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## Australia's Security Relationship with Japan: How much further can it go?

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# Australia's Security Relationship with Japan: How much further can it go?

*Paul Dobb*

## Introduction

Japan is one of Australia's most important security partners. In the past, it was the trade and foreign policy aspects of the relationship that dominated. But over the last decade and a half the bilateral security relationship has steadily grown, and in the last few years it has accelerated to a new level. The signing of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (Declaration) in March 2007 was a strategic landmark. Australia is the only country that Japan has such an agreement with apart from the United States.<sup>1</sup>

However, there is now a new Government in Australia and a new Prime Minister in Japan. We need to assess if the higher pace of security cooperation will be sustained or whether there will now be a tendency on each side to moderate the importance of the relationship.

This paper\* addresses how the bilateral defence and security relationship has developed in recent years and where Japan now ranks in Australia's security priorities. The importance of the Declaration and the relevance of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) with the United States are also addressed. The final section deals with some specific ideas to build on our current security cooperation in a more practical manner.

The previous Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, described Japan as Australia's best friend in Asia. He was an enthusiastic supporter of both the Declaration and the TSD. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has expressed bipartisan support for the Declaration, noting that it does not equate to a 'full bilateral security or defence pact with Japan'.<sup>2</sup> He is likely to put more balance into our relationship with China while recognising that the foundations of the relationship with Japan are strong. But no matter which political party is in government in Australia, there are important aspects of the security relationship between Australia and Japan that—in my opinion—will endure.

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\*This paper was given as a public speech in Japan on 8 and 9 March 2008.

## **Managing geopolitical risk together**

Japan occupies a key geopolitical position in Northeast Asia where an historic shift is occurring in the global balance of power. The twenty-first century will witness the reassertion of Asia as the locus of world power and the relative decline of the United States and Europe. The world will progressively become a multipolar world with three Asian great powers—China, Japan and India—and one Eurasian power, Russia, competing with each other and with the United States.

The central question of the next 20 years will be whether this new correlation of forces in Asia is a peaceful one or one of competition and conflict. History tells us that the rapid emergence of a new great power, such as China, has often disrupted the existing international order and led to conflict. So far, however, the auguries seem quite good: all the major powers are benefiting greatly from an unprecedented period of economic growth and interdependence.

But new pressures are emerging that could change all this: for example, the struggle for scarce resources (particularly energy) and the fact that sustained economic growth is inevitably leading to greater expenditure on military equipment. There are other serious problems looming in Asia: outstanding territorial claims, deep-seated historical antipathies combined with rising nationalisms, as well as ethnic and religious clashes.

There is the further problem of the prospect of reassertion of ideological confrontation between the authoritarian countries of China and Russia, on the one hand, and the democracies of the United States, Japan and Australia on the other hand. In particular, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is starting to look like a continental bloc opposed to the maritime alliance of the United States and its allies.

For both Japan and Australia, there is no more important challenge than ensuring that shifts in the geopolitical balance in Northeast Asia do not undermine our basic security. As democracies, the most serious risk to us is the rise of autocracies in China and Russia and them becoming the dominant powers in East Asia and circumscribing our freedom of action. The other potential challenge is the prospect of a preoccupied and weakened US ally not prepared to check the rise of China's power, leading to loss of confidence by its allies—including Australia and Japan—in its commitment to sustaining the democratic order in our region.

If these contingencies unfolded, they would be first-order strategic challenges for both Japan and Australia. This suggests that we should work together to ensure that we are not surprised by geopolitical developments in East Asia. Both countries need to deepen their understanding of the potential risks involved.

We also need to see what we can do to strengthen regional security dialogue and military transparency. Events must not be allowed simply to worsen in the absence of any established regional crisis management machinery. We should work harder on proposing verifiable confidence building measures and advancing realistic preventive diplomacy ideas. Defence diplomacy must become a higher priority for us to help manage Asia's stability and improve military transparency and arms control measures.

The unsettled relations, historical rivalries and shifting strengths of the Asian powers will make the necessary resolution of these uncertainties and potential threats immensely hard.

Therefore, Australia and Japan should hedge against possible turbulence and disequilibrium in East Asia. We need to be well prepared for an uncertain future as the Asian power balance inevitably changes in the decades ahead. We might need to rethink the amount of warning time we could receive about a strategic shock in our region and closely monitor the growth of regional military capabilities.

## **How Japan ranks in Australia's security priorities**

This underlines just how important shared geopolitical interests are to Australia and Japan. We both live in a part of the world that is undergoing radical change, both economically and militarily. Asia now spends over US\$270 billion a year on defence, or more than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) excluding the United States.<sup>3</sup> There is greater potential for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, as well as biological and chemical weapons, in this part of the world than in any other. And, unlike Europe, we have no overarching multilateral security organisation such as NATO and little in the way of arms control and crisis management mechanisms.

In addition, there are new non-traditional security threats which have arisen—including terrorism, climate change, pandemics, international crime, and illegal migration. As longstanding democracies and developed economies, Australia and Japan have a common cause in working together to maintain stability and security with a particular focus on our own region. It is natural that we should cooperate closely on contemporary security issues.

In addition, we are both maritime powers and key allies of the United States. From Australia's perspective, Japan is the second largest economy in the world and our largest export market.<sup>4</sup> Unlike China, Japan is a democracy that shares basic values (including freedom of the media and the rule of law) with Australia. Japan is the second-largest defence spender in the region after China, and its navy and air force are the most advanced in Asia.<sup>5</sup>

Japan and Australia work closely together in regional security forums, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit, where we generally share the same aims and objectives.<sup>6</sup> Australia also shares a wide range of other strategic interests with Japan, including freedom and security of navigation and trade, and support for the UN role in global security. Both Australia and Japan need a strong US military presence in the region, because without that presence Asia could become a dangerous and unstable place.

In recent years, Japan has ranked only second to the United States in contemporary Australian foreign policy priorities in the Asia-Pacific region. As already mentioned, it is too early to say whether the new government in Australia will change this by moderating its approach to Japan and putting more emphasis on China. But the enduring nature of our shared values and our close alliances with the United States will always give Australia's relations with Japan a special characteristic.

China is a one-party authoritarian country that is not an ally of the United States, now or foreseeably. And there are scenarios where Australia could conceivably find itself in military conflict with China alongside the United States (for example, the Taiwan Strait). The pace and scope of China's military modernisation could create misunderstandings and instability in the region, as the previous Australian Government has stated.<sup>7</sup> And the new Government has

encouraged China to further build regional confidence in its intentions, 'including by adopting a transparent approach to its military modernisation'.<sup>8</sup>

But, irrespective of changes of government, Japan's status as one of Australia's indispensable partners in the region will remain. The previous Australian Government's *Australia's National Security—A Defence Update 2007* observed that Australia has no closer or more valuable partner in the region than Japan.<sup>9</sup> The new Australian Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith, said in remarks at the Japan National Press Club during his first visit to Japan in early February 2008 that 'for many years Japan has been Australia's closest and most consistent friend in the region'.<sup>10</sup> I see this as a solid reaffirmation of the importance of the bilateral relationship by the new Australian Government.

From Australia's perspective, Japan's membership within the US alliance and multinational coalitions is in keeping with its economic and diplomatic weight and has long been supported by Australia.<sup>11</sup> Japan's alliance relationship with the United States has been one of the key stabilising features of post-Second World War Asia, and it will continue to play an important role.<sup>12</sup> Japan has made valuable contributions to operations in Iraq and East Timor, and Australia welcomes Japan's efforts to contribute more directly to regional and global stability.<sup>13</sup> At the same time, as Japan increases its security role, Beijing and Tokyo will have to work their way carefully through a changing strategic environment.<sup>14</sup>

This more challenging strategic situation will mean that the Asia-Pacific region will continue to be the primary focus of Australia's security attention for the foreseeable future—despite our involvement in the Middle East. The reason for this is simple: Australia's military deployments to the Middle East are ones of choice and they support our US ally; in our immediate region, however, we will often be called upon to act as security leader as a matter of necessity—as recent events in East Timor demonstrate.

Australia's enduring strategic priority is to keep Australia safe from attack or the threat of attack. Our defence planning will always include a sharp focus on our region. But we must recognise that there are distinct limits to Australia's defence capacity and influence. In Northeast Asia, Australia cannot expect to predominate as a military power and it would not act there militarily alone. Our aim would be to make significant (but not large) military contributions to coalition operations where our national interests are closely engaged.

I would note here that, from an Australian perspective, there is significant uncertainty about Japan's military contribution in any potential military crisis in Northeast Asia beyond the defence of its own territory. And, unlike Japan, Australia believes that our Armed Forces must be able to defend Australia without relying on the combat forces of other countries and that we must be the sole guarantor of our own security.<sup>15</sup>

The previous Australian Government was inclined to develop the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as an expeditionary force to operate as a subordinate element alongside the United States in distant military operations. The US alliance will remain as a fundamental element of Australian defence planning and we will continue to support selected coalition operations with our US ally.

But the Labor Party's election campaign platform (*Labor's Plan for Defence*) makes it clear that 'It is in our region where Australia's strategic interests are concentrated, our responsibilities exacting and our vulnerabilities greatest'.<sup>16</sup> I expect to see the Rudd Government enhance Australia's capacity for independent military operations in our own

region and focus more on the broader Asia-Pacific region as being critical to Australia's national security. The Labor Party Election Platform explicitly acknowledges that Australia's security is inextricably linked to regional stability.<sup>17</sup> In that sense, there should be a closer alignment of the national security priorities of Japan and Australia, even though we will both continue to have limited military commitments in the Middle East in support of our US ally.

Australia has major security interests at stake in Japan and our security links with Japan are becoming more important as the constitutional and political constraints on Japan's security policies are gradually loosened. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States have reinforced congruent security interests in our respective alliances with the United States, which culminated in our operating together in Al Muthanna province in Iraq. But, in addition, Australia and Japan have demonstrated increasing concern about regional security cooperation, which was reflected in the signing of the Declaration in March 2007.

### **Does the Joint Declaration foreshadow an alliance?**

The defence relationship between Australia and Japan has traditionally lagged well behind the trade and foreign policy relationship. But the Declaration signals two important new trends: first, Japan is asserting a sense of strategic independence beyond its traditional ties with the United States; and, second, Australia has accepted a role as a prominent regional security player beyond its immediate neighbourhood. These are important developments in a world where a distracted United States is preoccupied with the quagmire in Iraq and China is emerging as the dominant power in Asia.

The preamble to the Declaration states that our strategic partnership 'is based on democratic values, a commitment to human rights, freedom and the rule of law, as well as shared security interests, mutual respect, trust and deep friendship'<sup>18</sup>. The Declaration places Australia more squarely in the centre of Asian security affairs with a Japan that is taking its strategic situation much more seriously. It is only natural for Japan to want to strengthen its strategic partnership with other Western-oriented countries in the region.

The Declaration provides for increased practical cooperation between the defence forces and other security-related agencies of the two countries, including the exchange of views and assessments of security developments in areas of common interest.

The nominated areas of cooperation include, but are not limited to: law enforcement, border security, counter-terrorism, disarmament and counter proliferation, peace operations, exchange of strategic assessments, maritime and aviation security, humanitarian relief operations, and contingency planning.<sup>19</sup> This will involve, as appropriate, the strengthening of practical cooperation through exchanges of personnel, joint exercises and training (including in the area of humanitarian relief operations), and coordinated activities in the areas of law enforcement, peace operations, and regional capacity building.

This is a modest list on which to build, and in September 2007 an Action Plan to implement the Declaration was endorsed by former Prime Ministers John Howard and Shinzo Abe in Sydney. The Action Plan addresses a detailed agenda for the nominated areas of cooperation in the Declaration, as well as providing more detail on implementing security and defence cooperation, strengthening cooperation on issues of common strategic interest,

United Nations reform, and specifying dates for forthcoming dialogues (see the annexure to this paper).

There has been some criticism of the Declaration in Australia. Some see it as being aimed at containing China. But in a press conference with Chinese President Hu Jintao on 6 September 2007, Howard said that such ties were 'not directed at anyone, any more than the strategic dialogue between China and Australia which I have just announced is directed at anyone'<sup>20</sup>.

Some Australian media commentators claim there is a danger this Declaration might lead to a mutual security treaty or formal alliance. That is a proposition that I reject as being wholly unrealistic: neither Australia nor Japan is at all ready for that sort of commitment. The Declaration does not require Australian military support of Japan in the event of any specific conflict and this in itself reaffirms just how far it is from constituting a formal security alliance or defence pact. The fact is that the current modestly worded Declaration is about as much as the bilateral security relationship between us would bear for the foreseeable future.

Some Australian academics believe that the Declaration will not become a lasting component of the regional security architecture. They assert that the Declaration's birth was caused by the Howard Government pushing strongly for closer security ties with Japan at the same time as the rise of Prime Minister Abe and right-wing politicians in Japan.

This line of reasoning argues that the political factors that led to the Declaration may already be unravelling with the accession to power of Prime Ministers Yasuo Fukuda and Kevin Rudd, both of whom it is suggested will have a more accommodating attitude towards China. My view is that Japan and Australia signed the Declaration as an autonomous decision based on their own strategic perspectives, and not those of either America or China. Neither of our countries views the Declaration as a key element of a so-called balancing strategy against China.

## **Should the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue include India?**

I have the same basic attitude towards the TSD between the United States, Japan and Australia. It is an understandable arrangement between the three key democracies in the Asia-Pacific region, two of which (Australia and Japan) are America's closest allies in the region. It represents a significant intensification of the strategic dialogue between the three allies, and the TSD is now a well-established element of our regional security discourse.

The TSD is not a defence arrangement, although some areas of prospective cooperation such as maritime security and disaster relief have defence dimensions. The TSD has no defence representation, but there have been meetings of senior officials supporting the TSD. For example, defence officials met in Tokyo in April 2007 to discuss trilateral defence cooperation in areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, non-proliferation, and peace operations.

Any future trilateral defence cooperation, which is still at a nascent stage, will be focused on these types of uncontroversial subjects that build on existing areas of cooperation.

The TSD began at the level of senior officials in 2002 and it was elevated to the level of Foreign Ministers of the three countries at the inaugural ministerial meeting between the

three nations in Sydney in March 2006. The most recent round of the TSD was held in Canberra in December 2007: it was hosted by Australia's Foreign Secretary Michael L'Estrange with Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka and US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns. This was the first TSD meeting held under the Rudd Government and demonstrates the new government's commitment to continue the TSD process.

Contrary to some views in Australia, the TSD is not focused on China and is not a vehicle for containing it. The TSD partners welcome China's constructive engagement in the region. Australia believes in a policy of engaging with China, and encouraging China to become fully integrated into the security affairs of the region. It is, of course, understandable that China, as an increasingly significant element in the regional security equation, is addressed from time to time in TSD discussions. Australia also discusses a range of regional security and related issues with China in our separate bilateral strategic talks with that country.

As far as Australia is concerned, there is no current plan to change the trilateral arrangement now established between Australia, the United States and Japan. The idea of expanding the TSD to a Quadrilateral Dialogue—to include India—was largely the initiative of former Prime Minister Abe with his idea of an 'arc of freedom'<sup>21</sup>. Rudd is on record, when he was still Leader of the Opposition, as stating he would have reservations about any future expansion of the TSD that 'would unnecessarily exacerbate unresolved strategic tensions between the US and China in particular'.<sup>22</sup>

Including India, which is not a close ally of the United States, in order to create a Quadrilateral Dialogue, would start to look like a containment of China strategy.<sup>23</sup> Seeking to create a coalition of 'democracies' like this, so as to contain China's power, would be firmly rejected by the current Government in Australia.<sup>24</sup>

Of course, Australia regards India as an increasingly influential player, and as a country with which our own interests increasingly converge—especially in the Indian Ocean. Australia recognises the importance of reinforcing our relations with India, which in the past (especially in the Cold War) have not been very close.

## **What more can be done? Some modest proposals**

Addressing this question needs to be approached with some caution, recognising that we have come a long way in the last few years. There is probably a need to consolidate the significant progress already made and to focus on the Action Plan to implement the Declaration that was agreed in Sydney on 9 September 2007 by former Prime Ministers Howard and Abe. But first let us review what we are already doing together as security partners.<sup>25</sup>

Our current bilateral defence and security ties fall into three broad categories—intelligence exchanges, security dialogue and defence cooperation—the key elements of which are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Australian and Japanese defence ministers in September 2003. Formal intelligence cooperation began in the mid-1970s and now encompasses virtually all agencies of the Australian Intelligence Community and their Japanese counterpart organisations.

Strategic dialogue between senior officials and uniformed officers of the respective defence forces is conducted on a regular basis and extends to intelligence and Foreign Ministry officials. Australia was only the second country, after the United States, with which Japan established a regular security dialogue. Annual political–military and military–military consultations commenced in 1996 and are conducted at the senior official level, but there are also regular meetings between both countries defence ministers and defence force chiefs.<sup>26</sup>

Australia and Japan also cooperate operationally in an expanding range of defence and security activities including ocean surveillance, counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, Japan's space program, and through their participation in US-led maritime exercises such as the RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) series.<sup>27</sup>

Service–to–Service links have developed steadily. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN)–Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) links are particularly well-developed, which is perhaps not surprising given that we are both maritime powers. The RAN regularly sends ships to Japan to undertake goodwill exchanges. Due to current constitution interpretations, JMSDF ship visits to Australia are limited to training squadron visits.<sup>28</sup>

Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)–Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) relationships have developed quickly over the last few years, including annual air force-to-air force talks. Australian C 130-J *Hercules* and P-3C *Orion* aircraft have visited JASDF bases and participated in goodwill exercises.<sup>29</sup>

Australian Army–Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) links have also started to develop. There are annual army-to-army talks and some examples of common interest include Army restructuring, interoperability and Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) issues.<sup>30</sup>

According to my colleague, Professor Desmond Ball, Japan now ranks in terms of the frequency of military exchanges in the top five of Australia's security partners—after the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, but ahead of Indonesia and other Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries.<sup>31</sup> He argues that progressive further strengthening of security links is likely, although they will remain fairly modest. Even so, he predicts that current and prospective geopolitical trends will lead to further strengthening of the Australia–Japan security relationship.

I disagree when he states that it is increasingly likely that our two defence forces will serve together in operational situations, 'including not only combat support activities but also actual combat'.<sup>32</sup> But I agree when he asserts that however much the bilateral relationship is strengthened, it will remain distinctly secondary to our respective alliances with the United States.<sup>33</sup>

Even so, there is more we can do together. The Declaration and the subsequent Action Plan specifies a number of areas for security cooperation, including in the areas of defence cooperation, law enforcement, border security, counter-terrorism, disarmament and counter-proliferation (where we already work together in the Proliferation Security Initiative), peace operations, exchange of strategic assessments, maritime and aviation security, and humanitarian relief operations. It also foreshadows further intelligence collaboration and high-level strategic dialogue. The Action Plan identifies some 50 specific activities to be implemented in the years ahead that build on our existing cooperation in traditional and non-traditional security sectors (see the annexure to this paper)..

While the Declaration acknowledges the value in combined exercising and training, there are no plans at this stage for unilateral or combined training in Australia by Japanese Self-Defence Force (JSDF) personnel.

The real test for the future is going to be to move beyond dialogue, goodwill visits and limited intelligence exchanges to conduct more meaningful practical security cooperation. We should focus in the first instance on such areas as humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and terrorism, and build on our joint interests in maritime security.

We might also see if we can enhance our information exchanges and strategic assessments. And is there more we can do together with regard to training, exercises and personnel exchanges, including military and civilian defence officials? Is there anything we can do about beginning to exchange information on defence science and technology? Can we do more about exchanging doctrine and lessons learned from various operational environments?

What I have in mind here is no big advance from where we are now, but concentrating more on delivering results for both countries in terms of practical security cooperation. I would argue that the hurdles to making more progress in practical security cooperation are mainly on the Japanese side. The potential of our bilateral security relationship with Japan has yet to be realised, even in a limited way.

Our aim then should be a modest one of improving interoperability and building a better understanding of each other's strategic concerns. Our joint experience in Iraq demonstrated that we can operate together militarily in a war zone, as long as there are careful rules of engagement that respect each side's political limitations.

It would be a pity, however, if our limited security cooperation now were to stumble because of political inhibitions and bureaucratic hurdles in both our countries. The important policy issue is that both our countries confront a more challenging regional security environment, which suggests to me that we need to do more together as important regional security leaders.

## Notes

- 1 See *Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation*, available on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website (in both English and Japanese) at < <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html>>, accessed 24 March 2008.
- 2 Kevin Rudd, 'A Federal Labor Government Would Enhance Australia's Security Relationship with Japan', Media Statement, 7 March 2007, available at <<http://www.alp.org.au/media/0307/msloo070.php>>, accessed 4 April 2008.
- 3 International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2008*, Routledge, London, February 2008.
- 4 In the last 12 months China has overtaken Japan as Australia's largest trade partner overall, i.e. exports plus imports. See *Trade Topics: A Quarterly Review of Australia's International Trade*, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, September 2007. Australia's trade with China includes its trade with Hong Kong.
- 5 International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2008*, Routledge, London, February 2008, pp. 384–387 and 445.
- 6 Japan played an important role in assisting Australia's membership of the East Asia Summit.
- 7 Australian Government, Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security—A Defence Update 2007*, DPS: APR013/07, Defence Publishing Service, 2007, p. 19, available at <[http://www.defence.gov.au/ans/2007/pdf/Defence\\_update.pdf](http://www.defence.gov.au/ans/2007/pdf/Defence_update.pdf)>, accessed 24 March 2008.

- 8 *Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations, 2008 Joint Communiqué*, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 26 February 2008, available at <[http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/us/ausmin/ausmin08\\_joint\\_communique.html](http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/us/ausmin/ausmin08_joint_communique.html)>, accessed 24 March 2008.
- 9 Australian Government, Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security—A Defence Update 2007*, p. 19.
- 10 Address by the Hon. Stephen Smith, Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Japan National Press Club, available at <[http://www.australia.or.jp/english/seifu/speeches/?pid=DFAT\\_20080201](http://www.australia.or.jp/english/seifu/speeches/?pid=DFAT_20080201)>, accessed 24 March 2008
- 11 Australian Government, Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security—A Defence Update 2007*.
- 12 Australian Government, Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security—A Defence Update 2007*.
- 13 Australian Government, Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security—A Defence Update 2007*.
- 14 Australian Government, Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security—A Defence Update 2007*, p. 20.
- 15 Australian Government, Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security—A Defence Update 2007*, p. 26.
- 16 Kevin Rudd, Joel Fitzgibbon and Alan Griffin, *Labor's Plan for Defence*, Election 2007 Policy Document, November 2007, p. 1, available at <[http://www.alp.org.au/download/now/071112\\_\\_\\_labors\\_plan\\_for\\_defencexx.pdf](http://www.alp.org.au/download/now/071112___labors_plan_for_defencexx.pdf)>, accessed 24 March 2008.
- 17 Rudd, Fitzgibbon and Griffin, *Labor's Plan for Defence*. p. 5.
- 18 See the preamble to the *Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation*, available on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website (in both English and Japanese) at <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html>>, accessed 24 March 2008.
- 19 See 'Areas of Cooperation' section in the *Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation*.
- 20 Press conference between Chinese President Hu Jintao and former Australian Prime Minister John Howard on 6 September 2007 during the APEC summit in Sydney.
- 21 See Mahmud Ali, 'New "strategic partnership" against China', *BBC News Online*, 3 September 2007, available at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/6968412.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6968412.stm)>, accessed 24 March 2008; and also Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs, *On the 'Arc of Freedom and Prosperity'*, address on the Occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Founding of the Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc., available at <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/pillar/address0703.html>>, accessed 24 March 2008.
- 22 Peter Hartcher, 'Stop nuclear race: Labor', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 August 2007, section 4, p. 1.
- 23 See Robert Ayson, *Bilaterals, Trilaterals and Quadrilaterals: Japan–Australia Security Cooperation and Asia's Future Order*, article prepared for the Australian Studies Association of Japan, 21 November 2007.
- 24 For an early US support of the idea of an alliance of democracies in Asia, see Robert D. Blackwill, 'An Action Agenda to Strengthen America's Alliances in the Asia-Pacific Region' in Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb (eds) *America's Asian Alliances*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000, pp. 111–34 and the dissenting comments by Paul Dibb at pp. 135–36.
- 25 I am indebted to Guy Boekenstein for this information, which I have drawn on extensively from his paper entitled *An emerging strategic triangle? Future trilateral defence and security cooperation between the United States–Japan–Australia*, (NIDS paper, National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, 11 May 2007). He is currently Director, North and South Asia in the International Policy Division of the Australian Department of Defence. The views expressed in his NIDS paper are his own and do not represent those of the Australian Government.
- 26 Boekenstein, *An emerging strategic triangle? Future trilateral defence and security cooperation between the United States–Japan–Australia*.
- 27 Boekenstein, *An emerging strategic triangle? Future trilateral defence and security cooperation between the United States–Japan–Australia*.
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## **Annexure**

### **Major Elements of the Action Plan to Implement the Australia–Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation**

#### **1. Strengthening cooperation on issues of common strategic interest**

- (1) Enhance policy coordination on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
- (2) Exchange information and coordinate policy with respect to issues related to North Korea, such as the abduction, nuclear, and missile issues.
- (3) Enhance bilateral cooperation in the trilateral framework with the United States and in other multilateral frameworks including any existing and future regional security groupings.

#### **2. United Nations reform**

Continue dialogue and cooperation on UN Reform, including actively pursuing early realisation of Japan's permanent membership of the UN Security Council.

#### **3. Security and defence cooperation**

- (1) Update the Memorandum on Defence Exchange to promote bilateral defence cooperation including in the following ways:
  - (a) annual Defence Ministerial meeting;
  - (b) technical exchange;
  - (c) information exchange;
  - (d) cooperation in international peace cooperation activities, such as seminars relating to peacekeeping, studies on practical cooperation including logistics cooperation, exchange of information on disaster relief assets and capabilities, participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Desktop Exercise on Disaster Relief;
  - (e) enhancement of bilateral defence cooperation in such frameworks as Japan – Australia–US trilateral framework and the ARF;
  - (f) development of an annual calendar of cooperation and exchange activities.
- (2) Conduct activities in accordance with the current Memorandum on Defence Exchange:
  - (a) high-level exchange;
  - (b) working-level exchange;
  - (c) unit-to-unit to exchange;
  - (d) exchange between educational and research institutions, and Australia's participation in the Tokyo Defense Forum.
- (3) Establish a dialogue on cooperation in the Pacific.

(4) Conduct discussions on North Asian security in the framework of the Australia–Japan 1.5 Track Dialogue.

(5) Enhance exchange of views on human security.

#### **4. Law enforcement**

(1) Enhance the cooperative relationship between the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and Japan’s National Police Agency (NPA).

(2) Exchange information relating to illicit drugs, including drug precursor chemicals.

(3) Commence regular dialogue to coordinate regional aid strategies on trans-boundary threats in the region.

(4) Hold Customs Cooperation Meeting to consider new areas of cooperation such as establishment of regular dialogue for information exchange between Customs experts.

(5) Enhance cooperation to combat money laundering.

(6) Cooperate to progress discussion on the Arms Trade Treaty initiative.

#### **5. Border security**

Explore possibilities for bilateral cooperation in the area of border security.

#### **6. Counter-terrorism**

(1) Strengthen bilateral cooperation among counter-terrorism officials.

(2) Coordinate regional capacity building activities to help prevent the proliferation of MANPADS [Man Portable Air Defence Systems].

#### **7. Disarmament and counter proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery**

(1) Hold annually the Australia–Japan Bilateral Disarmament and Non-proliferation Talks.

(2) Cooperate to promote the PSI [Proliferation Security Initiative] in the region.

(3) Cooperate on counter-proliferation outreach efforts, including considering holding Chemical Weapons Convention implementation workshops.

(4) Promote the exchange of information relating to imports and exports of concern.

(5) Cooperate in the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty review process.

#### **8. Peace Operations**

(1) NPA to attend AFP’s International Deployment Group pre-deployment training.

- (2) Australia to contribute a trainer to Japan's pilot human resource development training program in peace building in Asia.

## **9. Exchange of strategic assessments and related information**

- (1) Commence discussions on measures taken by each country to protect classified information with a view to promoting information sharing among pertinent authorities.
- (2) Enhance the exchange of strategic assessments and related information through regular meetings between relevant agencies.

## **10. Maritime and aviation security**

- (1) Hold a bilateral dialogue on transport security.
- (2) Australia Customs and Japan Coast Guard to meet to discuss joint exercises, personnel exchange, and training opportunities.

## **11. Humanitarian relief operations, including disaster relief**

- (1) Australia to participate in Japan's annual Urban Search and Rescue training.
- (2) Establish an annual bilateral dialogue on disaster risk reduction in the region
- (3) Jointly strengthen the capacity of the UN to support regional disaster response and disaster management.

## **12. Forthcoming dialogues**

- (1) Japan–Australia Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations in Australia in 2008.
- (2) Foreign Ministers' meeting in Australia in 2008.
- (3) Defence Ministers' meeting in Australia in 2008.
- (4) Officials' pol.-mil. dialogue.
- (5) Officials' Defence Policy Talks.
- (6) Officials' Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Talks.
- (7) Customs Cooperation Meeting in 2008.

*Endorsed by former Australian Prime Minister John Howard and former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Sydney on 9 September 2007.*

*(Major Elements of the Action Plan to Implement the Australia–Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation is also available in both English and Japanese on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website at <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/action0709.html>>)*