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Threats, Media Coverage and Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations in Japan

A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy of
The Australian National University.


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September 2009



Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own work and has not been submitted in any form for another degree or diploma at any university or other institute of tertiary education. Where information has been obtained from other publications of my own, published both individually and jointly, appropriate referencing has been given. All other information obtained from the published and unpublished work of other authors has been acknowledged in the text, and a full list of references is given.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Matthew Linley", is written over a horizontal line.

Matthew Linley

15 September 2009

Horiuchi and the rest of her family for their dinners, barbeques, and wonderful memories.

Thank you all so much for making my time in Canberra so rich and fulfilling.

The fellow students who made my time at the ANU so enjoyable are numerous. I especially wish to thank Adam Johns, Francis Hutchinson, Jaya Pillai, Justin Whitney and Scott Brenton.

Though we all live in different parts of the world today, I continue to treasure their friendship and often look back on our days at Graduate House and the Sir Roland Wilson Building with great fondness.

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Finally, I owe a great debt of gratitude to my wonderful wife, Yae. Without her love and support, this dissertation would be nothing more than a few scribbled notes on a pad of paper. She has patiently waited for me, never complaining and put up with more than any wife of a PhD student should have to. Thank you.

The empirical analysis is conducted in three sections. First, using a cross-sectional time-series regression analysis with fixed effects, a negative relationship is found between changes in the attitudes of respondents from the Jiji polls in a particular month and the presence of a threat. A negative relationship is also found in changes in attitudes and media coverage of each type of threat, suggesting an interaction effect where higher media coverage of an issue is associated with changes of greater magnitude. Second, through a series of case studies of realistic threats; symbolic threats; and threats to national identity, a correlation is found between many, though not all, such issues and events and negative changes in public perceptions of the foreign nation in the same month. A closer examination finds that in many months in which public attitudes did change, elite and media rhetoric framing an issue as a threat were also present. Finally, I examine long-term trends in public attitudes towards the ten nations in the Jiji polls and find greater levels of stability towards nations that I assume are not salient to the Japanese public and greater evidence of change in those which I assume are.

Overall, this study finds evidence that Japanese public opinion is stable over long periods of time and, although abrupt changes do occur, they tend to be small in magnitude, short-term and are associated mainly with those issues and events perceived as threats. This corresponds with the findings of researchers in the United States who have found that public opinion about foreign policy is relatively rational.

<i>Analysis</i>	53
4. Perceived Threats, Media Coverage and Monthly Changes in Public Perceptions of a Foreign Nation in Japan, 1960-2007	61
<i>Introduction</i>	61
<i>Theoretical Propositions</i>	62
<i>Review of Measures and Methods</i>	63
<i>Threats and Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations</i>	66
<i>Threats and Media Coverage</i>	69
<i>The Effect of Threats and Media Coverage on Changes in Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations</i>	71
<i>The Effect of Realistic Threats, Symbolic Threats, Threats to Japanese Identity, Media Coverage on Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations</i>	73
<i>Discussion</i>	77
5. Realistic Threats to Japan and Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations	81
<i>Introduction</i>	81
<i>Hypotheses</i>	82
<i>Economic Disputes</i>	83
<i>Violations of National Sovereignty</i>	97
<i>Threats to National Security</i>	111
<i>Conclusion</i>	121
6. Symbolic Threats to Japan and Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations	123
<i>Introduction</i>	123
<i>Hypotheses</i>	126
<i>Nuclear Testing</i>	127
<i>Use of Military Force</i>	135

table of contents

<i>declaration</i>	<i>ii</i>
<i>acknowledgements</i>	<i>iii</i>
<i>abstract</i>	<i>vii</i>
<i>table of contents</i>	<i>ix</i>
<i>list of tables</i>	<i>xiii</i>
<i>list of figures</i>	<i>xiv</i>
<i>list of appendices</i>	<i>xvi</i>
1. Introduction	1
<i>Japanese Public Opinion about China</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>Statement of the Problem</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>Argument and Theoretical Framework</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>Data and Methods</i>	<i>8</i>
<i>Significance of Study</i>	<i>11</i>
<i>Roadmap</i>	<i>12</i>
2. Theoretical Framework	15
<i>Introduction</i>	<i>15</i>
<i>Past Research</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>Theoretical Framework</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Propositions</i>	<i>39</i>
3. Methods	40
<i>Research Design</i>	<i>40</i>
<i>Why Japan?</i>	<i>41</i>
<i>Variables</i>	<i>44</i>

<i>Killing of Civilians</i>	148
<i>Conclusion</i>	158
7. Media Coverage of Threats to Japanese Identity and Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations	161
<i>Introduction</i>	161
<i>Hypotheses</i>	162
<i>Foreign Criticism of Japan</i>	162
<i>Violations of Diplomatic Protocol</i>	176
<i>Anti-Japanese Demonstrations</i>	183
<i>Conclusion</i>	195
8. Long-Term Trends in Japanese Public Opinion about Ten Foreign Nations	
1960-2007	197
<i>Introduction</i>	197
<i>Cross-National Comparison of Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations in Japan</i>	198
<i>Non-Salient Nations</i>	201
<i>Switzerland</i>	201
<i>Germany</i>	202
<i>France</i>	204
<i>India</i>	205
<i>United Kingdom</i>	207
<i>Salient Nations</i>	209
<i>South Korea</i>	209
<i>Russia/USSR</i>	213
<i>The United States</i>	216
<i>China</i>	219
<i>North Korea</i>	223

<i>Discussion.....</i>	<i>227</i>
9. Conclusion.....	231
<i>Change in Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations in Japan</i>	<i>231</i>
<i>Theoretical Significance</i>	<i>232</i>
<i>Policy Implications.....</i>	<i>234</i>
<i>Future Research.....</i>	<i>237</i>
<i>references</i>	<i>240</i>
<i>appendices</i>	<i>252</i>

list of tables

Table 3.1: Japanese Sources of Information about Foreign Affairs, 2004-2007	44
Table 3.2: Operationalisation of Changes in Public Opinion for Case Studies	49
Table 3.3: Operationalisation of Media Coverage for Case Studies	53
Table 3.4: Selection of Cases	59
Table 4.1: Monthly Changes in Public Perceptions of Ten Foreign Nations by Threat, 1960-2007	67
Table 4.2: Media Coverage by Type of Threat, 1960-2007	69
Table 4.3: OLS Regression with Country and Month Fixed Effects for Aggregate Japanese Public Opinion about Nine Foreign Nations, 1960-2007	71
Table 4.4: OLS Regression with Country and Month Fixed Effects for Aggregate Japanese Public Opinion about Foreign Nations, 1960-2007	74
Table 5.1: Economic Disputes, Media Coverage and Changes in Japanese Public Perceptions of the Nation Involved, 1960-2007	85
Table 5.2: Violations of National Sovereignty, Media Coverage and Changes in Japanese Public Perceptions of the Nation Involved, 1960-2007	99
Table 5.3: Threats to National Security, Media Coverage and Changes in Japanese Public Perceptions of the Nation Involved, 1960-2007	112
Table 6.1: Nuclear Tests, Media Coverage and Changes in Japanese Public Perceptions of the Nation Involved, 1960-2007	129
Table 6.2: The Use of Military Force, Media Coverage and Negative Change in Japanese Public Attitudes toward Country Involved, 1960-2007	138
Table 6.3: Killing of Civilians, Media Coverage and Negative Change in Japanese Public Perceptions of the Nation Involved, 1960-2007	151
Table 7.1: Media Coverage and Negative Change in Japanese Public Attitudes toward Country Involved in Criticism of Japan	164
Table 7.2: Violations of Diplomatic Protocol, Media Coverage and Negative Change in Japanese Public Attitudes toward Country Involved, 1960-2007	178
Table 7.3: Anti-Japanese demonstrations, Media Coverage and Negative Change in Japanese Public Attitudes toward Country Involved, 1960-2007	185
Table 8.1: Public Perceptions of Ten Foreign Nations in Japan, 1960-2007	198

list of figures

Figure 2.1 Theoretical Classifications of Threats to the Mass Public	32
Figure 5.1: Front Page Stories of Economic Disputes and Change in Public Attitudes toward Nation Involved, 1960-2007	84
Figure 5.2: Front Page Stories of Violations of National Sovereignty and Change in Public Attitudes toward Nation Involved, 1960-2007	98
Figure 5.3: Front Page Stories of Threats to National Security and Change in Public Attitudes toward Nation Involved, 1960-2007	111
Figure 6.1: Public Opinion about What Type of Country Japan Should Be in the 21st Century, 2001	125
Figure 6.2: Front Page Stories of Nuclear Tests and Change in Public Attitudes toward Nation Involved, 1960-2007	128
Figure 6.3: Front Page Stories of Use of Military Force and Change in Public Attitudes toward Nation Involved, 1960-2007	136
Figure 6.4: Front Page Stories of the Killing of Civilians and Change in Public Attitudes toward Nation Involved, 1960-2007	149
Figure 7.1: Front Page Stories of Criticism of Japan and Change in Public Attitudes towards Nation Involved, 1960-2007	163
Figure 7.2: Front Page Stories of Violations of Diplomatic Protocol and Change in Public Attitudes towards Nation Involved, 1960-2007	177
Figure 7.3: Front Page Stories of Anti-Japanese Demonstrations and Change in Public Attitudes towards Nation Involved, 1960-2007	183
Figure 8.1: Cross-national Comparison of Trends in Japanese Public Opinion towards Ten Nations, 1960-2007	200
Figure 8.2: Japanese Public Attitudes towards Switzerland, 1960-2007	202
Figure 8.3: Japanese Public Attitudes towards West Germany/Germany, 1960-2007	203
Figure 8.4: Japanese Public Attitudes towards France, 1960-2007	204
Figure 8.5: Japanese Public Attitudes towards India, 1960-2007	206
Figure 8.6: Japanese Public Attitudes towards the United Kingdom, 1960-2007	208
Figure 8.7: Japanese Public Attitudes towards South Korea, 1960-2007	210
Figure 8.8: Japanese Public Attitudes towards the Soviet Union/Russia, 1960-2007	214
Figure 8.9: Japanese Public Public Attitudes towards the United States, 1960-2007	217

Figure 8.10: Japanese Public Attitudes towards China, 1960-2007

224

Figure 8.11: Japanese Public Attitudes towards North Korea, 1970 to 2007 223

list of appendices

Appendix 1: List of Threats to Japan, Classification of Threat Type, Media Coverage and Monthly Change in Public Attitudes towards Nation Involved, 1960-2007	252
Appendix 2: List of Cases Coded as Economic Threats to Japan, Media Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007	262
Appendix 3: List of Cases Coded as Threats to Japanese Sovereignty, Media Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007	264
Appendix 4: List of Cases Coded as Military Threat to Japan, Media Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007	266
Appendix 5: List of Cases Coded as Nuclear Tests, Media Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007	267
Appendix 7: List of Cases Coded as the Killing of Civilians, Media Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007	273
Appendix 8: List of Cases Coded as Criticism of Japan, Media Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007	274
Appendix 9: List of Cases Coded as Violation of Diplomatic Protocol, Media Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007	276

1. Introduction

Japanese Public Opinion about China

Japanese public opinion about China appears to have become increasingly hostile. In 2004, the Japanese Cabinet Office released a survey showing that within one year the percentage of citizens with friendly feelings toward China dropped by 10.3 percentage points from the previous year (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 2004). This was the lowest figure recorded since the survey began in 1978. Despite being Japan's largest source of imports and second largest export market after the United States, collective opinion towards China was even more negative than following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.

Despite their negative attitudes, most Japanese people have very little actual direct contact with anyone or anything to do with China. According to the 2000 population census, the 253,096 Chinese in Japan made up a mere 0.2 per cent of the overall population.¹ In an *Asahi Shimbun* poll ("*Nichikanchu 3-kakoku yoron chousa - shitsumon to kaitou* [Japan-South Korea-China Three Country Public Opinion Poll - Questions and Answers]", 27 April 2005, p.9), despite only six per cent of respondents saying that they had actually had any kind of contact with a Chinese person, the most common response among Japanese respondents when asked about their image of Chinese people was that they were "nationalistic" (64.7 per cent of respondents). When Japanese respondents were asked in the same poll

¹ According to the 2000 census, Japan's overall population at the time was 126,925,843.

about their thoughts on the Japanese Government's decision to cut foreign aid to China, 63 per cent said that they agreed and when asked about whether they were concerned about China hosting the Beijing Olympics in 2008, another 61 per cent said yes. A Pew Global Attitudes (2006) survey also found that most Japanese saw Chinese as "competitive" (84 per cent); "nationalistic" (82 per cent); "selfish" (75 per cent); and "greedy" (69 per cent). The image of China in Japan is currently not a positive one.

The quality of public opinion regarding foreign policy issues in Japan is crucial because of its implications for democracy. A citizenry that is well-informed and responsive to changing circumstances is more likely to elect better political leaders and support better policies than one that is ill-informed and overly emotional. Japanese public opinion has historically acted as a constraint on the preferences of policymakers, especially with regard to militarisation and the possession of nuclear weapons. Pyle (2007:23) believes that in the post war period "articulate opinion contributed to the structuring of debates among the elite, and the mass mood set the parameters for debate". Eldridge and Midford (2008:5) argue that Japanese public opinion has prevented those politicians, such as Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, from expanding Japan's military role overseas. Public opinion also affects relations with particular nations. Johnson (1986) notes that "all political, economic, and diplomatic ties [with China] are subtly skewed by the popular attitudes and aspirations of the Japanese people as these are mobilised by the Japanese press". In an increasingly interdependent and complex world, understanding how the Japanese public makes sense of its external environment is becoming ever more important.

The main variable of interest in this study is Japanese public opinion about foreign nations. This has the same meaning as both Wanta et al.'s (2004) term "public perceptions of foreign nations" and Page and Bouton's (2006) "feelings about foreign nations".² Understanding the dynamics of public opinion towards foreign nations is important because citizens use these beliefs as mental shortcuts to make sense of world affairs (P. R. Brewer 2004:324). They also provide citizens with guidance for specific policy preferences (Page et al. 2008:32). For example, Hurwitz and Peffley (1990:5) argue that during the Cold War, citizens of the United States relied on images of Eastern bloc countries to guide their support for increases in defence spending. An image defines a template for a particular country that then provides a picture citizens use to fill in gaps of missing information.³ As Page and Bouton (2006) put it in their study on American public opinion and foreign policy:

Countries seen as hostile or threatening to the United States engender cold feelings and tend to be regarded as appropriate objects of wary preparedness, economic sanctions, or even military attack. Countries regarded as friendly elicit warm feelings and are viewed as suitable to be alliance partners, recipients of foreign aid (if needed), and providers of U.S. military bases. In individuals' minds, evaluations of foreign countries and their leaders often have substantial effects on specific policy preferences (p.238).

² Although many terms have been used to describe variation in country attitudes such as "friendly" and "unfriendly" (Page and Bouton 2006), "favourable" or "non-favourable" (Manheim and Albritton 1984) and "trustworthy" or "untrustworthy" (P. R. Brewer 2004), I use the more neutral terms "positive" and "negative". When I use the term "public perceptions of a foreign nation", I am referring to the positive or negative feelings held by a particular percentage of the public towards a particular nation at a specific point in time.

³ A problem with this is that they affect memory of information, the reception of new information and the process of learning. The ordinary citizen is likely to forget which pieces of information about the other actor were derived from the empirical evidence and which were derived from schema.

Understanding how the Japanese public thinks about particular nations may go a long way in explaining why they support or oppose such policies as foreign aid, defence spending, and the US-Japan alliance.

Statement of the Problem

Japan is a nation in which the public's view of foreign nations is often considered to be highly susceptible to the influence of political elites. Eldridge and Midford (2008:2) characterise this as a belief that "Japanese public opinion is malleable and able to be manipulated". In recent years, various commentators have argued that nationalist politicians hoping to promote their own agendas have generated negative impressions of foreign nations among the public, especially China and the two Koreas. Fujiwara was quoted in the *Japan Times* ("Public opinion, conservative media alter policy on North Korea", 19 November 2007) as saying that Japanese public opinion was traditionally dovish until "supporters of national defence and traditional values came to be heavily represented in the media and the Internet during the 1990s." According to the *New York Times* (Onishi, N., 2006, "Japan rightists fan fury over North Korea abductions", 17 December, p.14), the issue of North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s is "kept alive in the news media every day by nationalist politicians and groups that pound at the topic as firmly as their cherished goals."

Some commentators also attribute responsibility for the increase in negative feelings towards Japan's Asian neighbours to the mass media. After Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's visits to Yasukuni Shrine, a former Japanese ambassador to Thailand and Saudi Arabia stated that "the mass media in Japan hampered Chinese moves to ease tensions over the [Yasukuni] issue" by

“highlighting the prime minister's shrine visit day and night, pestering Chinese officials for comments” (Okazaki, H., 2006, “Media role helps inflame the Yasukuni Issue”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 3 September, p.10). The *Asia Times Online* (Curtin, S., 2004, “China hits all-time low on Japan pop charts”, 25 December)⁴ claims that “the Japanese media, which have exaggerated the activities of a small number of Chinese criminals operating in Japan, and right-wing politicians, who have exploited anti-Chinese sentiment for political advantage, must also shoulder a very large portion of the blame for the very negative poll result.” Sakamoto and Allen (2007) argue that “explicit hostility” towards South Korea and China in Japan is the product of how the mass media report incidents such as Korean supporters booing the Japanese soccer team and 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations in China.

While understanding the reasons for the worsening of the Japanese public's views towards a specific country such as China or North Korea is certainly important, a more fundamental question remains unanswered. What factors influence changes in public opinion towards a foreign nation in the first place? Existing theories of public opinion about foreign policy have given some attention to changes in public attitudes but an explanation of why they should turn positive or negative has yet to be a topic of central concern. The dominant view in the theoretical literature is that although individuals may know little about politics or foreign policy, collective opinion is nonetheless relatively rational (Page and Shapiro 1992; Jentleson 1992). Citizens are not policy experts but they do manage to cope with political issues by

⁴ Available at: <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FL25Dh01.html> [Accessed 12 December 2008]

applying informational shortcuts, called “cognitive heuristics,” that help them make decisions with minimal mental effort (Kahneman et al. 1982).

However, if the dominant view in the theoretical literature is that public opinion is relatively stable over time and that cognitive heuristics serve people relatively well, then why have Japanese attitudes towards China turned so negative? Along with the United States, China is Japan’s most important economic partner. Although various minor disputes between the two nations exist, these are primarily over relatively unimportant matters, such as sovereignty over the small and uninhabited Senkaku Islands, the publication of history textbooks, and the visits by politicians to Yasukuni Shrine. A simple consideration by citizens of the positive effect of China’s economic growth on Japan should far outweigh these minor concerns. Yet such issues are often stated to be central to the relationship between the two nations. If the public is rational then why do Japanese citizens get so upset over the actions of a few unruly fans at a soccer match, as they did in August 2004 during the final of the Asian Cup? The most common approach to public opinion and foreign policy cannot explain why Japanese public opinion will turn negative towards a foreign nation over seemingly inconsequential issues.

Argument and Theoretical Framework

My purpose in this study is to answer the following question—*under what conditions, and to what extent, do public perceptions of a foreign nation in Japan change?* The main argument is as follows: changes in negative public perceptions of a foreign nation are related to issues or events perceived as a threat. Rouhana and Fiske (1995:54) define threat “as the extent to which the party feels danger to (or security in) its physical existence, social and economic well-being, or its

identity and values". For the purpose of this study, a perceived threat is an exogenous issue or event that can elicit negative emotions among citizens such as anger, fear and hatred. Such negative emotions will turn in to feelings of hostility towards the nation viewed as the source of the threat and this will be associated with a negative change in public attitudes towards that particular nation. Thus, it can be said that changes in negative changes in public attitudes towards a foreign nation are caused by the perceptions of an issue or event as a threat.

According to scholars of intergroup threat, the concept of threat is not unitary but can be sub-divided into three types. These are first, "realistic threats" to a group's resources, power and well-being; second, "symbolic threats" to an in-group's values, beliefs, and worldview; and third, "threats to group identity". The definitions of these will be explained further in Chapter Two. Together, these three conceptualisations of threat provide a theoretical explanation for not only why Japanese citizens pay attention to foreign policy issues associated with aggressive intentions and military capabilities but also why they choose to voice their negative opinion about those events which violate their values and worldview.

The mass media interprets issues and gives them greater or lesser significance. As a result, the magnitude of the effect of a threat on public opinion can be moderated by media coverage (Wood and Peake 1998:174). At any particular moment in time, the mass public concerns itself with various domestic and foreign policy issues representing the agenda of the nation (Erbring et al. 1980:45). To put it simply, Japanese citizens will not pay attention to foreign policy issues until they are salient. High media coverage increases the salience of particular threats and, therefore, the magnitude of their impact. Just by increasing the number of stories

about an issue, media organisations can make it stand out from amongst the confusing mass of other information that the public is exposed to every day.

The concern of this study is primarily with short-term opinion dynamics. Since the key factor in the activation of public opinion is issue salience, threats will only have an impact on public opinion so long as media coverage is high. As news organisations start to reduce their coverage of a particular issue, the public's attention will begin to wander before moving on to the next problem. Even those issues that may have generated a powerful emotional response at the time will eventually stop being part of the considerations of citizens when evaluating a particular foreign nation. When this occurs, public opinion should regress back to its previous level.

In sum, short-term opinion change is a function of the presence of an issue or event interpreted as a threat and the volume of media coverage that it receives. Although the public may not pay close attention to the finer details of international politics, it does pay attention to salient information. If that information generates negative emotions, such as what happens when citizens perceive a threat, this will tend to produce an increase in hostility towards the nation involved. The level of hostility among the general public is usually greater when a threat receives high volumes of media coverage because it is more salient. These effects, however, will tend to only be short-term.

Data and Methods

Although I explain my data and methods in greater detail in Chapter Three, I briefly introduce how I will be conducting the empirical analysis. The purpose of

the empirical analysis is to determine whether there is a regular association of perceived threats to Japan and negative changes in public attitudes towards the nation viewed as the source of the threat. This study uses publicly available aggregate-level media and government public opinion polls. My main dataset is compiled from monthly polls conducted by the Japanese media organisation Jiji Press and includes compositional aggregate Japanese public opinion towards ten countries—Switzerland, India, Germany/West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Russia/the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and the United States.⁵ The monthly data cover the period between June 1960 and March 2007, which includes the administrations of twenty-one Japanese prime ministers, from the last days of the Kishi Cabinet through to the Abe Cabinet. The number of country-month observations is 5,501. Of these, 314 of them were associated with a perceived threat to Japan. This provides an abundance of issues perceived as threats for analysis but which also vary in terms of media coverage. The case studies also include polls from *Asahi Shimbun* and *Yomiuri Shimbun* as support for the qualitative analysis.

Since no empirical indicator allows for the direct measure of the concepts of threat and media coverage, I generated my own measures by conducting a content analysis. A perceived threat to Japan is defined as any issue or event involving a foreign nation that could be interpreted as a danger to Japan's physical existence, social and economic well-being, or its identity and values. I generated measures for

⁵ I am grateful to Professor Kohno Masaru of Waseda University who supplied me with the data from 1960 to 1995 in electronic form. I collected the rest directly from Jiji's own publications during my fieldwork in Tokyo as a Japan Foundation visiting fellow at Waseda University from September 2006 to April 2007.

my two independent variables through content analysis. First, for an unbiased compendium of what issues and events could qualify as threats to Japan, I used Sasaki et al. (2005) and Kodama (2008), both of which contain a list of domestic and international events relevant to Japan between the years 1960 and 2004 for the first book, and 1960 and 2007 for the second. I identified those months in which an event occurred involving the ten nations in my dataset and that was likely to be interpreted by Japanese citizens as a threat.

Second, to measure media coverage, I used a keyword search from two of *Asahi Shimbun's* electronic databases, *Asahi Kikizou II Bijuaru* and *Asahi.com Perfect* and then counted the number of front-page news stories referring to a particular threat. The total number of stories that included references to a particular threat was used as the measure for media coverage in a particular month.

For the analysis, this study uses a mixed-methods approach. First, I conducted a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) regression analysis with country and month fixed effects to estimate the effects of the presence of a threat and the volume of media coverage that it received on changes in public opinion. Second, I used the comparative case study method to examine in greater detail the changes in public opinion following the occurrence of a threat, but with varying volumes of media coverage. The case studies build on the statistical analysis by allowing for greater description of specific events and, most importantly, the identification of specific factors that could lead an issue or event to be perceived as a threat in the first place. I use newspaper reports at the time to examine how a particular threat was framed. Finally, I looked at trends in Japanese public opinion towards the ten different

nations in my data to examine the long-term dynamics in public perceptions of each country. I explain my methods in greater detail in Chapter Three.

Significance of Study

Introducing the concept of threat to studies of public opinion and foreign policy assists greatly in increasing understanding of the dynamics of short-term public opinion, especially for why attitudes turn negative following particular events. Past studies of public opinion and foreign policy have identified political elites and media coverage as important variables in attracting the public's attention to foreign affairs issues. Only a few studies, however, have identified the types of issues likely to influence public opinion. Without a typology of issues likely to activate public opinion, a gap will continue to exist in explaining not only why public opinion changes but why it changes in a negative direction. Furthermore, moving away from the non-unitary conceptualisation of threat allows for an explanation for why such a wide range of issues can activate public opinion. Japanese citizens worry not only about their national security but also those issues and events that violate their values as well.

This study examines Japan, a democratic nation quite different from those of North America, Western Europe and Australia, but which is rarely the subject of public opinion research in English-language political science. Despite the call among researchers for greater generalisation in public opinion research, the core established democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Australia still dominate comparative studies (Heath et al. 2005). Foyle (2003) argues that the focus on such a small number of cases weakens theoretical generalisability since most theory and empirical evidence comes almost exclusively from research

conducted in the United States. In their review of public opinion and foreign policy, Baum and Potter (2008) explicitly call for greater comparative research to distinguish country-specific variables from generalisable ones. This study builds on the work by Eldridge and Midford (2008) who also seek to gain a greater understanding of how the Japanese public thinks about foreign policy while also using the theoretical literature in political science. If the generalisations made in studies on the United States are also found to apply to Japan then this increases the utility of these theories.

Roadmap

This study is divided into eight chapters. In Chapter Two, I first review the public opinion and foreign policy literature to show that a gap exists in explaining why public opinion towards foreign nations should turn negative and second, I introduce the two key concepts that will be used to explain short-term changes in public perceptions of foreign nations. These are threats and media coverage. The theory presented here is a simple one. Events that the Japanese public perceive as a threat will increase public hostility towards a foreign nation and negative public attitudes towards that nation will increase. Higher volumes of media coverage of a threat will increase the magnitude of the effect.

In Chapter Three, I explain the data and methods that I use to test my hypotheses followed by Chapter Four in which I conduct a cross-sectional time-series analysis using country and month fixed effects to measure the impact of media coverage on Japanese perceptions of nine countries in my dataset. I find a negative and statistically significant relationship between both threats and media coverage to changes in country attitudes. I also find an interaction effect between threats and

media coverage, suggesting that the greater the media coverage, the greater the effect on public opinion. The non-unitary conceptualisation of threat is also supported by my finding that each of the different types of threat is associated with negative changes in public opinion.

In Chapter Five, I conduct a series of case studies mixing qualitative and quantitative data to examine whether media coverage of realistic threats on public opinion has a major effect on Japanese public opinion.⁶ I operationalise the concept of realistic threat by examining those cases in which Japan faced economic threats; violations of national sovereignty; and military threats to its security. I find that, under certain conditions, these issues do tend to be associated with negative changes in public attitudes towards the nations involved.

In Chapter Six, my case studies of symbolic threats examine how the Japanese public reacts to those issues and events framed such that they are perceived to violate two of the most important norms of post-war Japan, anti-militarism and anti-nuclearism (Berger 1993). The operationalised definition of symbolic threats included nuclear tests; the use of military force; and the killing of civilians. Changes in public opinion tended to be associated with these classes of events suggesting they are causal factors.

In Chapter Seven, I look at cases of threats to Japanese national identity. As operationalised definitions of such threats, I examine the Japanese public's reaction to nations that criticised Japan; violated diplomatic protocol; and conducted

⁶ I define a major effect as any change in public opinion greater than six percentage points. This is explained in greater detail in Chapter Three.

large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations. While these types of events do appear to be correlated with changes in public opinion, they do appear to be more affected by media coverage than realistic and symbolic threats.

In Chapter Eight, I use time-series data to examine the long-term dynamics of Japanese public perceptions of the ten nations in my dataset. I found that although public perceptions towards foreign nations were highly stable over long periods of time, they were much less stable for those nations that tended to be involved in issues and events that the Japanese public interpreted as a threat. Public attitudes towards Switzerland, Germany/West Germany, India, France and the United Kingdom showed higher levels of stability than those towards the United States, South Korea, Russia/the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. I also found that the effect of salient issues on public opinion tended to be relatively short-lived. Finally, in Chapter Nine, I conclude the study with a discussion of the implications of my findings and suggestions for future research.

2. Theoretical Framework

Introduction

Why does public opinion about a foreign nation change? Despite evidence showing that general beliefs shape more specific policy preferences, existing theories of public opinion and foreign policy have given this question only limited attention. In this chapter, my two goals are: first, to show that the current literature on public opinion and foreign policy is limited in its ability to explain why it is that negative changes in public opinion about foreign nations are likely to occur; and second, to present a theoretical framework filling in this gap in the literature.

Any theory explaining what causes public perceptions of a foreign nation to change must be able to explain first, why citizens increase their attentiveness to a particular foreign nation and second, why this attentiveness produces a response that is negative. I argue that the current literature on public opinion and foreign policy does well on the first point but is less successful on the second. It is only recently that political scientists have begun to take an interest in how public opinion responds to the foreign policies of other nations (Foyle 2003; Goldsmith et al. 2005; Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2009). With the exception of the literature on the “rally round the flag” effect, until now, the aim of most previous work in the public opinion and foreign policy literature has been to explain how the public responds to the foreign policies of their own government and how governments respond to public opinion in their own country. Abrupt changes are often treated as fluctuations and do not tend to be of primary concern. As a result, the focus has been primarily on endogenous factors and long-term change. The literature

identifies the two most important actors in the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy as political elites and the mass media but, as I will show below, the focus on these two actors by themselves is not sufficient for understanding short-term changes in public opinion.

Exogenous factors are essential to any theory of changes in public perceptions of a foreign nation. The concept most useful in understanding such changes is that of “issues”. In particular, issues that elicit an emotional reaction among citizens are most likely to have an effect. The issues most likely to cause such a reaction to foreign affairs are those perceived as intergroup threats. I will argue below that changes in public opinion towards a foreign nation are a function of a threat to Japan or Japanese values and the amount of media coverage that it receives.

This chapter is divided into two sections. First, I briefly review past research on public opinion and foreign policy to argue that a gap exists in the literature that limits our ability to explain changes of public perceptions of foreign nations. Second, I present my theory which emphasises two variables: threat and media coverage. Although most of the literature on public opinion and foreign policy, as well as intergroup threat, has been developed in the United States, I assume that their theoretical insights are also applicable to other countries, including that of Japan.

Past Research

Before proceeding, it is necessary to establish three main assumptions that inform the current study of public opinion and foreign policy. First, the main assumption is that the public is relatively rational (B. Page and Shapiro 1992; Jentleson 1992).

Although citizens may not have a great deal of factual knowledge about foreign affairs, public opinion tends to be stable and people do a pretty good job at making decisions about foreign policy. Abrupt fluctuations in public opinion are treated as exceptions to the rule rather than the subject of study. Second, people are “cognitive misers”, meaning that they have severe cognitive limitations (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1993). Most citizens cannot deal with the overwhelming volume of information that they face in the sphere of foreign affairs. As Hurwitz and Peffley (1987:1103) put it, “political judgments in the international sphere must be made under considerable uncertainty and without many of the interpretive aids commonly used in the domestic arena”. To deal with this ambiguity, humans rely on simple mental shortcuts to reduce complex tasks and to manage the informational environment. These are known as “cognitive heuristics” (Tversky and Kahneman 1982:3). Heuristics compensate for people’s lack of knowledge and attention to politics and allow them to make reasoned judgments about foreign policy with small amounts of information. Third, people also rely on cues from better-informed sources to guide them as to how to think about politics (Zaller 1992). The two main sources of information about foreign policy are political elites and the mass media. In short, public opinion appears to be stable and to change in a reasonable manner because people use mental shortcuts and cues from better-informed elites to simplify complex information (Krosnick and Kinder 1990).

The main reason that the current literature on public opinion and foreign policy is limited in explaining how the public thinks about foreign nations is that it has primarily been developed to explain the dynamics of public opinion with regard to

foreign policy in a particular country. For example, in Aldrich et al.'s (2006:478) recent review of the literature, their primary concern was to understand how the public makes sense of foreign affairs to increase understanding of how people make "reasonable policy-based electoral choices". Since this literature is based primarily on the assumption that public opinion about foreign policy is a function of domestic factors, these theories have limited explanatory capability in explaining changes in public perceptions of foreign actors. I expand on the limitations of the mainstream approach to public opinion and foreign policy below.

Elite Debate

Public discussions among foreign policy elites are a crucial factor in determining whether or not the public comes to see a particular foreign policy as important. By foreign policy elites, most scholars are referring to members of the executive branch of government, the legislative branch, organised interest groups and commentators from the mass media, academia and think tanks.⁷ Jacobs and Page (2005) also suggest including business leaders and organised labour in this definition. According to Powlick and Katz (1998:34), public discussion involves reporting by major news media of government policies and important events, the reporting of elite reactions over a period of time and other analysis of policies and events. Numerous scholars have found, for example, that the American president has great powers in agenda-setting in foreign policy (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Powlick (1995) proposed a model linking foreign policy decision-making to elites, interest groups, the news media, elected officials, and the mass public. Foreign

⁷ This definition is adapted from Holsti's (1996:102) use of the definition used in the surveys by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

policies that do not lead to debate among political elites are unlikely to attract the interest of citizens. When foreign policy decisions result in what Page (1996:2) calls “public deliberation”, the reasoning and discussion about a policy among elites will activate the public interest. Since as Cohen (1995) shows, political elites can use public rhetoric to generate support for their policies, they may occasionally have incentives to directly generate positive or negative attitudes towards a foreign nation.

Political elites attempt to shape public opinion through framing (R. M. Entman 2004). Although many definitions exist, I refer to “framing” as the process by which citizens develop a particular conceptualisation of an issue or reorient their thinking about it (Chong and Druckman 2007:104). A frame is the central story line in a communication that suggests to the receivers of information what a particular issue is really about. Political leaders care about public perceptions and so to maintain their popularity, they must attend in some measure to what the public perceives as important (Nincic and Hinckley 1991). As the public pays greater attention to a foreign policy, so also must political leaders.

Although political elites are certainly important in shaping public opinion about foreign policy, by themselves they cannot explain short-term opinion change for four reasons. First, political leaders do not have the same monopoly of information over images of foreign nations that they do in other areas of foreign policy. Baum and Potter’s (2008:56) model of a “foreign policy marketplace” suggests that in international affairs, leaders enjoy a large informational advantage over the electorate that allows them to dictate foreign policy. However, while citizens may have little knowledge about complicated issues like the defence budget or a trade

agreement, they have a far greater number of sources of information, including direct contact, when it comes to evaluating a foreign nation.

Second, although occasionally political leaders may occasionally want to shape public opinion about particular nations, their incentives to invest attention or political capital to directly improve or denigrate the image of a particular foreign country are minimal. The actions of government officials with foreign policy authority are a function of bargaining with domestic groups who try to pressure the government to select those policies likely to benefit their members (Jacobs and B. I. Page 2005:107). While business interests, organised labour, defence contractors, and a few other interest groups may have some minor incentives to pressure elected officials to generate negative or positive attitudes towards a particular country when, for example, negotiating a trade agreement, lobbying for more foreign aid, or trying to increase the defence budget, this is unlikely to be a common request.

Third, although elites may frame foreign policies, the link to such frames with public perceptions of a particular nation is usually indirect. Unless a political leader goes out their way to label a nation as “good” or “bad”, as Ronald Reagan did with his “evil empire” comment, or George W. Bush in his “axis of evil” speech, citizens must make the mental step themselves linking a particular frame to an attitude. Assuming that people are cognitive misers, this added step increases complexity and, therefore, decreases the likelihood that all but the most politically attentive will allow a frame that does not elicit an emotional reaction to influence their attitudes.

Finally, the evidence that political elites even have the capacity to move public opinion at all is limited (Page et al. 1987). Most political officials have a credibility problem because citizens are aware of bipartisan differences and electoral incentives and so often do not trust what they have to say (Groeling and Baum 2008). In fact, Page and Shapiro (1984) found that the only group of elites that had any major influence in the American case was “popular presidents”. In sum, while over the long term elites may influence the debate regarding a particular foreign policy, it is unlikely that they have the incentives or the capacity to move opinion towards a particular nation in a particular direction, at least in the short term.

The Mass Media

Since Kinder and Iyengar’s (1987) pioneering work on agenda-setting, framing and priming, political scientists have believed that television news influences political judgments. Scholars of public opinion and foreign policy agree that in addition to political elites, the key actor is the mass media. By the mass media, I refer to those mainstream organisations in a country that are able to set the national agenda. In addition to its own incentives as an independent actor, the media is seen as the link between policymakers and the public. Policymakers follow media reports on public opinion and the media is the public’s primary source of information on policymakers (Soroka 2003:28).

Unless news organisations decide to cover a particular problem, public opinion will not be aroused (Powlick and A. Z. Katz 1998:39). According to the agenda-setting hypothesis, national media attention to a particular problem leads

treaty, it is less useful in understanding short-term changes for four main reasons. First, as with political leaders, the media do not have as large a monopoly on information about foreign nations as they do about foreign policy. Citizens can access any number of sources other than the news on which they can base their impressions of a particular country.

Second, except for some special cases, such as rallying public support for an international conflict, the media does not have incentives to generate negative attitudes towards a particular country. Bennett's (1990) "indexing theory" posits that the media closely links its coverage of politics to elite rhetoric because it depends on political leaders for access to information. But if policymakers do not have incentives to generate negative feelings towards a particular nation, it is unlikely that media organisations will either since they link their coverage to elite statements.

Third, the probability of citizens being influenced only by media coverage without a sudden or dramatic event is limited. In the absence of such events, any influence on public attitudes towards a foreign nation will most likely be indirect and gradual. Repeated exposure to a frame that portrays a particular nation as responsible for a foreign policy problem may lead to causal attribution and learning (Iyengar 1991). However, without some kind of focusing event, the media is not likely—by itself—to be able to cause an abrupt change in public attitudes towards a particular nation.

Finally, while the media does have the capacity to increase attention to an issue, this by itself will not determine the direction of change. High levels of media

coverage independent of a policy or issue cannot cause opinion change to move in a positive or negative direction.

The relationship between policymakers, the media and the mass public is complex. As Baum and Potter (2008) put it, “scholars have investigated every conceivable causal link between the public, decision makers (foreign and domestic), and the media”, but no consensus exists as to who influences whom. Although evidence does exist that the media shapes mass public views of foreign policy to a certain extent, a good understanding of the dynamics of such effects remains limited. The emphasis in the literature on endogenous factors, namely elite debate, media coverage, and frames, limits understanding of public opinion about foreign nations. Most importantly, neither political elites nor the mass media have strong incentives to directly influence how the public views foreign countries. In short, a gap in the literature exists in explaining the factors that can cause such changes. To understand this process, it is more useful to shift attention away from the incentives of political elites and the mass media and towards the impact of exogenous factors.

The Importance of Issue Salience

To understand the dynamics of short-term public opinion about foreign nations, it makes sense to begin any effort by focusing on issue salience. An issue is a disputed point or question, usually the subject of a conflict or controversy (Diehl 1992:333). Salience refers to the fact that colourful, dynamic or other distinctive stimuli may disproportionately engage citizens’ attention and, therefore,

disproportionately affect judgments (Ross and Anderson 1982:192).¹⁰ In this study, salience refers to the degree of attention that citizens give to a particular issue (Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995:110). Issue salience is important because it is likely that citizens will tend to use whatever information is most easily available about a nation at a particular point in time as a cognitive heuristic.¹¹ McGraw and Dolan (2007:316) posit that so long as people do not “personify the state”, meaning that they do not associate it with a salient figure in the political system such as a particular president or prime minister, attitudes will be formed by retrieving those pieces of information about the country most easily available in memory at the time that an attitude needs to be expressed.

The focus on issues in understanding changes in short-term public opinion about foreign nations is appropriate because unlike domestic politics, the process of foreign policy agenda-setting is primarily event-driven. Domestically, the process of getting public attention proceeds incrementally with occasional “focusing events” suddenly causing policymaking elites and the public to pay attention (Kingdon 2002). In those cases, examining elite debate and media attention is critical for understanding opinion change. In contrast, foreign affairs issues do not tend to arise in such a gradual fashion but rather “burst onto the scene as a result of crises or other dramatic occurrences” (Wood and Peake 1998:174). Such events involving foreign nations, and most importantly, the reaction of political elites and the mass media to them, are crucial if they are going to capture the attention of an inattentive public. It is only once an issue is on the national agenda that it is

¹⁰ Kahneman and Tversky (1982:11) point out that the effect of seeing a house burning is likely to have a greater effect on memory than reading about a fire in the newspaper.

¹¹ This is known as the “availability heuristic” (Sniderman et al. 1993).

possible for it to have an impact on public opinion. If the goal is to understand changes in short-term public opinion then, rather than focusing on long-running debates between political elites over particular policies, it may be more useful to look at those issues that suddenly become a part of the national discourse.

What kinds of issues are likely to attract attention? Large scale transformations in the bases of mass opinion usually require a “critical moment”, an intense communication with wide exposure and unmistakable value referents (Pollock 1994:427). For citizens who do not care very much about foreign affairs, the most likely issues to draw their notice are those that invoke their emotions. This goes partly towards explaining why media organisations are drawn to international stories involving violence and conflict. Powlick and Katz (1998:40) note that rather than international meeting or agreements, the media is biased in favour of such stories as disagreements among policy officials, wars, riots, and massacres. It is logical to assume that an issue that activates positive emotions will produce a positive response among citizens while one that activates negative emotions will produce a negative response. Therefore, any theoretical framework seeking to explain changes in public opinion must identify a typology of issues likely to first, capture the attention of the public and, second, elicit negative emotions. In the section below, I explain the theoretical framework that will guide the remainder of this study by focusing on a typology of issues likely to capture public attention based on theories of intergroup threat.

Theoretical Framework

For the purpose of this study, I focus on two key variables, perceived threats, or from here on, just “threats”, and media coverage. A threat is conceptualised as a

specific type of issue. The presence of a threat in the informational environment produces feelings of hostility towards the object that is perceived to be its source. High media coverage increases the salience of a threat and, therefore, its influence on the evaluations of the nation involved. When this occurs, public opinion towards that nation turns negative. In short, I posit that threat perception is the variable that explains the link between media coverage and changes in public opinion that are negative.

Threats

The following framework is based on theories of intergroup bias, most importantly “realistic conflict theory (RCT)” and “social identity theory”. Both of these bodies of literature are based on the assumption that social identity is derived primarily from group memberships. A group is a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional involvement in the common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of consensus about the evaluation of the group and their involvement in it (Tajfel and Turner 2004:56). In this study, the Japanese public is conceptualised as just such a group.

To explain the roots of hostility towards particular groups, scholars of intergroup relations, such as Tajfel (1971) and Brewer (2001), use the concept of threat. Both RCT and social identity theory have different explanations for the roots of hostility towards out-groups. RCT posits that it is a function of competition for scarce resources such as territory, wealth, or natural resources (LeVine and Campbell 1972). Social identity theory suggests that the purpose of intergroup bias is

motivational. People want to maintain a high in-group status relative to other groups so that group members can create a positive social identity, thus satisfying their need for positive self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner 2004). In political science, threat has been used to explain the motivations behind public support for the European Union (McLaren 2002), anti-immigrant sentiment among voters (Mughan and Paxton 2006), political positions on racial issues (Glaser 1994), and support for anti-terrorist policies (Huddy et al. 2005).

The diverse body of literature on intergroup threat begins with the basic assumption that human needs are often articulated and fulfilled through groups (M. B. Brewer 1991). Fears of an external threat can arise when a group is faced with a threat to the fulfilment of its basic needs. These can include material needs, like food, shelter, and physical wellbeing, but also psychological needs such as identity, security, recognition, autonomy, self-esteem and a sense of justice. The collective fears and needs of citizens combine with objective factors to determine whether or not a specific issue is perceived as a threat.

The presence of a perceived threat will activate negative emotions and, therefore, increase feelings of hostility by an in-group towards an out-group. The perception of threat occurs when an out-group's actions, beliefs or characteristics challenge the goal attainment or wellbeing of an in-group (Riek 2006). Although at first this hostility is generated because citizens seek to differentiate themselves from the source of the threat, this soon turns in to derogation when citizens associate an out-group with strong emotions such as fear, hatred, or disgust. When threatened, individuals can increase their self-esteem by denigrating an out-group (Fein and Spencer 1997). This denigration can then lead to prejudice against the threatening

out-group (Bettencourt et al. 2001). Brewer (2001) found that the normal constraints limiting intergroup hostility disappear when out-groups are associated with strong emotions. Those negative emotions are translated into hostility towards the source of the threat and can be an important factor in explaining not only prejudice but also verbal or physical attacks.

Since citizens have such a limited knowledge of foreign affairs, they can more easily determine whether an issue is important by judging whether or not it elicits an emotional reaction. Political scientists have found that citizens use emotions as a tool for information processing when thinking about politics.¹² For example, Marcus and Mackuen (1993:680) found that anxiety, a negative emotion, enhances learning about policies and political candidates. It should be noted, however, that emotions can also impair decision making. Using public opinion poll data from Israel, Gordon and Arian (2001) argued that if people feel threatened then their decision making about specific policies is dominated not by logic or rationality but by emotion. In contrast, when threat perception is low, both emotions and logic play a role in policy preferences.

As applied to this study, the proposition that threats to the in-group produce hostility towards the out-group suggests that a perceived threat to Japan should lead to an increase in public hostility towards the nation viewed as the source of the threat due to the activation of negative emotions. Japanese hostility towards a particular nation, in other words, is a product of an emotional response to threat. Vivid, concrete, and image-oriented events are especially likely to elicit feelings

¹² For a review of the literature on the use of emotions to make political evaluations see Marcus (2000).


like fear and hostility, as well as be retained in memory for a longer period than more abstract information (Nisbett 1980).¹³

Although the vast majority of foreign affairs issues will elicit no response from Japanese citizens and, therefore, have no significant impact on public opinion, a small minority of cases that are interpreted as threats should have a negative impact on public opinion. Foreign affairs issues perceived as threats are likely to generate negative emotions such as fear, anger and hatred. Negative feelings elicited by a salient threat should prime the public to attribute its cause to the nation viewed as its source. After artificially creating minimal in-groups and out-groups, Desteno et al. (2004) found evidence of this effect in experiments where stimuli that generated anger created automatic prejudice toward the out-group. An increase in negative attitudes towards a particular country is a function of the Japanese public attempting to differentiate itself from the foreign nation viewed as the source of the threat. For example, the almost visceral feelings of some Japanese to North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il may be an example of citizens attempting to differentiate themselves from a threat through denigration. A column in the *Japan Times* (McNeill, D. and Hippin, A., 2003, "Has rightwing hijacked Japan abductee issue?", 15 April) described this general view in the Japanese tabloid press "who portray Kim as a cross between Dr. Evil and Charlie Chaplin, fuming and 'stamping his feet' over Japanese skulduggery". Citizens direct these negative emotions towards the perceived source of the threat which then increases hostility and negative public opinion change.

¹³ While weaker emotions are associated only with avoidance, stronger emotions suggest actual behaviour directed towards the out-group.

Scholars of intergroup threat do not treat the concept of threat as unitary. Rather they identify three different types of threats: realistic threats, symbolic threats, and threats to group identity. Figure 2.1 shows the theoretical framework for this study using the three different types of threat.

Figure 2.1: Theoretical Classifications of Threats to the Mass Public



Realistic threats jeopardise the existence, political and economic power and physical or material wellbeing of an in-group. Symbolic threats, which may not directly involve the in-group, are a function of intergroup differences in basic values, norms and beliefs.¹⁴ Threats to group identity, which directly involve the in-group, are those which endanger the in-group's positive social identity.¹⁵ I explain in greater detail the nature of each type of threat below.

¹⁴ The major difference between realistic and symbolic threats is that symbolic threats do not involve competition over conflicting goals but conflict over values and beliefs.

¹⁵ Rather than conflicts over realistic interests, affronts to the prestige, status and pride of national and ethnic groups appear to be one cause of intergroup hostility.

The proposition that realistic threats will cause an increase in negative attitudes towards a foreign nation is derived from Realistic Conflict Theory which proposes that hostility towards an out-group comes from intergroup conflict over “real” issues like land, jobs, power and economic benefits. Realistic threats are those that may have a negative effect on the existence of the in-group; threats to the political and economic power of the in-group; and threats to physical or material wellbeing of the in-group and its members (W. G. Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman 1999:2222). In their interest model of public opinion Goldsmith et al. (2005:409) call these “material” interests, which they define as shared security and economic interests, and which are factors in public support for particular foreign policies.

The difference between realistic threat and the other two types is that it emphasises the physical threat posed to the welfare of the group and its members. For example, people in the American south who felt their economic interests were threatened by progress by African-Americans had negative political-racial attitudes towards blacks (Glaser 1994). However, while recognising that citizens do respond to events and issues that may cause them actual harm, it is also important to emphasise the subjective nature of realistic threats. Perceptions can lead to negative attitudes towards an out-group regardless of whether or not a threat is “real”. The greater the threat that the out-group is perceived to pose to the in-group, the more negative the attitude toward the out-group will be.

In terms of foreign affairs issues, I assume that realistic threats include any issue that citizens perceive to be a potential threat to the wellbeing of Japan or Japanese citizens. Evidence of concern over the deaths of fellow citizens has been found, for example, in the “casualty-aversion hypothesis” which suggests that the public

reacts negatively to casualties from their own country during wars (Mueller 1971). Gartner (2004) argues that local media organisations report on local casualties during international terrorist attacks because citizens are likely to take an interest if people from their community are affected. As posited by Realism, those larger issues that directly menace the existence of the Japanese nation, such as issues associated with warfare, as well as those that involve Japanese sovereignty, should also be perceived as a threat and, therefore, generate negative emotions. Katzenstein and Okawara (1993:98) also posit that Japan has an “uncontested norm of economic security” in which a general consensus exists that Japan should make every effort to reduce its economic vulnerability. As a result, economic threats such as trade sanctions or cheap imports may also be considered to be a threat to the nation.

The concept of symbolic threats comes from social identity theory. A person's hostility towards out-groups is produced by comparisons to other groups meant to bolster or maintain self-esteem, self-worth or social identity. Symbolic threats are concerns by citizens over group differences in morals, values, norms, standards, beliefs and attitudes (W. G. Stephan et al. 1999:2222). These elicit a negative and emotional reaction among in-group members because they appear to undermine or challenge the in-group's worldview. Threats arise due to the belief in the moral rightness of the in-group's system of values. Ethnocentrism comes from these types of beliefs in which groups holding different values threaten the in-group's ethnocentric worldview (Grant and Brown 1995; Grant 1993). Symbolic threat is closely related to the concept of symbolic racism, which posits White American hostility towards African-Americans is a response to the manner in which

African-Americans are perceived to violate traditional values shared by most Whites. This includes feeling that they violate values like self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline (Sears et al. 1979). Symbolic racial politics may reflect social competition aimed at enhancing self-esteem through group identification (Bovasso 1993).

For the purpose of this study, I assume symbolic threats are those issues that violate the worldview of the Japanese public. I assume that the two most important values for the public in terms of international affairs are the norms of anti-militarism and anti-nuclearism. These norms are the product of collective Japanese memories of the militarism of the 1930s and the decision to go to war against the United States (Berger 1993:120). The Japanese view of foreign policy is summarised by Katzenstein and Okawara (1993:101) who note that the public favours economic strength, peaceful diplomacy and a low-key consensus approach to foreign policy. Although Japanese opinion appears to be moving towards a “defensive realism” (Eldridge and Midford 2008), I assume that those issues which involve the use of force abroad, such as the killing of civilians, wars, terrorism and crises should activate negative emotions among a public that believes international disputes should be resolved by peaceful means. Even though Japan may not be directly involved in an issue or event, the use of force by a foreign nation to resolve an international dispute or the testing of a nuclear device should be viewed as violations of Japanese values.

Like symbolic threats, the concept of threats to national identity is derived from social identity theory. People can feel personally threatened in intergroup interactions because they are concerned about negative outcomes for the self such

as being embarrassed, rejected, ridiculed, or exploited (Stephan and Stephan 1985). Hostility towards an out-group creates or protects relatively high in-group status and, therefore, provides positive social identity for in-group members and satisfies their need for positive self-esteem. Since in-group members associate their self-image with belonging to a positively valued group, just the words of an out-group may challenge their sense of value. Anxiety will be especially high if groups have a history of antagonism. Successful bias towards the out-group should enhance self-esteem of the in-group.

I assume that any issue involving a threat to the value of Japanese group identity will produce a negative feeling among citizens towards the nation involved. The main difference between a realistic threat and a threat to national identity is that the latter does not involve an issue that could harm Japan's material interests. The difference between symbolic threats and threats to group identity is that threats to group identity involve both a symbolic action and Japan. Rather than coming from issues involving the actions of a foreign nation, threats to Japanese identity tend to be a function of communications. Such threats can be direct, such as when a policymaker from a foreign nation criticises Japan or when citizens from that nation engage in anti-Japanese demonstrations. They can also be indirect, however, like when Japan is the subject of a diplomatic snub. The negative feelings that such issues elicit from citizens are a product of a threat to their country's standing in the world.

Although scholars of intergroup theory recognise the different types of threats, this does not allow us to answer the question as to which of these types of issues will have the greatest impact on public opinion. This is important because policymakers

should know what types of issues are likely to cause a negative reaction among foreign publics. If the three types of threat can be differentiated then it may be possible to determine whether they differ in terms of the magnitude of their effect on public opinion. The literature, however, does not provide a clear answer to this question and so it must be answered empirically.

Media Coverage

Understanding changes in attitudes towards a foreign nation requires identifying the degree of salience the public places on particular threats. When attributing causality for a particular event, people tend to give greatest consideration to salient information (Ross and Anderson 1982:138). Threats influencing attitudes towards a foreign nation do not have a constant salience. Zaller (1992) has shown that when asked to express an attitude, people tend to state whatever information is most easily accessible in memory. If media coverage is high then an issue should be more salient. For example, media coverage can boost the impact of a presidential candidate's performance on a particular issue as a criterion for evaluation (Edwards, et al. 1995). Valentino (1999), for instance, found that evaluations of Bill Clinton were influenced by coverage in the media of stories about crime. The same process should be at work with foreign nations. When a particular foreign policy issue is made salient, citizens' evaluations of that country should be influenced by their perceptions of its role in that issue.

Like any issue, a threat will only be used to evaluate a foreign nation if it is salient. A problem that only attracts the attention of a few people, usually the most attentive and the most educated in a population, is likely to have only a minor

effect on public opinion. On the other hand, high media coverage of a threat increases its importance in the public's evaluations of a foreign nation because it draws the attention of even normally inattentive citizens. This increases the awareness of an issue for even that segment of the public who do not usually pay attention to foreign affairs. When this occurs, public opinion is activated.

Although people can form many different beliefs about a particular country, I assume that only those beliefs that are readily accessible in memory are able to influence attitude at any given moment (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). The implication is that once an issue no longer receives coverage in the media, it should no longer be a major factor in public evaluations of the nation in question (Zaller and Feldman 1992). Instead, citizens will access whatever information is most easily accessible. Salient issues will tend to only have a short-term impact on public opinion because as an issue's salience fades, public opinion will, on most occasions, return to its previous level.

In sum, understanding changes in public perceptions of a foreign nation requires not only thinking about what issues Japanese citizens consider to be realistic threats, symbolic threats or threats to their identity, but also their degree of salience. If an issue is interpreted as a threat then it will activate negative emotions among citizens which will then be used to evaluate the nation viewed as responsible for the threat. The increase in negative public attitudes towards a foreign nation is a function of this threat perception and the volume of media coverage. However, the impact of such issues on aggregate opinion should be temporary as media coverage subsides and the memory of a particular issue fades from the public's memory.

Propositions

Based on the discussion above, I have derived four propositions that will provide a framework for the remainder of this study.

Proposition 1: Issues interpreted as threats produce an increase in negative public perceptions of the nation viewed as the source of the threat.

Proposition 2: High media coverage of a threat increases the magnitude of the effect on public opinion.

Proposition 3: Realistic threats, symbolic threats, and threats to national identity all have a negative effect on public attitudes towards a foreign nation.

Proposition 4: The effects of threats on public opinion will be short-term.

In the following chapter, I explain the research design, data and methods that I use to empirically examine these propositions.

3. Methods

Research Design

This chapter presents an observational research design used to empirically test the propositions derived from the theory in the previous chapter. The primary aim of the empirical analysis is to discover whether or not the evidence shows that the presence of an issue or event interpreted as a threat is regularly associated with negative changes in public perceptions of the nation involved. Evidence of such a relationship will go towards supporting the argument that such threats are the cause of negative changes in public attitudes towards foreign nations. Furthermore, I am looking for evidence that threats that receive higher media coverage are associated with greater changes in public opinion than threats that receive lower levels of media coverage. The inference would be that any differences in the reaction of the mass public to similar types of threats but with different levels of media coverage is due in part to variations in media coverage and, therefore, salience.¹⁶

It is important to note that rather than objective threats, it is threat perceptions that are assumed to affect public opinion. The general assumption informing this study is that similar types of threats (realistic, symbolic, threats to national identity) elicit a relatively similar emotional response from the public. These perceptions held by Japanese citizens are a mix of pre-existing beliefs, beliefs derived from objective conditions, elite debate and media frames. Although I recognize the diversity of

¹⁶ I have chosen to examine only cases in which the public is exposed to information that a foreign nation is engaging in threatening words or actions because no theoretical reason exists for assuming that public opinion should change when the public is not exposed to such information.

threat perceptions and the fact that some events are likely to elicit a stronger response than other, for the purpose of empirical analysis, the magnitude of the effect of all types of threat is treated as relatively similar.

This study uses a mixed-methods approach. First, a large-n statistical analysis is conducted; second, a series of case studies using a combination of quantitative and qualitative data are compared; and finally, long-term trends in public opinion towards the ten nations in the dataset are examined. The goal of the statistical analysis is to estimate the effects of the presence of a threat and the media coverage that it receives on public attitudes towards a foreign nation. The purpose of the case studies is somewhat different. Although their main aim is to examine whether or not threats are associated with negative changes in public attitudes, their secondary function is to find out just what it is about particular issues that leads them to be perceived as threats in the first place. Finally, the goal of examining the trends in Japanese attitudes is to find out whether the impact of particular threats on the dynamics of long-term public opinion is short-term or long-term. In the remainder of this chapter, the subject of the study is introduced, the measures are operationalised, and how the analysis was conducted is explained.

Why Japan?

Although the goal of this study is theoretical generalisation, the subject is the Japanese public. Until now, political scientists have conducted most empirical analyses of public opinion and foreign policy in the United States and, to a lesser extent, other Western democracies. Given that each state faces a different series of foreign policy challenges, it is necessary to use data from as many countries as possible to test the literature's main hypotheses.

The most important reason to move beyond the case of the United States derives from its domestic politics and unique position in the international system. Its superpower status, decentralised media structure, and the policy differences between Republicans and Democrats over foreign policy raise serious questions as to the general applicability of any theories derived from this case and applied to other countries. Scholars interested in a theoretical understanding of public opinion and foreign policy should look to other democratic nations with high levels of media saturation but with a different position in the international system, such as Japan. Japan provides an excellent case for examining the impact of the media on public opinion about foreign policy. According to Krauss (1996):

Japan is a particularly good context to try to answer these questions of the universality or differences in the impact of the media. It is the society most similar to the United States in media use, but most different from Western democracies in societal, political and journalistic institutional arrangements. Japan thus provides an especially interesting laboratory for evaluating the universal or variant consequences of the media on politics (p.356).

The consensus among scholars and opinion leaders is that the Japanese mass media is the public's main source of information about politics.¹⁷ In a survey of various actors in Japanese political life, including the LDP, the bureaucracy, academics and opposition parties, the majority of respondents stated that they considered the mass media to be the institution with the greatest impact on politics (Kabashima et al. 2007:43).

¹⁷The most important works in English on the Japanese media are Feldman (1993), Pharr and Krauss (1996), and Krauss (2000).

Although some Japanese citizens may get their information about foreign nations through direct experience, this is unlikely to be the most important source. What is more, a large number of Japanese have never even been abroad. In a 2008 survey by the Japanese Cabinet Office, 57.3 per cent of respondents said that they had visited a foreign nation at least once. However, only 4.6 per cent of respondents said that they had lived abroad for more than three months and a rather large number of respondents, 38.1 per cent, said that they had never been abroad (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 2008). Perceptions of foreign nations are unlikely to be a product of direct experience.

The most important source of information about politics in Japan is the mass media. Table 3.1 shows a summary of four public opinion polls conducted by the Japanese Government between 2004 and 2007 asking citizens where they got their information about foreign affairs issues.

Table 3.1: Japanese Sources of Information about Foreign Affairs, 2004-2007

“What is your main source of information about foreign affairs?”					
Source	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
TV	4	94.00	0.88	92.7	94.6
Newspaper	4	78.08	3.13	74.4	81.9
Radio	4	18.73	0.53	18.1	19.3
Magazines	4	14.83	1.20	13.4	16.2
Internet	4	12.80	3.17	9.6	16.3
Movies	4	7.13	0.53	6.4	7.6
Travelling Abroad	4	6.05	0.65	5.5	6.9
Meeting Foreigners	4	3.58	0.26	3.3	3.8
Government Publications	4	3.23	0.49	2.6	3.8
Other	4	0.33	0.13	0.2	0.5
None	4	1.83	0.36	1.5	2.3

NOTE: Respondents were allowed more than one response.

SOURCE: Japanese Cabinet Office (2007).

Television and newspapers are by far the most important sources of information. Television is especially dominant with 94 per cent of respondents citing it as their main source of information. This survey supports Krauss's (2000) work on the importance of television news as the Japanese public's main source of information about politics. As expected in a highly literate and educated society such as Japan, 78.08 percent of the population gets information about foreign affairs also from newspapers. Although the use of the Internet as a source of information increased substantially from 9.6 per cent to 16.3 percent in four years, it still remains far less popular as a source of information than either newspapers or television. In sum, the Japanese public seems to get most of its information about foreign affairs from the mass media, especially television and newspapers, and so it makes sense for media coverage to be one of the key variables of interest.

Variables

Dependent Variable

The Japanese public's attitudes towards foreign nations were measured using responses to two questions in the Jiji polls conducted between June 1960 and March 2007.

What three countries do you like?

What three countries do you dislike?

Respondents were given a choice of ten countries—the United States, China, South Korea, North Korea (from 1970), the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany/Germany, India, and Switzerland—from which they could

state their preferences. Since 1960, Jiji Press, a private media company, has monitored public opinion in Japan with coordinated, monthly surveys of public attitudes asking a series of identical questions about public approval of Japanese political parties, the Cabinet, the economy, and foreign nations. Between June 1960 and March 1971, Jiji collected monthly stratified samples of approximately 1,250 respondents.¹⁸ Since April 1971, the size of the monthly sample has been between 1,000 and 1,700 respondents (Miyake, Nishizawa, and Kohno 2001:14). This variation in the choices available for respondents allowed for the analysis of public attitudes towards ten common stimulus objects using a regularly repeated standard question.

Although any public opinion research faces challenges due to question wording, irregularity in the timing or frequency of surveys, and changes in the sampling frame or survey procedure, the Jiji data avoid many of these issues. For example, a commonly used measure for public opinion about foreign nations is the annual polls about foreign policy conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Office asking the question: “Do you feel close to the United States (same questions for Russia, China, and South Korea) or not?”¹⁹ However, these polls cannot be used to address the question of short-term opinion change because they are conducted annually. As a result, inferences must be made based on public opinion change that may have occurred a significant period of time after the events themselves.

¹⁸ Stratification means that the population is classified into subpopulations based on supplementary information and then separate samples are selected from each subpopulation (Kalton 1983:19).

¹⁹ Available at: <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index-gai.html>. English translations of some of these polls are available at the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation Asian Opinion Poll Database <http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/index.htm>

Although only the national-level aggregate results of the Jiji surveys could be obtained, this should not be considered a limitation but rather an advantage. Aggregate public opinion poll data is appropriate for analysis by political scientists because it is collective, not individual, opinion that affects policymakers. Although the microfoundations of the theoretical framework of this study come from the individual level, it is assumed that collective opinion reflects the processing of political information by citizens.

The cross-national and cross-temporal comparability of the Jiji polls improves on past research on public opinion and foreign policy for two reasons. First, it allows for greater accuracy in the examination of not only long-term trends, but also short-term change due to temporal proximity of the explanatory variables to the dependent variable. Second, since Jiji asked the same question throughout the entire period of the study, this avoids the problem of question-wording effects. Zaller (1992:33) demonstrated that even a small change in the way that a question is asked can change people's responses. The examination of mass attitudes in a single country, over time and using the same survey questions, marks a consistency of methodology that allows for the analysis of change because both sample design and country-specific interpretations of questions remain constant. The assumption is that any reported change in attitudes results not from changes in how the public interpreted the questions but from changes in the informational environment. In sum, the Jiji polls provide a regularity, continuity and consistency of methodology

that make this dataset particularly useful for answering questions about public opinion and foreign policy.²⁰

Before generating a variable for changes in public opinion, it is necessary to measure public attitudes towards each foreign nation in each month. This is done using the percentage of respondents in the Jiji polls in a particular month who state that they like a country minus the percentage of respondents in the same poll who state that they dislike a country. For example, if 50 per cent of respondents said that they liked the United States, and 10 per cent of respondents said that they disliked the United States, then my measure for Japanese attitudes towards the United States in that particular month would be 40 per cent. When the percentage of respondents stating that they dislike a particular country is greater than the percentage of respondents saying that they like a country then I interpret this as negative public perceptions of that nation.²¹

Two different measures for change in public attitudes towards a foreign nation were generated from the Jiji polls. The first, for the statistical analysis, is an interval variable. The second, for the case studies, is an ordinal variable. For the statistical analysis, the variable for monthly change in public attitudes towards a foreign nation was calculated by taking the difference between two consecutive

²⁰ Despite the reliability and validity of the Jiji poll data, measuring change in public attitudes towards an object as ambiguous as a foreign nation is not an exact science. Since there is no way of knowing exactly what it is that citizens are thinking about at the time of the poll, it is assumed that only salient issues have a significant effect on public opinion. Since the polls may be subject to a certain amount of measurement error, or “noise”, both the results and any conclusions are treated with caution.

²¹ I do exercise some caution in interpreting the results of the polls because the data is compositional. Katz and King, (1999:19) define this as “a term that describes data sets that sum to unity for each observation.” This means that citizens were able to state three countries that they liked and three countries that they disliked. For the current study, however, I do not treat the data as compositional. Instead, I leave a more complex analysis for future research.

months in the public attitudes variable for a particular country. So, for example, if Japanese perceptions of the United States were a positive 10 per cent in June and 5 percent in July, change between June and July would be -5 percentage points.

For the case studies, as shown in Table 3.2, rather than using interval variables, an ordinal variable was generated for changes in public opinion to create a smaller number of easier to understand categories for the case studies.

Table 3.2: Operationalisation of Changes in Public Opinion for Case Studies

Changes in Public Opinion	Jiji Poll Monthly Change
No Change	Less than 3% points
Minor Change	Greater than 3% points and Less than 6% points
Major Change	Greater than and equal to 6 % points

The variable for changes in public opinion consists of three categories. “No change” is any monthly change in the Jiji data less than three percentage points. “Minor change” is a monthly change greater than three percentage points but less than six percentage points. “Major change” is any monthly change greater than or equal to six percentage points.

Independent Variables

Threat was measured by conducting a content analysis of the *Encyclopaedia of Postwar Japan 1945-2004, 2nd edition* (Sasaki et al. 2005:1056-1100) and *Nihonshi Nenpyo Chizu* [Chronological Tables and Maps of Japanese History]

(Kodama 2008:36-49).²² The tables from these two sources provide an annual list of issues and events involving Japanese politics, economics, and international issues from 1945 to 2007. The rarity of threats to Japan involving the countries in the Jiji data make it possible to examine the entire universe of events. It was important to use a Japanese source to identify issues and events so only those that were likely to be relevant to the Japanese public were included. The assumption is that what appears in this list was also interpreted as an issue of concern by the Japanese public at the time that it occurred. A major advantage of using the list of events from these two sources is that they provide the exact month, rather than year, which can then be matched with the monthly public opinion poll data.

The unit of coding is the occurrence of an issue or event interpreted as a threat in a particular month. To identify months in which a threat was present, a content analysis was conducted of the two sources mentioned above to identify all cases in which an issue or event occurred involving one of the ten nations in the dataset. Events were coded as either a threat or not a threat to Japan. All issues and events not classified as threats and/or which did not involve the ten nations in the Jiji polls were discarded. After identifying all issues that could be interpreted as threats by the Japanese public, they were then classified into one of three types of threat: realistic; symbolic; or a threat to Japanese identity. The definitions of each are explained below.

First, realistic threats were defined as those issues and events that could pose a threat to Japan's security or economic interests. Examples included economic

²² A list of these events can be found in Appendix 1.

disputes between Japan and the United States, such as when the United States introduced safeguards against Japanese steel; the use or display of military force, such as when North Korea launched a missile over Japan; and infringements on Japanese sovereignty, such as the negotiations with the United States over the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty and the abduction of South Korean dissident Kim Dae Jung from a Tokyo hotel room.

Second, symbolic threats were defined as those issues and events that could be considered to be violations of the Japanese values of anti-militarism and anti-nuclearism. This included events such as nuclear tests; actions associated with the use of military force to settle an international dispute; and the killing of civilians, such as the Tiananmen Square incident and the shooting down of Korean Air Flight 007.

Third, threats to Japanese identity were defined as those issues that did not pose a threat to Japanese security but may have had a negative impact on Japanese citizens' self-esteem. These included criticism of Japan and Japanese leaders by foreign governments; diplomatic snubs, such as the sudden cancellation of a visit to Japan by Boris Yeltsin in 1991; and public anti-Japanese demonstrations.

The second independent variable, media coverage, was measured by counting the number of front page stories mentioning a threat in *Asahi Shimbun*. According to the World Association of Newspapers (WAN), in terms of circulation, *Asahi* is the second-largest paper in the world after only the *Yomiuri Shimbun*.²³ What appears

²³ According to WAN, in 2003, Yomiuri's circulation was 14,067,000 while Asahi's was 12,121,000. Available at: <http://www.wan-press.org/article2825.html> [Accessed 11 September 2009].

in headlines on the front page of *Asahi* is likely to reflect what also appears in other media sources. Although based on a study conducted in the United States on presidential approval, Edwards et al. (1995:119) argued that front page newspaper coverage was the measure most closely related to television coverage.

For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that what appears on the front pages of *Asahi Shimbun* reflects what appears in other Japanese media. Although not a direct measure of the concept of media coverage, short of asking citizens to identify those threats that they deemed salient at the time of the Jiji polls, front page news in *Asahi* provides a valid measure for a threat's salience from the perspective of Japanese citizens. The decision to use this as the measure for media coverage was based on Epstein and Segal (2000:72) who measured issue salience by examining what appeared on the front pages of the *New York Times*. They selected the *Times* as their source for content analysis because of its general readership and national orientation which meant that it was unlikely to be biased towards regional events, especially on the front page. I assume that these characteristics are also common to *Asahi*. In his study of media exposure and political participation in Japan, Flanagan (1996:278) called *Asahi Shimbun* the Japanese equivalent to the *New York Times* while Krauss (1996:246) identified it as Japan's leading newspaper of record. The centralised nature of Japan's media market should also increase the probability that what appears prominently in *Asahi* should also appear prominently in other media as well.

The unit of coding for media coverage was the individual news story. To measure the volume of media coverage of a particular threat to Japan, front page *Asahi Shimbun* articles from 1960 to 2007 were content analysed. For each of the cases

previously coded as a threat to Japan, a keyword search was used to count the number of articles appearing on the front page of the morning and evening editions of *Asahi* in a particular month that mentioned a threat in the text of the article. This produced an interval variable ranging from 0 and up. For example, if a particular issue that had previously been coded as a threat was mentioned in 20 *Asahi* front page articles then the measure for media coverage with regard to that particular issue was 20. The content analysis for media coverage comes from the *Asahi Kikizou II Bijuaru* database which contains the full text of all *Asahi* articles from 1945 to 1985 and the website *Asahi.com Perfect* which contains the full text for all *Asahi* articles for the years 1985 to the present. These two databases allow keyword searches and the sorting of articles based on their page number.

For the case studies, as shown in Table 3.3, an ordinal variable was generated to operationalise media coverage. For each category, the number of front page stories covering a particular threat was counted using the *Asahi Shimbun* data collected in the content analysis.

Table 3.3: Operationalisation of Media Coverage for Case Studies

Media Coverage	Number of Asahi Front-Page Stories on Issue
Low	0-5
Moderate	6-15
High	Greater than 15

Threats that received 0-5 front page stories were classified as having “Low” media coverage; those that received 6-15 front page stories were classified as having “moderate” media coverage; and those that received greater than 15 stories were classified as having “high” media coverage.

The manual coding of threats and media coverage has two methodological limitations. First, since the measure for threats was coded from two sources, some issues and events that the authors did not include may have been missed. To compensate for this shortcoming, the content analysis was conducted as carefully as possible and crosschecked with other sources. Second, and more problematic, is the question of the validity of the measure for media coverage. The use of individual articles as the unit of coding analysis means the effects of media coverage may be underestimated since no distinction is made between the length of articles, their position on the front page, whether they included photographs, maps or figures. However, since only a single source is used with a large number of cases, this should help to minimise random error caused by particular cases. In other words, the number of *Asahi Shimbun* front-page articles should capture the key concept of issues salience at a particular point in time. Nonetheless, caution is exercised in interpreting the magnitude of the effect of media coverage.

Analysis

The following section outlines how the variables were analysed. The purpose of each method is to examine the empirical evidence for evidence that the presence of events interpreted as threats were associated with increases in the Japanese public's negative perceptions of foreign nations. The analysis consists of time-series cross-sectional regressions, a series of comparative case studies, and an examination of trend data.

Time-Series Cross-Sectional (TSCS) Analysis

To estimate the effects of threat and media coverage, a total of six time-series cross-sectional analyses were conducted using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with country-specific and month-specific fixed effects. The dependent variable in each model was the monthly change in public opinion towards each foreign nation except Switzerland, which was dropped to avoid multicollinearity. Standard errors were robust clustered standard errors where clusters were countries. The total number of country-month observations was 5491 with 314 months in which a threat was present.

The fixed effects allowed for the control of all observable and unobservable country-specific and period-specific factors. Since country-specific factors, such as history, culture, geographical proximity to Japan, and political system, were included in the fixed effects, it was unnecessary to include other control variables. For example, any bias in the Japanese public's feelings towards democracies and non-democracies; Asian and Western countries; and specific nations such as North Korea, China, Russia, South Korea and the United States were all captured in the fixed effects.

The month-specific fixed effects captured any time-specific factors. The most important factor during the period of this study was the Cold War. Entman (2004) has suggested that in the United States, contemporary public opinion about foreign policy faces far greater uncertainty than during the Cold War because of the breakdown of a mental framework to understand international relations. The Japanese public may have been more sensitive to threats during the Cold War than

after because of the possibility this could lead to a wider conflict. On the other hand, actions that people took for granted during the Cold War, such as nuclear testing, may no longer have been seen as necessary in the post-Cold War period. Factors specific to Japan, such as differences in overall attitudes between the period of high economic growth until the first oil shock in 1973 or the impact of a specific prime minister and cabinet, were also captured in the month-specific fixed effects.²⁴ In short, since many factors can be controlled by fixed effects, this allows for a close focus on the two main variables of threat and media coverage.

For all six models, the dependent variable was changes in public attitudes towards a foreign nation. The generation of this variable was described in the section above. In the first three models, two independent variables were used. First, a dummy variable was generated for threat in which the presence of a threat by a particular country in a given month was coded as 1. In those months where threats were absent, threat was coded as 0.²⁵ Dummy variables for realistic threats, symbolic threats, and threats to Japanese identity were also created. For example, in the August 1968-Soviet Union intercept, threat was coded as 1 because of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and symbolic threat was also coded as 1 because this involved the use of military force and, therefore, violated the Japanese norm of anti-militarism. In another example, for the September 1998-North Korea intercept,

²⁴ In my models, the two types of fixed effects can control a range of factors. However, variables which are country-specific time-variant factors cannot be controlled in my specification. For example, this might include the effects of Vietnam War on only attitudes towards the United States or the war in Afghanistan on only attitudes towards the Soviet Union. Collecting such variables requires significant time and so is beyond the scope of this study. I leave this for future research.

²⁵ Since previous research has found that the mass public is inattentive to foreign affairs, I have no theoretical reason to expect any significant changes beyond random measurement error in public perceptions of a foreign nation in those months in which no threat occurred.

threat was coded as 1 due to the missile test over Japan and realistic threat was also coded as 1 because it involved a military threat to Japan.

Second, media coverage, an interval variable was measured by counting the number of front-page news stories from *Asahi* about a particular threat. In the last three models, the hypothesis that each of the three different types of threats and media coverage has a negative effect on public perceptions of foreign nations was tested. Since the research in political communication on agenda-setting suggests that media coverage is likely to moderate the effects of information, it is possible that an interaction effect between threat and media coverage may exist. It is also possible that the effects of each different type of threat are not constant. For instance, high media coverage of a realistic threat may have a greater or lesser effect on public perceptions than high media coverage of a symbolic threat. To examine this question, three interaction variables for each type of threat and media coverage were included in the model. For all models, since dummy variables for each country and each month were incorporated, no other control variables were included.

Case Studies

While the large-n analysis estimates the effects of threats on collective opinion change, it cannot explain what it is about threats that cause changes to actually occur. As a result, following the statistical analysis are a series of brief case studies mixing quantitative and qualitative data.²⁶ The impact on changes in Japanese

²⁶ These studies are informed by suggestions found in George and Bennett (2005) and Gehring (2007).

public opinion of the different types of threats to Japan and the levels of media coverage that they received are compared. Through a description of how the media framed particular events, a more nuanced understanding of the types of issues that the Japanese public tends to interpret as threats is presented.

To test whether a causal relationship exists between threats and changes in public opinion, evidence must be provided that such changes tend to occur in the same months as events and issues that can be classified as threats. Furthermore, to test whether media coverage has an impact on public opinion, evidence must be provided that those threats associated with greater changes in attitudes tended to receive higher media coverage than those threats associated with smaller changes in attitudes. In each case, alternative causal explanations for the changes were considered and, if possible, eliminated. Assuming that the effect of different types of threats is not constant, cases were classified into subsets of realistic threats, symbolic threats, and threats to Japanese identity. To understand why the Japanese public may have perceived an issue to be a threat, various sources of reliable media coverage at the time were examined, including *Yomiuri Shimbun* and its English counterpart, the *Daily Yomiuri*; *Asahi Shimbun*; Kyodo News; the *Japan Times*; and the *New York Times*.

The selection of cases for each type of threat was based on an operationalisation of the concepts of realistic threats, symbolic threats and threats to Japanese identity. Table 3.4 shows the operationalised definitions of each variable.

Table 3.4: Selection of Cases

Type of Threat	Operationalised Definition #1	Operationalised Definition #2	Operationalised Definition #3
Realistic Threats	Economic disputes	Threats to Japanese sovereignty	Threats to national Security
Symbolic Threats	Nuclear tests	Use or threat of use of military force	Killing of Civilians
Threats to National Identity	Criticism of Japan by foreign government	Violations of diplomatic protocol directed at Japan	Anti-Japanese demonstrations

For realistic threats, cases were operationalised as any issue in which Japan faced a threat to its economic or political well-being. This included economic disputes, threats to Japanese sovereignty, and threats to national security. For symbolic threats, cases were selected if they involved nuclear tests, the use of or threat to use military force against another nation, and the killing of civilians by a foreign government. For threats to national identity, cases were selected in which a foreign nation criticized Japan, a foreign nation violated diplomatic protocol, and anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Long-Term Trend Analysis

In the final part of the analysis, the long-term dynamics of Japanese public perceptions of foreign nations was examined by analysing the continuity and change in public attitudes toward each country. By examining trends between 1960 and 2007, it is possible to see whether or not Japanese collective opinion is stable and whether exogenous factors have long-term effects. Based on the assumption that the public pays greater attention to some nations than others, the countries

were divided into two categories, non-salient and salient. Public opinion about salient countries is expected to change with greater frequency than that of non-salient countries since citizens are exposed to a greater number of issues, some of them threats, and media coverage. Evidence that trends tend to regress to the mean following exogenous shocks will suggest that the effects of threats are only temporary.

To summarise, this study is concerned with empirically testing the four propositions outlined in the previous chapter. To do this, it is necessary to have operationalised definitions for changes in public attitudes about foreign nations; threats to Japan; and media coverage of threats to Japan. This chapter has outlined how each variable was operationalised and the methods used to test each proposition. In the next chapter, a large-n statistical analysis of the Jiji data is conducted to estimate the effects of threats and media coverage on public opinion.

4. Perceived Threats, Media Coverage and Monthly Changes in Public Perceptions of a Foreign Nation in Japan, 1960-2007

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to use a large-n analysis to estimate the effects of threats and media coverage on public perceptions of foreign nations in Japan. I argue that issues or events that the Japanese public perceives to be a threat cause increases in negative attitudes towards the foreign nation believed to be responsible. Although ordinary citizens in Japan do not generally spend much time thinking about foreign affairs, as shown by Baum (2002) in the case of the United States, a salient issue or event can encourage people to suddenly, but briefly, increase their attention to the world outside their borders. Since issues that activate emotions are most likely to attract their attention, it is logical to assume that citizens will take an interest in those events that elicit negative emotions, such as threats. As discussed in Chapter Two, psychologists have found that an external threat will produce a feeling of solidarity among an in-group and a feeling of psychological distance from the out-group believed to be its source.²⁷ This can turn into hostility as in-group members attempt to differentiate themselves from the out-group (Tajfel and Turner 2004). The presence of an external threat to Japan should produce negative changes among the public towards the foreign nation viewed as the source of the threat.

²⁷ For a review of this literature see Hewstone et al. (2002).

This chapter is divided into four sections. First, the propositions about threats, media coverage and changes in public opinion from Chapter Two are briefly reviewed. Second, a summary of the variables and the methods discussed in Chapter Two are presented and the hypotheses to be tested are introduced. Third, the descriptive statistics of the main variables are presented. Finally, the results of the analysis are shown and discussed.

Theoretical Propositions

Three of the four propositions presented in Chapter Two are applicable to the large-n analysis. First, Proposition 1 was that issues interpreted as threats produce increases in negative public perceptions of the nation viewed as responsible. When the public receives information about a foreign affairs issue or event that can be interpreted as a threat this is likely to generate negative emotions among citizens. Citizens will direct their emotions towards the nation viewed as the source of the threat and opinion will change.

Second, Proposition 2 was that high media coverage increases the magnitude of the effect of a threat on the Japanese public. Since citizens are confronted with a deluge of information about politics and international affairs, they face a high level of uncertainty as they attempt to discern what types of issues they should take time thinking about and which can be safely ignored (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). The main cognitive shortcut that people use to deal with uncertainty is to rely on cues from better-informed sources, namely the mass media (Zaller 1992). As suggested by the concept of issue salience, the media tells citizens what is important in political affairs. When an issue is salient, it will prime citizens to use it in their evaluations of the nation with which it is associated. Therefore, rather than additive

effect, it may be that threats and media coverage have an interaction effect. This possibility is examined in the analysis below.

Third, Proposition 3 was that each of the three different types of threats will all have a negative effect on public attitudes towards the nations involved. Scholars of intergroup relations have argued that the concept of threat is not unitary but can be classified into three types: realistic threats, symbolic threats, and threats to national identity (Riek 2006). Each of these should generate feelings of hostility towards their source. Although it is possible that the effects of these threats are not constant, the theoretical literature does not provide a guide as to which should have the greatest effect. This is an empirical question and one that I will attempt to answer in this analysis.

Review of Measures and Methods

A detailed discussion of the data and methods used in the following analysis can be found in Chapter Three. For the purpose of the statistical analysis, I briefly provide the reader with a summary explanation of each variable as follows:

Y —changes in public perceptions of a foreign country: Monthly change in the percentage of respondents in the Jiji polls for nine nations in the dataset. Switzerland was dropped to avoid multicollinearity.

X₁ - threat —dummy variable coded 0 for months in which an event likely to be perceived as a threat to Japan was absent and 1 for months in which such an event was present. Events were taken from a content analysis of the *Encyclopedia of Postwar Japan 1945-2004, 2nd edition* (Sasaki et al. 2005:1056-1100) and *Nihonshi Nenpyo Chizu [Chronological Tables and Maps of Japanese History]*

(Kodama 2008:36-49). The list of events coded as threats can be found in Appendix 1.

X_2 - *media coverage* —total number of front-page stories in *Asahi Shimbun* in a particular month covering a particular threat to Japan. The measure for media coverage for each threat can be found in Appendix 1.

X_3 - *realistic threat* —dummy variable coded 0 for months in which an event coded as a realistic threat was absent and 1 for months in which such an event was present. Realistic threats include those issues and events that could potentially affect Japan's resources, power and wellbeing such as trade disputes; military actions involving Japan; violations of state sovereignty by foreign actors; disputes over territory; and any injury or damage to Japanese citizens or property. Those events coded as realistic threats can be found in Appendix 1.

X_4 - *symbolic threat* —dummy variable coded 0 for months in which an event coded as a symbolic threat was absent and 1 for months that such an event was present. Symbolic threats constitute all references to events that did not directly involve Japan but did violate Japanese values, beliefs and worldview, including the killing of civilians; the use of military force; and the development or testing of nuclear weapons. Those events coded as symbolic threats can be found in Appendix 1.

X_5 - *threat to national identity* —dummy variable coded as 0 for months in which an event coded as a threat to national identity was absent and 1 for months that such a threat was present. Threats to Japanese identity include issues associated with non-material threats related to Japanese prestige, such as criticism of Japan by a foreign leader; diplomatic insults directed at Japan; and anti-Japanese

demonstrations. Those events coded as threats to national identity can be found in Appendix 1.

X_3X_2 *Realmedia* —interaction variable created with realistic threat and media coverage.

X_4X_2 *Symbolmedia* —interaction variable created with symbolic threat and media coverage.

X_5X_2 *Identitymedia* —interaction variable created with threat to national identity and media coverage.

Country Dummy —Dummy variables were included for each of the nine nations in the analysis to control for country-specific effects.

Year-Month Dummy —Dummy variables were included for each year-month to control for time-specific effects.

I conduct a total of six time-series cross-sectional analyses using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with country-specific and month-specific fixed effects. Standard errors were robust clustered standard errors where clusters were countries. For a more detailed discussion of the methods used in this analysis, please see Chapter Three.

Before continuing on to the analysis, it is necessary to point out four assumptions and limitations inherent in the data. First, even though the dataset contains a diverse set of issues and events, all types of threats are assumed to exert an effect of relatively similar magnitude on public opinion. Second, interpretations of the coefficients are conducted with some caution since the Jiji data are compositional.

Third, since the events were coded by the author, a certain element of subjectivity was involved in deciding which issues to classify as threats and which to exclude. A full list of events and their coding as realistic threat, symbolic threat, and threat to Japanese national identity can be found in Appendix 1. Fourth, the measure used here for media coverage is indirect rather than direct. The assumption is not that the entire Japanese public is reading *Asahi Shimbun* but that what appears on the front page is a reflection of the information that the general public is exposed to at that particular time. With these caveats in mind, the hypotheses to be tested are as follows:

H1: Threats have a negative relationship with changes in public perceptions of the nation involved.

H2: Media coverage has a negative relationship with changes in public perceptions of nations viewed as the source of a threat.

H3: Realistic threats, symbolic threats, and threats to identity all have a negative relationship with changes in public perceptions of the nation involved.

H4: Realmedia, symbolmedia and identitymedia all have a negative relationship with changes in public perceptions of the nation involved.

Threats and Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations

Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the magnitude of monthly changes in public perceptions of foreign nations using 5,491 country-month observations.

Table 4.1: Monthly Changes in Public Perceptions of Ten Foreign Nations by Threat, 1960-2007

	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Total	5491	0.00	2.83	-34.1	13.7
No threat	5177	0.20	2.56	-11.5	13.7
Threat	314	-3.25	4.57	-34.1	8.5
Symbolic	155	-3.53	5.25	-34.1	8.5
Realistic	122	-3.05	3.53	-13.1	5.5
Identity	37	-2.79	4.64	-15.3	3.7

Note: The observations are the change in the difference in the percentage of respondents who said they liked a particular country minus the percentage of respondents who said they disliked a country. **Source:** Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008) and Jiji polls. A list of threats can be found in Appendix 1.

The mean of changes in attitudes towards a foreign nation in months when no threat was present was 0.20 percentage points. The range of monthly changes in public opinion was large with variations between -34.1 and 13.7 percentage points. When a threat was present, the mean of change in attitudes was -3.25 percentage points. The greatest single month negative change in public perceptions of a foreign nation was -34.1 percentage points towards China in June 1989 following the Tiananmen Square incident. The greatest single month positive change in public opinion was 13.7 percentage points towards France in November 1995, a positive fluctuation that occurred just after it conducted its nuclear test and public opinion regressed back to the mean.

Each of the three different types of threats was also associated with negative changes in public perceptions of foreign nations. Symbolic threats were associated with the greatest magnitude of attitude change with a mean of -3.53 percentage points. As mentioned above, the greatest single-month change was towards China

following the events of Tiananmen Square. The most positive single-month change was 8.5 percentage points, coming despite a nuclear test by the Soviet Union in February 1962. The positive change suggests that the nuclear test may not have been the most salient information received by Japanese citizens at that time. The same month, the Soviets also released Francis Gary Powers, the American who was shot down over the Soviet Union in a CIA spy plane in 1960, so this may have been the issue that was at the top of most respondents' heads when the poll was conducted.

Realistic threats were associated with the second greatest magnitude of opinion change with a mean of -3.05 percentage points. The realistic threat associated with the greatest change in public perceptions of a foreign nation was towards North Korea following its testing of a Taepodong missile over Japan in September 1998 at -13.1 percentage points. The realistic threat that produced a positive change of 5.5 percentage points was towards the United States in October 1969, despite an acrimonious meeting over the return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty. Public attitudes towards the United States may already have been low just prior to these negotiations due to the Vietnam War and so the Jiji polls did not detect any change.

Threats to Japanese identity were not only much less frequent than either realistic or symbolic threats but were also associated with the smallest magnitude changes in public opinion at -2.79 percentage points. The largest single-month change in opinion was -15.3 percentage points towards China in August 2004 following the Asian Cup soccer match final in which Chinese fans booed the Japanese team and pelted them with bottles and other objects. The positive change in opinion of 3.7 percentage points was towards China, despite its criticism of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's visit to Yasukuni Shrine in January 2003. The decision to visit

Yasukuni suddenly and on New Year's Day, along with the limited foreign criticism by China and South Korea on this occasion, likely meant that the Japanese public was just not paying attention to this issue at this particular time. The positive change detected in the polls was probably nothing more than random error.

Threats and Media Coverage

Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics for media coverage of the three different types of threats.

Table 4.2: Media Coverage by Type of Threat, 1960-2007

	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Symbolic	155	33.88	42.72	0	295
Realistic	122	26.57	30.03	0	179
Identity	37	10.73	9.72	1	41
Threats	314	28.31	36.20	0	295
No Threat	5,177	0.00	0.00	0	0
Total	5,491	1.62	10.85	0	295

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008) and various *Asahi Shimbun*. A list of threats and the media coverage they received can be found in Appendix 1.

Between 1960 and 2007, the mean of front page stories in *Asahi Shimbun* of events classified as a threat was 28.31. Symbolic threats were the most salient with a mean of 33.88 front page stories in a single month. The maximum was 295 front-page stories in *Asahi* during the Indo-Pakistani War in September 1965.²⁸ Four symbolic threats to Japan attracted no front page stories in *Asahi*. Two of these involved bombing missions by the United States during the Vietnam War in February and December 1967. These may have been so common at the time that

²⁸ I wish to remind the reader that the measure for media coverage includes all front page stories in both the morning and evening editions of *Asahi Shimbun*.

they were not considered as worthy of prominent attention. The other two events did not involve any deaths and are even questionable as being defined as symbolic threats: the United Kingdom's mobilisation of its ships in the Persian Gulf to deter Iraqi President Abdul Karim Kassem from taking action against Kuwait following its independence in June 1961 and the US announcement that it was going to establish a new headquarters for military operations in the Middle East in December 1982.²⁹

Realistic threats also tended to attract relatively high levels of media attention with a mean of 26.57 front page articles in a month in *Asahi*. The maximum was 179 in November 1969 during the Sato-Nixon meetings over the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty. In contrast, the media gave little attention to trade disputes with the US over the export of electronic pagers in June 1983 and over accusations by the US that Japan was dumping steel in August 1983 and again in December 1984. None of these stories received even a single front page news story in *Asahi Shimbun*.

Media coverage of events that Japanese citizens perceived as threats to their identity tended to be much lower than either symbolic or realistic threats, with a mean of 10.73 *Asahi* front page stories. In September 1985, anti-Japanese demonstrations by students in China over the visit of Prime Minister Nakasone to Yasukuni Shrine attracted only a single front page story. In contrast, *Asahi* reported 41 front page stories during the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in April 2005. In sum, media coverage of events classified as threats tended to be highest

²⁹ I code the mobilisation of British ships in the Persian Gulf as a symbolic threat because it involves the possibility of military action. The same goes for the establishment of American bases and headquarters in the Middle East. Japan has a strong antimilitarist norm.

for symbolic threats and lowest for threats to national identity. In the next section, I estimate the effects of threats and media coverage on public attitudes towards foreign nations.

The Effect of Threats and Media Coverage on Changes in Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations

According to the first two hypotheses, both threats and media coverage should be associated with negative changes in public perceptions of foreign nations. Treating threat as a unitary concept, Table 4.3 shows the results of Models I-III which estimate the effects of threat and media coverage on public attitudes. Unless otherwise stated, all statistical significance is at the 0.1 per cent level.

Table 4.3: OLS Regression with Country and Month Fixed Effects for Aggregate Japanese Public Opinion about Nine Foreign Nations, 1960-2007

	I	II	III
Threat	-3.64*** (0.39)		-2.71*** (0.44)
Media		-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.00)
<i>N</i>	5491	5491	5491
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.08	0.06	0.09

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses where clusters are countries. All models include country fixed effects and month fixed effects. Switzerland has been dropped from the analysis to avoid multicollinearity.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls. A list of threats can be found in Appendix 1.

Model I shows that the presence of a threat in a particular month has a negative and statistically significant relationship to changes in public perceptions of a foreign nation. In those months that the Japanese public was exposed to information that a foreign nation's actions or communications could be interpreted as a threat, public attitudes towards the nation involved tended to drop by -3.65 percentage points. This is a relatively large increase in public opinion since most of the time public

opinion tends to remain stable. This suggests that without controlling for media coverage the presence of an issue interpreted as a threat is related to increases in negative public perceptions of a foreign nation.

Model II estimates the effect of media coverage on public opinion without including threat. The relationship is negative and statistically significant but the magnitude of the effect of media coverage is small. The fact that a single front page news story is associated with a change in public opinion of only -0.07 percentage points makes sense. Still, the finding that front page news stories in *Asahi Shimbun* have a negative and statistically significant effect on public perceptions of foreign nations does support the hypothesis that media coverage produce increases in negative perceptions of a foreign nation.

Model III estimates the effects of both threats and media coverage. Although the magnitude of the effect decreases to -2.71 percentage points, the presence of a threat still has a negative and statistically significant relationship to public perceptions of a foreign nation. This reduction in the size of the coefficient, however, does suggest that an important part of the explanation for the effect of threats on public opinion is the high media coverage that they tend to receive. However, even after controlling for this, the presence of an event perceived as a threat is still likely to have an impact on public opinion. This suggests that a large part of the effect of threats may come from how issues are framed by elites and the mass media. Furthermore, although smaller at -0.03 percentage points, the effect of media coverage remains negative and statistically significant, also suggesting that media coverage has a negative effect on public perceptions of a foreign nation.

The findings in each of the three models are consistent with the first two hypotheses. First, threats have a negative relationship with changes in public perceptions of a foreign nation. Second, media coverage also has a negative relationship with changes in public perceptions of a foreign nation. It is important to note, however, that this does not tell us what it is about the presences of threats that produce change in collective opinion. Since citizens do not directly experience international events, as Entman (1989) argues it is more likely how the media and political elites frame a particular issue that play a significant role in determining the extent to which a particular issue is viewed as a threat. This question will be examined further in the case studies.

The Effect of Realistic Threats, Symbolic Threats, Threats to Japanese Identity, Media Coverage on Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations

To test the third and fourth hypotheses, it is necessary to subdivide the cases in to the three categories of threat identified in the literature on intergroup relations and to estimate the effects of each type of threat. Since it is also possible that the effects of a threat on public attitudes may be moderated by the level of media coverage that it receives, three interaction variables are included. A type of threat that receives low media coverage may be less likely to have as strong an effect on public attitudes as when it receives high coverage. The results of the statistical analysis can be found in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4: OLS Regression with Country and Month Fixed Effects for Aggregate Japanese Public Opinion about Foreign Nations, 1960-2007

	IV	V	VI
Realistic Threat	-3.46*** (0.28)		-2.34*** (0.23)
Symbolic Threat	-3.91*** (0.49)		-2.95*** (0.59)
Threat to Identity	-3.18** (0.74)		-1.54 (0.95)
Realmedia		-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.00)
Symbolmedia		-0.05** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Identitymedia		-0.23*** (0.04)	-0.15** (0.04)
<i>N</i>	5491	5491	5491
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.08	0.07	0.10

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses where clusters are countries. All models include country fixed effects and month fixed effects. Switzerland has been dropped from the analysis to avoid multicollinearity.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls. A list of threats can be found in Appendix 1.

Model IV shows that the relationship between each type of threat and changes in public perceptions of a foreign nation are negative and statistically significant although threats to identity are significant at the 1 per cent level. Symbolic threats had the strongest relationship with an average change in public attitudes of -3.91 percentage points. Even though such events may not involve Japan, a foreign nation which violates Japanese values may become the target of hostility among its citizens. Realistic threats had the second strongest effect on public attitudes with an average change of -3.46 percentage points. As would be expected if the public is rational and concerned with its wellbeing, those issues and events that could harm or weaken Japan elicit negative emotions. Threats to Japanese identity also had a negative effect on public opinion with an average change in monthly opinion of

-3.18 percentage points. The smaller size of the effect may have to do with the fact that such events and issues tend to receive lower levels of media coverage than either realistic or symbolic threats. Another reason could be due to the fact that such issues tend to only involve communications rather than actions and, therefore, are less salient.

Model V shows that the relationship between each of the interaction variables and changes in public perceptions of a foreign nation are negative and statistically significant. However, the interaction between symbolic threats and media coverage is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Interestingly, the strongest effect is the interaction between threats to identity and media coverage at -0.23 percentage points. This suggests that the effect of a threat to identity may not be constant but gets stronger when media coverage is higher. The magnitude of the interaction effect in cases of realistic threats is -0.08 percentage points while in cases of symbolic threats it is -0.06 percentage points. These findings suggest that an interaction effect is at work and that as media coverage increases so does the effect of each threat on public opinion.

Model VI include each type of threat and the interaction variables. Consistent with expectations, the effects of each type of threat and each interaction variable is negative. However, the effects of all variables are not statistically significant. The direct effects of realistic threats and symbolic threats are statistically significant but threats to identity are not. It may be that without media coverage, threats to identity have no impact on public opinion. Unlike realistic threats and symbolic threats, threats to identity tend to involve the interpretation of communications rather than actions. Such events may require much higher levels of media coverage for them to become salient than those that involve more easily interpretable actions.

The direct effect of a symbolic threat on public attitudes is strongest at -2.94 percentage points and a realistic threat is -2.34 percentage points. Since both of these types of threats tend to involve actions with low levels of ambiguity, they may be more easily interpreted by citizens and so will tend to have an effect on public opinion even without media coverage. The impact of these types of threats may come from how they are framed and from the fact that they are likely to attract elite debate. Although threats to identity are not statistically significant, the findings do support the hypothesis that symbolic threats and realistic threats have a negative relationship with public perceptions of foreign nations.

The fact that the interaction variables all have a negative and statistically significant effect on public opinion supports the fourth hypothesis. However, it should be noted that the interaction between symbolic threats and media coverage and threats to identity and media coverage are significant at the 1 per cent level. Interestingly, the effect of the each type of threat does not appear to be constant. The effects of both realistic threats and symbolic threats were greater when media coverage was high, -0.04 percentage points and -0.03 percentage points respectively. However, the magnitude of this effect in cases of national identity is much larger. Higher volumes of media coverage of such threats are associated with a change in public perceptions of -0.15 percentage points. This may be because when media coverage is high, threats to national identity may elicit a more emotional reaction than the other two types of threat because it activates nationalist sentiment. While low levels of media coverage of a threat to national identity, such as an insult to the nation or an anti-Japanese demonstration, may be ignored as nothing more than cheap talk or an event that can be ignored because it has no effect, higher media coverage may send a signal to citizens that the honour of the

Japanese nation has been infringed upon. Evidence of this interaction effect is an important finding and one that makes the study of public opinion and foreign policy more complicated.

Discussion

While much of the public opinion and foreign policy literature has quite understandably focused on long-term trends in public opinion, relatively less attention has been given to examining the causes of short-term opinion change. Since we have such little understanding of this phenomenon, it is necessary, at least for now, to include exogenous variables in any analysis because short-term public opinion change is most likely to be mainly reactive. Therefore, in addition to building on the work of public opinion and foreign policy, it may also be useful to reexamine the literature in psychology, especially that on intergroup relations and attitudes, to identify those exogenous variables likely to have an impact on public opinion (Hewstone et al. 2002; Ajzen 2001). Furthermore, it is especially important to understand not only what causes changes in collective opinion but also to understand what causes opinion to change in a particular direction. The concept of threat, derived deductively from the literature on intergroup relations, predicts that when exposed to a threat the direction of public opinion change will be negative. Empirically this appears to be the case.

The effects of media coverage on public opinion are subtle. Once media coverage is removed, the magnitude of the effects of all three types of threats goes down, but especially for threats to Japanese identity. Instead of a direct effect, media coverage appears to moderate the effects of a threat. This is not the first time such an effect has been detected. The media has been found, for example, to be able to affect evaluations of presidential candidates by reporting on crime (Valentino 1999).

Although all three types of threats were found to have a negative effect on public perceptions of a foreign nation, the greatest effect was found in media coverage of threats to national identity. As such threats could be considered as activating ethnocentrism, high media coverage of such issues may lead citizens to feel a direct threat to their self-esteem (Grant 1993). For example, information that Chinese or South Korean leaders have made comments deriding Japan is likely to be ignored if media attention is low. However, high media coverage may be able to whip up populist sentiment and lead to an increase in negative perceptions of those nations.

Although the variable for threat captures numerous factors that are difficult to measure quantitatively, such as how an issue is framed by the mass media and political elites, not much is known as to what exactly it is about a particular threat that moves public opinion. Is it the event itself, how the event is reported, or how political elites respond? For now, the claim here is limited to the empirical finding that perceived threats are associated with negative changes in public opinion. In the case studies in the following chapters, what it is about a particular threat that leads to collective opinion change will be examined.

While this chapter has presented a big picture view of changes in public perceptions of a foreign nation, I have said nothing about particular cases or the dynamics of long-term collective opinion change. As I pointed out, while I have shown that the presence of a perceived threat is associated with a negative change in public opinion towards a foreign nation, little is known about what causes an issue to be perceived as a threat in the first place. For the reader to get a good idea of how threats and media coverage interact with one another to activate public opinion, it is necessary to examine specific cases. In the next three chapters, the methodological approach switches to qualitative case studies that allow for the

examination of the process by which specific events classified as threats actually lead the Japanese public to increase negative feelings towards a foreign nation. The framing of events and issues by political elites and the mass media is found to be essential.

5. Realistic Threats to Japan and Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations

Introduction

The goal of the following three chapters is to build on the findings in the statistical analysis. The primary purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether cases of realistic threats to Japan tend to be associated with negative changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved. Realistic threats involve those issues and events that threaten an in-group's physical or material wellbeing; political and economic power; or existence (LeVine and Campbell 1972). The first argument is that realistic threats will produce negative changes in public perceptions of the nation viewed as its source because this activates negative emotions such as anger and fear. When two groups compete with one another over scarce resources, this can lead to an increase in in-group solidarity and out-group hostility. As applied to this study, the proposition that realistic threats to an in-group can produce hostility towards an out-group suggests that perceived realistic threats to Japan should produce an increase in negative public perceptions of the nation viewed as the source of the threat. Realistic threats are divided into three groups: economic disputes; violations of Japanese sovereignty; and threats to Japan's national security. The second argument is that those cases of realistic threat that receive higher media coverage should produce changes in public attitudes of greater magnitude. This occurs because a threat's salience is likely to increase the percentage of respondents who are aware of it. As a result, opinion will change.

The unit of analysis in this chapter is the individual case. As throughout this study, realistic threats are exogenous variables identified by a content analysis of Sasaki et al. (2005) and Kodama (2008). I define a case of realistic threat as any of the following three types of issues. First, “economic disputes” are any issue perceived as a conflict over economic issues, such as trade or access to natural resources. Second, “violations of Japanese sovereignty” are those issues involving illegal intrusions into Japanese waters and territory and those long-running conflicts with other nations over the sovereignty of Japanese territory. Third, “threats to national security” are those issues perceived as military threats, such as a direct military attack on Japan or any kind of military activity that sends a threatening signal.

As discussed in Chapter Three, the dependent variable for the case studies is change in public opinion. This is an ordinal variable classified as “no change”, “minor change” and “major change”. The main independent variables are the presence of a realistic threat to Japan and media coverage of the threat. Media coverage can be classified into “low”, “moderate”, or “high”. For more on how these variables were coded, see Chapter Three.

Hypotheses


This chapter is concerned with testing the following two hypotheses. First, cases of realistic threat should be associated with negative changes in Japanese public perceptions of the nation involved. Second, cases of realistic threats that receive high media coverage should have a greater effect on public attitudes towards the nation involved than those that receive low media coverage. These hypotheses are tested with cases involving the three types of realistic threats: economic disputes, threats to Japanese sovereignty, and threats to Japanese security.

Economic Disputes

In the following section, I argue that economic disputes between Japan and another country will tend to produce negative changes in Japanese public attitudes towards the other country. This is derived from Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT), which suggests that competition between groups for scarce resources can be a major factor in producing hostility. For example, threats to economic wellbeing have been shown to have a negative effect on attitudes towards immigrants (Zarate et al. 2004). Cases of economic disputes should be associated with changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved. Furthermore, cases of economic disputes that receive higher media coverage should be correlated with changes of greater magnitude in public opinion.

Using interval variables, Figure 5.1 shows a negative, but weak, relationship between the number of front page stories in *Asahi Shimbun* about a threat and changes in public opinion. A list of these cases can be found in Appendix 2.

Figure 5.1: Front Page Stories of Economic Disputes and Change in Public Attitudes toward Nation Involved, 1960-2007



N=28

Note: Cases are listed in Appendix 2.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

Although the relationship does not appear to be strong, media coverage of economic threats is associated with negative changes in public perceptions of the country involved. An example of a typical case of an economic dispute was a bilateral dispute over steel (Case 1) which received 0 front page stories and was associated with a change in opinion of -0.2 percentage points towards the United States. Another example of an economic dispute was a trade dispute over beef and citrus (case18), which received 26 front page stories but was associated with a change in attitudes towards the United States of only -2.1 percentage points in April 1984. One case of exceptionally high media coverage was the negotiations over fishing rights which received 147 front page stories and was associated with a

change in attitudes towards the Soviet Union of -11.1 percentage points in April 1977. Front page media coverage of economic disputes appears to usually be quite low and the magnitude of changes in attitudes appears to be quite small. Still the effect of such disputes and media coverage does appear to be negative. This provides some support for the argument that economic disputes are associated with negative changes in public opinion.

Using ordinal variables, Table 5.1 shows the effect of media coverage on public opinion in 28 cases of economic threats.

Table 5.1: Economic Disputes, Media Coverage and Changes in Japanese Public Perceptions of the Nation Involved, 1960-2007

	High	Moderate	Low	Total
Major Change	2 (15.38)	0 (0)	0 (0)	2 (7.14)
Minor Change	2 (15.38)	5 (50)	0 (0)	7 (25)
No Change	9 (69.23)	5 (50)	5 (100)	19 (67.86)
Total	13 (100)	10 100	5 100	28 100

Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 2 for list of cases. "Major Change" and "Minor Change" both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the variables were generated.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

The data show that in quite a few cases of economic threats, public opinion towards the country involved did change. Nine of the 19 cases were associated with negative changes in public opinion. Given that such events are not likely to be very

salient to the mass public, this is an interesting finding. Regarding the effect of media coverage, examining the row marked “Major Change”, it does appear that cases that received higher media coverage were also those associated with high media coverage. It appears that occasionally economic threats are associated with changes in public opinion and that higher levels of media coverage are associated with greater changes in opinion.

Low Media Coverage

Even when an important Japanese industry is threatened with disproportionate sanctions, if media coverage is low, this is unlikely to result in a change in public opinion if media coverage is low. An example of this was a trade dispute between Japan and China in 2001 that began when the Japanese Government introduced temporary safeguards on imports of leeks, shiitake mushrooms and *igusa* rushes, most of which come from China (“China duties loom as major threat”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 20 June 2001, p.22).³⁰ Even though the Japanese sanctions involved only agricultural products, China retaliated against high-value Japanese manufactured goods, placing 100 per cent punitive tariffs on imports of cars, mobile phones and air conditioners (“China and Japan tackle trade row”, *BBC News*, 3 July 2001).³¹ Chinese agricultural goods affected by the safeguards were only worth approximately \$100 million USD while Japanese goods affected by the Chinese tariffs were worth \$700 million USD (“Japan-China trade row lives on”, *BBC News*, 8 November 2001).³² This dispute received relatively low media coverage,

³⁰ Case 4 in Appendix 2. *Igusa* rushes are used to make *tatami* mats. Japanese investigators found that China had increased its exports of leeks to Japan by nine per cent between 1999 and 2000. As a result, domestic prices dropped by 12 per cent.

³¹ Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1419480.stm> [Accessed 4 May 2009].

³² Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1644491.stm> [Accessed May 4, 2009]

attracting attention only when it began and when it ended. In June 2001, the month in which the dispute received the greatest attention, Japanese attitudes towards China did not change. This suggests that the public did not see this issue as a salient threat. One reason may be that a topic like WTO safeguards is quite distant from the world of most Japanese citizens. Without media coverage to tell them that it is important, it is unlikely to be given much attention, much less activate emotions like anger or fear.

Another instance in which an economic dispute was limited to a particular industry was in March 2002 when the United States placed tariffs on steel products, including those from Japan, due to accusations that they were dumping steel on the US market at unfair prices. The Japanese government retaliated by raising tariffs on steel, benzene, textiles, leather products and other imports from the United States. In Japan, the restrictions on steel were believed to be a cynical concession by President George W. Bush to protectionist sentiment in the American steel lobby. According to the *Daily Yomiuri* ("U.S. steel decision move in right direction", 6 December 2003, p.4), "the Bush administration's latest decision was a calculated move linked to his re-election bid." However, this issue seems to have barely registered with the Japanese public. Jiji reported no change in attitudes towards the United States in March 2002. Although those in the steel industry may have been concerned with this issue since it affected their livelihood, without media coverage, concern over this issue was not likely to spread to the wider Japanese population.

Various other examples of economic disputes between Japan and the United States suggest that such events are not salient to the wider Japanese public. The United States accused Japan of dumping steel but in August 1983 and December 1984,

two months in which this was a salient issue, attitudes towards the United States did not change. Sometimes, the disputes would be over electronic products, such as when Washington accused Japan of dumping pagers. However, in June 1983, the month in which this issue was salient, attitudes towards the United States did not change. Despite the fact that each of these cases involved sectors of the Japanese economy facing potential damage, they appear to not have been interpreted as threats to Japan. As a result, public opinion towards the United States remained stable.

Moderate Media Coverage

Even many economic disputes that receive moderate media coverage were not associated with changes in public attitudes. While such disputes may generate some negative feelings towards the other country involved they are usually unlikely to be salient beyond those in the affected industry. Such disputes are unlikely to involve the activation of emotions either unless they involve some kind of nationalist frame. For example, in February 1980 a dispute erupted between the US and Japan over Japanese automobile exports when the representative for the United Autoworkers (UAW), Douglas A. Fraser, visited Japan for talks with Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi and Japan's four major car manufacturers to encourage greater investment in auto assembly plants in the US ("U.A.W. talks in Japan ended", *New York Times*, 15 February 1980, p.D8)³³. Fraser threatened Japanese carmakers that he would go to the American Congress and lobby for the introduction of legislation to limit Japanese imports ("Fraser bids Japan build cars in U.S.", *New York Times*, 14 February 1980, p.D1). Although the threat of

³³ This is Case 6 in Appendix 2.

limiting imports on cars may have had an impact on Japanese exports, and, therefore, the Japanese economy, the Jiji polls did not report any change in attitudes towards the United States in February 1980. Since the effect of any limits on Japanese cars was unlikely to have a significant effect on citizens beyond those in the automobile industry this dispute would not have been viewed as a threat to Japan. As a result, public opinion did not change.

However, some economic disputes that received moderate media coverage were associated with negative changes in attitudes towards the nation involved. In December 2003, after the United States announced its first suspected case of Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Washington State, Japan immediately halted all beef imports from the US.³⁴ At the time, these imports accounted for approximately 30 per cent of all Japanese domestic beef consumption (“U.S. BSE report hits retailers”. *Daily Yomiuri*, 25 December 2003, p.2).³⁵ The day after the announcement of the ban, the media reported that Japan was now facing a beef shortage. The Japanese restaurant and supermarket industries quickly expressed concern about the economic impact of this on their business. In December 2003, the month of the dispute, the data show that public attitudes towards the United States experienced a minor negative change of -4.7 percentage points.

Blame for the “BSE problem” was placed squarely on the United States with the *Daily Yomiuri* (“Stop dangerous imports at the water's edge”, December 25, 2003, p.4) writing that the source of the problem was “the laxity of the screening system in the United States, where only cows suspected of having contracted the disease

³⁴ Case 8 in Appendix 2.

³⁵ Two large Japanese restaurant chains, Yoshinoya and Matsuya, used primarily American beef in their *gyūdon* (rice topped with seasoned beef).

are subject to screening.” Feeling that their health was potentially threatened, the Japanese public agreed with their Government’s decisions to screen imported beef from the United States as shown in a *Yomiuri Shimbun* poll which found that 71.3 per cent of respondents supported the decision (“*Bei-BSE-gyu, zentoukensa ‘hitsuyou’ 9 wari / Yomiuri Shinbunsha zenkoku yoronchousa*; [Ninety percent agree to screening of all beef from US / *Yomiuri Shimbun* poll]” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 24, 2004, p.9). The Japanese public was concerned about this issue and it was salient.

Public attitudes towards the United States were associated with a minor negative change in December 2003. Although this was an economic issue—the banning of an agricultural import—it was framed by political leaders and the mass media as a health issue. Japan has historically been highly sensitive to its food safety with domestic stories of tainted food products often eliciting a strong reaction from citizens. It was the framing of this dispute as a health concern, rather than an economic dispute, that was likely responsible for the minor change in public opinion. Without the health aspect of the case, the decision to ban an American agricultural product like beef would likely have had little impact on public opinion. One implication may be that those domestic interest groups that frame issues such that citizens link trade to public health may be at least partly responsible for generating negative perceptions of a foreign nation.

High Media Coverage

Even though an economic dispute receives high media coverage, it is unlikely to have an effect if it remains solely about its effects on a particular industry. In 1968 and 1969, at a time when tensions were extremely high between Japan and the US

over first, the Vietnam War and second, the issue of Okinawan sovereignty, the two nations became locked into a dispute over whether limits on Japanese textile exports to the United States should be voluntary or mandatory (“U.S. and Japan push hunt for a textile agreement”, *New York Times*, 10 November 1970, p.67).³⁶ This issue was particularly important to some Japanese political and business leaders because of a growing fear of rising protectionist sentiment in the American Congress. The US wanted Japan to place mandatory restraints on its exports of textiles while the Japanese domestic textile lobby wanted to make such restraints voluntary.

Despite the high media coverage of this dispute and the involvement of both Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon, however, the Jiji polls did not report any change in Japanese attitudes towards the United States. One reason for the lack of public opinion activation may have been that this was only one of three major issues that Japan was concerned about with regard to the US. If neither the Vietnam War nor Okinawa were salient at the time then it is possible that the textiles dispute may have resonated with citizens. As suggested by Converse (1964), citizens can only consider a limited number of items on the national agenda at any one time. However, another possibility is that—like many of the economic disputes discussed above—the Japanese public just did not find this issue to be a serious threat to the nation as a whole. While American limits on textiles would certainly have an effect on that industry, and the involvement of top political leaders also signalled its importance, Japanese citizens just did not see this issue as a threat to their economic wellbeing. The result was opinion stability.

³⁶ Case 26 and Case 27 in Appendix 2. For a detailed analysis of this dispute see Destler et al. (1979).

Even when media coverage is high, disputes with other nations that revolve primarily around economic issues are unlikely to affect public attitudes towards the other country. Requests for aid packages from foreign nations that were rejected by the Japanese Government were not associated with any changes in public opinion. For example, in 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro made the first visit to South Korea by a Japanese leader since diplomatic relations were established between the two nations to discuss the continued negotiations between South Korea and Japan over a long-term loan ("Foreign Minister Abe discusses ROK loan issue", Kyodo, 5 January 1983) and in March 1993, Japan refused to approve an aid package to post-Soviet Russia, resulting in heavy criticism especially from French President Francois Mitterand and German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel ("Rebuts criticism of aid stance", Kyodo, 22 March 1993).³⁷ Despite high media coverage, public attitudes towards South Korea did not change in January 1983 and attitudes towards Russia did not change in March 1993. Media coverage by itself does not appear to be able to generate a sense of threat from economic issues. Most cases of requests for Japanese aid in which the Japanese Government refused did not tend to elicit an emotional reaction from citizens probably because they were simply not interpreted as serious threats.

Although sometimes it may appear that trade disputes between Japan and the United States are tinged with emotions, even with high media coverage, the typical trade disputes between the two countries that arose in the 1970s and 1980s did not tend to be associated any change in Japanese opinion about its main trading partner. For example, a dispute in late 1977 and early 1978 over the Japanese imports and

³⁷ These are Case 17 and Case 21 in Appendix 2.

the US trade deficit intensified but produced no change in opinion.³⁸ Other examples of economic disputes that did not correlate with a change in public opinion were a dispute between the US and Japan over beef and citrus fruit exports and a 1985 bill to limit Japanese imports into the US.³⁹ Even with high media coverage, trade disputes do not appear to be interpreted as threats to the nation and, therefore, do not have much of an effect on public evaluations of foreign nations.

A disagreement over Japanese aid to South Korea in September 1981 was associated with a minor change in public opinion of -4.7 percentage points⁴⁰. Suffering severe economic problems, Seoul requested from Japan a \$6 billion USD package in economic aid to support a five-year development plan to help its recovery ("Tokyo and Seoul again fail to agree on aid", *New York Times*, 13 September 1981, p.27). However, based on the grounds that South Korea was providing peace and stability on the Korean peninsula that was also of great benefit to Japan, South Korea insisted that the 1965 agreement on the normalisation of relations between the two nations be renegotiated and that South Korea should receive better terms (Roeder, B., 1981. "Japan's rift with South Korea", *Newsweek*, 14 September, p.21). Although Seoul was emphatic in linking the aid to its military policy directed towards North Korea, Japan objected to this.

The negative change in public opinion was likely a result of Japanese anger over the South Korean Government's tone in its demands and the rather unreasonable call for the renegotiation of a treaty that both nations had signed more than 15 years earlier. Although disagreeing with the South Korean position on this issue,

³⁸ Case 24 and Case 25 in Appendix 2.

³⁹ Case 18 and case 20 in Appendix 2.

⁴⁰ Case 19 in Appendix 2.

Japanese elites attempted to prevent the escalation of the dispute. The deputy secretary of the LDP, Minowa Nobaru, rejected South Korea's claims of Japanese free-riding and stated that Japan was already contributing to the defence burden in East Asia, especially with regard to the protection of sea lanes ("LDP's Minowa raps ROK economic aid argument", Kyodo, 19 August 1981). He clearly argued that first, it was unconstitutional to lend foreign aid to another nation for its defence and second, Japan's current fiscal situation prevented Japan from doing more. However, in spite of rejecting South Korean demands that aid be linked to defence matters, Japan was still enthusiastic about extending further aid to South Korea ("Suzuki-no meeting", Kyodo, 21 August 21 1981). Policymakers continually emphasised in their rhetoric that they wanted to give as much support to South Korea as possible. Despite the efforts by Japanese elites, however, the Japanese public was nonetheless likely unhappy with South Korea. This case suggests that even though Japanese political elites may attempt to prevent a dispute from escalating it can still activate public opinion. Other nations making economic demands in what can be interpreted as an arrogant manner are likely to elicit feelings of hostility.

While disputes that focus on only on trade or economic aid may not be perceived as threats to Japan, those that receive high media coverage and are linked to nationalist issues can elicit a strong negative reaction from the public. One example of this was the disagreement between Japan and the Soviet Union over a long-running dispute related to the rich fishing grounds off Hokkaido, Japan's northernmost prefecture.⁴¹ Local fishermen had complained for years that Soviet boats were fishing off the coast of Japan and, since 1968, had been sending large

⁴¹ Case 28 in Appendix 2.

trawler fleets into Japanese waters to catch sardine and mackerel ("Sea limit extension to cause problems with USSR", Kyodo, 27 January 1977).⁴² Not only would the larger Soviet trawlers sometimes damage Japanese nets and boats but they were also believed to be responsible for the decline in fish stocks.⁴³ In 1977, the Soviet Union unilaterally announced that it was increasing its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), also known as the 200-mile limit, so that it would encroach on Japanese waters. Japan responded to the Soviet action by engaging in a series of highly acrimonious high-level negotiations over the issue of access to the fishing grounds that fell within the EEZ but were also close to the disputed Northern Territories.⁴⁴ Tokyo insisted that the Soviets stop interfering with its fishing boats in the area while Moscow demanded that discussions of herring and salmon be excluded from the talks ("Suzuki raps USSR's excluding salmon, herring from talks", Kyodo, 15 March 1977).

This dispute, which only directly involved the small number of fishermen in Hokkaido whose catches were affected by Soviet actions, was correlated with a major negative change in public attitudes towards the USSR of -11.1 percentage points in April 1977.⁴⁵ One reason for that this issue may have had an impact was that media coverage of this dispute was extremely high. More importantly,

⁴² In 1977, it was reported that the Soviets had approximately 100 fishing boats catching fish in Japanese waters.

⁴³ Although Japan and the Soviets had negotiated a system for damage reparations, it had not yet come into effect. By 1977, the Japanese side had mounted 710 claims for damages but the Soviet committee responsible for such claims had approved of only two. Further infuriating Japanese fishermen was the fact that the Soviets would occasionally seize Japanese vessels, such as on February 4, 1977 when patrol boats held the No. 53 *Taihei Maru*, a 124-ton dragnet fishing boat with 20 crewmen operating in the Japan Sea ("Soviet patrol boat captures Japanese fishing boat", Kyodo, 4 February 1977).

⁴⁴ One reason for the high level of media coverage was the fact that the dispute was not only economic but also involved national sovereignty. However, while public opinion may have been influenced by nationalist considerations, the heart of the dispute was over access to economic resources.

⁴⁵ After the shooting down of Korean Airlines 007 in 1983, this was the second-largest single month change in Japanese attitudes towards Russia or the Soviet Union between 1960 and 2007.

however, was that while economic issues were involved, the dispute also involved the Soviet Union, a nation that the Japanese public had long viewed negatively and with a high level of distrust. This may have affected the public's perception of the negotiations. Furthermore, since the issue was linked by Japanese policymakers to the Northern Territories issue this may also have led citizens to view it in nationalistic terms, therefore, eliciting an emotional reaction. In short, various factors other than the solely economic aspects of this dispute were also salient at the same time. Once these emotions were activated, in what was once a case involving Hokkaido fishermen, came to be interpreted as a threat to the interests of Japan.

To summarise, the case studies suggest that those economic disputes linked to wider issues, such as health and national pride, are associated with negative changes in public attitudes towards the nations involved while those disagreements that involve primarily trade or development aid are not. It does appear that many economic issues are not interpreted as realistic threats to the nation. In some ways, it is surprising that citizens do not respond to issues that may affect their wellbeing. For example, trade barriers by the United States could damage Japanese industry which could then damage the wider Japanese economy. On the other hand, most of the economic disputes that involve Japan and other nations are likely to affect only a limited number of individuals. Unlike a missile threat from North Korea, safeguards from China on Japanese imports are probably not going to elicit much of an emotional response. Those cases that were associated with opinion change, such as the BSE dispute or the fishing negotiations with the Soviet Union, involved issues other than the economic dispute. For an economic issue to have an impact, it


may be necessary for it to be involved in a wider sense of threat beyond its solely economic aspects.

Violations of National Sovereignty

The following section addresses the question of whether or not violations of Japanese sovereignty by foreign actors are associated with changes in Japanese public opinion about the nation involved. Citizens should be concerned with the territorial integrity of their state because this involves the basic organising principle for order in international relations since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. For the purpose of this study, violations of national sovereignty can be classified into two general groupings. One set of issues involves disputes over territorial claims between Japan and other nations. This involves long-running issues such as the Senkaku Islands dispute with China, the Takeshima dispute with South Korea, and the Northern Territories issue with Russia. The other type of violations of sovereignty involve foreign actors entering Japanese territory without permission to commit covert or illegal acts, such as the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea and the abduction of Kim Dae-Jung by the Korean CIA in 1973. Since citizens are concerned with the sovereignty of their nation, such cases should be associated with negative changes in attitudes towards the nation involved. Higher media coverage should be associated with greater changes in opinion.

Figure 5.2 suggests a negative relationship between media coverage and changes in public perceptions of the nation involved in a violation of national sovereignty. A list of these cases can be found in Appendix 3.

Figure 5.2: Front Page Stories of Violations of National Sovereignty and Change in Public Attitudes toward Nation Involved, 1960-2007



N=33

Note: Cases are listed in Appendix 3.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

A relatively large number of cases are found near the fitted line. Higher levels of media coverage were correlated with changes in public perceptions of the country perceived to be responsible. A typical case of low media coverage was discussions between Japan and South Korea over Takeshima in February 1972 (Case 7) which received eight front page news stories and was correlated with a change in public opinion of -1.7 percentage points. A typical case of high media coverage was a dispute between Japan and China that escalated over the Senkaku Islands in May 1978 (Case 28). This received 64 front page stories and was associated with a change in opinion of -5.1 percentage points. The largest outlier was the case in which Chinese police entered the Japanese consulate in Shenyang without

permission in May 2002 to capture a family of North Korean refugees. This suggests that in addition to the media coverage and anger over this dispute, other factors were also involved in this large change in opinion. Figure 5.2 suggests that higher media coverage of sovereignty disputes is associated with increases in negative attitudes towards the other nation.

Table 5.2 shows the relationship between media coverage and threats to Japanese sovereignty using ordinal variables.

Table 5.2: Violations of National Sovereignty, Media Coverage and Changes in Japanese Public Perceptions of the Nation Involved, 1960-2007

	High	Moderate	Low	Total
Major Change	5 (27.78)	0 (0)	1 (20)	6 (18.18)
Minor Change	10 (55.56)	0 (0)	1 (20)	11 (33.33)
No Change	3 (16.67)	10 (100)	3 (60)	16 (48.48)
Total	18 (100)	10 (100)	5 (100)	33 (100)

Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 3 for list of cases. “Major Change” and “Minor Change” both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the variables were generated.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

As can be seen examining the column marked “Total”, 17 of 33 cases coded here as threats to Japanese sovereignty were associated with minor or major changes in public attitudes. This is a relatively high number. Furthermore, as can be seen in the row labelled “Major Change”, five cases of major changes in opinion was associated with high media coverage while only one case of low media coverage

was associated with a major change in public opinion. This supports the argument that higher media coverage of threats to national sovereignty produces larger changes in collective opinion. Below I examine in some more detail selected cases in which media coverage was low, moderate and high.

Low Media Coverage

Cases of sovereignty disputes with low media coverage do not usually produce changes in public opinion. One example of a sovereignty dispute that was not correlated with any change in public opinion in June 2005 was a stand-off between the Japanese and South Korean coastguards over a South Korean eel-fishing boat's entry into Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) near Tsushima, an island close to Nagasaki that is often the source of disputes between Japan and South Korea.⁴⁶ With two Japanese coast guard officers conducting an inspection on board, the Korean ship suddenly fled into the South Korean EEZ. This resulted in a standoff between the Japanese and South Korean coastguards, both of which claimed jurisdiction over the ship ("Japan, ROK coast guards end 2-day standoff", *Daily Yomiuri*, 3 June 2005, p.1). After two days, the issue was resolved peacefully.

One of the probable reasons for the lack of opinion activation was the fact that political elites on both sides had incentives to downplay the dispute, resulting in low levels of media coverage. According to the *Daily Yomiuri* ("Govt treads gently to avoid S. Korean Toes", 4 June 2005, p.3), both the Japanese and South Korean Governments were preparing for a summit between the two nations and so both had an interest to resolve the dispute peacefully. The quickness with which the

⁴⁶ Case 5 in Appendix 3. Tsushima is not to be confused with Takeshima, the island over which Japan and South Korea have their most serious sovereignty dispute.

incident was resolved and the lack of government rhetoric framing the issue as a serious threat meant that the media did not have much reason to continue their reporting. Although somewhat dramatic, a minor dispute such as this in which elite frames downplayed the incident and which media coverage was low meant that it was unlikely to be perceived as a serious threat to Japan.

Minor infringements of Japanese territory do not tend to activate nationalist feelings or anger among the general public. One sovereignty issue that appears on the national agenda from time to time is that of the Senkaku Islands, a small group of islands south of Okinawa that have long been the source of a dispute between Japan, China and Taiwan. As stated by Japanese Foreign Minister at the time, Aso Taro, “the Senkaku Islands are Japanese territory both historically and in the eyes of international law” (“Senkaku area not in China gas proposal/Japan seeks compromise”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 11 March 2006, p.1). In March 2004, seven Chinese activists landed on Uotsurijima, one of the Senkaku Islands, to reinforce China's territorial claims.⁴⁷ The activists were quickly arrested by Japanese authorities, taken to Okinawa, and then deported. These moves angered Chinese nationalists in Beijing who staged small protests in front of the Japanese embassy demanding the return of the activists and Japan's removal from the Senkaku Islands (“Anti-Japanese protests push Beijing to take hard line”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 28 March 2004, p.3). The Chinese embassy in Tokyo accused Japan of “abducting” the activists when they were placed under arrest.

However, despite the fact that the Chinese activists appeared to have had some support from their Government, Jiji did not report any change in public attitudes

⁴⁷ Case 6 in Appendix 3.

towards China in March 2004. The main reason for this was probably the restrained reaction by the Japanese Government and the lack of media coverage that followed. Despite the potential for chest-thumping nationalist rhetoric, Japanese leaders framed this issue as purely a legal matter. Japan treated this crisis as mainly a matter of international law—beginning with the assumption that the islands were part of Japan—and made strong efforts not to escalate it. Most statements by Japanese officials repeated the assertion that the islands were an inherent part of Japanese territory but, other than that, made no moral judgments. Koizumi's order to the Cabinet Secretary in charge of crisis management was "deal with it according to the law, and make sure there are no accidents" ("12 hours behind the scenes", *Asahi Shimbun/Asahi Evening News*, 27 March 2004). This calm approach by both China and Japan meant that media coverage quickly evaporated once the activists were deported. Had Japan taken more aggressive action against the men or had China increased its rhetoric, then the media may have had greater opportunity to increase their coverage and to frame the issue in more nationalistic tones. Without inflammatory statements by political leaders, however, media coverage soon subsided. The framing of the event by Japan as a minor legal dispute and the low media coverage that it received were likely the main reasons for the lack of salience and, therefore, lack of attitude change. The Japanese public appears to react rather reasonably to minor infractions by private individuals over peripheral territory.

Minor infringements of Japanese sovereignty that receive low media coverage are unlikely to produce any change in public opinion about the nation involved. For example, in April 1999, two unidentified ships believed to be of North Korean origin were spotted in Japanese waters and ordered to stop by the Maritime

Self-Defense Force (MSDF).⁴⁸ The Japanese Government suspected them of being part of a North Korean operation to transport spies, picking up North Korean agents in Japan, or gathering intelligence (“Were ships on N. Korean spy mission?”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 25 March 1999, p.2). This infringement on Japanese territorial waters was taken seriously by Tokyo, which sent a letter to the North Korean mission at the United Nations in protest (“Govt to protest over boat incident”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 31 March 1999, p.1).⁴⁹ Japanese elites were certainly concerned about this issue.

However, despite the elite rhetoric and the fears elicited by the image of mysterious ships lurking along the Japanese coast, public attitudes towards North Korea did not change in April 1999. Although the Japanese public may have been concerned about North Korean actions, the minor nature of this infringement and the lack of media coverage meant that it was insufficient to activate public opinion. In spite of public comments and rhetoric by political elites, all things considered, the public responded quite reasonably to an incursion in which no one was injured and no property was damaged.

High Media Coverage

Various cases of sovereignty disputes that received high media coverage were associated with minor changes in public attitudes. For example, one issue that has consistently produced minor changes in negative public opinion towards Russia/the Soviet Union when it became salient is the Northern Territories issue. This dispute concerns the sovereignty of a group of islands taken by the Soviets in the closing

⁴⁸ Case 3 in Appendix 3. I treat this as a violation of Japanese sovereignty rather than a threat to national security because the emphasis by the Government and the media was on the legality of the ships being in Japanese waters rather than whether they posed a direct threat to Japan.

⁴⁹ This letter was returned to Japan unopened.

days of World War II. Both nations have engaged in numerous discussions with one another over this issue but are no closer to resolving it. Yet the numerous official meetings that attracted high media coverage such as in October 1973, July 1992, and April 1993, only resulted in minor changes in public opinion of -3.7 percentage points, -5 percentage points, and -4.8 percentage points.⁵⁰ Various other territorial disputes between Japan and China and Japan and South Korea have also received high media coverage but only produced minor changes in public opinion. For example, a dispute over the Senkaku Islands attracted high media coverage but was associated only with a minor change in attitudes towards China of -5.1 percentage points in May 1978. A dispute with South Korea just prior to the normalisation of relations in October 1965 was correlated with a change in attitudes of -6 percentage points.⁵¹

Cases of violations of Japanese sovereignty that receive high media coverage are often associated with major changes in public opinion. Much has been written elsewhere about the relationship between media coverage, public opinion, and the North Korean abductions issue so it will only be briefly mentioned here.⁵² On September 17, 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro made a historic visit to Pyongyang in an attempt to engage in talks that could lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea. A stumbling block for relations between the two nations had long been the issue of the abductions of Japanese citizens from Japan by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. As the *Daily Yomiuri* ("No rush to normalize ties", 10 October 2002, p.15) put it in an editorial, "the abductions were

⁵⁰ These are cases 16, 18 and 23 in Appendix 3.

⁵¹ These are cases 28 and 31 in Appendix 3.

⁵² Case 30 in Appendix 3. There are many ways to view the abductions issue but, for the purpose of this dissertation, I treat them as a violation of Japanese sovereignty. Many Japanese also saw them as a violation of basic human rights norms but I treat them as most importantly a violation of Japanese sovereignty and a realistic threat to Japanese citizens.

a blatant infringement of Japan's sovereignty". At the summit, although Kim Jong-Il admitted to the abductions, Japan was strongly dissatisfied by the fact that North Korea did not give this issue a high priority and then told Koizumi that eight of the abductees had died. In October 2002, the month after the Pyongyang summit and the month in which five of the abductees returned to Japan, attitudes towards North Korea changed by -7.5 percentage points.

This brazen violation of Japanese territory and mistreatment of its citizens as a part of North Korean policy elicited strong negative emotions from Japanese citizens. The elite rhetoric attacking North Korea and the constant media coverage meant that it was highly salient. The dominant frame included a narrative of random Japanese citizens being plucked from their families and taken away to North Korea where they were forced to train spies. It was simple and so easily understood by even those citizens unlikely to be attentive to foreign policy. The anger of the families over the abductions of their relatives was also something most Japanese could relate to. The negative emotions over this issue quickly turned into hostility towards the source of this threat, North Korea. In October 2002, one month after Koizumi returned to Japan from Pyongyang, public opinion towards North Korea experienced a major negative change.

The abduction of even a single person from Japanese territory may be sufficient to produce negative attitudes towards an entire country, especially if media coverage is high. On August 8, 1973, Kim Dae-Jung, the leader of the South Korean opposition Democratic Party and opponent of the authoritarian President Park Chung-Hee, was abducted by a group of five Korean agents from his Tokyo hotel room ("Korean Reported Abducted in Tokyo; Friend says 5 seized foe of President

Park”, *New York Times*, 9 August 1973, p.8).⁵³ After drugging him, the abductors loaded Kim on to a boat and took him back to South Korea. After strong protests from Japan and the United States, Kim reappeared unharmed five days later at this family home in Busan. The Japanese Government was furious and explicitly claimed jurisdiction over the case because Japanese laws concerning kidnapping were broken and South Korean government agents had violated national sovereignty (Halloran, R., 1973, “Report by Seoul on kidnapping worsens breach with Tokyo; Kim's return asked”, *New York Times*, 30 August, p.10). Despite denials by the South Korean government of any involvement, and even a request by Seoul that Japan investigate the disappearance, police soon found evidence that the first secretary of the South Korean embassy in Tokyo was actually present at the kidnapping (Halloran, R., 1973, “Seoul receptive to a U.N. debate to face the North, Foreign Minister says talks with North cited a compromise is hinted”, *New York Times*, 6 September, p.11). The dispute, and therefore, media coverage, escalated further when Seoul refused to accept Japanese demands that it take responsibility for the incident (Halloran, R., 1973, “Tokyo rejects Seoul offer in kidnapping”, *New York Times*, 3 September, p.36).

In September 1973, the month after the abduction, Jiji reported a change in attitudes towards South Korea of -5.9 percentage points. This was an event in which the original frame of the abduction was likely to anger Japanese citizens and elite rhetoric by both Japanese and South Korean leaders were also bound to increase negative feelings. Japanese policymakers and the media establishment expressed moral outrage over the fact that the South Korean spies had posed as

⁵³ Case 32 in Appendix 3. These agents were later found to be members of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).

diplomats and that a neighbouring country would conduct so brazen an act as abducting a well-respected democratic leader. The escalation in tensions because of the Japanese Government's reaction to the abduction, which included several statements by high-ranking figures including the Minister of Justice, coupled with the South Korean Government's belligerent and clumsy reaction, ensured high levels of media coverage for almost two months. The dominant frame was clearly one in which this issue was interpreted by the Japanese public as a threat to Japanese sovereignty. The major change in public opinion in the two months following this event, and the lack of other salient issues at the time, strongly suggest it was the primary cause of this change.

Another case of a violation of Japanese sovereignty associated with a major change in opinion occurred on May 8, 2002 when a group of five North Korean asylum seekers in the northeast Chinese city of Shenyang suddenly rushed into the Japanese consulate.⁵⁴ Without first seeking the permission of consular officials, the Chinese police officers pursued the asylum seekers, entering the consulate and physically dragging them out. Video from security cameras showed startled Japanese diplomats failing to block the Chinese police as they removed the North Koreans, with one consular employee even going so far as to pick up one police officer's hat off of the floor and handing it back to him.

In May 2002, Jiji reported a major change in attitudes towards China of -12.8 percentage points. The Japanese public was already unhappy with China due to the high tension between the two nations over the visits by Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine. The Japanese Government's angry response to the incident in Shenyang

⁵⁴ Case 24 in Appendix 3.

attracted high levels of attention from the mass media.⁵⁵ The incident was framed as a violation of the Vienna Convention's granting of extraterritorial status to diplomatic missions.⁵⁶ This included visual images of the event which showed the Chinese police entering the grounds of the consulate and physically pulling the asylum seekers out. Media coverage continued for a month after the actual events due to the diplomatic standoff between Japanese policymakers demanding an apology for the incident and China's refusal to give it. Along with the high media coverage, the already antagonistic feelings towards China and the anger over what many saw as weak Japanese diplomats giving in to stronger Chinese police were all factors that contributed to the increase in negative opinion towards China. This threat produced a major change in public perceptions of China.

Issues that involve territory considered to be an integral part of Japan are likely to elicit strong negative emotions towards any nation perceived as a threat to this. Such a case involved negotiations in the late 1960s between Japan and the United States over the reversion of Okinawa back to Japanese sovereignty.⁵⁷ In the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty, the US did not agree to return Okinawa back to Japanese sovereignty. In November 1969, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and President Richard Nixon met for a summit, with Sato stating that he was staking his political life on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan (Oka, T., 1969, "Sato stakes career on return of Okinawa to Japan", *New York Times*, 8 November, p.2). Just

⁵⁵ Prime Minister Koizumi stated that he wanted "China to respond in all sincerity" and that the actions were a violation of the Vienna Convention ("Koizumi insists China hand over 5", *Daily Yomiuri*, 10 May 2002, p.1). He also demanded that China hand over the five asylum seekers to Japanese custody, which they eventually did.

⁵⁶ According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963: "The authorities of the receiving State shall not enter that part of the consular premises which is used exclusively for the purpose of the work of the consular post except with the consent of the head of the consular post or of his designee or of the head of the diplomatic mission of the sending State."

⁵⁷ Case 33 in Appendix 3.

prior to going to Japan, the American Senate passed a resolution that the President would require the Senate's "advice and consent" before allowing for the return of Okinawa. In order to achieve Okinawan reversion, Sato was forced to make numerous concessions on its sovereignty to the United States. Basically, he wanted the bases in Okinawa to fall under the same rules as other bases in Japan especially with regard to the need for Japanese permission whenever they were to be used in a conflict. On the other side, the United States was deeply concerned about what effect this would have on the Vietnam War if, as expected, it was still being waged at the time of the proposed reversion in 1972.

The meetings between Sato and Nixon over Okinawa in November 1969 were associated with a major negative change in public attitudes towards the United States of -6.8 percentage points while another high level meeting in May 1969 was associated with a major change in attitudes of -9.2 percentage points. The main reasons for the opinion change were the massive amounts of media coverage that this issue received and its emotional effects. The negotiations between Sato and Nixon were deemed to be so important to Japan's national interest that they even received higher media coverage in November 1969 than the dominant issue of the day, the Vietnam War. Both the Japanese Government and people saw Okinawa, and its people, as an inherent part of the Japanese nation-state and were angered by the fact that the US was using its bases in Okinawa to launch bombing raids against Hanoi. Furthermore, the public was unhappy with the deal brokered by Japan's leaders. The joint Nixon-Sato communiqué which emerged from the negotiations, and which outlined the conditions of Okinawan reversion to Japan, left many in Japan feeling highly dissatisfied. It was highly ambiguous as to the presence of nuclear weapons in Okinawa and whether or not B-52s would require prior permission

from the Japanese government before they were launched. Both Japan and the US also agreed to keep American bases at their current levels. The chief executive of the Ryukus, the highest ranking government official for the people of Okinawa, expressed the feelings of many when he said that “a real reversion means restoration of all constitutional rights to the Okinawan people” (“Accord on reversion to Japan leaves Okinawans dissatisfied”, *New York Times*, 22 November 1969, p.14). The anger and frustration over the Okinawa issue, along with its salience, produced major negative changes in public opinion towards the United States.


In conclusion, it appears that sovereignty disputes can produce negative changes in public opinion towards the nation involved. This is especially likely when media coverage is high. Although citizens do not appear to respond to minor infringements of sovereignty, especially those involving non-governmental actors, they will respond to major infringements by government officials. Illegal actions within Japanese territory by foreign governments are especially likely to elicit a negative response. The public is much more sensitive to threats to integral Japanese territory, such as Okinawa, than it is to those associated with those peripheral islands like Takeshima and the Senkakus. Arguably, this is reasonable. The findings suggest that Japanese citizens want their nation’s territorial boundaries to be respected and react with hostility towards those nations that violate this principle. Such perceived threats, especially how they are framed by the media and political elites, can be a cause of negative changes in public perceptions of the nation involved in the violation.

Threats to National Security

In the final section of this chapter, I address the question of whether or not threats to national security have an impact on Japanese public opinion about the nation involved. I argue that events that the Japanese public as a threat to Japanese national security will tend to produce an increase in negative public perceptions of the country that is the source of the threat. Empirically, the presence of a threat to national security should be correlated with negative changes in public opinion about that nation. Furthermore, as the media affect issue salience, higher media coverage of such threats should be associated with greater changes in public perceptions than lower levels of media coverage.

Figure 5.3 suggests a negative relationship between the number of front-page stories in *Asahi Shimbun* and public attitudes towards the nation involved in the dispute. A list of these cases can be found in Appendix 4.

Figure 5.3: Front Page Stories of Threats to National Security and Change in Public Attitudes toward Nation Involved, 1960-2007



N=6

Note: Cases are listed in Appendix 2.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

Although there are only six cases, the relationship between media coverage and changes in public opinion appears to be negative. As media coverage increases, so too do changes in public perceptions of the country involved. A typical case of low media coverage was the test of a long range-ballistic missile by China in August 1999 (Case 1). This received two front page news stories and was associated with a change in public opinion towards China of -2.5 percentage points. A typical case of higher media coverage was the sinking of a North Korean ship by Japan in December 2001 (Case 4). This event received 18 front page stories and was correlated with a change in public perceptions of North Korea of -7.1 percentage points.

Two outliers involved North Korea. One was the Taepodong missile test by North Korea over Japan in August 1998 (Case 5) which received 31 front page stories and was associated with a change in public attitudes towards North Korea of -13.1 percentage points. As to be expected by an event that attracts large amounts of rhetoric from political elites and commentary in the mass media, factors other than media coverage appear to have been highly influential on public opinion. The other was the North Korean missile tests in the Sea of Japan in July 2006 which despite 40 front page stories in *Asahi Shimbun*, were correlated with a smaller change in public opinion of -7.1 percentage points. Public perceptions of North Korea were already very low at this point so any change in public opinion may not have been detected in the polls. It is also possible that unlike the case of the Taepodong test in 1998, citizens were less surprised by North Korea's actions in 2006.

In all six cases of threats to Japanese security, public opinion turned negative and in three of them, the change was greater than -5 percentage points. Greater change also appears to be associated with higher media coverage. Taking into account the small number of cases from which to draw any conclusions, media coverage does appear to explain some part of the changes in Japanese public opinion following threats to national security.

Table 5.3 shows the relationship between media coverage and changes in public opinion following threats to Japanese security.

Table 5.3: Threats to National Security, Media Coverage and Changes in Japanese Public Perceptions of the Nation Involved, 1960-2007

	High	Moderate	Low	Total
Major Change	3 (100)	0 (0)	0 (0)	3 (50)
Minor Change	0 (0)	1 (100)	0 (0)	1 (16.67)
No Change	0 (0)	0 (0)	2 (100)	2 (33.33)
Total	3 (100)	1 (100)	2 (100)	6 (100)

Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 4 for list of cases. “Major Change” and “Minor Change” both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the variables were generated.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

Although the sample is small, the majority of cases of threats to Japanese security were associated with changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved. Of the six cases, three were associated with a major change in public attitudes and one was involved in a minor change in public attitudes. Cases that received higher media coverage were also associated with changes in opinion of greater magnitude. The row marked “Major Change” shows that three cases of major change in public opinion were related to high media coverage and none with low media coverage. Though not conclusive, these findings do suggest that first, a number of cases of threats to Japanese security were associated with major changes in public attitudes and second, higher media coverage was associated with changes of greater magnitude. Representative cases are examined in greater detail below.

Low Media Coverage

The Japanese public does not respond strongly to minor threats to national security which receive low levels of media coverage. As in violations of national sovereignty, even though elite rhetoric may be high, citizens are unlikely to respond to those events that are not intended to be threatening signals. One such case was the August 1999 test by China of a long-range ground-to-ground missile on which some in the Japanese security community expressed concern about.⁵⁸ This test was viewed with concern because it was conducted amid high levels of rhetoric in China over claims about a campaign by Taiwan to declare formal independence. Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo stated that he was “paying close attention to the incident” and Foreign Minister Komura Masahiko said that the incident was “not favourable” given the desire to reduce weapons of mass destruction (“Komura concerned”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 4 August 1999, p.1). For some in the defence community, the missile test was a signal of China’s growing military capabilities and, therefore, an act that could have consequences for Japanese security in the future. Despite the fact that such a test could have been perceived as a threat to Japan and a signal of China’s military power, public attitudes towards China that month did not change. The low volume of media coverage was likely a major factor. Furthermore, unlike the North Korean missile tests, the Chinese test was not interpreted as an intentional signal directed at Japan. According to one Japanese official, “It was conducted in China, not like the North Korean (missile) that flew over the Sea of Japan” (“Japan plans to convey concern over China’s missile test”, Japan Economic Newswire, 3 August 1999). Despite the potential for

⁵⁸ Case 1 in Appendix 4.

it to be perceived as a threat, the missile test was not related to any change in public perceptions of China in August 1999.

Another case of a threat to Japan that was not associated with any change in Japanese public opinion was the discovery that the Soviet Union had built bases near Hokkaido. In September 1979, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that the Soviet Union was building a new facility on the island of Shikotan, one of four islands retained by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. The US reported a division-size force of 10 000 to 12 000 troops on four islands claimed by Japan 64 kilometres off the northern Japanese coast ("Defence Agency on USSR troops on northern islands", Kyodo, 26 September 1979). Japan lodged a diplomatic protest over this issue but the Soviet Union responded to Japanese concerns by stating that it was free to construct military bases anywhere on its territory ("Soviet troops on islands off Japan", *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 29 September 1979).

Despite the fact that the base was built so close to Japan, on a disputed territory, and during the Cold War, this was not associated with any change in Japanese public opinion. The main reason for this lack of opinion activation was probably the issue's low level of salience. The Japanese Government reacted to the news of the Soviet actions calmly and made no efforts to escalate the issue. Media coverage was also low. Although the Soviet forces may have posed an objective threat to Japan, in 1979, it was unlikely that many people thought that the plan was invasion. Without any cues from political elites or the media, the public may have just not paid great attention to the Soviet bases or seen them as particularly threatening. The lack of change in opinion in the cases of the Chinese missile test and the

Soviet bases suggests that the Japanese public is not apt to panic when other nations engage in behaviour that could be interpreted as somewhat provocative.

Moderate Media Coverage

A minor negative change in Japanese attitudes towards China of -3.7 percentage points in November 2004 was associated with a report that a Chinese submarine had been detected in Japanese waters near Okinawa.⁵⁹ After confirming the submarine was of Chinese origin, the government formally protested to Beijing and demanded an apology (“Govt demands apology from China over sub”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 13 November 2004, p.1). One senior officer of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) described the intrusion of the Chinese Navy nuclear submarine as a possible attempt to flex China's naval muscles (“China may have been flaunting its power”, *Daily Yomiuri*”, 12 November 2004, p.3). According to an editorial in the *Daily Yomiuri* (“Beef up MSDF's ability to patrol nation's waters”, 11 November 2004, p.4), “if the latest intrusion was indeed made by a Chinese submarine, it will clearly demonstrate that China is becoming a real threat to Japan in areas surrounding Japan...China is expanding the activities of its marine research vessels under its state strategy of becoming a naval power”. One reason for the opinion change was likely the moderate media coverage that it received. However, part of the reason for the change may have been due to the fact that tensions between China and Japan were relatively high during the years of the Koizumi Cabinet. The elite rhetoric, media coverage, tense relations between the two nations, and the fears of military vessels in Japanese waters were likely all factors in generating antagonism towards China.

⁵⁹ Case 3 in Appendix 4.

High Media Coverage

Three cases of security threats to Japan, all involving North Korea, were associated with major changes in public opinion. Japanese attitudes towards North Korea experienced a major change in the month following a naval battle between the Japanese coast guard and a North Korean “spy ship”. As discussed earlier, for many years, the Japanese public had been concerned about North Korean ships operating in Japanese waters for the purposes of intelligence gathering and drug smuggling. In December 2001, the Japanese coast guard chased a North Korean spy vessel operating in Japanese waters and after a dramatic gun fight, the North Korean ship sank with all aboard killed.

Jiji reported a major change in public attitudes towards North Korea in January 2002 of -7.1 percentage points. High media coverage likely played an important role in whipping up public sentiment against North Korea. The fact that this involved North Korea, a nation that is generally disliked in Japan anyway, was also likely a factor. Past concerns about “spy ships” probably also primed the public to react negatively. More nationalistic elements of the Japanese media used this event to slam the Government’s capability to protect Japan and deal with military crises. The *Daily Yomiuri* (“Coordination, hard laws vital to nation's security”, 25 December 2001, p.3) stated: “The case of the suspected North Korean spy vessel detected in the East China Sea off the coast of Amami-Oshima island poses questions concerning the government's ability to patrol territorial waters and deal with security emergencies”. Japanese policymakers who had long been concerned about the issue of North Korea were also intent on making a public statement about this issue. The ship was raised and placed on display in Tokyo at the Museum of Maritime Science (“North Korean spy ship goes on public display”, *Daily Yomiuri*,

25 May 2003, p.3). The dramatic nature of the “shoot out on the high seas” and the rhetoric by elites and members of the media advocating more hawkish foreign policy towards North Korea framed the issue in a way that it resonated with Japanese citizens. As a result, negative public emotions were activated and attitudes towards North Korea turned negative.

Another case of a threat to Japanese security which received high media coverage and which was associated with a major negative change in public attitudes towards North Korea of -7.1 percentage points occurred in 2006, the same month that it provocatively launched six missiles into the Sea of Japan.⁶⁰ These included short-range Scud-C missiles, intermediate-range Rodong missiles, and one intercontinental missile believed to be capable of reaching the United States. The Japanese media reported that various ferries and fishing boats were operating in the Sea of Japan at the time of the tests and that citizens on the coast of the Sea of Japan were concerned that missiles could target nuclear power plants (“Nation reacts to launch of missiles/North Korean move triggers annoyance, bewilderment across Japan”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 6 July 2006, p.2). The Japanese Government responded strongly to this provocation, launching an official protest and halting remittance payments from North Koreans in Japan to their home country (“Govt planning 'stern action,' sanctions”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 6 July 2006, p.3). The UN Security Council was also asked to adopt a resolution condemning North Korea. The linkage in the minds of the Japanese public to the Taepodong launch eight years earlier was also certainly a factor. This combination of the nature of the event itself, the high media coverage and the framing of the issue as a threat by the Government and the mass media produced feelings of hostility towards North

⁶⁰ Case 6 in Appendix 4.

Korea. These missile tests and the reaction of Japanese elites and media were likely responsible for the negative change in public opinion towards North Korea in July 2006.

The final case of a military threat to Japan which received high media coverage was the launch of a Taepodong missile by North Korea into the seas between Russia and Japan. This was associated with major attitude change towards North Korea of -13.1 percentage points in August 1998. Rhetoric by Japanese elites played an important role in generating feelings of fear among the public. The Japanese Government was surprised by the North Korean action and concerned that it did not possess an independent monitoring system to warn of hostile missile launchings, instead relying on Washington for such information. Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo said that "Japan's people are extremely anxious and I am deeply worried" while Foreign Minister Komura Masahiko stated, "our relations with North Korea are going to be more severe than they have ever been" (Kageyama, Y., 1998, "Missile raises fears about Asian security, military ships sent", Associated Press, 1 September). In the days following the missile test, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka expressed concern about the re-election of Kim Jong-Il as Chairman of the National Defense Commission, telling a news conference that he was "worried that military power will take a greater position in North Korea" ("Japan frets over N. Korea's 'militaristic aspect'", Japan Economic Newswire, 7 September 1998). A *Daily Yomiuri* editorial on 3 September 1998 ("N. Korea act calls for firm response", p.6) called the act "outrageous" and demanded an explanation and apology from North Korea. The hostility directed towards North Korea was likely a product of fear that it could strike Japan anytime it wanted and

anger that it could act so brazenly. Elite rhetoric and media coverage meant that this issue was going to be salient and, thus, public opinion was activated.

To conclude this section, the evidence that many threats to Japanese security do tend to be followed by a change in public opinion towards the nation involved suggests that such threats can produce changes in public perceptions towards the nation involved. The findings also support the hypothesis that when media coverage is high, it will be associated with greater changes in public attitudes towards a foreign nation. This makes sense since these issues involve life and death. The public of any nation would be concerned with external threats to its security. But given Japan's geographic position and its non-democratic neighbours, it is hardly surprising that a sense of vulnerability is activated when a foreign nation engages in threatening behaviour. That being said, citizens do appear to respond rationally when threats involve only minor issues or events and media coverage is low, such as the cases of the Chinese ballistic missile test and the construction of the Soviet bases. Despite possible threats to their nation, and the attempts by some political elites to garner support for more hawkish policies, the Japanese public does seem to be rather rational.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown through a series of case studies and the use of the Jiji poll data that realistic threats to Japan are often associated with negative changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved. Of course, not every realistic threat is going to be associated with changes in public attitudes about a foreign nation. Collective opinion about a country is a product of complex factors, not only salient issues. Furthermore, the data used in this analysis are not always going to be able to detect changes in public opinion because it is an aggregate measure. For

example, if a nation is already viewed negatively then it may be difficult to detect the public's response to a particular event.

However, the findings do suggest that Japanese citizens often, if not always, respond to realistic threats with the result that public attitudes change negatively towards the nation involved. This is especially likely to be the case when events are inherently salient, such as a North Korean missile test over Japan or negotiations over Okinawa, and when political elites and the mass media frame events in such a way that they generate an emotional response from citizens. When it comes to short-term opinion change, it seems that issues interpreted as threats are essential in giving elites the opportunity to push their policy preferences on to the national agenda. It was also interesting to find that Japanese citizens do not seem to panic in their responses to realistic threats. In only a few cases were the magnitude of change in public attitudes exceptionally large. In sum the findings in this chapter support the propositions guiding this study—realistic threats can produce negative changes in public attitudes towards foreign nations and media coverage moderates this effect. The next chapter examines whether symbolic threats also are associated with negative changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved.

6. Symbolic Threats to Japan and Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations

Introduction

In the following chapter, I argue that issues or events interpreted as symbolic threats to Japan produce negative changes in public perceptions of the nation involved. As discussed in Chapter Two, the notion of symbolic threat begins with the premise that feelings of difference between groups can arise from perceived distinctions between the in-group and the out-group over morals, values, standards, beliefs and attitudes (Tajfel and Turner 2004). People value those beliefs that are part of their group identity because they want to feel as if this links them to the worldview of their group. To make the distinction between symbolic and realistic threats, realistic threats are about the desire to achieve group outcomes while symbolic threats are associated with conflict related to one group believing that they are better than the other. Scholars of symbolic racism theory, for example, have proposed that negative attitudes towards an out-group are not the product of competition or conflicting goals but rather conflicting values and beliefs (Feldman and Huddy 2005). Any issue that is perceived to violate this worldview should be perceived as a threat and, therefore, generate hostility towards the source of the threat.

As applied to this study, the proposition that threats to the in-group produce antagonism towards the out-group suggests that those issues that the Japanese public perceives as symbolic threats should produce an increase in public hostility towards the nation involved. In response to a violation of Japanese norms, citizens


will attempt to differentiate themselves from the other nation, leading to derogation. This derogation will produce negative feelings towards the nation viewed as the source of the threat. The magnitude of the effect of these feelings will be moderated by media coverage, with higher media coverage making a symbolic threat more salient and causing a greater change in collective opinion.

Public hostility towards a foreign nation is a result of the belief that a foreign nation violates, and therefore threatens, those values important to the mass public. For the purpose of this chapter, I assume that events will be interpreted as symbolic threats if they are seen to violate the Japanese norms of anti-militarism and anti-nuclearism.⁶¹ Although I do not make the claim that Japanese citizens are all pacifists, I do assume that they will react negatively to the use of military force by another country or its testing of nuclear weapons. These beliefs, which I assume to be common to most members of the public, are rooted in memories of the defeat of World War II and the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Public opinion polls support the claim that for most Japanese, “peace” is an important priority in their country’s international relations. According to Figure 6.1, the results of a public opinion poll conducted by *Yomiuri Shimbun* in 2001, respondents stated that the third most important goal for Japan was that it “promotes the importance of peace in the world”. This was a more common response than economic affluence, exercising political power in international relations and security.

⁶¹ For more on my theoretical framework, see Chapter Two.

Figure 6.1: Public Opinion about What Type of Country Japan Should Be in the 21st Century, 2001



Source: *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 2001. “21 seiki no nihon, kankyo/hukushi wo jyushisuru kuni ni / Yomiuri shimbunsha zenkoku yoron chosa [Yomiuri Shimbun Poll: People willing to make sacrifices for environment]”, January 10, p.32.

In addition to a general anti-militarism, Japanese citizens remain firmly opposed to anything associated with nuclear weapons. Any discussion of such issues among policymakers has long been a taboo in Japanese politics. This principle of anti-nuclearism was articulated by Prime Minister Sato Eisuke who said that Japan would not possess, produce or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. On November 21, 2006, when the *Yomiuri Shimbun* asked citizens whether they still supported Japan’s three non-nuclear principles, 66.6 per cent of respondents said that they fully supported them and 13.3 per cent said that they somewhat supported them (“Hikaku sangensoku ‘mamorubeki’ hachi-wari, ‘kaku hoyuu giron’ wa sanpi ryoron [80% support three non-nuclear principles while

divided on nuclear power/Yomiuri Shimbun poll]”, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 21 November 2006, p.2). For the purpose of this chapter, I assume that the Japanese public’s worldview is challenged whenever a foreign nation uses, or threatens to use, military force against civilians or another nation and whenever a foreign nation seeks to develop or test nuclear weapons.

To examine the effects of symbolic threats and media coverage on public opinion, this chapter presents a series of brief case studies on issues that could all be interpreted as symbolic threats. The Japanese public interprets an issue as a symbolic threat if it involves the behaviour of a foreign nation that is interpreted to violate and threaten values considered to be important in Japan. I operationalise symbolic threats as any of the following three types of issues: the testing of a nuclear device; the use of military force against another country; and the killing of civilians. *Nuclear tests* are those issues in which a foreign nation tests a nuclear device. *The use of force* refers to both wars and international crises that involve two different states, as well as the mobilisation of military forces which should also be interpreted as the willingness of a state to use force to achieve its political objectives. The *killing of civilians* is any issue framed as the wilful killing of non-combatants, such as a massacre or the destruction of a passenger aircraft.

Hypotheses

This chapter is concerned with testing the following two hypotheses. First, cases of symbolic threat should be associated with negative changes in Japanese public perceptions of the nation involved. Second, cases of symbolic threats that receive high media coverage should have a greater effect on public attitudes towards the nation involved than those that receive low media coverage. These hypotheses are


tested with cases involving the three types of symbolic threats: nuclear tests, the use of military force, and the killing of civilians.

Nuclear Testing

In this section, I argue that a nuclear test will produce a negative change in Japanese attitudes towards that nation. Any nuclear test is likely to be interpreted as a threat to the Japanese public because it activates cognitive schema among citizens associated with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To build up their sense of self-worth, citizens will differentiate themselves psychologically from the nation that conducts the test. When this happens, public feelings of hostility towards that country will increase and public opinion will turn negative. Higher levels of media coverage will make such tests more salient and, therefore, increase the magnitude of their effect. Although hundreds of nuclear tests were carried out by the nations included in this study, I have only included those taken from the content analysis of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008).

Figure 6.2 shows a negative and relatively strong relationship between media coverage of the nuclear tests included in this study and changes in public perceptions of the nation conducting the test. The list of cases can be found in Appendix 5.

Figure 6.2: Front Page Stories of Nuclear Tests and Change in Public Attitudes toward Nation Involved, 1960-2007



N=36

Note: Cases are listed in Appendix 5.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

Higher media coverage is correlated with greater magnitude negative changes in public opinion. The relationship also appears to be relatively strong. A typical case of a nuclear test that received low media coverage was an underground nuclear test conducted by France in June 1975 (Case 6). This received 3 front page stories and was associated with a change in attitudes towards France of -1.8 percentage points. A case of high media coverage was the Indian nuclear test in May 1998 (Case 35) which received 59 front page stories and was correlated with a change in public opinion of -11.4 percentage points. Two notable outliers are the French nuclear tests in the South Pacific in July 1995 (Case 28) and September 1995 (Case 36). Both of those cases were associated with extreme changes in public opinion

towards France. This suggests that in addition to the nuclear tests and the media coverage that they received, the Japanese public may also have responded negatively to other factors such as elite rhetoric and how the events were framed.

Using ordinal variables, Table 6.1 shows the relationship between media coverage and changes in public opinion.

Table 6.1: Nuclear Tests, Media Coverage and Changes in Japanese Public Perceptions of the Nation Involved, 1960-2007

	High	Moderate	Low	Total
Major Change	6 (37.5)	1 (10)	0 (0)	7 (18.92)
Minor Change	6 (37.5)	3 (30)	5 (45.45)	14 (37.84)
No Change	4 (25)	6 (60)	6 (54.55)	16 (43.24)
Total	16 (100)	10 (100)	11 (100)	37 (100)

Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 5 for list of cases. “Major Change” and “Minor Change” both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the variables were generated.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

The data show that a substantial number of nuclear tests were associated with a negative change in public attitudes towards the nation conducting the test. In the cases listed here, 21 of 37 were correlated with changes in public opinion. Furthermore, nuclear tests that received higher media coverage were associated with greater changes in public opinion than those that received lower media coverage. Examining the row marked “Major Change”, no cases of low media coverage were related to major changes in public opinion while six cases that were

received high media coverage. Both of these results suggest that nuclear tests may be a causal factor in changes in public attitudes towards a foreign nation and higher media coverage of such tests may produce changes in opinion of greater magnitude. Below is a closer examination of the relationship between nuclear tests and public opinion change.

Low Media Coverage

Nuclear tests that receive low media coverage do not tend to be associated with changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved. Especially during the Cold War, most of such tests were unlikely to be salient. While the public may not have approved of such testing, it may have been such a common occurrence that it was unlikely to attract public attention. To take an example, in August 1971, France's nuclear test in the Tuamotu Archipelago received low media coverage and was not associated with any change in public opinion.⁶² In July 1967 and March 1972, China tested nuclear devices but neither of these were correlated with any change in Japanese public opinion about China.⁶³ In September 1966, France tested a nuclear device but there was no change in Japanese attitudes.⁶⁴ The lack of change to such tests suggests that they were not salient to the public and, therefore, not interpreted as important threats.

High Media Coverage

Although nuclear testing was common throughout the Cold War period, one test stood out and it was associated with a major negative change in public opinion towards the Soviet Union. On Novaya Zemlya Island in the northern Arctic on 30

⁶² Case 8 in Appendix 5.

⁶³ Case 7 and Case 3 in Appendix 5.

⁶⁴ Case 10 in Appendix 5.

October 1961, the largest and most powerful nuclear weapon, called “Tsar Bomba”, was detonated.⁶⁵ The sheer size of this device, 27 tonnes, was likely to attract the attention of the public. In what was already a salient action, the high media coverage likely increased the magnitude of the effect of this test on the Japanese consciousness. The sheer magnitude of the bomb and the decision by the Soviets to test such a device were a violation of Japanese anti-nuclearism. Feelings of hostility towards the Soviet Union would have been generated following the test and likely influenced by fears of a realistic threat. Attitudes towards the Soviet Union in November 1961 turned negative by -7.6 percentage points.

North Korea’s first nuclear test was associated with a major negative change in Japanese public opinion. On October 6, 2006, just as newly appointed Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo was making his first trip abroad to South Korea and China, North Korea conducted its first ever nuclear test.⁶⁶ The act itself was highly provocative and its timing, whether intentional or not, made it salient to a Japanese public that had been looking forward to improving relations with its Asian neighbours in the post-Koizumi era. Pyongyang’s announcement to the world that it was a nuclear power likely elicited a negative reaction from the Japanese public who do not like nuclear tests in general but also have a strong dislike of North Korea. Furthermore, the fact that this was its first nuclear test meant that the North had violated the norm of non-proliferation. Finally, given the geographical proximity of the two nations and the lack of diplomatic relations, this was interpreted as not only a symbolic threat but also a realistic threat. The Jiji data

⁶⁵ Case 30 in Appendix 5.

⁶⁶ Case 37 in Appendix 5.

show a change in attitudes towards North Korea in October 2006 of -5.6 percentage points.

Adding to the perception of threat was the rhetoric of Japanese elites which framed North Korea's actions as a threat. Following the test, Prime Minister Abe said, "North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons drastically changes the security circumstances in Northeast Asia" and that "we're going to enter a new, more dangerous nuclear era" ("Japan's diplomacy tested by North Korea", *Daily Yomiuri*, October 12, 2006, p.2). In an editorial, the *Yomiuri* wrote that North Korea's actions "constitute a grave challenge by a rogue nation to the security of the international community" ("Safeguarding Japan in a 'dangerous new era'", *Daily Yomiuri*, October 11, 2006, p.4). Media coverage of this event was also high, adding to the salience of this event. The association of the major change in public opinion towards North Korea in October 2006 in the same month as its nuclear test supports the assertion that the Japanese public responds negatively to nuclear tests.

One of the largest single-month changes in public opinion in Japan towards a foreign nation throughout the period of this study came following its resumption of nuclear testing in the South Pacific in 1995 and 1996.⁶⁷ Attitudes towards France changed by -8.5 percentage points in December 1995, -10 percentage points in August 1995, and -29.7 percentage points in September 1995. One reason for the change in opinion was the high media coverage that they received. Nuclear issues were salient in 1995 because China had been conducting its own tests. The actions of China and France, both of which were attempting to collect as much data as possible before the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) came into effect, were

⁶⁷ Case 36, Case 31, Case 28, and Case 21 in Appendix 5.

viewed as unnecessary and harmful to the NPT regime. Furthermore, anger was further generated because the timing of the tests coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A large conference in Hiroshima at the time of the tests led numerous participants to protest France's actions ("French rapped as A-bomb meet opens in Hiroshima", *Daily Yomiuri*, 5 August 1995, p.2). The mayor of Hiroshima called the French tests "unforgivably reckless actions" and a reflection of "anachronistic great powers policy that still believes in a nuclear deterrent even after the end of the Cold War" ("Japanese angered, distressed over nuclear test", *Daily Yomiuri*, 7 September 1995, p.3).

Japanese media organisations were also highly critical, framing the tests as a violation of internationally accepted norms. The *Daily Yomiuri* ("France must end its nuclear tests", 29 January 1996) argued that France's actions harmed global efforts to promote disarmament and ban nuclear tests:

France's resumption of testing just contrary to this pledge has ended up tarnishing the country's international trustworthiness and its moral reputation...the tests have only served to show, blatantly, the arrogance of a nuclear power, thus rekindling the nonnuclear countries' dissatisfaction with the existing NPT regime (p.8).

The dominant frame saw the French as arrogant and as breaking international norms. In the post-Cold War period, the Japanese public appears to be much less tolerant of nuclear tests than it had been before. Finally, the fact that France conducted the tests in the South Pacific, a part of the world that had long been used by nuclear powers as a testing ground, also elicited anger among the Japanese public. The temporal proximity of the major change in public opinion towards France and the nuclear tests, along with the high media coverage they received, suggest that they were the cause.

The underground nuclear tests in Pokharan were associated with a major change in Japanese public opinion towards India of -11.4 percentage points in May 1998⁶⁸. Like with the French tests, both Japanese elites and media responded to India's action with outrage. Japanese leaders expressed disappointment in India and stated their concern that this could lead to an arms race with Pakistan since both nations were outside the agreed upon framework of the NPT regime. Japanese aid to India was suspended ("Japan to freeze grants to India", *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific*, 13 May 1998). The Japanese media also showed anger and expressed moral outrage, with the *Daily Yomiuri* ("India blasts away international trust", 13 May 1998, p.6) stating that "the decision to conduct the tests was dishonourable in that it showed utter disregard for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the autumn of 1996". The high media coverage of the tests also likely increased their salience and the anger generated by them turned in to hostility towards India.

In sum, the close association with many nuclear tests and changes in public attitudes towards the nations involved suggest that salient nuclear tests may produce increases in negative public attitudes towards foreign countries. This supports the theoretical proposition that symbolic threats are one cause of negative changes in public perceptions of foreign nations. Although the number of cases to draw inferences from is small, it does appear that the Japanese public is even more sensitive to nuclear tests conducted in the post-Cold War period. Part of the reason is the high volume of media coverage since the novelty of nuclear tests today means that they are newsworthy. In addition, political elites can use such nuclear tests as "valence issues" to garner public support since no members of the Japanese

⁶⁸ Case 35 in Appendix 5.


public are going to come out in support of a North Korean or Chinese nuclear test. Since nuclear tests are primarily symbolic issues, low cost political rhetoric from Japanese elites targeting those countries that conduct such tests is likely to be strong. These same elites, of course, do not make any mention of the fact that even though the United States no longer conducts such tests it remains the country with the world's largest nuclear arsenal. The Japanese public may also be more sensitive to nuclear testing today than during the Cold War because such tests are no longer deemed as necessary and the international norm against such testing may have been strengthened following the adoption of the CTBT by the United Nations in 1996 (though it has not entered into force). To conclude, the data do suggest that nuclear tests are likely to be associated with negative attitudes towards the nation conducting the test.

Use of Military Force

The threat to use force, or the actual use of force, can be considered to be a symbolic threat because it violates the Japanese value of anti-militarism. In this section, I test two hypotheses. First, the use of military force by a foreign nation should be associated with a change in public opinion towards the nation perceived as responsible for the dispute. Second, cases in which media coverage of a country's use of force is high should be correlated with greater magnitude change than in cases in which media coverage is low.

Figure 6.3 shows a negative but weak relation between media coverage of the use of military force and changes in Japanese collective opinion towards those nations involved. A list of cases can be found in Appendix 6.

Figure 6.3: Front Page Stories of Use of Military Force and Change in Public Attitudes toward Nation Involved, 1960-2007



N=64

Note: Cases are listed in Appendix 6.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

Higher media coverage of a use of force is associated with greater negative changes in public perceptions of the nation involved. A typical case of low media coverage was the border dispute between India and China (Case 18). This attracted eight front page stories and was associated with a change in attitudes towards India of -2.3 percentage points in December 1962. A typical case of high media coverage came when the United States announced that it was sending more combat troops to Vietnam (Case 60). This was related to a change in attitudes towards the United States of -6.6 percentage points in April 1965. Another example of high media coverage associated with a major change in opinion was the Falklands War, which received 203 front page stories in *Asahi* and was associated with a change in public

attitudes towards the United Kingdom of -5.9 percentage points. Higher media coverage of the use of military force does appear to be correlated with greater negative changes in public opinion.

However, the large number of outliers does suggest that factors other than media coverage are also important influences on public opinion. Understandably, invasions of smaller nations by larger nations tend to be associated with extremely large changes in public attitudes towards the invading nation. For example, the invasion of Czechoslovakia received 157 front page stories and was associated with a change in public attitudes towards the Soviet Union of -12.2 percentage points in September 1968 (Case 61). The invasion of Cambodia by the United States in June 1970 received 104 front page stories and was associated with an extremely large change in June 1970 of attitudes of -11.3 percentage points (Case 56). Japanese citizens do not seem to like it when large countries use military force against weaker opponents. This is not only a violation of the norm of anti-militarism but it could also be viewed as extremely unfair.

Table 6.2 shows a relationship between the use of force by a foreign nation and changes in public opinion. Many cases of the use of military force by a foreign nation were associated with changes in public attitudes towards that country. The column marked "Total" shows that in 34 of 64 cases of the use of military force, Japanese attitudes towards the nation involved changed. This supports the proposition that symbolic threats can have a negative effect on public perceptions of a foreign nation.

Table 6.2: The Use of Military Force, Media Coverage and Negative Change in Japanese Public Attitudes toward Country Involved, 1960-2007

	High	Moderate	Low	Total
Major Change	12 (30.77)	5 (33.33)	2 (20)	19 (29.69)
Minor Change	12 (30.77)	1 (6.67)	2 (20)	15 (23.44)
No Change	15 (38.46)	9 (60)	6 (60)	30 (46.88)
Total	39 (100)	15 (100)	10 (100)	64 (100)

Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 6 for list of cases. “Major Change” and “Minor Change” both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the variables were generated.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

Furthermore, cases of the military use of force were related to changes in public opinion of greater magnitude when media coverage was high. The row labelled “Major Change” shows that two cases of low media coverage and 12 cases of high media coverage were associated with a major change in public opinion. These results suggest that when media coverage of international conflict is high, the magnitude of public opinion change is likely to be greater than when it is low. This supports the proposition that media coverage moderates the effect of threats on public attitudes.

Low Media Coverage

Given that many international disputes occur in places that are unfamiliar to most citizens and involve conflicts that they have no knowledge of, it is unsurprising to find that those cases of the use of military force that received low levels of media

coverage were not associated with changes in public opinion. Minor border disputes that occasionally arise between nations, especially those geographically distant from Japan, do not appear to have a significant effect on public opinion. For example, the Kargil War between India and Pakistan in 1999 over Kashmir did not result in any change in public opinion.⁶⁹

Various issues associated with the Vietnam War that received low media coverage also were not associated with changes in public opinion towards the United States. As the war continued, such events were seen as more and more common and thus unlikely to be salient to most Japanese citizens. For example, in February, April and December 1967, American bombing of North Vietnam received low media coverage and did not result in any reported changes in attitudes in the Jiji polls.⁷⁰ As other countries joined the American war effort, this did not also appear to result in a reaction from the Japanese public. Neither South Korea nor France's decisions to send soldiers to Vietnam to support the United States were associated with any change in opinion in February 1966.⁷¹ The low level of media coverage and the constant salience of an international conflict, such as the Vietnam War, may tend to breed indifference among the public as information about violence just becomes a normal part of the news cycle.

Moderate Media Coverage

Since many cases of the minor use of military force are not salient they do not tend to produce negative changes in public attitudes. Various examples exist of such cases that were not associated with any changes in public attitudes towards the

⁶⁹ Case 3 in Appendix 6.

⁷⁰ Case 1, Case 2, and 4 in Appendix 6.

⁷¹ Case 5 and Case 10 in Appendix 6.

nation involved include the US shooting down of two Libyan jets in August 1981; the India-China border dispute in December 1962; and the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 during the war with Serbia.⁷² Although each of these events involved a use of military force and received moderate media coverage, they were not associated with any changes in public attitudes.

In some cases, even geographically distant conflicts can impact on public opinion, especially when they involve a major use of force. For example, the Algeria-France War was associated with a major negative change in public attitudes towards France in July 1961 of -9.3 percentage points and the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba by the US was associated with a major change in public perceptions of the United States in May 1961 of -8.2 percentage points.⁷³ Both of these cases suggest that even when a nation that is generally liked by the Japanese public is involved in a conflict, this can still produce a major change in public opinion.

The launch of missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan by the United States on Sudan and Afghanistan were associated with no change in public attitudes towards the United States in August 1998.⁷⁴ Despite the fact that this use of force was against two sovereign states, the Japanese public may have seen the American actions as justified. Some in the Japanese media pushed the frame that this was a reasonable response to the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. According to the *Daily Yomiuri* ("Fight terrorism together", 22 August 1998):

Naturally the Sudanese government and the Taliban militia of Muslim fundamentalists, which in effect controls Afghanistan, bitterly criticised the United States for the attacks...however, if what Washington says is true,

⁷² Case 13, Case 18, Case 25 in Appendix 6.

⁷³ Case 20 and Case 12 in Appendix 6.

⁷⁴ Case 14 in Appendix 6.

the U.S. assertion that it has only exercised its right to self defence in attacking the facilities has some legitimacy, although the targets were located in the territories of other countries (p.6).

Without much knowledge or familiarity with the two nations that were the target of the attacks, the more hawkish elements of the Japanese media may have been able to dominate the framing of the issue. Since the public may have seen these actions as a rational response to a terrorist act, and since the event only received moderate media coverage, it may not have been interpreted as a threat to Japanese values but rather a reasonable response to international terrorism.

Another example of a case of a use of military force that did not result in a change in public attitudes towards the nation involved was the invasion of Panama by the United States.⁷⁵ In December 1989, the month of the invasion, Japanese attitudes towards the United States remained stable. Despite the fact that approximately 1,000 people were killed, the invasion did not appear to have a strong effect on the Japanese public. One reason was certainly Panama's geographical distance and the unfamiliarity of the country for most citizens. However, perhaps the most important reason for the lack of public opinion activation was how it was framed. According to the *Diplomatic Bluebook* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 1989), "the Panamanian National Assembly of Representatives declared a state of war with the United States" and so "the United States resorted to use of force in Panama to protect U.S. citizens". Although the Japanese media framed the actions of the United States in Panama as "regrettable", the *Daily Yomiuri* ("U.S. Intervention of Panama", 22 December 1989, p.6) did argue that American anger over the issue was justified due to concerns about access to the Panama Canal. The

⁷⁵ Case 23 in Appendix 6.

lack of media coverage may have moderated the salience of the invasion and the framing of the invasion as one of “self-defence” likely limited the perception of America as the source of the threat. This suggests that when the Japanese public have little knowledge of an international conflict, they may be more susceptible to framing.

In another case, military exercises near Taiwan were associated with an increase in negative feelings among the Japanese public towards China.⁷⁶ Jiji reported that attitudes towards China experienced a major negative change of -7 percentage points in March 1996, the same month as the crisis. Just prior to the Taiwanese elections, China threatened Taiwan with a series of provocative missile launches in the Taiwan Straits. These events elicited a large amount of concern by Japanese leaders and the Japanese press. According to the *Daily Yomiuri* (“Threats won't break Taiwan deadlock”, 6 March 1996, p.6), “the planned missile launches run the risk of causing an ‘unforeseeable incident’ and thus we think China's decision is extremely regrettable...the upcoming exercises will only fan the flames of tension”. These events were not only of concern as a symbolic issue but also had implications for Japan’s own security.

High Media Coverage

Even when media coverage is high, those conflicts about which the Japanese public has little knowledge of are unlikely to activate public opinion. For example, even though media coverage of the Indo-Pakistani War was high, Japanese public attitudes towards India in December 1971 did not change.⁷⁷ The NATO attacks on

⁷⁶ Case 16 in Appendix 6.

⁷⁷ Case 57 in Appendix 6.

Serbia were not associated with any change in public attitudes towards the United States or the United Kingdom in April 1999.⁷⁸ Both the border dispute between the Soviet Union and China in March 1969 and the France-Tunisia war in July 1961 were associated with public opinion stability towards the nations involved.⁷⁹ Even when media coverage of the use of military force is high, this may not be sufficient to make conflicts in geographically distant areas salient.

The invasion of Afghanistan produced a minor change in negative public attitudes towards the Soviet Union. In January 1980, the month of the invasion, public attitudes towards the Soviet Union experienced a minor change of -4.9 percentage points. This change in public opinion came even though the Japanese Government was doing its best not to anger the Soviets. Tokyo did not want to antagonise Moscow because the two nations were deepening trade relations, including collaboration in developing Siberian natural resources and reaching an agreement over Japanese fishing operations in the Soviet controlled areas near northern Japan. Unlike the reaction from the United States and Western European nations, the only action that Japan took following the invasion was to cancel person-to-person ties between the two nations ("Government turning cautious", Kyodo, 13 January 1980). However, despite the lack of framing of this dispute as a threat by Japanese leaders, public opinion does appear to have been sufficiently activated so that attitudes towards the Soviet Union turned negative. This case suggests that even though political elites may wish to reduce the sense that a particular issue or event is a symbolic threat, sufficient media coverage of an event can help the public to resist these frames.

⁷⁸ Case 26 in Appendix 6.

⁷⁹ Case 29 and Case 51 in Appendix 6.

Another case of a use of military force that produced a change in Japanese public attitudes towards the nation involved was the 2003 Iraq War.⁸⁰ In March 2003, Jiji reported that Japanese public attitudes towards the United States experienced a minor negative change of -3.4 percentage points. This change can probably be attributed to the launching of what many in Japan considered to be an unnecessary war. What is interesting about this case is that it appears that the Japanese public resisted their Government's framing of the issue and perceived it as a symbolic threat. The Koizumi Cabinet publicly supported the efforts of the United States, using UN Security Council Resolution 1441 as the main rationale behind the war. Following the line taken by its ally, Japan also attempted to conflate the threat of terrorism in the minds of the Japanese public with the Iraq issue. The *Diplomatic Bluebook* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2004) states:

...the terrorist attacks in the United States (US) on September 11, 2001 made the international community clearly understand the threat by the possession and use of WMD and missiles by so-called states of concern (p.10).

Japan accused Iraq of insufficient cooperation in the work with nuclear inspectors and argued that the American and British military action was a last resort due to Iraq being in material breach of its obligations under the ceasefire agreement at the end of the Gulf War. The frame used by the more hawkish members of the Japanese media was almost word for word that of the American Government. In an editorial, the *Daily Yomiuri* ("Continue backing U.S. on Iraq", 14 March 2003) wrote:

We must not forget, Iraq is to blame. The regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein insists that it has disposed of its weapons of mass destruction, but

⁸⁰ Case 39 in Appendix 6.

this claim has not yet been proved. Baghdad has also failed to comply with a series of U.N. resolutions. Even though the regime pledged to cooperate fully and unconditionally with U.N. weapons inspectors, it merely did so in dribs and drabs to gain time (p.8).

Following the invasion, the *Daily Yomiuri* ("U.S., U.K. need free rein in Iraq", 11 April 2003, p.9) also stated that "the jubilation expressed by Iraqis at their freedom from Saddam's oppressive rule has demonstrated that the United States and Britain were correct in their decision to launch a war to topple the dictator". However, the minor change in public attitudes towards the United States in the same month that the war was launched suggests that the public may not have accepted this frame. The high media coverage of the invasion, plus certain less hawkish parts of Japanese society, may have led citizens to interpret the Iraq War as a symbolic threat and, like publics in other nations, see the unilateral actions of the United States as a threat to international order.

The invasion of Cambodia was associated with a major change in public attitudes towards the United States in June 1970 of -11.3 percentage points.⁸¹ In April 1970, President Richard Nixon announced the United States and South Vietnam were engaged in a campaign in Cambodia to eliminate the Viet Cong from their sanctuaries in that country. By this time, the Japanese public had already turned against the Vietnam War and feelings of anti-Americanism were also on the rise due to the Okinawa reversion issue. In the middle of a war that the majority of Japanese citizens opposed, the invasion of another small and poor Asian nation by the United States was simply deemed to be unacceptable. When the US invaded Cambodia, this was perceived as a symbolic threat not only because it was a use of military force but it was also the invasion of a neutral nation. The high media

⁸¹ Case 56 in Appendix 6.

coverage meant that even in the middle of another war, this action by the United States was nonetheless salient.

In another example, the invasion of Vietnam by China was related to a major change in public attitudes towards China of -8.6 percentage points in March 1979.⁸² On 15 February 1979, Deng Xiaoping announced that China was going to launch a limited attack on Vietnam to remove it from its occupation of Cambodia, an ally of China. Chinese forces invaded the northern part of Vietnam and withdrew one month later. Approximately 30 000 people were killed in the violence. The invasion of a smaller nation by a large nation like China, even though the Japanese public had mainly positive feelings towards China at the time, was likely to be interpreted as a symbolic threat, especially given the high volume of media coverage that it received.

The Falklands War was associated with a major change in Japanese attitudes towards the United Kingdom in April 1982 of -5.9 percentage points.⁸³ In April 1982, following Argentina's occupation of the Falklands Islands and the month that the war began, public attitudes towards the United Kingdom experienced a major negative change. Approximately 800 people were killed. The Japanese Government took the "basic position that the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means is the solemn responsibility assumed by all member states under the Charter of the United Nations and that, therefore, the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) dispute should also be settled by peaceful and diplomatic means in line with the principles and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations" ("Foreign Ministry issues statement on Falklands", Kyodo, 26 April 1982). In other words,

⁸² Case 40 in Appendix 6.

⁸³ Case 64 in Appendix 6.

they did not really have much to say on the matter. Even though the conflict was distant and involved a nation that the Japanese public generally liked, the fact that United Kingdom was engaged in a conflict with a smaller nation in a distant part of the world was not seen positively in Japan. Even without cues from political elites, the Japanese public still saw the Falklands conflict as a violation of the norm of anti-militarism and so, public opinion towards the United Kingdom turned negative.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was associated with a major change in public attitudes towards the Soviet Union in August 1968 of -12.2 percentage points.⁸⁴ This was an event that received massive amounts of media coverage worldwide. In the summer of 1968, Czechoslovakia was enjoying what was known as the “Prague Spring”, a period in which its citizens experienced some political liberalisation such as a loosening of restrictions on the media, free speech and travel. However, the Soviet Union decided that it was necessary to halt Prague’s increasingly liberal reforms and so, along with its Warsaw Pact allies, invaded Czechoslovakia. Approximately 500 Czechs were injured and 100 were killed. This invasion immediately halted the liberalisation in Czechoslovakia and led to a strengthening of the Czech communist party. Like the cases of China invading Vietnam and the British fighting with the Argentineans, this involved a much larger nation invading a smaller one. The images of the Soviet tanks moving down the streets of Prague and Czech protesters standing defiantly against them enhanced the salience of this event and produce a major negative change in public attitudes towards the Soviet Union.

⁸⁴ Case 61 in Appendix 6.


In conclusion, a large number of factors surrounding international conflicts make predicting the magnitude of opinion change difficult. Factors seeming to influence the salience of a particular conflict include its geographical proximity to Japan, the nations involved, the reaction by Japanese elites, and the volume of media coverage. The Japanese public appears to react especially strongly to attacks on smaller nations by larger nations. These cases may be perceived to not only violate the norm of anti-militarism but also norms related to fairness. Even in international affairs, people do not appear to like a bully. In sum, this section has found empirical support for the proposition that events interpreted as symbolic threats tend to produce negative changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved and media coverage moderates this effect.

Killing of Civilians

The killing of civilians by a foreign government is an action that violates the worldview of most citizens of the world, not only in Japan. As a result, nations that engage in such behaviour should be the target of feelings of hostility from Japanese citizens. In the following section, I argue that the killing of civilians by a foreign nation will produce an increase in negative Japanese public attitudes towards that nation responsible and that media coverage of such events leads to changes of greater magnitude. Although the number of cases is small, the empirical finding that changes in opinion are associated with such events lends support to both of these claims.

As Figure 6.4 shows, the relationship between the volume of front page stories in *Asahi* and the changes in public perceptions of a state viewed as responsible for the killing of civilians is negative. The list of cases can be found in Appendix 7.

Figure 6.4: Front Page Stories of the Killing of Civilians and Change in Public Attitudes toward Nation Involved, 1960-2007



N=10

Note: Cases are listed in Appendix 7.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

Higher media coverage does appear to produce a greater increase in negative public attitudes towards those nations involved in the killing of civilians. A typical case of relatively low media coverage was that of the Rangoon bombing in which North Korean agents attempted to kill the South Korean President in Burma but ended up killing 21 people and wounding 46 (Case 2). Media coverage of the incident was 27 front page stories and this was associated with a change in attitudes towards North Korea in November 1983 of -6.5 percentage points. A case of high media coverage of the killing of civilians was the Russian missile attack on Korean Airlines Flight 007 in which 269 people were killed (Case 10). Media coverage of this incident was 126 front page stories in *Asahi* and a change in public perceptions

of the Soviet Union in September 1983 of -20 percentage points. Higher media coverage was correlated with greater changes in public opinion.

Two major outliers exist. The first outlier was the shooting down of Iranian Air Flight 655 by the USS Vincennes, which was not associated with a significant change in public opinion towards the United States (Case 1). One reason for this may have been the relatively lower volume of prominent media coverage that it received. Another reason may have been its framing as an accidental rather than intentional action. Since the actions of the United States were not seen as intention, Japanese citizens probably did not see it as a symbolic threat. The second outlier was the Tiananmen Square incident (Case 6). This received 40 front page stories and public attitudes towards China in June 1989 changed by -34.1 percentage points, the largest single month change in public opinion towards a country in a single month throughout this entire study. Other than the volume of media coverage, other factors in this case were also important, especially the framing of this incident by the mass media. Although the change in public opinion was much greater than expected, this still supports the argument that the killing of civilians results in negative changes in public opinion towards the nation involved.

Table 6.3 shows that the majority of cases coded here as the killing of civilians were associated with negative changes in public perceptions of the nation involved.

Table 6.3: Killing of Civilians, Media Coverage and Negative Change in Japanese Public Perceptions of the Nation Involved, 1960-2007

	High Media	Moderate Media	Low Media	Total
Major Change	5 (55.56)	0 (0)	0 (0)	5 (50)
Minor Change	4 (44.44)	0 (0)	0 (0)	4 (40)
No Change	0 (0)	1 (100)	0 (0)	1 (10)
Total	9 (100)	1 (100)	0 (0)	10 (100)

Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 7 for list of cases. “Major Change” and “Minor Change” both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the variables were generated.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

Numerous cases exist in which the use of violence against civilians was related to changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved. In nine of the ten cases cited here, collective opinion changed. Furthermore, media coverage also appears to moderate the effect of such events. Examining the row labelled “Major Change”, five cases were associated with high media coverage and no cases were associated with low media coverage. Although the number of cases is small, both of these findings support the propositions that symbolic threats have a negative effect on public perceptions of foreign nations and media coverage moderates the magnitude of that effect. The cases are examined briefly below.

Moderate Media Coverage

The shooting down of Iranian Air Flight 655 by the USS Vincennes was not associated with any change in Japanese public attitudes towards the United States in July 1988.⁸⁵ In a period when tensions in the Persian Gulf were high and the Iran-Iraq War was ongoing, the USS Vincennes, thinking it was an F14 jet fighter, shot down an Iranian passenger airliner with two surface-to-air missiles. According to Iran, 290 crew and passengers were killed. Despite the number of people killed and the similarities to the KAL Flight 007 incidence, the month of the event, July 1988, public attitudes towards the United States remained stable.

Two reasons are probably behind the fact that public attitudes did not change. First, media coverage was moderate. While the Soviet shooting down of KAL Flight 007 received 126 front page stories in *Asahi*, the Iranian Air Flight 655 story received only 13. This lack of salience meant that Japanese public opinion was unlikely to be activated. The second reason for the lack of changes was that this incident was likely not perceived to be a violation of Japanese values because, as Entman (2004) reports in great detail, the dominant frame put forth by the United States Government and American media was that it was accidental rather than intentional. According to the *Diplomatic Bluebook* of 1988 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 1988), “a U.S. warship, which had been exchanging fire with Iran, mistook an Iranian passenger plane for a fighter plane and shot it down with a missile”. Without the assigning of responsibility or intention to the United States, this was unlikely to result in feelings of hostility. The result was no change in public opinion.

⁸⁵ Case 1 in Appendix 7.

High Media Coverage

Even when the killing of civilians involves distant nations and conflicts the Japanese public knows little about, if media coverage is high, this can still activate public opinion. The Soviet repression of Lithuanians in 1991 during what was known as the “January events” was related to a minor change in public attitudes.⁸⁶ In 1990, following the Republic of Lithuania’s declared independence from the Soviet Union, the economic situation there worsened and there were riots in front of the parliament building over rising prices and food rationing in January 1991. Under the orders of Gorbachev, Soviet troops were flown in to Lithuania to quell the disturbances. According to the *New York Times* (“Soviet loyalists in charge after attack in Lithuania; 13 dead; curfew is imposed”, 14 January 1991, p.A1), at least 14 people were killed in the events and 600 injured. According to the *Daily Yomiuri* (“Lithuania - Graveyard of reform?”, 13 January 1991, p.6), “television images of Soviet paratroopers firing warning shots over the heads of Lithuanians rallying in Vilnius cannot help but remind us of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968”. Public attitudes towards the Soviet Union in January 1990, the same month as these events, showed a minor negative change of -4.1 percentage points. The high media coverage, the salient images, and its linkage to events in Prague in 1968 appear to have been sufficient to activate negative emotions among Japanese citizens.

The Kwangju massacre was associated with a minor negative change in Japanese public attitudes towards South Korea of -5.3 percentage points in June 1980. In May 1980, the South Korean Government violently cracked down on

⁸⁶ Case 3 in Appendix 7.

pro-democracy protesters in the city of Kwangju, killing at least 200 people though the number is believed to have been higher (“Tribute to Kwangju massacred”, BBC News, 18 May 2000). One month later, after the events had come to light, Japanese attitudes towards South Korea experienced a negative and minor change. In Japan, the Opposition Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Korean students both were vocal in condemning the use of force by South Korea (“South Korean students stage rally in Tokyo”, Kyodo, 31 May 1980). However, the Government was relatively quiet as it was attempting to build economic relations with South Korea at that time. This suggests that even without elite framing, so long as media attention is sufficiently high the public will respond to salient events.

As was mentioned earlier, the assassination attempt of the South Korean President in Rangoon was viewed as an act of state terrorism and was related to a major change in Japanese attitudes towards North Korea of -6.5 percentage points in November 1983.⁸⁷ In November 1983, public attitudes towards North Korea experienced a negative and major change. Not surprisingly, the attempt to assassinate a head of state in a foreign nation was seen as a symbolic threat. Japanese elites also offered strong vocal support for South Korea following the event. Japan’s Foreign Minister, Abe Shintaro, met with South Korean President Chon Tu-hwan and expressed his support for South Korea, as well as urging the Burmese Government to take some kind of diplomatic action against North Korea if it was found to be responsible (“Abe meets Chon Tu-Hwan, returns to Tokyo”, Kyodo, 13 October 1983). The framing of the event as a case of state terrorism and the high media coverage was likely sufficient for it to be interpreted as a symbolic threat and for it to be salient.

⁸⁷ Case 2 in Appendix 7.

The destruction of KAL Flight 858 was related to a major negative change in public attitudes towards North Korea of -15.8 percentage points in February 1988.⁸⁸ In the late 1980s, North Korea was working to destabilise the South Korean Government, disrupt elections, and frighten foreign teams from attending the Seoul Olympics. On November 29, 1987, North Korean agents using Japanese passports planted a bomb on Korean Airlines Flight 858 bound from Abu Dhabi to Bangkok, killing all 115 passengers and crew aboard. The two North Korean agents had boarded the plane in Baghdad, left a time bomb, and then attempted to escape before being arrested in Bahrain (Bell, G. and Watts, G., 1987, "North Korea implicated in group that plotted crash", *The Times* (London), 3 December).

The data show a change in attitudes towards North Korea in February 1988, two months after the incident, probably because it was the same month in which it was revealed that North Korean agents had used fake Japanese passports to conduct this act. In addition to the fact that North Korea indiscriminately killed all of the passengers on board the flight, the association of Japan with such an incident outraged both Japanese policymakers and the mass public. Like the Rangoon bombing, a case framed as state terrorism that receives high media coverage is likely to elicit anger among the public and result in an increase in negative public perceptions of the nation viewed as the source of the problem.

The Tiananmen incident was associated with a massive negative change in attitudes towards China of -34.1 percentage points in June 1989.⁸⁹ On June 6, 1989, the Chinese army shot hundreds of civilians in an attempt to squash the large-scale protests that had been gathering in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. The army fired at

⁸⁸ Case 4 in Appendix 7.

⁸⁹ Case 6 in Appendix 7.

the unarmed protesters, primarily students, killing approximately 2,000 people. Even though the Chinese government had warned protesters that it would do whatever it saw as necessary to disperse them, the scale of the sudden violence was unexpected. The actions of the Chinese Government were condemned by governments from all around the world, including Japan. June 1989 saw a major change in Japanese public perceptions of China.

The high media coverage of the Tiananmen incident and its framing in the Japanese media were the primary reasons for its effect on public opinion. Japanese elites were very cautious in their criticism of China. According to the *Diplomatic Bluebook* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 1989), “the armed suppression by the Chinese authorities of the movement staged by students and citizens calling for democracy from April to June 1989 gave rise to denunciation of China mainly by countries of the West”. In contrast to the rather subdued reaction of political elites, media reaction to the events was much stronger. The dominant frame of the Tiananmen incident was that it was a massacre. *Asahi Shimbun*, for example, accompanied all of its articles with the phrase “Tiananmen Bloodshed” (*tenanmon ryuuketsu jiken*) written in large text. Even without government elites to tell them how to interpret events, the salience of unarmed protesters being killed by soldiers was likely sufficient to capture the attention of Japanese citizens and activate negative emotions.

One final example of a case in which the killing of civilians was correlated with a major negative change in public attitudes towards a foreign nation was that of the shooting down of KAL Flight 007.⁹⁰ Jiji reported a change in attitudes towards the

⁹⁰ Case 10 in Appendix 7.

Soviet Union in September 1983 of -20 percentage points. That same month, Korean Airlines Flight 007 had wandered into restricted airspace over the Soviet Kamchatka Peninsula and near to Sakhalin Island, both areas that the Soviet Union considered to be highly sensitive. Soviet fighter jets intercepted the passenger plane and shot it down, resulting in the deaths of the 269 passengers and crewmembers. Although the Soviet Union first denied responsibility, it later admitted that it had shot down the plane and accused it of spying. In September 1983, public perceptions of the Soviet Union experienced a negative major change.

The KAL 007 incident involved many factors that led it to resonate strongly with the Japanese public. The primary reason was the nature of the event itself. The shooting down of a civilian aircraft by military planes and the suggestion that this was intentional was bound to elicit negative emotions among Japanese citizens. It also elicited memories of a past event. In 1978, Korean Air Flight 902 was forced to land by Soviet jets in the Soviet Far East so it was not a stretch to believe that the actions of the Soviets had been intentional.⁹¹ In addition, Japanese citizens were on board so this may also have been interpreted as a realistic threat. One of the first statements by the Japanese Government was when Foreign Minister Abe stated: "We are concerned about the fate of 27 Japanese aboard the plane" ("Reportage on Soviet role in missing ROK plane", Kyodo, 1 September 1983). Japanese elites also condemned the actions with Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro calling the act "unpardonable" and "barbarous" ("Nakasone calls attack 'barbarous'", Kyodo, 4 September 1983). Soon after the event, polls found that the majority of Japanese supported economic sanctions against the Soviet Union ("Japanese people favour sanctions", Kyodo, 5 September 1983). The

⁹¹ Case 5 in Appendix 7.

indiscriminate killing of civilians on board the flight, the high media coverage, the framing of the event as intentional, and the response by Japanese elites all meant that this incident was likely to be perceived as a violation of Japanese values and, therefore, a symbolic threat. These factors, along with the empirical fact that there was a change in public perceptions of the Soviet Union in the same month as the event, all point to the incident as having been the cause of the major change in public perceptions of the Soviet Union. This was yet another case in which a symbolic threat, moderated by media coverage, appears to have produced a negative change in public opinion towards a foreign nation.

To summarise, this section has found support for the claims that the killing of civilians by a foreign nation is likely to cause a major change in public opinion of the nation involved and that high media coverage of such incidents is associated with greater magnitude changes in public opinion than lower media coverage. The one case of moderate media coverage was associated with no change in opinion while cases of high media coverage tended to be associated with major opinion change. Although the number of cases is small, this section has nonetheless provided support for the proposition that symbolic threats cause negative changes in public perceptions of foreign nations.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown that issues likely to be interpreted by the Japanese public as symbolic threats tend to have a negative effect on public perceptions of the nation perceived to be responsible. Media coverage is also important for increasing the magnitude of the effect of such incidents. Overall, these findings support the statistical analysis in Chapter Four which found that symbolic threats

can have a strong impact on public opinion, especially when media coverage is high.

These case studies are an important contribution to the literature on public opinion and foreign policy because they show that even those events which may have no impact on the material wellbeing of citizens can nonetheless activate public opinion. When it comes to foreign affairs, it appears that citizens do not only take an interest in those events that directly affect their welfare but also those that contravene their basic beliefs. The notion that people react to symbolic threats raises interesting questions for the rational public hypothesis because it suggests that citizens may allow their attitudes towards a nation to be affected by those issues and events that have no direct effect on their material interests. Would it be considered rational, for example, for the public to respond negatively to a nuclear test conducted in a foreign nation far from Japan or should this be considered to be nothing more than an emotional, and thus, irrational, response? Would it be rational for the public to support sanctions against such a country even though it may have a negative effect on the Japanese economy? These are important questions that require future investigation.

In conclusion, the theory and evidence suggest that symbolic threats have a negative effect on Japanese public perceptions of foreign nations. Japanese political elites play an important role in shaping whether a particular issue is perceived to be a threat or not and, therefore, on whether an issue has a negative effect on public perceptions. As suggested by theories of framing, rather than directly shaping public opinion, the influence of political elites comes from their ability to make moral judgments and attribute responsibility to particular countries. In sum, the proposition that symbolic threats can cause increases in negative public

perceptions of a foreign nation and the proposition that media coverage tends to increase the magnitude of the effect of such threats is supported by the findings in this chapter.

7. Media Coverage of Threats to Japanese Identity and Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations

Introduction

The main argument of this chapter is that events interpreted as threats to Japanese identity are associated with negative changes in public attitudes of the nation viewed as its source. The second argument is that those threats to Japanese identity that receive higher media coverage will be related to greater magnitude changes in public opinion. The chapter is divided into three sections that examine first, cases of criticism of Japan; second, violations of diplomatic protocol involving Japan; and third; anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Events interpreted as threats to Japanese identity should cause negative changes in public perceptions towards the nation involved because citizens respond negatively to challenges to their group's esteem. When the actions of an out-group potentially decrease the esteem of the in-group, this will be interpreted as a threat. Branscombe et al. (1999:36) define this type of situation as a threat to the in-group's perceived value. These threats will tend to produce feelings of hostility towards the out-group viewed as the source of the threat. As applied to this study, the proposition that threats to social identity can produce hostility towards an out-group suggests that an issue perceived as a threat to Japanese identity should produce an increase in negative public perceptions of the nation viewed as the source of the threat. Since I assume that the Japanese public identifies with the Japanese nation, threats to national identity should be viewed as threats to their own self-esteem. When the image of their nation is disparaged by an out-group,

citizens can choose to denigrate the source of the threat. When this happens, public attitudes towards the nation associated with the threat turn negative.

Hypotheses


This chapter is concerned with testing the following two hypotheses. First, cases of threats to Japanese identity should be associated with negative changes in Japanese public attitudes of the nation involved as measured using the Jiji poll data. Second, cases of threats to Japanese identity that receive high media coverage should have a greater effect on public attitudes towards the nation involved than those that receive low media coverage. These hypotheses are tested with cases involving the three types of issues and events: criticism of Japan by a foreign government; violations of diplomatic protocol associated with Japan; and anti-Japanese demonstrations.

Foreign Criticism of Japan

Cases in which a foreign nation criticises Japan should be associated with negative changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved. The denigration of Japan by the political leadership of another country should cause feelings of anger and hostility among the public. In order to deal with these feelings, people will direct them towards the country perceived to be the source of the threat. If media coverage is high then this will signal to the public that a particular communication was important and should be given their attention. Public perceptions of a nation, which tend to be stable, will then shift in a negative direction at the same time. Foreign criticism of Japan, moderated by media coverage, causes changes in negative public perceptions of the nation involved.

Figure 7.1 shows a negative relationship between front page news stories in *Asahi Shimbun* and changes in Japanese public perceptions of the nation involved. A list of cases can be found in Appendix 8.

Figure 7.1: Front Page Stories of Criticism of Japan and Change in Public Attitudes towards Nation Involved, 1960-2007



N=27

Note: Cases are listed in Appendix 8.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

The relationship between media coverage of foreign criticism of Japan and changes in public opinion is negative but weak. A typical case of low media coverage was when Premier Wen Jiaobao of China criticised Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi over his visits to Yasukuni Shrine (Case 1). This story received two front page news stories and was associated with a change in public attitudes towards China of only -0.9 percentage points. A typical case of high media coverage of criticism of

Japan was over what is known as the first history textbook issue dispute (Case 26). Despite receiving 30 front page stories in *Asahi Shimbun*, public opinion towards China only changed by -2.9 percentage points in August 1982. The small magnitude of change and the numerous outliers suggest that the impact of foreign criticism of Japan, even when media coverage is high, may not be very strong. Nonetheless, a few cases of foreign criticism of Japan do appear to be associated with negative changes in public perceptions of the nation involved.

Table 7.1 shows the relationship between media coverage and opinion change using ordinal variables.

Table 7.1: Media Coverage and Negative Change in Japanese Public Attitudes toward Country Involved in Criticism of Japan

	High Media	Moderate Media	Low Media	Total
Major Change	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Minor Change	2 (33.33)	3 (27.27)	4 (40)	9 (33.33)
No Change	4 (66.67)	8 (72.73)	6 (60)	18 (66.67)
Total	6 (100)	11 (100)	10 (100)	27 (100)

Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 8 for list of cases. “Major Change” and “Minor Change” both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the variables were generated.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

Some cases of foreign criticism of Japan are associated with change in public attitudes towards the nation involved. In nine of the 27 cases, public attitudes towards the other nation experienced minor negative change. Interestingly, in no

cases was any criticism of Japan associated with a major change in public opinion. Furthermore, there is little evidence of the effects of the media in these cases. Although two cases of minor change were associated with high media coverage, four cases of low media coverage were also associated with a minor change in public attitudes. While the relatively small number of cases means that any inference has to be made with caution, the data do offer some support for the proposition that threats to Japanese identity produce negative changes in public attitudes towards a foreign nation. However, the magnitude of change in such cases tends to be minor. The Japanese public may simply not perceive such criticism to be a serious threat. Furthermore, the media coverage of such cases does not appear to be influential. To examine some of the reasons for these findings, a series of case studies are examined below.

Low Media Coverage

Despite criticism of Japan by South Korea and China over Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's visits to Yasukuni Shrine in April 2002 and January 2004, public attitudes towards neither of these countries changed in those particular months.⁹² This suggests that the Japanese public did not see such criticism as a threat or insult to their country. From the time Koizumi made his first announcement in 2001 that he would visit Yasukuni, both China and South Korea repeatedly issued warnings that such high-level visits served to glorify Japan's past wars and aggression against Asian countries. For many Japanese, and certainly for Koizumi, Yasukuni "is basically a domestic matter as to when and how country's leader offers prayers to the war dead based on the traditions and customs of that country" and that "other

⁹² Case 4 and Case 6 in Appendix 8.

countries have no right to interfere” (“Koizumi's decision a wise one”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 14 August 2001, p.1). While many people may not have agreed with the decision of Koizumi to visit Yasukuni, by 2002, the Japanese public had become accustomed to the automatic haranguing of their political leaders by the leaders of other Asian nations. As a result, such criticism was no longer salient and was basically ignored. The result was no change in public opinion.

Furthermore, media coverage of these visits and the criticism by other nations was low. In 2002, Japan and South Korea were co-hosting the FIFA World Cup and so politicians in both countries, as well as the mass media, had strong incentives to reduce the salience of Koizumi's visits. The same year, since Japan and China were also celebrating the 30 year anniversary of their establishment of diplomatic relations political elites had incentives to downplay any controversy over the visits. Meanwhile, in 2004, the timing of the visit may have reduced the volume of media coverage and, therefore, the salience of the event. Koizumi made his visit on New Year's Day when most of Japan was on holiday and, it may be assumed, would have been less attentive to political affairs than at other times. The suddenness of the visit caught many within the political and media establishment in Japan off-guard. As a result, Opposition parties, the Japanese media, and the governments of China and South Korea were forced to react quickly and in an ad-hoc manner. The end-result was low media coverage and a relatively subdued reaction within Japan and abroad to that particular visit. Although impossible to say whether this was his intention or not, the decision by Koizumi to visit on New Year's Day appears to have been a strategic move to reduce the salience of the visit and limit the negative reaction. In sum, the fact that the Japanese public had grown accustomed to the complaints by China and South Korea and the low volume of

media coverage meant that the criticism of Japan over Yasukuni was not salient and, therefore, it was not associated with a change in Japanese attitudes.

Other cases of foreign criticism of Japan that received low media coverage were also not associated with any change in public opinion towards the nations involved. In December 2004, on the sidelines of an ASEAN summit meeting, Premier Wen Jiabao urged Koizumi not to visit Yasukuni Shrine and called on him to “take appropriate measures to deal with the problem” (“Wen calls for action on Yasukuni”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 1 December 2004, p.1).⁹³ In a meeting the previous month, Chinese President Hu Jintao had also criticised Koizumi for his visits to Yasukuni. The main explanation for the lack of change was again that the Japanese public did not find the constant criticism of Koizumi to be salient any longer. Yet despite this, public attitudes in December 2004 were not associated with any change. This was likely due to the low level of media coverage of Wen’s comments as well as the fact that Japanese citizens may have just gotten accustomed to China’s comments and so tended to ignore them. By constantly repeating the criticism of Japan over Yasukuni, it appears that the communicative value of China’s comments declined. Since nothing ever happened after these comments, Japanese citizens may have simply learned to ignore them. The lack of a correlation between cases of criticism of Japan that receive low media coverage and changes in public attitudes suggest that such cases do not cause any negative changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved.

⁹³ Case 1 in Appendix 8.

Moderate Media Coverage

The visit to Japan by President Jiang Zemin in 1998, where he made many comments about Japan's failure to properly recognize history, was not correlated with any change in public attitudes towards China.⁹⁴ Public opinion towards China in November 1998, the month of his visit, did not change from the previous month. This suggests that the Japanese public did not feel a threat to Japanese identity by his comments. During his visit, Jiang requested from Japan a "deeper apology for past hostilities in China" and official recognition that China maintained sovereignty over Taiwan ("China seeks apology, sympathy on Taiwan", *Daily Yomiuri*, 12 November 1998, p.2). During a speech at Waseda University he directly criticized Japan for its past actions, admonished its political leaders for making statements about history, and lectured it about its education system:

Japan caused 35 million casualties and more than 600 billion dollars in damage and brought a huge national disaster to the Chinese people...Japan's history of economic development owes everything to its choice of peaceful development, not development by military force. Japan should lead young people with a correct view of history, and must not allow a revival of militarism in any form...If Japan can stop people in high positions from making incorrect remarks...it will lead to a new development in China-Japan relations ("Jiang hails new era in Japan-China ties 3 hecklers held for interrupting Waseda speech", *Daily Yomiuri*, 29 November 1998, p.1).

The *Daily Yomiuri* ("Chinese government to blame for booing", 5 August 2004, p.4) described how Jiang "one-sidedly and doggedly repeated that Japan must keep learning lessons from history". For a political leader to come to Japan and make such comments, this should have been considered to be quite rude. Yet, despite all of this, public opinion towards China did not change.

⁹⁴ Case 13 in Appendix 8.

The main reason for this lack of opinion change was likely due to the efforts by Japanese leaders to frame the visit as a successful step in improving Japan-China relations. At the end of the visit, both countries made a joint statement in which they promised to build a “friendly and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity” (“New Start for Japan, China”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 27 November 1998, p.8). Once back in China, Jiang also sent a letter of gratitude to the Japanese Emperor which included a positive statement about future Japan-China relations (“Jiang ends 6-day visit to Japan, thanks Emperor”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 1 December 1998, p.2). When a Japanese weekly magazine accused Jiang of impoliteness because he wore a Chinese tunic at a banquet hosted by the Emperor, the Chief Cabinet Secretary admonished the magazine and accused it of being “rude to China” (“Nonaka slams criticism of Jiang tunic suit”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 5 December 1998, p.2). Despite many of the negative comments made by Jiang about Japanese historical recognition, these were probably given less weight in the considerations of the Japanese public than the positive comments of the visit by both the media and political leaders. The Japanese public appeared to ignore Jiang’s comments in favour of the more positive framing of his visit. Although it is often assumed that political elites will seek to generate negative impressions of other nations, this case suggests that they can also work to moderate such perceptions.

On some occasions, criticism of Japan over Yasukuni has produced negative changes in attitudes towards China. Koizumi’s first visit to Yasukuni as Prime Minister, a highly salient event because past Japanese leaders had been so reluctant to visit, was such a case.⁹⁵ Public attitudes towards China in July 2001, the month of his visit showed a minor negative change of -5.7 percentage points. Immediately

⁹⁵ Case 15 in Appendix 8.

after becoming Prime Minister in 2001, Koizumi Junichiro announced his plan for an August 15 visit to Yasukuni Shrine. China attempted to influence Koizumi's decision by personally appealing to Tanaka Makiko, Japan's Foreign Minister and the daughter of the Prime Minister who established relations between the two countries, to stop Koizumi from visiting ("Tanaka weathers diplomatic debut", *Daily Yomiuri*, 25 May 2001, p.6). In July, the three secretary-generals of Japan's ruling coalition visited China, only to be severely criticised by Premier Jiang Zemin who warned them that "history cannot be artificially changed", that such issues "must be addressed in a sincere manner", and that the Yasukuni issue "could ignite serious trouble".⁹⁶ Although Japanese political elites may have been restrained in their response to China, the media was not. This issue was framed as interference by an external power into Japan's domestic politics. The *Daily Yomiuri* praised Koizumi in his decision to visit Yasukuni because to not do so would mean that he was backing down in the face of foreign pressure over a domestic issue ("All over but the shouting", 9 August 2001, p.16). Given the frame of "foreign interference in domestic matters", it is not surprising that many Japanese citizens, maybe even those who did not agree with the visits, were angered. The constant accusations that Japan was moving towards militarism, despite a defence budget of only around one per cent of GDP, likely produced negative emotions. What is more, the hypocritical nature of the criticism from China, a nation that jealously guards its own sovereignty and lashes out at any comments about what it considers to be "domestic" issues such as Tibet or Taiwan, did not go unnoticed. As suggested by the change in public attitudes towards China

⁹⁶ The secretaries general of Japan's three ruling coalition parties were Taku Yamasaki of the Liberal Democratic Party, Tetsuzo Fuyushiba of New Komeito, and Takeshi Noda of Hoshuto (New Conservative Party).

the same month as the visits, this criticism and its salience produced negative feelings among the public towards China.

In another case, China and South Korea's severe criticism of Japan for the Ministry of Education's approval of history textbooks said to whitewash Japanese war responsibility was associated with a minor change in public attitudes towards the two countries.⁹⁷ In July 1982, *Asahi Shimbun* ("‘Nihon no kyokasyo kentei wa chugokujinmin eno chosen’ kyanpein chugoku ga kaishi [China starts campaign ‘Japan’s textbook approval defies the Chinese people’]", 24 July, p.2) reported that the Japanese Ministry of Education had requested a textbook making various changes, such as stating that the Japanese army had "advanced" into, rather than "invaded", Northern China. China, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan and Singapore all responded strongly to this report, arguing that Japan was seriously distorting history. China was the most vocal, saying that the decision to publish these was a violation of "the spirit of the 1972 Sino-Japanese joint statement" (Japan Economic Newswire, 27 July 1982). South Korea was not happy either and rejected a proposed Japanese mission to come to Seoul to discuss the issue (Japan Economic Newswire, 6 August 1982). In September 1982, the month that the dispute reached its highest pitch, public attitudes towards China showed a minor negative change from the previous month of -3.2 percentage points.

The main reason for the minor change in public opinion towards China and South Korea in September 1982 was probably the framing of this issue as an attempt by foreign governments to interfere in Japanese domestic education policy. Just as

⁹⁷ For the sake of the case studies, I classify this as a case of high media coverage with a minor change in public opinion because this dispute went on from June to September 1982. The media coverage was low in July 1982, moderate in August 1982, and high in September 1982.

many citizens did not agree with Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni, most citizens probably did not agree with statements by the Minister of Education, who said that he wanted a "correct Japanese view" of World War II which he argued was ignored by the US Occupation and the left-wing dominated Japan Teacher's Union ("Kyodo reviews textbook revision controversy", Kyodo, 10 August 1982). However, the claims by China and South Korea that the introduction of such a textbook represented a return to militarism and an attempt to distort history denigrated the Japanese public's sense of their country's accomplishments as a peaceful state during the post-war period. The attempted interference in domestic matters by two non-democratic nations may have been enough to anger citizens and generate hostility towards their source. As was shown in the cases of foreign criticism of official visits to Yasukuni, attempts to play the history card by China and South Korea can produce strong feelings of hostility towards those nations. As a result, public attitudes towards the nations associated with this dispute turned negative.

High Media Coverage

China's criticism of Japan for inviting Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to the Asian Games being held in Hiroshima in 1994 did not produce a change in Japanese attitudes towards China.⁹⁸ China said that it did "not welcome" the Japanese Government's invitation of Lee to Hiroshima, stating that "in disregard of the solemn positions of the Chinese government, the Japanese government decided to allow Hsu Li-the (Lee Teng-hui)... to visit Japan" and that "the Chinese government cannot accept this" ("China's Asiad stance troublesome", *Daily*

⁹⁸ Case 22 in Appendix 8.

Yomiuri, 17 September 1994, p.6). Despite this criticism and attempt to influence who Japan could grant a visa to, Japanese public attitudes in September 1994 did not change.

The fact that the criticism was based on a difference in policy over Taiwan rather than an attack on matters closer to Japanese identity, such as history, may have meant that citizens did not perceive this issue to be a particularly salient threat. As a result, public attitudes towards China did not change. Japanese policymakers also attempted to downplay the dispute with Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi saying that he hoped the problem would be resolved “amicably” (“Premier wants amicable solution, *Daily Yomiuri*, 9 September 1994, p.1). This result has important implications for scholars of public opinion and foreign policy because it suggests that while direct criticism of Japan may cause a negative change in public attitudes towards a foreign nation, even when media coverage of a foreign policy is high, this may not.

In another case, criticism of Japan over comments made to reporters by Eto Takami, the Director-General of the Management and Coordination Agency in the Japanese Cabinet, about Japan’s period of colonisation of Korea from 1910 to 1945 produced a change in public opinion about South Korea.⁹⁹ Public attitudes towards South Korea in November 1995, the month of his comments, showed a minor change from the previous month of -3.8 percentage points. South Korean political leaders were furious over off-the-record comments made to reporters by Eto who was quoted as saying, “I think Japan did some good, including educating Koreans and building ports and roads for them” (“Eto withdraws remark on Korea

⁹⁹ Case 24 in Appendix 8.

colonization”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 9 November 1995, p.1). The South Korean Foreign Minister immediately summoned the Japanese Ambassador in Seoul and stated that “it is simply deplorable that a public figure, a Japanese politician or whomever, would make a remark that was different from the Japanese government's view and unfavourably influence Japan-South Korea relations” (“S. Korea 'demand' for Eto to resign stuns government”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 10 November 1995, p.1). He continued that “it is not a matter that can be settled by retracting the remark after it had already become controversial”. Soon afterwards, in an official statement, the South Korean foreign ministry stated that “if the remark was true, we can hardly restrain our shock and anger”. These statements by South Korea were interpreted in Japan as demands that Eto resign from his post in the Cabinet.

The change in attitudes towards South Korea was likely a function of the Japanese public viewing those comments as a threat to national identity. Although not necessarily approving of the comments by Eto, Japanese citizens appear to have been unhappy about what seemed to be an over-reaction to comments made off the record. Just as in the cases of the Yasukuni visits and the textbook issue, the Japanese media framed the issue as one of interference in Japanese domestic politics. The *Daily Yomiuri* (“Who's in charge of the Cabinet?”, 12 November 1995, p.5) expressed concern that “the government's response gives the impression that it is willing to allow a foreign country to decide whether a cabinet minister should resign” and noted that “it has become almost an annual event for a cabinet member to make a controversial remark and then resign in the face of strong pressure from abroad”. What is more, South Korea already had a history of public outrage over insensitive comments made by a Japanese politician. In 1986, Seoul had also demanded the resignation of Fujio Masayuki, the Japanese Minister of Education,

over an interview in which he stated that the colonisation of Korea by Japan in 1910 was approved by the Korean side.¹⁰⁰ The combination of anger over South Korea's attempted interference in Japanese domestic matters and the salience due to high media coverage were the likely reasons behind the minor change in opinion.

To conclude, communications by a foreign nation critical of Japan can cause negative changes of the nation involved but not always. Furthermore, such changes tend to be minor. Even considering cases of high media coverage, such communications have never produced a major change in Japanese public opinion towards a foreign nation. In fact, the Japanese public appears to respond quite reasonably to those criticisms that come so often from China and South Korea, perhaps not viewing them as salient. Since most criticism only involves words rather than actions, citizens may simply disregard such criticism as cheap talk. After all, the public is well aware that political leaders are apt to use criticism of Japan to strengthen their nationalist credentials among domestic audiences so it makes sense to simply ignore such statements since they have no communicative value. These findings suggest a public that is not easily whipped up by nationalist or xenophobic feelings, even when comments do insult or denigrate Japan. In conclusion, these cases do offer some support for the proposition that symbolic threats cause increases in negative public attitudes towards foreign nations. Furthermore, media coverage does appear to moderate the effects of such criticism somewhat, but even when media coverage is high, this will still tend to only have a minor impact on public opinion.


¹⁰⁰ Case 24 in Appendix 8.

Violations of Diplomatic Protocol

Violations of diplomatic protocol that affect Japan should produce negative changes in public opinion towards the nation responsible. Cardozo (1963:67) notes that diplomats are sensitive to diplomatic protocol because “these are the indicia of rank, not just the man, but the country he represents.” Violations of such protocol, therefore, should be perceived by Japanese citizens as insults to their nation. Since a person’s self-esteem is assumed to be linked to national identity, such events should be interpreted as a threat and lead to negative emotions directed towards the nation that is its source. High media coverage of such violations should increase their salience and, therefore, the magnitude of their effect. When this occurs, public attitudes towards the nation involved should turn negative.

Violations of diplomatic protocol involving Japan are rare. Only three cases involving the countries in this study were coded as such events. Figure 7.2 shows that each of the events was associated with a negative change in attitudes towards the nation involved.

Figure 7.2: Front Page Stories of Violations of Diplomatic Protocol and Change in Public Attitudes towards Nation Involved, 1960-2007



N=3

Note: Cases are listed in Appendix 9.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

The lack of data points renders any inferences about whether the relationship is linear or whether it is strong or weak as highly uncertain. However, the data do show that high media coverage of such events is correlated with negative changes in public attitudes towards the nation viewed as responsible. In a typical case of low media coverage, Vice-Premier Wu Yi's sudden cancellation of a meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi attracted four front page stories (Case 1). Public attitudes towards China in the month that this occurred, May 2005, turned negative by -4.9 percentage points. In the only case of high media coverage, President Boris Yeltsin's sudden cancellation of his visit to Japan received 19 front page stories in *Asahi* and was associated with a change in public attitudes towards Russia in

September 1992 of -14.7 percentage points (Case 3). Violations of diplomatic protocol may have a negative effect on public attitudes towards the nation involved and the effect of such events appear to be magnified by high volumes of media coverage. This supports the propositions that first, threats to Japanese identity have a negative impact on public perceptions of foreign nations and second, media coverage moderates the effects of such events.

Table 7.2 shows that violations of diplomatic protocol are sometimes associated with changes in public opinion and sometimes they are not.

Table 7.2: Violations of Diplomatic Protocol, Media Coverage and Negative Change in Japanese Public Attitudes toward Country Involved, 1960-2007

	High	Moderate	Low	Total
Major Change	1 (100)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (33.33)
Minor Change	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (100)	1 (33.33)
No Change	0 (0)	1 (100)	0 (0)	1 (33.33)
Total	1 (100)	1 (100)	1 (100)	3 (100)

Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 9 for list of cases. "Major Change" and "Minor Change" both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the variables were generated.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

In the three cases of violations of diplomatic protocol, two of the three cases were associated with a change in public opinion. Further, as shown in the row marked "Major Change", the one case of major change in public opinion was associated with high media coverage so it is possible that media coverage of such events can

increase the magnitude of opinion change. Below is an examination in some more detail of the three cases in which diplomatic protocol was violated.

Low Media Coverage

The decision by Chinese Vice-Premier Wu Yi to suddenly cancel her meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi in May 2005 over his continued refusal to stop visiting Yasukuni Shrine caused a moderate negative change in public opinion towards China.¹⁰¹ As was above, this incident was associated with a minor change in public opinion towards China in May 2005 of -4.9 percentage points. According to a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman in reference to Japan, “Have they thought of the feelings of the Chinese people, who suffered from the Japanese invasion and have not recovered from the damage?” (“China admits Yasukuni link to Wu's snub”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 25 May 2005, p.1). The sudden cancellation of a meeting between the Japanese prime minister and an important foreign representative is a diplomatic snub that should be interpreted as an insult to Japan's prestige. Coming as it did just a month after the large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in China this incident resonated with the Japanese public. Both the Japanese media and political elites framed it as an act of rudeness directed at Japan. The *Daily Yomiuri* (“China's Wu cancels meeting with Koizumi”, 24 May 2005) quoted a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official who took grave offence to China's actions:

Don't they [China] understand diplomatic manners and rules? They should follow a minimal level of international protocol. Their sudden cancellation of the meeting is similar to last month's stoning of Japanese diplomatic missions in China (p.1).

¹⁰¹ Case 1 in Appendix 9.

Although the low media coverage may have reduced the salience of this action, the Japanese public still responded. The anger Japanese citizens would have felt over having their political leader treated so shabbily by a foreign guest and the minor change in public opinion the same month suggests that Wu's snub was the cause of the change in public opinion.

Moderate Media Coverage

The decision by Bill Clinton in June 1998 to skip Japan to spend nine days in China did not result in a change in Japanese public opinion about the United States.¹⁰² Although not an intentional diplomatic signal by the US towards Japan, Clinton's trip to China was interpreted by some Japanese commentators as a case of "Japan passing." Reflecting on the period ten years later, a *Daily Yomiuri* editorial in 2008 ("Clinton diplomacy a concern for Japan", 3 December, p.4) stated that "the hard-line stance against Japan taken by the Democratic administration that took power in the early 1990s is still fresh in our memories". The concerns that Japan was being bypassed by the US in favour of China reflected a greater insecurity among domestic political elites over Japan's international environment in the post-Cold War era. However, despite elite concerns that Clinton had "snubbed" Japan, in the June 1998, the month of his visit to China, Japanese public perceptions of the United States did not change.

The reason for the lack of attitude change was most likely due to the fact that most members of the Japanese public simply did not feel insulted by Clinton's decision to visit China. Unlike the previous case, the actions of Clinton and the United States did not appear to be intentional and did not represent any fundamental

¹⁰² Case 2 in Appendix 9.

change in the US-Japan relationship. It was quite reasonable for the public to assume that President Clinton spending time in China would have little substantive effect on their country. What is interesting in this case is that the public responded with such indifference to Clinton's actions despite grumblings by certain members of the Japanese foreign policy elite. Most Japanese citizens may simply have not interpreted this event as a threat and the lack of opinion change following this event supports this argument.

High Media Coverage

In September 1992, Boris Yeltsin's decision to suddenly cancel a high level meeting that included discussions of the highly contentious Northern Territories issue with his Japanese counterparts was associated with a major negative change in public attitudes towards Russia of -14.7 percentage points.¹⁰³ As in the Wu case, the unilateral and sudden cancellation of a high level meeting between foreign leaders over an important issue can be interpreted as a threat to national prestige. At the end of the Cold War, many commentators in Japan believed that the on-going Northern Territories issue could be resolved. It was with genuine excitement that Japanese political elites and the mass media greeted Yeltsin's planned three-day visit in September 1992 to Japan as an event that would usher in a new era for relations between the two nations. Despite these lofty expectations, however, Yeltsin suddenly, and without warning, postponed his planned trip to Japan, citing "changes in the international situation and mounting domestic problems" (Kurata, M., 1992, "Yeltsin Postpones Japan Visit", *Daily Yomiuri*, 10

¹⁰³ Case 3 in Appendix 9.

September, p.1). In the month of his cancellation, September 1992, Japanese public attitudes towards Russia experienced a major negative change.

The cancellation by Yeltsin of his visit was interpreted in Japan as a national insult. Japanese political elites and the mass media framed the issue as a violation of diplomatic protocol. The Chairman of the LDP Diet Affairs Committee, Kajiyama Seiroku, verbally attacked Russia by stating that “it does not make sense to expand our assistance to Russia after such disrespectful behaviour” (“Foreign Ministry raps Russia on Shikotan deal, *Daily Yomiuri*, 17 September 1992, p.1). The Japanese Ambassador to Russia stated that “the indefinite postponement of Yeltsin's visit to Japan goes against diplomatic etiquette and caused trouble not only for the Japanese government but also others concerned” (“Russia Rapped For Cancelling Japan Trip”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 14 September 1992, p.1). Along with political elites, media organisations had also been hoping for a breakthrough in the Northern Territories dispute, building up Yeltsin's visit and going so far as to cover what his wife would be doing during her time in Japan. Given the high level of attention to this incident by Japanese political elites and the mass media, and its framing as an insult to Japan, it is not surprising that the emotions of ordinary citizens were also activated and public attitudes towards Russia turned negative.


To summarise, although the number of cases is small, violations of diplomatic protocol do appear to be associated with negative changes in public attitudes towards foreign nations. Such change is most likely to occur when media coverage is high. Although far from conclusive, these findings do support the propositions that threats to Japanese identity produce negative changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved and that media coverage moderates the magnitude of the impact of such events.

Anti-Japanese Demonstrations

Anti-Japanese demonstrations should produce negative changes in Japanese public attitudes towards the nation involved. Large-scale protests and demonstrations by a group should be interpreted as a threat because they are a direct and salient expression of hostility towards Japan. This should result in negative emotions that are then directed towards the country viewed as the cause of the demonstrations. High media coverage of such demonstrations should increase their salience and, therefore, their impact on public opinion.

Figure 7.3 shows almost no correlation between media coverage of anti-Japanese demonstrations and public attitudes towards foreign nations. The list of cases can be found in Appendix 10.

Figure 7.3: Front Page Stories of Anti-Japanese Demonstrations and Change in Public Attitudes towards Nation Involved, 1960-2007



Note: Cases are listed in Appendix 10.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

Six of the seven cases of anti-Japanese demonstrations were associated with a negative change in public opinion towards the nation involved. However, higher media coverage of anti-Japanese demonstrations was not correlated with greater changes in public opinion. One “typical” case of an anti-Japanese demonstration that received moderate media coverage was that of South Korean students against Japan just prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries (Case 5). In July 1965, this event received 23 front page stories and was correlated with a change in public attitudes towards South Korea of -8.1 percentage points. One other case that appears to be relatively “typical” was that of the anti-Japanese demonstrations in Seoul following the assassination attempt by a North Korean resident of Japan on the South Korean President (Case 7). This event received 85 front page stories and was associated with a change in public attitudes towards South Korea in September 1974 of -7.9 percentage points. Three of the seven cases resulted in much larger changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved than predicted if media coverage was the main factor.

Using ordinal variables, Table 7.3 shows the effects of anti-Japanese demonstrations on public opinion.

Table 7.3: Anti-Japanese demonstrations, Media Coverage and Negative Change in Japanese Public Attitudes toward Country Involved, 1960-2007

	High Media	Moderate Media	Low Media	Total
Major Change	3 (100)	1 (50)	1 (50)	5 (71.43)
Minor Change	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
No Change	0 (0)	1 (50)	1 (50)	2 (28.57)
Total	3 (100)	2 (100)	2 (100)	7 (100)

Note: Percentages in brackets. See Appendix 10 for list of cases. “Major Change” and “Minor Change” both refer to cases of negative change in opinion. See Chapter Three text for how the variables were generated.

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

As in all of the case studies, the small number of observations means that any results should be interpreted with caution. However, cases of anti-Japanese demonstrations do appear to have a negative relation with changes in public opinion. Five of the seven cases of anti-Japanese demonstrations were associated with major changes. Further, the argument that higher media coverage of such cases produces greater change is supported by the row marked “Major Change” which shows that three cases of major change in public opinion were associated with high media coverage while only a single case was associated with minor media coverage. These results support the argument that anti-Japanese demonstrations produce increases in negative public opinion. Below these cases are examined in some more detail.

Low Media Coverage

The September 1985 demonstrations by Chinese students over Prime Minister Nakasone's August visit to Yasukuni Shrine did not cause a change in public opinion towards China.¹⁰⁴ As the first post-war prime minister to go to Yasukuni in an official capacity, Nakasone's visit elicited strong protests from two of Japan's most important geographical neighbours, China and the Soviet Union. ("Nakasone, cabinet members pay official visit to Yasukuni", Japan Economic Newswire, August 15, 1985). Two major demonstrations took place, one in Beijing and one in the city of Xian. The Beijing demonstrations consisted of approximately 1000 students ("1000 Peking students march in resentment against Japan", *New York Times*, 19 September 1985, p.4). Beginning at Beijing University, the protesters held signs such as "Down with Japanese militarism" and "Strongly oppose the second invasion" and joined up with students from other universities to hold a two-hour demonstration in Tiananmen Square. The Xian demonstrations also involved about 1000 students and included protesters carrying Chinese flags and such placards as "Down with Nakasone" and "We protest Prime Minister Nakasone's worship at Yasukuni Shrine" ("Anti-Nakasone demonstration erupts again in China", Japan Economic Newswire, 3 October 1985). Students made speeches denouncing the revival of militarism in Japan and accused Japan of shipping low-quality goods to China. However, despite these protests, public attitudes towards China in September 1985 did not change.

The main reason for the lack of opinion change was that the dominant frame attributed the cause of the demonstrations to Nakasone rather than to China. These

¹⁰⁴ Case 1 in Appendix 10.

demonstrations took place during a period in which Japan was split ideologically between left and right. Japanese Opposition parties used Nakasone's visit to attack him. His visit to Yasukuni was framed by these groups as the immediate cause of the Chinese demonstrations so it is likely that a large percentage of the Japanese public did not place as much blame on China as would have happened had they been spontaneous. The JSP linked the shrine visit to its criticism of Japan's recent defence build up and Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party questioned its constitutionality (The Associated Press, 15 August 1985). The anti-Japanese demonstrations and the criticism by China were integrated in to this frame.

What is more, Nakasone and the rest of the Japanese Government did nothing to counter this frame. When first asked about the anti-Japanese demonstrations, instead of criticising them, Nakasone declined comment ("Nakasone declines comment on Chinese demo", Japan Economic Newswire, 19 September 1985). When asked again later, he stated he had learned about the demonstrations through a newspaper but agreed that Japan had to do more to reflect on its actions during World War II, even going so far as to say that the Chinese demonstrations were understandable ("Nakasone on anti-Japanese Rally in Beijing", Kyodo, 25 September 1985). Although the Japanese Embassy in Beijing expressed surprise over the demonstrations, an official simply stated that though they did not like the demonstrations but they had heard that Chinese authorities had made all efforts to prevent them from happening ("AFP reports demonstration", Hong Kong AFP, 19 September 1985). The attribution of responsibility to Nakasone rather than to China in the dominant frame and the lack of media coverage of the demonstrations may have meant the Japanese public did not view China as the source of the threat.

In contrast to the events described above, the anti-Japanese behaviour and chanting by Chinese soccer fans at the 2004 Asian Cup final in Beijing was associated with a major increase in negative attitudes towards China.¹⁰⁵ In August 2004, at the final of the Asian Cup soccer tournament at Beijing Worker's Stadium, many Chinese spectators booed so loudly during the singing of the Japanese national anthem that the song was barely audible ("Chinese fans boo during 'Kimigayo', *Daily Yomiuri*, 8 August 2004, p.1). Following the final, a few Chinese fans were reported to have chanted insulting comments about Japan, burned its national flag, broke some car windows, and surrounded the accommodation facility where the Japanese team was staying ("Anti-Japan feeling running high", *Daily Yomiuri*, 10 August 2004, p.3). Attitudes towards China in August 2004, the same month as the tournament, experienced a major negative change of -12.6 percentage points.

Political elites in both China and Japan tried to reduce the salience of the incident. China appeared to be quite embarrassed, with Beijing police apologising for their inability to control the crowd and the Chinese Ambassador to Japan quoted as saying that the action of the fans was "regrettable" and "very unpleasant" ("Chinese ambassador expresses regret to Japan over rowdy soccer fans at Asian Cup", Associated Press Worldstream, 9 August 2004). Japan's Foreign Minister praised China, saying that the "government worked fairly hard to ensure that the safety (of Japanese tourists) would be protected" ("Anti-Japan feeling running high", *Daily Yomiuri*, 10 August, 2004, p.3). Any negative change in public attitudes could not be attributed to statements by elites in China and Japan over the issue.

¹⁰⁵ Case 2 in Appendix 10.

The Japanese public was certainly upset at the behaviour of the Chinese fans which violated those norms associated with sportsmanship at international events. This was especially salient because China was due to hold the Summer Olympics in 2008. As Zico, Japan's national coach, said, "I don't care about booing (by Chinese fans against the Japanese team) but any soccer fan in the world should pay due respect when a national anthem is played" ("Chinese government to blame for booing, *Daily Yomiuri*, 5 August 2004).

However, the main reason for the change in public opinion was likely the framing of the event in the Japanese media as rather than a simple case of soccer hooliganism, as a case of systematic anti-Japanese sentiment that was common throughout all of China. The action of a few rude fans was generalised to all of China and this resonated with the Japanese public. Media organisations blamed the behaviour of the Chinese spectators on China's anti-Japanese patriotic education system. According to the dominant frame, the Chinese Communist Party purposefully generated negative feelings towards Japan because this would allow it to maintain its legitimacy. According to the *Daily Yomiuri* ("Behavior mirrors bilateral ties/Local fan attitudes at Asian Cup in China becomes diplomatic issue", 7 August 2004, p.4), "undoubtedly this behaviour is partly caused by the anti-Japanese propaganda long promoted by the Chinese authorities" and that "Chinese society condones insulting Japan". It concluded that "the Chinese government should be blamed for developing such narrow-minded nationalism among the public" ("Chinese government to blame for booing", *Daily Yomiuri*, 5 August 2004, p.4). This simple generalisation of anti-Japanese sentiment among a few loud and vocal people attending the soccer match to the entire nation resonated with the public. As a result, this may have led negative public attitudes

towards China to increase. This case suggests that even when media coverage is low, a strong frame of an anti-Japanese demonstration that allows for it to be generalised to an entire country may be sufficient for a negative change in attitudes.

Moderate Media Coverage

Anti-Japanese demonstrations between March and April 2005 were associated with a major negative change in public opinion towards South Korea.¹⁰⁶ The catalyst of these demonstrations was the introduction of an ordinance bill in the Shimane Prefectural Assembly, a regional government within Japan, officially recognising February 22nd as “Takeshima Day”. Takeshima is a small island over which Japan and South Korea have a long-running sovereignty dispute. The purpose of the ordinance was to support efforts to establish Japan's sovereignty over the island and increase the awareness of the Japanese public. In response to the ordinance, the President of South Korea posted a message on this website promising that he would respond sternly to Japan’s “efforts to justify the history of aggression and occupation and moves to obtain its object of hegemony” (“Japan vows efforts to rebuild trust after Roh's statement”, Japan Economic Newswire, 24 March 2004). Public attitudes towards South Korea in April 2005 showed a major negative change of -10.8 percentage points.

The salience of the demonstrations over what most Japanese saw as an extremely minor issue was the main reason for the change in negative attitudes towards South Korea. The actions of the South Korean demonstrators were framed as nationalistic, emotional and wholly disproportionate in their response to the issue. A South

¹⁰⁶ Case 3 in Appendix 10.

Korean citizens' group held a demonstration in front of Japan's consulate in Pusan holding placards reading "Unwelcome", in reference to Prime Minister Koizumi and a meeting planning to be held there in the following November ("Spring Warmth in Japan-South Korea Ties Turning Chilly", Jiji Press Ticker Service, 11 March 2005). The BBC (Scanlon, C., 2005, "South Koreans vent fury at Japan" 18 March)¹⁰⁷ reported, rather sensationally, that "overwhelmed by fury, protesters have sliced off fingers, set themselves on fire, and in one case committed suicide by jumping off a bridge". At the Shimane Prefectural Assembly in Japan, before being taken into custody by the police, a Seoul Municipal Assembly member hung a banner that read, "Stop distorting history" and took out a box cutter which he said he was going to use to cut off his finger and write a letter of protest in blood ("Takeshima bill draws protests, support", *Daily Yomiuri*, 17 March 2005, p.2). Given the media's emphasis on these types of protests, it is unsurprising that Japanese citizens began to have negative feelings towards South Korea.

The dominant frame in Japan also attributed responsibility for the anti-Japanese demonstrations to the South Korean Government and its efforts to incite anti-Japanese sentiment for political benefit. President Roh was portrayed as a cynical politician attempting to "boost his administration's flagging popularity by emphasising its hard-line policy toward Japan" ("ROK interfering in Japan's affairs", *Daily Yomiuri*, 19 March 2005, p.4). Following these demonstrations, the Japanese public became quite pessimistic about relations between the two nations. In an *Asahi Shimbun* poll in April 2005 asking whether Japanese respondents thought that Japan-South Korea relations were going well, only 24 per cent of respondents said they were while 61 per cent said they were not ("*Rekishu ninshiki*

¹⁰⁷ Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4361343.stm> [Accessed 16 June 2009]

okina mizo, nikkanchu sankakoku yoron chosa [Division on perceptions of history, Japan-Korea-China poll], *Asahi Shimbun*, 27 April 2005, p.9). The media coverage of these incidents and the seemingly irrational behaviour of many of the protesters, which were given the greatest attention in news reports, may have produced anger among Japanese citizens towards South Korea.

High Media Coverage

Each of the three cases of high media coverage of anti-Japanese demonstrations was associated with a major negative change in public opinion. In one case, just prior to the signing of the Japan-South Korea treaty to normalise diplomatic relations, anti-Japanese protests by nationalistic student groups over the treaty were associated with a negative major change in public attitudes towards South Korea in August 1965 of -8.1 percentage points.¹⁰⁸ In another case in August 1974, South Koreans engaged in anti-Japanese demonstrations in Seoul in front of the Japanese embassy over the attempted assassination of their president by a North Korean resident of Japan.¹⁰⁹ Attitudes towards South Korea in September 1974 showed a change of -7.9 percentage points from the previous month.

The large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in various Chinese cities in April 2005 were correlated with a major change in public attitudes towards China of -12.6 percentage points.¹¹⁰ The demonstrations initially began as a protest against Japan's campaign to get a seat on the United Nations Security Council and the approval of history textbooks said to gloss over Japanese actions in World War II. The largest demonstration, organised by the Internet and mobile phone, took place

¹⁰⁸ Case 4 in Appendix 10.

¹⁰⁹ Case 7 in Appendix 10.

¹¹⁰ Case 6 in Appendix 10.

in Shanghai, where demonstrators threw stones, tomatoes, plastic bottles, and eggs at the Japanese consulate, reportedly damaging 20 windows. Although the building was guarded by about 2,000 Chinese police officers, the protesters seemed to be unmolested. The demonstrations got so bad that they became a serious diplomatic problem between the two countries, leading to a meeting between Koizumi and President Hu Jintao along the sidelines of a conference in Indonesia to discuss the problem.

As part of the dominant frame, the Chinese Government was portrayed as giving tacit support for the demonstrations and failing to protect Japanese consular buildings. “The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and other international laws make parties responsible for maintaining peace and order around other countries’ diplomatic facilities, and China is failing to fulfil that duty”, said Japanese Vice-Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi (“China owes Japan for riots”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 20 April 2005, p.3). One Japanese politician stated that “throwing stones at the Japanese Embassy is almost equal to attacking Japan” (“China criticized across party lines”, *Daily Yomiuri*, 12 April 2005, p.3). The framing of the event such that the Chinese Government appeared to condone the actions of the protesters was sure to infuriate the public.

Furthermore, like in the case of the Asian Cup hooligans, the demonstrations were framed as a massive anti-Japanese movement resulting from the Chinese Government’s anti-Japanese education policy. This thesis had even permeated official policy circles. Japanese Foreign Minister Machimura accused China’s “patriotic education” as being anti-Japanese and the *Daily Yomiuri* (“Wen seeking to justify anti-Japan violence”, 14 April 2005, p.4) editorialised that the main cause of the problem was former Premier Jiang Zemin’s “patriotic education” which

“was almost synonymous with an anti-Japan campaign primarily aimed at deflecting the public's criticism of the government, thereby maintaining the Communist Party's iron-fist rule”. High levels of media coverage of the anti-Japanese demonstrations also played a significant role in causing public attitudes towards China to worsen. The media consistently referred to the demonstrations as “anti-Japanese” (*hannichi demo*) while television coverage and photos in newspapers emphasised crazed-looking demonstrators burning Japanese flags and throwing eggs at the Japanese consulates and embassy. According to an *Asahi Shimbun* poll (“*Asahi Shimbunsha Kinkyu yoron chosa – sitsumon to kaito* [Asahi Shimbun urgent poll – questions and answers]”, 25 April 2005, p.3), only 19 per cent of respondents believed that Japan was the responsible for the demonstrations while 71 per cent said that it was not. The dominant frame, which portrayed the Chinese Government as responsible for encouraging anti-Japanese nationalism and generalised the feelings of the protesters to the entire country interacted with media coverage to produce a major change in public attitudes towards China.

Generalising from the findings in the case studies above, events framed as anti-Japanese demonstrations do appear to be one cause of changes in public perceptions of foreign nations. This makes sense as they are likely to be interpreted as a direct threat to Japanese national identity. Although such demonstrations are unlikely to have any actual effect on Japan's material wellbeing, they are nonetheless an attack on national prestige and may tend to elicit a negative reaction. The public denigration of their country by such demonstrations, which are often then projected to the rest of the world by the international media, generates negative emotions and hostility among the Japanese public towards the nation in

which the demonstrations are taking place. These findings support the propositions that threats to Japanese identity produce negative changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved and media coverage moderates that effect.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that threats to Japanese identity cause increases in negative attitudes towards the foreign nations perceived to be responsible. High media coverage of such threats tends to increase the magnitude of their effect on public opinion. The findings support the proposition that threats to Japanese identity produce negative changes in public attitudes towards the nation involved. Furthermore, it supports the general proposition that higher media coverage increases public perceptions of a foreign nation.

These findings have implications for the study of public opinion and foreign policy. The Japanese public does not appear to respond unreasonably to information that their country's national pride has been insulted. This chapter has provided further evidence that to understand short-term opinion change, it is necessary to understand the impact of exogenous events and how they are framed by political elites and the mass media. Even though such threats may have no real effect on policy or Japan's material wellbeing, they can nonetheless influence public perceptions of a foreign nation. These findings support the overall argument that perceived threats are a major cause of increases in negative public perceptions of a foreign nation. Like symbolic threats, it appears that, under the right conditions, public opinion can be activated by the actions of foreign nation that denigrates Japan, even when those actions may have no direct impact on the wellbeing of its citizens.

8. Long-Term Trends in Japanese Public Opinion about Ten Foreign Nations 1960-2007

Introduction

To this point, this study has been primarily concerned with changes in short-term public opinion. However, as mentioned in Chapter Two, Proposition 4 was that the effects of most threats should be short-term. In this chapter, I make three arguments. First, the Japanese public is generally rational when it comes to public perceptions of foreign nations. Over the long-term, attitudes towards particular nations are stable and when they do change tend to do so due to particular reasons.¹¹¹ Second, since people are exposed to a wider variety of information about nations that are geographically nearby and politically important, public opinion towards these nations will tend to be less stable than that towards nations that are not as salient. Third, exogenous issues and events, such as threats, will often cause abrupt changes in opinion but this will tend to be short-term rather than long-term. On rare occasions however, when international events are extremely salient, the public can “learn” about a particular nation and long-term collective opinion will move in a positive or negative direction.

To examine long-term collective opinion dynamics in Japan, this chapter uses the Jiji polls to examine trends in public attitudes towards the ten nations in the dataset. The following chapter is divided into three main sections. First, the descriptive statistics of the percentage of respondents with positive or negative public

¹¹¹ As King, Keohane and Verba (1994:56) state, the purpose of descriptive inference is to “distinguish the systematic component from the nonsystematic component of the phenomena we study”.

perceptions of the ten nations in the Jiji polls are compared. Second, trends in what respondents say are their perceptions of the five non-salient nations in the Jiji polls and trends in what respondents say are their perceptions of the five salient nations in the Jiji polls are analyzed. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the findings.

Cross-National Comparison of Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations in Japan

It is logical to assume that the public should have different attitudes towards different nations. For various historical, cultural, social, political and economic reasons, some countries will be viewed positively while others will be viewed negatively. Table 8.1 shows the mean and the standard deviations in the public attitudes of respondents towards the nations in the Jiji dataset.

Table 8.1: Public Perceptions of Ten Foreign Nations in Japan, 1960-2007

Country	Obs	Mean	SD
Total	5501	3.73	28.61
North Korea	443	-44.29	19.81
Russia/Soviet Union	562	-36.68	11.03
South Korea	562	-17.67	7.79
China	562	-7.59	17.24
India	562	-0.01	4.20
Germany/West Germany	562	12.79	3.70
France	562	25.42	5.76
United Kingdom	562	26.91	6.06
United States	562	31.35	9.70
Switzerland	562	36.95	4.33


NOTE: Compiled by author from Jiji polls, 1960-2007.

As to be expected, the overall mean of responses and stability of public opinion varies substantially depending on each nation. The mean of public attitudes towards all ten nations was 3.73 per cent and the standard deviation was 28.61. The

large standard deviation suggests a high level of variation in how respondents viewed the different countries. For the period of 1960 to 2007, the mean of attitudes towards five nations was positive while the mean for the other five nations was negative. The means were most negative towards North Korea (-44.29 per cent); Russia/the Soviet Union (-36.68 per cent); South Korea (-17.67 per cent); China (-7.59 per cent); and India (-0.01 per cent). The countries viewed most positively were Switzerland (36.95 per cent); the United States (31.35 per cent); the United Kingdom (26.91 per cent); France (25.42 per cent) and Germany/West Germany (12.79 per cent). It is notable that the data shows that Western, democratic nations tended to be viewed more positively among the Japanese public than Asian nations. Not surprisingly, attitudes seem to be particularly negative towards those nations with which Japan has long historical animosity and outstanding territorial disputes.

As Figure 8.1 shows, even over long periods of time, attitudes towards certain foreign nations barely moved while others moved substantially.

Figure 8.1: Cross-national Comparison of Trends in Japanese Public Opinion towards Ten Nations, 1960-2007



SOURCE: Jiji polls, 1960-2007

The data shows high levels of attitude stability towards Switzerland, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and India. Attitudes towards South Korea, the United States, and Russia show moderate levels of change. The two most interesting cases are attitudes towards China and North Korea, both of which show evidence of long-term change.

Below, I use the Jiji poll data to examine in greater detail the continuity and change in Japanese attitudes towards the ten nations. Based on the findings in Figure 8.1, I divide the ten nations in this dataset into two subgroups—non-salient and salient nations. The non-salient nations are those countries towards which Japan is geographically distant and which are only of peripheral interest to its foreign policy. These include Switzerland, Germany/West Germany, France, India, and the United

Kingdom. The salient nations are those countries with geographical proximity to Japan and its alliance partner. These are South Korea, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United States, China, and North Korea. Each graph shows the trends in the attitudes of respondents in the Jiji polls using the same scale so as to allow for better comparisons between nations.

Non-Salient Nations


The nations least likely to be of interest to an inattentive public in Japan are Switzerland, Germany, France, India and the United Kingdom. Give their geographical distance and minimal political importance to Japan, I assume that most of the time these countries will receive only minimal attention in the Japanese press or by its political leaders. Without any new or interesting information, the attitudes of the public should remain stable.

Switzerland

Japanese public attitudes towards Switzerland were very positive and very stable between 1960 and 2007. The sample mean of attitudes in the Jiji polls was 36.95 per cent—the highest of any of the ten countries in the dataset. Public opinion towards Switzerland reached its lowest point in July 1964 at 24.5 per cent and reached its highest point of 48.9 per cent in September 1995. Public attitudes in the Jiji polls were more positive towards Switzerland than any other nation, even the United States.

Figure 8.2 shows the trend in Japanese attitudes towards Switzerland.

Figure 8.2: Japanese Public Attitudes towards Switzerland, 1960-2007



SOURCE: Jiji polls, 1960-2007

The data show that only did the Japanese public seem to view Switzerland as a very friendly country but opinion also displayed a remarkably high degree of stability over time. The standard deviation of public opinion was only 4.33. The case of Switzerland is a good one for showing that public opinion is highly stable over time for non-salient countries. The likely reason for this is that during this period Switzerland was never associated with an issue or event that could elicit a positive or negative emotional response from the Japanese public.


Germany

The data show that Japanese attitudes towards both West Germany and a reunified Germany were consistently positive between 1960 and 2007. The sample mean of

public perceptions from 1960 to 2007 was 12.79 per cent. Public attitudes rose to 24.6 per cent in July 2006 while the minimum was 5.6 per cent in April 1984.

As shown in Figure 8.3, Japanese perceptions of both Germany and West Germany were highly stable.

Figure 8.3: Japanese Public Attitudes towards West Germany/Germany, 1960-2007



SOURCE: Jiji polls, 1960-2007


This claim to stability is supported by the standard deviation of 3.70. The absence of major change in public attitudes towards Germany following reunification suggests that even major international events may not have any long-term effect on public perceptions. Once again, the case of opinion towards Germany shows that non-salient nations tend to be viewed in Japan with a high level of stability.

France

With the exceptions of the abrupt changes in the same months as its nuclear tests in 1995 and 1996, the data show that the Japanese public had perceived France positively between 1960 and 2007. The mean of Japanese perceptions of France was 25.42 per cent. The maximum of Japanese perceptions of France rose to 36.8 per cent in June 1995. However, the low point in perceptions was associated with France's nuclear tests in the South Pacific in September 1995 at -16.3 per cent. Excluding the period of the nuclear tests, the minimum in public opinion was measured in May 1973 when it dropped to 15.9 per cent.

Figure 8.4 shows, with the exception of some months in 1995 and 1996, a high level of stability of Japanese opinion about France.

Figure 8.4: Japanese Public Attitudes towards France, 1960-2007



SOURCE: Jiji polls, 1960-2007

The standard deviation of 5.76 suggests a high level of stability. Although public attitudes towards France were positive, it is not a salient nation in Japan and so it is unsurprising to find that attitudes showed high levels of stability. The Japanese public is not usually exposed to salient information about France likely to elicit an emotional response. The exception was, of course, 1995 and 1996. The abrupt change in attitudes towards France occurred in the same months as its resumption of nuclear testing. When asked by Jiji what countries they liked or disliked in those months, a large percentage of respondents said that they disliked France. As discussed in Chapter Six, the remarks by Japanese political elites and the high media coverage probably primed citizens to use this in their evaluations of France. The data suggest that a salient event that activates negative emotions can produce a large and abrupt change in public opinion. However, just as interesting as the negative change in public attitudes is the rapid return in the percentage of respondents with positive perceptions of France in the months after the tests. This regression to the mean supports the hypothesis that issue salience is what matters. Once media coverage decreased and the public's attention began to wander to other matters, citizens no longer maintained negative percentages of France. In short, despite a strong negative reaction to the nuclear tests, this appears to have been only a salience effect.


India

Between 1960 and 2007, the data show that the Japanese public's views towards India were relatively ambivalent. The sample mean of public attitudes was -0.02 per cent. The most favourable perception of India was 16.5 per cent in December 1961 while the least favourable perception was in the month after India and Pakistan's tit-for-tat nuclear tests in June 1998 at -13.4 per cent. Excluding the

period of the nuclear tests, the lowest point in Japanese opinion was in August 1979 at -4.6 per cent.

Figure 8.5 shows a high level of stability in Japanese perceptions of India over a long period of time.

Figure 8.5: Japanese Public Attitudes towards India, 1960-2007



SOURCE: Jiji polls, 1960-2007

With a standard deviation of 4.20, the data show that Japanese attitudes towards India were relatively stable. Attitudes towards India can be divided into two periods. The first period from the early 1960s to about 1970 saw a gradual worsening of perceptions of India. It appears that no single event may have been responsible for this decline but it was the period in which India was involved in various military conflicts, including the invasion of Goa in 1961; a border dispute with China in 1962; the Second Kashmir War in 1965; and the Indo-Pakistani War

of 1971. Although not a salient nation in Japan, the accumulated effect of these conflicts may have been to produce a decrease in the percentage of respondents who saw India positively. The second period after 1970 saw Japanese views become much more stable.


Figure 8.5 also shows an abrupt negative change in public perceptions of India in 1998. This occurred in the same months as its nuclear tests. Compared to the change in public opinion in the months of the French tests, the change in public opinion in the months of the Indian tests was much smaller. The geographical distance of the tests from Japan, the lower media coverage, and the fact that the tests were being conducted in India rather than in a far away former colony may have contributed to a lower level of salience. The close association in the timing of the change in the number of respondents saying they had a positive view of India and the nuclear tests suggests that salient events can produce abrupt changes in public opinion. Although public attitudes towards India turned negative for a period after the tests, they had returned to their previous levels by 2001. This supports the argument that even when salient events occur their effects will not tend to last.

United Kingdom

The data show that the percentage of respondents with positive perceptions of the United Kingdom has remained relatively steady throughout the period of this study. The mean of public perceptions was 26.91 per cent. The most positive view of the UK was 42.5 per cent in May 2005 while the most negative was in June 1982, the second month of the Falklands War, at 10.3 per cent. Excluding the period of the Falklands War, the lowest point of Japanese impressions of the United Kingdom was in February 1974.

Figure 8.6, shows a high level of stability of Japanese attitudes towards the United Kingdom from 1960 to 2007.

Figure 8.6: Japanese Public Attitudes towards the United Kingdom, 1960-2007



SOURCE: Jiji polls, 1960-2007

The standard deviation of 6.06 also suggests a high level of stability. Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, the data show a gradual, but small, decline in the percentage of respondents with positive attitudes towards the United Kingdom. One possible reason for this change may have been an association of the United Kingdom with the Vietnam War during this period. From 1975, public opinion became gradually more positive.

Examining Figure 8.6 closely, two large abrupt changes in public attitudes towards the United Kingdom can be seen in 1975 and 1982. The change in 1975 was positive and lasted two or three months. This coincided with the visit of Queen

Elizabeth II to Japan. The change in 1982 was negative and lasted about three or four months. This was the period of the Falklands War. As argued, public attitudes towards the United Kingdom, a non-salient nation, have been primarily stable throughout the period of this study. As predicted by theories of salience effects, although the visit by the Queen and the Falklands War were associated with abrupt changes in attitudes towards the United Kingdom both of these effects were temporary.

Salient Nations

Due to their historical, political and economic importance to Japan, the public is likely to be attentive to information about Russia, South Korea, North Korea, China and the United States. Two important factors likely play a role in this salience. First, political elites, including politicians, academics, interest groups, and media commentators, have more incentives to influence and manipulate public opinion towards those nations that may affect the national interest. Second, given that the public is interested in the actions of these nations since they may affect Japan, the media is also likely to take an interest. Since citizens are exposed to a greater volume and wider variety of information about these countries, including some issues with a positive valence and some with a negative valence, public attitudes should show greater levels of variability than that towards nations that are less salient.


South Korea

Between 1960 and 2007, Japanese public attitudes towards South Korea were negative. The mean of attitudes in the Jiji polls was -17.67 per cent. The minimum of public opinion was -45.2 per cent in June 1960 while the maximum reached 1.60

percent in January 2005. Throughout this period, public opinion towards South Korea has been negative but has shown quite substantial variation.

As shown in Figure 8.7, between 1960 and 2007, the Japanese public's view of South Korea was consistently negative with relatively high levels of volatility between 1960 and 1975.

Figure 8.7: Japanese Public Attitudes towards South Korea, 1960-2007



SOURCE: Jiji polls, 1960-2007

The standard deviation of 7.79 suggests that perceptions of South Korea showed greater variation than those towards the non-salient nations discussed in the previous section. The trend in the data shows that while Japanese attitudes have remained negative over the past 47 years, they have been gradually moving in a positive direction, especially since the 1965 establishment of diplomatic relations. The years between 1970 and 1975, a period of various salient bilateral diplomatic

disputes between Japan and South Korea, including the abduction of Kim Dae Jung from a Tokyo hotel in 1973, the arrest of two Japanese democratic protesters in Seoul in 1974, and the attempted assassination of the President of South Korea by a North Korean resident of Japan, was marked by a volatility in public attitudes (Kim 1976). This was also a period of an increasingly authoritarian regime in Seoul. Although the data show an abrupt negative change in public attitudes in early 2005 at the same time as a large Korean anti-Japanese demonstration over the “Takeshima Day” dispute, the trend has been a gradual improvement in perceptions of South Korea from 1975 but a more rapid rate of improvement since 1995.

There are various possible explanations for the positive changes in attitudes towards South Korea since the 1960s. One possibility for this may be an incremental process of learning. As person-to-person contacts and economic interactions between the two nations have increased from the mid-1960s, this may have resulted in a steady decrease in Japanese hostility towards its geographical neighbour. The rapid increase in positive attitudes towards South Korea from 1995 may reflect the greater opening of South Korea to Japanese goods and the increase in South Korean goods in Japan. The decision to co-host the FIFA World Cup in 2002 may have also had some effect on reducing public hostility towards South Korea as it was broadly supported by political elites and the mass media. Some commentators attribute the improvement in public attitudes towards South Korea as a result of the attractiveness of Korean popular culture, the so-called “*kanryu* boom” (Brasor, P., “Korean wave may help erode discrimination”, *The Japan Times*, 27 June 2004). This is possible but its effects perhaps should not be exaggerated. The rapid improvement in attitudes since the late 1990s is significant but it is important to note that it is actually a continuation of a broader trend that

began around 1965. The Jiji data show an even more rapid improvement in public attitudes towards South Korea between 1965 and 1970, the years immediately following the establishment of diplomatic relations. The overall improvement in attitudes towards South Korea appears to be a product of broader forces than just popular culture. It is more likely that as contact between the two nations has increased, part of which certainly includes contact with one another's popular culture, attitudes have become more positive.

Another possible explanation for the gradual improvement in public attitudes towards South Korea may be generational change. The generation of citizens with memories of South Korea as a former colony of Japan has gradually faded away. The Jiji data begin in 1960, a mere 15 years following the end of Japanese colonialism in Korea and seven years after the end of the Korean War. A previous generation of Japanese who remembered South Korea as a poor and non-democratic country with which Japan had no diplomatic relations may have had more negative views of South Korea than later generations who only know South Korea as a relatively wealthy, technologically-advanced, and democratic nation with which Japan has relatively warm bilateral relations.

With the exception of the period between 1970 and 1975, the data suggest that Japanese attitudes towards South Korea have been relatively stable. However, attitudes towards South Korea do show greater variation than that of attitudes towards non-salient nations. Furthermore, the trend in attitudes has been in an increasingly positive direction. Despite a large number of issues and events that could be perceived as threats by the Japanese public, none of these appear to have had a long-term effect on public opinion. Despite an abrupt increase in negative attitudes towards South Korea between 1973 and 1975, continuing a trend that


began in 1965, public attitudes towards South Korea began to gradually improve again. It appears that while having an overall negative view of South Korea, attitudes continue to gradually move in a more positive direction. This may reflect a growing interdependence between the two nations and, thus, could be considered to be a rational response to changing conditions.

Russia/USSR

Between 1960 and 2007, the Jiji poll data show that the majority of respondents have had a negative view of both the Soviet Union and Russia. The mean of public perceptions was -36.68 per cent. The most positive impression of Russia was -14.4 per cent in June 2005 while the most negative impression was -68 per cent in September 1983. This was the same month that the Soviet Union fighter planes shot down the civilian airliner, Korean Airlines Flight 007. Excluding this event, the lowest point in public attitudes was -58.2 per cent in November 1980. This was shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan and a few months after the boycotted summer Olympics in Moscow.

Figure 8.8 shows the trends in attitudes towards the Soviet Union and Russia.

Figure 8.8: Japanese Public Attitudes towards the Soviet Union/Russia, 1960-2007



SOURCE: Jiji polls, 1960-2007

While public opinion towards Russia/the Soviet Union has remained consistently negative, the percentage of respondents with negative views has varied, as shown by the standard deviation of 11.03. The data suggest that the trends in attitudes can be divided into three periods. The first period from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s saw a gradual improvement in public opinion. One reason for this was likely the increase in negative attitudes towards its Cold War opponent, the United States, during the Vietnam War. Another factor may also have been détente between Moscow and Washington. The second period from 1975 to about 1985 saw a gradual decline in positive attitudes. The late 1970s were a period in which Japanese policymakers became increasingly frustrated with Soviet obstinacy over a series of bilateral disputes related to fishing rights and territorial issues, as well as development of oil resources in the Soviet Far East. Following the Soviet invasion

of Afghanistan and rising tension between the USSR and the West, the early 1980s was the era of the so-called “second Cold War”. The shooting down of KAL 007, an extremely salient event in Japan, enhanced this image of the Soviet Union as an aggressive nation. The third period from the mid-1980s to 2007 showed a gradual improvement in attitudes towards the Soviet Union and then a slightly more rapid improvement in attitudes after the year 2000. The decrease in tension between the US and the Soviet Union during Mikhail Gorbachev’s presidency and the end of the Cold War may have increased the percentage of respondents who no longer saw Russia as a threat to Japan.

Two possible explanations for the long-term negative attitudes towards Russia and the Soviet Union are the lack of a peace treaty between the two nations and the Northern Territories issue. Despite Japan’s geographical proximity to the Russian Far East, these outstanding issues, along with the Cold War, have led Japanese elites and the Japanese media to be extremely critical of Russia and prevented a warming of relations between the two nations. Assuming that the public is influenced by these actors, it is likely that their attitudes will tend to reflect elite frames.

The change in public perceptions of the Soviet Union and Russia following salient events were short-term. The abrupt increase in negative attitudes towards the Soviet Union following the acrimonious bilateral fishing negotiations in 1977 were followed by a gradual increase in attitudes. Even though the shooting down of KAL Flight 007 in 1983 was associated with a major drop in public attitudes towards the USSR, the data show a positive trend in opinion that went on until about 1992. The sudden decrease in positive attitudes towards Russia after Boris Yeltsin’s sudden cancellation of his visit to Japan was also followed by a gradual

increase in positive attitudes. While salient issues perceived as threats can have a powerful impact on public attitudes, their effects do not appear to be long-term. As the percentage of respondents who remember a particular event decreases, so too may its effect on public opinion.


Arguably one of the most interesting aspects of the data concerns a change in public attitudes that did not happen. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, public attitudes towards Russia did not abruptly turn positive. Instead, they have gradually improved and, by 2007, had reached a similar level as in 1973 during the period of détente and the Vietnam War. This suggests two things. First, prior images of a nation may exert a powerful influence on attitudes even when circumstances dramatically change. Second, the process of image change, or learning, appears to be gradual. The percentage of respondents with negative perceptions of Russia was only slowly replaced by those with more positive perceptions. Although primarily negative, the case of Russia/USSR does suggest that collective opinion is relatively rational and that the public do respond in a reasonable manner to changes in external conditions. The variations in public attitudes also suggest that collective opinion was less stable than that towards the non-salient countries in the Jiji data.

The United States

Between 1960 and 2007, the data show that the Japanese public had positive attitudes towards the United States. The mean of the percentage of respondents with a positive view of the United States was 31.35 percent. The data show that Japanese perceptions of the United States reached its lowest point around the time of the Watergate scandal at 1.3 per cent in June 1973. On the other hand, its maximum was 48.6 per cent in June 1964.

Figure 8.9 shows overall positive attitudes towards the United States over time with two periods in which it showed a substantial decline.

Figure 8.9: Japanese Public Attitudes towards the United States, 1960-2007



SOURCE: Jiji polls, 1960-2007

Although Japanese opinion towards the United States was positive throughout the period of this study, it has shown some variability with a standard deviation of 9.70. The data show two periods where positive attitudes towards the United States declined. The first period from around 1964 until 1973 was associated with the years in which the two dominant foreign policy issues were the Vietnam War and the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty. Both of these issues were the subject of debate among Japanese domestic political elites and received high media

coverage, making them highly salient.¹¹² The improvement in attitudes was associated with the decision to withdraw American troops from Vietnam and the reversion of Okinawa back to Japan. The second period of decreasing attitudes was from 2000 to about 2004, the years in which the United States prosecuted its “war on terror” following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on Washington, D.C. and New York City.¹¹³ Both of these periods were marked by American involvement in large military actions against small, poor and geographically distant nations. It is interesting to note that during both periods, the administrations of Sato Eisaku and Koizumi Junichiro were actually relatively supportive of the actions of the United States. Despite this, the decline in the percentage of respondents who viewed the United States favourably during these periods suggests that the public do not always agree with the policy decisions of political elites.

The Japanese public has been exposed to various events involving the United States that could be perceived as threats. Given the interdependent economic and security relationship between the two nations, as well as the America’s role as a superpower in the international system, frequent cases of abrupt negative changes in public opinion were bound to occur. During the 1980s, small fluctuations in attitudes were associated with a series of disputes between Japan and the US over trade and defence issues. The January 1991 First Gulf War was also correlated with an abrupt negative change in public perceptions.

¹¹² Under the San Francisco Peace Agreement, the United States maintained sovereignty over Okinawa, a prefecture of Japan. The negotiations over this issue were acrimonious with Japan demanding Okinawa’s return but the US insisting that it continue to have basing rights. Okinawa was eventually returned to Japan in 1972 following an agreement between President Richard Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato.

¹¹³ For a comprehensive study of Japanese public opinion related to the “war on terror” see Eldridge and Midford (2008).

The case of the United States supports the claim that over the long-term, public attitudes towards a foreign nation are rational. But given the high salience of the United States in Japan, it is not surprising that the data show less stability than that towards Western European nations. Furthermore, the impact of even highly salient events does not appear to be long-term. The rapid rise in the percentage of respondents with positive attitudes of the United States following the Gulf War suggest a decline in the salience of this issue over a relatively short period of time. Public attitudes towards the United States appear to be relatively rational and responsive to changes in external conditions. In fact, both the increase in the percentage of respondents with negative perceptions of the United States in the late 1960s and the early 2000s suggest that citizens may even be able to resist the frames of those political elites seeking support for their own policy interests. Whether this resistance is a product of public rationality or a lack of elite consensus is an area for future research.


China

Between 1960 and 2007, with the important exception of the seventeen-year period from 1972 to 1989, the Japanese public has had a generally negative view of China.¹¹⁴ The mean of public perceptions was -7.59 per cent. The most positive impression of China was measured in November 1984 at 21.2 percent. Meanwhile, the most negative impression was -44.3 per cent in September 1967.

As can be seen in Figure 8.10, the data show much greater variability in public attitudes towards China than any other case examined so far.

¹¹⁴ Wang (2004) suggests that negative attitudes towards China are based on past images of China as a communist and poor nation mixed with more recent images associated with illegal immigrants in Japan committing crimes and anger over the numerous historical disputes that often damage relations.

Figure 8.10: Japanese Public Attitudes towards China, 1960-2007



SOURCE: Jiji polls, 1960-2007

The high variation is supported by the data showing a standard deviation of 17.23. For all of the nations included in the Jiji polls, the public's attitudes towards China were the only case in which views of a particular nation shifted from negative to positive and then back to negative again.

Public attitudes towards China can be divided into three periods. In the first period from 1960 to 1972, the data show highly negative attitudes towards China. The reasons for this likely included such factors as memories of the Pacific War, the image of China as a poor and backward nation, its testing of a nuclear device in 1964 during the Tokyo Olympics, and the Cultural Revolution from 1966 onwards. Perhaps most importantly, the two nations did not have official diplomatic relations.

The second period shows an abrupt increase in positive attitudes from 1970 to 1972 and then more gradual improvement from 1972 to 1989. The rapid improvement in attitudes in 1972 was associated with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two nations following Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's visit to Beijing. In no other case involving the ten countries in the Jiji data has public opinion towards a nation improved so rapidly and for such a long period of time. After the initial increase in positive attitudes, throughout the 1970s, the percentage of respondents with a positive view of China incrementally increased. Reasons for this may have been the improving relations between China and Japan, as well as the United States, and the increased economic interactions between the two countries. During this period, Japanese companies were increasing their investment to China and the Government was increasing its development aid.

The third period from 1989 to the present is an era in which public attitudes towards China have become increasingly negative. The abrupt drop in positive attitudes occurred at the same time as the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. The Government's brutal and highly salient repression of democratic protesters appears to have had a significant and long-term effect on how China is perceived in Japan. The long term drop in public opinion following Tiananmen suggests that it may have been a case of learning. The vividness of the events on 6 June 2009 may have generated strong memories that citizens continued to associate China with, even long after the events themselves.

What is more, even three years after the Tiananmen events, the percentage of respondents with positive views of China remained substantially lower than before 1989. Since about 1993, attitudes have remained negative and even showed some signs of a gradual decline. It is somewhat ironic that even after the end of the Cold

War and increasing economic interdependence, perceptions of China as a threat may have actually increased. Pyle (2007) argues that the disappearance of the Soviet Union, a common threat which united Japan, China and the United States, has allowed various divisive issues to emerge. China may have reinforced threat perception among Japanese citizens with its nuclear tests, saber-rattling over Taiwan, buildup of military forces, and rapid economic growth. The data also show during this period one abrupt increase in negative attitudes in 2004 at the same time as the anti-Japanese behaviour by Chinese soccer fans at the Asian Cup final in Beijing and a second one correlated with the large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations throughout China in April 2005. However, the data do suggest that by late 2005, public attitudes towards China were already beginning to improve.

Although some commentators have blamed Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and his visits to Yasukuni Shrine for recent increases in negative perceptions of China, the long-term trends in public attitudes towards China do not support this claim. The data show that public perceptions of China have been gradually becoming more negative since 1989. In contrast to the increasingly positive attitudes towards South Korea and Russia, attitudes towards China have been trending in a more negative direction. This gradual change associated with a China growing in economic and military power suggests a case of learning. As political elites and the mass media express increasing concern over China's intentions and capabilities, this may be filtering down to the public who are also coming to see China as a potential threat. Salient issues since 1989 such as Tiananmen Square, saber-rattling over Taiwan, nuclear tests, and public displays of anti-Japanese sentiment may have all contributed to this overall image. As expected, public attitudes towards China show a higher level of variation than that of most other nations included in


the Jiji data. While the long-term negative attitudes may be a concern, the correlation with changes in public attitudes and Chinese behaviour does suggest a public that is attentive to not only bilateral relations but also domestic conditions in China as well.

North Korea

Between 1970 and 2007, the Japanese public has consistently held negative views of North Korea with the degree of unfavourability increasing gradually since the early 1970s. The mean of public opinion towards North Korea was -44.29 per cent. The most positive attitudes towards North Korea were -12 per cent in May 1973 while the most negative view came following a series of missile tests by Pyongyang in the Sea of Japan in July 2006 at -86.2 per cent.

Although public attitudes towards North Korea have been negative throughout the period of the Jiji data, Figure 8.11 shows a gradual decline in attitudes towards North Korea since around 1973.

Figure 8.11: Japanese Public Attitudes about North Korea, 1970 to 2007



SOURCE: Jiji polls, 1970-2007

The standard deviation of public attitudes was 19.81, the largest for attitudes towards any country. The reasons for the high percentage of respondents with negative views of North Korea are complicated. North Korea is a poor, closed, Stalinist country with which Japan has never had diplomatic relations and which at times engages in aggressive actions and communications directed towards South Korea, the United States, and Japan. It has been a sponsor of state terrorism and abducted a number of Japanese citizens from Japanese territory. The behaviour of its leaders during this period, Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il, has been the subject of various sensationalist reports in the Japanese media. Japanese political leaders have at times attempted to engage with Pyongyang but, more recently, have found it a good country to verbally attack so as to boost their nationalist credentials. The closed and belligerent nature of the North Korean state along with the lack of

contact with Japan appears to make it a target of high levels of hostility from the Japanese public. This is encouraged by political elites and media coverage of particular events and issues that produce feelings of threat.

The gradual increase in the percentage of respondents stating that they have a negative attitude towards North Korea suggests a case of learning. The large number of issues perceived as threats involving North Korea may have led members of the public to increasingly update their image of North Korea more and more negatively. Some of the most salient events associated with North Korea from just prior to the period of the Jiji polls until 2007 included an attempt to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-Hee in what is known as the “Blue House raid” in 1968; the hijacking of Japan Airlines Flight 351 by members of the Japanese Red Army who then were given asylum in Pyongyang in 1970; another attempt to assassinate Park by a North Korean resident of Japan which killed his wife in 1974; the “axe murder” killing of two United States army officers by North Korean soldiers along the border with South Korea in 1976; the Rangoon bombing in 1983; the destruction of KAL Flight 858 in 1988 by North Korean agents using Japanese passports; the nuclear crisis of 1993; the Taepodong missile test over Japan in 1998; admission to the abduction of Japanese citizens in 2002; and a nuclear test in 2006. The repeated threatening behaviour by North Korea may have captured the attention of an increasing number of Japanese citizens who began to increasingly see North Korea as a threat to not only their values but to their nation as well.

The Jiji data do suggest that some of the conventional wisdom on Japanese public opinion towards North Korea is incomplete. The negative attitudes towards North Korea cannot be wholly attributed to recent actions by right-wing politicians and

the mass media. Nor are negative feelings solely the product of the abductions issue. Public attitudes towards North Korea became increasingly negative from the early 1970s, long before Japanese citizens had even been abducted. The abrupt increase in negative public attitudes in 2002 does suggest, however, that the increase in salience of the abductions issue has had a significant and long-term effect on public attitudes. The issue itself, along with statements by members of Japan's political elite and the mass media, are all likely factors in producing the increase in hostility towards Pyongyang.

The Jiji polls do suggest that the effect of the abductions issue on Japanese opinion should be looked at in a wider context. The trend in public attitudes towards North Korea has long been in a negative direction. The association of this trend with the actions of North Korea suggests that the public is responding to its informational environment. In the face of information that North Korea may pose a threat to Japan, along with a lack of any kind of what Osgood (1962) calls a gradual reciprocal reduction in tension (GRIT) due to the absence of diplomatic relations, the image of North Korea in Japan has only worsened. However, this appears to be a rational response to changing conditions, rather than the overreaction suggested by some like McCormack (2004) who argues that nationalist politicians seeking Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) have played an important role in generating what he calls a "peculiar wave of Japanese fear and hatred for North Korea". Although Japanese citizens may see North Korea negatively, given the information that they receive about it, they may have good reason to.

As a country that is particularly salient, it is not surprising to find attitudes towards North Korea show lower levels of stability than that towards other countries. However, it is interesting to find that the data suggest that negative attitudes did

abruptly drop in 2002. Despite all of the belligerent actions of North Korea from the 1970s to the 1990s, it was the abductions issue that appeared to really capture the attention of the Japanese public. The stability in attitudes following the salience of the abductions issue suggests that its effects on how citizen view North Korea is long-term. However, it is important to note that even if the abductions issue had never become salient, the data suggest that public attitudes towards North Korea would have still been more negative than that of any other country. The gradual nature of attitude change and the association of this change with a regime like North Korea suggest public responsiveness to its informational environment that could be classified as quite rational.

Discussion

An examination of the trends in the Jiji poll data shows that Japanese public perceptions of foreign nations over the long-term appear to be quite stable. Much of the conventional wisdom of Japanese opinion towards foreign nations, especially China and North Korea, is incomplete because it focuses too much on the dynamics of short-term public opinion and pays insufficient attention to long-term public opinion. Even over long periods of time, the systematic component of Japanese feelings towards particular nations shows high levels of stability with only gradual change. Although perceptions of a particular country can vary greatly in terms of the degree of favourability, attitudes do not tend to move back and forth between positive and negative. With the exception of India, positive attitudes towards a particular country in 1960 were related to positive attitudes in 2007. All cases of negative attitudes towards a foreign nation in 1960 were associated with negative attitudes towards the same nation in 2007.

Public attitudes towards nations that are not salient tend to be stable over long periods of time. Public perceptions of Western European nations and India allowed for the examination of the dynamics of public opinion when subjected to a limited number of exogenous shocks. Various theoretical explanations may explain why attitudes are so stable. Hurwitz and Peffley's (1987) hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes, in which more general beliefs influence more specific attitudes, suggests that attitudes may be influenced by country images. Hermann, et al.'s (1987) work on national images also predicts that public attitudes should be resistant to change and, therefore, stable. The data also support Page and Shapiro's (1992) rational public hypothesis, lending support for the generalisability of their theory beyond the American case.

As suggested by Proposition 4 derived from the theoretical framework in Chapter Two, threats and other exogenous events are associated with short-term effects on public attitudes. Examples of changes in attitudes towards the nation associated with exogenous shock included the French nuclear tests in 1995 and 1996, the shooting down of KAL Flight 007 in 1983, and the Falklands War in 1982. The major exceptions to this finding appear to be the Tiananmen Square and abductions issues, both of which were extremely salient and, therefore, likely to attract the attention of a large percentage of usually inattentive citizens.

With the exceptions of Tiananmen Square and the North Korean abductions issue, most gradual changes in long-term public attitudes, however, are not associated with single issues. At the aggregate level where education levels and attentiveness to foreign affairs varies, it is unlikely that a large number of citizens will continue to use a single issue in their evaluations of a foreign nation for a long period of time. The short-term effects of threats on public opinion lend support to the

proposition that their effects will tend to be limited to amount of time that they are salient. While the public may experience negative emotions towards the nation viewed as the source of a particular problem, the intensity of these emotions should fade relatively quickly as public attention shifts away and people forget.

Any discussion of public attitudes towards foreign nations should be cautious not to confuse short-term change due to salience effects with long-term change due to other factors. The tendency to focus on outliers such as public attitudes towards the United States during the Iraq War or towards China during the anti-Japanese demonstrations of 2005 means that commentators may end up making generalisations based on temporary opinion dynamics. Although both short-term and long-term change is important, their causes differ. The negative change in attitudes following a particular threat, such as a nuclear test, is associated with different factors than long-term and gradual changes. The first seems to reflect a salience or priming effect caused by a surge in information that captures the attention of, and elicits negative emotions from, a large number of people at the same time. The second appears to be a function of long-term and systematic change in the underlying image of a nation by a large percentage of the population. One implication is that while the volume of media coverage of a particular issue may be important for short-term attitude change, it may be less important for long-term attitude change.

In sum, this chapter has shown that public attitudes towards the ten foreign nations in the Jiji polls display relative stability over time and that, when change does occur, it tends to do so only gradually. Attitudes tend to be more stable towards countries that are not salient than countries that are salient. When public opinion does change over the long-term, it does so only slowly. Although rare, exogenous

shocks can cause abrupt increases in public attitudes but they are only associated with short-term opinion change. The implication is that while threats and the mass media may be important causes of short-term opinion change they are limited in explaining the causes of long-term opinion change. It seems that this question requires a different theory and, thus, can be considered as a topic suitable for future research.

9. Conclusion

Changes in Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations in Japan

This study has examined the question of the conditions under which the Japanese public's perceptions of a foreign nation will change in a negative direction. The theoretical framework was derived from the literature on intergroup relations, which suggests that perceived threats to an in-group generate negative emotions towards the out-group believed to be their source, and agenda-setting, which suggests that higher media coverage of an issue will increase its salience. As applied to this study, it was hypothesized that public perceptions of a foreign nation would turn negative when it was perceived to be the source of a salient foreign affairs issue or event perceived as a threat and that the magnitude of change would be greater when media coverage was high. Threats generate negative emotions which then turn in to feelings of hostility towards the nation viewed as the source of the problem.

The concept of threat was not conceptualized as unitary but in such a way that it could apply to a wide range of issues. In this study, these were divided in to realistic threats, symbolic threats, and threats to national identity. A content analysis of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008) was used to generate a list of issues and events that could be classified as threats from the perspective of the Japanese public. The questions in the monthly Jiji polls asking respondents what countries they liked and what countries they disliked were used as the measure of public attitudes towards ten foreign nations. The Jiji poll data was examined for evidence of a regular association of the presence of a threat and attitude change in the same month. The results of both the statistical analysis and the case studies

showed evidence of a relationship between the presence of a threat in a particular month and a negative change in attitudes towards the nation associated with the threat. In addition, higher volumes of media coverage were found to be correlated with greater magnitude changes in collective opinion. Although threats and media coverage were associated with changes in attitudes about foreign nations mainly over the short-term, on rare occasions when events are extremely salient, they were also associated with long-term changes.

The empirical evidence supports each of the four propositions presented in Chapter Two. Proposition 1 was that threats produce negative changes in public perceptions of the nation viewed as its source. Proposition 2 was that high media coverage of threats increases the magnitude of their effect on public opinion. Proposition 3 was that each of the three types of threats had a negative effect on public perceptions of the nation involved. Proposition 4 was that the duration of negative changes in public attitudes about a foreign nation due to threats will tend to be short-term.

Theoretical Significance

Using polling and media data from Japan, this study has shown the theoretical robustness and generalisability of the work done on public opinion and foreign policy in the United States. The Jiji data show that the best predictor of public attitudes in one month is public attitudes in the previous month, suggesting long-term public opinion stability. Like its American counterpart, the Japanese public appears to only pay attention to foreign affairs under certain conditions. It also suggests that only a small amount of the massive stream of information about foreign affairs is able to capture public attention. However, when an issue or event interpreted as a threat does become salient, public opinion appears to move in the same direction as the valence of the information. The high level of opinion stability

and responsiveness to information about foreign affairs suggests support for Page and Shapiro's (1992) rational public hypothesis in Japan. In the past, what scholars have referred to as "moodiness", may actually have been a product of salience effects produced by information about threats and, therefore, temporary.¹¹⁵

When it comes to foreign affairs, citizens seem to care about a wider variety of issues than is usually thought. Scholars of public opinion and foreign policy generally assume that the public only take an interest in foreign affairs when it affects their country's "vital interests". For example, the literature on casualty aversion posits that citizens' views on a particular conflict are shaped by the number of their fellow citizens who have been killed (Mueller 1971). The emphasis on issues such as national security and international trade may be too narrow. Despite the public's reputation as being uninterested and uninformed about foreign affairs, ordinary citizens do appear to take an interest in three broad types of foreign policy issues: those likely to have an impact on their material wellbeing; those that violate their worldview or their values; and those that insult or denigrate the value of their nation. Despite the importance of symbolic issues to politics, this has yet to be a major area of interest in studies of public opinion and foreign policy. While citizens certainly pay attention to those issues that may impact on their self-interest, they also care about those events that violate their nation's values. This view suggests a public that is much more aware of the outside world than is usually thought.

¹¹⁵ For a review of the literature on the "Almond-Lippmann consensus" see Holsti (1992).

Policy Implications

As the world's second largest economy and a major player in East Asian political and economic issues, understanding the dynamics of Japanese public opinion about foreign nations is important. While recent studies by Green (2001), Pyle (2007), and Samuels (2008) have all provided important analyses of contemporary Japanese foreign policy, they have devoted limited attention to examining what ordinary citizens think. Eldridge and Midford's (2008) collection on Japanese public opinion and the "war on terror" fills in this gap by contributing to the understanding of how Japanese views of foreign policy have shifted from pacifism towards what they call "defensive realism". I have attempted to build on their work by examining how the Japanese public responds to a wider range of issues, greater number of countries, and longer period of time.

If, at least in some part, Japanese policymakers respond to public opinion then understanding the causes of such change is vital. The massive public interest in the North Korean abductions issue and concerns over its nuclear program has made foreign policy issues more salient in Japan than at any other time in the post-Cold War period. In the coming years, the future of Japan's alliance with the United States and how it deals with the rise of China will certainly depend on what the public feels about these issues. What is more, it may be that the loss of power of the Liberal Democratic Party in August 2009 may mark a new era in which political leaders seeking to be reelected will have no choice but to pay greater attention to what citizens think.

Understanding that perceived threats are a primary, but temporary, factor in producing negative feelings towards specific countries is also important because some observers of Japan use public opinion polls as indicators of nationalism.

Specifically, signs of anti-Chinese and anti-Korean sentiment among ordinary citizens are often used to imply a more nationalistic Japan. The Japanese government's concern over this view led the Japanese minister of public affairs in the embassy in Washington, D.C. to write an opinion piece in the *International Herald Tribune* (Kitano, M., "The myth of rising Japanese nationalism", 12 January 2006, p.6) saying that "reports of excessive Japanese nationalism are fashionable today in some U.S. news media" because of charges "that an extreme Japanese antipathy toward South Korea and China is on the rise". Moon and Suh (2008:200) also argue that one form of Japanese neo-nationalism has increasingly taken the shape of a xenophobic populism broadly shared by the Japanese masses. However, if the goal is an accurate understanding of the underlying, systemic aspects of Japanese public opinion then it must be measured over much longer periods of time and with regard to a much larger selection of cases. Evidence that Japanese public attitudes towards China have become hostile due to findings in a poll conducted immediately after a large-scale anti-Japanese demonstration is not a valid indicator of long-term trends but of information that is salient at a particular point in time.

Evidence of salience effects suggests that the use of public opinion by political leaders as a guide to policy should be done cautiously especially if it is based on polls conducted immediately after the occurrence of an event interpreted as a threat. Public attitudes will tend to be more negative than they usually are because they are overly influenced by negative emotions. Political leaders would be wise to ignore such activated public opinion since first, it is almost always temporary, and second, it reflects an emotional rather than deliberative response to an issue. It should never be a factor in international negotiations where it is necessary for

conflicting parties to engage in rational processes with logic taking precedence over emotional processes (Carol Gordon and Asher Arian 2001:213). Politicians should also be careful in the comments that they make following such events because the evidence in this study does suggest that they can increase or decrease the perceptions of threat.

Generalising from the case of Japan, it may be that the publics of other nations will also react negatively to those issues and events perceived as threats. This has implications for governments concerned about their image abroad. They should be aware that a wide variety of actions or communications can be interpreted as realistic threats, symbolic threats, or threats to the national identity of people in other nations. Since threats involve not only objective conditions but also perceptions, political leaders should not be surprised when some of their policies elicit feelings of hostility by foreign publics. Publics do not experience issue or events themselves. Information is mediated by domestic elites and local media who filter information in such a way that such actions may be interpreted as threats.

Political actors should at least be conscious of how their actions and words may be perceived, or misperceived, and to behave with some prudence. Mass publics do not only respond to threats directed towards them or their countries but also to those issues which they consider to be violations of their values. Therefore, while a government may argue that how it treats its own citizens or how it conducts its affairs are “domestic matters”, it should also not be surprised when some actions produce a strong negative reaction from publics abroad. The importance of symbolic threats suggests that those leaders dabbling in issues related to morality, nationalism and religion should be especially careful because these may set off a reaction that they do not anticipate.

Those policymakers seeking to improve the image of their country among mass publics through public diplomacy face a difficult battle. Although countries are spending increasing amounts of money and effort to communicate to the people of other nations, the Jiji data suggest that long-term attitudes towards nations appear to be fairly resistant to change. If the goals of public diplomacy are more modest, such as the targeting individuals who are most likely to affect policy, enough evidence exists to suggest that this may be an effective strategy. However, if the goal is to change collective opinion, the standard prescriptions of public diplomacy activities such as cultural exchanges and state visits are unlikely to be sufficient for the simple reason that they are not salient enough. As the Jiji polls showed, between 1960 and 2007 the only case of an event associated with a large and long-term positive change in Japanese public attitudes towards a foreign nation was that of China and the period after Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's visit to Beijing in 1972. No other evidence in the data of the ten nations and 47 years of observations suggests that it would be possible for a government to generate positive changes in public attitudes in Japan through any kind of public diplomacy activities.

Future Research

The most important goal of any future research on threats and public opinion is to identify what elements of a threat have the greatest effect on public attitudes. In other words, since citizens do not directly experience threats, what exactly is it that they are responding to? Although this study has treated threats as exogenous, they are clearly related to domestic media coverage and elite rhetoric. Objective conditions may be the immediate cause of negative changes in public attitudes but they are only part of the explanation. Many other factors in the causal chain prior to

the particular issue or event should also be considered, especially those related to why a particular issue is interpreted as a threat in the first place. In some ways, rather than simplifying matters, the suggestion that threats matter actually makes the study of public opinion and foreign policy more complicated. However, most importantly, it does show that short-term changes in public opinion are primarily a reactive phenomenon so focusing solely on the incentives of domestic political leaders and the domestic mass media is insufficient.

It is also important to develop a typology of issues that could be used to predict positive changes in public opinion. Extremely positive events such as the opening of diplomatic relations with China in September 1972 and the visits of Queen Elizabeth in May 1975 and Princess Diana in May 1986 were associated with increases in positive public perceptions of China and the United Kingdom. The question is whether these were special cases or whether some other systematic factors are also at work. As suggested by the gradual improvement in Japanese public opinion towards China in the 1970s and South Korea and Russia in the 1990s, increased cooperation between states and increased interdependence involving people and goods may be a factor in improving public attitudes. This is an especially important area of research for those interested in public diplomacy.

In closing, this study has shown that trying to understand how the Japanese public thinks about something as ambiguous as a foreign nation is no simple task. While I have shown that threats are associated with changes in public attitudes, much remains unknown as to why they are associated with such changes. However, it is reassuring to find that even though citizens may be faced with a torrent of confusing information about foreign affairs, they still manage to cope pretty well. The Japanese public appears rational and “pretty prudent”. Although public

opinion will occasionally abruptly change, such volatility is rare and changes in attitudes can usually be explained by examining what information was available to the public at a particular time.

It does not make sense to fault the Japanese public for negative responses to perceived threats. People have always used attitudes towards particular objects to make important decisions about approach or avoidance (Chen and Bargh 1999). Furthermore, why should people not feel negative emotions towards a nation that threatens Japan directly or violates the values that citizens consider to be important? So long as political leaders are careful when reacting to such public opinion, this is not something that should be of great concern. In fact, knowing that citizens respond in a regular and predictable manner to an issue area as distant from their daily lives as foreign affairs is reassuring.

Finally, my findings suggest that even when it comes to an issue area as ambiguous as foreign affairs, a sphere in which information can activate strong negative emotions, people's reaction to events can be explained and understood. Although negative attitudes towards a particular country can increase, this tends to be associated with the presence of a threat. However, such events are not only rare, but the magnitude of their effects is usually minor and usually temporary. In a democracy like Japan, where the country is faced with complex foreign policy issues and surrounded by nations that could be perceived as threats, it is somewhat reassuring to find that, over the long-term anyway, the Japanese public, like that in other nations, is pretty rational.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: List of Threats to Japan, Classification of Threat Type, Media Coverage and Monthly Change in Public Attitudes towards Nation Involved, 1960-2007

Year/Month	Country	Issue/Event	Threat Type	Media	Change (% points)
1960/10	Korea	Meeting with ROK over Lee Line	realistic	4	-4.9
1960/12	Korea	Meeting with ROK over Lee Line	realistic	14	-2.5
1961/1	Korea	Fishing boat incident at Lee line	realistic	3	3.4
1961/4	USSR	Laos Crisis	symbolic	21	-2.1
1961/5	France	Algeria-France war	symbolic	6	-9.3
1961/5	US	Bay of Pigs	symbolic	9	-8.2
1961/6	UK	Aircraft carrier to Persian Gulf	symbolic	0	0.0
1961/7	USSR	Berlin crisis	symbolic	24	-3.4
1961/7	France	France-Tunisia War	symbolic	67	3.7
1961/7	UK	Troops to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait	symbolic	21	1.8
1961/8	USSR	Berlin crisis	symbolic	31	-2.0
1961/9	USSR	Nuclear test	symbolic	48	-4.5
1961/11	US	Nuclear test	symbolic	25	-3.4
1961/11	USSR	Nuclear test	symbolic	26	-7.6
1962/1	India	Portuguese-Indian War	symbolic	50	-6.9
1962/2	USSR	Nuclear test	symbolic	10	8.5
1962/2	US	Nuclear test	symbolic	19	-1.6
1962/2	UK	Nuclear test	symbolic	10	-2.4
1962/3	UK	Nuclear test	symbolic	11	-3.2
1962/3	US	Nuclear test	symbolic	45	-5.6
1962/5	USSR	Nuclear test	symbolic	1	-4.7
1962/6	Korea	Anti-govt protesters arrested	symbolic	32	-6.9
1962/7	USSR	Nuclear test	symbolic	19	-4.8
1962/10	USSR	Cuban missile crisis	symbolic	91	3.1
1962/10	US	Cuban missile crisis	symbolic	76	-4.6
1962/11	US	Cuban missile crisis	symbolic	53	-3.5

1962/11	India	Border dispute with China	symbolic	24	0.9
1962/12	China	Border dispute with India	symbolic	24	-14.0
1962/12	India	Border dispute with China	symbolic	8	-2.3
1962/12	Korea	Japanese fishing boat seized by ROK	realistic	2	-8.9
1963/2	US	US nuclear submarine in Japan	realistic	7	-2.8
1963/2	Korea	Anti-govt protesters arrested	symbolic	17	-2.1
1964/4	Korea	Japan-ROK meeting	realistic	22	-4.7
1964/5	USSR	Northern Territories discussion	realistic	59	-3.9
1964/7	US	Gulf of Tonkin	symbolic	59	-5.7
1964/8	Korea	Japan-ROK meeting	realistic	3	-5.5
1964/9	Korea	Fishing boat seized by South Korea	realistic	6	1.5
1964/10	Korea	Fishing boat seized by South Korea	realistic	10	-2.2
1964/10	China	Nuclear test	symbolic	57	-3.7
1964/11	US	US nuclear submarine in Sasebo	realistic	24	0.9
1965/1	US	Okinawa negotiations	realistic	68	-6.0
1965/3	US	First combat troops to Vietnam	symbolic	160	-6.3
1965/4	US	More combat troops to Vietnam	symbolic	131	-6.6
1965/7	Korea	Anti-Japan demonstrations	identity	23	-8.1
1965/7	US	More troops sent to Vietnam	symbolic	37	-1.8
1965/8	Korea	Anti-Japan demonstrations	identity	12	0.1
1965/9	India	Kashmir dispute	symbolic	295	-4.9
1965/10	Korea	Dispute over diplomatic relations	realistic	133	-6.0
1965/11	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	symbolic	7	-4.1
1966/1	USSR	Aid for North Vietnam	symbolic	3	-6.6
1966/2	France	Participates in Vietnam war	symbolic	5	-3.1
1966/2	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	symbolic	37	-6.1
1966/2	Korea	South Korean soldiers to Vietnam	symbolic	3	1.6
1966/3	Korea	Fishing boat seized by South Korea	realistic	42	-2.2
1966/5	France	Nuclear test	symbolic	5	-3.0
1966/6	China	Cultural Revolution begins	symbolic	8	-0.7
1966/7	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	symbolic	84	-3.3
1966/7	France	Nuclear test	symbolic	17	-0.4
1966/9	US	US plane enters Chinese airspace	symbolic	9	-2.4
1966/9	France	Nuclear test	symbolic	5	1.7

1966/12	US	US plane crashes in Hanoi	symbolic	19	-5.4
1967/1	China	Nuclear test	symbolic	2	-4.6
1967/2	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	symbolic	0	3.0
1967/2	China	Border dispute with USSR	symbolic	29	0.0
1967/4	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	symbolic	2	-0.4
1967/5	China	US plane enters airspace	symbolic	1	-3.9
1967/7	China	Nuclear test	symbolic	3	-4.5
1967/9	China	Border dispute with India	symbolic	6	-6.2
1967/10	US	Okinawa negotiations	realistic	32	-5.3
1967/11	US	Okinawa negotiations	realistic	47	-6.8
1967/11	UK	Devaluation of Pound	realistic	29	-6.2
1967/12	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	symbolic	0	2.8
1968/2	US	Tet Offensive	symbolic	55	-6.7
1968/3	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	symbolic	21	-0.8
1968/4	US	General strike in Okinawa	realistic	8	-3.5
1968/5	France	Paris demonstrations	symbolic	85	-2.0
1968/6	France	Paris demonstrations	symbolic	20	-3.6
1968/6	US	US plane crashes at university	realistic	44	-0.8
1968/7	USSR	Dispute with Czechoslovakia	symbolic	40	1.7
1968/8	France	Hydrogen bomb test	symbolic	6	3.0
1968/9	USSR	Invasion of Czechoslovakia	symbolic	157	-12.2
1969/3	USSR	Border dispute with China	symbolic	20	-0.9
1969/4	China	Border dispute with USSR	symbolic	3	-9.3
1969/5	US	Okinawa dispute	realistic	27	-9.2
1969/7	US	Poison gas stored in Okinawa	realistic	29	1.5
1969/10	US	Discussion of Okinawa return	realistic	30	5.5
1969/11	US	Okinawa negotiations	realistic	179	-10.6
1970/1	US	Okinawa negotiations	realistic	13	0.8
1970/6	US	US invades Cambodia	symbolic	104	-11.3
1970/11	US	US-Japan textile dispute	realistic	78	-1.1
1970/12	US	US-Japan textile dispute	realistic	40	-1.9
1971/1	US	US poison gas stored in Okinawa	realistic	62	-3.5
1971/2	US	Okinawa negotiations	realistic	9	-0.3
1971/3	US	Okinawa negotiations	realistic	9	-1.0

1971/8	France	Nuclear test	symbolic	3	1.1
1971/11	India	India-Pakistan War	symbolic	13	-0.5
1971/12	India	India-Pakistan War	symbolic	104	-2.2
1972/3	China	Nuclear test	symbolic	2	0.5
1972/3	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	symbolic	36	-3.5
1972/5	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	symbolic	18	-6.2
1972/6	France	Nuclear test	symbolic	10	-3.7
1972/8	US	Anti-Vietnam protests	symbolic	43	-3.8
1973/1	US	End of Vietnam War	symbolic	185	-5.2
1973/9	Korea	Abduction of Kim Dae Jung	realistic	136	-5.9
1973/10	Korea	Kim Dae Jung incident	realistic	13	3.1
1973/10	USSR	Northern Territories meeting	realistic	19	-3.7
1974/3	USSR	Disagreement over fishing rights	realistic	8	-5.8
1974/4	Korea	Japanese citizens arrested	realistic	10	1.9
1974/4	USSR	Negotiations over fishing rights	realistic	9	-2.1
1974/5	India	Nuclear test	symbolic	10	-0.7
1974/6	France	Nuclear test	symbolic	10	-0.5
1974/7	US	Watergate	symbolic	20	-0.7
1974/7	Korea	Trial of two Japanese citizens	realistic	28	-2.5
1974/9	Korea	President assassination attempt	realistic	85	-7.9
1974/10	US	LaRoque Statement	realistic	54	-3.5
1975/6	France	Underground Nuclear test	symbolic	3	-1.8
1975/9	North Korea	Fishing boat incident	realistic	36	-3.4
1976/8	North Korea	Operation Paul Bunyon	symbolic	5	2.3
1976/9	USSR	Pilot defects in MIG-25	realistic	60	-4.7
1976/11	China	Mao secession crisis	symbolic	2	-6.2
1977/2	Korea	Discussions over Takeshima	realistic	8	-1.7
1977/4	USSR	Negotiations over Fishing rights	realistic	147	-11.1
1977/6	US	Inspection of nuclear plants	realistic	39	-1.8
1977/6	USSR	Negotiations over Fishing rights	realistic	29	1.2
1977/7	North Korea	Fishing limits dispute	realistic	13	-2.4
1977/7	USSR	Negotiations over Fishing rights	realistic	25	1.9
1977/10	USSR	Negotiations over Fishing Issue	realistic	10	1.0
1977/12	US	Japan-US trade dispute	realistic	35	-0.2

1978/1	US	Japan-US trade dispute	realistic	35	0.5
1978/4	USSR	KAL902 incident	symbolic	37	-3.1
1978/5	China	Dispute over Senkaku Islands	realistic	64	-5.1
1978/11	USSR	Soviet MIGs in Cuba	symbolic	1	-4.1
1979/3	China	Sino-Vietnamese War	symbolic	35	-8.6
1979/3	US	Three Mile Island	symbolic	42	-4.2
1979/9	USSR	Base built in Northern Territories	realistic	5	-0.4
1980/1	USSR	Invasion of Afghanistan	symbolic	85	-4.9
1980/2	US	Restrictions on Japanese cars	realistic	6	-2.3
1980/5	US	US fails to rescue hostages	symbolic	1	-4.3
1980/6	Korea	Kwangju incident	symbolic	57	-5.3
1980/9	Korea	Death penalty Kim Dae Jung	symbolic	32	-3.5
1980/12	US	US demands Japanese burden	realistic	1	-3.3
1981/2	USSR	Northern Territories Day	realistic	8	-4.4
1981/2	China	Cancels Japanese factory contract	realistic	9	-5.9
1981/4	US	Submarine & fishing boat collision	realistic	27	3.7
1981/5	US	US-Japan car negotiations	realistic	6	2.3
1981/6	US	US-Japan security negotiations	realistic	21	-3.9
1981/8	US	US shoots down two Libyan jets	symbolic	7	-2.7
1981/9	Korea	Dispute with Japan over loan/aid	realistic	27	-4.7
1981/9	North Korea	Missile at US military plane	symbolic	4	-4.8
1982/4	UK	Falklands War	symbolic	72	-4.7
1982/5	UK	Falklands War	symbolic	203	-5.9
1982/6	UK	Falklands War	symbolic	26	-2.2
1982/7	China	Textbook issue	identity	5	-3.8
1982/8	China	Textbook issue	identity	32	-0.7
1982/8	Korea	Textbook issue	identity	30	-2.9
1982/9	Korea	Textbook issue	identity	4	-3.2
1982/9	China	Textbook issue	identity	14	-5.0
1982/11	Korea	Textbook issue	identity	3	-0.5
1982/12	US	US announces Middle East Headquarters	symbolic	0	-1.4
1983/1	Korea	Dispute with Japan over loan/aid	realistic	25	-1.5
1983/4	China	Border dispute with Vietnam	symbolic	3	-1.3
1983/6	US	Japan criticized on pager imports	realistic	0	-2.8

1983/8	US	US accuses Japan of dumping	realistic	0	-1.0
1983/9	USSR	KAL007	symbolic	126	-20.0
1983/10	US	Invasion of Grenada	symbolic	25	0.9
1983/11	North Korea	Rangoon Bombing	symbolic	27	-6.5
1983/12	UK	Nuclear weapons on British ship in Japan	symbolic	10	-1.0
1984/4	US	Trade dispute over beef and citrus	realistic	26	-2.1
1984/5	USSR	Boycott LA Olympics	symbolic	18	-5.5
1984/12	US	Steel dispute	realistic	0	-0.2
1985/4	US	US bill limits Japanese imports	realistic	28	-3.7
1985/9	China	Anti-Japanese Demonstration	identity	1	-2.6
1986/5	USSR	Chernobyl	symbolic	35	-4.4
1986/5	China	Textbook issue	identity	5	-4.2
1986/9	Korea	Fujio comments	identity	18	1.2
1987/2	North Korea	Seizes Japanese fishing boat	realistic	13	-2.2
1987/6	Korea	Anti-govt protesters arrested	symbolic	25	-0.1
1988/2	North Korea	KAL858	symbolic	36	-15.8
1988/4	USSR	End of Afghanistan War	symbolic	20	-5.6
1988/7	US	Iran Air 655	symbolic	13	2.0
1988/9	North Korea	Negotiations over fishing boat	realistic	7	-0.2
1988/11	US	US navy exercises in Tokyo Bay	realistic	3	-5.4
1989/6	China	Tiananmen Square	symbolic	40	-34.1
1990/1	USSR	Repression of Azerbaijan	symbolic	42	-4.1
1990/1	US	US invades Panama	symbolic	11	-1.2
1990/4	USSR	Repression of Lithuania	symbolic	52	-5.1
1990/5	Korea	Colonisation apology	identity	28	-3.7
1990/8	France	Gulf Crisis	symbolic	20	-3.0
1990/8	US	Iraq Crisis	symbolic	127	-1.4
1990/8	UK	Iraq Crisis	symbolic	29	1.5
1990/9	US	Iraq Crisis	symbolic	56	-2.2
1990/9	UK	Iraq Crisis	symbolic	6	-3.2
1990/10	US	Iraq Crisis	symbolic	19	-3.3
1990/11	US	Iraq Crisis	symbolic	46	-4.9
1990/12	US	Iraq Crisis	symbolic	37	5.1
1991/1	US	Gulf War	symbolic	111	2.0

1991/1	UK	Gulf War	symbolic	9	3.5
1991/1	France	Gulf War	symbolic	27	-1.1
1991/2	USSR	January Events	symbolic	34	-8.1
1991/2	US	Gulf War	symbolic	112	-6.7
1991/8	USSR	Coup d'état in USSR	symbolic	49	2.7
1991/12	US	No apology for atomic bombings	identity	3	-1.6
1992/1	Korea	Apology over Comfort Women	identity	14	-0.6
1992/2	US	Bush trip to Japan	realistic	20	-7.9
1992/4	China	Jiang Zemin visits Japan	identity	6	-1.8
1992/7	Russia	Discussion of Northern Territories	realistic	24	-5.0
1992/9	Russia	Yeltsin cancels visit to Japan	identity	19	-14.7
1993/1	US	US strikes on Iraq	symbolic	29	5.5
1993/3	Russia	G7 Summit - Aid to Russia	realistic	28	1.2
1993/4	Russia	Northern Territories discussion	realistic	41	-4.8
1993/10	North Korea	Refuses IAEA inspections	realistic	12	-5.7
1993/10	Russia	Dumps nuclear waste in Japan Sea	realistic	22	-8.8
1993/11	Korea	Apology over colonisation	identity	5	2.6
1994/2	North Korea	Inspectors to North Korea	realistic	10	-1.1
1994/2	US	Japan ordered to open markets	realistic	11	-3.6
1994/5	US	Trade talks with US	realistic	11	-4.7
1994/6	North Korea	Nuclear Crisis	realistic	89	-6.3
1994/6	China	Nuclear test	symbolic	2	-5.9
1994/9	China	Asian Games dispute over Taiwan	realistic	17	1.3
1994/10	North Korea	Nuclear Crisis	realistic	28	-6.4
1994/10	China	Nuclear test	symbolic	5	-2.2
1995/1	Russia	First Chechen War	symbolic	26	-5.1
1995/4	US	Oklahoma City	symbolic	7	-7.4
1995/6	China	Nuclear test	symbolic	7	-3.8
1995/7	France	Nuclear test	symbolic	20	-13.4
1995/7	US	Enola Gay exhibit in Smithsonian	identity	2	2.3
1995/8	France	Nuclear test	symbolic	35	-10.0
1995/8	Korea	Apology for WWII	identity	2	2.1
1995/9	China	Nuclear test	symbolic	18	-7.3
1995/9	France	Nuclear test	symbolic	63	-29.7

1995/9	US	Okinawa Rape incident	realistic	7	4.1
1995/10	US	Discussions about Okinawa	realistic	14	-0.8
1995/11	US	Discussions about Okinawa	realistic	7	0.6
1995/11	Korea	Eto comments	identity	22	-3.8
1995/12	France	Nuclear test	symbolic	13	-8.5
1996/1	France	Nuclear test	symbolic	15	1.7
1996/2	China	China-Taiwan crisis	realistic	9	-7.0
1996/3	US	Discussions about Okinawa	realistic	7	-4.1
1996/3	China	China-Taiwan crisis	realistic	7	-6.6
1996/6	China	Nuclear test	symbolic	16	-1.4
1996/7	China	Nuclear test	symbolic	9	0.9
1996/9	China	Senkaku lighthouse issue	realistic	12	3.1
1996/9	US	Discussions about Okinawa	realistic	17	-5.2
1997/2	North Korea	Abductions issue	realistic	30	-5.9
1997/10	North Korea	Japanese wives issue	realistic	8	-0.5
1998/4	Russia	Northern Territories discussion	realistic	12	-2.6
1998/6	India	Nuclear test	symbolic	59	-11.4
1998/6	US	Clinton skips Japan for China	identity	11	-2.1
1998/8	US	Missile attacks on al Qaeda	symbolic	7	-0.8
1998/9	North Korea	Taepodong Test	realistic	31	-13.1
1998/11	China	Jiang Zemin and history issue	identity	11	-2.3
1998/12	US	Missile attack on Iraq	symbolic	10	0.5
1999/2	US	Clinton impeachment	symbolic	3	0.4
1999/4	US	NATO attacks Serbia	symbolic	17	1.4
1999/4	North Korea	Mystery ships issue	realistic	3	-2.2
1999/5	US	Bombing of China embassy	symbolic	14	-2.8
1999/5	India	Kargil War	symbolic	1	-0.6
1999/8	China	China tests long-range missile	realistic	2	-2.5
2000/7	US	Sexual assault by serviceman	realistic	2	-3.6
2000/9	Russia	Putin discusses peace treaty	realistic	5	-8.0
2001/2	US	Ehime Maru	realistic	21	-5.5
2001/4	China	US spy plane incident	realistic	11	-1.6
2001/6	China	Dispute over safeguards	realistic	4	3.0
2001/7	Korea	Criticism of Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni	identity	7	-4.5

2001/7	China	Criticism of Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni	identity	8	-5.7
2001/8	China	Koizumi visits Yasukuni	identity	9	-0.6
2001/10	US	Invasion of Afghanistan	symbolic	43	-6.7
2001/11	US	Invasion of Afghanistan	symbolic	22	-2.6
2002/1	North Korea	North Korean ship sunk	realistic	18	-7.1
2002/2	UK	Subcritical nuclear test	symbolic	3	-0.2
2002/3	US	Dispute over steel safeguards	realistic	5	-2.1
2002/4	China	Koizumi visits Yasukuni	identity	5	2.2
2002/5	China	Shenyang incident	realistic	42	-12.8
2002/8	US	Buildup to Iraq War	symbolic	6	-7.8
2002/9	North Korea	Koizumi visits Pyongyang	realistic	54	-1.1
2002/10	North Korea	Abductions issue	realistic	74	-7.5
2002/11	North Korea	Abductions issue	realistic	22	-2.5
2002/12	North Korea	Yongbyon reactivated	realistic	31	-4.7
2003/1	China	Koizumi visits Yasukuni	identity	6	3.7
2003/1	Korea	Koizumi visits Yasukuni	identity	6	3.5
2003/1	North Korea	NPT withdrawal	realistic	38	-3.2
2003/2	US	Preparation for Iraq	symbolic	62	-4.0
2003/3	UK	Iraq War	symbolic	31	-1.8
2003/3	US	Iraq War	symbolic	90	-3.4
2003/4	North Korea	Admission of nuclear weapons	realistic	45	-0.5
2003/4	US	Iraq War	symbolic	57	0.9
2003/4	China	SARS crisis	realistic	22	-1.6
2003/5	China	SARS crisis	realistic	30	-3.1
2003/12	US	BSE dispute	realistic	7	-4.7
2004/1	Korea	Koizumi visits Yasukuni	identity	3	-0.4
2004/1	China	Koizumi visits Yasukuni	identity	4	-4.0
2004/2	US	SDF arrive in Samawah	realistic	29	-2.4
2004/3	China	Senkaku Dispute	realistic	7	0.0
2004/4	US	Abu Ghraib	symbolic	5	-4.0
2004/5	North Korea	Koizumi visits Pyongyang	realistic	35	0.7
2004/5	US	Japanese journalists killed in Iraq	realistic	10	-1.0
2004/6	North Korea	Soga family reunion	realistic	7	-5.3
2004/6	US	Battle of Fallujah	symbolic	7	3.0

2004/8	China	Booing at Asian Cup	identity	2	-15.3
2004/9	Korea	Uranium enrichment	symbolic	6	2.9
2004/10	US	Escalation of violence in Iraq	symbolic	45	-2.9
2004/11	China	Chinese submarine near Japan	realistic	6	-3.7
2004/12	China	Premier Wen comments on Yasukuni	identity	2	-0.9
2005/4	China	Anti-Japan demonstrations	identity	41	-12.6
2005/4	Korea	Takeshima Day	identity	10	-10.8
2005/5	China	Vice-Premier Wu snubs Koizumi	identity	4	-4.9
2005/6	Korea	Japanese coast guard standoff	realistic	5	-2.6
2005/10	China	Koizumi visits Yasukuni	identity	10	-0.7
2005/10	Korea	Koizumi visits Yasukuni	identity	10	1.0
2005/11	France	Paris Riots	symbolic	5	-6.8
2006/3	China	Dispute over East China Sea	realistic	2	-8.6
2006/4	Korea	Survey ship to Takeshima	realistic	13	1.3
2006/7	North Korea	Missile tests	realistic	40	-7.1
2006/10	North Korea	Nuclear test	realistic	69	-5.6

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (Chen and Bargh 1999)(Chen and Bargh 1999)(2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

**Appendix 2: List of Cases Coded as Economic Threats to Japan, Media
Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007**

Case	Year / Month	Country	Issue	Media	Opinion	Front	Change (% points)
1	1984/12	US	Steel dispute	Low	No Change	0	-0.2
2	1983/6	US	Japan criticised on pager imports	Low	No Change	0	-2.8
3	1983/8	US	US accuses Japan of dumping	Low	No Change	0	-1
4	2001/6	China	Dispute over safeguards	Low	No Change	4	3.0
5	2002/3	US	Dispute over steel safeguards	Low	No Change	5	-2.1
6	1980/2	US	Restrictions on Japanese cars	Moderate	No Change	6	-2.3
7	1981/5	US	US-Japan car negotiations	Moderate	No Change	6	2.3
8	2003/12	US	BSE dispute	Moderate	Minor Change	7	-4.7
9	1974/3	USSR	Disagreement over fishing rights	Moderate	Minor Change	8	-5.8
10	1981/2	China	Cancels Japanese factory contract	Moderate	Minor Change	9	-5.9
11	1974/4	USSR	Negotiations over fishing rights	Moderate	No Change	9	-2.1
12	1977/10	USSR	Negotiations over Fishing Issue	Moderate	No Change	10	1
13	1994/2	US	Japan ordered to open markets	Moderate	Minor Change	11	-3.6
14	1994/5	US	Trade talks with US	Moderate	Minor Change	11	-4.7
15	1977/7	North Korea	Fishing limits dispute	Moderate	No Change	13	-2.4
16	1977/7	USSR	Negotiations over Fishing rights	High	No Change	25	1.9
17	1983/1	Korea	Dispute with Japan over loan/aid	High	No Change	25	-1.5
18	1984/4	US	Trade dispute over beef and citrus	High	No Change	26	-2.1
19	1981/9	Korea	Dispute with Japan over loan/aid	High	Minor Change	27	-4.7
20	1985/4	US	US bill limits Japanese	High	Minor	28	-3.7

			imports		Change		
21	1993/3	Russia	G7 Summit - Aid to Russia	High	No Change	28	1.2
22	1967/11	UK	Devaluation of Pound	High	Major Change	29	-6.2
23	1977/6	USSR	Negotiations over Fishing rights	High	No Change	29	1.2
24	1977/12	US	Japan-US trade dispute	High	No Change	35	-0.2
25	1978/1	US	Japan-US trade dispute	High	No Change	35	0.5
26	1970/12	US	US-Japan textile dispute	High	No Change	40	-1.9
27	1970/11	US	US-Japan textile dispute	High	No Change	78	-1.1
28	1977/4	USSR	Negotiations over Fishing rights	High	Major Change	147	-11.1

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

Appendix 3: List of Cases Coded as Threats to Japanese Sovereignty, Media Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007

Case	Year / Month	Country	Issue	Media	Opinion	Front	Change (% points)
1	2006/3	China	Dispute over East China Sea	Low	Major Change	2	-8.6
2	1961/1	Korea	Fishing boat incident at Lee line	Low	No Change	3	3.4
3	1999/4	North Korea	Mystery ships issue	Low	No Change	3	-2.2
4	1960/10	Korea	Meeting with ROK over Lee Line	Low	Minor Change	4	-4.9
5	2005/6	Korea	Japanese coast guard standoff	Low	No Change	5	-2.6
6	2004/3	China	Senkaku Dispute	Moderate	No Change	7	0
7	1977/2	Korea	Discussions over Takeshima	Moderate	No Change	8	-1.7
8	1971/3	US	Okinawa negotiations	Moderate	No Change	9	-1
9	1971/2	US	Okinawa negotiations	Moderate	No Change	9	-0.3
10	1996/9	China	Senkaku lighthouse issue	Moderate	No Change	12	3.1
11	1998/4	Russia	Northern Territories discussion	Moderate	No Change	12	-2.6
12	2006/4	Korea	Survey ship to Takeshima	Moderate	No Change	13	1.3
13	1973/10	Korea	Kim Dae Jung incident	Moderate	No Change	13	3.1
14	1970/1	US	Okinawa negotiations	Moderate	No Change	13	0.8
15	1960/12	Korea	Meeting with ROK over Lee Line	Moderate	No Change	14	-2.5
16	1973/10	USSR	Northern Territories meeting	High	Minor Change	19	-3.7
17	2002/11	North Korea	Abductions issue	High	No Change	22	-2.5
18	1992/7	Russia	Discussion of Northern Territories	High	Minor Change	24	-5
19	1969/5	US	Okinawa dispute	High	Major Change	27	-9.2
20	1997/2	North Korea	Abductions issue	High	Minor Change	30	-5.9
21	1969/10	US	Discussion of Okinawa return	High	No Change	30	5.5

22	1967/10	US	Okinawa negotiations	High	Minor Change	32	-5.3
23	1993/4	Russia	Northern Territories discussion	High	Minor Change	41	-4.8
24	2002/5	China	Shenyang incident	High	Major Change	42	-12.8
25	1967/11	US	Okinawa negotiations	High	Major Change	47	-6.8
26	2002/9	North Korea	Koizumi visits Pyongyang	High	No Change	54	-1.1
27	1964/5	USSR	Northern Territories discussion	High	Minor Change	59	-3.9
28	1978/5	China	Dispute over Senkaku Islands	High	Minor Change	64	-5.1
29	1965/1	US	Okinawa negotiations	High	Minor Change	68	-6
30	2002/10	North Korea	Abductions issue	High	Major Change	74	-7.5
31	1965/10	Korea	Dispute over diplomatic relations	High	Minor Change	133	-6
32	1973/9	Korea	Abduction of Kim Dae Jung	High	Minor Change	136	-5.9
33	1969/11	US	Okinawa negotiations	High	Major Change	179	-10.6

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

Appendix 4: List of Cases Coded as Military Threat to Japan, Media Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007

Case	Year / Month	Country	Issue	Media	Opinion	Front	Change (% points)
1	1999/8	China	China tests long-range missile	Low	No Change	2	-2.5
2	1979/9	USSR	Base built in Northern Territories	Low	No Change	5	-0.4
3	2004/11	China	Chinese submarine near Japan	Moderate	Minor Change	6	-3.7
4	2002/1	North Korea	North Korean ship sunk	High	Major Change	18	-7.1
5	1998/9	North Korea	Taepodong Test	High	Major Change	31	-13.1
6	2006/7	North Korea	Missile tests	High	Major Change	40	-7.1

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

**Appendix 5: List of Cases Coded as Nuclear Tests, Media Coverage and
Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007**

Case	Year / Month	Country	Issue	Media	Opinion	Front	Change (% points)
1	1962/5	USSR	Nuclear test	Low	Minor Change	1	-4.7
2	1967/1	China	Nuclear test	Low	Minor Change	2	-4.6
3	1972/3	China	Nuclear test	Low	No Change	2	0.5
4	1994/6	China	Nuclear test	Low	Minor Change	2	-5.9
5	2002/2	UK	Subcritical nuclear test	Low	No Change	3	-0.2
6	1975/6	France	Underground Nuclear test	Low	No Change	3	-1.8
7	1967/7	China	Nuclear test	Low	Minor Change	3	-4.5
8	1971/8	France	Nuclear test	Low	No Change	3	1.1
9	1994/10	China	Nuclear test	Low	No Change	5	-2.2
10	1966/5	France	Nuclear test	Low	Minor Change	5	-3
11	1966/9	France	Nuclear test	Low	No Change	5	1.7
12	1968/8	France	Hydrogen bomb test	Moderate	No Change	6	3
13	1995/6	China	Nuclear test	Moderate	Minor Change	7	-3.8
14	1996/7	China	Nuclear test	Moderate	No Change	9	0.9
15	1974/6	France	Nuclear test	Moderate	No Change	10	-0.5
16	1962/2	USSR	Nuclear test	Moderate	No Change	10	8.5
17	1962/2	UK	Nuclear test	Moderate	No Change	10	-2.4
18	1974/5	India	Nuclear test	Moderate	No Change	10	-0.7

19	1972/6	France	Nuclear test	Moderate	Minor Change	10	-3.7
20	1962/3	UK	Nuclear test	Moderate	Minor Change	11	-3.2
21	1995/12	France	Nuclear test	Moderate	Major Change	13	-8.5
22	1996/1	France	Nuclear test	High	No Change	15	1.7
23	1996/6	China	Nuclear test	High	No Change	16	-1.4
24	1966/7	France	Nuclear test	High	No Change	17	-0.4
25	1995/9	China	Nuclear test	High	Major Change	18	-7.3
26	1962/7	Russia	Nuclear test	High	Minor Change	19	-4.8
27	1962/2	US	Nuclear test	High	No Change	19	-1.6
28	1995/7	France	Nuclear test	High	Major Change	20	-13.4
29	1961/11	US	Nuclear test	High	Minor Change	25	-3.4
30	1961/11	USSR	Nuclear test	High	Major Change	26	-7.6
31	1995/8	France	Nuclear test	High	Major Change	35	-10
32	1962/3	US	Nuclear test	High	Minor Change	45	-5.6
33	1961/9	USSR	Nuclear test	High	Minor Change	48	-4.5
34	1964/10	China	Nuclear test	High	Minor Change	57	-3.7
35	1998/6	India	Nuclear test	High	Major Change	59	-11.4
36	1995/9	France	Nuclear test	High	Major Change	63	-29.7
37	2006/10	North Korea	Nuclear test	High	Minor Change	69	-5.6

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

**Appendix 6: List of Cases Coded as the Use of Military Force, Media
Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007**

Case	Year / Month	Country	Issue	Media	Opinion	Front	Change (% points)
1	1967/12	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	Low	No Change	0	2.8
2	1967/2	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	Low	No Change	0	3.0
3	1999/5	India	Kargil War	Low	No Change	1	-0.6
4	1967/4	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	Low	No Change	2	-0.4
5	1966/2	Korea	South Korean soldiers to Vietnam	Low	No Change	3	1.6
6	1983/4	China	Border dispute with Vietnam	Low	No Change	3	-1.3
7	1966/1	USSR	Aid for North Vietnam	Low	Major Change	3	-6.6
8	1969/4	China	Border dispute with USSR	Low	Major Change	3	-9.3
9	1981/9	North Korea	Missile at US military plane	Low	Minor Change	4	-4.8
10	1966/2	France	Participates in Vietnam war	Low	Minor Change	5	-3.1
11	1967/9	China	Border dispute with India	Moderate	Major Change	6	-6.2
12	1961/5	France	Algeria-France war	Moderate	Major Change	6	-9.3
13	1981/8	US	US shoots down two Libyan jets	Moderate	No Change	7	-2.7
14	1998/8	US	Missile attacks on al-Qaeda	Moderate	No Change	7	-0.8
15	2004/6	US	Battle of Fallujah	Moderate	No Change	7	3.0
16	1996/3	China	China-Taiwan crisis	Moderate	Major Change	7	-6.6
17	1965/11	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	Moderate	Minor Change	7	-4.1
18	1962/12	India	Border dispute with China	Moderate	No Change	8	-2.3

19	1991/1	UK	Gulf War	Moderate	No Change	9	3.5
20	1961/5	US	Bay of Pigs	Moderate	Major Change	9	-8.2
21	1996/2	China	China-Taiwan crisis	Moderate	Major Change	9	-7.0
22	1998/12	US	Missile attack on Iraq	Moderate	No Change	10	0.5
23	1990/1	US	US invades Panama	Moderate	No Change	11	-1.2
24	1971/11	India	India-Pakistan War	Moderate	No Change	13	-0.5
25	1999/5	US	Bombing of China embassy	Moderate	No Change	14	-2.8
26	1999/4	US	NATO attacks Serbia	High	No Change	17	1.4
27	1972/5	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	High	Major Change	18	-6.2
28	1966/12	US	US plane crashes in Hanoi	High	Minor Change	19	-5.4
29	1969/3	USSR	Border dispute with China	High	No Change	20	-0.9
30	1988/4	USSR	End of Afghanistan War	High	Minor Change	20	-5.6
31	1968/3	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	High	No Change	21	-0.8
32	2001/11	US	Invasion of Afghanistan	High	No Change	22	-2.6
33	1962/12	China	Border dispute with India	High	Major Change	24	-14.0
34	1983/10	US	Invasion of Grenada	High	No Change	25	0.9
35	1995/1	Russia	First Chechen War	High	Minor Change	26	-5.1
36	1982/6	UK	Falklands War	High	No Change	26	-2.2
37	1991/1	France	Gulf War	High	No Change	27	-1.1
38	1993/1	US	US strikes on Iraq	High	No Change	29	5.5
39	2003/3	UK	Iraq War	High	No Change	31	-1.8

40	1979/3	China	Sino-Vietnamese War	High	Major Change	35	-8.6
41	1972/3	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	High	Minor Change	36	-3.5
42	1965/7	US	More troops sent to Vietnam	High	No Change	37	-1.8
43	1966/2	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	High	Major Change	37	-6.1
44	2001/10	US	Invasion of Afghanistan	High	Major Change	43	-6.7
45	1972/8	US	Anti-Vietnam protests	High	Minor Change	43	-3.8
46	2004/10	US	Escalation of violence in Iraq	High	No Change	45	-2.9
47	1962/1	India	Portuguese-Indian War	High	Major Change	50	-6.9
48	1968/2	US	Tet Offensive	High	Major Change	55	-6.7
49	2003/4	US	Iraq War	High	No Change	57	0.9
50	1964/7	US	Gulf of Tonkin	High	Minor Change	59	-5.7
51	1961/7	France	France-Tunisia War	High	No Change	67	3.7
52	1982/4	UK	Falklands War	High	Minor Change	72	-4.7
53	1966/7	US	Bombing of North Vietnam	High	Minor Change	84	-3.3
54	1980/1	USSR	Invasion of Afghanistan	High	Minor Change	85	-4.9
55	2003/3	US	Iraq War	High	Minor Change	90	-3.4
56	1970/6	US	US invades Cambodia	High	Major Change	104	-11.3
57	1971/12	India	India-Pakistan War	High	No Change	104	-2.2
58	1991/1	US	Gulf War	High	No Change	111	2.0
59	1991/2	US	Gulf War	High	Major Change	112	-6.7
60	1965/4	US	More combat troops to Vietnam	High	Major Change	131	-6.6

61	1968/9	USSR	Invasion of Czechoslovakia	High	Major Change	157	-12.2
62	1965/3	US	First combat troops to Vietnam	High	Major Change	160	-6.3
63	1973/1	US	End of Vietnam War	High	Minor Change	185	-5.2
64	1982/5	UK	Falklands War	High	Minor Change	203	-5.9

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

**Appendix 7: List of Cases Coded as the Killing of Civilians, Media Coverage
and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007**

Case	Year / Month	Country	Issue	Media	Opinion	Front	Change (% points)
1	1988/7	US	Iran Air 655	Moderate	No Change	13	2
2	1983/11	North Korea	Rangoon Bombing	High	Major Change	27	-6.5
3	1991/2	USSR	January Events	High	Major Change	34	-8.1
4	1988/2	North Korea	KAL858	High	Major Change	36	-15.8
5	1978/4	USSR	KAL902 incident	High	Minor Change	37	-3.1
6	1989/6	China	Tiananmen Square	High	Major Change	40	-34.1
7	1990/1	USSR	Repression of Azerbaijan	High	Minor Change	42	-4.1
8	1990/4	Russia	Repression of Lithuania	High	Minor Change	52	-5.1
9	1980/6	Korea	Kwangju incident	High	Minor Change	57	-5.3
10	1983/9	USSR	KAL007	High	Major Change	126	-20

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

**Appendix 8: List of Cases Coded as Criticism of Japan, Media Coverage and
Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007**

Case	Year / Month	Country	Issue	Media	Opinion	Front	Change (% points)
1	2004/12	China	Premier Wen on Yasukuni	Low	No Change	2	-0.9
2	1995/8	Korea	Apology for WWII	Low	No Change	2	2.1
3	1982/11	Korea	Textbook issue	Low	No Change	3	-0.5
4	2004/1	Korea	Koizumi visits Yasukuni	Low	No Change	3	-0.4
5	1982/9	Korea	Textbook issue	Low	Minor Change	4	-3.2
6	2004/1	China	Koizumi visits Yasukuni	Low	Minor Change	4	-4
7	1993/11	Korea	Apology over colonization	Low	No Change	5	2.6
8	1982/7	China	Textbook issue	Low	Minor Change	5	-3.8
9	2002/4	China	Koizumi visits Yasukuni	Low	No Change	5	2.2
10	1986/5	China	Textbook issue	Low	Minor Change	5	-4.2
11	2003/1	China	Koizumi visits Yasukuni	Moderate	No Change	6	3.7
12	2003/1	Korea	Koizumi visits Yasukuni	Moderate	No Change	6	3.5
13	1992/4	China	Jiang Zemin visits Japan	Moderate	No Change	6	-1.8
14	2001/7	Korea	Koizumi to Yasukuni	Moderate	Minor Change	7	-4.5
15	2001/7	China	Koizumi to Yasukuni	Moderate	Minor Change	8	-5.7
16	2001/8	China	Koizumi visits Yasukuni	Moderate	No Change	9	-0.6
17	2005/10	Korea	Koizumi visits Yasukuni	Moderate	No Change	10	1
18	2005/10	China	Koizumi visits Yasukuni	Moderate	No Change	10	-0.7

19	1998/11	China	Jiang Zemin and history issue	Moderate	No Change	11	-2.3
20	1982/9	China	Textbook issue	Moderate	Minor Change	14	-5
21	1992/1	Korea	Apology over Comfort Women	Moderate	No Change	14	-0.6
22	1994/9	China	Asian Games dispute over Taiwan	High	No Change	17	1.3
23	1986/9	Korea	Fujio comments	High	No Change	18	1.2
24	1995/11	Korea	Eto comments	High	Minor Change	22	-3.8
25	1990/5	Korea	Colonization apology	High	Minor Change	28	-3.7
26	1982/8	Korea	Textbook issue	High	No Change	30	-2.9
27	1982/8	China	Textbook issue	High	No Change	32	-0.7

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

Appendix 9: List of Cases Coded as Violation of Diplomatic Protocol, Media Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007

Case	Year / Month	Country	Issue	Media	Opinion	Front	Change (% points)
1	2005/5	China	Vice-Premier Wu snubs Koizumi	Low	Minor Change	4	-4.9
2	1998/6	US	Clinton skips Japan for China	Moderate	No Change	11	-2.1
3	1992/9	Russia	Yeltsin cancels visit to Japan	High	Major Change	19	-14.7

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), Kodama (2008), various *Asahi Shimbun*, and Jiji polls.

Appendix 10: List of Cases Coded as Anti-Japanese Demonstrations, Media Coverage and Change in Public Opinion, 1960-2007

Case	Year / Month	Country	Issue	Media	Opinion	Front	Change (% points)
1	1985/9	China	Anti-Japanese Demonstration	Low	No Change	1	-2.6
2	2004/8	China	Booing at Asian Cup	Low	Major Change	2	-15.3
3	2005/4	Korea	Takeshima Day	Moderate	Major Change	10	-10.8
4	1965/8	Korea	Anti-Japan demonstrations	Moderate	No Change	12	0.1
5	1965/7	Korea	Anti-Japan demonstrations	High	Major Change	23	-8.1
6	2005/4	China	Anti-Japan demonstrations	High	Major Change	41	-12.6
7	1974/9	Korea	President assassination attempt	High	Major Change	85	-7.9

Source: Content analysis by the author of Sasaki, et al. (2005), various Asahi Shimbun, and Jiji polls.

