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POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS

By

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ABSTRACT

A policy continuum is conceptualised to represent the policy goals and objectives as one extreme and the policy actualisation the other. Within these two extremes, policy implementation analysis is postulated to commence at four distinct points: (i) prior to a policy pronouncement, to build the most detailed possible picture of the policy proposal and problems associated with implementing the policy proposal (ii) after a policy pronouncement, to provide detailed analysis of the practical problems and consequences of implementing the policy proposal according to an implementation strategy; (iii) during a policy implementation phase, to review the efficiency and effectiveness of the policy implementation strategy and suggest ways and means for improvement; and (iv) after a policy implementation process is over, to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the policy implementation process and to determine whether to continue, redirect and or terminate the policy program.

A model for a general framework for policy implementation analysis is presented which comprises four variables, namely the policy to be implemented, the policy target group(s), the policy implementing organisation(s) and the policy environment. Each variable in the model consists of a number of components which are considered to ascertain the ease or difficulty of implementing a policy proposal. Finally a qualitative and quantitative presentation of a policy implementation analysis is attempted.

1. INTRODUCTION

Lindblom's concept of incrementalism (1) has dominated policy formulation and implementation processes for many years in most pluralist democracies. The basic philosophy underlying incrementalism is deeply rooted in and largely postulated on the premise that policy choice is limited and confined to an arbitrarily selected incremental intervention that differs only slightly from the existing policy. Implicit in the concept is the daunted belief that by thinking small and constantly reacting to some kind of post-program feedback mechanism the policy implementation process can 'muddle through' without much reliance on an ex-ante type analytical support system. The thrust of the arguments for incrementalism in advanced capitalist countries, lies in the rationale that social systems are so complex that any co-ordinated planned effort to understand and model the system in order to optimize the outcome is in vain since during the time the planner would spend to understand and model, the system would change, making the model unrepresentative and thus inapplicable to the system (2). It is hypothesised that the relatively placid and prosperous economic conditions during the 50's and early 60's in the western world could have generated some positive reinforcement for the incrementalists. Although the mid 60's saw a rapid emergence of emphasis on the use of analytical support systems such as PPBS (Planning Programming, and Budgeting

System) in the USA (3) and similar budgeting systems elsewhere, (4) the policy decision-making process was still based on incrementalism. As the 1960's ended with reminiscences of the failure of various public programs (for example, family planning in Pakistan (5), constructing new towns and creating public service jobs in the USA (6)) and the early 70's pushed almost every country into deep economic recession, there emerged a new attitude to public policy making. Resource consciousness became the order of the day during the mid 70's (7). Despite this, implementation analysis had not been regarded as an integral part of policy analysis and this is still the case in many countries including Australia. In Australia there is no formal requirement for policy implementing departments to undertake policy program implementation analysis. At the Commonwealth Government level, while the Departments of Treasury, Finance, PM&C the Auditor-General and the Public Service Board are playing a central role in policy formulation, there is a paucity of comprehensive policy analysis that incorporates implementation analysis. In 1978, following the acceptance of the report on the Review of Post-Arrival Programs and Services for Migrants, the Australian Government established a task force (Galbally Implementation Task Force) to supervise the implementation of the report. Three years have elapsed since the task force was established, yet it is not public knowledge if the task force ever attempted an ex-ante or ex-poste implementation analysis of any recommendation, contained in the

report. The Senate Standing Committee on Social Welfare (Through A Glass Darkly - Evaluation in Australian Health and Welfare Services, Vol 1. P.17) reported in May 1979 that unfortunately, officials in the Departments of Treasury and Finance who were engaged in the development of broad economic policy had shown much more interest in evaluation limited to budgetary and audit functions than in evaluation with the effectiveness of the budgetary allocations under their control. The common assumption that once a public policy or program is decided, it will be implemented and its objectives and goals achieved without much difficulty and delay, is still in vogue in many countries. Public policies are announced and implemented without sufficient regard to the original aims set forth in the policy decision. There is a widespread discrepancy between plans and actions.

Jenkins (8) depicted the American scene as follows:

"Noise is a common phenomena in the World of policy and politics. Action or at least effective action is rare. Let it not be said that decisions never emerge; they do ... and almost ad nau seam."

To recapture the neglect of implementation analysis in policy-making process, a number of examples are mentioned

In 1961 President Kennedy twice ordered US missiles removed from Turkey but during the Cuban missile crisis the following year he learned they were still there (9). President Nixon ordered the CIA to destroy its biological weapons, but five years later

two of the most deadly poisons were still in the agency's hands (9). Difficulties with implementation led the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, (PPBS) introduced with great energy and presidential support, to be judged at least a partial failure five years later. (10) Martha Derthick (11) analysed the failure of seven construction projects, planned to provide housing units for low and moderate income families.

Derthick's analysis is a comprehensive example of how public policies and programs, no matter how simple and straightforward they seem to be, can give rise to program failure and waste of public funds if proper implementation perspectives are neglected. Pressman and Wildavsky (12) discussed the Economic Development Administration program, aimed to provide public service jobs in Oakland, USA and showed how in the absence of ex-ante implementation analysis the program failed.

In Pakistan the 'Land Reforms' failed twice because each time the Federal Government did not look into the implementability of the policy decision, in terms of greater co-ordination with the provincial government for bringing about an administrative framework to implement the federal decision, Similarly the Family Planning Program of the Pakistan Government collapsed during the mid 60's because the Family Planning Division of the Federal Secretariat and the two provincial directorates which were responsible for

implementing the program, did not create a conducive environment in terms of educating the target population for such an innovative and revolutionary program.

Enver Adil (13), commenting on the family planning program during 1960-64, made the following statement:

"whereas the establishment of family planning clinics was almost 100% of the total planned target during 1960-64, the new patients visiting the clinics were 31% of the target, training of medical and paramedical personnel 42%, distribution of condoms and foam tables, 17% and 15% respectively. Though the number of family planning clinics opened during 1960-65 reached the target, the program did not result in reaching the target population. The plan to cover 1.2 million women ... was not achieved. The reasons for failure were lack of motivation of people ..."

In Australia, the Kalgoorlie-Kwinana rail standardisation project (14) was commenced in November 1962. A preliminary report on the cost of the project was issued in January 1961 and it put the cost of the work at \$77.3 million. When in March 1966, the Master Plan was finally produced the cost of the project was estimated to be \$130 million, nearly 70 per cent more than the initial estimate. The Norgard Report - Review of the Commonwealth Employment Service (15) reviewed the delivery of manpower programs and observed that the CES had not been able to implement the programs effectively because of problems relating to implementability. The report stated that:

- "1. In both written submissions and discussions with CES staff, there have been criticisms that new labour market programs seem almost without exception to be announced and advertised through the media in a 'Sunday night' ministerial announcement without any detailed information about the

scheme or CES involvement in its implementation reaching the CES office for some days, or even weeks in certain cases. It is particularly frustrating and embarrassing for managers to be unable to help clients seeking information or assistance under a new scheme because they have no guidelines by which to determine eligibility.

2. The Review was dismayed that staff receive no special training for these new tasks. Indeed the Review has found that many CES offices do not volunteer information to clients or employer about new or complex established manpower programmes because they have insufficient staff to handle the work.
3. One group of managers submitted the opinion ... that the administration of NEAT had been chaotic right from its introduction. Instruction, guidelines and policy had varied frequently and it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain a high quality standard of administration of the program.
4. Apart from criticisms concerning the operational difficulties experienced with new programmes there appears to be still some feeling within the CES that the service should be devoted almost exclusively to providing a placement service. Both factors have created a reluctance on the part of some CES staff to accept delivery of manpower programmes as a clearly defined on-going function of the CES."

Once again in Australia, the ALP Government's Health Insurance Program, popularly known as MEDIBANK introduced in July 1975, has so far gone though at least four major structural changes and is presently near complete disaster because the factors and forces against the very concept of the program have had the stimuli and political strength to dismantle the program (15).

Finally the US aborted mission to rescue the American hostages in Tehran in 1980 was an example of the disregard of implementability of President Carter's policy decision. This was evident from a US congressional report (16) which stated that the planning for the attempted rescue mission was seriously flawed due to -

- . inadequate training of troops;
- . insufficient maintenance of helicopters;
- . poor intelligence and contingency planning;
and
- . division of command.

These are just a few examples of the problems that persist between policy decision and its successful implementation. This discussion has attempted to depict through these examples that the policy program failed partially or completely and or resulted in achieving results far from the stated policy or program objectives because policy analysis was not undertaken from the context of implementability of the program. As a result the programs were confronted with situations such as:

- (1) tremendous increases in project costs than ever anticipated;
- (2) Incompatibility of one project with others;
- (3) Undue delays and difficulties in project completion and operations;
- (4) termination of unfinished projects due to lack of public support and inadequate economic and political resources;
- (5) partial or complete waste of human and physical resources;
- (6) failure to deliver the promised goods and services.

Thus having outlined some case material and problems which indicate the lack of inadequacy of implementation analysis prior to policy formulation and implementation, the stage is now set to discuss and understand the genesis of implementation and implementation analysis. For this purpose the discussion is taken up by focussing on the various points on the continuum between policy proposal, on the one extreme, and the policy realisation or actualisation on the other. Two distinct but related dimensions of policy implementation, are conceptualised to reflect and delineate the various types of implementation analysis. The thrust of the discussion, however, is on the development of a general framework for policy implementation analysis which examines a number of variables. The discussion is expanded by a brief treatment of qualitative and quantitative presentations of implementation analysis.

2. TOWARDS DEFINING IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS

In order to comprehend the notion of implementation analysis one needs to understand the word implementation in its two distinct but related dimensions. One is theoretical and the other is physical. Under the theoretical dimension an analyst is required to build the richest possible picture or abstraction of the policy proposal and its feasibility and desirability in terms of physical implementability together with analytical descriptions of expected scenarios of both taking and not taking a set of alternative means required to achieve the desired objectives, enunciated in the policy proposal. In examining policy implementation from the view point of theoretical dimensions, one is very much engaged in physical planning and programming but only by visualising as best as one can, the ease of the policy implementation process, the availability and non-availability of the required policy program resources at both micro and macro levels and the anticipation of the full extent of the danger signals in terms of delays, disruption, problems and pit falls likely to appear in the way of successful implementation and operations of the policy proposal. Likewise a full assessment of all the factors and forces that can potentially enhance and accelerate the entire implementation process becomes a part and parcel of the analysis under theoretical dimension. More generally, under theoretical dimension a policy analyst will be examining the implementation process either between an idea and a

policy proposal stage or between a policy proposal and its formal pronouncement stage. This distinction is crucial to the nature of analysis because in the first case i.e. between an idea and policy proposal, the analysis is very much an unknown quantity and remains within the jurisdiction of a political party. This analysis has to be channelled and routed through the party's hierarchy and approved by the rank and file of the party including its upper echelon. In the second phase i.e. between policy proposal and its formal pronouncement stage it is hypothesised that a party has assumed power and is willing to pursue seriously one of its policy proposals. In this situation, policy implementation analysis includes legislative perspectives before the policy proposal is passaged through Parliament for enactment. Thus in pursuing implementation from the view point of its theoretical dimension one is moving along the policy making continuum. By so doing the aim is to attain clarity and understanding of the dynamics of the policy proposal under review and to attempt to identify ways and means in a practical sense to achieve the goals and objectives of the policy proposal. This analysis has to be undertaken in close conjunction with technical analysis - cost benefit/cost effectiveness of the policy proposal. Depending upon an acceptable time lead between this analysis and the possible timing of the actual passage of the policy proposal in the Parliament it must be ensured that a fresh and an

up to date analysis is available to the decision-maker. For example, almost everyone in Australia knows that the ALP (Australian Labor Party) has committed itself more than once in the past two general elections, to restore Medibank (a free universal health insurance scheme) if it won power. Now if this Party still intends to restore the health insurance scheme program it has got to examine afresh the implementability of this policy proposal at the time of the next general election. According to our concept of implementation analysis, the fresh analysis of the policy proposal near the next election would still be based on a theoretical dimension because, the Party would not be able to successfully move the proposal in the Parliament and thus the proposal would be far away from its possible formal pronouncement.

The second and the most important dimension of implementation analysis is that of physical dimension. In this context it is hypothesised that a policy proposal has been formally announced and enacted but it could still be years away from its physical or actual implementation. However, in practice, particularly in most pluralist democracies, the time lag between policy announcement and its implementation is around two years or within the Government's term of office. In Australia, as soon as the Labor Party formed Government in December 1972, it established the Health Insurance Planning Committee (17) to prepare detailed recommendations on the timing

and method of implementing the new Government's most favourite program of universal health insurance scheme. However, despite its top priority to the new program the ALP Government could not introduce the program on the anticipated date. The Government faced undue legislative obstacles and eventually the bill had to be passaged through a joint session of Parliament. The Health Insurance Bill 1973 was assented to on 8 August 1974 and the program was formally implemented nationwide on 1 July 1975, a year behind the Health Insurance Planning Committee's implementation date. The implementation problems encountered during the introduction of PPBS in the US Federal agencies, is another example of the lag between policy pronouncement and its actual or physical implementation. Despite the Presidential direct support and enthusiasm with PPBS in 1965 the surveys conducted by the General Accounting Office and the Bureau of the Budget, found three years later, that only three of sixteen domestic agencies had implemented a PPB system successfully (18). Thus under the physical dimension of implementation, the policy analyst is engaged in reviewing critically all those factors and forces; actions and policies by public and private individuals or organisations in and outside the country, that are directly or indirectly for and against the achievement of aims and objectives, set forth in the policy decision. The analyst examines the entire implementation process almost exactly as he does under the theoretical

dimension but with greater emphasis on practicality.

The difference between the two dimensions is more or less synonymous with that which exists between laboratory experimentation and field experimentation. The variables and attributes in the two forms of analysis remain almost identical. The main distinction between the two is that of rigour, timeliness and practicality. Both analyses as Lineberry (19) points out examine elements relating to:

- "1. Creation and staffing of a new agency to implement a new policy, or assignment of implementation responsibility to an existing agency and its personnel;
2. Translation of legislative goals and intents, operating rules of thumb; development of guidelines for use of the implementors;
3. Co-ordination of agency resources and expenditure to target groups; development of division of responsibility within agency and between agency and related agencies;
4. Allocation of resources to accomplish policy impacts."

Implementation of a policy decision is a complex social phenomenon. It deals with realities and hardcore physical entities. Thus the implementation process cannot take place in a vacuum. This fact about the process necessitates that implementation analysis must seek to appraise and ascertain the success of the implementability of the policy decision so that substantial assistance and understanding can be provided to the decision-maker over and above his or her intuitive judgement. The analysis must therefore envisage the feasibility and desirability

of actions such as:

- . issuing directives
- . enforcing directives
- . disbursing funds
- . making loans
- . awarding grants
- . making contracts
- . collecting information
- . disseminating information
- . assigning personnel
- . hiring personnel; and
- . creating organisation." (19)

These actions may also include some legislative requirements. For example, in order to implement the health insurance program in Australia under the Health Insurance Act 1973, the following legislations were involved:

1. legislative to provide for the future role of private insurance organisations and for the transition to the new program;
2. legislation to provide for the levy on taxable income;
3. legislation to make the necessary amendments in the related Acts, e.g. Social Services Act, Repatriation Act.

Thus far in this section an attempt has been made to delineate the two dimensions of policy implementation which are concerned with implementation analysis prior to policy pronouncement or commissioning of the physical implementation process. The other two dimensions which

may also be conceptualised as physical aspects of implementation are those which are concerned with implementation analysis conducted during or after the commissioning of the policy implementation process. The first is undertaken either as a pilot implementation project or a phased version of the entire process with a view to test certain procedures and processes before actual implementation commences on a full scale. The second is undertaken as a facet of a post-evaluation program with a view to redirect or terminate the policy implementation process after a specified time period. Within the current models of analysis and evaluation in Australia, there are examples of implementation analysis conducted both from the view points of theoretical and physical dimension. The two major political parties, namely the Australian Labor Party and the Liberal-National Country Coalition Parties have fairly extensive systems of policy formulation processes. When in the opposition, each party has a shadow ministry which allocates areas of public policy and administration to different shadow ministers. Each minister is responsible for policy analysis within at least his or her own portfolio. Policy documents are produced by each party but the extent to which rigour, sophistication and professionalism is used in these documents, is not known.

In regard to physical aspect of implementation analysis one would expect that Parliament has a crucial role to play. "In the larger sense

it evaluates in the construction, amendment and criticism of bills and budgets and its developing committee system has undertaken and is undertaking, evaluation of government activities at all levels. The Parliament also has a role in translating evaluations into decisions - for example, in determining, as a result of demonstrated deficiencies or strengths, whether a program should be modified, terminated or boosted." (20) The Parliament's various committee's e.g. House of Representatives Standing Committee on Expenditure, Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Government Operations, Senate Standing Committee on Social Welfare, Senate Estimate Committee and Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, have power to look into the efficiency and effectiveness of Government operations. At the Commonwealth Government level almost every Government department has a policy division which, inter alia, is responsible for undertaking policy analysis which includes implementation analysis. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet is particularly responsible for policy and program development and evaluation. It may be that PM & C only undertakes post-program evaluation but it should surely assist and facilitate implementation strategy and implementation process for implementing future policies of the Government.

Related to the various dimensions of implementation analysis and particularly the physical dimension, is

the aspect of policy goals, and objective setting. While the theoretical or abstract dimension of implementation can help formulate and reappraise policy goals, the implementation analysis based on the physical dimension, after the policy pronouncement, cannot commence if policy goals and objectives have not been clearly specified. Policy implementation is directly associated with the policy goals and objectives and therefore the success of a policy implementation process is directly proportional to the achievement of policy objectives in a predefined way. Pressman and Wildavsky (21) discuss this point in greater detail as follows:

"Implementation, to us, means just what Webster and Roget say it does: to carry out, accomplish, fulfill, produce, complete. But what is it that is being implemented? A policy, naturally. There must be something out there prior to implementation; otherwise there would be nothing to move toward in the process of implementation. A verb like "implement" must have an object like "policy" ... when policy remains a disembodied objective, without specifying actors or the acts in which they must engage to achieve the desired result, there is not implementation to study."

Erwin Hargrove's (22) analysis of the above point, is appreciated. He states that the term implementation can be used to refer to two different but interrelated processes which are embedded in the following two questions:

- "1. What will the consequences be of organising the program according to strategy and plan X rather than plan Y?
2. How do we carry out the strategy and plan we have chosen?"

The important point which stems from Pressman and

Wildavsky and Hargrove discussions is that there must be an implementation strategy or an explicit set of physical designs or processes to implement a plan if the success or failure of an implementation process is to be ascertained and evaluated.

Finally, in order to understand the dynamics and role of implementation analysis in decision-making structure one needs to distinguish between policy implementation and policy impact. In this context one needs to appreciate that the policy implementation process generates desired or undesired consequences which may further give rise to positive or negative impact which can create relatively more lasting effects. Policy consequences and impact are not the same, the former being what happens after a policy has been implemented and the latter being what happens as the consequences of a policy implementation. As Lineberry (23) implies, policy impact analysis looks at the consequences of a policy implementation and examines the 'relationship between means applied and ends achieved'. In implementation analysis, one needs to focus one's concern on all those actions which can put a plan into viable operation as well as on those factors and forces which may adversely affect the implementation of a policy. Following Dolbeare (24) one needs to recognise that impact studies typically ask 'what happened' whereas implementation studies ask 'why did it happen this way'. To Cook and Scioli (25) impact analysis, as opposed to the study of what causes policy, centres on the question of what policy causes.

3. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS DEFINED

Following the subject matter, discussed in the previous chapter one can easily appreciate that implementation analysis is primarily conducted to critically examine all factors and forces in the short term or long term, that are likely to enhance or deter the successful execution of a policy proposal or plan at the various points on the continuum between policy proposal on one extreme and the policy actualisation on the other. These points can determine the nature and types of policy implementation analysis which are pursued in this chapter.

Definitions of Implementation Analysis

Implicit in the concept of implementation analysis is the notion as to how the available resources can be best mobilised, integrated and utilised and what could be the red and green signs on the way and up to the actualisation of the policy goals and objectives. It is appreciated that the success of a policy depends upon the mutual relationship and linkage an implementation process has with policy realism. This implies that if some policies are based on abstract idealism, there is no question of their implementation analysis because they simply cannot be implemented. Therefore it is emphasised that implementation analysis is a viable proposition only for a viable policy rather than for a policy based on wishy-washy vaporous political promises.

In other words a policy implementation analyst must start from a logically conceivable proposition. This is not to suggest, however, that policy implementation analysis should only be undertaken for implementable policies. Obviously some viable social programs are difficult or even impossible to implement during, for example, times of rising inflation or strong opposition to higher personal income taxes. Now a number of definitions implicit or explicit, put forward and frequently discussed in literature are stated. The narrative below may not quite coincide with the phraseology used by the scientists in the treatment of the subject.

Allison (26) "Under implementation estimates we focus on guidelines for forecasting the capabilities, interests, and incentives or organisations to implement each alternative analysed by cost-benefit analysis, and for adjusting estimated cost and benefits in this light."

Cutt and Tydeman (27) "We are concerned specifically with implementation analysis, defined as an examination of those factors which can contribute to the realisation or non-realisation of project objectives."

Hatry et al (28) "Implementation analysis should attempt to -

- . indicate the potential impact of implementation difficulties on the costs and effectiveness of each alternative,
- . identify and quantify the main implementation difficulties of each alternative,
- . develop variations of the alternatives that would make implementation more feasible,
- . suggest means by which implementation might be eased by revising alternatives."

- Levine (29) "Planners have delineated noble and necessary goals and organisational analysts have provided sophisticated descriptions... in which we must reach these goals but have tended to ignore the goals. What is missing is the modern Machiavelli who will not only describe to his prince the way the world looks but will address analysis specifically to the question of how the prince can get from where he is to where he wants to go."
- Luft (30) "Infact, what is necessary is a 'feasibility' analysis that examines the project's economic, political and organisational feasibility".
- Quade (31) "Any analysis designed to assist a decision-maker in initiating or changing policy, thereby affecting individuals and institution, should consider whether anything can be done through analysis to help with implementation".
- Sabatier and Mazmanian (32) "In our view, the crucial role of implementation analysis is to identify the factors which affect the achievement of statutory objectives throughout this entire process (implementation). These can be divided into three broad categories: (i) the tractability of the problem(s) being addressed by the statute; (ii) the ability of the statute to favorably structure the implementation process; and (iii) the net effect of a variety of "political" variables on the balance of support for statutory objectives."
- Williams (33) "In its most general form an inquiry about implementation seeks to determine whether an organisation can bring together people and material in a cohesive organisational unit and motivate them in such a way as to carry out the organisation's stated objectives."

There are, of course, many definitions but all of them seem to focus on one common core, viz-a-viz how difficult it is to activate, execute and or implement a policy plan. Depending upon the timing between policy formulation and its actualisation, an implementation analysis acquires a different outfit and so does its nature. But irrespective to its form or format, an implementation analysis must seek to determine the extent to which a policy philosophy, enunciated in the policy's objectives, can be transformed into some recognisable determinants within an acceptable margin of limitation. By determinants it is meant some kind of policy performance or effectiveness whereas the term limitation is used to mean the degree to which the observed policy performance or effectiveness is not quite up to the maximum desirability of the policy impact. Thus a policy implementation analysis should attempt to build the confidence limits of the success of a policy plan and identify as to how this success can be materialised within a given implementation strategy. However, if this strategy is not available, it is emphasised that the analyst must endeavour to choose one such strategy in consultation with the decision-maker, prior to undertaking any analysis.

Turning back to the definition once again, it is emphasised that the concept of implementation analysis should be taken as analogous with interval estimation in the theory of statistics and is almost identical with Allison's estimate (26). Within this domain expected policy performance is conceptualised as the 'mean value' and limitation as the 'standard error' of the sampling distribution.

In general, implementation analysis attempts to determine a policy or program's feasibility from the view points of various evaluation criteria, including:

- . political
- . legislative
- . social/cultural
- . administrative and bureaucratic
- . economic
- . technical; and
- . environmental

In other words the analysis aims to find out, as Smith writes (34) what can go 'right' or 'wrong' during the implementation of a public policy that contributes to the effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of the policy? To Webb and McMaster (35) questions of central importance in implementation analysis, include:

1. "What is the probability that resources will be made available to carry out the programme?
2. How acceptable is the proposed program to the target group or groups?
3. Will the program be understood and accepted by staff of the implementing organisation?
4. Will the program be compatible with other tasks of the implementing organisation?
5. Is the program in its present form acceptable to other levels of governments."

As Cutt and Tydeman emphasise (36) implementation analysis should be treated as an integral part of the general framework of policy analysis. If technical analysis such as cost-benefit or cost effectiveness analysis is one arm of the body of policy analysis, then implementation analysis is the other arm. Both these analyses are interdependent and should be given equal

importance in the decision-making process. A program that may well be promising technically, cannot be accepted as a feasible project if it is not implementable due to any reason - social, political, economic, etc.

To sum up, one can perhaps stipulate that the essence of an implementation analysis is to study how a policy hypothesis can become a theory and how the theory be transformed into a viable reality.

Types of Implementation Analysis

The theoretical and physical dimensions of implementation analysis have already been discussed and these two dimensions have been related with different points on the continuum between policy proposal and policy actualisation. Now within the same dimensions the various types of implementation analysis can be formally defined. The descriptive treatment is heavily relied on by Cutt and Tydeman (37)'s concept of implementation analysis. There are, of course, two broad types of implementation analysis - the ex-ante and the ex-post. Ex-ante implementation analysis refers to analysis which is conducted prior to formal decision-making in order to provide an input into the decision-making process. Ex-post analysis on the other hand refers to a more detailed and rigorous analysis that is conducted after a policy decision is made. The purpose of this analysis is to provide a detailed feasibility report together with explicit identification of problems and pitfalls likely to arise during or immediately after the

implementation of the program. Cutt and Tydeman, but not with as much emphasis as do Webb and McMaster (38) and Van Meter and Van Horn (39), suggest two other types of ex-post implementation analysis. One, which is conducted during the implementation process and the other after the completion of the policy program. According to Webb and McMaster, the "objective of an implementation analysis conducted during the implementation phase is to review the effectiveness of the program and to suggest possible changes in the light of any feedback". Webb and McMaster's fourth type of implementation analysis is the one that is conducted after the completion of a program and is presumably designed to investigate as Van Meter and Van Horn put it - "Why did it happen this way". While the importance of these two types of implementation analyses is recognised, one needs to appreciate that the two analyses have not much relevance with the general premise upon which the entire philosophy and structure of policy analysis is based. To understand this, one needs to bear in mind Dror's (40) concept of 'a new professional mission' called policy analysis and Ukeles's definition of policy analysis (41) - the systematic investigation of alternative policy options and the assembly and integration of the evidence for and against each option. One should not undermine the importance of analysis and evaluation processes during or after the completion of a program and must appreciate that when a program is running unless it is commissioned as a part of a

complex still to be implemented on a full scale basis, a policy implementation analyst has got not much role to play because in this case the implementation process is virtually completed and the entire environment has become an operational system. Similarly when a program has been implemented, unless it is static in the sense that it is not yet operational, it no longer remains within the implementation domain and falls into that of operations and administration. It is realised that most classic studies of policy implementation are of the fourth type. But one also needs to realise that the major concern in showing some scepticism concerning these two types, especially to the fourth one, stems from the limited role, a policy analyst would have in the situation. It is hypothesised that when a program is running and specially when a program has been commissioned and completed, the policy analyst has virtually no power to interfere with the program. Bureaucratic hurdles are generally so many to surmount. In addition to this, monitoring and evaluation process is in practice handled by operating managers and its responsibility is entirely within the hands of administrators rather than policy analysts. Williams (42) seems to argue this point as follows:

"In either the policy or experimentation process there should be movement from speculation to a more orderly formulation of ideas and then to some decision on what to do. Implementation, the stage between a decision and operations, starts with the development of program guideline or design specifications moves to what may be

a quite lengthy stage of trying to work through a myriad of technical administrative, staff, and industrial problems that confront a new activity; and ends when the experiment is deemed ready to test or when the non-experimental activity is judged fully operational."

It does not, however, mean that policy analysts cannot play a crucial role when a program is running or after the program completion. Instead, it is emphasised that program or project analysts should be entrusted with the responsibility of examining the financial accountability, accountability for efficiency and economy, and the accountability for effectiveness. All what is required to be emphasised in this discussion is that implementation and operations are distinct entities. They should be treated separately and implementation analysis conducted during or after a project or program completion, can get confounded with factors, not associated with implementation alone. It is important to distinguish between a policy analyst and a policy implementation analyst. The former should be responsible for providing to a decision maker an analytic support to determine the overall effectiveness of a policy plan whereas the latter should be responsible exclusively for analysing the implementability of the plan according to a given strategy. It should be realised that the success of a good policy plan can be frustrated by the failure of a bad implementation. Similarly a bad plan can be successfully implemented without achieving the goals and objectives of the plan. Now to recapture and summarise the above discussion the four types are briefly stated:

Ex-ante

Type 1: Implementation analysis, conducted before a decision on a particular project or program is made,

Type 2: Implementation analysis, conducted after a particular program or project is chosen but prior to the program or project operation.

Ex-post

Type 3: Implementation analysis, conducted during a program or project is running but not yet completed.

Type 4: Implementation analysis conducted after the completion of a program or project.

4. WHY IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS

It has already been mentioned that the mid 70's pushed almost every country into deep economic recession. As a result of the depressed economic conditions and greater appreciation of policy sciences during the period, attitude to policy-making changed. Resource consciousness became the essence of public policy-making. This in turn has affected re-newed emphasis on the use of analytical support systems in public resource allocation. As in 1974 Benveniste (43) wrote :

"This is the age of planning: the expert briefing, the flip chart, facts and figures from computer printout, forecasts and trend analysis, the intervention and use of social measurements for policy formulation and feedback evaluation. In short this is the age of the multidisciplinary, large-scale approach to systems research for policy making."

In 1976 the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (RCAGA) recommended that authority be given to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to develop a small policy unit whose purpose amongst other things, would be to evaluate the effectiveness of ongoing programs against the general philosophy of the Government (44). The year 1977 saw the establishment of the Social Welfare Policy Secretariat in December 1977. The Secretariat has been responsible to the Permanent Heads Committee for the provision of advice on and the integrated development of plans, policies

and programs in the broad fields of health and welfare.

In 1978, the report on the Review of Post-arrival programs and Services for Migrants recommended that the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs' policy planning role be strengthened to include responsibility for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of all Commonwealth programs and services for migrants (45).

The Audit Amendment Act 1979 is aimed at evaluating public policies and programs in an ex-post dimension. At present, in Australia, the Departments of PM&C, Treasury, Finance, the Auditor-General and the Public Service Board are regarded as the influential policy agencies of the Commonwealth Government. The functions of the Department of PM&C include policy and program development and evaluation. The Department of Treasury advises the Commonwealth Government in the areas of economic, fiscal and monetary policies, while the functions of the Department of Finance include reviews and evaluation of public expenditure proposals. Similarly the PSB's functions include policy advice on personnel management and development.

To this point an attempt has been made to justify in implicit terms the use of policy analysis by reflecting in general the growing demands of the time and in particular in Australia the specific roles of the co-ordinating departments of the Commonwealth Government. The role of the Australian Parliament in policy decision-making has also been indicated. In addition to this, Royal commissions and committees on inquiry, play a specific

role in the formulation and evaluation of public policies and programs in Australia. Nevertheless the Australian Parliament has been reminded from time to time, of the need for more reliance on policy analysis. For example in 1978 an article - "Wake up the Watchdog" (46) observed:

"The Senate Committee on Finance and Government operations has no chance of covering all of the \$26,000 million a year in spending proposed by the bureaucrats and endorsed by the executive... The programs that make up the bulk of that \$26,000 million go relatively unchecked... In short, our government is inefficient. Any system which allows vast spending to pass without, comprehensive review, probing, criticism and amendment is not doing the job."

In 1979, the Senate Standing Committee on Social Welfare made a number of recommendations. Some of these recommendations were directed toward greater emphasis on the use of policy and program analysis in public sector organisations. For example the Committee recommended: (47)

1. "That evaluation reports tabled in the Parliament be referred to relevant committees of both Houses of the Parliament.
2. That the Commonwealth Government ensure that all health and welfare evaluation reports presented by or to it be tabled and printed as parliamentary papers, and that State Governments be encouraged to do the same.
3. That the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet be charged with the responsibility for ensuring that adequate program evaluation is carried out by all Commonwealth authorities and that it certify annually that the results of such evaluations have been properly reported to the Parliament.

4. That the Social Welfare Policy Secretariat either alone or after appropriate consultations, prepare a document or a number of documents outlining the methods available to organisations for the evaluation of their activities.
5. That, in future Commonwealth funding for any health or welfare organisation be contingent on a written agreement by the organisation that it will conduct ongoing evaluation of a quality that is approved by both the organisation and the Government; and that State Government be encouraged to follow a similar practice."

The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Expenditure - Parliament and Public expenditure also made a number of recommendations which supported a greater role for the Parliament to influence expenditure decisions and to ensure that budgetary allocations are based on analysis and evaluation, e.g. the recommendations regarding the development of forward estimates and program statements (48). McMaster and Webb (49) discussing 'the need for Policy Analysis Units' argued that in pursuant to Wilenski's Directions for change - Review of NSW Government Administration: An Interim Report, 1978, each Department at the Commonwealth level should be charged with analytic functions such as:

- . "advising Departmental Heads on the resources and planning necessary to ensure effective program implementation and evaluation;
- . preparing implementation statements for attachment to Cabinet submissions on new programs or modification to existing programs;
- . preparing comments on program implementation and evaluation for inclusion in the annual reports of Departments."

In addition to this, McMaster and Webb, specifically proposed the preparation of implementation statements so as to ensure that each Department in the Commonwealth or State Government does perform implementation analysis at various stages in policy or program planning and development.

By referring to the above recommendations and proposals it was meant to indicate the significance of implementation analysis. It may well be argued that since these are authentic recommendations and proposals, their prescriptive nature for implementation analysis is necessary and sufficient justification for undertaking the various types of implementation analysis. One should not, however, rely on this justification and instead pursue the rationality argument for implementation analysis. As a starting point one needs to focus, once again, attention on the concept of incrementalism. This is because the discussion so far has implicitly subscribed to incrementalism as one of the main reasons why implementation analysis is ignored in many pluralist countries. In this context it must be proved that as a policy-making process, incrementalism is not a rational decision strategy. Following Goodin and Waldner's (50) treatment of the concept of incrementalism, Lindblom's 'The Science of Muddling Through' (51) and Braybrooke and Lindblom's 'A Strategy of Decision' (52) one is convinced that the entire policy-

making process can be conceptualised as a system. It is then only common sense that for a comprehensive understanding and appraisal of a system, the system should be examined in totality. By this is meant inputs, outputs, transformation processes, control and feedback devices and the environment of the system. This study has to be supplemented with the understanding of the theoretical aspects of the system as well as with the consideration of explicit or implicit constraints under which the system is likely to operate. Accepting even the concept of incrementalism of taking small steps and reacting to feedbacks, one can argue that this concept is more or less the same as that of hypothesis testing. There does not seem to be a great deal of basic difference between the strategies based on incrementalism and non-incrementalism. Both strategies are sensible. The big difference between the two is that of timing. The incrementalists take an action, wait for the results and then rationalise the situation while the non-incrementalists rationalise the situation by a great deal of anticipation before they take an action. Now all that one requires to understand is the situation under study. If the situation is like the one referred to during the 50's and the early 60's i.e. placid and prosperous conditions, then one can perhaps accommodate too many undesired or at least unanticipated consequences by implementing a policy or program without due reliance on analysis. On the other hand, if there is a

crisis situation and or when every step (no matter how small it could be) is crucial then one has to rely on analysis and evaluation, otherwise the entire course of action would be tantamount to trying to find something in the dark. This discussion is not aimed at giving reasons for or against incrementalism. This is only to indicate that there is some kind of inbuilt pessimism in the concept of incrementalism, which should be thrashed out by subjecting a policy proposal to rigorous analysis. No one knows exactly what will happen in the future but at the same time one needs to recognise that human endeavour has always been involved in the quest for understanding and knowledge, advancement and excellence, with a view to make the world worthy of human kind. Surely one is not destined to always start with small increments. If a decision-maker knows for sure that he or she has a unique opportunity and support and resources required to implement a policy, then there is no need to be pessimistic about the implementation. All this policy decision-maker needs to do is to see whether or not the opportunity and the support and resources at his or her disposal, are viable and valid. This viability and validity is determined to a larger extent by subjecting that policy proposal to an implementation analysis. The policy-maker does not have to build unwarranted fear and pessimism into his or her decision strategy. This is not to advocate a 'high or long jump'

approach in policy making or policy implementation but at the same time one should not accept the inherent negativitism in incrementalism. It is believed, that no matter how big or small an intervention is, the policy decision should be based on an analytic support system. As Smith (53) indicates that policies in the Third World countries have to be ambitious and new, particularly where independence has just arrived or traditional rulers have been ousted. How a benevolent dictator or a nationalist leader in a Third World country who could be constantly under the fear of a military coup or an aggression from a super power, can engage himself in the trial and error syndrome like the one involved in incrementalism? There seems to be only one sensible and viable course of action open to him and that is to get his policy program fully analysed and evaluated in terms of its technicality and implementability. As a matter of fact financial assistance for development programs in the Third World countries by international organisations like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank is based amongst other things on feasibility studies which incorporate implementation analysis. It has already been mentioned that in Australia, the Royal commissions and Committees on Inquiry undertake policy and program analysis as well as suggest ways and means to improve various social action programs. Parliamentary committees as mentioned earlier are also engaged in policy planning and program evaluation. On receipt of reports of these inquiries,

senior public servants evaluate the findings of the reports and prepare the Government's response. This response is focussed on the social, economic, political and environmental factors affecting the implementability of the main recommendations. Last month the Commission of Inquiry into Efficiency and Administration of Hospitals, presented its report to the Commonwealth Government. Now this report is being reviewed and the emphasis is focused on, for example, how can the Government replace the present forms of cost-sharing health services with State Governments by this Commission's main recommendation of a method of 'formula funding' should the Commonwealth accept this recommendation. The 'how' part of the review is primarily structured along the lines of providing to the Government a comprehensive evaluation of the cost-containment aspects, emanating from introducing 'formula funding' for hospitals run by State Governments. The review is presenting to the Commonwealth, an explicit analysis of the economic, social, political and environmental consequences and impacts of following through the recommendations. Similarly each recommendation is subjected to an evaluation and analysis with a view to reflect the ease or difficulty of implementing it and its consequences in the foreseeable future, keeping in view the entire health care system in and outside Australia. All what has been described in brief, shows why to undertake implementation analysis. To put it in a prophetic style it is hypothesised that constraints on

public spending during the 80's would be much more stringent than, what they were during the 70's and this situation would impose upon governments greater demands to have their policies and programs properly evaluated and analysed before they would ever commit themselves to any course of action.

It is believed that implementation analysis will have to be regarded as an integral part of any paradigm of policy analysis and evaluation. One would have already seen some glimpses of the demands, referred to above. This was during the last general election in Australia when the Liberal-National Country Coalition Parties were accusing the Australian Labor Party for not having its new policies and programs evaluated.

For example, the Labor health and job creation programs were under fire on the pretext that if the ALP won the Government it would not be able to implement the two programs due to lack of resources or without generating huge deficit and imbalance in the balance of payments.

5. A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS

A policy continuum has been postulated to represent policy goals as one extreme and the realisation or actualisation of the policy goals the other. Now in order to develop an analytic framework for implementation analysis, one needs to visualise not only these two extremes but also all that can happen between the two. This may include static and dynamic processes, fixtures and features, systems and procedures, values and beliefs, physical and human resources, organised or unorganised, directly or indirectly associated with the continuum in the abstract and physical dimensions. Thus the framework should incorporate in its system of totality, a series of subsystems that may relate to both the physical and social sciences and more specifically to the economic, political, behavioural, institutional and bureaucratic problems, including possible impact of the environment of the system. It is assumed in this treatment that policy goals are the starting point in the whole processes of policy preparation and formulation. Nevertheless implementation analysis should be organised and structured in such a way that its range must encompass all those factors which can potentially impinge upon the policy implementation process. In other words the general framework must provide for the critical examination of all attributes and variables which should establish and explain an

acceptable relationship between policy and its realisation or as Van Meter and Van Horn imply, the linkage between policy goals and policy performance. Exploring this relationship or linkage one needs to examine the policy to be implemented from the view points of the following:

- the policy and its goals and objectives;
- the policy formulation process;
- the policy/program/project resources;
- the policy implementing organisation(s);
- the policy target group(s); and
- the policy environment

The above list of variables is not exhaustive. Depending upon the situation, the implementation analysis can vary the treatment of these variables, giving more or less significance to each and or even to include other variables. All that is essential in this whole exercise is that the analysis must provide an adequate treatment of the relevant variables and their weight an analyst would give to them in determining the overall implementability of a policy option. Just to give an example of some of other variables, we refer to Harper, Kramer and Rause (55)'s study of Implementation and use of PPB in Sixteen Federal Agencies, in the USA. The researchers used the following components within one, main variable of 'implemmentation organisation' referred to above.

- "number of analysts
- qualifications of analysts

- formal organisation promotes 'implementation (integration)
- Informal organisation promotes implementation (integration)
- Agency heads support
- perception of PPB's purpose."

Another set of variables which can be examined and included in the general framework for policy implementation analysis, may relate to ongoing or past policies, programs or projects associated or related with the policy being implemented and all other groups or their agencies engaged, generally, in policy-making process. For example any implementation analysis of a federal government policy should not only take into account other policies or programs of the Federal Government but also include in its setting due consideration of the state and the local government's policies and programs. All what is being attempted in structuring the model for analysis is to bring into the limelight each and every variable and its components which can help arrive at a logical, rational and viable decision in the ex-ante situation and consider each and every factor which could have given rise to understanding the policy outcomes in an ex-post situation. This structuring of the general framework is a kind of exercise in subjective future building and factor analysis in the ex-ante and ex-post dimensions respectively. Now a series of variables and the components which are generally influential in the realisation of policy plan through its implementation is discussed. This discussion is largely pursued along the lines suggested

by Smith (56), Cutt and Tydeman (57), and Van Meter and Van Horn (58).

The Policy

The Policy variable i.e. the policy to be implemented is the most crucial variable in the general framework for implementation analysis and it can be associated with a hypothesis. Thus it is the starting point from where the designing of an experiment is to commence. If a hypothesis does not make sense, nobody would bother to test it. In the same sense if the policy is based on a rationale contrary to the common ideology and philosophy it would be quite difficult to implement the policy program. Thus the analysis must attempt to determine, what one may say, the truth or to an extent the universality of the notion upon which the policy is based. In this respect the analysis would involve the critical investigation and evaluation of

- (a) the policy initiation and formulations;
- (b) the policy philosophy;
- (c) the policy goals and objectives;
- (d) the policy type; and
- (e) the policy resources.

These components of the variable of policy are discussed in the following passages.

- (a) Policy Initiation and Formulation It is believed that policy initiation and formulation has great impact on the policy implementation process. Many public policies are associated with political leaders themselves rather than with their parties and it is the power and the popularity of the

leader in a certain situation that becomes directly proportional to the ease or difficulty of executing the policy programs. In Pakistan, during the late 60's and early 70's the policies of the People's Party were accepted and adored with great zeal and enthusiasm not because the masses understood the policies, or as if they were formulated with maximum consultation or participation but simply because late Mr Bhutto, the Party Chairman, had become so popular after the 1965 war with India, that his word of mouth was taken as a message from the 'Lord'. Past performances in general and similar policies in particular, have greater impact on the implementation process of a policy. However, the implementation analyst should understand the motivating force behind the policy formulation process i.e. who's policy is this? No doubt policies are formulated and presented as policies of a political party but for an implementation analyst to accept this, is not sufficient. He or she must start from the personalities, circumstances and the nature of the policy formulation process, to be able to fully ascertain the chances of the successful implementation of the policy under review. Graham Allison's three conceptual models - the rationale actor model, organisational process model and the government politics model (59) explain how policies could be formulated in crisis situation and what chances

are there for their acceptance and successful implementation when different personalities barrack for different policies. As Dror (60) writes every policy has a certain chance of failing; 'my analysis of the problems involved in ascertaining the quality of policy-making by its real output has led us directly back to the policy-making process". Thus the implementation analyst must not take a policy or policy proposal for implementation analysis, as gospel. He or she must attempt to understand the forces behind the policy and the manner in which this policy has been put forward before he or she begins to determine the implementability of the policy proposal.

(b) The Policy Philosophy

Now irrespective as to how a policy has been formulated or who is behind a policy proposal, the success or failure of the policy implementation process is very much dependent upon the basic philosophy underlying the policy proposal. If this philosophy is in line with the common core philosophy of the community where the policy is to be implemented or if it is an acceptable idea, consonant with the values and beliefs of the community, the chances of successful implementation are potentially enhanced. Sabatier and Mazmanian (61) define this philosophy as "the availability of valid technical theory and technology" and Moynihan and Suchman (62), 'the underlying theory utilised to

formulate a policy.' According to Sabitier and Mazmanian, 'the absence of a valid causal theory and/or the requisite technology in turn poses a number of difficulties for the successful implementation of statutory objectives'. The two major problems the authors mention are:

1. "Any program poses costs to tax payers (in the form of program administration) and to target groups. To the extent that these costs cannot be justified by measurable improvements in the problem being addressed political support for the program will almost surely decline and thus statutory objectives will be either ignored or modified.
2. Disputes over the availability of the requisite technology will produce strong pressures for delaying deadlines for achieving statutory objectives and or considerable uncertainty over the most effective means of encouraging technology innovation..."

Moynihan, as Smith points out has been a vocal critic of the 'theory' utilised in the formulation of the War on Poverty program, in the USA. Similarly Suchman's concern for the theory underlying a policy is quite reflected in the following paragraph:

"If a program is unsuccessful, it may be because the program fails to 'operationalise' the theory, or because the theory itself was deficient. One may be highly successful in putting a program into operation but, if the theory is incorrect or not adequately translated into action, the desired changes may not be forthcoming..."

In Australia there have been a number of changes to the health insurance schemes since 1975. Each time, the policy changes have been almost successfully implemented by the decision-maker. The reason is simple and that is that the entire community is split into two opposing philosophies - one by

the Australian Labor Party and accepted by almost 50 percent of the electorate is based on the premise that all Australians should have access to basic health services regardless of their income and the other by the Liberal National Country Coalition Parties and equally accepted by half the electorate is that the responsibility of health care should eventually rest at the community level.

(c) The Policy Goals and Objectives

It is imperative for an implementation analyst to understand the substance and the entire range of the goals and objectives of the policy proposal and the constraints under which implementation process is likely to take place or in the case of an ex-post analysis, has taken place before he or she commits himself or herself to proceed with the analysis. Undoubtedly there are problems in understanding the goals and objectives of a policy proposal. These problems can stem from the diversity or the hierarchical nature of the decision-making authority and or from the policy images, each actor or group of actors can have. As an example, if a policy of cost-containment is to be implemented in a medical research sub-system of a health care system, the policy implementation analyst will have to understand that since the sole objective of the sub-system is medical research and patient care, the management of the sub-system would not

be ordinarily interested in or impressed with the policy of cost-containment. Thus the analyst will have to understand that the policy proposal is clearly in conflict with the objective of the sub-system and therefore the chances of a successful implementation are potentially limited. Nevertheless it will be necessary for the analyst to get the policy objectives clearly specified at some level of decision-making so that the implementation process, no matter how difficult it may be, can proceed in an expeditious and meaningful manner.

It is therefore essential on the part of the analyst to watch for any ambiguity or vagueness in the specification of goals and objectives. As there is a hierarchy of decision-making so is there hierarchy of goals and objectives. Additionally goals seen at one level of hierarchy of decision-making may not be seen as the same at another level of the hierarchy of decision making. This variation in perception of goals and objectives at different levels of an organisation can cause confusion. This confusion and ambiguity or vagueness must be cleared before an implementation analysis is to be undertaken. Policy making is an explicit and implicit political bargaining process in most pluralist democracies. Policy statements of major political parties in these democracies are often stated in their manifesto or policy speeches of their leaders in a rather

wishful manner. These statements are virtually geared towards giving some indication of the actual policies the party would like to adopt after gaining the office. These statements may simply be a policy feeler to attract public response with a view to formulate formal policies at a later stage in the light of the public response. The analyst must take notice of these statements if they are related to the policy proposal under evaluation for implementation analysis and this way, he or she can enrich his or her analysis. But he or she must also be aware that the policy proposal or the implementation process of a system, he or she is analysing, must have clearly specified goals and objectives. If goals and objectives are not clearly defined the question of undertaking an implementation analysis is somewhat crazy in the sense that the analyst may be expected to delineate goals and objectives himself or herself which he or she should not attempt to do in his or her own. This is because setting of objectives or goals is outside his or her domain. In general goals and objectives would be given. All that the analyst is required to do is to watch for any confusion, ambiguity, vagueness or misunderstanding on the part of the decision maker. William (63) emphasised the importance of the clear cut specification of goals and objectives as follows:

"Implementation analysis starts with a consideration of the clarity, precision, comprehensiveness, and reasonableness of the preliminary policy or design specifications. The analyst must ask if the proposal idea, rather than being merely a vaporous wish, addresses reasonable objectives cast in relatively specific terms, and if the treatment package is reasonably well specified."

It is realised that an ex-ante analysis might be required to assist in the formulation of goals and objectives. It is not, however, believed that an implementation analyst can initially specify the policy goals. All the analyst can do is to rationalise goals and objectives or their images to tailor them into formal goals and objectives. It is therefore imperative to emphasise that in the absence of clear cut specification of goals and objectives as the starting point from where the analyst is to take off, an implementation analysis would not be able to fully ascertain the implementability of a policy proposal and thus the sole purpose of the analysis to determine the confidence limits of the success of the policy realisation would be defeated. Two other matters closely related to the specification of goals and objectives are those of measures of performance and standards, i.e. how we are going to measure the implementability and against what". It is, therefore, emphasised that without operationally defined objectives in terms of which the implementability of a policy

proposal can be meaningfully determined, the outcome of the implementation analysis would not offer any useful purpose; nor would it give any support to the decision-maker. It is believed that measures of performance, when compared with the given standards, not only help specify the variables to be included in the domain of an implementation analysis but also add substance and meaning to policy implementation. Van Meter and Van Horn (64), discussing policy standards and objectives in the context of implementation, emphasise the importance of measures of performance as follows:

"Essentially the performance indicators assess the extent to which policy's standards and objectives are realised".

(d) The Policy Types

Policy type is another variable which has direct impact on the implementability of a policy or its program. This is because the implementation process can be hampered by the extent to which the new policy or program is different from the existing one, Smith (65) mentions three main types of policies as follows:

- "(i) Policies may be complex or they may be simple in nature. This distinction is similar to broad non-incremental policies and small scale incremental ones;
- (ii) Policies may be categorised as organisational or non-organisational. An organisational policy requires the modification (or the establishment) of a formal organisation. Non-organisational policies on the other hand, call for the establishment of patterns of interaction outside the formal organisation context.

- (iii) Policies also may be classified as distributed, redistributed, regulatory self regulatory or emotive-symbolic"

Once again, Van Meter and Van Horn (66) classify policies according to two distinguishing characteristics: the amount of change involved and the extent to which there is goal consensus among the participants in the implementation process, including consultation with or involvement of subordinates in the decision-making process. They also quote Lindblom and Wildavsky who suggest that incremental policy changes are more likely to engender a positive response than will drastic ones." This might be true in the fairly placid environment of some western democracies but not necessarily in the Third World countries where social and political crises have virtually become epidemic . Policies in these countries, would have to be non-incremental in nature otherwise the delay and the pessimism inherent in the nature of the incremental policies, would frustrate the capacity of the hungry and volatile masses to recognise the possible merits, occurring from incrementalism in policy making and implementation(67) .

Cutt and Tydeman (68) split this variable of the type of policy/project into various components such as "scale of project, complexity of project, gestation period and nature of output". The authors see complexity as having two dimensions;

the degree to which the project is clearly or vaguely defined and the nature of the production functions, i.e. relationship between inputs and outputs and the required technology content.

Obviously, the more complex a project is the more difficult it is to implement it. Gestation period is the time horizon of the project costs and benefits. In this respect it is hypothesised that policies/projects whose benefits take longer to accrue are likely to be less favourable to the decision-makers, implementors and the target group(s). Cutt and Tydeman (69) present this point as follows:

"our hypothesis is that projects which are re-distributive between generation, i.e. where net benefits do not occur until after substantial period, are likely to kindle less enthusiasm in decision makers, bureaucrats and (...) the general or specific target group to be favoured by that project, than projects which manifest themselves in net benefits in the relatively short run."

The nature of the policy/project output has also greater impact on the success of the implementation process and this can be determined as to whether a policy or project is:

- distributory - provides benefits to some people but imposes no visible tangible costs on anyone. i.e. charitable benefits;
- regulatory - obtains its objectives by constraining certain individuals or organisations i.e. Trade Practices Act etc.;
- re-distributory - provides benefits to some but at a direct tangible cost to other i.e. tariff cuts etc.

It is believed that distributory policies or projects are likely to be easier to implement than other types of policies. As an example, this ease in implementing distributory policies is quite reflective from the fact that at no stage, had there been any real problem implementing policies regarding social security benefits or pensions in Australia. On the other hand the health and economic policies of the Australian Labor Party during the 70's had faced all sorts of opposition and criticism due to the redistributory or regulatory nature of the policies.

(e) The Policy/Project Resources

The policy or project resources include all those tangible and intangible resources which can facilitate the smooth implementation of the policy program.

These resources in their broader perspectives may comprise:

- (i) legal, institutional and statutory support;
- (ii) physical and human resources;
- (iii) financial and capital resources;
- (iv) political and social resources;
- (v) good-will and moral support.

Additionally, the resources may also include the potential support from political or any other organisation and the incentives that might directly or indirectly encourage or facilitate the effective commissioning or running of the

the implementation process of a policy or its program. More specifically, resources could also include the whole network of infrastructure and as Van Meter and Van Horn (78) write, the "inter organisational communication and enforcement activities, the characteristics of implementing agencies the economic, social and political environment affecting the jurisdiction or organisation and the disposition of implementors". These elements of resources shall be discussed in detail under the main headings of target groups, the implementation organisation and the policy environment in the following sections. One may also add here another dimension to policy resources by including the climatic and geographic factors which could potentially assist the implementation process. However, one needs to realise that these two factors can equally act as deterrents to a smooth policy implementation process at different times and locations.

The Target Group(s)

To Cutt and Tydeman (70) the policy target group(s) is the one(s) on which the policy or project is intended to have direct or indirect impact, either as gainers or losers. Smith follows Dye's concept (Understanding Public Policy) and defines target group(s) as the "collectivity of individuals who are required to adopt new patterns of interaction as a result of the implementation of the public policy".

Following the first definition, it is obvious that a policy implementation process can generate four categories of target groups which are:

- (1) Direct gainers;
- (2) Indirect gainers;
- (3) Direct losers; and
- (4) Indirect losers

On the other hand the second definition involves the behavioural aspects, reflecting the extent to which the diversity and the amount of behaviour of the target group(s) is regulated. It is therefore imperative for the implementation analyst to take full account of the four categories and the behavioural aspects in assessing the implementability of each policy alternative. It is believed that a policy or project would be regarded more difficult to implement if it is likely to generate both gainers and losers.

This further implies that implementation would be easier if there are no intended losers.

Nevertheless, the variable of 'target group(s)' should be examined and its impact ascertained from the view point of the following components:

- . existence of each group of gainers and losers (direct and indirect);
- . size of each group, and its disposition;
- . leadership in each group and its disposition;
- . group's organisation, political strength, general reputation and success record or its reaction to policies in the past;
- . each group's effective reaction to the policy proposal (through statements/talks submissions etc)

These components have been put forward by Cutt and Tydeman (72). T.B. Smith (73) adds two more components. These are -

- . "the orientation towards government of the target group"; and
- . "the prior policy experience of the target group".

Now an attempt is made to reflect some impact of these components on the implementation process from the experience of certain policies or programs. One may refer to the changes in the health insurance arrangements in Australia. The Australian Labor Party Government program of 1975 (Medibank) faced teething opposition from three major target groups, namely the Liberal and National Country Coalition

Parties, the Australian Medical Association and the private health insurance organisations. Firstly, the ALP could not incorporate into the Health Insurance Act 1973, its initial proposal of 1.35% levy on taxable incomes due to opposition from the Liberal National Country Coalition Parties. Secondly, the Australian Medical Association presented 77 petitions to the House of Representatives and 22 to the Senate opposing the Medibank program. The Association's opposition to the program was instrumental in the defeat of the Health Insurance Bills 1973-74 in the Senate. The Association in collaboration with the private health insurance organisations and the private hospitals continued creating obstacles in the implementation of the program. Both the AMA and the private health insurance perceived the ALP program to be a serious threat to their existence. The AMA and the private insurance organisations formed a committee - the National Joint Health Advisory Committee in November 1974 to oppose the implementation of Medibank. Health insurance contributors were urged by the NJHAC directly and through media to retain their membership with the insurance organisations. Finally the New South Wales Branch of the AMA issued a writ in the High Court, challenging Section 17 and 18 of the Health Insurance Act 1973 but before a definitive decision was made by the court, the program itself virtually saw its doomsday

with the dismissal of the Labor Government on 11 November 1975. One may also recall the failures of the 'Land Reforms' and the family planning programs in Pakistan during the mid 60's. In the case of 'Land Reforms', while the size of the target group in the form of 'losers' was very small due to concentration of land ownership into a few feudal landlord families, the group had enough political and financial power to frustrate the program. In the case of family planning while there was no question of losers or gainers as a result of the program, the target groups did perceive the program to be very much against their beliefs and values. The nature of the program was so innovative and revolutionary that the target group did not have the capacity to comprehend it positively. In regard to prior policy experience by the target group, one can once again recall the Australian Medical Association's opposition to the Medibank program. It is suffice to mention here that the AMA had seen a similar program, proposed by the National Health and Medical Research Council during 1941-49's term of the ALP Government. In 1944, a Pharmaceutical Benefit Act proposed that medicine etc. would be supplied on a doctor's prescription free of charge to the patient, with the cost being met from the National Welfare Fund. The AMA, believing this to be the first step in a process of nationalisation of medical services, refused to co-operate and mounted a legal challenge. The Act was declared

invalid by the High Court in 1945. (74)

In regard to the past policy experience by the target group(s) Smith (75) maintains that "citizens may feel that regardless of the necessity and usefulness of the policy the administrators lack the diligence and ability to implement any policy effectively."

Now the question is as to how an implementation analyst can assess a target group's reaction and feeling about the new policy or program. In this respect one may hypothesise that if a target group has generally been vocal about public programs in the past, its opposition or reaction to the new policy would probably be well exposed and regimented. All what the analyst should do is to ensure that the target group is fully aware of the new policy and that the target group's reaction and disposition have been taken into account in his or her analysis. Bunker (76) claims that the disposition of a target group to a policy can be viewed from three broader perspectives; one is the "agreement dimension" and the other two are the "issue salience" and the "power resources". According to the author, these three concepts are defined as follows:-

Agreement Dimension - "a bipolar scale with a neutral midpoint, provides a way to map the position of an actor relative to the position of a positive advocate of the policy to be executed".

Issue Saliency - 'refers to the centrality of an issue for a particular actor, how much attention it commands, how important the actor (person or organisation) considers it to be.'

Power Resources 'is a vertical dimension defined by the number and potency of political resources an actor has available.'

Naturally, the higher the issue saliency and greater the agreement and power resources a target group may have, the greater the assistance for the policy's implementation by the target group. On the other hand if a target group has high 'issue saliency' coupled with low 'agreement dimension' and greater 'power resources' for a new policy it is likely to cause resistance to the policy implementation process.

Finally, the success of the implementation process of a policy plan is also dependent on the disposition and power of the leadership of the target group. A powerful leadership can best mobilize and utilize the strength of its rank and file members to oppose or support the implementation process of a policy program. However, this strength is very much a function of the integrity, strength and attitude of the leadership of the target group. This is because it is the leadership that provides initiatives and stimuli for the members of the target group to actively support, participate and work for the cause

of the group. More importantly, the leadership articulates, projects and presents the group's view point and stands up to any opposition to defend the group's views and objectives. We have seen both in Australia and Britain the unsuccessful implementation of the two Governments' policy of the Olympic boycott last year. The policy implementation failed because the Australian and the British Olympics Federations strongly opposed the policy and they successfully and forcefully presented a lively slogan - "keep politics out of sports". Another example of how the disposition of leadership of a target group can influence the implementation process of a policy is evident from the AMA's role in opposing the Medibank program in Australia. (77)

The Policy Implementing Organisation

The policy implementing organisation is a physical entity that may consist of one or more administrative structure(s) and whose responsibility is to implement or execute a public policy or program. In our system of responsible government while politicians are primarily responsible for policy making, government bureaucracy is responsible for implementing public policies. Any setting of a bureaucracy shall, however, involve decision-making but within the broad domain of a given policy goals and objectives. It is therefore important to appreciate that there are a number of points on the policy continuum where

bureaucrats have the opportunity and discretion to enhance or frustrate the policy implementation process. One needs to understand further that the social complexity, diversity and the hierarchical nature of most public sector organisations can be so opaque and difficult to break through that bureaucrats working in one area of an organisation, could be completely unaware of what other bureaucrats in the same organisation, pursuing the same policy goals, are doing. A number of factors have been identified by various policy scientists - e.g., Smith (79) Van Meter and Van Horn (80), Cutt and Tydeman (81), Sabatier and Mazmanian (82) to be crucial in understanding the role of an implementing organisation from the view point of implementation analysis. These factors are generally aimed at critically examining the two main aspects:

1. The implementing organisation's orientation with and positive perception of the policy philosophy and its goals and objectives; and
2. The capacity and the structure of the implementing organisation(s) to successfully execute a policy program according to an acceptable implementation strategy.

In regard to the first aspect it is believed as Van Meter and Van Horn (83) write, that the implementor's understanding of the general intent as well as the specific standards and objectives of the policy is important" for the success of a policy implementation process. The policy perception by the implementing organisation is significantly important. This is because if they themselves do not understand the policy

intent or for some reasons fail to see eye to eye with the policy goals and objectives, they are not likely to create a conducive environment for the target groups to positively respond to the success of the policy implementation. The misunderstanding or negative perception and or any lack of enthusiasm on the part of the implementing organisation is likely to generate confusion and disenchantment for the general community and for the target group(s) in particular. In view of this, the implementation analyst must focus his or her attention on the human psychology to ascertain whether or not the implementing organisation(s) is likely to be fully geared towards accepting the policy intent including the implementation strategy. It is further believed that while the implementors, in their official capacity, are seen as committed to the policy implementation process, they are very much part of a target group as well. Their private affiliation in regard to a policy program is quite influential in the discharge of the official functions. They may fail to complement policies if these policies somehow negate their personal beliefs and values. This is true in real life situation and is also explained by the nature of human psychology. For example, each time different political party's take over governments, they make senior appointments on the basis of the incumbents implicit and explicit party affiliation. John Menadue's appointment

as Permanent Head of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in February 1975 during the Whitlam Government in Australia is a case in point.

Van Meter and Van Horn (84) quote Petrick and Festinger who explain the psychological aspect as follows:

"It arises from the fact that human groups find it difficult to carry out effectively acts for which they have no underlying beliefs" (Petrick)

"Under circumstances of cognitive dissonance the individual may attempt to bring the displeasing message into balance with his perception of what the decision ought to have been" (Festinger).

This leads to the hypothesis that wide spread positive orientation and a sense of belonging with the policy goals and objectives, on the part of implementing organisation, would enhance greatly the potential of the success of the policy implementation process.

Sabatier and Mazmanian (85) confirm this hypothesis in the following words:

"No matter how well a statute structures the formal decision process, the attainment of statutory objectives which seek to significantly modify target group behaviour is unlikely unless officials in the implementing agencies are strongly committed to the achievement of these objectives".

The role of leadership has already been mentioned under the 'target groups' and the possible impact it can have on the success of an implementation process. In the same sense the leadership in an implementing organisation is also crucial to be given due regard in the implementation analysis.

Cutt and Tydeman (86) articulate the above discussion rather succinctly as follows:

"Our hypothesis here relates basically to the common link of goal consensus, and postulates that the greater the extent to which those responsible for the final delivery of the project share the goals of those who have decided upon the project, the greater will be the 'effort' and the easier will be implementation."

This discussion and its consideration in implementation analysis may indicate simply one question and this is the extent to which the implementing organisation is willing to execute a policy plan. However, the analysis cannot terminate here, it should attempt to answer the other question. This is about the extent to which the implementing organisation is competent to undertake the implementation process. While these two questions are related, they are very much distinct. Van Meter and Van Horn (87) address this second question in detail and put forward a number of elements. These elements are stated and where appropriate elaborated as follows:

"(a) the competence and size of an agency's staff;

(b) the degree of hierarchical control of sub-unit decisions and processes within the implementing organisation i.e. -

- . are those taking decisions remote from the implementors?
- . have implementors been consulted and involved in the policy formulation process?
- . are there effective checks and balances in the processing systems of the implementing organisations?

are there effective reward systems and opportunities for advancement?

- (c) the agency's political resources (e.g. support among legislators and executives);
- (d) the vitality and reputation of the organisation;
- (e) the degree of 'open' communications (i.e. networks of communication with free horizontal and vertical communications with persons outside the organisation) within an organisation;
- (f) the agency's formal and informal linkages with the policy-making or policy enforcing body".

It is believed that this element of policy enforcement is one of the most important parameters which should be examined in the implementation analysis. This is because the responsibility of policy enforcement would be assigned to an agency independent of the implementing organisation and this way the external monitoring and evaluation undertaken by the policy enforcing agency, would, to a larger extent, act as control and feedback devices to continually examine the performance of the implementing organisation. It is also believed that the role of the policy enforcing body can be one of an objective, impartial, unbiased and independent observer, aware of but uncompromised by the vested interests of the implementing organisation. It is however imperative to appreciate that too much interference by external evaluators can also cause hinderance in the implementation process. Nevertheless, it is important that the implementation analysis does examine this element and determine the probability as to what extent the policy-enforcing agency can be instrumental in successfully implementing a policy program.

The Policy Environment

No policy can be implemented in isolation.

There are economic, social, political, cultural, technological and other environmental factors which can affect the policy implementation process. As Smith (88) points out; "natural events such as disasters (floods, drought, hurricanes etc.) influence the effectiveness of public policies and create the necessity for new politics". One may add the discovery of natural resources, historical or 'sacred' sites as another factor that can affect the implementation process or even the termination of old policy to adopt a new one. Only last month the Australian High Court granted special leave to appeal to a group of Aborigines, seeking to prevent Alcoa building its new aluminium smelter at Portland in Western Australia. The Aborigines were claiming that site to be part of their tribal lands (89).

Cutt and Tydeman (90) describe environment as a variable that is comprised of five main components. These are interdependencies, judicial constraints, effect on social and cultural attitudes, indirectly affected groups and political feasibility. Within these components the following discussion is pursued. For example a policy or project which overlaps or threatens the existing or ongoing policies or projects is likely to be more difficult to implement than the

one which is deemed to be compatible with the others. Projects or policies relating to social issues such as abortion, legalisation of prostitution, homosexuality, incest; restoration of capital punishment, introduction of orthodox penal enactments, decrees etc are likely to generate problems of a complex nature in implementation of those projects. Sabatier and Mazmanian (91) identify the amount and continuity of media attention to the problem addressed by a statute" as an important component of environment, intervening the implementation process. Van Meter and Van Horn (92) summarise the impact of environment on policy implementation by examining the following six questions:

- "(a) Are the economic resources available within the implementing jurisdiction (or organisation) sufficient to support successful implementation? (discussed under policy resources).
- (b) To what extent (and how) will prevailing economic and social conditions be affected by the implementation of the policy in question?
- (c) what is the nature of public opinion; how salient is the related policy issue?
- (d) Do elites favour or oppose implementation of the policy?
- (e) what is the partisan character of the implementing jurisdiction (or organisation); is there partisan opposition or support for the policy?
- (f) To what extent are private interest groups mobilised in support or opposition to the policy?."

To this point, the above discussion has focused on the policy initiation and formulation, the policy philosophy, the policy goals and objectives, the policy type, the policy resources, the policy target group, and finally the

policy environment as the main variables which must be examined in conceptualising and undertaking a policy implementation analysis. A schematic modular general framework for implementation analysis, comprising all the variables, is presented in Figure 1. It is repeated that this general framework is primarily based on Smith (93), Van Meter and Van Horn (94)'s models, This presentation is then immediately followed by a breakdown of the variables which is adopted from Cutt and Tydeman (95)'s clusters of variables'. It has already been indicated that this list of variables is not exhaustive. Different variables or the emphasis upon them might be required for the same policies at different times or locations. Nevertheless, the variables (and the components) to be included in any form of implementation analysis, must indicate the nature and intensity of the problems associated with the

1. acceptability of the policy intent and its form by the general community and the implementing organisation(s);
2. availability of the resources, required to successfully execute the policy program; and the
3. operationality of the policy implementation process from the view point of its physical implementability.

A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS




Figure 1.

IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS
(CLUSTERS OF VARIABLES)




Figure 2.

Source: J. Cutt and J. Tydeman, A General Approach to the Analysis of Public Resource Allocation, Research Monograph Series No.1 The Australian National University, 1976 P.47.

6. PRESENTATION OF IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS

A number of variables and their components which can influence the implementation process have been discussed in the previous section. Now the question is as to how can one assign an implementation difficulty score to each component and integrate the individual score into an overall difficulty score for an alternative to implement a policy proposal. The main difficulty in assigning and particularly integrating these scores is due to the fact that most variables and their components differ in nature and there is no independence amongst them and thirdly but most importantly there is the problem of determining an "ideal score" in the positive or negative sense. By positive, is meant the ease of implementation whereas 'negative' is taken to imply the difficulty. In order to visualise these problems of assigning and integrating the difficulty score one can, for instance, compare a target group's strong opposition to a policy program with inadequate resources available at the disposal of an implementing organisation of the policy program. While the two variables will generate negative or difficulty scores, there is really no comparison between the two. The first variable i.e. target group, mainly deals with the social and political dimensions whereas the second variable i.e. policy resources may also involve hardware technology, systems and processes. However, one needs to appreciate that the immediate concern in the presentation of an implementation

analysis is not with absolute but with relative difficulties or ease. What one should be looking for through this exercise of presentation is an ordinal or preferably interval level of measurement of the difficulties or ease in respect of the various variables so that one could rank or rate the given alternatives to implement a policy program. If one can ascertain, for example, that alternative A is more difficult than alternatives B,C,D, etc and alternative C is more difficult than D etc, then one should be able to choose an alternative which is likely to be less difficult to implement than the others. Thus this analysis is aimed at ranking or rating of the policy alternatives on some kind of scale of increasing or decreasing difficulty. In this respect the methodologies put forward by Cutt and Tydeman (96) and Chase (97) are critically examined. Cutt and Tydeman suggest that "analysts might drive a utility score on a common interval rating scale, say, from zero to ten for each variable and in turn for each cluster of variables and by simple addition derive a final score for each delivery system on the same rating scale". They claim that the score will reflect the weights assigned to each major cluster of variables and to each component variable. Chase compares three programs in respect of a number of factors which influence the implementation process of the three programs. He grades each factor on three absolute bases:

- "... E (easy), if the factor presents few, if any problems or is easy to deal with;
- ... M (moderate) for the intermediate case; and
- ... H (hard), if it is very difficult to deal with or present, many problems"

His next step is to 'subtract out' or ignore all the E's and M's in respect of the three programs and then 'add up' all the H's and M-H's in each program and compare them. Chase unlike Cutt and Tydeman argues that "One of the more obvious things that we cannot do ... is simply to assign a number to each factor's grade in a program (such as 1 for E, 2 for M, and 3 for H) add them up, and produce a number representing the overall difficulty that a program's implementation is likely to entail." He defends this by saying that 'some factors are more critical than others in impact on a particular program's implementation. On the other hand Chase has not touched on any treatment that should be given to a vetoing variable' suggested by Cutt and Tydeman. Pursuing 'vetoing variable', the authors believe that "the nature of some projects may be such that a particular variable may have to reach a prescribed standard or totally negate the operation of the delivery system ... where that 'vetoing' variable take value of zero". If this is pursued a little further one can perhaps postulate that vetoing variable may be deemed to be the one which has a veto power in the sense that the potential implementation difficulty due to the

variable is so enormous that it overrides the possible support or ease generated by the remaining variables. Thus if an alternative has a vetoing variable it would not be regarded as feasible. However, if a vetoing variable is given 'zero' score as Cutt and Tydeman suggest and consider the overall difficulty score of the alternative, it might be possible that the alternative fares well as compared to those alternatives which do not have vetoing variables but variables which are regarded to be somewhat difficult to implement. Cutt and Tydeman, however, suggest that in the case of vetoing variable additional information be used. It is believed that once a vetoing variable is suspected it is useful to gather additional information to further investigate whether or not the variable in question is 'really a vetoing variable' but there is no point in taking the overall score for the alternative. This is where Chase's argument of not taking an overall difficulty score is stronger. Nevertheless comparing the two it is observed that both approaches are inappropriate when there is only one alternative to be analysed. It is believed that while there is generally more than one alternative to implement a policy program it is not always the case. In this respect it is only imperative that ranking or rating of the various variables be taken by a panel of experts familiar with the administrative, social and political environment under

which the implementation process has taken place or is likely to operate. None of the authors seems to suggest this. Secondly the two approaches do not seem to envisage the reliability aspect of the rating. By this, is meant that there is no explicit consideration in both the approaches, of using inter-rater reliability for each variable or component. This inter-rater reliability can be determined by using the technique of analysis of variance and is measured by reliability coefficient for each variable. The reliability coefficient of a variable should depict the extent to which the rating of the variable by the various experts or raters would be replicated. In other words, a reliability coefficient should represent a proportion of the times a variable would get the same rank or rate on the same utility scale.

Regardless of the qualitative or quantitative presentation of implementation analysis, the following proposals are deemed to be most crucial:

- (1) A panel of experts should rank or rate each alternative in respect of each and every relevant variable and component;
- (2) In the case of vetoing variable, further investigation be undertaken to assess the veto. If substantial veto is found, the vetoing variable should override the other variables and thus the policy alternative be dropped;
- (3) The technique, of 'analysis of variance' be used to determine reliability coefficient for each component which should be used to determine the final rating of the corresponding component;

- (4) Individual variable rating should be treated more seriously than overall rating. Overall rating should be considered only if all the alternatives are of the same nature; and
- (5) If overall ratings are considered, their confidence limits should be calculated on a level of significance to determine whether or not the alternatives are statistically different.

7. CONCLUSION

A policy implementation analysis is seen as the most serious attempt to model the policy implementation process on a continuing basis. In an ex-ante or what one may informally describe as the abstract dimension, a policy implementation analysis can, to a larger extent, provide an objective and rational scenario of the matrix of problems and difficulties likely to be encountered in implementing a policy program. Irrespective to whether a policy is new or incremental in nature, it needs to be examined from the view point of its physical implementability. A policy or project may sound feasible or even promising when rated on the basis of a technical analysis like cost-benefit analysis but it might be otherwise when it is required to determine as to how the two streams of costs and benefits would materialise. One needs to appreciate that technical analysis is only one aspect of the general framework of policy analysis. The success of a policy program is not only determined from the view point of increasing economic indices. There are a host of factors and forces which affect the entire policy continuum. Policy-making and policy implementation are hard core real life situations. They are physical entities and they involve economic, social, political, cultural and environmental aspects of human life. It is, therefore, absolutely essential that in order to justify the desirability

and feasibility of a public policy, the public authorities must see implementation analysis as an integral part of the general framework for policy-making process. Public policies and programs can be incremental as has been just mentioned but one needs to realise that the 80's are imposing stringent demands for constraining public spending and that resource consciousness will have to be one of the top priorities of public authorities. While incrementalism could still be exercised in policy making and implementation, the very decision for 'moving in small steps' will have to be determined on the basis of an analytic support system, including implementation analysis. It is believed that there is a good possibility that the 80's would bring incrementalism and analytic systems together to merge them into a new paradigm.

In an ex-post dimension, soon after the commissioning of a policy program, implementation analysis is seen as serving a significant role. This is regarded so not only because at this point of the policy continuum, the policy analysis would assist in determining "how we are going" but would be the last chance of saving scarce resources from going to waste. One should not undermine the importance of an implementation analysis undertaken after the completion of a policy implementation process. The analysis at this point of time is necessary to determine the extent to which policy goals and objectives

have been achieved and secondly to assess the degree to which an ex-ante analysis, if taken, has been realistic by comparing its anticipated implementation problems with those encountered during the actual implementation process. However, one needs to emphasise the importance of ex-ante analysis and agree with Williams(98) when he says that "if implementation analysis is to have any value it must be performed before a decision is made and its results must be available at the same time that the policy or experimental recommendations are." Throughout the discussion there have been references to the difficulties and problems, many public policy programs had encountered due to lack of implementation studies. These difficulties and problems ranged from tremendous cost escalation and delays in program completion to utter wastage of public resources including human and physical degradation. In Australia expenditure on health has been growing at a faster rate than total national expenditure as measured by G.D.P. At present this expenditure accounts for 8 percent of G.D.P. as opposed to 5.4 per cent ten years ago. Costs escalation of hospital services, in particular, has become one of the financial problems faced by both the Commonwealth and State Governments. This was just an example. There are competing demands for more and more public funds. The situation obviously warrants concerted efforts on the part of the Governments to ensure that the scarce resources at their disposal,

are allocated only for those policies or programs which are likely to be implemented successfully.

The likelihood of the success of a policy implementation process can only be ascertained through an implementation analysis. It is therefore believed that there is an urgent need for a basic change in our approach to policy-making and implementation process. In this respect it is proposed that these two processes be strengthened by making implementation analysis mandatory in public decision making and budgetary processes.

All public authorities initiating policy proposal or program changes should be required to support their submissions with implementation strategy, and implementation analysis.

Finally, while the variables and their components discussed in the general framework for policy implementation analysis should assist in determining how difficult a policy program can be their list is, of course, not exhaustive. Surely as the complexity of implementation problems exacerbate or more sophisticated measures of implementability become available, the list will have to be revised.

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