

Regionalizing the Local, Localizing the Region

The Okinawa Struggle and Place-Based Identity

By Shinnosuke Takahashi

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of
The Australia National University

Canberra
September 2015

Unless otherwise indicated, this is my own original work

Shinnosuke Takahashi

22 September 2015

For Clara and Ichirō Takahashi

To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human soul. It is one of the hardest to define. A human being has roots by virtue of his real, active and natural participation in the life of a community which preserves in living shape certain particular treasures of the past and certain particular expectations for the future.

Simone Weil "The Need for Roots", 1987: 41.



“The Tree of Hope” and “the Monument of Arirang”.
Located on a site of a former Korean “comfort women” station in Miyako-jima Island, Okinawa.

(Taken by Takahashi Toshio, May 2013)

Table of Contents

Acknowledgement	10
Abstract.....	14
List of Acronyms.....	16
A Map of Okinawa Island.....	18
A Map of the Ryūkyū Islands in East Asia	19
Notes on Romanization and Name Convention	20

Chapter One

Introduction	21
1.1. Introduction.....	22
1.2. Literature Review: Debates on the Formation of “Okinawan Identity”	32
1.3. Geography, Human and Identity	40
1.4. Locality	44
1.5. Region	46
1.6. Research Questions	50
1.7. Case Study and Research Method	51
1.8. Chapter Outline	53

Chapter Two

Making the Okinawa Struggle under the US Occupation.....	56
2.1. Introduction	57
2.2. The Military Occupation	59
2.3. People’s Lives under the Occupation.....	64
2.4. Farmers	68
2.5. Okinawa Teachers and School Staff Association.....	71
2.6. Political Parties	74
2.7. Students.....	78
2.8. The Island-wide Struggle.....	81
2.9. The Reversion Movement to Japan.....	86
2.10. The Anti-reversion Movement.....	92
2.11. Between Okinawa as Hometown and Japan as Homeland	94
2.12. Conclusion	98

Chapter Three

Re-making the Okinawa Struggle: The Kin Bay Struggle and the Rise of “Okinawan Identity” in the Post-reversion Era	100
3.1. Introduction.....	101
3.2. Okinawa after “Reversion”	103
3.3. “Aquapolis” and Developmentalism in Post-reversion Okinawa	109
3.4. Anti-CTS Struggle: The origin of Okinawa’s civic movement.....	113
3.5. The Arc of the Ryūkyūs	119
3.6. The Southern Perspective	121
3.7. <i>Ryūkyū-ko</i> as the Okinawan Identity	126
3.8. Conclusion.....	128

Chapter Four

Writing “Okinawa Struggle”	131
4.1. Introduction	132
4.2. Masamichi Inoue and the Okinawa Struggle as a Civic Movement.....	139
4.2.1. Questions on “Japaneseness” in Japanese Studies at the Turn of the Century	139
4.2.2. The Okinawa Struggle as “Civic” Movement	141
4.2.3. Beyond “Here” and “There” or Citizen as Positionality.....	146
4.2.4. Between Local and Global: A regional perspective	150
4.3. Miyume Tanji and the Rise of Feminism	153
4.3.1. Feminism, Individuality, and Social Practice	153
4.3.2. A View from Australia	157
4.3.3. Locating Feminism in Okinawa as Mediation between the Local and Global	160
4.4. Kelly Dietz and the Rise of Indigenism	162
4.4.1. Practicing “Indigenous Identity”	162
4.4.2. “Take the Bases Back to Japan”	164
4.4.3. Beyond Nationalism: Internal Colony and Okinawan Autonomism	166
4.5. Conclusion	171

Chapter Five

Takae Anti-helipad Movement: Making of the Protest Community from Margin ...	173
5.1. Introduction.....	174
5.2. Towards the North	175

5.3. Yanbaru, Higashi Village, Takae.....	178
5.4. The Village Embraced by the US Military Helipads.....	185
5.5. Into the “Protest Community”	193
5.6. “We Need Everyone’s Attention!”: Social Netowkrs of the Takae Residents’ So- ciety	199
5.7. Who Are the Locals?: Rural Community and “Yosomono”	204
5.8. Affective Community	213
5.9. “Flowers in A Dream”	215
5.10. Conclusion	218

Chapter Six

Yanbaru and Recreating “Okinawan Identity”	219
6.1. Introduction	220
6.2. “Authorised Entry Only”: ODB and Governing the Yanbaru Forest	220
6.3. “Go Home Yamatū”: The Tanaka Incident and the Meaning of “Japaneseness”	225
6.4. “ <i>Bōeikyoku, Go Home!</i> ”: Takae and Meaning of “Japaneseness”	231
6.5. “We <i>Uchinaanchu</i> ” and Takae.....	236
6.6. “It’s Going to A Hard Time”	238
6.7. “It’s None of Your Business!”	240
6.8. “Solidarity with Okinawa”	245
6.9. Reclaiming “Okinawan Identity” from Margin	250
6.10. Conclusion	252

Chapter Seven

From Okinawa to Asia: Okinawa Korea People’s Solidarity and Connecting Anti-base Struggles in Asia	255
7.1. Introduction.....	256
7.2. A Chapel beside the Naha Port	258
7.3. Okinawa Korea People’s Solidarity	259
7.4. Remembering the Other War-dead	262
7.5. In Search of the International Solidarity of Anti-US Base Activism	267
7.6. From ACSA to OKPS	270
7.7. Mutual Preconceptions	276
7.8. Face-to-Face Relationship	278
7.9. “Let’s Learn from Okinawa/Korea”	279

7.10. <i>Okikan Style</i> : “5.15” the Emergence of the Younger Generations	286
7.11. Imposed Boundaries	290
7.12 Conclusion	296

Chapter Eight

Regionalizing Locality: Making Regional-Local Identity in Okinawa	298
8.1. Introduction	299
8.2. Arasaki Moriteru.....	301
8.2.1. Early Life.....	302
8.2.2. A Patriotic Boy.....	304
8.2.3. Identity Loss.....	308
8.2.4. Becoming “an Expert on Okinawa Problem”	309
8.2.5. Thinking Okinawa as “Region”	312
8.2.6. Finding Colonial Korea in Okinawa, Feeling Okinawa’s “Pain” in Korea	316
8.3. Takahashi Toshio	322
8.3.1. Early Life.....	323
8.3.2. A Militant Activist	325
8.3.3. “Walking on Broken Glass with Bare Feet”	327
8.3.4. Becoming An “Okinawan”	329
8.3.5. Visiting Korea	331
8.3.6. Japan-Korea Early Solidarity Movement	332
8.3.7. Becoming A Korean Expert	334
8.4. Yu Yǒngcha	338
8.4.1. Early Life.....	339
8.4.2. Anti-fingerprinting Struggle	342
8.4.3. Becoming A Buddhist Nun and Visiting South Korea.....	344
8.4.4. Moving to Okinawa	346
8.4.5. Complex Boundaries	348
8.4.6. Living as <i>Zainichi</i> Korean in Okinawa.....	349
8.5. Conclusion.....	351

Chapter Nine

Conclusion	352
Bibliography	368

Acknowledgement

In the very early days of my PhD program, a senior academic told me that doing a PhD is “a life-changing event”. At that moment, I had no idea what this scholar was telling me, or why. But I must say towards the very last stage of my program—he was totally correct. My life has certainly changed in a way I did not even imagine, both intellectually and personally, when I started my postgraduate life in 2010. In the course of my research, I was fortunate to meet many excellent people both inside and outside of the Australian National University. This thesis owes tremendously to their guidance, encouragement, criticism, and love.

First, I would like to thank my mentor, Professor Tessa Morris-Suzuki, for her selfless commitment. I am not really sure how to express my gratitude for Tessa. Her encouragement, critical views, sincerity, optimism and passion saved me many times. I was perhaps not such a “good student” for her in many ways. Rather my incompetency and immaturity as a PhD candidate might have confused her as to how to guide me as my main supervisor. Nonetheless, she always encouraged me even when I was not really sure where my research was heading. While known as a critical thinker on Japan and the East Asian region, Tessa taught me the great joy in thinking of the world “historically”. She also introduced me to new intellectual worlds like geography, globalization studies, and Area Studies. Her deep thought and genuine passion as an historian had a great impact on me in writing this thesis.

Also, I have been very fortunate to meet many other great scholars and friends at the Australian National University whose presence and involvement enriched and deepened my narrow intellectual views on Japan, Australia, Asia and the Pacific, and the world. My special thanks goes to Dr Ruth Barraclough who widened my view on East Asian history by introducing me to the significance of the Koreas. As an advisor, she was extremely helpful in giving me intellectual inspiration from gender studies and colonial and post-colonial literatures. Also, I appreciate Professor Gavan McCormack and Dr Miyume Tanji who are

my senior Okinawan scholars at ANU. I learned many things from their endeavors and commitment to Okinawa as scholars and social activists, including the meaning of approaching Okinawa from Australia. I owe my interest in the Pacific region to Professor Brij V. Lal. His perspective liberated me from a narrow understanding of Okinawa and Japan, and helped me to relocate them in the history of the Pacific region, where, like Okinawa, the American influence has been critical since the end of World War II. These members on my panel enlightened me to think about Asia and the Pacific region as connected spaces historically, socially, and culturally. My thanks also goes to other friends at the ANU and in other parts of Australia including Karashima Masato, Kobayashi Yasuko, Danton Leary, Kikuchi Miho, Ewelina Sikora, Pedro Iacobelli, Negishi Kaima, Ikeda Shun'ichi, Nic Halter, Paik Yonjae, Jeong-yoon Ku, Lina Koleilat, Bec Heland, Chris H. Park, Adam Croft, Kawamura Satofumi, Andō Takemasa, Ros Hewitt, Tamura Keiko, Andrew De Lisle, Zag Puas, Hanbyol Lee, Shuge Wei, Adam Broinowski, Lauren Richardson (all from ANU), Vera Mackie, Alexander Brown (from the University of Wollongong), Julia and Ken Yonetani from Katoomba (now in Okinawa), and Justin Tutty and the members of Base Watch in Darwin.

In Japan, people such as Ishiwata Hiroshi, Fujita Tadayoshi, Shiobara Yoshikazu, Kaneko Kazuhiro, Chiba Yui, Fukada Yūko, Kawabata Kōhei, Miyamoto Rika, Park Sarah, Yasui Daisuke, Chung Jihye, Lee Haengri, Joel Matthews, Tabuchi Yoshihide, Shibuya Nozomu, Nezu Sōshi, and Mori Keisuke are among those from whom I learnt tremendously in writing this thesis. In particular, my deep thanks goes to the scholars, activists and other people I met in Okinawa. Professor Wakabayashi Chiyo very kindly gave me the chance to use the archives and other facilities at Okinawa University. She also invited me to join the Modern Asian Thought project run by Professor Wakabayashi and her friends from other parts of East and Southeast Asia. Professor Abe Kosuzu is another person I would like to

thank. Although she was probably surprised when I asked her to take me to Takae without ever having met her before, she told me to come and meet her at 5AM at the corner of Kokusai Dōri Street on the weekend. Abe-san (as she prefers rather than being called “Professor”) also invited me to join her weekly seminar with her students at the University of the Ryūkyūs where I could meet a young activist Tasaki Manami, by whom I was inspired. Together with these two leading activists/scholars, I would like to thank Arasaki Moriteru, Kawamura Masami, Takazato Suzuyo, Yamashiro Hiroji, the members of Okinawa Korea People’s Solidarity including Tomiyama Masahiro, Takahashi Toshio, Yu Yōngcha, Ishikawa Takashi and Nishio Ichirō. In Takae, I would like to thank Takahashi Masahiro, the former Director of the Takae Residents’ Society, and other warm-hearted residents including Ashimine Gentatsu, Miyagi Katsumi, Morioka Kōji, and Isa Masatsugu. Others including Kakinohana Kaoru in Aka-jima Island, Miyazato Kiyogorō at the Kerama Oceanic Museum, Shinjō Ikuo from the University of the Ryūkyūs, Oyakawa Yūko and Okamoto Yukiko are among many who helped me in different venues. Furthermore, I want to thank those who helped me from outside Japan and Australia, including my former mentor Professor Modjtaba Sadria in Iran, Daniel Joachim in Germany, Kim Yeong-hwan and Kang Sang-won in South Korea, Professor Kuan-Hsing Chen in Taiwan, Professor Sun Ge in Beijing, Professor Keith Camacho from the UCLA, Professor John Brown-Childs and Professor Hiroshi Fukurai at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Professor Heonik Kwon at the University of Cambridge.

Writing this thesis would not have been possible without the generous support of other people. I thank the National Library of Australia, especially Shinozaki Mayumi, the Head of Japan Section, for assisting me to use its rich collection on Japanese history in the Asia Reading Room. I also thank Maxine McArthur for proofreading my draft. My uncle Yang Seung-eun, my grandparents Takahashi Chūshiro and Sachiko, the ANU Japan Alumni

Scholarship Committee, and the School of Culture, History and Language, ANU, gave me their generous financial support.

For their love and support, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my family. My partner Melissa Ahlefeldt has been my strongest supporter and critic from the beginning of this research project. Our two year-old son Kai always made me smile while I was struggling to write this thesis. Born in August 2013, this little chunky baby boy joined in my journey as a son and friend. Thanks to him, my writing took longer than it was supposed to. Eric and Lynne Ahlefeldt warmly welcomed me as a new family member and I appreciate their involvement in my life. Lastly, but not least, I would like to thank my parents/the best teachers of life, Yang Kuy-young (or Takahashi Clara) and Takahashi Ichirō, for bringing me to this world. Without you two, this thesis would not have existed.

Abstract

My PhD thesis examines the diverse concepts and manifestations of Okinawan identity that underlie the Okinawan anti-base movement or the so-called Okinawa struggle (or *Okinawa tōsō* in Japanese). Located between the East China Sea and the Philippine Sea, Japan's southern-most prefecture, Okinawa, was once a stepping stone for Japan's colonial expansion to Taiwan in the late 19th century. After the Battle of Okinawa from March to June 1945, Okinawa became a crucial defense line in the north-western Pacific for the United States and Japan in the latter half of the 20th century. The Okinawan anti-base movement, which started in the late 1940s, still continues today, almost seventy years on. Although its core demands are for the removal of US bases from Okinawan soil, many local residents see it in wider terms as a demand for the liberation of Okinawa from its subordinated status under the US-Japan security system. Explicit or implicit notions of "Okinawan identity" are therefore crucial to this movement.

While the notion of "Okinawan identity" appears to be a self-evident and homogenous concept based on culture, ethnicity, and historical experience, this understanding of identity obscures the complexity and dynamism of identity and community within the anti-base movement. Okinawan identity is not a fixed entity, and to understand its creation and evolution it is not sufficient to focus simply on the administrative territory labelled Okinawa. Through case studies of two recent strands in the anti-base movement, this thesis highlights the vital role of place in formation of discourses and practices of Okinawan identity. The case of the Takae Residents' Society illuminates the importance of a *localized* sense of place, while the case of Okinawa Korea People's Solidarity shows an emerging *regionalized* sense of place across the national boundaries. Applying recent theories on space, place and identity to these case studies, this thesis explores multi-leveled forms of identity—local, archipelagic and regional which the Okinawa struggle has created. This thesis thus

seeks to challenge our understanding of the long and ongoing Okinawa struggle, and contributes to wider debates about identity and protest movements in the contemporary world.

The List of Acronyms

USCAR: The United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands

SCAP: The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

GRI: The Government of the Ryukyu Islands (Ryūkyū Seifu: 琉球政府)

CIA: The Central Intelligence Agency

PoW: Prisoners of War

OYA: Okinawa Youth Association (Okinawa Seinen-kai: 沖縄青年会)

OWA: Okinawa Women's Association (Okinawa Fujin-kai: 沖縄婦人会)

OTSA: Okinawa Teachers and School Staff Association (Okinawa Kyōshokuin-kai: 沖縄教職員会)

ODA: Okinawa Democratic Alliance (Okinawa Minshu Dōmei: 沖縄民主同盟)

OPP: Okinawa People's Party (Okinawa Jinmin-tō: 沖縄人民党)

OSMP: Okinawa Social Mass Party (Okinawa Shakai Taishū-tō: 沖縄社会大衆党)

RDP: Ryūkyū Democratic Party (Ryūkyū Minshu-tō: 琉球民主党)

CROHC: The Council for the Return of Okinawa to the Home Country (Sokoku Fukki Kyōgi-kai: 祖国復帰協議会)

OLDP: Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party (Okinawa Jimin-tō: 沖縄自民党)

RMAR: The Residents' Movement of the Arc of the Ryūkyū (Ryūkyū-ko no Jūmin Undō: 琉球弧の住民運動)

CTS: Central Terminal Station (Sekiyu Bichiku Kichi: 石油備蓄基地)

MITI: The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Tsūshō Sangyō-shō: 通商産業省)

KBPS: The Kin Bay Protection Society (Kin Wan wo Mamoru-kai: 金武湾を守る会)

NOF: The New Okinawa Forum (Shin Okinawa Fōramu: 新沖縄フォーラム)

IRS: The Institute of Regional Studies (Okinawa Daigaku Chiiki Kenkyūjo: 沖縄大学地域研究所)

NSMT: New Social Movement Theory

OWAAMV: Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence (Kichi Guntai wo Yurusanai Kōdōsuru Onnatachi no Kai: 基地軍隊を許さない行動する女たちの会)

ACSILs: The Association of Comprehensive Studies for Independence of the Lew Chewans (Ryūkyū Minzoku Dokuritsu Sōgō Kenkyū Gakkai: 琉球民族独立総合研究学会)

AIPR: Association of Indigenous People in the Ryūkyūs (Ryūkyū-ko no Senjū Minzoku-kai: 琉球弧の先住民族会)

FHAN: Futenma Henoko Action Network

NTC: Northern Training Center (Hokubu Kunrenjō: 北部訓練場)

VoT: Voice of Takae

ODB: Okinawa Defense Bureau (Okinawa Boueikyoku: 沖縄防衛局)

ACSA: The Action Committee for Solidarity with Asia (アジアと連帯する実行委員会)

OKPS: Okinawa Korea People's Solidarity (Okinawa Kankoku Minshū Rentai: 沖縄韓国民衆連帯)

SACO: Special Action Committee on Okinawa

KPUJ: The Korean Residents Union in Japan (Zai Nihon Daikanminkoku Mindan: 在日本韓国)

GAKR: The General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Zai Nihon Chōsenjin Sōrengō-kai: 在日本朝鮮人総聯合会)

JMD: The Japanese Ministry of Defense (Bōeishō: 防衛省)

LDP: Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyūminshu-tō: 自由民主党)

DPJ: Democratic Party of Japan (Minsh-tō: 民主党)

A Map of the Okinawa Island¹



¹ Download from http://3mafband.lapoint.net/okinawa/images/Okinawa_Relief_90.jpg, 21.7.2015.

A Map of the Ryūkyū Islands in East Asia²



² Download from http://okinawa.com.pl/mapa/images/Okinawa-Ryukyu_Islands.GIF, 21.7.2015.

Notes on Romanization and Name Conventions

In this thesis, the names of Japanese and Koreans are written in East Asian order except in the case of scholars writing mainly in English. Therefore, in the text of the thesis, surname comes first followed by given name. (Given name is followed by surname in the footnotes.)

For Romanization of Korean characters, this thesis uses Revised Romanization.

For Romanization of Japanese and Okinawan pronunciation, this thesis generally uses macrons when necessary. (e.g. *uchinānchu*)

This thesis generally uses “Okinawa”, but Ryūkyū or Ryukyu is also used to describe particular names of institutions (e.g. the University of the Ryukyus), places (the Arc of Ryūkyū), and the cultural and social movements. (e.g. Association of Indigenous People in the Ryūkyūs)

Chapter One

Introduction



The photo was taken by the author at Henoko Beach in November 2011.

1.1. Introduction

Mornings in Takae are rather quiet.³ Located in the northern highlands of Okinawa Island—the main island of Japan’s southern-most prefecture Okinawa—Takae is one of the smallest hamlets in Okinawa with about 160 residents. Around this small hamlet, there is a massive rainforest, which the local islanders call Yanbaru Forest (or *Yanbaru no mori*), embracing the village and its people. In the midst of this forest, there is Arakawa Creek, which provides approximately 60 percent of the water supply on Okinawa Island. Here, with luck, one may see a listed endangered local species, Okinawa rail (or *yanbaru kuina*). Usually, the day begins with the sounds of cars driving on the only paved road. The sound of engines is the sign which informs the local residents of the beginning of the day for this farm village. In the Yanbaru region, the majority of the local population has historically made their livelihoods through agriculture and forestry.⁴ Takae is not exceptional in this regard. Therefore, after the busy hours in the daytime, the village goes quiet before the whole sky is filled with the numerous stars, which are rarely seen in the highly industrialized south of the island.

However, in this remote end of Okinawa, there is a place that becomes very crowded on weekends. Villagers gather at a meeting place called *tūtan-ya*. This prefabricated blue tin building has been used by the locals as a place for social events and is the only guest house in this area. Even when there are no events at *tūtan-ya*, both young and old community members appear without any particular reason. Sometimes someone brings a guitar, and someone sings. Someone comes with a bottle of local spirit, *maruta*, and shares this with

³ Takae (高江) is one of six communities in Higashi Village in the north-eastern part of Okinawa Island.

⁴ Yanbaru (山原) is the unofficial, yet commonly used, name given to the northern half of Okinawa Island, the main island of Okinawa prefecture, the southernmost prefecture of Japan. In Chinese characters, it consists of two words, “mountain” and “field”. As these words suggest, the area is covered by abundant rainforest. Yanbaru region is made up of nine official administration units—six villages, two towns, and one city. The massive rainforest spreading over the region provides great natural and cultural benefits to the rest of Okinawa. Because of its distinctive natural habitat, it became a candidate to be registered as a world heritage site in 2003 by the Examination Committee Concerning the Proposed Places for the World Heritage. Also, Arakawa dam is one of the major sources of water for the rest of the island.

other people. The locals discuss various issues, from everyday topics, including farming and family, to serious issues such as politics, often with humor, sometimes with more seriousness. Rumpling their suntanned faces, their conversation often continues until midnight. This is one of the scenes that I saw in Takae's "protest community". Having been conducting a sit-in against the military helipad construction site in their village since 2007, these villagers are often described as "local protesters" (or *jimoto hantai jūmin*) in the nation-wide mass media, as though they were dissidents egoistically opposing their government's decisions.

This thesis examines the various forms of Okinawan identity that underlie the Okinawan anti-base movement. While the notion of "Okinawan identity" tends to be understood as a homogenous concept, I argue that this understanding of identity as a fixed entity obscures the complexity, creativity and dynamism of identity and community within the anti-base movement. By examining two case studies of two recent anti-base movements, this thesis shows how concepts of place can add a new dimension to existing discourses and practices of Okinawan identity. One case study illuminates the importance of a localized sense of place, while the other draws attention to an emerging regionalized sense of place across national boundaries. Applying recent theories on space, place and identity to my case studies, this thesis thus highlights the need to recognize multi-leveled forms of identity—local, archipelagic and regional—which interact within the Okinawa struggle. This thesis seeks to deepen our understanding of the Okinawa struggle from historical and contemporary perspectives, and it eventually aims to contribute to the wider debate about identity and protest movements in the contemporary world.

Located next to Taiwan and mainland China, Okinawa is one of forty-seven Japanese prefectures. Made up of about 300 inhabited and uninhabited islands, which are scattered in the southern fringe of the East China Sea, Okinawa is the only prefecture in Japan whose climate belongs to a subtropical area. Okinawa's unique characteristics are not limited to the

local climate; it also has a history distinct from the rest of Japan. Before Okinawa Prefecture was established in 1879, there was an independent Ryukyu Kingdom (*Ryūkyū ōkoku*)⁵, which was an important hub of the regional trade within the Chinese tributary system prior to the late nineteenth century.⁶ The Ryukyu Kingdom was incorporated by modern Japan after the “Ryukyu Disposal” (*Ryūkyū shobun*) in 1872.⁷ Treated discriminatorily compared to other Japanese prefectures⁸, Okinawa’s modern experiences under the Japanese Empire ended with

⁵ In 1609, the House of Shimazu based in Satsuma Domain in Kyūshū Island invaded the Ryūkyūs to govern it as their vassal state. It was then that the Ryūkyū Kingdom was incorporated under Satsuma’s influence and assigned a duty of offering tribute to the Shogun in Edo. Yet, in that period, the Ryukyu Kingdom could still maintain its status, autonomous rule of its territory and the traditional relationship with the Chinese Dynasty. In 1854, the Ryukyu Kingdom signed the Friendship Treaty with the United States as a sovereign state (琉米修好条約: *Ryū-bei Shūko Jōyaku*). (Takeshi Araskaki, "Michishirube o Motomete," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, 1 May-11 June 2014.)

⁶ For example, Takara Kurayoshi, a notable historian of pre-modern Okinawa, demonstrates the rich maritime connection of Ryukyu Kingdom and its neighbors including south-east Asian kingdoms such as Malacca during the 15th and 16th centuries. (See, for example, Kurayoshi Takara, *Ryūkyū Ōkoku* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993).)

⁷ The Ryukyu Kingdom as a sovereign state came to an end when the territory was annexed to Japan after the Meiji Restoration in the late nineteenth century. In order to incorporate the Ryukyu Kingdom as its own territory, the first step that the Japanese political leaders conducted was to recognize the Ryukyu Kingdom as a regional domain (*han*). King Shō Tai (1843-1901) was forced to live in the new capital city of Japan, Tokyo, where he was placed under Japanese Imperial authority and added as one of the noblemen of the Japanese Imperial court, bestowed with the rank of the Earl. Also, the Meiji government demanded that Ryukyu Domain end its conventional tributary relationship with the Ching Dynasty in China. Although the local leaderships (the three councils) refused Japan’s demand to abandon their diplomatic relationship with China, this dispute ended with the arrival of the military and police forces from Japan in order to “punish” the leaders of the Ryukyu Kingdom for their disobedience. In March 1879, the Meiji Government declared the abolition of the Ryūkyū Domain. The annexation was a crucial historical event not only in its own right but also because of the contexts in which it occurred, amid the change of the regional power-balance between Japan and China. As the first modernized empire in East Asia, Japan was eager to extend its territory to other parts of the region. Prior to Okinawa’s annexation to Japan, the Meiji Government in Tokyo decided to send the military troops to Taiwan in May 1874 (the Japanese Invasion of Taiwan or *Taiwan Shuppei*). It was Japan’s first attempt after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 to occupy foreign territory. This invasion was conducted to punish indigenous Taiwanese who killed over sixty residents from Miyako and Yaeyama Islanders (Mudan Incident or *Botansha Jiken*). Although both Miyako and Yaeyama Islands belonged to the Ryukyu Kingdom in that period, Japan demanded compensation from the Ching dynasty, insisting that the victims were Japanese nationals. As China denied Japan’s demand, Japan sent troops to occupy the southern part of Taiwan. This initial Japanese invasion of Taiwan failed, with soldiers affected by endemic disease such as malaria, in June 1874. Nevertheless, this event triggered regional tension between the Ching Dynasty and the Meiji government (明治政府), which eventually led to the first Sino-Japanese War in late 1894. As a result of this war, Japan annexed Taiwan as its external territory. This also affected Okinawa. After this incident, Okinawa was forced to end its historical relations with China. Therefore, the political turmoil between Okinawa and Japan was not only a problem specific to those two countries, it was also the very first step for Japan to achieve its territorial ambitions in other countries. The Ryukyu Kingdom as a hub of the regional trade system became a key site of conflict in the modern regional geopolitics.

⁸ Okinawa was not treated equally with the rest of Japan, either politically and culturally. Although social activists such as Jahana Noboru (1865-1908) had conducted political campaigns since the late 1890s, Okinawans were

the atrocities of the Battle of Okinawa, when Okinawa was treated as “a sacrificial stone” to delay the advance of American forces into mainland Japan.⁹ After the end of World War II in 1945, Okinawa was governed by a US military regime until May 1972. This was the beginning of Okinawa’s seventy-year history of anti-base movements (or so-called Okinawa *tōsō*, which means Okinawa struggle).

not given the political rights to send their delegates to the National Diet until 1912. In everyday life, the local language was strongly discouraged and even banned in public places such as public schools. Traditional customs were categorized as uncivilized native culture, as were other indigenous cultures in Japan. In 1903, at the Japan Industrial Expo in Osaka, a few selected Okinawan locals were “displayed” at one pavilion called the Museum of Mankind, as native tribes in traditional costume, together with people from other Japanese colonies such as Taiwan, Korea and Hokkaido. In mainland Japan, the Okinawan migrant community which lived in the major industrial cities such as Tokyo and Osaka were segregated from other ‘ordinary’ Japanese. In terms of administrative category, Okinawa was not a colony. However, the people and their culture were not treated on an equal standard with the rest of *naichi* (mainland Japan). This ambiguous status embedded a unique identity among the Okinawan people. On the one hand, they were treated as mainland Japanese who were different from colonial subjects. However, on the other hand, they were different Japanese from the rest of the mainland Japanese. This complexity was reflected in a self-recognition which Higa Shunchō (1883-1977) describes as the “eldest son of Japanese colonization” followed by Taiwanese as the second and Korean. (Kirsten L. Ziomek, “The 1903 Human Pavilion: Colonial Realities and Subaltern Subjectivities in Twentieth-Century Japan,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* (2014): 493-516; Richard Siddle, “Colonialism and Identity in Okinawa before 1945,” *Japanese Studies* 18 (1998): 117-133; Higa Shunchō, “Furui Jida no Omoide,” in *Higa Shunchō Zenshū* (1971): 182, cited in Osamu Yakabi, “Kindai Okinawa ni okeru Mainoritī Ninshiki no Hensen,” *Bessatsu Kan* 6(2003).

⁹ Okinawa’s ambiguous status in Japan was regarded as a “problem” again towards the end of the Asia and the Pacific War in early 1945. The land was distinctively regarded as the Emperor’s holy ground as part of Japan’s internal territory, and accordingly, there was discussion in Tokyo as to whether to use the islands as a ‘sacrificial stone’. The decision of Japan’s military leaders was to block the Allied Forces in Okinawa in order to earn some time for Tokyo. This decision directly caused the loss of a quarter of the local population in Okinawa in the battles in Okinawa between US and Japanese troops from March until June 1945.



Image 1-1: Kadena Airbase in Kadena Town, one of the largest American airbases in Japan. The photo was taken by the author in July 2010.



Map 1-1: The map of the US military bases and other facilities in Okinawa Island. The map is retrieved from the website run by the Okinawa Prefectural Government (http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/images/map_en.gif, accessed October 27, 2014).




Chart 1-1: Proportion of the US military facilities in the local areas on Okinawa Island as of 2010. The number on the left side shows the proportion of the occupied area by the US facilities. The chart is made by the author based on the data provided by the Cabinet Office of Japan (http://www.ogb.go.jp/gaikyou/h250401shichouson/13_shichosonmenseki.pdf, 27/10/2014).

How do Okinawans conduct the local anti-base movements? What kind of people participate in the activism? What are the important identities for those participants? These three questions provide the basic framework of this thesis. To address these questions, first I will discuss the historical background of the Okinawa anti-base movement (or Okinawa struggle) after the end of World War II in two phases: from the late 1940s until the early 1970s; and from 1970s until the 1980s. Next, I will examine the local anti-base movement since the late 1990s, focusing particularly on people's mobilization of place in making their communal identities. While discussing contemporary characteristics of the formation of protest identities in Okinawa, this thesis highlights two grassroots anti-US base activist groups which started in the last two decades: the "Takae Residents' Society to Protest against the Helipad Construction" (*Helipaddo Kensetsu ni Hantai suru Jūmin no Kai*, or the Takae Residents' Society); and "Okinawa-Korea People's Solidarity" (*Okinawa-Kankoku Minshū Rentai*, or OKPS).

"The Okinawa struggle" (*Okinawa tōsō*) is a generic term which encapsulates all kinds of local social, cultural and political movements against the US military bases, which have continued over the last seventy years. The Okinawa struggle was started spontaneously in different parts of Okinawa Island by those who felt their livelihood spaces to be threatened by the American base construction. The first mass collective action occurred in 1956 against the decision made by the US Government over land compensation for the local Okinawans. The campaign was joined by farmers, students, politicians and local communities regardless of political ideology. As the protest was organized in many different parts of Okinawa Island, the event is called "the island-wide struggle" (*shimagurumi tōsō*). The experience of the first island-wide struggle became the point of origin in the historical narrative of the Okinawa struggle, highlighting its characteristics of pacifism. This spirit of the Okinawa struggle was reinforced through further events such as the reversion movement to Japan (*sokoku fukki*

undō) during the latter half of the 1950s and the 1960s, led by the local social and political leaders from Okinawa Teachers and School Staff Union (*Okinawa kyōshokuin kumiai*), and the so-called anti-reversion movement by students and workers during the late 1960s and early 1970s, opposing the immediate return of Okinawa to Japan.¹⁰ From the late 1970s onwards, the peace movement in Okinawa was infused with the grassroots environmental movement or so-called residents' movements in various places such as Kin and Shiraho. While the residents' movements did not create mass campaigns, their legacy is essential to consider the contemporary Okinawa struggle in Henoko, Takae and elsewhere.¹¹ Okinawa's pacifism is also influenced by other new types of social movements such as the local feminism movements, which became a vocal group in the anti-base campaign from the mid-1990s, and political campaigns for the rights of indigenous Ryūkyūan people.

The movements that form the case studies in this thesis, OKPS and the Takae Residents' Society, which started in 1997 and 2007 respectively, play crucial roles in developing the anti-base movements in contemporary Okinawa. However, both Takae

¹⁰ Participants in the anti-reversion movement were well-informed and aware of Okinawa's role and responsibility in the Vietnam War. Raising the banner of solidarity with North Vietnam, it was a remarkable moment when people sought a unique meaning of Okinawan identity not just as Japanese but as people in the oppressed world under the American and Japanese supremacy in the Asia and the Pacific region. The movement questioned the existing local histories by referring to the colonization of Okinawa by Japan, and the American imperialism over the region. Therefore, the emergence of pacifism in that period contained multiple ideological strands – war experience and anti-imperialism. It was also expressed in the solidarity movement with Black GIs in Okinawa. (Yuichiro Onishi, "The Presence of (Black) Liberation in Okinawan Freedom : Transnational Movements, 1968-1972," in *Extending Diaspora: New Histories of Black People*, ed. Dwane Y. Curry et al. (University of Illinois Press, 2009): 178-202; Yuichiro Onishi, "Occupied Okinawa on the Edge: On Being Okinawan in Hawai'i and US Colonialism toward Okinawa," *American Quarterly* 64 (2012): 741-65.)

¹¹ In the mid-1970s and 1980s, Okinawan citizens undertook protest campaigns against the destruction of the natural environment in places such as Kin in the central coastal district of Okinawa Island and Shiraho in Ishigaki Island. These places were designated as construction sites for a petrol storage plant and a new airport. Also, in places in northern Yanbaru region, local residents conducted protest movements against excessive land development, which caused various kinds of environmental damage including draining of red clay into neighboring coastal waters. Although these environmental movements were not directly related to the anti-base movement, they were regarded as part of the problems underlying Okinawa's weak economy, which was largely dependent upon the base-related industries in major cities (*kichi keizai* : 基地経済). In order to fill in the economic gap between Okinawa and mainland Japan, both Okinawa prefectural government and the Japanese government promoted investment—particularly in the construction industry—from mainland Japan to Okinawa.

Residents' Society and OKPS are less visible than some other local activist groups in Okinawa such as Okinawa Women Act against Military Violence (Kichi Guntai o Yurusanai Kōdōsuru Onnatachi no Kai, hereafter OWAAMV), and the local struggle against the off-shore base construction in Henoko. This probably reflects the fact that OWAAMV and the anti-offshore base construction campaign in Henoko are unprecedented social struggles which have had a significant impact on local, national and international politics in the last two decades. Feminism and environmental activism have taken the central role in activism in the Okinawa struggle since they first emerged in the Okinawa struggle in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the local struggles in Takae Village and OKPS are also crucial activism because these two examples of civic activism highlight some aspects of the local activism identities which have been little discussed within the existing studies.

While the researchers on Okinawa's anti-base movements such as Akibayashi Kozue and Kumamoto Hiroyuki have highlighted the roles of OWAAMV and Henoko in discussing the emergence of new social identities such as women and citizens, the Takae Residents' Society and OKPS introduce us to the significance of place to frame the concept of identity for Okinawa's anti-base movements.¹² Founded in 2007, the Takae Residents' Society has been conducting a protest campaign in Takae in their north-eastern village on Okinawa Island. The purpose of their local activism is to prevent construction of five helipad landing zones deep in the local forest.¹³ One of the unique characteristics of the Takae Residents' Society is a strong attachment to the land they live in, particularly to the rich natural environment of the Yanbaru Forest. This attachment is widely shared by the local protesters,

¹² Hiroshi Hatakeyama and Hiroyuki Kumamoto et al. *Okinawa No Datsugunjika to Chiikiteki Shutaisei: Fukkigo-Sedai No Okinawa* (Meiji Daigaku Gunshuku Heiwa Kenkyujo, 2006); Kozue Akibayashi and Suzuyo Takazato, "Okinawa: women's struggle for demilitarization," in *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts*, ed. Catherine Lutz and Cynthia Enloe (NYU Press, 2009): 243-269.

¹³ Construction of Takae's helipad was decided by the Japanese government as one of the conditions for closure of Futenma Airbase located in Futenma City, the central part of Okinawa. For more detail, see Chapter Five.

and thus protection of the local forest became one of the most important agendas for the local community.

While the case of Takae implies localization of identity based on a distinctive natural environment within Okinawa, the case study of OKPS helps us to understand a type of civic activism in Okinawa that introduced a cross-border regional perspective to the anti-base movement. Working with various activist groups in South Korea, OKPS is one of the earliest groups in Okinawa which works to create a cross-border anti-US base solidarity campaign. Although the group was started in the late 1990s, its origins go back to the late 1980s. The group was started by some experienced activists, but it was joined by other individuals who did not have any experience as activists. By organizing cultural and social events between the two countries, OKPS largely contributed to creating a basis for a transnational anti-base movement in both Korea and Okinawa (and Japan).

Focusing particularly on historical contexts and current social and cultural practices, I shall examine the social process through which these new forms of local identities were developed. This thesis aims to deepen and reshape our understanding of the contemporary Okinawan anti-base struggle in the local, national and regional contexts.

1.2. Literature Review: Debates on the Formation of “Okinawan Identity”

The earliest writings on the Okinawan people’s anti-base struggle date from the late 1950s. Senaga Kamejirō (1907-2001), a founder of Okinawa People’s Party (*Okinawa Jinmintō*, which was later incorporated by the Japanese Communist Party), wrote some of the first works on the Okinawa struggle: “The Tragedy of the Okinawan People” (*Minzoku no Higeiki*), and “Report from Okinawa” (*Okinawa kara no Hōkoku*) in 1959. A decade later, in the late 1960s, there was a period when some young intellectuals emerged and became

prominent writers on the Okinawa struggle. Ōta Masahide, Hiyane Teruo, Arakawa Akira, and Arasaki Moriteru were among those who wrote seminal works, discussing the Okinawa struggle extensively from historical and philosophical perspectives. As they spent their formative years in war-time imperialistic education (*kōkoku kyōiku*) and post-World War II democratic education (*sengo minshushugi kyōiku*), these intellectuals who were born in the 1920s and 1930s were called “the wartime generation” (*senchūha*). Although their individual approaches vary, these intellectuals from the war-time generation similarly focus on Okinawan identity as a key concept to understand the meanings of the Okinawa struggle. Building upon the legacy of earlier generations of scholars who had founded Okinawa studies (*Okinawa-gaku*) in the pre-war period, scholars from the war-war time generation such as Hiyane reinterpreted the meaning of the local cultural identity as a concept to discuss Okinawa’s distinctive political culture by arguing that Okinawan identity exists in essence prior to political opinions and ideologies.¹⁴

However, there are some major differences between the pre-war and the war-time generations in their understandings of Okinawan identity. The pre-war Okinawan experts such as Iha Fūyū (1876-1947) were influenced mainly by early Japanese ethnologists such as Yanagita Kunio (1875-1962). Their primary aim was to study their local culture, and to establish Okinawan studies as a modern academic subject. By studying classical texts such as poems, they promoted the institutionalization of knowledge related to Okinawa. Yet, this was also reflection of their concern about their homeland as “backward” compared to mainland Japan. In other words, Okinawan studies as an intellectual project in the pre-war period was the product of an ambiguous self oscillating between “uncivilized Okinawa” and “civilized Japan”. For the war-time generation scholars, Okinawan identity was not only built on traditional culture. Other historical experiences such as memory of the Battle of Okinawa,

¹⁴ Ken’yu Uchima, “Hiyane Teruo Shi Ni Kiku”, *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, October 9, 2012, 3.

violence under the US military administration were the major elements in their expression and discussion of their local identity, which they linked to the idea of pacifism. In their critical articulation, Okinawa identity became an essential concept that explained the spirit of the local anti-base struggle not only against the US military bases *per se* but also in the broader political and social context of issues relating to post-WWII Okinawa.¹⁵

While the war-time generation contributed greatly to shaping the historical consciousness and narrative of the Okinawa struggle, their works were criticized and developed by the following generations, the so-called “postwar generation” (or *sengo sedai*) and also “the post-reversion generation” (or *fukkigo sedai*). The approaches to Okinawan identity utilized by those following generations vary depending on the individual scholar. Nevertheless, it is possible to generalize their different approaches in three ways.

The first approach helps develop the existing narratives by studying the details of socio-economic aspects of Okinawan society early in the US occupation period. Most notably, Arasaki Moriteru’s historical view on the early occupation period as “Okinawa’s dark age” (*Okinawa no ankoku jidai*)¹⁶ was further developed by scholars including Toriyama Atsushi, Wakabayashi Chiyo, and Tobe Hideaki.¹⁷ Although they do not constitute a particular school or group of researchers, these scholars take a similar approach in exploring people’s reaction to the US military government in the early occupation period in the 1940s and 1950s. For example, Toriyama describes diverse currents of political movements by local

¹⁵ Cf. Teruo Hiyané, *Sengo Okinawa No Seishin to Shiso* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2009), 7-14 and Chapter Four.

¹⁶ Arasaki’s historical narrative of the Okinawa struggle regards the early occupation period from the late 1940s until the early 1950s as “the Dark Age” (*ankoku jidai*) because it was the period when the US military control became complete and Okinawan society could not conduct effective resistance against the local US authority. (Moriteru Arasaki and Yoshio Nakano, *Okinawa Mondai Nijū-nen* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965), 50-70.

¹⁷ Cf. Atsushi Toriyama, *Okinawa: Kichi-shakai no Kigen to Sōkoku 1945-1956* (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2013); Hideaki Tobe, “‘Sengo Okinawa ni Okeru Fukki Undō no Shuppatsu: Kyōinsō Kara Miru Senjyōgo/senryōka no Shakai to Undō,’” *Journal of Japanese History* 547 (2007): 102-124; Chiyo Wakabayashi, “Jīpu to Sajin: Senryō Shoki Okinawa-shakai no ‘henyō’ to ‘hen’i,’” *Okinawa Bunka Kenkyū* 29 (2003): 239–240.

leaders, and their relationship with the US military government in the late 1940s. Tobe discusses the role that local school teachers played around the same period, giving us a sense of the way that local civil society responded to the military occupation. These researchers provide new insights into the political and social dynamics which set the stage for the further progressive movements in later periods.

A second approach is motivated by the sense of self-critique among the younger generations. This approach raised methodological questions regarding “how to study postwar Okinawa”. In particular, scholars highlighted issues such as how to learn the history of the war, and how to pass on the memories, experiences and histories of the older generation. Whereas people of the war-time generation created Okinawan identity based on their experiences of the war, poverty and the military violence of the early US occupation period (including forced eviction) those who were born after World War II learnt about those events and experiences by hearing the stories of the previous generation. With this motivation, Yakabi Osamu, an influential historian of the postwar generation, discusses the importance of positionality in learning experiences and histories that he did not directly experience.¹⁸ Yakabi’s contribution widened the scope of debate on Okinawan identity by questioning the presupposed ideas that delineate “Okinawans”. His perspective towards Okinawan identity became influential particularly when the discourse was appropriated by local historical revisionists such as Takara Kurayoshi.¹⁹ Takara insists upon the separation of the Okinawa struggle and Okinawan identity because, Takara argues, Okinawan history should not be studied from the perspective of a particular political ideology. For Takara, Okinawa’s local history has been biased because of the narratives of Okinawa struggle and discourses by the

¹⁸ Yakabi discusses the issue of positionality for the postwar generation in various places. For example, see: Osamu Yakabi et al. *Okinawa ni Mukiau: Manazashi to Hōhō* (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōron-sha, 2008).

¹⁹ Osamu Yakabi, “Okinawa no Aidentiti wo Kataru-koto soshite Katarinaosu-koto,” Moriteru Arasaki, et al ed. *Chiiki no Jiritsu, Shima no Chikara* (Tokyo: Komonzu, 2006).

war-time generation. This was a left-leaning “emotional” (*kanjōteki*) historical view that needs to be overcome by a “rational” (*gōriteki*) mind.²⁰ In defence of Okinawan identity as the ground of Okinawa’s unique political culture, Yakabi criticises Takara’s approach to Okinawan history, particularly Takara’s notion of “rationality”. Yakabi argues that this rationality is a guise that conceals a particular political intention.²¹ However, Yakabi does not simply repeat the views of the war-time generation scholars. He tries to reframe the notion of Okinawan identity by adding a new meaning to the concept. Together with an influential senior Okinawan scholar, Okamoto Keitoku, Yakabi discusses Okinawan identity as something that even the postwar generations can acquire through learning history and participation in the Okinawa struggle. This insertion of an additional layer to delineate Okinawan identity does not aim to introduce a new condition that narrows the definition of Okinawans. On the contrary, Yakabi’s methodological criticism of Okinawan identity creates a social space in Okinawa where so-called Okinawans and non-Okinawans can come together in the collaborative work of making Okinawa’s local political culture.²²

Although less widely discussed than the other two approaches, a third approach, which I call “the constructivist approach”, also provides insights into the development of Okinawan struggle study. There is no particular academic group which adopts the constructivist approach. Nonetheless I used this term to refer to an intellectual trend concurring in different places around the globe around 2000. Particularly, this approach is often seen amongst overseas researchers on the Okinawan struggle. People such as Miyume Tanji, Julia Yonetani, Masamichi Inoue, Kelly Dietz, Tada Osamu, Nomura Kōya and

²⁰ Kurayoshi Takara, Tsuneo Oshiro, and Morisada Maeshiro, *Okinawa Inishiatibu* (Naha: Okinawa Bunko, 2000).

²¹ Osamu Yakabi, *Okinawa-sen, Beigun-senryō-shi wo Manabinaosu* (Yokohama: Seiri Shobō, 2009).

²² Abe Kosuzu calls Yakabi’s reconstruction of Okinawan identity “dislocating’ Okinawan identity” (*Okinawa identitī wo dakkyū saseru*). Kosuzu Abe, “Radikaru na Okinawa no ‘Tōjisha’: Kussetsu suru Integiriti to Okinawa Sengo-shi Purojekuto,” *Okinawa Bunka Kenkyū*, 28 (2012), 291-317.

Mathew Allen discuss the Okinawa struggle by focusing on participants and their diverse social and cultural identities.²³ Based on ethnography, their works help unveil social actors who had previously been regarded as marginal to the struggle, including feminists, ordinary citizens, independence activists, and people from the outer lying Okinawan islands within the Okinawan anti-base movement. However, these scholars do not simply highlight the diversity of identities. They also challenge the existing mainstream representation of Okinawans and the discourse of Okinawan identity by showing certain limitations of these discourses in interpreting recent dynamic aspects of Okinawa's political culture. Their works cast light on issues such as gender, regional problems within Okinawa, and marginalized cultures in the popular narrative of the anti-base movement.

One of the most crucial issues for the constructivist approach is the significance of “community” as the basic unit of analysis. While much previous research had defined “Okinawan” based on the written texts, constructivists conduct ethnography to elucidate diverse communities and the complex identities of the people who join the local anti-base struggle. For example, one of the key scholars of this topic, Miyume Tanji, uses the concept of “protest community” (or community of protest) in order to address the “myth” and “reality” of the Okinawa struggle. She argues:

Perhaps, the Okinawan community of protest has slowly built a kind of solidarity not grounded on anything as a single or overarching principle—whether “reversion

²³ Miyume Tanji, *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa* (Routledge, 2006); Julia Yonetani (2004), “Appropriation and Resistance in “Globalized” Village: Reconfiguring local/Global Dynamic from Okinawa”, *Asian Studies Review*, 28(4): 391-406; Kelly Dietz, “Demilitarizing Sovereignty: Self-determination and Anti-military Activism in Okinawa, Japan”, in Philip MacMichael (eds.) *Contesting Development: Critical Struggles for Social Change* (Routledge, 2010); Osamu Tada, *Okinawa Imēji no Tanjō: Aoi Umi no Karuchuraru Sutadīzu* (Tōyōkeizaishin-pōsha, 2004); Kōya Nomura, *Muishiki no Shokuminchishugi: Nihonjin no Beigunkichi to Okinawajin* (Ochanomizu-shobō, 2005).

nationalism” or a faith in democratic processes. ...Nevertheless, as I have endeavored to argue throughout this book, the community of protest is loosely but powerfully a myth of an “Okinawan struggle”, which survives in an informal repertoire of protest strategy and telling and retelling shared common history of suffering and struggle.²⁴

The concept of protest community widened the collectivity of the Okinawa struggle by introducing a variety of local identities. Especially, when we consider the development of Okinawa’s anti-base movement in the mid and late 1990s, the constructivist approach provides useful perspectives from which diverse protest communities and new kinds of social identities such as feminism, environmental activism and the indigenous rights movement can be included in the analysis. Scholars such as Tanji discuss the emergence of a new identity by referring to New Social Movements theory, particularly Alberto Melucci’s use of

²⁴ Miyume Tanji, *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2006), 180.

identity.²⁵²⁶²⁷²⁸ In this sense, the diversification of approaches to Okinawan identity was also a theorization of the Okinawa struggle in order to discuss it in the broader context where Okinawa's local experiences can be examined not as an isolated struggle but as one crucial case in the global struggle against US military bases. In this way, the constructivism approach enables us to consider the micro-politics in which the Okinawan identity is constructed by many different social actors.

²⁵ In October 1995, nearly 90,000 local citizens gathered to protest the US and Japanese governments' responses to the rape incident of a local female student by three American military personnel. A year later, then Governor of Okinawa, Ōta Masahide (大田昌秀), also refused to sign the land lease contract with the Japanese authority. The protest movement became the island-wide campaign. It was Okinawan feminists from Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence who took an initiative to create the mass protest campaign in that period. Their campaign affected the governmental policy between Tokyo and Washington. In response to this revolt against Japan and the US, two national leaders—the former Japanese Prime Minister Ryūtarō Hashimoto (橋本龍太郎) and the US President Bill Clinton—decided to establish the Special Action Committee on Okinawa in 1996 to review the Japan-US Security Guideline and also to discuss gradual reduction of the existing US military facilities in Okinawa. For more detail, see Chapter Four.

²⁶ Environmental activism gradually became a crucial movement in the Okinawa struggle. In the northern fishing village of Henoko (辺野古), the base installation plan was proposed by the Japanese government in 1996. It coincided with the closure of Futenma Airbase, which has been regarded as one of the most dangerous US bases in the world. In order to protect the rich nature near the Ōura Bay in Henoko, which is known as the northern-most habitation zone for dugong and some other endangered species, Japanese and local Okinawan citizens have started organising a sit-in. This is a crucial protest campaign against the destruction of the local environment in contemporary Okinawan history. For more detail see Chapter Four.

²⁷ The indigenous rights movement was started in the late 1990s by a small group of local anti-base activists such as Matsushima Yasukatsu and Miyazato Gosamaru. They started an NGO called Association of Indigenous Peoples in Ryūkyūs aiming to promote the idea of Ryūkyūans as indigenous people in Japan. They have been participating in the international conferences including the UN as well as domestic activities in Japan and Okinawa. In 2012, AIPR was granted Special Consultative Status from the UN Economic and Social Council, which allows them to be involved in consultative work with the council. See more detail in Chapter Four.

²⁸ Miyume Tanji, *Myth, Protest and Struggles in Okinawa* (New York: Routledge, 2006). For basic references to New Social Movements, see e.g. Alain Touraine, *The Voice and the Eyes: An Analysis of Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Alain Touraine (1969), "Towards Actionalist Sociology", *Social Science Information*, 8(5): 147-166; and Alberto Melucci, "New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach", *Social Science Information*, 19: 199-226. For further reading on recent theoretical development, see, e.g. Alberto Melucci, *Playing Self: Person and Meaning in the Planetary Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

1.3. Geography, Human and Identity

While drawing on these previous studies, this thesis also addresses questions raised by recent theoretical debates about social and cultural movements. One of the problems for much of the existing literature within the constructivist approach is that it pays relatively little attention to the significance of space and place in making communal identities in the contemporary Okinawa struggle. This problem is derived primarily from a theoretical setting in which social position (as woman, local resident etc.) is the central focus for discussing identities. But alongside actor-based analyses, place-based analysis can also provide a useful perspective to understand agencies that are involved in making communal culture and identity. The eminent geographer, Yi-Fu Tuan is one of those who has contributed to the theoretical development of place in relation to the issue of identity. Discussing affective and cultural factors such as emotion, experiences, and sensation in considering geographical space, Tuan emphasizes the significance of the role that those aesthetic elements play in making sense of space.²⁹ What he terms “humanistic geography” sees space not only based on geographical demarcation on a map but also compels us to take subjective elements into consideration so as to understand the meaning of a locale as perceived by those who encounter or inhabit it.

In relation to the visual perspective, some geographers and anthropologists such as Tim Ingold have also developed theories to understand what place is in terms of identity. Ingold challenges the way in which we see images of a locale or landscape as if they were “given-ready-made”.³⁰ Referring to the art of Australian indigenous people, for example, Ingold discusses how a view of place can be different depending on the influence of cultures which are represented by signs, symbols or texts. In this sense, what he calls “cultural

²⁹ Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis, Minn.: Univ of Minnesota Press, 2001).

³⁰ Tim Ingold, "The Temporality of the Landscape," *World Archaeology* 25 (1993): 162.

landscape” is an important approach to understand how a locale is related to one’s identity. Ingold’s concept of cultural landscape also indicates two crucial elements: the “temporality” and “internality” of the landscape. He observes that the landscape contains many symbolic and cultural elements, and he clarifies the significance of the process within which the landscape is produced by action (e.g. painting as an action of producing the landscape). In this sense, the landscape is a temporary and performative product, the images of which vary depending on who, when, where, and how action takes place.

To counter Ingold’s landscape approach, Tim Cresswell differentiates landscape from place in terms of the historical origins of these two concepts. According to Cresswell, the concept of the landscape originated from the expansion of mercantile capitalism. From this perspective, he argues that the landscape was motivated by concerns to illustrate objects based on the scientific gaze, whereas the concept of place is meant to discuss space in terms of lived-experience.³¹ He also separates landscape from place by arguing that landscape is an “intensely visual idea” of a portion of the land, while the concept of place focuses on “very much things to be inside of”.³² This indicates that place is the concept that analyzes inner affinity to a locale, whereas landscape has been regarded as being the perspective of outsiders who share little of the lived experiences. Yet the recent theoretical development in geography obscures the distinction between two concepts. Although Cresswell is critical of the direct application of landscape to the discussion of place, he also admits that an external gaze is a crucial element in the creation process of “the inside” socio-cultural space.³³ Using the concept of “transgression”, Cresswell also thinks that enactment of the internality of place (a concept which defines material and immaterial attachment to geographical space as social

³¹ Tim Cresswell, *Place: A Short Introduction* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), 11.

³² *Ibid.*, 10.

³³ *Ibid.*, 102.

order) requires agency which crosses a line between “the inside” and “the outside”.³⁴

Criticizing Cresswell’s separation of place and landscape, Brian Wattchow tries to formulate a constructive relation between those two concepts. He argues that both landscape and sense of place are crucial elements by which the attachment to a particular locality is produced.³⁵ Antonia Noussia discusses not only constructive relations of landscape and place but the creative role that landscape plays in order to make a specific sense of locality. Highlighting various museums in England and their specific use of space, Noussia examines how the open-air art projects in those museums are designed to not only to exhibit but also to deliver a particular narrative and representation of local life³⁶ What is important here is how the relationship between landscape—which is material and relies on an external view—and place—which is seen as emerging from intimate experiences of a particular locale—represents geographical heritage. While the museum space contains objects or artifacts arranged to represent the landscape and the ways of local life, it is also designed so that visitors to experience the narrative of a certain locale. Therefore Noussia shows how both landscape and place are constituted within the same space.

In order to overcome a dualistic understanding of experience and gaze, John Wylie discusses “dwelling” as a perspective within which a gaze is embodied through “relational contexts of involvement” with its environment.³⁷ According to Wylie, this perspective enables us to understand that the environment or nature is not detached from the self but it is embedded within one’s mind. Therefore, the dwelling perspective is close to ecological

³⁴ Ibid., 103.

³⁵ Brian Wattchow, “The Landscape and a Sense of Place: Creative Tension,” in *The Routledge Companion to Landscape Studies*, ed. Peter Howard et al. (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 87-96.

³⁶ Antonia Noussia, “Constructing Spaces, Representing Places: The Role of Landscape in Open-Air Museum Sites,” in *The Routledge Companion to Landscape Studies*, ed. Peter Howard et al. (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 179–89.

³⁷ John Wylie, *Landscape* (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 158.

thought on the self and environment in the sense that it argues that the self comes to be realized in complex relationships within nature.³⁸ Contrary to Creswell's explanation on landscape as something detached from place, these recent studies suggest that landscape is an indispensable concept in order to understand the production of place. Above theorists emphasise interactive relations of landscape and place from various viewpoints. This theoretical development is noteworthy because they not only demonstrate the interconnectedness of two previously conflicting concepts but also enables us to understand the nature of our social space and how it is created by the external gaze and by a sense of attachment to place.

Other approaches to place and identity delve into these issues in terms of cultural representation. For example, anthropologists Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson discuss place as a useful methodological concept to examine process and power-relations in making identities. Although place and identity tend to be merged in notions such as "home", the "local", "homeland" and so forth, Gupta and Ferguson separate these two concepts by arguing that place is a site within which social process takes place, and identities are created as a product of this social process.³⁹ Another notable anthropologist, Arturo Escobar, too, discusses the nature of place as a site upon which local and extra-local factors create "multiple social relations".⁴⁰ These cultural theorists discuss place not merely as a meaningful concept that leads us to understand the political economy of identity making, but rather, their perspectives similarly emphasize the usefulness of place as a frame for seeing the polyphonic state of identities. In this sense, as Arif Dirlik argues, the concept of place can offer us two

³⁸ Ibid., 158-159.

³⁹ Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, "Beyond 'Culture': Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference," *Cultural Anthropology* 7 (1992): 6-23.

⁴⁰ Arturo Escobar, "Place, Economy, and Culture in a Postdevelopment Era," in *Places and Politics in an Age of Globalization*, ed. Roxann Prazniak and Arif Dirlik (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 206.

different types of social activism: one that is exercised under the rubric of identity politics or identity-based politics, and one that is exercised over the meanings of an identity in a certain locale or what he calls “place-based politics”.⁴¹

By introducing cultural aspects, these analyses similarly widen our view of place not only as a geographic entity but also as including social relations and human activity. In this sense, place is a result of physical and cultural interaction as much as it is the product of the natural environment. These perspectives provide some hints for developing a concept of place that goes beyond positivistic or “objective” understandings: it leads us to consider place as a matter of cultural representation. In other words, these perspectives question how people view and participate and bring their own experiences to bear on the process of “making sense of place”. Drawing on these approaches, I consider human agency, visions and experiences that are involved in the actual place-making process. In order to highlight the characteristics of place, I discuss two frameworks: locality and region. These frameworks help us clarify spatial settings in which the sense of place is located.

1.4. Locality

The concept of locality illuminates a crucial aspect of the concept of place. Most often, locality evokes some connotations associated with identity such as home, groundedness, fixity, and origin contrasted with globality. However, in the context of modern Japanese society, locality has been discussed as something unsettled under the influence of globalization. For example, by focusing on the urbanization of Japanese rural communities and the predicament of traditional social capital, sociologist Yoshiwara Naoki is one of those

⁴¹ Arif Dirlik, “Place-Based Imagination: Globalism and the Politics of Place,” in *Places and Politics in an Age of Globalization*, ed. Roxann Prazniak and Arif Dirlik (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 15-52.

who has led the discussion on the predicament of locality since the 1970s.⁴² Highlighting conflicts between the major economic capitals and the local community over the issues such as security, he analyzes how the local agents create public spheres like neighborhood associations to govern their communities.⁴³ In the similar vein, Kawabata Kōhei also focuses on the social impact of rural gentrification on the senses of community and on marginalized social actors. His research demonstrates two contested aspects of the predicament of local identities in rural communities: the enactment or creation of new hometown identities and the erasure of memories of the marginalized social actors such as ethnic Koreans in Japan.⁴⁴ Contrary to an interpretation by which locality is considered to have relatively fixed and homogeneous identities, recent research offers a notion in which even the identities of Japanese rural communities are created through diverse kinds of social actors and their labor. What it means to be “local” can no longer be reduced to the rubric of a single, homogeneous cultural setting but needs to be considered as a product of conflict, negotiation and action of different social and cultural backgrounds such as ethnicity, gender, generation and so forth.

Highlighting diverse social actors within the locality allows us not only to examine micro-politics among these actors but also it enables us to understand the current cultural and social settings of locality which indispensably involve the social links to the global level. In this sense, Arjun Appadurai’s conceptualization of the local/global relationship is important to understand the current nature of locality. Appadurai conceptualizes locality as a product of various different global cultural flows.⁴⁵ In doing so, however, Appadurai regards locality not only as something produced by globalization but also as an active participant which

⁴² Naoki Yoshiwara, “Jūmin Soshiki to Jūmin Undō: ‘Chiiki Shakai’ no Kokoromi,” *Studies in Sociology, Psychology, and Education*, 25 (1975): 25–31.

⁴³ Naoki Yoshiwara, *Chiiki Shakai to Chiiki Jūmin Soshiki* (Tokyo: Yachiyo Shuppan, 1993).

⁴⁴ Kohei Kawabata, *Jimoto wo Aruku: Mijika Na Sekai No Esunogurafii* (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 2013).

⁴⁵ Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis, MN: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 1996). Especially, see Chapter Nine.

contributes to shaping globalization by its contexts, experiences and knowledge.⁴⁶ For example, referring to local civic movements in Mumbai, Appadurai explicates the significance of human activity as an agency which formulates entangled social spaces between local and global as much as other material and immaterial flows do.⁴⁷ From a different perspective, John Brown-Childs also theorizes what it is to be local in relation to global social relations. His understanding of locality does not stem from a rigid identity discourse but is the locus upon which politics surrounding the meanings of identities are contested between global capitalism and resistance. His notion of resistance is thus not the same as identity politics on the basis of ethnicity or nationalism. Rather, it is a concept that characterizes forms of resistance or counter-politics against global capitalism on the basis of a coalition in which a range of different social and cultural actors and groups participate.⁴⁸

1.5. Region

While discussion around locality provides some useful theoretical references on place as a politically contested site, the concept of region offers different perspectives. Like locality, region, too, spatializes place in terms of the web of diverse social relations. Yet region spatializes place differently from locality, in that it highlights social relations in a broader frame where multiple locales create a social space, and it often crosses national boundaries. The notion of region has been discussed primarily within the field of Area Studies. In the classical sense, regional demarcation was considered based on civilizational difference. In the case of Okinawa, its location has been regarded as part of East Asia in which Chinese cultural influence has been regarded as dominant. However, during the Cold War period Okinawa's

⁴⁶ Ibid., 27-47.

⁴⁷ Arjun Appadurai, "Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination," *Public Culture* 12 (2000): 1-19.

⁴⁸ John Brown-Childs, *Transcommunalism: From the Politics of Conversion to the Ethics of Respect* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2003).

regional location was considered to be the Northern or Northwestern Pacific as much as East Asia. This demarcation was made largely as a result of the American regional strategy in Asia and the Pacific region. Since the middle of Cold War era, and particularly around the 1990s, scholars within Area Studies have started questioning the dominant idea of region. By pointing out aspects of Area Studies complicit with American Cold War policy, they have criticized Area Studies as “the largest institutional epistemology” created by governmental sponsorship. This criticism of Area Studies contributed substantially to the creation of new critical trends of Area Studies, which compelled area specialists to understand area or region as a dynamic socio-cultural space rather than a mere cartographical entity.⁴⁹ Scholars such as Willem Van Schendel and Tessa Morris-Suzuki as well as Appadurai and Dirlik are among many others who discuss visions for new ways to look into region.⁵⁰

Among them, Arjun Appadurai is one of earliest theorists to seek to find new directions on the notion of “area” in the context of globalization. He criticizes Cold War Area Studies by arguing that the idea of area was conceived based on “conceptions of geographical, civilizational, and cultural coherence that rely on some sort of trait list”. In his understanding, therefore, Area Studies tends to see area as “relatively immobile aggregates of traits, with more or less durable historical boundaries and with unity composed of more or less enduring properties.” In order to discuss new Area Studies, Appadurai stresses the

⁴⁹ Immanuel Wallerstein is one of the early critics of Area Studies’ intellectual and institutional involvement with the American policy making from the late 1990s. By calling its mission ‘intellectual colonization’, Wallerstein’s critique of Area Studies originated from his disagreement with the role that Area Studies played during the Cold War and with its “colonial gaze”. Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies,” *The Cold War and the University*, ed. Noam Chomsky et al. (New York, NY: New Press, 1997), also see for example David L. Szanton, “The Origin, Nature and Challenges of Area Studies in the United States,” *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Disciplines*, ed. David Szanton (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004).

⁵⁰ Willem van Schendel (2002), “Geographies of Knowing, Geographies of Ignorance: Jumping Scale in South-east Asia,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 20 (6): 647-668. However, one of the earliest critique of area studies goes back to the late 1940s, most notably to John Dower ed. *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975).

importance of *process* in making our understanding of a region. To highlight “significant areas of human organization as precipitates of various kinds of action, interaction, and motion” instead of featuring commonality of locality in terms of geographical setting, Appadurai proposes the notion of “process geography” in which area is determined based on the fluid nature of flow including human activity as agency.⁵¹

An historian of Southeast Asia, Willem Van Schendel, also examines region in terms of process. While conventionally region was considered based on civilizations and the nation-state, he looks into the process within which the understanding of region is produced. He explicates the issue in terms of three different social spaces: physical space, symbolic space and institutional space. In area studies, geographical space has played a crucial role in understanding the unique characteristics of the society and culture. However, as a Southeast Asianist, Van Schendel argues that the conventional notion of geographical space has its limits in addressing that uniqueness because Southeast Asia has distinctive geographical characteristics: it is made up of thousands of islands, whereas often continents have been regarded as the basic entity of demarcation. Therefore, he says, Southeast Asianists look at another “physical” aspect to discuss region as social space, which is flow of human activity. This notion of physical space needs to be seen in connection with symbolic space, “a site of theoretical knowledge production rather than a mere object of specialist knowledge”⁵², and institutional space, “as the name of transnational scholarly lineage, circles of referencing, structures of authority and patronage”.⁵³ By clarifying conceptual tools that invent region, Van Schendel discusses possibilities for envisioning regions that are not illustrated on the map, such as Zomia—a highland area of continental Southeast Asia which spans national borders. Although Zomia is by no means a country or a territory officially recognized by

⁵¹ Arjun Appadurai, “Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination,” 6-7.

⁵² Willem van Schendel, “Geographies of Knowing, Geographies of Ignorance: Jumping Scale in Southeast Asia,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 20 (2002), 654.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 650.

some international authority, it is a region to the extent that the land is populated by the locals who share linguistic and other cultural elements.

Historian Tessa Morris-Suzuki also discusses region as an artifact created through the historical process of material and immaterial flows. As in the works of Appadurai and Van Schendel, Morris-Suzuki discusses the importance of human activity as a creative agency in making a region. “Through interacting with one and other over relatively large distances”, she states, “people discover or create commonalities of life-style or understanding.”⁵⁴ One of the distinctive aspects of her understanding of region is her focus on fluidity or liquidity as a key concept to examine region and social and cultural interaction as creative practices. In what she conceptualizes as “Liquid Area Studies”, Morris-Suzuki discusses some hints to reinterpret the meaning of area. Firstly, the concept of liquidity offers a perspective by which we understand possible radical changes of shape or even disappearance of region, depending on how and in which direction movement occurs. It also means that there are “no grounds for assuming that the cultural cohesion and integration of any area will survive unchanged over long periods of time” because the area “may be very fluid, undergoing repeated and dramatic metamorphoses over time”.⁵⁵ Secondly, through the lens of liquidity, we will be able to understand different regions overlapping in one locale. “Within the same town or rural area”, she says, “it is possible to have different groups of people who live in different social spaces and thus participate in different areas.”⁵⁶

The Critical Area Studies scholars introduced some useful perspectives from which to interpret the meanings of place and place-based identity. As in the discussions of locality, region, too, is also a form of social space that has been created through processes within

⁵⁴ Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Liquid Area Studies: North East Asia in Motion” (paper presented at Transnational/Transcultural Comparative Area Studies, Tokyo, 14-15 February, 2009), 8.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

which material and immaterial interactions take place. In this sense, as Van Schendel elaborates, physical space becomes a crucial vehicle by which material and immaterial interactions are made possible. This enables us to consider two relationships of region and place. First, if we situate human activity as the significant driver of the region making, we can imagine regions that emerge through the interaction of diverse locales. In this sense, region not only contains places but it is born out of connection and fusion of different places. At the same time, as Morris-Suzuki argues, regional boundaries can be considered as phenomena that create place. Okinawa, as a borderland where diverse contexts of differences meet climatically, historically, culturally, and politically, is thus a crucial site to investigate two different yet indispensable processes of place making—regionalization of locality and localization of region.

1.6. Research Questions

Building upon those theoretical debates on place, identity and social activism, this thesis investigates the following points:

- (1) How do different levels of place (i.e. local, archipelagic and transnational) interact in the formation of visions of “Okinawan identity”?
- (2) What resources and political agents are mobilized and involved in making the distinctive characteristics of the place-based identities in Okinawa?
- (3) Following from the above two questions, how can we reconsider the meaning of “Okinawa struggle”?

By considering these questions, this thesis intends to demonstrate how the notion of place functions to make inclusive, interactive and diverse forms of the Okinawa struggle.

Eventually, the main aim of this thesis is to contribute to enriching our understanding of the

local anti-base struggle.

1.7. Case Study and Research Method

As I briefly mentioned earlier in this chapter, I explore place-based identity in the Okinawan struggle through an in-depth examination of two apparently contrasting case studies: the Takae Residents' Society in the northern Yanbaru region; and the Okinawa Korea People's Solidarity (OKPS) based in southern Naha City.

The Takae Residents' Society is a protest community based in a small rural hamlet in north-eastern Okinawa Island. It was founded in 2007 in order to protect the residents' existing local livelihood space from destruction caused by the construction of a helipad landing zone for US military helicopters. OKPS was founded in the late 1980s by local residents from the industrial southern cities of the island. It was started to create international networks between the anti-base movements in Okinawa and overseas countries. While both have attracted less attention compared with some other well publicized local anti-base campaigns such as in Henoko, these two cases are also important examples to understand some aspects of the relationships between the Okinawan anti-base movement and local identities. They both reveal the role of place as the distinctive source which provides identities for the protest communities.

On the one hand, in the case of the Takae Residents' Society, place consciousness is directed to the abundant natural environment of the region. Inspired by this nature, local residents who participate in the anti-helipad movement consider that their communal identity is based not only upon Okinawan identity but also their more localized identity as residents in Takae who are struggling for environmental conservation. On the other hand, OKPS was started by a group of activists who aimed to build regional solidarity with Asian neighbors. Their sense of identity is strongly built upon Okinawa and its historical relationships with

Korea. Their historical consciousness can be understood when closely examining the members' motivation and concerns, and we can also see their critical reflection on Okinawa's historical position not only as victim of war but also as part of Japanese colonial expansion, especially towards Japan's Asian neighbors, including Korea and Southeast Asian countries. Their social activity is largely based on Okinawa's embedded ambiguous historical position within East Asia. While many studies of the anti-base movement focus on a relatively unitary "Okinawan identity" as the source of activism, these two cases are of interest because they illustrate the power of two other forms of "local/regional identity"—one at a smaller localized level and one at a broader regional level—which coexist and interrelate with "Okinawan identity" in the anti-base study.

This study is based on a combination of archival and interview research. My fieldwork was conducted in two different periods: from October 2011 until June 2012; and from June to July 2013, in Naha in Okinawa and in Tokyo. I conducted my archival research mainly at the Library and the Area Research Institute (*Chiiki Kenkyūjo*) of Okinawa University. Among local institutes and archives, Okinawa University has been one of the most active research centers in relation to Okinawa's social movements including the anti-base movements. Founded by a notable Japanese environmental activist and pioneer of environmental pollution study, Professor Ui Jun, the Area Research Institute is particularly known as the core research unit of the university. Its archives contain extensive historical materials including locally circulated journals such as *Keishi Kaji* and hand-written unpublished newsletters from the early days of Okinawa's ecological movements during the 1970s. In Tokyo, I conducted archival research at the National Diet Library, Waseda University Library and Hosei University Library. Waseda and Hosei Universities are known for the largest collections on Okinawa studies outside Okinawa Prefecture. In particular, Hosei University succeeded to the collection from the Okinawa Resource Center, one of the

few Tokyo-based research institutes on Okinawa during the occupation period, when it was closed in the early 1970s.

During my fieldwork period, I also conducted participatory observation in places including Takae and Naha. By joining various community activities of the Takae Residents' Society, including sit-in, and of OKPS, I could learn from within the ways in which these “protest” communities have been run and experienced by various types of people. In order to understand the members' personal experiences and contexts, I conducted interviews with fifteen people from the two communities. In both cases, I obtained the interview appointments through the “snowball sampling” method. These interviews were conducted under an ethics protocol approved by the Australian National University. For a researcher like myself who had no relationship with those communities prior to my fieldwork, this was an effective method to understand the personal networks of the community members.

1.8. Chapter Outline

This thesis consists of nine chapters including this Introduction (**Chapter One**) and the Conclusion (**Chapter Nine**). In **Chapters Two** and **Three**, I will discuss the historical background of Okinawa's anti-base movement. The aim of these two chapters is to introduce the basic issues and events of the local anti-base struggle based on three different phases: the 1950s as the origin of the Okinawa struggle; the 1960s when the second climax of the anti-base movement appeared widely in Okinawa; and the anti-base movement post-reversion of Okinawa to Japan, especially around the 1990s when the so-called third island-wide struggle took place. The importance of this chapter is not only to introduce the historical development of the Okinawa struggle but also to discuss the formation of “Okinawan identity”, which is seen as a shared historical consciousness in Okinawa, particularly in the anti-base movement.

Chapter Four discusses how this Okinawa struggle has been analyzed internationally with a focus on three scholars' works; Masamichi S. Inoue, Miyume Tanji, and Kelly Dietz. These researchers simultaneously sought ways to integrate the Okinawa struggle and its local identity into the context of global social movements such as feminism, indigenous land rights and civil society. Their challenge was how to make distance from Okinawan identity discourses in order to bring attention to the local military base problems as everyday concerns for the local life rather than an abstract issue of identity. In order to reconcile the Okinawa struggle and everyday life, these researchers conducted ethnographic research across academic disciplinary boundaries. Their research is also distinguished by their self-reflexivity and examination of their positionality as researcher. By struggling with the complex entanglement of locality, globality and researcher's positionality, their works carve out alternative understandings of the Okinawa struggle in terms of socio-cultural practices as well as identity discourses. Nevertheless I shall problematize the need for further analyses on place consciousness and place-based identity in the existing works, in order to overcome limitations in our understanding of social practices occurring in the local protest movements.

Based on the methodology discussed in earlier chapters, I will examine the two case studies in the following **Chapters Five to Eight**. In **Chapters Five** and **Six** I will discuss the case of Takae Residents' Society. **Chapter Five** introduces the local history and general socio-economic structure of the region and the contexts in which the Takae Residents' Society was founded, including the core members' brief biographies and life experiences. I will also discuss the general characteristics of Takae's protest community, which highlights how the identity of the community is based not only upon the self-recognition as Okinawan but upon identification as "Takae residents". In **Chapter Six**, I examine the political aspects of the communal identity of the Takae Residents' Society. This issue will be examined by looking into the situation in which their community interacts with larger powers such as

Okinawa Prefecture, the major construction company workers, the Japanese Ministry of Defense and other stakeholders.

In **Chapters Seven** and **Eight**, I will analyze the case of the group called OKPS. **Chapter Seven** examines the general historical background of OKPS and its social activities in order to highlight their unique collective identity and their consciousness about the position of Okinawa in the region. By doing so, this chapter aims to reveal the process through which the Okinawa struggle could develop a regional solidarity network with South Korean counterparts. In **Chapter Eight**, I will delve into the origin of OKPS by investigating the life histories of three prominent members. This will elucidate the complex relationships that make the collective identity and place consciousness of an Okinawan protest community in a regional context.

Chapter Two

Making “The Okinawa Struggle” under the US Occupation



Ōhama Nobumoto (right), the chief political advisor of the Japanese Prime Minister Satō Eisaku's private committee on Okinawa's reversion to Japan, with a delegate (left) from the Rockefeller Foundation, October 1963. Born in Ishigaki Island in Okinawa, Ōhama became the President of Waseda University in 1954. He was also one of the leaders in Okinawan community in Tokyo. He became a member of the brain trust for PM Satō over Okinawa's reversion to Japan, and played a crucial role between Japan and the United States during the 1960s and early 1970s. The image was preserved by Waseda University in January 2012.

2.1. Introduction

Okinawa's anti-base movement has lasted for nearly seventy years, and it is sometimes depicted as a movement with a single continuous identity. The term "Okinawa struggle" (*Okinawa tōsō* or 沖縄闘争 in Chinese character) reinforces this image, as though the movement has always shared the same concerns about the problems caused by the US military bases. The "Okinawa struggle" provides a useful historical framework, particularly when we consider the historical continuities characterizing the Okinawa struggle up to the present day. This concept is also meaningful because it makes the people's struggle an important historical subject in Okinawan history since World War II, but at the same time, the notion of a single "Okinawa struggle" can obscure the diversity and dynamism of the historical process.

Okinawan intellectuals such as Ōta Masahide, Hiyane Teruo, and Arasaki Moriteru are the pioneering public intellectuals whose works greatly influenced the making of the narrative of the "Okinawa struggle" as a unified collective movement. By highlighting the significance of people's historical consciousness in Okinawan history in fields such as history, journalism, poetry and cultural criticism, these local intellectuals contributed to shaping Okinawa's distinctive postwar cultural and political identity. Their works redefined what it means "to be an Okinawan" not merely in terms of cultural uniqueness but in terms of critical approaches to historical and social problems of Japanese imperialism, war, and American occupation.

Historian Arasaki Moriteru is one of the prominent scholars whose works have contributed to developing the notion of the Okinawa struggle as an historical perspective. His famous theory of "the three waves" became an important concept for examining continuity and change in the Okinawa struggle in the latter half of the twentieth century. By exploring the political and social dynamics related to Okinawa's US bases, Arasaki analyzed the mass

anti-base protest campaign that involved the whole Okinawa Prefecture (the so-called “island-wide struggle” or *shimagurumi tōsō*), highlighting three different periods: the 1950s, the 1960s and early 1970s, and the 1990s. The three wave approach enables us to examine the historical characteristics of non-state actors including farmers, students, unions, other community leaders and members as the subjects of historical consideration in Okinawa. In this respect, Arasaki argues that the Okinawa struggle is a history of popular (or, civic in his later works) movements against the “structurally discriminated situation” of Okinawa under the Japan-US alliance.⁵⁷

However, while Arasaki’s pioneering works carved out an alternative perspective on historical and social understandings of Okinawa, there were also limits in his approach. From the mid-1990s, the narrative of the Okinawa struggle has been challenged by the scholars from a new generation such as Julia Yonetani, Wakabayashi Chiyo, Abe Kosuzu, Miyume Tanji, Masamichi Inoue, Matthew Allen, and Kelly Dietz. Despite their disciplinary differences, their shared interests revolve around the marginalized stories of the Okinawa struggle. With this motivation, these scholars focus on the significant roles played by social actors who are excluded on the basis of gender, nationality, ethnicity, and residence. These scholars’ works not only complicate the representation of the Okinawa struggle but also demonstrate how marginalized perspectives contribute to diversifying the meanings of the Okinawa struggle by articulating more localized social and communal identities. In doing so, they revealed the active roles that local protest communities played and the “social densities”⁵⁸ that were created through formal and informal channels of connectivity and interaction across different communities.

⁵⁷ For more detail on the concept of “structural discrimination”, see, for example, Moriteru Arasaki, *Arasaki Moriteru Ga Toku Kōzōteki Okinawa Sabetsu* (Tokyo: Kōbunken, 2012).

⁵⁸ I use social density as a key concept in understanding the historical development of the Okinawa struggle. For example, Alain Touraine uses this term to define “a new mode of production” in the post-industrial period,

Focusing on individual actors and their roles, this chapter aims to introduce the dynamic history and political culture of the Okinawa struggle from the 1950s until 1972. By highlighting the unity and diversity of collective identity, I shall discuss the historical development of the Okinawa struggle as a product of historical and social relationships among different communities, events and ideas. Particularly, I shall underline the ideas and social actors who contributed to building the “Okinawa struggle”, including the farmers of Ie Island, students from the University of the Ryukyus, the Okinawa Teachers and Staff Union, political parties, regional communities, cultural autonomists, and feminists. This chapter examines the origins and historical conditions from which “Okinawan identity” was formed in different periods and the diverse motivations which shaped the Okinawan anti-base movement before Okinawa’s return to Japan.

2.2. The Military Occupation

In April 1945, the Allied Forces, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, landed in Yomitan, a village located in the western part of Okinawa Island. Based on Proclamation Number One under the Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, the Allied Forces established the Military Government of the Ryūkyū Islands.⁵⁹ From that moment Okinawa was occupied by the United States military government regime until May 1972.

replacing the hegemony of industrial society. He implies that social density is a distinctive rationale of social change in the contemporary era, created through communication and networks. In this regard, Loise Maheu explains that Touraine’s idea of social density is a basis where modern institutional settings of ‘the body, education, and the autonomy of the global setting’ are created. Based on Tourainian understanding, I used this concept so as to highlight interactive aspects of different local communities as a driver for the historical development of the movement. (cf. Alain Touraine, “Social Movements: Participation and Protest,” *Scandinavian Political Studies* 10 (1987): 212; Jon Clark, Marco Diani, eds., *Alain Touraine* (London ; Washington, D.C: Routledge, 1996), 105.

⁵⁹ See Image 2-2.

When the US committed itself to a long-term occupation of Okinawa in December 1950, the US Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands was transformed into the US Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands or USCAR. Although USCAR was the “civil administration”, it was still a military regime, as USCAR was run by US Army officers until Okinawa’s return to Japan.⁶⁰ In the early period, USCAR was represented by the Governor. But the position of Governor was held by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) based in Tokyo. Therefore, it was the Deputy Governor who was responsible for the local administration of Okinawa. The Deputy Governor was chosen from officers with the rank of General in the US Army. This system was maintained until the strategic transformation in 1957, when the US Far East Command was integrated into the Pacific Command based in Hawaii. After that, USCAR became directly affiliated to the US Department of Defense. The Deputy Governor was replaced by the High Commissioner, who had greater responsibility and authority than the previous appointment. Having a strong administrative influence over the Ryukyu Islands, USCAR was responsible not only for the local US military troops but also for the civil administration for the local residents of the region.⁶¹ With mixed feelings of awe and hostility, the local Okinawans called him “the Emperor of Okinawa”.⁶²

⁶⁰ Therefore, in this thesis, I use the term “the US military government” to describe USCAR as well as the US Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands.

⁶¹ The civil administration under military control was possible for two reasons. First, Okinawa was considered to be a key area for America’s defense line of the western Pacific. However, there was no legal basis to claim Okinawa be a part of the US. Therefore, as the long-term control was determined, the US Military Government transformed itself to the civil administration which not only aimed to possess Okinawa for the strategic purpose but also to establish a democratic political system in Okinawa under the supervision of the US. USCAR was the local authority delegated by the Far East Command until 1957, and by the US Department of Defence until 1972.

⁶² Historian Ōta Masahide investigates the difference between the Deputy Governor and the High Commissioner and discusses the superiority of the High Commissioner to the Deputy Governor in terms of the power they were given. As one example, he mentioned that while the Deputy Governor was the local delegate of SCAP in Tokyo, the High Commissioner was placed directly under the US Department of Army. He states that the High Commissioner was wearing ‘the four hats’, which represent the Heads of (1) the US Ryukyu Commands, (2) the Coordinator of the US Army, Navy, Air-force and Marines in Okinawa as the representative of the Command of the US Pacific Command, (3) the Commander of the Nine Division of the US troops, and (4)

“Imperialism without colonialism” is a good description of the history of the US role in Okinawa. The military government (*gunsei*) in Okinawa did not intend to build a colony.⁶³ According to the Executive Order signed in June 1957 by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, one of the nominal missions of the military government was “to encourage the development of an effective and responsible Ryukyuan government based on democratic principles”.⁶⁴ The US military government began to practice this principle immediately after its occupation of Okinawa began. Bringing together former local senior politicians, the Okinawa Advisory Council (*Okinawa shijun-kai*) was established in a displaced persons’ camp in 1945, and was transformed into the Okinawa Civilian Government (*Okinawa Minseifu*) to implement local administration of Okinawa Island in 1946. The same kind of administration was created to rule other places in the Ryukyu Islands such as Miyako Islands region, Yaeyama Islands region and Amami Islands region. These administrative groups formed the four regional governments (*Guntō Seifu*) in 1950, where the Governors and the members of the assembly for each region were elected by local residents.

However, according to the US Military Government Special Proclamation Number 37, the resolutions by the local assembly were inferior to the decisions made by the US military government. Therefore, the US military government was able to invalidate the local decisions made by the regional governments. As the movements for Okinawa’s return to Japan were heightened among local leaders, particularly led by the Governor of the Okinawa Island Government, Taira Tatsuo, the US authorities decided to dissolve the existing system and integrated the regional governments into the Government of Ryukyu Islands or GRI

the US High Commissioner of USCAR. For more detail, see, for example, Masahide Ōta, *Okinawa no Teiō Koto-benmukan* (Tokyo: Kume Shobō, 1984).

⁶³ Prasenjit Duara, “The New Imperialism and the Post-Colonial Developmental State: Manchukuo in Comparative Perspective,” *Japan Focus* (January 30, 2006), accessed 15 November 2013. <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Prasenjit-Duara/1715/article.html>.

⁶⁴ “Dwight D. Eisenhower. Executive Order 10713 - Providing for the Administration of the Ryukyu Islands,” accessed July 7, 2015, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=106354>.

(*Ryūkyū Seifu*) in 1952. This new local authority consisted of three apparatuses: the Legislature, the Government and the Court.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the superior power of USCAR was not changed. As Historian Ōta Masahide states, local autonomy was tolerated as long as it did not threaten the authority of USCAR.⁶⁶

One of the crucial reasons why SCAP and the US Department of Defense granted USCAR such strong authority to interfere in Okinawan local politics was to establish America's influence not only in Okinawa but also in East Asia and the northern Pacific. Prolongation of America's governance over the Ryūkyū Islands was already regarded as necessary for postwar US strategy in the region, due to the emergence of communist powers in the region. According to a recently declassified document from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) titled "The Ryukyu Islands and Their Significance", dated August 1948, the location of the Ryūkyū Islands was considered to be "one of the most controversial issues in any settlement of Far Eastern problems." Following this statement, the document reports that control of this region would enable the occupying country to gain the benefit in both "offensive and defensive operations" in Asia and the Pacific regions, which would also be effective "to discourage any revival of military aggression on the part of the Japanese."⁶⁷ The document also reports the potential risk if the US withdrew from the Ryukyu Islands that Chinese communist forces would take over the region. One year later, this concern had become more serious for the US when the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949.

⁶⁵ However, the Amami Islands region was returned to Japan in December 1953 because of the rise of strong local demand for reversion to Japan. Cf. Robert D. Eldridge, *The Return of the Amami Islands: The Reversion Movement and U.S.-Japan Relations* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004.)

⁶⁶ Masahide Ōta, *Okinawa No Teiō: Kōtōbenmukan* (Tokyo: Kume Shobō, 1984).

⁶⁷ The United States Central Intelligence Agency, "The Ryukyu Islands and Their Significance," accessed November 28, 2014. http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000259203.pdf.

The facilities that had already been constructed by the Japanese Imperial Army also attracted America's attention. The CIA report mentions that there are overall "twenty-two airplane bases and sea plane bases, eleven of which were constructed on Okinawa during the war". Also, the report says that six of the eleven airbases on Okinawa Islands were capable of accommodating the heavy bomber B-29s "Superfortress". Furthermore, the document reports that other surrounding islands "would present an excellent base from which heavy bombers could bring within range of the interior of China, any part of Japan and Korea, portions of eastern Siberia including Vladivostok, the whole Philippine Islands, Guam and Marinas, and portions of Southeast Asia and the Netherlands East Indies."⁶⁸ Considering these strategic purposes, it was evident that Okinawa was useful as a "keystone" for the US to win the potential regional conflict with communists and to monitor any emergence of the re-militarization of Japan.

However, the problem for the US occupation authority was how to justify their occupation of Okinawa. While Okinawa had experienced six years of US occupation under SCAP as a former "enemy territory", the issue of Okinawa's sovereignty had not yet been clarified. This was because there was no statement in either the Cairo Communique or the Potsdam Declaration which defined Okinawa's position. Okinawa's status was not decided until the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed in 1951. When the Peace Treaty became effective in April 1952 Japan recovered its territorial sovereignty accordingly. However, Okinawa was incorporated under America's direct administration. While the Peace Treaty recognized Japan's "residual sovereignty" in Okinawa, it also "authorized exclusive authority" over the Okinawa Islands together with three other regions in Okinawa Islands (i.e. Miyako Islands, Yaeyama Islands, and Amami Islands) and Bonin Islands to the US for

⁶⁸ *ibid.*

an “indefinite” period.⁶⁹ Thus Okinawa’s position as the borderland of America’s defense line in the north-western Pacific was determined.

2.3. People’s Lives under the Occupation

The war and occupation also had significant impacts on civic life. One fourth of the local residents died during the Battle of Okinawa, and those who were captured by the US troops were kept in the camps created around the islands during the war. There were sixteen camps in the Ryukyu Islands, eleven of which were established on Okinawa Island. The eleven camps on Okinawa Island were built in villages located in the middle and northern parts of the Island. Camps in places such as Ishikawa, Kin, Kushi, Taira and Ginoza were allocated to civilians, whereas former military soldiers, officers and personnel, including mainland Japanese, Okinawans and Koreans, were kept in camps in villages such as Yomitan, Chatan, Urazoe and Yaka as Prisoners of War (PoW). The largest camp for civilians was in Ginoza. The area used for the camp occupied almost the whole village. At one point this camp contained over 200,000 Okinawan residents. This number was nearly one-third of the entire local population in that period.⁷⁰ Although there were camps in the southern part of Okinawa Island, such as Ōnoyama in Naha City, most of them were later closed because the US military government had already planned to construct military bases in that region.⁷¹

After the Japanese government accepted the Potsdam Declaration in August 1945, the local civilians and Okinawan PoWs were allowed to return to their homes. In the same

⁶⁹ See, for example, Pedro Iacobelli, “The Limits of Sovereignty and Post-War Okinawan Migrants in Bolivia,” *Japan Focus* 25 August 2013, accessed October 3, 2013, <http://japanfocus.org/-Pedro-Iacobelli/3989/article.html>.

⁷⁰ According to the survey, the population per camp in the northern region was as follows: 10,000 for the camp in Ogimi Village, 57,000 for Haneji and Taira, 30,000 for Nakagawa and Kanwa, 30,000 for Kushi and Henoko, and Sedake 30,000. (See, for example, Masa’aki Aniya, “The Pacific War,” in *Yomitan-son Shi* Vol. 5 (Yomitan-son, Okinawa: Yomitanson-shi Henshū-iinkai, 2002.).

⁷¹ Ibid.

period, from 1945 to 46, Korean and mainland Japanese PoWs as citizens of a “defeated nation” were also returned to their homelands.⁷² However, it was not easy for Okinawan people to “return” to their home. While many returned to their local land, as Wakabayashi Chiyo points out, it was not uncommon for the Okinawans to remain in or around the camps in the middle and northern regions rather than going back to the devastated south.⁷³ The southern areas were the sites of the fiercest battles during the war. This meant that it was not easy to identify one’s former home. An even more important factor that hindered the locals from returning to their homes was the construction of the military facilities in the former residential areas. In Naha City, for example, places such as Ōnoyama were already closed to the former local residents in the late 1940s in order for the US military to construct the bases. The US military had also confiscated lands and ports to build facilities including residential areas for the US military families (in Mawashi village, which is currently part of Naha City), storage and power plants (Urazoe City), and the military hospital (Ginowan City).⁷⁴ This also happened in the central region of Okinawa Island, such as Futenma, in which over two thousand meters of aircraft landing zone was built by the US military amid the Battle of Okinawa. In most of these cases, the original owners had no choice but to give up their lands.⁷⁵

These radical changes in postwar Okinawa caused not only displacement but also the transformation of the local economy and society after the war. Prior to the 1945 battles, the main industry in Okinawa was agriculture, which accounted for more than sixty percent of its

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Chiyo Wakabayashi, “Jīpu to Sajin: Senryō Shoki Okinawa Shakai No ‘Henyō’ to ‘Hen’i’,” *Okinawa Bunka Kenkyū*, 2003: 242-243.

⁷⁴ Atsushi Toriyama, *Okinawa: Kichi-shakai no Kigen to Sōkoku 1945-1956* (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2013), 106.

⁷⁵ The number of the former local residents who could not return to their homelands in 1949 is as follows: over 30,000 people for Naha City, 7450 for Yomitan, 7700 for Chatan, 4980 for Kadena. (Toriyama. *Okinawa: Kichi-shakai no Kigen to Sōkoku 1945-1956*), 106.

entire economy. This situation did not change after the war until around 1947.⁷⁶ However, towards the late 1940s, farmers were increasingly leaving their jobs. This was triggered by multiple causes such as the fall in price for agricultural products and the prohibition on using land around the bases for farming, as well as the loss of private property.⁷⁷ These factors made it difficult for an industry like agriculture to recover because it requires high intensity of labor and long times to produce. Furthermore, there was another factor that changed Okinawa's industrial structure. In the late 1940s, the US military bases suffered from a lack of labourers. After 1945, the number of the US military personnel radically declined as they were sent to other bases in mainland Japan. In August 1945, the US military had more than two hundred fifty thousand personnel in Okinawa. However the number declined by twenty thousand in 1946, and ten thousand in 1948.⁷⁸ This radical decrease in military personnel inevitably created labor demand in Okinawa as the US military government planned to fill in the insufficiency of base workers with local Okinawans. This is how the interdependent economic relationships between the locals and the bases emerged. In many cities of the middle and southern parts of Okinawa the base-dependent economy (or *kichi keizai*) was created. In such circumstances, how did the Okinawan people start the anti-base struggle and what were their motivations? In the following section, I shall describe the formation and development of the Okinawa struggle under the US occupation.

⁷⁶ Chiyo Wakabayashi, "Jipu to Sajin: Senryō Shoki Okinawa Shakai No Henyō to Hen'i": 252.

⁷⁷ Particularly, some districts of the south and middle lost large portions of the private land including farmland due to high concentration of the US military bases and facilities by the beginning of the 1950s. In the case of Chatan Village, the loss of the farmland was ninety-six percent.

⁷⁸ Atsushi, Toriyama, *Okinawa: Kichi-shakai no Kigen to Sōkoku 1945-1956*, 42.



Image 2-1: A beach in Aka-jima Island, Kerama Islands. The fleet of the Allied Forces approached the Okinawa Islands from Kerama Islands. In March 1945, the Allied Forces attacked this island with over 50,000 shells. The photo was taken by the author in April 2012.




Image 2-2: A hand written copy of the US Proclamation Number 1 or "Nimitz Proclamation", translated into Japanese. The photo was taken by the author in April 2012 at the Museum of Kerama Marine Culture, Zamami Island.

2.4. Farmers

In July 1955, a group of men and women, both young and elderly, walked along Kokusai Dōri, one of the main streets running in the middle of the capital city of Okinawa, Naha. Starting from the building of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI), they headed slowly in the direction of Cape Hedo, which is about a hundred kilometers north of Naha on Okinawa Island. Some of them were carrying placards with messages addressed to the rest of the islanders. One of the placards read, “We have no homes, no jobs and no food. What should we farmers from Ie Island do?” This was the start of what was later called, “the march of the beggars” (*kojiki kōshin*). This march was organized by farmers and their families from Maja Village, Ie-jima Island. In his memoir, one of the group leaders, Ahagon Shōkō, recalls that participants in the march thought that becoming beggars was shameful not just for themselves but also for other community members. “Nevertheless”, he describes “what is really shameful is the Government and its inhumane behavior in forcibly appropriating people’s land, making them jobless, starving, and eventually turning them into beggars.”⁷⁹ During this long march, some of the participants composed a song about their reasons for carrying out this march.

This is such a disgraceful world. Please listen to us, everyone in Okinawa. We will tell you from our heart. Please listen... Please listen, chief executive. It’s unusual that we farmers come in front of you. We could survive thanks to the farm land from our ancestors. Please give our land back immediately...⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Shōkō Ahagon, *Beigun to Nōmin: Okinawaken Iejima* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1973), 127.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 128-129.

This long march attracted attention from other Okinawans. Many of those who witnessed it sympathized with the farmers. Ahagon writes “some women were shedding tears while listening to us. Those who didn’t have wallets went back to their homes to grab money for us. Sympathetic police officers hesitated about giving us donations but instead asked some women to pass these on to us.”⁸¹ The march by the farmers from Ie Island was a unique event, but people already had an idea of the reasons why the farmers had to walk.

In April 1953, USCAR announced the commencement of land acquisition under Ordinance Number 109.⁸² This ordinance allowed the US military government to confiscate privately owned lands in order to build various kinds of US military facilities. It was the beginning of “the military-use land policy” (*gunyōchi seisaku*), which was conducted with “bayonets and bulldozers”. Justifying the legitimacy of the land acquisition by saying “the United States has certain requirements concerning the use and possession of land in the Ryukyu Islands” in which “there are no provisions of Ryukyuan law whereby such requirements may be satisfied”, they argued that it is “appropriate and necessary” to introduce a decent procedure for the land acquisition including “just compensation” in the Ryukyu Islands.⁸³ However, in many cases, the process of acquisition was exercised forcibly upon the Okinawan villagers without their consent.⁸⁴ Furthermore, farmers not only lost their land but also could not receive even a decent amount of financial compensation.

Land acquisition by the US military government took place not only in Ie Island but also in many places on Okinawa Island in that period. In villages such as Maja on Ie Island

⁸¹ Ibid., 132.

⁸² According to Arasaki, the US military government began land inspection in order to identify owners from the late 1940s. They completed compiling the cadastre by 1951. Based on this record of private land ownership, USCAR issued certificates of land ownership to the owners. See, Yoshio Nakano and Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Mondai Nijyūnen* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965), 71.

⁸³ United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Office of The Deputy Governor. “APO 719, CA ORDINANCE NUMBER 109, 3 April 1953, LAND ACQUISITION PROCEDURE.” Accessed September 3, 2013. <http://ryukyu-okinawa.net/pages/archive/caord109.html>.

⁸⁴ Shōkō Ahagon, *Beigun to Nōmin: Okinawaken Iejima*, 90-92.

and Aja, Mekaru and Oroku in Naha City, the local villagers were evicted between 1953 and 1955. Yet there were some small episodes of resistance against the US military. In Oroku and Isahama, the villagers and their supporters, such as students from the University of the Ryukyus and school teachers, conducted a sit-in to protest against America's unjust land policy. However, facing armed soldiers, it was difficult for the locals to win in such an extremely unequal relationship. For example, in the case of Maja, about three hundred armed soldiers arrived on 11 March 1955. They were supplied with tear gas in order to evict protesters, and also stretchers in preparation for potential injuries. Many of those who refused to hand over their land were beaten and arrested and even chased by trained military dogs. Houses were burnt or crushed by bulldozers, and residents were forced to move to tents which were designated as "the shelters for evacuees". Some villagers were forced to receive a bag of money as "compensation" before their houses were demolished. This is one example of how the US military gained "consent" from the locals.⁸⁵ This experience was remembered as a day of humiliation for many residents.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ According to Proclamation, there were some exceptional ways to appropriate farm land without the actual consent of the landlords, e.g. the fifth clause of Article 2, which says "Should it be deemed of urgent necessity by the CG, RYCOM, that the use and possession of land or other real property be taken by the United States after the publication of a Notice of Intent, but prior to the acquisition of the estate or interest required, the Deputy Governor shall issue an order directing the vacating of the premises." (UNITED STATES CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, Office of The Deputy Governor. "APO 719, CA ORDINANCE NUMBER 109, 3 April 1953, LAND ACQUISITION PROCEDURE." Accessed September 3, 2013, <http://ryukyu-okinawa.net/pages/archive/caord109.html>.)

⁸⁶ Shōkō Ahagon, *Beigun to Nōmin: Okinawaken Iejima*.

2.5. Okinawa Teachers and School Staff Association

The struggle of the farmers illuminates one aspect of the social impact of the American military government in Okinawa. There is another story which highlights a different kind of social reaction in the early occupation period. The history of various local societies such as Okinawa Youth Association (OYA), Okinawa Women's Association (OWA), and Okinawa Teachers and School Staff Association (OTSA) shows how the local communities became involved with the Okinawa struggle. The OTSA in particular played a very crucial role in mobilizing the local communities to join the Okinawa struggle. OTSA was established in 1947. It was initially called the Okinawa Education Consortium (*Okinawa Kyōiku Rengō-kai* or *Kyōren*), and was started under the initiative of the Department of Education of the Okinawa Civilian Government. Its primary mission was to set up a basic schooling system in each local district including supplying textbooks and building schools. In April 1952, the Okinawa Education Consortium became the Okinawa Teachers and School Staff Association. This organization played a significant role as the hub of the local communities.

OTSA, which consisted of school teachers and other staff members including school principals, had different organizational characteristics from the Okinawa Education Consortium. While the Okinawa Education Consortium was primarily involved with the establishment of educational infrastructure, OTSA was more politically engaged than its predecessor organization. As I shall explain later in this chapter, OTSA was to become one of the main social forces which led the so-called reversion-to-Japan movement or Okinawa's reversion movement, especially during the 1960s and the early 1970s. When OTSA was established, they enacted two goals: "self-governance (*jichi*)" and "restoration (*fukkō*)".⁸⁷

⁸⁷ Hideaki Tobe, "1950 Nen-dai Okinawa Kyōshokuin-kai No Chiiki 'Shindan'", *Shikan* 147 (2002): 1–16.

By mobilizing school teachers, who were also regarded as respected community organizers in that period, OTSA gradually became an influential force in Okinawa. Among school staff members, there were many young newly hired people who had just graduated from either high school or the teachers' colleges. Although they were not experienced teachers, there was high demand for teachers in Okinawa after the war, because around six hundred school teachers had died during the war.⁸⁸ These young teachers not only taught but also played crucial roles in terms of community service. They were often sent to participate in the farmers' anti-base protest by their school principals, even when this required taking leave from teaching duty.⁸⁹ Their importance in the local communities increased with Okinawa's socio-economic transformation from a largely agrarian community to a base-dependent economy from the late 1940s. One of the major roles that the young teachers played was to maintain public safety in the new cities and towns.⁹⁰ The new cities flourished in the base economy because their income came from the US bases and new urban dwellers who chose not to return to their hometowns. Most base towns had "entertainment" districts. Local societies such as OYA, OWA and OTSA were concerned about the prevalence of the sex industry in the middle of the city as a potential cause of moral hazard and bad influence on young students.

The local schools also played an important role linking early career teachers with other community members. Schools were not only places to study. They were also used for various community activities. Thus, it was common for people to use schools as places where adults gathered for drinks and to exchange recent updates about their community. Also, school buildings were used for stationing the local community members who were acting as

⁸⁸ Ibid., 107.

⁸⁹ Makoto Sakurazawa, *Okinawa no Fukki Undō to Hokaku Tairitsu* (Tokyo: Yūshisha, 2012), 75-76.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

civilian police.⁹¹ Usually local young male teachers as well as other male community members were stationed in schools in case trouble occurred within their community. They had to cover various kinds of problems such as theft and other crimes. Sometimes they even had to deal with domestic problems such as marital disputes.⁹²

They were most concerned about the social problems caused by soldiers from US bases. It was not uncommon for locals to be victims of crimes and accidents caused by American soldiers in that period, including rape, theft, and car accidents and so forth. Approximately 1000 crimes were recorded as being committed by the US military personnel in 1964 alone in the Okinawa Islands.⁹³ Although there was a police authority called the Ryūkyū Police on Okinawa and other remote islands, crimes by American military personnel were almost entirely outside their jurisdiction. In Okinawa under the US administration, US soldiers and other military personnel were protected under extraterritoriality. Therefore, Ryūkyū police did not have the power to arrest criminals except when they were caught in the act. Moreover, even if the local police officers could arrest US military personnel who were in the act of committing an offense, it was difficult to prosecute the criminals. All the criminals were supposed to be judged under the US court martial, which was regarded as superior in status to the local Ryūkyūan jurisdiction. Accordingly, civilian support was necessary for crime prevention. Standing not only on the frontline of the anti-base protest but also of civil life vis-à-vis possible threats from the US soldiers, young school teachers and their societies acquired trust from local communities.

⁹¹ The civilian police system was originally established in the camps during wartime in order to maintain public order in the community. Some civilians in the camps were appointed to perform communal services including acting as civilian police in the camp.

⁹² Sakurazawa, *Okinawa no Fukki Undō to Hokaku Tairitsu*, 76-78.

⁹³ "Fukki-mae no Okinawa, Beihanzai Yaku Issen-ken", *Shinbun Akahata* (27 November 2010), accessed September 24 2013, http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik10/2010-11-27/2010112702_04_1.html.

2.6. Political Parties

When we consider political activism as part of the Okinawa struggle, understanding the role of political parties under the American occupation is also important. The first political party in postwar Okinawa was the Okinawa Democratic Alliance or ODA (*Okinawa Minshu Dōmei*). It was established by local Okinawan leaders in June 1947 in Ishikawa, a city located in the middle region of Okinawa Island. One of the prominent leaders was Nakasone Genwa. Nakasone had been one of the earliest members of the Japanese Communist Party when it was established in 1921. However, after he was arrested in 1923 he gradually withdrew from the communist movement.⁹⁴ Later, he restarted his political career as a Member of the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, but now as an anti-communist. Nakasone and his colleagues such as Yamashiro Zenko and Miyazato Eiki established the ODA with the aims of “democratization of Okinawa”, “independence” and “restoration of Okinawa”. In particular, they insisted on the importance of “the liberation of Okinawa by the people of Okinawa”.⁹⁵ With this principle, the ultimate political goal of ODA was to create a republican state independent from Japan. The establishment of the ODA was problematic for the US military government, because this first home-grown political party in postwar Okinawa was critical of the Okinawan Civilian Government and the US authority, especially its way of choosing local leaders. In that period, the Governor and other senior members of the Okinawan Civilian Government were all appointed by the US military government. Also, political activism in public places, especially criticism of the Civilian Government, was not allowed in Okinawa. In such an environment, local leaders such as Nakasone conducted a political campaign calling for the election of their representative to the Okinawa Civilian Government.

⁹⁴ Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Gendaishi e no Shōgen* (Naha: Okinawa Taimusu-sha), 75-77.

⁹⁵ Atsushi Toriyama, *Okinawa: Kichi-shakai no Kigen to Sōkoku 1945-1956*, 75.

A month after the establishment of ODA, in July 1947, another political party, the Okinawa People's Party or OPP (*Okinawa Jinmin-tō*), started in Ishikawa. The founders were a group of local journalists, including Senaga Kamejirō, Kaneshi Saichi and Ikemiyagi Shūi. Some key figures such as Senaga and Kaneshi were already known for their political careers as labor and community activists before 1945. Although the OPP was later identified as the political party most threatening to the US authorities, the situation was different during the late 1940s. Senaga and his OPP colleagues thanked the occupation forces for liberating the people of Okinawa from oppression under Japanese imperialism. The target of criticism for OPP was also the Okinawa Civilian Government. OPP criticized the Civilian Government as an authority that only represented the US military government but not the people of Okinawa. OPP also criticized the core leaders of the Civilian Government for their previous political careers supporting, and participating in the dominant political party during wartime, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (*Taisei Yokusan-kai*). When OPP organised its first congress in July 1947, it presented a political manifesto that included a call to purge those wartime local political leaders as well as the establishment of an independent government by Okinawa's people.⁹⁶

The momentum of political movements such as the ODA and OPP increased to the point where the US military government could no longer ignore these parties. In December 1947, ODA submitted a petition to the US military government with signatures of 10,000 people calling for public elections. Also, the ODA, the OPP and even the pro-American party called the Okinawa Social Party (*Okinawa Shakai-tō*, established in September 1947) organized a joint campaign, calling for the positions of the Governor and the Members of the

⁹⁶ Ibid., 75-76.

Government to be elected by the Okinawan people, rather than appointed by the US authority.

Despite the strength of these political movements, the US military government was reluctant to respond. The military government used the still undecided status of Okinawa as a reason to justify its direct control over Okinawa. Nevertheless, as the rise of political movements increased momentum, the US military government started considering the situation seriously. The US military government was particularly concerned about criticism of the American authorities. In this political environment, the US authorities decided to dissolve the Civilian Government and conduct a public election for the Governors and the Members of the Assemblies of the four newly established regional governments in Okinawa, Miyako, Yaeyama and Amami in September 1950.

However, the political parties mentioned above had little influence on the first election. As Higa Mikio has pointed out, the ODA, OPP and the Okinawa Social Party were all organized by social elites whose political and social philosophies were not important to the majority of the voters. Instead, Okinawan politics in that period was mostly affected by personal influence and connections rather than political ideology. Therefore, in the end many non-partisan figures entered the political world.⁹⁷ Higa noted that this was shown in the establishment of the Okinawa Social Mass Party or OSMP (*Okinawa Shakai Taishū-tō*) led by the former mayor of Taira City, Taira Tatsuo. He was one of those who ran in the election campaign as an independent candidate, and he was elected as the Governor of the Okinawa Regional Government. After the election, Taira and his supporters decided to establish Okinawa Social Mass Party in October 1950. Participants from all political backgrounds joined OSMP. For example, Kaneshi Saichi, one of the founding members of OPP, joined

⁹⁷ Mikio Higa, *Okinawa: Seitō to Seiji* (Tokyo: Chūkō Shinsho, 1965), 109.

OSMP. Also, people such as Higa Shūhei, originally a high-school teacher of English, who became one of the main trusted counterparts of the US military government, joined the party. By incorporating other small parties which came in to power in other regional governments, OSMP became an all-Okinawan party which involved diverse political interests.

With a clear majority position in local politics, this all-Okinawan party was influential when the four regional governments were brought together in order to establish the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. In late 1951, the Governors and the Members of Assemblies in four regional governments decided to establish a Government responsible for all regions. Based on this decision, the US Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands or USCAR issued Proclamation Number 13 in which the US authorities approved the establishment of the Ryukyu Government.⁹⁸ It consisted of independent executive, legislative, and judicial powers, where the Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Government was to be appointed by the Legislature. Although this was still defined as a “Provisional Central Government” under USCAR’s initiative, Okinawa’s political struggle came to have more effective influence over its territory compared to the previous status quo.

Higa Shūhei was appointed the first Chief Executive. However, after this appointment, Higa and his supporters decided to leave the OSMP in order to start a more conservative and pro-America party called the Ryūkyū Democratic Party or RDP (*Ryūkyū Minshu-tō*) in August 1952. In addition to former members of the OSMP, the RDP also absorbed former members of the ODA, which was dissolved after the first election and became the Republican Party (*Kyōwa-tō*), and other non-partisan politicians.

⁹⁸ UNITED STATES CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, Office of The Deputy Governor. “APO 719, CA ORDINANCE NUMBER 13, 29 February 1952, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RYŪKYŪ ISLANDS.” Accessed September 4, 2013. <http://ryukyu-okinawa.net/pages/archive/caproc13.html>.

Not only conservative political leaders but also progressive politicians, such as Kaneshi Saichi, left the OSMP. When Senaga Kamejirō, who was the leader of Okinawa People's Party, was purged from his position as mayor of Naha City in November 1957,⁹⁹ Kaneshi planned to run in this election campaign as a candidate from OSMP.¹⁰⁰ However, the Headquarters of his party had decided to endorse Taira Tatsuo as the official candidate. This conflict split the party. Kaneshi and his supporters left OSMP and Kaneshi ran the election without the official support from his party. However, the result was that Kaneshi won the majority of votes and he was elected as the new mayor of Naha in January 1958.¹⁰¹ After the victory, he and his supporters started the Okinawa Socialist Party (*Okinawa Shakai-tō*).¹⁰² This is how major political parties in post-1945 Okinawa—the Okinawa Democratic Party (later, the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party or OLDP), the Okinawa Social Mass Party, the Okinawa People's Party and the Okinawa Socialist Party—were created.

2.7. Students

Finally, I shall briefly discuss students and their significance in the Okinawa struggle. Students from the local universities, particularly the University of the Ryūkyūs, played a crucial role in the development of the Okinawa struggle. Some of them were actively involved with the protest campaign against land confiscation in places such as Isahama in

⁹⁹ Senaga's victory in the Naha mayoral election came as a surprise not only to the local politicians but also to USCAR. After Senaga was appointed as the new mayor of Naha City, the High Commissioner of USCAR, James Edward Moore, amended USCAR Proclamation 143 whereby Senaga, who had a criminal record dating from 1954, was banned from becoming a politician.

¹⁰⁰ Although in the earlier days of his leadership Senaga and OPP regarded the US troops as liberation forces, OPP had already been targeted as a subversive communist party by the US military government. The High Commissioner of USCAR, General James Edward Moore, amended the laws related to dismissal of the city mayor by the Members of the Parliament, which eventually enabled the anti-Senaga powers such as RDP to purge Senaga with the agreement of only a half of all Members of Assembly, where previously the agreement of a two-thirds majority of the Assembly would have been required.

¹⁰¹ See, for example, Mikio Higa, *Okinawa: Seitō to Seiji*, 104, 191. Also, see Masahide Ōta, *Okinawa No Teiō: Kōtōbenmukan*, 121-125.

¹⁰² To avoid confusion with an earlier *Okinawa shakai tō*, founded as a pro-American party, I described the later *Okinawa Shakai-tō* as Okinawa Socialist Party. However, they shared the same name in Japanese.

1955. In other cases, those who participated in the anti-base movement during college later became the organizers of workers' unions in public and private sectors such as the Teachers' Union and other public service unions. Also, some became politicians, journalists, writers and university scholars. In this sense, local Okinawan youth are essential subjects in understanding the creativity of Okinawa's political culture. How did those young students participate in the anti-base movement? What were their motivations?

Considering students as crucial actors in the Okinawa struggle, one of the important events that we need to understand is the so-called Ryūdai Incident (*Ryūdai jiken*). In 1953 and 1956 eleven students of the University of the Ryūkyūs were expelled from the university allegedly due to their subversive activism. In May 1953, the executive committee of the University of the Ryukyu decided to expel four students: Hamada Tomimasa, Uehara Seiji, Nakano Ken'ichi, and Miyagi Kurasuke. One of the reasons for the decision to expel these students was an event organised by the students in March. Around ten students from a club called "Seikei Club" (the Political Economy Club) organized an event called the *Genbaku-Ten* in Naha City for six days. The *Genbaku-ten*, or the Atomic Bomb Exhibition, was held to show the impact of the A-bomb in Hiroshima through graphic images. The images displayed were from a photo journal, *Asahi Graph*, published in August 1952.

During the occupation period in mainland Japan, SCAP strictly censored publicity about the bombing of mainland Japan, including photos of the effects of the A-bombs. After the San Francisco Peace Treaty became effective and Japan's sovereignty was restored in April 1952, however, the press code was deactivated and images of damage caused by the A-bombs became public. In Okinawa, though, censorship of this subject was still maintained under USCAR, but some of the members of the Political Economy Club managed to obtain the journal from mainland Japan.

As the university was established and funded by the US authorities, this event was a crucial problem. USCAR told the executive board of the university that they would freeze funds unless the university took some action against the students.¹⁰³ The four main students who organized the exhibition were expelled from the university on 9 May 1953, because of the exhibition and other acts of previous disobedience, such as organizing protest against night-time blackouts and publication of a journal called *Jiyū* (Freedom).

Three years later, in the middle of the first island-wide protest in June 1956, four hundred university students conducted a protest walk from Shuri to Naha. Responding to this event, USCAR notified the University of the Ryūkyūs that it might freeze financial assistance if the university did not take any action against the students. Despite this warning, the university executive committee, particularly the President of the University of the Ryūkyūs, Asato Genshū, was very reluctant to expel the students. This was based on their self-critical reflection on the harsh treatment of the students during the first Ryūdai incident. A few days later, Asato met a liaison officer from the Japanese government, Takashima Shōzō, and asked Takashima to bring this issue to the attention of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁰⁴ Asato hoped that the Japanese government would raise the issue with the US. Although Asato's effort did not move either government on this issue, he did not immediately expel the students from the university. He first decided to suspend the students from the university. However, the Civil Administrator of USCAR, General Vonna F. Burger, insisted on the expulsion of the students from the university. The Director of Civil Information and Education Division, who was also responsible for the University of the Ryukyus Foundation,

¹⁰³ Daigaku-jin Kyūjo no Kai Ryūkyū Daigaku Kyōshokuin-kai, *Ryūdai Jiken to wa Nandattanoka* (Ginowan, Okinawa: Ryūkyū Daigaku Hōmu Kenkyū-ka, 2010), 44.

¹⁰⁴ "Ryūdai Jiken Kujū no Shobun: Asato gakuchō daigaku sonzoku de handan," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, 19 February 2011, accessed February 2, 2014, <http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-173678-storytopic-3.html>.

Henry E. Diffenderfer, also insisted strongly on the expulsion of the students. In the end, six students were expelled and one student was suspended from the university in August 1956.

Although USCAR was suspicious about the involvement of Okinawa People's Party in the students' political activism, as Uehara Seiji says, the activism was not connected with the progressive political parties.¹⁰⁵ These students were rather motivated by their own various experiences during and after the war. For example, Hamada Tomimasa, one of the students expelled in 1953, raised the fear of war, particularly of nuclear missiles as a crucial reason why the students were attracted to pacifism.¹⁰⁶ Poverty after the war was also a crucial motivation for these students. Nakano Ken'ichi, another of the students expelled in 1953, said that seeing a young girl taken by the police on suspicion of prostitution was the crucial experience that motivated him to take protest actions against the occupation forces. Nakano also spoke of the discrimination experienced by Okinawan people in that period. For example, Okinawans had the lowest salaries, after Americans, Filipinos and Japanese. Under such miserable social conditions, the university students were deeply disappointed with Okinawa under US occupation and felt that Okinawa was in a period "without any hope in the future."¹⁰⁷

2.8. The Island-wide Struggle

During the period of widespread land confiscation on Okinawa and neighboring islands, six Okinawan delegates went to Washington D.C. in June 1955. They were representatives from the Ryukyu Legislature, the Government of the Ryukyu Island, the Okinawan Mayors' Association, and the Association of the Okinawan Landlords. One of the primary missions of

¹⁰⁵ Ryūkyū Daigaku Kyōshokuin-kai, *Ryūdai Jiken to wa Nandattanoka*, 122-123.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 33-34.

these delegates was to negotiate directly with the US government on the newly planned land acquisition policy. Prior to their departure, in March 1954, USCAR had proposed a plan which enabled the US military government to pay lump-sum rental fees for the use of the privately owned land over sixteen and a half years. The Chief Executive of GRI, Higa Shūhei, and the majority party in the Legislature of the Ryukyu Islands, the Ryukyu Democratic Party (RDP), were both happy to follow this proposal. However, two opposition parties, the Okinawa People's Party and the Okinawa Social Mass Party, were strongly opposed to this plan. On 30 April 1954 the proposal was rejected in the Legislature. Reflecting this decision, the local political leaders decided to visit the US House of Representatives in order to discuss the issue with the House Armed Services Committee.

In response to the Okinawans' visit to Washington D.C., delegates from the Armed Services Committee arrived at Kadena Airbase on 23 October 1955. The team comprised over ten members including Charles Melvyn Price, a member of the US House of Representatives who was also appointed chairperson of the delegates. Their visit was organized to inspect the military bases on Okinawa Island. However, their stay in Okinawa lasted only a few days. After their short stay on mainland Okinawa, the American delegates submitted a report to the US House of Representatives. In this report (the so-called Price Report), the American delegates supported the proposal for lump-sum payments for land leases. Also, they affirmed USCAR's need to continue land confiscation.

These statements intensified the anger among the local islanders directed at the US government. Protesting Okinawan citizens thought that the US authorities had ignored their "four principles to protect local land" (*tochi wo mamoru yon gensoku*), which was fully endorsed by the member of the Ryūkyū Legislature. The four principles were: (1) refusal of lump-sum payment of rental fees; (2) decent compensation for the confiscated land; (3) decent compensation for the affected land owners who lost their lands; and (4) objection to

new land confiscation by the US government. As “an essential part of our worldwide defenses”, the report stated, “our base tenure is dependent upon the continued existence of friendly governments.” Noting “the absence of a belligerent nationalistic movement”, the delegates also insisted on the necessity of “long-term use of a forward military base in the offshore island chain of the Far East-Pacific area, subject, of course to our own national policy.”¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, the report not only asserted the importance of the presence of its own troops in Okinawa but also it stated that Okinawa did not have any “restrictions imposed by a foreign government on our rights to store or to employ atomic weapons.”¹⁰⁹

The impact of the Price report was decisive in Okinawa not only for social elites but also for many of the local citizens. Cooperation with USCAR and the United States had been believed to be the best way in which Okinawans could obtain self-governance and socio-economic recovery from the war. However, what historian Toriyama Atsushi calls “the decade of cooperation” resulted in disappointment for most of those who had put their faith in the US.¹¹⁰ The land acquisition policy and the Price report infuriated Okinawan locals. On top of these events, the rape and murder of a six year-old girl in Kadena in September 1955 further angered the locals.¹¹¹ All this frustration and anger against the American occupation forces invigorated the local aspiration for just treatment.

This created a protest campaign throughout Okinawa. On 15 June 1956, the representatives of the four local authorities—the Ryukyu Legislature, the Government of the Ryukyu Island, the Okinawan Mayors’ Association, and the Association of the Okinawan Landlords—decided to dissolve the joint council. Dissolution of the local authorities was

¹⁰⁸ Special Subcommittee of the Armed Service Committee, House of Representatives, “Report of a Special Subcommittee of the Armed Service Committee, House of Representatives Following the Inspection Tour, 14 October-23 November 1955,” accessed August 3, 2013, <http://ryukyu-okinawa.net/pages/archive/price.html>.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Atsushi Toriyama, *Okinawa: Kichi-shakai no Kigen to Sōkoku 1945-1956*, 245.

¹¹¹ Miyume Tanji, *Myth, Struggle and Protest in Okinawa* (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2006), 70-71.

seen as a way to prevent the policy from becoming effective. On 18 June, OTSA, OYA, political parties, and other major civic groups decided to organize a joint struggle in order to promote the four principles to protect the land, and to present a united front against USCAR. The organization they established was named the Council for the Promotion for Solution of the Military Land Problem (or *gunyōchi mondai kaiketsu sokushin renraku kyōgikai* or *renkyo*). On 20 June, there were large protest meetings in 56 towns, villages and cities in Okinawa, where over 300,000 people participated in total. Considering the fact that Okinawa had 64 different districts on the island, this was literally an island-wide protest against the foreign occupation in which people gathered regardless of their political beliefs.¹¹² These protest meetings were possible because of the enormous numbers of individual participants as well as because of organizational mobilization.

The mass protest campaign in Okinawa surprised the US local authorities who thought that Okinawa was characterized by “the absence of a belligerent nationalistic movement”. Nevertheless, USCAR did not show any signs of change in their land policy. On the contrary, they started implementing penalties on Okinawan citizens. First, as mentioned earlier, USCAR demanded punishment of the university students who attended the public protest campaign. Also, by threatening a possible suspension of financial support to the university, USCAR placed pressure on the executive committee of the university. Second, in August 1956, USCAR declared the central region of Okinawa Island off-limits to US military personnel for an indefinite period. In this region, a large part of the local economy depended on the bases. Therefore, withdrawal of the military personnel from this region meant critical damage for the local economy. Reflecting this policy by USCAR, the mayors of the central region who were concerned about economic damage decided to ban the political meetings in

¹¹² Yoshio Nakano and Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Sengo-Shi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1976), 84-85.

many places in this region of Okinawa Island. In both cases, the main intention of the US authority was to split the opinion of Okinawan citizens.¹¹³

The historical verdict on the first island-wide struggle is ambiguous. It is true that this first mass protest campaign by Okinawan citizens became a landmark in the history of people's struggles in Okinawa. This was because of concessions that the locals won from USCAR in relation to its land acquisition policy. In April 1957, High Commissioner Moore announced temporary suspension of the lump-sum payment system. A few days later, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced that the US government was considering revision of the existing military land policy in Okinawa. In May, six Okinawan leaders, including the new Chief Executive of GRI, Tōma Jūgō, were invited to visit Washington DC to have a meeting with the government officials and politicians on the renewal of land compensation. On 7 July, the two sides issued a joint communique in which the leadership of the US government and the GRI undertook to make an effort to build a more harmonious relationship in relation to the US bases in Okinawa. Following their statement, on 13 October, two proposals on the land problem were passed with support from the majority of the Ryukyu Legislature. With this new legislation, the land price for leases for the US military was increased six-fold compared with the level before the island-wide people's protest occurred. Also, lump sum payments became optional rather than mandatory. From this perspective, the land struggle during the 1950s appeared to end in the Okinawan locals' victory.¹¹⁴ However, some profound issues remained unsolved, including the possibility of new land acquisition.

¹¹³ Ibid., 107.

¹¹⁴ Yoshio Nakano and Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Mondai 20 Nen* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965), 133-134.

2.9. The Reversion-to-Japan Movement

The energy of the 1950s popular struggle created the basis for the struggle of the next decade, which witnessed the reversion-to-Japan movement or “the second wave” of the island-wide protest campaign against the US occupation regime. People’s fears, anxieties and the problems caused by US soldiers and the military bases generated an atmosphere for the reversion movement. Under the banner of “reversion to Japan”, what people hoped for was to recover their status as citizens under Japanese sovereignty. The second island-wide movement had two main characteristics. The first characteristic was that in the early period the reversion movement was primarily led by local groups such as the OTSA (Okinawa School Teachers and Staff Association). With influential leaders such as Nakasone Seizen (1907-1995) and Yara Chōbyō (1902-1997), the OTSA was the leading social force whose activity had great impact in terms of the mobilization of the other local groups such as Parent Teachers’ Associations and Okinawa Women’s Association. The second characteristic of the reversion movement was the strong sense of Japanese nationalism in Okinawa. While there were pro-US political parties, such as the Okinawa Democratic Party, the return to Japan became a bipartisan concern transcending conservative and progressive political ideologies during the 1960s. This was strongly reflected in the ideology of the OTSA, which gained hegemony in the reversion movement. For these reasons, the political activity of the OTSA is the key issue for understanding the reversion movement.

In postwar Okinawa, the first reversion movement appeared in the early 1950s. In 1951, the Association for the Return of Okinawa to Japan (or APRJ) was founded jointly by the Okinawa Communist Party and the Okinawa Social Mass Party.¹¹⁵ One of the founders of the OSMP, Taira Tatsuo, was a passionate advocate for Okinawa’s reversion to Japan. A

¹¹⁵ The original name of this organization in Japanese is *Nihon Fukki Sokushin Kisei-kai* (日本復帰促進期成会).

local journalist and the former mayor of Shuri City, Nakayoshi Ryōkō, was another influential organizer who joined APRJ. Working together with the Association of Okinawan Residents in mainland Japan, APRJ petitioned for the revision of Article Three of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, under which Okinawa was controlled separately from the rest of Japan, but their campaign could not succeed in changing the Treaty. After the petition failed, in January 1953 APRJ was transformed into the Association for the Return of Okinawa Islands to the Home Country (or AROIHC) with new leadership.¹¹⁶ One of the prominent leaders of this second attempt of the reversion movement was a former high school chemistry teacher and then representative of the OTSA, Yara Chyōbyō.

The increasing significance of Yara and the OTSA in Okinawan progressive society attracted USCAR's attention. In February 1954, USCAR sent a letter to Yara and the OTSA in which it warned that teachers should not be involved with social activities other than education of students. When Yara planned to travel to Tokyo in order to receive donations for school building in April, USCAR would not give him travel permission. Furthermore, in May, the Deputy Governor of USCAR, Major General David A. D. Ogden, expressed his concerns about the OTSA and its political activism.¹¹⁷ The US authorities demanded Yara's resignation as leader of the coalition force. A week later, Yara resigned, and subsequently the Association for Return of Okinawa Islands to Home Country was dissolved.¹¹⁸ However, Yara's influence remained strong. Although he was no longer the representative of the reversion movement, he still remained the leader of the OTSA and an energetic participant in social activism.

¹¹⁶ The original name of this organization in Japanese is *Okinawa Shotō Sokoku Fukki Kisei-kai* (沖縄諸島祖国復帰期成会).

¹¹⁷ Nakano and Arasaki, *Okinawa Sengo-Shi*, 64; Chōbyō Yara, *Yara Chōbyō Kaikoroku* (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun-sha, 1977), 40-41.

¹¹⁸ Chōbyō Yara, *Yara Chōbyō Kaikoroku*, 38-39.

Yara's strong community-wide leadership was demonstrated in the following year. As mentioned earlier, in September 1955, a 6 year-old school girl, Nagayama Yumiko, was found dead on a rubbish dump in Kadena. A US serviceman was arrested for the rape and murder of the girl. This incident, the so-called "Yumiko-chan Incident", was widely reported around Okinawa. A week after the tragic murder, another, 9 year-old girl was raped by a US military serviceman. The Ryūkyū Legislature expressed the strongest dismay in condemning the criminals. USCAR also mentioned the possibility of imposing severe punishment on the criminals. However, Okinawa's local judiciary could not interfere in the rape and murder cases due to Section 10 of USCAR Proclamation Number 13, which guaranteed the superior status of the Governor and the Deputy Governor of USCAR over the local Okinawan jurisdiction.¹¹⁹ This extraterritoriality triggered wide anger against the US authority. Concerned parents and teachers belonging to PTA and also the Okinawa Women's Association as well as OTSA established the Association for Protection of Okinawan Children (APOC), and Yara was chosen as the inaugural representative of the society. APOC organized a series of actions including petitions, protest and negotiations with USCAR for the just treatment of the victims and their families. Not long after these events, in June 1959, an American military plane crashed at a local school, Miyanomori Elementary School, killing 17 people, including 11 school children, and injuring more than two hundred people within and without the school. The ineffective local jurisdiction over the base-related crimes generated a strong sentiment of distrust in the US and local authorities in Okinawa.

On 28 April 1960, the Council for the Return of Okinawa to the Home Country (CROHC or *Fukki-kyō*) was founded.¹²⁰ CROHC was organized as an umbrella society for a

¹¹⁹ UNITED STATES CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, Office of The Deputy Governor. "APO 719, CA ORDINANCE NUMBER 13, 29 February 1952, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RYŪKYŪ ISLANDS." Accessed September 4, 2013. <http://ryukyu-okinawa.net/pages/archive/caproc13.html>.

¹²⁰ *Fukki-kyō* (復帰協) is the acronym for *Okinawa-ken Sokoku Fukki Kyōgi-kai* (沖縄県祖国復帰協議会).

bipartisan island-wide reversion movement. Although the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party¹²¹ did not participate, the council still obtained a wide range of local support in Okinawa Island with the involvement of progressive political parties such as the OPP and OSMP, workers' unions such as the Okinawa prefectural government employees union (*Kenrōkyō*), vocational societies such as the OTA, and local communities such as the OYA and Parents and Teachers Association (PTA) among many others. Supported by many organizations and groups, Okinawa's reversion movement became an island-wide phenomenon.

Towards the late 1960s, Okinawa's return became a crucial issue not only in Okinawa but also between the Japanese and US governments. In 1965, Japanese Prime Minister Satō Eisaku had the first official meeting with the US President Lyndon Johnson on Okinawa's status. Two years later in 1967, the two leaders presented a joint communique in which a possible plan for Okinawa's return to Japan in the following three years was mentioned for the first time. Also in this year, the Satō government established the advisory council on the treatment of Okinawa. Directly accountable to the Prime Minister, it was led by the former President of Waseda University, Ōhama Nobumoto, and Suetsugu Ichirō, a political fixer. Ōhama originated from Ishigaki Island and had been a respected leader of the Okinawan community in Tokyo. The anti-Vietnam War movement in Japan also motivated the Japanese government to take action on the treatment of Okinawa's reversion. Knowing that bombers were sent from Okinawa (and the Philippines) to Vietnam, Japanese citizens were concerned

¹²¹ The Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party was founded in February 1960 with participation from the Okinawa Democratic Party, which had been in the majority in the Legislature, a coalition of other independent Pro-U.S. military administration politicians in the Legislature called *Shinsei-kai* (新政会), and Okinawan elite bureaucrats. It was designed to take a conservative political role in the Legislature and Prefectural Assembly after the reversion.

about their involvement with the war in the future.¹²² Their concerns functioned to enhance public awareness in mainland Japan about the situation in Okinawa. In November 1969, Prime Minister Satō presented a joint communique with the new President of the US, Richard Nixon, in which it was announced that Okinawa's return was to take place in 1972.

Amid the growing movement for Okinawa's return to Japan, on 31 October 1968, USCAR announced that Washington and the US President Lyndon Johnson had decided to hold a popular election of the chief executive of GRI. After this announcement, both conservative and progressive parties began to prepare for this first attempt to elect the chief executive of the GRI.¹²³ The conservative coalition decided to put forward the President of the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party (OLDP), Nishime Junji (1921-2001), while a progressive coalition joined by the Okinawa People's Party, Okinawa Socialist Party, and Okinawa Social Mass Party chose Yara Chōbyō as their candidate. While Yara's supporters were educational societies and workers' unions, Nishime's supporters were primarily business owners and members of economic elite. This ideological difference was expressed in slogans for the election campaign. While the conservative side appealed to voters by asking whether Okinawan people would choose "to eat potatoes by voting for Yara, or to be prosperous with young Nishime (*Yara wo erande imo wo kūka, wakai Nishime de sakaeruka?*)", the progressive side questioned whether Okinawans would choose to become

¹²² Eiji Oguma, *"Minshu" to "Aikoku": Sengo Nihon No Nashonarizumu to Kōkyōsei* (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 2002), 604. Journalist Jon Mitchel argues that the US bases in Okinawa including Camp Schwab were the main air-bases not only for the air-raid mission but also aerial application of Agent Orange. See, for example, Jon Mitchell, "Agent Orange on Okinawa - The Smoking Gun: U.S. Army Report, Photographs Show 25,000 Barrels on Island in Early '70s," (September 30, 2012), accessed March 7, 2014, <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Jon-Mitchell/3838/article.html>.

¹²³ However, a CIA document declassified under the Freedom of Information Act reveals that the US Central Intelligence Agency, in collaboration with a senior politician of the Liberal Democratic Party Kaya Okinori, was planning to conduct a covert operation directed at influencing the result of the election. (The United States Central Intelligence Agency, "Central Intelligence Agency Japanese Imperial Government Name Files, Kaya Okinori, document 75, FJTA 55122," (September 25 1968), accessed September 2, 2015, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/search/site/Kaya%20Okinori>).

perpetrators of war against (North) Vietnamese people despite their own experience of war during the Battle of Okinawa. The progressive coalition forces began to be even more radicalized in their demands against the U.S. bases. In contrast to the conservative claim for the gradual removal of the bases taking economic concerns into consideration, the progressive coalition insisted on complete clearance of the bases when Okinawa was returned to Japan.¹²⁴

The Japanese government did not welcome the Okinawan progressive coalition and their radicalization that unsettled the governmental negotiation over Okinawa's return between Tokyo and Washington. Although Okinawa's return had become one of the chief agendas for both governments, they had not yet made a roadmap with a clear schedule for the return of Okinawa. Therefore, the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party supported Nishime and the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party by sending ministers of the cabinet and other executive members of the party. They also mobilised nationally popular people including the award-winning writer and MP, who later became the Governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintarō, and the national female volleyball team, which won the gold medal at the Tokyo Olympics. These popular campaigns were successful in the beginning.

Despite their high popularity, however, those mainlander supporters from the Liberal Democratic Party could not acquire sustainable endorsement from local Okinawan voters. This was partly because of the attitude among LDP's executives toward the reversion movement. Politicians from the mainland LDP, such as the Secretary-General of the party, Fukuda Takeo, who later became Prime Minister during the 1970s, stated that reversion would be delayed if Yara won the election. This absence of sensitivity and basic understanding of the Okinawan political environment among the mainland LDP members

¹²⁴ Yoshio Nakano and Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Sengo-shi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1976), 172-174.

caused it to lose its popularity in Okinawa. In the end, the election resulted in Yara's victory over Nishime. Although it was anticipated, this election result was considered as the climax of the Okinawan progressive movement before Okinawa's return. Yara's electoral triumph meant more than simply choosing their leader. It was understood as the victory of Okinawan people's struggle which had started from the land struggle in the 1950s.

2.10. The Anti-reversionists Movement

Towards the end of the 60s, a counter movement against the reversion movement also gained momentum. The movement was called "the prevention of ratification struggle" (*hijun soshi tōsō*) or later "anti-reversion struggle" (*hanfukki tōsō*). One of the aims of the movement was to protest against the local leaders who worked for ratification of Okinawa's immediate return to Japan. The protest campaign was conducted by diverse social forces. Students from the local universities and highschools, also workers from the local unions such as the All Base Workers Union (*zengunrō*), Okinawa Teachers and Staff Unions, public servants and many individuals participated in street marches and public forums.

One of the concerns that induced some Okinawan people to participate in a protest campaign against the return to Japan was the fact that local communities had lost control of the reversion movement. Although the reversion movement originally emerged spontaneously from the local community, the issue became a governmental agenda when the Japanese and the US governments started taking initiatives in the mid-1960s. After the Satō–Nixon communique was released, promising the return of Okinawa in 1972, the whole discussion about Okinawa's return to Japan revolved around the extent to which the Japanese government would regain its administrative rights over Okinawa. What the anti-reversion were particularly concerned about were nuclear weapons, which were rumored to be that it

was kept in the American military bases in Okinawa.¹²⁵ The local anxiety about nuclear weapons became acute when a B-52 bomber exploded in Kadena Airbase on 19 November 1968. The locals were horrified as they immediately thought that the war had started again.¹²⁶ Anti-reversion campaigners were particularly concerned whether nuclear weapons were contained in the bomber.

In relation to the anxiety about the nuclear weapons, emerging anti-war sentiment towards America's war in Vietnam was another force that fueled anti-reversion movement. A week prior to Okinawa's return being approved by the National Diet of Japan on 17 November 1971, union workers, students and other concerned Okinawan citizens conducted a protest campaign and general strike simultaneously, and held a protest march in the middle of Naha. On that day, nearly a hundred and fifty thousand people participated in the protest against the immediate return of Okinawa to Japan.

Although the anti-reversion movement was a minority movement in that period, it contributed to creating a new kind of intellectual trend in the Okinawa struggle, which is called "the philosophy of anti-reversion" (*han-fukki no shisō*) by local intellectuals. One of the eminent intellectuals involved was Arakawa Akira, who published works such as "Okinawa: Antithesis to the Nation State" (*Hankokka no Kyōku*) in 1971. This contains various essays written during the 1960s and the early 1970s. In the book, he was particularly critical of the utopian image which local leaders held of the return to Japan and the postwar Japanese "peace constitution", and of these local leaders' role in promoting state-oriented Japanese nationalism in Okinawa. By combining ideas related to class conflict and the anti-

¹²⁵ With this issue, the Japanese Prime Minister Satō Eisaku expressed reluctance to allow the US troops to bring in the nuclear weapons on to the ground of Okinawa. However, the type of nuclear weapons that the Japanese government refused to contain was the dated long-distance rocket such as MGM/CGM-13 or so-called Mace B on which was possible to attach a nuclear warhead. Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa 70 nen zengo*, 163.

¹²⁶ NA, "B52 Kadena ni Tsuiraku," *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, November 19, 1968, accessed 2 August 2013, <http://ryu-kyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-170304-storytopic-9.html>.

Vietnam war movement, Arakawa became a pioneering postcolonial thinker in Okinawa.

Arakawa's friends such as Kawamitsu Shin'ichi, Okamoto Keitoku, Nakazato Yūgo, and Irei Takashi were also actively involved with anti-reversionism as local intellectuals. Although the anti-reversion thinkers did not refuse to become "Japanese nationals", people such as Irei Takashi thought that solidarity between Japanese and Okinawan would only be possible if citizens from both regions collaboratively struggled against the expansion of Japanese capitalism in Okinawa.¹²⁷

2.11. Between Okinawa as Hometown and Japan as Homeland

What we have discussed until now is the formation of the Okinawa struggle in its early period. By focusing on diverse social and political actors, this chapter has looked into the process by which the Okinawa struggle was created from different perspectives. Also, this diverse perspective enables us to consider the process by which the "Okinawan identity" of Okinawa's anti-base movement was formed in the early period. While in recent years the notion of "Okinawa nationalism" is becoming more frequently used, "Okinawan identity" as the core cultural integrity for the anti-base movement was initially used as part of Japanese nationalism in Okinawa in the 1950s and 1960s.¹²⁸ The leading activists of the reversion movement in its very early period such as Nakayoshi Ryōkō were surely Okinawan. However, they also considered that Japan is their "homeland" (*sokoku*). Nakayoshi was a journalist working for several different newspaper companies in Okinawa, mainland Japan and in the United States before the Pacific War broke out. After he experienced the end of the Pacific War in Tokyo, Nakayoshi moved back to Okinawa and became the mayor of Shuri City, the old capital during the Ryūkyū Kingdom. While Nakayoshi's friend and fellow

¹²⁷ Kōichirō Yoshiwara, ed. *Okinawa: Hondo Fukki no Gensō* (Tokyo: San'ichi Shoten, 1968), 28.

¹²⁸ See, for example, Chapters Four and Six.

reversion movement activist, Taira Tatsuo, was a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (*Taisei Yokusan-kai*) and an active supporter of Japan's war-time totalitarian regime in Okinawa during the war, Nakayoshi was not necessarily a supporter of Japan's pre-war regime. Rather, his political view was closer to liberalism rather than totalitarianism. After he returned from the US, Nakayoshi became a member of *Rikken Seiyūkai* (Friends of the Constitutional Government), the first Japanese political party established in 1900.

With regard to Nakayoshi's view on Japan, there are at least two different historical perspectives. While Nakayoshi's motivation for the reversion movement had been considered in relation to his cultural nationalism by scholars such as Arasaki Moriteru, recently some historians such as Noutomi Kaoru highlight his social reformism.¹²⁹ Criticizing Arasaki, Noutomi argues that Nakayoshi was a modernizer rather than a nationalist, who aimed to reform Okinawa's underdeveloped culture and society. In her analysis, Nakayoshi's reformism was created while he lived in the US and in Tokyo. She argues that from his point of view Okinawans in the US were considered as Japanese, while still being different from other Japanese in ways in which they behaved, talked and made community in the foreign country, which reminded Nakayoshi of Okinawa's local characteristics.¹³⁰ The critical moment for Nakayoshi to feel the imperative of Okinawa's modernization was in the 1920s when Okinawa's local economy collapsed after it was hit by the global economic recession. Facing the bankruptcy of the local banks and drastic fall in the price of sugar cane, local people were eventually driven to eating cycads, a widely available but potentially lethal wild plant, which caused the death of a number of the local residents.¹³¹ This famine or so-called

¹²⁹ Nakano and Arasaki, *Okinawa Sengo-Shi*.

¹³⁰ Kaori Noutomi, "The Reexamination of Ryoko Nakayoshi : The Role of Fukki-Otoko in the Modern History of Okinawa," *Historica* 57 (2004): 46.

¹³¹ In the parliamentary discussion over the bailout plan of this great famine, the term "Okinawa problem" or *Okinawa mondai* was first coined in Japanese politics. (Ichirō Tomiyama, *Ruchaku no Shisō: 'Okinawa mondai' no keifugaku* (Tokyo: Inpakuto Shuppan, 2013), 14-16).

“the hell of cycads” (*sotetsu jigoku*) compelled him to act for Okinawa’s modernization in Tokyo.¹³² As a member of the Okinawa Association in Tokyo, Nakayoshi actively participated in relief activities and created his networks with the Japanese political and economic elites in Tokyo during this period. Meanwhile, he began to advocate the necessity of social and cultural reformation of Okinawa to be a modernized nation. From this perspective, Noutomi argues that Nakayoshi’s reversion movement needs to be understood in relation to his involvement with Okinawa in the 1920s, and his patriotism or identity as Okinawan on which his Japanese nationalism was built.

Compared to Nakayoshi’s reformist view on Okinawan identity and Japan, Nakasone Seizen’s story provides us with a different perspective. Originally a local high school teacher, Nakasone was known especially for his career as the leader of *himeyuri* students, a group of local female students who participated in the Battle of Okinawa as a nurse unit, where a large number of them were either committed suicide or died during the war. This tragic experience made him anti-Japanese in the very early postwar period.¹³³ Under the initiative of the American military administration, Nakasone participated in the promotion of non-Japanese school education by emphasizing Okinawan or Ryūkyūan ethnicity.

However, through his involvement with activities for the restoration of education in Okinawa together with another influential educator, Yara Chōbyō, Nakasone’s view on Japan gradually changed. Their campaign was started in 1953, in which Nakasone and Yara travelled to mainland Japan. The aim was to collect donations to rebuild the public schools in Okinawa. Supported by his fellow Okinawans in Tokyo and other cities, Nakasone and Yara visited the major cities in mainland Japan and asked for financial assistance for Okinawan

¹³² Noutomi, “The Reexamination of Ryoko Nakayoshi : The Role of Fukki-Otoko in the Modern History of Okinawa”, 47.

¹³³ Makoto Sakurazawa, *Okinawa no Fukki Undō to Hokaku Tairitsu* (Tokyo: Yūshisha, 2012).

school children and their teachers. There, they were introduced to the executives such as Shibusawa Keizō, former chairperson of the Bank of Japan and the Minister of Finance. Known also as an ethnologist studying the cultural life of rural areas, especially fishery villages, Shibusawa was sympathetic with the situation of Okinawa. Therefore, he readily accepted the offer to become the representative of the Society for the Promotion of Rebuilding Okinawan Schools Affected by Warfare (*Okinawa Sensai Kōsha Fukkō Sokushin Kisei-kai*) and contributed by collecting financial support, which became over sixty million yen (in 1953 values). Having been welcomed by these fellow Japanese, Nakasone became a pro-reversionist. In addition, Nakasone, as well as Yara, was also attracted by postwar Japan under the “peace constitution”. While his direct involvement in the Battle of Okinawa had overshadowed his view on Japan, the image of postwar Japan as democratic country, breaking away from its imperial past, made him consider the reversion of Okinawa as the best way to enable Okinawa to recover from the war devastation and occupation.

Between Okinawa as hometown and Japan as homeland, the advocates of the reversion movement sought the best solution to achieve territorial sovereignty for Okinawa that was determined by Okinawan people. Social reform, economic modernization, abhorrence of warfare and anxiety about everyday life under the occupation were core themes for this generation. There were various motivations which drove the reversion movement, but the majority of Okinawans equally believed that “becoming Japanese” was the best solution to make their lives better. In other words, the rise of Japanese nationalism within the reversion movement was the means by which Okinawans tried to articulate Japaneseness within the framework of their own distinctive local experiences as a path to liberation from the existing political and social situation. As I argued earlier, those who conducted the “anti-reversion” movement also did not disagree with this view. However, what made anti-reversionists become significant was that some of them understood that Okinawans had lost

control of the debate about reversion, and so Okinawa's situation would not be changed merely by becoming part of Japan. Although their campaign was not successful around the period of the reversion movement, as we will see in the next chapter, activists and intellectuals who joined the anti-reversion movement became central social actors in the reconstruction of the Okinawa struggle after the return to Japan.

2.12. Conclusion

This chapter has examined the origins and formation of the Okinawa struggle under the US occupation by focusing on major actors and events during the 1950s and 1960s. I explored diverse local experiences of the American occupation. On the one hand, the cases of farmers and the OTSA reveal the socio-economic impact of the military government and people's reactions through the stories of land confiscation and the emergence of the base towns. On the other hand, we also traced the motivation and aims of the formation of political parties. Also, the stories of the university students show us how educated youths perceived America's surveillance and oppression of their subversive activism. The first island-wide struggle and the reversion movement were created through the interaction of these diverse socio-political groups. To understand the Okinawa struggle, we need to view it from two perspectives: first, from the perspective of the underlying concerns and issues that persisted throughout the struggle; and second, in terms of the diverse objectives and experiences that existed within the struggle. The former aspect is important to understand the emergence of a unified critical subject struggling for its autonomous status, whereas the latter is important to understand the diversity of the actors involved in the struggle and their contexts and motivations.

In the next chapter, I discuss the formation of a range of new actions and identities within the Okinawa struggle after Okinawa's return. The US military bases remained in

Okinawa even after its return to Japan in May 1972. The treaty between Tokyo and Washington confirmed that the continuing presence of the US bases in Okinawa remained important even after the return of Okinawa, which meant that the extraterritoriality of the bases and the military personnel in Okinawa remained unchanged. Meanwhile, the former progressive leaders such as Yara Chōbyō became part of the local establishment. These new local leaders became negotiators with the central government in Tokyo by limiting their involvement in grassroots political and social movements. In this context, I will discuss how Okinawan citizens developed the local struggle and what kind of local identity emerged from their activism.

Chapter Three

Re-making the Okinawa Struggle: The Kin Bay Struggle and the Rise of “Okinawan Identity” in the Post-reversion Era



The photo was taken by the author in Aka Island (Aka-jima) in April 2012.

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the Okinawa struggle during the 1970s and 1980s. By highlighting the rise of a “civic movement” in Kin Town, a town located in the mid-eastern part of Okinawa Island, as a case study, I examine the context in which local civic activism was conducted.¹³⁴ This civic activism (the so-called Kin Bay struggle or *Kin-wan tōsō*) is a crucial case illustrating new aspects of social movements in post-reversion Okinawa. First, the Kin Bay struggle was one of the first cases of social activism created by local citizens after Okinawa was returned to Japan. Secondly, the Kin Bay struggle contributed to strengthening the Okinawa struggle by incorporating environmental activism. In other words, the Kin Bay struggle is a significant case in which protection of the local ecology and community from the ravages of excessive land development and industrialization became a core identity of the social movement. Thirdly, related to the second point, the Kin Bay struggle is an important

¹³⁴ The concept of “civic movement” in the context of the Okinawa struggle means a type of social movement that is started and developed by “individuals”. The notion of individuality, individual, or individuals (*ko* or *kojin* in Japanese) was one of the crucial topics of intellectual discussion in Okinawa during from the 1970s until the 1980s. Some key local intellectuals such as Kawamitsu Shin’ichi, Okamoto Keitoku, Nakasone Isamu and Arasaki Moriteru used this concept to discuss an alternative social actor within the Okinawan struggle, which is different from mainstream political actors affiliated to political parties or other social forces such as workers’ unions. There is no clear definition of this concept among those intellectuals. Yet most of them (except for Arasaki) were those who participated in the anti-reversion movement (see Chapter 2). After the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, these intellectuals felt it necessary to reconsider the Okinawa struggle in terms of social actors. It was important to reverse the co-option of Okinawan progressive politics by the national government in Tokyo. What they similarly considered was importance of “individuals” as social actors independent from party-led politics in Okinawa. However, their argument went beyond political analysis. Kawamitsu sought individuality in the Okinawan historical context and Arasaki defined individuality by referring to modern citizens. In particular, Okamoto Keitoku is one of the few intellectuals who tried to define what the individual is within the local cultural context in his long essay “*Suiheijiku no Hassō*” (The Philosophy of Horizontal Relationships). In the essay, Okamoto problematises the concepts of the self in the Okinawan cultural context. He argues that the self in Okinawa entails an “inferiority complex” towards mainland Japanese. Okamoto considers that this inferiority complex caused the historical tragedies during the Battle of Okinawa such as the collective suicide in places such as Tokashiki-jima Island and Zamami-jima Island in 1945. His discussion on the self and Okinawan culture was considered provocative in Okinawa when it was released in the 1980s, because the issue of collective suicide was still a taboo in Okinawa. But what made his essay more disputable was his comparison of collective suicide with the reversion to Japan movement. Okamoto argues that the leaders of the reversion to Japan movement, most of them locally established social and political elites, also had an inferiority complex towards the Japanese, and therefore, those leaders were eventually incorporated by Japanese politics. What Okamoto suggests in order to overcome this problem is to create “individuals” who would not be subsumed into the logic of the self in Okinawan culture. His conception of “horizontal relations” was an eye-opening concept for Okinawan readers in that period, which enabled them to consider “relationship” and “distance” among individuals in understanding Okinawan culture.

case to understand the new political environment of the Okinawa struggle. The participants in the Kin Bay Protection Society (KBPS) needed to struggle not only with the Japanese and US governments but also with the political and economic establishment within Okinawa which designated Kin as one of the main sites for the building of an off-shore petrol storage system known as the Central Terminal Station (CTS).

Although the local campaigners lost their court case against the Okinawan government, the Kin Bay struggle is considered as an historic movement in the context of post-reversion Okinawa. Raising the concept of “the right of existence” (*seizon-ken*), the actions of Kin Bay residents carved out a new space for Okinawan civic activism, attracting other Okinawan citizens from different locales. Among them were those who started a support network, the Residents’ Movement of the Arc of Ryūkyū or RMAR (*Ryūkyū-ko no Jūmin Undō*). One of the main aims of this group is to create linkages amongst various kinds of local civic activism struggling with similar environmental pollution problems in their localities. Organising activities such as study camps and publishing pamphlets, RMAR played a significant role in linking the Kin Bay struggle to localized environmental activism from Amami on the northern fringe of Ryūkyū Islands to the southernmost islands such as Yonaguni-jima Island. Most significantly, RMAR created a new sense of cultural identity based on the concept of a region called *Ryūkyū-ko* (the Arc of Ryūkyū). Starting from an examination of the political and economic situation in Okinawa during the 1970s and the 1980s, through the analysis of the Kin Bay struggle, I discuss how the local citizens recreated the Okinawa struggle, including the local (re)articulation of “Okinawan identity” during those periods, and then go on to examine the nature and significance of the concept of *Ryūkyū-ko*.

3.2. Okinawa after “Reversion”

In May 1972, the administration of Okinawa was handed over from the US to Japan. After twenty-seven years of American military government, Okinawa again became a Japanese prefecture. As we saw in the previous chapter, by mobilising large numbers of participants from all corners of Okinawa, the reversion movement of the 1960s had been a crucial historical event for Okinawan citizens. Okinawans became legitimate participants in selecting their leaders and determining the future of Okinawa for the first time in the post-WWII era.¹³⁵ Backed by strong popular support, the last Chief Executive of the Government of Ryukyu Island, Yara Chōbyō, who became the inaugural Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, defined five principles for the new Okinawa: (1) construction of peaceful Okinawa; (2) resolution of the US base problems; (3) redevelopment of the Okinawan economy; (4) improvement of social welfare; and (5) enhancement of self-governance of the cities, towns and villages. However, Yara’s administration of the new Okinawa was hampered by its external relationship with the Japanese government. First, the Liberal Democratic Party in Tokyo did not support Yara’s progressive manifesto because the central government regarded it as “unrealistic”. Also, the US military presence in the prefecture did not change. Instead of reclaiming the land used by the US bases, the Japanese government allowed the continuation of the US bases in Okinawa. The extraterritorial status of the US military and its personnel in Japan was continued under the Status of Forces Agreement, which was concluded in 1960 when the former Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke and the US President Dwight Eisenhower renewed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between United States and Japan. Although territorial sovereignty was restored and Okinawans became Japanese citizens, the Okinawan locals had to endure the continuing presence of the US military bases.

¹³⁵ Yoshio Nakano and Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Sengo-Shi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1976), 9.

Yara's political choices were limited because of Okinawa's weak economy. Although he sought progressive policies to assure the strong self-governance of Okinawa, the reality was that Okinawa Prefecture did not have any option but to ask the Japanese government for financial support. The Satō administration in Tokyo established the Okinawa Development Agency (*Okinawa Kaihatsu-chō*) and in December 1972 presented a plan for Okinawa's socio-economic development for the next ten years (The First Promotion and Development Plan for Okinawa or so-called *daiichiji Okinawa shinkei*).¹³⁶ In order to encourage Okinawa's economic development, large subsidies were provided by the Japanese government to the Okinawan economy to modernize infrastructure. To promote rapid social and economic development, the Japanese government also invested in the Okinawan tourism industry. Highlighting Okinawa's distinctive subtropical climate, the prefecture was designated as the host prefecture for national and international events. One of the earliest events that Okinawa hosted after its return to Japan was the International Oceanic Expo in 1975. In the lead-up to this event, the investment from mainland Japan gave strong momentum for the building of resort facilities on Okinawa Island, particularly in the northern region called Yanbaru, which had been less developed compared to the southern part of Okinawa Island.

As Tada Osamu argues, this kind of economic stimulus caused the Okinawan economy to be dependent on government-led investment. Under the name of “promotion measures (*shinkō-saku*) for Okinawa prefecture”, Okinawa was gradually reintegrated into

¹³⁶ As the motivation of this policy, the Japanese government cited the need for Okinawa's rapid economic growth to fill the gap compared with the rest of Japan, which was caused by ravages of the hard-fought battles (*karetsu na senka*) with the US during the war and its long-term separation from Japan (*naganen ni wataru hondo to no kakuzetsu*). Based on this motivation, the official document of the plan reports that the Japanese government must make efforts to provide basic infrastructure to support the independent development (*jiritsu-teki hatten*) of Okinawa. However, Arasaki Moriteru harshly criticises this policy because he argues it was made to urge less developed Okinawa to catch up with the rest of Japan. (The Cabinet Office of Japan. “Dai Ichiji Okinawa Shinkō Kaihatsu Keikaku” (Tokyo: The Cabinet Office of Japan, 1972), 1; Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Gendaishi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005), 51.

Japanese developmentalism.¹³⁷ The Japanese government regarded this economic stimulus as “compensation” for the war and twenty-seven years of the US military occupation which the Okinawan people had experienced. However, as Arasaki Moriteru points out, the economic promotion plan was not only compensation for past suffering but also it functioned to ease internal frustration about the continued existence of the bases in Okinawa.¹³⁸ Although the US bases in mainland Japan substantially decreased in size in the late 1960s to early 1970s, the area of the US bases in Okinawa showed only a small decrease. The size of the US bases in mainland Japan was reduced from approximately 30,000 hectares (as of 1960) to 20,000 hectares by 1972, whereas the area in Okinawa only decreased from thirty thousand hectares to twenty-six thousand hectares, and then rose to around forty thousand hectares (See Figure below). The proportion of the US bases between Okinawa and Japan reversed in terms of land used, and this is how Okinawa Prefecture, which only accounts for less than 1 percent of the total Japanese land area, became the place to host about 74 percent of the entire US bases in the country (as of 2011, see Chart 3.2).

Besides, Okinawa’s return to Japan also brought some critical changes in the political situation around the local anti-base struggle. Progressive political parties— the Okinawa People’s Party (OPP) and Okinawa Socialist Party (OSP)—joined the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) respectively and became their local branches. This incorporation of the local political parties made them more inflexible when making

¹³⁷ Osamu Tada, *Okinawa Imēji no Tanjō: Aoi umi no karuchuraru sutadīzu* (Tokyo: Tōyōkeizai Shinpō-sha, 2004).

¹³⁸ Although the Yara administration campaigned for the removal of the US bases from Okinawa, it did not take any legal actions against the Japanese and US governments. Instead, Yara signed a memorandum under which Okinawa Prefecture received ‘compensation’ from the Japanese government. Following Yara’s decision, most of the provincial governments in Okinawa Prefecture also signed the memorandum.

decisions by themselves because these the local branches always need to consult with their headquarters in Tokyo when taking political actions.¹³⁹

¹³⁹ Yoshio Nakano and Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Sengoshi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1976).




Chart 3-1. The area used for the US military bases and other facilities. This chart is made by the author of the thesis based on the data from Okinawa Prefectural Government, available at <http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/documents/h24toukei-6.pdf>. Note: the number on the left side is hectare (1 hectare is 10,000 square meters)




Chart 3-2. The composition of exclusive-use facilities of the US Forces (by prefecture). The chart is made by the author of the thesis based on the date from Okinawa Prefectural Government, available at <http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/documents/2011.6%20eng.pdf>

3.3. “Aquapolis” and Developmentalism in Post-reversion Okinawa

“My fellow Japanese citizens, we must learn the lesson of our valuable history, and reaffirm our determination for peace, and strive to build a peaceful and wealthy Okinawa as a bridge of friendship and cooperation with our neighbors in Asia and the Pacific.”¹⁴⁰

These words were uttered on 15 May 1972 by then Japanese Prime Minister Satō Eisaku in a speech at the ceremony to celebrate Okinawa’s return to Japan. Satō’s speech was eloquent and confident. Okinawa’s return to Japan was one of the initial policies which Satō emphasized when he became the Prime Minister of Japan in 1964. The fluency of his speech was backed by confidence and achievement. However, Okinawa was not easy to manage for anyone, even Satō. One of the major problems was the gap in economic development and social infrastructure between Okinawa and the rest of Japan. During the twenty-seven years of the US military administration, there had been little socio-economic investment in Okinawa. While some of the southern cities in Okinawa Island flourished, in many rural places, particularly the northern part of Okinawa Island, there was little investment in development. In those places, main drainage was uncommon, and roads and public transport also remained far less developed than in the southern areas of Okinawa Island. In such circumstances, the modernization of Okinawan infrastructure to catch up with the rest of Japan was an urgent matter.

With this in mind, the Satō cabinet had decided to incorporate Okinawa into Japan’s New Master Plan for the National Land Development (*Shin Zenkoku Sōgō Kaihatsu Keikaku* or *Dai-niji Shin Zensō*). The first Master Plan of Land Development (*Dai-ichiji Zensō*) was

¹⁴⁰ Takayoshi Egami, “Fukki-go no Okinawa Shinkō Kaihatsu Keikaku,” *Opinion* 47 (August 2003), accessed November 18, 2014, <http://www.waseda.jp/jp/opinion/2003/opinion47.html>.

developed and implemented under the initiative of the former Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato during the 1960s, as part of his famous “Income-doubling Plan” (*Shotoku Baizō Keikaku*). Taking “the balanced development of the national land” as its slogan, this master plan provided a grand design for equitable social improvement in postwar Japan. In the earlier plan of the 1960s, the Ikeda administration had two aims: doubling annual income per capita; and creating regional industrial centres between major industrial cities to avoid further centralisation of population. Although average annual income per capita dramatically increased by up to four times compared with the previous decade, the high concentration of population and capital in urban areas was not solved. Therefore, in the new nation-wide land development plan, the Sato administration aimed to fill in the gap of socio-economic development between the major cities such as Tokyo and the regional areas by distributing social investment more extensively around the country.¹⁴¹ In the second master plan for land development under the Satō administration, one of the major tasks was to establish transport networks. This included not only constructing roads but also establishing ports and airports in order to connect regional areas and major cities.

For land development, Okinawa was one of the frontiers for investment firms. The report on the second master plan (first published in 1967, and the revised version published in 1969) stated that Okinawan society had been constrained in its development compared to the rest of Japan because of its “isolation from the mainland, vulnerable local economy, lag in the extent of social infrastructure, the bases that occupy massive areas of the land, small and scattered islands and the impact of typhoons.”¹⁴² However, the report also said “its location between Japan and Southeast Asia, unique nature as the only subtropical region in Japan,

¹⁴¹ Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, “Zōho Shin Zenkoku Sōgō Kaihatsu Keikaku” (Tokyo: Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 1969), 9-10.

¹⁴² Ibid., 80.

abundant marine resources and many different kinds of resources for tourism make this region a culturally and naturally distinctive place.”¹⁴³ Therefore, the report argued that “the whole of Okinawa needs to be developed to the standard of the mainland in order to depart from the base-dependent economy and transit to a peaceful economy.”¹⁴⁴ In order to achieve Okinawa’s development, the Satō administration emphasized the importance of establishing communication infrastructure, particularly roads, ports and airports in Okinawa. In the report, the need to renovate airports in Naha and remote islands such as Miyako, Ishigaki, Kume, and Yonaguni are listed as crucial agenda items, as well as the need to repair roads and ports around the region. The report particularly emphasizes the need for urgent development of Naha as the centre of the regional network.¹⁴⁵

In order to attract investment to Okinawa Prefecture, the Japanese government decided to designate Okinawa as the host prefecture of the World Expo in 1975. The Tokyo Olympics of 1964 and the Osaka World Expo of 1970 had already proven the usefulness of such major events for the hosting cities in terms of the development of social infrastructure. Inspired by Okinawa’s unique oceanic culture, the event was called the Okinawa Oceanic Expo (*Okinawa kaiyō haku*). The Foundation for the Expo was established with Ōhama Nobumoto, who was a key political advisor of Prime Minister Satō on Okinawa’s reversion process, as the chairperson.

With participation from thirty-six countries from around the world, the Expo was the largest international event that Okinawa had experienced in its modern history. It had a particularly great socio-economic impact in the development of the northern part of Okinawa Island, where investment from mainland Japan to Okinawa was small prior to 1972. To build

¹⁴³ Ibid., 80.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 81.

and maintain the US military facilities, Japanese construction companies such as Shimizu Corporation and Taisei Corporation, together with local Okinawan firms, had played major roles when the US military bases were extended from the late 1940s until the early 1950s.¹⁴⁶ However, in the earlier period, the northern half of Okinawa Island drew less attention for investment compared to the southern and central regions of Okinawa Island such as Kadena and Naha (where most of the bases were located). In this sense, the Okinawa Oceanic Expo was welcomed by most locals with great enthusiasm. For this event, the world's largest aquarium and a symbolic site called the "aquapolis" were built in Motobu town in the northwest of Okinawa Island. Modern infrastructure was also rapidly established around the northern Yanbaru region.

While the development stimulated by the Expo helped modernize the socio-economic environment of the northern region, it also left some critical problems. Overdevelopment of the land caused the run-off of red soil into the ocean. The coastline was coloured red because of soil which leached from the mountains when there was heavy rain in the region because of deforestation of the mountains. This leached red soil caused critical environmental damage to the native sea habitat such as coral reefs.¹⁴⁷ Also, the sudden rise in investment caused an economic bubble with a sharp rise in the land prices in the region. The local *Ryūkyū Shimpō* newspaper reported that the price of land per square meter in Motobu Town, which was twelve yen in the early 1970s, had reached ten-thousand yen by the mid-1970s.¹⁴⁸ This drastic rise in land prices prompted the purchase of land primarily by mainland Japanese speculators. The sudden emergence of Okinawa's bubble economy also created other changes in the local

¹⁴⁶ According to Toriyama Atsushi, 88 percent of the construction market was taken by the mainland Japanese firms in 1950, which changed to 89 percent in 1951 and 79 percent in 1952. See Atsushi Toriyama, *Okinawa: Kichi-shakai no kigen to sōkoku*, 107.

¹⁴⁷ Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Gendaishi*, 53.

¹⁴⁸ Anon., "Tochi Kaishime, Chika Kōtō," *Ryūkyū Shimpō* (2 December 1972), accessed October 2, 2013, <http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-150894-storytopic-9.html>.

economy including wage rises and abandonment of farmland by farmers.¹⁴⁹ This was later called “the Oceanic Expo Shock” (or, *kaiyōhaku shokku*).

3.4. Anti-CTS Struggle: The origin of the Okinawan civic movement

One of the major characteristics of the Okinawa struggle after 1972 is the emergence of rural residents, many of them not necessarily experienced activists, as the main actors of the movement. This grassroots activism led by local residents is often called the “residents’ movements” (or *jūmin undō*). In the postwar Japanese context, this type of social movement started from the 1960s as small groups of residents created anti-pollution and anti-development movements in both regional and highly industrial areas such as Yokkaichi City in Mie prefecture.¹⁵⁰ The history of residents’ movement in Japan, however, goes back to the late 19th century. One of the most famous examples is the protest campaign against the pollution of rice fields affected by the waste water from a local copper mine in Ashio, Tochigi prefecture.

However, the term “residents’ movement” came to be widely used in Japan from the 1960s. As Simon Avenell points out, the term implies social movements led by local “citizens”, a concept which was not applied to describe Japanese nationals before WWII, to protect their living space from ravages of environmental destruction.¹⁵¹ Also, another distinctive characteristic of the residents’ movement in the postwar Japanese context is that it

¹⁴⁹ Osamu Tada, *Okinawa Imēji no Tanjō: Aoi umi no karuchuraru sutadīzu* (Tokyo: Tōyōkeizai Shinpō-sha, 2004).

¹⁵⁰ In Yokkaichi City, sulphurous acid gas released from the petrochemical complex on the coast caused asthma among the locals, which is known as Yotsukaichi asthma. In the 1960s, the local residents in Yokkaichi City and surrounding regions decided to bring a court case against chemical firms in the complex, which resulted in the victory of the residents in the early 1970s. Yotsukaichi asthma is known as one of the four big diseases amid the high industrialization of Japan.

¹⁵¹ Simon Avenell, “Regional egoism as the public good: residents’ movements in Japan during the 1960s and 1970s,” *Japan Forum* 18 (2006): 93; also, as an introduction to the study of the Japanese residents’ movement, see: Kamon Nikarai and Jiro Matsubara. *Jūmin Undō no Ronri: Undō no tenkai katei, kadai to tenbō*. (Tokyo: Gakuyō Shobō, 1976).

was driven by the spirit of self-help and autonomy of local regions against the institutional pressure of development imposed by the Japanese government and chemical industries. In the residents' movements, the protest communities raised issues related to the effects of rapid economic growth on their living areas. In particular, issues surrounding the natural environment are often raised by campaigners. By involving not only the local residents but also concerned citizens from other parts of the country, including university scholars, the movement played a crucial role to advance civic movements in Japan.¹⁵²

In the Okinawan context, too, residents' movements were initiated by local residents who were directly affected by the environmental problems and citizens concerned about the mass scale of land development in the early 1970s. As I discuss later, one of the strong concerns of the Japanese government with Okinawa prefecture was to ensure that the local economy and living standards caught up with the rest of Japan. In addition to the 1975 Oceanic Expo, from the 1970s the Japanese government launched plans to reconstruct social infrastructure in various places around the prefecture. However, these development plans were often created with little consideration of their effects, particularly on the local lives including people. Therefore, from the mid-1970s, Okinawans organised protest campaigns against this development that was destructive to their everyday life. For example, in places such as Shiraho in Ishigaki Island, the local fishermen conducted a protest action against the renovation of the local Ishigaki Airport in 1979 because they were concerned with destruction of the natural environment around the coast inclusive of coral reef. In 1986, residents in Awase in Okinawa City started a campaign against the landfill of the local intertidal flat. Although the scale of these movements was far from the 'mass' protests of the 1950s and 1960s, the type of social struggle that emerged in the 1970s played an essential

¹⁵² For involvement of university scholars in the Japanese anti-pollution movement, see e.g. Simon Avenell, *The Borderless Archipelago: Toward a Transnational History of Japanese Environmentalism*, *Environment and History* 19 (2013): 397-425.

role in post-reversion Okinawan history in the sense that these movements created a basis for new forms of anti-base struggle mobilising environmental issues in places including Kadena from the 1980s onwards, Futenma and Henoko from the 1990s and Takae from the 2000s.¹⁵³

When we consider the historical origins of residents' movements in postwar Okinawa, one of the earliest cases was that of a group of the local citizens who conducted a protest campaign in Kin Town during the 1970s and 1980s.¹⁵⁴ Located in the central-eastern coastal area of Okinawa Island, Kin Town was designated as the site for construction of a petroleum storage plant by the Okinawan Prefectural Government. At a time of rapid growth, central terminal storage (CTS) sites became important for the Japanese government to secure safe energy supplies throughout the country. Some major foreign gas firms such as Esso and Caltex showed their interest in investing in this project. Aiming to extend their business in the Asian region, these transnational petroleum firms saw the return of Okinawa to Japan as an important opportunity for investment.¹⁵⁵

However, it was the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) which initiated this idea. In 1967, then Chief Executive Matsuoka Seiho decided to attract foreign investors to build the CTS in Okinawa. After being refused by the local residents in other places such as Yonagusuku, Matsuoka designated his hometown Kin Town as the site for this project.¹⁵⁶ Construction started in 1970. The CTS was built on reclaimed land around neighboring islands such as Heianza Island. However, soon after the CTS started operation, the sea water around the coast of Kin Town became polluted due to leaked oil, bad odors from the petrol

¹⁵³ In terms of the US military bases, in 1982 around nine hundred local residents in Kadena Town brought a lawsuit against the Japanese and US governments due to the noise pollution from the jets from Kadena Airbase. Inspired by the citizens in Kadena, in 2002, concerned residents in Futenma Town also started taking legal action against the US military in relation to the loud noise from Futenma Airbase.

¹⁵⁴ The local pronunciation of Kin puts strength on 'n' sound. Therefore, in Okinawa, the English name is written as "Kinn" instead of "Kin". However, for the sake of convenience, this thesis uses "Kin".

¹⁵⁵ Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Sengoshi*, 205-206.

¹⁵⁶ Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Gendaishi*, 54.

storage tanks and a change in the sea current caused by land reclamation, which damaged the local fishing industry.

Prior to the start of the CTS operation, concerned local residents and environmental activists launched the Kin Bay Protection Society (KBPS: Kin-wan o Mamoru-kai) in September 1973.¹⁵⁷ One of the leaders of KBPS was a former high-school principal, Asato Seishin. Born in Okinawa, Asato returned after the war from Korea, where he had taught as a local high-school teacher during the Japanese colonial period. After his return, he was a senior regional organiser for the Okinawa Teachers and Staff Association (OTSA) in the central region of Okinawa Island while continuing his teaching career. The local residents of Kin Town, mostly fishermen, were also active members of this newly established protest community. By inviting environmental experts and civic activists, they voluntarily organised a study group on damage related to CTS. Also, Asato and the local residents conducted protest campaigns by collaborating with other Okinawan civic groups from different regions. Their campaigns were successful in gaining support from workers' unions such as the prefectural government workers union (*kenrōkyō*) and the school teachers' union, which occupied influential roles as the major supporting bodies for the Governor Yara Chōbyō during the reversion movement. As a result of their lobbying and petitions, Yara decided to withdraw approval to start operating CTS in Kin in January 1974.

However, the Japanese government authority (Okinawa Development Agency), and investing firms disagreed with Yara's decision.¹⁵⁸ As construction of the facilities had been started, cancellation of the approval would cause a huge loss for investors. Referring to the

¹⁵⁷ Among recent studies, a researcher, Uehara Kozue, writes an introductory essay on anti-CTS struggle. (Kozue Uehara, "Minshū no 'Seizon' Shisō kara 'Kenri' wo Tou: Shiseiken Henkan-go no Kinn Wan, Han CTS Tōsō Saiban wo Megutte," *Okinawa Bunka Kenkyū* 39 (2013): 128.)

¹⁵⁸ The Okinawa Development Agency (or Okinawa Kaihatsu-chō: 沖縄開発庁) was started in May 1972 with the aim of overseeing economic promotion in Okinawa. As its mission, this government agency was responsible for creating Okinawa's economic development plan and the supervision of Okinawa Development Finance Corporation (Okinawa Shinyō Kaihatsu Kinyū Kinkō: 沖縄信用開発金融金庫).

oil shock in 1973 and Japan's poor domestic energy resources, the major stakeholders such as Okinawa Mitsubishi Development and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) strongly urged Yara to sign the form to approve the operation of the CTS in Kin Town. In that period, Yara was not able to handle the politics of CTS operation by himself. Minister of MITI, Nakasone Yasuhiro, who became the Japanese Prime Minister from 1982-1987, dismissed Yara's decision, emphasizing that the Japanese government aimed to boost the stockpiles of petrol in the country, and also that the government was prepared to negotiate with the local residents.¹⁵⁹ Okinawa Mitsubishi Development also disagreed with Yara, and it proposed no other options but building CTS.¹⁶⁰ Despite the petition movement and negotiations conducted by KBPS with ruling progressive parties such as Okinawa People's Party, Okinawa Socialist Party and OKMS, Yara decided to rescind his decision, and approved the operation of the facility in October 1975.

After its voice was dismissed by the local political leaders, KBPS brought a lawsuit in the Naha District Court against Yara and Okinawa Mitsubishi Development. This court case created a split between Yara and his former right-hand man, Asato, who had worked together during the reversion movement. Yara was elected on the basis of his promises to introduce "peaceful industry" (*heiwa sangyō*), which he promised to create "peaceful Okinawa" and "independent Okinawa" not by relying on the base-related economy but by promoting industrialization of the local economy. The KBPS lawsuit against Okinawa prefecture expressed a strong critique of the potential consequences of the CTS and "peaceful industry" for Okinawa. By raising issues such as sea contamination from leaked petrol and construction of the storage tanks, the group's activism was crucial in enhancing public awareness of the environmental problems and their impact on people's everyday lives. Moreover, the protest

¹⁵⁹ Nakasone quoted in Kozue Uehara, "Minshū no 'Seizon' Shisō kara 'Kenri' wo Tou: Shiseiken Henkan-go no Kinn Wan, Han CTS Tōsō Saiban wo Megutte" *Okinawa Bunka Kenkyū* 39 (2013): 29-30.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 29.

movement contributed to a reconsideration of the meanings of “wealth”, “development”, and “rationalization” (which was equated with modernization, or more specifically industrialization) imposed by the Japanese government. In this context, Yara’s political vacillation and his final decision to allow the operation of the CTS were regarded not only by KBPS but also other concerned Okinawan citizens as subservience to the central government.¹⁶¹ While Yara played a crucial role in emancipating Okinawa from the US military occupation through Okinawa’s return to Japan, this political vacillation enhanced an atmosphere in which the locals were forced to reconsider the meaning of “progress” (*kakushin*) and of Okinawa’s true emancipation or independence (*jiritsu*) from Japan as well as the US.

The court battle between KBPS and Okinawa Prefecture lasted for nearly ten years. In the end, the request for a provisional injunction to stop the operation of the CTS was dismissed with no further appeal from KBPS in October 1982. The court case ended in victory for those who promoted the construction and later operation of the CTS. However, the protestors’ defeat in court did not mean the end of this new direction in the Okinawan people’s struggle. On the contrary, the anti-CTS struggle contributed to the development of the people’s movement because it attained an historical position as the pioneer of the residents’ movements in Okinawa. Highlighting the protection of the natural environment and of people’s existing ways of life, Asato and KBPS were the first groups in Japan to use the concept of “the right to existence” (*seizonken*) in order to justify their struggle. Also, another new aspect of this movement was active networking with mainland Japanese activists over environmental pollution, destruction of natural landscape and erosion of livelihood space. Lawyers, researchers, students and individuals in the mainland were involved with the

¹⁶¹ Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Dōjidaishi 1973-1977: Yogawari no uzu no nakade, Jiritsu e no shikōsakugo* (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 2004), 37.

anti-CTS struggles in Okinawa. Documents, information and experiences were brought to Okinawa in order to combat corporate interests and the prefectural government. Those interactions with activists in other locales played an important part in the course of the development of the anti-CTS struggle.¹⁶² By succeeding to the spirit of the anti-US base movement from the previous decades, the anti-CTS struggle also brought the Okinawa struggle into a new phase and extended its meaning.

3.5. The Arc of the Ryūkyūs

Kin Bay Protection Society (KBPS) involved participants from not only the local Kin Town but also from places such as Naha, which is about one hour away by car from Kin Bay. Among them were young intellectuals such as Arasaki Moriteru, who later became an eminent Okinawan historian, and Arakawa Akira, who had already been known for his anti-reversion campaign. Together with other concerned intellectuals such as literary critics Okamoto Keitoku and Irei Takashi and Yamakado Ken'ichi (an environmental expert) these intellectuals based in Naha started a campaign to promote the Kin Bay struggle widely around Okinawa prefecture. This group, called the Society to Promote Anti-CTS Struggle (*CTS Soshi Tōsō wo Hirogeru-kai* or *Hirogeru-kai*), was formed in September 1974. One of the founding members of this society, Arasaki Moriteru, became the coordinator of the group.¹⁶³ Arasaki says that he and other founding members including Arakawa decided to organise the group in order to spread information about the anti-CTS struggle among people living in different areas of Okinawa.¹⁶⁴ Although the Kin Bay struggle was initially started by a small group of the local residents as an isolated movement, the networks with other

¹⁶² Kozue Uehara, "Minshū no 'Seizon' Shisō kara 'Kenri' wo Tou: Shiseiken Henkan-go no Kinn Wan, Han CTS Tōsō Saiban wo Megutte," 140.

¹⁶³ For Arasaki's biographical information, see Chapter Eight.

¹⁶⁴ Moriteru Arasaki, interview by Shinnosuke Takahashi, December 3, 2011.

communities gradually spread around Okinawa Prefecture through the *Hirogeru-kai*. Based in Naha, Arasaki and others regularly reported the ongoing situation of this social movement in the local newspapers, sending financial donations, and organising study groups in order to share information with people who were unable to participate in the protest movement in Kin Town.¹⁶⁵

In 1976, building upon the activity of *Hirogeru-kai*, Arasaki and others re-formed the group under the new name Residents' Movement in the Arc of the Ryukyus or RMAR (*Ryūkyū-ko no Jūminundō*). The Arc of the Ryukyu is a geographical term referring to the chain of small islands from southern Kagoshima Prefecture to Sakishima, the island nearest to Taiwan. As the name signifies, one of the major purposes of this group was to become a platform for residents' movements throughout the Ryukyu Islands. Eventually, over ten civic groups created a network within the arc of Ryukyu Islands. Arasaki and his colleagues of RMAR played a crucial role to connect these different regional societies.¹⁶⁶ As one of its main activities, for example, RMAR organised an annual study camp beginning in 1979. Staying on various islands in the Okinawa region, activists exchanged their experiences and information. This camp lasted for ten years until 1989. Also, RMAR published a regular pamphlet, and organised symposiums, and other social events from time to time in different places.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ *Hirogeru-kai* was started by participants with diverse objectives, and therefore it is not easy to generalize the personal motivations that run underneath. Nonetheless, we could identify some similarities among the founding members' careers. For example, people such as Arakawa Akira, Irei Takashi and Okamoto Keitoku were originally students from Ryūkyū University who joined the literary circle *Ryūdai Bungaku* during the mid-1950s. Later, they supported anti-reversion campaign. Those critical local intellectuals were not only critical of Okinawan political elites who led the reversion movement but also considered that the CTS project was a product of Japanese economic incorporation of Okinawa backed by American expansionism in Asia. Therefore, the Kin Bay struggle was not only an environmental movement but also entailed the meaning as struggle against Okinawa's social integration by Japan and America.

¹⁶⁶ Moriteru Arasaki, "Amami, Okinawa, Ryukyu-ko: Gendai-shi kara no shiten," *Shin Okinawa Bungaku* 41 (1979): 94-95.

¹⁶⁷ Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Dōjidaishi 1978-1982: Ryukyu-ko no shiten kara* (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 2004), 193, 222.

3.6. The Southern Perspective

In adopting the notion of “the Arc of the Ryukyus” or “*Ryukyu-ko*”, the founding members such as Arasaki were inspired by the idea of *Yaponesia* (or *Japonesia*), which offered an alternative perspective for viewing the Japanese archipelago and its connections to the Pacific region.¹⁶⁸ By exploring the “underlying Japanese cultural stratum in the South Pacific”, the novelist Shimao Toshio (1917-1986), who coined the concept, tried to re-conceptualize the Ryūkyū Islands as the key region for understanding Japanese culture and history.¹⁶⁹ Shimao’s concept of *Yaponesia* was based on personal experience. After finishing his university degree, Shimao was recruited towards the end of the Asia-Pacific War to head a suicide-attack squadron of motor boats called *shinyō* (or *marure* as the code name; see Image 3.1 below).¹⁷⁰ Shimao was sent to the island Kakeroma-jima Island in Kagoshima Prefecture to await the order to conduct his suicide mission. Located in the northern fringe of the Ryūkyū Kingdom until the early 17th century, Kakeroma Island had also been annexed by the Shimazu clan of the Satsuma domain. After the Meiji Restoration, Satsuma’s territory became Kagoshima prefecture. Therefore, the local life on Kakeroma Island was created under the two different cultural influences.

The war ended before Shimao received the order to carry out his mission. After living in various places in Japan, Shimao and his wife, who was a native of Kakeroma Island, returned to Kagoshima Prefecture. They settled in Naze District in Amami Ōshima Island. Like Kakeroma-jima Island, Amami Ōshima Island was also part of the Ryūkyū Islands. However, like other northern parts of the Ryūkyū Islands, Amami was incorporated into

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 68-69.

¹⁶⁹ Phillip Gabriel, “Rethinking the margins: Shimao Toshio and *Yaponesia*,” *Japan Forum* 8 (1996): 205-220.

¹⁷⁰ Under the command of the Japanese Imperial Army, this Kamikaze boats project was launched in 1944. Because of the lack of iron, the boats were made of plywood. The ports were located along the Pacific coastline of the Japanese archipelago. Many of them were concentrated in the southern part of Japan such as Kagoshima Prefecture and Okinawa.

Satsuma during the 17th century. In this place, Shimao wrote his seminal work *The Spike of Death* (*Shi no Toge*) in 1960, which is a novel based on Shimao's personal story of his relationship with his wife who was suffering from a severe mental illness. Also, in Naze, Shimao wrote many short essays about this area. His experiences and curiosity about the history and culture of these islands contributed to Shimao's vision of Japan from the perspective of the Arc of the Ryūkyūs.



Image 3-1: *Marure*, or the boat used to conduct the suicide attack during the Battle of Okinawa. The image was taken by the author in April 2012 at Kerama Marine Cultural Museum in Zamami Island in Okinawa.

Shimao used the terms *Yaponesia* and *Ryūkyū-ko* for the first time in his essay, “Yaponesia no Nekko” (The Roots of Yaponesia) in 1961. The concept was a mixture of two terms, Japan and *nesia* derived from the ancient Greek *nesos* (which means ‘islands’). According to Philip Gabriel, Shimao used the idea of Yaponesia in order to signify “a plurality of cultures within the confines of the nation we call Japan” by re-situating its location as an extension of the Pacific region from the perspective of the Ryūkyūs or Okinawa.¹⁷¹ Viewing Japan from the perspective of Amami Ōshima, Shimao saw the country to be culturally similar to Pacific archipelagos such as Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia as well as Indonesia. Shimao’s positive images of the islands in the southern Pacific not only as utopian, but also as a crucial cultural reference for understanding modern Japanese urban life has been criticised because of its exoticization of the Ryukyuan or Okinawan region and its people.¹⁷²

However, this does not mean that the concept of Yaponesia was not accepted by the local Okinawans. Rather the local Okinawan intellectuals, especially those who were involved with the anti-reversion movement, considered it a key concept by which Okinawans were liberated from the national boundaries and *re-imagined* their cultural identity in a wider regional and historical context beyond Japan. Inspired by Shimao, some local intellectuals such as poet Takara Ben discussed a similar concept called “*Ryūkyū-nesia*” (the word created by combining *Ryūkyū* and *nesos*), and a journalist Miki Takeshi proposed “*Oki-nesia*” (*Okinawa* with *nesos*). Also, Arakawa Akira wrote a book “Nantō Fudoki” (*the Culture and Geography of Southern Islands*) when he was working for a local newspaper company in Ishigaki-jima Island, which is one of the southern-most islands in Okinawa. Arakawa recalls

¹⁷¹ Phillip Gabriel, “Rethinking the margins: Shimao Toshio and *Yaponesia*,” 164.

¹⁷² See, for example, Keitoku Okamoto, *Gendai Okinawa no Bungaku to Shisō* (Naha: Okinawa Taimusu-sha, 1981), 193-259.

that Shimao and his wife Miho strongly encouraged him to write this book, which later shaped his philosophy of the anti-reversion movement. In retrospect Arakawa said:

...Ishigaki-jima was the place where I spent my childhood. So, (when he arrived) I became nostalgic. But I had in my mind mostly sorrow that I was miserably dispatched to this place which I had considered as my second hometown. I lost my motivation to work, and had spent a month without writing anything. One day the Headquarters (in Naha) suggested to write a report (about Ishigaki) once a week, one page. ...I thought this would be a chance to rediscover the meaning of my existence, not by writing about Ishigaki in relation to Okinawa (Naha) and Japan (Tokyo), but by writing about Ishigaki and its relation to further remote islands in the South....The piles of report, which was titled “Nantō Fudoki”, became a book 13 after the first report was published. Meanwhile, the people who convinced me when I hesitated to publish my works were Shimao (Toshio) and Miho.¹⁷³

The impact of the idea of Yaponesia on Arakawa and other young Okinawan people was extraordinary. Although some senior local intellectuals such as a novelist Ōshiro Tatsuhiro was critical of the junior local intellectuals because he thought they merely used a new idea proposed by the mainland Japanese, Arakawa and his fellow young Okinawan intellectuals believed in the potentiality within Yaponesia to reconstruct Okinawa’s critical regional imagination against the state-bounded, Tokyo-centered perspective on Japan. Arakawa argues that the criticality of this regional imagination enabled them to consider the Japanese archipelago from a “de-nationalised” (*datsu kokka*) perspective and understand it as

¹⁷³ Akira Arakawa, *Tōgō to Hangyaku* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2000), 94-95.

a creation of “three different cultural domains—‘Ezo’ (eastern and northern part of the archipelago), ‘Wa’ (the central part), and ‘the Arc of the Ryūkyūs’ (western and southern part)” by highlighting their affinities to the Pacific region.¹⁷⁴ For Arakawa as well as many other Okinawans who “internalized” (*naimen-ka*) the Tokyo-centered perspective and regarded themselves as marginalized people, Shimao and his geographical and cultural imagination were significant to not only decentralize the view on modern Japan but to enact diverse historical, cultural and social contexts on which the architecture of modern Japan was built.

3.7. *Ryūkyū-ko* as “Okinawan Identity”

The members of the Residents’ Movement of the Arc of the Ryūkyūs articulated Shimao’s idea of *Ryūkyū-ko* as a concept that represents the social identity of those who were struggling against ravages of their lives by development and pollution in various parts of Ryūkyū Islands. In other words, *Ryūkyū-ko* was a central concept for considering the meaning and context of the Okinawa struggle and “Okinawan identity” during the 1970s and the 1980s. As mentioned earlier, RMAR was actively involved to connect the residents’ movements from the northern islands such as Amami to southern islands such as Yaeyama. In retrospect, one of the key members, Arasaki Moriteru says:

We started using the concept of “the Residents’ Movement in the Arc of the Ryūkyūs” at a meeting in January 1976. At that time, we intended to make a network of residents’ movement within the cultural area of the Arc of Ryūkyū, which includes Edaku in Amami and Yaeyama...Around that period, some members such as Mr. Kinjō Asao proposed that

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 117.

the Okinawan agriculture, particularly that of Yaeyama, should learn not from Hawaii or Japan but from the South, such as the model of Taiwan, so they went to Taiwan.¹⁷⁵

Arasaki's account indicates that the meaning of "Okinawan identity" for RMAR was something different from a homogenous discourse of cultural distinctiveness or ethnic unity of Okinawa. Instead, their notion of *Ryūkyū-ko* represents the regionality of Okinawa struggle. It means that "Okinawan identity" is considered as a product of diverse social practices and networks of civic activism emerging from different locales within the Ryūkyū Islands. Also, the notion of regionality represents a form of "Okinawan identity" that is decentralized and network-based. By including local struggles in different parts of Okinawa, the concept of regionality introduced a new spatial sense to the notion of "Okinawan identity". This new concept of "Okinawan identity" was inspiring especially for those who conducted anti-pollution or anti-development campaigns in remote islands which had been regarded as periphery within Okinawa.¹⁷⁶

In 1993, the RMAR was transformed into a new society called the New Okinawa Forum (NOF, *Shin Okinawa Fōramu*). Built on the group's various activities over fifteen years, the founding members felt it imperative to start NOF with the aim to become not only the hub of the residents' movement but also a public forum for sharing and discussing issues related to the independence and self-determination of Okinawa, including possible collaboration with similar cultural and social movements around the globe.¹⁷⁷ Since then, their various public events and activities have been introduced through a journal called *Keishi*

¹⁷⁵ Arasaki et al., "Okinawa, Heiwa, Komonzu," in *Tamanoi Yoshiō Chosaku-shu Volume 3: Chiiki-shugi karano Shuppatsu*, ed. Kazuko Tsurumi and Moriteru Arasaki (Tokyo: Gakuyō Shobō, 1990), 294.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 295.

¹⁷⁷ For more detail of NOF, see: Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Dōjidaishi 1988-1990: Yawarakai Shakai wo Motomete* (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 2004), 175-176.

Kaji in which Okinawans and other citizens report on residents' movements from many different places inside and outside Okinawa including overseas countries.¹⁷⁸

The idea of *Ryūkyū-ko* also influenced the local intellectuals to support Okinawa's residents' movements. In 1988, celebrating thirty years since its establishment, one of Okinawa's earliest private universities, Okinawa University, founded the Institute of Regional Studies (IRS). For the university, whose motto is "rooted in, learning from, and living with the region", this institute was envisaged as the centre of research on the Okinawa region in terms of culture, history, and society. By using the word "regional", however, IRS did not intend to limit its research to the narrowly defined Okinawa Prefecture. The first Director of IRS, Ui Jun, an eminent scientist who is well-known as a founder of the study of pollution in the 1970s, defined two basic dimensions of the region that IRS would research: the Arc of the Ryukyus, and the broader Asia and Pacific Region.¹⁷⁹ Although KBPS and its activism were not able to stop the ravages caused by the government-led land development, the spirit of KBPS greatly influenced Okinawa's popular movements in which the activists started questioning what it means to be Okinawan within Japan.

3.8. Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed the development of the Okinawa struggle during the 1970s and 1980s. By highlighting the Kin Bay struggle, I analyzed the context of Okinawan residents' movement and its characteristics. As one of the earliest residents' struggle in post-reversion Okinawa, the Kin Bay struggle became a crucial event to consider the history of the Okinawa

¹⁷⁸ The name, *Keishi Kaji*, means "the wind blows backward after typhoon has passed" in the Okinawan language. The name also implies the spirit of this journal that it will always send a critical perspective (the wind) to the existing situation.

¹⁷⁹ Moriteru Arasaki, "Chiiki Kenkyūjo no Kanōsei wo Saguru," *Okinawa Daigaku Chiiki Kenkyūjo Nenpō* 18 (2004): 195.

struggle. Yet the significance of the Kin Bay struggle lay not only in its timing but also in its form of social activism. This movement was carried mainly by people who did not represent conventional activist organizations such as political parties and labor unions. Instead, distancing themselves from political organizations, these people joined the movement as individuals. As mentioned in the Introduction of this chapter, some local intellectuals interpreted the appearance of individuals as the beginning of civic activism in Okinawa.

Also, it is crucial that the Kin Bay struggle was rooted activism in a specific locale. Motivated by the protection of their living environment, concerned local residents and citizens from other parts of Okinawa raised the issues which were related to the destruction of a particular ecosystem. In this context, “the right to existence” was claimed by the activists, who questioned the legitimacy of the notions of developmentalism and industrialisation widely prevalent in formal political debate about Okinawa. In doing so, the participants in the Kin Bay struggle confronted a complex politics not only of the Japanese government, the mainland construction firms and multinational petroleum companies but also local Okinawan government and business. In such a complex political and social environment, the Kin Bay struggle carved out a space for civic activism which was independent from the local and national establishment. The importance of the Kin Bay struggle in the history of the Okinawa struggle is therefore the fact that it revealed the structure of the political and economic subordination of Okinawa under the influence of the major local, national and international political and economic powers, and created a basic form of civic activism to combat this structure.

In the latter part of this chapter, I discussed another aspect of the importance of the Kin Bay struggle by considering how the movement contributed to forming “Okinawan identity” in a post-reversion context. I examined the activity of the Residents’ Movement of the Arc of Ryūkyū, which was originally a group to promote external support for the Kin Bay

struggle. Founded by a group of scholars, journalists and other types of local intellectuals, RMAR played a crucial role to create the network between Kin Bay Protection Society and the residents' movements in other parts of Okinawa and Kagoshima prefectures which were similarly committed to anti-pollution campaigns. They were not only acting to connect different places but also framing those different local struggles with the notion of the region as the Arc of the Ryūkyūs. The idea of region that RMAR proposed by Arasaki and his colleagues was critical of notions of "Okinawan identity" in which the representation of Okinawa ignored peripheral societies (and places which are no longer considered part of Okinawa prefecture such as Amami) within the Ryūkyū Islands. It brought different dynamics when considering the meaning of "Okinawa", which was often considered in relation to mainland Japan.

Overall, the Kin Bay struggle and RMAR are crucial movements which contributed to building the basis of the Okinawa struggle in the post-reversion context. Although it became more difficult to mobilize a significant number of people to make the island-wide struggle post-reversion, the experience of the Kin Bay struggle is crucial for understanding more recent developments in the Okinawa struggle. Places such as Henoko and Takae which are central to the struggle today have taken up and further developed key concepts that emerged from the residents' movements of the 1970s. Also, the legacy of RMAR is still reflected in its successor organization, the New Okinawa Forum, and its publications such as *Keishi Kaji*. While discussing development of the Okinawa struggle in the 1990s, the next chapter will examine how Okinawa's base problems and the local anti-base movement became crucially connected to global issues. I will discuss this phenomenon by examining the intellectual and social involvement of three overseas scholars with the Okinawa struggle.

Chapter Four

Writing the “Okinawa struggle”



With two Australian visitors at Henoko Beach.
The photo was taken by the author in February 2012.

4.1. Introduction

Triggered by the rape of a twelve-year old schoolgirl by three US military personnel, the mass protest in 1995, which was joined by over 80,000 local citizens, not only swayed opinion in domestic Okinawan society, but also strongly reminded the rest of Japan about the fact that the Okinawan people's struggle against base politics and "structural discrimination" by Japanese and American governments had yet to end.¹⁸⁰ In this sense, as Abe Kosuzu argues, there was practically no "post WWII in Okinawa", but rather "Okinawa exists in continuation of the war."¹⁸¹ Following this protest, or "the third wave of the island-wide struggle", former progressive Governor of Okinawa, Ōta Masahide, announced that he had decided to refuse to sign the temporary land lease contract for the US bases in September 1995.¹⁸² The whole train of events expressed Okinawa's anger through explicitly adversarial action against the two national governments.

In response to the recurrence of the mass anti-base campaign in Okinawa, Japanese and US Governments established a joint committee called the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to discuss the future relocation of the American bases in Okinawa. In the final report, released in December 1996, Japanese and American leaders decided on the return of land and facilities currently used by the US military in Okinawa, including the return of half of the Northern Training Centre in the northeastern part of Okinawa Island, and the relocation of Futenma Airbase in Ginowan City.

¹⁸⁰ Moriteru Arasaki, *Arasaki Moriteru ga Toku Kōzōteki Okinawa Sabetsu* (Tokyo: Kobunken, 2012).

¹⁸¹ Kosuzu Abe, "'Sengo'" ga Mitsukaranai," *Shunju*, 521 (August 2010): 12–14.

¹⁸² Based on Special Measures Law for US Military Bases enacted in 1952, the Japanese government leased the private lands to the US military in Okinawa without agreement of the land owners. This special measure allowed the Governor of Okinawa to sign the contract instead of each owner. However, the contract was supposed to be renewed first every ten years. In 1996, when the contract needed to be renewed, then Governor Ōta Masahide refused to sign the contract with Japanese government.

However, this final decision was a new beginning of the Okinawa struggle. In the final SACO report, the Japanese and US governments identified the eastern offshore of Nago City, Okinawa Island, as the place to build an aircraft landing zone to offset the closure of Futenma Airbase. In response to this announcement, in September 1997, Nago citizens, together with anti-base citizen groups outside the city, conducted a petition demanding the holding of a referendum by which Nago citizens would make their voices heard. As a result of this petition, a referendum was held, which ended with victory going to the opponents to the base relocation. However, in 1998, ignoring the result of the Nago city referendum, the new Governor of Okinawa, Inamine Keiichi, selected Henoko Village in Nago City, a small fishing village in the middle-eastern part of Okinawa, as the site of the new base. In this village, there was already a US Marine Base, Camp Schwab, established in 1959. Japanese and the US defense authorities came to an agreement to build the aircraft landing zone by extending Camp Schwab towards Oura Bay. This was supposed to be part of a policy to “reduce Okinawa’s burden.” (*Okinawa no futan keigen no tame*)

Inspired by these historical incidents, a new generation of scholars began to conduct creative research on the contemporary nature of the Okinawa struggle. These scholars were influenced by senior academics inside and outside Japan who similarly attempted to deconstruct the dominant discourse of Japaneseness and its monolithic ideological narratives on its culture and history. Moreover, these younger scholars developed a critical approach to Japan’s past and present by articulating the histories and social practices of marginalized subjects such as Okinawans. In this way their research on Okinawa opened up new ways to reveal plural social identities within the Okinawan anti-base movement.¹⁸³

¹⁸³ The following references are limited but cover the essential works to consider critical engagement with Japanese studies in which the research on Okinawa was to become one of the crucial topics: Carol Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); Gavan

In this chapter I will discuss several different intellectual discourses that emerged around this period, and will go on to consider how these researchers articulated diverse social identities within the local anti-base struggle. Highlighting the impact of New Social Movements Theory (NSMT) as their primary contribution to the development of the field, I argue that by synthesizing research on Okinawan anti-base movement with NSMT, they re-situated the research on the movement in the context of so-called late modernity. In this chapter, I will examine three scholars and their discussion of the Okinawan anti-base movement in order to clarify changes as well as continuities in Okinawan studies internationally.

The three scholars whose work I will examine are: Japanese American anthropologist, Masamichi S. Inoue based in Kentucky, Australian-based scholar on gender and International Relations, Miyume Tanji, and American scholar on critical international and comparative studies, Kelly Dietz in Ithaca, NY. Based in different disciplines, locations, and personal contexts, their research makes distinctive and also path-breaking contributions to understanding the dynamic political culture of the Okinawan anti-base movement. Prior to the emergence of this research, the major approaches among overseas scholars to Okinawa's base politics largely relied upon analyses of established politics in fields such as diplomacy, defence and military. For example, one of the earliest responses to the rise of the third wave from outside Okinawa and Japan was a book edited by Chalmers Johnson and entitled *Okinawa: Cold War Island* published in 1999.¹⁸⁴ In this volume, eminent scholars from both inside and outside Okinawa such as former governor Ōta Masahide, US-based Ryūkyūan-Okinawan scholar, Kōji Taira, along with historian of Japan Gavan McCormack and others

McCormack and Yoshio Sugimoto, ed. *Democracy in Contemporary Japan* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1986); Donald Denoon et al. *Multicultural Japan: Palaeolithic to Postmodern* (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

¹⁸⁴ Chalmers A. Johnson, *Okinawa: Cold War Island* (Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research Inst, 1999).

provide comprehensive structural analyses of Okinawa facing Japan and the US in the late 1990s.

This is one of the earliest collections of non-Japanese language essays on the contemporary Okinawan struggle vis-à-vis its surrounding major powers. Also, this book was important in the way in which it emphasizes not only how the US–Japan alliance dominates Okinawa and subordinates local life, but also how Okinawans resist the dominant structure. However, the book does not focus directly on the cultural dynamics of the grassroots politics. The Okinawan anti-base struggle is presented in terms of the dichotomous narrative of the US–Japan alliance as subordinating subject and Okinawa as subordinated object. This approach overlooks some complex strands within Okinawa’s resistance against its structural subordination.¹⁸⁵ In other words, we need to look more closely at questions such as “who” represents “what aspect” of “Okinawa” as a “community of protest”.

By contrast, the new generation of scholars sought to introduce concepts such as social identities within the local protest movement. This enabled them to develop insights on the Okinawa struggle by highlighting more complex and subtle aspects of the movement. In order to examine subjective voices from Okinawa, these younger scholars addressed Okinawa’s cultural politics, not by taking Okinawan identity as a given, but rather by seeking how that identity is formed in the process of the anti-base struggle.

This new methodology, which I call the New Social Movement Theory based (NSMT-based) approach, is crucial not only because it unveiled the complexity of cultural politics within the anti-base movement, but also because it elucidated how system, structure and power operate in complex ways to subordinate Okinawa. Gender, civic and ethnic identities are central to these complex power-relations in everyday life. The notion of NSMT

¹⁸⁵ I do not intend to criticise what I call the “earlier generations”. I rather use the term to distinguish later generations and their approach from previous generations.

encompasses a diverse range of approaches. In its early stages, scholars such as Alain Touraine and his disciples such as Alberto Melucci highlighted the necessity to change our view in order to understand social movements, which were then facing diversification of social structure and changing mode of production since the 1960s, and particularly during the first half of the 1970s. The advocates of NSMT presented the dissolution of class conflict in the classical sense as the major driving force of social dynamics. Instead, they emphasized the significance of individualized forms of identity and a diverse range of social practices in order to re-formulate understandings of collectivity. A series of significant new social movements arose during the 1960s, including ecological movements, peace movements, anti-colonialism, anti-racism and feminism: all sorts of social activism that could not be reductively understood using the existing interpretation of social movements as class struggle.¹⁸⁶

NSMT has become a major paradigm for understanding the contemporary nature of social movements by focusing on actors and their identity and social practices. Particularly, the concept of *experience* has come to be one of the crucial concepts for understanding the ways in which individuals organize collective action. This is discussed recently by theorists such as François Dubet and Kevin McDonald. Dubet, for example, emphasizes the emerging sense of collective identity which is derived from one's embedded experience. Dubet argues that the society can no longer be imagined on the basis of a pre-existing collective identity, and therefore we need to analyze how collective identity is the outcome of diverse individual experiences.¹⁸⁷ Thus, for Dubet, experience is the central issue of his methodology. From this perspective, social movements are created by the dynamics of individuality and culture.

¹⁸⁶ Alain Touraine, *The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

¹⁸⁷ François Dubet, *Sociologie de l'expérience* (Paris: Fayard, 1994). Trans. By Masayuki Yamashita, Eiji Hamanishi, and Jirō Morita. 2011. *Keiken no Shakaigaku* (Tokyo: Shinsensha, 2011).

McDonald casts light on the same issue from a different viewpoint, putting more emphasis on the significance of the body. The body, in his theory, is not only the site of experience of a single person, but is the site of experience shared with others through communicative action.

¹⁸⁸ Therefore, from the perspective of NSMT, the concept of experience emerges from the interactions of embodied individual and collectivity.

Similar approaches to identity are evident in the work of Inoue, Tanji and Dietz, who conducted a close examination of social activism in relation to everyday local life. The generation of Okinawa researchers to be discussed here depicted how a diverse range of key issues such as gender, ethnicity, citizenship, community, natural environment, and the diverse experiences of individual participants, are crucial aspects to understanding the cultural politics of Okinawan activism.¹⁸⁹ While the classical notion of the Okinawa struggle tends to reconfirm the “myth of a unified struggle of ‘Okinawans’”, the scholars I discuss here shed light on the subjecthood and agency of the actors involved based on an ethnography of people’s grassroots struggles.¹⁹⁰ In other words, these scholars attempt to explore the construction of the generic notion of the Okinawa struggle by highlighting micro politics, addressing multiple identities, rather than simply identity as “Okinawan”. When the third wave arose in the mid-1990s, it was that complex agency and identity that galvanised a new chapter of the Okinawan anti-base struggle. What are the common characteristics of this NSMT-based approach among the four scholars? What are the crucial achievements of the NSMT-based approach? Also, what are the limits of this approach, and what implications can we draw from the achievements and limits of the NSMT-approach?

¹⁸⁸ Kevin McDonald, “Oneself as Another: From Social Movement to Experience Movement,” *Current Sociology* 52, no. 4 (7 January 2004): 575–93.

¹⁸⁹ One of the earliest volumes in which those young generations of researchers examine the subjectivity of Okinawa is a book edited by Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle, *Japan and Okinawa: Structure and Subjectivity* (London: Routledge, 2002); Laura Hein and Mark Selden, *Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power* (Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003).

¹⁹⁰ Miyume Tanji, *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa*, 37.

In order to answer these questions, first of all, I will review discussions by Japanese-American scholar, Masamichi S. Inoue. By illuminating the role of citizens (*shimin*) as key actors, Inoue analyzes what he calls “a different kind” of Okinawa struggle in contemporary grassroots movements. Secondly, I will analyze the work of Japanese-Australian researcher, Miyume Tanji, who discusses the rise of feminism. While Inoue is partially inspired by the idea of the public sphere, drawing on the ideas of Jürgen Habermas, Tanji’s work on feminism highlights how women have been playing a key role in the recent development of the people’s movement in Okinawa. Although she does not refer to Nancy Fraser’s criticism of Habermas’ conceptualization of the public sphere, Tanji’s pioneering works on feminism can be interpreted as critique of Inoue’s concept of citizen.¹⁹¹ Her work entrenches different meanings in the discourse of Okinawa struggle. Thirdly, I will refer to American scholar on critical international and comparative studies, Kelly Dietz and her discussion on indigenism in the Okinawan anti-base movement. Having worked with local civic activist groups both in Okinawa and in mainland Japan, Dietz explores the discursive limits of the concept of citizen in analyzing the contemporary anti-base movement. She focuses on discourse and people’s practice of collective identity and autonomism/self-determination within the Okinawan anti-base movement. Based on an understanding of Okinawa as an “internal colony” of Japan, she finds that the concept of citizen is not necessarily an empowering one in the Okinawan context; it can create difficulties for the movement. She argues that the concept of citizen constrains Okinawans’ political position within Japanese constitutionalism. Instead, Dietz raises the significance of indigenous identity as an alternative element in “Okinawan autonomism”.

¹⁹¹ Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A contribution to critique of actually existing democracy," *Social Text* 25/26 (1990)

4.2. Masamichi S. Inoue and the Okinawa Struggle as a Civic Movement

4.2.1: Questions of “Japaneseness” in Japanese Studies at the Turn of the Century

Masamichi S. Inoue graduated from Tōhoku University in Sendai, in the late 1980s. Having worked in the public sector in Japan for several years, he went to the United States to study at the University of Pennsylvania in the early 1990s. After he finished his master program, he went on to study anthropology at Duke University.¹⁹² He studied with scholars such as Anne Allison, who is known for her works on the anthropology of Japanese post-industrial society, particularly on youth culture, and Arif Dirlik, historian of modern China who is also widely known for his involvement with postcolonial historiography. He regards his cross-cultural experience as an essential starting point of his later academic career. Like many who study outside their countries of birth, Inoue often found that he was asked to perform his own national cultural characteristics as “Japanese” in front of an “American” audience. In other words, he “learnt” how to be and perform as a “Japanese”.¹⁹³ However, he also felt the awkwardness of his representation as a Japanese fulfilling the stereotypes possessed by his American interlocutors: something he had not been conscious of prior to his overseas experience. This feeling of awkwardness between calling subject and responding subject as “a native Japanese” should not be dismissed in understanding Inoue’s perspective and analysis of the Okinawan struggle.¹⁹⁴

This experience was a crucial starting point of Inoue’s critical engagement with his academic disciplines—anthropology and Japanese studies—where, he argues, “native” intellectuals tended to create “domesticated” and “neutralised” representations of “Japanese”

¹⁹² Masamichi Inoue, "'Japan' as Asylum: A New Possibility of Native Anthropology," *The Contemporary American Studies Consortium of Japan* (Tokyo: Tokyo American Center, 24 June 2013).

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

that “exaggerate the familiar aspects of the text and thereby disperse its discreteness in the hegemonic sphere” of the United States, thus becoming complicit with Japan’s institutional promotion of particular national characteristics in those periods, as Masao Miyoshi argues.¹⁹⁵

The late 1980s and 1990s constituted the first significant period in which a series of self-critical examinations took place within Japanese studies. There were already researchers conducting critical inquiries of Japan in the post-World War II and emphasizing the Japanese continuing imperialistic legacy.¹⁹⁶ But the rise of this new stream of critical reflection was inspired by a different intellectual context. Scholars working in Japanese studies began to introduce the semiotic approach developed in disciplines such as literary criticism and later influenced by anthropology and history studies, in order to conduct discourse analysis of texts. Discourse analysis was also applied to examining symbolic representations of social and cultural realities of Japan. Incorporating concepts such as Hayden White’s “meta-history”, the semiotic approach to Japanese historical and social studies not only elevated the significance of cultural inquiry and interpretation of local material culture but transformed notions of Japanese “culture” into a problematic topic that required further examination.¹⁹⁷ The result was an intellectual movement in which researchers challenged cultural discourses of Japan, presenting material and cultural discourse as symbols and signs imbued with power relationships. This was the intellectual milieu in which Inoue began his academic career. Experiencing methodological changes and challenges in Japanese studies at the turn of the century, Inoue visited Okinawa, which he regards as “somewhere neither inside nor

¹⁹⁵ Masao Miyoshi, *Off Center: Power and Culture Relations Between Japan and the United States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 9.

¹⁹⁶ See, for example, Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack, *Japanese Imperialism Today: Co-Prosperity in Greater East Asia* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973).

¹⁹⁷ See, for example, Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths*; Harry D. Harootunian, *Things Seen and Unseen: Discourse and Ideology in Tokugawa Nativism* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Masao Miyoshi and Harry D. Harootunian (eds.) *Postmodernism and Japan* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989).

outside”.¹⁹⁸ For him, far from Tokyo and the rest of mainland Japan, Okinawa was a crucial place to consider what it means to study Japan and to be a Japanese in a globalized world.

4.2.2. The Okinawa Struggle as “Civic” Movement

Ever since his first visit to Okinawa in 1996, Inoue visited the Okinawa Island every summer until 2002. When he first arrived, Okinawa was still in the middle of escalated political antagonism against Tokyo and Washington over the issues of the rape case a year before and the revision of lease contracts on privately own lands used by US bases. The next summer in 1997, Inoue began to conduct an ethnography of the anti-base movement based in Henoko, which emerged as the designated site for the relocation of Futenma Airbase. According to the final report of Special Action Committee of Okinawa released by Tokyo and Washington in 1996, both governments agreed with construction of off-shore bases in Ōura Bay in Henoko district. This was the beginning of the Okinawan people’s long-term struggle against the relocation of the base which continues today, and also of Inoue’s involvement with the local community as a researcher.

Like other “base towns” in Okinawa and elsewhere, the small fishing village of Henoko had experienced a prosperous period. However, by the time Inoue arrived in 1997, this had passed. He writes:

...I drove into the Henoko district for the first time on a hot summer day in July 1997.

Slowly moving forward, I saw bars and restaurants, run-down and long deserted, whose faded and peeling signs identified them in English as: “ALL THE WAY,” “LIBERTY,”

¹⁹⁸ Masamichi Inoue, "Mainichi ga Firudo Wāku: Yanbaru to watashi," *Keishi Kaji* 36 (Naha: Shin Okinawa Fōramu, September 2002), 39.

“QUEEN” and so forth. Along the street, storefronts that had once contained a photo studio, an electric shop, a pawnshop, a barbershop, and a tailor shop stood shuttered; apparently they had gone out of business some time ago. These were the remnants of what had been the time of Henoko’s prosperity—during the Vietnam War period, this community had been a bustling and lively venue providing “recreation” and “entertainment” to the U.S. servicemen of Camp Schwab.¹⁹⁹

By describing the past prosperity of Henoko as a base town, he also illustrates scenes and sites where everyday conversation took place among the residents. Inoue also describes a “prefabricated structure just off the Henoko beach”. This was the building for the protest community organised mainly by “relatively affluent” residents of this district.²⁰⁰ His narrative shows how the protest community is embedded in the life of the locals. In contrast with images and discourses circulating in the media that depict Okinawa as a “community of protest”, Inoue illustrates many different facets of this small community that are not merely reduced to social activism. In other words, his depiction of the protest community in relation to everyday life complicates the subject of the protest movement called the Henoko struggle (or *Henoko Tōsō* in Japanese). This complication relates to a major theme of his argument—the recognition of the existence of “Okinawans... of a different kind”.²⁰¹

Originally, the expression, “we are Okinawans but of a different kind”, was used by local Henoko residents who supported accepting the construction plan of the military base—later called Camp Schwab—by the US Civil Administration of Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) in the 1950s. To be more precise, this expression was used in order to express opposition to

¹⁹⁹ Masamichi S. Inoue, *Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization* (Columbia University Press, 2007), 14.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 17.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 17-18.

those who criticized Henoko residents for their decision to accept the military base. Henoko residents were regarded as “traitors” by other Okinawans who were involved with resistance against the base construction. The anti-base protesters expressed their identity in terms of resistance by claiming “we are Okinawan.” However, the fishing town of Henoko was devastated by the war and postwar land appropriation. In this isolated environment, like many other base towns, the majority of the local residents chose to accept the base construction to improve the living standard in their town. “We are Okinawan but of a different kind” was the retort addressed to protesters and their slogan “we are Okinawans”. In other words, this statement reflects the historical context of a local marginal community of Okinawa. However, Inoue’s notion of a “different kind of Okinawans” explains not merely the mind-set of residents who struggle with economic problems. Rather, in Inoue’s approach, this complication of Henoko’s identity by articulating a “different kind” of Okinawan-ness highlights the complex realities interweaving political, social and economic concerns including issues such as generation and gender. Based on this idea of the complex nature of the local anti-base movement, Inoue considers it important to explore the “micro-political practices” of Okinawan people “who actively and unexpectedly borrow, engage, and redefine—in short, ‘appropriate’—the national and global power (the base, money, and U.S. servicemen) to produce specific local cultural forms and social practices.”²⁰²

This is the central point of Inoue’s approach, which tries to avoid the classical adversarial formula of “subordinated” Okinawan and “subordinating” Japan and US. By regarding the conventional academic approach to the anti-base movement as a dialectic “game” of “Self and Other”, Inoue argues that researchers tend to oversimplify narratives of people’s local struggles against such global mechanisms as the US military bases. Inoue argues that this dialectic relationship of “Self” and “Other” is a perspective at “a level of

²⁰² Inoue, *Okinawa and the U.S. Military*, 22.

generality at which historical, geographical, class, race, and other specificities and differences tend to disappear.”²⁰³ His complication of Okinawan identities in the anti-base struggle seeks to escape from the dominant form of dichotomous narrative.

Based on this mixed consciousness, Inoue raises the notion of “the third person” who does not belong to the “game”. Quoting Immanuel Levinas and his critique of love as “the negation of [plural] society” when it is employed in relation to a bilateral relationship,²⁰⁴ Inoue considers his conception of the third person as an alternative way to describe the hybridized political consciousness of Henoko residents—and also Okinawans as a whole. As an example of this notion of the third person, Inoue proposes the notion of citizen, or *shimin* in Japanese, as a new kind of identity of the Okinawan anti-base movement. Differentiated from older notions such as people or *minshu*, the citizen or *shimin* (as the term is deployed by Inoue), is characterized as “affluent, confident, and planetary yet grounded”. Inoue uses this term to describe new social actors during and after the 1990s or “the post-cold-war era of globalization”.²⁰⁵ These new actors, the *shimin*, create a public sphere, which is “an open, inclusive, and nonviolent realm of solidarity that emerges from among diverse perspectives of the third persons, a realm characterized by unrestrictedness with respect to who can participate, who can speak, and who can be heard”.²⁰⁶ This does not mean, however, that Inoue merely intends to disavow the legacy of the previous form of the Okinawa struggle. Rather, he suggests an extensive perspective on “Okinawans” to include nonconventional social actors and issues in the light of socio-economic concerns which tended to be less visible within the mainstream narrative.

²⁰³ Ibid., 25.

²⁰⁴ Emmanuel Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht, Netherlands: M. Nijhoff, 1987), 20, cited in Inoue, *Okinawa and the U.S. Military*, 26.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 63.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 27-28.

This conception of citizens as “confident and affluent” subjects from “diverse backgrounds” who “awakened to globally disseminated ideas about democracy, human rights, ecology, women’s issues, and peace”, helps us to understand the significance of the Okinawa struggle as civil activism, such as the mass protest in 1995 and the Nago Referendum (or so-called Nago Shimin Tōhyō) in September 1997.²⁰⁷ In the wake of the protest against the rape incident, the Nago Referendum was the first referendum by citizens in recent years in Nago City, to which Henoko district belongs, over the issue of off-shore base construction. As a result of the political campaign for the Nago city referendum, opposition to the new base construction acquired a majority.²⁰⁸ By raising and articulating agendas such as environmental damage, and also by incorporating new actors such as youths and women who were excluded from the mainstream of the anti-base movement, the Nago Referendum symbolically opened a new page in the contemporary history of Okinawan people’s anti-base movements. In Inoue’s understanding, collaboration by citizens from diverse backgrounds in terms of generation, gender, and occupation, was possible due to “the desire for a life and a world without the military.”²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ Ibid.: 208.

²⁰⁸ For more detail of the 1997 Nago referendum, see, *ibid.*: 156-186.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*: 181.

4.2.3. Beyond “Here” and “There” or Citizen as Positionality

How can we understand Inoue’s complication of contemporary Okinawan identity? This is not a simple question. As an ethnographer of Okinawa’s anti-base movement, Inoue was conducting participatory observation in Henoko. He was involved with the anti-base movement as an interpreter from Japanese to English and vice-versa. However, he also went to talk with diverse residents including those who supported the base construction, Filipino hostesses working at local bars, and US soldiers in Camp Schwab. These activities made local Okinawan protesters suspicious about Inoue. Thus, he was confronted with “ethical” questions from the local residents such as “who are you?” and “aren’t you a spy for supporters of base construction?” Also, he was criticised by participants of the protest campaign who told him “you are cheating us because you don’t come with us when we are busy.”²¹⁰ Recalling the days in Henoko, he says that the place “imposes tension” onto the fieldworker to feel that “it is a very difficult place to be.” He also says when he approached pro-base people, he himself doubted whether this “betrays protesting people or not” and whether he had “collected convenient information from protesters and supporters of the base construction for his own sake.”²¹¹

Another factor which made Inoue feel uncomfortable when he approached the local Henoko community was his identity as “mainlander” Japanese. Despite the fact that the locals are in most cases friendly and supportive towards an outsider such as Inoue, this historical category created an unavoidable situation of incongruence between Inoue and the locals in Henoko. Recalling a conversation with elderly women, he writes:

²¹⁰ Masamichi Inoue, “Mainichi ga Firudo Waaku: Yanbaru to watashi,” 38.

²¹¹ Ibid., 38-39.

They talked about their worsening health, their children and grandchildren, and about me—urging me to find a wife in Henoko. Our conversation turned to Henoko’s past, then eventually to the battle of Okinawa...Another woman talked about how Japanese soldiers had treated her family members as spies of the U.S. military. In the middle of this, one of the women turned to me and asked, “Do you know what kinds of things your fathers [the Japanese] did in and to Okinawa?” The sense of intimacy the conversation had built disappeared at once, and was replaced by an unbridgeable distance between the women—Okinawans—and me—a Japanese. I even felt like I should apologize on behalf of the Japanese state. Yet at the same time, I resented this woman’s construction of me simply as “the Japanese,” the outsider.²¹²

This conversation with local elderly women explicitly shows the discomfort that Inoue experienced. He writes:

...I had to be silent in the fragmented and dismayed feeling that I felt: on the one hand “I am not the same as such horrible Japanese. Don’t mix me up with such Japanese” but on the other hand “I was raised to be a Japanese in such postwar Japanese society.”²¹³

In my own interpretation, however, this conversation implicitly shows more complicated aspects of Inoue’s positionality in his ethnography of the social life of Henoko (or of Okinawa in general) as not only “a Japanese” and “outsider” but also as “young” “male” person who came to the small rural community of Henoko from the United States. Such

²¹² Inoue, *Okinawa and the U.S. Military*, 222-223.

²¹³ Masamichi Inoue, “Gurōbaruka no Naka no ‘Okinawa inishiatibu’ Ronsō: Kioku, aidentitī, kichimondai,” *Shisō* 933 (2002): 261.

categories surely pose ethical questions to not only Inoue but also to most ethnographers of various races, ethnicities, and nationalities in the highly sensitive (and extremely dense) atmosphere of the anti-base movement. In this sense, Inoue was right to say the place imposes tension onto him and thus, it is a difficult place to be. While communicating with both sides of politics, Inoue increasingly finds it difficult to move between the two camps of “pro” and “anti” base construction.

Nevertheless, it is also important to highlight that he later realizes that this “difficulty” is what many of Henoko’s residents experience in their everyday life. He describes how, as an “outsider” he came to understand the “depth of Okinawa’s ‘domestic’ difficulty torn by opposition and endorsement, and integrity and diversity”.²¹⁴ In other words, the challenges of two adversarial identities which he experienced made him understand the complex identity that Okinawa residents, in particular, Henoko residents, face in everyday life. Through this realization of the complex nature of the local reality, Inoue departs from the conventional approach of Okinawan studies by un-placing Okinawa and re-placing it in relation to wider social processes that are embedded in the global context. This is what he calls a “position in neither inside nor outside (*naibu demo gaibu demo nai yō na ichi*)”, or the perspective of “the third person” which is not merely constrained by the game of self and other but goes further by finding more plural social spaces within the local anti-base struggle.”²¹⁵ By raising this perspective, Inoue discusses the importance of questioning the “position(s)” of the researcher in the Okinawan anti-base movement. Through this discourse of “position(s)” —teasing out complex identities of anti-base movement—Inoue himself and Okinawa as a place come to find a point of connection with the broader public sphere.

²¹⁴ Masamichi Inoue, “Masamichi, Mainichi ga Firudo waaku: Yanbaru to watashi,” 39.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 39.

Inoue's theoretical elaboration can be criticised in relation to its practicality in the actual field of the Okinawan anti-base movement. This is not the kind of research which reveals previously unknown details of the US policy towards Okinawa or Japan. Nor is his discourse giving us a radical voice from within Okinawa. On the contrary, what it reveals is the uncomfortable position of a peripheral community in Okinawa where financial issues and the desire for a better life tear the community apart. However, his work illuminates the experiences of many people who have been involved in the anti-base movement from the 1990s onwards with lesser degrees of traditional activist mentality. Those are the "silent majority" of base politics.

As a Japanese-born American scholar who was trained "within the critical tradition of cultural anthropology" of his home university, in which his mentors were "radically problematizing nation-bound research paradigms that ignored transnational movements of people, goods, capital, and information," Inoue chose to engage with the U.S. base problems in Okinawa for his topic. He never rejects anthropology as his academic discipline. However, he is involved not only in understanding the other, "but also negotiating and re-crafting the anthropologist's own identity in the contexts of changing relations of power and history that produce this Other."²¹⁶ In this sense, he used the disciplinary theory of anthropology to explore a form of agency that is neither "Japanese", "Okinawan", nor "native", but a "citizen" agency in the context of a globalized Okinawa. This inter-play of Inoue and anthropology (or Japanese native and university discipline) as one axis and Okinawa and US–Japan as another axis forged a new pathway to consider how and where we can engage with Okinawa in everyday life.

²¹⁶ Inoue, *Okinawa and the U.S. Military*, 222.

4.2.4. Between Local and Global: A regional perspective

Inoue's methodological contribution was path-breaking for those who study Okinawa from "outside". While Okinawa's politics and political culture tend to be discussed in relation to Japan and the United States, the researcher's positionality and his or her perspective also tend to be considered in the power relations between Okinawa and Japanese and American.

Inoue's positionality as a Japanese who is also culturally minoritized in the US made him critical of homogenous notions of culture and identity in the globalized world. Based on this context, he studied the Okinawa struggle by highlighting differences within Okinawa's anti-base struggle by which he showed the citizens as possessing agency to create the Okinawa struggle. However, his concept of citizens pays little attention to the spatial aspect of globalization and the Okinawa struggle. As I discuss in detail later in Chapters 7 and 8, if we consider Okinawa's issue from this perspective, it is evident that the Okinawa struggle is becoming a regional issue, as well as local and global one, from the late 1990s. There is an emerging sense of regional identity that became prevalent among some local Okinawans. Although Inoue's concept of "the third person" is useful to discuss the agency of the Okinawa struggle, the regional perspective may help us understand the creativity of the human agents and their activities from the spatial perspective.

As a researcher whose ethnic background originated from Korean and mainland Japanese, I had a different positionality from Inoue who situated himself among Okinawa, Japan and the US. Although I share much in common with Inoue in terms of experience as a Japanese scholar coming from mainland Japan, I was perceived as a "mixed" one whose maternal side also experienced the crucible of Japan's colonialism like Okinawans. In this realm of identity politics, my presence confused my interviewees because I was "a mainland Japanese but of a different kind". When someone introduced me to his or her friends, they mostly add "his mother is Korean" after they mentioned my very Japanese-style name.

Sometimes, they asked me about my mother's original surname and started calling me "Mr Yang" instead of Takahashi. This unfamiliar name strongly reminds me of two different historical experiences of Japanese colonialism embodied in my flesh. But what struck me most was the agency that enables the Okinawa struggle to situate itself within historical relationships not only between the Japan–Okinawa and the US–Okinawa relationships but also between Okinawa–East Asia, which share many similar historical experiences with each other under Japanese influence before 1945. The eminent local historian, Higa Shunchō, famously called Okinawa "as the eldest, Taiwan as the second, and Korea as the third son of the Japanese Empire."

As I elaborate in Chapter 7, Okinawans' perspectives on their historical relationships with East Asian countries are not simple. Rather, the ambiguity of the local historical consciousness reflects a deep sense of Japanese colonialism within Okinawa towards their regional neighbors. As Okinawans, it is true that they were inhabitants of one of the earliest territories which was forcefully incorporated by mainland modern Japan in the late 19th century. However, Okinawans were not quite the same as the locals in other territories which were annexed by Japan in later periods. Administratively, Okinawa was not considered as Japan's colony, and Okinawans were not the colonized subjects but they were "Japanese". Therefore, it is not always the case that Okinawans' regional perspective is shared with their interlocutors in the region. Nevertheless, as Heonik Kwon argues, if "the analytical integration of issues in international politics with forms of local politics interaction is an issue that is widely discussed today in international studies circles", and the local communal life can be considered "as important and instructive as the newly discovered archival sources on diplomatic history", the historical consciousness of the local Okinawan activists on their

regional relationship also provides us with a clue to illustrate a different identity of the Okinawa struggle to what is revealed in Inoue's analysis.²¹⁷

What my "mixed" presence and the local historical consciousness towards East Asian neighbors made me realize was the concept of region as critical reflection towards the self-image of Okinawanness. Indeed, the historical narrative of Okinawa's modern experience and its historical relationships with Japan and the US can be critical towards the orthodox international politics led by state elites. However, by referring to the unfilled gap between postcolonial critique and the Cold War, Kwon argues that this "native's point of view" can also be a weakness because it tends to be oblivious when the issues come to the political economy of representation of "the natives".²¹⁸ In the case of Okinawan activists, the critical point about the region or East Asia in relation to Okinawan identity is that it not only reveals the ambiguous identity of the locals as Okinawan and Japanese but it also reminds them of the direct or indirect involvement with the politics that determine hierarchical relationships between Okinawans as Japanese and the regional neighbors as the colonial subjects. This critical historical consciousness towards East Asia is a matter that local Okinawans deal with as their own past. As I discuss in more detail later, this also became a crucial engine for local activism in order to create the transnational anti-base struggle between Okinawa and South Korea from the 1990s. In this context, the concept of the region highlights agency or citizens and their creative activities within the Okinawa struggle.

²¹⁷ Heonik Kwon, "Writing an International History from a Village Ethnography," paper presented at the Association of Social Anthropologists, London, 2008, 2.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 24.

4.3. Miyume Tanji and the Rise of Feminism

4.3.1. Feminism, Individuality, and Social Practice

Around the same period when Inoue conducted his fieldwork in Henoko, another scholar also visited Okinawa from overseas to conduct a study on grassroots movements. Miyume Tanji is a Japanese-Australian researcher who was based in Murdoch University in Western Australia. Born and raised at the other end of the Japanese Archipelago, in Hokkaido, Tanji studied International Law and Politics at Sophia University in Tokyo. After graduating from Sophia, she moved to Australia for postgraduate study. Her PhD thesis was later turned into a book titled *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa* published by Routledge in 2006.

Just as Inoue examines Okinawan identity in terms of diversity of actors, Tanji also raises questions about the prevailing notion of Okinawans as a community collectively protesting against US bases. She writes:

On my first visit to Okinawa, I could not find an umbrella organization encompassing the whole of the locals' anti-US military protest... it was also difficult to trace evidence of an "Okinawans' movement" committed to political action to demand secession from Japan. Rather, my impression was that the local activists tended to accept, and even appeared proud of, the chaotic complexion of organizations engaged in protest.²¹⁹

This complexity of Okinawan activism in everyday life led her to re-examine existing studies of "the US, Japan and Okinawa relationships", because she argues that they tend to overlook

²¹⁹ Tanji, *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa*, 4.

“differences within the Okinawan protest community”.²²⁰ Citing a document from JPRI (Japan Policy Research Institute) in San Francisco, which is one of the most highly regarded academic institutes over Japan politics and economy, she critically points out that some notable scholars within the field employ a homogeneous notion of Okinawan protesters as if this represents all Okinawan’s political opinions without examining its internal complexity.²²¹ Referring to Australian anthropologist of Okinawa Mathew Allen, who also investigated the complexity of domestic cultural contexts,²²² Tanji seeks to distinguish the way in which the local Okinawans use the term “Okinawa” in a generic sense from the way in which scholars use “Okinawa” in their academic work, and to point out Okinawa’s diversity of subjects.²²³

Nevertheless, while both Inoue and Tanji agree in complicating the notion of Okinawans as critical subjects of the anti-base movement, their approaches take different directions. Compared with Inoue’s study, which proposes “citizen” as a new concept that encapsulates Okinawan critical subjects, Tanji tries to find individualized or individualizing factors within diversity. In her research this individualizing element was the rise of feminism in the Okinawan anti-base movement. Through ethnographic research, talking one-to-one with those involved in the movement, Tanji gradually comes to identify the so-called “Okinawa struggle” as a mythical form of collective identity, which is constructed by the participation of diverse individual social actors. Based on this assumption, Tanji tries to differentiate the elements of feminism in the movement from the conventional narrative of the Okinawan people’s history of struggle. In other words, she seeks to illuminate the role of women not merely as participating in but as spearheading the contemporary context of the Okinawan anti-base movement. She finds the significance of feminism in the context of the

²²⁰ Ibid.: 4-5.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Matthew Allen, *Identity and Resistance in Okinawa* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).

²²³ Tanji, *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa*, 5.

mass protests of the 1990s. When the rape incident occurred, it was Okinawan female activists who made an immediate response to the US, Japan and the rest of the world. A number of them had just returned from the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 in Beijing. Like many other scholars of similar generations studying the Okinawan anti-base movement, Tanji was also one of those who were inspired by this historical moment.

Notwithstanding the differences of Inoue and Tanji's approaches to the Okinawan anti-base movement, key notions in Tanji's work, such as diversity and individuality, are also based on New Social Movement Theory. Highlighting the fact that Okinawan society has an increasingly 'new middle class' culture, she argues:

In Okinawa, during the first—and second—"wave" of postwar mass protest, major concerns driving collective action were directly connected to 'materialist' demands, such as land repatriation and base workers' working conditions. American rule was easily identified as the source of Okinawa's impoverishment. However, reversion to Japan changed this. Since reversion, the Japanese government has provided material benefits to supporters of US military presence in Okinawa. On the other hand, the focus of protest against structural economic dependence today relates to fears of pollution, hazards such as noise and militarism...²²⁴

Her writings suggests the applicability of NSMT as a useful theory to analyze the Okinawan struggle after Okinawa's return to Japan by raising new kinds of social issues. Nevertheless, her argument does not merely address the change of Okinawa's social economy. Also, she does not dismiss the older notion of the Okinawa struggle as myth. More importantly, she

²²⁴ Ibid.: 13.

demonstrates the theoretical usefulness of NSMT in shedding light on how identity is formed through social movements. While Inoue uses the NSMT-based approach in order to propose the emergence of the “citizen” as an alternative category of actors not necessarily associated with the older form of social movement, Tanji employed the NSMT-based approach in order to shift our perspective to considering the process of formation of more individualized social identities. Referring to one of the pioneers of NSMT, Alberto Melucci, Tanji argues:

...invisible and shared definitions of “we” that give a sense of unity among multiple actors do not exist from the start in a fixed and visible form. It is, rather, the end result of mutual interactions among protest actors in the process of collective actions...Focusing on collective identity draws attention to the ideas shared collectively among the subject (“we”) of social movements, to the purpose of their activities, and to what is at stake, by what means, and in what external (political, social, and cultural) context. The concept of collective identity helps to illuminate the fact that “Okinawa” as a subject of protest is constantly constructed, redefined, changed, and sustained. Constructed collective identity for the Okinawan protesters is about defining who “Okinawans” are and what their “struggle” is about.²²⁵

In order to understand the micro-politics within the social activism called “the Okinawa struggle”, Tanji highlights mutual interactions and the creation of collectivity. In employing such concepts, one of Tanji’s arguments is that individuality should be the basic entity or premise when we consider people’s activism in Okinawa. This is one of the few studies that

²²⁵ Ibid.: 14.

highlights individual actors and their different social practices as the constitutive power of the historical narrative of Okinawa's anti-base movement.

4.3.2. A View from Australia

In order to explore the intellectual background to Tanji's approach, another issue that needs to be considered is the development of Japanese Studies in Australia during 1990s. I do not intend to essentialize Australian Japanese Studies. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Japanese Studies in Australia experienced a distinctive moment which produced a different type of critical discourse from that developed in the US. While the so-called Cultural Turn in the US helped to create crucial interventions by scholars based in the University of Chicago such as Harry Harootunian, Tetsuo Najita, Victor Koschmann, Norma Field and Masao Miyoshi²²⁶ during the 1980s and 1990s, Australian Japanese Studies also forged a critical context by scholars based in Melbourne, Western Australia and Canberra such as Yoshio Sugimoto, Vera Mackie, Gavan McCormack, Kōichi Iwabuchi and Tessa Morris-Suzuki. Their works are widely shared not only in Australia but also in Japan and elsewhere.²²⁷ In such a milieu, Tanji experienced this wave of Australian Japanese Studies. Therefore, we probably need to take a quick glimpse at this period in which she cultivated her critical awareness of Okinawa.

So far, there are few studies in which scholars have tried to map the trends of Japanese Studies in Australia. One of the earliest works that covers the general historical development of Japanese Studies was written by Morris Low in 1997. Discussing the outset

²²⁶ Although Miyoshi was never affiliated as a formal faculty member, he was a visiting scholar at the University of Chicago during the late 1980s, where he began to join the local critical Japanese studies circle. For more detail, see, Masao Miyoshi, *Teikō No Ba E: Arayuru Kyōkai Wo Koeru tame ni* (Kyoto: Rukuhoku Shuppan, 2007).

²²⁷ Josef Kreiner, *Sekai No Okinawagaku: Okinawa Kenkyū 50 Nen No Ayumi* (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobō, 2012), 74-75.

of Japanese Studies in Australia in the late 19th century, Low points out that social science started playing a significant role in Australian Japanese Studies in a relatively earlier period compared with the influence of humanities subjects, such as literature. One reason is that after World War II, from the perspective of Australian strategy, it became particularly urgent to develop analysis of Japan's political role in the region. Low also argues that this tradition has provided the seedbed for what he calls "Australian style Japanese Studies" (ASJS) as an alternative to the modernization theory-based approach to Japan, which was the major epistemological context for Japanese Studies in countries such as the US during the 1950s and 1960s.²²⁸ While eminent economist Peter Drysdale and the Australia-Japan Research Centre in the Australian National University undoubtedly played a leading role in strengthening the two countries' ties in both policy and academic aspects, those who are included in ASJS scholars served to produce academic works of socio-cultural understandings of Japanese society by questioning monolithic discourses of Japaneseness (or *nihonjinron*).²²⁹

Sociologist Kawabata Kōhei's summary of Australian Japanese Studies explains the further detailed contextual background and additional meanings to Low's conception of ASJS. He argues that the critical trend of Japanese Studies in Australia which started in the late 1970s was not only a critique of modernization theory. Rather, its works should be understood as analyses of a particular historical moment in Japan.²³⁰ Japan during this period was experiencing not only a dramatically expanding economy, but also a structural transformation of the economy, with the hollowing out of domestic industry as factories relocated to developing countries in East and Southeast Asian regions, and as neoliberal

²²⁸ Morris Low and Alan Rix, *Visions of Japanese Studies in Australia: A Short History and Discussion* (Sydney: Japan Cultural Centre, 1997).

²²⁹ The books written by Sugimoto during this period include Yoshio Sugimoto, *Nihonjin wo Yameraremasuka?* (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun-sha, 1996); (with Ross Mouer), *Nihonjinron no Hōteishiki* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1995).

²³⁰ Kohei Kawabata, *Jimoto o Aruku: Mijika na sekai no esunogafi* (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 2013).

policy became increasingly dominant. Likewise, other socio-economic problems such as social welfare and employment of young people were coming to the fore. Kawabata argues that Japan from the late 1970s was gradually entering into late modernity, and that the contribution of ASJS in its early days needs to be understood in this context. In other words, the critique of *nihonjinron* and monolithic representations of Japanese culture can be interpreted as a critique of Japanese late modernity at its outset.²³¹ In this context, Australian critical scholars deployed cultural concepts such as identity, diversity, and the margins to rethink Japanese studies. Kawabata also highlights the influence of the local Australian context, in which multiculturalism was formalised as the national policy in the 1970s, as a factor that gave momentum to the expansion of Asian studies in Australia and thus also to this intellectual movement.

In this intellectual context Okinawa, together with some other marginalized areas in the historical course of Japanese modernization, became one of the crucial reference points in Japanese Studies. Having been influenced by preceding scholars whom I mentioned earlier, scholars such as Julia Yonetani and Matthew Allen conducted anthropological research on historical memory, experience and cultural identity in the Okinawan context, using ethnography as methodology.²³² Tanji, who moved to the Australian National University to undertake her MA program in the late 1990s, was also a member of that emerging generation in the context of Australian Japanese Studies. Although there are many differences in detail, one of the similarities among these scholars was the impact of cultural studies, especially of its critical inquiry into cultural identity and ethnicity. Regardless of discipline, such analytical concepts were widely shared among those young scholars. For example, Yonetani argues that

²³¹ Ibid., 20-21.

²³² Julia Yonetani, *Making History from Japan's Margins—Ota Masahide and Okinawa*, PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 2002; Matthew Allen, *Identity and Resistance in Okinawa* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002)

the notion of “ambiguity” is “at the foundation of the endeavor to conceive and empower a collective Okinawa subject, just as Okinawa’s historical and political incorporation within hegemonic structures forms a core philosophical and political dilemma in the very attempt to conceive of an Okinawan autonomous subjectivity.”²³³ In other words, she did not take ethnic identity merely as a generalized marginal voice in order to build a binary with its Japanese counterpart. Rather, these scholars attempt to understand ambiguous aspects of Okinawan identity and its history of “resistance” and “compliance”. Yonetani also highlighted the important roles of many unnamed people in producing political and cultural practices which contest dominant power structures.²³⁴ Through communicating with her contemporaries such as Yonetani and Allen, Tanji formed her approaches to the Okinawa struggle.

4.3.3. Locating Feminism in Okinawa as Mediation between the Local and Global

Tanji, like Inoue, examines the intersection of the local and the global. For her, feminism is a social movement in which two different layers—local and global—are deeply connected. Focusing on a women’s anti-base activist group called Okinawan Women Act against Military and Violence (OWAAMV)—a primary initiator of “the third wave” of island-wide struggle in 1995—Tanji recognizes this group as part of the network of global feminism. For instance, by tracing activities of the group, particularly of Takazato Suzuyo, a leading Okinawan feminist, she explores the group’s participation in the Third International Women’s Conference in Nairobi in 1985, a decade before the rape incident occurred, and in the Fourth Conference in Beijing in 1995.²³⁵ Like Inoue’s methodology, Tanji’s research on

²³³ Ibid., 26.

²³⁴ Ibid., 26-27.

²³⁵ Tanji, *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa*, 152-153.

feminism in the anti-base movement locates the Okinawan struggle in international politics. She argues:

As part of their standard activity, the Okinawan women were accustomed to integrating with global civil society. The strategy used during Shiraho struggle to appeal for coral conservation to the global environmental movements has been taken by Okinawan women to an even greater extent, addressing the international feminist community.²³⁶

Through ethnographic analysis along with text analysis, and also in their use of a methodology based on the NSMT approach, Inoue and Tanji share some key aspects of their research method as both ethnographer and narrator of marginalized people's critical social practices. Nevertheless, one of the distinctive aspects of Tanji's research is that her work helped to entrench the autonomous space of feminism in the discourse of the contemporary Okinawan anti-base movement. By articulating feminists' active involvement both in the local and global public arena, she also situates Okinawan feminists as protagonists whose practice of struggle in the Okinawa struggle plays a crucial role in the global arena.²³⁷

²³⁶ Ibid., 153.

²³⁷ Tanji's approach invokes Nancy Fraser's critique of the Habermasian conception of the public sphere in a way that tries to highlight differences within the public sphere as cultural platform expressed as liberalistic discursive space. By doing so, she raises what is conceptualized as "subaltern counterpublics" that "signal that they are parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs." Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A contribution to critique of actually existing democracy," *Social Text* 25/26 (1990): 67.

4.4. Kelly Dietz and the Rise of Indigenism

4.4.1. Practicing “Indigenous Identity”

In this section, I will discuss the rise of indigenism in the contemporary Okinawan struggle, and then discuss the work of Kelly Dietz, US-based scholar of critical international and comparative studies who discusses this issue by referring to the global decolonisation movement. Indigenism is an emerging current in the contemporary context of the Okinawa struggle. It presents Okinawan/Ryūkyūans as indigenous people who have been discriminated against under Japanese-American structural subordination. Raising problems of Japanese colonialism and Okinawa’s distinct ethnicity is not a new approach in the history of the Okinawan anti-base struggle. The ethnic difference of *Uchinaa* (Okinawans/Ryūkyūans) and *Yamatū* (Japanese mainlanders) has been one of the most frequently employed ways of distinguishing Okinawans from other Japanese. But the current revival of Okinawan/Ryūkyūan identity, discourse and cultural practice is different from preceding discourses in that the new discourse not only emphasizes cultural and historical differences that separate Okinawa from the rest of Japan, but also aims to reconceptualize the Okinawa struggle as an indigenous people’s movement by claiming their own territorial sovereignty at international venues such as the United Nations.

By employing the term “Ryūkyūans” instead of “Okinawans” or “Okinawan people”, contemporary indigenism tries to re-establish an autonomous cultural terrain distinct from Japan and Japanese nationals. Moreover, the indigenous movement in Okinawa not only emphasizes cultural autonomy but also stresses differences in economic and political administration from the rest of Japan. One of the most recent examples of an indigenist group is the Association of Comprehensive Studies for Independence of the Lew Chewans

(ACSILs), established in March 2013.²³⁸ ACSILs is founded by scholars such as Matsushima Yasukatsu, a scholar and a long-term activist and expert on the indigenous rights of Ryūkyūans in the international political arena. Before he founded ACSILs together with other Ryūkyūan colleagues, he had also created an organization called the Association of Indigenous People in the Ryūkyūs (AIPR) with fellow activist Miyasato Gosamaru and others in the late 1990s. Matsushima and Miyasato were both born in the mid-1960s and another key figure, mathematical sociologist Tomochi Masaki was born in the mid-1970s. Sociologist Nomura Kōya (who later became widely known for his strong criticism of Japan and the Japanese internal colonization of Okinawa in his book: *Unconscious Colonization*) was also born in the late 1960s.²³⁹ These activists belong to the post-reversion generation (*fukkigo sedai*), who spent their formative periods around the time of Okinawa's return to Japan. Although these new indigenists have not gained wide support from ordinary Okinawans, they actively conduct lobbying and other political activism within and beyond Okinawa through which they are slowly gaining support.

By insisting on autonomy or independence of both people and territory, contemporary indigenous activists in the Okinawan anti-base movement try to use the international, as well as the Japanese, political arena effectively. They aim to acquire the rights of self-determination over the land of Ryūkyū based on the principles of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People.²⁴⁰ As Matsushima discusses, the international experience of the indigenous rights movement widens their understandings on the location and progress of

²³⁸ ACSILs is an academy that “will conduct interdisciplinary and comprehensive research. Our members are all Lew Chewan people who aim to achieve the independence of the Lew Chew.” Membership is limited to people whose ancestry background can be traced as Ryūkyūan. The information is available at <http://www.acsils.org/english>.

²³⁹ Kōya Nomura, *Muishiki no Shokuminchishugi: Nihonjin no Beigunkichi to Okinawajin* (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 2005).

²⁴⁰ To understand the context of AIPR, see, for example, Hideaki Uemura, et al. *Shimin no Gaikō: Senjū Minzoku to Ayunda 30 Nen* (Tokyo: Hōsei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 2013), 145-159.

Okinawan's campaign for self-determination by comparing it with other areas where local residents are engaged in similar kinds of direct action. Especially, the Ryūkyūan indigenous movement is strongly connected to places such as Guam, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, with whom they share historical experience of colonialism and US occupation of their lands. Also, they refer to countries in the Pacific region which gained independence from US rule, such as the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau. At the same time, they also consider the experiences of more distant countries such as Malta, which was administered under the British military regime until the 1960s, the Basque country and Catalonia, in which distinctive local cultures underpin local residents' autonomous identity, and Scotland, which has a relatively high level of administrative autonomy from the central British government.²⁴¹ This awareness of other societies, countries and regions where indigenous or ethnic minorities strive for their autonomy or independence is expressed in Matsushima's view of colonial history in Okinawa/Ryūkyū.²⁴²

4.4.2. "Take the Bases Back to Japan"

Chinin Ushii is one of the most vocal activists advocating indigenous identity in the contemporary Okinawan anti-base movement. She was born in Naha City, Okinawa, in 1966, and graduated from Tsuda Women's University and the University of Tokyo. According to Chinin's recollections, that was the time when she began to question her identity.²⁴³ After returning to Okinawa, she started teaching at Okinawa International University as a lecturer. It was then she started using her Ryūkyūan style name, Ushii, rather than her Japanese name,

²⁴¹ Yasukatsu Matsushima, *Ryūkyū Dokuritsu e no Michi: Shokuminchi-shugi ni Aragau Ryūkyū Nashonarizumu* (Tokyo: Hōritsu bunka-sha: 2012).

²⁴² Ibid., 40-120.

²⁴³ Gavan McCormack and Satoko Oka Norimatsu, *Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 236, 239.

Yukino. Around the same time, Chinin also started her career as a commentator on current affairs by contributing articles regularly to a local newspaper. Like letters written to close friends, her essays are characterized by their plain style of writing, which attracts many readers. She discusses current Okinawan people, society and culture and her messages are always conveyed straightforwardly to the readers. Her career as a public intellectual in Okinawa is not only limited to being a writer. She has been an active organizer of the anti-base movement. She started her career in anti-base activism by joining a group called *Kamadūgwa-tachi no Tsudoi* (Gathering of Little Girls) in 2002. In Ryūkyūan language, *kamadūgwa* means “beloved people”. This is a group consisting of local women mainly living in Ginowan City, where Futenma Airbase is situated.

Although Chinin’s writing style is simple, as she considers her audience to be not only academia but the general public, much of her inspiration comes from earlier generations of activists and intellectuals involved with the decolonization movement around the globe, such as Malcom X and Frantz Fanon.²⁴⁴ Chinin quotes these thinkers within the Okinawan context, accusing Japan of internal colonialism over Okinawa. Like her colleagues such as Nomura Kōya, Chinin also makes this accusation not only against the Japanese government but also against Japanese nationals, separating them from Okinawans/Ryūkyūans in terms of identity. Calling this critical attitude to Japan “decolonization of consciousness” she argues

...it is mainland Japan – the government, the bureaucrats, the mass media, and the people who keep saying “no” to the Okinawa that is demanding *kengai isetsu* (moving the bases outside Okinawa prefecture)... Then I felt uncomfortable with the adjective “Japanese”

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 240.

being attached to our islands. “Japanese” reverberates with the meanings “Japan occupies” and “Japan colonizes” Okinawa.²⁴⁵

Her perspective is primarily underpinned by a critique of the continuing relationship of colonizer and colonized between Japan and Okinawa. In her critiques, she often writes that Japanese people should take the US bases back to Japan for their own national security without imposing the burden on Okinawa.²⁴⁶ However, one of the distinguishing aspects of her critique, as compared with those of her colleagues such as Nomura, is that her practice as indigenous Okinawan is directed not only towards Japanese nationals but also towards Okinawans, to convey the need for a restoration of an indigenous sense of history, voice, culture, and territory: in other words, a reappropriation of the indigenous place and identity of Okinawa.

4.4.3. Beyond Nationalism: Internal Colony and Okinawan Autonomism

One of the researchers overseas who focuses on this emergence of a cultural movement of indigenous identity in the context of the Okinawa struggle is American political scientist Kelly Dietz, professor of the Department of Politics at Ithaca College in New York. Dietz obtained her MA and PhD from Cornell University. Dietz is also one of those who conducted fieldwork in Okinawa during much the same period as Inoue and Tanji. She has had a long-term career not only as an academic but also as a social activist on the base problems and environmental issues primarily in Okinawa. In the midst of the Henoko struggle, Dietz became one of the co-founders of a transnational NGO called Futenma-Henoko Action

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 237-238.

²⁴⁶ Ushii Chinin, et al. *Tōsōsuru Kyōkai: Fukkigo sedai no Okinawa kara no Hōkoku* (Tokyo: Miraisha, 2012: 25-26).

Network (FHAN) together with her colleagues from Japan, Okinawa, US, UK and elsewhere. She was also a visiting researcher at the University of Ryūkyūs from 2004-2005 while engaged with the anti-base movement.

One of the characteristics of Dietz's analysis of the Okinawan anti-base movement is that she highlights the ethnic movement as a new current in the Okinawan struggle. She describes activists who are involved with this cultural movement as "autonomist" and their campaign as "Okinawan autonomism". Although I will discuss the meaning of autonomism later, I would like to note here that Dietz focuses on Okinawan autonomism as part of the global decolonization movement. Thus, while she acknowledges the Okinawan domestic context of the anti-base struggle, Dietz also views the Okinawan indigenous movement in parallel with the global decolonization movement.

The politicization of Okinawan indigenous identity aims to reactivate a collective identity as an ethnic minority who are "politically and socially displaced within Japan; as a nation/people".²⁴⁷ This way of re-establishing the Okinawan subject is not simply a reinforcement of the "myth" of Okinawan identity to keep the historical narrative of the Okinawa struggle alive as a discourse of mobilization. Rather, Okinawan cultural autonomism branches out of the traditional narrative of the Okinawa struggle by adopting more progressive views of anti-colonialism against Japan and the US. The notion of "practicing indigenous Okinawa" also means that the movement is part of the wider global movements by indigenous people, where other ethnic minorities also insist on their cultural and territorial sovereignty. Therefore, like the work of the other two researchers discussed above, Dietz's analysis provides us with a perspective not only for understanding a new

²⁴⁷ Kelly Dietz, "Demilitarizing Sovereignty: Self-Determination and Anti-Military Base Activism in Okinawa, Japan," in *Contesting Development: Critical Struggles for Social Change*, ed. Philip McMichael (New York: Routledge, 2010), 195.

current in the Okinawan anti-base movement, but also for capturing this local movement in a wider context. She argues:

While they can only emerge out of a strong attachment between a particular people and place, they rest fundamentally on an ability to locate Okinawa's particular history and circumstances within a world-historical context that exposes the imperial dimensions of the state system.²⁴⁸

Dietz's reflexive perspective avoids particularizing the Okinawan indigenous movement, for she embeds the movement in a global political framework with specific historical experience with Japan and the US. Her analysis is combined with the presentation of actual voices from local Okinawan activism. The Association of Indigenous People in the Ryūkyūs (AIPR) is one example of organizations that have been involved with the global indigenous people's movement for self-determination in the context of Okinawa. Dietz argues that this resilient struggle of the Okinawan anti-base movement has generated a situation where "an increasing number of Okinawans articulate a desire for greater freedom from Japan's control".²⁴⁹ She also argues that

...the politicization of Okinawan identity comes at a time when demands for greater ethnic autonomy are increasing around the world. Despite the apparent success of anti-imperialist movements and postwar decolonization, contemporary movements for self-determination are on the rise and span the globe: from Ogoniland in Nigeria to Nagaland in India; from

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 183.

Scotland and the Basque region of Spain to the Kurdish region that transverses Turkey and Iraq. Within Japan itself the ethnically distinct Ainu began making indigenous rights claims against the Japanese government in the 1980s.²⁵⁰

By employing the notion of the decolonization movement to describe Okinawa's ethnic movement, Dietz seeks to distinguish what she calls the socio-cultural movement for local autonomy after the "ethnic turn" from another frequently employed concept in the context of anti-US base movement: nationalism. She argues:

...the politicization of Okinawan identity in the Okinawan de-militarization movement implies a different story and outcome from the nationalist sentiments animating anti-US military movements in for example, South Korea, the Philippines, and even mainland Japan. In these places, nationalist sentiment is rooted in a notion of citizens' popular sovereignty and a desire to strengthen state capacities vis-à-vis the United States. In contrast, claims and efforts aimed at securing greater autonomy in Okinawa implicate Japanese practices of rule in ways far beyond a critique of particular administrations that bow to US pressure, or to pressures from domestic forces benefiting from the presence of US forces. Okinawan rights claims against US military presence increasingly challenge the legitimacy of the Japanese state itself: they call into question its very meaning within Okinawa's territorial and socio-political context.²⁵¹

This notion of internal colony is re-emphasized later in her argument. Dietz points out that the post-colonial era in which former colonized countries could acquire their independent

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 183-184.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 185.

status and sovereignty as nation-states left the issue of indigenous people unresolved. What happened to indigenous culture such as the Ryūkyūs was incorporation as an internal colony as part of the colonizing process that was conducted around the globe. Therefore, while Dietz recognizes that decolonization in former colonies and the establishment of new nation-states was crucial, she is also critical of the rise of nationalism, arguing that it dismisses “histories of invasion, colonization, and systematic discrimination of peoples within emerging and established nations.”²⁵² Therefore, in her discussion of Okinawan autonomism, politicising Okinawan identity is intended to raise the autonomous subject as Okinawan without being reduced to the logic of nationalism.²⁵³

As in Tanji’s discussion, it is important to recognize Dietz’s argument as a critique of the citizen model proposed by Inoue, although it is not entirely correct to envision an antagonistic relationship between the indigenous identity and citizen identity because they both are contemporary movements that are being developed in parallel. However, as a matter of fact, it is also important to acknowledge that the notion of citizen does not provide a satisfactory account for this emerging local consciousness. Dietz’s concept of Okinawan autonomism is, therefore, important in the sense that she draws attention to aspects that the discourse of citizen overlooks in the Okinawa struggle. Like Inoue and Tanji, Dietz also connects the Okinawan local context by articulating it with similar external contexts. This helps us connect ethnic practices in the Okinawa anti-base movement with other indigenous movements around the globe.

²⁵² Ibid., 187.

²⁵³ Dietz argues that articulation of indigenous identity as political identity means there is a proactive shift of Okinawan status from “second-class citizens” to “Okinawan subjects”. See, Kelly Dietz, “Demilitarizing Sovereignty,” 195.

4.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed some approaches to the contemporary modes of the Okinawan anti-base struggle. I called these new approaches the NSMT-based approaches because the three researchers discussed here similarly developed critiques of the conventional notion of primordial notions of Okinawan identity by drawing on New Social Movement Theory. By examining actually practised identities in grassroots politics, Inoue, Tanji and Dietz have shown the complex agency involved in making Okinawan identity. Two main points emerge from this discussion. First, by reading these scholars' works and their engagement with the Okinawa struggle, I sought a significance that enables us to re-situate the Okinawan anti-base movements in the current situation of political-economy and social relations. In the first place, this means that we are no longer able to return to the binary mode of thought based on the dichotomy between dominant and dominated. The three scholars' works all emphasize the fact that, in studying Okinawan anti-base activism, it is crucial to discuss how local cultural politics shapes the struggle by processing the global issues and re-producing vernacular forms of cosmopolitanism. This finding enables us to embed the Okinawan anti-base movement in an inter-referential system of knowledge about local struggles against militarism in many parts of the globe. The NSMT-based approach also emphasizes the production of Okinawan activism within the complicated entanglement of local socio-cultural-economic relations. Thus, we need to shift our attention from the struggle of the marginalized against the far distanced central powers such as Tokyo and Washington to their struggle for meaning within the world they live in.

The second point is an extension of the first. The three scholars discussed here conducted analyzes of Okinawan people's everyday life not merely as "observers" but also as "participants". Although it is only Inoue who explicitly discusses his experiences and the issues regarding participatory research on the Okinawa struggle, other researchers also have

similar experiences to the extent that they were engaged in the Okinawa struggle both as researchers overseas and as participants of the local activism. Although I could not fully explore these experiences in this chapter, their pioneering work as ethnographers and participants in the local anti-base movement made a significant contribution in developing not only Okinawa studies but also more broadly methodology on the ethnography of social activism, which clarifies the actuality of the Okinawa struggle. The difference between the discourse and the experience of the Okinawa struggle is one of many examples which was revealed by those ethnographers. In my understanding, the works of Inoue, Tanji and Dietz lead us to consider Okinawa's local experiences in the broader public sphere by connecting it with other local experiences and types of social movements in different parts of the globe such as feminism and the indigenous rights movement. In this sense, these scholars connect inside/outside Okinawan activism to show "the third space". Overall, Inoue, Tanji and Dietz show new ways to understand and acknowledge the Okinawan anti-base movement.

Chapter Five

Takae Anti-Helipad Movement: Making a Protest Community from Margin



With Yamashiro Hiroji, Director of Okinawa Peace Movement Center (Left).
The photo was taken by the author in Takae in February 2012.

5.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have discussed new aspects raised in research on the Okinawan anti-base movement by certain scholars. In particular, these scholars highlight the significant impact that New Social Movements Theory brought to research on Okinawa's anti-base movement. My previous chapter concluded that the three studies by those scholars illuminate various aspects of the anti-base movement especially in relation to the politics of everyday life. By theorizing the complexity of the struggle, they help us to consider meanings and forms in Okinawa's anti-base movement which had not previously been the focus of major attention. Therefore, I argued that these studies re-situate Okinawa not only as a site for examining the people's anti-base struggle, but also for problematizing contemporary forms of social movements by exploring the deeper levels of local identity politics.

If we connect the work of these three scholars to the dialogue between the two Okinawan critics Yakabi Osamu and Okamoto Keitoku (discussed in Chapter 1), we can see that collective "Okinawan identity" is not just a precondition for the anti-base struggle. Rather, it relates to the question: who makes the anti-base struggle? In their dialogue, Okamoto argues that the contemporary anti-base movement is sustained by the diverse participation of individuals regardless of their origins.²⁵⁴ He notes that these individuals are people who are strongly concerned with the history and ecology of Okinawa. Based on this perspective, Okamoto seeks to establish a new kind of social actor who develops Okinawa's anti-base struggle. That is, he argues that the Okinawa struggle is carried out by the people who have "become" Okinawan people through the process of participation in direct actions. His intention is to identify who is in fact participating in the anti-base struggle, and this involves a provocative separation of this subject of the struggle from an identitarian

²⁵⁴ Keitoku Okamoto, *"Okinawa" ni Ikiru: Okamoto Keitoku Hihyo-Shu* (Tokyo: Miraisha, 2007), 211.

understanding of “Okinawan people” based on ancestry and ethnicity. Reflecting on the use of “Okinawan identity” by conservative political forces in the publication *The Okinawa Initiative*, Yakabi similarly insisted on the need to consider an alternative integrating concept other than ethnic identity (see Chapter 1).²⁵⁵

In this chapter, I consider Okamoto and Yakabi’s discussion on the new subjects of the Okinawa struggle by analyzing the case of Takae, a hamlet in the northern Yanbaru region of Okinawa Island. This small hamlet in Okinawa Island has become one of the most active places of the anti-base struggle since 2007. Through analyzing the local protest community in terms of the formation of the collectivity, I shall seek an alternative view of social cooperation in the contemporary Okinawa struggle, which revisits notions of Okinawan identity by deploying the concept of “place”.

5.2. Towards the North

After leaving Naha at dawn, I was in my friend’s car driving north. My friend Kosuzu is a faculty member at a local university, teaching the history of American ethnic minorities. She is also an experienced activist who has been involved in the local anti-US military base movement for the last ten years. This trip was a result of her kind offer. When I started asking questions about recent events in the Okinawa struggle, she simply told me to come along with her to see the real circumstances. The place she was going to take me was one of the ongoing protest sites, a small hamlet located in the north-eastern part of Okinawa Island, called Takae. She drove her big Toyota Hilux from Naha up towards the north of Okinawa Island on Route 58. I found myself wondering why she had chosen such a large car. In

²⁵⁵ Osamu Yakabi, “Okinawa no Aidentitī wo Kataru-koto Soshite Katarinaosu-koto: ‘Okinawa Kenkyū’ no Gen-zai ni Tsuite,” in *Chiiki no Jiritsu, Shima no Chikara Gekan*, ed. Moriteru Arasaki, et al. (Tokyo: Komonzu, 2006), 143-144.

Okinawa, where there is no railway except for a short monorail in Naha city, the majority of the local population drive cars. The most popular type is a small lightweight van, called *kei* (which literally means “light”). Compared to this popular car, however, Kosuzu’s car looked extraordinarily large. Known not only for its size but also toughness, this brand of pick-up truck carried rocket launchers during the Chadian-Libyan Conflict in the late 1980s. When I asked her the reason why she drove such a gigantic car, her answer was very practical: “This size is convenient when we need to make barricades”.

The southern part of Okinawa Island has historically been more populated and economically prosperous. The old and new capital cities, Shuri and Naha, are both located in the south. So the further we went towards the north, the fewer residential houses we saw. After passing Nago, the border city of south and north, a landscape different from the urban south unfurled before us: over 7,000 hectares of stunning mountains and forests. With diverse ranges of vegetation, this subtropical environment has fostered unique indigenous creatures such as Okinawa woodpecker (or *noguchigera* in Japanese) and Okinawa rail (or *Yanbaru kuina*). This is the reason why the northern half of Okinawa Island has been called *Yanbaru*, which is written by a combination of two Chinese characters of “mountain” and “field”. As it is located amid rich forest, access to Takae has not been easy for southern dwellers. By the time we arrive in Taira, one of the areas neighboring Takae, the sun had already risen and was blazing in the sky.



Image 5-1. A view of Yanbaru Forrest, taken by the author, November 2011.

5.3. Yanbaru, Higashi Village, Takae

The Yanbaru region is not an administrative territory. It is the historical name of the northern half of Okinawa Island used by the local people. When people visit Yanbaru from the southern area of Okinawa, the gateway to the region is Nago City, the only local city. In addition to this, Yanbaru includes eight other towns and villages. But compared with Nago and the southern cities, many of these towns and villages in this northern area are not prosperous. Takae is a part of one of the villages, called Higashi, located in the north-eastern part of Yanbaru. Higashi Village was created as a result of the reorganization of six different hamlets (Takae, Kesaji, Arime, Taira, Kawata, and Miyagi) in 1924.²⁵⁶ This community has been considered to be one of the most peripheral areas in the whole of Okinawa Island. For example, there is a line in a Ryūkyūan classic poem about Takae which reads “Even places such as Takē and Arakā, if I was together with you, would be like a heaven of flowers.”²⁵⁷

There are several factors that represent Takae’s peripheral status in Okinawa. The first factor is population. According to the latest census, the population of Higashi Village is estimated as 1707, in about 700 households. As Figure 8-1 below shows, Higashi Village is one of the smallest administrative units among all the cities, towns and villages in Okinawa Island. Although most communities in the Yanbaru region such as Kunigami, Ogimi, Nakijin, and Motobu are sparsely populated, Higashi Village is the least populous area even amongst these small communities. Figure 8-2 shows the population by different hamlets within Higashi Village. From this, we can see that Takae is the least populated area among the six hamlets. It is estimated that approximately 144 people, in 69 households, are currently

²⁵⁶ In terms of administration, Higashi and other communities have mayors and members of the local assembly, who are democratically elected by the local residents.

²⁵⁷ Higashi-son-shi Henshū linkai, ed. *Higashi-son-shi*, vol 1 (Higashi-son: Higashi-son Yakuba, 1987): 212.

registered as residents. Although there used to be over 300 in the late 1940s, the population decreased to almost half of its peak from the mid-1970s to 2010.




Figure 5-1. Population by Cities, Towns and Villages in Okinawa Island (as of April 2014). This chart is created by the author based on data provided by Population by Cities, Towns and Villages, Department of Statistics, Okinawa Prefecture. (http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/toukeika/estimates/estimates_sukei.html last accessed 1/6/2014, 1 June, 2014)




Figure 5-2. Population by districts in Higashi Village. This chart is created by author based on data provided by the Registered Population by Cities, Towns and Villages, Department of Statistics, Okinawa Prefecture. (<http://www.pref.okinawa.lg.jp/site/kikaku/shichoson/4343.html>, 1 June, 2014)

The second factor is the lack of strong industry. The main source of income for the residents of Takae has been agriculture. However, the population drain to industrialized areas, which has accelerated since the 1970s, caused the number of people engaged in agriculture in the community to decrease. Therefore, under the initiative of Higashi Village, farmers of Takae (and other hamlets) were encouraged to start pineapple farming in the mid-1980s. Pineapple is one of a few kinds of agricultural products that were able to be grown in the soil of this area.²⁵⁸ However, the pineapple industry was not successful. The quantity of production has been declining since 1993. This was directly caused by the liberalization of imports of foreign pineapples in 1990.²⁵⁹ Furthermore, the collapse of the Japanese bubble economy in the early 1990s derailed investment plans for a major resort facility in the village. As the latest attempt, the Higashi Village government began to promote ecotourism in recent years by advertising the untouched natural environment of Yanbaru Forest.²⁶⁰ But the new policy was not very effective in boosting the local economy. Higashi Village's weak industry has been one of the major causes of the village's low output per capita, which is ranked as the lowest compared with other communities in the island. Also, this low growth rate of productivity has been the reason for the low average annual income of the residents in the community (see Figure 8-4). An official report from Higashi Village Government demonstrates the concern that people's annual income is lower than average income for Okinawa Prefecture.²⁶¹

²⁵⁸ Unlike the southern region of Okinawa Island, northern Yambaru region, including Takae, is made of red clay soil, which is not an appropriate soil for agricultural products to grow due to the high percentage of minerals in the ground.

²⁵⁹ Higashi Village, "Sangyō/Keizai (Higashi Village Directory)," accessed on June 1, 2014, <http://www.vill.higashi.okinawa.jp/UserFiles/File/sonnnogaiyou/sonseiyouran/sangyoukeizai.pdf>.

²⁶⁰ Based on the Ecotourism Promotion Acts passed in 2007, the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLIT) has been promoting the utilisation of the unique natural environment of each local region, mostly peripheral areas for its own local industry. Apart from Takae, the author had conducted research on similar cases in various places near Tokyo such as Kawaji Village in Tochigi Prefecture from 2007 to 2008.

²⁶¹ From the Fourth Total Plan of Higashi Village released by Higashi Village Government in 2011, available at http://www.vill.higashi.okinawa.jp/UserFiles/File/kikakukannkouka/4ji_sogokeikaku_kouki.pdf. (2 June, 2014).




Figure 5-3. Changes of production quantity and agricultural area in Higashi Village. This chart is created by the author based on data provided by the Registered Population by Cities, Towns and Villages, Department of Statistics, Okinawa Prefecture, accessed June 1, 2014, <http://www.vill.higashi.okinawa.jp/UserFiles/File/sonnnogaiyou/sonseiyouran/sangyoukeizai.pdf>.




Figure 5-4. Total annual income by cities, towns and villages in Okinawa Island. This chart is created by author based on data provided by the Registered Population by Cities, Towns and Villages, Department of Statistics, Okinawa Prefecture, accessed June 1, 2014, http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/toukeika/ctv/2013/2.H22_bunpai.pdf.

Together with those factors, we also need to consider the impact of the US bases in the Yanbaru region. In October 1957, the US military government began to use a large part of the forest as a training centre. This area—the Northern Training Center (NTC) or Camp Gonsalves—has been used by soldiers from the US Marine Corps to conduct simulations of jungle battles. The training center played a particularly crucial role during the Vietnam War period. Local residents from surrounding suburbs including Takae were mobilized by the US for training purposes. In a simulated village called “the Third World Village”, the locals were required to play the roles of locals in Vietnam.²⁶² In 2013, the size of the Northern Training Centre is estimated as 7824 hectares of Yanbaru Forest. This includes part of the territory of two northern villages—Kunigami and Higashi. According to one study, nearly 44 percent of the training center belongs to Higashi Village, while 56 percent belongs to Kunigami, where the local villagers prevented construction of the aircraft landing zone from taking place in the late 1980s.²⁶³ Although the size of the training center diminished after Okinawa’s return to Japan, the local residents are still not allowed to use most of Yanbaru forest as the territory is owned and administered by the Japanese government as a state forest.

5.4. The Village Embraced by the US Military Helipads

The small population and lack of industry made Higashi Village the most marginalized area in Okinawa Island; and the problems of the marginalized in Okinawa are not only economic. As the case of Henoko has explicitly shown, being an economically peripheral community in Okinawa means the area is likely to become a target for the site of the military bases. In this sense, Higashi Village—particularly Takae—is no exception. In the final report of the

²⁶² Chuji Chinen, *Taiga No Nagare to Tomoni* (Minamihaeburu: Akebono Shuppan, 2008).

²⁶³ Okinawa-ken Chiji Kōshitsu Kichi Taisaku-ka, “Okinawa no Beigun-kichi oyobi Jieitai-kichi,” (Okinawa: Okinawa-ken, 2013), 12.

Special Action Committee of Okinawa (SACO) released in 1996, the Japanese and US governments agreed “to lighten the burden (*futan keigen*)” of the US military bases for citizens in Okinawa. As I discussed in Chapter Four, SACO was established under former Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō and US President Bill Clinton following the rape incident of a school girl by three US military personnel and the island-wide mass protest movement in the mid-1990s strongly demanded revision of the Status of Forces Agreement.

In the SACO report, one of the main decisions that the leaders of US and Japan made was the closure of Futenma Airbase. However, closure of the Futenma Airbase did not mean removal (*tekkyo*) of the bases. Rather, it was a plan to “transfer (*isetsu*)” American military functions to other locations in Okinawa. Thus, the Japanese government sought possible locations to build new military facilities. On the east coast of mainland Okinawa Henoko district was designated to be one of the alternative locations to construct an offshore aircraft landing zone. But it was not only Henoko. The other decision for the reduction of the American military facilities was the partial return of the Northern Training Centre in Yanbaru Region. Although the NTC occupies approximately 7,800 hectares (as of 2014), according to the SACO report, the United States agreed to return about 3,987 hectares, which is about half of the current area. Yet there was one condition, which was the relocation of seven helipads which existed in the area to be returned. At that time, there were in total twenty-two helipads scattered around the NTC. Many of them were located within Higashi Village and some of them were in Kunigami Village, located in the north of Higashi Village. After about ten years of “contemplation” at the governmental level, most of the training area in Kunigami Village was designated for return to Japan. However, it means that the military facilities including seven helipads were supposed to be transferred to Higashi Village.²⁶⁴

²⁶⁴ Gavan McCormack and Satoko Oka Norimatsu, *Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 167-168.

Since the US and Japanese leaderships decided on the reduction of the NTC, they started searching for the possible places to relocate the seven helipads. Although Higashi Village and Kunigami Village were the main stakeholders of this relocation plan, they were excluded from the discussion table. Instead, the plan was discussed within high-level leadership. Therefore, when the relocation plan was released in late 2006, the local residents and the provincial government of Higashi Village were surprised. The designated sites were located around Takae district, the least populated area within Higashi Village (see Image 5-2). Although helipad construction sites were reduced from seven to six, it did not change anxiety among the local Takae residents. On the northern side of Takae, two helicopter landing zones (or so-called N-1A and N-1B by the Okinawa Defense Bureau²⁶⁵ as well as the local residents) were to be constructed; on the eastern side, another two helipads called G and H; and in the southern part of Takae, another two helipads (N-4A and N-4B) were to be constructed. Among them, two helipads in N-4 zone are located only 400 meters away from the residential area. In other words, the Takae residents were concerned with their future because their livelihood would be surrounded by these new helipads once the construction has been finished.

When this plan was made public by the Japanese government in late 2006, the local political assembly of Higashi Village decided to oppose this helipad construction plan. Politicians and residents organized a village-wide protest campaign. The campaign was led by a group called “the Association for Protection of Broccoli Forrest (*Burokkorī no Mori wo Mamoru-kai*)”. It was named after the landscape of Yanbaru Forrest, where trees seem like bunches of broccoli. However, as scholar Abe Kosuzu explains, the name has another implication, symbolizing the intention of the local residents to differentiate themselves from

²⁶⁵ Okinawa Defence Bureau is a regional division under the Japanese Ministry of Defence, which is in charge of providing facilities to the local US military including preparation of the helipad construction. For more historical detail, see Chapter Six.

major progressive social forces. Therefore, instead of using conventional terms such as “to fight (*tatakau*)” and “to prevent (*soshisuru*)” in their name, the local citizens used the term “protect” and referred to the broccoli forest, which evokes the unique natural environment of Yanbaru Forest.²⁶⁶ (See Image 5-4) When Higashi Village took up the protest campaign, the assembly of Higashi recognized certain local families as the civic representatives of this village-wide protest action. However, in May 2007, the mayor of the village, Ijū Morihisa, decided to withdraw from the protest. Although Ijū was criticized by the members of the local assembly for this sudden decision, his mind was not changed by these criticisms. This reflected the official announcement of the commencement of construction by Okinawa Defense Bureau in 2007. Following this decision, the campaign by the Broccoli Association also ceased. Since that moment, the local families who stood up to take direct action had to continue their protest without the official support of the local political body. The local residents were thrown into direct confrontation with the Japanese government and its base politics. This is how the Takae grassroots protest community called “No Helipad Takae Residents Society (*Helipaddo Iranai Takae Jūmin-no-kai*; hereafter the Takae Residents Society)” was born in August 2007.


The local protesters set up tents next to the N-4 zone in front of the gate for the construction site because they were informed that the construction would start from that area. However, the sit-in in this early period was very difficult to organize due to the permanent shortage of the participants to prevent the officials from ODB and the construction workers from entering the N-4 construction site. Also, the ODB came to Takae in the middle of the night or the very early morning. As the official agency of the Japanese government, one of the missions of the ODB is to supervise the construction workers. Also, the ODB officials

²⁶⁶ Kosuzu Abe, “Kurikaeshi Kwaru: Okinawa ni okeru Chokusetu Kōdō no Genzai Shinkōkei”, *Seisaku Kagaku, Kokusai-kankeironshu*, Vol. 13 (Okinawa: Ryūkyū Daigaku Hōbungakubu, 2011), 61-90.

were supposed to “help” them conduct the process smoothly. Although the protesters made a barricade with a net in front of the gate in order to prevent the workers from entering the construction zone easily, the ODB officials came to cut each thread of the net with large scissors before construction workers arrived. Although the sit-in by the local protesters was effective to delay the construction work, the absolute inferiority in numbers of the local protesters allowed the construction works to advance gradually.



Image 5-2: An aerial view of construction sites. On the bottom of the left is Arakawa Dam. The photo was retrieved from the website of the Okinawa Prefectural Government. (<http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/1172.html>, accessed, July 16, 2015)



Where is Yanbaru?

The wide forest area in the northern part of Okinawa island is called Yanbaru. Its subtropical natural forest and mountain streams provide habitats for over 5,000 species of wild life and more than a thousand species of plants. Out of these, some 11 animals and 12 plants are native to Yanbaru alone. Many of them are listed in the endangered species Red List, such as the Yanbaru Kuina (Okinawan Rail) or Noguchi Gera (Okinawan Woodpecker). It's such a valuable storage of wildlife that even the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) requests its preservation. This same area is now also a World Natural Heritage Site and National Park nominee, and in the middle of all this, is the village of Takae.



Takae in Higashi village and the U.S. military bases

Higashi is one of the villages in Yanbaru, and the small district located in the northern part of it is called Takae. Its population is approximately 150 people, 20% being teenagers and younger. The kids are happily growing up in Peacefulness of the surrounding beautiful mountains and rivers. However, adjacent to this natural area is the U.S. marines' Northern Training Area (Jungle Warfare Training Center), which totals up to 7,800 hectares. America started using this training area in 1957, a few years before U.S. went down in to the quagmire of the Vietnam War, mainly for the purpose of guerrilla warfare training. Originally there were 22 helipads scattered around the training area. Takae residents have been forced to suffer from the ear-breaking sound of the helicopters, as well as facing the

Image 5-4. The brochure "Voice of Takae" issued by the Takae Resident Society. Available from <http://nohelipadtakae.org/files/VOT-english2013Oct.pdf>.

5.5. Into the Protest Community

Towards the end of our drive to Takae, I saw some flags beside the street, with protest messages such as “no helipads in Takae!” written on them. A while later, we saw a large white tent beside the narrow road, and in the distance I could see more of the same kind of tents. The nearest tent was decorated with signboards reading: “We Don’t Need A Helipad”. “Let’s Protect Our Peaceful Yanbaru Forest from Warfare”. “Rescue Takae”. Painted colorfully, these hand-made signboards also conveyed protest messages against the helipad construction in both Japanese and in English. In the tent, a middle-aged man with a tanned face was smoking a cigarette. When he recognized Kosuzu, he shouted to her:

“We’ve got a *hiijā*, a wild one! Hurry to Arakawa! They just started slaughtering!”

Arakawa is the creek that runs through the middle of Higashi Village to the Pacific Ocean. At the riverside, I saw a group of children who were playing in the creek, splashing water at each other and screeching. There was also a bunch of adults with them. As soon as I got out of the car, I was struck by an unfamiliar smell, something similar to the smell of sweat. On a rock in the beautifully clear creek, swinging a thick butcher knife downwards, a man with disheveled long hair was cutting the meat and bones of some animal. Every time he swung the butcher knife up and down, his greasy black hair followed the movement of the knife. Thick bones were splashing blood that made hundreds of red and brown dots on his t-shirt. On the riverside, some people were scraping the rest of the meat from the bones. At the other side of the creek, the rest of the adults were chopping up other parts of pink meat or washing it with water from the creek.

“Hey, come and help us.”

One of them summoned me, waving his hand. He gave me a knife and told me to help one of the people chopping meat beside the creek. The closer I approached to the creek, the stronger

the smell of flesh became. The chunk of pink meat on the chopping board was not the same as what is usually seen in the shops. The raw meat was slimy.

“What’s this meat?” I asked a woman working on the same chopping board as mine.

“This is *hiiijā*. Goat,” she answered.

“It’s very rare to catch such a big wild goat,” the man next to her said.

According to his explanation, some villagers found this wild goat in the morning, with its legs stuck in a narrow ditch beside the road. The goat had broken its legs, so instead of rescuing it from the ditch, they decided to catch it to eat.

“And we eat every single part of it. This is how we show our respect for it.”

After butchering the goat, we went to a one-story prefabricated house with a flat tin roof. The local people called this house *tūtan-ya* (it meant “the tin roof house”). The house is used as the community centre for the members of the Takae Residents’ Society. The *Tūtan-ya* was surrounded by three small houses. They were all one-story, flat tin roof pre-fabricated buildings. The smallest one was the *jimusho* (“the office”), while the other two were *shukuhakujo* (“accommodations”): one for male and the other for female visitors.

In the evening, people gathered at *tūtan-ya* to eat the goat that they slaughtered during the day. People were visiting from all around the neighborhood. They chatted cheerfully while drinking a local spirit, *maruta*. I asked one older man sitting next to me whether such an event is held regularly. He said that in fact it is illegal to catch a wild goat. Then, he went on:

“But very occasionally there are goats injured. They cannot live so long, so we catch and slaughter them. We consider it as a gift from Yanbaru Forest.”

Goat is one of the traditional local cuisines. Originally imported from mainland China in the 15th century, the animal has been a crucial part of the local diet, providing valuable protein.²⁶⁷ However, when goat was introduced to Okinawa from China, it was not simply for the locals to eat in everyday life. Rather, goat was one of the animals, together with pig and cow, slaughtered when the envoys from Chinese dynasties visited Ryūkyū Kingdom. The Chinese missions arrived twice a year (spring and autumn) to celebrate the spirit of Confucius.²⁶⁸ In people's everyday life, too, goat was slaughtered mainly for festive events. Especially, when the local peasants held festivals where they prayed for fertility, goat was one of the animals offered to the spirit of fertility around Okinawa.²⁶⁹ After Okinawa entered the modern period, goat farming was commercialized and goat became a common food for the locals. With the passage of time, it gradually lost its spiritual meaning. The local Okinawans eat not only the meat but also other parts, including organs and blood in soup called *hiijā jiru*. Since goat was once believed to be effective to cure disease, its meat, blood and other organs were used for medical purposes. For the same reason, the locals thought it is effective to energize men's sexual potency. This was one reason why women were traditionally not allowed to eat goat.

In places like Takae where commercial farming of goats has little impact compared to the industrialised southern region, it is rare to find a place to eat this local animal. Also, because it is such a rare opportunity to catch a wild goat, it gave us a chance to see the distinctive Okinawan food culture and people's practice that remains in Takae, which includes the Takae residents' spirituality and their cultural relationships with the wild animals. Some of the village elders told me that it was a gift from Yanbaru Forest. What this means is that the overwhelming scale of Yanbaru Forest not only creates a sense of awe for

²⁶⁷ One of the earliest record of slaughtering goat in Okinawa is in 1579. (Okinawa-ken Kyōiku linkai, ed. *Okinawa Kenshi*, Vol. 22 (Tokyo: Gen'nan-dō Shoten, 1974: 213-214.)

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 213.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

the local natural environment among the residents, but is also seen as an abundant source of food that the locals eat. Wounded goats that are sometimes found are not simply considered the same as the dishes served in restaurants. The Takae locals rather understood them as fortune given by Yanbaru Forest. Therefore, in this context, the goat needs to be understood not only in its material aspect as food but also as representing spiritual relationships and interaction between the local residents and their place.

We can also consider the Takae people and their spiritual relationship with their place by looking at the location in which they butchered the goat. In many parts of Okinawa Island, rivers, creeks or the sea were essential elements in spiritual sites. In the past, these sites were places to pray for fortune and were places to pour the first water on a newborn baby. Historically, Arakawa Creek was believed to be one of the sacred places for the local villagers. There were two regions along Arakawa Creek—upper creek and lower creek. In each region, there were sacred sites with a shrine. Takae is part of the upper creek region. According to the official history of Higashi Village, the local villagers held an annual festival in which people prayed for fertility for two days every September.²⁷⁰ Given the history of Okinawans and their relationship with the river, it is possible to perceive the importance of Arakawa Creek for the local life, which also explain why the local villagers chose this creek to slaughter the goat. Based on this contextual understanding, we can imagine how the natural environment of Takae contributes to shaping local identity.

At the same time, this cultural activity has more practical meanings for the locals in Takae. People worked collaboratively in order to process the meat. From capturing the wild animal and slaughtering it to cooking, it required many different kinds of collaborative work. This experience of shared practice helped to build a sense of community among those who

²⁷⁰ Higashi-son-shi Henshū linkai, ed. *Higashi-son-shi* (Higashi-son, Okinawa: Higashi-son-shi Henshū linkai, 1987: 212).

were involved with processing the goat. Although a number of people in the Takae protest community originated from outside Okinawa (as I discuss later), these collaborative works help them have a sense of community. Also, this work was conducted in an open environment regardless of age and gender. This was reflected during dinner time as well. While traditionally women were banned from joining in this particular cuisine, now everyone is involved with the work of preparing and eating the goat. In this sense, the goat became a figure that created another layer of shared experiences among the locals. This was my very first encounter with the most upfront protest community in Okinawa.



Image 5-5. The white tent in front of N-4 zone in Takae. The photo was taken by the author in November 2011.



Image 5-6. Arakawa Creek. The photo was retrieved from the official blog of the Takae Residents' Society, *Yanbaru Takae no Genjō* (July 14, 2007), accessed September 3, 2015, <http://takae.ti-da.net/e1649662.html>.

5.6. “We Need Everyone’s Attention!”: Social Networks of the Takae Residents’ Society

When one refers to Okinawa’s anti-base movement, one is in fact speaking of various kinds of actors, philosophies, styles of social activism, and locations. This fact always reminds us of the difficulty of generalizing the characteristics of the Okinawa movement. However, it is still fair to divide local protest movements into two different categories. One is organizational participation and the other one is non-organizational civic participation. In the former case, there are groups affiliated with or derived from political parties, workers’ unions, and student unions. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) and Japan Social Democratic Party (JSDP) are the most notable examples. Besides, these parties have affiliated organizations, such as Okinawa *Tōitsu-ren* for JCP and The Centre for Okinawa Peace Movement for JSDP, that are committed to the Okinawa struggle. Workers’ unions such as the teachers’ union, and prefectural and regional government public servants unions, have also been active in showing their strong presence in protest rallies. Also, Trotskyist student groups from local universities have joined in street protests.

In the case of the second category, the anti-base movement is created by individuals or grassroots activism which is often characterized by loosely connected individual participation. The individuals in non-institutional civic movements often take a distance from the hierarchical collective action led by political parties or unions because of the latter’s structural inflexibility. While they have difficulty in mobilizing participants, they implement a diverse range of anti-base activities that are not restricted by a top-down order.

Issues raised by non-institutional movements are more attached to the everyday life of the locals. Prior to the 2000 Okinawa G8 Summit, the Okinawa Citizens’ Network for Peace (OCNP or *Okinawa Heiwa Shimin Renrakukai*) was established in August 1999 as the umbrella network that mediates the diverse interests of activist groups with the participation

of thirty-three activist groups in Okinawa. This network connects widely diverse social problems such as gender, ecology, local economy, and so forth. Its primary activities are organizing regular meetings and study groups to update participants on the latest situation of the base politics and also circulating information about protest action.

The Takae Resident Society receives support and assistance from both organizational and non-institutional civic networks. The JCP has supported their activism since the Takae protest group was formed. Also, its affiliated organizations such as the Japan Peace Committee, Association of Democratic Medical Doctors, and Co-op are involved. Along with the JCP and affiliated groups, the JSDP and related groups such as Okinawa Teachers and School Staff Union, and Okinawa Peace Movement Centre are also involved with Takae's struggle, sending supporters to join sittings-in. From the non-institutional side, OCNP regularly transports people who wish to join the sit-ins from Naha. Retired people and housewives who are concerned with Takae's ongoing struggle provide free pick-up services for those who do not have cars.

However, one of the distinctive characteristics of Takae's struggle is the participation of individuals who have distinctive subcultural backgrounds and networks. People who come to Takae are often informed of the local protest movement through various channels other than traditional activist networks. One of the main social networks is that of organic farmers from all over Okinawa. As I will mention later in this chapter, there are quite a few members of Takae's protest community who are running organic farms in Higashi Village. These farmers have their own networks inside and outside Okinawa. Together with the organic farmers' network, social networks of local musicians contribute to making Takae's protest distinct. This is also derived from the fact that some community members have careers as professional musicians. As there are quite a few musicians among local protest members, they even launched a band called *Suwarokaazu*. It has two meanings in Japanese: "let's sit!"

and “sitting rock musicians”. By organizing and participating in music concerts inside and outside Takae, the musicians’ networks help to publicize Takae’s struggle to audiences who are not necessarily familiar with the local anti-base movement.²⁷¹ Apart from the farmers’ and musicians’ networks, individual participants come to Takae through various channels. Concerned surfers’ and divers’ communities from coastal areas of Okinawa are an example. Along with them, backpackers and students coming from outside Okinawa also play an important part. Also, retired people come to participate in the sit-ins protest from the rest of Okinawa and Japan.

These social networks are maintained by various kinds of effort to publicize Takae’s struggle to the outside world. Effective use of cyber space including websites, e-mail lists, online broadcasting and electronic pamphlets to publicize the latest situation of Takae is another distinctive feature of this protest campaign. The Takae Residents’ Society always updates the current situation on a weblog called “Yanbaru Takae Now (*Yanbaru Takae no Genjō*)”.²⁷² This weblog has a subscription function for interested people to register their email accounts. Once registered, any information on updates of the weblog is delivered to the designated inbox. Also, with the help of external media such as the Independent Web Journal, actual confrontations with government officials and construction workers are streamed online. Furthermore, an electronic brochure called “Voice of Takae (VOT)” provides basic information in English and Japanese with respect to the helipad construction plan in Takae as well as related problems. Saying “We Need Everyone’s Attention!”, the brochure calls for further help:

²⁷¹ For example, around the time when Takae’s protest movement was formed, a music festival called “Yanbaru Peace Music Festival in Takae” was organised in 2006.

²⁷² The official blog of the Takae Residents’ Society is: <http://takae.ti-da.net/>. The latest information of Takae and its anti-base movement are updated on this blog. Also, other advertisement of the local cultural events are informed through this blog.

Even today as you're reading this, sit-in is taking place in Takae. This area of great nature has become the forefront for the nation heading towards warfare potential, Japan. This is not a particular issue of Takae; the same situation might occur at any time anywhere in Japan and in other parts of the world. The U.S. military and Japan's self-defense forces are steadily combining by wasting our taxes to realign the forces (budget of 3,000 billion yen). So, if only to enable us to guard the future of our children, and to ensure a peaceful future for all, we request your kind attention to this issue!²⁷³

What is important here is that Takae's protest is jointly made by both local and extra-local elements. This synchronisation of local and extra-local elements is expressed more explicitly than in other protest communities in Okinawa. In this regard, we may recall Arturo Escobar's discussion on place in which he criticises the neglect of place in social and human sciences that pursue abstract theories. Based on a close reading of the philosopher Edward Casey, Escobar argues:

... it is our inevitable immersion in place, and not the absoluteness of space, that has ontological priority in the generation of life and the real. It certainly does so in the accounts and practices of most cultures, echoed in the phenomenological assertion that, given the primacy of embodied perception, we always find ourselves in places. We are, in short, placelings. Place has "ontological priority in the generation of life and the real".²⁷⁴

Nevertheless, Escobar does not comfort himself with the notion of place in nostalgic ways that disciplines such as anthropology and Area Studies have sometimes done in the past. His

²⁷³ The Takae Residents' Society, "Voice of Takae": 4.

²⁷⁴ Arturo Escobar, "Culture Sits in Places: Reflections on Globalism and Subaltern Strategies of Localization," *Political Geography* 20 (2001): 143.

intention in highlighting place is to establish an alternative ontological plateau that can replace the problematiques associated with the notion of identity. He argues that:

Place is, of course, constituted by sedimented social structures and cultural practices. Sensing and moving are not presocial; the lived body is the result of habitual cultural and social processes... This means recognizing that place, body, and environment integrate with each other; that places gather things, thoughts, and memories in particular configurations; and that place, more an event than a thing, is characterized by openness rather than by a unitary self-identity... This also means that people are not only “local”; we are all indissolubly linked to both local and extralocal places through what might be called networks.²⁷⁵

This remark can be applied to consider the local and extra-local dimensions of Takae’s struggle. On the one hand, the abundant nature of Yanbaru Forest and the rich history of pacifism in the Okinawa struggle are important factors that shape the ‘local’ aspect of their struggle. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that Takae’s struggle is conducted openly by networking outside the community. In this sense, the local struggle uses extra-local elements as a useful means to serve its own purposes. Furthermore, the “local” residents who started Takae’s struggle include many residents with a “non-local” background: a point I will develop further below.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 143-144.

5.7. Who Are the Locals? Rural Community and “Yosomono”

“Who are the people in the Takae Residents’ Society?” After a few weeks of my stay in Takae, I found myself asking this question. One reason why I began to confront such a question was because the Takae Residents’ Society was such a different community in many respects from many other anti-base groups and communities in Okinawa. First of all, while ageing is a common problem for not just the Japanese population but also for anti-base activists in Okinawa, the Takae Residents’ Society has a high proportion of younger people. While many protest communities in Okinawa are led by people with grey hair who were born around the late 1940s, most of the people in the Takae Residents’ Society were younger than their mid-50s when I visited. Secondly, many of the community members do not have an accent influenced by the local dialect. Some speak a kind of pidgin language of the local dialect and the standard Japanese, and some speak with an Okinawan accent. Contrary to my previous encounters with other protest communities and my stereotypical image of Okinawa’s rural community, these elements made me intrigued about who these people were.

This demographic diversity within Takae’s protest community reflects the fact that the majority of them were born outside Okinawa. Although the actual number is still uncertain, a large number of residents who participated in the Takae struggle are from mainland Japan. To my knowledge, Miyagi Katsumi is the only person who was born and spent most of his life in Takae. The co-founders of the Takae Residents’ Society, Ashimine Gentatsu and Isa Masatsugu, are both native Okinawans, but their wives who also play crucial roles in the community are both from Tokyo. One of the residents in the community, Higa Masato, also has Okinawan parents but was born and raised in Nagoya in Aichi Prefecture as a second generation Okinawan migrant. Apart from them, most of the community members originally came from many different parts of mainland Japan. Some of

them migrated because of this untouched natural environment of Yanbaru Forest before or after 2007 and some came to participate in the anti-base struggle.

The Takae Resident Society contains people from diverse backgrounds. In terms of occupation, they are farmers, teachers, public servants and artists. Most of them came from elsewhere to live in this rural place, attracted by Takae's rich natural environment. One of the senior figures of the protest community, Ashimine Gentatsu, is one of the earliest people among the community members to move into Takae with his family in the early 2000s. Ashimine was born and raised in Naha in the early 1960s. After graduating from a local elementary school, he stopped going to classes in his early teenage years. With "only a graduate certificate from elementary school" (to use his own words) Ashimine started working as a carpenter in his hometown.²⁷⁶ As he became older, Ashimine moved to mainland Japan and lived in Tokyo for several years working as a house builder. After coming back to Okinawa, he lived in different parts of Okinawa including remote islands. It was in the early 2000s that he moved with his wife and their children to Takae, where they started organic farming. When they first visited Takae, Ashimine was mesmerized by the forest, which also used to exist in his hometown, Naha, before it was industrialized. Particularly, his favorite spot was near the headwaters of Arakawa Creek. Fortunately, he could buy an abandoned farm for an "extremely cheap price." While living in a van, Ashimine built his house and café near the creek in the middle of the deep Yanbaru Forest. The café was named "Yamagame", which means a "water jar in the mountain". This name shows his attachment to the rich natural environment of Yanbaru Forest, which is one of the main water supplies for the rest of Okinawa. When the residents established No Helipad Takae Resident Society in 2007, Ashimine participated as a founding member. His participation was based on a very simple reason. He felt that this place of dreams embraced

²⁷⁶ Interview with Ashimine Gentsu, 28 Jan, 2012.

by Yanbaru Forest would disappear once construction started. Without any experience of social activism, this was how his life as a “protesting local resident” (*jimoto hantai jyūmin*) began.

Another senior figure of the community, Morioka Kōji, is also running an organic farm. He was born and raised in downtown Tokyo in the late 1970s. While he lived in Tokyo, he was known as a guitarist in the indie music scene. After working in many different kinds of jobs while continuing his career as an indie musician, Morioka had some financial problems with what he describes as “troublesome people.” So he decided to quit all previous jobs including music, and left Tokyo. After travelling to various countries in Asia, he came back to Japan, and he met his future wife, who studied natural farming under a pioneer of the “natural farming method”, Fukuoka Masanobu.²⁷⁷ They moved together to Takae in the early 2000s. Despite the great environment, living by natural farming in Takae was not easy. The problem was the poor quality of the soil for raising vegetables: “when I first started farming here, it was stony so almost no one expected that I could succeed in producing crops.”²⁷⁸ Yet, after years of experience, Morioka’s farm land began to grow produce such as potatoes, cabbages, lettuce, radishes and so on. This story was well-known in the village, and impressed other community dwellers. They said Morioka’s farm made tomatoes out of stones.

Among the younger community members, Shimizu Akira is a unique character in the community. He was born in Tokyo to a family of medical doctors. His brothers were all educated in order to follow their father’s career. It was only Shimizu who refused to walk on

²⁷⁷ Fukuoka Masanobu (1913-2008) is one of the earliest advocates of “natural farming”, a type of organic farming method. Fukuoka’s natural farming is characterized by four principles, which are “no cultivation of farmland”, “no fertilisation”, “no pesticide”, and “no weeding”. One of the main inventions of Fukuoka is a ball of soil mixed with various different types of seeds and clay called *nendo bōru* or seed ball. In fact, this seed ball contains a small amount of non-chemical fertilizer. He planted this ball in designated areas and let some of the seeds grow. As his farming method relies largely on the power of the soil and minimum human intervention, it was called natural farming to distinguish it from other organic farming methods. Fukuoka’s seed ball was later adopted in various countries to restore natural environment in deforested areas.

²⁷⁸ Interview with Morioka Kōji, January 28, 2012.

the same path as his other family members. Instead, he chose to study painting at an art college. His rejection of family tradition was so determined that he left the family house and chose to live as a homeless person in various places including by a riverside in Tokyo. One day, Shimizu learnt the story of Takae from his friend. So he took a trip to visit the community in the late 2000s, and he somehow began to settle in. He acts as a child carer in the community. While other members are working on farms, he takes care of their children. He is also the manager of *tūtan-ya* and the accommodation for the visitors.

The director of the No Helipad Takae Resident Society, Takahashi Masahiro, is one of the younger members of the community. Although Takahashi is relatively young, he has been in this position as director since 2010. Born and raised in the northern part of Japan, Sendai City, Takahashi withdrew from high school after attending only a few months. When I asked him why he chose to leave school, he quietly said “I only aimed to pass the exam and enter that prestigious high school. I liked their school culture. But once I entered, I lost my interest in that school.”²⁷⁹ After working in his local town a few years, he travelled around China and mainland Southeast Asian countries. His encounter with the hamlet of Takae was accidental. He was travelling Okinawa to learn its traditional string-musical instrument called *sanshin*. With his modest and mature personality, he did not take long to become popular among other community members. When the protest movement heated up in the late 2000s, Takahashi was asked by Ashimine to stay in Takae longer and also to work for the Residents’ Society as the Director. However, he refused Ashimine’s offer at first. He felt that the job was too responsible for an outsider like him. So he left Takae with ambivalent feelings of affection with its community and embarrassment to be involved with internal communal matters. Takahashi came back to Takae a year later in 2009. However, Takahashi still does

²⁷⁹ Interview with Takahashi Masahiro, January 28, 2012.

not feel comfortable to act as director. Although he is clearly trusted by the community, he often describes himself as “*yosomono* (outsider)”.

Takahashi’s self-recognition as “outsider” is not only his personal story but it is actually a key term which characterizes the unique membership of the Takae Residents’ Society. Many of the Takae’s protest community members in Takae are “*yosomono*”, in that they came from elsewhere in Japan. Individual and group participants who are called “supporters (*shiensha*)” are also outsiders who regularly or irregularly visit Takae to participate in sit-in. Although their level of commitment varies depending on the individual and their circumstances, some of those non-resident participants from mainland Japan stay in Takae for several months. The notion of Okinawan ethnic identity cannot really encompass the nature of this movement in Takae. On the contrary, careless use of the discourse of ethnicity creates tension within the community (a point which we will discuss more fully in the following chapter). In order to re-examine the commonality that connects the diversity of Takae’s movement, we need to consider alternative frameworks based on the subtle balance of locality and extra-locality.²⁸⁰

The discourse of “*yosomono*” or “outsider” is important not only to highlight the diversity of the membership. It also characterizes the Takae Residents’ Society in relation to other residents in Takae who do not participate in the protest movement. In fact, the term is often used by other local Takae residents to differentiate themselves from the protest community members. Although the demography of Higashi Village has been changing dynamically since the beginning of the modern period, there is a clear line between the local villagers who are involved with the protest movement and those who are not using the notion

²⁸⁰ Kosuzu Abe, “Kurikaeshi Kwaru: Okinawa ni okeru Chokusetu Kōdō no Genzai-shinkōkei”.

of “insider” and “outsider”.²⁸¹ Locals who disagree with the protest community use the term “old residents” (*furui jūmin*) to refer to themselves and “new residents” (*atarashii jūmin*) for those who join the sit-in movement. Those “old” and “new” are not merely temporal classification but those terms also differentiate people who know the history of the difficult environment of Takae and those who are newly settled in the village. For “old residents”, newcomers are people who do not understand the experiences and the history of the village from the days when the locals still made their living mainly by forestry and by cultivating new fields.

This is also related to the local experience under US influence. For many villagers, the US military had been perceived not only as enemy or threat but also as modernizer of Takae’s backward infrastructure, making roads and installing electricity. It is true that there were many tragic incidents which happened between the local residents and US military, such as an old woman who was shot by US soldiers when she walked in the Yanbaru Forest. Also, there was a case where a house was burnt without any apparent reason by Americans. The most notorious problem concerns the Vietnam War period, when some locals were required to play the role of Vietnamese guerrillas for the training purposes of the US Marine Corps. However, as journalist Mikami Chie notes, some villagers say that the relationship between the locals and Americans was one of “give-and-take”. Therefore, for many of those

²⁸¹ According to the official history of the village, Higashi Village experienced mass mobility of people several times. The first mass settlement of people in this region occurred in the nineteenth century. After the Ryūkyū Disposal, the warriors who did not own their lands moved to Yanbaru to develop the area. This movement was encouraged by Okinawa Prefecture from the 1890s until the early twentieth century. Having an intention to increase the population of the region, the Okinawa government provided financial support for those who moved to the northern part of the island. These early settlers were mostly engaged in the forestry industry. The second mass movement of people to Yanbaru region occurred during the Battle of Okinawa. They were refugees who fled to the northern Yanbaru from south and central parts of Okinawa such as Naha and Yomitan Village. The exact number is still uncertain. However, the local official history introduced an episode by a war survivor who considered that nearly 100,000 people came from the South. During the final stages of the war, most of these refugees and the local residents were kept in the camps such as Taira by the Allied Powers. However, there was a number of people who experienced the end of the war in the forest.

who lived in Takae over decades, the Takae Residents' Society does not represent all residents. However, the separation of "old residents" and "new residents" is not fixed. Even among "old residents", there are people involved with the protest movement such as Miyazato Katsuya. Also, there are quite a few Takae residents who are sympathetic to the sit-in community.²⁸²

Through the lens of "*yosomono*" or "outsider", we can understand what makes Takae's protest community. It is not only made of Okinawans and Okinawan identity but also of attachment to a specific locale within Okinawa. As Masamichi Inoue reveals by examining the case of the local protest movement in Henoko, so too in Takae the notion of "Okinawan identity" alone has limits in effectively mobilizing people and resources. Therefore we need to consider alternative concepts which can be more appropriate to frame the identity of a local protest community. The notion of "outsider" becomes a key to understand this issue. While the term is often used to separate Okinawan from the mainland Japanese in the mainstream narrative of the Okinawa struggle, in the case of Takae the term also includes newly settled Okinawans who do not share the local history as their own experience. In this sense, new residents from Okinawa such as Ashimine and Isa and from mainland Japan such as Takahashi and Morioka are all "outsiders" for the majority of Takae residents who do not participate in the movement. Although lack of effective support from the majority of other villagers is a problem because of their nature as marginal within the peripheral village, it shows rather clearly why this small communal movement by Takae's new residents attracts many participants from all over Japan and elsewhere and how their relatively inclusive and network-based community was created. Most of the *shiensha* or supporters who visit and stay in Takae are informed of the local protest community through their social and cultural networks. In other words, one of the key factors that develops Takae's protest community is

²⁸² Taku Morizumi and Chie Mikami, "Okinawa Takae Yanbaru de Ikiru," (Tokyo: Kōbunken, 2014): 127-128.

the pre-existing personal networks that those “outsiders” established before they moved into Takae.



Image 5-7. A farm in Takae. The photo was taken by the author in December 2011.

5.8. Affective Community

If conventional explanations of the Okinawa struggle can only partially explain Takae's struggle, what are the other elements that explain communal values in the struggle?

Sociologist Abe Kosuzu recently presented an important analysis in this regard. Through long-term participation as an activist as well as researcher, she focuses upon subcultural elements as key components for making Takae's struggle community. While Okinawan identity based on ethnicity and the historical narrative of colonial Okinawa emphasizes social cooperation, a focus on subcultures provides us with a microscope to see other layers of mutuality among community members. Abe raises the examples of shared subcultures in Takae such as music and naturalism (e.g. Do It Yourself, organic farming, and refusal of consumerism and chemical products in everyday life). Although these elements have not been much discussed in relation to the Okinawa struggle, they are surely important in understanding the intimacy of Takae's protest community. Raising these affective elements, Abe emphasizes the intimate relationships of *friendship*.²⁸³

In the earlier part of this chapter, I mentioned some examples of the local practices of intimacy. A senior community member, Ashimine, is one of the practitioners of DIY culture. With his skills as a house builder, he has built his house, motels and a café around Takae by himself. Morioka is another person who built his own house once he settled in. One of the co-representatives of the Takae Residents' Society, Isa Masatsugu, is a further good example. He is one of the few remaining artisans who professionally make traditional Okinawan spiritual tablets called *tōtōme*. But besides his work, Isa built his own studio near his house after he settled in this new environment. Nevertheless, I do not intend to merely introduce people who make their own living place. The important point is that their DIY culture is

²⁸³ Kosuzu Abe, "Kurikaeshi Kwaru: Okinawa ni okeru Chokusetu Kōdō no Genzai Shinkōkei," 68.

closely associated with their naturalistic philosophy and avoidance of modern chemical products in everyday life. For example, most houses in Takae are not connected to a sewage system. They are designed to only store waste water underground or leak water through drains. In either case, the waste water is most likely to be absorbed to the ground. Therefore, it is harmful for the surrounding natural environment if the local residents use chemical products such as synthetic detergent or mass-produced shampoos. When I asked what they use for washing, for example, Ashimine said that he and his family use additive-free soap made of rice bran.

Nevertheless, it is also important to remind us of the fact that the community is not totally removed from modern urban social life. The Takae community offers synthetic detergent and other popular daily products for visitors and use various kinds of electric products. However, the important point is to focus on their critical concerns with popular social life. As shown in some of the personal episodes earlier, most of the community members were previously city dwellers at some stage of their lives, but experienced discomfort with a highly industrialized way of life. From this perspective, it is fair to argue that their discomfort with urban life was derived from a sense of excessively fabricated state of production and consumption. Instead, what they wanted was immediate or intimate relationships with their life world including economic activity such as production, exchange and consumption. It is those affective aspects that connect Takae's protest community members.

In this sense, as Abe carefully discusses, Takae's protest is characteristic of the contemporary wave of anti-base movements in the Okinawa struggle. Like the Henoko protest, Takae's protest community can also be categorized as an environmental movement to protect nature (in this case the beautiful Yanbaru Forest). Yet, it is equally important to remind ourselves that Takae's struggle is not separate from other anti-base struggles in

Okinawa. On the contrary, the Takae protestors learn from Okinawa's past struggles through the experience of conducting their sit-in. Exchanges of ideas with experienced Okinawan activists are a crucial social practice in Takae. The participation in sit-in represents a conscious continuation of Okinawa's conventional way of peaceful direct action. These social practices induce the protestors to imagine the voices of Okinawa's past.²⁸⁴ From this perspective, it is evident that the conventional narrative of the Okinawa struggle still plays a vital role. In other words, the narratives and experiences of the Okinawan people in the past are embedded and actualised in the community members through their direct experiences of sit-in.

5.9. "Flowers in A Dream"

Lastly, I would like to introduce one further example of Takae's communal practice. As I mentioned earlier, music plays a crucial role in making organic relationships among community members. There are quite a few local residents who are skilled performers of musical instruments of many kinds—guitars, *sanshin*, drums, and so forth. The genres of music they play cover a wide range including folk music, classic and contemporary Okinawan songs, and improvisation. Some of those whom I introduced above have been professional performers. Thus, in community building and developing social bonding among with each other, music often appears to work to strengthen local identity. Nevertheless, I also need to stress that music is not only working inwardly but also outwardly. That is, the local residents use music as a means to deliver the the message of the ongoing local struggle of Takae to people outside. In this sense, music plays a crucial role as a medium that connects the community and the outside world.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., 80-90.

The following song called “*Yume no Hana*” (Flowers in A Dream) is one which I heard during my stay in Takae—most often at drinking parties after meetings by seniors at *tūtan-ya*. The song is originally composed by Shimizu, who has never been professionally trained as a musician. Nevertheless, this unsophisticated song with an uncharacteristically plain rhythm performed on the *sanshin* soon became a popular song among other community members due to its easy melody and friendly lyrics. The song has become a favourite not only because of its peaceful aura but also because of the fact that it has a message that reflects the spiritual dimension of the locals in Takae towards destruction of their livelihood space. This song acknowledges the diverse natural habitat that the locals live with, and thus gives us an insight into the elements that motivate and unite the local residents to join the anti-base movement, and helps us to see how a local livelihood space has turned into a “protest community”.

“*Yume no Hana*” (Flowers in A Dream)

If I see a dream, I would walk to it

(*Yume wo mitara soko e aruitetteshimau*)

So I want a dream

(*Dakara yume wa taisetsu*)

Once I thought the shape of a rainbow is semicircular

(*Niji wa hanbun to omotte itakedo*)

But I saw a circular one

(*Marui niji wo mitayo*)

If I see a dream, I would walk to it

(*Yume wo mitara soko e aruitetteshimau*)

We can do it, walk

(*Watashitachi wa dekiru, aruku koto ga*)

Don't give up, let's see a dream

(*Akiramenaide yume wo miyō*)

Don't rush, let's walk


(*Murishinaide arukō*)

5.10. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have examined contemporary characteristics of Okinawa's anti-base movement using the example of the protest community in Takae. As mentioned earlier, Takae, together with Henoko, is another "focal point" of the debates on the base relocation in Okinawa. Based on Yakabi and Okamoto's approach, my question was how people organize a protest community without emphasising conventional Okinawan identity. In other words, the major concern of this chapter was how a protest community is made by people who redefine their membership between locality and extra-locality. In order to examine this issue, I employed social networks, local spirituality and affective relationships such as friendship as alternative useful concepts to analyze the case of Takae's struggle. Through the lens of those concepts, this chapter demonstrates what form local communal identity is and how it is created and practised. In the next chapter, I shall consider the unique collectivity of Takae's protest community in relation to local, national and global base politics. In doing so, I aim to identify both the vulnerability and resilience of this community, which has become a crucial node of transnational anti-base civic struggle.

Chapter Six

Yanbaru and Recreating “Okinawan Identity”



The photo was taken by the author at Henoko Beach in November 2011.

6.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed some distinctive aspects of the current protest community in Takae. By analyzing the Takae Residents' Society in terms of actors, lived experiences and their social practices, I discussed how the local movement is created by people across diverse social backgrounds, their social networks and their attachment to the place. Facing a crisis of their local livelihood due to the base construction how does the Takae Residents' Society articulate the notion of "Okinawan identity" to promote their ongoing local struggle against state violence? What is "Okinawan identity" for the protest community in Takae? How does this discourse of cultural identity function for the local activists? Also, how do the local protesters use or differentiate themselves from the discourse of "Okinawan identity"? By illustrating the dynamics of the political and social environment around the local protest community, in this chapter I analyze the complicated relationship of the Takae Residents' Society to "Okinawan identity".

6.2. "Authorized Entry Only": ODB and Governing the Yanbaru Forest

Takae is located in the highlands of the Yanbaru ranges, so mornings in Takae's winter are colder than in the southern cities. It is also much quieter than the south. With few cars driving on the street, I could hear birdsong in the distance, including the endangered Okinawa woodpecker (or *noguchigera* in Japanese). However, one day in mid-November 2011, the heavy roar of cars broke the morning silence.

"That must be *Bōeikyoku*. They're heading to the tents," said an elderly man with large glasses.

This man was Tomihisa from Kanagawa, who is one of those who visit Takae regularly as a supporter (*shiensha*). We rushed to the tents of the sit-in in front of the construction site.

When we arrived at the N-4 tents, I saw a few small trucks and white vans parked on one side of the road, and protesters sitting quietly on the other side of the road. With their hand-made barricade with ropes, wires and cars, they were facing a group of men in white working clothes and helmets. These men in the working uniform were officers from Okinawa Defense Bureau (ODB). Today, the ODB (or *Okinawa Bōeikyoku* in Japanese) is one of the eight regional defense bureaus, which are in charge of administration with regard to the defense facilities under the Minister of Defense. These regional defense bureaus were originally established in 1947 under Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA). Its mission was to supply materials and build facilities for the US occupation forces around Japan. The local branch in Okinawa was established after Okinawa's return to Japan in 1972. Following the establishment of the Japanese Ministry of Defense (JMD) in 2007, DFAA and the regional bureaus were incorporated as part of JMD and the ODB became the main administrative body that plans and implements the policy related to the US base facilities in Okinawa Prefecture. The ODB is not only working for the US bases in Okinawa. It also plays a central role to connect the local infrastructure companies and the JMD and the US bases in Okinawa. The ODB is the responsible government agency that organizes tenders for the construction works related to the US and Japanese Self-Defense Forces to the local construction firms and supervises construction processes.

“Authorized entry only in this area. Please leave this place,” a senior ODB officer pronounced through a loudspeaker to the protesters who were conducting the sit-in at the gate of the construction site.

There were about fifteen ODB officers confronting the protesters. The protesters were looking down at the ground on which they were sitting. None of them replied to the call from the ODB officers. Following their leader's statement, the younger officers repeated exactly the same words to the protesters. “This is a private area. Please remove your cars...”

“Authorized entry only in this area. Please leave this place...” Surprisingly, they repeated the same sentences over and over again. From early in the morning until noon, this endless chanting lasted for several hours. Another group of ODB officers held a small video camera, filming the protesters from the back of the trucks.

Behind the ODB officers were a group of men in blue jackets and baseball caps. Some were wearing blue vests saying “Police” in English. These officers were sent from the Okinawa Prefectural Police. Like the ODB officers, the police officers were also recording the protesters with video cameras. However, these two public authorities came to Takae for different purposes. While ODB came to open the gate to the construction site, the police officers’ main job was to monitor the protesters. Standing separated from the ODB and the protesters, they were monitoring whether the people’s protest action was practised without violating legal regulations. According to the Act called *Keitokuhō*,²⁸⁵ unauthorised entry to the local US military bases is strictly prohibited. In Takae’s case, the protesters are not allowed to go beyond the gate of the helipad construction site, which is recognized as state-owned land by the Japanese government. Also, the people involved with the sit-in are not allowed to occupy public roads during the protest campaign. The space the protesters use for the sit-in is limited to the land between the gate and the driveways. Within those regulations, freedom of expression is one of the very few legal rights which they can mobilize in their direct protest action. However, those who conduct the sit-in are usually quiet. Senior protesters are worried about possible unexpected physical clashes between the protesters and

²⁸⁵ *Keitokuhō* is an abbreviation of *Nihon-koku to Amerika-koku tonō aida no Sōgo Kyōryoku oyobi Anzen Hoshō Jōyaku Dai-rokujō ni Motozuku Shisetsu oyobi Kuiki narabini Nihon-koku ni okeru Gasshūkoku no Chi-i ni Kansuru Kyōtei no Jisshi ni Tomonau Keiji Tokubetsu Hō*. (Act to Provide for the Special Criminal Act pertaining to the Enforcement of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan)

the ODB. Therefore, when Takahashi Masahiro, Director of the Takae Residents' Society, saw me arrive at the tent, he told me strictly not to say anything and sit quietly.

The protesters were all sitting silently. Some of them were looking up at the faces of the ODB officers, and some were looking down to the ground. Some of them were smoking cigarettes, and some were eating their breakfast. Yet, they were all equally silent. These silent people formed a human chain to barricade the entrance of the helipad construction sites. The major concern among senior members of the protest group is the possibility that some participants might violate a law or give some excuse for the ODB and the police to justify forceful dismantling of the protest. Therefore, sitting quietly is the safest. When the protesters are tired of listening to the ODB officers, or when they want to stretch their legs, people leave the barricade line and go to one of the nearby tents. Although the protesters usually do not have any physical contact with the ODB, their silent protest action required stamina and is stressful for the participants.



Image 6-1. Officers from Okinawa Defence Bureau facing the local residents and supporters. Two elderly women wearing straw hats are playing Okinawan traditional songs on *sanshin* in order to drown out the voices of the ODB officers. The photo was taken by the author in February 2012.



Image 6-2. Okinawa Prefectural Police officers monitoring protestors. The photo was taken by the author in February 2012.

6.3. “*Go Home Yamatū*”: The Tanaka Incident and the Meaning of “Japaneseness”

Being Director of the ODB is one of the most challenging positions for defense bureaucrats. However, it is also one of the best ways to climb the career ladder. Tanaka Satoshi took over this position in August 2011. This elite bureaucrat in his 50s was widely regarded as ambitious and self-confident. Graduating from Osaka University, one of the most prestigious Japanese universities, Tanaka carved out his career as an elite bureaucrat mainly in the management of the defense facilities in regional areas, including Okinawa. After the previous Director of the ODB, Manabe Rō, resigned earlier in the month due to his long service as the Head, the newly appointed regional director was sent not merely to oversee construction work in Henoko and Takae but also to resolve this difficult work that had been delayed for many years because of the local protest campaign.

A few months after his appointment, on 28 November 2011, Tanaka organized an informal dinner session with journalists. As the local delegate from the JMD, his main mission was to help restart the building process of the off-shore landing zone in Ōura Bay in Henoko and Takae in Yanbaru, which was suspended in this transition period of the Head of the ODB. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government had gained wide support from Okinawan progressive camps during the national election campaign in December 2009 because its manifesto included a promise to close Futenma Airbase without building substitute military facilities in Okinawa. But the leadership radically changed its national security policy after the Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio resigned, admitting that the DPJ's manifesto had been unrealistic. Instead of pursuing its initial policy, the DPJ government shifted its policy and agreed to follow the SACO (Special Action Committee of Okinawa) agreement signed by the leaders of the previous LDP government with Washington back in 1996. The Japanese Minister of Defense, Ichikawa Yasuo, was desperate to progress the base construction in Henoko and Takae. The Japanese government was planning to submit an

environmental assessment of Henoko in order to get approval to start construction from the Governor of Okinawa, Nakaima Hirokazu.²⁸⁶

In this context, Tanaka was dispatched to Okinawa with expectations not only from the Japanese government, but also from the US. Tanaka's informal drink session with invited journalists from approximately 10 different companies was designed as an opportunity to exchange frank conversation with them. During the conversation, some journalists asked Tanaka about the possible schedule for submitting an environmental assessment report to Governor Nakaima. The Defense Minister, Ichikawa, had said that the Japanese government planned to submit this by the end of the year. All the journalists who joined that evening were keen to know when the government planned to submit the report. However, Tanaka did not provide any more information than the official announcement. Thus, some of the participants asked why the information needed to be kept from the public. In response, Tanaka asked the journalists, "If you were planning to assault [or rape] someone, would you tell them in advance?" (*Korekara okasu mae ni okasu to iimasuka?*) As this was a statement at an "informal" drink session, most of the media did not publicise Tanaka's comment, but the local Okinawan newspaper, the *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, did report his words. Its editorial board recognized that "this statement is a matter of public interest."²⁸⁷ Soon after the editorial board decided to publicize this news, an extra edition was printed. Following the *Ryūkyū Shimpō*, another major local newspaper the *Okinawa Times* also covered Tanaka's statement on the front page the next morning. (See Image 6-3) Reflecting on this statement, the Headquarters

²⁸⁶ The Environment Impact Assessment Act (*Kankyō Eikyō Hyōka Hō*) was passed in 1997 to define the legal process of the construction of the mass infrastructural facilities. Based on this law, the business operator is obliged to conduct an assessment of the possible environmental impact caused by the construction of mass infrastructure, to create the report on the result of the assessment and to submit the report to the government and other related public agencies. This law has regulatory power to affect the ways of conducting construction of mass public facilities such as dams, roads, power plants, airports etc.

²⁸⁷ Anon, "'Okasumae ni luka'Tanaka Bōeikyokuchō Henoko Hyōkasho Teishutsu meguri,'" *Ryūkyū Shimpō* (29 November 2011), accessed July 20, 2015, <http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-184598-storytopic-3.html>.

of JMD in Tokyo decided to force Tanaka to step down from his position only a few months after his appointment.

In Japanese, the term “*okasu*” has different meanings depending on the circumstances. Generally, it implies acts to violate laws and morals. Yet in more specific contexts, it can also mean to assault (including in the sense of sexual assault). In the context of the Okinawan anti-base movement, the word comes to have an even more particular meaning. The term evokes the rape incident committed by three US military personnel in 1995, the memory of which is far from disappearing from people’s minds. Immediately after the news was reported, Tanaka’s statement was interpreted as a rapist’s threat. The *Okinawa Times*’ headline was “the abuse against women”. Along with people involved with environmental activist groups who opposed restarting off-shore base construction, Okinawan feminists came to the frontline of the protest campaign. There were a number of protest demonstrations and meetings around early December of 2012. University students and faculty members from local universities held several symposia on the issue. Workers’ unions, peace activist groups, and progressive political parties organized street demonstrations in front of the Prefectural Government building and the headquarters of ODB in Kadena City. Local political leaders such as the Governor of Okinawa, Nakaima Masahiro, also expressed deep disappointment with Tanaka’s statement.²⁸⁸ Although the number of participants was not great compared to the protest campaign in 1995, Tanaka’s careless statement triggered an island-wide protest campaign across political lines.

“Take your bases back home, *nihonjin* (Japanese)!”

“Die, *yamatū* (Japanese)!”

²⁸⁸ *Ryūkyū Shimpō* special edition (November 29, 2011), accessed July 20, 2015, <http://ryukyushimpo.jp/uploads/img4ed4c0f19f4c7.pdf>.

One of the senior activists who is also a famous Christian pastor, Shimada Zenji, shouted these words through an amplifier during the street demonstration in Naha. Not only Shima but also many Okinawan citizens were extremely frustrated with the DPJ, which they once voted for, hoping that this new ruling party would implement the base relocation to outside Okinawa as promised in its manifesto. Even after Tanaka's dismissal, the people's anger in Okinawa did not seem to calm. The sentiment of betrayal by the DPJ was expressed in aggressive words not only against the government but also against the Japanese people as a whole.



Image 6-3. Okinawa Taimusu (Okinawa Times), reporting Tanaka's statement, 30 November 2011.



Image 6-4. Protest in front of the Headquarters of the ODB in Kadena, 30 November 2011.



「不適切発言」について議論を交わすパネリスト
たち＝8日、琉球大学

「沖縄支配の意識表出」

琉大不適切発言シンポ 批判相次ぐ

田中聡前沖縄防衛局長の不適切発言について意見を交わす「緊急シンポジウム」が8日、琉球大学であった。パネリストからは、官僚だけでなく、日米両政府に根付く沖縄への差別意識を批判する声が相次いだ。主催は、県内大学の研究者らでつくる「合意しないプロジェクト」。

琉球大学法文学部の新城郁夫教授は、田中前局長が米軍普天間飛行場移設問題に重ねて発言したことを問

題視。「米国の軍事戦略を推進する日本政府の姿勢を表した発言。日米両政府の軍事同盟が沖縄との分断を生み出し、植民地意識につながっている」と構造的な差別を解説した。

同大の阿部小涼准教授は、田中前局長の発言に対する仲井真弘多知事の「口が汚れる」というコメントについて「自分は汚されていない、被害者ではない」という意識の表れだ」と立事者意識をただした。

また、同大学院修士生の田崎真奈美さん、ひろしま女性学研究所長の高雄きくえさんも登壇した。

Image 6-5. A newspaper article reporting about a symposium held by concerned scholars, feminist activists and students on Tanaka's statement, 8 December 2011.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁹ Okinawa Times, 9 Dec 2011.

6.4. “*Bōeikyoku, Go Home!*”: Takae and the Meaning of “Japaneseness”

The Tanaka incident also changed the atmosphere of the Takae anti-helipad movement. As the base relocation plan was directly related to the future of Takae as well as Henoko, the Residents’ Society also raised their voices. With the help of experienced senior activists, the Director of the Residents’ Society, Takahashi, wrote a protest statement and disseminated it immediately to other protest communities in Okinawa. Beginning by saying that Tanaka’s forced resignation was “unavoidable”, the statement accused the Japanese government of appointing “a terribly barbaric bureaucrat” (*osorubeki yaban na kanryō*) as the person responsible for overseeing the base construction in Henoko and Takae amid the serious confrontation between the Japanese government and the people in Okinawa Prefecture.²⁹⁰

Yet the release of the statement was not the end. In contrast to the silent sit-ins which had occurred until then, some senior activists in Takae started raising their voices. On the streets, they yelled directly at the ODB officers. One of these activists who lifted his voice using a loudspeaker was Yamashiro Hiroji. Yamashiro is originally the Director of a Naha-based activist group called Okinawa Peace Movement Centre, which is affiliated with the Japanese Social Democratic Party. He is also one of the most well-regarded peace activists in Okinawa, and has run for the national parliamentary election. Since the Takae struggle started in 2007, Yamashiro became one of the most frequent visitors to the protest site. Moreover, he plays a role as a senior advisor for the protest campaign in Takae. He shouted at ODB officers that no one any longer trusts the ODB’s words about reducing “the burden of the bases” in Okinawa.

²⁹⁰ The content of the protest statement is available from Shun Medoruma, *Uminari no Shima kara*, <http://blog.goo.ne.jp/awamori777/e/17b5782ba00668264bc38c75477b2e0b>.

His shouts were so loud that the ODB officers started blocking their ears with their hands, but Yamashiro did not stop. He then shouted:

“ODB, go home! Protect our Yanbaru Forest!” (*Bōeikyoku wa kaere! Yanbaru no mori wo mamore!*)

Other protestors joined in, and, confronted by the chorus of voices, the ODB officers retreated to their vans and then left. After that, they did not come back for several weeks, returning only in late December. It was a small moment of victory for the protestors.

The Tanaka incident not only intensified the tension between the protestors and their opponents but it also changed the methods of the protest. As I mentioned earlier, the protest around this period became more vocal, rather than only having people silently sitting on the ground. People such as Yamashiro did not choose their words randomly. These experienced activists were careful in their choice of expressions. For example, Yamashiro and his fellow protestors shouted “Okinawans will not be betrayed by Japanese government”, and “Okinawans are all angry with you [ODB and Japanese government]”. These words express the adversarial relationship between Okinawan people and Japanese. However, it is important to note a major difference between the words that Yamashiro used in Takae and those used by Shimada in Naha. In the Takae protests, the term “Japanese” was always used in combination with “government”, whereas people such as Shimada in Naha used the term to mean “Japanese people and government” during the demonstration in Naha. As Richard Siddle says, the meaning of “Okinawan identity” is complicated and used differently even among Okinawan anti-base activists.²⁹¹ The differences between Yamashiro's and Shimada's protest slogans exemplifies the complexity of the term “Japanese” in relation to “Okinawan”.

²⁹¹ For contested understanding of the history of Okinawa, see, for example, Richard Siddle, “Colonialism and Identity in Okinawa before 1945,” *Japanese Studies* 18 (1998): 117–33.

Also, it is important to consider how the local protesters express not only anger with the Japanese government but also attachment to their local space. In this context, the Yanbaru Forest becomes a symbol of their local environment to protect from destruction. The words “protect our Yanbaru Forest” are a key expression of the reason or legitimation for conducting their protest in Takae. As Masamichi Inoue finds in the local struggle in Henoko, what we can understand from the Takae struggle is that the local protesters have a different communal identity that cannot be covered by any monolithic notion of “Okinawan identity”. Takae’s communal identity and Okinawan identity overlap in many respects. But Takae’s communal protest campaign is conducted by “the Takae residents” against the “ODB” and “Japanese government”, whereas in some other cases “Okinawan identity” is pitted against a unitary “Japan” (including government and people) to condemn Japan’s indifference and discriminatory policy on the base problems in Okinawa. Therefore, from this perspective, the divisive notion of “Japanese” and “Okinawans” are considered as highly sensitive words in Takae.

It is true that when the local Okinawans shout a vulgar statement against “Japanese” to criticize the current political situation in Okinawa, they say that it clears their minds temporarily. Also, it is fair to argue that Okinawa’s subordinated situation under the Japan–US security system has historical roots in the outset of Okinawa’s incorporation by the Japanese in 1879. From this perspective, we can understand the reason why such a divisive term is still effective among the local activists. However, what complicates our understanding of the local identity is that people like Shimada who shouted hostility against Japan are not necessarily supporters of Okinawa’s independence movement. Also, their communities are not always exclusive towards the mainland Japanese. In fact, Shimada has been the representative of a protest community, *Futenma Bakuon Soshōdan* (the Citizens against the Noise from Futenma Airbase), which consisted not only of Okinawans but also some

mainland Japanese. In this sense, although it tends to be simply considered as divisive and antagonistic statement against the rest of the Japanese outside Okinawa, this interpretation represents little of the actual intention of Shimada's accusation. Rather, we always need to remind ourselves of the political context of Okinawa in which people like Shimada have to use the term "Japanese".



Image 6-6. An elderly woman begging ODB officers to stop construction of the helipad. The photo was taken by the author in December 2011.

6.5. “We *Uchinānchu*”²⁹² and Takae

After the Tanaka incident ignited the island-wide protest campaign, the number of visitors to Takae increased. Many of these visitors came on one-day trips from the southern cities of Okinawa. After hearing or reading about Takae’s anti-helipad construction campaign, they came to visit, usually on weekends. One day in mid-December 2012, a middle aged couple from the Oroku district of Naha visited our tent. Yamashiro, Kosuzu, Takahashi and myself were there at the time. As always, Takahashi politely welcomed the visitors with tea. As he sipped his tea, the visitor from Naha started to talk about the Tanaka incident, saying “That was terrible statement”. He then went on to say that the *Yamatū* (Japanese) have never changed.

Listening to this man speaking about his old days in which he often participated in demonstrations and a “zigzag rally”, Yamashiro, who is also middle-aged, just nodded quietly.²⁹³ Although Yamashiro spent his college life in Tokyo, he is one of the best-known activists in Okinawa and has participated in various different demonstrations first as a main organizer of the prefectural government union and then the Director of his NGO for almost three decades. Following Yamashiro, others also remained quiet.

“By the way, are you *uchinānchu* (an Okinawa-origin person)?” the man asked, looking at Kosuzu.

“No.” she responded.

“Yeah, that’s what I thought. You don’t look like us.”

²⁹² *Uchinānchu* is an Okinawan vernacular word, which means Okinawan people. This word is composed of two different words “*Uchinā*” (which means “Okinawa”), and “*nchu*” (which means person). It is often used among locals to call themselves or express their cultural identity.

²⁹³ The zigzag Rally, or zigzag demo, is a type of protest demonstration which was popular among student activists during the 1960s and 1970s. Occupying streets, participants proceed while marching from one corner of the street to the other.

Having been a core member since the Takae Residents' Society was founded, she was obviously irritated by this comment. He then asked the same questions to Takahashi and myself. When he found out neither of us is from Okinawa, he sighed. It appeared that this middle-aged man lamented the fact that the Takae's anti-helipad movement had been led by the mainlanders. After this man's lament, silence enveloped us. Yamashiro still kept a warm smile but looked a little disappointed. Yet, the silence also made the man frown. This uneasy exchange reflected the fact that the man from Naha was an outsider in Takae, whereas a number of those active in this protest community (such as Kosuzu and Takahashi) are not *uchinānchu*.

This might not be a particularly surprising episode. Nevertheless, the episode indicates the delicate balance which underlies the local struggle in Takae. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, the identity of the Takae Residents' Society is primarily defined by the sense of belonging to this specific land and its nature. This identity, however, is not always compatible with "Okinawan identity". It is true that Takae is part of Okinawa. Yet, "Okinawan identity" and the local identity of Takae's protest community are not necessarily interchangeable. The difference is partially derived from the distinctive origins of the Takae struggle in terms of the members. More importantly, however, the distinction between "Okinawan identity" and "Takae identity" becomes significant if the former is assumed to be able to subsume the latter within its narrative. "Okinawan identity" cannot explain the delicate balance that runs through Takae's local identity, because Takae's communal identity is not only based on "Okinawan identity" but also it is made by both Okinawans and the locals who are not necessarily categorized as "Okinawans". In the tent, the silence between the Takae locals and the visitors from Naha revealed such invisible elements of the Takae Residents' Society within the Okinawa struggle.

6.6. “It’s Going to Be a Hard Time...”

On a mild day in late January, I was wandering in the Heiwa Dori Market in Naha. All of a sudden, I encountered a large crowd gathered in the market. Some of them, wearing bright orange baseball jackets, were moving from one shop to the next. Surrounding them were people raising their mobile phones to take photos of the people in orange jackets. Initially I thought this could be a mainland TV crew with some popular reporters, who are often comedians. Yet the person who was in the middle of the crowd was not a TV personality but a Member of the National Diet, Shimoji Mikio, who was hurrying to shake hands with his supporters. The crowds were cheering him and shouting “we support you, Mr. Shimoji!” “Good luck, Sir!” From all corners of the market, his supporters flocked to swell the crowd, indicating his popularity amongst the citizens of Naha. Responding to their voices with a charming big smile, Shimoji and his team seemed to be walking through a sea of his supporters.

Shimoji occupied an unusual position in the Japanese political scene during this period. Born in one of the remote islands of Okinawa, Miyako Island, as the second son of an influential business person who later became the mayor of his local city, Shimoji worked for his father’s company prior to embarking on his political career. He was then elected as a member of the national Lower House in the mid-1990s from a constituency based in Naha. Although he was supported by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the conservative ruling party then (and now) in power, his political views were not always the same as those of other conservatives in his party, but were sometimes closer to those of opposition groups such as the progressive Social Democratic Party. In particular, Shimoji was one of the few LDP politicians who opposed the base relocation from Futenma to Henoko. Instead, he proposed the merging of Futenma Airbase with the Kadena base. His proposal was not just dismissed but actively opposed by other local and national conservatives. Because of this, he resigned

from the LDP. Rather than expressing a political ideology, Shimoji was a politician who primarily represented the interests of Okinawa's business circles. This was the reason why Shimoji could still maintain his popularity among Okinawan citizens even after he left the LDP. Despite his relatively young age and career, Shimoji earned local support by creating a bridge between the business elites of Okinawa and mainland Japan.

Shimoji was one of the political figures to whom the local residents in the Takae Residents' Society paid close attention. Their reasons for following Shimoji were not just related to his political views but also to his links to his family business, Daiyone Construction, which has grown to be one of the largest construction companies in Okinawa.²⁹⁴ Although the company is run by Shimoji's elder brother, Yonezō, and Daiyone is not directly involved with Shimoji's political activities, Shimoji played a distinctive role in the local base politics. While many Okinawa-elected MPs insisted on the removal of the bases from Okinawa, Shimoji was one of the rare politicians who advocated internal relocation of the bases within Okinawa. However, Shimoji strongly disagreed with the new base construction in Henoko, insisting that relocation from Futenma to Henoko is impossible as long as the local protest campaign continues. As an alternative, what Shimoji proposed was the internal relocation to a small district in Kunigami Village in Yanbaru region, called Aha. As in Takae, there was also a plan to construct a helipad for the US military in Aha. However, in 1981, the construction plan was withdrawn because of the local protest campaign. Shimoji was promoting not only reviving this plan but building a large airbase there in exchange for the closure of Futenma. Therefore, although Shimoji's real intentions

²⁹⁴ The local construction companies in Okinawa play a crucial role in Okinawa not only in the economy but also in politics. For example, Kokuba Kōichi, President of *Kokuba Gumi*, a rival construction company for *Daiyone Kensetsu*, is the President of the Okinawa Defence Association, a local branch of the nation-wide lobbying group to promote public awareness and to contribute to strengthening the basis of the national defense. The Vice-President, Nakadomari Kōji is also the President of a local construction company in the northern Yanbaru region, *Higashi Kaihatsu*. (Jun Ōkubo and Jun Shinohara, *Okinawa no futsugō na shinjitsu*, Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 30-31; 39-41).

were yet to be made clear, people in Takae were carefully watching him. Their concern became a real problem when Daiyone made a bid for the construction contract for the helipads in Takae in May 2012.

I visited Takae after this news was announced. Many of the protesters shared concerns about this news. Even senior activists such as Yamashiro sighed at the news, saying that the direct involvement of Daiyone would make the protest movement more difficult, since the company is closely connected with a person who is influential in national politics. Miyagi Katsumi, a local member, was concerned with a different issue. He assumed that Daiyone would bring many construction workers from its home base, Miyako Island. He went on to say that people from Miyako (*Miyakonchu*) are known amongst other Okinawans as being “rough personalities”. Although this is merely a stereotype of Miyako islanders, he was expressing an anxiety about the arrival of a new construction contractor from a distant part of the archipelago in Takae. Miyagi and other local protesters were concerned whether the small protest community in Takae could resist this major construction company of whom they had had no previous experience. For the members of the Takae Residents’ Society, this was not only a challenge brought by the local economic establishment but also it was a critical moment for their future struggle over the concept of being “Okinawan”.

6.7. “It’s None of Your Business!”

“The gate has been occupied by *Bōeikyoku*!”

Takahashi’s mobile phone rang early one morning in July 2012. There had been no one from the Takae Residents Society monitoring the N-4 gate the previous night. Although there are usually people monitoring the gates at night-time, it is not possible to have someone on duty all the time, due to the lack of people. To make matters worse, vans and micro-buses, which

were usually parked in front of the gate as barricades in day and night, had all been returned to their original owners at that time, and thus there was no blockade when the ODB officers arrived. Once he heard the report, Takahashi started his car and went to N4 gate. There were a few trucks parked in front of the gate blocking access. Ironically, it appeared that the ODB officers adopted the strategy which the protesters had used.

A few days later, a long line of cars arrived in front of the gate. The first few vehicles were vans carrying the ODB officers. After them came the ODB cars, several vans and dump trucks. They were carrying construction workers from Daiyone and its subcontractor Hokushō Construction. Their trucks carried hundreds of sand bags. Along with the construction workers and the ODB, police officers also arrived. Within twenty minutes or so, nearly one hundred people in their white (ODB), black (construction worker), and blue (police) uniforms had gathered. Unlike the situation in the demonstration described earlier, the ODB officers were trying to reach the gate to open it, yelling at protesters to leave. They went into the bushes outside the road and, using knives and scissors, started cutting the ropes, steel wires and net that the protesters had spread extensively as an instant barricade. Although one of the protesters tried to prevent the ODB officers from cutting the barricades, some officers came from behind and pulled him away.

“Mr. Taira, we must talk.” Ashimine Gentatsu said to the chief ODB officer, Taira, who was watching the progress quietly. Taira did not reply.

Ashimine persistently tried to get Taira to talk, but Taira just said: “We have permission to use this site for our work. So please leave here.”

While the protesters were clashing with the ODB officers, the construction workers started their mission. Instead of approaching the construction site from the gate, they went into the bush to reach the site. The supervisor of the project was giving them instructions.

There were more than ten protesters near the gate when the ODB and others arrived, but their number was overwhelmed by the hundred or so ODB officers, construction workers and police officers. The construction supervisor, who appeared to be in his mid-40s with a tanned face, shouted to bring one of the large dump trucks, which carried a crane lift, which was to be used to move sand bags into the construction site without unlocking the gate. The crane lift started working with a roar. Some construction workers on a dump truck with sand bags started carrying them into the crane lift container, and these were lifted and passed on to the fellow workers who were already inside the gate and waiting for the material to arrive. Sand bags were carried over protesters heads. The operation was conducted as if the workers were completely indifferent to the protesters who were trying to block the crane. When protesters pointed out to the supervisor that it could be dangerous if the bags were to fall onto protestors conducting the sit-in at the gate, his only response was “If you think it’s dangerous, leave here, otherwise we will kick you out!”

As time went by, other protesters and Takae residents gathered little by little. They were all equally speechless at this unprecedented scene. Among the shocked and disheartened crowd was a thin tall man who approached the supervisor quietly but with a visibly angry expression. This was Shimizu. He stood in front of the supervisor and looked down on his face.

“Please stop this.” He murmured. Some other construction workers surrounded him.

“Who are you?” they asked.

The supervisor looked up at this tall man. But Shimizu did not answer his question.

“I am asking who you are and what’re you doing here?”

“I’m a Takae resident (*Takae jūmindesu*).” Shimizu replied.

“You are a *naichaa* (Japanese mainlander), aren’t you?” The supervisor laughed mockingly.

“I’m living here. I am a resident of Takae.” Shimizu repeated.

“Go back home, you mainlander! It’s not your business!”

At these harsh words, the workers standing around Shimizu seized his arms and body and pulled him down to the ground. Shimizu yelled something when he was pulled down. The police officers witnessed the scene but made no attempt to intervene in this situation. Soon after, the crane started working again, carrying sand bags over people’s heads.

Although this episode might sound similar to the story about the visitors from Naha in terms of “Okinawan identity”, there is a crucial difference between those two cases. While the previous episode shows a failure to recognise the subtlety of Takae’s protest community, this episode shows an attempt to use *naichā* and *uchinā* to divide the protest community. The statement “it’s none of your business” expresses division and exclusion from participation. In the case above, Shimizu was excluded by an Okinawan construction worker who considered that this is not the business of mainlanders. However, this phrase does not only exclude *naichā*. In fact, this exclusionary phrase has to do with something other than ethnicity. In this context, “It’s none of your business” is also a phrase used to exclude Takae’s protest community from involvement with the base construction. Here, *naichaa* such as Shimizu are just the easiest target. The intention of this message was to shut off the local involvement in the base construction because it is the business among the leadership in Japan, the US and Okinawa, not the local villagers.

In April 2015, Shimajiri Aiko, a conservative Okinawan politician, described the protest movement in Henoko as an “irresponsible civic movement” (*musekinin na shimin*

undō).²⁹⁵ She meant that the protesters do not understand the political context of the base relocation to Henoko. The phrase which the construction supervisor shouted at Shimizu can be also understood from this perspective. “It’s none of your business” effectively functions to divide Okinawa society between “good” citizens who understand the importance of the base construction in Henoko and Takae and “irresponsible” people who are motivated merely by their national interest over local interests. In this logic, while the people in the former category are regarded as the “insiders” who understand what the benefit of the construction plan is for the Okinawan community, the people in the latter category are labelled as “outsiders” and “the Left-leaning” if not “communists”, both of which contain derogatory meanings to criticize the local protest activists. It is no doubt that the members of Residents’ Society are people affected by this project. Nevertheless, they are not included within this limited definition of “stakeholders” since the real meaning of this phrase entails only those who involved in planning and carrying out the construction project, which was decided by high-level politicians and bureaucrats in Tokyo, designed by the Governor of Okinawa, and implemented by the construction companies. Under the guise of an “Okinawan identity” discourse, what really happens is exclusion of the local protesters who are not “stakeholders” from the perspective of those implementing the construction project in Takae. In other words, the exclusionary political discourse expressed in phrases like “it’s none of your business” shows the contested political and social process involved in creating the meaning of “locality” by two different camps, both of which involve people, resources and networks from many different places.²⁹⁶

²⁹⁵ Anon, “‘Sekinin no Nai Shimin Undō’ Henoko Kōdō ni Shimajiri Giin,” *Okinawa Times* (April 5, 2015), accessed September 3, 2015, <http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/article.php?id=110372>.

²⁹⁶ In her study of Henoko anti-base struggle, Julia Yonetani points out the “predicament of locality” in which she demonstrates how local identity is a social product that involves global, regional, national as well as local political contexts and power-relations of the base construction in Okinawa. (See: Julia Yonetani, “Appropriation and Resistance in a ‘Globalised Village’: Reconfiguring Local and Global Dynamics from Okinawa,” *Asian Studies Review* 28 (2004): 391-406.)

6.8. “Solidarity with Okinawa”

In late November 2011, I visited Naha Civic Hall in order to attend the opening ceremony of the Japan Peace Assembly (JPA). JPA is one of the major events of the peace movement, joined by seven organizations. Some of the organizations are workers’ unions and some are civic groups affiliated with the Japan Communist Party. The executive committee is located in Tokyo. They organize an annual assembly in which affiliated groups and individuals from all over Japan participate. The venue changes every year but it is always held at a place where American military bases exist. In 2011, Okinawa was the host prefecture. In the large hall, there were hundreds of people. Some people were waving flags representing their local prefectures. Kanagawa, Nagasaki, Hokkaido, etc... All these prefectures have US bases, like Okinawa.

The event was well-organized. After the performance of a traditional Ryūkyūan dance by local school children, over 20 international delegates were introduced. The delegates were invited from many parts of the world where the local residents are struggling against the US bases such as Hawaii, Guam, Philippines, South Korea, mainland US and elsewhere. After introducing the guests, a few notable public figures came on to the stage, among them an influential politician from the Japan Communist Party, Ichida Yoshihiko, and an emeritus professor of the University of Tokyo, Wada Haruki. These guests and delegates all raised the same question—what has changed in Okinawa forty years after Okinawa’s return to Japan? Besides the presence of all these high-profile public figures, one of the other distinctive aspects of this peace conference is its mobilization of activists nation-wide and from overseas. Having activists and people involved with anti-base activism from many local areas, the conference appeared to be successful as a venue for the nation-wide and region-wide campaign for anti-US militarism. As one Hawaiian delegate put it, “Okinawa is not alone. We are sharing the similar situation facing America, who regards the Pacific Ocean as

their playground since 19th century”.²⁹⁷ Similarly, Japanese delegates raised their voices in “solidarity with Okinawa”.

The next day, participants of the Japan Peace Assembly visited Takae, traveling in several coaches. This half-day trip to Takae was one of the conference events. The tents at the construction gate suddenly became overpopulated with visitors. Led by a tour guide, the visitors walked around and looked at the gate of the construction site. Many were taking photos of the landscape of Yanbaru, the gate and the local neighborhood. It appeared as though they were a group of tourists sightseeing. One middle-aged man told me that it was his first trip to Okinawa. I asked where he is originally from. “Yamato City, Kanagawa,” he said. He looked satisfied with his first visit to Okinawa. He said that he had learnt so much about Okinawa’s experience by visiting Henoko and Takae. However, after staying for half an hour or so, the visitors including this man went back to the buses and left Takae. Waving to us from behind the windows they departed and the silence returned. I was wondering what they could learn about Takae by staying for only 30 minutes.

“We should be thankful to them for visiting us, even just for a short while.” Takahashi replied to me when I asked this question.

This is one of the many episodes that demonstrates the difficulty for Takae in terms of its representation. Unlike the previous episodes, this story is important to consider how Takae people are represented as “Okinawan” through the eyes of people who aim to experience “solidarity with Okinawa”. As Takae is relatively open to outsiders of their protest community, there are many visitors coming to see the local protest movement. Nevertheless, among the visitors, it is difficult to find anyone who is sensitive to Takae’s unique local environment in terms of the ways in which the local protest community is conducted. In these

²⁹⁷ Kyle Kajihira, *Gunji-shugi to Shin Jiyūshugi ni Taikō Suru*, Kēshi Kaji 73 (2011): 34-46.

circumstances, “Okinawan identity” is presupposed to replace Takae’s distinctive social environment. Over all, this is a small episode about Takae’s local struggle, the particularity of which becomes difficult to perceive due to monolithic representation under the banner of “solidarity with Okinawa”.



Image 6-7. A scene from Japan Peace Conference held in Naha, Okinawa in 2011. The conference was organised by Japan Peace Committee and its affiliated party, the JCP. It was attended by Peace Committees based in 47 Japanese prefectures and foreign delegates from Guam, The Philippines, South Korea, and so forth where anti-military base movements take place. In this photo, Ichida Tadayoshi, an executive board member of JCP who is also Member of Japanese National Diet, is giving a speech to the audience.



Image 6-8. A scene from the bus tour of Takae by participants in the Japan Peace Conference. A number of tourists visited Takae after the conference on this day.

6.9. Reclaiming “Okinawan identity” from the Margins

In the midst of the Tanaka Incident, there was another parallel event that affected Takae’s sit-in. This was the court case against representatives of the local sit-in for obstructing traffic.²⁹⁸

Litigation was brought by the Okinawa Defense Bureau against fourteen local Takae residents in 2008. These fourteen residents were the founding members of the Takae Residents’ Society and their families, including one child, who was at that time eight years old. Responding to the sluggish progress of the construction, which he blamed on the local protest, the head of the ODB, Manabe Rō, decided to take civil litigation against the local residents. Manabe said “We have started construction in order to reduce Okinawa’s burden since last July (in 2007). Yet we could only make little progress so far. Therefore, we decided to bring civil litigation for the first time in our history. We had no other decent options except for this.”²⁹⁹

Although it shocked the Takae Residents’ Society to hear that the Japanese government planned to take legal action, the members also decided to take their own action immediately against the ODB. They brought a protest letter to the headquarters of the ODB in Kadena, but the ODB refused to receive them. In 2009, a judgement in Naha Regional Court found in favour of the ODB, but out of fourteen residents indicted, only two residents were found guilty. They were Ashimine Gentatsu and Isa Masatsugu, co-representatives of the Takae Residents’ Society. The lawyers for the Residents’ Society labelled the litigation by Okinawa Defence Bureau a “SLAPP” (Strategic Lawsuit against Public Participation). Also, the Takae Residents’ Society decided to appeal to the judgement of Naha Regional

²⁹⁸ The Litigation on Prohibition of Traffic Disturbance (*Tsūkō-bōgai Kinshi Kari-shobun Mōshitate Jiken*), No. 166, 2008. The statement of the verdict is available from <http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20100201125634.pdf>.

²⁹⁹ Printed in *Okinawa Times*, 26 December 2008, evening edition (*yūkan*).

Court. This was the start of the so-called “Takae SLAPP Lawsuit Case (*Takae surappu soshō*)”.

Three months before the judgement was handed down, over 150 people gathered in front of Naha Regional Court from the early morning. They all came to attend the public examination of Ashimine and Isa. As time passed, the number of people increased, so the court conducted a lottery to select people to enter the court. Prior to that, there was a small gathering next to the court. This was organised by the Takae Residents’ Society and groups supporting Ashimine and Isa. Director of the Takae Residents Society Takahashi, Isa, and Ashimine all attended this gathering. Although Takahashi always modestly insisted that he was not the proper figure to stand at the front, on this occasion he was clearly acting as a representative of his community. Shimizu and the wives of Ashimine Gentatsu and Isa Masatsugu were also there.

Ashimine spoke on behalf of the Takae Residents’ Society. He began his speech by acknowledging all the support for Takae. As usual, Ashimine spoke softly. Although he was using a microphone, it was sometimes difficult to hear his voice, which was drowned out by the background noise of traffic. His speech was also very simple, just telling the audience why he still wants to live in Takae with his family. However, his speech moved many of audience members. Some people were even wiping tears from their eyes. Unlike some professional activists, Ashimine did not express hostility and anger against the ODB and the Japanese government. His speech was filled with warm words, expressing his, his family’s and his friends’ affection for the bounteous Yanbaru Forest. This presented a strong message shared by the audience: a message of their wish to protect their livelihood in Yanbaru from destruction: “Although our village is very small,” said Ashimine, “We don’t want Yanbaru Forest to be involved with any warfare...” Ashimine’s warm words reached the hearts of audience members. He concluded his speech by asking for help from all corners of Okinawa.

In other words, Ashimine recreated a form of “Okinawan identity” based on his particular place consciousness. After this speech, they entered the court.³⁰⁰

6-10. Conclusion

Building on the previous chapter, in this chapter I have discussed in detail aspects of the formation of the protest community in Takae. In particular, I sought to elucidate how the local communal identity is created and practised by disentangling complicated relationships between Takae community and external societies and political institutes. By avoiding essentialistic understanding of communal identity or collectivity, I placed my emphasis on power-relations and human interactions that shape local identity in Takae. The examples cited here, for example, help us to see how ethnic and cultural discourses such as “*uchinaa*” and “*yamatu*” or “Okinawans” and “Japanese” are used differently during the protest demonstrations in Naha and Takae. This reflects different contexts in which various protest movements were formed. While a simple division between “Okinawans” and “Japanese” has been used in the context of the anti-base movement since the early 1970s, organizing a protest community in Takae requires a more subtle framing of who they are fighting against. While this issue tends to be considered within “centre and periphery” relations within the Okinawan anti-base movement, diverse participation in the Takae movement by people from many regions within Japan indicates the more complicated or translocal contexts which actually make up the communal identity of the Takae protest movement.

³⁰⁰ In March, the Naha Regional Court gave a verdict that Ashinmine had conducted a legitimate protest action. However, Isa was found guilty of obstructing traffic. Immediately they appealed to the Kyūshū Higher Court, but the final judgement given in 2013 was the same as the previous case. Later, they appealed to dispute the case at the Supreme Court. In June 2014, the Supreme Court rejected Isa’s appeal.

In the latter part of the chapter, I discussed how the division between “Okinawans” and “Japanese” was mobilized by a construction worker to exclude non-Okinawan protesters as “outsiders”. This exclusionary discourse is a critical issue in places like Takae: an effort to split the community in terms of a generic discourse of Okinawan identity, which does not apply to the majority of community members. However, I argue that the discourse also can divide participants or stakeholders of the base politics in Takae into “those who benefit from the base construction” and “those who are irresponsibly protesting against government policy”. Therefore, this logic of “insider” and “outsider” in the context of Takae can be understood as a discourse that seeks to frame and restrict the legitimate right to participate in the base politics not only in terms of one’s ethnic or cultural background but also one’s political interests. When we include this dimension of political interests we can understand that the protest community in Takae strives to recapture the meaning of “locality” from the state-capitalism complex.

In the last two episodes, I discussed how Takae’s protest community articulates Okinawan identity. Performing “Okinawanness” by situating itself within the broad historical trajectory of Okinawa struggle is crucial considering the peripheral nature of the Takae community. Despite significant differences from the mainstream narrative of the Okinawa struggle, representation as part of the “Okinawa struggle” by Japanese mainland visitors is still important to spread their struggle widely in Japan. From a similar perspective, Ashimine’s speech in Naha can also be considered as a practice of Okinawan identity by which he [Ashimine] asked for wider support from other anti-base communities. Overall, in this chapter I analyzed the dynamic social process by which the Takae protesters articulate locality as their distinctive political identity. This reveals the significant position of this peripheral protest community, which is important not only to understand the historical

development of the Okinawa struggle but also how a protest community can create its identity within the contemporary Okinawan anti-base movement.

Chapter Seven

From Okinawa to Asia:

Okinawa-Korea People's Solidarity and Connecting Anti-base Struggles in Asia



A textile sent by South Korean activists who conduct anti-base construction campaigns in Jeju.
The photo was taken by the author in Takae in November 2011.

7.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will introduce another version of the dimension of identity which has developed within the Okinawa struggle particularly over the last two decades. In Chapters Five and Six I discussed trans-locality as an important element to examine Takae's anti-helipad movement from both local and extra-local perspectives. This chapter seeks to investigate flows of people, ideas, and experiences which create an identity for the Okinawan struggle based on "region" or "East Asia". I look into the process by which the region is incorporated by Okinawa's anti-base movement activists as their local identity. In other words, the challenge that this chapter tries to tackle is to analyze the concept of region which serves as an integral part of the Okinawa struggle, and to understand how Okinawan activists articulate and use it as part of their local identity.

In order to examine this dimension of the Okinawa struggle, I will analyze a protest community called Okinawa Korea People's Solidarity (or OKPS). OKPS is one of many local protest communities in Okinawa. Founded in late 1998, this group is one of the earliest Okinawan activist groups to start a transnational anti-US base network with anti-US base movements in overseas countries. Ever since it started, OKPS has been working with South Korean anti-US base activists such as a group called the Headquarters for the National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops, the earliest anti-US base activist group in South Korea. With over 30 members on its list, OKPS is a middle-sized group among Okinawan anti-base communities. However, this group is not well-known even among Okinawan activists. This is partly because of the nature of OKPS, especially its activities as "a protest community". When compared to other local groups such as the leading local feminist group, Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, OKPS does not have a strong guiding principle in its activism. Also, unlike the protest movement in Henoko and Takae, OKPS does not have a particular place to conduct its activism. It does not have any

flag to raise at the protest. Nor does OKPS conduct high-profile activities like organizing symposia, conducting law-suits against the national government, or declaring the independence of Ryūkyūs.

However, this invisibility does not mean that OKPS is an insignificant group. On the contrary, I argue that this group has many important aspects that we need to consider when we study Okinawa's anti-base movement. First, there was almost no precedent before OKPS for a group of Okinawan activists to engage in an international solidarity movement in overseas countries. The experience of OKPS over two decades is therefore crucial in considering the "internationalization" of the anti-base movement. Together with activists from various places such as South Korea, Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines and Australia, the transnational network has become an important part of the local anti-base movements in Asia and the Pacific region. Second, it is important to understand the period in which OKPS was formed from the late 1980s until the 1990s. This decade was the period when the Philippines and South Korea were democratized. The rise of "people's power" which overturned the dictatorships greatly inspired the Okinawan activists. Okinawans thought that the democratization of the Philippines and South Korea would change regional dynamics. Twenty years after the return of Okinawa to Japan, some local activists who would later become the founding members of OKPS felt they had reached an impasse with their local anti-base struggle. Therefore, they considered that international solidarity with people from those countries would contribute to galvanizing their movement. Third, OKPS also is a significant part of the Okinawa struggle which created a regional perspective to the local anti-base movement. This involves not only the contemporary solidarity movement but also results in a reconsideration of Okinawa's historical relations with Japan, the US and also with other regional countries. Especially, the founders of OKPS reflect on the historical position of Okinawans as "the first colonized subject" of the Japanese Empire, but also as a place which

whose inhabitants later turned into “colonizers/Japanese” in other Japanese colonial territories in Asia and the Pacific. In other words, their long-term commitment to the international solidarity movement revealed the entanglement of regional history as an indispensable aspect of Okinawa’s local identity.

Based on interviews and archival data related to OKPS, I will examine the following questions: (1) How was OKPS initiated, and by whom? (2) What is the process by which its concept of region was articulated? (3) What new dimensions of the Okinawa struggle does it reveal? By considering the history and contemporary activities of OKPS, I discuss the formation of regional-local identity within Okinawa’s anti-base struggle.

7.2. A Chapel beside Naha Port

One early evening in late November, 2011, I was walking on Kokusai Dōri [International Street] towards the western part of Naha City. This main street of Naha is crowded with tourists and locals. Walking several blocks down to the west, I could feel the sea breeze on my face. The wind came from Naha Port, from where ferries, cruises and tankers take their passengers and cargos not only to the remote islands of Okinawa, Japan, and the US but also to other ports in Asia such as China and the Philippines. My destination, Uruma Chapel, was located near the port.

It is rather difficult to believe that the place is a chapel. Its facade is not decorated with symbolic religious features. Like other residential and commercial buildings on the street, it is just a grey two-story concrete building. On the ground floor, there are sliding doors on which, when I visited, the schedule of bible study reading group information was displayed. I knocked on the door, and a tall elderly man appeared. He was Nishio Ichirō. This elderly man in his late seventies is a pastor of the United Church of Christ in Japan, a father

with one daughter, the owner of a local kindergarten and also one of the founding members of OKPS.

He told me to wait for his friends to arrive for the interview I had scheduled. Meanwhile, he gave me plates of cucumbers and carrots, which, he said, came from his vegetable garden. Soon after, a middle-aged man with long black hair flecked with grey arrived: this was Tomiyama Masahiro, who is also one of the founding members of this protest community. Although Tomiyama said he came directly from his office, he looked rather relaxed, as though he had just come back from a local beach. While Nishio wore a white shirt with a pair of trousers, Tomiyama was more casual in shorts, thongs, and a t-shirt, even in the cool weather of late autumn. Shortly after Tomiyama's arrival, they were joined by Ōta Kunio, another member of OKPS. Ōta and Tomiyama are more or less of a similar generation, in their late fifties. In the relaxed atmosphere, with food and drink on the table, the three men started chatting about their recent news. This was my first contact with this distinctive Okinawan protest community.

7.3. Okinawa Korea People's Solidarity

As discussed briefly in Chapter Five, the protest community in Okinawa is made of diverse types of civic activist groups. The largest umbrella organization is the Okinawa Citizens' Peace Network (OCPN), an organization which links many different local communities from all over Okinawa including groups in Takae and Henoko. While the activists of Takae and Henoko have been engaged in the movement in their local communities, city dwellers who live far from these remote areas are also involved with various activities to study, promote, and help ongoing activism in those regional communities. Also, some urban civic groups near the US military bases such as Kadena and Futenma have been conducting activism based on

their local contexts. In this environment, OKPS plays a distinctive role. It is one of the most important of the groups that are primarily involved with internationalization of the Okinawan anti-base movement. OKPS thus works as one of the main links between overseas anti-US base activists and Okinawan activist communities.

OKPS was founded in 1998 by five male activists from Okinawa and mainland Japan. Nishio and Tomiyama were both participants from the beginning of the group together with three other members: Takahashi Toshio, To Yusa, and Arasaki Moriteru. These founding members come from diverse backgrounds (to be discussed further in Chapter Eight). Arasaki is a senior academic known for his research on the history of the Okinawan people's anti-base struggle after World War II. Based in Okinawa University since 1974, Arasaki has been one of the front-runners of this research field. He was also the President of his university during the 1980s. Besides his commitment to the anti-base movement as an academic, Arasaki had been involved in founding many activist projects in Okinawa, most notably the Society of *Hitotsubo* Anti-war Land Owners.³⁰¹ Tomiyama Masahiro has been an active participant of the anti-base movement since his teenage years. While Arasaki has devoted himself to the movement through intellectual work, Tomiyama has always been involved through anti-base activism in the frontline of physical confrontation.

While Arasaki and Tomiyama are both native Okinawans, Takahashi Toshio came originally from the mainland in the early 1980s. He had been known as the leader of a radical sect of student activism when he lived in the mainland, but when Takahashi became involved with the Okinawan anti-base movement, he hid his former career and changed his name.

³⁰¹ *Hitotsubo* is a size of land which is equivalent to 3.3 square meters. The main activity of this society is to purchase the land from the original landlords who have their property within the US military bases. In doing so, the activists refuse to rent their land to the Japanese Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for offering the land to the local US military, and engage in a court battle with Japanese authority over the land. The participants of this project are widely spread all over Japan, in places such as in Tokyo and Osaka as well as in Okinawa.

Nishio also originated from the mainland, but has been involved in activism in Okinawa for the last four decades. As a radical pastor whose usual activities are missionary activity and running a kindergarten, Nishio is also known for his long-term involvement with peace and ecology activism. To Yusa is also one of those who became involved with OKPS from outside Okinawa. As an Osaka-based Korean activist, he has been involved with political activism including helping anti-war American GIs to desert during the Vietnam War and supporting the democratization movement in South Korea from Japan.³⁰²

The founding members of OKPS all came from different backgrounds, but they came to know each other as they were all the members of *Hitotsubo* Anti-war Land Owner's Association. As I explain further in the next chapter, these individuals gathered to establish OKPS with the aim of internationalizing Okinawa's anti-base struggle, particularly by establishing links with South Korean anti-base activism.

Today, over thirty people are registered as members of OKPS. The members are widely dispersed. Many of them are residing in Okinawa Island, and some of them are living in mainland Japan and South Korea. In a strict sense, people who are registered as members are expected to pay 500 yen as a monthly membership fee to cover costs of group activities. But because of the nature of the membership, it is difficult to collect from all the members. Thus, in a practical sense, this rule is applied loosely and irregularly. Also, as another principle, the members are expected to attend a monthly meeting to discuss activity, policy and other administrative matters. However, this has never been made mandatory because it is hardly ever possible to bring all the members together because of their dispersed locations. Likewise, although OKPS has an annual assembly where all the members are supposed to gather, in fact the annual assembly is usually organized as one of the regular monthly

³⁰² Moriteru Arasaki, Masahiro Tomiyama, Toshio Takahashi, Ichirō Nishio, and Yusa To. "Tomoni Manabi, Tomoni Kwaru, Okikan Minshu Rentai no Ayumi," *Keishi Kaji* 70 (July 2011): 6-25.

meetings. However, these loose aspects of the membership and organizational structure do not mean that the group is inactive. There are members who regularly attend the meetings every month from cities, towns and villages including Naha, Urazoe, Futenma, and even Yomitan, which is more than an hour away from Naha by public transport. These people serve as core members in implementing various group activities, corresponding with a widely dispersed network of individuals inside and outside Okinawa.

7.4. Remembering the Other War-dead

Although OKPS was founded in June 1998, its origins go back to the late 1980s. One of the crucial moments in this early period occurred when 5 South Korean men visited Okinawa in November 1986. They were survivors of a group of laborers who were forcibly taken to various places around Okinawa from colonial Korea during World War II. According to a historical study, about 350 Koreans, including the 5 men who visited Okinawa, were mobilized to work around the Kerama Islands, located forty kilometres away from the mainland of Okinawa in June 1944.³⁰³ They were part of a total of some 15,000 Korean laborers who were collected to work in various places in Okinawa towards the end of the Pacific War.³⁰⁴ Most of the Koreans in Kerama Islands came from Gyeongsang County in North Gyeongsang Province. Arriving in Kerama, they were put to work building the secret shelters used to keep small boats to be used for suicide attacks against the Allied Powers. Conducted under the orders of the Japanese Imperial Army, this mission was called *marure*.³⁰⁵ During the Battle of Okinawa, about 80 Korean laborers in Kerama died, including some who were executed by the Japanese soldiers. Struggling with hunger, they

³⁰³ Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Dōjidaishi 1983-1987: Shōkokushugi no tachiba de* (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 2004), 107.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

stole potatoes from the local farmland, but were found by the local villagers and reported to the Japanese military officers. In the end, 257 people survived and they were captured by the American soldiers. After the war, they returned to Korea. These survivors had been longing to take back the remains of their fellow Korean forced laborers to their homeland. They established an organization called the Pacific Fellows Association (*Taiheiyō Dōshikai*) together with other former Korean forced laborers engaged in different parts of Japan during wartime.³⁰⁶ This is how the five Koreans came to visit Kerama Islands, particularly Aka Island and Zamami-jima Island, in order to commemorate the spirits of those who could never return to their homeland.

The visit of the five Korean survivors inspired not only Okinawans but also some descendants of colonial era Korean migrants living in Japan (so-called *Zainichi* Koreans). Among them was an independent documentary maker, Park Sunam. She filmed the Korean survivors' journey to Kerama and made a film titled "Ariran no uta: Okinawa kara no shōgen" (*The Song of Arirang: Testimony from Okinawa*), which premiered in 1991. Born in Mie Prefecture as a second generation Korean resident in Japan, Park had established her career as a journalist and activist for her fellow *Zainichi* Koreans since the early 1960s, most famously for her book about the killing of two school girls in the so-called Komatsugawa Incidents (*Komatsugawa-jiken*).³⁰⁷ Park produced a number of films related to Koreans during wartime, including Koreans who were affected by the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. With the help of her Okinawan friends such as senior activist Fukuchi

³⁰⁶ Ibid.: 108.

³⁰⁷ This was the rape and murder of two Japanese school girls by a young male *zainichi* Korean. Park exchanged a number of letters with this man, who was sentenced to capital punishment, and she edited a book based on those letters titled: "Tsumi to Ai to Shi to" (*Guilt, Love and Death*) in 1963. Some intellectuals such as Michihiko Suzuki publicly criticized the capital punishment imposed on Lee. For example, see: Suzuki Michihiko *Ekkyō No Toki: 1960 Nen Dai to Zainichi* (Tokyo: Shūeisha, 2007).

Hiroaki and photographer Ishikawa Mao, Park embarked on her journey in the Kerama Islands at the time of the visit of the five Korean former forced laborers.

The visit of the Korean survivors unveiled some crucial aspects of Okinawa's wartime history. Although they had been mentioned in the work of some local historians such as Miyazato Kiyogorō, the founder of the Kerama Oceanic Culture Museum, the stories of Korean forced laborers in Kerama Islands were otherwise hardly remembered in Okinawa. Especially, memories of the execution of Koreans were preserved by only a limited number of the local residents. In this sense, unraveling the history of Koreans in Okinawa during wartime introduced a new perspective to the history of the war in Okinawa. But for locals, the forgotten history of the Korean forced laborers posed difficult questions for Okinawa's historical narratives. In particular, the presence of Korean forced laborers complicated the view of Okinawan "victimhood" during the Battle of Okinawa. While the exact number of Korean laborers, which includes young Korean females who were forced to serve as so-called "comfort women", is not known, the memory of Koreans in war-time Okinawa made it necessary to see local history from the perspective of "another victim" of the war.

In other words, the five Koreans' visit raised the question of Okinawa's historical position in relation to East Asian neighbors who were formerly Japanese colonies or occupied territories. Like other ethnic groups from the territories of the former Japanese Empire, Okinawans were not considered as equal to mainland Japanese. However, despite all the discriminatory treatment, Okinawans were not the same as Koreans and Taiwanese. While people in these places, which had more recently been incorporated into the Japanese Empire, were categorized as people of "the external territories" (*gaichi*), Okinawans were regarded as people from the internal region of Japan proper (*naichi*). This was related to the political administration used to govern the empire. While Koreans and Taiwanese were administered by the Governor Generals who represented the authority of the Japanese government,

Okinawa was one of the Japanese prefectures. From this perspective, we can understand the complexity of Okinawa's modern experience, in that it was not a colony but was treated in a discriminatory manner by some of those from mainland Japan.

The re-appearance of Korean laborers in Okinawan history confronted Okinawans with ambiguous problems of self-recognition as (on the one hand) the victims of Japanese Imperial expansion who were incorporated into modern-nation state and located in a peripheral position, and (on the other) as people who were not the same as other colonized regional neighbors such as Koreans. However, this was a crucial moment in the history of OKPS. Some of the founding members such as Arasaki, Takahashi, and Tomiyama were involved in the visit of the Korean war-survivors. As the President of Okinawa University, Arasaki contacted the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and arranged the issue of visas for the visit. Although official relations between South Korea and Japan were normalized in 1965, it was not easy for Korean and Japanese tourists to visit each other's country until the Seoul Olympics were held in 1988. Takahashi and Tomiyama joined the film crew and travelled in Aka, Tokashiki and Zamami Islands with director Park Sunam.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁸ Interview with Takahashi Toshio, March 26, 2012.




Image 7-1. A former Korean military worker visited Aka-jima Island where he conducted a traditional Korean commemorative ceremony. The photo was retrieved from Sunam Park, *Arirang no Uta: Okinawa kara no shōgen* (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1991).

7.5. In Search of International Solidarity in Anti-US Base Activism

The encounter with former Korean forced laborers was a crucial moment. It was the first experience for Okinawan activists to see Koreans who survived the war in Okinawa and hear their memories. As Arasaki notes, their visit cast light on a little-studied area of Okinawan history. Also, the significance of this period lies in the fact that this trip became the earliest occasion on which the some key members of OKPS gathered to work together. By joining the commemorative trip to Kerama, the founders of OKPS came to recognize another colonial history in Okinawa, which also influenced local activists to consider Okinawa's historical present in relation to other Asian neighbors. But this encounter with former Korean laborers was not the direct trigger to start the international anti-base solidarity movement with South Koreans. Although it was undoubtedly an important moment for Okinawan activists to understand their colonial past in relation to Korea, Okinawans did not yet consider this history in relation to their contemporary activism. Although Okinawans were aware of anti-authoritarian student movements in South Korea, they did not have the means or personal network to develop substantial links to Korean activism.

This does not mean that there was no action during this period. In the early 1990s, some Okinawan activists, who later became the founders of OKPS, attempted solidarity with the Philippine activists. Tomiyama says that at that time he wondered if it was possible to win the struggle against the US bases just by the actions of Okinawan people only. Other activists too had similar concerns about the isolation of Okinawa's anti-base movement. Knowing that there were other places where people took their anti-base struggle to the world, these concerned Okinawans began to feel the necessity to create an international solidarity campaign. One of the first countries Tomiyama and his colleagues contacted was the Philippines. They were greatly inspired by the rise of Philippine democratization, especially with its success in ending the long dictatorship of President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 (the

so-called People Power Revolution). Tomiyama also had a friend, Arakaki Tokiko, who founded a citizens' group called the Society for Friendship of Okinawa and Philippines. This group was started with the aim of creating cultural exchange between the two places on the grassroots level. So, through her introduction, Tomiyama first visited Manila in the late 1980s.

Following Tomiyama's first visit, he and his fellow activists visited the Philippines almost every year until the early 1990s. Their main contact was a progressive activism network called Bayan (the *Bagong Alyasang Makabayan* or the New Nationalist Alliance). As an umbrella organization joined by many different leftist movement organizations, Bayan was founded in 1985 and conducted general strikes as a means of protest against Marcos' dictatorial regime. Together with communist and other progressive organizations in provincial areas, Bayan was a core force of the People Power Revolution in 1986.³⁰⁹ The drastic change of the Philippine political landscape in the late 1980s was of strong interest to Okinawan activists. Yet what attracted Okinawans most was the 1991 agreement for the transfer of Clark Airbase from the US Air Force to the Philippine government, which was put into effect in the following year. Like Futenma and Kadena Airbases in Okinawa, the Clark Airbase had also played an important role for the US military during the Vietnam War. Therefore, the closure of this, one of the largest US airbases in the region, was perceived as a great achievement by the Philippine citizens. Therefore, when they heard the news, some Okinawans thought that they should learn from this neighboring country, and they started organizing a trip to the Philippines.

³⁰⁹ Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements In Nondemocracies* (University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 146.

To strengthen Okinawa-Philippine solidarity, Tomiyama, Arasaki, Nishio and some other activists organized a group to study the history and current political and economic situation of the Philippines. The main aim of this study group was to study how the Philippines had been able to remove the American bases from the country. They also studied the relations between the Philippines and Japan, including the history of the Japanese wartime occupation of the Philippines, and contemporary issues such as the local impact of Japanese trade and investment.³¹⁰ In the meantime, Tomiyama visited the Philippines several times. After Tomiyama's visits over several years, the Okinawan side decided to organize a symposium to learn about the Philippine experience of anti-base movement activism. In this context, Nishio, Tomiyama, Takahashi, Arasaki and their friend To Yusa started a group called the Action Committee for Solidarity with Asia (ACSA or *Ajia to Rentaisuru Shūkai Jikkō Iinkai*) in 1994.

However, the correspondence between Okinawa and the Philippines was not consistent and did not last long after 1994. Like many grassroots activist movements, ACSA faced problems such as insufficient membership, lack of language skills to communicate with the Philippine activists, and funding to support its activities. Those problems were overcome by volunteers and donations from the fellow activists. Also, even though the members of ACSA had some problems of communication, the language was not the real problem. Nishio retrospectively said that the Philippine and Okinawan activists were able to communicate adequately with each other, because the situations in those two places were very similar.³¹¹ But one of the major reasons why this early period of Okinawa's solidarity ended in failure was (ironically) because of the very fact of the closure of the US bases in the Philippines. After withdrawal of the US military from the Clark Airbase, American military bases were no

³¹⁰ *Ajia to Rentai suru Shūkai Jikkō Iinkai*, ed. *Introduction of Okinawa-Kankoku Hankichi Kōryūdan Hokokushū 20 – 23 February*. (Naha: Ajia to Rentaisuru Shūkai Jikkō Iinkai, 1997), 1.

³¹¹ Interview with Nishio Ichirō, November 23, 2011.

longer the major issue among the Philippine activists. After all, the anti-base movement had not been the main reason for the establishment of Bayan. The umbrella organization was created to tackle broad social and economic inequality in the country. American imperialistic involvement in the Philippine politics and society, including its support for the Marcos regime, was an important agenda issue during the democratization period. Insofar as the American presence continued, the US bases were a symbol that represented its influence in the Philippines. But after 1992, this symbol was not a major issue any more for the local citizens.

7.6. From ACSA to OKPS

The turning point for the activity of ACSA came rather coincidentally in late 1996 when an activist named Kim Yong-han visited from South Korea. He was the leader of a group called the Headquarters of the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crimes by US Troops (*Juhan Migun Beomjoe Geunjeor Undong Bonbu*, or *Jumibun* in Korean). Established in 1993 after the rape and murder of a young local woman by a US soldier, “the Yun Geum-I case” of October 1992, this group has been playing the leading role in the anti-US military base movement in South Korea. The Yun Geum-I case was a brutal murder case that triggered a nation-wide protest campaign, seeking a fair criminal judgement against US military and the revision of Status of Forces Agreement between the US and South Korean governments. Prior to revision of the rules governing the criminal prosecution of US military personnel in 2001, the South Korean government did not have jurisdiction over the US servicemen who committed crimes in the country. Therefore, South Korean activists such as Kim Yong-han were impressed by reading a report of the 1995 island-wide protest triggered by a rape case in Okinawa, because this small provincial government in Japan became the

greatest concern for both Tokyo and Washington. Looking at the political events triggered by Okinawa's mass protest campaign, Korean activists considered that they should learn from Okinawa's experiences and local activism. Like Okinawans, activists from *Jumibun* also conducted a protest campaign against sexual assaults by US military personnel, and against the Status of Forces Agreement with the US. In such an intense political environment, Kim arrived in Naha with the help of his fellow Korean activists in August 1996.

This first encounter with Kim Yong-han also brought great benefit for Okinawan activists. As Arasaki recalls, although declaration of the end of military government and the political democratization of South Korea since 1988 had been reported in Okinawa, the knowledge that Okinawan activists had about Korean social activism was limited to media coverage, and thus the domestic situation of South Korean society was hardly visible to Okinawan activists.³¹² In this sense, Kim's visit to Okinawa was one of the earliest opportunities for Okinawan activists to learn about the South Korean anti-US base struggles, including the unequal status of the security treaty with the US which guaranteed the extraterritoriality of the local US soldiers and personnel. This first encounter prompted the creation of a new channel of communication between activists from the two countries. Seven months later, in February 1997, forty-three South Koreans visited Okinawa to meet with Okinawan activists. One of the main reasons for the Koreans to visit Okinawa was to observe the public hearing at Naha Regional Court of a case between *Hitotsubo* Anti-war Landowners Association and the Japanese government about the issue of forced leases of privately owned land to the US military. This was the crucial moment that enhanced mutual awareness between South Korea and Okinawa.

³¹² Moriteru Arasaki, et al. "Tomo ni Manabi, Tomo ni Kowaru, Okikan Minshu Rentai no Ayumi," *Keishi Kaji* 70 2011, 7.

After this second meeting, the interaction between Korea and Okinawa became increasingly active. Even though both Koreans and Okinawans were approaching each other without sufficient knowledge of the other, each side was inspired by their counterparts. It was indeed an unprecedented event in the histories of their respective anti-base movements that activists in two different regions came to meet with each other. Yet in a more pragmatic sense, what made the activists connected was the fact that deployment of the US military bases was a common social and political problem across national boundaries. In other words, through collaboration between Okinawa and Korea, activists in the two countries sought to reframe the anti-US base struggle as a Northeast Asian regional problem. According to Tomiyama and Nishio, activists in Okinawa felt that their struggle was not isolated any more when they came to know that Koreans were also struggling with similar problems.³¹³ After hosting a meeting with the forty-three activists from Korea attended by over two hundred people, the founding members of ACSA decided to dissolve and re-form the group. This is how people who founded ACSA decided to start *Okinawa Korea People's Solidarity* (whose formal name is: *the Association that Aims to Create People's Solidarity through Anti-US Military Base Movement in Okinawa and South Korea*, or *Okikan* or OKPS for short). The group was established in June 1998.

Like ACSA, OKPS was based in Nishio's Uruma Chapel. What the members urgently needed to start collaborative works with Koreans was a basic knowledge of Korean social movements. While some members such as To, Takahashi, and Nishio had been individually involved with the Korean democratization movement while they were in mainland Japan, their basic knowledge of South Korean society was limited. With the help of *Zainichi* Korean such as Suh Sung, a *Zainichi* Korean activist who had been detained in South Korea for nineteen years due to his political involvement with the anti-authoritarian regime campaign,

³¹³ Interview with Nishio Ichirō and Tomiyama Masahiro, November 23, 2011.

the OKPS members organized social and cultural events from late 1997 until early 2002 to inform people about the base problems in South Korean politics. During this period, over twenty-five visits took place between the two regions. The reasons for the trips were diverse, including participation in academic conferences, and attendance at demonstrations in both Okinawa and various places in South Korea. Through the exchange of people, Okinawan activists and South Koreans learnt about each other. Also, from 1998, with the help of Korean students studying at the University of the Ryūkyūs and Japanese students who returned from South Korean universities, an evening Korean language class was opened. Although people such as Takahashi and Tomiyama were working during the daytime, at night they frequently went to study Korean. They could also recruit new members for OKPS through the class. In addition to language lessons, the members of OKPS held study groups. Initially they intended to focus on the base problems. However, according to Tomiyama, the issues that the members eventually needed to study covered a wide range of topics other than the anti-base movement, such as historical and territorial problems between Japan and South Korea.³¹⁴ Tomiyama also states that OKPS succeeded in building a relationship of trust with Korean activists over the course of the first five years as a result of their frequent interaction across borders.

³¹⁴ Moriteru Arasaki et al., "Tomo ni Manabi, Tomo ni Kowaru, Okikan Minshu Rentai no Ayumi," 10.



Image 7-2. The cover photo from the first annual activity report made by Action Committee for Solidarity with Asia in 1997.



Image 7-3. Clippings from local Okinawan and Korean newspaper articles reporting 43 Koreans' visit in Okinawa to see the public hearing from Hitotsubo Anti-war landlords at the Naha local court. The photo was retrieved from the annual activity report made by the Action Committee for Solidarity with Asia in 1997.

7.7. Mutual Preconceptions

The visit of the Korean activists to Okinawa in 1997 was indeed the beginning of a process that opened a gateway for bilateral grassroots networks. However, there was also some ambivalence and scepticism in the feelings of each side towards each other. For Korean activists, their ambivalent feelings were primarily based on the history of Japanese colonialism in Korea. In the mid-1990s, there were still a large number of Korean anti-US base activists who thought that the presence of US military bases in Japan prevented Japan from rearming. They saw the US forces as a “jar lid”, containing any possible resurgence of Japanese militarism.³¹⁵ From this perspective, many Korean activists were sceptical about the aims and philosophy of the Okinawan anti-US military base movement. Furthermore, there was a widespread perception in Korean society that US military bases helped South Koreans protect their country from the North Korean threat. Takahashi recalls that many South Korean journalists were interested in asking Okinawan activists why they were opposing the US military bases.³¹⁶

At the same time, Okinawans were worried about developing a solidarity movement with South Korean activists. Although military dictatorship had formally come to an end when President Roh Tae-woo, a former General of the South Korean Army, declared the democratization of South Korea in 1987, Okinawan activists were still concerned about surviving elements from the former military regime, best represented by the issue of the National Security Act. As a second generation *Zainichi* Korean who also had a long-term involvement with the democratization movement of South Korea in Japan during the 1970s and 1980s, To Yusa knew only too well that many of his fellow *Zainichi* Korean activists

³¹⁵ Ibid., 14.

³¹⁶ Ibid., 15.

from Japan were imprisoned in Korea under the National Security Act.³¹⁷ Tomiyama says that he and fellow Okinawan activists in the 1970s and 1980s had a preconception that there was no freedom of speech and no social activism in South Korea under dictatorship.³¹⁸

Hesitation to deepen the solidarity movement with Koreans was not only derived from the image of the South Korean military regime shared by the members but also from personal experiences. Some members had visited South Korea before 1987, where they had witnessed South Korean everyday life which was quite different from life in Japan at that time. Some of them were deeply shocked by their experiences in Korea, and had stopped his involvement with activism related to Korea until the late 1990s. Among them was Nishio Ichirō. Nishio, who was studying at a theological school in Okayama called Nōson Dendō Shingakkō (the Okayama Theological Seminary for Rural Mission), flew to South Korea with his Korean friend in early August 1974. Although this visit was part of their religious training at a rural chapel in Seoul, he was also involved with left-wing student activism at his previous theological college, Tokyo Union Theological Seminary (Tokyo Shingaku Daigaku). Because of this political background, Nishio was anxious about his first visit to South Korea. On his arrival he was greeted by the sight of Korean soldiers with machine guns at Seoul's Gimpo International Airport. His anxiety reached its peak when he was about to leave South Korea in mid-August. At the immigration desk of Gimpo Airport, the officers confiscated his passport. Knowing little about his situation or the local language, Nishio was in a panic and only recalled what he was told by his friend: "Never lose your passport." Later he found out that this was because of the assassination of Yuk Young-soo, the wife of the President Park Chung-hee, by a young Korean resident in Japan, Moon Se-gwang. When this so-called "Moon Se-gwang Incident" occurred, South Korean police suspected that the

³¹⁷ Ibid., 10.

³¹⁸ Ibid., 14.

perpetrator was Japanese. Therefore, all the Japanese who planned to leave the country around this period were blocked from departing. The only exception was fishermen.³¹⁹

7.8. Face-to-Face Relationship

In the course of building trust with South Korean activists, the members of OKPS have kept one principle as the motto of their activity. That is to create and prioritise “face-to-face relationships” (*kao no mieru kankei*) with South Korean counterparts. The former representative of OKPS, Nishio Ichirō, said that, when he and his friends launched OKPS, they decided to build up a close relationship with South Koreans to the point at which they would be able to see their Korean counterparts as friends.³²⁰ Firstly, this meant an actual exchange of people between the two areas. As we have seen, the relationship between the two different groups of social actors started with suspicion and unfamiliarity towards each other. With such a beginning, the best way in which the members of OKPS could break the ice with South Korean activists was to establish a regular cycle of movement of people. During the first few years, the members of OKPS frequently flew to Korea and also invited Korean anti-US base activists to visit Okinawa. Through the members’ participation in events such as study groups, symposiums, academic conferences, study tours and actual anti-base struggles, Okinawans increasingly learnt about South Korean anti-base struggles from firsthand experience.

Secondly, the principle of face-to-face relationships also implies a type of solidarity based on inter-personal relationship rather than organizational connectivity. This approach enabled Okinawan activists to create flexible and wide-ranging individual relationships in

³¹⁹ Interview with Nishio Ichirō and Tomiyama Masahiro, November 23, 2011.

³²⁰ Interview with Nishio Ichirō and Tomiyama Masahiro, November 23, 2011.

many different kinds of anti-US base activist groups in South Korea. Although this group's first encounter with the Korean anti-base movement was through Kim Yong-han and his HNCECUST, the members of OKPS were involved with anti-US base campaigns in other places including Mae Hyang Ri, where local villagers and supporting activists demanded the closure of a military base used as a target practice site including depleted uranium shells, and also with a protest campaign against the extension of the military training facility in Pyeongtaek. In recent years, some members of OKPS began to be involved with the anti-naval base construction movement in places like Gangjeon, Jeju Island. Their relationships with Korean activists have been growing through these shared experiences.³²¹

7.9. "Let's Learn from Okinawa/Korea"

Despite their initial unfamiliarity with ways in which to approach their South Korean counterparts, OKPS and their Korean counterparts have created mutual trust. This was achieved in part through frequent communication that ensured Okinawans understood people's lived experiences and knowledge born out of the social contexts in South Korea. Through meetings at conference venues, at protest sites being exposed to freezing water from the water canon of riot police in Pyeongtaek's cold winter, and at downtown bars where they drink together, OKPS has become the first Japanese anti-base group which could successfully build a solidarity movement with Koreans over the issue of the US military bases. Inspired by OKPS, civic groups in other areas of Japan with US bases, such as Yokosuka in Kanagawa Prefecture, began to follow OKPS in creating collaborative projects with Koreans.

³²¹ Interview with Tomiyama Masahiro, November 21, 2011.

Meanwhile, the Korean activists also found Okinawa to be an important “reference” for the anti-base movement. Here, the notion of “reference” means that the Koreans not only refer to their counterparts but also introduce ideas and strategies from Okinawa’s anti-base movement into their local activism. The anti-base struggle is indeed a translocal movement in which Okinawan and Korean participants are connected through people and ideas across different local contexts. In this sense, the forty-three Koreans’ visit to Okinawa in 1997 was profoundly important in that it was the one of the earliest moments in which Korean activists learned Okinawan ways of conducting anti-base campaigns. Through this event, Korean activists learnt the strategy developed by the *Hitotsubo* Anti-War Landlords. This strategy was introduced to the struggle in Korea. By purchasing a portion of privately owned land collectively, Korean citizens in Maehyang-ri started to initiate their local version of anti-war land owners from the late 1990s. Bringing a court case against the Korean government over the noise from the US bases is also another strategy that was introduced from Okinawa. Following examples from places such as Kadena and Futenma, where local citizens organize groups to take legal action against noise pollution (*bakuon soshō dan*), Korean activists in places such as Pyeongtaek sued their government over similar problems.

However, it needs to be noted that “learning from Okinawa” is not a one-sided approach. OKPS was started to create a bilateral relationship through which mutual learning between Okinawans and their counterparts overseas could be developed. In this sense, while Korean activists say that they should learn from Okinawa, Okinawans also learn from Korean experiences. With regard to this point, Arasaki’s comment on Korean activism is helpful. Looking at the surge of Korean nationwide protest against the US military over an accident in which two local school-girls were killed by an American tank in 2002, Arasaki said:

When I was studying South Korean base problems, I saw a pamphlet which says “let’s learn from Okinawa” but I thought this was an overestimation. The point (of the pamphlet) was “Okinawa made the US apologize, but the US have never apologized to us (South Korea)”...Although they (South Koreans) are saying that they should learn from Okinawa, I am doubtful about the current situation of the Okinawan anti-base movement. I rather think that Okinawans are encouraged by Koreans... I keenly feel the importance of considering how we can learn from them.³²²

In particular, Arasaki thinks that the active participation of young people in the anti-base movement is a characteristic that Okinawa needs to learn from South Korea. From a different perspective, Tomiyama says that he is always amazed by the number of people which South Korean activism mobilizes and by their creative strategy for the anti-base campaigns in Seoul. He said:

South Korean activism is always sensational and exciting. When I was marching with other fellow activists in front of Seoul Mayoral Building, people suddenly spread a big American flag. It was a massive flag. You know what happened? A few young guys ran in the middle of the crowd to cut the flag into two. I was thrilled. I wished we could also do that performance in Okinawa.³²³

Perhaps one of the most crucial things that Okinawa learned through interaction with the Korean anti-base movement was the significance of Okinawa’s geopolitical location in the region. Kadena Airbase in Okinawa was one of the main sites from which American B-29

³²² Moriteru Arasaki et al. “Tomo ni Manabi, Tomo ni Kawaru, Okikan Minshu Rentai no Ayumi,” 13.

³²³ Interview with Masahiro Tomiyama, December 14, 2011.

bombers were sent to the Korean Peninsula during the Korean War. After half a century, while the US military command has changed globally since 2001, reflecting 9/11 and the subsequent attack on Afghanistan, Okinawa is still regarded as a crucial place for America's regional strategy in the Asia-Pacific, especially in relation to Northeast Asian affairs. Although this fact has been widely known among local activists in Okinawa, the actual strategic connection between Okinawa and Korea was not known until OKPS learned about this through colleagues in South Korea. As To Yusa says, since the Korean War, the Headquarters of US Forces Korea, located in Yongsan near Seoul, has been a center for US military operations in the Northeast Asian region including Okinawa. He also says that when the Commander of the US Eighth Army is changed, it has been conventional that the newly appointed officer is always taken on a tour of inspection of the bases in not only Korea but also Japan, including the places such as Futenma and Kadena in Okinawa and Atsugi, Yokosuka, Hokkaido and Yamaguchi.³²⁴

This intra-regional connectivity within Asia also raises ethical questions for the Okinawan anti-base movement. Tomiyama recalled that when Okinawan activists succeeded in stopping the import of America's depleted uranium bombs in 1997, they did not even imagine that those bombs would instead be relocated to a base in South Korea. He said that until he learnt about these events in Korea he did not consider the impact of this "success", from the Okinawan perspective, which in fact just shifted the burden to their regional neighbors.³²⁵ For the members of OKPS, acquiring this sort of knowledge through interaction with Korean activists helped Okinawans reconsider the meanings of their activism in relation to other places in the region.

³²⁴ Moriteru Arasaki et al. "Tomo ni Manabi, Tomo ni Kawaru, Okikan Minshu Rentai no Ayumi," 18.

³²⁵ Interview with Tomiyama Masahiro, November 21, 2011.

Five years of constant interaction with South Korean activists from 1998 until 2002 have brought slight changes to the Okinawan anti-base movement. Compared to the early days, visits of Korean activists to Okinawa are no longer unusual, and have instead become important annual events for Okinawans. Although their activities are still not very well-known, growing interest in the Okinawan anti-base movement amongst Korean activists and an increase in the number of visitors show that the activities that OKPS has organized for the last two decades have had some impact. This has encouraged further collaboration between Okinawans and Koreans in fields such as the environmental movement. Citizens from Okinawa and Korea started undertaking a collaborative survey of land contamination on the sites of former US military camps from the mid-2000s. This was indeed positive progress of the transnational solidarity movement.



Image 7-4. A local Okinawan newspaper article reporting about Korean anti-US base activists starting a *hitotsubo* anti-war landlords' movement.



Image 7-5. A local Okinawan newspaper article reporting Korean activists who participated in the annual anti-war campaign on 15 May in Okinawa.

文化

思潮 97

—新崎盛圓

ほとんど20歳、30歳代

去る二月十一日、公開審理の終了後、審理会場近くの駐米セシターで、韓国の防仲団との交流集まりがあった。訪仲団は、韓国各組の米軍基地反対運動を行っている人ひと四十三人で、公開審理の日には合わせて来仲し、基地を視察したり、公開審理を傍聴した後、交流会に臨んだのである。

防衛に關して、わたしはまず最初に印をうけられたと、アンバーの道である。そのほどか、とほ二十歳代後半から三十歳代に見えた。

訪沖団の若さに強い印象

新しい闘い、新しい世代が……

[illegible][illegible]

交流に想う

沖繩と韓國の

Image 7-6. A report on the visit of Korean activists in Okinawa written by Arasaki Moriteru. He wrote that Okinawans were impressed by Korean activism which was organised by the much younger generations than the Okinawan movement, which was led by mainly senior generations.

7.10. *Okikan Style*: “5.15” and the Emergence of the Younger Generations

15 May is an important day for Okinawa’s post-World War history. Every year, there are prefecture-wide ceremonies and events that take place around this date, which marks the anniversary of the day when Okinawa was “returned” to Japan in 1972. When “Go Ichi Go” (15 May in Japanese) is approaching, there have always been public events around Okinawa. One of the main ceremonies is usually organized by the Okinawa Prefectural Government. The governor of Okinawa and high-profile political figures come to give speeches to celebrate this historical day. However, anti-base activists and scholars also organize events with quite different motivations. Organizing public fora such as symposia, panel discussions and lectures, they question what “reversion” actually meant for Okinawa and its people. Also, during the week, there has been a tradition of making a human chain that surrounds the US Futenma Airbase.

In 2012, this historic day was to have its fortieth anniversary. For this memorable year, both the prefectural government and civic groups had been working to organize events on a greater scale than previous years. There were numerous posters and flyers displayed at corners of streets and on billboards. In this environment of excitement, the members of OKPS had also been working on their events. Ever since 2003, OKPS have been inviting Koreans to participate in the series of events around 15 May. With guests from diverse organizations, they have organized public events in different places in Okinawa. Also, the members of OKPS become tour-guides, and take Korean visitors to Henoko and Takae to show them the ongoing protest campaigns.

The members of OKPS usually start working on this project from the previous year. For the events of May 2012, they started planning the Koreans’ visit from late September 2011. The agenda items for the monthly regular meeting, which are not so numerous at other

times of the year, gradually increase as the anniversary approaches. With senior figures such as Takahashi and Nishio as coordinators, the members discuss issues related to this week-long event. The agenda is extensive. Jobs such as booking accommodation, organizing a pick-up service for Korean guests from the airport, interpretation at formal and informal venues, stage setting, and preparation of lunches are all conducted by OKPS.

In addition to the tour-guide role, OKPS has been working on a musical event. Since 2009, OKPS has invited cultural performance groups such as Deoneum and Kkottaji. Deoneum performs traditional farmers' music called *pungmur nori*. Playing the drums and dancing in a circle, the performers not only showcase classic folk culture but also express protests against the political establishment. Based in Incheon, one of the centers of South Korean industrialization, they have been collaborating closely with industrial workers. The group Kkottachi is also known for its use of music performance as a means of social protest. While Tōnūm plays traditional music, Kkottachi sings in a contemporary pop music style. In Okinawa as in Korea, music plays a crucial role in the culture of the peace movement including the anti-base movement. Indie artists such as rappers Kakumakushaka and Chibana Tatsumi are among the singers whose works have been popular in Okinawa, particularly among youths. OKPS approached several local musicians, and was able to book an Okinawan traditional music singer, Ayumu Yonaha, for the coming event.

The annual music event for 15 May had been organized by new members of OKPS rather than the senior founding members. People in their thirties or forties were particularly active. Among them is Ishikawa Takashi, who proposed the idea of inviting Kkottachi. Originally born and raised in Chiba Prefecture, Ishikawa used to work in Tokyo as a medical doctor, particularly for manual laborers. He moved to Okinawa in the early 2000s at the invitation of a senior pulmonologist in Naha. While working in the local Daidō Hospital, Ishikawa has been involved with OKPS ever since he arrived. He is one of the main

contributors to OKPS in terms of financial assistance. Yet his career as an activist started when he was a university student. When he was a medical student in Chiba University, Ishikawa started becoming involved with social activism to support workers affected by industrial accidents, particularly those suffering from respiratory disease. During that period, he met concerned medical students in South Korea who also worked for the laborers. It was then that Ishikawa was introduced to Kkottachi, and OKPS was able to invite the group because of his connections. Participation of the young generations is not only helpful for the seniors but is also playing a vital role in introducing new kinds of activities to OKPS. The young participants do not necessarily share the contexts and experiences of their elders. But OKPS has gradually become better known among local activists and other local citizens through cultural events such as music concerts during the events of 15 May, which embodies the distinctive cross-border reach of this group. In this sense, the spirit of OKPS is developed not only by its senior members but also by the younger members who are creating new styles of collaboration between Okinawa and South Korea.



Image 7-7. Deoneum performs traditional farmers' music called *p'ung-mur nori* at the 50th anniversary of Okinawa's return to Japan. The photo was taken by Takahashi Toshio, May 2012.

7.11. Imposed Boundaries

Ever since the day that the five Okinawan citizens started OKPS, it has been remarkably successful in building a transnational solidarity against US military bases with South Korean activists. Its experiences provide us with a crucial reference for understanding the emergence of a type of Northeast Asian regionalism. This transnational solidarity movement challenges boundaries that are not merely drawn on the map of the region but are also deeply embedded in historical experiences. It is fair to say that OKPS and its 30 years of activities have helped to re-discover and connect localities, and in so doing have enabled Okinawan activists to rearticulate their distinctive local experiences of the anti-base movement within regional contexts. The participants in this transnational solidarity movement are thus carving out a space for shared histories and identities in order to create more inclusive relationships with their regional neighbors.

This rich international experience sometimes made OKPS become a cause of conflict with other local activists in Okinawa. In particular, OKPS was one of the few voices which opposed Okinawa's base relocation outside the prefecture. In 2009, then mayor of Ginowan City, Iha Yōichi, insisted on the closure of the Futenma Airbase to relocate it to Guam. Known as one of the most vocal activists in Okinawa, his opinion was supported by many of the senior activists. Although the founding members of OKPS, including Tomiyama, were also Iha's long-term friends and colleagues, they disagreed with the relocation plan advocated by Iha and other senior leaders. Through the interaction with Korean activists, they became concerned with the idea of relocation because it risked creating other victims of the base problem. What they insisted instead was the closure of all the US bases in Okinawa to return them to the US. However, few people supported OKPS. Rather, the local leaders criticized Tomiyama and other members. There, OKPS was "very isolated", said Tomiyama, because they were regarded as people who stopped the momentum for the closure of the Futenma

Airbase. In this sense, OKPS plays a vital role to extend the horizon of pacifism that Okinawa's anti-base movement created. However, their transnational activism is not easily understood even within Okinawa.

Also, there were some other difficulties for OKPS to build the anti-base network with South Korean activists. Particularly when OKPS is confronted by the regulatory actions of the state, their transnational activism become vulnerable. On the 5th of September in 2012 at around 12:45 in the afternoon, three activists from OKPS—Takahashi Toshio, Tomiyama Masahiro, and Tomita Eiji—arrived at Incheon International Airport in South Korea. Their plan was to visit Jeju Island via Seoul in order to attend a conference organised by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). This conference has been run annually since 1948 and brings together national governments and non-government organizations (NGOs) for the purpose of discussing the protection and promotion of natural heritage around the globe. With an official letter from a member of the South Korean National Assembly, Takahashi, Tomiyama and Tomita were invited guests of the conference. However, after they disembarked at Incheon Airport, an immigration officer asked them to go to the administration desk. At the desk, another immigration official required the three men to submit their passports and took their finger prints. Showing the letter of invitation, Takahashi asked for an explanation for their treatment, but the official did not respond to his inquiry and told them to wait for a superior official to come. In the meantime, Takahashi called the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. He told the Japanese official that they had been detained in the airport. However, this Japanese official told him to contact the Japanese Embassy again if they were refused entry.

After they had waited for about two hours, two Korean immigration officers told Takahashi and the others that their entry into South Korea had been denied, and they were to leave the country on the same day. A return ticket had already been prepared by Asiana

Airlines. When Takahashi and the others were told they would be deported, they responded by arguing that this order from the Korean authorities without any reasonable explanations was not acceptable. Takahashi demanded that the Korean Ministry of Justice should write a letter explaining the reason to decline their entry into the country, but all of his requests were dismissed by the officials. Around 4.00pm, Takahashi called the Japanese Embassy in Seoul again, and explained what had occurred. He asked a Japanese official to negotiate with the Korean Government, saying that this decision for the visitors to be deported without any clear reason was a violation of human rights. However, the official at the Japanese Embassy said to Takahashi that the decision was made by the Korean Government, and therefore there was nothing the Japanese Embassy could do to help. In the end, the three men were sent back to Fukuoka in Japan late the same afternoon.

Later, it was revealed that a number of other people from Okinawa, Japan and elsewhere had been refused entry when they arrived at the airport. As with Takahashi, Tomiyama and Tomita, the other people were all planning to participate in the conference of the International Union for Conservation of Nature in Jeju. Some Korean NGOs and activist groups released protest statements about these refusals. Okinawan activists also held a press conference at the Okinawa Prefectural Government building. The news was released in a local newspaper next day. The South Korean government kept silent on this issue, but activists speculated that the Korean government was concerned about the escalation of the anti-base movement in Gangjeong Village on Jeju Island, located in the southern part of Jeju Island in South Korea, the South Korean government announced the plan to create a naval base in Jeju for the first time in 1993. After 15 years to search for the possible location for the naval base, the government eventually appointed Gangjeong Village in 2007. Since then, the concerned villagers and activists from Korea and the rest of the world have been conducting an anti-base construction campaign. Six months before Okinawas' visit to Jeju, the then

President of South Korea Lee Myung-bak and his government had decided to destroy the rocky shoreline in preparation for the construction of a new naval base. The rocky shore, which was listed as a world heritage site harboring rare local species, was designated as the central site of the base construction. The incident in September 2012 involving the OKPS members and others could be seen as a somewhat draconian response by President Lee to the risk of an escalation of political activism in Gangjeong.



Image 7-7. A photo of three men from Okinawa taken to the departure lobby. The photo was taken by Takahashi Toshio September 2012.



Image 7-8. Three men (from left: Tomiyama Masahiro, Tomita Eiji and Takahashi Toshio) at the departure lobby waiting for the return flight to Fukuoka.



Image 7-9: A local Okinawan newspaper reporting that Takahashi and others were refused entry into South Korea.

7.12. Conclusion

This chapter examines the process by which one group of Okinawan anti-base activists gained a regional perspective on the meaning of their local activism. The project of building a transnational network was initiated by five local activists who felt a common imperative to seek new ways to develop Okinawan anti-base activism. But the founders of OKPS were not only motivated by anti-base politics. By reflecting upon the historical relationships between Okinawa and South Korea, they questioned the dominant historical narrative of Okinawa's victimhood at the hands of Japanese imperialism. In other words, the OKPS was founded by the local citizens who realized the necessity of reconsidering their local histories by including regional neighbors whose colonial past and experiences were hardly remembered in the popular accounts of Okinawa's modern history. In this sense, it is important to highlight the significance of historical consciousness with regard to Okinawa's postwar (or, arguably Okinawa's postcolonial) conditions that motivated people to start the transnational solidarity movement.

While based on such historical awareness, the actual transnational cooperation became possible through a series of relatively fortuitous events in the late 1990s. Although the group was founded by concerned local Okinawan citizens in the mid-1990s, its existence would not have been possible without the visit of Korean activists who became interested in Okinawa's mass protest campaign in 1995. After the failure of their first attempt at transnational cooperation with Philippine activists, Okinawan activists faced difficulties in starting a new international solidarity movement. In such circumstances, the first visit of a Korean activist in 1996 and the following visit by forty-three Koreans to learn about the Okinawan anti-base struggle gave a hope for Okinawans to restart their project. Thus the transnational anti-base movement between Okinawa and South Korea was made possible by

a coming together of people who similarly sought new visions to develop their struggles in two different locations.

The effort that OKPS has made to develop relationships with South Korean activists over the last twenty years has created solidarity based on trust between different activist groups across national borders. Through exchanges of people, ideas and experiences, they could establish a type of mutual reference system by which the activists in different locales could compare and learn about the anti-base movement in two different locales. At the same time, this solidarity movement also generated a regional perspective in which Okinawan and Korean activists could reflect upon the impact and the meanings of their local activism on their counterparts. For OKPS, this means that the notion of region has widened the scope of their activism by extending it in relation to regional neighbors. In this sense, one of the significant outcomes that OKPS has brought to the Okinawan anti-base movement has been the idea of “region”, through which the local anti-base activists can consider the implications of their movement beyond their own local situation. In the next chapter, I will look in further detail at the origins of OKPS. I will emphasize the diversity of historical contexts that are involved in the creation of OKPS. By analyzing the personal histories of some key figures, I will examine how the notion of region became a crucial part of the communal identity of OKPS and what region means to key members.

Chapter Eight

Regionalising Locality: Making Regional-Local Identity in Okinawa



OKPS members with South Korean activists in May 15, 2012.
The photo was taken and provided by Takahashi Toshio.

8.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed the general history of Okinawa Korea People's Solidarity (OKPS). I looked at the historical background of the group, and considered what OKPS has achieved, the problems that it has overcome, and the lessons that it has learned in the process of building collaborative anti-base activism with South Korean activists. Although it is a small activist group, what makes OKPS crucial among the local protest communities is its distinctive activism by which Okinawa's anti-base movement became a key instance of transnational civic activism. However, it is also important to consider another aspect of OKPS: that is, the identity that it formed based on Okinawa's distinctive locality and on the historical context of a wider East Asian region. I call this distinctive form of community identity "regional-local identity". This concept shows the extensive sense of place of Okinawan anti-base activists which lies both in local and regional contexts. Also, it highlights the entanglement of the local anti-base movement in Okinawa with regional neighbors in space and history. This entanglement provides us with a new perspective to consider the meaning of the Okinawa struggle in relation to not only Japan and the US but also East Asian societies (i.e. the Koreas, China, Taiwan and the Philippines).

The main aim of this chapter is to look in further detail at the formation of this local-regional identity by examining the life histories of three key members of OKPS, who originate from different cultural backgrounds and have diverse life experiences. The stories of these activists—Arasaki Moriteru, Takahashi Toshio, and Yu Yeongja—provide us with important perspectives which elucidate the complexity of "locality". They reveal not only individual stories but diverse social contexts and forms of historical awareness of OKPS embedded within their personalized narratives. By looking at these stories, this chapter aims

to consider “local identity” as a multi-leveled concept and explore the contexts which create “local-regional identity”.

The life history of Arasaki, who was born as the second generation of Okinawan migrants in Tokyo, helps us to understand the forces that moulded one of the most prominent Okinawan historians, and also highlights the historical process by which this local anti-base activist came to incorporate a regional perspective through his interaction with South Korean citizens. Takahashi’s story tells us about the involvement of former new left activists in shaping local-regional identity in Okinawa. While we tend to think of the notion of Okinawan people under the rubric of ethnicity or cultural identity, Takahashi’s life history complicates this assumption and reveals the role of the Japanese new left movement and the sense of internationalism which emerged in Japan in the 1960s and 1970s in the Okinawan anti-base movement. Finally, Yu’s story shows the involvement of ethnic Koreans living in Japan (or so-called *Zainichi* Koreans), which provides us with yet another perspective on making local-regional identity. The story of Yu, as a non-Japanese and non-Okinawan, is important to critically examine the problems of the fixity of Okinawa’s local identity, which is built on dichotomous views of “local Okinawan” and “the mainland Japanese”. Also, her life experience before and after joining OKPS extends our view to the historical context of OKPS that is deeply rooted in Japan’s past with Korea. From these three perspectives, this chapter examines how this multi-faceted process of identity formation takes place in Okinawa.

Together with written documents, I rely on oral history as a useful method to highlight the lives of these activists. Oral history is an approach which has increasingly been mobilized in recent scholarship on the history of social movements. One of the useful aspects of oral history is that it helps us understand collective consciousness through a prism of

individual perspective.³²⁶ Also oral history can reveal the relationship of one form of activism to various other social movements. It is not only helpful in understanding historical details but is also a critical method that is “disruptive” and unsettles collective history by introducing diverse perspectives on a major historical narrative.³²⁷ By focusing on the diverse historical experiences and the processes of identity formation of these three activists, this chapter analyses multiple levels of place consciousness in OKPS.

8.2. Arasaki Moriteru

A scholar, educator, university manager, critic, and activist, Arasaki Moriteru has been a prominent figure in the contemporary Okinawa anti-base movement. As professor of contemporary Okinawa history, Arasaki’s works including his seminal books on the subject such as *Okinawa Sengoshi* (Postwar Okinawa History) and *Okinawa Gendaishi* (Contemporary Okinawa History) are among the most important texts for understanding the development of the anti-base movement and Okinawa’s political environment after the end of World War II. In recent years, Arasaki’s texts have been published in other languages such as Korean and Chinese, and a translation into English is under way. Also, Arasaki is one of the founding members of Okinawa Korea People’s Solidarity in 1997, and has been an important Okinawan counterpart for Korean visitors since the late 1980s.

Despite his significance in the anti-base movement, Arasaki’s life history is little known even among the local Okinawan citizens. While his public image as one of the most vocal speakers on the Okinawa problem is widely known, and a number of students, scholars

³²⁶ Bret Eynon, “Cast upon the Shore: Oral History and New and New Scholarship on the Movements of the 1960s,” *The Journal of American History* 83 (1996): 560-561.

³²⁷ Kim Lacy Rogers, “Oral History and the History of the Civil Rights Movement,” *The Journal of American History* 75 (1988): 567-568.

and others read his texts as an introduction to the Okinawa struggle, it does not necessarily mean that his life experiences are well-known. However, in order to conduct in-depth reading of his text, understanding the life history of this *kamajisaa* is important.³²⁸ In particular, his life history becomes crucial for understanding the meanings of “locality” and “region” in the context of the Okinawa struggle, and for grasping how these two concepts are connected to the wider East Asia. How was this high-profile commentator on contemporary Okinawa history created? What was the motivation for him to engage with Korea? What does his involvement with OKPS reveal about his perspective on region and locality? By focusing on these aspects, I will analyze Arasaki’s local-regional identity.

8.2.1. Early Life

Arasaki Moriteru was born in Suginami, a western suburb of Tokyo in 1936. Living far from Okinawa, Arasaki spent most of his formative period in various districts of Tokyo. He was the eldest son of Arasaki Seichū and Arasaki Tawo.³²⁹ Both of his parents were first generation migrants from Okinawa. Although his parents were not members of the social elite, they were both well educated people. Tawo was a poet, writing traditional Okinawan poems, *ryūka*. Born in Tokunoshima Island, which currently belongs to Kagoshima Prefecture, Tawo finished her education at one of the most prestigious women’s high-schools in Okinawa. After working as a school teacher for several years, she married Arasaki Seichū, who also worked at a local public school in Okinawa as an English teacher. Seichū’s family, the Arasaki clan, had been part of the former aristocracy before Okinawa was annexed by Japan. However, when Seichū grew up his family did not hold any prestigious title. Rather,

³²⁸ *Kamajisā* means “a man who is an ungenial, serious, and sulky in appearance” in local Okinawan language. I heard some people using this term to describe Arasaki with endearment.

³²⁹ Interview with Arasaki Moriteru December 20, 2011.

the family was struggling financially. Yet this family was still different from the majority of the local population. Some of Seichū's relatives and siblings had high educational backgrounds. For example, one of Seichū's elder siblings, Arasaki Seibin (1912-n.d.), studied natural science at the Tokyo Imperial University, where he later became the first Okinawan-born Professor of Phycology, studying algae.³³⁰ Seichū also graduated from the local teachers college and became an English teacher. However, he was not given any chance to study further at university. Priority in education was given according to seniority for financial reasons. Seichū, who was the second son, could not receive the opportunities his elder brother did.

Nevertheless, Seichū did not give up his plan to receive tertiary education. He decided to leave his home and job in Okinawa and go to Tokyo with his wife. Working during the day time as a national government bureaucrat, Seichū became a night-class student at Nihon University in Tokyo. Seichū was interested in British novelists and playwrights, particularly in George Bernard Shaw, and had a collection of Shaw's works on his shelf. Born in Okinawa after annexation and living in the imperial capital, Seichū's life coincided with that of the Irish play writer and critic. Having been inspired by Shaw, Seichū also wanted to become a writer.³³¹ However, he had to give up his dream because of the difficulty of managing work and study at the same time. He withdrew from university and decided to live the rest of his life as a public servant. Seichū's son, Moriteru (hereafter Arasaki), nurtured his intellectual curiosity in such a family environment.

Arasaki's childhood was not easy. First, he was not physically strong, and suffered from tuberculosis and a heart problem which became an ongoing health problem. He had to take one year's leave from school to undergo medical treatment. Even after he returned from

³³⁰ Interview with Arasaki December 20, 2011.

³³¹ Interview with Arasaki December 20, 2011.

hospital, Arasaki's vulnerable health prevented him from participating in hard physical activities. Also, the air raids on Tokyo by the Allied Forces towards the end of World War II made his life difficult. Although Arasaki and his family were not directly affected by bombing, Seichū and Tawo decided to evacuate from Tokyo. The destination to which the whole family moved was Kumamoto Prefecture in western Kyūshū Island.³³² While Tokyo was suffering air raids, the Arasaki family's home island, Okinawa, was also reduced to ashes due to the Battle of Okinawa. Although Arasaki's parents wished to return to Okinawa, they did not have any option but to live outside Okinawa. The main reason why Seibin and Tawo decided to move to Kumamoto was because Kyūshū Island was one of the closest places to Okinawa. Unlike some other prominent anti-base Okinawan activists of the same generation, such as Ōta Masahide, Arasaki thus did not experience wartime life in Okinawa.

8.2.2. A Patriotic Boy

One of the key terms to understand Arasaki's early postwar experiences was "patriotism" (*aikokushin*). As happened to most of the "war-time generation" (or *senchū-ha*), who were born around the 1930s, Arasaki grew up with a strong spirit of Japanese patriotism. Such children were later called "patriotic boys" (*aikoku shōnen*). Despite his health condition, his dream was to become a soldier and fight the Americans on the battlefield.³³³

However, after the end of WWII, like many patriotic boys, Arasaki also had to face drastic changes in his living environment. Under the Allied occupation, Arasaki was confused by the sudden changes in society. For Arasaki in his early teenage years, the most symbolic representation of this social change was his school teachers. He simply despised the sudden change in his teachers who had once supported the advancement of the Japanese

³³² Moriteru Arasaki, "Watashi ga Ikita Okinawa-shi, soshite Sekai-shi 2." *Keishikaji* 76 (October, 2012): 56-65.

³³³ Ibid.

Imperial Army and then suddenly started to denounce the previous regime and became advocates of American-style democracy. Although the concept of “*kichiku beiei*” (Barbaric Britons and Americans like devils and animals) was no longer taught in his classroom, it was still significant in his mind. Therefore, the experience of postwar democracy education embedded a deep scepticism in his mind about Americans as well as Japanese leaders.³³⁴

The young Arasaki’s suspicion towards postwar Japanese democracy became explicit by the time he was a high- school student. When the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force on 28 April 1952, the school principal of Tokyo Koyamadai High-school, where Arasaki had recently enrolled, called all the students to the school grounds. In front of all the students, the principal celebrated Japan’s restoration of independence from the allied occupation with shouts of *banzai*.³³⁵ Hearing the school principal’s words, many of the Koyamadai students shouted criticism at their principal. The left-leaning students criticized their school principal since they considered Japan’s “independence” was in fact nothing more than incorporation into the American capitalist order, whereas the conservative nationalist students, including Arasaki, criticized the school principal because they considered that independence had only been achieved through the strong support of the US, which had been Japan’s biggest enemy during the Pacific War.³³⁶

Although many politically concerned students of his high- school belonged to left-leaning student clubs such as the Social Science Club, Arasaki was not a member of any of these groups. Instead, he chose to join the Debating Club because of its “neutral political views”.³³⁷ There he trained his skills of oratory and became one of the most outstanding debaters in his school. During his first year, Arasaki became a finalist in the debating

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Interview with Arasaki Moriteru December 20, 2011.

³³⁷ Interview with Arasaki Moriteru, December 20, 2011.

competition. The title that he chose was: *The True Way to Japan's Independence*. There, Arasaki insisted that the recovery of lost territories, including Okinawa, was necessary for restoration of Japan's territorial sovereignty in its true sense.



Photo 8-1. Arasaki in his first year of Koyamadai High school, at the venue of the school-wide debate competition. (Arasaki in the centre of the back row)

8.2.3. Identity Loss

Although Arasaki had been a patriotic boy, it did not take long for him to realize the presence of a “borderline between Okinawa and Japan, and between *yamatonchū* (Japanese people) and *uchinanchū* (Okinawan people)”.³³⁸ The turning point came in 1952, during his first summer holiday after becoming a Koyamadai high-school student. While reading a newspaper, Arasaki found Douglas MacArthur’s comment on Okinawans, in which MacArthur described the obedient people of Okinawa as ethnically different from Japanese.³³⁹ Arasaki was stunned by MacArthur’s statement. It was the first time that the young Arasaki had heard Okinawans described as ethnically different from Japanese. Following this, Arasaki read another newspaper article written by an American journalist which increased his unease. It reported how the locals in Okinawa had happily welcomed the US occupation. Until that moment, Arasaki had strongly believed that Okinawans were the same as Japanese. With this idea of sameness, Arasaki’s Japanese patriotism could co-exist with his Okinawan identity. However, his belief was undermined after he read those newspaper articles. What if Okinawa was not part of Japan but had been occupied by Japan, just as Americans had occupied Japan? What if Okinawan people were different from Japanese people? Were the Okinawa locals really pleased to have Americans? These concerns emerged in his first year of high school, and slowly made his intellectual interests shift from Japan to Okinawa and its local history.

In this year, there was another crucial experience that shaped Arasaki’s thought. During the summer holidays in August, one of his friends gave him the latest issue of *Asahi Gurafu*, one of the earliest Japanese photo journals. As Arasaki read the journal, some of its photos attracted his attention. They were images of the victims of the atomic bombing of

³³⁸ Moriteru Arasaki, “Watashi ga Ikita Okinawa-shi, soshite Sekai-shi 2.” *Keishikaji* 76 (October, 2012): 58.

³³⁹ Ibid.

Hiroshima. During the occupation, the Press Code for Japan strictly prohibited the publication of information which could “directly or indirectly, disturb the public tranquility”, and or which contained “destructive criticism of the Allied Powers and anything which might invite mistrust or resentment of those troops”.³⁴⁰ Photos showing the effects of the atomic bombings were also heavily censored, and therefore, it had not been possible to show the catastrophic images of the victims during the occupation period. Arasaki was shocked not only by the visual images of the victims but also by the fact that so many civilians had been killed during World War II. Not long after, Arasaki had a chance to read a novel about the Battle of Okinawa. The book was about the tragedy of the Himeyuri Nursing Unit at the end of the war. Many of this group of female students who were mobilised as a nursing unit during the Battle of Okinawa committed suicide towards the end of the war. Reading about these experiences made a significant impact on the young Arasaki, and as a result he became determined to study further about the history of Okinawa.

8.2.4. Becoming “an Expert on the Okinawa Problem”

After graduating from high school and taking a year off, Arasaki entered the University of Tokyo in 1956. Aiming to become a journalist, he chose sociology for his major. With his mentor, Hidaka Rokurō, who was known as one of the most influential advocates of the postwar Japanese peace movement in that period, Arasaki began to conduct academic research on Okinawa. The topic he chose to study was the early US occupation period in Okinawa. In particular, he was strongly intrigued by the first island-wide struggle that occurred a year before Arasaki became a university student. For Arasaki, this first mass

³⁴⁰ GENERAL HEAD QUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Civil Censorship Detachment, “CODE FOR JAPANESE PRESS (21 Sept. 1945),” accessed May 15, 2014, http://digital.lib.umd.edu/binaries/content/assets/digital/prange_presscode.doc.

protest uprising of Okinawan people against the US occupation was an historical event as significant as the Hungarian Uprising against the occupation by Soviet Russia, which occurred in the same year. He considered the people's uprising as an expression of Okinawa's dynamic political culture: contrary to media images of Okinawans as "obedient" people, local people had raised voices against foreign occupation. Based on the principle of self-determination, Arasaki discussed this as a grassroots demand for the reunification of Japan. Although his choice of research was not appealing to some senior sociologists in the faculty such as Odaka Kunio (1908-1993), his main supervisor, Hidaka Rokurō (1917-), was supportive of Arasaki's project. Arasaki's undergraduate thesis was entitled "An Inquiry into the Reversion Movement to Japan: Notes on understanding Okinawa Problems" (*Nihon Fukki Undō no Kenkyū: Okinawa Mondai Rikai no Tamen oboegaki*).³⁴¹

When Arasaki was approaching the end of his student life, he was introduced to one of Hidaka's colleagues, Nakano Yoshio (1903-1985). Nakano was originally Professor of English Literature at the University of Tokyo. However, ever since he read the collection of essays written by Okinawan students in Tokyo, "Okinawa without Homeland" (*Sokoku Naki Okinawa*), Nakano had been actively participating in the campaign for Okinawa's return to Japan.³⁴² When Nakano met Arasaki for the first time in 1958, he was planning to establish a research centre on Okinawa in Tokyo. Nakano's project, the Okinawa Resource Centre, attracted attention from his friends and colleagues such as the chief editor of a current affairs journal *Sekai (the World)* and the organiser of the Council of Peace Studies (*heiwa mondai danwakai*), Yoshino Genzaburō (1899-1981); Professor of Law who became the President of the University of Tokyo, Kato Ichirō (1922-2008); the Professor of European History at

³⁴¹ Moriteru Arasaki, "Chiki to Tomoni Ikiru Daigaku," *Daigaku to Kyōiku* 31 (2002): 15-39.

³⁴² Nakano's relationship to Okinawa began when he was a high school student. One of his close friends during that period was 'the last governor' of Okinawa before 1945, Shimada Akira, who died in the battle of Okinawa. (Yoshio Nakano, *Okinawa to Watashi* (Tokyo: Jijitsūshin-sha, 1972).

Hitotsubashi University, Uehara Senroku (1899-1975); and a lawyer, Umino Shinkichi. Nakano offered Arasaki a job at this newly established civic think-tank. His office was a small room in Umino's office. Arasaki started his career as a part-time researcher at this institute, while also working as a public servant of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Based on his undergraduate thesis, Arasaki published one of his earliest works on Okinawan society, "20 years of the Okinawan Problem" (Okinawa Mondai Nijū-nen), co-authored with Nakano Yoshio in 1965.

In 1974, two years after Okinawa was reincorporated as part of Japan, Arasaki and his family settled in Naha. He was offered a position teaching modern Japanese and Okinawan history at Okinawa University. Established in 1961, Okinawa University was one of the first private universities in the prefecture. However, after Okinawa's return to Japan, the university was facing closure because the Japanese government planned to implement a "one national and one private university" policy in Okinawa. The Japanese Ministry of Education planned to integrate it with other local private colleges and universities such as the International University. Facing this difficult period, the local staff members of the university asked for help from concerned people in mainland Japan as well as in Okinawa.³⁴³ In such circumstances, Arasaki was one of those who responded to the voices from Okinawa by joining the campaign to maintain the university. He not only joined the campaign from the mainland but also accepted the invitation to become a lecturer at this university. In that period, Okinawa University was suffering severely from a lack of teaching staff members. Although he had already established his career as an expert on Okinawa in mainland Japan, Arasaki hoped to live in Okinawa, and felt that this was an opportunity to fulfil this wish. Therefore, despite the risk to his career, Arasaki moved to Okinawa with his wife and son.

³⁴³ For more detail, see Okinawa Daigaku 50 Nen Shi Henshū linkai, ed. *Chiisana Daigaku no Ōkina Chōsen: Okinawa Daigaku 50 Nen no Kiseki* (Tokyo: Kōbunken Shuppan, 2008).

Shortly after he moved, Arasaki began to be involved with not only the university continuation campaign but also with the various activities related to the local anti-base movement. Together with his friends, Arasaki founded a support network for the environmental protection movement against construction of an oil storage terminal in Kin Bay. Also, in 1982 Arasaki organised another movement called the Association of Anti-war Land Owners (see Chapter 3). While Arasaki was known as an expert on Okinawan history, his activist career was little recognised compared to his writings in those days. After he became involved in these new projects, his vigorous attitude gradually elevated Arasaki within Okinawa's local activist community.

8.2.5. Thinking Okinawa as “Region”

Although Arasaki had many different commitments after he moved to Okinawa, he also kept publishing his works in the mainland Japanese media. Some of his works written during this period, including “Nihon ni Natta Okinawa” (*Okinawa that became Japan*) published in 1987, and “Okinawa: Tennōsei e no Gyakkō” (*Okinawa: The Backlight of the Imperial System*) published in 1988, reflect his changes in thought after he moved to Okinawa. A key aspect of his writing during the 1980s was that he tended to highlight the historical differences of Okinawa from the rest of Japan. However, this was a new turning point for Arasaki and his perspective on Okinawa. While known for his critical stance towards the Okinawa reversion process which was largely led by political elites in Tokyo and Washington, Arasaki was also critical of those who promoted the anti-reversion movement when he was in Tokyo. He positively valued the rise of Japanese nationalism in the occupied Okinawa as a means of liberating the oppressed Okinawans from the American military regime. In this sense, compared to his Okinawan friends who were active anti-reversionists

such as Arakawa Akira and Kawamitsu Shin'ichi, Arasaki's political stance on Okinawa's reversion to Japan was close to the local leaders of the reversion movement. Yet in the course of his direct involvement with the Okinawa struggle, Arasaki's frustration with Okinawa after reversion increased, and as a result he became increasingly critical towards mainland Japan.

Yet even after he became more critical of Okinawa-Japan relations, Arasaki was still different from those who had been involved with the anti-reversion movement. While some of them started arguing in favour of the possibility of the independence (*dokuritsu*) of Okinawa (or the Ryūkyūs) as a modern state, Arasaki was reluctant to follow that argument. Instead, what he adopted as his central motif was the concept of high autonomous status or self-reliance (*jiritsu*) of Okinawa based on its distinctive "region" (*chiiki*) in Japan. He argues

I think self-reliance is the state in which people's voices are reflected to the fullest extent to decide political, economic, social and cultural activities in one regional society.

Therefore, this could ultimately mean independence as a state. At any rate, I think that the basis of self-reliance is [an autonomous] self-governance (*jichi*), and it means all levels from the limited sense of self-governance to independence... The reason why self-reliance became a key issue in Okinawa today is because it is obstructed. It is obstructed by the centralized state power which rejects the regional characteristics (*chiiki-teki dokujisei*), those who indulge themselves by enjoying benefits from the state, and those who accept [the status quo] without criticism.³⁴⁴

³⁴⁴ Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Dōjidaishi 1988-1990: Yawarakai Shakai wo Motomete* (Tokyo: Gaifū-sha, 2004), 116-117.

What we can see in his argument is not merely a cautious approach to the independence of Okinawa. It is also an analytical perspective which Arasaki had developed in order to pursue a high level of autonomy for Okinawa. In developing this perspective, Arasaki sought to reconsider Japanese discourses of homogeneity. As I mentioned in Chapter Three, Shimao Toshio's idea of the Arc of the Ryūkyūs had a profound influence on Arasaki when he organised a supporting network of various kinds of residents' movements in Okinawa. The so-called *Ryūkyū-ko* was a crucial concept by which Okinawa and other Ryūkyū Islands were considered as a region related to the Pacific rather than simply to Japanese culture. Arasaki articulated this concept with his activism and tried to reconceptualize the Kin Bay struggle and other residents' movements as a struggle for Okinawa's regional autonomy.

Yet to understand the importance of Arasaki's thought and activity in the 1970s and the 1980s, we need to consider another figure who also profoundly influenced Arasaki's concept of region: that is, Tamanoi Yoshirō (1918-1985). Tamanoi was former Professor of Economics when he taught at the University of Tokyo. After he retired from Tokyo University in 1978, he came to teach at Okinawa International University, where he wrote many essays on region and regionalism before leaving Okinawa in 1988. Like Shimao in his notion of *Yaponesia*, Tamanoi conceptualized the Ryūkyū Islands as a region with its own culture, which cannot be subsumed into Japan. Like Shimao too, Tamanoi's concept of region emphasizes Okinawa's geographical significance and transnationality embedded in its local historical experiences of connections, especially with Asian countries.³⁴⁵

However, one distinctive aspect of Tamanoi's concept of region is its emphasis on ecology, which he considered as a profound basis to constitute the local economy, culture and

³⁴⁵ Yoshirō Tamanoi, "Ajia wo Miru Me," in *Tamanoi Yoshirō Chosaku-shū Volume 3: Chiiki-shugi kara no Shupatsu*, ed. Kazuko Tsurumi and Moriteru Arasaki (Tokyo: Gakuyō-shobō 1990), 175-198.

society of Okinawa. He also considers that local residents who inhabit that environment (*seikatsusha*) should be the people who decide the direction of their local community.³⁴⁶ Tamanoi argues that economists have long neglected the importance of ecology as a living system and how it serves as the basis of growth.³⁴⁷ Humans are also part of this ecological system, and therefore he emphasizes the need to reconsider the meaning of growth.³⁴⁸ From this perspective, Tamanoi considers Okinawa—with its distinctive location, ecology, and society—as a model for considering how to create sustainable social and economic development. As Arasaki notes, Tamanoi’s notion of region contributed to developing the Okinawa struggle in both theory and practice. In particular, his ideas highlighted Okinawa’s local struggles for natural conservation, including the Kin Bay Struggle.³⁴⁹ Arasaki says that Tamanoi “showed a direction for the movement, encouraged the participants, and enhanced public awareness.”³⁵⁰

Furthermore, Tamanoi’s regionalism did not only draw attention to the importance of restoring local autonomy but also it showed the possibility of considering local issues within a wider Asian region. Based in the Institute of Southern Islands at Okinawa International University, he sought to rediscover Okinawa’s indigenous connectivity with overseas countries. By adopting the concept of reciprocity from economic anthropology, especially from the writings of Karl Polanyi, Tamanoi sought to reinterpret the maritime networks between the Ryūkyū Kingdom and other Asian neighbors as having a dynamic different from that of commercial trade in the modern period.³⁵¹ By doing so, he tried to lay out an extensive

³⁴⁶ Yoshirō Tamanoi, “Okinawa wo Omou,” in *Tamanoi Yoshirō Chosaku-shū Volume 3: Chiiki-shugi kara no Shuppatsu*, ed. Kazuko Tsurumi and Moriteru Arasaki (Tokyo: Gakuyō-shobō 1990), 202.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 202-203.

³⁴⁸ In contrast to the economic profit-oriented growth model, Tamanoi calls it economy that is based on “human scale”. (Yoshirō Tamanoi, “Chiiki-shugi no Fukamari no Nakade,” in *Tamanoi Yoshirō Chosaku-shū Volume 3: Chiiki-shugi kara no Shuppatsu*, ed. Kazuko Tsurumi and Moriteru Arasaki (Tokyo: Gakuyō-shobō 1990), 158.

³⁴⁹ Moriteru Arasaki, “Foreward,” in *Tamanoi Yoshirō Chosaku-shū Volume 3: Chiiki-shugi kara no Shuppatsu*, ed. Kazuko Tsurumi and Moriteru Arasaki (Tokyo: Gakuyō-shobō 1990), 1.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁵¹ Yoshirō Tamanoi, “Ajia wo Miru Me,” 196-197.

view of Okinawa's ecological world which goes beyond local and national domains.

Tamanoi's concept of region was thus crucial and enlightening for Okinawan activists in that it provides their local struggle with new historical and spatial meanings. Overall, his regionalism introduced an alternative perspective on the Okinawa struggle which went beyond the national-local dichotomy, and redefined it within a space built across three different domains—locality (Okinawa), nation (Japan) and region (Asia).

8.2.6. Finding Colonial Korea in Okinawa, Feeling Okinawa's "Pain" in Korea

In the mid-1980s, when Arasaki was the President of Okinawa University, one of his colleagues, Shirato Shin'ichi, then Professor of Commerce at the university, asked if he was interested in inviting delegates of the Pacific Fellows Association, a civic group of surviving former Korean forced labourers, to Okinawa. Shirato told Arasaki that these delegates were particularly interested in visiting Okinawa in commemorating the spirits of fellow Koreans who died at the end of World War II on some of remote islands in Okinawa (see Chapter 7). However, travel between South Korea and Japan was not still easy for ordinary citizens in that period. This was a few years before the declaration of South Korea's democratisation in 1987, and visas were not issued easily to South Korean citizens by the Japanese government. Hearing this story, Arasaki played a central role in organizing the visit of the five Korean survivors and put forward a plan to invite these war survivors as special guest speakers for one of his classes. Arasaki contacted the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and managed to obtain visas for the guests.³⁵²

This first interaction with Korean survivors inspired Arasaki to consider the history of Koreans during the Battle of Okinawa. Although there were several books on Koreans in

³⁵² Keiko Itokazu, *Okinawasen to Heiwa Gaido* (Tokyo: Shiryō Sentā Hogō, 2008), 31-32.

wartime Okinawa such as “The House of the Red Tiles” (*Akara no Ie*), there were no works that provided an overall picture on this issue.³⁵³ The number of Koreans forcibly taken to Okinawa as manual labourers and “comfort women”—who were forced to serve as sexual slaves for Japanese soldiers—was estimated at approximately 15,000 people, though this number is based on a rough calculation, and cannot be verified.³⁵⁴ Arasaki considered that the Koreans’ visit and their memories of World War II would shed light on a crucial aspect of history little known to Okinawans.

It was not the first time for Arasaki to “find Korea” in Okinawa’s modern experiences. To be sure, the visit of the war survivors from South Korea was an unprecedented event. But he had already been aware of the relevance of Korea’s modern experiences to Okinawa. For instance, from very early on, Arasaki’s talks and writings mention the significance of the Korean War for post-World War II Japan. In particular, his critical perspective on Japan’s relations with Okinawa and Korea became explicit in the lecture he gave at an event called “the Christian Youth Peace Seminar” organised by Takahashi Saburō, a minister and peace activist, in 1969. There, Arasaki argues that both Okinawa and Korea are the places upon which Japan’s postwar economic prosperity was built. According to Arasaki, post-WWII Japan’s economic prosperity was obtained through “the blood that was shed in the Korean Peninsula” during the Korean War.³⁵⁵ While the economic boost due to “special procurements” (*tokuju*) by the American occupation forces for Korean War purposes was commonly seen as “a gift from heaven” (*tenkei*) in Japan in those days, Arasaki saw it as the other side of the war in Korea. He also discussed the impact that the Korean War had on Okinawa by arguing that Okinawa’s incorporation into

³⁵³ Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Dōjidaishi 1983-1987: Shōkokushugi no tachiba de* (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 2004), 107.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁵ Moriteru Arasaki, in Saburō Takahashi et al. *Okinawa Mondai to Kirisuto-sha no Sekinin* (Tokyo: Seitō-sha, 1970), 22.

America's military regime and separation from Japan were decided by the American occupation forces when the war in Korea broke out because of the local airbases where bombers departed for the Korean Peninsula.³⁵⁶

In 1987, a year after the five Koreans visited Okinawa, the members of the Pacific Fellows Association invited Arasaki and another six Japanese citizens to participate in the commemoration ceremony including unveiling event of a monument to the spirits of former forced labourers in Gyeongsang Province in South Korea in 1987. Although Arasaki had visited the People's Republic of China in the late 1970s, and Taiwan and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) in the early 1980s, this was his first visit to South Korea. During the trip, he was taken to museums and historical sites which were related to Japan and the Japanese colonization of Korea. Arasaki, who had also visited the Revolutionary Museum in North Korea, witnessed the unresolved divisions in the memories of North and South Koreans. However, according to his report, some mainland Japanese tourists could not stand images of Japanese torturing Koreans in these museums, and expressed concern about the negative implications that those grotesque images conveyed for Japan-South Korea relations in the future. Hearing this criticism, Arasaki riposted that "...after all, a man who steps on other people's feet does not feel their pain."³⁵⁷

This early interaction between Arasaki and the Pacific Fellows Association did not last long. This was mainly because the project to commemorate their fellow Koreans finished when the members of the Pacific Fellows Association completed the monument in their local region, but it was also related to the fact that Arasaki and Okinawan activists later found out that this Korean civic group was closely linked to the South Korean government which was still headed by the then President and former military general Roh Tae-woo. However, as I

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Moriteru Arasaki, *Okinawa Dōjidaishi 1983-1987: Shōkokushugi no tachiba de* (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 2004), 116.

discussed in Chapter Seven, this early encounter gave a strong momentum for Okinawan activists to create an international anti-US base solidarity movement with Korea soon after.

Born into an Okinawan migrant family and educated around the transition period of Japan from the imperialistic and nationalistic country to post-WWII liberal democratic country, Arasaki underwent a series of struggles to define himself as an “Okinawan in Japan”. While Okinawa was still separated even after the Japan’s independence, Arasaki invested his youth in bringing Okinawa back to Japan’s discursive space. His early works were greatly inspired by the rise of Japanese nationalism in Okinawa, as expressed in the first island-wide struggle in 1956. However, his career at Okinawa University and a variety of civic activism in Okinawa after Okinawa’s return to Japan led him in an opposite direction to his earlier works. Instead of being in favour of Japanese nationalism in Okinawa, he became one of the most outspoken critics of the Japanese government. This reflects his deep disappointment with the continuing subordinated situation of Okinawa under the US–Japan security treaty. Yet this period can also be considered as the beginning of Arasaki’s concept of region as an alternative space of subjectivity created by the Okinawa struggle. Defining Okinawa’s cultural and historical contexts as social space, he and his colleagues conceptualized region as a space of dwellers [*seikatsusha*], rather than of the nation. This concept of region as social space extended to include East Asia. Finding a common ground with Korean history as formerly occupied territory by the Japanese Empire, Arasaki incorporated Korean history within the local historical narrative. Arasaki provides an example of a notable Okinawan activist whose involvement with the anti-base movement led him to create another meaning of “the local”, which is considered not only in combination with “the national” but also in combination with the alternative and more open-ended concept of “region”.



Image 8-2. Unveiling ceremony of a memorial to the victims of former Korean forced labourers who died during the Battle of Okinawa in 1987. Arasaki is standing in front of the microphone. This monument was built in North Gyeongsang Province. (The photo is retrieved from Keiko Itokazu. *Okinawa-sen to Heiwa Gaido* (Tokyo: Shiryō Sentā Hogō, 2008), 29).



8-3. Arasaki (the second from the right) presented the recent situation of anti-base struggle in Okinawa at the Shanghai Biennale in Shanghai. The photo was taken by the author in October 2012.

8.3. Takahashi Toshio

Although Takahashi Toshio originates from mainland Japan, he has become a prominent and highly regarded activist in the Okinawa struggle. He is one of the founding members of OKPS, and has also been acting as the main coordinator of the group. Whenever people receive notices of the next meeting and minutes of the previous meeting, it is always Takahashi who sends those emails. Also, his role as coordinator includes collecting many different ideas from the members during the monthly regular meeting. While other members tend to bring many different opinions and agendas, including seemingly irrelevant topics, this calm leader has always been the one who hears and summarises the diverse opinions. However, what made him known as an activist is not his job at OKPS. On the contrary, there are perhaps few people who know of his work in OKPS. Takahashi is rather known as one of the main organizers of a protest community called “the Citizens against the Noise from Futenma Airbase” (*Futenma Bakuon Soshōdan*). Based in a main office in Futenma in Ginowan City, Takahashi and other members are working to bring a lawsuit against the local US military and Japanese government over the loud noise from the airbase in Futenma Town by collecting signatures from the local residents of the town.

Takahashi’s life history is important in that it highlights how and why some mainland Japanese who do not have familial or cultural ties and affinities to Okinawa are involved with the Okinawa struggle. The participation of non-Okinawan Japanese in Okinawa’s anti-base struggle was not always welcomed by local activists.³⁵⁸ Nonetheless, if we look closely into the membership of the local protest communities, it is not difficult to find non-Okinawans, including people who used to be student activists in mainland Japan. In particular, considering the size of the group, OKPS has a significant number of former new left activists

³⁵⁸ See, for example, Eiji Oguma, 1968 Vol. 2: *Hanran no Shūen to sono Isan* (Tokyo: Shinyō-sha, 2009).

from mainland Japan. In this context, I highlight Takahashi's life history to consider how this former student activist decided to live as a "local" Okinawan and to participate in OKPS.

8.3.1. Early Life

Takahashi was born in Nangoku City, Kōchi Prefecture, in 1953. As in many other parts of Japan, there was a large Korean community in Nangoku City. The community was built in the early 1940s by Korean workers who had been mobilized by the Japanese during the war to build the local infrastructure, such as dams and the airports, and their families. Takahashi's house was located near this local Korean community. He lived in Kōchi until he graduated from high school. In 1971, Takahashi became a university student of Tōhoku University in Sendai, the northeastern part of the Japanese mainland. He chose to major in mechanical engineering.

When he was a first-year student, Takahashi began to be involved with social activism. For Japanese university and high-school students and young labourers, it was not unusual to participate in the progressive movement in the 1960s and the 1970s. Organising student groups and workers' unions, young Japanese citizens in those periods were actively involved with social activism inside and outside their schools and work-places. In particular, the university students who were concerned with issues related to social justice such as war, discrimination against cultural minorities, poverty and hard labour conditions became the main actors in the movement. In this context, Takahashi joined one of the student activist groups, the Revolutionary Workers Association (RWA or *Kakurōkyō*), which played the leading role among many student groups at Tōhoku University in the 1970s.³⁵⁹ As a member

³⁵⁹ The Japanese student movement during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s can generally be categorized into two different types. The first type is the movements led by nation-wide political parties, the Japan Communist

of this group, he participated in protest campaigns in many different places including Onagawa Town in Miyagi Prefecture against nuclear power plant construction and Narita City in Chiba to prevent construction of Narita Airport (in a protest also known as Sanrizuka Struggle—*Sanrizuka tōsō*).

Although it was common to be part of the progressive student movement in those periods, Takahashi's experience was uncommon compared with those of his fellow activists. While his friends gradually quit their involvement with activism, Takahashi's involvement became so serious that he could not continue his study of mechanical engineering. Takahashi left Tōhoku University without graduating in the early 1980s and moved to Kanagawa Prefecture with his wife. One of the reasons for this move was because his wife was appointed to a teaching position at a local primary school in Kanagawa. However, this was not the only reason why he left Sendai. The other reason was that there was a base of his group, called Revolutionary Workers Association, at Kanagawa University in Yokohama City in that period. There, Takahashi spent a short period as the leader of this group.

Party (JCP) and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). The second type is the movements led by other groups which did not belong to those national parties. The former type usually meant student activism led by two major student bodies, the Democratic Youth League of Japan (DYLJ or *Minsei*) and the Socialist Youth Alliance (SYA or *Shaseidō*). These movements were conducted under the two progressive national parties, JCP and JSP. DYLJ was founded originally in 1923 by then university students who belonged to the JCP. Having experienced the political purge of communism under the Japanese government from the 1920s until 1945, the student organization was restarted in the late 1940s after World War II. Under the leadership of JCP, student activists organized branches in major national and private universities. The Socialist Youth Alliance was initiated at the first national congress of the Japan Socialist Party, which was also held in 1960. The Liberation Faction or *kaihō-ha* was founded by Takiguchi Hiroto and his colleagues who belonged to the most progressive yet minority group within SYA in 1969. They left JSP and called for the dissolution of the existing left politics and its reorganization as a force separate from JCP and JSP. For more detail, see, for example, Keinosuke Higuchi, *60 Nen-dai Shaseidō (Kaihō-ha) Shi-shi* (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōron-sha, 2012).

8.3.2. A Militant Activist

Takahashi joined the student movement in the early 1970s. In the history of Japanese new left student activism, this was after the climax of the movement. The first climax of Japan's new left movement was from 1959 until 1960 when the Bund, together but not in cooperation with other much larger progressive forces including groups such as one of the nation-wide the workers' unions, *Sōhyō*, and progressive political parties and their student groups gathered in the centre of Tokyo. To prevent then Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke from renewing the Japan-US Security Treaty, over 300,000 people gathered in front of the National Diet in Tokyo to conduct a protest campaign in June 1960. This is called the 1960 struggle against the Japan-US Security Treaty (or *the 1960 Ampo struggle* or *Rokujū-nen Ampo Tōsō*). Originating in the late 1950s, when former youth members of the Japan Communist Party including Shima Shigeo started the Communist Alliance or the Bund (or *Bunto* in Japanese) in 1958³⁶⁰, Japan's new left movement was led by the university students and young workers.³⁶¹ Although the security treaty was renewed, Kishi and his cabinet were forced to resign. After the mass protest campaign, the Bund was dissolved, and a non-partisan progressive movement was continued by former members of the Bund and Trotskyists who

³⁶⁰ One of the direct reasons for Shima and others to create the Communist Alliance was because of their disappointment with the bureaucracy of JCP and its internal political conflict within the leadership. Shima and his colleagues considered the struggle for hegemony by different factions within JCP was nothing but a sign of the dysfunctional aspects of the party. In 1955, at the sixth party congress, then JCP leaders including Miyamoto Kenji released a statement that JCP would moderate its policy for social reformation. This included suspension of armed struggle and prioritisation of parliamentary politics. Before that, the JCP and its previous leaders such as Tokuda Kyūichi and Nosaka Sanzō had pursued social change through armed revolution by workers and peasants in urban and rural areas. (*busō tōsō rosen*) Following the strategy conducted by the Chinese Communist Party, the JCP also intended to start revolution from rural provinces. To do so, JCP mobilised university students and other educated young party members to send them to provincial parts of Japan. This strategy continued until the mid-1950s. Their mission was to 'enlighten' workers and farmers to become revolutionary subjects. Although Shima and his friends were not directly involved with armed struggle, they were strongly against the decision of the leadership of the JCP to adopt parliamentary politics for social change. Therefore, they split the party and started their own communist movement. See e.g. Eiji Oguma, *1968 Vol.2*.

³⁶¹ Shima Shigeo was a medical student at the University of Tokyo when he organised the Communist Alliance with his colleagues. Shima is regarded as an important New Left figure who, as we shall see, was also to develop significant connections to Okinawa and Takahashi's life after he moved to Okinawa.

did not belong to the Japan Communist Party or Japan Socialist Party. These non-party leftists joined groups such as the Revolutionary Communist Alliance (RCA or *kakukyōdō*), founded in 1957.³⁶² One of their aims was to stop renewal of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1970.

The second climax occurred in late 1968-1969, when the University of Tokyo and other universities were occupied by the new left student activists. The occupation of the University of Tokyo by student activists continued for 6 months until January 1969. In the teeth of fierce criticism, the then Provost of the University of Tokyo, Katō Ichirō, eventually decided to allow the riot police to enter the university, leading to the arrest of many student activists who had barricaded themselves inside the Yasuda Auditorium, which they used as their headquarters. Similar student rebellions and campus occupation movements (or *gakuen tōsō*) occurred in many university campuses in Tokyo and neighboring prefectures. Other than the occupation of the university campuses, the new left movement conducted various protest campaigns including protests against the normalization of Japan-South Korea relations in 1965, the struggle against the entry of the US Navy nuclear-engine carrier the Enterprise into the port of Sasebo, and the protest against Prime Minister Satō Eisaku's 1969 visit to the United States to discuss the issue of Okinawa's return to Japan. These student uprisings were also connected to the protest against the renewal of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1970. Besides these new left groups, the nation-wide peace activism led by citizens such as the Citizens League for Peace in Vietnam (or *Beheiren*) also emerged from the late

³⁶² While the Bund did not have a strong ideology and written program, RCA had a clear ideology, which was based on Trotskyism. The leaders such as Kuroda Kan'ichi and Ōta Ryū criticized the JCP for its authoritarianism, bureaucratism and aim of realising of socialism in one country. They regarded the JCP as Japanese Stalinism. In order to break away from the doctrines of the JCP, RCA pursued participation of the Fourth Internationalism under the umbrella of Trotskyism. RCA was not as well known as the Bund among the university students in its early period. In contrast to the Bund which did not have the party program and was a relatively open environment, RCA was begun with an exclusive study group to learn revolutionary theory. Oguma, *1968 Vol.2*, 180.

1960s. However, while sharing the same aim of conducting anti-war and anti-imperialism campaigns, the individual groups were not always working together. Rather, after the failure of the occupation of the University of Tokyo in 1969, the new left movements started to lose their influence in society and began a violent struggle among themselves for the leadership over students and workers unions.

In this context, Takahashi also participated in this violent struggle as a leader of the Revolutionary Workers Association. Although he did not tell me much of his past, during that period Takahashi changed his name and was known as Izumi Masaaki among the activist community. Also, in order to increase the support for his group (and to avoid arrest), Takahashi kept moving from one place to another. After he left Sendai, Takashi moved to Kanagawa, and from Kanagawa he moved to Okinawa in the early 1980s. The specific purpose of his visit to Okinawa was to create a local branch of his group in this historically highly contested place. By collaborating with local counterparts, mainly with the Okinawan branch of the Central Core Faction (*Chūkaku-ha*), Takahashi aimed to gain hegemony over the local anti-base movement. Initially, his stay in Okinawa appeared to go well. He joined *hitotsubo* anti-war land owners association and developed his personal connections with fellow Okinawan activists.

8.3.3. “Walking on Broken Glass with Bare Feet”

However, it did not take long for Okinawan anti-base activists to realize Takahashi’s hidden intentions. After his political agenda was revealed, some local activists began a campaign to attack Takahashi as an infiltrator who disguised his career and name in order to use Okinawans and the Okinawan struggle for his organization. These campaigners ultimately tried to get Takahashi removed from Okinawa. New Left activists from mainland Japan were not always welcomed by Okinawan citizens. On the contrary, some Okinawans had strong

suspicion and distrust of the mainland New Left activists. They considered that these student activists were harmful because they would try to split the local anti-base movement for their own purposes. In particular, Arasaki was a harsh critic of the mainland New Left activists. He and other activists had a strong philosophy that the Okinawa struggle should be led by Okinawan citizens, not by political parties.

In this environment, Takahashi could not remain engaged in local Okinawan activism. However, to return to the mainland was not an easy option because his family, including two sons, had already settled in Okinawa. Also, his group RWA was no longer able to support Takahashi's life because of lack of resources. RWA was targeted by the police as one of the most subversive "far left violent groups" (*kyokusa bōryoku shūdan*). Takahashi's former colleagues were gradually leaving the group. Takahashi's life as a revolutionary activist, which had taken half of his life from his late teenage years until his early thirties, had reached a dead end.

In such a critical situation, Takahashi turned to several people for help. The first person was Nishio Ichirō, a pastor and a long-term activist who is also one of the mainland Japanese in Okinawa. In the midst of the anti-Takahashi campaign, Nishio offered his chapel as a shelter to Takahashi. Meanwhile, this senior activist asked around and consulted with his fellow Okinawan colleagues to allow Takahashi to stay with them. One of those he consulted was his long-term friend of similar age and an influential figure, Arasaki Moriteru, while a second was Takahashi's friend Tomiyama Masahiro. As the head of the student union and the Central Core Faction based at Okinawa University, Tomiyama already knew of Takahashi. He was also well connected with influential figures including Chibana Shōichi, who was Tomiyama's senior student at his university and later became publicly well-known by burning the Japanese national flag at the National Sports Festival in 1987. Through the efforts of these people, Takahashi was pardoned by fellow Okinawan activists. But there was one

condition required by local activists for Takahashi to be allowed to remain, which was that he withdraw from his previous career and live as an Okinawan local. For Takahashi, this meant abandoning his beliefs and work for the last fifteen years. Recalling his feeling in those days, Takahashi described it as though he were walking on broken glass with bare feet.

8.3.4. Becoming an “Okinawan”

Besides his two colleagues mentioned above, there was a third person with whom Takahashi consulted. That was Shima Shigeo, the founder of the Bund. While he was regarded as the champion of the New Left by his followers among student activists, including Takahashi, this legendary figure had already withdrawn himself from social activism after the end of the 1960s *Ampo* movement and returned to the University of Tokyo to finish his medical degree. In the mid-1980s when Takahashi met him, Shima lived in Okinawa and worked as a psychiatrist at a local hospital in Ginowan City. Shima advised Takahashi to leave student activism. Yet Shima did not tell him to stop participating in social activism. Instead, he told him to find a different path to be involved with society by living in Okinawa as a local, not as a New Left activist.

Shima’s advice to Takahashi reflected the course of his own life. When he withdrew from activism, Shima was exhausted not only in terms of finances but also in terms of his career as an activist. Therefore, Shima disappeared from the world of activism and hardly spoke about his previous career in public. However, he did not withdraw from committing himself to social movements. He chose different ways to be involved with society as a psychiatrist in a rural community. Shima arrived in Okinawa a year prior to the return to Japan in 1971 when local society was in the middle of transition from American occupation period to Japanese administration. Because he had been brought up in the nation’s capital and educated in the most elite school in the country, the place he was first assigned showed him a

different reality that he had not experienced before. He was particularly shocked by the harsh living environment of patients with mental illness. There were few mental hospitals, and the costs were very high as mental illness was not categorised during the American occupation as an illness covered by public health. Also, patients were segregated from local communities.³⁶³ The situation of these patients in Okinawa did not change even after the return to Japan. Although the number of hospitals showed an increase and national health insurance became available to cover medical fees, Shima felt that the patients were being incarcerated in the name of ‘social welfare’.³⁶⁴ He thought that one of the best treatments was to include patients as local community members. Yet the reality was that many rural communities suffered from rapid urbanization and population drain. Visiting various communities such as Kume-jima Island and the northern Yanbaru region in Okinawa Island, his work in rural areas over fifteen years was an alternative approach to society after he retired from social activism.

Meeting his New Left predecessor, Takahashi learnt of Shima’s life philosophy, which most student activists would have not known. Shima’s story was compelling enough for Takahashi to decide how to live his second life as an Okinawan local. Being local meant, not merely living in Okinawa, but being rooted in the soil of this place, which was contrasted with his past in which he kept moving from one place to another. Following in Shima’s footsteps, Takahashi became a qualified social worker, specializing in mental illness. In 1988, he became the founding Director of the semi-prefectural organization called Okinawa Mental Health Welfare Association.

³⁶³ While contagious diseases such as tuberculosis, sexually transmitted diseases and leprosy were treated by hospitals under the US occupation, mental illness was excluded from public treatment. Instead, the local US administration allowed the families of patients to keep patients in private confinement in which many patients were treated inhumanly. Shigeo Shima, *Bunto Shi-shi: Seishun no Gyōshuku Sareta Hibi Tomoni Tatakatte Yūjin-tachi e* (Tokyo: Hihyō-sha, 1999), 48.

³⁶⁴ Ibid. 53-54.

8.3.5. Visiting Korea

Takahashi's first visit to Korea took place in his undergraduate days. He visited Seoul in May 1974. Takahashi was involved with a petition campaign to release his friend who was in jail in South Korea. His friend was an ethnic Korean in Japan (or *Zainichi* Korean) who had also studied at the medical school of Tōhoku University. When this friend was a visiting student at Seoul National University, he was arrested in Seoul on suspicion of involvement with anti-government activism in South Korea. In those days, the political situation in South Korea was extremely tense. After the coup d'état in May 1961, the then President of South Korea, Park Chung-hee, had been strictly policing pro-communists, socialists, student activists in South Korea. Park's regime also targeted educated *Zainichi* Koreans who came to visit South Korea, particularly those suspected of having relations with the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (GAKR, *Chongryon* or *Chōsen Sōren*) which is closely connected to North Korea. After execution of Cho Young-soo, an executive member of the Korean Residents Union in Japan (KPUJ or *Mindan*), because of his active role in establishing the newspaper *The People's Times* (*Minzoku Jihō*) in December 1961, a number of *Zainichi* Koreans were arrested under Park's government.³⁶⁵

Park's regime became even more oppressive towards dissidents after he won the presidential election over Kim Dae-jung, an influential opposition leader. After this narrow victory over his rival, Park declared martial law and amended the constitution by which the South Korean President was given greater powers to himself (Restoration System or *Yushin* System). To protest against the new system which reinforced governmental control, South Korean university students from the Democratic Youth Student Association (DYSA) started taking political action, and nearly two hundred students were arrested, including Takahashi's

³⁶⁵ KPUJ or Mindan is one of two major organizations joined by ethnic Koreans in Japan together with GAKR. In contrast to GAKR, KPUJ is known for its support of the South Korean government.

friend.³⁶⁶ So, the purpose of Takahashi's visit was to submit a petition to the Japanese Embassy in Seoul on behalf of civic groups working to release this Korean student. Takahashi was chosen to visit Seoul as a delegate of his group because many senior activists had arrest records due to their involvement with activism, while Takahashi was one of the few with no record of being arrested.

8.3.6. Japan-Korea Early Solidarity Movement

In the mid-1970s, many Japanese socialists and other progressive activists and intellectuals, including new left student activists, were already reasonably well informed about political problems in South Korea. Although information was limited, the early solidarity movement with South Korean radicals was emerging in Japan. One important event to take place was the protest campaign against the treaty of normalisation between South Korea and Japan. Park Chung-hee's repressive regime in South Korea as the America's liberal capitalist front in East Asia and Park's positive attitude towards the normalisation treaty with Japan triggered a nation-wide protest campaign in South Korea. Meanwhile, Japanese citizens and political parties such as Japan Communist Party and Japan Socialist Party also conducted a protest campaign opposing the conclusion of a separate treaty with South Korea alone.³⁶⁷ The Japanese protesters demanded that North Korea should have a seat at the discussion table.

The actual beginning of the solidarity movement between Japan and South Korean activists took place in the early 1970s. In August 1973, the leader of the South Korean opposition party, Kim Dae-jung, was abducted from his hotel in Tokyo. After Park Chung-hee launched his *yushin* regime and reinforced his dictatorial leadership, Kim Dae-jung fled overseas to North America, Europe and Japan. His kidnapping by South Korean agents in

³⁶⁶ See e.g. Myeonggwon Chi, *Kankoku Minshuka e no Michi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), 89-90.

³⁶⁷ See e.g. Jung-jin Park, "Nikkan-kaidan Hantai-undō," in Jongwong Lee et al. *Rekishi toshite no Nikkan Kokkō Seijōka* (Tokyo: Hōsei Daigaku Shuppan, 2011), 259-290.

Tokyo evoked shock not only amongst activists but also amongst ordinary Japanese citizens. In the context of the early solidarity movement, the abduction of Kim Dae-jung was a critical moment in which various joint actions took place between Japan and South Korea.

For instance, influential scholars and activists such as Wada Haruki, a prominent historian of Korea, and Oda Makoto, one of the founders of a famous anti-Vietnam War group called Peace for Vietnam (also known as *Beheiren*), released a joint statement which criticised the Japanese and South Korean governments for their secrecy over this incident and demanded the truth. In 1974, these intellectuals and activists started a group called Japan-South Korea Solidarity Assembly (Nikkan Rentai Kaigi) in support of South Korean democratisation movement from Japan.³⁶⁸ Also, Christian organizations started to conduct protest actions by collaborating with church groups in South Korea and the western world. The issues of concern were not only the actions of the two governments but also the presence of Japanese capitalism working in collaboration with the Park Chung-hee government. Furthermore, Japanese and *Zainichi* Korean feminists problematized Japanese male tourists visiting Korea for sex tours (or so-called *kāsen kankō*) in the early 1970s. The early 1970s was also the moment in which Japanese, South Koreans and *Zainichi* Koreans began to seek a common ground to consider their political situation. It was in this international context that Takahashi arrived in Seoul.

Arriving in Seoul with the petition, Takahashi considered himself as the delegate of all concerned citizens in Japan. In spirit, he saw himself as one of the closest friends of South Korean activists. However, when he visited the officials in the Japanese Embassy, Takahashi's naïve sense of heroism collapsed when he was confronted by the unpopularity of his government in South Korea, which was symbolised by the large number of eggs which

³⁶⁸ See e.g. Naoki Mizuno and Gyung-su Moon, *Zainichi Chōsen-jin: Rekishi to Genzai* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten: 2015).

had been thrown at the wall of the embassy. It was deeply shocking for this young student activist to realize the depth of Korean anger towards Japan. Also, his first experience to be exposed to life under martial law, such as night time curfew, made Takahashi anxious and exacerbated his sense of unease. He was well-informed of the harsh political oppression under Park's dictatorial regime and anti-Japanese sentiment among South Korean nationals. However, the actual experience of life in South Korea in the early 1970s became an unforgettable memory. After this first visit to South Korea, he had avoided being involved with the Korean political movement until he joined OKPS.

8.3.7. Becoming a Korean Expert

A turning point came about ten years later, when Takahashi had a chance to re-engage with Korea. He was introduced to Park Sunam, the *Zainichi* Korean film director who was interviewing Okinawan local islanders about the memories of Korean forced labourers and Korean "comfort women" in Okinawa. (see Chapter 7) It was a rare chance for Takahashi to discover the entangled histories of Koreans in Okinawa and Japan at the end of World War II. Visiting various places around Okinawa, he and his friend Tomiyama helped Park's project. This experience changed Takahashi's perspective on Okinawa in that he found historical links with Korea in Okinawa's local history. Finding this new and ambiguous dimension of the history of Okinawa, Takahashi's interest in Korea gradually increased.

Together with other friends who helped Park's film making, Takahashi participated in starting the project Action Committee for Solidarity with Asia (ACSA), which became Okinawa Korea People's Solidarity in 1997. Also, feeling the necessity to learn the Korean language, Takahashi and other members started going to the Korean language class organised first by a Korean student studying at the University of Ryukyus, and then by Japanese students who came back from studying in South Korea. He recalls that this was the only

Korean class which was held in Okinawa in those days. While many other learners gave up, Takahashi was one of the few students who became fluent in both writing and speaking Korean to the extent that he could translate from Korean into Japanese without problems. With his language skill and a wide network of South Korean activism, Takahashi eventually became not only an experienced translator but also one of the few civic experts on current Korean affairs in Okinawa.

Takahashi's life as a former new left activist of Japan who later settled in Okinawa gives us a different perspective to reconsider the static meaning of locality in the context of the Okinawa struggle. To be sure, Takahashi was an outsider to most of the Okinawan activists when he arrived in Okinawa. However, his long-term involvement, despite the early criticism of his mainland Japanese identity among Okinawan activists, changed Takahashi's identity to become "local". But equally importantly, Okinawan activism was in some small way also changed by the influence of Takahashi's involvement. While working for a local medical institute for people with mental disorders, Takahashi became a founding member of one of the most well recognised local anti-base groups in Futenma. Moreover, his involvement with OKPS clearly demonstrates his influence on the local anti-base movement. What his story shows is thus not merely a story of man who overcame a Japanese identity to become one of the local Okinawan activists. Rather, Takahashi's story highlights how Okinawa's locality is constructed through the interaction of local and national historical experiences of social activism against the Japanese government, and how this interaction created a movement like OKPS.



Image 8-4. Takahashi in Seoul in 1974. The photo was provided by Takahashi Toshio.



Image 8-5. Takahashi in Jeju 2013 with his Korean friend. The photo was provided by Takahashi Toshio.

8.4. Yu Yeongja

The last person that I introduce in this chapter is Yu Yeongja. Yu is one of the few Korean participants in OKPS. Unlike Arasaki and Takahashi, Yu was not the founding member of OKPS but one of those who joined in the group in the mid-2000s. Yet because of her likeable character and contribution, she soon became a trusted member in the group. Yu was one of the few fluent Korean speakers in the group until other members such as Takahashi became fluent in Korean. Wherever other members went in Korea, she always followed other senior members as an interpreter. Yu is also a Buddhist nun who preaches at her school in Yomitan Village, in which she serves the local community by organizing religious study groups and through personal consultations with the villagers. However, the importance of Yu is not only the fact she is one of the few Korean speakers but also her identity, life and experience as an ethnic Korean. These have made major contributions to OKPS in its process of creating regional-local identity within Okinawa's protest community.

So far I have looked at the formation of regional-local identity from two different perspectives. On the one hand, Arasaki's case demonstrates the production of this distinctive form of identity from an Okinawan perspective. On the other hand, the story of Takahashi highlighted the regional-local identity in from the perspective of a person originating in mainland Japan. Takahashi's story not only complicates our views of the participants in the "Okinawa struggle" but also enriches the meaning of the Okinawa struggle by extending the notion of "local activists" and by showing the historical context of the early Japan-South Korea solidarity movement. Yu's perspective—which is neither Japanese nor Okinawan—adds an indispensable further dimension. In order to delineate regional-local identity, we need to consider the details of Yu's commitment and contribution, and also examine the challenges that she has experienced in the course of her involvement. Through the lens of her

life, we see the even more complicated process by which this ambiguous yet inclusive form of identity was formed.

8.4.1. Early Life

Yu Yeongja was born in Hiroshima in 1951. She was the youngest child of nine siblings of an ethnic Korean family who migrated to Japan during Korea's colonial period under the Japanese Empire from Jeolla Province, in the southwestern part of Korean peninsula.³⁶⁹ The family including Yeongja moved to Kobe, Hyōgo Prefecture when she was little. She spent most of her life in Kobe before she moved to Okinawa. Hyōgo Prefecture, known as an industrial area along the coast, was also known for its multicultural city environment with Koreans as well as Japanese. As the most populated city in the prefecture, Kobe had one of the largest Korean communities in the western part of Japan. In such conditions, there was already the social basis for a civil rights movement by the ethnic Koreans in this city. One of the earliest and the most well-known examples was the Hanshin Education Struggle in the late 1940s. The Korean League (*Chōsenjin Renmei*) took direct action to protest against the local Japanese police and American Occupation Forces over the right to ethnic education in Osaka and Kobe, and this eventually resulted in physical clashes with police and occupation forces.³⁷⁰ In Kobe, Yu went to the local ethnic Korean school run by the General Association

³⁶⁹ Jeolla Province, as well as Jeju Island and South Gyeongsang Province, the southern-most region of Korea, were the major provinces from which Koreans migrated to mainland Japan during the 1920s and 1930s. It was traditionally known for its rich soil, and the Japanese government conducted land reform specifically in this province to increase the production of rice during those periods. Affected by this land reform, a substantial number of peasants lost their lands and fled to Seoul to become wage labourers. In the same manner, a large number of former peasants also migrated to Japan to work in industrialised areas such as Hiroshima, Kobe, Akashi and Osaka (See, e.g. Gyung-su Moon, *Gendai Kankoku-shi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005).

³⁷⁰ The Korean League was founded in October 1945 as the society for ethnic Koreans living in Japan in that period. One of the founders of the Korean League was a notable communist and workers union organizer, Kim Chon-hae. The Korean League was established to protect the rights of ethnic Koreans who became a liberated nation in postwar Japan, and to support building the independent state for Korean nationals in their homeland. Like the Okinawan League (*Okinawa-jin Renmei*) that existed in the same period, some leaders of the Korean League such as Kim Chon-hae were members of the Japan Communist Party, and therefore the group was also affiliated to the JCP. The Korean League was ordered to dissolve by the occupation forces in 1949, but the activities were continued by other groups, particularly by GAKR from 1955 onward.

of Korean Residents in Japan (GAKR or *Chōsen Sōren*) until high school. Although her family originated from the southern part of Korea, which was by then Republic of Korea, Yu's parents (like many others in the same situation) sent their daughter to a school closely affiliated to North Korea. However, political ideology was not such a major issue for her parents. Rather, they wanted Yu to be educated in a way that would maintain her Korean identity. Yu said:

Neither of my parents was literate. But they wanted their children to be educated. So, they sent us to school. But it was not Japanese school but a Korean ethnic school (*minzoku gakkō*).³⁷¹

According to a study, 20 to 25 percent of Korean families sent their children to the ethnic Korean schools whereas the rest of the ethnic Korean children went to the local Japanese schools during the 1960s.³⁷² As Mizuno Naoki and Moon Gyongsu write, the majority of ethnic Koreans who went to Japanese local schools were already losing their close connection to *Sōren* or *Mindan* in that period.³⁷³ In this context, the case of Yu's parents indicates how passionate they were to pass on Korean identity to their children. In retrospect, Yu said:

Tuition fees (of ethnic Korean school) were not cheap, but they [her parents] worked very hard. My mother often told me “you did nothing wrong, so you should be proud of being Korean.” I think she told us this because they suffered a lot...³⁷⁴

³⁷¹ Interview with Yu Yeongja, March 2, 2012.

³⁷² Naoki Mizuno and Gyung-su Moon, *Zainichi Chōsen-jin: Rekishi to Genzai*, 117.

³⁷³ *Ibid.*, 176.

³⁷⁴ Interview with Yu Yeongja, March 2, 2012.

At school, she learnt Korean language and became “ethnic Korean in Japan” or what she calls *Chōsen-jin*.³⁷⁵ Also, she met her future husband who was a leader of Korean civil rights activism at the school. Although Yu was never involved in the student activism, she was still interested in political affairs around the Korean minority in Japan. Instead of becoming a social activist, she had a dream to become a wife of a famous Korean activist whom she thought of as a revolutionary figure. She met her husband at the same high school. Her future husband was a leading student activist. They married after graduating from high school. Yu’s husband later became an art teacher at a local Japanese high school, and Yu began to run a Korean-style barbeque restaurant in Kobe while raising three children.

8.4.2. Anti-finger Printing Struggle

The first big turning point for Yu’s activist career was in 1988. She started being involved with the protest campaign against the compulsory finger printing of foreign residents in Japan.³⁷⁶ *Zainichi* Koreans, who are categorized as “special permanent residents”, were the people most affected by this system. In 1980, an anti-finger printing movement was started by a Tokyo-based male *Zainichi* Korean, Han Jong-sok. Although he was risking a penalty, either one year in prison or paying 200,000 yen (which is nearly equivalent to 2,000 US dollars), Han chose to refuse to be finger printed, insisting that this system was against the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Japan became a signatory in

³⁷⁵ After the normalization treaty was signed between South Korea and Japan, ethnic Koreans could choose to become South Korean or remain as Korean. In the former case, the passport and nationality were granted. Yet because Japan did not have diplomatic relations with North Korean government, those who did not choose South Korean nationality had their place with origin registered as Korea or Chōsen, as in the national registration system under the Japanese Empire.

³⁷⁶ The finger printing system was introduced in 1955 as a part of the Alien Registration Act, which was enacted three years prior in 1952, with the aim to control and surveillance of non-Japanese residents within Japan. When foreign nationals need to live in Japan more than 90 days, they are obliged to be issued with an official certificate of registration, the alien registration card, by the municipal governments in the area where they live. Until 2000, foreign nationals were supposed to have their finger prints taken at the time of submitting the application for and of renewing the certificate.

1978. When Yu looked at fellow Koreans who struggled for their rights, particularly similar generations to her, she was strongly inspired by them.

From the 1970s, there were a number of civil rights movements taking place around Japan. One of the key issues to be tackled was Japan's discriminatory system towards foreign residents, in particular the requirement of Japanese nationality for jobs in public sector areas such as teaching in national and other public universities, or working for the national telecommunication company, or as lawyers, nurses, and public servants in municipal governments. Both at national and local levels, *Zainichi* Koreans and concerned Japanese citizens denounced the illegitimacy of the nationality requirement and demanded that jobs in the public sectors should be opened to foreign residents like ethnic Koreans. Their protests were directed not only at the public sector but also at private firms. At job interviews, many companies required the submission of the family registration documents (known as *koseki*), which contain personal family details. While regarded as residents, those who have South Korean nationality or affiliation to North Korea do not have their registration documents in Japan. Therefore, for many *Zainichi* Koreans who live with Japanese names, the requirement to family registration documents is critical since it shows information including nationality and place of the ancestral origins.³⁷⁷ Based on the information in the family record, many ethnic Koreans were not hired regardless of their ability and qualifications.³⁷⁸

What inspired Yu most was the fact that these movements were not started by GAKR or KPUJ but by individuals who were actually affected by Japan's discriminatory system and by Japanese supporters concerned with these problems. However, when she decided to refuse finger printing, Yu's husband was not supportive of his wife's decision. Although he had

³⁷⁷ See e.g. David Chapman, *Zainichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity* (Routledge, 2007).

³⁷⁸ For example, one of the most famous examples is the law-suit made by then 19 year-old *Zainichi* Korean, Park Chong-sok, against Hitachi, Ltd. Under his Japanese name, Arai Shōji, Park passed the entrance examination and was employed by Hitachi. However, after he submitted his family registration, Hitachi revoked Park's employment and decided not to hire him. After four years of court battle, Park won his case and became an employee of Hitachi until his retirement in 2011.

been a leader of Korean student activism in his younger days, he was no longer involved with activism. While teaching art at a local Japanese school in Kobe, he came to believe that ethnic Koreans should not be involved with Japanese civic activism because it is “their” problem, not “ours”. Other family members and her *Zainichi* friends also gave a similar kind of advice to Yu: “the finger printing system is Japan’s problem therefore it should be Japanese people who participate in this political campaign.” Yet the opposition from her family members did not change Yu’s mind. Her husband finally said that he would divorce if she still insisted on this issue. Remembering those days, Yu smiled at me and said:

My husband thought that I would change my mind if he said he would divorce. But my answer was “yes”. I told him “let’s divorce and I won’t bother your life.” I was confident with myself at that time and thought I would live freely without him. Until that moment, I was pretty quiet and followed my husband’s opinion, not like now. So, it must’ve been a big surprise for him to see me saying that. He said that he didn’t know that I was that sort of person.³⁷⁹

In the end, she and her husband did not divorce. Instead, her family turned out to be supportive of her. With strong back-up from her family, Yu’s career as an activist started. Together with her Korean and Japanese friends, she started publishing a community journal called *Peace People*. As a principal organizer, she wrote many articles sitting at the table of her barbeque restaurant after business hours. However, her name suddenly became known nationally because of a long essay published in the *Mainichi Shinbun*, a nation-wide newspaper, in 1991. At that time, the *Mainichi Shinbun* was calling for applicants for the Twenty First Century Award. Founded in 1872 as one of the earliest modern Japanese

³⁷⁹ Interview with Yu Yeongja, March 2, 2012.

newspaper companies, the *Mainichi Shinbun* established this award to be granted to those who wrote the best essays on urgent issues for humanities including human rights in 1981. Yu wrote her essay on the topic of humans and their affinity to their nations. Her essay was awarded one of the top prizes of the year.

8.4.3. Becoming A Buddhist Nun and Visiting South Korea

The second turning period came soon after she started participating in the anti-finger printing campaign in the late 1980s. One of her friends asked her to attend a local study group on World War II and colonialism in Himeji, a city not far from Kobe. The event was organized by a local Buddhist group from the Jōdo Shinshū School. At first Yu was not interested in the event, because she was a strong atheist. But the name of Kinjō Minoru, a prominent Okinawan sculptor, writer and activist, as a guest speaker on a flyer for the event attracted her interest. This event was part of a whole series on the thought of the Japanese Buddhist monk Shinran—the 12th-13th century founder of Jōdo Shinshū. Participants not only read Shinran's texts but also learnt his way of thinking by discussing historical and contemporary problems of Japanese society. The event was enlightening for Yu not only because of Kinjō but also because of the thought of this school. Until that moment, she had considered that religion dealt with morals based on a strict rule in order to have a good life after death. Also, Yu's impression of the Jōdo Shinshū school had been negatively affected by the events of history. While known as one of the largest Buddhist Schools, Jōdo Shinshū was also deeply involved in Japanese colonialism in Korea. Promoting a mixture of syncretic Buddhism with the national Shintoism, this school had played a crucial role in establishing Japanese Buddhism around Korea. In this context, many local Korean temples were either transformed into Japanese style or abolished.

However, what Yu learnt from one of the monks at the venue changed her views. Yu's skepticism about Buddhism was shaken particularly when she learnt about the school's idea of the past, present and future. In Shinran's text, the monk told her, Buddha does not give any answer to the question of whether there is life after death. Instead, the monk continued, Shinran's Buddhism respects the present moment, which can be found when one realizes the calls from both past and future. Based on this view and on remorse about their politico-religious activities during the colonial period, the monks and believers participating in the study group were all very critical of Japan's colonial history. This experience changed her life. Yu was increasingly fascinated by Jōdo Shinshū and its thought. She started attending the study group as a regular member. Yet it did not satisfy her intellectual interests. Therefore, in order to know more of Shinran's thought, she decided to study at Otani University, one of the Buddhist universities founded by Jōdo Shinshū, where she was granted a qualification to become a nun when she was 52 years old.

At Otani University, she also had another encounter. Yu met a *Zainichi* Korean scholar, Chung Cho-myo (also known as Chung Sanae). She was Professor of International Studies, teaching ancient Korean history. It was Chung who introduced the world of South Korea to Yu. Like many *Zainichi* Koreans of her generation who were educated strictly to become "a local delegate of the General Kim Il-sun" at the ethnic Korean school, Yu did not have a positive image about South Korea. Despite the fact that it was her parents' home country, Yu knew almost nothing about that country. Understanding Yu's suspicion towards South Korea, Chung thought that she needed to take Yu to South Korea in order for Yu to understand their origins more deeply. Therefore, in 1999, Yu went to South Korea with Chung. It was the first experience for Yu to visit the country where her parents were born. In retrospect Yu recalls this trip and says:

Because of my education at *Chōsen Gakkō*, I didn't have any positive image about South Korea before I visited. But as in the old saying, seeing is believing. I was really grateful to Prof Chung who convinced me to visit there. She and I visited many different places, including my parents' hometown. Of course I'd never been there before. But I became very nostalgic, like thinking "Ah, this is where they're from..."³⁸⁰

For Yu, feeling the air, and seeing the landscape on her visit to South Korea was an important experience for her and made this trip an opportunity to rediscover herself as a Korean. Born in Japan as a member of an ethnic minority and educated under socialist ideology, Yu found that her visit to South Korea was a moment where she could finally feel her ancestral roots, which filled in the space that had long been a blank space in her Korean identity.

8.4.4. Moving to Okinawa

Yu and her daughter moved to Okinawa in the early 2000s. Forty years after she had married, Yu decided to leave her home in Kobe. She was asked to open a local study group on Shinran and Jōdo Shinshū by Kinjō Minoru, who was already her close friend by then. However, there was another reason that she decided to move. As she got closer to sixty, Yu began wanting to have some new challenge in her life. There was no better chance for her than the invitation from her friends in Okinawa. Her husband also supported her suggestion that they live separately for some time each year. Yu thus started living in Yomitan Village and Kobe for part of the year.

Yomitan Village has been traditionally known as one of the most progressive local communities in Okinawa. This is the village where many locally and nationally well-known activists who led Japan's peace movement originated. Yu's close friend, Kinjō Minoru, is a

³⁸⁰ Interview with Yu Yeongja, March 2, 2012.

good example. Apart from his career as a sculptor, Kinjō is famous for his activist career as one of the leaders of a local group which opposed the enshrining of Okinawan soldiers who died during WWII at Yasukuni Shrine (Okinawa Yasukuni Soshō-dan).³⁸¹ Also, Chibana Shōichi, who burnt the Japanese flag at the National Sports Festival in 1987, was a resident of Yomitan. He was originally the owner of a local supermarket before becoming a local politician as a member of the village council. In national politics, Yomitan has produced some important Okinawan politicians who are also peace activists such as Itokazu Keiko, who first introduced the peace bus tour in Okinawa, and Yamauchi Tokushin, who was a former high school teacher. Both of them later became members of the Japanese House of Councilors. The first Governor of Okinawa, Yara Chōbyō, was also from Yomitan Village. Yu started living in this community from 2004.

Yu started organising a study group upon her arrival in Yomitan Village. The venue was in a corner of Kinjō's studio. Because of her likeable character and welcoming manner regardless of religious background, the class soon became popular among the locals. As she experienced in her first class in Himeji, Yu did not only read and discuss the texts with people but she tried to associate those works with Japanese historical contexts. In doing so, however, she created her own manner of critical religious practice using her Korean background. This is demonstrated by the clothes she would wear for the class. When preaching in front of people, she usually wears a black Buddhist gown called *kesa*. But occasionally she also comes to the class wearing *chima jeogori*, the traditional Korean women's dress. This way of presenting herself reflects her particular social and cultural background as a nun and Korean. She considered that her experience as a *Zainichi* can be

³⁸¹ The Yasukuni Shrine is one of the major Shinto shrines located near Kudanshita Station, Chiyoda Ward in Tokyo. It was founded in 1869 the souls of soldiers who died in service of the Japanese Empire until 1945. It also includes and commemorates those who died during the Japanese civil war before the establishment of Meiji Japan, which is also known as the Boshin War. The Yasukuni Shrine became problematic within Japan and with East Asian neighbors, particularly because of the fact that A-class war criminals of the Asia and the Pacific War are enshrined as war victims.

shared with the Okinawan locals in that they both represent cultural minorities in Japan, living under cultural and political subjugation that originated from the history of Japan's colonial aggression in the region.

After moving to Okinawa and while organising a school to preach Shinran's idea of Buddhism in Yomitan Village, Yu also started participating in the sit-in struggle in Henoko. By participating in the sit-in campaign in Henoko, her network with activists in Okinawa was extended. In Henoko, Yu was introduced to some senior local activists including Tomiyama Masahiro who later became Yu's good friend in Okinawa Korea People's Solidarity. Participating in the sit-in not only enabled her to make friends among the Okinawan locals but also made her realize that many participants in Okinawa's sit-in were mainland Japanese and there were also a few *Zainichi* Koreans.

8.4.5 Complex Boundaries

Although Yu's active involvement with the Okinawan anti-base movement was welcomed by many fellow activists, this was not always the case. In fact, her presence as an ethnic Korean sometimes caused problems with some local activists. One incident happened in 2010 when Yu joined protest in front of Okinawa Prefectural Government. Prior to this gathering, she was informed by her friends that the next protest aimed to pressure Okinawa Prefecture by representing "the voices of all Okinawan residents" who disagreed with the base relocation from Futenma to Henoko. Therefore, she thought that she should attend the event in her favourite *chima jeogori*. Preparing herself from early morning, Yu drove down to Naha from Yomitan Village. However, during the protest, she was surrounded by a group of local women who also participated in the meeting. One of them asked her why she came with "such a strange dress". Yu replied that it was her dress which represented her cultural origin and also said that it is a formal dress to wear at a public event. Yet the woman told her that it

was inappropriate to have an “outsider” like Yu because the protest should be a gathering by Okinawans. Moreover, some other group members told her harshly to “go back home”.

This was a distressing experience for Yu, who had been acting to connect Okinawans and *Zainichi* Koreans in the anti-base movement. Although she understood that she was a new resident in Okinawa and her participation with the local activism has a different origin and context from most of the activists, the welcoming environment of her local friends in Yomitan Village gradually made her think that she was a local Okinawan who wore *chima jeogori*. Yet, after this event, she seriously started considering returning to Kobe. However, many of her close Okinawan friends tried to dissuade her. They were frustrated that such a divisive view was prevalent within certain groups of fellow Okinawan activists.

Of those friends, what Yu recalls was a warm comment from Miyagi Setsuko, who is one of the most highly respected senior activists because of her long-term involvement from the 1970s. Miyagi told Yu that Okinawans needed a person like Yu who brought fresh air to the local protest movement. Yu’s strong supporter Kinjō Minoru, who is a community leader in Yomitan Village, also said that Okinawans should work together with ethnic Koreans in Japan as they both share unresolved historical wounds caused by Japan. Hearing this encouragement, Yu was reassured that her decision to move to Okinawa was not the wrong choice. Yet, through this experience, she also learnt about complex boundaries between Okinawa and *Zainichi* that she needs to overcome.

8.4.6. Living as *Zainichi* Korean in Okinawa

Yu’s life in Okinawa was not always easy. Cases like the one I mentioned above still “occasionally happen”, she said. But after living in Okinawa for nearly ten years, Yu also found many reasons to stay. In Yomitan Village, Henoko and elsewhere, she has good friends. Inspired by Yu’s life and religious views, some of her friends including influential

activists such as Chibana Shōichi started studying Jōdo Shinshū. Chibana indeed became a Buddhist monk. It is not only friends that keep attracting her in Okinawa but also many other ordinary people she meets at some venue or on the street. She introduced me to one of episodes with an elderly woman at an outdoor market.

She [the elderly woman] asked me where I come from. I told her that I'm originally from Kobe but I'm Korean. Then, this woman, smiling as always, said "Korean, Okinawan, we are the same." I felt a real warmth from her but at the same time it's a sad thing isn't it if we imagine the history she had to live...³⁸²

She said that the woman she talked with at the market strongly reminded her of her mother who would have been a similar age to her. So, it made her think what her mother would say if she knew of Yu's life in Okinawa.

As a nun, mother, wife, social activist and *Zainichi* Korean, Yu's life informs us of many different experiences which she has lived through, and these cannot easily be subsumed into a single identity. Instead of summarising her rich experiences, it might be more meaningful to think what kind of influence she has with the Okinawan protest community. The population of Korean or *Zainichi* Korean residents in Okinawa is small. In this sense, as a minority within Okinawa, her presence is hardly visible if we view the Okinawa struggle at a distance. Yet, if we closely look into the local protest community, her influence is clearly visible. Like Takahashi's story, Yu's life in Okinawa deepens our understanding of "the locals". The representation of the "protest community" and "Okinawan protesters" contain such "non-Okinawan" elements. What we learn from Yu's story is that it is not only Yu who approached Okinawans but also it is Okinawans who approached Yu and learnt from her

³⁸² Interview with Yu Yeongja, March 2, 2012.

experiences as an ethnic Korean in Japan, and these “non-local” aspects of the Okinawa struggle eventually created a perspective for seeing the local within the regional, and the regional within the local.

8.5. Conclusion

By looking into the details of the lives of three key activists, this chapter has shed further light on the historical background of Okinawa Korea People’s Solidarity. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, oral history is an effective research method which unsettles the major historical narrative by investigating diverse views and practices of individual agents. By highlighting different dimensions of OKPS and its form of regional-local identity, the chapter helps to elucidate how the unique characteristics and identity of this protest community were created. What this chapter reveals is the multilayered historical contexts that run under the surface of OKPS and its actions to internationalise Okinawa’s local anti-protest movement. The life histories of three main figures demonstrated that OKPS is the creation of diverse historical contexts and diverse forms of historical consciousness. Therefore, I argue that the life histories of these individuals enable us to consider not only OKPS but also the Okinawa struggle in a wider web of meanings in Japan and Korea beyond local Okinawan history. In other words, what this chapter suggests is the possibility of shifting our perspective on the Okinawa struggle from a strictly “local” to a “local and regional” perspective. Ultimately, these life histories suggest a possible way to revisit the local history of the Okinawa struggle in a way that locates it in a chain of social struggles within a wider East Asian history.

Chapter Nine

Conclusion



Okinawan activists visited Darwin in February 2013.
The photo was taken and provided by Justin Tutty.

9.1. Introduction

This thesis has examined the diverse concepts and manifestations of Okinawan identity underlying the Okinawan anti-base movement. While the notion of “Okinawan identity” is often regarded as homogenous based on culture, ethnicity, and historical experience, this understanding obscures the complexity, creativity and dynamism of identity and community within the anti-base movement. In particular, I problematized such images of identity as a fixed entity. Through case studies of two recent anti-base movements, I showed how concepts of place can add a new dimension to existing discourses and practices of Okinawan identity. One case study illuminated the importance of a localized sense of place, while the other drew particular attention to an emerging regionalized sense of place across national boundaries. Applying recent theories on space, place and identity to these case studies, I thus highlighted the need to recognize multi-leveled forms of identity—local, archipelagic and regional—which interact within the Okinawa struggle. This thesis has thereby sought to deepen our understanding of the long and ongoing Okinawa struggle, and contribute to wider debates about identity and protest movements in the contemporary world.

While my thesis examines Okinawa’s anti-base movement, this research is built on my general interest in the production of social space and the role of cultural identity in modern Japan. In particular, I have long been interested in the process by which local community is created in a multicultural environment, especially highlighting the significance of non-Japanese contexts. My curiosity is a product of my own personal experience. While the homogenous cultural discourses of “Japan” or “Japaneseness” were, and perhaps still are, prevalent in many aspects of cultural and social life in Japan, this monolithic discourse does not explain the reality that I lived. Born to a migrant family, and growing up in Kawasaki, a city which is one of the most ethnically and culturally diverse communities in Japan, I found that the “Japanese” discourses never entirely represented my living environment. Instead,

cultural differences, conflict and identity negotiation were part of everyday life in my family and neighborhood. Understanding our experience as “deviant”, I started my research during my undergraduate degree to consider how my local experience in contemporary Japanese society has its own dynamism; and how it is connected to a wider web of meanings than “Japanese”. Although this thesis is about contemporary Okinawan history, this basic theme underlies my research. Here, I would like to share snapshot of the origin of this research with reference to my personal background. This will help the reader understand the perspective from which I have examined the local identity of the Okinawan anti-base movement in this thesis.

9.2. Identity, Locality, and Region: A Personal Story

My mother, Yang Kuy-young or Takahashi Clara, was born in Seoul a few months after the Korean War “ended”. From her childhood, drawing was her favorite activity, which led her to Tokyo where she studied at an art college in the mid-1970s. In that period, people’s exchange was still strictly regulated between South Korea and Japan. It was thus not surprising that she was the only Korean student in her school. She was able to go to Japan because of her father’s connection. My grandfather, Yang Chun-suk, studied engineering in Tokyo during the Japanese colonial period. So he had some close Japanese friends, one of whom became her guarantor.

This young student from South Korea soon made a name for herself in the art salon in Tokyo for her talent and also for her rarity as a student from South Korea. Her works including oil and acrylic paintings as well as prints received awards at exhibitions. Backed by the rise of the Japanese economy in the 1980s, her Japanese patrons bought her works and in this way she could earn enough income to live. As she became a well-known artist, she started using her Christian name, Clara, in her professional and private lives. Although her

father was reluctant to support her artistic career initially (because of its low status in Confucius social hierarchy), her success changed his attitude. Chun-suk was waiting for her to return to Seoul. He even bought a flat for his daughter to use as an atelier. But his dream was not realized. She decided to stay in Japan.

Her student life in Tokyo in the late 1970s and early 1980s was “totally different” from her previous life in Seoul. She thought that life in Korea was “gloomy and backward” compared to her lively city life in Tokyo. Also, she had a fiancé whom she met at her school. When she told her parents that she would marry this Japanese man, her father did not oppose her decision. Yet he was not happy either. He asked my mother “why are you marrying *ilbon-nom*” (which means “Japanese bloke” and has a disrespectful tone). This is how my mother’s life as a migrant started.

After she married, my mother stopped her artistic career for the next fifteen years. The main concern of her life was not art any more but her newly born son. She decided to focus on raising me. Meanwhile, she worked at various places, including a language school, a trading company, nursing home, insurance company and so on. In her workplaces, no one knew or cared about her previous career. She was regarded only as a woman and a Korean, a person from the “gloomy and backward” country. Wherever she worked, the result was always the same. She ended up quitting her jobs due to prejudice, discrimination and harassment from her colleagues. These hardships were more than enough to change her views of Japan and Japanese. From a country of chance, hope and prosperity, Japan became a gloomy, discriminatory, and backward place. Yet having a family in Japan, she had no place to “return” to any more. Although her strong character generally kept her from making complaints in front of her family, there were some times in a year in which her accumulated anger, frustration, loneliness, and disappointment were expressed with tears and screams,

followed by her collapsing on the floor. Those extreme memories have never left and will never leave me.

While my mother's story had a great impact on my perception of culture and identity, my father, Takahashi Ichirō, and his family also illuminate another strand that underlies my perspective. Although my father was a Japanese who was born in downtown Asaka City in Saitama Prefecture, he was also a son of a migrant family. His father, Takahashi "Carlos" Chūshirō, was a second generation Japanese migrant in Peru. Born in Trujillo, a coastal city located northwest of Peru, my grandfather moved with his family to the capital city, Lima, where Chūshirō attended a local school with children from many other ethnic backgrounds. His father, my great-grandfather, Sadae, originated from Fukushima Prefecture. He was running a Japanese grocery store in Lima. Although Sadae's store became a target when anti-Japanese riots occurred in 1940, Chūshirō's childhood was just the same as many other children.

However, Chūshirō's life suddenly changed when Sadae went missing in 1942. About a week after Sadae's disappearance, local police officers came to Chūshirō's home, and told the family to get on a train with minimum necessities. With little time to prepare, Chūshirō's family rushed to the train without knowing where they were going. Their destination was not in Peru but Crystal City, Texas, where the US government founded one of 12 Japanese internment camps during the Pacific War. Manuel Prado, then President of Peru, was a supporter of the United States, and started persecuting Japanese migrants as "enemy nationals" when the war broke out. This included the forceful relocation of about 2000 Japanese to the United States. In the foreign land of Texas, the family could meet my great-grandfather again.

After the war, Japanese internees were all released from the camps. Sadae and his family wished to return to Peru. He had two grown up children who were living in different

parts of Peru and thus they were not directly affected when the rest of family was taken to the US. However, the Peruvian government rejected the return of his family (like many other Japanese internees) to its country. Also, they were not American citizens, and thus were not allowed to remain in the US. The only option for Sadae and his family was to return to Japan. With many other Japanese, the Takahashi family started a long trip to Japan via Seattle, leaving some of their children in Peru. For Chūshirō, this was his first experience of his “homeland”.

This family’s hardship still continued even after they arrived in Japan. Sadae found that his name had been removed from his family register in Fukushima. They had no place to “return” to. Living in the outskirts of Tokyo, the parents and grown-up children had to find jobs to survive. Chūshirō, who was 15 years old, was no exception. However, he had some difficulties to start with. One of them was his language skills. Spanish was his first language, and he could speak only a few words in Japanese when he arrived in Japan. In fact, he studied English in the internment camp to communicate with Americans and descendants of Japanese Americans who also lived in the same internment camp. With such language skills, he struggled to get a job. Yet there was one place he was treated better than other Japanese, which was an American military base. He was employed as a warehouse worker at the US military base in Asaka City, Saitama Prefecture, which was also known as Camp Drake. There, he learnt English from the American soldiers and Japanese from other colleagues. His eldest son, my father, spent his childhood in an environment in which American, Peruvian and Japanese cultures were all mixed.

Growing up with this family background, my childhood was “different” from most of my classmates at school in terms of cultural experience. It is true that I was raised as a “Japanese”. Going to a Shinto shrine near our house on New Year’s Day was one of my favorite moments throughout the year. Japanese was the language of communication with my

family. I was educated and socialized in the local Japanese public school in which I was the best at Japanese history. Furthermore, my name, Shinnosuke, represents undoubtedly my Japanese origin. However, “Japaneseness” was not of all of me. While we celebrated New Year’s Day in the beginning of January like most Japanese, my mother respected the first day in the lunar calendar. As many Japanese visit their ancestral graves to pray for the ancestral spirits in August, we celebrated *Chuseok*, the period for the Korean harvest festival and for the ancestral worship in September. We returned to Seoul at least once a year until my grandfather’s death in 2001. In my childhood, my mother often took me to visit her good Korean friends whom she met at her church. When we celebrated my paternal grandfather’s birthday, he always cooked at least several different Peruvian dishes with my grandmother. Even when we had *sashimi*, my grandfather often used a tomato sauce to dip it in instead of using soy sauce. Furthermore, he was my private English teacher when I was a middle school student. Though he said his English was broken because he never received formal language education, I enjoyed the weekly Saturday class, often with stories of his old days. Therefore, while discourses such as “Japan”, “Japanese” or “Japaneseness” explain some aspects of my life experience, it was part of our multicultural family life.

Nevertheless, my cultural experience was not so uncommon in my neighborhood. In fact, I was privileged to have some friends who also had non-Japanese ethnic backgrounds. This was perhaps because of the nature of my hometown, Kawasaki, which is a major port city and also known as one of the most ethnically diverse places in Japan. I always had friends whose parents were culturally different from most Japanese. They were from countries including Brazil, Argentina, Germany, India, the Philippines, China and Korea. Although we did not always talk about our family to each other, “we”—the sons and daughters who had newly migrated parent(s)—were similarly conscious of our differences from other Japanese students. We also shared some similar experiences of being teased or

bullied because of our appearance, name, or parents who told their children that “we” are different from “them”.

This “minority experience” in my local town, however, not only sharpened my cultural sensitivity but also enriched my perspective on the relations between my local town and the wider regional and global communities. Hearing, talking and reading histories from my family, friends and neighborhood were the moments in which I could set myself free from suffocating “Japanese” cultural discourses, which were not reflective of the actuality of diverse local lives. In other words, these were moments when I could be someone closer to what I really am by re-situating myself and my local community in a wider context.

This perspective underlies my thesis. Although my curiosity about Okinawa’s local history started relatively recently, after I first visited Okinawa for a week in 2008 as part of a week-long “peace study tour” sponsored by my university in Tokyo, I was also struck by a strong sense of community and identity from the local people that I met during that trip, including some who were involved with the anti-base construction movement in Henoko. These local Okinawans not only maintained their own historical past and memory of war but were also very well-informed and sympathetic towards their regional neighbors. This local attitude was remarkably represented on the commemorative monument for the war dead on the Hill of Mabuni (*Mabuni no Oka*). The top of the hill from which I could see the horizon of the East China Sea was the place where the last brutal battle took place between the Japanese military and the Allied Powers at the end of the Battle of Okinawa. On the black walls of the Cornerstone of Peace (*Heiwa no Ishiji*), there are numerous names of people who died in this war. Regardless of occupation (civilians, soldiers, and other military workers), nationality, and gender, the names of the war dead are inscribed, and the number is still continuing to grow. There, I learnt that the Battle of Okinawa involved not only Okinawans, Japanese and Americans but also Koreans, Chinese, and people from other parts of Asia.

Through this experience, I became interested in exploring more about Okinawa and its historical relations with other parts of the region.

9.3. Main Findings of the Thesis

My PhD thesis illuminates the role that the concept of place plays in making the political identity in Okinawa by examining the historical development of the Okinawa struggle and current protest movement. While this thesis showed the complexity of identity within the Okinawa struggle, it also highlighted the interconnectedness of various forms of protest movements. Through two case studies, of the Takae Residents' Society and Okinawa Korea People's Solidarity, I demonstrated that the concept of place is central to understanding how various discrete individual, social, intellectual and historical contexts are interconnected to each other to produce a particular community. In other words, the concept of place—whether it is local or regional—enables us to understand that the Okinawan protest community and its identity are sustained and developed based on diverse political and social identities. While maintaining discrete senses of community, the local protest communities also share the meaning of the Okinawa struggle. In this sense, what I discovered through Takae and OKPS is the importance of *Okinawan identities* rather than Okinawan identity. With this concept, we can consider the dynamism, resilience and creativity of the Okinawa struggle. This plural form of Okinawan identity is based on my observation of the Okinawan anti-base movement. At the same time, my life experience and involvement with the anti-base movement also shaped my perspective on interactive relations between identity and the local protest community.

In order to illuminate the multiplicity of identities within the Okinawa struggle, this thesis started with chapters devoted to explaining the historical development of the Okinawan anti-base movement. Chapters Two and Three showed the complexity and plurality of the

local political identities from a historical point of view. There, I revealed the complex history of the formation of “Okinawan identity” by highlighting the involvement of different social and political actors, their cooperation and conflict. Chapter Two looked at the origins and early period of the local anti-base struggle under the US occupation, which was started by evicted farmers, politicians, other concerned residents and progressive university students. Chapter Three illuminated the emergence of ordinary citizens as major political actors of the anti-base struggle, their achievements and challenges in post-reversion Okinawa. In Chapter Four, I introduced some recent perspectives on the anti-base movement, including perspectives mobilizing the framework of the indigenous movement, of civic movements and of feminism, by examining three key researchers and their works. In so doing, I discussed how these scholars sought to theorize the Okinawa struggle and to illuminate it as a crucial political movement not only for Okinawa or Japan but also for all people involved in peace activism globally.

While building on the existing scholarship, I argued that there was scope for further study of the issues of space and place and their complex relations to the formation of the local identity in the anti-base movement. Therefore, in Chapters Five and Six, I explored the case of the Takae Residents’ Society in which activists mobilize the sense of place (i.e. the attachment to the local natural environment and feeling of “dwelling” or “rootedness”) and their dynamic social networks in making their communal identity. These two chapters showed the process by which a particular local identity was created, and how the local identity negotiates with and contradicts “Okinawan identity”. In Chapters Seven and Eight, I discussed how the Okinawa struggle has begun to embrace a regional perspective. The story of Okinawa Korea People’s Solidarity demonstrated another form of place-based identity, which extends its vision to the East Asian region. By examining the historical context of the group and life histories of three key members, I revealed that the historical origins of

Okinawa Korean People's Solidarity movement were deeply related to the histories and personal experiences of the members in Okinawa, mainland Japan and East Asia in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Overall, my research suggests the significance of multi-leveled identity created by diverse social actors, their political interests and various contexts of interaction with Okinawa's anti-base movement. By understanding that Okinawan identity is plural and multi-leveled, we can understand the reasons for intermittent clashes between differing perceptions of identity, but can also appreciate why different identities are able to co-exist within the Okinawa struggle in an inclusive, dialogical and multidirectional way.

The understanding of multi-leveled identity also enables us to see the fluidity of identity, which is created through multiple flows of people, ideas and information across boundaries. In this sense, one of the similarities of the two case studies in this thesis is that they both highlight translocality as a key concept to understand the forms of communities. While the Takae Residents' Society is a localized protest community based in a remote area of the northern part of Okinawa Island, this community includes people who originated from various parts of Okinawa and Japan. The translocal experiences that underlie the Takae Residents' Society enable the local community to be connected to wider social networks around Okinawa and other parts of the Japanese archipelago. While the case of Takae shows that the people, their activities, and various experiences contribute to enriching the sense of locality, the case of OKPS reveals an emerging sense of communal identity or extensive understanding of "we-ness" in a wider East Asian regional context. In other words, these two cases illustrate how activists articulate the notion of place in making their local communal identities, and remind us that we need to be conscious of the translocality which enables these people to create such senses of space.

However, there are differences between these two cases. While the first case illuminates the physical aspects of place (i.e. the landscape of and the natural environment in Yanbaru Forest), the second case highlights the conceptual aspect of place (i.e. region or East Asia). This difference between locality and region clarifies the meaning of multi-leveled identity, and allows us to see two principal ways of understanding consciousness toward place among the activists. Namely, the first case shows the material relationship between people and their living environment, or “dwelling”, as a way to make the identity of the Takae Residents’ Society. The second case shows that an ideological relationship across the boundaries, or “connectivity”, is a way to create a regional solidarity in the anti-base movement. Overall, by examining the fixed notion of Okinawan identity critically, my PhD thesis showed two different creative dimensions of the Okinawa struggle—localization and regionalization.

9.4. Connecting the Pacific: A New Journey Just Begun

While this research illuminated diverse human activities that connect the Okinawan anti-base struggle with mainland Japan and South Korea, I was also keenly aware of the issues that I could not address in this research because of lack of time and space. One of these issues is the networks that Okinawa’s anti-base movement is creating with activists from many different parts of the Asia and Pacific region. While I illuminated the solidarity movement between Okinawa and South Korea, there are also emerging networks between Okinawa and places including Guam, Hawaii, mainland United States, the Philippines, and Australia. Among these emerging networks is a group of activists from Darwin in the Northern Territory of Australia who I had a chance to be involved with. Since January 2012, I have been working with local citizens in Darwin who initiated a campaign to oppose the installation of American military bases in their territory.

In November 2011, US President Barack Obama announced that the United States would deploy marines in Australia. Welcoming this announcement, the former Prime Minister of Australia, Julia Gillard, endorsed the strategic expansion of the US troops in the southern part of the Pacific. This reinforcement of the US military forces was part of “rebalancing” the power-relations in Asia and the Pacific, particularly with regard to the rise of the Chinese influence over other countries in the region. Situating Darwin under the same chain of command as Guam and Okinawa, the United States government planned to deploy US Marine Corps in these three places on six-month rotations from 2012.

This news concerned many local residents in Darwin, especially because it was a sudden announcement that they had not been given any hint of earlier. Knowing the fact that US military personnel had committed a number of crimes in other host countries of US military bases, the concerned citizens started a grassroots NGO called Base Watch. While some members originated from Darwin, most of the members were people who had come to live in this place from Melbourne, Sydney, Adelaide and other parts of Australia, attracted by Darwin’s tropical natural environment that has shaped a distinctive culture. The demography of the members is diverse and includes lawyers, former union workers, housewives, IT workers, and veterans of the Australian Defence Force. They are all experienced activists in environmental conservation including those who have been involved in the anti-mining campaign, indigenous land rights, feminism and the labor movement. Collaborating with the nation-wide peace movement, IPAN (Independent and Peaceful Australia Network), the members of Base Watch started organizing study groups and symposiums to publicize their activities and to enhance public awareness.

I met two members, Justin Tutty and Cat Beaton for the first time in Yokohama in January 2012. I was introduced to these two activists by our mutual friend at the venue of *Nuclear Free Now*, a world congress of the anti-nuclear campaign. In the wake of Japan’s

triple disaster in March 2011, some Australian environmental activists started a solidarity movement with Japanese NGOs on the problems of nuclear energy. For Australian activists, the explosion at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was not someone else's problem. Rather, they considered that it was a disaster in which the Australian mining industry was implicated. In fact, most of the uranium used in Fukushima power plants was imported from South Australia. Darwin was one of the major ports for shipping the uranium to Japan. Therefore, the Fukushima disaster was considered as not only an environmental crisis but also a moral crisis for many of the Australian activists.

Yokohama was not the only place on Justin's and Cat's itinerary. They also planned to travel to Okinawa. Coincidentally, I had just booked my flight ticket to visit Okinawa around the same period. My friend, Abe Kosuzu, rang me and asked if I was interested in interpreting for two Australian activists visiting Okinawa. Since I was keen to explore the history of the Australian peace movement, I saw no reason why I should not accept her offer. These "Australian activists" were Justin and Cat.

Since this first meeting with the activists from Base Watch, I have become aware of new dimensions of the connection between Japan and Australia. The Pacific no longer seems like a space that separates these two places; rather, it links them through the movement of people and common concerns across boundaries. This regional perspective allowed me to have an interesting experience when I visited Darwin in February 2013. For some reason, I had a false sense that I was in Okinawa. It was partly because of the local climate including the humid air, squalls in the late afternoon, and the mangroves in the forest. But there were also other reasons for this illusion. The view of the long walls of wire fences of the military camps alongside roads also strongly reminded me of Camp Foster and Route 58 in Okinawa. It was not only I who had this illusion. Other visitors from Okinawa with whom I traveled also felt the same. Although we had never traveled to Darwin before, we all saw this place as

very familiar. In fact, Justin and Cat, too, were surprised by the fact that there was so much in common between Okinawa and Darwin including the climate, calm beaches, history as a frontier, and the military bases. With these similarities of Okinawa and Darwin, we could not help but compare the two different places.

The development of connectivity between Australia and Japan has been deepened not only at the grassroots level but also at the state political level. Although the ongoing debates and cooperation on regional security between the two countries are not headline news, the institutional cooperation of the two countries has been rapidly progressing in recent years, especially since 2012. In 2014, the Japanese Ministry of Defense established a division to promote security cooperation between Australia and Japan. In 2015, the first joint exercises by the Japanese Self Defense Forces and Australian Defence Force together with the US Army were held in Townsville in Queensland, and these three countries have been the main participants of RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Exercise) in the South China Sea (with the Philippines and South Korean naval fleets).

In the period when the northern and southern edges of the Pacific Rim are becoming closer than ever before, institutionally and socially, how should we consider the significance and relationship of anti-base struggles in Darwin and Okinawa? How can we consider their solidarity movement in terms of the critical region making? Is it possible to create wider regional networks by involving anti-base movements in societies across different identities and localities? If so, what would be the forms of critical regional identity that might “reclaim” the Pacific not as a ground for military exercises nor a place of tension and competition among the nations of the region, but as a place to pursue cooperation for social justice beyond national interests? This thesis has laid the foundations of my future work to explore these questions by illuminating Okinawans’ historical endeavors and the dynamics of Okinawan identities. Building on this basis, I hope in the future to conduct more extensive

research on the anti-base movement in the Pacific region from historical, comparative and transnational perspectives. My journey has just begun.

Bibliography

English Sources

Akibayashi, Kozue, and Suzuyo Takazato. "Okinawa: Women's Struggle for Demilitarization." In *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts*, edited by Catherine Lutz and Cynthia Enloe, 243-269. New York: NYU Press, 2009.

Allen, Matthew. *Identity and Resistance in Okinawa* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc, 2002).

Appadurai, Arjun. *Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

Appadurai, Arjun. "Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination." *Public Culture* 12 (2000): 1-19.

Avenell, Simon. "Regional Egoism as the Public Good: Residents' movements in Japan during the 1960s and 1970s." *Japan Forum* 18 (2006): 89-113.

Avenell, Simon. "The Borderless Archipelago: Toward a Transnational History of Japanese Environmentalism." *Environment and History* 19: 397-425.

Brown-Childs, John. *Transcommunality: From the Politics of Conversion to the Ethics of Respect* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2003).

Chapman, David. *Zainichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity* (Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2009).

Cresswell, Tim, *Place: A Short Introduction* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004).

Denoon, Donal, Gavan McCormack, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Mark Hudson, *Multicultural Japan: Palaeolithic to Postmodern* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Dietz, Kelly, "Demilitarizing Sovereignty: Self-Determination and Anti-Military Base Activism in Okinawa, Japan." In *Contesting Development: Critical Struggles for Social Change*, edited by Philip McMichael, 182-198. New York: Routledge, 2010.

Duara, Prasenjit. "The New Imperialism and the Post-Colonial Developmental State: Manchukuo in Comparative Perspective." (January 2006). Accessed November 15 2013.

Eldridge, Robert D. *The Return of the Amami Islands: The Reversion Movement and U.S.-Japan Relations* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004).

Escobar, Arturo. "Place, Economy, and Culture in a Postdevelopment Era." In *Places and Politics in an Age of Globalization*, edited by Roxann Prazniak and Arif Dirlik, 193-217. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.

Escobar, Arturo. "Culture Sits in Places: Reflections on Globalism and Subaltern Strategies of Localization." *Political Geography* 20 (2001): 139-174.

Eynon, Bret. "Cast upon the Shore: Oral History and New Scholarship on the Movements of the 1960s." *The Journal of American History* 83 (September 1996): 560-570.

Fraser, Nancy. "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A contribution to critique of actually existing democracy." *Social Text* 25/26 (1990): 56-80.

Gabriel, Phillip. "Rethinking the margins: Shimao Toshio and *Yaponesia*." *Japan Forum* 8 (1996): 205-220.

Gluck, Carol. *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).

Gupta, Akhil, and James Ferguson. "Beyond 'Culture': Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference." *Cultural Anthropology* 7 (1992): 6-23.

Halliday, Jon, and Gavan McCormack. *Japanese Imperialism Today: Co-Prosperity in Greater East Asia* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973).

Harootunian, Harry D. *Things Seen and Unseen: Discourse and Ideology in Tokugawa Nativism* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

Harootunian, Harry D. *Postmodernism and Japan* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989).

Hein, Laura and Mark Selden, ed. *Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

Hook, Glen D. and Richard Siddle. *Japan and Okinawa: Structure and Subjectivity* (London: Routledge, 2002).

Iacobelli, Pedro, "The Limits of Sovereignty and Post-War Okinawan Migrants in Bolivia." *Japan Focus* (August 2013). Accessed November 2 2013.

Ingold, Tim. "The Temporality of the Landscape." *World Archaeology* 25 (1993): 152-174.

Inoue, Masamichi S. "'Japan' as Asylum: A New Possibility of Native Anthropology." Paper presented at the Contemporary American Studies Consortium of Japan, Tokyo, 24 June, 2013.

Inoue, Masamichi S. *Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007).

Johnson, Chalmers A. *Okinawa: Cold War Island* (Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999).

Kwon, Heonik. "Writing an International History from a Village Ethnography." Paper presented at the meeting for the Association of Social Anthropologists, London, March 17-18, 2008.

Levinas, Emmanuel. *Collected Philosophical Papers*. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. (Dordrecht, Netherlands: M. Nijhoff, 1987).

Low, Morris F., and Alan Rix. *Visions of Japanese Studies in Australia: A Short History and Discussion* (Sydney: Japan Cultural Centre, 1997).

Maheu, Louis. "The Sociology of Alain Touraine: A Modernist Look at Post-Industrialization and the Ambivalence of Social Movements." In *Alain Touraine*, edited by Jon Clark and Marco Diani, 93-112. London: Routledge, 1996.

McCormack, Gavan, and Yoshio Sugimoto. *Democracy in Contemporary Japan* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1986).

McCormack, Gavan and Satoko Oka Norimatsu. *Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012).

McDonald, Kevin. "Oneself as Another: From Social Movement to Experience Movement." *Current Sociology* 52 (2004): 575-93.

Melicci, Alberto. *The Playing Self: Person and Meaning in the Planetary Society*, (Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Mitchell, Jon. "Agent Orange on Okinawa - The Smoking Gun: U.S. Army Report, Photographs Show 25,000 Barrels on Island in Early '70s." *Japan Focus* (September 2012). Accessed 15 January 2013.

Miyoshi, Masao, *Off Center: Power and Culture Relations Between Japan and the United States*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).

Morris-Suzuki, Tessa, "Liquid Area Studies: North East Asia in Motion." Paper presented at the meeting for Transnational/Transcultural Comparative Area Studies, Tokyo, 14-15 February, 2009.

Noussia, Antonia, "Constructing Spaces, Representing Places: The Role of Landscape in Open-Air Museum Sites," In *The Routledge Companion to Landscape Studies*, edited by Peter Howard, Ian Thompson, and Emma Waterton, 179-89. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013.

Ōnishi, Yuichiro, "The Presence of (Black) Liberation in Okinawan Freedom: Transnational Moments, 1968-1972." In *Extending Diaspora: New Histories of Black People*, edited by Dawne Y. Curry, Eric D. Duke, Marshanda A. Smith, 178-202. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2009.

Ōnishi, Yuichiro, "Occupied Okinawa on the Edge: On Being Okinawan in Hawai'i and US Colonialism toward Okinawa." *American Quarterly* 64 (2012): 741-65.

Rogers, Kim Lacy. "Oral History and the History of the Civil Rights Movements." *The Journal of American History* 75 (1988): 567-576.

Schock, Kurk. *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies* (Minneapolis, MA: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).

Siddle, Richard. "Colonialism and Identity in Okinawa before 1945." *Japanese Studies* 18 (1998): 117–33.

Szanton, David L. "The Origin, Nature and Challenges of Area Studies in the United States." In *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Disciplines*, edited by David Szanton, 1-33. Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2004.

Tanji, Miyume. *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa* (Abington, Oxon: Routledge, 2006).

Touraine, Alain. *The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

Touraine, Alain. "Social Movements: Participation and Protest." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 10 (1987): 207-222.

Tuan, Yi-Fu. *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis, MA: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).

Ui, Jun, Kihirō Shōji, Masurō Sugai, Yasuhiro Hoshino, and Nobuko Iijima. *Industrial Pollution in Japan* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1992).

Wallerstein, Immanuel. "The Unitended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies." In *The Cold War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years*, edited by Noam Chomsky, Laura Nader, Immanuel Wallerstein, Richard C. Lewontin, Richard Ohmann, and Howard Zinn, 1-33. New York: New Press, 1998.

Wattchow, Brian. "The Landscape and a Sense of Place: Creative Tension." In *The Routledge Companion to Landscape Studies*, edited by Peter Howard, Ian Thompson, and Emma Waterton, 87-96. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013.

Willem van Schendel, "Geographies of Knowing, Geographies of Ignorance: Jumping Scale in Southeast Asia," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 20, no. 6 (2002): 647-668.

Wylie, John. *Landscape* (London; New York: Routledge, 2007).

Yonetani (Humphry), Julia. "Making History from Japan's Margins: Ota Masahide and Okinawa." PhD thesis, the Australian National University, 2002.

Yonetani, Julia. "Appropriation and Resistance in a 'Globalised Village': Reconfiguring Local and Global Dynamics from Okinawa." *Asian Studies Review* 28 (2004): 391-406.

Ziomek, Kirsten L. "The 1903 Human Pavilion: Colonial Realities and Subaltern Subjectivities in Twentieth-Century Japan." *The Journal of Asian Studies* (2014): 493-516.

Japanese Sources

Abe, Kosuzu. "Kurikaeshi Kawaru: Okinawa ni okeru Chokusetu Kōdō no Genzai-shinkōkei." *Seisaku Kagaku, Kokusai-kankeironshu* 13 (2011): 61-90. (阿部小涼「繰り返し変わる：沖縄における直接行動の現在進行形」『政策科学・国際関係学』)

Abe, Kosuzu. "'Sengo' ga Mitsukaranai", *Shunju*, 521 (2010): 12-14. (阿部小涼「＜戦後＞が見つからない」『春秋』)

Abe, Kosuzu. "Radikaru na Okinawa no 'Tōjisha': Kussetsu suru Integiriti to Okinawa Sengo-shi Purojekuto." *Okinawa Bunka Kenkyū*, 28 (2012), 291-317. (阿部小涼「ラディカルな沖縄の〈当事者〉：屈折するインテグリティと沖縄戦後史プロジェクト」『沖縄文化研究』)

Ahagon, Shōkō. *Beigun to Nōmin: Okinawa-ken Iejima*. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1973). (阿波根昌鴻『米軍と農民：沖縄県伊江島』)

Ajia to Rentai suru Shūkai Jikkō Linkai, ed. *Okinawa-Kankoku Hankichi Kōryūdan Hokokushū*. (Naha: Ajia to Rentaisuru Shūkai Jikkō Linkai, 1997). (アジアと連帯する集会実行委員会編『沖縄韓国反基地交流団報告集』)

Aniya, Masa'aki, Takashi Higa, Takeshi Ōwan, Kiyohiro Kobashigawa, Tomoaki Tokuyama, Masayoshi Tōyama, Tsuyoshi Tamaki, and Yumiko Tamaki. *Yomitanson-shi* vol. 5. (Yomitanson, Okinawa: Yomitanson-shi Henshū-inkai, 2002). (安仁屋政昭、比嘉隆、大湾武、小橋川清弘、渡久山朝章、當山正喜、玉城毅、玉城裕美子『読谷村史 第五卷』)

Arakawa, Akira. *Tōgō to Hangyaku* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2000). (新川明『統合と反逆』)

Arasaki, Moriteru. *Okinawa Gendaishi e no Shōgen*, (Naha: Okinawa Taimusu-sha, 1982). (新崎盛暉『沖縄現代史への証言』)

Arasaki, Moriteru. *Okinawa Gendaishi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005). (新崎盛暉『沖縄現代史』)

Arasaki, Moriteru. *Arasaki Moriteru Ga Toku Kōzōteki Okinawa Sabetsu* (Tokyo: Kobunken, 2012). (新崎盛暉『新崎盛暉が説く構造的沖縄差別』)

Arasaki, Moriteru. *Okinawa Dōjidaishi 1973-1977: Yogawari no Uzu no Naka de* (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 2004). (新崎盛暉『沖縄同時代史 1973-1977：世替わりの渦の中で』)

Arasaki, Moriteru. *Okinawa Dōjidaishi 1978-1982: Ryukyu-ko no Shiten kara* (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 2004). (『沖縄同時代史 1978-1982：琉球弧の視点から』)

Arasaki, Moriteru. *Okinawa Dōjidaishi 1983-1987: Shōkokushugi no tachiba de* (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 2004). (新崎盛暉『沖縄同時代史 1983-1987 : 小国主義の立場で』)

Arasaki, Moriteru. *Okinawa Dōjidaishi 1988-1990: Yawarakai Shakai wo Motomete* (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 2004). (新崎盛暉『沖縄同時代史 1988-1990 : 柔らかい社会を求めて』)

Arasaki, Moriteru. "Chiiki Kenkyū-jo no Kanōsei wo Saguru." *Okinawa Daigaku Chiiki Kenkyūjo Nenpō* 18 (2004): 193-198. (新崎盛暉「地域研究所の可能性を探る」『沖縄大学地域研究所年報』)

Arasaki, Moriteru. "Amami, Okinawa, Ryukyu-ko: Gendai-shi kara no shiten." *Shin Okinawa Bungaku* 41 (1979): 94-104. (新崎盛暉「奄美、沖縄、琉球弧：現代史からの視点」『新沖縄文学』)

Arasaki, Moriteru, Masahiro Tabeta, Asao Kinjō, Eiko Asato, and Osamu Yakabi. "Okinawa, Heiwa, Komonzu." In *Tamanoi Yoshirō Chosaku-shū Volume 3: Chiiki-shugi kara no Shuppatsu*, edited by Kazuko Tsurumi and Moriteru Arasaki, 293-320. Tokyo: Gakuyō-shobō, 1990. (新崎盛暉、多辺田政弘、金城朝夫、安里英子、屋嘉比収「沖縄、平和、コモンズ」鶴見和子、新崎盛暉編『玉野井芳郎著作集 第三巻』)

Arasaki, Moriteru, Masahiro Tomiyama, Toshio Takahashi, Ichirō Nishio, and Yusa To. "Tomoni Manabi, Tomoni Kawaru, Okikan Minshu Rentai no Ayumi," *Keishi Kaji* 70 (July 2011): 6-25. (新崎盛暉、豊見山雅裕、高橋年男、西尾市郎、都裕史「ともに学び、ともに変わる、沖縄民衆連帯の歩み」『けーし風』)

Arasaki, Moriteru. "Watashi ga Ikita Okinawa-shi, soshite Sekai-shi 2." *Keishikaji* 76 (October, 2012): 56-65. (新崎盛暉「私が生きた沖縄史、そして世界史 2」『けーし風』)

Arasaki, Moriteru. "Chīki to tomo ni Ikiru Daigaku." *Daigaku to Kyōiku* 31 (March 2002): 15-39. (新崎盛暉「地域とともに生きる大学」『大学と教育』)

Chi, Myōngkwan. *Kankoku Minshuka e no Michi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995). (池明観『韓国 民主化への道』)

Chinen, Chūji. *Taiga No Nagare to Tomo ni* (Minamihaebaru, Okinawa: Akebono Shuppan, 2008). (知念忠二『大河の流れとともに』)

Chinin, Ushii, Hidetake Yogi, Kazuhiko Tōbaru, Atsushi Gotada. *Tōsō suru Kyōkai: Fukkigo sedai no Okinawa kara no Hōkoku* (Tokyo: Miraisha, 2012). (知念ウシ『闘争する境界：復帰後世代の沖縄からの報告』)

Daigaku-jin Kyūjō no Kai Ryūkyū Daigaku Kyōshokuin-kai. *Ryūdai Jiken to wa Nan datta no ka* (Ginowan, Okinawa: Ryukyu Daigaku Hōmu Kenkyū-ka, 2010). (大学人九条の会、琉球大学教職員会『琉大事件とは何だったのか』)

Dubet, François. *Sociologie de l'expérience*. Translated by Masayuki Yamashita, Eiji Hamanishi, and Jirō Morita. Tokyo: Shinsensha, 2011. (フランシス・デュベ著、山下雅之、濱西栄司、森田次朗訳『経験の社会学』)

Hatakeyama, Hiroshi, and Hiroyuki Kumamoto, ed. *Okinawa no Datsugunjika to Chiikiteki Shutaisei: Fukkigo-sedai no Okinawa* (Tokyo: Meiji Daigaku Gunshuku Heiwa Kenkyujo, 2006). (畠山大、熊本博之『沖縄の脱軍事化と地域的主体性：復帰後世代の沖縄』)

Higa, Mikio. *Okinawa: Seitō to Seiji* (Tokyo: Chūkō Shinsho, 1965). (比嘉幹夫『沖縄：政党と政治』)

Higa, Shunchō. *Higa Shunchō Zenshū* Vol. 4 (Naha, Okinawa: Okinawa Times-sha, 1971). (比嘉春潮『比嘉春潮全集 第四巻』)

Higashi-son-shi Henshū Inkai, ed. *Higashi-son-shi* vol 1 (Higashi-son, Okinawa: Higashi-son Yakuba, 1987). (東村史編集委員会編『東村史 第一巻』)

Higuchi, Keinosuke. 60 Nen-dai Shaseidō (Kaihō-ha) Shi-shi (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōron-sha, 2012). (樋口圭之介『60年代社青同（解放派）私史』)

Hiyane, Teruo. *Sengo Okinawa no Seishin to Shisō* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2009) (比屋根照夫『戦後沖縄の精神と思想』)

Inoue, Masamichi. “Gurōbaruka no Naka no ‘Okinawa inishiatibu’ Ronsō: Kioku, Aidentitī, Kichimondai.” *Shisō* 933 (2002): 246-267. (井上雅道『グローバル化の中の「沖縄イニティアティブ」論争：記憶、アイデンティティ、基地問題』『思想』)

Inoue, Masamichi. "Mainichi ga Fūdo Wāku: Yanbaru to Watashi." *Keishi Kaji* 36 (September 2002), 38-39. (井上雅道「毎日がフィールドワーク：やんばると私」『けーし風』)

Itokazu, Keiko. “Okinawasen to Heiwa Gaido” (Tokyo: Shiryō SentāHogō, 2008). (糸数慶子『沖縄と平和ガイド』)

Kajihiro, Kyle, and Suzuyo Takazato. “Gunji-shugi to Shin Jiyūshugi ni Taikō Suru.” Translated by Shinnosuke Takahashi, *Kēshi Kaji* 73 (2011): 34-46. (カイル・カジヒロ、高里鈴代著、高橋進之介訳「軍事主義と新自由主義に対抗する」『けーし風』)

Kawabata, Kōhei. *Jimoto wo Aruku: Mijika-na Sekai no Esunogurafii* (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 2013). (川端浩平『ジモトを歩く：身近な世界のエスノグラフィー』)

Katamitsu, Shin'ichi. *Ne kara no Toi: Kyōsei e no Katsubō* (Tokyo: Tairyū-sha, 1978). (川満信一『根からの問い：共生への渴望』)

Kreiner, Josef. *Sekai no Okinawagaku: Okinawa Kenkyū 50 Nen no Ayumi* (Tokyo: Fuyō Shobō, 2012). (ヨーゼフ・クライナー『沖縄研究 50 年のあゆみ』)

Lee, Jong Wong, Masashi Kimiya, Toyomi Asano. *Rekishi toshite no Nikkan Kokkō Seijōka* (Tokyo: Hōsei Daigaku Shuppan, 2011). (李鐘元、木宮正史、浅野豊美『歴史としての日韓国交正常化』)

Matsushima, Yasukatsu. *Ryūkyū Dokuritsu e no Michi: Shokuminchi-shugi ni Aragau Ryūkyū Nashonarizumu* (Tokyo: Hōitsu Bunka-sha: 2012). (松島泰勝『琉球独立への道：植民地主義に抗う琉球ナショナリズム』)

Miyoshi, Masao. *Teikō no Ba e: Arayuru Kyōkai wo Koeru tame ni* (Kyoto: Rakuhoku Shuppan, 2007). (三好将夫『抵抗の場へ：あらゆる境界を越えるために』)

Mizuno, Naoki, and Moon Gyung-su. *Zainichi Chōsen-jin: Rekishi to Genzai* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten: 2015). (水野直樹、文京珠『在日朝鮮人：歴史と現在』)

Moon, Gyung-su. *Gendai Kankoku-shi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005). (文京珠『現代韓国史』)

Morizumi, Taku, and Chie Mikami. *Okinawa Takae Yanbaru de Ikiru*. (Tokyo: Kōbunken Shuppan 2014). (森住卓、三上智恵『沖縄・高江 やんばるで生きる』)

Nakano, Yoshio, and Moriteru Arasaki. *Okinawa Mondai Nijū-nen* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965). (中野好夫、新崎盛暉『沖縄問題二十年』)

Nakano, Yoshio, and Moriteru Arasaki. *Okinawa Sengo-Shi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1976), 84-85. (中野好夫、新崎盛暉『沖縄戦後史』)

Nakano, Yoshio. *Okinawa to Watashi* (Tokyo: Jijitsūshin-sha, 1972). (中野好夫『沖縄と私』)

Nitagai, Kamon and Jirō Matsubara. *Jūmin Undō no Ronri: Undō no tenkai katei, kadai to tenbō*. (Tokyo: Gakuyō Shobō, 1976). (似田貝香門、松原治郎『住民運動の論理：運動の展開過程、課題と展望』)

Nomura, Kōya. *Muishiki no Shokuminchishugi: Nihonjin no Beigunkichi to Okinawajin*, (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 2005). (野村浩也『無意識の植民地主義：日本人の米軍基地と沖縄人』)

Noutomi, Kaori. “The Reexamination of Ryoko Nakayoshi: The Role of *Fukki-Otoko* in the Modern History of Okinawa.” *Historica* vol. 57, 2004: 44-62. (納富香織「仲吉良光論：沖縄近現代史における「復帰男」の再検討」)

Oguma, Eiji. *Minshu to Aikoku: Sengo Nihon no Nashonarizumu to Kōkyōsei* (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 2002). (小熊英二『民主と愛国：戦後日本のナショナリズムと公共性』)

Oguma, Eiji. 1968 Vol.2: *Hanran no Shūen to sono Isan* (Tokyo: Shinyō-sha, 2009). (小熊英二『1968 下巻：叛乱の終焉とその遺産』)

- Okamoto, Keitoku. *Gendai Okinawa no Bungaku to Shisō* (Naha, Okinawa: Okinawa Taimusu-sha, 1981). (岡本恵徳『現代沖縄の文学と思想』)
- Okamoto, Keitoku. *"Okinawa" ni Ikiru: Okamoto Keitoku Hihyō-Shū* (Tokyo: Miraisha, 2007). (岡本恵徳『「沖縄」に生きる：岡本恵徳批評集』)
- Okinawa Daigaku 50 Nen Shi Henshū Linkai, ed. *Chiisana Daigaku no Ōkina Chōsen: Okinawa Daigaku 50 Nen no Kiseki*. (Tokyo: Kōbunken Shuppan, 2008). (沖縄大学 50 年史編集委員会『小さな大学の大きな挑戦：沖縄大学 50 年の軌跡』)
- Okinawa-ken Kyōiku Linkai, ed. *Okinawa Kenshi* vol. 22 (Tokyo: Gen'nan-dō Shoten, 1974).
- Okubo, Jun, and Shō Shinohara. *Okinawa no Futsugō na Shinjitsu* (Tokyo: Shinchō-sha, 2015). (大久保潤、西原章『沖縄の不都合な真実』)
- Ōta, Masahide. *Okinawa no Teiō Kōtōbenmukan* (Tokyo: Kume Shobō, 1984). (大田昌秀『沖縄の帝王 高等弁務官』)
- Sakurazawa, Makoto. *Okinawa no Fukki Undō to Hokaku Tairitsu*. (Tokyo: Yūshisha, 2012). (櫻澤誠『沖縄の復帰運動と保革対立』)
- Park, Sunam. *Arirang no Uta: Okinawa kara no Shōgen* (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1991). (朴寿南『アリランの歌：沖縄からの証言』)
- Shima, Shigeo. *Bunto Shi-shi: Seishun no Gyōshuku Sareta Hibi Tomoni Tatakatta Yūjintachi e* (Tokyo: Hihyō-sha, 1999). (島成郎『ブント私史：青春の凝縮された日々ともに闘った友人たちへ』)
- Sugimoto, Yoshio. *"Nihonjin" wo Yameraremasuka?* (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun-sha, 1996). (杉本良夫『「日本人」をやめられますか?』)
- Sugimoto, Yoshio and Ross Mouer, *Nihonjinron no Hōteishiki* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1995). (杉本良夫、ムーア、ロス『日本人論の方程式』)
- Suzuki, Michihiko, *Ekkyō No Toki: 1960 Nen Dai to Zainichi*. (Tokyo: Shūei-sha, 2007). (鈴木道彦『越境のとき：1960 年代と在日』)
- Tada, Osamu. *Okinawa Imēji no Tanjō: Aoi umi no karuchuraru sutadīzu* (Tokyo: Tōyōkeizai Shinpō-sha, 2004). (多田治『沖縄イメージの誕生：青い海のカルチュラルスタディーズ』)
- Takahashi, Saburō, Chōsei Kabira, Moriteru Arasaki. *Okinawa Mondai to Kirisuto-sha no Sekinin* (Tokyo: Seitō-sha, 1970). (高橋三郎、川平朝清、新崎盛暉『沖縄問題とキリスト者の責任』)
- Takara, Kurayoshi. *Ryukyu Ōoku* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993). (高良倉吉『琉球王国』)

Takara, Kurayoshi, Tsuneo Ōshiro, and Morisada Maeshiro. *Okinawa Inishiatibu: Okinawa-hatsu Chiteki Senryaku* (Naha: Okinawa Bunko, 2000). (高良倉吉、大城常弘、真栄城盛定『沖縄イニシアティブ：沖縄発・知的戦略』)

Tobe, Hideaki. “1950 Nen-dai Okinawa Kyōshokuin-kai no Chiiki ‘Shindan’.” *Shikan* 147 (2002): 1–16. (戸邊秀明「1950年代沖縄教職員会の地域「診断」」『史観』)

Tobe, Hideaki. “Sengo Okinawa ni okeru Fukki Undō no Shuppatsu: Kyōinsō kara Miru Senjōgo/Senryōka no Shakai to Undō.” *Journal of Japanese History* 547 (2002): 102-124. (戸邊秀明「戦後沖縄における復帰運動の出発：教員層からみる戦場後/占領下の社会と運動」)

Tomiya, Ichirō. *Ruchaku no Shisō: “Okinawa mondai” no Keifugaku* (Tokyo: Inpakuto shuppan, 2013). (冨山一郎『流着の思想：「沖縄問題」の系譜学』)

Toriyama, Atsushi. *Okinawa: Kichi-shakai no Kigen to Sōkoku 1945-1956* (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2013). (鳥山淳『沖縄：基地社会の起源と相克 1945-1956』)

Uehara, Kozue. “Minshū no ‘Seizon’ Shisō kara ‘Kenri’ wo Tou: Shiseiken Henkan-go no Kin Wan, Han CTS Tōsō Saiban wo Megutte,” *Okinawa Bunka Kenkyū* 39 (2013): 127-158. (上原こずえ「民衆の「生存権」思想から「権利」を問う：施政権返還後の金武湾、反CTS闘争裁判をめぐる」)

Uemura, Hideaki, Yoshikazu Shiobara, Makiko Kimura, and Gosamaru Miyazato. *Shimin no Gaikou: Senjū Minzoku to Ayunda 30 Nen* (Tokyo: Hōsei Daigaku Shuppanyoku, 2013). (上村英明、塩原良和、木村真希子、宮里護佐丸『市民の外交：先住民族と歩んだ30年』)

Wakabayashi, Chiyo. “Jipu to Sajin: Senryō Shoki Okinawa-shakai no ‘Senyō’ to ‘Hen’i’.” *Okinawa Bunka Kenkyū*, 29 (2003): 233–286. (若林千代「ジープと砂塵：占領初期沖縄社会の「変容」と「変位」」『沖縄文化研究』)

Yakabi, Osamu. “Kindai Okinawa ni okeru Mainoritii Ninshiki no Hensen.” *Bessatsu Kan* 6 (2003). (屋嘉比収「近代沖縄におけるマイノリティー認識の変遷」『別冊・環』)

Yakabi, Osamu. *Okinawa-sen, Beigun Senryō-shi wo Manabinaosu* (Yokohama: Seori Shobō, 2009). (屋嘉比収『沖縄戦、米軍占領史を学び直す』)

Yakabi, Osamu, Ikuo Shijō, Ken’ichi Fujisawa, Ken’ichirō Kondō, and Atsushi Toriyama. *Okinawa ni Mukiau: Manazashi to Hōhō* (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōron-sha, 2008). (屋嘉比収『沖縄に向き合う：まなざしと方法』)

Yakabi, Osamu. “Okinawa no Aidentitī wo Kataru-koto Soshite Katarinaosu-koto: ‘Okinawa Kenkyū’ no Genzai ni Tsuite.” In *Chiiki no Jiritsu, Shima no Chikara Gekan*, edited by Moriteru Arasaki, Masao Higa, and Shigeru Ienaka, Tokyo: Komonzu, 2006, 129-153. (Tokyo: Komonzu, 2006). (屋嘉比収「沖縄のアイデンティティを語り直すこと、そして語り直すこと：「沖縄研究」の現在について」『地域の自立、シマの力 下巻』)

Yara, Chōbyō. *Yara Chōbyō Kaikoroku* (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun-sha, 1977). (屋良朝苗『屋良朝苗回顧録』)

Yoshiwara, Kōichirō, ed. *Okinawa: Hondo Fukki no Gensō* (Tokyo: San'ichi Shoten, 1968). (吉原幸一郎『沖縄：本土復帰の幻想』)

Yoshiwara, Naoki. "Jūmin Soshiki to Jūmin Undō: 'Chiiki Shakai' no Kokoromi," *Studies in Sociology, Psychology, and Education*, no. 25 (1975): 25–31. (吉原直樹「住民組織と住民運動：「地域社会」の試み」)

Yoshiwara, Naoki. *Chiiki Shakai to Chiiki Jūmin Soshiki* (Tokyo: Yachiyo Shuppan, 1993). (吉原直樹『地域社会と地域住民組織』)

Online Sources

The Association of Comprehensive Studies for the Independence of Lew-chewans.
<http://www.acsils.org/english>.

Eisenhower, Dweight D. "Executive Order 10713: Providing for the Administration of the Ryukyu Islands." Accessed July 7, 2015. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=106354>.

Egami, Takayoshi. "Fukki-go no Okinawa Shinkō Kaihatsu Keikaku." *Opinion* 47, Accessed November 18, 2014. <http://www.waseda.jp/jp/opinion/2003/opinion47.html>.

GENERAL HEAD QUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Civil Censorship Detachment. "CODE FOR JAPANESE PRESS (21 Sept. 1945)." Accessed May 15, 2014.
http://digital.lib.umd.edu/binaries/content/assets/digital/prange_presscode.doc.

Higashi Village. "Sangyō/Keizai." Accessed June 1, 2014,
<http://www.vill.higashi.okinawa.jp/UserFiles/File/sonnnogaiyou/sonseiyouran/sangyoukeizai.pdf>.

The Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. "Zōho Shin Zenkoku Sougou Kaihatsu Keikaku." Accessed June 27 2014.
http://www.kokudokeikaku.go.jp/document_archives/ayumi/23.pdf.

The Cabinet Office of Japan. "Dai Ichiji Okinawa Shinkō Kaihatsu Keikaku." Accessed June 27, 2014. http://www.ogb.go.jp/sinkou/shinkou-kaihatu/dai1ji_shinkou.pdf.

The Litigation on Prohibition of Traffic Disturbance (*Tsūkō-bōgai Kinshi Kari-shobun Mōshitae Jiken*), No. 166, 2008. Accessed July 20, 2015.
<http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20100201125634.pdf>.

Medoruma, Shun. "Uminari no Shima kara." Accessed August 15, 2015.
<http://blog.goo.ne.jp/awamori777>.

The Okinawa Prefecture, ed. “Okinawa no Beigun-kichi oyobi Jieitai Kichi.” Accessed 30 August, 2015. <http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/toukeisiryousyu2403.html>.

Special Subcommittee of the Armed Service Committee, House of Representatives “Report of a Special Subcommittee of the Armed Service Committee, House of Representatives Following the Inspection Tour, 14 October-23 November 1955.” Accessed August 3, 2013. <http://ryukyu-okinawa.net/pages/archive/price.html>.

UNITED STATES CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, Office of The Deputy Governor. “APO 719, CA ORDINANCE NUMBER 109, 3 April 1953, LAND ACQUISITION PROCEDURE.” Accessed September 3, 2013. <http://ryukyu-okinawa.net/pages/archive/caord109.html>.

UNITED STATES CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, Office of The Deputy Governor. “APO 719, CA ORDINANCE NUMBER 13, 29 February 1952, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RYŪKYŪ ISLANDS.” Accessed September 4, 2013. <http://ryukyu-okinawa.net/pages/archive/caproc13.html>.

The United States Central Intelligence Agency. “The Ryukyu Islands and Their Significance.” Accessed November 28 2014. http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000259203.pdf

The United States Central Intelligence Agency. “FJTA 55122 September 25 1968.” Accessed October 12, 2014. <http://www.foia.gov/>.

The United States Central Intelligence Agency, “Central Intelligence Agency Japanese Imperial Government Name Files, Kaya Okinori, document 75, FJTA 55122,” (September 25 1968), accessed September 2, 2015, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/search/site/Kaya%20Okinori>.

The Takae Residents’ Society website. <http://takae.ti-da.net/>

Newspapers

Ryūkyū Shimpō (琉球新報)

Okinawa Times (沖縄タイムス)

Shinbun Akahata (新聞赤旗)

Names of Interviewee

- ***Okinawa Korea People’s Solidarity***
 - Arasaki, Moriteru (新崎盛暉)
 - Takahashi, Toshio (高橋年男)
 - Yu, Yōngcha (俞漢子)
 - Tomiyama, Masahiro (豊見山雅裕)

- Nishio, Ichirō (西尾市郎)
- Ishikawa, Takashi (石川節)
- Ashitomi, Hiroshi (安次富浩)
- Itokazu, Keiko (糸数慶子)

- ***The Takae Residents' Society***
 - Ashimine, Gentasu (安次嶺現達)
 - Takahashi, Masahiro (高橋昌宏)
 - Isa, Masatsugu (伊佐真次)
 - Morioka, Kōji (森岡浩二)
 - Shimizu, Akira (清水暁)
 - Miyagi, Katsumi (宮城克己)
 - Higa, Masato (比嘉真人)

- ***Other Okinawan Activists***
 - Yamashiro, Hiroji (山城博治)
 - Taira, Osamu (平良修)
 - Taira, Etsumi (平良悦美)
 - Tasaki, Manami (田崎真奈美)
 - Kinjō, Minoru (金城実)