The Fifty-sixth George Ernest Morrison Lecture in Ethnology 1995

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ISBN 0 7315 2301 6
ISSN 0 726-2523

Printed by Central Printery
The Australian National University
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The economic and cultural gap between city and countryside is one of the most fundamental problems of development. Research indicates that when development occurs, almost always there is a profound urban bias, with rural cultivators losing out economically and being looked down upon by their urban countrymen.[1] Development via centralised socialist planning does not avoid this urban bias and may make things even worse. Certainly, if the example of the former Soviet Union is any guide, socialist development may involve not simply disadvantages but brutal mistreatment of the rural population.[2] Soviet state socialism was marked by a profound urban bias throughout its history.

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1 The most comprehensive treatment of urban bias in development is Michael Lipton, *Why Poor People Stay Poor* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977). For exceptions to this pattern, see John H. C. Fei, Gustav Ranis and Shirley Kuo, *Growth with Equity: The Taiwan Case* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Robert H. Bates, *Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). The disadvantages suffered by rural residents are not solely economic, but extend to all areas of social life. For example, Barrington Moore argued in his classic work, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), that regardless of whether the political outcome of early modern change processes was dictatorship or democracy, the peasants always lost out politically.

2 The literature dealing with the semi-feudal subjugation and brutal mistreatment of the Soviet rural population in the Stalin era is massive. The most compelling indictment is Robert Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine*

Observers of post-1949 China for a time believed that Chinese state socialism was different and was avoiding the urban biases that characterise development almost everywhere else. Unlike the situation in Russia, Mao Zedong and many of the other significant leaders of the Chinese communist revolution (including Deng Xiaoping) were born and grew up in the countryside. Even though these Party leaders of peasant origin gravitated to the cities and even abroad in early adulthood, the rupture of the first united front in 1927 led them to seek a new power base in China's countryside. As is well known, when they marched to victory in 1949, it was at the head of an overwhelmingly peasant-based army and a similarly predominantly rural-origin Chinese Communist Party. The consolidation of power saw hundreds of thousands of rural veterans of the revolutionary struggles put in charge of all manner of urban institutions, with new urban recruits to the cause placed, for the most part, in subordinate posts.[3] If, as Michael Lipton and others

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(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). A recent study estimates that nine million excess deaths can be attributed to collectivisation in the USSR. See Massimo Livi-Bacci, 'On the Human Costs of Collectivisation in the Soviet Union', *Population and Development Review* 19 (1993), pp.743-66. The long-term problems of Soviet agriculture can be traced to the neglect and mistreatment of the rural population. Of course, as James Millar points out, as a consequence of these difficulties, the authorities had to invest very substantial sums in rural areas in order to avoid even worse agricultural problems, so the pattern of state investment was not tipped in favour of urban areas as the phrase 'primitive socialist accumulation' might indicate. See his article, 'Mass Collectivisation and the Contribution of Soviet Agriculture to the First Five-Year Plan', *Slavic Review* 33 (1974), pp.750-66.

3 The tensions caused when poorly educated rural veterans of the revolution gave orders to much more highly educated urban subordinates became one of the sore points raised during the 1957 Hundred Flowers Campaign. In the ensuing Anti-Rightist Campaign, of course, the rural veterans obtained revenge for these insults and consolidated their power even more fully by purging their critics.

argue, the city origins and preferences of elites in most developing countries are a major source of urban bias in development, these special conditions should have helped exempt China from the general pattern.[4]

A combination of slogans and policies adopted in subsequent years appeared to be vigorously combatting any tendency for the fruits of victory in the Chinese revolution to be monopolised by urbanites. More was involved than simply the rhetoric of 'agriculture first', 'industry should serve agriculture', and 'overcome the three great differences' (one of which was the gap between town and countryside).[5] Numerous efforts — to freeze urban wages, limit the growth of cities, send educated urbanites down to the countryside, and emphasise rural industry and cooperative medical insurance, for example — seemed to indicate that development of a different sort was taking place. A number of observers concluded that the rural origins of the revolution translated into a Chinese development path that was at least balanced or even biased in favour of the countryside.[6]

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4 See the discussion in Lipton, op. cit.; Bates, op. cit. Other explanations of urban bias focus on capitalist institutions or the role of world market forces, and these factors were also largely absent in post-1949 China.

5 The other two 'great differences' are those between workers and peasants and between mental and manual labourers.

6 For examples of this evaluation of development in the pre-1978 period, see Charles Cell, 'Deurbanization in China: The Rural-Urban Contradiction', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 11 (1979), pp.62-72; John Gurley, 'Capitalist and Maoist Economic Development', in E. Friedman and M. Selden (eds), *America's Asia* (New York: Vintage, 1971). This sort of favourable evaluation was not limited to Cultural Revolution enthusiasts. A more restrained version of the same evaluation can be found in Alexander Eckstein, *China's Economic Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). On page 304 of that work Eckstein concludes that ' ... average urban-rural income differentials were almost certainly narrowed in the past twenty years'. See also Dwight Perkins, 'The

It is now quite evident that these claims were wrong. In fact the policies and practices adopted during the period from the 1950s to the 1970s profoundly favoured urbanites and systematically disadvantaged China's rural population. Indeed, in certain respects an urban bias developed in more extreme forms than are visible in other developing societies or even in the Soviet Union. This is perhaps the supreme irony of the Chinese revolution — that rural revolutionaries who were committed to combatting urban bias ended up institutionalising precisely that bias in extreme and deep-rooted forms. China today still suffers from the effects of this development. In this paper I describe the situation both before and after 1949 and then speculate on some of the reasons for this ironic outcome of China's rural revolution. Finally, and more tenatively, I discuss whether the post-1978 reforms have been at all successful in reversing this urban bias.

The Pre-1949 Gap between Town and Countryside

As I read the evidence, the gap between town and countryside was relatively modest in China in imperial times but appeared to be increasing in the century prior to 1949.[7] There are no good aggregate income figures available to support the 'minimal gap' conclusion, which is based on general accounts of cultural patterns, life styles, and geographic and social mobility. China for centuries had lacked the kind of serf-like subordination of the peasantry that had characterised many European countries and Japan. China's open class system imposed no legal barriers to prevent rural

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Central Features of China's Economic Development', in R. Dernberger (ed.), *China's Development Experience in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).

7 The pre-1949 situation is discussed more fully in my article, 'Town and Country in Contemporary China', *Comparative Urban Research* (Summer 1983). See also Frederick Mote, 'The City in Traditional Chinese Civilization', in James T. C. Liu and Wei-ming Tu (eds), *Traditional China* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

residents from moving to the cities and taking up urban occupations, and the rural roots of many urbanites colored rural-urban relations. Rhoads Murphey provides the following generalisations: 'In China there was no such split between urban and rural worlds [as in the West], and no place in ... traditional China for Marx's contempt for the "idiocy of rural life" ... There was no denigration of rural circumstances and values, but rather, on the part of many urbanites, a longing for the countryside, to which they would retreat whenever they could and to which they almost invariably retired'.[8]

China's cities in the late 19th century were still organised in substantial measure in terms of rural native place and clan associations, and its villages in terms of lineages, and in combination these institutions fostered close human connections between rural and urban Chinese. China's villages poured out regular streams of sojourners to work in cities and send back remittances to their families, and those who put down city roots and raised families there nonetheless often kept close ties with their rural places of origin — returning for visits on holidays, for celebrations of family events, and perhaps even to be buried.[9] Certainly these characteristics of the late imperial Chinese social order have to be balanced against a recognition that cities were places in which power and wealth were concentrated and where life

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8 Rhoads Murphey, *The Fading of the Maoist Vision* (New York: Methuen, 1980), p.21.

9 On the openness of Chinese villages to geographic and social mobility, see in particular G. William Skinner, 'Chinese Peasants and the Closed Community: An Open and Shut Case', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 13 (1971), pp.270-81; and 'Mobility Strategies in Late Imperial China: A Regional Systems Analysis', *Regional Analysis* 1 (1976), pp.327-64. The limited nature of urban consciousness in China is conveyed by the way in which urban Chinese, if asked where they were from, would generally give their rural places of origin, even if they were born and brought up in the city and had never even been to their native place.

was much more varied and cosmopolitan than in villages. My claim is not that China at the time lacked a rural-urban gap, but that this gap was relatively small in comparative perspective.

The generalisation that the gap between town and countryside in China was increasing during the century prior to 1949 is similarly based upon impressionistic evidence, rather than on systematic statistics. After the 1840s many of China's cities were, of course, part of the system of treaty ports in which extra-territorial privileges were granted to foreign powers. Although Western contact and influence were not confined to China's cities, the emergence of new life styles and cultural patterns modeled after those of the West was primarily concentrated in urban locales. Some have argued that the increasing disorders of the century prior to 1949 also prompted large numbers of rural elites to flee to the greater comfort and security of the cities. The resulting rise of absentee landlordism helped to undermine the social bonds between city and countryside. As a result of these trends, not only the Chinese Communists but also their liberal critics characterised China's cities in the twentieth century as having an increasingly parasitic relationship toward the countryside.[10] While these trends may have threatened the social bonds that linked China's rural and urban areas into one society, their impact pales in comparison with the forces that aggravated the gap between town and countryside after 1949.

Urban Bias in China, 1949-78

Five primary manifestations of urban bias were evident during this period: a widening gap in income, declining migration and weakened kinship bonds, implementation of divergent organisational systems, enforced contact and stigmatisation of the

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10 See, for example, Fei Hsiao-t'ung, *China's Gentry* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), chs 5, 7.

peasantry, and a growing disparity in culture and customs.[11] These will be examined in turn. I make no claim here that Mao and other Chinese leaders intended to increase the rural-urban divide. The irony that abounds in this realm lies in the fact that the gap between town and countryside was widened by measures that were often intended to have the opposite effect.

Increasing Gap in Incomes

The surveys and official statistics for periods prior to the 1980s are highly imperfect, but the available evidence indicates that the gap between the average incomes of China's urban and rural populations increased between the 1950s and 1970s and became unusually large in comparative terms. The urban-rural per capita income ratio seems to have been of the order of 2:1 in the 1950s and widened to 2.5:1 or even 3:1 by the time that Mao died, although some authorities give estimates for the 1970s as high as 5 or 6:1 (see Table 1, line 1).[12] During this same period the ratio of

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11 My analysis differs from one presented earlier by Marc Blecher. See his article, 'Balance and Cleavage in Urban-Rural Relations', in William Parish (ed.), *Chinese Rural Development: The Great Transformation* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1985). Blecher argued that in terms of the distribution of income and other resources the rural-urban gap declined after 1949, while the status cleavage between villagers and urbanites increased. Evidence now indicates that both 'imbalance' and 'cleavage' characterised the 1949-78 period.

12 For one well-informed estimate for the 1950s, see Christopher Howe, *Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China: 1949-1972* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p.50. Dwight Perkins and Shahid Yusuf estimate that the per capita urban-rural income ratio widened from 3.9:1 in 1957 to 5.5:1 in 1975. See Perkins and Yusuf, *Rural Development in China* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p.127. Thomas Rawski estimates that the urban-rural income gap had widened by 1978 to between 5:1 and 6:1. See Rawski, 'The Simple Arithmetic of Chinese Income Distribution', *Keizai kenkyu* [Economic Research] 33 (1982), pp.12-

consumption of food grains, vegetable oils, and cotton cloth between urbanites and rural residents also widened sharply, in part due to the use of imports to protect urban consumption levels.[13] As a result of this divergence, the disparity between the incomes and living standards of China's urban and rural residents in recent times has been unusually large — larger than the gap in India, Bangladesh, and Southeast Asian countries, and much wider than the comparable gap in Taiwan.[14]

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26. One discordant set of official figures provided by China's State Statistical Bureau is cited by Zhao Renwei. According to these figures, the ratio was 3.48:1 in 1957 but only 2.38:1 in 1964 and 2.36:1 in 1978 (see Table 1, line 2). See his article, 'Three Features of the Distribution of Income during the Transition to Reform', in Keith Griffin and Zhao Renwei (eds), *The Distribution of Income in China* (London: Macmillan, 1993), p.82. The 1957 figure appears implausible in view of other estimates; the later figures still indicate an unusually large gap in international comparative perspective.

13 See Nicholas Lardy, 'Food Consumption in the People's Republic of China', in R. Barker, R. Sinha and B. Rose (eds), *The Chinese Agricultural Economy* (Boulder: Westview, 1982), pp.157-8; Nicholas Lardy, *Agriculture in China's Modern Economic Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), ch.4. For detailed comparative statistics on urban and rural consumption of various commodities over the period from 1952 to 1984, consult Jeffrey Taylor and Karen Hardee, *Consumer Demand in China* (Boulder: Westview, 1986).

14 An unusually comprehensive and systematic survey of rural and urban incomes conducted through a Chinese-Western collabouration in 1988 yielded an estimate of the ratio of per capita incomes in China's urban and rural areas of 2.42:1. This compares with estimates in recent years for India of 1.4:1, Bangladesh 1.5, Indonesia 1.7, the Phillipines 2.1, and Thailand 2.2. See Griffin and Zhao, op. cit., pp.69, 83. Surveys in Taiwan found that the urban to rural per capita income ratio was only 1.2 in 1966, although it widened somewhat to 1.5 in 1972 (the non-farm to farm income ratios were narrower — 1.02 and 1.32 in the same years). See Fei, Ranis and Kuo, op. cit., pp.244-5. See also the figures presented in

The reasons for this growing disparity are numerous. On the urban side of the picture, despite a long-term wage freeze enforced after the 1950s, increases in the proportion of urban family members who were employed, and particularly of married women, helped to increase family cash incomes. More to the point, the growing dominance of state sector employment in urban areas and the wide range of fringe benefits and subsidies which state sector employees enjoyed boosted real urban incomes even when wages were relatively stagnant. On the rural side of the equation, the devastation produced by the Great Leap Forward, along with low state grain procurement prices, anemic state investment in agriculture, recurrent bureaucratic interference in cropping patterns, restrictions on off-farm economic activities, and demands that local funds be used to support an increasing range of facilities and services helped to perpetuate the immiseration of rural families in many parts of China.[15] The legacy of the Great Leap Forward weighs particularly heavily in this picture. In addition to depressed rural incomes, the estimated 30 million excess deaths produced by this campaign — overwhelmingly deaths of rural residents — provide powerful testimony against claims that Mao's policies favoured the countryside.[16]

Lipton, op. cit. Economist Lloyd Reynolds earlier estimated that, in terms of the distribution of skills required, an income gap between 25-30 per cent between cities and countryside was perhaps justifiable (cited in Howe, op. cit., p.8).

15 See the discussion in Nicholas Lardy, 'State Intervention and Peasant Opportunities', in W. Parish (ed.), *Chinese Rural Development: The Great Transformation* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1985); Lardy, *Agriculture in China's Modern Economic Development*, op. cit.

16 See the discussion in Basil Ashton, Kenneth Hill, Alan Piazza and Robin Zeitz, 'Famine in China, 1958-61', *Population and Development Review* 10 (1984), pp.613-45; Peng Xizhe, 'Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces', *Population and Development Review* 13 (1987), pp.639-70.

Yet arguably the most important source of the growing income gap between rural and urban residents after the 1950s was instead the elaborate system of migration restrictions implemented in China during the period of Mao Zedong's rule. The combination of household registration requirements and rationing that was implemented after the 1950s effectively interrupted almost all of the free movement of people across the rural-urban divide that had existed prior to the revolution.[17] China's rural residents were penalised in multiple ways. Depressed villages could not react to hard times by having members go off to the city in search of employment opportunities, and thus few rural families could count on urban remittances to ease their poverty. The combination of migration restrictions and the collectivised form of agriculture implemented after 1956 also interfered with migration from depressed rural areas to more prosperous villages. China's communes and their subdivisions became, in effect, exclusive membership organisations, and except for new brides it became very difficult for outsiders to gain admission.[18] A final way in

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17 There were, as is well known, limited exceptions to this interruption of rural-urban migration. Students admitted to urban schools, villagers whose land was confiscated for industrial development, and a number of other categories of individuals were entitled to move into urban places and change their registrations from rural to urban. In addition, urban work units in a number of circumstances employed temporary or contract workers from the countryside, although the latter were usually not entitled to change to an urban registration. These limited and selective movements of rural individuals into the cities only in a minor way qualify the general point about the interruption of rural-urban migration.

18 Brides were able to join the production teams of their new husbands, and as a consequence there was a strong tendency for women to leave poor villages and marry into richer ones, and to move from hills to plains and from distant villages toward the suburbs of cities. See William Lavely, 'Marriage and Mobility under Rural Collectivism', in R. Watson and P. Ebrey (eds), *Marriage and Inequality in Chinese Society* (Berkeley: University of California

which changes in migration control after the 1950s harmed rural areas lay in the burdens imposed by the official demand that millions of urban residents be resettled in the countryside. Although rural areas received initial 'settling down' subsidies to help them cope with those rusticated from the cities, and some of the latter eventually earned their keep, on balance many rural communities felt that the effect of this reverse migration was more a drain than a contribution.[19]

China's strict institutions designed to 'keep 'em down on the farm' were seen by some observers as a way to aid rural development by preventing a 'brain drain' of talent out of the countryside. However, in so doing China assured that for the most part advantaged areas (including urban areas in general) would remain so, while depressed rural regions would be deprived of one of the most effective means of escaping from poverty. Dwight Perkins and Shahid Yusuf have argued that in any society the freedom of movement of individuals and families is a very effective natural mechanism for spreading development from richer communities to disadvantaged locales and groups.[20] Brains are not being 'drained' if talented individuals can bring more benefits to

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Press, 1991). Men, however, had a much more difficult time moving to another village. Lavely argues that in localities where prior to 1949 uxorilocal marriages — the groom moving to live with his bride's family — were fairly common, collectivisation made such marriages less acceptable.

19 For a general discussion of the program of sending people to the countryside, see Thomas Bernstein, *Up to the Mountains, Down to the Villages* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

20 See Perkins and Yusuf, op. cit., ch.6. China's emphasis during the period of collectivised agriculture on self-reliance and on 'learning from Dazhai' can in this sense be seen as an exhortation to poor communities to pull themselves up by their bootstraps in the absence of substantial state assistance or the freedom of villagers to take advantage of outside economic opportunities.

their families and home communities by migrating than by staying at home.[21]

Despite this widening income gap, it is not the case that every aspect of rural and urban welfare diverged during the 1949-78 period. Education and health care are realms in which the rural-urban gap declined somewhat during these years, although the picture is not entirely unambiguous. For example, in 1962 only 37.1 per cent of the students enrolled in lower middle schools were rural, as were only 7.8 per cent of the students enrolled in upper middle schools. By 1971 the rural share of lower middle school enrollments had been boosted to 73 per cent, and by 1978 to 77.5 per cent; for upper middle schooling the rural share rose to about 61 per cent in both 1971 and 1978 (see Table 1, lines 5-6).[22] To be

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21 One of the main sources of the relative rural-urban parity in Taiwan's development is the combination of migration and remittances. See the discussion in Susan Greenhalgh, 'Families and Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development', in Edwin A. Winkler and Susan Greenhalgh (eds), *Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1988). Migrants may return with new skills and contacts, and they may set off chain migration, so that the benefits received in the home community need not be limited to the money received as remittances. Given the distinctive strength of family obligations in the Chinese kinship system, the likelihood of migrants benefiting their home communities and families is greater than in most other societies. For a clear illustration, involving an isolated village in Hong Kong being lifted out of poverty as a result of the restaurants its migrants established in Britain, see James L. Watson, *Emigration and the Chinese Lineage* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

22 Figures from *Zhongguo jiaoyu nianjian, 1949-1981* [China Education Almanac, 1949-1981] (Beijing: China Encyclopedia Press, 1984), p.1006. The figure given for the rural share of upper middle schooling in 1977 is even higher — 66 per cent. For primary schooling the increases were less dramatic — from a 77.2 per cent rural share of primary enrollments in 1962 to a 83.6 per cent figure for 1971 and 88.1 per cent in 1978 (see Table 1, line 4). See ibid.,

sure, some of this increase is artificial, attributable to the truncation of years of schooling during the Cultural Revolution and the relabeling of village primary schools as primary-and-lower middle schools. Nonetheless, the increases in rural enrollments were impressive, particularly those at the upper middle school level, which usually required getting to a school in the commune town.

A similar indicator on the health care front is the proportion of hospital beds in rural areas. In 1949 only 25.2 per cent of hospital beds were in rural hospitals (at the county level and below). This figure rose to 40.2 per cent by 1965, 53.8 per cent in 1970, 60.1 per cent in 1975, and 61.4 per cent in 1978 (see Table 1, line 7).[23] This

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p.1023. By the latter years some of the rural gain can be attributed to the faster urban decrease in fertility. Another indicator of the education gap is found in an article examining the educational attainment of women, using data from the 1982 census. For women born in the year 1940, there was a 50 per cent higher illiteracy rate (67 per cent vs 17 per cent) for rural than for urban women. For women born in 1960 the gap had been reduced to 27 per cent (28 per cent vs 1 per cent), and for those born in 1965 to 16 per cent (16 per cent vs 0 per cent). The same survey shows a more modest closing of the gap in rural versus urban completion of secondary schooling by women, from a 63 per cent advantage for urban women born in 1955 (20 per cent vs 83 per cent) to a 48 per cent gap for those women born a decade later (48 per cent vs 96 per cent). See William Lavely, Xiao Zhenyu, Li Bohua and Ronald Freedman, 'The Rise of Female Education in China: National and Regional Patterns', *The China Quarterly* 121 (1990), pp.61-93.

23 Percentages calculated from State Statistical Bureau, *China Statistical Yearbook, 1993* (Beijing: China Statistical Information and Consultancy Service, 1993), p.726; *Zhongguo weisheng nianjian 1986* [China Health Yearbook 1986] (Beijing: China Medical Publishing House, 1986), p.493 (for 1949 and 1978 figures). I thank Gail Henderson for providing me with the latter source and for advice on interpreting these statistics. See her article, 'Increased Inequality in Health Care', in Deborah Davis and Ezra Vogel (eds), *Chinese Society on the Eve of Tiananmen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p.270. It might be noted that the proportion

final figure is still considerably short of rural-urban parity, but these statistics do show realms where the rural-urban gap narrowed during the pre-reform period, despite the widening of the gap in so many other respects.

Declining Migration and Weakened Kinship Bonds

The new barriers to rural-urban migration helped to disrupt the chains of human ties that had knit together China's cities and villages. During the 1950s, to be sure, there was massive migration into the cities, as economic recovery, buoyant economic growth, and a mushrooming bureaucratic system created millions of new urban employment opportunities that could only be filled by recruits from China's countryside. After the Great Leap Forward, however, it was as if the last major wave of migrants to the city pulled up the ladder behind them and closed the door.[24] Sojourning in the form of temporary or contract labour jobs in the city was still available to the favoured few, but moving to the city was no longer a viable option for most of China's villagers. Urbanites found themselves enmeshed in very demanding work schedules and

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of doctors serving in rural areas (county and below, but not including village health workers and 'barefoot doctors') displayed a different trend over time, declining from 81.8 per cent in 1949 to 64.7 per cent in 1965, rising slightly to 65.7 per cent in 1970, and then declining again to 58.2 per cent in 1975 and 57.2 per cent in 1978 (see Table 1, line 8). (Figures calculated from the same two sources as for hospital beds.) However, since these figures presumably include traditional Chinese medical practitioners of varying training, the favourable supply situation of rural doctors in the early years may be exaggerated. These figures do not allow us to examine separately trends in rural and urban supply of modern trained or Western-style doctors.

24 Actually the change was even more dramatic, since an estimated 20 million urban residents, most of them recent migrants, were sent back to rural areas as part of the response to the collapse of the Great Leap Forward.

organisational discipline. Visits back to rural native places to take part in ritual life there became inconvenient or were even discouraged. Increasingly, urban young people found that their classmates were others similar to themselves, born and brought up in the city, rather than a mixture of the city-bred and new rural migrants.[25] Rural and urban branches of Chinese kin groups increasingly became disconnected strands, with different sets of life concerns and infrequent contacts.[26] Marriage patterns reinforced the self-enclosed nature of China's cities. A survey of 2,170 ever-married women between the ages of 20 and 55 carried out in Beijing in 1991 revealed that 90 per cent of the men these women married were Beijing residents at the time of the wedding, and 98 per cent of the husbands were urbanites![27]

The disruption of the human ties that had linked China's cities and villages prior to 1949 was not, to be sure, absolute. Some urban

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25 For systematic data on the dramatic shift toward urban origins of the younger generation in one major Chinese city (Chengdu) see my article, 'Adaptation of Rural Family Patterns to Urban Life in Chengdu', in G. Guldin and A. Southall (eds), *Urban Anthropology in China* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993).

26 I do not know of systematic statistics to document this impressionistic generalisation. I am currently engaged in a collabourative research project in Baoding, Hebei, and our questionnaire includes a range of questions asking about frequency of contacts with and assistance from various relatives. I hope to be able to use data from this survey to compare contacts with rural and urban kin more systematically.

27 Figures computed from the Survey of Marriage and Family in Beijing, conducted by the Population Studies Center at the University of Michigan, in collabouration with the Beijing College of Economics and the Social and Economic Research Centre of the Beijing Municipal Government. The degree of urban exclusiveness of marriages in Beijing appears to be more extreme than in other cities. Data from related surveys I have collabourated on in Chengdu, Sichuan, and in Baoding, Hebei, show somewhat higher numbers of marriages across the rural-urban divide.

parents coped with the dual burdens of work and family responsibilities by sending their children to be cared for by rural grandparents. Some ailing urban elderly, aware of the growing official demands for cremation in the cities, returned to their native villages so that they could be sure of a decent burial. Chinese kinship bonds and obligations are very strong, and seeking assistance from relatives on the other side of the rural-urban divide always remained an option. However, a wide variety of changes in addition to the new controls on migration created obstacles that weakened the social integration of China's cities and rural areas.

Post-1949 campaigns destroyed the native place and clan associations, guilds, and other traditional forms of grass-roots associations in China's cities, and the socialist transformation of the mid-1950s secured bureaucratic control over jobs, housing, and other urban resources. Through such changes, networks of patronage and mutual assistance based upon kinship and native place were disrupted, and new networks based upon political performance and loyalty were substituted.[28] By the same token the confiscation of lineage property and the campaigns against traditional religious activities and elabourate weddings and funerals in rural areas meant that important ritual and family events whose celebration had drawn urbanites back to their home villages began to disappear.[29] Other changes to be discussed below also

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28 One can debate the degree to which reliance on formal bureaucratic procedures replaced reliance on *guanxi* as a result of the post-1949 changes, or whether the 'rules of the game' required in order to cultivate *guanxi* simply changed. I think that both kinds of changes occurred, but in any case the result was that traditional modes of seeking assistance from relatives and personal contacts were no longer so effective. The most detailed treatment of the new interpersonal order in post-1949 urban China is Andrew Walder, *Communist Neotraditionalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

29 The timing of these changes varied. Lineage land and temples were for the most part confiscated during the land reform campaign of

cumulatively helped to weaken the bonds between relatives on opposite sides of the rural-urban divide.

Implementation of Divergent Organisational Systems

The psychological and human barriers between rural and urban were also increased as a result of the very different organisational systems that were implanted in the two realms after the revolution. Most urbanites became dependent upon state-run work units (*danwei*) and secondarily on residents' committees (*jumin weiyuanhui*).[30] City dwellers worked for fixed wages and received a wide range of fringe benefits, lived in cramped but heavily subsidised public housing, juggled ration booklets and coupons to meet family consumption needs from state stores, coped with difficult travel to work on public transportation, and tried to prepare their children to succeed in a highly bureaucratic and politically volatile environment, one in which their children would not be able to contribute economically until adulthood.

Their rural counterparts also had their lives transformed in a bureaucratic direction, but with substantially different results. Life in the countryside in the collective era meant not *danwei* and residents' committees, but teams, brigades and communes.[31] Work points rather than wages determined one's livelihood, and few fringe benefits were provided. Housing almost everywhere was financed and built by families, without public support or subsidies. Similarly, managing family consumption was not so much a matter

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1950-53; the attacks on traditional ritual life and elabourate family events peaked during the Great Leap Forward and again during the Cultural Revolution.

30 For a general overview, see Martin King Whyte and William L. Parish, *Urban Life in Contemporary China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

31 For an overview, consult William L. Parish and Martin King Whyte, *Village and Family in Contemporary China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

of ration coupons and state stores, but of combining the fruits of the family's own efforts on their private plot with the grain and cash they had earned through their collective labours (supplemented, when allowed, by free market exchanges). Despite the political uncertainties that rural areas shared with urban ones, training by parents in agricultural and domestic skills and assistance from children in work in both realms remained central to rural families.

Some of the contrasts I am drawing, to be sure, would be found between urban and rural areas in any developing society. My claim is that by implementing quite different organisational systems in China's cities and rural areas after 1949, Mao and other Chinese leaders created conditions that would make the gulf between the life experiences and daily concerns of urbanites and villagers much wider than in other countries, and certainly much wider than they had been in China prior to 1949. In theory some of the contrasts listed above involve not urban versus rural but state versus collective employment. For example, state employees residing in the countryside faced a somewhat hybrid existence, with fixed wages and ration coupons, but usually not subsidised public housing. However, life for those dependent upon urban collective employment was much more similar to that of other urbanites than it was to commune members.[32] On balance one can safely stress that the revolution created two increasingly distinct worlds of organisational experience that corresponded quite closely to the rural-urban divide.

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32 Urban collective units did tend to pay their employees less well than state units, and to provide a narrower range of fringe benefits. However, during the 1960s and 1970s the collective/state distinction became increasingly blurred, as collective units were expected to conform more closely to the regulations governing state enterprises. Those attached to urban collective units could identify more with low status state employees than with rural residents.

Enforced Contact and Stigmatisation of the Peasantry

As a byproduct of the systems of migration restrictions and household registration instituted during the 1950s, a two-caste system was established in China. Individuals belonged to either agricultural or non-agricultural households. As with any caste system, this status was inherited from one generation to the next. Curiously, while other ascribed statuses in the PRC (such as class origin labels) followed the traditional pattern of patrilineal inheritance, household registration status explicitly followed the maternal line.[33] Individuals born to rural mothers were, except in special circumstances, stuck for life with a rural registration.[34]

This system of migration restrictions and graded urban/rural status categories might have been sufficient, in combination with the attractions of urban places in any society, to cause a growing denigration of villagers and rural life by those who lived in China's cities. However, a set of practices was implemented in addition to this status hierarchy that guaranteed such denigration. Selection for movement up within the hierarchy became a rare privilege; enforced movement down to a less urban place, and particularly to a rural area, became a common punishment. Urban residence, even

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33 For a discussion of how the system worked, see Sulamith Heins Potter, 'The Position of Peasants in Modern China's Social Order', *Modern China* 9 (1983), pp.465-99. The practice of following the maternal line ensured that the children of men with urban registrations who chose to marry rural women would have rural registrations. An urban woman marrying a rural man was a much rarer occurrence.

34 Within the urban caste, of course, there were also important subcastes based upon household registration and migration regulations. Even though a person had a non-agricultural household registration, he or she was not entitled to the opportunities and benefits of a higher order urban place. In effect, then, these systems established a ladder-like hierarchy of urban places, with agricultural households as one vast bottom rung.

if for many years or even generations, was not a right but a privilege that could be lost.

Many of the campaigns to send urbanites down to the countryside were accompanied by rhetoric designed to obscure or minimise the fact that a loss of status was involved. Urban educated youths sent 'up to the mountains and down to the villages' were supposed to learn from the peasants and contribute to rural construction; intellectuals and cadres sent to 'May 7th Cadre Schools' after 1968 were depicted as part of a general scheme of rotating stints of purification via rural labour; urbanites dispersed to rural areas after the Ussuri River clashes in 1969 were portrayed as helping to prepare for a possible Soviet invasion. Since none of these moves was either universal or voluntary, and since it was particularly those who possessed questionable individual or family histories and lacked bureaucratic patrons who were 'sent down', the rhetoric was not successful in hiding the fact that a severe form of downward mobility was involved. The precariousness of urban status and privileges led most urban families to exert tremendous efforts to maintain that status, or to regain it if it had been lost.[35]

One can debate whether, on balance, the day-to-day experiences of enforced common residence and work in the countryside of urbanites and villagers which were so common during the period between 1949 and 1978 created more amity or enmity. Individual accounts of these experiences differ, with some stressing heightened appreciation of rural life and culture, and others emphasising the bleakness and backwardness of the villages.[36] We know from research on intergroup relations in other

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35 Urban youths who had been sent to the countryside prior to 1966 saw the Cultural Revolution as a chance to express their grievances with the policy and demand a return to the cities. Many joined rebel Red Guard factions that contributed to the turmoil of the period. See the discussion in Bernstein, op. cit., ch.6.

36 For an example of a fairly positive account, see Jack Chen, *A Year in Upper Felicity* (New York: Macmillan, 1973); for a quite different picture, consult He Liyi, *Mr. China's Son* (Boulder: Westview, 1993)

societies that prolonged contact between status equals promotes mutual appreciation, while prolonged contact between groups with unequal status is likely to heighten mutual antagonism.[37] On balance the negative outcome was probably more often true in China. Higher-status urbanites forced to endure hardship in the countryside were unlikely to feel common cause with the villagers around them, and certainly a high regard for villagers and rural life is not a sentiment widely shared in China's cities today. Nor does it appear common for urbanites to stay in close touch with the villagers they lived and worked with during their rural exile periods. Rural labour stints for urbanites, intended to help break down the 'contradiction' between city and countryside, generally ended up having the opposite effect.

The Growing Gap in Culture and Customs

Given the many structural differences and barriers constructed after 1949 between rural and urban, it is not surprising that the customs and ways of life of Chinese villagers and urbanites increasingly diverged. Perhaps the most extreme example of this divergence is to be found in the customs surrounding death. In China's large cities cremation increasingly replaced burial from the 1950s, and eventually became mandatory. In rural areas, with few exceptions, burial remains the rule even today. Accompanying this distinction

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and Yu Luojin, *A Chinese Winter's Tale* (Hong Kong: Renditions, 1986).

37 The classic statement is Gordon Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley, 1954). For a review of later research on this point, see M. Hewstone and R. Brown (eds), *Contact and Conflict in Encounters* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). One other factor affecting group relations is whether the two groups are involved in competitive or cooperative activities. Both typically occurred when urbanites practised 'three togethers' with their peasant hosts. However, the inherent zero-sum nature of work point remuneration systems probably tipped the balance toward competition and, therefore, toward antagonism.

are a number of others — for example, urban funerals became spartan, collective affairs with local cadres officiating, while rural funerals remained family-based and more elabourate; in addition, religious rituals and death anniversary observances that used to be obligatory virtually disappeared in large cities, while at least truncated versions of such rituals, even including 'second burials' in some regions, persisted in the countryside.[38]

Diverging customs became visible in many other realms. Arranged marriages virtually disappeared in large cities, and introductions arranged by parents became less and less common. In the countryside, in contrast, parental introductions remained quite common, and parentally dictated marriage partners not rare. In most rural areas a substantial bride-price payment had to be given by the groom's family to the bride's. In the cities family-to-family exchanges (either bride-price or dowry) became rare, although from the 1970s onward, expectations soared that the groom would present expensive gifts to the bride herself. In the cities many young couples started out married life in a separate residence, and living with the wife's parents became an acceptable arrangement, if still less common than moving in with the husband's family. In most rural areas, in contrast, moving in with the husband's parents was still the general rule. Residence with the bride's family was seen as highly undesirable, and this fact is connected with other growing disparities between rural and urban customs. In China's large cities daughters as well as sons began to share responsibility for supporting aging parents; in rural areas support only from sons remained the general rule.[39]

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38 See my paper, 'Death in the People's Republic of China', in James Watson and Evelyn Rawski (eds), *Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). The 'second burial' custom, in which the bones of the deceased are dug up, cleaned, placed in a special urn, and reburied in an appropriate site, continues in many areas of Guangdong and Fujian.

39 These contrasts are based primarily on my own past research in collabouration with William Parish. See Parish and Whyte, *Village*

The realm in which the divergence of patterns between rural and urban can be documented most precisely is fertility. In the early 1950s the average rural mother was having only about 16 per cent more children than her urban counterpart. In 1960 the Great Leap-induced famine wiped out this differential, with urban mothers tending to have 3 per cent *more* births than rural ones. In later years, however, a sharp differential emerged as urban women reduced their fertility much more than rural women. Rural women tended to have about twice as many babies as their urban counterparts (see Table 1, line 9).[40] In recent years this disparity has been enshrined in official family planning enforcement, with women in big cities required to conform to the 'one child' policy, while rural women generally face a *de facto* two child limit.

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and Family in Contemporary China, op. cit.; and Whyte and Parish, *Urban Life in Contemporary China*, op. cit. Although our work was not based on a representative selection of locales in China and was heavily slanted toward Guangdong, the generalisations offered above seem consistent with the work done by others in different locales. However, we lack ethnographic descriptions of the contemporary customs of large parts of the Chinese countryside. Evidence that rural and urban practices in regard to mate choice and weddings diverged in the 1950s is presented in my article, 'Adaptation of Rural Family Patterns to Urban Life in Chengdu', op. cit.

40 The statistic being referred to in this section is the total fertility rate (TFR), which is a projection demographers calculate to indicate how many births an average woman would have in her lifetime if current fertility patterns continued. In 1950 the rural TFR was 5.7 and the urban TFR 4.9; in 1955 the comparable figures were 6.3 and 5.4, and in 1960 4.0 and 4.1. In recent years the rural TFR has generally been in the 2.5-3 range, and the urban TFR in the 1.2-1.5 range. See Ansley Coale and Chen Shenli, *Basic Data on Fertility in the Provinces of China, 1940-1982* (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1987); Zhong Guochen, Huang Dexing and Pan Chuanjiu (eds), *Quanguo shengyu jieyu chouyang diaocha baogaoji, shengyu juan* [Collection of Reports on the National Fertility and Birth Control Survey, Fertility Volume] (Beijing: Zhongguo Renkou Chubanshe, 1993), p.13.

As a result of the enlarging of such disparities in social, cultural, and even religious patterns, China's urbanites and villagers had less in common than they did before the revolution. Indeed, urbanites who where sent to live in the countryside in the 1970s often felt like amateur anthropologists, confronted with strange customs that had to be deciphered. The fact that many such customs were traditional ones that urban rusticants had never learned did not make it any easier to appreciate them. Given all of the other structures and practices discussed earlier, it was easy for Chinese urbanites to conclude that rural people were ignorant and backward, hopelessly mired in feudal attitudes and behaviour.

To sum up, in fundamental respects the gap between city and countryside grew much larger during the period of Mao Zedong's rule. Underneath the egalitarian rhetoric, a structure was being institutionalised that had more in common with feudalism than socialism. Rural residents were bound to the land and required to engage in agricultural production. Urban residents were also tightly bound to their work units and residences, where the preferential treatment they received encouraged them to look down on their rural brethren. The population was divided into two separate castes, with increasingly diverging lives and concerns. China's peasants were the moving force behind the revolution, but most of the fruits of victory were reserved for urbanites.

Sources of Urban Bias, 1949-1978

How did it happen that a new government with deep roots in the Chinese countryside implemented policies and practices that promoted such pervasive forms of urban bias? A proper answer would require access to a multitude of internal documents from the 1950s, when most elements of the system were put in place. Instead I offer here a speculative explanation, based on the logic of the many policies and practices involved. At the core of the new system of rural-urban relations were the institutions designed to restrict urban migration and to create contrasting organisational systems in

city and countryside. Together, these core elements suggest a special concern of China's post-1949 leaders with preserving urban social order. Mao and his colleagues seemed particularly anxious to give everyone who resided in large cities a secure place there (in terms of jobs, housing, health care, and protection from unemployment, crime, and other urban ills), while at the same time preventing those who didn't have such a secure place from flooding into the cities. Concern for the peasants was of a lesser order — their livelihood should be improved as much as possible, but primarily through the efforts of local communities, rather than through state guarantees and funds. It appears as if the rural roots of China's revolution meant that Mao and his colleagues took the peasantry for granted, while they felt they had to devote special attention to the needs of cities and urban dwellers.

I am suggesting, paradoxically, that the institutionalisation of such comprehensive advantages for urbanites may be attributable to the special fear and hostility that the Chinese Communist Party felt toward cities and urban life. Cities had been, after all, centres of KMT control since the failed urban insurrections of 1927. They had also been centres of foreign influence, and of prostitution, secret societies, drug addiction, begging, and other social evils. Cities were also, of course, centres of critical intellectual life and social protest movements against unjust rulers. The inexperience of the CCP in running large cities until 1948 convinced some foreign observers that the new government could not possibly do so without continued Western assistance and involvement.[41] This hope proved illusory, but China's new leaders may have felt that, compared with mobilising villagers for guerrilla struggle and land reform, the task of subduing the cities would be much more difficult.[42] Fixation

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41 See Noel Barber, *The Fall of Shanghai* (London: Macmillan, 1979).

42 This discussion was developed more fully in my earlier book with William Parish, *Urban Life in Contemporary China*, op. cit. See also the discussion in Lu Feng, 'The Origins and Formation of the Unit (*Danwei*) System', *Chinese Sociology and Anthropology* (Spring 1993), pp.1-92. On the reasons for China's urban bias, consult also

with the problem of making sure that urbanites would not cause them problems led the CCP to adopt practices that institutionalised severe disadvantages for the rural population.

The assumption that villagers would benefit from having China led by individuals of rural origin turned out to be dead wrong. In more democratic societies it may be the case that leaders from the countryside feel they have to serve the interests of their rural constituents, but in China's Leninist state very different considerations applied. Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders felt bound by no constitutuency, rural or otherwise, and it was precisely their lack of a social base in the cities that led them to adopt measures that served urban interests.

One other element that has to be taken into account in explaining the ironic urban bias enforced after 1949 is the role of Marxist ideology. The Marxism of China's new leaders oriented them to think in terms of classes as the fundamental units of social and political analysis. Given the agrarian nature of the society they had gained control of, the CCP had to modify conventional class analysis to suit Chinese conditions, adding a multitude of categories. Nonetheless, in practice these categories were lumped together into 'good class' and 'bad class' groupings, which then became the basis for repeated class struggle campaigns. Indeed, class origin labels became the focus for preference, sanctions, and political struggles long after they had ceased to have any meaningful relationship to the means of production or present economic circumstances.[43] If there were issues of exploitation, injustice, or redistribution in China, these were seen in terms of official class categories. Urban versus rural did not fit this framework, since good and bad classes existed on both sides of the divide.

Peter Nolan and Gordon White, 'Urban Bias, Rural Bias or State Bias? Urban-Rural Relations in Post-Revolutionary China', *Journal of Development Studies* 20 (1984), pp.55-82.

43 See the discussion in Richard Kraus, *Class Conflict in Chinese Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

Curiously, it was Mao Zedong who particularly championed other ways of looking at the Chinese social landscape. In speeches and articles such as 'On the Ten Major Relationships' (1956) and 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People' (1957), Mao stressed the importance of non-class cleavages, including the 'contradiction' between rural and urban. He also noted the danger that such 'non-antagonistic contradictions' could be transformed into antagonistic ones. Nevertheless, in his later years Mao presided over an accentuation of class struggle during which concern for non-class cleavages fell by the wayside. Whenever potential contradictions between rural and urban were discussed, the response tended to involve public relations slogans about friendship and mutual support across the divide and self-reliant development for rural communities, rather than a serious redirection of state investment priorities or other efforts to make the conditions of life in cities and countryside more equal.[44] The primacy of class analysis and class struggle during the period prior to 1978 obscured the extent to which the rural-urban gap was being aggravated. This lack of attention and concern prevented anything from being done to reverse the trend toward a growing rural-urban cleavage.

The Reform Era: Closing the Rural-Urban Gap?

The reform policies instituted in China since 1978 include no commitment to close the rural-urban gap or, for that matter, to

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44 The regular practice of sending large numbers of urbanites to live and work in rural areas might seem an exception to this generalisation. At the time these programs were described as intended in part to foster rural economic development. However, the financial burden of these programs on the state budget was minimal and these programs also had the effect of reducing the number of people entitled to urban benefits and guarantees. See the discussion in Bernstein, op. cit. For the dismal record of the PRC in agricultural investment, see Lardy, *Agriculture in China's Modern Economic Development*, op. cit.

foster any other aspect of equality. Instead, with rapid economic development the central objective, whatever policies and trends are likely to further that goal were accepted. Many observers argue that the result has been both dynamic growth and rising inequality. However, given the paradoxical fact that the previous commitment to equality coincided temporally with the institutionalisation of a caste-like cleavage between China's cities and villages, it is worth considering whether the rural-urban gap has widened or narrowed since 1978.[45] The same five aspects of rural-urban relations discussed earlier (the income gap, migration and kinship bonds, organisational systems, rural-urban contacts, and the gap in culture and customs) will be examined briefly in the pages that follow.

The best available estimates indicate that initially there was some closing of the gap in incomes between rural and urban China after 1978. The significant rise in agricultural procurement prices at the outset of the reforms, the collapse of collectivised agriculture, the restoration of freedom to engage in market exchanges, and other changes produced a more rapid increase in rural than urban incomes. In official statistics the per capita income gap shrank from 2.36:1 in 1978 to less than 1.9:1 by the mid-1980s.[46] However, after the mid-1980s, as the impact of the rural changes receded and grain yields stagnated, and as urban reforms were pushed vigorously ahead, the trend was reversed, with the rural-urban income gap widening to its 1978 level or even worse (see Table 1, lines 2-3).[47] While the average income gap between city and

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45 See also the discussion in Jean Oi, 'Reform and Urban Bias in China', *Journal of Development Studies* 29 (1993), pp.129-48.

46 See Zhao Renwei, 'Three Features of the Distribution of Income', op. cit., Table 2.5.

47 Official statistics give the per capita urban-rural ratio for 1990 as 2.42:1 (see ibid). The more detailed collabourative 1988 income survey reported on in the same volume produced a per capita urban-rural income estimate for that year of 2.43:1, whereas the estimate for 1988 from China's State Statistical Bureau was only 2.19:1, so these official figures probably underestimate the size of the gap in all

countryside has deteriorated since the mid-1980s, the growing diversity in economic activity in the countryside may obscure this fact in popular conciousness. Given the publicity devoted to booming rural industries and to local industrial magnates who build elabourate mansions and drive around dusty rural roads in chauffeured foreign-made limousines, villagers and urbanites may not be fully aware of the overall deterioration in the relative incomes of rural families.[48]

In regard to other aspects of popular welfare the rural-urban gap has widened further during the reform era. The years after 1978 saw a sharp decline in rural secondary school enrollments, as village parents kept children (and particularly daughters) at home to work. As a result, the rural share of students enrolled in lower middle schools fell from 77.5 per cent in 1978 to 68.2 per cent in 1986 and 59.7 per cent in 1993, while the drop in the rural share at the upper middle school level was even more dramatic — from 61.1

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years. On the stagnation in rural incomes since the mid-1980s, see also Scott Rozelle and Leying Jiang, 'Survival Strategies and Recession in China's Agricultural Economy', paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Meetings, Boston, April 1994; Scott Rozelle, 'Stagnation without Equity: Patterns of Growth and Inequality in China's Rural Economy', *The China Journal* 35 (January 1996, forthcoming). Official Chinese statistics on trends in per capita consumption in urban and rural areas display a similar, curvilinear trend during the reform era. The urban to rural per capita consumption ratio stood at 2.9 in 1978; it was reduced to only 2.2 in 1985 but then began to worsen once again, reaching 3.1 in 1992. Figures from State Statistical Bureau, *China Statistical Yearbook 1993*, op. cit., p.246.

48 I do not mean to suggest that China's villagers are generally optimistic that they can attain prosperity. In recent years there have been recurring rural riots and other forms of protest against poor economic treatment. However, it may be the case that hostility in poor rural areas is directed more toward people in richer villages and regions, and less toward urbanites in general, than would have been the case in earlier years.

per cent to 25.2 per cent and then 18.5 per cent over the same years (see Table 1, lines 5-6).[49] Along the same lines, the reform era saw a collapse of a large portion of the rural cooperative medical insurance systems established during the collective era, with various kinds of pay-as-you-go collective and private medical facilities only partially filling the gap.[50] The number of village midwives and health care workers declined sharply, and the proportion of hospital beds in rural hospitals fell from 61.4 per cent in 1978 to 55 per cent in 1986 and 42.9 per cent in 1993 (see Table 1, line 7).[51]

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49 See the sources cited in Table 1. According to the same sources, the share of rural students in national primary school enrollments dropped from 88.1 per cent to 82.7 per cent and then 72.2 per cent during this same period (see Table 1, line 4). As another reflection of the rural drop, in the study of female educational attainment cited earlier, the rural-urban gap in women students completing secondary schooling widened once more from 48 per cent (96 per cent urban completion versus 48 per cent rural completion) for those born in 1965 to 56 per cent (92 per cent versus 36 per cent) for those born in 1967. See Lavely et al., op. cit., p.67.

50 In 1989 only 4.8 per cent of China's administrative villages still had cooperative medical insurance programs in operation. See Gail Henderson, John Akin, Li Zhiming, Jin Shuigao, Ma Haijiang and Ge Keyou, 'Equity and the Utilization of Health Services: Report of an Eight-Province Survey in China', *Social Science Medicine* 39 (1994), p.687. See also Henderson, op. cit.

51 The number of village midwives decreased from 743,498 in 1978 to 466,974 in 1988, while the number of village doctors and health care workers declined from 1,559,214 in 1975 to 1,247,045 in 1988. Figures from *Zhongguo weisheng nianjian, 1989* [China Health Yearbook 1989] (Beijing: China Medical Publishing House, 1989), pp.572-3. I thank Gail Henderson for referring me to this source. The hospital bed figures are computed from *China Statistical Yearbook, 1993*, op. cit., p.726. During the reform period, the proportion of doctors serving in rural hospitals continued its long decline, from 57.2 per cent in 1978 to only 41.2 per cent in 1993 (see Table 1, line

The contrasting trends in rural per capita income versus access to education and health care in both the collective and reform eras indicate that policies that affect the public/private balance in the use of funds have a particularly dramatic impact in the Chinese countryside. The depression of rural household incomes and consumption levels during the Maoist era stemmed in part from state-enforced local investment in community infrastructure, including health care and educational facilities. In the reform era, rural households have captured more of the economic gains, but community infrastructures have suffered.[52]

While no sustained progress has been made in reducing the rural-urban gap in income and welfare in the reform period, more substantial progress has been made in regard to weakening barriers against migration. The household registration system remains more or less intact, although there are now provisions allowing those with agricultural registrations to convert these to rural township registrations if they meet certain conditions. More significantly,

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8). These figures refer to physicians and do not include the village health care workers.

52 What is not clear is whether any substantial share of the deterioration of the rural share of school enrollments and of health care facilities can be accounted for by migration to urban areas and administrative reclassification of rural areas under urban jurisdictions during the reform period. One careful recent study concludes that the most accurate estimate of the urban share of China's population in 1990 is 27 per cent. See Kam Wing Chan, 'Urbanization and Rural-Urban Migration in China since 1982: A New Baseline', *Modern China* 20 (1994), pp.243-81. Using this figure, the rural share of all the educational and health facilities shown in Table 1 for recent years except primary school enrollments display clear and increasing urban bias. (Even primary schooling may contain a slight urban bias, given the higher fertility levels in recent years in the countryside). However, several contradictory figures on the urban share of the population have been used in Chinese sources in recent years, as discussed in the Chan article, and it is not clear what breakdown lies at the base of the various series shown in Table 1.

urban rationing has been dramatically reduced, as have prohibitions against urban families and employers hiring individuals without local registrations. Changes such as these have unleashed a flood of migration, with some estimating that at any point in time there are 80-100 million members of a 'floating population' residing in China's cities.

Rural individuals still cannot readily obtain urban registrations, and even if they stay and work in an urban area for years they retain their separate and lower status. In addition, they mostly perform arduous and dirty jobs that urbanites would not want to perform. Nevertheless, millions feel that low status urban jobs are preferable to staying in the village. Furthermore, with the breakdown of the commune system, large-scale migration across rural areas has also resumed. One of the largest surveys undertaken of the new migration flows found, in fact, that nearly 50 per cent of the out-migrants had gone to other rural areas, rather than into the cities.[53] These changes mean that in distressed villages people once again have the option of going where they can earn a better living and send funds back home.

It is unclear whether this increased movement of people has done much to rebuild kinship bonds across the rural-urban divide. To be sure, most members of the floating population in China's cities are sojourners from villages and towns and retain strong bonds there. However, the marginal nature of the urban identities of most 'floaters' means that they cannot do as much to forge human ties between city and countryside as they could if they secured a more permanent urban status. Some of the new migrants may have used long-standing and perhaps dormant kinship relations with urbanites to gain access to urban jobs. However, this does not appear to be the dominant mode used by 'floaters' to obtain access

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53 See Geng Dechang (ed.), *Quanguo 220-cun laodongli qingkuang diaocha zilaoji, 1978-1986* [Materials from a Survey of the Labour Force in 220 Villages in China, 1978-1986] (Beijing: China Statistical Press, 1989). The survey covered 91,989 households in villages in 11 provinces in 1986.

to urban opportunities, and I am not aware of any general inclination of China's urbanites to search for their roots in their native villages and rekindle dormant kinship relations.[54] Nor is there any evidence to suggest that urbanites in greater numbers are marrying individuals from the countryside. Despite the increased movement of people in China today, the dual caste nature of rural and urban residence established during the years of Mao's rule persists today and inhibits the development of kinship ties between urban and rural castes.

The organisational systems that affect the lives of Chinese have altered since 1978, modestly in the cities and more dramatically in the countryside. In rural areas, of course, the dismantling of the communes and the institutionalisation of the household contract system have revived the family as the primary organiser of production activity. In the cities a modest proportion of private enterprises, generally taking the form of family-run firms, has arisen as well, and there are also foreign joint ventures and other novel organisational forms. However, most urbanites still have their lives organised by state enterprises or the rapidly growing collective enterprises. This means that the conditions of organisational life and social control for most rural and urban residents are even more divergent than during the pre-reform period. Whereas in China's cities the grip of work units, residents committees, and other bureaucratic forms has weakened only

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54 One study conducted in Dongguan city in the Pearl River Delta region of Guangdong found that less than 10 per cent of the outside workers hired in that city had relied on introductions through friends and relatives. The bulk of such hires occurred through bureaucratic arrangements by city and rural county labour bureaus and by enterprise labour bosses. From an unpublished survey cited in Dorothy Solinger, 'China's Urban Transients in the Transition from Socialism and the Collapse of the Communist "Urban Public Goods Regime"', *Comparative Politics* 27 (1995), p.131.

slightly, in the countryside the collapse of the commune system has more substantially 'de-bureaucratised' rural life.[55]

If we take a broader view, however, we will note important trends that make the conditions of rural and urban life more similar than in the past. The dismantling of the urban rationing system and the flowering of market activity in China mean that both villagers and urbanites face pressures to produce products or services with market appeal and a need to make consumption decisions when faced by multiple choices. To the homogenising impact of the market can be added the influence of communications. Although the poorest and most remote villages are still being bypassed, the spread of television and other forms of modern communications into the countryside means that increasingly Chinese villagers are participating in much the same media and cultural universe as are urbanites.[56] As a result of trends such as these, China's urbanites and rural residents are not as walled off from one another culturally

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55 There is a substantial debate over whether decollectivisation and other post-1978 changes have given rural residents greater autonomy from bureaucratic control, and if so, to what degree. Clearly Chinese villagers still are subject to powerful controls over many of their activities, as the draconian enforcement of official family planning policy shows most vividly. However, the intimate regulation of the day-to-day work and private lives of rural residents has clearly weakened substantially with the collapse of the commune system. See my paper, 'Who Hates Bureaucracy? A Chinese Puzzle', in Victor Nee and David Stark (eds), *Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989). For an alternative view, see Vivienne Shue, *The Reach of the State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).

56 By some estimates about 10 per cent of China's population still does not have access to electricity, a figure which means that about 15 per cent of the rural population is left out. See *The New York Times*, 7 November 1994. In the commune era the media experience of most rural residents differed quite sharply from urbanites, with wired broadcasting networks being a central feature of rural, but not urban, life.

as in the past, despite the continued contrasts in the way most work is organised in the two settings.

One major change in rural-urban relations in the reform era has been the virtual termination of programs to send urbanites to resettle in the countryside.[57] The cities and not the countryside are now where most contacts between rural and urban residents occur. China's large cities are awash with both large numbers of 'floaters' and also with regular streams of rural sellers of produce and handicrafts. Since these contacts occur as a result of voluntary moves 'upward' in the urban hierarchy, rather than involuntary moves 'downward', they are less likely to produce resentment and conflict. However, several features of the situation limit the ability of these contemporary contacts to foster mutual understanding and appreciation. Rural migrant workers are repeatedly made aware of their lower caste status and are relatively powerless and vulnerable to mistreatment and exploitation in the cities.[58] Urbanites, for their part, have very little opportunity to get to know members of the floating population personally and learn about their ways of life, and many fear rural migrants as a source crime and other social problems. The relatively superficial and ambivalent contacts between rural and urban residents do little to bridge the psychological barriers between rural and urban that were erected during the Mao years.[59]

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57 There are occasional reports recently of urbanites still being mobilised to serve in rural locales and in border and minority areas. However, these efforts appear to be on a smaller scale and to be carried out on a more truly voluntary basis than the rustication campaigns of the Mao era. After 1978 most of the urban educated youths who remained in the countryside from those earlier campaigns were allowed to return to the cities.

58 See the discussion in Dorothy Solinger, 'China's Transients and the State: A Form of Civil Society?', *Politics and Society* 21 (1993), pp.91-122.

59 One survey conducted in Beijing in 1991-92 found that 83 per cent of the migrants surveyed had no personal contacts with any local

Indeed, China's urbanites continue to view their rural countrymen as backward and ignorant, and to rationalise the privileges of urban residents as the deserved perquisites of those who can contribute most to national development. Recent research raise serious questions about this rationalisation. A survey of individual attitudes was carried out by Alex Inkeles and colleagues in 1990 in Tianjin and its rural suburbs. Three decades earlier Inkeles launched a research program which focused on examining the development of 'modern' attitudes in individuals in six nations. Over the years his surveys were replicated in many additional countries, including one state socialist society (Bulgaria in 1988). In this research Inkeles and his collabourators were able to validate a syndrome of modern attitudes which is much the same around the globe, and which includes components such as feelings of personal efficacy, the ability to rationally plan one's activities, an inclination to use scientific approaches to solve problems, and so forth.[60]

In every other country in which such surveys have been carried out, including socialist Bulgaria, urban people were significantly more modern in their attitudes than rural people. In Tianjin, in dramatic contrast, rural people were significantly more modern than urbanites! Furthermore, within urban areas, individuals employed in state enterprises were the *least modern* of all the groups included in the sample.[61] Inkeles and his colleagues explain these counter-intuitive findings by arguing that the nature

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residents (figures from an unpublished MA thesis at Beijing University by Zhu Suhong, cited in Solinger, 'China's Urban Transients in the Transition from Socialism', op. cit., footnote 44).

60 For a detailed discussion of the attitude syndrome of 'overall modernity' and its correlates in the original six countries studied (India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Israel, Chile and Argentina), see Alex Inkeles and David Smith, *Becoming Modern* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).

61 See Alex Inkeles, C. Montgomery Broaded and Zhongde Cao, 'Causes and Consequences of Individual Modernity in Mainland China', unpublished paper, 1995.

of contemporary Chinese urban life, despite reforms, continues to encourage orientations of fatalism and dependency much like a 'traditional' feudal or tribal society, rather than the rational planning and sense of personal efficacy fostered by urban institutions in other societies. In rural areas, in contrast, the reforms have more substantially broken down the collective dependency of the Mao era and substituted conditions of life in which individuals and families know they have to rationally plan and sacrifice for the future in order to survive and get ahead. The more substantial nature of China's rural reforms, as compared with those in the city, has thus reversed the 'normal' differentials in personal attitudes and orientations. If we accept this argument, then this evidence indicates that China's rural residents now possess on average orientations more conducive to economic development than do urbanites, yet urbanites continue to stigmatise them as backward.

In terms of the final realm considered earlier, it is not clear whether the gap in culture and customs that grew between China's cities and villages prior to 1978 is being reduced. In one realm, fertility rates, surveys from the early 1990s indicate a further tightening of family planning enforcement, with China's population growth rate falling below replacement level. This stunning development means that rural fertility rates have decreased substantially, reducing the rural:urban fertility gap somewhat below the 2:1 figure common during the 1980s (see Table 1, line 12).[62] However, in other realms it appears that reform-era changes have

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62 See the figures cited in Griffith Feeney and Yuan Jianhua, 'Below Replacement Fertility in China? A Close Look at Recent Evidence', unpublished paper, March 1994, Table 3. According to figures calculated from a 1992 survey conducted by China's State Family Planning Commission, by 1991 the total fertility rate in rural China dropped below 2 (see Table 1, line 12). For a discussion of how this reduction was achieved in rural areas, see Susan Greenhalgh, Zhu Chuzhu and Li Nan, 'Restraining Population Growth in Three Chinese Villages, 1988-93', *Population and Development Review* 20 (1994), pp.365-95.

contributed to increased divergence between urban and rural customs. The reform era political and economic changes have allowed two formerly suppressed cultural streams to revive and spread — Western culture and traditional Chinese culture.[63] Although signs of both cultural streams are visible in cities and villages alike, Westernisation is the dominant trend in large cities, and a resurgence of traditional customs is more visible in the villages, despite the homogenising influence to television and other media mentioned earlier. Be it Western fashions, classical Western music, beauty pageants, or break-dancing, urbanites are more affected than rural residents, while ancestor worship, consulting geomancers, building new lineage halls, and other revivals or modified versions of traditional customs are more a feature of contemporary village life.[64] On balance it does not appear that reform-era changes have reduced the rural-urban gap in customs and may even have widened it.

Conclusion

The reform era changes have had a mixed and ambiguous impact on the rural-urban gap. In some respects the cleavage between town and city has been reduced, while in others it appears not to have

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63 See my article, 'Evolutionary Changes in Chinese Culture', in C. Morrison and R. Dernberger (eds), *Asia-Pacific Report, 1989* (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1989).

64 Referring to these customs as 'traditional' obviously does not mean that I accept a view of Chinese villagers as generally backward or superstitious. Rather, as noted in discussing the survey conducted by Alex Inkeles and colleagues, in certain respects Chinese villagers in the 1990s appear to be more modern in their outlooks than urban people. My use of the term simply indicates that in figuring out how to cope with the world around them and in carving out a set of customs to express their increased autonomy from the socialist state, villagers are more likely than urbanites to draw on (and often modify) a repertoire of customs that were familiar from before the revolution.

changed or has widened. On balance, the legacy of the extreme gap that had developed between rural and urban during the Mao era has not been reduced in any substantial way. Despite much greater movement of people away from China's villages and into the cities, China is still characterised essentially by a two-caste system, with fundamental distinctions in the lives and opportunities of the people born into each caste and relatively little mutual appreciation and understanding between the castes. If the terminology were still in widespread use, it would be fair to say that during the era of Mao's rule an antagonistic or potentially antagonistic contradiction was created between China's cities and countryside that persists to this day. This contradiction complicates efforts to develop China and maintain social control, and it would pose serious obstacles to any future effort to democratise China.[65] In a fully reformed, market-based society there is no place for such a caste structure, which generates injustice and resentments and wastes human talent.

Given the existence of such a profound urban bias for more than a generation, it would require major policy changes and huge state investments in both the countryside and in cities to substantially reduce the rural-urban gap.[66] An alternative and

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65 The urbanites who have been the primary advocates of democratic reforms in China seem to be profoundly nervous about the prospect of sharing electoral and other political rights with their much more numerous rural brethren. Long before 1949 advocates of democracy argued that some form of tutelage or indirect participation was necessary in the countryside in order to compensate for the presumed political immaturity of rural people. See the discussion in Andrew J. Nathan, *Chinese Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1985). In view of this contention it is worth noting that in many other East Asian states, and particularly in Japan, electoral arrangements are rigged so that rural people have much *more* political voice than urbanites (although the rural populations in question are, of course, much smaller both relatively and absolutely).

66 A primary reason why major urban investments would be needed is to provide housing and other infrastructure required to cope with expanded rural to urban migration.

cheaper approach would be to gradually eliminate the many forms of special treatment and subsidies enjoyed by urban residents, but to do so would risk the urban social turmoil that China's leaders so fear.[67] There are occasional reports of high-level policy discussions in Beijing aimed at phasing out the household registration and migration restriction systems and the organisational disparities that divide Chinese cities off from the villages, but so far no systematic effort along these lines has been mounted.[68] Whether or how the remaining elements that divide town and countryside into two separate castes can be dismantled is one of the most severe challenges facing China's future leadership.

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67 Dorothy Solinger argues that the existence of a huge floating population in China's cities is unintentionally whittling away these special urban privileges, which she terms the 'urban public goods regime'. See her article, 'China's Urban Transients in the Transition from Socialism', op. cit.

68 See the news report by Kathy Chen, 'China to Erase Policy Favouring City over Farm', *Wall Street Journal*, 26 April 1994, p.A19.

Table 1: Selected Quantitative Indicators of Trends in the Rural-Urban Gap in China

	1949	1952	1957	1962	1965	1970	1975	1978	1980
Per capita income:									
1. Urban/rural income estimates			ca.2:1					ca.3:1	
2. Official urban/rural income			3.48:1		2.38:1			2.36:1	2.30:1
3. 1988 survey urban/rural income									
Education:									
4. Rural % of primary students				77.2	80.9	83.6	87.8	88.1	87.3
5. Rural % of lower middle students				37.1	33.7	73.0	72.0	77.5	77.5
6. Rural % of upper middle students				7.8	9.0	61.3	54.0	61.1	45.6
Medical facilities:									
7. Rural % of hospital beds	25.2	24.4	25.1	36.7	40.2	53.8	60.1	61.4	61.3
8. Rural % of doctors	81.8	80.9	74.7	68.9	64.7	65.7	58.2	57.2	54.3
Fertility rates:									
9. Rural/urban TFR series 1	1.2:1		1.1:1	0.98:1		1.9:1	2.2:1	1.9:1	2.1:1
10. Rural/urban TFR series 2									2.2:1
11. Rural/urban TFR series 3									1.7:1
12. Rural/urban TFR series 4									

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Per capita income:									
1. Urban/rural income estimates									
2. Official urban/rural income	1.88:1	2.15:1	2.19:1	2.19:1	2.31:1	2.42:1			2.54:1
3. 1988 survey urban/rural income				2.42:1					
Education:									
4. Rural % of primary students	82.8	82.7	81.5	80.1	78.6	78.4	76.1	74.3	72.2
5. Rural % of lower middle students	68.1	68.2	68.4	67.5	66.4	66.3	64.1	61.6	59.7
6. Rural % of upper middle students	26.7	25.2	26.4	25.8	24.6	24.1	22.1	20.7	18.5
Medical facilities:									
7. Rural % of hospital beds	56.8	55.0	53.1	49.9	48.0	47.1	46.1	44.5	42.9
8. Rural % of doctors	49.8	48.1	46.5	45.2	44.7	44.5	43.7	42.3	41.2
Fertility rates:									
9. Rural/urban TFR series									
10. Rural/urban TFR series 2	2.3:1	2.3:1	2.2:1						
11. Rural/urban TFR series 3	2.0:1	2.0:1	2.0:1						
12. Rural/urban TFR series 4			1.9:1	1.9:1	1.9:1	1.8:1	1.9:1	1.7:1	

Sources:

1. Urban/rural income estimates: rough, consensus estimates made by Western authorities (see discussion in the text).

2. Official urban/rural income: through 1992 from Zhao Renwei, 'Three Features of the Distribution of Income during the Transition to Reform', in K. Griffin and Zhao Renwei (eds), *The Distribution of Income in China* (London: Macmillan, 1993), p.82. Figure given for 1965 is actually the estimate for 1964. Figure for 1993 computed from State Statistical Bureau, *China Statistical Yearbook 1994* (Beijing: China Statistical Information and Consultancy Service, 1994), p.241.

3. 1988 survey urban/rural income: from Griffin and Zhao, *The Distribution of Income in China*, op. cit., p.34.

4. Rural percentage of primary students: for 1962 through 1980 from *Zhongguo jiaoyu nianjian, 1949-81* (Beijing: China Encyclopedia Press, 1984), p.1023. For 1985 and later years calculated from figures on the following pages of the annual volumes in English entitled *Statistical Yearbook of China* (1986 and 1987 editions) and *China Statistical Yearbook* (1988-94 editions): 1985 — p.656 in 1986 edition; 1986 — p.698 in 1987 edition; 1987 — p.809 of 1988 edition; 1988 — p.728 of 1989 edition; 1989 — p.692 of 1990 edition; 1990 — p.663 of 1991 edition; 1991 — p.687 of 1992 edition; 1992 — p.676 of 1993 edition; and 1993 — p.616 of 1994 edition. The 1986 volume was published in Hong Kong by the Economic Information and Agency; subsequent volumes were published in Beijing by the China Statistical Information and Consultancy Service. Figure given for 1970 is actually the figure for 1971.

5-6. Rural percentage of lower middle school and upper middle school students: computed from the same sources as for primary students: 1962-80 from p.1006; 1985 — p.650; 1986 — p.692; 1987 — p.803; 1988 — p.722; 1989 — p.686; 1990 — p.657; 1991 — p.681; 1992 — p.670; and 1993 — p.610. Figures given for 1970 are actually the figures for 1971.

7-8. Rural percentage of hospital beds and of doctors: for all years except 1949, 1978 and 1993 computed from figures in *China Statistical Yearbook 1993* (Beijing: China Statistical Information and

Consultancy Service, 1993), p.726; figures for 1949 and 1978 computed from *Zhongguo weisheng nianjian 1986* (Beijing: China Medical Publishing House, 1986), p.493; for 1993 from *China Statistical Yearbook 1994* (Beijing: China Statistical Information and Consultancy Service, 1994), p.665. The hospital bed figures include both county hospital beds and beds in township clinics. The figures for doctors refer both to those with university training and those with specialised secondary school medical training, and to both those trained in Chinese and in Western medicine. I presume that the figures on doctors do not include village paramedical personnel.

9. Urban/rural TFR series 1: from 'Analysis of the National One-in-One Thousand Fertility Sample Survey', *Renkou yu jingji* [Population and Economy] (1983), pp.53-4. Figure given for 1962 is actually the estimate for 1960.

10. Urban/rural TFR series 2: computed from Zhong Guochen, Huang Dexing and Pan Chuanjiu, *Quanguo shengyu jieyu chouyang diaocha baogaoji, shengyu juan* [Collection of Reports on the National Fertility and Birth Control Survey, Fertility Volume] (Beijing: China Population Press, 1993), p.13 (reference provided by Wang Feng).

11-12. Urban/rural TFR series 3 and 4: computed from Griffith Feeney and Yuan Jianhua, 'Below Replacement Fertility in China? A Close Look at Recent Evidence', unpublished paper, Table 3. The figures in series 3 are based upon the 1988 two per thousand fertility survey conducted by the State Family Planning Commission; for series 4 they are computed from unit record data of the 1992 survey conducted by the State Family Planning Commission. These TFRs, unlike those in series 1 and 2, are based upon period parity progression ratios.

THE GEORGE ERNEST MORRISON LECTURE IN ETHNOLOGY

The George Ernest Morrison Lecture was founded by Chinese residents in Australia and others in honour of the late Dr G. E. Morrison, a native of Geelong, Victoria, Australia.

The objects of the foundation of the lectureship were to honour for all time the memory of a great Australian who rendered valuable services to China, and to improve cultural relations between China and Australia. The foundation of the lectureship had the official support of the Chinese Consulate-General and was due in particular to the efforts of Mr William Liu, merchant, of Sydney; Mr William Ah Ket, barrister, of Melbourne; Mr F. J. Quinland and Sir Colin MacKenzie, of Canberra. From the time of its inception until 1948 the lecture was associated with the Australian Institute of Anatomy, but in the latter year the responsibility for the management of the lectureship was taken over by the Australian National University, and the lectures delivered since that date have been given under the auspices of the University.

The following lectures have been delivered:

Inaugural: W. P. Chen, *The Objects of the Foundation of the Lectureship and a Review of Dr Morrison's Life in China.* 10 May 1932.

Second: W. Ah Ket, *Eastern Thought, with More Particular Reference to Confucius.* 3 May 1933.

Third: J. S. MacDonald, *The History and Development of Chinese Art.* 3 May 1934.

Fourth: W. P. Chen, *The New Culture Movement in China.* 10 May 1935.

Fifth: Wu Lien-teh, *Reminiscences of George E. Morrison; and Chinese Abroad.* 2 September 1936.

Sixth: Chun-jien Pai, *China Today: With Special Reference to Higher Education.* 4 May 1937.

Seventh: A. F. Barker, *The Impact of Western Industrialism on China.* 17 May 1938.

Eighth: S. H. Roberts, *The Gifts of the Old China to the New.* 5 June 1939.

Ninth: Howard Mowll, *West China as Seen Through the Eyes of the Westerner.* 29 May 1940.

Tenth: W. G. Goddard, *The Ming Shen. A Study in Chinese Democracy.* 5 June 1941.

Eleventh: D. B. Copland, *The Chinese Social Structure.* 27 September 1948.

Twelfth: J. K. Rideout, *Politics in Medieval China.* 28 October 1949.

Thirteenth: C. P. FitzGerald, *The Revolutionary Tradition in China.* 19 March 1951.

Fourteenth: H. V. Evatt, *Some Aspects of Morrison's Life and Work.* 4 December 1952.

Fifteenth: Lord Lindsay of Birker, *China and the West.* 20 October 1953.

Sixteenth: M. Titiev, *Chinese Elements in Japanese Culture.* 27 July 1954.

Seventeenth: H. Bielenstein, *Emperor Kuang-Wu (A.D. 25-27) and the Northern Barbarians.* 2 November 1955.*

Eighteenth: Leonard B. Cox, *The Buddhist Temples of Yun-Kang and Lung-Men.* 17 October 1956.

Nineteenth: Otto P. N. Berkelbach van der Sprenkel, *The Chinese Civil Service.* 4 November 1957.

Twentieth: A. R. Davies, *The Narrow Lane: Some Observations on the Recluse in Traditional Chinese Society.* 19 November 1958.

Twenty-first: C. N. Spinks, *The Khmer Temple of Prah Vihar.* 6 October 1959.

Twenty-second: Chen Chih-mai, *Chinese Landscape Painting: The Golden Age.* 5 October 1960.*

Twenty-third: L. Carrington Goodrich, *China's Contacts with Other Parts of Asia in Ancient Times.* 1 August 1961.

Twenty-fourth: N. G. D. Malmqvist, *Problems and Methods in Chinese Linguistics.* 22 November 1962.*

Twenty-fifth: H. F. Simon, *Some Motivations of Chinese Foreign Policy.* 3 October 1963.

Twenty-sixth: Wang Ling, *Calender, Cannon and Clock in the Cultural Relations between Europe and China.* 18 November 1964.

Twenty-seventh: A. M. Halpern, *Chinese Foreign Policy — Success or Failure?* 9 August 1966.*

Twenty-eighth: J. W. de Jong, *Buddha's Word in China,* 18 October 1967.*

Twenty-ninth: J. D. Frodsham, *New Perspectives in Chinese Literature.* 23 July 1968.*

Thirtieth: E. A. Huck, *The Assimilation of the Chinese in Australia.* 6 November 1969.*

Thirty-first: K. W. Wittfogel, *Agriculture: A Key to the Understanding of Chinese Society, Past and Present.* 6 April 1970.

Thirty-second: I. de Rachewiltz, *Prester John and Europe's Discovery of East Asia.* 3 November 1971.*

Thirty-third: Eugene Kamenka, *Marx, Marxism and China.* 6 September 1972.

Thirty-fourth: Liu Ts'un-yan, *On the Art of Ruling a Big Country: Views of Three Chinese Emperors.* 13 November 1973.*

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Fifty-fourth: W. J. F. Jenner, *A Knife in My Ribs for a Mate: Reflections on another Chinese Tradition*. 6 October 1993.*

Fifty-fifth: Ramon Myers, *The Socialist Market Economy in the People's Republic of China: Fact or Fiction?* 8 November 1994.*

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