

RENAISSANCE FRENCH STUDIES

MONTAIGNE: Essais

Week 4: Montaigne's scepticism I — the "crisis"

- 1 Pyrrho; Pyrrhonism
- 2 Gui de Bruès: *Dialogues* (1557)
- 3 "Spiritus sanctus non est Scepticus" (Luther)
- 4 Francisco Sanches (Sanchez): *Quod nihil scitur...* (1581)
- 5 Heinrich Cornelius von Nettesheim (Cornelius Agrippa);
Her Trippa
- 6 Diogenes Laërtius: *Lives of the Philosophers*
- 7 Sextus Empiricus: *Hypotyposes* (*Institutions* [ou *Esquisses*]
pyrrhoniennes; *The Outlines of Pyrrhonism*)
- 8 *la curiosité est un mal naturel en l'homme* (II, 164)
la gloire et la curiosité sont les deux fleaux de nostre âme
(I, 230)
la peste de l'homme, c'est l'opinion de sçavoir (II, 154-5)
j'ay peur que nous avons les yeux plus grands que le ventre, et
plus de curiosité que nous n'avons de capacité (I, 251)
la curiosité est vicieuse par tout... (III, 84)
- 9 *Que sçay-je?*
- 10 *l'accoustumance hebeate nos sens* (I, 113)
l'usage nous desrobbe le vray visage des choses (I, 122)
m'avoit la coustume osté l'appercevanee de cette estrangeté
(I, 116)
"qu'est-il de plus vain que de vouloir deviner Dieu par nos
analogies & conjectures, le regler & le monde à nostre
capacité & à nos loix, & nous servir aux despens de la
divinité de ce petit eschantillon de suffisance qu'il luy a
plu despartir à nostre naturelle condition? (II, 178)
- 12 *"A careful reading of this [the Apologie] seems to make it*
pretty clear, if we keep in min. Montaigne's hint to the wise
to 'catch his meaning' and read between the lines, that the
title was intentionally misleading, and that the whole chapter
is an attack on Christian beliefs in general..."

(Trechmann's footnote to the title of the *Apologie*)

MONTAIGNE: HIS SCEPTICISM 1: the "crisis" (1967)
(1969)
(1971)
(1972)
(1973)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

In addition to the general works already mentioned most of which have their chapter or few paras on this subject

BRUSH, Craig B: M and Bayle, variations on a theme of skepticism
(in Menzies, on loan all term) (excellent stuff) (most acute; fresh light).

POPKIN, RH: The history of scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes
(most much help; perhaps as an introduction?)

articles

DREANO, Mathurin: La crise sceptique de M? in B d'H et R xxiii, 1961,
pp252-264

FRAME, DM: Did M betray Sebond? in RR xxxviii, 1947, pp297-329
(essential to an understanding of the Apologie)

GENZ, HE: Exaggeration and anger in the Apologie in RR55, April 1964,
pp81-84

on Agrippa, see :

NAUERT, Charles G: Agrippa & the Crisis of Renaissance Thought

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MONTAIGNE: THE SCEPTICISM

Or perhaps better to talk of ^{a)}M's so-called scepticism. ^{And of this b) so-called "crisis" (of which more later)}

^{a)}For it was not until long after M's death that the word sceptic, came to by an understandable piece of semantic subversion, came to have the meaning that comes first to our minds and that would have shocked M himself: one who doubts the truth of the Christian religion. The original meaning in Greek was simply to consider ^{*}(and is related to its distant descendant scope and the first meaning of scope: a target for shooting at) and sceptic came to mean (OED):

^{*}spell it

one who, like Pyrrho ^{*}(1) and his followers, doubts the possibility of real knowledge of any kind; one who holds that there are no adequate grounds for certainty as to the truth of any proposition whatever

It was unfortunate for M that he was subverted in this way; by the XVIIth century scepticism had already come to mean universal doubt ^{including doubt on religious matters;}, M was alleged to be 'a sceptic therefore without reading him one knew that he was a universal doubter, therefore in 1676 he was Indexed although during his own life the Papal censors had read his book and found little to raise their eyebrows at and lick their blue pencils.

In order then not to mislead one another it might be advisable to talk not of M's scepticism (which might make you think he was a sort of anti-religious 19th century rationalist avant la lettre, which would be sadly wrong) but rather of his Pyrrhonism ⁽¹⁾; though even this is misleading, but not as much as scepticism.

* see The Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol 7 p 449: 'Originally the Greek term skeptikos meant "inquirer"

M was not, of course, the only person in 16th century Europe to be disenchanted with the achievements of the human mind; there was before him and all about him a tradition of reluctance a) to admit that knowledge was possible and b) if it was possible, to admit that it could possibly be of the slightest value to men. Eg in France ~~there was Rabelais~~, there was Gui de BRUËS⁽²⁾ a friend of Ronsard who brought out, in 1557, his Dialogues⁽²⁾ (selon Brush p 28, the first work in French dealing exclusively with philosophy) — a work destined to warn the younger generation against the sceptical movement (selon le Dictionnaire des lettres françaises, XVI siècle, p 137; also: "M a lu Bruës et lui doit bcp; L'A de R de S reproduit presque textuellement certains passages des dialogues.")

Brush p 30 on Guy de Bruës

M read the Dialogues and made use of them in his Essais (...) fascinated by the incrimination of the legal code and the judicial system, (...) relativity of morals (and the morality of moderation), (...) praise of the state of nature and the condition of the animals, the repeated attacks on foolish erudition, (...) the constantly reiterated theme of the diversity and contradiction in every field of human affairs...

Erasmus too was part of the tradition, despite the fulminations of Luther against it: "Spiritus sanctus non est Scepticus"⁽³⁾ says Luther to the doubts of Erasmus, insisting that a Christian cannot be a skeptic. "Erasmus' solution, that of suspending judgment and accepting the Catholic view on faith and tradition, was later developed into what is sometimes called Christian Pyrrhonism"

Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, vol 7, p 451

Another purveyor of the Pyrrhonian trad was Francisco SANCHES⁽⁴⁾

or Sanchez, a refugee from the Spanish Inquisition (1550-1623).

His work Quod nihil scitur⁽⁴⁾ dates from 1581 (one year after the first edition of the Essais) to show that science cannot be attained; that senses and the nature of things prevent even a knowledge of anything more than appearances; [fideistic] conclusion that truth can be attained only by faith (Encyc of Phil, 7, 452). Encyc of Phil also calls Sanchez M's "distant cousin", figuratively no doubt.

One of the most uncompromising and certainly the most widely read of these doubters was Heinrich Cornelius von Nettesheim, known as Cornelius Agrippa¹. (5)

Cornelius Agrippa was a German who led a career of the sort known as chequered: an alchemist who was for a time the Emperor Charles^I's official historiographer, implicated in a revolutionary plot in Catalonia, ^{satirised by Rabelais in the Tiers Livre under the name Her Trappa;} lectured in Theology in Köln, ^{to have been alluded to by Marlowe's Dr Faustus (16th) & events have touched Goethe's Faust 200 years later;} inquisitioned in Metz, doctor to the Queen Mother of France, imprisoned in Brussels accused of magic, entire works (selon Brush) proscribed by the Council of Trent in 1564 (p26 note). His best known works in the early 1500s were on the philosophy

~~of the occult~~

1 And how in 16th century Germany does Heinrich of Nettesheim come to be called Agrippa? Was he born feet first? (aegre partus, mis au monde difficilement, nom donné chez les Romains aux enfants venus au monde les pieds devant). Did he take this nickname in honour of the Agrippa, Greek sceptic 2nd or 3rd siglo AD, whose philosophy he had embraced and propagated? I know not; but an interesting point, though minor, and one on which no reference book helps me. Or was it a common name? cf d'Aubigné.

Advent, p. 9, note 4: " "Agrippa" was a personal name taken because of his origin in Cologne, Colonia Agrippina. His children & grandchildren living in France used "Cornel-Agrippa" as their surname..."

of the occult and On the uncertainty and vanity of human knowledge (notice again the two things I mentioned before: doubting^a the possibility and ^b the point), and who had died in the South of France when M was 2.

Agrippa had denied the possibility that the human mind could ever reach certainty and truth and had inveighed ~~against~~ men's intellectual pretensions; ridicule and denunciation rather than philosophical analysis; he even denounced monks ("almost a Catholic Luther" says the Encycl of Phil). His Vanity of Sciences can be seen as a stage in his journey from the occult to a simple Biblical faith opposed to late Medieaval scholasticism, appealing to a type of fundamentalist anti-intellectualism (Encycl of Phil). It is probable that M read him (and the ^{other} ancient writers from ^{whom Montaigne} he derived much of his Pyrrhonist thought) in the early or middle 1570s, shortly after he had retired from public life to read away the rest of his days in his tower:

Plutarch in the translations of Amyot 1560s and 70s, Lives and Moralia;

Diogenes Laertius: ⁽⁶⁾ Lives of the Philosophers;
and especially

Sextus Empiricus: ⁽⁷⁾ Hypotyposes traduction 1562 by Henri Estienne, prefaced by Vie de Pyrrhon of D. Laertius; Brush calls it by the name of Outlines of Pyrrhonism, p 3, a great compendium of classical scepticism; selon le Dict. des oeuvres, III, 44 = Institutions (ou Esquisses) pyrrhoniennes, a précis de la

philosophie pyrrhonienne du médecin Sextus Empiricus (2nd-3rd century AD) who seems to have been a Greek, and whose work offers a vast collection of all the arguments used by the Greek sceptics against their adversaries, especially the Dogmatists.

I don't know that we can explain why M was attracted to Pyrrhonism; I don't know that we have to explain why. But certainly, living in the middle of the so-called wars of religion ^{{ II, 43} (I 408, & Coutras) as he did, and being appalled at the havoc and misery and treachery wrought among his contemporaries and compatriots and having administered for 13-14 years laws which he may well have thought absurd and pernicious (if one can judge from his ^{later} attitude when he once started to write), ^{then} it would have ^{been} difficult for him, I imagine, to have any high esteem for the constancy or mental power of his fellow-men. Also, he was inclined to attribute the evils of novelty and change wrought by war and the Reformation basically to man's inborn chronic curiosity and liking for needless sophistication of elementary ~~truths~~ self-evident truths:

(8) { la curiosité est un mal naturel et originel en l'homme
 la gloire et la curiosité sont ^{deux} les fléaux de notre âme ^{I 552 Apologie = II, 164}
 la peste de l'homme, c'est l'opinion de sçavoir ^{I 197 = Ixxvii C'est folie de...}
 j'ay peur que nous avons les yeux plus grands que le ventre, et plus de curiosité que nous n'avons de capacité ^{I 540 Apologie = II, 154-5}
 la curiosité est vicieuse par tout... III, v = II, 296 Vers de V
 III, 84

There does not seem to have been an abrupt change in him. From
once
Usual to speak of his Stoic period (essays on Solitude, Fear, Death, Cowardice, Military Advice, Constancy etc) being succeeded by a sceptical period (the phrase crise sceptique that Villey used of this development suggests something sudden^(as we saw 2 weeks ago)er than it was). See a very early essay I xxvii C'est folie de rapporter le vray et le faux à nostre suffisance, dated by Villey Frame etc at 1572-4, ie en pleine période dite stoïque, yet it reads already like a page from the Apologie; the same one could say of I xxxii Qu'il faut sobrement se mesler de juger des ordonnances divines, dated at the same two years (in fact p^{266, I} 247 of vol I suggests it was written as early as 1571). The very titles of these two early brief essays contain the main themes of the Apologie.

conf.? Some of you may also be a little perplexed by the apparent lack of incompatibility between Stoicism and Scepticism: one seems a moral and the other a metaphysical preoccupation; and I think there is no contradiction between them, except of a general sort: that whereas the early M the apprentice-Stoic ~~tends to think highly of his own and of~~ ^{aims at strengthening} man's ability to use his intelligence to govern his passions and body, encourages an exaltation of man; on the other hand Pyrrhonic scepticism, by doubting the capacity of the mind of man, tends to belittle man, to devalue him. Anyway M himself saw little difference at least between the moral consequences of the two schools: at ^I 558 and ⁶⁵⁰ he talks of Ataraxy the souverain bien of _(II, 169) _(II, 243)

the sceptic: imperturbability, detachment from the vicissitudes of the state of man. This was also the aim of Sextus Emp, of course (Brush p9) and of the Epicureans (Classiques Hatier ed I 89), but also of the Stoics themselves! And M seems to have admired Pyrrho for the first time during the so-called Stoic period, not as the doubter but as one who tried to faire répondre sa vie à sa doctrine (II 366-367 109-110 and thus make himself indifferent to the contingencies [cf Brush p7 note 2 (if one can accept Villey's dating of this essay II, xxix De la vertu, one of the most Stoic of all, it is from 1578! ie after the sceptic crisis; Brush says he's not sure, perhaps from before Sextus was read by M in 1575-6. I must, in my ignorance of the finer points of Montaigne scholarship, say that Brush's view seems the more plausible to me, if only because the essay reads like others from the earlier period).]

So, several vexed points there: the division between Stoic and Sceptic periods is contradicted by evidence from the Essais themselves, and anyway M himself probably saw little difference between them (although he does abandon his admiration for the Stoicest of them all, the younger Cato).

What we can say is that by the mid-70s M was immersed in sceptical writers and was nourishing from them his own jottings up in the tower; and that though the vehemence of his attack on the intellectual pretensions of men was to abate in the 80s,

But though not the wittiest or the most original, it must be read from end to end by anyone who wants to know M; not to read the Apologie would be to read the Bible and leave out the Gospels; it is M's Sermon ^{sur la Montagne} ~~of~~ the Mount (bilingual pun). It was the core of the essays of 1580 and best sums up that part of M's intellectual life that those first essays represent. It helps to explain many things in M eg his religious convictions or his autobiographing, for it was the discovery that it was impossible for his puny human mind to acquire useful knowledge of things outside himself that made him determine to follow the Socratic precept to know himself, and thus made himself into the subject of his book.

And having encouraged you to read the Apologie (or at the very least parts of it, perhaps pp ²⁵²⁻²⁶⁸ 661-681?) I feel I must take a closer look at it with you

- a to make your task easier by
- b trying to bring out the main points from the tangle of arguments that M hid them in.

~~This~~ ^{my} suggested division of the essay into ^{several parts} ~~several parts~~ is quite personal; ^{to me;} Frame divides it in a different way, others in others; a mere guide. ^{{ Intro & 5 other sections} ^{{ but one thing it shows, this division, is a clue to the probable growth of the Apologie, out of 5 or 6 different unconnected fragments, — which could have become 5 or 6 different essays!}

^{{ 105-117}
M's Introduction (pp 479-about 495)

Section I

Describes what purports to be the history of the essay — in fact the genesis of it is probably very different (see Frame's

article Did M betray S? in RR38,1947; and Brush 74-6). *i.e. most probably 5 or 6 smaller pieces welded together to form a single essay*

M says in these first ^{twelve} fifteen pages how Sebond came into his father's possession, request for translation. M states his purpose, twofold: to protect ladies against 2 objections usually made against S's Theologia naturalis (dates from ^{*}1487) they being S's usual readers ** Well - S had died in 1436, but the edition was probably from 1487!*

1 that Christians shouldn't bother to do what S had done: support their belief with human reason (^{II, 107}482);

2 (^{II, 115}491) that S's human arguments are feeble and badly chosen to support Christian faith. It is on this second point that M expands at such great length, having dealt with the first one in the few pages after he mentions it; but in so expanding (and here's the rub!) he utterly demolishes S and his own, M's, expressed intention of combatting that first objection — for, far from rebutting that objection (that Christians shouldn't support their faith with human reasons) he reiterates it and reinforces it and the essay becomes a long-drawn out attack on human reason as a support for faith. Thus it has been said (by Cons Anthologie littéraire de la Renaissance fr, Holt, NY, 1931, p143, quoted by Frame RR 38, 1947 p 300) that the Apologie supports S, but as the rope supports a hanged man!

M's method of supporting S against the charge that his arguments are weak and inapt is to belittle man's pretensions in everything, to show up his futility and uselessness without God, to compare man with animals, from ^{II, 118-153}496-538

II Animal section } II, 118-153
496-538

M argues intelligence in animals; better adapted to nature; communicate as well as humans; no reason to assume they act from instinct rather than from reason; difference between man and them is man's unbridled mind, but this is little to be proud of, since it is the source of man's infortunes; animals can learn human skills: acting singing, speech, bullocks that can count to 100, nightingales actually teach one another to sing! elephants practise music in their spare time and, like ants, show rudimentary religious feelings and behaviour; animals behave like human beings, have feelings of friendship and envy, justice, they exercise self-control, they're better than men since they do not enslave their own kind or go to war — no wonder Frame coined the happy description of this section as "cock and bull stories".

M's conclusion from this section: men despise animals only because they're full of self-importance and despise whatever is different from themselves, no other reason.

(Brush's conclusion on these pages: "paucity of Pyrrhonist argument"; "that these pages originally formed an independent essay written without the Apologie in mind" p 80 note; Villey's idea, quoted Brush loc cit: "these pages may be an interpolation made in 1578-80"). And, looking back on this animal section from the end of the essay, it does appear as self-contained, detachable & relating to nothing else in the essay.

III II, 153 - 228
538-631 The Attack on the Philosophers (almost 100 pp)

M lays about him on all sides, all the ancients get it in the neck: Aristotle, Plato, Stoics, Epicureans, even his beloved Socrates gets a coup de patte now and then — all, that is, except the Pyrrhonists whose doubting about the human intellect's capacity to know M finds sole commendable.

M establishes:

- 1 that knowledge cannot make men happy;
- 2 that knowledge cannot make men good;
- 3 that ignorance is more beneficial than any knowledge, and that the best belief in God springs from utter ignorance;
- 4 that the Ataraxy of the Sceptics is the most respectable philosophical attitude ie non-commitment;
- 5 that God (and any subject) are fundamentally incomprehensible to the human mind ^{II, 176, 178, 183} 566; 570, 576
- 6 that the conflicting opinions of the philosophers on the nature of God show merely that men like to deify men or to humanize God and that they are therefore unbelievable, since any thinking duckling would also make God into a duck;
- 7 that the philosophers' conflicting opinions on the nature of matter and the universe show the pointlessness of having any opinion on them: only (as I've said) as much geometry as to measure a plot of land for sale ^{II, 200} 597;
- 8 that, for all their boasting knowledge about the outside world, the phils never stop to wonder if they can know themselves ^{II, 204} 601;

9 that human reason is untrustworthy since it cannot even understand its own workings;

10 that the only principles that man can have must come through divine revelation.

M catalogues philosophers' opinions not only on a nature of God and b the nature of the universe, but c on the nature of the soul, d the location of the soul, e behaviour of the soul, f immortality of the soul, g origin of the world, h nature of human semen; and concludes from this long inquisition and its inventories of the beliefs of the phils that the phils have been playing themselves, not taking themselves seriously, that they confess the incompetence of the mind not by word but by the muddle of conflicting theories it leads them into; that there is no absurdity under the sun which has not at some time been sanctified by the name of philosophy; that man knows nothing about himself, either spiritually or physically.

II, 228 - 236

W

631-641 Fickleness and changeability of the mind

The mind can reach different conclusions under the influence of the weather, corns, money, vanity etc, therefore no such thing as a normal state of mind, therefore this prevents truth lodging there. M is so suspicious of his own changeable nature that he is reluctant to change old ideas for new ^{II, 235} 639, therefore one should believe no new ideas eg Copernicus ^{II, 235} 640 what does it matter which of them moves? what difference will it make to us?

especially since a third opinion will probably come to be held and contradict the other two.

✓ I, 236 - 252
642-661 Variety of beliefs throughout the world

This variety invalidates all beliefs produced by the mind (except: rudimentary similarities to Christian religion among remote pagans = proof of M's own religion!! ²⁴⁰645). Men don't know what is best for them; summum bonum is Ataraxy of the Pyrrhonists ²⁴³650; variety = no universal truth nor natural laws or if there is a natural law it is vitiated in men by reason ^{I, 246}653.

✓ I, 252 - 268
661-681 The Relativity of Perception=Unknowledge

From this relativity comes the impossibility of ever establishing truth by the use of those perceptions. All knowledge comes to the human mind through~~x~~ the five senses

les sens sont le commencement et la fin de l'humaine
 cognoissance ²⁴³662 le plant et les principes de tout le
 bastiment de nostre science ²⁵³662 ce sont nos maistres 661 ²⁵²

This beginning reads already like an 18th century's empiricist's eulogy of the senses as the base and sole means of knowledge. Difference: the 18th century empiricist was glad of this certainty and built on it; M sets about destroying the value of the senses as vehicles of worthwhile knowledge.

The senses are the limit of our awareness; we can know nothing except via them — what then if there exists some undiscovered America of the soul which we shall be forever igno-

rant of, just as colour is invisible to a blind man from birth? How do we know we don't lack an essential sense for the discovery of truth, as soem animals already lack one that we have and consider essential for real knowledge of the world? Perhaps we need not five but 8 or 10 senses to be able to perceive truth?

Reality enters us in its appearance, not its essence; it is perceived differently by each creature, by each man — how can we agree on penceptions if our perceptions differ so much?

M's conclusion ^{¶264} 676: our senses prevent us from knowing things as they really are. We would need an absolute impartial touchstone with which to check and verify our experience and the evidence of our senses. Things are never themselves, nothing IS; things either were or will be or are merely becoming. God is the only thing which IS and it is only through God that man can ever hope to know anything, not through his own resources.

It can be seen then how misleading to our modern minds is the term M's scepticism. To represent M as the universal doubter is to misrepresent him: there is always God for him, the sole incomprehensible source of certainty, who can only be grasped through faith and never by the puny impotent minds of men:

- (11) qu'est-il plus vain que de vouloir deviner Dieu par nos analogies et conjectures, le régler et le monde à nostre capacité et à nos loix, et nous servir aux despens de la divinité de ce petit eschantillon de suffisance qu'il luy a pleu despartir à nostre naturelle condition?

I 570

II, 178

* → PTO for M's intentions vers Selond.

Principal effects of the ^{Pyrrhonism} sceptical crisis on the Essais,

a profound upheaval, tremors from which were to be felt in many distant parts of his mind and personality

1 autobiography of a sort, writing about self as the only knowable thing, only usefully knowable;

2 satisfied with self and status quo, see I, 165-166 I 125's acceptance of things as they are and of the done thing, which suited^a M's temperament; ^b his politico-religious conservatism; ^c and was to be found in Sextus Empiricus;

3 reinforcement of fideistic intuitive ^{religious} belief;

4 education of boys: having demolished useless knowledge, M sets about reconstructing useful knowledge; wariness of theories, jargoneers, knowledge-mongers, etc; (I, xxv, xxvi)

5 connected to 1, the importance of self-containment, of independence of others for emotional sustenance, self-reliance

* 6 Conclusions

lecture could (should!) end here!

quit? { M's so-called scepticism, which is as much a religious phenomenon as a philosophical one (for after all the Apologie, the summa of M's scepticism, was composed as a defence of M's religion), can be seen as a reaction against two of the main

* 6 a general cautiousness of belief, a reluctance to commit himself, a suspicion of Opinion & of the hand-me-down gullibility which ~~bottomed~~ swallows hook, line & sinker every hint of the superstitious, the supernatural, the miracle, the old wives' tale, the witch on her broomstick, the magic medals for curing ^{importance on the point of medicine} ~~the most useful~~

trends of thought of the Renaissance

1 the attempt to resolve the intellectual contradiction inherent in being at the same time a Christian and an admirer of the non-Christian classical antiquity; to blend the two traditions of belief and admiration, of faith and reason, in one. One can see evidence of this trend as far back as the 13th century: Aquinas had felt the need to assimilate Aristotle, had "baptized" him (as Haydn puts it p xii), made of reason the servant and support of faith; and the process was still going on in the 16th: Erasmus says:

To be a philosopher and to be a Christian is synonymous in fact(...) When I read certain passages of these great men, I can hardly refrain from saying, "Saint Socrates, pray for me..."

Haydn, 46

But by this time the trend was towards a take-over by reason; from considering Plato and Socrates the enlightened ancestors of Christ, from being the accessory to faith in the late Middle Ages, reason was now becoming able to dispense with faith, or if not with faith at least with dogma, and Erasmus's "simple undogmatic religion of simple morality" (Haydn 46) was already adumbrating the deism of the 17th & 18th

2 even the central Renaissance concept of man; for much of M's effort (at least in the 1570s, the late 70s) was to belittle human pretensions, and especially man's reason, the very quality that the Christian humanists were proudest of, as being incom-

petent, pernicious and absurd. M in these two ways was fighting a rearguard action as it were, doing his small bit to slow down the movement of the Middle Ages into the modern world, a King Canute trying to turn the tide of the Renaissance, to call off the movement of knowledge that was manifesting itself in various ways as religious reform, political unrest and scientific curiosity.

for next week read:

II, xvii, xviii

III, ii, xiii

+ Sayce, chap. 4 p. 50 - 73