Laying Groundwork for a 'Theory of Hegemonic Tendencies': How Diplomatic Styles and Strategic Cultures Enhance Understanding of Variations in Foreign Policy Behaviours Among Rising Middle Powers

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Abdullah Bin Khurram

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Abstract: This Ph.D project argues that existing scholarly works and frameworks are insufficient to explain the variations in hegemonic behaviours among contemporary rising middle powers. This significant research gap can be filled by analysing hegemonic behaviours outside the traditional confines of established theories of international relations and diplomacy, so that the focus primarily could be the hegemon and its strategies. This thesis reviews the literature on the types of powers, theories of international relations, theories of hegemony, works on diplomatic style and strategic culture, and state-specific research to explore why some rising middle powers pursue hegemony differently from others. This project argues that power is not something that self-uses or self-maximises. Rather, how power is perceived, and ultimately employed, is dependent on the historical experiences and the ideological makeup of the states, as well as on the worldview of the individuals making decisions over when and how to use that power. This makeup of the state comes from both its diplomatic style as well as its strategic culture. The project lays the groundwork for a new *theory of hegemonic tendencies*, which specifically calls for rising middle powers to be divided into two analytical categories: "primacy-aspiring states" and "supremacy-aspiring states." Primacy-aspiring rising middle powers, such as Brazil and Indonesia, enjoy good relations with states in their neighbourhoods and are more integration-oriented. These states promote the strengthening of regional institutions and are more likely to abstain from resorting to political and military threats and/or interventions. On the other hand, supremacy-aspiring rising middle powers, such as India and Iran, do not enjoy good relations in their neighbourhoods. They are less integration-oriented, less likely to strengthen regional power-sharing institutions, and more likely to make political and military threats and/or interventions. These variations in hegemonic tendencies between primacy-aspiring and supremacy-aspiring states is a result of these states' respective diplomatic styles and strategic cultures.

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CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

It is a truism that different states behave differently; some are aggressive, while others not so much. Ideologies and ideas that form the foundation of a state, as well as institutional structures and institutional cultures within, all vary from state to state, and each of these factors can help shape foreign policy behaviours. Therefore, to claim simply that every state is aiming to maximise power does not do justice to the understanding of the complex forces driving and shaping states' behaviours.

World War II redefined international politics, with some states emerging stronger than how they were perceived before the war. However, today, the global landscape is again experiencing rapid changes: the overall "economic pie" is expanding, while the "political pie" is experiencing a diversion, whereby power is shifting from a few states to a larger number of states. One group of states experiencing this increase in their regional and/or global clout has been labelled "middle powers." While definitional issues related to this term will be highlighted later, the term "middle powers" broadly refers to states which are not great powers, but which have a large influence, and are experiencing an expansive trend in terms of their global outreach.

In an era in which great power politics is becoming increasingly tense, the space for middle powers to expand their influence can possibly increase. Gilley and O'Neil argue that "middle powers are not content to define their roles in relation to the increasingly explicit U.S.-China rivalry. Nor are they satisfied with playing only 'bridge-building' roles to bring the great powers together."[1] Thus, their real roles — as well as their self-conceptions of those roles — are both changing and becoming more important. Middle powers are increasingly becoming "hegemonic" in contemporary international relations because the system is slowly becoming "decompressed" from great power politics, and "is not disorderly enough to require a great power concert" taking place all the time.[2]

Within middle powers, states can be categorised as "traditional middle powers" and "emerging [or rising] middle powers." Traditional middle powers include states such as

[1] Bruce Gilley and Andrew O'Neil, *Middle Powers and the Rise of China* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014) p.238.
[2] Ibid, p.254.

Australia and Canada which have long been social democratic, stable, wealthy and egalitarian. On the other hand, rising middle powers include states such as Brazil, Indonesia, India and Iran, which have recently experienced a significant increase in their influence in their respective regions.

Yet some scholars emphasise that it might be inaccurate to use the middle power framework to study the behaviours of such states, and contend that it is rather national interests and power dynamics that should be studied as primary factors, which then create a need for those states to call themselves middle powers. Adam Chapnick argues that Canada's projection of itself as a middle power endows it with more authority in global affairs than it might otherwise have in practice.[3] Similarly, states such as India, on the one hand, continue to promote global inclusivity by challenging the status quo via lobbying for international institutions to give an increased say to it and like-minded states such as Brazil; yet, these states also continue to exhibit varying hegemonic tendencies in their own respective regions.

Therefore, simple version of middle power theory might not be able completely to explain the behaviour of these states; rather, it might purely be power-related international relations theories such as realism that can do so. This relationship between diplomacy and state power has fascinated scholars since ancient times.[4] One recalls the Peloponnesian War in the fifth century BC and Thucydides's formulation that "the strong do what they can and the weak accept what they must."[5]

Yet if power alone explains the behaviour of the states, then why are there examples of one middle power being more aggressive than another? Why does Iran have more ambitious plans for its neighbourhood than Indonesia? Why does Brazil pursue integration through the regional body Mercosur while India does not show much interest in the regional institution known as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)? Why does Indonesia enjoy a good image in the eyes of its neighbours while India has strained relations with almost all of its neighbours? All this means that neither a simple middle power framework nor power-based theories such as realism explain sufficiently the behaviour of rising middle powers. Perhaps the study of states' behaviours has to go beyond realist thought to analyse

[3] Adam Chapnick, 'The Canadian Middle Power Myth', *International Journal*, vol.55, no.2, 2000, pp.188-205.
[4] Yolanda K. Spies, 'Middle Power Diplomacy', in Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr and Paul Sharp (eds), *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy* (London: SAGE Publications, 2016) pp.281-293 at p.281.
[5] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1954) at p.118.

whether the makeups of the states, through their diplomatic styles and strategic cultures, help give us further clues about their behaviours.

In this context, Ikenberry and Kupchan argue that the international system is experiencing "outcomes that are not explicable simply in terms of the manipulation of material incentives."[6] Similarly, Richard Haass maintains that the defining feature of the modern-day diplomatic arena is one where power and influence are not automatically linked.[7] Thus, the notion that power can be situational leads to a new emphasis on middle power diplomacy, where state behaviour — and not state attributes — might play a more important role in explaining a state's policies, thus focusing on the performative aspects of power.[8]

Therefore, it is vital that one delves further into the study of power and influence, and go beyond theories of realism to ask the following questions in the context of rising middle powers: why do some states pursue power differently from others? Why are some states more hegemonic than others? Why are some states integration-oriented while others are not? Why are some states more likely to make military threats and interventions than others? Do the ideological makeups of the states and their unique historical experiences have any link with how states perceive and employ power?

To answer these questions, this thesis reviews the literature on the types of powers, theories of international relations, theories of hegemony, works on diplomatic style and strategic culture and state-specific research. The remainder of the chapter first discusses regional powers, rising powers and middle powers; then, it discusses the notion of hegemony; thereafter, it discusses existing work on diplomatic style and strategic culture; and finally, lays the groundwork for a new *theory of hegemonic tendencies*, which specifically calls for rising middle powers to be divided into two analytical categories: "primacy-aspiring states" and "supremacy-aspiring states." Thereafter, in chapters 2 and 3, Indonesia and Brazil are studied as examples of "primacy-aspiring" rising middle powers. Next, in chapters 4 and 5, India and Iran are discussed as case studies of "supremacy-aspiring" rising middle powers. Finally, the last chapter of the thesis concludes the discussion of the four states and ties it all up to the theory that will be proposed later in this chapter.

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[6] John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', *International Organisation*, vol.44, no.3, 1990, pp.283-315 at p.283.
[7] Richard Haass, 'The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow US Dominance?', *Foreign Affairs,* vol.87, no.3, 2008, pp.44-56.
[8] Andrew Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim R. Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a changing world order* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993).

TYPES OF POWER

The remainder of this chapter first sheds light on the concepts of hard power and soft power, and then discusses the distinct, yet sometimes overlapping, features of the concepts of middle powers, rising powers and regional powers. Delving into the literature on these themes will eventually assist this project to lay the groundwork for a new *theory of hegemonic tendencies*.

Soft Power and Hard Power

Wilson describes 'power' in international relations as entailing the ability to influence another to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise, and this power can be both hard and soft.[9] Hard power is the capacity to exercise influence over the other through coercion, through strategies that focus on military intervention, and economic sanctions.[10] Kearn adds that without a certain amount of hard power resources, it is exceedingly difficult to envision a state possessing a significant degree of influence in world politics.[11]

However, Joseph Nye argues that instead of forcing other states to change and comply through threats of military or economic weapons, it is important to set the agenda of attracting them.[12] Nye coined the term "soft power," which is the ability to affect other states to obtain the outcomes a state wants through attraction rather than coercion.[13] A state's soft power is based on its culture, arts, systems, values and policies. Nye argued that a state could defend its interests by promoting its soft power.[14] Therefore, in contrast to hard power, the concept of soft power describes the capability to persuade and co-opt rather than use coercion as a tool to convince and align other individuals, groups and states with one's desired outcomes. It notes the limitation of viewing diplomacy simply as a "traditional foreign policy tool" that can be

[9] Ernest J. Wilson III, 'Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol.616, no.1, 2008, pp.110-124.
[10] Ibid
[11] David W. Kearn, 'The hard truths about soft power', *Journal of Political Power*, vol.4, no.1, 2011, pp.65-85.
[12] Joseph S. Nye, 'Public Diplomacy and Soft Power', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* vol.616, no.1, 2008, pp.94-95.
[13] Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
[14] Ibid.

used to promote or maximise "soft power," and opts instead to create positive attraction by creating networks of influence and achieving its goals through them.[15]

A discussion of soft power and hard power allows for a better understanding of states' attempts to increase their global influence. While some states prefer the use of soft methods, other states might show an inclination to resort to hard power to further their influence and attain their objectives. The use of soft power by some states will be further highlighted in the case studies and will expand the understanding of the motivations behind states' decisions to adopt such approaches to attain power and influence.

Middle Powers

The middle power concept was originally used to explain the role of two states — Canada and Australia — that were pursuing a path that differentiated them from both great powers and minor powers.[16] However, it has a much broader relevance for states in the contemporary international system. The middle power concept "has served as a critical prism for interpreting the rise of states on the verge of transformation," and to "delineate the limits of these states' transformational agency."[17] Middle powers can broadly be defined as states that "lack system-shaping capabilities but nevertheless cannot be 'ignored'," meaning that while they cannot challenge great powers, they have the capabilities to resist any imposition by great powers.[18]

Jordaan divides middle powers into two categories: traditional (or established) and rising (or emerging).[19] Traditional middle powers are likely to exhibit similar kinds of behaviours, adopting a functional rather than a dominant approach toward their neighbourhood. Their diplomacy can be considered transparent in the sense that it is predictable and adheres to a pre-established normative frame of ideas. They are driven by a sense of morality and believe in peace and the rule of law. Moreover, as Spies highlights, these states have 'out-aided' great

[15] Jonathan McClory and Olivia Harvey, 'The Soft Power 30: getting to grips with the measurement challenge', *Global Affairs*, vol.2, no.3, pp.309-319.
[16] Charalampos Efstathopoulos, 'Reinterpreting India's rise through the middle power prism', *Asian Journal of Political Science*, vol.19, no.1, 2011, pp.74-95.
[17] Ibid, p. 76
[18] Eswaran Sridharan, 'Where is India headed? Possible future directions in Indian foreign policy', *International Affairs*, vol.93, no.1, 2017, pp.51-68.
[19] Eduard Jordaan, 'The concept of a middle power in international relations: distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers', *Politikon*, vol.30, no.1, 2003, pp.165-181 at p.167.

powers in providing official development assistance (ODA) to states that are economically struggling.[20] These states believe in multilateralism and in persuading other states to form values-based coalitions.[21] Thus, even without the requisite hard power to exert influence globally, these states are able to display influential leadership. Condensing their diplomatic resources to specialised issues to maximise outcomes in areas where they have a comparative advantage is what has been referred to as "niche diplomacy."[22]

Established middle powers exist as hugely independent in their state affairs but lack the ability to support other states massively.[23] Such middle powers can be both irrepressible and adaptable.[24] Irrepressibility, in this context, refers to states being able to make decisions on their own and supporting them. Interference from outside, for instance, may be met with opposition and this can make other powers wary of them. Adaptability, on the other hand, refers to states' ability to assess influences from external players and decide whether to bandwagon or oppose.

Established middle powers, to a great extent, can be self-sufficient. The main focus of middle powers is not on competition but on the aim of making their environment friendly for the citizens. A major aspect of these middle powers is their ability to support their national values effectively, such as on matters to do with democracy and human rights, thereby strengthening internal safeguards to withstand pressure from outside. Moreover, one of the vehicles of upholding sovereignty is through middle powers ensuring that their relationships with other middle powers remain highly cordial.

Established middle powers such as Canada have been at the forefront of offering assistance to states in the developing world. Thereafter, the states receiving funds can end up offering their political support in return. Such dealings with small powers then help the middle powers in various avenues including military power optimisation, industrialisation, and in advancing socio-political ideologies, especially when middle powers move on to become regional powers.[25] Such middle powers are, to a large extent, diplomatic role models under

[20] Spies, 'Middle power diplomacy', p.284.
[21] Carl Ungerer, 'The "middle power" concept in Australian foreign policy', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol.53, no.4, 2007, pp.538-551 at p.538.
[22] See Andrew Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997).
[23] Charalampos Efstathopoulos, *Middle Powers in World Trade Diplomacy: India, South Africa and the Doha Development* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) pp.167-194.
[24] Thomas Wright, 'Middle powers and the multilateral pivot', in Mo Jongryn (ed.), *MIKTA, Middle Powers, and New Dynamics of Global Governance: The G20's Evolving Agenda* (New York: Palgrave Pivot, 2015) pp.13-31.
[25] Martin Beck, 'The concept of regional power as applied to the Middle East', in Henner Furtig (ed.), *Regional Powers in the Middle east: New Constellations after the Arab revolts* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) pp.1-20.

whom weaker states seek to grow and subsequently transition to the middle power classification. These powers are often transparent in their operations and are predictable. Similarly, they tend to support the interests of the weaker states allied to them. Such states tend to act similarly in their involvement in international and regional bodies.[26] And at the same time, they have constantly structured themselves to navigate through international order and to pursue their interests mainly diplomatically, rarely opting for the use of coercive power.

On the other hand, rising middle powers display different behaviours, mainly in terms of norm-entrepreneurship. Because of their history with colonialism, these states take issue with the status quo. According to Rothgeb, these states act like trade unions and remain wary of the "parallel universes."[27] They are less concessionary and more reformative in behaviour because they are eager to see international institutions become more representative.[28] Because of this perceived feeling of victimisation and historical injustice, the diplomacy of rising middle powers tends to have an ideological vigour, and thus, at times, can be very vocal and confrontational in nature.[29]

For example, since its transition in 1994, South Africa has rallied other like-minded developing states to support major agreements such as the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998, and to adopt Millennium Development Goals in 2000.[30] Similarly, Brazil's foreign policy rests on "globalist protagonism" and the need for global equality.[31] This foreign policy is also conducted by raising the state's voice internationally through making reciprocal trips abroad. Specifically, during the eight years of the Lula administration, "Brazil received 904 visits from 137 countries or organisations; the President made 259 visits to 83 countries, while the Chancellor travelled 467 times to 101 countries."[32]

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[26] Suhnaz Yilmaz, *Middle Powers and Regional Powers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017) at p.222.
[27] John Rothgeb, 'The Changing International Context for Foreign Policy*',* in Jeanne Hey, Laura Neack and Patrick Haney (eds), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995) pp.33-49.
[28] Jordaan, 'The concept of a middle power in international relations', p.167.
[29] Donald J. Puchala, 'Third World Thinking and Contemporary International Relations', in Stephanie Neuman (ed.), *International Relations Theory and the Third World* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1998) p.151.
[30] Deon Geldenhuys, 'South Africa's role as international norm entrepreneur', in Walter Carlsnaes and Philip Nel (eds), *In Full Fight: South African Foreign Policy After Apartheid* (Midrand, South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2006) pp.93-107.
[31] Eduardo Brigidi de Mello, 'New independent foreign policy, a matter of emphasis', *AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*, vol.3, no.5, 2014, at p.251.
[32] Ibid, p.252.

Rising middle powers can exercise both hard power influence and soft power influence. Examples of soft power influence can be India's leveraging of Bollywood and Nigeria's leveraging of Nollywood. Similarly, their economic strength may also be increasing, especially vis-à-vis their neighbouring states. For example, South Africa's GDP is almost triple the size of the combined GDP of its nine fellow southern African states.[33] Yet rising middle powers can also face multiple domestic challenges, including tremendous urban-rural divide issues, acute income inequality, deep-rooted structural problems and unconsolidated democratic behaviour.[34]

Rising middle powers such as Iran and India can also have rigid or "illiberal democracies." This can be because most regional powers are in constant pursuit of excellence and dominance in their regions. Leaders in these states may consider themselves as examples and, hence, deem themselves to be free of any flaws.[35] Therefore, truly liberal democratic opinions can often be viewed as unnecessary opposition, and often, they can be rapidly eliminated. Therefore, such states can also come under scrutiny on the human rights front.

James Manicom and Jeffery Reeves divide middle powers into three categories: first, ''positional middle powers'' that exercise their influence to create an order that serves their interests; second, ''behavioural middle powers" that, on top of promoting their interests, also build coalitions and engage in niche diplomacy toward substantive ends; and third, ''ideational middle powers'' that claim to be good international citizens, adhering to liberalist goals. States keep moving back and forth between these categories depending upon who is in power politically. However, for any middle power to be fully formed, it needs all three: material capabilities, right behaviour and idealism.[36]

However, some scholars have emphasised that it might be inaccurate to use the concept of middle powers as a matter of genuine normative internationalism. Instead, it could be argued that national interests and power-diplomacy dynamics create a need for those states to call themselves middle powers.[37] In this context, Chapnick argues that Canada's projection of itself

[33] Spies, 'Middle power diplomacy', p.289.
[34] Jordaan, 'The concept of a middle power in international relations, p.165.
[35] Louise Fawcett, 'Rising powers and regional organization in the Middle East', in Jamie Gaskarth (ed), *Rising powers, global governance, and global ethics* (London: Routledge, 2015) pp.133-151 at p.133.
[36] James Manicom and Jeffery Reeves, 'Locating Middle Powers in International Relations Theory and Power Transitions', in Bruce Gilley and Andrew O'Neil (eds), *Middle powers and the rise of China* (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2014) pp.23-44.
[37] See, for example, Chapnick, 'The Canadian middle power myth', 2000; Spies, 'Middle power diplomacy', 2016; Ungerer, 'The "middle power" concept in Australian foreign policy', 2007.

as a middle power endows it with more authority in global affairs than it might have in practice otherwise, thus, pointing towards explanations rooted not in a middle power framework, but in a power-diplomacy nexus instead.[38] Similarly, Ungerer argues that the diplomacy of middle powers is as utilitarian as any other category of states, and, in effect, they prudently evaluate when using their 'middlepowerness' can or cannot serve their national interests.[39]

During the Cold War, realist scholars of international relations helped further develop the theoretical constructs at the interplay of power and diplomacy. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz argued that state power could extend to a "restrictive" capability, which would then translate into diplomatic ability to set agendas in specific spheres in international relations.[40] Jordaan argues that middle powers have a broad interest in maintaining the global order, and only seek reform when it helps them tilt the balance of power in their favour.[41] Similarly, the call for the inclusion of more members in the UN Security Council by India, Brazil and South Africa stems from their national interests pertaining to power expansion, and does not stem from a truly internationalist perspective.[42] Similar is their behaviour with other states within their own category of states. For example, when South Africa was invited to join the BRIC (now BRICS) in 2011, the inaugural speech by South African President Zuma said, "We are now equal co-architects of a new equitable international system."[43] Likewise, the notion that middle powers are more peace-loving and less likely to resort to hard power can be debunked by their decisions to expand their respective militaries, or the numerous interventions they have initiated or joined. Some examples include Qatar and Egypt's military cooperation in Libya in 2014; Pakistan and India acquiring nuclear weapons in the 1990s; and last but certainly not least, India and Saudi Arabia being the world's two largest arms importers.[44]

Therefore, in essence, middle powers, just like great powers, have a strong sense of self-interest — certainly much more than they often choose to proclaim. The evidence for this can be found in the fact that, on the one hand, they can challenge the status quo by lobbying for international institutions to become more inclusive, yet, ironically (or rather un-ironically), they

[38] Chapnick, 'The Canadian middle power myth', 2000.
[39] Ungerer, 'The "middle power" concept in Australian foreign policy', 2007.
[40] Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power', *The American Political Science Review*, vol.56, no.4, 1962, at pp.947-52.
[41] Jordaan, 'The concept of a middle power in international relations, p.167.
[42] Spies, 'Middle power diplomacy', p.290.
[43] Pádraig Carmody, 'The geopolitics and economics of BRICS' resource and market access in Southern Africa: aiding development or creating dependency?', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol.43, no.5, 2017, pp.863-877.
[44] Jeremy Bender, 'These are the world's largest arms importers', *Business Insider*, 23 February 2016.

can also behave as local hegemons in their own respective regions. Thus, it could be very much possible that diplomacy is their current favourite weapon of choice, or to put it another way, their currently preferred instrument of foreign policy. Yet, the question remains: will these states always prefer to use diplomacy over other instruments of power, or will acquiring more power ultimately change their behaviour?

Moreover, as Spies points out, evidence of middle powers claiming to be more diplomacy-oriented than they really are can be found in the fact that most of the middle power theorists come from states that identify themselves as middle powers, and similarly, most of the theorists of diplomatic studies also come from same parts of the world.[45] This is "generally not a coincidence: they [those states and theorists] take diplomacy very seriously."[46] However, whether they take diplomacy seriously as an instrument to advance toward a more fair and equitable world, or whether they take it seriously as the currently best available tool to advance their own national interests remains an open question.

While this thesis classifies Brazil and India as rising middle powers, it must be noted that there are arguments suggesting that these two states can no longer be considered middle powers. It has been argued that Brazil does not fulfill the criteria of being a middle power, owing to its economic clout, regional prominence and global aspirations.[47] Moreover, Malamud has argued that instead of being a rising middle power, Brazil is closer to being a traditional middle power.[48] Gardini asserts that these different understandings of Brazil's categorisation are due to the state's "ambiguous policies and leadership attitudes."[49] However, for the most part, scholars have characterised Brazil's foreign policy and role at the international stage as that of a rising middle power.[50]

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[45] Spies, 'Middle power diplomacy'.
[46] Ibid, p.290.
[47] Sean Burges, 'Mistaking Brazil for a Middle Power', *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research*, vol.19, no.2, 2013, pp.286-302.
[48] Andrés Malamud, 'A Leader Without Followers? The Growing Divergence Between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy', *Latin American Politics and Society*, vol.53, no.3, 2011, pp. 1–24.
[49] Gian Luca Gardini, 'Brazil: The State of the Art of Its Rise and Power Projection', in Gian Luca Gardini and Manuel Tavares de Almeida (eds), *Foreign policy responses to the rise of Brazil: balancing power in emerging states* (New York: Springer, 2017) pp.12-28.
[50] Ibid; see also Charalampos Efstathopoulos, 'Southern middle powers and the liberal international order: The options for Brazil and South Africa', *International Journal,* vol.76, no.3, 2021, pp.384–403; Dawisson Belém Lopes, Guilherme Casarões and Carlos Frederico Gama, 'A tragedy of middle power politics: traps in Brazil's quest for institutional revisionism', in Paulo Esteves, Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert, and Benjamin De Carvalho (eds), *Status and the rise of Brazil: global ambitions, humanitarian engagement and international challenges* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020) pp.51-69; Feliciano de Sá Guimarães and Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, 'From Middle Powers to Entrepreneurial Powers in World Politics: Brazil's Successes and Failures in International

Similarly, it has been argued that India's regional role, population, size of economy and aspirations for a prominent global role mean that it transcends the category of middle power. However, Sridharan refutes the potential classification of India as a great power since, despite its possession of nuclear weapons, it "lacks a global strike capability, lacks serious extraregional power projection capabilities, does not decisively dominate its own region, and is not a system-shaping power in either economic or military balance terms."[51] Moreover, India is geographically and geostrategically constrained as a regional power, since it is surrounded by China and Pakistan, two rival states with nuclear capabilities; in addition, India is not accepted as South Asia's leader or spokesperson by the other states in the region, with its position being actively challenged by Pakistan.[52] Efstathopoulos highlights that India's ideational resources, including its soft power, coalition-building with other rising powers and multilateral activism are best explained through the middle power framework.[53] Hence, despite claims towards the inaccuracy of the middle power concept to explain India's status in the global arena, the characteristics of Indian foreign policy and the power that the state exercises in its region and beyond point towards a classification as a middle power, albeit one that is rising and gaining increasing prominence in international affairs.[54] As such, this thesis will follow the classification of India and Brazil as rising middle powers.

Rising Powers

Rising powers are defined as states which have in recent decades shown substantial growth in their economies as well as in the expansion of their political clout. Many scholars have studied rising powers such as the "BRICS": Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.[55] All these states have experienced tremendous economic growth and they have been able to optimise on the use of their factors of production. This economic clout gives these states more bargaining power in international markets, as well as the capacity to enhance the living standards of their own citizens. This economic leverage is then closely associated with giving

Crises', *Latin American Politics and Society*, vol.59, no.4, 2017, pp.26–46; Andrew Hurrell, 'Lula's Brazil: A Rising Power, but Going Where?' *Current History*, vol.107, no.706, 2008, pp.51–57.

[51] Sridharan, 'Where is India headed? Possible future directions in Indian foreign policy', p.56.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Efstathopoulos, 'Reinterpreting India's rise through the middle power prism'.

[54] See Jan Cartwright, 'India's Regional and International Support for Democracy: Rhetoric or Reality?' *Asian Survey*, vol.49, no.3, 2009, pp.403–28; Ian Hall, 'The other exception? India as a rising power' *Australian Journal of International Affairs,* vol.64, no.5, 2010, pp.601-611; Satya R. Pattnayak, 'India as an Emerging Power', *India Quarterly*, vol.63, no.1, 2007, pp.79-110.

[55] See Oliver, Stuenkel, *The BRICS and the future of global order* (London: Lexington Books, 2020).

these states progress in the global political arena.[56] The term "BRICS" was first seen in a 2001 Goldman Sachs report "BRICs" referring to the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China.[57] Since the emergence of the initial group, there have been several permutations, such as "BRICS" and "BRICSAM" (including South Africa and Mexico).[58] However, Lindsay Jacobs and Ronan Van Rossem argue that the BRIC group carries the promise of strong domestic economic growth and, more importantly, the prospect of becoming a global power.[59] However, ever since this terminology became more common, discussion of rising powers became overly focused on these states, at the expense of discussion of other states which one could argue are in the same category. These states could include Turkey and Indonesia, among others, as they have shown signs of strong economic growth, as well as exerted more influence internationally than before.

Rising powers can be of various different sub-categories. One category could be rising great powers, such as Russia and China. Both these states have developed substantial military resources and they continue to exert great influence in international politics. At the same time, the Chinese economy is growing fast, and some even suggest it has surpassed that of the United States.[60] A second category could be rising middle powers, including states such as Brazil, Indonesia, India, South Africa and Turkey, among others. These states are growing economically, as well as politically; however, their military means and influence only gives them a regional standing and not the ability to dominate global affairs. However, it is important to note that the categories noted above only differentiate states on the basis of their global clout or the ability to have their will and say in the international arena. Yet what stays constant is the need for economic development, which is of the essence in ensuring growth and sustainability. Sustainability, in this case, refers to how well a state can continue to position itself, fulfil its national interests and spread its ideas in the longer run.

[56] Charles Wolf Jr., *The Economic Pivot in a Political Context* (New York: Routledge, 1997).
[57] Jim O'Neill, 'Building better global economic BRICs', *Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper*: no.66 (New York: Goldman Sachs, 2001).
[58] Andrew F. Hart and Bruce D. Jones, 'How do rising powers rise?', *Survival*, vol.52, no.6, 2010, pp.63-88 at p.65.
[59] Lindsay Marie Jacobs and Ronan Van Rossem, 'The BRIC Phantom: A comparative analysis of the BRICs as a category of rising powers', *Journal of Policy Modeling*, vol.36, 2014, at p.S47-S66.
[60] Euromonitor International, 'China overtakes the US as the world's largest economy: Impact on industries and consumers worldwide', *Euromonitor International*, 2014.

Regional Powers

To classify a state as a regional power, one must first also be able to delve into questions such as: what is a "region" in diplomatic relations? Is the "region" classified politically, economically or socially? What are the positive indicators for regional powers? Are they gross domestic product, military power and/or soft power leverage? However, regardless of the economic or social strength a state has, it ought to show strong political standing for it to be considered a regional power.[61]

That said, challenges exist in classifying a state as a regional power. For example, the U.S. is a superpower, a title few states would contest, yet the question of whether it should also be classified as a regional power or not remains. Similarly, a good illustration is provided by China and Russia. Both of these states are growing economically, as well as politically; however, whether they should be known also mainly as "regional powers" or not remains a question. On the other hand, there could be states such as the UAE or Egypt which some scholars could argue to be regional powers, while others would contend are not. Therefore, the question of what really qualifies a state to be known as a regional power requires some attention.

Often the answer to whether a state can qualify to be known as a regional power or not is founded on its interactions with other states in the region. Some scholars could relate regional power to economic standing and subsequently argue that their chosen state has or has not achieved economic prowess. However, irrespective of a state's economic performance, it might or might not be doing strongly on other fronts such as political standing or military capabilities. Therefore, regional powers cannot be wholly classified under one formula and the typology is thus distributed across numerous factors, some of which could also be beyond the states' material capabilities.[62]

Important work in this regard has been done by Øyvind Østerud, who defines a regional power as:

- "a state which is geographically a part of the delineated region
- a state which is able to stand up against any coalition of other states in the region

[61] Romain Pasquier, *Regional Governance and Power in France* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
[62] Henner Furtig, 'Prospects for new regional powers in the Middle East', in Henner Furtig (ed.), *Regional powers in the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) pp.209-220.

- a state which is highly influential in regional affairs
- a state which, contrary to a middle power, might also be a great power on the world scale in addition to its regional standing."[63]

Another approach is that of Detlef Nolte, who argues that regional powers, as compared to middle powers, also have to bear special responsibility for the maintenance of regional security and order. In order for a state to qualify as a regional power, he sets forth the following conditions:[64]

- "The internal dynamics of such a state should allow it to play a stabilising and leading role in its region.
- Such a state should indicate and demonstrate its willingness, and of course also its capacity or ability, to assume the role of regional leader, stabiliser and, if not peacekeeper, or at least peacemaker.
- Should be acceptable to its neighbours (the members of the security complex in which it operates) as a leader responsible for regional security. A broader, or extra-regional acceptance is perhaps a necessary condition, but not sufficient, even if supported and promoted by big powers."[65]

Another scholar, Stefan Schirm, sets forth the following criteria for a state to qualify as a regional power:

- The claim for leadership as *rule maker* in the region;
- The material and ideological resources for effective power projection;
- Activities conducted to honour their own claim of leadership;
- The recognition of their leadership status by other states in their neighbourhood;

[63] Oyvind Osterud, 'Regional great powers', in Iver B. Neumann (ed.), *Regional great powers in international politics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992) pp.1-15 at p.12.
[64] See Detlef Nolte, 'How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics', *Review of International Studies*, vol.36, no.4, 2010, pp.881-901.
[65] Ibid, p.890.

- Having power and influence over outcomes in the region.[66]

Andrew Hurrell points out that under the traditional international relations framework of realism, states are categorised in accordance with material capabilities.[67] However, the current global developments demand that a state willing to command power in its region ought first to attract support from other states and also rely on various international norms to extend its influence. The interaction between states was initially studied on the bases of their economic and military power; however, this approach has been frequently critiqued by scholars. For instance, Douglas Lemke noted that interpreting power through measures of capability is crucial in determining the growth of a state, but it cannot substantiate the attainment of power in the regional realm or at the systemic level.[68] However, many scholars still use the traditional theoretical lens of realism to categorise states as regional powers or otherwise. Those who subscribe to this school of thought, suggest that regional propensity for conflict is, among other reasons, one of the causes of growth in states' military capabilities. A natural corollary from this follows that states with better-equipped militaries are more likely to influence the direction of conflicts in their regions. This could still qualify states with higher military capabilities as regional powers, while those with lesser might or capabilities are placed in lower classifications.

One study points out that it is crucial that states command a significant share of power in their respective regions if they aim to qualify as a regional power.[69] To this effect, states ought to show either skill or high differentiation in their regions which makes them stand out and become powerful. For instance, if a certain group of goods are produced within a state, and if those goods are responsible for supporting the economies therein, then states are more likely to seek ways of dominating regional markets. More specifically, differentiation in international politics refers to the measure of political order that a country exudes that is different from others in the political stage, as in their geographical location or in a systemic sense.[70]

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[66] Stefan A. Schirm, 'Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.16, no.2, June 2010, pp.197–221.
[67] Andrew Hurrell, 'Rising powers and the emerging global order', in John Baylis (ed.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) pp.80-94.
[68] Douglas Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at pp.54-55.
[69] David Tier, 'Regional Alliances: A Political, Military, and Economic Strategy to Confront Hostile Regional Powers', *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, vol.13, no.4, 2014, pp.25-52.
[70] Oliver Kessler and Friedrich Kratochwil, 'Functional differentiation and the oughts and musts of international law', in Mathias Albert, Barry Buzan and Michael Zurn (eds), *Bringing Sociology to International Relations: World Politics as Differentiation Theory* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) pp.159-181 at p.160.

Kenneth Waltz discusses the transition of power in regions and infers that the increase in power of one state is always relative to that of the power of other states.[71] Therefore, with the rise of a powerful state in a region, its power can affect other states in the same neighbourhood. With security being a core concern among states, regional powers can fuel or participate in regional conflicts based on several factors. First, regional powers are equipped in their military capabilities; thus, they tend easily to dictate the trajectory of any conflict.[72] Second, for Waltz, states exist for self-preservation as they are in constant competition. In this regard, a regional power could, for instance, feel threatened by states in the same region which are in conflicts.[73] Therefore, the former is likely to act forcefully against other states that show a higher propensity for conflict and thus try to overtake regional powers in any aspect be it politically, economically or any other distinguishing factor. This is how states are ultimately able to diffuse power and dictate the future of their regions.[74] This is supported by the need for smaller states to maintain regional sanctity as states are most likely to stay away from conflicts with regional powers.[75] The power which is exuded at the regional level, however, could be limited or restricted at the international or systematic levels.[76]

Regional powers exercise greater influence in their regions and are, therefore, also better equipped for the promotion of ideas in their regions. These ideas could include, for example, globalisation, or the responsibility to protect (R2P). It is also possible that the regional powers would also have to contend with smaller states whose democratic dispositions might not be as developed as in the regional powers. Besides, the latter depend on smaller states for the exertion of their own power. Some regional powers could, for instance, show inefficiencies in their institutional structures or cases of human rights abuses might remain prevalent. They, therefore, urge smaller states to observe democratic principles but might not necessarily observe these principles themselves. However, regional powers, at times, also exercise the use of economic and military power to influence the smaller states. Economic remediation includes placing trade embargoes and restrictions on states which are against ideological or systemic ideas pushed by the regional powers.

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[71] Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Catarina Laranjeiro, 'How many nations are we able to imagine?', *Comunicação e Sociedade*, vol.29, 2016, pp.93-106 at p.94.
[75] Robert Kappel, 'Israel: The Partial Regional Power in the Middle East', in Henner Furtig (ed.), *Regional Powers in the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) pp.145-161 at p.145.
[76] Chi-Young Choi, Horag Choi, and Alexander Chudik, 'Regional inequality in the U.S.: Evidence from city-level purchasing power', *Journal of Regional Science*, vol.60, no.4, 2020. pp.738-774.

On the other hand, states which cooperate with regional powers can be supported through economic backing and favourable trading conditions. Research points out that regional powers compete not only with smaller states, but also amongst themselves.[77] This competition among regional powers can often also be very intense and can fuel regional or global conflicts. The Syrian crisis can be a case in point. From Saudi Arabia to Iran, from Turkey to Israel, nearly every major regional state is involved in this conflict, competing with each other for influence. Similar is the case in Libya where Egypt and UAE find themselves on one side of the conflict, while Turkey is on the other. Thus, regional powers also work towards the maintenance and possible expansion of their power.

Hence, the classification of states as regional powers is based on a variety of factors, among which material capability is important from a realist perspective. However, there is increasing understanding that a state's classification as regional power does not solely depend on material capability; rather, more important is the attainment of power relative to other states in the region. Moreover, the theoretical understanding of the rise of regional powers allows for rising states and their behaviours to be viewed vis-à-vis power attainment, and the use of material capability to advance strategic interests. On the other hand, the behaviour of states which are already dominant in their regions can also be understood through their efforts to maintain power and compete with other regional powers.

HEGEMONY

This section discusses works on realism, as well as works on hegemony outside the traditional frameworks of theories of international relations. By discussing these theories and works, a better understanding may be developed of states' perception of power — and their methods of attaining it. Moreover, the discussion of the theories of hegemony and realism will provide a foundation to understand states' behaviour based on the traditional viewpoints and highlight the aspects of rising middle power behaviour which cannot be comprehensively explained through the traditional theories.

Throughout history, observers and researchers have focused on hegemony in one way or another. Be it in the study of imperialism, colonialism, great power politics or dominance;

[77] Anthony McGrew, 'Globalization and global politics', in John Baylis, Patricia Owens and Steve Smith (eds), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) pp.19-34.

hegemony has featured greatly in these observations and researches. However, it is Robert Keohane to whom is attributed the phrase 'hegemony in international relations.'[78] The word 'hegemony' was derived from the Greek word 'hegemonia', meaning leadership or dominance. Here, hegemony entails the position that a state takes in the context of international relations, that is the dominance of one state as exerted onto others.[79] Hegemony can be defined as a situation where a state has:

> Great capacity for coercion and/or a great degree of influence or control of the structures of the international system and the international behaviour of its units, but it excludes situations where we have the establishment of relations of direct and official control of foreign governments or territories. Along these lines, for instance, we can distinguish the concept of hegemony from the concept of colonisation (which implies direct, official control).[80]

Similarly, Ikenberry and Kupchan argue that "the constitutive elements of hegemonic power include military capabilities; control over raw materials, markets and capital; and competitive advantages in highly valued goods."[81] Hegemonic states are often quick to control or check their rivals, that is, any state that can diminish their influence in any aspect.[82]

However, hegemony traditionally has only been conceived of in terms of the material power a state possesses. The focus of such analyses has mainly been the political, military and economic power of a state. Such theories come from traditional works on realism, as well as from works directly written on hegemony.

All the various theories of realism are based on the assumption that global politics is primarily affected by the inherent power in the structure of the states. Therefore, factors beyond the power of states, such as the global economy, natural calamities and global epidemics, are not considered as consequential to how international politics is shaped. Realism is also built on an assumption that states are rational actors and can go to higher extents in pursuit of their interests. When a state faces opposition, it can go to greater lengths to fight for its interests,

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[78] Amitav Acharya, 'After liberal hegemony: The advent of a multiplex world order', *Ethics & International Affairs,* vol. 31, no.3, 2017, pp.271-285 at p.277.
[79] Peter D. Thomas, *The Gramscian Moment: philosophy, hegemony and Marxism* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2009).
[80] Andreas Antoniades, 'From "Theories of Hegemony" to "Hegemony Analysis" in International Relations', *49th ISA Annual Convention, San Francisco*, *USA*, vol.28, 2008, pp.2-3.
[81] Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', pp.287-88.
[82] Wendy Dobson, *Partners and Rivals: The Uneasy Future of China's Relationship with the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017).

even if that entails calling for war. Realist theorists also take cognisance of the balance of power theory, which indicates that structural conditions are harmonised or stabilised only when there is a balance of power between the states.[83]

Classical realism suggests that states are the biggest contributors to global politics, and they do so through the hierarchy of power. Therefore, stronger states or those higher up in the power hierarchy command more influence in international politics. This approach has been used by various philosophers, including Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes suggested that humans are naturally "anarchic," and that they are always likely to turn to measures to defend their positions.[84] When the same assumption is applied in international politics, it may be deduced that the global arena is inherently anarchic, and it is every state for itself, constantly competing for resources and influence. The survival fight, therefore, takes states to their respective positions in the power hierarchy.[85] This can be achieved militarily, as well as through diplomacy, and sometimes, with a mix of both. However, which state opts for which choice, or what mix between the two, depends totally on what they perceive their national interests to be.

To illustrate, state A, for instance, may have a larger economy with an abundance of raw materials, including some untapped mineral fields at its borders with state B. For a long time, it continues to be recognised that that particular land belongs to state A. However, upon discovery of the minerals, state B now also lays claim to the ownership of the land, and thereby, to the minerals underneath, and this could become a basis for conflict between the states. Now should a path of diplomacy be chosen, it would most likely recommend for the two states to share the minerals and avert the occurrence of war. If the decision were to be implemented, state A would be the victim and could suffer more since the land boundary had been recognised for a long time. At the same time, state B would benefit unfairly. Thereafter, it is likely that state A might react through military means to protect the area whose jurisdiction was in question. Similarly, state B might too react with military force by arguing that the diplomatic solution achieved has not been implemented by state A. Each state would claim that it had the right to defend its sovereignty and national interests at regional and international levels. Similar can be issues that can give rise to security dilemmas in international relations. When one state

[83] Chris Brown, 'Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Human Nature', *International Relations*, vol.23, no.2, 2009, pp.257-270.
[84] For Hobbes's ideas, see Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (London: Penguin Books, 2017).
[85] James Sperling, 'Neo-classical realism and alliance politics', in Mark Webber and Adrian Hyde-Price (eds), *Theorising NATO: New Perspectives on the Atlantic Alliance* (London: Routledge, 2015) pp.61-92 at p.64.

heightens its security measures, other states can assess their position to be threatened, and therefore, wanting to enhance their security measures too, in turn prompting the former to enhance its measures even more, and the cycle could theoretically be endless.[86] As demonstrated by the behaviours of states A and B, this analysis reflects claims of the offensive realism theory, that the international system is anarchical and states can never be certain of the intentions of other states.

Moving onto structural realism, this theory of international relations was pioneered by Kenneth Waltz.[87] It suggests that there exist defined structures in international relations, accompanied by capabilities of distribution among states. Structural realists argue that states, despite dependency on anarchic dispositions, have distinct characteristics that make them occupy their positions in the hierarchy of international power.[88] Anarchy, on the international political scene, is considered an outcome of lack of coordinated global governance instead of being a result of varying national interests.[89]

Structural realism (or neorealism) is also concerned with the relationship between states' behaviour and its effects on international relations.[90] Waltz, in the light of this, observed that there do not exist truly global powers.[91] Therefore, it would be particularly hard for any state to exert influence on all states and lead them to conformity.[92] John Mearsheimer also argues that "in essence, great powers are trapped in an iron cage where they have little choice but to compete with each other for power if they hope to survive."[93] Therefore, global powers often turn to aggression when they are unable to push for their interests. Hegemons, according to structural realists, are weaker than they are mostly considered to be. Indeed, it is by no means certain that at a given time, there will be any hegemonic players in the system. To be effectively powerful, global powers ought to stretch their resources to a substantial level which, one could argue, is quite untenable.

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[86] Mehran Kamrava, *Troubled Waters: Insecurity in the Persian Gulf* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018) p.112.
[87] See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
[88] Jesse D. Savage, *Political Survival and Sovereignty in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020) p.218.
[89] Silviya Lechner, *Hobbesian Internationalism* (Cham, Germany: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019) pp.111-137.
[90] Caroline Eades, 'Neorealism: Another 'Cinéma de Papà' for the French New Wave?', in Saverio Giovacchini and Robert Sklar (eds), *Global Neorealism* (Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2011) pp.103–124 at p.104.
[91] Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*.
[92] Michael Lee and William R. Thompson, 'Major Powers vs. Global Powers: A New Measure of Global Reach and Power Projection Capacity', in William R. Thompson (ed.), *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
[93] John Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).

On power, structural realists believe that anarchy in international relations builds the incentive for power. Actions of the rival states determine the position that a state holds and therefore it is crucial first to evaluate the leverage points of its rivals in its effort to compete against them. Hegemons, as a result, emerge once there is an asymmetrical distribution of power across power webs and structures internationally.[94] Structural realists point to military power and economic power as the two largest contributors to maintaining hegemonic power. Military power, in this case, helps states deter any physical aggression which may occur, while economic power is crucial for a state to maintain economic dominance at the regional and/or international level. States are persistently in pursuit of power in international relations. Maintaining international power is two-pronged. The first approach is where a state seeks to increase its influence. For instance, a state under this category will seek to establish new allies and will try to reconcile with states that were formerly hostile to it. The other approach is grounded on a situation where a state limits the growth of any other state which could possibly rival its growth.

Structural realism is split into defensive and offensive realms. Defensive realism argues that states maximise their efforts for survival. States are considered as poles of the international system, with the factors determining pole size being the population size, economic power, existence of natural resources and ability to exploit them, the size of defence forces, as well as the competence of the state institutions. Institutions, in this case, refer to elements such as the education system, industrialisation propensity and the coordination of government and non-government sectors to achieve mutual good through the promotion of national values.

Strong states are known to deploy multiple aspects of their resources either as a show of international capability or as a means to combat any threats to their hegemony. According to defensive realists, states react strongly to the distribution of power or to any looming dangers therein.[95] As such, states retaliate through the deployment of increased capabilities when their position in the power hierarchy is threatened.

Defensive realists maintain that the international system encourages states to pursue moderate and restrained behaviour to ensure their survival and safety, whilst it rarely encourages states to expand for increasing their security. Lobell notes that the expansionist

[94] Klaus Winkler, *Negotiations with Asymmetrical Distribution of Power*, *Contributions to Economics* (Heidelberg, Germany: Physica-Verlag, 2006).
[95] Michael Ruse, 'Realists and Pacifists', in Michael Ruse (ed.), *The problem of war: Darwinism, Christianity, and their battle to understand human conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018) pp.120-137.

endeavour is rarely profitable as the aggression provokes counterbalancing behaviour from other states.[96]

Under offensive realism, it is argued that states maximise power, and those states that prefer this form of realism are self-sufficient.[97] They employ strategies not only to maximise their own power but also to limit that of other states. Even if a state is increasing its power at the expense of other states that are lower in the hierarchy, it is considered justifiable. Powerful states recognise that seeking dominance and power maximisation even with the possible alienation of weaker states offers more benefits than costs. That is precisely why states take measures to ensure that they are the dominating powers in their regions.[98]

Offensive realism can also be practised through, for example, the provision of grants and aid to the weaker and less developed states.[99] The dominant states in international relations use grants and aid as instruments for offensive realism to make the weaker states more dependent on them and also to prevent the rise of other similar dominant powers. Such actions help maximise power both regionally as well as internationally.[100] This aid is often given with various conditions associated, which in turn constricts the institutional freedom of thought and action of the recipient state. On the other hand, other dominant states become restricted in how they can interact with the states that are beneficiaries of aid from their competitor states. At the same time, the beneficiary states would be cautious about receiving aid from other dominant states to prevent any backlash.

Moving on from the traditional approaches in international relations such as realism to discussing the theories of hegemony, *Hegemonic Stability Theory* contends that an open world economy requires a hegemonic power to ensure global stability.[101] However, this assumption was challenged by neoliberalism; Keohane argued that the international system could continue to function through international institutions even after the collapse of the hegemonic power —

[96] Steven E. Lobell, 'Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism', *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of International Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) pp.1-5.
[97] Kim Jin-Ha, 'North Korea's Offensive Realism and the Strategy of Nationalism', *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol.27, no.1, 2020, pp.41-69 at p.51.
[98] Evan Montgomery, *In the Hegemon's Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016) p.24.
[99] Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985).
[100] John I. Mantu, 'International Institutions and the Protection of Human Rights Regionally and Internationally', *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2019. Available at SSRN 3449790.
[101] Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939* (London: The Penguin Press, 1973).

the very power which might have created that system in the first place. Thus, hegemony could outlive the hegemon.[102]

Another theory of hegemony was developed by A.F.K Organski. His *Power Transition Theory* argues that there is a hierarchical international system with a hegemonic power at the top and the rest of great powers, middle powers and small powers subordinated to it. The theory contends that states do not want to maximise power; rather they only want to maximise net gains over scarce resources. Thus, the international hierarchy reflects the distribution of power resources that serves the interests of the hegemonic power, and the international order remains stable as long as that power remains satisfied with this distribution. International stability is disturbed if a great power challenges the hegemonic power over this distribution.[103] David Grondin went on to argue that disturbance in global stability could even trigger a counter-hegemonic reaction: a unilateral action from the hegemon which undermines its leadership at the top of the international hierarchy.[104] In this regard, Schmidt comments that the functioning of a liberal, open economic order is contingent upon the existence of a hegemon that is willing to exercise the necessary leadership to maintain the system.[105]

Lemke then built upon this theory and formulated a *Multiple Hierarchy Model*. Instead of having only one hegemonic power at the top, he argues that there are parallel hierarchies simultaneously operating in various regions.[106] These sub-systems work in exactly the same way, with a dominant power at the top, and the remaining states being subservient to it. This entire sub-system then itself also operates in a global hierarchy on top of which remains a global hegemonic power.[107]

Owen Worth, on the other hand, contends that there are three types of hegemony: global, ideological and regional hegemony.[108] First, global hegemony, in its absolute sense, is almost untenable, and even the pursuit of it requires stretching of resources, and projection of dominance throughout the world. Second, regional hegemony entails the same power projection, though at a regional level. Third, ideological hegemony relates to a state's

[102] Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
[103] Abramo F.K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958).
[104] David Grondin, 'Mistaking Hegemony for Empire: Neoconservatives, the Bush Doctrine, and the Democratic Empire', *International Journal,* vol.61, no.1, 2006, pp.227–241.
[105] Brian C. Schmidt, 'Hegemony: A conceptual and theoretical analysis', *Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute*, 2018, p.9.
[106] Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace*, pp.54-5.
[107] Ibid, pp.54-5.
[108] Owen Worth, *Rethinking Hegemony* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

domination in ideologies. For example, some states are more powerful than others in diffusing their ideologies in international institutions, and among the global public.

Another framework that puts regional hierarchies at the centre of its theoretical approach is Regional Security Complex Theory (RCST). Buzan differentiates between great powers which have a global level impact and regional powers which have a regional level impact. For a power to become a great power, it needs material resources, as well as a formal recognition of its status by other great powers. Regional powers define the structure of any regional security complex; however, their capabilities remain limited to their respective regions.[109]

Some scholars have dealt with this subject as "single-issue hegemony" where the power of states is measured by single factors, that is, political, military, economic or cultural and states possessing more of any of these single factors were considered hegemonic.[110] Single-issue hegemony, however, remains a restrictive lens for studying the subject because a state could be called hegemonic based on only one factor, and its weaknesses or lack of power in other areas would not necessarily be discussed. Therefore, states would look strong, despite performing poorly in some or even many other areas. As an example, having solid economic and military power would give the impression of a strong, hegemonic state under the 'single-issue hegemony' perspective, yet studying further factors could reveal weaknesses in internal governance or other areas. By contrast, "multi-issue hegemony" assesses a state's power based on various parameters. The final analysis, in this case, lies with a broader view of hegemony. This way the strong performance of a state in any single area would not necessarily make it a hegemon until its performance is studied in other areas too. Therefore, it is vital to understand the foundations of hegemony more broadly, which is why a discussion of sources of hegemony beyond the traditional conception of power is required.[111] For a state to be effective, it has to command authority across multiple areas, including but not limited to political strength, economic performance, as well as defence resilience.[112]

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[109] Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p.32.
[110] Clint Peinhardt and Todd Sandler, *Transnational Cooperation: An Issue-Based Approach* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015) p.100.
[111] Carla Norrlof, 'Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Unipolarity: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations of Hegemonic Order Studies', in William R. Thompson (ed.), *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
[112] Miriam Gleizer, 'From Hegemony to a Multi-Uniqueness Communities', in Vaslie Chis and Ion Albulescu (eds), *Proceedings of the Education, Reflection, Development, 4th Edition ERD 2016*, European Proceedings of Social and Behavioural Sciences, vol.18 (ERD 2016) (Future Academy, 2016) pp.378-388 at p.380.

According to the theory of *co-operative hegemony*, processes of regional institutionalisation are best explained by the interests of the strongest state in a particular region. On top of undertaking regulation through formal institutions, regional hegemonic powers resort to transnational regulatory frameworks to pursue their interests. Co-operative regional power is pursued when a regional power has the capacity to convince a sufficient number of states in the region to pursue the path suggested by it. Other characteristics of this form of hegemony are an ability to share power with weaker states in the region and a deep commitment to long-term regional institutionalisation. This "soft" form of hegemony allows for a state to have a more stable and more legitimate kind of power in the region.[113] In this regard, Detlef Nolte contends that because the current world order is dominated by a single superpower (the U.S.), the only form of hegemony feasible to pursue by a regional power is co-operative hegemony.[114] Sandra Destradi explores how such an environment could be called "leader-initiated followership."[115] However, she also claims that there could be situations where a region experiences "follower-initiated leadership."[116] This could happen in cases where a group of states are too weak and are facing a crisis or an outside threat.

A similar theory is that developed by Antonio Gramsci, which argues that there are two types of political control; first, through coercion; second, through consent.[117] His work contends that hegemony is a process by which the ruling elite of society transform their own beliefs and interests into 'common sense' for all other sections of society. This approach "locates the subject of hegemony not in a powerful state but in transnational social forces that dominate in the mode of production."[118] Later on, the neo-Gramscian framework suggested that in order to conceptualise hegemony, it should be viewed as the culmination of negotiated processes as states seek to secure the approval of social forces for power to be considered legitimate.[119] In this case, a state could, for instance, be considered 'powerful' according to the traditional international relations framework. However, its attractiveness in the neighbourhood would still

[113] Thomas Pedersen, 'Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration.' *Review of International Studies*, vol.28, no.4, 2002, pp.677–696.
[114] Nolte, 'How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics', pp.881–901.
[115] Sandra Destradi, 'Regional Powers and Their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony, and Leadership', *Review of International Studies,* vol.36, no.4, 2010, pp.903-930 at p.924.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971) p.366.
[118] Antoniades, 'From "Theories of Hegemony" to "Hegemony Analysis" in International Relations', p.4.
[119] Ji-Young Lee, *China's Hegemony: Four Hundred Years of East Asian Domination* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016) pp.79-103.

be dwarfed due to its limitations on the social and cultural front. In this regard, Ikenberry and Kupchan also note that:

> There are two basic ways in which a hegemonic nation can exercise power and secure the acquiescence of other nations. The first is by manipulating material incentives. Through threats of punishment or promises of reward, the hegemon alters the political or economic incentives facing other states...The second way...is by altering the substantive beliefs of leaders in other nations. Hegemonic control emerges when foreign elites...internalise the norms and value orientations espoused by the hegemon and accept its normative claims about the nature of the international system [the authors refer to this process as socialisation]...These two ways of exercising hegemonic power are mutually reinforcing and frequently difficult to disentangle.[120]

They further argue that hegemony built on coercion and threats constantly requires the hegemon's material resources; however, on the other hand, hegemony that promotes socialisation significantly reduces the material cost for the hegemon, and makes the running of hegemony easier.[121] Reviewing the idea of having soft power and hard power as hegemonic instruments, Wang & Yeh-Chung Lu emphasise that hegemony and leadership require the support of both non-material foundations and material resources.[122] Kearn notes that after setting up a favourable system, providing some measure of common goods (most notably security) to those who accept its leadership, a hegemonic state institutes norms and rules, infused with its values and ideals, that shape its subsequent behaviour and provide means by which transgressors can be identified and punished.[123] Similarly, Jonathan Joseph argues that there are two different types of hegemony; first, agential, that is hegemony that focuses on social actors and their construction of consent; and second, structural, that is hegemony that emphasises social mechanisms and institutions that allow the system to stick together.[124]

The globalisation of world politics and diplomacy is now also viewed as a hegemonic world order, which in this case calls for the involvement of the state for enactment and practicability.[125] Hurrell pointed out that there have been various associations in the last two

[120] Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', pp.285-6.
[121] Ibid, p.287.
[122] Wang Hongying and Yeh-Chung Lu, 'The Conception of Soft Power and its Policy Implications: A comparative study of China and Taiwan', *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol.17, no.56, 2008, pp.425-447.
[123] David W. Kearn, 'The hard truths about soft power', *Journal of Political Power*, vol.4, no.1, 2011, pp.65-85.
[124] Jonathan Joseph, 'A Realist Theory of Hegemony', *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, vol.30, no.2, 2000, pp.179-202.
[125] Hurrell, 'Rising powers and the emerging global order', pp.80-94.

decades that have redefined international politics.[126] To this effect, structural power associations have been on a steady rise, and this has graduated to elite interactions, which have yielded unforeseen results, to the great advantages of some states, and to the possible, though not always proportionate, disadvantage of others. In this context, ideological hegemony is the biggest contributor to the form of relationships carved out of globalisation. Besides, the mode of operation, which is under the neo-Gramscian school of thought, requires states to sustain relationships across the international arena and subsequently transcend transnational forces. Despite the model discussing its operation at the international level, it is worth mentioning that the organisations and laying of strategies for states' growth as stated in the neo-Gramscian perspective can effectively be applied at the national level too.

Antoniades argues that on top of agential and structural approaches to hegemony, a third approach needs to be introduced which researches the "movement of power," that is, which studies the source of power, the relationship between power and the ones exercising it, and whom that power is targeted to affect. In this regard, he asks some very pertinent questions: "Is power an external characteristic (e.g. weaponry) or something that defines the internal composition of its subject (e.g. identity)?"; and "does power aim to change only the external behaviour of its objects or does it aim to affect their internal composition and identity."[127]

Presenting his synthesis on these theories, Nolte contends that "regional powers should be analysed using a multilevel system that embraces both the regional level — the relations of the regional power with other states in the region — and the interregional level — the relations between regional powers (but also with states outside of their own region) — as well as the global level. It makes sense not to act on the assumption of only one global power hierarchy but rather to presuppose a parallel and superposed system of global, regional and, in some cases, sub-regional power hierarchies, which are in a permanent process of interaction."[128]

DIPLOMATIC STYLE & STRATEGIC CULTURE

This thesis argues that in order to enhance the understanding of the variations in hegemonic tendencies among rising middle powers, the effect of these states' diplomatic styles

[126] Ibid, pp.80-94.
[127] Antoniades, 'From "Theories of Hegemony" to "Hegemony Analysis" in International Relations', pp.1-2.
[128] Nolte, 'How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics', pp.881–901.

and strategic cultures on their behaviours needs to be examined. This section starts with a brief discussion of constructivism, and then goes on to discuss diplomatic style and strategic culture.

Constructivism is a school of international relations that focuses on the role of ideas and norms in politics. It stresses the role of "intersubjective" ideas and understandings of social life.[129] The theory is based on the premise that human interaction is shaped by ideational factors as well as material factors, and that shared beliefs form the interests of purposive actors. Constructivism stands in contrast to realism which emphasises how security concerns and material forces determine international relations.[130]

Emanuel Adler defines constructivism with the proposition that "the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world."[131] Constructivism asserts that even the most enduring practices within international relations are based on collective understandings which provide individuals the grounds for deciding how they should use their abilities and resources. Constructivists believe that international relations consist primarily of social facts, which are facts only by human agreement. To illustrate this, one can look at the famous contention of Alexander Wendt: anarchy is what states make of it.[132] Wendt explains how self-help is a function not of anarchy but of process and, as such, is itself an institution that determines the meaning of anarchy and the distribution of power for state action.[133]

Diplomatic style, in essence, presents a picture of the microelements of culture and human interactions that ultimately shape the ways in which foreign policies are implemented. By contrast, strategic culture presents a macro picture of the institutional cultures that develop over time as a result of various factors including geography and history. Thus, the combination of both can provide a nuanced view of the micro as well as macro elements that shape the states' foreign policy behaviours.

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[129] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics', *Annual Review of Political Science,* vol.4, no.1, 2001, pp.391-416 at pp.392-393.
[130] Ibid.
[131] Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2004) p.90.
[132] Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization,* vol.46, no.2, 1992, pp.391-425.
[133] Ibid.

Diplomatic Style

In this context, one could argue that Jeffrey Robertson's work on diplomatic style is actually a constructivist approach to diplomacy. Much of the discussion that follows on this subject draws on his pathbreaking scholarship — which itself builds upon greatly on the works of British diplomat, Harold Nicolson. The habits and traditions, the everyday practices, the aims and the desires of individual diplomats impact their actions, which then affect state-to-state relations. International relations then is not an exact science; rather, it is dependent upon subjective human judgement. Although the diplomatic style of a state has important implications for international relations, it has received little scholarly focus. Instead, most of the scholarship has focused on 'diplomatic culture.' Diplomats from around the world are seen to be part of one community with a set of shared norms and values unique to them. Following this line of thinking, the national styles of diplomacy have largely been ignored and disregarded. Many scholars have subsumed the study of diplomatic styles under the study of foreign policy. Studies that comprehensively analyse the foreign policy of a state often include a commentary on its diplomatic methods and practices; however, such commentaries only provide cursory overviews of the relevant diplomatic style.[134]

Diplomacy has two constituent components: the functional and the extra-functional. The functional components of diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy consist of four major areas: 1) representation of the sending state in the host state; 2) protecting the interests and the citizens of the sending state in the receiving state; 3) negotiating with the government of the receiving state; and 4) ascertaining the conditions and developments in the receiving state and reporting them to the sending state.[135] These are embedded in treaties such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961.

While the functional components of diplomacy mentioned above are extremely important, it is the understanding of extra-functional components of diplomacy that would allow for the appreciation of the significance of *style* in diplomacy. It is therefore important first to define diplomacy. The modern Oxford English Dictionary provides a definition:

> The management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of

[134] Jeffrey Robertson, *Diplomatic Style and Foreign Policy: A Case Study of South Korea* (New York: Routledge, 2016) pp.1-4.
[135] Ibid, p.21.

> the diplomatist; skill or address in the conduct of international intercourse and negotiations.[136]

In common parlance, diplomacy is often thought equivalent to negotiation and as the opposite of war. However, such an understanding is an oversimplification of the conduct of state-to-state relations. Furthermore, diplomacy and statecraft are two different concepts that are often conflated. Mark Amstutz distinguishes between the two:

> "Statecraft is essentially concerned with foreign policy-making. Diplomacy, by contrast, involves the peaceful pursuit of foreign policy through negotiation. Moreover, whereas statecraft is the responsibility of elected government officials, diplomacy is the responsibility of a trained cadre of professionals."[137]

Thus, the use of diplomacy as a replacement for statecraft fails by not distinguishing between the creation (statecraft) and the implementation (diplomacy) of policy. Furthermore, such a conflation fails to distinguish between the political elites who create the policy and the professional diplomats who implement the policy. Jeffery Robertson points out that diplomacy can be thought of as "the glue that connects the instruments of statecraft."[138] When evaluating diplomacy, there is a need to recognise both the long-standing traditions of diplomatic culture and the constant changes through which it has been transformed.

Moreover, diplomacy must also be distinguished from foreign policy. Berridge and James note that "the use of the word diplomacy as a synonym for foreign policy, which is especially common in the United States, can obscure the important distinction between policy and the (non-violent) means by which it is executed."[139] Moreover, Harold Nicolson highlights that the failure to discern between these two terms means that the public is unable to differentiate between the early deliberative stages of policy-framing and decision-making, and the later stages when the policy is being implemented.[140]

As negotiation is a major component of diplomacy, it must be explored in further detail. In addition to its primary function of exploring and reconciling conflicting positions, it can also

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[136] *The Oxford English Dictionary vol. IV* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p.696.
[137] Robertson, *Diplomatic Style and Foreign Policy*, at p.19.
[138] Ibid, pp.18-21.
[139] G.R. Berridge and Alan James, A Dictionary of Diplomacy, vol. 2 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), at p.70.
[140] Robertson, Diplomatic Style and Foreign Policy, at p.19; for more on Nicolson's work on diplomacy and diplomatic style, see Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

serve other functions such as strategic delay or intelligence gathering. Negotiation can take place through both formal channels such as forums to discuss multilateral agreements, or informal channels such as dinners. For the modern diplomat, the function of negotiation takes place at extremes. Certain diplomats might never participate in negotiation, instead focusing on the functions of representing and reporting, while others focus only on negotiation, their tasks being set within a specific negotiating forum.[141]

The extra-functional components of diplomacy highlight the importance of style. Diplomats represent not only the objectives of their states, but also their society's thoughts, ideas and conscience. The aesthetic component of representation can be seen in the architecture of resident embassies. For example, in the Australian capital, Canberra, the architectures of many embassies were specifically designed in light of the sending nations' cultures as part of city planning and construction in the 1950s and 1960s. The United States Embassy in Canberra, opened by Eleanor Roosevelt in 1943, is designed in the Georgian style of the American colonial south. The Chinese embassy has a modern style, complemented by traditional motifs. Both embassies convey a sense of power, attraction and influence. This aesthetic representation conveys a message free from the conventions of communication, yet still maintains comprehension and understanding. Similarly, negotiation has an aesthetic component to it. The negotiator represents his or her social position and experience, while also representing their sovereign. The aim is to persuade the other side, and to arrive at a settled understanding of conflicting positions. As such, the aesthetic function of negotiation does not have much to do with the conventions of communication. Rather, it chooses to convey its position through physical manipulation of the negotiating space to achieve the required results.[142]

After defining diplomacy, it is important to evaluate the concept of style. Schaper notes that style is "the idiom in which a number of works speak recognisably the same language. Recognising the idiom is knowing what to do with the work, how to approach it, how to read it in relation to other works."[143] The human mind is capable of assembling and categorising its experiences into categories at various levels of abstraction. It then labels these categories and uses these labels in communication and thinking. If style is to be recognised through explicit knowledge, there is a vast literature in the field of diplomatic studies, which consists of works on diplomatic history, international relations and practitioner treatises (memoirs and

[141] Ibid, p.24.
[142] Ibid, pp.27-30.
[143] Ibid, pp.35-37.

instructional texts). Despite this vast literature, there has been a lack of theoretical interest in diplomacy; as Paul Sharp has noted that "we might think that students of international relations would pay a great deal of attention to diplomacy, but they do not. The study of diplomacy remains marginal to and almost disconnected from the rest of the field."[144]

If tacit knowledge is to be looked at, it is the unarticulated and implicit knowledge based on intuition, speculation and feeling.[145] The usage of this type of knowledge is highly dependent on certain social contexts. It is informal in nature and embedded in personal experience and social interactions. This type of knowledge is quite relevant to diplomacy. Corneliu Bjola and Markus Kornprobst refer to this concept as "deeper backgrounds" of diplomats. According to them, diplomats are embedded within certain contexts and follow a set of deeply-ingrained ideas that take a practical shape in their everyday diplomatic practices. The skill of communication is often dependent on the tacit knowledge of a diplomat. Diplomats use this ability to evoke emotion, tradition, values or shared goals. Although communication techniques might be explained explicitly to a diplomat, his or her application of them within a specific context relies on their tacit knowledge.[146]

Diplomacy occurs within a set of constraints that include international law, diplomatic norms and principles, norms of professional conduct, accepted standard operating procedures, and linguistic boundaries. Within these constraints, diplomatic style[147] can be defined as the "unique behavioural characteristics which distinguish the diplomats of one state from those of another state." It is based on both explicit and tacit knowledge which communicate the characteristics of a state's diplomacy.[148]

Strategic Culture

When presented with a similar security problem, two different states are quite likely to develop distinct approaches to resolving the issue depending upon their respective strategic cultures. Strategic culture essentially refers to the cultural dimension of strategy. Colin Gray

[144] Paul Sharp, 'For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations', *International Studies Review*, vol.1, no.1, 1999, pp.33–57.
[145] See Michael Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).
[146] Robertson, *Diplomatic Style and Foreign Policy*, pp.41-48.
[147] It must be noted that diplomatic style differs from a state's foreign policy priorities. The former relates to the conduct of a state's diplomats as they pursue their objectives, while the former refers to the diplomats' aims and objectives.
[148] Ibid, p.53.

defined culture as "the persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation" that can be associated with a geographically-defined community which has had unique historical experiences.[149] It must be noted, however, that strategic cultures can change and evolve over time, as societies absorb new experiences and ideas. Scholars have highlighted various parameters to observe strategic culture. Among these scholars, Stuart Poore has provided a comprehensive definition. He has defined strategic culture as the "shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behaviour, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives."[150]

There are numerous factors that determine a state's strategic culture. Various researchers have, in the past, explored the sources of strategic culture, and the list is non-exhaustive. However, there are sectoral alignments and thematic dispositions that point to how states have developed their strategic cultures. It is determined by the geography of states, historical occurrences, economic standing, political culture, international relations and ideological dispositions.

Strategic culture has broad implications for policy-making. It has a major impact on the analysis of various security threats and the subsequent policy responses to such threats.[151] States can be in constant competition for power, and this prompts each state to expand its influence and safeguard its own interests. For instance, when World War II ended, states broadly committed to upholding international peace and order. However, internally, the states were wary of each other and the environment of mistrust led to the Cold War.[152] The Cold War was a unique period in which states spread propaganda and misinformation against each other. Furthermore, states focused on the development of nuclear weapons, and positioned themselves for potential external threats. This trend has continued into the 21st century. States continuously scan the strategic horizon for threats and plan for any eventualities which may present a threat to the state. States' respective histories can give a crucial understanding of the various

[149] Colin S. Gray, 'Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back', Review of International Studies, vol.25, no.1, 1999, pp.49–69, at p.51.
[150] Stuart Poore, 'Strategic Culture', in John Glenn, Darryl Howlett and Stuart Poore (eds), *Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture* (London: Routledge, 2018) pp.45-71 at p.46.
[151] Shrikant Paranjpe, *India's Strategic Culture: The Making of National Security Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2020) p.31.
[152] John T. O'Neill and Nick Rees, *United Nations peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era* (London: Routledge, 2005) p.24.

advantages as well as downsides that a state may have perceived and experienced with regards to its geography and other factors.[153] States often support ideologies and plans of action that historically they have found to bear favourable results.[154] In that sense, decisions which were made in the past are likely to be replicated in the future. Long-lasting national preferences are developed over time and are often pervasive.

The concept of strategic culture refers to the values, attitudes, beliefs and collective national behaviours by which states are influenced by the promotion of their national interests.[155] The idea of strategic culture in international relations was distinctly noted in the pioneering of strategic culture by Jack Snyder, who evaluated relations between the U.S. and USSR in the light of the Cold War. He notes that "strategic culture can be defined as the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy."[156] Through his study, Snyder sought to illustrate how states thought about the nuclear capabilities of their adversaries. In this regard, the Soviet Union dealt with nuclear arms propaganda, facts, opinions and perceptions, differently from the United States. Each state, therefore, followed its distinct behaviours, patterns of thinking, as well as ideologies to make decisions in their interests.

Ken Booth is arguably the most feted strategic culture analyst. His work evaluates the role of cultural frameworks in understanding decision-making processes within the states.[157] He argued that ethnocentrism is the founding pillar on which states establish their strategic cultures.[158] Ethnocentrism is the tendency of an individual or a state to evaluate the other's cultures by using one's own culture as the standard unit of comparison.[159] Ethnocentrism can be a source of major bias, especially because the side applying it is likely to consider traits of its own culture as superior. This is contextually applicable to states' strategic cultures. When each state considers its ideologies and values as superior to those of others, then the tendency to call the other inferior, and subsequently to have a higher willingness to adopt a dominating

[153] Alastair I. Johnston, 'Thinking about strategic culture', *International security,* vol.19, no.4, 1995, pp.32-64.
[154] Mark Visser, Marcel Lubbers, Gerbert Kraaykamp, and Eva Jaspers, 'Support for radical left ideologies in Europe', *European journal of political research*, vol.53, no.3, 2014, pp.541-558 at p.542.
[155] Frederick W. Mayer, *Narrative politics: Stories and collective action* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) at pp.126.
[156] Jack Snyder, 'The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor', in Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.), S*trategic Power: USA/USSR* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990) pp.3-9 at p.3.
[157] Ken Booth, *Theory of world security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) p.7.
[158] For more on ethnocentrism, see Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (London: Routledge, 2014).
[159] Ken Booth, 'The concept of strategic culture affirmed', in Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.), *Strategic Power: USA/USSR* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990) pp.121-128 at p.123.

position vis-à-vis the other state, likely increases. Similarly, strategic cultures are also influenced by the collective behaviours that push states to war.[160] For example, in times preceding wars, states often act against each other's progress and consider the other party's prosperity as having negative effects on its own stability.[161]

TOWARD A NEW THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: INTRODUCING THE THEORY OF HEGEMONIC TENDENCIES

This section recaps the crucial elements of key international relations theories and then goes on to lay the groundwork for a new *theory of hegemonic tendencies.*

Realism would suggest that states care deeply about the balance of power and that the structure of the international system leaves them little choice but to compete with each other. Kenneth Waltz developed a theory of *defensive realism* which argues that it is in states' interests not to maximise their share of power because the system would punish them if they tried to do so. It is strategically naive to pursue hegemony because ultimately, balancing would occur.[162] On the other hand, John Mearsheimer developed the theory of *offensive realism* which proposes that all states aspire for hegemony and power maximisation as that is the best way to ensure survival.[163] However, this thesis agrees with Gilley and O'Neil when they contend that "Middle powers have reframed and initiated policies that realist theories centred on great powers cannot predict: the operation of ASEAN, the role of regional leadership, and the human security agenda are all evidence that great power approaches are insufficient for explaining contemporary international politics."[164]

Constructivists, on the other hand, argue that the defining component of international relations is social, not material. Wendt's argument that "anarchy is what states make of it" suggests that any study of international relations should be based upon the ideas and beliefs shaping the individuals who carry and define human, societal and state-level consciousness.[165] The international and regional orders remain "a set of ideas, a body of thought, a system of

[160] Julian Schofield, 'Theories of Nuclear Non-Sharing', in *Strategic Nuclear Sharing* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) pp.7-14.
[161] United Nations, 'UNSCOL (Lebanon): Maintaining Stability in Lebanon', in *Year in Review: United Nations Peace Operations, 2012* (New York: United Nations, 2013) pp.59-60.
[162] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.
[163] John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001).
[164] Gilley and O'Neil, *Middle Powers and the Rise of China*, p.254.
[165] Wendt, 'Anarchy is what States Make of it', pp.391-425.

norms, which has been arranged by certain people at a particular time and place."[166] Thus, while studying various rising middle powers, this thesis delves into the makeup of these states to understand which states aspire for which kind of hegemony and what is the role of their civilisational past, and their state ideology overall, in shaping their respective foreign policy behaviours.

Ironically, simple middle power framework which this thesis regards as insufficient in explaining the behaviour of rising middle powers also has its roots in constructivism. Theorists of middle powers used constructivism to develop an overarching framework in which they assumed all middle power behaviour could be located. However, this thesis does not use a top-down approach of first forming a framework and then studying state behaviours through its lens. Instead, it takes its inspiration from a bottom-up approach, where first the forces shaping the behaviours of rising middle powers — these states' diplomatic styles and strategic cultures — in different regions of the world are studied, which are then used to view and better understand the variations in foreign policy behaviours of rising middle powers.

Therefore, this thesis considers it important that hegemony not be studied within the narrow confines of any one theoretical perspective. Rather, this thesis will treat hegemony as an independent phenomenon, using only side insights from the traditional international relations theories. This thesis contends that only by studying hegemony as an independent phenomenon, a plausible analysis may be developed that can help understand the variations in hegemonic behaviours among rising middle powers.

It might be true that every rising middle power is looking for some elevated or special position in their region; yet, at the same time, not all states are looking for the same *kind* of position. Some states are only looking for primacy, while others are looking to go beyond primacy and are instead aiming for regional supremacy — both types discussed in detail below. Therefore, this thesis contends that there is a need to develop a new *theory of hegemonic tendencies* to study variations in states' hegemonic behaviours. This can be done by dividing rising middle powers into two categories: "primacy-aspiring states" and "supremacy-aspiring states." This thesis demonstrates with case studies that some rising middle powers belong in the former category, while others belong in the latter.

[166] Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) p.162.

Primacy-aspiring rising middle powers can be defined as states which are aspiring to play *a* central role in regional affairs, and want to exert influence in shaping the regional order, which, at times, is done in cooperation with their neighbouring states. They do not want to act as hegemons and do not intend to resort to hard power to implement their vision of this order. On the other hand, supremacy-aspiring rising middle powers can be defined as states which aspire to *the* central role in shaping the regional order, and are also willing to resort to hard power and hegemonic behaviours to ensure their vision takes effect, even at the cost of angering and not cooperating with their neighbours.

The thesis contends that primacy-aspiring rising middle powers enjoy good relations with states in their immediate neighbourhoods. They are more integration-oriented and are more likely to promote the strengthening of regional institutions. At the same time, they are less likely to employ tools of cultural hegemony, and more likely to abstain from resorting to political and military threats. Brazil and Indonesia fit this category.

On the other hand, supremacy-aspiring middle powers do not enjoy good relations with most of their neighbouring states. Such states are less integration-oriented, less likely to strengthen regional power-sharing institutions and more likely to employ tools of cultural hegemony. At the same time, they are also more likely to resort to hard power and to make political and military threats. India and Iran fit this category.

Moreover, this thesis contends that states with a strong civilisational past are more likely to aspire for supremacy rather than primacy. For example, India was first the centre of Indus Valley Civilisation, and later, of the Mughal Empire. Similarly, Iran was the centre of the Persian empire. On the other hand, the ancient Javanese kingdoms had considerable influence over the modern-day Indonesian region, but no single kingdom or dynasty maintained complete dominance in modern-day Indonesia. As such, Indonesia does not have a civilisational past similar to that of Iran and India, and nor does Brazil.

To add to this, this thesis also argues that an active modern-day anti-colonial memory may make states less interventionist and less supremacy-oriented. For example, Brazil and Indonesia both detested their colonial rulers, and as a result, became anti-interventionists. On the other hand, India, despite having a colonial history, does not carry so active an anti-colonial memory in its day-to-day narrative and identity, and hence, is not opposed to interventionism and aspirations for supremacy.

Furthermore, this thesis argues that power is not something "out there" which self-uses or self-maximises. Rather, how power is perceived, and ultimately employed, is dependent on the historical experiences and the ideological makeup of states, as well as on the individuals making decisions about when and how to use power. In addition, this thesis also argues that contrary to generally-accepted notions, the behaviour of great powers in any region is not a determining factor in shaping a regional power's approach; that is, the great power's actions are not the primary factor in influencing whether that particular regional power would aspire for primacy or supremacy. For example, the U.S.-China rivalry in South Asia has not fundamentally altered India's quest to influence the behaviour of Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Similar are the examples of Brazil and Indonesia, which are both continuing to rise with their own visions despite U.S.-China rivalry in each of their regions, namely South America and Southeast Asia. Similarly, the U.S.-Russian rivalry in the Middle East has not fundamentally altered the Iranian quest for supremacy in the Middle East and Levant. It could very well be argued that Iranian behaviour would be the same taking into account its own state-level thinking and the presence of Saudi Arabia and Israel alone, without even factoring in the U.S. presence and policies in the region. Thus, it could be argued that the behaviours of great powers do not change a rising middle power's behaviour fundamentally; rather it solidifies its thinking further in the same direction in which that state was either working before, or in which it could be working irrespective of other considerations.

Therefore, this work follows the argument of Gilley and O'Neil that the world needs to be examined as "a hive of cells rather than as competing webs of great power alliances." As they put it, "both China's rise and America's preeminence are treated here as the background, not the centre, of international politics. There is no centre, only a hive of adjacent cells that interact through complex networks."[167]

This thesis, therefore, explores the following research questions:

1. Can the variations in hegemonic tendencies among rising middle powers be explained comprehensively through the middle power framework and the power-based theories of realism?
2. Does the makeup of a state, based on its strategic culture and diplomatic style, play a larger role in guiding its foreign policy behaviour?

[167] Gilley and O'Neil, *Middle Powers and the Rise of China*, p.254.

3. To what extent does change in leadership and the worldviews of the political decision-makers influence foreign policy behaviour?

Methodology

These research questions are examined by laying the basis for a *theory of hegemonic tendencies*. To conceptualise this theory, this thesis utilizes a comparative case study analysis, in order to categorise rising middle powers into primacy-aspiring and supremacy-aspiring rising middle powers. Chapter 1 reviews and discusses the literature on the types of power, theories of realism, diplomatic style and strategic culture. This thesis then examines Indonesia and Brazil (chapter 2 and 3) as potential primacy-aspiring rising middle powers and India and Iran (chapter 4 and 5) as potential supremacy-aspiring rising middle powers. It demonstrates that they fit these categories. The conclusion (chapter 6) sums up the findings of the thesis.

This thesis contends that Indonesia and Brazil display similar behaviours in multiple ways. Brazil enjoys thriving ties with almost all its neighbours, and same is the case with Indonesia. Both Indonesia and Brazil also show similar behaviour in terms of promoting strong integration through regional institutions Mercosur and ASEAN respectively. Likewise, both states do not threaten or overshadow their neighbouring states, and both these states have a strong sense of anti-colonialism, which makes them ideologically anti-interventionists.

On the other hand, almost all immediate neighbours of India have problems with it, and almost the entire region in Iran's neighbourhood has problems with its behaviour. Moreover, India has also intervened and shown further inclination to intervene militarily in states in its neighbourhood. An example is the Indian military's repeated threats to take action against anti-India groups present on Pakistani soil. Similarly, Iran uses its proxy fighters throughout the region from Lebanon to Syria to Iraq, to advance its objectives. Likewise, in both India and Iran, the doctrine of the ruling party is slowly becoming the doctrine of the state, i.e. the Hindustanisation of India as perceived by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and the Islamisation or perhaps Shia'isation of Iran as perceived by the ruling theocrats.

That said, not all rising middle powers need be primacy-aspiring or supremacy-aspiring. In contrast to both these analytical categories, South Korea, not discussed in further detail, shows signs of being categorised as a rising middle power; however, its thinking does not call for the state to have regional centrality even in the form of primacy, let alone supremacy.

After analysing these four case studies, this thesis shows why it is that the middle power framework and traditional power-based theories of international relations do not fully explain the variation in hegemonic tendencies among rising middle powers. For example, if it is the "middle powerness" or the "rising middle powerness" of the states which determines their foreign policy behaviours, then why would different states end up demonstrating noticeably different behaviours while all of them are supposedly categorised as "rising middle powers"? Similarly, if both economic growth and an expansion in political clout are necessary conditions for a state to expand its regional influence, then why have India and Iran ended up showing similar hegemonic behaviours in their respective regions while having two very distinct economic trajectories, where Iran is facing economic sanctions from the West, while on the other hand, the Indian economy in the past two decades has been overall booming? This thesis contends that neither the middle power framework nor traditional theories of international relations fully explain variations in hegemonic tendencies among rising middle powers. Rather, the diplomatic styles and strategic cultures of these states help enhance the understanding of these variations.

To summarise, this thesis lays the groundwork for a new *theory of hegemonic tendencies* which is formulated via a comparative case studies analysis, based on fieldwork interviews with serving and former officials, as well as with experts and scholars in Indonesia and Brazil. Owing to the difficulty of conducting research in India and Iran, an expanded desk research was conducted to cover these two states. Apart from interviews, the following added value to this thesis:

i) Studying the initiatives taken to promote regional institutions, the role played in strengthening or undermining those institutions over the years;

ii) Examining the current level of political embeddedness in the mentioned regions;

iii) Examining state ideologies, cultural notions, historical experiences with colonialism, and other ideas shaping/guiding the state and the ruling elite;

iv) Analysing, through speeches of leaders, official documents, voting records at international fora, the claims of leadership, the aggressive or non-aggressive stances taken, and instances where threats were made or cooperation was offered;

v) Analysing the demands made, the policy/reform proposals put forth, and the reputation and recognition enjoyed by these states regionally as well as internationally in the eyes of great powers and other regional powers.

CHAPTER II: INDONESIA

Indonesia is the first case analysis of this thesis. Along with being the largest state in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is also one of the most populous states in the world. Its location affords it notable geostrategic importance, especially since the emergence and subsequent intensification of the U.S.-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Indonesia enjoys thriving relations with its neighbours and plays a leading role in Southeast Asia, as well as in the regional organisation, ASEAN. As such, Indonesia's foreign policy behaviour is in contrast with some other rising middle powers in Asia such as India. This makes Indonesia a relevant case study for this thesis, since it exemplifies a primacy-aspiring rising middle power.

Fully to understand Indonesia's approach to its regional and international affairs, it is important to understand the state's diplomatic style and strategic culture. Studying them will involve an examination of ideas and beliefs, as well as historical circumstances and events, that have influenced the diplomatic style and strategic culture of Indonesia. Doing so would lead the discussion towards the *theory of hegemonic tendencies*, whereby Indonesia's position as a primacy-aspiring rising middle power would be demonstrated.

Located at the intersection of the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, between the continental lands of Asia and Australia, Indonesia is the biggest archipelagic state in the world.[168] Possessing more than 17,000 islands, it is a mix of archipelagos and several large islands, amounting to a vast maritime domain. Indonesia controls four major maritime chokepoints, including the Straits of Malacca, providing the state considerable strategic importance.[169] The state has land borders with Malaysia, Papua New Guinea and East Timor, while maritime borders are shared with Australia, Malaysia, Palau, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam. With its territorial waters and exclusive economic zones (EEZs) factored in, Indonesia has an area of 7.9 million square kilometres.[170] Thus, it has a unique geographical position that presents equally distinctive opportunities and threats. At the same time, it is the fourth most populous country in the world, hosting the largest Muslim population anywhere in the world.

[168] For more on the concept of an archipelagic state in international law, see Muhammad Munawwar, *Ocean States: Archipelagic Regimes in the Law of the Sea* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995).
[169] Evan A. Laksmana, 'The enduring strategic trinity: Explaining Indonesia's geopolitical architecture', *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, vol.7, no.1, 2011, pp.95-116.
[170] Robert Cribb and Michele Ford, 'Indonesia as an archipelago: Managing islands, managing the seas', in Robert Cribb and Michele Ford (eds), *Indonesia beyond the Water's Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009).

It is ethnically diverse, with more than 580 languages and dialects spoken.[171] The Indonesian population is distributed across its territory; however, around sixty percent of the population lives on Java, making it the most populous island, with more than 10 million people living in Jakarta alone.[172]

Several kingdoms dominated the modern-Indonesian territories in the pre-modern period; the Majapahit empire, in particular, dominated the region from the late thirteenth century to the early sixteenth century.[173] Soon after that period, the Europeans started arriving, with the Portuguese and the Spanish being early visitors. The Dutch and the British followed, thus affecting trade and politics in the region. The Dutch East India Company (VOC) gradually assumed power in the archipelago, with the Dutch controlling trade from Amsterdam. After the VOC ran into bankruptcy, the Dutch assumed direct control of the region, which was thereafter known as the Dutch East Indies. Even as the colonial state expanded, Indonesian nationalism began to develop in the twentieth century, and manifested in an active struggle for independence. The Indonesian struggle for independence was significantly affected by the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies during the Second World War.[174] After Japan lost the war, nationalist leaders Sukarno and Hatta declared independence for Indonesia.

As Indonesia declared independence, the Dutch sent in their troops to re-establish their colonial rule. While they were able to occupy major cities and regions fairly quickly, the Dutch faced fierce guerrilla warfare and regaining the countryside proved to be a difficult task. As the struggle escalated, many casualties were inflicted. Finally, in 1949, the Netherlands caved into international pressure. Dismayed with the military stalemate, it recognised Indonesia as a sovereign state.

Indonesia's independence also saw the development of the "Pancasila" ideology which has to date remained prominent as the guiding vision of the Indonesian state. Pancasila refers to the five principles which guide the Indonesian people.[175] These five principles refer to the

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[171] 'Facts and figures', *Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, Washington DC,* https://www.embassyofindonesia.org/index.php/basic-facts/.
[172] Ibid.
[173] Laksmana, 'The enduring strategic trinity: Explaining Indonesia's geopolitical architecture', pp.95-116.
[174] For more on the effects of Japanese occupation on the Indonesian struggle for independence, see Robert E. Elson, *The idea of Indonesia: A history* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Also see George S Kanahele, *The Japanese occupation of Indonesia: prelude to independence*, Dissertation, Cornell University, 1967.
[175] For a detailed study of the Pancasila ideology and its impact on Indonesian thinking, see Eka Darmaputera, *Pancasila and the search for identity and modernity in Indonesian society: A cultural and ethical analysis* (Leiden: Brill, 1998); Michael Morfit, 'Pancasila: The Indonesian state ideology according to the New Order government', *Asian Survey,* vol.21, no.8, 1981, pp.838-851.

belief in a Supreme Being, which guides Indonesia's recognition of state religions, including Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism; commitment to a just and civilised society; commitment to the unity of the Indonesian state; emphasis on a government led by consultation and consensus; and a commitment to social justice for the Indonesian people.[176] These principles have stayed relevant over the decades, steering the actions and policies of multiple Indonesian governments.

After independence, Sukarno, who had led the struggle for independence, assumed leadership of Indonesia. His presidency focused on establishing and maintaining Indonesia's sovereignty, resisting the Dutch attempt to recolonise the state, and negotiating the transfer of West Papua from the Dutch. In 1959, Sukarno established autocratic rule and began to radicalise internal policies while also supporting the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).[177] In 1965, after an aborted coup attempt, the military began a nation-wide crackdown against the communists in Indonesia, and by 1967, military leader Suharto was able to take over power as Sukarno resigned from the presidency.[178] Suharto remained the Indonesian president until 1998.[179] Since Suharto's fall from power, a process of democratisation has begun after decades of non-democratic rule. In the 21st century, as Indonesia has democratised, it has also experienced significant economic progress and was considered a part of Southeast Asia's "tiger economies."[180] Indonesia's diplomatic engagement has also transformed since the democratic transition, with more focus on the dimensions of economic diplomacy and public diplomacy — in that sense, Indonesia has arguably established a unique diplomatic image among the rising states of the Indo-Pacific.

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[176] Morfit, 'Pancasila: The Indonesian state ideology according to the New Order government'.
[177] Rizal Sukma, 'The evolution of Indonesia's foreign policy: An Indonesian view', *Asian Survey,* vol.35, no.3, 1995, pp.304-315. For more on Sukarno's ideology and the role of communism in Indonesia from 1959-1965, see Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian communism under Sukarno: Ideology and politics, 1959-1965* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2006).
[178] Stefan Eklöf, *Indonesian Politics in Crisis: The Long Fall of Suharto, 1996-1998* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1999).
[179] For a detailed study of Suharto's rise and fall from power, as well as his military roots and economic policies, see Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian politics under Suharto: The rise and fall of the New Order* (London: Routledge, 1998).
[180] Anja Eifert, 'Indonesia as an example of 21st century economic statecraft', Centre on Public Diplomacy, 29 Jan 2014, https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/indonesia-example-21st-century-economic-statecraft.

History of Diplomatic Practice from Colonial Times

Diplomatic practices from historical times present an incomplete picture as Indonesia was never a unified territory prior to the 20th century. Nevertheless, various kingdoms existed in today's Indonesian territory and in the Southeast Asia region, which engaged with their regional kingdoms and other great empires through diplomatic practices, which were guided by traditional values that influence Indonesia today. The geography meant that civilisations were mostly concentrated near the coastal areas, while the kingdoms were often divided along maritime boundaries. As such, maritime diplomacy became prominent in the medieval and post-medieval periods in the Indonesian archipelago. Their diplomatic practices encompassed all aspects of life, including economic, political and military issues, along with cultural ties. These diplomatic interactions occurred between coastal civilisations that were common in the region and were connected through sea, through which they carried out exchanges and activities.[181] Moreover, the political instability of various kingdoms and the development of maritime trading meant that Java gained a very prominent status in the archipelago — a position which it continues to have today.[182]

While it is true that the Javanese kings often pursued the subjugation of external regions through conflicts and violence, scholars suggest that political integration through the tributary system was an important method adopted by the kingdoms.[183] This was furthered by their use of maritime diplomacy; Javanese inscriptions illustrate that diplomacy with overseas territory entailed "the king's gifts to the local kingdoms, political marriages, recognition, and the act of giving praise towards the glory of Javanese kings, etc."[184] This process of political integration by Javanese kingdoms legitimised the smaller kingdoms, who revered their connection with the much larger and powerful Javanese.[185] Thus the culture of building relations has been a part of Indonesia's civilisational past.

Moreover, marriage emerged as one of the most significant tools of maritime diplomacy and relationship-building between the maritime powers of the region during this period. For instance, marriage diplomacy was pursued by the Majapahit Kingdom in Java and the Champ

[181] Endang Susilowati, Singgih Tri Sulistiyono and Yety Rochwulaningsih, 'Coastal civilization and maritime diplomacy in premodern Southeast Asia', *The International Journal of Maritime History,* vol.30, no.4, 2018, pp.649–662.
[182] Ibid.
[183] Ibid.
[184] Ibid, p.658.
[185] Ibid.

Kingdom on the eastern coast of Vietnam, as well as by the Srivijaya Kingdom in Sumatra with the Mataram Kingdom in Java.[186] Another important element of this particular diplomatic style pursued by the kingdoms of the Indonesian archipelago was the dissemination and spread of the dominant culture and values to the peripheral areas; consequently, Javanese culture spread outside Java and integrated with local cultures.[187] Thus, exchange of ideas and values took place along with economic exchanges and activities throughout the region. This civilisational history suggests that building cooperation and furthering integration have been key parts of Indonesia's cultural values and embedded beliefs.

After the early modern period when the Europeans arrived in Southeast Asia, the power of the local kingdoms faded away as colonial rule was gradually established. The Dutch slowly expanded their dominion over the archipelago. After Indonesian independence, however, diplomacy began to flourish once again and took a distinct shape in the wake of its founding fathers' ideals as well as the collective beliefs and ideas of Indonesian society.

Hence, the diplomatic practices that were prevalent in the modern-day Indonesian archipelago in pre-colonial times mostly revolved around building relationships through marriage and maritime diplomacy, and through the process of cultural assimilation of smaller kingdoms. The Javanese kingdoms played an influential role in this process, and Javanese values spread across the archipelago as a result. As Indonesia's diplomatic style is believed to be influenced by Javanese customs, the history of diplomatic practice provides an insight into the roles that ancient Javanese practices continue to play in the diplomatic style of the modern-day state.[188]

Indonesia's Strategic Culture

Indonesia's unique geographical location is an influential factor that must be taken into account when reviewing the constituent elements of the state's diplomatic style and strategic culture. Deeply-embedded ideas and beliefs — developed through fear and insecurities, as well as through hopes and aspirations — continue to influence how the Indonesian state perceives its outlook and position in the world. Indonesia's unique location, along with its abundant natural resources, presents many opportunities for development and growth. However, the

[186] Ibid.
[187] Ibid.
[188] Astari Daenuwy, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 31 July 2018.

importance that Indonesians associate with geography is accompanied by fear and a sense of insecurity regarding exploitation and destabilisation at the hands of great powers; this belief in Indonesia's vulnerability remains an ever-present theme in the state's perception of its geopolitical outlook. As Indonesia's strategic culture is intrinsically linked with the geopolitical buildup of the state as well as the region, the geographical vulnerability is a significant factor in the state's strategic culture as well. There are a number of factors which have led to the development of this fear among the Indonesian public and political leaders.

Historical experiences with foreign hostile states and external invasions have fostered the belief that Indonesia's archipelagic geography presents a significant challenge which makes defence a challenging task. The Dutch invasion right after Indonesia's declaration of independence is a prominent example of the vulnerabilities that the state's unique territory presents. The memory of this event — as well as of the Japanese occupation during World War II — has been notable in shaping the geopolitical outlook of the Indonesian public and political leaders. Regarding the multitude of threats faced by the state in its early existence, former Armed Forces Commander Benny Moerdani remarked: "The threat which endangers the sovereignty of the republic comes not only from the Northern area. Rather, danger would also come from all directions, be it from the South, from the East, or from the West of the Nusantara Archipelago".[189]

The colonial experience, exacerbated by the Dutch invasion after Indonesia's independence declaration, has also left a deep imprint on Indonesian society which maintains strong anti-colonial feelings. In fact, this anti-colonial sentiment is evident in the first line of the preamble of Indonesia's 1945 constitution: "Whereas independence is the inalienable right of all nations, therefore, all colonialism must be abolished in this world as it is not in conformity with humanity and justice."[190] This anti-colonial attitude added to the Indonesians' mistrust of great powers who might display imperialist tendencies. Furthermore, the historical great-power rivalries in the region also aggravate these feelings, as Indonesians fear exploitation by great powers aiming to maintain or expand their hegemony. Another reason for this sense of vulnerability is the use of imperialist tactics against Indonesia in the post-independence period. Scholars have argued that after its independence, Indonesia was the target of 'divide and rule' strategies by great powers aiming to exploit the strategic location and natural resources of the

[189] Laksmana, 'The enduring strategic trinity: Explaining Indonesia's geopolitical architecture', pp.95-116.
[190] 'Indonesia Constitution: Preamble', 1945, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/id/id048en.pdf.

state.[191] In fact, separatist movements in the period after independence are thought to have received "clandestine support from outside, either by air-dropping or from foreign submarines and ships along the coast."[192] This has meant that Indonesians developed a deeply-embedded insecurity about possible hostile actions of imperialist states seeking to divide the state.

Indeed, anti-colonial sentiment became a cornerstone of Indonesian strategic culture during the early period of the state's history. President Sukarno's speeches perfectly illustrate the deeply embedded sentiments of anti-colonialism which guided Indonesian thought at the time and continue to do so today. In Sukarno's address to the Asia-Africa Conference in 1955, he stated:

> And, I beg of you do not think of colonialism only in the classic form which we of Indonesia, and our brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa, knew. Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skilful and determined enemy, and it appears in many guises. It does not give up its loot easily. Wherever, whenever and however it appears, colonialism is an evil thing, and one which must be eradicated from the earth.[193]

Sukarno, thus, highlighted colonialism's many forms and evils and placed colonialism as the 'master signifier.'[194] It was also essential for Indonesia, which was pursuing a handover of West New Guinea by the Dutch, to maintain this anti-colonial stance in order to gain international support.

Moreover, the perception of Indonesia's location as a vulnerability is considerably affected by its ethnic and cultural composition. Ever since Indonesia's independence, separatism has remained a strategic threat. This problem is intrinsically linked with Indonesia's islands and archipelagos in its territory which are host to various unique ethnicities with their own distinct languages and cultures. Moreover, the modern-day Indonesian territory was only seen as a unified geopolitical entity in the 20th century after a "process of administrative and

[191] Leonard C. Sebastian and Imran G. Lanti, 'Perceiving Indonesian approaches to international relations theory', in Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (eds), *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2010) pp.148–173.
[192] Muhamad Arif and Yandry Kurniawan, 'Strategic Culture and Indonesian Maritime Security', *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, vol.5, no.1, 2017, pp.77–89.
[193] Sukarno, 'Address given by Sukarno', in *Asia-Africa speak from Bandung*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1955, pp.19-29, https://www.cvce.eu/s/3o.
[194] Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, 'Sukarno and colonialism: An analysis of Indonesia's foreign policy discourse, 1955-1961', *Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional*, vol.16, no.1, 2020, pp.1-17.

territorial consolidation by the Dutch colonial authority;" before that, no single kingdom or ruler controlled these lands as a unified whole.[195] Naturally, this lack of historical unity allows for separatist arguments to be made, especially with groups who have genuine or perceived grievances with the central government. In the immediate post-independence period, several separatist movements along with rebellions rose up across Indonesia, at times aided by militia groups, and this trend of separatist movements has continued ever since. For instance, the province of Aceh had witnessed the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), part of which was involved in an insurgency against the Indonesian government for nearly three decades and which ended only after a peace negotiation in 2005.[196] This illustrates the ever-present threat of separatism that Indonesia has faced throughout its history which has meant that territorial consolidation and unity of the archipelago has become a strategic priority for political and military leaders. The rise of terrorist threats has also furthered this sense of vulnerability; the development of religious radicalism in Indonesia is linked with groups in Central and South Asia, presenting another security threat to the state.[197] The rise of these internal security issues, coupled with the insecurity regarding divide and rule policies of foreign powers, has strengthened Indonesian belief in its geographical vulnerability.

Apart from the internal threats, Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia — known as *Konfrontasi* — between 1963-1966 also influenced Indonesian attitudes towards the threats that the state faced. As Malaysia gained independence from the British in 1963, Indonesia perceived Malaysia to be a neo-colonialist attempt by the British to maintain influence in Southeast Asia, and President Sukarno stated his will to 'crush' Malaysia.[198] This policy was reversed after Suharto assumed power in Indonesia, and ties with Malaysia were subsequently improved. This confrontation, however, demonstrated Indonesians' perception of their state's vulnerability to outside influence, as well as apprehensions regarding the motives of imperialist powers.

The threats of external invasion as well as internal separatism in the period after independence were believed to be linked with the inter-territorial waters which, at the time,

[195] Laksmana, 'The enduring strategic trinity: Explaining Indonesia's geopolitical architecture', p.98.
[196] David Webster, 'From Sabang to Merauke: Nationalist secession movements in Indonesia', *Asia Pacific Viewpoint,* vol.48, no.1, 2007, pp.85-98.
[197] Laksmana, 'The enduring strategic trinity: Explaining Indonesia's geopolitical architecture', pp.95-116.
[198] See Peter Busch, 'The Origins of Konfrontasi: Britain, the Cold War and the Creation of Malaysia, 1960–1963', in Michael F. Hopkins, Michael D. Kandiah, and Gillian Staerck (eds), *Cold War Britain, 1945–1964* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) p.181. Busch's chapter focuses on the British policy during the Konfrantasi and demonstrates that there was some justification in Indonesian concerns that the creation of Malaysia had neo-colonialist ambitions behind it. For a detailed study of the Konfrontasi period, see James A. C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963-1966* (Kuala Lumpur; New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).

were recognised as international waters. At the time of independence, Indonesia only had sovereignty over its islands, with the maritime territory only extending to three miles from the low-water mark; this three-mile territorial boundary did not cover the archipelago as a single jurisdictional entity, as most islands were separated by a distance of more than six miles.[199] This meant that "most of the waters between the islands were internationally taken as international waters through which freedom of navigation were taken for granted."[200] Owing to its vast territory and the fact that freedom to navigate through the waters surrounding the islands was internationally granted, it was almost impossible for the new state to secure itself from the threat of foreign invasion, as well as to equip itself to deal with militia groups involved in rebellions against the state. Moreover, due to the open seas, these early years after independence saw an "increasing rise and significance of smuggling in the archipelago, the growing unrest and rebellions in various regions."[201] More importantly, the open seas meant that any foreign ships with hostile intent were free to pass through the archipelago. In particular, the Indonesians were concerned about Dutch naval activities in West New Guinea — which was a territory claimed by Indonesia, and over which negotiations were underway with the Dutch. This latter aspect was particularly important as it hurt Indonesian pride and integrity, as Dutch ships were able to pass through the open seas between Indonesian islands towards West New Guinea. This affected Indonesian decision makers' perception of the strategic threats to the national integrity of the state and helped form the basis for a long-lasting strategic culture which associates the Indonesian maritime boundaries with vulnerability and weakness.

In light of the vulnerability caused by the open waters, Indonesian leaders realised the need for controlling their maritime boundaries. Hence, Indonesia sought to close off its open waters and "unify the archipelago into a single entity" through the Djuanda Declaration in 1957.[202] The declaration asserted that "the whole [Indonesian] archipelago along with the sea lying within it must be regarded as one total unit."[203] Subsequently, Indonesia sought its recognition as an archipelagic state from the United Nations, which finally materialised, after decades of lobbying, in 1982 in the form of the 3rd United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). More importantly, the Djuanda Declaration established the Indonesian belief in the concept of Archipelagic Outlook, or *Wawasan Nusantara*, which is a culmination

[199] Ibid
[200] Arif and Kurniawan, 'Strategic Culture and Indonesian Maritime Security', p.79.
[201] Laksmana, 'The enduring strategic trinity: Explaining Indonesia's geopolitical architecture', p.99.
[202] Ibid, p.100.
[203] Dave McRae, 'Indonesia's South China sea diplomacy: A foreign policy illiberal turn?', *Journal of Contemporary Asia,* vol.49, no.5, 2019, pp.759-779 at p.763.

of Indonesian ideas and beliefs about its strategic culture as well as geopolitical thought. Among other beliefs, the Archipelagic Outlook represents Indonesia's perception of its geographical location and its vulnerability, suspicion of other great powers, concerns over national unity and aspirations for regional leadership.[204] Indeed, the Archipelagic Outlook has stood as the pinnacle of Indonesia's geopolitical thought, and has thereby been an integral part of its strategic culture; it is believed to represent "a geopolitical conception which is uniquely Indonesian."[205]

Another implication of the threats faced or perceived by the newly independent Indonesian state was the significance attached to national integrity and political sovereignty. As the unified polity was perceived to be under threat from secessionist elements as well as from foreign actors attempting to divide the new state across ethnic lines, post-independence leaders deemed the protection of Indonesian sovereignty and territorial integrity to be of paramount importance. Hence, they sought to channel Indonesian nationalism — which had been crucial in unifying the diverse population against the Dutch in the fight for independence — towards the idea of protecting the national integrity and political sovereignty of the state. Over the decades, this has manifested itself in the form of sustained belief in the Archipelagic Outlook and the principles of Pancasila which, to this day, embody Indonesian ideas regarding geopolitical thought and strategic culture.

Thus, these embedded ideas and beliefs of the Indonesian people — strongly linked with their colonial history and geographical position — have shaped their strategic culture which is reflected in the actions of Indonesian governments. Specifically, the belief in the Archipelagic Outlook has implications for the security outlook of the state which has tended to be a continuation of this strategic culture. As the Archipelagic Outlook emphasises national unity, territorial integrity and the geographical vulnerabilities of the state — which signal the prioritisation of internal threats and issues — it is believed to be an inward-looking concept, especially in the domains of defence and diplomacy.[206] In turn, this leads to an inward-looking

[204] Leonard C. Sebastian, Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto and I. Made Andi Arsana, 'Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook: The law of the sea, maritime security and the great powers', in Leonard C. Sebastian, Ahmad D. Habir, and Christopher B. Roberts (eds), *Indonesia's Ascent: Power, Leadership, and the Regional* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) pp.308-334.
[205] Laksmana, 'The enduring strategic trinity: Explaining Indonesia's geopolitical architecture', p.101.
[206] I. Gusti Bagus Dharma Agastia, 'Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum: An updated archipelagic outlook?', *The Diplomat*, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/indonesias-global-maritimefulcrum-an-updated-archipelagic-outlook/.

strategic culture which prioritises the safeguarding of Indonesian sovereignty and national integrity.

Perhaps the best demonstration of the inward-looking strategic culture is Indonesia's defence mechanism and the structure of its armed forces. Despite the Indonesian archipelago being historically dominated by kingdoms with strong maritime dominions — thus presenting Indonesia with vast potential for having a strong maritime force — the state's armed forces (TNI) are largely dominated by the army, which is land-based, with the navy and air-force being designated to play a supporting role for the army.[207] Moreover, under President Suharto, who was the leader of the military at the time, the Indonesian military adopted a dual function doctrine (*Dwi Fungisi*).[208] This doctrine involved the military's increased involvement in the government, with parliament seats being reserved specifically for military officers.[209] It was the result of military officers' belief that they had to be involved in the government so that the state could achieve political stability.[210] The doctrine reflects the military's embedded beliefs regarding its role in the state's day to day affairs, along with its traditional security role.

For the most part of Indonesia's history, the navy has focused on maritime law enforcement and internal security roles, addressing threats such as piracy, smuggling and illegal trafficking. That the state never developed a strong navy also suggests that the vulnerabilities presented by the archipelagic geography outweighed its opportunities in the minds of the political and military leaders. This suggests that the armed forces are structured to focus more on internal threats — which continue to present themselves, now in the form of terrorism and radical groups — as opposed to external ones.[211] It is also important to note that this focus on internal threats is justifiable as statistics show that out of a "total of 249 military operations conducted by the Indonesian military between 1945 and 2009, only 30 per cent were aimed at dealing with external threats while the remaining 67 per cent were conducted to fight internal adversaries."[212] Even today, Indonesian military and political leaders continue to believe that the state is far more vulnerable to internal threats than external invasion, and this is aggravated

[207] Arif and Kurniawan, 'Strategic Culture and Indonesian Maritime Security', pp.77–89.
[208] Salim Said, 'The political role of the Indonesian military: Past, present and future,' *Asian Journal of Social Science*, vol.15, no.1, 1987, pp.16-34.
[209] Ibid.
[210] Ibid.
[211] Muhamad Arif and Yandry Kurniawan, 'Strategic Culture and Indonesian Maritime Security', pp.77–89.
[212] Ibid, p.81.

by fears regarding national disintegration, the history of separatist movements and the growing threat of terrorism.

These beliefs are also reflected in the belief of the military in 'total people's war', which is a major component of the defence strategy.[213] The Indonesian National Armed Forces' (TNI) doctrine focuses on the concept of Total People Defence System (*Sistem Pertahanan Rakyat Semesta/Sishanrata*), which entails that a united national resilience is needed to defend Indonesian sovereignty.[214] Practically, this security outlook translates into military strategies such as guerrilla warfare, territorial warfare and layered defence.[215] This indicates that the military leaders believe that their *conventional* military prowess may not be able to match foreign powers, thus their use of 'total people's war' is the best way to defend Indonesia. A manifestation of this belief is the strategy of 'layered defence zone' whereby the state's navy and air force are designated to engage the enemy in the outer zones of Indonesian territory while the army mobilises land defence to protect the islands.[216] Moreover, very few kingdoms and empires ruled multiple islands of the Indonesian archipelago; hence, the idea of a land-based defence is deeply cultivated in Indonesians' mindset as historical polities in the archipelago mostly existed as land-based powers due to their limited geographical areas of influence.[217] This long-standing land-based defence system exhibits Indonesia's inward-looking strategic culture in its defence structure and strategy and the application of Indonesian beliefs and insecurities in the state's security outlook.

In addition to beliefs regarding the geographical vulnerability and the relative importance of internal threats, Indonesian strategic culture is influenced by the unique circumstances and problems faced during the Indonesian war for independence and during the early stages of Indonesia's existence as a state. In the minds of the Indonesian leaders and the public, despite the extensive diplomatic campaign to gain international support for its sovereignty, Indonesia's independence was won militarily against the invading Dutch, which was done through mobilising the public and adopting a strategy of guerrilla warfare.[218] This led the founding leaders of Indonesia to develop the belief that physical revolution, *revolusi fisik*,

[213] Bhatara Ibnu Reza, 'The total people's defense and security system: Problems of state-sponsored militia in Indonesia', *Indonesia Law Review,* vol.2, 2017, pp.155-177.
[214] Ibid.
[215] Arif and Kurniawan, 'Strategic Culture and Indonesian Maritime Security', pp.77–89.
[216] Ibid.
[217] Laksmana, 'The enduring strategic trinity: Explaining Indonesia's geopolitical architecture', pp.95-116.
[218] Reza, 'The total people's defense and security system: Problems of state-sponsored militia in Indonesia', pp.155-177.

was the only way to ensure independence and political sovereignty of the state; notably, this belief correlates with the military's strategy of 'total people's war.'[219] After the Dutch invaded Indonesia following the declaration of independence, and fighting commenced, the lack of concrete support from the great powers shaped the view that Indonesia had to be self-reliant and preserve its own sovereignty at all costs.[220] In particular, the lack of support for Indonesia's right to self-determination from the U.S. and other Western powers fostered the impression that the West favoured the colonial and imperialist countries.[221] This significantly impacted Indonesians' attitude towards the Western powers, leading to a deeply-embedded suspicion of their motives. Consequently, when the Dutch eventually recognised Indonesian sovereignty, it was believed to be the result of the internal resistance and struggle of the Indonesian people.[222] The prolonged struggle, mixed with the initially ambivalent attitude of the Western countries, further strengthened the anti-imperialist sentiments among Indonesians, which remain an important part of the state's strategic culture.

Indonesia's inward-looking strategic culture also lays down specific foreign policy doctrines and helps explain the state's prioritisation of domestic issues over external foreign policy objectives. Indonesia, thus, is wary of any alignment with great powers or the presence of foreign powers near its territory. Moreover, this strategic culture has also led political leaders to pursue internal development, especially economic growth, as a way to ensure long-term survival of the state and build its ability to protect its political sovereignty. This was particularly witnessed during President Suharto's New Order government where Indonesia adopted the agenda of *pembangunan nasional* (national development) as internal reconstruction was considered a prerequisite for Indonesia being able to pursue a free and active foreign policy.[223] Recently, the elected government of President Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) has continued this focus on internal development. Thus, while Indonesia remains active in regional and international forums and promotes integration, it does so with the aim of protecting its national security interests and political sovereignty.

Indonesia's strategic culture has been formed by the state's particular experiences with colonialism, actions of imperialist powers in the aftermath of its independence, a host of secessionist movements the state has dealt with, the fears and insecurities related to exploitation

[219] Sukma, 'The evolution of Indonesia's foreign policy: An Indonesian view', pp.304-315.
[220] Ibid.
[221] Ibid.
[222] Ibid.
[223] Ibid.

by foreign powers through 'divide and rule' strategies, a deep concern about the preservation of the state's territorial and national integrity and the perception of its archipelagic geography as a source of vulnerability. This strategic culture has been reinforced and reiterated by the state's doctrine of the Archipelagic Outlook, which remains as a guiding principle for political and military leaders. The Archipelagic Outlook reflects the concerns over national disintegration, the need for territorial unity and political stability, the sanctity of Indonesia's maritime borders and the sense of vulnerability towards the state's maritime domain. This strategic culture and the belief in the Archipelagic Outlook lead to an inward-looking perception of security.

Indonesia's Diplomatic Style

Similar to Indonesia's geopolitical thought and strategic culture, its diplomatic style has also been transformed by the inherent values and beliefs of Indonesian society. While there is very little scholarly research focusing on Indonesia's diplomatic style, the study of Indonesian culture and norms can help in understanding the formation of a distinct identity which characterises Indonesian diplomats. Moreover, some of the inherent beliefs and insecurities that have influenced Indonesia's strategic culture have also affected its diplomatic style. Astari Daenuwy, a diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, highlights that Indonesia never adopted the diplomatic style imparted by the Dutch.[224] Moreover, religion has not affected the state's diplomatic style.[225] These aspects further highlight the major influence that Indonesian society's values and beliefs have had on the state's diplomatic style. It is also important to note that for most of Indonesia's history, crucial ambassadorial posts have been awarded to military officers, due to the important role held by the military throughout the New Order era; as such, it is to be expected that the military's culture and doctrines are also linked to some degree with the diplomatic style.

Indonesia's diplomatic style is perhaps best characterised by a willingness to find consensus, favouring consultation and working towards conflict resolution. The Indonesian ambassador to the UN, Dian Triansyah Djani, who was elected the president of the UN Security Council, said regarding Indonesia's diplomatic style: "we always try to find a consensus, a middle ground," while also highlighting Indonesia's role as a "peace broker" in the Security

[224] Astari Daenuwy, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 31 July 2018.
[225] Landry Subianto, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 31 July 2018.

Council.[226] During an interview, Gilang Kembara explained that Indonesians always try to find a middle ground so that everyone can "stand and shake hands," hence, further highlighting the consensus-building and cooperation-seeking style of Indonesian diplomacy.[227] Researchers often argue that the consensus approach promoted by ASEAN, in fact, traces its origins to Indonesia's traditional village culture, with particular focus on the notions of "musyawarah (the decision-making process through discussion and consultation) and mufakat (the consensus decision arrived at)."[228] This illustrates not only that consensus-building is a deep-rooted traditional practice in Indonesia, but that its applicability at the ASEAN-level suggests a possible Indonesian role in promoting this approach at a regional level, where Indonesia has significant influence. More importantly, this strengthens the linkage between Indonesian diplomatic style and the use of a consensus-building approach. Hidayatullah, while analysing Indonesia's role as a middle power, also demonstrates that Indonesia has gained the trust of its neighbouring states by promoting consensus-building and regional integration.[229] In a speech to the Indonesian Council for World Affairs, then President Yudhoyono interpreted Indonesia's diplomatic principles as a means to "use our independence and activism to be a peace-maker, confidence-builder, problem-solver, [and] bridge-builder."[230] Indonesia's diplomatic style is also low-profile and quiet, and as such, assertive and aggressive methods are not pursued.[231] This can also be understood in terms of the Indonesian society's culture, which encourages a low-profile identity.[232]

The inward-looking beliefs and ideas which form the basis of Indonesia's strategic culture, are also a major determinant of the state's diplomatic style. Indonesian diplomats and diplomatic missions are naturally expected to adhere to these ideas and beliefs while carrying out policy implementation. Thus, fully to understand Indonesia's diplomatic style, it is

[226] Stephanie Fillion, 'The UN security council's new president: An Indonesian economist and 'peace broker'', *PassBlue,* May 2019.
[227] Gilang Kembara, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 31 July 2018.
[228] Hiro Katsumata, 'Reconstruction of Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict Adherence to the "ASEAN Way"', *Contemporary Southeast Asia,* vol.25, no.1, 2003, pp.104-121, at p.109.
[229] Nur Luthfy Hidayatullah, 'Indonesia's role as a middle power: A neo-liberalist and constructivist analysis', *Journal of International Relations Analysis,* vol.6, no.2, 2017.
[230] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, 'Speech by H.E. Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia before the Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA)', 2005, https://ex.kemlu.go.id/en/pidato/presiden/Pages/Speech-by-H.E.-Dr.-Susilo-Bambang-Yudhoyono-President-of-the-Republic-of-Indonesia-before-the-Indone.aspx.
[231] Kavi Chongkittavorn, 'The future of ASEAN political and security cooperation', in Surin Pitsuwan, Hidetoshi Nishimura, Ponciano Intal, Jr., Kavi Chongkittavorn and Larry Maramis (eds), *The ASEAN Journey: Reflections of ASEAN Leaders and Officials* (Jakarta: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, 2019) pp.251-267.
[232] Astari Daenuwy, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 31 July 2018.

important to understand the political leaders' perception of the role of diplomacy and the inherent beliefs and ideas which influence foreign policy.

Firstly, it is important to highlight the crucial principles of 'free and active' foreign policy, which have been established as the cornerstones of Indonesian foreign policy since the 1950s and have been influential in developing Indonesia's diplomatic style. The principles of 'free and active' were established by Indonesia's first Vice President Hatta in the early period of Indonesia's existence. In his famous speech, "Mendajung Antara Dua Karang" — Rowing between two coral reefs — he provided a detailed framework on which Indonesia's 'free and active' foreign policy would be based.[233] Hatta stressed that foreign policy would be based on the foundations laid out in the state's Pancasila ideology, and an independent policy-making would be pursued that would aim to serve the state's national interests without any external interference. In doing so, Hatta established that Indonesia would not side with the U.S. or the USSR in the growing Cold War rivalry. Moreover, not conforming to the ideologies of the great powers, he "sought to cultivate national unity by taking an independent position toward the outside world."[234] Hatta further asserted that:

> Indonesia plays no favourites between the two opposed blocs and follows its own path through the various international problems. It terms this policy 'independent' and further characterises it by describing it as independent and 'active.' By active I meant the effort to work energetically for the preservation of peace, through endeavours supported if possible by the majority of the members of the United Nations.[235]

Thus, Hatta provided a clear framework for Indonesian foreign policymaking and the working of Indonesian diplomacy. This foreign policy structure was described by Indonesia's former Foreign Minister Adam Malik as "independent and active, opposed to imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations, and participating in implementing a world role based on independence, abiding peace and social justice."[236] Hence, based on this framework, some key principles and beliefs influencing Indonesian foreign policy can be identified: anti-colonialism, independence and pragmatism.

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[233] Sukma, 'The evolution of Indonesia's foreign policy: An Indonesian view', pp.304-315.
[234] Ibid, p.308.
[235] Mohammad Hatta, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy', *Foreign Affairs,* vol.33, no.3, 1953, pp.441-452 at p.444.
[236] Karin-Liis Lahtmäe, 'Indonesia: An analysis of regional hegemony-building', Master's thesis, University of Tartu, 2015, p.31.

Historically, Indonesia's diplomats have been viewed as integral to the state's sovereignty; most notably, Indonesian diplomats were essential in building up international support during the period of the post-independence Dutch invasion, as well as in the quest for recognition as an archipelagic state with the right to determine its maritime borders, eventually achieved through UNCLOS III in 1982.[237] Many of Indonesia's crucial national objectives are often achieved through diplomatic efforts — something which has become an established belief among the state's political and military elite.

As with the state's strategic culture, its diplomatic style is also closely linked to a belief in the Archipelagic Outlook. The doctrine's focus on concerns over territorial disintegration, political sovereignty and stability and the need for economic development, forms the basis of diplomatic identity as well. The inward-looking nature of the Archipelagic Outlook leads to the diplomatic style of the state being moulded towards the fulfilment of internal goals, rather than outward-looking expansionist policies. A manifestation of this inward-looking diplomatic style is the current Indonesian government's focus on 'pro-people's diplomacy' and economic diplomacy, with the view of diplomatic missions as an opportunity for building economic partnerships.[238] President Jokowi has emphasised that "diplomacy activities should lead to domestic economic benefits" for the people.[239] Moreover, President Jokowi believes in building people-to-people links to improve relations with other states, while also expecting his diplomats stationed overseas to make impromptu visits to their constituents to foster relations.[240]

Thus, Indonesian diplomatic style can best be described as inward-looking. Philips Vermonte believes that Indonesians are not opportunity-hunters as a nation, and that this is reflected in the state's diplomatic style and its approach to foreign relations.[241] Moreover, Indonesian leaders perceive diplomacy as a means to ensure national security in the absence of strong conventional means — such as a strong military — as well as advance other national objectives. Indeed, Indonesian leaders view diplomacy "as a wise proactive alternative to a state that lacks sea power to project its maritime interests and secure its borders, an approach that

[237] Greta Nabbs-Keller and Hadianto Wirajuda, 'Indonesia: Diplomacy as nation building', *The Lowy Institute*, 5 May 2016. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-diplomacy-nation-building
[238] Mathew Davies and Susan Harris-Rimmer, 'Assessing Indonesia's normative influence: Wishful thinking or hidden strength', *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, vol.3, no.1, 2016, pp.83-91.
[239] Muhammad Tri Andika, 'An analysis of Indonesia foreign policy under Jokowi's pro-people diplomacy', *Indonesian Perspective,* vol.1, no.2, 2016, pp.1-13 at p.7.
[240] Davies and Rimmer, 'Assessing Indonesia's normative influence: Wishful thinking or hidden strength', pp.83-91.
[241] Philips Vermonte, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 07 August 2018.

supports its claim to regional leadership."[242] Moreover, given the breadth of security issues and threats faced by the state, especially in the post-independence period, the strategic culture of Indonesia rules out an expansionist foreign policy, as securing political sovereignty of the state and addressing internal threats remains the primary focus. Hence, Indonesia's inward-looking culture leads to an introverted outlook towards diplomacy, which then forms the basis of the diplomatic style of Indonesia.

In practical terms, this inward-looking diplomatic style has meant that Indonesia prioritises domestic issues and concerns, as opposed to outward-looking international involvement, while still maintaining healthy relations with neighbouring states and great powers. Similar to President Joko Widodo's use of diplomacy to forward economic development, President Suharto used diplomacy to ensure regional stability and peace, as well as the non-intervention of great powers in Southeast Asia, while simultaneously focusing on internal development. At times, this diplomatic style invites criticism as it comes at the expense of greater international engagement; however, it clearly establishes the prioritised status assigned to domestic issues and internal security and is consistent with the strategic culture of the state.[243]

This diplomatic style is intrinsically linked with the belief that building economic capacity at the domestic level, through development and investment, is essential for not only the survival of Indonesian sovereignty, but also for the eventual expansion of the state's influence in the world. In other words, Indonesian leaders have long believed that focusing inwards is the best way to advance their position at the international stage, as "national power should be based on domestic capabilities."[244] These beliefs manifested themselves during the New Order government of President Suharto, and President Jokowi's economic diplomacy follows a similar vision of domestic capacity-building. President Jokowi views Indonesia as a "regional power with selective global engagement."[245]

While Indonesian diplomatic style is focused more on achieving internal goals, it does not mean that the state is not involved in regional and international bodies. On the contrary,

[242] Multamia R. Lauder and Allan F. Lauder, 'Maritime Indonesia and the Archipelagic Outlook: Some reflections from a multidisciplinary perspective on old port cities in Java', *Wacana, Journal of the Humanities of Indonesia,* vol.17, no.1, 2016, pp.97-120 at p.100.
[243] Andika, 'An analysis of Indonesia foreign policy under Jokowi's pro-people diplomacy', pp.1-13.
[244] Mohamad Rosyidin, 'Foreign policy in changing global politics', *South East Asia Research,* vol.25, no.2, 2017, pp.175-191 at p.182.
[245] Ibid, p.176.

Indonesia has maintained prominence in regional affairs through the regional organisation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and has also emerged as a major regional leader. And it is also true that for periods in Indonesia's history, especially under President Yudhoyono from 2004 to 2014, the diplomatic outlook tended to focus relatively outwards — towards expanding Indonesian influence on the global stage — even as the core identity stayed the same.[246]

However, for the most part, the Indonesian engagement at the regional level is tied up with achieving internal strategic objectives. During President Suharto's New Order government beginning in 1966, he realised the need for fostering better relations with neighbouring states and replaced the "revolutionary and confrontational foreign policies," previously pursued by President Sukarno.[247] During this period, Indonesian policymakers came to believe that regional instability could lead to new threats for Indonesia, which would then be compounded by the vulnerable geo-strategic make-up of the archipelago. In the Cold War climate, Suharto identified regional peace and the non-involvement of great powers — the U.S. and the USSR — in Southeast Asia as essential to Indonesia's national security objectives being met although it should be noted that Suharto was much more open towards a strong relationship with the U.S. than his predecessor Sukarno had been, due to Sukarno's communist sympathies.[248] Based on his belief in the need for non-involvement of great powers in Southeast Asia, Suharto made efforts to establish Indonesia as a cooperative, integration-seeking state, and contributed to the founding of Southeast Asia's regional body, ASEAN.[249] In this way, Indonesia's diplomatic style developed with the core values of cooperation, regional integration and an effort towards regional stability.

These aspects of Indonesia's diplomatic style manifested in the state taking a leading role in ASEAN. Through this, Indonesia furthered cooperation with regional states and sought to resolve potential conflicts in the region, often acting as a third-party mediator in conflicts. For instance, Indonesia was actively involved in mediation efforts in a number of major conflicts in the region, which includes the dispute between Thailand and Cambodia over Preah Vihear temple, the Cambodian conflict in the late 1980s and the South China Sea dispute

[246] Ibid.
[247] Bama Andika Putra, 'Indonesia's leadership role in ASEAN: History and future prospects', *International E-Journal of Advances in Social Sciences,* vol.1, no.2, 2015, pp.188-197.
[248] Ibid.
[249] Ibid.

between China and several ASEAN states.[250] Over time, as ASEAN has adopted greater significance in regional affairs, the body has become an important part of Indonesia's foreign policy and its diplomatic style. Indonesia's peacebuilding efforts are often initiated through ASEAN channels.

Overall, Indonesia adopts a quiet and low-key profile in its diplomacy, while simultaneously striving for regional peace and integration. The ideas and beliefs of the Archipelagic Outlook regarding political sovereignty, domestic capacity-building, and securing its status as an archipelagic state have influenced this approach. This diplomatic style has had influence from Indonesian traditional culture (specifically Javanese), culminating in a consensus-based, cooperative approach to foreign policy today. The state has formed an inward-looking diplomatic style, where domestic interests are the primary focus of diplomacy. Thus, the diplomatic style of Indonesia can be viewed as an act of balance between domestic capacity-building and pursuing national security objectives through diplomacy, while playing a leading role in regional affairs to maintain stability.

Diplomats' Training, Conduct and Roles

Indonesia's diplomats play a crucial role in the state's representation and interactions on the international stage; even though Indonesia did not inherit any diplomatic or foreign policy institution at the time of independence, the state has recognised the important role of diplomacy — whether it be economic diplomacy, public diplomacy or defence diplomacy — in fulfilling Indonesia's goals.[251] Thus, the training of diplomats needs to prepare them for the effective handling of these issues. Indonesia's Foreign Ministry has a Centre for Education and Training which is responsible for the training of Indonesian diplomats. Through the training, the diplomats are expected to gain competencies in three areas: knowledge, skill and attitude.[252] Hence, the diplomats go through tailor-made exercises to enhance their skills of interpretation, infographics and consensus building.[253] The ministry also arranges several workshops and training events to advance the diplomats' knowledge of and expertise about Indonesia's strategic interests and priorities. For instance, a training event arranged by the foreign ministry in collaboration with the International Trade Centre focused on economic diplomacy, equipping

[250] Ibid.
[251] Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 6 August 2018.
[252] Putra, 'Indonesia's leadership role in ASEAN: History and future prospects', pp.188-197.
[253] Yayan Mulyana, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 30 July 2018.

the diplomats with the necessary knowledge and skills to lead economic negotiations and make better decisions to maximise Indonesia's export market opportunities.[254] Another workshop led by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research focused on the diplomats' ability to work with the UN representatives while understanding the intricacies of UN's operations.[255]

Perhaps the most important initiative towards diplomats' training is the partnership of the Centre of Education and Training with the Clingendael Academy of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Indonesia's relationship with the Netherlands, though historically volatile, has normalised in the 21st century and one area of cooperation between the two states has been the training of diplomats. Since 2004, Indonesian diplomats of all levels have received training by the Clingendael Academy as part of this collaborative project.[256] Around 900 diplomats have been trained by the Clingendael Academy since the beginning of this collaboration, and the topics being focused on during this training include security dimensions in the region, maritime security, priorities for Indonesia's economic relations, as well as regional cooperation in ASEAN.[257] Thus, the training focuses on areas relevant to today's political, economic and social environment, as well as catering to Indonesia's unique diplomatic style and strategic culture. This allows Indonesian diplomats to operate effectively with the aim of safeguarding and advancing the state's national interests. The focus on ASEAN politics and diplomacy is especially important due to Indonesia's leading position in regional politics, as well as ASEAN's role in ensuring Indonesia's goals of regional peace and stability. Moreover, such a partnership with a major European training academy also increases the prestige of the diplomats' training and allows them access to modern training exercises and programs.

The conduct of diplomats has been extremely important for Indonesia's foreign policy objectives that are inherently tied to national security aims to be fulfilled. The composition of Indonesia's diplomats on foreign missions and those assigned to crucial ambassadorial posts affects the agenda-setting capabilities of diplomats. During the rule of President Sukarno, for instance, when he had politically embraced Indonesia's Communist Party (PKI) and embarked

[254] 'Training Indonesian diplomats to spot export potential, promote trade partnerships', *International Trade Centre*, 2017, https://www.intracen.org/news/Training-Indonesian-diplomats-to-spot-export-potential-promote-trade-partnerships/
[255] 'Indonesian diplomats trained on UN system, leadership and conference diplomacy', *United Nations Institute for Training and Research,* 2011, https://www.unitar.org/about/news-stories/news/indonesian-diplomats-trained-un-system-leadership-and-conference-diplomacy.
[256] 'More than 15 years of training for Indonesian diplomats', *Clingendael*, https://www.clingendael.org/training-case/more-15-years-training-indonesian-diplomats
[257] Ibid.

on a course of revolutionary politics, the Foreign Ministry and under Dr Subandrio overseas diplomatic missions started to become politicised.[258] Moreover, Indonesia's rhetoric against neo-colonialism and neo-imperialist states affected the composition of diplomatic missions, where western education became a liability for some diplomats while preferential treatment was awarded based on ideologies and party affiliation.[259]

This changed with the dramatic events of 1965. Under President Suharto, as Indonesia built an image of a cooperative and integration-favouring state, army officers were increasingly awarded critical ambassadorial posts. This composition meant that Indonesian diplomats adhered to certain ideational values — this time, the ones held by the military. After President Suharto's downfall and democratisation of the state, with the military's socio-political role downsized, career diplomats dominated the positions of Heads of Mission at critical overseas posts. The democratisation process also witnessed institutional reforms that allowed for "greater accountability of Indonesia's ambassadors, consul-generals and consuls, and greater efficiencies in the management of personnel and resources at post."[260] As such, Indonesian diplomats now tend to work under the ideational directives and goals set out by the head of government; for instance, President Jokowi's government has focused on economic diplomacy, which undoubtedly factors into the work of diplomats at overseas missions. Indeed, under President Jokowi, as bilateral relations and forums have become increasingly important to advance Indonesia's economic interests, the role of diplomats has also been expanded, as they are now expected to play an active role in integrating Indonesia with the world market and to propel the state's competitive advantages.[261] Thus, Indonesian diplomats have the ability to shape agendas to meet the state's political and economic goals, as they are in a position to facilitate trade relations and advance investment opportunities while also being able to bring about greater political cooperation between the states. However, the work of the diplomats is guided by the vision set out by the head of government, and the Indoneesian diplomats do not exercise the kind of autonomy that, for example, the Brazilian diplomats do (as discussed in the next chapter).

[258] Nabbs-Keller and Wirajuda, 'Indonesia: Diplomacy as nation building'.
[259] Ibid.
[260] Ibid.
[261] Andika, 'An analysis of Indonesia foreign policy under Jokowi's pro-people diplomacy', pp.1-13.

Indonesia's National Security Apparatus

Policymaking in the Indonesian national security apparatus is led by the Ministry of Defence, *Kementerian Pertahanan*; several agencies work under the Ministry and are responsible for the setting of policies and guidelines. These policies are, in turn, implemented by the security forces of the state, consisting of the armed forces. However, the military (TNI) has maintained significant influence over policymaking for much of Indonesia's history.

Indonesian governments have often stressed that diplomacy is the state's "first line of defence."[262] This means that the state's national security is achieved through diplomacy, which is part of Indonesia's broader agenda of "strategic hedging," whereby the state builds healthy relations with major powers while simultaneously building its traditional military defence.[263] Thus, the foreign-policy-making process as well as the conduct of diplomats assume a prominent role within the national security apparatus of the state. More important to the execution of Indonesia's national security strategies are the armed forces, which have dominated the strategic and security dimensions of the state's foreign policy. The role of these institutions in formulating and executing Indonesia's security strategies is crucial, especially since the state does not align itself with any great power and hence, cannot depend on powerful foreign actors to support its defence.

Naturally, the nature of security challenges faced by Indonesia makes the role of the military and the armed forces important. The TNI has maintained a position of influence ever since the state's formation, especially under the authoritarian rule of Suharto. After 1998, the armed forces' extraordinary power, especially on political processes and decisions, was criticised and efforts were made to limit the military's powers. Subsequently, the military had to agree to certain reforms in 2004, whereby its role in the internal politics of the state was restricted.[264] However, despite these legal restrictions, the armed forces remain dominant within the state's national security apparatus, while also maintaining some influence over government decision-making.[265]

[262] Iis Gindarsah, 'Strategic hedging in Indonesia's defense diplomacy', *Defense & Security Analysis*, vol.32, no.4, 2016, pp.336-353.
[263] Ibid.
[264] Marcus Mietzner, *The politics of military reform in post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite conflict, nationalism, and institutional resistance* (Washington, D.C.: East West Center, 2006).
[265] Diah Ayu Permatasari, 'An overview of the Indonesian security outlook', *Journal Keamanan Nasional*, vol.1, no.1, 2015, pp.1-25.

How Diplomatic Style and Strategic Culture Guide Indonesia's Actions as a Primacy-Aspiring Rising Middle Power

Indonesia's position in Southeast Asia makes it best poised to assume the role of a regional hegemon if it wanted. Realist theories would indicate a scenario where Indonesia would try to maximise its power in the region. However, theories of realism fall short of explaining comprehensively Indonesia's behaviour regarding its power projection style as a regional power. Indonesia displays a general lack of assertiveness in its regional leadership, despite its potential and status, which suggests a lack of initiative vis-à-vis power maximisation and aspirations for regional hegemony. On the other hand, even though Indonesia is overly concerned about the survival of its political sovereignty, it has nonetheless demonstrated aspirations for regional leadership through its constructive role in ASEAN, through a willingness to protect the stability of the region, and through a disposition to expand its influence through cooperation and integration in the region. Hence, while Indonesia's position may be considered as that of a regional power, its approach is not consistent with the behaviour of other states, such as India, aspiring for regional dominance supremacy. This thesis seeks to enhance understanding of Indonesia's behaviour by conceptualising it as a primacy-aspiring rising middle power, whose approach to a position of regional leadership is different from that of supremacy-aspiring rising middle powers.

The following sections seek to analyse Indonesia's activities on the regional and global stage as part of its hegemonic behaviour. Through a discussion of the state's negotiation styles and diplomatic strategies, its handling of great power competition, regional leadership and integration, and its power projection style and hegemony, the role of Indonesia's diplomatic style and strategic culture in influencing and developing the state's approach to foreign relations is highlighted, and as such, Indonesia's identity as a 'primacy-aspiring' rising middle power is demonstrated.

Negotiation Styles and Strategies in International Diplomacy

Indonesia's negotiation style in its diplomatic practice reflects the influence of its diplomatic style and strategic culture. Indonesia mostly refrains from taking a hard-line approach in its negotiations with foreign actors, and instead strives to adopt a more cooperative and accommodating attitude in its international diplomacy. At the same time, Indonesia does

not let itself be exploited by larger states and seeks to advance its interests in the best manner possible. The state has historically lobbied the UN and great powers to negotiate matters of crucial national importance and advance its agenda — for instance, the lobbying of Indonesian diplomats in building up international support for the adopting of UNCLOS III in 1982 which legitimised Indonesia's long-held position regarding the measure of its maritime boundaries.[266] Indeed, this aspect of lobbying and building support for its positions has become an inherent part of Indonesian diplomatic style and strategic culture. This allows the state to advance its objectives without confrontation or acts of animosity towards other states.

Indonesia relies on its friendly relationships with states to advance its position and has negotiated trade deals and other collaborative initiatives with various states. For instance, an economic empowerment program was negotiated with Australia resulting in the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA) of 2019.[267] Moreover, negotiations with the EU are currently ongoing regarding a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Indonesia and the EU.[268] Indonesia has also lobbied the U.S. to advance its objectives regarding the inclusion of its products in the Generalised System of Preferences (GSM) and to achieve other trade concessions.[269]

Thus, Indonesia manages its negotiations with the world's powerful states quite effectively, adopting a strategy of accommodation and cooperation, along with lobbying. Indonesia's diplomatic style and strategic culture — with their focus on the role of diplomacy in advancing the national interests and economic development — are key instruments affecting this process. Consistent with its diplomatic style and strategic culture, which carry the values of cooperation and regional integration, Indonesia does not try to strong-arm states smaller and less powerful than itself. On the contrary, in recent decades, Indonesia has tried to build up healthy relations with its neighbouring states.[270] Perhaps the best illustration of Indonesia's cooperative and accommodating negotiation style is the state's recent dealings with Malaysia over outstanding maritime boundaries issues. Due to Indonesia's strategic and geopolitical

[266] John G. Butcher and R. E. Elson, 'How did Indonesia become an archipelagic state?', *The Strategist*, 11 May 2017. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indonesia-became-archipelagic-state/
[267] 'Indonesia-Australia comprehensive economic partnership agreement (IA-CEPA)', *Australian Trade and Investment Commission,* https://www.austrade.gov.au/Australian/Export/Free-Trade-Agreements/iacepa.
[268] 'The texts proposed by the EU for the trade deal with Indonesia', *European Commission*, 22 February 2021. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1620
[269] 'U.S. removes tariff for five Indonesian products', *Reuters*, 30 October 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-usa-trade-idUSKBN1X90OW.
[270] 'PNG, Fiji and Indonesia agree to negotiate trade deal', *RNZ*, 22 March 2019, https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/385333/png-fiji-and-indonesia-agree-to-negotiate-trade-deal.

mindset, maintaining the integrity of its borders is paramount. Despite this, Indonesia has not taken a hard-line stance against Malaysia and has continued negotiations while reiterating its cooperation towards its neighbour.[271] Historically, Malaysia and Indonesia have had disputes over the Ligitan and Sipadan Islands which were awarded to Malaysia by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which Indonesia accepted.[272] These Indonesian actions depict a contrast with the behaviour of other rising middle powers — such as India — that tend to display confrontational behaviour over such matters. In contrast, and in accordance with its classification as a primacy-aspiring rising middle power, Indonesia, in general, has steadfastly adopted a cooperative style in its negotiations on such disputes.

Navigation of Great Power Competition

Indonesia's diplomatic style and strategic culture point to a deep mistrust of great powers, partly due to its strong anti-imperialist sentiments. This has resulted in the state pursuing an independent foreign policy which seeks to fulfil national objectives while not aligning with any major power as that is believed to present a potential threat to Indonesia's political sovereignty. Hence, Indonesian policymakers believe the state's needs are best served by striking a balance in its relationships with great powers.

Indonesia's approach is best summed up by its first Vice President, Mohammad Hatta, who referred to as "rowing between two coral reefs," at a time when the newly independent state was under pressure to side with the Soviets, which would have undoubtedly invited the animosity of the U.S. and its allies.[273] Hatta, instead, opted to pursue a middle ground between the USSR and the U.S., maintaining neutrality in the growing rivalry between the two great powers.[274] Hatta proclaimed, "Have the Indonesian people fighting for their freedom no other course of action open to them than to choose between [de facto Great Powers?] … [Indonesia] should be an active agent entitled to decide its own standpoint."[275]

[271] Sheany, 'Indonesia, Malaysia to speed up negotiations on border agreement', *Jakarta Globe*, 23 July 2018, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-malaysia-speed-negotiations-border-agreement/.
[272] John G. Butcher, 'The International Court of Justice and the territorial dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia in the Sulawesi sea', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol.35, no.2, 2013, pp.235-257.
[273] Sukma, 'The evolution of Indonesia's foreign policy: An Indonesian view', pp.304-315.
[274] Ibid.
[275] Ann Marie Murphy, 'Great power rivalries, domestic politics and Southeast Asian foreign policy: Exploring the linkages', *Asian Security,* vol.13, no.3, 2017, pp.165-182 at p.173.

It must also be noted that Indonesia's foreign policy, in its early independence period, was under considerable pressure from competing and sometimes contradicting views and ideologies in its domestic politics — during this period, the nature of domestic politics "was characterized by complex political cleavages and divisions among Indonesian elites."[276] These domestic divisions not only impacted the foreign policy outlook, but extended along "political, ethnic, ideological, and religious lines"; this contention mainly focused on the important topic of the approach in dealing with the Dutch, and in defining Indonesia's international identity.[277] This meant that there were considerable ideological divisions and subsequently, the government faced pressure from different groups on the topic of siding with one of the two blocs on the world stage. Eventually, Hatta formulated a clear framework based on which relations with the two competing blocs will be based on, and in doing so, defined the foreign policy outlook of the new Indonesian state and its focus on neutrality.

This position of neutrality was maintained throughout the Cold War period, as well as in the 21st century, as China is emerging as a competitor to U.S. dominance in the region. Former President Yudhoyono described Indonesia's approach as "navigating a turbulent ocean."[278] Moreover, the position of neutrality has been reinforced through Indonesia's participation and leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement. Moreover, Indonesia considers the non-involvement of great powers in Southeast Asia's affairs as vital to national security objectives, as it believes that the presence of great powerscan present a potential threat to Indonesia's sovereignty. This position has also been reiterated by the state through ASEAN. Thus, Indonesia has a clear and consistent vision of non-alignment with great powers.

The position of neutrality does not mean that healthy relations cannot be established with great powers. In fact, Indonesia has maneuvered rivalries between great powers to its advantage on a number of occasions. For instance, once President Sukarno decided to pursue a military solution to the West New Guinea dispute with the Dutch, he negotiated arms deals with both the USSR and the U.S.[279] Even though the Americans refused at first, the USSR's willingness to provide arms to Indonesia changed their stance and ultimately, Indonesia received considerable military assistance from the Western bloc.[280] More importantly, the

[276] Sukma, 'The evolution of Indonesia's foreign policy: An Indonesian view', at p.307.
[277] Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 20.
[278] Andika, 'An analysis of Indonesia foreign policy under Jokowi's pro-people diplomacy', p.4.
[279] Yeremia, 'Sukarno and colonialism: An analysis of Indonesia's foreign policy discourse, 1955-1961', pp.1-17.
[280] Ibid.

eventual resolution to the West New Guinea dispute came through Indonesia's successful efforts to involve the U.S. in the issue, as President Kennedy appointed the U.S. Attorney General, his brother Robert Kennedy, to lead negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands.[281] Thus, while Indonesia refrained from aligning ideologically or strategically with the U.S. during the Cold War, it has tried to capitalise well on great power competition to advance its own national interests.

It is also important to note that Indonesia does not use aggressive measures in its dealings with great powers, but rather manages its relations diplomatically. Scholars believe that a major reason for the resumption of diplomatic ties with China in 1990 was the growing influence and stature of China in world politics, which meant that cooperation was the best way forward for the protection of Indonesian interests.[282] The growing rivalry between China and the U.S., culminating in the onset of a trade war between the two economic powerhouses, has again resulted in Indonesia steering a balanced course. China's ascension to the global stage presents different challenges to Indonesia, as China's activities in the South China Sea present strategic and security threats to Indonesian territories. Thus, while President Joko Widodo has taken a hard stance on illegal fishing in Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) — which has also resulted in capture or sinking of foreign ships or vessels — he has not, however, been overly confrontational with China. Moreover, Indonesia and the U.S. initiated a "comprehensive partnership" in 2010, while also initiating a "comprehensive strategic partnership" with China in 2013.[283] Indonesia is also benefiting from China's bid to achieve economic dominance through its Belt and Road Initiative, by inviting Chinese investments in infrastructure projects.[284] Indonesia's future approach may be more inclined towards closer ties with the U.S.; Gilang Kembara remarks that while China is a helpful trading partner, the U.S. has assumed the role of Indonesia's strategic partner in recent times.[285] However, Phillips Vermonte maintains that Indonesia does not side with either the U.S. or China, as non-alignment gives the state a sense of independence.[286]

[281] Ibid.
[282] Evan A. Laksmana, 'Pragmatic equidistance: How Indonesia manages its great power relations', in David B. H. Denoon (ed.), *China, The United States, and the Future of Southeast Asia* (New York: New York University Press, 2017) pp.113-135.
[283] Murphy, 'Great power rivalries, domestic politics and Southeast Asian foreign policy: Exploring the linkages', pp.165-182.
[284] Ibid.
[285] Gilang Kembara, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 31 July 2018.
[286] Philips Vermonte, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 07 August 2018.

Indonesia has adopted a nuanced foreign policy whereby it balances its relationships with two contemporary major powers, the U.S. and China, without strategically aligning with either, while at the same time expanding relations with other important states such as India and Japan to diversify its economic partnerships.[287] This diversification of economic partnerships is helping Indonesia balance between enjoying economic benefits from China and ensuring that it is not overly dependent on Chinese investment. Perhaps, it can also be said that Indonesia's policy towards China involves cooperation in geo-economics and competition in geo-politics. Indonesia's response to the growing U.S.-China rivalry has been to ensure healthy relations with both states while reiterating its commitment to its free and active foreign policy and maintaining its neutral stance. To ensure that its geo-strategic and security objectives are met, Indonesia has sought to enforce ASEAN's centrality among its member states, so that Southeast Asia does not become a "playing field" in the competition between U.S. and China.[288]

It should also be noted that Indonesia's handling of great power relations goes beyond just the U.S. and China. The state has managed its relations with regionally influential states such as Australia, Japan and India. This is also illustrated through Indonesia's signing of defence and security partnerships with thirty-one states between 1999 and 2014.[289]

Indonesia's behaviour with reference to its relations with great powers can be further understood by discussing the state's position vis-à-vis power attainment and aspirations for furthering influence. For instance, Organski's *Power Transition Theory* would suggest that a rising middle power, such as Indonesia, cannot maximise power, but can rather maximise its net gains over resources, and thereby increase its influence relative to other states. Thus, while power maximisation is not the main goal, maximising control and influence over resources is. In this regard, one might expect Indonesia to adopt a more friendly approach to its relations with the U.S., considering that its historical relations with China have been distraught. Moreover, currently, China presents a strategic threat to Indonesian territorial integrity and influence in the broader region. Indonesia's position as the biggest state in the region with emerging democratic ideals and common interests regarding China make it a suitable candidate for the role of a U.S. strategic ally. Having such an alliance can significantly expand Indonesia's control over scarce material resources and further its position as a regional power. Despite these

[287] Gilang Kembara, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 31 July 2018.
[288] Laksmana, 'Pragmatic equidistance: How Indonesia manages its great power relations', pp.113-135.
[289] Evan Laksmana, 'Indonesia's Strategic Thinking: Breaking out of Its Shell?' in Ron Huisken and Olivia Cable (eds), *CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 2015* (Canberra: Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, 2014) pp.35-38.

opportunistic prospects, Indonesia has not adopted stronger strategic ties with the U.S., which is in stark contrast to other rising middle power states such as India.

The analysis on Indonesia's approach towards relations with great powers demonstrates that Indonesia's diplomatic style and strategic culture influence the state's thinking in terms of alliances with great powers. Indonesia continues to remain apprehensive of any close alignment with great powers as it might affect its political sovereignty. While the effect of material and circumstantial factors cannot be ignored, viewing Indonesia's relations with the great powers through its unique diplomatic style and strategic culture allows for an enhanced understanding of the state's behaviour.

Regional Leadership and Integration

Indonesia's approach to regional affairs and ASEAN sheds further light over its status as a rising middle power with primacy-aspiring tendencies. In general, Indonesia has taken a leading role in ASEAN ever since its formulation. Despite changes in leadership and the state's political structure, Indonesian leaders have displayed steadfast commitment to ASEAN, along with being vocal supporters of regional integration and cooperation among states in Southeast Asia. Former Foreign Minister Adam Malik described ASEAN as the "cornerstone" of Indonesian foreign policy.[290]

Indonesia's promising demographic outlook, in combination with its immense geo-strategic potential, makes it the natural leader of Southeast Asia in the eyes of scholars as well as the international community.[291] This sense of entitlement as the leader of ASEAN is felt among the Indonesian people as well.[292] Indonesia's engagement in the regional community has been consistent with this notion of leadership, as the state had assumed a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1950s,[293] and under President Suharto, strengthened this

[290] Felix Heiduk, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Regional leadership between ambition and ambiguity* (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2016).
[291] Ralf Emmers, 'Indonesia's role in ASEAN: A case of incomplete and sectorial leadership', *The Pacific Review,* vol.27, no.4, 2014, pp.543-562.
[292] Hastin Dumadi, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 31 July 2018.
[293] Yayan Mulyana, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 30 July 2018.

position by playing a leading role in the formation of ASEAN in 1967.[294] According to Putra, Indonesia is perhaps the most influential member of the organisation.[295]

As Indonesia faced political instability after the Asian financial crisis and transitioned to democratic rule, it somewhat lost its mantle of regional leadership as other states assumed greater prominence. It has since re-emerged after solidifying its democracy and resolving domestic problems, thereby restoring its leadership credentials.[296] Even before the establishment of ASEAN, the significance and influence that Indonesia had in the region was immense. For instance, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) — formed by Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines — never gained international credibility as Indonesia, the biggest state in the region, was absent.[297] Moreover, Indonesia's role in the G20 has also highlighted its influential position on the global stage.

While Indonesia's position as regional leader is essentially undisputed, it is surprising that Indonesia has often been noted to lack assertiveness in its involvement and has been labelled as a 'silent' leader in the region.[298] Rising middle powers, in their pursuit of power might be expected to take advantage of such a position by being more assertive in their engagements in order to advance their interests. However, Indonesia's approach stands in stark contrast to this expectation. Its role in ASEAN, for instance, has been described as "relatively humble and unpretentious."[299] This furthers the notion that Indonesia is only seeking primacy in the region, for which its approach has been to further integration and cooperation while abstaining from imposing its dominance on its neighbouring states.

Indonesia's primacy-aspiring approach is also demonstrated through its willingness to repair relations with neighbouring states in the aftermath of President Sukarno's revolutionary politics which resulted in confrontation with Malaysia. It was essential for Indonesia to reverse its course for regional cooperation to be possible. Emmerson highlights Indonesia's approach as crucial to the survival of ASEAN:

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[294] Yayan Mulyana, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 30 July 2018.
[295] Putra, 'Indonesia's leadership role in ASEAN: History and future prospects', pp.188-197.
[296] Ibid.
[297] Michael Leifer, 'The ASEAN peace process: A category mistake', *The Pacific Review*, vol.12, no.1, 1999, pp.25-38.
[298] Pattharapong Rattanasevee, 'Leadership in ASEAN: The role of Indonesia reconsidered', *Asian Journal of Political Science*, vol.22, no.2, 2014, pp.113-127 at p.120.
[299] Ibid, p.120.

> If Indonesia had not punched under its weight inside ASEAN—lowering its voice in foreign affairs, forsaking Sukarno's high-decibel rhetoric against Malaysia, accepting the need to cooperate with its underweight neighbours—the organisation would not have survived and the region might well be less stable today.[300]

Indonesia's willingness to overhaul the foreign policy direction pursued by Sukarno and make efforts to renew collaborative relations with neighbouring states illustrates its commitment to regional stability and integration. It must also be noted that Indonesia's cooperative conduct and efforts towards integration are essential to ASEAN's survival. Indonesia's geo-strategic significance is not lost on ASEAN officials who regard the state's involvement as essential to the regional body's relevance. A former ASEAN technocrat remarked that, "if Indonesia starts to be more aggressive, it doesn't matter if it is rich or poor, just by the sheer size of Indonesia it can affect and destabilise ASEAN."[301] Many regional organisations rely on the integration-seeking approach of the largest states in the region, and in the absence of such an approach, the bodies soon become irrelevant. For example, it can be argued that SAARC has failed to develop any significant influence in the South Asian region because of the lack of efforts from India — the region's major power — to further integration in the region. Indonesia's approach, thus, illustrates its commitment to regional integration and development under ASEAN.

Despite Indonesia being labelled as a 'silent' leader, it remains involved as well as committed to solving regional problems. Indonesia's efforts to maintain stability are illustrated through its mediation roles in regional conflicts, for instance, the South China Sea dispute between China and various Southeast Asian states, and the Preah Vihear temple dispute between Thailand and Cambodia.[302] Moreover, in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, Indonesia's diplomatic initiative, in close cooperation with ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan, was crucial in convincing the military junta in Myanmar to stop its blockade of humanitarian aid.[303] Indonesia's leadership in ASEAN can also be witnessed in President Yudhoyono's efforts to promote regional integration in the management of natural disasters as he believed them to be a threat to 'public well-being' in the region.[304] Moreover, as Indonesia has consolidated its

[300] Donald K. Emmerson, 'Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends', in Anthony Reid (ed.), *Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia's Third Giant* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012) pp.49-76 at pp.73-74.
[301] Rattanasevee, 'Leadership in ASEAN: The role of Indonesia reconsidered', pp.113-127.
[302] Putra, 'Indonesia's leadership role in ASEAN: History and future prospects', pp.188-197.
[303] Heiduk, 'Indonesia in ASEAN: Regional leadership between ambition and ambiguity'.
[304] Ibid, p.27.

democracy, its regional soft power has increased further. Now, Indonesia promotes democratic ideals and principles of social justice in the region, allowing it further influence as well as bolstering the state's credentials as a regional leader.

The state's diplomatic style and strategic culture have further played a role in channeling its efforts towards advocating for peace and stability, as well as the non-interference of foreign powers in national and regional affairs through its leadership in ASEAN. This is particularly witnessed in Indonesia's role in the establishment of two guiding principles of ASEAN. The Asian Zone for Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) was formed in 1971 to ensure security against foreign involvement, while the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) signed in 1976 serves as a guideline for regional relations and disputes.[305] Indonesia was a driving force in the formulation of both of these principles, which are in alignment with the state's strategic culture, with specific focus on political sovereignty and non-interference by external states. Indeed, Indonesia's identity as an advocate for peace and non-interference has attained greater importance after the emergence of U.S.-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region.

Having played a leading role in the formulation of ASEAN's main principles, Indonesia has now taken a fresh approach in light of the changing world order. Indonesia's vision for ASEAN's role in managing regional affairs has been summed up by the state's proposed 'ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific' which was adopted by ASEAN as a foreign policy guideline for its members.[306] This outlook illustrates Indonesia's role in furthering cooperation and integration in the region. It focuses on the centrality of ASEAN in deciding regional issues, and a regional order which is inclusive, complementary and non-interventionist.[307] Thus, despite increasing security challenges in the region, Indonesia has chosen to pursue an approach which seeks to maximise cooperation between the member states. Some scholars believe that this shows Indonesia's vision to build trust among the member states; instead of using the regional body to focus on threats and challenges, Indonesia sees ASEAN as a platform to "find common ground so that mutual trust arises."[308] Indonesia's perception of ASEAN states as core partners in maintaining the region's security also indicates its confidence in the regional body.

[305] Putra, 'Indonesia's leadership role in ASEAN: History and future prospects', pp.188-197.
[306] I. Gusti Bagus Dharma Agastia, 'Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum: An updated archipelagic outlook?', *The Diplomat*, 17 December 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/indonesias-global-maritime-fulcrum-an-updated-archipelagic-outlook/.
[307] Ibid.
[308] Devindra Oktaviano, Jonni Mahroza and Helda Risman, 'Indonesia defense strategy towards Indo-Pacific (Case study: The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific)', *International Affairs and Global Strategy*, vol.80, 2020, pp.21-29.

More importantly, given the growing security challenges, and Indonesia's diplomatic style and strategic culture of prioritisation of its security and sovereignty over external goals, this approach implies that Indonesia views ASEAN as the best tool with which to ensure its security, which, in turn, is due to a decades-long commitment to advocating for combined efforts to pursue peace. Again, this stands in contrast with supremacy-aspiring rising middle powers which often adopt a confrontational approach to security challenges in order to ensure territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Indonesia's status as a G20 state has also bolstered its position inside ASEAN. Being the only state from Southeast Asia in the G20, Indonesia has used its G20 membership to highlight issues facing the Southeast Asian region, and in doing so, 'represented' ASEAN at the G20 stage.[309] This further builds up Indonesia's status as a regional leader in the perception of the ASEAN states as well as the international community. Indonesia has also been supportive of steps taken by ASEAN regarding economic integration of the region. The ASEAN free trade agreement (AFTA), signed in 1992 and ratified by 2003, caused a sharp increase in Indonesia's trade with its neighbours.[310] With Indonesia being the largest economy in Southeast Asia, its support for these agreements is crucial for economic integration in the region.

Despite ASEAN's long-standing centrality in Indonesia's regional approach, the state has started to think of the regional organisation as 'a' cornerstone — rather than 'the' cornerstone — of Indonesian foreign policy.[311] This change in approach can be better understood through the evolution of Indonesian diplomatic identity. While traditionally, Indonesia derived some of its identity and importance in regional affairs from ASEAN, the recent expansion of influence through G20 membership, along with increased prominence in the United Nations Security Council as a non-permanent member, has led to the evolution of Indonesia's identity on the global stage.[312] As a result, Indonesia has recently looked to explore other avenues to expand its influence and take other initiatives to increase integration with other states in the broader Asian region; hence, the state is expanding its influence beyond "the backyard," for instance, through increased focus on the Indian Ocean Rim Association.[313] This

[309] Putra, 'Indonesia's leadership role in ASEAN: History and future prospects', pp.188-197.
[310] Yose Rizal Damuri, 'Indonesia', in Ponciano Intal & Lurong Chen (eds), *ASEAN and Member States: Transformation and Integration* (Jakarta: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, 2017) pp.124-140.
[311] Gilang Kembara, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 31 July 2018.
[312] Astari Daenuwy, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 31 July 2018.
[313] Gilang Kembara, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 31 July 2018.

suggests that Indonesia is expanding its leadership by taking further initiatives, which indicates the state's willingness to use its diplomatic agency to further integration.

Overall, Indonesia's efforts to build cooperation and further integration in the region through ASEAN are consistent with the state's diplomatic style and strategic culture. By involving smaller states and building trust through ASEAN, Indonesia establishes its centrality in the region. This cooperation-building, integration-seeking approach distinguishes Indonesia from other rising middle powers with dissimilar approaches to powerhood. Indonesia's approach to gaining influence has shown an aversion to strong-arming smaller states, a commitment to building trust and cooperation among states in the region, and furthering integration based on ASEAN's centrality in regional affairs. This thesis's proposed *theory of hegemonic tendencies* captures this Indonesian approach by conceptualising the state as a primacy-aspiring rising middle power, so as to distinguish its behaviour from that of other states such as India and Iran that are supremacy-aspiring rising middle powers.

Indonesia's Hegemony and Power Projection Style

Indonesia's leadership role in Southeast Asian affairs has been demonstrated, whereby Indonesia's position as a 'silent' yet influential leader is highlighted. This Indonesian approach of being non-assertive yet vying for greater influence enhances the understanding of Indonesia's role vis-à-vis hegemony building and power projection style. Indonesia has also used its credentials and influence to contribute to the resolution of conflicts and has played a significant role in multilateral forums and organisations. Thus, despite the inward-looking nature of Indonesia's diplomatic style and strategic culture, the state maintains a leading yet non-assertive role in global affairs and in its dealings with neighbouring states. Indonesia has largely avoided confrontational behaviour and has instead promoted shared humanitarian values — and in the last two decades, democratic ideals.

The Multiple Hierarchy Model — which proposes that parallel hierarchies exist in several regions — would suggest Indonesia, as the largest and most influential state in Southeast Asia, and as such, at the top of the regional hierarchy. Whereas this chapter's analysis of Indonesia's foreign policy behaviour suggests that while Indonesia does have considerable influence in Southeast Asia, it is also important to note that it is not a dominating power, and that other states in the region also hold influence. As examples, Thailand and the Philippines

are U.S. allies in a region which is becoming an area of contestation between the U.S. and China. Similarly, Singapore has gained considerable global influence, diplomatically and economically, despite its small size. While other rising middle powers, such as Iran, have viewed other states' increasing influence as a challenge to their own, this has not been the case with Indonesia. As such, Indonesia has sought to establish its influence in the region through a cooperation-based approach.

Moreover, the theory of co-operative hegemony also helps expand an understanding of Indonesia's behaviour. The theory demonstrates that regional powers can enhance their hegemony and dominance over the region through cooperative means, which is classified as a 'soft' form of hegemony. Indonesia's case demonstrates such cooperative behaviour, as the state has shown an inclination to share power with smaller states, and by and large has convinced other states in Southeast Asia of its leadership credentials. This approach also allows Indonesia to use ASEAN to further its own vision and objectives. Similarly, Indonesia's approach can be viewed as a means to attain power by consent, instead of using a hardline approach, which it has done through mending and improving relationships with neighbouring states, taking initiatives in ASEAN and by showing a willingness to compromise.

To understand fully the motivation behind Indonesia's approach, this chapter attempted to highlight the state's diplomatic style and strategic culture, which can enhance an understanding of Indonesia's foreign policy behaviour. By doing so, this chapter demonstrates Indonesia's behaviour through the proposed *theory of hegemonic tendencies*, by classifying it as a primacy-aspiring rising middle power, as opposed to a 'supremacy-aspiring' one. As previously highlighted, Indonesia's regional leadership and integration-building approach help support its classification as a primacy-aspiring rising middle power.

For further demonstration, it is also important to discuss comprehensively the state's power projection style as part of its role as regional leader; this will help gain a deeper understanding of its status as a primacy-aspiring state. Despite an inward-looking diplomatic style and strategic culture, Indonesia has remained a leading voice at the regional level, and the state's position is further elevated by its G20 membership and the significance attached to its strategic location. Indonesia is often characterised as the 'first among equals' in Southeast Asia as well as the natural leader of ASEAN.[314] Despite the state being overly focused on internal issues, insecurities regarding territorial disintegration and other strategic vulnerabilities,

[314] Chongkittavorn, 'The future of ASEAN political and security cooperation', pp.251-267.

Indonesia is best positioned to be the leader of the Southeast Asian region due to its strategic location and economic capabilities. At the same time, Indonesia has adopted a more cooperative and consensus-seeking approach in its foreign policy behaviour, which can be seen through its activities in ASEAN.

Thus, due to its unique diplomatic style and strategic culture, Indonesia has been against interventionism and does not try to project its power by getting involved in other states' affairs or achieve its security or strategic objectives through confrontational means — although the invasion of East Timor in 1975 is an exception to this behaviour. At the same time, it tends to take strict measures against maritime border infringement by foreign vessels and ships, due to concerns over the territorial integrity of the state. However, for the most part, Indonesia has projected its power and influence in the region through non-confrontational approaches, relying on building cooperation and using public diplomacy. Indonesia prides itself for having 'zero enemies' and having cooperative relations with all states; President Yudhoyono described Indonesia's outlook as follows, "Indonesia is facing a strategic environment where no country perceives Indonesia as an enemy and there is no country which Indonesia considers an enemy. Thus, Indonesia can exercise its foreign policy freely in all directions, having a million friends and zero enemies."[315]

Indonesia's hegemonic activities have also been influenced by the state's commitment to maintaining neutrality between great powers, which is an underlying principle of the 'free and active' foreign policy that Indonesia claims to pursue. As Indonesia has avoided a close alliance with any great power and instead opts for a balanced relationship with competing global powers, the state has had to be much more cautious in its power projection style. For instance, India may not face significant consequences currently if it resorts to confrontational measures with its neighbouring states as it has the backing of the U.S. due to U.S. and India's shared strategic interests concerning China. However, unlike modern-day India, Indonesia avoids such deep strategic ties with great powers. More importantly, Indonesia does not involve itself in other states' conflicts as a participant and remains free to pursue its own vision of diplomacy and foreign policy.

This cooperative approach was followed at the outset of the post-independence period, when Indonesian leaders sought to establish ties with other states. Indonesia co-organised the

[315] Ted Piccone and Bimo Yusman, 'Indonesian foreign policy: 'A million friends and zero enemies'', *The Brookings Institute,* 14 February 2014. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/indonesian-foreign-policy-a-million-friends-and-zero-enemies/.

Afro-Asian Conference (also known as the Bandung Conference) of former colonial states, and played a leading role in the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement, which reflected the state's sentiments of anti-colonialism as well as its avoidance towards siding with any great powers. However, even though efforts were made to build relationships based on cooperation and understanding, the Indonesian leadership was not hesitant in taking a hard stance, as illustrated through the termination of diplomatic relationships with the Dutch who had remained unfriendly and refused to hand over West New Guinea to Indonesia.[316]

Indeed, one of the major foreign policy issues in the post-independence period was the handover of West New Guinea which was part of the Indonesian archipelago but was still under Dutch control. Indonesia started negotiations with the Netherlands over the settlement of this territory, but the Dutch seemed determined to keep the western part of the island under their control.[317] When bilateral diplomacy failed, Indonesia pursued multilateral channels to solve this dispute. For instance, "The Question of West Irian" was formally submitted to the agenda of the UN General Assembly.[318] Indonesia used its position in the Afro-Asian Conference to shed further light on the issue. The strong rhetoric around anti-colonialism was essential in building consensus and support towards the Indonesian position among Asian and African states; portraying the West New Guinea issue as a symbol of colonial injustice was also key in gaining international support.

However, after further deadlocks in bilateral negotiations and lack of support from the UN, Sukarno started working towards a military solution, gaining aid and arms deals from both the USSR and the U.S.[319] Soon, Sukarno was able to gain the support of President Kennedy for Indonesia's position and after mediation efforts from the U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the Dutch agreed to hand over the territory of West New Guinea.[320] Indonesia's handling of the West New Guinea issue demonstrates that the state first exhausted all bilateral and multilateral channels to resolve the issue, after which President Sukarno considered the possibility of a military solution. Even then, Indonesia remained open to mediation, which ultimately resolved the issue. This stands in stark contrast to the confrontational methods

[316] Vincent Kzitenbrouwer, 'Beyond the 'trauma of decolonisation': Dutch cultural diplomacy during the West New Guinea question (1950–62)', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, vol.44, no.2, 2016, pp.306-327.
[317] Nino Viartasiwi, 'The politics of history in West Papua - Indonesia conflict', *Asian Journal of Political Science,* vol.26, no.1, 2018, pp.141-159.
[318] Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, 'Sukarno and colonialism: An analysis of Indonesia's foreign policy discourse, 1955-1961', *Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional*, vol.16, no.1, 2020, pp.1-17.
[319] Ibid.
[320] Ibid.

pursued by supremacy-aspiring rising middle powers over territorial disputes. It is also worth noting that Indonesia made a calculated decision not to side with the USSR; this emphasises the state's strong belief in the free and active foreign policy principles.

While Indonesia has mostly adopted cooperative methods while dealing with other states and tends to resolve conflicts through bilateral diplomacy, there are some exceptions. In general, President Sukarno changed Indonesia's cooperative approach after he abandoned liberal democracy and steered Indonesia towards a 'Guided Democracy' which helped him retain political power.[321] Sukarno's beliefs revolved around eradicating possible threats to Indonesian sovereignty and territorial unity through revolutionary struggle, which had previously achieved independence for the country.[322] This resulted in him radicalising foreign policy by inculcating extreme nationalist rhetoric and anti-(neo)colonial sentiment directed at the West; this process was partly aimed at achieving a solution to the West New Guinea issue. Sukarno also started leaning towards the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). In the same mould as his pursuit of a military solution to the West Irian dispute was his opposition to the creation of Malaysia which he believed to be an attempt by colonial powers — namely, the United Kingdom — to maintain influence in the region.[323] After the creation of Malaysia, both Malaysia and Indonesia engaged in confrontation and cross-border raids from 1963 to 1966.[324] The ideological views of Sukarno and his insecurity regarding the British presence in Malaysia may help explain part of this confrontation.

After Sukarno's fall in 1966 and the emergence of the New Order government, Indonesia's hegemonic behaviour changed as President Suharto sought to rebuild Indonesia as a cooperative and integration-seeking state. Indonesia repaired its relationships with Malaysia and other neighbours, as well as the West. In essence, diplomatic practice moved back to the original foreign policy framework laid out by Hatta — the role of revolutionary politics was eradicated along with the banning of the Indonesian Communist Party. The belief that internal growth was necessary for pursuing a free and independent foreign policy was consolidated under the New Order government.[325] President Suharto realised the need for internal reconstruction and for building a strong domestic structure which allowed for economic growth.

[321] Sukma, 'The evolution of Indonesia's foreign policy: An Indonesian view', pp.304-315.
[322] Ibid.
[323] Ibid.
[324] 'Indonesian Confrontation 1963-66', *Australian War Memorial*, https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/atwar/indonesian-confrontation
[325] Rizal Sukma, 'The evolution of Indonesia's foreign policy: An Indonesian view', pp.304-315.

This change in Indonesia's approach facilitated the creation of ASEAN in 1967 with significant Indonesian contribution, which was based on advancing shared interests of the founding states by ensuring regional stability and maximising cooperation.[326] The Indonesian role in ASEAN's creation signified a marked change in the state's approach to ensuring its strategic objectives — instead of using confrontational methods as Sukarno did, Suharto was committed to ensuring regional cooperation and stability through ASEAN. In the democratic era after 1998, the state continued to advance its interests through ASEAN and through its commitment to regional stability and democratic ideals.

Indonesia's role in mediation in regional conflicts and efforts to resolve potential issues has been well documented. Indonesia adopts a distinct course of action by facilitating dialogue and mediating disputes, such as in the Thai-Cambodian border conflict in 2011.[327] This relates to Indonesia's orientation as a primacy-aspiring state, whereby it exerts its influence and status as a regional leader by furthering stability. Indonesia's involvement in the resolution of these conflicts highlights a general pattern of commitment towards peace and stability in Southeast Asia. However, it can also be argued that Indonesia's conflict resolution practice is aimed to ensure the fulfilment of its own security objectives, as prolonged conflicts in the region may result in repercussions for Indonesia and lead to the involvement of great powers in the region's conflicts. The South China Sea dispute, in particular, can affect Indonesia's own territorial structure as well, resulting in direct threats to its sovereignty over the archipelago.[328] Hence, consistent with its diplomatic style and strategic culture, Indonesia's security fears lead the state to play a more active role in solving the region's conflicts and maintaining peace. This approach further supports Indonesia's classification as a primacy-aspiring rising middle power.

Indonesia has also displayed a general willingness to compromise and cooperate on issues facing the region. In Southeast Asia, haze has emerged to be a major health problem. It is mostly caused by illegal land clearing in Sumatra, as well as in the Indonesian part of Borneo.[329] Upon complaints from Malaysia and Singapore, then-President Yudhoyono even apologised to Indonesia's neighbours for its role in the problem and called for a 'war against haze.'[330] While political opinion within Indonesia was divided on the haze issue, President

[326] Rattanasevee, 'Leadership in ASEAN: The role of Indonesia reconsidered', pp.113-127.
[327] Heiduk, 'Indonesia in ASEAN: Regional leadership between ambition and ambiguity'.
[328] Putra, 'Indonesia's leadership role in ASEAN: History and future prospects', pp.188-197.
[329] Heiduk, 'Indonesia in ASEAN: Regional leadership between ambition and ambiguity', 2016.
[330] Ibid, p.30.

Yudhoyono's actions depict Indonesian leaders' willingness to listen to its neighbouring states and work with them to solve regional issues.

Indonesia's growing engagement with the world was also witnessed in President Yudhoyono's comments on the Syrian conflict during a meeting with a delegation of Muslim scholars, where he suggested that the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad should step down to allow for a political transition.[331] Indonesia's engagement can be defined as an effort to hold the Muslim world to principles of human rights and democracy.[332] Importantly, despite such views, Indonesia did not align itself with any side in any of the conflicts, as that would have contradicted its belief in non-interference. Similarly, Indonesia supports Palestine in the Israel-Palestine conflict; however, unlike other Muslim states, Indonesia's support is not a result of its Muslim identity; rather it is the result of the state's beliefs in anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism.[333] Moreover, Indonesia's approach towards the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar was to view the issue as a humanitarian crisis, rather than an issue of Muslims being persecuted.[334] Indonesian leaders have approached the issue by involving the Myanmar government, as well as by showing concern for the displaced people, thus demonstrating its objective-oriented approach to the issue, instead of taking any one side.[335] These examples highlight Indonesia's international behaviour and approach.

While Indonesia's actions are consistent with its classification as a primacy-aspiring rising middle power, the Indonesian invasion of East Timor represents an approach inconsistent with the overall behaviour shown by the Indonesian state in its dealings with such issues. In 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor; the invasion followed in-fighting between East Timor's two biggest parties, after which independence was declared. This prompted fears within the Indonesian military regarding instability in East Timor, as it is right next to Indonesia's borders.[336] The decision to invade was, thus, "based principally on security fears, concerns over territorial unity and an obsession with anti-communism."[337] However, it must be noted that Indonesian forces had started secret attacks on East Timor months before the invasion as it "feared a communist state on its doorstep and that a newly independent state in its sphere could

[331] Piccone and Yusman, 'Indonesian foreign policy: 'A million friends and zero enemies'.
[332] Ibid.
[333] Yayan Mulyana, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 30 July 2018.
[334] Gilang Kembara, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 31 July 2018.
[335] Ibid.
[336] Grayson J. Lloyd, 'The diplomacy on East Timor: Indonesia, the United Nations and the international community', in James J. Fox & Dionisio B. Soares (eds), *Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor* (Canberra: ANU Press, 2000) pp.74-98.
[337] Ibid, p.76.

destabilise the rest of the archipelago."[338] Indonesia's occupation is considered to have been brutal in East Timor, which was declared to be one of the state's provinces after the occupation.[339] Therefore, despite in general pursuing a cooperative approach with states, Indonesia's policies towards East Timor — which was a non-self-governing territory at the time of Indonesia's invasion — represent a stark exception. Overall, Indonesia continues to follow an inclusive foreign policy approach by forming cooperative relations with other states, including the now-independent state of Timor-Leste.

This discussion demonstrates Indonesia's power projection style to be uncharacteristic of a regional power vying for supremacy in the region. Indonesia believes in its capacity to resolve conflicts and preserve its sovereignty through non-confrontational means, which can seem surprising, especially given the strategic culture of fear regarding the vulnerability of the archipelago to external attacks and internal threats. States around the world with similar insecurities and threats to their political sovereignty have often responded by heavily investing in their armed forces, as military capability is viewed to be necessary to preserve territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Moreover, states assuming leadership in their regions have also preferred to develop military might so as to better exert their influence on their regional neighbours. Indonesia, by contrast, depicts a lack of dependence on military strength, resulting in relatively small defence spending; in 2019, Indonesia only spent 0.7 percent of GDP on defence.[340] Moreover, it has adopted a diplomacy-centric approach, seeking to build cooperation in the region, resolving potential issues through negotiation, and using soft power to increase its influence. In doing so, Indonesia still exerts its influence as a regional leader, albeit in a less assertive manner.

Thus, Indonesia's power projection style demonstrates a contrast with an overall approach adopted by other rising middle powers, such as India or Iran. Indonesia's approach revolves around establishing its centrality in ASEAN affairs, which adds to its influence as a state. However, it must be noted that Indonesia's internal problems — separatist threats, radical terrorism and other vulnerabilities related to territorial disintegration and security — have dominated its thinking lately. Thus, while the state endeavours to advance its role in the region,

[338] Alison Rourke, 'East Timor: Indonesia's invasion and the long road to independence', *The Guardian*, 29 August 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/30/east-timor-indonesias-invasion-and-the-long-road-to-independence.
[339] Ibid.
[340] 'Military Expenditure (% of GDP) — Indonesia', *The World Bank*. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=ID.

it often prioritises the security of its political sovereignty and national integrity, whether by working towards regional stability — as seen through its activities in ASEAN — or by securing its maritime borders and taking strict action towards vessels illegally entering its maritime territories. This further reinforces the analysis of Indonesia's inward-looking diplomatic style and strategic culture.

Overall, Indonesia's power projection style and its approach as a regional power in Southeast Asia reveal a stark contrast with the actions of a number of other rising middle powers. As such, Indonesia's status needs to be distinguished from those of states such as India which have a vastly different approach to powerhood and foreign relations. The proposed *theory of hegemonic tendencies*, by conceptualising Indonesia as a primacy-aspiring rising middle power, attempts to fill this gap, furthering understanding of Indonesia's behaviour and approach through the lens of the state's diplomatic style and strategic culture.

CHAPTER III: BRAZIL

The second case analysis of this thesis focuses on the state of Brazil — the largest state in South America. Brazil, a rising middle power, holds considerable influence in South America because of its size, resources and a distinct foreign policy approach. Moreover, Brazil has not been involved in any major conflict since World War II, in contrast to a number of other rising middle powers. These factors reflect Brazil's distinct perception of and approach to power, thus making it an intriguing case to study, with relevance for this thesis's focus on the influence of diplomatic style and strategic culture on states' foreign policy behaviours.

Hence, this chapter attempts to make sense of Brazil's behaviour in regional and global affairs through the lens of its diplomatic style and strategic culture; these, in turn, have been formed through the embedded beliefs and values of the Brazilian society, as well as the historical events and circumstances that the state has faced.[341] Discussing the state's behaviour in terms of its diplomatic style and strategic culture will help understand why Brazil can be classified as a primacy-aspiring rising middle power.

The Federative Republic of Brazil accounts for almost fifty percent of the South American continent's land mass.[342] Some of the factors which contribute to Brazil's continental scale are its vast geographic space, its population in proportion to South America's, and its economic and political importance in the region. Brazil's natural resources and its emerging grandeur on the global stage give the state a prominent position in South America. Brazil shares borders with ten states: Uruguay, Suriname, Venezuela, French Guiana, Guyana, Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay.[343] The state's land size also enables substantial access to the Atlantic Ocean, with fifteen out of the twenty-six federative units accessing the coastline that extends for 8500 kilometres.[344] With the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) accounted for, Brazil has an area of 12.14 million km².[345] The access to a lengthy Atlantic coastline contributed to the arrival of European powers in the region between the 15th and 17th centuries. Brazil has

[341] Fernando L. Neto, 'Power and Culture: The Cultural Foundations of Brazilian Sociology', *Cultural Sociology,* vol.14, no.1, 2020, pp.3-21.
[342] Wilber A. Chaffee, 'Brazil', in Harry E. Vanden and Gary Prevost (eds), *Politics of Latin America: The power game* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
[343] Ibid.
[344] Silvio Jablonski and Martinus Filet, 'Coastal management in Brazil - A political riddle', *Ocean & Coastal Management,* vol.51, no.7, 2008, pp.536-543.
[345] Rodrigo Fracalossi de Moraes, 'The Parting of the Seas: Norms, Material Power and State Control over the Ocean', *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, vol.62, no. 1, 2019, pp.1-18.

a population of nearly two hundred and fourteen million people, one which presents a mix of native indigenous peoples of the Americas, descendants of slaves of African descent, and immigrant families predominantly from Europe, Japan and Lebanon.[346]

Prior to 1500, modern-day Brazil was inhabited by various tribes; European contact with today's Brazilian region started with Pedro Alvares Cabral's arrival at Coroa Vermelha in 1500.[347] The first permanent Portuguese settlement was founded in 1532, after which the Portuguese began to establish colonies to expand subsistence agriculture and cultivation across the coast.[348] In 1808, as Napoleon invaded and conquered Iberia, the Portuguese king fled to Brazil and established his new capital in Rio de Janeiro, as a result of which national politics in Brazil were centralised.[349] Chaffee argues that the development of Brazilian nationhood occurred during this period.[350] After Napoleon was defeated, the Portuguese Royal Family returned to Lisbon in 1821; subsequently, Dom Pedro, the Portuguese Crown Prince, proclaimed the independence of Brazil in 1822.[351] Later, in 1889, a presidential republic was formed after a military coup overthrew the monarchy. The monarchical rule in Brazil was important, as it helped maintain national unity in the 19th century, unlike what transpired in other South American states at the time.[352]

At the end of the second world war, Brazil began the process of democratisation and free elections were held in 1945. However, the democratic period did not last long as rising political tensions led to a military coup in 1964.[353] Thereafter, Brazil was ruled by the military until 1985.[354] The military administration curtailed several key rights, including direct elections for the presidency and other political freedoms. At the same time, the regime presided over a period of sustained economic progress, especially during the period of the "Brazilian miracle"

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[346] 'Brazil Population 2021', *World Population Review*, https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/brazil-population
[347] Chaffee, 'Brazil'.
[348] Ibid.
[349] For further details on the transfer of the Portuguese royal court to Rio de Janeiro in 1808 and the politics of Brazil until their departure in 1821, see Kirsten Schultz, *Tropical Versailles: empire, monarchy, and the Portuguese royal court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821* (London: Routledge, 2013).
[350] Chaffee, 'Brazil'. For more on the impact of colonial rule on Brazil, see Caio Prado Jr., *The colonial background of modern Brazil* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
[351] Ibid.
[352] Paulo Roberto de Almeida, interview by the author, Brasilia (Brazil), 11 July 2018.
[353] For more on the period of liberal democracy between 1945-1964, see Leslie Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the liberal republic, 1945-1964', in *The Cambridge History of Latin America Volume IX: Brazil Since 1930* (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
[354] For more on the military regime in Brazil, see Thomas E. Skidmore, *The politics of military rule in Brazil, 1964-1985* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

from 1968 to 1973, when Brazil's GDP growth rate reached double-digits.[355] The military rule ended in 1985, and after a period of transition and the introduction of a new constitution in 1988, presidential elections were held in 1989.[356] After the return of democracy, the government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) was influential in increasing Brazil's regional and global engagement. He believed that it was not possible for Brazil to develop "without an active insertion into the international system."[357]

This approach of increased international engagement, initiated by Cardoso, was built upon by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010), who undertook various initiatives in the region as well as expanded Brazil's role in the international context — Zilla describes this period as "Brazil's foreign policy ascent."[358] President Dilma Roussef's government (2011-2016) faced increased domestic troubles, which contributed to the absence of major regional initiatives similar to those initiated by President Lula, even though Brazil successfully hosted the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Summer Olympics in 2016.[359] In 2018, Jair Bolsonaro, a right-wing parliamentarian, was elected as president and brought a new approach to foreign relations. He sought to bring reforms to the Itamaraty[360], Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and allowed the promotion of younger diplomats at the cost of more experienced ones.[361] This was closely linked to the change in foreign policy approach pursued by President Bolsonaro, which took an ideological tone, inspired by religious beliefs, and contradicted Brazil's historically-held beliefs in the liberal international order and the defence of human rights.[362]

[355] Timothy J. Power, 'The Brazilian Military Regime of 1964-1985: Legacies for Contemporary Democracy', *Iberoamericana*, vol.16, no.62, 2016, pp.13-26.
[356] For more on transition from military to democratic rule, see Adriano N. Codato, 'A political history of the Brazilian transition from military dictatorship to democracy', *Revista de Sociologia e Política*, vol. 2, 2006, pp.1-33.
[357] Sean W. Burges and Fabrício H. Chagas Bastos, 'The importance of presidential leadership for Brazilian foreign policy', *Policy Studies,* vol.38, no.3, 2017, pp.277-290, at p.282.
[358] Claudia Zilla, *Brazil's Foreign Policy under Lula* (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2017) p.5.
[359] Burges and Bastos, 'The importance of presidential leadership for Brazilian foreign policy', pp.277-290.
[360] *Itamaraty* is referred to as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil (Portuguese: *Ministério das Relações Exteriores*) named after the first building which housed the ministry (Itamaraty Palace, in Rio de Janeiro). Since 1970, the current location of the ministry has been in Brasilia, where the building is also known as the Itamaraty Palace.
[361] Miriam Gomes Saraiva, 'The democratic regime and the changes in Brazilian foreign policy towards South America', *Brazilian Political Science Review,* vol.14, no.3, 2020, pp.1-39.
[362] Ibid.

History of Diplomatic Practice from Colonial Times

The Portuguese, upon their arrival in Brazil, prioritised the establishment of trade links to metropolises in Iberia; this meant that Brazil's interior area was not properly explored by the Portuguese in the 16th and 17th centuries. Over time, the Portuguese developed several colonies (called captaincies) in the region, which served as centres of power.[363] Many of Brazil's values and beliefs regarding its identity were formed during Portuguese colonial rule. Initially, the Portuguese did not find any precious metals, and "consequently no easy path to fabulous wealth."[364] Instead, the Portuguese developed agriculture and subsequently trade links with Africa and Europe. This meant that from a very early stage of its history, Brazil interacted with Europe and Africa, and had an "Atlantic and eastward-looking orientation" which may have contributed towards Brazilians expressing a lack of association with a distinct South American identity. Brazil looked towards Europe for its cultural, legal and political models.[365] Moreover, the lack of trade with Spanish America meant that Brazilians only interacted with them through border disputes, which contributed to the "sentiments of cultural insularity and uniqueness," which then influenced Brazil's identity and strategic thought.[366] According to Freyre, this isolation from the rest of the continent contributed to the development of the values of hospitality and an aversion to conflicts of any kind, which continue to influence Brazilian society.[367]

Gradually, a lucrative sugarcane industry developed in Brazil; this meant that abundant labour was required. Initially, the settlers brought members of the indigenous population to work on these sugarcane farms.[368] However, the indigenous in Brazil soon fell victim to European diseases and fled into the interior. This resulted in the inflow of African slaves in order to provide labour for the sugarcane industry.[369]

It can also be argued that Brazil's focus on negotiation and dialogue was initiated during the Portuguese colonial rule. As the sugarcane industry developed, other European powers attempted to gain control over the region; the French were twice expelled by the Portuguese,

[363] Chaffee, 'Brazil'.
[364] Thomas Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America* 6th edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) p.23.
[365] Marcos Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought', Ph.D Dissertation, University of Central Florida, 2016, p.110.
[366] Ibid.
[367] Ibid.
[368] Skidmore and Smith, *Modern Latin America*, p.23.
[369] Ibid.

while the Dutch were able to control large parts of the land for about 24 years, before being defeated and expelled by the Portuguese army.[370] This latter conflict with the Dutch led to extensive negotiations between the Portuguese and the Dutch. These territorial conflicts and the ensuing negotiations are considered to be important in the development of Brazil's territorial unity.[371] Former Foreign Minister Celso Lafer notes,

> By means of such negotiations, Portugal reestablished diplomatically the monolithic character of its dominion in South America, which for a quarter of a century had been broken by the Dutch presence in Pernambuco. This foreign policy development had great importance for preserving what was to become the future of Brazilian territorial unity.[372]

Thus, the negotiations by the Portuguese to consolidate their control over the territories helped lay the foundation for the boundaries of the modern Brazilian state. Similarly, the Treaty of Madrid in 1750, signed by the Portuguese and Spanish monarchs, established the boundaries between Portuguese America and Spanish America; the content of the treaty would later be used by Brazil's revered diplomat and foreign minister, the Baron of Rio Branco, to negotiate a territorial dispute with Argentina.[373]

As noted earlier, after Napoleon's invasion of Iberia, the royal family of Portugal established Rio de Janeiro as the capital of their empire, which is often considered as the point when a political consciousness began developing for the formation of an independent Empire of Brazil.[374] The arrival of the royal family led to massive development in the city, including new roads, universities, military academies and banks, as well as a range of bureaucratic and judicial institutions.[375] In this way, the Portuguese developed the city of Rio de Janeiro before Brazil's independence. After the departure of the Portuguese king to Lisbon in 1821, the Portuguese Crown Prince, Dom Pedro, declared independence and assumed the role of emperor within a constitutional monarchy.[376] Thus, Brazil's history from colonial times and the legacy of the Portuguese has been instrumental in the development of Brazil's distinct identity, its strategic thought, as well as the infrastructural and institutional development of the state. In this

[370] Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought'.
[371] Ibid.
[372] Celso Lafer, 'Brazilian international identity and foreign policy: Past, present, and future', *Daedalus*, vol.129, no.2, 2000, pp.207-238.
[373] Ibid.
[374] Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought'.
[375] Ibid.
[376] Ibid.

way, the colonial period helped develop the Brazilians' belief in their unique identity, and a preference for negotiation to avert conflicts.

Brazil's Strategic Culture

Brazil's strategic culture has been influenced by the values, beliefs and outlooks of the Brazilian people, which have developed over time. These values, beliefs and outlooks have formed as a result of the unique historical circumstances and events that Brazil has faced.

Brazil's strategic thought has been influenced by the way Brazilians perceive themselves and their position in the world. Fully to understand Brazil's perception of itself, the impact of its location and geography on the state elites' thinking has to be considered. The fact that Brazil borders ten different states and has an extensive coastline means that its borders present security threats. However, Brazil's population is mostly distributed along the coast which means that the vast interior of its continental mass is largely uninhabited, while the Northwest region is largely covered by the Amazon rainforest. This provides a natural defensive cover from other neighbouring states. As Eakin points out, this has also led to the relatively low number of border conflicts in Brazil's history.[377] Moreover, Brazil's location is far away from centres of geopolitical tensions and conflicts, thus leading to a relatively secure and stable environment.[378]

More importantly, Brazil's history, size and population have played a role in the state's self-perception. Brazil, being one of the world's largest democracies and the seventh-largest economy, perceives itself as deserving of a more prominent role in regional and global affairs.[379] Moreover, Brazilians point towards the absence of border disputes or other conflicts in the state's modern history, which has fostered in them a sense of exceptionalism in the region. These factors, coupled with Brazil's size and population, "have inspired a belief that the state belongs among the global elite."[380] Former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso described Brazil's aspirations as a "dream of world prominence."[381] Scholars also note that the state's

[377] Ibid
[378] David C. Wolfe, 'Brazil's Difficult Road to Greatness', *USAWC Strategy Research Project,* 2008.
[379] Marcos Degaut, 'Brazil's military modernization: Is a new strategic culture emerging', *Rising Powers Quarterly* vol.2, no.1, 2017, pp.271-297.
[380] Hal Brands, *Dilemmas of Brazilian grand strategy* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010) p.6.
[381] Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *The accidental president of Brazil: a memoir* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007) p.255.

ruling elite has always pursued this quest of acquiring greater international influence.[382] Thus, Brazil's unique geopolitical and strategic position, territorial size and resources, and economic and political clout have led to aspirations for prominence.

It must also be noted that while Brazil has significantly developed its economy and other political and diplomatic credentials, it has not prioritised its military capabilities to the same extent. Franko notes that Brazil's "transformational changes in the economic and political realms have not been accompanied by advances in military power."[383] Franko further argues that considering its size and economy, Brazil "underspends on its defence."[384] While the lack of a stronger military may be a result of Brazil's unwillingness to assert itself with material resources and other ideational factors, the state's aspirations for greater global influence may be affected by this. As former Defence Minister Nelson Jobim notes, "I affirm that this gap has now reached worrying proportions, once the defence's limited capacity to support Brazilian foreign policy prevents us from adopting bolder diplomatic initiatives."[385] While Brazil's military capacity may not match that of other rising middle powers, Brazil by far has the largest defence budget and the strongest military capabilities in South America.[386]

Brazil's strategic culture has also been influenced by a sense of nationalism, which is interrelated with the cultural diversity in Brazil and the formation of a distinct Brazilian identity. Freyre argues that centuries of racial, social and cultural intermixing has created a unique melting pot and has allowed for the development of a unique Brazilian identity.[387] Thus, Brazil has been able to achieve a sense of geographical and cultural unity despite a diverse ethnic and racial population. Eakin remarked that centuries of cultural and racial mixing has produced a state with "an impressive internal homogeneity that provides it with an ability to act globally without the linguistic, ethnic, sectarian, and regional divides" that have fragmented other states; thus, this mixing has "produced a people with a remarkable set of shared symbols, rituals, and beliefs — who share a profound unity."[388]

[382] Carlos Milani, Leticia Pinheiro, and Maria Regina Soares De Lima, 'Brazil's foreign policy and the graduation dilemma', *International Affairs,* vol.93, no.3, 2017, pp.585-605.
[383] Patrice Franko, 'The defense acquisition trilemma: the case of Brazil', *Strategic Forum*, no.284, 2014.
[384] Ibid, p.10.
[385] Nelson Jobim, 'Brazil and the world - Opportunities, ambitions and choices', Transcript of a speech delivered at a Chatham House conference, 2011, p.4.
[386] Malamud, 'A leader without followers? The growing divergence between the regional and global performance of Brazilian foreign policy'.
[387] Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought'.
[388] Ibid, p.116.

Regarding the influence of nationalism in Brazilian strategic thinking, Franko describes Brazil as a state "whose strategy has been grounded by nationalism in the service of sovereignty."[389] This Brazilian identity is also tied with the people's perception of Brazil as a state destined for greatness. Hence, the Brazilian identity, based on self-aggrandisement and nationalist sentiments, played a big role in the formation of the state's strategic culture. It must be noted, however, that Brazil's nationalism has not led to expansionist behaviour, as Lafer highlights.[390]

Another important component of Brazilian identity is the lack of shared values and culture with other South American states. While Brazilians recognise that they share an Iberian and Catholic background with other South American states, there is very little common between them in terms of history, geography, language and culture — which was due to vastly different colonial experiences of Portuguese America and Spanish America.[391] Brazil regarded itself as relatively stable and 'civilised' after independence, compared to the Spanish American republics — the states formally under Spanish colonial rule — whom it regarded as "violent, extremely unstable and barbarous."[392] Hence, Brazil's unique identity and its sense of exceptionalism also developed because of differences in state-building between Brazil and other South American states. Brazil's perception of its distinctive journey compared to other South American states has continued till today. A statistical survey on Latin Americans' public opinion on their identities, conducted in 2015, reported that 79% of Brazil's population identified themselves as "Brazilians," 13% as "citizens of the world," 4% as "Latin Americans," and only 1% as "South Americans;" on the contrary, the average population who defined themselves as "Latin Americans" in six other countries of the region (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru) was 43%.[393] Hence, Brazil's sense of exceptionalism and its unique identity continue to influence its strategic culture.

It is important here to acknowledge that the unity and the sense of shared identity being witnessed in Brazil today was preceded by ethnic violence and discrimination. As Abdenur and Call note, the formation of Brazil as a people was the result of a violent process; this process began with the extermination and marginalisation of indigenous populations under colonial

[389] Franko, 'The defense acquisition trilemma: the case of Brazil', p.127.
[390] Lafer, 'Brazilian international identity and foreign policy: Past, present, and future', pp.207-238.
[391] Leslie Bethell, 'Brazil and Latin America', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol.42, no.3, 2010, pp.457-485.
[392] Ibid, p.461.
[393] On the statistical findings on public opinion on foreign policy in Latin American, see, Guadalupe Gonzalez, Jorge A. Schiavon, David Crow, and Gerardo Maldonado, *The Americas and the World 2010-2011: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru* (Mexico City: CIDE, 2011).

rule; this history of institutional discrimination continues to have an effect on Brazilian society today.[394] Thus, while the cultural intermixing has led to a unique identity — which has influenced the state's strategic culture — the process of the formation ofthis identity has a history of discrimination and marginalisation.

While Brazil's self-perception and its identity has been an important component of its strategic culture, these aspects are tied with and influenced by the beliefs in pacifism and non-violence. Scholars believe that after its independence, Brazil adopted a "culture of pacifism" in its relation to other states.[395] This means that the state strongly believes in non-interference and non-intrusion in the affairs of other states. This belief in pacifism has continued to guide Brazil's behaviour through the 20th and 21st centuries. The 1934 Constitution of Brazil, for instance, declared that Brazil will "never engage in a war of conquest" and will not engage in a military conflict until arbitration has been pursued. While the 1934 constitution only survived for 3 years, it served as a basis for future constitutions, and hence, highlights the importance of pacifist beliefs in the state's strategic thinking.[396] Thus, these beliefs have shaped the state's strategic culture.

The Brazilian elites' beliefs in pacifism relate to the importance of diplomacy in the state's history. As Casarões argues, Brazil was "almost entirely forged by diplomacy — to the extent that our rejection of the use of force has become part of our national identity."[397] Mr. Sergio Lima, a diplomat at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, reiterates this view by highlighting the role of diplomacy in the establishment of Brazil.[398] Brazil established non-aggressive, non-confrontational methods of dealing with foreign states. This non-confrontational behaviour also stems from Brazilians' perception of themselves in the decades after independence where there was some threat of a European attempt at recolonisation; as such, the state's leaders perceived Brazil as "a weak marginal state seeking the assistance and protection of more powerful nations."[399] Thus, Brazil's lack of material power and reliance on diplomacy in the early decades of its history influenced the state's non-confrontational approach and its belief in pacifism, which have become important components of its strategic culture.

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[394] Adriana E. Abdenur and Charles T. Call, 'A "Brazilian way"? Brazil's approach to peacebuilding', in Charles T. Call and Cedric de Coning (eds), *Rising Powers and Peacebuilding: Breaking the Mold?* (Cham, Germany: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017) pp.15-38.
[395] Ibid, p.6.
[396] See Article 4, Constitution of Brazil 1934.
[397] Guilherme Casarões, 'Itamaraty's Mission', *The Cairo Review of Global Affairs,* vol.17, 2014, p.88.
[398] Sergio Lima, interview by author, Brasilia (Brazil), 11 July 2018.
[399] Degaut, 'Brazil's military modernization: Is a new strategic culture emerging', p.288.

It should also be noted that the adoption of pacifist, non-interventionist, and non-confrontational values and beliefs has served Brazil well, as the state has not been involved in an inter-state conflict for decades and its last border dispute was settled more than a hundred years ago.[400] This historically peaceful existence has undoubtedly strengthened Brazilians' belief in values of non-confrontation and pacifism.

Another important component of Brazilian strategic culture has been the quest for autonomy in the international system. Brazil considers the international system to be a constraint on the independent, autonomous formulation of policies.[401] In the post-Cold War era, however, Brazilian elites thought that there was "enough policy space to reform existing regimes and institutions" in order for Brazil to achieve a preferred position, whereby it would have more autonomy to pursue its policies.[402] This conception of autonomy has remained important in Brazilian elites' thinking with regard to regional organisations and integration initiatives, which might impose new constraints on the state.

We have seen that Brazil's unique identity, self-aggrandisement and pacifist beliefs combine to form a strategic mindset that aims to advance Brazil's influence in the world while adhering to the values of non-violence and non-interference. This strategic culture has led to Brazil's adopting of non-violent methods of conflict resolution and displaying an aversion to the use of force; moreover, Brazilian efforts towards gaining influence and power in the region and on the global stage have almost exclusively involved diplomatic initiatives. As Vigevani and Ramanzini Junior elaborate, Brazil "pursues its projection abroad by means of an intense participation — although with differing strategies — in regional and multilateral political and economic forums."[403] Moreover, Brazil has shown an inclination to use soft power resources to advance its national interests; Brazilian strategic culture has contributed to a dependence on non-material aspects of foreign policy.[404] Combined with the relative lack of material capacity,

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[400] Ibid

[401] Andrew James Hurrell, *The Quest for Autonomy: The evolution of Brazil's role in the international system*, (Brasilia: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2014).

[402] Matias Spektor, 'Brazil: Shadows of the Past and Contested Ambitions', in William I. Hitchcock, Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro (eds), *Shaper Nations* (Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 2016) pp.17-35 at p.20.

[403] Tullo Vigevani and Haroldo Ramanzini Júnior, 'The impact of domestic politics and international changes on the Brazilian perception of regional integration', *Latin American Politics and Society,* vol.53, no.1, 2011, pp.125-155 at p.126.

[404] Eduarda P. Hamann, 'Brazil and R2P: A rising global player struggles to harmonise principles and practice', in Malte Brosig (ed.)*, The Responsibility to Protect — from evasive to reluctant action? The role of global middle powers* (Johannesburg: Hanns Seidel Foundation, 2012) pp.71-89 at p.72.

the above factors have shaped Brazilian elites' preference for non-coercive methods of achieving strategic goals.

The beliefs and values that form Brazil's strategic culture have thus promoted the use of negotiations and dialogue. This has resulted in Brazil taking a greater part in mediating conflicts between South American states; for instance, under President Lula, Brazil was involved in dialogue facilitation and conflict resolution in Venezuela (2002), Honduras (2009), and Ecuador (2010).[405] Similarly, highlighting the role of dialogue in Brazilian thinking, Larissa Wachholz, a specialist on Brazil-China investments and the Vice President of Irelgov, remarks that Brazil has developed its skills to become adept at negotiation.[406] She also highlights Brazil's strong trade unions and an elaborate history of labour law negotiations, which have contributed to Brazil becoming a proficient negotiator.[407]

Another important aspect of the state's strategic thinking is the value attached to internal development, as Brazilian leaders have continued to prefer the resolution of domestic economic issues over greater involvement in the region and the world.[408] As such, in the pursuit of greater influence in the world, which has been a long-held aspiration of Brazilian leaders, the state considers economic development as a prerequisite. They believe that "economic development is a necessary precondition for achieving an international status commensurate with Brazil's geographic and demographic size."[409]

In more recent times, Brazil's strategic thinking vis-à-vis militarisation and material capacity has evolved. This has been the result of the belief that a foreign policy which is "excessively based on negotiation may show signs of weakness and may generate more damage than benefits."[410] This shift in thinking is also linked with Brazil's aspirations for greater global prominence; Brazilian elites believe that for Brazil to "reach its deserved spot in the world, it will have to be prepared to defend itself not only from aggressions, but equally from threats."[411] This has led Brazil to rethink its strategic and security conceptions regarding militarisation and the use of force, along with the applicability of its overarching belief in pacifism; former Navy

[405] Spektor, 'Brazil: Shadows of the Past and Contested Ambitions', p.29.
[406] Larissa Wachholz, interview by the author, Brasilia (Brazil), 16 July 2018.
[407] Ibid.
[408] Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought'.
[409] Harold Trinkunas, *Brazil's rise: Seeking influence on global governance* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2014) p.7.
[410] João Fábio Bertonha, 'Brazil: an emerging military power? The problem of the use of force in Brazilian international relations in the 21st century', *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional,* vol.53, no.2, 2010, pp.107-124, at p.12.
[411] 'National strategy of defence: peace and security for Brazil', *Ministry of Defense of Brazil*, 2009, p.8.

Minister Admiral Mário Flores remarked that "pacifism is not conformity, and modern military power should not be improvised. It will be too late if we think of it only in times of need."[412]

There is increasing debate about Brazil's strategic priorities in terms of its future direction. The values and beliefs that have become important components of Brazil's strategic culture provide a contradictory approach for the elite to pursue. On the one hand, Brazil's aspirations and self-aggrandisement indicate a possible pursuit of great power status and a wish to be incorporated into the developed world; contrarily, Brazil also sees itself as an ally of developing states around the world.[413] Wolfe points out that "a fundamental debate among Brazilians is whether the grand strategy should be pursuit of leadership of the developing world, or of junior membership in the developed world."[414]

Overall, a number of embedded values and beliefs, formed through historical events and circumstances, have influenced Brazil's strategic culture. As such, issues and opportunities related to Brazil's geography, location and a unique nationalist identity have dominated Brazil's strategic thought. More importantly, the state's strategic thinking has also been influenced by Brazil's strong adherence to values of pacifism, non-confrontation and non-interference. Brazil's strategic culture promotes dealing with foreign relations through primarily diplomacy and soft power; at the same time, Brazil's military capacity is relatively lacking compared to other rising middle powers such as India. There are signs that Brazil's strategic culture is evolving, with the state elite realising the need for stronger material capacity and resources to support Brazil's rise and aspirations for greater influence in the world.

Brazil's Diplomatic Style

Brazilian diplomatic style has also been affected by the inherent values and beliefs of the society. Moreover, the values of diplomacy prevalent in the region have also played a role in influencing Brazil's diplomatic style. In addition, the influence of individual diplomats and statesmen in Brazil's history, particularly the Baron of Rio Branco, has to be considered fully to understand the formation of the unique values that guide Brazil's diplomatic style.

[412] Degaut, 'Brazil's military modernisation: Is a new strategic culture emerging', p.287.
[413] Wolfe, 'Brazil's Difficult Road to Greatness'.
[414] Ibid, p.6

The earlier discussion of Brazil's strategic culture reveals the society's beliefs in the values of pacifism, non-confrontation and non-interference. These values have also influenced Brazil's diplomatic style and as such, also play a role in Brazil's approach to foreign relations. As a result, Brazil's diplomatic style is distinguished by its focus on ensuring non-violent resolution of conflicts and maintaining peaceful relations with neighbouring states. This diplomatic style has led to Brazil being classified as having a "vocation for peaceful conflict resolution" and being a "natural mediator."[415] Brazilian diplomats have often defined their principle of non-interference as a distinctive "Brazilian way."[416] Thus, Brazil's diplomatic style indicates the state's preference for a consensus-based, cooperation-seeking approach, based on Brazilians' belief in pacifism and non-violence. Article 4 of the federal constitution of Brazil establishes basic principles of Brazilian international relations, which includes non-intervention, prevalence of human rights, self-determination, international cooperation and the peaceful settlement of conflicts, amongst others.[417]

Moreover, the diplomatic style of Brazil has also been influenced by its elites' perceptions of Brazil as a state that is destined to play a great role in international affairs.[418] This idea leads to the pursuit of increased participation in multilateral forums and an active role in mediating conflicts, especially between developed and developing states.[419] In particular, Brazil's diplomatic style has been influenced by the belief that multilateral channels can serve as a way to increase Brazil's influence without the use of force, and as a result, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations, Itamaraty, has promoted multilateralism.[420]

Fully to understand the formation of Brazil's diplomatic style, the prevalent diplomatic norms and practices in South America as a whole must also be considered. Merke argues that *concertación* (concertation), which can be characterised as a focus on dialogue, consensus-seeking and peaceful resolution of conflicts, is a "key practice that forms the core of diplomatic culture in Latin America" and has influenced Brazil's diplomatic thinking.[421] This diplomatic culture has led to "the relatively peaceful settlement of disputes that has characterised the

[415] Andrew Hurrell, 'An emerging security community in South America?', *Cambridge Studies in International Relations,* vol.62, no.1, 1998, pp.228-264, at p.7.
[416] Abdenur and Call, 'A "Brazilian Way"? Brazil's Approach to Peacebuilding'.
[417] Article 4 of the Federal Constitution of Brazil.
[418] Milani, Pinheiro and De Lima, 'Brazil's foreign policy and the graduation dilemma', pp.585-605.
[419] Ibid.
[420] Justin Ferber, 'Brazil as a Regional and International Leader', Master's thesis, CUNY City College, 2012.
[421] Federico Merke, 'Neither balance nor bandwagon: South American international society meets Brazil's rising power', *International Politics,* vol.52, no.2, 2015, pp.178-192 at p.185.

international relations of the region, especially in South America, since 1883."[422] This South American diplomatic style of consensus-building and peacefully resolving conflicts has influenced the development of Brazil's diplomatic style as well.

Another important component of South American diplomatic style — which has influenced Brazil's diplomatic style — is the adherence to international law and belief in legalism, which has to be viewed in conjunction with the concertación. Merke explains that international law provided South American states with a "language" and a "mechanism" through which they could apply their political reasoning to regional problems and conflicts.[423] As a result, Kacowitz highlights that "in comparative terms, Latin America sustains a world record of adjudication and arbitration."[424] In this way, adherence to legalist values and international law has also grown to be an important part of South American diplomatic style.

It must be noted that concertation in South America, and its influence on Brazil's diplomatic style, was not the result of regional brotherhood as Brazilians do not associate with the Latin American or South American identity. Rather, concertation is the result of South America facing "material systemic pressures, namely U.S. hegemony and globalised capitalism," along with a regional diplomatic style that is rooted in "formalist, legalist tradition inherited from Spain and Portugal."[425] Hence, the circumstances facing the South American region led to the development of the belief in concertation, which has become an important part of the region's diplomatic style. Through this process, Brazil has adopted and embraced the norms of concertation and legalism, and has developed an ethos to deal with conflicts and disputes through diplomacy and the rule of law.[426]

Historical events and diplomatic initiatives taken by Brazilian leaders and diplomats over the decades have reaffirmed the practice of concertation, pacifism and the non-confrontational approach, and have strengthened the diplomatic norms of the state. The tenure of the Baron of Rio Branco, Jose Maria da Silva Paranhos, as the foreign minister of Brazil

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[422] David R. Mares and Arie M. Kacowicz (eds), *Routledge handbook of Latin American security* (New York: Routledge, 2015).
[423] Merke, 'Neither balance nor bandwagon: South American international society meets Brazil's rising power', p.185.
[424] Arie Kacowicz, 'Compliance and non-compliance with international norms in territorial disputes: the Latin American record of arbitrations', in Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch (eds), *The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation: Theoretical Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) pp.194-215 at p.199.
[425] Merke, 'Neither balance nor bandwagon: South American international society meets Brazil's rising power', pp.187-8.
[426] Celso Lafer, 'Dilemmas and challenges in Brazil's foreign policy', *Estudos Avançados,* vol.14, no.38, 2000, pp.63-71 at p.94.

between 1902-12 was particularly influential in strengthening Brazil's diplomatic style. He was able to negotiate successfully with Brazil's neighbours with regard to the delineation of their borders. This earned him a revered status among Brazilians, as his efforts added 342,000 square miles of additional territory for Brazil (an area of land greater than France's).[427] Apart from establishing the state's borders with its neighbours, Rio Branco was instrumental in articulating and strengthening Brazil's international identity. This involved improving ties with the United States, which was, at the time, emerging as a centre of world power.[428] Indeed, his diplomatic legacy is "revered as of great importance for the construction of the international identity of Brazil."[429] Thus, he contributed towards fulfilling the Brazilians' aspirations to be recognised in the world.

Rio Branco's approach to diplomacy influenced Brazil's adoption of "constructive moderation" as a diplomatic approach, which is defined by former Foreign Minister Celso Lafer as the capacity to "de-dramatize the foreign policy agenda by reducing conflicts, crises and difficulties to their diplomatic bedrock."[430] Thus, Rio Branco's endeavours as foreign minister consolidated Brazilians' belief in concertation and the use of negotiations. This led to the evolution of Brazilian diplomatic style and reaffirmed the use of diplomacy and negotiations to achieve key strategic and geopolitical goals.

Rio Branco is also attributed with developing and modernising the institution of Itamaraty, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and inspiring the diplomatic approach that characterises Brazil today.[431] He expanded the diplomatic workforce and recruited young intellectuals, thus setting the foundation for a successful foreign ministry.[432] He turned Itamaraty from a "cramped and disorganised" institution to an "up-to-date, efficient, and tightly run ministry" which was capable of successfully implementing foreign policies.[433]

The inherent values and beliefs of the Brazilian society, the region's history and circumstances, and the influence of Rio Branco's remarkable diplomatic achievements have developed Brazil's diplomatic style. This diplomatic style is also influenced by the state's

[427] Wolfe, 'Brazil's Difficult Road to Greatness'. Also see Ferber, 'Brazil as a Regional and International Leader'.
[428] Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought'.
[429] João Paulo Alsina Jr, 'Rio Branco, grand strategy and naval power,' *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, vol.57, no.2, 2014, pp.9-28 at p.9. For America's rise as a major power in the Americas and in the world between 1865 and 1908, see Fareed Zakaria, *From wealth to power: The unusual origins of America's world role* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
[430] Lafer, 'Brazilian international identity and foreign policy: Past, present, and future', p.215.
[431] Ferber, 'Brazil as a Regional and International Leader'.
[432] Ibid.
[433] Ibid, p.52.

preference for soft power over hard power. Indeed, Brazil has shown preference for soft power resources in order to "foster international changes that might shape a more favourable international environment into realising its political and economic interests."[434] While it is clear that Brazil's use of soft power resources stems from the state's embedded values and beliefs in concertation, non-violence, and pacifism, it must be noted that the lack of material resources has also played a part in this approach. Hamann argues that Brazil's approach is "moulded by strong non-material aspects and lack of material capacity;" these two conditions combined "act in favour of the use of soft power to deal with international politics, which justifies Brazil's preference for non-coercive measures to maintain or restore international peace and security."[435] Thus, the lack of material capacity has also played a role in Brazil's approach.

Nevertheless, Brazil's diplomatic style promotes the use of soft power. Brazil has striven to increase its outreach through its culture; a notable example of the prowess of Brazilian culture is football, with Brazil having produced some of the most talented players of the game.[436] For instance, in 1968, the conflicting groups of the Nigerian civil war agreed to a forty-eight hours cease-fire in order to watch Brazilian player Pele play an exhibition game in the Nigerian city of Lagos.[437] In this way, Brazil's diplomatic style has developed to promote the use of soft power resources, including Brazilian culture and sports.

Hence, the values and beliefs of pacifism and non-interference have influenced Brazil's diplomatic style, promoting a more consensus-based and cooperative approach to foreign relations. The diplomatic culture of South America, and its focus on concertation, has promoted legalism, consensus-seeking and adherence to international law, thus instilling these values in Brazil's diplomatic style. Moreover, the diplomatic initiatives and negotiations conducted to demarcate Brazil's borders by the Baron of Rio Branco played an influential role in shaping Brazil's diplomatic style. Thus, Brazil has developed a diplomatic approach which promotes the use of soft power resources to advance the state's objectives.

[434] Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought', p.283.
[435] Hamann, 'Brazil and R2P: A rising global player struggles to harmonise principles and practice', p.72.
[436] Ferber, 'Brazil as a Regional and International Leader', p.109.
[437] 'James Lawton: Rooney shares Pele's gift for turning a match on its head', *Independent*, 10 October 2011, https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news/james-lawton-rooney-shares-pele-s-gift-for-turning-a-match-on-its-head-755809.html.

Diplomats' Training, Conduct and Roles

The Brazilian diplomatic relationships represent an approach where decision-making power is not concentrated in the higher echelons of the executive branch of government; rather, its diplomats possess substantial agenda-setting capacity.

Diplomats are essential in the formulation of foreign policy and, therefore, need to engage in studying the states where they would be assigned in the future. They provide contextual information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brazil, which is necessary in formulating sound foreign policies.[438] Diplomats are also negotiators, and in Brazil's context, they are trained and tested on their abilities to represent the state on the international political scene. Brazilian diplomats exercise considerable autonomy in their roles and agenda-setting capacities. They undertake the activities of representing Brazil in other states and international organisations, contribute to the formation of the state's foreign policy, negotiate on behalf of the state, and provide consular services to Brazilians abroad.[439]

Brazil has relied heavily on the skills developed by its diplomatic service to maximise its autonomy in the international system, always emphasising sovereignty, non-intervention and peaceful resolution of disputes and cooperation.[440] The idea of sovereignty for all peoples has been advocated by all Brazilian governments, irrespective of their differences in political ideology.[441]

The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs falls under the federal government and is responsible for Brazil's diplomatic missions as well as the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Itamaraty has set the standards of diplomats' training in South America; in this regard, Marshall Eakin pointed out how the "Itamaraty shaped a culture over the twentieth century priding itself on recruiting some of the best and brightest young Brazilians into its ranks and projecting an image of a meritocratic intellectual and cultural elite."[442] The training of diplomats involves a great deal of diplomatic education and academic study. Borzova et al.

[438] Alla Borzova, Santos J. Da Costa and Maria L.C. Quiroga, 'Study on International Relations and Training of Diplomatic Personnel in Brazil and Bolivia', *6th International Conference on Education, Language, Art and Inter-cultural Communication*, 2020.
[439] 'Itamaraty and the Foreign Service Careers', *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, 24 August 2018, https://www.gov.br/mre/en/access-to-information/frequently-asked-questions/itamaraty-and-the-foreign-service-careers#I11.
[440] Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought'.
[441] Marco Tulio, interview by the author, Brasilia (Brazil), 12 July 2018.
[442] Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought', p.131.

observe, "…modern Brazil is characterised by a convergence of academic studies and diplomatic thought, which makes it possible to create a more active foreign policy".[443]

Established in 1945, the Rio Branco Institute (RBI) is the academy where the Itamaraty trains the state's diplomats.[444] To become a diplomat and begin training, one must pass the public contest organised by the Rio Branco Institute.[445] The RBI offers a wide range of courses for diplomats' training, including introductory training courses and higher-level courses.[446] The candidates seeking admission into the Foreign Service undergo an extremely rigorous national public exam; two years of intensive training follows, after which young diplomats can be sent to serve in one of the 250 Brazilian diplomatic missions spread around the globe.[447] The RBI also offers opportunities that are shaped for specific groups and for specific posts; for instance, Brazilians of African descent are offered a scholarship which allows them to gain diplomatic positions.[448]

Once a candidate satisfies all the conditions and is admitted to RBI, they are presented with three semesters of training, which entails both theoretical and practical aspects of diplomatic tradecraft. There are both core and elective areas that the diplomats under training are supposed to cover. Some of the mandatory areas that the trainees cover are international law, economics, diplomacy, international politics, as well as diplomatic language and expressions. To give them an experience of real-life situations, the Brazilian government engages diplomat trainees — through the Institution Rio Branco — in internships in their third semester of training. The interns are inducted into various divisions and departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or government institutions dealing with foreign relations. These internships provide new diplomats with the opportunity to become familiar with day-to-day functions and activities of a career in the Brazilian diplomatic corps. Thus, the RBI's training enables diplomats to access all the necessary skills required to carry out Brazil's foreign policy objectives.

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[443] Borzova, Da Costa and Quiroga, 'Study on International Relations and Training of Diplomatic Personnel in Brazil and Bolivia'.
[444] Ibid.
[445] 'Itamaraty and the Foreign Service Careers,' *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, 24 August 2018, https://www.gov.br/mre/en/access-to-information/frequently-asked-questions/itamaraty-and-the-foreign-service-careers#I11.
[446] Borzova, Da Costa and Quiroga, 'Study on International Relations and Training of Diplomatic Personnel in Brazil and Bolivia'.
[447] Ibid.
[448] Ibid.

National Security Apparatus

Brazil's Ministry of Defence is responsible for the state's security policy. The national security apparatus of Brazil is dependent on the state's armed forces, which are further divided into three branches: Brazilian Army, Brazilian Navy and the Brazilian Air Force.[449] The state also has a Military Police and the Military Firefighters Corps which are described as an auxiliary reserve force of the Army. Despite Brazil's disinclination towards using hard power, the Brazilian armed forces receive the 15th highest military budget globally, even though this budget is usually considered small when considered in proportion to the size of the Brazilian economy.[450]

The civilian governance structures have not always been able to exercise strong control over the military since the formation of the Republic in 1889 and as such, the military has continued to play an active political role as well. The military remains close to national policy making and has mostly maintained its own structure; thus, the influence of the military in policy-making and shaping Brazil's behaviour over the years cannot be discounted.

It must be noted that the Brazilian military has been losing its political influence since the fall of the military dictatorship in 1985.[451] The military still plays a key role in many issues; however, as Tollefson points out, they do not enjoy any exclusive rights to national resources, and rather have to compete for them with the civilian leaders.[452] This lack of control over resources can be demonstrated through the Brazilian federal government's willingness to halt military projects or cut the military budget in the case of a fiscal or economic crisis, as the government did in 2013.[453] This suggests that the military's role in policy-making and agenda-setting has diminished over the years. In terms of foreign policy making and establishing strategic objectives, the most important role is played by the Itamaraty, which has significant power.[454]

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[449] Article 142 of the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil.
[450] 'Military Expenditure (% of GDP) - Brazil | Data,' *Worldbank.org*, 2021, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=BR.
[451] Scott D. Tollefson, *Civil-military relations in Brazil: the myth of tutelary democracy* (Pittsburgh, P.A.: Latin American Studies Association, 1995).
[452] Ibid.
[453] Diego Lopes da Silva, 'How Brazil's political and economic crisis affects its military spending', *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, 22 June 2017, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2017/how-brazils-political-and-economic-crisis-affects-its-military-spending.
[454] Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, 'Civil–Military Relations in Brazil: A Reassessment', *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, vol.6, no.2, 2014, pp.107-138.

The considerable influence of the Itamaraty over Brazil's national security thinking may in part be explained by the lack of security threats that Brazil faces, despite having land borders with ten states. This has, in turn, reduced the need for military engagement in the region. Similarly, the threats of terrorism and internal conflicts have not affected Brazil in the same way as they have to many other states around the world, such as Indonesia and India. The former Minister of Defence, José Viegas Filho, in an interview in 2002, responded,

> No one can say that they are immune to terrorism. But if you were to draw up a list of states that are vulnerable to this problem, Brazil would certainly be in one of the lowest rankings. Brazil has no enemies. There is not one country in the world that hates us or is prejudiced against us.[455]

This highlights the low gravity of threats that Brazil faces internally and regionally, which means that the state does not have to develop military capability and focus on national security policy with the same urgency as Indonesia or India, states which face considerable internal threats.

While this chapter has highlighted Brazil's relative lack of focus on military development over the decades, it must be noted that in recent times, Brazil has initiated a process of modernising its army, navy and air force. This is also related to the evolution of Brazil's strategic culture, as the state has begun to realise that material capacity is necessary for Brazilian global influence to grow. This change in thinking has resulted in, for instance, the Brazilian Navy's pursuit of a nuclear submarine, which is directly related to Brazil's ambitions for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council.[456] Brazilian navy officers have argued that all other UNSC members have nuclear submarines; a former Brazilian Admiral remarked that when Brazil possesses a nuclear submarine, the state will become stronger "from both military and strategic points of view. It will have solid means to claim a seat on the Security Council."[457] Similarly, the army has been trying to increase its power projection capability by buying new equipment such as modern tanks.[458] While this demonstrates that Brazil's strategic thinking vis-à-vis military capability has evolved from previously-held beliefs, it must be noted that the modernisation process has been influenced by an aspiration to gain greater prominence through the mere possession of military capability — for instance, to gain a UNSC permanent

[455] Thomas C. Bruneau, 'Civilians and the Military in Latin America: The Absence of Incentives', *Latin American Politics and Society,* vol.55, no.4, 2013, pp.143-160.
[456] Degaut, 'Brazil's military modernisation: Is a new strategic culture emerging'.
[457] Ibid, p.290.
[458] Ibid.

seat — rather than to use it in conflicts. This suggests that Brazil's evolving strategic culture has combined the state elites' long-held pacifist, non-confrontational beliefs with a strategy of having sufficient military capability to match Brazil's perceived status of itself in the world.

How Diplomatic Style and Strategic Culture Guide Brazil's Actions as a Primacy-Aspiring Rising Middle Power

Brazil assumes a prominent role in the regional leadership in South America, arguably as a result of its growing influence and importance in the international order. However, the traditional theories of international relations appear to be insufficient in comprehensively describing Brazil's power projection style, hegemonic behaviour and strategic calculations in the regional system. Brazil maintains broad advantages in the region — economic size, strength of armed forces, size of territory, large population) — and this undoubtedly contributes to its regional leadership. But despite these advantages, Brazil does not seek to maximise its power to become the hegemon in the region. Yet, Brazil also demonstrates strong interest in expanding its influence by assuming a regional leadership role in the South American bloc through cooperation and integration. While this behaviour may be linked with that of a regional power or a middle power, Brazil's political position and approach is still different from other regional powers. For example, while other regional powers such as India and Iran are willing to make use of hard power resources and to develop the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, Brazil — due to its preference for pacifism and non-aggression — is unwilling to make such advancements despite having the capacity to pursue them. Similarly, some rising middle powers such as India are able to maneuver internationally by enacting soft power tools of attraction and persuasion, while also displaying dominance, instances of undemocratic behaviour and supremacy-aspiring ambitions in the region, but Brazil's behaviour is not consistent with these examples either.

Therefore, this chapter refers to Brazil's behaviour as that of a primacy-aspiring rising middle power, which approaches a position of regional leadership that is different from that of supremacy-aspiring rising middle powers. In the following sections, Brazil's behaviour and initiatives in the regional and global stages will be analysed. The state's navigation of great power competition will be reviewed, followed by its approach to regional leadership and integration. Furthermore, the state's power projection style and hegemonic tendencies will be

demonstrated by highlighting the role of Brazil's diplomatic style and strategic culture in influencing and developing the state's approach to foreign policy behaviour.

Navigation of Great Power Competition

Historically, Brazil has had to balance its relationship with various great powers. In the post-independence era, as Brazil faced the threat of a possible European invasion and occupation, it aligned itself with Britain, the dominant great power at the time. Throughout the 19th century, Brazil had close commercial and financial relationships with Britain, which also served as the "unofficial model" for the Brazilian empire at the time.[459] At the turn of the 19th century, however, this alignment began to change, as Brazil recognised the growing influence of the United States, a state that was also geographically closer to Brazil than Europe. As a result, Brazil developed strong political and trade ties with the United States. As Brazil became a republic in 1889, it looked towards the U.S. for inspiration.[460] Thus, unlike other rising middle powers such as Indonesia and India that developed a strong belief in non-alignment with great powers, Brazil's history did not make it averse to aligning with great powers.

The Brazilian alignment with the United States, which was further strengthened by the Baron of Rio Branco, involved the acceptance of U.S. regional hegemony in the Americas, as can be witnessed from Brazil's acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine.[461] However, it must be noted that Brazil's historical alignments with great powers — Britain and the U.S. — had to do with the external threats that the state faced from the Europeans. The association with great powers served to provide security for Brazil; for instance, the Monroe Doctrine was recognised as an "element for the territorial defence of the continent."[462] Thus, it may be understood that Brazil has historically taken a pragmatic approach to alignment with great powers to suit its strategic and security objectives.

After World War II, Brazil did not face the same compulsive situation that other states around the world faced in terms of pressures of alignment in the Cold War rivalry. This was

[459] Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought', p.60.
[460] Ibid.
[461] The Monroe Doctrine was the result of US President James Monroe's message to European states against their interference in the Western Hemisphere, in any attempts at colonisation or recolonization. As such, it established the US's perception of the Americas as its sphere of influence.
[462] Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought', pp.61.

perhaps because of the low strategic value attached by the U.S. towards South America in the Cold War context.[463] Nevertheless, Brazil's initial position in the Cold War rivalry can be described as an association with the United States; however, the two states soon began to disagree on a number of issues and bilateral relations deteriorated after the 1960s.[464] This change in relations was also based on the Brazilian belief that the US had acted to block its path to first-world status.[465] On the other hand, during the Cold War, Brazil did not sever relations with the Soviet Union. The two states had distant relations, but they did not cut their diplomatic and trade ties. The maintenance of relations with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union demonstrated that Brazil did not align itself strongly with either of the competing powers.

Brazil has, in general, continued to have cordial relations with the United States, however, Brazil-U.S. relations have not always been perfect. The relationship between the two states has been described as that with an immense history of misperception and misunderstandings.[466] The U.S. has often been seen by Brazil as a source of "recognition, investment and technology transfer."[467] At the same time, Brazil has sought to move out of the U.S.'s shadow, in order to "enhance its autonomy" and promote its national interests.[468] This has meant that current Brazil-U.S. relations can best be described as "prudent coexistence, possible collaboration and minimal collision."[469] Thus, Brazil-U.S. ties in recent decades have not developed into closer strategic ties.

One important factor in Brazil-U.S. ties has been Brazil's perception of the constraints that are imposed on South America because of being within the sphere of influence of the United States. This relates to the two states' incompatible approaches to international relations and regional affairs, especially in regard to conflict zones and crises. Brazil has been concerned with the U.S.'s approach to the drug war in Colombia, along with being wary of U.S.'s political involvements in Venezuela and Bolivia.[470] In Colombia, the U.S. wanted to increase its direct involvement in the conflict, while Brazil opposed such an approach. Brazil's disagreement with

[463] Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Monica Hirst, 'Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities', *International affairs,* vol.82, no.1, 2006, pp.21-40.
[464] Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought'.
[465] Ibid.
[466] Samuel W. Bodman, James D. Wolfensohn and Julia E. Sweig, 'Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations', *Independent Task Force Report,* no.66, 2011.
[467] Merke, 'Neither balance nor bandwagon: South American international society meets Brazil's rising power', p.185.
[468] Ibid, p.188.
[469] De Lima and Hirst, 'Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities', pp.21-40.
[470] Ibid.

the U.S.'s interventionist behaviour has also extended to global crises, such as the Gulf War (1991), the crisis in Haiti (1996) and the Kosovo War (1998).[471] This incompatibility can be better understood through Brazil's diplomatic style and strategic culture which promote the values of non-interventionism and non-confrontation, and which clash with the U.S.'s approach in South America and in other conflicts around the world.

Since the return of democracy in 1985, however, another major point of contention with the U.S. has been trade and investment.[472] These contentions were driven by the desire of Brazil to gain maximum economic benefits from the United States through investment and transfer of technology.[473] This has been further complicated by the growth of regional organisations such as Mercosur and Unasur, which hope to increase economic integration in South America; as a result, bilateral trade relations between the U.S. and Brazil have "become inextricably linked to multilateral trade disputes carried forward at the WTO and to regional trade negotiations."[474] Hence, for Brazil, advancement of regional integration has affected its ties with the United States. Overall, Brazil has continued to maintain cordial relations with the U.S.; however, these relations have involved disagreements and tensions regarding Brazilian views of the U.S.'s approach in regional and global crises and conflicts.

In a discussion at CEBRI, a think-tank based in Rio De Janeiro, the experts shared further insights on Brazil's approach to relations with great powers.[475] While they elaborate the historically-strong trade ties between the U.S. and Brazil, they highlight that Brazil-U.S. trade ties are now being replaced with China, which passed the U.S. as Brazil's largest trading partner in 2009.[476] This means that China's growing global influence is bound to affect Brazil-U.S. relations as well.

Brazil and China established diplomatic relations in 1974. Despite the ideological differences between Brazil's anti-communist military dictatorship and China's communist government, the two states were able to identify areas of mutually beneficial collaboration.[477] Since the establishment of bilateral relations, Brazil has considered China to be a relevant

[471] Ibid, p.33.
[472] Merke, 'Neither Balance nor Bandwagon: South American International Society Meets Brazil's Rising Power', pp.178–92.
[473] Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought'.
[474] De Lima and Hirst, 'Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities', p.34.
[475] Discussion with experts at CEBRI think-tank by the author, Rio De Janeiro (Brazil), 10 July 2018.
[476] Ibid.
[477] Yanran Xu, *China's strategic partnerships in Latin America: Case studies of China's oil diplomacy in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, 1991–2015* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016).

economic partner. Although the two states signed a strategic partnership in 1993, their relationship stagnated in the late 1990s, as Brazil focused its foreign policy towards the United States.[478] However, the relationship received renewed vigour at the beginning of the 2000s, with a series of bilateral visits. Since then, dozens of bilateral agreements have been signed and trade has intensified.[479]

This growth in the bilateral relationship with China was a manifestation of President Lula's foreign policy priority of diversifying the state's diplomatic relations and strengthening South-South cooperation.[480] Under this policy, Brazil focused on fostering relations with other intermediate powers. As China's economic power and international influence grew, it presented a good alternative to the traditional orientation of Brazil's foreign policy, which was focused primarily on its relations with Latin America, the United States and Europe.[481] As China has become Brazil's largest trade partner, and as China's global influence grows, Brazil-China ties will be important in shaping the future of South America.

Therefore, Brazil's navigation of great power competition involved an association with the United States, especially in the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War period. Brazil overall maintained a non-aligned posture in the Cold War. However, unlike the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, the U.S.-China rivalry is bound to affect Brazil more directly as the state has strong trade and strategic relations with both the U.S. and China. In the state's efforts to navigate these rivalries, the role of the diplomatic style and strategic culture of Brazil can be witnessed. Brazil has taken a more balanced approach, which supports its classification as a primacy-aspiring rising middle power.

Regional Leadership and Integration

Brazil's role in regional affairs allows for an understanding of its behaviour vis-à-vis its classification as a primacy-aspiring rising middle power. Brazil's size and population — when considered in relation to other states in the region — make it best placed to assume the position of regional leader. Brazil also considers itself to be the natural leader of the region, especially in economic terms, considering that it accounts for more than half of the region's GDP.[482]

[478] Ibid.
[479] Ibid.
[480] Ibid.
[481] Ibid.
[482] Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought'.

Overall, Brazil has been involved in regional organisations and bodies and has taken a leading role in furthering integration in South America.

However, it must also be noted that Brazil was not actively involved in working towards regional integration before the 1980s.[483] The idea of integration had been present in the preceding decades; for instance, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was formed in 1960, even though it could not achieve its desired outcome of advancing integration.[484] However, Brazil's active efforts towards integration began after the late 1980s; as Lazarou and Luciano note, the democratisation processes in Brazil and Argentina brought the two states closer, and ignited Brazilian belief in a "South American project, with a particular focus on fostering a special relationship with Argentina."[485] Thus, in recent times, Brazil has shown a greater inclination to be involved in regional organisations, as it envisions the building of a strong South American bloc.[486] Under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003), Brazil was actively trying to lead the region, although even then, Brazil avoided any claims to regional leadership in its public rhetoric. President Cardoso later explained that "this was our rhetoric. Behind it was the idea that true leaders do not need to say they are taking leadership."[487] This demonstrates Brazil's willingness to take an active, yet non-assertive role in the region.

The motivation to form a strong regional bloc can be better understood through Brazil's diplomatic style and strategic culture. Even though Brazilian institutions, due to their non-confrontational beliefs, are disinclined to consider the use of material power, they still aspire to gain prominence in the world. As such, a strong regional bloc is required so that Brazil is able to negotiate with the world "at equal footing."[488]

Brazil initially started making greater efforts to promote regional cohesion and economic integration with its collaboration with Argentina in 1985; Brazilian President Sarney and Argentine President Alfonsin signed a bilateral agreement on economic cooperation.[489] This agreement was succeeded by the Treaty of Asuncion, which established the Common

[483] Larissa Wachholz, interview by the author, Brasilia (Brazil), 16 July 2018.
[484] Elena Lazarou and Bruno Theodoro Luciano, 'Regionalism as an instrument: assessing Brazil's relations with its neighbourhood', *Global Society,* vol.29, no.3, 2015, pp.390-408.
[485] Ibid, p.391.
[486] Marcos Degaut, interview by the author, Brasilia (Brazil), 16 July 2018.
[487] Sean W. Burges, 'Revisiting consensual hegemony: Brazilian regional leadership in question', *International Politics,* vol.52, no.2, 2015, pp.193-207.
[488] Marcos Degaut, interview by the author, Brasilia (Brazil), 16 July 2018.
[489] Riordan Roett, *The New Brazil* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011) pp.127-128.

Market of the South (Mercosur) in 1991. The treaty intended to promote free trade among Mercosur's member states Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Mercosur was initially successful in furthering integration of the economies in the region. Mercosur members' exports to Brazil grew from $2.1 billion in 1992 to $9.23 billion in 1998.[490] However, it was not able to establish dispute resolution mechanisms or deeper institutional cooperation.[491] In recent times, Mercosur's utility in furthering integration has significantly stalled.[492] Even then, Brazil's involvement and commitment towards Mercosur's progression in the 1990s provides us with insights regarding the state's approach towards regional integration. In 1993, former Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Lafer noted the importance of Mercosur for Brazil's regional goals and his own foreign policy vision,

> It seemed to me to be evident that Latin America in general, and the Mercosur in particular, were our circumstance, our life, our destiny. Right from the start I saw in the Mercosur a platform for Brazil's competitive insertion, which was important due to the opportunities it generated and for what it represented in terms of interlocution at the world level.[493]

The establishment of Mercosur demonstrates Brazil's role in initiatives to advance integration. Marco Tulio, a diplomat at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, has emphasised that the creation of Mercosur, along with other regional organisations, has promoted a consensus-based approach, and Brazil has not sought to assert itself; rather, the state has been cautious in its power projection in these organisations.[494] In this regard, he further remarked that Brazil did not want to be the owner, but rather the shareholder in regional organisations.[495] Burges elaborates further regarding this aspect,

> Rather than resorting to the sort of overt and direct economic and security pressure found in neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches to hegemony as the basis for forming a South American space, an indirect and consensual approach was taken that drew on the interrelation of ideas, economic factors and overarching security concerns. The imperative was not to subsume other regional states to Brazilian will, but

[490] Burges, 'Revisiting consensual hegemony: Brazilian regional leadership in question', p.196.
[491] Roett, *The New Brazil*.
[492] Gabriela Lomeu Campos, 'From success to failure: under what conditions did Mercosur integrate?' *Journal of Economic Integration*, vol.31, no.4, 2016, pp.855-897.
[493] Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought', p.96.
[494] Marco Tulio, interview by the author, Brasilia (Brazil), 12 July 2018.
[495] Ibid.

> instead to cycle the region-forming process through Brazil and position the state's propositions and prerogatives as the central unifying factor of a potential South American region.[496]

In this way, Brazil's foreign policy approach to regional organisations demonstrates the state's belief in cooperation and consensus building, which stems from its diplomatic style and strategic culture.

While greater institutional and political cooperation has not been achieved through Mercosur, Brazil has continued to make efforts towards a more unified region. In 2004, the South American Community of Nations was created at the South American Summit in Peru. The summit resulted in the Cusco Declaration, which aimed to promote further integration in the region. In 2008, this organisation was transformed into the Union of South American Nations (Unasur), which had the overarching goal to establish an EU-like body, with a parliament in Cochabamba, Bolivia, and with coordination on matters such as integration of regional energy and transportation networks, immigration policies and other related matters.[497] Despite these ambitious goals, the Unasur has remained a strictly intergovernmental organisation without any executive power; essentially, the decision-making has remained with national authorities and the presidents of the member states.[498]

Apart from these regional organisations, Brazil is also a part of the Organisation of American States (OAS), which is an international organisation that promotes cooperation among the states in the Western Hemisphere.[499] Despite the OAS being a U.S.-dominated organisation, Brazil has gained increased influence in the organisation in recent decades, as the body has aimed to promote democratic ideals and human rights in the post-Cold War period.[500] However, as Gratius and Saraiva note, Brazil's interests in the OAS are rather limited, even though it has a more institutionalised structure than any of the South American regional organisations.[501] Brazil's limited interest in the OAS indicates that Brazil's efforts towards regionalism are currently limited to South America.

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[496] Burges, 'Revisiting consensual hegemony: Brazilian regional leadership in question', p.75.
[497] Roett, *The New Brazil*, pp.129-30.
[498] Spektor, 'Brazil: Shadows of the Past and Contested Ambitions', p.29.
[499] For more on the role of the OAS in the Americas, see Andrew Cooper, and Thomas Legler, *Intervention without intervening? The OAS defense and promotion of democracy in the Americas* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
[500] Susanne Gratius and Miriam Saraiva, 'Continental Regionalism: Brazil's prominent role in the Americas', *Centre for European Policy Studies*, 2013.
[501] Ibid.

However, despite its limited interest in the OAS, Brazil has enthusiastically been involved in the formation of regional bodies in South America which aim to further integration in the region. Moreover, Brazil's initiatives towards greater regional cooperation can also be demonstrated through President Lula's proposal to form a South American Defence Council with the goal of establishing "South America as a zone of peace, a base for democratic stability and comprehensive development of the peoples, as a contribution to world peace."[502]

Similarly, Brazil has striven for broader integration in Latin America. It organised the first Latin American and Caribbean Summit for Integration and Development (CALC) in 2008. Heads of thirty-three Latin American and Caribbean states participated in this summit.[503] Moreover, Brazil's leadership in the region also extends to contributions towards peace in the neighbouring states. Brazil has used its military to contribute towards regional peacekeeping missions organised under the ambit of the UN and other multilateral organisations. For example, Brazil successfully ran the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).[504]

While Brazil has shown leadership and promoted integration in the region through various initiatives, it must also be noted that Brazil has been unwilling to incur the costs of assuming a more formal leadership role.[505] As Brazil has the largest economy in the region, this means that it would be expected to contribute more towards the process of integration in the region — for instance, to establish regional multilateral organisations.[506] Notably, scholars such as Spektor have argued that Brazil's commitment to the development of a South American regional body has been "partial," and the Brazilian leaders have remained ambivalent about the implications of a unified South America in terms of commitments and resources.[507] Vigevani and Cepaluni emphasise that Brazil's top priority in regional behaviour remains the preservation of its domestic policy autonomy.[508] Based on this view, Daudelin and Burges argue that Brazil is not willing to give any real authority to any regional organisation which it may not be able to control.[509] This has resulted in minimal institutional development through

[502] Roett, *The New Brazil*, pp.129-30.
[503] Ibid.
[504] Roett, *The New Brazil*, p.133.
[505] Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought', p.244.
[506] Ibid.
[507] Spektor, 'Brazil: Shadows of the Past and Contested Ambitions', p.30.
[508] Gabriel Cepaluni, Tullo Vigevani and Phillippe C. Schmitter, *Brazilian foreign policy in changing times: the quest for autonomy from Sarney to Lula* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009).
[509] Jean Daudelin and Sean Burges, 'Moving in, carving out, proliferating: The many faces of Brazil's multilateralism since 1989', *Pensamiento propio,* vol.33, 2011, pp.35-64.

Mercosur and Unasur.[510] Hence, Brazilian elites' concern regarding autonomy, which forms an important component of the state's strategic culture, has influenced Brazil's approach towards the development of regional organisations. Moreover, Brazil's efforts towards regional integration can also be understood through the state's desire to counter U.S. influence in its neighbourhood.[511] Hence, while Brazil has shown leadership in the region and advanced integration through a cooperative and consensus-based approach, its dedication to a South American project has sometimes been questioned.

Overall, the role of Brazil has been critical in furthering regional cooperation and integration in South America, as is evident from its involvement in the creation of Mercosur and Unasur and its hosting of the CALC summit, amongst other initiatives. Moreover, Brazil's regional behaviour indicates that it has not sought to overpower the smaller neighbours in the region and has, instead, adopted a cooperative approach. This behaviour can be understood through the values and beliefs that are dominant in Brazil's diplomatic style and strategic culture, which promote consensus-based thinking, dialogue and diplomatic initiatives. As such, Brazil has taken a modest approach in facilitating regional integration, which further supports the state's aspirations for primacy in the region, rather than supremacy.

Brazil's Hegemony and Power Projection Style

Brazil's leadership and initiatives towards integration in South America have demonstrated the state's leading position in regional affairs. Moreover, the effect of the state's diplomatic style and strategic culture on its behaviour vis-à-vis great power navigation and regional integration has also been discussed. Brazil's values of non-confrontation and pacifism have been demonstrated to lead to an approach centred on negotiation, dialogue and consensus-building — this supports Brazil's classification as a primacy-aspiring rising middle power. However, to better understand Brazil's approach, its behaviour vis-à-vis hegemony and power projection needs to be observed in its relations with other states, as well as its engagements at the global level. This will enhance the understanding of Brazil's position as a primacy-aspiring rising middle power, while distinguishing the state's behaviour from that of supremacy-aspiring rising middle powers.

[510] Ibid.
[511] Spektor, 'Brazil: Shadows of the Past and Contested Ambitions', pp.17-35.

Brazil does not employ a coercion-based approach to its regional relations. Instead, Brazil's behaviour in its relations with regional states has been described by scholars, such as Burges, as that of consensual hegemony.[512] Burges notes that Brazilian leaders and diplomats have always been concerned about Brazil's association with terms such as 'hegemon' or hegemony,' as these terms sometimes imply the use of coercion and domination in international relations.[513] Brazil's behaviour, on the other hand, has involved the use of an ideational approach to gain consent of other regional states to its position as a regional leader. This approach is seen through the state's attempts at formation of regional bodies since the 1990s.[514] Thus, Brazil's overall behaviour does not conform to the traditional understanding of power-based theories of hegemony; rather, Brazil has adopted a cooperative and consensus-building approach that has led to consensual hegemony.

Some scholars, such as Weyland, believe that realism best explains Brazil's rise in the region and its overall hegemonic approach. Weyland argues that close proximity to the U.S., which is the regional hegemon in the Americas, has made Brazil forego the conventionally realist instruments of power projection and building hegemony.[515] However, the discussion of Brazil's diplomatic style and strategic culture suggests that Brazil has held non-confrontational and pacifist beliefs even before the United States became a great power; moreover, Brazil has, until recently, not focused on the development of its military capability in proportion to its economic size. This suggests that Brazil's approach cannot solely be explained through realism; rather, discussing the state's behaviour through the lens of its diplomatic style and strategic culture can help better understand the motivations behind Brazil's approach, whereby the state has adopted an approach largely based on diplomacy, engagement and leadership in order to expand its influence in the region and the world.

While Brazil's behaviour regarding regionalism in South America has been highlighted, in order to understand Brazil's hegemony and power projection style, the discussion can now move forward to highlight the state's approach and conduct with its neighbours, as well as its engagement at the global level.

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[512] Sean W. Burges, 'Consensual hegemony: theorizing Brazilian foreign policy after the Cold War', *International relations,* vol.22, no.1, 2008, pp.65-84, also see Burges, 'Revisiting consensual hegemony: Brazilian regional leadership in question'.
[513] Burges, 'Consensual hegemony: theorizing Brazilian foreign policy after the Cold War'.
[514] Ibid.
[515] Kurt Weyland, 'Realism under hegemony: theorizing the rise of Brazil', *Journal of Politics in Latin America,* vol.8, no.2, 2016, pp.143-173.

Brazil has used its leadership in the region to promote democracy and stability in its neighbouring states. For instance, Brazil has used its platform in Mercosur to assist in Paraguay's institutional crises in 1996, 1999 and 2001; additionally, Brazil also played a role in the stabilisation of Venezuela in 2002 after a coup attempt was made against President Hugo Chavez.[516] This shows that Brazil has chosen to project its power and influence through promoting democratic and state-building ideals.

Brazil has had a long history of engagement in multilateral organisations. It was the only South American state to take part in World War I, and as a result, it was present at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.[517] Brazil also played an active role in the efforts to reform the League of Nations and was a founding member of the United Nations and of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Through these organisations, Brazil sought to promote its economic development and political autonomy.[518] In these affairs, Brazil supported a trade regime based on the norm of cooperation and development, as outlined by UNCTAD, in opposition to the open market principles advocated by GATT.[519] However, for the most part, Brazil had been reluctant to be deeply involved in international affairs as it adopted the strategy of maintaining its autonomy through distancing itself from multilateral organisations. In this regard, Brazil's behaviour has changed since its move towards democracy in 1985, particularly due to the influence of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010). Under President Cardoso, this approach changed as Brazil established its focus on multilateralism and adopted the logic of "autonomy through participation," thus marking "a major break with historical patterns of Brazilian foreign policy making."[520]

Hence, under President Cardoso, Brazil reignited its multilateral engagement. This change in approach notably involved the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1997, which Brazil had refused to sign since 1967.[521] In this way, under President Cardoso, Brazil initiated a process of greater global integration and engagement. The signing of the NPT was followed by Brazil's active role in the newly created World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the

[516] Lazarou and Luciano, 'Regionalism as an instrument: assessing Brazil's relations with its neighbourhood'.
[517] De Lima and Hirst, 'Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities', pp.21-40.
[518] Ibid.
[519] Ibid, at pp.25-26.
[520] Jeffrey W. Cason and Timothy J. Power, 'Presidentialization, pluralization, and the rollback of Itamaraty: explaining change in Brazilian Foreign Policy making in the Cardoso-Lula Era', *International Political Science Review,* vol.30, no.2, 2009, pp.117-140, at p.119.
[521] Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought'.

creation of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) with Portugal and five other states.[522] Moreover, Brazil also signed a free-trade agreement with the European Union and pursued stronger ties with other rising powers in the world, including China, Japan, India and South Africa.[523] Brazil's increasing engagement and improved relations with rising powers also allowed these like-minded states to push collectively for reforms of the international system.

Thus, Brazil under President Cardoso displayed increased engagement at the international level and a commitment to multilateralism. This approach can be linked to the state's diplomatic style and strategic culture, whereby Brazil prefers the use of diplomacy, dialogue and consensus-based action to work towards its aim of greater influence. As Brazil, under President Cardoso, and later President Lula, has tried to advance its global image and prominence, it adopted an approach which appeared to be consistent with the diplomatic style and strategic culture of the state.

After 2002, President Lula's beliefs greatly influenced Brazilian behaviour in the region and in the world. As he believed that the international system was designed to favour the developed world while creating constraints for developing states, he pursued an approach of "autonomy through diversification."[524] This meant that Brazil continued to remain engaged in multilateral forums and organisations, but with a greater focus on South-South relations.[525] The result of this approach of greater global engagement was an increase in Brazil's diplomatic capacity, as Lula invested heavily in the state's diplomatic apparatus.[526] Approximately 70 percent of President Lula's foreign visits were to states in Latin America, Asia and Africa, indicating the direction of the overall foreign policy approach under his administration.[527] Moreover, under Lula, Brazil doubled its presence in Africa by opening up 19 new embassies.[528]

Thus, Brazil's approach under President Lula focused on notions of solidarity and South-South development cooperation, presenting a vision opposed to the power asymmetries

[522] Ibid.
[523] Ibid.
[524] Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, 'Lula's foreign policy and the quest for autonomy through diversification,' *Third World Quarterly*, vol.28, no.7, 2007, pp.1309-1326 at p.1309.
[525] Ibid.
[526] Jorge A. Schiavon and Bruno Figueroa, 'Foreign Policy Capacities, State Foreign Services, and International Influence: Brazil versus Mexico', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, vol.30, no.4, 2019, pp.816-828.
[527] Ibid.
[528] Ibid.

present in the developed world's relationship with the Global South.[529] However, despite the increased focus on South-South cooperation, Brazil has continued to increase its engagement with the developed world; for instance, the state established a strategic partnership with the European Union in 2007.[530] In this way, President Lula continued Brazil's engagement with the world, with particular focus on South-South relations.

In terms of Brazil's relationship with the developing world, Brazil's ties to Africa must also be considered. Brazil's trading ties had started in the 1970s, as the military regime tried to increase the state's engagement with the developing world.[531] Notably, this involved Brazil's recognition of the independence of the Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde in July 1974, even before their independence was conceded by Portugal.[532] In a similar move, Brazil recognised the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government in Angola — a move opposed to U.S. interests in the Cold War as MPLA was supported by communist powers.[533]

In the late 1990s, Brazil began to develop a stronger relationship with South Africa, which culminated in the formation of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) forum. Brazil and South Africa have also "actively led multilateral dialogue and coalitions that championed the agenda of the developing South (and Africa in particular) in various global dialogues and forums," while also undertaking development projects in Africa under IBSA.[534] As White explains, Brazil has continued to engage with Africa in political diplomacy, trade and development co-operation.[535] For instance, Brazil has also encouraged its state-affiliated and private enterprises to increase mutually beneficial trade with African states, which has resulted in the involvement of the state oil company Petrobras, the airplane manufacturer Embraer and private companies such as Camargo Correa (a conglomerate comprising industries ranging from oil and gas to construction) in Africa.[536] This growing engagement with Africa has been a part of the approach taken by Brazil to advance South-South relations, and can also be linked to

[529] Abdenur and Call, 'A "Brazilian Way"? Brazil's Approach to Peacebuilding', pp.15-38.
[530] Degaut, 'Ideas, Beliefs, Strategic Culture, and Foreign Policy: Understanding Brazil's Geopolitical Thought'.
[531] Lyal White, 'Understanding Brazil's new drive for Africa', *South African Journal of International Affairs,* vol.17, no.2, 2010, pp.221-242.
[532] Ibid.
[533] Ibid, p.224.
[534] Ibid, p.225.
[535] Ibid.
[536] Abdenur and Call, 'A "Brazilian Way"? Brazil's Approach to Peacebuilding', p.29-30.

Brazil's rise as a regional leader and as an economically and politically important state on the global stage.

The discussion regarding Brazil's engagement with Africa and its increasing involvement in multilateral forums highlights Brazil's approach to its quest for greater prominence in the world. Instead of adopting a hard-line approach with its neighbours and smaller states, Brazil opted to become a leader for the developing world, furthering cooperation and advancing development in the Global South. An understanding of this behaviour can be enhanced by considering Brazil's diplomatic style and strategic culture, which entail a belief in using dialogue, diplomatic channels and cooperative methods to pursue greater influence. At the same time, Brazil's strategic culture places immense importance on maintaining the state's autonomy. This was reflected in Brazil's behaviour under both President Cardoso and President Lula. Even though their approaches were different, with Cardoso pursuing 'autonomy through engagement' and Lula adopting the strategy of 'autonomy through diversification', they were both centred on protecting Brazilian autonomy. In this way, the understanding of Brazil's diplomatic style and strategic culture helps enhance the understanding of Brazil's foreign policy behaviour.

In recent times, Brazil has increased its involvement at the United Nations. It has argued for the expansion of the UN's agenda beyond the traditional focus on international peace and security, and for the inclusion of social welfare and economic development to the UN's priorities.[537] It has also participated in various UN peacekeeping missions, such as the UN observer missions in El Salvador and Mozambique, the UN mission in Angola, as well as the UN peace operation in East Timor.[538]

More importantly, Brazil has advocated for reforming the Security Council and has actively advocated to obtain the permanent membership of the UNSC. Brazil had first officially expressed its ambitions to become a permanent member of the Security Council in 1994, when it was announced by then Foreign Minister Celso Amorim.[539] Brazil argues that this would lead to a more balanced representation, which would increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of the body's decisions. More recently, Brazil has been gathering support by reaching out to states across the globe and by making UNSC reform a major point in its multilateral initiatives such

[537] De Lima and Hirst, 'Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities', pp.21-40.
[538] Ibid.
[539] Ibid.

as IBSA.[540] In the mid-2000s, Brazil joined Germany, Japan and India to form the G-4; these states support each other's bids to join the Security Council so that the body reflects "contemporary interstate relations rather than the aftermath of World War II."[541] Brazil has sought to increase its global prominence by pursuing permanent membership of the UNSC, while also actively contributing to UN peacekeeping missions around the world.

Brazil's increasing engagement and improved relations with rising powers also allowed like-minded states to push collectively for reforms of the international system. For instance, the BRICS initiative — which involves Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — launched new institutions, such as the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB).[542] This bank has the aim to finance infrastructure spending in the developing world, and at the same time, it can also be used to pressurise established institutions such as the Bretton Woods organisations to partake in substantive reforms.[543] The BRICS bloc, in particular, has become a symbol of a "changing global order" where states such as Brazil are gaining an increasingly important diplomatic and economic role in the world.[544] The states have coordinated in highlighting the need for more recognition and inclusion of emerging markets in the global institutions. While tensions between India and China are currently an obstacle to greater unity between the BRICS states, the bloc has helped its member states to increase their diplomatic engagements globally and created new financial institutions such as the NDB.[545]

While this behaviour of Brazil vis-à-vis its global engagement has been largely consistent over the past few decades, the election of President Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 has markedly changed Brazil's approach. Under Bolsonaro, Brazil has shown a disinclination to support human rights, promote peaceful resolution of conflicts, or support efforts to prevent climate change — which all contradict Brazil's approach in the decades prior to his election.[546] President Bolsonaro's approach has been "characterized by an explicit rejection" of the elements of the liberal international order, including multilateralism, coalition-building and international cooperation — all of which have been important parts of Brazil's traditional

[540] Ibid, p.29.
[541] Abdenur and Call, 'A "Brazilian Way"? Brazil's Approach to Peacebuilding', p.23.
[542] Ibid, p.22.
[543] Ibid, p.22.
[544] Guilherme Casaroes, 'Brazilian Elections and the Future of the BRICS', *Italian Institute for International Political Studies*, 05 October 2018, https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/brazilian-elections-and-future-brics-21347
[545] Alyssa Ayres, 'How the BRICS Got Here', *Council on Foreign Relations*, 31 August 2017, https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/how-brics-got-here
[546] Saraiva, 'The democratic regime and the changes in Brazilian foreign policy towards South America'.

foreign policy approach.[547] Instead, he has endeavoured to pursue a foreign policy approach more aligned to his political, social and religious view, leading to efforts to centralise foreign policy decision-making. In particular, he has attempted to forge a new identity for Brazil on the global stage — as a "conservative, anti-globalist, and nationalist country," according to Ernesto Araujo, who was the foreign minister in the Bolsonaro administration between January 2019 to March 2021.[548] This approach has also resulted in the increased turnover of experienced diplomatic officials and the promotion of younger diplomats.

In this way, Bolsonaro has challenged the established diplomatic consensus, based on the liberal international order, in Brazil. He has also attempted to gain greater control over foreign policymaking by influencing the promotion of younger and more obscure diplomats to prominent positions — including former foreign minister Araujo — in the Itamaraty; however, Saraiva notes that Itamaraty have so far resisted the government's ideological proposals and have sought to follow their traditions of acting multilaterally.[549] This change in Brazilian approach indicates that even though the diplomatic style and strategic culture of any state shape its behaviour, the ideology of the political leadership also has the potential to foster decisions and influence discourse in a way that is distinct from the past strategic culture, thus affording leaders greater agency in imposing their personal beliefs on state policies.

Overall, Brazil's behaviour and power projection style has largely revolved around increasing its engagement at the global and regional level and playing a more active role in order to gain prominence. This has involved furthering cooperation with the Global South, advancing partnerships with other rising powers, and advocating for UN reforms and a permanent seat at the UNSC. Furthermore, Brazil's actions regionally and globally seek to strengthen its domestic development and autonomy. As previously highlighted, Brazil has started to modernise its military; however, despite this, the state's power projection style has remained consistent. Thus, Brazil's overall approach to foreign policy has conformed to the key elements in its diplomatic style and strategic culture: non-intervention, self-determination, international cooperation and the peaceful settlement of conflicts.[550] These principles have also been enshrined in the state's 1988 constitution. As a result, in general, the state has exhibited

[547] Guilherme Casarões and Déborah Farias, 'Brazilian foreign policy under Jair Bolsonaro: far-right populism and the rejection of the liberal international order', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs,* 2021, pp.1-21, at p.1.
[548] Ibid, p. 3.
[549] Saraiva, 'The democratic regime and the changes in Brazilian foreign policy towards South America'.
[550] Abdenur and Call, 'A "Brazilian Way"? Brazil's Approach to Peacebuilding', p.23.

the consistent use of a softer approach to pursue power and influence, which supports Brazil's classification as a primacy-aspiring rising middle power.

CHAPTER IV: INDIA

Having analysed the cases of two primacy-aspiring states, Indonesia and Brazil, this thesis will now consider the case of India, a regional power in South Asia which has experienced tremendous economic growth in the post-Cold War period. India's emerging economic might, coupled with its military strength and geostrategic location, makes it a distinctive state in terms of potential impact on regional and international politics in the near future. Moreover, India's behaviour in the region conforms to the classification of a supremacy-aspiring rising middle power, making it an intriguing case to study. India's case can add to the subject of this thesis, by helping understand the factors that steer a state's foreign policy behaviour. Therefore, this chapter aims to examine India's diplomatic style and strategic culture. Examining these will involve studying the aspirations and insecurities of the Indian state, which have been influenced by historical circumstances and cultural ideas and beliefs. Thereby, this chapter will demonstrate the value of the *theory of hegemonic tendencies*, while highlighting India's status as a supremacy-aspiring rising middle power.

India is a densely populated state in South Asia which houses the second largest population in the world. The modern state has historically been a part of the Indian subcontinent, which comprises modern-day Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. India is surrounded by the Bay of Bengal in the southeast and the Arabian Sea in the southwest. The state shares land borders with six states: Pakistan to the west, China and Nepal to the north, and Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar to the east.[551] Moreover, India has maritime borders with Sri Lanka in the south, as well as Thailand and Indonesia to the southeast.

India is immensely diverse in terms of culture and demographics, with a multitude of ethnicities, languages and religions being present. There are 22 officially recognised languages spoken around India; unofficially, there are hundreds of different languages and dialects present.[552] The diversity in religion is demonstrated by the presence of some of the world's oldest religions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Sikhism and Jainism.[553] Moreover, the region is also widely recognised as the birthplace of Hinduism and Buddhism.

[551] See Map of India. Geology, 2020, https://geology.com/world/india-satellite-image.shtml

[552] 'Languages of India - New World Encyclopedia', https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Languages_of_India.

[553] For more on India's history, culture, and diversity, see A.L. Basham, *The wonder that was India* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1954).

In the medieval period, multiple kingdoms existed in present-day India. However, in the 16th century, Babur established the Mughal empire as he conquered the local kingdoms and gained control over large parts of the region. The Mughals maintained their hegemony in the region until the start of the 18th century, when the British East India Company (EIC) — which had entered India to trade — began slowly to gain control over the region.[554] Eventually, the Mughals' power was extremely diminished, and they only maintained control in the region around Delhi. In 1857, after the people of India unsuccessfully rebelled against the EIC, the Mughal Empire was abolished, and the British Crown took direct charge of India, with Queen Victoria being proclaimed Empress in 1876.

By the start of the 20th century, various movements had started to gain momentum in British-controlled India, initially vying for self-rule. Slowly, the calls for independence strengthened, with the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League taking the lead. British India was eventually partitioned in 1947; two separate independent states — India and Pakistan — were created. Although the division was made along religious lines, with many of the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent moving to Pakistan, India retained a very sizeable Muslim minority.

The process of partition proved to be complicated and led to critically strained relations between the newly formed states. In particular, the issue of Kashmir, which is a territory in the north-west region of India, took centre stage as both states claimed sovereignty over the region. The British had given the princely states the option to choose one of the newly formed states, based on the preferences of their population. However, the Hindu ruler of Kashmir acceded to India, while the population was overwhelmingly Muslim; India claims that this decision makes Kashmir a part of India, while Pakistan maintains that since it is a Muslim-majority area, it should be a part of Pakistan. This triggered the Kashmir conflict, and India and Pakistan fought a brief war in 1947-48, dividing Kashmir between the two states, and deciding that a UN plebiscite would determine the fate of the territory. To this day, the conflict remains a significant geopolitical issue for India.

[554] For a detailed study on the rise of the East India Company in the region, see William Dalrymple, *The anarchy: The relentless rise of the East India Company* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020)

History of Diplomatic Practices from Colonial Times

India's diplomatic tradition has continued on from the colonial times, where, under British rule, the foundations for Indian diplomacy and foreign policy were laid down. Scholars assert that after World War I, India achieved a 'quasi-international status;' this developing status was also reflected in India's participation in the Imperial War Conference in 1917.[555] Moreover, India was a founding member of the League of Nations, being the only non-self-governing state to have that position, which was considered to be an "anomaly among anomalies."[556] However, despite these developments in its international status and participation of Indian delegations in British Imperial Conferences and in the League of Nations, India and its foreign relations remained subjugated to the British government and very little diplomatic agency was given to Indians. The post-independence Indian state perceived itself as a successor of the colonial state, rather than a new political entity, as is evident from Indian Prime Minister Nehru's letters to Indian representatives abroad, where he emphasised that "there is no change in our external relations whatever because we are a continuing entity."[557] This belief also viewed Pakistan as having seceded from India, rather than both being successors of a partitioned state.[558] Thus, the pre-independence diplomatic period, despite the lack of agency held by Indians, holds significance in India's self-perception of its role in the world that is in part derived from its status during the pre-colonial and colonial eras.

As early as the Mughal period, diplomacy had played an important role in the region. The Mughal empire adopted unique Indo-Persianate protocols for diplomacy with neighbours as well as distant states, even though envoys were permitted to "display deportment according to their own diplomatic protocols."[559] These protocols included the removal of headgear or footwear, suitable gestures of respect, and language of address, amongst others. While these

[555] Vineet Thakur, 'The colonial origins of Indian foreign policymaking', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol.49, no.32, 2014, pp.58-64.
[556] R. P. Anand, 'The formation of international organizations and India: a historical study', *Leiden Journal of International Law,* vol.23, no.1, 2010, pp.5-21, at p.5.
[557] Thakur, 'The colonial origins of Indian foreign policymaking', pp.58-64. India's membership in the League of Nations came despite the requirement for all member states to be at least 'a fully self-governing colony'. For all the other dominions who became members of the League of Nations, the preliminary covenant was signed by their own leaders or statesmen; for India, it was the British Secretary of State who did so, highlighting India's continued subjugation and lack of self-rule. For more on India's international role in the pre-independence period, see T. T. Poulose, 'India as an Anomalous International Person (1919-1947)', *British Yearbook of International Law*, vol.44, 1970.
[558] Ibid.
[559] Michael H. Fisher, 'Diplomacy in India, 1526–1858', in H. V. Bowen, Elizabeth Mancke and John G. Reid (eds), *Britain's Oceanic Empire: Atlantic and Indian Ocean Worlds, C.1550–1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) pp.249–281.

diplomatic protocols reflected the Mughals' cultural affiliation, historical background and religion, their diplomatic objectives were not influenced by these factors. Rather, Mughal diplomacy was influenced by pragmatism and geopolitical realities; for instance, the Mughals under Akbar gave support to the Safavid empire despite sectarian differences, as the decline of the Safavids would have increased the power of the Uzbeks, which would have threatened Mughal territorial interests.[560] Mughal diplomatic style is also evident in the selection of diplomatic envoys to foreign states. There were elaborate criterion for choosing ambassadors; special care was taken to ensure that religious or historical backgrounds of the envoys would match those of the monarchs to whom they were being sent — for instance, the ambassador to the Uzbek monarch would be of Central Asian origin and the one to the Safavid empire would share the ruler's religious sect.[561]

After the abolition of the Mughal empire and the establishment of the British Raj in India, the state's diplomacy lay in the hands of the British government. However, as movements for self-rule — and later, independence — grew in the Indian subcontinent, Indians were increasingly involved in diplomatic efforts to gain support for the cause of independence. These efforts took the shape of unofficial overseas diplomacy to gain sympathy and support for political reform in India; for instance, the Indian National Congress established an agency in England to gain support of the British public for the Congress's objectives.[562] This endeavour of unofficial overseas diplomacy was further reflected in the establishment of the Congress Foreign Department in 1928, with the aim of getting "into touch with all such organisations and all such peoples" which were in a similar position to India's, in terms of the fight for independence, so that cooperation between them could be furthered.[563] Moreover, individual leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru undertook diplomatic trips to foreign states to gain support for independence. The unofficial and official diplomatic activities of Indians before 1947 ensured that the newly independent state had a range of personnel with experience in diplomacy — many of the Indians who had engaged in unofficial diplomacy

[560] Naimur Rahman Farooqi, 'Diplomacy and diplomatic procedure under the Mughals', *The Medieval History Journal,* vol.7, no.1, 2004, pp.59-86.
[561] Ibid.
[562] Terence A. Keenleyside, 'Diplomatic apprenticeship: pre-independence origins of Indian diplomacy and its relevance for the post-independence foreign policy', *India Quarterly,* vol.43, no.2, 1987, pp.97-120.
[563] *Report of the 43rd Session of the Indian National Congress*, Calcutta, 1938, at p.91.

during the struggle for independence assumed important positions after 1947, including Nehru and Krishna Menon.[564]

During the struggle for independence, some key principles were developed which have been established in Indian diplomatic practice and strategic culture ever since, especially since the newly formed Indian state sought to ensure continuity with the colonial polity. Commitment to decolonisation appeared to be a major component of the foreign policy of the Indian state — although it must be noted that anti-colonial or anti-imperialist thought did not persist in India's diplomatic style and strategic culture, as it has for other rising middle powers such as Indonesia. Moreover, the long struggle for independence dissuaded India from siding with any great powers, in fear of being controlled or dominated, with the state choosing to remain non-aligned. Subsequently, India played a leading role in the UN as well as in the Non-Aligned Movement — states that did not side with any great power bloc. Moreover, pre-1947 diplomacy had highlighted the ethical values of the Indian peoples, which were derived from the teachings of Buddhism and Hinduism; this position of superior morality would play a role in Indian strategic culture in the future.[565] Thus, India's pre-colonial and colonial diplomacy set the foundations for the conduct of the Indian state after independence, as well as providing key principles which helped develop the state's approach to foreign policy.

India's Strategic Culture

States with rich civilisational past often have long traditions or history of deep strategic thought which usually influences their strategic culture. However scholars such as George Tanham argue that India has not had a great tradition of strategic thinking, with most of the strategic thought of the Indian state being developed by its founders and subsequent leaders.[566] Tanham, in his pioneering work on Indian strategic thought, asserts that India does not have any formal institution to formulate strategies; he further argues that the elites in India have never consistently thought about a national strategy.[567] This can be attributed to the lack of political unity in the Indian region, as historically very few unified polities have existed in the Indian subcontinent. This lack of unity meant that smaller kingdoms would be concerned with

[564] Keenleyside, 'Diplomatic apprenticeship: pre-independence origins of Indian diplomacy and its relevance for the post-independence foreign policy'.
[565] Ibid.
[566] George Tanham, *Indian strategic thought: an interpretive essay* (California: Rand, 1992).
[567] Ibid.

their own defences and interests. Hence, the foundations of strategic culture for the modern-day Indian state were only laid with the arrival of the British; this is why the Indian strategic culture has adopted some of the strategies imparted by the British.

However, Tanham's arguments are not accepted by the Indian political elite. Former Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor, Siv Shankar Menon, has argued that India possesses a strategic culture, which is consistently used in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.[568] Regardless of Indian elites' pursuit of long-term strategic thinking, embedded ideas, beliefs, cultural values and self-perception of its geography and status in the world, have influenced the development of strategic culture for modern India. At the same time, the period of British rule influenced Indian strategic thought, as the post-independence Indian state viewed itself as a continuation of the polity that existed under the British.

India's geography has also played an important role in the development of its geopolitical conceptions as well as the evolution of its strategic culture. Historically, the Himalayan mountains in the north and the Indian ocean in the south were viewed as protective barriers, providing a sense of security; however, these conceptions were slowly shattered, as armies repeatedly invaded India through the north-western passes, while the Europeans arrived by sea.[569] In the period after independence, the Chinese invasion during the Indo-China War of 1962 reaffirmed the flaws in this conception of the Himalayas as a protective barrier.[570] Hence, Indians have developed insecurities regarding the geographical build-up of the state. In particular, the northwest, now the state of Pakistan, remains an area of grave strategic and security concern, as India and Pakistan remain embroiled in territorial conflict over Kashmir. The threat from Pakistan is perceived to be much more serious than that presented by China, even though China has a far greater military capability than Pakistan. According to Tanham, this attests to Indian perception of the northwest as an area of grave security concern, while China is viewed as an outside threat.[571] In this way, India's geopolitical perceptions and challenges have influenced its beliefs and insecurities regarding its geography.

The concerns over India's geography are further exacerbated by the territorial disputes the state faces. Apart from India's dispute over Kashmir with Pakistan, the state also faces a

[568] Shivshankar Menon, 'India has a Unique Strategic Culture and Diplomatic Style', New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 2013.
[569] George Tanham, 'Indian strategic culture', *Washington Quarterly,* vol.15, no.1, 1992, pp.129-142.
[570] Harjeet Singh, 'India's strategic culture: the impact of geography', *Manekshaw Paper,* vol.10, 2009.
[571] Tanham, 'Indian strategic culture'.

border dispute with China and Nepal. The border dispute with China became an issue after independence, with the two states going to war in 1962 over the issue. This dispute has continued over the decades, with several skirmishes and clashes taking place in 2020.[572] Initially, India was not as concerned about the threat from China, as Tibet was believed to be a buffer state between India and China.[573] However, China's occupation of Tibet meant that India now shared a long border with China, which raised the level of threat that India faced from China.

Despite the continued tensions at the Chinese border, Pakistan remains the focal concern of Indian strategic and security thinking. India's relations with Pakistan have remained troubled ever since independence in 1947. The two states waged a war over Kashmir in 1947-48, after which the territory has remained divided. India and Pakistan went to war again in 1965 over the Kashmir dispute. Moreover, India became involved in Pakistan's civil war in 1971, helping separatists in East Pakistan to break away and form the state of Bangladesh; in 1999, a serious border conflict took place in the Kargil area of Kashmir.[574] This history of conflict with Pakistan intensifies the Indian state's security concerns, which have played an important role in the development of its strategic culture. Thus, India's borders are seen as an area of grave concern, thereby lending further importance to security threats in India's strategic thinking.

Despite the rich history of the Indian subcontinent, the Indian elite has embedded concerns and fears over Indian unity, which they consider fragile.[575] This thinking is based on the Indian subcontinent's long history of political disunity and turmoil. Even though the political disunity and the threat it poses is recognised by the Indian elite, they also view the Indian subcontinent — Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka — as a single geographical, economic and strategic unit which shares common cultural space and legacy.[576] This is related to the Indian state's perception of itself as a continuation of the British Raj, which means that in the post-independence period, it tended to view the Indian subcontinent as a single unit, at least in the cultural sense. This can also be understood through the internal opposition to the partition of British India from major segments of Indian society, including the political

[572] India-China clash: 20 Indian troops killed in Ladakh fighting', *BBC*, 16 June 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53061476
[573] Singh, 'India's strategic culture: the impact of geography'.
[574] Ibid.
[575] Tanham, 'Indian strategic culture', p.129-142.
[576] Ibid. Also see Singh, 'India's strategic culture: the impact of geography'.

elite in British India; hence, the creation of Pakistan was not completely accepted, with India viewing the entire Indian subcontinent as an area of influence.[577]

This perspective of the Indian subcontinent as a single unit, which was influential among Indian elites at the time of independence, made the aforementioned insecurity over political disunity more critical. India views Pakistan as the instigator of the breaking of the strategic unity of the Indian subcontinent.[578] India also views unfavourably Pakistan's relations with some foreign states — who are often involved with Pakistan militarily — due to its concerns over the involvement of great powers in the region which can affect India's strategic autonomy and influence in the region.[579] These arguments, perhaps, help explain India's prioritisation of Pakistan as a bigger security threat than China, despite the latter's greater military capability. Tanham also believes that India's prioritisation of the Indian subcontinent in its strategic and security concerns is evident by the "relatively clear, pragmatic, and effectively applied" strategy towards its neighbours, while the same is not true in India's approach to global affairs.[580] Moreover, the fear of involvement of great powers in its neighbourhood corresponds with India's fear of encirclement by powers who might intervene and challenge Indian sovereignty.[581] Thus, the presence of great powers in South Asia, in any capacity, was seen as a potential threat to Indian influence in the region and an obstacle in the pursuit of dominance over South Asia.

While it is true that the Indian subcontinent has historically lacked political unity, the region also has a shared cultural heritage. Additionally, cultural values hold a prominent position in Indian society, and have come to influence the beliefs and insecurities of the Indian political elite. Indian society has a caste-dominated and hierarchical nature, which leads to "a conservative view of life, which in turn creates an inherently defensive mentality and accounts for traditionally slow social change."[582] This hierarchical view of society and life also influences how Indians perceive the world. India views the international system as a "hierarchical layering of nations according to wealth and power and believe that India should

[577] Jona A. Dohrmann, 'The Congress Party as the Creator, Preserver and Destroyer of the Indian State?', in Günter Schucher and Christian Wagner (eds), *Indien-Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft* (Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, 2005) pp.53-77.
[578] Tanham, 'Indian strategic culture'.
[579] Ibid.
[580] Ibid, p.133.
[581] Ibid.
[582] Ibid, p.131. For more on the social and cultural values of India, including its society's caste-based structure, see Deepak Lal, *The Hindu Equilibrium: India C.1500 BC-2000 AD* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

be in the top ranks of the world hierarchy".[583] This, coupled with the importance attached to India's rich civilisational past, also means that India views itself as the leading state in the South Asian region. Besides the hierarchical view of the international system, Indian elites recognise it as anarchical as well, believing that there is no executive authority which can enforce international law.[584] Such views of the Indian elite — shaped by the hierarchical structure of Indian culture — influence the state's perception of the world and the role of India in the region.

Scholars also believe that deep-seated ideological convictions in Indian society have affected Indian strategic culture; for instance, the habits of *jugaad* (last-minute improvisation) are thought to prevent consistent and sound strategic thinking.[585] Tanham also notes that Hindu culture, which does not have a sense of time and views life as an "eternal present," discourages long-term planning.[586] In this way, societal beliefs and perceptions, based on Indian culture, also affect Indian strategic thought.

Pillai's research on Indian strategic culture highlights a distinct set of ideas that influenced Indian strategic thought in the immediate post-independence period, under the influence of India's first Prime Minister Jawarhalal Nehru. In the first few years following Indian independence, the belief in strategic autonomy was established as an important part of Indian strategic thought; indeed, strategic autonomy has remained a consistent theme in India's strategic culture and has influenced the state's security policy.[587] The state's geography, history and cultural values, along with the external threats it faced, were important factors which led to the belief in strategic autonomy. The belief in strategic autonomy also means that India strives to safeguard its security and territorial integrity without relying on any external power, which translates into an aim of self-dependence or self-reliance. Regarding the importance of self-dependence for India, Nehru said,

> In our external, internal or domestic policy, in our political policy, or in our economic policy, we do not propose to accept anything that involves in the slightest degree dependence on any other authority.[588]

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[583] Tanham, 'Indian strategic culture', p.131.
[584] Ian Hall, 'The Persistence of Nehruvianism in India's Strategic Culture', *Strategic Asia,* vol.17, 2016, pp.141-167.
[585] Sandy Gordon, *India's Rise to Power* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995) pp.5–6.
[586] Tanham, *Indian strategic thought: an interpretive essay*, p.50
[587] Mohanan Bhaskaran Pillai, 'Indian Strategic Culture: The Debates in Perspective', *SSRN*, 2020.
[588] Raj Verma, 'China, India and the future of the international society', in Jamie Gaskarth (ed.), *International Affairs*, vol.92, no.6, 2016, pp.1552–1553.

In the post-independence period, ensuring India's strategic autonomy was closely tied with the belief in non-alignment. During the Cold War era, which started around the same time India gained its independence, non-alignment became a core strategic value, as India, under Nehru, believed that involvement in the Cold War could be detrimental to the development of a newly-independent state. Nehru remarked regarding India's need to steer clear of great power politics:

> We propose as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale.[589]

In this way, strategic autonomy and non-alignment have been important components of the Indian strategic culture, as they were thought to be critical for the protection of India's sovereignty. However, it must be noted that India's adherence to non-alignment does not translate into neutralism; it is rather a balancing act to navigate great power competition.[590] Indeed, India's non-involvement in the great power competition in the Cold War era would change in the post-Nehru period, with India establishing close military and economic ties with the Soviet Union.

After independence, the Indian state did not view its regional and global role in terms of military capability and strength. In a speech after India's independence, Prime Minister Nehru said, "India is going to be and is bound to be a country that counts in world affairs, not I hope in the military sense, but in many other senses which are more important and effective in the end."[591] However, at the same time, the Indian elites realised that the acquiring and using of military power was necessary to safeguard the state's national security.[592] In recent decades, India has greatly developed its military capabilities and weapons.

While it might be true that India does not have a tradition of consistent strategic culture from its pre-colonial history, as has been argued by scholars such as Tanham, the influence of ancient cultural and religious texts on Indian thinking cannot be ignored. The rich cultural heritage and diversity of thought present in the major Indian religions — Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism — makes it difficult to single out a few traditions of thought which inspire the

[589] Devender Kumar Gupta, 'Role of India in Non-Aligned Movement: A Select Annotated Bibliography', Doctoral dissertation, Aligarh Muslim University 1987, p.2.
[590] Tanham, 'Indian strategic culture', p.129-142.
[591] *India's Foreign Policy, in Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* (Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1983) p.47.
[592] Hall, 'The Persistence of Nehruvianism in India's Strategic Culture'.

thinking of modern Indian society and its elite. Nevertheless, scholars have identified three philosophical dispositions, present in various ancient Hindu texts, that have become integral to the thinking of the Indian elite: fatalism, moralism and activism.[593] Through the modern interpretation of classic Indian texts, with some integration of Western ideas and concepts, these three outlooks were more broadly promulgated and hence adopted by a sizable proportion of Indian society in the 20th century. In this respect, the influence of Mahatma Gandhi was paramount, as he promoted moralism by encouraging the use of Buddhist and Jain ideas — while rejecting Western influences — and encouraged Indian traditional thought. This belief in Buddhist values also led him to promote nonviolence as a way to oppose colonialism.[594]

The influence of fatalism on Indian strategic culture can be viewed in conjunction with the beliefs of Indian society regarding the non-linearity of time, which discourage planning and long-term thinking. Similarly, fatalism rests around the idea that future events are already predetermined, which discourages long-term planning as well. On the other hand, moralism's impact on Indian strategic culture is evident through Indian global diplomacy in the colonial and post-independence period — where India held ethical positions on war and peace, as well as highlighting the evils of the apartheid and emphasising the right to self-determination of colonial states. Singh also notes that India's civilisational heritage "makes it place morality above reality."[595]

It is important to note that the acceptance of these three dispositions among the Indian elite and the broader society is not absolute, owing to India's rich diversity. This is also reflected in scholarly research on Indian outlooks and dispositions, where scholars give varying degrees of importance to these dispositions. For instance, Tanham argues that fatalism and moralism best characterise the strategic culture of India.[596] By contrast, India's secular modernists in the post-independence period, such as Prime Minister Nehru, believed in moralism and activism while rejecting fatalism.[597] Despite this, all three outlooks are important facets of beliefs held in Indian society, and as such, have been important in shaping Indian strategic thought.

Based on the ideas, beliefs, insecurities and philosophical outlooks of the Indian elite, as well as the historical progression of India's strategic thought, scholars mainly classify Indian

[593] Ibid.
[594] Martin T. Adam, 'Nonviolence and Emptiness: Buddha, Gandhi, and the "Essence of Religion"', *The Journal of the Faculty of Religious Studies,* vol.34, 2006, pp.1-14.
[595] Singh, 'India's strategic culture: the impact of geography', p.7.
[596] Tanham, *Indian strategic thought: an interpretive essay*.
[597] Hall, 'The Persistence of Nehruvianism in India's Strategic Culture'.

strategic culture as being influenced by three schools of thought: Nehruvianism, Realpolitik (hyperrealism) and Hindu nationalism.[598]

The secular modernists, led by Prime Minister Nehru, were responsible for the development of a consistent state strategy post-independence. They had a progressive, modernising vision, and did not adhere to Hindu revivalism; Nehru described his ideas and philosophy as "scientific humanism."[599] The ideas and beliefs of Nehru and the other secular modernists developed, over time, into the 'Nehruvian tradition' or 'Nehruvianism', and have become the mainstream tradition of Indian strategic thought since independence, and have "done the most" to influence India's strategic culture.[600] Nehruvianism combines the moralist ideas of Gandhi with Nehru's activism, while also emphasising the limitations that a relatively poor state faces in the pursuit of its interests and aspirations. Important facets of this strategic outlook are self-reliance, strategic autonomy and the pragmatic but cautious acquisition and use of military power. A key dimension of Nehruvian thought has been the belief in India's rich civilisational past and the aspiration of restoring India's status on the world stage; at the same time, Nehruvians highlight the state's lack of material power, which is needed to elevate India's status.[601] Thus, they have a realist outlook on international relations. Moreover, Nehruvians view South Asia as India's sphere of influence and believe in safeguarding against the Chinese threat from the north.[602] Hence, the Nehruvian thought promotes a strategic culture of moralism and activism, which is used to elevate India's position on the global stage, as the state does not yet possess the material power to achieve great power status.

While Nehruvian thought has mostly dominated in the thinking of the Indian elite, there are opposing views present in the Indian society. Realpolitik, or hyperrealist, thought rejects moralism, while criticising the Nehruvian ideas for settling for "inexpensive, low-risk prestige."[603] Hence, they believe in more assertive building and utilisation of military power to expand India's influence.

In recent decades, the Nehruvian ideology has seen greater opposition in the form of Hindu nationalist ideology, which has been mainstreamed by the rise of the Bharatiya Janata

[598] Ibid.
[599] L. Sujatha, 'Nehru - the spirit of Humanism', *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, vol.19, no.7, 2014, pp.103-105 at p.105.
[600] Hall, 'The Persistence of Nehruvianism in India's Strategic Culture'.
[601] Ibid.
[602] Ibid.
[603] See Verghese Koithara, *Society, State and Security: The Indian Experience* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999) p.98.

Party (BJP) in recent decades. It has been argued that the influence of Hindu nationalism stems from these ideas being in the 'broader realm' of 'public culture', which means that these beliefs are circulated in the "everyday practices of the socialisation process."[604]

Hindu Nationalist ideology is centred around their perceived recognition of Hinduism's greatness, through which all other aspects of strategy are perceived — the movement is committed to achieve a "Hindu Renaissance."[605] As such, military power is conceived as a means to attain this eventual aim. An important facet of this ideology is the focus on internal threats presented by Muslims and Communists, with external threats having secondary importance.[606] Moreover, Hindu nationalists view the existence of multiple civilisations, rather than as nation-states, as threats. In the 19th and 20th century, the West and Islam were the "civilisations of concern," while China has also been added to this list in the 21st century.[607] These concerns translate into an effort to limit exposure of Indian citizens to Western ideas and materialism, foreign forms of Islam and Chinese influence.[608] This also results in careful handling of India's relations with great powers, so that the influence of foreign ideas could be limited. The concept of strategic autonomy — which is not followed by contemporary Nehruvians — remains a significant belief of the Hindu nationalists. Based on this belief, in the current global economic climate, Hindu nationalists resist the process of complete market liberalisation. For instance, BJP leader Subramanian Swamy, an economist and member of the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of India's parliament) believes that "unbridled globalisation" is against Indian values; hence, he argues for a controlled, state-led model of economic development that ensures autonomy.[609]

The influence of these ideas has been significant in India's strategic culture, and has led to strategic policies and positions held by the state. At the start of the post-independence period, Nehru had defined India's position on various key strategic issues, by adopting the policy of nonalignment, maintaining a strong, albeit civilly controlled army, and using diplomacy on the international stage to advance India's interests.[610] Hall argues that these policies "mixed

[604] Muhammad Shoaib Pervez, 'Strategic culture reconceptualized: the case of India and the BJP', *International Politics,* vol.56, no.1, 2019, pp.87-102.
[605] Edward Anderson & Arkotong Longkumer, 'Neo-Hindutva: evolving forms, spaces, and expressions of Hindu nationalism', *Contemporary South Asia,* vol.26, no.4, 2018, pp.371-377.
[606] Hall, 'The Persistence of Nehruvianism in India's Strategic Culture'.
[607] Ibid.
[608] Ibid.
[609] For more on strategic autonomy, see Subramanian Swamy, *Hindus Under Siege: The Way Out* (New Delhi: Har Anand, 2007) p.88.
[610] A.P. Rana, 'The Intellectual Dimensions of India's Nonalignment', *Journal of Asian Studies,* vol.28, no.2, 1969, pp.299–312.

idealistic hopes about a future international order with realistic calculations about the risks inherent in allying with one bloc or another."[611] Moreover, the Nehruvian focus on diplomacy also reflects the belief that India's cultural heritage, especially Buddhist and Hindu ideas and beliefs, can help mitigate conflicts at the international stage.

The Nehruvian ideology saw some changes after the death of Nehru, while remaining the most prominent ideology affecting Indian strategic thought, as subsequent political and bureaucratic leaders belonged to the Indian National Congress (Nehru's party) and were mentored by Nehru.[612] However, some core strategic values of Nehruvian thought were altered in the 1960s. India's defeat by China in the 1962 war raised serious questions about the effectiveness and standard of Indian military capability. As India developed its military capability after 1962, it realised a need for a reliable source of military equipment; this was exacerbated by the U.S.'s ban on weapons exports to India and Pakistan in the 1965 war.[613] This led India to incline towards the Soviets, eventually leading to a strategic partnership, as witnessed through the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971.

However, since then, Indian strategic thought has evolved; among other circumstantial factors, this evolution can be viewed through the increasing influence of other ideologies competing with Nehruvian thought. In particular, the build up of India's nuclear capability, improved relations with the U.S., and the emergence of Hindu nationalism, are the key components which have marked this shift and development of Indian strategic culture.

India's nuclear build-up was inspired by the Indian defeat by China in 1962 and China's subsequent attainment of nuclear weapons in 1964, prompting India to reconsider its position regarding a nuclear deterrent. Moreover, nuclear weapons were perceived as the means to protect India's strategic autonomy. Even then, scholars assert that the Indian nuclear program, owing to its gradual development and progression, has an emphasis on "restraint, stability and minimalism," as most Indian elites deem the use of nuclear weapons to be "morally unacceptable."[614] Varadarajan uses a constructivist approach to explain India's development of

[611] Hall, 'The Persistence of Nehruvianism in India's Strategic Culture', p.23.
[612] Nehru's influence on the next generation of Indian leaders and bureaucrats can be further understood through Jagat S. Mehta, *The Tryst Betrayed: Reflections on Diplomacy and Development* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2010).
[613] Hall, 'The Persistence of Nehruvianism in India's Strategic Culture'.
[614] Rajesh Basrur, 'Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol.38, no.2, 2001, pp.181-198, at pp.181-184. Basrur conducted interviews with a number of Indian political and strategic elites to reach his conclusion. For more on this issue, see Rodney W. Jones, 'India's Strategic Culture', *Defense Threat Reduction Agency*, 2006, p.26.

nuclear weapons and argues that asserting the state's identity was a reason behind the decision, even though India argued that external forces pushed the state to pursue nuclear weapons.[615]

The idea of a nuclear deterrent is supported by the Hindu nationalists among the Indian elite. Pervez highlights the significant role of the BJP government in 1998 and the Hindu nationalist ideology which influenced the development of India's nuclear weapons program.[616] The Hindu nationalist ideology of BJP elites, he asserts, requires a "rejuvenated Hindu identity" and the "rejuvenated security practices that are reminiscent of the past glory of Hindu rajas and the kings who ruled over the Indian subcontinent."[617] To fulfil this idea of a new Hindu identity, the BJP government pursued nuclear tests to transform India's ambiguous nuclear approach to an overt nuclear posture. In doing so, the strategic perceptions of the Indian state were transformed as the possession of a nuclear deterrent improved India's security position vis-à-vis threats from the neighbouring states and strengthened Indian belief in its own quest for great power status. In the post-independence period, India had adopted an anti-nuclear stance on the global stage during Nehru's leadership, advocating for bans on nuclear testing. Even when India realised the need for the development of nuclear weapons in the 1960s, and subsequently developed a nuclear capability in 1974, it maintained an ambiguous posture on the world stage regarding its actual capacity for nuclear weapons. The change in India's ambiguous nuclear identity to a more overt one highlighted the growing influence of the BJP's Hindu nationalist ideology within the Indian elite, thereby changing the behaviour of the state on the global stage. Thus, even though the development of nuclear weapons can be attributed to realist views regarding India's security situation, the influence of the Hindu nationalist ideology of the BJP government can help explain the change of the state's global posture.

The lack of a tradition of developed strategic thought from India's otherwise rich past has meant that the modern Indian state's strategic culture has developed mostly in the post-independence period. Thus, Indian strategic culture focuses on the threats faced by India on its borders, particularly from Pakistan and China, as well as a quest for strategic autonomy and self-reliance, and the belief in the state's role as a regional leader and aspiration to be a great power. Moreover, Indian elites hold embedded concerns about the involvement or presence of great powers in the region, as that might affect India's regional influence and present challenges in the enhancement of Indian dominance. India sees its military power as a necessity to protect

[615] L. Varadarajan, 'Constructivism, identity and neoliberal (in) security', *Review of International Studies,* vol.30, no.3, 2004, pp.319–341.
[616] Pervez, 'Strategic culture reconceptualized: the case of India and the BJP'.
[617] Ibid.

national security. The philosophical outlooks of moralism, fatalism and activism play an important role in Indian culture, and as such, are important in the strategic thinking of the political elite. These ideas, beliefs and outlooks have influenced three traditions of strategic thought: Nehruvianism, hyperrealism and Hindu nationalism. While all three are different from one another, the basis of these ideologies is rooted in the Indian culture and the ideas, beliefs and insecurities that are dominant in Indian society. While Nehruvian thought remained dominant for most of India's history, Hindu nationalism has grown over the past decades and holds a prominent position in Indian strategic culture today.

India's Diplomatic Style

India's diplomatic style has also been influenced by the inherent values, beliefs, insecurities and outlooks of the state's elites and decision-makers. The diplomatic style of India is connected to the norms of the Indian society, as well as the visions and outlooks of its leaders. Additionally, the values and beliefs that influence India's strategic culture have also impacted the state's diplomatic style.

The Indian elite viewed India as a land with rich cultural diversity and a place where the 'cultures of all lands' would be welcomed.[618] As the struggle for independence had been based on values of non-violence derived from Buddhist and Hindu values, leaders of the newly independent state were influenced by cultural considerations. Cultural values affected the development and evolution of diplomacy in subsequent years and left a profound impact on the policy instruments of the state, specifically those responsible for the interactions with foreign powers. India's diplomatic culturist posture is also rooted in the perception of Indian uniqueness or exceptionalism, due to the state's cultural heritage which extends back to the start of human civilisation. Teresita and Howard Schaffer in their book, *India at the Global High Table* highlighted the core elements of Indian foreign policy behaviour, which includes strategic autonomy and economic diplomacy; their argument was based on the significant effect of India's civilisational identity on the state's diplomatic style.[619]

[618] Debidatta A. Mahapatra, 'From a Latent to a 'Strong' Soft Power? The Evolution of India's Cultural Diplomacy', *Palgrave Communications*, vol.2, no.1, 2016, pp.1–11.
[619] Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard B. Schaffer, *India at the Global High Table: The Quest for Regional Primacy and Strategic Autonomy* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016).

Given the influential role played by India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in India's behaviour in foreign relations, his vision and beliefs were significant for India's diplomatic style. Nehru had adopted the non-violence principles promulgated by Gandhi and incorporated them into the state's foreign policy agendas.[620] As such, Nehru's beliefs in maintaining India's strategic autonomy significantly influenced Indian diplomatic conduct in the post-independence period, as diplomacy was viewed as an important method to ensure India's strategic autonomy was safeguarded. The striving for strategic autonomy was closely linked with another of Nehru's guiding principles for Indian behaviour: non-alignment. This meant that India would strategically secure its decision-making power by not associating itself with any bloc or alliance; in the Cold War period, it meant remaining strategically non-aligned between either of the blocs. The adoption of non-alignment also provided it with the chance to focus on the geopolitical situation near home while additionally promoting India's moralist and activist credentials on the global stage. It is important to note that India's non-alignment did not dispose it to pursue an isolationist policy; rather, it was a means to engage with the world differently. This could be witnessed in Nehru's active engagement with global powers and other global initiatives, participation in the Commonwealth of Nations, raising of the issue of apartheid at the UN forum for the first time, and greatly contributing to the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[621]

India's diplomacy in the post-independence period displayed India's moralist approach to global affairs and commitment to work towards world peace. Menon asserted that India aimed to serve and strive towards peace in a "truer and nobler sense," because for Gandhi and his generation, "peace through non-violence is not merely a matter of necessity but a matter of conscience."[622] Nehru believed that India was capable of preventing the confrontation of the two great powers at the time.[623] It is also important to note that India's perceptions of these great powers were based on India's unique cultural values and historical circumstances. For instance, Nehru preferred the Soviet Union over the U.S. as the USSR was "untainted by the evils of racism and colonialism."[624] Indeed, a major part of Indian diplomacy in the post-

[620] Yudhishthir R. Isar, 'Cultural Diplomacy: India Does It Differently', *International Journal of Cultural Policy,* vol.23, no.6, 2017, pp.705–716.
[621] Vinod Khobragade, 'India's Engagement with The World: Contemporary foreign policy interests', *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, vol.19, no.2, 2015, pp.44–59.
[622] Kumara P. S. Menon, Speech at Indian Defence Staff College, in *K. P. S. Menon Collection, Speeches and Writings*, file 35, 1949; also see Vojtech Mastny, 'The Soviet Union's Partnership with India', *Journal of Cold War Studies,* vol.12, no.3, 2010, pp.50-90.
[623] Ibid, p.52.
[624] Ibid, p.53.

independence period involved activism against racism — including apartheid — and support for the right to self-determination for colonial states. In this way, the diplomatic style of India was influenced by this approach towards diplomacy in the post-independence period, whereby the Indian state used a moralist and activist approach to raise crucial issues on the global stage.

India's culture derives from its historical civilisational values and beliefs, which are also related to the Buddhist and Hindu religions. It has been argued that the values of peaceful co-existence — promulgated by Gandhi — led India to pursue soft power to enhance its influence in the world.[625] India has incredibly rich and diverse soft power assets which create a favourable environment to improve India's global image. Ranging from the rich Indian culture exported by Bollywood (Indian film industry) to the everyday spiritualism of Yoga, the message that goes across all around the world is that of diversity and peace. With such an abundance of soft-power resources, India has a prominent presence on the global stage, even though it has not been able to match the influence of the West or that of China. This is mainly attributed to the discrepancy that exists between India's soft power projections abroad and its behaviour at home.[626] The effect of the message of universalism and diversity sent to foreign lands is dampened by the proceedings of domestic institutions and foreign policy. India's growingly forceful stance in regard to its neighbouring states and high expenditure on the military all occur while the GDP per capita is at a level similar to many poverty-stricken African states.[627] It is imperative that the message to the world be in line with the message conveyed at home in order for soft power to succeed in its objectives.[628]

That said, former Indian diplomat and current member of the Indian parliament Shashi Tharoor disagrees with the focus on the use of soft power for India to gain influence, as he claims that " …soft power becomes credible when there is hard power behind it; that is why the U.S. has been able to make so much of its soft power."[629] This suggests that there needs to be a balance between the application of hard power and the export of soft power in order to achieve substantial geopolitical results.

[625] Rohan Mukherjee, 'The False Promise of India's Soft Power', *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations,* vol.6, no.1, 2014, pp.46-62.
[626] Ibid.
[627] Ibid.
[628] Ibid.
[629] Shashi Tharoor, 'India as a Soft Power', *India International Centre Quarterly*, vol.38, no.3-4, 2011, pp.330–343.

Indian negotiators, across issue areas and over time, have the distinction of epitomising the near-constant use of the strict distributive strategy (also known as the value claiming strategy).[630] This strategy comprises a set of tactics that are useful only for claiming value from others. Examples can include refusing to make any concessions, holding others' issues hostage, making very high opening demands, not reciprocating similar requests, and in India's case, often saying 'no' at the negotiation table. This suggests that India is viewed as a difficult and inflexible negotiating partner. While this style of India is evident in the area of international trade negotiations, it is also substantially apparent in matters relating to nuclear weapons and non-proliferation, where India has refused to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Although this stance is a product of diplomatic evolution stretching across many decades and withstanding multiple geopolitical tensions, for a state to be at a point where it does not consent to a secure and nuclear-free world does indeed call into question the moral grounds it claims. However, for India, it became a question of pragmatism and regional security not to sign the NPT and to proceed with weaponising its nuclear power. However, before that, since its independence, India has been a strong opponent of nuclear weapons; Gandhi declared them immoral and Nehru advocated for global nuclear disarmament as early as 1948.[631] India continued with the same vision, banning nuclear testing in 1954 and strongly supporting a non-discriminatory treaty banning nuclear proliferation in 1965.[632] However, with Indira Gandhi's authorisation of a 'peaceful explosion,' the Gandhi-Nehru legacy began to wither away. The choices are explainable based on the increasing Chinese expansion and to gain an advantage over Pakistan; however, they made India lose the moral high ground it earlier possessed regarding nuclear disarmament.[633]

On the other hand, Indian negotiators are often described as meticulous and detail-oriented. Teresita and Howard Schaffer describe how Indian negotiators demonstrate a strong grip over the content matter, make extensive use of diplomatic symbolism and operate in an expansive hierarchy while thriving in it through strong networks and prize loyalty.[634] India's willingness to use a strict distributive strategy is best captured in a statement made by an Indian foreign delegate in Geneva, as noted by Amrita Narlikar, "…it is easier for our minister to come

[630] Amrita Narlikar. 'Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation? Explaining the Negotiating Strategy of a Rising India', *International Affairs*, vol.82, no.1, 2006, pp.59–76 at p.62.
[631] Rajesh Basrur, 'India and Nuclear Disarmament', *Security Challenges*, vol.6, no.4, 2010, pp.69-81.
[632] Ibid.
[633] Ibid.
[634] Sarang Shidore, 'Higher Order', *India Today*, 15 December 2016, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/books/story/20161226-india-us-south-asia-foreign-policy-830047-2016-12-15.

back home empty-handed as a wounded hero, rather than coming back with something after making a compromise".[635] India's style originates partly from the state's experience under colonial rule, but it is also a product of India's perception of itself and of its place in the world.[636] As observed by Stephen Cohen, Indian officials believe they are representing a civilisation, not just a state.[637] Therefore, high expectations and privileged hopes are maintained by Indian negotiators during discussions.

In his book *Diplomacy: Indian Style* K.P. Fabian aptly describes the Indian diplomatic style as being immensely influenced by the decisions made by the ruling governments, specifically during the wars fought in the past with Pakistan and China.[638] The author discusses how the Indian diplomatic style lacks a contextual and holistic approach; rather, it is very textual,[639] therefore failing to capture the complexities that arise during warring times, such as the intentions of the opponent, geopolitical implications and domestic shocks.[640] The 1962 Indo-China War, among many other reasons, is suggested to be a result of Nehru's failure to recognise the strategic implications of a Chinese invasion of Tibet.[641] After the Indo-Pakistan 1971 War, Indira Gandhi's decision to accept the terms of the Simla Agreement resulted in Zulfiqar Bhutto's enabling of Pakistan to retrieve its lost territory and approximately 90,000 prisoners of war (POWs); at this point; India could have been perceived to have lost its dominant, dictating position.[642] However, it can be argued that the Simla Agreement achieved a strategic objective as Pakistan agreed not to pursue the Kashmir issue through multilateral forums, thus establishing the conflict as solely a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan, which is the preferred Indian strategy for issues pertaining its immediate neighbourhood.

The diplomatic style of India has evolved over the decades; India's approach has become bolder during the tenure of Prime Minister Modi's government. At the same time, the state has also started focusing extensively on deploying India's soft power to accomplish strategic interests. This emphasis on soft power was guided by five factors namely Samman (dignity), Samvaad (dialogue), Samriddhi (shared prosperity), Suraksha (regional and global security) and Sanskriti evam Sabhyata (cultural and civilisational links), as highlighted by

[635] Narlikar. 'Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation? Explaining the Negotiating Strategy of a Rising India'.
[636] Ibid.
[637] Stephen P. Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004) p.52.
[638] K. P. Fabian, *Diplomacy: Indian Style* (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2012).
[639] Ibid.
[640] Ibid.
[641] Latief A. Dar, 'Book Review - Diplomacy, Indian Style', *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, vol.73, no.4, 2012, pp.797–799.
[642] Ibid.

Ambassador Bhaswati Mukherjee.[643] Consequently, during the second term of Modi's BJP party, there has been a significant shift in Indian behaviour which has departed from its initial internal reorientation phase to displaying more supremacy-aspiring tendencies, characterised by the pursuit of geopolitical ambitions. PM Modi's faction — with its firm belief in the Hindu nationalism — believes that the Indian example can be a model for the world to follow, particularly the notion of 'vishwaguru' which means world teacher.[644] This suggests that Indian elites believe that India's rich ancient culture gives the state a capacity to lead. The significance given to ancient cultural practices through Yoga as a cultural export, became clear when the Indian government successfully exerted its soft power, and a resolution was passed by the UN which designated the 'International Yoga Day.'[645] Similarly, Prime Minister Modi's style has been very different from that of his predecessors, specifically in the sphere of foreign visits. There has been a consistent frequency of addressing the Indian diaspora on each of his visits, most notable being a visit in Houston that attracted around 50,000 Indians.[646]

The vision of the founding fathers led to the adoption of the principles of non-alignment and strategic autonomy as essential components of the state's strategic thinking. While India has tried to use its soft power to increase its influence, its diplomatic style still focuses more on taking a non-concessionary approach to achieving its diplomatic goals, even though the state's official outlook promotes cooperation and dialogue.

Diplomats' Training, Conduct and Roles

The government of India, through the Ministry of External Affairs, conducts training for diplomatic officers. Applicants for diplomats' posts apply to the ministry from where selection is taken based on the credentials that the ministry assesses.[647] However, some individuals may be handpicked, such as from the civil service, after showing desirable characteristics and a willingness to represent India abroad. After shortlisting, the candidates who pass the interview process are subjected to compulsory training at Lal Bahadur Shastri

[643] Bhaswati Mukherjee. 'Distinguished Lectures', *Ministry of External Affairs*, 18 Oct. 2019.
[644] Ian Hall, 'Narendra Modi and India's normative power', *International Affairs*, vol.93, no.1, 2017, pp.113-131.
[645] Padmapriya Govindarajan, 'Indian Soft Power at Work: International Yoga Day Captures Global Attention', *The Diplomat*, 23 June 2016.
[646] Mahapatra, 'From a Latent to a 'Strong' Soft Power? The Evolution of India's Cultural Diplomacy'.
[647] Ian Taylor, 'India's Economic Diplomacy in Africa', in Ajay K. Dubey and Aparajita Biswas (eds), *India and Africa's Partnership* (New Delhi: Springer, 2016).

National Academy of Administration (LBSNAA).[648] The academy is situated in Mussoorie, Uttarakhand, in the Dehradun District. The training takes one year, and the content is mostly concentrated on diplomatic functions, conduct, and bilateral relations as well as politics.

After the training at LBSNAA, aspiring diplomats are put in real-life contexts working in the Foreign Service Institute of India, now known as the Sushma Swaraj Foreign Service Institute (SSFSI). The SSFSI, situated in New Delhi, trains diplomats on scenarios and offers deeper learning than at LBSNAA. The SSFSI, for instance, subjects the trainees to a rigorous study of law, foreign languages and international relations.[649] After passing through SSFSI, diplomats are dispatched on attachments internally. By the attachment stage, trainees are required to demonstrate a substantial comprehension of a second language.[650] Upon the satisfaction of the evaluators with the performance both in diplomatic content and second languages, trainees are inducted as assistant secretaries at the Ministry of External Affairs. Later, trainees are posted to states that match their second language. They are cross evaluated on language mastery and diplomatic content once more, and once they pass the tests, they are inducted in the post of Third Secretary, which is the entrant position. Diplomats may then be promoted across various ranks with *Ambassador* or *High Commissioner* being the highest post.

The Indian Foreign Service also ensures that Indian diplomats are aware of their state's diverse peoples and rich heritage, as cultural values play an important role in India's unique perception of the world. For this reason, the training includes interesting features such as a 10-day Himalayan trek, a 12-day visit to a certain remote village, and state-wide tours that take trainee diplomats to India's cultural and religious treasures such as temples, ashrams and major historical sites.[651] This training aspect is greatly reflected in India's diplomatic style where diplomats understand the richness of their soft power resources and internalise the belief of Mahatma Gandhi, who saw India as 'a land of all cultures.' These training aspects allow diplomats to understand the importance of India's cultural values and their incorporation in its diplomatic style. The Indian Foreign Service has also dealt with internal challenges which could threaten the prestige and quality of the diplomatic services of the state. A caste-based hierarchy has existed in India, which discriminates against people with low caste backgrounds, despite

[648] Leena Warsi, Joshua Orme and Jeremi Suri, 'India', in Robert Hutchings and Jeremi Suri (eds), *Modern Diplomacy in Practice*. (Cham, Germany: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).
[649] Ibid.
[650] Ibid.
[651] Robert Hutchings and Jeremi Suri, 'The Making of an Effective Diplomat: A Global View', *American Foreign Service Association*, 2019.

their similar ambitions of becoming effective diplomats. Even though affirmative action has been introduced for people with low caste backgrounds, there are still discrepancies in the number of ambassadorial posts awarded to them.[652]

Over the years, the Indian Foreign Service has remained incredibly small in terms of personnel. According to Markey, this has been the result of a highly selective recruitment policy — from the 300,000 people who take the written exam each year, only 300 become part of the national bureaucracy, of which approximately 20 join the IFS.[653] The MEA has recognised that the number of IFS officers is insufficient to fulfill the needs of India's diplomatic commitments, and has made efforts to rectify this; between 2007 and 2017, the number of IFS diplomats rose from 708 to 941, nearly a one-third increase.[654] Despite this increase, the number of IFS diplomats remains small for a state of India's size and aspirations for influence. For instance, India's total diplomatic corps is around 2700, as compared to 4500 for China, 5700 for Japan, 2000 for Brazil and 1250 for South Korea — this suggests that while the diplomatic corps number is not uncharacteristic for rising middle powers, it signals a lower diplomatic capacity for a state seeking increased influence on the global stage.[655] Moreover, Markey highlights that diplomats in the IFS "tend not to cultivate or rely on outside expertise", while Indian foreign policy think tanks lack access to government and funding.[656] As such, India's diplomatic capacity does not necessarily match its aspirations for increased diplomatic influence, as indicated by the low number of IFS diplomats.

Nevertheless, Indian diplomats have remained a significant decision-making pool, which displays a high level of independence in thought, and collaborates with the executive in pushing for Indian interests abroad. For that reason, the Indian approach in international relations can be considered an integrated approach, in which diplomats collaborate with the executive without unnecessary interference. Even though over the past seven decades, there have been shifts in the direction of foreign policy-making, the role of diplomats has displayed a large

[652] 'Top IFS posts still out of bounds for SCs, STs', *The Hindu*, 5 December 2015, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/top-ifs-posts-still-out-of-bounds-for-scs-sts/article7950262.ece. For a detailed history of affirmative action in Indian civil services, including the Indian Foreign Service, see Rikhil R. Bhavnani and Alexander Lee, 'Does affirmative action worsen bureaucratic performance? evidence from the Indian administrative service', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol.65, no.1, 2021, pp.5-20.
[653] Daniel Markey, 'Developing India's Foreign Policy "Software"', *Asia Policy*, no.8, 2009, pp.73-96, at p.78.
[654] Kanti Bajpai and Byron Chong, 'India's Foreign Policy Capacity', *Policy Design and Practice*, vol.2, no.2, 2019, pp.137-162, at p.147.
[655] Ibid, at p.147.
[656] Markey, 'Developing India's Foreign Policy "Software"', at p.78.

degree of continuity — while still incrementally adapting to changing foreign policy positions of the state.[657]

However, under the BJP government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, diplomatic decision-making and foreign policymaking has been centralised. This has been the result of Prime Minister Modi's efforts to integrate his ideological and populist views into India's foreign policy decisions; moreover, under the BJP government, India has implicitly attempted to move "from its long-held nonalignment to a contemporary, globalized practicality."[658] As such, the agenda-setting role of the Indian diplomats has been diminished as more authority is exercised by the prime minister.

National Security Apparatus

India's strategic thought and the threats the state perceives from other states in the region have influenced the development of its national security apparatus. The Ministry of Defence oversees the state's defence policy as well as preparedness in the face of threats. Due to India's aspirations for dominance, as well as the need for defensive capacity, military capability has been extensively developed. Shiv Shankar Menon remarked that India's options in the defence sector "range from defensive power through the offensive capability to aggrandisement."[659]

India's modern security apparatus has transformed since the state's acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998. The nuclear authorities have been tied with the Ministry of Defence as well as the intelligence services, including the Intelligence Bureau which is responsible for internal intelligence, and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), which is responsible for external intelligence.[660] Since 2002, the newly developed Defence Intelligence Agency has worked on combining the intelligence networks of the armed forces.[661] Thus, the intelligence agencies, defence ministry and the nuclear authorities have been interlinked. Moreover, the National Security Council of India (NSCI) was set up after the 1998 nuclear tests and plays an important role in the formulation of strategic and security policy; the council covers all political,

[657] Neelam Deo, 'Indian foreign policy: a paradigm shift?', *Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations*, 16 December 2016, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/indian-foreign-policy-a-paradigm-shift/.
[658] Brahma Chellaney, 'The Remaking of Indian Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Challenges', *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*, 2021.
[659] See Pillai, 'Indian Strategic Culture: The Debates in Perspective'.
[660] Raminder Kaur, 'Sovereignty without Hegemony, the Nuclear State, and a 'Secret Public Hearing' in India', *Theory, culture & society,* vol.30, no.3, 2013, pp.3-28.
[661] Ibid.

economic, energy and strategic security concerns, and incorporates members of the cabinet together with the chiefs of the military. Kapila remarks that the formation of the NSCI marked the first time that national security issues were placed on the governmental agenda, which was the result of a nuclear arms race in the region, proxy wars in Kashmir, as well as the changing regional security environment.[662] Under the BJP, the defence sector has been developed in the pursuit of a 'strong India.'[663]

The biggest threats that India faces are from Pakistan and China. Scholars have emphasised that India's doctrine regarding Pakistan is "strategic restraint and engagement," while policy concerning China is "dissuasive defence."[664] Moreover, they highlight that the state's nuclear capabilities are perceived as a "credible nuclear deterrent."[665] In this way, India's national security apparatus is structured to respond to the strategic and security threats that it faces.

How Diplomatic Style and Strategic Culture Guide India's Actions as a Supremacy-Aspiring Rising Middle Power

India's behaviour in the region points towards aspirations of supremacy, rather than primacy. This is evident through the strained relations with multiple neighbouring states. South Asian states view India as the 'big brother' of the region; at the same time, India has displayed hegemonic tendencies in its behaviour towards its neighbouring states — India's approach under Indira Gandhi was adjudged as "hegemonic interventionism."[666] However, scholars have noted that India practises the principle of strategic restraint when it comes to the use of military force.[667] This approach stands in contrast with the use of interventionism and hegemony building in South Asia through the strong-arming of neighbours. Moreover, India has, by and large, not expanded efforts towards regional integration, nor has it shown a commitment to

[662] Ibid, p.12.
[663] Apurba Kundu, 'India's National Security under the BJP/NDA: Strong at Home, Engaged Abroad', *European Institute for Asian Studies*, vol.8, no.3-4, 2004.
[664] Rajan Suresh, *The Changing Dimensions of Security: India's Security Policy Options* (Delhi: Vij Books India, 2016).
[665] Pillai, 'Indian Strategic Culture: The Debates in Perspective'.
[666] Ian Hall, 'Is a Modi Doctrine Emerging in Indian Foreign Policy?' *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol.69, no.3, 2015, pp.247-252 at pp.250-251.
[667] Sunil Dasgupta, 'The Fate of India's Strategic Restraint', *Current History*, 2012, pp.129-134

solve the region's issues and conflicts. This is in stark contrast to other states, such as Indonesia and Brazil, who are also seeking influence at the regional level but are very integration-oriented.

This chapter aims to discuss India's case through the *theory of hegemonic tendencies*. To understand the motivations behind India's behaviour, the diplomatic style and strategic culture of India that leads this thesis to classify it as a supremacy-aspiring rising middle power — as opposed to a primacy-aspiring one — has been emphasised. For further demonstration, the following sections discuss India's approach at a regional and international stage.

Navigation of Great Power Competition

India's diplomatic style and strategic culture highlight the state's belief in non-alignment in the post-independence period. The adoption of the non-alignment principle determined the state's behaviour in the Cold War era, as India sought to protect its strategic autonomy and limit the involvement of great powers in the region. While India was targeted by both the U.S. and the Soviet blocs as a potential strategic partner, Nehru chose to steer the newly-independent state towards the Non-Aligned Movement; the Indian approach at this time followed the mantra of "Asia for Asians" which resulted in opposition to the involvement of great powers in regional matters.[668] Additionally, the Indian aversion to siding with the U.S. was based, among other factors, on the perception of the U.S. as "over-developed, materialistic, and driven by a Manichaean view of the world" in contrast to the Indians' perception of the world; on the other hand, the Soviets were largely seen as "harmless" and "an errant but fundamentally friendly state."[669]

It must be noted that India's adoption of the non-alignment principle in the post-independence period did not lead to neutrality. Indeed, India began to strengthen relations with the Soviets in the 1960s, culminating in the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1971. The shift towards friendlier relations with the Soviet Union, instead of the United States, occurred due to the latter's efforts to employ Pakistan's help to build up support for anti-Soviet alliances in Asia — which resulted in the Baghdad Pact and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO).[670] Moreover, India's increasing tensions with China occurred at the

[668] Nisar Rana Danish, 'India-US Relations Through the Lens of Cold War: The Time of Estranged Relations (Brief Overview)', *Bulletin of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia,* vol.6, no.4, 2019.
[669] Stephen P. Cohen, 'India and America: An Emerging Relationship', *Conference on the Nation-State System and transnational forces in South Asia*, vol.8, no.10, 2000, p.4.
[670] Mastny, 'The Soviet Union's Partnership with India'.

same time when Soviet-China relations were beginning to sour; as such, China's role as a 'common enemy' to India and the Soviet Union influenced this relationship. When Indira Gandhi assumed power in 1966, she worked towards closer relations with the Soviets. Her approach was based on the belief that "India is the main country that can, in course of time, prevent further Chinese expansion. India's ability to do so, however, is crippled by her disputes with Pakistan."[671] Thus, the move towards closer relations with the Soviets highlighted India's fears and insecurities about the rise of China and the closeness of U.S.-Pakistan relations.

It must also be noted that Indira Gandhi's approach to international relations, and the move towards friendship with the Soviets, was motivated by a realist understanding of world affairs, as she understood that the Soviets were guided by their own self-interests.[672] While the realist perspective, in combination with circumstantial factors, might partly explain India's preference for building ties with the Soviets rather than the U.S., the values and beliefs of the Indian strategic culture are also highlighted in this approach. For instance, India remained concerned about the Soviets' involvement in South Asia's affairs; as such, Indira Gandhi wanted to "calibrate Soviet arms sales to India and Pakistan" in order to make sure that the Soviet Union does not take over "management of the subcontinent."[673] In this way, even in the establishment of close relations with the Soviets, India was concerned with the implications for its strategic autonomy and influence in the region, which to this date remains essential components of its strategic culture.

While the later decades of the Cold War period saw India establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union, it must be noted that India never became part of the Soviet bloc and as such, remained non-aligned — even though India's non-alignment was perceived as the state being pro-Soviet.[674] With the fall of the Soviet Union and India's rapid development following market liberalisation, India's relations with the U.S. slowly began to improve, even though India maintained good relations with Russia. India's relations with the U.S. transformed from "estrangement" to "engagement" in the 1990s and slowly progressed toward a closer partnership.[675] Since then, Indian elites had started to increasingly look toward the U.S. as a potential strategic partner, mainly due to India's economic development, integration in the

[671] Ibid, p.64.
[672] Ibid.
[673] Ibid, p.64.
[674] Pillai, 'Indian Strategic Culture: The Debates in Perspective'.
[675] Danish, 'India-US Relations Through the Lens of Cold War: The Time of Estranged Relations (Brief Overview)', p.292.

world economy and the establishment of an influential Indian diaspora in the United States.[676] The growing strategic importance of the Indian ocean in the post-Cold War era might also help in understanding the improvement in India-U.S. strategic ties. Moreover, the Asia-Pacific region has emerged as an area of contention in the emerging U.S.-China rivalry, as the region has the largest energy reserves in the world. As China's interests in the region directly threaten India's interests as well as U.S. dominance, the two states have found common strategic interests against China's growing influence.[677]

Another important aspect of the India-U.S. relationship is the increased U.S. presence in South Asia through joint military exercises with India.[678] This Indian behaviour stands in stark contrast with India's historical strategic culture, a major component of which is the apprehension India has over the involvement or presence of great powers in South Asia, as it might threaten India's own dominance in the region. That is why India has shown mistrust and insecurity over its neighbours' facilitation of great power presence in the region. However, in recent times, the state has itself allowed the presence of the U.S. military in the region. This change in behaviour can also be witnessed through the change in India's stance on the Indian Ocean, where previously India advocated against the involvement of great powers. As Pillai remarks, "India which always favoured keeping away great powers from the Indian Ocean is now not averse to the presence of the U.S. in the Indian Ocean region and quietly buried the concept of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace."[679] This contrasting approach can be understood through the threat that China presents to Indian dominance. India's apprehension about its neighbours for their facilitation of great power presence in South Asia was the result of the state's fears of losing influence in the region.

Currently, India perceives from China its biggest threat to ambitions for regional dominance. As a strategic ally of India, the U.S.'s military presence helps safeguard against the Chinese threat. Moreover, Indian strategic culture emphasised on India's lack of material resources which meant that the state was not in the position to counter any threats from a great power in the 20th century. However, India's material resources and power have greatly enhanced, with India having taken a more assertive role globally in recent times. Thus, the

[676] Satinder K. Lambah, 'In a New Context', *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal,* vol.2, no.3, 2007, pp.1–7.
[677] Danish, 'India-US Relations Through the Lens of Cold War: The Time of Estranged Relations (Brief Overview)', p.292.
[678] Amer S. Latif, *US-India military engagement: Steady as they go* (Washington D.C.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2012).
[679] Pillai, 'Indian Strategic Culture: The Debates in Perspective'.

attainment of material power, in terms of a strong military and impressive economic growth, also means that India is closer than ever to its aspiration for a state with a powerful status in the world. This means that Indian behaviour has evolved as the fears regarding great power involvement in South Asia have either been alleviated or been put on the backburner; the attainment of material power has allowed India actively to pursue its aspirations for regional supremacy. However, it must be noted that India's aspirations for supremacy, based on its ideational values and perspectives of India's role in the world, were formed way before India achieved sufficient material power to pursue these goals — the existence of these aspirations and ideational values is demonstrated through the analysis of the state's diplomatic style and strategic culture.

In this way, India's approach of non-alignment with the great powers has transformed over the decades. India maintained healthy relationships with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, while relations with the U.S. were affected by American strategic partnership with Pakistan. In the post-Cold War period, the U.S. and India have slowly developed a key strategic partnership and China's rise to global prominence has further enhanced this partnership.

Regional Leadership and Integration

Considering the size of India relative to other South Asian states — 72 percent of South Asia's land is covered by India, while 77 percent of the region's population lives in India — its natural position to assume a leading role in regional and global affairs is abundantly clear.[680] This has translated into great importance attributed to India in regional affairs, even though India's claims to regional leadership have not always been accepted, especially by its neighbouring rival, Pakistan. India has been considered "a factor for the stability and protection of democracies and human rights in the South Asian region."[681] It is also believed that "regionalism cannot grow without India's active support."[682] However, while India has actively taken part in global affairs, its role in regional governance has been dominated by ongoing bilateral conflicts and issues. While India aspires to serve as a 'friendly regional peacekeeper,' its overall approach and behaviour towards regional affairs and neighbouring states has led to

[680] Madhavi Bhasin, 'India's Role in South Asia: Perceived Hegemony or Reluctant Leadership?', *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal,* vol.3, no.4, 2008, pp.1-25.
[681] Ibid.
[682] Khriezo Yhome and Tridivesh Singh Maini, 'India's evolving approach to regionalism: SAARC and beyond', *Rising Powers Quarterly,* vol.2, no.3, 2017, pp.147-165, at p.157.

increased apprehensions regarding India's conduct in the region. By and large, India's leadership role stands in contrast with those of other regional leaders around the world, in that India has not actively advanced integration and cooperation among states. This led to India's position in South Asia being described as "powerful enough to be feared but not powerful enough to be respected."[683] However, India's approach to South Asian affairs must also be understood in relation to the broader historical context. South Asia stands in contrast to some other regions, in that it emerged as a region "characterised by political disharmony and strategic schism."[684]

To understand India's behaviour and the lack of an integration-seeking, cooperation-building approach, it is important to highlight India's initial stance on regionalism in the post-independence period. Prime Minister Nehru actively initiated and participated in several political conferences with South and Southeast Asian states, which include the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in 1947, the Colombo Conference in 1954 and the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference of 1955.[685] Michael also notes that these initiatives were aimed to further cooperation among Asian states and contribute to world peace.[686] However, it is important to note that while Nehru favoured the creation of a regional body of Asian states, his vision was based on the participation of the more powerful states. For instance, Nehru called for a 'South Asia Federation,' in which he envisioned the participation of Afghanistan, India, Iran, Iraq and Myanmar; Nehru's assumption was that the smaller states would follow India's lead in creating Asian regionalism.[687] Nehru's overall approach and beliefs were summed up by Muni, who notes:

> (Nehru) at times inadvertently displayed a tendency to take the smaller neighbours for granted.…Nehru seldom thought in terms of assiduously building a community with the smaller immediate neighbours. If at all, he thought that such a community would be encompassed within the broader goal of Asian solidarity.[688]

The discussion in previous sections revealed Nehru's immensely significant role in the development of Indian diplomatic style and strategic culture. This approach of Nehru to view

[683] Stephen P. Cohen and Richard L. Park, *India: Emergent Power?* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1978) p.213.
[684] S. D. Muni, 'SAARC: Building Regionalism from below', *Asian Survey,* vol.25, no.4, 1985, pp.391-404, at p.392.
[685] Yhome and Maini, 'India's evolving approach to regionalism: SAARC and beyond'.
[686] Arndt Michael, *India's Foreign Policy and Regional Multilateralism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
[687] Yhome and Maini, 'India's evolving approach to regionalism: SAARC and beyond', p.150.
[688] Muni, 'Problem Areas in India's Neighbourhood Policy'.

regionalism in the context of the more powerful states has perhaps impacted India's willingness to lead the South Asian region. The Indian elites' tendency to view India as a potential great power and their aspirations for greater influence can help explain this approach. Moreover, the Indian elite perceive the Indian subcontinent as their sphere of influence — with the same culture but divided by political boundaries. It has also been emphasised that Nehru's initial efforts towards regionalism were negatively perceived by India's neighbouring states, which dissuaded India from taking a leading role in building regionalism in subsequent decades.[689]

In the 1970s and 1980s, the need for a regional body was increasingly felt, and this eventually led to the creation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). India's lack of leadership towards integration-building was again demonstrated in its hesitations to form this regional body. India was concerned that a regional body might affect its ability to deal with its neighbours bilaterally and allow the 'regionalising' of these bilateral issues — which might, in turn, lead to its neighbours 'ganging up' on it.[690] Moreover, India was also concerned about majority decision-making being institutionalised, which could possibly affect its "freedom in foreign affairs."[691] India's eventual participation in SAARC happened after the regional body adopted the basic principles of bilateral issues being excluded from regional forums and unanimous approval for decisions regarding external assistance or interventions.[692] These fears regarding neighbours ganging up on India reveal a deep mistrust towards the South Asian states — which is to be expected, considering that India is involved in multiple disputes and disagreements with these states. More importantly, concerns regarding SAARC's formation reveal India's unwillingness to compromise on its bilateral issues, even if that means forgoing the chance for improving regional integration and cooperation. Indian diplomatic style and strategic culture's focus on ensuring strategic autonomy at all costs — as well as the critical nature of bilateral issues, especially those with Pakistan — also help understand these concerns regarding SAARC's formation.

For SAARC, however, India's involvement and leadership is crucial; the state has been referred to as "key to the development and progress of SAARC," while being expected "by deeds and words" to "create the confidence among us so necessary to make a beginning."[693]

[689] Yhome and Maini, 'India's evolving approach to regionalism: SAARC and beyond'.
[690] Ibid.
[691] Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating cooperation, institutional structure* (London: Routledge, 2008) p.87.
[692] Ibid.
[693] Bhasin, 'India's Role in South Asia: Perceived Hegemony or Reluctant Leadership?'

However, SAARC's role in South Asian affairs has been minimal — for instance, the organisation has failed to initiate a single all-SAARC project since its formation in 1985.[694] While India's failure to contribute to regional governance can be explained through the inability of SAARC to exert influence in the region, it can also be argued that India's lack of effective leadership and contributions to SAARC have hindered the organisation's ability to carry out its functions effectively. In the early years of SAARC, India largely remained uninterested in the organisation due to its belief that it was "unlikely to accrue substantial economic benefits from any SAARC arrangements."[695] Bhasin argues that India's approach highlights "supervisory postures rather than a more favourable participatory leadership character."[696] Thus, India's behaviour cannot be viewed as a traditional leadership role in South Asia.

Despite India's general lack of leadership and initiative in SAARC, Muni believes that India is now committed to SAARC's survival, because a "dead SAARC at India's behest will only make India's neighbourhood policy more difficult and its international image more unpalatable."[697] As such, India in the 1990s adopted a policy of initiating friendly relations with its neighbours. While India adopted a new approach of working towards 'collective prosperity,' its strained bilateral relations with several neighbours remained an issue.[698] However, despite the history of lack of leadership in South Asia, there has been a marked change in the state's approach to regionalism since the 1990s, which has been driven by strategic factors and the rise of China in the region. India had introduced a 'Look East' policy in the 1990s; and later, at the turn of the century, India started pursuing this eastward policy more strongly. This resulted in India establishing the Mekong–Ganga Cooperation (MGC), along with Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, to promote cooperation in tourism, culture and transportation linkages.[699] This policy change came after a change in Indian thinking and the realisation that India's foreign policy objectives were better advanced "if it enjoys a greater support and understanding of its neighbours and its efforts and attention is not unduly trapped within the South Asian region."[700] Thus, India's behaviour towards regional affairs has evolved in recent decades; a major component of this new approach is the increased importance of the Indo-Pacific region in India's regional thinking. This new behaviour can in part be explained by the

[694] Yhome and Maini, 'India's evolving approach to regionalism: SAARC and beyond'.
[695] Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating cooperation, institutional structure*, p.199.
[696] Bhasin, 'India's Role in South Asia: Perceived Hegemony or Reluctant Leadership?'
[697] Muni, 'Problem Areas in India's Neighbourhood Policy', p.188.
[698] Yhome and Maini, 'India's evolving approach to regionalism: SAARC and beyond'.
[699] Ibid.
[700] Muni, 'Problem Areas in India's Neighbourhood Policy', p.186.

rise of China; India sees China's rise as a potential challenger to its influence in South Asia and has adopted a policy of making new friendships with the Southeast Asian countries who are also concerned about China's growing influence.[701] Moreover, India's rapid economic rise after market liberalisation in the 1990s has made it realise that regional instability can affect its economic development.[702] Thus, the new approach was the result of a change in strategic thinking whereby India's own security could not be insulated from the region's possible instability.

After the election of Prime Minister Modi in 2014, India has taken an even greater interest in the security and economic dynamics of the Indo-Pacific through the 'Act East' policy, while also launching a 'Neighbourhood First' policy for South Asian states.[703] Yhome and Maini highlight that India's willingness to work towards regional integration might also be changing; India has recently launched sub-regional initiatives, while also gifting a South Asia satellite for communication purposes to all its neighbours except Pakistan.[704] Indeed, sub-regionalism has become an important part of India's approach to South Asia, as it has become harder to take initiatives through SAARC.[705]

Hence, India's approach has changed from Nehru's initial vision of a regional organisation of the Asian community to the current two-pronged approach where South Asia and Indo-Pacific are given equal importance. India now recognises the importance of not only South Asia but also the regions encompassing the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean as critical to its strategic interests. The evolution of India's behaviour and thinking can be viewed through the lens of its aspirations for increased influence in the region and the world. The political emergence of the BJP can also help explain this change in approach; as the BJP's Hindu nationalist thought believes in the pursuit of recognition of Indian and Hindu greatness in the world, it can help understand the policy changes, which eventually led to a change in overall behaviour with respect to regional issues. Moreover, India sees China's rise as a threat to its own aspirations of regional dominance and global influence, as well as a possible challenge to its strategic autonomy, which remains an important component in today's Hindu nationalist

[701] Raja Mohan, 'Peaceful Periphery: India's New Regional Quest', *Centre for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania*, 2007.
[702] See Shivshankar Menon, 'Peaceful Periphery is a Prerequisite to Sustain our Growth', speech at International Institute of Strategic Studies, 3 May 2007.
[703] Aryaman Bhatnagar and Ritika Passi, 'India, India's Neighbourhood and Modi: Setting the Stage', in Aryaman Bhatnagar and Ritika Passi (eds), *Neighbourhood First: Navigating Ties Under Modi* (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2016).
[704] Yhome and Maini, 'India's evolving approach to regionalism: SAARC and beyond'.
[705] Ibid.

strategic thought. Another important factor is that India's pursuit of an eastward policy has been made possible by its economic development in the 1990s and 2000s, which has also allowed India to expand its strategic interests beyond South Asia. Consequently, India has been able to act towards the fulfilment of these aspirations of greater influence in a more expansive manner after the acquisition of economic power. These factors help explain the change in India's behaviour vis-à-vis cooperation, integration and leadership in South Asia and the broader region.

Overall, India's approach to regional affairs and its neighbours highlights the adoption of a restrained form of leadership, as India has not taken major initiatives in the region, nor represented the interests of the regional body and states at the global stage, as some other regional leaders — such as Indonesia and Brazil — have continued to do. Moreover, scholars highlight that India has shown a disinclination to make concessions to neighbouring states which resulted in further damage being caused to regional cooperation and integration.[706]

Thus, India's lack of integration-building and cooperation-seeking, coupled with the lack of general leadership in the region, points towards a commitment to expanding India's national objectives and sphere of influence without furthering integration or compromising. While India shares the aspirations of regional leadership with other rising middle powers, such as Brazil and Indonesia, its approach towards the realisation of its potential has been markedly different from these states. The diplomatic style and strategic culture of India also suggest that the political elite sees regional influence and dominance as India's natural right, owing to its position and rich civilisational history; as such, the makeup of the Indian state might helps explain its disinclination to work towards reaching the position of regional leader in South Asia by furthering cooperation and integration, and providing strong leadership, as other rising middle powers have done.

[706] Bhasin, 'India's Role in South Asia: Perceived Hegemony or Reluctant Leadership?'

India's Hegemony and Power Projection Style

India has often been perceived to pursue hegemony in the South Asia region. Scholars have highlighted India's aspirations for hegemony in South Asia.[707] Traditional theories of hegemony help classify India's behaviour as hegemonic. India's behaviour, analysed through these theories, points towards an aspiration to achieve the role of regional hegemon, while existing inside a global hierarchical system. However, it is not clear through this analysis why India adopts a more hard-line approach towards its neighbours, while some other rising middle powers, such as Indonesia and Brazil, are able to pursue their goals of regional dominance and influence through softer approaches with their neighbours. The makeup of the India state, studied through its diplomatic style and strategic culture, helps expand the understanding of India's behaviour and pursuit of hegemony.

Indian diplomatic style and strategic culture treat any presence of external powers in the region as a threat to its strategic autonomy and as such, the state showed an aversion to its neighbours' possible involvement and facilitation with the presence of any great powers in South Asia, as that might threaten India's influence in the region. Due to this, India tends to act against any neighbouring state which might be facilitating any external power's presence in South Asia.

India's behaviour in South Asia in the 20th century involved the creation of a security structure, whereby the state could minimise "the intrusion of external great powers into the region and thereby both legitimise India's role as the managerial power in South Asia and augment its capacity to act autonomously of the two power blocs in the wider global arena."[708] Ayoob further argues that through the use of its security framework, India has aimed to "define the broad parameters within which the foreign policies of all South Asian states - and their security linkages to powers outside the region, in particular - would be formulated and implemented."[709] This would allow India to move towards translating its "pre-eminence in the subcontinent," which is based on the state's size, population and economic capacity, into "a

[707] Yhome and Maini, 'India's evolving approach to regionalism: SAARC and beyond'; Mohammed Ayoob, 'India as regional hegemon: external opportunities and internal constraints', *International Journal,* vol.46, no.3, 1991, pp.420-448; Bhasin, 'India's Role in South Asia: Perceived Hegemony or Reluctant Leadership?'.
[708] Ayoob, 'India as regional hegemon: external opportunities and internal constraints', p.421.
[709] Ibid, p.421.

form of regional predominance whose legitimacy would be accepted by all states in the region."[710]

This Indian behaviour can also be demonstrated through the Indira Doctrine, which represented a set of ideas that formed the basis of a "coherent concept of regional policy" under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.[711] As part of the Indira Doctrine, India considered its neighbouring states as important to the state's national security, and as such, the Indian elite believed that domestic conflicts in these states "should only be solved with the help of India and not by interference of outside powers or international organisations."[712] In this way, India designed a regional security policy to "insulate the region from the adverse effects of the Cold War," which resulted in India projecting a more assertive and hegemonic behaviour in the region. Moreover, neighbouring states were perceived as threats if they aspired to challenge India's supremacy in the region.[713] Thus, the Indira Doctrine was adopted to pursue India's strategic and security goals more vigorously and assertively.

Based on its behaviour in South Asia, India's approach has been referred to as an aspiration towards "hegemonic authority"; although the Indian state had hoped to achieve regional consensus on its predominance, this behaviour has, over time, raised apprehensions and concerns of the neighbouring states regarding India's approach.[714] This apprehension has been validated a number of times through India's actions which can be classified as interventionist. In particular, the Indian actions in the liberation movement in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) in 1971, in the ethnic cleansing crisis in Sri Lanka in 1987, as well as during the attempted coup in Maldives in 1988, are often considered as validation of India's hegemonic behaviour in the region.[715] Moreover, India's intervention in Sikkim, a Northeastern Indian state which enjoyed protectorate status under the British and later in independent India, also highlights India's hegemonic behaviour.[716] After protests and demonstrations against the monarchy in Sikkim in 1973, the Indian army got involved to control the situation; subsequently, in 1975, Sikkim voted to terminate its democracy and merge with India.[717] Hence,

[710] Ibid, p.422. Also see Mohammed Ayoob, 'India in South Asia: the quest for regional predominance', *World Policy Journal*, vol.7, no.1, 1989, pp.107-133.
[711] Christian Wagner, 'From hard power to soft power? Ideas, interaction, institutions, and images in India's South Asia policy', *Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics*, 2005, p.3
[712] Ibid, p.3
[713] Bhasin, 'India's Role in South Asia: Perceived Hegemony or Reluctant Leadership?'
[714] Ibid.
[715] Ibid.
[716] For more on India's relationship with Sikkim under British rule and in the two decades after independence, see Leo E. Rose, 'India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relationship', *Pacific Affairs,* vol.42, no.1, 1969, pp.32-46.
[717] Ranjan Gupta, 'Sikkim: The Merger with India', *Asian Survey*, vol.15, no.9, 1975, pp.786-798.

India's behaviour in the region has raised concerns regarding the state's aspirations of establishing hegemony in South Asia.

In the Bangladesh liberation movement, India supplied arms and provided military support, before intervening directly, in the civil war in Pakistan which eventually created Bangladesh. India justified its intervention in its neighbour's internal conflict by citing the human rights atrocities being committed by West Pakistan at that time, adding that India's requests to the United Nations to act against West Pakistan had not resulted in anything.[718] Similarly, India used the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987, which had allowed Indian diplomatic involvement in ethnic conflicts in Sri Lanka, to become involved militarily in the conflict, which left a deep imprint on India's image in the region.[719] The negative Indian perceptions were further reinforced when India was involved in the Maldives by helping the government stop an attempted coup.[720]

If considered individually, it could be argued that these three examples do not count as indicators of India's hegemonic role; however, collectively, they form a pattern of behaviour whereby India has exercised its political and military clout to intervene in its neighbours' internal affairs. This Indian approach was also summed up by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev who said in response to India's naval activity in the Indian ocean:

> India wants for everyone to 'rotate' around it…It wants to have a 'patrimony' with vassals in the region. That's why it is not reacting well to our initiatives about naval disarmament in the Indian Ocean.[721]

In more recent decades, India has attempted to change its approach to its neighbours by adopting a more friendly posture. This change in approach can be witnessed through the Gujral Doctrine, which was an attempt by then-Foreign Minister (and later Prime Minister) I.K. Gujral to remove the 'big brother' tag attached to India; the doctrine focused on being benevolent to neighbouring states without any expectation of reciprocity and has been termed as "restraint magnanimity."[722]

However, Bhasin argues that the Gujral Doctrine "proved to be too mild in the face of the impregnable perceptual framework of India's neighbours" regarding India's hegemonic

[718] Ibid.
[719] Ibid.
[720] Ibid.
[721] Mastny, 'The Soviet Union's Partnership with India'.
[722] Hall, 'Is a Modi Doctrine Emerging in Indian Foreign Policy?' p.250-251.

behaviour and aspirations for dominance over the region.[723] Moreover, J.N. Dixit asserts that even the gestures of generosity adopted by the Gujral Doctrine highlight "a certain incipient big brotherly hegemonistic attitude" on part of India.[724] More importantly, India has not always applied this doctrine in its policies, and the magnanimity and generosity has sometimes been subject to reciprocal concessions. For instance, trade concessions to Bangladesh were made conditional to the provision of transit rights to India.[725] This suggests that India has retained its hegemonic behaviour in South Asia, and thus, has largely remained consistent in its approach towards its neighbours, even though the rhetoric and posture of India's role in the region has changed through the Gujral Doctrine and more recently through Prime Minister Modi's 'Neighbourhood First' approach.

While India's conflict with Pakistan started as a result of territorial conflict, it can be argued that the continuation of the conflict and the failure of any negotiated settlement since independence has its roots in India's aspirations for supremacy in the region. India's diplomatic style and strategic culture have highlighted the importance Indian elites attach to the pursuit of influence in the region. Through the guise of India's regional aspirations for dominance, Tanham argues that Pakistan has consistently challenged India's supremacy in the region and refuses to accept India's leadership.[726] Moreover, Pakistan's associations with great powers, including the U.S. and China, ever since its independence, has exacerbated India's perception of the threat Pakistan presents.[727] This relates to India's fears regarding the potential involvement of great powers in South Asia, which has shaped its behaviour towards its neighbours.

Apart from Pakistan, India's relations with several neighbouring states are strained and there are bilateral issues which remain unresolved. Bhasin further highlights that the neighbouring states prefer a multilateral approach to solving these issues, due to India's overwhelming bargaining power in bilateral negotiations; these states view India's bilateral strategy as 'coercive diplomacy.'[728] India, on the other hand, views these issues as bilateral problems and not fit for multilateral discussions. As demonstrated in the previous section, one of the concerns India had regarding the formation of SAARC related to the possibility of

[723] Bhasin, 'India's Role in South Asia: Perceived Hegemony or Reluctant Leadership?'
[724] Ibid.
[725] Ibid.
[726] Tanham, 'Indian strategic culture', pp.129-142.
[727] Ibid.
[728] Bhasin, 'India's Role in South Asia: Perceived Hegemony or Reluctant Leadership?'

neighbouring states pursuing multilateral negotiations and 'ganging up' on India. This reflects that India remains concerned about any possible loss in its leverage and bargaining power in bilateral issues with its neighbours, which include territorial disputes as well and as such, are important for India's national security objectives being met.

At the same time, India's perceived hegemonic attitude should not cloud the fact that India has still shown regional leadership on several occasions. For instance, India promptly responded to the Tsunami that hit the Indian Ocean Islands in 2006, particularly affecting neighbouring Sri Lanka, and launched operations to aid the affected areas.[729] Similarly, India provided relief supplies to Pakistan when a strong earthquake hit Jammu and Kashmir in 2005.[730]

Overall, this interventionist behaviour distinguishes India from other states vying for regional power. Some rising middle powers, despite their size and influence in the region, refuse to adopt a hard-line approach and rather enhance their influence and power through consensus-building and through improving relations with their neighbours. For instance, Indonesia and Brazil have demonstrated that strengthening bilateral relations through cooperation and integration in the region can result in greater influence and eventually, primacy in their respective regions. India, however, adopts a markedly different approach as it seeks to further its national interests by taking decisive actions, resulting in interventions in its neighbours' affairs and contributing to its reputation as a state displaying hegemonic behaviour. This Indian approach can be better understood by its diplomatic style and strategic culture, whereby it views the region as its sphere of influence; the strategic culture also demonstrates deep-seated beliefs about regional prominence and aspirations to attain great power status, befitting the state's rich civilisational heritage. Moreover, the diplomatic style and strategic culture are based on insecurities of the Indian elite regarding security threats that India's neighbours — especially Pakistan — present, which leads India to adopt a hard-line approach in South Asia. In more recent times, India has been concerned about the instability in neighbouring states affecting its economic growth. As such, India's behaviour stands in contrast with some other rising middle powers and supports India's classification as a supremacy-aspiring rising middle power.

India's behaviour and approach to global affairs has been different from its regional behaviour, even though the two are sometimes interrelated as India attempts to bolster its global

[729] Ibid.
[730] Ibid.

role based on its regional influence. Ever since independence, India has striven to adopt a leading role in global affairs through the United Nations. Nehru was deeply involved on the world stage, where he raised a series of issues, including the independence of regions under colonial rule.[731] Scholars, such as Gehlot, classify Nehru as an advocate for world peace, due to his belief in non-alignment with the U.S. or the USSR at the time, as well as proposals towards disarmament and limiting the build-up of nuclear weapons in the world.[732] This aspect of Indian leadership in the UN and other multilateral organisations has continued. Sreenivasan highlights that India has adopted the position of the leader of the developing world, as well as the spokesperson of the G-77 — which is a group of 134 developing states in the UN — in various negotiating bodies, and has taken initiatives in climate change negotiations, for instance, in the Rio Conference of 1992.[733] Moreover, India had raised the issue of terrorism at UN forums long before the 2001 attacks against the U.S., and India also remains one of the top sources of UN peacekeeping forces.[734] Thus, India's approach on the global level reflects the values and outlook of activism, which has remained significant over the decades. In this way, India's diplomatic style and strategic culture help expand an understanding of India's behaviour in global affairs.

India has also been pursuing the reform of the UN Security Council; at first, the proposals focused on increasing the number of non-permanent members but were modified to include additional permanent members as well.[735] These attempts are based on Indian elites' beliefs that the state's population, size and commitment to the UN warrants a permanent place in the Security Council. However, these attempts have failed so far and India's attainment of a permanent seat at the Security Council appears unlikely.

Another important aspect of India's global engagement is the use of soft power to bolster the state's image. However, even though India claims to maintain a liberal standpoint, its domestic issues and crises sometimes negate the effect of soft power. Mukherjee argues that even though India's civilisational history and cultural values of assimilation are a "potent source

[731] N. S. Gehlot, 'Reflection on the political ideas of Jawaharlal Nehru: A Critique', *The Indian Journal of Political Science,* vol.51, no.2, 1990, pp.260-275.
[732] Ibid.
[733] T. P. Sreenivasan, 'India at the United Nations: More Give than Take', *India Quarterly,* vol.65, no.4, 2009, pp.475-481.
[734] C. S. R. Murthy, 'Assessing India at the United Nations in the changing context', *International Studies,* vol.47, no.2-4, 2010, pp.205-223.
[735] Sreenivasan, 'India at the United Nations: More Give than Take'.

of attraction," this effect is often offset by the state's domestic institutions and foreign policy behaviour.[736]

India's overall behaviour and approach at the global stage present a stark contrast to the state's conduct in its relations with neighbouring states. Whereas India has shown leadership, consensus-building, and represented the developing world at the global stage, it has not adopted a similar approach in its regional conduct. This behaviour is also in contrast with other rising middle powers. For instance, Indonesia has used its G20 membership to bring the challenges facing ASEAN states to the global level; on the other hand, India has not pursued such an approach with regards to its neighbours. This disparity in India's behaviour can be viewed in light of India's diplomatic style and strategic culture, which highlight the aspirations of the Indian elite to achieve supremacy. This means that India realises its material constraints when it comes to achieving global prominence and hence, adopts the approach of multilateral leadership and cooperation to build its influence. On the other hand, India presupposes its right to dominance in South Asia and as such, does not pursue cooperation-seeking and integration-building behaviour. It must be noted, however, that in recent times, India has adopted a friendlier approach to some of its neighbours, as it has realised that a better regional image and stronger relations with neighbours can positively influence the state's global image.

It must also be noted that India's behaviour towards its neighbours is determined in light of its effects on India's quest for global influence. At the time when the Indian elite feared that the involvement of its neighbours with great powers might affect India's influence in the region, it adopted a more hard-line approach with such states. Thus, the overarching and primary concern of India remains the expanding of its own regional dominance and global influence, which can be better understood through the state's diplomatic style and strategic culture. Overall, this foreign policy behaviour supports the classification of India as a supremacy-aspiring rising middle power.

[736] Mukherjee, 'The false promise of India's soft power', p.56.

CHAPTER V: IRAN

Iran is the fourth and final case study of this thesis. Iran's case is unique because the state does not have a regional leadership role as such, yet it exerts a significant influence in regional affairs. As a rising middle power, Iran's approach to power has been hard-line and supremacy-oriented. Iran's active involvement in regional conflicts and tensions with great powers is indicative of its distinctive hegemonic behaviour. Therefore, it becomes a compelling case study for this thesis. This chapter will attempt to analyse the role of diplomatic style and strategic culture in shaping the hegemonic foreign policy behaviour of Iran. This will involve an examination of Iranian society's values and beliefs, as well as historical circumstances and events that have influenced the Iranian approach to power.

Iran is located on the coast of the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf. It is the seventeenth largest country worldwide in terms of area. In the Middle East, it is the second largest after Saudi Arabia. It shares land borders with seven different states: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Turkey and Armenia. Its geography, therefore, puts the state in a strategic geopolitical position. Iran is home to almost 84 million ethnically diverse people, making it the eighteenth most populated country in the world. Its topography consists of rugged mountains and closed basins.[737] Iran also borders the Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, the two waterways immensely important for global oil transportation.[738]

Iran has served various roles throughout history; it has joined hands both with the Soviet Union and the Western states.[739] It also witnessed, in 1979, the largest revolution in its modern history, an event that laid the foundation for an anti-Western theocratic regime to take power.[740]

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[737] For works on Iran's geographical landscape, see Vasilii Barthold and Svat Soucek, *An Historical Geography of Iran* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Saeid Naji, 'Iran, the Center of 'Strategic Energy Ellipse'', *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations*, vol.3, no.1, 2011, pp.155-175.

[738] Cynthia C. Northrup, Jerry H. Bentley, Alfred E. Eckes Jr, Patrick Manning, Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, *Encyclopedia of World Trade: From Ancient Times to the Present, Vol.1-4* (London: Routledge, 2015).

[739] Ellie Geranmayeh and Kadri Liik, 'The new power couple: Russia and Iran in the Middle East', *European Council on Foreign Relations,* September 2016; also see Donette Murray, *US Foreign Policy and Iran: American-Iranian Relations since the Islamic Revolution* (London: Routledge, 2009).

[740] For works on the Iranian Revolution, see Ali Ansari, *Modern Iran since 1797: Reform and Revolution* (London: Routledge, 2019); Misagh Parsa, *Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989); Jahangir Amuzegar, *Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy*, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991); Charles Kurzman, 'Historiography of the Iranian Revolutionary Movement, 1977-79', *Iranian Studies*, vol.28, no.1-2, 1995, pp.25-38; Roger Homan, 'The Origins of the Iranian Revolution', *International Affairs*, vol.56, no.4, 1980, pp.673-677.

Iran's relations with great powers have played a major role in its history. These relations were greatly influenced by its diplomatic style and strategic culture.

A state where politics and religion are deeply intertwined, Iran has experienced various kinds of governments, including monarchical rule, autocratic systems and a theocratic regime.[741] The region has historically been under the rule of multiple dynasties. After being governed by various nomadic tribes, the region was unified under the Safavid Dynasty, which remained one of the longest-ruling dynasties in the region's history. Iran's history under the Safavid dynasty was eventful, as the Safavid Empire competed with the Ottoman Empire for influence.[742] It launched numerous expansion campaigns until the early 18th century, when it faced a series of defeats, resulting in the loss of its influence in the region.[743] Later, with efforts by Nader Shah — a military genius who became the Shah of Iran and founded the short-lived Afshari Dynasty — and his allies in the 1730s, the state regained power in the region, but after his death, Iran again fell victim to a civil war.[744]

The civil war in the 18th century gave power to the Qajar Dynasty, which lasted from 1796 to 1925. The Qajar Dynasty's rule witnessed dramatic changes, including territorial disputes, demographic shifts, large-scale migration and the Great Famine of 1870. However, with the dawn of the 20th century and during the final years of the Qajar Dynasty, the state went through a reform process. These reforms included the formation of a limited constitution and a constitutional monarchy.[745]

During this time, oil reserves were also discovered in Iran; this would have a major economic, social and political impact on the state for decades to come. With an increased interest in the region from the great powers of that time — primarily due to its oil reserves and for its strategic position — parts of Iran were occupied by the British, Soviet and Ottoman forces. The internal vacuum created by the power struggle and intervention of the foreign

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[741] For works on the early history of Iran, see Abbas Amanat, *Iran: A Modern History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017); George Cameron, *History of Early Iran* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Richard Frye, *The History of Ancient Iran* (Munich: CH Beck, 1984); Michael Axworthy, *Revolutionary Iran: a History of the Islamic Republic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Nikki Keddie and Yann Richard, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).
[742] Stephen Dale, *The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
[743] Adel Allouche, *The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict (906-962/1500-1555)* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983).
[744] Michael Axworthy, 'The Army of Nader Shah', *Iranian Studies*, vol.40, no.5, 2007, pp.635-646.
[745] Vahid Rashidvash, 'The Qajar Dynasty in Iran: The Most Important Occurrence Evented in the Qajars Monarchy', *International Journal of Business and Social Science*, vol.3, no.12, 2012, pp.181-187.

powers led to movements against the Qajar Dynasty.[746] This allowed for Reza Shah Pahlavi, also referred to as "Raza Shah," to rise to power, and subsequently, the Pahlavi dynasty ruled Iran for 54 years.[747]

Reza Shah was succeeded in 1941 by his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi — commonly referred to as "Shah" or "the Shah" — who began his rule under a joint British-Soviet-supported Iran. Iran's oil wealth and the Shah's leaning towards the West helped improve Iran's image in the world. However, the clergy rejected the liberal modernisation attempts and foreign influence, and in turn, Iran witnessed the most important event of its modern history: the Iranian Revolution of 1979.[748] The Iranian Revolution and the events that followed had a major impact on Iran's diplomatic style and strategic culture. The ideological foundation of the Iranian Revolution revolved around a complex combination of nationalism, political populism and Shi'ite Islamic religious dogmatism.[749] The idea that Muslims should reject the influence of liberal capitalist states as well as that of communist states, eventually pushed the people towards religious nationalism.[750] These factors continue to guide state policies and behaviour.

Iran's Civilisational Past and Persian Identity

The history of the region that is now Iran dates back to 7000 BC, with some scholars claiming that the Persian civilisation began at that time.[751] Unlike some other states discussed in this thesis, events in Iran's ancient history remain relevant today when discussing its diplomatic style and strategic culture.

Iran's history can be traced back to the Early Bronze Age when the region was known as Persia. The region went through various stages where it served as a battleground for rulers and invaders. The area was initially known for its Zoroastrian practices; however, in 633 A.D., Muslims conquered the region, and the populace began converting to Islam.[752] During this early

[746] Homa Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-modernism 1926–1979* (New York: Springer, 1981).
[747] Miron Rezun, *The Soviet Union and Iran: Soviet Policy in Iran from the Beginnings of the Pahlavi Dynasty Until the Soviet Invasion in 1941* (Leiden: Brill Archive, 1981).
[748] Shahrough Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1980); Amin Saikal, *The Rise and Fall of the Shah: Iran from Autocracy to Religious Rule* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
[749] Ervand Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
[750] Robin Wright, *The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran* (New York: Vintage, 2010).
[751] Rouhi Shafii, *Scent of saffron: Three Generations of an Iranian Family* (London: Scarlet Press, 1997).
[752] A.I. Akram, *The Muslim Conquest of Persia* (Birmingham: Maktabah Publications, 2009).

period, when Islam was expanding, Persia was the only non-Arabic speaking region that came under the fold of Islamic rule.[753] The region quickly became Muslim-majority; however, because the Iranian region was different from the rest of the Muslim-majority areas in terms of its language, culture and civilisational history, it resulted in the formation of a unique identity. This unique Persian identity remains relevant today and is one of the reasons why the region was not able to establish greater common ground with other Muslim empires in the world.

While the Persians accepted Islam, they did not adopt the Islam of the Arabs. Instead, they maintained their cultural values and beliefs which were based upon their prior religious and ethno-linguistic identities. Meanwhile, the Iranian branch of religion came to be referred as the Islam-i-Ajam (Islam of the non-Arabs).[754] In his book *Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period,* Bulliet mentions that the Iranian conversion to Islam was slow during the Arab-centric Ummayad period, and only ten percent of the population converted to Islam.[755] However, he highlights that after the Abbasid period, when there was a mix of Persian and Arab rulers, the conversion rates started increasing, and by the middle of the 9th century, forty percent of the region had converted to Islam.[756] By the end of the 11th century, the region had fully converted.[757] Nasr further asserts that the Persians were not ready to accept Islam when it came directly from the Arabs but were more receptive to the religious preaching when they were promulgated by Persian rulers; this reflects a longstanding aversion of the people in this region towards foreigners imposing their beliefs on them.[758] The advent and rise of Islam-i-Ajam — a uniquely Persian strand of the Islamic faith — in the region suggests how the region maintained its Persian identity, even when foreign powers invaded or spread their beliefs. Consequently, the Persians started spreading the Persian Islam to the Turks in Central Asia and to the-then neighbouring India.[759] In this way, the region's non-Arab Islamic identity contributed to building a unique identity.

This unique Persian identity is an amalgamation of the Persian culture and the Shi'ite sect of Islam. The region was majority Sunni before Shah Ismail I, the founder of the Safavid

[753] Ibid.
[754] Bernard Lewis, 'Iran in history', Lecture, Tel Aviv University, 29 April 2007.
[755] Richard Bulliet, *Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).
[756] Ibid.
[757] Ibid.
[758]Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 'Reflections on Islam and Modern Thought', *Studies in Comparative Religion*, vol.15, no.3, 1983, pp.1-13.
[759] Bernard Lewis, 'Iran in history'; see also Robert Canfield, *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

dynasty, captured Tabriz in Iran. Shah Ismail was the first Shi'ite ruler of the region and therefore initiated the conversion of the masses to Shi'ite ideology in the conquered territories. Brown notes that Ismail was "the most successful and intolerant [Shi'ite] ruler since the fall of the Fatimids."[760] He further adds that Ismail had aimed for the complete elimination of Sunni Islam and had started achieving that in areas that he had conquered.[761] Keddie and Richard mention that one of the major reasons that Ismail followed this policy of forced conversion was to give the region and the Safavid lands a unique identity compared to the neighbouring Sunni majority empires — most notably the Ottoman Empire.[762] Thus, apart from the unique Persian identity that had developed, the region also developed a religious identity that differed from neighbouring empires and kingdoms. Hence, along with an influence of the region's civilisational past and its ethno-linguistic identity, the unique identity that the Iranians hold today can also be traced to the 16th century when the region experienced a major Sunni to Shi'ite conversion.

Iran's Strategic Culture

Ehteshami argues that Iran's geopolitical landscape has played a significant role in its conception and must be given due importance when discussing Iran's foreign policy.[763] Several factors — including Iran's geographical location, historical experiences of foreign interventions, challenges from surrounding empires and abundant resources — come together to form the state's approach to foreign policy.[764]

A history of foreign invasions and the constant threat that Iran faced from great powers shaped the lack of trust the state today has towards major players in the world. It also led to a constant fear of exploitation at the hands of great powers looking to expand their influence by taking advantage of Iran's economic potential. At the time of the Safavids, the empire at its peak controlled all of the modern-day territories of Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Armenia, Eastern Georgia, the North Caucasus, Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan, in addition to parts of Turkey, Syria, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. However, during the first half of the 19th

[760] The Fatimid Caliphate was an Ismaili Shi'ite caliphate between the 10th and 12th centuries. It ranged from modern day eastern Saudi Arabia (Hejaz) all the way to modern-day Morocco.
[761] Daniel Brown, *A New Introduction to Islam* (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004).
[762] Nikki Keddie and Yann Richard, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*.
[763] Anoushiravan Ehteshami, 'The Foreign Policy of Iran', in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds), *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002) pp.283-309.
[764] Ibid.

century, the region faced major losses at the hands of an expanding great power of the time — the Russian Empire. The Iranians lost most of their territories which were then used as battlegrounds by the Russians to expand their influence and power.[765] This instilled the initial seeds of the state's sentiment of mistrust as well as a general dislike and sense of insecurity in its perception of great powers.

The state faced threats and interventions in the 20th century which were linked with the discovery of oil reserves in the region. The discovery of oil brought the spotlight on Iran as it now held both economic and geopolitical importance.[766] Iran was again caught up between the great powers who viewed Iran as a land of abundant resources located on a geographically strategic location. Iran's occupation by the British, Russians and the Ottoman Empire during World War I, and the Anglo-Soviet invasion during World War II, were primarily motivated by the geographical location of the state and the sea trade routes through the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, making it, as Fuller mentions, "the centre of the universe" during those times.[767] The significance of Iran's location, especially during World War II, can also be highlighted by the fact that it was the gateway for around 45 percent of the total oil supply being received by the Soviet and British forces during the war.[768] During World War II, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union used Iran's resources to advance their own positions and interests. The exploitation of Iran's resources sowed the seeds of the need for self-sufficiency, and consequently, the state no longer wanted foreign powers to either take advantage of Iranian resources or to advance their positions in the war using Iran as a buffer zone.

After witnessing the exploitation of the state's resources, its leaders began to take measures in order to protect the state's resources from the great powers. The state started negotiations with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) to bring further economic benefit of the oil production to the state, as they believed the British were exploiting Iran and dealing on unfair terms. The AIOC offered a deal in 1950; however, it did not include the fifty-fifty profit-sharing provision that the Iranians were demanding. Dr Mosaddeq, then head of the parliament (Majlis), rejected this proposal and started the movement for the nationalisation of oil, which gained much popularity among the masses. In 1951, even after the AIOC agreed to the fifty-

[765] Karl Meyer and Shareen Brysac, *Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia* (New York: Basic Books, 2006).
[766] Massoud Karshenas, *Oil, State and Industrialisation in Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
[767] Graham Fuller, *The Center of the Universe: The Geopolitics of Iran* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).
[768] Steven Ward, *Immortal: A Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014).

fifty proposition, the sentiment of nationalisation was too strong, and the Iranians ended up rejecting the deal. Prime Minister Razmara rejected the idea of nationalisation and was subsequently killed by a militant of the Faydan-e-Islam[769]. Under immense pressure from the public, the Majlis voted to nationalise the oil industry, and in April, the Shah gave in to the rising sentiment and named Dr Mosaddeq the Prime Minister. The nationalisation of oil helps explain how mistrust in the great powers — Britain, in this case — was a sentiment among the public that was popular and powerful enough to have made its way through to the ruling elite.

However, later in 1953, a coup, in which the United States played a role, was staged against Dr Mosaddeq, which brought the Shah back to power albeit in complete opposition to the public opinion.[770] In the aftermath of this coup, the public's distrust of great powers also led them to become increasingly apprehensive and disdainful towards rulers, who were seen as pro-American, facilitators of American exploitation and promulgators of Western ideology in Iran. In turn, the Shah launched a special police force to control and oppress the population if they decided to stand up against him.[771] The Shah was a close friend of the U.S., and therefore the masses believed that the U.S. was pulling the strings and interfering in Iran's internal affairs. This was evident from the protests against the U.S.-backed Shah regime during the Iranian Revolution, which revolved around the rejection of all kinds of influence from foreign powers. With such sentiments backed by historical experiences, the state, in the aftermath of the revolution, developed an assertive posture against great powers.

This sentiment also played a leading role in the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and led to the rise of national policies that reflected these feelings of mistrust and fear of exploitation. After the revolution, the new government of post-revolution Iran added "the complete elimination of imperialism and the prevention of foreign influence" as a state goal under the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.[772] The constitution further states:

> The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its territorial integrity, the defence of the

[769] Faydan-e-Islam is a Shi'ite fundamentalist group that was founded in 1946. It aimed to purify Islam by getting rid of corrupt individuals.
[770]Saeed Dehghan and Richard Norton-Taylor, 'CIA admits role in 1953 Iranian coup', *The Guardian*, 19 August 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/cia-admits-role-1953-iranian-coup.
[771] Nikki Keddie and Yann Richard, '*Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*'.
[772] See Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979.

> rights of all Muslims, non-alignment with respect to the hegemonic superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations with all non-belligerent States.[773]
>
> Any form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the natural resources, economy, army, or culture of the country, as well as other aspects of the national life, is forbidden.[774]

The feelings of mistrust and fear of exploitation of the state's resources contributed to a process of revolutionary change that saw the state adopting a strategic paradigm focused on ensuring Iran's territorial integrity and sovereignty, the safeguarding of its national interests, and the protection of its natural resources. To achieve these objectives, the state continued with the tradition of its former empires of building a strong military to deter any threats of invasion.[775] The Iranian ruling elite viewed the military as a means to deal with not only external but also internal threats. The use of military groups to channel domestic politics has been an old tradition in Iran and dates back to the Qajar dynasty.[776] Similarly, the creation and use of armed groups to suppress anti-regime groups have also been an old practice for the ruling elite in Iran. When economic progress picked up after the discovery of oil, the Shah dedicated a large portion of the budget to build a strong military force for the state's safety and to increase its influence in the region.[777]

In Iran's history, civil wars and power struggles of dynasties that were influenced by or allied with great powers have contributed to its mistrust of those powers. During World War II, Iran initially did not side with anyone.[778] However, noticing the German victories in the early stages of the war, the state decided to become a German ally. In response to this, the state was invaded by the Anglo-Soviet alliance in 1941.[779] Moreover, the mistrust of great powers was exacerbated by the reneging on the Tehran Declaration by the Soviets regarding the presence of their troops around the Iranian borders after World War II.[780] A similar instance occurred when both the UK and the U.S. — former allies of Iran — succeeded in removing Prime

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[773] Ibid.
[774] Ibid.
[775] Ward, *Immortal: A Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces.*
[776] Michael Rubin, *Into the shadows: radical vigilantes in Khatami's Iran* (Washington D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001).
[777] Abbas Milani, *The Shah* (New York: Macmillan, 2012).
[778] Glenn Curtis and Eric Hooglund, *Iran: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2008).
[779] David S. Sorenson, *An introduction to the modern Middle East: History, religion, political economy, politics* (London: Routledge, 2018).
[780] Gary Hess, 'The Iranian Crisis of 1945-46 and the Cold War', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol.89, no.1, 1974, pp.117-146.

Minister Mosaddeq through the 1953 coup.[781] This trend continued into the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Iran was left alone to defend itself. There was a weak response from the international community, including the United Nations, on the Iraqi use of chemical weapons. This created further tensions and resulted in Iran perceiving the international response as hypocritical in the enforcement of international agreements. Such experiences have contributed to the ideological makeup of Iran's ruling elite, who view great powers as imperialist states with apprehension and mistrust.

Another important factor contributing to Iran's strategic culture is its long-lasting Persian pride. The Iranians have kept their Persian history alive throughout the course of history.[782] This pride of being one of the largest and most sophisticated civilisations of the world still exists in the Iranian culture. In fact, it connects back to the times of Zoroastrianism when the Persians considered it a supreme religion and made efforts to spread it across the region before Islam came to the region in the 7th century.[783] Civilisational pride also extends to the pride in linguistics of the region. Thus, even after the conquest of the Arabs, the language and culture inside Persia was retained and further expanded. The retention and expansion of language contributed to the formulation of notable Persian literature from different states in the region. An example of this is the influence of the Persian language in the South Asian region; other languages, such as Urdu, have been greatly influenced by Persian.[784]

Pride in its civilisational past and its unique Persian identity has continued with Iran to the present. As Fuller mentions in his book, these ideas have promoted an "intensely Irani-centric" conception which has allowed Iranian nationalism to be an impetus behind major actions taken by the state.[785] This connection with the past is also visible in statements of current leaders; as one Iranian parliament member put it, "Three Arab capitals have today ended up in the hands of Iran and belong to the Islamic Iranian revolution."[786] In another instance, an Iranian advisor stated, "Baghdad is the capital of the Iranian empire," which he later clarified was only

[781] Vasu Mohan and Alan Wall, 'Foreign Electoral Interference: Past, Present, and Future', *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, vol.20, no.1, 2019, pp.110-116.
[782] Azar Gat, 'Persian-Iranian National Identity. The longue durée, from Achaemenid times onward', in Meir Litvak (ed), *Constructing Nationalism in Iran: From the Qajars to the Islamic Republic* (London: Routledge, 2017) pp.32-39.
[783] Anthony Smith, 'Hierarchy and Covenant in the Formation of Nations', in Annika Hvithamar, Margit Warburg, and Brian Jacobsen (eds), *Holy Nations and Global Identities: Civil Religion, Nationalism, and Globalisation* (Leiden: Brill, 2009).
[784] Abu Musa Mohammad Arif Billah, 'Linguistic influence of Persian on South Asian languages: Special reference to Urdu', *SACS Special Issue*, 2018, pp.98-110.
[785] Graham Fuller, *The Center of the Universe: The Geopolitics of Iran*.
[786] 'Sanaa Is the Fourth Arab Capital to Join the Iranian Revolution', *Middle East Monitor*, 27 September 2014.

in terms of cultural similarities.[787] These statements and strong memories of the past show the reflection of the long-held Persian pride and hint at an embedded ambition among the Iranian elites to strive towards the Persian glory and dominance of the past.

The Persian pride accompanied by Iran's negative interactions with foreign powers has left a great impact on the Iranian psyche, which has guided the nationalistic thinking of the ruling elite.[788] The past interactions with foreign powers — where the state was under the influence of great powers for most of its modern history — were perceived as a humiliation for a state that champions past glory and dominance. At the same time, the notion of being oppressed by foreign powers found space in the strategic culture of the state. The most recent example of this oppression narrative was visible in the 1979 Iranian Revolution, where Ayatollah Khomeini presented himself as the leader of the oppressed. This idea was a major contributing factor that led to the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty.[789] This also built on the idea of the Persian pride along Islamic religious lines which resulted in the conception of a "Self Sufficient Iran." Multiple other factors may have contributed to this self-image of Iran, including the deception by great powers, threats in the neighbourhood and exploitation of its mineral resources. Public support for this conception of self-sufficiency can be viewed from the time of the Iranian revolution where major protests erupted with the slogans of "Iran is self sufficient" and that "The West cannot do anything about them." This long-standing fear of a foreign power meddling in its internal affairs, along with the pursuit of becoming a self-sufficient regional power, led to a deterioration in Iran's relationships with its neighbours. The Iran-Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946, the Iranian Revolution, and the Iran-Iraq War, were all related to issues of safeguarding the territorial integrity of the state, strained foreign relations, and maintaining the image of a self-sufficient and powerful Iran.

It is important to consider the role of religion in the formation of modern-day Iran's strategic culture. The strategic thought of Iran is heavily influenced by the state's Shi'ite ideology. Indeed, after the revolution of 1979 and the formation of a theocratic regime, Iran's ruling elites have been major proponents of the Shi'ite ideology and have looked to promulgate their Shi'ite beliefs in the region. The modern-day state has undergone a process whereby its Islamic and Persian identities have fused to form the state's current ideology which can be best described as religious nationalism.[790] This new ideological outlook views Shi'ism as tied with

[787] 'Iranian Advisor Clarifies 'Baghdad Capital of Iranian Empire' Remark', *Al Arabiya English*, 13 March 2015.
[788] Anoushiravan Ehteshami, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*.
[789] Ervand Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran*.
[790] Ibid.

Iran, while Sunni Islam is associated with "Arab tribalism and chauvinism."[791] In this way, religious nationalism is a major component of the state's strategic culture.

History of Diplomatic Practices of Iran

Iran's recent history, specifically the 20th and 21st centuries, can be broadly segmented into four different phases of diplomatic practices; these phases were a result of the shifts that occurred due to changes in the state's ideological makeup. The first phase can be regarded as the time under the Pahlavi dynasty, which saw Iran as a secular state, one which was enriched by the oil boom and pursued an outward-looking diplomatic policy. During the Pahlavi regime, Iran's relationship with the West flourished as Reza Shah crafted a Western-friendly rhetoric using soft power resources such as cultural exchanges, which included the celebration of the Persian heritage. These diplomatic efforts and the significant influx of wealth from Iran's oil fields, one of the largest reserves in the world, helped the state secure advanced modern weaponry and maintain strong alliances with Western states. Its geopolitically strategic position also played to Iran's favour as the Western alliance was closely following the advances of the Soviet Union around the region; Iran was well-positioned to contain Soviet expansionism. During the same time, the Nixon doctrine assisted Iran in uplifting its regional status to that of a policeman through the selling of arms and conventional weapons.[792] Internally, Reza Shah, followed by his son Muhammad Raza, made considerable efforts to Westernise the state on similar lines as Ataturk had done in Turkey. Their reforms included the secularisation of domestic institutions. These reforms helped Iran portray a Western outlook which put it in a favourable spot diplomatically with Western states. In the words of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, an influential Iranian politician who hearkens back to those times, "I drove around all the European countries myself. When I wanted to go from one country to the next, I just showed my passport. Today we have reached a point where people are afraid to take their wives abroad because it [their reception] will be disrespectful."[793] This anecdote highlights the stark shift in Iran's diplomatic standing after the 1979 revolution.

The second phase can be regarded as the time after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 where the Pahlavi dynasty was overthrown, and a theocratic regime was established. The Shah's

[791] Ibid, p.2.
[792] Roham Alvandi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
[793] Faramarz Davar, 'The Diplomat King: The Shah's Foreign Policy', *IranWire,* 27 July 2020.

deteriorating control over the state and his failing policies had created a great sense of unrest among many factions of society. From the religious bloc led by the Ayatollahs to the liberal progressive bloc that advocated for economic and political reform, a great portion of the population, with a united effort, were successful in overthrowing the Shah's autocracy. However, after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the state's ideology underwent a significant change. From an open and Westernised state to a closed isolationist Islamic republic, Iran adopted the slogan of "Neither East nor West, Islamic Republic."[794] This undid many of the diplomatic relationships with the Western powers that the Shah had carefully developed over the years. The new Islamic republic pursued an Iran-centric, anti-Western foreign policy.

The theocratic establishment's tendency to think of the world order in terms of grand conspiracies was reflected in Iran's diplomatic responses, as can be seen in its behaviour towards the U.S. and Israel; both states were regularly blamed for being responsible for the entire world's chaos and disorder.[795] During this period, the characteristic features of Iran's diplomatic style under the Islamic republic can be viewed, which are different from the style under the Pahlavi period, and are influenced by religious and cultural techniques. The doctrine of 'taqiyyah' which means to guard oneself, allows Shi'ite Muslims in the position of a persecuted minority to engage in double-dealing to secure their interests, which essentially means pursuing two different objectives at the same time.[796] On the diplomatic front, such a doctrine creates ambiguity and confusion, which has now become one of the identifying features of Iranian diplomacy.[797] Similarly, the doctrine of 'tanfih' pushes for a delaying strategy until the state has shifted the gravity in its favour.[798] Finally, the doctrine of 'khodeh' essentially means bending the truth in one's favour without telling the whole truth or leveraging legal loopholes to secure interests.[799] Landsberg and Solomon described this transformation in diplomatic practices as "the transformation of Iranian diplomacy into faith-based tradecraft and the concurrent elevation of religious techniques."[800]

In the third phase, Iran began to depart from its isolationist policy and started to open up to the rest of the world and forge alliances. This shift began after the end of the eight-year

[794] Evaleila Pesaran, *Iran's Struggle for Economic Independence: Reform and Counter-reform in the Post-Revolutionary Era* (London: Routledge, 2011).
[795] Mark Hitchcock, *Iran and Israel: Wars and Rumors of Wars* (Eugene: Harvest House Publishers 2013).
[796] Carel Landsberg and Hussein Solomon, 'How Do Iranian Diplomats Negotiate?', *American Foreign Policy Interests*, vol.32, no.1, 2010, pp.13–25.
[797] Ibid.
[798] Ibid.
[799] Ibid.
[800] Ibid.

long Iran-Iraq War, which had, accompanied by burgeoning sanctions, greatly burdened the Iranian economy. These pressures made it imperative for Iran to re-evaluate its diplomatic considerations and pursue a pragmatic approach towards engagement with the West. This new foreign policy direction helped Iran improve its standing among the Arab and European states and restore its soft power resources to a certain extent. Iran took a softer stance towards the Western powers and began to engage actively with states across the globe. This diplomatic re-alignment opened channels for bilateralism and multilateralism, which proved beneficial to Iran in its economic recovery.

In the current and fourth phase, it can be argued that Iran is on course to reverting to its isolationist policy and its previously improving perceptions in the West have changed. After 9/11, the U.S. declared war against, what President Bush referred to as, the "axis of evil," which included Iran, Iraq and North Korea. Ever since then, there has been a stronger Western opposition, led by the U.S., to Iran's activities in the region leading to a severe straining in Iran's relationship with the West. Similarly, with the fall of the Saddam regime, there was a considerable vacuum of power in the region which Iran tried to exploit. This led to a further deterioration of relations between Iran and regional states. Although, there is also reason for the West not to be treated as a monolithic body in its policy response to Iran as is reflected in the stances of many of the European states who continued to be a part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement with Iran and opposed the unilateral policy reversal by the U.S. These four phases allow for an understanding of the historical context which has influenced the makeup and the evolution of the Iranian state.

Iran's Diplomatic Style

Similar to Iran's strategic culture, its diplomatic style has also influenced the beliefs and values held by the Iranian society as well as the ideology of the ruling elite. There has been a variation in its diplomatic style which corresponds to the four diplomatic phases highlighted above and the foreign policy approach prevalent in those periods. The diplomats of Shah's Iran were quite Western in their sensibilities, disposition and negotiation styles, while at the same time, they aimed to preserve a certain sense of their unique Persian identity. The post-revolution diplomatic cadre, however, took a different and a much more confrontational, non-compromising approach.

The Pahlavi Dynasty era is an example of when the state was well known for its cultural diplomacy. When oil was discovered in the region and trade was increasing, the Shah took advantage of the opportunity by promoting a culturally rich image of Iran. Many events used to take place in the state, including the Shiraz Art Festival and the 2,500–year celebration of the Persian Empire in 1971, attracting many foreigners and culture enthusiasts.[801] However, just like other significant changes in Iran, diplomacy was also impacted in the light of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The state's ideology changed and so did the direction of its diplomatic practices. Under Khomeini's rule, Iran saw a shift from soft cultural diplomacy to one where spreading the state's Islamist ideology in the region became the main objective.[802] Under the motto of "Neither East, nor West, Islamic Republic," the state formulated an Iran-centric, anti-imperial and hard-line diplomatic approach which has continued to this day.[803]

Iran's contemporary diplomatic style is perhaps best characterised by the concept of revolutionary diplomacy. Armstrong suggests that revolutionaries - as Iran's ruling elite sees themselves - "proceed from ideologically derived black-and-white views of the world" and see the international society as "an oppressive, unequal and immoral structure of power."[804] Another characteristic of the revolutionary diplomacy pursued by Iran, as highlighted by Armstrong, is that diplomats perceive their prime role "to be that of spreading the revolutionary cause."[805] Since this type of diplomacy often ignores international established norms of diplomatic conduct, states such as Iran are more prone to violate the protections attributed to diplomats, as was seen during the aftermath of the revolution when American diplomats were held hostage in Iran. Thus, Iran follows a diplomatic style similar to that of a revolutionary state and as such, operates outside the established confines of diplomatic norms.

Building on the self-sufficiency rhetoric, Iranian diplomats have described Iran as a fearless state that is ready to respond to external threats. This unconventional behaviour has caused major rifts in negotiations between Iranian diplomats and their counterparts. It is also noteworthy that many international responses from Iran are recorded directly by the Supreme Leader, or its military leaders, and are often aggressive in nature, which sometimes include

[801] Robert Gluck, 'The Shiraz Arts Festival: Western Avant-Garde Arts in 1970s Iran', *MIT Press Direct Leonardo*, vol.40, no.1, 2007, pp.20-28; Amuzegar, *Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy*.
[802] Andrew Mumford, *Proxy Warfare* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013).
[803] Pesaran, *Iran's Struggle for Economic Independence: Reform and Counter-reform in the Post-revolutionary Era*.
[804] David Armstrong, 'The Diplomacy of Revolutionary States', in Jan Melissen (ed.), *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999) pp.43-59, at p.44.
[805] Ibid, p.48.

direct threats to counterparts. For instance, after the assassination of Iranian military leader, General Qasem Soleimani, when the U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted that Iran would face a response a thousand times greater in magnitude if it targeted any U.S. interests, an Iranian official responded with the following statement the very next day:

> We hope that they do not make a new strategic mistake and certainly in the case of any strategic mistake, they will witness Iran's decisive response.[806]

At an earlier instance, a response came directly from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of Iran in 2009, highlighting Iran's self-sufficiency approach:

> We don't count on the British government and some other European countries whose actions are clear and have no reputation in the world. They are politically retarded groups and have become desperate in managing their own country and therefore make such remarks against Iran to cover their own crimes… Do you want to use this language with Iran? If this is your stance, there will be nothing left to talk about. Do you think this behaviour will solve your problems? This will not have any result except that the people will consider you someone similar to Bush… I hope you will avoid interfering in Iran's affairs and express regret in a way that the Iranian people are informed of it… In case of a real change from you, the Iranian nation would welcome it.[807]

Additionally, the diplomatic style of Iran also highlights an Iranian perception of justice that gives little consideration to the international system. Warren Christopher, in his article for the New York Times in 2006, shared his understanding of Iranian negotiation style by calling it "bazaar behaviour" and claiming that it resembled a Middle Eastern marketplace because of the diplomats' "outlandish demands, feints at abandoning the process and haggling over minor details up to the very last moment."[808] There are several examples where Iran has criticised and condemned international policies and organisations such as the UN. One such example comes from a recent statement by a state spokesman claiming that the UN Human Rights approach is one-sided and should not be used to investigate Iran's case.[809]

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[806] 'Iran Warns US against 'Strategic Mistake' after Trump's Threat', *Al Jazeera*, 15 September 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/15/iran-warns-us-against-strategic-mistake-after-trumps-threat.
[807] 'IRI President: Mr. Obama made a mistake,' *IRIB News Agency*, 25 June 2009.
[808] Warren Christopher, 'Opinion | Welcome to the Bazaar', *The New York Times,* 13 June 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/13/opinion/13Christopher.html.
[809] Maryam Sinaiee, 'Iran Spokesman Claims UN Human Rights Approach Is One-Sided', *Iran International,* 24 March 2021.

Moreover, Iran has also curated a diplomatic style in which it tends to remain as ambiguous as possible. As Ghubin highlights, this particular approach has been observed many times during the dealings of Iran with the IAEA and EU during the nuclear negotiations.[810] Iran's use of vague language and ambiguity in the proceedings allows it to make new adjustments to its demands later in the process, provide last-minute changes and in some cases, redefine obligations for itself according to its interests. This behaviour also reflects a reliance on strategic delay in decisive matters. One example of such a case has been Iran not ratifying the 'Additional Protocol' of the Tehran Agreement of 2003 after the state had already signed it.[811] Even when the Trump administration imposed new and stricter sanctions on the state, Iran still managed to stick to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for approximately 13 months, highlighting the patience Iran has showcased during such a tense atmosphere.[812]

Iran's National Security Apparatus

In the past century, Iran has undergone transformational political and ideological changes, which have significantly impacted its national security apparatus too. With Mohammad Reza Shah's return to power after the 1953 coup, Iran engaged in a rapid modernisation of its military apparatus by utilising the wealth generated by its oil reserves. Leveraging its alliances during the Cold War, Iran procured advanced weapons systems, which included a wide variety of the latest arms and ammunition, F-5 and F-14 fighter aircraft, Cobra helicopters, tanks and missile technologies.[813] This modern military required foreign experts and technicians for its maintenance, experts who were mainly provided by the U.S. However, with the turn of events during the Iranian revolution of 1979, and the beginning of the U.S.-imposed economic sanctions and arms embargoes, the Iranian military suffered a serious shortage of foreign experts who were imparting technical knowledge to its personnel, which resulted in the deterioration of Iran's ability to carry out effective maintenance of its military

[810] Shahram Chubin, *Iran's Nuclear Ambitions* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).
[811] Paul Kerr, 'Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations', *Library of Congress Congressional Research, 2012.*
[812] Michael Trinkwalder, 'The Fecklessness of Strategic Patience: How to Save the Iran Deal', *The Policy Corner*, 18 October 2019.
[813] Defense Intelligence Agency, *Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2019).

assets.[814] This was first observed during the Iran-Iraq War where initially Iran's military performed poorly, making it clear that Iran was not prepared for a conventional conflict.

The Iranian regime considers political, cultural and social issues as components of the state's national security agenda because it deems that these issues can challenge the stability of the state. The Supreme Leader heads most of Iran's executive power structures and serves as the ultimate commanding authority for its national security apparatus. Iran's major military and security institutions include the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS), Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS), Regular Forces (Artesh), Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Law Enforcement Force (LEF) and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). The SCNS is the top authority that is responsible for Iran's security policy. In contrast to the President who has a limited mandate over national security policies, the Supreme Leader is the authority figure who approves the final decisions and passes down direct orders to the military, thus having control over the decision to wage war or maintain peace. The AFGS is the primary headquarters of the military which is responsible for the formulation of military policy and strategy under the directives of the Supreme Leader. Artesh is the traditional military loyal to the Supreme Leader and is responsible for protecting the state's borders through its ground, air and naval forces. The IRGC is a military force that exists to directly support the state's theocratic establishment and thus considers itself the protector of the Islamic revolution. It has been involved in unconventional methods of warfare which has resulted in the U.S. declaring it a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO).

With the arrival of more technologically advanced Western or Western-backed militaries in the region - as demonstrated in the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the case of the former, and the provision of weapons to Israel and Saudi Arabia in the case of the latter - Iran's war strategy has shifted towards unconventional means that rely heavily on asymmetric tactics. The Iranian government has utilised different factions and groups (mainly Shi'ite) to engage in proxy warfare with other states in the region. There has been an emphasis on making up for the power differential by avoiding direct confrontation and by incorporating non-confrontational tactics such as spreading disinformation or propaganda and engaging in cyber warfare to harm the opponent's digital infrastructure. From an economic perspective, Iran is already exhausting itself financially, and the sanctions and embargoes have exacerbated the situation; therefore the only way for it to support its aspirations of regional hegemony is to

[814] Ibid.

engage in non-conventional warfare, utilising proxies to advance its regional interests and gain leverage over its opponents.[815] This strategy has benefitted Iran and has allowed it to establish itself as an influential player in the region, as seen by the reach and activities of Hezbollah, one of the major proxy groups in the Middle East supported by Iran.[816]

One of the primary components of Iran's security agenda is maintaining long-lasting relationships with its proxy groups in Lebanon, Palestine, Syria and Iraq. Over the past few decades, Iran has had a strong history of supporting militia groups in different regions of the Middle East, providing huge amounts of funding and advanced weaponry to further their interests. The formation of Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1982 provided Iran with two big advantages: 1) extending Iran's reach to the Mediterranean Sea by providing land and air support that could be used to accomplish Iran's regional objectives, seen through to the end by Hezbollah's activities; and 2) providing a strategic buffer between Israel and Iran.[817] Similarly, Iran's support for proxy groups and non-state militia outfits against Israel has also been prominent in the past decades, where it has equipped and provided assistance to groups such as Hamas, Al-Aqsa Brigade and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Proxy warfare has proven to be an effective strategy for Iran as it has provided a shadow under which the state can exert its regional influence and further its vision in an indirect manner. The provision of military expertise, financial funding and strategic guidance helps Iran secure regional alliances and establish the state's influence remotely, which is not possible by means of conventional military strategies. One of the reasons for Iran's strategic gains in the region has been its success in identifying and supporting militia groups which allow it to strategically exploit power vacuums. Iran has successfully leveraged the developments unfolding in Yemen, Iraq and Syria to its advantage. For Iran, proxy warfare is the most effective strategy to counterbalance the growing influence of other Middle Eastern states such as Saudi Arabia and Israel.

How Diplomatic Style and Strategic Culture Guide Iran's Action as a Supremacy-Aspiring Rising Middle Power

Iran's size, natural resources and material power mean that the state has been in a position to attain the role of a regional hegemon. Iran's behaviour displays an unwillingness to

[815] Ibid.
[816] Augustus R. Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).
[817] Nakissa Jahanbani. 'Reviewing Iran's Proxies by Region: A Look Toward the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa.' *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,* 29 May 2020.

work towards regional cooperation and integration, a confrontational behaviour towards other states in the region and the West, and acceptance of support from states such as Russia and China due to shared interests regarding the U.S. To expand the understanding of Iran's thinking and the motivations behind its behaviour, this chapter attempts to view the state's behaviour through the lens of its diplomatic style and strategic culture. To do so, Iran's navigation of great power competition, regional leadership and integration, and hegemonic behaviour and power projection style are analysed. Through this, this chapter highlights the relevance of the state's diplomatic style and strategic culture in enhancing an understanding of Iran's supremacy-aspiring behaviour.

Navigation of Great Power Competition

As noted above, Iran has not had a pleasant experience with great powers throughout its modern history. In recent years, tensions between the United States and Iran have escalated as the U.S. has imposed stricter sanctions targeting Iran and has pressured other states to halt their economic activity with the Iranian state. The U.S. began imposing sanctions under President Jimmy Carter's administration, who put up the first set of sanctions in November 1979 as a response to the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.[818] These sanctions were followed by an arms embargo in 1984 by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and even stricter sanctions in March 1995 by U.S. President Bill Clinton in response to the Iranian nuclear program.[819] This was later followed by the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which impacted foreign companies investing in the oil and gas industry in Iran.[820] Similarly, the state faced multiple unilateral and bilateral sanctions from the U.S. and its allies in the following decades.[821]

Even though these sanctions have resulted in major economic issues for the state, Iran continues to operate in an aggressive manner, which shows the minimal influence of these measures on its behaviour. In July 2018, Iran's President Hassan Rouhani made the following statement, addressing U.S. President Donald Trump:

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[818] Charles Brower and Jason Brueschke, *The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998), p.7.
[819] Josh Levs, 'A summary of sanctions against Iran', *CNN*, 23 January 2012, https://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/23/world/meast/iran-sanctions-facts/index.html.
[820] Patrick Clawson, 'U.S. Sanctions', *The Iran Primer*, 11 October 2010.
[821] 'Timeline: Sanctions on Iran', *Al Jazeera*, 17 October 2012, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2012/10/17/timeline-sanctions-on-iran.

> Mr. Trump, don't play with the lion's tail, this would only lead to regret. America should know that peace with Iran is the mother of all peace, and war with Iran is the mother of all wars. You are not in a position to incite the Iranian nation against Iran's security and interests.[822]

On another occasion, Ambassador Eshagh Al-Habib, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations issued the following statement on December 31, 2020, addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to the President of the United Nations Security Council:

> Excellency, I am writing to inform you that the military adventurism of the United States of America in the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea has heightened, particularly in recent weeks. In addition to dispatching advanced and highly sophisticated weaponry to this region in the past several weeks, the United States has conducted a number of provocative military acts that include, but are not limited to, the flight of a number of its long-range strategic bombers in recent days over the Persian Gulf… Warning against the aforesaid measures, I must stress that while the Islamic Republic of Iran does not seek conflict, our ability and resolute determination to protect our people, to defend our security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and vital interests as well as to respond decisively to any threat or use of force against Iran must not be underestimated.[823]

Iran's rhetoric was similarly aggressive in response to the U.S. assassinating the commander of Iran's Quds Force, General Qasem Soleimani, by an aerial drone strike in January 2020. The President of Iran released a statement saying, "there is no doubt that the great nation of Iran and the other free nations of the region will take revenge for this gruesome crime from criminal America."[824] A similar response from Iran's current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that "severe revenge awaits the criminals."[825] Such statements and responses indicate Iran's consistently aggressive approach and further highlights the

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[822] 'Iran's Rouhani warns Trump about 'mother of all wars'', *Reuters*, 22 July 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-nuclear-usa-rouhani-idUKKBN1KC084

[823] 'Iran responds to U.S. Deployments', *The Iran Primer*, 6 January 2021, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/jan/06/iran-responds-us-deployments.

[824] 'Will Take "Revenge" Against US For Commander's Killing: Iran President', NDTV, 3 January 2020, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/iran-president-hassan-rouhani-says-will-take-revenge-from-us-for-qasem-soleimani-killing-2158139.

[825] 'Qasem Soleimani: US Kills Top Iranian General in Baghdad Air Strike', *BBC News,* 3 January 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50979463.

animosity between the United States and Iran. Furthermore, these incidents demonstrate the influence of the diplomatic style and strategic culture of the state on its foreign policy behaviour and official communication. An anti-imperial culture based on self-sufficiency and reciprocity has contributed towards Iran becoming a supremacy-aspiring rising middle power.

It is also important to discuss Iran's relations with Russia. The relationship between both the states have varied according to the prevalent ideology of either state at any given moment. Iran's anti-imperial strategic culture and previous hostile experiences such as the Russia-Iran War and events during World War II influenced its relations with the Soviet Union; this resulted in Ayatollah Khomeini dubbing the Soviet Union as "the Lesser Satan."[826] However, the relations saw a shift after the Soviet Union's support for Iran increased in light of the sanctions placed by the U.S., and this resulted in various trade and arms deals between them. Russia's long-standing rivalry with the U.S., coupled with Iran's continued resistance to the U.S. has naturally allowed for the development of common ground between the two states. Russia also served as a signatory to the JCPOA agreement and assisted Iran in complying with the nuclear deal. In a recent interview to Press TV, a top Iranian negotiator gave the following statement while discussing the JCPOA nuclear deal, "We have common positions with Russia and China on many issues, almost on all issues, and there is a good understanding between the three delegations, and we have very close cooperation."[827]

In 2017, when he met with his Russian counterpart, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said:

> [It is] possible to have logical dialogue and cooperation with Russia as a big power about big jobs that require determination and effort...Iranian and Russian cooperation has had a great impact in fighting terrorism in the region...The joint cooperation and consultations are very important in the final stages too...We are very pleased that, apart from our bilateral relations, our two countries play an important role in securing peace and stability in the region.[828]

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[826] Mark Katz, 'Iran and Russia', in Robin Wright (ed), *The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), p.186.
[827] 'Araqchi to Press TV: US Must Remove All Post-JCPOA Sanctions before Returning to Deal', *Pars Today*, April 28, 2021, https://parstoday.com/en/news/iran-i140682-araqchi_to_press_tv_us_must_remove_all_post_jcpoa_sanctions_before_returning_to_deal.
[828] 'Russia's Vladimir Putin in Iran for Talks on Syria, US 'Sanctions Pressure'', *Deutsche Welle*, 1 November 2017, https://www.dw.com/en/russias-vladimir-putin-in-iran-for-talks-on-syria-us-sanctions-pressure/a-41193681.

While Iran's side-lining in the regional and international political landscape and sanctions from the U.S. may have strategically incentivised it to partner with Russia, a similar approach can be observed in the case of its relations with China. Other than cooperation in areas of trade and military affairs, China has also offered diplomatic support to Iran at various forums, including voicing opposition to U.S. sanctions and embargoes.[829] Iran has also backed China over the controversial Hong Kong national security law at the United Nations Human Rights Council.[830] Both states continue to have significant economic ties, as proven by the most recent development that came in the shape of a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement signed by both states in March 2021. The cooperation aims to cover economic activities, including collaboration in oil, mining, transportation, agriculture and tourism.[831]

Another significant player in the great power competition is the United Kingdom, even though it does not have the same influence it did in the first half of the 20th century. Both states have had a turbulent relationship through much of the 20th and the 21st centuries. Significant events in the history of UK-Iran relations include the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran and the involvement of the UK in the removal of Prime Minister Dr. Mosaddeq in a coup attempt.[832] After the Iranian Revolution, the UK broke off its diplomatic relations with the Iranian state and supported the Iraqi regime during the Iran-Iraq War.[833] The later years also followed with sanctions, political tensions, including events such as the attack on the embassy, seizure of naval personnel and the election controversy.[834] The early 2000s observed some improvements in the relations, which were again hampered due to the conflict in the Strait of Hormuz.[835] The tensions between both states continued to rise as the nuclear deal with Iran in the JCPOA ran into difficulty. In a recent joint statement by the UK, France and Germany, the states raised

[829] George Simpson, 'Russian and Chinese Support for Tehran: Iranian Reform and Stagnation', *Middle East Quarterly*, 2010, vol.17, no.2, pp.63-72; Manochehr Dorraj and Carrie Currier, 'Lubricated with Oil: Iran-China Relations in a Changing World', *Middle East Policy Council*, vol.15, no.2, pp.66-80.
[830] Dave Lawler, 'The 53 Countries Supporting China's Crackdown on Hong Kong', *Axios*, 2 July 2020, https://www.axios.com/countries-supporting-china-hong-kong-law-0ec9bc6c-3aeb-4af0-8031-aa0f01a46a7c.html.
[831] Shannon Tiezzi, 'What's in the China-Iran Strategic Cooperation Agreement?', *The Diplomat*, 30 March 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/whats-in-the-china-iran-strategic-cooperation-agreement/.
[832] Mohan and Wall, 'Foreign Electoral Interference: Past, Present, and Future'; Sorenson, *An Introduction to the Modern Middle East: History, Religion, Political Economy, Politics*
[833] Christine Gray, 'The British Position with regard to the Gulf Conflict (Iran-Iraq): Part 2', *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, vol.40, no.2, 1991, pp.464–473.
[834] 'Protest at Iran's 'Evil UK' Claim,' *BBC*, 19 June 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8109303.stm; 'Iran protesters storm UK embassy in Tehran'. *BBC*. 29 November 2011; 'Timeline: UK-Iran Relations,', *BBC*, 20 August 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-15949285.
[835] Bethan McKernan, 'Iranian boats 'attempted to impede' British oil tanker in strait of Hormuz', *The Guardian*, 11 July 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/11/iranian-boats-harass-british-oil-tanker-in-strait-of-hormuz.

concern over Iran's nuclear activity and compliance with the JCPOA.[836] On the other hand, Iran has called on the UK to repay the money it owes for the non-delivery of tanks ordered by the Shah before the Iranian Revolution.[837] Such events have caused the relations to remain turbulent as Iranian elites continue to be very apprehensive of the UK, viewing it as a state with imperialist tendencies still looking to interfere in the Middle East.[838]

Iran's relations with the great powers highlight how the state's diplomatic style and strategic culture have played a role in shaping its behaviour and its foreign policy decisions. Iran's behaviour reflects not only the state's ideological build-up and values, but also its inability actively to pursue these aspirations in a direct manner due to a lack of material power.

Regional Leadership and Integration

Iran's position in the region is unique as it is the largest Shi'ite-majority Muslim state. At the same time, all of its neighbours, except for Azerbaijan and Iraq, are Sunni majority Muslim states. Iran, acting as a supremacy-aspiring state, has never been able to establish a strong ally in the region, as it has tried to exert its dominance through the use of proxies, leading to strained relations with most states in the region.

After establishing the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, the Supreme Leader Rouhollah Khomeini criticised the Middle Eastern monarchies. remarking that monarchical rule was not Islamic.[839] Many states in the Gulf, which were established monarchies, viewed this statement as a threat. The Supreme Leader of Iran had a policy of supporting the *mustazafeen* (those who are wronged or oppressed) — and many Iranian jurists declared citizens of several Arab states as the *mustazafeen,* who needed to be freed from oppression.[840] This led to further deterioration in the relations between Arab states and Iran. This behaviour can be linked to Iran's religious

[836] Patrick Wintour, 'France, Germany and UK Raise Concern over Iran's Nuclear Plans', *The Guardian*, 14 April 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/14/france-germany-and-uk-raise-concern-over-iran-nuclear-plans.
[837] Patrick Wintour, 'Zaghari-Ratcliffe: UK Acknowledges Debt Owed to Iran over Shah's Tank Order', *The Guardian*, 4 September 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2020/sep/04/uk-defence-secretary-acknowledges-debt-owed-to-iran-over-shahs-tank-order.
[838] James Landale, 'Iran Attack: How Much Influence Does UK Have in US-Iran Crisis?', *BBC News*, 8 January 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-51038802.
[839] Henner Fürtig, 'Iran and Saudi Arabia: Eternal "Gamecocks"?', *Middle East Institute*, 29 January 2009.
[840] Henner Fürtig, 'Iran and the Arab Spring: Between Expectations and Disillusion', *German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA)*, no.241, November 2013, p.6.

identity and its sense of civilisational superiority, which has led to the state taking an assertive and moralist approach towards other states in the region.

Iran is also part of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), and the state's level of participation in the organisation has been linked with the status of its relations with Saudi Arabia — the de facto leader of the Sunni Muslim world. The state has only hosted the Islamic Summit of the OIC once in 1997 and ever since then has had constrained relations with the OIC. Iran's non-cooperative diplomatic style has deterred any possible initiative towards furthering regional cooperation and harmony. In response to Iran's actions and growing influence in the region, in January 2016, the OIC released an anti-Iran statement sponsored by Saudi Arabia, which accused Iran of interfering in domestic affairs of other states and supporting domestic terrorism in the region.[841] This led to Iran's further isolation within the organisation. Iran, therefore, has acted as a state which aspires for supremacy as it understood that it was very hard for it to establish common ground with most of the states in the region due to differences in language, culture, religious identity and civilisational history.

Iran's use of soft power is nevertheless an important tool for exporting its ideology and influence in the region. The state is the *de-facto* leader of the global Shi'ite Muslim community. The Shi'ite Muslim community accounts for a considerable number of the Muslim population in the Middle East and South Asia. Iran hosts Shi'ite Muslims from around the globe at the holy sites in the country. The state uses this as an opportunity to rally these visiting Shi'ite Muslims to side with it. This, in turn, increases its influence in states with significant Shi'ite Muslim populations. Iran also uses soft power to attract Shi'ite Muslims across the region, including from neighbouring states Afghanistan and Pakistan, to join the proxies and militias it sponsors to fight against the perceived Western aggression.[842]

It can be seen from the discussion above that Iran has been building its own narrative in the region to expand its influence and has faced opposition from almost all the states in its neighbourhood in its pursuit of regional supremacy. The state, however, has succeeded in becoming a major player in the region due to its non-direct methods of warfare and confrontation.

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[841] Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, 'Geopolitical Implication of Iran Nuclear Agreement', *APERC*, 2017, p. 12.

[842] Ahmad Shuja Jamal, 'The Fatemiyoun Army: Reintegration into Afghan Society', *US Institute of Peace*, 1 March 2019, pp.1-24; Suddaf Chaudry, 'Iran Lures Pakistani Shias to Fight Its War in Syria', *The Arab Weekly,* 16 September 2018, https://thearabweekly.com/iran-lures-pakistani-shias-fight-its-war-syria.

Iran's Hegemony and Power Projection Style

Iran's diplomatic style and strategic culture also help enhance an understanding of its power projection style. Building on the analysis of the national security apparatus of the state, it may be understood the way Iran promotes its influence in the region. It does so by creating proxy groups, by making large investments in the military and by exploiting regional instability to its advantage.

On the military end, the state has invested heavily in its armed forces and has created the largest missile force in the Middle East, which is reported to have a number of major cities of rival states within its range.[843] This strong buildup is partly a result of the lessons learned from the Iraq-Iran War, as the missile attacks from Iraq resulted in major devastation in Iran.[844] While maintaining strong defence capabilities is one of the reasons for investing in the military, the armed forces are also used to project strength to regional adversaries.

As discussed above, Iran has a strong belief in exporting its doctrine to other regional states and to be supportive of Shi'ite Muslim populations across the globe. It does this through a combination of soft power diplomacy and proxy warfare. The state has been at loggerheads with Saudi Arabia, a Sunni-majority state, as both states want to emerge as the dominant power in the region and are threatened by one another's influence. During the Cold War, both states were U.S. allies; however, after the revolution in 1979, Iran pursued the policy of independence from the West and its allies in the region, which included Saudi Arabia.

Iran's proxy wars have expanded to different states in the region including Israel, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Bahrain.[845] The state has been involved in supporting different rebel groups or governments based on their Shi'ite political ideology.[846] Working with these proxies has allowed Iran not only to influence other states, but also to shape regional dynamics without direct confrontation. Iran has gained some success in its pursuit of gaining influence in the region through these indirect confrontations. In 2008, the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki went against the Saudi-backed group "Sons of Iraq" and started filling important posts

[843] 'Iran's Power Projection Capability', *Hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security*, 5 Nov. 2015. Homeland Security Digital Library.
[844] Warren Richey, 'Iranians Await Iraqi Attacks in Campgrounds and Luxury Hotels', *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 April 1988.
[845] Seth Jones, *War by Proxy: Iran's Growing Footprint in the Middle East* (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2019).
[846] Ibid.

in the military with Shi'ite Muslims.[847] Hence, despite the economic sanctions imposed on Iran, the state has slowly gained influence in the region through its use of proxy warfare.

Iran's allies in the region include the Syrian Assad government, the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, Iraqi Shia militias and the Yemeni Houthi movement, all of whom are often collectively referred to as the 'Axis of Resistance'.[848] Iran ensures its presence in Syria by supporting the Assad regime in maintaining power, which facilitates Iran in arming and supporting its regional allies such as Hezbollah. Syria, being a Sunni majority state, would pose a significant threat to the hegemonic aspirations of Iran if the Assad regime were toppled and replaced with a Sunni government hostile to Iran. Therefore, the protection of Syria's current regime is of considerable interest to Iran. As pointed out by Katzman, "According to estimations, Iran is deploying the members of the Quds Force and the Revolutionary Guard inside Syria, estimated at 1,300 to 1,800, in addition to the presence of some members of the Iranian regular army."[849] Similarly, the UN special envoy to Syria, Staffan de Mistura, estimated in 2015 that the Iranian military and economic aid to Syria amounted to an approximate $6 billion a year.[850] Through understanding Iran's presence in Syria, the power projection style of the state becomes apparent.

Looking at Iran's behaviour through the dual lens of its diplomatic style and strategic culture allows for a better appreciation of Iran as a supremacy-aspiring state. The civilisational history, unique identity, geopolitical thought, historical events and the ideological makeup of the state have influenced its diplomatic style and strategic culture which, in turn, have shaped its foreign policy behaviour. With tense relations with great powers and its own regional rivals, sanctions from many states, and unstable political and economic conditions domestically, Iran faces significant challenges ahead. It is hard to predict what the future holds for Iran; however, one thing is evident from the state's behaviour: attaining supremacy in the region remains among the topmost priorities for the state.

[847] Renad Mansour, 'The Sunni Predicament in Iraq', *Carnegie Middle East Center,* March 2016.
[848] Payam Mohseni, and Kalout Hussein, 'Iran's Axis of Resistance Rises', *Foreign Affairs*, 24 January 2017.
[849] Kenneth Katzman, 'Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies', *Congressional Research Service Washington United States*, p.55.
[850] Huda Raouf. 'Iranian Quest for Regional Hegemony: Motivations, Strategies and Constraints'.

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

Scholars distinguish between rising middle powers and established middle powers, based on their behaviours, ideologies, and aspirations for leadership. Rising middle powers is a diverse categorisation of states that, as a result of recent economic and political growth, have assumed a greater role in regional affairs and have aspirations for leadership on the global stage. In the international relations literature, theories of realism are often utilised to analyse and evaluate the foreign policy behaviour of states, including that of rising middle powers. These theories are mainly based on the power-structure in the international system, which they view as inherently anarchic and hence, states' behaviours are influenced by either their desire to survive or to accumulate and maximise power. This thesis also delves into the literature on diplomatic style and strategic culture — which are viewed as potential determinants of state behaviour. Diplomatic style is defined as the distinguishing behavioural characteristics of a state's diplomats and is based on both explicit and tacit knowledge. On the other hand, strategic culture is the set of beliefs, ideational values and modes of behaviour — based on a state's unique historical experiences, geography and political culture, amongst other factors — that influence a state's strategic decisions.

This thesis contends that while rising middle powers, such as Brazil, Indonesia, India and Iran, have all strived for an increased influence in their respective regions, there are variations in the foreign policy behaviours of these states. For example, Indonesia's and Brazil's approaches to regional and global affairs are markedly different from the approaches of India and Iran. Hence, this thesis argues that the discrepancies between the behaviours of rising middle powers can neither be sufficiently explained by the middle power framework nor through power-based theories of realism or hegemony. However, it must be noted that the utility of the traditional power-based theories of realism in explaining *some aspects* of the behaviour of individual rising middle power states is not disputed; rather, this thesis argues that while power-based theories of realism and hegemony help explain the states' broad quest for power and influence in their regions, these theories are insufficient when it comes to explaining the *varying degrees* of hegemonic tendencies among rising middle powers. Therefore, this thesis argued that to enhance the understanding of the positioning of rising middle powers, it is essential to explore and understand these states' diplomatic styles and strategic cultures. This involved an examination of states' ideological outlooks, the unique historical events that influenced their thinking, along with the beliefs and worldviews of the states' decision-makers.

Hence, in order better to explain the behaviour of rising middle powers and the discrepancies in their approach to power, this thesis lays the groundwork for a new *theory of hegemonic tendencies*, which calls for the division of rising middle powers into two analytical categories: "primacy-aspiring states" and "supremacy-aspiring states." Primacy-aspiring rising middle powers, such as Indonesia and Brazil, generally pursue regional and global relations based on an integration-oriented and cooperation-building approach. These states promote the strengthening of regional institutions and do not resort to confrontational and assertive behaviours in their relations with other states. On the other hand, supremacy-aspiring rising middle powers, such as India and Iran, have strained relations in their neighbourhood and show a tendency to pursue a more confrontational and aggressive approach in their relations with neighbouring states. They are less integration-oriented and more likely to use political and military threats. This categorisation into primacy-aspiring and supremacy-aspiring rising middle powers can be better understood through the lens of these states' diplomatic styles and strategic cultures. This categorisation helps in attempting to understand variations between the behaviours of rising middle powers.

Chapter 1 offered an introduction to the thesis and focused on the literature pertaining to the types of power, theories of international relations and theories of hegemony, and the existing works on identifying and analysing states' diplomatic styles and strategic cultures. Through this, the need for a new approach was emphasised, and a new *theory of hegemonic tendencies* was conceptualised. Subsequent chapters dealt with case studies of four rising middle powers: Indonesia, Brazil, India and Iran. Through these case studies, this thesis attempted to demonstrate that the behaviours of rising middle powers can be better understood when one takes account of their diplomatic styles and strategic cultures. By categorising the states through their behaviours into primacy-aspiring rising middle powers and supremacy-aspiring rising middle powers, this thesis added to the understanding of the variations between these states' hegemonic behaviours.

Now, this conclusion chapter will provide a brief overview of the findings of the case studies analysis. By doing so, it ties the cases of Indonesia, Brazil, India and Iran to the *theory of hegemonic tendencies.*

Indonesia

The formation of Indonesia's diplomatic style and strategic culture demonstrates the influence of cultural values and beliefs on the outlook and decision-making of the ruling elite. Cooperation and consensus-building are integral values that play an important role in the state's diplomatic style. The diplomatic style of Indonesia is inward-looking, leading to a low-profile style of diplomacy. Moreover, historical events and circumstances — including the colonial experience, secessionist threats and exploitation by foreign powers — have led to fears and insecurities regarding foreign threats, which have consistently influenced the strategic culture of Indonesia. Thus, its strategic culture has shaped Indonesia's priorities in terms of its conduct, and the state attaches immense importance to internal threats and concerns regarding territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Indonesia's behaviour in the region involves efforts towards integration. Despite occupying a central position in ASEAN affairs and holding significant influence over the workings of the organisation, Indonesia has shown a general willingness to compromise and build consensus in its dealings with neighbouring states. It has shown an aversion to taking a hard-line approach, even when it comes to smaller states, and has instead worked towards building trust and consensus among the ASEAN members. Moreover, Indonesia has pursued a policy of non-alignment and shown great mistrust with regard to the intentions of great powers. Indonesia has also sought to increase its influence by leading initiatives to advocate for humanitarian causes around the world. The state has worked towards conflict resolution in Southeast Asia while taking the role of mediator in multiple conflicts. On the global stage, Indonesia exerts its influence through the UN and its G20 membership. As Indonesia has consolidated its democracy in the past two decades, it has also promoted democratic ideals and humanitarianism in the region. At the same time, Indonesia is often labelled as a 'silent' leader in the region.

As such, Indonesia's behaviour points towards a non-assertive, non-confrontational approach to international relations and regional affairs. Even though Indonesia has the material resources and capability to strong-arm smaller neighbouring states, it has shown a disinclination to pursue such an approach. Here, the theories of realism and hegemony fail to explain comprehensively the deviation of Indonesian behaviour from an outright and direct pursuit of hegemony and power in the region. Indonesia adopts a softer form of hegemonic behaviour, whereby the state seeks to increase its influence through developing friendlier relations and

leading initiatives in the region, while primarily remaining concerned with protecting its territorial sovereignty and internal security.

By discussing Indonesia's case from the lens of the state's diplomatic style and strategic culture — which promote an inward-looking thought and diplomacy, a culture of cooperation and a policy of non-alignment — Indonesia's behaviour can be understood more clearly. Indonesia's description as a 'silent' leader can be better understood by the Indonesian people not being "opportunity hunters as a nation," which is also closely linked with the state's prioritisation of internal affairs.[851] Hence, while Indonesia aspires for primacy and influence in the region, the diplomatic style and strategic culture of the state demonstrates that Indonesians are willing to pursue power in a more restrained manner as compared to supremacy-aspiring states, such as India and Iran. Indonesia's case serves as strong evidence of the utility of the *theory of hegemonic tendencies*, as Indonesia's classification as a primacy-aspiring rising middle power distinguishes it from states that are pursuing a more assertive — or even aggressive — approach to projecting power.

Brazil

Brazil's diplomatic style and strategic culture were influenced by unique historical events and circumstances, which formed the beliefs and values of the Brazilian institutions. Due to the economy, size and population of the state, Brazilians hold a self-aggrandised perception about their state's greatness, similar to India and Iran. However, unlike India and Iran, Brazilians also have embedded values of pacifism, non-confrontation and consensus-building, which influence their strategic culture. Brazilian leaders have prioritised domestic autonomy and development when envisioning their external affairs policies. Brazil's strategic culture, thus, promotes dialogue, negotiation and diplomatic initiatives as a way to gain influence; the state has traditionally lacked military capabilities relative to similar middle powers, but efforts to modernise the military are ongoing. Furthermore, Brazil's diplomatic style has also been affected by its embedded beliefs in Brazil's greatness, as well as through the South American culture and values, which promote concertation and consensus-building. The achievements of the Baron of Rio Branco as foreign minister have reinforced the Brazilian way of negotiating,

[851] Philips Vermonte, Personal interview (by author), Jakarta (Indonesia), 7 August 2018.

consensus-building and relying on diplomacy to gain prominence, all of which have become tenets of the state's diplomatic style.

Brazil's navigation of great power rivalries suggests that the state has historically been willing to align itself with great powers. Though, in the Cold War, Brazil only aligned with the U.S. in the beginning, after which relationships between the two states deteriorated. Recently, Brazil has established ties with China while also having developed better ties with the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. Brazil has also made efforts towards further cooperation and integration in South America since the 1990s and has taken an active leadership role in the region. It has promoted economic integration through various initiatives, some of which include the formation of regional bodies such as Mercosur and Unasur. Brazil's approach to regional leadership has been non-assertive, as the state has tried to advance its influence through cooperation and consensus-building.

Brazil's power projection style and hegemonic behaviour have mirrored its approach to regional leadership, where it has adopted a non-confrontational, yet an engaging and active role. Brazil has sought to develop greater relations with the developing world. For instance, Brazil's engagement with African states has grown over the last few decades, accompanied by an increase in development assistance, investment and trade. Moreover, the state's ties with other rising powers, such as China, India and Japan, over the last two decades have resulted in a combined effort to reform the international system. Additionally, Brazil has taken on an active role in the UN and has pushed for a permanent membership of the UNSC. Hence, Brazil has continued to advance its prominence and influence regionally and globally through diplomacy, negotiation and taking initiatives designed to promote development and cooperation among states. While Brazil has recently made efforts to modernise its military and gain greater material resources, its overall behaviour vis-à-vis power projection has remained consistent.

Brazil's conduct and behaviour can be better understood through the values and beliefs that have influenced the state's diplomatic style and strategic culture. Brazilians have long believed in pacifism, non-confrontation and dialogue. These values continue to reflect in the state's behaviour, as Brazil has prioritised a consensus-building and cooperation-seeking approach. Brazil's overall behaviour and its disinclination to pursue a hard-line approach towards its neighbours, and rather adopting a diplomacy-focused approach to gain influence, helps fit Brazil into the category of a primacy-aspiring state. As such, Brazil's case demonstrates the value of the *theory of hegemonic tendencies* in helping understand the

contrasting behaviours of primacy-aspiring rising middle powers from that of supremacy-aspiring rising middle powers.

In contrast to the behaviour of Brazil and Indonesia, Iran and India are more assertive in their pursuit of power and their overall behaviour means that they can be classified as supremacy-aspiring rising middle powers.

India

India's strategic culture reflects the impact of the region's rich civilisational past, as well as the threats presented by India's geography, particularly from the Northwest, where Pakistan remains a major security concern in the state's perception. Moreover, strategic autonomy, nonalignment, the influence of moralism, fatalism and activism, are important components of India's strategic culture. Historically, the impact of Nehruvianism — based on the values of Prime Minister Nehru — has been profound. In recent decades, Hindu nationalist thought has begun to dominate India's strategic thinking, which has led to renewed Indian aspirations to attain power on the global stage. In a similar way, India's diplomatic style has been influenced by the outlooks of moralism and activism, a belief in strategic autonomy and nonalignment, a belief in its rich cultural heritage, a general unwillingness to compromise and the use of soft power to improve India's global image.

India's beliefs in nonalignment led to a position of relative neutrality in the period right after its independence. However, the U.S.'s strategic partnership with Pakistan and the increasing threat from China led India to develop greater military and strategic ties with the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, India began to develop strategic ties with the U.S., which have become stronger with the rise of China.

India's approach to regional leadership and integration is in contrast to some of the other rising middle powers such as Brazil and Indonesia, in that India has not taken on an active role to further integration in South Asia. India's approach to the regional body SAARC has been dominated by political differences and conflicts with other member states. This has led to SAARC playing a minimal role in regional affairs. It must be noted that India's lack of initiatives in South Asia is coupled with greater efforts towards cooperation with Southeast Asian states since the 1990s. Thus, India's overall leadership in the region has been restrained

because of the state's involvement in bilateral conflicts, which have hindered regional cooperation and integration.

India's behaviour with neighbouring states reflects the state's aspirations of 'hegemonic authority' in the region. India has tried to influence neighbouring states' behaviour and intervened in their internal affairs on a number of occasions, including supporting the Bengali organisations during the civil war in East Pakistan, thus helping create the state of Bangladesh in 1971. This demonstrates one example of where India has chosen to pursue a hard-line approach with its neighbouring states.

India's behaviour can be better understood by considering the influence of the state's diplomatic style and strategic culture — which promotes the belief in strategic autonomy, India's civilisational past, natural leadership in the region and aspirations for great power status. As such, an understanding of India's hegemonic behaviour has been enhanced, as a state that adopts a hard-line approach and does not focus on integration and cooperation in the region. India's global approach, in contrast to its regional one, is softer, with a focus on improving its image through soft power. This can be better understood through Indian culture's hierarchical view of the world. It could be argued that India — based on its size, population and material resources — sees itself at the top of South Asia's hierarchy of power and as such, sees itself as the hegemon in the region; at the same time, it recognises its position in the global hierarchy, and understands that it needs to build up its image and resources to gain further power on the global stage.

This thesis argues that India's behaviour has been dissimilar to that of Indonesia and Brazil in terms of efforts towards regional leadership and integration because of the state's diplomatic style and strategic culture. While it is true that India's position as the state best poised to assume the mantle of regional leader is similar to that of Indonesia, it must be considered that India faces intense conflicts with neighbouring states, unlike Brazil and Indonesia. Thus, it could be argued that India's conflicts in the region, and the threats that they present to India's sovereignty, are bound to affect the state's security decisions and policies in the region, ultimately leading to a behaviour that is different from that of Brazil and Indonesia.

However, it must be considered that Indonesia was also involved in a conflict with Malaysia between 1963-66 after the latter's independence; this conflict stemmed from Indonesia's fear that Malaysia's independence would allow for the UK's influence in the region to grow, thus diminishing Indonesia's influence and presenting a potential threat to its

sovereignty. It was Indonesia's willingness to reconcile and cooperate that allowed for peaceful resolution of the conflict, as well as improved relations with Malaysia after the conflict. This allowed for Southeast Asia's regional cooperation and integration to grow — indeed, ASEAN was formed in 1967, one year after the end of the conflict. On the other hand, India's conflict with Pakistan has persisted on since 1947, with India unwilling to compromise in any way, which has now greatly diminished any hopes for a strong and active regional organisation. This demonstrates that Indonesia's behaviour — which culminated in an eventual reconciliation with Malaysian independence — stands in contrast to that of India's towards Pakistan.

Thus, under seemingly similar circumstances and threats to their national sovereignty, India and Indonesia took vastly different approaches. The reasons for these contrasting behaviours can be better understood through the lens of these states' diplomatic styles and strategic cultures, whereby India's belief in taking a dominating and confrontational approach stands in contrast to Indonesia's culture of cooperation and consensus-seeking.

Iran

Iran's strategic culture, in the same way as India's, is influenced by its rich civilisational past, which has led to a unique ethno-linguistic Persian identity. Iran's strategic culture is based on a deep mistrust and animosity towards the Western powers, fears of exploitation and of the state's resources being plundered, as well as a unique religious nationalist identity derived from the state's Shi'ite and Persian identity. Similarly, Iran's diplomatic style is influenced by the ruling elite's beliefs in exporting its religious ideology to neighbouring states, as well as maintaining a hard-line stance towards foreign powers.

Iran had good relations with the U.S. before the revolution of 1979; after that, however, relations with the U.S. became deeply hostile. Iran's opposition to the U.S. can be seen as a result of the state's strategic culture, which revolves around mistrust and fears of exploitation by great powers. Yet its relations with Russia and China are thriving, with one reason being the common mistrust of the U.S. among all three.

Iran's role in regional leadership has been minimal, due to its strained relations with most states in its neighbourhood. Iran's influence in the region, however, comes from its inclination to build its military capacity in the pursuit of regional dominance. However, Iran, having realised the limitations of direct military conflict with opposing states, has also utilised

proxy groups to advance its strategic objectives. At the same time, Iran's economic development is severely hindered by sanctions imposed by the West.

Iran's opposition to Saudi Arabia and its efforts to displace Saudi Arabia as leader of the Muslim world have also strained its relations with other Muslim-majority states, which do not adhere to Iran's ideological viewpoints. Iran has not managed to maintain cordial relations even with states with majority Shi'ite populations, such as Azerbaijan, as can be witnessed in Iran's support for Armenia in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War fought between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Similarly, Iran's relations with Iraq were severely strained before the removal of Saddam Hussein. This demonstrates that while Iran has looked to export its ideology to other states, it has been actively involved in conflicts with states in its proximity. At the same time, Iran has supported Syria's Alawite (a branch of Shi'ite Islam) leader Bashar Al-Assad, because in case of his removal from office, power would be transferred to the state's Sunni-majority population, which would be harmful for Iranian interests.

In Iran's case, it is important to note that the current behaviour of the Iranian state and its pursuit of power and dominance in the region is based on the embedded values and beliefs of the ruling theocratic elite, which comprise the superiority of Persian culture, the righteousness of Shi'ite Islam and the state's supposed responsibility to spread its ideology. Hence, Iran's ideological dispositions were developed both before and after the revolution of 1979, as demonstrated through the discussion of the state's diplomatic style and strategic culture. After the theocrats assumed power in 1979, their personal beliefs determined the course of Iranian hegemonic aspirations.

As such, these case studies demonstrate that the varying approaches to power of Indonesia, Brazil, India and Iran add to an understanding of the hegemonic behaviours of rising middle powers and the influence of diplomatic styles and strategic cultures on the states' aspirations and foreign policy behaviours.

Overall, this thesis attempted to enhance understanding of the foreign policy behaviours of rising middle powers, and therefore, by laying the groundwork for a new *theory of hegemonic tendencies,* introduces fresh analytical categories of "primacy-aspiring rising middle powers" and "supremacy-aspiring rising middle powers" based on the states' diplomatic styles and strategic cultures. This will hopefully allow future researchers to more comprehensively analyse and understand the behaviours of rising middle powers.

Appendix I: List of Interviewees

Arthur Meyer, Graduate War College, interview by the author, Brasilia (Brazil), 11 July 2018.

Astari Daenuwy, Diplomat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 31 July 2018.

Captain Rafael Frischgessel, Brazilian Navy, interview by the author, Rio De Janeiro (Brazil), 09 July 2018.

Discussion with experts at CEBRI think-tank, Rio De Janeiro (Brazil), 10 July 2018.

Filho, Diplomat, Brazilian Foreign Ministry, interview by the author, Brasilia (Brazil), 12 July 2018.

Gilang Kembara, Research Assistant, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 31 July 2018.

Hamzah Tayeb, Diplomat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 07 August 2018.

Hassan Wirajuda, former Foreign Minister of Indonesia, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 01 August 2018.

Hastin Dumadi, Diplomat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 31 July 2018.

Jose Tawares, Diplomat at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director for ASEAN, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 08 August 2018.

Landry Subianto, Diplomat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 31 July 2018.

Marcos Deagut, Deputy Special Secretary for Strategic Affairs, Office of the President, Brasilia (Brazil), July 16 2018.

Marco Tulio, Diplomat, Brazilian Foreign Ministry, interview by the author, Brasilia (Brazil), 12 July 2018.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Brazilian Foreign Ministry, interview by the author, Brasilia (Brazil), 11 July 2018.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Brazilian Foreign Ministry, interview by the author, Brasilia (Brazil), 16 July 2018.

Philips Vermonte, Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 07 August 2018.

Pribadi Sotiono, Diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview by the author, 08 August 2018.

Sergio Lima, Diplomat, Brazilian Foreign Ministry, interview by the author, Brasilia (Brazil), 11 July 2018.

Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, Diplomat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 06 August 2018.

Yayan Mulyana, Director, Diplomatic Academy of Indonesia, interview by the author, Jakarta (Indonesia), 31 July 2018.

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