

# EXTERNAL FACTORS IN YUGOSLAV POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

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## PREFACE

Included as Parts I and II of this monograph in reverse order of the title are revised versions of two long papers presented at seminars in the Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, and the Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, respectively, at the Australian National University during 1977. The two papers were written with an eye to eventual incorporation into a larger work on the development of Yugoslav policies and institutions under Tito. It was decided to publish the two papers together here as a separate Occasional Paper, since they offer complementary perspectives on one of my major areas of concern, foreign policy decision-making in Yugoslavia and its influence on the evolution of the domestic political system, an area which has been either ignored or purposely discarded by most Western scholars. It is my contention that this neglect represents a serious shortcoming in the literature, especially for those seeking to understand the nature of the Yugoslav system for policy review or policy-recommendation purposes.

Part I combines both structural and rational-actor approaches in analyzing Yugoslav policies in six major decisional situations at critical stages in the development of foreign and domestic policy. It examines situational factors and the apparently competing perceptions of the associated constraints and opportunities for each of these sets of decisions. As the story unfolds, the unique role of Tito in the decision-making process becomes increasingly evident.

In Part II the nature of Tito's role and of his position among the Yugoslav political leadership is investigated, applying some of the basic conceptual apparatus of personality theory. The focus of this section is on the relationship between Tito and his chief lieutenants and the ways in which his personality and style of leadership have affected the form and content of the decisions analyzed in Part I.

At the end of Part I, I offer some extremely speculative suggestions concerning the implications of the Yugoslav pattern of interactions of foreign and domestic factors for the evolving Eurocommunist movement. It is obvious that the Yugoslav leaders currently place a good deal of hope in this movement for a number of political, as well as ideological, reasons. But it is equally obvious that the unique role of Tito in the Yugoslav system, which is hardly likely to be replicated in the leading Eurocommunist parties, makes any lessons to be derived from the Yugoslav experience highly tenuous. Nevertheless, the issues involved deserve some consideration.

From the relatively short length of the monograph it is not to be expected that the analysis offered will be at all exhaustive. I hope that my efforts will serve as at least a partial corrective to what I consider a serious gap in the treatment of Yugoslav policy-making and that the patterns and tendencies presented will be sufficiently suggestive to stimulate further research and commentary.

Canberra  
August 1977

R.F. Miller

## PART I

### EXTERNAL FACTORS IN YUGOSLAV POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT



## INTRODUCTION

Despite her many problems Yugoslavia is looked upon by Western scholars, with considerable justice, as an innovator in social and political development; that is, in the development of institutions for effecting and maintaining the socio-economic and political patterns deemed suitable for a modern socialist community by her leaders. The principal innovatory directions of Yugoslav policy efforts in the post-1948 period are symbolized by the three key concepts of *nonalignment* in foreign policy, *worker self-management* in the organization of domestic economic and political relations, and *national integration* in the handling of the acute ethnic frictions which have historically encumbered relations among the peoples of Yugoslavia. Some may perhaps question the practical effectiveness of Yugoslav efforts at operationalizing any or all of these concepts. Nevertheless, the efforts continue, and it cannot be doubted that a number of significant achievements have been recorded, especially when one considers the enormous social, economic and ethnic problems inherited by the new communist regime at the end of the war.

The relative openness of the Yugoslav system has made it possible for Western scholars to investigate many of these problems and achievements using the concepts and methodologies of modern social science and aided in many cases by well trained Yugoslav co-workers. Unfortunately, Western analysts often tend to treat the Yugoslav policy process as if it were fully autonomous and insulated from external pressures and constraints.<sup>1</sup> In doing so they unconsciously replicate the approved positions and arguments of Yugoslav official spokesmen (sometimes garbed in the robes of academia), who have sufficiently good political reasons for playing down the salience of external factors. But there is obviously a serious analytical cost entailed in following the official line, or guidelines, in this manner. Studying policy development in, say, worker self-management or national integration by focussing purely on self-generated internal forces and variables may cause one to neglect much that is important for a comprehensive understanding of given decisions, and especially their timing. For, as this study argues, it is quite clear that many of the most crucial phases in the development of the Yugoslav system have been set in motion and substantively influenced by external consideration.

That Yugoslavia is a good deal less autonomous in both foreign and domestic policy-making than her leaders publicly admit is not at all surprising. In some ways Yugoslavia behaves like a typical small or middle power. (In the literature the two terms are often used interchangeably). A common definition of the small or middle power describes it as a state whose interests and influence are limited to its geographic region.<sup>2</sup> By this criterion Tito's Yugoslavia is perhaps not a typical small power although this discrepancy can partially be accounted for by the special position that Tito has attempted to cast for her in international relations. But the objective circumstances of her power and location undoubtedly do limit her capacity for independent action.

Carsten Holbraad has noted that under cold war conditions middle powers have tended either to join the major alliance systems or to attempt to mediate between them; and the group of 'uncommitted' middle powers have enjoyed substantial room for manoeuvre. But in a situation of 'condominium' between the superpowers, such as obtains in the current era of *détente*, as codified by the 1975 Helsinki Agreements, the scope for autonomous action is significantly reduced.<sup>3</sup>

David Vital has described the paradigm case of the small power which is neither a pawn nor a *protégé* of a superpower, observing that the small state 'may be sure of retaining identity and autonomy only so long as its capacity for autonomous action is not put to a serious test. Conflict with a great power is, ultimately, a conflict over autonomy. If it seeks and gains protection from another great power it loses autonomy. If it remains unprotected, it is faced with unquestioned preponderance of usable force, which ... the minor power can neither deter nor, *a fortiori*, hope to overcome'.<sup>4</sup> Detailed case studies of Czechoslovakia in 1938, Israel after 1967, and Finland after 1939 lead Vital to emphasize the tremendous importance of the national leaders' will to resist as a factor in the capacity of a small power to preserve its autonomy. Nevertheless, he points out, along with Holbraad, that over time, as the correlation of forces in the vicinity of a small power crystallizes, it becomes more difficult to call upon the rival superpower to counter threats by the aggressor superpower, thus reducing the small power's room for manoeuvre.<sup>5</sup>

Merely to state these generalizations is to suggest their relevance to the Yugoslav situation. It is apparent that Tito and his colleagues tend to view the predicament of their country in essentially these terms, albeit with some notable differences in emphasis and the conclusions to be drawn. Although welcoming *détente* in its structured Kissingerian formulation as a barrier to naked aggression in at least some parts of the world, Tito has long been sensitive to the dangers for the interests of small powers inherent in superpower 'condominia'. That is why Yugoslav spokesmen have insisted on small-power participation in the forging of major international agreements.<sup>6</sup>

Yugoslavia's special prominence in the nonaligned movement, of which she is a charter members, is another expression of her special status among the smaller powers. This activity has regularly projected her influence far beyond the boundaries of her region. To be sure, this may be interpreted primarily in terms of the personality of President Tito: for a man of his international stature a merely regional arena may seem unduly restrictive. But a fuller explanation of Yugoslavia's forward diplomatic strategy must surely go beyond matters of personal style. Yugoslav leaders undoubtedly view maximum international exposure and involvement as an important element of security for their country.

At the same time they are well aware that nonalignment is far from a reliable guarantee of autonomy; and they often act accordingly. Indeed, the record of Yugoslav policy under the nonalignment rubric

shows that it closely parallels Soviet foreign policy on all important issues of the 'struggle against imperialism'. Some Western scholars, for example Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Ernst Halperin, would rejoin that this virtual congruence of policy positions is more a reflection of Soviet acceptance of Yugoslav viewpoints in recent decades than the reverse. Rubinstein asserts that 'on no major issue involving nonalignment has Belgrade abandoned or altered a previous held position out of deference to Soviet wishes'.<sup>7</sup> But one could equally reasonably argue 1) that the near identity of policies is what has made Yugoslav nonalignment acceptable to Soviet leaders since Stalin; 2) that Yugoslav policymakers have consistently taken probable Soviet reactions into consideration in formulating their foreign policy stance, in a way that they have rarely taken Western reactions into account (except in periods of extreme crisis in Yugoslav relations with Moscow); and 3) that consequently nonalignment as practiced by Tito represents as much a mortgage on her autonomy as it does a guarantee of that autonomy.

Now, it may well be that Tito and his colleagues, as Marxists, if not Marxist-Leninists (and they sometimes claim to be the latter when it suits them domestically), come naturally to their interpretations of world processes and events and, therefore, more or less automatically agree with their Soviet counterparts on the policy conclusions to be drawn. If so, the only thing that really distinguishes them from fully fledged members of the Bloc is their insistence on making these evaluations and decisions on their own and on fashioning their own instruments for implementing them. To be sure, this distinction should not be underrated. And to the extent that this commitment and the often reiterated willingness to defend it by force of arms have resulted in the denial of Yugoslavia's strategically located territory to Moscow, Yugoslav nonalignment has been worth the considerable Western investment in her security. But Western policymakers should have no illusions as to the underlying philosophical and political basis of Tito's policies.

For in many respects Yugoslavia can be described as what James N. Rosenau has called a 'penetrated political system'; that is, a system open to the direct or indirect influence of outsiders on policy-making in specific 'issue-areas'.<sup>8</sup> Yugoslavia, indeed, represents a special case of the penetration phenomenon. Her leaders have more or less consistently asserted a strong public commitment to maintaining an autonomous international position as a nonaligned power with a unique kind of socialist internal order. At the same time, the ideological origins of the Yugoslav political elite, the need for Western assistance imposed by the Cominform blockade of 1948, and the subsequent adoption of market-type elements in the model of economic development have made the country peculiarly open to influences from both East and West. However, the nature of penetration by the two world superpower configurations has been substantially different. Eastern influence has tended to flow primarily from top to bottom, operating through the ideological affinities of the dominant political elite or important sections thereof, whereas Western influence has tended to well up from the

middle and lower strata of the population more directly involved in the management and operations of the economic system, in some cases 'infecting' certain segments of the political elite as well. The resulting cross pressures have manifested themselves in continuing friction between ideological-conservative and pragmatic-liberal forces in the public policy arena. Basically the conservatives have tended to gravitate toward an Eastern orientation externally, while the pragmatists have adopted a more westerly orientation. In addition to these indirect forms of influence on policy there have, of course, also been many instances of more direct forms of pressure from both East and West at various stages in the postwar history of Yugoslavia.

In the following pages I shall attempt to trace the pattern of interactions which have characterized the triangular relationship between Yugoslavia, the East and the West, concentrating on major turning points to illustrate the impact of these foreign influences and domestic orientations on the directions of Yugoslav political development. A preliminary statement of the hypothesized relational patterns will be helpful for an understanding of the kinds of issues that are to be illustrated in the sequence of case studies which comprise the body of the present study:

1) The Soviet model has had both a positive and a negative influence on the creators of the Yugoslav road to socialism. The system of worker self-management was consciously formulated as an alternative to the 'bureaucratic centralist' order created by Stalin in the USSR, which Yugoslav theorists had come to view as a degenerate pre-socialist formation. On the other hand, the founders of the Yugoslav alternative were themselves a product of the Stalinist system. And many of them have continued to regard some of the principles and practices of the Soviet Communist Party as a proper model for the guidance of socialist construction.

2) The impact of Western influence has been substantially different. Western aid was regarded as an unavoidable necessity for national survival in the dark days of the Cominform blockade and later as a useful spur to economic development. Certain features of the capitalist economic system were welcomed as an adjunct to the decentralized self-management system that was in process of elaboration. But the liberalizing social and political complements of the Western assistance package were far less enthusiastically received by Tito and his colleagues.

3) The periodic rapprochements with Moscow in the post-Stalin era thus offered the Yugoslav leaders a welcome respite from the worrying spasms of political and socio-psychological accommodation to the apparent requirements of Western-type modernization. During these rapprochement phases the reform impulse has tended to atrophy; harmful accretions of bourgeois social influence are repressed; and certain forms and practices of the Soviet model are revived.

4) By contrast, in periods of heightened tension with the Bloc, reform movements are accelerated, both to maximize support in the West and to underline the Yugoslav system's distinctiveness from the Soviet

model, thus challenging Moscow with a more attractive form of socialism in the world ideological market-place.

5) Individual leaders have tended to be associated to some extent with either the Eastern or the Western orientations of Yugoslav policy. Tito has usually striven to remain at least outwardly somewhere in the middle, the ultimate arbiter of the direction and timing of the major shifts. His unique authority in the system has allowed him to carry along the majority of his colleagues and the popular masses, even when his judgments have appeared faulty.

These propositions will be examined in the analysis of foreign and domestic factors in the following six cases - major phases or turning points in the political development of Yugoslavia in the post-war world: (1) the break with the Cominform and the origins of worker self-management; (2) the post-Stalin rapprochement with the East; (3) the second Soviet-Yugoslav rift and the new party programme; (4) the economic reform campaigns of the sixties; (5) the invasion of Czechoslovakia and domestic liberalization; (6) the anti-nationalist and anti-liberal campaign of the seventies. Obviously each of these cases is worthy of a lengthy article or monograph in its own right. Some have received excellent treatment by themselves or in broader studies of various aspects of Yugoslav policy.<sup>9</sup> I have no intention of repeating such detailed analyses in the limited space available here. Rather I shall attempt merely to discern patterns of interaction between domestic and foreign factors in the making of decisions affecting the nature of the Yugoslav political system and if possible to find and account for changes in the relative weighting of these factors over the past three decades. Finally, I shall endeavour to seek out generalisations from the experiences of Yugoslavia, as a socialist political system not subject to direct Soviet control, which may suggest the possible direction of political developments in those Western countries seemingly destined to be governed by communist parties of the 'Eurocommunist' stripe.

#### (1) THE BREAK WITH THE COMINFORM AND THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT

The ouster of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in June 1948 came as almost as much of a shock to the Yugoslav Communists as it did to most Western observers.<sup>10</sup> In the three years after liberation Tito and his colleagues had placed virtually all their country's political and economic 'eggs' in the Soviet basket. Anti-Western riots and frontier incidents in Trieste, the shooting down of unarmed American transport aircraft, and blatant Yugoslav military assistance and sanctuary for the communist side in the Greek civil war had dissipated the considerable reservoir of war-time goodwill in the West. Yugoslav foreign trade patterns were abruptly and massively reoriented toward the East, and diplomatic support was given to the Soviet position on almost every international dispute in the early post-war period. Soviet economic, military, and political advisers enjoyed a virtual monopoly on technical assistance for post-war economic rehabilitation and development.

To be sure, Soviet-Yugoslav relations were not without friction, but at the time the individual incidents seemed of minor importance in the overall process of replicating the Soviet model on Yugoslav soil.

The mental set that lay behind this pro-Soviet orientation was unambiguous. For the Yugoslav leaders Stalinist Russia was the ideal polity. Despite occasional flashes of recognition that everything in the Fatherland of Socialism was not perfect and that the behaviour of some of its representatives was less than comradely, they did not question that the future socialist Yugoslavia would be but a smaller scale copy of the USSR. Indeed, Edvard Kardelj had openly assured Soviet representatives during one rather acrimonious exchange in 1945 that Yugoslavia was consciously preparing herself for eventual incorporation into the USSR.<sup>11</sup> Tito expected merely that the Yugoslav leaders on the scene would be allowed to determine the pace at which specific elements of the Soviet model would be introduced and what forms of Soviet aid were most suitable under given conditions.

In Stalin's eyes this was expecting very much indeed. The fact that the Yugoslav Communists, who were far less beholden to Soviet assistance for maintaining themselves in power than were their East European counterparts, had freely chosen their commitment to the USSR was not at all reassuring to Stalin. In the developing confrontation with the West he demanded absolute submission from his followers. Tito, with his experience in prewar Comintern politics, was acutely sensitive to the implications of this demand, both for his own physical survival and for his vision of a socialist Yugoslavia. But he was willing to give almost any other kind of assurance of fealty to Moscow, as he proved by his policy decisions during the initial period of the split with the Cominform.

For, in addition to lending continued support for Soviet foreign policy initiatives throughout the world during the first year of the Cominform blockade, the Yugoslavs actually intensified their implementation of the Soviet model. In answer to Soviet accusations of revisionism in economic development they accelerated the drive to collectivize agriculture and to construct a heavy industrial base, mobilizing masses of the population for socialist construction in a manner reminiscent of the Soviet pattern in the early thirties. In the process they generated a complex Soviet-style bureaucratic apparatus for the centralized direction of all aspects of economic and social activity. Harsh measures were taken to extirpate those 'bourgeois' elements in society whom the Russians had accused them of coddling. In short, while taking energetic steps to weed out the not inconsiderable numbers of Cominform supporters and outright Soviet agents in their midst, the Yugoslav leaders tried their hardest to demonstrate their orthodoxy as Marxist-Leninist-Stalinists.

More than a year of acute ideological hostility directed from Moscow, total economic blockade, and an increasingly threatening military situation on the frontiers with the Bloc nations, brought a realization that the rift was more than a temporary misunderstanding among comrades. Toward the end of 1949 Yugoslav leaders began a vigorous attack on Soviet foreign policy practices and even dredged up the sensitive issue of the Hitler-Stalin Pact.<sup>12</sup> But it was still

difficult for many of them to attack the legitimacy of the Soviet domestic order itself - too many accepted principles that had been hammered out in the struggles with Trotskyism and which now served as the rationale for their own far from mild system of rule might be placed at risk.<sup>13</sup>

The show trial of Laszlo Rajk on charges of Titoism in Hungary in September 1949 was a turning point in the attitudes of most Yugoslav leaders toward the sanctity of the Soviet system. By early 1950 the function of the Soviet model in Yugoslav decision-making had subtly changed from a pattern for positive emulation to a yardstick for negative criticism, a source of bad examples to be avoided in constructing a viable socialist system. Writing some twenty years later, a prominent Yugoslav social scientist and erst-while political participant in the events has described the atmosphere of the period:

The conflict with Stalinism strongly impelled party cadres to reflect on all problems of socialist theory and practice. There began an extraordinary preoccupation with the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, whose teaching was accepted as the only criterion which must decide the 'ideological war' between the CPY and the Cominform.<sup>14</sup>

The resulting ideological analysis of the Soviet system led to a number of bold conclusions that became the basis of subsequent Yugoslav efforts at socio-political engineering: 1) the retention by the Soviet state bureaucratic apparatus of a monopoly of control over the economy and society long after the consolidation of power had robbed the system of its genuinely socialist, democratic character (indeed, in the fall of 1950 Djilas began to argue that the USSR was not really a socialist state at all); 2) the Yugoslav state bureaucracy was already showing signs of petrification and arbitrariness engendered by its increasing isolation from the masses; 3) therefore, immediate steps would have to be taken to begin the process of 'withering away' of the state - that is, the dismantling of the centralized state bureaucratic control system. The system of worker self-management and market socialism were efforts to act upon this diagnosis.

But more than 'ideological war' with the Bloc was at stake in this crucial period. The ambitious Five Year Plan, which economic overlord Boris Kidrič had insisted on pushing recklessly forward despite the opposition of some comrades, was in serious difficulty.<sup>15</sup> The possibilities of economic and even military aid from the West - no matter how distasteful the prospect was for some leaders, especially in the light of the accusations from Moscow - had to be confronted and justified, if not to the people, at least to one another.

Western statesmen made their task somewhat easier by quietly removing some of the more onerous restrictions previously placed on commerce with Yugoslavia as a Soviet client state.<sup>16</sup> Trade agreements with the USA, the UK, and Italy in the latter part of 1949

promised to alleviate some of the miseries ensuing from the Cominform blockade and Kidrič's obsessive developmental program; but certain political obstacles, largely of the Yugoslav leaders' own making, continued to hamper the development of normal relations. Two major issues which fed the anti-Tito biases of certain influential conservative groups in the West were the Trieste question and the incarceration on charges of wartime collaboration of Croatian Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac. Western criticism of Yugoslav policy on both issues was strongly resented in Belgrade. Tito's refusal to compromise on these and other issues pointed up the narrowness of the basis for any real rapprochement with the West and foreshadowed the fact that subsequent dealings would be largely on Yugoslav terms, with but meagre opportunities for direct Western influence on specific policies.<sup>17</sup> By demonstratively asserting a reckless determination to 'tough it out' even without Western aid, Tito regularly managed to reinforce his credibility among the faithful at home and usually succeeded in bluffing the West, and particularly Washington, into giving him what he wanted without major concessions. His increasing self-confidence in his ability to handle the West<sup>18</sup> in this strangely asymmetrical relationship with the two power blocs provided Tito with substantial leeway in mounting his aggressive challenge to the Soviet system.

The foregoing observations do not mean that Tito was unwilling to go a considerable distance toward meeting certain more general Western demands for evidence that Yugoslavia was not merely another Soviet-type dictatorship. M.S. Handler, the *New York Times* correspondent in Belgrade, noted a more 'liberal' spirit in Yugoslav political life in the latter part of 1950.<sup>19</sup> Significantly, at this time intensive negotiations were in progress with the World Bank, and requests were being made for major food aid from the U.S. in the wake of a serious drought and mounting peasant resistance to collectivization. McVicker claims that certain initial steps toward opening up the electoral processes were taken at about this time in response to pressures from the American Embassy.<sup>20</sup>

This, then, was the atmosphere in which the Basic Law on Management of State Economic Enterprises introduced the concept of worker self-management in June of 1950. The Law proclaimed the institution of 'social property' as a higher form of ownership of the means of production than state property, as enshrined in the Soviet-type systems. Elected workers' councils were to manage the enterprises in which they worked, acting as stewards for society as a whole.<sup>21</sup>

Another important step in the dismantling of the so-called 'administrative system' of economic and social control was the Law on the Planned Administration of the National Economy, enacted by the Federal Parliament in late 1951. This law changed the basis of the central planning system by abandoning direct allocation of planned tasks to individual enterprises in favour of a set of centrally determined proportions covering use of existing capacity, investment in expansion of capacity, and the total wage fund for each enterprise. The plants themselves were to set their own product assortment plans in conformity with perceived requirements of the market.<sup>22</sup>

A third major step in demonstrating Yugoslavia's difference \*  
 from the Soviet model was the formal alteration of the  
 role of the Communist Party at the Sixth Party Congress in  
 November 1952. The new role was symbolized by a change in the  
 name of the CPY to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY).  
 Henceforth the Party was to abandon its involvement in the details  
 of social and economic administration in favour of a role as the  
 ideological and political conscience of society. The Politburo  
 was renamed the Executive Committee and expanded to include  
 important regional and functional representatives. The Party  
 secretariat was similarly opened up to a wider circle of the elite.<sup>23</sup>

Despite these changes the 'big four' of Tito, Kardelj, Djilas  
 and security chief Aleksandar Ranković, continued to exercise a  
 monopoly of effective decision-making power. And in many other  
 respects the much publicized devolution of economic and political  
 authority remained a matter more of form than of substance.  
 Reviewing the achievements of this first period, one would have to  
 agree in large part with the conclusions of Steven K. Pavlowitch:

On the whole, the changes instituted in 1950-52, while  
 correcting some particularly objectionable features of  
 the Stalinist system, had little immediate effect,  
 because they did not change much in the relationship  
 between government and economy, between labour and  
 management. The same people who had been formed by  
 the Stalinist system and placed their faith in it,  
 continued in charge of the Yugoslav economy and operated  
 the changes.<sup>24</sup>

Pavlowitch's assessment applies with at least equal force to  
 the state of Yugoslav political life in general during this period.  
 For liberals, like Djilas, who were genuinely committed to the  
 development of a socialist alternative to Stalinism, the formal  
 changes introduced in 1950-52 were merely a framework, to be  
 fleshed out by further democratization in practice. For the  
 conservatives, like Ranković, the formal changes had already gone  
 too far, but were accepted grudgingly as a weapon in the struggle  
 with Stalin.

## (2) THE POST-STALIN RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE EAST

The death of Stalin in March 1953 was a crucial event in the  
 evolution of Yugoslav policy, both at home and abroad. Despite any  
 immediately visible signs of an abatement in Bloc hostility, the  
 Yugoslavs quickly recognized that a change for the better was bound  
 to come. Kardelj noted in June 1953 on the fifth anniversary of the  
 split that Stalin's death 'must evoke a loss of equilibrium in the  
 [Soviet] system'. A 'new phase in the development of international  
 relations' had begun, 'which demands also a new testing of political  
 methods and forms'.<sup>25</sup>

The first tangible sign of rapprochement was an agreement on joint administration of the Iron Gates section of the Danube with Rumania in May 1953. Frontier incidents with Yugoslavia's other Warsaw Pact neighbours continued, but it was clear that change was in the wind.

Meanwhile, to cover himself and, doubtless, to raise his bargaining position vis-à-vis Moscow, Tito continued the series of intensive military, economic and political negotiations begun earlier with the West. Agreements were concluded for the delivery of American jet trainers, F-84 fighter-bombers, and M-47 tanks; and Chief of Staff General Peko Dapčević journeyed to Washington for staff planning talks.<sup>26</sup> Also in March Tito himself travelled to England, where he managed to extract from Prime Minister Churchill the kind of vague pledge of assistance in case of Soviet attack which the Yugoslavs were coming to favour over more explicit forms of alliance.<sup>27</sup> Talks also proceeded on the Balkan Pact linking Yugoslavia indirectly to NATO through Greece and Turkey.

This increasing cooperation with the West apparently had its impact on the post-Stalin Soviet leaders. The Yugoslav Chargé d'affaires in Moscow reported to Belgrade after meetings with Molotov and Valerian Zorin in May that the Russians were hinting at a desire to normalise relations.<sup>28</sup> At about this time Radio Moscow suddenly ceased its anti-Tito diatribes and shifted to a more factual style of reportage on Yugoslavia, although the satellite media did not immediately follow suit.<sup>29</sup>

Undoubtedly, there were many among the LCY leaders who welcomed this opportunity to re-establish closer ties with the socialist world. However, it is unlikely that the timid feelers from the Bloc would have been sufficient in themselves to induce a turnabout in Yugoslavia's increasing orientation toward the West had not a series of irritations in Yugoslav-Western relations arisen at this time to convince Tito that reliance on the West was potentially dangerous to his regime. In addition to less tangible signs of Western 'penetration' the re-emergence of the Trieste question and outside interference in Yugoslav church-state relations became particularly irksome in the latter half of 1953. The Djilas affair at the turn of 1954 can be viewed in several respects as the 'last straw' in the regime's flirtation with Western progressives and gave substantial ammunition to those forces in the leadership who argued for a more easterly orientation in both foreign and domestic policy.

Moves by the Italian Government to extract as much territory in the Trieste region as possible before Yugoslavia was locked into the Western security system through the pending Balkan Pact, including the threat to dispatch Italian troops into Zone A in violation of treaty commitments, suddenly bore fruit in the form of a joint British and American declaration of 8 October 1953 on the impending withdrawal of their troops from Zone A. The substance and timing of this move are difficult to explain except as a clumsy attempt by London and Washington to eliminate a source of friction with their Italian ally at Yugoslavia's expense, based on a misreading of the irreversibility of Yugoslav dependence on Western military and economic aid. Tito

reacted by calling up his own troops and threatening to occupy all of Zone A if Italian troops set foot across the border. His belligerent speech in Leskovac on 9 October, in which he committed himself to go to war over the issue, even if this meant sacrificing all Western aid, was undoubtedly at least partly bluff; but it evoked a wave of popular anti-Westernism and enthusiastic support such as had not been seen since the Communist assumption of power.<sup>30</sup> The West eventually backed down, setting in motion a chain of negotiations which led to the signing of the Treaty of London a year later, defusing the issue for another twenty years. But the damage had been done. The incident had clearly demonstrated Western readiness to sacrifice socialist Yugoslavia's interests to the demands of a capitalist ally, even an ally that had been a member of the wartime Axis enemy and an occupier of Yugoslav territory. This was certainly grist to the mill of the opponents of closer relations with the NATO powers.

The increasing tension in Yugoslav relations with the Roman Catholic Church were part of the general hardening of the regime's attitudes toward organized religion in the latter half of 1953. Diplomatic relations with the Vatican had been severed in December 1952 over the Stepinac affair, but Rome had continued to involve itself in Yugoslav church matters, specifically prohibiting the Catholic clergy from joining a network of priests' associations which the Yugoslav authorities were attempting to organize. The Yugoslav Government responded by a campaign of fiscal and political measures against church institutions of all denominations, which resulted in a wave of unofficial mob violence against individual priests, including the beating of the 75-year-old Orthodox Metropolitan of Sarajevo.<sup>31</sup> Mindful of the outrage this was producing in the West, Tito ultimately called a halt to the nastier manifestations of the campaign, but it was clear that the policy bore an official imprimatur. It was in fact traceable to a semi-secret 'Letter' from the LCY Central Committee that was later published in the weekly *Komunist* recording Tito's displeasure at a recent secret Central Committee session over the decline in Party discipline and activism. Tito had stressed that the recent orientation toward the West did not imply toleration of Western ideologies and values, and he had suggested that at this stage he considered liberalism a more pressing danger than Stalinist dogmatism in the Yugoslav Party.<sup>32</sup>

The Djilas affair was undoubtedly the most noteworthy example of the perils of liberalizing Western influences. One of Tito's closest wartime comrades, Milovan Djilas, had distinguished himself after the war by the vehemence of his anti-Westernism. The break with Stalin had affected him deeply, but he had adapted to the new situation with amazing swiftness, allegedly under the influence of Aneurin Bevan and the eclectic social-democratic ideology of the left wing of the British Labour Party. Djilas was one of the originators of the workers' self-management concept and presumably a major force behind some of the other decentralizing measures aimed at curbing the growth of bureaucratic power.<sup>33</sup> However, he became increasingly agitated over the slow pace at which the reforms were taking hold, ultimately concluding that as long as the Party retained its monopoly of political

and ideological direction no real democratization of Yugoslav society could occur. This was the central message of the series of articles he published in *Borba* and the cultural journal *Nova misao* between 11 October 1953 and 7 January 1954.<sup>34</sup> In these articles he criticised not only the political orientation but also the dogmatic Marxist-Leninist ideological posture of the LCY, and, finally, the in-group elitism and snobbery that had developed in interpersonal relationships among the families of the Yugoslav political leaders. Initially, many of the latter had responded positively to Djilas's critique, but as the attacks began to hit closer to home a defensive groundswell erupted.<sup>35</sup> Finally, on the 16th and 17th of January Djilas was brought before the bar of Party justice at a special Central Committee meeting, where his ideas were declared a revisionist heresy, and he was removed from all positions of responsibility. The message of the session was clear: decentralization and socialist democracy were to stop short of an undermining of the leading role of the Party and of the basic commitment to the Leninist interpretation of Marxism.

The effect of the Djilas affair and other phenomena associated with the recent post-Stalin change in the international atmosphere was to move the Yugoslav leaders to suspend further experimentation with social, political, and economic reform, ostensibly on the grounds that the self-management system was already 'consistent and more or less built and perfected for the given historical stage'.<sup>36</sup> In the opinion of Dušan Bilandžić the reasons for this three-year suspension of reform were: 'over-heavy investment, the need to stabilize the social changes introduced, phenomena connected with the fear of anarcholiberal ideas, the influence of the normalization of relations with the CPSU, complacency over successes achieved, insufficient pressure from the base ('from below'), the strong resistance of centralist forces, the statist heritage of the SKY, and so on'.<sup>37</sup>

Bilandžić's list would be hard to improve upon; it suggests something of the complexity of the forces and considerations involved in the decision to seek closer relations with the Bloc. Not surprisingly, he makes no explicit connection between the desire for rapprochement and the suspension of efforts at further reform, however. Stephen Clissold does suggest such a linkage when he asserts, 'Tito realized that some way must eventually be found to end Yugoslavia's ostracism from the socialist camp if the ultimate erosion of the communist basis for his regime was to be avoided ...'.<sup>38</sup> One way of facilitating rapprochement, of course, was to avoid further overt challenges to the well-known Soviet sensitivity toward structural and procedural divergence from their own model.

Thus, in addition to the general uneasiness in the LCY over the forces that had been unleashed by the drive for self-management and market-socialism, conservative groups in the Yugoslav political elite could point to the advantages which a suspension of reform, not to say a retreat to a more orthodox Party-centred form of domestic rule, might bring for strengthening ties with the socialist camp. These groups were clustered about the circle of conservative Party and police bureaucrats around Ranković, particularly in the Serbian Central Committee. Richard Löwenthal has described their attitude in the following terms:

These people were as good Yugoslav patriots, as determined to defend their country's independence against all comers, as Tito himself; but because they hoped that better relations with Russia would stop the dangerous drift towards 'liberalization' at home, they were only too willing to believe that these better relations could be secured without danger to their independence, simply by talking less about ideological differences.<sup>39</sup>

The progress of the movement toward rapprochement from 1954 through 1956 has been treated thoroughly elsewhere and need not be recounted here.<sup>40</sup> Tito's policy throughout the period was grounded on the assumed benefit to Yugoslavia of encouraging 'wholesome' forces and tendencies in the Soviet leadership committed to a repudiation of Stalinist methods of intra-Bloc relations and a more flexible view of international politics. Some time in late October or early November 1954 the LCY received a letter from the CPSU Central Committee signed by Khrushchev (which surprised the Yugoslavs, who had thought Malenkov to be still firmly in control) declaring that the removal of Djilas and Beria had eliminated the main obstacles to normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Although apparently dismayed by the brazenly personalist scapegoating of the Russian approach, not least by the idea that Djilas could personally impose his views on the entire Yugoslav leadership, they welcomed the offer.<sup>41</sup> Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, who was scheduled shortly thereafter to go to Washington to arrange grain deliveries to bail Yugoslavia out of another disastrous harvest, expressed his pleasure at the prospect of closer relations with Moscow, regretting only that he had to travel to America to beg for food at such an auspicious moment.<sup>42</sup> The prospect of lessening economic dependence on the West was undoubtedly a major factor in spurring Yugoslav efforts toward rapprochement.

For the next two years Tito's policy was directed at helping the ostensibly liberal Khrushchev in his fight against conservative anti-reform and anti-Yugoslav forces in the Soviet Presidium. Tito would adopt a similar position towards Gomulka in Poland when the latter regained Party leadership in October 1956. Although Tito continued to prosecute his own line on intra-Bloc relations - for equality among socialist states and the acceptance of the validity of different national roads to socialism - and tried to sell the Soviet leadership on the viability and usefulness of the nonaligned movement as a progressive force in international relations, and although he was careful not to burn all his bridges to the West, it is clear that he was deeply affected by the acclaim and respect accorded by Khrushchev in welcoming him back into the councils of the socialist world. Tito obviously relished the role he was demonstratively accorded as an elder statesman and arbiter among Bloc leaders. On balance he felt he had gained much by way of acknowledgment in the Belgrade Declaration of 1955 and the Moscow Declaration a year later of Yugoslavia's right to be different and yet be accepted as a member in good standing of the forces of socialism in the world. That is why he was so badly shaken when Khrushchev suddenly demanded full submission to Soviet

authority and a more explicit pledge of allegiance to the Bloc once the policy of liberalization which Tito himself had largely inspired backfired so loudly in the Hungarian explosion of October-November 1956.

### (3) THE SECOND YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RIFT AND THE NEW LCY PROGRAMME

The aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Hungary left Tito and his colleagues in a state of confusion. His evident endorsement of the second Soviet intervention on November 4th and his Government's strong support in the UN for Soviet moves on the Suez crisis naturally angered Western officials. Djilas's criticism of these actions in an article on the lessons of Hungary, which was published abroad, undoubtedly reflected the thinking of numerous Yugoslavs as well. The arrest and subsequent imprisonment of Djilas for this action illustrated just how sensitive Tito was on the issue, for the ensuing outcry in liberal Western circles was quite predictable, and the mounting anti-Yugoslav campaign in the Bloc made it likely that Tito would soon need all the Western support he could muster.

In a way Khrushchev's anger at Tito's preachments on Hungary was understandable. We now know that Khrushchev had flown secretly to Brioni between the two Soviet interventions in Hungary to consult with Tito on the developing situation. In Vukmanović's memoirs Tito is said to have given his agreement 'for Soviet troops to intervene and prevent the counterrevolution'.<sup>43</sup> Tito's speech in Pula on November 11th criticizing the Soviet role in the development of the Hungarian crisis thus must have had more than a slightly hollow ring to Khrushchev and his Bloc colleagues, now hard pressed from all sides by their Stalinist critics.

Wishing to salvage something from the wreckage of his commitment to rapprochement and mindful of the key role that Khrushchev would play in any future restoration of the 1955-1956 relationship, Tito tried to dissociate himself personally from the developing polemic with the Bloc, leaving it to others not so closely identified with the pro-Soviet line - for example, Foreign Secretary Koča Popović - to counter Bloc criticism. Tito limited his own contribution to bland assurances that normal relations would eventually be restored.<sup>44</sup> Meanwhile, Yugoslavia steadfastly refused to join in the UN condemnation of the Soviet intervention. Polish leader Gomulka apparently played an important role in keeping the lines of communication between Belgrade and Moscow open and in keeping alive the moderate position in Bloc politics, although the anticipated Chinese assistance in this task failed to materialize.

Just as Tito had sought to exploit difference within the Soviet hierarchy and among Bloc leaders, the Soviets attempted to use apparent disagreements within the Yugoslav leadership to smoke out 'anti-Soviet elements'. They also resorted again to economic pressure and ridicule of the Western material basis of the Yugoslav road to socialism.<sup>45</sup> Throughout the spring of 1957 the Bloc's campaign of invective waxed and waned, with only an occasional counter-thrust by the Yugoslavs.

In the meantime Tito sought to broaden his room for manoeuvre in the West by repairing some of the damage to his image wrought by the abrupt shift Eastward. In the beginning of 1957 steps were taken to refurbish eroded links to non-communist left-wing political parties in Western Europe. As a sop to Western progressives Vladimir Dedijer, Tito's erstwhile official biographer and a consistent Djilas supporter, who had been forced to live in poverty under severe employment restrictions since early 1954, was suddenly given his passport in April and allowed to go to Sweden to deliver a series of lectures.<sup>46</sup> And strenuous efforts were made to restore suspended or curtailed Western military and economic aid programmes. As usual, Washington met these moves half way, although the American public debate on the Yugoslav aid programme was often humiliating to Yugoslav sensibilities. Tito received an invitation to visit President Eisenhower in April, but the invitation was later declined on the grounds that threatened protests by American anti-communist groups would preclude a favourable atmosphere for discussions. It is more probable, however, that Tito had declined in order not to jeopardize sensitive conversations then in progress with Moscow on a resumption of normal relations.

For, suddenly in May the campaign of invective came to a halt. Toward the end of the month the Secretary of Defence Ivan Gošnjak, once a student at the Comintern School in Moscow in the thirties, was invited to the USSR as the guest of Soviet Defence Minister Marshal Zhukov, now one of Khrushchev's closest supporters in his current struggle against the 'anti-Party Group'. Significantly, the visit came in the midst of one of Belgrade's periodic outbursts against the terms of the U.S. military assistance programme.<sup>47</sup> Khrushchev, on the verge of a major victory over his Party rivals, was apparently ready to bargain again for an accommodation with Yugoslavia, and relations began improving rapidly in July, when Kardelj and Ranković journeyed to Moscow for meetings with Khrushchev and Bloc leaders. Yugoslav media coverage remained cautious to avoid unduly alarming the West once again, but by early August Tito had evidently decided to push hard for a comprehensive understanding with Khrushchev. The secret meetings between the two in Bucharest on the 1st and 2nd of August seem to have marked the high point in their efforts at personal rapprochement. Tito is said to have conceded almost everything short of formal re-integration into the Bloc's military, political and economic organizations. He even agreed to attend the forthcoming Fortieth Anniversary celebrations in Moscow in November, although he must have suspected that the Soviet Union would make some attempt to reassert its dominance over the Bloc. These concessions caused some uneasiness among Tito's comrades, but, in the words of Löwenthal,

he was willing to stake the future of Yugoslavia on the chance of influencing Khrushchev; and once again he over-ruled the voices of caution, of which there were many.<sup>48</sup>

In the weeks that followed, Tito virtually discarded nonalignment. In September during a visit by Gomulka he accepted several previously objectionable formulations on 'proletarian internationalism' and the

'leading role' of the USSR.<sup>49</sup> In early October, Marshal Zhukov, now a full member of the CPSU Presidium, repaid Gosnjak's visit with an extended tour of Yugoslav military installations. On October 15th Tito finally bowed to Bloc pressure and formally recognized the German Democratic Republic, realizing full well that the Federal Republic was likely to retaliate with a rupture of relations under the 'Hallstein Doctrine'.<sup>50</sup>

The resulting strain in Yugoslav relations with the West (Djilas had just been tried and sentenced to seven more years in jail for publication of *The New Class*, and Dedijer had a little earlier been refused a passport to take up a one-year fellowship in England because of anti-Soviet remarks uttered during his lecture tour of Sweden), and Tito's evident pliability convinced Khrushchev that the time was now ripe for pushing Belgrade over the remaining hurdles to full re-integration. According to Löwenthal he demanded to see the incomplete draft of the new LCY Programme, work on which had been set aside once the prospects for rapprochement had improved again, although few high ranking Yugoslav Party officials had even seen this document.<sup>51</sup> And he presented Tito with a draft of the Declaration to be signed by heads of ruling Communist Parties in November: in Löwenthal's words,

it was a harsh and uncompromising Cold War document, and clearly faced the Yugoslavs with the implicit choice of either unconditionally joining the Warsaw Pact, or being attacked as 'revisionists' and expelled from the Communist family.<sup>52</sup>

Tito at last realized that he had been manoeuvred into a trap. The ouster of Zhukov on his return from Yugoslavia and Albania was interpreted by Tito as a personal humiliation and a challenge. He responded by cancelling his scheduled attendance at the Moscow celebration: the gamble on his ability to influence Khrushchev in a liberal direction had been a failure. Tito and his colleagues now had much work to do to retrieve a modicum of support in the West. Fortunately, Khrushchev and the Bloc hard-liners could be counted on to help by the vehemence of their renewal of attacks on Tito and the West in 1958.

The abrupt turnabout in relations with the Bloc in late 1957 brought about a resumption in work on the new LCY Programme for presentation at the forthcoming Seventh Party Congress scheduled for late April. Now there was a renewed emphasis on the unique aspects of the Yugoslav road to socialism and nonalignment between East and West. A draft of the Programme was published for public discussion on 13 March 1958. It codified earlier formulations on the need for steady, concrete progress on the withering away of the state and the expansion of worker and citizen self-management toward the goal of a 'free community of producers', based on a 'continuing expansion of the freedom of the individual'. In a direct jibe at the Soviet model the Programme declared:

Socialism cannot subordinate the personal happiness of the individual to some 'higher goals', because the highest goal of socialism is the personal happiness of man.<sup>53</sup>

Vukmanović recalls in his memoirs his naive expectation at the time that the Soviets would offer no serious objections to the draft, since they were already well aware of the Yugoslav positions on these issues. He recounts the request by Polish leaders to send a delegation to discuss the draft, to which the Yugoslavs agreed. The only changes the Polish visitors, Ochab and Morawski, suggested were in the foreign policy sphere, where the Yugoslavs consented to the elimination of an offensive passage equating the Warsaw Pact with NATO as a danger to world peace.<sup>54</sup>

Other Yugoslav leaders were less sanguine as to probable Soviet reactions, and with good reason. On 15 April, a week before the Congress, *Kommunist*, the CPSU's main theoretical journal, issued a scathing critique of the draft by a team of ideologists.<sup>55</sup> The Seventh Congress itself, held in Ljubljana from 22 to 26 April, was boycotted by Bloc Party leaders, including, to the chagrin of the Yugoslavs, Wladyslaw Gomulka. The speeches at the Congress were firm in their responses to Bloc criticism, but there were significant differences in tone. Ranković's remarks, as if in recompense for his earlier support of Tito's rapprochement efforts, were so strident that the Bloc ambassadors in attendance staged a demonstrative walkout, only the Pole remaining to the end. Vukmanović was equally abrasive, probably for similar reasons, and he especially castigated the Italian Party representatives for blindly supporting Bloc charges. Kardelj and Koča Popović were firm but notably less vehement in their comments, while Tito was the mildest of all, in both his opening and closing speeches. He patiently rebutted the arguments of the *Kommunist* article; and he reserved his bitterest remarks for Djilas, whom he called a 'Judas'. Even in his defence of accepting Western assistance, Tito was careful to include a note of caution on the dangers of Western pressures and interference.<sup>56</sup> Clearly Tito was doing his utmost to avoid burning all his bridges to Moscow.

To be sure, internal Yugoslav practices did not immediately or always consistently follow the decentralizing and liberalizing impulses expressed in the Programme. For one thing, the renewed dalliance with Moscow and its equally abrupt termination had had an unsettling effect on the internal political scene, the more overt manifestations of which Tito had no intention of tolerating. However, the resulting security actions were notably 'even-handed' and were as likely to be directed at pro-Muscovite as at pro-Western activities.<sup>57</sup> Meanwhile, in January 1958 the country's first major industrial strike occurred in the Slovenian mining town of Trbovlje. It took a while for the regime to adjust to such an unaccustomed phenomenon, but the renewed commitment to self-management undoubtedly had some influence on the relative mildness of the response ultimately settled upon.

As the year 1958 progressed, the commitment to uniqueness acquired a logic and a momentum of its own, and further steps toward liberalization followed. It is certainly 'no accident' that these developments unfolded in the context of improving relations with the West and increasing tensions with the East. For the time being, however, the reformist tendencies did not attain systemic proportions. That would not occur until the economic reforms of 1961, when once again the interplay of external and domestic forces was of crucial importance.

#### (4) THE ECONOMIC REFORM CAMPAIGNS OF THE SIXTIES

With the possibilities of accommodation with Bloc forestalled while Khrushchev was making his final efforts to arrange a *modus vivendi* with Mao Tse-tung, Yugoslavia turned increasingly toward the West and the Third World. Moscow's earlier 'postponement' of a promised large industrial development credit had seriously impeded Yugoslav industrialization plans. In June 1960, however, agreement was reached with Washington for an alternative industrial development loan and on dinar purchases of agricultural commodities under the P.I. 480 programme. Meanwhile, relations were being strengthened with Nasser and Sukarno within the framework of a rapidly crystallizing nonalignment movement. And in July Tito was visited by the U.S. Under Secretary of State, C. Douglas Dillon, for conversations on a projected far reaching reform of the Yugoslav foreign exchange and foreign trade systems in preparation for eventual membership in GATT. The decision had been made to seek fuller integration of the Yugoslav economy into the capitalist world market, a movement which the West had indicated its willingness to underwrite by means of a \$275 million standby credit to help stabilize the internal economy against the initial shock of exposure to foreign import competition. Also included in the package was a substantial change in the exchange rate of the dinar, aiming at eventual free convertibility.<sup>58</sup>

As usual the turn toward the West had important internal political corollaries of a generally liberalizing character, a main effect of which was to inject some life into the moribund forms of worker self-management. A quotation from Bilandžić well illustrates the situation which the reform was intended to remedy:

At the end of the fifties and beginning of the sixties, when the 10th anniversary of the transfer of the factories to the management of the workers was being celebrated in Yugoslavia, the power of the state in the administration of the economy was still very great. State organs disposed of almost the entire surplus value, in the main directly by special centralized funds for investment and for intervention in the economy. In other words, political power was still the main economic force, which regulated almost all economic processes. Opposed to this were the law on workers' management, the documents of the VIth Congress, the documents of Congress of Workers' Councils, the Programme of the LCY, and thousands of other documents and discussions, which conceptualized the social order differently from that which really existed. It was a matter, accordingly, of a sharp gap between the real and the normative or programmatic.<sup>59</sup>

A new economic reform law of 1 March 1961 was designed to give the workers of individual enterprises a real say in the disposition of the income they had created, the workers' councils being given almost total autonomy in deciding the share of net enterprise income to be apportioned between wages and investment.<sup>60</sup> Other important changes in the political system tending to move it still further from the Soviet model were foreshadowed by Tito in a speech on Republic Day (the 29th of November), 1960, when he announced that work had recently begun on a new federal constitution to be promulgated in 1962. Its main focus was to be on further decentralization of powers to the workers' council and commune levels, reducing the role of the LCY apparatus and the state bureaucracy in the management of local political and economic affairs.<sup>61</sup> The parole of Milovan Djilas five years ahead of time in January 1961 and an improvement in relations with the various religious communities were other steps taken obviously with an eye to their effect on the West at this time.

This 'era of good feelings' toward the West and toward domestic supporters of liberalization was of very short duration, however. The economic reform had been badly timed. Previous over-spending on long-term investment projects, a lag in labor productivity, combined with a misinterpretation of certain data on investment saturation, bad weather conditions which again threatened the harvest, and the flagrant abuse by both the workers' councils and enterprise staffs of their new rights to set wages - all quickly undermined the confidence of the Yugoslav leaders in the correctness of the liberalization course. Opponents of liberalization were emboldened to press for the abandonment of key elements of the reform; and administrative controls over income distribution and prices were reimposed early in 1962.<sup>62</sup> Once again, external considerations were a factor in the decision to abort the reform programme.

For, in the latter half of 1961 relations with Moscow had suddenly improved in the wake of the failure of Khrushchev's attempts at rapprochement with China. On Yugoslav initiative Foreign Minister Koča Popović visited Moscow in July and was warmly received by Soviet officials. Both the Soviet and Yugoslav media held out the prospect of a rapid improvement in relations despite continuing ideological differences. Meanwhile, relations with the West had begun to turn sour again over, among other things, Tito's markedly pro-Soviet stand at the first nonaligned summit conference in Belgrade in early September. Washington took particular umbrage at Tito's refusal to condemn the unilateral Soviet resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing on the very eve of the Belgrade conference. A few days later Khrushchev was reported to have vowed to protect Yugoslavia if she were attacked by the imperialists, since, he remarked quite pointedly, 'We regard [her] as a socialist country'.<sup>63</sup>

President Kennedy, although expressing a continuing interest in the preservation of Yugoslav independence, bowed to Congressional pressure and ordered a full review of the U.S. aid programme to Yugoslavia.<sup>64</sup> A further irritant to relations with the West was the

embarrassing defection of Nenad Popović, a prominent economic official seconded to the IMF, who had helped to negotiate the \$275 million economic reform package.<sup>65</sup> Popović's defection was probably a good indication of the seriousness of Yugoslav efforts to seek out Eastern economic assistance once again, as well as of the dissatisfaction that such a reorientation was evoking among certain officials. The leeway afforded by the new prospects in the East was evident in the unnecessarily harsh tone of a speech by Tito in Skopje in mid-November, in which he warned the U.S. against using economic pressure to attempt to force Yugoslavia to alter her foreign policy, while praising Khrushchev for his dedication to peace and for his persistence in combatting domestic Stalinism. Tito also echoed Soviet fears of the consolidation of the European Economic Community, although here there were obviously genuine Yugoslav interests at stake as well.<sup>66</sup>

Domestic correlates of the sudden thaw with Moscow were predictably anti-liberal. Work on the new constitution began to encounter the resistance of conservative forces, encouraged by the difficulties of the reform and the improvement of opportunities in the East. It was reported, for example, that new constitutional restrictions on the still tolerated activities of private entrepreneurs were being contemplated.<sup>67</sup> In a speech to the LCY Central Committee in late November Tito called for a tightening of discipline in party ranks and threatened the expulsion of LCY members who persisted in 'acting like capitalists'.<sup>68</sup> According to Bilandžić the attempts at reform made during 1961 had caused a 'crisis of monolithism' within the LCY leadership. For the first time since 1937, he asserts, the apex of the Party was deeply split over a major issue of (domestic?) policy, a condition he attributes to 'the changed structure of group, regional, national and other interests'.<sup>69</sup> It was essentially a split between liberals and conservatives: and the latter were, for all practical purposes, the same group that had pressed for rapprochement with the Bloc in the mid-fifties. For the moment Tito was apparently content to remain slightly above the fray.

During 1962 relations with Moscow steadily improved against a background of increasing friction with the West and a selective tightening of the domestic political situation. Visits to Yugoslavia by Gromyko and the then Chief of State Brezhnev were followed by tangible improvements in commercial relations. Meanwhile, France had moved to reduce diplomatic ties in anger over Belgrade's support of the Algerian FLN. The United States, although ultimately deciding to continue an aid programme at reduced levels, deprived Yugoslavia (along with Poland) of Most Favored Nation treatment.<sup>70</sup> Internally, Djilas was again arrested, tried and sentenced to almost nine years in prison, this time for the publication abroad of *Conversations with Stalin*. At the 1962 May Day parade Western observers were surprised by the appearance of Soviet-made T-54 tanks in Yugoslav battle colors, the first major acquisition of Soviet equipment since 1948.<sup>71</sup> In December Tito travelled to Moscow and was given the unusual honor of addressing the Supreme Soviet. Clearly the pace of this most recent rapprochement phase was quickening as 1962 drew to a close.

It is not surprising, then, that the new Federal Constitution, as finally adopted in April 1963, was a compromise document that did not materially threaten the state bureaucracy's dominance of the decision-making system. It proclaimed Yugoslavia a socialist republic (the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia); it introduced the principle of rotation for all public offices except that of Tito himself as President of the Republic; and it brought in a new five-chamber structure for the Federal Parliament designed to increase the directness of sectional self-management representation in the legislative process. But the basic distribution of power remained as it had been: the conservatives had again beaten back efforts for major substantive reform.<sup>72</sup> However, the fact is that some positive changes had clearly been made. By this time it was evident that no one in authority was contemplating a full return to the Soviet model, let alone a return to the Bloc itself. For the sequential East-West shifts were not truly cyclical: successive disappointments with rapprochement had left a residue of mistrust of the Bloc. While Khrushchev was evidently someone with whom Tito felt he could work comfortably, the Soviet leader, perhaps because of his continuing internal difficulties, could never again be considered a fully reliable negotiating partner.

Furthermore, the basic parameters of the Yugoslav economic system had been more or less firmly established by the early sixties; and its structures and processes were already strongly conditioned - 'penetrated' - by a decade of Western exposure. The performance of this system, although occasionally shaken by business-cycle-like deformations, still compared favorably in terms of growth rates and consumer satisfaction with that of the neighbouring socialist countries. The objective conditions now facing the Yugoslav economy, however this might be denied by the LCY conservatives, demanded more, rather than less, liberalization and rationalization if the growth potential immanent in the system was to be realized.

These considerations may help to explain Tito's apparent caution in the face of Khrushchev's blandishments in 1963. It is true that on his return from his mildly triumphal visit to Moscow in December 1962 Tito seemed to be experiencing yet another spasm of rapprochement euphoria. He spoke enthusiastically of the prospects for close all-round cooperation with the Bloc short only of membership in the WTO and COMECON. And once again he threatened a crackdown on domestic liberals and cultural 'decadents', suggesting that Yugoslav moral and political life should be brought closer to that prevailing in the other socialist countries.<sup>73</sup>

At the same time there was a suspicion that the Soviets might be using Yugoslavia as a weapon in the struggle against the Chinese for leadership of the international movement and that the Yugoslav connection might once again be sacrificed in some new effort to placate Mao Tse-tung. Furthermore, the effusiveness of Khrushchev's statements on Yugoslavia and in general Soviet media coverage - for example, the unprecedented 'correction' of *Pravda's* May Day Theses to include Yugoslavia under the regular formula for Bloc states 'building socialism'<sup>74</sup> - were becoming an embarrassment, particularly

for relations with a Washington governed by the strict *quid pro quo* policies of the Kennedy Administration. That is undoubtedly why, shortly after the publication of *Pravda's* 'correction', Tito wrote a personal assurance to Kennedy of his Government's continuing commitment to independence and non-alignment, and the new Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington, Veljko Mićunović, was ordered to seek out additional U.S. contacts and exchanges, including a visit by the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk.<sup>75</sup>

Tito also evidently faced considerable opposition at home to his renewed pursuit of rapprochement with Moscow. In a speech to the LCY Central Committee in May he found it necessary to chide those communists who were resisting an improvement of relations with the USSR, declaring that Yugoslav independence in international affairs ought not to be prosecuted at the expense of the socialist countries.<sup>76</sup> Tito's vigorous, and apparently successful, efforts to convince Rusk of the sincerity of his desire to improve relations with the U.S. during the latter's visit to Belgrade in early May were thus probably at least partially directed toward domestic skeptics as well as Washington - and Moscow. This careful balancing act was maintained throughout 1963. The swift and substantial American response to the Skopje earthquake disaster was widely reported in the Yugoslav press, as was Tito's reception by President Kennedy during a visit to the U.S. to attend the opening of the UN General Assembly. But this demonstration of friendliness with the West was at least fully counter-balanced by the cordial reception of Khrushchev during the latter's tour of Yugoslavia in August and the subsequent Yugoslav decision to accept the status of an observer in a number of COMECON bodies in September. It should be noted that much of the impetus for the improvement in relations in 1962 and 1963 had come from the Soviet side. Khrushchev's acceptance of Yugoslav nonalignment and the workers' council system as a valid exception to the prescribed model of socialist construction undoubtedly made it easier for Tito to sell the idea of rapprochement to his colleagues. But equally illustrative of the new relationship was Tito's response to Khrushchev's pressure during much of 1964 to endorse the convocation of a world conference of communist and workers' parties to drum the Chinese out of the movement. Tito adamantly refused to support the calling of such a conclave, fearing the *de facto* re-establishment of a Cominform-type institution, and he refused to attend one if it was called.<sup>77</sup> Throughout the year Tito was very actively involved in Bloc politics and held several meetings with the leaders of individual Bloc states. Some reports suggest that he was actively championing Khrushchev's initiatives on a number of disputed issues, for rapprochement was obviously very closely associated in his mind with the personal ascendancy of Khrushchev.<sup>78</sup> But there is no indication that Tito was prepared to sacrifice Yugoslavia's freedom of domestic or international action in any material way at this time, particularly in view of the unstable situation which appeared to be developing in Moscow. Indeed, in 1964 the Yugoslavs seemed to be going out of their way to support the Romanians' efforts to promote their own road to socialism.<sup>79</sup> The final ouster of Khrushchev in mid-October seemed merely to confirm the wisdom of Tito's circumspection in his dealings with Moscow.

It is probable that the resulting confusion in the Bloc played a role in weakening the conservative opposition to reform within Yugoslavia at this time. More importantly, the internal difficulties in the Yugoslav economy, which had not at all been alleviated by the conservatives' efforts to reassert central administrative control after 1961, produced increasing pressures for reform during 1964. It is perhaps not accidental that the decision to revive and intensify the economic reform programme was finally taken at the Eighth Party Congress in December, not long after Khrushchev's political demise. The essence of the new reform, which was to take effect on 1 July 1965, was a substantial increase in the decision-making autonomy of the individual enterprise and a broad opening of the economy to the forces of domestic and foreign competition. Enterprises were now required to compete, more unrestrictedly than even before, for investment funds and sales, even if the result was the liquidation of inefficient firms and an increase in unemployment. Direct governmental intervention in the economy was in theory drastically reduced.<sup>80</sup>

Conservative opposition to these radical measures was not long in making itself felt. The inevitable difficulties of implementation and the distress of those less able to compete under the new conditions, as well as of those many groups whose wages could not keep up with the rapid increase in consumer prices, provided fertile soil for a resurgence of local nationalism and other forms of economic and political demagoguery, which Ranković and other conservatives were able to manipulate for their counterattack against the reform. The smashing of the Ranković group in the well known showdown with Tito on Brioni in July 1966 put an end to the most powerful anti-reform influence, but the struggle for liberalization and reform was far from over.<sup>81</sup>

#### (5) THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND DOMESTIC LIBERALIZATION

The destruction of the Ranković group and the reduction in power of the nationwide security empire it controlled set in motion a process of political liberalization, administrative decentralization and devolution of central party authority that promised to make genuine self-management a real possibility for the first time. In the words of a Yugoslav commentator, 'Toward the end of the sixties Yugoslavia was regarded as one of the most open societies in the world'.<sup>82</sup> This judgment may be a slight exaggeration in view of the occasional arrests or dismissals of individual dissidents and the withholding of their passports for foreign travel (the case of Mihajlo Mihajlov and his family, for example). But for the most part expressions of political, ethnic, or economic disagreement with the official line were tolerated, albeit often grudgingly, and the courts were remarkably even-handed and lenient in those instances where individuals were actually brought to trial.

The international background of these developments was complex in the extreme. Relations with the U.S. were seriously encumbered at the public level by the increasing American involvement in Vietnam. Tito's

harsh public condemnation of the American role irritated the Johnson Administration, yet concrete ties were not materially affected, and Tito's mediation with Hanoi was apparently sought on several occasions. Moreover, the Yugoslav Government introduced certain unique measures during this period to encourage direct private American investment in the Yugoslav economy.

Relations with the Bloc remained generally good, at least in the economic sphere. Two-way trade with the COMECON states reached its highest level as a share of total Yugoslav foreign trade since before the split in 1948. But the ouster of the Ranković faction and the weakening of the hardline ideological influence and the Soviet-type institutional basis it represented evidently did not sit well with the Soviet leaders.<sup>83</sup> Moscow's continuing efforts to establish an institutionalized united front against the Chinese raised Yugoslav apprehensions, while, in turn, the Yugoslav encouragement of independent and/or liberalizing tendencies in individual Bloc countries - notably Romania and Czechoslovakia - earned the resentment of the Kremlin leaders.

An important event which threatened to reverse the liberalizing, non-aligned trend in Yugoslav policy was the Six-day War between Israel and the Arab states in June 1967. For his own reasons Tito interpreted this conflict and its massive victory for Israel as the culmination of a system of imperialist counterthrusts against 'progressive forces' throughout the world - a chain of events which had included a wave of military coups against leaders of the Third World in Asia and Africa. Tito was reported as fearing an eventual American-inspired military attack against Yugoslavia herself.<sup>84</sup> Accordingly, at the height of the Arab-Israel fighting he flew to Moscow for a secret summit meeting of Bloc leaders to plan a unified strategy in the Middle East. One result was that Tito placed Yugoslav territory at the disposal of the Soviet re-supply programme for Egypt and Syria; another was that he joined the Bloc countries (with the sole exception of Romania) in severing diplomatic relations with Israel. Tito's unilateral actions in making most of these radical policy decisions caused serious disagreements within the Yugoslav leadership. Apparently his judgment was directly criticized by certain of his colleagues, although, not surprisingly, his basic line prevailed. But it would appear that the sequence of events weakened Tito's authority for a time,<sup>85</sup> and he was forced to ease off somewhat in his belligerently pro-Nasser and anti-American stance. Domestically the net result appears to have been a strengthening of the hands of the younger liberal, more Western-oriented forces then coming to prominence in the LCY leadership.

Some evidence of this can be seen in Tito's behaviour during the student riots at Belgrade University in June 1968. This outburst was undoubtedly stimulated by the analogous events in France a month previously and the rapid movement toward socialist democracy in Czechoslovakia throughout the spring, but it was directly focussed on concrete problems of Yugoslav student life.<sup>86</sup> More importantly, the student protesters condemned the increasingly flagrant violations of the oft-proclaimed principles of self-management by the new bureaucratic and technocratic elite - contemptuously referred to as the 'peugeoisie' because of the expensive French cars they favored. Rather

than ordering a massive crackdown on the students, as the Belgrade police authorities requested, Tito adopted their demands as his own. In one notable speech he went so far as to pledge his resignation if he could not correct the grievances which the students had raised.<sup>87</sup>

This heady atmosphere of commitment to democratization and socialist humanism would undoubtedly have dissipated fairly soon, and indeed perhaps turned into its opposite, given the embarrassing persistence of the students and their left-wing academic champions, had not Yugoslav relations with the Bloc suddenly collapsed over the massive suppression of the Czechoslovak experiment. The military invasion by five of the Warsaw Pact nations, brazenly justified by the so-called 'Brezhnev Doctrine' of a 'higher sovereignty' of the socialist community, raised Yugoslav fears of similar treatment and for the moment completely dampened Tito's enthusiasm for demonstrating his country's institutional *bona fides* as a socialist country. Thus, not only did the Yugoslavs prepare themselves militarily and seek to strengthen their economic and political links with the West, but they also undertook a programme of organizational reform of the LCY and the governmental structure aimed, among other things, at radically differentiating the Yugoslav system from the institutional and procedural norms of the Bloc party-states.

As already noted the reform of the LCY was initially set in motion by the Ranković affair. At the Brioni Plenum of the Central Committee in July 1966, following the ouster of Ranković, a special party reform commission was established under the chairmanship of Mijalko Todorović, the pragmatic economic policy leader. The commission's final report was published in May 1967 as a set of 'Draft Theses on the Further Development and Reorganization of the LCY' and presented for public discussion. Because of the lingering opposition of conservatives and the hesitation of middle-of-the-roads, however, serious implementation was delayed until after the Czechoslovak invasion. The author of the most complete Western study of the LCY reform to date<sup>88</sup> has suggested that Tito was never more than lukewarm in his support of the changes, a judgment that subsequent events have certainly tended to confirm.

The main impetus of the reform, as ratified by the Ninth LCY Congress in March 1969, was to transform the party from a force acting upon society from outside (above) to an influence operating from within society by the personal actions and examples of individual members. One means of accomplishing this broad goal was the 'deprofessionalization' of leadership roles in the LCY primarily by means of the rotation of offices and a prohibition on the holding of simultaneous positions in party and government. Institutionalized party involvement in day-to-day decision-making was to be curbed by the disbanding and consolidation of many of the basic LCY organizations at the grassroots level in places of employment and residence.

Another major change was the 'federalization' of the LCY by shifting the preponderance of political authority from central to republican party bodies. The increasing economic autonomy of the republics under the post-1965 economic reforms was thus buttressed by substantive political power, as republican party leaders took over the main responsibilities for cadre appointments.<sup>89</sup>

Thus, the combined reforms of the late sixties had stimulated an important alteration in the distribution of power, among other things bringing to the fore a number of younger politicians of a markedly liberal stamp in federation-wide issues, but with a rather conservative coloration in prosecuting the interests of their respective republican economic bases. Most prominent among them were Mika Tripalo and Savka Dabčević-Kučar in Croatia, Stane Kavčič in Slovenia, Mirko Čanadanović in the Vojvodina, Krste Crvenkovski and Slavko Milosavljević in Macedonia, and Marko Nikezić and Latinka Perović in Serbia. Despite occasional disagreements on particular issues these people were all politically liberal in the Yugoslav context and basically pragmatic in their institutional economic preferences. In the heady days of the immediate post-Czechoslovak period their ideas and aspirations dominated the media.

However, the atmosphere which had initially been so propitious for these views soon began to change. The burgeoning of sectional interests, social criticism, and 'bourgeois' morality fostered by the new climate of toleration became a matter of concern to the aging President of the Republic and made him more receptive to the jeremiads of the unreconstructed conservatives in his entourage.<sup>90</sup> The sudden improvement in relations with Moscow initiated by the Kremlin in the fall of 1969 was undoubtedly an additional factor of significance in Tito's gradual withdrawal of his support for the reform. Gromyko's visit in September was soon followed by an announcement by Tito in the course of a speech in Zagreb in mid-October that he and the Soviet leaders had agreed to settle their differences.<sup>91</sup> What this change in relations portended for the reform was suggested by the jailing later in October of the editor of the liberal journal *Književne novine* for 'defamation' of the USSR.<sup>92</sup> Many of the reform leaders had placed themselves in a similarly exposed position at the height of the Czechoslovak crisis. The prospect of a restoration of normal relations with the Bloc made them extremely vulnerable on that score. The new Yugoslav Ambassador sent to Moscow in this sensitive period was Veljko Mićunović, considered a *persona grata* by the Soviets during an earlier rapprochement period, but also recently Belgrade's Ambassador to the U.S.

Obviously in the wake of the Czechoslovak events there seemed to be little likelihood of a return to the close inter-Party relations of the early Khrushchev era; indeed, Belgrade was now making energetic efforts at a simultaneous rapprochement with the Chinese People's Republic - which the Chinese were obviously happy to reciprocate after the Czechoslovak shock. Furthermore, during 1970 there were still a number of points of friction and recrimination in relations with Moscow, prompting the Yugoslavs to continue to 'reinsure' themselves by improving relations with Bonn, the Vatican, and Washington. President Nixon's visit in September provided Tito

with a cherished opportunity to enunciate his determination to preserve Yugoslav independence.<sup>93</sup> Nevertheless, the termination of the state of extreme apprehension over Bloc intentions and the ensuing general improvement in relations with the Soviet leaders, if only on a superficial level, bode ill for the chances of basic reform in Yugoslavia.

#### (6) THE ANTI-NATIONALIST AND ANTI-LIBERAL CAMPAIGN OF THE SEVENTIES

National integration, ever since the economic reforms of the mid-sixties, and especially after the ouster of Aleksander Ranković and his followers, had without a doubt become the number one problem of the Yugoslav system. '*Bratstvo i jedinstvo*' ('brotherhood and unity') had ceased being merely a slogan but a matter of the very survival of the Yugoslav state. The crackdown on radical national self-assertion in Croatia in 1971/1972 was soon turned against political liberalism in general, and by the end of 1972 every one of the liberal republican party and government leaders mentioned in the preceding section had been removed and replaced by a group of rather colorless dogmatists, loyal to Tito and his present grayish conceptions of the proper societal norms.

To a certain extent the return to a hard line domestically was merely a predictable sequel to the liberalization of the late sixties. Treating the two sets of events as separate cases in the present article can be defended on analytical grounds, perhaps, since the political vector had shifted so markedly from the one period to the other. But the underlying external and internal conditions leading up to the most recent shift had clearly been laid in the preceding period. In many ways the complexities of the situation in the mid-seventies represent an encapsulation of the full range of problems that have plagued Yugoslav policy-makers throughout the postwar era. And the very fact of having gone through the earlier experiences, with their hopes and disappointments, has made the present cumulation of problems all the more difficult for them to address with great confidence.

The deposition of Ranković and the dismantling of his apparatus of *de facto* Serbian predominance was probably unavoidable in the light of the growing economic power and political self-consciousness of the non-Serb regions under the impact of the major reforms of the sixties - and, of course, in view of the direct challenge to Tito's authority posed by Ranković in 1965.<sup>94</sup> But Tito's victory had a number of side-effects which imperilled the stability of the entire system. The most important of these was the disintegration of the solid phalanx of Serbian support upon which the ultimately synthetic edifice of the Yugoslav state tacitly rested. Deprived of this underpinning, Tito could no longer count on the automatic solidarity of key groups and population segments in the event of a serious external challenge to the nation.

Thus, in the wake of the Czechoslovak invasion Tito found himself in a Catch-22 type of situation. In order to satisfy the aspirations for autonomy of the various non-Serb peoples he had endorsed a number of devolutionary constitutional changes which, for all practical purposes, transformed Yugoslavia into a confederation.<sup>95</sup> But the broader the autonomy granted to the other republics and provinces, the greater the disillusionment of the leading Serbian politicians and intellectuals, a disaffection that was understandably intensified by the intemperate anti-Belgrade (read 'anti-Serb') accusations and demands emanating from outside of Serbia, and especially from the Croatian capital, Zagreb. Evidence of this wounded Serbian pride can be seen in the hostility to the proposed devolutionary amendments expressed in a series of debates at the Law Faculty of Belgrade University in March 1971, and in the acrimonious exchanges between the media of the two capital cities throughout that year.<sup>96</sup> There were also extremely serious anti-Serbian outbursts by ethnic Albanian intellectuals in the Kosovo Autonomous Province, once the heartland of the medieval Serbian kingdom. Feeling threatened from both north and south and realizing that their nation lacked the numbers to exercise the kind of natural dominance over the general Yugoslav community that, say, the Russians have enjoyed in the USSR, many influential Serbs of various political inclinations began to nurture the old dream of going it alone in an independent 'Greater Serbia'.

These sentiments were undoubtedly reinforced when the anti-nationalist purge, which had hit the Croatian leadership in the winter and spring of 1971-72, was turned against the leaders of the Serbian and Vojvodina party organizations in the fall of 1972. The immediate resignations of the prominent Serbian federal politicians Koca Popović and Mirko Tepavac were an eloquent protest against this apparent affront to Serbdom and illustrated how deeply split the top LCY leadership was on the nationality issue.<sup>97</sup> There seemed to be dangerously few persons among the surviving authoritative figures of the revolutionary generation who were still committed to the Yugoslav idea. The crucial question of what would happen 'after Tito', which had long been posed in the West and dismissed by Yugoslav politicians as irrelevant or impertinent speculation, now increasingly agitated many responsible Yugoslavs themselves.

Certainly among the most keenly interested in this question were the Russians. The precise role and character of Soviet involvement in the upsurge of national tensions in the early seventies and the ensuing repression are very difficult to establish. Most of the information available comes from emigré circles and Western journalists' accounts based on rumors and 'inside dope', some of which may actually have been planted by Yugoslav authorities for tactical purposes.

Constrained by the logic of détente in Europe and the repeated, vague assertions by Washington of a continuing 'interest' in the independence of the Yugoslav state, Moscow shifted from a policy of direct external confrontation in the immediate aftermath of the Czechoslovak crisis to one of long-term internal penetration, leaving

to the Bulgarians the option of a more overt challenge to Yugoslavia's territorial integrity on the Macedonian question. Two of the main targets of Moscow's efforts at subversion were, paradoxically, the major anti-communist Croatian emigré groups, notably including even the Ustashi movement of Branko Jelić in West Berlin; and disaffected Serbs in and out of active political life in Yugoslavia.<sup>98</sup> Among the latter it is necessary to distinguish among several categories of persons: the so-called 'cominformists' - discredited remnants of the old faction which had worked to overthrow Tito and lead Yugoslavia back into the Bloc; 'neocominformists' - newer recruits to this same general cause allegedly linked to leaders of the former group operating from exile;<sup>99</sup> and Serbian nationalists willing to avail themselves of Moscow's assistance in establishing an independent 'Greater Serbia' presumably in return for a pledge of close alignment with the USSR. The numbers involved in the last category - it is evidently too heterogeneous to warrant classification as a group - are probably larger than in the first two and are said to include figures in the army and other institutions of social and economic power.<sup>100</sup>

In addition to exploiting the nationality issue the Soviets have been active in attempting to penetrate various other interest groups in Yugoslav society. In an interview with an Italian newsman in October 1970, Milovan Djilas noted the significant political and propaganda advantages Soviet trade officials had been gaining by bailing inefficient Yugoslav consumer goods enterprises out of impending bankruptcy by buying up entire inventories of unsaleable goods for the virtually insatiable Soviet market.<sup>101</sup> Indeed, in 1975, at a time when Yugoslav trade with the West was suffering the effects of the European recession, exports to the Soviet Bloc jumped to 46.8% of the total Yugoslav export trade, the highest share going to the Bloc since the 1948 split.<sup>102</sup> The large number of so-called 'political factories' situated throughout Yugoslavia in uneconomical locations as a reward for past political services provides a ready reservoir of opportunities for this form of Soviet activity, since the enterprises in question are unable to meet foreign or domestic competition in a market context.

Another area of potential Soviet penetration is the traditional affinity of the Orthodox southern Slavs for Russia, the historical protector of Orthodox slavdom. The Montenegrins, the Serbs, and the Macedonians are usually mentioned in this connection, in that order of susceptibility. The results of a poll conducted in Serbia by the Institute for the Social Sciences published in October 1972, for example, showed that Russia was considered the 'best friend' of the Serbs by a wide margin over any other power - by six times as many respondents as selected the United States, for example.<sup>103</sup> But this factor has probably been overrated in the West as a predictor of Yugoslav behaviour. It suggests a bias toward the East in popular sentiment on relatively inconsequential matters, such as the Fischer-Spassky chess match in 1972, as the present writer found in his travels throughout the Yugoslav countryside at the time, but little else of real political substance. On the other hand, there has been some

concern recently over the substantial numbers of Yugoslav youth, mainly from the ethnic minorities with links to neighbouring Bloc countries, who are enrolled in tertiary educational institutions in those countries, where they are subjected to 'different' conceptions of socialist construction and to overtly anti-Yugoslav, 'cominformist' influences.<sup>104</sup>

Perhaps the most significant 'interest group' target of Soviet penetration are the hardline conservatives within the LCY. And they are not necessarily confined to any particular republic. Soviet condemnation of Yugoslav liberalism in politics, economics and culture has always struck a responsive chord among persons of the older generation throughout society, particularly veterans of the National Liberation Struggle who have felt their basic values, not to mention their socio-political status, to be threatened by the general rationalization and liberalization of the economic and political system in the past decade. For these types the Soviet model has had a continuing attraction, although the operational significance of this affinity - whether they were willing to lend themselves to Soviet attempts at active penetration - has obviously varied from individual to individual.

Whatever the actual magnitude and effectiveness of the Soviet campaign of subversion to date, it clearly poses grave dangers for Tito in his efforts to leave behind for posterity a viable, independent socialist state. This situation has been magnified by the apparent decline in the American capacity and will for active involvement in the problems of the border areas between East and West and the Mediterranean in particular.

The events of the late sixties and early seventies have thus placed Tito in a serious dilemma. In addition to alienating a significant part of the vital Serbian component of the political system, devolution of Party and governmental authority and the subsequent crackdown on nationalistic and liberal 'excesses' had emasculated the LCY and the governmental administration as effective forces for national integration. At the height of the Croatian crisis in December 1971 Tito openly declared that in the end he might have to resort to the army to maintain the integrity of the nation and that he would have no hesitation in doing so.<sup>105</sup> Ironically, Tito's power and the fate of his independent self-management road to socialism had thus come to depend on the Yugoslav National Army, necessarily an authoritarian institution. But how reliable is the army? The military hierarchy itself has been subject to a good many cross pressures, reflecting those within the society at large. Indeed, Djilas has remarked that the ethnic rivalries within the army constitute a primary 'safety valve' against a military coup.<sup>106</sup> And Ciliga asserts that although the present defense chief, General Nikola Ljubicić, a Serb from Western Serbia, is a supporter of the Titoist aim of a united and independent Yugoslavia, the aims of his military colleagues are far less clear.<sup>107</sup>

The problem for Tito in the short and medium term is, therefore, to satisfy the basically conservative forces of the army and the current political leadership, and to pacify the Soviets as well, by repressing political and intellectual dissidence, while rebuilding the LCY along basically centralized, Soviet-type lines.<sup>108</sup> In following this course Tito is largely doing what comes naturally, for he has never reconciled himself to the *effects* of liberalization and toleration, whatever his attitude toward the *policies* associated with these movements at any given time. On the other hand, for the sake of his own historical reputation, as well as the avoidance of a total alienation of the leaders and citizens of the outlying republics he has sought to retain as many of the forms and practices of devolution and socialist self-management as possible. This paradox was illustrated by the almost simultaneous adoption, on the one hand, of the new 1974 Constitution, which incorporates the various devolutionary amendments to the previous constitution and adds some complex procedural elements to the processes of economic and political decision-making on a mass participatory basis, and, on the other hand, of a new Party Statute and several resolutions at the 10th Congress of the LCY, increasing party involvement in all areas of public life and tightening political controls over nominally self-managing institutions. This dialectical process of developing the forms of self-management while at the same time strengthening the instruments of centralized political manipulation has been the dominant feature of the Yugoslav political system throughout the seventies.

The precariousness of the domestic political situation sheds additional light on the extreme activism of Tito's foreign policy in these last years of his long reign. Tito himself has continued to play a leading role in the burgeoning nonaligned movement, taking a substantial personal part in the proceedings of the nonaligned summit conferences in Algiers in 1973 and in Colombo, Sri Lanka in August 1976. However, the recent explosive growth of the movement, which has been joined by such 'nonaligned' powers as Cuba and North Korea, has probably diminished to some extent its importance as a 'third force' between East and West and diluted the significance of Tito's status within it as a buttress of Yugoslavia's independence.

With respect to the main East-West conflict recent Yugoslav behaviour seems to bear out the validity of David Vital's proposition, noted earlier, on the dangers to a small power of a situation where the correlation of forces in its region have crystallized. The Helsinki Agreements, whatever else they may have accomplished, did 'crystallize' the situation in Eastern Europe, removing most of the uncertainty over potential American crisis responses upon which Yugoslavia has customarily relied as a counter to Soviet moves. The consternation of Yugoslav officials over the 'Sonnenfeld Doctrine', which seemed to confirm such an interpretation of American policy, bears witness to their sensitivity to this change. The resulting perception that the persistent and increasing Soviet danger to Yugoslav independence must be faced without the customary resort to a credible Western deterrent - reinforced by the overwhelmingly conservative weighting of the domestic power balance - has led to a

policy orientation, both internally and externally, that is unusually sensitive to Soviet sensibilities. Hence the continuing campaign of repression of domestic dissidents and the markedly contemptuous dismissal of Western appeals on their behalf. Hence, also, the blatant revival of the Trieste and the Austrian Carinthia issues to rally all-Yugoslav support against a putative Western danger, while the intrinsically much more dangerous Soviet threat is treated in a remarkably tactful manner.<sup>109</sup> It is true that the Bulgarian claims to Macedonia have been challenged by the Yugoslav media with unrestrained vigor, but there the Soviets have obviously been content to sit back and watch while their Bulgarian clients act out their own nationalist fantasies.

Tito's strategy within the international communist movement stands in apparent contradiction to this policy of appeasement of the Soviet Union in the East-West context. His efforts to associate his regime with the liberal 'Eurocommunist' parties of Western Europe, - especially the large and influential Italian Communist Party of Enrico Berlinguer - which have been increasingly vocal in their resistance to Soviet domination, is obviously extremely irritating to Moscow. Tito's aim is evidently to foster a new kind of nonalignment within the communist world to provide the protection for Yugoslav independence which the ideologically and politically heterogeneous original non-alignment movement can no longer offer. Moreover, the socialist character of this new movement, which even Moscow would have to recognize, especially if its component parties achieved political power in their respective countries, would provide just the sort of international ideological cement which Tito feels is necessary to keep his own system from succumbing to bourgeois temptations without the stifling uniformity which reintegration into the existing Soviet Bloc would entail. It is an interesting gamble. Whether Moscow will be willing to acknowledge Yugoslav membership in such a movement is one crucial question. Whether such regimes, once in power, would remain faithful to the vague principles of 'Eurocommunism' is another.

## CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing case studies have been presented to place in perspective the impact of external factors on the development of the Yugoslav system. In one way or another, foreign influences have affected the timing, if not the precise form and content of the evolution of the socialist self-management order, and a good case could be made for the importance of those influences for the actual functioning of the system.

But the sequence of cases has also shown that the triangular pattern of relationships presented in the introductory section was somewhat oversimplified. The successive shifts between the predominantly Eastern and the predominantly Western orientations of Yugoslav foreign policy and their domestic policy correlates have not been truly cyclical, although the basic relationships between foreign orientation and domestic liberalism or conservatism appears to hold

up fairly well. It has also been shown that Yugoslav relations with the two world superpower blocs have never been fully symmetrical. The ideological inclinations of Tito and most of his colleagues have naturally pushed them toward an alignment with the East. But ever since the eve of the split with Stalin Tito has demonstrated his unwillingness to pay the political price demanded by Moscow for a full accommodation with the Soviet-dominated socialist community. And the growing institutionalization of self-management and non-alignment, as the authentic hallmark of the Titoist contribution to socialist theory and practice, has made such an accommodation increasingly unthinkable for Tito himself.

Since the late nineteen sixties, however, a number of problems have arisen to make the full realization of the distinctive Yugoslav model of socialism difficult to achieve. Economic rationalization and political liberalization unleashed a welter of sectional interest claims which, unfortunately, were articulated along traditional ethnic lines, recalling the disastrous experiences of the prewar Yugoslav monarchy and the wartime fratricidal conflict. On the international plane the longstanding efforts by Moscow to bring Yugoslavia in toto back under its wing took an especially ominous turn with a broad programme of subversion aimed at exploiting nationalist frictions to build up a clientele for more direct intervention in the post-Tito period. The Soviet threat for the future appeared all the more menacing to independent-minded Yugoslavs in the light of the declining credibility of the American deterrent to Soviet expansionary moves in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. The prospects for the preservation of an independent, nonaligned Yugoslavia, following her own path of internal development after Tito's departure, thus seem considerably less bright today than they were a decade ago.

Much of the blame for this situation probably rests with Tito himself. His customary dislike of the practical results of genuine self-management and liberalization led him to overreact to the manifestations of pent up nationalism in the early seventies. His ensuing purge of virtually a whole generation of able politicians in the four most important and most sensitive republics destroyed the core of a potentially viable successor collective leadership with demonstrated popular support in their respective home regions and proven administrative and political capacities. The structural foundation for such a collective leadership would undoubtedly have been some form of confederation rather than the existing quasi federation or the unitary state which Belgrade conservatives have always preferred. But under Yugoslav conditions a confederation would probably have the best chance of survival in the potentially dangerous international environment its leaders will have to face. Fortunately, the ousted republican leaders have been treated humanely and spared the kinds of accusations which in the Bloc countries have usually resulted in total disgrace, if not worse.<sup>110</sup> Thus, it is possible that in some future period their talents will once again be available to help maintain national integrity against the challenges which lie ahead.

On an even more highly speculative plane it is extremely tempting to hazard a few comments on the possible implications of the Yugoslav experiences for the increasingly likely accession to power by communist parties in certain Western countries. Italy, France and, perhaps, eventually, Spain are the most obvious examples. Granted that the political circumstances of each of these countries are unique and substantially different from the Yugoslav case and that the current leaders of the respective communist parties have been no less forceful than Tito in proclaiming their independence of Moscow, the potential effects of the kind of Soviet penetration we have noted in the upper echelons of the LCY are still worth serious consideration.

For one thing, the present generation of party elites in these countries are likely to have had even closer relations with the apparatus of the CPSU than have their Yugoslav counterparts, if only because of the latter's periodic isolation from Moscow in times of heightened Yugoslav-Soviet tension. While it is true that relatively liberal 'Eurocommunists' are now in the saddle in each of the three Western parties, there is no guarantee of their remaining in power. There are obviously large numbers of conservatives behind them, for whom the Soviet *Weltanschauung* and *modus operandi* remain attractive and influential. In any case, the extent to which the Berlinguers, the Marchais', and the Carrillos have really distanced themselves from Soviet practices can be fully known only when they actually hold the reins of governmental authority. It remains to be seen whether they will be able to maintain their ascendancy over their conservative colleagues once in power and forced to make difficult decisions in the face of certain obstructionism by the non-communist opposition, more or less overtly supported from outside. Whatever the answers to these questions, it is highly probable that the range and impact of Soviet penetration within the respective party elites will not be greatly dissimilar to the situation prevailing in Yugoslavia.

In foreign policy this suggests in the short run the effective neutralization of these countries. Recent statements to the effect that under communist leadership Italy, at least, would remain faithful to the Western Alliance in order not to disrupt the East-West strategic balance can probably be dismissed as mere soothing syrup for the domestic bourgeoisie and NATO liberals. French neutralization, as well as, ultimately, the Spanish, would be even more certain. It is likely that all three countries would seek to enter the broader nonaligned movement, somewhat in the fashion of Romania. Their policies within that movement could be expected to be at least as pro-Soviet in orientation as Yugoslavia's has been over the years.

On the other hand, the precarious economic situations in all three countries and the obvious inability of the Soviet Bloc to provide substantial alternative assistance would cause the new communist-led regimes to attempt at least initially to moderate their economic policies in order to avoid a total disruption of non-communist international trade and investment partnerships. The absence, in the foreseeable future, of the kind of total domestic political control which Tito's regime has enjoyed since 1945, would probably make these regimes more reluctant than the latter to assume even temporarily the

internal political risks of isolation from the non-communist Western economy and the attendant decline in living standards.

In the longer run, however, there is little reason to expect that once firmly in power the conservative and authoritarian mainstream of the communist political elites would be any more willing to tolerate the give and take of democratic politics or the attacks of vigorous intellectual dissent than their Yugoslav counterparts have been, especially in periods of economic or political difficulties. Indeed, it would be surprising if they did not seek to foment and manipulate crisis situations precisely to justify appeals for unity and the stifling of opposition. In such an atmosphere party liberals would be little better equipped to defend themselves and their policies than their Yugoslav colleagues proved to be.

Judging from the Yugoslav experience alone, then, one would have to conclude that, regardless of the inclinations of individual Eurocommunist leaders, communist parties in power are destined to repeat at least some of the excesses of the original Soviet model. It is worth reiterating, of course, that each country has its own unique political traditions. The traditional democratic political culture of France, for example, might impose a very different sort of behaviour on the communist leaders of that country. In Italy the extensive experience of the Communist Party at the local government level may, similarly, have instilled a certain capacity for self-restraint in the party elite at higher levels as well. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav record must serve as a warning against undue optimism and complacency over the extent of the changes that will accompany any shift to communist party rule in these countries.



## PART II

### TITO AS POLITICAL LEADER



## INTRODUCTION

In Part I on "External Factors" the evolution of the Yugoslav political system and its policies was linked to changes in the international situation as perceived by the primary Yugoslav decision-makers. It was argued that their perceptions were conditioned by certain experiential phenomena and ideological affinities. To restate the argument briefly, it was found that Yugoslavia is a "penetrated" socio-political system in a special sense of the concept of penetration coined by Rosenau; that the nature and mode of external penetration have differed as between East and West; and that there has been a differential apprehension of the significance of influences emanating from the two polar sources. Direct forms of penetration, subversion, and political or economic pressures have not, on the whole, been very successful, thanks largely to the diligence of the Yugoslav security services and to the ultimate determination of the President of the Republic, Josip Broz Tito, to resist all such incursions.

Indirect forms of penetration, however, have been both more successful and more interesting analytically. Here the differences between Eastern and Western modes of penetration are quite striking. It was observed in Part I that Western influences have tended to well up from below through the middle ranks of society as a result of Western-inspired structural changes in the economic system and associated processes of cultural diffusion resulting from the relatively uninhibited contacts with Western societies. For most of the older political leaders, including Tito, the manifest social consequences of Western penetration have been anything but welcome, particularly when expressed in the form of demands for extended "bourgeois" civil and political liberties.

Indirect Soviet penetration has, by contrast, tended to flow from the top down, through the leading Yugoslav politicians themselves. It operates through the ideological and stylistic affinities of most of the Yugoslav leaders for certain traditional Soviet political perceptions and practices and is likely to be strongest in periods of especially cordial relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR.

Despite their apparent lack of dogmatism in personal contacts, particularly with non-communist outsiders, their avoidance on principle of formal membership in the institutional nexus of the Soviet Bloc, and their strong commitment to the development of their own model of socialism, the Yugoslav leaders exhibit many of the familiar characteristics of a ruling communist elite. Among these are submission to the disciplinary code of "democratic centralism"; an insistence on the preservation of a monopolistic one-party political system which denies to outsiders any legitimate right to participate in decision-making on really important issues and vigorously, although not ruthlessly, suppresses dissent; a commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology as the only acceptable framework of political ideas and a profession to being guided by it (as they interpret it) in analyzing and acting upon socio-political problems.

In short, apart from certain unique structural and stylistic peculiarities, the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), as a *group*, appears to act very much like a traditional ruling communist party apex. However, when we look inside the "black box" and examine the relationships which have prevailed within the group over the years, we become aware of some unusual features. The most unusual of all is, of course, the central role of President Tito, now 85 years old and certainly one of the outstanding political figures of the Twentieth Century.

Part II will seek to examine the unique position of Tito in the Yugoslav decision-making system, exploring certain aspects of his personality and style of leadership to trace the evolution of his role as politician, decision-maker, and theorist of the system and to try to account for the ways in which his perceptions of his own and Yugoslavia's position in the world have tended to influence the course of domestic politics and political development.

From the outset it should be noted that Tito's role as a theorist has not been especially pronounced. Unlike most other communist leaders Tito has never laid claim to the mantle of a leading theorist or interpreter of Marxist ideology, nor, until recently, has he allowed a cult to be built up around him as a major original contributor to the "treasure house of Marxism-Leninism". None of the major conceptual innovations of Yugoslav socialism, for example, worker self-management or active coexistence and nonalignment, have been attributed to him personally, even if they have been closely associated with his name. In recent months a minor campaign appears to have been developing among certain military leaders to ascribe to him the authorship of the concept of "all-people's defense" (*svenarodna odbrana*),<sup>1</sup> but this is certainly exceptional.

This modesty in matters of theoretical in itself distinguishes Tito from the great majority of ruling communist politicians, who have evidently found it essential to buttress their legitimacy as "supremos" by demonstrating their ideological facility, not to say genius. It is not suggested at all here that Tito is an ideological illiterate or that he is scornful of the value of theory. Rather, his reputation and authority have been built on his skills as a political leader and organizer and as an adept handler of subordinates, capable of delegating responsibility without neurotic fears of being upstaged.

One of the responsibilities which Tito has customarily delegated, first primarily to Milovan Djilas and Moša Pijade and later to Edvard Kardelj and Vladimir Bakarić, is that of ideological elaboration and conceptual development to explicate, theoretically orient, and legitimize the concrete policies he has decided upon. The evidence suggests that this is not merely a formalistic ritual. No one who has closely followed the development of Yugoslav social and political institutions or the course of nonalignment in recent years could convincingly argue that theory is nothing but an embellishment or a mere *post factum* justification for *ad hoc*, opportunistic policies. The Yugoslav regime has seemed to be guided in its policies, more than

most other ruling communist bodies (with the obvious exception of Maoist China), by theoretical considerations and deductive projections from specific ideological constructs. The fact that Tito has usually been willing to accept the predictably disruptive practical consequences of theoretically motivated structural changes suggests that he has a substantial appreciation for the value of applied theory, even if he has been more the arbiter and enunciator, rather than the author of that theory.

To understand how he has managed to maintain the authority to operate in this manner it is worth examining, as closely as the available evidence and space permit, Tito's style of leadership and the personality characteristics associated with it.

### TITO'S PERSONALITY AND STYLE OF LEADERSHIP

Lucian Pye has argued that studies of decision-making and the role of elites too often ignore the personality factor in their preoccupation with structure and processes.<sup>2</sup> This observation, made a number of years ago, sounds rather quaint today in view of the present concentration on "organizational process" and "bureaucratic politics" explanations of decision-making; but it still retains much validity. Indeed, there is already a substantial body of theoretical and substantive literature on personality as a factor of political behavior.<sup>3</sup> Much of this literature is concerned with the construction of psychoanalytic portrayals of specific individuals and groups with evidently pathological characteristics. Among the most familiar examples are the psychoanalytical biographies of Martin Luther, Woodrow Wilson, and the Authoritarian Personality type.<sup>4</sup> Critics of this approach, apart from those who reject psychoanalytic modes of explanation entirely, frequently object that as a general area of analysis it focuses too heavily on pathological traits. They argue either that most political leaders or groups do not exhibit behavioral characteristics that are pathological in any politically relevant sense, or that whatever pathological traits do exist are effectively repressed or "cancelled out" in the practice of political activity.<sup>5</sup>

These types of objections deserve serious consideration, especially when we are dealing with evidently well integrated personality types like Tito. However, some of the more recent theoretical works in the area, such as F.I. Greenstein's *Personality and Politics*, suggest that personality studies need not be preoccupied with pathology, that such personality functions as "ego-defense", for example, can be put into perspective as only one element of a comprehensive portrayal of political attitudes and behavior.<sup>6</sup> Greenstein suggests a multi-element analytical framework in which the pathological or irrational dimension is merely one factor in the total personality structure, which is itself the product of a concatenation of the social, societal, informational, and life-situational influences associated with a given individual.

M. Brewster Smith, upon whose work Greenstein bases a large portion of his conceptual apparatus, sets forth a three-fold "functional basis" for the influence of personality components on political behavior:<sup>7</sup>

- 1) an *object appraisal* function - the structure of a personality or a person's attitudinal set specialized for dealing with objective reality;
- 2) the function of *mediation of self-other relationships* - the structure of attitudes relative to reference groups, orienting the self to positions held by others, for example, the Communist Party, the Comintern, or Stalin;
- 3) an *externalization and ego defense* function - the structure of a personality directed toward handling inner conflicts and anxieties.

This last function is usually the primary focus in the "depth psychology" psychoanalytical studies noted above.

Greenstein advances the hypothesis that the relative strengths of the three basic personality components in a given individual indicate the way in which he will react to situational stimuli: "It also sometimes is instructive to think of attitudes and situation as being in a kind of push-pull relationship: the stronger the attitudinal press for a course of action, the less need for situational stimuli and vice-versa".<sup>8</sup>

Smith, incidentally, quite explicitly separates out personal *stylistic* characteristics from personality as such. Among the stylistic attributes he mentions, under the three headings of cognitive, temperamental, and behavioral, are intelligence, incisiveness, optimism, decisiveness (and their opposites). He regards these traits as not being motivational in their own right but as nevertheless exerting an obvious influence on political behavior which is likely to be overlooked by a purely functional approach.<sup>9</sup> The dividing line between attitudinal and stylistic attributes is not, it seems to me, quite as clearcut as Smith suggests, although the distinction is doubtlessly an important one analytically; and the kinds of traits he suggests in his list seem a bit restrictive. In the analysis of Tito a somewhat broader conception of style will be used and its place in the discussion of Tito's role will be rather more central than some personality theorists would find acceptable.

The research strategy proposed by Greenstein for single-actor personality studies involves three "overlapping but analytically separable" operations: analysis of the *phenomenology*, the *dynamics*, and the *genesis* of the individual's personality. *Phenomenology* are the observed regular patterns of behavior manifested by the individual under various conditions; this is mainly a descriptive operation. *Dynamics* are the inferred psychological and situational explanations for these behavioral patterns. *Genesis* are the deeper psychic and experiential roots of the behavioral patterns and the "inferred underlying dynamics", usually expressed in terms of psychoanalytic theory.<sup>10</sup> The suggested operational sequence thus proceeds from the

fairly concrete and descriptive to the speculative, although the kind of personal life-history information needed for a proper analysis of the *genesis* of personality is also obviously of a high order of concreteness and detail. Clearly we are not likely to find much reliable detail of this kind in the available biographical literature on Tito. Thus, apart from any reservations I have as to the validity and salience of inferences that might be drawn from this type of analysis, the data problem more or less compels me to limit my focus to the less speculative levels of inquiry. The analytical framework just described will not in any case be very rigorously applied, although it has strongly influenced the choice of questions I have sought to answer and the type of information I have brought to bear.

The kinds of personality and stylistic information which I am primarily interested in are those which have had some apparent bearing on the form and content of the major decisions and situational responses described in "External Factors". The substance of the decisions and the situational context will be mentioned, if at all, only in passing.

Among world communist leaders Tito has long stood out as an unusually colorful figure, among other things for the elegance and fastidiousness of his physical appearance. Most of his biographers have noted this characteristic,<sup>11</sup> some with obvious embarrassment over its possible anal and authoritarian implications, although his other traits would seem to rule out any significant tendencies in this direction. It is of some interest in this connection that his early ambition as a peasant youth, about to seek his fortune in the wider urban world, was to become a tailor in order to keep himself well clothed.<sup>12</sup> After a brief stint as a waiter he was eventually indentured as an apprentice in the ideologically much more acceptable trade of metal worker; nevertheless, he retained his interest in fine clothes and jewellery throughout his life. It is suggestive that he used the fees he received for a series of lectures and translations in Moscow while on assignment as a penurious Comintern functionary in the late thirties to purchase a diamond ring and other expensive small personal items. Ostensibly this was done merely to have something readily convertible into cash for the unpredictable contingencies of underground revolutionary life when he returned to Yugoslavia;<sup>13</sup> but it probably also reflected a vestige of the desire of the former peasant youth to have some tangible sign of success for encounters with his former fellow villagers, which some of his biographers have noted in connection with his clothing.

Tito's elegant appearance and the suave, man-of-the-world image he had successfully cultivated by the latter thirties evidently stood him in good stead as a disguise in his various adventures on Yugoslav party and Comintern business in Europe during this period, when he often travelled as a prosperous-looking Czech or Swedish engineer.<sup>14</sup> Within Yugoslavia his well groomed appearance helped to avert suspicion of his movements, since communists had a reputation among the police for bohemianism and slovenliness even by contemporary Balkan standards. But the trait was obviously deep-seated and more

than simply a matter of disguise. In a brief respite between battles during World War II, for example, Tito took the time to design a marshal's uniform for himself to be made up in Moscow and flown back to him on one of the Soviet military liaison mission aircraft.<sup>15</sup>

Tito's elegance and suavity undoubtedly distinguished him from among his colleagues in the Partisan leadership, particularly when it came to meeting foreign statesmen and military leaders both during and after the war. Within the core leadership of the party it seemed to enhance his authority and charisma. In not one of the official Yugoslav or sympathetic Western biographical or memoir literature is there any criticism or suggestion of foppishness. Nor, despite the fact that Tito was obviously attractive to women - and has had three wives - has there ever been a suggestion that he was a womanizer. Indeed, the sexual codes of the Partisan movement were notoriously strict and puritanical. For persons like Milovan Djilas and Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, these characteristics appear mainly to have reinforced Tito's authority and image as "Stari", the "Old Man", the nickname commonly used with affection by his colleagues in personal address.<sup>16</sup>

This question of Tito's personal relations with his colleagues is certainly a key element in any attempt to explain his role in the political system. The relationship has been an unusual one in the annals of the communist movement, not customarily noted for the humanitarian qualities of inter-personal relations. Failure to understand this difference was a major reason why Stalin so badly overestimated his capability to eliminate Tito in 1948.<sup>17</sup>

Any short list of the phenomenology of Tito's personality relevant to the development of this relationship would include paternalism, tactfulness, empathy, responsibility, *amour propre*, independence, ethnic neutrality, and decisiveness. Except for paternalism and, perhaps, *amour propre*, with its connotation of stubbornness, the list conforms admirably to the portrayal of the ideal communist leader which one might find in textbooks and pamphlets on the shelves of any Political Literature bookshop in Moscow, but which has been so rare in the real life of the communist movement. Possibly Mao, but not Lenin and certainly not Stalin or Trotsky, possessed a similar combination of traits conducing to genuine loyalty and affection. The prewar and wartime experiences of comradeship under extreme stress were undoubtedly a factor in the development of this relationship in the Yugoslav (and perhaps the Chinese) parties, but it did not seem to develop elsewhere under similar circumstances. Tito's personality was clearly a crucial ingredient. Milovan Djilas describes the circumstances in the party in 1937 when Tito returned to take over command of the organizations within the country:

On his arrival Tito introduced one important change: the Central Committee met regularly to discuss outstanding issues. Although we considered Kardelj the chief figure in Tito's absence, he had not functioned as the party Secretary. With the arrival of the party Secretary, the Central Committee membership had someone to turn to. Indeed,

both as a functionary and as a man Tito knew how to conduct business, how to treat people, how to take them firmly in hand. With his arrival our need for a more centralized leadership was finally realized.<sup>18</sup>

Evidence of the traits of paternalism, tact, empathy and, perhaps, *amour propre* as well can be seen in Djilas's further description of an incident at a meeting in Zagreb in 1937 where he had been accused by Tito (who had allegedly been put up to it by Herta Haas, his second wife) of suspicious conduct in the issuance of a false passport for a communist leader subsequently "unmasked" as a Trotskyite. Djilas had been furious to the point of resigning from the party;

By the time the meeting was over I had composed myself a little. As I was about to leave Tito asked me to join him for a walk. As a rule he didn't move much around Zagreb, fearful that he might be recognized. I was sure he was going to apologize, and I began to thaw out. But he didn't do that at all. He simply chatted with me about all kinds of things, particularly my personal life. From time to time he would smile gently. There was something so human and warm in this that when we parted, without having exchanged a word about the incident, I was happy, a child whose father understood that he had administered unjust punishment but couldn't quite admit it. Ranković and Ribar were very please when, on the train going back to Belgrade, I related what had happened.<sup>19</sup>

On another occasion, when Djilas was under fire for carelessness in handling party funds and documents, he said that Tito had raised no special fuss, adding that "anyway, it was not in Tito's nature to be bothered by such minor things".<sup>20</sup> Thus, there was none of the pettiness which often associated with fastidiousness and concern with physical appearances. But Djilas reveals another side of Tito's character:

During the war, I had many minor run-ins with Tito. There was nothing serious in that, though. They were personal squabbles, sometimes quite sharp, between short-tempered people in trying situations. He never cast any political doubts on my character. Nor did he use his authority to settle such personal arguments. But in political conflicts he did use his authority, and in such matters he was adamant, even intolerant. He never admitted he was wrong in personal or in political conflicts. He ignored them instead, stating implicitly that he 'realized what it was all about', and that normal relations should be resumed.

In all our personal conflicts, and until the final blow-up [i.e., when Djilas was expelled from the Central Committee in January 1954 - R.F.M.], he maintained that special father-and-son relationship between us. He had a similar relationship with Lolar Ribar, to whom I, in turn, felt like an older brother. Tito may have been politically closer to other comrades, and I know he was to Ranković, for example, but not in a family or 'blood' sense.<sup>21</sup>

Tito's fatherly toleration of the foibles of talented younger colleagues is vividly illustrated in the career of another high-strung Montenegrin, Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo. Tempo's memoirs reveal him as an obvious neurotic whose frenetic energy, courage, and administrative talents Tito evidently valued and carefully nurtured through subtle applications of humor and ego massage. When, for example, in the spring of 1953 Tempo was on the point of a nervous breakdown from overwork and the frustrations of bureaucratic opposition to his initiatives, he learned of Tito's personal concern for his health. Kardelj, vacationing with Tito nearby in Slovenia, where Tempo was trying to relax, had suggested fishing as a possible therapy.

"No way!" Tito interrupted him. 'If he begins to fish, he'll get himself into a bother that he didn't catch more. His condition will get worse.'

Tempo recalls: "I laughed pleasantly at this story, and it was nice for me to know Tito was worried over my health".<sup>22</sup>

Tempo offers some interesting insights on another aspect of Tito's relations with his subordinates, his readiness to delegate responsibility. Approximately eighteen months after the above incident, apparently recovered from his nervous disorder, Tempo had been sent to Washington in the fall of 1954 to negotiate a development loan from the World Bank and to arrange emergency grain shipments to alleviate serious shortages because of a severe drought. Relations with Moscow were significantly improving at this time, and Tempo was loath to continue the charade, as he viewed it, of bargaining with the "imperialists". In his characteristically primitive, boorishly frank proletarian style Tempo, once in Washington, immediately succeeded in alienating his American hosts. He ostentatiously rejected any of the conditions for the loan or the grain shipments laid down by Washington and was on the point of breaking off negotiations and heading back to Belgrade without even keeping a scheduled meeting with President Eisenhower. Meanwhile, all his frantic cables to Belgrade demanding additional instructions or endorsement of his actions remained unanswered. Just as he was about to depart, the Americans backed down and agreed to provide assistance without any onerous conditions. At a reception for Tito immediately after Tempo's return to Belgrade, the latter confronted his leader accusingly:

'You left me to work on my own! I was in a terrible dilemma. Accept - I couldn't; refuse - I couldn't do that either! I knew that there was no bread at home.'

'If you had done badly, I would have contacted you', laughed Tito. 'In any case, you were there on the spot and naturally you were the best one to judge the situation'.

That's characteristic of Tito; he lets people work as they think best, work independently, and he intervenes only when he feels that trouble is coming. That's the way he creates a leading cadre; not a cadre which waits for orders and knows only how to implement them, but a cadre which knows by itself how to find its way under all circumstances, to come to decisions independently.<sup>23</sup>

Tempo's hard-nosed frankness was in evidence in his dealings with Khrushchev, too. Tito obviously continued to find him a useful emissary on certain kinds of missions abroad, where he considered a bludgeon more effective than a scalpel in achieving his objectives, or in conveying a certain kind of impression. Ultimately he was forced to put Tempo out to pasture in a ceremonial position. He had become simply impossible for others to work with.<sup>24</sup> But his long and, on the whole, distinguished career illustrates Tito's ability to orchestrate the various talents, strengths, and weaknesses of his colleagues. He remained extremely tolerant of the personal weaknesses and idiosyncrasies of his subordinates, particularly the younger ones, as long as they showed themselves to be energetic and effective.



But two other criteria seem to have been essential for the maintenance of his favor: ideological orthodoxy - at least to the extent of immunity from the attractions of Western liberalism or even Western social-democracy, and personal loyalty to Tito himself. Of the two, personal loyalty to Tito was probably the more important. It should be stressed that this insistence on loyalty has not, for the most part, been of a notably paranoid or neurotic character. There is in it a large element of political prudence. As a student and Comintern functionary in Moscow for lengthy periods during the wholesale purges of the thirties, Tito was surely well aware of the ways in which Stalin used personal rivalries and antipathies among national communist party elites to eliminate potential dissidents and maintain fealty to himself in the name of ideological rectitude and higher principle. Tito's confrontation with the Byzantine facts of Soviet political life and the distorted system of values reigning in Moscow sharply aroused his caution and forced him in upon himself while in the Soviet capital. Ideology and applied revolutionary theory, which he had been so assiduously and, apparently successfully studying there were, he discovered, rather low on the scale of Kremlin priorities, a fact he undoubtedly filed away for future reference.

The lessons of caution and suspiciousness which he had learned in Moscow were soon put into practice in the organization of his illegal passage back into Yugoslavia for underground party work in the latter half of 1936:

From Gorkić [Milan Gorkić, alias Jozef Cizinski, then General Secretary of the CPY, operating from exile in Vienna - R.F.M.] I received an order to go to Yugoslavia immediately. He got me a passport and instructed me on the route to take to Yugoslavia, which border station to cross. However, I got a different passport and sought out an entirely different route, because it often happened that comrades for whom Gorkić had gotten passports were immediately arrested as soon as they arrived at the Yugoslav border...<sup>25</sup>

It is worth noting that Gorkić was recalled to Moscow within a year and executed as a Trotskyite. According to Phyllis Auty, Tito later admitted to her that Gorkić was not a spy or a traitor.<sup>26</sup> This admission is all the more interesting, since Tito had gone along with the official Kremlin view of Gorkić's perfidy until well into the postwar period, and he encouraged his supporters to accept this view. His behavior suggests either a well developed sense of political expediency or, at the very least, a substantial capacity for self-deception. His grim experiences in Moscow should have alerted him to the real nature of such accusations and to the kind of game Stalin was playing. Yet like so many other non-Soviet communists, apart from increasing his sense of personal vigilance, his experiences do not seem to have appreciably weakened his faith in Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism or his loyalty to the USSR. Djilas has described how he and his comrades had managed to rationalize the evident excesses of Soviet politics in the name of the greater goal they were all serving.<sup>27</sup> There is little reason to believe that Tito was significantly more immune to such an exercise than were his colleagues.

But there were obviously great potential stresses in this kind of relationship to Moscow, especially when Tito found himself in the position of a leader of a successful socialist revolution. The essence of the dilemma lay in the contradiction between Tito as a communist - a member of an international revolutionary fraternity - and as a national political leader. Moscow represented, for him, at once the center of that fraternity and a source of potential subversion of his leadership. This dilemma was reflected in his attitude toward his colleagues, namely in the duality of the criteria of their personal acceptability.

The persistence of the ideological criterion (the personal loyalty criterion needs no special explanation at this point) can perhaps be explained in terms of Smith's personality function of *mediation of self-other relationships* mentioned earlier. Despite the often stormy and ultimately schismatic character of his relations with the USSR, Tito has always viewed himself as an orthodox Marxist-Leninist. This attitudinal posture has constrained him to express himself on a wide range of domestic and foreign issues in a predictably structured

ideological manner, which commonly conforms to Soviet positions on these issues, although the policy conclusions drawn often diverge from the Soviet conclusions. Tito's insistence on his ideological orthodoxy, emphasized by his refusal to entertain anything but the most superficial relations with Western social-democrats, while at the same time steadfastly refusing to act in formal concert with the Soviet Bloc on most occasions, has been a source of confusion and consternation for successive post-Stalin Soviet leaders. It has often been confusing to some of Tito's colleagues, too. They have at times mistaken his occasional liberalization of policy for a liberalization of his ideological stance or misconstrued a temporary assertion of ideological orthodoxy as an endorsement for a hard line on policy. His signals are not always very clear.

In general, however, Tito has expected his colleagues to maintain an orthodox stance on broad ideological questions, while demonstrating their loyalty to him by accepting his political judgments, even if he does not always indicate clearly what his policy choice is or what precise changes he has in mind. The Djilas affair, which reached its *dénouement* just at a time when the prospect of rapprochement with Moscow was in the air, was a case in point. As late as the first or second week in December 1953, Djilas still thought he had Tito's blessing for the series of articles which resulted in his expulsion from the party leadership a month later.<sup>28</sup> Tito's handling of the case of Sreten Zujović is an illustration of the other side of the orthodoxy-loyalty coin. Zujović was the only member of the CPY Central Committee to advise a moderate, conciliatory response to Stalin's ideological accusations in April 1948. For acting in an orthodox Comintern-style manner he was condemned as a traitor to the Yugoslav revolution (read: Tito) and cast into prison.<sup>29</sup> There is undoubtedly a strong tactical dimension to Tito's failure to deliver clear signals on matters of principle. His refusal to be drawn into taking a forthright position in periods of strained relations with the USSR since the death of Stalin has undoubtedly produced some confusion among his subordinates, but it has made subsequent rapprochements easier to arrange for him personally. The anti-Soviet utterances of his colleagues during these periods have been useful for winning points in the West; and they are more easily repudiated when relations with Moscow improve than if the remarks had come directly from him.

Another of Tito's noteworthy phenomenological characteristics that is perhaps too obviously relevant to his political behavior at certain critical junctures, but which is less easy to account for in personality theoretic terms is his intense insistence on independence. This trait was clearly manifested at a fairly early stage in his career as a communist leader in connection with the financing of the operations of the underground communist party in Yugoslavia. Shortly before his return to Yugoslavia to take charge of internal affairs in 1936 he requested the speediest possible termination of Comintern subsidies to finance in-country party operations.<sup>30</sup> At the time this was an almost unheard of proposal, since most Comintern officials had already become accustomed to total reliance on Moscow for their subsistence. Tito's ostensible reason for breaking this pattern was

that self-reliance would guarantee a more efficient and economical use of resources and would force the party to fall back on its working class base. Indeed, his earlier experiences as a party and trade-union organizer had made him fairly confident that sufficient funds could be raised locally for the kind of frugal and purposeful existence that he expected of his party cadres. But more importantly, such a policy would help to protect him and his supporters from Moscow's practice of using financial leverage to intervene in internal party politics and to compel foreign party obedience to Comintern dictates. It is clear from Tito's behavior during and shortly after the war that he did not anticipate or even conceive of a situation of total independence from Moscow. He simply expected that the relationship would be based on solid ideological and political commitment, freely given, and not on extraneous financial pressures and inducements.

This concern with independence undoubtedly contributed to Tito's great effectiveness as a wartime resistance leader, as compared with most other communist leaders in Axis-occupied Europe; the parallels with Mao Tse-tung in Asia are striking. But it probably also predisposed him to a much more objective assessment of the practical benefits of Soviet assistance and advice to Yugoslavia in the immediate postwar years and certainly stiffened his subsequent resistance to Soviet attempts to subdue him by economic blockade and credit manipulations. By the same token it reinforced his determination to withstand Western efforts to apply financial pressures in the various confrontations, especially with Washington and Bonn, over specific policy issues, such as Trieste and Yugoslav recognition of the DDR. Indeed, the brandishing of the economic or military aid weapon by either Moscow or Washington seems almost invariably to have had the reverse of the intended effect on Tito, evoking an almost visceral reaction, as if an affront to his personal dignity was involved. Thus, if some of his colleagues have apparently been prepared to yield at least *pro forma* to such pressures, Tito has rarely been willing to contemplate such a compromise, even where a less forthright rejection might have seemed the more rational course of action.<sup>31</sup>

One thing that is absolutely clear is that in major foreign policy matters Tito has always been the sole effective decision-maker. On a number of occasions - for example, the decision to press ahead for rapprochement with the USSR in August 1957 despite the harsh rebuffs of late 1956 and early 1957 and the decision to join the Bloc nations (except for Romania) in severing ties with Israel and actively assisting the Arab states in June 1967 - he has apparently encountered some opposition among his colleagues (see Part I, pp. 17, 26); but there was evidently no discussion at all. Tito simply decided and demanded acceptance of his judgment. His handling of relations with the USSR just prior to and after the invasion of Czechoslovakia suggests a similar decisiveness on his part, based on a similarly misplaced confidence in his own ability to read the situation. As Djilas has remarked, there could never be any question of an admission that he might have been wrong on these judgments.

Tito's punitive treatment of the nationalist excesses of 1970/71 illustrates a similar pattern of behavior, although in such domestic matters he appears to be much more open to discussion and more tolerant of dissenting opinions among his colleagues, at least until he has come to a firm decision. On such occasions he has even given the appearance of indecisiveness. Indeed, in the summer of 1970 the writer heard it said by a number of Serbian intellectuals, who have since had occasion to rue their words, that Tito was no longer a significant factor on the political scene, that he had become a mere figurehead. The relatively harsh treatment of political liberals, especially in the key republics of Serbia and Croatia, and the general crackdown on political and cultural dissent since the end of 1971, which resulted in the decimation of virtually an entire generation of republican political standard-bearers whom Tito himself had been tacitly grooming as the future leaders of the country,<sup>32</sup> can at least partly be interpreted in terms of ego-defense. These persons and their high-level supporters in Tito's entourage had succeeded in convincing him that political and economic liberalization and greater freedom for ethnic self-expression were an appropriate response to the challenges of student unrest and the Czechoslovakian invasion of 1968.<sup>33</sup> There were many among his conservative comrades of the wartime and early postwar period who had warned against such a policy of conscious relaxation, and well before the actual crackdown there were numerous signs that Tito himself had begun to change his mind.<sup>34</sup> His refusal to reverse the basic policy for as long as he did probably reflected his characteristic reluctance to admit that he might have been mistaken. In any case, the vehemence and scope of the crackdown when it finally came, the special vendetta against Marko Nikezić in the Serbian leadership, and the ostentatious commitment to the restoration of orthodoxy in ideology and party structure - suggest a strong element of ego-defensiveness and rationalization in his actions. The extent to which persons like Savka Dabčević-Kučar in Croatia and Latinka Perović in Serbia (both energetic and attractive women) had been openly manipulating his signals of displeasure to justify the policies of their own republican party organizations must certainly have appeared as a challenge to his *amour propre*.<sup>35</sup> Whether this interpretation is valid or not, the vigor of Tito's counterattack and the extent of the ensuing reversion to past practices of domestic political control, although partly understandable at the time and to a certain extent predictable, were not really a rational response to the problems facing Yugoslavia in the difficult period ahead. That this fact is now dawning upon the party leadership is evident in recent top-level discussions about the role of the party in society. It is not at all surprising that Kardelj, and not Tito himself, has been the person to suggest that the past policies may have been mistaken.<sup>36</sup>

The nationalities problem is undoubtedly, as many have pointed out, the most crucial issue facing Yugoslavia in the post-Tito future, not that it has lain dormant under his rule. Indeed, it has had certain far from negligible influences on relationships within the core leadership group itself. One of the most significant aspects of Tito's ability to maintain his position among the ethnically

diverse central leadership of the LCY is his reputation for impartiality among the various ethnic communities in a country where ethnic identification has always been considered a primary attribute of personality.

Tito himself is a product of a mixed marriage. His father was a Croatian peasant from the northern border region near Slovenia (the "Hrvatsko Zagorje"); his mother was a Slovenian peasant from a nearby border village across the river Sutla in Slovenia. Tito spent much of his early childhood with his maternal grandfather and uncle in Slovenia and was apparently equally at home in the languages of both parents.<sup>37</sup> Ante Ciliga makes the assertion that Tito was imbued in his early home life with a greater admiration for the solid, stolid, and hard-working qualities of his maternal nationality, the Slovenes, than for the allegedly softer and more dissolute characteristics of his father and the Croatian nationality he represented, creating something of an identity crisis within him.<sup>38</sup> This is how Ciliga explains Tito's failure to exhibit the nationalistic preferences and prejudices so common among Yugoslav politicians. He also finds significant Tito's decision to "flee" Croatia for Vienna to seek employment after completing his apprenticeship and his apparently happy years spent there enjoying the attractions of life in an imperial capital. Moreover, Ciliga claims that Tito gladly identified with the Hapsburg Empire, serving in its army willingly and very diligently as a conscript and eventually a non-commissioned officer until the fortunes of war and politics placed him in circumstances conducive to the transfer of his allegiance to another multi-national empire, that of the new Bolshevik Russia.<sup>39</sup> Ciliga alleges that Tito, the "last of the Hapsburgs", has attempted to reconstruct a kind of multi-national Austro-Hungarian Empire in postwar Yugoslavia, similarly based on a single dominant "elder brother" nation, in this case the Serbs.

The account Ciliga presents is extremely tendentious and probably fanciful, but it does raise some interesting possible insights, among other things, into Tito's activism on the international scene. Tito clearly considers the framework of a small Balkan nation as rather restrictive for the proper exercise of his talents and ambitions as a world socialist leader and statesman. With the original arena he had chosen for the display of his talents, the Soviet Bloc, apparently closed to him for all practical purposes, he sought another and found it in the nonalignment movement, which he was instrumental in creating.

Ciliga obviously has a very large Croatian axe to grind, and his explanation of Tito's alleged conspiracy to submerge the Croatian nation in an artificial, Serb-dominated mini-empire in terms of psychological de-racination and/or a "Franz-Josef" complex cannot be taken very seriously. Nevertheless, his overall discussion does offer some interesting points of departure for exploring the important ethnic dimension of Tito's relations with his colleagues.

The ethnic composition of his wartime and early postwar entourage was a fair sample of the national complexity of Yugoslavia: Edvard Kardelj, Boris Kidrič, and Franc Leskošek were Slovenes; Vladimir Bakarić, Andrija Hebrang, and Ivan Gošnjak, Croats; Aleksandar Ranković, Sreten Žujović, Blagoje Nešković, and Ivan Milutinović, Serbs; Moša Pijade, an assimilated Serbian Jew; Milovan Djilas and Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, Montenegrins.<sup>40</sup> Of the real inner circle only Kardelj, Kidrič (who died early in 1953), and Bakarić could be said to be above the ethnic hyper-sensitivity endemic among Yugoslavs. And when the chips were down in the middle and late sixties, even they found it necessary to champion their native republics against the centralist Serbian offensive being mounted by Ranković and his party and police cohorts.<sup>41</sup> But they did so in manifest support of Tito, and in general their active anti-nationalist image must be assumed to be an important factor in his continuing closeness to them after he has broken with so many of his other comrades. For Tito, the violent spasms of resurgence of the old nationalistic conflicts have been a particularly bitter symbol of failure. In October 1969 he admitted that the recent upsurge of inter-republican friction had been giving him many sleepless nights, something that not even the most dangerous moments of the war had done.<sup>42</sup>

The case of Aleksandar Ranković and his ultimate ouster, after an apparently direct challenge to Tito's rule, in July 1966, is well known and need not be recounted here.<sup>43</sup> But certain details are of interest from the standpoint of Tito's relations with his colleagues. As was suggested in the quotations from Djilas's *Memoir*, Tito was "politically closer" to Ranković than to many other of his comrades. Tito had great respect for Ranković's unique organizational and security-management abilities, proven during the battle with Stalin. And there can be little doubt that he generally shared Ranković's conservative interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and his enthusiasm for closer ties with Moscow after Stalin's demise as a guarantee against further ideological backsliding in the LCY, something which both of them feared as a result of increasingly close association with the West. But once again, it was the realization, in the middle sixties, that Ranković was becoming personally disloyal to him which cancelled out this ideological and political affinity and impelled Tito to eliminate Ranković and the Serbian party and security satraps beholden to him. The resulting purge increased Tito's reliance on Kardelj and Bakarić and placed him in an ideological and political ambience for which he had no particular liking and the centrifugal consequences of which were to cause him so many difficulties in the next five years. The subsequent crack-down on the younger devolutionist republican leaders and their intellectual supporters has probably helped to alleviate Tito's ideological qualms, but it has also had the effect of weakening the broadly based structure of personal support, including ethnic support, upon which he has so long relied to maintain his authority in the system.

The generational factor is the final personality-related variable to be discussed here in connection with Tito's relations with his comrades and other aspects of his role as leader. Tito, born 1892, was almost twenty years older than most of his closest associates: Kardelj, born in 1910; Kidrič, 1912-1953; Hebrang, 1899-1948; Bakarić, b. 1912; Ranković, b. 1909; Žujović, unknown, but probably closer to Tito's age; Pijade, 1899-1957; Djilas, b. 1911; Vukmanović, b. 1912.<sup>44</sup> Stalin's purges had eliminated most Yugoslav Party leaders of Tito's age before the war, so that in a literal sense he was "Stari", the Old Man. It would appear that he did not get on very well with most of his older colleagues, as the removal of Hebrang and Žujović for Cominformist sympathies would seem to suggest. One might assume that experienced persons nearer his own age withheld the kind of unquestioning personal loyalty and acceptance of his judgment that Tito seems to have required. Moša Pijade was an exception. He had been Tito's close colleague and his first instructor in the systematic study of Marxist ideology while in Lepoglava prison in the early thirties. But Pijade's personality, his function in the party, and his anomalous ethnic status marked him as less of a personal threat to Tito's leadership than perhaps any of the others.

Tito's physical and spiritual youthfulness, elegant style, and warmly paternalistic manner made him extremely popular with his younger comrades. They used to spend much of their free time with him, hunting and socializing. This was not at all the terror-stricken, false camaraderie which pervaded Stalin's entourage,<sup>45</sup> but apparently an intense personal bond. Central Committee members used to congregate after working hours at Tito's suburban Belgrade villa to play billiards and chess, and to chat about current problems. According to Dedijer, it was Žujović's sudden avoidance of these gatherings which alerted his comrades that he had stopped being one of them.<sup>46</sup>

There was, perhaps, something abnormal in Tito's preference for younger comrades. No doubt it reinforced his feelings of youthfulness and vigor, but it also constrained him to maintain his role as an exemplar and a wise father-figure, something, according to Ciliga, his own father had not been. This continual role-playing must have been rather a strain upon him. Phyllis Auty suggests this in connection with Tito's relationship with Miroslav Krleža, the well-known Croatian writer:

He was also among the few people with whom Tito could relax and be himself, without the need to play a part or be withdrawn. They had known each other for a very long time and shared much common experience. Both had been at the same barracks during the first world war, though Krleža's war service had not taken him to Russia like Tito ... Tito had allowed the perceptive Krleža to see something of his innermost character. This remained a bond between them for life, although in later years Krleža often stuck firmly to views that were not popular with the party leaders ...

Relaxation of this kind with a friend of his own age, an outstanding character and no less intelligent, was already rare in Tito's life, and was to become even rarer in the future...<sup>47</sup>

One noteworthy trait illustrated in this vignette by Auty is Tito's ability to get along with those older persons who do not pose a potential challenge to him politically on his own home ground or in a wider arena which he has any hope of dominating. This attitude can be seen in his dealings with foreign leaders, particularly in the nonaligned movement. The contrast between his friendship for the dashing, younger Colonel Nasser of Egypt and his more distant relations with Nehru of India is striking.<sup>48</sup> The non-aligned movement was a forum in which Tito clearly had hopes of playing a leading, if not a dominant role. He was evidently able to exercise his accustomed fatherly charms over Nasser, who was in many respects similar in temperament to the younger Serbs and Montenegrins of his own entourage. But the older, more sophisticated and more contemplative Nehru was apparently not quite so impressed. Tito's relations with the flamboyant Sukarno of Indonesia were somewhat more cordial than with Nehru, but it is doubtful that Tito, with his strong sense of propriety, ever established really strong personal rapport with the sybaritic Indonesian leader. More recently Tito seems to have established a fairly sympathetic relationship with the young, puritanical, and erratic Colonel Qaddafi of Libya, just as he had earlier with Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria.<sup>49</sup> The persistence of the generational pattern is striking.

Tito's relations with Nikita S. Khrushchev provide a whole range of insights into the personality and stylistic characteristics we have been discussing. The shrewd Nikita Sergeevich was able to play upon Tito's strengths and weaknesses to his own advantage on several occasions, but Tito was usually shrewd enough, on his part, to avoid any irreparably damaging concessions or commitments. Khrushchev understood Tito's felt need to be treated with respect, not only as a world statesman, but as a fully legitimate spokesman of Marxism-Leninism as well. He received Tito with the appropriate pomp and ceremony on his several visits to the USSR and forced erstwhile Bloc antagonists to make him feel welcome once again in the "socialist family" and to pay court to him as an elder statesman. This technique was apparently quite successful in 1956, 1957, and again in 1962, despite the disastrous reversals in the state of Yugoslav-Bloc relations in the intervening periods (see Part I, pp. 15-16, 18-19, 23-24); Tito obviously relished the attention and honors he received, and he placed considerable value on the personal rapport he had achieved with Khrushchev, going out of his way to give him the benefit of the doubt whenever state-to-state relations took a turn for the worse. Tito was more than understanding of Khrushchev's evident political difficulties at home, and he tried hard not to add to the Soviet leader's difficulties by attacking him personally, by flirting too ostentatiously with the West, or by allowing Yugoslav domestic political development to diverge too widely from Soviet practices as long as there seemed to be any chance at all of a rapprochement. At the same time, however, he reacted vigorously to any overt Soviet efforts to split

his own followers or to pressure him unduly into giving up his cherished freedom of action by formally tying Yugoslavia into the Bloc institutional nexus - that is, to place him in a position where he was personally subordinate to any individual or structure.

The personal relationship which Tito had enjoyed with Khrushchev - a wary respect and admiration for the kinds of transformation he was doggedly trying to bring about in Soviet domestic and foreign policies<sup>50</sup> - was never to be replicated with the latter's successors. This lack of personal rapport has undoubtedly been a factor of considerable disquiet for Tito in the uncertain period since the Bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Indeed, perhaps the most salient characteristic of Tito's personality and style of leadership to emerge from this brief portrait is the extreme personalism of his approach to politics. Within his own bailiwick he has operated as a wise patriarch, usually benevolent, but demanding unquestioning loyalty and obedience once he has chosen to assert a position. Those who persist in opposing him and questioning his basic orientations, as Djilas did in 1953, have been summarily expelled from the family and disinherited.<sup>51</sup> There is evidently a strong element of ego defensiveness in this pattern of conduct, but it also points to a powerfully developed sense of role, a tendency to regard himself as a particular type of authority figure - a socialist leader of world historical stature - and to act in accordance with this self-image. Tito is perhaps less neurotic or pathological, less megalomaniacal, than other comparable figures who have manifested this characteristic, such as Charles de Gaulle, Stalin, and probably Richard Nixon. He is much more warmly human, undoubtedly a carryover from the early personality traits which he brought to the revolutionary movement and which he consciously sought to repress or at least to remould after his initial careless brushes with the Yugoslav Royalist regime and his subsequent five-year prison term. These engaging emotional qualities have clearly contributed to the effectiveness of his role-playing, but they have probably produced considerable strains upon him as well, sometimes impeding his objectivity in assessing situations and sizing up individuals.

Tito's extreme personalism is especially noticeable in his conduct of foreign affairs. If in domestic matters he is willing to listen to others and to be guided, to a certain extent, by the competing arguments of his colleagues, he has felt much less bound to seek consensus on foreign policy decisions. The differences in age and worldly experience between Tito and his colleagues, owing both to the Stalinist purges and his own process of selection, have left him without a real peer in this field (although Kardelj does have considerable foreign experience, particularly from the early postwar years). In addition, Tito's striking successes in preserving his country's independence in the conflict with Stalin and in the ensuing contest of wills in fending off both Eastern and Western pressures have undoubtedly increased his own self-confidence and strengthened the tendency of his followers to leave foreign policy matters to his judgment.

Tito obviously enjoys his role as a world statesman. For an octogenarian he spends a remarkable amount of his time abroad on strenuous trips to the far corners of the globe. This is, no doubt, a sign of his confidence in the stability of his personal power, but one suspects that it is also a reflection of a desire to escape from the nagging problems and conflicts of Yugoslav domestic politics.

However, his vaunted foreign policy judgment has proved to be less than impeccable on more than one occasion. But as the coterie of close wartime comrades has shrunk, there have been fewer and fewer persons to whom he has felt any sense of accountability or who could effectively object to his actions. And Tito has always shown himself to be something of a gambler, especially in his reliance on his personal judgments of individuals, as we have seen in the case of Khrushchev. His unique charm and skill in talking his way out of the difficulties which this penchant for gambling has sometimes gotten him into, particularly the damage he has done to relations with the West at certain crucial moments, and his ability to "sell" the image he has created for himself and for his country to sympathetic, influential persons in the "imperialist camp", have thus far been sufficient to avert disaster. But to an increasing extent in the past decade or so, ever since the ouster of Ranković, the only real restraint on Tito's emotionalism in his foreign policy decisions has been his own ego strength - his capacity for keeping the exercise of his role-playing fairly closely attuned to a reasonably astute appraisal of the objective international situation. Thus, on balance, Tito's personalist approach to foreign policy has served to keep Yugoslavia afloat in very stormy seas. The question is, to continue the metaphor, what will happen when the hand of this second "great helmsman" is no longer on the wheel?

## TITO, THEORY, AND POLICY: IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION

Turning again to the specific question of Tito as theorist, the above portrayal suggests that his attitude toward theory is a complex one. He is not an original thinker in the sense of contributing to the development of concepts or the application of Marxist theory to concrete issues of domestic and foreign policy. One suspects that he may be somewhat ambivalent about the reigning ideology as it has been used in the communist world. It is interesting to note that in the final stages of the emergence of the public split with the Cominform he found it necessary to warn his less politically sophisticated followers that the dispute was not about ideological principles at all, despite Soviet accusations, and that it would be dangerous for them to allow themselves to be drawn into an ideological debate with Stalin: "It seems to me", he said at the fateful meeting of the CPY Central Committee on 12 April 1948, "that they are using ideological questions to justify their pressure on us, on our state ... That's what it's all about, comrades".<sup>52</sup> His experiences with the Comintern had taught him to recognize a clear power play when he saw one, and he feared that his colleagues could not.

But that experience had also taught him a good deal about theory itself. He had obviously enjoyed immersing himself in the independent study of Marxist economics and philosophy while in Moscow in the thirties. He had also studied military theory à la Clausewitz and M.V. Frunze,<sup>53</sup> as well as the required courses on Party structure and Soviet party history.<sup>54</sup> In short, he has acquired probably as good a basic grounding in Marxist-Leninist theory as most other ruling communist politicians. He has apparently maintained a belief in the value of a solid grounding in Marxism for all citizens of a socialist society, and especially for potential leading cadres. In his major address to the 10th Congress of the LCY in May 1974, he demanded, in line with his call for a general return to orthodoxy, an increased emphasis on ideological education for Yugoslav youth, especially students; and he decried the downgrading of this requirement in recent years.<sup>55</sup>

As far as his own use of theory is concerned, we have seen that ideological rectitude is an important part of the image he has created for himself as a world socialist leader. In his speeches and writings for non-socialist audiences he has generally avoided the use of Marxist symbols and code words,<sup>56</sup> but before a socialist public he tends to express himself in the full flower of ideological symbolism. One may assume that he adopts a similarly differentiated approach in private conversations, thus enhancing his acceptability to both capitalist and communist leaders alike.

For his domestic and foreign communist audiences his invocation of ideological symbols undoubtedly performs a legitimizing function, but it would probably be wrong to attribute this primarily to opportunism. There is little reason to believe that he does not view the world in ideological terms, albeit less dogmatically than some other communist leaders because of the vastly greater experience he has had in dealing with different individuals and systems. Ideological pronouncements are part of the role he has been playing for so long that he must have substantially internalized it. Moreover, his personal obstinacy on political matters, which we have noted in several places above, probably reinforces his tendency to adhere to a given principle or theoretical construct more tenaciously than pure expediency or a concern with direct political advantage would indicate. This adherence to principle has had both positive and negative consequences. There can be little doubt that his steadfast adherence to the principles of worker self-management and nonalignment, so frequently and forcefully proclaimed, has helped him to withstand Moscow's incessant pressures for ideological and political conformity and international socialist solidarity. It has, of course, had a similar effect in his dealings with the West. The opportunity costs of this steadfastness have sometimes been high, especially in terms of economic benefits foregone; but on balance the net results have probably been favorable. Nevertheless, the commitment appears to have a more intrinsic dimension as well. These principles are, after all, an important element of Tito's, and his country's, uniqueness in the world; and they are attractive enough in their own right to confer a certain degree of influence on their practitioners, at least to the extent that they are seen to be practically applied. Tito is

well aware of this;<sup>57</sup> and even when the current political line favors tightening up on domestic liberals and restrictions on the scope of actual self-management, or when the international situation is perceived to require "leaning to one side" in the East-West conflict, he never allows the principles and the practices associated with them to be entirely submerged. In short, for a number of reasons, psychological, as well as political, theory does exert a moderating, as well as a motivating influence on Yugoslav policy-making under Tito.



## CONCLUSION

The two parts of this monograph have presented different perspectives on the Yugoslav decision-making system. Roughly the differences parallel, but certainly do not exhaust, the classical dichotomy between structural and rational-actor modes of policy-making analysis. Thus, it was argued in Part I that the situation of Yugoslavia, as a strategically located small power compelled to struggle for her independence against continuous pressures from the superpowers, has imposed structural constraints on her activities in international relations. Even in the area of domestic policies these structural constraints have had an observable impact: the patterned sequence of liberal-conservative orientations on domestic issues dependent to a large extent on the state of Yugoslav relations with the respective superpower centres.

However, as we have seen, the structure of the Yugoslav situation does not explain very much by itself about her actual political behavior over the years, except perhaps in periods of especially serious danger to her physical existence. For the crucial variable seems to be the perceptions of her leaders - how they have perceived the structural constraints and the situational opportunities at any given point of time and how they have viewed the latter in the context of their personal conceptions of their own and their country's historical role. In the case of Tito and his colleagues (and this would probably apply to most ruling communist elites) the conception of historical role is itself fairly explicitly structured by the canons of Marxism-Leninism, but as the example of Tito in Part II shows, personality is an important determinant of how these canons will be interpreted and translated into practical political behavior.

Tito's unique position in the system as the ultimate arbiter of Yugoslavia's theoretical and political orientation has undoubtedly played a major role in the successful maintenance of national autonomy and integrity, but it also has some serious implications for the future stability of the country and the conduct of its foreign and domestic policy. The specific decisions discussed in Part I suggest that on virtually every major issue of foreign and domestic policy since World War II there have been important differences among his lieutenants in their perceptions of situational requirements. The special quality of Tito's relations with his colleagues and his monumental authority in the political system have allowed him to act decisively as he has seen fit, despite these differences, without accumulating a residue of serious disaffection within the politically important core of the elite, even when he has decided unwisely. This situation prevailed at least until the late sixties. But the Ranković affair and the subsequent shrinkage of the original membership of that core as a result of biological and political wastage point up the ultimate fragility of this kind of political system. The evidence of China in the last years of Mao's reign and since reinforces this conclusion.

Thus, the elaborate party and governmental scaffolding which Tito has hastily assembled in recent years to prepare for his eventual departure from the scene may help to ensure a measure of stability, but it can hardly supply the flexibility and forcefulness of leadership in critical times which he has so long provided to the system and upon which it has come to rely so heavily for its preservation and progress. A strong, selfconsciously and consistently liberal Eurocommunist movement might conceivably offer an effective substitute for some aspects of Tito's leadership by serving as a source of legitimacy and inspiration to continue the more popular and progressive aspects of the Yugoslav system, or at least by providing a shield from the deadening pressures for conformity that will undoubtedly increase from Moscow in the post-Tito era. However, as we have seen, it is not at all certain that the Eurocommunist movement will be able to keep its own house in order and provide the necessary support for a post-Tito Yugoslavia, to say nothing of progressive inspiration. Thus, it is likely that the heirs of Tito will have to fend for themselves. The prospects are not necessarily discouraging, for one can expect that the force of his example and the institutional arrangements he has played a major role in creating will have had some lasting value. But it cannot be denied that his guiding hand will be sorely missed.

## NOTES (Part I)

- 1 This attitude is especially prevalent in studies which apply the methodologies of rigorous social science analysis. See, for example, M. George Zaninovich, "Elites and Citizenry in Yugoslav Society : A Study of Value Differentiation" in Carl Beck, Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. et al., *Comparative Communist Political Leadership* (New York : David McKay Company, Inc., 1973) pp. 226-297 and the recent monograph by Gary K. Bertsch, *Values and Community in Multi-National Yugoslavia* (Boulder, Col.: East European Quarterly, 1976).
- 2 *The Role of Middle Powers in World Politics* (Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 1968); p. 4.
- 3 Carsten Holbraad, "The Role of Middle Powers", *Cooperation and Conflict* (Nordic Journal of International Politics), No. 2, 1971, p. 84.
- 4 David Vital, *The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/ Great Power Conflict* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 12.
- 5 *Ibid.* p. 130.
- 6 Yugoslav leader Edvard Kardelj had expressed this position as far back as June 1953 in the changed atmosphere after Stalin's death. See Edvard Kardelj, *Problemi naše socijalističke izgradnje*. vol. 3 (Belgrade : Kultura, 1954), p. 342.
- 7 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 317. See also, Ernst Halperin, *The Triumphant Heretic : Tito's Struggle Against Stalin* (London: Heinemann, 1958), pp. 276-277.
- 8 James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 65.
- 9 To mention only a few of the most substantial treatments of individual periods : Adam B. Ulam, *Titoism and the Cominform* (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1952); and Hamilton Fish Armstrong, *Tito and Goliath* (New York : Macmillan, 1951); Charles Zalar, *Yugoslav Communism, A Critical Analysis* (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961). This is a highly critical report to the U.S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and its judgements can be accepted only with caution, but it contains a wealth of useful material. A book which many Yugoslavs consider especially insightful is Charles P. McVicker's *Titoism : Pattern for International Communism* (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1957). Of the more general studies the most

comprehensive to date on domestic political development is Dennison Rusinow's *The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1977). Rusinow explicitly denies the importance of external factors as determinants of domestic policy, but his treatment of foreign relations is too sketchy to permit him to argue the issue convincingly one way or the other. Another very thorough general work is that of Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Yugoslavia* (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1971). On Yugoslav relations with the Bloc, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski's *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, Revised and Enlarged Edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967) has retained its value.

- 10 A. Ross Johnson shows rather convincingly that there were plenty of signs of serious ideological and policy differences between the Yugoslav leaders and Moscow well before the conflict came out into the open. *The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case, 1945-1953* (Cambridge, Mass: The M.I.T. Press, 1972) see esp. pp. 27-32, 52. Still, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the actual split did come as a genuine shock to Tito and his colleagues.
- 11 See the report by the Soviet Ambassador on his interview with Kardelj on 5 June 1945, excerpted as document 112 in Stephen Clissold, ed., *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973: A Documentary Survey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 166-167. This is a very useful collection of documents with a good introductory essay by a recognized specialist on Yugoslav affairs.
- 12 *Moša Pijade, Priča o sovjetskoj pomoći za dizanje ustanka u Jugoslaviji* (Belgrade: "Borba", 1950), pp. 6-7.
- 13 Johnson argues that Kardelj was ahead of his colleagues in his readiness to attack Soviet doctrines. Djilas was, for a while, reluctant to mount a frontal attack on the Soviet system itself, but he soon became the most virulent Yugoslav critic of the Stalinist model. Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.
- 14 Dr Dušan Bilandžić and Stipe Tonković, *Samoupravljanje, 1950-1974* (Zagreb: Globus, 1974), p. 22. This section was written by Bilandžić.
- 15 Ernst Halperin argues that the two main alleged "Cominformists" in the top Yugoslav leadership, Andrija Hebrang and Sreten Žujović, were not Russian agents at all, but fell afoul of their comrades and ultimately took the Soviet side because of their disagreements with Kidrič's unrealistic 5-year development plans. Halperin, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-70.
- 16 C.L. Sulzberger, "Tito Faces West for Foreign Trade", *New York Times*, 8 April, 1949, p. 7. On 18 February 1949 the U.S. Government lifted an embargo on shipments to Yugoslavia, except for military supplies.

- 17 Svetozar Vukmanović - Tempo boasts in his memoirs how Yugoslav economic officials published fictitious trade balances to thwart American efforts to influence investment policies. *Revolucija koja teče: Memoari* (Belgrade: Kommunist, 1971), vol. 2, p. 131.
- 18 President Truman's statement of support for Yugoslav independence in a farewell message to the new U.S. Ambassador to Belgrade, G.V. Allen, was certainly a boost to Tito's self-confidence. "Truman Reaffirms Aim on Aggression", *NYT*, 23 December 1949, p. 6.
- 19 M.S. Handler, "Liberalism Gains in Yugoslav Views", *NYT*, 3 November 1950, p. 13.
- 20 McVicker, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.
- 21 For a good description of the formal arrangements of this system see Velimir Vasić, *Ekonomska politika Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Savremena administracija, 1970) 5th edition, revised and enlarged, pp. 51-56.
- 22 The rationale behind the new planning system is critically examined in Dušan Bilandžić, *Ideje i praksa društvenog razvoja Jugoslavije, 1945-1973*, (Belgrade: Kommunist, 1973), pp. 127-131.
- 23 *Šesti kongres Komunističke partije Jugoslavije (Savez komunista Jugoslavije) 2-7 novembra 1952; stenografske beleške* (Belgrade: Kultura, 1952). See also Moma Marković and Ivan Laća, *Organizacioni razvitak komunističke partije Jugoslavije (SKJ)* (Belgrade: Kultura, 1960) pp. 102-106.
- 24 Pavlowitch, *op. cit.*, p. 242.
- 25 Kardelj, *op. cit.*, pp. 338-342.
- 26 Jack Raymond, "U.S. Delivers Jets to the Yugoslavs", *NYT*, 11 March 1953, p. 7.
- 27 Jack Raymond, "Tito Bares Pledge by Britain to Back Yugoslavia in War", *NYT*, 1 April 1953, p. 1.
- 28 Harrison E. Salisbury, "New Soviet Policy on Belgrade Seen" *NYT*, 19 May 1953, p. 1.
- 29 *Ibid.*
- 30 For a good, comprehensive treatment of the Trieste question through 1954 see Bogdan C. Novak, *Trieste, 1941-1954: The Ethnic Political, and Ideological Struggle* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), esp. pp. 428-433, where the reaction to Tito's speech at Leskovac and Soviet moves to lend support to Yugoslav claims are described. For an account of the considerations which informed the British policy on the Trieste issue see

*Full Circle: The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden* (London: Cassell, 1960), pp. 181-186.

- 31 *NYT*, 23 August 1953, p. 67.
- 32 "Yugoslav Warned on Drift From Marx", *NYT*, 12 August 1953, p. 5, and Jack Raymond, "Anti-Church Acts in Yugoslavia Rise", *NYT*, 22 August 1953, p. 3.
- 33 Djilas recounts the genesis of the idea of self-management by Kardelj and himself, with some assistance from Kidrič, in the spring of 1950 in *The Unperfect Society: Beyond the New Class* Translated by Dorian Cooke. (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1969) pp. 157-158. On Djilas' friendship with Aneurin Bevan and his wife Jennie Lee see Michael Foot, *Aneurin Bevan: A Biography*, vol. 2: 1945-1960 (London: Davis-Paynter, 1973), pp. 347-348, 420-423. I am indebted to Colin Hughes for calling this source to my attention.
- 34 The articles have been published in Milovan Djilas, *Anatomy of a Moral: The Political Essays of Milovan Djilas*, edited by Abraham Rothberg (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1959).
- 35 See for example, the reaction of Vukmanović and his colleagues as described in his *Memorari* vol. 2, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-195.
- 36 Bilandžić, *Ideje i praksa*, p. 166.
- 37 *Ibid.*
- 38 Clissold, *op. cit.*, p. 63. In the omitted part of the sentence Clissold qualifies this statement with an assertion that Tito would never accept rapprochement at the expense of Yugoslav independence and security - which is probably correct as a general proposition.
- 39 Richard Lowenthal, "Tito's Gamble", *Encounter*, vol. xi, No. 4, (October 1958), p. 59.
- 40 For example, by Brezezinski, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 176-268, *passim*. For a useful collection of documents on the 1956 events see Paul Zinner, ed. *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956).
- 41 Vukmanović *Tempo*, *Memorari*, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 210.
- 42 *Ibid.*, p. 211.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 276.

- 44 See, for example, Tito's year-end interview in *Borba* with Jože Smole, cited by Elie Abel, "Tito's Reply Mild in Soviet Dispute", *NYT*, 30 December 1956, p. 1.
- 45 Clissold, *op. cit.*, documents 184 and 185.
- 46 "Tito Lets Dedijer Go Abroad", *NYT*, 10 April 1957, p. 5.
- 47 Elie Abel, "Yugoslavia Objects to Proposed Terms for U.S. Arms Aid", *NYT*, 18 May 1957, p. 6.
- 48 Lowenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
- 49 *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.
- 50 Elie Abel, "Tito to Establish East German Tie", *NYT*, 15 October 1957, p. 6; *Ibid.*, 18 October 1957, p. 9.
- 51 Lowenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 63; Vukmanović Tempo, *Memoari*, vol. 2, p. 322, confirms that he had not seen the early versions of the Programme.
- 52 Lowenthal, *loc. cit.*
- 53 *Yugoslavia's Way: The Program of the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia*, Translated by Stoyan Pribechevich (New York: All Nations Press, 1958), p. 137.
- 54 Vukmanović Tempo, *Memoari*, vol. 2, pp. 322-323.
- 55 P. Fedoseev, I. Pomelov, V. Cheprakov, 'On the Draft Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia', *Kommunist*, 15 April 1958, translated in Vaclav L. Benes, Robert F. Byrnes, Nicholas Spulber, eds., *The Second Soviet Yugoslav Dispute* (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, n.d.), pp. 95-130.
- 56 Josip Broz Tito, *Selected Speeches and Articles, 1941-1961* (in English) (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1963), pp. 229-230.
- 57 See, for example, "Rise in Hostility Conceded by Tito", *NYT*, 17 April 1958, P.S.; "Belgrade Seizes Friends of Soviet", *NYT*, 7 June 1958, P.S.: Elie Abel, "Yugoslavs Imply Moscow Intrigue", *NYT*, 14 June 1958, p. 4.
- 58 Paul Underwood, "Dillon to Begin Yugoslav Talks", *NYT*, 17 July 1960, p. 9. For a comprehensive treatment of the financial aspects of the 1961 and 1965 reforms see John Michael Cayton, *Banking, Credit and the Yugoslav Economy: 1952-1965* (unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Texas, Austin, 1972).

- 59 Bilandžić, *Ideje i praksa*, p. 201.
- 60 *Ibid*, pp. 204-208.
- 61 Paul Underwood, "Tito Pledges Curb on Role of State", *NYT*, 29 November 1960, p. 1.
- 62 Vasić, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-141. See also, Bilandžić, *Ideje i praksa*, p. 213.
- 63 E.W. Kenworthy, "U.S. to Shelve Polish Aid Plea Because of Berlin Crisis; Tito Also Faces Delay on Requests", *NYT*, 14 September 1961, p. 5; See also the interview of N.S. Khrushchev by *Times* correspondent C.L. Sulzberger, *NYT*, 8 September 1961.
- 64 American Ambassador to Belgrade George F. Kennan describes with great poignancy the difficulties he encountered with the Congress in trying to keep the nature of the American aid program in proper perspective and to explain that Yugoslavia was not just another Bloc country. He was not helped very much in his efforts by Tito's frequent pro-Soviet sallies or by President Kennedy's submissiveness to Congress and domestic emigré elements on the anti-Communist issue. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1950-1963*, volume II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972) esp. pp. 278-311, *passim*. Kennan's general account of the 1961-63 period is extremely valuable and unrightful but he tends to lean rather heavily on the side of over-generosity toward Tito in explaining away the latter's pro-Soviet behaviour on certain occasions.
- 65 'Yugoslav Economist Reported to Defect', *NYT*, 21 October 1961, p. 1.
- 66 Paul Underwood, "Tito Charges U.S. Exerts Pressure", *NYT*, 14 November 1961, p. 1.
- 67 *NYT*, 17 December 1961, p. 22.
- 68 Paul Underwood, "Yugoslav Reds Warned by Tito", *NYT*, 28 November 1961, p. 22.
- 69 Bilandžić, *Ideje i praksa*, pp. 214-215.
- 70 Kennan explains why this punitive action was potentially much more serious for Yugoslavia than a cutoff in economic and military and which was negligible by this time. Kennan, *op. cit.*, pp. 294-296.
- 71 "Yugoslavs Show New Soviet Tanks", *NYT*, 2 May 1962, p. 4. The tanks were presumably paid for out of the growing surplus in Yugoslavia's ruble account due to her expanding exports to the USSR.

- 72 Bilandžić, *Ideje i praksa* pp. 227-228. Some idea of the early expectations for the new Constitution can be found in "Pred novim ustavom", lead editorial, *Socijalizam*, No. 5 (May 1962), pp. 3-16.
- 73 Paul Underwood, "Tito Closing Rift with Soviet Bloc", *NYT*, 31 January 1963, p. 2.
- 74 Compare the 'corrected' greeting to Yugoslavia in *Pravda*, 11 April 1963, p. 1, with the original in the May Day These in *Ibid*, 8 April 1963, p. 1.
- 75 "Tito Assures U.S. of His Neutrality", *NYT*, 20 April 1963, p.1.
- 76 David Binder, "Belgrade Seeking Closer Soviet Tie", *NYT*, 19 May 1963, p. 1. In this speech Tito went out of his way to endorse Khrushchev's hard line on the Chinese Party.
- 77 Henry Tanner, "Tito and Khrushchev Urge Red Unity", *NYT*, 9 June 1964, p. 1; "Tito Back from Talk with Soviet Premier", *NYT*, 10 June 1964, p. 4. For a good summary of the contemporary Titoist line on Bloc unity see Puniša Perović, "O odnosima i saradnji u međunarodnom radničkom pokretu", *Socijalizam*, No. 1 (January 1964), pp. 46-66.
- 78 Harry Schwartz, "Satellites Still Worry Moscow", *NYT*, 28 June 1964, section IV, p. 6, where Tito is described as a messenger of unity for Khrushchev. A poignant description of Khrushchev as visionary among dull, conventional subordinates is given by Tempo in a report to Tito after a visit to Moscow in 1964. "he is three spear lengths [sic!] above the rest of his colleagues, but he is so far ahead of the others that no one supports him. That's his tragedy". Vukmanović-Tempo, *Memoari*, vol. 2, p. 428.
- 79 See for example, "Yugoslav Praises Rumania", *NYT*, 15 February 1964, p. 3; David Binder, "Rumanians Plan Close Tito Ties", *NYT*, 5 April 1964, p. 8. Closer relations with the increasingly independent-minded Italian party leadership were also being cultivated at this time. "Togliatti Pays Visit to Tito; Party Level Talks Included", *NYT*, 16 January 1964, p. 15.
- 80 See, for example, Bilandžić, *Ideje i praksa*, pp. 243-244; also, Cayton, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-257, for a good, concise description of technical financial aspects of the reform.
- 81 On the Ranković affair see Ilija Jukić, "Tito's Last Battle", *East Europe*, vol. 16, no. 4 (April 1967), pp. 2-17. For the liberal LCY view of essential reforms in the political system prior to the Ranković affair see Krste Crvenkovski, "Vodeća uloga Saveza komunista Jugoslavije", *Socijalizam*, No. 7-8 (July-August, 1964), pp. 945-966.

- 82 Bilandžić<sup>V</sup>, *Ideje i praksa*, p. 259.
- 83 According to Ante Ciliga, in the twenties a high official in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia subsequently exiled to Siberia as a Trotskyite, Ranković was directly involved in a conspiracy with Moscow during the sixties. Ante Ciliga, *La Crisi di stato della Jugoslavia di Tito: Il Vero Dilemma: spartizione 'Fifty-Fifty' O Confederazione con Djilas e Savka Dabčević* (Rome: Edizioni ODEP, 1973), p. 412. Ciliga throughout this work takes a liberal pro-Croatian position. The source is valuable in a number of ways, but it is poorly documented and should be used with caution. The *New York Times* also repeats the charge that Ranković was closely linked with the KGB. "Ousted Yugoslavs Linked to Moscow", *NYT*, 22 July 1966, p. 4.
- 84 For a more or less official line on this conspiracy theory see the lead editorial "Bez kompromisa sa agresijom", *Socijalizam*, No. 6 (June, 1967), esp. pp. 722-723. See also Richard Eder, "Yugoslavs Confirm Soviet Replacement of 100 MIG's Egyptians Lost in War", *NYT*, 18 June 1967, p. 24; Richard Eder, "Soviet Military Men Visiting Yugoslavia", *NYT*, 23 June 1967, p. 1.
- 85 Party Secretary Mijalko Todorović was said to be the chief critic of Tito's decisions. Richard Eder, "Mideast Crisis Said to Stir Pro-Soviet Shift in Yugoslav Policy", *NYT*, 25 June 1967, p. 14. Rusinow writes that Marko Nikezić, then Foreign Secretary, committed "an unpardonable sin by telling the President on Tito's return from the Moscow summit meeting of June 1967, that he should not have gone or committed Yugoslavia to the Soviet line on the Middle East Crisis without first consulting his colleagues." Rusinow, *op. cit.*, p. 214.
- 86 On the student disorders see the special edition of *Praxis*, No. 1-2 (June 1968) which contains a comprehensive collection of documents concerning the events. For an extended treatment of the events and their significance see the forthcoming book by Ralph Pervan, *Tito and the Students: The University and the University Student in Self-Managing Yugoslavia*, (Nedlands, W.A., University of Western Australia Press, 1977).
- 87 "Tito Govori" - printed text of a speech by Tito on Belgrade Television, 9 June 1968, published in *Praxis*, No. 1-2 (June 1968), pp. 337-340.
- 88 Martin Charles Sletzinger, *The Reform and Reorganization of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, 1966-1973*, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, September 1976, pp. 46-47.
- 89 Bilandžić<sup>V</sup>, *Ideje i praksa*, pp. 270-271.

- 90 Note especially his warnings against "inundations from the West" in his speech in Zadar on 29 August 1969, quoted in Ciliga, *op. cit.*, p. 102.
- 91 "Naše <sup>V</sup> samoupravno društvo ne trpi autarhizam i regionalna ograničenja", *Borba*, 11 October 1969, pp. 4-5.
- 92 "Yugoslav Is Jailed for Scorning Soviet", *NYT*, 29 October 1969, p. 17.
- 93 Alfred Friendly Jr. "Nixon-Tito Talks Termed Cordial", *NYT*, 2 October 1970, p. 1. However, Yugoslav observers, both at home and in exile, took particular note of President Nixon's apparent encouragement of Croatian autonomy during his visit to Zagreb. Compare Ciliga, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-213, with the account by domestic hardliner Jure Bilić, "Dvadeset prva sednica se nije pojavila isnenada", *Politika*, 3 December 1976, p. 6.
- 94 See, for example, Ilija Jukić, "Tito's Legacy", *Survey*, No. 77 (Autumn 1970), p. 94. See, also, Tempo's rather disingenuous account of the proceedings in *Memoari*, vol. 2, pp. 488-494.
- 95 Bilandžić notes with tacit approbation that the new system brought Yugoslavia closer to a confederation than a federation. *Ideje i praksa*, p. 281.
- 96 Excerpts from the Belgrade University Law Faculty debates are published in Bilandžić, *Ideje i praksa*, pp. 286-288. One of the best accounts of the events in Croatia at this time is Dennison J. Rusinow's "Crisis in Croatia", Parts I-IV, in *Fieldstaff Reports* of the American Universities Field Staff, Europe series, vol. XIX, No. 4, 5, 6. (April-July 1972).
- 97 "Tito's Foreign Minister Quits", *NYT*, 29 October 1972, p. 6; "Top Serbian Politician Resigns from the Yugoslav Government", *NYT*, 3 November 1972, p. 2.
- 98 Ciliga, *op. cit.*, p. 467. For a recent report on Soviet KGB relations with Croatian exile groups in West Germany and elsewhere and the alleged readiness of certain left-wing elements among them to enlist Soviet military support for the dismemberment of Yugoslavia see "'Support' for Soviet Invasion", *Canberra Times*, 13 June 1977, p. 7.
- 99 See, for example, the case of former "cominformist" Vlado Dapčević in Fay Willey and Anthony Collings, "Tito's Last Roundup?" *Newsweek*, 15 December 1975, pp. 24-25.

- 100 See, for example, Johann Georg Reissmuller, "Wo Steht der Stalinismus in Jugoslawien?", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26 February 1974, p. 2. Ilija Jukić, "Tito's Legacy", p. 98. Jukić argues that after the Czechoslovak invasion these persons gave up efforts to enlist Soviet support. But this article was published in 1970. Ciliga, *op. cit.*, pp. 494-495, 499, gives evidence of a continuation of the Serbian-Muscovite "connection".
- 101 Giorgio Fattori, "Con i russi alle spalle", *La Stampa* (Turin), 17 October 1970, p. 3.
- 102 Zdenko Antic, "Yugoslav Foreign Trade Problems", Radio Free Europe Research: RAD Background Report/97 (Yugoslavia), 3 May 1976, p. 7, (Table 4).
- 103 Raymond E. Anderson, "Soviet Top-Rated in Serbian Poll", 8 October 1972, p. 6.
- 104 Radivoj Cvetičanin, "Ko studira u inostranstvu", *NIN* (Belgrade), 29 August 1976, p. 12.
- 105 Tito's speech at Rudo, Bosnia on 22 December 1971, excerpted in Ciliga, *op. cit.*, p. 486. Earlier in the year Tito had appealed, apparently without effect, to the LCY against these same "internal enemies". See Paul Yankovitch, "Le Maréchal Tito appelle la Ligue des communistes a se débarrasser de tous les ennemis intérieurs", *Le Monde* 18-19 April 1971, p. 2.
- 106 Giorgio Fattori, *loc. cit.*
- 107 Ciliga, *op. cit.*, pp. 494-495.
- 108 A token of Soviet approval of the hardline course of the LCY reconstruction was an article by Soviet correspondent Aleksandr Bovin on the eve of the 10th Congress. "Yugoslavskie vpechatleniia", *Izvestiia*, 12 April 1974, p. 4.
- 109 See, for example, Vladimir Bakarić, "What Is New in the Activities of Cominformists", *Yugoslav Information Bulletin*, No. 11 (November, 1975), pp. 14-16; and the article by security chief Franjo Hrljević, "Zašto nasrću na nas", *Politika*, 28, 29, 30 November 1976, p. 13.
- 110 Not even the Croatian leaders have been charged with actual complicity with the national separatist movement. See Ivan Perić, *Ideje "Masovnog pokreta" u Hrvatskoj*, (Zagreb: Narodno sveučilište grada Zagreba, Centar za aktualni politički studij, 1974), esp. pp. 241-242.

## NOTES (Part II)

- 1 See, for example, "Otvorene postdiplomske studije Visoke vojno-političke škole JNA", *Politika*, 7 December 1976, p. 7; and Nikola Ljubičić, "Epohalan značaj Titovog vojnog dela", *Politika*, 15 December 1976, p. 8.
- 2 Lucien W. Pye, "Personal Identity and Political Ideology", in Bruce Mazlish, ed., *Psychoanalysis and History* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 157.
- 3 For a comprehensive bibliographical essay on the literature on personality and politics see Michael Lerner, "A Bibliographical Note", in Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 154-184.
- 4 Erik H. Erikson, *Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History* (New York: Norton, 1958); Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study* (New York: John Day, 1956); Theodore W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950).
- 5 For a critique of the most common objections to personality theory as a tool of political analysis see Greenstein, *op. cit.*, chapter two.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 58.
- 7 M. Brewster Smith, "Personality in Politics: A Conceptual Map, with Application to the Problem of Political Rationality", in Oliver Garceau, ed., *Political Research and Political Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 86-87.
- 8 Greenstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29
- 9 Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 88.
- 10 Greenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
- 11 See, for example, Phyllis Auty, *Tito: A Biography* (London: Longman, 1970), pp. 287-288, 290; Konni Zilliacus, *Tito of Yugoslavia* (London: Michael Joseph, 1952), p. 286; Vladimir Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito: Prilozi za biografiju* (Belgrade: "Kultura", 1953), p. 50; Fitzroy Maclean, *Disputed Barricade: The Life and Times of Josip Broz-Tito, Marshal of Yugoslavia* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1957), p. 102.
- 12 Vilko Vinterhalter, *Životnom stazom Josipa Broza* (Belgrade: "Kultura", 1968), p. 56; Zilliacus, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
- 13 Maclean, *op. cit.*, p. 102.
- 14 Zilliacus, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

- 15 Stephen Clissold, *Whirlwind: An Account of Marshal Tito's Rise to Power* (London: The Cresset Press, 1949), p. 180.
- 16 Djilas claims that he and youth leader Ivo Lola Ribar gave Tito this nickname before the war. Milovan Djilas, *Memoir of a Revolutionary*, translated by Drenka Willen (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973), p. 353.
- 17 According to Khrushchev, in his so-called "Secret Speech" at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, Stalin had boasted that he would "shake his little finger" and Tito would be overthrown.
- 18 Djilas, *Memoir*, p. 351.
- 19 *Ibid.*, p. 352.
- 20 *Ibid.*,
- 21 *Ibid.*, pp. 352-353.
- 22 Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, *Revolucija koja teče: Memoari* (Belgrade: Kommunist, 1971), vol. 2, p. 178.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 222.
- 24 This assessment was offered to the writer by a Yugoslav official in a private conversation. The position was membership in the Council of the Federation.
- 25 Dedijer, *op. cit.*, p. 250.
- 26 Auty, *op. cit.*, p. 120.
- 27 Djilas, *Memoir*, pp. 275-276.
- 28 See, for example, the excerpt from Tito's speech at the January 1954 Central Committee Plenum, "Djilas Has Gone Too Far" (Tito) in Michael and Deborah Milenkovitch, *Milovan Djilas: Parts of a Lifetime* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), pp. 225-226.
- 29 See Dedijer, *op. cit.*, pp. 520-521, for an account of the confrontation with Žujović at the April 12th (1948) session of the Central Committee. Žujović's later recantation suggests that contrary to contemporary Yugoslav charges, he was not being entirely self-serving in his stand, although the evidence is far from conclusive.
- 30 Dedijer, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

- 31 Some of Tito's lieutenants were even less flexible than he was. Blagoje Nešković, the Serbian Prime Minister, for example, resigned in protest over the decision to seek Western aid in 1952. Rusinow, *op. cit.*, p. 45. Vukmanović, on the other hand, made compromise easier - and, in fact, unnecessary - by 'cooking' the official statistics to make it look as if Yugoslavia were following Washington's advice, while not actually doing so. Thus, Belgrade received Western aid without conceding a lower industrialization rate, as Washington had recommended. Vukmanović-Tempo, *Memoari*, vol. 2, p. 130. The best account of the rise and fall of the republican party liberals is to be found in Dennison Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1977), chapters 6-8.
- 32 ... in Rusinow, *op. cit.*, chapters 6-8.
- 33 *Ibid.*, pp. 229-254. For a more narrowly focussed interpretation of party reactions and nationalist manipulations which views the conflict as essentially between liberals and conservatives see Martin Charles Sletzinger, *The Reform and Reorganization of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, 1966-1972*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, Department of Government, September 1976.
- 34 Sletzinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-47. He argues that Tito was never more than lukewarm toward the reforms.
- 35 Rusinow suggests that Tito's sense of his own dignity, and his historic role, was at issue, citing a remark by Tito in October 1972: "there have been instances of unfavorable and impermissible comment ... not only about me as a personality and man, but also not taking account of the fact that I am the President of the LCY and have been for a long time - since 1937." Rusinow, *op. cit.*, p. 325.
- 36 Edvard Kardelj, "Sloboda i demokratija samoupravnog socijalizma", speech at opening of session of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCY, *Politika*, 14 June 1977, pp. 1-4. Kardelj remarked: "First, we must critically review the current state of our political system and undertake measures to make it conform with changes in the socio-economic and the self-management structure of society ..." (p. 2). As usual, however, Kardelj's convoluted formulation of a solution does not promise any significant enhancement of the democratic character of the system, which he declares to be essential.
- 37 Dedijer, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25; Auty, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
- 38 Ante Ciliga, *La Crisi di Stato della Jugoslavia di Tito: Il Vero Dilemma: Spartizione "Fifty-Fifty" o Confederazione con Djilas e Savka Dabčević* (Rome: Edizione ODEP, 1972), p. 331.
- 39 *Ibid.*, p. 339.

- 40 There are brief biographical sketches of many of the members of Tito's entourage and other prominent Yugoslav personages of the prewar and wartime period in Charles Zalar, *Yugoslav Communism, A Critical Analysis* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), Appendix II.
- 41 According to Ilija Jukić, Kardelj and Bakarić threatened to take their respective republics out of the Federation if Tito were deposed by an allegedly impending coup being planned by Ranković. This confrontation occurred at a special meeting of the Executive Committee of the LCY hastily summoned on the evening of 9 December 1964. Ilija Jukić, "Tito's Last Battle", *East Europe*, vol. 16, no. 4 (April, 1967), p. 4.
- 42 Ilija Jukić, "Tito's Legacy", *Survey*, No. 77 (Autumn, 1970), p. 104.
- 43 For details of the Ranković affair see the two articles by Jukić cited above and Rusinow, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-191. For a rather disingenuous insider's account of the proceedings see Vukmanović Tempo, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 489-494.
- 44 These dates are in Zalar, *op. cit.*, Appendix II.
- 45 The most striking accounts of Stalin's entourage are by Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (London: Hart-Davis, 1962) and by Khrushchev in his "Secret Speech" at the 20th Party Congress. Ulam has characterized Stalin's "all-male nocturnal banquets" as having "the atmosphere of a college freshman outing - with middle-aged men appropriately indulging in drinking bouts and bad practical jokes - and a festive Mafia gathering". Adam B. Ulam, *Stalin: The Man and His Era* (New York: The Viking Press, 1973), p. 436.
- 46 Dedijer, *op. cit.*, p. 507.
- 47 Auty, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-118.
- 48 These differences can be noted, for example, in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 110, 229, 239. The impression of restraint in Tito's relations with Nehru was conveyed to the writer by an Indian Journalist present at several of their meetings.
- 49 *New York Times*, 10 February 1970, p. 11; 19 November 1973, p. 3; 21 November 1973, p. 16.
- 50 See Vukmanović's assessment to Tito upon his return from Moscow in 1963, Vukmanović Tempo, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 428.

- 51 See C.L. Sulzberger's account of a conversation with Tito in May 1954 from which Sulzberger concluded that "Obviously Tito now dislikes Djilas personally". C.L. Sulzberger, *A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries (1934-1954)* (Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1969), p. 1007.
- 52 Dedijer, *op. cit.*, p. 518.
- 53 Auty, *op. cit.*, p. 102.
- 54 Dedijer, *op. cit.*, p. 238.
- 55 Josip Broz Tito, "Razdoblje izmedju dva kongresa bogato je velikim uspesima i revolucionarnim iskustvima", *Politika*, 28 May 1974, p. 9.
- 56 See, for example, Tito's article in the American quarterly *Foreign Affairs*, "On Certain Current International Questions", (October 1957), pp. 423-434, published in Josip Broz Tito, *Selected Speeches and Articles, 1941-1961* (Zagreb: "Naprijed", pp. 197-206.
- 57 For an example of one of Tito's frequent references to Yugoslavia's "enormous prestige" in the world see "President Tito's Speech at Bar", *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), vol. XXVII, no. 628 (June 5, 1976), pp. 13-15.