

Comparative Environmental Regionalism

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4 East Asia and sub-regional diversity

Initiatives, institutions and identity

Lorraine Elliott

Introduction

Despite the assertion by Lee Kuan Yew (former Prime Minister and now Minister Mentor of Singapore) that East Asia is "an idea that [will] not go away" (cited in S. Kim 2004: 60), this is a region in which economic and political diversity remains a key challenge for regionalization and for environmental governance. Northeast Asia includes the highly developed economies of Japan, the rapidly developing economies of South Korea and parts of China, and much poorer areas in rural China, Mongolia and North Korea (see I. Kim 2007: 444). In Southeast Asia the combined average per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of the longer-standing member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is six times that of the four newer members (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Burma).¹ Politically, the region includes democratic and transitional systems; various forms of centralized, one party systems; and authoritarian military regimes. It is also a region with a history, in some cases quite a recent history, of invasion, conflict, and border disputes. As a result, wariness and lack of trust among some countries remains. Yet it is also this history and diversity that has shaped regional efforts to build, first, a security community and then to entertain ideas about a more robust economic and social community. The evolution of regional environmental governance has taken place against this framework of diversity on the one hand and community-building on the other.

For the most part transnational and multilateral environmental governance in East Asia has not functioned in any authoritative way at the macro-regional level. What continues to count here are the sub-regions – Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia.² Environmental issues also feature in the activities of what are, in this elaboration of multi-level governance, the "sub-sub-regions" such as the Mekong in Southeast Asia and the Tumen River in Northeast Asia. These are more managerial sites of authority and multilateral engagement and less tied to notions of "identity-building": constraints of space preclude detailed analysis in this chapter. In the two key sub-regions of Northeast and Southeast Asia, environmental cooperation has become caught up in debates about regional identity, in disputes over the usefulness and relevance of the principle of non-interference and a preference for soft institutionalism (the so-called "ASEAN way"), and efforts to demonstrate

that multilateral environmental arrangements can still be effective in the absence of European models of integration. Vertical modes of governance – those described by Rosenau as reflecting a “downward flow of authority originating ... among national states and their bureaucracies” (2002: 80) – are much more prominent than horizontal modes in both Northeast and Southeast Asia. Yet these two sub-regions are also characterized by very different institutional models of environmental governance, even though they face similar environmental collective action challenges and share a normative attachment to a form of regionalism that respects national sovereignty and the principles of quiet diplomacy, consensus and non-interference. Three decades of attention to environmental challenges under ASEAN has resulted in regional environmental cooperation that is increasingly institutionalized and, in its latest phase, moving to incorporate multi-level, networked modes of governance although these are somewhat different from the kind of bottom-up, inclusive, and spontaneous networked forms that Katzenstein (1996) has described as central to East Asian regionalism. Regional environmental cooperation efforts are also being developed in Northeast Asia, albeit from a very low base and over a much shorter period of time. Environmental cooperation there has generally taken the form of initiatives rather than institutions or networks and these initiatives remain fragmented with little real authority to function as effective agents or sites of governance.

Informed by Katzenstein’s argument that regionalism in East Asia “is ‘given’ by geography [but] ‘made’ through politics” (2006: 32), this chapter focuses primarily on regional environmental arrangements that reflect multilateral efforts pursued by countries as part of a region-building process. Yet, the evolution of environmental regionalism in East Asia has not been an entirely indigenous process. Trans-regional institutions such as the Regional Office Asia Pacific of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP ROAP), the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have had an important role to play in providing financial support and expertise to specific programs, initiatives and agencies. UNEP, in fact, was central to ASEAN’s first efforts to address environmental concerns at a regional level and UNESCAP continues to have an important supporting role in Northeast Asia. The impetus for governments to respond regionally to environmental challenges has also been generated by a growing regional activism and agency on the part of domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and transnational civil society groups, some endogenous to the region and others represented by local offices of global organizations such as Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, and the wildlife NGO TRAFFIC, among others.

Mapping environmental challenges

The reminder from the ASEAN Secretariat to member states that “any drastic and irreversible reduction in the region’s resources or degradation of its environment will ... have far reaching implications for [Southeast Asia’s] ecosystem

and quality of life" (ASEAN Secretariat 1993: 33) applies equally to East Asia as a whole.³ But East Asia does not constitute a single ecoregion. Southeast Asia is characterized by at least two distinct ecosystem types – the maritime ecosystems of island Southeast Asia and the continental, riparian ecosystems of the mainland countries – with a wide diversity of local ecosystems and natural resource endowments within them. Northeast Asian geographies range from subtropical zones in southern parts of China and Japan to frigid climate zones in Mongolia (see UNEP 2004: 3). Despite this ecological diversity, there is a remarkable similarity in the kinds of environmental problems that face countries in the region and the patterns of unsustainable development that have driven them that have increasingly demanded regional rather than simply national or local responses.

In the 40 years between 1961 and 2001, East Asia's demands on world ecological capacity grew from 15 percent to 40 percent. The region's ecological footprint is now reported at more than one-and-a-half times its own biological capacity (Wackernagel *et al.* 2005: 3, 8).⁴ East Asia's population is becoming more urban, driven by the push factor of rural poverty and the pull factor of urban-based industrialization and the promise of jobs – and urban lifestyles are generally more energy and resource hungry as well as more polluting than rural lifestyles.⁵ Growth in manufacturing capacity has often been in highly polluting industries that "use outdated technologies and operate under pollution control regimes that have little or no enforcement" (UNESCAP 2005).⁶ From 1990 to 2002 the amount of energy used to produce a unit of GDP in the region actually increased (UNEP 2006: 15). Land-use patterns have changed more quickly in East Asia than in any other part of the world and the amount of land given over to agriculture (on a per capita basis) has actually declined. Rural modes of production have become more intensive, commercialized and industrialized as well as more reliant on high levels of agrochemical use which, somewhat ironically, makes soils vulnerable to acidity and waterlogging and therefore less fertile and productive.

Unsustainable development has left a legacy of environmental priorities for policy-makers in East Asia. In a 1997 report on challenges for an emerging Asia, the Asian Development Bank suggested this model of economic development had left the region "dirtier, less ecologically diverse and more environmentally vulnerable" (ADB 1997: 99). The Bank appeared even more pessimistic in a 2001 report, calling environmental degradation in the region "pervasive, accelerating and unabated" (ADB 2001: 4). By 2006, UNEP was reporting some "encouraging signs" that governments in the region were responding to population pressures and "extremely rapid economic growth" to deal with environmental problems (2006: 18). Despite this guarded optimism, environmental degradation remains a serious challenge for governments and policy-makers in the region.

According to some estimates, land degradation in East Asia now runs at two to six times that of North America and Europe (reported in ASEAN Secretariat 2001: 89). In Southeast Asia, 56 million hectares of arable land is now severely affected

by a decline in soil fertility. Forest cover in East Asia is lower than the global average but deforestation rates remain above the global average: approximately 1.2 percent to 1.8 percent of forest cover is lost in the region annually, compared with a global rate of about 0.23 percent although the deforestation rate is declining in some parts of the region.⁷ Biodiversity is under threat.⁸ Coastal, mangrove and coral reef ecosystems are increasingly endangered. The region's wetlands, including those protected under the 1971 Ramsar Convention, have been damaged, often seriously, by logging, agricultural conversion, mining, oil exploration and pollution. Many of the region's fish stocks are close to exhaustion through over-exploitation, illegal fishing, and technologically advanced commercial trawling activities in an over-capitalized industry. Freshwater fish stocks are also in decline. To compensate for the loss of marine and riverine fisheries, fish farming (aquaculture) has been pursued with such vigor that Asian countries now dominate world production. The environmental costs include "destruction of mangrove forests, conversion of wetland habitats, introduction of exotic species, increased use of chemicals ... degradation of water quality, and discharge of nutrients and other wastes" as well as the loss of breeding grounds for wild fish stocks (UNEP 2001: 28).⁹ Demand for water is outstripping supply, as domestic and industrial requirements grow to compete with agriculture. In Southeast Asia, for example, where agriculture still generates 75 percent of demand, overall water consumption is anticipated to double in the latter part of this century. Many of the region's rivers are seriously polluted (see ASEAN Secretariat 2009: 31, 38). Air pollution is widespread. Many urban areas exceed the World Health Organization's recommended safe limits of suspended particulates, sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide, exposing many millions of people to pollution-related health vulnerabilities.¹⁰

East Asia also faces the global challenges of climate change. Of the ten countries in the world most imperiled by climate change in terms of the number of people likely to be affected, six are in the East Asia region: China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand and the Philippines. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports a worrying litany of likely climate change impacts for the region: a decline in crop yield, an increase in climate-induced disease, an increased risk of hunger and water scarcity, an increase in the number and severity of glacier melt-related floods, significant loss of coastal ecosystems, many millions of people in coastal communities at high risk from flooding, and an increased risk of extinction for many species of fauna and flora (see IPCC Working Group II 2007). In its report on the economics of climate change in Southeast Asia, the ADB concludes that the region is "likely to suffer more from climate change than the rest of the world," and that "the potential economic cost of inaction is huge" (2009: xxvi). Although per capita contributions to greenhouse emissions remain low in East Asia compared with world contributions (despite claims that China is now one of the world's leading polluters), emissions are growing and this places pressure on governments to address problems of mitigation as well as adaptation.¹¹

These environmental problems are such that it is increasingly difficult for them to be addressed effectively without some form of regional cooperation.

This applies not only to those problems that are explicitly transboundary, such as air or marine pollution, but also those such as food insecurity that could generate other kinds of transboundary externalities and those that are so common and widely shared that it makes sense to construct regional arrangements to share policy experience and reduce transaction costs in dealing with them.

Regionalizing environmental governance: Southeast Asia

Multilateral efforts on environmental challenges in Southeast Asia are closely linked to the evolution of ASEAN and to the determination of member states to present themselves as a coherent regional unit with authority over what happens "in" the region, rather than being defined simply as a sub-region of the Asia-Pacific. The influence of the behavioral and procedural norms of the ASEAN way has meant that for much of its history, environmental cooperation in Southeast Asia has been confined to functional cooperation and characterized by a weak form of institutionalism and a reliance on national institutions rather than some form of centralized, regional bureaucracy. This reflects the ASEAN preference for non-binding agreements and a general reluctance to interfere in, or to direct in any authoritative way, the environmental practices of member states. The expansion of ASEAN in the 1990s brought new demands and challenges, particularly for the least developed members of the Association for whom capacity-building in sustainable development and environmental management has been a key issue.¹² Expansion also, however, delivered the opportunity to engage all countries in Southeast Asia in a regionalizing move to more robust institutional frameworks and commitments on environmental protection, mitigation and adaptation. It is perhaps telling that as ASEAN has evolved to include all ten Southeast Asian countries, environmental challenges have been moved from the functional cooperation sector and redefined as a transnational issue on the Association's agenda.

Environmental issues did not feature in ASEAN's founding Bangkok Declaration in 1967. This is hardly surprising: transboundary environmental challenges were barely even part of the international multilateral agenda at the time and ASEAN's primary purpose was to build security through commitments to regional solidarity, good neighborliness, and regional resilience based on strong national identities. However both the Bangkok Declaration and the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (which repeated many of the declaratory commitments to solidarity and peace in the Declaration) anticipated flexible forms of widening cooperation in "economic, social, technical, scientific and administrative fields ... and all other matters of common interest" (ASEAN 1976: article 4).

Environmental issues were first inscribed on the ASEAN agenda in 1977, the year after the five member states at the time adopted the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Since then, ASEAN has developed an increasingly complex web of soft-law declarations, resolutions, plans of action, issue-specific programs and two binding multilateral agreements (see Elliott 2003). Formal decision-making

on the environment rests with the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment (AMME). Since its first meeting in 1981, AMME has met officially every three years. Since 1994 it has also met informally on an annual basis. Responsibility for developing policy recommendations and for promoting regional cooperation falls on the ASEAN Senior Officials on the Environment (ASOEN) and its subsidiary working groups of which there are seven at the time of writing.¹³ ASOEN, which meets annually, is in turn supported by the Environment Division within the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Department of the ASEAN Secretariat headquartered in Jakarta.¹⁴ Other ministerial and senior official arrangements, particularly those for Agriculture and Forestry, also have mandates in areas that are directly related to environmental challenges.¹⁵

UNEP was instrumental in encouraging ASEAN to adopt its first regional policies on the environment. In 1977, it commissioned an ASEAN sub-regional environment program (ASEP) which was adopted the following year as ASEP-I by what was at the time known as the ASEAN Experts Group on the Environment. The ASEAN environment ministers adopted two further such programs, the second (ASEP-II) for the years 1982–87, and the third (ASEP-III) for the years 1988–92. In keeping with non-interference norms, the ASEAN countries stressed the primacy of national laws, and the priority of national policy-making and national implementation. In keeping with a procedural voluntarism, the members were generally keen to avoid legally binding agreements. In keeping with ASEAN's informalism, AMME declarations on environmental cooperation were confined for the most part to agreement on general principles and broad guidelines. The very clear purpose of this first phase of cooperation was to maintain the "continuous availability of natural resources" (AMME 1981) in order to overcome poverty and improve quality of life. Environmental protection was secondary to development. The declaration adopted by the first ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment in 1981 – the Manila Declaration – called for member states to ensure that environmental concerns were given consideration in development policies only "*as far as practicable*" (AMME 1981, emphasis added). The environmental agenda in this early period of cooperation focused mainly on conservation. As well as mirroring much of the international agenda, conservation had fewer transboundary dimensions and was therefore a policy issue that did not challenge government's intentions to sustain their authority over their own resources and development policy.

In pursuit of this conservation agenda, member states (by then numbering six) agreed in 1984 to establish a network of ASEAN national heritage parks and nature reserves although it was clear that these would remain under the managerial auspices of individual governments.¹⁶ The Declaration was later augmented by the legally binding 1985 Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. While, at the time of writing, the Agreement is still not in force (because the required six ratifications have not yet been received) it nevertheless signaled a transition into a new phase of cooperation in which environmental factors were to be given equal consideration with economic and social ones.¹⁷ Among other things, it recognized that member states

had a legal obligation to minimize cross-boundary environmental impacts. It set out principles by which shared resources were to be managed and transboundary environmental effects such as pollution avoided.

While the first phase of regional cooperation focused on national resilience and environmental assets, this second phase paid much more attention to transnational challenges and transnational responsibilities. Environmental challenges thus contributed to the idea of a "region" bound together by more than simple multilateral convenience. There was a more clearly articulated awareness that environmental problems affected the "common well-being of the people of ASEAN" (AMME 1987) and that environmental protection and sustainable development were essential to a "better quality of life" (AMME 1992). Normative developments were reflected in the way that resolutions and agreements began to speak of eco-efficiency and environmental stewardship (see AMME 1997). Policy recommendations called for environmental concerns to be *integrated* with economic ones. In contrast with the first phase of cooperation, in this second phase there was even some low-level dissatisfaction with ASEAN's anti-institutionalism. The 1987 Jakarta Resolution suggested that the member states' common goals would be "best served by the establishment of a regional body on the environment of sufficient stature" (AMME 1987) to undertake tasks including making policy recommendations and monitoring environmental quality. While no such body was (or has yet been) established there was some cautious institutional change within ASEAN itself. The ASOEN working groups were restructured to focus on issues rather than projects. The small ASEAN Secretariat was reorganized in 1992. By 1995, there was growing recognition that functional cooperation was important and it was elevated to a "higher plane" at the fifth ASEAN Summit in 1995, although the number of professional staff in the Secretariat and the Bureau of Functional Cooperation remained small.

A new ASEAN Strategic Plan on the Environment was adopted in 1994 two years after ASEP-III had run its course. This Plan was much more explicit than earlier ones in calling for institutional development, harmonization of goals and policy measures, and operational and technical cooperation including joint action. The year 1995 was declared the first ASEAN Year of the Environment and two years later, in 1997, the Secretariat released the first ASEAN *State of the Environment Report*. ASEAN's agenda of environmental concerns was also expanding. Pollution issues became much more prominent in discussions at AMME and ASOEN. ASEAN environment ministers agreed to develop minimum regional standards for ambient air and river water quality; they established an ASEAN Urban Air Pollution Monitoring and Control Program and a contingency plan for the control and mitigation of marine pollution. The most prominent pollution initiatives were in response to the haze – transboundary particulate-laden smoke originating from Indonesian land-clearing and peat fires. In 1995, ASEAN adopted a Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution which gave perhaps the clearest demonstration yet of the transnational impact of environmentally destructive behavior and reinforced the idea that countries did have environmental obligations beyond their own borders. The Plan was important for

another reason. It declared that Southeast Asia constituted a single ecosystem. Despite being ecologically inaccurate, this claim served two purposes. First, it gave further support to environment ministers' demands for joint action and for the institutionalization of transboundary responsibility. Second, it strengthened the image of one Southeast Asia, joined not only by a common history and culture but now also by a common, shared ecosystem.

The haze heralded a third phase in ASEAN's approach to regional cooperation on the environment. In a speech in Sydney in 1998, ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino called the 1997 haze events an "environmental disaster" for the region (Severino 1998). ASEAN had established a Regional Haze Task Force in 1996 and a Regional Haze Action Plan in December 1997, but Severino argued that ASEAN's "visible unwillingness or inability to take timely and concrete co-operative steps ... to tackle the problem of the haze" raised questions about its "methods, effectiveness and relevance" (cited in Ahmad and Ghoshal 1999: 760).¹⁸

The transition to a third phase of environmental regionalism in Southeast Asia proceeded in step with ASEAN's move to a more formal mode of community- and region-building. Those community-building efforts include ASEAN Vision 2020 (adopted in 1997); the 2003 Bali Concord II which identified the three formal pillars of an ASEAN community (socio-cultural, economic and security); the November 2007 ASEAN Charter; and the Blueprint for the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community 2009–15 endorsed by the ASEAN Leaders at the fourteenth ASEAN Summit in March 2009. This latest phase of environmental cooperation has been marked less by normative developments and more by the institutionalization of a series of ambitious environmental goals and objectives. Sustainable development and environmental protection goals have been increasingly incorporated into the broader plans and vision statements that member states have adopted in their political efforts to transform ASEAN and Southeast Asia into a "community" of states and peoples. In line with claims that ASEAN is a people-centred community, governments have called on the region's "rich cultural traditions" to encourage a "public sense of stewardship towards protecting [the] environment" (AMME 2000). ASEAN Vision 2020 called for a "clean and green ASEAN [by 2020] with fully established mechanisms for sustainable development to ensure the protection of the region's environment, the sustainability of its natural resources and the high quality of life of its peoples" (ASEAN Secretariat 2002: 2). This wording was reproduced in the 2007 ASEAN Charter as one of the Association's key purposes. There might also have been external pressures at work here. The September 2000 UNESCAP Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development in Asia and the Pacific (which was attended by all ASEAN members) specifically called for priorities in Southeast Asia to be "better articulated and more focused and targeted" (UNESCAP 2000b: 2).

The 1998 Hanoi Plan of Action (HNPA), adopted to implement ASEAN Vision 2020, included a series of measures to protect the environment and promote sustainable development in Southeast Asia. Those goals were subsequently incorporated into the Strategic Plan of Action on the Environment

(SPAEC) 1999–2004 which the environment ministers adopted in April 2000. Both the HNPAA and the SPAEC called for stronger harmonized environmental standards, especially on ambient air and river water quality. They anticipated regional centers and action plans on protection of coastal zones, on water conservation and on the protection of marine environments from land and sea-based activities to be developed. The HNPAA was followed by the 2004 Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) which proclaimed environmental sustainability and sustainable natural resource management as one of four “strategic thrusts” to support the development of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. To this end, the VAP articulated 12 strategies and 55 program areas and measures on environmental and natural resource management. In the Declaration on Environmental Sustainability adopted at the thirteenth ASEAN Summit in 2007, member states committed to intensify their regional efforts on a wide agenda that included environmental sustainability, pollution prevention, water quality, habitat management, species protection, alternative energy and the conservation of natural resources.¹⁹ The VAP has now been superseded by the Community Roadmap and the Blueprint for the ASCC which identifies 11 environmental areas of regional importance and designates a lead country and ASEAN agency for each.²⁰

Quite a bit of the declaratory effort described above has translated into project activity. Agriculture and forestry ministers adopted a framework for regional criteria and indicators for the sustainable management of natural tropical forests in October 2000. In 2002, environment ministers adopted a regional coordination program for the protection and management of the coastal and marine environment which included criteria for Marine Water Quality, Marine Heritage Areas and National Marine Protected Areas. A long-term strategic plan for water resource management was adopted in 2003. At their meeting in December 2003, environment ministers also endorsed a Framework for Environmentally Sustainable Cities in ASEAN, drawn up by ASEAN city managers and government officials as a set of comprehensive policies, strategies and programs to support environmental sustainability for ASEAN cities. In 2006, the environment ministers endorsed an ASEAN Peatland Management Strategy. With support from UNEP, ASEAN member states also began negotiations for their second binding environmental agreement, this time on transboundary haze pollution. This was adopted in June 2002 and entered into force on 25 November 2003.²¹

Moves to strengthen the internal coherence of ASEAN have been matched by efforts on articulating a coherent and united *regional* position to external audiences. This has been most pronounced on the climate change issue, most recently under the umbrella of the ASEAN Climate Change Initiative. This Initiative, which is still in the early stages of development at the time of writing, is intended to function as a consultative platform to strengthen regional coordination and cooperation on climate change, to improve the region’s capacity for mitigation and adaptation efforts, and to articulate the region’s interests and priorities in international negotiations. The ASEAN line has been a consistent one: regional cooperation on energy (cleaner, more efficient and, where possible, alternative); an

emphasis on adaptation as well as mitigation; and international climate agreements that are fair, equitable and give full effect to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. In its Joint Statement on Climate Change to the fifteenth UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of Parties (the Copenhagen meeting in December 2009), ASEAN member states collectively called for industrialized countries to take deeper and earlier cuts in their greenhouse emissions, to reaffirm their commitment to providing technology, financing and capacity-building support to developing countries, and to recognize the importance of the specific issue of integrated coastal and oceans management.

One of the most interesting institutional developments in this latest phase of environmental regionalization has been a growing emphasis on networks – horizontal rather than vertical modes of governance – to coordinate the development and implementation of environmental policy and regulatory tasks. The ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity, for example (which was established and continues to function with EU support), has a specific mandate to build strategic networks and partnerships with the private sector, international institutions and civil society to enhance effective programs and knowledge management in pursuit of “fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of ... biodiversity”.²² The ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network, established in December 2005 to support the Regional Action Plan on Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora 2005–10, is tasked to “deliver ... effective coordination and information sharing” among police, customs and environment agencies and officers at national and regional levels to enhance their capacity to combat the “organised trans-boundary criminal activities of wildlife trafficking and trade” (ASEAN Secretariat 2005). The explicit strategic and political claims that are made for the advantages of network arrangements reflect an intention to further embed ASEAN as the institutional focus of “region Southeast Asia.” The terms of reference for the ASEAN Regional Knowledge Network on Forest and Climate Change, for example, explain that this will help to broaden the knowledge base, support intra-ASEAN learning, and stimulate research and debate. Networks of this kind have also been pursued because of the view that they will enable “ASEAN to be more independent of international ‘consultants’ and external advice” (Thang 2009: 6).

But ASEAN has never stood alone in its regional efforts. Southeast Asian governments participate in environment, sustainable development, and natural resource management programs and projects under the auspices of a number of intergovernmental supra-regional bodies. The most prominent are the ADB, UNESCAP, and the regional Asia Pacific offices of UNEP and the United Nations Development Programme. Each has, in turn, spawned a range of initiatives and agreements focused wholly or in part on Southeast Asia, some intended to support the efforts of individual governments and some directed more to enhancing regional responses.²³ ASEAN has also relied on relationships with its Dialogue Partners (and with international foundations) as a “major source of financial and technical support for [its] programmes” (ASEAN Secretariat 2009: 140). NGO efforts have been important in supporting ASEAN programs and also in facilitating other mechanisms for dialogue, cross-border

cooperation, and sometimes regulation and standard-setting on which governments have come to rely. The institutional strengthening of the ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network, for example, has been reliant on the efforts and contributions of both USAID, and wildlife NGOs TRAFFIC and the Freeland Foundation.

This willingness to work so closely with NGOs and civil society groups in a formally structured way is new, despite claims in the *Fourth ASEAN State of the Environment Report* that "ASEAN has always welcomed and encouraged the participation of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in its regional programmes and activities" (ASEAN Secretariat 2009: 140). Although ASEAN committed in 1986 to build relationships with NGOs, it was only in 2005 that civil society groups were formally welcomed at the ASEAN Summit. The CSO statement to that Summit argued, among other things, that ASEAN was not on a path to sustainable development and implied that the Association needed to be less top-down, more transparent, and more engaged with civil society if these goals were to be achieved (see Chavez 2005). The first ever official CSO Forum on the environment, recognized formally by ASEAN and ASOEN, was held in Kuala Lumpur in May 2007. This meeting was convened as the ASEAN CSO Consultative Forum on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development. While the intention was that the Forum would be formally established under an interim secretariat, the Southeast Asian Civil Society Environment Alliance, which would then seek formal accreditation with ASEAN and change its name to the ASEAN Civil Society Environment Alliance, none of this has yet happened.

Regionalizing environmental governance: Northeast Asia

In contrast to the Southeast Asian experience, regional environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia is much less well developed. This is in part a function of time – cooperation there really dates only to the 1990s – but it also reflects a different institutional context and different understandings of the idea of "region" and "regional identity." ASEAN offered an institutional structure and process to marshal multilateral environmental cooperation in Southeast Asia. The move towards environmental governance in Northeast Asia has been a process of trying to build multilateralism on the back of bilateralism in the absence of a regional institution. In contrast to Southeast Asia, there has been much less of an attempt in Northeast Asia to construct a sense of "region" or shared identity either in general terms or through environmental cooperation more specifically. The environmental agenda has also been a narrower one than in Southeast Asia, focusing in the early stages at least more on problems of pollution and waste management than on conservation or harmonization of standards.

In late 1993, China and the Republic of Korea signed an Agreement on Environmental Cooperation. The following year, China and Japan adopted an Environmental Cooperation Treaty.²⁴ These two agreements did a number of things. They created opportunities for bilateral exchange of information and data, technology transfer and capacity-building. They established a vehicle for identifying further opportunities for cooperation, including joint research on environmental

concerns of mutual interest such as acid rain, hazardous waste, and marine pollution.²⁵ They also led to a low-level of institution-building: the establishment of a Japan–China Friendship Environmental Protection Center based in Beijing and a Korea–Japan Environmental Cooperation Joint Committee. While some have gone so far as to argue that this early “bilateral cooperation within NEA [Northern Asia] has developed into an institutionalized channel for environmental protection” (Yoon 2003: 49), this probably overstates the case. Nevertheless, the bilateral experience did generate an impetus for countries to establish formal channels for some degree of trilateral cooperation and intergovernmental discussion on environmental issues of shared concern.

“The most significant development” in Northeast Asian regional environmental cooperation, as one observer puts it (Yoon 2003: 48) has been the Tripartite Environmental Ministers’ Meeting (TEMM). This has met regularly since 1999 although, as the name reveals, it includes only some of the countries of Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, TEMM has provided a vehicle for China, Japan and South Korea to agree to joint projects and, over time, to regularize proto-institutional arrangements such as the Tripartite Joint Working Group which was established at the sixth TEMM in 2004 and entrusted with the task of drafting future cooperation plans. In an echo of the much earlier Southeast Asian experience, the countries in Northeast Asia have used channels such as TEMM to adopt cooperative environmental plans, articulate “vision statements” and pursue cooperation on specific challenges such as the problem of transboundary dust and sandstorms. In 2000, for example, the second TEMM agreed to focus on five main areas for cooperation: raising the consciousness of the environmental community, prevention of fresh water (lake) pollution, prevention of land-based marine pollution, cooperation in the environmental industry, and ecological conservation of northwest China. By the tenth TEMM in 2008, the agenda of discussions included chemicals (following a Tripartite Policy Dialogue on Chemicals Management in September 2008), electronic waste (e-waste), regional air pollution, marine litter, water management, sound waste management, low carbon economies, and the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.

A second key mechanism for regional dialogue has been the Senior Officials Meeting on Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia (SOMECEA) that predates TEMM (it first met in 1993 with secretariat support from UNESCAP). The regional significance of SOMECEA is that it includes participants from North Korea, Mongolia and the Russian Federation.²⁶ It also functions as the governing body for NEASPEC, the North-East Asian Subregional Programme for Environmental Cooperation, which has become a focal point for environmental cooperation among the six countries. While NEASPEC and SOMECEA are responsible for outlining project intent and guidelines, implementation still relies on individual countries taking responsibility for lead action. It also relies on continuing support from trans-regional bodies such as UNESCAP and the ADB.²⁷ Several projects have been established under NEASPEC, some of them addressing controversial transboundary issues. These include a program for the mitigation of air pollution from coal-powered plants in Northeast Asia which

supports environmental monitoring, data collection and analysis; a program for the prevention and control of dust and sandstorms from source areas in China and Mongolia; and a framework Nature Conservation Programme in North-East Asia, implemented from April 2005 with the task of developing a strategy and action plans for disseminating good practices for the conservation of large cats and migratory birds.²⁸

Yoon likens the Northeast Asia TEMM to that of the European experience of formalized meetings among environment ministers, suggesting that it "could eventually be as effective a cooperative mechanism as ... in the European case" (2003: 49). This is perhaps optimistic, particularly as other observers continue to bemoan the lack of an effective high level ministerial meeting (Chung 2008: 161). Cooperation on environmental issues in Northeast Asia under NEASPEC and SOMECEA confirms that this is a functional mode of governance based on a "step by step and practical approach ... decision making by consensus" and a program focus on "capacity building, information sharing and technology transfer" (M. Kim 2004: 195). The report of the 1996 SOMECEA made it clear that this was a framework rather than a governance arrangement:

The Meeting decided that it was not yet an appropriate time to develop a strategy for subregional cooperation since it required definition of future prospects after careful and extensive consideration based on the evolution of the subregional cooperation in North-East Asia over time.

(UNESCAP 1996a: para. 20, p. 6)

The meeting stressed that in the first instance, the program would be "primarily aimed at strengthening ... relevant technological and managerial capabilities" (UNESCAP 1996b: para. 3.2, p. 3). In 2000, SOMECEA adopted a non-binding Vision Statement on regional environmental cooperation in North-east Asia which, as well as encouraging further assistance and general cooperation, called for effective partnerships with other Northeast Asian regional networks and, more controversially, for better stakeholder involvement. The NEASPEC dialogues and projects have been overlaid with other intergovernmental opportunities in Northeast Asia. Some form part of a global network of activity under institutions such as UNEP – the Northwest Pacific Action Plan, focusing on the Yellow Sea and East Sea is one such example. Others, such as the East Asia Acid Deposition Monitoring Network led by Japan, are region-specific.

As in Southeast Asia, governments have started to look to partnership and network arrangements that can involve multiple stakeholders in providing support for environmental initiatives. One such arrangement has been the North-east Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation which Takahashi describes as a forum for "frank dialogue" (2000: 1) and Wilkenin calls "Asia's first regional-scale, scientific [environmental] monitoring network" (cited in I. Kim 2007: 451). It has convened annually since 1992 as a forum to deepen understanding by bringing research institutions, international organizations and

NGOs together with government representatives. Program-based networks include the Partnership for Eco-Efficiency in Northeast Asia, which is mobilized through various stakeholder forums and expert networks, and the Northeast Asian regional network for dust and sandstorm monitoring, and early warning. Regional environmental governance in Northeast Asia has also developed transnational initiatives below the state, such as the inter-city cooperative venture between Kitakyushu in Japan and Dalian in China which has since blossomed into the Kitakyushu Initiative for a Clean Environment, focusing on sustainable cities in developing countries.²⁹

Intra-regionalizing efforts: East Asia writ large(r)?

While the main vehicles for multilateral cooperation on environmental issues in East Asia have proceeded at the sub-regional level, governments have also pursued various efforts at intra-regional dialogue and constructing wider regional environmental arrangements. Some of this comes by way of "bilateral" interaction. ASEAN and China, for example, instituted a Policy Dialogue on Environmental Cooperation in 2004 and specifically identified environmental cooperation as a field of cooperation at the eleventh China-ASEAN Summit in 2007. Dialogues and cooperation projects have also been instituted between ASEAN and Japan, and ASEAN and the Republic of Korea. Events such as the Environment Congress for Asia and the Pacific and the five-yearly UNESCAP Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development provide various opportunities for discussion among environment ministers across the region. The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process has provided the most recent forum for efforts to develop multilateral engagement. The first APT Environment Ministers Meeting (EMM) was held in 2002 in part in response to recommendations from the East Asia Vision Group.³⁰ The Group's report in 2001 urged governments to "engage actively in the establishment of a comprehensive East Asian environmental cooperative body" which would include a "dispute settlement mechanism and a regional environmental database" (EAVG 2001: 19). Senior APT environment officials began regular meetings in 2004. Since then, the APT EMM has resulted in declaratory commitment (at least) to several areas of cooperation including biodiversity, climate change, environmental education, water resources management, promotion of environmentally sound technology and cleaner production, and solid waste and hazardous waste management. This formal arrangement has been supplemented with consultation visits by ASEAN Senior Officials to each of the individual 'Plus Three' countries with the objective of establishing working level contacts with relevant officials and institutions. The APT agriculture and forestry ministers have also been meeting regularly since 2000 to promote cooperation on, among other things, food security, sustainable local forest management, and sustainable and effective use of living marine resources. However regional environmental governance under APT faces substantial limitations in both environmental and political terms. It does not include all Northeast Asian countries. The priority areas are driven very

much by the ASEAN agenda, the meetings are usually held back-to-back with ASEAN ministerial meetings and are chaired by whoever holds the chair of the AMME at the time.

As with the two sub-regions, various private and public-private arrangements also operate across East Asia. While these are usually mobilized by non-state actors, they can provide further opportunities for governments to engage with each other as well as contributing to policy development and implementation. The issue area of forest protection demonstrates perhaps the most active range of such regional governance arrangements. The Asia Forest Partnership, for example, includes governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society organizations.³¹ The leading partners – the governments of Indonesia and Japan, the Center for International Forestry Research, and The Nature Conservancy – are equally accountable and (in theory at least) none has more authority or rights than other partners. WWF's Global Forest & Trade Network (Asia Pacific) is active in China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam. It brings together forest owners (sometimes including governments), producers and buyers to commit to verifiable sustainable development and certification processes and, by doing so, helps to create markets for environmentally responsible forest products.

Conclusion

In both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, governments have made a commitment to work together to overcome environmental degradation, to achieve sustainable development, to harmonize policy initiatives, to enhance project collaboration, and to strengthen regional processes and institutions. There has been considerable movement towards "regionalizing" governance in both sub-regions of East Asia, although these have taken different trajectories depending on the existence or otherwise of institutional structures within which environmental cooperation can be embedded. In Northeast Asia, the regionalization of environmental governance has moved from dealing with potential areas of dispute (such as transboundary air pollution and marine issues) to issues that will benefit from harmonization of standards and program cooperation. Yet, as Shin argues, "regional environmental cooperation ... has been more discussed than acted on, and less institutionalized and less productive than was originally hoped" (2007: 9). In Southeast Asia, regionalization has proceeded from functional approaches that initially focused on project-based cooperation through to efforts to establish and implement regional policy initiatives and standards, even though some transboundary environmental externalities such as the haze seem to have been much more difficult to address in the ASEAN context. Governance has also moved both upwards and downwards (Yap 2006: 19). The former is characterized, for example, by the processes associated with ASEAN Plus Three, the latter by initiatives such as those on environmentally sustainable cities which, in both sub-regions, focus on promoting environmental improvements and sustainable development in urban areas through establishing inter-city networks.

But there is no doubt, as Wilkening argues, that "East Asia is still deficient in regional environmental governance mechanisms" (2006: 435). The form and function of multilateral cooperation remains in part a product of the so-called ASEAN way: the non-interference norm that gives priority to national sovereignty and a preference, in both Southeast and Northeast Asia, for step-by-step, quiet and consensus-based non-confrontational diplomacy. Although considerable emphasis is placed on the advantages of cooperation to address the region's environmental security challenges, environmental governance arrangements have still sought to maintain the authority of governments over that of institutions. In Northeast Asia there has been little effective leadership in turning NEASPEC into a more regional rather than intergovernmental institutional format. While the 2000 Vision Statement adopted by SOMECEA in 1999 called for the framework to be developed into a "comprehensive Programme for environmental cooperation in North-East Asia, preferably by the Eighth Meeting of Senior Officials on NEASPEC [that is, 2002]" (UNESCAP 2000a: para. 3), no legally binding commitment underpins the program and there is no legal certainty to the multilateral processes. Some have argued that APT is likely to be the "leading player to frame ... East Asian environmental cooperation and coordination" (Huan and Guo 2005: 1) but in the absence of the other three Northeast Asian countries, and in the absence of more equitable institutional structures, this is unlikely in the short and medium-term.

Most of the regional environmental initiatives, especially in Northeast Asia, also suffer from "weak financial foundations" (IGES 2001: 23). The environmental sector is usually underfunded and understaffed compared with other sectors. The ADB estimates that countries in East Asia spend on average between 1 percent and 2 percent of GDP on environmental protection compared with, say, defense budgets which range up to 6 percent. In other words, traditional security budgets surpass environmental security budgets by about three to one. Environment budgets, the ADB suggests, should be at least 7 percent of GDP (ADB 2001: 24). While ASEAN has a well-established institutional structure, its financial structure for supporting regional environmental governance remains weak. In Northeast Asia, there are problems with continued reliance on transnational agencies for funding and secretariat support. A lack of material resources in terms of technology, funds and human capacity (including expertise and know-how) also makes it difficult to implement agreed programs or to develop accepted indicators for assessing the impact of national programs and regional agreements. While the TEMM communiqués have characterized the tripartite projects as "outcome-oriented and ... implemented effectively and efficiently" (2008: para 13), bilateral and multilateral programs have not always been well coordinated or systematically linked. A 2001 report by the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies showed that the various inter-state initiatives in Northeast Asia functioned at different levels (ministerial, diplomatic and governmental officials) with little coordination between them (IGES 2001: 22). In effect, multi-centric and multi-level governance can be a weakness rather than a strength in environmental governance terms in the absence of a regional institutional structure.

In this sense, material challenges exacerbate problems of policy failure. Across the region, institutionalization and, indeed, effective regulation, standard setting and implementation have also been constrained by political differences over the importance and severity of environmental degradation; over environmental versus economic priorities amid concerns about compliance and transaction costs; over financial and technical resource issues; and even over how research should actually be conducted or projects implemented. Despite a commitment from all governments that development should be environmentally sustainable, environmental protection goals are rarely prioritized over economic growth or trade objectives. Environmental issues on which the cost of action is anticipated to be high – in either economic or political terms – are often characterized by weak compliance mechanisms with few if any sanctions. This, for example, is the explanation for problems with the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. Although it entered into force late in 2003, it has done little to prevent further haze events – Tacconi *et al.* (2006: 3), for example, point out that the 2006 haze event was the worst since that of 1997. In 2001, Chang and Rajan suggested that “an informed observer would be hard pressed to offer an optimistic spin on the effectiveness of these regional initiatives” (2001: 666), and doubts remain, even among governments in the region, more than a decade after the issue first really hit the ASEAN environmental headlines.

Regional governance structures have also failed to offer effective channels of communication for and among a wide range of stakeholders, including local communities and subnational units. Many commentators have pointed to the importance of civil society transnational engagement for robust regional environmental governance structures and processes. Badenoch argues, for example, that “improved institutional structures that can better deal with multiple interests and complex human–environment interactions, along with refined governance practices to enhance the breadth and depth of stakeholder involvement, will contribute to more sustainable and equitable environmental outcomes” (2002: 2). Morada (2008) suggests that ASEAN will sustain and increase its relevance only if it opens up to “participatory regionalism.”

Pempel asks whether increased cooperation among regional partners “prefigures ... deeper and more comprehensive” regionalism (2006: 240). In East Asia, modes of environmental regionalism have not been static even though the regional imprint has differed between the sub-regions. The environmental agenda has expanded, and the terrain has become more complex, inhabited now by a variety of initiatives, programs, projects, dialogues, visions and, increasingly, institutions and networks that reflect horizontal and transnational approaches rather than relying only on vertical and intergovernmental arrangements. This is nevertheless an uneven process, with coherence and fragmentation equally represented. In East Asian terms, however, the processes discussed here do reflect a change in views not just about what is possible, desirable or even necessary in terms of regional cooperation if environmental challenges are to be met, but also about what it means to function as a region.

Notes

- 1 The longer-standing members include the five founding states – Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines – plus Brunei Darussalam which joined ASEAN in 1984, almost two decades after the Association was founded. These figures are based on US dollar purchasing power parity in 2005 reported in the ASEAN Macroeconomic Indicators; see Morada (2008: 46).
- 2 The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) defines Northeast Asia as China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia, the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), on the other hand, includes the Russian Federation in the Eastern European region for the purposes of analysis in its Global Environment Outlook series. UNESCAP includes Timor-Leste along with the ten ASEAN member states in Southeast Asia and UNEP also adds the Australian territory of Christmas Island.
- 3 ASEAN has now produced four *State of the Environment Reports*, the most recent at the end of October 2009, which together provide an insight into the range of environmental challenges that face member states. The ADB also publishes regular overviews of the environmental and development challenges in the region, as does UNEP through its Global Environment Outlook series.
- 4 The ecological footprint is a measure of the biologically productive area needed both to produce the resources consumed and to absorb the wastes generated by a population unit (for example an individual, city or country). Ecological or biological capacity refers to the ability of an ecosystem to continue to produce resources and environmental services in order to maintain its current condition. The figures cited here do include Australia and New Zealand in the definition of the Asia Pacific.
- 5 The United Nations Population Division reveals that urban populations in East Asia increased from about 29 percent in 1985 to 44 percent in 2005, possibly rising to almost 60 percent by 2025 (UNEP 2007: 23). In Southeast Asia, the proportion of the population living in urban or peri-urban areas increased from 31.6 percent in 1990, to 40 percent in 1999 to about 44 percent in 2005 (see ASEAN Secretariat 2001: 22; ASEAN Secretariat 2006: 14; ASEAN Secretariat 2009: 14).
- 6 In its third *State of the Environment Report* the ASEAN Secretariat (2006: 71) estimated that toxic waste production would increase by about 350 percent between 1993 and 2010.
- 7 In China and Vietnam, on the other hand, reforestation efforts have actually worked to increase coverage. Some parts of Southeast Asia have a higher-than-average cover, close to 50 percent compared with a world average of less than 30 percent (see ASEAN Secretariat 2009: 53). But overall, less than 20 percent of original frontier forest remains in Southeast Asia and much of it, in sub-regions such as the Mekong, is of "critically low quality" (ADB 2002: 15).
- 8 The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List reports high species threat in Southeast Asia, for example, with 580 mammals, 514 bird species and over 1,700 plant species on the endangered list. The equivalent figures in North-east Asia (although this excludes Russia) are 143, 230 and 545. The calculations here do not include reptiles, amphibians, fish or other invertebrates. For more see IUCN (2009).
- 9 Approximately one-third of the commercial fish catch is now used not to feed people but to provide fish meal and fish oil to feed farmed fish; see UNESCAP (2006: 84).
- 10 The highest number of estimated annual premature deaths from air pollution occurs in the developing countries of Asia and the Pacific (Cohen *et al.* cited in UNEP 2007: 52).
- 11 Averaged across all countries, for example, Southeast Asia's per capita contributions to CO₂ emissions amount to about 1.5 tonnes per person compared with an average

- developing country contribution of about 2.1 tonnes and an OECD emission rate of about 10.9 tonnes per capita a year (ASEAN Secretariat 2002: 40).
- 12 New member states joined ASEAN as follows: Brunei Darussalam January 1984, Vietnam July 1995, Lao PDR and Burma July 1997, and Cambodia April 1999.
 - 13 These are the ASEAN Working Group on Nature Conservation and Biodiversity, on Coastal and Marine Environment, on Multilateral Environmental Agreements, on Environmentally Sustainable Cities, on Water Resource Management, on Environmental Education, and on Climate Change (this latest adopted only at the eleventh AMME in October 2009).
 - 14 The Environment Department falls under the Cross-Sectoral Cooperation Directorate within the ASCC Department. Prior to the reorganization of the Secretariat approved by ASEAN Foreign Ministers in December 2008 and the formal adoption of the Blueprint for the ASCC, in March 2009, support was provided by what was then the Environment Unit in the Bureau of Functional Cooperation.
 - 15 These are the ASEAN Ministers on Agriculture and Fisheries, and the ASEAN Senior Officials on Forestry.
 - 16 As of October 2009, 28 ASEAN heritage parks had been declared and adopted by the AMME.
 - 17 As of 30 September 2009, only three ASEAN member states – Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand – had deposited instruments of ratification, all of them in 1986. According to Badenoch, the ASEAN Agreement on Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources was drafted by a Western conservation NGO (which he does not name). The Agreement includes a potentially innovative accountability model by which one country could be required to pay for conservation efforts in another but lack of political support from member governments means that this has never been implemented (see Badenoch 2002: 7).
 - 18 The haze was not the only challenge to ASEAN's relevance at this time: it coincided with the financial crisis, the 1997 coup in Cambodia and events in East Timor, none of which ASEAN seemed to be able to address in any meaningful way.
 - 19 Energy, environment, climate change, and sustainable development were the themes of the thirteenth ASEAN Summit.
 - 20 These are: addressing global environmental issues; managing and preventing trans-boundary environmental pollution; promoting sustainable development through environmental education and public participation; promoting environmentally sound technology; promoting quality living standards in ASEAN cities and urban areas; harmonizing environmental policies and databases; promoting the sustainable use of coastal and marine environment; promoting sustainable management of natural resources and biodiversity; promoting the sustainability of freshwater resources; and responding to climate change and addressing its impacts.
 - 21 For a more detailed and lengthy overview of ASEAN activity, see ASEAN Secretariat (2009: chapter 9).
 - 22 See the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity website, www.aseanbiodiversity.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=45&Itemid=57.
 - 23 Examples include the Partnerships for Environmental Management for the Seas of Southeast Asia; the UNEP Coordinating Body on the Seas of East Asia; the Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Centre, which has adopted the Plan of Action on Sustainable Fisheries for Food Security; the Southeast Asia Water Partnership; and the Regional Action Plan for Environmentally Sound and Sustainable Development (2001–05), adopted at the UNESCAP Ministerial Conference in September 2000.
 - 24 For more on Japan–China environmental cooperation, see Hirono (2007).
 - 25 The latter included a China–Korea program on pollution in the Yellow Sea although, as Yoon (2003: 47) points out, this has suffered from financial constraints.
 - 26 South Korea was the driving force behind SOMEONEA with the support of UNESCAP, UNEP, the United Nations Development Programme and the ADB.

- 27 UNESCAP support for the NEASPEC Secretariat was intended to be provisional only until 2002 and is still identified as “interim support” on the NEASPEC website. There was no consensus on a 2007 proposal from South Korea to host and fund the Secretariat, and the opening of a UNESCAP Northeast Asia regional office has further postponed any final decisions (see UNESCAP 2009).
- 28 Chung (2008) provides more detail on specific NEASPEC projects and programs.
- 29 For more, see Shin (2007: 9).
- 30 The APT members established the East Asia Vision Group of eminent persons in 1988 with a view to exploring options for an East Asian Community.
- 31 For more, see the Asia Forest Partnership website, www.asiaforests.org/.