

THE PRESS IN INDONESIA AS EXEMPLIFIED
IN REACTIONS TO CONTROVERSIES ON
THE BASIS OF THE STATE

by

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
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The work described in this thesis was carried out by the author at the Australian National University. Where the work of others was employed, appropriate references have been given.

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CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
PART I - INTRODUCTORY	
Introduction	1
Ideology and the Political Public	3
Communication in Underdeveloped Countries with Special Reference to Indonesia	17
Indonesian Political History	41
Chapter 1 - Press History	51
Chapter 2 - Press in General	68
Chapter 3 - Choice and Description of Analysed Papers	114
Chapter 4 - Choice and Description of Controversies	126
PART II - 1953 ISLAMIC-PANTJASILA CONTROVERSY	
Introduction	152
Chapter 1 - Abadi	154
Chapter 2 - Non-Islamic Newspapers	175
Conclusion	185
PART III - 1959 ISLAMIC-1945 CONSTITUTION CONTROVERSY	
Chapter 1 - Abadi	189
Chapter 2 - Merdeka	245
Chapter 3 - Pedoman	256
Chapter 4 - Sin Po	279
Conclusion	299
PART IV - CONCLUSION	
Epilogue	301
General Conclusion	311
Bibliography	316

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Part I - Introductory

Introduction

To date there is no full-scale monograph in English on the Press in Indonesia.

There have been general articles on the subject in English and a large body of material in Indonesian on various aspects of the Press, but the field is still a very open one and it has not been possible in this thesis to depict the Press in broad outline so as to provide a foundation for future research. Instead it has been decided to compare reactions of the Press as a whole and particularly of newspapers representative of opinion to controversies occurring over a period of time, but paired according to their underlying themes, in order to try to reach some conclusions about the character of the Press.

In practice, limitations of time have narrowed this exercise down to the period of the 1950s and to two controversies arising, firstly, from a speech by President Sukarno at Amuntai in Kalimantan (Borneo) at

the beginning of 1953 calling for support for a secular rather than an Islamic state and, secondly, from the Government's decision at the beginning of 1959 to return to the 1945 Constitution. The pair of controversies which has been selected deals with the perennial controversy over whether Indonesia should remain a semi-secular state, committed to no one religion, as at present, or make Islam the basis of its existence. The dispute has been shelved rather than settled and is just one of Indonesia's many basic problems.

In the earlier years party divisions were not clear-cut, but, except on this issue, they did not follow Islamic versus non-Islamic lines. Later, party alliances were more clearly defined. After 1957 particularly, the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia - Indonesian Nationalist Party), PKI (Partad Kommunis Indonesia) and the NU (Nahdatul Ulama - Moslem Scholars' Party) consistently supported the Government in Parliament, while the Masjumi and PSI were in opposition.

But in the Constituent Assembly, in session since 1956 with the task of framing a permanent constitution to replace the provisional one inaugurated in 1950, division was between Islamic and non-Islamic parties on the question of the basis of the State and this extended to the many small splinter parties.

Masjumi and the NU increasingly found themselves allied, while the PSI and Masjumi were, in their own moderate fashion, opposed to each other.

Also for reasons which so far are not clear, the Government did not step in to quell the sometimes violent criticisms levelled by the Islamic press in 1959 at the proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution, even though this occurred in a period of quite severe press control.

Ideology and the Political Public

These controversies will be discussed more fully later, but it can be stated here that although they provide a basis for discussing the character of the Indonesian Press they illustrate a view which will be stated at the beginning rather than point to a conclusion arising from the press reactions themselves.

The view they illustrate is not only that the nature of the press is ideological, but the reasons why it is ideological. The controversies themselves reflect the readership of the newspapers which in turn reflect (and report upon) them. The controversies were ideological in character and the people who were interested in them were the political public. Because the nature of its

readership primarily determines the character of the Press,¹ it is a fair inference that the political public constitutes the newspaper reading public and that the Press reflects the ideological character of that public.

By contrast, in developed, Western, countries, the political public forms only a small part (probably with country-to-country variations) of the newspaper readership, a result of near universal newspaper distribution and literacy in those countries.

The statement that the political public defines newspaper readership in Indonesia is complementary to a statement by Herbert Feith² that regular newspaper reading was probably the clearest indication of membership of the political public.

Feith gives a clear definition of the political public as distinct from the political elite, which is a much smaller group. He defines members of this public as persons of a middle range of political effectiveness, who although outside the political elite see themselves as capable of taking action which could affect national government or politics. He describes them as the mobilised section of the population, in Deutsch's sense of the mobilisation for communication between individuals which is a necessary condition of nationalism.³

In 1950 most members lived in cities and towns, but many lived in ketjamatan (subdistrict) townships, and others were relatively educated village dwellers.

Membership approximated to the group of those who shared in the modern, urban-centred all-Indonesian culture which had grown up around the nationalist movement and also a large number of those alienated from the nationalist movement.⁴ Both, especially the former, would be predisposed to the ideological type of politics. Neither would be inclined towards a policy-making type of politics cutting across ethnic and religious divisions.

A majority of the political public were members of modern-type associations, writes Feith, speaking of the year 1950. Although in the years preceding the 1955 general elections there was a rapid expansion of party membership when many members of such associations, particularly parties, did not share the attitudes of the political public, this does not affect the argument about the political public itself. Later party members were presumably not newspaper readers, being drawn from the illiterate masses.

Dealing with his identification of the political public with the newspaper-reading public, Feith notes that Indonesian newspapers were expensive and their

content was almost wholly political.⁵ He does not discuss why, but the argument here that the political public defines the newspaper readership could provide the answer.

In 1953 there was a total of 104 daily newspapers with a circulation of 630,000, of which 76 were Indonesian language dailies with a circulation of 463,500, 11 Dutch language dailies with a circulation of 64,000, 16 Chinese language dailies with a circulation of 97,500, and one English language daily with a circulation of 5,000.

Using the basis of Feith's estimate for 1950, the sharing of each copy of Indonesian language newspapers between three readers, plus the reading of Dutch and Chinese language newspapers by one Indonesian citizen, one reaches the conclusion that about a million and a half Indonesian citizens read newspapers, which was roughly the size of the political public.

Detailed figures for later years are not available, but an indication of the growth of the political public may be seen in the fact that in 1959 the total circulation of 90 papers was claimed to be 1,039,000.⁷

Because of the importance of the 'political public' as the readership, and therefore the primary determinant

of the character, of the Press, the concept of that public is examined more closely.

That there is some confusion between the elite and the political public in Indonesia is demonstrated by articles by James Mysbergh and Guy Pauker which appeared in Volumes XXVI and XXVIII respectively of Far Eastern Survey.⁸

Mysbergh suggests the gradual broadening of his elite, but does not equate it with the political public and states that its core consists of 'probably not more than two hundred' persons. Although he distinguishes between the old aristocracy and the new Westernised intelligentsia, he states that the latter is the successor to the former and consists largely of its descendants. He also makes it clear that Dutch education was the unifying factor of the intelligentsia and this education was restricted to a very few persons.

On the other hand he makes references to the rural leadership as a political factor, particularly in the 1955 elections. Surely the definition of 'the political public' includes them, particularly as writers on mass media, e.g. Schramm,⁹ suggest that such opinion leaders are usually the few newspaper readers in the villages?

Party and personal interests are given as the main motivation of the existing elite, a view which Pauker,

probably correctly, describes as too superficial a view; but neither of them really discusses the ideology of the elite, still less of the wider 'political public'. To some extent their concepts of a political public meet, but Pauker's is more explicit in dealing with intermediate groups.

He says we need to know the nature and role of intermediate social strata placed between the elites and the masses as the supporting cast of politics. In a country in Indonesia's stage of development it was equally unlikely that politics is the exclusive play of an elite including less than 1,000 people, or that a substantial proportion of the population of (at that time) about 87.5 millions was meaningfully involved in the political process.

As noted above, these concepts to some extent meet, but neither clearly define the political public, a task which is undertaken by Feith, in his passage discussed earlier, who in this respect actually resolves the apparent conflict between Mysbergh and Pauker.

Pauker goes on to deal with divisions in Indonesian politics. While admitting that political parties are usually identified on an ideological basis, as religious, nationalist and marxist, he thinks because this division

has less deep roots in Indonesian culture than ethnic and religious ones it is not so sharp. He notes that all parties are nationalist and, although they are not always marxist, are invariably socialist in their orientation.

However, his characterisation of ideological divisions as not being as sharp as ethnic and religious ones seems an underestimate of their importance. Ideological divisions may not be traditionally as deeply rooted as religious and ethnic ones, but they can be traced back to the early stages of Indonesian nationalism and are as basic to Indonesian politics as they certainly are to the Press. Furthermore, they are reinforced by religious and ethnic divisions which are indeed expressed in politics through ideology.

The existence of ideological divisions itself presupposes a wider political public than the intellectual elite, because of their religious and ethnic basis. In fact, the intelligentsia is to a large extent represented by the PSI.

It is suggested it is the effort by ethnic and religious groups in the wider political public to assert their identity at the national level which determines the ideological character of politics and the Press. This is characteristic of transitional society, in which strict

adherence to traditional divisions would cause disintegration of the state, while an attempt to run politics on modern, flexible, policy-making lines would lead to disappearance of religious and ethnic groups as political forces, a fate for which they are not yet prepared.

The limited character of the newspaper reading public renders its members relatively immune to the non-political 'pop culture' of Western newspaper readership, although there is some expression of it in the magazine-type Sunday issues. Immunisation is probably reinforced by the non-Western values of the society.

The ideological character of the political public is most readily seen in "Modjokuto," the real town in Java with a mythical name, which is the subject of several studies by Clifford Geertz and his associates. In this regard Modjokuto is a microcosm of Indonesian society (allowing for the fact that Java is numerically, although not geographically, representative of Indonesia as a whole).

A very wide stratum of society is regarded by Geertz as being "aware" and this category is particularly evident in urban Modjokuto.⁹ However, caution must be used about the term "aware" (as also with the Indonesian

word "modernen" - the Indonesian view of what is modern). Indonesia is actually a transitional society and a feature of such a society are what Riggs calls cliques or "clelects," which combine the characteristics of the modern clique and the traditional sect and are typical both outside and inside bureaucracies as a way of bypassing modern institutional processes and dealing directly with the officials concerned.¹⁰

Riggs' concept seems an important corrective to any temptation to regard the "political public" as completely modernised. Many of the modern-type associations mentioned by Feith are not really modern, but belong to Riggs' intermediate stage of "clelects" and it is the sectarian element which clings to them which is regarded here as giving them their ideological character.

Nahdatul Ulama and the PNI are not really parties in the modern sense. The former is a political expression of the santri (orthodox Moslem) element and the latter of the prijaji (Hinduistic) element, both largely Javanese. Even Masjumi has a religious (modernistic Moslem) basis and with other religious parties represented Outer Island religious and ethnic groups, while the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia), whose core professed a more modern type of political religion, may be said to a large extent

to represent the abangan (pre-Hindu) element, particularly in Java.¹¹

Of course, the above observations are still more true of the mass parties which were mobilised about the time of the 1955 elections, but there is no evidence that apart from swollen membership the bases of the parties were transformed.

The PSI (Parta Sosialis Indonesia - Indonesian Socialist Party) was one of the few which could be considered a party in the fully modern sense and the elections showed it drew most of its support from the elite itself, the intelligentsia which formed the most completely modernised segment of Indonesian society.¹²

Geertz is helpful in relating the traditional bases of these parties to their ideological expression.¹³ He calls the ideologies "religiopolitical" and goes far towards substantiating what was said above about these being an expression of "religious" (in the broad sense) and ethnic divisions.

After 1910 or 1915 the purely traditional aspects of these divisions began to be transformed in Modjokuto. It is significant that this change roughly coincides with the emergence of ideological movements in Indonesia as a whole. Instead of the purely concrete definitions of the

divisions and their roles, they began to be expressed in abstract but intensely felt principles and some attempt was made to find pragmatic means towards reaching their respective goals.

Geertz implies, although he does not state, that this change was largely the result of external forces. The "world" (as a framework for Indonesian society) was becoming more unsettled and social changes occurred in response to its unsettled state.

Reference to ideology leads to some discussion of its role. It is evident from the beginning that Geertz regards ideology as having a positive aspect. He discusses this more general question more fully elsewhere.

In Apter's compilation¹⁴ Geertz finds deficiencies in the theories that ideologies are the result of either interests or strains and argues that in the new or renewed states at least there is a need for an ideology (not too clearly formulated) to provide a framework which will meet the need of citizens whose dominant feeling is one of disorientation.

However, Geertz takes as his example, not the internal ideologies already mentioned, but Pantjasila, the pre-independence five principles enunciated by Sukarno, as a national ideology, which served as a useful

national framework in the early years of the Republic. The strength of Islamic concepts of the state was only one of many reasons why it failed. The others were similar to the reasons for the decline of constitutional democracy itself - a combination of the deteriorating economic system, the pathological relationship with the former colonising country, the rapid growth of the PKI and the inability of the "administrators" (as a type of leader) to court mass support, together with the administrative deficiencies of the "solidarity makers". These last terms are Feith's, not Geertz's, but Geertz uses the same concepts; the decline is related in Feith's book which takes its title from this development and which has been cited before.

Geertz gives 1957 as the landmark by which Pantjasila had become the subject of abuse rather than of concensus. Ideological pluralism collapsed with constitutional democracy. However, we shall see that the seeds of this collapse, at least in its ideological aspect, were planted by the opposition of the concept of an Islamic state to Pantjasila, as conceived by supporters of a secularistic state, as early as the beginning of 1953.

We shall be concentrating on the period of transition to "guided democracy," but even after that period positive

guidance was limited to subscription to an overall ideology which allowed some freedom for manoeuvre within an overall framework. The operation of the press within full-blown guided democracy will be given some consideration in the epilogue, but already in this transitional period the political framework within which it was to operate, and which indeed was foreshadowed in the political climate in which the contemporary press operated in the late '50s, had become evident.

It rested upon the support which President Sukarno was able to obtain from a balance of power between the interests of the PNI, the NU, and the PKI. The three parties represented Sukarno's version of the nationalist, religious and marxist currents of political thought. There was also the unacknowledged power of the Army, thrust into increased prominence by its victory over a rebellion in Sumatra and Sulawesi (Celebes) by elements of the Masjumi and PSI.

All these forces subscribed to Pantjasila, as indeed did all significant political groups, although with varying emphases.

But the parties which came to be identified with guided democracy also supported Manipol-USDEK, that is, the president's political manifesto contained in his

speech "The Rediscovery of Our Revolution," given on Independence Day in 1959 (with the addition of later notes) on the Indonesian Revolution and its programme; and the components of the Indonesian language acronym USDEK - 1945 Constitution Socialisme á la Indonesie, Guided Democracy itself, Guided Economy and Indonesian Identity.

In more recent years the PNI and NU decreased in importance, leaving Sukarno the task of balancing the Army against the PKI. There was also, during the later, transitional, 'fifties, still some scope for the opposition Masjumi and PSI, but these parties had been linked by Sukarno with the 1958 rebellion¹⁵ and were becoming increasingly subject to harrassment by the authorities.

Manipol-USDEK was regarded by Geertz as a substitute-ideology and he insisted that ideology must meet a real need and correspond to reality to have positive value. However, it can be argued that even Manipol-USDEK was not entirely a diversionary smoke-screen, but had some continuity with the past, for example in its opposition to economic imperialism.

Communication in Developing Countries
With Special Reference to Indonesia

That Indonesia is a developing country within the special meaning which that term has acquired since World War II is regarded as axiomatic.

Developing countries in this sense are countries which, compared with those of Western Europe and North America and countries peopled largely by settlers from those regions, have recently been, and in many cases still are, economically backward.

Societies in such countries are in a state of transition from their traditional cultures to a modernism which owes its origin to the culture of the West.

There is now a large literature dealing with the politics of developing countries. However the titles of some of these articles demonstrate how far from maturity this highly important field is.¹⁶

Of course, it is the proliferation of new nations since World War II which has given rise to this new field and it cannot be expected to have developed very far in the space of 20 or so years. However the problems are urgent and in order to provide a setting for this study deserve at least a glance.

It seems to this writer that basic terminology is still often inexact. The term "underdeveloped countries"

is often used as though their underdevelopment was mainly political. There may be a case now for writing about political underdevelopment, although its definition is still not clear, but earlier writers seemed to really mean the politics of economically underdeveloped countries. The point is, it is the economy which is underdeveloped. In many countries, including Indonesia, the reverse side of this coin is political instability, rather than political underdevelopment. Instability is a characteristic of Indonesian politics, corresponding to the country's economic underdevelopment.

According to the United Nations an "underdeveloped" country has an annual per capital income of \$300 or less.¹⁷ Indonesia falls within the group of countries whose per capital gross domestic product at factor cost in 1958 was \$US100 or less.¹⁸

Indonesian society, and those of other developing countries, are, as was mentioned earlier, in a state of transition from their traditional cultures to a modernism which owes its origin to the culture of the West. In many cases, as to a large extent in Indonesia, these countries inherited a civilisation of their own, but this civilisation had become static and has needed the infusion of imported values to make them adaptable to modern

conditions. However, it is not their relation to imported values, but their communication characteristics which concern us here.

Societies have been divided into Modern, Transitional and Traditional as follows¹⁹

	Literacy	Urbanisation	Communication System
Modern	Over 61%	Over 25%	Media
Transitional	21-60	10-25	Media-Oral
Traditional	Under 20	Under 10	Oral

A literacy of 43% (age 15+) in the early 1960s²⁰ (it would probably have been somewhat lower in the mid '50s) places Indonesia firmly in the transitional category, if other considerations had not led to the same conclusion. From our point of view the importance of the conclusions tabulated above are that the (mass) media, including the Press, form only a part of the communication system.

Their characteristics are therefore to be understood in the light of the fact that they are used by only part of the society, in the case of Indonesia by the "political public" discussed before.

As a criterion for describing the characteristics of the press, it is necessary to establish what the functions

of the press are, and then to discover how they are fulfilled and what difficulties are faced in fulfilling them.

There is a growing literature in the research field of communications, but much of it deals with economic development, including economic development by political means.

The direct impact of communication on economic development is incidental to this study. Schramm²¹ dismisses any "chicken and egg" controversy about the causal relationship between communication and economic development by denying that either economic development or information are prime movers in national development; he says they interact and their interaction is "constant and cumulative."

In Indonesia Vice-President Hatta complained that insufficient attention was given in the Press to economic matters despite their great importance. He attributed this to the belief that people in new countries regarded politics as easy, but economics the province of the expert. Hatta offered no solution, but suggested the Press should meditate on the deficiency.²² There is, however, an indirect impact of communication - political advocacy of development as a direction.

The political communications function itself is discussed by Gabriel A. Almond.²³ Almond, like most observers, draws a contrast between the urbanised, "modern," public and the rural, traditional masses in developing countries, but he does it by comparing the performance of the political communication function in a modernised system with that in a traditional system. He says political information is more homogenous in Western political systems - the same information penetrates the whole system; whereas in transitional societies specialised communication media are to be found only in urban areas, among the literate and educated, and then tend to be organs of political groups and parties, while between them and the traditional masses, whether in cities or rural areas, there is a cultural gap which cannot be bridged.

Similarly, in a modern Western system there is a free flow of information, while in a transitional system it does not reach traditional society. Also there is a greater flow of information flowing through a modern system, the system itself creating information by bringing hidden communication into the open. In a transitional system the flow is uneven and remains hidden.

Finally, in a modern Western system information flows back to government as much as from government to the

people; in transitional societies the flow tends to be mainly in the latter direction, and here only partially, for the reasons given earlier.

The connection between the urbanised sector in transitional societies and the political public in Indonesia is obvious, with the reservation again that this urban sector is not yet fully "modern". Incidentally, it is not being argued here that modernisation in Indonesia or any other developing country is necessarily Western, although this could be the conclusion from reading much of the literature on the subject. The precise way in which modernisation will be combined with indigenous cultural values is still being worked out in these countries and few, either within or outside them, would be bold enough to state what form their societies will take at various times in future.

It is, however, clear that they are indeed transitional societies and many of their features are incompatible with modernism. Almond's comparison has demonstrated the importance of the communication function in the operations and cohesion of political systems; it has also demonstrated in the political field the partial nature of communications generally in transitional societies, while pointing the way to what must be the goal

of modernisation in this area. It has suggested that in Indonesia the close relationship between the press and political parties (to be described to some extent later) is an aspect of the limited field of mass media; that much information in the traditional section remains hidden; and that from the Press one gets the impression of information coming mainly from the top - government and party leadership, which is borne out by experience.

Some writers²⁴ regard political participation as an index of the availability and use of facilities for participation in all sectors of the social system. By "political participation" they mean representative government, but there is by no means agreement that this is the goal of all societies. The most that can be said with any confidence is that if such is the case it must be seen as the end of a very long continuum in which modernisation would have reached the level it has now reached in Western democracies. It would be interesting to see whether there is any correlation of the factors tabulated earlier between Modern, Transitional and Traditional societies and the degree of political participation.

Establishment of representative government has even been regarded by implication as one of the functions of a

communications system in a transitional society.²⁵ While Indonesia had a representative constitution during the 'fifties, by the end of the decade the shakiness of its foundations was already evident. In the end, as it will be seen, there was little effort by the Press to save it.

The question remains whether as a short term goal the Press should have tried to save it. As a long term ideal it may be an admirable aim, but for Indonesia, and probably for most other developing countries, economic development seems a much more urgent priority. In the event, the Press in Indonesia was far more concerned in pressing its ideological interests than in either of the above aims.

Pye dwells on the failure of the mass media to reach the rural sector, a fact which,²⁶ as mentioned before, applies to Indonesia as to other developing countries. It is not suggested there is no connection whatever between, say, Djakarta politicians and "grass roots" in the villages, but these connections are tenuous and unorganised. They have more influence in the long term than in the day-to-day conduct of politics.

The function of mass communication media are perhaps best illustrated by studies of rural areas which lack them. Little has been done in Indonesia in this regard,

but other studies elsewhere, e.g. in India, are relevant to the Indonesian situation. Sommerlad²⁷ makes a rather indirect reference to a study carried out in India. He is citing a paper written by Schramm and Winfield and presented by UNESCO to the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology in Developing Countries at Geneva in 1963.

The paper quotes "a study conducted in India about ten years ago" and was probably the one reported by Y.B. Damle.²⁸ Schramm and Winfield told how the study "measured the diffusion of modern ideas through villages at different distances from the metropolis." In the farthest village no one but the head man knew anything about world ideologies, important recent international events, or who were the nation's friends or enemies. Knowledge of the country's independent status and partition was patchy and in only four villages did people know anything about community development projects.²⁹

Damle³⁰ reported that in one village people who read newspapers were aware of political policies and were estimated as being approximately 20% of the population there.

These figures, varying as they do from village to village, illustrate certain propositions about distance

from cities and the impact of mass media which are equally applicable to Indonesia. Unlike Western countries, where the communications network is fairly evenly spread, in Indonesia information decreases in proportion to distance from cities and large towns, although this must be taken as a general statement, unsupported by detailed research of the kind carried out by Damle in India.

More will be said later about the press in general in Indonesia and its circulation, but there is some evidence supporting the above statement. Only four people in a village in Central Java in 1950 regularly received a newspaper or journal, most of which were not in the Indonesian language. They were the village chief, his secretary, a hadji (former pilgrim) and a local "capitalist."³¹ Illiteracy, low incomes and unfamiliarity with the Indonesian language were given as the main reasons for the small circulation of newspapers in the countryside. Villages fairly near important regency or district towns might receive newspapers published in those towns from agents within them.

The impact of mass media in enlightening the people able to receive them can only be surmised, but it must be equally as great as in India. Such enlightenment is one of the more obvious Press functions.

There can be no doubt that many journalists themselves see the function of the Press in Indonesia in ideological terms. At the end of the 'fifties, as mentioned earlier, stress was laid on a national ideology within which the "lesser" ideologies of the nationalist, marxist and religious types could continue to express themselves harmoniously.

Dr. Arifin Bey, editor of the Indonesian Observer, an English language daily, may be taken as representative of this ideology. Although, so far as is known, he never committed his views on the subject to writing, he saw the press as an instrument of nation-building. For him the nation came first. The contemporary role of the state was more important than its history, he said, emphasising its task of binding together the power of the sub-nationalities, in which the Press had played a role.

The role of welding national unity was even above truth, Dr. Bey said; even Lincoln had put the Federation first. In the interests of national unity the Press was controlled, but the method of control was by regulation rather than by "unofficial" censorship, which he claimed was imposed behind the scenes in Western countries. Dr Bey did not believe in objectivity as an independent value; what was good for the nation was objective, he said.

Indonesia was developing a philosophy of government directed towards homogeneity rather than the reverse. The state must be constructed mentally and spiritually as well as physically.

Arifin Bey's attitude accords well with Sukarno's statement³² that "the Press is an instrument to mobilise the masses to realise the achievements of the revolution."

However, not all journalists thought like this. Throughout the 'fifties (although in the end prevented from expressing themselves in the Press) there were journalists who placed the modern Western value of objectivity above ideology. Even among them there were differences of approach to the question, as illustrated by the respective attitudes of Mochtar Lubis, editor of Indonesia Raya, and Rosihan Anwar, editor of Pedoman.

There was a long controversy between these two editors in 1961, reflected in the proceedings of the International Press Institute. However, it seems clear that essentially the difference between the two was on strategy and that in principle they were in agreement vis à vis the views expounded by Arifin Bey.

The controversy was reported by IPI Report,³³ which stated Rosihan Anwar had been informed he was to be suspended from membership of the International Press

Institute at the request of Mochtar Lubis, the local chairman, who had himself been under house arrest for more than four years. The action had been taken because Anwar had, the previous December, signed a "nineteen point undertaking" demanded by the Government from editors as a condition for continuing publication. Other editors had closed down rather than sign the document.

Rosihan Anwar's agreement had not saved him from a similar fate, as he had been ordered to close down Pedomam on January 7, and he received the IPI's letter of suspension after he had learned of the Government's order. The IPI asked Anwar to state his case and he had done this, but in the meantime Lubis had replied to an IPI request that he should be named as the instigator of the action taken against Anwar.

In his letter Rosihan Anwar said it had been brought home to the democratic journalist that democracy, in the final analysis, did not rest on the guarantees embodied in the Constitution, but in the awareness of the people of their rights and on their willingness to fight for them. It was the duty of the democratic journalist and Press to keep the flame of democratic aspirations alive in the face of government pressure.

It seemed to him, said Rosihan Anwar, a betrayal of their obligations to the ideal of democracy, and a cowardly

act, for the democratic journalist, in order to keep his hands clean and his reputation unblemished, to close down his paper and sit back with a self-righteous attitude.

On the other side, Mochtar Lubis by implication upheld the traditional Western view that the Press should be uncompromising in its independence and a newspaper should be prepared to face closure and punishment of its editor rather than submit to government dictation.

Anyone reared in the Western tradition of Press freedom must sympathise with this view and respect those who are prepared to suffer for it. No attempt is being made here to champion compromise or the outright acceptance of an ideologically-committed role, but it should be acknowledged that in the circumstances of developing countries these are defensible views of the functions of the Press.

Commitment to the Press's role as a political instrument under guided democracy is consistent with a sincere belief in the ideology of guided democracy itself and probably many editors subscribed to it for the best of motives. On the other hand, acceptance of Press control and association with the regime laid newspapers open to time-serving conformity and debasement which could give rise to the forms of corruption described by Mochtar Lubis

in his lurid but socially important novel, Twilight in Djakarta.³⁴

Lubis and Anwar may be said to have emphasised the Press's function of the expression and formation of public opinion at the expense of its function of national unification. One would like to think both these functions were compatible, but this is an unresolved question and probably lies at the root of the controversy outlined above.

For reasons which have been given earlier, one cannot state that the establishment of representative government is an undisputed function of the Press either.

So, while it is a basic question, the functions of the Press in Indonesia are, in various aspects, in dispute and there can only be stated here what various people have believed them to be, because this provides the only measure of the way the Press in Indonesia works. Even the uncontroversial functions may not be regarded as proper Press functions by some people, but they have been regarded by the people who propounded them as important. They are: 1/ economic development; 2/ modernisation; and 3/ (connected with 2/) orientation of the rural, fragmented, sector of society with the outside world. We may also list the controversial suggested functions: 4/ establishment of representative government; 5/ national

unification; and 6/ (from our point of view the most important) the expression and formation of public opinion.

As to how these functions are fulfilled, we may briefly survey the position.

1/ Economic development. Economic development itself has been minimal and the Press's main concern has been with the direction of national policy - towards national development or towards solidarity, a search for national identity and other goals.

2/ Modernisation. The influence of the Press in this field is more subtle, but its whole tone has no doubt contributed to the partial modernisation of the newspaper-reading public. Politically speaking, this assessment must be qualified by the reservation that the Press has not only expressed, but also consolidated ideological positions, a fact which may have delayed modernisation.

3/ Orientation of rural society with the outside world. Difficult to assess, but probably there has been some slow and limited success, as in other developing countries.

4/ Establishment of representative government. Some sections of the Press have striven to establish, or rather deepen the roots, of representative government. These efforts are, no doubt, continuing, but it will be a long

time before they bear fruit, if at all. In any case, their efforts, while perhaps necessary, have been critical rather than constructive; freedom to criticise has been stressed rather than the maintenance of a democratic constitution.

5/ National unification. In later years the resources of the Indonesian press were devoted to the cause of national unity, at least openly. In supporting particular causes, such as the return of West Irian or confrontation with Malaysia, it seems to have achieved a large degree of success, but later events seemed to show that underlying causes of internal disunity remained.

6/ Expression and formation of public opinion. A function which has some connection with some of those listed above, but which, particularly in the years immediately following independence, assumed a violently partisan character. The function could be expressed as the articulation and aggregation of group interests.³⁵

Because the last function is the one illustrated best by this study, it is regarded as the most important for our purposes and will be investigated in more detail.

Journalism played an important role in its exercise and Pye,³⁶ referring to it specifically, notes its development almost simultaneously with a new awareness of

the outside world in developing countries and a new national self-consciousness. He recalls the importance of direct foreign influence in the early stages of journalism in traditional societies and states that it is only by reference to foreign models with which they were in contact that many of the characteristics of the press in various countries can be understood.

However, the development of the new ideas of nationalist modernists was more important and this was very much so in the case of the Indonesian Press, as we shall see in the historical prologue later.

Pye notes as a result a close union between social and political reform and journalism from the beginning of modernisation. Virtually all early journals in Asian countries had been related to reform movements, he claimed. Certainly Indonesia was no exception in this regard, as again the historical survey later will show.

His comment does not invalidate the argument that it is primarily the character of the newspaper-reading public which determines the character of the Press. Journalists cannot write in a vacuum and readers and writers obviously interact. In the early years, moreover, the readership in Indonesia was probably largely composed of members of the elite itself, as it was very small.

Pye describes the character of the early nationalist press in underdeveloped countries as oppositional, a feature which is related to its reform bias. He continues, "The result of the historical journalistic bias is that as transitional states emerge into independence or into greater control of their own destiny, they have an oppositional partisan press, which finds it difficult to transform itself into the kind of responsible, non-partisan press that the new situation requires."³⁷

Once again, the Press does not operate in a vacuum. Just as the newspaper-reading public primarily determines its political character, so it primarily determines its oppositional, partisan character. It has to be remembered too, that even the elite (in the sense of the modern intelligentsia) has not always been part of the establishment (in the sense in which that word can be used in a colonial, pluralistic society). The elite itself had an oppositional, partisan character in colonial times. Nevertheless, history has, of course, contributed to the character of the modern Press in these regards. Of course, subsequent to the period under review the Press in Indonesia was anything but oppositional and partisan.

The above considerations provide the key to the inability of the Indonesian Press to make much contribution

to economic development. It may also suggest why it often found it difficult in the 1950s to think nationally rather than sectionally.

We shall now consider the relation of these facts to the position of journalists themselves in the modern Press.

Shils³⁸ deals with the present status of journalists and wants them to become "an independent centre of opinion" rather than torn between scandal-mongering and deference to authority, a condition which he ascribes to their small number and dispersion. In Indonesia the Press has tended to be demagogic itself, possibly because the number of journalists employed in the capital has been small relative to the population, but probably more because of a lack of true unity owing to ideological commitment, either personally or by their papers. With a few exceptions, the journalists' dilemma, as described by Shils, has prevented them from exercising the restraining influence by a professional stratum which he advocated.

The historical survey will also illustrate another of Pye's propositions, that "In colonial countries the early press was characteristically in the language of the metropolitan country, with vernacular presses developing later....Moreover, even when the vernacular press came into being it was usually much inferior to the metropolitan-language press."

Indonesia was fortunate in one respect: unlike some Asian countries, e.g., India, it developed a vernacular national language. The Indonesian language was not a ready-made national language in the sense that Burmese, Thai and Khmer were, but it had developed from a lingua franca into a national language by the 1930s and was therefore used by the infant Indonesian Press quite early in its history.

The Dutch ban on use of the Dutch language by most of the indigenous population speeded up the development and use of Bahasa Indonesia and this trend was further accelerated by the complete ban on Dutch by the Japanese during their 1942-45 occupation.³⁹ Another favourable development was the romanisation of the language which had taken place by the time of the Japanese occupation and which removed the difficulties faced by presses elsewhere in supply of appropriate type faces, etc.⁴⁰

Pye,⁴¹ after contrasting the mass Press of Japan with the "largely party or governmental press" of Communist and strongly autocratic states, mentions "guided democracies," such as the U.A.R., Guinea, Ghana and Mali, but considered that Indonesia, which had given the term to the world, had not gone so far in suppression of the Press. He was writing in the early 'sixties, when Indonesia had made the transition to the original "guided democracy."

In the mass media field, and in Indonesia this means predominantly the Press, government control took the form of a growing censorship, the effectiveness and form of which will be discussed later.

As this study is concerned primarily with the ideological character of the Press, or the way it performs its opinion-forming function, some consideration should be given to anti-colonialism and relative tolerance of Communism in non-Western countries, a feature which applied to pre-coup Indonesia perhaps more than most. The tolerance of Communism is despite the fact that religion is the central value of life. There is often no conflict between religion and Communism and sometimes very religious Moslems are also Communists (although as will be seen these two ideologies generally represent opposite poles of the spectrum).

Suggesting the reason for these phenomena, Bruce L. Smith⁴² writes of the jailing of a large proportion of current political leaders in some countries who opposed what they saw as typical Western removal of their natural resources. Considering the Communist emphasis on "liberation," and the fact that the Communists were not in power in any country before 1917 (indeed they depicted themselves as representing the colonised rather than the colonisers), and therefore were not in a position to

exploit, it is not surprising that Communist propaganda is so effective.

The study of Communism in Indonesia is a study on its own. As one of the ideologies with which we shall be dealing it cannot be ignored, although its part in the controversies under discussion was tactical rather than ideological. Its success in Indonesia is no doubt partly a by-product of anti-colonialism, as Smith suggests, but it is also a result of economic underdevelopment, particularly as it affects the lower social strata, e.g. squatters, estate workers, and industrial workers (a small group). One would expect the poorer peasants, who are undoubtedly affected by economic underdevelopment, to also contribute to the success of Communism, but some observers say many of these are too depressed economically to support Communism, and that it is only among peasants who can still see some hope of improvement that it gets much support.

On the other hand, Communist newspaper readers were more likely to be found (in spite of propaganda about workers and peasants) among traditional (in the historical sense) supporters of the party, educated groups frustrated by lack of opportunities.⁴³

Pye looks forward to the day when the pattern of political communication in Indonesia can be reshaped so that provincial leaders will have access to the world of

the national elite and break down the division between local and regional interests on one hand and the central government on the other.⁴⁴ From an earlier comment on South-East Asia in general he appears to think this can be achieved by the spread of literacy stimulating the emergence of professional communicators.⁴⁵

To this writer the chief gain from the spread of literacy is the expansion of the potential newspaper-reading public to include the rural, traditional masses. Although there is a need for greater modernisation of provincial opinion leaders (as well as literates in the capital and other major cities), it seems doubtful whether the emergence of professional communicators is the answer, unless Pye has in mind the greater expression of provincial news at all levels, which is, up to now, sadly lacking.

Pye uses the confusing word "elite" in respect to provincial as well as national leaders, and it is not clear whether he means the elite proper or the wider political public, but from Feith's definition there is hardly such a thing as a provincial "elite." Shils also talks about the elite,⁴⁶ but in this case is more likely to be talking about the elite proper, as he confines his attention to the capitals of the new states generally. If this diagnosis is correct, he is probably justified in including journalists within the elite.

Indonesian Political History

In Indonesia, as in varying degrees in all developing countries, the demands of the 20th Century are being felt and increasingly recognised, although the problems to be overcome in facing this challenge are enormous. The legacy of colonial rule in Indonesia, as elsewhere, is difficult to assess.

The West has come to some countries which have never been ruled by Europeans, such as Thailand, and some would say these countries are making an easier transition than those where Western civilisation has been imposed.

However that may be, colonialism was the medium by which Western civilisation came to Indonesia and the 350 years of Dutch rule, patchy though it was geographically and although for much of the time indirect and remote in its application, had a profound effect on Indonesia's position when she emerged after the Japanese occupation into independence between 1945 and 1949.⁴⁷

While the Dutch were very concerned that their East Indian Empire should run efficiently and introduced modern means of communication, together with a veneer of a cash economy, health and sanitation and education, these benefits were directed in the main towards making it a profitable source of plantation and mineral products.

In an almost obsessive desire to preserve the status quo, the colonial rulers maintained traditional rulers in power in return for co-operation in terms of service and produce from their subjects and the maintenance of law and order. Dutch administrators were attached to the courts of local rulers and formed an additional civil service to the native administrative corps, known in Java as the pamong pradja.

Literacy was low and only a meagre education was obtained by all except the aristocracy until the last years of Dutch rule, and then on a very restricted basis.

This was the environment in which appeared the Indonesian Press, whose development will be described later.

Indonesian society, together with its institutions, may be said to have been in transition since long before the proclamation of independence in 1945. However, following the period of armed struggle, which ended in 1949 with the signing of the Round Table Conference Agreements, Indonesia embarked on a period of parliamentary government, which declined by slow degrees.⁴⁸

The view that developments in the 1950s did in fact represent a "decline" has been challenged.⁴⁹ It is said parliamentary democracy was just a passing phase and its successor, "Guided Democracy," represented more truly the

identity of the Indonesian people. Such a view has been put forward most often by persons with historical or anthropological backgrounds, as well, of course, by politicians.

However, it is arguable, and recent events seem to bear this out, that Guided Democracy was itself a transitional phase in Indonesia's search for identity in the modern world.

The decade of the '50s may be subdivided further. Tendencies which conflicted with the principles of parliamentary democracy appeared in fact quite early and were evidenced by political instability seen in rapid changes of government. In fact, while Parliament in the most democratic period, in the early '50s, probably roughly represented political forces in the country, it was not an elected body, conditions having prevented the holding of elections.

By the time elections were held, in 1955 (largely to restore parliamentary democracy), these tendencies were far advanced and the indeterminate nature of the election results accelerated the breakdown of institutions associated with parliamentary democracy and the growth of political insecurity generally.

The years 1957-59 in particular may be regarded as a period of transition to Guided Democracy, beginning with

President Sukarno's announcement of his "Conception" (Konsepsi) - Communist cabinet membership and a National Council composed principally of functional groups⁵⁰ - and ending with his promulgation of return to the 1945 Constitution by decree.

It is on this decade that the present study concentrates. As mentioned above, the development of the Indonesian Press in earlier years will be summarised in an historical prologue. There will also be a brief epilogue dealing with the Press since 1959.

Much of this introduction has been concerned with background information putting the analysis which is the subject of this thesis in its setting. Much more information could be provided - an attempt at some elaboration will be made in following chapters - and some of it would no doubt add to the reader's knowledge of the Indonesian Press.

In connection with the present study it is, however, important to realise that most of the Press is closely connected with political parties, if not organically, then effectively, and that these parties, as mentioned earlier, represent interests and ideologies, but not policies in the Western sense. They tend therefore to be inflexible and repetitive and this tendency is reflected in their Press. There is little room for manoeuvre.

As to methodology, the writer is particularly indebted to Schramm's study, One Day in the World's Press.⁵¹ Schramm analysed the reactions of 14 "prestige" newspapers throughout the world to events on one day in November, 1956, when the Suez and Hungary crises were at their height. He had the advantage of being able to reproduce them in facsimile where they were in English and in translation using the original layout where they were not.

Obviously important modifications were needed in the present study. The periods covered are of three weeks each; four papers at a time in one country are dealt with; and extensive quotation has replaced reproduction. But the debt is still there.

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Chapter 1 - Press History

The history of the Press in Indonesia can be traced back to the days of the Dutch East India Company when printed bulletins gave official news to the European community.¹

The earliest newspaper proper mentioned by Van der Kroef was Nederlandsch-Indisch Handelsblad, which however existed only between 1828 and 1833. It was followed by the Soerabaiasche Courant in 1837 and the Samarangs Advertentieblad in 1845. The latter was re-named De Locomotief in 1863 and not only employed Indonesians on its staff, but set an important precedent by including articles in the "Indonesian" (presumably Malay) language. De Locomotief, important for its political and social reforms, still existed when Van der Kroef wrote in 1954, but all Dutch-owned newspapers still published closed down in 1958 when Dutch enterprises were expropriated as a reprisal for the Netherlands' refusal to transfer sovereignty in West New Guinea. Also among the casualties was Java Bode, founded in 1852 and in 1954 the largest Dutch paper in Indonesia.²

So it is seen that into a completely traditional society (although one already being forced into the world

economy through the Culture System of growing and levying cash crops) was introduced an alien medium of communication, supplementing that of the travelling merchants and entertainers who had hitherto held the field. Furthermore, the new medium was, in the first instance, in the language of the colonial power and designed to meet the utilitarian needs of the colonisers. At the beginning it was probably hardly read by Indonesians.

The first newspaper for Indonesian-speaking Chinese was founded in Surabaya in 1856 and called Soerat Kabar Bahasa Malayoe ("the newspaper in the Malay language"), but the previous year the first Indonesian paper, Bromartini, had been founded in Soerakarta. In 1860 Slomporet Malajoe ("Malay Trumpet") began in Semarang and Bintang Timur ("Eastern Star" - not the present paper of that name) was founded in Surabaya in 1862.³

Even these Indonesian newspapers had Dutch publishers and their circulation was very small. In addition it was difficult for them to develop normally because of the wide censorship powers of the Government under press control legislation.

Ruslan Abdulgani, who in 1952 was Secretary-General of the Department of Information (he rose to become Minister of Co-ordination of Relations Between the

Government and the People under Guided Democracy) wrote at that time, "The National press was only allowed just to exist, so that the Netherlands Indies Government, as a colonial government which could not possibly be a democratic government, could label itself 'democratic.'⁴

Van der Kroef gives lack of funds, political persecution, and above all the fact that more than 95 per cent of the Indonesian people were illiterate as the reasons for the Indonesian press's precarious existence. He adds, "It probably also explains in part the marked aggressiveness and irritated editorial overtones."⁵

There was an interesting attempt at official support of one of the first Malay language publications run on Western journalistic principles, Bintang Hindia, ("Star of the Indies"), an attempt which backfired. It was a weekly magazine, started in the Netherlands about 1904 by Dr. Abdul Rivai and Lt. Col. Klockner Brousson. Klockner Brousson went to the East to take charge of distribution and translation there. He was supported by the Governor-General, Van Heutsz, who subsidised the periodical and recommended public servants to subscribe to it.

However, Rivai stayed in Holland and introduced a political and social flavour into the magazine which was definitely anti-colonial. As a result in 1907 the

magazine was closed down, but not before he had pointed out the anomaly of liberal democracy not applying its principles to its colonial subjects.⁶

Almost immediately afterwards in 1908 the first Indonesian nationalist movement, Budi Utomo (Glorious Endeavour), was founded. In 1912 the Nationale Indische Partij (National Indies party) was to be formed and one of its founders was a Eurasian named Douwes Dekker.⁷ In 1908, however, he was associated with the Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad (Batavian Journal), which largely through his influence became looked upon as "the voice of Young Java" among Europeans.⁸

The association was one of the first between journalism and politicians which has continued in Indonesia ever since. In fact it was on a charge of journalistic excesses in the party journal, De Expres, that the three leaders of the Indische Partij, Dekker, Dr. Tjipto and Soewardi, were tried and subsequently exiled in 1913.⁹

Another new nationalist organisation, Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Traders' Association), based on Surakarta, founded its own newspaper, Sarotomo ("Guided Force"), in 1912. Its editor was a man named Tirto, but it collapsed within a very short time, according to Van Niel, either

because Tirto had mismanaged the funds or because it cost more than anticipated.¹⁰

Yet another nationalist paper founded in 1912 was Kaum Muda ("Young Society" or "Youth"), started by A. Widiadisastra, Abdoel Moeis and Mohammed Djumas. It was associated with Sarekat Islam, the Islamic Association, which was the new name of Sarekat Dagang Islam, but which now was organised on a wider basis and had more definitely political aims.

Widiadisastra and Moeis were expected to be implicated with Soewardi, of De Expres in "journalistic excesses" and when they were exonerated by the Dutch they lost the confidence of the young nationalist movement.¹¹

The official organ of Sarekat Islam, was Utusan Hindia ("Indies Courier"), which was published by the Setya Usaha Company, of which Hasan Ali Soerati was the head. However, financially its support came from outside groups, originally Arab, but Sarekat Islam lost Arab support and the paper was relying by 1914 upon advertising contributed mainly by Chinese merchants.¹²

The fate of Utusan Hindia reflects the problems faced by early nationalist organs. To reach even the limited readership open to them they required finance which their sponsoring organisations were unable to provide. They

therefore had to depend on support from sources which were often not in sympathy with their aims.

A leader of Sarekat Islam, Hadji Agoes Salim, also became in 1917 editor of a Government-subsidised newspaper, Neratja ("The Balance"), designed to counter the influence of nationalist journals. After World War I, however, he was editor-in-chief of Mestika ("Flower"). Salim became an early Foreign Minister of the Republic.

The Algemeen Nieuws en Telegraaf Agentschap (Aneta) was founded in 1917 as the first news agency in the Netherlands East Indies. It was backed by the Government and was followed by the establishment of foreign news agencies in the country. Partly because of its lack of access to these services, the function of the Indonesian Press was limited mainly to political agitation. Van der Kroef comments that its role in helping to form a "sound" public opinion was virtually nil.

What constitutes a "sound" public opinion under a repressive colonial regime is another matter. It is likely, however, that the historical concentration on agitation hindered the formation of a responsible Press after independence. On the other hand one cannot quarrel with Van der Kroef's conclusion, that "in retrospect it may be said that its [the Press's] main function in the

colonial period was to provide a forum for political ideologues and the programmes of nationalist leaders and to help them and their followers in crystallising their aspirations in a coherent scheme of action."

The Communist revolution in Russia had its impact on the Indonesian Press. About 1918 Darsono, a Marxist journalist, became a free-lancer for Sinar Hindia ("Light of the Indies"), a leftist Marxist daily. However, it was not long before the Communist executive (which at that time must have been very rudimentary - there was no "official" Communist Party in Indonesia until 1920¹³) sent him to Surabaya, to edit Suvara Raja ("The Great Voice"), a revolutionary Socialist newspaper.¹⁴

Meanwhile Sneevliet, a Dutchman who had won sympathy for the Russian Revolution in Sarekat Islam, had been tried and expelled from Indonesia, also on a charge of "journalistic excesses", this time in a Socialist paper, Het Vrij Woord ("The Free Word").¹⁵

A split arose in Sarekat Islam between the old guard nationalists led by Salim and Soerjopranoto and Communist sympathisers left behind by Sneevliet. The split led to the expulsion of the latter, who later formed the Communist Party of the Indies.¹⁶

One of their leaders was Darsono, who in Sinar Hindia (now the organ of the new party), on October 6, 7 and 9,

1920, revenged himself on the old guard nationalist leaders by attacking them and the Sarekat Islam.¹⁷

There seem to be few detailed accounts of the Indonesian Press between the wars, but Mochtar Lubis has included in his general article¹⁸ a pocket biography of Parada Harahap, later a high official of the Ministry of Information and president of the Academy of Journalism, presumably as an epitome of the Press during this period.

Although he began writing reports for a local paper on bad conditions in the plantation where he worked in 1916 his journalistic career may be said to have begun when in 1919 he established his own paper, Sinar Merdeka ("Light of Freedom"). Soon afterwards his activities earned him three months' imprisonment, and in 1922 he went to Jakarta and eventually founded a semi-monthly magazine, Bintang Hindia (to be distinguished from the earlier periodical of the same name) with a capital of \$200.

From this beginning Parada Harahap founded several other papers; too many, in fact, in too short a time. He lost his earlier chain, but survived to establish a daily, Tjaja Timur ("Eastern Light"), replacing one he had lost.

An inkling of the type and quantity of Indonesian Press activity between the wars (remembering that relative to the general population it was still very small) may be

gained from the numbers of nationalist leaders who were active in journalism. They included ex-President Sukarno (editor and publisher of the magazine Fikiran Rakjat ("People's Thought"); ex-Vice-President M. Hatta, a regular contributor to the magazine Daulat Rakjat ("People's Sovereignty"), and Amir Sjarifuddin, an early premier of the Republic of Indonesia, a member of the editorial staff of Banteng ("Wild Buffalo").

As in other colonial countries, journalism was the school for future political leaders, another factor in the politicisation of the Press.

The European and Chinese press ceased to exist during the Japanese occupation (1942-45) and the only Indonesian newspapers published were those sponsored by the Japanese.¹⁹ Only 14 papers were permitted to be published, although Indonesian journalists were encouraged to mobilise Indonesian public opinion behind Japan's concept of a Greater Asia Co-prosperity sphere. Dutch newspaper plants were used to publish the Japanese-controlled Press.²⁰

Abdulgani summarises the position as follows: "The Indonesian press during the Japanese time was characterised by outward development but weakening of its function of giving leadership to political opinion in Indonesian society."²¹

However, in the jungles and mountains mimeographed papers were being produced by nationalist publishers before the end of the war.²²

The revolution brought a division between the Press in Republican territory and that in Dutch-occupied territory. The former supported the revolution, but the majority of the latter made a show of adherence to Dutch rule, although even so the Dutch closed several presses down.²³

However, the Republic, too, continued the tradition of censorship against those newspapers whose views disagreed with official policy. Rather, this is the impression one gets from Van der Kroef.²⁴ Actually, as he admits, censorship was directed mainly against Communist sympathisers during the agitation which led to the Communist attempt to overthrow the Republic at Madiun in Java in 1948.²⁵ It may be argued that any country is entitled to use censorship when it is fighting for its existence externally at the same time as its Government is threatened by violent overthrow from within. Also even the Communist-sympathising Front Demokrasi Rakjat (People's Democratic Front) carried out censorship so far as it was able.

The second Dutch "police action" in December, 1948, forced the nationalist press into the countryside with the guerillas until the negotiations leading to independence.

Questions concerned with relations with the Government became uppermost in the years immediately following independence. The Press in areas controlled by the Dutch throughout the greater part of the revolution still observed regulations allowing censorship and legal action in matters like defamation of character, incitement to unrest and insulting the state and its officers, although the Provisional Constitution guaranteed freedom of opinion.²⁶ Furthermore the Government of the original Republic of Indonesia in Jogjakarta had drawn up a draft ordinance to amend the pre-war Indisch Wetboek van Strafrecht which had largely regulated the Press.²⁷

On March 17, 1950, a Press Commission was appointed to draft proposals concerning:

- 1/ Replacement of colonial Press legislation;
- 2/ Giving the Indonesian Press a firmer socio-economic basis (i.e., credit facilities and possible government assistance);
- 3/ Improvement of the quality of Indonesian journalism;

4/ Adequate regulation of the social and judicial position of Indonesian journalists (i.e., living standards and pay scales, legal protection, journalistic ethics, etc.)

The strongest demand from the Press itself was for financial assistance; the demand was for both direct assistance and for protection from re-establishment of Dutch and Chinese newspapers.

The Government reacted favourably to both demands. It made it possible to grant assistance, especially for procuring improved equipment, paper and financial credit; and took the view that, as Ruslan Abdulgani put it, "the activity of foreign journalism should be restricted, on the grounds...that the policy of freedom of the press and publicity in Indonesia does not imply that foreign newspapers should be allowed to interfere in internal affairs and propagate foreign ideology, which is destructive as regards development of our state."²⁸

However, implementation of the first Government decision did not satisfy the Press. By 1952 Mochtar Lubis was saying that, although Indonesian newspapers were now making a serious effort to import their own printing equipment, they were hampered by high prices, high foreign exchange rates and lack of capital. The Government still

had not provided the nationalist Press with full facilities to work freely and gain strength.²⁹

The weak financial position of Indonesian newspapers was given by Lubis as the reason why they were exposed "to all kinds of influences." While some would not take stands on certain issues for fear of losing readers or advertisers, others let themselves be used by political parties. It is clear Lubis traces political control of the press (as distinct from determination of its content) to lack of financial support from sources other than political parties. While this is no doubt largely true, it seems that other factors mentioned earlier predisposed newspapers to a particular political line and then they found the only way of pursuing that line was to obtain party support.

He does point out that in 1952 few were real party organs and cites Abadi (Masjumi) as an example of these; but he cites Merdaka as being "identified with the old guard group in the PNI" and Pedoman as voicing the views of the PSI. He could mention only a Medan paper, Rakjat ("People"), as being a Communist paper.

However, a more serious problem than that of party control was already beginning to make itself felt; one which, although it did not directly affect until the very

end the controversies which are the subject of this study, increasingly became a backdrop to them and finally stopped entirely their expression in the Press. The problem referred to is that of Press restrictions.

Mochtar Lubis, whose connection with this problem was destined to be so significant, both for himself and for Press freedom in Indonesia, wrote in 1952 that freedom of the Press was frequently violated in practice by government officials, both civil and military. "Newspapermen have been jailed for weeks or months and then released without any lawful process," he wrote. "The situation of the press is especially difficult in areas where there is still martial law. On the island of Ambon and in the Riau Islands newspapers were closed for some time by local military commanders." Lubis said the Indonesian Press fought strongly to preserve its freedom, but was joined by only a few of the Chinese and Dutch papers.³⁰

By 1953 history had already shaped the conditions which in varying degree were to dominate the Press in Indonesia for the next six years: an ideologically orientated content, limited circulation, financial weakness, party control and government restriction. Many of these conditions still apply at the time of writing as the epilogue will show.

In the next chapter we shall look more closely at the general condition of the Press in the years 1956-59, when it had to fulfil its functions in interaction with the dramatic changes described in the Introduction.

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Chapter 2 - The Indonesian Press in General

It is proposed in this chapter to outline some of the general characteristics of the Indonesian Press, in order to provide a descriptive framework for the analysis of particular newspapers.

Press Restrictions

The dominant trend in the Press in Indonesia in the years 1953-59 is the steady increase in governmental restriction.

One observer suggests 1957 as the year which ended development in Indonesia of "some of the liveliest, most reform-minded and enthusiastic national newspapers in any of the emergent nations."¹ Threats, closedowns and take-overs by Government appointees went on rapidly from 1959, the final year of our period.

It is tempting to anticipate a later period, when this trend was still farther advanced, and some reference will be made in an epilogue to those conditions. There is some truth in the contrast drawn between the early and mid '50s on one hand and the early '60s on the other. However, it is already relevant to ask whether the contrast depicted by our observer, a former IPI director, is not overdrawn.

In the first place, although as will be seen, the Press showed some lack of restraint, it was not as free in the earlier period as it appeared. Encroachments on Press freedom before 1953 have already been described. In the summer following the Islamic-Pantjasila dispute (to be analysed) the editors of two newspapers in Bandjarmasin, Kalimantan (Borneo), were arrested, but not for any actions connected with that dispute. Their offence was to publish articles which, it was alleged, insulted local authorities.² They were arrested as a preventive measure, as the law under which action was taken permitted imprisonment without proof of guilt.³ Eventually they were freed as a result of protests by the Indonesian Press.⁴

One of the difficulties of the Press was the ambiguity of Article 171 of the Penal Code, which made liable to penalties anyone responsible for spreading inaccurate news which might create disorder and which the disseminator might have known was inaccurate. However, there is no definition of "inaccuracy" or what was liable to "create disorder", which it was left open to the authorities to be interpreted, possibly in the broadest way.⁵

The Penal Code in general was ambiguous in other respects and some of its other provisions were applied to

the Press. For example, an article of a colonial penal law of 1848 allowed the authorities to take preventive measures if they considered that a crime might be committed or public order might be disturbed and in October, 1953, the public prosecutor in Djakarta used this article as a pretext for the imposition of restrictions (removed as a result of protest) on publication of "inflammatory speeches made in public sessions of Parliament or in public trials calculated to excite public opinion."

Also in 1953 Asa Bafagih, editor of Pemandangan ("Consideration"), Djakarta, was sentenced, and in the following year two journalists from Kalimantan were imprisoned, for refusal to reveal sources.⁶ On this question, however, it is difficult to point the finger of scorn at Indonesia, as it is still a controversial matter in several Western countries. In any case, Bafagih was released following a demonstration by the Press, another example of the Press making a successful stand in its own defence.

A more general measure restricting the Press in 1953, an important year in the history of Indonesian Press freedom, was the instruction of Defence Minister Iwa Kusumasumantri, Minister for Defence in the Government of

Ali Sastroamidjojo which took office in July, 1953, that the circulation of four opposition dailies in detention camps was to be stopped. These camps contained persons detained under the State of War and Siege (Martial Law) regulations which had been in force ever since the Dutch imposed them in 1939, but which were being gradually lifted as a result of the policy of the Government of Mr. Wilopo, which preceded Sastroamidjojo's. The dailies involved were Abadi, Indonesia Raya, Pedoman and Sumber ("Source").⁷

Iwa told Member of Parliament Andi Z. Abidin, of PSI on October 22, 1953, that "...the above dailies publish unconstructive reports and often go so far as to publish intrigues which trouble the situation. They may therefore hamper efforts to achieve the mental restoration of S.O.B. [= Staat van Oorlog en Beleg - state of war and siege] detainees."⁸

After the cabinet's appointment the Attorney-General's office frequently called on journalists from opposition papers to give explanations in connection with reports in their papers, and the official reporting of these explanations often meant the loss of many valuable working hours.

While there was still formal acknowledgement of Press freedom, its actual significance was relative. Already

there was debate as to whether such significance was justified. While an Indonesian writer contended that real acknowledgement of Press freedom must be struggled for,⁹ an outside observer thought that in many respects Indonesia was not yet ready to make use of a free press, "in view of the isolation, illiteracy and persistent traditionalism of so many people in the archipelago."¹⁰

However, this in itself was scarcely a defensible argument. A free Press could have been established and maintained in preparation for the time when the country as a whole could make use of it. More to the point was the likely effect of a free Press on those who were already able to use it.

At all events, there remained in Indonesia a class of Press "offences" which were a thorn in the side of all Press practitioners. It is noteworthy that an article appearing in 1956,¹¹ while pleading for greater freedom for the Press, is limited in scope. For example, it argues that preventive censorship (the action of the Government in "clearing" material before publication) is a breach of Press freedom and therefore of Article 19 of the Provisional Constitution, which stated, "Every person has the right of freedom to hold and publish opinions." However, it makes the curious statement that "repressive" (as distinct from preventive) action does not conflict

with Press freedom. The article makes it clear that "public interest" or self-defence are defences in a criminal libel action by a Minister (a defence which would be impossible under preventive censorship), but it does leave the impression that libelling a Minister is more serious than libelling other people.

It is clear from the article that the law of the Press in Indonesia, especially application of the Criminal Code to the Press, was chiefly concerned with what might be called "political" offences. References to criminal libel (in Indonesian the same word is used for "insult") in fact concern this type of "offence" and they must certainly have constituted a thorn in the side of the Press.

At the end of 1954 the notorious persbredel-ordonnantie (press-suspension ordinance) had been repealed, but were replaced by other laws, but it is not known if they covered preventive censorship.¹² A new law dealing with the whole field of regulation of the Press was submitted to Parliament in 1955, but it was never passed and Press legislation (specific Press laws were still felt to be necessary) was not enacted until recent years.

A Ministry of Information spokesman complained in 1956 that the Press seemed to forget that the country's freedom surpassed all other freedoms. He thought the

Press desired an absolute freedom which quite often ignored the national interest.¹³ In the same year Mochtar Lubis assured an IPI Asian conference that Government pressures on the Press were not part of a deliberate policy. He was probably correct in that Government action was probably a reflection of the attitude described above rather than a carefully thought out policy of muzzling the Press.

He had probably been anxious to present the situation in Indonesia in its best light when he spoke to the conference. He described as "ideal" the conditions under which local journalists were working, but warned them to watch out for potential threats to their freedom.¹⁴ However, as we have seen, potential, if not actual, threats were already present.

It was, however, the Dutch language Press in Indonesia which suffered most in the early and mid '50s from the arbitrary use of obsolete colonial laws. E. Evenhuis, editor of the Surabaya daily Vrije Pers and correspondent of Algemeen Handelsblad, Amsterdam, was arrested and expelled in February, 1954, for writing a report of attacks on a Dutch enterprise. The report was considered likely to incite the population by stating that the Surabaya local government was carrying out a hostile policy towards the Dutch. He was also accused of

endangering public order by his "tendentious and offensive" writings as a whole.

The IPI's Indonesian Committee formally condemned the Government's treatment of Evenhuis as contrary to the freedom of the Press, so the plight of the Dutch language Press was not entirely ignored.¹⁵

In October, 1956, the Army Chief of Staff issued a new ordinance which prohibited the publication of "destructive and provocative" news items. However, application of this ordinance was ameliorated as a result of criticism in parliament and the Press.¹⁶

However, martial law was again declared in 1957 and Government pressures on the Press increased. Not only were papers suspended for political articles, but editors were arrested.¹⁷ Both Left and Right protested at the restrictions, but to no avail. On the other hand Army leaders often thought of the Press as "provocative, divisive, sensationalist and politically motivated."¹⁸ The Army's first action after proclamation of the state of siege was to clamp down on political reporting, first of Army affairs and then increasingly of nearly all other kinds. Temporary closures, bans and arrests of journalists became the order of the day, but the Press did not submit quietly. Because of its life and vitality it

put up a continuous and vigorous battle against the restrictions.

However, the protests had no effect, although (and here again too sharp a contrast should not be drawn between the earlier and later periods) limitations on the daily Press varied from region to region. Press restrictions never did reach the level of totalitarian countries, or even of many other authoritarian countries, as was noted in the Introduction. However, editors had to express their views by increasingly roundabout means and major political issues received less and less discussion in the daily papers.¹⁹

It is estimated that during 1957-58 about 30 Indonesian newspapers were suspended. In addition at least a dozen editors were arrested for publishing material which the Government disliked. Of items of a military nature only those coming from official sources could be printed. Imprisonment was usually without trial and, generally speaking, it was the decision of the authorities, not the intentions of newspaper publishers, that determined what information was to be given to the people.²⁰

In February, 1959, the Minister of Information stated the idea of a free press was long past and was as obsolete as other "liberal democratic ideas."²¹

Already Mochtar Lubis's warning had proved justified in his own case. He was put under house arrest in March, 1957, in connection with the breakaway by Army commanders in Sumatra at that time. In his paper, Indonesia Raya, Lubis had criticised Sukarno for his support of the Left against the insurgents. Following his arrest his paper reminded its readers of his arbitrary imprisonment daily in a boxed notice on Page 1. Following an order from Sukarno to leave out the notice, the paper replaced it by white space where it would have been, plus another gap substituted for the editorial. Within a year Indonesia Raya had been closed four times.²²

Yet, as we shall see, until June, 1959, there was an exception to this general policy of restriction: the dispute on the basis of the state - Islam or Pantjasila. The reason for the Army's long patience on this score is hard to guess, but it is possible there was an important division of opinion on the issue within its ranks. Certainly the Army held a dominant position among the authorities controlling the Press.²³

Government Relations With the Press

Outright restriction is not the only aspect of Government relations with the Press. Of great importance was, and still is, the question of material and financial support and newsprint allocation.

As early as 1951 Ruslan Abdulgani said the Government did everything possible to overcome the Press's difficulties, but one had to take into account factors beyond the Government's control. He added, "For the time being the only solution seems to be in intensive journalism instead of extensive; one has to be selective."²⁴ But on what basis was selection to be carried out?

In 1952 Abdulgani expanded his statement to explain what material help the Government was giving the "national" (i.e., Indonesian as distinct from Dutch and Chinese) Press. It had started in 1950 and covered administrative and financial help to instal presses and newsprint.²⁵

Van der Kroef in 1954 gave as the reason for the continued dependence of the newspaper world in Indonesia on government "its financial insecurity, which has resulted in an extensive programme of assistance or subsidisation by the state."²⁶

It did not emerge at that time that there was to be any Government discrimination in assistance, in spite of Abdulgani's earlier hint. However, from 1955, particularly, the Government tended to grant financial assistance only to those newspapers supporting its policy. Although Indonesia Raya ("Greater Indonesia" - Mochtar Lubis's paper) had been in principle granted credit to bring its

equipment up to date, it did not receive the full amount of the grant. Also the Government decided not to help any longer newspapers whose newsprint supplies it had subsidised in previous years, but to assist those which had not received much help previously. Although this seems just, actually pro-Government papers were usually favoured at the expense of opposition papers as the former were usually more recent. In fact, Press organisations pointed this out to the Government. A further loophole in favour of the pro-Government Press was that the Minister of Information could waive the rule if he wished and if he thought a paper still deserved assistance. Most newspapers protested that the whole Press needed help from the state.²⁷

As Sommerlad has pointed out, direct Government assistance is harmful to the freedom of the Press,²⁸ as the case of Indonesia illustrates. On the other hand where the Press is materially weak it often has little choice but to ask for Government support, although alternative forms of such support suggested by Sommerlad might be tried. The lesson seems to be that a free Press should be able to support itself or it is in danger of being caught in a vicious circle.

Press Responsibility

Did the Government have any justification for the restrictions, open and subtle, which they imposed on the Press?

Irrespective of the exigencies of Indonesia's situation and of any Government philosophy about the functions of the Press, the question arises as to just how responsible the Press was in commenting on the political situation; in other words, how it exercised what freedom it had. The question is bound up with the ideological nature of the Press, but here it is useful to look at its practical expression. Much of what is said generally here will emerge in greater detail and concrete example in the analysis in later chapters, but it may be helpful at this point to look at the position of the Press as a whole in this regard.

The three most obvious channels for expression of opinion were editorials, letters to the editor and a corner of Page 2 and 3 of the paper in which sarcastic comments were written; the last was called the podjok or "corner piece."

Although Ruslan Abdulgani thought the journalistic level of the Press was improving, he also thought the improvement brought with it a sharpening of tone and increasing sarcasm. He described leading articles as

"generally restrained and responsible," but said it was accompanied by "corner journalism," where the tone was "hot and loud." He described this type of journalism as a way of being satirical without the necessity of proof, but with evasion of responsibility. Abdulgani castigated both the butts of the podjok and its readers as members of the elite and thus outside the orbit of the ordinary newspaper reader. While Abdulgani grudgingly praised the humour, he deplored its tendency to become injurious sarcasm.²⁹

That much of Abdulgani's criticism was justified seems borne out by an article in a newspaper which itself carried a podjok as a regular feature. A detailed discussion of the podjok was carried out by a writer named Masmimar in a special number of Pedoman in 1954. He, however, discounted Abdulgani's charge that the podjok had only a limited appeal and also pointed out that corner writings were special to the Indonesian Press. Apparently the podjok was originally confined to community situations, but its sphere was extended to include people's private affairs. Sleeplessness seems to have been a chronic complaint of the podjok victim. As a result of applause, the podjok writer, on the other hand, sometimes succumbed to the temptation of accusing and deriding his subjects and sometimes violated the Code of Ethics of journalism.

The podjok, unlike the editorial, attempted to be as popular as possible, so as to be easily understood by all levels of its readers. Often words from regional and foreign languages were sought by the writer to more exactly fit the situation with which he was dealing. Masmimar asked whether the podjok was the most effective way to deal with such questions as corruption. He suggested a better way to deal with such matters would be to dig up all the facts by investigation and proof and to publicise them boldly in news columns.

Even humour could be included in factual reports, he suggested, depending on the news writer's liveliness in using the facts. Caricature could convey a newspaper's opinion concisely and jestingly. Even an editorial writer could convey his opinions by interesting writing on small problems which needed general improvement. Although the editorial was not the place for a writer to vent passion and insinuation against someone's evils, the same was true of podjoks, which often undermined for the sake of undermining. Masmimar thought readers as well as newspapers should assess whether the podjok was needed or not.³⁰

As will be shown, the Press seemed largely aware of its responsibilities but found it difficult to live up to them in the face of the character of the readership. As a

result there was sufficient irresponsibility to arouse Government antagonism. A picture is sometimes drawn in Indonesia of the Press in Western countries being absolutely free and therefore running riot and endangering law and order. The truth is, of course, that although the Press in Western countries has many faults, freedom has brought responsibility. Responsibility is not due solely to legal and governmental pressures, although these do in fact exist. In Indonesia, on the other hand, the tradition of Press restriction was so long-standing that the Press took advantage of any loopholes and turned liberty into licence.

In this it was encouraged by the ideological character and limited scope of its readership, so inviting continued restriction and perpetuating yet another vicious circle.

It was part of the propagandist nature of the Press that it often failed to distinguish between fact and opinion. Rosihan Anwar, in the same number of Pedoman,³¹ said this added to the tensions already found in society. Anwar made it clear that often it was lack of knowledge which caused journalists to mix facts with opinion, but that there were also journalists who intentionally mixed the two. Readers eventually came to accept this mixture as desirable in a newspaper. Surprisingly, Anwar chose a

fairly responsible paper, not unsympathetic to his own politically, to provide an example of mixing facts with opinion - the Chinese-owned daily, Keng Po. In fact, he agreed that this paper was of good quality.

It was not that Anwar disagreed with Keng Po's opinion, but he thought the reader would draw the same conclusions as those put forward by Keng Po. If Keng Po still wanted to express its opinion, the place to do it was in the editorial and not in the news columns.

Another criticism made by Anwar was of headlines. While it was generally accepted that the headline depicted concisely the contents of a report, some newspapers also made their headlines a commentary on the report. Again Keng Po was singled out for special mention, a speech by Hatta to the Labour Ministry staff being taken as an example.

Anwar claimed the columns of Keng Po clearly showed how reports mixed facts with opinion, thereby actually producing little commentaries and little editorials. If Keng Po did not carry an editorial every day, there were actually each day several commentaries and little editorials on the front page, a fact often forgotten by readers who compared Keng Po with other newspapers. Anwar quoted Keng Po journalists as saying that because they considered readers did not have time to think for

themselves about what they had read they were given guidance and leadership; also they thought the current period was abnormal and there was need for indication as to which was the "true way" (presumably in particular situations).

Anwar likened this "conscious" way of giving information to what he called "guided newspapers," such as those in Eastern European countries, or to the PKI newspaper Harian Rakjat ("People's Daily").

At first the Press abroad had wished for facts only in reports, but with the increasing difficulty of international questions and increasing world unification, scope had been given to the journalist to put forward interpretation also; however, opinion was still regarded as forbidden in reporting.

Discussing the question as to whether mixture or separation of fact and opinion was the better journalism, Anwar stated that two things needed to be acknowledged: journalists remained in the "business of selling words;" and it was readers who decided which journalism and paper they liked.

In a footnote Pedoman invited readers to submit suggestions and opinions (if necessary for publication) on the above problems. Pedoman was evidently concerned to find out which journalism, of the two depicted, readers in

Indonesia liked. Any answers it received, however, might have been peculiar to readers of Pedoman anyway. Readers who like their facts and opinion mixed might have gone elsewhere - say, to Keng Po.

In this as in other aspects of the Indonesian Press, for example, parliamentary reporting, the heart of the matter is whether readers' desires must be followed. It was precisely because of the ideological nature of the readership that the emphasis in parliamentary reporting was on political in-fighting rather than on legislation, particularly legislation of an administrative or economic type like the examples given by Mohammed Sadrie, in a third article in the special number of Pedoman.³²

Sadrie suggested the provisional character of parliament was a cause of readers' lack of interest in legislative activity. He stated there was less desire to know more deeply about laws made by a gathering which did not represent the people. Sadrie thought the present reporting policy and the existing orientation of readers' interests towards parliament could not be continued indefinitely when the coming general election was over and the people had really elected parliamentary members. He considered attention would have to be given much more to the basic problems which were the true tasks of parliament. In this he demonstrated the great expectations held of the

results of the elections, expectations which were not fulfilled. There is no evidence of a change in attitude by either Press or public after the elections, because of the inconclusive nature of the results.

There is evidence from the above of a wide range of acceptance of responsibility, from an aspiration towards objectivity in reporting and reasonableness of opinion as seen in Pedoman itself to the completely propagandist standards of Harian Rakjat. Keng Po was somewhere in between and was probably not much less responsible than many Western newspapers.

Indonesian Journalism: Training and Organisation

The foregoing remarks about restraints and, to some extent, Press irresponsibility might give the impression that journalism in Indonesia was of a poor standard. It is difficult to generalise, but the best journalists in Indonesia reached (as they still do) a high standard.

Merrill, writing in 1964, says, "Many observers say that the Indonesian Press is vigorous, progressive, and in general commendable."³³ However much it may have deteriorated after 1959, this description was certainly applicable between 1953 and 1959.

To achieve a Press of this quality there had to be a core of proficient journalists. Some names stand out: Parada Harahap, who belongs mainly to the earlier history

of the Press, Rosihan Anwar of Pedoman, and Mochtar Lubis of Indonesia Raya have already been mentioned; another notable journalist was Burhanuddin Mohamad Diah of Merdeka, who became Minister of Information in Suharto's Cabinet following the fall of Sukarno.³⁴

Most of these journalists had achieved prominence by 1953; they therefore belonged to a generation which taught itself its craft during the revolutionary period. The first move towards systematic training was made by the Ministry of Information in 1951, by setting up an Academy of Journalism (Akademi Wartawan), but (presumably because it concentrated on theory) it was not widely supported by practising journalists. However in 1954 a private institution was established, according to Van der Veur.³⁵ This would seem to be the institution described in Almanak Pers Indonesia, 1954-1955 as the College of Journalism Foundation (Jajasan Perguruan Tinggi Djurnalistik), designed to train academically qualified experts in the Press and journalism.³⁶

In addition, there was the Press and Public Opinion Institute Foundation (Jajasan Lembaga Pers dan Pendapat Umum) established by the Ministry of Information in 1952 as a kind of Government-sponsored professional body concerned with establishment of Press libraries and a

documentation service, organisation of seminars and provision of teachers of Press science.

According to Van der Kroef³⁷ the Institute's library was inadequate at the beginning because of lack of works on journalism in the Indonesian language, although the Dutch Foundation for Cultural Co-operation (Stichting voor de Culturele Samenwerking) sent several thousand books.

Abdulgani considered journalists should study such fields as political science, sociology, economics, psychology, history and constitutional law. He also advocated travel inside and outside Indonesia and commended the J.P.P.U. for giving an opportunity to all Indonesian journalists and those interested in journalism to equip themselves scientifically. He mentioned the Chair of Journalism at Gadjarda University, Jogjakarta, and suggested an opportunity to take similar action should be given to universities in other places. Indonesian journalism had had the experience of resistance to colonial rule and subservience to Japanese domination, but now needed to adjust to independence, he said.³⁸

Although the Djakarta branch of the Indonesian Journalists' Union (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia) had awarded a prize of Rp. 1,000 (US\$100) in 1951 for the best journalistic work in 1950, there is no evidence the prize was given in succeeding years. Actually it was given in

"recognition of merit" to Mochtar Lubis for an article on Korea, but the prize for the best journalistic work was not awarded because the judges felt none of the work submitted reached the required standard. The donor had offered a similar prize for future years, but interest was small in the first year and it is possible continuing lack of interest caused the offer to be withdrawn.³⁹

One of the attractions of journalism in Indonesia has been its independence of the State, and indeed, despite restraints, it has often been very critical of the Government.⁴⁰ On the other hand, except in favoured positions, material rewards were not so large. As in most places, salaries varied with the size of newspapers, although editors-in-chief of large papers could receive larger salaries than those of provincial governors.⁴¹

On the industrial relations side, journalists were organised in the PWI, founded in 1946 at Solo in Java. For some years its president was Teuku Sjahril, of the Djakarta paper Pemandangan. It numbered approximately 600 members in 1956. There were two proprietors' organisations, the Newspaper Industry Association (Serikat Perusahaan Surat kabar) comprising subscribers to the Antara news agency, and the Indonesian Newspaper Association (Perserikatan Persuratkabaran Indonesia) comprising subscribers to Aneta.⁴²

The PWI was probably the most important of these organisations. It was not so concerned with opposing the proprietors on its members' behalf as fighting for the improvement of the conditions of the Press as a whole, which was probably the most realistic course in Indonesia, as journalists' position was not likely to improve until the Press as a whole was conducted on a secure basis. It therefore urged provision of more newsprint and printing presses. The PWI also assisted in sponsoring the Press and Public Opinion Institute. Like journalistic associations in other countries it was concerned that ethical standards should be established and maintained in the profession, and established a Journalistic Council of Honour (Dewan Kehormatan) for this purpose.⁴³ Prominent figures in journalism and the community were members of this Council, which in 1955 was chaired by Ruslan Abdulgani. Standards were regulated by the Code of Ethics of Journalism, which, however, was not in force in 1953. The decision to draft a new Code of Ethics was taken at a joint meeting on May 1, 1954, of editors-in-chief of all newspapers in the country and delegates of all PWI branches and the Code became effective as from May 1, 1955.⁴⁴

Newspaper Ownership

The question of the ownership of newspapers in Indonesia is a difficult one.

The ideological character of the Press was such that newspapers were often identified with particular parties or groups when they were in fact privately owned. A combination of economic and political factors often made a paper increasingly dependent on a political party and it ended up as a party organ.

A conversation with an Indonesian ex-journalist leads to the conclusion that papers which were relatively independent in 1953 had become, at least in practice, party organs in 1959.

In the issue of Almanak Pers Indonesia for 1954-55,⁴⁵ about the middle of the period being examined, a diagram comparing daily newspapers throughout Indonesia according to form of enterprise gives 78 per cent as company-owned, 14 per cent as individually owned and eight per cent as owned by "foundations" (probably mainly political parties). However, this is a purely formal distinction and the introduction to the statistical section makes the following comment:

...the prevailing realities in the press world are that the press does not like itself to be connected clearly with a political party. Excepting a few dailies whose connection with one of the political parties cannot any longer be

doubted, generally newspapers will become angry if they are said to be mouthpieces of some party. They do not feel bound by a party; they only direct their politics to a party. Therefore if we establish a classification in this way, namely a "party-bound" press and a "party-directed" press, regarding a neutral press as non-existent - because it is well known a press which is 100 per cent neutral does not exist and always there is a political orientation towards some party, we will arrive at a ratio of 3:109. The number of newspapers which are party-bound is actually very small. On the other hand, the figure 109 for newspapers which are party-directed does not give a uniform picture, but varies from strongly directed to only very slightly directed politically towards some party.⁴⁶

Of course, these observations apply to many countries, Western as well as non-Western. It is well-known that practically all newspapers have some degree of political orientation. Lack of official connection with a political party merely means that a paper's political philosophy does not reflect the party line, but represents one of the gradations of opinion often found within a political party. Also, even in the West there are some daily newspapers which are well-known to be party organs. In Indonesia, however, it seems clear political commitment by "independent" papers is stronger than in most Western countries. Approximation to a Western position for such newspapers is probably given by the Almanak's definition of "Liberal:" a press which attempts to determine its course freely.⁴⁷ A diagram comparing daily

newspapers throughout Indonesia according to their "political course" indicated that such newspapers still accounted for 69 per cent of the total.⁴⁸ By this reckoning the remainder were either "party-bound" or so "Party-directed" as to be regarded as committed to some ideology.

Nevertheless, some of the most important papers were regarded in 1956 as mere mouthpieces of political parties. They included Abadi (Masjumi), Suluh Indonesia (PNI), Pedoman (PSI), Duta Masjarakat (Nahdatul Ulama), and Harian Rakjat (PKI).⁴⁹ Merdeka, which the Almanak described as "liberal", an observer in 1956 regarded as strongly pro-PNI; similarly Trompet Masjarakat ("Community Trumpet"), a Surabaya paper, although "liberal" in its political course, according to the Almanak, was described as favouring the PKI by the observer. The observer thought Indonesia Raya, Lubis' paper and one of the few really important independent papers, owed its excellent coverage "in part to good relations with men in the Army top command."⁵⁰

The whole question of party newspapers and "general" (i.e., independent) newspapers was raised in an article by "St. M." (probably Sjamsuddin Sutan Makmur) in the special number of Pedoman mentioned previously.⁵¹ He noted that more and more party newspapers were appearing and defined

them as papers which were financed by a political party and which in their reporting as well as in their editorials defended frankly and to the utmost the political parties which published them.

The party newspaper lived from funds supplied by the party and therefore was not so dependent upon subscriptions or advertising. Harian Rakjat carried few advertisements at all. Party newspapers could compete with "general" newspapers in lowering sales prices as well as advertising rates.

"General" newspapers were newspapers whose reporting covered the widest possible field and did not favour a particular party. But this did not mean they had no clear standpoint or even that they did not support the policy of a particular party. From this definition it is clear "general" newspapers could include "party-directed" papers. However, the standpoint, if it existed, was expressed in its editorial column (or podjok). In news columns standards of objectivity had to be held firmly; in the editorial only was the standpoint of a general newspaper discernible. It is not clear whether the writer was setting an ideal or describing the actual condition of "general" newspapers. From what was written elsewhere about Keng Po, an ostensibly "general" paper, it seems

that some "general" newspapers certainly mixed opinion with their facts.

The writer then describes the position abroad, taking Italy as an example; party papers had flourished there after World War II, but in more recent years "general" papers had gained in influence and importance. He thought the rise of party papers in Indonesia was connected with the atmosphere of preparations for a general election. On the other hand, political parties might be disappointed in their expectation that the Press would have great significance in the election, because in the end victory would be determined by work at the "grass roots" and not by whether parties happened to have their own newspapers.

The papers having the greatest circulation, according to the writer, were "general" and not party newspapers. He did not state, however, whether these were the papers reaching the standards he had laid down. Evidence suggests that the Socialist-orientated Keng Po with its dubious reporting standards had a larger circulation than Indonesia Raya, the more strictly independent and, from the reporting aspect, objective, paper.⁵²

A survey of the independence or otherwise of the Indonesian Press tends to confirm its ideological character. Ideological commitment was a positive value to most readers in Indonesia; objectivity was not. The Press

tended to reflect this attitude in circulation figures and general economic levels.

Circulation and Newsprint

Overall circulation has been touched on in the Introduction. Equally interesting is the average circulation of Indonesian newspapers.

At the end of 1952 there were 66 Indonesian language dailies with a circulation of 369,000 copies, giving an average circulation of 5,590. By the end of 1953 the number of Indonesian language dailies had increased to 71 and the total circulation to 467,000, raising the average to 6,577. In the middle of 1954 the number of dailies had dropped by one, but circulation had increased to 469,050, an average of 6,700. The average improvement of circulation from 1952 to 1953 was therefore 987, and from the end of 1953 to the middle of 1954, 123.⁵³

Figures for subsequent years were as follows: 1955: 78 dailies, 729,600 circulation; 1956: 75 dailies, 741,550 circulation; 1957: 96 dailies, 888,450 circulation; 1958: 79 dailies, 818,200 circulation; 1959, 75 dailies, 857,450 circulation. These figures are for "Indonesian-owned" papers and probably cover a slightly larger number of dailies (including English language ones).⁵⁴ The figures show a rise in both the number of dailies and circulation until 1957, then a drop in both to the end of the period.

Average circulations for these years were as follows: 1955, 9,355; 1956, 9,887; 1957, 9,255; 1958, 10,357; and 1959, 11,428. The most striking aspect of these figures is the fact that in 1957, when the number and total circulation of papers was at the highest for the period, there was a drop in average circulation. The sharp reduction in the number of dailies in the following year improved the average markedly and the conclusion seems to be that in 1957 the number of dailies was too large for the available readership. An average circulation of 9,225 for Indonesian-owned dailies was probably too small economically, but whether this, or outside factors such as Government closures, was chiefly responsible for the reduction in numbers is not known.

The average improvement for the years 1955-59 was 2,173, which is quite dramatic considering there was a decline of 632 over the year 1956-57. Although, of course, this improvement was not large compared with circulation increases in some other countries, it was a great improvement on the situation before World War II, when the highest circulation reached by any Indonesian paper was 5,000, by the Surabaya newspaper Soeara Oemoem ("Public Voice"). There were 42 dailies whose circulation was between 1000 and 5,000 at the end of 1952, a decrease of one the following year and a drop to 28 by the middle

of 1954.⁵⁵ The figure for the end of 1954 is absorbed in the number of dailies with circulations of less than 1000.⁵⁶ These decreases may have been partly accounted for by a steady increase in the number of dailies whose circulation was between 5,000 and 10,000. There were 14 of these at the end of 1952, 15 at the end of 1953 and already 27 by the middle of 1954.⁵⁷ By the end of 1954 the figure had climbed to 31.⁵⁸ Figures for later years are not available, but by 1963 there were very few dailies with circulations of 5,000 or less and most were at least 10,000.⁵⁹

By the middle of 1954 the Ministry of Information was able to report eight dailies with circulations between 10,000 and 15,000, five dailies between 15,000 and 20,000 and two dailies whose circulations were more than 20,000.⁶⁰

On the other hand, the total circulation of all 75 Indonesian-owned dailies in 1959, 857,100, contrasts with the U.S.A. total for the same year of 1,755 dailies with a total circulation of 58,300,000. India's total of 420 dailies with a circulation of 4,281,000 shows, however, that Indonesia's figures were comparable, allowing for the population of India being approximately five times as large.⁶¹

The contrast with the United States is more easily understood when it is realised that one hour's work in California can buy 50 copies of a 40-page newspaper - 2,000 pages, while an hour's work in Indonesia will buy seven copies of a four-page paper - 28 pages.⁶²

The spread of literacy has been dealt with in the Introduction, but growing literacy causes problems. It creates a demand for printing paper (including newsprint) to such an extent that in countries with a very high rate of illiteracy, an increase of one per cent in literacy would probably have the same impact of demand for printing paper as an increase of five per cent in per capita income.

The average consumption of newsprint in Indonesia over 1946-50 was 0.1 kilograms per person; in 1961 it was 0.2 per cent. Although it seems a small increase it is a per capita increase in consumption of 100 per cent⁶³ and increased literacy is almost certainly the chief factor. However, the full impact of the present educational growth on mass media will not be felt until the present generation comes into productive adulthood.⁶⁴

All newsprint during the period under review had to be imported. It was not until later years that paper mills were established in Indonesia. Economic difficulties in establishing plant, rather than lack of

natural resources, were responsible for this situation. There are ample supplies of conifer trees in Indonesia awaiting exploitation.⁶⁵

Pressures exerted by the Government in distributing scarce supplies of newsprint have already been dealt with. Some idea of the cost to the country of importing newsprint in competition with other much needed goods can be gained from the fact that in 1954 Indonesia imported 10,553,751 kilograms gross weight of newsprint at a cost of Rp. 23,413,590.⁶⁶

Layout of Newspapers

Scarcity of newsprint resulted in newspapers averaging from four to eight pages, with four pages being most typical. News appeared on the first page, more news and the editorials (one being the most common number) on Page 2, news and advertisements on Page 3 and advertisements (display rather than classified) on Page 4. Many papers had nine-column pages.⁶⁷

Other Press Problems

The scope of this study limits the aspects of the Press in Indonesia which can be touched on here, and the choice must to some extent be arbitrary. There were, however, some problems of the Press which should at least be mentioned. Many of these are, of course, still

relevant. Wide adoption of the Indonesian language should not allow us to forget that the national motto of Indonesia is "Unity in Diversity" and the country comprises approximately 50 ethnic groups and about 80 regional languages and dialects.⁶⁸ Although most newspapers were produced in the national language there were some published in regional languages.

Also until the end of 1957, when they were forbidden to publish, mainly as a reprisal for the Dutch attitude in the West Irian dispute,⁶⁹ there was a Dutch language Press, still Dutch-owned, but circulating largely among educated Indonesians. There was also, throughout the period, a Chinese language Press, in addition to Chinese-owned Indonesian language papers (including Indonesian language editions of Chinese language papers). Publishers were hampered by these cultural factors, as they limited their readership.

Advertising was scarce in a society in which there was a small commercial middle class and a largely subsistence economy. The result was low advertising rates.

The quality of printing was poor because of the age and shortage of equipment. To cover costs subscription prices were high (papers were sold by periodic subscription rather than as individual copies). As a result many

literate people could not afford them and a large potential readership was lost.

Merrill concludes (writing in 1964, although conditions had not substantially changed since the period with which this study is concerned) that there was "just not enough political and economic stability, nor enough literate citizens, to support a strong and independent Press."⁷⁰

Effect of the Press

Given this situation, what then was the effect of the type of Press which existed in Indonesia? Drs. Marbangan thought that although the daily Press made the exercise of democracy possible it also formed one of the greatest threats to democracy.⁷¹ The reason was that the educational function of the Press was crowded out by the function of forming public opinion. Such a function could be used by political parties to form a public opinion according with their respective ideologies, so that instead of one there were various "public opinions."

Marbangan's idea that there could ever be one public opinion seems rather unrealistic, but he is probably correct in stating the opinion-forming function crowded out the educational function of the Press, thus preventing the creation of an informed public opinion.

He justified his belief that in that situation it was difficult for the truth to "flash out" from the collision of various opinions because these opinions were put forward, not with a desire to reach the truth, but with a desire to push them forward as the only truth. Of course, every political persuasion is entitled to advance its own views as forcefully as it can, but if it does so in the conviction that its views amount to a revealed religion the result is likely to be political anarchy.

Such a situation causes the reader to ask what the truth really is. Although it could lead him to desire to know more, it could also subject him completely to the influence of the paper he read. As the general election approached, so the party struggle, reflected in the Press, increased in violence. One-sidedness and sensationalism became the rule and the newspaper-reading community was in confusion.

In general readers were grouped around opinions put forward by the newspapers which they read. They uncritically accepted their papers' analyses and as a result, without becoming party members sometimes became more fanatical than party members themselves.

The openness of each man to be influenced was realised by the parties, who used their influence through

the Press. Politics made a Press, free to fulfil its task as an educator, no longer possible.

It might be thought these questions faded into the background in the "regional" (i.e., provincial) Press. Actually a feature of the Press in Indonesia was its pre-occupation with national and ideological questions, so that in the regions there was little difference in content from Djakarta and other large cities. Already we have noted this in connection with parliamentary news, but as long ago as 1952 Abdulgani commented on the same phenomenon in the coverage of the Press generally.⁷²

In fact, he stated, the only difference between the papers of Djakarta and other cities and those of the regions was that the former sometimes had news from their own correspondents while the latter were for the greater part completely dependent on news agencies, because it was far too expensive for local papers to have correspondents in Djakarta. It might be added that from Abdulgani's description apparently it was too expensive for them to have local reporters too.

As a result the local Press never mirrored the local situation and so did not fulfil its function. Not that there was any lack of material; often a paper could be closer to its readers by discussion of local problems than by pre-occupation with national questions. A newspaper

could be very important in correcting maladministration in local government and in organisations in the region.

"Centre" newspapers could hardly be expected to have any more interest in local problems than regional papers. It was only when a centre paper journalist visited a region that articles about difficulties of the region appeared. Out of commonsense and commercial considerations, a centre newspaper would not very easily send a journalist to an area where there was no proof that enough readers existed to make the visit worthwhile, even though there should be enough important news affecting readers outside the area. Neither the regional Press nor centre papers gave enough attention to regional affairs; they only did so by way of variation. Abdulgani admitted that while the diagnosis and policy of the central government might be very good, this diagnosis and policy did not always penetrate to the regions and their local government apparatus; when this penetration did not occur there would be something wrong with the State.

The Press filled a very important function as a forum of public opinion for millions who were not connected with any organisation. Total readership in a region would increase when papers occupied themselves with its local affairs. At present it was more profitable for regional

citizens to read papers from centres which generally speaking had a broader view, more variety, and speedier despatch and delivery than regional newspapers.

Since the War there had been too much concentration on political affairs without any interest in the day to day affairs of one's own area. The Press could make itself more useful by restoring the balance of news.

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Chapter 3 - Choice and Description of Papers

The papers to be analysed were chosen on: a/ degree to which they represented the main currents of political opinion, and b/ availability. Also it was thought desirable, though not essential, to maintain the continuity of papers, through both selected crises, if possible.

It was decided the main currents were: 1/ Nationalist; 2/ Communist; 3/ Religious (preferably Moslem); and 4/ Socialist. It will be observed that this is not a reflection of the party position in Indonesia during the years 1953-1959, particularly after the 1955 elections, when there were two large Moslem parties and Socialism, as used in the restricted sense of democratic socialism, was represented only by a minor party. However, the importance of the last mentioned party was out of proportion to its numerical strength and despite serious differences the two Moslem parties were sufficiently alike to make a division of the Religious stream unjustified in this context.

Choice of the Moslem paper lay between Duta Masjarakat (NU) and Abadi (Masjumi). Neither was easily available, but it proved possible to purchase the relevant runs of Abadi on microfilm from Cornell University. Abadi was the party organ of Masjumi, and although its fortunes

waned with that of the party, it could still be regarded as representative of Moslem opinion on the basis of the State.

The Nationalist paper chosen was Merdeka. Merdeka was a large and influential paper, but it was not a party organ ("party-bound") and it was not an orthodox PNI supporter. However, apart from availability, its stand on the basis of the State was so similar to official PNI policy as to be virtually identical with it.

Pedoman was always regarded as closely associated with the PSI, even though formally it was privately owned. Like Merdeka and also Sin Po it was easily available and so, given the appropriateness of including the Socialist current, was eminently suitable for selection.

Finally, Sin Po was chosen as representing the Communist "current" on similar grounds to the choice of Merdeka. Harian Rakjat, the PKI organ, was difficult to obtain when analyses were being written and in 1953 it was a relatively obscure paper. Sin Po was Chinese-owned, but this fact was incidental in its choice. While not a party organ, its increasingly pro-Peking sympathies drew it close to the PKI. If it had a party affiliation it was probably to Baperki, which, like other similar bodies in Indonesia, was strictly speaking not a party at all. Baperki was an abbreviation for Consultative Council on

Indonesian Citizenship, an organization for Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent; however, it secured election of some of its members to parliament and functioned as a political party. On the other hand, it was so influenced by Communism as to be virtually the Chinese wing of the PKI - its affinity was far closer than that of the national-communist Murba Party, for example.

In the event, all the chosen papers were available for both crises. If some did not have the same importance in both crises, at least by maintaining some continuity they gave a better basis for comparison than different newspapers could have done, even though there were probably subtle changes in the newspapers' policies.

We turn now to a description of the newspapers themselves.

Abadi

Abadi, which could be translated "Eternity," was founded in 1951,¹ so was still quite a new paper at the time of the 1953 Islamic-Pantjasila State controversy. Generally regarded as the mouthpiece of Masjumi, the principal Moslem party at the time, it could be expected to support the concept of an Islamic State.

Its managing editor at that time was M. Tasrif and its circulation was 8,000,² which was round about the average for Indonesian dailies then (see previous chapter).

By 1955 it had risen to 17,000 (according to the Ministry of Information).³ The news coverage of national and international events was good and the style of the paper's own writing (as distinct from that of contributors and correspondents) clearer and more forceful than that of many other Indonesian papers. Although certain parts of the paper were devoted to religious articles of a didactic type, the general tone of the paper was such as to appeal to the general reader.

Pungent features such as the cartoon devoted to one "Pak Djenggot" (literally "Father Beard"), and the podjok supposedly written by him, appeared regularly, and advertising and other items were similar to those found in any other Indonesian newspapers.

At the outset it must be said the paper gave much more space one way and another to various aspects of the controversy than any other analysed. The amount of attention given suggests more interest in the subject within the Islamic community, which presumably formed the bulk of the paper's readers, than in other sections of the population. Figures of the distribution of Abadi are not available, but much news and correspondence was centred on West Java and it is reasonable to assume that it received greater support in this strongly Moslem region than, for example, in Central Java, where the santri (orthodox)

element forms a minority. Indonesian, particularly Javanese, socio-religious categories and the work of Geertz in connection with them, have been discussed at some length in the Introduction, where also their bearing on the political situation was given some attention.

The eight-column layout of the pages gave more spaciousness than other papers displayed. Apart from this the paper was quite orthodox in layout, with double column spreads for introductions, medium headlines and frequent use of pictures.

Advertising in Abadi was almost entirely confined to the back page, about 200 column inches. The retail price of Abadi was Rp. 0.75.⁴ Its publisher was given as N.V. Penerbitan "Hidup," but all observers seem to agree that it was in fact the Masjumi party organ.

As Abadi was read on microfilm, measurements, which with other unattributed facts were taken from the paper itself, are approximate.

Merdeka

Merdeka ("Freedom" or "Independence") was founded on 1 October, in the year 1945 according to Almanak Pers Indonesia⁵ (although the date printed in the newspaper itself looks like 1943). The former seems the more likely date, judging by the title, which would be additionally

appropriate considering the date was six weeks after the proclamation of independence on 17 August. Thus by 1953 it was still only eight to ten years old.

It was founded, as each issue reminds the reader, by B.M. Diah, who, from various references, seems to have been managing editor for the entire life of the paper.

The circulation in 1953 was 11,000,⁶ which was well above the average for daily newspapers in 1953. By 1955 it was 20,000, according to the Ministry of Information.⁷ Merdeka was roughly average among Indonesian newspapers in its degree of objectivity at that time. As mentioned earlier, Merdeka was known to support the PNI.

Its retail price for a single issue was Rp. 0.65 in 1955,⁸ but by 1959 the price had risen to Rp. 1.-.

It was published by N.V. Merdeka Press and consisted of the usual broadsheet of four pages. These were of nine columns each and included an editorial. The front page was well designed with a good use of boxes and pictures, which were of good quality. The leading paragraphs often ran across more than one column. Page 2 devoted about a third of its space to advertising, about a half of Page 3 was also taken up with advertisements and Page 4 was entirely an advertising page, except for a serial strip half way across the bottom.

Pedoman

Pedoman (the name means "Guide" or "Compass") was founded in 1948.⁹ Its circulation during 1953 was 16,800¹⁰ which was roughly five per cent of the total circulation of Indonesian language dailies at the end of 1952, 369,000, as stated in the previous chapter. It had risen by 1955 to 30,000 (according to the Ministry of Information).¹¹

After the Indonesian editions of the Chinese-owned Keng Po and Sin Po, Pedoman had the largest circulation of any Indonesian language daily in the country. This perhaps reflected the large measure of support which was still given by the newspaper reading public to the PSI.

The retail price of Pedoman in 1955 was Rp. 0.70.¹²

It was published by N.V. Badan Penerbit "Pedoman" and the chairman of the editorial board was Rosihan Anwar. The other members of the board (in 1959) were the well-known public figure Soedjatmoko and Sanjoto Sastromihardjo. The paper was under the "management" of A.K. Loebis, not to be confused with Mochtar Lubis (same pronunciation) of Indonesia Raya.

Considerably more space was given to the 1959 controversy than to the one in 1953. Pedoman shared with other dailies the characteristic four-page format, with a front page featuring bold headlines, usually two-column

introductory paragraphs for the more important stories and four or five pictures, in this case of good quality. Page 2, however, often had three double column editorials, together running the length of the page. It also covered less important home news, including sport and finance. Page 3 was devoted to home and overseas general news, the podjok, half a page of advertisements and a serial. Page 4 consisted entirely of advertising.

The layout was more attractive than that of many Indonesian papers, the principal feature being seven-column pages, giving a much more spacious appearance.

Sin Po

Because it was far older than any of the other papers analysed, an outline is given of the history of Sin Po.

It was founded, according to itself, in 1921. However, Kwe Kek Beng, in an article in Cultureel Nieuws,¹³ stated the paper celebrated its 40th anniversary on 1 October, 1950. A change of name may explain the discrepancy.

Kwe stated the paper was very mild when it first appeared in 1910, but after the proclamation of the Chinese Republic in 1912 more colour and life was noticed in it. For a short time the newspaper was directed by an ex-Government official, J.R. Rayoux Kühr, and the

implication seems to be that the Government put him there to make the paper more docile.

Later on, the paper was again regarded as fiercely Chinese-nationalistic, but it had good relations with the Indonesian independence movement. Kwe stated Sin Po was the first newspaper to consistently use the word "Indonesië" in its columns and that one of its staff members was Soepratman, composer of "Indonesia Raya," the Indonesian national anthem, but he did not say when this was.

The paper had followed events in China and when Chiang Kai-shek seemed to spend more time and energy in trying to destroy the Chinese Communists than in trying to save the country from the Japanese, Sin Po had fiercely criticised him. One day the office had been painted with tar and red paint.

When in 1937 war broke out between Japan and China and Chiang Kai-shek resisted the Japanese, the tune of Sin Po changed, presumably to a pro-Chiang one, until the Japanese conquered the Netherlands Indies and changed the paper's name to Kung Yung Pao. Almost all the staff were interned and the non-interned had to go underground. After the Japanese surrender Sin Po reappeared.

There was a Chinese language as well as an Indonesian edition. The paper fully supported the Chinese People's

Republic and aligned itself with Sheng Hwa Pao, a newspaper appearing just after the War, which was from the beginning Left-orientated.

Go Tiau Goan was the managing editor of the Indonesian language edition, but the paper as a whole was under the management of Ang Jan Goan.¹⁴ The circulation of the Indonesian edition was 18,000 in 1955.¹⁵ It is interesting to note that 74 per cent of the distribution was outside the city (presumably Djakarta) compared with 26 per cent inside.¹⁶ It is perhaps difficult to assess the influence of Sin Po in 1953. Its circulation was one of the largest, yet its Left wing orientation was not very influential in governing circles. Unfortunately there are no figures available showing the numbers respectively of ethnic Indonesian and "peranakan" (Indonesian-orientated) Chinese readers, but the former were probably a minority. By 1959 the political situation had changed completely and Sin Po was a Government supporter on most issues.

It can be said that Sin Po had not developed the fully partisan approach which characterised the other main Left wing paper, the Communist Party's official daily, Harian Rakjat. This is fairly well illustrated by the Islamic-Pantjasila dispute, when Sin Po's line is almost identical with, although perhaps a little more "popular" than, that of Merdeka in absolute terms.

The type of news and advertising content in Sin Po is not very different from that in Merdeka. The front page featured bold headings and a broad layout, with leading paragraphs often running across more than one column. Advertising space was great for a four-page paper: it occupied the whole of Page 3 and most of Page 4, where there was also a serial story. The paper had a slight Chinese bias, but its news was set in an Indonesian context. There was a liberal use of good quality pictures. Apparently by 1959 there were "lunch" (siang) and "late afternoon" (sore) editions. Some issues of the paper in the middle of May, 1959, had narrower pages.

Between the two controversies there was a change of managing editor: in 1959 he was Kwa Sien Siau. Also an editorial had appeared, although there was none in 1953.

The retail price of Sin Po was Rp. 0.60 per copy in 1955¹⁷ and it was published by N.V. Pertjetakan "Sin Po."

Particulars of Sin Po in the 1950s relate to the Indonesian language editions.

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15. Cultureel Nieuws Indonesië, 1953, Persnummer 26-27, p.671.
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Unless otherwise cited, the source of information in this chapter is the newspaper concerned.

Chapter 4 - Choice and Description of Controversies

In practice, the choice of controversies, and hence the periods to be covered, determined the choice of newspapers to be analysed. It would have been impossible to choose the newspapers without knowing which periods the relevant issues had to cover.

Three weeks was decided upon as a convenient period for each analysis. Although the period was arbitrary and imposed limitations upon the controversies, it proved practicable, although not particularly easy, to decide upon a three week period during which each controversy was at its height. A description of the controversies will make it clear that they were not limited to these periods.

A list of crises was drawn up and attempts were made to pair them according to subject. Apart from those actually chosen there were the issue of Mutual Security Aid (January-February 1952) and the question of U.S. Foreign Aid in 1963; the storm in the Army (September-October 1954) and the Army and the PKI (1961); the Anti-Communist arrests of August 1951, and the '45 Generation and "Sukarnoism" (1964). There were also the following controversies which it proved impossible to pair: appointment of the Djuanda Cabinet and Sukarno's

"Conception" (1958), "Retooling," etc., May 1961, 1964 party strife (rationalisation, unification, etc., of parties) and 1964 educational controversies.

Quite early, the first pair was decided on as suitable, and periods for analysis pinpointed, namely 14 April to 5 May, 1953, and 13 May to 3 June, 1959, inclusive. However, at that time it was envisaged that two pairs of crises would be analysed and finally the two controversies on relations with the United States were chosen. As explained in the Introduction, limitations of time ultimately restricted the analyses to the first pair, with consequences which have determined the direction of the whole of this study.

Pinpointing of the 1953 and 1959 crises was not quite so difficult. The 1959 case, particularly, was relatively clear cut. The final controversy on the return to the 1945 Constitution, centring on the votes in the Constituent Assembly was chiefly concerned with the issue of the enforceability by the State of Islamic law on believers. The controversy culminated in the June 3rd military ban on political activities, which significantly stipulated that only official statements on the 1945 Constitution could be published. The period 13 May to 3 June was thus a convenient one for the dispute.

The 1953 period was a little more difficult to narrow down. Although reaction to Sukarno's Amuntai speech (see Introduction) increased slowly and as gradually tapered off at the end, the greatest controversy occurred at the beginning and end of the period of the controversy, say 13 February to 4 March and 14 April to 5 May. Of these two it was decided the second was the better as Press comment seemed to come to the fore more, and there was greater diversity of opinion, when the dispute was linked with the beginning of the long election campaign at that time.

Ideological Basis of Islamic-Pantjasila Disputes

Historically, the ideological basis of the disputes between those seeking a religious foundation for the State and those wanting a secularistic one can be traced back to the last days of the Japanese occupation in 1945.¹

The Japanese set up an Indonesian Independence Investigation Body (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Kemerdekaan Indonesia). Its discussions marked the beginning of the controversy. In these debates Soekarno represented the secular nationalists and was supported by representatives of other non-Islamic groups; Abdoel Kahar Moezakkir of the Islamic group is also named by Noer as a supporter, but he seems rather (judging by his later actions) to have played a compromise role. The champions

of Islamic ideology were Ki Bagoes Hadikoesoemo of Moehammadijah, Kijahi Wahid Hasjim of Nahdatoe Oelama and Kijahi Ahmad Sanoesi of Persatoean Oemmat Islam Indonesia. (It will be noted that many of these names changed their spelling after the transfer of sovereignty at the end of 1949). It was during the debates that Soekarno produced the five principles of Pantjasila. Thirty-eight members of the Investigation Body who are also members of the Tzeio Sangi In (the Japanese-named Central Advisory Council) were present at a meeting of the latter body which set up a nine-man committee, including four persons belonging to Islamic political groups and five others (including Soekarno and Hatta).² Moezakkir was also a member of this committee and he proposed that in the new state Moslems should be obliged to observe Islamic laws. Maramis, a Christian, accepted this compromise on behalf of the non-Islamic groups and the proposal was given the form of the Piagam Djakarta (Djakarta Charter) on 22 June, 1945. The Charter was signed by all nine of the committee members. The original Charter contained the phrase that the State would be based on "Divine Omnipotence, with the obligation for Moslems to observe Islamic laws.

However, this was only the beginning of the long and involved history of the Charter. When the Investigation Body met in its second session in July, 1945, it rejected

the Djakarta Charter as the preamble of the draft constitution. On the other hand, although it drafted another preamble, it retained the principles of the Charter, including the compromise formula mentioned above. When the Body discussed the articles of the draft constitution itself, difficulties arose over the religion of the chief of state, which Moslems said should be Islam, a claim which was opposed by both secular nationalist and Christian members. Moslems also were not satisfied with the mention in the preamble of observance by Moslems of religious duties; they also wanted provision to be made for it in articles of the Constitution. Finally Soekarno persuaded his supporters to agree to Islamic demands and the draft constitution seemed satisfactory to the Moslem representatives.⁴

Early in August, 1945, however, the Japanese appointed the Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence) to replace the Investigation Body and to complete final preparations for independence. On this committee they appointed only two Moslems: Ki Bagoes Hadikoesoemo and Kijahi Wahid Hasjim. Although these were both influential leaders within their organisations (Moehammadijah and Nahdatoel Oelama respectively), as well as being extremist

ideologues, they lacked training in politics compared with their secular nationalist fellow Committee members.

Soekarno added five more members to the 20-man Preparatory Committee following the Indonesian proclamation of independence on 17 August, 1945. They included one person who had been the leader of a pre-war Islamic political group, Kusman Singodimedjo. However, he had never played an important part in the pre-war nationalist movement and Soekarno probably chose him for the position in order to rally behind the proclamation members of Peta, the Japanese-controlled auxiliary force in which Kusman was a garrison commander.

Finally, the 1945 Constitution had the Djakarta Charter as its preamble, but the all-important compromise formula was not included either in letter or in spirit. To quote Deliar Noer, "Even the word Allah, the specific name for God as used by Moslems, was replaced by Tuhan. [Tuhan also means God, but it does not touch the hearts of Moslems as does the word Allah]".⁶ The remarkable thing is that Moslems did not protest. Apparently they felt protest was useless because other representatives outnumbered them, and also because thorough and careful discussion and "confrontation of ideas" was impossible in the conditions of that time.

However, not only the Islamic representatives, but other Moslem leaders, were disappointed with the result of the Preparatory Committee and Kahar Moezakkir in December, 1957, told the Constituent Assembly (then meeting to frame a "permanent" constitution), that the agreement, the Djakarta Charter and provisions in the July, 1945, draft Constitution favouring Islamic principles, had unilaterally been revoked by the secular nationalists. Ki Bagoes Hadikoesoemo expressed his disappointment with the result of the Preparatory Committee at the Moehammadijah Conference of Consuls (Madjelis Tanwir), which was in session at Djokjakarta.

Soon after the independence proclamation, however, Moslems were aware of Dutch determination to return as colonial rulers and they deferred the controversy, hoping the general election, originally planned to be held six months later, would result in an Islamic victory.⁷

Sukiman, chairman of Masjumi, said soon after the party's formation that whoever controlled the State and its apparatus would be able to realise his ideals physically and spiritually.⁸ Early in 1946 the party issued its action programme, calling for the "realisation of the Islamic ideology in state affairs in order to be able to establish a government structure based on democracy and a society based on justice in line with

Islamic principles." On the other hand, it called for deeper and firmer realisation of the principles laid down in the existing Constitution in order "to found an Islamic society and state." The action programme supported the holding of direct general elections.⁹

On 6 June, 1947, a new Masjumi manifesto expressed the opinion that the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia was founded on principles "agreed to by Islam or not contrary to the principles of Islam." The manifesto also again considered it Masjumi's duty to strengthen and maintain the principles of the Constitution.¹⁰ According to Noer, Moslems generally considered the Republic of Indonesia to be an Islamic state and Pantjasila, especially its first pillar, Divine Omnipotence, was interpreted from the Islamic point of view.

Mohammed Natsir, one of the Masjumi leaders, maintained this tolerant attitude towards Pantjasila even in the first years after transfer of sovereignty. When Natsir visited Pakistan in 1952 he described Pantjasila "as the spiritual, moral and ethical foundation of the state and the nation."¹¹ In the 1953 dispute also, as it will be seen, he held a compromise view, as he did also before establishment of the Constituent Assembly.

Noer does not think Natsir's rejection of Pantjasila in 1957 constitutes a reversal of this view.¹² The Five

Principles as Natsir explained them were interpreted in terms of the Koran, but in debates in the Constituent Assembly he referred to Pantjasila as defined by the "secularists." Sukarno made a speech at a meeting of the Movement for the Defence of Pantjasila at the Palace in Djakarta on 17 June, 1954, which suggested that the first principle, Divine Omnipotence, was a human creation. As Sukarno was known to champion a secular state, Natsir concluded that "for a secularist the question of Theism, even the question of Divine Omnipotence, has nothing to do with revelation; for him, the existence of God is the [sic] changing creation by man."

Natsir regarded Nazism as one of the dangerous consequences of secularism and argued that a secular Pantjasila made no sense to the minds of Indonesian people, of whose activities religion was the mainspring.¹³ Although Natsir held an Islamic interpretation of Pantjasila itself, he did not agree with Sukarno that Pantjasila was a rallying point for all communities in Indonesia. He mentioned in this connection Communists, who could never agree to the first principle, despite their support in the Constituent Assembly for its passage. The kernel of Natsir's view seems to lie in his statement that in itself Pantjasila had no sense; it should always be related to the substance of an existing ideology. As

Pantjasila, as championed by Sukarno, purported to be neutral towards all ideologies, Natsir considered this to show that it lacked substance.

In addition, Natsir said the Constituent Assembly was a forum for sincere orientation on living ideas on society, demanding frank clarification of members' respective standpoints.

Natsir said the Assembly should draft a Constitution which would be "unassailable even until the time of the following generation." Therefore, he would not agree to another provisional constitution, partly because of his feeling of responsibility to the next generation and partly because of his conviction of the merits of Islam as the basis of the state, intrinsically as well as because of the Islamic majority in Indonesia.¹⁴ It is not known how far he was influenced by ulamas (Moslem scholars) on this question, but their standpoint would only have reinforced his already established opinion.

These ulamas came from Natsir's own party, Masjumi, as well as from their own particular party, Nahdatul Ulama. They would not tolerate any other basis for the State but Islam and some of them even considered it forbidden by the Sacred Law for a Moslem to support other ideologies.¹⁵

1953 Islamic-Pantjasila Dispute

There were two reasons why Masjumi could not consider adoption of the 1950 Provisional Constitution to be a side road towards attainment of power and a change in the basis of the state. Firstly, they agreed to it only on condition that it would in fact be a provisional constitution and that in general elections all people could express their views as to the kind of state they wanted. Secondly, as typified by Natsir above, most Masjumi members believed, at the time the Constitution was approved, that Pantjasila was not in conflict with the aim of an Islamic state.¹⁶ Indeed, in Natsir's opinion it was only lack of real content that made Pantjasila unacceptable in later years. The 1950 Constitution, like the 1945 Constitution and the short-lived 1949 Constitution of the United States of Indonesia, was based on Pantjasila.

It was on 27 January, at Amuntai, South Kalimantan, a strongly Moslem area, that President Sukarno commented on a banner which asked, "Indonesia: a National State or an Islamic State?" He was reported to have said: "The state we want is a national state consisting of all Indonesia. If we establish a state based on Islam, many areas whose population is not Islamic, such as the Moluccas, Bali, Flores, Timor, the Kai Islands, and Sulawesi, will secede.

And West Irian, which has not yet become part of the territory of Indonesia, will not want to be part of the Republic."¹⁷

Even then, top Masjumi leaders did not disapprove strongly. Sukiman, the Masjumi chairman, suggested to party members at Medan on 2 March, 1953, that the problem should not be overstressed and said it was a Moslem brotherhood internal problem to be settled "by Islamic methods."¹⁸ Natsir referred to the ignorance of many people about Islamic ideology. He thought the terms "national state" and "Islamic state" had created confusion and said Islam had adopted a tolerant attitude on this question; there was an obligation on every Moslem to uphold religious freedom and to protect other religions, he said.¹⁹

However, another Masjumi leader, Isa Anshary, chairman of the West Java region of Masjumi, objected strongly to Sukarno's speech. He sent a note to the Government declaring the speech to be undemocratic, unconstitutional, and in conflict with Islamic ideology, an ideology which was professed by the great majority of Indonesians.²⁰ The ambiguity of this last statement has been discussed in the Introduction. A number of Moslem organisations also protested, including the GPII

(Masjumi's youth organisation), Nahdatul Ulama and the Front Muballigh Islam of North Sumatra.²¹

On the other side, a number of PNI leaders claimed Sukarno had special prerogatives because he was a revolutionary leader and inspirer of his people as well as constitutional chief of state. They said there was a danger to democracy in oppression of minorities, meaning in this case Indonesian Christians, who had strongly expressed fears about their future in a possible Islamic state.²² They did not, for fear of embarrassment, refer to their own objections as secularists, because they were nominally Moslems (see Introduction).

Natsir regarded the question as one of interpretation of Pantjasila and said not one of the interpretations of its formulations had a monopoly, mentioning that he also had a right to his interpretation. Also he believed that the leaders and other public figures who had participated in the formulation of Pantjasila (he evidently did not ascribe formulation to Sukarno alone), of whom "the majority" were Moslems, would not have justified a formulation which clearly contravened the principles and teachings of Islam. Taking each of the Five Principles of Pantjasila in turn, and comparing them with the teachings of the Koran, Natsir asked how the Koran could à priori be in conflict with them. On the other hand, the matter was

quite different if the Five Principles were merely lip service; Natsir concluded, What remains [of Pantjasila] is its framework, which can most easily be applied to cover up activities which are tanpa sila (without principle).²³

The point is now reached at which the analyses begin. On 12 April a number of Moslem leaders of various parties spoke at a Djakarta rally on the occasion of Mi'radj, the Prophet Mohammed's Ascension to Heaven. Anshary was one of them but his speech was given just before the opening of the period covered by the newspapers to be analysed. He said:

In Indonesia at the present time there is a cold war between Islam on the one hand and on the other those who call themselves Islamic and are not. The central question is whether the state is to be based on God's law or not.

Anshary continued that the Islamic State, as established by Mohammed himself, ensured generous protection of their religious rights of Christians and Jews, but it gave no protection to munafik (hypocrite Moslems).²⁴ It was, however, Anshary's reported description in the same speech of President Sukarno as a "two-headed snake" which aroused most controversy. The Press gave more attention to the President's Mi'radj speech, the text of which will be the opening feature of the analyses.

PNI leaders made their contribution in election speeches at a mass meeting in Bandung on 19 April. The

most challenging of them was Gatot Mangkupradja, although Anshary hit back later. Feith notes that, "As a result of these exchanges there was widespread apprehensiveness at the prospect of an election campaign in which all the contending parties would resort to unrestrained agitation."

A direct consequence of Sukarno's speech was a further deterioration of the relationship between Masjumi and the PNI, officially Government partners, which was already strained. The reason was the President's connection with the PNI, even though he was not a member of it; the view of some people that he was the "shield" of the PNI is reflected in the columns of Abadi. Therefore Moslem leaders felt challenged by the PNI because it was known that these leaders aimed at establishment of an Islamic state. According to Feith, the breach constituted "an important factor in strengthening the association of the PNI with all anti-Masjumi organisations, especially the Communist Party."²⁵

The parties were faced with a serious problem in considering Pantjasila. In its functional and manipulative meaning, that is, as a national ideology providing a framework and a unifying force (discussed in the Introduction), it was a "dynamic force which was competent to provide not only goals but also means to accomplish them."²⁶ Most Indonesians realise the functional value

inherent in Pantjasila, but the political parties which carried this ideology had to fit their own aims into it. For the PNI this was relatively simple. Their own ideology was a blend of Western and indigenous views of the State and they had incorporated all Pantjasila principles except belief in God into their own ideology. The PKI had difficulty in even accepting this principle as the state ideology. While some Moslem parties were able to accept Pantjasila as being already part of their own ideologies, Masjumi separated itself even farther from them and never solved the problem.

The reason is not very clear, but it seems Masjumi thought of Pantjasila in its practical application increasingly as an alternative to Islam as a basis of the state, probably because it was presented in that way by the secularists.

The PNI was able to represent itself as fighting for the cause of Pantjasila, which, it alleged, was threatened, thus changing the function of Pantjasila, as described in the Introduction. As Mestenhauser puts it, Pantjasila "was no longer the umbrella under which political competition took place, but instead became part of the political competition and struggle itself."²⁷ This new function increased competition between the parties, in the hope they would gain enough votes to put their own

ideologies into effect. However, except for the PNI, they were still obliged to play a dual role and pay lip service to Pantjasila as the official framework of government, which in addition was propagated as the official ideology by the Ministry of Information. Even the official support for gotong rojong (mutual co-operation) was in conflict with the increased competitiveness of party politics. Yet originally, of course, Pantjasila had itself been a compromise.²⁸

1959 Islamic-1945 Constitution Controversy

The controversy in 1959, which reached crisis proportions, between those groups which supported the Government's proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution and those which opposed it, grew in intensity during the Constituent Assembly debates.

Its climax was reached with the military ban, announced on 3 June, on "political activities." The period covered by the analysis is the last three weeks of the controversy, from 13 May (or in newspaper terms from the following day, 14 May). However, this period cannot be considered in isolation, particularly from the preceding months.

For convenience as a starting point may be chosen the "open talk" between the President and Cabinet on the matter of functional groups in Parliament, held at Bogor

on 5 December, 1958. These were followed by the President's discussions with leaders of the PKI, PNI and NU on 11 January.

Arising from discussions between the President and the Dewan Nasional (National Council, an appointed advisory body) on 12-13 January, 1959, a committee was formed. Two more "open talks" were held, on 15 and 26 January and at the second one a formula was devised for reconciling the views of the parties and the Dewan. The parties' comments on the formula were awaited.

On 12 February it was announced it seemed unlikely that talks were possible and the President would hand the problem to Cabinet for action. Prime Minister Djuanda announced on 20 February the Cabinet and President had decided on a return to the 1945 Constitution and the inclusion of Functional Groups in Parliament.

Although at least one commentator suggested the Press was not giving adequate coverage to the controversy at this stage, it was clear the nationalist and communist press had rallied to the President's cause. Conspicuous in their support were Harian Rakjat, Pemuda, Merdeka and Bintang Timur.

During March there was some elaboration of the new constitutional formula. On 3 March the Muslim League (a loose coalition of Islamic parties originally formed by NU

as a counterweight to Masjumi, but in 1959 apparently including Masjumi as a leading member) again emphasised it was striving for an Islamic state, although the NU had earlier supported a compromise.

The Preparatory Committee of the Constituent Assembly published two conflicting preambles to the constitution on 19 March. They dealt with the basic problem of the alternatives of an Islamic or a "national" state (borrowing the terminology of the 1953 dispute). On 22 April Sukarno addressed the Constituent Assembly, urging it to return to the 1945 Constitution to "give force to the ongoing revolution."²⁹ The next day he left the country on a world tour.

The NU, which had members in the Government, had officially supported the Government's proposal, but the rank and file were increasingly vocal in demanding an "Islamic state."³⁰

Masjumi had consistently opposed return to the 1945 Constitution unless there were substantial amendments, and to avoid identification with that party several NU leaders went out of their way in late April and May to attack Masjumi, particularly on other issues like compromise with the rebels in Sumatra and Sulawesi and Masjumi's demand for the return of Hatta as vice-president.

Lev sums up the difference and common interest between the two parties thus: "...although Masjumi spoke more vehemently on more issues - at times Islam hardly seemed the chief interest of Masjumi leaders, while for the NU it was the sole condition - in Islam the parties of the Faith came together."³¹

The point on which the Islamic parties took their stand was the significance to be given to the Djakarta Charter, which enjoined all Moslems to obey Islamic law. While the Government agreed to the Djakarta Charter being recognised only as an historical document, Islamic parties wanted it to become the preamble to the Constitution.³²

It will be recalled that the existing preamble to the 1945 Constitution omitted the obligation on Moslems to observe Islamic laws, originally proposed by Kahar Moezakkir as a compromise. The NU also wanted article 17 of the 1945 Constitution, dealing with religion, to oblige Moslems to follow Islamic law, which would counter any interpretation that the preamble was not binding.

The Government realised it had lost the two-thirds majority necessary to promulgate a return to the 1945 Constitution and Djuanda tried desperately to persuade the NU representatives to change their minds. However, on 12 May, one of the NU leaders, Zainal Arifin, put the new NU policy before the Constituent Assembly and proposed

inclusion of the Djakarta Charter in the Bandung Charter, the instrument of promulgation of the 1945 Constitution, which had already been drafted.³³

Such was the position at the opening of our analysis period. On 21 May Djuanda agreed to incorporate the Djakarta Charter into the Bandung Charter, but not to regard it as the fundamental source of law. The Islamic leaders continued in the Assembly, on 25-26 May, to demand this further concession.

As Lev comments, "By this time the ideological issue had precedence over all others, and the daily press was filled with contending arguments and feverish counting of likely votes. Immense pressure was brought to bear on the NU, which the pro-Government press accused of giving in to Masjumi and of defaulting on Idham's commitment to the cabinet."³⁴ Idham Chalid, one of the principal leaders of the NU, had committed his party to supporting return to the 1945 Constitution.

A political movement known as IPKI, closely associated with the Army, held a conference at which it threatened to approach the President and the Army to abolish the Constituent Assembly and to decree the 1945 Constitution into effect if the Assembly did not accept the Constitution.

General Nasution held a military conference to decide Army action in the event of an Assembly deadlock. Idham could do nothing to make his party toe the Government line, despite the requests of Djuanda. Djuanda spoke again to the Assembly on 27 May and warned of political chaos, producing an emotional but politically ambiguous handshake from Kiaji Masjkur, one of the NU leaders present.³⁵

It was decided to vote first on the Islamic amendment to incorporate the Djakarta Charter in the constitution, then to take three votes on the constitution itself. On the night of 29 May Wahab Chasbullah of the NU told the Assembly the admendment was the minimum the Islamic parties could accept. The ensuing defeat of the amendment (265-201) ensured Islamic opposition to the constitution and failure to reach the necessary two-thirds majority.

The first (open) vote on the 1945 Constitution showed 269 for and 199 against; the second (closed), on 1 June, was even more inconclusive: 264 in favour and 204 opposed; the last vote (again open), on 2 June, 263 agreed and 203 against, with 2 abstentions.³⁶

After further discussion, it was decided to go into recess for a few weeks and the Islamic parties agreed to continue the struggle. Only Masjumi was happy to take the consequences in defence of principle.

The PKI joined other pro-1945 Constitution parties in urging that extra-constitutional action should be taken to circumvent the failure of the Assembly to approve it constitutionally. The PSI, among others, feared this would give an advantage to the PKI and destroy "the spirit of 1945" which it was hoped by its supporters would result from a return to the 1945 Constitution.³⁷

Sudjatmoko, one of the PSI leaders, made an important speech in the Assembly on these lines and it was reported by Pedoman.

The decisive step was taken by the Army. On 3 June Nasution prohibited all political activities. One result of this, as Lev notes, was that "Press restrictions were tightened."³⁸

The Army's action may be regarded as the end of the transition to Guided Democracy. After Sukarno's return to Indonesia the Constituent Assembly was declared unable to meet because of the refusal of many of its members to attend, and the 1945 Constitution was decreed as the permanent constitution for the Indonesia of 1959.

It is premature to discuss here the effect on the Press, but for the remainder of the period under discussion it did not return to the relatively unfettered freedom to criticise it had enjoyed up to June, 1959.

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Part II - 1953 Islamic-Pantjasila Controversy

Introduction

To make clearer the order of events and the essence of statements reported an outline is necessary.

The first was the President's speech apparently on the evening of 13 April in commemoration of Mi'radj. In this he answered a speech by Isa Anshary, given on 12 April just before the opening of the period covered by the newspapers to be analysed. He concentrated on Anshary's description of him as a "two-headed snake," saying that whether he was 100 per cent Islamic or not was a matter for God alone. He devoted the rest of his speech to an appeal to Moslems not to be exclusive and answered a letter from the Islamic Students' Association.

From 11 to 15 April a Congress of Religious Scholars and Islamic Preachers was held at Medan, calling on Moslems to elect candidates aiming at the application of the doctrine and law of Islam and discussing the fundamentals of the Constitution.

On 16 and 17 April the (Protestant) Christian Party, Parkindo, met and its leaders called for a non-discriminatory "national" state. On 20 April PNI

spokesman Gatot Mangkupradja in Bandung attacked Isa Anshary and Bung Karno.

About 28 April the Islamic Organisations Contact Body (Badan Kontak Organisasi Islam) called for unity in the Islamic community. On the following day Merdeka reported the absence of Anshary from an election meeting at which he was expected to launch a counter-attack against the PNI.

Chapter 1 - Abadi

The first item to note, on April 14, gives immediately the appeal to a particular group in its emphasis in the report of the President's speech, "Mi'radj in Palace: 'Islamic followers - don't be exclusive and become isolationist.'" But an accompanying picture was of mothers at the celebration of the festival at Ikada field two days earlier, with an inset of Isa Anshary speaking. This was the occasion on which Anshary made his notable "two-headed snake" speech.

About 25 column inches was given to the story and about 13 to the picture and caption. Both were at the top of Page 1.

The headline was repeated in the opening sentences, which quoted the President as saying withdrawal of the Islamic community into itself would cause its downfall.

The story gave heavy emphasis to the President's treatment of the letter from the Islamic Students' Association and his decision to postpone answering it publicly in the interests of unity.

Finally, there was the President's brief answer to Anshary's charge. The lack of prominence given to this by Abadi, as compared with other papers, seems significant.

The next day a picture of Sukarno making his speech was placed near the bottom of Page 1.

On April 16 Abadi published what seemed to be a copy of the letter sent by the executive of the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic Students' Association) and signed by the chairman, A. Dahlan Ranuwihardjo.

An editorial note at the end said: "We publish the letter above at the request of the writer to clarify the position concerning the request of the HMI which was touched on in the Mi'radj speech in the Palace last Tuesday evening."

The letter was a long one and occupied about 30 column inches on Page 2, half way down Columns 1 and 2 and the foot of Column 3.

In part, the letter stated: "...within our society there is still confusion concerning [National State and Islamic State], as if one were the opposite of the other.

"In Islamic circles there are those who believe that the National State is the opposite of the Islamic State idea which they desire, so that the existence of the National State is regarded as something which is not in accordance with their ideals.

"In non-Islamic circles there are those who believe that the Islamic State idea is in conflict with the existence of the National State, so that Islamic State

ideals are regarded as aiming to abolish the National State which has been founded.

"The second problem concerns the relationship between the ideology of Pantjasila and the ideology of Islam."

The writer said there were opinions on either side that they did not conflict and also the opinion that they did and that a choice had to be made between them.

"...the problem of ideology is a political problem and political problems are decided by those who hold power over the state, a matter which will be decided by the result of the general election later...as a realisation of the democratic system which is now practised by the Indonesian nation.

"The question is,...how far do political groups in Indonesia have national consciousness and constitutional consciousness so as to respect and wait for each legitimate government which is formed through a democratic system which they have together agreed to use...

"...the problem concerns not only the National State and the Islamic State, but also concerns the National State and the Communist State, the National State and the Socialist State...etc.

"...What we desire is concurrence of views between Bung Karno and the Islamic leaders; if this cannot be achieved, then at least the existence of a good atmosphere

and mutual understanding between Bung Karno and the Islamic Community, though mutual understanding does not mean mutual agreement."

In the same issue, near the bottom of the page next to the letter was a short news item ($4\frac{1}{2}$ column inches) headed "Decision of the Congress of Religious Scholars and Islamic Preachers," datelined Medan, 15 April. The item stated the congress had taken a decision concerning the coming general election.

The decision stated: "...All Indonesian citizens who are Islamic by religion have the duty to elect only candidates who have the aim of carrying out the doctrine and law of Islam in the country."

Two days later more decisions of the congress were published. They occupied 11 column inches in Columns 3 and 4 just below the middle of Page 1.

The item read: "Among the important decisions are those concerning the fundamentals of the Constitution, which are divided into 7 articles as follows:

I. Sovereignty and power: Full sovereignty is the property of God and power to rule the Indonesian State is carried out by the Indonesian people as a commission of God communally within legal limits for the happiness of worldly and spiritual humanity.

II. State Foundations: The State is founded on Islam.

III. Legal basis of the State: The State legal basis is the Koran and the Moslem traditions.

IV. Form of State: The State has the Republican form.

V. Chief of State: The Chief of State is a Moslem citizen. And the Chief of State occupies Government leadership and has responsibility to the people.

VI. Basic human rights: The State guarantees fully basic human rights, among others personal freedom and liberty, religious freedom, freedom of thought and expression, freedom of association and assembly and freedom of individual property rights.

VII. Social Economy: Economy regulated by the State for the happiness of all people.

The Congress called on "Islamic followers who enter organisations which do not have an Islamic ideology to return to an Islamic organisation and to those who have not yet entered organisations to join organisations which struggle for an Islamic ideology.

The report of the Parkindo meeting was also carried on April 18. It was headed, "Parkindo desires a national state" and sub-headed, "Which is without discrimination, says Mr. Tambunan." This story was published without

prominence on Page 2 near the bottom of the page and in Columns 4 and 5. It was given $9\frac{1}{2}$ column inches.

It mentioned "an explanation concerning the aim of Parkindo, namely the desire for the existence of a national state in the form of a Republic headed by a President, having a cabinet responsible to Parliament, a state which is inhabited by the Indonesian nation and citizens and which covers all the area of the former Dutch India.

"Said Mr. Tambunan furthermore, Parkindo desires a state which is secular, an earthly state and not one which is founded on one of the religions.

"Pak Djenggot" gave the controversy his attention on April 21. His feature, "Koram Ketjil" ("Little Newspaper") appeared at the top of Column 8, Page 3 of Abadi.

His comment was headed "Choice" and read as follows: According to "Antara" press, in the PNI public meeting in the Bandung "Varia" cinema, spokesman Gatot Mangkupradja has attacked the speech of Isa Anshary, chairman of the West Java district of Masjumi, in Ikada field recently at the Mi'radj celebrations.

According to Gatot the statement of Anshary at that time was intended only to completely confuse. "I have the right," according to Gatot, "to say that behind Isa Anshary's screen of words are matters which arouse suspicion."

"Bluntly Gatot challenged those present at the meeting to choose 'Isa Anshary or Bung Karno'

"Although Pak Djenggot thinks it is certain Isa Anshary will feel honoured to be placed on a level with Bung Karno, actually it is puzzling why Gatot took shelter behind Bung Karno. Or does Bung Karno want to be made a shield of the PNI?

"Because actually there will be an equal choice for those who must choose if it is said 'Choose either Isa Anshary or Gatot Mangkupradja.'"

There is a good deal of sidestepping in the above polemic battle, but it is clear that without actually agreeing with Anshary, "Pak Djenggot" has attempted to weaken the strong card of Gatot and the PNI - the implied support of the President.

After this there was a week's lull until April 28, when there appeared at the top of Page 2, Columns 7 and 8 and near the top of Page 2, Column 2, a call for Islamic unity by the Badan Kontak Organisasi Islam ("Islamic Organisations Contact Body"). The item was headed "BKOI call: Indonesian Islamic Community must unite to face general election."

In part the BKOI statement read: "...In their campaign to face the general election, Political Parties

and groups who do not agree with the carrying out of the Laws and doctrines of Islam in the State have launched attacks against Islam.

They give a wrong picture concerning Islam, to confuse the way of thought of many people concerning the holy ideals of the Koran on Statehood."

The same issue carried an editorial in the usual place, Columns 1 and 2, Page 2, commenting on the BKOI call.

The editorial stated, "triumph for the Islamic community is impossible of attainment, if the whole Indonesian Islamic community, which has common ideals about the foundations of our country's life, does not unite in facing the coming general election, which will have a very important significance in the history of our country since the attainment of independence."

Also in this issue appeared a letter headed "Who is a Religious double dealer?" The letter was written by a correspondent named Asydy, of Bandung, and appeared underneath the editorial, occupying about 15 column inches (as the paper was read on microfilm, magnified to approximately three quarters actual size, measurement is difficult).

Asydy referred to an analysis by Isnaeni of the problem of the general election, made at a recent P.N.I.

public meeting in Bandung. The speaker had warned those present not to elect "Religious Double Dealers" and "Political Double Dealers".

"The speaker took as examples of Political and Religious Double Dealers the Former Speaker of Parliament and...K. Isa Anshary," wrote Asydy.

"Certainly the speech of Isa Anshary could not only be not so sweet to hear also by people who are not Islamic, but even not sweet to hear also by people who embrace the Islamic Religion but do not have an Islamic ideology like brother Isnaeni himself."

Turning to Gatot, Asydy wrote, in connection with Gatot's Islamic greeting and Koranic verses and prayers, "In connection with such a situation we were reminded that the former speaker mentioned "Religious Double Dealers... Mang Gatot himself has played tricks with the Islamic Religion for the interests of his party.

"And for us Moslems there is no problem. Gatot Mangkupradja invites us to choose Bung Karno or Isa Anshary as if he were offering them for sale, but we will choose leaders who have love for Religion and the nation to fill Parliament. Well, if people whom we have chosen betray the teachings of Religion, it is not their Religion which is wrong, but the people themselves.

"If the Islamic community feels satisfied with the present foundation of Pantjasila it will defend it; if not, we as a people must be willing to decide our own foundations....Because the present foundations are provisional foundations." The provisional character of the present foundations was a key part of the Masjumi argument, as they maintained Pantjasila had never been finally determined as a basis of the State.

The next day another letter appeared with the same heading. It also appeared on Page 2, Columns 1 and 2, near the top, and occupied about 17 column inches.

It was accompanied by an Editor's note which stated: "In connection with the letter from brother Asydy, Bandung, yesterday concerning the above problem, brother Gatot Mangkupradja has sent the letter below. Although within it are sentences which we ourselves wish could be written with more discretion, we publish the answering letter on the responsibility of the writer without changing a word."

Thus Abadi gives an impression of fairness while making it clear which side of the fence it stands.

Gatot wrote, in part, "Concerning the matter of brother Isa Anshary...it is not proper to make such statements on the Prophet's Mi'radj Day.

"The matter of 1% or 100% Islamic [referring to the President] cannot be measured by any person or Party, but only God knows it."

Gatot referred to Moslem friends and organisations who gambled and formerly received money from the Dutch and asked, "Do we measure this behaviour by Islamic standards?"

On May 4 an editorial appeared mentioning President Sukarno would give a public lecture on 7th May in the Hall of the University of Indonesia.

Stated the editorial: "As is already generally known, since President Sukarno delivered his speech in Amuntai, Kalimantan, concerning the problem of the National State and the Islamic State, from the circle of Islamic organisations (with beginnings pioneered by K. Isa Anshary) there have been many violent reactions concerning one of the sections of the President's above-mentioned speech in Amuntai.

"In the middle of the reactions which emerged in the circle of Islamic organisations afterwards, during a trip in Atjeh, President Sukarno explained in a meeting more or less that the state in which we organised this nation desires to remain national, whereas its content may be Islamic or may follow other ideologies desired by the people.

"Although this statement may be said to have added a little calm to an atmosphere which had become rather warm in connection with the President's utterances at Amuntai earlier, there is really still no satisfaction in the circle of Islamic organisations."

After recalling the postponement of further discussion by the President at the Mi'radj celebrations, the editorial explained the coming lecture was to carry out the President's promise to discuss the problem deeply.

The editorial stated there was no need further to explain that the problem was a burning question "and needs to be analysed with discretion to as not to cause offence in the circles involved, which would cause the re-emergence of a hot and unhealthy atmosphere.

"It is hoped the President can limit himself in his coming analysis...and get rid of demagogic ways which are usually used in mass meetings. Utterances like 'If we establish a state founded on Islam, then many areas whose inhabitants are not of the Islamic religion will secede' (which often or always is uttered by the President in speaking before mass meetings concerning this problem) etc....it is hoped will be avoided, because they only form an a priori attitude without putting forward the reasons...."

"Besides the ardour of the President to clarify his vision towards problems about the National State and the Islamic State for himself, we think also Islamic leaders cannot remain passive or have only a defensive attitude by merely giving reactions towards the President's speeches concerning the matter. The initiative must come from the Islamic leaders themselves, in a clear and universally understandable way, to put forward a concept of government, economics, sociology, etc., founded on the doctrine of Islam, because at this moment it can be said many people still do not have a clear picture concerning the form and structure of the Islamic State, so that it is therefore easy to cause misunderstandings and prejudices.

"Therefore it is hoped the public lecture of President Sukarno concerning the problem of the national state and Islamic ideals will be accompanied by public lectures given by promoters of the Islamic movement from Masjumi, PSII, Perti, Nahdatul Ulama, etc.

"Or perhaps there would be advantages, if there are those who want to take the initiative, to hold a symposium on this matter like the one held in 1952 in the Adhuc Stat building, Djakarta, on the difficulties of the present transition period."

The above editorial has been quoted rather fully as giving the best example of Abadi's attitude to the controversy.

It is notable for its outspoken attitude towards President Sukarno, which bears no trace of having been written with an eye to the censor, and its firm, if constructive, support of the concept of the Islamic State. Most of the protagonists on either side seemed more concerned with polemics than with developing reasonableness, knowledge, enlightenment, etc., as themes. While Abadi carefully avoided analysing Sukarno's most telling point, the danger of disruption of national unity in an Islamic state, it did plead for a constructive examination of what an Islamic state would mean in practice.

The May 4 issue of Abadi was particularly rich in material. In the middle of Columns 1 and 2 of Page 2 appeared a 12 column inch letter on "The nationalist spirit and the Islamic spirit." The letter was unsigned, but the next day an errata note was published admitting the paper forgot to affix the writer's name. The letter was from bro. M.S. Maarauff, of Kendal.

However, although the letter was a reply to the one written by Gatot, it was chiefly concerned to defend the actions of the Moslem organisation called the Hisbullah/Sabilillah Front under the Japanese occupation.

Finally in this issue there appeared an article by Ki Moesa'l Machfoeld. Liberally sprinkled with Arabic

quotations and using sentences of Arabic construction it does not make easy reading, but some of it was fairly relevant to the controversy.

The article was entitled "The Problem of the National State and Islamic Ideals." It began by referring to the announcement that on 7 May the President would give his lecture on "The National State and Islamic Ideals."

"If the words 'Islamic Ideals' have the meaning 'Islamic State'...then it may be said that the news...is good news," wrote Machfoeld.

"The problem...will move to the place which is safe and wise. That is, move from the field of agitation to the field of knowledge, move from the mass meeting to the lecture.

"In my opinion that is a good sign....Especially at this time [for] the Indonesian Republican State, meaning as we, all of us, sons and daughters of Indonesia, are facing all the present international possibilities...no more will there occur opportunities [for] all devils to incite friend against friend.

Machfoeld suggested not only Sukarno but also "100% Islamic intellectuals should lecture academically on the problem: 'The National State and the Islamic State,'" and not only at the University of Indonesia but also at every place and on every occasion, ordinary and extraordinary.

He went on to appeal for the removal of misunderstanding: "General understanding in Indonesia now concerning an Islamic State is still founded on prejudice which notes well...the lessons of the Dutch-India schools, among others [those] concerning the 'harem', 'sword to extend the area of Islamic power,' etc. This is promoted further now with...news about all kinds of disturbances in West Java, that is, the news is given a D.I. colour; yes, although this D.I. does not axiomatically mean 'Darul Islam,' because in Indonesia we already had far earlier the D.I. which means Dienaar van Indië, political slave of Dutch-India. Even though it is possible that not all kinds of disturbances in West Java are necessarily made by what is called 'Darul Islam' but are in fact by 'Dienaar van Indië,' yet willy-nilly all cruel murders, burning of villages, robbery of buses, trains, etc., are now apparently already turned into a generalisation concerning indication of the character of an Islamic State."

The writer then developed his article into a homily on the necessity to do more than merely show the difference between an Islamic and a non-Islamic State: "What is primary in the character of the Islamic State...must be introduced accurately to the public....Because if they are still only the sama mowon (just the same), then does not the public need to ask whether non-Islamic people will

have a reason to choose the Islamic State which is still six of one and half a dozen of the other in its character with the non-Islamic State?

"And what the advantage as well as the character of the Islamic State is must be introduced accurately to the public in my opinion; not only its theory, but at the same time also its practice, which from this time can already be carried out by instalments through the living practice of the Islamic community themselves in all fields of our present State."

By giving space to such an article, clearly propagandist even though not inflammatory, Abadi made it clear that an Islamic State must be the goal of all Islamic groups.

On May 5 Abadi gave 39 column inches in the middle of Pages 2 (Columns 1 and 2) and 3 (Columns 4 and 5) to a letter, once again headed "Who are the Religious Double Dealers?" The letter was a rejoinder by Asydy to Gatot's earlier reply.

Asydy wrote: "Concerning the writing of brother Gatot, who said it is only the Lord who can measure truly whether the Islam of somebody is one% or 100%, he is of the same opinion as us....Within the Koran the Lord decreed: 'Those who do not agree to the enforcement of

Islamic laws in their state are people who are the same as pagan unbelievers.'

"Brother Gatot has felt puzzled at friends who have become members of an Islamic organisation which dares to offend the doctrine of its religion by drinking arrack, gambling, committing adultery, etc. BUT WE FEEL MORE PUZZLED STILL,...WE have friends, even Religious Scholars, ...DARING TO ENTER A PARTY OTHER THAN AN ISLAMIC PARTY; THIS IS MORE TRAGIC AND DANGEROUS THAN THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE FRIENDS MENTIONED WHO DRINK ARRACK, GAMBLE, COMMIT ADULTERY AND RECEIVE WAGES FROM THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT." The blocks are Asydy's. Strong words indeed!

Many similar sentiments were voiced by Asydy, who did not hesitate to criticise Sukarno himself.

But more relevant to the present topic is his reference to an Islamic State, which was an article of belief, rather than a clearly thought out concept, with all its implications analysed.

He wrote, "The question of brother Gatot concerning Religious Scholars who do not enter one of the Islamic Parties is already clear in our explanation above. What is important is not their party" (rather self-contradictory) "but their spirit and ideology. If they do not wish for the carrying out of ISLAMIC LAW in their state, that is included in the Lord's decree above; it

means their hearts are still blank. Concerning the persons of Kyai Gentur and Bodjonghering, ALTHOUGH NOT IN ONE OF THE ISLAMIC PARTIES we believe THEY MUST DESIRE AN ISLAMIC STATE. Because we also once studied under them, so know them already."

Total space was about 800 column inches per day. On May 4 about 60 column inches were given to the controversy, about 7.5%. This was higher than most days, but throughout Abadi's proportion would have been well above that of other newspapers. Merdeka, for example, never gave more than 2.6% of its total space.

According to Herbert Feith,¹ "the bitter controversy was a source of considerable embarrassment to the 'administrator' leaders of the Masjumi. These men saw Anshary's directness and his appeal to mass radicalism as a danger both to their own position in the party and to the party's relationships with other political organisations. Thus Natsir and Sukiman made statements which attempted to minimise the importance of the issue which had been raised. They contended that the disagreement resulted from a confusion of terms and that the matter was an internal one of the Moslem community and not to be discussed in exaggerated terms outside it."

Tasrif, the editor of Abadi, was a Natsir man, and it seems likely that his readers, and particularly letter-

writers, went farther than he would have liked. There is certainly a contrast between the shrill tones of Anshary and his supporters and that of editorials and other expressions of the paper's own policy, however much in general agreement they may have been.

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Chapter 2 - Non-Islamic Newspapers

Merdeka

The Mi'radj (Moslem festival) commemoration in the State Palace was not only placed on the front page, but illustrated by a picture immediately above the story at the top of the page. The story was given 15 column inches.

The paper stated (without giving its authority) that the prepared message which was to have been given by the President concerning the Islamic State and the National State, Pantjasila and Islam and Democracy in connection with the General Election had been postponed. In fact it was given after the period under review, on May 7, when the President confined himself to saying the National State formed a framework within which ideologies, including Islam, could function. He also appealed for a spirit of compromise such as he said had produced Pantjasila in 1945.

The April 14th speech, as a presidential statement, would probably receive prominence in most Indonesian papers and the amount of space which Merdeka gave to it - 15 column inches - is not in itself a reliable indication of the paper's bias.

However, the overall pattern of news of the controversy is fairly consistent.

On April 18th Merdeka carried the story of an address by Dr. Leimena, a cabinet minister of the (Protestant) Christian Party, concerning the Indonesian Republican State. This story, which began on the front page and carried over to Page Two, quoted Leimena as saying people did not think of a communist, socialist or Islamic state at the time of the proclamation of independence, but only of an Indonesian Republican State. He said the State covered the whole nation and all streams of religion.

Four days later, on April 22nd, the paper reported the beginning of the Partai Nasionalis Indonesia's campaign for the general election. It quoted Gatot Mangkupradja as saying, "The PNI is founded on Pantjasila." After indicating that Anshary had recently been active in attacking PNI leaders as mentioned above, he asked, "If you must choose between Bung Karno and Isa Anshary, who will you choose?" Back came the response from the crowd, "Of course, Bung Karno."

Letters from readers which a paper chooses to publish can be an indication of a paper's own policy. During this period there were no letters supporting Anshary, but one from a correspondent named M.T. Abdullah. Weighing the merits of the words "Islamic" and "National", he said, "Islam is our 'Faith', but 'National' we like more,

because Nationalism is an ideology which can be professed by the Indonesian community, which has more than one faith."

There was no further mention of the issue until April 30th and then only a brief $1\frac{1}{2}$ column inch announcement at the bottom of Page One that President Sukarno would give a public lecture in the University of Indonesia on May 7th on "Several problems concerning the national state with Islamic ideals."

A table may be made depicting the treatment of this issue by Merdeka in the relevant period:-

	No. of Col. Inches	Proportion of Total Space (794 c.i.)	Proportion of Ed. Space
April 14	15	1.88%	2.42%
" 18	$19\frac{1}{2}$	2.46%	3.45%
" 22	10	1.26%	1.25%
" 23	10	1.26%	1.88%
" 30	$1\frac{1}{2}$.19%	.31%

Obviously the amount of editorial space varies with the amount of advertising; the amount of advertising varies between $\frac{1}{4}$ and $\frac{1}{3}$ of the total space. Most of Page Four and some of Page Three of each issue are devoted to advertising, aimed mainly at a middle and upper class readership.

A large part of the editorial space is given to serious news and a large proportion of this (though not the major portion) is world news.

It is obvious the amount of space and prominence given to the dispute was quite small, but what evidence there is points strongly to a bias in favour of the pro-Pantjasila side of the controversy. Given Merdeka's political alignment (mentioned in Part II) this was hardly surprising.

It is more difficult to explain the "minor key" mentioned above. Here a comparison with the other side, say with Abadi, is enlightening. From it the conclusion may be drawn that the initiative (or discontent) lay with the pro-Islamic side and that the pro-Pantjasilaists represented by Merdeka were on the side of the status quo.

Pedoman

It is difficult to judge this paper's objectivity from its coverage of this dispute because coverage was negligible.

However, there was a certain attitude of detachment and objectivity about the paper, and very little sensationalism.

The only reference to the dispute during the period under review was a five column inch report of the President's Mi'radj speech. The story was at the bottom of Page 1, although there was a picture and caption at the top of the page.

The story, published a day late, was headed, "Isra' and Mi'radj Celebration in the State Palace." It gave one sentence at the bottom to the reply to Isa Anshary, merely stating, "The President said the problem of whether a man is 100% Islamic or whether he is not is the right of God to determine later."

Thus, including the picture and caption, the total space given to any event connected with the controversy was 12 column inches out of the 588 published that day, a mere 1.12% of the total space and 1.65% of the editorial space.

This apparent lack of interest seems significant. It does not reflect lack of concern for serious issues, because Pedoman devotes at least as much space to this type of news as any other Indonesian newspaper.

But viewed in the light of the PSI's position it may reflect a political attitude. On many issues the PSI and Masjumi were closely aligned, but on the question of a Pantjasila versus an Islamic state the PSI, as a secular Socialist party, was bound to disagree with those Masjumi leaders who favoured some sort of Islamic basis for the state.

On the other hand the PSI could not afford to antagonise Masjumi, which was its most important ally in opposition to radical nationalism and Communism. It

therefore seems logical that the PSI and its organ, Pedoman, should adopt the attitude that the quarrel was none of its business.

Sin Po

Like Merdeka, Sin Po gave little prominence to the controversy, although the stress was on the "pro-Pantjasila" side. Sin Po differs in style from Merdeka, one of the important differences being the space and prominence given to "background."

For example, in reporting the President's Mi'radj speech in the April 14 issue, Sin Po opened with an account of the interest shown in the speech, the fact that it was a commemoration of Mi'radj, a description of the size of the crowd and a statement that "Interest this time was more tremendous than in past years because people wanted very much to hear the answer of Bung Karno to various severe criticisms which were levelled at him by various Islamic leaders, as a result of his speech at Amuntai some time ago" [barely mentioned in Sin Po] "which desired a form of Nationalism for the Indonesian Republic. But those present became rather disappointed. Bung Karno did not want to touch on the problem of the National State and the Islamic State in his speech."

The above extract suggests that Sin Po was even more anxious than Merdeka for a rebuttal of Masjumi criticisms.

Sin Po quoted the President as saying the maintenance of unity was the reason for not dealing with the subject at that mixed gathering.

The Mi'radj speech was spread over 66 column inches at the top of the front page. The following heading ran across the three column story: "Bung Karno: Whether I am 'a two-headed snake' is not anyone's affair!"

After the introduction already quoted, Sin Po continued: "In connection with people repeatedly heard ridiculing the quality of Bung Karno's Islamic faith, among them Kiai Hadji Isa Anshary, the prominent Masjumi leader, who in his speech at Ikada field last Sunday sharpened again his statements, saying there is no place for half Islamic believers, half infidels, or two headed snakes, Bung Karno said that if somebody had made the Islamic Confession (acknowledging the existence of the Lord and that Muhammad is the Prophet of the Lord) it did not matter if anyone else said that person was not an Islamic believer according to the teaching of Muhammad."

Whereas Merdeka gave only 15 column inches to the story, Sin Po spread it over 66 column inches and included more background and greater detail. On the other hand, Sin Po gave only 16-3/4 column inches to Dr. Leimena's speech, reported on April 18th, although again the heading was more flamboyant: "Violent reaction to the desire to form an Islamic Republic."

The story included a report of a statement by another speaker at the West Java regional conference of Parkindo (Indonesian Christian Party - Protestant). He was Mr. Tambunan, who said, "...Parkindo wants a secular state, an earthly state and not one which is founded on one of the religions.

"According to Mr. Tambunan, the national state is a state which has the ideology of Pantjasila, where there is no discrimination in opportunities to hold office, from high to low, caused by religious differences, sex, or hereditary differences. Concerning this, Mr. Tambunan mentioned Article 45 of the Constitution, which only demanded the condition of Indonesian citizenship for the President and made no stipulations concerning his religion.

"The distinctive Sin Po heading style showed itself again in the PNI election campaign report, carried a day earlier than Merdeka. The heading read: "Gatot Mangkupradja: Choose Isa Anshary or Bung Karno. It is noteworthy that Sin Po gave more space to this story than the pro-PNI Merdeka, 26½ column inches in just under 1½ columns, compared with only 10 column inches in Merdeka. Also, while Merdeka placed the story near the bottom of its front page, Sin Po put it at the top.

Gatot was quoted as saying, "The utterance of scholar Isa Anshary is only intended for incitement. I have the

right to say that behind the screen of words of Isa Anshary are matters which arouse suspicion."

"An item which could not be found in Merdeka appeared in Sin Po on April 22nd and 29th. On the 22nd, under the heading, 'Isa Anshary will attack the PNI,' it was reported that, "According to the information of a Masjumi leader in Indramaju, Kjai I. Anshary will launch a 'counter-attack' against the PNI in connection with the PNI attack which was recently made bluntly against Anshary at a public meeting in Bandung."

But on April 29th Sin Po announced, "Masjumi counter-offensive not to take place." Stated Sin Po, "On Sunday Indramaju was crowded with people attending the Masjumi propaganda meeting in connection with the coming general election. The greater part of those attending felt sorry when it was announced that former Prime Minister Natsir and Kijai I. Anshary would not be able to attend this meeting, especially because it had previously been announced that Anshary would launch a 'counter offensive' against the PNI, which at its recent meeting in Bandung had 'attacked' the leaders of 'certain' organisations in general and Kijai Anshary in particular."

Whether Sin Po merely scented a good story here or whether, as seems more likely, the pro-Communists were anxious to promote the controversy for their ultimate

advantage is not clear. Certainly the earlier attitude of Sin Po, by its enthusiastic reporting of pro-Pantjasila statements, does not suggest it was really hoping for an effective and conclusive reply from the other side.

The following table illustrates treatment of the controversy by Sin Po during the three weeks:-

	No. of Col. Inches	Proportion of Total Space (672 c.i.)	Proportion of Editorial Space
April 14	66	10.78%	14.63%
" 18	16.75	2.49%	4.44%
" 22	3	.45%	1.48%
" 29	6	.9%	2.76%

As in Merdeka, more space was given to the sequel to the "October 17 Affair", an important demonstration against political control of the Army. Sin Po, however, did not publish editorials on this or any other matter.

Conclusion

What conclusions can be drawn from Press reactions to the 1953 controversy?

Whatever may be said about the press overall, the obvious contrast in attitude is that between the Islamic press (represented by Abadi) and the non-Islamic press.

The first thing to note is the greater amount of space given by Abadi, indicating that Abadi attached greater importance to the controversy.

On the other hand, Abadi, as the Masjumi organ, exercised considerable restraint, reflecting the views of the leadership rather than the rank and file, although the paper found it increasingly difficult to ignore the latter, especially when the controversy reopened after a week's lull, this time with election overtones.

However, Abadi's restraint was nothing compared with the underplaying of the issue by the PNI paper, Merdeka, for example. A comparison of Merdeka with Abadi only confirms that the pro-Pantjasilaist Merdeka represented the status quo and were not anxious to express, much less to fan, the discontent felt by the Islamic side, who probably saw it as an excellent election issue in the future, however embarrassing it might have been to the Government supported by Masjumi leaders at the time.

The Government was headed by "moderate" PNI leader Wilopo, whom Merdeka probably approached closely in policy. He stood for co-operation with Masjumi, constitutional government and economic reform.¹

Pedoman, the PSI paper, was similar to Merdeka in the amount of space it gave to serious news and in its apparent lack of interest in this controversy, although the latter was even more marked.

Its motives, however, were probably rather different in view of the PSI's alliance with the Masjumi on one hand and its opposition to an Islamic state on the other.

The attitude of the (at the time) mildly pro-Communist Sin Po, was similar to that of Merdeka, but perhaps a little more popular in tone. It gave more "background" (of a superficial kind) and was anxious for a rebuttal of Masjumi criticisms.

On the other hand, Sin Po did not suggest it was hoping for conclusive replies and probably hoped to keep the controversy going in the hope of gaining at the expense of both sides.

The untypical character of press reactions to controversies affecting the basis of the state as between Islam and Pantjasila is thus already clearly seen. Whereas on many issues the line-up would be Abadi (Masjumi) and Pedoman (PSI), versus Merdeka (PNI) and Sin Po (pro-PKI),

in this case Pedoman by its silence indicates non-agreement (rather than open disagreement) with Abadi, leaving that paper as an organ of Islamic opinion isolated from the other three representative papers.

Another non-typical feature is the restraint shown all round. At a time when the Indonesian press was relatively uninhibited and free from Government control, Masjumi's participation in the Cabinet restrained Abadi from expressing what were no doubt very strong feelings by the rank and file in all Islamic parties. Merdeka also soft-pedalled the reaction of the PNI as the leading partner in the coalition, while all the non-Islamic papers, as defenders of the status quo, paid relatively little attention to the controversy, even though the pro-Communists may have hoped to reap some advantage by prolonging the controversy.

Party control and the resulting powerful influence on editorial policy are thus shown as the dominant theme of this controversy and notwithstanding the untypical character of the controversy itself, there is no reason to suppose that the same consideration did not apply to other issues.

References

1. Feith, H.: The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Ithaca, Cornell Univ. Press [1962], pp.228-233, 299-302.

Part III - 1959 Islamic-1945 Constitution Controversy

Chapter 1 - Abadi

Abadi in 1953 gave more space to the controversy then raging over an "Islamic" versus a "national" state than other papers did, and the proportion given by Abadi in 1959 was similarly greater. In addition, however, Abadi, in common with other papers, gave far more space in 1959 than it did in 1953 to the relevant controversy. In fact, greater selectivity has been required in analysis, thus eliminating non-Islamic issues bearing on the constitutional controversy and making comparison between selections from the two periods less exact.

However, it would be true to say that for Abadi the Islamic aspect was the most important, and while considerable space was given to other features, such as the role of the President and the tendency towards dictatorship, the omission from the proposed Constitution of any specific Islamic content, and particularly of the Djakarta Charter, aroused the most comment, outside perhaps even more than inside the Constituent Assembly.

Examination of Abadi through the relevant period discloses the emergence of at least nine sub-topics, which may be listed as follows:-

- 1/ Djakarta Charter.
- 2/ Islamic Solidarity.
- 3/ PKI attitude and PSII unity.
- 4/ Government statements.
- 5/ Spiritual basis of Islamic stand.
- 6/ Importance of Islamic role in national life.
- 7/ "Soul and spirit" of the 1945 Constitution.
- 8/ Intimidation.

An attempt will be made to separate these sub-topics of the specifically Islamic-1945 Constitution Controversy, although they are in fact intertwined.

1/ Djakarta Charter

The part which the Djakarta Charter played in this dispute has been outlined in Part I.

When our period opens the Government had already acknowledged the existence of the Charter as an historic document and this was welcomed (according to Abadi) by M. Tahir Abubakar, spokesman for the PSII (Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia - Indonesian Islamic Association Party).

Abubakar's speech was quoted on Page 1 of Abadi on May 14 (he made the speech on May 12), but it was given much more fully in "From the Constituent Assembly Rostrum", on Page 3 on May 20 and 21. The above-mentioned feature was a column (using that word in the broad rather than the exact sense) which reported speeches made in the

Assembly at great length. Abubakar's speech in this feature was contributed, which perhaps accounts for the time-lag.

While much of his speech was relevant to our discussion, it can only be summarised here. He said that after acceptance of the 1950 Provisional Constitution the value and position of the 1945 Constitution as well as of the "Djakarta Charter" was no more and no less than that of an "historic document".

The Government asked the Constituent Assembly, including the Islamic group, to free the 1945 Constitution from its refrigerated isolation and to give it the status of being the Constitution, but it still wanted the "Djakarta Charter" to remain isolated and in cold storage and acknowledged only as an "historic document" not having the force of law or any legal position.

The Government was asking for too many sacrifices from the Islamic group and did not give anything in return, said Abubakar. Whether the Djakarta Charter was acknowledged or not it was an "historic document" and could not be deleted from the pages of history.

The text of Abubakar's speech, of which the section relating to the Djakarta Charter has been summarised above, indicates that his "welcome" for acknowledgement of the Charter was lukewarm and that he would have preferred

something which gave it much more legal force than a mere acknowledgement of its existence would allow.

The May 14 instalment of "From the Constituent Assembly Rostrum" gave a speech by H. Zainul Arifin of the NU (Nahdatul Ulama - Moslem Scholars' Organisation).

Quoting from Islamic writers, he drew the parallel of the Djakarta Charter as the radiance of a light which would enable the 1945 Constitution to illuminate the road which must be taken by the nation.

The front page lead on May 19 gave prominence to the reply of K.H. Masjkur, chairman of the NU fraction in the Constituent Assembly, to a question by an "APB" correspondent. He said that in accordance with an NU Executive Plenary Session decision, "the stand and attitude of the NU in accepting return to the '45 Constitution [was that this was on] the condition of the inclusion of the 'Djakarta Charter' of 22 June 1945, which can inspire the '45 Constitution as a source of law and the inclusion of results which have been achieved by the Constituent Assembly up to now...."

On page 3 of the same issue was a report of a speech by Prof. Kahar Muzakkir, who referred to the Government's motive in acknowledging the Djakarta Charter only as an historic document and to the NU's demand that it also be accepted as a source of legal interpretation.

Mazakkir regretted that the Djakarta Charter was not to be made the basis of law in the '45 Constitution, but only acknowledged as consolation to the feelings of the Islamic Community in Indonesia. He continued, "If the Government now says that it was the 1945 Constitution only which was legalised on 18 August 1945, I wish to ask, 'From where did the Government get the 1945 Constitution draft? Was not the Constitution draft taken from what had been done by the Independence Materials Investigation Body in July 1945?' The scheme is based on Bung Karno's speech on 1 June 1945 and the Djakarta Charter of 22 June 1945. I want to get the Government's explanation, if it is different from that. I am convinced there will not be anything different from that."

Muzakkir said the Constitution resulted from the Djakarta Charter, which was included in the Constitution draft with the Preface and was subsequently deleted. The 1945 Constitution as at present proposed for restoration was a constitution in which all those things which could interest the Islamic people had been deleted and nullified. In the Djakarta Charter Islam had its mind only on the Preface and what Muzakkir called "the executive field."

An NU view was reported at the bottom of Page 2 and the top of Page 3 on May 20. The report quoted a statement by NU secretary-general Saifuddin Zuhri to the press to

the effect that the "Djakarta Charter", as the inspiration of the whole '45 Constitution, was in accordance with the President's recent message to the Constituent Assembly.

The statement quoted the President as saying, "this Djakarta Charter carries fully the message of the People's sufferings." Also the President was quoted as saying, "The message of the people's sufferings inspires the '45 Constitution entirely.

Zuhri added, "So that, with other sentences the president said that the 22 June '45 Djakarta Charter inspires the '45 Constitution in its entirety."

Zuhri concluded that if the text of the '45 Constitution must be realised, its spirit, namely the Djakarta Charter, must be realised also. According to him, such a way of thinking led inevitably to the conclusion that the '45 Constitution was only the full realisation of the Djakarta Charter and therefore the text of the Constitution must be reconciled with the Charter to give meaning to the latter.

Mutual understanding was needed concerning the position of the Djakarta Charter as the inspiration of the '45 Constitution, as a way of compromise between the ideals of the Nationalist and Islamic groups. Therefore the part of the Djakarta dealing with the obligation on

the State to carry out the law of Islam for its adherents should be included in the body of the Constitution.

Zuhri urged the necessity to remember that the Djakarta Charter was acknowledged as an inspiration of the Constitution as the realisation of an endeavour to discover a compromise in fulfilling differing ideals with a long history. The balance of signatories of the Charter - four Nationalist, four Islamic and a Christian figure reflected a compromise.

Acknowledgement of the Djakarta Charter as an historic document was included in the draft of the Bandung Charter, the proclamation of the 1945 Constitution as a permanent constitution, which was published in Abadi on 22 May at the top of Page 3 as the Government reply to the Assembly debate. The full official statement was given more than 20 column inches.

The 23 May issue contained a report of a comment by Ismail Hasan Metareum, Islamic Students' Association (HMI) Executive General Chairman, on P.M. Djuanda's statement. He described it as "forming a very encouraging picture." Abadi published a picture of Ismail Hasan with the story.

The report quoted an implied challenge by Ismail Hasan to the Government to listen to the desires of Constituent Assembly members, as the extent to which it was prepared to do this would now be apparent. He also stated that the inclusion of articles in the Constitution giving force to

Islamic law and having a truly Islamic inspiration now became the minimum demand of the Islamic community.

Inspiration of the '45 Constitution by the Djakarta Charter did not depend upon Government acknowledgement, he said.

At the bottom of Page 3 there appeared the first of two articles by Alauddin La Wugi on "How far the President's Conception Can meet the Islamic group."

La Wugi said it was logical that the completion and maintenance of security was not the true motive for acknowledgement of the existence of the Djakarta Charter. He gave the following reasons:

1/ Agitation was not caused by the Islamic group exclusively (if it was caused by them at all).

2/ The facts showed that the Bamboo Spears Front, the Protest Front and PRRI-Permesta also agitated the state.

It was probably more correct to seek the motive for meeting the desires of the Islamic community directly in undeniable activities inside and outside the Constituent Assembly, with a pedigree of events as long as the history of the national struggle.

Within the Constituent Assembly the Islamic group was a potential which could not be ignored, said La Wugi. Outside the Assembly it was not Pantjasila or the 1945

Constitution but Islam which motivated the revolutionary struggle in 1945.

On May 25, in the middle of Page 1, Abadi reported a PSII statement accepting return to the 1945 Constitution if the Djakarta Charter became its Preamble in accordance with the soul and spirit of the 17 August 1945 proclamation.

Abadi reported, "This PSII attitude was because... since its inception the PSII had made its ideal, and struggled for, the enforcement of Islamic laws as widely and fully as possible in the Indonesian homeland."

Another report on the same page stated: "In connection with the explanation of Murba Party General Chairman Sukarni to 'Antara' about the position of the Djakarta Charter which said the 'Djakarta Charter was entirely unconnected with, if not divergent from, the 17 August 1945 Proclamation, H. Firdaus, A.N., Indonesian Moslem Congress Secretary, said 'These words of Sukarni form only a trial balloon...to twist and falsify the history of Indonesian independence.'

"Firdaus said 'because its value is so high...the very close connection of the 'Djakarta Charter' with the '45 Constitution [would mean for us inclusion of] the 'Djakarta Charter' as an absolute condition for return to the '45 Constitution. (Antara).'"

Firdaus seems to be countering Sukarni's attempt to separate the two historically by making acceptance of the '45 Constitution dependent on inclusion of the Djakarta Charter.

Also on May 25 the second of La Wugi's articles was published at the bottom of Page 3. He asked how far the determinations of the 'Djakarta Charter' were able to meet the desires of the Islamic group. "Is the formulation: '...based on Belief in God with the obligation to carry out the law of Islam for its adherents' already considered to meet the Islamic group's desires? Our reply is, 'No. Not at all.'

Asking himself why not, La Wugi put forward the following answers:

1/ The "Djakarta Charter" was merely acknowledged as existing as an "historic document."

2/ The "Djakarta Charter," although acknowledged as part of the 1945 Constitution, did not have any meaning because it did not have legal effect containing a sanction.

3/ The determination "with the obligation to carry out the law of Islam for its adherents," as was inserted in the "Djakarta Charter," became entirely fluid in Article 29, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the 1945 Constitution, which was no different from the present 1950 Provisional Constitution. In fact the 1950 Provisional Constitution

was better able to protect religious groups as persons and citizens because in other places articles on Basic Human Rights were inserted, while they were not found within the '45 Constitution.

4/ The above guarantee had vanished entirely according to the President's interpretation of the Djakarta Charter given before the Constituent Assembly on 22 April of the present year, which did not mention the formulation "with the obligation to carry out the law of Islam for its adherents."

Supposing the President and Government still wanted to listen to the Islamic group's desires, among amendments which were wanted by the Islamic group was the making of the Djakarta Charter not only the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, but also the source of all valid law.

One of the roads to be taken to return to the '45 Constitution was to make the "Djakarta Charter" the source of all law. Furthermore, to include decisions of the Constituent Assembly plenum and complete decisions of the Constitution Preparatory Committee (PPK) in the 1945 Constitution for its completion. What was not complete should be handed to the Government to be converted into materials for compilation of a constitution.

La Wugi reiterated that what was most important to the Islamic group in the Djakarta Charter was the obligation

to carry out the law of Islam for its adherents. He said this did not mean the Charter being created the source of law was seen as the whole Islamic concept. Moreover, according to their opinion, the "law of Islam" was only religious service: divine worship, the Moslem fasting period, religious tax, etc. It did not concern community problems. So it became a question whether the Djakarta Charter was intended to be created the source of all law.

If it was not, the Islamic community's struggle in the Constituent Assembly was not entirely to be considered from the angle of the Islamic conception as a whole.

La Wugi concluded by saying the wish to meet the Islamic group's desires by merely acknowledging the Djakarta Charter in the framework of return to the 1945 Constitution, or the establishment of the Djakarta Charter as the source of all law, had no utility within the state ideals of the Islamic group, even with the inclusion of Constituent Assembly plenary decisions and complete PPK decisions, into the 1945 Constitution. The President and Government would not succeed in their efforts to meet the Islamic group's desires.

"Finally," said La Wugi, "the validation later of the 1945 Constitution in its present form, with new additions hinted at in the President's conception of the present

state constellation, closes the door on the struggle of Islamic ideals in the constitutional field in a legal-parliamentary way."

La Wugi's prophecy proved correct. In many ways his articles were not only perceptive but seemed authoritative, as the Islamic case in the Constituent Assembly debates followed closely his reasoning. However, it does seem from this article and from other Islamic statements that the obligation of the state to carry out the laws of Islam for its adherents was only a minimum demand and fell short of introduction of an Islamic state by the back door as claimed in other quarters.

On May 26 there were reports of several speeches in the Assembly, including one by Safiuddin, of the minor party Penjaluran, who emphasised his stand that the Djakarta Charter was not only something to be acknowledged, but must be an integral part of the 1945 Constitution.

Tahir Abubakar, of the PSII, quoted earlier, restated his fraction's standpoint of accepting the concept of return to the 1945 Constitution provided the Djakarta Charter became its introduction and that Article 29, paragraph 1 should be reconciled with the introduction by insertion of the obligation to carry out the law of Islam for its adherents.

A similar view was reported by Abadi on 28 May as having been expressed by K.H. Mansur, of NU, and Dr. Nadaribasa, of Perti, on 26 May.

The first of two articles by Jusuf Abdullah Puar on the "Sukarni myth concerning Djakarta Charter" appeared at the bottom of Page 3.

Earlier, the 25 May edition quoted a report of the reply of H. Firdaus, A.N., to a statement by Murba Party General Chairman Sukarni that the Djakarta Charter was entirely unconnected with, if not divergent from, the independence proclamation on 17 August 1945. Sukarni's statement was made on 21 May, and a further, fuller, reply was made in Puar's articles in Abadi on 26 and 29 May.

Puar wrote on 26 May that Sukarni's statement about the lack of connection between the two documents conflicted greatly with the official explanation of President Sukarno and the Working Cabinet as expressed in the President's Message before the Constituent Assembly on 22 April, 1959.

The message not only acknowledged the existence of the Djakarta Charter, but acknowledged the influence of the Djakarta Charter on the 1945 Constitution, not only concerning the Preamble, but also its articles. It also stated the Djakarta Charter preceded the 17 August 1945 Proclamation Law.

Puar continued that if according to Sukarni the Djakarta Charter had entirely nothing to do with the 17 August 1945 Proclamation it was impossible for President Sukarno to positively emphasise that the Djakarta Charter preceded the 17 August 1945 Proclamation Law.

Sukarni claimed "precede" in this sentence meant to pioneer, clear the way, clear a path and "mark the limits and residential site boundaries which will be used by the Constitution."

If, as Sukarni said, the Djakarta Charter had entirely nothing to do with the Proclamation, it was impossible for President Sukarno to determine positively that the Djakarta Charter was material for compiling the 1945 Constitution, wrote Puar. Clearly, a person who used material for some conception, especially the conception of a constitution, knowing the material was not related, and there was no connection and relationship with the conception material, such a person was insane.

Puar asked how, if Sukarni gave an explanation which had no consistent meaning, he could be trusted to manage a party which was based on consistent action.

One thing in Puar's article, however, is not clear. The 1945 Constitution, which he treats as synonymous with the 17 August 1945 Independence Proclamation, was not promulgated until the week following the first meeting, on

August 18, of the Independence Preparatory Committee.¹ Confusion between the two could be basic to Puar's whole argument.

Puar also quoted Sukarni as saying the Djakarta Charter was an independence preparation charter according to the Japanese plan, while the independence proclamation was prepared and struggled for by the Indonesians themselves. Puar asked how, according to Sukarni, was the Djakarta Charter a Japanese conception, while the Proclamation had no relation to the Japanese factor. However, in outlining the course of events to refute Sukarni's statement, Puar mentioned that the Independence Preparation Committee in session on 18 August 1945 had announced the Constitution.

He continued that if, around the time of the Proclamation, Sukarno and Hatta had not agreed with Sjahrir's opinion that a statement of Indonesian Independence should not be made by the (Japanese sponsored) Independence Preparation Body, Sukarni understood now that the Proclamation could not be said to have entirely no relation to the factor of Japan.

The second article by Puar appeared on May 29 at the bottom of Page 3. Puar agreed with Sukarni that the Independence Proclamation was prepared and struggled for by the Indonesians themselves, but said this was not to

omit the above historical facts. He described Sukarni's statement that the Djakarta Charter was a charter for the preparation of independence according to a Japanese plan as very useful as agitation material in mass meetings to hit at party opponents, but biased and unjust in a written explanation and certain to face sharp criticism from people who understand the history of Indonesian independence and put forward positive facts.

He challenged Sukarni not to pretend to be shy to admit that the 1945 Constitution was a Japanese "production" and the Indonesian Independence Preparation Committee a Japanese period "authority." Puar asked why, if Sukarni brazenly said the Djakarta Charter was according to a Japanese plan, he was not brave to answer Hatta, who had said the Independence Preparation Efforts Investigators' Body (an earlier organisation), the 1945 Constitution, even the 1945 Constitution, were all not in a very different situation from that.²

Also on May 29, "From the Constituent Assembly Rostrum" featured Masjumi spokesman Prawoto (pictured), who answered Sukarni in another connection. Apparently Sukarni had spoken in the Constituent Assembly and Prawoto said the whole climate of his speech lessened further the inner meaning of the Government's readiness to acknowledge the existence of the Djakarta Charter as an historic

document inspiring composition of the 1945 Constitution Preamble and part of the Constitution Proclamation.

Prawoto said Sukarni had not felt the need to seek the organic and causal connection of the historical facts and his interpretation would not give a broad understanding concerning events surrounding the days of the proclamation.

It seems that none of the Islamic group speakers really refuted Sukarni's claim that the Djakarta Charter was unconnected with the independence proclamation, but Sukarni had been careful not to deny any connection between the Charter and the 1945 Constitution. Hatta's article did not refute Sukarni's statement: it merely stated as an historical fact that all the documents and bodies concerned had some measure of Japanese sponsorship. It could also be argued that the documents themselves were entirely of Indonesian authorship.

The cases put forward by each side were thus not completely honest, and insofar as Abadi lent its columns to the arguments of Islamic group spokesmen, whether in articles, or reports, the same observation can be applied to the newspaper, because equal space and initiative in presenting arguments was certainly not given to the other side.

The reader usually only learned of Sukarni's statements when they were answered by Islamic group spokesmen.

2/ Islamic Solidarity

The tendency throughout the crisis was for a growing unity between the Islamic parties, but much of this could have been due to pressure from Islamic organisations outside the Constituent Assembly and often outside the political parties as such. It has been noted in Part I that the NU policy was changed, as a result of pressure from the rank and file, from support of return to the 1945 Constitution to a demand for legal recognition of Islam as the basis of the state. There was similar pressure on all Islamic parties to maintain a similar stand.

Thus on May 15 at the top of Page 1 was a report of the All-Islamic Former Armed Struggle Union Congress which was held from 27 to 30 April in Bandung. The Congress urged Islamic fractions within the Constituent Assembly to still struggle for only "Islam" as the State Basis.

It also urged former leaders (presumably of the Islamic Armed Struggle Union) who now had responsible positions not to take steps which could raise new difficulties in addition to those already existing in facing the concept of return to the 1945 Constitution.

The above resolutions were mentioned in an editorial, also on May 15, which recalled a recent report of a meeting between a delegate from the "Anshor" Youth Leadership Council and the leadership of Islamic fractions

in the Constituent Assembly (Masjumi, NU, PSII, Perti, PPTI) to express the Council's hope that Islamic fractions in the Assembly would remain solid and unanimous in facing the question of return to the '45 Constitution. That meeting followed a recent meeting of the Council in Bogor. The editorial suggested there were other organisations which felt the same way about Islamic solidarity on this issue.

It also quoted the statement of basis of the Muslim League, an organisation of Islamic parties (but not including Masjumi). The basis, which had been compiled six years earlier, stated: "Indonesian Muslims are convinced that as long as the Indonesian State Constitution is not founded on God's Law it certainly will still have a provisional character, that is, experience changes which are very harmful to the interests of the People and State, which will always be exploited by groups which do not believe in God."

Finally, the editorial called on the Islamic fractions to be solid in improving on results already achieved, not "solid" in retreating, much less in surrendering. It concluded on a hopeful note.

Minggu Abadi had been created since the 1953 crisis as a Sunday edition of the paper; in fact the weekday edition was specifically called Harian Abadi to

differentiate between the two. Minggu Abadi was very much a magazine type paper and contained little hard news. Examples of the style were an article as front-page lead and the inclusion of a cartoon strip.

Each picture of the cartoon strip dealt with a separate current event and on May 17 one depicted figures representing Islamic parties pointing symbolically to a crescent and star.

The front page lead on May 19 gave prominence to the reply of K.H. Masjkur, chairman of the NU fraction in the Constituent Assembly, to a question by an "APB" correspondent.

He stated that the solidarity of the stand and attitude of the Islamic fractions in the Assembly, including Masjumi, was maintained in accordance with ideals of the whole Islamic Community. The Community desired that the Assembly would be able to validate Islamic law in Indonesia.

It is not clear why Masjumi should have been singled out in this regard, except perhaps to suggest that it was less "Islamic" than other fractions in the group.

Masjkur said it was hoped the Government would be able to take a decision which was as wise as possible, thus giving sufficient satisfaction, especially to the

Islamic group, and that the decision would be announced in the Government reply to the debate.

According to Masjkur, there was information from another Islamic group which indicated a rejection of return to the '45 Constitution. In a note the editor asked if this were the Masjumi.

It does suggest the NU believed, or professed to believe, that the "other group" preferred outright rejection rather than amendment of the Constitution.

The NU seemed concerned to emphasise its own acceptance of the '45 Constitution, although with amendments.

The "Little Newspaper" under the editorship of Pak Djenggot (literally "Father Beard") on the same day had an item headed "Solid" (The Indonesian word is usually translated "compact", but "solid" seems more appropriate in this context).

It commented on Masjkur's statement on Islamic solidarity, implying that those who doubted this solidarity were unaware of the way the Islamic fractions voted in the Constituent Assembly.

On 20 May it was reported that the governing board of the Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement (GPII) had welcomed with pleasure the attitude which showed the solidarity of

Islamic fractions in the constituent assembly in facing the Government proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution.

K.Z. Muttaqien, GPII Governing Board chairman, said that the attitude of unity of all Islamic fractions in the Constituent Assembly was patriotic and was parallel with the issue of the stand of the whole Indonesian Islamic community.

"Indonesian Moslem people, with unceasing prayers, note with sharp eyes the struggle of their representatives in the Constituent Assembly.

"According to Muttaqien, he was convinced that the government came to the constituent assembly to negotiate, not just to ask a blessing or inform...

"Also the GPII Governing Board chairman was convinced that all the Islamic fractions themselves have prepared themselves to confer and consult to seek something better which can be welcomed by the Islamic community for the glory of the Indonesian Republic and for the future of the Indonesian Islamic community.

"...the alternatives to reject or to accept the '45 Constitution are not 'solutions' but we must expend our abilities in getting a Constitution which approaches perfection and guarantees daily the future of the Islamic community and...the carrying out of political stabilisation, and changes today's rotten situation.

"With the co-operation of all Islamic fractions and national democratic fractions we are convinced that the constituent assembly can complete the task with which it is charged [within] the time which it has been given."

An editorial on the same day stated: "The solidarity of the Islamic front in the Constituent Assembly up to this moment certainly has aroused varied reactions in the circles of groups which...support fully the suggestion of return to the 1945 Constitution. There are those who...attempt...through the press to spread instigation and [slander], to try to incite Islamic parties which are one with other Islamic parties against each other...."

"It is clear that as long as the Islamic bloc in the Constituent Assembly remains...intact and solid,...all intentions and carried out plans...to belittle the role of the Islamic community are certain to meet with failure in the end.

"...Thus the voices of PSII figures and figures of other Islamic groups which are raised in the Constituent Assembly forum are voices which the Islamic community entrusts to them. And on [the other hand] it is a betrayal of the people who have elected those figures if they do not struggle [on behalf of] the [mandate]."

The reference to the PSII is concerned with the side-issue of internal PSII unity which will be dealt with below.

In the report on 23 May of the comment by Ismail Hasan Matareum, Islamic Students' Association (HMI) Executive General Chairman, on P.M. Djuanda's statement in the Constituent Assembly, Ismail Hasan was quoted as recalling that some time ago the HMI Executive had issued a call to all Islamic fraction members in the Constituent Assembly to remain united in struggling for the [mandate] of the people who elected them.

In the same issue, in Alauddin La Wugi's article, "How far the President's Conception Can meet the Islamic group," he stated the following:

"In the Islamic struggle effort in the Constituent Assembly now in connection with the President's proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution, Islamic fractions are flooded by demands, urgings, plans and delegations from 'umpteen' organisations, parties, [and] individuals from throughout the fatherland who demand an Islamic state basis. We mention only the Governing Boards of GP, ANSHOR, PP Former Armed Islamic Struggle Union, PB Islamic Students' Association, PP Eastern Section Indonesian Islamic Young Generation, PP South Sulawesi People's Traditional Union, PP Eastern Indonesian Islamic Youth Struggle Concentration, etc. Still not included are individual figures from all corners of...the fatherland. All of them urge the closest possible unity [between] Islamic fractions and [the

continued] defence of Islam as the state basis.

Furthermore they consent to taking all risks raised by the struggle."

In Minggu Abadi on May 24, at the bottom of Page 11, in the usual cartoon strip, there appears another cartoon depicting Islamic unity. Representatives bearing their Islamic party labels are shown approaching the Constituent Assembly building carrying a poster bearing the words "Solid fractions." There is also a cartoon of Djuanda carrying a bag labelled "Government Reply" as he heads for the Constituent Assembly building.

On 25 May Abadi reported at the top of Page 1 yet another call for solidarity and persistence in requiring the meeting of the Islamic fractions' full demands, this time from the BKOI (Islamic Organisations' Co-operation Body).

Another solidarity call, this time by PORPISI (Indonesian Islamic Youth Organisations' Association), was published by Abadi on May 26, accompanied by a statement that Islamic youth was ready to shoulder responsibility for all the consequences.

On 27 May the editorial on Page 2 dealt with the PORPISI statement and was headed "Islamic Youth Determined."

The editorial commented that with this statement of firm determination conveyed by PORPISI, there was another

guarantee to Islamic fractions in the Constituent Assembly to prevent them from having cause to feel confused and allowing them to maintain their stand, despite the violence of threats and insinuations launched by parties or groups which did not acknowledge Islam had this role in Indonesia.

PORPISI deserved to be heeded and regarded as a guide to warn the young generation how heavy was the burden which it much shoulder later in the event of the elders who represented the Islamic group being led into a trap, destroying the potential of the Indonesian Islamic community.

The editorial continued, "All mistakes and miscalculations, whether intentional or unintentional, made in these one or two days mean misery and disappointment which must be suffered by the generation which is represented by PORPISI now in facing the future course of history....

"Perhaps the determination of Islamic youth which has been given birth by PORPISI will be a signal for Islamic leaders to never-fear to face all the risks of the struggle...so that with the determination of Islamic youth as a model, Islam will finally achieve victory.

"We remain convinced that the destiny of religion, nation and fatherland is on the shoulders of Islamic youth...."

A report in the same issue was datelined 25 May. It read: "In the Hotel Orient, AA Road, Bandung, Monday, was held a joint meeting of 27 West Java Islamic parties, student, university student, women's, labour, and peasants' organisations."

The joint meeting, which was attended by leaders of the organisations, issued a statement supported unanimously by the participating organisations and signed by Djaja Rachman of Masjumi, Kijaji M. Dinjata (NU) and Abdul Hamid Murzana (PSII).

It was issued as the statement of the "West Java Islamic Parties and Mass Organisations Consultative Body" and included the following points: [This Body]

"1. Expresses Praise to God for the [continuing] existing solidarity of Islamic fractions in the Constituent Assembly in facing the 'Return to the 1945 Constitution' concept; [and]

"2. Expresses a feeling of obligation that solidarity must be cultivated and maintained to achieve Islamic ideals for the glory of Religion, State and Nation."

The 27 May issue seems to have laid the greatest stress on solidarity, because it also contained individual support for Islamic solidarity in the form of a letter to the editor from a reader signing himself Usman.

Two items were published at the top of Page 1 on May 29 under the heading, "Islamic fractions in Constituent Assembly remain solid and united: Prawoto and K.H. Masjkur Islamic Fractions spokesmen: Delegations from Porpisi and Islamic Organisations Co-operation Body meet Islamic Fractions."

The two bodies were reported to have conveyed their pleasure because until then Islamic fractions in the Constituent Assembly remained solid. The delegations hoped such a situation could still be maintained until the final phase.

The delegations also stated that they stood behind the Islamic fractions' demands as shaped by the proposed amendment of K.H. Masjkur and associates to make the Djakarta Charter the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, including within it the obligation to carry out the law of Islam for its adherents.

Finally, the delegations said they stood behind the Islamic fractions in sad as well as joyful situations. In reply the fractions expressed unanimity in their determination to remain solid and united.

A letter in the same issue from a reader named Ibrahim Muchlis called on Islamic fraction members to "show proof of your ability in shouldering the [Islamic] Community's mandate."

It cannot be denied that the Islamic fractions in the Constituent Assembly fulfilled their supporters' expectations by remaining united and determined in their stand to the end. Also it is doubtful whether any other course of action would have been more effective in the circumstances.

The Islamic community or ummat would indeed have to wait until the times were propitious for its younger generation to take effective political action, but, even then, action was not in the direction of an Islamic basis for the state.

During the crisis the ummat seemed determined that supporters of the secular state would have to achieve consolidation of their victory over the objections of the Islamic group, however ineffective they might be.

Intimidation and other forms of pressure may indeed have been behind Islamic fears that their representatives would become divided and compliant, yet once return to the 1945 Constitution became an accomplished fact there was no open protest by the Islamic community.

The Constituent Assembly debates seem to have marked the end of the open society and this fact was reflected in the press, a fact which will receive more attention elsewhere.

3/ PKI Attitude and PSII Unity

The attitude of the Communist Party of Indonesia as a component of the secular state front received only passing attention from Abadi in this crisis, but it is a reminder that in the party political spectrum Masjumi and the PKI had long regarded each other as opposites.

Abadi attention to the PKI arose from press reports of disunity within the minor, but still important, Islamic party PSII (Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia - Indonesian Islamic Association Party).

According to Abadi's editorial on 20 May, from the contents of the speech of Tahir Abubakar, PSII Constituent Assembly member, he clearly made it obvious that PSII figures in the Constituent Assembly still held firmly to the mandate of the Islamic community which they represented. In short the PSII still stood firmly on the side of the Islamic bloc in facing the question of return to the 1945 Constituion.

The editorial quoted the daily Pemuda as stating, "Apparently the PSII will not disappoint the people and will not disappoint its own members and sympathisers by taking its place by the side of Masjumi to reject the idea of return to the 1945 Constitution." Abadi stated that such a voice came out of the brains of people in a panic and fearful to see the solidity and firmness of the Islamic front.

The editorial continued, "...recently a certain press in the capital [very] diligently carried reports which originated from the PSII in the regions, saying they protested against the attitude of PSII representatives in the Constituent Assembly, so that obviously it is clear how they wish to incite the Regional PSII and the Central PSII against each other." In the analysis of the near-Communist Sin Po it will be noted that there appeared a disclaimer, by the chairman of the Surakarta Branch of the PSII, of his fraction's objections to a return to the 1945 Constitution. Abadi suggested that perhaps the PKI itself had changed its attitude and noted a Pedoman editorial on 19 May which stated that, at the beginning, the PKI professed to accept return to the 1945 Constitution as a whole without reserve, but now was rather inclined towards making reservations on the draft constitution. Pedoman had asked whether the PKI calculated on the atmosphere and tendencies in the Assembly.

At the bottom of Page 1 of the May 22 issue was a report on the unity of the PSII bearing the dateline 20 May. It quoted a statement by Muhammad Djajuli Kartawinata of the PSII Secretariat to Antara.

Kartawinata emphasised that the attitude, standpoint and actions of his party's fraction in the Assembly towards the problem of "Return to the 1945 Constitution"

was not at all in conflict with the political struggle strategy of the PP (Central Board) of the PSII, but was always parallel.

Kartawinata said that on 22 May after the Government reply to the debate, a Party Central Board Extraordinary Conference would decide the problem of accepting or rejecting a return to the 1945 Constitution. He stressed that firm and close co-operation remained between the fraction and the PSII Central Board.

On May 25, in the middle of Page 1, Abadi reported a PSII statement accepting return to the 1945 Constitution if the Djakarta Charter became its Preamble in accordance with the soul and spirit of the 17 August 1945 proclamation.

Abadi reported, "The reason for the PSII attitude was that,...since its [inception], the PSII had made as its ideal, and struggled for, the enforcement of Islamic laws as widely and fully as possible in the Indonesian homeland.

"...the PSII acknowledges and realises the existence of the state of emergency faced by the state at this time," he said.

The PSII statement closed the episode of PSII branch revolt and PKI interference (if reports in some newspapers could be so called).

Abadi did not question the accuracy of the reports, but the fact that pro-PKI papers were prepared to publish them clearly constituted interference in its eyes.

There is no doubt newspapers everywhere, by their inclusion of some news and omission of other news, reflect their bias, but to claim that the inclusion of a particular item does this is an admission of a situation in the Indonesian press which is far from healthy. It is an acknowledgement that the press exists solely for propagandist purposes, even in its selection of news. The acknowledgement is another indication of its ideological nature.

As for the PSII policy, the party found it convenient to take the same attitude as other Islamic parties, which in its case was particularly convenient. It could still claim to support return to the 1945 Constitution, as one at least of its branches wished, while in fact opposing such a return by insisting on the unacceptable condition of the enforcement of Islamic laws.

4/ Government Statements

In one sense, government statements do not form a sub-topic, but so much prominence and space was given to them, to the expectations of them and to reactions to them that they are treated as such, although, naturally, there is much overlapping with other sub-topics.

The full report in Abadi on 20 May of Tahir Abubakar's speech in the Assembly on 12 May implied that the proposal in the President's message of 22 April to return to the 1945 Constitution should have been presented to the Assembly as an item on its own and not as a proposal within the framework of "guided democracy."

On 21 May Djuanda delivered the Government reply to the debate, in which it repeated the President's acknowledgement of the existence of the Djakarta Charter as an historic document and incorporated it in the Bandung Charter. An Abadi editorial on 22 May commented that it could see a sympathetic attitude from the government towards a people's consultative body which was to be formed by way of a general election and therefore result from the choice of the people themselves. What the Government hoped for was consultation without an unconditional stand and without compulsory action. The Islamic community up to then had felt faced by an unconditional attitude and standpoint accompanied by ideas and emphases based on compulsion.

Abadi challenged the Government and its supporters to adopt an attitude of understanding towards the ideals, desires, wishes and struggle of the Islamic community. The Government should not ask people to be patient for another five or six years, that is, if the MPR (People's

Consultative Assembly) was formed. Possibility of such a postponement was reflected in Prime Minister Djuanda's statement, "Anything which may be still considered not yet satisfied and requiring addition or completion in the '45 Constitution, which will become the permanent constitution, still leaves open the possibility of continuous struggle in the MPR later...."

The welcome given the Government statement by Ismail Hasan Matareum, and his implied challenge, similar to the Abadi editorial's, has already been mentioned. Taken together they constitute an implied approval, but the basic objection to the statement, that the Government was not prepared, at least at the present stage, to give the Djakarta Charter legal force, was only mentioned in passing.

The Djakarta Charter aspect was pressed more strongly by Alauddin La Wugi in the same issue and his case has been dealt with more fully above.

In the "Little Newspaper" on Page 2 of the 25 May issue there was an item headed "Not Understood." According to Pak Djenggot, "...Harian Abadi several days ago wrote, concerning the government reply in the Constituent Assembly session, that the...reply could be able to be evaluated if the Government at the same time urged itself and groups supporting it to...accept [and] understand the

Islamic community's desires, already expounded by Islamic fractions in the Constituent Assembly;...Antara in quoting the article said that Harian Abadi could evaluate the Government reply.

"If you want to quote accurately, Harian Abadi, please [note]: 'Could be able to evaluate' is different in meaning from 'Could evaluate' only."

Pak Djenggot called on Antara to understand the Indonesian language better.

The distinction seems to be between being in a position to evaluate and mere ability to do so. Antara's version suggests Abadi admits incapability of evaluating Djuanda's statement.

Abadi's editorial on May 26 was headed "Problem: Absolute Duty."

It quoted Djuanda in his reply speech as saying: "Recalling the fact that the majority of the Indonesian people embraces the Islamic religion, and remembering also democratic procedure, namely a general election to choose people's representatives to the People's Representative Council and the People's Consultative Assembly later, the Government is convinced that the two representative bodies just mentioned...will not accept, or determine the decision of, laws or other government regulations which are in conflict with Islamic law, while not whittling away

the decision written in article 29 of the 1945 Constitution for adherents of other religions."

The editorial commented that the above extract from Djuanda's speech was another angle which could be considered sympathetically. It quoted the following comment by Bintang Timur on 22 May:

"It is indeed amazing, if those who truly have conviction in their ideology, or a certain religion they profess, at the same time so distort the greatness of the ideology or religion professed that they demand an absolute guarantee for the...ideology or religion which is the conviction of their lives."

Moreover, Bintang Timur had written: "The greatness and vitality of the laws and doctrines of God cannot be guaranteed by law which is made by man, but only by the holiness and sublimity of the religion itself. This probably [is] the conviction of all adherents of the religion."

Abadi commented that PM Djuanda, as a Moslem, as well as Bintang Timur, which existed in a state a greater part of the people of which were of the Islamic religion, should know that the problem was not just whether the Parliament or the People's Consultative Assembly would not accept, or determine the decision of, laws or other government regulations conflicting with Islamic law. The problem was

just the absolute duty of all Moslems to carry out God's laws, which had been laid down in the Koran and Moslem traditions, in whatever occupation they were. As was clearly stated in the Koran: "Whoever does not carry out God's laws, they are unbelievers." The condemnation of these unbelievers, according to the Koran, was very heavy, in this world as well as in the world hereafter.

From all this it was clear that if Islamic fractions in the Constituent Assembly had decided in their hearts to determine an "Islamic Basis" for the Indonesian Republican state, in which the law of Islam was to be carried out to its fullest extent for its adherents, it was not because of doubts or to ask for absolute guarantees for the determination of this religion, but just to fulfil the holy calling of the creator of the law himself, who obliged each Moslem to carry out Islamic law to its fullest, to realise Divine Justice between fellow men in the Indonesian Archipelago.

Abadi's editorial demonstrates that the Islamic aim was not to make the laws Islamic, but to ensure that Moslems were themselves truly Islamic.

The obligation they urged on the state to carry out the laws of Islam for its adherents would have provided no stronger guarantee than already existed that the basis of the state, in the sense of the emphasis of law and policy,

would be Islamic, but it would have ensured personal observance of at least some aspects of Islamic religion by many people whose claim to be Moslems was purely nominal.

The editorial concluded by stating the conviction that neither Djuanda nor President Sukarno nor any other Indonesian patriot wished the greater part of the Indonesian people who were of the Islamic religion to be punished for their disobedience, because the destruction of the Islamic community would mean the annihilation of the Indonesian nation itself.

On 25 May, on Page 1, there was a general report of the second phase of the general consideration by the Constituent Assembly on return to the 1945 Constitution, covering the speeches of the previous two days. Many of them dealt with various aspects of the Government reply, among them that of Da Costa (Catholic), who dealt with that part of the reply referring to him and denied that he was of the opinion the 1945 Constitution was already decrepit. He said it was not the Constitution as a whole which he regarded as decrepit, but its articles (there was no indication as to which articles). According to Abadi, many of those present were heard to laugh. He asked the Government to agree to give a reply to the second phase of the general consideration "for discretion and tolerance."

Hamka (Masjumi) stated he was not satisfied with the part of the Government reply which was directed to him, accusing him of having acted provocatively with personal abuse. Hamka said what was provocative and intimidatory was not himself but the message of President Sukarno. He indicated Page 29 of the text of the President's message, which read: "Watch that the state and people do not look forward too long, so that the people are later compelled to act themselves, as was witnessed at the beginning of our national revolution."

On May 28 Abadi reported that the Government would reply again to the Constituent Assembly debate, Stage II of the General Consideration having ended.

An extract from the report, datelined Bandung, 26 May, stated K.H. Mansur of NU had said that after having heard the first Government reply his fraction could not hold back feelings of disappointment and sadness, because as a fraction which supported the Government it could not maintain genuine loyalty because of desires originating from his fraction. His fraction maintained the '45 Constitution must be brought into line with the Djakarta Charter.

Mansur's statement was the clearest indication so far of the NU commitment.

In "From the Constituent Assembly Rostrum" on 29 May, Masjumi spokesman Prawoto said it was a pity that, perhaps influenced by desire to give a reply and satisfaction to all speakers, the Government had been less careful in studying thoughts which were put forward by speakers. The name of a Member had been mentioned in relation to a certain problem which the Member concerned had not joined in discussing, and he was also given an answer and criticism concerning the sequence of a certain problem while the root of the problem and his own conclusions were not allowed to be discussed at all. Thus the Government reply had been very unconvincing.

Furthermore the Government hope for no "absolute" opinions clearly had to be interpreted within maintenance of the absolute of the '45 Constitution.

Mansur said that in phase I of the general consideration he had reached the conclusion that the Government in conveying its decision "had treated the problem well." The carrying out of the matter raised doubts.

5/ Spiritual Basis of Islamic Stand

The ideological nature of Indonesian politics is touched on in Part I and indeed its bearing on the character of the press is one of the themes of this thesis,

but its application to the constitution dispute itself is more obvious.

Two of the major ideologies in Indonesia, Nationalism and Communism, are secular in the broad sense, although Communism has some religious characteristics and Nationalism in Indonesia has a socio-religious background.

The third major Indonesian ideology, Islam, in its political context, is the direct application of a religion as such in the field of politics.

Discussion of ultimate political aims and goals is beyond our present discussion, but even ideologies, as opposed to mere political creeds, usually have material goals, however utopian they may be. The goals of religions, however, are spiritual and Islam is no exception.

Islam's motives in entering the political struggle in Indonesia could only be that it believed its spiritual aims could be at least partly realised in the field of politics.

References to the spiritual basis of the Islamic stand are not therefore merely empty rhetoric, but a genuine reflection of the motivations of Islamic representatives, in the press, in the Constituent Assembly and in outside organisations.

The extent to which these motivations are made explicit varies with the individual and with his role in society.

The following statement was made by a Constituent Assembly member originating from Atjeh (one of the most zealous, even fanatical, Moslem areas), who was also a religious teacher and author, H. Abu Bakar, of the Masjumi fraction. On 22 May Abadi reported that he called on the whole Islamic community in Indonesia to pray to the Almighty Lord to save the Indonesian State and Nation from danger "in this world as well as in the world hereafter." Furthermore it was stated that the call was in connection with the crisis being faced by the Assembly at that time.

Abadi's editorial on 26 May commenting on PM Djuanda's reply, stated that if indeed Indonesia worked to build a just and prosperous society with the guarantee of the Lord Almighty, the only way was to carry out God's law and doctrine in relation to believers to the fullest.

It asked what was the meaning of a state based on belief in Almighty God if God's laws and doctrines might not be made the source of law for believers. Because of that, it was correct for Abadi to call on Islamic fractions in the Constituent Assembly still to fulfil their promise to their electors first and remain alert towards the heavy warnings of the Lord.

In his contribution to "From the Constituent Assembly Rostrum" on May 29, Masjumi spokesman Prawoto quoted the Koran in similar vein. He cited a paragraph in the

epistle of Isra' which read, "May your God pity you. But if you do return to pre-Islamic ways, i.e., forget the carrying out of God's laws over His followers, then We [said God] will return to drop miserable punishment upon you. And We create Hell as a residence for persons who are [unfaithful]." Prawoto hoped the warning of the Koran would be a guide for Islamic representatives in the Constituent Assembly and for all Indonesian Moslems in facing "these critical moments," so that they still put first the command to do good deeds and banish sin from all their earthly interests, as spoken by the Great Prophet Muhammad.

6/ Importance of the Islamic Role in the National Life

Another theme, used by Islamic spokesmen for obvious reasons, was the importance of the Islamic role in Indonesian national life.

A typical example is the speech of Prof. Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, reported on 19 May.

"Does not the Government need sympathy and support from the Islamic Community?" he asked. "Please act if you are certain there is no need."

He went on to suggest there might be parties which were uncomfortable to hear such statements, but the Islamic Community, before the coming of foreign

colonialism, had Islamic states in Indonesia. The coming of foreign colonialism had wiped out the states and their constitutions, but national history had proved that the national resistance had been raised and urged on by the spirit and soul of Islam. Muzakkir said he could not understand why the national government of a national state, which was led for the most part by Moslems, still dared to advance proposals which conflicted with the philosophy of life of the Islamic Community in Indonesia. The colonial government had still heeded the judgements and advice of the Adviser for "Indian" Affairs, but why did the Djuanda Cabinet not heed and quietly consider the feelings of the Islamic Community in the same way?

The first of Alauddin La Wugi's articles on "How far the President's Conception Can meet the Islamic group" on 23 May also stressed this aspect. Some of his comments in this connection are mentioned above in the section on the Djakarta Charter.

La Wugi then catalogued heroes in Indonesia's history who had rebelled against the Dutch and other colonialisms "for none other than the call of their religion."

He said the President's acknowledgement that the Islamic Community formed the largest group in Indonesian society (he cited Res Publica, Once More Res Publica, Page 32) was probably true. It was just this size of the

Islamic group which through democracy dictated that the state should meet and should place as the kernel of the state constitution the desires of the Islamic group.

Abadi's editorial on 26 May answering Bintang Timur's criticisms also had much to say about the importance of the ummat. In a typical paragraph the editorial said the demands of the Islamic fractions in the Constituent Assembly had to be understood in connection with the "safety and welfare" of the majority of the Indonesian people, and if people asked that this very important question be solved by full toleration, then toleration towards the Islamic community must be very especially needed, for the future prosperity of Indonesia.

While the Islamic claim was a form of special pleading, it had some basis in fact. Irrespective of real religious conviction, the badge of Indonesian nationalism during Dutch colonial rule was adherence to the Islamic religion.

Islam was regarded as one of the distinguishing marks of Indonesian identity, as Christian mission activity was regarded as part of Dutch colonial policy and other allies of the Dutch, such as the Chinese, were non-Islamic. Many rebellions under Dutch rule and many of the earlier manifestations of modern nationalism were also under the aegis of Islam and undertaken for partly religious reasons.³

However, in the 1930s, and increasingly after independence, secular nationalism played a dominant role and nominal Moslems no longer felt the need to put loyalty to Islam first. In fact the santri element merely formed a large minority in the country as a whole and a relatively smaller minority in Java, the most populous island.

The claim of the Islamic group to represent the majority was therefore an ambiguous one and unlikely to carry much weight. Even the prominence of Islam in the independence struggle, while it was probably acknowledged, would have been set against comparable efforts by other groups.

7/ "Soul and Spirit" of the 1945 Constitution

The mystical element in Indonesian ideology enters into much of the discussion on return to the 1945 Constitution.

Although one of the principal reasons for the proposal was to give the President more powers, as evidenced by the frequent references to "the framework of Guided Democracy," an ostensible reason, and the one most usually put forward for general consumption, was that such a return was the only way to recapture the "soul and spirit" of that constitution, which was the "soul and spirit" of the 1945 revolution itself.

There is no doubt there was a wistful looking back to the revolution and to the spirit of unity which it produced. It was thought that, if this spirit could be recaptured, the evils afflicting Indonesian society could be banished, particularly the divisiveness which had arisen as a result of disillusion with the results of the revolution.

The belief that such a reformation would result from re-adoption of a written constitution designed to meet the conditions of 1945, as if the document had some magic property to cure the political, social and economic malaise, was, however, the kind of mysticism which is found in many aspects of Indonesian politics.

Although the Islamic parties did not make a frontal attack on the 1945 Constitution, one of the more positive aspects of their criticism was to minimise the mystical aspect and to suggest that the "spirit and soul" of the 1945 Constitution could not be found in its letter.

Muzakkir put forward this view in his Assembly speech, reported on May 19. He said he felt the spirit and soul of 1945 still lived fresh in the spirit of the Indonesian Islamic Community, which was still loyal to State independence and still defended it with the spirit and soul of the 1945 revolution.

Tahir Abubakar also mentioned the Government's ideological emphasis in returning to the 1945 Constitution in the instalment of his speech published on 21 May. Noting the Government's desire for restoration of national potential, contained in the spirit of that constitution, he commented that this was regarded as a factor in achieving political, economic and social stabilisation aiming at a just and prosperous society, and the Government felt that those who did not wish for such a result (by implication through return to the 1945 Constitution) were not children of Indonesia. Abubakar continued the Islamic group desired not only a "just and prosperous society" but also to obtain the forgiveness of Almighty God. In the centre of restoring the soundness of national potential must be a spiritual basis and for unity were needed precision, understanding, patience and perseverance, together with mutual give and take between all sides. Such a proposal as return to the 1945 Constitution was in fact the same as making a new constitution; the spiritual aspect must still be noted. If forced recklessly, while it was certainly still possible to complete it, if "national potential" was achieved like that no stabilisation on the political, economic and social levels could be created.

In the second of La Wugi's articles, on 25 May, he listed the amendments to the 1945 Constitution required by the Islamic group before accepting it as the permanent constitution and noted the first as being the putting first of the soul and spirit of Return to the '45 Constitution, namely progress towards national peace and unity, including return of the Sukarno-Hatta duumvirate.

Prawoto, on 29 May, was reported as saying Masjumi could agree to return to the soul and spirit of 1945, but with great regret he stated they were not convinced; the Government conception was different from their conception, which brought them to the 1945 spirit and soul in its most perfect and fullest meaning.

The "Friday Meditation" by Alyus Iskandar on the same day recalled that Government judgement, in returning to the 1945 Constitution, according to Djuanda, was based on objective considerations, to overcome various difficulties in the state and community, although this constitution as promulgated, like other constitutions up to the present, had actually caused many of those difficulties.

Where the Islamic bloc failed to provide a full solution to the problem of a return to the soul and spirit of the 1945 Constitution was in their failure to find any

broader foundation than an Islamic basis for the state, but, of course, from their point of view this was the ideal solution.

8/ Intimidation

As noted above, intimidation could have been one of the reasons for the emphasis on Islamic unity, but intimidation was openly alleged only towards the end of our period.

The statement of the "West Java Islamic Parties and Mass Organisations Consultative Body," published on 27 May, included one of the first references to intimidation, saying that its existence in any form whatever was not justified and therefore the Body hoped for the attention of the authorities.

On the same day, on Page 1, there was a report from the Constituent Assembly session which also concerned alleged intimidation. Safiuddin (Penjaluran) mentioned that there was intimidation by letters or by telephone of the side which opposed the Government proposal.

The editorial on 28 May, referring to Safiuddin's statement, asked what was the Government action on the matter, and whether Government scruples did not already guarantee members against all forms of intimidation.

Besides that, the Government also had a duty to maintain a calm atmosphere in the Constituent Assembly, so

that the concept of a return to the 1945 Constitution could be discussed maturely and correctly by Constituent Assembly members, who were elected by the people, said the editorial.

"It is not a nice feeling if later voices are heard that the Government launched intimidation at Constituent Assembly members who were against the Government proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution. Because it was only those members who opposed who were affected..., while none on the other side were affected."

The editorial thanked God that the intimidation was still only in the form of letters and telephone calls, but asked how the matter would be if later intimidation became bullets and took the form of force. However, in this case Abadi said it was convinced that the Government would act and it was thankful Indonesia still had a legitimate Government from which it could request protection from intimidation in whatever form.

The last sentence could have been meant as a challenge to the Government to prove its truth rather than as a mere statement of fact. It also attempted to forestall any argument that Abadi did not recognise the Government as legitimate (which many people, notably the PRRI-Permesta rebels, did not).

Conclusion

These sub-topics are by no means exhaustive, but they are possibly the ones with the greatest news interest. Among omissions, for example, are lengthy arguments on the historical background which has been presented in Part I.

In the succeeding days, up to the ban on political activities on June 3, the polemic continued, but arguments tended to be repetitive. Speeches of Islamic leaders were reported fully and the taking of successive votes in the Constituent Assembly were given adequate coverage.

It is evident that as far as Abadi was concerned, editorial policy had a greater influence than fear of censorship on news and comment. There was in fact less restraint during the 1959 crisis than in the 1953 dispute.

This can be ascribed to the unity which was felt on the issue not only within the Masjumi party but between the Islamic parties, especially after the NU, which participated in the Government, threw its weight on the side of amendment of the 1945 Constitution.

The strength of the case of the Islamic parties is outside the scope of the present thesis, but the arguments which were used to support it in the press were not very convincing, e.g., given the Islamic identification of religion and state, the idea of including enforcement of

the law of Islam for its adherents may be understandable, but logically there seems no reason why Moslems should need to be legislated into obeying the rules of their religion any more than any other community.

Based on such arguments, there was hardly more objectivity on the Islamic side than on that of their opponents and this is reflected in the press not so much in distortion as in over-reporting and comment almost ad nauseum.

However, on this particular aspect of the proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution it would be optimistic to expect balanced and objective treatment.

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Chapter 2 - Merdeka

In 1959 Merdeka, of our four representative newspapers, came closest to the Government position.

The Government itself at that time was the so-called Karya or Working Cabinet consisting of individuals of whom some were members of parties (mainly NU and PNI) and some not. It was led by the non-party Ir. Djuanda.

The essential fact about the Government was that it was appointed (on a doubtful constitutional basis) by President Sukarno. Moreover the proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution was agreed between the President and the Government and was probably originally his idea.

Although not strictly the member of any party, President Sukarno, at least until recent years, was associated with the PNI and indeed formed a party with the same name and somewhat similar principles during Dutch rule before the War, although continuity with the present party is rather tenuous.

Merdeka was a "non-party" paper, but indicated it preferred the PNI and was not yet subject to the deviations which finally caused it to be banned. It was therefore close to the views of the President, if not to those of the Government itself.

The 14 May issue dealt with the forthcoming speeches in the Constituent Assembly and also briefly reported some of the speeches delivered on May 12, including that of I.J. Kasimo (Catholic), supporting the Government's proposal.

It also reported Prof. Kahar Muzakar (Masjumi) as claiming that the proposal was not genuine because sources of Islamic law were not found in the 1945 Constitution.

On May 15 Merdeka reported PM Djuanda as stating that the Government would still reply to the debate on 21 May. He had attended Assembly sessions with other ministers and was optimistic that difficulties could be overcome.

In answer to a question, PM Djuanda said he had made contact with "influential" people, apparently to attempt to smooth a way to return to the 1945 Constitution.

On 16 May Merdeka reported that no large party positively rejected the proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution, but that there were very many "nuances" among groups putting forward amendments and conditions and that even within fractions there was no certainty as to how individuals would vote. It was also reported that PM Djuanda had held discussions with NU leaders, although the NU spokesman denied they concerned non-acceptance of the 1945 Constitution. He said the NU would first hear the Government reply and that the PSII had also not finally determined its attitude.

Merdeka dealt at some length with the lack of solidarity within some of the smaller fractions.

It reported the NU standpoint on the Djakarta Charter on 20 May in such a way as to minimise the party's conflict with the President's message of 22 April, although, to be fair, this was the party's own emphasis in the statement of its Secretary-General, Saifuddin Zuhri. The statement was to the effect that if, as the president had said, the spirit of the 1945 Constitution was as important as its letter, the Djakarta Charter, which was the spirit of the Constitution, was as important as the text of the Constitution itself.

The text of the 1945 Constitution must therefore be reconciled with the Djakarta Charter.

On May 21 Merdeka reported a meeting of twenty '45 struggle figures in Surabaja to commemorate National Awakening Day. The meeting urged the Constituent Assembly to accept the '45 Constitution without amendment - a nationalist counter to Islamic meetings with the opposite intention.

Merdeka reported on 22 May a statement by Djuanda to the Constituent Assembly that the Government felt enough material had been conveyed to the Constituent Assembly to enable it to determine its final attitude. Djuanda was delivering the Government reply to the Assembly's debate.

In an editorial on the Government reply, the paper said it indicated the Government's conviction that its proposal could be accepted by the Assembly. The Government's reply to Masjumi had been in accordance with that party's own attitude, the editorial stated.

The Government had said it did not need to listen to criticisms of a personal character by several Masjumi members of President Sukarno.

The Government had clarified to the NU that although acknowledgement of the existence of the Djakarta Charter did not mean that historic document was in force directly, yet it was also an acknowledgement that the Charter inspired the 1945 Constitution, especially its preamble and article 29.

There was also a reminder of the possibility of later "perfection" of the Constitution through the People's Consultative Assembly (not yet formed, but confidently expected to be established soon).

Merdeka's opinion was that the Government reply was sufficiently clear and firm and that its analysis was based on the greatest tolerance. Merdeka maintained its conviction (sadly astray in the event) that the NU would achieve agreement with the majority to accept return to the '45 Constitution as a whole.

The editorial claimed the President's proposal was that the Constitution be accepted entirely and not amended even a little, because amendment would destroy its authenticity.

On the same page the text of the new charter plan to give effect to the '45 Constitution was published, including acknowledgement of the Djakarta Charter as an historic document and the text of that charter.

On May 25 Merdeka foreshadowed the very short second phase of the Assembly's general consideration of the Government proposal.

Merdeka reported the PSII attitude on 26 May, which was to accept a concept of return to the 1945 Constitution "in which the Djakarta Charter dated 22 June 1945 becomes its introduction in accordance with the spirit and soul of the 17 August 1945 Proclamation."

On 27 May Merdeka reported that Chairman Mr. Wilopo proposed that, if there were those who really wished for amendments, they should submit their amendments in writing to the Constituent Assembly secretariat; the Government had intimated that it would not reply again in the Assembly.

Merdeka gave prominence to Djuanda's warning of the consequences if the Government proposal were refused and

to his willingness to accept Assembly decisions as binding, without amending the '45 Constitution.

In the same issue the paper reported Prawoto Mangkusasmito (Masjumi) as saying his party was not convinced that the Government conception would really bring the nation to the soul and spirit of 1945.

Masjkur (NU) reaffirmed his fraction's attitude that it wanted the Djakarta Charter acknowledged as the basic principle and source of law of the state and that the '45 Constitution must be in accordance with the Charter.

On 30 May Merdeka reported differing interpretations of a decision to determine the Constitution as a whole before discussing the implementing Bandung Charter with its amendments. Prawoto Mangkusasmito said an amendment to the main body of the Constitution must be discussed first, to which the proposer of the original decision did not agree.

Merdeka said the PNI was of the opinion that what must be decided was the Constitution without amendment. The meeting closed without an agenda being determined.

Evidently these difficulties were soon resolved, because on 1 June Merdeka reported that a meeting of the Assembly had closed with a ballot in which 269 votes agreed to the Constitution and 199 disagreed, less than the required two-thirds majority.

The report mentioned that on 27 May Islamic fractions had inserted an amendment that the Djakarta Charter be made the introduction to the Constitution and that the obligation to carry out the law of Islam for its adherents be included in article 29 paragraph (1).

An Islamic proposal to hold a ballot on the amendment and the Constitution itself simultaneously was rejected. The ballot on the amendment was therefore held on the Friday night and that on the Constitution as a whole on the Saturday. Merdeka reported K.H. Masjkur (NU), proposer of the motion, as saying that the amendment was genuine and that there would be no compulsion on religion, a rather ambiguous statement.

The head or Rois Aam, of the NU, K. Wahab, speaking as an individual, stated the Islamic fractions' amendment was minimal. If it were rejected, Islamic fractions could not accept the 1945 Constitution without change.

Mention was made of the fact that several members of minor fractions did not agree to the amendment.

In an editorial, Merdeka said it was difficult to hope that the majority in favour of a return to the 1945 Constitution would be any greater in future ballots. It noted that Wahab's statement although camouflaged as a personal opinion, proved that the NU no longer stood by

the support it had given to the Djuanda Cabinet decision and President Sukarno's proposal.

Merdeka considered that the NU had aligned itself with "other fractions" which had opposed the Government from the beginning, although NU members had seats in the Cabinet. Yet NU General-Chairman Idham Chalid, before going abroad, had stated that the NU agreed to the country's return to the old State Constitution and had only touched on the Djakarta Charter as an historic document.

These comments reflect PNI bitterness at NU actions.

Inability to return to the 1945 Constitution would hamper Guided Democracy, which was a way of aiming at a just and prosperous society, and this was material for reflection, said Merdeka. The last word about a decision to return to the '45 Constitution rested with President Sukarno himself, the editorial concluded, resting its conviction on the forthcoming departure of a delegation to report to the President.

On 2 June Merdeka reported the second ballot, held on the previous night, resulting in a vote of 264 in favour and 204 against. A two thirds majority would have been 313 in favour.

The next day Merdeka accompanied its report of the inconclusive third ballot with a picture of Prime Minister

Djuanda with Zainal Arifin of the NU fraction a few minutes before the ballot and another of Bandung inhabitants swarming in front of the Assembly building to get the ballot result. Merdeka reported the opinion of PKI speaker Anwar Sanusi, that the Assembly should dissolve itself. On the other hand it also included an NU statement that the session should be temporarily adjourned.

The ban on political activities was reported only briefly on June 3, with a promise to carry the regulation in full in the next day's issue.

The editorial on June 3 gave the best summary of Merdeka's views on the crisis. It gave the opinion that the best road for President Sukarno to clear away obstacles in the Constituent Assembly would be to promulgate the 1945 Constitution.

Recalling that the Islamic bloc called the addition to article 29 paragraph (1) a very minimal request, the editorial commented that Merdeka actually could understand that the Assembly had rejected the "minimal proposal" because to accept it would mean that in fact the Indonesian Republic would become an Islamic State. If the Assembly accepted the proposal the Islamic parties would achieve their aims too easily.

Merdeka thought the "minimal proposal" was fundamental.

On the other hand, Merdeka thought the impasse created a situation in which the President could issue a decree without having to take into consideration the feelings of the opposition.

In Merdeka's opinion the place of the Djakarta Charter was not in the introduction to the Constitution, but in the state documentation archives and it was no longer possible for it to become the source of law. It had carried out its function and had no more strength and significance except as documentation material for history book writers.

Although the editorial admitted that the '45 Constitution introduction originated from the "Djakarta Charter", it had already experienced a change in principle before it was inserted into the Constitution, as the words regarding the law of Islam were omitted from the Constitution. The '45 Constitution introduction was an improvement and perfection of the Djakarta Charter, which was regarded as less good and less perfect.

Even in 1945 the Indonesian nation has rejected or corrected the Djakarta Charter. Therefore replacing the '45 Constitution introduction with the original text of the Djakarta Charter would mean also return to something which once was considered less good and less perfect.

In Merdeka's opinion, the placing of the Djakarta Charter within the Noble Charter to return to the 1945 Constitution (apparently Merdeka means substantively and not as an historic document) would only create a source of difficulty which would raise dualism in legal interpretation in future.

The Indonesian nation could now return to the Proclamation Constitution in its purest form, without the Djakarta Charter.

The outright rejection of the Islamic bloc's demands, the reliance on President Sukarno's authority and the almost mystical belief in the '45 Constitution were all typical of PNI sentiment.

Chapter 3 - Pedoman

Compared with other newspapers, Pedoman gave a similar proportionate amount of attention to the 1959 constitutional crisis as it did to the 1953 dispute on the basis of the state.

In other words, it played the controversy down, in marked contrast to Abadi.

On the other hand, in absolute terms, a greater amount of space was given to the 1959 than to the 1953 dispute by Pedoman, as was appropriate to the much greater importance of the later controversy.

Yet, as before, for Pedoman the issue was not primarily one of Islam versus Pantjasila; in fact at the end of the dispute the paper deplored such a dichotomy between groups. True, it supported a return to the 1945 Constitution, but it did so, not for the sake of that Constitution in itself, but for the aims which it was hoped to achieve by such a step, namely a return to the 1945 spirit.

Pedoman was much more concerned that the change should be brought about constitutionally, or at least that any unconstitutional step in an emergency should be openly admitted as such and that constitutionalism itself should not be undermined.

In the end the Communists and their fellow-travellers came in for sharper criticism than supporters for an Islamic basis for the state and arguments against such a basis in the columns of Pedoman were negligible.

Pedoman entered the dispute on May 15 to report the stand of its own party, the PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia - Indonesian Socialist Party). Under a cross-heading in the same news item it reported the decision of the PPI (All-Indonesian Former Armed Strugglers' Union) Congress on the question of an Islamic state basis.

The overall heading stated: "PSI agrees to return to '45 Constitution for moral regeneration and intellectual renaissance. Opportunity which is given '45 Constitution must truly be used." Twenty column inches was given to the main item, at the top of Page 1, while 2-3/4 column inches was given to the PPI Congress.

The Congress, which was held from 27 to 30 April in Bandung, was attended by delegations from regions and branches from throughout Indonesia. It "decided that in taking a decision [on their] attitude towards the concept of return to the 1945 Constitution, the [PPI] urges Islamic fractions within the Constituent Assembly to still struggle for only Islam as the State Basis. Also it urged all leaders who have responsibility, that, when facing the concept of return to the 1945 Constitution, [they] do not

take steps which could raise new difficulties in addition to those already existing."

There was a straight report of the first vote in the Constituent Assembly in the issue on May 16. It was headed: "Constituent Assembly and return to '45 Constitution. Balanced picture of votes which agree and those [which] do not, not yet clear."

In the same issue there was an interesting report on Government relations with the NU at this stage. It read as follows: "In the office of Constituent Assembly deputy chairman II, K.H. Fatcharrachman Kafrawi, PM Ir. H. Djuanda Wednesday afternoon - a moment before the Constituent Assembly plenary meeting ended - held a consultation with NU figures who attended the Constituent Assembly session. According to report, the consultation, which lasted more than one hour revolved around the NU attitude in the Constituent Assembly, which was expressed by Constituent Assembly member H. Zainal Arifin."

The Government was evidently already concerned at the swing against its proposal by the NU.

An editorial on May 19 stated: "If it can be summarised simply, probably it can be said that in the last days of the first stage of the general consideration in the Constituent Assembly...several tendencies increasingly appear.

"It has been requested that the Djakarta Charter should not be considered as the preamble to the 1945 Constitution, but to form the source of all sources. The Djakarta Charter...is the basis of the independence proclamation and not of the 1945 Constitution. This standpoint is clarified truly by the NU. And there is no doubt still that the Islamic fractions' sentiment is parallel with it.

"Other parties cannot agree whether the Djakarta Charter is to be created the source of law.

"An addition to the '45 Constitution has also been requested to be made. [This would take the form of a supplement] containing the results of the Constituent Assembly [which] later would be used by the government to perfect the 1945 Constitution.

"...the Djakarta Charter problem and the Additions problem were enough to give difficulty to the government."

On May 20 Pedoman reported a meeting between PNI and NU leaders "to promote efforts to overcome difficulties in the Constituent Assembly."

Pedoman reported that the meeting did not reach any conclusions and "the respective sides only put forward [their] respective views on the question of a return to the 1945 Constitution."

In the same issue the paper gave in full the first part of the text of an important speech by Soedjatmoko of the PSI in the Constituent Assembly on 13 May.

As background on the PSI attitude to return to the 1945 Constitution the speech is valuable, but it is remarkable in the present context in making no direct reference to the dispute on the basis of the state.

Soedjatmoko said the PSI believed that the existence of a draft constitution as soon as possible was more important than improving upon it. He stressed the transitional character of the present stage of Indonesian history and therefore the relative unimportance of the formulation of a complete constitution.

It needed to be concise, brief, flexible and easily amendable to suit the transitional character of the present national consciousness.

Soedjatmoko stressed that the 1945 Constitution did not stand alone but was part of a process based on a desire to seek a way out of the general political crisis. The Constituent Assembly's task was to try to ignore purely political problems and to seek reasons for the crisis which were connected with state political institutions and structure.

In the present historical stage, what was normal was instability, while the terms stabilisation and

normalisation were none other than empty words. The Constituent Assembly needed always to realise and give a place to a desire for change and progress within the institutional structure and must give a place and role to it within the Constitution.

State institutions should be arranged in such a form that tensions could be accepted and channelled peacefully.

National life in future would take place between two poles, the pole of change and progress and the pole of the need to guard national unity. It must always be possible to reconcile these poles within the framework of the state constitution.

Two criteria of measurement needed to be held in facing Indonesian constitutional questions: whether the Indonesian Constitution gave opportunity to carry out the process of change and progress; and whether it gave the opportunity to Indonesians to live together "as occupants of one house."

According to Soedjatmoko, it was not difficult to see that the '45 Constitution fulfilled both these criteria.

In the second part of the text, the following day, Soedjatmoko advocated the giving of a special place to functional groups which took a direct part in economic development.

He continued: "We are conscious, Mr. Chairman, that in putting forward all this we have not yet finished discussing our problem; questions, doubts and anxieties which are in the minds of members of a part of the Constituent Assembly are not yet answered. But part of those questions actually are outside the special constitutional field, and have a political character. Within my discussion here, Mr. Chairman, I am forced to limit myself to the constitutional aspects. [In] my opinion this is not the place and time to discuss problems which are actually situated in another field. Yet although not discussed, it is perhaps good to also try to place them in connection with these constitutional aspects."

Soedjatmoko said the Constitution had three functions: to determine the limits of the political authority of the state towards its citizens, and the rights of citizens towards the state; to determine the ordering of state institutions; and to determine social aims which must be carried out by the state as an instrument.

However, the Constitution was an opportunity, not a guarantee. The guarantee was in the consciousness, conviction and courage of the citizens.

Soedjatmoko did not feel that such was the configuration and ordering of powers in society that anxiety [about] the concentration of dictatorial authority

could be regarded as having foundation, because clearly there was no one group or one party whose power was sufficient in Indonesia to carry out its will alone against those who differed.

So Soejatmoko continued, answering general objections to the Constitution as such. Only at the very end of his speech did he allude to the state basis question: "Mr. Chairman, in a closing word, the Indonesian Socialist Party fraction understands also the objections of several other fractions to accepting the Government proposals without amendment.

"But the Indonesian Socialist Party Fraction feels that the possibility of seeking a form of procedure to [meet] those objections still exists and from the side of the Indonesian Socialist Party Fraction there is always readiness to give a contribution towards that."

The above statement was placatory, but in fact the PSI was firm in its support for the 1945 Constitution and strongly opposed to the Djakarta Charter.

On May 22 Pedoman reported a statement by Prime Minister Djuanda before the Constituent Assembly. He hoped the session would achieve accord and unanimity and later the Constituent Assembly, together with the government, would achieve accord and unity on the concept

of return to the 1945 Constitution without absolute standpoints and without acting compulsorily to contain various kinds of emphasis.

Pedoman continued, "Concerning only the gist of the thought that 'to meet the desire of Islamic groups in connection with the completion and maintenance of security, the existence of the Djakarta Charter dated 22 June 1945 which was signed by 9 national figures is to be acknowledged,'" PM Djuanda put forward as follows:

"Towards honourable members, Brothers K.H.M. Sjukri, Saifuddin Zuhri and Kuasini Sabil, it is put forward that the meaning of acknowledgement of the existence of the Djakarta Charter...has been clarified within the President's Message on 22 April 1959 that it is as an 'historic document' having great meaning for the struggle of the Indonesian Nation and as material for compiling the 1945 Constitution Preamble, which became part of the 1945 Constitution Proclamation.

"Although acknowledgement of the existence of the Djakarta Charter does not mean that the 'historic document' mentioned has direct force, yet, as has been emphasised, the term...contains an acknowledgement that the Djakarta Charter inspired the 1945 Constitution, especially for its Preamble and article 29, an article which furthermore must

become a basis for the existence of law in the field of religion.

"The connection between the Djakarta Charter and the 1945 Constitution was felt to be sufficiently clarified in the Government explanation to the People's Consultative Council dated 25 April 1959, among other things on the question of honourable member Bro. Achmed Sjaichu, which, as is known, was also conveyed to the Constituent Assembly.

"Furthermore the Government considered it necessary to state that, remembering the fact that the greater part of the Indonesian people embraces the Islamic religion and remembering also democratic procedure, namely a general election to choose people's representatives to the People's Representative Council and the People's Consultative Assembly later, the Government is convinced that both representative Bodies...will not accept or determine a decision on Laws [or] other regulations which conflict with Islamic law, while not subtracting [from] the decision which was written down in article 29 of the 1945 Constitution for adherents of other religions.

"In addition to that it is good that we together realise that, according to the 1945 Constitution, consultation in the People's Representative Council and People's Consultative Assembly is guided by 'the wisdom of discretion in representative consultation.'"

Despite the full treatment given to this section of Djuanda's statement ($9\frac{1}{2}$ column inches), Pedoman did not comment on it in its editorial that day. Instead it dealt with the general state of affairs in the Constituent Assembly.

The editorial, headed "Constituent Assembly decisions next week," stated: "...In its broad lines three sides of the question [of return to the 1945 Constitution] can be summarised, [but] each party gives evaluations which differ from [those of the other parties]. The three sides are that which can be said to touch on the spirit of the 1945 Constitution; that which concerns its formulation; and steps to return to the 1945 Constitution as a road to achieve political stability within the country. The 'spiritual' question in its clearest form revolves around differences of opinion on the question of the Djakarta Charter, concerning which Islamic groups can be said to draw a line. The formulation question, in the sense of the possibility of addition/amendment to the 1945 Constitution, still is a hot point, while those who see the step to return to the 1945 Constitution as a way to achieve political stability in the country by itself [use] criteria which [differ widely] also.

"Actually, in the present stage of the situation a feeling of the existence of political stability, which

gives confidence to the community in a democratic climate, is the principal urgent question for the safety of our state. The rise of a spirit of service to the state and the public interest, fresh inspiration which can remove the spirit of corruption and the putting first of self-interest is itself a necessity which is acute if collapse of the political, economic and moral situation in our country should be prevented from advancing farther. In that connection it is already certain that what determines are not words and slogans, but deeds and actions.

"In the present picture above, developments within the Constituent Assembly [centre] on the field of constitutional procedure. Next week evidently will bring determinations which are sufficiently decisive in that connection."

Decisions of the second IPKI conference were reported in Pedoman on May 25 as in other papers.

There was also a report of the PSII leadership decision that only if the Djakarta Charter became the Preamble would it agree to return to the 1945 Constitution. Pedoman gave more space than Abadi to this story, even allowing for its inclusion of the "BKOI cable" report which Abadi treated separately.

The report stated: "The Indonesian Islamic Association Party General Management Session, which was held

successively on 25-26 April and [2]1 and 22 May and which was attended also by the Chairman and members of the PSII Fraction in Parliament and the Constituent Assembly, together with PSII Regional Commisariat delegations [from] Central Sumatra, South Sumatra, Greater Djakarta, West Java, Central Java, East Java, the Lesser Sundas and Sulawesi South/Southeast, took place at Taman Matraman Timor No. 2, Djakarta.

After discussing deeply and widely the problem of the concept of return to the 1945 Constitution, in accordance with a PSII General Management Policy Team decision dated 26-27 February, 1959, [the session] was of the opinion:

1. That since the standpoint of the Indonesian Islamic Association Party makes [as its] ideal, and struggles for, enforcement of Islamic laws to the widest and fullest [extent] in the Indonesian [homeland];

2. That the extraordinary...assembly of the Indonesian Islamic Association Party in Surabaya in 1959 has drafted an Indonesian Republican State Constitution according to PSII [desires];

[Therefore:]

1. That the PSII acknowledges and realises the existence of an emergency situation which is faced by the State at this time;

2. That the Djakarta Charter dated 22 June 1945 from the beginning was to become the Introduction of the 1945 Constitution [draft].

"The session decides that the Indonesian Islamic Association Party accepts a concept of return to the 1945 Constitution in which the Djakarta Charter dated 22 June 1945 becomes the Introduction in accordance with the spirit and soul of 17 August, 1945."

Under a cross-heading, the BKOI (Islamic Organisations' Co-operation Body) cable was reported as follows: "Greater Djakarta BKOI Chairman A. Imran Kader, in the name of 63 Islamic organisations which are grouped in the [body] mentioned, in his cable, which was conveyed to Islamic fraction chairmen in the Constituent Assembly in plenary session today, stated:

1. So that Islamic fractions in the Constituent Assembly remain solid and guard the heart of the Islamic Organisations 100%; [they]

2. [Watch] with Islamic alertness infiltration by non-Islamic groups, to prevent the flattery which damages the Islamic constitutional struggle;

3. [Guard against] all kinds of promises from a third side which could weaken the frontal defence of Islamic parties in the Constituent Assembly.

4. [The body] realises fully the responsibility of Islamic representatives who will determine [the result] of Islamic struggles in the Constituent Assembly.

5. [The body] holds firmly to the [mandate] of all Islamic voters by taking an attitude and action which is consistent on the basis of the full demands of the Islamic constitutional struggle.

"Such were the contents of the cable."

The report which was published on May 25 in Abadi of Moslem Congress Body Secretary H. Firdaus' statement did not appear in Pedoman until the following day. However, again much more space was given to the story by Pedoman (possibly because so much space was given by Abadi to other aspects of the dispute).

On the other hand, most of the Pedoman report is taken up by the report of a reply by Murba to Firdaus, which does not seem to have been published in Abadi and was, of course, much more critical of the Djakarta Charter.

The report read as follows:

"In connection with a statement of H. Firdaus A.N. in connection with Sukarni's explanation, the 'Murba Party' Party Council Agit./Prop. Bureau gave an affirmation i.e. as follows:

"It is certainly true, as was stated by H. Firdaus A.N., that the 'Djakarta Charter' forms a source which

radiated fire. But the fire was 'the fire of the Dai Nippon Teikoku sunrise', And it is clearly obvious [it was] not the fire of the 17 August 1945 Proclamation, which radiated from Indonesian Revolutionary-People's-Mass-Action, which had as capital the bamboo spears and a flaming spirit of 100% independence. So said 'Partai Murba' Party Council Agit./Prop.

"As [evidence] that the 'Djakarta Charter' was born in the opzet of freedom a la 'Dai Nippon Teikoku - leaders, protectors, defenders of Great East Asia' (AAA), 'Partai Murba' D.P. Agit./Prop. quoted the Constitution Preamble Draft notes in a meeting on 14 July 2605 [1945]."

Reports on May 27 of Constituent Assembly speeches were similar to Abadi's, although not quite so much space was given to Hamka's speech. Special mention may be made of the following speeches which were reported in Pedoman:

"Simorangkir (Parkindo) reaffirmed the stand of his fraction, namely agreeing that the 1945 Constitution be accepted as a whole. The Djakarta Charter was not part of the 1945 Constitution,...did not form a source of law,... did not have the force of law and did not need to be [included] in the Bandung Charter.

"...Muljono Muljopranoto (Sudjono and associates) could accept return to the 1945 Constitution as a whole; he felt he did not have material to express an opinion on

the Djakarta Charter and could not follow the Government intention with its Bandung Charter plan.

"...Ko Kwat Oen (Persatuan [- Unity]) expressed an intention [to support] the group which accepts return to the 1945 Constitution. [In his] opinion Islamic fractions had a determining vote and therefore he urged that they hold a meeting to [attempt] to solve the Djakarta Charter problem."

Pedoman reported on May 30 the visit of Idham Chalid to Bandung to take part in the Constituent Assembly ballot and his holding of discussions with NU Executive members before his visit.

On 1 June Pedoman reported the result of the first vote in the Constituent Assembly as follows:

"In the first stage of voting, the Constituent Assembly, in Bandung Saturday afternoon at 14.10 hours, did not succeed in reaching a 2/3 majority to realise the government proposal to establish the 1945 Constitution as the RI permanent Constitution.

"In accordance with the Constituent Assembly Consultative Committee, on Monday evening a vote will be taken for the second time. If it still does not reach a 2/3 majority, a third vote will be taken also on Tuesday morning next.

"Saturday's vote was carried out openly, the session leadership calling the names of members one by one to state their attitudes, whether agreeing or not to the government proposal.

"269 members agreed, 199 members disagreed. According to the members' list 474 persons attended, so that the quorum to reach a 2/3 vote was 316.

"Before the taking of the vote, members Njoto of PKI, Sarino Mangunpranoto of PNI, Mr. Simorangkir of Parkindo, A. Bastari of P3RI, Baheramsjah Sutan Indra of the Labour Party, Usman Ismail of IPKI [and] Rumaseuw of the West Irian Union gave speeches which in essence supported the government proposal, while member W.A. Rachman of PSII, who spoke in the name of 8 Islamic fractions, expressed rejection of the government proposal.

"W.A. Rachman expressed his regret because discrimination was found...[as] between the amendment which was put forward by Islamic fractions and the main body of the '45 Constitution itself.

"All supporters, according to the speaker, always proposed unity, but the actions of the fractions mentioned on the contrary disrupted unity. He said that Indonesian Islamic parties which [conveyed] the desire of the Indonesian Islamic community were ready to accept the government proposals with conditions, although each in its

own way. The easiest condition was the amendment which was put forward by Islamic fractions but not accepted by the session. Therefore Islamic fractions could not accept the proposal to return to the '45 Constitution, according to the speaker.

"The first stage of the voting could only be held at 12.30 after the session had been adjourned twice.

"Up to 11.00 hours the meeting was suspended twice with the intention of again holding a meeting of the Constituent Assembly Consultative Committee, because the earlier PMK decision had been amended again by the NU, who still asked to speak on arrangements concerning voting.

"The Friday night meeting to discuss the Islamic fractions' proposed amendment ended at 1.30. That vote was taken twice. The first [vote] was stated [to be] invalid because the number of votes did not tally; [there was] a surplus of 8 votes. Those who attended were 470, the number of votes 478. In the repeat vote the Islamic fractions' proposed amendment was rejected by a [difference] of votes of 208 against 201.

"Islamic fractions [at this] session (on 27/5) had submitted an amendment that the Djakarta Charter be created the 1945 Constitution introduction and that article 29 paragraph (1) be amended so that it contains the sentence "Belief in Almighty God with the obligation to carry out

the law of Islam for its adherents." (Article 29 concerns religion. Paragraph (1) originally read: State based on belief in Almighty God).

"...According to the Bandung 'Antara' correspondent's notes, 8 fractions accepted the proposed amendment, 28 fractions rejected, among others PNI, PKI, Republican Proclamation (within which are gathered 17 fractions), GPPS, Parkindo, [and] Catholic...

"Before the voting was held, Islamic fractions proposed that voting on the amendment and the 1945 Constitution be held [simultaneously], but other fractions wished the votes to be held twice. The Islamic fraction proposal was rejected and with that the voting was held... on the amendment proposal and on Saturday [voting] on the 1945 Constitution as a whole.

"K.H. Masjkur (NU) in...his motion speech stated that the proposed amendment was genuine, and there would be no compulsion on religion. Besides Masjkur, several [other signatories] to the amendment [spoke], while NU Rois Aam. [General President] K. Wahab, in his own name, stated that the Islamic fractions could not accept the 1945 Constitution without amendment.

"On [the opposite side] several members of fractions which did not agree with the amendment, among others Ir. Setiadi, Asnawi Said (Proclamation) and Asmara Hadi, stated

they could not support the amendment because if [it] were accepted other religions would not get guarantees like the Islamic religion. While Rumaseuw (from Irian Darat - Unity fraction) stated if the amendment were accepted the matter would add to the difficulties of the West Irian struggle."

In the same issue the editorial commented as follows:

"With 269 votes agreeing and 199 votes disagreeing, the call of the President and government to return to the 1945 Constitution failed...

"...Now with the intention to hold a repeat vote up to twice more it is felt difficult to be able to hope there will be a sensational change of balance, as long as the attitudes of fractions - especially the attitude of fractions included in the Islamic group - do not change.... It is felt the distance between the number of supporters' votes [and] the 2/3 majority is too [great] to be... overcome just by mobilising again votes which still will... support...the 1945 Constitution...

"Already the question becomes critical: what will happen if the call of the President and government does not achieve the necessary 2/3 of the votes?

"Firstly what is most interesting is the warning of PM Djuanda at the time of giving the government reply on phase II of the general consideration, when he pictured

the possibility of there occurring "things which have happened in several of our neighbour states."

"A second possibility which was mentioned by Djuanda was the government surrendering again its mandate, but then it would become difficult to form a new cabinet. A third possibility was dissolution of Parliament, but it would be difficult to hold a general election again for a new Parliament because of the security situation in several regions. A fourth possibility is that the government as well as Parliament would continue, but could not co-operate, in which case difficulties would also arise. It is felt possibilities imagined by Djuanda were not unreal, but on the other hand it cannot be denied all of them are consequences of the road which the cabinet has taken as its policy. So just now it can be hoped that all of them are being considered. It will be strange, however, if the government has taken this road...basing it merely on a hope that its proposals could be realised in the Constituent Assembly."

Pedoman, unlike Sin Po, which urged the Government to resign and assured it of popular support, did not urge any particular course of action, but contented itself with speculating as to whether the President would speed up his return home.

In a later editorial Pedoman made the points mentioned at the beginning of this analysis. It may be said that its policy remained as consistent as those of other papers, but its support for the Government became increasingly lukewarm as it saw the chaos into which the government policy was leading, even though it agreed with that policy in general terms.

The policy of Pedoman was to this extent ambiguous, but it must be reckoned as a moderate and fairly objective force on the pro-1945 Constitution side.

Chapter 4 - Sin Po

The position of the paper itself, six years after its earlier description, is given in Part I. The most obvious difference in the treatment of the later story as compared with the earlier is the amount of space given.

Day after day, during the three weeks from May 14 to June 3 inclusive, the story was to be found at the top of Page 1 and often, in addition to the leading item, there were subsidiary ones on the same subject, also usually on Page 1. On many days the controversy was the subject of the editorial.

From Sin Po's point of view the cause was pro-1945 Constitution, just as it had been pro-Pantjasila in 1953. But while the paper was careful not to antagonise Islamic feeling (perhaps particularly necessary in a Chinese-run organ) it was far more stident in its case for return to the 1945 Constitution than in its anti-Islamic tone.

Not that in the period in question it carefully argued the case for such a return. Spokesmen on the Government side were quoted on the advantages of particular aspects of the 1945 Constitution, but the overall correctness of such a move was regarded as axiomatic. In fact the return was portrayed as an accomplished fact, held up only by the formality of reaching the necessary

two-thirds of Constituent Assembly votes - and the Assembly no longer reflected the will of the people anyway.

Extensive coverage was given at the beginning of the period to a Central War Administrator's Instruction for the formation of regional committees to celebrate May 20 as National Resurgence Day. According to Sin Po, "the basis of the celebration is to strengthen support for the idea of return to the 1945 Constitution and spread military-popular co-operation which will be carried out in various ways, among them with parades, sporting contests, and art instruction which depict support for return to the '45 Constitution and the carrying out of guided democracy to aim for a just and prosperous society (Sin Po, May 14).

A confident Prime Minister Djuanda was reported on the same day as saying that while in Bandung he had established relations with influential leaders in the Constituent Assembly and that the Government had already decided it would not change its programme to give the government's answer on 21 May at 10 a.m. to points raised in the Constituent Assembly debate.

An editorial, also on May 14, recalled that the Constituent Assembly had just finished the first phase of its general consideration of the Government's proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution. It continued that supporters of the proposal "believe in the idea of return

to the 1945 Constitution as the nearest way to overcome difficult situations in our country in recent times.

"Yet, while extremely regretting it, it must be noted that those who rejected the idea of return to the 1945 Constitution did not put forward concrete reasons which were convincing and which could show 'another way' which could be accepted as a better way than the idea of return to the 1945 Constitution."

Particular attention was paid in the editorial to criticism of those (presumably Masjumi and its papers) who digressed to discuss the former Sukarno-Hatta duumvirate "as if this were the most important factor for saving our R.I."

The editorial warned that the situation could not be allowed to drag on and also that the consequences of a rejection, without a better alternative, of the proposal were heavy.

On May 16 an Antara correspondent was quoted as saying that no large party positively rejected the proposal "but between groups which accept/agree 100% with the proposal, and groups which give an impression of non-approval, are found very many 'nuances', even within one fraction, so that the picture in the Constituent Assembly is still that

it cannot yet be said such and such a vote approves and such and such a vote is opposed."

Antara's breakdown is then given of fractions which accept either unconditionally or with amendments and "those which put forward conditions and amendments which are such that apparently they do not agree with the proposal, although not saying they reject it." A special mention is made of NU (90) "with their desire that the Djakarta Charter be used as the source of the 1945 Constitution by way of being central."

The May 19 issue showed a picture of 11,000 letters, resolutions, etc., whose contents were claimed to support the 1945 Constitution. There was also a disclaimer by the chairman of the Surakarta Branch of one of the smaller Islamic parties, the PSII (Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia - Indonesian Islamic Association Party) of the objections by the PSII fraction in the Constituent Assembly to return to the 1945 Constitution and a request to the Assembly to continue its task.

He claimed that the party had agreed to return to the 1945 Constitution with the understanding that there was still sufficient opportunity to struggle for Islamic ideals in the Indonesian state. The Surakarta Branch had sent a protest to the Governing Board in Djakarta against fraction members who violated party discipline.

In the same issue was an editorial which blamed the NU for difficulties in connection with return to the 1945 Constitution. The editorial commented, "Truly it is rather amazing also that the voice of NU in the Constituent Assembly is different from the attitude of its ministers within the cabinet. We cannot believe that the Government suggestion which was made by the President does not get support from NU ministers, and the Government proposal is none other than that the Constituent Assembly legalise the 1945 Constitution without amendment. Amendments are to be made in the coming MPR [People's Consultative Assembly]....

"If we look at the process up to the concept of return to the 1945 Constitution, it is very clearly reflected how the Pantjasila group has shown the greatest tolerance in not dragging on endlessly the debate on Pantjasila and Islam. The Pantjasila group accept return to the 1945 Constitution while giving a way of satisfaction which is suitable to the Islamic group, namely, with an agreement to put the Djakarta Charter into the Bandung Charter, the historic document of acceptance of the coming of the 1945 Constitution.

"Also in the first phase of the general consideration in the Constituent Assembly...the Pantjasila group has stopped the cry of Pantjasila, so that the Pantjasila foundation will not become a problem again.

"On the contrary the Islamic fractions evidently have less tolerance and they persistently present the Islamic foundation which already has clearly caused bogging down.

"Therefore if difficulties emerge again in the Constituent Assembly concerning the concept of return to the 1945 Constitution, it will be very easy for people to hurl the accusation that certainly the difficulties are deliberately made by those who obstinately desire Islam to become the State foundation.

"But is such a case realistic and able to be justified in the balance of power in Indonesia as at present? And are there also among us those who want to enforce their desires without minding again the existing reality?

"Our observation now is aimed at NU, a party which up to now we always believed realistic and able to decide the right attitude at the right moment!"

"Realism" and ability "to decide the right attitude at the right moment" were indeed the hallmarks of the NU, which was noted for its opportunism, but evidently "the right attitude" for NU was not Sin Po's at that moment, hence the appeal to the party's self-interest by trying to persuade it that its best interests lay elsewhere.

The above editorial was one of the best expositions of Sin Po's views in the crisis, in which its complete

identification with return to the 1945 Constitution is evident. For Sin Po this was a logical development of the Pantjasila ideology.

On May 21 the paper reported Prime Minister Djuanda's reply to the Constituent Assembly, asking for agreement in a "family spirit."

Djuanda suggested that amendments could be made later in the People's Consultative Assembly. He claimed the Government's decision "was a result of deep and earnest thought."

Tracing the development of Guided Democracy, he came to the discussions between the president and the ministers' council the previous December-January. The following passage was in bold type: "In those consultations arose the conviction of the president as well as of the government that it was difficult to carry out their conceptions on the basis of the 1950 Provisional Constitution now in force."

He emphasised the Government would continue to use constitutional processes.

Reporting Djuanda's denial of any aim to dissolve the Constituent Assembly in his proposal, Sin Po emphasised in bold type a passage in his speech stating that the task of forming the Constitution, according to the Provisional

Constitution, was "to be placed upon the Constituent Assembly and the Government together."

Not surprisingly, Sin Po also emphasised a point of agreement by Djuanda with Njoto of the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia): "With the term 'the power of the people's representative council is limited' the Government - in accordance with the opinion of member Njoto - never intended a priori to deny parliamentary rights, like the right to question, the right of enquiry and the right of interpellation."

The May 21 issue also contained the full text of a revised Bandung Charter to give effect to the return to the 1945 Constitution.

In the same issue was an editorial on the Government reply. It gave its opinion that: "By agreeing to the inclusion of the whole text of the Djakarta Charter and all results of the Constituent Assembly up to now in the Bandung Charter, to be later handed over to the MPR to perfect the 1945 Constitution, [the Government] has probably given a guarantee that under no circumstances does return to the 1945 Constitution mean disregarding the results of the Constituent Assembly up till now and also does not reject the inclusion of the Djakarta Charter in the Constitution...."

On May 22 Sin Po continued its long report of Djuanda's speech, which somewhat clarified the editorial above. A key passage was as follows: "Although acknowledgement of the existence of the Djakarta Charter did not mean that the above-mentioned 'historic document' was in force directly, yet as had been emphasised, the term just used contained an acknowledgement that the Djakarta Charter inspired the 1945 Constitution, especially regarding its Preamble and article 29, an article which furthermore must become the basis for the existence of law in the field of religion."

Sin Po reported in full Djuanda's certainty that, as the majority of the people were Islamic, representative bodies would not make laws which conflicted with Islamic law, while still protecting the rights of religious minorities.

It also reported Djuanda's compliance with a request by Njoto to make the transitional period between the present situation and formation of the People's Consultative Assembly as brief as possible.

On May 23 Sin Po reported a decision of the party IPKI, which had close Army ties, at its second congress in Bandung. The party stated that if the Government proposal on return to the 1945 Constitution failed in the

Constituent Assembly, IPKI would instigate and carry out "firm and orderly" revolutionary actions through the National Front.

Acting President Sartono was reported as telling another meeting, in Jogjakarta, that return to the 1945 Constitution was the only way to create a just and prosperous society.

In the same issue was an editorial suggesting the words "revolutionary action" used by IPKI were ominous coming from an organisation getting support from Army members. It is probable that Sin Po was using IPKI and the Army here to frighten Constituent Assembly members, and especially the NU, whose vote was crucial and as yet uncommitted, into ratifying the 1945 Constitution.

At this time the Nationalists, Communists, the Army and allies of all of them had a common interest in supporting the Government proposal and although there were times of bitter rivalry between Communist supporters and the Army when the Army were in the ascendant, the former were not above using the Army to browbeat their opponents at other times. They even supported freedom for Army members to take part in elections at this time (there was a reference to this in Djuanda's Government reply speech).

On May 25 Sin Po claimed "the balance of forces in the Constituent Assembly evidently is changing towards favouring the Government.

"According to competent sources, people at the present stage seriously realise bad results will arise which it will be difficult for the country to understand if the Constituent Assembly rejects the Government proposal.

"Because, if [this happens] one thing is certain, that the Working Cabinet will have to resign because its [proposal] is rejected. And if this happens, the people know what will happen, the more so after IPKI recently announced its plan to bring about firm revolutionary action if we fail to return to the 1945 Constitution."

On May 26 the paper reported, "Masjumi, which strongly opposed the idea of return to the '45 Constitution, through its representative Hamka in the second phase of the general consideration Tuesday evening, still expressed its rejection of the concept of return to the 1945 Constitution."

"The speaker charged the Presidential message, which was delivered before the Constituent Assembly session on 22 April, with being provocative and containing intimidation. The part of the Presidential message which is meant is that which reads: 'Watch lest the State and

People look forward eagerly too long, so that the People later are compelled to act themselves as we witnessed at the beginning of the revolution.'"

Sin Po obtained a comment from the "official side" on Hamka's speech to the effect that "what was said by Hamka certainly was in accordance with the Masjumi Congress decision in Jogja recently.

"The national peace which was desired by Masjumi was making peace with the rebels of Masjumi."

On May 27 Sin Po reported: "H. Masjkur of NU clarified the attitude of his fraction that they still desired acknowledgement of the Djakarta Charter as the fundamental principle of the state [and] the source of law, so therefore the contents of the 1945 Constitution must be in agreement with the Djakarta Charter. [The Charter] began with the sentence: By the justice of God, so in the preface to the 1945 Constitution [and] in article 29 paragraph 1 belief in the One Lord must be mentioned, with the duty of adherents of Islam to carry out its law."

In an editorial the same day, Sin Po stated, "After a voice [was heard] that a certain party wants to take revolutionary measures if the Constituent Assembly fails to legalise the 1945 Constitution, as its counter-balance comes also a voice proposing that we have a tolerant attitude. [The second reference is not clear].

"The word 'revolutionary', as was once written in these pages, is too hair-raising in its [connotations] and gives rise to many meanings. Moreover the word revolutionary is connected with the atmosphere of the State of War which has been in force in our fatherland until now.

"But revolutionary action in the meaning of our revolution now is unconditional.

"So the problem which we face now is whether any action which is called 'revolutionary' truly guarantees for the people our revolution or not. Because if the revolutionary action does not give a guarantee towards the completion of our revolution, then the result of the revolutionary course itself will be hindered. Thus it will happen that action to get out the 'revolutionary' flag produces a result which is just counter-revolutionary.

"It is matters of this kind which must truly be examined carefully by those who yell out the slogan 'revolutionary' in connection with return to the 1945 Constitution at present.

"Besides that, the group which yells the slogan 'tolerance' actually only [wishes] to understand the word 'tolerance' in inviting other parties to agree with their conception, meaning non-confrontation of conflicting opinions.

"In our opinion, an attitude like that is not a 'tolerant' attitude.

"In an atmosphere which is of this kind we very much desire and hope that all parties are conscious of the nobility of the government attitude which was expressed by PM Djuanda before the Constituent Assembly plenary session when giving clarification of Stage I concerning the concept of return to the 1945 Constitution, namely that we put first the way of consultation and not absolutism.

"If the road which was indicated by the Government is this, we take it together; we do not need to feel as though blocked by a blind alley!"

The above editorial seems to be a belated slap to IPKI in the reference to "revolutionary" actions (possibly a hint of the underlying animosity towards the Army and of a use of the word "revolutionary" which Sin Po and its allies did not sanction). It was also probably a slap to Masjumi, who wanted peace with the PRRI. These attacks were coupled with the usual devotion to the Government line.

On May 28 the paper published Djuanda's warning of the results of non-acceptance of the Government's proposal. Among these were dissolution of the DPR (People's Representative Council - Parliament) or, alternatively, non-co-operation between that body and the Government.

One of the NU ministers was reported as supporting the Government.

Dr. Sukiman, vice-chairman of Masjumi, was one of those reported (and pictured) as following Djuanda's statement with great interest.

Sin Po, mentioning a reference by Djuanda to neighbouring states, stated, "thus the Government sees there are indications of the possibility of occurrences in Indonesia like those which took place in several states neighbouring Indonesia."

The obvious reference seems to be to military coups, although a military coup was not specifically mentioned by Djuanda as a possible consequence of failure to accept the 1945 Constitution. There had been coups in Burma, Thailand and Pakistan in late 1958.

It was said in the same issue that, "according to enquiries which were made by a Sin Po journalist in Bandung, NU say they are not 'stubborn' in facing the proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution and therefore an optimistic atmosphere was noticed in the Constituent Assembly."

There was also an editorial which commented, "there is one thing which should be meditated upon, namely, if up to the last moment the Working Cabinet still tries its

hardest to take the constitutional way (legal way) this cannot be understood other than as great tolerance."

The editorial suggested it was unnecessary for the Government to surrender its mandate in the event of rejection of its proposal. The Working Cabinet had enough authority to take actions which would not amount to "unconditional surrender", it said.

It drew the attention of NU to its responsibility towards the safety of the State and Nation which NU figures themselves said was "greater" than group/party interests.

A statement by PKI secretary-general D.N. Aidit was published on May 29. It said, "The PKI will attempt to the utmost of its strength to make the Constituent Assembly succeed in fulfilling President Sukarno's message. But if the Constituent Assembly fails, the last word remains with the people, while the road back already does not exist any more. The only way is to advance immediately with the '45 Constitution without change."

An editorial in the same issue criticised conduct of the session by Chairman Wilopo in giving several members opportunity to speak on a proposal which had already been agreed to, according to Sin Po, that the Constituent Assembly first determine the 1945 Constitution and after that discuss the Bandung Charter in detail, so that

amendments could be inserted for conveyance to the MPR. Criticism of the chairman's action was repeated in more satirical vein in Sin Po's corner column "Variegated Flowers."

There was also an uncomplimentary comparison of the Constituent Assembly to a coffee shop.

May 30 saw a report on failure to achieve the necessary two-thirds majority.

The report read: "After the proposal of the Islamic fractions to amend the preface to the 1945 Constitution and article 29 paragraph (1) with article 45 of the '45 Constitution to be brought into line with the Djakarta Charter was rejected by the plenary session of the Constituent Assembly Friday evening, when 265 votes rejected and 201 accepted, this Saturday morning the Constituent Assembly will vote on the proposal of the president and government to return to the 1945 Constitution.

"But the last report which was sent per 'interlocal' [trunk call] by a Sin Po correspondent in Bandung stated that up to 11.30 a.m. the Constituent Assembly had not yet succeeded in holding the vote on the '45 Constitution decision, although according to the agenda at first the vote will soon be carried out at the meeting this (Saturday) morning. Up to 11.00 hours the meeting had already been suspended twice, the first time for 40

minutes and the second possibly 1 hour, because until this report was sent, the meeting had not yet been started again.

"This double suspension was intended for the holding again of a consultative meeting, because the decision of the Constituent Assembly Consultative Committee earlier was amended again by the NU, which still asked to speak on the timing arrangements for the vote.

"It needs to be added that while attendance remains large, Idham Chalid was not seen in the ministers' box, while other ministers attended as usual.

"In this connection, the Sin Po correspondent who follows the course of Constituent Assembly sessions in Bandung reported furthermore that if this (Saturday) morning 2/3 of the votes which are needed to reach the 'goal' of the proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution were not achieved, so that therefore the '45 Constitution cannot be ratified by the Constituent Assembly, although the majority already agreed with it, then a new situation would arise....

"On the Constituent Assembly plenary session Friday evening, which rejected the Islamic fractions' amendment proposal, it can be added that when it was held there was confusion because pro votes were clearly 210 and those which opposed the Islamic fractions' amendment were 268

votes, or a total number of 478 votes, while the attendance list at the session only reached 470 members' names.

"Therefore, the vote was repeated. All members who had not yet signed the attendance roll did so, while the voting procedure was changed by calling one by one the names of members to be asked to give their votes pro or contra the Islamic fractions' proposal.

"The repeat vote was held under the guidance of Constituent Assembly Deputy Chairman Ir. Sakirman, to whom ...was handed over leadership of the session by chairman Mr. Wilopo.

Later, in a very orderly way, Ir. Sakirman completed the repeat vote with the result of 265 rejecting and 291 accepting. It needs to be explained that the 'decline' in votes which were obtained by the two sides was caused by there being several Constituent Assembly members who went home before casting their votes. But, fundamentally, votes which were included did not exceed the attendance roll at the session, and by such a result the vote is valid."

On May 31 the legality of return to the 1945 Constitution was stressed by Sin Po.

On June 1, in an editorial, "What Now?" Sin Po compared the situation to the deadlock on the foundations of the state, Pantjasila or Islam. It asked whether the

course of dissolving itself was the only proper one for the Working Cabinet to take and reminded Djuanda of his backing in the country. It closed with further encouragement to return to the 1945 Constitution.

On June 2 a second inconclusive vote was reported. Wilopo rejected suggestions that the Assembly should dissolve itself and said it should go into recess only.

An editorial called on President Sukarno to "interfere" to save the state from danger.

On June 3 the Central War Administrator, General Nasution, announced a regulation banning all political activity. There was no editorial on this subject.

There is certainly no very strong evidence of censorship in Sin Po, although, as a supporter of the Government case, this is not so surprising.

The lack of objectivity noticeable in the earlier crisis was continued, and the alliance between the PKI and its allies on the one hand and the PNI on the other was complete.

Conclusion

Much greater coverage was given by all the papers to the 1959 controversy, although between them there was great disparity in quantity.

Abadi gave by far the most space and its lack of restraint in opposing Government policy on this issue is probably the most remarkable feature of the coverage of the dispute. Over-reporting and seemingly endless comment reflect the ideological commitment of the paper to the cause of an Islamic state.

Merdeka gave considerably less space to the dispute than Abadi and expressed PNI sentiment in its outright rejection of the Islamic bloc's demands, its reliance on Sukarno's authority and its rather superstitious attitude to the 1945 Constitution.

The attitude of Pedoman was interesting, although the amount of space it gave the issue was minimal. Although it remained committed to a secularistic solution it feared the amount of authority the 1945 Constitution would give the Government, with whose general policy it did not agree. Otherwise moderation and lack of distortion characterised the paper.

There could be no greater contrast than that of Sin Po, with its complete and unbalanced commitment to the

1945 Constitution, reflecting the close links between the Government and the PKI and its sympathisers. As another supporter of the "Establishment," Sin Po gave a similar amount of space to that given by Merdeka in reporting and commenting on the dispute.

The whole controversy typifies the ideological commitment of the Press and illustrates its nature and that of its readership, as outlined in the Introduction.

Part IV - Conclusion

Epilogue

With the end of the 1959 Press controversy this study actually comes to an end. To truly place it in its setting, however, it is necessary to look at the subsequent history of the Press in Indonesia.

Also the study is not a purely historical exercise. It will be seen that many changes have taken place in the Press, as in many other aspects of Indonesian public life, since June, 1959. Yet fundamentally the problems faced by the Press have altered little and a study of the Press in the 1950s is still relevant today.

By a brief summary of the changes which have occurred, the nature of the Press can be seen persisting under changing conditions. Outwardly, the Press of 1959 has disappeared; the outward form of the Press is unrecognisable to anyone familiar with the scene in 1959. But until the readership in Indonesia changes basically (and there is no evidence this has yet happened) changes are a matter of degree rather than kind.

Abadi, richest source of material, was seized early in 1961, when its circulation had reached 20,000. As the voice of the banned Masjumi it could not be allowed to continue.¹

Merdeka was more fortunate. It was able to persist, but its influence declined. Party affiliation was probably not the reason, because its ties with the PNI, with which it had greatest affinity, were never very close. Possibly it lost business support.²

Finally it became involved in "Sukarnoism", sometimes known as the BPS Movement, which by using Sukarno's name and some of his earlier statements, attacked Communist participation in the governmental structure, which by 1964 had become an integral part of Sukarno's doctrine of "Nasakom" (unity between nationalist, religious and Communist currents). As a result the paper was banned, not long before the end of the Sukarno regime.

Pedoman was an early casualty. It was one of nine papers closed down in November-December, 1960, although it had a circulation of 55,000 (presumably not long before its closure).³

Sin Po was the most fortunate of all. In November, 1959, soon after the constitutional controversy, it was banned for criticism of economic measures, but soon afterwards it reappeared under the title Wartabhakti. It was then able to survive until the end of the Sukarno era.⁴

Press control was, indeed, one of the main themes of Indonesian newspaper history from June, 1959, onwards. So

much so that as early as March, 1960, a speaker at the International Press Institute meeting at Tokyo described Indonesia as the "Asian country with the severest suppression of news."⁵

The Djakarta Army War Administrator's Office on August 1, 1961, placed under its direct supervision more than 200 private printing presses in the capital. In the following 18 months the few remaining outspoken papers were closed. At this time Communist papers were not immune and in November, 1961, Harian Rakjat, the official PKI paper, was suspended by the Djakarta War Administrator. One of the few papers to take a critical stand at the time was the Indonesian Observer, which regarded the Press as "licensed."⁶ Accompanying this control was a shortage of newsprint.

The Manado paper Sadar ("Consciousness"), whose editor, Eddy Remengan, was sentenced to five months' imprisonment on a charge of defaming an important official in the region, in 1964 created a controversy in its place of publication. The acting chief prosecutor in Manado told the publishers this was an example of guidance, not censorship. However, all proprietors had to submit final proofs of newspapers and all non-approved material had to be deleted or replaced by something acceptable to the chief prosecutor's office. Publishers reported that the

rule also covered editorials. Sadar's editor made a report to the PWI central executive on 8 April.

The PWI Branch secretary said this practice consumed a great amount of time. Such detailed supervision, however, was not general, as is indicated by the report in Suluh Indonesia. Indeed by 23 April, the problem had been "solved". It is not clear how, but the agreement of all parties suggests some relaxation of the censorship in Manado.⁷

Mention was made in the Introduction of the declaration of acceptance of the state ideology, which led to a difference of opinion between Mochtar Lubis and Rosihan Anwar. Several periodicals which sympathised with Masjumi and the PSI lost their licences to publish for refusing to sign the declaration. In 1961 the Government started indoctrinating journalists in Manipol-USDEK.⁸

At the same time, the Government reduced imports of newsprint while using more for its own printing, thus reducing the average circulation of 1,039,000 copies of 90 dailies in 1959 to one of 710,000 copies for 65 dailies in 1961.⁹

The remaining papers had to give a large part of their four pages to government declarations which Feith describes as unabridged and heavily repetitious. There was little foreign news or news supplied by the papers's own reporters. The rigidity of Press censorship, however,

varied "widely, between different cities and towns, depending on the attitude of the military authorities in the area concerned." A greater degree of freedom was allowed in most other cities than in Djakarta. Also efforts to circumvent the censorship by subtle insinuations became the pastime of many intellectuals.

The change in ideological attitude from the position up to 1959 is shown in the fact that there was no direct criticism of what had become the state ideology of Manipol-USDEK, as outlined in the Introduction.

In addition, much important news was left out of the Press.¹⁰ Yet by 31 December, 1963, there were 102 Indonesian-owned dailies with a total circulation of 1,299,200 per day.¹¹

A presidential decree of 5 July, 1959, looked towards "socialist mass communication" as an objective. The potential of the Press and other mass media was recognised, but they were regarded as prisoners of the legacy of a "liberalised capitalist system." It was intended to guard against the re-entry of "Liberalism" into newspapers and forbade publication of sensational or indecent news or articles and Chinese serials. It also restricted the number of advertisements which might be inserted by newspapers each day, etc. Sufficient space

was to be given to discussion of the state ideology, based on Sukarno's "17 August" speeches.

MPRS (Provisional People's Consultative Assembly) Decisions aiming at bridging the gulf between the actual and the ideal included No. 4/MPRS/1960, which provided for indoctrination of Manipol-USDEK through the Press, and MPRS/1963 which reaffirmed the aim of creating a Press Law and hopefully directed improvement in the distribution and technical quality of the Press.¹³

Supreme War Administrator's Regulation No. 3 of 1960 forbade the "printing, publishing, receiving, distributing, trading and/or bill-sticking enterprise of newspapers which use characters which are not Latin characters or Arab characters."¹⁴ The regulation was obviously aimed at the Chinese language Press, but after the ending of the "State of Danger" on 1 May, 1963, it was allowed to publish again.

A system of publishing licences was introduced in 1960. Presidential Decision No. 6, 1963, laid down conditions of granting licences and penalties for printers who printed newspapers without them.

Also in 1963 a "Council of Assistance to Manage the Press" was established with the Minister for Information as chairman.¹⁶ In the same year the Afro-Asian Conference

of Journalists was held in Indonesia, but it was largely a propaganda exercise.

"Sukarnoism" has already been mentioned in connection with Merdeka. As a result of this anti-Communist movement 21 publications lost their licences, including, besides Merdeka, such well-known papers as Berita Indonesia, Indonesian Observer, Warta Berita, and Revolusioner. In addition, several journalists associated with them were expelled from the PWI.¹⁷

The PKI had dominated both Antara and the PWI, but as a reaction the Army founded several newspapers even before the abortive coup of 30 September, 1965. They not only employed journalists expelled from the PWI, but used army information agencies instead of Antara; there were even moves to form nationalist or religious party journalists' associations. One month before the attempted coup Stuart Graham noted it was often said that ex-P.S.I. and -Masjumi journalists were employed by Army agencies.

The counter-coup of 1 October did not lead to all-round liberalisation, but it did result in the banning of PKI and some PNI or Partindo (an allied party) papers. New anti-communist army or religious party papers replaced them. The PWI expelled 300 more members, presumably from the other side this time, and Antara, after being closed

for some days, was restaffed. Even some extreme anti-communist papers were suspended.

The Information Ministry limited paper ownership to political parties or public authorities, with a limit of one paper per party, but these restrictions were lifted early in 1966 and there is now much greater freedom for the Press.

A Press Law was finally passed in 1966 after repeated postponements since before the 1955 elections. It rescinded many of the decrees of the Sukarno era, banned publications based on "Communism/Marxism-Leninism", established a Press Council, and banned censorship. Freedom of the Press was guaranteed.

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General Conclusion

As indicated at the beginning, the controversies do not point to a conclusion arising from Press reactions, but illustrate the ideological nature of the Press and through it of the limited, but constantly growing, newspaper-reading public.

Instead, Press reactions to the controversies will be summarised and compared, their relation to the above view indicated, and some general remarks made.

As mentioned earlier, considerably more space was given to the second controversy than to the first, because of the critical importance of the second dispute.

Whereas Abadi showed restraint in the first crisis, despite the relatively unfettered nature of the Press situation, in the second it threw caution to the winds, although there had been a background of increasing Press control, especially during the previous two years. The only explanation seems to be the part played by editorial policy, which favoured restraint of the more fanatical Islamic elements during the early period of co-operation with the PNI, but all-out opposition to an increasingly hostile PNI and a last-ditch stand in defence of the long-cherished ideal of an Islamic state during the second period.

Merdeka displayed the same support for a secular state in the second crisis that it had in the first, but also with fewer inhibitions about antagonising the Moslems, particularly Masjumi. It had less to fear from Government action than had Abadi. On the other hand, while impatient with the NU attitude of opposition to the 1945 Constitution, it did not need to demonstrate the feeling of desperation which Abadi had.

Pedoman, practically silent in the first controversy, did show its hand more in the second. Its support for the 1945 Constitution was muted, however, by the knowledge that not only were its Masjumi allies the chief opponents of that Constitution, but that the President and Government which proposed it were among its own opponents and would probably use the authority the Constitution gave them against Pedoman and its PSI sponsors.

Sin Po, very much on the sidelines in the first dispute, was secure in the knowledge in 1959 that it was a Government ally and used this position to claim that a large minority in the Constituent Assembly was blocking the will of the people.

All, in their various ways, demonstrated their ideological commitment; not only reports of resolutions from various bodies, but letters from individuals, showed that they accurately reflected the mood of their readers.

Possibly the statement about commitment can be qualified in the case of Pedoman, which represented the opinion of the PSI, the least ideologically committed party.

But even Pedoman felt itself faced by a choice between the 1945 Constitution and an Islamic state. The question is, whether there was a third alternative. Moves were being made for a compromise solution when the Government made its proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution.

The trouble was that the existing 1950 Provisional Constitution had proved unworkable and some alternative had to be found. Moslems claimed they had only accepted it because it was provisional anyway. Yet its decline coincided with the decline of constitutional democracy itself in Indonesia, and whatever interpretation Sukarno may have placed on the 1945 Constitution, few observers would agree it was democratic by any interpretation.

Louis Fischer's view, admittedly American-biased, has something to commend it. In Indonesian conditions a Parliamentary Cabinet gave the President too much power.¹ But this was because of the weakness and fragmentation of the party system, and this in turn was partly the fault of the proportional representation electoral system. There is nothing inherently undemocratic in a Parliamentary

Cabinet system. What was dangerous was the combination of a weak elected parliament and a strong unelected president.

The failure of the PSI, and therefore of Pedoman, was in not looking for a third alternative and it therefore sacrificed pragmatism for ideological commitment.

The need for ideology to provide orientation for citizens in a traditional society was discussed in the Introduction. But when ideologies clash as they did in Indonesia in the 1950s the foundations of the State are in danger.

The new regime in the mid-1960s has provided a basis on which a responsible Press could gradually evolve. The first duty of the Press, in the face of the enormous pressures of the readership, must be to gradually develop a sense of the importance of pragmatic policies as distinct from ideologies. The cut and thrust of party debate may then take place in an atmosphere in which the safety of the state is no longer threatened and Government repression will become increasingly indefensible.

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