 January 1929.

troops, assembled before large crowds in Manado to inaugurate an obelisk bearing the following inscription.

This monument was erected by the Minahasan people to commemorate the treaty of alliance signed 250 years ago in the fortress Amsterdam by Governor of the Moluccas Robert Padtbrugge, representing the Dutch East India Company, and Padat, Supit and Pedro Rantu, representing the *landstreek* which is now called Minahasa. (2)

The monument had indeed been paid for by donations from Minahasans themselves.³ As it was unveiled, a Minahasan choir sang the royalist song which had become customary on public occasions. Sung in Malay to the tune of the former Dutch national anthem *Wien Neerlandsch Bloed*, this was regarded by many people as the Minahasan *volkslied*.⁴

<i>Hai orang Minahasa gnep</i>	Hai all Minahasans
<i>Angkatlah hatimu</i>	Lift up your hearts
<i>Dan minta berkat yang tetap</i>	And ask for the blessing
<i>Kepada rajamu.</i>	Of your queen.
<i>Siapa cinta printahnya</i>	Whoever loves her rule
<i>Jang memberikan untung terang</i>	Which brings such clear blessings
<i>Ialah minta selamatnya</i>	Will pray that good fortune
<i>Diberikan Allah grang.</i> (5)	Be hers by God's will.

Resident of Manado H.J. Schmidt gave a speech of thanks, and telegram messages of goodwill from the governor general and the queen were read out.⁶ The company then proceeded to the village of Woloan, where the resident inaugurated a second monument, this time a gift from the government to Minahasa. It was built over the old grave of one Hukum Mayor Supit,

2. 'De Minahassa en Nederland' 1929: 52.

3. 'De Minahassa en Nederland' 1929: 52.

4. MR 1229/1931; Brouwer 1936: 60; Van Kol 1902: 284; Van Nes 1925: 509.

5. Lyrics reproduced in *Soeara Militair Manado*, November 1940.

6. The telegrams are reproduced in *Fikiran*, 26 January 1929.

presumed to be the same Supit whose signature or mark had appeared on the 1679 treaty.⁷

The 10 January anniversary subsequently became an annual event, and was celebrated with enthusiasm right up to the Japanese invasion.⁸ Such public displays of affection for Holland confirmed Minahasa's early twentieth century reputation as the "twelfth province" of the Netherlands, a bastion of imperial loyalty, as well as Christianity and Dutch culture, in the East Indies.

Like the idea that Minahasa itself had been united in ancient times, the tradition of a quarter millenium alliance with Holland involved considerable distortion of the historical facts. The fame of Hukum Mayor Supit, for instance, rested partly on the conviction that he was one of several Minahasan chiefs who travelled to Ternate toward the end of the Spanish period to request VOC support against Castilian oppression.⁹ According to this tradition, the 1679 pact was ultimately the result of a Minahasan initiative. VOC records, however, show that although envoys from North Celebes did seek Dutch protection against Spanish enemies in 1643 and 1654, they came both times in the name of the raja of Manado and Bolaang, not the upland communities.¹⁰ If Alfurs were really involved, they

7. 'De Minahasa en Nederland' 1929: 52.

8. *Manado Bulletin*, 11 January 1940; MR 368X/1939.

9. *Tjahaja Sijang*, 1 October 1921; *Fikiran*, 2 February 1929, 29 December 1928; Graafland 1898 II: 400.

10. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 13, 14.

probably represented only that western part of Minahasa which recognised the suzerainty of Bolaang at a time when other *walak* were leaning toward the Spanish.¹¹ Dutch intervention in the *landstreek van Manado* may therefore have begun more because of internal conflicts among the *walak* than as a result of their common antipathy to Spain.¹² Equally possible is that tradition simply exaggerated the historical role of some later figures, and that there never really was any Minahasan invitation to the VOC.¹³

Whatever prompted the Dutch decision to occupy Manado in 1655 cannot in any case have had much to do with the treaty signed there 24 years later. The contract of 1679 was just one of a series of treaties which confirmed various parts of North Celebes as VOC dependencies after the defeated kingdom of Makasar surrendered a tenuous claim to the region in 1667.¹⁴ Nor is there anything in the text of the agreement to suggest an especially benevolent relationship with Minahasa. Protection - from Bolaang, not Spain - is extended to the Alfurs only on the condition, among others,

11. The four messengers named by Riedel (1869: 516) were all from Tombulu *walak*.

12. Riedel (1862: 51; 1869: 515) implies that rivalry between Tombulu and Tondano was involved. The Tondano *walak* were the staunchest Spanish allies (Riedel 1869: 515).

13. Three of Riedel's four names are also those of chiefs to whom the Dutch gave special powers at the end of the 17th century (Godée Molsbergen 1928: 90, 97). The date on Supit's grave - 1738 - also makes it unlikely that he was already an important figure in the middle of the 17th century (Graafland 1898 II: 401).

14. Alders (1955: 83-88) summarises the equivalent agreements with Gorontalo, Limboto, Siau and Sangir. Stapel (1922: 243) reproduces the relevant part of the 1667 treaty with Makasar.

That they always recognise the Honourable Company alone as their only rightful overlord after God himself, acknowledging and obeying none other, now or in the future, and doing all this of their own free and uncoerced will.(15)

This is vassalage by contract rather than conquest, but vassalage nonetheless. Elsewhere in the treaty, the Minahasans are referred to as "subjects of the Company".¹⁶ The word *bondgenoten* or treaty partners, interpreted by later writers to indicate a degree of equality between the signatories, does appear in a supplementary contract of 1699.¹⁷ That same document, however, also reconfirms the 1679 agreement in full and adds the new stipulation that Alfurs who indulge in the traditional practice of headhunting are to be tried and punished by the Company.¹⁸

Such impositions were resisted. The Dutch were not fully able to enforce their own order in Minahasa until after the Tondano War of 1808 and 1809, a serious conflict in which artillery and a nine month siege were necessary to defeat the rebels.¹⁹ The myth of an historic friendship between Holland and Minahasa was developed only later, and mainly by Dutchmen.

The story of Supit and the Minahasan appeal to the VOC, for instance, though apparently derived from an oral tradition,

15. The first clause of the 1679 treaty, reproduced by Godée Molsbergen (1928: 55).

16. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 56.

17. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 92 (clause 9).

18. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 90, 91 (clauses 1 and 3).

19. Godée Molsbergen 1928: 165-169; Mambu 1986: 56-81; Supit 1986: 154-194.

was popularised by J.G.F. Riedel in his 1862 booklet on Minahasan history.²⁰ The anthem *Hai orang Minahasa gnep* came from Graafland's songbook *Parindu*, first published in 1863 for use in the NZG schools.²¹ The cult around Hukum Mayor Supit was apparently a twentieth century innovation; Graafland noted in 1898 that his grave was not venerated.²² The Twelfth Province epithet, finally, was made popular by Dutch "ethical" politician C.T. Van Deventer soon after the turn of the century.²³

But if maintaining the stereotype of Minahasan loyalism involved inventing a good deal of tradition, few Minahasans objected to the distortion. Nor, in 1929, did very many see a contradiction between Minahasan nationalism and loyalty to the Dutch crown.

Our Minahasan ancestors were not lacking in love for their fatherland. When Minahasa was suffering under the harsh rule of Spain, they patriotically sent their greatest warriors to Ternate to ask the Dutch for help. As a result, we and our *tanah air* have been under the rule and protection of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the last two and a half centuries. We are eternally grateful to our ancestors for that wise and good deed, which opened up a fine, wide road to wellbeing for their descendants. (24)

The fact that Minahasan loyalty to Holland was predicated upon the continuation of this "road to wellbeing" was

20. Riedel 1862: 55. This booklet is ostensibly based upon Minahasan oral tradition.

21. Kroeskamp 1974: 172, 221; *Tjahaja Sijang*, 6 September 1895.

22. Graafland 1898 II: 400.

23. V 27/12/1921/A14X. The earliest reference to this phrase which I have found is from 1910 (Viersen [1910]: 23).

24. By an anonymous writer in *Fikiran*, 15 September 1928.

ultimately to make the relationship vulnerable. For the moment, however, there were reasons to believe in the essential benevolence of colonial rule in Minahasa.

COLONIALISM AND RECIPROCITY

Despite its novelty, Dutch rule resonated in some respects with precolonial culture. In Riedel's adapted oral account of the arrival of the Dutch, the Minahasans decided "to take the Company as their mother and father".²⁵ The same metaphor was often used by Minahasans to characterise their relationship with the colonial government and with the NZG in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.²⁶ Astute Dutch officials like Resident Jansen even employed it themselves when addressing Minahasan audiences.

Your ancestors appealed for help against their enemies and protection from internal conflicts. They wanted to take the Company as their mother and father. The Company gave its help. Your enemies were driven out, peace was established in this land, and the Company accepted the people of Minahasa as its children.(27)

The metaphor of parenthood is, of course, a very common feature of colonial ideologies. In the Minahasan case, however, it had a special meaning because of an indigenous custom called *mekioki*. This was a form of adoption with a strongly instrumental character, in which adoptive parents and children were entitled to various types of practical

25. Riedel 1862: 55.

26. For instance, in *Tjahaja Sijang*, 22 January 1894, and MR 2955/24.

27. From A.J.F. Jansen's 1859 speech to all of the Minahasan chiefs, reproduced by Panawuot ([1926]: 57).

help from each other. Usually the latter supplied labour and the former material support, but the system was flexible enough to permit, for instance, the adoption of chiefs for political purposes.²⁸ The leading principle was not kinship but practical reciprocity, and *mekioki* is best characterised as a way of establishing a patron-client relationship.²⁹ Although one party had explicit superiority in terms of status and respect, both stood to gain, albeit not usually to the same degree.

It would be simplistic to suggest that the special relationship which really did develop between Minahasa and the Dutch in the nineteenth century was a matter of pure calculation on the Minahasan side. As Graafland's loyalist song suggests, affection for the Dutch sovereign was part and parcel of the carefully packaged world view which Minahasans embraced during a cultural crisis beyond their control. Having accepted the superiority of Dutch power and civilisation, however, Minahasans clearly stood to gain as loyal "children" of the *Kompania*, as they continued to call the government.³⁰

28. Adam 1925b: 473. The main recompense for the chief was usually the land which he inherited from his adoptive parents.

29. Adoptive children did not necessarily become members of the household or receive the same share of the inheritance as true children. In some cases they were actually older than their adoptive parents (Adam 1925b: 470, 471).

30. From the Spanish term for the VOC (Schwarz 1908: 173).

In the first place, they gained the prestige associated with closeness to the Dutch.³¹ This was felt most tangibly by the chiefs, whose social position was consolidated by Dutch administrative policy, and by the Minahasan soldiers, with their privileged status in the colonial army. Secondly, many other Minahasans also acquired the opportunity to translate prestige into authority and money as white collar workers throughout the Dutch East Indies. Finally, and most paradoxically, Minahasa's loyalty helped win it a degree of political emancipation unequalled in colonial Indonesia.

Minahasans began to use loyalism as a political weapon as early as 1878, when the district chiefs addressed a joint protest to the governor general against a new regulation designating all uncultivated land in Minahasa as state domain.

What will the *raja* and people of Bolaang-Mongondow say, and the other kingdoms which border on Minahasa, and were formerly our enemies? They do not serve the government as faithfully as we do, or lend it so much help, or bring it so much profit. They are at liberty to sell their coffee for high prices to private traders, while we, who have always been loyal and obedient to the government, must sell our coffee at very low prices. And while we aid the government and fill its coffers, our political contracts, or those of our ancestors, are nullified, and our land is appropriated by the government.(32)

Apart from its emotional and moral appeal, the petition was based upon the legal argument that because neither the original treaty of 1679 nor the supplementary contracts of

31. This ambition had been foreshadowed, ironically, during the Tondano War. According to a Dutch source quoted by Mambu (1986: 37), the rebel chiefs decided in 1808 that "they wanted to be the Company and Resident themselves".

32. Reproduced by Van Kesteren (1879: 30).

1699 and 1790 had stated explicitly that Minahasa was Dutch sovereign territory, the government had no right to treat it as such now without a new treaty. Although the evidence suggests that the chiefs' opposition to the *domeinverklaring* had much to do with their own personal claims to potentially lucrative land, they made their protest in the name of the Minahasan people.³³

We, chiefs of Minahasa, humbly request that our contract be extended, or a new one offered, or the existing one left to stand intact, so that Minahasa does not become state land, but remains as before the land of our *volk*, according to the rights and customs of the country, and also according to the contract entered into by our ancestors. (34)

The petition ends with a promise of renewed loyalty and obedience in the event that it is successful. In the end the appeal was rejected, but not before it had stirred up considerable debate in the colonial press and found its way to the Hague.³⁵

Fifteen years later, a similar protest led to the resignation of the highest Dutch official in North Celebes. Once again, one of the issues involved was the erosion of certain privileges previously enjoyed by district chiefs. Although gratified by their enhanced security as civil

33. Partly because of their access to *heerendienst* labour, district chiefs were in a position to clear, claim and cultivate more land than anybody else. They had also begun to sell land to Europeans. Both practices were obstructed by the new regulation (Edeling 1919 [1875]: 13, 39-45; Graafland 1898 I: 65; II: 266-267; Schouten 1978: 44-45).

34. Van Kesteren 1879: 30.

35. Schouten 1978: 45. Part of the slightly modified petition sent to the Dutch home parliament in 1878 is reproduced in 'Een request uit de Minahassa' (1879: 113-114).

servants, the chiefs were less pleased with other aspects of the bureaucratisation process. In 1881, for instance, they were deprived of the right to personal labour services from their subjects.³⁶ Disrespectful treatment from increasingly interventionist Dutch *controleurs* rankled too.³⁷ Then in 1891, Resident M.C.E. Stakman completed the insult by withdrawing the ceremonial parasols issued to the chiefs as symbols of nobility in 1859.³⁸

Stakman's reformist policies also included modifications to the *corvée* and tax systems which, although designed to spread the burden more evenly among the population, caused increased hardship for many Minahasans in the short run.³⁹ This enabled disaffected chiefs once more to combine a statement of their own grievances with a broader protest on behalf of the Minahasan people.⁴⁰ In 1891 A.L. Waworuntu, a young district chief previously praised by the Dutch, invited the governor general to visit Minahasa and assess

36. Stakman 1893: 6-7.

37. One chief, E. Sahelangi, complained of being treated "like a coolie, and that in public, so that I lose all respect in the eyes of the people" (Schouten 1978: 88).

38. These *payung* were replicas of those long sported by Javanese aristocrats. Stakman replaced them with a uniform (Graafland 1898 II: 252-253; Schouten 1987: 124).

39. One of Stakman's ideas was to force relatively privileged Minahasans to pay a tax in lieu of *corvée* labour rather than simply evading it (Stakman 1893: 59-60). Achieving this, however, tended to involve enforcing all existing *corvée* regulations with greater strictness than in the past (Schouten 1987: 122).

40. The written protest, composed by A.L. Waworuntu, is reproduced by Stakman (1893: 97-114).

the situation for himself.⁴¹ The latter declined to do so in person, but did send a deputy instead. As a result of the ensuing investigation, Resident Stakman was advised to apply for an honourable dismissal.⁴²

The central government, however, was swayed by evidence of economic deprivation among the Minahasan peasants, not by the loss of independence suffered by their chiefs.⁴³ Control over the Minahasan bureaucratic corps was actually tightened after Stakman's resignation, and discontent persisted. Waworuntu and two other chiefs now entered into correspondence with the Dutch socialist parliamentarian H. Van Kol, whom they warned that Minahasa was on the verge of rebellion over excessive taxation and a draconian new interpretation of the *domeinverklaring* regulation.⁴⁴

Van Kol visited Minahasa in 1902 as part of a study tour of the colonies. He left convinced that the threat of popular revolt had been a political fiction, although declining to judge whether selfish or altruistic motives had inspired the deception.⁴⁵ The highlight of his visit was a public meeting in Tondano attended by several hundred Minahasans, including private individuals as well as village and

41. A.L. Waworuntu (1862-1925) became a district chief at the age of 25 in 1887, and was decorated by the government in 1896 (Van Gent 1923: 86).

42. Schouten 1987: 132.

43. Schouten 1987: 130-133.

44. Schouten 1978: 93. The memorandum which Van Kol presented to parliament on the basis of this correspondence is reproduced by Jellesma (1903: 5-9).

45. Van Kol 1903: 277-278, 291-292.

district officials.⁴⁶ One issue discussed at the meeting was the political relationship between Minahasa and the Netherlands. Loyalist district chief A.H. Supit supported direct Dutch rule in emotional terms.

Do you want us to lose everything we have gained under Dutch protection? To abandon the heights which we have reached in education, civilisation, and Christianity, and sink back into the filth and darkness in which our forefathers lived? (47)

Others, more pragmatically, pointed out that because of its heavy involvement in education, the government now spent more money annually in Minahasa than it received. If Minahasa were to become a *zelfbesturend landschap* like its neighbours, it would no longer be entitled to such privileges.⁴⁸ Even A.L. Waworuntu, to the approval of the audience, was quick to deny that his own intention had been to reject Dutch sovereignty.

No! Minahasa does not ask to become a state in its own right. Minahasa wishes always to remain attached to the Netherlands, to become a part of the Netherlands, because Holland can bring Minahasa good fortune, provided only that what was promised in the contracts is not forgotten. (49)

In reality, none of the VOC contracts had promised Minahasa anything beyond protection from its enemies. Nevertheless, the insistence that colonialism was a contractual arrangement, a bargain reached between two peoples whose interests coincided, was to remain a hallmark of Minahasan politics throughout the colonial period. Political

46. Jellesma 1903: 173.

47. Quoted by Van Kol (1903: 237).

48. Van Kol 1903: 236-237.

49. Quoted by Van Kol (1903: 237).

opposition would mostly consist in attempting to renegotiate, as it were, the terms of the contract.

In other respects, too, the early political actions by district chiefs set the pattern for the twentieth century. Thanks to their education, usually at a primary school for Europeans and then at the Tondano *Hoofdenschool*, the chiefs were able to express their protests in a language - both literally and metaphorically speaking - which their rulers could understand. Metaphorically, because they cast themselves as representatives of their *volk* - rather than, say, divinely appointed rulers - and appealed effectively to the Dutch sense of imperial duty and justice. Literally, because they not only wrote their letters and petitions in the Dutch language, but also made use of the Dutch colonial press for political purposes. In 1891 and 1892, for instance, the disaffected chiefs placed articles in the *Bataviaasch Handelsblad* and other Java periodicals to embarrass the government.⁵⁰ In 1909 Waworuntu established his own critical newspaper in Manado, the *Manado Courant*.⁵¹ The gift of literacy was beginning to cause problems for its bringers.⁵² Even at village and district level, written petitions became the usual form of complaint against

50. Schouten 1987: 127-128, 138.

51. Manus, Parengkuan, Sigarlaki & Pangkey [1979]: 111; Viersen [1910]: 24.

52. As early as 1875, Resident P. Van der Crab warned that criticism of Dutch officials in the Java press was damaging the prestige of the government among those Minahasans who read overseas newspapers (Stakman 1893: 3).

officials, whether from victims of maltreatment or from prospective rivals.⁵³

In some important ways, however, Minahasan nationalism was still in an embryonic state. Although the chiefs talked about representing popular interests, the message was for their Dutch superiors, not for the populace itself. If a show of support was called for, as at the 1902 meeting in Tondano, they relied upon their traditional and personal authority to gather followers.⁵⁴ They did not attempt to mobilise society in new ways, or to form national organisations. Their selfish motives were conservative, their more altruistic ones paternalistic. Nationalism as a movement was to originate among a different group of Minahasans.

ORGANISED NATIONALISM: *PERSERIKATAN MINAHASA*

In May 1909, noncommissioned officers at the Magelang military base in Central Java founded *Perserikatan Minahasa*, the Minahasa Association.⁵⁵ This was the first explicitly Minahasan political organisation. That it should have grown out of such an environment is readily explicable. Nationalist movements often begin among exiles who discover their unity as a minority in an alien society. In the case of the Minahasan soldiers on Java, moreover, we have seen

53. See, for instance, Van Kol (1903: 279-280) and Schouten (1987: 130).

54. Jellesma 1903: 173.

55. *Nafiri Minahasa*, 31 July 1916, reproduced by Soeharto & Ihsan (1981: 160).

that the usual sense of isolation and solidarity was enhanced by military *esprit de corps*, by feelings of superiority over the Javanese, and by frustration at their own inferior status with respect to the European troops.

Nevertheless, *Perserikatan Minahasa* soon transcended its military origins. It quickly attracted interest among Minahasan students and white collar workers on Java, and by 1915 there were branches in Minahasa too.⁵⁶ By 1917 *Perserikatan Minahasa* had at least 10,000 members, making it the second largest native association in the Netherlands Indies.⁵⁷ In 1918 A.L. Waworuntu, long retired as a district chief but still influential both in Minahasa and in Batavia, became chairman of the organisation.⁵⁸ Waworuntu's election established a continuity with the pioneering political actions of the nineteenth century.

The original statutes of *Perserikatan Minahasa*, approved by the governor general in 1910, list three official goals: to raise the level of cultural, mental and moral development among Minahasans, to promote their material prosperity, and to help and support members of the association and their

56. *Tjahaja Sijang*, 1 September 1916. In 1919 about 4,000 of the 14,000 members were in the homeland (G.A.J. Hazeu in V 27/12/1921/A14X).

57. Van Hinloopen Labberton 1917: 60. This author gives a figure of 15,000. Other sources suggest 12,000 (Ratulangie & Laoh 1917: 473) or 10,000 (V 15/5/1918/64). *Sarekat Islam*, however, was vastly larger, with as many as 700,000 members between 1912 and 1916 (Korver 1982: 194).

58. *Nafiri Minahasa Celebes*, 10 October 1918.

families.⁵⁹ In addition, the association became a new kind of vehicle for the old ideal of Minahasan unity.

Perserikatan Minahasa is a *volksbond*, a people's league, because it is meant to be for the good of our people as a whole. So we Minahasans must give the association our full attention and work together to support it. We must forget our personal interests and unite to work for the good of our association. (60)

Perserikatan Minahasa was explicitly recognised as a Minahasan national organisation. "There is a sense of nationality, a Minahasan nationalism", wrote the intellectuals G.S.S.J. Ratulangie and F. Laoh in a Dutch language article published in 1917. "Everything Minahasan, everything which involves a national ideal, is concentrated in *Perserikatan Minahasa*".⁶¹ The rhetoric accompanying the inauguration of a new branch in 1915 makes it clear that even when the ambiguous Malay word *bangsa* is used, the European nation is the model.

Minahasa, my *bangsa*! Do not be discouraged by fatigue, adversity, ridicule or oppression. Look at what is happening in Europe, where each man so loves his *bangsa* that if he dies on the battlefield it is as if to say: take my worthless body, I fought to the death for the glory of my country and the good of my *bangsa*. The dramatic progress which Minahasa is making now will be a beautiful memory for our descendants, and the beginning of everlasting greatness for our Minahasan land and people. (62)

Minahasan nationalism itself never took violent forms in the colonial period. *Perserikatan Minahasa* did, however, take

59. Reproduced by De Koning (1916: 29).

60. A.A. Warokka, quoted in *Nafiri Minahasa*, 31 July 1916, reproduced by Soeharto & Ihsan (1981: 160-161).

61. Ratulangie & Laoh 1917: 472, 473.

62. J.U. Mangowal, Manado, 15 December 1915, quoted in *Nafiri Minahasa*, 31 July 1916, reproduced by Soeharto & Ihsan (1981: 167).

up political arms in defence of Minahasan rights and privileges.

The first important political campaign came soon after the birth of the association, and was directed against a threat to public education in Minahasa. The government was considering a plan to reduce Minahasa's exceptionally large education budget by handing most of the state schools established in 1882 back to the NZG.⁶³ The mission would receive a small state subsidy for each converted school, but both teaching facilities and staff salaries would inevitably suffer. This prospect appealed neither to the government teachers nor to the parents of their pupils.⁶⁴ Minahasans called the state schools *sekolah pangkat* - *pangkat* meaning rank, status, or position - and regarded them as a far surer route to prestigious employment than their NZG equivalents.⁶⁵ Few were eager to see that route blocked.⁶⁶

Encouraged by the Dutch headmaster of a state school in Manado, T.F. Viersen, Minahasan government teachers formed a Manado Residency Teachers Association - *Perserikatan Guru-Guru Residentie Menado*, PGGRM - to oppose the conversion

63. Gunning 1924: 512-513; De Vreede 1935: 341. When the issue was first investigated in 1906, 61 percent of the total government budget for Minahasa was consumed by education and religion (De Vreede 1935: 341).

64. De Vreede 1935: 341.

65. Kruijf 1894: 383.

66. Ratulangie and Laoh (1917: 470, 477-478) state that antipathy toward the European preachers was also a factor in the movement against the schools conversion.

plan.⁶⁷ When Viersen was transferred to Java in 1912, apparently as a punishment for his obstructiveness, *Perserikatan Minahasa* devoted an issue of its organ to the schools question. The NZG was accused of attempting to reassert lost authority in Minahasa, with the complicity of the state and to the detriment of Minahasan interests.

We Minahasans are already Protestant Christians. Do not try to force the Christian religion upon us any longer, because from now on we can learn all we need to know at the government schools. Besides, there are government teachers who can match any missionary or assistant missionary in knowledge of the bible. Take your mission schools to Puruk Cahu, Halmahera and Merauke, and if you should need extra staff there, then we will lend you a helping hand.(68)

True to established practice, *Perserikatan Minahasa* aimed its protest high by sending free copies to the governor general, the minister of colonies, and every member of the Dutch parliament, as well as every government official in Minahasa.⁶⁹

The combined protests of the Minahasan organisations and their Dutch sympathisers had the desired effect of embarrassing the government and the NZG into reconsidering their conversion plan.⁷⁰ A compromise was reached whereby only half of the government schools were converted, and each affected village was allowed to choose between an NZG school and a new type of secular school funded jointly by the

67. Ratulangie & Laoh 1917: 468-469; Viersen [1910].

68. From *Nafiri Minahasa*, 29 June 1912, quoted in 'Een volksstem' (1912: 522). Puruk Cahu is in the interior of Borneo.

69. 'Een volksstem' 1912: 522.

70. Gunning 1924: 514-515.

government and the local population. Only 10 villages out of 40 chose the mission school option.⁷¹ The episode had proved once again that the Dutch authorities were responsive to protest, provided it was expressed peacefully and in suitably loyal terms, and that differences of opinion within the European community could be exploited to Minahasan advantage. This time, moreover, the protest had come primarily from soldiers and teachers rather than chiefs. The era of mass politics was beginning.

The loyal reputation and large membership of *Perserikatan Minahasa*, and particularly the fact that it included almost all of the Minahasan military personnel, were effective bargaining counters in the schools conflict. A few years later, however, the association overplayed its hand by making a demand which the government was simply not prepared to meet. In April 1919, a *Perserikatan Minahasa* congress at Yogyakarta sent the governor general a telegram requesting immediate legal equalisation of all Minahasans with Europeans.⁷² Although the appeal was for *gelijkstelling* of civilians as well as soldiers, this unprecedented action was primarily a result of discontent in the army. Resentment of European privileges had been heightened by the news that Minahasan soldiers were shortly to lose their own lesser privileges relative to other native troops.⁷³ Government commissioner for native affairs G.A.J. Hazeu noted that the

71. Viersen 1913: 16.

72. V 27/12/1921/A14X.

73. *Kilat*, 20 May 1919; De Vries 1988: 19, 26-27.

Minahasan response reflected a sense of betrayal as well as humiliation.

For them, the words of the late Mr. C.T. van Deventer, who called Minahasa "the twelfth province of the Netherlands", are more than just a political promise. They see in that metaphor a constitutional right. "No less a man than Mr. Van Deventer" - and from my informant it sounded naively reverential - "gave in that phrase an accurate description of the constitutional position of the Minahasan volk and a correct interpretation of its feelings". They do not understand why the government does not behave accordingly. After all, history shows that the Minahasans are allies of the Dutch volk, with contractual rights and obligations, and not subjects of an alien colonial regime.⁽⁷⁴⁾

Reducing Minahasans to the status of ordinary native subjects, rather than accepting them as equals, was interpreted as a breach of the colonial contract.

This perceived injustice rendered the normally conservative military community receptive to radical influences. The man behind the *gelijkstelling* campaign, J.H. Pangemanann, was a member of the *Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereniging* - the precursor of the Indonesian Communist Party - as well as vice chairman of *Perserikatan Minahasa*.⁷⁵ The chairman, Waworuntu, quickly distanced himself from the Yogyakarta petition - not, he said, because he disagreed in principle with its content, but because he knew that it had no chance of success.⁷⁶ More importantly, he also saw that any association with radicalism would destroy the political

74. In V 27/12/1921/A14X.

75. V 24/12/1921/A14X. Pangemanann, a journalist, had established an organisation of his own called *Rukun Minahasa* at Semarang in 1912. Blumberger (1931: 49) and others have confused this with *Perserikatan Minahasa*.

76. Blumberger 1931: 50; V 24/12/1921/A14X.

credibility of *Perserikatan Minahasa* in the eyes of the government. For a time the organisation was split between a conservative and pragmatic faction known as *Perserikatan Minahasa Celebes*, led by Waworuntu, and a radical faction, known by the original name, under Pangemanann.⁷⁷

The fact that the *gelijkstelling* request did not even receive a reply was not quickly forgotten by Minahasans.⁷⁸ Nor was the abolition of Minahasan military privileges in 1921, although some of these were restored in 1925.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, the immediate crisis of loyalty was soon over. In November 1920 a *Perserikatan Minahasa* representative toured Minahasa reassuring former members that the association was no longer headed for "betrayal, disaster, disgrace, the red flag, revolt against the government, and catastrophe for the land and people of Minahasa".⁸⁰ One reason why the breach was so quickly repaired is that the disappointing developments in Java coincided with a promising advance toward political autonomy in the homeland.

Besides unity and progress, *Perserikatan Minahasa* also embodied elements of another classic nationalist ideal, independence. The revised statutes introduced by Waworuntu in 1918 include the goal of *loyaal streven naar zelfbestuur*,

77. Waworuntu's group drew its support mainly from the intelligentsia in Java and Manado, and from those parts of rural Minahasa where the Waworuntu family was influential (MR 779X/20; V27/12/1921/A14X).

78. It was still a subject of political satire in 1923, for instance (*Tjahaja Sijang*, 8 September 1923).

79. De Vries 1988: 20, 30.

80. J. Jacob, quoted in *Tjahaja Sijang*, 15 November 1920.

loyal pursuit of self-government.⁸¹ This might serve as a succinct statement of the political aspirations of most politically conscious Minahasans at any time up to 1942. In 1919 those aspirations began to be realised with the inauguration in Manado of the Minahasa Council or *Minahasaraad*.

COLONIAL DEMOCRACY: THE MINAHASARAAD

The *Minahasaraad* was an elected body responsible for public services and local taxation throughout Minahasa. The electorate consisted initially of all adult males with an annual income in excess of 300 guilders, and the 36 elected Minahasan members were supplemented by five appointed representatives of the local European and Foreign Oriental groups.⁸² With its overwhelming native majority and direct system of election, the *Minahasaraad* was the most democratic organ of government ever created in the Dutch East Indies.⁸³

The creation of the *Minahasaraad* was widely regarded as a vindication of the loyalist strategy. Although the *raad* was actually just one part of the *decentralisatie* programme initiated by the central government in 1903, the Minahasan reputation for loyalty, and the petition for just such a

81. Reproduced in *Nafiri Minahasa Celebes*, 10 October 1918.

82. Brouwer 1936: 99-102. The large size of the council made it slow and inefficient, so in 1923 the number of elected members was reduced by central government ordinance to 18. This decision did not go unopposed (Brouwer 1936: 102; Tideman 1926: 61-63).

83. All other regional councils were elected indirectly via stepped voting systems (V 27/10/1938/20).

council submitted by *Perserikatan Minahasa* in 1917, must have influenced the decision.⁸⁴ Local commentators certainly thought so. A writer in Gorontalo noted the government's favouritism and concluded that "those who are not scared to demand their rights, and do not tire of doing so, are the successful ones".⁸⁵

To judge by the local press, the new council was received well by most Minahasans.

With the establishment of the *Minahasaraad*, the people have indeed obtained the right to participate, through their representatives, in control of the budget for Minahasa and in many other affairs affecting this land. The *Minahasaraad* has debated many and varied subjects, in fact almost everything relating to the everyday life of Minahasans and to past and future policies on public and private issues. We are proud of everything that is happening in our land as a result of the promises made - no, obligations accepted - by the government in the *Minahasaraad* ordinance. (86)

Although limited in its legislative powers, chaired by a Dutch official, and subject to veto by the governor general, the *Minahasaraad* proved more than just a talking shop. In 1925, for instance, it presided over the abolition of *corvée* labour, something for which *Perserikatan Minahasa* had campaigned for many years.⁸⁷ In 1926 it initiated a popular colonisation programme to relieve overpopulation in the Tondano area by facilitating migration to the relatively

84. The petition is included in V 11/3/1919/36. It notes the comparatively high level of education in Minahasa, which must also have been a factor in the government's thinking.

85. "Doud" in *Tjahaja Sijang*, 1 May 1920.

86. "M." in *Tjahaja Sijang*, 15 May 1922.

87. Brouwer 1936: 112-113; V 15/5/1918/64.

empty south of Minahasa.⁸⁸ The *Minahasaraad* also became involved in public health, markets, cooperatives, and credit services.⁸⁹

Other successes were achieved by means of the council's right of petition to higher authorities. The greatest of these came in 1929, when the *Minahasaraad* secured a major extension of its own franchise to include all male income tax payers.⁹⁰ This raised the number of voters from about 10 percent of the adult male population to almost 70 percent.⁹¹ *Minahasaraad* protest was also instrumental in the abolition of unpopular agricultural regulations in 1921 and the introduction of a government programme to relieve the debts of Minahasan coconut farmers in 1936.⁹²

Besides the successful proposals, the *Minahasaraad* made many others which were not accepted by the government. At the very first meeting, for instance, there was a call for female suffrage.⁹³ Later came repeated demands for an elected Minahasan chairman in place of the Dutch assistant

88. Brouwer 1936: 116; Tideman 1926: 86-88.

89. Van Rhijn 1941: 56-57.

90. Brouwer 1936: 102-103; MR 3204/1928.

91. The electorate numbered 7,870 in 1926 and 54,092 in 1930 (Van Aken 1932: 51). The total native population of Minahasa in 1930 - excluding Manado town, which had its own council - was 274,524 (*Volkstelling* 1933-1936 V: XI, 141). Of these, approximately 28.6 percent, or 78,500, were adult males (*Volkstelling* 1933-1936 V: 190).

92. Logemann 1922: 66; Van Rhijn 1941: 102; *Tjahaja Sijang*, 1 October 1921.

93. Brouwer 1936: 102.

resident.⁹⁴ Conversely, the *Minahasaraad* was not afraid to turn down responsibilities which might jeopardise its popularity with the electorate. It refused, for instance, to take control of public education in Minahasa, preferring to let the central government take responsibility for any shortcomings in this politically sensitive area.⁹⁵ Members of the council campaigned constantly for greater government spending on education, answering the argument that Minahasa was already privileged in this respect by reminding the Dutch of their "blood debt" to the Minahasans who had fought for them in Aceh.⁹⁶

Some of the reasons for the popularity of the *Minahasaraad* had little to do with any popular demand for political autonomy. Free elections, for instance, appealed enormously to the Minahasan love of competition, as well as the ambitions of individual Minahasans.⁹⁷ Held once every four years, they were as much contests for status as matters of representation or even power. Nevertheless, the *Minahasaraad* did give Minahasans a genuine taste of the practicalities and problems of democracy. The replacement of *corvée* labour by a universal road tax, for instance,

94. Van Aken 1932: 3; Brouwer 1936: 98-99.

95. Van Aken 1932: 57-58; Brouwer 1936: 118; MR 2955/1924; MR 23/1927.

96. Van Aken 1932: 190; Tideman 1926: 156.

97. Elections were accompanied by printed propaganda, rash promises, free meals, and even violence. Turnout was 76, 71 and 68 percent in 1930, 1934 and 1938 respectively ('Herziening van het kiesrecht voor den Minahassaraad' 1929: 883; Van Rhijn 1941: 195). Resident A.P. Van Aken noted that "if anything was ever well received in Minahasa, it was the electoral ordinance of 1929" (Van Aken 1932: 52).

caused considerable discontent among groups formerly exempt from work on the road gangs.⁹⁸ It also brought home the fact that *corvée*, always used mainly for the upkeep of roads, had been as much a contribution to the public good as a form of colonial exploitation. In fact, a form of optional *corvée* was successfully reintroduced in 1935.⁹⁹

The democratic *decentralisatie* represented by the *Minahasaraad* was paralleled by a transfer of administrative responsibilities from Europeans to Minahasans. The technical and clerical staff employed by the *Minahasaraad*, and by the town council established for Manado at the same time as the *Minahasaraad*, were all Minahasans.¹⁰⁰ In 1926 the two Dutch *controleurs* stationed in the Minahasan interior were withdrawn as part of the general *ontvoogding* or "detutelage" programme. Their duties were taken over by six district chiefs of a new type, with enhanced powers.¹⁰¹ The new style chiefs were not popular, and people increasingly circumvented the bureaucracy by taking issues and complaints straight to their *Minahasaraad*

98. These included Minahasan *burgers* and retired soldiers as well as Europeans and Foreign Orientals (Van Aken 1932: 66-67; Brouwer 1936: 112-114).

99. During the depression, people found it easier to pay their road tax *in natura* (Brouwer 1936: 114).

100. Brouwer 1936: 90. The Manado *gemeenteraad* was also the only one in the Indies without a European majority (Brouwer 1936: 91).

101. Brouwer 1936: 40-41; 47-65.

representatives.¹⁰² There were rumours, however, of incompetence and corruption in the *Minahasaraad* too.¹⁰³

One effect of all this was to reinforce an already distinctly pragmatic approach to politics and, among many Minahasans, a sceptical attitude to the idea of national independence.

What can Minahasa hope to gain from independence? Nothing. Minahasans understand fully that no *bangsa* is free. Everybody must obey a government, and the question is merely whether or not the governors belong to the same *bangsa* as the governed.(104)

Others continued to believe in progressive emancipation, but identified the problem of finding sufficiently capable and patriotic Minahasan leaders as a more serious obstacle to that process than Dutch obstructiveness.

We must choose as our leaders diligent and sensible people, people who will set an example with their selflessness and their love for our *tanah air*, people who will devote all their energies to the advancement of the land and people around them. If we do not find such people, then Minahasans will always remain under tutelage, like immature children who must be guided in all things by their guardian.(105)

If Minahasans were realistic about the *Minahasaraad*, the council also obliged the Dutch to be realistic about Minahasan opinion. "Minahasa", wrote Resident F.H. Visman in 1935, "is not a land where policies can be implemented

102. Van Aken 1932: 10, 40-45; Brouwer 1936: 104-105; *Fikiran*, 23 July 1927. In 1930 only two of the six new style district chiefs were elected to the *raad*.

103. *Fikiran*, 10 March 1928, 18 May 1929.

104. By an anonymous writer in *Fikiran*, 6 July 1929.

105. *Fikiran*, 15 September 1928.

without the full understanding of the thinking part of the population and the agreement of its leaders".¹⁰⁶

The reciprocal quality of the colonial relationship, in other words, was more or less maintained. One local newspaper article from 1929 makes a shrewd comparison between the confrontational nationalism of Java and Sumatra, which "bangs and smashes at the government's door", and the more restrained - and effective - Minahasan variety.

Minahasa, which might be called sophisticated, is never slow to face the government either. But it comes respectfully, knocking on the door, requesting admission and asking that its wishes be granted. Those Minahasans who have some political awareness know how to make practical use of politics, know exactly what to do and how to behave in order to benefit their land and bangsa.(107)

It was this sophistication which rendered Minahasan nationalism compatible with the stylised loyalism of the "twelfth province".

Between 1924 and 1927, G.S.S.J. Ratulangie was secretary of the *Minahasaraad*. The council selected him in preference to a Dutch candidate and against the will of the resident. One contemporary wrote that when Ratulangie applied for the job, "national feeling among Minahasans rose 100 percent".¹⁰⁸ Already a very influential man, Ratulangie did more than anybody else to stimulate public interest in the

106. Visman 1935: 4.

107. A.M. Tareran in *Fikiran*, 6 April 1929.

108. *Fikiran*, 10 March 1928.

Minahasaraad, which he called "an ultramodern body" and "an absolute success".¹⁰⁹

It was a very fortunate addition to the statute book when *Staatsblad* 64 of 1919, applying the decentralisatie law to North Celebes, designated Minahasa as an autonomous zone. The historical development of Minahasa has made it a discrete ethnic, cultural and economic unit, and the population is strongly aware of this regional and ethnocultural demarcation. Also very fortunate was the division into electoral districts almost identical to the old tribal territories as they were in the middle of last century. Although the stimulating influence of political organisations is missing in Minahasa, the high level of participation in elections, which has even led to stormy incidents and police intervention, is convincing evidence that the population approves of the council. (110)

The "stimulating influence" of *Perserikatan Minahasa* had indeed been drastically reduced since the split of 1919. The association survived as a professional union for the Minahasan soldiers - who, partly because of increased political realism and partly because some of their ethnic privileges were restored in 1925, now became more and more conservative. As a political vehicle for civilian interests, however, *Perserikatan Minahasa* was overshadowed - in a sense even replaced - by the *Minahasaraad*. Not until 1934 would candidates for the *Minahasaraad* stand as members of a party as well as individuals hoping to represent their electoral districts.

The continued presence of civilian members proved in any case to be a problem for *Perserikatan Minahasa* when the Dutch military authorities refused to consider petitions

109. Ratulangie 1930: 9; 'Herziening van het kiesrecht voor den Minahassaraad' 1929: 883.

110. Ratulangie, quoted in 'Herziening van het kiesrecht voor den Minahassaraad' (1929: 883).

from an organisation which did not consist exclusively of soldiers.¹¹¹ In August 1927, Ratulangie and another Minahasan intellectual, the psychiatric doctor R. Tumbelaka, solved the problem by creating a new political party, *Persatuan Minahasa* or Minahasa Union, to represent the civilians.¹¹² The full story of *Persatuan Minahasa* has much to do with political developments outside Minahasa, and will be told in the next chapter. However, it also intersects with another important internal nationalist current, one inspired by religion.

CHRISTIANITY AND NATIONALISM

If colonial benevolence and the experience of limited self-government took some of the shine off emancipation as a political ideal, it survived untarnished as a religious ideal. We have seen that the Protestant mission always regarded the creation of an independent Christian community as the ultimate goal of its work in Minahasa. Between 1875 and 1882, however, the same financial crisis which forced the NZG to abandon some of its schools also led it to transfer its missionaries and assistant missionaries one by one to the payroll of the Indies state church, the *Indische Kerk*.¹¹³ As they retired, the missionaries were replaced by clergy appointed from Batavia and subject to frequent

111. *Fikiran*, 23 June 1928; *Minahasa Revue*, 31 January 1927; De Vries 1988: 31. *Perserikatan Minahasa* had submitted petitions in 1923 and 1925 calling for improved treatment and conditions of service for Minahasan soldiers.

112. Blumberger 1931: 306.

113. Van 't Hof 1951-1952 IV: 118.

transfer.¹¹⁴ The Protestant church in Minahasa became an appendage of the state, and for half a century little progress was made toward ecclesiastical autonomy.¹¹⁵ "The Christian community in Minahasa", wrote a *Tjahaja Sijang* correspondent in 1925, "is already old, yet still suckling at the nipple".¹¹⁶

In the first years after the *Indische Kerk* takeover there were already Minahasans who were openly opposed to it. Two members of staff at the training school for NZG teachers, W. Sumampouw and J. Walintukan, resigned their posts in 1892 after pressing unsuccessfully for the appointment of Minahasan pastors.¹¹⁷ In subsequent years it was the graduates of this training school who, as teachers at those village schools which remained under NZG control, formed the backbone of support for an independent Minahasan church.¹¹⁸ Their idealism as guardians of the old missionary spirit was complemented by resentment at their relatively low pay and status. As teachers they were effectively outranked by those at the more prestigious government schools, and as part time lay preachers, which they remained in most cases,

114. Gunning 1924: 502-503; De Vreede 1935: 344. The *Indische Kerk* also took over the training of Minahasan assistant missionaries in 1886 (Gunning 1924: 504).

115. Gunning 1924: 500-501; Van 't Hof 1951-1952 IV: 117-128; De Vreede 1935: 344-347.

116. P. Lumentut, an NZG teacher, in *Tjahaja Sijang*, 8 January 1925.

117. *Fikiran*, 9 February 1935; Taulu 1976: 7; De Vreede 1935: 343.

118. Between 1882 and 1933 the Dutch Mission Society was in the paradoxical position of maintaining an extensive school system in Minahasa, but no missionaries.

they were subordinate to the assistant missionaries - now confusingly called *inlandse leraars* or native teachers - employed by the *Indische Kerk*.¹¹⁹

In 1915 the NZG teachers formed an association called *Pangkal Setia* to defend and promote their interests.¹²⁰ Under the leadership of teacher training college instructors A.M. Pangkey and J.U. Mangowal, *Pangkal Setia* developed considerable vigour. In 1923 it began to publish a fortnightly periodical. In 1925 it campaigned against cutbacks in the government subsidy for mission schools.¹²¹ In 1932, when a further subsidy reduction obliged the NZG to consider handing over all of its remaining Minahasan schools to the *Indische Kerk* at last, *Pangkal Setia* was in the vanguard of a campaign to make the transfer conditional upon independence for the church in Minahasa. The schools would then pass to the new Minahasan church rather than to the *Indische Kerk*. This quickly became a major political action involving *Persatuan Minahasa* as well.

Pangkal Setia was not in the first place a political organisation. "Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's", advised the first issue of its organ in 1923.¹²² Two

119. This was particularly galling because many NZG teachers were equal to the *inlandse leraars* in religious knowledge and preaching experience (Van Randwijk 1932: 526-529; De Vreede 1935: 343). The "native teachers", moreover, did no teaching.

120. *Fikiran*, 3 March 1924; De Vreede 1935: 344.

121. Tideman 1926: 158.

122. *Pangkal Setia*, 10 June 1923. This issue also reproduces the statutory goals of the association, which include

circumstances, however, prepared it for involvement with the secular nationalist movement in 1932. Firstly, the fact that the *Indische Kerk* was part of the Netherlands Indies state automatically gave any action against it political overtones.¹²³ Secondly, *Pangkal Setia* was heir not only to the mission ideal of ecclesiastical independence, but also to a tradition of loyal political opposition which the NZG had done much to establish.

"Christianity produces loyal subjects", wrote Graafland in 1898, "but a people which understands the notions of right and justice must also be treated justly".¹²⁴ During the nineteenth century the missionaries in Minahasa were not always in harmony with the secular colonial authorities. Some government officials were simply opposed to the work of the mission in principle. Resident A.J. Van Olpen, for example, attempted in 1844 to create a system of secular schools to compete with those established by the NZG.¹²⁵ On other occasions, however, the missionaries publicly took what they felt to be the side of the people - against the state - on purely secular issues. The mission newspaper *Tjahaja Sijang*, for instance, was threatened three times with a publication ban for arguing that all Minahasans

"strengthening the relationship between Minahasa and the Netherlands".

123. The dangers of this situation were recognised by Dutch observers (Van Randwijk 1932: 526).

124. Graafland 1898 II: 135.

125. After 1877 most of the 23 schools created by Van Olpen were taken over by the NZG (Graafland 1898 I: 400-401; Kroeskamp 1974: 264). Lesser incidences of friction between mission and state were common (Grundemann 1873: 168; Gunning 1924: 471; De Vreede 1935: 338).

should have the option of paying an extra tax instead of performing *corvée*.¹²⁶ In the twentieth century, and especially after its transfer to wholly Minahasan editorship in 1920, *Tjahaja Sijang* became a critical and political newspaper.¹²⁷

In this way the NZG provided a kind of prototype for nationalist opposition in Minahasa. Certainly it did a lot to create a political culture in which the legitimacy of loyal dissent was taken for granted. Of all the Dutch colonial territories, Minahasa was probably unique in this respect. "Community of religion binds the Minahasan more closely to his European rulers," as a Javanese author observed in 1930, "but at the same time he does not show that submissiveness found among other peoples of the archipelago".¹²⁸

By withdrawing from the churches after 1875, the NZG relieved itself of any responsibility for the slowness of progress toward ecclesiastical autonomy. Despite the unpopularity of its bid to take control of the government schools in 1912, it retained a positive public image insofar as it was associated with the ideal of an independent church. "Handing over the mission schools to the *Indische Kerk* in its present form", declared a motion passed jointly by *Pangkal Setia* and *Persatuan Minahasa* in July 1932, "would

126. Graafland 1898 II: 393.

127. Lopian (1979: 918-920) gives a sample of the critical articles published from 1920 onward.

128. Prijoetomo 1930: 73.

totally defeat the purpose of the mission, to create an indigenous Minahasan church".¹²⁹

Negotiations with the *Indische Kerk*, however, elicited only a guarantee that the church in Minahasa would continue to develop gradually toward autonomy under the guidance of E.A.A. De Vreede, a Dutch pastor and church administrator already appointed for that purpose five years earlier.¹³⁰ Despite a protest meeting involving 2,000 people at Tondano in October 1932, it was also decided to hand over the 230 mission schools to the *Indische Kerk* in 1933, before the Minahasan church was ready for independence.¹³¹

In June 1933 a group of teachers and retired church officials, supported by *Persatuan Minahasa*, took matters into their own hands by inaugurating a breakaway national church called *Kerapatan Gereja Protestan Minahasa*, the Minahasa Protestant Church Union or KGPM.¹³² The *Indische Kerk* now hastened its own autonomy programme, and the established church in Minahasa received formal independence in September 1934 as *Gereja Masehi Injil Minahasa*, the

129. Reproduced in *Fikiran*, 29 June 1932.

130. Van 't Hof 1951-1952 IV: 127-128; V: 159-160; Van Randwijk 1932: 529-532; De Vreede 1935: 347-348. De Vreede was not a popular figure in Minahasa (MR 807X/1934). The only other concession made was that the status of NZG teachers and *inlandse leraars* would be equalised (Van Randwijk 1932: 530).

131. *Fikiran*, 19 October 1932; Van Randwijk 1932: 524, 529. In April 1933 there was a support meeting in Batavia, organised by G.S.S.J. Ratulangie (*Fikiran*, 8 April 1932).

132. *Fikiran*, 10 June 1933.

Minahasan Evangelical Protestant Church or GMIM.¹³³ With its great institutional momentum, GMIM remained the majority church, but KGPM expanded rapidly and included 61 congregations by 1941.¹³⁴

The KGPM showed greater creative energy and more genuine self-reliance than any other Minahasan organisation in the colonial period. Aside from sponsoring a few schools and a scholarship fund, *Perserikatan Minahasa* had restricted itself to social activities and the submission of petitions to the government.¹³⁵ *Persatuan Minahasa*, likewise, was more a political party than a self-help organisation. The main activity of KGPM, by contrast, was building, funding and running a large number of churches and schools. From 1938 onward it even trained its own teachers.¹³⁶

At the same time, KGPM also retained close links with secular nationalism. Its leader, B.W. Lapien, had also been a member of *Persatuan Minahasa* and the *Minahasaraad* as well as vice chairman of *Pangkal Setia*.¹³⁷ In 1938 the *Minahasaraad* elected him to represent Minahasan interests in

133. 'Algemeen reglement der Minahassische Protestantsche Kerk' 1935; Lintong 1978: 27.

134. Lapien 1985: 95. Watuseke (1968: 55) estimates that the GMIM continued to include 80 percent of the population.

135. A Minahasa Study Fund, supported by public donations, was established at Batavia in 1913 (Ratulangie & Laoh 1917: 471-472). *Perserikatan Minahasa* founded six Dutch language medium schools in Minahasa, and *Pangkal Setia* two (Tideman 1926: 162).

136. Lapien 1985: 95.

137. *Fikiran*, 18 May 1932 & 20 July 1932.

the *Volksraad*, the central People's Council in Batavia.¹³⁸ As a *Volksraad* member, Lapien became known as a prominent Indonesian nationalist.¹³⁹ At home, however, his KGPM continued to draw inspiration and appeal from a more parochial nationalism inherited directly from the NZG. At the first anniversary celebration for one KGPM church in 1935, a speaker recalled how the missionary A.C. Kruyt had promised him as a child that Minahasa would have its own church in his lifetime. The KGPM, he said, was the fulfilment of that prophecy.¹⁴⁰ Even the official "KGPM song" had the kind of patriotic flavour of which Graafland would have been proud.

*Atas gunung dan di lembah
Tanahku Minahasa,
Tidak kurang loncing gentah
Mewartakan Injil berjasa:
Hai saudara, insyallah,
KGPM kaumasuklah!
Kauinsyaf, kaumasuk,
Kaumasuklah KGPM. (141)*

In the mountains and the valleys
Of my land, Minahasa,
There are many church bells singing
Of the holy gospel's goodness:
Awaken now, my brother,
Come and join KGPM!
Awaken now and join us
Come and join KGPM.

The official GMIM, headed by a Dutchman and financially dependent upon the colonial government, was much less the realisation of a Minahasan ideal. Nevertheless, it too was eager to portray itself as a Minahasan *volkskerk*. It was the Minahasan vice chairman of the GMIM synod, A.Z.R. Wenas, who insisted that it be called the Minahasan Evangelical Protestant Church and not just *Gereja Masehi Injil di*

138. Lapien 1985: 95.

139. MR 154X/1940. Lapien was also to play an important role as an Indonesian nationalist after 1945.

140. *Fikiran*, 9 February 1935.

141. Reproduced in *Fikiran*, 1 May 1934. Original NZG hymns were also sung in KGPM services (Lapien 1985: 95).

Minahasa, the Evangelical Protestant Church in *Minahasa*, as originally proposed.¹⁴² Although the two churches were rivals, they both confirmed that *bangsa Minahasa* was the ultimate focus of identity for *Minahasans*.

POLITICS AND IDENTITY

Minahasan political history in the colonial period is all of a piece. It seems to follow a smooth and familiar progression, like a tiny microcosm of European history without the invasions and revolutions. First the chiefdoms are bureaucratised, and modern forms of political activity appear among the bureaucrats. Then come popular political organisations, followed by an official representative institution, the *Minahasaraad*. If the Japanese invasion had not intervened, the progression would have continued with the creation of a *Minahasan groepsgemeenschap*, a semiautonomous political unit based upon an enlarged *Minahasaraad* with increased powers.¹⁴³

As always, *Minahasa* in the early twentieth century was plagued by personal and family rivalries - hence, in part, the continuing fascination with unity as an ideal. *Persatuan Minahasa*, for instance, had difficulty maintaining party discipline when it came to putting up candidates for council elections. Executive members affected by what the press called *kegilaan hormat* - prestige madness - proposed themselves or their relatives regardless of party

142. Lintong 1978: 29, 75.

143. Van Rhijn 1941: 229-235; V 27/10/1938/20.

guidelines.¹⁴⁴ On the other hand, Minahasa was also relatively free of sustained conflicts between large social or economic groups. This was both a reflection of, and reflected in, its political development. Nationalism in Minahasa was typically either an aspect of the relationship with Holland or an instrument of unity, seldom a weapon used by one group of Minahasans against another.

Some structural tensions did exist, of course. The antipathy between NZG teachers and *inlandse leraars* has already been mentioned. There were also times when some of the administrative chiefs, represented by their own association, the *Hoofdenbond*, were at odds with the nationalist organisations.¹⁴⁵ Such tensions, however, did not usually run very deep. They were too readily diffracted by individual enmities and alliances, or overcome by common causes. Three retired *inlandse leraars*, for instance, joined with *Pangkal Setia* members to establish KGPM in 1933.¹⁴⁶ *Perserikatan Minahasa* elected a retired chief, A.L. Waworuntu, to lead it in 1918. Contemporaries noted the difference between the Javanese and Minahasan nationalist movements here.

In the Javanese movement there are clear divisions between the high aristocracy, the civil servants and lower aristocrats, and the common people,

144. *Fikiran*, 2 July 1938; MR 272X/1936. There were also cases of abuse of party funds (*Fikiran*, 6 August 1938).

145. In 1933, for instance, *Persatuan Minahasa* clashed with the *Hoofdenbond* over the plan to give district chiefs automatic sitting on the *Minahasaraad* and over a mutiny of Minahasan sailors on board the Dutch warship *Zeven Provinciën* (*Fikiran*, 16 March 1933, 23 December 1933).

146. Interview, A. Rondo, Manado, 22 September 1988.

represented by the *Princenbond* and *Regentenbond*, *Budi Utomo*, and *Sarekat Islam* respectively. In the Minahasan movement, by contrast, commoners and chiefs are united in *Perserikatan Minahasa*. (147)

In 1923, Waworuntu adroitly passed on the baton of leadership by recommending G.S.S.J. Ratulangie, son of another chiefly family but also the doyen of the younger intellectuals, as secretary of the *Minahasaraad*.¹⁴⁸ Ratulangie's *Persatuan Minahasa* later recruited members among the younger district officials, and in 1934 it even sponsored one for election to the *Volksraad*.¹⁴⁹

A similar continuity, reaching back into the previous century, is evident in the language used by supporters of the nationalist organisations. In 1923 J.U. Mangowal, editor of the *Pangkal Setia* newspaper, drew inspiration from a map - quite possibly the one drawn by Graafland himself.

Sitting for the first time at the editor's desk I can see a map of Minahasa, covered in rivers, mountains, forests, and the other works of God which adorn our *tanah air* and give life to its people. Hidden among those works of God are the villages, small and large, where our brothers and sisters dwell. Here is the origin of *bangsa Minahasa*, which is now scattered throughout the Indies. (150)

In the same year J.F. Rawung, second secretary of *Perserikatan Minahasa*, exhorted Minahasans to support the organisation in an only slightly updated version of the language found in *Tjahaja Sijang* three decades earlier.

So, brothers, friends, members of the association, and all you who have pure Minahasan blood, think of your land and join the movement of your times. Grasp

147. Ratulangie & Laoh 1917: 477.

148. *Minahasa Revue*, 31 March 1927.

149. *Fikiran*, 16 March 1933 and 2 February 1935.

150. *Pangkal Setia*, 10 June 1923.

the banner of the association and march forward together. Show that we are truly united. Follow the example of the ancestors from whom we inherited the name Minahasa - unity, unified, united in all good and righteous endeavours, for the good of the association and for the love of our land and bangsa. (151)

Persatuan Minahasa official J.C. Weijdemuller used similar and equally familiar imagery to promote the newer organisation in 1932:

Minahasans! Unite and join together to build up *Persatuan Minahasa* and to unfurl its banner throughout the land of Toar and Lumimuut - that is, wherever in the Indies the descendants of Toar and Lumimuut have made their homes. (152)

Like the Minahasan churches, *Persekutuan Minahasa* and *Persatuan Minahasa* confirmed and accentuated the function of Minahasa as a moral community. So, in a more practical way, did the *Minahasaraad*. All of these institutions embodied the idea of a public good, and all defined that public as a Minahasan public. As far as they were concerned, natives of other parts of the Netherlands Indies belonged essentially to different publics.¹⁵³ This point will be elaborated in the following chapter.

There remains the question of whether the Minahasan political experience also enhanced the distinction between Minahasan and European identities. *Persekutuan Minahasa* members included Eurasians and *gelijkgestelden*, and some of its leaders still clung to the nineteenth century dream of

151. In *Tjahaja Sijang*, 19 September 1923.

152. In *Fikiran*, 12 March 1932.

153. Because of its origins among the "Manadonese" military, however, *Persekutuan Minahasa* included Christian Sangir islanders as well as Minahasans ('Een volksstem' 1912: 523). After the civilian wing became *Persatuan Minahasa* in 1927, the military wing was renamed *Persekutuan Manado*.

collective assimilation into European society.¹⁵⁴ This dream was reflected, for instance, in the political thinking of A.L. Waworuntu.

The welfare of Minahasa depends, in my opinion, upon Dutch rulers and Minahasan subjects merging with each other. My political goal is a prosperous and free Minahasa under Dutch suzerainty, and a friendly, brotherly cooperation between Netherlanders and Minahasans. (155)

There is an intrinsic tension here between the idea of a "free Minahasa" and that of a Minahasa dissolved into Holland. J.H. Pangemanann, defending the *gelijkstelling* petition of 1919, had to emphasise that the aim was legal equality, not mass naturalisation, and that Minahasans wished to remain Minahasans.¹⁵⁶ By the time *Persatuan Minahasa* came on the scene, the ideological tension was beginning to resolve itself into frank admission of the antithesis between *sini* and *sana* - "here" and "there", native and European. Weijdemuller, though a Eurasian, had assimilated to Minahasa and was prepared to state the colonial antithesis himself.¹⁵⁷

Persatuan Minahasa acknowledges that under the circumstances now prevailing in this land of Indonesia there is a wide gulf, both in political

154. A list of *Perserikatan Minahasa* leaders compiled in 1920 includes a *burger* and a *gelijkgesteld* Minahasan representing the European community on the *Minahasaraad*. It also mentions European sympathisers associated with leading *Perserikatan Minahasa* families by marriage or acquaintance (MR 779X/1920).

155. Waworuntu 1918: 665.

156. 'Eenheid der Minahassers' 1919; *Kilat*, 20 May 1919.

157. J.C. Weijdemuller was a retired colonial soldier who helped found the Manado branch of *Persatuan Minahasa* in 1929, although he resigned from it in 1933 (F. Winter, interview, Manado, 15 August 1988; *Fikiran*, 5 January 1929, 17 January 1933).

and in social terms, between the needs of *sini* and those of *sana*. The two sides can negotiate across that gulf, but they cannot now close it, because the history of past centuries has determined that the aspirations of *sini* and *sana* are irreconcilably different. (158)

In part, this realisation was a product of Minahasa's own experience in the twentieth century. Although there was no radical mobilisation against foreign rule, the Minahasan political organisations and the *Minahasaraad* automatically highlighted real conflicts of interest between Minahasa and the colonial government. The failure of the *gelijkstelling* campaign, and the gradual erosion of Minahasan privileges discussed in the last chapter, had a similar effect.

On the other hand, Weijdemuller's use of the word Indonesia shows that his abandonment of the old principle of mutuality and reciprocity also reflects exposure to ideas originating outside Minahasa. This exposure and its consequences are the subject of the next chapter.

158. Weijdemuller chairing a *Persatuan Minahasa* meeting in April 1932, quoted in *Fikiran*, 14 May 1932.

CHAPTER 6: MINAHASA AND INDONESIA

This chapter describes how Minahasans responded to their inclusion in a wider political community centred upon Batavia, and to the idea of a unified and independent Indonesian nation. The tension between Minahasan and Indonesian nationalisms was resolved, at least to the satisfaction of leading Minahasan intellectuals, by the concept of a free federal Indonesia in which the political and cultural rights of each regional *bangsa* would be guaranteed. Since, however, this ideal appeared to correspond both with the theory of Dutch colonial *decentralisatie* and with its actual application in Minahasa, the adjustment to Indonesian nationalism was made without any radical transformation of the relationship with Holland.

WIDENING HORIZONS

The history of Minahasa as a perceived community cannot readily be divided into a period of isolated development followed by a separate one of integration into the Indonesian world. With the exodus of Minahasans to other parts of the Netherlands Indies as soldiers, teachers and civil servants from the middle of the nineteenth century, the perceived community outgrew its original boundaries almost before they had been fully established. At the same time, literacy in the Malay and Dutch languages was opening up the homeland to news and information from the outside world. In 1875 at least three Malay periodicals from Java,

as well as the Dutch colonial newspaper *De Locomotief*, were being read by Minahasan chiefs.¹ Even *Tjahaja Sijang*, which did much to crystallise Minahasa as a perceived community in its own right, also introduced its readers to the wider community of the Netherlands Indies or *Hindia*. From 1873 onward, *Tjahaja Sijang* distinguished in its layout between *Chabar Minahasa*, *Chabar Hindia*, and *Chabar Europa* - Minahasan, Indies, and European news. Between 1890 and 1900 it also published regular articles by Dutch missionary H.C. Kruyt and his Minahasan assistants in the Karo Batak lands of Sumatra, articles in which attention was drawn to the cultural similarities between Bataks and Minahasans.²

Nevertheless, cultural differences, combined with the already powerful sense of separate identity among Minahasans and the social barriers created by their feelings of superiority over other native *bangsa*, were sufficient to prevent the expatriate Minahasan communities from identifying very strongly with any of the indigenous societies around them. Their resistance to assimilation was stressed with pride by G.S.S.J. Ratulangie when he campaigned for an investigation into ways of improving the job prospects for Minahasan emigrants in 1919.

As you know, these emigrants are absolutely not people who have severed all relations with the land of their birth. On the contrary, all are still orientated toward Minahasa, all remain Minahasans in their thinking and feelings. Improving their chances

1. Schouten (1978: 62), quoting Resident P. Van Der Crab.

2. For instance, *Tjahaja Sijang*, 7 October 1890 and 7 January 1895.

in life means boosting our national strength and our resilience as a race.(3)

Minahasan periodicals of the late colonial period featured sentimental verse by nostalgic exiles.⁴ In 1929 a song called "Manadonese Homesickness" even became available on record.⁵ In 1932 the expatriate Minahasans proved that they could spare more than just sentiment for their homeland by contributing the major part of a substantial relief fund for the victims of an earthquake there.⁶

Despite their social isolation, however, Minahasans were in certain ways better prepared to take their place in an Indonesian nation than many other ethnic groups. Some of the most important seeds of Indonesian nationalism were implicit in the ideology of Dutch colonialism itself, even in its most strident forms, and Minahasans had been more intensively exposed to those than almost any other people in the Indies. A booklet produced by the state publishing house *Balai Pustaka* in 1923 to celebrate the exploits of Manadonese soldiers in the colonial army provides an example. Its Dutch author insists that by supporting the colonial pacification of the Indies, Minahasans are doing their duty not only to the government, but also to all the people of the archipelago.

3. From a letter by Ratulangie to the leaders of *Perserikatan Minahasa*, dated 1 January 1919, in MR 779X/1920.

4. For instance: *Fikiran*, 14 January 1933; *Maesa* 46, August 1938; *Minahassa Revue*, 31 March 1927; *Tjahaja Sijang*, 1 November 1918.

5. Advertised in *Fikiran*, 12 October 1929.

6. *Fikiran*, 3 August 1932.

With their help a new situation has been created in these Indies, one in which the population is liberated from the cruelty and greed of its former rulers. Only those who close their eyes and cover their ears can deplore this. And who can be more proud of it all than those who have helped bring it about? (7)

Ironically, this kind of argument was of practical value when it came to defending Minahasan privileges. In 1924, for instance, opponents of cutbacks in local school subsidies pointed out in the *Minahasaraad* that because of the archipelagic role of Minahasans as soldiers, teachers and officials, education for them was also an indirect blessing for the rest of the Indies.⁸ Expediency aside, however, many Minahasans really believed it when they said that their soldiers fought "for the happiness and tranquillity of *tanah Hindia*", or that their mission schools and churches made Minahasa "a source of evangelical light for the whole of the Indies".⁹ Initially they were committed to *Hindia* only in the same sense as many Dutch people were committed to it, as guardians and tutors. The difference, of course, was that the Minahasans were of the Indies rather than merely in them, a distinction which political developments in the early twentieth century were to underline.

Minahasan leaders were already alert to political conditions elsewhere in the archipelago by 1877, when they complained that neighbouring territories, though less loyal and less

7. Van Gent 1923: 6.

8. MR 2955/1924.

9. J.U. Mangowal in *Nafiri Minahasa*, 31 July 1916, reproduced by Soeharto & Ihsan (1981: 163); "M." in *Tjahaja Sijang*, 15 May 1922.

profitable to the government than Minahasa, were not subject to the *domeinverklaring*.¹⁰ In subsequent years they remained acutely sensitive to any sign that other areas were being favoured above their own. A.L. Waworuntu, for instance, was quick to protest the continued use of *corvée* labour in Minahasa after it had been abolished in Java.

Minahasans make comparisons not only with the Europeans in the Netherlands Indies but also, as we grow better informed, with the Javanese, who after all are "natives" too. The Javanese used to be much more heavily burdened by government coffee growing, the cultivation system, the land tax and so on. On the other hand, much more has also been done much faster to relieve the burden in their case, especially where *corvée* labour is concerned, than in ours. (11)

The political awakening represented by *Perserikatan Minahasa* was also influenced and inspired by Javanese developments. Although some Minahasans later denied it, the foundation of *Perserikatan Minahasa* by Minahasan soldiers in 1909 must have been connected - albeit by way of defensive emulation rather than as an expression of solidarity - with the establishment of military chapters of the new Javanese national association *Budi Utomo* in the same year.¹²

By 1917, Ratulangie felt that the political parallels were strong enough to qualify *Perserikatan Minahasa* as part of an

10. In the first petition to the governor general, reproduced by Van Kesteren (1879: 465).

11. Waworuntu 1918: 654.

12. Nagazumi 1972: 94. Another possible antecedent for *Perserikatan Minahasa*, however, is a group called "Wilhelmina" established at Magelang by an Ambonese soldier in September 1908 (Blumberger 1931: 46). In 1915, a *Perserikatan Minahasa* spokesman in Manado denied that the founders of the association had been inspired by any other organisation (Soeharto & Ihsan 1981: 159).

Indische beweging or "Indies movement", despite the social gulf separating it from organisations like *Budi Utomo* and *Sarekat Islam*.

Perserikatan Minahasa goes its own way amidst a predominantly Javanese movement, without hindrance and without hindering others. The members of the different organisations belong to groups which are racially quite distinct. Their propaganda efforts do not interfere with one another, and there is no contact between the groups in social life, where conflicts of interest might conceivably arise. Nevertheless, they certainly do influence each other indirectly, particularly in terms of their attitudes to the government. (13)

Many Minahasans continued to perceive the reciprocal influences in terms of ethnic competition rather than cooperation. This rivalry extended even to patriotism itself. "Minahasans", bristled one writer in response to the suggestion that other groups were more nationalistic, "can rival anybody in the Indies in love for their *tanah air*". For historical reasons, their political development had simply "followed a different path".¹⁴ Institutional changes, however, were now drawing the paths together.

Perhaps the most important of these changes was the inauguration in 1918 of a central representative council, the *Volksraad*, for the whole of the colony. Its first two Minahasan members, A.L. Waworuntu and F. Laoh, found themselves in a situation where they often had to choose between supporting colonial policy or aligning themselves with the native opposition. Waworuntu, for instance, could not defend the special privileges of the Minahasan military

13. Ratulangie & Laoh 1917: 476.

14. *Tjahaja Sijang*, 7 June 1922.

units without alienating other native members, whose help he needed in order to campaign for improvements to barrack conditions in general.¹⁵ Explaining his refusal to support the *gelijkstelling* petition of 1919, Waworuntu argued that the government would not make an exception for a single ethnic group and that "a campaign for legal *gelijkstelling* of all races in the archipelago could only succeed after careful planning and in cooperation with other groups".¹⁶ The *Volksraad*, in other words, tended to polarise its members between Indonesian nationalist and colonial loyalist factions. After his election to the *Volksraad* by the *Minahasaraad* in 1927, G.S.S.J. Ratulangie represented the Indonesian option while the other Minahasan member, district chief P.A. Mandagie, remained a staunch loyalist.¹⁷

Minahasans seem to have been introduced to the concept of solidarity with other *bangsa* on the basis of common Indonesian identity - although the word Indonesia was rarely used at first - partly through the *Indische Partij*. Several prominent members of *Perserikatan Minahasa* were also involved in this multiethnic party, a brainchild of the Eurasian journalist and politician Douwes Dekker. In 1922 one of them was A.B.S. Ward, simultaneously a member of the

15. De Vries 1988: 20.

16. V 27/12/1921/A14X.

17. Their most celebrated dispute occurred over the violent Dutch response to a mutiny led by Minahasan seamen on board the warship *Zeven Provinciën* in 1933. Mandagie supported the government's action on behalf of "the chiefs and people of Minahasa", and Ratulangie, speaking for *Persatuan Minahasa*, questioned his right to do so (*Fikiran*, 16, 18 and 30 March 1933; MR 807X/1934).

Indische Partij executive committee and chairman of *Perserikatan Minahasa*.¹⁸ Addressing an audience of soldiers, Ward played upon the resentment aroused by the recent elimination of pay differentials between native ethnic groups in the army in order to emphasise the community of interest between Minahasans and other Indonesians.

The old standpoint that Minahasa is the twelfth province of the Netherlands must be abandoned. We are natives. We will not achieve unity if we insist that we are better than the natives of Java. It is useless to remain isolated; we must come to an understanding with the other natives of the Netherlands Indies. Only through unity can we make any progress.(19)

In sharp contrast to most of the calls for unity within Minahasa itself, however, early statements by Minahasans favouring cooperation with other Indonesian groups were often more apprehensive in tone than idealistic. Ratulangie, for instance, wrote in 1920 that Minahasa had no choice but to renounce its twelfth province ideology "in order to avoid becoming the target of accusations in the future".²⁰

If we possibly can, we Minahasans must be a stimulating rather than a retarding force in the struggle to popularise the new thinking and the new norms. We should see to it that the *volk* to which we belong accumulates maximum credit with the community of *volkeren* in the Indies. This is not primarily a matter of national pride. It is also a question of

18. V 20/5/1924/R6X. At least one *Perserikatan Minahasa* leader in Manado, A.A. Warokka, was also involved in the *Indische Partij* (Wowor 1977: 15; MR 779X/1920).

19. Quoted in V 20/5/1924/R6X.

20. Ratulangie 1920: 125.

self preservation for us in the future, not as individuals, but as a *volk*. (21)

Three years later an anonymous writer in *Tjahaja Sijang* argued just as bluntly that *Perserikatan Minahasa* simply could not afford to align itself too closely with *sana*, the Dutch, as opposed to *sini*, Indonesia.

Although I do not yet fully understand what the current developments mean, I feel it is time for us as children of Minahasa, which is part of the Indian archipelago, with our Minahasan blood that is also Indies blood, to think about our present and future stance toward this movement. We must beware of what might happen if, in times to come, we should find ourselves alone and isolated. We cannot afford to make a false step, we cannot risk becoming trapped. (22)

This sense of insecurity resulted in part from an acute awareness of the small size of Minahasa in relation to the other *bangsa* in the Indies. According to the census of 1930, Minahasans constituted only half of one percent of the 59,138,067 Indonesians.

21. Ratulangie 1920: 127.

22. "J.J.", in *Tjahaja Sijang*, 20 October 1923.

Table 6.1: Sizes of some Indonesian ethnic groups in 1930. (23)

	Number	Percentage of all Indonesians
Minahasans	281,599	0.5
Other North Celebesians	612,701	1.0
Buginese	1,533,035	2.6
Javanese	27,808,623	47.1
Sundanese	8,594,834	14.5
Minangkabaus	1,988,648	3.4
Ambonese	232,573	0.4

The very first issue of *Tjahaja Sijang*, back in 1869, had already drawn attention to the fact that Java alone supported more than 100 times the population of Minahasa.²⁴ Twentieth century Minahasans had few illusions about the stature of their homeland in the wider world.

Minahasa is really just a speck on the map, and its name is unknown to the leading *bangsa* of the world. If a man meets a foreigner from Europe, America, Asia, Africa or Australia and tells him that he is from Minahasa, the stranger will have to ask where Minahasa might be. (25)

A.L. Waworuntu referred to Minahasa as his "little fatherland" and as "a very small part of the colonies".²⁶ Such realism enhanced the Minahasan feeling of dependence, first upon Dutch protection, and later upon the goodwill of other Indonesians.

23. *Volkstelling* 1933-1936 VIII: 88-89.

24. *Tjahaja Sijang*, 20 January 1869.

25. *Tjahaja Sijang*, 1 January 1912.

26. Waworuntu [1915]: 1, 2; Waworuntu 1918: 665.

PERSATUAN MINAHASA AND INDONESIA: FEDERAL NATIONALISM

The *Indische Partij* was a minority party which ultimately lost the support of more radical and popular groups like *Sarekat Islam*, and failed to form the nucleus of an Indonesian national movement. The really difficult political choices for Minahasa were therefore postponed until the appearance of Sukarno's *Partai Nasional Indonesia* in 1927, the same year in which *Persatuan Minahasa* was born.

The new wave of unitarian nationalism embodied in the PNI acquired much of its energy from the growing numbers of students and graduates of secondary and tertiary educational institutions in Java. In the schools and colleges of Batavia, Bandung and Surabaya, the same processes which had crystallised Minahasa as a perceived community in the previous century were now at work on an Indonesian scale. Minahasa, with extensive primary and lower secondary schooling but no more advanced educational facilities of its own, was well represented among the student population in Java, and hence also in the emerging youth movement there. Two of the seven speakers at the first Indonesian Youth Congress in 1926, for instance, were Minahasans.²⁷ Two years later, members of the Minahasan students' association in Batavia were among those who took what became known as the Indonesian Youth Pledge, swearing allegiance to "one land, one nation, and one language".²⁸

27. *Laporan kongres pemuda Indonesia pertama 1981* [1926].

28. *Maesa* 11/12: 206.

It is also well known that Ratulangie was one of the prime movers behind the "Soetardjo petition" of 1936, which called for a planned transition to independence for Indonesia within ten years, that his magazine *Nationale Commentaren* was an important voice for the Indonesian nationalist movement between 1937 and 1942, and that in 1939 *Persatuan Minahasa* was a founding member of the *Gabungan Politik Indonesia* or GAPI, a concentration of parties based upon the principle of Indonesian unity.²⁹

These facts, however, represent only part of a more complex social and political situation. The absorption of the Batavia students into *Indonesia Muda* or Young Indonesia in 1929, for example, proved premature, and in 1934 a new Minahasan youth association, *Maesa*, was set up to fill the resulting vacuum.³⁰ When a Minahasan delegate from *Indonesia Muda* tried to recruit members in Manado in 1930, he was forced to use the name *Minahasa Muda* instead - because, as he admitted himself, "almost nobody was sympathetic to the goals and direction of *Indonesia Muda*".³¹ And *Persatuan Minahasa*, although always formally committed to "solidarity among all the ethnic groups of Indonesia", was conspicuously absent from the PPPKI, the federation of nationalist parties sponsored by Sukarno and his PNI in 1927.³²

29. Pluvier 1953: 83, 118, 136; Pondaag [1966]: 26, 68.

30. KAPAK 1976: 27-28; *Maesa* 11/12: 206.

31. G.R. Pantouw, reported in *Fikiran*, 7 June 1930.

32. Blumberger 1931: 306; Poeze 1982-1983 I: 123.

It is also striking that the explicitly Indonesian political parties, despite their presence in Minahasa, never had a strong following there. In 1932 a small branch of *Partindo* was established in Manado under the leadership of Javanese lawyer Iskaq Tjokroadisoerjo, one of the founders of the by now defunct PNI.³³ When *Partindo* also became defunct in 1936, most of its Minahasan members joined the new Leftist Indonesian party *Gerindo*.³⁴ They remained peripheral, however, to local political life. *Gerindo* candidates, for instance, were all unsuccessful in the 1938 *Minahasaraad* and Manado town council elections.³⁵ In 1940 two *Minahasaraad* members sympathetic to *Gerindo* founded a new Minahasan party, *Perserikatan Kaum Minahasa*, in order to combine Leftist politics with ethnic appeal.³⁶

The position of *Persatuan Minahasa*, with its inbuilt ethnic appeal, was very different from that of the Indonesian parties. In both the 1934 and 1938 elections, *Persatuan Minahasa* candidates won every native seat on the Manado council.³⁷ Insofar as the *Minahasaraad* was politicised along party lines, it too was dominated by *Persatuan*

33. *Fikiran*, 7 May 1932; MR 697X/1932; MR 1125X/1933.

34. MR 389X/1938.

35. MR 444X/1939. *Gerindo* had sponsored three candidates - including a Sangiirese - for the *Minahasaraad*, and one for the Manado council.

36. MR 426X/1940; *Manado Bulletin*, 8, 16 and 19 February 1940.

37. MR 740X/1935; *Fikiran*, 27 August/7 September 1938. Not until 1939, when one independent candidate was elected, did *Persatuan Minahasa* lose a single seat on the town council (*Manado Bulletin*, 16 September 1939; MR 426X/1940).

Minahasa, to which one half of its elected members belonged between 1934 and 1938.³⁸

Of course, these results did not reflect conditions of complete political liberty. Particularly after the imprisonment of Sukarno and the effective suppression of the PNI in 1931, the colony was a police state in which Indonesians risked arrest if they made any statement which could be interpreted as prejudicial to public order or dangerous or insulting to the government. At least one Minahasan member of *Partindo*, M. Tumbel, was imprisoned under these regulations.³⁹ All the same, the rules were less rigorously applied in *Minahasa* than in other regions. "In this land where the critical faculties of the population are quite highly developed", noted an official report in 1934, "the police generally turn a blind eye to what goes on at public meetings".⁴⁰ In any case, it was not only members of the Indonesian parties who occasionally ran foul of the law. In 1931 a member of the *Persatuan Minahasa* committee in Manado, J.C. Weijdemuller, received a four month prison sentence for a "public expression of contempt for the government of the Netherlands".⁴¹

One reason for the relative popularity of *Persatuan Minahasa* was the attention which it gave to local Minahasan issues.

38. MR 740X/1935. The remainder seem to have claimed no formal party affiliation.

39. MR 807X/1934.

40. MR 807X/1934.

41. MR 697X/1932.

The party was founded in Batavia, but at the beginning of 1929 it established a branch in Manado and in 1930 it drew up a "Minahasa Programme" listing desirable changes to the local administrative, tax and education systems.⁴² The real upsurge of local activity, however, began in 1932, when *Persatuan Minahasa* launched a campaign to save the MULO or advanced primary school at Tondano, successor to the old *Hoofdenschool*, from closure as a result of more education cuts.⁴³ This was immediately followed by involvement in the battle for an autonomous Minahasan church, as described in the previous chapter. The schismatic KGPM which emerged from this conflict retained close links with *Persatuan Minahasa*, and in 1939 the KGPM chairman, B.W. Lopian, also took up a position in the *Persatuan Minahasa* leadership.⁴⁴ In the later part of the decade, finally, the Manado branch of *Persatuan Minahasa* campaigned against the monopoly position of the state shipping line in the copra trade.⁴⁵

More than the old *Perserikatan Minahasa*, then, *Persatuan Minahasa* was active in Minahasa itself as well as among the Minahasan diaspora elsewhere. In 1933 there was even a strong move to transfer the headquarters of the party from Batavia to Manado, although this was ultimately rejected on

42. *Fikiran*, 5 January 1929 and June 7 1930. One primary recommendation of the Minahasa Programme was that Minahasa and Bolaang-Mongondow, until then part of the same administrative division despite the status of the latter as a *zelfbesturend landschap*, be separated.

43. *Fikiran*, 26 March, 16 April & 18 May 1932; MR 1125X/1933.

44. *Manado Bulletin*, 8 January 1940; MR 154X/1940.

45. *Nationale Commentaren*, 3 April 1939: MR 426X/1940.

the grounds that proximity to the central government was indispensable.⁴⁶ Precise membership figures are not available, but in 1932 the number of members in Minahasa was estimated at 600, while the number of branches there rose from 13 in 1932 to 27 in 1936.⁴⁷ The party also had an affiliated youth organisation in Minahasa, *Persatuan Pemuda Minahasa*.⁴⁸ *Persatuan Minahasa* membership and activity declined after 1936, but not due to competition from any other organisation.⁴⁹ *Gerindo* had only one branch in Minahasa in 1939, and no other political party was significant in the area.⁵⁰

Debates within and around *Persatuan Minahasa* regarding the relationship between Minahasa and the Indonesian nationalist movement began dramatically in 1928, when Ratulangie announced that the party would not become part of Sukarno's *Permufakatan Perhimpunan-Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia* or Consultative Union of Indonesian Nationalist Political Organisations. Speaking at a party congress in May, he explained that although the central committee agreed both with the ultimate goal of independence and with the principle of Indonesian unity, it had two objections to the

46. MR 807X/1934.

47. MR 1125X/1933; MR 389X/1938. The majority of members, however, probably remained outside Minahasa. In 1929, 5,120 voted in the *Persatuan Minahasa* central committee elections (*Fikiran*, 6 July 1929).

48. MR 272X/1936.

49. MR 389X/1938; MR 444X/1939.

50. MR 444X/1939.

programme of the PPPKI. Firstly, *Persatuan Minahasa* held that the time for independence was still well in the future.

At present, said the speaker, we are not yet ready to receive our independence because we do not have enough educated people who are capable of taking the reins of government. So the transfer of power must be deferred. More and more positions formerly held by Dutch people are indeed being taken by Indonesians now, but this process is still only just beginning. (51)

The radical noncooperative stance of the PNI toward the colonial government was therefore rejected. Secondly, Ratulangie objected to the unitarian character of the PPPKI.

Regarding the form which independence should take, it is first of all necessary to acknowledge the diversity of *bangsa* present here, to establish what they have in common and also in what ways their cultures differ. In the speaker's view the peoples of Indonesia can be divided into territorial units, each with its own rights as a *bangsa*. Any political federation must take this as its starting point. The federation should be constructed at two levels, one insular - Java, Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes - and the other more local. (52)

Whether or not the idea of Celebes as a federal unit reflected his own former dream of Minahasan hegemony on that island, Ratulangie resented the presence in the PPPKI of parties which claimed to speak for groups larger than individual ethnic *bangsa*.

One reason for the central committee's refusal to join is that the PPPKI is based upon *kebangsaan* in name only. In reality its unity does not reflect the rights of each *bangsa* in Indonesia. The *Sarekat Islam* party and the PNI in particular, although they claim to act on the basis of *kebangsaan*, do not represent specific *bangsa* in the sense just explained. (53)

51. Reported in *Bintang Timoer* and reproduced in *Fikiran*, 23 June 1928.

52. *Fikiran*, 23 June 1928.

53. *Fikiran*, 23 June 1928.

The decision to remain aloof from the PPPKI was deplored by the PNI and its sympathisers, including the Sundanese nationalist party *Pasundan*, which had already decided to join. Some members of *Persatuan Minahasa* were unhappy with it themselves. Speaking for the Jakarta city branch, A. Mononutu regretted the insult to *Sarekat Islam* and the PNI and warned that "however stubborn we try to be, Minahasa is still just a small part of Indonesia, and in the end we will be forced to join the others anyway".⁵⁴ In 1930 some of the radicals left *Persatuan Minahasa* in protest and formed a rival group called *Perserikatan Celebes*.⁵⁵ The new party, however, remained unimportant in Java and attracted almost no support in Minahasa, although it did achieve some success in South Celebes as a cooperative venture between Minahasan and local politicians.⁵⁶

At a speech in Manado in 1930, Ratulangie further elaborated the official *Persatuan Minahasa* standpoint.

The main purpose of *Persatuan Minahasa* is to guard the safety and wellbeing of *bangsa Minahasa*. There is no need for us to hide this, because it is a good and fine purpose. It cannot be called egotistical, for it is inherent in human nature. Everybody has the right and duty to look after their own selves, provided they do not damage the public interest in the process. Likewise, every *bangsa* has the right and duty to look after itself, provided it does not disadvantage other *bangsa*. For this reason, *Persatuan Minahasa* must give its primary attention to the local situation in *tanah Minahasa* itself. Because although *bangsa Minahasa* is now scattered

54. *Fikiran*, 23 June 1928.

55. Blumberger 1931: 307-308.

56. Caron 1933: 14-16; Swaab 1936: 14-15; MR 1229/1931. In 1933 *Perserikatan Celebes* became *Partai Sarekat Celebes* and moved its headquarters to Makasar (Pringgodigdo 1964: 126-127).

throughout Indonesia, we are all tied to our birthland by spiritual bonds.(57)

At the same time, he emphasised that the party was not indifferent to the wider Indonesian struggle. On the contrary, *Persatuan Minahasa* fully acknowledged the inherent conflict of interests between *sini* and *sana*, together with all its political and ideological consequences.

This antithesis inevitably leads to political conflict, and we have no doubt that our place in the conflict is on the side of *sini*. In short, *Persatuan Minahasa* must take on board the spirit of Indonesian-ness. We must make a place in our hearts for this new spirit and feeling, and all our thoughts must be inspired by it.(58)

Any attempt to popularise Indonesian nationalism in Minahasa, however, had to contend with a segment of public opinion which, on practical as well as sentimental grounds, was straightforwardly opposed to a change of government.

How can such teachings find an echo in the Minahasan heart, when so few high officials in Minahasa are not themselves Indonesians, or rather Minahasans? *Indonesia Merdeka* means *Minahasa Merdeka*. But in what way is Minahasa enchained? Where is the evidence that Minahasa is enslaved and needs to be set free? Which Minahasan aspirations are being ignored? (59)

The effect of the Great Depression upon Minahasan farmers might conceivably have been a source of political discontent. It was certainly a severe blow for the Minahasan economy when the price of copra in Manado fell from between 15 and 25 cents per kilogram in 1929 to less than three cents in 1934. It had recovered to 13 cents per

57. Reported in *Fikiran*, 31 May 1930.

58. *Fikiran*, 31 May 1930.

59. "Mimeb" in *Fikiran*, 2 March 1933.

kilogram by 1938, however.⁶⁰ In the meantime, Minahasans were able to cope with the depression by cutting down on their use of Sangirese wage labour for coconut harvesting and by eating more local foodstuffs instead of imported rice.⁶¹ There were no food shortages. The crisis was also offset by a successful government programme to free copra growers from their accumulated debts.⁶²

Another moderating factor was renewed appreciation for the income provided by Dutch government and business sources. In 1932, a Dutch economist estimated that salaries and pensions were contributing 60 percent of Minahasa's total money income.

60. Van Aken 1932: 158; Van Rhijn 1941: 34. *Pikul* figures were converted to kilograms on the basis 1 *pikul* = 62 kg.

61. Jansen 1989: 70; *Verslag over het resultaat van plaatselijke onderzoekingen* 1932: 2-3. The *Verslag* also notes that the price of imported manufactures fell during the depression, reducing its impact upon consumption patterns.

62. The debt liberation campaign is described by Van Rhijn (1941: 90-114).

Table 6.2: Estimated annual money income of Minahasa as a region, 1932.(63)

	Amount (guilders)	Percentage of total
Wages paid by government and private enterprise	3,360,000	47
Pensions	960,000	13
Copra sales	2,640,000	37
Sales of other products	240,000	3
Total money income	7,200,000	100

As copra prices fell, Minahasa became proportionally more dependent upon government salaries and pensions for its welfare.

In May 1932, an editorial in the influential Manado newspaper *Fikiran* warned against confusing the views of the nationalist intelligentsia - either on colonialism or on Indonesia - with those of the Minahasan people as a whole.

Who would dare claim that the common people are interested in speeding up the liquidation of Dutch rule in this colonial land, Minahasa? There is simply no reason, current or historical, why they should want to do so. After all, we cannot use the story of the Company and the Cultivation System to judge the government here. Are the people to be blamed for their attitude, then? I leave it to our intellectuals to decide. But whatever the answer, we Minahasans have aspirations like everybody else. As human beings with human feelings, we yearn for a political life too, even if only for our children. And that political life and conviction will arise of its own accord among the Minahasan people, with or without Indonesia. Everybody must understand that. The peoples of both Holland and Indonesia will then be dealing with an ally - or an enemy - which they cannot take lightly.(64)

63. Figures quoted by G.S.S.J. Ratulangie in *Maesa* (11/12: 217). I have not been able to trace the origin or basis of these estimates.

64. *Fikiran*, 25 May 1932.

A few days later a correspondent, noting that a recent Islamic congress in Java had adopted the slogan "Indonesia is an Islamic world", agreed with *Fikiran* that Minahasa should seek its independence "with or without Indonesia: after all, Minahasa is a bigger country than, say, the Republic of Haiti".⁶⁵

Despite its commitment to Indonesia, *Persatuan Minahasa* profited from attitudes like these in its competition with the unitarian parties. The Dutch interpretation of the upsurge of *Persatuan Minahasa* support in 1932 - that it was partly a reaction against the establishment of a local *Partindo* branch in the same year - probably contained an element of truth.

Although no open stand was taken against *Partindo*, this heightened organisational activity can be regarded partly as an attempt to shield Minahasa from Javanese nationalist influences, partly as a spontaneous upsurge in Minahasan self-awareness, and partly also as the beginning of a propaganda campaign for the 1934 *Minahasaraad*, town council and *Volksraad* elections.⁽⁶⁶⁾

At the same time, the Dutch authorities were also aware that regional nationalism, while preferable from their point of view to unitarian nationalism, was still not to be confused with procolonial loyalism.

This *Persatuan Minahasa* movement deserves our support, but it is sufficient to maintain contact with the leading figures. We should not attend meetings ourselves, because any ostentatious appearance provokes reaction.⁽⁶⁷⁾

65. *Fikiran*, 11 June 1932 (original emphasis).

66. Resident F.H. Visman in OR 1125X/1933.

67. Van Aken 1932: 6.

The "twelfth province" variety of loyalism certainly survived the decade in Minahasan society at large, but it became increasingly rare in political life. Military associations - *Persatuan Bekas Pendekar Manado*, the Union of Manadonese Army Veterans, and *Perserikatan Manado*, the purely military descendant of *Perserikatan Minahasa* - were the only significant Minahasan organisations still faithful to it by 1942.⁶⁸ Minahasan public figures found it much easier to work with the cooperating nationalists who dominated the Indonesian political scene in the last few years of Dutch rule than they had with radicals like Sukarno, and most were now able to reach an accommodation with the Indonesian nationalist movement.

Ratulangie's successor in the *Volksraad*, B.W. Lapien, quickly joined the *Nationale Fractie*, a faction led by the moderate Indonesian nationalist M.H. Thamrin.⁶⁹ In August 1939 the other new Minahasan *Volksraad* member, N.F.G. Mogot, a district chief and a representative of the previously conservative *Hoofdenbond*, surprised observers by declaring that he too was in favour of independence for Indonesia.⁷⁰ When the *Persatuan Minahasa* leaders in Batavia decided unilaterally to take the party into GAPI, many outsiders expected a reaction from conservative members in Minahasa.

68. *Persatuan Bekas Pendekar Manado* had 63 branches and around 2,000 members in 1933 (MR 807X/1934). In 1939 it campaigned unsuccessfully for the establishment of a reserved seat on the *Minahasaraad* for a representative of the veterans (MR 1387X/1940).

69. *Manado Bulletin*, 29 July 1939.

70. *Manado Bulletin*, 10 August 1939.

Instead, the Manado branch voted strongly to ratify the decision.⁷¹

Journalists familiar with the Minahasan scene made much less of these events than their colleagues in Java, where the twelfth province stereotype of Minahasa prevailed.

Minahasan affairs are not always accurately reported in newspapers published elsewhere. We read, for instance, that Minahasa is shocked by the behaviour of Mr. Mogot and Mr. Lapien in the *Volksraad*, and that the Minahasan *volk* is now busy demonstrating its displeasure with the direction which they have chosen. Well, we have not noticed much of that shock here. Do they imagine over there that Indonesian nationalism is something completely unknown in Minahasa?(72)

Yet there were still educated Minahasans who, having outgrown crude loyalism, nevertheless saw Minahasa as the real *bangsa* and *bangsa Indonesia* as something much more nebulous. In 1938 the young *Maesa* intellectual W.S.T. Pondaag described Indonesia as a "slogan" which, "although still in its early days, is undeniably taking on pretensions to nationhood already".⁷³ At the same time he gave a good summary of the forces which continued to strengthen an exclusively Minahasan "national consciousness" in the homeland.

That this consciousness exists is evident from the need for, and the creation of, various Minahasan associations working for the unity and interests of Minahasa. Also indicative is the psychological phenomenon that Minahasans today feel themselves more and more deeply to be Minahasans, rather than just members of their own village or tribal communities as in the past. Factors which promote

71. MR 426X/1940.

72. *Manado Bulletin*, 10 November 1939. The *Bulletin* was generally a conservative newspaper.

73. W.S.T. Pondaag in *Maesa* (40: 805).

this unity include the autonomy and self government granted to Minahasa in the form of the *Minahasaraad*, the relatively high level of education among our countrymen, and finally the modern means of communication in our land, which have virtually ended the old isolation and self-sufficiency by making possible greater contact between localities. (74)

As Pondaag's views suggest, even the expatriate Minahasan society to which he belonged in Batavia was still substantially a world of its own. When Ratulangie, as patron of *Maesa*, gave a talk to its members later in the same year, he felt it necessary to remind them "that there are other lands in the world besides Minahasa, and other *volkeren* and *naties* than the Minahasan one".⁷⁵

To the extent that the political alliance with other Indonesian nationalities was based upon fear of what might happen if they became enemies, it remained a source of anxiety as well as security for Minahasans. Doubts often surfaced when the prospect of an independent Indonesia was contemplated.

The danger lies in the construction of the future state. The various political programmes have so far made practically no provisions here, and this is precisely the threat. Who and what can give us a guarantee that we Minahasans will really form "an integral part of the great united Indonesian realm"? We who will constitute such a tiny minority within the Indonesian national union? (76)

Persatuan Minahasa, of course, did have a clear vision of how the Indonesian state would be constructed: as a federation of regional *bangsa*. Federalism was the only

74. W.S.T. Pondaag in *Maesa* (46: 924).

75. From a speech of 25 September 1938, reproduced in *Maesa* (48: 961).

76. W.S.T. Pondaag in April 1938 (*Maesa* 42: 849).

practical way to allay Minahasan fears of domination by their more numerous neighbours, and the only ideological way to reconcile the old Minahasan nationalism with the new Indonesian one. Federalism was by no means an unusual idea among those prewar Indonesian nationalists who were not Javanese.⁷⁷ Minahasans, however, were probably unique in the steady emphasis which they gave it.

Ratulangie, otherwise rather notorious for the changeability of his opinions, seems to have been fully consistent on this point up to 1942. Ratulangie always recognised Indonesia as a geographical entity - in fact, he was one of the first people to popularise the concept outside scientific circles.⁷⁸ But his vision of its political future was resolutely pluralistic. At the All Indies Congress organised by the *Indische Partij* in 1922, he pleaded both for the adoption of the name Indonesia and for federalism as the basis for its political development.⁷⁹ When he founded *Persatuan Minahasa* in 1927, its objectives included "the creation of a system of government on a federal basis".⁸⁰ In 1930 he assured a meeting in Manado that "the organisation of the future state must be based upon the

77. Mohamad Hatta, for instance, was a federalist (Ingleson 1979: 12).

78. As a student in Amsterdam in 1917, Ratulangie was among the founders of the first organisation ever to bear the Indonesian name, the *Indonesisch Verbond van Studerenden* (Nagazumi 1973: 96). After his return to the Indies he launched an "Indonesia Insurance Company" (Pondaag [1966]: 27).

79. *Laporan Kongres Pemuda Indonesia Pertama* 1981 [1926]: 47; *Minahassa Revue*, 31 March 1927.

80. Poeze 1982-1983 I: 123.

federal principle, with full recognition of the rights of each autonomous *bangsa* within the Indonesian framework".⁸¹

In 1938 a dispute between *Parindra* and the Sundanese nationalist party *Pasundan*, which had sponsored rival candidates in the Bandung city council elections, gave Ratulangie an opportunity to restate his view without being accused of expressing his own regional chauvinism. A similar conflict had also occurred in Makasar, where *Parindra* insisted on backing a Javanese candidate to represent South Celebes in the *Volksraad*. *Pasundan* accused *Parindra* of working for a "Greater Java" rather than for Indonesia as a whole. Ratulangie, while denying that ethnic factors had influenced *Parindra's* behaviour, wrote that more was nevertheless at stake here than personal differences between local leaders.

It is better to admit frankly that these conflicts have a foundation in principle. And the difference in principle is easily defined: *Parindra* is a unitarian nationalist group, while *Pasundan* and many other national political organisations are federal nationalists. Of course, there can be no doubt that all nationalist organisations are based upon the ideology of overall Indonesian unity. But *Pasundan* accepts the existing ethnic and cultural differences as justifications for the right of each ethnic group to an independent political life within its own domain. *Parindra* ignores these differences, and its policy so far has evidently been based upon the assumption that the Indonesian *volk* is homogenous. (82)

In Ratulangie's view, regional autonomy was simply a precondition for Indonesian unity.

81. Quoted in *Fikiran*, 31 May 1930.

82. *Nationale Commentaren*, 26 November 1938. Ratulangie enjoyed good relations with the *Pasundan* leaders, and had addressed a *Pasundan* congress in 1932.

The national unity of the Indonesian *volk* is a political unity. It rests upon the political will to form a unity and to be a political nation. With full recognition of the cultural and ethnic differences between the various groups, and of the political consequences of those differences, we must campaign strongly for the recognition, acceptance and realisation of the political unity of the component parts of the Indonesian *volk*. It must be impossible for anybody to drive the wedge of "divide and rule" between them. To achieve this, our leaders must understand the absolute necessity of political solidarity against anything which lies outside the ideology of Indonesian unity. On the other hand, it is equally necessary that they recognise the right of every ethnic group to retain its autonomy within its own ethnically defined region.(83)

Despite Ratulangie's protestations of solidarity, however, a corollary of federal nationalism was that Minahasans were much less sceptical than many other groups of the official *decentralisatie* programme by which the colonial government claimed to be promoting the progressive emancipation of the Indonesian peoples. The *Minahasaraad*, after all, was a product of this policy, and while Minahasans could and did criticise the *Minahasaraad* for its limited powers - J.H. Pangemanann called it a "farce" in 1919 - few thought of denouncing it as an instrument of "divide and rule".⁸⁴ *Persatuan Minahasa* was committed by its statutes to play a role in local councils, and did so with enthusiasm.⁸⁵

Minahasans also took a keen interest in the "Government of the Great East" created in 1938 to administer the eastern archipelago from Makasar, and in plans which were still pending in 1942 to develop the *Minahasaraad* into a *groepsgemeenschap* or "group community" government for

83. *Nationale Commentaren*, 26 November 1938.

84. *Kilat*, 20 May 1919.

85. The statutes are reproduced in *Fikiran*, June 7 1930.

Minahasa. Ratulangie pressed successfully for an amendment to the Great East plan such that the government in Makasar would include an advisory council with elected members, and members of the *Minahasaraad* campaigned for the absorption of Manado, which they argued was essentially a Minahasan town rather than a Western enclave, into the planned *groepsgemeenschap*.⁸⁶ In short, Minahasan aspirations and Dutch policies, even in the last colonial years, did not diverge sufficiently to alter the moderate character of Minahasan nationalism or to end the continuity and autonomy of Minahasan political history.

INDONESIA AND MINAHASAN CULTURAL NATIONALISM

Minahasan political nationalists often became cultural nationalists too. Given the extent to which Minahasans had already come to identify with Western culture by the beginning of the twentieth century, this tended to involve a dramatic reversal of attitudes. "Prior to contact with Western civilisation", Ratulangie once wrote as a student, "we had no culture whatsoever".⁸⁷ A few years later his views had softened, however, when he conceded that "every *volk* modifies the cultural elements which it absorbs to suit its own character".⁸⁸ And by 1930 his mental revolution was complete:

86. *Nationale Commentaren*, 3 February 1940; *Manado Bulletin*, 10 June 1939.

87. Ratulangie 1914: 34.

88. Ratulangie 1920: 125.

Every self respecting *bangsa* receives a sacred heirloom of culture and tradition from its ancestors. We must preserve our culture and tradition with all our spirit, because that spirit itself consists of nothing else but culture and tradition. The flowers of our culture and tradition may change, and certainly we will modernise them, but we will not change the seeds, because those are implanted in the blood and heart of any *bangsa*. (89)

Between 1930 and 1942 there were a number of attempts by educated Minahasans to give new life and relevance to some aspects of precolonial Minahasan culture. *Maesa*, a monthly magazine produced by the youth organisation of the same name, was the forum for a long debate on the value of oral tradition and the place of the indigenous languages in future Minahasan society. Four novels based upon old Minahasan folktales were also published.⁹⁰ The leading figure in this movement, a student called M.R. Dajoh, even wrote a short book on the principles of Minahasan cultural nationalism.⁹¹ In it he identified *mapalus*, a form of communal labour, *tarendem*, a style of improvised poetry, and the Minahasan languages themselves as three aspects of traditional culture particularly worthy of preservation and development.

As an intellectual reaction against cultural Westernisation, this revaluation of indigenous culture ran parallel to similar developments elsewhere in the Netherlands Indies.

89. From a speech in Manado on 11 May 1930, reproduced in *Fikiran*, 31 May 1930.

90. *Bintang Minahasa* (1931) by H.M. Taulu; *Woelan Loemeno diperanak tiri* (1936) by W. Mamuaja; *Pahlawan Minahasa* (1935) and *Putera Budiman* (1942) by M.R. Dajoh. All were published by *Balai Pustaka* in Batavia.

91. Dajoh [1937].

Dajoh certainly came to see it as part of a wider Indonesian project.

The authors of these books are all young. Some of them have had a Western education, but one still based upon a foundation of Minahasan nationality, which is essentially part of Indonesian nationality too. Their traditions and behaviour, if we examine them closely, are basically oriental - or, to state it more clearly, Indonesian. (92)

From 1939 onwards, Dajoh published poems celebrating Indonesian unity as well as Minahasan tradition.⁹³ Like the political alliance with Indonesian nationalism, however, its cultural equivalent was based upon rivalry and calculation as well as idealism. Dajoh made this explicit at a *Maesa* debating evening in 1938.

Finally, the desirability of absorption into the future Indonesian commonwealth was discussed. Mr. Dajoh welcomed such an absorption and argued that the Minahasan *natie*, if it was not to risk being looked down upon by its Indonesian brothers, must contribute a valuable culture of its own to the common Indonesian culture. One of the reasons why Mr. Dajoh works so hard to develop Minahasan culture, he continued, is the contempt in which the Javanese hold us, a contempt based partly upon the inferiority of our culture. (94)

In 1940 he warned again that what he called the cultural "hermaphroditism" of excessively Westernised Minahasans would "bring them into a dangerous position in Indonesian society".⁹⁵

Although cultural nationalism among Minahasans was inspired by the Indonesian dream in the last years of Dutch rule, it

92. Dajoh 1940: 138.

93. In *Poedjangga Baroe* (6: 211-212; 7: 135-136).

94. Reported by "Nano" in *Maesa* (42: 860).

95. Dajoh 1940: 140.

had quite independent historical roots. Many of these roots were to be found in nineteenth century missionary thought. Out of personal as well as professional interest, for instance, missionaries had done most of the early documentary work on Minahasan language and culture, and their contribution here was not forgotten despite their part in the destruction of the precolonial lifestyle. In 1936 Dajoh acknowledged his debt to the NZG missionaries N. Graafland and J.A.T. Schwarz, and particularly to the Dutch Bible Society linguist N. Adriani, from whose writings he quoted extensively.⁹⁶

Motivated by a combination of sincere belief in the value of some old customs and apprehension about the corrupting effect of excessive Westernisation, some missionaries had gone beyond documentation and deliberately attempted to incorporate existing elements into the new Christian culture. Missionary carpenters, for instance, helped combine indigenous and European styles to produce the characteristic stilt house which has remained a symbol of Minahasa ever since.⁹⁷ Beginning in 1879, traditional crafts like rattan work, mat making and basketry - "all that is truly Minahasan in the sphere of industry", as Graafland put it - were introduced into the mission school curriculum.⁹⁸ Despite the general use of Malay, there were several translations of secular and religious teaching

96. Dajoh [1937]: 27-34, 51.

97. Graafland 1898 I: 338, 510; Kruijf 1894: 333.

98. Graafland 1880a: 250.

material into Minahasan languages, culminating in the publication of a compendium of Tontemboan bible stories in 1908.⁹⁹ The local joint author of this book, J.F. Regar, had chided his countrymen in 1895 for showing less interest in the Minahasan languages than the Dutch foreigners did.¹⁰⁰

Another target of missionary encouragement was the *mapalus* custom which Dajoh was later to admire.¹⁰¹ This form of structured labour exchange - a variety of what is now called *gotong royong* - was consistent with the mission ideal of cooperation among Minahasans, as well as effective as a stimulus to hard work.¹⁰² Apparently the NZG also sanctioned a modified version of a ritual dance called *maengket*, which Graafland described as "one of the national dances".¹⁰³

99. The missionary printer A. Mattern had already produced several short Tombulu texts by 1843 (Graafland 1898 I: 271). Adriani & Adriani-Gunning (1908: 5-8) and Schouten (1981: 41-42, 117) list other missionary publications in the Minahasan languages. They include two schoolbooks for spelling and reading in Tombulu by Graafland.

100. *Tjahaja Sijang*, 7 January 1895. Government officials also stimulated interest in the local languages. In 1894, A.L. Waworuntu contributed to an article on the Tontemboan language edited by Resident E.J. Jellesma (Waworuntu 1894).

101. In 1903, *Tjahaja Sijang* exhorted village officials to put *mapalus* teams to work on land overdue for harvesting (1 September 1903). Two years later it included a series of articles on this "good and ancient institution" (beginning on 15 March 1905).

102. *Mapalus* teams worked under strict discipline, and their leaders, though elected, were entitled to administer corporal punishment (Hekker 1987: 110-111; Supit 1986: 46).

103. Graafland 1898 I: 227. Graafland expressed his approval of such dances in 1874 (Graafland 1874: 30-32), and missionary tolerance, if not encouragement, must have played a role in the survival of *maengket* - minus, significantly, its original shamanic element (Schwarz 1907 II: 259-262) - into the 20th century.

Nor were the missionaries the only foreigners interested in promoting Minahasan culture. An old Minahasan wardance usually known as *cakalele* remained part of official ceremonies.¹⁰⁴ Between 1922 and 1928 the local Dutch administration attempted - albeit without success - to use *mapalus* as the basis for an officially sponsored system of credit cooperatives.¹⁰⁵ In 1937 the government, with *Minahasaraad* support, created an ethnological research centre called the Kruyt-Adriani Institute in Manado.¹⁰⁶ One of its first projects was to make a study of the *maengket*.¹⁰⁷ The Dutch, then, provided not only a blueprint for Minahasan cultural nationalism, but also institutional scaffolding to help build it up.

Another development conducive to cultural nationalism was a spontaneous reaction against the social deserters who abandoned their Minahasan identity in favour of a "fake" European one. This too had begun well before Indonesia entered the picture. In 1912, a local writer in *Tjahaja Sijang* exhorted assimilated Minahasans overseas to be proud of their origins instead of dismissing their countrymen with a haughty "No, I'm Dutch, I don't know you, *meneer*".¹⁰⁸

104. This was performed, for instance, at the 1929 anniversary celebrations (*Fikiran*, 5 January 1929). *Cakalele* is actually a generic name also used in the Moluccas; the Minahasan name is *mahasasau* (Graafland 1898 I: 130).

105. Van Aken 1932: 86; Brouwer 1936: 80.

106. Van Rhijn 1941: 18.

107. *Manado Bulletin*, 16 February 1940.

108. *Tjahaja Sijang*, 1 January 1912.

Another patriot made the same point even more scathingly in 1924.

If our Minahasan forebears Toar and Lumimuut could rise from their graves and see their descendants today, their cheeks would run with tears. They would weep to watch Minahasans graduating from Dutch schools and behaving as if their blood had been exchanged for Batavian blood, pretending not to recognise lesser souls because they imagine themselves counts or barons. Is this Minahasa?(109)

Here too, of course, the influence of Dutch opinion is evident. When Dajoh and others denounced the *évolués* as "mimics" and "parrots", their insults could just as easily have come from illiberal Europeans.¹¹⁰

The effect of cultural nationalism upon the perceived relationship between Minahasa and other Indonesian peoples was ambiguous. In the first place, Minahasan culture was simply different from that of other regions. When a Minahasan argued in 1930 that local women should abandon Western dress and adopt the Javanese or Malay *sarong* as a statement of nationality, he was ridiculed in the Manado press for his inconsistency.¹¹¹ Ratulangie's more sophisticated suggestion that culture should be more liberally defined - "Why should Friday worship at the mosque be called 'culture', yet not our Sunday church service?" -

109. "P.F.K." in *Tjahaja Sijang*, 3 March 1924.

110. Dajoh 1940: 141; Dajoh 1941: 48. An editorial in *Fikiran* for 20 July 1929 also mentions "parrots" who "only make people laugh".

111. *Fikiran*, 25 October 1930.

did equally little to further the cause of Indonesian unity.¹¹²

Even when it was inspired partly by the ideal of unity, the search for cultural roots sometimes turned out to highlight uniqueness rather than similarity. Dajoh, for instance, might have chosen to emphasise the wide knowledge of Malay among Minahasans as a bond between Minahasa and the rest of Indonesia. But Malay had been an instrument of colonialism in Minahasa, and his endeavour to show that precolonial Minahasa had been an important part of the Indonesian culture complex led him to glorify the indigenous languages instead - languages which, as Dutch linguists had discovered and Dajoh proudly repeated, were among the most grammatically complex in the archipelago.

The reasons for this lie in the perfected poetic art of our old improvisers, poets and singers, who made their language ever richer, finer, and more beautiful. "Made", I say, because the present generation is so strongly influenced by Malay - the "impoverished" language - and by Dutch that it hardly knows its own language any more.(113)

Not only was Malay foreign and "impoverished", then, but also a destructive influence upon the native tongues. "No, Malay is not your language!", Dajoh insisted elsewhere.¹¹⁴ He was referring primarily to the Manadonese dialect of Malay rather than to standard Indonesian, but the fact remains that linguistic nationalism in Minahasa was always

112. From Ratulangie's foreword to Dajoh's booklet on the development of Minahasan culture (Dajoh [1937]: 4).

113. Dajoh [1937]: 18.

114. Dajoh [1937]: 31.

focussed upon the Minahasan languages themselves, which were spoken nowhere else.¹¹⁵

Another area in which existing differences were artificially exaggerated was the relationship between culture and politics. While Suwardi Suryaningrat, Supomo and other Javanese intellectuals were conceiving the idea of a corporatist Indonesian state based upon the adat principles of natural hierarchy and organic unity, Minahasans were interpreting their own adat as a premonition of liberal democracy. In 1917, Ratulangie was already praising the "democratic spirit" of the Minahasans, who "have never known an absolute monarchy, with or without a feudal aristocracy".¹¹⁶ A year later, A.L. Waworuntu - himself, ironically, a part of the bureaucratic aristocracy created by the Dutch in the nineteenth century, but also leader of the popular association *Perserikatan Minahasa* - welcomed the *Minahasaraad* on the grounds that "its composition is based upon old Minahasan adat, whereby chiefs are always chosen by majority vote of all adult members of the tribe".¹¹⁷

When it was announced in 1933 that six district chiefs would henceforth have automatic sitting on the *Minahasaraad*, B.W.

115. When the language issue was first debated by Minahasan students in Batavia in 1918, for instance, opinion was divided between those who preferred Dutch as the language of administration and education in Minahasa, and those who wanted to see Minahasan developed to play that role. There was apparently no strong support for Malay (*Maesa* 29: 579; *Tjahaja Sijang*, 3 October 1922).

116. Ratulangie & Laoh 1917: 471.

117. From a speech to the *Volksraad* on 20 June 1918, in *Handelingen Volksraad* (1918: 208).

Lapian argued that the *raad* should then also have a role in their selection and appointment - a reform which he claimed would "run parallel to our *adat*".¹¹⁸ During a debate over the organisation of the planned Minahasan *groepsgemeenschap* in 1939, Lapian again used tradition as a surrogate for democracy when he welcomed the idea of a revitalised *walak* administration.

The important thing is that the government of the Minahasan *walak* should be based upon *adat* principles. The population concerned, which has always been democratic, should be given a say in the selection of chiefs to which it can entrust its welfare. (119)

Lapian's proposals were not accepted by the government, and the corps of appointed bureaucratic chiefs survived to the end.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, the existence of the *Minahasaraad* alongside it meant that a degree of convergence between the democratic ideal and the political reality was maintained. One poignant reflection of this convergence was the adoption by the council of a Minahasan *wapen*, or coat of arms, in 1931.

The *raad* reminds the people of times, remembered in tradition, when the elected chiefs likewise formed a council to protect their common interests. It was this thought, together with a strong sense of unity based upon kinship, which inspired one of the Minahasan members to design for the *raad* a coat of arms reflecting ancient tradition. (121)

118. From a speech to the *Minahasaraad*, reproduced in *Fikiran*, 23 December 1933.

119. From a speech in the *Volksraad*, quoted in the *Menado Bulletin*, 14 September 1939.

120. Many Dutch officials, however, accepted in principle the argument that Minahasan *adat* was compatible with modern democracy (Stuurman 1936: 12).

121. Brouwer 1936: 119.

The emblem was based upon the owl, the chief messenger of the gods in Minahasan mythology.¹²² With slight modifications, it remains the official symbol of *kabupaten* Minahasa today.

Most expressions of Minahasan cultural nationalism had this symbolic quality. They were declarations of identity, not practical programmes for change. From the beginning, cultural nationalism in Minahasa was essentially unrealistic. Graafland, for instance, though he admired the Minahasan languages, had to admit that their future prospects were not bright.

Even if the various dialects could eventually merge into a common *volkstaal*, the population of this land would still not be large enough to develop a literature of its own. Besides, Minahasans are quick to adopt Malay, which they need in their relations with the coastal settlements. And Malay is already becoming a *lingua franca* for the whole archipelago, and seems destined to play that role more and more in the future. (123)

The accuracy of this prognosis is sufficiently evident from the ironic fact that every book and article produced by the later cultural revival was written either in Malay or in Dutch. The few experiments with native language education in the schools, moreover, were unpopular with most Minahasans.

Attempts by our spiritual leaders to introduce Tombulu and Tontemboan in the schools met with very little interest either from the pupils or from the teachers. Disdain for our own languages was one reason for this, but the main cause lay in the difficult situation in which Minahasa has long been

122. It also incorporated the *tawa'ang*, a plant used by *walian* for ritual purposes (Van Aken 1932: 50; Brouwer 1936: 120).

123. Graafland 1898 I: 538.

placed by developments in the Indies as a whole. Knowledge of Malay, and above all of Dutch, always promises Minahasans more than knowledge of their own languages. After all, examinations and office jobs require no knowledge of our native languages.(124)

For the same reasons of practicality and firmly established prestige, Western dress was equally entrenched in Minahasan custom. Dutch mission schoolteacher A. Limburg saw this as a metaphor for the futility of any attempt to reverse the direction which cultural change had taken.

And who will now throw it off, this clinging garb of the West, in favour of a costume more appropriate to the children of nature? Those who would try it must bear in mind that they will be regarded as nudists, ridiculed by the ignorant public, and consigned to a psychiatric institution.(125)

A final irony is that Minahasan cultural xenophilia probably had genuine roots in the precolonial past. It was noted in chapter four that foreign products were already associated with prestige in tribal times. Part of the appeal of the Malay language taught by the missionaries may even have been that, like the ritual language of the *walian*, it was arcane, obscure, and foreign. Developments under Dutch rule selectively enhanced these existing xenophilic tendencies to create what postwar anthropologist W. Lundström-Burghoorn has described as a "tradition of change" in Minahasa.¹²⁶ In a sense, then, it was the nationalists, rather than the

124. Nalo Kamu 1937: 222.

125. Limburg 1911: 35. Limburg had been headmaster of a prestigious school for Minahasan girls at Tomohon. The Javanese had their *sarong*, but the old Minahasan *cidako* or loincloth was inappropriate for modern conditions. "A useable national costume", Graafland had conceded, "did not exist" (Graafland 1898 I: 342).

126. Lundström-Burghoorn 1981.

"mimics" whom they criticised, who were attempting to brush Minahasan culture against the grain.

But if Minahasan cultural nationalism was unrealistic as a social project, its very freedom from the constraints of practicality made it all the more accurate as a mirror of political thinking. Both of the key characteristics of Minahasan political development in the early twentieth century were clearly reflected in the views of the cultural nationalists. Firstly, the continued influence of Dutch ideas about Minahasan cultural identity mirrored the essentially cooperative nature of the political relationship between the two *bangsa*, even though the thrust of cultural nationalism was precisely to emphasise their separateness. Secondly, the writings of the cultural nationalists reflect the same concern for Minahasan autonomy which inspired the federal idea in the political sphere. This is most obvious in the case of a regular contributor to the *Maesa* cultural debate who signed himself "Tamporok".

A *volk* which abandons its language loses its nationality. Suppose an Indonesian state does come into being, with, say, Malay as its official language. Do you want us to be dissolved completely among the Indonesian *volkeren*, and cease to exist as a distinct people? For nothing will then distinguish us apart from our religion. But through our language we can preserve our nationality. So how can you be indifferent to whether it disappears or not, whether it is ennobled or bastardised? If you wish our *volk* to take a worthy place among the united states of Indonesia, maintain your nationality by preserving your language. (127)

Both Tamporok and the more politically radical Dajoh agreed that there was an instructive parallel between the cultural

127. "Tamporok" in *Maesa* (46: 926).

position of Minahasa in Indonesia and that of the Flemish people in Belgium.¹²⁸ To give Tamporok, with his Flemish comparison, the last word:

There we have an unfree volk which fights for its language, and in the process not only develops its own literature to a very high standard, but also secures - after the Great War - official recognition as an ethnic group. Here, by contrast, we have an unfree volk which is already abandoning its language before the Indonesian state has even come into existence, and will consequently run a great risk of being treated as a negligible quantity because of its lack of nationality. Whatever becomes of Indonesia, we ourselves must remain a distinct and united people, bonded by, and bonded to, our language and history. (129)

128. Dajoh made the comparison in an article written for the fifth anniversary of the Maesa society in 1939, reproduced by KAPAK (1976: 83).

129. Maesa 46: 927.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE

In his 1953 standard work on the nationalist movement between 1930 and 1942, Pluvier summarised what are still the usual assumptions about "regional nationalism" in the colonial period.

The existence of various forms of local nationalism or patriotism, sometimes of considerable strength, was understandable. These fell outside the scope of Indonesian nationalism, which always had a strong element of unity. It was more the feudal chiefs who professed a regional nationalism, based upon the tradition and the adat which gave them their authority, than the common people of the areas concerned. At the same time, the fact that such local patriotism was supported by the government made it suspect in the eyes of the Indonesian nationalists. To regard all of the many local parties as expressions of local patriotism is, however, mistaken. In many cases the provincialistic character of an organisation often had more to do with a particular local support base than with a narrowly local objective.(1)

None of these assumptions is valid in the Minahasan case. I will deal with them briefly in reverse order. The "provincialistic character" of the Minahasan parties was strongly connected with local objectives, both in principle and because public support depended upon it. *Persatuan Minahasa* was most successful as a popular movement when taking up local grievances in the early 1930s, not during its later GAPI phase. The colonial government was more favourably disposed toward Minahasan than unitarian nationalist parties, but lent the former no active support, and regarded Ratulangie and his followers as adversaries. Nor was Minahasan nationalism a traditional or "feudal"

1. Pluvier 1953: 15.

affair. The leadership of the main organisations combined overlapping bureaucratic and intellectual groups in an uneasy but remarkably durable alliance. Indeed, genuinely reactionary elements held fast to a modern imperial ideology, leaving indigenous tradition to radicals who attempted to portray it as a premonition of democracy.

Did Minahasan nationalism, finally, fall "outside the scope of Indonesian nationalism"? In the end, no. By 1942, educated Minahasans accepted that whatever their political future, it would be part of the future of Indonesia as a whole. Most of the real intelligentsia also embraced Indonesian independence as an ultimate ideal, and some worked actively to help realise it. But the image of Indonesia which prevailed among them was very different from that promoted by Sukarno. Unitarian nationalism - the nationalism of *satu nusa, satu bangsa, satu bahasa* - remained alien to the vast majority of Minahasans, including most intellectuals. The Indonesian nation was a political project, not an historical or cultural fact. *Bangsa Indonesia* was an abstraction; a future Indonesian state could only be a federation of diverse *bangsa* in which each would maintain political as well as cultural autonomy.

The importance which Minahasans attached to the autonomy issue before *kemerdekaan* had even been won reflects a deep concern for their own land and people. Perceived as a community defined by a common homeland, linked by common descent, and bonded by shared ideals of social and political

unity and progress, *bangsa Minahasa* was, in effect, a nation in its own right.

Only within an established nation-state - and sometimes not even then - can there be full agreement on the distinction between nation and region. In a colonial context, where the state is not a nation-state and no putative nation can boast its own state, both concepts must remain matters for debate. The conceptual status of late colonial Minahasa in this respect was ambiguous to a high degree. For many of its people, Minahasa satisfied all reasonable criteria for nationhood. On the other hand, it is also true to say that the number for whom Minahasa was ever the only conceivable national identity was considerably smaller. Minahasan nationalism in its formative years, articulated by servants of church and state, was never a mass movement or an important instrument of political mobilisation. Barely were new elite groups in a position to change this when they were caught up in broader developments which made it impossible to see Minahasa as an entirely exclusive cause. Nevertheless, Minahasa retained such autonomy as a focus of social ideals, political endeavours and patriotic loyalties that even in 1942 the ambiguity persisted. Minahasa was still a *vaderland* rather than a *provincie* and a *tanah air* rather than a *daerah*.

THE MAKING OF THE MINAHASAN NATION

The story of Minahasa, like that of Indonesia, began when a discrete territory was excised by sharp colonial boundaries

from an ancient geography of continuous cultural variation and high demographic mobility. The *landstreek van Manado* so defined had at its core what might be regarded as an *ethnie*. This consisted of a sizeable group of communities which shared some basic cultural patterns, recognised a common genealogical origin, and expressed their unity in the sphere of ritual and religious belief. The cultural emphasis, however, was upon systematic and complementary differences rather than upon homogeneity and solidarity, and the *ethnie* as a whole had no name. Moreover, it shared the *landstreek* with a substantial minority of alien groups which did not fit into the same genealogical and cultural pattern. An ethnic account of the Minahasan perceived community is valuable only in combination with explanations stressing the impact of the colonial experience.

In the nineteenth century, that experience was one of deep and rapid transformation. Enormous ecological, economic and political changes destroyed the most concrete features of the old cultural order. At the same time an intensive evangelical campaign successfully introduced Christianity in almost all parts of the territory, a territory now called Minahasa - unity - as a result of its more or less forcible political unification by the Dutch. Unity was implicit in the commonality of these experiences and explicit in the message of the missionaries, who associated it with Christian brotherhood. It may also have appealed to a spontaneous nostalgia for vanished institutions which had maintained social solidarity in a very competitive traditional society. Chronic internal competition remained

characteristic of Minahasa in Christian times, but seemed only to enhance the ideal of a higher unity.

Another old cultural feature which survived Christianisation was a powerful social and spiritual orientation toward genealogy and ancestry. Perhaps underestimating its autonomous religious significance, the missionaries consciously exploited this interest in order to stabilise the new Christian community, promoting a standardised genealogy which portrayed Minahasa as one great family.

A complementary process was the articulation of Minahasa as an integrated and exclusive communication community. This was activated by the structure of the new government and mission institutions and by the appearance of a Minahasan press.

The onset of a reactive nationalism among Minahasans was delayed by an ethic of honourable and advantageous dependence which had its roots partly in traditional culture and partly in Dutch imperial ideology. Also important was the relatively permeable character of local European society. Racial stratification always remained more continuous and less discrete in Minahasa than in other parts of the Dutch colonies. Nevertheless, a reaction against European policies and prejudices began to enhance Minahasan identity among local chiefs and mission personnel before the turn of the century. It accelerated as more Minahasans entered modern institutions, including the colonial army, where ethnic stratification was absolute.

Matters were complicated by the consolidation of the Netherlands Indies as an overcapping territorial and communication community, and above all by the entry of Minahasans onto a wider stage in prominent but not always applauded roles as colonial auxiliaries of various kinds. This experience, analagous to that of the Indo-European group, promoted Minahasan solidarity even if it did little to maintain the serviceability of Minahasa as a vehicle for higher ideals.

The active political dissemination of Minahasan nationalism began in 1909 with a movement to improve the situation of Minahasan soldiers in Java, followed by a campaign against restriction of educational opportunities in the homeland. The military movement was so reactive in nature that it briefly became associated with revolutionary socialism. After 1919, however, tensions between Minahasans and the colonial government were brought substantially under control by increased political realism and by the institutionalised democracy of the *Minahasaraad* and *Volksraad*. A bargaining relationship, already foreshadowed in the nineteenth century, emerged between Minahasan elites and the state. Mutual cooperation was the keynote of this relationship.

In the 1930s the *Minahasaraad*, the Minahasan churches and the political party *Persatuan Minahasa* combined to provide an institutional shell in which Minahasa could retain a degree of conceptual and practical autonomy while coming to terms with Indonesian nationalism. *Bangsa Minahasa* had enough historical momentum to do so without losing its own

national cachet, despite stigmatic elitist associations. Nor should it be assumed that a willingness to accept non-Minahasans as compatriots always reflected a generous idealism. Indeed, nationalist warnings against the long-term dangers of isolation from Indonesia appealed more explicitly to ethnic self-interest than did the rhetoric of colonial loyalism.

In Indonesian and post-revolutionary perspective, it is plausible to dismiss Minahasa as a political anomaly, a privileged region with a vested interest in the kind of incremental, decentralised emancipation favoured by the Dutch. But for Minahasans of the day, Indonesia was the anomaly. If comparisons are necessary, it is perhaps fairer to begin with one which they made themselves, not with other Indonesians, but with Filipinos.

PHILIPPINE PARALLELS

While Javanese and Sumatran intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s often looked to the nationalist movement in British India for inspiration, their Minahasan counterparts were more interested in developments in the American Philippines. When future Philippine president Manuel Quezon met Batavia Minahasans on a visit to Java in 1934, the possibility was even raised that Minahasa might one day secede from the Indies to join the neighbouring republic.² Ratulangie, who

2. G.M.A. Inkiwirang, interview, Manado, 21 August 1988. Minahasan student leaders were to bring up the same possibility in 1945 as a bargaining counter in the debate over the status of Islamic law in the Indonesian

gave extensive coverage to Philippine affairs in his magazine *Nationale Commentaren*, was a personal friend of Quezon.³ Part of the reason for such feelings of affinity was cultural. In the Christian Tagalog or Visayan, Westernised in dress and manners, most Minahasans could see something of themselves. Ratulangie had written in 1914 that Minahasans socialised more comfortably with visiting Filipino pearl fishers than with the Javanese.⁴ Most of the real historical links between Minahasa and the Philippines had in fact been severed in the nineteenth century as the Dutch and Spanish colonial economies both grew more self contained, but an awareness of geographic proximity nevertheless enhanced the affinity, as did attempts to form an international federation of copra producers in the 1930s.⁵ Moreover, there was also a widespread perception that the Philippine political experience was relevant to Minahasans.

Despite the obvious differences in scale and chronology, there are striking parallels between Minahasa and the northern Philippines in terms of overall social and political development under colonial rule. In both cases,

constitution (E.A. Pangalila-Ratulangie, interview, Amstelveen, 31 May 1987).

3. Pondaag [1966]: 108.

4. Ratulangie 1914: 33.

5. *Het Manado Bulletin*, 6 October 1939. In the middle of the 19th century most Chinese in Manado were immigrants from the Philippines, and there was regular trade with Sulu and Manila. By the 1890s this traffic had diminished to a trickle, and in 1930 there were just 45 Filipinos in the residency of Manado (Spreeuwenberg 1845-1846 III: 43; Francis 1856-1859 III: 344, 400-407; Graafland 1898 II: 21, 117; *Volkstelling* 1933-1936 VI: 273).

many small Austronesian communities, unshielded either by a world religion or by an overcapping indigenous polity, were dramatically transformed and welded into a single national community by Christianity and the colonial state. In both cases acculturation was considerable, and assimilation to colonial society never wholly ceased to be attractive despite the emergence of a genuine political nationalism and a more restricted, less realistic cultural nationalism. In both cases, too, the church was an important focus of nationalist attention and unrest.⁶

In the twentieth century both Minahasa and the Christian Philippines saw the establishment of a dynamic political equilibrium between nationalism and colonialism. Educational progress, a degree of economic welfare and considerable indigenous participation in government reduced the scope for conflict, while representative institutions provided for constructive expression of discontent.⁷ Equally important was a sense of political progress. Like their Filipino counterparts, most politically conscious Minahasans felt that the colonial principle of progressive detutelage did offer the best route to self-government, even if the pace in practice was often too leisurely.

A major contrast, however, was that whereas Christian Filipinos constituted a large demographic majority in their

6. Lapan (1985: 87, 92-96) draws attention to this parallel.

7. It is interesting to note that only 14 percent of the population of the Philippines was enfranchised in 1941 (Corpuz 1965: 133). In quantitative terms, political representation in Minahasa was far more democratic.

colony, an accident of political geography ultimately made Minahasa part of a colonial state in which the "Moros", so to speak, constituted almost 90 percent of the population. Moreover, whereas one group had a virtual monopoly over nationalism in the Philippines, Minahasans had to come to terms with nationalist ideas and movements originating outside their own territory but within the same colony. Although essentially similar in nature to autochthonous Minahasan nationalism, many of these were different in political colour and cultural content as well as geographic scope. Some fertilised and conditioned the growth of Minahasan nationalism, but none ever fully subsumed it. The Minahasan vision of Indonesia as a federation of autonomous *bangsa* was a genuine reflection of the autonomy of Minahasan nationalism. It represented an honest attempt to face the challenge posed by Indonesian nationalism without retreating into a self-serving procolonial conservatism which would have divested *bangsa Minahasa* of its accumulated ideals.

INDONESIAN CONTRASTS

It was Minahasa's misfortune that by 1942 its own understanding of the nature and structure of Indonesia was less widely shared than most Minahasans imagined. For although many different ethnic and geographic units in the Netherlands Indies were identified as nations by some people at some point in the late colonial period, it is probably true to say that the ambiguity of the term *bangsa Minahasa* was unique in its depth and persistence.

Because of its attempt at separation from Indonesia in 1950, the part of the South Moluccas known loosely as Ambon is often assumed to provide the closest parallel. The Ambonese nationalism of the *Republik Maluku Selatan*, however, had shallow historical roots. Although *bangsa Ambon* constituted a perceived community of sorts in the late colonial period, it was deeply divided between Christians and Moslems, remained weakly supported by unitary Ambonese institutions, showed limited political expression, and had no clear territorial dimension.

Conversion to Christianity was too incomplete in Ambon to play the same dynamic integrating role as in Minahasa, whether in an institutional or an ideological sense. Contrasts between town and countryside and between traditional and modern elites were also far greater. The regional council which Ambon acquired under the *decentralisatie* programme in 1921 was a less directly representative institution than the Minahasaraad, and failed to perform the same organic function.⁸ An external party, the *Indische Partij*, played a much stronger pioneering role in the organisation of political opposition in Ambon than in Minahasa.⁹ And even in the 1930s, Ambonese political life, such as it was, still revolved to an extent which would have seemed archaic in Minahasa around the question of loyalty or

8. Elections to the *Ambonraad* were indirect, with villages voting *en bloc*. There were also appointed native members (V 27/10/1938/20; Chauvel 1984: 146).

9. Chauvel 1984: 124, 142-231.

disloyalty to the Dutch crown.¹⁰ In short, Ambon was far less a nation than Minahasa.

Another Christianised group, the Toba Batak, offers a closer comparison. Here, as in Minahasa, a tribal upland population was united and bounded in the process of conversion. Although the Toba Batak identity seems to have had a more genuine primordial basis than Minahasa, it evolved within a similar bounded matrix of essentially modern institutions, and generated a strong and exclusive patriotism expressed in the idiom of European nationalism.¹¹ As in Minahasa, opposition to European authority, manifest above all in an active endeavour to nationalise the Batak church, was also a formative factor.

Here too, however, there are contrasts. The political development of Toba Batak nationalism was limited by the absence of representative institutions. And perhaps partly because the missionaries involved were German rather than Dutch, even the ecclesiastical conflict occurred quite outside the political sphere. In their relations with the colonial state, Batak religious leaders were mostly staunch loyalists.¹² According to Castles, what political manifestations of Batak nationalism did occur were initially expressing "an embryonic Indonesian nationalism which had not been given ideological elaboration nor subjected to the

10. Chauvel 1984: 288-289.

11. An example of this idiom is the patriotic hymn cited by Hutaauruk (1980: 167).

12. Hutaauruk 1980: 272-275.

tests of conflicting ethnic interests".¹³ Only later, after "the desire not to belong to any other group" had been aroused by interaction with the outside world, were the boundaries of the *bangsa* more explicit in political discourse.¹⁴ Such an evolution is not evident in the case of Minahasa, where ethnic boundaries were clear from the beginning and where "tests of conflicting ethnic interests" left them neither enhanced nor blurred.

The numerous Indonesian societies which had not been Christianised were mostly more traditional and less dynamic than *bangsa Minahasa* or *bangsa Batak* in structure and outlook. This made them intrinsically less prone to regard themselves as nations. We have seen that before its transformation under colonial rule, only a very questionable approximation to nationality was to be found in the ethnic composition of what was to become Minahasa. As internal sources from precolonial or early colonial times confirm, the same can generally be said of the other groups which Bachtiar calls the "old nations" of Indonesia. The memoirs of Prince Diponegoro, for instance, show that while he was much concerned with "the land of Java", his objective in the Java War was to conquer it, not liberate it.¹⁵ Nor did he apparently have any notion of the Dutch as a collectivity

13. Castles 1972: 173. Castles cites a statement from 1919 in which the term *bangsa* refers to the Batak but "foreign" means non-Indonesian rather than non-Batak.

14. Castles 1972: 173.

15. Kumar 1972: 103.

counterposed to the Javanese.¹⁶ The best known *hikayat* from the Aceh War, on the other hand, is clear about the identity of the Dutch unbeliever, but makes no mention of Aceh.¹⁷ Moreover, one of the crimes of which its author accuses the kafirs is that they "treat everybody in the same way: one cannot distinguish any longer...who is a slave, and who is a lord".¹⁸ There is little room here for the horizontal comradeship of an Acehnese nation.¹⁹

Some of the major traditional cultural domains of the Indies did nevertheless achieve an exclusive national awareness as they began to acquire their own Westernised social strata and institutions in the early twentieth century. Javanese nationalism and its misrepresentation in the historical literature were mentioned in the introductory chapter, but a better comparison with Minahasa is perhaps the Sundanese nationalism of the *Pasundan* movement. Indeed, in political terms, the Sundanese parallel is closer to Minahasa even than that of the Toba Batak.

West Java was the first area in which the *detutelage* policy was applied, and in 1926 it also became the first autonomous province, complete with representative council, under the decentralisation programme. In this way Sundanese

16. Anderson 1983: 19 (footnote).

17. *Hikajat Prang Sabi*, reproduced and translated by Damsté (1928).

18. Damsté 1928: 595.

19. The composer of the *hikayat* uses the Acehnese language not out of pride but "so that the ignorant can understand it" (Damsté 1928: 599).

nationalism acquired an official institutional shell to complement the political one being built up from below by *Pasundan*, an organisation formed in 1914 to promote the "mental, moral and social development" of the Sundanese.²⁰ *Pasundan* was led more by intellectual than by aristocratic elements, and received considerable support from the population at large. Its attitude to the colonial authorities, although not confrontational, was nevertheless oppositional. Combined with a strong sense of territory and a homogenous culture expressed in a considerable Sundanese language press, these political developments gave *bangsa Sunda* something of the same unity and dynamism of *bangsa Minahasa*.²¹

The eventual reconciliation between Sundanese and Indonesian nationalisms was more complete than in the Minahasan case. Unlike *Persatuan Minahasa*, *Pasundan* did join the PPPKI federation in 1927, and the chairman of a 1929 *Pasundan* congress rejected all separatism by declaring that "the Sundanese form a *volk* and not a *natie*; *Pasundan* is a component of Indonesia, which encompasses more than one *volk*".²² Nevertheless, the Sundanese *volk* continued to mean much more to *Pasundan* than a regional basis of support for the Indonesian cause. In its preoccupation with local issues, its concern for the political as well as cultural autonomy of the homeland, *Pasundan* displayed the same

20. Blumberger 1931: 38.

21. O'Malley 1980: 608-609.

22. Blumberger 1931: 295.

exclusive patriotism, the same polycentric understanding of Indonesia, and the same centrifugal potential as *Persatuan Minahasa*.

The Sundanese example shows that colonialism and the reaction to colonialism could generate or enhance moral and political communities even without the assistance of Christianity. The strength of the Minahasan identity owed a great deal to a specific cultural matrix and a particular experience of conversion, and in that sense it was unique. Yet in another sense it was only part of a broad spectrum of such identities which also included not only *bangsa Batak* and *bangsa Sunda*, but also *bangsa Indonesia*.

To conclude, I suggest that if there is any broad analytic model which can illuminate this spectrum as a whole, then it has to do with the uneven social impact of colonialism in time and space. It was 'islands' of intense European influence, and local accumulations of mutually reinforcing modern institutions, which tended to cradle nations narrower than Indonesia. Where the time lag between the emergence of such a modern community and the crystallisation of pan-Indonesian social institutions was slight, as in the case of Java, fissiparous tendencies were relatively weak. But for a group already established as something approaching a nation in its own right, the demotion from *bangsa* to *sukubangsa* was more difficult to face. In the end, the key to the ambivalent position of *bangsa Minahasa* with respect to *bangsa Indonesia* may be that Indonesia, for Minahasans, was not part and parcel of modernity. Minahasa itself had

already served as the social vessel of modernisation. Indonesia was just a problematic option faced by a people already welded into conceptual unity by a dramatic social and cultural transformation.

EPILOGUE: MINAHASA AND INDONESIA AFTER 1942

This study would be incomplete without some brief consideration of what has become of Minahasan nationalism since 1942. Although a powerful sense of regional patriotism persists among Minahasans today, it subsists within a secure and more or less unquestioned Indonesian national identity. No longer a *tanah air*, Minahasa is a *daerah* of the single Indonesian motherland. *Bangsa Minahasa* has settled down as one of the many *sukubangsa* which make up *bangsa Indonesia*. It is arguable that this transformation has become complete only in the New Order period. The key changes, however, occurred in the tumultuous decade following the Japanese invasion.

Even conventional modern nationalist accounts concede that the Japanese occupation of Minahasa gave violent impetus to the idea of a unitary Indonesian nation.

It is ironic that the Japanese armed forces made the people of North Celebes absolutely and drastically aware of their own Indonesian nationality. Before the Japanese occupation it was difficult for our pioneers to instil the ideal of independence. The colonial ruler constantly suppressed every expression of nationalism. But when Japanese troops landed in the region, forcing their way into houses with fixed bayonets and asking in menacing voices: "Dutch or Indonesian?", then of course the answer,

for the sake of our lives and property, had to be
"Indonesian!".(23)

During the battle for Minahasa in January 1942, local KNIL troops and volunteer militiamen inflicted considerable casualties upon a superior Japanese force. Many were killed in action or executed after capture.²⁴ Occupation policy over the subsequent three and a half years combined harsh exploitation and repression with intensive anti-Western propaganda, paramilitary conditioning for the young, and selective cooptation of prewar radicals as leaders and advisers of various kinds. By the time of the Japanese surrender, the few veteran unitarian nationalists led a substantial body of revolutionary youths or *pemuda* who regarded themselves as the local vanguard of the Indonesian national cause. On the other hand, they also faced bitter hostility from compatriots who saw them as unprincipled collaborators, and the returning Dutch as agents of deliverance. This polarisation was contrary to the spirit of prewar Minahasan society and politics, and it left little room for Minahasa as an independent category. For much of the revolutionary period, Minahasa was effectively just a stage upon which what was understood as a wider conflict was played out.²⁵

23. Wowor 1977: 18.

24. Nortier 1988: 22-60. Minahasan troops, of course, also fought elsewhere in the Indies during the brief defence against Japan.

25. In February 1946 a localised rebellion by KNIL soldiers led to the hoisting of the Republican flag in Manado. Within a month the revolt was suppressed internally, without Dutch intervention but in the name of the crown (Giebel 1976: 172-195; Wowor 1977: 45-81).

The proclamation of Indonesian independence in August 1945 presented a dilemma for intellectuals whose primary political orientation had previously been toward Minahasa, many of whom cherished *kemerdekaan* even if they mistrusted Sukarno. For those who decided to ride the tide of revolution, the indivisibility of Indonesia became an obligatory shibboleth whether they believed it or not. Those who preferred an accelerated version of the old decentralised evolutionary process, on the other hand, found themselves depending upon a Dutch-sponsored federal plan widely interpreted as an attempt to restore colonial power.

By far the most critical public conversion to the unitarian doctrine was that of G.S.S.J. Ratulangie himself. Recruited by the Japanese in Jakarta, Ratulangie was posted to Makasar in 1944 as an adviser to the naval government of the eastern archipelago.²⁶ In August 1945 he took part in Japanese-sponsored preparations for independence and was appointed as governor of Celebes for the Republic of Indonesia.²⁷ From that point onward there was no turning back, and he was irrevocably committed to the revolutionary cause. In a letter addressed to the youth of Minahasa in January 1946, Ratulangie went so far as to draw a distinction which he would never have countenanced before the war by declaring himself "an Indonesian and not a Minahasan".²⁸

26. Pondaag 1966: 72.

27. Pondaag 1966: 73; Harvey 1974: 132.

28. Wowor 1977: 41.

Equally ominous for the future of Minahasa as an autonomous cause was that the first attempts to mobilise Minahasan loyalties as such after the occupation were made by reactionary forces. In March 1946 a new political party called *Twapro* - from *Twaalfde Provincie*, the Twelfth Province - was formed to campaign for the integration of Minahasa into the Dutch state.²⁹ Usually a mere metaphor before the war, the twelfth province now became a concrete political programme. *Twapro* quickly built up a large following among retired soldiers, government employees, and victims of the Japanese terror. It made extensive use of the familiar alliance myth based upon the VOC treaty of 1679. "We are not Indonesians", declared young loyalists at a *Twapro* meeting in March 1947, "we are Minahasans and we belong with the Netherlands and the Queen".³⁰

Among the overseas diaspora the polarisation was even more complete, but Indonesia benefited more than the Dutch. If a concern for communal self preservation had sometimes inclined Minahasans toward Indonesian nationalism even before the war, participation became a matter of life and death for many of those caught in Java during the revolution. The Minahasan militia group KRIS - *Kebaktian Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi* or Devotion of the Indonesian People of Sulawesi, one of the most effective republican military organisations - originated partly as a response to

29. Manus, Sigarlaki, Tandi & Rompas [1980]: 160; 'Halfmaandelijks politiek-economisch verslag over de residentie Manado', 1-15 May 1948, in ASB I 1/10/2/8.

30. 'Halfmaandelijks Politiek-Economisch Verslag over de Residentie Manado', 1-15 March 1947, in ASB I 1/10/2/7.

the excesses of revolutionaries who regarded all Minahasans as enemies by definition.³¹ KRIS waged what its founder describes as a "battle on two fronts", on the one hand against the colonial forces and on the other against "mistaken views within the community".³² Minahasans of all former political shades were inducted into the Indonesian revolution on the republican side under the strong wing of KRIS.

The regional issue began to resurface in Minahasa in late 1946 as the isolation of the area broke down and preparations were made for its incorporation into a Dutch-sponsored State of Eastern Indonesia (*Negara Indonesia Timur*, NIT). As a result, political opinion diversified somewhat as various federalist standpoints emerged. The most complete development of federalist thought was expressed in 1949 by the *Komit  Ketatanegaraan Minahasa* (Minahasa Constitutional Committee) or KKM. This was a coordinating body formed to campaign for the separation of Minahasa from the increasingly pro-Republican NIT and the formation of an autonomous Minahasan state, with its own constitution, within a future United States of Indonesia.³³

31. Anderson 1972: 261; Patang [1976]: 311-315; Badan Kontak Wanita KRIS [1977]: 10, 16-17; E.A. Pangalila-Ratulangie, interview, Amstelveen, 31 May 1987.

32. A.R.S.D. Ratulangie, in his contribution to a commemorative booklet published by Badan Kontak Wanita KRIS ([1977]: 10).

33. 'Hoofdpunten mei 1949', in ASB I 1/10/2/8. Some sources state that the KKM desired absolute rather than federal independence for Minahasa, but although this was probably discussed it was not the official position (Manus, Sigarlaki, Tandi & Rompas [1980]: 167; A.P. Supit, interview, Tondano, 9 August 1988).

Judging by the outcome of elections to the reconstituted Minahasaraad in the previous year, parties backing the KKM - including, by this stage, *Twapro* - had the combined support of about half of the population.³⁴ The KKM sent an independent delegation to the sovereignty transfer negotiations in the Hague, demanding a referendum in Minahasa before the Dutch withdrawal. KKM propaganda stressed the Christian, westernised, democratic aspects of Minahasan society, and insisted "that there are peoples in Indonesia which desire to form a nation, but that there is no nation as yet".³⁵

The social composition of the KKM is illuminating. Although several prominent administrative chiefs became members, the founders and leaders of the group were mainly highly educated professionals, including doctors and senior teachers.³⁶ The KKM was the vehicle of a 'traditional elite' only in the sense that bureaucratic and intellectual groups had long ceased to be entirely distinct in Minahasa. Despite widespread resentment against some district chiefs, there was no real "social revolution" in this period.

34. The *Minahasaraad* election of March 1948 - the first in Indonesia to feature universal male and female adult suffrage (Watusake 1968: 63) - gave 9 seats to Republican-orientated parties, 9 to federalist and separatist groups, and 7 to the chiefs' *Hoofdenbond* (Groen 1979: 74; 'Halfmaandelijks politiek verslag over de residentie Menado', 1-15 March 1948, in ASB I 1/10/2/8).

35. *Komit  Ketatanegaraan Minahasa* [1949]: 13 (quoting Dutch colonial minister J.H.A. Logemann).

36. 'Politiek-economisch verslagen over de residentie Menado, Juni 1949 and 2^e helft september 1949', in ASB I 1/10/2/8; *Komit  Ketatanegaraan Minahasa* [1949]: 27; Winter 1974: 22-23; Manus, Sigarlaki, Tandi & Rompas [1980]: 167.

Minahasan society did not have far enough to revolve. The operative distinction was not between *adat* and modern elites, but between one mixed group whose social and political views had been decisively moulded or remoulded by the transformations since 1942, and another which clung to older assumptions.³⁷ The KKM represented the latter tendency. Although its sponsors included refugees from the Republic and dissillusioned NIT politicians, the KKM was not wholly wrong when it described itself as "a process *sui generis* among a dependent people, a normal manifestation of their quest for freedom".³⁸ It was, in fact, a last true echo of the moderate, consensual, avowedly democratic, and above all Minahasan style of politics of the prewar years.

By 1949, however, there was simply no more political scope for Minahasa *sui generis*. Too many Minahasans, conservatives as well as revolutionaries, had learned to see things in Indonesian terms, and too many non-Minahasans were disinclined to recognise a specifically Minahasan point of view. The Republicans were bent upon a unitary state, while the Dutch still believed that they too could play for Indonesian rather than regional stakes. In the end, the choice for opponents of the Republic in the regions was between integration and a unilateral declaration of independence. In Ambon there were elements, predominantly among the military, which were prepared to choose the latter option and offer bloody resistance without real hope of

37. Many of the younger district heads, for instance, had Republican sympathies in 1948 (Groen 1979: 74).

38. Komite Ketatanegaraan Minahasa [1949]: 18.

external support. In Minahasa, colonial army units ultimately played an opposite role by mutinying against their Dutch officers and declaring themselves part of the Republican army a few days before the arrival of a central government expeditionary force in May 1950.³⁹ The *Minahasaraad* had voted for integration with the Republic at the end of April.⁴⁰ No plebiscite, however, was ever held.

There is a paradox in this contrast between Minahasa, where an apparently powerful separatism evaporated at the last minute, and Ambon, where a much less developed separatism suddenly exploded into violence. Contemporary Dutch observers attributed it to the greater natural pragmatism of the Minahasans.⁴¹ But it also reflected the fact that whereas separatism in Ambon was primarily about betrayed loyalty to the Dutch crown, Minahasan separatism stressed loyalty to Minahasa itself. This was substantially true even of *Twapro*. "You are the national vanguard", an article in the *Twapro* organ told veteran soldiers in September 1948. "Take your place in the front line. If necessary you must sacrifice not just your pensions, but also your bodies and souls, for your land and people".⁴² In this emotional context, sentiment as well as expediency dictated the

39. Kaam 1977: 115; Wowor 1977: 92; Manus, Sigarlaki, Tandi & Rompas [1980]: 226-231.

40. Manus, Sigarlaki, Tandi & Rompas [1980]: 222-223.

41. Groen 1979: 90.

42. Quoted in 'Halfmaandelijks politiek-economisch verslag over de residentie Menado', 1-15 September 1948 (in ASB I 1/10/2/8).

abandonment of separatism once it seemed likely to endanger Minahasa rather than protect it.

While Minahasa was finally swallowed by Indonesia in the years 1945-1950, it was nevertheless swallowed whole. Ratulangie had pretended to renounce Minahasa, but his homeland knew the difference between strategy and sentiment. When his body was returned to Tondano after his death in June 1949, posters hailed him as "our *kawanua*" and "the father of the whole Minahasan people".⁴³ Former soldiers of the colonial army, as well as KRIS *pemuda*, lined the path of his bier.⁴⁴ The importance of Ratulangie's ultimate role as a shackle between Minahasa and the Indonesian nation can hardly be overestimated; indeed, it continues today. This concatenation helped Minahasa to survive as a moral community even after the demise of the KKM and the collapse of the federal structure robbed it of its political ideology, its autonomy, and also its last shades of nationhood.

It was therefore as a demotic, apolitical community that Minahasa began the 1950s. Only the GMIM, the Minahasan Protestant church, provided real institutional continuity with preceding periods, and only there did *bangsa Minahasa* tend to persist in public life.⁴⁵ Yet its political significance was still far from over.

43. "Bapa seluruh kaum Minahasa". Poster reproduced by Torar (1985: 110).

44. 'Halfmaandelijks politiek-economisch verslag over de residentie Menado', 1-15 August 1949, in ASB I 1/10/2/8.

45. Lintong 1978: 100.

The 1950s saw the Minahasan economy seriously weakened by a central government monopoly over copra purchase and marketing, while an underfunded local government was unable to maintain the extensive but crumbling transport system and other infrastructure. In 1957 mounting popular grievances in Minahasa intersected with a broader movement for regional autonomy called *Permesta* (from *Perjuangan Semesta* or "Inclusive Struggle") sponsored by a fragile coalition of eastern Indonesian soldiers and politicians in Makasar. When Jakarta went to war against *Permesta* in 1958, Minahasans were the only group to offer serious resistance, and the rebellion quickly became a purely Minahasan affair.⁴⁶

That resistance was so tenacious that even after the fall of Manado to central government forces, fighting continued in the hinterland for three more years. Among the peasantry, *Permesta* received what Lundström-Burghoorn describes as "unconditional support".⁴⁷

Everybody seems to have supported *Permesta*, though it was a period of economic sufferings for the peasants, who had to feed both the government troops and the rebels. Everyone is proud of the fact that this little region could fight the central government for such a length of time. Solidarity on the basis of ethnicity was more important here than in Central Sumatra, where economic demands more clearly defined the movement at the local level. People stressed the common struggle, the union of all Minahasan people. (48)

46. The course of the *Permesta* rebellion is extensively described by Harvey (1977).

47. Lundström-Burghoorn 1981: 44.

48. Lundström-Burghoorn 1981: 44. This is a highly idealised image of *Permesta*, which was riven in its last months by

Permesta, even in its Minahasan phase, was led by men who had been in the forefront of the Indonesian national revolution, and they proclaimed to the bitter end that their goal was another type of Indonesia, not a disintegrated Indonesia.⁴⁹ Yet the character of the rebellion at the popular level offers powerful confirmation that the Minahasan patriotism of pre-war writers and politicians had been no shallow elite phenomenon.

Although Minahasans can never again be an elite people to the former degree, they have recovered a measure of dignity as well as welfare under the New Order. Even *Permesta*, reinterpreted on the basis of its anticommunist overtones as a sort of premonition of 1965, is now respectable. This rehabilitation has occurred by courtesy of the Indonesian state, and amid such a proliferation of national institutions that a new generation of Minahasans has grown up for whom Indonesia seems neither an abstraction nor an ideal, but a concrete matrix of daily life. Minahasa is a stable element of that matrix.

Yet Minahasa continues to mean something more special to its people than do other Indonesian regions. In 1984 the local

personal rivalries among its leaders (Harvey 1977: 121-149). Nevertheless, it is the people's own image. During the rebellion, as ever, Minahasan unity was more an ideal than a reality, but that did not prevent thousands of Minahasans from dying for *Permesta*.

49. The "*Permesta* Charter" of 1957 opened with the words "We as Indonesian patriots" and stressed that "we are not separating ourselves from the Republic of Indonesia" (Harvey 1977: 164, 166). One of the most prominent Minahasan *Permesta* leaders, A.E. Kawilarang, said in late 1959: "Many of our comrades have died defending this red and white flag; we have as much right to it as does Sukarno" (Harvey 1977: 128).

kabupaten government produced an official handbook for Minahasa. In format and content - stiff forewords by local dignitaries, expositions of the political principles of *Pancasila*, lists of serving and retired officials, development statistics - this guide is like others produced all over Indonesia in the New Order years. One feature, however, reveals that Minahasa is still no ordinary *kabupaten*. Echoing Graafland's old patriotic hymn *Minahasa yang tercinta*, the compilers gave the compendium an unbusinesslike and almost un-Indonesian title: *Minahasa tanah tercinta* - Minahasa, the beloved land.

LIST OF ARCHIVAL MATERIALS

The following documents are held by the Algemeen Rijksarchief in Den Haag. Only items actually referred to in the footnotes are listed here. A short summary of the relevant contents of each is provided. Items prefixed with V (verbaal) or MR (mailrapport) are catalogued by the Algemeen Rijksarchief under *Ministerie van Koloniën na 1900*. Secret (geheim) documents are indicated by an X in their code numbers. Items prefixed with ASB I are held under *Algemene Secretarie te Batavia, eerste zending*. *Memories van overgave* are included in the main bibliography under the names of their authors.

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V 11/3/1919/36: *Perserikatan Minahasa* petitions for a regional council in Minahasa, 1917.

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MR 426X/1940: Political report on the residency of Manado in 1939.

MR 1387X/1940: Political report on the residency of Manado in September 1939.

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ANU	Menzies Library, Australian National University, Canberra.
ARA	Algemeen Rijksarchief, Den Haag.
KB	Koninklijke Bibliotheek, Den Haag.
KITLV	Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Leiden.
KIT	Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Amsterdam.
NLA	National Library of Australia, Canberra.
PN	Perpustakaan Nasional, Jakarta.
RO	Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, Amsterdam.
UA	Library of the Universiteit van Amsterdam.
UL	Library of the Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden.
VU	Library of the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam.

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