

THE NEW SOUTH PACIFIC

R.G. CROCOMBE



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The New South Pacific introduces the reader to the scattered islands and territories of Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia. While some are still under foreign rule most of the islands are now emerging as independent nations. After a century and a half of European control they must now work out their own destiny. The author describes the indigenous traditions of the past and the impact of the alien's way of life. Future trends and developments are also covered. But the main focus is strongly on the present and the search for an authentic identity here and now.

Politics and religion, art and culture, social and economic organisation—all are discussed in a lucid manner. The writer's personal judgments are sometimes controversial but always stated clearly, and his text is not without humour.

This book is an important contribution to the growing body of writing on the Third World and to the Development Debate. The issues raised are of vital importance to a world that faces the choice of confrontation leading to polarisation, or dialogue leading to an acceptance of a pluralistic world community. Because of the issues raised and the simplicity of style this book will be welcomed by the general reader as well as being a valuable addition to the serious study of South Pacific territories and people.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The author is Professor of Pacific Studies at the University of the South Pacific, which serves students from ten member countries and territories in the South Pacific from its main campus in Suva, Fiji. Formerly Field Director of the New Guinea Research Unit of the Australian National University, he has also held teaching appointments at the University of California and the University of Hawaii.


Professor Crocombe was born in New Zealand but has lived most of his life in various Pacific Islands, and has conducted research in most major island groups. His publications include nine books and monographs about the Pacific, and over fifty articles in professional journals.

He is married to Marjorie Tuainekore Crocombe, a Cook Islander, who has written a number of children's books as well as some academic publications on Pacific history, and is editor of the Pacific creative arts journal *MANA*.



An informal photograph of (left to right) Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Prime Minister of Fiji; Hon. Leolofi Tamasese, Prime Minister of Western Samoa; Hon. Albert Henry, Premier of the Cook Islands, and H. R. H. Prince Tu'ipelehake, Prime Minister of Tonga.

Front cover: This is a full-colour reproduction of a painting by Aloï Pilioko, an artist from the New Hebrides who has recently received a gold medal from the French Government in recognition of his artistic work.



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PREFACE

This small book aims to provide a brief and personal view of some major trends in the past, present and possible future of the diverse and stimulating societies of the world's most widely scattered region.

Part I is concerned with the Pacific today, but emphasises that much of what happens today is conditioned, in varying degrees, by what happened yesterday, both within the Pacific and beyond. It was written as a set of talks in an extension series for a general audience at the University of the South Pacific. The New Zealand Broadcasting Commission then requested the series for use on radio, and the present publishers asked for publication rights after the broadcasts.

Part II is an exploratory projection into the future of Pacific cultures. No one can be definitive on such a topic, but it is a matter of such widespread concern that some discussion of issues and alternatives seemed to be warranted. It was first published in volume 1 of the Journal, *Pacific Perspective*, in 1972.

The bibliography and note on further readings, like the text, do not aim to be comprehensive, but rather to enable those with an interest in particular topics to follow them a stage further.

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The map on the inside cover was drawn by Mr John Mora, cartographer of the University of Papua and New Guinea. Typing of the final manuscript was undertaken in the Australian National University's New Guinea Research Unit, with which I was associated from mid-December 1971 to mid-February 1972.

R. G. C.

PART I

THE PAST IN THE PRESENT

PEOPLE

A history of movement

Early Migrations

Almost all the people, plants and animals in the Pacific originated from Asia in the distant past. The first people probably arrived about 50,000 years ago, moving from what is now Indonesia into the western part of New Guinea. At that time human technology was very simple, and canoe transport did not yet exist. The water spaces between Indonesia and New Guinea were then much narrower than today because the level of the sea was considerably lower, so the crossings were probably made by raft or log, or even possibly by swimming.¹

The migrants presumably came in extremely small numbers, at very long intervals of time, and probably in situations of crisis—either escaping or being blown away. Most of them would have died out, but on the few occasions when they had females with them a new human community could develop. These early settlers lived by hunting and gathering, which necessitates a very large area of land to support an individual—perhaps only one to three persons per square mile. They continued to filter into and spread over this huge and rugged island but their technology did not enable them to get much past New Guinea, except to Australia which was for a long time connected to New Guinea by a land bridge north of Cape York.

About 5,000 years ago New Guinea began to experience the effects of a major cultural revolution which had been evolving slowly in Southeast Asia through the development of agriculture and the domestication of animals. Occasional migrants or castaways scattered elements of these new technologies along the coasts of New Guinea. Unlike hunting and gathering, efficient agriculture can carry a few hundred people per square mile, so population multiplied.

Among other things, these agriculturists from Asia brought pottery, a new kind of stone technology, and the manufacture of bark cloth. The technology of bark cloth making, and even the words for it in many Pacific languages, can be traced back to the South of China.² They also brought more efficient techniques of water transport. The development of canoes led to a slow expansion eastward through the islands now known as New Britain and New Ireland to the Solomon Islands, the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, and eventually to Fiji. These endless minor movements, over many thousands of years, involved very small numbers of diverse peoples. The diversity resulting from the small size and relative isolation of each group is reflected in fact that the 3,000,000 people of Melanesia speak over 1,000 languages. Linguistic fragmentation is greater in Melanesia than anywhere else in the world; so much so that nearly one-quarter of all the world's languages are in Melanesia.³

Perhaps 3,500 years ago the first people arrived in Fiji, and not long afterwards the spread continued to what is now called Polynesia—the last part of the earth's surface (Antarctica excepted) to be settled by man. Tonga was probably settled first then Samoa. It was mainly from Samoa that people moved, about 2,000 years ago, to what is now called French Polynesia. At each place people seem to have consolidated and expanded over a number of generations before migrating to neighbouring small islands and then undertaking long-range movements—one of the greatest being from the Marquesas to Hawaii. Several hundred years later there was a migration from the Society Islands to Hawaii. Migrants mainly from the Society Islands also populated the Cook Islands and New Zealand.⁴

In addition to the major trends, there has always been a great deal of movement in all directions throughout the Pacific. Even in recent years drift voyages occur. A few years ago a small boat sailing from Rakahanga in the northern Cook Islands to Manihiki about twenty-five miles distant, was caught in a storm and landed 2,000 miles away in the New Hebrides, more than two months later. There were only a few survivors.⁵ This sort of haphazard, small group movement, sometimes through crisis and sometimes through design, sometimes by navigation and sometimes by drift, and in a great diversity of directions, has occurred throughout the Pacific for hundreds of years.⁶

People and ideas from South America also reached the Pacific Islands in Eastern Polynesia. That contact however was late, small, and culturally not very significant.⁷

The Coming of Europeans

The next major phase in the history of the Pacific began about 400 years ago with the expansion of European influence. For 1,000 years or more transport in Europe was less developed than it was in Polynesia. At that time Polynesia probably had the most highly developed sea transport in the world, but its continued evolution was restricted by its very small population, limited resources, and lack of metals. Polynesian marine technology had probably reached its peak at the time that European technology was making the major advances which led to the movement of people from Europe into the Pacific.⁸

Like the whole process of expansion that has been going on in the Pacific for thousands of years, this expansion from Europe brought new peoples into contact, sometimes to mutual advantage and therefore harmoniously, sometimes to apparent disadvantage and therefore with hostility and conflict. The areas most suited to migrants from Europe, because of similar environments, were Australia and New Zealand, which soon became settled by Europeans whose population multiplied rapidly. The Maoris had not exploited New Zealand's resources intensively, for after more than 1,000 years of occupation the Maori population had only grown to about 250,000. The adaptation of the tropical Maori technology to the cold climate, like any human adaptation, was very slow and was interrupted by the arrival of migrants from Europe.⁹ People often explain the contrast between the impact of European migrants on Aboriginal society in Australia and on Maori society in New Zealand in terms of the better quality of the English migrants in New Zealand. But the different adjustments made by the competing human populations in Australia and in New Zealand were much more influenced by the differences in indigenous demography, technology, ecology and social organisation.

European settlement in the Pacific was intensive in temperate areas like Australia and New Zealand, substantial in New Caledonia and Hawaii which are marginally temperate, sparse and scattered in the tropical islands like the Solomons and New

Guinea, and negligible on the atolls. People from Europe still find it very difficult to adjust to the more extreme tropical environments, especially deserts and atolls, to which their indigenous inhabitants had adjusted well.¹⁰

New Migrants from Asia

There seems to be much more awareness of the Europeans who came to the Pacific than of the Asians. But in fact more Asians have come to the islands in the last 100 years than Europeans. By the time of their arrival, however, the dominant roles in government, commerce, missions and the military were already taken by Europeans, and the Asian people came mainly as unskilled workers or small traders. In Hawaii and Fiji, Asians came to permanently outnumber the indigenous people, although not nearly to the same extent as the European populations of New Zealand and Australia.

Both Asian and European immigrants were divided by nationality and by religion. The Chinese,¹¹ like the Europeans, spread throughout the Pacific, but the other Asian peoples were more localised—Indians only in Fiji;¹² Vietnamese and Indonesians mainly in New Caledonia;¹³ some Indonesians and Filipinos in New Guinea; Japanese in the Marshalls, Marianas, and Carolines between 1914 and 1944 when they came to outnumber the Micronesians;¹⁴ and large numbers of Japanese, Koreans, and other Asians in Hawaii.¹⁵

Non-indigenous Movement Today

Since the Second World War there has been a new pattern of population movement in the islands. Asian and European populations are withdrawing from places where they are a minority. Where they are a clear majority, as in Australia and New Zealand, they appear firmly entrenched. Where they are not a majority, the withdrawal is selective. Particularly in government, and to a lesser extent in the missions, foreign staff are being localised. But localisation has been much faster in political and administrative posts than in technical fields, and is much less evident in business. Most Vietnamese and Indonesians left New Caledonia some years ago, and returned to their original homelands. About 1,000 Indians are moving each

year from Fiji to Canada, the United States, New Zealand, and Australia. The number of Fiji Indians going to Australia is quite small but may increase greatly by the end of the 1970s.

At the same time new people are coming in, as volunteers (with Volunteer Service Association, Peace Corps and other organisations), as employees of the United Nations and other international agencies, as technical specialists in such fields as telecommunications, and as some categories of business men. Most of them stay for only a few years. And very large numbers are coming as tourists, as increasing levels of income make people throughout the world much more mobile.¹⁶

Ethnic Mixture

This whole process of movement has involved ethnic mixture. Of course ethnic mixture has been going on since the first settlement in the islands and Pacific islanders, like the rest of us, are of diverse ancestry. With the arrival of Europeans and Asians, new ethnic mixing took place to such an extent that probably there is no person of Hawaii, Tahiti, Marquesas, Cook Islands, or New Zealand who does not have some European, Asian, or other non-Polynesian blood, even though many are not aware of it. After all, the average young person of today has over 500 direct ancestors, not just relations, dating from Captain Cook's time, and nobody of any race or nation knows all his ancestors, even though he may know that small fraction of them that constitute one particular line.¹⁷ To look at it another way, a child of one of Cook's men could easily have traces of his blood spread by now through more than 10,000 people.¹⁸

By contrast with the extensive race mixture in Eastern Polynesia, the races in Fiji were sharply segregated during the colonial era as a matter of government policy, reinforced by differences in language, culture, religion, and interests. The Fiji case illustrates the most marked separation in the whole Pacific area, yet even there ethnic mixture has been considerable. At the opposite extreme is Hawaii, where the majority of marriages contracted today are between persons of different racial origins, and the majority of children being born are of racially mixed ancestry.¹⁹

Islanders on the Move

For 50,000 years this process of movement and mixture has been going on in the Pacific, slowly in some periods and places, faster in others. It is not generally realised that Pacific islanders were much more on the move in the mid-1800s, when sailing ships and new employment opportunities were introduced, than they were in the mid-1900s. This was because by 1900 movement was restricted by the establishment of centralised governments, both colonial and national. We do not know what will happen in the next 50,000 years, but at the moment there are three trends in the movement of Pacific islanders.²⁰

The first is the movement from the small islands to the large ones: from the various Ellice and Gilbert Islands into Tarawa, from the smaller Cook Islands into Rarotonga, from over a hundred small islands of Fiji into the main island of Viti Levu, from the whole Tongan Archipelago into Tongatapu, and so on. This has gone so far in French Polynesia that many atolls are now completely uninhabited. In addition, there is a movement within the large islands into their urban capitals: from the rest of Viti Levu into Suva, from all over Tongatapu into Nuku'alofa, from the rest of Guadalcanal into Honiara, and so on.

Many Pacific islanders today live in towns. In places like Hawaii and Guam, almost everyone does and if we include all people living by urban or governmental employment, the number is well over half the people in the Cook Islands, and almost half those in Fiji. Even in the more isolated and scattered places like the Solomon Islands, nearly 8 per cent of the whole population lives in the largest town, Honiara, and about one-quarter depend on wage labour for a living.²¹

A second pattern of movement of Pacific islanders is from those Pacific countries which have fewer employment opportunities to those which have more, for example, from the Mariana and Caroline Islands to military-linked employment in Guam; from the Gilbert Islands to the phosphate mines of Nauru; from Tahiti, the New Hebrides, the Loyalty Islands, Wallis and Futuna to the nickel industry in New Caledonia; and from Western Samoa to lavishly subsidised American Samoa.

The third and latest movement is that from the Pacific Islands

to the Pacific border-lands. For instance, there are half as many Cook Islanders permanently resident in New Zealand as there are in the Cook Islands. There are probably more Niueans living off Niue (in New Zealand, Samoa and elsewhere) than on the island, and many more Wallisians off the island than on it. There are about as many American Samoans in Hawaii, the American West Coast, Vietnam, Guam, and other places as there are in American Samoa. Western Samoans are moving in significant numbers to New Zealand and to a lesser degree to the United States. More than 10 per cent of the population of the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands now live in the United States and Guam. Many Tahitians are permanently resident in New Caledonia, France and elsewhere. A considerable proportion of young Gilbertese men work as crew on overseas ships, many of them sailing between the United States and Europe. These and other opportunities will attract more and more islands people out of their present environment. And there is a real possibility of Australia opening its doors to substantial migration from the Pacific during this decade.

The Pacific people came originally from Asia, although during the last 200 years they have been greatly influenced from Europe. Direct European influence is now declining, but since 1940 American influence has greatly increased and growing, although subsidiary, influences have come from Australia and New Zealand. In the future the main external influences on the islands may again come mainly from Asia, with a subsidiary movement developing later this century from South America.

CULTURE

Unity in diversity

Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia

The three major culture areas in the Pacific are those of Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia. Like any culture area, the boundaries between them are not precise, and there is a great deal of overlap.¹ They all contained relatively small-scale societies, deriving their livelihood mainly from subsistence farming and organised mainly on the basis of relationship by blood and marriage.

The points of the Polynesian triangle are New Zealand at the bottom, Hawaii at the top, and Easter Island in the far east. Within the triangle are Tonga, Samoa, the Cook, Niue, Ellice, Tokelau and other Islands. The Polynesian population today is about 750,000, which is roughly the same as it was 200 years ago when Captain Cook arrived. Last century the populations fell drastically, mainly as a result of epidemics, but this century they have returned to their former levels and are now increasing very rapidly.

Micronesia is mostly in the northern Pacific, a series of small islands lying mainly north of the equator. It contains only about 160,000 people, distributed between the Gilbert, Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands, as well as Nauru. In addition, there are nearly 90,000 people on Guam, most of whom are directly or indirectly associated with American military installations there. Many of them are not Micronesian.

Melanesia is by far the largest part of the Pacific in terms of land area and population. Diversity is the keynote in Melanesia, diversity of terrain and diversity of people. By comparison, Polynesia is very uniform. The main components of Melanesia are New Guinea (including West Irian, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea) with about 3,500,000 people, the

Solomon Islands with 180,000, the New Hebrides and New Caledonia with about 90,000 and 120,000 respectively, and Fiji with just over 500,000 people.

However, whether Fiji is regarded as part of Melanesia or of Polynesia or of both is largely a matter of choice. Dr Nayacakalou, a Fijian anthropologist, once said with his tongue in his cheek that the bodies of Fijians are Melanesian but their cultures are Polynesian. There is some truth in this for physically the Fijian people are similar to many other Melanesian peoples, but their cultures have more in common with Polynesian cultures. Fiji has for many centuries been a region of contact and mixture between Pacific peoples.

Social Contrasts

Both ascription and achievement are important in any human society, but there are very marked differences of emphasis between Polynesia and Melanesia in this respect.² There was little social stratification in Melanesia, the emphasis being rather egalitarian. This was in marked contrast to Polynesia, Fiji and most of Micronesia, where social classes and hierarchical systems of chieftainship were very important. Most Polynesian and Micronesian societies, both past and present, are characterised by ascribed status, that is, status determined at birth. One is born a chief, or a commoner or whatever, and can do relatively little to change one's status. In such a system, the higher levels impose strict controls on marriage, as we saw recently when King Taufa'ahau of Tonga annulled the marriage of his niece to a commoner. I do not defend it, but if it is decided to perpetuate that kind of system, the only way to do it is by rigidly limiting who can enter the privileged classes. Parts of Polynesia and Fiji still have class structures of this general type today.

In achieved status systems, on the other hand, as in most of Melanesia, everyone's chances are ideally equal at birth, and whatever status one achieves as an adult is mostly a matter of one's own efforts. The man with ability and ambition could climb socially by successful economic activity, especially by trade, manufacture, or the accumulation and distribution of wealth. A person who thus gained economic power usually also gained political power, in principle rather like the modern

American system. In Polynesia the relationship between political and economic power tended to be the reverse. A chief had political power because he was born a chief, and from this he derived power over the economy.

One classic distinction between Polynesia and Melanesia is that Polynesian social systems recognise what English speakers call cousins, that is, children of brothers and sisters are related to one another as cousins. But in parts of Melanesia, including Fiji, persons who are parallel cousins (the children of two brothers) are regarded as markedly different from those who are cross cousins (the children of a brother and sister). These two categories form the two basic divisions in many Melanesian societies. In a general way, parallel cousins are like brother and sister, but cross cousins are like husband and wife.³ A stranger moving into this kind of system can be very confused if he is not aware of the rules.

Economic Contrasts

One other interesting contrast is the much greater range of basic resources available to the Melanesian people than to the Polynesians. This was an important factor in the pre-contact societies, as the more limited the technology, the greater the influence of environment on culture. In the stratified societies of Polynesia and Micronesia, the larger the island and the richer its resources, the more it was divided by social class, and the higher its hierarchy of chiefs extended. Leonard Mason once did a study of social class in seven atolls in Micronesia, ranging from the smallest to one of the largest. On the smallest atoll, where people lived barely at a survival level, there was almost no class differentiation. On the larger islands class differentiation and chiefly privilege increased. On the largest atolls special foods, places and privileges were reserved for chiefs, who did no work in the gardens, and commoners had to show great deference to them.⁴

Trade too was affected by environment. On small isolated islands everybody had access to the same commodities: to interior hills for hunting and gathering, to lagoons for sea-food, and to various kinds of garden land for particular crops. This situation was typical of much of Polynesia, so very little trade developed. In Melanesia, on the other hand, the great physical

diversity fostered trade. Inland there were valuable resins, feathers, fats and minerals that many coastal people did not have, while coastal peoples had surplus turtles, fish, sea-shells, salt and pottery. Because of this uneven distribution of resources a mass of trade routes developed throughout Melanesia, even in the rugged New Guinea highlands, despite tribal warfare and other risks.⁵

Not only was the volume of trade much greater in Melanesia, it tended to be between equal trading partners. In Polynesia, on the other hand, goods passed up through the rank hierarchy according to the instructions or wishes of the chiefs. This still occurs on a large scale in places like Tonga and Samoa, particularly on occasions of marriage, death, accession to aristocratic titles, and other large-scale ceremonial exchanges. After the goods are accumulated by the tribal or other group, they are redistributed, but the people at the top of the structure—as all humans at the tops of structures do—“milk it a bit” before redistributing the remainder to the lower levels.

Their different bases of traditional economic organisation have important implications for Melanesia and Polynesia today. In the early 1950s the New Caledonian agricultural economist, Jacques Barrau, observed that Polynesian people regarded themselves as generally superior to Melanesians. This may then have been so in terms of literacy, formal education, and degree of involvement in a money economy. Many Europeans also regarded Polynesians as in some way “ahead” of Melanesians. Barrau said at that time that, because of differences in social organisation, this situation would soon be reversed and that Melanesia would leave Polynesia far behind, economically, educationally and culturally.

There may be some truth in this. Barrau attributed this mainly to differences in social organisation. Assuming that no major world war or changes in political systems occur and therefore, that the peoples of the Pacific will continue to be involved in a predominantly capitalist economy, the Melanesians will have a tremendous advantage. This is particularly so for New Guinea highlanders, who constitute nearly half the Melanesian people, and who have always traded, bargained, haggled and struggled. Many characteristics of their cultures were not of the modern capitalistic kind, but nevertheless the adjustments that they

need to make are much smaller than those of the Polynesian systems in which these features were anathema. Polynesian social and cultural systems contain tremendous obstacles to their members' exploitation of a capitalistic economic system. I am not advocating capitalism, but merely observing that it is the pattern at this moment.

The other resources which Melanesia appears to have in quantity are minerals (some of the world's largest deposits of nickel in New Caledonia, copper in Bougainville and mainland New Guinea, and natural gas in Papua), a relative abundance of land, and significant numbers of people. Once these people acquire a high level of technical and political skill, they will have great advantages over the rest of the Pacific.

Cultures in Conflict and Contact

Contact with cultures from Europe and Asia brought some substantial changes to Pacific Islands cultures. Possibly one of the most important was the greater effectiveness of European military technology which enabled Europeans to dominate local people. This domination is related to the matter of confidence, which, though very difficult to measure, may have been one of the most important factors in the last 100 years of Pacific history. When one human group is, for whatever reason, dominant over another, they become not only very confident but often very arrogant. We share this behaviour with most other animals.

If the subordinate group cannot match that dominance, they may become embittered or resentful, but they must withdraw, and such a withdrawal has been manifest during the last century in the Pacific. It has not been an entirely happy withdrawal—human beings do not withdraw happily—and withdrawal is associated with people's confidence in themselves being diminished. We are now in a very exciting period when all this is changing, when the Pacific Islands people are regaining confidence in themselves. They will presumably gain more as the peoples of European origin lose confidence in themselves. The Europeans in the Pacific are now tending to be withdrawn and self-critical. There has been a reversal of roles.

This reduction in European confidence did not come about by military conquest, or through a loss of goods or better

technology. It has come through Europeans' uncertainty of the legitimacy of their presence. The things Europeans now regard as bad have generally existed before in much the same ways, but were often previously regarded as good. This change of psychological orientation in Europeans is apparent throughout the Pacific. At the same time local people are asserting their new confidence. Some of them may become as arrogant as the Europeans were during their period of dominance, as any human group is likely to be when it wields power.

European cultures have been very important influences during the last 200 years, a short period relative to the 50,000 years of Pacific history. The waning of European influence will be followed by a resurgence of many aspects of Pacific Islands cultures, possibly followed later by a major cultural dominance from Asia, rather similar in kind, perhaps, to that from Europe.

People talk about the tremendous changes going on in the Pacific today, and there *are* tremendous changes. But they are nothing compared with the changes that went on in most of the eastern Pacific last century, when the whole indigenous religion was overthrown, the indigenous economic system was destroyed, the native technology superseded, and new systems of government were imposed. Everything seemed to be changed. Why then were these cultures not totally destroyed? Many people at that time understandably said that the Pacific cultures were finished. Some said so regretfully, some thankfully, but all felt that the forces of change were so great that the local cultures could not survive. Many still feel that way today and probably will for a long time to come. Yet Fijian, Tongan, and Samoan cultures, for example, are very much alive today; not the pre-contact cultures, but still very distinctively Fijian, Tongan and Samoan.

The most extreme example in the Pacific of the persistence of aspects of indigenous culture is the island of Guam. Here an indigenous population of 50,000 was reduced in a few generations to 1,500, most of whom had some Filipino, Spanish or other non-Guamanian parentage.⁶ Immigrants from Spain, Japan and the United States have totally dominated the indigenous culture there for centuries, and yet a Guamanian culture and Chamorro language still exist.

The same principles apply throughout the Pacific. The

external influences have been so prolonged and so intense that we should not be surprised if Pacific Islands cultures today were like those of New Zealand or England or Australia. But in fact they are not, and do not look like becoming so. There will be substantial changes of various kinds, but the models that early observers had assumed these societies would change to did not come about. Pacific cultures today are very much alive. Some have been bruised, all have been modified, but they seem to be entering now a new period of growth and development, each a unique adaptation within the common framework of world culture.

3

PERSONALITY

Loading the dice

Personality and Cultural Change

Although all human beings share many attributes of personality in common, these are modified by our cultures. The particular patterns of life that we have been brought up with, the values we have learned to observe, the kinds of opportunities we have been taught to exploit or not to exploit, all greatly condition our individual personalities. This is a field in which much research remains to be done, in the Pacific as elsewhere, but the indications to date are worth considering, though we should keep an open mind about the results of further study.

As cultures change, personalities change, but personality does not change at the same time or at the same speed, or necessarily always in the same directions. Far from it. It is now clear that basic personality can withstand radical cultural change. I am not suggesting that this is good or bad, but rather more important, that it seems to be the case. Psychological studies in Hawaii, Tahiti, the Cook Islands, New Zealand, and elsewhere in Polynesia and Micronesia, show that where people have experienced extremely radical cultural change over a period of a 100 years or more—radical change in technology, economy, religion and political organisation, in fact changes of almost every type—nevertheless, some important aspects of basic personality remain much less changed than most of us would expect.¹

For example, it was widely assumed by early Christian missionaries, that if Christianity was adopted by the islands people they would develop the kinds of personalities and adopt the kinds of behaviour patterns that were common among middle-class Europeans at that time. This did not happen. Similar assumptions were (and still are) made by many Euro-

pean and Asian businessmen, government officials and others. But none of these assumptions has proved valid, at least not to anything like the extent that was expected, even over a very long period.

Traditional Child-rearing Patterns

One of the obvious influences on the formation of our personalities is child-rearing. A number of studies show some broad similarities in the child-rearing patterns in the stratified or chiefly societies of the Pacific, especially those of Polynesia, Micronesia and Fiji. The socialising influences in most of Melanesia, particularly in places like the New Guinea highlands, are very different, and are associated with different personality patterns. In most Polynesian societies the child receives, for its first year or two of life, a great deal of personal handling. It is indulged, passed from hand to hand, and given constant bodily contact and a great deal of affection. This must be a very comforting experience. All its needs tend to be immediately met. This is understandable and very sensible, particularly in communities where people live in close proximity. You cannot have screaming children if there are twenty people occupying a one-roomed dwelling.

Then, somewhere between two and four years of age, a child experiences rejection. This rejection is not seen or intended as such by the parents, although it is the parents who do it. It is usually accentuated by the fact that another child comes along. Parents can only spare a certain amount of time to be with children and a new child must be given a lot of attention. The older child feels relatively neglected. Another factor is that the parents feel that because the two or three-year old can now walk, it is more psychologically mature than in fact it is.

Psychological studies so far indicate that this feeling of rejection is serious, and that the child continues to be influenced by it, in many cases for the rest of his life. The rejection phase continues for the next fifteen years or so until young adults are again able to re-establish, through marriage or otherwise, the close personal relationships that have been restricted between early childhood and adolescence. At first children tend to react to this rejection by demanding reacceptance, but often feel punished for this by being laughed at, scolded or pushed away.

The child continues to strive subconsciously for reacceptance, and finds that the only way he can gain it is by being passive. That is, the child is allowed to stay in the company of its parents or other elders provided it says little, does little, remains quiet and unobtrusive. It must not express itself freely in their presence. If it wants to express itself, it must go well away from the adults and shout or perform with other children on the beach or elsewhere. Thus much of its learning is unintentionally provided by other children. The main models to be copied or obeyed are children several years older, and the child usually finds that if it does what they want, it will be reasonably well looked after; if it does not, it will be either beaten or made to conform in one way or another. The older children will not support it or play with it, or tolerate its company unless it does. Contact with the father particularly is often characterised by subservience, obedience, holding oneself in, not expressing oneself, not developing oneself. High-ranking children, who will later be expected to lead, are naturally encouraged to develop and express themselves more. Generally, however, parents do not encourage their children to ask questions, to participate in conversations, to express ideas or to undertake creative activity. The child finds that the best way to handle his environment is to put on a pleasant front and face everybody with a friendly, accepting, agreeable image, without disclosing too much of what is inside him.

Adapting to Changing Circumstances

This pattern was characteristic of, and rather well adapted to, the lower levels of stable, isolated, stratified societies. But in recent years the range of opportunity has greatly increased, scope for more kinds of achievement has been created, and people move about much more. These childhood experiences are not so well adapted for this new situation. The youth tend to lack confidence in themselves as individuals, but are much more confident as members of groups. Their early conditioning has taught them that if they act too much as individuals, or are creative, they are likely to be regarded as upstarts. Rewards, on the other hand, come from conformity. A young person serves, the older people reap the rewards. In a village situation with little social or economic change this system has many ad-

vantages. In a highly mobile commercial economy it has some drawbacks.

Hostility, which all human beings have, has to be repressed in the interests of oneself and of others, but some of it inevitably comes out. In the olden days, it could be expressed in warfare. Sometimes today it is associated with the consumption of alcohol, which provides an opportunity to release some of the aggression that has been built in and bottled up. This outlet is particularly noticeable when people from these societies migrate to live in other cultures.

Where to be acquisitive and creative does not bring rewards, the talented person tends to use his skills in persuasion. Oratory, and particularly the use of speech in persuasion or political manipulation, is highly valued. A skilled orator gives his listeners an aural massaging as it were, handling them verbally in a personal way.

This value in manipulating people is illustrated, for instance, in the choice of studies and occupations. For example, of the first sixty-two Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana islanders who took university degrees, twenty-eight were in political science. There were more in political science than in history, geography, economics, philosophy, and the other humanities together, and more than in all the physical sciences together. This is not an accident. People in these cultures greatly value the man who can persuade and manipulate others, and political science is the study of manipulation of people for political ends. Not one of the students was interested in commerce or industry. They aspire instead to jobs handling people, especially political and, to a lesser extent, administrative roles. Many of the others move into teaching and service roles, because these too are consistent with their personality training, that of being considerate to others and serving others. Very few aim to go into business, as the idea of making profit from transactions with one's own people, of innovation in an entrepreneurial sense, is contrary to the lessons of one's upbringing. It is perhaps significant that most of those who do go into business, apart from some who are culturally marginal by having been raised by Europeans or otherwise, want to deal with foreign tourists to whom these constraints are less applicable.

Some people feel that if they abandoned the chiefly system,

the socialising and child-rearing patterns would change, and people would adapt to the new environment. But this is not necessarily so. Hawaii, for example, used to have a very powerful chiefly system, the last vestiges of which were destroyed by the end of last century. It has been as good as dead for three generations, but recent studies demonstrate that a number of personality features that were present at the time of first European contact are still manifest in many Hawaiian people today.² This leads them not to want to achieve in Hawaii's commercial culture. Those who do achieve, tend to do so mainly in service roles or in politics. In business there are extremely few.

Fijian Study

An interesting study was undertaken by Allan Howard of the comparative achievements of Rotumans and Fijians within Fiji.³ Rotuma is a culturally distinct island 400 miles north of Fiji, but is politically part of the Dominion of Fiji. Many more people want jobs in the gold-mining industry than are available but, proportionate to population, there are nearly nine times as many Rotumans employed there as Fijians. More important still, there are about eighteen times more Rotumans, relative to population, in supervisory jobs there than Fijians. To take another example, there were over twice as many Rotumans in professional occupations throughout Fiji, relative to population size, as Fijians. Moreover, Rotumans saved several times more money per individual than Fijian people did, they were much more involved in business, and they had much greater success in business than Fijians.

What reasons can be given for such marked differences? Educational opportunities in Rotuma have been less than in Fiji. Opportunities for making money are much greater in most of Fiji than in Rotuma. Some have suggested that Rotumans have been favoured by Europeans but, even if this is so, it could not adequately explain the difference in many of these fields. Howard considered that much of the difference could be accounted for by differences between Rotuman and Fijian social systems. The Fijian child (it is male children that these contrasts have been concerned with) tends to be dominated by his father. He is required to give total obedience, and not to

express himself in front of his father.⁴ The father is the authority figure and children become accustomed to a state of dependency, of remaining submissive and agreeable, of not developing the potential that they undoubtedly have. The conditioning process, except for persons of high hereditary rank, continues throughout life, teaching everyone to know his place.

But today, when all sorts of new opportunities are opening up, nothing holds people back more than "knowing their place". The Fijian system places great emphasis on teaching people to know their place. The Rotuman system is much more flexible.

The easy and popular answer to this problem is probably the wrong one. It is that if such people want to achieve more in a commercially-oriented society, they should do away with the inhibiting aspects of the culture, including changing the child-rearing patterns. It is a difficult enough task to adapt, let alone decide, those aspects of society which are creating problems for people, or holding them back. Nobody in the world can say with confidence that theirs is the best child-rearing system. A serious vacuum is created if people do away with the old system but do not provide adequate substitutes. It leaves them worse off than they were, and helps create an unskilled, poorly motivated, generally unhappy and often unemployed urban proletariat. You will find such people in most towns of the Pacific Islands, especially the larger and more distant ones like Honolulu and Auckland.

Achievement Among Migrants

Once people leave their homeland culture and settle in a new environment, do they achieve much more? In some instances they do, but in many they do not. Of about 40,000 Pacific islanders who live permanently in New Zealand, where educational and employment opportunities are generally considerably better than in the islands, extremely few of the immigrants or their children go to university or into business or the higher professions. The same is true of the thousands of Samoans and Tongans in Hawaii. Rather paradoxically, a higher percentage of those brought up in their own cultures aspire to and reach university education, professional employment and business enterprise. I think there are two main reasons for this.

One is that those who settle in New Zealand or Hawaii find that their aspirations for higher income than they received in the islands are very quickly met, and can be satisfied by unskilled work. The difference between the wage of an unskilled worker and a skilled worker in New Zealand or Hawaii is not nearly as great as in the islands. A thrifty unskilled worker can have a motor car, a house, and other things which in his home island he may not have been able to own. The second, and very important, reason may be that many of the immigrants have a feeling of inferiority. Many of them tend to lack confidence in their own abilities, or are conditioned not to "push" themselves. They feel safe and accepted in the unskilled or semi-skilled categories where they can obviously undertake the work well, where nobody is going to question them, where their ability is not going to be put to excessive tests, where they are not going to innovate. Much of their cultural conditioning has taught them not to innovate, not to work out their own destiny, not to strive to improve their position. When people with this kind of conditioning move into an urban environment, especially if they come from the lower social orders, they tend to join the unskilled urban proletariat. Effective techniques for helping them to escape from that bind are not yet well developed.

4

ECONOMY

How long in foreign hands?

Impact of Colonisation

About this time last century Pacific islanders were involved in shipping in quite a big way. Many sailing ships were captained by islanders, but they were owned by tribal groups (often in the name of the chief) because the chiefly hierarchy provided a clear, effective means of capital accumulation which fitted into the people's desire to be involved in ship owning. This was then the most prestigious form of business enterprise.

By the turn of this century or shortly thereafter, islanders withdrew from shipping. One of the causes was inadequate knowledge of book-keeping and business management. Another obstacle was that when motorised ships were introduced, tribal and other groups could raise money to buy them, but lacked the technical knowledge and the opportunity to learn it, to keep them running. Soon the money was gone and many of the ships were lost. In addition large foreign trading firms were established and ran their own ships, carried their own goods, and set up their own trading agencies on each island in competition with local ones. The local people did not have the connections with overseas buyers and sellers, or the familiarity with banking and other skills needed for a large mercantile business. After an interesting flourish, most of the indigenous businesses of last century folded up.¹ Not until the 1960s was there a major resurgence of business activity by islands people.

During the colonial era, a period of two to three generations, Pacific islanders withdrew from active participation in the economy, apart from being passive labourers, passive buyers of bully beef, passive producers of fruit or copra. This must have been a peaceful period, a time of growing population and improving health, but it must also have been a period of great

dullness, with very little apparent purpose in life. There was little opportunity for people to achieve anything and few ways in which they could express themselves or develop their talents.

During this period a very tight set of communication lines developed between colonial powers and colonies, but the islands people could not participate significantly in any of them. Shipping lines developed between the USA, Hawaii and American Samoa; between France and her colonies of Tahiti and New Caledonia; between New Zealand, Niue and the Cook Islands; between Australia and Papua; and between Germany and her then colonies of Western Samoa, Micronesia and Northeast New Guinea.²

Reaction to Dominance

The islanders were not altogether happy about this state of affairs, but there was not much they could do about it. There was, during this period, a series of what we might call resistance movements, all of which were effectively suppressed because the islanders did not have sufficient skills, technology, or capital to organise, and the colonial governments (and more particularly the colonial trading companies) were in a much stronger position. In Fiji there were Apolosi's attempts over a number of years to get Fijians to boycott foreign trading firms and to set up their own trading companies. There was a major Tongan company of this type in the early years of this century. In the Cooks, there were similar attempts by returned indigenous soldiers of the First World War. There was a co-operative movement in Nauru which was forcibly broken up by Australia, and there was the relatively successful Mau movement in Samoa, which for a period banned its members from trading with foreign firms.³

Usually the boycotts were more successful than the attempts to set up alternative commercial enterprises, because the latter had to sell to overseas trading firms which had their established links in the islands. So it was a period when the islanders had little effective participation, although they made various attempts to engage in more meaningful economic activities.

Co-operatives

After the Second World War came a period of mixed idealism,

remorse and self-interest when the colonial powers re-evaluated their past history and their future long-term interests. They decided to provide more opportunities for economic participation by the Pacific peoples, lest the colonial powers be rejected and lose not only commercially and politically, but also strategically, as there was a fear of communism spreading.

These, as well as altruistic considerations, led to a general acceptance of the principle that the islands people should have a much larger slice of the economy. The creation of the South Pacific Commission reflected this general feeling. It was to establish facilities that would tend to encourage the Pacific peoples to remain in a mutually acceptable association with the colonial powers. This included means to enable islanders to take a more meaningful part in economic activity.

Co-operatives were seen as the means by which this would be achieved and particularly during the 1950s they grew rapidly. In the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, co-operatives took over almost all commercial enterprise, as all foreign firms had moved out during the Second World War, and were persuaded not to come back. To a lesser extent co-operatives spread throughout the Pacific with the exception of the French territories.⁴

Co-operatives have had a chequered career, some having done fairly well and some poorly, but the movement has survived and I think we will look back on it historically as a very significant and a relatively successful movement, given its goals and its scope. We must remember that when co-operatives were introduced the people had, for at least two generations, been effectively denied any meaningful participation in the economy, and had almost no experience in business affairs. They had very little education, and had been substantially, though unintentionally, deprived of their confidence in themselves. Not that they were all necessarily full of confidence before, but there are indications of a marked drop in people's self-confidence during the colonial period. Co-operatives provided them with specific skills, helped to restore some confidence, and enabled more meaningful participation in their own economic systems.

Co-operatives have contributed in other areas as well. For example, many successful Pacific Islands businessmen received their original training in commerce and book-keeping as co-

operatives' managers or secretaries, and it is surprising how many active and effective politicians in the Pacific also received their original training in this area. It is perhaps significant that the first three countries in the Pacific to gain independence or self-government, were headed by men who spent years promoting the development of co-operative enterprises in their home countries: the former Prime Minister Fiaame Mata'afa of Western Samoa, President Hammer de Roburt of Nauru, and Premier Albert Henry of Cook Islands.

During the 1960s co-operatives reached something of a plateau and while they are likely to continue to operate, they are unlikely to become the major form of commerce. During the 1960s there was some disillusionment with co-operatives, because many people had unrealistic expectations about what they could achieve.

Government Participation

The emphasis then shifted to governmental activity in the economy. This was most marked in Tonga, where the government took over internal shipping services and also began operating ships from Tonga to Australia, Fiji, Rotuma, Samoa, the Tokelau Islands and elsewhere. This has been a relatively successful enterprise and now the government of Nauru has built up a fleet of ships operating widely in the Pacific.

During most of the colonial era the marketing of produce was handled by private foreign firms, but during the 1960s many governments took over (or at least controlled more tightly) the marketing of export crops. This was partly a reaction to demands within the Pacific area itself, and partly a result of influence from colonial countries, especially Australia and New Zealand, where governments had come into power which favoured the marketing of primary produce being governmental or co-operative enterprises rather than private business.

Recent Trends in Commerce

The next move, especially since about 1965, was to increase the opportunities for Pacific islanders to become businessmen. Some Pacific countries are now placing considerable emphasis on this policy. New Guinea has recently imported overseas

consultants, set up a special government agency, a development bank, and a network of services aimed to facilitate the emergence of a class of small-scale indigenous businessmen.⁵

The development of independent indigenous entrepreneurs may be of limited applicability. In the larger islands of Melanesia there is more room for it than in Polynesia, both because the Melanesian cultures are better adapted to it and because the isolated valleys and islands need small stores, work-shops, truck operators and so on. For this generation at least, but probably not for much longer, there is scope for the development of one-man businesses in the larger islands of Melanesia. There is not as much scope in Polynesia, however, partly because competitive business is less compatible with some aspects of Polynesian culture and personality, and partly because the islands are much more accessible. This accessibility leads to more foreign capital per head being attracted in.

The small local trader is at a great disadvantage against firms that operate branches throughout the Pacific and the world, and which gain much of their income from monopoly handling rights on products ranging from motor-cars to alcoholic beverages. Small local ship-owners find it very difficult to compete with large foreign-owned fleets. This is even more so with airlines. Slowly more and more functions in the economy are being taken over either by governments or by large-scale international capital. The proportion of total business handled by small businessmen is dwindling all the time.

The latest trend in economic change⁶ (I prefer not to call it economic development because "development" tends to have a fallacious connotation of something inevitable and invariably desirable) is for combined indigenous-expatriate enterprise. That is, a major foreign firm moves in and shares with local people. This has many advantages and it does facilitate participation, but in practice many of these organisations end up very substantially foreign owned, and with only token local participation.

The foreign enterprise, being much larger and more experienced, is more likely to establish a profitable operation, but the main task of a local subsidiary is to serve its foreign parent company. Its loyalty, not only its moral obligation but its legal obligation, is to make as much profit as it can for its share-

holders, the vast majority of whom are foreign. This question of partnership between foreign and local business is likely to become a crucial political issue in the Pacific in the 1970s.

One aspect of joint ventures that could have serious consequences is that the local participant is usually chosen from within a fairly small, elite class. This is usually a strongly politically affiliated and unrepresentative segment of the local population. Joint enterprise in these circumstances may increase the already substantial political power of the local business elite, and divorce it further from the common people. There is evidence of this in several parts of the Pacific. As those with political power gain more economic power, they can entrench themselves in a smaller and smaller, more and more exclusive, richer, and indigenous but foreign-influenced elite. And that inevitably has political consequences, for when hereditary or other leaders divorce themselves from their people and align their interests more closely with foreign business, there is a danger that (as in other forms of divorce and remarriage) the children feel abandoned and tend to hate their step-mother. Such resentment can be hidden or muffled for a time and to a degree, but there are distinct limits.

LAND

Resource or Obstacle?

Customary Tenure

Emotional involvement in land is very strong in the Pacific. It is sometimes suggested that emotion should be ignored in planning, but this would be very inappropriate for we human beings make our decisions much more on feelings than on facts. Emotional feelings become political realities, and feelings are among the most important factors in land matters in the Pacific today.

The very diverse tenure systems in the Pacific have several features in common.¹ They were devised for subsistence agriculture, in situations where people produced almost all their own food. About one-quarter of an acre of land per person was needed under crop at any time, although this varied with the crop and the soil. Because of high temperatures, heavy rainfall and leaching of soil, the land was left to fallow for some years after cropping, so one to four acres of agricultural land per head, or up to twenty acres per family, was needed. In addition land was needed for hunting, foraging and other purposes.

Rights to land were in all cases vested in groups. The groups varied in composition, and there were rights held by individuals, extended families, lineages, clans, tribes and so on. That is, in any one piece of land there was a hierarchy of rights at several levels.

The sale of land was traditionally unknown in most of the Pacific Islands, and is still forbidden by law in many of them. The transfer of land in the customary systems was mainly by inheritance from parents.

Warfare was another very important means of land transfer. When governments and missions stopped warfare, they did so without adequate assessment of the functions it served in land

distribution. When warfare ceased, there was a need for other means of land transfer, but unfortunately in most of the Pacific throughout the 100 years since local warfare ceased, no adequately flexible facilities for land transfer have been provided.

Whereas a person could live off one-quarter acre of crop in the subsistence society, more was needed to earn an equivalent living from cash cropping. There was no shortage of land for the first few generations after contact, because the populations of the Pacific were drastically reduced by introduced diseases and by warfare with more lethal weapons. The populations declined from the first half of last century until the turn of this century, and this created an apparent surplus of land. It was assumed that population decline would continue.

A second major effect of contact on traditional land rights concerned transport. Three miles had been about the limit within which one could effectively maintain land rights. But with improved shipping, motor transport, and no risk of attack, it became possible to hold land rights over a very much longer time and distance. This has led to a very acute problem in much of the Pacific—that of the absentee landowner. Registration of land aggravated the problem. In the traditional society land rights were retained not by inheritance alone, but also by residence and active participation in the community. If active participation ceased and was not renewed within a reasonable time, one's rights withered away.

This major difference between the land tenure systems of Europe and the Pacific Islands has led to a great deal of misunderstanding. In the islands societies land rights waxed and waned, they increased and they diminished, whereas in capitalistic societies they start and finish at a particular moment, that is, at the moment of sale the seller's rights are completely extinguished and the buyer takes them over in total. This was not so in any traditional Pacific Islands system, where rights were subject to the right-holder's continuing to be an acceptable member of the community. Rights were never absolute but were constantly strengthened or weakened or faded out for those absent too long. When the registration of land was introduced, it was at first assumed that it would provide stability, yet in practice registration introduced too much rigidity.

Problems of Codification and Registration

When land commissions were set up in most of the Pacific to demarcate and register land, people usually insisted that they register the traditional boundaries of the areas then recognised as theirs for subsistence purposes. But the small, fragmented lots into which they had traditionally marked their lands for subsistence gardening were very different in size, shape and distribution from what is needed for commercial farming.

After registration land can usually be acquired only by accidents of birth, that is, by inheritance from one's parents. By any principle of logic this is a poor basis for allocating what is in many cases the nation's most valuable resource. It leads to many people who never use land owning lots of it, to many who would like to use it having none, and to vast areas lying unused or under-used throughout much of the eastern Pacific. The only child of an only child is usually rich in land, but he is also likely to be in regular paid employment and does not use it; whereas the fifth child of a fifth child, starting from the same original amount, has an uneconomic fragment, although he is probably dependent on it as he is likely to have fewer educational and other opportunities. Traditional mechanisms of gift, permissive occupancy, voluntary reallocation and even warfare have not been adequately substituted, and a mobile population in a commercial economy needs much more flexibility of land transfer.

In the subsistence society the over-riding rights of the local community were recognised—the need of the society as a whole was greater than the need of one of its members. The community is now the nation, and land rights will increasingly become allocated in terms of national interest. But cultural change takes place at different speeds, and land is always an area of cultural lag. It may take some time for the system of land allocation to catch up with the current needs of the society.

Problems due to the persistence of aspects of the subsistence system include those associated with livestock. In the early stages of contact with Europeans, cattle were in great demand because they contain a lot of meat; yet in more than a century they have not become significantly incorporated into any island's agricultural system. This is important—people want

them and many people have tried them, but most have either abandoned them or kept only a few. One of the reasons is that very few individuals have sufficiently exclusive rights over a sufficiently large area to allow them to farm cattle effectively.

Moreover, many islands people have a strong psychological resistance to fences. One's land should be accessible to neighbours and friends. People need to walk over it to get to their own land, and building a fence suggests to your neighbours that you do not trust them. One hears many instances of people getting their fences chopped down by others who are resentful of them. Putting up fences was not the done thing, and it is only very slowly becoming acceptable. Problems of these kinds are being overcome, but a number of adjustments are necessary in the process.

Many governments have tried to codify custom, but this very process changes the custom. Introduced legal, judicial and administrative structures all modify the custom very greatly because one of the keys of these customary systems was that they were not based on law, or on formal administrative structures, or on written records. This left them with a great deal of flexibility. The people who first codified the customary systems were not to blame, because at that time the populations were declining and it seemed that there was going to be plenty of land, and also because the problems do not arise until the generation after first registration. At that stage governments should have been on the alert for problems of multiple ownership and made appropriate provisions for freer transfer of land to meet the changing needs, but in no case did they do so.²

One of the major problems as a result is that everybody's name, once on the register, stays on the register, and people who by customary processes would have dropped out and no longer have been regarded as land-owners, now retain their legal title to the land. In most of eastern Polynesia a person inherited land either through his father *or* through his mother, but not generally through both. But the governments of Tahiti, the Cook Islands, Niue and New Zealand all misunderstood these systems. The people said in effect, "We inherit from our fathers and our mothers", which indeed was true, but they did not normally or *continuously* inherit from both. Where colonial governments legislated to give full rights of inheritance to all

children from both parents, they unintentionally created problems which are now of fantastic proportions. There are many sections of land in Tahiti, the Cook Islands and New Zealand with hundreds of legal owners yet the land concerned is not big enough to support a single farm. I know many house-sites in the Cook Islands with room for only one house, yet with 100 or more legal owners. The situation is even worse in Tahiti. These problems are caused, not by the traditional systems, but by misunderstandings of them by colonial governments. The governments did not understand the customary ways in which unused rights withered away, because custom does not prescribe the obvious; custom provides rules or principles for situations in which there would otherwise be doubt.

If land is registered, and all offspring inherit equal rights to it, this doubles the number of registered owners of any piece of land at each generation. This is now a major problem in much of the Pacific.³ One of the difficulties is that it has gone on for so long that many islanders now believe that this was their ancient inheritance system.

Land Alienation

Between 1850 and 1900 foreigners, mostly Europeans, alienated very substantial areas of land from Pacific islanders. Alienation slowed down around 1900 with the beginning of the colonial era, followed by a long period of stability, when colonial governments decided to limit land alienation. Since 1950 the reverse has occurred, with land being returned to Pacific islanders from alien settlers. This has gone on throughout almost all the Pacific except New Zealand and Hawaii. When the Marshall, Mariana, and Caroline Islands were a Japanese mandate, in which there were more Japanese settlers than Micronesians, the Japanese acquired most of the land—rather like Europeans did in New Zealand. Since the Second World War almost all land in Micronesia has been handed back to Micronesian individuals and institutions. In the Gilbert and Ellice Islands the lands that were owned by foreign individuals and companies have been bought back since the Second World War for use by islanders. Nauru was Australian territory until 1968 when it was re-acquired by the Nauruans. In New Guinea in the last few years, as a result of changing political forces, the Australian govern-

ment has handed back over 100,000 acres of land, and there will probably be a lot more handed back, given the build-up of political pressure there. In the Solomon Islands Lever Brothers Limited handed back 77,000 acres not long ago, and in New Caledonia the grant of Melanesian voting rights was associated with the return between 1958 and 1963 of about 74,000 acres of land to Melanesians. In Fiji several years ago, local co-operatives started to buy foreign-owned land. This would probably have become widespread were it not for a tourist boom that has inflated land prices beyond the reach of local people. Nevertheless, although economic forces have put it outside their range for the moment, political forces may bring it back within their range. The trend is fairly clear—as aliens lose political power their rights to land also diminish.

Land Reform

On the question of land reform, one cannot make a law effective if it is too far from the realities of life in the particular society. When colonial governments have tried to change a particular pattern of tenure by legislation alone, they have seldom succeeded. For example, France introduced the French metropolitan law to Tahiti 100 years ago. It has been the law there ever since, but it has left Tahiti with probably the worst land tenure problems and the lowest agricultural productivity in the Pacific. The system that the French have tried to impose for four generations has not taken root and the actual system in Tahiti bears little relationship to the legal system. Similarly, elsewhere in the Pacific over the last fifty or sixty years, few of the land reforms have achieved the hoped-for increases in productivity.

I once made a study of six land reforms in the islands to find out their effects on productivity and was amazed to find that in almost all cases productivity declined rather than increased after the "reform".⁴ Although much greater changes in Pacific land tenures are necessary, they will have to be tailored much more closely than in the past to the specific needs of the islands concerned. If one has an extreme national emergency and an extremely powerful military government like Taiwan had, then radical changes can be made. But if, like Indonesia, which adopted very similar legislation, there is inadequate internal co-ordination to carry the reform through, it remains a dead letter.

Most of the land reform legislation in the Pacific has not achieved the goals set for it because planners have not kept close enough to realities, neither have they had an adequate measure of what could be effectively changed and how far, by what forces, and at what speed.

One of the points that has been missed in most reform programmes was that land rights provide psychological and social security, and unless you have old-age benefits and sickness benefits and building societies and all the other things to provide for your time of vulnerability, then you need your land rights. In the Gilbert Islands several years ago I made a brief study of 214 pieces of land that had been individualised only fifteen years before. By the time of my visit however, only 38 per cent of these lands was being worked individually by the owners. The Gilbertese preferred to borrow a bit from a relative here, to lend a bit to an in-law there, to allow a friend to use a bit somewhere else and so on, partly because with each arrangement there is a body of unspoken commitment to reciprocate in some way at some time. The people who introduced that reform did not give sufficient attention to the social security functions of this complex network of customary land rights, and thus did not make appropriate alternative provisions for social security.

Population in the Pacific is rising rapidly. For this reason it is desirable to make the fullest use of available land, but unfortunately it seems that land will not be exploited to the full in this decade at least. Legal, cultural and administrative difficulties will keep land under-exploited, and people will turn to alternative sources of income, if they are available, such as work in the tourist industry or in commerce or factories. Part of the reason for this is that land reform is difficult to carry out, is very expensive, and is politically very hot. No government likes to tackle these things unless the pressure is really on, and independent governments, like their colonial predecessors, keep putting off the evil day.

The situations for which the traditional land tenure systems were devised are very different from those today and particularly from those of tomorrow and, therefore, people would be wise to adapt. But this does not mean copying the French or the English or the New Zealand system; it requires effective planning to suit local circumstances.

6

POLITICS

New and old sources of power

The present political structures in the Pacific are more diverse than those of any equivalent population anywhere in the world. The less than 6,000,000 people have twenty separate governments, almost every one of which differs significantly from the others. They include a kingdom (Tonga), a dominion (Fiji), an independent state in which only chiefs can vote or be elected (Western Samoa), a republic (Nauru), an associated state (the Cook Islands), two United Nations Trust Territories (New Guinea and the United States Trust Territory—though there are major differences of governmental structure between them), a French-British condominium (the New Hebrides), a protectorate (the Solomon Islands), a crown colony (the Gilbert and Ellice Islands), a province (West Irian—of Indonesia), and several other forms.¹ But in addition to these present constitutional diversities, there are other differences which derive from much earlier influences.

Traditional Systems

Before European contact there were two main kinds of political system in the Pacific Islands: the aristocratic societies of Polynesia and Micronesia and the democratic societies of Melanesia, and they are still very important in the 1970s. This is an over-simplification, because there was considerable diversity within these areas, and even in aristocratic societies, high birth was not the only determinant of leadership. But generally speaking, the peoples of New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides lived in small fragmented societies in which political power was achieved through skills in production, organisation, politics and war. To a substantial extent, any man of proven ability was acceptable as a leader. In

Polynesia, on the other hand, heredity was very important. Most chiefs were the sons of chiefs and most high priests were the sons of high priests, and although a few outstanding individuals from lower ranks achieved high status because of superlative performance in war or otherwise, being a member of the aristocracy was a prime criterion for leadership.²

The introduction of guns, swords, sailing ships and commerce by the early European traders, gave certain Polynesian and Micronesian chiefs the opportunity to expand their political power. They established the Polynesian kingdoms—on a much larger scale and much more tightly organised than ever before, but using the traditional aristocratic hierarchy of chiefs as the basis of their organisation and government.³

This did not happen in Melanesia, largely because its traditional societies and beliefs did not, like the traditional aristocracies, provide such a convenient basis for the development of kingdoms. Fiji was, in this and some other ways, like Polynesia, and Fiji's powerful aristocratic systems of leadership were influenced by those of Tonga.

The Polynesian kingdoms had not been long established, and were in some cases still being established, when European colonial powers annexed or otherwise took effective control of the various islands. The only kingdom which survived was the Kingdom of Tonga.

Colonial Systems

The colonial era is now coming to an end,⁴ but as most Pacific islanders still live under colonial rule, it is of interest to look at some of its main features. Until the Second World War there was fifty years of relative stability, or stagnation, depending on one's point of view. Medical services were improved and populations increased, some low-level schooling was instituted, and centralised government was established.

The Second World War saw most of the northern and western Pacific Islands conquered by Japan and, without American aid, Australia and New Zealand would have been also. After the war, the colonial powers began, through a mixture of idealism and self-interest, to take a new interest in the Pacific Islands. The South Pacific Commission was set up to facilitate social, economic and medical development, but also to



Outward Movement: these Tokelau Islanders flying to New Zealand are part of a recent widespread movement from the islands to the Pacific borderlands. Nearly 50,000 islanders, mostly from Samoa, the Cook Islands and Niue, now reside in New Zealand.

BOTTOM LEFT:

Inward Movement: volunteer organisations entered the Pacific on a significant scale in the 1960s. Now over a thousand volunteers from Australian Volunteers Abroad, New Zealand's Volunteer Service Association, the United Kingdom VSO, and US Peace Corps, Japan's Cooperation Volunteers Abroad, the French Voluntary organisation, Cooperation, and several others serve in various parts of the Pacific in teaching and other fields. Here a New Zealand volunteer of VSA is working on a farm development project in Western Samoa.


TOP RIGHT:

Passing through: tourism in the Pacific Islands is growing more rapidly than in any other region of the world. Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada and Japan are the main sources of tourists, but an increasing proportion is expected from Asia.

BOTTOM RIGHT:

Travelling within: Air Micronesia is jointly owned by Micronesian shareholders, Continental Airlines and Aloha. This 727 Continental-Air Micronesia jet provides services between the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana Islands as well as to Hawaii, Guam and Okinawa.








Markets and trading are an ancient feature of many Melanesian societies, though fresh produce markets such as this one are now a common feature throughout the Pacific.




The government of Tonga owns a fleet of ships which provides services to Australia, Fiji, Samoa and elsewhere, as well as within the Tongan Islands. The *Niuvakai* runs a regular service to Sydney, Suva and Samoa.

Co-operatives in Papua-New Guinea handle an annual turnover of nearly \$10,000,000, mostly in trading. Co-operative stores are supplied by ships such as the *Papua*, which is owned by the Co-operative Federation of Papua.





For the isolated Polynesian island of Niue, making plaited-ware for sale is an important source of income for island women.



Solomon Islands women on Malaita making shell "money". Still much in demand for its traditional use in marriages, funerals and ceremonies, it is also selling increasingly overseas.





Directors of Hara Hara Prints, a firm of New Guinean highlanders who specialise in screen printing of traditional designs and related arts, with some of their materials.

LEFT: One of the completed articles of shell "money". A tremendous amount of skilled hand labour is involved in its manufacture.



Traditional Polynesian societies were characterised by hereditary aristocracies, and last century a number of kingdoms existed in Polynesia. The only one in this century is the Kingdom of Tonga. Here, in 1967, King Taufa'ahau Tupou IV accedes to the throne after the death of his mother, Queen Salote.

serve the interests of the colonial governments which directed and financed it. In the 1940s and 1950s at least, it aimed to keep United Nations activity in the Pacific to a minimum, as it was feared that this would not be sympathetic to the interests of colonial governments. It also functioned to slow down political development in the islands by prohibiting from all Commission agenda and programmes, any discussion of matters with significant political implications.⁵

The most striking differences in colonial policies have perhaps been between the United Kingdom colonies, where chiefly systems were strengthened and made the basis of the colonial government, and the French colonies, where the chiefly systems were systematically destroyed. The French had a strongly nationalistic colonial policy which aimed, at least nominally, to imbue the islanders with French culture, whereas the English placed greater emphasis on the preservation of the indigenous culture.⁶

The United Kingdom clearly aims to facilitate the independence of her colonies, and to withdraw from the Pacific as soon as possible, but France is holding her colonies with determined tenacity. New Caledonia is the main one, and as it contains one of the world's largest deposits of nickel, as well as supplies of other minerals, it is a centre for vast French investment and involvement. France intends to remain in New Caledonia at almost any cost.

Australia has the largest colonial responsibility in the Pacific, for she controls Papua New Guinea with its 2,500,000 people—more people than all the other Pacific Islands put together. Australia's record has not been particularly inspiring, and after more than fifty years only between five and ten per cent of New Guinea people are literate. Even today, less than half the school age children receive any schooling, and much of it is of very low quality. Government policy is for eventual independence for New Guinea and most parties agree that it will be within five years and possibly much sooner. The New Guinean people will then be faced with an enormous task for Australia has done very little (except in the last few years) to promote the integration of its 700 separate language and culture groups into a single nation. The institution in which Australia has developed the most cohesion and unity in New Guinea is, unfortunately, the army.

The second largest colonial power in the islands until 1962 was Holland whose only colony in the region was West New Guinea. Holland virtually ignored West New Guinea during its first 100 years of control, but in the 1950s, after losing Indonesia, she made a major effort to institute a huge development programme in West New Guinea. Despite ample staff and money, it was too late. Indonesian pressure, supported by American interests, made West New Guinea a part of Indonesia in 1962. Despite Indonesian assertions to the contrary, West Irian, as it is now known, is for all practical purposes a colony. By most criteria it is the worst administered colony in the Pacific. I would not have believed the extent of the brutality, misunderstanding or incompetence of Indonesian officials there if I had not seen it with my own eyes. There is no doubt that the people there would prefer to be independent, but there is almost no possibility of Indonesia allowing it. Indonesia is, unfortunately, at least as self-centred in her relationship with her Pacific colony as France or the United States.⁷

American colonial interests in the Pacific have been almost entirely military.⁸ American Samoa was acquired by negotiation with Germany (in which the Samoans had no significant say) as a naval base, and it was used for that purpose until well after the Second World War when changes in military technology made it obsolete. It was then handed to civilian, but still colonial, administration. For over fifty years the people of American Samoa were controlled by the commander of the naval base. America's other main Pacific Islands colony is Guam, acquired from Spain by military conquest at about the same time as she acquired American Samoa. Guam remains today almost exclusively a military fortress and the indigenous adult population is equalled if not outnumbered by representatives of the colonial power—mostly working directly or indirectly on American military programmes. The Mariana, Marshall, and Caroline Islands are a United Nations Trusteeship, but they are administered by the United States, which wants continued association with these islands, mainly for military purposes. The United States will grant nominal self-government but wants to determine military and other major decisions. As almost everything in those islands has military implications, and as they have been made almost totally

dependent on United States financial aid, this could leave them with little self-government in practice.

New Zealand's colonial responsibilities in the Pacific have been relatively small, and her administrative record rather dull.⁹ By comparison with the United Kingdom, France and Holland, which used highly trained and well-educated specialist staff, New Zealand's colonial officials were not well equipped for the task. Nevertheless, the administration was generally well-intentioned, though more effective in achieving improvements in welfare than in production. New Zealand's territories were probably fortunate to come under Maori ministers for most of the pre-war period—Sir James Carroll, then Sir Maui Pomare, then Sir Apirana Ngata—who were concerned to improve social services and to minimise industrial and commercial developments which they feared might disrupt island cultures.

Although New Zealand did much more in primary education than most colonial powers, technical and higher education in its territories has always been grossly inadequate. The islanders are thus dependent to an unnecessary degree on New Zealand staff, and much more so than Fiji or Tonga or Samoa for example. Many problems in the Cook Islands today are directly due to the fact that before self-government, New Zealand had not prepared an adequate pool of trained, qualified local manpower to undertake the existing and emerging tasks. I hope that the New Zealand people in the 1970s will honour the obligation that the previous generation did not adequately discharge—to equip sufficient islanders with the skills to enable them to more fully use the limited resources available to them. Cook Islanders, Niueans and Tokelau islanders are, after all, New Zealand citizens who could, if they chose to, insist on receiving a much greater share of New Zealand's resources than they do at present.

Federation was seen by some people in the 1940s and 1950s as the best solution for the Pacific Islands. Each island group was so small that there were obvious advantages of scale to be gained from joining forces. Three main proposals have been put forward—one for a Melanesian federation to include New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides; one for a central Pacific federation based on Fiji, Tonga and Samoa; and one for all the Pacific Islands. None of the proposals has come

to fruition and none is likely to. The peoples are diverse, the cultures are different, the distances vast, and a federal government would add a large new burden of expense. Territories which are trying to obtain more autonomy from colonial powers or have recently obtained it, are not, in this generation at least, likely to be interested in any form of political federation which would curtail their independence.

Self-Government and Beyond

In the 1950s the idea of eventual self-government for the various islands came to be cautiously accepted, and in the 1960s complete independence became almost universally adopted as the goal, with Western Samoa, Nauru, Tonga and Fiji becoming completely independent, and the Cook Islands partially so.

The period since independence has been, in all cases, much more politically stable than many people assumed it would be. This is not to suggest that these countries do not have problems, or that there may not be future crises, but so far the outlook is promising. Each of them has difficult political problems to cope with. Fiji, with its population delicately balanced between Indians and Fijians, has a tremendous task ahead. It was at about that stage of population balance between immigrant Englishmen and resident Maoris in New Zealand that the so-called Maori wars occurred. A similar crisis in Fiji is unlikely, but not impossible, and the welding of these two diverse cultures, plus European, Chinese and other minorities, into a unified nation, will be a major task until the year 2000 at least.

Tonga is one of the world's few remaining kingdoms. It is not in any usual sense democratic, and most forms of power and privilege are concentrated in the hands of a small, predominantly hereditary, elite. The climate of world opinion is no longer sympathetic to such a form of government, and there are indications that this is becoming increasingly the case in Tonga also. But the aristocracy and its associated non-aristocratic elite, like any privileged minority in any human society, is unlikely to reshape the society voluntarily, either far enough or fast enough to meet the mounting desire for change.

In varying degrees, Samoa, Tonga and Fiji have all given constitutional and other privileges to hereditary chiefs. In the past, these chieftainships have had a number of advantages,¹⁰

and it is not without significance that the countries that achieved independence first were the ones with strong hereditary chieftainships. In the future, however, the advantages of chiefly authority are likely to continue to decrease, and their disadvantages to multiply. This is particularly so in the psychological effects which such rigid class levels have in inhibiting the development of the talents of the great majority of common people. New Guinea, the Solomons and the New Hebrides never had these aristocratic systems, and in many ways in the past this was a disadvantage. But in the quite different political and economic context of the future, they may be fortunate not to be burdened with a leadership system which is not well adapted to the aspirations or the economy of Pacific islanders in this generation.

Within individual countries and territories, new political forces are taking shape. Greatly increased urban employment has led to worker interests being expressed through political involvement by trade unions. Where sectional interests of a non-traditional kind are clearly distinct, political parties have emerged (and significantly they have not emerged in Western Samoa or Tonga). Race is becoming a major focus for political alignment—Islanders, Europeans and Asians being the main categories—but in Micronesia and Melanesia there is also considerable political division between islanders on the basis of language or other cultural or regional origins and in Fiji persons of mixed European-Fijian origin constitute a distinguishable political entity. Ideology too is becoming more important. As people become aware that alternative political systems are possible, imported ideologies are sought and examined and some of them are likely to be of increasing political significance.

Independence in the islands is relatively recent. Four new nations have come into being in the last decade, at least another four are likely to be created in the 1970s. Independence is thus valued highly and people are very sensitive to any reduction of it. In practice, however, it is likely to be whittled down considerably in the coming years.

Regional Co-operation

Joint action among island nations is likely to increase. A South Pacific Forum of Prime Ministers, Presidents and Premiers has

been established. A Pacific Islands Producers Association has been set up to serve the common interests of all the islands which supply bananas and other fruit to New Zealand; the South Pacific Conference is now held every year and has become very political; the University of the South Pacific has been established to serve Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, Niue, the Cooks, Tokelaus, Gilberts, Ellice, Solomons, Hebrides and Nauru; various islands governments are shareholders in Air Pacific, and there are possibilities of trade and tariff agreements within the islands.

In addition, the various islands are becoming closely tied to outside countries through trade agreements, military alliances, foreign aid and other commitments. They are also becoming involved in multilateral arrangements through the United Nations, the British Commonwealth, and other multi-national organisations. Each of these commitments limits their freedom of action a little—reduces their independence if you like. Each of the island nations is so small that the impact of such restrictions is often great, and there is no doubt that they will become involved in more and more of them as time goes on.

Their independence will be limited even more by their great dependence on foreign capital—investments in factories, hotels and commerce as well as loans for government, local bodies and industry. The percentage of the commercial assets, business profits and loan repayments in the islands that go to foreigners is extremely high, perhaps even dangerously high. Although colonialism in the old political sense has largely gone from the Pacific, in the economic sense it is stronger than ever. Unless foreign investors are prepared to do much more to share the benefits from their investments with islanders, the reaction is likely to be stronger than that against the colonial governments. Foreign involvement is likely to be one of the most important political issues in the Pacific this generation.

PART II

THE PRESENT IN THE FUTURE

INTRODUCTION

Preserving which tradition?

Leading Pacific Islands politicians, intellectuals and writers give high priority to the preservation of the indigenous cultures.¹ There is widespread support for this principle, but much less action in practice, partly because few if any have spelled out in detail what they mean by indigenous culture. Some who strongly advocate it devote much of their own time and resources to acquiring specific goods, skills, arts and institutions from other cultures. These are not necessarily incompatible with indigenous cultures, but more thought is needed about which aspects of existing cultures people wish to retain (and why, and how), which aspects of former cultures to revive, which aspects of other cultures to adopt, what amalgam of local and exotic cultures to develop, and what new cultural patterns to create. It is not a question of which one of these, but how much of each.

All human cultures are continually changing, sometimes slowly, sometimes fast. Culture is not a state but a process, in which some core themes are identifiable over a long period, while other, often less meaningful facets change at varying speeds. The 1970s are a time of rapid change throughout the world and nobody, anywhere, wants to preserve the culture of 1973 *exactly* in its present form. All cultures have considerable limitations. Moreover, when it comes to changing them, there is great difference of opinion as to what should be preserved, abandoned or changed, and what should be adopted from other cultures. And anyway, cultures are not changed by laws or edicts, but by slow and complex processes which can be consciously modified only to a limited extent.

The debate on the advantages and drawbacks of different cultural forms is worldwide, and just as important for Western

Europe or Russia, or the United States or China, as for any Pacific nation. This fact, however, is not always fully appreciated in the islands. Likewise, many are not aware of how diverse the cultures of the industrialised nations are. The existing cultural patterns that the industrialised nations have stumbled into in the 1970s are only in part derived from ancient patterns. The implied assumption that people in Europe today live a life just like that of their forefathers is false. The differences in the way of life between the 1770s and the 1970s are as great for many Europeans as they are for Pacific islanders.

Nevertheless, the Pacific peoples are probably more conscious of their cultures than are most peoples of the industrialised nations, and because most societies in the Pacific are very small, they may be able to influence the future shape of their cultures more than individuals in the larger nations can. But their smallness also makes them vulnerable to being swamped by external forces.

Pacific peoples have a moral right to shape the cultures they wish to live in, though they will not be the only ones to determine what happens in practice, for mass media, military alliances, foreign travel, treaties and trade will all influence the outcome.² Much of the influence of Pacific islanders on their own cultures will be neither planned nor conscious, for a culture is the product of actual behaviour. As the advertising industry is well aware, behaviour can be manipulated and even exploited, but it can only to a limited extent be planned. This last point is fortunate, for if it were not so, those with power—whether commercial, governmental, religious or other elites—would control personal behaviour even more than they do now. Nevertheless, unless Pacific leaders take positive and well-organised action to influence the pattern of their own cultures, they will be even more dominated by external forces than they have been in the past.

Culture can be broadly defined as a way of life—the way we think, believe and behave, as well as the way we make, do and use things. Culture is the way a people express themselves—not only verbally, but in dress, life style, beliefs and practices. Again all culture can be seen as language, for all we do and the way we do it is communicated to others. Dance is clearly a language of movement and symbol, but so is religion a language, and

customary behaviour and all aspects of living. It all has meaning for those using it and for those who see them using it.

Some of the aspects of culture which would need to be examined if one was to have a policy or set of priorities on cultural matters are listed below. The extent to which traditional precedents are adhered to tends to increase as we go down the scale from the technical and impersonal to the creative and personal:

Minimal traditional precedents:

- Technology
- Economy
- Government

Moderate use of traditional precedents:

- Religion
- Ethics and philosophies of life
- Social organisation

Major use of traditional precedents:

- Customary behaviour
- Creative arts
- Language

The following chapters are concerned with the relevance of each of these topics to the evolution of future cultural patterns in the Pacific Islands.

TECHNOLOGY

If it works, use it!

Technology includes means of transport (vehicles, planes, roads, canoes, etc.), other means of communication (radio, journals, books, letters, television, films, telephones, and so on), domestic technology (such as housing, cooking equipment, utensils, refrigeration and furnishings) and the tools of production (industries, machinery and equipment).

One aspect of technology which needs to be considered is its utility or efficiency. Pacific islanders have generally adopted the products of industrial technology where these provide a quicker, easier or otherwise apparently more advantageous way of achieving one's purpose. As with other peoples throughout the world, however, the decision to buy and use equipment is never made *only* on utilitarian grounds; prestige, status, personal expression, and other social and psychological values are also involved, as well as pressure from advertisers. Thus, for example, it is common for small farmers throughout the world to want to buy tractors of their own even when their farms are so small that they would be much better served by hiring tractors on the few occasions they are needed. Much the same applies with motor vehicles, private boats and rides on aeroplanes. Likewise with houses, refrigerators and furniture it is extremely hard to determine to what extent these are purchased on criteria of utility (and these criteria are very arbitrary) and to what extent they are to fulfil social and psychological needs. Paradoxically some Pacific Islands farmers have abandoned relatively efficient features of traditional agricultural technology and replaced them by less efficient substitutes.

In any case, there seems to be a worldwide tendency not to be very nationalistic or culture-bound about technology. That is, most people are not greatly influenced by traditional precedents

in their choice of the main *things* they use. They may be more traditionally oriented in the *way* they use things, but even in use, most peoples are influenced more by convenience than tradition. The technology we use inevitably modifies the kind of life we live.

Symbols of Identification

Traditional technology remains relevant in manual arts, which are discussed later, and in the preservation or reconstruction of outstanding features of the ancient cultural environment. Proposals for the development of a system of national parks throughout Micronesia "by and for the Micronesian people" (see Wenkam's report) are of wider significance. Historical structures, such as the magnificent remains of the ancient stone city at Nan Madol in Ponape, have considerable psychological potential. They can be abandoned, weed-infested ruins which epitomise the collapse of one's ancestral culture and reinforce feelings of inadequacy or impotence. Or they can be well-maintained shrines to the memory of respected origins, a source of confidence and inspiration. It depends on how they are used and interpreted—and this is a field in which governments and particularly educational systems can play an important role. Such historic trusts can also be a source of income, although that is perhaps a secondary role which needs to be planned judiciously so as not to subvert their contribution to confidence and culture. The Pacific is full of such historic treasures, but few indeed of them have yet played a positive role in the development of cultural integrity.

This applies to natural features also, to some extent. The Swiss derive a range of satisfactions from "possessing" the Alps, the Japanese from Mt Fuji, the Americans from the Grand Canyon, and New Zealanders from the "thermal wonderland"—even though they did not make them! The Pacific-wide moves for national parks (including those under water where the Pacific's most exotic wild-life lives) make good sense both culturally and economically.

When people want to put technology into a museum, it is usually a sign that it is dead. Bad museums can become graveyards of culture, but good museums give the objects a new life

as items of symbolic meaning and educational value when their utilitarian purpose has been superseded.

Traditional themes and designs may be of more relevance than the technology of their construction—in housing, for example. Professionally built Samoan houses are works of art in themselves. Some New Guinean structures are quite magnificent. The materials used in construction can in many cases be improved by manufactured substitutes, but some of the substitute designs are inferior in every respect. A few churches, hotels, public buildings, and private homes show the potential of marrying traditional and imported design concepts.¹ But there is still much scope for creative architecture in the islands. The emergence of a cadre of indigenous architects will probably be necessary before it is achieved.

ECONOMY

Not only what kind, but whose?

Economy and Social Order

The economy is the way in which goods and services are produced, distributed and exchanged. As a result of industrialisation, most things can be made available to more people at lower cost if they are manufactured on a large scale. Also, in most circumstances (though not all) people obtain more income if they specialise, and produce goods for sale elsewhere. Farmers in the Pacific generally earn more if their crops are sold to the other side of the world (e.g. vanilla, copra, sugar, coffee) than if they are sold locally.

Money may be the root of much evil, but it is also the source of considerable convenience; so much so that it has developed from ancient origins in the Middle East, Asia and Melanesia, into a universally used medium of exchange.

Many Ways of Doing It

A money economy greatly influences the life of any people. Nevertheless, the ways in which money is used in Pacific cultures, as well as the priorities and purposes it is used for (at all levels from the personal to the national) differ in significant respects from, for example, Australia or China or Egypt. May they continue to do so—at least in some respects. For example, many of the indigenous Pacific economic systems emphasised public standards of living much more than private. Some of the world's most powerful nations are now beginning to appreciate this principle more fully than they have in the past, and to reorder their priorities accordingly.

No one wants to return to the fully subsistence economy of their ancestors (and everybody else's ancestors incidentally). And Pacific peoples are fully aware of the value of a money

economy and international trade. But many want to modify the organisation, control, operation and effects of the way they function at present—and with good reason. Some others want not so much to modify the forms of organisation as to take them over. This too can be a legitimate goal. Having power to determine policies and to control organisations is a major source of satisfaction in any culture.

Societies where the indigenous culture remains strong may also be productive economically. Lockwood's study of a range of Samoan villages showed that Poutasi people put in the highest working hours per villager, had the best housing and a relatively high income. Poutasi was also the most "Samoan" in such things as not allowing non-Samoan houses to be erected in the main village, in the frequency and effectiveness of meetings of traditional institutions, and in the power of its chiefs. The Tolai of New Britain, the Mekeo of Papua, and the Aoba of the New Hebrides, some of the most productive groups of farmers per head in the Pacific, are also among the most strongly attached to their own cultures. This is not to suggest that the present systems are ideal, but to note that it is incorrect to assume that those who value their indigenous cultures highly are therefore less successful in money terms.

Non-Economic Consequences Need More Attention

Insufficient attention has been given to the social and other costs of certain kinds of economic activity. Creating artificial demand for unnecessary goods and services irrespective of their use or value makes people worse off even though it shows up in the statistics as "economic growth" and gives a false impression that welfare has been improved.¹

The fact that the "best of both cultures" does not necessarily evolve on its own is sadly demonstrated by the "Mr Whippy" ice cream vans which prowl the slums of Port Moresby and other towns, coercing, by their jingling presence on wretched children, poverty-stricken mothers to spend desperately needed money on valueless imported commodities which create their own demand, thus worsening the problem of undernourishment. I once heard the Australian official who was responsible for granting licences for such businesses, warmly and sincerely support this one as a contribution to "economic development".

The social costs of urbanisation and industrialisation also need more careful assessment. Urban peoples commit more crime, suffer more mental breakdown, become addicted in a higher percentage of cases, and cost much more in welfare services than villagers. In other words, the indigenous cultures are providing a number of economic, social and psychological services which are not adequately recognised at present. This is not necessarily an argument against urbanisation and industrialisation, both of which *can* contribute to better living. But they do not necessarily do so in practice. The economic development plans produced so far do not contain any realistic assessment of the additional money costs, let alone social and psychological costs, of these processes. For example, I suspect that when a fuller appreciation of the total costs of such industries as tourism is available, the industry will be required to contribute more to the public purse to compensate for the indirect costs with which it burdens the host community.²

Unemployment and Migrant Labour

Employment is a coming economic problem, as population is growing rapidly and in many islands exceeds employment opportunities (including those on the land). It is sometimes suggested that richer neighbours like Australia, New Zealand, Canada and U.S.A. should offer any unemployed surplus the opportunity to live there. This may be reasonable if the problem was temporary, or if the islands now had effective family planning (as do the countries to which they want to migrate). The countries mentioned are taking some, and I personally hope they take more, but it is unreasonable for any country to breed unlimited numbers and expect others to take responsibility for the surplus. Not only do cultural differences make their absorption in large numbers more difficult, but most are unskilled. Moreover, islands with adequate land or job opportunities are very reluctant to help their less fortunate neighbours. The Solomon Islands, with considerable surplus land, absorbed a few thousand landless Gilbertese in the colonial era, but refuses to help more. New Guinea, with some vast empty spaces, has denied them entry. Nauru uses Gilbertese labour, but does not allow them citizenship or even permanent residence. Tongans who call Australia "racist" for accepting too few

Tongan immigrants, approve their own government's refusal of citizenship to Fiji Indians and others, some categories of whom could contribute effectively to its economy. Western Samoa has evicted from its relatively ample lands some virtually landless Tongans, and the Cook Islands rightly insists on free entry and full privileges for Cook Islanders to New Zealand, but restricts other New Zealanders entering the Cook Islands.

Even within some territories, there is resistance to free migration of citizens seeking better economic opportunities. In the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for example, people of some districts not only resent, but in some cases actively resist fellow citizens from other districts seeking jobs—even when there are ample available. New Guinea suffers similar internal inflexibility.

Even in its economic effects, racism is a serious affliction. Undoubtedly the Pacific's white neighbours are guilty of it, but in practice most islanders are equally racist at both a personal and a governmental level. When all parties realise that this is a universal problem with deep psychological and cultural as well as economic implications, there will be a better chance of remedial action.

Who Aids Who?

Paradoxically, restrictions on permanent migration lead to the poorer independent islands subsidising their rich neighbours! The Tongan economy, for example, pays the heavy costs of raising and educating children who produce nothing but consume a lot. When they become potentially productive, however, the young men seek paid employment overseas. Women, as well as unfit and aged men, remain a relative drain on the reduced proportion of active men left in Tonga. New Zealand, Nauru and the other countries employing Tongan labour, gain by acquiring fit men, usually without their dependents, at minimal pay-rates and minimum overhead costs in short-term jobs. When they become redundant or old they are returned to Tonga. In other words, contract employment which New Zealanders call "aid" to Tonga is more properly Tongan aid to New Zealand. For seasonal harvesting (which Fijians particularly undertake in New Zealand) Fiji in effect pays the unemployment benefits which New Zealand would have to pay during the off-season if

New Zealand had a full work-force for these least desired tasks. (Incidentally, island villages have for over a century been subsidising foreign-owned plantations in the islands in the same way). It was the Fiji and Tonga governments which requested New Zealand to provide job opportunities for their under-employed citizens. It was not an exploitative plot by New Zealand to boost its economy with cheap island labour while the islands pay the overheads—but that is the way it will be increasingly regarded, and in effect it contains an element of truth.

Unskilled migrant labouring can be exciting once or twice, but as a way of life it is culturally sterile and psychologically depressing. Melanesians at home drop it in favour of almost any alternative. Permanent migration, on the other hand, does help the situation back home so long as it does not become a brain drain of the top talents.

The Pacific economies need aid, but much of it so far has been designed to benefit the donor countries more than the recipients. Indeed, beggars cannot be choosers, but it is probably to the long-term advantage of the donors also to give more thought to long-term consequences. The aid relationship needs much further rethinking to generate opportunities rather than charity, confidence rather than humiliation, and self-reliance rather than dependence.

GOVERNMENT

Are some less bad than others?

Even the most diverse forms of governmental organisation today have much in common. They are based on bureaucracy, upon hierarchies of control, laws, procedures, memoranda and telephones. But it is easy to overemphasise the similarities. There are also substantial differences.

Cultural Continuities

The relative significance of traditional forms in the present-day structure and functioning of governments in the Pacific is closely related to the co-ordination at the national level, as well as the strength at the local level, of the culture concerned. The governments of Tonga and Western Samoa operate to a very substantial degree on traditional precedents, despite their being formally cast in a Westminster mould. In the Marshall and Caroline Islands, traditional forms have been very significant in the district legislatures, but very much less so in the "federal" Congress of Micronesia. This is because traditional patterns are relatively uniform at the district level but diverse at the "federal" level. Fijian precedents have significant force today, even though indigenous Fijians are a minority population in Fiji. In the Cook Islands, where traditional precedents are mainly of a ceremonial order, tradition is reflected in the House of Ariki (high chiefs) whose functions are confined largely to advising in matters of custom, protocol and land tenure. The Solomon Islands has embarked on an interesting experiment in consultative committees rather than ministers to control government departments (on the ground that this accords better with indigenous practice). The French territories, in government as in all else, are almost totally assimilated to the French model.¹

Societies in the eastern Pacific developed systems of government in which leadership was determined largely by accidents of

birth. Such systems are now much less widespread in the world than they used to be. The decline has resulted partly from a weakening of beliefs about the rank or status of a person being determined by a god or gods. Partly it is due to evidence showing (contrary to beliefs in such stratified societies) that ability in government and other skills is learnt rather than in-born, and that both high and low intelligence are found among both high ranking and low ranking persons. These changes in knowledge and belief, and the greater mobility of people, have led to a decrease in the importance of hereditary leadership.

This is one of many examples where those who advocate the preservation of traditional cultures tend to be selective. Some persons who value the preservation of traditional culture, but are not themselves of high inherited rank, do not want the hereditary privileges to be preserved. On the other hand, those who gain from the recognition of traditional systems of privilege, use traditional precedent as a justification for the perpetuation or extension of their advantage. In this as in other things, our beliefs are much influenced by our own interests.

Scope for Creative Adaptation

All governments contain much that is carried over from the past, plus some features that are constantly modified by current pressures. In creating governmental systems for the needs of tomorrow, there is room for much improvement. But Pacific people need not be overwhelmed into the wholesale adoption of foreign models. Most of the capitalist governments in the world today are based on structures designed for conditions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Communism was designed to solve the problems of last century. No government was designed for today's problems and conditions, still less for tomorrow's. The island nations can therefore afford to look at their own governmental systems afresh, and from the perspective of their own needs.

Bureaucratic organisation has an inevitable tendency to standardise and consequently to stultify. There is an urgent need for an effective, flexible linkage between the government and the young and creative sectors of the population. This may perhaps be more readily achieved among the small populations of the Pacific than in the vast populations of Asia or Europe.

RELIGION

How many sources of truth?

Was The Baby Thrown Out With The Bathwater?

Polynesian religions were especially elaborate and contained elements of aesthetic beauty and philosophical genius. The traditional religions of the Pacific were nevertheless (like Christianity incidentally) the products of small, isolated societies. In their original form they have little relevance to life today, but some aspects of them may be very relevant, and research, thought and action in this area of traditional culture may well be merited. Though much has been lost, much more than is generally realised was recorded, mainly last century, and is available as a source of some kinds of precedent and identification.¹ Christianity has during the past century been incorporated into, and modified by, local cultures to a considerable extent. More recently, some students at the Pacific Theological College have been seeking traditional precedents for inclusion in Christian ritual and teaching, and a recent meeting of indigenous Melanesian priests expressed "an urgent need to reformulate Christian theology in accordance with Melanesian religious concepts and expressions".² Other islanders may look to the traditional philosophies for precedents concerning other aspects of life.

Cannibalism, the strangling of widows, the killing of certain categories of infants, and the launching of canoes over human bodies were all integral parts of some traditional belief systems. No one favours their reintroduction. But it is false to assert that because of these features, all other aspects of traditional belief systems are inappropriate. It is like saying that Christianity or Islam have no redeeming features just because both have been closely involved with massive warfare from the Crusades to the Second World War; or that the cultures of Europe have nothing

to contribute because it was once common to burn witches at the stake and to determine innocence or guilt by methods involving physical suffering of the most brutal kind.

Inherited Outward Forms

To look at more material aspects of religion today, we need to consider the costs of religious services. This is not to suggest that they merit more expense or less, which is a matter for the communities concerned. But in much of the rural Pacific, the total costs of religious services and structures (in terms of labour, food and other costs as well as money) as against their utilisation (in terms of hours per week and number of persons etc.) are the heaviest form of tax the community has to bear. In urban areas, on the other hand, one often hears requests for more religious facilities. What is a reasonable volume or proportion of total resources to devote to these purposes? There are several common arguments. One is that a work of art transcends material value, and that a community is enriched by the creative act of making and using beautiful structures. I agree with this principle, and feel that few communities in the world devote enough of their talents and resources to things of beauty, creativity and symbolic expression. The mural on the Catholic church at Naiserelangi in Fiji is of continuing value not only to that parish, but to the people of Fiji and beyond. There are many other examples of creative expression through religious structures, but let us be honest. Many churches in the Pacific, as elsewhere, are deadly dull.

If people want to build churches to the glory of God, then why should they not make them longer, wider, higher, larger than is needed to seat the congregation? This argument would make more sense if the main motivation was the glory of God, but a much stronger motivation in building outsize churches has been the glory of the community which built them, and the humiliation of neighbours with smaller churches. And many such churches reflect the greed and conceit of their builders.

Another view is that if people choose to build churches larger than are needed to seat their congregations, that is their own business since the money and resources have been given freely. This is reasonable, but with a qualification: how free is one to give or withhold? Many feel obliged to give more for social and

supernatural reasons based on fear—fear of what their neighbours and leaders might say, and of what God might do, if they do not (and corresponding favours if they do).

If a church is big enough to comfortably accommodate those who use it, how frequently is it used? Both the number of services per week, and the proportion of people attending them, have been declining in the Pacific in the past decade, as in other parts of the world. This raises the question of alternative or additional uses of church buildings, staff and other resources. Some consider it an insult to God to use a church building for art, music, education, health or other community needs. Others consider it an insult to God not to. But even among those who accept the latter view, little action has been taken so far.

If Christian ministers dressed in the way which Christ dressed, or like fishermen or carpenters dress today, I could understand the symbolism, for dress is an important symbolic system of communication in any culture. What then are Christian ministers communicating in their dress? Those who wear a cross bear a clear symbol which makes their beliefs and role in the community clear. Now that we all move about so much, it enables those who want to communicate with or to avoid ministers, to do so more easily. But an objective study of the garments worn by ministers of religion in the islands today, to find which categories of other persons their dress resembles most, would show that many who have based their dress on foreign models seem to have done so in the pattern of the foreign businessman and the colonial administrator, and many who have patterned their dress on indigenous models tend to have done so in the style of chiefs. I wonder how consistent it is with the teachings of Christ that his spokesmen should dress themselves in ways which identify them with the aura of certain attributes of foreign businessmen, colonial administrators and hereditary chiefs.

Contribution of Christian Missions

This particular example of rigidity and association with privilege should not lead us to overlook the major contributions which Christian missions made to the Pacific. Not only literacy, but almost all formal education was until recently provided by the churches, as were most medical and welfare

services. Their religion too was more universalist than the traditional systems. Again, their concern for indigenous interests, exemplified by those who devoted their lives to the care of lepers during the decades when cure seemed impossible, stands to their eternal credit. The conflicts between denominations have been largely overcome in the last decade and the transition from foreign mission to indigenous church has been generally accomplished.

Religion in the Future

But to return to the more important question of the content and functions of religious beliefs and practices, radical change is already in progress. In the same way as many aspects of the traditional religions were not well adapted to elements of the industrial culture which was accepted at the same time as Christianity, many aspects of Christianity are ill adapted to the age of computer technology and mass communication. Yet nineteenth century Christianity has become a sheet-anchor for many, a fixed point in a sea of sometimes bewildering uncertainty. But the anchor is neither as fixed, nor as secure, nor even as useful as it used to be, and the task of reshaping new philosophies, new ideologies, new beliefs and values, and new ethical principles, is now being faced by some of the most creative minds among young Pacific islanders.

PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS

Guidelines for living

The easy alternative to shaping one's own way of life is to adopt an existing model, but the two major export models—of General Motors and Coca-Cola on the one hand, and of Marx and Mao on the other—seem equally sterile. The Pacific peoples may create some adaptations from which the rest of the world could learn.

Conflicting Values

Great emphasis is often given to the importance of preserving the philosophy of life of particular island cultures. It is difficult to define precisely what this means, though it obviously does have meaning—quite intense meaning in many cases. Some values which are commonly discussed in this context are unlikely to survive because people are attracted more by other changes antithetical to these values.

A common example is people's lamenting the decline in co-operation among relatives, particularly in towns. Some co-operation between relatives is likely to continue throughout the world, but its extent will probably continue to diminish (though it will probably remain more important in the Pacific Islands than in Europe or America). The demand for more paid employment, for laws and police and courts to deal with persons who deviate too far from acceptable standards of behaviour, for governments to provide facilities which were formerly provided by the family or village, and for much more movement of things and people, all lead to a continuing reduction in co-operation among relatives. One cannot legislate for the preservation of co-operation among relatives, and indeed action to increase it would be so directly opposed to other things which people in practice value even more, that it would

be futile. In other words, some behaviour which is valued as "traditional" may be more correctly described as universal behaviour of small groups in partially subsistence economies.

One often hears pleas for the preservation of this or that traditional philosophy of life and, almost in the same breath, pleas for equal success in business, education or other pursuits with Asians, Europeans or other islanders whose lives are influenced by significantly different philosophies. In fact, of course, the acceptance of the one is often related to non-achievement of the other. Seldom are we prepared to think through, let alone accept, the consequences of adopting a particular philosophy. This is understandable, because it is difficult to substantiate the precise connection between particular aspects of philosophy and particular degrees of success or otherwise. But detailed studies demonstrating the nature and scale of this relationship would be valuable indeed, for common assumptions about features of traditional philosophy being obstacles to other goals may be as false as those which deny or ignore any casual connection.¹

One apparent difference of emphasis is in the relative value placed on goods as against personal relationships. Even though all cultures support reciprocity and generosity and all individuals want to accumulate things for themselves, cultures vary greatly in the relative emphasis they place on the one or the other, for they inevitably conflict. In a general sense, a higher value placed on the *accumulation* of property in western, and particularly highlands Melanesia (and among Gujurati, European and Chinese businessmen) while the emphasis in most Polynesian and Micronesian societies is on *distribution*. This may facilitate the more ready adoption of capitalistic enterprise in Melanesia than in Polynesia or Micronesia. One way in which traditional behaviour limits new opportunities is seen in the relatively few Fijians who sell at the Suva market (the biggest retail produce market in the Pacific) and their lack of salesmanship, as such behaviour is incongruent with Fijian values. Nevertheless, some Fijian sellers are now becoming assertive and skilled at that kind of selling. If all members of a society place a similar emphasis on accumulation and distribution, equilibrium is maintained. But if one group emphasises generosity and distribution (as do Fijians) and another emphasises hard bargaining and accumu-

lation (as does the Indian business community in Fiji) there is an inevitable flow of property from the "distributors" to the "accumulators". Moreover, the fact that the latter do not reciprocate in the manner of the former inevitably causes strained relations between them.

Respect and honouring are other related values which many islands peoples (particularly those in "chiefly" societies) feel are diminishing. These values are hard to measure because the words are used to mean so many different things. Honouring is ideally the recognition of outstanding personal qualities or performance. Respect for authority partly reflects fear of the consequences of displeasing authority, but it is also an acceptance of a certain system of authority as being right and proper. When authority is taken over more and more by centralised governments (and the independent governments are at least as centralised as the colonial ones) it is inevitable that respect for persons in local authority will diminish.

New Forms of Authority

One of the real needs is to transfer at least some of the respect which attached to earlier forms of authority (e.g., community councils, chiefs or churches) to the newer forms (e.g. central governments, new political institutions and police). Otherwise there is a danger that although respect for other forms of authority disappears, the new forms are not treated with any respect. This may result in those in power using crude force to get obedience, conformity and even submission. This is a poor substitute for respect based on mutual understanding and an appreciation of the various roles in society. Unfortunately some governments in the Pacific, like some in other parts of the world, are introducing a degree of intimidation and coercion that many citizens do not regard as a legitimate means of achieving social order. Increased coercion is likely to lead to a reduction in the legitimacy of government, and this again to further coercion. In brief, some governments are taking the course which is cheapest in the short term but likely to be most expensive in the long term. Gross coercion is likely to be self-defeating—it either fails and leads to anarchy, or it succeeds by breaking the spirit of people, and with it the creative potential of the society.

Attitudes to Time

The value and use of time is another much-discussed aspect of philosophy. Again this is partly moulded by technology (especially industrial technology with its compulsion to man the machine), partly perhaps by climate and partly by tradition. Pacific islanders are eager to have regular paid employment, and for the present at least this is geared to a forty-hour week (give or take a few hours). Since urbanisation is a part of this process, few can live at work, and commuting takes time. When one then sets aside time to eat and sleep there is not a great deal left to allocate in either traditional or non-traditional ways, though shorter working hours in future may give more scope for people to handle time in their own way.

Most traditional social rituals took more time than can be spared today, both because there are many more things to do, and because each person is doing different things. There is thus a continuing trend to reduce the time spent on each funeral, marriage, birth, reception of guests, or celebration of achievement, as well as to divert these activities from day to night and week-day to week-end.

The Religion of Commerce

One of the greatest needs today is for a new ethical system or systems to be evolved in the islands. The traditional religions are largely gone and the associated philosophies greatly eroded. Christianity, Hinduism and Islam are less and less referred to as guidelines for behaviour. They are being supplanted by the much more effective preaching of the commercial advertisers who, over every radio, in every newspaper, on every package proclaim the ethic of selfishness and greed.

The main commandments of the religion of commerce, imbedded in almost every one of its advertisements, are to value:

1. Yourself over others
2. Consumption over production
3. Waste over conservation
4. Immediate effects over long-term consequences

The world contains many ethical systems, but this is one of the most barbaric. The great religious and ethical systems recognise the nature of the human animal as well as the adver-

tisers do. That is, man's immediate, instinctive reaction is self, now, consume. Whereas commerce uses this knowledge to exploit, most ethical systems aim to provide a framework within which these basic needs are integrated with the less instinctive needs of wider groups, which are of relatively recent formation in human history. It is only with contemplation and cultural evolution that man sees the need for, and builds, ethical and other systems to modify primitive individual drives, to give higher priority to the needs of others and to longer term perspectives.

The religion of commerce is so powerfully represented through its influence in politics and the mass media that it will take great courage to challenge it. Fiji's Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, has warned commerce to think a little less of its legal rights and a little more of its obligations to society. It is a first step on a long road to the evolution of more human ethical systems for the Pacific of the future.

SOCIAL ORGANISATION

Networks of commitment

Social organisation includes the ways in which privilege is distributed, the ways in which the many groups which each of us belongs to are structured, and the ways groups form, regroup or disintegrate. As technology, economy and government change, so do social systems. Each influences the other. When one gets markedly out of alignment with the others, and they are never in perfect alignment, some tension or loss of satisfaction results. The need for adjustment is often not noticed for some time because so much of our behaviour is learned unconsciously that we tend to do things in the way we are accustomed, without thinking about the reasons or consequences.

Old and New Elites

The present distribution of privilege is questioned most strongly in the remaining colonies, where the privileges of the colonial elite are challenged to such an extent that the colonial system is no longer acceptable, except for a relatively short transitional period. While attention is focussed on rejecting old-style colonialism, however, economic imperialism flourishes. The social and political consequences of this system of privilege have hardly begun to be understood, let alone dealt with. Consideration must also be given to the privileges accorded to senior civil servants, both national and international (and including academics), in places where they are grossly disproportionate to those available to the public. Education is becoming a source of privilege and power, and some islanders have suggested that the gap between commoners and the educated elite is as great as that between islanders and the white elite during the colonial era.

The second area of contention is hereditary privilege, which is

most marked in the central South Pacific (especially Fiji, Tonga and Samoa). The religious and philosophical assumptions which formerly provided a legitimate basis for these privileges are now less extensively accepted. Some who advocate the retention or strengthening of traditional practices emphasise those aspects of culture which enhance the interests of a privileged elite. This creates a reaction among the young and the under-privileged, and particularly those of humble social origins with high formal educational or other qualifications of a nontraditional kind.

But there is a danger that the abandonment of traditional rank structures in the absence of equally effective substitutes will improve the lot of foreigners, not islanders. The indigenous commoners of Hawaii, French Polynesia, the Cook Islands and New Zealand were accustomed to taking a subordinate role, and thus when the traditional polity was destroyed it was not skilled commoners who filled the power vacuum and took over, but foreigners.

This is not a case for the artificial propping up of effete and decadent aristocracies whose power will inevitably be eroded by both internal and external forces. But it is a case for hastening the preparation of a new leadership, for to the extent that one goes without the other being effectively present, foreign (and local) business interests, foreign governments and other foreign interests tend to fill the gap—the pay-off for them can be considerable. Privileged elites can play an important role, but unless they adapt to the needs of the times, they fossilise and either wither into insignificance or are overthrown. The world is too full of examples to need any quotations.


Shame inhibits people of any culture, and often for good reason, but in societies based on hereditary stratification ("chiefly" societies) shame is less of a restraint on those high up the scale than on those below. When the young reject the values of traditional hierarchy, however, they become less constrained by shame. Done to a mature extent this can release creative talent, but overdone it can lead to the abandonment of all restraint and consideration for others. The important point is that those at the top of the scale are just as much to blame as the deviants at the bottom. If the privileges of others seem to be unachievable, and inconsistent with what is felt to be reasonable or proper, aggressive rejection of the system is a natural reaction.



Land is a focus of strong personal involvement. Here parties to a case attend the Land and Titles Court of Western Samoa.



Dr John Guise, former Speaker of Papua-New Guinea's parliament and one of its best known political figures, chose a Speaker's regalia which incorporated features of symbolic significance to various parts of the country—bird of paradise plumes, tapa cloth cape, pearl shell necklace, as well as such features as the wig from the Westminster model.



Bishop Louis Vangeke stands before some traditional sacred figures outside the Port Moresby Roman Catholic Cathedral.





ABOVE: A traditional Sepik *haus tambaran* of the kind used as a model for the Port Moresby Cathedral.

LEFT: The Port Moresby Roman Catholic Cathedral contains a wealth of traditional religious symbolism. The frontal tower is designed on the lines of a Sepik *haus tambaran* or traditional religious centre.



Leaders of the Pacific nations which first achieved independence.

TOP LEFT:

Hon. Fiame Mataafa Mulinu'u II, Prime Minister of Western Samoa from the time of independence in 1962 until 1970, and since 1973.

TOP RIGHT:

H.R.H. Prince Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake, Prime Minister of Tonga since formal independence in 1970. Tonga has, however, always been substantially independent.

BOTTOM LEFT:

Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Prime Minister of Fiji, which became independent in 1970.

BOTTOM RIGHT:

President Hammer de Roburt of the Republic of Nauru, the world's smallest independent nation, which was established in 1969.

BELOW:

Hon. Albert Henry, Premier of the Cook Islands, which became a self-governing state in association with New Zealand in 1965.





The headquarters in Noumea, New Caledonia, of the South Pacific Commission, an inter-governmental body concerned with economic, social and medical issues of common concern in the Islands. Originally set up by the colonial powers, independent island nations are now also full members and exercise the major influence on policy.

The extent of social differentiation, whether on grounds of class, caste, income, occupation, race, intelligence, religion or otherwise is a debated issue anywhere, but has special significance for Pacific cultures, in which there is rather more internal diversity than in most. The main lines of cleavage between the diverse tribes of New Guinea, the Solomons and the New Hebrides are linguistic and cultural, and to a lesser extent, physical. In New Caledonia and Fiji the deep divisions are racial—between Asians, Europeans and Melanesians—though there is also considerable division within each racial group. In Samoa, Tonga and the Marshall Islands, the major divisions are in terms of rank.

There is now a general preference for reducing the boundaries between these various categories. Such a process necessitates positive change in the factors which led to the differentiation in the first place, and it inevitably takes considerable time and substantial adjustment—and even the most desirable adjustments are seldom painless.

Family Structures

With increasing urbanisation, mobility, and monetisation of transactions, there will be continuing changes in social organisation. Not all of them will be in expected directions. For example, Dr Adrian Mayer made a study of three rural Indian communities in Fiji twenty years ago. When he made a restudy recently he found that there were *more* extended and joint families now than previously. Dr John Harré's research in urban Suva likewise shows that a large majority of urban Fijian households, even those living in housing reserved for nuclear families, are in fact extended families. Urbanisation and monetisation do not necessarily result in nuclear family households as is often believed.

The disadvantages that can be associated with urban extended families are well known for extra residents can consume the time, money and energy of their hosts. But the system can also have some positive functions in the provision of accommodation and other services for aged, unemployed and other disadvantaged persons. It is not necessarily to the disadvantage of the household head, for some additional members are wage-earners, or supply domestic help in the home.

Social Needs and Services

Pensions and insurance against unemployment, accident, sickness and other risks are being introduced. Banks, savings societies and related means of capital accumulation are spreading. Laws, police and other bureaucratic means of social control are growing. All these facilities replace traditional systems. Although many of the new techniques are better suited to town living and a money economy, some do not serve their purposes as well as those they replaced.

The impersonal bureaucratic facilities not only require more money and more skilled personnel than many countries can afford, but governmental social services are unlikely to be able to adequately cope with growing social problems. Even the United States, spending more per head on governmental social services than any other country, has failed rather miserably to cope with the problems it has set out to solve. Dr Margaret Mead once observed that those American towns with most voluntary and community (as opposed to governmental) social services had the fewest social problems. In other words, it will be both economically and socially wise to encourage such aspects of welfare and social cohesion as can reasonably be handled by existing social systems. Moreover, functional social systems save time and human dignity as well as money. The relatively small populations of the Pacific Islands provide a context for more extensive use of these facilities than in more populous countries.

No development plan that I have read makes any realistic assessment of the additional financial or social costs of extra police, welfare services, mental health services etc., which become necessary as a result of the implementation of the plans.

A small example lies in a contrast in social control between American Samoa and Western Samoa. The former uses nearly four times as many police, relative to population numbers, as the latter. The difference in density of police between the Gilbert Islands and their neighbouring Marshall Islands is even greater. To take an example of another kind, Polynesians in both New Zealand and Hawaii have much higher crime rates than the dominant populations (against whom most of the crime is committed), but have, until recently at least, very much lower rates of mental breakdown. It is likely that the greater emotional

interdependence in Polynesian cultures provides greater psychological security for the individual.

The unintended effects on social organisation and social relations of the rapid expansion of tourism must also be considered. It has been demonstrated that the tourist industry in the islands of the Caribbean has actively worsened relations between local people and foreigners.¹ Though there is no research data available for the Pacific, I have the impression that this is also true here.

A brief look at the cultural degradation of the Caribbean islands, measured by almost any criterion, made me feel that almost any integrated culture is better than none. Barbed wire around private homes, steel bars over windows, overt personal aggression on a large scale, despondency, resentment, hostility and despair among common people—all in societies which the tourist industry projects as being happy and carefree!

These small examples illustrate the need for much more detailed thinking about the social consequences of economic goals in the development plans. Careful social planning can be helpful, though comprehensive thinking on the forces of change and the degree to which certain adaptations can be encouraged or resisted, has scarcely begun. Segments of it are being dealt with in educational policies, broadcasting, housing, migration, rural development, social legislation and so on, but it merits the kind of detailed analysis and comparison of alternatives that is now given to economic planning. In fact, the priority now being given to economic planning in the Pacific, without equivalent resources, thought or skills being devoted to social processes, is leading to a gross imbalance—an overemphasis on money rather than men, on volume rather than quality, and at times on measured trivialities rather than deeper but presently unmeasured fundamentals.

CUSTOMARY BEHAVIOUR

Some is less useful than others

Europeans in the Pacific adhere to their traditional customs and beliefs rather more rigidly than most islanders. This was even more pronounced during the colonial era, and understandably, for any dominant group uses the symbolism of its customary behaviour as part of the means by which it continues its dominance. All power elites, whether foreign or indigenous, whether colonial, hereditary, military or financial, appreciate this function of elite customary ritual. In time, the symbol comes to be valued for its own sake, and the costs and disadvantages, or growing irrelevance, of particular customs obscured.

Artificial Cooling of Artificial Heating

The "necktie syndrome" among Europeans in the Pacific is a minor example. The lynch-pin of the visible aspect of this customary complex of behaviour is a three-foot length of particular forms of cloth, cut in a very restricted range of shapes, adorned with a limited assortment of patterns and pins, and knotted at the throat by one of very few approved techniques. Once thus bound, one's whole pattern of dress is substantially determined. To wear the tie without a shirt would be unthinkable, or at least unactable. The shirt must be of a limited range of designs and styles, and must end about the genitals, though from the navel down it must be tucked out of sight between two, three or more other garments designed to cover the shame of the region between "wind and water". The tie carries an inbuilt compulsion to cover the legs, either by long trousers, a sulu, or long socks, and a leather shoe of a limited number of styles and colours. This customary wrapping evolved over many generations (though this does not give any custom the guarantee of suitability or validity that is often implied) in a different climate

and culture. In tropical climates the custom is so ludicrous that one would expect any human group to abandon it without further thought.

But traditional behaviour does not die easily. The pressures to conform to it are so great that, rather than adapt dress to climate, thousands of Europeans in the islands have willingly suffered great discomfort for many years. Those who can afford to, spend large sums of money to redesign buildings and install machines to cool the air so that their skin temperature is very similar to what it would be if they dressed, or rather undressed, in a way appropriate to the normal climate. In some down-town areas in the Pacific, these machines are already so numerous that they increase the external temperature, thus necessitating more and larger machines to control the internal temperature. Not only do they add unnecessary noise and pollution, but they use resources which are scarce in these low-income countries, and exacerbate status differences between rich and poor. For of the various factors which motivate people to install air-conditioning, archaic clothing is one, but social status is another.

Causes of Continuity

Why are such apparently irrational customs adhered to so tenaciously? Partly, because they are common habits, they acquire an aura of respectability and people feel secure in conforming to them, and feel guilt and/or shame in not doing so. Partly, as they have been symbols of a dominant minority, they reaffirm the feeling of superiority and separateness of that minority. There has been an understandable weakening of the necktie custom with the closing of the colonial era, and it has persisted much more among the remaining agents of foreign power (especially businessmen and representatives of governments) than among those not competing for status recognition in this way (for example, volunteers, tourists and academics).

But Europeans are not alone in their resistance to changing customary patterns. This is a human tendency which may have had survival value in the early phases of cultural evolution. Nevertheless, as the dodo and the bald eagle found at the cost of their extinction, behaviour should not be too far removed from the realities of life. Culture change in the Pacific has been much faster than it was in Europe, but there is still considerable scope

for a critical examination of particular customary practices to determine their suitability to the context of today. Unfortunately some of Europe's sillier customs have been adopted rather readily. "A tragedy occurs," says Samoa's Albert Wendt in a personal note, "when the colonised ape the ways, thoughts, attitudes, customs and values of the colonialists. When we become shadows with black bow ties, we develop an inferiority complex and consider all things foreign superior to our own. The quest is then for the white-collar miracle, with its symbols of dog-kennel houses, Mafia sunglasses, cocktails, thrift—and schizophrenia!"

Members of any culture want to be free from cumbersome and awkward obligations and restrictions, but this freedom is not always easy to achieve. In many cases everyone wants to in theory, but no one is prepared to start in practice. The conflict is between the vested interests of the individual and the long-term interests of the society. Bride price is an example.

Women's Liberation?

Bride price is a term used to describe the various customary payments made in many Melanesian societies from the groom's relatives to the bride's relatives. There was usually a series of transactions, beginning with engagement, and repeated in a different form at the time of marriage, birth of first child and so on—sometimes continuing for longer than the lifetime of the bride concerned. Customs varied, but it was common for a wide range of relatives to contribute valuable ornaments, shell money, pots, mats, wooden-ware and food. The amounts contributed were limited by relatively slow and dangerous communication and the extensive time and energy needed to make or buy shell money and other valuables. The goods contributed were not retained by the bride and groom, but were redistributed among their relatives in reciprocation for like contributions from them for other birth, death, marriage and related ceremonies.

In recent years bride price has disappeared or declined in some areas, but in many areas it has boomed on a larger scale than ever before, and even been adopted by peoples who did not practise it traditionally. Most of those who do practise it want to stop the custom, or at least reduce it. Local councils and committees have passed regulations forbidding or limiting it,

but seldom with any effect. The problem is the inevitable conflict between public interest in limiting it, and the personal interest of those who stand to gain on any particular occasion, who want to encourage it. Everyone is ready to stop after he has recouped the payments due to him for his outlay—and that means never.

Moreover, whereas the traditional custom was to transfer goods for redistribution, the current practice is to include larger amounts of cash and capital goods. Even large new trucks have been given as bride price, and a \$5,000 truck cannot be cut up and shared to many dispersed relatives. In such circumstances the father of the bride can make a windfall if he manipulates the system to his own advantage.

Everyone sees the problem; the difficulty is how to get off the merry-go-round. Dr Latukefu's article on "The Place of Tradition in Modernisation" highlights similar vicious circles in customary rituals and pig exchanges.

Women have been particularly bound by customary restrictions, but, as elsewhere in the world, these restrictions are slowly being modified. Taboos on contact between brothers and sisters, prohibitions on speaking to one's mother-in-law, restrictions on the use of names, and limitations on movement were all both customary and reasonable in a number of societies. Increased mobility and new patterns of living are making them cumbersome or unduly restrictive, and it usually takes considerable time and trouble to adjust to the new situation.

CREATIVE ARTS

The soul of a people

A Need for Selectivity

Traditional creations in stone, shell, bone and wood have been reasonably well preserved (though often in overseas museums from which at least some must be returned). The revival of most handicrafts or manual arts could only be for different purposes, such as for sale to tourists,¹ for use as patterns or styles on things which are currently used, or as aesthetic objects or identifying symbols. These are all legitimate, and the market for high quality artefacts is considerable in some islands. Traditional design precedents may give a stamp of uniqueness and of confidence, and are almost essential for many exotic craft objects.

Music, dance, drama and decorative arts have not been well preserved. In fact, there are large gaps in the knowledge about these arts before contact with industrial technology. To advocate the total resuscitation of traditional fine arts would be artificial in the extreme. The life of which they were a meaningful part is no longer lived. Some of these art forms do have aesthetic appeal, and some may be an effective means of asserting one's identity or independence (though in some circumstances they may also unnecessarily isolate or divide communities). But too much insistence on adherence to "true" forms can be sterile, even ludicrous. Kasaipwalova has warned fellow New Guineans against lamenting the present and overglorifying the past, and advocates instead a "creative and continuous transformation of the present". Or as Jack Golson recently observed, culture should be preserved "as a living body, not an embalmed corpse".

There is a much-quoted opinion in Fiji that the "true" kava ceremony must be performed in full for tourists whether they like it or not. As there was considerable variation traditionally,

both in different parts of Fiji and according to the different purposes of the ritual, and as there was little traditional precedent for tourists, only an arbitrary decision could determine what ritual pattern and sequence should be regarded as the "true" one. Fijians themselves modify kava ritual greatly in terms of the method of its preparation (sometimes ground by machine and plastic-packed, sometimes ground at home in a steel pipe end), the containers it is served in (wood, enamel, glass, china or tin and of various shapes and sizes), the social purposes it is to serve (the function of honouring seems to be diminishing and that of socialising to be increasing), and the concoctions that are mixed with it (including rum, methylated spirits and shoe polish).

There is a danger that if kava rituals are performed in full for tourists, foreign dignitaries and the local aristocracy, they could become archaic and artificial, losing their relevance to life as it is lived. If the formal ritual takes on a new role as an entertainment or dramatic performance (as it may be doing), this may be justifiable provided it is recognised that this is very different from its original function.

Traditional Arts and Tourist Income

Herein lies a dilemma which actively concerns many islands people. Should their fine arts be an expression of their own culture, as part of themselves, as a vital aspect of their way of life? This can be psychologically very satisfying (though it is not necessarily so). Or should the fine arts be used as a marketable resource which may have little other meaning? For many aspects of art the two are compatible, but for some esoteric areas there is conflict. In other words, the more these aspects of culture become something to sell to tourists, the less they are uniquely your own. It is these aspects of culture that tourists most want to buy. Giving others access to one's secrets can reduce their value as secrets, for while we want to share some aspects of culture, we want to keep others as a refuge for ourselves.² We all fear the humiliation of being "seen into" while we yearn the appreciation of being "understood". All human groups use the mystique of unique features of their culture to some extent as insulation or as a protective shield. Bringing others into our private world has the potential for either greater

or less understanding, for creating respect or contempt, for generating admiration or derision. This dilemma about which result is likely to occur, makes the reaction to self-exposure (which tourism feeds on) very ambivalent.

It is not only the over-commercialisation of most travel, but also its present gross imbalance in favour of white peoples and industrialised nations, that creates a problem out of what could be a solution. Unless the visiting is two-way, a high density of visitor population becomes indigestible. What could lead to cross-cultural understanding can then lead instead to cultural pollution and mutual contempt.

In Tahiti, Rarotonga and Hawaii many people earn their living by dressing in clothes they never wore traditionally and never wear today, *except* when performing for tourists. In fact, grass skirts were not traditional in Polynesia, but most tourists are prepared to pay to have the images that the travel industry has trained them to expect, revealed to them and their cameras—even though double deception is necessary to artificially satisfy the artificial demand. Men taking off their trousers to put on grass skirts for tourists brings money, but it also brings cynicism and after a time, quite frequently, hostility. If performers feel that what they are doing is a sham or a deception, they find it hard to maintain for long much respect for either those they are deceiving or themselves. Such a condition has adverse effects on the personality of the performer as well as on intergroup relations. Mr. Taura Eruera recently reminded us that it strips not only the performer, but his people, of their human dignity.³ Eruera's emphasis was rightly on the loss of human dignity. And what is dignity? Confidence, worth, esteem, faith in oneself—the basic needs of any healthy human personality. The travel industry is, alas, corrupt. Not in the shallow sense of money bribes perhaps, but in the much deeper sense of distorting, twisting, falsifying, cheapening, in order to increase its income. Though at present they are among the most reputable acts in a much respected business, they will very probably come to be regarded as shameful, and possibly as criminal. Successful pirates used to be among the most respected of businessmen, and both blackbirding and the slave trade were, in their respective hey-days, rewarding both financially and socially.

Masiofo Fetaui Mata'afa, Pro-Chancellor of the University

of the South Pacific, recently told tourist industry representatives:

The culture, the friendliness, the songs and dances, the handicrafts and customs of my people of the Pacific are your most valuable asset, an asset which you can use without having to invest one single cent. . . . Destroy it and you have destroyed your main asset which can never be created again. . . . new business opportunities beckon. Let us safeguard these opportunities by safeguarding our customs and traditions in a way that will preserve both our profits and our heritage.⁴

There will be considerable support in principle for the views expressed. Detailed planning for their implementation to a feasible extent is a major and vital task. Much more needs to be known of the very complex processes by which aspects of cultures are influenced, in ways seen as beneficial as well as in those considered deleterious, by tourism as well as by other aspects of large industrial-urban cultures.

Clearly one cannot have all the traditional culture as well as all the tourist income, and islanders do not insist on all of one or all of the other. Nevertheless, many travel industry investors are in practice adopting policies which are likely to be destructive of assets which can "never be created again". Investors will not suffer much—they can transfer their capital to more profitable alternatives, particularly as products that worsen human welfare are often more profitable than those which improve it. But the destruction will indeed be irreplaceable.

Development plans so far make little or no provision for encouragement of the creative arts and other creative talents. When their total potential contribution to the development of both the individual and the society is more fully realised, however, more is likely to be done. Even in the narrow field of employment and monetary growth, the potential is substantial. Tourists are unlikely to be greatly attracted by bands which play third-rate versions of the noises many of them are trying to escape from at home, nor be entertained by what a Solomon Islander once aptly described as a "bastardised Tahitian hippie-hippie shake-shake". Pacific islanders have great talents for developing both the entertainment industry and the manual and

fine arts for commercial markets, but both need the opportunities for their most skilled peoples to get together and study (but certainly *not* to be “trained” by foreign “experts”), preferably within the islands, to refine their arts, and to transmit them to others.⁵

16

LANGUAGE

Are all 1,200 necessary?

A Complex Problem

There are about 1,200 languages, and many more dialects, spoken in the Pacific Islands. In fact the Pacific contains nearly one-quarter of all the world's languages, yet the Pacific Islands populations average less than 5,000 speakers per language. That in itself creates a great problem. Moreover, few of the island nations are in the convenient position of Tonga and Western Samoa which have only one language each, and Samoan is the only language which is spoken in more than one country or territory except by small groups of migrants.¹

Most Pacific islanders speak three languages—usually their home area language, the dominant local language of their country, and an international language (either English, French or Indonesian).² Many have varying degrees of knowledge of other languages. There is a danger, and it is a reality in many places, that children grow up knowing several languages badly and *none* well. As language is the tool of thought, this greatly restricts their capacity to think and communicate effectively. Only a very small minority speak all three well.

It is natural that any human group will want to keep its language, partly for reasons of self-respect or sentiment, partly for convenience (though sometimes short-term rather than long-term convenience). But as world communication increases, the costs of maintaining very small languages increase greatly. The publishing of books and papers is only a tiny fraction of the extra cost. The cost of writing them, or even translating them, is not only vastly greater, but on any substantial scale relative to the need, is quite impossible because of the tremendous volume of publications produced and of highly skilled manpower needed for translation. Even countries like Australia and New Zealand,

with relatively large populations and speaking a major world language, do not have the skills or finance to write or adapt a fraction of the books they use, so they make much more use of publications from the mass printers of Europe, North America and Hong Kong than they consider would be ideal. For most radio and television programmes, and for films, this is even more so.

English and Vernaculars

None of the possible courses of action is ideal. The adoption of one or more world languages and the abandonment of vernaculars is unacceptable for valid social, psychological and political reasons. It is most unlikely that the peoples of Samoa, Tonga or other major language communities would either initiate or tolerate an attempt to replace their languages. There is indeed a tendency for minor internal languages and dialects to wither (and many have disappeared or have been greatly modified in the direction of the dominant language) in favour of a single national vernacular, but this is a process taking many generations.³

Moreover, neither English nor any other language can fully express all concepts. We are all constantly limited in our thoughts and expressions by the constraints of language. Anyone who has a good knowledge of two or more languages will know that although much can be expressed equally well in either, some things can be more meaningfully expressed in the one, and others in the other. World developments may be hastened in the short term if all people spoke one language, but it would almost certainly stultify development in the long term. No existing language is adequate for the world of tomorrow, and the retention of multiple languages is likely to provide a stimulus to cross-fertilisation of different patterns of thought.

The cost of using multiple languages is high in money terms and also allows less time for learning in other fields, but most Pacific peoples will be prepared to pay these costs, at least to the extent of providing facilities for education, publication and radio communication in one local language and one international language. In any case there are probably good reasons for everyone in the world today having to learn at least one language in addition to his mother tongue. Beyond two, at this

stage at least, there is more debate, and decisions in that field would be greatly assisted by a detailed assessment for particular countries, of the financial, social, psychological and political costs and benefits of various numbers of languages being supported or encouraged with varying degrees of intensity and for various purposes.⁴

There is a major problem too, in developing ways to increase the flexibility of languages that will remain in long-term use, to handle more quickly and effectively the wide range of additional things and concepts that mass communication and industrial technology have introduced to the cultures concerned.

The common argument that English is the only language suitable for the Pacific in the future is fallacious. Today it is the world's most widely used language (though second to Chinese in number of speakers) but that may not be so in the coming generations. English used to be as limited in vocabulary and concepts for dealing with modern science as any Pacific language. English was developed in a subsistence economy, but it has expanded greatly as a result of the expansion in knowledge, the great increase in communication, and in the number of speakers. No Pacific language is ever likely to have as many speakers, but the expanded knowledge and communication is now *potentially* as available to Pacific languages as it has been to English. Moreover, English is a mess—unphonetic, irregular and shattered into dozens of dialects. (Pacific Islands students have considerable difficulty with the respective dialects of English spoken by their various Australian, New Zealand, American, Indian, Scottish, French, Polynesian and other teachers). Like any language (or other trait of a culture which is temporarily in ascendance), English is likely to resist adaptation of spelling or otherwise, and could become increasingly cumbersome. If it does, substitutes will become increasingly attractive.

Which Pacific Languages?

To expand and adapt the 1,200 Pacific languages to the degree that English has done would be an enormous task in both time and effort. It is most unlikely to be attempted. Expanding and adapting the major Pacific languages, however, has been proceeding as a result of increased communication, education and range of experience. A major task of relevance to these areas is

to determine the steps by which English, Russian and other world languages developed unconsciously in the last two hundred years (and, closer to home, Motu, Roviana, Kotte and other Pacific languages which have been developed as languages of trade, administration or Christian education) and to use this knowledge to make the expansion and adaptation of the major Pacific languages infinitely faster and more effective. Radio and television, greater understanding of psychology, linguistics, and learning, and rapidly rising educational levels, all suggest that the process should be achievable much more rapidly than it was for English. The great problem for Pacific leaders to solve is *which* languages are to be given the facilities in terms of use in formal education, radio and mass media time, publishing subsidies, translators and other skills, to encourage their development in this way. What number of speakers (now or potentially) is too few to merit such a major task, and what volume of resources can be spared for those which are to be actively expanded?

The question of number of speakers applies not only to the language as a whole, but also to particular topics. The quarter-million or so speakers of Samoan, living in a compact community with relatively few non-Samoans, are more than adequate for the perpetuation of that language. But the number of Samoans who will need to be expert in the details of aerospace technology, Eskimo ethnology or Kantian philosophy is so few that attempts to provide a full range of terminology and concepts for them in Samoan would be both expensive and futile. But this is one of the dilemmas of the language issue. It seems almost certain that people will use one language for some aspects of life (particularly the intimate, domestic and local issues) and one or more foreign languages for others (particularly scientific and philosophical esoterica). But just how and where the line will be drawn in actual usage is a question that is best not attempted until much more is known of the current trends in the existing languages.

If English or another foreign language is taught in schools, used by radio, worked and developed by literally hundreds of millions of people daily, it is going to develop further and further (though not necessarily in every direction) than languages with only a few thousand speakers. If the major Pacific languages are

to be functional tools, kept reasonably effective for communicating the life of today, they too will need to be taught in schools, researched and developed. Otherwise they may constrain the intellectual scope of those who speak them. An international language today is a universal necessity, but there is relatively little support for an international language (whether English or other) being the *only* language.

Many older islanders speak of a decline in efficient use of their vernaculars by the younger generation. They refer to a reduction of precision, the loss of vocabulary, declining awareness of nuances of meaning, and diminishing skills in oratory. As this is said by men who specialise in those fields, and as they quote many instances, their point must be considered very seriously.⁵ To the extent that the loss is in topics like stone technology, reef ecology or traditional magic, the loss is a normal adjustment to changed realities of life. But those closely concerned with it assert that their concern is not with this sort of loss, but with the efficiency of the vernaculars as tools of communication for the circumstances of today. Almost all schooling is in foreign languages, but if certain vernaculars are to survive as effective instruments for communication and thought within the cultures concerned, many feel that they too will need to be taught in schools. This will necessitate the training of teachers as specialists in their own languages,⁶ more detailed dictionaries, grammars and other linguistic aids.

The Future of Pidgin

Any discussion of language in New Guinea, the Solomon Islands or the New Hebrides must consider the future of Pidgin (or Neo-Melanesian as it is becoming known).⁷ It is a new language, developing by the same process that English and other languages developed, but very much faster and under unusual circumstances. With the coming of formal education and mass media, it is an open question whether Pidgin will continue to develop, or will wither away. This controversy continues but Percy Chatterton, after listening to Pidgin in Parliament for many years, recently described it as inadequate for the discussion of economic and political (and one might add legal) issues, though having a great future as a medium of social intercourse and for poetry, drama and creative writing.⁸

Pidgin has two great assets. Firstly, it is easy to learn. Without being formally taught (and therefore at no cost to governments or other institutions) it has been acquired by two million people in northern Melanesia. Second, Pidgin provides a verbal bridge between speakers of the 100 or so languages of the New Hebrides, the 80 of the Solomons, and the more than 700 of Papua New Guinea.

As most rural people in these countries still receive no formal education, and as much of what they do receive is not of high quality, the value of Pidgin as a lingua franca must not be underrated. Its long-term future is indeed open to question, but even its opponents acknowledge its role and its value in this generation at least. The kinds of decision to be taken concerning the development or otherwise of the other languages, need also to be taken in respect of Pidgin.

Barriers as well as Bridges

It is also appropriate to look at some negative aspects of multiple languages. In the same way as separate national or linguistic identifications are cohesive for the group contained by them, they are divisive as between groups. The use of more than one vernacular within a single country or territory (and this is the situation in most of the Pacific) inhibits national unity and probably increases costs.

Between Pacific countries as well as within them, it can reduce effective communication. Everyone in the Pacific is familiar with the way in which people frequently use their vernacular language as a means to isolate, keep at a distance, or sometimes even reject, speakers of other languages. That is, the fact that multiple languages are sometimes used to segregate and to bolster prejudice, needs to be weighed against their advantages. If people feel the need of a protective shield, separate languages can indeed provide this defence, but it is well to be fully aware of their costs as well as their benefits.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LEGITIMACY

Doing one's own thing

Two questions frequently arise in relation to the creative arts, and to a lesser extent in relation to culture generally. The first is what constitutes authentic (or true, or valid or legitimate) culture. The second is what period of history is to be regarded as traditional.

The emphasis given to *true, authentic, genuine* cultural precedent shows the great value placed on, and confidence derived from, feelings of legitimacy and validity.

The word "authentic" is presumably used so frequently (and often corruptly) by the writers of tourist brochures because it attracts people. They want, or at least think they want, that which is "authentic". Authenticity is also stressed by islands leaders referring to cultural performances that will be seen by visitors or exported as a symbol of that place.

What things are described as authentic? Firstly, they are usually seen as unique to that culture. Secondly, they must have some traditional association. A pattern or practice is not considered authentic at the time of its creation. It only becomes regarded as authentic after a body of people identify it as their own. And when they do, it usually gives confidence. The creation of a new authenticity may, as John Kasaipwalova has pointed out, be a high priority for the creative intelligentsia.¹

An aspect of a culture, then, is "authentic" if it is acceptable as such, though it must contain identifiable components which derive from the past of the culture concerned. Which period of the past is not so important, so long as the feeling of identification is there. For example, Sir Arthur Gordon created a system of land tenure and local government in Fiji to suit the needs of a particular phase of colonial history. Over the years, however, the new system came to be accepted as Fijian, and as

such acquired an aura of legitimacy. The concept of the "Fijian way of life", like that of the "American way of life", can be useful even though each culture is different for every individual.

Pacific cultures, like other human cultures, have always been changing. Cultures which do not change are dead. There is sometimes a tendency to accept selected parts of that culture which was lived at the time of first contact with Europe as in some way more authentic than that at earlier periods of history (and the earlier cultures are being increasingly revealed by archaeological research). It is like saying that Rolls-Royce is not English, or the stars and stripes not American, merely because they did not exist at the time Captain Cook sailed for the Pacific.

Is Culture Copyright?

Is tradition transmitted by blood or by learning? Most people would agree that culture is something learned rather than innate, though practice does not always follow principle. Thus some who deny that foreigners can ever learn certain aspects of local culture, still believe that local people can learn any aspect of foreign cultures.

Quite apart from whether human beings *can* learn the culture of others (and all available evidence suggests that they can if they devote the necessary time, effort and skill) the question is often implied whether they *should*.

Is it proper for a Japanese to dance a *tamure*? Or an Australian to speak Nauruan or a Fijian to speak English, or a Gilbertese to sing a Fijian song? Or for a European to accept a Samoan chiefly title and participate in the associated ritual? Or for a Tongan to wear a Papuan tatoo? Or an Indian woman to wear a Fijian dress? Or a New Hebridean to wear the Tongan *ta'ovala*? In practice there is an unstated sentiment that it is in varying degrees inappropriate for certain categories of person to engage in certain kinds of cultural activity. For example, I have seen both Maoris and Europeans express displeasure at seeing Europeans publicly performing Maori action songs (even though action songs are a phenomenon of this century, *not* of precontact Maori culture), but most of the persons concerned would have welcomed such a performance in a *private* gathering. Likewise I have heard a distinguished Tongan speak very

critically of a non-Tongan who wore a *ta'ovala* with the intention of showing respect.

Swamping by other cultures leads to both change and resistance. Cultures which are greatly affected by cultural dominance (e.g. the Maori) often make great efforts for regeneration and renewed identification. People living in isolated, minimally influenced cultures often put much more effort into rejecting the old and reaching out to the new. To the extent that the new is attractive, it is sought after; to the extent it is not, it is rejected. But this is selective to individuals and different for each, according not only to his own personality, but also his status, training and personal interests.

This is often spoken of as though there was a naturally selective process which took the best of the foreign and retained the best of the local. But it is far from always so in practice. The foreign can be both deceptive and seductive; the local both parochial and an easy way out.

MANIPULATING THE SYMBOLS

Foreign wolves in traditional sheep's clothing

Appreciating the way in which customers are attracted by the package as well as (and sometimes more than) the product, and realising that traditional precedents with favourable connotations are comforting or acceptable to islanders, some of the most foreign introductions get wrapped in some of the most traditional clothing. Many people with things to sell—whether goods, acceptance of a commercial enterprise, religion or political philosophies—realise the validity of Firth's comment that in a situation of rapid social and cultural change, people "respond most easily to stimuli which have some continuity with, or analogy to, their traditional values and forms of organisation".¹

Theologians are seeking traditional symbols with which to present the Christian religion—a radically different belief system from those of the indigenous cultures. Many foreign corporations give their enterprises traditional names, traditional decor and symbolic aspects of traditional imagery (including personnel of traditional status in visible "front" roles) because they realise that the naked reality is unattractive.² Communists advocate their philosophy as being consistent with the "natural" or "communal" way of life of various Pacific cultures, even though the systems in fact have little in common.

The *Fiji Times*, probably the largest newspaper in the islands, daily reported proceedings of the Fiji Tourism Convention in November 1971. The majority of the photographs published were those of the tiny minority of indigenous people who took part, thus conveying the visual image, reinforced in the news columns, that this was a meeting substantially of islanders concerned with indigenous interests, when in fact it was overwhelmingly a meeting of foreign businessmen concerned with foreign interests.

The tourist industry reflects this par excellence. Although it has tremendous potential to increase human understanding, it has equal potential to frustrate it. Dr. John Guise, one of New Guinea's most prominent politicians, has pointed out that it invests vast sums on the planned creation of largely spurious images of primitiveness, condescending notions of simplicity, and the exaggeration of differences. The foreign visitor is seduced into becoming a participant in the myth so created. The reality is of sharing, with other tourists of one's own culture, much the same accommodation, food and circumstances as are to be found back home. But reality is made of little relevance. What the travel agent sells the tourist above all else is status. The artificial myth of exotica which provides a validation for the purchase of the status, receives a fallacious fulfilment in the presentation of pseudo-traditional performances in the foreign contexts of the hotel lounge, the purchase of "evidence" of cross-cultural contact in the handicrafts from the Toorak lathes, and in the polychrome postcards.

One of the first organised reactions against the misuse of traditional symbols as promotion gimmicks is that by the Hawaii Residents Bureau (see illustration between pages 102-3). It aims to counter the influence of the Hawaii Visitors Bureau which, though set up by the government, is indirectly dominated by those with investments in the travel industry, and emphasises their interests rather than those of the public. Former Lieutenant-Governor of Hawaii, Thomas Gill, described the Visitors Bureau as a "force for unlimited and even irresponsible expansion of tourism, without regard for the public interest". Likewise the Fiji Visitors Bureau, though required by law to foster Fijian culture, has not done so. Instead it appointed a Fijian officer to foster a favourable image for tourism in Fijian schools and communities.

1984 in 1973?

The Program of Tourist Development for French Polynesia emphasises that the arriving tourist "has a preconceived notion of this tropical paradise and . . . is not so forgiving where he is wrong in this image of the islands and their people". If a distinctive cultural pattern for visitor reception does not exist, it states, one should be created to persuade the visitor "that this

is indeed the vacation paradise of his dreams". All employees having contact with tourists are to be "well indoctrinated in the philosophy of hospitality" and the "promotion and indoctrination" of a unique image is regarded as requiring immediate priority, for "the *product* must match the *image*". (Their italics.)

American Samoa takes the process one step further. There, the government-owned television service, beamed compulsorily into all classrooms as part of the school curriculum, indoctrinates children in the "need" as well as the techniques for them to behave in ways which tourists have been led to expect.

Tourism is the fastest growing industry in the islands. It has vast potentials, both positive and negative. It could be geared to personal and cross-cultural enrichment as well as financial gain, but unfortunately the current trend is to turn the islands into a great Disneyland and the islanders into well-trained puppets, whose life and behaviour are to be fashioned to fulfil the dream expectations of the travelling public from the richer nations. It is not too late to change the pattern, but it is unlikely to be achieved in view of the tremendous effort needed to do so against the vested interests in keeping it as it is, for the quickest short-term profits come from a maximum flow-through of pre-conditioned visitors, encouraged to consume the most expensive range of food, drinks, trips and pampering.

At present the forces are so heavily loaded in favour of private investors that their short-term demands are the main determinants of the shape the industry will take. It suits investors best to assume that visitors only want to consume. Most tourists I have met have more intelligence and more potential goodwill than they are given credit for or the opportunity to develop and express. What could become a bridge for cross-cultural understanding is becoming instead a monument to human greed and gullibility.

HOW MANY CULTURES?

One can be restrictive

The human animal is characterised more by similarity than difference. All cultures always have had much in common, and industrial technology and rapid communication are increasing the similarities of detail. Nevertheless many differences are likely to remain.

There is always a danger that too much identification with one culture can degenerate into racism, religious persecution, or other negative and destructive misuses of uniqueness. In a recent letter to the editor of the *Fiji Times*, Samisoni Qaranivalu claimed that indigenous Fijians, who comprise only about 40 per cent of the country's citizens "should have at least 80 per cent of Development Plan Six If we are not given a fair share . . . the Fijian people will . . . resort to a political war". Chauvinistic demands of this sort do not help cross-cultural communication.

Some islanders who have little knowledge of European cultures see their adoption as a solution to their problems. This is broadly also how they came to accept Christianity, and then colonial government, but neither had quite the results expected. Some people have come to expect science and technology to produce solutions to all our problems, but as the Duke of Edinburgh recently said, "We have come to the end of the honeymoon with science and technology". Rose has gone further, saying that "Science, which gave promise of delivering mankind from superstition, has itself turned into the most pretentious and bloodiest superstition in history. This will prove to be the tragedy of modern civilisation".

Sir Paul Hasluck, in opening the 1971 Pacific Science Congress, noted the growing "disillusionment with science" and its overemphasis on material goals which have no necessary

association with the achievement of human satisfaction. We have, he warned, come to confuse fatness with prosperity, and adopted a big belly as a symbol of progress. Indeed, in the United States of America, with more material things than any other country, the prevalence of crime, pollution, addiction, mental breakdown, and other indicators of lack of fulfilment are among the highest in the world.

The Need for Diversity

Nothing would more quickly stultify human creativity or impoverish the richness of cultural diversity than a single world culture. Cultural uniformity is not likely to bring peace; it is much more likely to bring totalitarianism. It would facilitate domination of a unitary system by a privileged few, and the mechanical drudgery of Orwell's *1984*. Cultural diversity is one of the world's potential sources of both sanity and fulfilment. "A country without culture", said the Fiji Education Commission in explaining its importance, "is a country without soul".¹

But in the 1970s each of us needs to be able to operate not only in more than one language, but also in more than one culture. This is no major problem—rather, perhaps, an enriching challenge. Te Rangi Hiroa (Sir Peter Buck) who had an intimate knowledge of both Polynesian and European cultures, emphasised that he belonged to both, appreciated both, and found the dual cultures much more rewarding than either one. Some people in a marginal position between two or more cultures find themselves at a loss to know which to belong to. They are not sufficiently aware that they have the much richer option of belonging to both. In Te Rangi Hiroa's day relatively few people successfully lived in two or more cultures—today it is both much more common and much more appreciated. We will soon reach the stage when a person who knows only one culture will be regarded as impoverished.

Most of the Maoris who have reached outstanding roles in New Zealand, whether in Maori or Pakeha affairs, speak the Maori language and have a good knowledge of the culture. Yet only a small proportion of Maoris can do so. One might think that having to know and be able to function in two languages and cultures would be an obstacle to the emergence of such

leaders. The facts do not support this view, and suggest rather that it may be an advantage.

Anyway, it is clear that no Pacific islander wants to be limited to one culture. Almost all use an international language and various features of other cultures. With the greatly increasing contact between peoples, there will be a growing tendency for all of us to learn relevant elements from many cultures rather than all aspects of one or two. As this stage approaches, it becomes less and less meaningful to speak of cultures as mutually exclusive packages. The uniqueness will not be in the components, but in particular combinations of them, with certain key features giving the stamp of identification to particular groups. The basic aim is to find oneself as an individual. Having achieved a satisfying identification with one's own culture group gives the confidence and strength to cope with other cultures.

The tendency to form into groups is neither good nor bad, it is inevitable. Group formation is a part of man's innate heritage that needs to be accepted, like food and sex, as a fact of life. The main current trends in human grouping are that there are more and more to choose from and that each individual belongs to more than ever before. Even though almost all human activities are undertaken in groups, each of us belongs to a different set and each plays different roles in them. Nobody wants to be so unique as to be the only member of a culture, but each is increasingly able to adopt a personal style and occupy a personal niche.

At the University of the South Pacific one often hears students complain of insufficient integration, of too little cross-cultural communication, and too much segregation of ethnic groups. Those campaigning for office in the Students' Association use integration on the campus as a platform. None speaks against it. Yet in practice sports groups, lunch groups, dancing groups, talking groups, drinking groups and most other groupings are substantially ethnically separate. Why the disparity between ideology and behaviour? Why is a desire that is so clearly expressed not more fully realised?

Firstly, the ideology is currently international and is therefore popular. All mass media support it. But there is no necessary correlation between espousing a system of religion,

politics or behaviour, and behaving according to its tenets. Second, there is inhibition, restraining people from doing what they want to do because it is not yet usual. Third, there is a great difference between wanting to play a guitar and being able to play it. Any culture is very complex, and we each spend many years learning our own, largely informally and unconsciously. Learning another person's culture requires effort, concentration and conscious learning over a considerable time. Language is just one of these aspects of culture which have to be learnt if a full involvement is to be achieved. Obviously there is a limit to the number of cultures one can learn deeply. I do not say totally, because no one can ever know any culture totally, not even the one into which he was born.

Despite the limits on the learning of other cultures, there is scope for very much more than is undertaken in practice. The fastest way to learn a language or most other aspects of a culture is by intensive professional training reinforced by living within the culture concerned. Time, money and other commitments limit the extent to which this can be done, but institutions can help greatly by providing readily obtainable courses. Handbooks such as F. J. Grattan's *Introduction to Samoan Custom* can provide a useful introduction. There is a need for more of them, including introductions to European custom for islanders interested in knowing them. The Peace Corps is evolving some effective techniques for rapid cross-cultural learning. There is some inhibition and embarrassment to be overcome in the learner and in a few cases some resistance from the culture concerned. Generally, however, members of a culture are delighted to teach it to anyone who is genuinely interested.

CONCLUSION

The quest for a unique, respected and functional identity

Many Pacific Islanders are seeking a new identity. There are advantages in being part of a world community, but the scale of it is overwhelming. Most of us need to belong to smaller units, to identify with groups which both cover a restricted area, and have more interests in common. We also enjoy taking a part in the creative process, and the larger the population which uses a similar pattern, the fewer the numbers who effectively participate in its formation and adaptation.

Choices of Identity

Though the Pacific shares this problem with Europe and the world, there is a major difference. Most people in the Pacific (both islanders and Europeans) confuse industrial technology with European people and the cultures of Europe. But technology is totally separate from race, and is distinct from cultures. Technology is merely the tools. Much more of the technological equipment used in the Pacific today comes from Asia than from Europe or America. Technology indeed influences a culture, but to speak of industrial technology as European (or "western") is as misleading as regarding all paper as Chinese, all cotton cloth as Indian, all glass as Egyptian, all rubber as Mexican, or all Christianity as Palestinian, merely because the particular processes or thought patterns happen to have developed in those places. Much more important than being simply misleading, however, it is humiliating.¹

Things that can more justifiably be classified as European (and/or American) include the English language, most of the newspapers, journals, books and films available in the Pacific, much of the music and dance, and some rather trivial customs (like the wearing of neckties). Mass communication is likely to

increase rather than diminish, though whether it will remain so overwhelmingly Euro-American remains to be seen. But to some extent this generates a desire for a distinct identification, a haven from the overwhelming deluge of foreign words and images.

The people of small and isolated countries do not have the resources to excel in world terms in manufacture or science, in military power or size of population. They must seek identities which are achievable in the context as it is, yet in some ways distinct from those of others. The symbolic value of distinctness should not be under-rated. The task, as many leaders in the islands are aware, is to create identities which are deeply meaningful but which do not obstruct their quest for other goals.

There is at times an uneasy balance between the demand for the products of industrial culture and the welfare state on the one hand, and (perhaps as an unconscious reaction to the inevitable reduction of unique identity as part of the process) the demand for one's own language and culture.

What is so good about the culture one happens to have been descended from? There are thousands of cultural patterns in the world. They cannot all be the best. Why restrict oneself to the limited range of choices developed in communities where experience was limited in range by the distance one could walk or go by canoe, in time depth by the knowledge that could be transmitted by word of mouth, and in breadth by the very restricted experience of an isolated, non-literate, stone-tool culture?

The short answer, of course, is don't. But also, don't throw out the baby with the bathwater. Cultural systems are easier to destroy than to create, and it is wise to consciously reject an aspect of culture only when a better substitute is offering. And cultural identification is vital to both individual and group confidence and integrity. It can certainly be modified, but to totally and suddenly reject it is likely to lead to serious trauma.

A Healthy Mixture of Cultures

It is perhaps significant that the reasons given by Demas Nwoko for advocating the perpetuation of African artistic traditions were "*the good health of the New African and . . . our effective contribution to world civilisation*". In a similar vein

Dr Karl Schmidt, a specialist in mental health, recently wrote the following as a prescription for *mental health* for people of the South Pacific:

Live your own culture

Enrich it where possible

Incorporate the best from other technologies without identifying with the cultures from which they stem.

Enrich and *incorporate* are the key concepts in this formula. This raises the question as to what should be the mix of the established and the exotic. Obviously this will vary greatly.

Total reversion to traditional cultures is impossible. It denies one of the most basic of truths: that any way of life is greatly influenced by the environment, by the number of people involved (e.g., village or city), the economic system (e.g., subsistence or market), the political system (e.g., isolated community, or nation-state with international alliances), religions and beliefs (e.g., local and unique community religion or international religion), and communication (e.g., range of a few miles and seldom, or range of much of the world and frequently).

How big a component should the traditionally-oriented be in, say, language, song, dance, art or social organisation? All young Pacific islanders want to know some language in addition to their own, to sing some songs of other origins (and sometimes only foreign songs to the exclusion of the indigenous), to dance some dances other than those of their forefathers, to see films and other non-traditional forms of entertainment.

A recent distinguished speaker urged fellow Melanesians to make their towns "modern, but Melanesian in character". It may be possible, depending on what is meant by the term "Melanesian", which refers to the very diverse peoples of more than a thousand different language and culture groups. The speaker did not clarify the terms further, but it is apparent that they convey meaning and feeling to those who use them. The roads, basic structures, plumbing, lighting, fuel, shopping facilities, transport and communications aim to be essentially "modern". The people will of course remain physically Melanesian, and their dress could remain distinctive. The decor of buildings could embody Melanesian motifs and styles much

more than is now done, as could the field of entertainment. Schools and churches, though relatively new institutions, can indeed take on distinctive characteristics both in the structures themselves and the activities undertaken within them. Another delegate at the same conference advocated more change "while keeping intact the basic fabric of Samoan culture". Which aspects of the fabric can in fact be kept in a situation of rapid change? Language certainly, certain features of social organisation, and distinctive styles of dress, creative arts, religion and entertainment. There are of course limits, but so long as these are appreciated, the goal is legitimate if it is valued.

Speaking of the increased interest in local history and traditions which has arisen in the face of external pressures, Raymond Firth says:

To maintain their social identity in a wider social universe, where so many pressures and attractions lead them to merge themselves in that universe completely, they want to call on any aids. Traditional tales are helpful here since they are relatively neutral from an action point of view . . . The tales can be maintained as true, they can be held to have a symbolic character or they can be regarded as . . . recreational or aesthetic products. In any case, as a property that is indubitably belonging to the group concerned, the traditions can serve as an identity badge, and a social rallying point.²

Much the same point applies to vernacular song, some forms of dance, and indeed to use of vernacular language. The recent, post-independence, surge of tattooing in Western Samoa likewise shows the value to the people of this form of identification and artistic expression, despite more than a century of mission efforts to stamp it out.

Emergence of national (rather than tribal or local) cultures is likely to increase as a result of the common "enclosure" of many tribal cultures within a single nation-state. Thus, aspects of a distinct New Guinean culture are now appearing which transcend the hundreds of language and culture groups within that country, and draws aspects from many of them into a new synthesis. The emergence of some pan-Pacific cultural features based on *some* common traits, is likely to increase as the awareness increases of common current problems vis-à-vis the



Kava ceremonies are characteristic of the "Fijian way of life". They involve the ritual preparation and distribution of the powdered root of the plant *piper methysticum*. The nature and sequence of the ritual reflects the relative status of participants.



IMAGE MANUFACTURE

The advertisements illustrate the South Pacific's booming travel industry and symbolise some of the images projected by the tourist trade.

Man's longing for a paradise where nature and man are in harmony and peace comes true at PACIFIC HARBOUR, on the tropical island of Fiji—hub of the sun-drenched South Pacific.
(from the publicity brochure)



An aspect of the new colonialism. This Qantas advertisement symbolises the image created by the travel industry of white tourists pampered by native servants and entertainers.



DON'T BUY



please don't visit Hawaii

until we are able to save what's left!

Resort-travel-land interests are
ruining us - and our islands - to get
your money. Prices, taxes soar; wages
diminish. You can't buy ALOHA!

Honolulu, Hawaii

HAWAII RESIDENTS BUREAU

LEFT: Reacting against symbol manipulation and tourist over-sell, the Hawaii Residents Bureau (set up by concerned citizens to counter the travel-industry controlled Hawaii Visitors Bureau) distributes this poster.

BELOW: New Hebrideans demonstrating in 1971 in support of action to curb speculation by American, Australian and other foreign investors in land in the New Hebrides.





Pacific Theological College, an interdenominational college serving the whole South Pacific area and providing tuition on both English and French.


TOP RIGHT:

Students and staff of many cultures come together at the University of the South Pacific which was set up by and serves the Cook Islands, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Hebrides, Niue, Solomon Islands, Tokelau Islands, Tonga and Western Samoa. Here the late Dr R. R. Nayacakalou of Fiji, as Deputy Chairman of the University Council, escorts Queen Mata'aho of Tonga and leads the University's Pro-Chancellor Masiofo Fetaui Mata'afa of Western Samoa and Chancellor King Taufa'ahau of Tonga to perform the first graduation in 1971. The multi-cultural environment of the University involves adjustment, but provides diversity, stimulus and cultural enrichment.

BOTTOM RIGHT:

Students from many parts of the South Pacific relax on the lawn of the University outside the Fijian *bure* where the South Pacific Forum meets. In the middle background is a staff house and behind it are four-storey student hostels.





Aloï Pilioko, a Wallis Islander who has held showings in much of the Pacific as well as France and elsewhere in Europe and has achieved international recognition for his artistic creations.



Hon. Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan, a Maori member of the New Zealand parliament and a constant advocate of the need to understand and operate in multiple cultures.

wealthier industrialised cultures.³ Common cultural heritage will be used to reinforce this, but the "commonness" will be secondary—the unity will be derived from current circumstances. If circumstances change, societies can fairly readily adapt the content and emphasis of supporting historical and cultural information and belief, to better secure the present need.

Culture and Wealth

It is sometimes suggested that traditional culture is glorified by privileged elites to make the poverty of the masses more bearable. There is sometimes a grain of truth in the suggestion. Moreover, the extent of preservation of traditional culture and social cohesiveness in the Pacific does correlate inversely with income. Oversimplified, the more money, the less culture. To see the way in which money, in association with American emphasis on consumerism, can erode a culture one need only compare the cultural richness and financial poverty of Western Samoa, with the monetary richness and cultural poverty of American Samoa, where rates of crime, delinquency, alcoholism, addiction, emotional tension, and other indices of social stress are much higher. In Western Samoa, per capita income is vastly lower but social cohesion and cultural integrity are infinitely greater. Even within Western Samoa, nearly 70 per cent of the reported crime is said to be committed among the 18 per cent of the population which lives in the capital.

But it is a popular fallacy to think that higher income inevitably causes cultural deprivation. On the contrary, more money creates a potential for cultural enrichment. However, the context in which the money is at present generated subverts much of the potential for human development into chromium plate, sugar coating and stomach ulcers. It is the commercial ethic, the advertising, the media and the *thing*-oriented planning that results in the over-valuation of goods and the under-valuation of personal growth and cultural development.

Culture and Self-Respect

If a language has to be developed to the same extent and to serve similar purposes as English, why not just use English? Why go to all the trouble and expense of developing another?

And if support for indigenous culture costs time and money in arts councils, subsidies and organisation, why not simply take over American or other models? As Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara said when asked what he expected Fiji would gain by becoming independent, he replied simply, "Self-respect". Language, the expressive arts and certain forms of customary behaviour are symbols of identification, of self-respect. Many people do not want to lose the dignity and self-respect which they fear would go if they lost these symbols. As Ulli Beier has pointed out, "Self-expression becomes the pre-condition for the attainment of the self-respect without which a new nation cannot hope to succeed and grow".⁴ Moreover, these are not the kinds of issues that are decided by edict. The language a mother uses with her child, and the way in which people express themselves, are not determined by concepts of cost or efficiency.

We are unduly obsessed with measurement, and a consequent tendency to overvalue things which can be measured. In particular, economics (which can degenerate into a kind of secular theology which grossly overemphasises human greed and leads to everything being valued ultimately in terms of material goods) provides a framework which does not adequately cope with concepts of dignity, expression, creativity or self-realisation (except in the very limited, and at times sordid, consumption aspects of these terms).

Without doubt there is an element of self-protection in the desire to retain a minor language or cultural form. But defence of this kind can be more readily justified at a fraction of the cost of conventional military-type "defence".

Most of us are inconsistent in our thought and action about culture. We express conflicting views, in different contexts and at different times, about what cultural precedents we prefer. The demand for the preservation of indigenous culture is usually strongest among those who know foreign cultures best and thus are aware of the inadequacies and limitations of those cultures. To some extent the same people gain by the preservation (or even merely by the advocacy) of a traditional culture in which they often have a specialised role and can acquire higher status.

Most of the leading exponents of traditional cultures live by them only to a limited extent themselves, and use only certain key symbolic features of them to reinforce an identity which

might otherwise be in doubt. The validity of a quest for identity may be reinforced by the fact that those leaders advocating truly indigenous Pacific cultures appear to include a very high proportion of persons who have lived for long periods in foreign cultures, or are themselves of part foreign ancestry. This is probably to be expected, as a person whose cultural status is to some extent marginal should be more aware of the relativity of cultural systems (which tend to be taken for granted by persons who are intimately familiar with only one). Marginal people are likely to be more aware of the losses sustained as well as gains derived in the rejection of traditional values and practices, and are also likely to give greater emphasis to creating a firm identification in whatever model they choose to adopt.

More specifically, almost none of the main spokesmen for encouraging traditional culture live in villages or in traditional-type houses. Almost all are urban-dwelling professionals, earning salaries in higher education, government or in politics, and follow a life-style which has more in common with, and keeps them in closer daily contact with, other professionals and with overseas colleagues than with those living a more traditional life-style at home. But this is probably to be expected. It is among the more highly educated professional section of any community that one would expect to find creative thought most clearly expounded, and such persons will in almost any society be mainly salary-earning urban dwellers.

On the other hand, traditional identification is at times used as a focus to make a particular political leadership acceptable by identifying it with goals and symbols which are valued, whether they are achievable or not. As some politicians are well aware, there are some goals which everyone favours verbally but no one acts (and in some cases no one wishes) to attain. This is because the *seeking* itself, the quest for identity, the acknowledgment of its significance, may be as important as (and is certainly separate from) its achievement.

In some instances, the feeling of being members of an economically underprivileged group may be compensated by (or defended with) assertions of strong pride in a distinct ethnic identity. There is at times an ambivalence about imported values, and a rejection of the identification that goes with them. This leads to a commitment to an undefined tradition, though

commitment to a vague and intangible goal may not necessarily be associated with action towards achievement of the goals implied (but not spelt out) in the commitment. Nevertheless, provisions to meet legitimate needs for personal identity do not necessarily achieve the social and economic goals which are sought at the same time. To some extent these distinct needs can be met by common or compatible action, but some action to meet the one may run counter to achievement of the other.

Cultural Integration and Integrity

Islands leaders are anxious to avoid one of the most tragic of fates: that of being degenerate sub-cultures, permanently dependent on the guilt, embarrassment, generosity or self-interest of larger, richer neighbours. One has only to look at American Samoa to get a glimpse of the kind of process that could lead small isolated territories (and all Pacific territories are small by world standards) to a state of being permanent welfare cases, with the depressing psychological concomitants of permanently living on charity.⁵

This is very different from a state of interdependence, which is now essential for all the world, and one in which each contributes the best his physical resources and, more important, his skills, can offer.

It is sad to see Tonga, historically one of the Pacific's greatest and proudest cultures, having to eke out a living today by contributing largely unskilled labour to Niue, Nauru, Hawaii, American Samoa, New Zealand, the New Hebrides and elsewhere, doing jobs which are vacant because the citizens of those countries consider them the least acceptable forms of employment.⁶ There is a vast difference between their former position as the Pacific's greatest navigators and the present one as its most numerous deck-hands. In other words, a population which is allowed to greatly outstrip resources without developing alternative high-order skills, is forced to humiliate itself by doing the menial tasks for, or begging handouts from, wealthier neighbours.⁷ This reality is in direct contrast to the image which people want to create of themselves.

The achievement of a unique identity is not of itself enough. The Pacific peoples understandably want a respected identity. Dependency erodes respect and generates an ambivalence of

gratitude and resentment. Whether economic or cultural, excessive dependency can have serious social and psychological consequences. To see the effects of the total dependency of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands on the United States, is to appreciate the impotent bitterness, the slackness, the gutlessness, the decadence that can be generated by extreme dependence. As a Micronesian told me, "So long as you keep your mouth on the U.S. tit, you don't even have to suck, it just flows". The short-term payoff is in vast amounts of money; the long-term cost, if it continues, a psychologically, economically and culturally dependent and degenerate people. A self-respecting identity necessitates a considerable degree of self-reliance.

Finally, the integrated set of identifying symbols must not only be unique, but respected and workable. The symbols must provide an effective focus for unity and confidence, and for reasonable achievement of the goals of the society. A symbol system devised for isolated subsistence agriculturists will not be functional for the 1970s unless appropriately modified. Yet some key concepts from that culture of origin are an essential component of the new.

It is easy to explain the changes that have taken place in Pacific cultures in the last two hundred years. What is harder to explain is their extraordinary resilience; the extent to which they have retained so much in the face of such vast changes in technology, social organisation, communication and belief. Most culture change in the Pacific has not led to the total adoption of foreign models, but rather to a protective reaction, and a creative adaptation incorporating elements from both. Pacific cultures are not dead. Substantially modified and incorporating much that is old and much that is new (and more than is usually admitted of that which is simply human), the post-independence era in the Pacific is likely to see a new surge of creativity and new adaptations of what may be one of man's most sought-after needs—the human dignity that can be associated with unique and valued identity.

NOTES

1: PEOPLE

1. For a magnificent summary of information on Asian origins of Pacific peoples, see Golson, 1972. For data on plant origins see Barrau, 1963.
2. Suggs, 1960.
3. For broad classifications of Pacific languages see Grace, 1968, or Biggs, 1967.
4. For archaeological and linguistic evidence for the origins of particular Polynesian societies see Green, 1966.
5. Wynne, 1966.
6. Many instances of accidental as well as planned voyages are cited in Sharp, 1963, and Denning, 1963. An interesting study of what would happen to canoes drifting at random, given the existing current, wind and other conditions, is given by Levison and Ward, 1972.
7. Nobody doubts that there was some contact between parts of Polynesia and parts of America, but almost all the economic plants came from Asia or Western Melanesia. The sweet potato is the only plant of definitely South American origin, but even that was propagated in the Pacific Islands by techniques derived from south-east Asia rather than the Americas (see Yen, (1963). The major linguistic affiliations are clearly with south-east Asia (Grace, 1968) and the main cultural features likewise. There is a vast literature on this subject. An interesting summary of the evidence to that time is contained in de Josselin de Jong, 1953.
8. The expansion of Europe into the Pacific has been extensively documented. Some of the major references include: Grattan, 1963; Morrell, 1966; Oliver, 1961.
9. Te Rangi Hiroa (Sir Peter Buck), 1966, presents a major study of the adaptation of Maori culture to the New Zealand environment.
10. For human ecology and adaptation in the Pacific islands see Fosberg, 1965.
11. For Chinese in Tahiti see Coppenrath, 1967; Moench, 1963.
12. Gillion, 1962; Mayer, 1972.
13. Dewey, 1964.
14. The Japanese took these islands from Germany during the First World War and lost them during the Second World War to the United States, which still administers them as the United States Trust Territory of the Pacific islands. The Japanese were repatriated when U.S.A. took over. The story of the Japanese mandate is told in Clyde, 1967.
15. Daws, 1968; Lind, 1967.
16. Objective study of the tourist industry has hardly begun. Most reports, including those by international agencies, are biased in favour of the foreign tourist operator. Of the few studies of the effects of tourism on the host community see Mahoney, 1970; and Cottingham, 1970.
17. Some people find it hard to credit such a number of ancestors, but allowing 25 years per generation, and remembering that everyone at each stage had 2

parents, then we had 4 grandparents 2 generations ago, 8 great-grandparents at 3 generations, 16 at 4 generations, 32 at 5 generations, 64 at 6, 128 at 7, 256 at 8 generations.

18. This from an average of only between 3 and 4 children born to each person per generation.
19. This situation was being approached in the early 1960s at the time of Lind's study, but has since become a reality.
20. I am not aware of any comprehensive study of population movement in the Pacific, though there are many studies of particular migratory patterns. Some general data is contained in McArthur, 1961, and more detailed studies include that by Ward, 1971.
21. For information on the urbanisation process in the Pacific see Harré, 1973.

2: CULTURE

1. A general survey of each of the culture areas is contained in Oliver, 1961 (chapters 4-6). For ancient Polynesian society the most comprehensive study is that by Goldman, 1970; for Micronesia, Mason, 1968. For Melanesia, Brookfield's 1971 geographical study contains a survey of principles of social grouping in chapter 9.
2. A useful article highlighting the contrast is that by Sahlins, 1963.
3. A detailed description of one such system is contained in Nayacakalou, 1955 and 1957.
4. Mason, 1959.
5. Hughes, 1971.
6. Carano and Sanchez, 1965, page 104.

3: PERSONALITY

1. The most comprehensive summary of the data for Polynesia and Micronesia is that by Levy. Localised studies include those by Beaglehole in New Zealand, Hawaii and the Cook Islands; Levy in the Society Islands; Ritchie in New Zealand; and Spiro in the Caroline Islands. For details of these studies, see Bibliography.
2. Gallimore and Howard, 1969.
3. Howard, 1966.
4. This pattern of extensive filial respect in Fijian Society is commented on by Nayacakalou, 1955 and 1957, Ravavu 1971, Sahlins, 1962 and others.

4: ECONOMY

1. This phase of the history of the Pacific has not yet been adequately documented.
2. Oliver, 1961, (chapter 9) provides some information on this topic, but I am not aware of any comprehensive study of it.
3. For movements in Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, and the Gilbert Islands see Couper, 1968; for the Cook Islands, Gilson, (in press); for Nauru, Viviani, 1970 (pages 61-2) and for Samoa, Davidson, 1967 (chapter 5).
4. A full study of co-operatives in the Pacific has not been made, but a detailed study of most extensive co-operative movement in the Pacific (that of Papua New Guinea) is contained in Singh, 1973.
5. This has been a major point of contention in relation to the New Guinea economy. Even in 1972 Australians operate barbers shops, taxis, an estimated 94 per cent of all retail trading, and a host of other small enterprises, many of which New Guineans could operate given appropriate provisions. An extensive debate on this topic appears in the journal *New Guinea*, vol. 3, nos. 1 and 4, and vol. 4, nos. 1, 2 and 3. See also Crocombe, 1972.
6. For recent general review of Pacific economies see Fairbairn, 1971.

5: LAND

1. An overview of Pacific land tenure systems is given in Crocombe 1971, particularly chapters 1 and 18.
2. This is illustrated for Fiji by Nayacakalou, 1965.
3. The result is illustrated by a recent instance quoted by Mr J. McAuley, Registrar of the Cook Islands Lands Court. A four-acre block in Rarotonga was registered earlier this century in the names of twenty members of a particular family. It now has registered legal owners with as little as one five thousand and fortieth part of a share in the land, and land is divided into sixteen shares. Cases of this kind are quite common.
4. Crocombe, 1971, pages 376-80.

6: POLITICS

1. Basic information of the constitutional and governmental structures is contained in Tudor, 1972.
2. For further details of the respective systems see Goldman, 1970 and Sahlins 1963.
3. For details of the actual and emerging kingdoms of last century see Daws for Hawaii, Langdon for Tahiti, Gilson for Samoa and the Cook Islands, Latukefu for Tonga, Derrick for Fiji and Maude for the Central Gilbert Islands.
4. For an excellent summary of the decolonisation process in the Pacific see Davidson, 1971.
5. A comprehensive study of the South Pacific Commission is now being written by T. R. Smith, a former Secretary-General, who is now at Victoria University of Wellington.
6. The contrast is apparent in the comparison of Langdon's study with that of Derrick.
7. One of the few studies of politics in Papua New Guinea and West Irian in a single book is Hastings, 1969.
8. For American Samoa see Gray, 1960; for Guam see Carano and Sanchez, 1965; for the United States Trust Territory see Meller, 1969.
9. Details of New Zealand's administrative record in the islands are given in Crocombe 1962, Davidson, 1967, Gilson, (in press), Ross, 1969 and Stone, 1971.
10. Their effectiveness has been prolonged somewhat by the practice which a distinguished Polynesian has termed "rank marries ability".

7: INTRODUCTION

1. For a recent statement by a leading political figure see Tamasese, 1970. For the views of Pacific Islands writers and intellectuals see such periodicals as *Kakamora Reporter* of the Solomon Islands, *Dialogue* of New Guinea, literary publications like *Kovave*, students publications of the Pacific universities, and other expressions of local opinion.
2. As Dr Gerald Arbuckle has pointed out, the right is associated with a corresponding obligation to consider the needs of all others, particularly the disadvantaged, both within the islands concerned and without. The principle of interdependence is of increasing relevance.

8: TECHNOLOGY

1. Attractive examples include the Catholic Cathedral in Port Moresby which is designed after a New Guinean cult house, the Pago Pago Intercontinental Hotel which expands the theme of the Samoan *fale tele*, Guam International Airport which draws on the Chamorro *latte*, Western Samoa's new house of

Parliament based on the traditional meeting house, the Solomon Islands Museum, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara's traditional *bure* in Suva, the Koror Council house in Palau, and Mr Jack Neale's home in Aitutaki. Readers are also referred to Dr Schmidt's interesting paper on the future of the Samoan *fale*.

9: ECONOMY

1. For examples of rural villagers selling *kava* to buy beer, coke and cordial; selling fresh taro to buy less nutritious white bread; selling coffee beans at ten cents a pound and buying back instant coffee at several dollars a pound; exporting peanuts and buying back canned American peanuts at fourteen times the price; being persuaded to buy sunglasses by false fears of eye damage artificially generated by advertisers, and vitamin pills and processed foods by irresponsible implications about their benefits, see Crocombe, 1971. All these show up in economic statistics as "growth". Likewise, increasing malnutrition in Samoa is said to be linked with excessive consumption of imported white flour and canned fish and such local "developments" as ice-cream and soft-drink factories built with the aid of government tax concessions.
2. The substantial psychiatric and social costs of intensive tourism on the local community are discussed in relation to Hawaii by Cottingham and Mahoney. Some common fallacies about assumed monetary advantages from tourism are discussed in the articles by Levitt and Gulati, and by Bryden and Faber.

10: GOVERNMENT

1. Persons interested in looking further into this question in various parts of the Pacific may find the following references in the Bibliography useful as initial sources: Davidson for Western Samoa, Haas and Stone for the Cook Islands, Latukefu for Tonga, Meller for the Caroline, Mariana and Marshall Islands, Nayacakalou and Fisk for Fiji, Russell for the Solomon Islands, and for the French territories either West, or a new book by V. Thompson and R. Adloff.

11: RELIGION

1. Of the very considerable volume of this material which has been recorded, the works by the Chadwicks, Radin and Williamson listed in the Bibliography give a good introduction and include useful bibliographies. Taylor's bibliography is also useful for this purpose.
2. *Catalyst*, vol. 1, no. 2, page 84.

12: PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS

1. For example, studies by Alan Howard (see Bibliography) show that the much greater success of Rotumans than of Fijians in professions, business and industry is associated with differences in the social organisation, values and philosophies of the two groups.

13: SOCIAL ORGANISATION

1. See Bryden and Faber, pages 81-2.

15: CREATIVE ARTS

1. A very recent trend, but one which is apparently increasing, is for the islanders themselves to be consumers of local craft manufactures which had been almost exclusively for export. Harry Dansey recently reported that the main buyers of *piupiu* and other traditional Maori garments are now themselves Maori.
2. For example, Masiofo Fetaui Mata'afa recently noted that the use of certain sacred ceremonies for tourist entertainment "undermines that aspect of our culture which has retained our identity and dignity".

3. In an unpublished address at the University of the South Pacific.
4. Mata'afa, pages 6-7.
5. The first South Pacific Arts Festival, which was held in Fiji in 1972 with participants from throughout the Pacific, was a major breakthrough in this field. The Cook Islands National Theatre is another. The potential for creative growth, fulfilling in economic as well as social, psychological and national terms is considerable. At the same time we need to heed the sentiments recently expressed by a Solomon Islander who warns of the dangers of "developing ways of dancing and behaving to suit the tourist trade":

If we say that the Arts Festival will show the world "the best of Pacific culture" (as Mr Carrell seems to believe), we are making a completely false statement, since all it will show are some technical aspects of some Pacific cultures—it will not show that we Melanesians are transforming our culture, quickly and painfully, to take over our own destinies, or that Tongan culture is strangling its people politically, or Gilbertese culture acting as a dead weight on economic progress, or Fijian culture giving the Indians a clear field in commercial enterprise. The Festival will show the trimmings, the pretty wrappings on our cultures, and that is all.

So let's be honest about it. The main benefit of the Arts Festival will be to the tourist trade. The tourists will love it, and so will the Suva hotel-keepers, shop-owners and brothel-minders . . . another \$3 million in trade for Fiji. Very good; we're not saying it's bad; but let's be honest about why Fiji and the rest of us want an Arts Festival. . . . Let's not pretend that we are "preserving our culture" (whatever that means) through the Arts Festival. (*Kakamora Reporter*, Sept. 1971, no. 19, page 3.)

16: LANGUAGE

1. Samoan is the language of Western Samoa and American Samoa, and the languages of the Tokelau Islands and the Ellice Islands are very closely related and mutually intelligible. It is also spoken by the tens of thousands of Samoans now living permanently in New Zealand, Hawaii and California.
2. Indonesian is the official language of Irian Barat (West New Guinea), French of New Caledonia, Loyalty Islands, Wallis and Futuna, the Society Islands and other groups of French Polynesia, and partly of the New Hebrides. English is the "second language" elsewhere in the Pacific.
3. This process has perhaps gone furthest in French Polynesia—the Society, Tuamotu, Marquesas, Gambier and Austral Islands (see Prevost, pages 256-60). The same trend has gone a considerable distance in the Cook Islands and Fiji. Dr. Stefan Wurm (personal communication), a specialist in New Guinea languages, has expressed the view that 150 of Papua and New Guinea's 700 languages are likely to be still actively spoken in one hundred years' time.
4. In the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, for example, civil servants must pass examinations at two levels in both the Gilbertese and the Ellice languages as prerequisites to higher levels of promotion. It can be argued on the one hand that this takes time that could be better used for other purposes, but if the two societies are to remain together as a single self-governing unit (as is currently proposed) a heavy investment in mutual intelligibility and communication may be politically sensible (and, conceivably, even economically cheaper than some alternative ways of holding diverse cultures together). Moreover, it has been pointed out that in practice the mental stimulus of learning another culture has value in itself, and is generally done in time that would not be otherwise actively used.
5. I have heard this from a very wide range of persons, including Mr Pasoni

- Tafaki in respect of the Gilbert and Ellice languages, Mr Taira Rere for Cook Islands languages and Mr Paula Niukula for Fiji. A good example in print is the article by Levy (1968) in which he documents the atrophy of Tahitian language as a tool for precise handling of interpersonal relations.
6. Many islanders fail to realise the necessity for this. Englishmen who teach English in England still require a great deal of formal training to do so effectively with the complexities of today's world, and the same applies with any other language.
 7. Four different viewpoints are expressed in *New Guinea* under the title, "The future of Pidgin", in vol. 2, no. 2 June-July, 1969. See also, references below to Hall, Mihalic and Salisbury.
 8. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, vol. 42, no. 4, April 1971, page 29.

17: THE IMPORTANCE OF LEGITIMACY

1. In two brief but significant articles, John Kawaiपालova and Kumulau Tawali express different views on this topic in *New Guinea Writing*. Referring to culture in a wider sense than just the creative arts, the latter author advocated a return to past tradition, whereas the former emphasised the need to create a new tradition, unique to New Guinea, and expressing the values and aspirations of New Guineans of today.

18: MANIPULATING THE SYMBOLS

1. Firth, 1958, page 198.
2. An example which occurred while writing this paper was the establishment of the periodical *Nakamel* in the New Hebrides. It is named after the traditional indigenous meeting house. The periodical is owned and operated by, and from its content clearly represents the interests of, foreign businessmen and planters.

19: HOW MANY CULTURES?

1. Fiji Education Commission, page 26. Since writing the above I have read Alvin Toffler's *Future Shock* which points out more fully the value of cultural diversity even in highly industrialised nations.

20: CONCLUSION

1. As has been shown in the writings of such people as Fanon, Memmi and Mannoni.
2. Firth, 1961, page 161.
3. We now see such statements as "We, the people of Melanesia, are a group . . ." (*Kakamora Reporter* May 1971, page 5), which would have had little if any meaning a few years ago.
4. Beier, page 4.
5. Some American Samoans see themselves as having the best of both worlds, being almost totally financed by U.S.A. while retaining some aspects of its own culture. Others see themselves "hooked" on total aid, and fast losing the prospect of ever getting off it. Like any other form of addiction, it can be euphoric in the early stages.
6. Some Tongans have moved into important roles as business and professional men as well as skilled artisans in various countries, but language differences as well as limited educational facilities have resulted in a larger proportion of migrant workers being in the low-skill categories.
7. The present King of Tonga, when Prime Minister, advocated a vigorous family planning programme, but public support was then negligible. New official efforts may be more successful.

FURTHER READING

About one new book a day is published on the Pacific Islands, and much more is contained in academic and professional journals. C. R. H. Taylor's *Pacific Bibliography* contains details of about 16,000 publications relating to man in the Pacific, and that is probably much less than half the total published to date, excluding vast amounts in magazines and newspapers.

The following recommended readings are a brief personal selection. They are divided into three sections: those dealing with the first 50,000 years—the period before contact with industrial technology; then the last 200 or so years—the period since Captain Cook; and finally the present or very recent past. Fuller details of each are given in the Bibliography. As much very interesting material is continually being published in journals, a brief selection of the best of them is also given.

The First 50,000 Years

- Barrau *Plants and the Migrations of Pacific peoples*
Chadwick "The Oral Literature of Polynesia"
Goldman *Ancient Polynesian Society*
Golson *Polynesian Navigation*
Golson "The Remarkable History of Indo-Pacific Man"
Green "Linguistic Subgrouping . . . the Implications for Prehistoric Settlement"
Highland *Polynesian Culture History*
Hiroa *Vikings of the Pacific*
Hiroa *The Coming of the Maori*
Levy *Personality Studies in Polynesia and Micronesia*
Maude *The Evolution of the Gilbertese Boti*
Parke "A Short History of Rotuma"

The Journal of the Polynesian Society also contains considerable material on this period.

The Last 200 Years

Oliver's *The Pacific Islands* gives a valuable summary of this whole era, though it was written a generation ago and much new information has come to light since.

Other valuable references include:

Carano and Sanchez	<i>A Complete History of Guam</i>
Daws	<i>Shoal of Time: a History of the Hawaiian Islands</i>
Derrick	<i>A History of Fiji</i>
Gilson	<i>Samoa: 1830 to 1900</i>
Gilson	<i>The Cook Islands</i>
Grattan	<i>The South Pacific to 1900</i>
Kiki	<i>Ten Thousand years in a Lifetime</i>
Langdon	<i>Tahiti</i>
Latukeyu	<i>Church and State in Tonga</i>
Morrell	<i>Britain in the Pacific Islands</i>
Rutherford	<i>Shirley Baker and the King of Tonga</i>
Scarr	<i>Fragments of Empire</i>
Souter	<i>New Guinea: the Last Unknown</i>
Various authors	<i>The History of Melanesia</i>

Probably the most significant journals for this period are the *Journal of Pacific History* and *Journal de la Société des Océanistes*.

The Present Decade

For the Pacific today there is a vast array to choose from, but as research and publication take a long time, nothing can ever fully cover current happenings. Dozens of daily, weekly and monthly newspapers and journals are published in the islands and contain immediate news. The *Pacific Islands Monthly* gives a reasonable current coverage of the whole area.

Quarterly, six-monthly, and annual journals dealing with current affairs are also numerous. *Pacific Perspective* and *New Guinea* deal with current social, economic, and political issues. *Pacific Viewpoint* is more academic and geographically oriented. The "Current Developments" section of the *Journal of Pacific History* also contains valuable information on major current events in the islands.

Most of the current books are more specialised, dealing with particular topics or particular areas, for example:

Brookfield	<i>Melanesia: a Geographical Interpretation</i>
Crocombe	<i>Land Tenure in the Pacific</i>
Davidson	<i>Samoa mo Samoa</i>
Davidson	"The Decolonization of Oceania"
Fairbairn	"Pacific Islands Economies"
Fisk	<i>The Political Economy of Independent Fiji</i>
Harre	<i>Living in Town</i>
Lind	<i>Hawaii's People</i>
Lockwood	<i>Samoa Village Economy</i>
Macdonald	"Constitutional Development in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony"
Meller	<i>The Congress of Micronesia</i>
Nayacakalou	<i>Fijian Leadership</i>
Viviani	<i>Nauru</i>
Ward	<i>The Politics of Melanesia</i>

Some Leading Journals Concerned With Pacific Affairs

Of more than a hundred periodicals published about the Pacific Islands, the most useful for the general reader probably include:

The Journal of Pacific History. Now in its seventh year of publication, this outstanding journal appears only once a year but is the length of a full book. The presentation is particularly interesting and the quality of content extremely high. Subscriptions should be sent to the Editor, Journal of Pacific History, Australian National University, Box 4, Canberra, 2600, Australia.

Pacific Perspective is a new journal which focuses on current economic, social, and political issues in the Pacific area. Its address is Box 5083, Raiwaqa, Suva, Fiji, or care of the Editor, (Sione Tupouniua), Box 1168, Suva.

The Journal of the Polynesian Society, a quarterly which has now been produced regularly for eighty years, is the longest established journal dealing with the societies and cultures of the Pacific. Originally set up to serve Polynesia alone, the journal has for many years included material on Micronesia and Melanesia also. The address of the Polynesian Society is Box 10323, The Terrace, Wellington, New Zealand.

The South Pacific Bulletin is an attractively illustrated quarterly containing brief and non-controversial articles concerned largely with technical, social, and economic development. It is produced by the South Pacific Commission, Box 306, Haymarket, N.S.W., 2000, Australia.

New Guinea and Australia, the Pacific and South East Asia, is generally known simply as *New Guinea*. It is a quarterly journal of comment produced by the Council on New Guinea Affairs and dealing with current economic, political, and social affairs pertaining mainly to New Guinea, but also to other parts of the Pacific. Subscriptions should be sent to G.P.O. Box 1813, Sydney, 2001, Australia.

Journal de la Société des Océanistes is a high quality quarterly published in France and dealing with Tahiti, New Caledonia, New Hebrides, Loyalty Islands, Wallis and Futuna, as well as with the rest of the Pacific. Much of the text is in French, but some of it is also in English. The address of the Société des Océanistes, is Musée de l'Homme, Paris 16E, France.

Pacific Viewpoint is a geographically oriented biennial journal which deals not only with the Pacific Islands, but also the Pacific borderlands in South-East Asia and South America. It is obtainable from the Geography Department, Victoria University, Box 196, Wellington, New Zealand.

Kovave is a high quality literary journal concerned with the Pacific Islands. The editor (Apisai Enos) and almost all the contributors are Pacific islanders. The business address is care of Jacaranda Press, 46 Douglas Street, Milton, Brisbane, Australia.

In addition to the above publications which deal with the Pacific as a whole, the following is a small selection of the many which deal with particular island groups:

The Kakamora Reporter, a roneoed monthly published by Henry Raraka and Ella Bugotu at Box 169, Honiara, Solomon Islands. It was the first, and remains one of the best, regular periodicals owned, edited, produced, and distributed by islanders.

New Hebridean Viewpoints, the first indigenous publication from the New Hebrides, is edited by Mr Walter Lini, Longana, Aoba, New Hebrides.

Journal of the Papua and New Guinea Society is published quarterly in association with the University of Papua and New Guinea. Its address is Box 172, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.

The Fiji Society: Transactions and Proceedings is published annually, and contains mainly papers presented to the Society at its meetings in Suva. Its address is Box 1205, Suva, Fiji.

Bulletin de la Société des Etudes Océaniques is concerned with Tahiti and neighbouring islands in French Polynesia, and has its headquarters at the Museum, Box 110, Papeete, Tahiti.

The Micronesian Recorder is a new publication of the Micronesian Area Research Centre at the University of Guam, Box EK, Agana, Guam, 96910. It contains articles on historical as well as current affairs in Micronesia.

The New Guinea Research Bulletin contains the results of social science research in New Guinea and to a lesser extent in other parts of Melanesia. Issues appear about five times a year and are available from the New Guinea Research Unit, Australian National University, Box 1238, Boroko, New Guinea.

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BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE MAIN PACIFIC ISLAND NATIONS AND ISLANDS*

Nation or island group	Area (sq. miles)	Approximate population	Main ethnic categories	Political status
Caroline Islands (see Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands)				
Cook Islands	92	22,000	Polynesian	Self-governing (in association with New Zealand)
Easter Island	30	1,500	Polynesian	Dependency of Chile
Fiji	7,055	550,000	Indian 51 % Fijian 43 %	Independent Dominion
French Polynesia (Tahiti and neighbours)	1,544	110,000	Polynesian	Overseas Territory of France
Gilbert and Ellice Islands	376	60,000	Micronesian 90 % Polynesian 10 %	British Crown Colony
Guam	200	90,000	Micronesian 60 % (?) U.S. military 40 % (?)	Territory of U.S.A.
Hawaii	6,425	750,000	Asian (mainly Japanese) 40 % European 25 % Polynesian (or part) 20 % (very approximate)	State of U.S.A.
Irian Barat	160,000	900,000	Melanesian	Province of Indonesia
Nauru	9	7,000	Micronesian 79 % Chinese 13 % European 8 %	Independent Republic

Nation or island group	Area (sq. miles)	Approximate population	Main ethnic categories	Political status
New Caledonia	7,082	120,000	Melanesian 48 % European (French) 36 % Polynesian 9 % Asian 7 %	Overseas Territory of France
New Guinea (see also Papua and Irian Barat)	93,000	1,860,000	Melanesian	U.N. Trust Territory administered by Australia
New Hebrides	5,700	90,000	Melanesian 92 % European 5 %	A Condominium of France and Great Britain
Niue	100	5,000	Polynesian	Territory of New Zealand
Papua	90,540	700,000	Melanesian	Territory of Australia
Samoa, American	76	30,000	Polynesian	Territory of U.S.A.
Samoa, Western	1,140	150,000	Polynesian	Independent State
Solomon Islands	11,500	165,000	Melanesian	Protectorate of United Kingdom
Tokelau Islands	5	2,000	Polynesian	Territory of New Zealand
Tonga	259	90,000	Polynesian	Independent Constitutional Monarchy
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (i.e. Caroline, Mariana and Marshall Islands)	706	105,000	Micronesian	U.N. Trust Territory administered by U.S.A.
Wallis and Futuna	50	10,000	Polynesian	Territory of France

*The most useful single source for general information on the various islands is the *Pacific Islands Year Book*, eleventh edition, 1972.

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