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The Hegemon's Alliance Security Dilemma:

US Accommodation With Japan and the ROK From 1994 to 2004

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I declare that this thesis is the result of my original work and all sources
have been acknowledged.



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14 December 2004

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ABBREVIATIONS

DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
JDA	Japanese Defense Agency
JMSDF	Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
HEU	Highly Enriched Uranium
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
PHP	Power Projection Hub
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
SOFA	Status of Force Agreement
TMD	Theatre Missile Defense
TCOG	Trilateral Policy Coordination and Oversight Group
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States

ABSTRACT

According to the logic of the offensive realism paradigm, the contemporary hegemon, the United States of America (US), ought to be coercing its junior allies to conform with the US security policies so that the US will retain its relative power in the international system.

However, in dealing with the nuclear and conventional threats posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) from 1994 to 2004, the US has showed more accommodation than coercion toward its junior allies, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Why?

To analyse this puzzling behaviour by the US, I make some adaptations to the realist conceptual framework called the 'alliance security dilemma', which was originally proposed by Michael Mandelbaum and later refined by Glenn Snyder. In many cases, Snyder's model has been used to focus on the fear of junior partners in an alliance that the major power will either abandon them in their hour of need or entrap them in conflicts that are harmful to their national interests, or perhaps even do both.

In this thesis I argue that the alliance security dilemma also applies to the major alliance partner. The explanation for the US's accommodation of Japan and the ROK is that the US fears that the junior allies may partially abandon the alliance framework, and in so doing, reduce its hegemonic status. Although US accommodation is best demonstrated during the 1993-94 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula while the Clinton administration was in power, this trend continues during the current Bush administration.

The findings of this thesis contribute to the literature on alliance politics by suggesting that security dilemma continues to play a key role in alliance maintenance.

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INTRODUCTION

The 1993-94 nuclear crises on the Korean Peninsula was an important event in world politics not least because it signalled an important shift in US policy from coercive diplomacy to an engagement policy with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).¹ The Clinton administration had previously considered surgical strikes on suspected nuclear sites in the DPRK or imposing economic sanctions on the regime. The DPRK warned that Seoul would be a 'sea of fire' if the US took those coercive measures. But following a special visit by the former US president Jimmy Carter, the DPRK's leader Kim Il-sung agreed to stop his country's nuclear program in exchange for the US supplying less bomb-prone nuclear reactors to the DPRK. Not long after the visit, the US shifted to a policy of engagement.²

The other major development at that time, which is the focus of this thesis, has received much less attention. Alliance dynamics intensified between the US and Japan and also between the US and the ROK during this period. During the Cold War, the US,

¹ See, for example, the following literature. Andrew Mack, ed., *Asian Flashpoint: Security and the Korean Peninsula* (Canberra, Australia: Allen & Unwin in association with the Department of International Relations, RSPAS, ANU, 1996); Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hayes, eds., *Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); Michael J. Mazarr, *North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Leon V. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Victor Gilinsky, *Nuclear Blackmail: The 1994 U. S.-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Agreed Framework on North Korea's Nuclear Program* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institute Press, 1997); Robert S. Litwak, *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War* (Washington D.C: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000), pp. 198-237; and Scott Snyder, *Negotiating On the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior* (Washington, USA: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999); Victor D Cha and David C Kang, *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); and O' Hanlon, Michael and Mochizuki, Mike, *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How To Deal With a Nuclear North Korea* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003)

² See Sigal, *ibid.*, for the US shift of its diplomacy with the DPRK from coercion to cooperation. Sigal argues against US traditional coercive nonproliferation diplomacy and focuses on the US shift from coercion to cooperation with the DPRK during the nuclear crisis in 1994, but accounts of US dealings with Japan and the ROK are sparse. See also Rock, *ibid.*

as the senior ally, was able to elicit cooperation from its junior alliance partners. For the US, Japan and the ROK were strategically important against communist elements in Northeast Asia. For Japan and the ROK, on the other hand, US extended deterrence strategy, both in nuclear and conventional terms, was essential to its own security interests because both allies were unable to provide such deterrence capabilities on their own against the USSR, China, and the DPRK. Therefore, Japan and the ROK generally demonstrated their willingness to support the US in one form or another during times of crisis. If the US perceived any unwillingness of the junior partners to provide strategic support for its own strategy, it applied coercive behaviour or gestures to change the attitude of the junior partners. Usually, this tactic succeeded.

During the period under review in this study, however, the US also moved from a coercive to a more cooperative approach towards its two junior allies, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK).³ This shift in US policy deserves attention because both Japan and the ROK were reluctant to support the original US policy to bomb or impose sanctions on the DPRK.⁴ Given its status as the sole superpower, the US was in a position to enforce its policy without much consultation with Japan and the ROK. However, surprisingly, the US shifted from a more coercive to a more cooperative stance toward the two smaller allies.

The question that this thesis poses is why did the US, the sole superpower, undertake this latter shift at this time and furthermore why did it maintain this position for several years? Consulting the mainstream theoretical propositions in the international relations security literature only serves to heighten the puzzle. According

³ Again, the literature mentioned in note 2 above have few descriptions of Japan's and the ROK's role during the nuclear crises from 1993 to 1994. The literature's focus is not generally on the two states' behaviour per se.

⁴ Japan and the ROK became more supportive for US-led economic sanctions against the DPRK, but both remained reluctant about the bombing. See the following Background in body.

to the logic of offensive realism,⁵ the US should have exercised more coercion toward Japan and the ROK, its two junior allies, to maximise its relative power while exercising coercion toward the DPRK, its enemy. According to the logic of the other mainstream theory, defensive realism, the US should have been coercive toward Japan the ROK because structurally the US is far more powerful than any other state.⁶

This is where the logic of alliance security dilemma should be weighed. I propose that the United States' accommodation of many of its junior allies' interests during the Clinton administration was the outcome of the United States' alliance security dilemma with its junior allies, Japan and the ROK. An alliance security dilemma arises when allies experience mutual concerns about each other's motives and behaviours. They may fear that the other ally may either abandon them or entrap them in crises or contingencies.⁷ This is not all that surprising in the highly competitive world of international security politics. Alliances are products of relative gain calculations made by each ally in a relationship which is not predicated on affection but a convenient convergence of interests. Allied interests present the prospect that defending one's security partner or its interests could become too costly relative to the gains accrued by alliance affiliation or support. The security dilemma applies even for large powers such as the US. Alliance politics is a crucial part of US security policy. It becomes problematic when Washington pursues its national security interests without cooperation from its alliance partners.

It was constantly present, for example, in the NATO alliance during the Cold War in alliance relations between the US and France. More recently, it has been increasingly

⁵ I will explain these theories in the next section.

⁶ See next section for an elaboration of defensive realism.

⁷ The concept of alliance security dilemma will be described in Chapter One in more detail. For the definition of alliance security dilemma, see Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, July 1984, p. 462.

evident in relations between the US and South Korea. South Korea's liberal governments under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyon have intermittently argued that the Bush administration's 'preemption' strategy as potentially entrapping Seoul into a US-North Korean conflict that South Korea does not want to fight.

I therefore suggest that the entrapment-abandonment explanation applied to the behaviour of the Bush administration, at least until the nuclear crisis with North Korea in 2003. It is highly relevant to understanding US alliance politics in Northeast Asia. Even before George W. Bush became President, his senior advisor for foreign and security policy had written an article in which she outlined Republican policy and argued for closer ties between the US and Japan and the ROK against the DPRK.⁸ The Bush administration's tougher stance on the DPRK did indeed place the ROK, which had been pursuing the Sunshine Policy toward the DPRK, in a difficult situation, but the US did respond to some of the ROK's major interests over the 2002 nuclear crisis and the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US also accommodated Japan's interest in dealing with the issue of Japanese civilians who had been abducted by DPRK agents in the 1970s. Therefore, it is appropriate to ask why, during two different US administrations, the US superpower suffered from the alliance security dilemma when it could exercise unilateralism.⁹ Furthermore, since the purpose of this thesis is not an extended comparison of the two Presidential administrations, and as the Clinton administration was in power longer, examination of the policy of the Bush administration will be given less space in this thesis.

⁸ Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 1, 2000, pp. 45-62.

⁹ During the process leading up to the wars in Afghanistan and especially Iraq, the US was under criticism by the international community for being unilateral in deciding to militarily strike the two countries.

In the remainder of this Introduction, I will outline the background to this development, locate the hypothesis within the literature, suggest where the thesis could contribute to this literature and finally, outline the structure of the thesis.

The Post Cold War Political Situation around the Korean Peninsula¹⁰

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the Persian Gulf War from 1990 to 1991 was taken by many scholars to mean that the Cold War was finally over and that the reconstruction of a new world order had begun. However, commentators were divided on whether the US should be involved in world affairs that did not seem to be highly relevant to US national interests in the post-Cold War period.¹¹ Regional conflicts that followed these major events in 1991 were, many argued, better dealt with by the United Nations (UN) through its peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations.¹² However, the 1993-94 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula challenged this view and served as a warning that the Cold War was not quite over especially in Northeast Asia.

The DPRK's nuclear development had long been a strategic issue not only for the US and its Northeast Asian alliance partners but also for China and the Soviet Union,

¹⁰ The following account relies on the literature in note 2. For US-Japanese relations at this stage of the event, I referred to Yoichi Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999).

¹¹ Both IR scholars and journalists joined the debate. Representative works include the following. David P. Rapkin, ed., *World Leadership and Hegemony*, International Political Economy Yearbook, Vol. 5 (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990); Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1991; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 86-124; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York, New York: Touchstone, 1994).

¹² The UN led the establishment of a transitional government to maintain peace after the end of a civil war in Cambodia in 1993. The transitional government was called the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. This was considered a major success of post-Cold War peacekeeping operations. However, it remains questionable if the peace-building efforts were really successful because of another series of internal conflicts in the following years in the country. In addition to Cambodia, UN peacekeeping operations have take place in Mozambique, Somalia, and Rwanda, although these cases involve both successes and failures.

the DPRK's two bigger communist allies since 1950s. Originally, the DPRK had been protected by China and the Soviet Union under their nuclear umbrellas against the US and the ROK on the Korean Peninsula. But the DPRK believed that the US nuclear power would overwhelm its two communist allies' military capabilities and that it needed its own nuclear weapons.¹³ Moreover, the DPRK also believed that with its own nuclear weapons it could play China against the Soviet Union or *vis versa* and maintain its autonomy between the two communist powers. For the DPRK, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis revealed that under pressure, the Soviet Union would succumb to the US.¹⁴

The DPRK became even more serious about developing its own nuclear weapons during the 1970s. After the end of the Vietnam War, the US began reducing its military commitment to the ROK and even threatened to withdraw its nuclear forces from the ROK. This made the ROK want to have its own nuclear weapons. As a result, the DPRK considered developing its own.¹⁵ Although the US did reduce its conventional forces in the ROK, the US nuclear protection for the ROK continued. The DPRK's motives for nuclear development also continued, but its technological level remained low and insufficient to actually produce a bomb until the mid 1980s. Up until that time, China and the Soviet Union provided the DPRK with some nuclear protection. However, in the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union shifted from further military build-ups to economic reforms and reduced its energy aid to the DPRK. This made the DPRK even more serious about its nuclear development. In 1984, a US intelligence satellite spotted a suspected nuclear site in the DPRK, and both the US and the Soviet Union, along with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), began to persuade the DPRK to

¹³ For an account of the history and motive of the DPRK's nuclear development, see Mazarr, *ibid.*, especially pp. 15-34.

¹⁴ Mazarr, *op cit*, pp. 21-24.

¹⁵ Mazarr, *op cit*, pp. 25-28.

formally join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) so that the IAEA could send an inspection team to the DPRK.¹⁶ The DPRK agreed in 1985 to join the NPT in exchange for the Soviet Union's supply of four light-water (less bomb-prone) reactors to the DPRK for energy development. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 nullified this deal and made the DPRK return to its own nuclear development program.¹⁷

The 1993-94 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula erupted against this backdrop. During the Cold War, the US had adopted a coercive nuclear nonproliferation policy, but this time, the US' initial response was mixed.¹⁸ When the DPRK refused intrusive inspections by the IAEA into two suspected nuclear facilities in Yongbyon in February 1993, the Clinton administration did not try to take the direct initiative in dealing with the DPRK but took a backseat to the IAEA.¹⁹ At that time, the Clinton administration's policy toward the Korean Peninsula was that the US would reduce its military responsibilities on the peninsula.²⁰ However, the DPRK, aiming to draw attention, economic assistance, and negative assurances²¹ from the US, began nuclear blackmail by announcing that it would withdraw from the NPT. This caused panic in the Clinton administration because once out of the NPT, the DPRK would be free from IAEA inspections. The US decided to enter negotiations with the DPRK and agreed to provide negative assurances and light-water reactors in exchange for the DPRK remaining party

¹⁶ Mazar, op cit, p. 40.

¹⁷ Chapter Three will briefly discuss the relationship between the DPRK's nuclear program and the establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization.

¹⁸ Mazarr, op cit., especially, p. 282, fn 18.

¹⁹ Andrew Mack, *Nuclear Endgame On The Korean Peninsula*, Working Paper No. 1994/9, (Canberra: Australian National University, 1994). See especially p. 3. The suspected sites were spotted in late 1992 by a US military satellite.

²⁰ At that time, both the US and the ROK were in agreement that the US would reduce its military commitment to the ROK and that the ROK would shoulder more military burden toward the unification of the Korean Peninsula. The ROK's taking more military responsibilities was called Koreanisation of Korean security.

to the NPT. The IAEA undertook inspections in the suspected sites in the DPRK in April 1994, but no nuclear material was found. However, it was suspected that the DPRK had removed the material from the sites before the inspection.²² The IAEA requested that the DPRK accept special inspections, but the DPRK refused. Then, the US finally decided to threaten military force and economic sanctions through both the UN Security Council (UNSC) as well as through the US' bilateral alliances with Japan and ROK. However, China and Russia were against both military and economic sanctions on the DPRK. So the US sought to act outside of the UN with the ROK and Japan, its two allies. The ROK and Japan were also partly reluctant to use military force and to follow US-led economic sanctions.²³ In a dramatic turn, the DPRK announced that it would attack Seoul and Tokyo if economic sanctions were issued.²⁴ The situation on the Korean Peninsula had reached crisis point, and war was about to break out.²⁵

Behind the diplomatic front however, the Clinton administration's assessment of the military situation on the Korean Peninsula was one of the major factors that led the US to refrain from surgical strikes on the DPRK's suspected nuclear sites. The DPRK had the advantage in conventional weapons over the ROK and US forces located between Seoul and the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). Specifically, the DPRK held approximately 10 thousand artillery deployed underground in the north of the DMZ, most of which were targeted at both the US Second Infantry Division and Seoul.²⁶ Even if the US had successfully bombed the suspected nuclear sites, the DPRK could have

²¹ Negative assurances mean a nuclear weapons state's agreement that it would not attack pre-emptively a non-nuclear weapons state with nuclear weapons. See Mack, *ibid.*, p. 4.

²² Mack, *op cit*, p. 4.

²³ I will give more detailed accounts in Chapter Two of Japan's and the ROK's response to US action at this time.

²⁴ Mack, *op cit*, p. 4.

²⁵ Robert Gallucci, US chief negotiator with the DPRK, revealed that the US was about to begin enter war with the DPRK. See "Untold Story of US-DPRK Agreement: How War Was Avoided," *Gaiko Forum (Diplomatic Forum)*, September 1999, pp. 58-65, especially p. 58.

exercised a massive artillery strike against Seoul and US forces.²⁷ The Clinton administration wanted to avoid any American casualties.

In July 1994, events took a major turn when former US President Jimmy Carter went to Pyongyang in his private capacity to meet with the late Kim Il-song to discuss the crisis. As a result, the DPRK's leader agreed, in principle, to stop nuclear weapons development. Initially, the Clinton administration was reluctant to endorse Carter's initiative and reconsidered taking further coercive measures against the DPRK. The administration thought Carter's involvement could complicate the situation.²⁸ When Kim agreed that the DPRK would stop its acknowledged nuclear program in exchange for less bomb-prone nuclear reactors,²⁹ US officials began drafting a formal agreement between the US and the DPRK.³⁰ At this point, the DPRK and the US returned to the negotiating table.

The 1993-94 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula was thus resolved short of military conflict. And at the same time the US shifted away from a military-oriented approach to diplomacy with the DPRK in its further attempts to disarm the so-called nuclear rogue state.³¹

²⁶ Gary Luck and William Perry, Testimony at the US Senate, *US Department of State Transcript*, January 15, 1995.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Personal interview with Gallucci on June 23, 2000. Gallucci is currently Dean, The School of Foreign Service and Diplomacy, Georgetown University.

²⁹ Sigal, *op cit.*, pp. 155-156.

³⁰ "Untold Story of US-DPRK Agreement: How War Was Avoided," *Gaiko Forum*, *ibid.*, pp. 58-65. I will further elaborate on this point in Chapter Six.

³¹ Litwak, *op cit.*

US Cooperation with its Junior Allies: The Puzzle and the Hypothesis

The question that this thesis poses is why did the US undertake this latter shift and continue it for several years? This question is important because it leads to a wider question of why a hegemon should accommodate the interests of its followers. It is puzzling that the US, the world's largest military power and the sole superpower, apparently had the option of being a *coercive* hegemon not only toward its adversary but also toward its allies, Japan and the ROK, in dealing with security threats on the Korean Peninsula.³²

The puzzle arises from certain assumptions that are made about the context in which states operate. The first is that, as realists claim, states in the international system operate under conditions anarchy and are driven by their perceptions that other states are threats to their survival. Second, states only cooperate when working with others make them stronger than an opponent. Hence states will form alliances when under threat. Third, other types of institutions, those based on shared values, do not make states secure in a realist world. Fourth, in this realist world, which offensive and defensive realist theories depict, a hegemon maintains its alliances not through cooperation but rather through coercion. To solve the puzzle, although I assume that states operate in a realist world, nonetheless I want to challenge the fourth assumption with regard to the way hegemons maintain alliances. But to do that I need to further elaborate on the world as it is seen especially by offensive realists so that the nature of the puzzle is quite clear.

³² Duncan Snidal, "The Limit of Hegemonic Stability Theory," *International Organization*, 1985, pp. 579-642.

The Problem of Offensive Realism

As indicated earlier the US accommodative behaviour toward its weaker allies is puzzling because it conflicts with the logic on the mainstream international relations security theories, offensive and defensive realism.³³ According to John Mearsheimer, great powers seek to limitlessly maximise relative power to achieve their ultimate goal of becoming a hegemon.³⁴ Offensive realism posits that states relentlessly and aggressively seek to increase their power. Offensive realism tends to deny conciliatory policies, such as accommodation or appeasement. In fact, Mearsheimer sees appeasement as “fanciful and dangerous” because, like bandwagoning, it shifts the balance of power in the aggressor’s favour and thus “contradicts the dictates of offensive realism.”³⁵ Thus, according to the logic of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, the hegemon would not adopt an accommodative strategy towards either an adversary or an ally.

Therefore, if the logic of offensive realism is right, the US should have exercised more coercion toward Japan and the ROK, its two junior allies, to maximise its relative power while exercising coercion toward the DPRK, its enemy.³⁶

The US behaviour is also puzzling to the logic of defensive realism. Defensive realism claims that preserving power is the main goal of states and therefore states seek to maintain their security and the balance of power. Although defensive realism allows some space for some form of compromise with an enemy or weaker states, preserving power is central and coercion is still predictable. Therefore, if the logic of defensive realism, or structural realism, is right, the US could still be coercive toward Japan and

³³ Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World - Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security,” *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002), pp. 149-173.

³⁴ Mearsheimer, op cit, p. 21.

³⁵ Mearshiemer, op cit, pp. 163-164.

the ROK because the US is far more powerful than any other state. In brief, US accommodative behaviour is puzzling to the logic of two of the mainstream theories in the international relations literature.

The seven case studies in this thesis seek to solve the puzzle of how US behaviour contradicts these theoretical propositions and why another explanation is required. First, although during 1993-1994 the US threatened coercive measures against the DPRK and adopted a strategy of verbal coercion against Japan and the ROK,³⁷ in the end the US failed to convince the two allies to whole-heartedly support its military or economic options.

Second, in 1995, the US was unable to persuade Japan to help pay for all the heavy fuel oil shipments to the DPRK. Japan agreed to help with the first shipment but not the second.

Third, the US was unable to convince the ROK to alter its tough policy stance about the DPRK submarine incursion into ROK territorial waters. The ROK changed its stance only when the DPRK apologised to the ROK for the incident.

Fourth, despite its earlier opposition to Japan's decision to introduce its own intelligence satellites in the wake of the DPRK's missile launch, the US finally accepted Japan's decision.

Fifth, despite its earlier reluctance, the US accommodated the ROK's interest in extending its missile target range in exchange for the ROK's participation in the Missile

³⁶ Mearshiemer, op cit, pp. 163-164.

³⁷ The first case study will appear in the latter part of Chapter One whose former part sets up an analytical framework.

Technology Control Regime (MTCR), another US-led institution originally set up separately from the DPRK security issue.³⁸

Sixth, despite its earlier hesitation, the US accommodated Japan's request to address the DPRK's renewed missile threat.

Seventh, despite its initial reluctance about revising the US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in favour of the ROK, the US agreed to the ROK's request.

Finally, since 2001, when the tougher administration of George W. Bush came into office, the US has accommodated Japan's stance on the issue of the DPRK's abduction of Japanese civilians and the ROK's insistence on the partial return of the land occupied by US forces.

The above developments lead to a set of questions. Why, as these case studies suggest, did the US accommodate the smaller allies in dealing with the DPRK? Why, given its hegemonic position did the US not just go ahead and impose its original policies on the smaller allies? Why did the US choose these seemingly time-consuming diplomatic and bargaining processes?

Again, why has the US, the sole superpower in the contemporary world, not exercised coercive tactics but instead employed accommodative tactics towards its smaller allies?

Returning to the mainstream theoretical literature does not seem to provide any answers. According to John Mearsheimer's version of offensive realism, a hegemon as a power maximiser will seek to gain regional control and want to avoid the emergence of

³⁸ The US used MTCR, which does not involve either Japan or the ROK, as an exchange for the US compromise on the ROK's interest in extending its missile target range. See Chapter Seven.

rivals.³⁹ His argument about hegemonic behaviour is useful in theoretically drawing on a hegemon's behaviour toward its allies, not adversaries. For a hegemon, an alliance is a good institution to constrain the rise of a rival great power wanting to become the hegemon. Therefore, it is vital for the hegemon to keep whatever alliance it leads in good shape. This is where the junior allies become significant.

An alliance is an important strategic tool for a hegemon because it helps the hegemon to keep the allies in check, to ensure that they will not become its future rivals or join the enemy's camp. Although Japan and the ROK have been its junior allies under the US nuclear umbrella and have remained far smaller in both military and economic power, they still have the potential to become a regional nuclear power. Then, what is the most likely behaviour of the hegemon toward the junior allies? If a hegemon is to maximise its relative power, as Mearsheimer claims, why wouldn't it remain coercive toward Japan and the ROK to get them to do what it wants them to? Why wouldn't the US try to keep them within its control by coercion? Mearsheimer's offensive realism has limited explanatory power because it does not envisage accommodation.⁴⁰

Like offensive realism, defensive realism or structural realism also cannot properly predict the US accommodative behaviour as long as the theory is applied as a grand theory or broader system-level analytical framework. Defensive realism deals mainly with cooperation among great powers to maintain their balance of power, but it fails to provide a clear explanation of why the US has had to accommodate its smaller allies.⁴¹ It can be argued that if junior allies become closer in power to their senior ally, who is also a hegemon, and if the hegemon fears they will potentially become its rival, then the hegemon would be accommodative. However, the US has been, and remains,

³⁹ Mearsheimer, *op cit*, pp. 140-142.

⁴⁰ Mearsheimer, *op cit*, pp. 140-142.

the only superpower. Why should it accommodate the interests of its smaller allies? This seems to be the limit of the explanatory power of defensive realism. To fill this gap, there should be some mid-level theory. This is one of the major tasks for this thesis.

The Argument: the Hegemon's Alliance Security Dilemma

My answer to the questions posed above, and the hypothesis of the thesis, is that the US accommodated its smaller allies' interests because it suffered an alliance security dilemma, especially fear of abandonment by Japan and the ROK.⁴² The idea of alliance security dilemma was initially developed by Glenn Snyder. In Snyder's account, the dilemma arose because of the fear of entrapment or entanglement, which means being dragged into a conflict by an ally, in which another ally does not want to get involved. Snyder paid particular attention to the notion of abandonment. In his definition, abandonment means (1) the ally's realignment with the adversary, (2) abrogating the alliance contract, (3) the ally's failure to make good on its explicit commitments, or (4) the ally's failure to provide support in contingencies where support is expected. Support includes not only military support, but also financial and diplomatic support.⁴³

However, my model of the alliance security dilemma further develops Snyder's concept of fear of abandonment. It would be unrealistic to anticipate an immediate realignment by Japan and the ROK with the DPRK or a total abrogation of their alliance with the US because Japan and the ROK have been heavily dependent on the US in the security area. Abandonment in this thesis, therefore, will focus on "partial

⁴¹ Stephen R. Rock, *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective* (Chapel Hill, London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989)

⁴² Glenn H. Snyder, *ibid.*, and Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance, Balance and Stability," *International Organization* 45, 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 121-142. I will further elaborate on Snyder's model in Chapter One.

⁴³ Mearsheimer, *op cit*, pp. 140-142.

abandonment” in which allies fail in one way or another to provide support in contingencies where support is expected. In addition, although Snyder’s original model focused on the military area where these realignments occur, I will focus on the diplomatic realm as well.

The eight case studies in this thesis will show that the evidence of US alliance security dilemma can be found in US officials’ verbal statements that show concern about the behaviour of the smaller alliance partners, Japan and ROK. In particular, their vague declarations of alliance commitments and denial of commitment; their paucity of offers for immediate military or non-military support in a US contingency; their declarations to consider arrangements to leave, either wholly or partially, particular alliance arrangements such as access to military bases, logistic support, or economic and financial assistance to the US.

The case studies are constructed from various types of evidence: primary and secondary open sources in English, Japanese and Korean; and personal interviews with officials and scholars in the US, Japan, and the ROK.⁴⁴ Although I will depend mostly on written sources, I will also employ personal interviews where they are lacking or sparse.

Alternative Explanations

This thesis argues that offensive realism is problematic in explaining a hegemon’s accommodative behaviour and that other types of alliance theory may well provide better explanations. One such theory that may provide additional insights is the theory of

⁴⁴ In South Korea, interviews were conducted in both English and Korean. In the US, interviews were conducted only in English. In Japan, interviews were conducted in Japanese.

alliance burden-sharing.⁴⁵ This theory has two major characteristics: comparative advantage-based explanation and good cop-bad cop bargaining process. By drawing on collective action theory in economics, the former assumes that alliances have their own comparative advantage and that they incur an allocated amount of the cost incurred in achieving a common task or goal, according to their comparative advantage, rather than threat perception.⁴⁶ For example, in the case of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, the US provided the largest amount of military power, while other states provided the smaller size of military troops or economic and financial assistance.⁴⁷ This could be a possible explanation for the kind of cooperation among the US, Japan and the ROK that is demonstrated in case studies above. For example, this argument seems promising in explaining the formation of a Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) where the US proposed to provide political leadership and the smallest amount of the cost for running the organisation, while the ROK pledged the largest and Japan promised the third largest amounts of financial cost for the organisation.⁴⁸ However, logically speaking, allies agree to share the burden only when they agree to cooperate. This means that when allies disagree over a specific issue, especially when threat perceptions diverge among the allies, this theory seems unhelpful. This is because there has to be some explanation, perhaps some psychological reason, of what drives allies to cooperate with one another in the first place.

As for the other characteristic of alliance burden-sharing theory, it focuses on bargaining process in which an ally tries to extract concessions from other allies.

⁴⁵ Andrew Bennet et al., "Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War," *International Organization* 48, 1, (Winter 1994), pp. 39-75. For the classical treatment of this issue, see Mancar Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) and Mancar Olson et al., "An Economic Theory of Alliances," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Number 48, August 1966, pp. 266-279.

⁴⁶ Bennet et al, op cit.

⁴⁷ Bennet et al, op cit.

⁴⁸ I will discuss KEDO in Chapter Three.

Andrew Bennet, for example, suggests that at the time of the 1990-91 Gulf War, the US took a good cop-bad cop strategy toward Japan to extract Japan's financial support for the US-led multinational forces.⁴⁹ In this case, the US administration played 'good cop', while American Congress played 'bad cop'.⁵⁰ This good cop-bad cop model seems to contradict the assumption of unitary actor in international politics, but as long as both the administration and Congress have a broad consensus about a strategy toward either the enemy or allies, the theory can be seen to maintain consistency with the unitary actor assumption. Also, it is possible that the roles of good cop and bad cop may be shared among allies, if not between the administration and US Congress. If the good cop-bad cop version of alliance burden-sharing theory is applied in this way, it may be able to explain some of the cases in this thesis. For example, Chapter Four would be a good test case because it examines a situation in which the ROK maintained a tough stance on the DPRK, while the US was softer on the DPRK in persuading the DPRK to apologise for its submarine infiltration into ROK territorial waters in 1996.

However, as we will see in Chapter One, it is important to note that both Japan and the ROK accepted burden-sharing with the US basically because they wanted US security assurances at both the nuclear and conventional levels of alliance strategies. The US nuclear umbrella or extended deterrent and the US commitment to defending the two smaller allies against armed attacks that they cannot deal with independently has been vital to both Japan and the ROK in the postwar era. The desire of the two smaller allies to sustain this is consistent with traditional realist alliance theory and apparent in the individual case studies presented by this thesis.

⁴⁹ Bennet et al, op cit.

⁵⁰ Bennet et al, op cit.

Second, we have to ask if the theory of institutionalism could provide an alternative explanation. It is potentially useful for addressing US decisions demonstrated in the case studies to establish new multilateral, or mini-lateral institutions.

Institutionalism includes alliances as institutions. Several scholars in this camp have particularly studied the persistence of US alliances after the collapse of the USSR.⁵¹

However, they focus mostly on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to argue against the neorealist prediction that NATO would dissolve in the absence of the common threat of the USSR between the US and its European smaller allies.⁵² They have paid some attention to the Asian cases, but they have not studied the Asian cases as deeply as they did with NATO. Furthermore, the institutionalist literature does not address the role of the smaller allies in generating the fear of abandonment that my thesis proposes. Therefore, this literature does not seem to be appropriate.

⁵¹ By institutionalists, I mean neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism.

⁵² The recent literature on alliance persistence in Europe after the Cold War have been provided largely by neoliberals who emphasise the impact of high-level institutionalisation within alliances on alliance persistence after the Cold War. Their work was first motivated by neorealists' failure to predict the fate of NATO after the Cold War. For neorealists' predictions about NATO after the Cold War, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19 (1994/1995) pp. 5-49; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18 (Fall 1993) pp. 44-79. For neoliberals' arguments, see Fred Chernoff, *After Bipolarity: The Vanishing Threat, Theories of Cooperation and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1995); Gunter Hellmann, and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," *Security Studies* 3 (Autumn 1993) pp. 3-43; Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995); Ronald R. Krebs, "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict," *International Organization* 53 (Spring 1999) pp. 343-377; Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," *International Organization* 50 (Summer 1996) pp. 445-475. The most recent and most comprehensive theoretical overview on alliance is Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival* 39 (Spring 1997) pp. 156-79. Walt points out the neorealist expectation of hegemonic leadership in addition to neoliberals' expectations of domestic politics and solidarity, shared identities, or sense of community as the major factors affecting alliance persistence. Furthermore, the most recent comprehensive work on US alliances in the Asia-Pacific after the Cold War may be William Tow et al., eds., *Bilateralism in a Multilateral Era: The Future of the San Francisco Alliance System in the Asia-Pacific* (Queensland, Australia: Griffith University, 1997) This book covers five US alliances in the Asia-Pacific, addresses the questions of if threat perceptions have been revised, if the San Francisco system is becoming irrelevant because of domestic ideological shifts in US allies, if the US willingness to maintain its alliances is still intact, and if alliance cooperation is still stable, and draws policy implications for the future. Although the book points out several expectations derived from IR theory by Stephen Walt, the book fails to explicitly examine its findings against the expectations. The book is oriented toward policy implications rather than toward theoretical contributions.

The review of the above possible alternative explanations points towards the theory of alliance burden-sharing as the most promising alternative way of answering the question of why the US accommodated many of the Japanese and the ROK interests in the face of the DPRK's nuclear and conventional threats. Based on comparative advantage, allies can shoulder a certain amount of burden, or particular mission, to achieve a common goal. It should also be remembered that this theory stresses the importance of allies' good cop-bad-cop strategy in persuading other allies to share burden.

Another alternative theory to be tested would be the structural liberal theory of co-binding. As we saw above, without providing a clear definition of liberalism, the theory focuses on the hegemon's liberal nature and the hegemon's cooperative behaviour. The theory also argues that the hegemon uses institutions to engage with its enemy or allies. In testing this theory in the case study chapters in this thesis, I will see if there are clear linkages between America's liberal nature and cooperative outcomes and also if the US has utilised institutions for alliance management.

In addition, the bigger ally's accommodation of its smaller partners could be seen as normal politics in which the bigger ally accommodates its smaller ally in one area in exchange for the smaller ally's cooperation with the bigger ally in another area.

However, this thesis deals with the psychological dimension of alliance politics as the prime driver for such normal politics, but the focus will be on the bigger ally's psychological dimension, which has not been given adequate attention. As I have already stated, this thesis assumes that potential security threats are the main drivers in international politics and that threat perceptions cannot easily be ameliorated by institutions based on values. However, it challenges the realist depiction of alliance.

The first contribution of this thesis will be my conceptual framework. It will provide a way of analysing an alliance leader's fear of abandonment or entrapment by smaller allies. The framework builds on Glenn Snyder's model, and could be used to examine the possibility of intra-alliance bargaining focused on senior allies' security dilemma. While many works focus on the smaller allies' security dilemma, this thesis focuses on the bigger ally, by addressing the alliance leader's security dilemma, especially fear of abandonment. Thus it extends analysis to the bigger allies' security dilemma and fills a gap in the literature. Victor Cha, has showed the function of entrapment and abandonment fears on the part of the US junior partners (Japan and the ROK) by interviews and documents. This thesis, instead, will focus on the US' fear of abandonment or entrapment. Furthermore, another difference between Cha and this thesis is that while Cha takes a longer-term period (from the 1960s to the 1980s, and partly early 1990s) of alliance interactions between the US and the ROK and the US and Japan, this thesis examines a shorter period (from 1993 to 2004). This is because, as I will discuss in Chapter Two, America's security dilemma, especially fear of abandonment, toward Japan and the ROK became more evident over the particular issue of the DPRK's nuclear and conventional threats rather than the major threats of the USSR during the Cold War. Therefore, this thesis could serve as a follow-up study of US alliance politics with Japan and the ROK. However, this study will not deal directly with the interactions between Japan and the ROK, which was Cha's subject of study. The relationship between the Snyder-Cha model with this thesis' own analytical framework will be more detailed in Chapter One.

The second possible contribution of the thesis is its focus on the hegemon's threat perceptions and the impact this has on alliance maintenance. One of the major problems of system-level realist theory is that while it deals with threat perceptions, it does not

necessarily give sufficient attention to the psychological dimensions, or the state of mind of policy makers. The concept of fear of abandonment or entrapment indicates a state of mind of policy-makers and suggests that some threat perceptions may diverge from realist theoretical expectations. Even a hegemon, who is actually in a more secure position, may fear, perhaps even unnecessarily, its followers. This suggests that alliance maintenance requires attention to the hegemon's perceptions of external and internal threats. Alliance maintenance may require the hegemon to maintain other institutions, such as KEDO, that address its interest.

Third, the brief comparison between the reactions of the Clinton administration and the George W. Bush administration over the DPRK's nuclear and conventional threats could help to examine how two different administrations exercised hegemonic leadership. Although this thesis takes most of the case studies from the Clinton era because this was a longer period, and fewer from the first term of the Bush era, the thesis will try to provide some answer to these questions by briefly comparing the two administrations with each other.

The Organisation of the Thesis

The rest of the thesis will be organised as follows. Chapter One develops the analytical framework based on the concept of alliance security dilemma. Chapter Two applies the framework to the initial stage of the rise of US fear of abandonment regarding the 1993-94 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Chapter Three examines Japan's refusal to be involved in the second round of heavy fuel oil shipments to the DPRK. Chapter Four examines the series of events that led to US acceptance of the ROK's tough stance on the DPRK's submarine incursion into ROK waters. Chapter Five examines how the US

eventually accepted Japan's decision, to introduce its own intelligence satellites in the wake of the DPRK's alleged test-launch of a ballistic missile over Japan. Chapter Six examines how the US compromised its original position on the ROK's missile target range extension in exchange for the MTCR. Chapter Seven examines US accommodation of Japan's interest in addressing a re-emergence of the DPRK's missile threat in 1999. And Chapter Eight examines the US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) revision. Conclusion briefly examines the George W. Bush administration's accommodation of Japan's interests in addressing the abduction issue and of the ROK's interests related to the ongoing six party talks on the DPRK nuclear problem. It also summarises the preceding chapters, discusses the study's overall findings, and suggests questions for future study.

CHAPTER ONE

The Conceptual Framework for Studying the Hegemon's Alliance Security Dilemma

Introduction

This chapter sets up an analytical framework to examine my hypothesis that the US cooperation with Japan and the ROK in dealing with the DPRK's nuclear and conventional threats can be explained in terms of its alliance security dilemma. The framework aims to provide a way of solving the puzzle of why the US – the sole superpower and hegemon – was eventually willing to accommodate the interests of its junior allies. The framework also aims to show how aspects of grand theory, particularly the offensive and defensive realist emphasis on threats to states' survival and the resulting formation of alliances, are fundamental to understanding states behaviour. However, the framework diverges from realist assumptions when it comes to alliance maintenance, preferring to allow for the option of accommodation rather than assuming hegemons will always coerce junior partners into agreement. To show that this option is available to hegemons the framework will canvass middle level theories that examine the politics of alliance maintenance.

I will first take a look at Glenn Snyder's middle level model of alliance security dilemma and the literature on international institutions. I take three steps. First, I will show how Snyder and others have either directly or indirectly addressed the concepts of alliance security dilemma and accommodation.⁵³ Second, I will discuss how, or under

⁵³ They include the following works. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland* (New York, Oxford: Oxford

what conditions, the alliance leader's or hegemon's security dilemma begins to emerge and the processes by which it becomes manifest. Third, I suggest the behavioural manifestations that would indicate an alliance security dilemma. Finally, I will clarify where my approach can be located within the study of alliances.

Building an Analytical Framework from Glenn Snyder's Alliance Security Dilemma Model

The study of alliance formation was a central issue in international politics well before the concept of an alliance security dilemma was introduced. For example, one of the fathers of realism, Hans J. Morgenthau, argued that alliances are a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a multiple-state system.⁵⁴ Another realist, Glenn Snyder, developed the model of an alliance security dilemma that focused more directly on the psychological aspect of alliance politics rather than on balance of power. He showed that alliance politics can be analysed not only as interaction between great powers but also between bigger and smaller allies. However, Snyder did not clearly distinguish alliance formation from maintenance.

University Press, 1991); Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Leonard J. Schoppa, "Two-Level Games and Bargaining Outcomes: Why *Gaiatsu* Succeeds in Japan in Some Cases but Not Others," *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 353-386; Gerald L. Curtis, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change* (Armonk, New York and London, England: An East Gate Book, 1993); Hyun In-Taek, *Pressure for Defense Burden-Sharing and Patterns of Defense Spending in Japan and South Korea* (Ph.D thesis submitted to UCLA, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1992); Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: Japan and Korea As Quasi-Allies* (Ph.D. thesis submitted to Columbia University, 1994) (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1995); and Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: the United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999); and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, "The End of the Alliance?: Dilemmas in the US-Japan Relations," in Peter Gourevitch, Takashi Inoguchi, and Courtney Purrington, eds., *United States-Japan Relations and International Institutions: After The Cold War* (La Jolla, California: The Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1995).

⁵⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1948), p. 175.

After the end of the Cold war the focus on alliance maintenance or endurance received more scholarly attention. Some neoliberals argued against the neorealist prediction that alliances would break down once their common adversary is gone and the balance of power changes.⁵⁵ The main focus of neoliberal arguments was the continuation of NATO well after the former Soviet Union had ceased to be a superpower.⁵⁶ Although the neoliberal arguments were a significant challenge to realist's predictions, there was little attention given to alliance politics of the kind raised in Snyder's alliance security dilemma.

Realists like Snyder have generally focused on the smaller allies' security dilemma, especially fear of abandonment by the bigger ally. This is perfectly understandable and legitimate since the weaker allies' were more likely to experience a security dilemma, especially during the Cold War when the rivalry between nuclear great powers was very serious. Nonetheless, it remains the case that realists have not proposed that the hegemon might suffer a fear of being abandoned.

Snyder's model had its origins in the 1981 study by Michael Mandelbaum, which proposed the concept of fear of abandonment.⁵⁷ Mandelbaum proposed the concepts of "entrapment" and "abandonment" and emphasised that the smaller partners in an alliance tend to fear entrapment and abandonment by the bigger partner more than the bigger ally fears entrapment and abandonment by its smaller partners, especially in the nuclear context. However, Mandelbaum did not provide clear or operational definitions of these concepts.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ See, for example, Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," *International Organization* 50 (Summer 1996) pp. 445-475.

⁵⁶ McCalla, op cit. See also footnote 53 in INTRODUCTION.

⁵⁷ Michael Mandelbaum, op cit.

⁵⁸ Mandelbaum, op cit.

Snyder added further clarification on these issues. He argued that in alliance politics, states confront two decisions. The first decision is whether or not they form an alliance as a means to achieving security. If states do form an alliance, then the second decision concerns 'how much' commitment they should show to one another in a specific contingency. According to Snyder, entrapment or entanglement means being "involved by an ally in a conflict in which another ally does not want to get involved."⁵⁹ Abandonment, on the other hand, means (1) the ally's realignment with the adversary, (2) abrogating the alliance contract, (3) the ally's failure to make good on its explicit commitments, or (4) the ally's failure to provide support in contingencies where support is expected.⁶⁰ Support includes not only military support, but financial and diplomatic support as well. Snyder thus divides this dilemma into (1) the 'primary alliance dilemma' and (2) the 'secondary alliance dilemma.'⁶¹

In the situation that this thesis focuses on, the US has already formed an alliance with both Japan and the ROK. Therefore, the decision the allies have to make is how much commitment they should make to each other in dealing with the dilemma between entrapment and abandonment by one another in dealing with the DPRK. Logically, there is no reason to focus exclusively on the smaller ally's alliance security dilemma. However, the focus in the alliance literature has almost exclusively been on the smaller

⁵⁹ Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, July 1984, p. 466.

⁶⁰ Glenn Snyder op cit., p. 467.

⁶¹ Glenn Snyder, *ibid.*, pp. 462-468. Snyder calls the alliance security dilemma in the first phase the primary alliance dilemma and that in the second phase the secondary alliance dilemma. The primary alliance dilemma occurs when a country has to decide whether or not to form an alliance with another state or to decide whether to exit from or remain in an alliance. The secondary alliance dilemma occurs when a country has to decide how much support it should provide to other alliance partners in a contingency.

allies' alliance security dilemma with the bigger ally, especially their fear of abandonment by the bigger ally.⁶²

As mentioned in the Introduction of this thesis, the predominant focus on the smaller allies alliance security dilemma and resulting accommodation is also obvious in the literature examining cooperation between the US and Japan and between the US and the ROK. For example, the *Gaiatsu* (external pressure) school focuses on Japan's tendency to comply with US demands.⁶³ Another study by In-taek Hyun focuses on Japan's and the ROK's compliance with US hegemonic pressure in the domestic political arena.⁶⁴ These two works, however, do not explicitly use the concept of fear of abandonment. Another study, by Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, introduces the concept of "prosperity dilemma" to illustrate that the US has a dilemma towards Japan.⁶⁵ This concept is useful in analysing the impact of the alliance relationship on their economic and trade relations rather than the security dimensions of the alliance. One study that does look at both cooperation and the fear of abandonment, as I have already briefly discussed, is a work by Victor Cha. But Cha explains cooperation and conflict between the ROK and Japan mainly during the Cold War and focuses exclusively on the ROK's and Japan's fear of abandonment (or entrapment) in their respective relations with the US.⁶⁶ These latter two studies refer directly to Glenn Snyder's alliance security dilemma model, but they do not look directly at the bigger ally's fear of abandonment. All of the

⁶² Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder used the concepts of "chain-ganging" and "buck-passing" to predict alliance formation patterns in multipolarity among equal size powers. Their study was on alliance formation patterns before WWI and WWII. They claim that their work is similar to Glenn Snyder's work without giving details. I will use Glenn Snyder's concept of alliance security dilemma rather than their "chain-ganging" and "buck-passing" notions. See Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168.

⁶³ Leonard J. Schoppa, op cit.

⁶⁴ Hyun In-Taek, op cit.

⁶⁵ Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, *ibid.* By this concept of "prosperity dilemma," Tsuchiyama highlights the importance of an economically prosperous ally in America's decision to provide defense for the ally in a military contingency.

above studies confirm the proposition that abandonment and accommodation are central to understanding alliance behaviour, but that the focus has always been on the smaller allies, which is of course, perfectly legitimate.

However, I argue that the alliance security dilemma, especially the senior ally's fear of abandonment by the junior allies, should also be extended to the senior ally. My argument makes three main points. The first concerns the situation where the senior ally becomes worried that the non-cooperation of, or even the loss of, one smaller ally may have a domino effect that leads to a chain reaction among allies. This intra-alliance dynamic is concerned with alliance maintenance or management rather than an alliance formation. The domino effect creates an environment in which the alliance leader begins to have doubts about how much cooperation will be forthcoming from smaller allies and contemplates the possibility that losing even one small ally's cooperation could lead to losing another's in a chain reaction. Snyder's model does not address the psychological processes of fear or this kind of chain reaction. However, the so-called perceptual realists, for example Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, have called this fear the domino image or belief.⁶⁷ The domino image was occasionally referred to by US policymakers during the Cold War to explain their belief that the defection of one US ally from the US camp to the Soviet's Communist camp could lead to the defection of another.⁶⁸ Therefore, it is possible to argue that reference to the domino image can be seen as evidence that in principle there are situations when the bigger ally fears being abandoned by its smaller allies.

⁶⁶ Victor D. Cha, 1994, *ibid*; and 1999, *ibid*. The difference between Cha's work and this thesis is showed in Table I in the Introduction of this thesis.

⁶⁷ Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, *op cit*.

⁶⁸ Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, *op cit*.

While this dynamic has previously been applied to broader issues of cooperation, it is possible to argue that this psychological process can also be applied to US concerns about nuclear issues. Indeed, there is discussion in the literature that during the Cold War the US feared the spread of a 'nuclear allergy' among its allies, especially after New Zealand's refusal to allow nuclear ships to visit. Another dimension of the nuclear domino image concerns, on the one hand, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the DPRK's nuclear program, and on the other hand, Washington's initial assessments of the reactions to this situation by Japan and the ROK. One reaction could be that Japan and the ROK individually considered the nuclear option for their own self-defence. In other words, the US fear concerns a nuclear domino dynamic spreading between the two smaller allies.⁶⁹

The second point I argue is that the senior partner's fear of abandonment also begins in situations where there is an asymmetry in mutual dependence among the alliance partners. The kind of alliance that this study examines is not an ideal type of alliance among equal powers. During the Cold War, US-led alliances, just like Soviet-led alliances, had a hierarchical structure. This type of alliance is often called the hubs-and-spokes model, or the San Francisco system.⁷⁰ During the Cold War, the US provided the smaller allies with overall military power or intelligence in particular contingencies. Likewise, the Soviet Union provided security to its Eastern European allies, in a dominant and often coercive way. However, I suggest that in reality, the senior partner depended on the smaller allies in various ways, for example, to provide places for bases on their territory, to provide support for the funding for the bases plus

⁶⁹ Another dimension of US fear in the nuclear area was nuclear allergy. A representative example is the defection of New Zealand, a US smaller ally, from the US nuclear umbrella.

⁷⁰ William Tow et al. eds., *Bilateralism in a Multilateral Era: The Future of the San Francisco Alliance System in the Asia-Pacific* (Queensland, Australia: Griffith University, 1997)

other forms of minor military and economic assistance.⁷¹ Thus, there are different types of asymmetries in mutual dependence between the US and its smaller partners. The asymmetry can be roughly illustrated as:

Asymmetry in Mutual Dependence

Overall alliance (overall military power in conventional and nuclear dimensions, intelligence)

US > Japan and ROK

Specific coalition/cooperation (economic sanctions, US base cost)

US < Japan and ROK

The logic of asymmetrical dependence suggests that the bigger ally may, in a specific contingency, accommodate the smaller allies because it is dependent on the smaller partners for particular assets to perform that contingency. In a contingency where the bigger ally sees its dependence on the smaller partners as crucial accommodative behaviour toward the smaller allies would become more likely. In addition, asymmetrical alliance security dilemma suggests that an ally fears 'partial abandonment or entrapment,' if not 'total abandonment or entrapment.' Given the power differences between the US and Japan and the ROK it is more likely that the US would be concerned about 'partial abandonment' or 'partial entrapment'.

⁷¹ Strictly speaking, hegemonic stability theory would predict that hegemons provide economic public goods such as free markets and energy in exchange for their followers providing to the hegemons consumption goods. For the sake of analytical parsimony, however, I will narrow down my focus here to the security aspect. See *ibid.*

The third point I argue is that in the above environment, where there is a domino dynamic and an asymmetrical alliance relationship where the bigger ally is dependent in specific contingencies on its allies, the bigger ally's alliance security dilemma be observed in governmental leaders' and officials' statements regarding (a) the level of threat; (b) the level of abandonment or entrapment; (c) the issues of concern; and (d) the probable type of ensuing state behaviour.

(a) Level of Threat

Glenn Snyder is not explicit on what dynamism is produced when the level of threat is different among allies. Geography, offense or defense capabilities, and offensive intension affect the level of perceived threat. The more-closely located the enemy is, the more threatening it is. The more capable the enemy is, the more threatening it is. The more offensive the enemy is, the more threatening it is. Allies do not necessarily share the same level of threat. Therefore, there could occur an asymmetry of threat among allies.

During the period this thesis focuses on, the US, and its two allies, suffer from threat asymmetry. This situation produces an interesting dynamism in the alliance security dilemma among the three allies. In many cases, the three countries' geographical proximity to the DPRK made their threat perceptions different. For example, as we will see in Chapter Two, the three allies' different threat perceptions of the DPRK's nuclear weapons, partly explains their different roles in a Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) to help halt the DPRK's nuclear program. Furthermore, as highlighted in Chapter Five, the difference of geographical proximity to the DPRK among the three allies resulted in differences of the perceived threat of the

DPRK's test-launch of a Taepodong missile over Japan. Specifically, the DPRK's short-range missiles threaten the ROK, its intermediate-range missiles threaten Japan, and its long-range missiles threaten the US.

(b) Level of abandonment and entrapment

As already stated above, in Glenn Snyder's definition, entrapment means being involved in an unwanted armed conflict and abandonment means (1) the ally's realignment with the adversary, (2) abrogating the alliance contract, (3) the ally's failure to make good on its explicit commitments, or (4) the ally's failure to provide support in contingencies where support is expected.⁷² In short, abandonment can be either defection from the overall alliance agreement or defection from cooperation in specific issues including strategic and diplomatic issues. Therefore, the bigger ally's fear of abandonment by the smaller allies means that the bigger ally fears losing the smaller partners from its alliance bloc or losing their cooperation in a specific contingency even though the smaller allies still remain in the alliance.

However, it would be unrealistic to directly apply the concept of fear of "total abandonment" to the cases in this thesis. Japan and the ROK have been so heavily dependent on the US in the security area that they would not rush to total defection from their alliance with the US. Therefore, abandonment in this study will include "partial abandonment" in which allies fail, in one way or another, to provide support in contingencies where support is expected. In addition, although Snyder's original model focused on the military area, where these realignments occur, I will also focus on the diplomatic realm.

⁷² Glenn Snyder, *op cit*, p. 467.

(c) Issues of concern

Although Glenn Snyder's original security dilemma model does not provide specific criteria to determine the issues of concern, he suggests that allies are sensitive to their general, specific and strategic interests.⁷³ These interests can be distinguished against specific case studies. In the case studies of this thesis, the US was often sensitive to the areas or issues concerning intelligence, US bases in the smaller allies' territory, economic sanctions on the DPRK, energy assistance to the DPRK, the issue of the ROK's missile target range, and finally, the issues of diplomatic initiative in dealing with the adversary.

(d) Probable behaviour

This is the most problematic part of Glenn Snyder's alliance security dilemma model because the model cannot predict the specific types of state behaviour or "interaction"⁷⁴ resulting from alliance security dilemma. When Glenn Snyder discusses state behaviour, he only suggests realignment, cooperation, and defection. As Snyder implies, it is an analytical question to determine the form of behaviour. The Snyder model is purported to predict only the allies' likely choice of action, that is, abandonment or entrapment. Abandonment suggests not providing security support to another ally for defection from an alliance. Entrapment suggests providing assistance to another ally in an armed conflict, while risking being attacked by the enemy. However, the model does not provide a clear account of more detailed internal dynamics among allies. Glenn Snyder

⁷³ Glenn Snyder, *op cit*, pp. 474-475.

⁷⁴ Glenn Snyder, *ibid.*, p. 464.

implicitly admits this problem and only suggests that the model can predict the possibility of bargaining among states to keep one another within an alliance.⁷⁵ Based on my initial observation of the events from 1994 to 2001 that have been previously discussed in the Introduction of this thesis,⁷⁶ I argue that accommodation with the smaller allies is an indication of a probable behaviour of a bigger power that suffers from being entrapped or abandoned by the smaller allies.

In this thesis, evidence of accommodation is indicated by the following items:

- (1) Statements by national leaders or officials that suggest that they are afraid of the consequences of the loss of their junior allies;
- (2) The shift of the bigger ally's or the hegemon's more coercive behaviour toward its smaller partners or followers to a more cooperative one; or
- (3) The bigger ally's or the hegemon's inability to completely reject the smaller allies' opposition to its strategy or tactic in dealing with the adversary or the bigger ally's inability to push hard the smaller allies to do what it wants them to.

Of the above three points, the first one is the most important as it focuses on the initial perception that makes action possible. In this thesis, I will focus on the perception of threat indicated in the statements by the US government and its officials.

Regarding how actually to approach to specific cases of US alliance security dilemma toward Japan and the ROK. From the above discussion, it is fair to conclude 1) that US fear of abandonment is likely to occur when the US sees Japan and the ROK have room for taking independent actions in the strategic area and 2) that such fear is likely to turn into accommodation instead of coercion when coercion could push the junior allies for the direction opposite to US expectations.

⁷⁵ Glenn Snyder, *op cit.*, p. 463.

While America's concern over possible abandonment and entrapment could explain its accommodative behaviour toward its two smaller allies, one may still ask why Washington's smaller Asia allies should accept its accommodative behaviour at the same time they were accelerating their own forms of alliance burden with the US. Key concepts that are to be better understood and assessed in this context are US security guarantees and those guarantees were reinforced. The Cold War period provides some useful examples of this within this broader study of US alliance security dilemma politics as it relates to Japan and the ROK.

US Security Guarantees for Japan and the ROK

During the Cold War, the US fear of abandonment by its smaller Asian security partners was not immediately evident. The focus, instead, was more on the smaller allies' fears of both entrapment and abandonment.

The US-Japan alliance, for example, grappled with both abandonment and entrapment fears during the Cold War. Japan's fear of entrapment became most obvious during the 1950s with the start of the Korean War and the consolidation of the Cold War in Asia. During this time, Washington's earlier policy of demilitarising Japan began to slow quite dramatically.⁷⁷ Yet, Japan was concerned that this signalled the US, involved in the potential conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and with China over Taiwan, would expect more direct Japanese involvement in these contingencies. This concern was the basis of Japan's fear of entrapment. However, in the early 1970s, following the return of Okinawa to Japan, and the US decision to partially disengage from Asia after the Viet

⁷⁶ See the Introduction of this thesis.

⁷⁷ Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, "International Relations Theories of the US-Japan Alliance: Views from Realism, Liberal-Institutionalism, and Constructivism," *International Relations*, Vol. 115, May 1997, pp. 161-179. See especially p. 170.

Nam War, Japan began to fear that it might be abandoned by the US. The 1975 Sakata-Schlesinger meeting signalled Japan's shift from entrapment fears to abandonment fears. Accordingly, Japan committed itself to increased military capabilities within the US-Japan alliance.⁷⁸

Accelerated Japanese alliance commitments were formalized in the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, including Japan's commitment to provide logistical support for the US military in contingencies.⁷⁹ At the Japan-US Summit Meeting in 1981, the term "alliance" was used formally in that meeting for the first time, even though both countries had formed a 'de facto' alliance in 1951.⁸⁰ Throughout the 1980s, Japan continued to strengthen its alliance commitments. It supported US research on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). It also purchased a US-made *Aegis* and 100 P3C surveillance aircraft in the late 1980s.

The mutual fear of abandonment between the US and Japan was not as evident in the nuclear dimension as it was in the conventional area. This was because the US fear of abandonment by Japan was occasionally expressed, especially among US intellectuals, in the context of frustration over Japan's persistent lack of alliance burden-sharing.⁸¹ On Japan's part, too, policy-makers were concerned about the US disengagement or its involvement in contingencies in the Far Eastern region.⁸²

However, after the Cold War, the mutual fear of abandonment between the two allies became more evident. As we will see in the following case studies, the ongoing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula as well as 1995-96 Taiwan Crisis compelled both the US and Japan to recognise the need for redefining their alliance relations.

⁷⁸ Tsuchiyama, *ibid*, p. 170.

⁷⁹ Tsuchiyama, *op cit*.

⁸⁰ Tsuchiyama, *op cit*.

The Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration in 1996 and the revised Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation in 1997 are the clear indications of the will of both allies to alleviate their mutual alliance security dilemma by defining areas of cooperation and burden-sharing in a purely military context.⁸³ For Japan in particular, the declaration and the redefining of the alliance was reassurance that the US would sustain an extended nuclear deterrence guarantee and conventional military protection to Japan against external aggression. This kind of reassurance appeared more clearly in the Joint Statement of US-Japan Security Consultative Committee of October 2005 in which both sides stipulated ten overarching common strategic objectives. The statement noted that:

- The U.S. will maintain forward-deployed forces, and augment them as needed, for the defense of Japan as well as to deter and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan. The U.S. will provide all necessary support for the defense of Japan.
- U.S. strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the U.S. remain an essential complement to Japan's defense capabilities in ensuring the defense of Japan and contribute to peace and security in the region.⁸⁴

With respect to South Korea, its fear of abandonment by the US began in earnest during the Park Chong-hee administration in the 1960s. Since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War, the ROK desperately needed the US military backing in any confrontation with the North. While the 1954 Mutual Defence Agreement between the US and the ROK guarantees “mutual denfece” against common threat(s), it allows freedom of action of each side stating, “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self-help and mutual aid,

⁸¹ Cha, 1994, op cit.

⁸² Interview with a Japanese Foreign Ministry official dealing with Japan's nuclear policy, March 6, 1998.

⁸³ The new guidelines aim “to create a solid basis for more effective and credible U.S.-Japan cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Guidelines also provide a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies.” See *The Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation*, September 23, 1997 (<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/defense.html>)

the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.”⁸⁵ This language left room for constrained response to future alliance contingencies. For the ROK, however, US alliance flexibility meant ‘freedom to not respond.’ Therefore, Seoul has always been apprehensive about the actual US determination to provide necessary defence for the ROK against external threats.

Indeed, the ROK’s fear of abandonment by the US led it to participate in the Viet Nam War in 1970. The US reduction of its military commitment to the Asia-Pacific region in the early 1970s further reinforced the ROK’s fear of potential abandonment. In 1978, the Carter administration threatened to withdraw US ground forces from the ROK. In response, Seoul threatened that if the US did withdraw, it might ‘go nuclear’.⁸⁶ This was in direct response to the Carter administration’s decision to withdraw approximately 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons from the ROK.⁸⁷ However, the US Congress’s worried that a security vacuum had been created by such a withdrawal and recognized that the withdrawal itself could drag the US into the military conflict it would not desire. This forced the Carter administration to stop further US strategic retreat on the Korean Peninsula.⁸⁸

Between fear of abandonment and fear of entrapment, therefore the former was stronger for US allies throughout most of the Cold War period. US security

⁸⁴ *Security Consultative Committee Document US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future*, October 29, 2005 (<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html>)

⁸⁵ *Article 2 of Mutual Defense Treaty Between the US and the ROK* (signed in October 1953 at Washington and entered into force in November 1954) (www.korea.army.mil/sofa/mutdef.htm)

⁸⁶ Peter Hayes, “The Republic of Korean Nuclear Program as a Problem of State Survival,” in Andrew Mack, ed., *Asian Flashpoint*, Chapter Six, pp. 51-83, 1996; Yun Don-min, *Taepuk Haekhyopsangwi Jonmal: Pihaek kwa Kongdongsononesoe Geneva Hapwikkaji (The Process of Nuclear Negotiations with North Korea: From the Joint Denuclearization Statement to the Geneva Agreement)* (Seoul, South Korea: Haelwu, 1995.) Especially pp. 156-158.

⁸⁷ Koji Murata, *President Carter’s US Troop Withdrawal Policy from South Korea* (Tokyo, Japan: Yuhikaku, 1998), p. 182.

⁸⁸ Murata, *ibid.*

commitments were often coloured by an accompanying frustration over the smaller allies' "not doing enough" to uphold their share of the collective defense burden. Ultimately, US extended deterrence strategy remained in place.

However, in the post-Cold War era, the US fear of "partial" abandonment by its allies has become more evident. The following chapters aim to demonstrate this by tracing specifically selected case studies to examine this shift in perception.

Locating the Framework within the Literature on Alliances

Before using the proposed new analytical framework, it would be necessary to clarify the location of the framework within the existing alliance concepts and frameworks. On the one hand, with regard to the grand theories of realism, the framework shares the view that states operate in a threat-based international environment. That is, states' threat perceptions are central to understanding their behaviour. The formation of alliances therefore reflects states' concerns about threats. Alliance formation is another aspect of self-help, alongside military force, when a threat seems imminent. Otherwise, states prefer self-help without alliances.

On the other hand, the framework does not share some realist assumptions about how states, in particular hegemons, maintain alliances. Offensive realists assume that states seek power unrelentingly and that hegemons have enough power to do as they wish. The logic of these assumptions is that overall hegemons will coerce their allies into agreements. Indeed, the mid-level theory of alliance politics and dilemmas assumes that smaller allies fear being entrapped, because of the above assumptions and logic.

However, my conceptual framework challenges these assumptions about the means of alliance maintenance. In particular, my framework follows the mid-level focus on the politics of alliance maintenance but importantly it differs in that it allows for the hegemon's pursuit of several options to maintain its alliance. Specifically it allows for the hegemon's cooperation with its junior allies through eventual accommodation of their interests, which previously the hegemon has opposed.

The framework also allows for the possibility of a more nuanced insight into threat perceptions, than does grand theory. Although allies may share a common threat of another country, the way that threat is perceived can differ given the factors discussed earlier. This is important given that the US and its two allies, Japan and ROK, had differing threat perceptions about the DPRK.

The framework, like Snyder's model, emphasises the psychological elements in an alliance, that is fear. But unlike Snyder and Cha, the focus is on the fear experienced by the hegemon. Finally, like the Snyder and Cha models, this framework focuses on the intra-alliance dynamics of alliance maintenance but offers ways of examining the inner concerns of the hegemon. In Table 1, both Cha's approach and my approach can be termed alliance security dilemma thesis variants. While Cha focuses on the weaker allies' alliance security dilemma toward the US and on interactions between Japan and the ROK, my focus is on Washington's alliance security dilemma toward Japan and the ROK and on its politics with the two weaker allies respectively. Here, I emphasise that America's alliance security dilemma can be observed as well as the weaker allies' dilemma toward the stronger ally.

The next chapter will apply the analytical framework to the initial phase of the 1993-94 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

Table 1: The location of this thesis in the study of alliance politics

Variables	Independent Variable	Intermediate Variable	Dependent Variable
Alliance security dilemma thesis variants			
Cha's Quasi-Alliance Model (Snyder-Cha Model)	Threat	Abandonment/Entrapment complex (asymmetrical dilemma between junior allies)	Alliance behaviour (cooperation or non-cooperation between junior allies)
The Bigger Ally's Alliance Security Dilemma	Threat	Abandonment/Entrapment complex (asymmetrical dilemma between the bigger ally and the smaller allies)	Alliance behaviour (accommodation with smaller allies)

CHAPTER TWO

The Rise of US Alliance Security Dilemma with Japan and the ROK

Introduction

This chapter applies the conceptual framework as a tool for analysing the initial rise of Washington's alliance security dilemma with Japan and the ROK during the early period of the 1993-94 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The hypothesis that I proposed in the Introduction of this thesis is that the US cooperation with Japan and the ROK in dealing with the DPRK's nuclear and conventional threats is explained in terms of its alliance security dilemma with Japan and the ROK.

The Initial Application of the Framework: The Rise of US Alliance Security Dilemma with Japan Regarding the 1993-94 Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula

After the collapse of the Cold War structure, Washington's concern about the loosening of the commitments of Japan to the US-Japan alliance also became more visible when the US began to show its frustration with Japan's reluctant attitude toward cooperation with the US. This frustration, however, deepened during the 1993-94 nuclear crisis when Japan demonstrated its reluctance to help the US when the latter expected assistance.

In 1993, the US expressed its concern about the draft of the review of National Defense Program Outline (*boei taiko*).⁸⁹ The draft was discussed and prepared by a Prime Ministerial Special Advisory Panel (*boei kondankai*) on the review of the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). NDPO began under the Hosokawa administration in 1993 and was later continued by the Hata administration in 1994. Pentagon officials became suspicious that Japan might be aiming to abandon the US-Japan alliance. This was because the sequence that Japan had organized its preferred security options appeared to downgrade the importance of the US. In the draft, Japan had placed its bilateral alliance with the US second to multilateral approaches, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC).⁹⁰

Japan's apparent preference for multilateralism triggered the so-called Nye Initiative.⁹¹ Joseph Nye Jr, deputy assistant secretary for defense, set about reversing the US policy of reducing forces in East Asia, which had already begun in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nye not only shuttled between US and Japanese defense officials and security experts to clarify mutual alliance commitments, but he also worked with Thomas Hubbard, deputy assistant secretary of state, to ensure that Japan would be involved in the US ongoing strategy toward the DPRK.⁹² Hubbard agreed that the State Department's ongoing engagement with the DPRK would remain in concert

⁸⁹ Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program*, McNair Paper 31, November 1994, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC.

⁹⁰ Cronin et al, *ibid*.

⁹¹ According to Akihiko Tanaka, Professor at the University of Tokyo, the general impression within the US administration was that the US was losing its credibility of long-term alliance commitments toward Japan. See Akihiko Tanaka, *Anzenhosho (Security)*, Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1997, p. 336.

⁹² At first, Nye was multilateralist. He even chaired the Aspen Institute's Strategic Group in 1993, which proposed that the US encourage Japan to play a larger role in international and regional organizations such as the United Nations, the IMF and G7 and also proposed to establish a multilateral security organization in Asia that is similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). See Tsuneo Akaha, "Beyond self-defense: Japan's elusive security role under the new Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1998, pp. 461-483. See especially p. 466. However, Nye's discussion with the concerned Pentagon officials and Japanese experts turned him

with the Defense Department's policy to engage with Japan.⁹³ With the Nye Initiative,⁹⁴ the US fear of abandonment by Japan seemed to be alleviated.⁹⁵

However, Washington's fear was rekindled by the Korean nuclear crisis in June 1994. By that time, the US had given up on the idea of United Nations mandated economic sanctions against the DPRK because China opposed the idea. But, the US then decided to lead alliance-based economic sanctions on the DPRK, involving Japan and the ROK. Importantly, the US threatened to strike the DPRK militarily.⁹⁶ However, the US was disappointed by Japan's response. The US expected Japan to show full support for the US, both economically and militarily, but, as demonstrated below, Japan hesitated in offering such a commitment.

US Fear of Abandonment Expressed as Verbal Coercion

The US response to Japan's hesitation involved verbal coercion against Japan. This became evident when the Japanese government, upon US demand and by Japan's own

into an alliance advocate, according to several Japanese security experts with whom Nye consulted with during his tour in Japan.

⁹³ Yoichi Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999). See especially Chapter One "The Nye Initiative," pp. 248-279.

⁹⁴ The previous chapter illustrated the Nye Initiative as the beginning of a "reverse course" in US post-Cold War security policy in the Asia-Pacific.

⁹⁵ The previous chapter showed that at the later stage of the Nye Initiative in November 1994, Nye and Ezra Vogel, then-CIA official specializing in Japan, came up with a "new vision" of Japan-US security cooperation in a post Cold War Asia. The new vision included Japan's role in KEDO and the theater missile defense (TMD) initiative. See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, evening edition, February 18, 1994, p. 1. Nye and Vogel, however, emphasized that even with the constraint of the socialist Murayama Cabinet, Japan could play active roles in non-military areas within the Japan-US alliance in a post-Cold War era. This suggests that Japan's involvement in KEDO was already part of the US blueprint for the US new security policy in Asia. See Thomas Hubbard, "US Sees N Korea Framework Basis for NE Asia Security," remarks to Heritage Foundation, January 31, 1995, *Public Diplomacy Query*, United States Information Agency, Tracking Number 376998.

⁹⁶ *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 6 1994, p. 9. US Defense Secretary William Perry told the media that the sanctions option is possible by the US and its allies, Japan and South Korea. The US administration's firm resolve on the sanctions option was supported by the American public support. A CNN survey found that 80% of the American public supported economic sanctions on the DPRK at the height of the Korean nuclear crisis in June 1994. However, another report pointed out that despite US expectations on US alliance cooperation, Japan was still cautious about the imposition of economic sanctions on the DPRK, indicating a "gap" between the US and Japan in terms of policy toward Pyongyang.

initiative, began war-game simulations in March 1993 on contingencies on the Korean Peninsula that would require Japan's military action.⁹⁷ Washington, through the US Embassy in Tokyo, angrily questioned the reported result of the simulations, saying "(W)hy can't Japan even provide minesweepers to South Korean territorial waters?"⁹⁸ This angry reaction was not expressed in directly coercive words, but it was coercive enough to be taken as an outside pressure, or *gaiatsu*, by Japanese Foreign Ministry officials.⁹⁹

From Washington's perspective, it was important to see how Tokyo would respond to these simulations of the US demand for military support. This is because Japan's response would indicate not only how much logistical support Tokyo could actually provide, (along with providing military bases in a Korean contingency) but equally important, how willing Japan would be politically to provide such assistance to its alliance partner. The US was beginning to see Japan's response as a test of its alliance loyalty, partly because it had already started to doubt Japan's alliance commitment during the process of reviewing the draft of the 1995 National Defense Program Outline (or *boei taiko*).¹⁰⁰

From Japan's perspective, however, the intent was to avoid repeating the 1990-91 Gulf War embarrassment suffered by the policy community.¹⁰¹ The Foreign Ministry, the Self-Defense Forces, an inter-ministry and agency panel, led by Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobuo Ishihara, the US-Japan Defense Official Joint Panel and the US-Japan

⁹⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*, April 15 and 16 1999. Asahi carried a two-day special report on Japan's response to the 1993-94 nuclear crises on the Korean Peninsula.

⁹⁸ *op cit.*, p. 18.

⁹⁹ Personal interview with Japanese reporters in Tokyo on July 5, 2000.

¹⁰⁰ Personal interview with Japanese reporters in Tokyo on July 5, 2000.

¹⁰¹ When the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait broke out and a US-led coalition was formed, Japan's was slow compared to other US allies, and Japan soon came under bitter criticism that Japan's contribution was too slow and too little.

Governmental Consultation Panel all undertook various simulations independently.¹⁰² In the simulations, the US requested Japan's logistical support based on the US-ROK Joint Operation 5027.¹⁰³ The US focus was on Japan's actual capability to swiftly provide military assistance to US forces in a Korean contingency. However, the US became frustrated with Japan's response. This was because the results of the simulations that Tokyo and Washington jointly conducted were a disappointment to the US.

Not only were the above simulations a frustration for the US, but so too was Japan's response during the 1994 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. At that time, Tokyo had already announced its support for UN-led sanctions, although not particularly US-led sanctions. The US media criticized Japan as making it difficult for America to impose economic sanctions on the DPRK.¹⁰⁴ Tokyo, through the Japanese embassy in Washington, reiterated to US reporters its support for economic sanctions on Pyongyang, and even asked the US State Department to announce that Japan had already made clear its support for such sanctions. A Japanese Embassy official stated, "I am flabbergasted by the US media's allegation. The allegation would put Japan into a situation similar to that during the Gulf War."¹⁰⁵ Although some US State Department officials sided with the US media's frustration, the Department itself announced Japan's positive stance on economic sanctions on Pyongyang.¹⁰⁶ Although the US administration played "good cop" while US Congress played "bad cop" during the 1990-91 Gulf War,¹⁰⁷ this time the US administration played "good cop" while the US media played "bad cop". What this episode highlights is that the US' earlier frustration towards Japan's less than expected

¹⁰² *Asahi Shimbun*, April 15 1999, p. 1.

¹⁰³ Shunji Taoka, Japan's "Cooperation" with the US in a Contingency Was Revealed," *Asahi Shimbun*, March 8, 1999, p. 4.

¹⁰⁴ *New York Times*, June 9 1994.

¹⁰⁵ *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, evening edition, June 10 1994, p. 4.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with a former US State Department official, June 29, 2001.

indication of alliance commitment. This suggests that the US fear of abandonment by Japan was on the rise.

In addition to the above simulations, Tokyo conducted another series on Japan's possible economic sanctions on the DPRK in 1993.¹⁰⁸ In these simulations, the Japanese government focused primarily on the stoppage of remittances to Pyongyang from the pro-Pyongyang community in Japan. However, the outcome of the simulations found that the remittances were likely to be diverted through a third country.¹⁰⁹ Although the Japanese government was not necessarily reluctant to join US-led economic sanctions, the US was generally disappointed about Japan's attitude.¹¹⁰

The above two episodes of the simulations suggest that the US disappointment or growing frustration expressed in coercive words toward Japan's perceived reluctance to help the US in dealing with the DPRK can be interpreted as at least a symptom of Washington's fear of abandonment.

US Fear of Abandonment by Japan in the Nuclear Dimension

US fear of abandonment by Japan in the nuclear dimension appeared in the form of a domino image. International suspicions of Japan going nuclear persisted during the Cold War era. However, the US fear of abandonment by Japan in the nuclear dimension emerged again during the 1993 North Korean nuclear issue and continued into 1995.

¹⁰⁷ Andrew Bennett, Joseph Leggold, and Danny Unger, "Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War," *International Organization* 49, 1, Winter 1994, pp. 39-75.

¹⁰⁸ *Asahi Shimbun*, March 23 1994, p.1; and *Japan Times*, April 21 1994, p. 4.

¹⁰⁹ The Ashikaga Bank in Tokyo, the main agent for dollar remittances to Pyongyang, and the Finance Ministry allegedly stopped all dollar-based transactions with Pyongyang in May 1994, but both the bank and the ministry denied the allegation. See *Asahi Shimbun*, March 23 1994, p.1. In addition, Christopher Hughes assumes that the alleged stoppage of remittances to Pyongyang was part of Japan's preparation for full-scale economic sanctions on Pyongyang. See Christopher W. Hughes, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Japanese Security," *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 2, Summer 1996, p. 90.

¹¹⁰ *New York Times*, June 9, 1994.

This fear was probably even stronger than that in the conventional dimension at that time.¹¹¹ Triggered by a *Washington Post* article “Yen for the Bomb: Nervous Japan Rethinks the Nuclear Option,” the US administration, Congress, academics,¹¹² and the media expressed suspicions that Japan might be aiming to go nuclear.¹¹³ US Secretary of Defense William Perry reportedly said at a Senate military committee hearing on February 2, 1994, that:

My concern is that the vigorous North Korean nuclear bomb program with delivery systems might make temptations for countries like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to go ahead with a nuclear bomb program irresistible.¹¹⁴

This statement suggests the US fear of the nuclear domino in which the nuclearisation of the DPRK would lead to that of the ROK, Japan and Taiwan. Such a fear has been more frequently described as “nuclear proliferation.” The US nuclear domino fear in the form of “proliferation” became more evident after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the domino image itself has been ever present, especially in sustaining its alliance system against the Soviet Union, since the beginning of the Cold War.¹¹⁵ In an effort to study the possibility of Japan going nuclear, US specialists of Japan in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US Department of Defense, led by Nye and Ezra Vogel, national security advisory member, undertook various simulations concerning Japan’s nuclear options in the context of a DPRK nuclear attack on Japan.¹¹⁶

¹¹¹ The most comprehensive description of international suspicions of Japan’s nuclear armament may be Mataka Kamiya, “International Suspicions of Japan’s Nuclear Armament (Kaigaini Okeru ‘Nihon Kakubushoron’),” *International Affairs (Kokusai Mondai)*, No. 426, September 1995, pp. 59-73.

¹¹² For academics, see, for example, Kenneth Waltz’s “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1993.

¹¹³ Kamiya, *ibid.*

¹¹⁴ *Japan Times*, May 5 1994, p.1.

¹¹⁵ Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, *op cit.*

¹¹⁶ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 15, 1995. These simulations were conducted from the autumn of 1994 to early 1995.

Japan took these international suspicions seriously. Masayoshi Takemura, Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Hosokawa Cabinet claimed, in response to these suspicions that:

Japan's nuclear option would only serve to undermine the stability of the international circumstances surrounding the nation, such an option would be detrimental to the national interests of peace and prosperity.¹¹⁷

During the 1994 DPRK nuclear crisis, especially when the US was striving to form a sanction regime against the DPRK both inside and outside the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), US expectations of Japan's economic power mounted. On the one hand, US leaders only vaguely hoped that Japan would financially help the US provide the proposed light-water reactors to the DPRK,¹¹⁸ but on the other hand, the US did expect Japan to apply economic leverage over the DPRK, including economic assistance to, or sanctions on, the DPRK. That was because US sanctions against the DPRK had already been in place, and because the US was unable to add sanctions to these existing ones. The US also wanted Japan to participate in the US-led sanction regime to secure the future possibility of such sanctions against the DPRK.¹¹⁹

The Snyder alliance security dilemma model suggests that fear of abandonment appears not only in the military area but also in the economic area.¹²⁰ Snyder's original model and some application of his model to the Japanese-US alliance take the alliance security dilemma in the economic model mainly as the possibility of undermining trade relations between the allies.¹²¹ However, the above episode shows that the bigger ally's

¹¹⁷ *Japan Times*, February 2 1994. p. 1.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Robert Gallucci, July 6, 2000.

¹¹⁹ Interview with Robert Gallucci, July 6, 2000.

¹²⁰ Snyder, *ibid*.

¹²¹ Snyder, *ibid*; and Cha, *ibid*, 1999.

fear of abandonment by its junior partner does appear in the form of fear of losing the junior ally's economic power.

The above episode shows that the bigger ally's fear of abandonment by its junior partner does appear in the form of fear of losing the junior ally's economic support. This partly confirms Snyder's alliance security dilemma model, which suggests that fear of abandonment appears not only in the military area, but also in the economic area.¹²² But Snyder's original model and some applications of his model to the Japanese-US alliance take the alliance security dilemma in the economic area mainly as the possibility of undermining trade relations between the allies, rather than losing economic support.¹²³

US Fear of Abandonment by the ROK

Washington's fear of abandonment by the ROK at this time was expressed as a nuclear domino image. The image was evident in William Perry's statement above, but an ROK analyst also noted that:

There is concern that South Korea and Japan will acquire their own nuclear weapons in response to the nuclearisation of North Korea, thus causing a nuclear arms race in North-east Asia. Indeed, it is very likely that South Korea will seek nuclear weapons if the North acquires the capability and if the US appears unlikely to fulfill its protective commitment. The nuclearisation of either part of the Korean peninsula will almost certainly lead to Japan following suit.¹²⁴

The US had held this concern since the collapse of the Soviet Union,¹²⁵ and the DPRK's nuclear threat increased the US fear of nuclear proliferation. This is evidenced

¹²² Snyder, op cit.

¹²³ Snyder, op cit; and Cha, op cit, 1999.

¹²⁴ Park Sand-hoon, "North Korea and the Challenge to the US-South Korean Alliance," *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 78-91. The quotation is from p. 85.

¹²⁵ *ibid.*

by the fact that the “Koreanisation of South Korean defense”¹²⁶ initiative was slowed down. Although the first phase (1990-93) of the US force reduction plan was implemented, the 1994 US-ROK Security Conference decided to slow down the plan, and the second phase was not yet underway.¹²⁷ The US was also sceptical about the ROK’s willingness to follow the US in dealing with the DPRK’s threat.

Another example can be found in William Perry’s speech given in China just three days before the signing of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and the DPRK.

Perry stated:

Let me point out to you that the security alliance with Japan, for example, gives Japan a reason for not having a major arm build up of their own. The United States so-called nuclear umbrella for Japan and Korea give both of those nations a reason for not having a nuclear development program of their own. That’s why I believe those alliances contribute to the security and stability in the entire region.¹²⁸

The US role, in this image, can be termed as “the cork in the two bottles,” meaning that the US maintains its military presence in both Japan and the ROK to keep them in check to make sure they would not destabilise the East Asian region. It is notable that Perry made this statement just three days before the US signed the Agreed Framework with the DPRK, which set the legal basis for the non-military nature of US engagement policy toward the DPRK because this indicates that the softer the US becomes on the adversary, the softer the US has to become on the smaller allies. In fact, as we will see in the following chapters, the US shows little coercive behaviour toward the ROK and Japan.

¹²⁶ “Koreanisation of Korean security” means that the ROK takes the full responsibility for its defense against the DPRK rather than depending on the US forces stationed in the country by reducing the size of the US forces.

¹²⁷ Masao Okonogi, ed. *Posuto Reisenno Chosenhanto (The Post-Cold War Korean Peninsula)*, Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1994. See especially Chapters Four and Five.

Washington's fear of abandonment by the ROK was also expressed as US accommodation of the ROK's interests. As I said in the Introduction of this thesis, the US was on verge of attacking the DPRK at the height of the 1994 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Kim Yong-sam, ROK President at that time, strongly argued against the US' use of force in solving the crisis. Kim revealed that a last-minute phone conversation he had with US President Bill Clinton stopped the US from launching an air strike against the DPRK's nuclear facilities in June 1994. Kim said that:

(A)t that time, the situation was really dangerous. The Clinton administration was preparing a war. The US already deployed an aircraft carrier off the eastern coast at a distance close enough for its warplanes to hit the DPRK's nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. US warships were also ready for a naval bombardment of the nuclear facilities, some 90 kilometres (56 miles) north of Pyongyang. One day, I heard (then US Ambassador James) Laney was about to hold a press conference the following day and announce the withdrawal of relatives of US embassy staff. I called in Laney (US Ambassador to Seoul) and told him that he would not move even a single soldier of our 650,000 troops in case a war broke out because of the bombing of Yongbyon.¹²⁹

Kim told Clinton that there would be no inter-Korean war while he was President. Clinton tried to persuade Kim to change his mind, but Kim criticized the US for planning to stage a war with the North on our land.¹³⁰ Clinton then relented and proposed to set up a secret telephone line linking the US White House and the ROK presidential Blue House for close consultation on the DPRK nuclear issue. Kim said that three days later, a team from the White House arrived, and at around the same time former US president Jimmy Carter arrived in the ROK on his way to the DPRK in a bid to defuse the tense situation. President Kim asked Carter to warn then-DPRK President

¹²⁸ William Perry, "Perry Cites Stability of Asia-Pacific Region," remarks at the PLA National Defense University in Beijing regarding the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, October 18, 1994, US Department of States Information Agency, *Public Diplomacy Query*, Text Link: 364531, USIA Notes:*94101803.PFE.

¹²⁹ *Hankyoreh*, May 24, 2000.

¹³⁰ *ibid.*

Kim Il-Sung of the seriousness of the situation and to convey his wish to avoid a war.¹³¹

This episode of Kim's phone call to Clinton seems to be a new addition, if not a contradiction, to the widely acknowledged fact that Carter's visit to the DPRK played the crucial role in solving the 1994 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. As I pointed out in the Introduction of this thesis that US military and civilian high-ranking officials were mainly concerned about the deployment of the DPRK conventional weapons over the DMZ, but this episode suggests that the US accommodated the ROK's interests at the last minute during the 1994 nuclear crisis because of the ROK's potential refusal of conventional military assistance to the US.

Thus, in the context of the above example Washington's alliance security dilemma, especially fear of abandonment by its junior partner, appeared as both a nuclear domino image and accommodation to the ROK.

Alternative Explanations

Which other theories can explain Washington's accommodative behaviour toward Japan and the ROK in the above episodes? At this initial stage of the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula from 1993 to 1994, the rise of the US security dilemma seems to be more useful in explaining such behaviour than the claim of offensive realism and the theories of alliance burden-sharing and structural liberalism.

Instead of coercing Japan and the ROK into following the US initial attempt to strike the DPRK, the Clinton administration accommodated their interests and backed away from military action. Why should a hegemon who can coerce them to preserve and

¹³¹ "South Korea Stopped US Strike on North Korea: Former President," *Agence France Presse*, May 24, 2000.

enhance its relative power compromise? Fear of abandonment seems to be a more persuasive explanation.

For the theory of alliance burden-sharing to be effective, as mentioned in the Introduction of this thesis, there should be some agreement among allies on what specific burden, whether military or non-military, to share among them to achieve a common goal. There should also be a good cop-bad cop bargaining process toward such an agreement. However, in this case, those conditions have not been met. No clear process can be found to suggest that US policy-makers were calculating comparative advantages of the US, Japan and the ROK in dealing with the DPRK at this stage. If there had been any calculation on the part of US policy-makers, it must have been the weighing of the costs and benefits of military strike against the DPRK and the negative consequences of nuclear proliferation in the Northeast Asian region. As mentioned above and in the Introduction of this thesis, William Perry and US Commander Gary Luck estimated huge casualties among South Koreans and US troops and an enormous economic impact on the neighbouring countries in case of military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula.¹³² Fear of Japan's and the ROK's nuclear armament was also clear in the above account. But this is not the kind of calculation involved in the theory of alliance burden-sharing that takes into account what military, economic, or other burden the US and the ROK share in dealing with the DPRK.

The structural liberal theory of co-binding does not fit here either. If the theory had been to hold, then there should evidence of the US emphasising the values of liberalism and of deciding to negotiate a compromise with Japan and the ROK because of such

¹³² Gary Luck and William Perry, Testimony at the US Senate, *US Department of State Transcript*, January 15, 1995.

values. However, rather than such evidence, the fear of US policy-makers of “partial abandonment” by Japan and the ROK seem to be more compelling.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I used the modified Snyder model to analyse the early periods of US dealings with Japan and the ROK over the DPRK nuclear issue. I argued that the shift of the bigger ally's or the hegemon's more coercive behaviour toward its smaller partners or followers to a more cooperative one or that the bigger ally's or the hegemon's inability to completely reject the smaller allies' opposition indicates the bigger ally's abandonment fear.

Under the Cold War structure in which US junior allies were more dependent on the US as a whole, the US was sometimes more dependent on them in some areas in some specific contingency, Washington's fear of abandonment by Japan was often expressed in words suggesting its frustration with Japan's loose commitments to providing military assistance to the US. Washington's fear of abandonment by the ROK, on the other hand, was expressed not only in words but in deeds as well. The US, especially during the Carter administration, decided not to withdraw both US nuclear and conventional forces from the ROK when the ROK threatened to go nuclear after the withdrawal. The ROK's behaviour was often seen as the evidence of the ROK's fear of abandonment by the US. However, the US decision not to withdraw its forces from the ROK also shows Washington's fear of abandonment by the ROK, or the ROK's defection from the US overall alliance arrangement.

Regarding the 1993-94 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, it was argued that the initial rise of US abandonment fear involved verbal coercion, particularly towards Japan, rather than accommodation through institutions. The US abandonment fear arose from its perception of Japan's loose commitment to the US-Japan alliance over multilateral institutions and the nuclear-domino dynamic in 1994. The US' fear of abandonment by the ROK during this period, on the other hand, appeared not only as the nuclear domino image, but also as accommodation. While the US government was more concerned about the DPRK's threat of conventional artillery and rockets targeted at the US forces and perhaps American residents in Seoul, it can be pointed out that at this initial phase of the DPRK nuclear problem, ROK President Kim Young-sam's last minute call to US President Bill Clinton seems to have facilitated the US policy shift from coercion to appeasement in dealing with the DPRK nuclear problem.

Thus, the theory of alliance security dilemma seems to be more useful in explaining Washington's accommodative behaviour toward Japan and the ROK than the logic of offensive realism, the theory of alliance burden-sharing, and the logic of structural liberalism. This does not mean that the following case studies do not provide any support for these alternative theories, but it does suggest that the senior ally's security dilemma, especially the senior ally's fear of abandonment, is a central factor explaining alliance behaviour on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere.

CHAPTER THREE

The US Accommodates Japan's Refusal to Pay for Heavy Fuel Oil Supply to the DPRK

Introduction

This chapter examines Washington's accommodation of Japan's interest in not paying for the second shipment of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK, part of the arrangements under the Korean Peninsula Development Organisation (KEDO).¹³³ Japan had agreed to pay for the first shipment in 1996 but by 1997 the US was unable to persuade its junior ally for a second time.

The US feared losing Japan's financial support for the other project of KEDO. Moreover, the US was aware that its presence at bases in Okinawa was highly sensitive to the Japanese domestic audience, especially following the rape of an Okinawan girl by two US marines. The US ultimate concern was the possibility that trying to coerce Japan into paying for the heavy fuel oil might result in Japan eventually, if not directly, threatening to withdraw US base access to Okinawa—a form of abandonment within the framework of the US-Japan alliance. This possible behaviour by a junior ally is not predicted by the logic of offensive realism. Further, neorealist logic could not have anticipated that the US would fail to pressure Japan to provide economic assistance in such a contingency.

While offensive realism cannot predict the US inability to reverse Japan's decision not to pay for the heavy fuel oil shipment to the DPRK, Washington's accommodation

¹³³ I will briefly describe KEDO in the next section of this chapter.

of Japan's interest in this chapter can be better explained by the concept of a bigger ally's fear of abandonment by its junior ally.

As for alternative explanations, it is true that alliance burden-sharing holds some merits in explaining the creation of KEDO, but with regard to the maintenance of the agreement among the US and Japan, alliance security dilemma seems to be more appropriate.

This chapter concludes that the US feared that Japan would abandon its previous support for US troops in Okinawa, an important arrangement under the auspices of the alliance between the two countries, and that, therefore, it was unable to change Japan's hard stance.

Background: The US Base Issue and Alliance Cooperation in KEDO

As I mentioned in the Introduction of this thesis, the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis was officially resolved when the US and the DPRK reached an Agreed Framework (AF) on October 21, 1994.¹³⁴ The AF stipulated that the DPRK would stop the acknowledged nuclear development programmes in exchange for the US providing the DPRK with heavy fuel oil for energy use and light-water nuclear reactors to replace the DPRK's bomb-prone reactors over the next ten years.¹³⁵ Thus, only the US was to supply heavy fuel oil to the DPRK, while it was joined by its two junior allies in providing light-water reactors to the DPRK. Based on this agreement, the US, the ROK, and Japan formed an international consortium called KEDO on March 9, 1995.¹³⁶ KEDO began with two

¹³⁴ *Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, Geneva, October 21, 1994. <http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf>

¹³⁵ *ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Agreement on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization*, March 9, 1995. <http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/EstablishmentKEDO.pdf>

projects: heavy fuel oil project and light-water reactor project. The organization was later joined by the European Union (EU) as a board member, but the US and its two allies have remained as the core members. The US promised to assume the former, while the ROK and Japan the latter.¹³⁷ As we will see in the rest of this thesis, the ROK's and Japan's participation in the project gave the two smaller allies bargaining power against the US.

Another important background issue is the so-called Nye Initiative. As argued in Chapter One, the Clinton administration embarked on the initiative partly because it feared that Japan might be developing a preference for regional multilateralism, which could, over time, challenge its bilateral alliance with the US. The alliance was also under stress, as demonstrated by the 1997 discussions on the need to redefine the alliance relations demonstrated,¹³⁸ because of the US presence in Okinawa. Sensitivity had increased following the rape of a twelve year old girl in Okinawa on September 7, 1995. The report of this incident immediately raised anti-American sentiment all over Japan. This increased when it became clear that the Japanese investigation authorities were unable to take custody of the three men immediately. The local Japanese demonstrated and demanded that Article 17 of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Japan and the US be revised the agreement prevented the Japanese police from holding the three men in custody.¹³⁹ The US sought to rectify the matter by offering

¹³⁷ The US, the ROK, and Japan were original members, but later the EU joined as a board member state and several more countries joined the organization as normal members. These members include New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Chile, Argentina, Poland, Czech Republic, and Uzbekistan. However, KEDO was virtually frozen by the Bush Administration because of the DPRK's new nuclear crisis in October 2002. The Conclusion of this will touch upon this issue.

¹³⁸ Yoichi Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999). Especially Chapter One "The Nye Initiative," pp. 248-279; and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, "What Was the Redefining of the Japan-US Alliance?" in Masashi Nishihara et al., *Nichibeidomei Q & A 100* (The Japan-US Alliance: 100 Questions and Answers), Akishobo, 1998, pp. 226-227.

¹³⁹ *ibid.*

Japan not only an ambassadorial apology but a presidential one as well. Eventually, the problem was resolved, but anti-US sentiment continued to make the US vulnerable.

The US was also vulnerable because domestic pressures at home made the US somewhat reliant on Japanese financial assistance for the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework (AF). The AF between the US and the DPRK obliges the US to supply the DPRK with 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually for five or six years, until the core part of the less bomb-prone light-water nuclear reactors are built.¹⁴⁰ However, the Clinton administration confronted US Congressional opposition to the project. The Republican-dominated US Congress often refused to approve the appropriate level of funding for the fuel shipment, because they were opposed to what they saw as the Clinton administration's appeasement policy toward the DPRK while acknowledging the difficulty of the military option toward the country. The US shipped the first heavy fuel oil supply to the DPRK immediately after the establishment of KEDO. However, as opposition from the Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations and Diplomacy became tougher and the DPRK's criticism of Washington's apparent failure to keep its promise increased, the US began to turn to Japan and the ROK. In January 1996, the US raised the issue with Japan and the ROK.¹⁴¹ As is often the case, the US focused on Japan because it had a good record of being a good chequebook ally in the 1990-91 Gulf War.

The US had quite high expectations that Japan would provide financial contribution to the light-water reactor initiative because Japan had earlier suggested to Ambassador Robert Gallucci that Japan would be willing to help the US finance heavy

¹⁴⁰ See Chapter Six for the signing of the Agreed Framework and establishment of KEDO.

¹⁴¹ KEDO secretary general Stephen Bosworth and US Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Hubbard revealed at the KEDO ambassadorial-level meeting on January 15, 1996 that the US could provide only US\$ 2 million annually for the heavy fuel oil supply, although the US was obliged to provide approximately US\$ 50,000,000 annually heavy fuel oil to the DPRK. See *Mainichi Shimbun*, January 16, 1996, p. 3.

fuel oil supply to the DPRK.¹⁴² Also, US optimism or miscalculation about other countries' willingness to provide funding for the project make the US rush to the creation of KEDO. Gong Ro-myung, then ROK Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, recalls that it was a high-ranking official's miscalculation about funding that started the problem. According to Gong, the US high-ranking official believed that other countries would be willing to help the US pay for the fuel and also the reactors.¹⁴³ The administration's tendency to rely on other countries, especially on Japan, persisted even after the establishment of KEDO, and the tendency became the source of the problem of heavy fuel oil funding.¹⁴⁴

Washington's Initial Success in Getting Japan to Say Yes

To show that the US did accommodate Japan's interest regarding the issue of heavy fuel oil supply to the DPRK, it is necessary to show first why the US was successful in the 1996 round of the issue but was unsuccessful in the 1997 round.

Prior to approaching Tokyo, Washington asked Seoul for help, but Seoul refused.¹⁴⁵ Then the US turned to Japan through KEDO. KEDO Secretary-General Stephen Bosworth asked the Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda for emergency help. Bosworth stated, "We have to solve this issue on a short-term basis."¹⁴⁶ Ikeda did not answer immediately, instead he took the offer to Cabinet.

¹⁴² At this stage, Japan had also a very vague idea of taking part in the initiative and did not seem to be clear on the difference between the light-water reactor initiative and the supply of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK. In the 1994 Agreed Framework, only the US was obliged to provide heavy fuel oil to the DPRK.

¹⁴³ Personal interview, November 22, 1999 in his office at Dongkuk University, Seoul, the ROK.

¹⁴⁴ *ibid.*; and personal interview in New York with a former US KEDO official, August 3, 2000.

¹⁴⁵ "US-DPRK Agreed Framework Backfires," *Sankei Shimbun*, February 24, 1996.

¹⁴⁶ *Mainichi Shimbun*, January 25, 1996, p. 3.

Walter Mondale, US Ambassador to Tokyo, also asked Taku Yamazaki, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)'s policy head, on February 6, 1996, to provide US\$ 12 million.¹⁴⁷ Yamazaki, however, replied, "This kind of issue requires our people's agreement. This means that the resumption of Japanese-DPRK normalization talks is necessary."¹⁴⁸ Yamazaki also asked Mondale to support the LDP delegation to be dispatched to the ROK.¹⁴⁹ Japan began to take the US request more seriously at the governmental-level. On the same day, Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda suggested that in case the US could not provide funding for the heavy fuel oil to the DPRK, Japan might do so for the US.¹⁵⁰ However, Ikeda stated, "The money would only be a *tsunagi*, or bridge, until the US passes bills related to the heavy fuel oil project. Japan, the US, and the ROK will realistically approach this issue."¹⁵¹ On February 7, 1996, US Presidential Advisor for national security Anthony Lake officially asked Ikeda in Tokyo to provide money for the project as *katagawar*, or giving money to the US without the US having to return. This request differed greatly from the previous request of a *tsunagi*. Ikeda said, "We will discuss what we can do, but remember the task of heavy fuel oil supply to the DPRK is solely yours. We can provide only *tsunagi*, (but not *katagawari*.)"¹⁵² Lake only responded, "Implementation of the Agreed Framework is important. I anticipate Japan's maximum efforts," but did not specify the amount of money the US needed this time or his understanding of the terms of the agreement.¹⁵³

The following day, Lake also asked the Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to provide the funding. Hashimoto replied, "To solve the risk of short-term liquidity (lack of funding), we want to discuss what Japan can do. I expect the US to

¹⁴⁷ *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 6, 1996, p. 3.

¹⁴⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 6, 1996, p. 4.

¹⁵¹ *ibid.*

¹⁵² *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 7, 1996, p. 4.

fully accomplish its obligation for the later part of the year.”¹⁵⁴ The next day, Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama met with Lake and said to him, “Our contribution this time would be an exceptional and temporary one.”¹⁵⁵ The Japanese Foreign Ministry bureaucracy, on the other hand, was more realistic about the security dimension of the heavy fuel oil issue. A high-ranking Foreign Ministry official said, “We decided to help the US pay for the shipment because we had to keep the Agreed Framework from falling apart...Any delay of the project could give Pyongyang a pretext to break the Agreed Framework.”¹⁵⁶ The Foreign Ministry officials were also concerned that Japan’s direct energy aid to the DPRK would make for tensions with the ROK. A ministry source said, “If Japan gave the DPRK heavy fuel oil directly, this could antagonize the ROK. That is why we decided to do this (heavy fuel oil supply for the US) through KEDO. But this is not part of negotiations with the DPRK.”¹⁵⁷ However, the Foreign Ministry emphasized that the money was not a free gift for the US but a special or emergency fund to KEDO, and that therefore, the ministry was not expecting the money to be returned.¹⁵⁸ The government thus formally decided to help the US pay for the project.¹⁵⁹ The US agreed not to ask Japan again in the future to help pay for the heavy fuel oil project.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵³ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 8, 1996, p. 3.

¹⁵⁵ *Mainichi Shimbun*, Evening Edition, February 8, 1996, p. 3.

¹⁵⁶ “Japan to Provide KEDO’s Heavy Fuel Oil Cost: Tokyo Swallows Washington’s Buck and Pays US\$ 1900,000,” *Sankei Shimbun*, February 24, 1996. The same logic was restated when Japan decided to resume KEDO activities despite the DPRK’s Taepodong missile launch over Japan in 1998. See Chapter Five.

¹⁵⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ *ibid.*; and personal interview with a Foreign Ministry official (Mr. N) responsible for KEDO, Northeast Asia Section, Asia Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 14, 2000.

¹⁵⁹ The government held a meeting the Foreign Ministry and the Finance Ministry. However, they did not specify the amount to pay at this stage. See *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 9, 1996, p. 3. Satoshi Morimoto, a security analyst, was also cited as criticizing the decision, “Japan decided to pay for the (heavy fuel oil) cost not only for the US but for the ROK as well.”

¹⁶⁰ *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 12, 1996, p. 3.

The Hashimoto-Clinton Joint Declaration

Against the background of anti-US sentiment over Okinawa and the need to redefine Japan's alliance relations with the US, Hashimoto took the initiative, and the government announced its decision to pay for heavy fuel oil. The government decided to announce that Japan would help pay partially for US heavy fuel oil supply to the DPRK at the coming summit meeting with Clinton in Santa Monica.¹⁶¹ Hashimoto stressed that Japan was about to provide a total of US\$ 1.9 million, but that the money was an emergency liquidity fund for KEDO, not particularly for heavy fuel oil.¹⁶² In response to Clinton's expression of gratitude at the Summit, Hashimoto emphasised that "Heavy fuel oil supply is Washington's responsibility."¹⁶³ Their commitment to KEDO was further expressed at the April summit as well. This came when Hashimoto and Clinton declared the New Alliance Joint Statement.¹⁶⁴ Thus, Japan's decision to help the US pay for the heavy fuel oil shipment was Hashimoto's alliance commitment to Clinton.

Washington's Inability to Convince Japan to Pay in 1997

Although the first shipment of heavy fuel oil was provided by Japan, it was not a permanent solution to the administration's financial problem for KEDO's heavy fuel supply project.

The major obstacle was the tough stance held by the Republican-led US Congress toward the Clinton administration's policy on KEDO. In late June 1996, Congress passed a foreign aid resolution to reduce financial contributions to the heavy fuel oil

¹⁶¹ *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 22, 1996, p. 1.

¹⁶² *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 25, 1996, p. 2.

¹⁶³ *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 25, 1996, p. 1.

¹⁶⁴ Some elaborations on US-Japanese redefining of the alliance to be inserted here, including citations

project from US\$ 25 million to US\$ 13 million.¹⁶⁵ The US Department of State tried to convince Congress otherwise arguing that “The DPRK’ nuclear issue is concerned with US fundamental security. The US\$ 12 million difference of amount should be resolved. We must implement our promise. We ask Congress to appropriate the money.”¹⁶⁶

Secretary of State Christopher also suggested that Clinton might exercise his veto power.¹⁶⁷ The State Department also criticized the DPRK’s warning that if the US could not keep its promise by supplying heavy fuel oil on schedule, the DPRK would review the frozen (nuclear) programme by saying, “The statement is childish. The DPRK should be patient, and understand that the US is trying to implement the promise.”¹⁶⁸

Japan rejected the US request this time. Japanese ambassador to KEDO, Hiroki Segi, clearly rejected the US request for the payment of the shipment of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK. Segi stated that:

The (Clinton) administration should scrounge up for the money by itself. The Japanese government is not in the position to compensate for the lack of the cost for the (heavy fuel oil) project... They have not yet officially requested our help. But we provided US\$ 1.9 million of emergency fund. It is inconsistent of them to ask us again to compensate for the cost. I don’t think they can do so this time.¹⁶⁹

Not only the Japanese representative of KEDO, but also Japanese Foreign Ministry officials and LDP high-ranking policy-makers expressed their rejection of the US request. A governmental official said, “The last decision (of the Japanese government) to ship heavy fuel oil sent Pyongyang a wrong message that it can only ask

from the statement text concerning the Korean Peninsula.

¹⁶⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ Yukio Kashiwama, “US Government Puzzled with Congress’s Decision to Reduce Heavy Fuel Oil Cost,” *Sankei Shimbun*, Evening Edition, July 2, 1996.

¹⁶⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ “Interview with Hiroki Segi, Ambassador to KEDO; Japan Denies Any *Katagawari*,” *Sankei Shimbun*, July 18, 1996.

Washington to move Japan.”¹⁷⁰ An LDP high-ranking member also criticized that “There should be no such idea as special fund for KEDO. It is illogical to make such a fund to be able to give money to America.”¹⁷¹

Japan did not soften its stance. In the face of Japan’s rejection, the Clinton administration decided not to continue to push Japan to pay for the shipment of heavy fuel oil this time because it felt that Japan might reconsider remaining in the light-water project in KEDO if further pushed on this issue.¹⁷² It is not clear, though, if the US administration was also afraid of the consequences of Japan’s defection from the KEDO project, such as the total breakdown of the AF. However, the most crucial fact in this case is that the US was unable to force Japan to do what it wished because of fear of partial abandonment by its junior ally.

In addition, it is also worth pointing out that some Clinton administration officials were afraid that the Okinawa base issue might re-emerge to undermine the redefining of the US-Japan alliance between Hashimoto and Clinton.¹⁷³

Thus, the US government was unable to convince Japan to pay for the 1997 shipment of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK.

Alternative Explanations

The above explanation of America’s accommodation of Japan’s interest has been based on the revised alliance security dilemma model with emphasis on the alliance leader’s

¹⁷⁰ *Sankei Shimbun*, February 24, 1996.

¹⁷¹ *ibid.*

¹⁷² Personal interview in Washington with a former US KEDO official and a US Department of State official, July 21, 2000.

¹⁷³ Personal interview with Michael Green, senior fellow at the Council for Foreign Relations, in Washington on July 22, 2000.

fear of abandonment. Particularly, against the offensive realist prediction that the US would be able to reverse Japan's decision not to pay for the 2nd shipment of heavy oil fuel to the DPRK, the US was unable to do so.

Regarding alliance burden-sharing theory, as I discussed in the Introduction of this thesis, if the theory stands, there should be agreement between the US and Japan to share burden regarding the issue of heavy fuel oil shipment to the DPRK. There should also be a good cop-bad cop negotiation process in which the hegemon draws concessions from its allies. As we saw above, KEDO itself can be seen as a form of alliance burden-sharing in the financial area because the US and its two junior allies agreed to share the costs of supplying the light-water reactors to the DPRK, but they also agreed that the US alone would provide heavy fuel oil to the DPRK to help compensate for the energy loss caused by the halt of the DPRK's suspect nuclear reactors. However, the issue here is about the shipment of heavy fuel oil, not the light-water reactors. Therefore, it can be seen that in this case, the US is asking Japan to share burden also in the issue of heavy fuel oil. The fact that Japan did agree to help the first shipment of heavy fuel oil can be seen from alliance burden-sharing as Japan's effort to help the US maintain the AF and KEDO, but it still cannot explain why the US was unable to reverse Japan's decision not to repeat what it did for the first shipment.

However, as for the first shipment, the US was successful in getting Japan to say yes. The good-cop and bad-cop version of alliance burden-sharing may have some merits here. This version of the theory would predict that the US was successful in persuading Japan to pay for the first shipment by playing both good-cop (the Clinton administration) and bad-cop (the Republican-dominant Congress). This explanation is

promising, but the linkage between Japan's decision to pay for the first shipment and Japan's concern about the Congress's stance is not necessarily clear.

Regarding the structural liberal theory of co-binding, for the theory to be effective, the linkage between the liberal nature of the US and Washington's inability to force Japan to agree to pay for the shipment of heavy fuel oil should be established. There should also be a process in which the US tried to keep Japan in the institution of KEDO. As I pointed out in the Introduction of this thesis, the proponents of structural theory do not necessarily provide a clear working definition of liberal hegemons, it is hard to say if this theory can actually explain the hegemon's accommodative behaviour toward its weaker allies. Even if we accept that the US is a liberal hegemon and could be more compromising than coercive hegemon, the fact that in this chapter's case study the US was more concerned about Japan's possible defection from the light-water project of KEDO leads us to conclude that the theory of hegemons' alliance security dilemma, especially fear of partial abandonment by its junior ally, provides more plausible explanation for America's accommodative behaviour. Furthermore, the good cop-bad cop strategy is not evident in this case.

Conclusion

The case of the issue of heavy fuel oil supply to the DPRK between Japan and the US represents Washington's accommodation of Japan because the US was unable to completely reject Japan's opposition to its offer.

Against the offensive realist prediction that the US would successfully coerce Japan to provide economic assistance to the US to calm the enemy regime, the US failed

to push Japan to pay for the second shipment of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK. Instead, the US accepted Japan's rejection of the request because it feared that Japan would abandon the other project of KEDO and might eventually threaten to withdraw its support for US troops in Okinawa, an important arrangement under the auspices of the alliance between the two countries.

Furthermore, as for the validity of burden-sharing theory in this particular chapter, the particular decision of the US not to push Japan to send fuel to the DPRK seems to have sparse linkages with this explanation, although the alliance burden-sharing thesis seems effective in explaining Japan's decision to pay for the first shipment of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK.

Thus, while this chapter seems to support the hegemonic alliance security dilemma thesis, it cannot fully deny that the alliance burden-sharing thesis may have some merits.

As for structural liberal theory of co-binding, the two important conditions for this theory—the linkage between the US liberal nature and the outcome of Washington's accommodation of its weaker allies and America's use of KEDO to engage its weaker allies—are not apparent in this case.

Therefore, this chapter concludes that the hegemon's alliance security theory is more powerful than alliance burden-sharing theory and the structural theory of co-binding in explaining America's inability to push Japan to pay for the 2nd shipment of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK.

CHAPTER FOUR

UA Accommodation of ROK's Position on the DPKR Submarine Incursion

Introduction

This chapter shows that the US accommodated the ROK's interest through the US-ROK bilateral framework in dealing with the incursion of a DPRK submarine into the ROK territorial waters in September 1996. The US initially employed coercive language toward the ROK, but it was unable to force the ROK to change its stated options to attack the DPRK and cease participation in KEDO and the Four Party Peace Talks.¹⁷⁴ The Four Party Talks were proposed jointly by US President Bill Clinton and ROK President Kim Young-sam to begin talks among the US, the two Koreas, and China to reach a permanent peace treaty to replace the 1953 Armistice.

The real purpose of the talks was to make another opportunity for the ROK to directly talk with the DPRK in addition to KEDO. Although the ROK government was willing to participate in the talks, the submarine incident made the ROK reconsider its involvement in the talks. Later, however, on the condition that the ROK softened its position, the US moved away from coercion and played the role of go-between. As a result, the DPRK issued a formal apology to the ROK, and the incident was resolved. This chapter argues that the shift from coercion to accommodation in Washington's behaviour toward the ROK indicates Washington's fear of abandonment by the ROK, its junior ally.

¹⁷⁴ For KEDO, see the Introduction of this thesis.

Background: The Submarine Incident

Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, Pyongyang had carried out several offensive terrorist attacks and submarine infiltrations into ROK waters. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the DPRK's provocations against the ROK were aimed at getting closer to the US. In other words, the DPRK used the ROK as an instrument to get Washington's attention. The DPRK had shifted its diplomatic efforts away from Russia and the PRC to the US because it believed that getting closer to the US would facilitate the reduction of US forces in the South.¹⁷⁵ The DPRK's submarine incursion into ROK waters on September 18, 1996 was one such provocation. The incident was the most important because it had the potential to end the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and the DPRK and also the Four Party Peace Talks.¹⁷⁶ The incident also highlighted the difference of threat perception between the US and the ROK. The ROK was more sensitive to the DPRK's frequent provocations, while the US was more concerned about the political consequences of the breakdown of KEDO and the Four Party Peace Talks.

A thirty-seven-yard long DPRK *Shark*-class submarine, with 26 army squad agents on board, infiltrated ROK waters. An ROK taxi driver happened to see the abandoned submarine near Kangnung, on the east coast of the ROK, and notified the local police. The ROK Defense Ministry mobilized 40,000 troops, helicopter gunships, and sniffer dogs to search for the agents.¹⁷⁷ Twenty five of the 26 DPRK agents were found dead in the mountain. They had killed each other to avoid being caught. One agent, Lee Gwans-

¹⁷⁵ The negative security assurance article in the 1994 Agreed Framework was to alleviate the DPRK's fear of the US forces in the ROK and the US nuclear umbrella covering the ROK.

¹⁷⁶ Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 387-393; Kashiyama Yukio, "Beichoukoushou No Uchimaku 94-99 Shousai Ge (1994-99 US-DPRK Negotiations Inside Report (2))," *Sankei Shimbun*, November 24, 1999, p. 4; Lee Kwang-soo, *Senkosirai* (translated by Shinichi Pyon, *The Order of Infiltration: Confession on the DPRK's Submarine Guerrilla Incident* (Tokyo: Za Masada, 1998).

soo was arrested alive. The DPRK agents were not the only victims. Four civilians, two military personnel and two policemen also died.¹⁷⁸ The search for the submarine agents ended in early November.

The ROK government demanded that the DPRK formally apologise to the ROK for the incident, but the DPRK initially refused. The DPRK, instead, announced that the incident was only an accident, and even demanded that the ROK return the bodies of the submarine crew to the DPRK. The DPRK insisted that the submarine had encountered engine trouble and had drifted south, leaving the crew with no other choice but to get to the enemy side's land. The DPRK even threatened to abandon the Agreed Framework and resume its nuclear program at Yongbyon.¹⁷⁹ Thus, tensions on the peninsula rose again, and the incident became a test for the US-ROK alliance ties.

The ROK's Response

The ROK's reaction to the submarine infiltration was strong. President Kim Yong-sam was extremely angry. The government immediately formulated a plan to strike the DPRK's clandestine submarine base in Wonsan with F-16 fighters.¹⁸⁰ The DPRK reciprocated with a tough statement demanding the immediate return of the submarine and its crew members.¹⁸¹ The ROK Parliament Committee on Military Affairs called for a report from Defense Minister Lee Yang-ho.¹⁸² The ROK Ministry of National Defense announced on September 29 in response to the DPRK's demand for the immediate return of the submarine and crew members:

¹⁷⁷ Oberdorfer, *ibid.*, p. 387.

¹⁷⁸ Some were shot dead during the shooting exchanges between the ROK authority and the DPRK agents.

¹⁷⁹ Oberdorfer, p. 389. My account here is based on his interview with ROK high-ranking officials at the ROK Ministry of Trade and Foreign Affairs.

¹⁸⁰ *ibid.*

¹⁸¹ *Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)*, September 23, 1996.

¹⁸² "Mujang Kanjop Taecheok Chukung Kukbanwi Nokwum," *Chosun Ilbo*, September 19, 1995.

The recent North Korean armed infiltration, deploying a submarine and mobilizing specialized troops, was a military provocation. It is obvious last April when North Korea declared that it was abandoning its duty to maintain and control the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the military Demarcation line (MDL), thus heightening tension on the Korean Peninsula. The latest provocation could be defined as combat...The Republic of Korea Government flatly rejects the threat and makes it clear to the world that it will resolutely counter any further provocation by North Korea.¹⁸³

ROK Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Gong Ro-myung requested the UNSC issue a statement of condemnation against the DPRK. In response to Gong's request, the UNSC, including China, issued a statement expressing serious concern over the submarine incursion by the DPRK.¹⁸⁴ The ROK also demanded that the DPRK issue a formal apology for the incident. The ROK froze its KEDO activities and the Four Party Peace Talks.¹⁸⁵ When the submarine incident occurred, the DPRK negotiating team was at the KEDO headquarters in New York for site-and-service protocol negotiations.¹⁸⁶ When the submarine accident occurred, according to Scott Snyder, the incident had little effect on the negotiations themselves.¹⁸⁷ However, the DPRK appeared to have hastened the conclusion of negotiations following the submarine incident. The site-and services protocol was also signed a week after the submarine incident occurred. However, Kim Young-sam, threatened to stop the ROK's contribution to KEDO.

¹⁸³ Lt. Yong-ok, Assistant Minister of National Defense for Policy, September 23, 1996.

¹⁸⁴ Presidential Statement Adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), *Expressing Serious Concern over North Korea's Infiltration of Armed Agents Aboard a Submarine into the South and Calling on Pyongyang to Abide by the Korean Armistice Agreement*, New York, October 15, 1996. At a formal meeting of UNSC, all 15 council members unanimously adopted the statement. UNSC already issued an "oral" press statement expressing concern over the incident.

¹⁸⁵ The Japanese government also expressed his understanding of the ROK's reaction. Personal interview KEDO officials in New York on July 20, 2000.

¹⁸⁶ Scott Snyder, *Negotiating On the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior* (Washington, USA: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), p. 132.

¹⁸⁷ *ibid.*

Washington's Accommodation of the ROK's Interest

In the face of the ROK's threat to halt its KEDO contribution, the US expressed concern, but was unable to reject the threat.

The Secretary General of KEDO, Stephen Bosworth, expressed concern that KEDO's light-water reactor project would be delayed by Kim Yong-sam's decision to postpone dispatching a team of site inspectors from the ROK to the DPRK,¹⁸⁸ but he anticipated such delay. Bosworth stated that:

The US, the ROK, and Japan cannot change the idea to promote the (KEDO) plan, but KEDO cannot exist in a political vacuum. It is obvious that (the DPRK's) behavior such as the submarine incident brings about some consequences. (The incident) would affect the future schedule (of the light-water reactor project).¹⁸⁹

KEDO officials tried to prevent erosion of progress in implementing the project in this difficult and tense environment. However, the US finally accommodated the ROK's interest. The US government decided to side with the ROK to temporarily halt the KEDO project. US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Winston Lord, on a visit to Seoul, declared a pause in the implementation of the KEDO project.¹⁹⁰ It was decided that the last of the site survey teams, whose job it was to determine the site of the LWR, could not travel north in such a tense atmosphere for fear of possible reprisals.

¹⁸⁸ The inspectors were to check the geographical conditions for building the two light-water nuclear reactors in Kumho, the DPRK.

¹⁸⁹ Yukio Kasiyama, "Kedo Director General Admits Light-Water Reactor Construction Would Delay," *Sankei Shimbun*, Evening Edition, October 25, 1996. Bosworth, however, emphasized that despite the ROK's decision, KEDO would proceed with preparations for the construction of the reactors with the prospect that the construction site would be determined anyway. Bosworth also revealed that as for the heavy fuel oil project, the shipment for the year of 1996 was already made to the DPRK on October 21.

¹⁹⁰ Oberdorfer, *ibid*, p. 387.

and the South because the latter could lead to the break-up of the former. The outcome of this talk was that the US offered another food aid package to the DPRK and that both sides agreed to continue to directly talk to each other.¹⁹⁴ The US was thus successful in calming down the DPRK.

The next step the US took was to remind the ROK of the importance of the maintenance of the 1994 Agreed Framework. At the APEC meeting in Manila in November 1996, Clinton had an opportunity to stress directly to President Kim the importance of keeping the Agreed Framework in place while managing political tensions between North and South Korea.¹⁹⁵ At the meeting, Clinton won Kim's reassurance that the US would get the DPRK to issue a formal statement of apology to the ROK.

Washington's diplomacy with the DPRK focused on the form of a DPRK apology that would be politically acceptable to the ROK. During the first three weeks of December, US negotiators met with DPRK counterparts with the intention to pacify Seoul's outrage at the incursion. During almost a dozen sessions, US and DPRK officials determined the strength of the statement of regret, to whom it would be directed, and how it would be disseminated.¹⁹⁶

In the end, the DPRK issued a formal apology through its official KCNA foreign broadcast to the ROK for the submarine incident. The DPRK Statement, according to Scott Snyder, "effectively broke the Gordian knot of tension between North and South and paved the way for North Korea's acceptance of a joint briefing with the United

¹⁹³ *Sankei Shimbun*, 1999.

¹⁹⁴ *NAPSNet Daily Report*, The Nautilus Institute, September/October, 1996.

¹⁹⁵ Snyder, *op cit*, 1999, p. 133.

¹⁹⁶ Snyder, *ibid*.

States and South Korea regarding the Four Party Talks proposal.”¹⁹⁷ Shortly after the DPRK statement was issued, DPRK Ambassador Ho Jong traveled to New York to sign the site-and-service protocol, and the normal pace of KEDO operations and interaction with North Korea was immediately resumed.¹⁹⁸

Resolution of the Incident: DPRK Apology and Facilitated US-DPRK Talks

The North-South confrontation was formally resolved when the ROK accepted the DPRK’s statement of regret over the incident as a formal “apology” in late 1996. The DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman announced through its official Korean Central News Agency:

The spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK is authorized to express deep regret for the submarine incident in the coastal waters of Kangnung, South Korea, in September 1996, that caused the tragic loss of human life. The DPRK will make efforts to ensure that such an incident will not recur, and will work with others for durable peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.¹⁹⁹

The statement was accepted by the US at the 10th round of US-DPRK talks on December 29, 1996. Consequently, the ROK agreed to return the dead bodies of the 25 submarine crew members to the DPRK. The US Department of State issued a statement praising the DPRK’s “apology” and the resolution of the incident. However, the US and

¹⁹⁷ Snyder, *bid.*

¹⁹⁸ Snyder, *bid.*, p. 133. In addition, Snyder notes, “The submarine incident demonstrated the vulnerability of the KEDO operation during periods of high political tensions between the two Koreas. One result of the crisis was that it provided a clear rationale for pursuing contacts on the fundamental issue of replacing the armistice with a more permanent peace mechanism. This was the primary objective of the Four Party Talks that had been proposed by Presidents Kim and Clinton in April 1996. A powerful political motivation thus lay behind U.S. diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula throughout 1997, the focus of which was to entice North Korea into accepting the Four Party Talks proposal. Without progress in a political dialogue on tension reduction such as that promised through the Four Party process, the Geneva Agreed Framework and KEDO would not be sustained.”

¹⁹⁹ “North Korea’s Statement Apologizing for its Submarine Incursion into South Korea, Expressing Deep regret for the Incident and Ensuring it Would Not Recur, Pyongyang,” December 29, 1996, reprinted in *People’s Korea*, No. 1773, January 18, 1997, p. 1.

the ROK also confirmed that both allies would maintain a firm stance against any future DPRK provocations. The two allies announced a joint statement showing “deep concern” over the DPRK’s provocation and refuted that there were any policy gaps between the two:

Both the ROK and the U.S., after holding consultations during Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord’s visit to Korea, expressed deep concern over the recent North Korea incursion and its threats of retaliation against the ROK. Both sides reconfirmed the importance of maintaining the strength of the alliance and its joint defense readiness...The U.S and the ROK affirm the steadfastness of our alliance and refute reports in the media of policy differences between us.²⁰⁰

President Clinton also expressed his personal gratitude to President Kim for agreeing to issue the statement. Clinton stated on December 29 that:

I extend my appreciation to President Kim Young-sam for his personal efforts to resolve the submarine incursion in a way that opens the door for future South-North dialogue. The United States and South Korea have cooperated closely as firm allies to resolve this issue. I hope discussions can begin to move forward on the Four Party Peace Talks that President Kim Young Sam and I offered last April.²⁰¹

Clinton’s reference to the Four Party Peace Talks indicates the US’ concern that it might lose cooperation from the ROK regarding the framework.

The US Department of State also issued an independent announcement on the resolution of the submarine incident. Sandra J. Kristoff, Special Assistant to the

²⁰⁰ ROK-U.S. Joint Press Statement, *Expressing Deep Concern over the North Korean Incursion and Its Threats of Retaliation Against the ROK*, Seoul, October 12, 1996.

²⁰¹ Bill Clinton, *Statement on Nkorea’s Deep Regret For Sub Incident*, US Department of State, December 29, 1996. (<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/nksec1.htm>)

President and Senior Director for Asian Affairs, National Security Council, announced that:²⁰²

In fact, in retrospect the President's meeting with Kim in Manila was, in many ways, a kind of a turning point in our handling of this issue and our thinking about this issue, because it was that meeting that reconfirmed and reiterated that the U.S-South Korea alliance was the best deterrent to provocative North Korean actions. It was reaffirmation of the US-South Korean commitment that the Agreed Framework and the Four-Party talks would be treated separately and apart from the submarine incident and would not be put in jeopardy because of inflammatory conditions on the peninsula.²⁰³

The announcement emphasized the resolution was a result of US-ROK cooperation, but this can be seen as the result of Washington's accommodation of the ROK's stance because of Washington's fear of abandonment by the ROK.

Alternative Explanations

This chapter has explained Washington's accommodation of the ROK's interest by the logic of the bigger ally's fear of abandonment. As for alternative explanations, other explanations do not seem to fit in this case.

First, according to the offensive realist view, Washington's coercion should be successful in getting the ROK to remain silent about the submarine incident. On the contrary, the US shifted from coercion to accommodation. I suggest that the shift indicates Washington's fear of abandonment by its junior ally. The US agreed to persuade the DPRK to issue a formal apology to the ROK in exchange for the ROK's agreement to withdraw its decision to strike back and to stop its contribution to KEDO.

²⁰² Sandra J. Kristoff, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asian Affairs, National Security Council, *Special Briefing on Resolution of Submarine Incident on Korean Peninsula*, December 30, 1996.

President Clinton's statement thanking President Kim's effort to resolve the incident suggests that the US feared the break-up of the Four Party Peace Talks. Thus, as discussed in Chapter One, the shift from coercion to accommodation in Washington's behaviour toward the ROK indicates Washington's fear of abandonment by the ROK.

Second, if the theory of alliance burden-sharing is effective, there should be agreement between the US and the ROK to share burden or mission. Also, there should be a bargaining process in which the US takes a good cop-bad cop strategy to get its junior ally to do share burden. Regarding this good cop-bad cop part of the theory, it would predict that the US should act to accommodate the ROK's tough stance on the DPRK because the US and the ROK had already agreed to that the US would play good cop, while the ROK would play bad cop in order to get the DPRK to apologise for the submarine incursion into ROK territorial waters. However, there was no agreement between the two allies to share mission in the case of Pyongyang's submarine incursion. Rather, as I already mentioned, the threat perception between the US and the ROK was so divergent that that the US feared the ROK's defection from both KEDO and the Four Party Peace Talks. As a result, the US accommodated the ROK's demand.

Finally, the structural liberal theory of co-binding would argue that the US accommodated the ROK's stance because its interest is co-bound with that of the ROK in KEDO and more importantly, its alliance with the ROK. This argument seems to be able to explain Washington's accommodation of the ROK's interest in this chapter except for the argument's sparse connection between liberalism and the tendency to accommodate junior allies' interest. Fear of abandonment by smaller allies can better explain Washington's accommodation in this case.

²⁰³ Ibid.

Conclusion

Against the offensive realist prediction of the hegemon's coercive and uncompromising attitude toward its junior allies, this chapter showed that in response to the DPRK's submarine incursion, the ROK threatened to strike back and halt its contribution to KEDO and participation in the Four Party Peace Talks. The US initially tried to coerce the ROK, but it then shifted to accommodation out of fear of partial abandonment by the ROK.

Where the alternative explanations seem to be unable to provide better explanations of America's accommodation with the ROK, it can be concluded that hegemonic alliance security dilemma is more useful in explaining Washington's accommodation of Seoul in this chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

The US Failure to Keep Japan from Deciding to Launch Intelligence Satellites

Introduction

This chapter is a case study of Washington's accommodation toward one of its junior allies in the face of the DPRK's security threat. This chapter shows that the US was unable to stop Japan from launching intelligence satellites for fear that Japan might not resume its financial contribution to, and participation in, the LWR project in KEDO, which Japan had halted in the wake of the DPRK's missile launch over Japan on August 31, 1998.

The US feared losing Japan's cooperation in KEDO because that would lead to the break-up of the Agreed Framework-KEDO scheme. The US was also concerned about Japan's decision to possess and launch its own intelligence satellites because it meant Japan's distrust toward Washington's intelligence capability and Japan's future independence from the US "information umbrella". However, the US accepted Japan's decision to launch its own intelligence satellites while gaining Japan's reassurance of its participation in the US-led missile defence initiative and Japan's agreement to resume its activities at KEDO.

Background: The DPRK's Missile Launch over Japan

The DPRK's missile launch over Japan shows how the shift in threat perception could affect the dynamism of alliance politics. Before the launch, threat perception of North Korea's missile was divergent among Washington, Seoul and Japan. Table 2 summarises the divergences.

Table 2: Allies' Threat Perceptions

	Missile Threat	Stance on Missile Defense	Position on DPRK Nuclear Program	Conventional Threat
US	High on Long Range	Positive	CVID	Low (Except for UFSK)
ROK	High on Short Range	Negative	Freeze	High
Japan	High on Mid Range	Positive	CVID	Low (Except if the weapons are used by special forces in Japan)

(Note: CVID stands for complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of nuclear programmes.)

An unidentifiable object was launched over Japan on August 31, 1998. It was the day when KEDO executive member countries were about to confirm their funding for the light-water reactor project in New York. A US intelligence satellite initially identified the object as a rocket, two or three-staged, but was unable to be more precise. The DPRK announced that it had successfully placed a satellite of its own making into orbit.²⁰⁴ However, both governments of Japan and the US were unable to confirm the presence of such a satellite.²⁰⁵ The US, the ROK, and Japan, working both separately

²⁰⁴ North Koreans Declare They Launched a Satellite, Not a Missile," *New York Times*, September 5, 1998.

²⁰⁵ The US initially acknowledged that the object launched by the DPRK was a satellite, as the DPRK claimed, but the satellite never successfully entered orbit. *New York Times*, "A North Korean Satellite? U.S. Is Searching," September 6, 1998; "U.S. Appears Unsure Over Launching by North Korea," *International Herald Tribune*, September 9, 1998; "Disagreement Over How Far NK Rocket Debris

and in collaboration attempted to confirm what had been launched.²⁰⁶ Finally, they reached consensus that the DPRK test-launched a Taepodong 1 missile with a target range of 1,500 km.²⁰⁷

Prior to the launch, both the US and its allies were aware of signs that the DPRK was preparing for a missile test-launch. On August 14, 1998, the US government told visiting Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Kohmura that the DPRK was preparing for such a test.²⁰⁸ However, the US was unable to specify the kind of missile to be launched. Immediately after Komura's visit to Washington, the Defence Agency of Japan (JDA) immediately dispatched an Aegis ship with a radar detection system and an EP 3 intelligence collection ship to monitor the DPRK's moves regarding the possible test. JDA assumed that the missile would fall somewhere in the Sea of Japan just as a Rodong 1 missile had done in 1993.²⁰⁹ The Japanese MOFA asked the DPRK not to resume missile tests at the bilateral informal and irregular working-level meetings in Beijing, but there was no formal response from Pyongyang. Despite this initial information, the missile launch came as a surprise to the allies because many US, ROK, and Japanese officials did not expect the DPRK to have access to such technology.²¹⁰ The rocket's third stage failed to place a satellite into orbit, as the DPRK claimed it was

Reached: Pentagon," *Korea Times*, September 18, 1998; "NK Missile Caught U.S. Intelligence Unawares," *Korea Times*, September 24, 1998.

²⁰⁶ On September 15, 1998, US defence officials announced that they believe the object was a three-stage rocket, not two-stage, but that the rocket failed to enter orbit. The officials also announced that the rocket was more powerful than initially expected because the third stage of the rocket used solid fuel, which means North Korean "missiles" could be long-range ones capable of reaching as far as Alaska. *New York Times*, "U.S. Calls North Korean Rocket a Failed Satellite," September 15, 1998.

²⁰⁷ Christopher Hughes, *Diplomatic Bluebook 1999*, *Asahi Shimbun*, September 1, 1999, p. 3.

²⁰⁸ *Asahi Shimbun*, September 2, 1998, p. 3.

²⁰⁹ *Asahi Shimbun*, op cit.

²¹⁰ Personal interview with a US defence official on July 22, 2000; personal interview with Japanese defence officials on December 23, 1999; and personal interview with ROK defence officials on December 15, 1999.

attempting to do, and the rocket flew further than the US and its allies had assumed was capable by Pyongyang's rocket programmes.²¹¹

Japan's Responses

Japan was both surprised and angry at the missile launch. Even though, on August 14, Japanese and US leaders actually discussed that possibility, but they were unsure what specific missile Pyongyang would test-launch.²¹² Accordingly, when the DPRK actually launched the missile launch, the event caught Japan by surprise. The Japanese government took the following measures in response to the launch:

- (1) Convey to NK our sense of regret and strongest objection at all levels and demand explanations from NK as well as urge them to suspend the development and export of missiles.
- (2) Although Japan has so far indicated its willingness to resume the normalization negotiation without precondition, Japan will not enter into such negotiation for the time being.
- (3) Food and other assistance to NK will not be extended for the time being.
- (4) Depending on further developments, further measures will be considered by the Government as a whole.

.... After consulting with US and ROK, progress on KEDO will be suspended for the time being.

- (1) Information sharing will be further strengthened among relevant government agencies by holding information meetings in time of emergency, and such concrete measures as research on the use of visual image satellites will be promoted in with a view to enhancing Japan's own information gathering capabilities.
- (2) In connection with Japan's defence policy, technical study on the ballistic missile defence system will be further continued, and the bills related to the Japan-US Defence Guidelines are expected to be approved and enacted soon.²¹³

²¹¹ "NK Missile Caught US Intelligence Unawares," *Korea Times/Hankuk Shinmun*, September 24, 1998.

²¹² *Ibid.*

²¹³ *Announcement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Japan's immediate response to North Korea's missile launch*, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 1, 1998.

The most notable decision in the above announcement was Japan's suspension of contribution to KEDO because it had been a symbol of alliance ties between Japan and the US regarding the DPRK nuclear issue. In addition to above announced measures, on September 2, Japan withdrew the permission that had been granted to North Korea's Air Koryo for nine charter flights between Pyongyang and Nagoya, and decided not to permit any further chartered flights. Japan also condemned the DPRK through the UN, suspended bilateral talks and all civilian exchanges with the DPRK.

US Successful Persuasion of Japan to Return to KEDO

At first, the US acknowledged as legitimate Japan's decision to suspend its contribution to KEDO because the missile was launched on the same day Japan was to confirm its financial support for the light-water reactor project. However, among Japan's announced measures, the US was more worried about its suspension of KEDO contribution than its increased interest in introducing its own intelligence satellites because the US feared that Japan might not resume the contribution.²¹⁴ The US government, through KEDO's Executive Director Desaix Anderson, said to Japanese officials that "We can proceed (despite the launch). Don't dismiss your support for KEDO".²¹⁵ US officials tried hard to persuade Japan to go back to KEDO. They also suggested that halting KEDO would give the DPRK an excuse for resuming its nuclear program. Japan joined KEDO because the US would protect Japan from Pyongyang's nuclear threat. In light of the missile launch, Anderson's request, and the US offer, came as Washington's concern increased that Japan would be the culprit for breaking the AF, which had worked as the de facto institutional lynchpin in US engagement with the DPRK.

²¹⁴ Personal interview with Desaix Anderson, KEDO Executive Director in New York, July 5, 2000.

²¹⁵ Personal interview with Desaix Anderson, KEDO Executive Director in New York, July 5, 2000.

In response to their offer, Japan agreed to sign the light-water agreement after the UN decided, on Japan's request, to issue a formal condemnation to the DPRK's missile launch.²¹⁶ On October 21, 1999, the MOFA announced that it would resume its contribution to KEDO. The Ministry stated that:

Regarding the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) as the most realistic and effective framework for preventing North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, and judging that Japan should not give North Korea an excuse to resume nuclear weapons development by causing the collapse of this framework, the Government announced on 21 October that it would reopen cooperation in KEDO. Japan simultaneously made clear that it would maintain the above-mentioned measures other than those related to KEDO so as to avoid any misunderstanding by North Korea.²¹⁷

Thus, Japan went back to KEDO. But as the above statement indicates, Japan's strong stance was maintained. Although Japan compromised about KEDO, Japan did not do so on possession of intelligence satellites. There was no clear agreement between the US and Japan that Japan resumes its KEDO activities in exchange for the US agreement on Japan's possession of intelligence satellites. However, as demonstrated below, the US wanted Japan to remain in KEDO to maintaining the AF. This indicates that the US feared partial abandonment by Japan - defection from KEDO. And the US allowed Japan to give vent to its distrust toward the US intelligence capability by possessing its own intelligence satellites.

²¹⁶ *Sankei*, *ibid.*

²¹⁷ *Diplomatic Bluebook 1999*. Also personal interview with a Japanese official responsible for KEDO.

Washington's Accommodation of Japan's Interest in Intelligence Satellites

Japan had long been considering the introduction of its own intelligence satellites. Both the MOFA and the JDA had been studying the introduction of intelligence satellites.²¹⁸

JDA became even more serious about Japan's own intelligence satellites because of the uncertainty of whether the DPRK's missile fell on the Sea of Japan or the Pacific Ocean.²¹⁹

It is in this context that the LDP began to voice loudly the need for Japan's own satellites. JDA Director General Norota Hosei, who was also an LDP member, asserted that "Japan should have its own intelligence satellites for intelligence collection."²²⁰ At the LDP general session on September 1, former Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama said that:

The Diet decision on restrictions on space development has been an obstacle to Japan's having its own intelligence satellites, but it is tragic that we cannot fully employ our ability to launch our own (intelligence) satellites.²²¹

Nakayama formed and led a team by LDP Diet members to further investigate the introduction of Japan's own intelligence satellites.²²² MOFA requested that funds be allocated in the 1998 budget for a second year of studies.²²³ There was, however, one

²¹⁸ Another explanation for MOFA's study of intelligence satellites independent from JDA holds that doing so would give such a study a lower-key outlook.

²¹⁹ The US told JDA that Pentagon was still unable to confirm the precise spot where the missile hit, but the ROK Defense Ministry revealed to reporters that the missile fell on the Pacific Ocean, not the Sea of Japan. *Asahi Shimbun*, September 2, 1998, p. 3. Initially, ROK Defence and JDA agreed beforehand to announce that the missile fell on the Sea of Japan, but the ROK told reporters that the missile flew 1,380km for slip of the tongue. "1,380km" means the missile went over Japan from the DPRK and fell somewhere on the Pacific Ocean.

²²⁰ *Asahi, Shimbun*, *ibid.*

²²¹ *Asahi, Shimbun*, *ibid.*

²²² The LDP satellite investigation team visited the US and initially concluded the satellites be US-made. However, Japan decided to produce its own satellites instead of importing from the US. Japan also decided to launch four satellites by 2003. The US is still asking LDP to use US satellites, and given that Japan has to depend on the US for personnel training, the satellite technology would likely be US-made anyway.

²²³ *NAPSNet Daily Report*, the Nautilus Institute, October 3, 1998.

large legal obstacle to Japan's introduction of its own satellites. The 1969 House of Representative Resolution on the Basic Principle of Development and Use of Space regulates space development only for peaceful use. However, the LDP argued that the satellites would indeed be used for peaceful purposes. They explained the proposed satellites were not in breach of the resolution, as they would be used for information gathering for positive peace, democracy, deployment of defence policy for security as exclusively defensive, and contribution for democratic goals of emergency preparation, and diffused in foreign countries for commercial use.²²⁴ The Democratic Party also agreed to the LDP's interpretation of the resolution and to the introduction of the satellites.²²⁵ The Obuchi Cabinet then formally decided on November 6 to introduce the satellites. Prime Minister Obuchi stated, "We conduct some measures like the introduction of information-gathering satellites in order to achieve our country's security in the surrounding international environments."²²⁶ In May 1999, the government decided not to buy US-made satellites and to have Japanese industries develop satellites. Chief Cabinet Secretary, Hiromu Nonaka, announced that the government would introduce the satellites to respond swiftly to contingencies in operation or maintenance. He also pointed out that National Aerospace Development Agency (NASDA) had the technologies required to develop the satellites and that one-meter definition photographs could provide significant information.²²⁷

²²⁴ *LDP Policy Statement*, June 21, 1999. <http://www.jimin.or.jp/jimin/saishin/seisaku-21.html>.

²²⁵ *Sankei Shimbun*, June 28, 1999.

²²⁶ Prime Minister's Office, November 19, 1999. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/souri/990119sisei.html>.

²²⁷ Prime Minister's Office, November 19, 1999. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/souri/990119sisei.html>.

US Reaction to Japan's Move toward Intelligence Independence

From a US perspective, Japan's move toward having its own intelligence satellites appeared to be Japan's effort to gain more independence from the US in the security area. The move was not as dramatic as officially deciding to seek military nuclear capabilities, but independence from the US in strategic intelligence signified an even more chilling scenario to the US.²²⁸ Washington's initial reaction to Japan's move toward having its own reconnaissance was negative. When Japanese policy-makers began calling for Japan's own intelligence satellites in September, US defence officials reacted by saying "why."²²⁹ US defence and intelligence officials then began considering the suspension of technical assistance to Japan if Japan continued to build the satellites.²³⁰ It was reported that the official reason for the US opposition to Japan's intelligence satellites was that Japan would be duplicating US capabilities and that this would not be an efficient utilization of Japanese resources.²³¹ The US officials also noted that the treaty that ties US and Japanese defence specifically stresses that each nation should seek to exploit areas in which they have superior capabilities. According to US officials technological duplication violates the spirit of the treaty and squanders scarce resources on an unnecessary capability,²³² However, the US concerns were deeper than mere budgetary ones. The US intelligence capability is a powerful

²²⁸ Personal Interview with US defense officials, July 22, 1999.

²²⁹ *Sankei Shimbun*, June 28, 1999.

²³⁰ Stratfor Global Intelligence Update, "US-Japanese Squabble over Japanese Spy Satellite," October 9, 1998. Initially, the LDP satellite investigation team was considering introducing multi-purpose satellites, instead of intelligence satellites because of US opposition to Japan's own intelligence satellites. However, because of US inclination to agree to Japan's decision to introduce its own intelligence satellites, Nakayama, leader of the team, decided to narrow his focus to intelligence satellites. Furthermore, Nakayama also decided to include JDA's view that multi-purpose satellites are technologically far more complicated to use and that they are of no use for reconnaissance. Nakayama stated, "(Also) reconnaissance activities are necessary for security, and all self-defense forces are actually engaged in these activities." However, Nakayama decided not to stick to the term "reconnaissance satellite" because the general public of Japan might not easily accept such a term. See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, "Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Project on Satellite Narrows Down to Reconnaissance Purpose," October 2, 1998. (<http://www.yomiuri.co.jp>)

²³¹ Personal interview with US defense officials in Washington, July 23, 1999.

instrument in managing both enemies and allies.²³³ *Desert Storm*, the US military operation during the 1990-91 Gulf War, demonstrated the US ability and willingness to withhold some space-based intelligence from coalition partners and to shape strategy and limit allied options.²³⁴ Allowing Japan to have its own intelligence satellites would lower the effectiveness of “America’s information edge.”²³⁵ The US media also cited Japanese officials as expressing a need for Japan’s own intelligence satellites for example, *The Washington Post*, carried a column stating that:

Subtle signs of change in outlook and the laying of a foundation for greater activism in world politics in the future were also apparent on a recent visit to Tokyo. One was a low-key symbolically important Japanese decision to design, build and launch within four years four wholly Japanese reconnaissance satellites... One official told me Japan would also resist expected U.S. pressure for a joint satellite project, adding: “This is technology we will develop on our own.” North Korea’s firing of a new test missile into the Sea of Japan last August is cited as the trigger for the satellite effort by several officials. “There is a need here to cover North Korea on a more regular basis than U.S. satellites can, given their global responsibilities, said one.”²³⁶

In response to the concern, the Japanese Embassy in Washington announced that such claims were merely exaggerated.²³⁷ Japanese Ambassador to Washington and former Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Kunihiko Saito criticized a column in

²³² Personal interview with US defense officials in Washington, July 23, 1999.

²³³ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and William A. Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1996, p. 20.

²³⁴ Some US allies in Europe reacted negatively to US monopoly of intelligence during the war. After the war, France, for example, began developing an autonomous European spy satellite capability to avoid being put at a disadvantage again.

²³⁵ The media reacted to Japan’s decision to introduce its own intelligence satellites quite negatively. This negative reaction set a schema in the US elite to perceive further Japanese defense behaviour, such as strengthening maritime power against DPRK spy ships, as Japan’s military independence from the US. See for example, Nicholas D. Kristof, “Japan May Launch a Satellite in Response to North Korea’s,” *New York Times*, September 11, 1998. Stephanie Strom, “Japan Beginning to Flex Its Military Muscles,” *New York Times*, April 8, 1999. Japanese Ambassador to Washington Shunji Yanai soon rebutted US media’s criticism by arguing that Japan’s move was quite natural but that the move does not signify Japan’s willingness to remilitarise. See *NAPSNet*, April 10, 1999. However, as the DPRK’s threat escalates, US media began to see Japan’s defence activities as “healthy.” See “Japan Discovers Defence,” *New York Times* (editorial), August 26, 1999.

²³⁶ Jim Hoagland, “Land of Subtle Change,” *Washington Post*, May 30, 1999, B07.

²³⁷ “Ambassador Yanai Rebutts Washington Post,” *Asahi Shimbun*, May 31, 1999.

Washington the Post on May 30 regarding Japan's decision to launch reconnaissance satellites. Saito stated, "It is mistaken to think that Japan is beginning to go its own way."²³⁸

On July 28, 1999, the US officially announced that it supported Japan's decision to possess its own intelligence satellites. US Secretary of Defense announced that:

The United States and Japan expect to sign a Memorandum of Understanding soon that will establish a framework for our collaboration on TMD research. It will also cover subsequent development and production, if this is the path that Japan selects. It is important to note that Theater Missile Defense is purely a defensive system, both for the United States and Japan, and our work on this project should not be a threat to anyone. On satellites, I made it clear that the United States supports Japan's indigenous program, and we are willing to cooperate on that program. Our technical experts will continue the discussions underway of this particular matter. And we are also going to continue to share our intelligence and information with Japan just as we do now.²³⁹

The US thus officially accepted Japan's decision to possess its own intelligence satellites as well as Japan's increased commitment Theatre Missile Defense (TMD). Japan's increased commitment, according to some US defense officials, worked as a reassurance of Japan's commitment to the US-Japan alliance and alleviated Washington's fear of abandonment.²⁴⁰ However, some concern remained on the part of the US regarding Japan's decision. Some US defense officials were concerned that the US inability to provide sufficient defense information to Japan, including critical information about the DPRK's missile capability, might cause Japan to drift further

²³⁸ "Ambassador Saito Rejects Washington Post Article," *Asahi Shimbun*, June 2, 1999.

²³⁹ *Press Conference in Tokyo, Japan with Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Minister of State for Defence Housei Norota*, US Department of Defense News Briefing, July 28, 1999.

²⁴⁰ Personal interview with US defense officials on July 23, 2000.

away from the US.²⁴¹ They suggested that their concern was also reflected in the so-called Nye-Armitage Report that stated that:

Tokyo has made it clear that existing US-Japan intelligence ties do not meet its needs.²⁴²

The above sentence, in itself, only shows the US acknowledged Japan's recognition of the problem of the existing US-Japan intelligence relationship, and does not necessarily mean the US was concerned about Japan's future course. It could mean that the US welcomed Japan's increased interest in improving the intelligence ties or it could mean that the US feared a stronger Japan. However, the more-broadly shared concern among the Clinton administration was the latter.²⁴³

It is not that the US accepted Japan's possession of its own intelligence satellites *in exchange for* Japan's resumption of KEDO activities. However, some US defense and state officials suggested that "The resumption of the KEDO activities was so urgent and Japan's reassurance that it would strengthen its involvement in the US-led missile defense initiative was so reliable that the Clinton administration had no reason to continue to frown at Japan's desire to strengthen its own security."²⁴⁴ The officials stressed that Japan, as an independent state, has the right to do so, and that it is Japan's own decision." They also emphasized that as long as Japan remains as an American ally, a stronger Japan would be welcome."²⁴⁵

²⁴¹ Personal interview with US defense officials on July 23, 2000.

²⁴² Richard L. Armitage, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., et al., *The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership*, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University, Special Report, October 11, 2000. p. 7.

²⁴³ Personal interview with US defense officials on July 23, 2000.

²⁴⁴ Personal interview with US defense officials on July 23, 2000.

²⁴⁵ Personal interview with US defense officials on July 23, 2000.

Alternative Explanations

Now, let us turn to other possible explanations for the US inability to restrain Japan's decision to develop and launch its own intelligence satellites.

First, against the offensive realist claim that the bigger ally coerces the smaller ally to follow its decision, this chapter's case study highlights that Washington's accommodative behaviour toward its junior partner was attributable to its fear of being abandoned.

Second, for alliance burden-sharing theory to be an effective explanation for Washington's accommodation of its junior allies, there should be agreement among the allies to share burden or mission according to their comparative advantage. There should also be a bargaining process in which the US draws concessions from the weaker allies by a strategy of good cop- bad cop. If the theory is effective in this case, Japan should not have decided to launch its own satellites in the first place because it knows that the US has a far greater comparative advantage in the area of intelligence. Rather than comparative advantage, threat perception played the larger role here. To Japan, although the DPRK's Taepodong intermediate-range missile may not be directed to Japan unlike the Nodong short-range missile, the fact that Japan falls within the target range of the Taepodong missile was threatening to Japan. Japan's decision to launch its own intelligence satellites indicate that Japan lost confidence in some of the US abilities to defend Japan. In fact, the US was unable to reverse the decision but could do little else than live with it. The US feared pushing Japan any harder on the issue, because doing so may have accelerated Japan's desire for greater independence from the US or

undermining the KEDO framework. The US thus feared being abandoned by Japan. In addition, the process of good cop-bad cop is not evident in this case.

Finally, if the structural liberal theory of co-binding is appropriate in this case, there should be some linkage between American liberalism and America's accommodative behaviour toward Japan. There should also be America's recognition of the need to maintain engagement with Japan through KEDO, an international institution. While the first condition cannot clearly be met, structural liberals would argue that the US took a strategy of co-binding itself with Japan through KEDO and had to accommodate the junior ally's interest because its own security interests were strongly tied to the junior ally. However, the US fear of Japan's defection from KEDO was more highlighted than the US recognition of the need to keep engaging with Japan through the institution of KEDO.

Conclusion

This chapter showed that the US accommodated Japan's interest in possessing its own intelligence satellites for fear that Japan might not resume its activities in KEDO that Japan had halted in the wake of the DPRK's missile launch over Japan in 1998.

The US feared losing Japan's contribution to KEDO, indicating a kind of abandonment, in the wake of the DPRK's missile launch over Japan in 1998, but it was able to ensure Japan remained in KEDO. However, the US was unable to change Japan's decision to launch its own intelligence satellites, despite US fear of Japan's future independence from the US "information umbrella," another kind of abandonment by the junior ally. This is because the US thought it necessary to give Japan a chance to

alleviate its distrust toward the US intelligence capability and also because Japan reassured its commitment to TMD and increased intelligence ties with the US. Japan also compromised, but it should be noted that the US accommodated Japan's interest for fear of abandonment, in the terms defined in this thesis.

The bigger ally's fear of abandonment seems to be more useful in explaining Washington's accommodation of Japan's interest than alliance burden-sharing theory and both structural liberalism and structural realism.

Postscript

The intelligence satellite issue between the two allies did not resolve even after Japan's resumption of KEDO contributions in October 1998. The issue progressed in September 1999, more than one year after the Taepodong missile launch. The US agreed to sell Japan 11 types of high-performance parts for four intelligence-gathering satellites that Japan planned to build and launch by 2002. Moreover, the US agreed to provide intelligence to Japan more broadly than before because doing so would not undermine US dominance in intelligence-collection.²⁴⁶

The first two of Japan's four intelligence satellites were launched on March 28, 2003.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁶ Stratfor Commentary, "United States Still Benefits in Japanese Satellites Construction," September 24, 1999. (<http://www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/c9909242120.htm>)

²⁴⁷ For the post-2000 development of Japan-US MD cooperation, see Dan Blumenthal, 'The Revival of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,' *Asian Outlook*, February-March 2005, pp. 1-6, especially p. 4.

CHAPTER SIX

US's Accommodation of the ROK's Request for Revision of the US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement

Introduction

This chapter is a case study of Washington's accommodation of the ROK's interest for fear of abandonment by the smaller ally. This chapter shows that the US agreed with the ROK to revise the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the US and the ROK in late 1999 because it feared that the ROK might abandon it. Previously, the US had been reluctant to revise the SOFA and negotiations had been going on for over five years. However, when the ROK announced that it would hold the first ever summit with the DPRK, the US became concerned that this could lead to a closer ROK-DPRK relationship and it could make Washington's dealings with the DPRK threat more difficult. It was at this point that the US decided to revise the agreement. Both sides formally agreed on the revised contents of the SOFA and signed the revised Agreement on January 18, 2001.

Background

Traditionally, the US is sensitive and defensive about the SOFA issues because it concerns the US military presence in the ROK. Any amendment of the agreement, often proposed by the ROK government with strong South Korean nationalism behind it, could give the impression that the ROK might be less committed to its alliance with the

US. Washington wanted to avoid this situation at a time when the DPRK's threat was still very real.

For Seoul, the SOFA was also a sensitive issue because it was a source of South Korean anti-Americanism. The agreement made it legally impossible for Seoul to punish US soldiers who had committed crimes in the ROK. This inequality was intolerable to many South Koreans, especially since the Japanese-US SOFA agreements and the German-US SOFA agreements permit local authorities to take American military personnel accused of crimes in custody. Furthermore, the increased security cooperation among the US, the ROK, and Japan made the ROK more aware that the US has treated its allies according to the importance the US attaches to them.²⁴⁸ Scott Snyder points out that:

(D)ifferences between handling of cases involving alleged crimes by U.S. military personnel in Japan and Korea is one issue that rankles South Koreans. The primary South Korean concern here is that SOFA-related jurisdictional issues are most likely to arise in South Korea in emotional cases where public opinion is more easily inflamed and may have a broader influence on long-term South Korean public support for the alliance relationship.²⁴⁹

The South Korean anti-American sentiment combined with their desire to be equal with Japan generated a push by President Kim Dae-jung to revise the SOFA.

²⁴⁸ Personal interview with ROK defence officials in December, 1999. See also Scott Snyder, "New Challenges for U.S.-ROK Relations," *Korea and World Affairs* (Spring 2000), pp. 29-45. See especially p. 33.

²⁴⁹ Scott Snyder, "New Challenges for U.S.-ROK Relations," *Korea and World Affairs* (Spring 2000), pp. 29-45.

US Reaction to the ROK's Surprise Announcement of the First-Ever Inter-Korean Summit Meeting : From Enthusiasm to Concern

On April 9, 2000, the ROK announced that it would hold the first-ever summit meeting with the DPRK in Pyongyang on June 12-14 of that year.. ROK officials revealed that the issues to be discussed at the meeting would include economic cooperation, reunification of separated families, and political reconciliation.²⁵⁰ They also agreed with their DPRK counterparts to hold preparatory talks in April for consultations on the procedural matters. The ROK's aspiration for the summit, according to ROK Unification Minister Park Jae-kyu was that it would "make its mark as an end to the Cold War of confrontation, and a starting point to create a new history of reconciliation and cooperation."²⁵¹ The DPRK's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) also claimed the summit was a "historic meeting" and saw it as "aimed at accelerating national reconciliation and unity, exchange and cooperation, peace and reunification."²⁵²

Washington's initial reaction was also positive. The US formally welcomed and expressed support for the announcement. US State Department Counsellor Wendy Sherman said, "[I]t's been an underpinning of US policy...that dialogue is central to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula."²⁵³ The US Department of State also released a statement by President Clinton in which he said that:

I welcome the announcement that the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will hold an historic first summit in June. Direct dialogue between the two Koreas is something we have long advocated and is fundamental to solving the problems of the Korean Peninsula. This announcement is testimony to the wisdom and long-term vision of President

²⁵⁰ "North-South Korean Relations:A Chronology of Events in 2000 and 2001," *CRS Report for Congress*, January 9, 2002.

²⁵¹ *Korea Herald*, April 9, 2000.

²⁵² Howard W. French, "Two Koreas Agree to First Meeting at Summit Level," *New York Times*, April 10, 2000.

²⁵³ Doug Struck, "Two Koreas Agree to Historic Summit," *Washington Post*, April 10, 2002.

Kim Dae-jung's engagement policy. I congratulate both leaders on their decision to meet.²⁵⁴

US State Department spokesman James Rubin also said that:

We believe (this) could be a history-making event. We've long said that central to developing peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is a direct dialogue between the north and the south.²⁵⁵

These are the initial positive reactions by the US to the announcement of the summit. However, US concern about the summit grew as the meeting drew closer.

The announcement by the ROK government of the first-ever summit between the North and the South in June 2000 came as a surprise to the US. US Representative for policy toward the DPRK Charles Kartman said that Washington was "shocked" by the announcement because the ROK had not consulted closely with the US.²⁵⁶ Although the US had officially welcomed the announcement, the lack of consultation made the US suspicious about the ROK's commitment to close policy consultation and coordination with Washington, which had been stipulated in the Perry Report.²⁵⁷

However, it has been suggested that the US should have anticipated the announcement.²⁵⁸ Earlier that year, on March 9-10, President Kim Dae-jung had made a friendly statement in Berlin signaling Seoul's interest in extending economic assistance to Pyongyang in exchange for reopening an official contact. In what was later termed as the Berlin Declaration, Kim Dae-jung said that:

²⁵⁴ "US Hopes Historic North-South Korea Talks Curb Growing Nuclear Threat," *Agence France Presse*, Washington, April 10, 2000; and "US Welcomes Korean Summit Talks," *Associated Press*, Washington, April 10, 2000.

²⁵⁵ "US Welcomes Korean Summit Talks," *Associated Press*, Washington, April 10, 2000.

²⁵⁶ Hudson Institute senior fellow Yoshitaka Hidaka's televised interview with Kartman, June 3, 2000, during Tokyo Television programme *Hidaka Report*.

²⁵⁷ Personal interview with a senior researcher at the National Institute for Defense Studies, Defense Agency of Japan on June 2, 2000.

-The ROK is willing to help the famine-struck North and ready to help the North tide over its ongoing economic difficulties.

-At the present stage, the ROK's immediate objective is to put an end to the Cold War confrontation and settle peace rather than attempting to accomplish reunification.

-The DPRK should respond to the South's call for arranging reunions of families living in different parts of the divided peninsula.

-The ROK calls for an exchange of special envoys ultimately aimed at opening an inter-Korean dialogue at the high government level, including a summit with DPRK leader Kim Jong-il.²⁵⁹

ROK Senior Presidential Secretary for Diplomacy and National Security Affairs Hwang Won-taek revealed that the declaration was conveyed to the North through the truce village of Panmunjom one day before Kim Dae-jung's announcement.²⁶⁰ ROK Minister of Unification Pak Jae-kyu also said that that the declaration was sent to the US, Japan, Russia and China.²⁶¹

Nevertheless, as the June 2000 inter-Korean summit meeting drew nearer, the US became less enthusiastic. This suggested the linkage between the summit meeting and the SOFA issue.²⁶² Previously, in October 1999, the ROK had handed over a new set of proposals to the US in an attempt to resume negotiations to revise SOFA. The US soon replied that it would work on counterproposals.²⁶³ US Secretary of Defense William Cohen agreed to resume the talks on SOFA revision by the end of April 2000. However, after the announcement of the June summit, the US apparently became cautious about revising the SOFA. On April 24, 2000, the US told the ROK that it was unable to keep its earlier promise to reopen the talks.²⁶⁴ The message was conveyed from US

²⁵⁸ Interview with Joel Wit in July 1999. Wit was a US State Department official dealing with the Korean Peninsula issue.

²⁵⁹ Lee Chang-sup, *Korean Times*, March 9, 2000.

²⁶⁰ Lee Chang-sup, *Korean Times*, March 9, 2000.

²⁶¹ Lee Chang-sup, *Korean Times*, March 9, 2000.

²⁶² Personal interview with an ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, June 3, 2000.

²⁶³ Son Key-yong, *Korean Times*, April 25, 2000.

²⁶⁴ Son Key-yong, *Korean Times*, April 25, 2000.

Ambassador to Seoul, Stephen Bosworth, and Commander of US Forces Korea (USFK), General Thomas Schwartz, to ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Lee Joungh-binn and Defense Minister Cho Seung-tae.²⁶⁵

ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Lee Joungh-binn had already made it clear on April 17 that the leaders of the North and the South would not be discussing the withdrawal of US forces from the South.²⁶⁶ From the ROK's perspective, the summit meeting would be a golden opportunity for the ROK to restore some initiative in dealing with the DPRK. Former ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Han Sung-joo wrote that:

(T)here has been an asymmetry between US-North Korea and inter-Korean relations until April 2000. More often than not, the US has had to play the middleman in North-South Korean relations and dialogue. The aborted summit of July 1994 was brokered by former president Jimmy Carter. Both the United States and Republic of Korea worked hard to mend the situation. It took much effort to include a paragraph on inter-Korea dialogue in the Agreed Framework, delaying its signing for at least one week. The Four Party talks of the US, China and North and South Korea were a *modus vivendi* to bring South Korea into discussion of the Korean Peninsula with North Korea. Today, we are about to restore a balance in that situation. The North-South Korean summit was agreed between and is being arranged by Koreans themselves. The US is interested in what goes on in North-South Korean dialogue as much as South Korea was interested in what went on in US-North Korean dialogue. Inter-Korean dialogue is going to be the main factor in how other dialogues, especially US-North Korea and Japan-North Korea dialogues, will proceed.²⁶⁷

Despite the ROK's reassurances, the US remained concerned about the possibility of the two Koreas discussing the withdrawal of US forces from the peninsula. This was

²⁶⁵ Son Key-yong, *Korean Times*, April 25, 2000. This meeting was called the two plus two meeting.

²⁶⁶ Son Key-yong, *Korea Times*, April 18, 2000.

²⁶⁷ Han Sung-joo, "US Troops Issue Cannot Be Subject for Pyongyang Talks," *Korea Times*, May 26, 2000.

spurred by the DPRK's verbal threat that it would try to include the matter in the agenda for the inter-Korean summit meeting.²⁶⁸

Anti-US Sentiment in the ROK

US concern was further highlighted by the new wave of anti-American sentiment following an accident in May 2000 by the US Air Force. A US plane with engine trouble at Maehyang-ri accidentally bombed some villages near the bombing range. Maehyang-ri residents and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) critical of the US military presence in the ROK threatened to form a huge protest against the US. At first, it was the ROK that feared the adverse effects of the rise of anti-American sentiments on the US forces in the ROK. The Kim Dae-jung administration urged the residents and NGOs to remain calm by promising financial compensations for the residents near the bombing range.²⁶⁹ One ROK official revealed that one worry is that "unless anti-US sentiment is constrained, it could mar traditional bilateral ties and worsen relations between the two peoples."²⁷⁰

At this stage, however, the US was more concerned about the fast pace of inter-Korean contacts. The particular fear being that Seoul may reach agreement with Pyongyang without full consideration of the long-term ramifications or the interests of Washington and Tokyo.²⁷¹ Washington wanted Seoul to address Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs at the summit while avoiding talks of reducing or removing US

²⁶⁸ Choe Sang-hun, "Koreas Closer to Agenda for Summit," *Associated Press*, May 4, 2000.

²⁶⁹ Lee Chang-sup, *Korea Times*, May 18, 2000.

²⁷⁰ Lee Chang-sup, *Korea Times*, May 18, 2000.

²⁷¹ Lee Chang-sup, *Korea Times*, May 18, 2000. The academic circle in South Korea took a different stance on the rising anti-US sentiments. Kim Byung-kook, professor at Korea University, for example, argued that it is not true that anti-US sentiment is growing but that what is going on is a growing awareness of rights. See *Korea Times*, June 7, 2000 and *Jungan Ilbo*, June 7, 2000. Han Sung-joo also argued that the US troops issue would not and cannot be a subject for discussion as it is exclusively an issue between the US and South Korea. See Han, in *Korea Times*, May 26, 2000.

troops from Korea.²⁷² Washington's cautious attitude appeared more explicitly in its policy toward the DPRK. On April 28, Washington decided to keep the DPRK on its list of terrorism-sponsoring states in the Congressional report of the year.²⁷³ Anti-US movements continued into May. ROK autoworkers and students joined forces on May 25 to protest the presence of US troops in the ROK and a possible takeover of ailing Daewoo Motor Company by a US car-maker.²⁷⁴

US Abandonment Fear Reinforced by the ROK-DPRK Summit

The leaders of the two Koreas met in Pyongyang on June 13-15, 2000 for the first time since the 1950-53 Korean War. The US was cautious enough not to overreact, at least officially, to the summit. US officials said that the inter-Korean summit would have no short-term effect on US defense commitments in Asia or on security policy at home.²⁷⁵

US Defense Department spokesman Ken Bacon said that the outcome of the ROK-DPRK summit would not lead to an immediate change in US troop deployment.²⁷⁶

Bacon also said that ROK President Kim Dae-jung had told US Defense Secretary Cohen that even if there is unification in the future, he would like US troops to remain on the Korean peninsula because they are a stabilising force. He also said that the US troop presence in South Korea apparently was not discussed at the summit.²⁷⁷ Bacon also provided reassurance over the 2005 first phase deadline for the US National Missile Defence program, saying that:

²⁷² Han Sung-joo, "US Troops Issue Cannot Be Subject for Pyongyang Talks," *Korea Times*, May 26, 2000.

²⁷³ Son Key-young, *Korea Times*, April 28, 2000.

²⁷⁴ Some 250 students chanted, "Withdraw American troops," while about 150 workers of Daewoo Motor carried a banner that read: "GM Ford No! We oppose U.S. invasion in Korean auto market." See "US Troop Presence in Korea Protested," *Washington Times*, May 26, 2000.

²⁷⁵ David Sands, "US Defense Chages Not Expected in Asia," *Washington Times*, June 16, 2000.

²⁷⁶ "Pentagon Spokesman's Regular Briefing, June 15," US Department of State, June 15, 2000.

North Korea is not the only country we worry about. We worry about Iraq, we worry about Iran, and we worry about other countries that are working on long-range missiles or that already have chemical and biological weapons and would like to have ways to deliver them with long-range missiles.²⁷⁸

President Kim Dae-jung said that the DPRK understood the ROK's rationale for keeping US troops on the peninsula. He said that he told DPRK leader Kim Jong-il that:

If the 100,000 U.S. troops in Korea and Japan withdraw, the security and balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and East Asia and the Pacific will be seriously affected. I have to say to you the continued presence of the U.S. troops in Korea is compatible with our national interests.... The ROK would maintain "firm coordination with the US and Japan. At the same time, we will keep our closer partnerships with China and Russia. There is no reason why North Korea should not become friends with all four."²⁷⁹

Despite Kim Dae-jung's reassurance, the US concern was not fully eliminated.²⁸⁰

The US had to state unequivocally that the US forces in the ROK are necessary. US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, told a news conference that US troops must stay on the peninsula despite the DPRK's recent re-engagement.²⁸¹ She said that:

I think it is very clear that the United States is a Pacific power as well as an Atlantic power ... that our forces, when they are stationed somewhere, provide the evidence of American interest.²⁸²

She did not rule out the possibility of her meeting with DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun if he attended the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in Thailand in the next month.²⁸³

²⁷⁷ "Pentagon Spokesman's Regular Briefing, June 15," US Department of State, June 15, 2000.

²⁷⁸ "Pentagon Spokesman's Regular Briefing, June 15," US Department of State, June 15, 2000.

²⁷⁹ "N. Korea Understands Need for US Troops," *Reuters*, June 24, 2000.

²⁸⁰ Personal interview with US defence officials, July 22, 2000.

²⁸¹ Elaine Monaghan, "Albright Files US Flag in S. Korea, Defends Troops," *Reuters*, June 23, 2000; and "Albright Does Not Rule Out Meeting N. Korea Minister," *Reuters*, June 23, 2000.

²⁸² "Albright Does Not Rule Out Meeting N. Korea Minister," *Reuters*, June 23, 2000.

²⁸³ *ibid.*

Negotiations Back on Track but Pessimism on Both Sides

In response to growing concern in the US administration about the status of US forces in the ROK, President Kim began to alleviate the concern by emphasizing the importance of the continuation of the US military presence. President Kim stressed the importance of the close ROK-US alliance and the role of US Forces in Korea (USFK) in deterring war on the Korean peninsula. Kim said, "The United States and its troops here have been, are, and will be important for Korea." He added, "Only when the military is strong, we can maintain peace with the North. When you really want peace, you must be fully prepared for war." He also questioned whether the ROK would have been able to realize economic prosperity had it not been for the US troops. He said, "As Korean soldiers joined hands with American servicemen here to beef up security and deter any armed aggression, we were able to sign an accord with the North for exchanges and cooperation."²⁸⁴ According to Chong Wa Dae spokesman Park Joon-young, it is President Kim's belief that ROK-US relations, including the role of US troops in the ROK, should not be swayed by transitory sentimentalism.

In response to this, the US began to soften its stance on the possibility of amending the SOFA. US Ambassador to the ROK Stephen Bosworth said that the US would be willing to discuss altering the status of the US troops stationed in the ROK if the DPRK were no longer perceived as a military threat.²⁸⁵ He stated, "Any future changes in the role and the mission of the US Forces in Korea, if this threat diminishes or hopefully disappears, will obviously be a subject of discussion between the United States and Korea."²⁸⁶ He also said that he would not rule out the DPRK leader Kim

²⁸⁴ Lee Chang-sup, "US Troops Necessary for National Interest: Kim," *Korea Times*, June 30, 2000.

²⁸⁵ Shin Yong-bae, "US Can Discuss Troop Status if Threat Reduces, Envoy Says," *Korea Times*, June 29, 2000.

²⁸⁶ *ibid.*

Jong-il visiting the US, if inter-Korean relations and US-DPRK relations continued to progress. The US, he said, prepared for further discussions with the DPRK that could lead to the easing of additional sanctions.

Nonetheless, whatever the changes were being contemplated it was not in the US interests to withdraw from the ROK, even if unification was a possibility. US Defense Secretary William Cohen said that:

I don't think that we should consider pulling troops out of South Korea for the foreseeable future. I think our troops should remain there, even if there were to be unification or some kind of federation, a confederation or whatever the political arrangement might evolve. If we are to pull our troops out of South Korea that would call into question our deployment in other areas in the Asia-Pacific region.²⁸⁷

On August 2-3, 2000, Washington officially agreed to revise the SOFA.²⁸⁸ A ROK foreign affairs and trade ministry official announced that the resumed talks would be the first such meeting since September 1996 and that "We will launch negotiations on all issues concerned, including the criminal jurisdiction clauses of the bilateral agreement."²⁸⁹ One of the US requests was to limit the scope of crimes under ROK's jurisdiction.²⁹⁰

The ROK was reluctant at this stage to accommodate the US request, as it viewed the request as an attempt to worsen an already biased agreement. There was much scepticism in the ROK about the prospect for the negotiations and, from the beginning, negotiations did not go smoothly. Vice-Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon on July 31 gave a report to the opposition Grand National Party about the gaps between the ROK and the

²⁸⁷ Janet Guttman, "US Should Keep Troops in South Korea, Chosen Says," *Reuters*, July 1, 2000.

²⁸⁸ Son Key-young, "ROK, US to Resume SOFA Talks Aug. 2-3," *Korea Times*, July 12, 2000.

²⁸⁹ *ibid.*

²⁹⁰ *Path to an Agreement: The U.S.-Republic of Korea Status of Forces Agreement Revision Process*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2001, p. 6.

US on revising the SOFA.²⁹¹ His report said that there still exist substantial differences between Seoul and Washington on changing the SOFA codes.²⁹² Ban was sceptical that positive results would evolve from the talks, slated for August 2-3, saying that “It would be better (for the political community) to watch the negotiations with patience.”²⁹³ He added that the government was now fully aware of the significance of the talks and would make its best efforts to rewrite the SOFA in accordance with the South Korean public wishes. President Kim re-emphasised the importance of US forces in the ROK, but he also pointed out the troops’ “wrongdoings.” Kim warned against anti-US sentiment among a small group of activists. He told a group of activists who were demanding that the US withdraw its 37,000 US troops stationed in the ROK, “We must criticize wrong American policies but that should not lead to anti-Americanism. Cooperative relations with the United States should remain strong. Anti-Americanism does not help our national interests.”²⁹⁴ Despite the improving relations with the DPRK, Kim reconfirmed that the ROK needed the US military presence for its security as well as regional stability.²⁹⁵ He added, “The United States remains our biggest supporter not only in security and international relations but also in economic relations.”²⁹⁶

Again, despite Kim’s reassurance, the US remained pessimistic. US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Frederick Smith began the two days of discussions in Seoul with ROK officials by saying that the US was prepared to make some changes to SOFA.²⁹⁷ However, US Defense Department spokesman Ken Bacon, speaking in the US

²⁹¹ Kim Yong-bom, “Seoul, Washington Still Split on SOFA Revision,” *Korea Times*, August 1, 2000.

²⁹² *ibid.*

²⁹³ *ibid.*

²⁹⁴ *ibid.*

²⁹⁵ Sang-Hun Choe, “S. Korea Leader Speaks Up for US,” *Associated Press*, August 1, 2000.

²⁹⁶ *ibid.*

²⁹⁷ Son Key-young, “Korea, US to Reopen SOFA Talks Today,” *Korea Times*, August 2, 2000; “S. Korea, US Negotiate on Troop Agreement amid Anti-US Hostility,” *Agence France Presse*, August 2, 2000; and Jae-Suk Yoo, “US, S. Korea May Revise Agreement,” *Associated Press*, August 2, 2000.

several hours before the talks, suggested that the negotiations would be tough. Bacon said that:

We would like to get it wrapped up, but we want to get it wrapped up in a way that protects the interests of our soldiers and protects the interests of the Koreans, and so far we haven't been able to achieve that balance. They obviously have their own issues, legal and political issues to deal with, but so do we.²⁹⁸

Thus, while insisting its own interest, the US began to take the ROK's interest more seriously.

Another area of contention was the environmental damage caused by the US military, with the ROK pushing for an amendment to SOFA to punish offenders. The ROK and the US were also at odds over the labour rights of ROK nationals hired to work at US bases and food quarantine issues. Some progress was made. US and ROK officials ended two days of talks in Seoul about revising the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).²⁹⁹ A joint statement said that the US had agreed in principle with ROK demands that the SOFA be brought in line with similar agreements for US troops in Germany and Japan. The statement said, "The talks were constructive and productive and provided the basic framework for the early revision of the ROK-US SOFA."³⁰⁰ It said that the two sides would meet again within the next two months in the US in a bid to finalize a revision. The statement also said, "The two sides agreed to transfer custody at the time of indictment with ensured legal rights for the accused."³⁰¹ Press reports said that because the US had less faith in the justice system of the ROK than those of Japan or Germany, it was demanding a series of safeguards. The reports said that the US

²⁹⁸ *Korea Times*, *ibid*.

²⁹⁹ "S. Korean-US Talks on Troop Treaty End with No Deal, Some Progress," *Agence France Presse*, August 3, 2000; "US to Give South Korea More Jurisdiction over US Soldiers," *Associated Press*, August 3, 2000.

³⁰⁰ *Associated Press*, *ibid*.

wanted better confinement facilities for suspects and total legal jurisdiction over all crimes committed by US troops that would carry a jail sentence of less than three years. Leaks of the reported demands sparked outrage from civic groups in the ROK who complained the exemption would mean that US troops would evade Korean justice for virtually all but the most serious crimes.

In September 2000, during President Kim's visit to the US, he met privately with President Clinton and discussed revising SOFA. Kim said that he wanted the SOFA to be revised quickly and reasonably.³⁰² Kim also said in a dinner speech on September 8 at the Korea Society in New York that "There is frustration and criticism over the slow progress in the work of revising the Korea-US Status of Forces Agreement. The call is that it should be brought up to be a par with the agreements the United States has with Germany and Japan. I believe this is reasonable."³⁰³ Moreover, he asserted that:

The SOFA issue, the reported killing of Korean civilians by US troops during the Korean War, and the US military's recent release of toxic chemicals into a Seoul river would increasingly undermine the friendship of the two nations. What I fear is that if the problems are left to fester, they could be exploited by the very few who are against the United States to expand their influence.³⁰⁴

The reaction of US officials to Kim's statement indicates Washington's fear of abandonment. One official told that if they wouldn't compromise on the SOFA, their forces would face difficulties, many of which are uncertain to determine but will certainly undermine our strategic relations with South Korean.³⁰⁵ "Difficulties,"

³⁰¹ *Associated Press*, *ibid.*

³⁰² "Seoul Asks Fast Accord with US on Pact, Urges North Reach Out," *Reuters*, September 10, 2000; and Chon Shi-yong, "President Calls on US to Resolve Nogun-Ri, SOFA Conroversies," *Korea Herald*, September 10, 2000.

³⁰³ *Korea Herald*, *ibid.*

³⁰⁴ *Korea Herald*, *ibid.*

³⁰⁵ Personal interview with US defense officials on July 23, 2000.

according to the official, included the possibility of the withdrawal of the US forces from the ROK.³⁰⁶

US Accommodation: Agreement on the Revision

In response to Kim's call for the revision of the SOFA, the US, while still holding a cautious stance on some issues, basically agreed to accelerate talks with the ROK on the issue. A US official said on November 29 that the US could not embrace the ROK's proposal to include regulations on environmental protection in the SOFA.³⁰⁷ However, the official said that they wanted to produce a separate agreement, which is not a part of the SOFA.³⁰⁸

The ROK and the US on Saturday held talks on December 3, 2000 to revise the SOFA.³⁰⁹ The two sides discussed criminal jurisdiction, labour rules and quarantines in the morning and environmental issues and facilities in the afternoon. Chief negotiators at the talks were Director General Song Min-sun of the ROK Foreign Ministry's North American Affairs Bureau and Frederic Smith, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia and the Pacific. In the Track I session covering criminal jurisdiction, the two sides discussed which crimes ROK courts would have jurisdiction over. They also discussed whether to stipulate US suspects' rights. In the Track II session, they discussed environmental protection, quarantine of plants and animals, labour rights for ROK employees and the return or granting of property and facilities.

³⁰⁶ Personal interview with US defense officials on July 23, 2000..

³⁰⁷ Sohn Key-young, "US Rejects Environmental Provisions in SOFA," *Korea Times*, November 30, 200.

³⁰⁸ *ibid.*

³⁰⁹ "Korea, US Hold 2nd Day of Talks on SOFA Revision," *Korea Herald*, December 4, 2000.

Nearly six months after the historic summit between the North and South Korea, the US and the ROK finally reached agreement on SOFA revision. In July the ROK had a major victory captured by a sentence in the SOFA that read:

On major crimes, both sides shall advance the timing of transferring the accused SOFA personnel to Korean authorities from the current "upon completion of all judicial proceedings" to "at the time of indictment." If the Korean police arrest someone for an egregious crime, such as murder or rape, the Korean police will have the right to maintain custody. The Korean government agreed to the protection of the rights of the accused SOFA personnel.³¹⁰

ROK Foreign Minister Lee Jung-Binn said that:

I am certain that the revised SOFA will contribute to a stable environment for the US forces in Korea, foster friendship between them and the Korean public and further strengthen the ROK-US alliance.³¹¹

Lee signed the accord with senior US embassy counsellor Evans Revere who stood in for Ambassador Stephen Bosworth. The two sides said in a joint statement that:

Both governments expressed the mutual understanding that this SOFA revision satisfactorily reflects both nation's interests in a wide range of fields, including criminal jurisdiction, environment, labour, quarantine regulations, facilities and areas, non-appropriated fund facilities and civil proceedings.³¹²

The accord was aimed to increase the number of crimes to be ruled by ROK courts to twelve and of US suspects to be handed over to the ROK before indictment. Stricter environmental conditions were also set for US bases and regulations for the dismissal of ROK employees on US bases. The accord would go before the ROK National Assembly for ratification.

³¹⁰ US., *Korea Completes Status of Forces Agreement Negotiations*, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, US Department of Defense, December 28, 2000.

Thus, the US accommodated the ROK's interest by compromising on the base issue. The compromise, however, was not the ROK's complete victory because the revision did not move the ROK up to the level of Germany and Japan in terms of SOFA. Some frustration has remained on the part of the ROK. But what it is more relevant here is that the US *did* compromise, though carefully, to keep the whole relationship of the US-ROK alliance from being undermined by the issue of the SOFA revision. This reflects Washington's fear of partial abandonment by the ROK.

Alternative Explanations

The above account of Washington's accommodation of the ROK's interest regarding the revision of the SOFA shows that the offensive realist prediction of the coercive hegemon is problematic.

Given the nature of the SOFA issue, it is impossible for alliance burden-sharing theory to stand. The issue here is about how the hegemon would react to its junior ally's unilateral demand.

Structural liberals would argue that the US accommodated the ROK because both allies are liberal democracies. While it is true that they are both liberal democracies, as we saw in the Introduction, structural liberalism has not provided any clear method of operationalisation of its theory of co-binding. However, for the theory to be effective, there should at least be the linkage between the liberal nature of the US and Washington's accommodative behaviour toward its weaker allies. There should also be Washington's recognition of the need to engage with its junior allies through institutions.

³¹¹ *ibid.*

³¹² *ibid.*

Regarding the first condition in particular, a joint statement between the two allies emphasising their common value of liberalism or democracy could be evidence for the structural liberal claim. In this case study, both the US and the ROK emphasised the importance of their military alliance, rather than their common value of liberal democracy. It is difficult to conclude that the structural liberal theory of co-binding has merits in this case.

Conclusion

The case of the revision of the US-ROK SOFA indicates that the US accommodated the ROK out of fear that the ROK would get closer to the DPRK and disrupt the US military presence on—or lead to the withdrawal of the US forces from—the ROK. Washington's fear was more strongly felt before the historic summit between the ROK and the DPRK and at a time of anti-American sentiments in the ROK. The US eventually agreed to revise the SOFA, although the ROK also made some compromises.

The American accommodation of South Korea's interest in revising the SOFA can be better explained by the hegemon's fear of partial abandonment rather than alliance burden-sharing theory and structural liberalism.

CHAPTER SEVEN

US Accommodation of the ROK's Request for an Extended Missile Target Range

Introduction

This chapter is a case study of US accommodation with its smaller ally. It shows that the US allowed the ROK to extend its missile target range from 180 km to 300 km in exchange for the ROK's participation in both a missile control regime (MCTR)³¹³. In the process, the US offered to provide the ROK with short-range missile technology and also requested that the ROK should participate in the US-led Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) initiative. These offers were made to persuade the ROK not to extend its missile target range beyond 180 km. However, the ROK refused the offers, and as a result, the US accommodated the ROK's interest in extending its missile target range from 180 km to 300 km. The US made the agreement because it feared that the ROK would become a more independent military power and have less reliance on the alliance and thereby be under less US influence. However, Washington's fear was not necessarily the fear that the ROK would defect from the overall alliance arrangement. In

³¹³ The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a voluntary arrangement among 27 countries consisting of common export policies applied to a common list of controlled items. MTCR was originally established in 1987 by the US and G-7 economies, including Canada, the former West Germany, Italy, Japan, France and the UK. MTCR was also originally concerned only with nuclear capable delivery systems, but in 1993, the participants extended the guidelines to cover delivery systems capable of delivering all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. MTCR is neither a treaty nor an international agreement but is a voluntary arrangement among countries, which share a common interest in arresting missile proliferation. MTCR considers "missiles" to include ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles and sounding rockets. MTCR aims to restrict the proliferation of missiles, unmanned air vehicles, and related technology for those systems capable of carrying a 500 kg payload at least 300 km, as well as systems intended for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction. See Federation of American Scientists (FAS) on Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). (<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/mtr/>)

this sense, this chapter concludes, America's fear of abandonment was not total abandonment, but *partial* abandonment, by the ROK.

Regarding alternative explanations for America's accommodative behaviour, both alliance burden-sharing theory and structural liberalism do not seem to fit in this case.

Background

In response to growing missile threats from the DPRK, the ROK began to express dissatisfaction with its 1979 agreement with the US, which restricted the range of the missile target the ROK's indigenously developed surface-to-surface missiles to 180 km. The ROK had made its dissatisfaction clear to the US since the 1980's but the US had ignored its requests. The ROK wanted to extend the range so that it could hit a wider range of targets in the DPRK.

Following the DPRK's launch of a Taepodong missile in August 1998, the ROK became even more intent upon improving its own missile capability against the DPRK, rather than depending on the US. The ROK was already quietly developing its own intelligence satellites. The ROK's Agency for Defense Development was working on a highly specialized surveillance satellite, which it planned to launch by the year 2005. The Agency's director Bae Moon-han admitted the existence of the project during questioning before the National Defense Committee of the National Assembly.³¹⁴ Bae emphasised that the satellite technology could also be used to launch ROK-made satellites for non-military use and that the surveillance satellite currently being developed could monitor DPRK military activity from 680 km in orbit and last up to

³¹⁴ *Chosun Ilbo*, November 3, 1998

five years.³¹⁵ However, the ROK's major objective was to extend its missile range. In July 1999, when the DPRK was again allegedly preparing for another missile launch preparation, the ROK officially asked the US to review the agreement, and the US agreed to start the process.³¹⁶

By this time the US had become concerned about the ROK's missile capability. In early 1999, the ROK test-fired a short-range missile without telling the US in advance.³¹⁷ The US filed a protest with the ROK government because the missile launch potentially violated the memorandum of understanding that prohibits the ROK from developing missiles with a range exceeding 180 km.³¹⁸ After some investigation, the US concluded that the missile fired at a test site near the West Sea actually had a range of at least 296 km, even though it only flew approximately 50 km.³¹⁹ The US suspected that ROK scientists had filled the missile with a reduced amount of fuel to limit its range and thus not provoke a response.³²⁰

The ROK initially denied the allegation that it had such intentions and claimed that the test was only a "routine work." The ROK Ministry of Defense said that the launch on April 10 was a "routine" measure to improve independent missile development capacity.³²¹ The ministry, however, did not admit that the missile had a range of up to 300 km, thus violating the limit put on missile range. The ministry also stated that:

³¹⁵ *ibid.*

³¹⁶ *International Herald Tribune*, November 14, 1999.

³¹⁷ *Chosun Ilbo*, April 19, 1999.

³¹⁸ *ibid.*

³¹⁹ *ibid.*

³²⁰ *ibid.*

³²¹ *Korea Herald*, April 20, 1999.

The latest test missile flew at the height of 38km and the range of 40km, which was not in violation of Seoul's self-restrictions on the development of longer-range missiles.³²²

Washington's other worry over the ROK's desire to increase to its missile capability was Pyongyang's negative response to the ROK's missile development. US administration officials worried that the ROK might be pushing ahead with several missile projects that could further fuel an arms race on the Korean Peninsula.³²³ A US official said that the political pressure in the ROK to deploy such missiles was bound to grow if the DPRK launches another Taepodong missile over the Sea of Japan in the coming weeks. He said that he believed that the ROK had "a fairly determined rationale to create capabilities that are competitive with the North Korean capability."³²⁴ He also said that the ROK does not want to be overly dependent on the US to supply all of their weaponry. He added that some ROK officials had complained that the US was not being tough enough on the DPRK about its missile, while pressuring the ROK to contain its own development ms.³²⁵

Washington's Accommodation of the ROK

The US fear of abandonment by the ROK was evident in the way it approached the ROK. Instead of coercively and directly requesting the ROK to have second thoughts on extending its missile target range, the US tried to persuade the ROK to join the TMD initiative. From the US perspective, the ROK could enhance its deterrence against the DPRK's missile threat, not by participating in its missile target range, but by

³²² *ibid.*

³²³ Personal interview with a US official at the US Department of Defense, June 21, 2000.

³²⁴ Personal interview with a US official at the US Department of Defense, June 21, 2000.

³²⁵ *New York Times*, July 1, 1999.

implementing the US-led TMD system. However, the ROK rejected the offer and announced that “At this stage, we have neither an intention nor ability to take part in the TMD plan, which requires a huge sum of investment and up-to-date technology.”³²⁶ Defense Minister Chun Yong-taek reiterated that, considering Seoul’s finances and technology, the TMD plan was not an effective measure to counter Pyongyang’s missile threat.³²⁷

In response, the US changed its negotiation tactic. The US gave up persuading the ROK to join TMD and instead offered to provide short-range missile technological assistance to the ROK. As the US State Department Deputy Spokesman James Foley stated, “The US has offered to provide technological support to the ROK’s short-range missile capabilities.”³²⁸ The US was prepared to help with short-range technology but not happy about the ROK’s desire to extend its missile capability beyond that.³²⁹

However, the ROK did not react positively to Washington’s offer. Instead, the ROK was not satisfied with the US offer, and in early July 1999, Kim directly asked Clinton that the ROK be allowed to increase the range of its missiles to 500 km to counter threats from the DPRK.³³⁰ Washington’s initial response was negative. According to a ROK official, “President Clinton expressed concern over missile proliferation in Northeast Asia following President Kim’s suggestion that Seoul extend its missile range capability.”³³¹

Washington’s concern about missile capability was reinforced by a US Defence Department report that the ROK had built a rocket motor test station without notifying

³²⁶ *ibid.*

³²⁷ *ibid.*

³²⁸ “US Provides Technical Support for ROK Short Range Missiles,” US State Department, July 1, 1999.

³²⁹ *ibid.*

³³⁰ *Agence France-Presse*, July 5, 1999.

³³¹ *ibid.*

the US.³³² Officials said the station, which included a large concrete or tempered steel cradle in which rocket motors are locked for firing tests, appeared to have been built secretly as part of a larger ROK ballistic missile programme. The officials stressed, however, that no single piece of intelligence had suddenly prompted the administration's efforts to limit the ROK missile. An official also said that the US was interested in greater transparency in their missile development. He said, "We don't want this issue to become a point of friction in our bilateral relationship."³³³ The official said that the US had known about ROK efforts to develop ballistic missiles for years and has been working consistently to contain the ROK's programme. US officials said that although no final agreement between the US and the ROK has been reached, the Clinton administration had told the ROK that it would accept an increase in the range of its ballistic missiles to 300 km. US State Department spokesman James Rubin stated that:

It is public knowledge that South Korea would like more flexibility in its missile. The US is sympathetic to its needs and desire for flexibility, and we are hoping to work out an arrangement that conforms to our nonproliferation goals and the missile regime standards.³³⁴

On November 16, 1999, the ROK revealed that it had developed a new short-range surface-to-air missile and would begin deployment in the following month, but denied trying to develop longer-range missiles. The ROK Defense Ministry said the deployment of the first locally developed short-range missile, code-named "Chonma" or Pegasus, would mark a milestone in the ROK's effort to improve its defense capability. According to the ministry, the missile was designed and developed by the state-run

³³² *New York Times*, November 14, 1999.

³³³ *ibid.*

³³⁴ *ibid.*

Agency for Defence Development and had a 10 km range, high mobility, and an advanced guidance system.³³⁵

This made the US begin to soften its stance on the ROK regarding the missile target range issue.³³⁶ US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn announced that he would hold talks with Song Min-soon, director-general of the North American Affairs Bureau of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, on November 18-20.³³⁷

The ROK also revealed to the US on February 6, 2000, that it needed to develop attack missiles with sufficient range to combat the military and security threat from the DPRK.³³⁸ A ROK foreign ministry spokesman said that:

In case of military missiles, South Korea will make utmost efforts to secure such ranges as necessary to meet the demand for military security. Our position is also that there should be no range ceilings on Seoul's developing rockets for civilian and scientific purposes.³³⁹

Song left for two-day talks in Hawaii with US Assistant Secretary of State for non-proliferation Robert Einhorn.³⁴⁰ Song revealed after the talks that the two sides narrowed most of their differences and agreed to work out a formal agreement within a few months.³⁴¹ He also revealed that the US has agreed, in principle, to let the ROK build missiles capable of travelling up to 300 km.³⁴²

³³⁵ *ibid.*

³³⁶ Personal interview with US defense officials in Washington, July 23, 2000.

³³⁷ *Reuters*, November 12, 1999.

³³⁸ *Agence France Presse*, February 7, 2000.

³³⁹ *ibid.*

³⁴⁰ *US State Department Noon Briefing*, February 4, 2000.

³⁴¹ *ibid.*

³⁴² *Early Bird News Service*, US Department of Defense, July 17, 2000.

Formal Agreement

The ROK also revealed on April 27, 2000 that it had won an informal agreement from the US to pursue its own missile development capability in exchange for participating in MTCR. ROK Deputy Minister of Defense Ahn Byong-kil announced that the US and the ROK governments had agreed to nullify the limit on range and loading weight of commercial launch vehicles produced in the ROK.³⁴³ Ahn also said that under the agreement, the US would also help the ROK join the MTCR after the two countries complete negotiations on missiles. However, the US insisted that an official memorandum of understanding be signed before the agreement was implemented. The ROK government wanted to conclude the agreement through a letter of intent. The US wanted to have the agreement in a stricter format because it was worried that the ROK might be pushing ahead with several missile projects that could further fuel an arms race on the Korean Peninsula.³⁴⁴ According to a US official, the political pressure in the ROK to deploy such missiles was bound to grow if the DPRK fired another Taepodong missile over the Sea of Japan in the coming weeks. He said that he believed that the ROK had “a fairly determined rational to create capabilities that are competitive with the North Korean capability.” He also said that the ROK does not want to be overly dependent on the US to supply all of their weaponry. He added that some ROK officials have complained that the US was not being tough enough on the DPRK about its missile, while pressuring the ROK to contain its own missile development programme.

The ROK declared that it would develop new missiles capable of hitting targets in most of the DPRK. The ROK foreign ministry said in a statement that:

³⁴³ *Chosun Ilbo*, April 27, 1999; and *Korea Times*, April 27, 1999.

³⁴⁴ *The New York Times*, July 1, 1999.

Today our government adopted new guidelines on missile and commercial rocket development.³⁴⁵

The ROK said its missile development would boost its independent security and promised to join the MTCR. The ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade announced that its rocket development would be used only for peaceful and commercial use and had already announced that it would build a satellite launch centre on the south coast by 2005 but gave no details about the missile plans.³⁴⁶ In mid January 2000, Seoul formally announced its new missile policy to develop and deploy missiles with ranges of up to 300 km and warheads of up to 500 kg.³⁴⁷

Alternative Explanation

The above account shows that against the offensive realist prediction of hegemons' coercive and uncompromising behaviour toward its smaller allies, the above account showed that the US accommodated South Korea's interest in the extension of its missile target range. And the above account has relied on the theory of alliance security dilemma. Alternative explanations such as alliance burden-sharing theory and structural liberalism do not seem to fit in this case.

First, as I discussed in the Introduction of this thesis, for alliance burden-sharing theory to be effective, there should be agreement, or at least coordination, between Japan and the US regarding the share of burden, mission, or role in dealing with the possession and the use of missiles against the DPRK. There should also be a bargaining process in which the US utilizes a good cop-bad cop strategy to draw concessions from

³⁴⁵ *Associated Press*, January 17, 2001.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

its weaker allies. However, there was neither agreement on burden-sharing or a good cop-bad cop negotiation process to produce burden-sharing among the allies. Instead, the ROK sought to extend its own defense capability apart from sharing burden or roles with the US against the DPRK's threat and that the US did try to persuade the ROK out of doing so. Washington's victory was Seoul's entry into the MTCR. However the fact is that the US was unable to coerce the ROK out of the missile target range extension, and this strengthens the account based on the hegemon's fear of partial abandonment by the smaller partner over an account based on alliance burden-sharing theory.

Structural liberals would predict the hegemon's co-binding with its junior allies, or cooperation with its junior allies through institutions. In this chapter's case, the theory would see that the US nature as a liberal hegemon made it allow the ROK to extend its missile target range in exchange for the ROK's participation in the MTCR, which is an international organization to regulate the proliferation of missile technology. However, as I argued in the Introduction of this thesis, the definition of liberal hegemon is not clearly given by major advocates, especially John Ikenberry, we cannot determine if the case in this chapter can be explained by the theory of structural liberalism. Even if the US liberal nature is established, it seems that the US fear of partial abandonment by the ROK is the driving force for America's accommodative behaviour.

Thus, alliance security dilemma theory seems to be more powerful than the structural liberal account in this case.

In addition, apart from international relations theories, there is a more policy-based counter view to my argument. The counter view would be that the US accommodated the ROK's interest because of its interest in the nonproliferation of missiles on the Korean Peninsula rather than out of fear of partial abandonment by the

ROK. It is true that the US persuaded the ROK to join the MCTR in exchange for allowing it to extend its missile target range. However, the idea of using the MCTR to keep the ROK from going beyond its target range was not canvassed at an earlier stage and was developed in an *ad hoc* manner. This indicates that the original intent of the US was not necessarily non-proliferation. This leads us to say, again, that missile non-proliferation was a last minute effort to prevent the ROK from partially abandoning its alliance with the US. Furthermore, with regard to nuclear proliferation, as discussed in Chapter Two, this is something which drives Washington's fear of abandonment by its smaller allies because such proliferation could strengthen either the smaller ally, or the enemy, in a way unfavourable to the US.

Conclusion

This chapter showed that instead of exercising coercion, the US accommodated the ROK's desire to increase its missile target range out of fear of partial abandonment by the ROK. The major indication of the US fear of partial abandonment was its efforts to contain the ROK in MTCR, which is a US-led minilateral institution. In the first place, the idea of using the MCTR to keep the ROK from going beyond its target range was not canvassed at an earlier stage and was developed in an *ad hoc* manner. Therefore, it can be concluded that the original intent of the US was not necessarily non-proliferation but was a last minute effort by the US to prevent the ROK from partially abandoning its alliance with the US.

Regarding alternative explanations for America's accommodative behaviour, both alliance burden-sharing theory and structural liberalism do not seem to fit in this case.

CHAPTER EIGHT

US Accommodation of Japan's Interest in Addressing the DPRK's Re-Emerging Missile Threat

Introduction

Unlike the previous chapters, this chapter provides a case study that demonstrates that Washington's accommodation of the junior ally's interests is affected by both its fear of abandonment and also its fear of becoming involved in an unwanted war as a consequence of its relationship with a junior ally.

First, this chapter focuses on the re-emergence of the DPRK's missile threat from late 1998 to autumn of 1999. This threat led the US to accommodate Japan's interest in addressing the missile issue by engaging with the DPRK and highlighting Japan's concern in the so-called Perry Report.³⁴⁸ In the process leading up to the completion of the report, Japan threatened to halt its financial contribution to KEDO and threatened independent economic sanctions against the DPRK because of the re-emergence of the DPRK's nuclear program, its preparation of another missile launch, and the incursion of two DPRK ships into Japanese territorial waters. This made the US fear that Japan would likely pursue independent measures against the DPRK, which might not only undermine the AF, between the US and the DPRK, but could also lead to an unwanted war on the peninsula.

Second, as highlighted in Chapter One, Snyder's alliance security dilemma model assumes that a state suffers both fear of abandonment and fear of entrapment. This thesis

has so far been focused on the bigger ally's fear of abandonment, but this chapter confirms that the bigger ally accommodates the smaller ally's interest by suffering both sides of the alliance security dilemma. The US agreed to address Japan's concern about the DPRK missile issue due to fear that Japan might partially abandon its alliance with the US partially by defecting from KEDO. However, the fact that the US agreed to ease economic sanctions against the DPRK cannot be well explained by the hegemon's fear of abandonment. It can be attributed to America's fear that Japan's economic sanctions could get the US involved in an unwanted armed conflict with the DPRK. However, this would be a forced interpretation.

This chapter concludes that although there remains some ambiguity, as a whole, this case study supports the proposition that the bigger ally does accommodate the smaller ally's interest out of fear of abandonment by the smaller ally.

Background: Change in Washington's Stance from Accommodative to Difficult

After the DPRK's launch of its Taepodong ballistic missile over Japan on August 31, 1998, the US became more serious about the DPRK's missile development and began to question the whole post-AF process. On November 12, 1998, the Clinton administration appointed William Perry, former US Secretary of Defense, as the US DPRK Policy Coordinator to consult and coordinate with the ROK, Japan and China and undertake a comprehensive review of US policy toward the DPRK since the signing of the AF. The Clinton administration had decided to pursue an engagement policy rather than

³⁴⁸ The Perry Report is a US policy review by former US Defense Secretary William Perry issued in November 1999 after eight months of the review process. More details will be described in the next section.

containment one toward the DPRK in response to the nuclear crisis in 1994. However, the 1998 Taepodong missile launch by the DPRK invited much opposition from the Republican Congress and the media. The Clinton administration appointed Perry mainly to deal with such opposition because he was seen by the conservatives in the Congress to be able to take a sterner stance against the DPRK.³⁴⁹

Although Perry was originally scheduled to finish the review of US policy toward the DPRK in March 1998, a few events occurred that worked to delay the review. These events included the emergence of another DPRK's suspected nuclear site, the incursion of two DPRK ships into Japanese territorial waters, ROK-DPRK naval skirmishes, and the DPRK's preparation for another missile launch.³⁵⁰

On March 10 1999, Perry visited Japan to meet with Japanese leaders.³⁵¹ Perry told Japanese leaders, including Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka, and Defense Agency Director General Hosei Norota, that his ongoing review of US policy toward the DPRK would be a more comprehensive one, extending to missile and other conventional issues from the existing nuclear oriented AF,³⁵² not reversing the AF.

Obuchi understood this notion of "comprehensiveness" and emphasized the importance of policy cooperation among the US, Japan, and the ROK. Nonaka also understood the nature of this would-be US policy toward the DPRK and appreciated that

³⁴⁹ Personal interview with a group of US defense officials on July 27, 2000.

³⁵⁰ Among these events, the incursion of two DPRK ships into Japanese territorial waters and the DPRK's preparation for another missile launch are the most relevant ones in this chapter. Therefore, I will focus on these two events.

³⁵¹ *Asahi Shimbun*, "Perry also considers Japan's stance," March 10, 1999, p. 1. Perry visited Seoul before Japan and Beijing after Japan. Perry had visited the three countries in December 1998 as well. The purpose of his visits was to only listen to these countries' views on policy toward the DPRK according to him. See "Press Release on Perry Visit to Korea," *US Department of State Washington File*, December 8, 1998.

³⁵² "Press Release on Perry Visit to Korea," *US Department of State Washington File*, December 8, 1998.

the US would deal with other issues, such as the missile issue and the DPRK's suspected kidnapping of Japanese civilians, more seriously.

However, Defense Agency head Norota, on the other hand, suggested that in addition to the AF, there should be another framework to deal with Pyongyang's other nuclear programs and the missile issue.³⁵³ He also expressed Japan's stance that another missile launch by Pyongyang would lead Japan to halt its contribution to KEDO. Norota stated, "I appreciate the existing AF, but the framework covers only the nuclear site in Yongbyon, and cannot cover other nuclear and ballistic missile facilities. If another missile were launched, it would be impossible for Japan to provide financial aid to KEDO."³⁵⁴

At this time, Perry was tougher than before on the DPRK. Perry stated that:

If North Korea refused to be reasonable, we could expect to have the United States, Japan, and South Korea united in both the need for sterner measures and the way in which we carry them out... (T)hese measures could include military strikes and across the broad economic blockades of North Korea.³⁵⁵

Generally, US officials, especially high-ranking officials at the US Department of State were soft on the DPRK. For example, US Assistant Deputy Secretary of State Ross said, "I expect Japan to return to a major aid country,"³⁵⁶ expecting Japan to ease its stance in providing food aid to the DPRK. In response to Ross's statement, a Japanese Foreign Ministry official said, "It is difficult for Japan (to do so) because there is no visible change on the part of the DPRK."³⁵⁷

³⁵³ *ibid.*

³⁵⁴ *ibid.*

³⁵⁵ Elizabeth Becker, "Clinton Advisor Says North Korea is Advancing Its Nuclear Program," March 12, 1999, *New York Times*, p. 8.

³⁵⁶ *Asahi Shimbun*, March 8, 1999, p. 3.

³⁵⁷ *ibid.*

However, at the time, Perry held a stance close to, and sympathetic with, that of Japan. Perry's above statement was encouraging to Japanese officials.³⁵⁸ As I will show later in this chapter, however, Perry's stance became more cautious about taking sides with Japan, although he continued to accommodate Japan's interest in addressing the DPRK's missile threat.

At this stage, there were mixed feelings in Tokyo about the US' stance toward the DPRK regarding divergences among US officials. However, Japan's rage toward the DPRK and frustration toward the US initiative in dealing with the DPRK began to grow because of the incursion of two DPRK ships into Japanese waters.

DPRK Spy Ship's Infiltration into Japan

Only two weeks after Perry's visit to Japan, the DPRK's two spy ships infiltrated Japanese waters. On March 23, a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense (JMSDF) P-3C surveillance airplane spotted two unidentified ships, named *Daiichiohnish Maru* and *Daiiniyamto Maru*, on the sea near the Noto Peninsula in Western Japan. The Japanese Maritime Agency (JMA) also traced the history of these two ships and found that they might be spy ships.³⁵⁹ A JMA boat ordered the ships to stop running immediately and fired a warning shot, but the ships ignored both the order and the warning shot and motored away at high speed. This was the best the JMA boat could do. Japanese Minister of Transport Jiro Kawasaki judged that the task of dealing with the runaway ships should be left to the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) or JMSDF.³⁶⁰ He then told the Japanese Defense Agency Director General that the task should be handled by the

³⁵⁸ Personal interview with a Japanese defense agency researcher, March 13, 2002.

³⁵⁹ *Asahi Shimbun*, March 23, 1999; *Asahi Shimbun*, March 24, 1999. *Dense White Paper 2000*, Japanese Defense Agency. (<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/library/wp/2000/honbun/04019300.HTM>)

³⁶⁰ *Dense White Paper 2000*.

Cabinet.³⁶¹ Then, Defense Agency Director General Hosei Norota asked Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi to allow JMSDF to take maritime patrol action³⁶² in order for a JMSDF vessel (destroyer) to fire a warning shot, order the ships to halt immediately, and to enter the ships for inspection on national security grounds. The Cabinet and the National Security Council decided to approve JMSDF's maritime patrol action for the very first time since the establishment of the Japanese Self-Defense Force. Based on this order, a JMSDF destroyer fired a warning shot and P-3C aircraft dropped a warning bomb near the suspicious ships, but both kept running away and finally exited from Japanese Defense Identification Area (DIA).

Of course, as an ally, the US actively helped Japan. The US sent its own P-3C aircraft to keep track of the spy ships.³⁶³ US forces in Japan and Hawaii also announced that intelligence on the ships gathered by US P-3C were provided to JMSDF.³⁶⁴ Thus, in collaboration with US defense intelligence authorities, JMSDF found that the ships later went into DPRK bays.

However, Japan decided not to take any retaliatory action against the DPRK. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka announced on March 25, "(Even if the DPRK does not agree to give the two ships to Japan,) the Japanese government will continue to solve problems with Pyongyang one by one through dialogues and negotiations, while

³⁶¹ *ibid.*

³⁶² Maritime patrol action, or *kaijo keibi kodo*, allows JMSDF to order the halt of and inspections into ships consider to be conducting illegal activities in Japanese territorial waters. The issue of the action this time marks the first of its kind, and therefore was seen both inside and outside Japan as the beginning of Japan becoming a "normal nation."

³⁶³ *Asahi Shimbun*, Evening Edition, March 24, 1999, p. 3.

³⁶⁴ *ibid.*

strengthening our national security readiness...As for KEDO, we will separate this issue from KEDO because KEDO is directed to the nuclear issue.”³⁶⁵

KEDO was saved, but the spy ship incident clearly reinforced Japan’s self-defense behaviour. In response to the incident, the Japanese government also made it legally possible for the JMSDF to fire shots at spy ships.

However, many defense and state department officials in the Clinton administration were not necessarily happy about Japan strengthening a measure against the DPRK’s threat because they thought it could provoke the regime, although many conservatives in the Congress acknowledged the move as normal.³⁶⁶

The DPRK’s Other Missile Launch Threat

In July 1999, the threat of another missile launch by the DPRK emerged. There had been continual threats of another missile launch in early 1999, but this time the threat was perceived more credible by the US, the ROK, and Japan. To be sure, the US and the DPRK had a series of talks on the missile issue in June. However, the DPRK’s missile development program and preparation for another missile launch was repeatedly and widely reported. According to US Senator Robert Torricelli, who visited the DPRK in July, the DPRK appeared intent on test-firing a new long-range missile. Torricelli stated, “Despite the illogic and the enormous setback that I believe will ensue, the North Koreans may indeed proceed with the firing of a multi-stage rocket this summer.”³⁶⁷

Torricelli also said that he was discouraged after talks on missiles with DPRK Vice

³⁶⁵ *ibid.* It should be noted, however, that Nonaka’s decision came out of his own belief that Japan should be soft on the DPRK because of Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula during the last war.

³⁶⁶ Personal interview with US defense and state department officials in Washington on July 27, 2000.

³⁶⁷ “Washington, Pyongyang preparing to Resume Suspended Missile Talks,” *Korea Herald*, June 12, 1999.

Foreign Minister Kim Gywe-gwan. He said, "My impression is that beyond defending their right to engage in these tests, I believe they have the intention of doing so."

Torricelli said that another DPRK rocket launch would be an act of extraordinary consequence. Torricelli said that the DPRK's food situation was bad but it has improved. He added that withdrawing food aid would be counterproductive, neither undoing the DPRK nor furthering US interests.³⁶⁸

Japan's concern was expressed strongly all the more because of the news that Japanese technology had been used for the DPRK's missile. According to Japanese legislators, Ichita Yamamoto and Keiichiro Asao, the DPRK's ballistic missile program relies heavily on Japanese-made components. They urged the Japanese government to tighten its export restrictions. Yamamoto and Asao, who were among a group of lawmakers who visited the ROK in May, said that in addition to inspecting the DPRK submarine captured in the ROK, they had also spoken with DPRK defectors familiar with the DPRK missile program and its military imports. The defectors told them that up to forty percent of the semiconductors and gas burners used in the Taepodong missiles were imported from Japan.³⁶⁹ Asao, an upper-house Japanese lawmaker, stated, "It's ridiculous that missiles built with our own technologies are threatening the very security of our own nation."³⁷⁰ The defectors also said that about twenty percent of the components used in the captured spy submarine, such as a depth meter and a periscope, had been made by Japanese Furuno Electric Company and Japan's Canon Inc.³⁷¹

Yamamoto and Asao said that although the companies that manufactured the equipment should not be blamed, the material was easily available on the market. Asao stated, "All

³⁶⁸ Charles Hutzler, "N. Korea Said May Fire Test-Missile," *The Associated Press*, July 12, 1999; and "US Senator Says N. Korea Intent on Missile Test," *Reuters*, July 12, 1999.

³⁶⁹ Norihiko Shirouzu, "Japanese Lawmakers May Tighten Export Rules After Missile Scare," *Wall Street Journal*, July 8, 1999.

³⁷⁰ *ibid.*

the parts that we found can be exported legitimately to North Korea."³⁷² They said that Japan must adopt stronger export controls towards the DPRK similar to those used by the US, Great Britain, and Germany. Spokesmen for Canon and Furano Electric said that their companies currently do no business with the DPRK, although Furano Electric said it legally exported a small number of radar, sonar, global-positioning systems and other electronic devices for fishing and pleasure boats to the DPRK until the missile launch last year.³⁷³

In response to this news, the Japanese government thought of exercising export sanctions against Pyongyang. This time, even Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka said that Japan could freeze aid to the DPRK if it goes ahead with plans to test another long-range missile. Nonaka said that another DPRK launch would make it difficult for the Japanese people to support continuing government aid to help the DPRK build two nuclear reactors.

Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi warned the DPRK against launching a long-range missile. Obuchi said, "The government has judged that a North Korean missile attack is not imminent. But if North Korea does launch another missile, it will have serious effects on Japan's security and Northeast Asia's peace and prosperity. It would also definitely have effects on North Korea's relationships with other nations. That would not be beneficial to North Korea either."³⁷⁴ Obuchi reiterated that a missile

³⁷¹ *ibid.*

³⁷² *ibid.*

³⁷³ Nicholas D. Kristof, "North Korean Missile Parts Said to be From Japan," *New York Times*, July 9, 1999; and Norihiko Shirouzu, "Japanese Lawmakers May Tighten Export Rules after Missile Scare," *Wall Street Journal*, July 8, 1999. The first and most widely-covered report on Japanese technologies used for the DPRK missile development was by *Asahi Shimbun's* weekly journal *AERA* in 1998. See *AERA*, p.28-32.

³⁷⁴ "Japan Warns N.Korea Not to Launch Nissile," *Reuters*, Tokyo, July 13, 1999.

launch might make it tough for Japan to go ahead with a planned US\$1 billion contribution to KEDO.³⁷⁵

The US also warned against another launch. Stephen Bosworth, the US ambassador to the ROK, stated, "that another firing of a long-range missile would have serious consequences for improvement of relations with North Korea. North Korea's management of the Taepodong program will be a strong indicator of whether North Korea is willing to seek more positive relations."³⁷⁶

Against Washington's warning, however, the DPRK's missile launch preparation continued. The DPRK moved its Taepodong-2 missile to a launch site on the east coast.³⁷⁷ The US Department of Defense dispatched two spy ships, the *Cobra Gemini* and the *Invincible* to the East Pacific to track the movements of the DPRK missile program. Japanese Defence Agency Director-General Hosei Norota said at a seminar held by the LDP on July 18, 1999 that the Taepodong-2 missile had a range of 6,000km, meaning it could reach parts of the US, including Alaska and Guam. Norota added that some experts are saying a third missile has been developed. Norota pointed out that the DPRK was designing a Taepodong-3 with an increased range up to 8,000km. Furthermore, according to an unnamed intelligence source, the DPRK has deployed 170mm self-propelled guns with a 50km to 70km range and 240mm rocket launchers along the west coast near the Demilitarized Zone.³⁷⁸ He said that the DPRK had been moving the rocket launchers to a naval base since April, but after the exchange of gunfire in July it also began moving the heavy artillery pieces into the area. The DPRK

³⁷⁵ *ibid.*

³⁷⁶ "Japan May Freeze Aid to North Korea," *Associated Press*, Tokyo, July 13, 1999.

³⁷⁷ Park Doo-shik, "NK Moves Missile to Launch Site," *Chosun Ilbo*, July 18, 1999.

³⁷⁸ Yoo Yong-won, *Chosun Ilbo*, July 18, 1999.

has also newly deployed approximately 20 tank and artillery companies along the Pyongyang- Kaesong highway.

The DPRK's threat of another missile launch brought the three allies together to a consultation. At the ASEAN meeting on July 27, 1999, the US, the ROK, and Japan held a foreign ministerial meeting. At the press conference after the meeting, Japanese Foreign Minister Komura stated in response to the below questions and suggested that economic sanctions on the DPRK in case of its another missile launch had become the Japanese government's policy:

QUESTION: The ministers today said that you stick to the KEDO project and agreed framework. But yesterday you allegedly said that you've frozen KEDO loan in case of the North Korean missile launch. So are you sure that you are stick to the KEDO project and the agreed framework? Thank you.

MINISTER KOUMURA (through interpreter): Well, what I've been saying over and over again - let me repeat this accurately. The KEDO framework is to deter - - is the most realistic and effective framework to deter nuclear development by North Korea. Now should there be another test launch by North Korea, in view of the Japanese people's sentiment, it will be extremely difficult for Japan to continue its cooperation with KEDO. That is all I can stay at this stage.

QUESTION: (through interpreter): One question for Minister Koumura. Looking at this joint statement, the message that is contained here is not out for the first time. And I wonder if you really believe that you will be able to deter the North from launching another missile by announcing this declaration. If in spite of this, the launch goes ahead how would you respond to that?

MINISTER KOUMURA (through interpreter): The three foreign ministers of Japan, U.S. and Korea have expressed as their unified view that if North Korea shows a positive response to the comprehensive and integrated approach offered by Dr. William Perry, the North will enjoy benefits. But conversely, should they go ahead with the test launch, they will suffer serious negative consequences. We have come out with this clear message. And if you consider which is greater, benefits or the negative consequences, I believe it would be obvious to them that positive response to our appeal will bring greater benefits than negative consequences. At least, that is obvious in our statement. But the North Koreans may not be able to understand that so I don't know if we have 100% probability that they will respond positively. But I think nevertheless it was meaningful that we came out with this joint statement.

Now should the North still go ahead with the test launch, I really can't give you details at this stage as to how we shall respond. But with regard to the flows of people, goods and money, we might consider taking some actions. But beyond that I have no intent to go into details.³⁷⁹

Komura obviously threatened economic sanctions against the DPRK in case of further missile test launch by the regime. . In response to pressure from Japan, the US held talks with the DPRK to address the missile issue from September 7 to 12.

However, the US failed to get a solid statement from the DPRK to refrain from another missile launch test. Instead, the US decided to lift some economic sanctions in the hope that the DPRK would refrain from the test if the US softened its stance. The White House announced on September 17, 1999 in Berlin that:

Today the President announced his decision to ease some sanctions against the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (North Korea), administered under the Trading With the Enemy Act, Defense Production Act, and the Department of Commerce's Export Administration Regulations.

The United States is taking this action in order to pursue improved overall relations with North Korea, support the Agreed Framework, and as a result of U.S.-North Korean discussions in Berlin September 7-12, 1999. On the basis of these discussions, it is our understanding that North Korea will continue to refrain from testing long-range missiles of any kind as both sides move toward more normal relations.

The easing of sanctions will allow most consumer goods to be available for export to North Korea and will allow the importation of most North Korean-origin goods into the United States. To support this easing of sanctions in the trade of goods, most personal and commercial funds transfers will be allowed between U.S. and North Korean persons. The relaxation of transportation restrictions will allow commercial air and sea transportation between the U.S. and North Korea for passengers and cargo, subject to normal regulatory requirements.³⁸⁰

³⁷⁹ Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Hong Soon-Young, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Masahiko Kōmura, Joint Press Conference, Four Seasons Hotel Singapore, July 27, 1999. <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/alb727.htm>

³⁸⁰ "Statement by the Press Secretary," Office of the Press Secretary, White House, September 17, 1999.

Japanese officials were not necessarily happy, although some of them expressed their hope for improvement of the relationship between the US and the DPRK.³⁸¹

Perry went to Japan to meet with Prime Minister Obuchi on September 24. In a press conference after the meeting, Perry took into consideration Japan's tough stance on the DPRK and stated that:

We do not like threat containment. But if necessary, we must be prepared to take those actions, and North Korea must understand that we are prepared to. But, I believe that it will not be necessary. That, instead, this first step will lead in time to a removal of the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction on the Korean Peninsula. With the prospect of this threat being removed, all other problems will be easier to resolve, including bilateral issues between Japan and North Korea. A better environment will lay the groundwork for resolving those issues of particular concern to Japan, including the sensitive issue of abduction cases.³⁸²

But five years ago, we narrowly avoided a military conflict with North Korea over its nuclear program. The DPRK nuclear facility at Yongbyon was about to begin reprocessing nuclear fuel, which would have yielded enough plutonium to make about a half-dozen nuclear bombs. We believed that the introduction of these nuclear weapons could upset the deterrence posture on the Peninsula, and we were within a day of imposing severe sanctions.

North Korea said that it would consider the imposition of these sanctions as an act of war. Although some argued that this was only rhetoric, it could not be dismissed. We therefore undertook a detailed review of our war contingency plan, and the U.S. began preparations for sizable reinforcements to our troops in the ROK. In the event of a war, we were confident of a clear allied victory, but not without high casualties on all sides.³⁸³

Based on this observation, Perry decided to continue a non-military engagement policy toward the DPRK. This observation was the same observation Perry made in June 1994 when the Korean nuclear crisis was on the rise. At that time, he predicted that

³⁸¹ Personal interview with Japanese cabinet and foreign ministry officials on March 20, 2000.

³⁸² Press Conference by Dr. William J. Perry, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State U.S. North Korea Policy Coordinator, Embassy of the United States, Tokyo, Japan, September 24, 1999

³⁸³ Testimony before The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs By Dr. William J. Perry, Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State, October 12, 1999.

there would be huge casualties if the DPRK fired its artillery and rockets located along the Northern edge of the DMZ.³⁸⁴

Washington's Accommodation of Japan's Interest Expressed in the Perry Report

It took eight months for Perry to finish the task. The Perry report emphasized the importance of peaceful resolutions to the tensions on the Korean Peninsula and cooperation among the three allies, but it did not specify any clear road map for the solution. In essence, the report confirmed the *status quo* in its policy toward the DPRK.

The US finally agreed to mention Japan's concern about the DPRK's missile programme and took special note of the likelihood of Japan's reconsideration of its financial contribution to KEDO. The Perry Report states that:

Another close U.S. ally in the region, Japan, has become more concerned about North Korea in recent years. This concern was heightened by the launch, in August 1998, of a Taepo Dong missile over Japanese territory. Although the Diet has passed funding for the Light Water Reactor project being undertaken by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) pursuant to the Agreed Framework, and the government wants to preserve the Agreed Framework, a second missile launch is likely to have a serious impact on domestic political support for the Agreed Framework and have wider ramifications within Japan about its security policy.³⁸⁵

"Wider ramifications within Japan" in the above citation were meant to include Japan's independent economic sanctions.³⁸⁶ Interestingly, given Perry's statement in

³⁸⁴ See Chapter Two.

³⁸⁵ William J. Perry, *Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations*, US Department of State, October 12, 1999.

³⁸⁶ Personal interview with a Japanese Defense Agency researcher, March 22, 2002.

Beijing on October 20, 1994 about the chance of Japan going nuclear,³⁸⁷ the “ramifications” mentioned in his report may have been a subtle reference to the risk of this possibility.

The above account shows that the US accommodated Japan’s interest in having its stance in the Perry Report to send a strong message to the DPRK. However, the US decision to ease some economic sanctions on the DPRK, and Perry’s observation of the situation, cannot be well explained by the hegemon’s fear of abandonment. It can be interpreted that the US also feared being entrapped in a war on the Korean Peninsula that might have been caused as a result of Japan’s economic sanctions against the DPRK, but this seems to be a forced interpretation.

In addition, the above account does not necessarily deny the possibility that the US might have had grave concerns about the DPRK’s increased threat while deciding to take a diplomatic line in dealing with the threat regardless the fear of partial abandonment or entrapment by Japan. This raises the question of how strong America’s alliance security dilemma with Japan was in this case.

Alternative Explanations

I have argued that the US agreed with Japan to address the DPRK missile issue because of the US fear of partial abandonment by Japan. Let us now see if alliance burden-sharing theory, offensive realism, and structural liberalism could provide alternative explanations.

³⁸⁷ See Chapter Two.

First, it is obvious that alliance burden-sharing does not fit in the situation in this case. AS the DPRK's missile issue reemerged, Washington's fear rose to the point where it had to agree to address Japan's concern about the issue so that Japan might not take independent action against the DPRK. The US feared uncertain consequences of such an action in terms of both the KEDO project and other unspecified complexities.

Second, against the offensive realist expectation that the bigger ally coerces the small ally to get what it wants, there is no evidence that the US coerced Japan to follow it lead. Instead, the US agreed to state Japan's concern about the DPRK's missile development in the Perry Report and went so far as to mention the possibility of Japan taking significantly independent security measures.

Finally, it is true, as structural liberalism would argue that the US did not lose its security interest in maintaining KEDO, but there is no clear evidence that shows that the US co-bound with Japan because it is a liberal state. The bigger ally's fear of abandonment seems to be more useful in explaining Washington's accommodation of Japan's interest.

Conclusion

This chapter illustrated that a re-emergence of the DPRK's nuclear and missile threat from late 1998 to autumn of 1999 led the US to accommodate Japan's interest in addressing the missile issue by mentioning Japan's concern in the Perry Report,. In the process leading to the completion of the report, Japan had threatened to halt its financial contribution to KEDO and threatened independent economic sanctions against the DPRK because of the re-emergence of the DPRK's nuclear program, the DPRK's

preparation of another missile launch, and the incursion of two DPRK ships into Japanese territorial waters. This made the US fear that Japan would likely take independent measures against the DPRK, which might undermine the AF and could work against Washington's initiative in dealing with the DPRK in general.

However, there are some ambiguities that the alliance security dilemma model cannot fully explain. The US agreed to address Japan's concern about the DPRK missile issue out of fear of Japan's defection from KEDO, but at the same time agreed to ease economic sanctions against the DPRK. Furthermore, we cannot deny the possibility that the US might have had grave concerns about the DPRK's increased threat while taking a diplomatic approach to the DPRK regardless of the alliance security dilemma with Japan.

Despite these ambiguities, this case still shows that the bigger ally does accommodate the smaller ally's interest out of fear of partial abandonment by the smaller ally.

CONCLUSION

The previous chapters examined episodes that occurred under the Clinton administration. This chapter, which is this study's overall conclusion, extends the analysis to the George W. Bush administration, which came to power in 2001. It argues that although the Bush administration has been less compromising toward Japan and, to a larger extent, the ROK in dealing with the DPRK's nuclear and conventional threats, it nevertheless remained consistent in its interests to ensure that both Tokyo and Seoul avoided intensifications of the alliance security dilemma.

Because the Bush administration is a different administration from the Clinton administration by nature, it is essential to articulate the historical context in which the Bush administration became accommodative toward the two smaller allies. I will begin by reviewing the initial course of the administration's foreign and security policy and then discuss the impacts of the 9.11 terrorist attacks on the US, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. I will then review the new developments of the DPRK's nuclear issue and Washington's alliance relationships with Seoul and Tokyo. With these global and regional backgrounds in mind, I will show that the US has accommodated both Japan's and the ROK's interests out of alliance security dilemma despite the administration's often-mentioned hawkish nature. Finally, I will defend the findings against theory of alliance burden-sharing.

Background

The Bush administration was expected to take a stronger stance toward the DPRK than the Clinton administration and position itself more closely to Japan and the ROK well before the official commencement of the administration. Condoleezza Rice, then Stanford University professor and currently presidential advisor for National Security, wrote an article on Republican foreign policy in *Foreign Affairs* in April, 2001, in which she suggested a tougher policy toward the DPRK and the Peoples' Republic of China as well.

The challenges of China and North Korea require coordination and cooperation with Japan and South Korea. The signals that we send to our real partners are important. Never again should an American president go to Beijing for nine days and refuse to stop in Tokyo and Seoul.³⁸⁸

The Bush administration's tougher stance became more evident in President Bush's inaugural address on January 20 in 2001. Although there were six months between the publication of Rice's article and the inauguration of the Bush administration, Rice's foreign policy thinking had much influence on the administration's foreign and security policy. Along with going against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and defending allies and US national interests, he claimed that the administration would create a balance of power in favour of freedom.

We will build our defenses beyond challenge, lest weakness invite challenge.

We will confront weapons of mass destruction, so that a new century is spared new horrors.

The enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of

³⁸⁸ Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 1, 2000, pp. 45-62. The quotation is from p. 54.

power that favors freedom. We will defend our allies and our interests. We will show purpose without arrogance. We will meet aggression and bad faith with resolve and strength. And to all nations, we will speak for the values that gave our nation birth.³⁸⁹

Interestingly, Bush's claim of shaping a balance of power was the first time a President had discussed the issue in his inaugural address since Woodrow Wilson's second inaugural address in 1917.³⁹⁰ The only difference was that President Bush was obviously speaking from a realist stance, while Wilson had called for idealism instead of realism in the aftermath of WWI.

Still at this stage, as discussed in the introduction of this chapter, the 50 years old deterrence structure on the Korean Peninsula was the most crucial geopolitical factor of the absence of war on the peninsula. That is, the larger part of Seoul and the US 2nd Infantry Division was still well within the target range of the North Korean artillery deployed in the northern part of the DMZ. This situation has not changed even under the Bush administration, though it is in the process of changing since the 9.11 terrorist attacks on the US.³⁹¹ Thus, the Bush administration has also been constrained with respect to military options against North Korea, just as the Clinton administration had been. Under these constraints, the Bush administration has also had to choose between coercive and accommodative approaches to the DPRK and to its two junior allies as well. Ultimately, the Bush administration has chosen to be tough on the DPRK, while selectively engaging with both approaches toward the ROK and Japan.

³⁸⁹ George W. Bush, *Presidential Inaugural Address*, January 20, 2001.

³⁹⁰ Woodrow Wilson, *Second Inaugural Address*, March 5, 1917.

³⁹¹ In July 2004, The Bush Administration announced its decision to reduce UFSK by one third beginning 2006.

The 9.11 Terrorist Attacks on America and Fear of Abandonment

The impact of the 9.11 terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington DC in 2001 on the Bush administration's overall foreign and security policy has been significant. From the viewpoint of alliance politics, it is significant because it resulted with the war on terror becoming Washington's highest priority in its foreign and security policy. This could mean two things. Firstly, that the rest of world would fear Washington's anger against the terrorists and follow most of its requests in the war against them. Secondly, that Washington would now have to suffer alliance security dilemma, especially fear of partial abandonment more strongly because it *needed* cooperation from others to win the war on terrorism. This time, both occurred in order.

At first, the rest of the world showed much understanding or sympathy toward US national sorrow and anger over the 9.11 terrorist attacks and acknowledged its strong language against terrorism. The general reaction to President Bush's illustration of the DPRK as part of an axis of evil, along with Iran and Iraq, in the January 2002 State of the Union address can partly be understood in this context.³⁹² Many individuals have criticised the characterisation in various ways, but no nation avoided explicit condemnation of the US for its public designation of the DPRK as part of an axis of evil along with Iraq and Iran. Washington's war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was able to rally relatively large numbers of allies. Japan and the ROK also joined the war both militarily and financially.

The war in Iraq, on the other hand, has not enjoyed so much support. The Bush administration has often pointed out that some 50 countries support the US in the Iraqi War in one way or another, but it failed to gain full support of major powers including

³⁹² George W. Bush, *State of the Union Address*, January 23, 2002.

Russia, France and Germany. The US has relied largely on the UK and Australia, Anglo-Saxon allies, and Japan. Thus, America's dependence on those junior allies has been larger in the Iraqi War than it was in the Afghan war. This is the very background in which America's alliance security dilemma could emerge and, I argue, has actually emerged.

The rest of this chapter will discuss America's accommodation of Japan's tough stance on the DPRK in the issue of the DPRK's abduction of Japanese civilians, the impacts of the DPRK's revelation of its uranium enrichment program in October 2002 and the two rounds of the Six Party Talks. The revelation was the beginning of what is now called the second nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Although the DPRK has denied the allegations,³⁹³ the US stance toward the DPRK has toughened. The first most drastic measure the Bush administration took against the DPRK was to suspend its oil shipment through KEDO in November 2002. The suspension eventually led to the *de facto* termination of the KEDO project in 2003. Since then, the US has consistently demanded that the DPRK should dismantle all nuclear programs before it receives any energy and economic assistance.

However, the US has become tougher on South Korean, as well. Although the Clinton administration supported the sunshine policy of South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, the Bush administration has been at odds with the Roh Moo-hyun administration because Roh has resumed the sunshine policy and has maintained an even softer stance on North Korea and an even more anti-American posture. The Roh government initially demanded the return of the US bases to South Korea, but withdrew the demand once Washington began to express its dissatisfaction. However, because the

³⁹³ 'Operation and Building of Nuclear Facilities to Be Resumed Immediately,' *Korean Central News Agency*, December 12, 2002. <http://www.kcna.co.jp>

US embarked on a military transformation program that accompanies the relocation of US forces out of North Korea's artillery target zone, the US has continued to live up to South Korea's initial request. Currently, the US claims that it still keeps a strong commitment to defending South Korea against the North and to maintaining deterrence on the Peninsula, but some high-ranking officials in the South Korean government speculate that the US has shifted from deterrence to pre-emption and would actually pre-empt the North soon after the completion of the relocation.³⁹⁴

The ROK's reaction to the Bush administration's tougher stance toward itself took the typical form of a junior ally's fear of abandonment by the senior ally. In response to Washington's strong demand that the ROK dispatch its troops to Iraq in one way or another, the new government in Seoul showed alliance loyalty by sending 3,000 troops to Iraq for mainly non-military operations against the strong opposition of ever-growing anti-Americanism among the Korean public. Moreover, when a Korean worker in Iraq was killed by a group of insurgents who had kidnapped him in response to the ROK government's refusal to withdraw its troops from Iraq, the ROK government maintained its resolved stance.

Unlike the tougher stance that the Bush administration took on the ROK, Japan was recognised by President Bush in his State of the Union Address in 2003 as Washington's number three ally despite the small amount of troops it dispatched to Iraq.³⁹⁵ The US sees Japan as a more important ally than the ROK. The Bush administration also has fear of abandonment by Japan.

Both Japan and the ROK indeed fear abandonment by the US. But the fact is that even the sole superpower suffers alliance security dilemma. The US, dealing with Japan

³⁹⁴ Personal interviews with South Korean National Security Council and Foreign ministry officials in Seoul on July 27, 2004.

and the ROK over the DPRK nuclear issue is a good example to examine such a dilemma. Furthermore, America's accommodation toward Japan can be observed in the issue of the DPRK's abduction of Japanese civilians.

US DPRK Policy Before and After 9/11

When George W. Bush came in office, there was much expectation that his administration would be harsher on the DPRK. The termination of the AF and KEDO was much anticipated. Rhetorically, the Bush administration was tougher on the DPRK. In reality, however, from the outset the administration has been cautious enough not to halt food aid to the DPRK through the UN's World Food Programme on humanitarian grounds.

However, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US changed all this. Washington's tougher stance on so-called 'rogue' states became clearer at Bush's State of the Union address in January 2002.

The New Nuclear Crisis: October 2002

The so-called second nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula made the US even tougher towards North Korea. On October 3, US Assistant Deputy Secretary James Kelly met with DPRK First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju in Beijing, who had also been the key counterpart of US chief negotiator Robert Gallucci back in 1993-94 during the first Korean nuclear crisis, to discuss the nuclear issue. During the meeting, according to the US side, Kang admitted having a programme of highly enriched uranium (HEU)-based bombs. In response to this, KEDO's Executive Board decided to suspend the

³⁹⁵ George W. Bush, *Presidential State of the Union Address*, January 23, 2003.

supply of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK.³⁹⁶ The DPRK began to deny in early 2003 that it had admitted having such a program, but the US has disregarded this denial. The revelation made the US stance on the DPRK tougher.³⁹⁷ The Bush administration became even more sceptical about the DPRK when Spain detained a North Korean ship off the Arabian Sea in December 2002. The ship was found to carry some missile parts. This prompted the US to embark on what is now known as a proliferation security initiative (PSI). In January, the DPRK announced that it would leave the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The US also found in February that the DPRK had resumed reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. But the US had not taken any remarkable step to stop the DPRK from going further. The US has only reiterated its tough stance on the DPRK, presumably because of the volatile situation in Iraq. Notwithstanding, the US has maintained that the DPRK should dismantle its nuclear programs completely, verifiably, and irreversibly.

US Threat Perception of the DPRK

The Bush administration's perception of the DPRK's nuclear and conventional threats has been clear and constant. The Bush administration's recognition of the danger of the situation around the DMZ was strikingly similar to the Clinton administration's in 1995.³⁹⁸ John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for disarmament and nonproliferation, has emphasized the threats of the DPRK's uranium enrichment, other WMD, conventional artillery tubes deployed in the Northern part of the DMZ, and the combination of them to target at Seoul and the US forces. Bolton admitted that:

³⁹⁶ "Recent Events (2002-Present)," *KEDO: Promoting Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula and Beyond*, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation, November 2004.

<http://www.kedo.org/index.asp>

³⁹⁷ Interview with a US State Department official dealing with the DPRK on November 23, Tokyo.

As you know, last month during official talks between the United States and North Korea, North Korean officials acknowledged that they have a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons...

The fact that the North Koreans are seeking a production-scale capability to produce weapons-grade uranium is a cause of grave concern to us, to the states in the region and to the world as a whole...

North Korea poses other dangers. We have long been aware of North Korea's role as the world's No. 1 exporter of missile technology and equipment...

With regard to chemical weapons, there is little doubt that North Korea has an active program...

The news on the biological weapons front is equally disturbing. ...North Korea likely has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents within weeks of a decision to do so.

Finally, North Korea has one of the world's largest armies - nearly one million men under arms. This force has over 10,000 artillery tubes, many of which can reach Seoul and surrounding areas south of the De-Militarized Zone. Such a force, far larger than needed for legitimate defense needs, is capable of inflicting massive damage, as it would most likely be charged with deploying chemical and biological weapons during the course of an attack.³⁹⁹

Thus, the Bush administration also recognised that North Korea's conventional military weapons targeted at Seoul and the US 2nd Infantry Division was hard to deal with. It is noteworthy that even a US with highly advanced military power still could not claim perfect superiority over the DPRK with much smaller military power.

US Alliance Security Dilemma with the ROK

Washington has grown frustrated with the new administration in Seoul. The new South Korean regime of Roh Moo-hyun, seen as leftist and anti-American by the West, once demanded the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. Although he later refrained

³⁹⁸ See the statements by General Luck and Defense Secretary Perry in their 1995 congressional testimony and the Perry Report released in 1998, cited in INTRODUCTION.

³⁹⁹ John R. Bolton, "The International Aspects of Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction," The Second Global Conference on Nuclear, Bio/Chem Terrorism: Mitigation and Response, Sponsored by The Hudson Institute Washington, DC, November 1, 2002.

from pushing the demand, the Bush administration has not displayed any tolerance towards him. The US-ROK relations deteriorated further when the US announced in July 2004 to move 3,600 troops from South Korea to Iraq. But the more politically sensitive decision the US has made was to begin reducing UFSK by one third from 2006. Although the decision to reduce the forces there had been discussed between the US and the ROK even before 9.11, the decision stirred anxiety among Korean political circles. The US has claimed that the decision is consistent with the agreement between the two allies from the early 1990s and also with the US military transformation on a global scale in which the US would relocate its military bases and shift strategic focal points in the world. Within this program, the US forces in the ROK are now in the process of relocation. At least until 2006, when the process of force relocation would be finalised, the US strikes, whether surgical or total, seem unlikely. However, the ROK's sense of being abandoned by the US is felt acutely.

As for Washington's fear of abandonment by the ROK, there has been some change from the Clinton administration. Currently, the ROK's fear of abandonment by the US is stronger than Washington's fear of abandonment by the ROK. The current Bush administration is undertaking a transformation of the US forces stationed outside US territory. US forces in the ROK, mainly the 2nd Infantry Division, are now to be relocated from the north of the Han River to the south of the river over a few years. The Bush administration has stressed that the relocation does not mean the withdrawal of the US forces from the ROK and reassured the Roh Moo-hyun administration that the US-ROK alliance will provide continued deterrence on the peninsula. However, the ROK government feared that the relocation might begin soon and therefore strived to make the dates of relocation as vague as possible. In fact, the US-ROK agreement in June 2003 only states that the procurement of the site for relocation would begin in 2004. The

agreement is unclear on the prospect for the procurement and the exact dates of relocation. It states that:

The two sides agreed on the need to develop detailed plans to carry out the vision of the two Presidents on modernizing the alliance. They reaffirmed the relocation of Yongsan at an early date and the consolidation of U.S. forces in Korea around key hubs, taking careful account of the political, economic and security situation on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. In this regard, they agreed to begin work on several important implementation plans with the goal of completing them by the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in late September:

...The two sides agreed to proceed with transfer of certain missions between U.S. and ROK forces, in conjunction with the ROK-US combined capabilities enhancement. Both sides agreed that this is in keeping with the agreement at the summit meeting that the ROK's growing national strength provides an opportunity to expand the role of the ROK military in defending the Korean peninsula. The two sides reaffirmed their agreement to study possible mid- and long-term changes to command relationships.

...In order to support the early movement of U.S. forces currently located in Yongsan out of Seoul and the overall realignment of U.S. forces in Korea, to include those north of the Han River, both sides agreed that the ROK government would start procuring appropriate land in 2004. Once the implementation plan is finalized selected facilities can be returned in the first year. The consolidation will take a number of years and proceed in two phases. Under the first phase, U.S. forces north of the Han River will consolidate in the Camp Casey and Camp Red Cloud area. In phase two, U.S. forces north of the Han River would move to the key hubs south of the Han River. The two sides agreed to sustain a U.S. military rotational training presence north of the Han even after the completion of phase two.⁴⁰⁰

Thus, Washington's fear of abandonment by the ROK seems to be becoming weaker under the current administration.

As mentioned earlier, instead of the US fearing abandonment by the ROK, the ROK's fear of abandonment by the US has become more evident.

⁴⁰⁰ Result of the Second Meeting of "Future of the ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative," *US Department of Defense Press Release*, June 5, 2003.

US Alliance Security Dilemma with Japan

The Bush administration has sided with Japan against the DPRK on the issue of abductions. This thesis examined the cases that occurred under the Clinton administration, and the concept of a bigger ally's fear of abandonment seems still effective in explaining the current George W. Bush administration's efforts to obtain broad security cooperation from its allies in the war on terrorism since 9-11. Because the issue of the fight against terrorism and Iraq was so urgent to the US, the US was in desperate need for cooperation from its allies.

In the nuclear dimension, too, there has still been some sign of Washington's fear of abandonment in the nuclear dimension. US Vice President Dick Cheney expressed his concern that a nuclear DPRK could lead to Japan going nuclear. Cheney said in an interview on March 16, 2003 that:

The idea of a nuclear-armed North Korea with ballistic missiles to deliver those will, I think, probably set off an arms race in that part of the world, and others, perhaps Japan, for example, may be forced to consider whether or not they want to readdress the nuclear question.⁴⁰¹

The American media reacted to Japan's going nuclear more strongly than the Bush administration, but the administration has not been so loud as to express concern over Japan's nuclear option.

Japanese Prime Minister's Visit to Pyongyang and the Abduction Issue

The only issue that could divide Japan from the US has been the issue of the abduction of Japanese civilians by North Korean agents that begun in the 1960s. The issue has

⁴⁰¹ Cheney's Interview during US NBC's *Meet the Press*, March 16, 2003.

long been overshadowed by the nuclear issue and by the DPRK's denial of the existence of such an issue. In fact, the abduction issue was one of the major bilateral issues between Japan and the DPRK in early 1990s, but the Japanese administration at that time, consisting of the Japanese LDP and Socialist Party coalition members, decided not to push the DPRK on the issue. The reason for the decision has not been clear.

According to an LDP administrative member, one theory holds that the late Shin Kanemaru, long-time LDP kingmaker, made a secret deal with then DPRK leader Kim Il-sung when he visited the DPRK with his socialist party partners in 1992.⁴⁰² Another reason may be that the generation including Kanemaru and his socialist counterparts share remorse toward Koreans about the conduct of the Japanese in Korea during Japan's colonisation of the Korean Peninsula.⁴⁰³ In any event, however, the issue reemerged to the front stage of diplomacy at the time of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's possible visit to Pyongyang on September 17, 2002, when Kim Jong-il admitted the regime's abduction activities and apologised to Japan.⁴⁰⁴

Both Koizumi's visit and the revelation of the abduction activities made the US nervous. The US was upset that the visit was secretly prepared. Just before Koizumi announced on his plan to visit North Korea, visiting US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage suggested to Koizumi to "be careful."⁴⁰⁵ The US was also concerned that Japan's possible softer stance on the abduction issue could allow the DPRK to place a wedge between the US and Japan in the Six Party Talks on the DPRK's nuclear issue. That is, the DPRK could make Japan side with the DPRK against the US by

⁴⁰² Personal interview with an LDP administrative member on March 20, 2003.

⁴⁰³ *ibid.*

⁴⁰⁴ In fact, the issue had been discussed between Japan and the DPRK when both began secret diplomacy to work on the preparation for Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang. However, the Japanese government has not officially released the details released presumably because those involved in the secret interactions still remain at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁴⁰⁵ Personal interview with an official from the US Embassy in Tokyo on March 23, 2003.

compromising Japan (or by actually returning some abductees to Japan). The latter concern of the US was excessive because the revelation of the abduction by the DPRK made the Japanese public even harsher on the DPRK and the US-Japan alliance has not deteriorated in the favour of the DPRK.

However, Washington's fear of partial abandonment by Japan has not been unilateral. Japan has also feared partial abandonment by the US. This has been observed in the fact that Japan dispatched its ground self-defense troops to Iraq, although the troops have been allowed to engage in non-military and humanitarian operations.

Another prominent compromise by the US for Japan can be found in the fact that, for the first time, the US State Department stated the abduction issue was one of the DPRK's terrorist activities in its annual report on global terrorism.⁴⁰⁶

Thus, the Bush administration has accommodated Japan's interest out of fear of partial abandonment, which has been affected by the Iraqi situation rather than the Korean situation.

As I mentioned before, the US has begun to reduce the number of its forces stationed in South Korea, though the Bush administration emphasises that it is military *effectiveness*, not *numbers*, that matter. However, as it prepares to leave the ROK, or shift its strategic base from the ROK to Japan, America's fear of abandonment by Seoul is diminishing, but its fear of abandonment by Tokyo is increasing. This explains why the Bush administration has accommodated Japan's approach to the abduction issue. So

⁴⁰⁶ *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*, the US Department of State, June 22, 2004. The report states that: At a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in Pyongyang in September 2002, National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il acknowledged the involvement of DPRK "special institutions" in the kidnapping of Japanese citizens... Pyongyang has allowed the return to Tokyo of five surviving abductees and is negotiating with Tokyo over the repatriation of their family members remaining in North Korea. ... Although it is a party to six international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, Pyongyang has not taken substantial steps to cooperate in efforts to combat international terrorism. See pp. 91-92.

far, America's fear of abandonment by Japan has been mitigated by Japan's alliance reassurance, which is seen in the exceptionally close relationship between President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi.

Alternative Explanations

The above analysis shows that against the offensive realist prediction, the Bush administration has accommodated the interests of its junior allies.

Regarding alliance burden-sharing, if the theory is effective, there should be agreement among the US, the ROK, and Japan to share the responsibilities or mission in dealing with North Korea or other issues including Iraq based on each ally's comparative advantage. There should also be a process of good cop-bad cop by the US to persuade its weaker allies to share burden or mission. However, there was no agreement on burden-sharing or mission-sharing among the allies. Instead, what is more evident is Washington's unilateral withdrawal from the ROK, despite the ROK's desire for the US military presence to remain, and Washington's obvious support for Japan with respect to the abduction issue. Even with the ROK, the US has decided to provide modernised weapons with the ROK to compensate for the withdrawing forces in order to maintain deterrence or to even strengthen it against the DPRK. Although Washington's fear of partial abandonment by the ROK is weak, such fear still remains strong with Japan.

It is possible that the US is only being cautious in maintaining deterrence until the US forces that fall within the DPRK's artillery target are withdrawn to a safer position. If so, then the US current accommodation with the ROK would be only a temporary one.

However, whether such an accommodative behaviour is temporary or not, it remains that the US does fear abandonment by the ROK because of the loss of deterrence or stability on the Korean Peninsula.

This leads to us to conclude that the explanation of the bigger ally's security dilemma, especially fear of partial abandonment by the smaller allies, is more persuasive than that of alliance burden-sharing.

As of October 6, 2004, the US agreed to extend the deadline of complete withdrawal of the US forces out of the target range of the DPRK's artillery and rockets to 2008 from the original deadline of the end of 2005.⁴⁰⁷ This was resulted from several months of the ROK government's negotiations with the US government.⁴⁰⁸ This also shows that while the US has become more unilateral, the US could still listen to its junior ally's request.

Summary and Review

This thesis has so far focused on America's alliance security dilemma with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) as an important example of the security dilemma facing the senior party in an alliance, a dilemma that students of alliance formation and maintenance have occasionally noted in passing, but have failed to examine systematically. Only by taking the security dilemma of the senior partner seriously is it possible to explain adequately the persistent tendency of the United States (US) to

⁴⁰⁷ "U.S., Republic of Korea Reach Agreement on Troop Redeployment," *US Department of Defense Statement*, October 6, 2004.

⁴⁰⁸ Personal interview with a Japan Defense Agency Official and an ROK ministry of trade and foreign affairs official in Tokyo on November 12, 2004.

accommodate the interests of its much weaker allies in dealing with the nuclear and conventional threats posed by the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK).

To further develop this point I will take several steps in this conclusion. First, I will review the findings of the chapters in order to demonstrate both the original observation that the US accommodated its junior allies' interests and the validity of my argument (against alternative explanations) that this was because the US feared being abandoned by Japan and the ROK. Second, I will show how this finding makes a major contribution to our understanding of an important aspect of world politics, alliance maintenance. It does so in two ways: it demonstrates the continuing importance of threat perceptions in explaining states' behaviour. Importantly, this thesis shows that the US threat perceptions arose from both external *and* internal sources. The second major contribution is that US alliance maintenance involved the role of another institution, KEDO. These empirical insights into alliance maintenance also have important implications for grand and middle level theories, which I will discuss.

Review of Chapter Findings: Confirming Accommodation and Fear of Abandonment

In Chapter One, I developed an analytical framework based on Glenn Snyder's alliance security dilemma model to study the bigger ally's alliance security dilemma toward its smaller allies. In doing so, I introduced the concept of partial abandonment, as opposed to total breakdown, of an alliance. To operationalise America's fear of partial abandonment leading to accommodation, I proposed as points of observation 1) statements by national leaders or officials that suggest that they are afraid of the consequences of the loss of their junior allies, 2) the shift of the bigger ally's or the

hegemon's more coercive behaviour toward its smaller partners or followers to a more cooperative one, or 3) the bigger ally's or the hegemon's inability to completely reject the smaller allies' opposition to its strategy or tactic in dealing with the adversary or the bigger ally's inability to coerce the smaller allies to do what it wants them to.

This framework challenges many theoretical assumptions about the means of alliance maintenance. In particular, it follows the mid-level focus on the politics of alliance maintenance but importantly it differs in that it allows for the hegemon's pursuit of several options to maintain its alliance. Specifically, it allows for the hegemon's cooperation with its junior allies through eventual accommodation of their interests, which previously the hegemon has opposed.

The framework also allows for the possibility of more nuanced insights into threat perceptions than does grand theory. Although allies may share a common threat of another country, the way that threat is perceived can differ given the factors discussed earlier. This is important given that the US and its two allies, Japan and ROK, had differing threat perceptions about the DPRK.

By using the framework, Chapter Two made clear the initial stage of US fear of abandonment—or partial abandonment—by Japan and the ROK between 1993 and 2001. I argued that the shift of the bigger ally's or the hegemon's more coercive behaviour toward its smaller partners or followers, to a more cooperative one, or that the bigger ally's or the hegemon's inability to completely reject the smaller allies' opposition indicates the bigger ally's fear of partial abandonment. During the Cold War, US junior allies were more dependent on the US as a whole, but the US was sometimes more dependent on them in some areas, or in some specific contingencies. In such a situation, Washington's fear of abandonment by Japan was often expressed in words suggesting

its frustration with Japan's loose commitments to providing military assistance to the US.

Washington's fear of abandonment by the ROK, on the other hand, was expressed not only in words but also in deeds. The US, especially during the Carter administration, decided not to withdraw both US nuclear and conventional forces from the ROK when it threatened to go nuclear after the withdrawal. The ROK's behaviour was seen as the evidence of its fear of abandonment by the US. However, the US decision not to withdraw its forces from the ROK also shows the US feared abandonment, or feared the ROK's defection from the overall alliance arrangement.

Regarding the 1993-94 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, I argued that the initial rise of US abandonment fear involved verbal coercion, particularly towards Japan, rather than accommodation. The US abandonment fear arose from its perception of Japan's loose commitment to the US-Japan alliance over multilateral institutions and the nuclear-domino dynamic in 1994. Washington's fear of abandonment by the ROK during this period, on the other hand, appeared not only as the nuclear domino image but also as accommodation. ROK President Kim Young-sam's last minute call to US President Clinton can be seen as part of the drive for the US shift of its policy from coercion to appeasement in dealing with the DPRK's nuclear problem. However, regarding Washington's use of bilateral or multilateral institutions to alleviate its fear, the US relied more on its bilateral alliances with Japan and the ROK. The difference of US fear of abandonment by Japan and the ROK was that US fear of abandonment appeared more clearly as accommodation toward the ROK than toward Japan.

In Chapter Three, contrary to the offensive realist prediction that the US would successfully coerce Japan to provide economic assistance to the US to calm the enemy

regime of the DPRK, America's inability to reject Japan's refusal to cooperate with the US was made clear. I examined Japan's refusal to be involved in the second round of heavy fuel oil shipments to the DPRK. The case of the issue of heavy fuel oil supply to the DPRK between Japan and the US represents Washington's accommodation of Japan because the US was unable to completely reject Japan's opposition to its offer.

As for alliance burden-sharing theory, if the theory stands, there should be agreement between the US and Japan to share burden regarding the issue of heavy fuel oil shipment to the DPRK. There should also be a good cop-bad cop negotiation process in which the hegemon draws concessions from its allies. KEDO itself can be seen as a form of alliance burden-sharing in the financial area because the US and its two junior allies agreed to share the costs of supplying the light-water reactors to the DPRK, but they also agreed that the US alone would provide heavy fuel oil to the DPRK to help compensate for the energy loss caused by the halt of the DPRK's suspect nuclear reactors. However, the issue here is about the shipment of heavy fuel oil, not the light-water reactors. Therefore, it can be seen that in this case, the US is asking Japan to share burden also in the issue of heavy fuel oil. The fact that Japan did agree to help the first shipment of heavy fuel oil can be seen from alliance burden-sharing as Japan's effort to help the US maintain the Agreed Framework and KEDO, but it still cannot explain why the US was unable to reverse Japan's decision not to repeat what it did for the first shipment.

On the other hand, it can be argued that the US was successful in persuading Japan to pay for the first shipment by playing both good-cop (the Clinton administration) and bad-cop (the Republican-dominant Congress). This explanation is promising, but the

linkage between Japan's decision to pay for the first shipment and Japan's concern about Congress's stance is not necessarily clear.

As for the structural liberal theory of co-binding, it can not meet its two important conditions in this chapter and elsewhere. One condition is the linkage between the liberal nature of the US and Washington's inability to force Japan to pay for the second shipment of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK.

Chapter Four also showed the hegemon's inability to completely reverse the ROK's tough stance on the DPRK's submarine incursion into ROK waters. In response to the DPRK's submarine incursion, the ROK threatened to strike back and halt its contribution to KEDO. The US initially tried to coerce the ROK, but it then shifted to accommodation. According to the offensive realist view, Washington's coercion should be successful in ensuring the ROK remained silent about the submarine incident. On the contrary, the US shifted from coercion to accommodation. I argued that the shift indicated Washington's fear of abandonment by its junior ally. The US agreed to persuade the DPRK to issue a formal apology to the ROK in exchange for the ROK's agreement to withdraw its decision to strike back and to stop its contribution to KEDO. President Clinton's statement thanking ROK President Kim Young-sam for his effort to resolve the incident suggests that the US feared the break-up of the Four Party Peace Talks. Thus, the shift from coercion to accommodation in Washington's behaviour toward the ROK indicates Washington's fear of abandonment by the ROK.

As for alternative explanations, if the theory of alliance burden-sharing is effective, there should be agreement between the US and the ROK to share burden or mission. Also, there should be a bargaining process in which the US takes a good cop-bad cop strategy to get its junior ally to share the burden. Regarding this good cop-bad cop part

of the theory, it would predict that the US should act to accommodate the ROK's tough stance on the DPRK because the US and the ROK had already agreed that the US would play good cop, while the ROK would play bad cop in order to get the DPRK to apologise for the submarine incursion into ROK territorial waters. However, this chapter found that the theory can not meet the two crucial conditions of the theory in this case.

The structural liberal theory of co-binding would predict that the US accommodated the ROK's stance because its interest is co-bound with that of the ROK in KEDO and more importantly, its alliance with the ROK. This argument could explain the US accommodation of the ROK's interest in this case but it fails to establish the connection between liberalism and Washington's tendency to accommodate junior allies' interest.

Chapter Five showed that the US accommodated Japan's interest in possessing its own intelligence satellites for fear that Japan might not resume its activities in KEDO, which it had halted in the wake of the DPRK's missile launch over Japan in 1998. Japan's actions resulted in US fear over losing Japan's contribution to KEDO. Although the US was able to convince Japan to remain in KEDO, it was unable to stop Japan from deciding to launch its own intelligence satellites. The US thought it necessary to give Japan a chance to alleviate its distrust toward the US intelligence capability and also because Japan reassured its commitment to TMD and increased its intelligence ties with the US. Japan also compromised, but it should be particularly noted that the US accommodated Japan's interests for fear of abandonment in the terms defined in this thesis. Against the offensive realist claim that the bigger ally coerces the smaller ally to follow its decision, this chapter finds no such evidence. Instead, this case study finds the

US accommodative behaviour toward its junior partner was attributable to its fear of abandonment by the junior partner.

Regarding alternative explanations, for alliance burden-sharing theory to be effective, there should be agreement among the allies to share burden or mission according to their comparative advantage. There should also be a bargaining process in which the US draws concessions from the weaker allies by a strategy of good cop- bad cop. Again, these conditions were not met in this case.

If the structural liberal theory of co-binding is appropriate in this case, there should be some linkage between American liberalism and America's accommodative behaviour toward Japan. There should also be America's recognition of the need to maintain engagement with Japan through KEDO, an international institution. Although the first condition cannot clearly be met, it can be argued that the US took a strategy of co-binding itself with Japan through KEDO and accommodated the junior ally's interest because its own security interests were strongly tied to the junior ally. However, we concluded that the US fear of Japan's defection from KEDO was more highlighted than the US recognition of the need to keep engaging with Japan through the institution of KEDO.

Chapter Six examined the revision of the US-ROK SOFA. This case highlighted that the US accommodated the ROK out of fear that the ROK would get closer to the DPRK and disrupt the US military presence on—or lead to the withdrawal of the US forces from—the ROK. America's fear was felt more strongly before the historic summit between the ROK and the DPRK and during a wave of anti-American sentiment in the ROK. The US eventually agreed to revise the SOFA, although the ROK also made some compromises.

Given the nature of the SOFA issue, it is impossible for alliance burden-sharing theory to stand. The issue here is about how the hegemon would react to its junior ally's unilateral demand.

As for the structural liberal theory of co-binding, for the theory to be effective, there should at least be the linkage between the liberal nature of the US and the US accommodative behaviour toward its weaker allies. There should also be America's recognition of the need to engage with its junior allies through institutions. Regarding the first condition in particular, a joint statement between the two allies emphasising their common value of liberalism or democracy could be evidence for the structural liberal claim. In this case study, both the US and the ROK emphasised the importance of their military alliance, rather than their common value of liberal democracy. It is difficult to conclude that the structural liberal theory of co-binding has merit, and thus, in this example the theory remains ambiguous.

Chapter Seven also showed that against the offensive realist prediction, the US had to compromise with the ROK's demand. Here, I examined how the US compromised its original position on the ROK's missile target range extension in exchange for the MTCR.

As for alternative explanations, for alliance burden-sharing theory to be effective, there should be agreement between Japan and the US regarding the sharing of burden in dealing with the possession, and the use, of missiles against the DPRK. There should also be a bargaining process in which the US utilizes a good cop-bad cop strategy to draw concessions from its weaker allies. However, these conditions were problematic in this case.

The structural liberal theory of co-binding would predict the hegemon's co-binding with its junior allies, or cooperation with its junior allies through institutions. In this chapter's case, the theory would see that the US nature as a liberal hegemon made it allow the ROK to extend its missile target range in exchange for the ROK's participation in the MTCR, which is an international organization to regulate the proliferation of missile technology. However, because the definition of liberal hegemon is not clearly given by the theory, it is impossible to determine if the case in this chapter can be explained by the theory. Even if the US liberal nature is established, it seems that the US fear of partial abandonment by the ROK is the driving force for America's accommodative behaviour. Therefore, the explanatory power of structural liberalism remains ambiguous in this case.

Chapter Eight showed that a re-emergence of the DPRK's nuclear and missile threat from late 1998 to autumn of 1999 led the US to accommodate Japan's interest in addressing the missile issue by mentioning Japan's concern in the Perry Report. In the process leading to the completion of the report, Japan had threatened to halt its financial contribution to KEDO and threatened independent economic sanctions against the DPRK because of the re-emergence of the DPRK's nuclear program, the DPRK's preparation of another missile launch, and the incursion of two DPRK ships into Japanese territorial waters. This made the US fear that Japan would likely take independent measures against the DPRK, which might undermine the AF between the US and the DPRK in particular, and could also work against Washington's initiative in dealing with the DPRK in general. Moreover, the US agreed to address Japan's concern about the DPRK missile issue out of fear of Japan's defection from KEDO.

However, there are some ambiguities that the alliance security dilemma model cannot fully explain in this chapter. The US agreed to address Japan's concern about the DPRK missile issue out of fear of Japan's defection from KEDO, but at the same time agreed to ease economic sanctions against the DPRK. Furthermore, we cannot deny the possibility that the US might have had grave concerns about the DPRK's increased threat while taking a diplomatic approach to the DPRK regardless of the alliance security dilemma with Japan.

Despite these ambiguities, this case still shows that the bigger ally does accommodate the smaller ally's interest out of fear of partial abandonment by the smaller ally.

It is obvious that alliance burden-sharing does not adequately explain the situation in this case. AS the DPRK's missile issue re-emerged, Washington's fear rose to the point where it had to agree to address Japan's concern about the issue so that Japan might not take independent action against the DPRK. The US feared uncertain consequences of such an action in terms of both the KEDO project and other unspecified complexities.

Also, it is true, as structural liberalism would argue, that the US did not lose its security interest in maintaining KEDO, but there is no clear evidence that shows that the US co-bound with Japan because it is a liberal state. The bigger ally's fear of abandonment seems to be more useful in explaining Washington's accommodation of Japan's interest.

As for structural liberalism, it would argue, that the US did not lose its security interest in maintaining KEDO, but there is no clear evidence that shows that the US co-bound with Japan because it is a liberal state. The bigger ally's fear of abandonment

seems to be a more useful explanation for Washington's accommodation of Japan's interest in this chapter.

Lastly, this thesis extended the analysis to the Republican President, George W. Bush, who came in power in 2001, and argued that although the Bush administration has been less compromising toward Japan and, to a larger extent, the ROK than the previous Clinton administration was in dealing with the DPRK's nuclear and conventional threats, the administration has accommodated Tokyo's and Seoul's interests out of alliance security dilemma. For Japan, the US has supported Japan's tough stance on the abduction issue. For the ROK, on the other hand, the US agreed to postpone the dates of the reduction and withdrawal of US forces out of the target range of the DPRK's conventional artillery deployed along the Northern edge of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The chapter concluded that America's alliance security dilemma leading to US accommodation of Japan and the ROK in dealing with the DPRK can still be observed.

However, America's fear of abandonment has decreased significantly from the Clinton period, partly in the context of US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's global program of US military posture review. In fact, Seoul's fear of abandonment by the US appears to be stronger than Washington's fear of abandonment by the ROK. This seems to fit into typical alliance politics, in which a weaker ally fears abandonment by a stronger ally.

Regarding Japan, Washington's fear of abandonment by Japan has been still strong as the US has given more importance to Japan's symbolic support for its Iraqi policy and Rumsfeld's plan for US military transformation. However, Japan has also showed its alliance commitment by sending its troops to Iraq for non-military operations.

Regarding alliance burden-sharing, if the theory is effective, there should be agreement among the US, the ROK, and Japan to share the responsibilities or mission in dealing with North Korea or other issues including Iraq based on each ally's comparative advantage. There should also be a process of good cop-bad cop by the US to persuade its weaker allies to share burden or mission. However, there was no agreement on burden-sharing or mission-sharing among the allies. Instead, what is more evident is Washington's unilateral withdrawal from the ROK, despite the ROK's desire for the US military presence to remain, and Washington's obvious support for Japan with respect to the abduction issue. Even with the ROK, the US has decided to provide modernised weapons with the ROK to compensate for the withdrawing forces in order to maintain deterrence or to even strengthen it against the DPRK. Although Washington's fear of partial abandonment by the ROK is weak, such fear still remains strong with Japan.

It is possible that the US is only being cautious in maintaining deterrence until the US forces that fall within the DPRK's artillery target are withdrawn to a safer position. If so, then the US current accommodation with the ROK would be only a temporary one. However, whether such accommodative behavior is temporary or not, the point remains that the US does fear abandonment by the ROK because of the loss of deterrence or stability on the Korean Peninsula.

This leads to us to conclude that the explanation of the bigger ally's security dilemma, especially fear of partial abandonment by the smaller allies, is more persuasive than that of alliance burden-sharing.

Regarding the structural liberal theory of co-binding, there should be the linkage of the US liberal nature and Washington's accommodative behavior toward its smaller

partners. There should also be America's recognition of the need to engage with its junior allies through institutions. However, especially with the ROK, the Bush administration's unilateral, or less liberal, attitude is more evident. Regarding Japan, on the other hand, Washington's accommodative behaviour is more attributable to the fear of partial abandonment by Japan.

I also pointed out that as of October 6, 2004, the US agreed to extend the deadline of complete withdrawal of the US forces out of the target range of the DPRK's artillery and rockets to 2008 from the original deadline of the end of 2005 in response to the ROK's patient negotiations. This indicates that although the Bush administration is often termed hawkish and unilateralist, it can be accommodative when it needs to, even to the ROK.

The above summary leads us to conclude that the explanation of the theory of alliance security dilemma, especially the bigger ally's fear of partial abandonment by the smaller allies, is more persuasive than that of offensive realism, alliance burden-sharing and structural liberalism. The results are summarized in the table below.

Table 3: Analytical Results

CHAPTER	Alliance Security Dilemma	Alliance Burden-Sharing	Offensive Realism	Structural Liberalism
TWO	Positive	Negative	Negative	Negative
THREE	Positive	Ambiguous	Negative	Negative
FOUR	Positive	Negative	Negative	Negative
FIVE	Positive	Negative	Negative	Negative
SIX	Positive	Negative	Negative	Ambiguous
SEVEN	Positive	Negative	Negative	Ambiguous
EIGHT	Positive but some ambiguities remain	Negative	Negative	Negative
CONCLUSION	Positive (with Japan)	Negative	Positive (with ROK)	Negative

Implications of the Findings for Alliance Maintenance

The thesis' conclusion, that the US accommodated its junior allies' interests because it feared being partially abandoned, is an important insight into our understanding of alliance maintenance. First, it demonstrates that not only are US perceptions of external threats important to alliance maintenance, as realists suggest, but so too are US *internal* threat perceptions. Second, it shows that another institution, KEDO, had a role in alliance maintenance. These two empirical findings have implications for grand and middle-level theoretical propositions.

External and Internal Threat Perceptions

Much of the literature on alliances looks to external threats as both the reason for forming alliances and continuing with them. The US was concerned about the threat of nuclear proliferation posed by the DPRK and this served as another reason for keeping the existing alliances with the ROK and Japan robust. However, as the case studies showed, while the ROK and Japan also considered the DPRK a threat, they did so in ways that were different to the US. This often led them to challenge what the US saw as its interests with their own interests. For the US, such a situation constituted an *internal* threat to the cohesion of the alliance. The US feared the ROK and Japan may partially abandon the alliance, which for the US was integral to security in Northeast Asia: both to address the proliferation problem and US perceptions of the threat posed by China.

Identifying that the US perceived there was an *internal* threat to the alliance and that this led to its accommodation of junior allies' interests is a finding that provides new insights into alliance maintenance. Moreover, identifying that the internal threat

had a psychological dimension for the US, that is fear, is another consideration in alliance maintenance.

Studies of alliance maintenance should therefore canvass not just perceptions of external threats, which realists emphasise, but also perceptions of internal threat experienced by the hegemon, which realists do not recognise. Of course, the two are interrelated, though the thesis does not aim to detail the exact relationship.

For this finding to have wider explanatory value it would be necessary to apply it to other cases. Nonetheless, it is a hypothesis that has the potential to add to the literature on alliance persistence that is the focus of liberal institutionalists and functionalists.

Studies of alliance maintenance should also apply frameworks that go beyond propositions of grand theories and include middle level theories that focus on alliance politics. These frameworks should focus on *both* the junior allies' and the hegemon's psychological fears of being abandoned in some aspects of the overall alliance.

The Role of Institutions in Alliance Maintenance

The second contribution that the thesis makes is the insights it provides into the role of other institutions, such as KEDO, in alliance maintenance. It is clear from the majority of the case studies that the US considered KEDO as the prime forum in Northeast Asia to counter the potential of a DPRK nuclear threat. Since KEDO comprised the US and its alliance partners, Japan and the ROK, it was important that both institutions were supported by the junior allies. Indeed, it was US fear - that its allies may cease to

support one or the other institutions, and that non-support in either case would undermine the effectiveness of both institutions - that led to US accommodation.

This insight suggests that maintaining an institution like KEDO required that the US either accommodated the interests of junior allies or risk their defection, which would undermine the overall alliance relationship. Understanding that alliance maintenance involves the role of associated institutions is useful.

Study of the role of institutions in realist theory might well consider the finding that for the US, KEDO was able to serve as the basis of the forum that made it vulnerable to its junior allies, because they could counter US power by suggesting that they might defect. In fact, there was also a trilateral policy coordination and oversight group (TCOG) among the US, Japan, and the ROK to deal with the DPRK's security issues that was established after the DPRK's launch of the Taepodong missile over Japan. The habit of interaction among the allies in KEDO can be seen to have made such a group possible. As I discussed in the Introduction of this thesis, according to John Mearsheimer, hegemony acts through institutions or utilises institutions to maintain or increase their power. Institutions, such as alliances and other multilateral organizations, are useful to the hegemony only as long as they can exercise overwhelming power over other actors through these institutions. As we saw in Chapter Seven, the US utilised MTCR to manage its alliance security dilemma with the ROK. This is also a good example of hegemonic utilisation of international institutions. However, with regard to KEDO in particular, despite the fact that the US did not have overwhelming power in KEDO, it continued to support it.

Thus, the role of institutions is important to the maintenance of alliances and the use of institutions will continue to be a useful strategy for hegemony's alliance

management. While liberals call many international institutions *liberal* institutions, realists could call some of them *realist* institutions. Alliance and its associated institutions are the best example of *realist* institutions. This is an area worth exploring further in the future.

Thoughts on Further Research

In the further testing of the alliance security dilemma theory, it is also important to take into consideration the changing reality of alliances, especially the US-centred alliance system. The US has been undergoing a military transformation and global posture review (GPR) in order to adjust to the post-Cold War security environment, even before the 9.11 terrorist attacks. The Bush administration already announced its plans to reduce the number of troops in Germany and the ROK by 60 to 70 thousand over the next ten years. The reduction and redeployment of US forces in the ROK is more relevant to this thesis. By moving from the area near the DMZ to the south of the Han River, the US Army 2nd Infantry Division can get out of the target range of the DPRK's massive artillery and rockets. This means that the troops would no longer be the 'trip wire' or hostage to ensure America's commitment to defending the ROK from the DPRK's military threat. As I mentioned earlier in this Conclusion, this is the cause of the increase of the ROK's fear of abandonment by the US, although the US has claimed that the redeployment does not mean the reduction of the US commitment to the defense of the ROK against the DPRK. The US has also argued that the reduction and redeployment of the US forces would be compensated for by better military technologies or would even strengthen deterrence against the DPRK. The ROK's apparent fear of abandonment by the US seems to be currently overshadowing the US fear of partial

abandonment by the ROK. Another possibility is that Japan and the ROK could further develop their cooperation at least in the security area, but the issue of history between the two countries remains an obstacle to such cooperation.⁴⁰⁹

On the other hand, US reliance on Japan is obviously increasing because the US GPS plans to build a main operating base (MOB) in Japan by moving to the US Army 1st Corp HQ to Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture from the US homeland (Washington State). As we already saw in Chapters Four and Eight, the DPRK's increasing missile threat has made Japan more security-minded since 1998. While Japan has realised the need to strengthen its own defense capability against the DPRK, it has also realised the value of strengthening its alliance with the US. On the US part, the 9.11 terrorist attacks added asymmetric threats to US threat perceptions and accelerated the plan to transform the US military to have the capacity to swiftly respond to any situations in an arc of instability that runs from the Middle East to Asia. From the US strategic point of view, Japan is the most suitable geographical location to build a MOB to deal with those situations. Therefore, the US has increasingly seen Japan as an important ally. In addition, those situations include crises on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, both of which affect Japan's security. Thus, the interests of both allies converge, and as a consequence, both allies continue to need each other. This confirms the neorealist version of threat-driven alliance cooperation.

Currently, although there are some disagreements between the two allies in the negotiations regarding US bases in Okinawa, Japan seems to be forward-looking about the idea of building a MOB in Japan. The building of a MOB in Japan would raise the strategic importance of Japan within the US-centred alliance system. This also suggests

⁴⁰⁹ For the possibility of Japanese and ROK security cooperation, see Quansheng Zhao, 'Changing Regional Economic and Security Framework in East Asia', *Korea Review of International Relations*, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 69-90, especially pp. 79-80.

that America's potential fear of abandonment by Japan would strengthen in cases where Japan would become reluctant to assist the US or even hinder the smooth functioning of the hub in contingencies. Although this scenario is highly unlikely at this stage, the possibility cannot be totally ruled out. As of October 2005, based on the common strategic objectives that recognise the importance of Taiwan (against China), both the US and Japan agreed to share defense missions and roles in areas including ⁴¹⁰areas surrounding Japan and other areas for international peace cooperation activities.⁴¹¹

On the other hand, factors in the US-ROK alliance have shifted more significantly. The US has reassured Seoul that it would continue to provide the ROK with its extended deterrence guarantee. But it has also more visibly accommodated the ROK about 'strategic flexibility' based on premise that the ROK should not automatically get involved in global conflicts irrelevant to the Korean Peninsula prior to US consultation with the ROK. It has also discussed changes in wartime command arrangements under the Combined Forces Command. This includes allowing the ROK forces to be commanded by an ROK general during wartime.

Outside of the US-Japan alliance and the US-ROK alliance, burden-sharing theory may be able to explain the responsibility or role sharing between the US and Australia in combating terrorism in Southeast Asia. The Howard Government of Australia has contributed to the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq by sending troops to these regions, partly to show alliance commitment to the US. However, after the suicide car

⁴¹⁰ According to the text of the 37th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communiqué released on October 21, 2005, "Secretary Rumsfeld reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the security of the ROK, and to the continued provision of a nuclear umbrella for the ROK, consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty. Similarly, Minister Yoon reaffirmed the ROK commitment to mutual defense," and "the Minister and the Secretary agreed to appropriately accelerate discussions on command relations and wartime operational control. They also reaffirmed the continuing importance of the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in the ROK and pledged to continue discussions on the issue based on the spirit of the Alliance." See the full text of the communiqué which is available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2005/d20051021uskorea1.pdf>.

⁴¹¹ *Security Consultative Committee Document US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future*, October 29, 2005 (<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html>)

bombing in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in August, many Australians began to believe that Australia should focus more on security in their own region. The Howard administration may not be able to ignore their voice and may turn more of its security efforts to the Asia-Pacific region. If the US and Australia agreed that Australia mainly takes responsibility of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, while the US takes care of the other regions in the area of combating terrorism, this would be a good example of alliance burden-sharing between the US and Australia. The validity of the burden-sharing thesis would show the weakness of the unitary rational actor model of neorealism.

Thus, both theories of alliance security dilemma and alliance burden-sharing may continue to show their value in the future. It is the task for the students of alliance politics to remain willing to develop them by testing them against the reality.

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