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Language and Ideology in North Korean Language Planning

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**A sub-thesis submitted to the Department of Linguistics of
the Australian National University in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts**

August 1998

**I hereby declare that unless otherwise acknowledged,
the work contained in this sub-thesis is my own.**

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Moon', written in a cursive style.

**Hyun-Hee Moon
August 1998**

dedicated to my father

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Introduction

The division of Korea for more than half a century has created two separate socio-political entities in the Korean peninsula. These two Koreas, led by elites with different ideologies, have undergone politically induced changes which have embraced every facet of life. The Korean language, which is the only language spoken by the ethnically homogeneous Korean people, has not escaped the extensive socio-political engineering of both regimes.

Language planning has been an integral part of the national policy of North Korea. The communist regime has attempted to institutionalise its political ideals in the language in order to bring changes to the life of the people and to mobilise them towards socialist construction. There has been a constant emphasis on language reform and purification to expunge linguistic elements which are considered to be inconsistent with political objectives of the regime.

Language planning in North Korea has been developed in parallel with changes in the ideological orientation of the regime: the adoption of Soviet Marxism-Leninism in 1945; the declaration of a North Korean brand of communism, the idea of *Juche* which highlights national self-reliance and independence in the 1960s; and an increasing emphasis on the personality cult of the late leader, Kim Il Sung since the 1970s. However, what has pervaded the whole process of language planning is the idea that language is an effective tool for achieving the socio-political objectives of the regime, as was epitomised by Kim Il Sung:

Our spoken and written language serves as a powerful weapon in the development of the economy, culture, science and technology of our country, in all fields of socialist construction (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 16).

This thesis attempts to present the development of language planning in North Korea from its formation until the mid-1990s, with special attention to its close connection with socio-political changes.

Chapter 1 provides background information on language planning in North Korea, including a brief history of the Korean people and their language, and an overview of North Korean communist ideology in conjunction with which language planning has been carried out. In the last section of this chapter, after examining several different views on the periodisation of North Korean language planning, I suggest a new periodisation on which following chapters are based.

Chapter 2 begins the discussion of the historical development of language planning in North Korea, examining the first and second periods. The first period covers language planning during the post-independent era up to the Korean War (1945~1953). Language planning activities of this period are dealt with as a part of the decolonisation and self-authentication policy of the new state. The second period is from the post-war era until the mid-1960s. Language planning actions in this period are presented as a way of carrying out the post-Korean War reconstruction scheme.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are dedicated to the third period of language planning which began with North Korea's proclamation of political independence from the Soviet Union and China, and the subsequent development of *Juche* as the North Korean communist ideology. After reviewing Kim Il Sung's speeches as a source of ideological orientation for language planning based on *Juche*, Chapter 3 examines major corpus planning activities in areas of orthographic reform, vocabulary management and dictionary compilation. Chapter 4 discusses two contrasting varieties of language usage: language of deference for the leader, Kim Il Sung; and language of contempt for the enemies of the state, with a brief summary of recent changes in language planning. Chapter 5 provides an overall review of achievements and limitations of the third period.

Romanisation of the Korean language in this thesis mainly follows the Yale system except for some widely known conventions including place names. Regarding the Romanisation of Korean personal names, the thesis follows the common convention of putting the family name first, followed by the given name connected by a hyphen, as in Hong Kil-Tong, with the exception of some widely published and recognised cases such as Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

Chapter 1

History, Language and Ideology

This chapter presents background information on language planning in North Korea. The history of the Korean people and their language, and an overview of North Korean communist ideology, are introduced to lay a base for an understanding of North Korean language planning in close connection with the socio-political life of the community. In the last section, after discussing several different views on the periodisation of North Korean language planning, a new periodisation is proposed to provide a framework for the discussion which follows throughout the remainder of the thesis.

1.1 Formation of North Korea

1.1.1 Korea before the Japanese Colonial Rule in 1910

From the 14th century on, the Korean peninsula was ruled by the Cosen dynasty. Its main governing principle was Confucianism, which put an emphasis on the notions of unity and harmony (Nahm 1988: 108-115). To achieve harmony in the human world, society was to be arranged according to a hierarchy. Two main categories in this hierarchy were the aristocratic elites (*yangpan*) and the commoners (*phyengmin*). A superiority-subordination relation could also be observed, in which the ruler was over the subjects, parents over children, the older over the younger and men over women.

Except for brief periods, kingship in Cosen was not strong. The king could not administer the country at his own will, but needed consensus from the bureaucratic *yangpan*. His power was also limited by the material strength of the *yangpan*, who converted the land allocated to them into private holdings, thereby competing with the

king for land resources and tax revenues. With the revenue base of the throne growing smaller, the burden of taxation fell more heavily upon the peasants. They became victims of both the demanding king and the exploitative *yangpan*. They fell into debt to the *yangpan* and sank more deeply into poverty. In the 19th century, their dissatisfaction was expressed in the form of popular rebellions, which rapidly weakened the administrative power of the dynasty.

In addition to internal disorder, international rivalry among Japan, China and Russia¹ was a determining factor in the fate of modern Korea. The court, at first, sought to take a policy of isolationism, trying to keep foreigners out of Cosen. After being forced to open its ports, the king and factions in the court disagreed over what course of action to follow, and each allied itself with different foreign powers. The tripartite struggle was settled in Japan's favour. When a peasants' rebellion broke out in 1894, China and Japan dispatched troops to suppress it. Just after the suppression of the rebellion, clashes started between China and Japan, and China was defeated in 1895. Japan finally established its exclusive dominance over Korea by expelling the Russians in 1904 (Wagner et al. 1990: 214-223). After this, Korea became a protectorate of Japan in 1905 and was annexed to Japan in 1910. Japan kept Korea in colonial subjugation from 1910 till the end of the Second World War.

1.1.2 Korea under the Japanese Rule

After the annexation, the Japanese colonial government set up a military administration and established a large number of police stations all over the country. Political activities of the indigenous people were tightly regulated and the media was strictly controlled. Throughout the whole period of Japanese rule, Koreans were deprived of freedom of speech, press, assembly and association.

¹ After the Meiji restoration in 1867 (Wagner et al. 1990: 198), Japan transformed itself into an organised industrial country and turned the economic results into building up a military force. Cosen, which had already lost the strength to meet the challenge from its powerful neighbours was conceived by Japan as a corridor for advances into the Asian continent. Though the dominance of China over its neighbouring countries had been weakened by internal political disorder and by the arrival of Western imperialism in the 19th century, China could still maintain its hold over Cosen claiming its suzerainty. In addition, Russia, which had aspired to obtain an ice-free port, wanted to extend its political influence over Cosen.

Economic exploitation took the form of the 'Decree of Land Survey', which stipulated that all lands belonging to the court were to be seized by the colonial government and that ownership of lands and buildings had to be proven and registered. Some landlords from the old regime who could conform to these requirements had their ownership status certified, while most small holders, not understanding the procedures, lost their holdings. The land thus confiscated was sold at favourable terms to the Japanese Oriental Development Company, and then was purchased by Japanese residents in the colony at cheap rates (Brun and Hersh 1976: 42-47). The direct appropriations of land, however, were not the only hardship imposed on the peasants. Heavy land taxes, land rent and compulsory levies made it much harder for them to maintain their livelihood. Some chose to migrate to Japan or Manchuria.

In the cultural sphere, official emphasis was placed upon the Shinto religion and the divinity of the Japanese emperor, to whom the Koreans were ordered to show their allegiance. Koreans were regarded as racial inferiors whose indigenous culture should be destroyed and remoulded by a program of 'Japanisation'. Only minimum education was allowed to Koreans, and this produced a low skilled and poorly paid work force and prevented the potential development of nationalist intellectuals. All forms of cultural expression that might be considered to foster nationalist spirit were banned. After Japan launched its war against China in 1937, these cultural policies turned to forced assimilation of the Korean people (Kim Eugene 1973: 137-145). Young men were conscripted into service with the Japanese army, adult men were mobilised as forced labourers in mines and mills and women were forced into prostitution through the Japanese 'comfort stations'. In this manner, the policies of Japanese imperialism victimised nearly all segments of the Korean population politically, economically and culturally.

1.1.3 Emerging Nationalism

The Korean people's resistance to Japan began on the very first day of Japanese rule and never stopped. However, it was not until 1919 that the first mass-scale movement broke out. About two million people in more than 1500 separate places throughout the country gathered peacefully claiming independence for Korea (Lee Jeong-Soo 1983: 49). This peaceful movement was brutally suppressed by the colonial authorities and

resulted in shifting the centre of the later independence movement abroad. The provisional government of Korea was established in Shanghai.² The Korean-Chinese border area was chosen for sustained resistance activities. This area was suited for linking up the resistance movement internally and internationally. As many Koreans, who were forced to leave their native soil due to poverty and oppression, migrated to this region³, anti-Japanese organisations could easily mobilise material and human resources.

With the growth of the resistance movement in the border area, the nationalist movement developed gradually along communist lines to the extent that communists succeeded in taking control of the movement from moderate nationalists. Of the communist groups operating in this region, the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army is worth noting. Formed in the early 1930s under the leadership of Kim Il Sung, it carried out armed struggles against the Japanese. Its best known feat was a raid in 1937 on the Japanese stronghold of Pochenpo in which many Japanese soldiers were killed and much artillery was captured. After the raid, the Japanese authorities organised a special military squad to arrest Kim Il Sung (Simmons 1995: 169). This victory enhanced the prestige of the communists above all other resistance forces, and promoted Kim Il Sung as one of the most prominent resistance leaders (Park Cay-Kyu 1997: 12-18). This military success, however, later had a negative impact on guerrilla activities in the region. Japanese forces launched a huge attack against the guerrillas and eventually pacified the area. The survivors of the attack, including Kim Il Sung, fled to south-eastern Siberia, where they were trained under the Red Army and cultivated strong ideological ties with the Soviet communists (Simmons 1995: 139-145).

1.1.4 Independence and the Formation of the Two Koreas

On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan and attacked the

² Those who formed the provisional government never agreed on a method of achieving independence. One group favoured a campaign of propaganda to win support from Western governments. Another group wanted to wage a military attack on the Japanese forces. Still another insisted on a program of education and enlightenment (Oliver 1993: 138-139). Due to this internal split, the provisional government could not operate effectively.

³ About 200,000 Koreans lived in the border area by 1910 and the numbers increased to 1,400,000 in 1940 (Oliver 1993: 122).

Japanese Kwangtung Army (Nahm 1988: 330). The Soviet troops as liberators marched into Korea, but stopped their advance to the south at the 38th Parallel, complying with the demands of the United States which feared the occupation of the whole peninsula by the Soviet Army. Shortly afterward, the United States also landed in the southern part of Korea, bringing about a temporary division of the country.

Before the foreign forces put the post-colonial situation under their control, indigenous political activities took place on an unprecedented scale and the nationalists and communists organised themselves openly. People's committees which were formed spontaneously all over the country disarmed the Japanese army, liberated political prisoners, punished collaborators with Japan and organised mass-gatherings to discuss future nation-building (Park Cay-Kyu 1997: 19).

The United States and the Soviet Union had different policies on the indigenous movements, as well as on other matters in the peninsula. The United States, fearing that communists would take advantage of the new situation, declared all voluntary civil organisations illegal, set up a military government to control the South directly and proclaimed it as the sole government of Korea. All laws which were issued by the Japanese colonial authorities were to continue in full force. Colonial property rights were reaffirmed and former collaborators with administrative skills were recruited to fill posts in the military government (Simmons 1995: 159-160). Of the conservative nationalists returning home, the military government backed Rhee Syngman to take power as he was one of the very few political figures opposed to any compromise with the communists and the North.

The Soviet authorities, rather than trying to gain direct control over the North, encouraged the development of indigenous People's Committees and police units, and proclaimed public control of educational and cultural institutions (Simmons 1995: 162-165). This, however, did not mean that freedom to carry out political activities was given equally to every political group. Although the progressive wing of the nationalists was not suppressed openly, favour was given to communists. In October 1945, the North Korean Branch of the Korean Communist Party (NKBCP) was formed with strong support from the Soviet Union (Park Cay-Kyu 1997: 20-21).⁴

⁴ This implied a separation of communists in North Korea from the previous party centre in Seoul. The separation was opposed by the domestic communist faction which argued for 'One Party in One

While the preparations for the establishment of NKBKCP were going on, Kim Il Sung, who returned to North Korea in September 1945, did not come to the fore in the political arena (Park Cay-Kyu 1997: 20-21).⁵ It seems that he wanted to monitor the domestic situation and power relations among the communists. Only after the foundation of NKBKCP did he appear in public. A large mass rally was organised by the Soviet Union, where the secretary of the NKBKCP and other leading communists welcomed him and praised him as 'a national hero' (Nahm 1988: 333). With this public display, Kim's position as one of the most prominent political figures in the North was confirmed, and the Soviet Union's position as an advocate for Kim was clearly demonstrated.

After the mass rally, Kim quickly gained ascendancy over other renowned communist leaders and became the secretary of the NKBKCP in December 1945 (Park Cay-Kyu 1997: 22). It is not easy to explain his rapid advance. His association with the Red Army and his readiness to take the position of a middleman for the Soviet Union may be partial answers (Suh Dae-Sook 1989: 64-66). His successful career as a commander of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army, which gave him fame among Koreans, and the well-organised guerrilla members under his control might also have played a role. Some analysts also note his exceptional talent and leadership (Brun and Hersh 1976: 113-114; Park Cay-Kyu 1997: 21-22). Whatever the reasons, Kim was able to establish a solid basis of power at the end of 1945, which nobody could match.

Just after Kim took the position of secretary in the NKBKCP, the Three Ministers' Conference, which convened in Moscow in December 1945, revealed a plan to place Korea under the trusteeship of the United Nations for five years (Wagner et al. 1990: 340). The communists, at first opposing the trusteeship, later changed their position while the nationalists and the conservatives both in the South and the North

Nation', but the opposition was dismissed by the returnees from China and the Soviet Union (Park Cay-Kyu 1997: 20). The establishment of the NKBKCP reveals that the power struggle between factions of North Korean communists went in favour of the returnees.

⁵ The real name of Kim Il Sung was Kim Sung Cwu. Because he had changed his name, the South Korean authorities claimed that he was not the legendary hero of the Pochenpo raid. Instead, the South argued that Kim Sung Cwu, who was recruited as a member of the Soviet intelligence during the Second World War, changed his name and identified himself with the hero in order to win the people's minds. The fact that he was 33 in 1945, which implied that he led the raid at the age of 25, was also used by the South to support the claim that he was not the genuine Kim Il Sung.

vehemently objected to the plan. The confrontations over the issue of trusteeship were particularly acute in the South and symptoms of cleavage became more and more apparent.

When the US-Soviet committee failed to reach an agreement about the issue of trusteeship, the United States unilaterally referred the matter to the United Nations. Despite opposition from the Soviet Union and the North, the UN made a proposal that a general election would be held in Korea to form a unified government. However, the UN commission was refused entry into the North. The general election took place only in the South and the Republic of Korea was proclaimed on August 15, 1948 (Lee Se-Jin 1983: 71-73). Immediately afterward, mass demonstrations and regional rebellions broke out in the South, in opposition to the policies of the United States (Brun and Hersh 1976: 83). Although these rebellions were suppressed by the government with US military assistance, maintaining law and order was becoming more and more difficult. The situation was even more serious in many rural areas where government troops ruled during the day and communist guerrillas at night. Substantial areas of South Korea were outside the control of the government during 1949 and into 1950 (Simmons 1995: 181-184).

In the North, the issue of trusteeship turned out to be an opportunity for Kim Il Sung to consolidate his power. Branding prominent nationalist leaders as American collaborators, he put them into jail and later purged them from the political arena. He also tried to strengthen his power by initiating a series of reforms. In the political sphere, People's Committees at the provincial level were reorganised into a unified central structure in 1946. A year later, the Supreme People's Assembly was inaugurated to draft a constitution. In accordance with the draft accepted by the Supreme People's Assembly an election was held in August 1948 and Kim was subsequently installed as the premier of North Korea (Khil Young-Whan 1984: 34).

In the economic sphere, a land reform law was enacted, stipulating that the land of those who owned more than 5 *cengpo* (about 5 hectares) be confiscated without compensation and an equal amount of land be redistributed to the landless peasants and small holders. The large land owners deprived of their holdings were forced to move to other places. The free distribution of land, affecting about 76 percent of the rural population, was a very popular measure and was able to extract support from the

populace. Moreover, as many landlords opted to move to the South, the land reform brought about the political effect of removing opponents to Kim's rule (Brun and Hersh 1976: 128-140). Economic reform also included the nationalisation of all heavy industries, mines, forests, public utilities, and communication and transportation systems which had been owned by the Japanese and the pro-Japanese Korean businessmen. In this way, 90 percent of all industries in the North were confiscated without compensation (Park Cay-Kyu 1997: 26).

By early 1947, social and economic reforms had produced a stable political system in the North. Following the proclamation of a new state in the South, the North declared the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on September 9, 1948 and proclaimed it to be the legitimate representative of the entire Korean people.

Political disorder and the outbreak of regional rebellions in the South led the South regime to resort to the armed forces and to depend on the United States to maintain its power. Despite the harsh repression, on which about 60 percent of the state budget was spent, the regime was not able to stabilise the situation until 1949. This escalating chaos became a problem even in the United States and led the US Congress, under the assumption that South Korea was indefensible, to decide to withdraw the majority of US troops in late 1949. The United States continued to press the regime to carry out a general election by threatening to withhold its economic aid. Rhee finally gave in and a general election was held on May 30, 1950. The result was a fatal blow to Rhee: out of the 210 new assembly members only 45 supported him. Under these circumstances, only an event of exceptional nature could save Rhee's regime (Brun & Hersh 1976: 88). This happened shortly after the election: a war broke out on June 25, 1950.

The war went through several phases. Its first week ended with the almost total collapse of the South Korean forces. The North Korean People's Army was able to advance into the southernmost part of the peninsula without facing any severe resistance. Then came the intervention of the United States. The Allied Forces made a rapid advance toward the North Korean-Chinese border at the end of 1950. This was followed by a massive counter attack from the Chinese People's Liberation Army, which brought Korea into a long, protracted war. After three years of intense fighting, the UN forces accepted the Soviet Union's proposal for a cease-fire and the armistice was made on July 27, 1953 (Simmons 1995: 188-194).

The war left a deep scar in the consciousness and the memory of the Korean people. There were millions of human casualties and countless homes and factories were destroyed. More than anything else, mistrust and hatred between the North and the South grew deeper and these have played a pivotal role in determining the course of later development in the Korean peninsula.

1.2 Korean Language before the Formation of North Korea

1.2.1 Korean Language before Japanese Colonial Rule in 1910

It was not until the 15th century that the Korean people had their own writing system. *Hangul* (Korean Letters), originally proclaimed as *Hunminjeongeum* (The Right Sounds to Teach the People), was invented by a small number of scholars under the patronage of King Sejong, the fourth ruler of the Cosen dynasty. As a phonetic alphabet which originally consisted of 28 letters, the native system was easy to read and write.

Before the invention of *Hangul*, Chinese characters had been used as the official written language of the government and the medium of education for more than a thousand years. It was in the Cosen dynasty, however, that Chinese influence came to permeate every facet of Korean culture, due to the adoption of Confucianism as the state ideology. The influence of Chinese was so enormous that a dual system of Sino-Korean and native Korean words pervaded the entire Korean vocabulary system. The ideographic Chinese writing system, which required time-consuming effort to master, highlighted the class division between the commoners, who could not spare time to achieve literacy, and the nobles. This situation created a language hierarchy in which words adopted from Chinese ideographs formed the superstratum, and were regarded as more polite, cultured and scholarly than native words. This also brought about a sharp cleavage between written and spoken Korean.

The invention of a native script was not able to bring about a change in the established language hierarchy, nor could it challenge the monopoly of Chinese characters in written communication. Classical Chinese continued to function as the official written language of the Cosen bureaucracy. The literati, whose authority was based on their

Chinese literacy and Confucian knowledge, disregarded the native Korean script as a low-class form of the language and delimited its function. Prose written in *Hangul* was called *Enmun* (vulgar script or vernacular writing) and was considered only to be suitable for the less educated, and for women, and for use in such texts as folktales. It was not until the end of the 19th century, with the collapse of the political and educational systems of the Cosen dynasty, that the monopoly of Classical Chinese was questioned in relation to the Korean national identity.

During the last two decades of the Cosen dynasty, anti-foreignism was spreading among the Korean masses and the importance of national autonomy became central for intellectuals, in response to the presence of foreign powers and their growing threat to the sovereignty of Korea. A strong national consciousness was fostered and this led to a reform movement to renovate the old Korea, which had already fallen into the mire of foreign powers.

In an effort to ensure Korean political autonomy, the reform-minded intellectuals attacked the official view of the Cosen dynasty towards China, namely *satay* (serving the Great [China]) which acknowledged Korea's subordination to China and accepted Chinese centrality in the East-Asia tributary system. The reformers, instead, emphasised the creation of a national identity.

The Korean language was extolled as a symbol of national identity and as a means of communication to draw patriotic support for the reform movement (Robinson 1988: 9). In 1886 the first Korean language newspaper, the *Toklip sinmun* (The Independence Newspaper) was published as an organ of the *Tokliphyephoy* (The Independence Club), which was the leading forces of the reformation movement (Kim Hyong-Kyu 1968: 133). In the 1890s, there were heated debates over the use of the native Korean script in government documents. The question of which language should be the official written language linked to the question of national identity and the use of native Korean script was regarded as a means to terminate the cultural dependence on China and to enhance national autonomy (Robinson 1988: 34). By the end of the 19th century, a convention of using the Korean script and Chinese characters gradually gained currency in official use and became the dominant writing pattern (Wu Hyeng-Sik 1995: 99-100).

1.2.2 Korean Language under Japanese Colonialism

After the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, the colonial authorities declared Japanese to be the official language of the colony, and made a concerted effort to enforce this policy. In all schools, the medium of education was Japanese, except in limited Korean language classes (Kim Hyong-Kyu 1968: 117-118).

During the first decade of Japanese rule, the growing anti-Japanese sentiment reached the point of massive political action. The 1919 mass independence movement brought about considerable changes in the management of the colony and a new policy of 'Cultural Rule' was introduced to soften the appearance of repression. Taking advantage of the new policy, nationalists in the colony extended their political and cultural activities, including the publication of two Korean language papers, *East Asia Daily* (*Tonga ilbo*) and *Korea Daily* (*Choson ilbo*), and a few intellectual journals dealing with political affairs (Nahm 1988: 229- 230).

Language and education were central issues in these nationalist publications. They appealed to the people to fight for the right of Koreans to use their native tongue and to abolish the forced Japanese language policy. Concerned with the rapid spread of the Japanese language use in Korea, they maintained that the use of Japanese was tantamount to the acceptance of Japanese consciousness. Such concerns fuelled the drive for language policy reform, the establishment of private schools which were less controlled by the colonial authorities than the public ones, and the spread of *Hangul* use (Robinson 1988: 84).

The propagation of indigenous language use was equated with national survival by nationalists. *Coseneyenkwuhoy* (The Korean Language Research Society) was at the forefront of the language movement throughout the colonial period from its foundation in December 1921.⁶ The Society laid the corner stone for a unified movement to promote the use of the Korean language by launching language standardisation projects. The publication of prescriptive rules for *Hangul* in 1933, the collection of standard Korean vocabulary in 1936 and the agreements on standardised transliteration rules in 1940, were some of the results of the work of the Society. In 1930, it began to work

⁶ The Society's name was changed to the *Cosenehakhoy* (The Korean Language Study Society) in 1931 and to the *Hangulhakhoy* (The *Hangul* Society) in 1949 (Wu Hyeng-Sik 1995: 76, 102).

on a comprehensive Korean language dictionary, which was taken over by South Korean linguists after the division of Korea, and was completed in 1957 (Kim Hyong-Kyu 1968: 118-119). To implement its codification efforts, the Society not only urged colonial education officials to incorporate its standardised new rules into Korean language textbooks, but also organised a series of training courses for Korean-language teachers (Robinson 1988: 90-91).

Another important activity of the Society involved status planning for the native Korean script. In order to promote the status of *Hangul* from the lower class vernacular to the national language, the Society rejected the pejorative term, 언문 *Enmun* (vulgar script) and proposed such terms as 국어 *Kwuke* (national language), 국문 *Kwukmun* (national script) and 한글 *Hangul* (Korean letters). The Society also made an effort to foster people's pride in the indigenous writing system by promoting it as the best system in the world and a suitable means for dealing with political, academic and cultural matters. Along with this symbolic status planning, nationalist linguists did not miss pointing out the practicality of using the native system, highlighting its simplicity as the optimal means for the propagation of literacy and an efficient tool to achieve modernisation (Oliver 1993: 108).

The success of the language movement owed much to the consensus about the importance of language issues among nationalists, despite ideological disputes among them.⁷ Moderate nationalists regarded national language education as a means of enlightening the masses, while radical nationalists and communists found immense benefit of the mass literacy movement in mobilising and activating the masses for their causes (Robinson 1988: 91).

The favourable situation for the language movement underwent changes after the Japanese attack on China in 1937. The colonial authorities prohibited all cultural activities in *Hangul* and tightened the policy of forced Japanese language use. They eliminated the use of the Korean language in the bureaucracy in 1937, and in the press in 1939 (Robinson 1988: 92). With the new educational decree issued in 1938, schools

⁷ After 1919 the nationalist movement split along ideological lines into moderate and radical nationalists. The former advocated a gradual program of reform, education, and economic development to lay the basis for future independence within the political confinement of the colony. The latter advocated social revolution and overt resistance to Japanese imperialism, and thus became an easy prey for the Japanese oppression (Robinson 1988: 8, 157-166).

at all levels were forbidden to use the Korean language in any form, and Korean teachers and students were compelled to speak only in Japanese both at school and home. In addition, English language classes were removed from the school curriculum when Japan declared war against the United States and Britain in 1941 (Oliver 1993: 116-117, 146-147). By the 1940s, all businesses and banks in the colony were forced to keep records exclusively in Japanese, and publications in *Hangul* were all closed down (Wagner et al. 1990: 315). Koreans were made to alter their family names to the Japanese style. Korean place names were also replaced by Japanese names: Chongjin was changed to Seisin; Wonsan to Genzan; Pyongyang to Heizyo; Inchon to Zinsen; and Kwangju to Kosyu (Oliver 1993: 145-146). These measures were taken to exterminate the national identity of the Korean people by suppressing their language. This also indicated that the colonial authorities considered the use of the Korean language as a cultivator of Korean identity and culture, as a cradle of nationalist spirit and as a form of political defiance.

1.2.3 Korean Language in the Immediate Post-independence Period

Independence at the end of the Second World War led to a resurgence in Korean language learning. The revival of Korean language education and the propagation of literacy were one rare area of consensus between the North and the South. There were also movements to displace Japanese and Sino-Korean words and to coin Korean words.

The North and the South, however, showed considerable differences in the selection of an official language. In the South under the US Military Government, English, another foreign language for the Korean people, was proclaimed in September 1945 as the language of the government for all purposes during the military control (Wu Hyeng-Sik 1995: 102). Although the Military Government did not suppress the use of the Korean language for ordinary purposes, it was once again disqualified as the official language and was placed in an inferior position in the language hierarchy, where foreign languages formed the superstratum.

In the North under the Soviet Union, the Korean language gained official status as the national language. This policy was taken by the Soviet authorities who aimed at

integrating nationalistic cultural pride and loyalty into a broad acceptance of communism (Oliver 1993: 191). The Soviet Union declared public control of all educational and cultural institutions with their policy stipulation issued in September 1945, and the Korean language became the medium of education, press and broadcast (Simmons 1995: 165).

Since the division of Korea, the North and the South have adopted different terms for the Korean script. In the South, it has been called *Hangul*, while in the North *Cosene*. These terms are in parallel with the difference in referring to 'Korea' as *Hankwuk* in the South and *Cosen* in the North. This largely politically motivated distinction was a prelude to divergent linguistic changes in the two Koreas for more than half a century.

1.3 Ideology of the North Korean State

North Korea adopted a form of Marxism-Leninism for state building. Virtually a satellite state of the Soviet Union from the communist takeover in 1945 until the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, North Korea had few choices but to accept the ideology of the Soviet Union as a model.⁸ The Soviet Union's communist texts, such as *Brief History of the Soviet Communist Party* and Stalin's *Foundations of Leninism*, were used in training courses for communist leaders (Shin Il-Chul 1993: 22-24). In August 1946, Marxism-Leninism was stipulated as the guiding principle of the Party in the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) bylaw (Park Cay-Kyu 1997: 40).

Since then, the official ideology of North Korea has changed several times, and each time Kim Il Sung exploited the ideology to consolidate his power base. The developmental process of North Korean ideology was consistent with the history of domestic power struggles, through which Kim Il Sung became a totalitarian leader. It was also in line with the history of North Korea's international struggle for autonomy, through which North Korea eventually became an orthodox communist country on its own, rather than a state affiliated with the big communist powers, the Soviet Union and China, at least in ideological terms.

⁸ A statement that Kim Il Sung made during his visit to the Soviet Union in March 1949, indicated the nature of North Korea-Soviet relations at the time. In the statement Kim Il Sung is said to have made a pledge to Stalin that North Korea would follow the Soviet line in the socialist state construction and accept Bolshevik thinking as the source of knowledge (Byun Dae-Ho 1990: 51).

1.3.1 Formation of *Juche* and its Development

1.3.1.1 Overview

The North Korean brand of communism, *Juche* (or the *Juche* idea), was at first proposed as a creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete socio-political conditions of North Korea in the early 1960s (Byun Dea-Ho 1990: 94-95). The *Juche* idea was also called Kimilsungism, attributing the authorship of the idea exclusively to Kim Il Sung, and was elevated to the position of the most advanced revolutionary ideology, superseding (classic) Marxism-Leninism from the late 1960s (Lee Cong-Sek 1995: 52-53). This change marked a transformation of *Juche* from a North Korean version of Marxism-Leninism to a universal principle of revolution. This promotion of *Juche* was exploited to advance Kim to an equal status with the most eminent communist leaders of the time, Stalin and Mao, and to reinforce the personality cult of Kim Il Sung. The *Juche* was finally crowned as the state ideology of North Korea in the Socialist Constitutions of 1972 and 1992.

The term, 주체 *Juche*, which consists of two Sino-Korean words, 주 *ju* (master, owner, or centre) and 체 *che* (body, frame or style), indicates clusters of positive meanings such as 'independence', 'self-reliance' and 'autonomy'. *Juche* is contrasted with 사대 *satay*, which means 'serving the great', 'dependence', 'subservience' or 'lackeys', and with 종속 *ongsok*, which means 'subordination' or 'humiliation'. *Satay* was the major ideological stance of the Confucian Cosen dynasty towards China - accepting the centrality of China in the international hierarchy of East Asia. By the end of the 19th century, with the advent of strong nationalism, *satay* became synonymous with political and cultural dependence on China (Robinson 1988: 34).

To the Korean people who had aspired to have a genuine independent government and who had fought for national independence against Japanese colonial rule, the notion of *Juche* was more than appealing. After liberation, the significance of *Juche* to the Korean people became more acute, due to the division of the nation by external forces. Political independence from neighbouring big powers was the national concern and the issue of *Juche* was identified with the question of legitimacy of the two regimes with contrasting ideologies. For North Korea, *Juche* meant a denial of the interference of

the two big communist neighbours, the Soviet Union and China in policy making and the elimination of American influence as was found in the South (Khil Young-Whan 1984: 108).

Kim Il Sung explained *Juche* as “having an attitude of the master toward revolution and construction” (Kim Il Sung 1973: 9), namely an attitude of rejecting dependence on others and carrying out revolution in a self-reliant manner. To be self-reliant in revolution, it was necessary to devise one’s own revolutionary theory to lead the state and the people, to build a self-sustaining economy and to defend the people by one’s own military forces. *Juche* also teaches that any foreign experience should be adopted after thorough assimilation to the socio-political conditions of the nation. Efforts should also be made to eradicate national nihilism of any sort, to cultivate national confidence and to respect national independence (Kim Il Sung 1972, vol.5: 504-505).

The emphasis on the self-reliance reveals the strong nationalistic nature of *Juche*. This led many western scholars to regard *Juche* as pseudo-Marxism, namely a nationalism disguised by communism (Scalapino and Lee Chong-Sik 1972: 868-873; Suh Dae-Sook 1988: 268-271). This evaluation, however, cannot be accepted by North Koreans who maintained that *Juche* was in parallel with the Moscow declarations in 1957 and 1960, which allowed individual countries to apply Marxism-Leninism to their specific historic conditions (Byun Dae-Ho 1990: 33-36). Kim Il Sung clearly expressed this point in his earliest statement on *Juche*:

It is our principle that we advocate our independence based on *Juche* and at the same time strengthen international unity and cooperation. ... Each nation struggles for its own revolution under its own conditions and by doing so, enriches and contributes to the international revolutionary movement. The idea of *Juche* is based on this communist movement and directly derives from it (Kim Il Sung 1973: 47-48).

In the following section, the developmental process of *Juche*, which brought tremendous impact on language planning in North Korea, is presented.

1.3.1.2 Development of *Juche*

The idea of *Juche* was first mentioned in Kim Il Sung's speech entitled 'On Eliminating Formalism and Dogmatism, and Establishing *Juche*' in December 1955 (Lee Cong-Seok 1995: 66).⁹ In an effort to find a Korean identity as a counterweight to the influence of the Soviet Union, Kim stated that "there is no set principle that we [North Koreans] should follow the Soviet pattern" (Kim Il Sung 1982, vol.9: 403). He argued that Marxism-Leninism should be creatively applied to the North Korean situation, and urged North Korean scholars to study Korean history to find Korean revolutionary traditions. The pronouncement of *Juche* in this speech was aimed at attacking his political rivals, who advocated the Soviet Union's new policy of Peaceful Coexistence with the West and de-Stalinisation.¹⁰ By condemning them as lackeys, opportunists or revisionists who accepted foreign influences unconditionally, and by claiming his own position to be the true Korean stance, Kim Il Sung could defend himself as trying to emulate Stalin in consolidating his own totalitarian power and his regime in North Korea, which had been formed and maintained under the umbrella of the Cold War (Suh Dae-Sook 1988: 125-126). These political motives hindered the idea of *Juche* being fully applied to national policy, until the dawning of a new political situation.

The Fourth Party Congress in 1961 proved that Kim Il Sung had monopolised the Party. The Party was filled by his partisans, as a result of removing all other communist factions. In contrast to this political stability, international socialism was on the verge of splitting. China was appearing as a new power centre, challenging the monopoly of the Soviet Union, and the conflicts between China and the Soviet Union were ever

⁹ North Korea claims that the *Juche* idea originated from Kim Il Sung's anti-Japanese guerrilla struggle in the 1930s. According to Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Sung's speech delivered to a regional youth group in Manchuria in June 1930 "heralded the creation of the *Juche* idea and the birth of the *Juche*-oriented revolutionary line" (Kim Jong Il 1982: 8). Kim Il Sung is claimed to have said that the Korean revolution must be carried out by Korean revolutionaries. The problem for this early origin of *Juche* lies in the credibility of Kim's early speeches, which all appeared in publication in the 1970s for the first time (Suh Dae-Sook 1988: 264-265).

¹⁰ In this speech, *Juche* aimed at limiting the influence of the Soviet Union. China was spared, as Kim Il Sung said that North Koreans should model themselves on the Chinese rectification campaign (Suh Dae-Sook 1988: 266). The speech was made when Chinese influence was growing as a result of its intervention in the Korean War, and this was in contrast to the diminishing influence of the Soviet Union after the war. It should be noted that the *Juche* idea was formulated in the context of North Korea's manoeuvring of its position between China and the Soviet Union.

deepening. An optimal choice for the survival of a small communist state like North Korea, positioned between great powers with whom it shared its borders, lay in maintaining a neutral stance, rather than becoming a supporter of either side. North Korea not only adjusted itself to the situation, maintaining a balance between the big powers, but also took advantage of the situation to declare its independent stance in the polycentric communist world. With these changes in internal and external situations, *Juche* began to be developed into the state ideology.

In February 1963 Kim Il Sung pronounced the idea of *calip* (economic self-sustenance) and *cacwu* (political independence) in a speech made on the 15th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army. He also stressed the importance of *Juche* in training genuine Korean soldiers unspoiled by Soviet influence. The idea of *cawi* (military self-defence) was stated in a speech delivered to the Kim Il Sung Military Academy in October 1963 (Suh Dae-Sook 1988: 266). These speeches were prompted by the Soviet Union's criticism that North Korea's heavy industry-oriented economic policy deviated from the international division of labour and cooperation among socialist countries, and by the sharp curtailment of economic and military aid from the Soviet Union to North Korea (Byun Dae-Ho 1990: 97-98).

The whole character of *Juche* was first presented in April 1965 when Kim Il Sung visited Indonesia:

To establish *Juche* means holding fast to the principle of solving all problems of one's country for oneself and mainly by one's own efforts. ... While resolutely fighting in defence of the purity of Marxism-Leninism and in opposition to dogmatism and flunkeyism, our Party has made every effort to establish *Juche*. *Juche* in ideology, *cacwu* (independence) in politics, *calip* (self-sustenance) in economy and *cawi* (self-defence) in national defence - this is the stance taken by our Party (Kim Il Sung 1968, vol.4: 219-220).

An editorial entitled "Let Us Defend Independence" which appeared in the Party organ, *Lotong sinmun* in August 1966, declared North Korea as a *Juche* state, which would implement an independent policy based on complete equality in relations with other countries. This stance was further developed with North Korea's declaration of independence in foreign policy in October 1966. This was the time when North Korea-China relations were strained over the Vietnam problem and North Korea's restoration

of relations with the Soviet Union. North Korea-China relations were further aggravated during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, to the extent that the Chinese attacked Kim Il Sung as a 'fat revisionist and disciple of Khrushchev' (Kim Il-Phyong 1974: 108).

The *Juche* idea, which had developed to function as the state's defence strategy in response to the chauvinistic big powers, and as Kim Il Sung's political weapon for neutralising different opinions about his national policy, was transformed into a means to develop a leadership cult with mass political purges in 1967 (Lee Cong-Seok 1995: 65-70). Those who opposed Kim's heavy industry-oriented economic development program and the personality cult were executed, to the extent that almost two-thirds of key local government and the Party posts were made vacant (Byun Dae-Ho 1990: 43-44). This political purge eradicated any base from which anti-Kim forces could grow, and the state and the people sank more deeply into Kim's grip. The leadership cult was then systematically incorporated into *Juche* as a core strategy (Lee Cong-Seok 1995: 214-223).

In December 1967, the Supreme People's Assembly declared *Juche* to be the only correct thought in North Korea and officialised this in the form of the *Yuil sasang cheykyey* (Monolithic Ideological System) (Byun Dae-Ho 1990: 94-96). The Party bylaws, which were revised at the Fifth Party Congress in November 1970, codified *Juche* as the 'revolutionary thought of the great leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung' (Lee Cong-Seok 1995: 99) and as the guiding principle of the Party. In the 1972 and 1992 Socialist Constitutions, *Juche* was ordained as the state ideology, ultimately replacing Marxism-Leninism. In the 1992 Constitution especially, *Juche* was explicitly promulgated as the orthodox communist ideology with the deletion of the last remaining references to Marxism-Leninism: changing from 'the creative application of Marxism-Leninism' in the 1972 Constitution to a 'human-centred world view and revolutionary idea' in the 1992 Constitution.

1.3.2 *Juche* and National Policy

Juche has been the single most important determiner in deciding North Korea's national policy, as Kim Il Sung instructed that every Party policy should be based on

the *Juche* idea (Koh B.C. 1974: 86). The following section discusses how *Juche* was applied in national policies relating to ideology, diplomacy, the economy, the military and in domestic politics.

The aim of *Juche* in ideology was to unite people with the revolutionary theory of their own leader. *Juche* as an idea was claimed to be based on human-centred thought that people were masters of everything and decided everything (Kim Jong Il 1995: 14-18). Such mastery was not given by birth, but was achieved through a struggle for self-reliance. *Cacwuseng* (nature to be the master of one's own life), which was considered to be the essential driving force in the realisation of self-reliance, should be developed at both individual and collective levels.

However, based on an assertion that a nation-state was a unit for self-reliance in the present developmental condition of human history, *Juche* extolled collectivism and condemned individualism. Therefore, the collective struggle for socialist revolution was the only correct path for *Juche*. The people could become masters of their own destiny in this struggle, only if they were armed with the revolutionary thought of the leader and were united under his guidance. This maximised the role of the leader and forced the majority in the state to suppress their own *Juche* for the success of the revolution, and to obey the will of the leader unconditionally (Kim Jong Il 1995: 18-22). Ultimately, this 'human-centred idea' compelled the majority of the people to lead a totally passive life serving the master, rather than being the masters of their own life.

Juche on the diplomatic front was represented as *cacwu* (political independence). Establishing complete equality and mutual respect in international relationships was the prerequisite for a country to be a master of its own revolution. The idea of *cacwu* (political independence) was formulated in the process of restricting the influences of the Soviet Union and China and was stipulated in the 1972 and the 1992 Socialist Constitutions as the ultimate principle of foreign policy.

From the North Korean point of view, complete equality among countries was not tenable without resolute struggle against the imperialists who sought to subjugate other countries. Contrasting with this, all socialist countries were equal because they were united under a common socialist goal. This dualistic concept, however, underwent significant changes during the Sino-Soviet disputes. Having become disillusioned with

the ideals of international socialism, Kim Il Sung charged China with being domineering and the Soviet Union with being revisionist, while avoiding applying the term, 'imperialist' to these states (Byun Dae-Ho 1990: 101-107).

In *cacwu* diplomacy, therefore, North Korea proposed two basic lines: for friendly countries, complete equality, independence, mutual respect, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and mutual benefits were the principles; and for the imperialists headed by the United States and revisionists, resolute fighting and confrontation were seen to be the principles (1972 and 1992 Constitution, 1980 KWP bylaws).

Juche in the economic sphere was represented by *calip* (a self-sustaining economy). This involved developing the economy using one's own material and human resources and technology. The idea of *calip* was a source of North Korea's heavy industry-oriented economic development, sacrificing people's needs for necessities. Dependence on imported goods and technology was contradictory to the idea of *calip*, in that participation in the international economy hindered the independent economic development of small countries (Lee Tay-Wuk 1988: 113-131). Although out of necessity, North Korea has been increasingly participating in the world economy, it practiced autarchy, at least in ideological terms (Khil Young-Whan 1984: 11).

Juche in military affairs meant to defend the state and the people with one's own military forces. Military self-defence (*cawi*) was indispensable for a state to maintain political independence and to advance economic development. The idea of *cawi* was materialised as the 'Four Military Lines' (Payk Cong-Chen 1989: 330-337), which aimed to transform the entire population into an armed force and the whole country into an armed camp. This overwhelming importance placed on self-defence was reflected in the military sentiment which permeated the whole society, and in the dominance of military goals over economic ends, which constantly drained the national resources.

Juche in domestic politics sought to perpetuate Kim Il Sung's one man-dictatorship, for which the *Yuilsasangcheykyey* (Monolithic Ideological System) and the *Yuilyengtocheykyey* (Monolithic Leadership System) were formulated in the 1972 Socialist Constitution. The Monolithic Ideological System was proposed to eliminate sectarianism and flunkeyism and to achieve the unity of the state. Its goal was to

achieve a society where the whole Party, the whole country, and the entire people were firmly united like a monolithic organism which breathe, thought and acted only in accordance with the revolutionary ideas of the great leader (McCormack 1981: 54-55). This system represented little more than the imposition of Kim Il Sung's totalitarian reign over the people through an extreme control of the ideology.

Yuiyengtocheykyey (Monolithic Leadership System) aimed to legitimise Kim's totalitarian dictatorship by theorising the status of the *swuleyng* (supreme leader) in the socialist revolution as an absolute being. The Monolithic Leadership System taught that the masses should obey the instruction of the *swulyeng* unconditionally. This is because the masses, although being the masters of the revolution, could not play the role of masters unless they were led by the *swuleyng* (Kim Jong Il 1995: 21). This absolute role of the *swulyeng* rested on the assumption that the *swulyeng*, the Party and the masses were integrated into one immortal socio-political body, the brain of which was the *swulyeng*, who gave immortal political life to the people (Kim Tong-Swu 1984: 112). Denial of or any doubt about the role of the *swulyeng* and his authority was seen as a fundamental crime, violating the state constitution and North Korean communist morality. Following the Monolithic Leadership System, an active program emphasising unconditional loyalty and obedience to Kim Il Sung, 'The Ten Principles for Establishing the Monolithic Leadership System', was declared in 1974 (Park Cay-Kyu 1997: 36).

The ideology of North Korea has had a strong influence on language planning. The close connection between *Juche* and language planning was clearly expressed in Kim Il Sung's January 1964 speech, where the national language was highlighted as a pivotal tool for establishing national *Juche*. The policy of linguistic *Juche* was again emphasised in Kim's May 1966 speech, in which North Korea's own standard language was proclaimed to be separate from its South Korean counterpart. The nationalistic characteristics of *Juche* were reflected in the subsequent language purification movement, which removed foreign linguistic elements and replaced them with native resources. With the incorporation of the personality cult of Kim Il Sung in the idea of *Juche*, special efforts have been paid to codifying and implementing language prescriptions which are exclusive to Kim Il Sung. These issues and the relationship between this general political context and language planning are discussed in the following chapters. But, before moving on to the next chapter which opens the

discussions of historical development of language planning in North Korea, several different views on the periodisation of language planning are examined and then I propose a new periodisation on which the following chapters are based.

1.4 Periodisation of North Korean Language Planning

Kim Min-Swu's periodisation of North Korean language planning is based on orthographic revisions (Kim Min-Swu 1985, 1991, 1997). Kim divides language planning in North Korea into four periods, taking four orthographic conventions as criteria: *Hangul macchwumpep thongilan* (Unified Plan) of 1933, *Cosene chelcapep* (Korean Orthography) of 1954, *Cosenmalkyupemcip* (Korean Language Prescription) of 1966 and *Cosenmalkyupemcip* (Korean Language Prescription) of 1987.

Period 1 (1945~1954)	<i>Thongilan sitay</i> (Period of the Unified Plan)
Period 2 (1954~1966)	<i>Chelcapep sitay</i> (Period of Orthography)
Period 3 (1966~1987)	<i>Kyupemcip sitay</i> (Period of Prescription)
Period 4 (1987~present)	<i>Saykyupem sitay</i> (Period of New Prescription)

(Kim Min-Swu 1991: 15-21)

Kim Chin-W. disagrees with a periodisation based on orthographic revision, pointing out that "language planning is more than orthographic conventions" (Kim Chin W. 1978: 252). Orthographic reforms, in fact, were carried out as a part of macro-language planning in North Korea.

Hong Yun-Sook (1991) proposes the following periodisation, by selecting the abolition of Chinese characters in writing Korean in 1949, and the designation of *Munhwae* as the North Korean standard language in 1966, as pivotal events.

Period 1 (1933~1949)	Mixed Writing Period
Period 2 (1949~1966)	Exclusive <i>Hangul</i> Writing Period
Period 3 (1966~present)	<i>Munhwae</i> (Cultured Language) Movement Period

(Hong Yun-Sook 1991: 147)

Hong takes 1933, when the 'Unified Plan' was proclaimed, as the starting point of the first period of North Korean language planning. However, the year, 1933 is inappropriate as a reference point for North Korean language planning, since before

independence, the condition of the Korean language was the same across the whole peninsula. There was neither the North nor the South. Accordingly, there was no separate treatment of the language. It seems that Hong's intention in naming the first period as the 'Mixed Writing Period' (mixture of Korean script and Chinese characters in written Korean) was to highlight the significance of the 'elimination of Chinese characters' and the introduction of the 'Exclusive *Hangul* Writing Period'. The mixed writing convention, however, had been a dominant practice in writing Korean since the end of the 19th century.

Kumatani (1990) periodises North Korean language planning according to the geographical location of the variety on which the North Korean standard language was based.

- | | |
|-------------------------|---|
| Period 1 (1945~1954) | The 'Seoul (the capital of South Korea) Centred Korean' Period: the period of the eradication of illiteracy and elimination of Chinese characters |
| Period 2 (1954~1964) | The 'Common Korean' period: the <i>Phyocwune</i> (Standard Language) Period |
| Period 3 (1964~present) | The 'Pyongyang (the capital of North Korea) Centred Korean' Period: the <i>Munhwae</i> (Cultured Language) Period |

(Kumatani 1990: 89)

The first period is based on the preamble of the 'Unified Plan' of 1933, which designated the Seoul dialect as standard Korean. The 'Common Korean' of the second period was adopted from the standard language provision of the 1954 'Korean Orthography'. However, the avoidance of a specific reference point (locality) for the standard language did not mean that the standard language of North Korea in the second period had changed much from that of the first period. *Phyocwune* remained basically the same as the 'Seoul Centred Korean' of the first period. The third period is based on Kim Il Sung's 1966 reformulation of the North Korean standard language, *Munhwae*, based on the language of Pyongyang. Unlike Hong Yun-Sook, Kumatani dates the *Munhwae* period from Kim Il Sung's 1964 speech, claiming that "*Munhwae* policy can indeed be considered to begin with the 1964 dialogue" (Kumatani 1990: 89). By '*Munhwae* policy', Kumatani means language standardisation activities, such as

orthographic reform or dictionary compilation. He also adds that after the 1964 speech, social controls regarding vocabulary usage became strict.

Each of the periodisations discussed above is based on a specific aspect of language planning, which is usually conceived in isolation from developments in North Korean politics and policy. In this thesis, I propose the following periodisation for dealing with language planning in North Korea.

Preparation Period (1945~1953): Independence and Democratisation of Language.

Immediately after independence in 1945, language planning of North Korea started. Its major features were the reinstatement of Korean as the national language, the promotion of indigenous script and the demotion of Chinese characters as a writing system.

Transitional Period (1954~1963): State Reconstruction and Language Standardisation.

As a part of the post-Korean War national rehabilitation program, standardisation and codification of the language were made major goals of the language planning activities in this period.

***Munhwae* Period (1964~present): Principle of Self-reliance and Language Purism.**

As a part of *Juche* national policy, *Munhwae* was proclaimed as the North Korean standard language and a strong puristic movement characterised the language planning activities in this period.

Important political changes have provided turning points in language planning in North Korea. The year of independence, 1945, is taken as the starting point for North Korean language planning rather than 1948, when the North Korean government was officially proclaimed. The language was already subject to the control of different authorities in the North and the South from 1945, due to the separate disarmament of the regions by different allied forces. In the first period, the *Hangul* literacy movement and the demotion of Chinese characters were the major language planning activities in North Korea.

The year 1954, when national reconstruction programs were launched in earnest after the cease-fire of the Korean War, was another turning point in language planning. In this second period, efforts were made to settle irregularities in language usage and to create North Korea's own language regulations.

A further significant landmark in language planning in North Korea was raised by Kim Il Sung in two speeches in 1964 and 1966. These speeches were a part of a series of speeches on *Juche*: political independence and economic self-sufficiency in February 1963; military self-defence in October 1963; the whole concept of the *Juche* idea in April 1965; and the proclamation of 'Self-Reliance' in August 1966. Although the term, 'linguistic *Juche*' and the title for the North Korean standard language, *Munhwae*, were introduced in the 1966 speech, I take the 1964 speech as the starting point of the '*Juche* Language Period'. This is because the ideas about the self-reliant development of language were clearly articulated in the 1964 speech, and the 1966 speech was a re-emphasis of this. The announcement of *Munhwae* was a way of executing a *Juche* language policy, and was a part of macro policy in North Korea, reforming the country as a *Juche* state. Since Kim's 1964 speech, the national language was highlighted as an indispensable tool for establishing national *Juche* and the most important symbol of national identity. Language purism and language nationalism, removing foreign language elements and relying on native linguistic resources in order to make the language embody the spirit of self-reliance and to enhance national pride, were major elements of language planning in the this period.

In the following chapters, language planning in North Korea is discussed through three phases, Preparation (1945~1953), Transitional (1954~1963) and *Munhwae* period (1964~present), during which important questions about the form and function of language were addressed.

Chapter 2

Language Planning in North Korea (1945~1963)

North Korea has made official, sustained and conscious efforts to alter the function and the form of language. The communist regime, from its inception, appreciated the socio-political value of language as an indispensable medium for shaping, representing and implementing Party policy. Language planning was thus dictated by objectives of national politics and socialist state building. The Korean language, a hammer and sickle for the formation of North Korea and a medium to express the national identity, has changed in an unprecedentedly systematic way over a short period.

This chapter discusses the Preparation period (1945~1953) and the Transitional period (1954~1963) of language planning in North Korea. In the Preparation period, the literacy campaign in indigenous script and the abolition of Chinese characters in writing Korean are mainly dealt with. These are discussed as a part of an authentication scheme of promoting Korean to the national language, reflecting the changed status of the nation from a colonised to an independent nation. Activities carried out for the standardisation of language including orthographic revision, dictionary compilation and vocabulary management, are also examined. The overall planning activities in the Preparation period are presented as an act of laying the basis of state building. Discussion of the Transitional period of language planning is focused on its transitional nature in overcoming the devastation of the Korean War, and advancing toward the self-reliant status of planning in the *Munhwae* period (1964~present). Planning activities such as orthographic revision, dictionary compilation and vocabulary management are discussed. The issue of standard language is given special importance, as it foretells the second stage of status planning taking place in the next period of language planning, namely the designation of the new standard language as *Munhwae* (Cultured Language).

2.1 The Preparation Period (1945~1953): Independence and Democratisation of Language

The major status planning activity in this period was the officialisation of the Korean script, which was one of the most significant status planning actions in the history of the Korean language. Efforts were also made to increase literacy in the Korean script and to abolish Chinese characters as a mode of written language. These were aimed to rectify problems resulting from the language policies of the Cosen dynasty and the Japanese colonial government and to increase the new regime's capacity to manage and mobilise the people. The codification of the language, including standardisation of language rules, vocabulary management and dictionary compilation, was also carried out. Language standardisation, however, was not a main concern, since the elimination of illiteracy was the primary task of this period.

2.1.1 The Literacy Campaign

Immediately after independence in 1945, the elimination of illiteracy was an urgent task faced by regimes in both the North and the South. Illiterates numbered about 2,300,000, or one third of the population in the North (Choy Ceng-Hwu 1983: 152), while 78 percent of the population aged above 12 were illiterate in the South (Hoe Man-Gil 1994: 52). The high rate of illiteracy was a legacy of pre-modern Korea, which had excluded the common people from the world of written language and also of Japanese colonial language policy, which had made Japanese the official language of the colony. Elimination of illiteracy was made a national goal by the communist regime, and in less than four years after independence, the regime claimed to have achieved almost 100 percent literacy throughout the country.

Literacy movement in rural areas was considered most important because the illiterate population was mostly concentrated in these areas. In November 1946, the Preliminary People's Committee adopted an intensive literacy plan, the 'Winter Illiteracy Eradication Movement in Rural Areas', which was to be conducted over the four months from December 1947 to March 1948. Official organs were directed to act as driving forces for the project and the education board was to be the supplier of textbooks and school equipment. Men and women between the 12 and 50 age group

were required to participate in the project compulsorily (Taylyukyenkwuso 1990 vol.4: 146). In December 1947, the People's Committee decided to implement another literacy campaign aiming at the total elimination of illiteracy by 1949. It was claimed that full national literacy was achieved from this campaign, which was run in rural areas over the four months from December 1948 to March 1949 (Choy Ceng-Hwu 1983: 158).

The entire literacy movement was organised and controlled by political organs. The North Korean People's Committee (initially, the North Korean Preliminary People's Committee) was at the centre, while People's Committees were concerned with the lower administrative levels. The entire population was mobilised either as literacy teachers or as students. The Youth Organisation, the Women's League and the Peasant's League were all called on to participate in this national movement. College students and teachers were mobilised as literacy teachers to teach in adult schools at night, and were dispatched all over the country during the vacation. Apart from formal educational bodies, special institutions were established for the spread of *Hangul*, such as *Sengin hakkyo* (Adult Schools). Adult night schools were formed at each workplace for factory workers, while the teaching of peasants was concentrated in winter, the peasants' slack season (Choy Ceng-Hwu 1983: 151-159). These efforts brought a sharp increase in adult schools: from 8,000 in 1945 to 40,000 by 1947 (Co Kyeng-Im 1991: 248).

It is very likely that there was a gap between the actual results of the program and those reported. The North Korean claim for the total eradication of illiteracy in less than four years, however, reveals the fact that the literacy campaign was considered an urgent national task for laying the basis for the construction of a socialist state. The aims, the methods and the outcomes were all thoroughly controlled by the regime which intended to exploit mass literacy as a tool for presenting the state ideology to the people and for mobilising the people for socialist state building. The literacy campaign, therefore, was not carried out alone, but in close connection with ideological education. In November 1946, *Kenkwuksasang chongtongwen wuntong* (The Movement for Total Ideological Mobilisation for Founding the Nation) was launched, the purpose of which was to wake the people from the obsolete thoughts and customs of the Cosen dynasty and the colonial period, to remould their thought and to provide an ideological impetus to the literacy campaign (Choy Ceng-Hwu 1983: 153).

The strong emphasis on mass literacy was a part of the communist tradition. Lenin maintained that "An illiterate person is outside politics and he has to be taught his ABC. Without this, there can be no politics" (Lenin 1918 cited in Lewis 1983: 313) and launched an illiteracy eradication movement. It is also claimed that Kim Il Sung emphasised Korean literacy from his anti-Japanese guerrilla days by saying that "Without learning we can not reach the lofty summit of Marxism-Leninism. Guerrilla soldiers should learn while fighting. The first step is to learn how to write our language" (S.K.C. 1973: 40 cited in Co Kyeng-Im 1991: 245).

The passionate drive for mass literacy was urged on by nationalistic and socialist goals. The nationalistic goal was fulfilled by restoring the right of the Korean people to use their own language. *Hangul* had been subordinate to Chinese characters in pre-modern Korea and to the Japanese language in the colonial period. After independence, the Korean language became a symbol of restored national independence and a source of national pride. From the socialist perspective, mass literacy was a way to preach socialist ideology to the people and to expedite the implementation of Party's policy for state building.

In addition, much weight was placed on the Russian language. In December 1946, the Preliminary People's Committee made a decision to establish Russian language training schools for translators in major cities including Pyongyang (Taylyukyenkwuso 1990, vol.4: 149). By 1948, the study of Russian was made compulsory at the middle school and all upper level officials were required to be fluent in Russian (Oliver 1993: 191).

2.1.2 Abolition of Chinese Characters in Written Korean

Chinese characters had enjoyed an undisturbed authority as the official written language of the Cosen bureaucracy. The supremacy of Chinese characters had not been challenged by the creation of *Hangul*, but instead a new hierarchy of writing systems developed: orthodox Chinese writing at the top, followed by the mixed style of *Hangul* and Chinese, and the unmixd pure *Hangul* at the bottom.

Immediately after independence, the process of eliminating Chinese characters began by promoting a *Hangul* only policy through newspapers, magazines and radio.

Preferences for writing in Chinese characters were condemned as obsolete and reactionary, and thus should be discontinued. The exclusive use of *Hangul* was first introduced in publications for the younger generation, workers and peasants. Around early 1947, newspapers and magazines as well as school text books began to carry articles in *Hangul* only and by 1948, Chinese characters had disappeared from school textbooks. In general publications, they were banned in early 1949 when popular literacy in *Hangul* reached saturation point (Choy Ceng-Hwu 1983: 162-164), although they were maintained for scientific and technical terms, and for personal and place names. These exceptions were written in both *Hangul* and Chinese characters, although the latter was presented in parentheses (Kumatani 1990: 92-93). With these policies, the exclusive use of the indigenous Korean writing system, *Hangul*, was formally implemented, which was an unprecedented event in the history of written Korean.

Seen from the perspectives of utilitarianism and revolutionary ideals, the decision to remove Chinese characters in writing Korean was probably the optimum choice from among the possibilities which policy makers of North Korean language planning could take.¹ Firstly, the achievement of converting 2,300,000 illiterates into literates in a period of less than 4 years would have been unrealistic if the pattern of literacy had been other than pure *Hangul*. Popular literacy in a form involving Chinese characters would certainly take an incomparably longer period to introduce. This is because *Hangul* is a syllabary with a limited number of symbols, while a large number of Chinese characters is needed for even basic literacy. In terms of learning the system, *Hangul*, therefore, had a great advantage over the more complex system involving Chinese characters (Coulmas 1989: 115-122). By selecting *Hangul* as a literacy code, the communist regime could spare time and effort while, at the same time, quickly establishing a material basis for effective communication with the people.

Secondly, the regime could fulfill nationalistic and socialist goals by abolishing Chinese characters in writing Korean. Chinese characters were not only foreign in origin, but

¹ With the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese themselves pursued writing reform in earnest to lessen the difficulty of learning Chinese characters. Mao, in his book, *On New Democracy* (1943), argued for the Latinisation of the Chinese writing system for the benefit of promoting literacy and modernisation (Kim Hyong-Kyu 1968: 124-129). The reform policy of the Chinese communist regime mainly included the standardisation and simplification of Chinese characters, the creation of a Romanised orthography and the nationwide promotion of the standard language (Coulmas 1989: 244-248).

also had continued to be foreign to most Korean people, except for a handful of literati. This foreign writing system served as a mechanism for the elites to perpetuate its power over the people, because literacy in Chinese was the main source of their authority. The entrenchment of privilege through a foreign writing system was a conspiracy for the revolutionary era in which allegedly no oppressor and oppressed existed. By discontinuing the established foreign writing system, and by democratising written language with the switch to the indigenous system, the regime could effectively manifest newly-won national independence and display their socialist achievement.

The digraphic pattern in writing Korean, with the Chinese system consistently taking the high form and the several different indigenous systems at different times serving the low form, was finally dissolved by the North Korean regime. With this decision, North Korea severed a link from the past in terms of writing practice. The decision, at the same time, drew a symbolic line on the 38th Parallel, differentiating the language practice of the North from the South where the mixed writing convention of Korean and Chinese was and still is in use.²

2.1.3 Language Standardisation

The official recognition of *Hangul* as the language of the government, education and cultural activities required standardisation to serve multiple and complex communicative needs. Efforts were made to codify language rules in grammar books and dictionaries, and to develop new terminologies.

An important project launched in this period, which would be a lasting issue in North Korean language planning, was the language purification movement. Words and phrases adopted from Chinese were planned to be either discarded or nativised. Japanese style Chinese words which had flooded into the Korean language during the colonial period were also the object of the movement.

Nativisation of loan words was regarded as a way to decrease the confusion which

² For a brief period from 1957 to 1964 and from 1970 to 1972, the South Korean government adopted a *Hangul* only policy. However, it was fiercely opposed by the public and the media, and was soon replaced with mixed writing of using both Korean and Chinese (Kim Chin-W. 1978: 247).

resulted from the elimination of Chinese characters, since the prohibition of Chinese characters created a large number of homonyms which could no longer be disambiguated by the writing system. There were many cases where words written as different Chinese characters were represented in one form in *Hangul*. For example:

Chinese Character	Korean Script	Gloss
便	편 (<i>phyen</i>)	side, part, direction
編	편 (<i>phyen</i>)	compilation
篇	편 (<i>phyen</i>)	volume, chapter

When Chinese characters were used, it was possible to disambiguate these words by their form, but in *Hangul* the potential ambiguity increased greatly. At the same time, the nativisation campaign required lexical intellectualisation of the Korean language, as scientific and political terms were usually of Chinese or Japanese origin. To this end, in February 1949, the Academic Terms Decision Committee was established in the Department of Education. In the Committee, 18 sub-committees for developing technical terms and one sub-committee for deciding a list of essential Chinese characters were organised. Compulsory implementation of the results of the Committees' work was ordered by the Cabinet for all educational and publication bodies (Taylyukyenkwuso 1990, vol.4: 185).

However, the language purification movement does not seem to have been carried out successfully in the Preparation period. Concrete results of the Academic Terms Decision Committee was not reported (Kumatani 1990: 93, 96), and even in 1956 there was an indication that "since our [North Korean] publications are like Chinese writings with postpositions only in Korean, our decisions and directions are too difficult to understand" (Lee Yun-Phyo 1991: 39).

North Korea proclaimed its first separate language rules in January 1948 when the literacy campaign was in full swing. The first North Korean language prescription called *Cosene sinchelcapep* (New Korean Orthography) was a revision of the *Hangul macchwumpep thongilan* (Unified Plan) of 1933 issued during the colonial occupation.

The most distinctive change made in the 'New Korean Orthography' was the adoption of new six graphemes – △, ㅍ, ㅑ, ㅓ, ㅕ, ㅗ. In Korean, some irregularly declined words either lose their final consonants or change into another sound depending on the

following phonetic environment (Kumatati 1990: 93-94). The graphemes were devised to be used as final consonants in such cases, in order to maintain morphophonemic consistency regardless of sound change.

Stem (meaning)	Base Form '-ta'	Inflection '-nikka'		
놀 <i>nol</i> (play)	놀다 <i>nolta</i>	/nol/ root + /nikka/	->	/nonikka/ (l -> Ø)
걸 <i>ket</i> (walk)	걸다 <i>ketta</i>	/ket/ root+ /nikka/	->	/kelunikka/ (t -> l)

In applying the new graphemes, the above words, 놀다 and 걷다 are represented as

놀다 and 걷다

Judging from the fact that the new letters did not have wide currency, and that only some of the other changes introduced in the 'New Korean Orthography' were used (Ko Yong-Kun 1989: 191), it is quite certain that the 'New Korean Orthography' was not forcibly implemented. This incomplete implementation, accordingly, led to a dual system of prescriptive grammars: the 'Unified Plan' and the 'New Korean Orthography'. This seems to be the reason why most South Korean linguists, who periodise North Korean language planning by orthographic change, do not regard the 'New Korean Orthography' as a separate period. They assume that the 'Unified Plan' continued to be in full force until a new language prescription named *Cosene chelcapep* (Korean Orthography) was introduced in 1954. Moreover, the 'New Korean Orthography' movement seems to have been swept under the carpet, and official discussions of the development of language prescriptions in North Korea ignored the 'New Korean Orthography'. For example, the preface to the 'Korean Orthography' of 1954 recognised the 'Unified Plan' as the standard language prescription before 1954. The same attitude is seen in *Cosenehakkaylon* (*An Introduction to Korean Linguistics*, Choy Ceng-Hwu 1983), which excluded the 'New Korean Orthography' in the history of North Korean language prescriptions. In his 1964 speech Kim Il Sung blamed the linguists who had introduced the new letters in the 'New Korean Orthography' for "erasing the common national characteristics, [which would eventually] split the nation" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 14).

One of the changes adopted in the 'New Korean Orthography' was the introduction of the word-initials, /l/ and /n/ (when followed by diphthongs) in writing and pronouncing words of Chinese origin. In Sino-Korean word, the use of the sounds, /l/ and /n/ (when followed by diphthongs) varies, depending on in which position they occur: in the

word-initial position, /l/ is written and pronounced as n, while /n/ (when followed by diphthongs) is omitted. The prescription for the word-initials, /l/ and /n/ was introduced to prevent this morphophonemic inconsistency, as was the rationale for the adoption of the six new letters (Ko Yong-Kun 1989: 177).

Sound (meaning)	In Other Positions (meaning)	In the Word-Initial Position (meaning)
로 老 /lo/	경로 敬老 /kyenglo/	노인 老人 / <u>n</u> oin/ (l → n)
(old)	(respect for the aged)	(old person)
녀 女 / <u>n</u> ye/	자녀 子女 /ca <u>n</u> ye/	여자 女子 /yeca/ (n → ∅)
(woman)	(sons and daughters)	(woman)

In applying the new prescription, the traditional and South Korean spelling, 노인 /noin/ was now to be written as 로인 /loin/ and 여자 /yeca/ as 녀자 /nye-ca/. This prescription has become one of the most distinctive features of the North Korean standard language, sounding strikingly different to South Koreans, whose prescriptive grammar proscribes the use of the word-initials, /l/ and /n/ (when followed by diphthongs) in writing and pronouncing Sino-Korean words.

The 'New Korean Orthography' promulgated 42 letters (19 consonants, 17 vowels and 6 new graphemes), instead of 24 (14 consonants and 10 vowels) as in the 'Unified Plan', since it recognised five double consonants, seven diphthongs and the new six graphemes as basic letter forms. Details of the change in the Korean alphabet system are presented later in this chapter, when another orthographic revision in the Transitional period of language planning is dealt with.

A Cabinet meeting held in October 1948, immediately after the establishment of the North Korean government in September 1948, directed a compilation of a Korean language dictionary, with the purpose of constructing a new national culture. The dictionary compilation was prompted by practical and ideological reasons. First, although there were numerous dictionaries in Chinese characters, there were a very limited number of Korean language dictionaries and this resulted in wide dialectal and spelling variations. Second, under North Korean language and education policies, reference works on the language, such as dictionaries and prescriptive grammars, came to be needed for mass education and language standardisation. Third, the compilation

of a Korean language dictionary could symbolically display a restored national independence and the achievements of the regime. This was especially so, due to the experience of Japanese colonial policy which had attempted to extinguish Korean national identity by suppressing the language. The Japanese jailed and tortured Korean scholars who prepared a *Hangul* dictionary, which intensified the symbolic status of *Hangul* as a marker of Korean identity.

The *Phyocwunmal macchwumpepsacen* (Standard Language Orthography Dictionary) was published in March 1947 with the purpose of 'solidifying the basis of the Korean culture' (Introduction to the dictionary). Another dictionary, the *Cosenesacen* (Korean Dictionary), was compiled in October 1949. The entries in these dictionaries did not show great differences from those of South Korea of the time (Cha Cay-Un 1991: 189-192), since these were compiled before the beginning of systematic language engineering in the *Munhwae* period (1964~present). In addition, a Russian and Korean bilingual dictionary, *Rocosacen* (Russian-Korean Dictionary) was published in 1954. This dictionary was indicative of the importance of relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union.

After the initiation of the movement to abolish Chinese characters, the development of the 'New Korean Orthography', the compilation of the 'Korean Dictionary' and the purification movement, further implementation of language planning activities was temporarily halted by the Korean War in 1950. The emergency situation and the survival of the community occupied the entire human and material resources of North Korea during the war, which left the country ravaged. The war also created an intense animosity towards South Korea and the United States.

2.2 The Transitional Period (1954~1963): State Reconstruction and Language Standardisation

Language planning became an integral part of the comprehensive national rehabilitation programs after the cease-fire of the Korean War in July 1953. Language was emphasised as an indispensable instrument for carrying out state reconstruction under the post-war slogan 'to mobilise everything for economic reconstruction [of the socialist fatherland]' (Preface to the 'Korean Orthography' of 1954). Standardisation

was made a major goal of language planning in this period, due to wide spread confusion in language practices after the war. Codification and implementation were emphasised as immediate tasks for North Korean linguists. Shin Kwu-Hyun stressed the importance of codification on the grounds that establishment of a grammar and compilation of a dictionary played a pivotal role in enhancing the social function of language as a cultural weapon (Cha Cay-Un 1991: 193). The standardisation process began with the proclamation of North Korea's second revision of prescriptive rules, the 'Korean Orthography' of 1954. This was also the year that the post-war economic reconstruction program was actively embarked on, with the commencement of the Three Year Economic Rehabilitation and Development Plan (1954~1956) and the establishment of experimental collective farms. The 'Korean Orthography' was followed by *Oylaye phyokipep* (Writing Loan Words) of 1956 and 1958, which consisted of rules about Romanisation of Korean and Koreanisation of foreign languages, *Cosenmal sacen* (Korean Dictionary) of 1960~1962, and *Cosene munpep 1* (Korean Language Grammar 1) of 1960. This period was also the seminal stage in the development of the North Korean standard language, *Munhwae*.

2.2.1 Standardisation

2.2.1.1 Revision of Orthographic Rules

In September 1954, North Korea proclaimed a revised language prescription, named *Cosene chelcapep* (Korean Orthography), to remove irregularities in spelling Korean and to incorporate changes in pronunciation, grammar and vocabulary. This new orthography was claimed by North Korean linguists as the first set of popular language rules based on the language of the proletariat and developed under the guidance of Kim Il Sung. It is also considered to have contributed greatly to the establishment of the unified language rules which would finally be realised in the *Cosenmal kyupemcip* (Korean Language Prescription) of 1966 (Choy Ceng-Hwu 1983: 187-188). Most South Korean linguists regard the changes as minor, but consider them as the beginning of divergence in language prescriptions between the two Koreas.

A noticeable change in the revised orthographic rules was the elimination of the six new letters which had been introduced by the 'New Korean Orthography' in 1948. This

elimination, in fact, increased the similarity between the 'Korean Orthography' and the 'Unified Plan' of 1933. This might be one reason why South Korean linguists treat the changes made by the 'Korean Orthography' lightly. Nevertheless, the 'Korean Orthography' maintained some changes introduced by the 'New Korean Orthography', such as the prescription of word-initials, /l/ and /n/ (when followed by diphthongs) in writing and pronouncing Sino-Korean words. It also preserved double consonants and diphthongs as basic letter forms. Four additional diphthongs were recognised as basic letter forms and the names of some letters were slightly changed in this revision. With this adjustment, the instability in the Korean alphabet system in North Korea was finally settled, and the system was to be retained in the orthographic revisions of 1966 and 1987. The Korean script which was finally settled in this revision is given below, in comparison with its two predecessors.

	Unified Plan (1933)	New Korean Orthography (1948)	Korean Orthography (1954)
	Basic Letters and Names	Basic Letters and Names	Basic Letters and Names
Consonants	ㄱ <i>kiyek</i>	ㄱ <i>kiuk (ku)</i>	ㄱ <i>kiuk (ku)</i>
	ㄴ <i>niun</i>	ㄴ <i>niun (nu)</i>	ㄴ <i>niun (nu)</i>
	ㄷ <i>tikut</i>	ㄷ <i>tiut (tu)</i>	ㄷ <i>tiut (tu)</i>
	ㄹ <i>liul</i>	ㄹ <i>liul (lu)</i>	ㄹ <i>liul (lu)</i>
	ㅁ <i>mium</i>	ㅁ <i>mium (mu)</i>	ㅁ <i>mium (mu)</i>
	ㅂ <i>piup</i>	ㅂ <i>piup (pu)</i>	ㅂ <i>piup (pu)</i>
	ㅅ <i>sios</i>	ㅅ <i>sios (su)</i>	ㅅ <i>sios (su)</i>
	ㅇ <i>iung</i>	ㅇ <i>iung (u)</i>	ㅇ <i>iung (u)</i>
	ㅈ <i>ciuc</i>	ㅈ <i>ciuc (cu)</i>	ㅈ <i>ciuc (cu)</i>
	ㅊ <i>chiuch</i>	ㅊ <i>chiuch (chu)</i>	ㅊ <i>chiuch (chu)</i>
	ㅋ <i>khiukh</i>	ㅋ <i>khiukh (khu)</i>	ㅋ <i>khiukh (khu)</i>
	ㅌ <i>thiuth</i>	ㅌ <i>thiuth (thu)</i>	ㅌ <i>thiuth (thu)</i>
	ㅍ <i>phiuph</i>	ㅍ <i>phiuph (phu)</i>	ㅍ <i>phiuph (phu)</i>
	ㅎ <i>hiuh</i>	ㅎ <i>hiuh (hu)</i>	ㅎ <i>hiuh (hu)</i>
Double		ㄲ <i>kkiukk (kku)</i>	ㄲ <i>toynkiuk (kku)</i>
Consonants		ㄴㄴ <i>ttiutt (ttu)</i>	ㄴㄴ <i>toyntiut (ttu)</i>
		ㅃ <i>ppiupp (ppu)</i>	ㅃ <i>toynpiup (ppu)</i>
		ㅆ <i>ssiuss (ssu)</i>	ㅆ <i>toynsius (ssu)</i>
		ㅈㅈ <i>cciucc (ccu)</i>	ㅈㅈ <i>toynciuc (ccu)</i>

	Unified Plan (1933)	New Korean Orthography (1948)	Korean Orthography (1954)
	Basic Letters and Names	Basic Letters and Names	Basic Letters and Names
Additional Graphemes	△ ○ ㅏ ㅑ ㅓ ㅕ ㅣ		
Vowels	ㅏ <i>a</i> ㅑ <i>ya</i> ㅓ <i>e</i> ㅕ <i>ye</i> ㅗ <i>o</i> ㅛ <i>yo</i> ㅜ <i>wu</i> ㅠ <i>yu</i> ㅡ <i>u</i> ㅣ <i>I</i>	ㅏ <i>a</i> ㅑ <i>ya</i> ㅓ <i>e</i> ㅕ <i>ye</i> ㅗ <i>o</i> ㅛ <i>yo</i> ㅜ <i>wu</i> ㅠ <i>yu</i> ㅡ <i>u</i> ㅣ <i>I</i>	ㅏ <i>a</i> ㅑ <i>ya</i> ㅓ <i>e</i> ㅕ <i>ye</i> ㅗ <i>o</i> ㅛ <i>yo</i> ㅜ <i>wu</i> ㅠ <i>yu</i> ㅡ <i>u</i> ㅣ <i>I</i>
Diphthongs		ㅏㅑ <i>ay</i> ㅑㅑ <i>yay</i> ㅓㅑ <i>ey</i> ㅕㅑ <i>yey</i> ㅗㅑ <i>oy</i> ㅜㅑ <i>wi</i> ㅡㅑ <i>uy</i>	ㅏㅑ <i>ay</i> ㅑㅑ <i>yay</i> ㅓㅑ <i>eu</i> ㅕㅑ <i>yey</i> ㅗㅑ <i>oy</i> ㅜㅑ <i>wi</i> ㅡㅑ <i>uy</i> ㅏㅑ <i>wa</i> ㅓㅑ <i>we</i> ㅕㅑ <i>way</i> ㅓㅑ <i>wey</i>
Number of Characters	24	42	40

2.2.1.2 Dictionary Compilation

Several dictionaries were published in the Transitional period: *Cosene sosacen* (Concise Korean Dictionary) and *Cosenechelcapepsacen* (Korean Orthography Dictionary) in 1956, a series of *Cosenmalsacen* (Korean Dictionary) from 1960 to 1962, *Sayokphyen* (New Dictionary of Chinese Characters) in 1963 and *Loeswukesacen* (Russian Phrase Dictionary) in 1955. The 'Korean Orthography' of 1954 and the 'Rules about Romanisation of Korean and Koreanisation of Foreign Languages' were used in these dictionaries. In the following, two of the national language dictionaries, the 'Concise Korean Dictionary' and the 'Korean Dictionary' are examined.

The 'Concise Korean Dictionary' was the first North Korean language dictionary to adopt North Korea's own language rules as distinct from those of South Korea. The dictionary was compiled with two purposes. The first was to codify the standard forms of the language by providing prescriptive rules for orthography, pronunciation, and the formation and usage of words. The second was to codify words which had been developed over a decade of state building. These included newly introduced words, among which socio-political terms relating to the communist system were specially emphasised. Some examples of these words are: 로동당 *lotongtang* (workers' party), 인민군대 *inminkwuntay* (people's army), 인민전선 *inmincensen* (people's front), 인민경제 *inminkyengcey* (people's economy), 인민해방전쟁 *inminhaypang-cencayng* (people's liberation war) and 쏘베트 *ssopeythu* (Soviet). There were also words which already existed, but underwent semantic changes, and whose meanings diverged from their South Korean counterparts. For example, 자본가 *caponka* (capitalist) was explained as "the ringleader of the ruling class in a bourgeois society, the owner of capital exploiting and betraying workers' labour and the enemy of democracy" (Concise Korean Dictionary 1956: 380).

In an effort to highlight vocabulary change under the communist regime, the dictionary excluded words, or some meanings of a word, which were regarded as inconsistent with the ideals of the regime. When these words were selected as entries, notes were added to restrict their use: for example, *kwanlyo thongchihaeyse* 'under bureaucratic rule'; *nalkun sahoyeyse* 'in the old society'; *misincek kyenhayeyse* 'from a superstitious viewpoint'; *pongken sahoyeyse* 'in the feudalistic society'; and *kyeykupsahoyeyse* 'in a

hierarchical society', etc. For instance, 하인 'hain' (servant) was explained as "an errand person or a lowly person" (Concise Korean Dictionary 1956: 524) with the note of 'in a hierarchical society'. The exclusion or labelling of words was a way of manipulating language, rejecting or marking words whose meanings were negatively projected in North Korea. It was claimed in the preface of the dictionary that the selection and explanation of words were based on Marxism-Leninism.

The overall content of the dictionary, however, showed no great differences from those of Seoul-centred standard language dictionaries (Co Cay-Swu 1986: 20-21), although the language planning authorities were trying to modify the form of language following their own rules and ideas of language. Chinese characters were still used for some Sino-Korean words, though in parentheses and only if clear understanding of these words were not guaranteed without Chinese characters. When marking the origin of non-Chinese loan words, a general term, *oylay* (foreign origin) was added, instead of indicating the origin specifically.

The 'Korean Dictionary' was an enlarged version of the 'Concise Korean Dictionary', which incorporated only an essential part of the language, especially focusing on new terms. The aim of the 'Korean Dictionary' was to make a comprehensive language dictionary, so that a wide range of words were included as entries, detailed explanations were given and word origins were specified.

Dictionary entries covered a broad range of words from 15th to 19th century classical literature, old-fashioned and archaic words, dialect and modern Korean words. Above all, socio-political and technical terms were listed in quantity and were explained in detail with the purpose of codifying changes in the vocabulary system under the rapid technical and cultural revolution in North Korea. Words which began to be used in South Korea after independence were also chosen as entries, if these appeared frequently in North Korean publications. This was done for the purpose of laying the basis for the unified development of the Korean language. In addition, there was considerable change in the treatment of loan words. Word origin was not only specified, but foreign scripts were provided: Chinese characters for most entries of Chinese origin; Cyrillic script for those of Slavic origin; and Latin script for those of other loan words. The separate treatment of Russian words reflect the special place of the Soviet Union in North Korea at that time.

The practice of adding special notes, which was introduced in the 'Concise Korean Dictionary', was maintained. Some examples are: *koyloy thongchi hauy nampanpueyse* 'in the southern part under the puppet government'; *nalkun sahoeyse* 'in the obsolete society'; *pongken sahoeyse* 'in the feudalistic society'; and *haypang ceney* 'before liberation'.

However, the comprehensiveness of the 'Korean Dictionary' itself became a target of criticism shortly after the completion of all volumes in 1962.³ Kim Il Sung, referring to the large number of words adopted from Chinese, commented that "it [the 'Korean Dictionary'] looks like a dictionary of Chinese ideographs. From now on, dictionaries should not be compiled in this way" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 23). In this speech, he went on to say that in future dictionary compilation, the principle of linguistic 'self-reliance' should be followed, by rejecting foreign words as far as possible and replacing them with native words.

2.2.1.3 Vocabulary Management

In the Transitional period, North Korea actively launched a renewed language purification movement. The main targets of the movement remained the same as in the Preparation period, namely nativising difficult Sino-Korean words and Japanese words, among which many were technical and academic terms. Language purification was pursued in parallel with the movement toward lexical unification of the written and spoken language. The nativisation campaign was promoted as a way to linguistic democratisation for the equal participation of the public in language activity, by enhancing the simplicity and clearness of words and expressions (Kumatani 1990: 96).

Since 1956, several articles on vocabulary management had been published. In 1956 Choy Hyen proposed an organised nativisation campaign contrasting Sino-Korean words and their native equivalents (Choy Yun-Kap 1993: 262-265). In 1959, the Academic Terms Decision Committee, which was organised in the Preparation period, published revised academic words for educational purposes (Ceng Kyeng-Il 1989: 41).

³ Work on the dictionary began in 1957. The first volume was produced in August 1960 and the dictionary was finally completed in November 1962. The dictionary appeared in 6 volumes containing 187,137 entries.

A linguistics journal, *Cosenemun*, carried a special column devoted to language purification which showcased refined words and expressions.

At the same time, the notion of *inminseng* (the principle of the people) began to be incorporated into the language purification movement. *Inminseng* urged the codification of commonly used, easily understood and quickly accepted words in lieu of difficult loan words.

The nativisation movement undertaken in the Transitional period seems to have achieved a positive result. According to Pak Cong-Tay, the standard language was augmented by native Korean words as a result of eliminating Sino-Korean words and other loan words. Lyu Lyel stated that the language had reached its highest developmental stage in the unification of writing and speaking, as a result of the nativisation movement (Lee Yun-Phyo 1991: 40).

However, the language purification movement in the Transitional period does not seem to have been planned and implemented in a systematic way, but rather in a sporadic manner. Individual linguists presented their ideas on the direction of language purification through journals. It was not until the *Munhwae* period that the purification movement began to be organised in a top-down centralised way and implemented in close connection with ideology, education and mass media.

2.2.2 Discussions on the Standard Language

The Transitional period was a seminal stage in the development of the North Korean standard language. Efforts were continuously made to define its nature and criteria. In the early part of this period, discussions of the standard language mainly involved the establishment of unified language prescriptions in orthography and pronunciation. Although North Korean linguists emphasised the significance of standardisation, they did not clarify which variety of the Korean language they regarded as the basis of the North Korean standard language. The discussions were not yet imbued with the ideological standpoint of the North Korean regime, which claimed historical legitimacy for the North Korean standard language over its South Korean counterpart.

From 1961, the North Korean standard language was promoted as the most advanced form of the national language, on the grounds that it consisted of the most refined rules and excellent elements of the language of Korea (Song Na-Li 1991: 62-63). An implicit assumption in the argument was that the standard language of North Korea was more developed and more refined than that of South Korea. To support this claim, the study of the language situation in South Korea was set as an important task for North Korean linguists (Lee Sang-Hyek 1991: 18-19), although the study was categorically limited to making criticisms of the South Korean language. These developments indicated that the language began to be perceived by North Korea as another field of competition for supremacy and legitimacy with South Korea.

In 1963, the term, *munhwaseng* (cultured nature or attitude) was introduced as an element in the North Korean standard language. It was proposed that the standard language was the most important instrument for cultivating a cultured attitude in speaking and writing, since it consisted of the most refined, easy and common linguistic elements (Song Na-Li 1991: 63). The term, *munhwaseng* evolved as a core symbol of the socialist language of North Korea, and finally crystallised into *Munhwae* (Cultured Language), the name given to the North Korean standard language by Kim Il Sung in 1966. *Munhwae* marked a clear separation from the established Seoul-based standard language, *Phyocwune* (Standard Language). From this point on, North Korean language planning has been driven by stronger puristic and nationalistic forces than before, resulting in considerable language divergence between the two Koreas.

The transitional features of this period in the formation of the North Korean standard language are also seen in the criteria used to define the standard language. In the 'Korean Orthography' of 1954, the North Korean standard language was defined as 'modern speech most commonly spoken by Koreans' (Preface to the 'Korean Orthography') in which only 'commonness' is mentioned as the criterion for the standard language. Neither locality nor class basis was specified. This broad definition was in contrast to the 'Unified Plan' of 1933, in which the standard language was defined as 'modern speech of the middle class in Seoul' (Hangulhakhoy 1989), and which North Korea had recognised as prescriptions of the standard language until 1954. It was also in contrast to the reference point for *Munhwae* in the third period, whose locality and class basis were clearly specified as the language of workers and revolutionaries in Pyongyang. The broad criterion for the standard language in this

period seems to reflect the transitional nature of North Korean language planning in the immediate post-war era. On the one hand, the reference point for the standard language in the 'Unified Plan' was irrelevant at a time when the prospect of national unification had become more remote than ever, due to the renewed and reinforced division of Korea after the cease-fire. On the other hand, reclaiming Seoul as the locality of the standard language would mean that the reference point for the North Korean language was in the enemy's territory, and this was not something acceptable to North Korea.⁴ As North Korea, however, had not yet established a new reference point for its standard language in its own territory, it seems to have found a temporary solution in this broad definition.

In sum, prompted by the independence of Korea from Japanese colonisation in 1945, and the establishment of socialist North Korea, important status planning activities for the Korean language were carried out during the Preparation period (1945~1953). Korean was restored as the national language in response to the nationalistic spirit of the time, thereby manifesting the newly-won independence. The mass literacy campaign in *Hangul* and the official elimination of Chinese characters in writing Korean, were thoroughly implemented to make Korean into a pure, fully-fledged, working national language. These movements were vigorously pursued, because of the regime's motivation to preach socialist ideology and to convey its policy to the people.

In the Transitional period (1954~1963), language planning activities were focused on the standardisation and codification of language prescriptions as a part of post-Korean War national reconstruction programs. The results of these efforts were seen in the orthographic revision, the publication of national language dictionaries and grammars, and in vocabulary management. This period was also seminal for the next stage of status planning in North Korean language planning: preparing for the designation of its own standard language as *Munhwae* during the third period. Language began to be clearly perceived by the North Korean regime as a field of competition for legitimacy with South Korea.

⁴ North Korea, however, kept Seoul as the constitutional capital, until it stipulated Pyongyang as its capital in the revised Socialist Constitution of 1972.

Chapter 3

The Munhwae Period (1964~present):

Formation of *Munhwae* and Lexical Development

Kim Il Sung's *kyosi* (the leader's speech)¹ on language policy in speeches of January 1964 and May 1966 are considered a landmark, opening a new period in the history of North Korean language planning. Most ideas in the *kyosi* were not new, and were a synthesis of what had been discussed by North Korean linguists. Due to the weight that *kyosi* had in North Korea, and the fact that these were major *kyosi* which dealt with various issues in language planning, these speeches have become the ultimate sources for language planning. Since the mid-1960s, all linguistic material published in North Korea has contained quotations from the *kyosi*, and linguists have not proposed their own ideas without referring to the *kyosi*. The ideas presented in the *kyosi* have also been seen as the sole educational thought on language, and have been systematically taught to students through the national language curriculum from the beginning of their schooling.

This chapter begins by reviewing Kim Il Sung's two *kyosi* as a source of rationale for the formation of the North Korean standard language, *Munhwae* (Cultured Language). The national language is highlighted as a pivot for the self-reliant development of language, and *Munhwae* is proposed as an embodiment of such language. Corpus planning activities for the standardisation of language are examined in the later part of the chapter. The focus is on vocabulary management which is at the heart of lexical purism, demonstrating the self-reliant spirit of this period of language planning. Orthographic reform and dictionary compilation are also discussed.

¹ *Kyosi*, the literal meaning of which is 'enlightened teaching', refers exclusively to Kim Il Sung's speeches on various national affairs, on which national policies should be based. It is printed in bold type in North Korean publication, indicating Kim's supremacy in the society and drawing readers' attention to his speeches.

3.1 Ideological Basis of *Munhwae*

3.1.1 Nationalism and *Munhwae*

In the 1960s, the idea of *Juche* was pronounced as a central ideological tenet in North Korea. Language was not an exception and Kim Il Sung urged the application of the *Juche* idea to North Korean language planning. A language filled with the *Juche* spirit should be nationalistic, socialistic and democratic, and it was proposed that such a language be called *Munhwae* (Cultured Language) (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 289). *Munhwae* was thought to function as a weapon for accelerating the attainment of a socialist victory.

Kim Il Sung was conscious of a possible contradiction that might arise from the two characteristics of *Munhwae*, namely, the nationalistic and socialist principles. From the socialist viewpoint, it can be argued that all people are comrades in the socialist revolution, so that a common language is required to unite their struggle against capitalism (Spiridobich in Kim Min-Swu 1985: 103). Kim admitted that one universal language would be necessary for the ultimate victory of socialism, but he appraised that the time was not yet ripe for developing such a language (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 15). The unit of revolution at this stage of socialist development was a nation-state and effort should be made to preserve and develop a national language properly²:

It goes without saying that we should not discard the national characteristics of our language too hastily, simply in order to bring its development into line with common world trends. ... our national ways should be preserved for the time being. It is wrong to see only what is universal while losing sight of what is national (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 15).

Kim also stated that the preservation of a nationalistic language was necessary, since language was used as a medium to expand a nation's influence over others. Imperialist countries had attempted to spread their languages to weaker countries, gradually deepening the degree of dependence of the latter on the former and eventually

² This idea, which had been put forward by Stalin in 1950 (Stalin 1965, vol.3), was known to the North Korean socialists and was emphasised strongly in North Korea in the 1960s.

encroaching on the national sovereignty of the weaker countries (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 284). Consequently, maintaining a national language was the way to preserve national independence and to guarantee the victory of socialist revolution in one nation.

The international political situation in the 1960s should also be considered in order to understand Kim's strong emphasis on nationalism in planning *Munhwae*. China was consolidating its position as a new power centre in the socialist block, challenging the dominance which the Soviet Union had exercised over other socialist countries. The fact that the Sino-Soviet disputes had developed from national interests of these countries rather than socialist ones led Kim to become disillusioned with the ideals of international socialism and made him realise the importance of nationalism. In addition, the conflicts between the two big socialist countries gave him favourable conditions to pursue an independent stance in managing the nation (Byun Dae-Ho 1990: 101-107). These factors spurred him to propose the principles of independence and self-reliance in constructing *Munhwae*.

3.1.2 Unification of Korea and *Munhwae*

In his 1964 speech, Kim Il Sung asserted that "Even though a people are all of the same stock and live on the same territory, they cannot be called a nation if they speak different languages" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 13). Using this linguistic viewpoint, he put forward a somewhat extreme argument that those countries under different political systems can be regarded as one nation in so far as they speak the same language (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 13) and applied this argument to the Korean situation. "Though our country is now split into north and south ... our nation is one", [because] "at present, Koreans both in the north and south speak the same language and use the same alphabet" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 13).

From this perspective, Kim Il Sung pointed out problems in the previous linguistic reforms in North Korea: the introduction of *yukcamo* (the six new graphemes) in the first orthographic reform and the abolition of teaching Chinese characters at school. Kim Twu-Pong, a linguist who had led the first orthographic reform, the 'New Korean Orthography' in the late 1940s, was blamed for disregarding the significant role of language in unifying the politically divided nation. According to Kim Il Sung, the

introduction of the new letters would have resulted in removing one of the common bonds between the two Koreas. Such an attempt to change the writing system before unification was viewed to hinder communication between the North and the South, and would eventually create two nations (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 13).

Kim Il Sung also instructed that the abolition of teaching Chinese characters at school should be reversed. This urge to reinstate Chinese characters was somewhat surprising, because the central trend of language planning in the previous periods had been to fully utilise native linguistic resources in order to remove foreign elements from the spoken and written language. Kim was aware of this inconsistency, and justified the change in terms of the urgency of maintaining a unity between the two Koreas. He maintained that in language planning, the fact that language was the binder of the divided nation should also be taken into account (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 15-16). "We must instruct students ... how to read and write them [Chinese characters]" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 293). This was because "[Chinese characters] appear in south Korean publications ... If we [North Koreans] are to make it possible for people to read them, it is necessary to teach a certain number of Chinese ideographs" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 294). Kim, however, instructed that Chinese characters should not be taught in national language classes and that they should not be used in school textbooks (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 294). Consequently, teaching Chinese characters was taken as a part of foreign language education.

The reintroduction of Chinese characters may have been prompted by practical needs, namely that there was a high proportion of Sino-Korean words in the Korean language and without knowing the Chinese characters, the meaning of some Korean words could be misunderstood. Though this point was not clearly mentioned in Kim Il Sung's two speeches, it is quite certain that he recognised the necessity of learning Chinese characters.³ The fact that South Korea still used Chinese characters, and the claim that it was necessary to maintain commonality with South Korea seem to have given Kim good excuses to bring about a shift in educational policy.

So far, we have seen Kim Il Sung's urge to make *Munhwae* nationalistic and his

³ The problems centring on Chinese characters had been discussed by North Korean linguists. For example, Kim Tong-Ho found that students had only limited knowledge of Sino-Korean words and had wrong understandings of the meanings of these words (Leyikko 1991: 272).

emphasis on the role of language as a binder of the split nation. From this, a question may be posed as to why, of the two Korean languages used in the Korean peninsula, North Korean, not South Korean, should be the basis for developing the national language. The answers Kim gave to this question show his ideas about the problems of the South Korean linguistic situation and the direction that *Munhwa* should take.

3.1.3 Critique of the South Korean Language and *Munhwae*

Kim Il Sung characterised the South Korean language as being corrupted by several foreign languages of powerful countries. Words which originated from Chinese, Japanese and English were mixed with everyday speech in South Korea to the extent that "[if these words were eliminated] there would be nothing left of our own language except grammatical particles such as *-ul* and *-lul*" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 284). He believed that this had brought about a dangerous situation in which "if it is left unchecked, our national language will be threatened with the danger of extinction" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 284).

Kim also made the point that the South Korean language was both anti-democratic and sexist. The South Korean language was considered anti-democratic because of the wide gap between the written and spoken language. In the Cosen dynasty, difficult Chinese characters were heavily used in the written language, and commoners did not have the opportunity to learn these properly. Kim claimed that this gap had widened since the establishment of the South Korean regime, with the privileged few adopting Chinese words which even the Chinese themselves did not use (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 284). The language of the South Korean workers and peasants was seen as having been oppressed, while a language adapted to the decadent tastes of landlords, capitalists and reactionary bureaucrats had been flourishing due to the dominance of the American life style. Corrupted expressions and sentimental ways of speaking were thought to be prevalent in the South (Lee Sang-Pyek 1975: 3, 8).

The South Korean language was thought to be sexist because it retained features which marked women as subordinate to men. It was claimed that women's ways of using language were conceived to be different from those of men and a strong emphasis was put on the way their speech was delivered. For instance, when speaking to men, South

Korean women were thought to use language in such a fashion as to be pleasant to men, so that a nasal voice quality used to flirt was favoured (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 31).

Having identified problems in the South Korean language, Kim Il Sung argued that the basis for the development of the national language should be the North Korean language (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 288). The language used in North Korea, however, could not be adopted without modification. It should be revised in accordance with the nationalistic, democratic and socialist goals of the state.

3.1.4 Directions for *Munhwae*

The first principle in developing *Munhwae* was that it should be nationalistic. A nationalistic language in this context was supposed to be a language thoroughly based on pure native words, free from foreign influences. Kim Il Sung argued that “We should not copy from the language of any other country” (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 22), because foreign words would ‘bastardise’ the North Korean language “to such a degree that it does not sound like our mother tongue and the national characteristics of our language [would] gradually disappear” (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 284). At first sight, Kim’s position vis-à-vis loan words seems to be very clear and puristic. However, his ideas could not be implemented directly in the actual process of *Munhwae* planning. There had been a constant inflow of words from foreign countries over a long period of time and such words were so integrated into the Korean language system that it was quite hard for Koreans to make a sentence without using loan words. Kim was also aware of this complexity when he said that “we cannot just abolish all the loan words in our language, for it is impossible to avoid using words of foreign origin, at least to some extent, and some new words may even have to be introduced” (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 20). Thus, he recommended alternative ways of dealing with loan words.

Kim Il Sung classified loan words into two types in accordance with their origin: those adopted from Chinese and those from other countries. Kim further divided words of Chinese origin into three subgroups. (1) Those words which had been fully assimilated. These were ordered to be retained. In his speeches, however, Kim did not clarify how the degree of assimilation of loan words was to be judged. (2) Those words which had not been assimilated and were still perceived as foreign. These were to be abolished.

(3) Those words which had not been assimilated fully, but had been used widely in scientific treatises and political reports. These were to be maintained, but were to be kept to an indispensable minimum (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 18-19). Kim recommended that non-Chinese loan words which would enter Korean through scientific and cultural exchanges with other countries in the future be replaced with North Korean equivalents as soon as these were introduced (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 287).

Dialects were regarded as a potential source for the nationalistic development of *Munhwae*. Kim Il Sung's emphasis on the need to accept words from local dialects shows this point. He stated that "we must also trace good words in our dialects and use them. ... If we make a careful survey of our dialects, we shall find excellent words of our own which can be accepted even now" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 285). In this respect, *Munhwae* as proposed by Kim, was a language that embraced excellent native elements from all over the country.

The second principle in developing *Munhwae* was that it should be democratic and oriented to the demands of the working class. The prejudice of some people, that those who used scholastic and pedantic words were learned and eminent, ought to be abandoned (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 292) and *Munhwae* should be made simple and clear to speak and write. Kim also proposed that wide publicity should be given to replace difficult words with those which could be easily understood by the masses (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 24). With this, 'the masses' could be enlightened to keep abreast of socialist development, and to be able to participate actively in building a socialist nation.

The third principle in developing *Munhwae* was that its linguistic resources should not be restricted to a specific regional dialect, but should be based on the language of socialist revolutionaries. This point was not proposed clearly, but was present implicitly in the speeches. In some sense, it was possible to maintain that *Munhwae* was based on a single locality, namely Pyongyang, given that Kim Il Sung put forward, "We should preserve and develop the national characteristics of our language with Pyongyang as the centre and the speech of Pyongyang as the standard" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 288). Several South Korean scholars (Hong Yun-Sook 1991: 144-146; Kim Chin-W. 1978: 254) have interpreted this statement literally and argue that *Munhwae* proposed

by Kim Il Sung was the regional dialect of Pyongyang (*Pyongyange*). *Munhwae* conceptualised in this manner is a counterpart of *Phyocwune* (the standard language of South Korea) which is defined as the language used by people living in Seoul.

As Kumatani (1990) points out, Pyongyang in Kim Il Sung's speech meant not only a locality but a centre of socialist revolution and, accordingly, a centre where the socialist language was used. In this sense, 'the speech of Pyongyang' in Kim's *kyosi* does not seem to mean the language used by those who resided in Pyongyang, but rather the language of those who held revolutionary ideas. Kim proposed that *Munhwae* be based on Pyongyang because it is "where the general staff of our [North Korean] revolution is and where its strategies and tactics are planned for all political, economic, cultural and military fields" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 288).

In sum, Kim Il Sung suggested the *Juche* idea as the prime principle of North Korean language planning. The major characteristics of *Munhwae* featured in Kim's two speeches were that it should be nationalistic, democratic and socialist. To make *Munhwae* nationalistic, strong puristic measures were taken. Loan words were to be abolished and native linguistic resources were to be fully utilised. This principle, however, could not be implemented strictly and a compromise was made to overcome practical difficulties. Several categories of loan words were allowed to be used, such as fully nativised Sino-Korean words and other loans words which were thought to be necessary to develop modern science and technology. Selective adoption of indigenous words from dialects was also viewed as an alternative way to enhance the purity of the Korean language. To make *Munhwae* democratic, strong emphasis was placed on simplicity and easiness. To make *Munhwae* a socialist language, it was proposed to draw linguistic resources from those who held revolutionary ideas.

3.2 Orthographic Reform

In July 1966, the third orthographic reform was carried out in North Korea. The new orthography, *Cosenmalkyupemcip* (The Korean Language Prescription; hereafter, 'Prescription'), which was ordered and approved by Kim Il Sung in the January 1964 and May 1966 speeches, was one of the first fruits of *Munhwae* language planning, unconditionally reflecting Kim's opinions on language planning.

Being composed of four separate components – orthography, word spacing, punctuation, and pronunciation – the ‘Prescription’ was a systematic and detailed revision of the 1954 ‘Korean Orthography’ in which rules for word spacing, punctuation and pronunciation were dealt with as minor parts of orthographic rules. As for the number of letters, there were still disparate opinions shortly before the proclamation of the prescription: some argued for 24 letters as in the ‘Unified Plan’ of 1933, while others supported 40 letters as in the ‘Korean Orthography’ of 1954. The issue was finalised by adopting 40 letters after Kim Il Sung had given his view that “before letter reform is introduced, I prefer 40, which is the number now in use” in his May 1966 speech (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 296).

Overall, the ‘Prescription’ did not show much difference in rules for orthography from the ‘Korean Orthography’. However, rules for word spacing were revised in the manner of closing up of words, following Kim’s suggestion that “too many spacings, as used now, make it [Korean letters] difficult to read” (Kim Il Sung, 1984, vol.20: 295). For example, ‘Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ and ‘Socialist Construction’ which had been written as 조선 민주주의 인민 공화국 *Cosen mincwucwuy inmin konghwakwuk* and 사회주의 건설 *Sahoycwuy kensel* in the ‘Korean Orthography’ were changed to be written as 조선민주주의인민공화국 *Cosenmincwucwuy-inminkonghwakwuk* and 사회주의건설 *Sahoycwuykensel* in the ‘Prescription’, leaving out all spaces between words.

Kim Il Sung considered the change of word spacing as a temporary solution to the question of enhancing reading efficiency, for which he believed letter reform was an ultimate answer (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 22; vol.20: 294). Kim, however, strongly objected to immediate letter reform with the idea that any such reform before the reunification of Korea would hamper inter-Korean communication, and thus would erase one of the most important national characteristics binding the divided nation. He also pointed out that delays in scientific and cultural development would result from such a letter reform (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 13-16; vol.20: 295).

Rules about the Koreanisation of foreign languages were also published as a separate book: *Oykwukmalcekkipep* (Writing Foreign Language) in 1969 and its extended amendment in 1982. Until that time, *Oylaye Phyokipep* (Writing Loan Words) of 1958,

which comprised rules for the Romanisation of Korean and the Koreanisation of foreign languages, had been used.

3.3 Vocabulary Management

Vocabulary management played a pivotal role in the construction of *Munhwae*. Replacing loan words with native words, removing those words which were in conflict with the views of the North Korean regime and creating those words which represented North Korean socialist ideology and institutions, were considered a cornerstone in establishing linguistic self-reliance. Successful implementation of the project would lead people to use their language in an intelligent and a cultured way, and would allow the language to function as an efficient tool for elevating people's national pride and for achieving socialist objectives (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 16-17; vol.20: 292). This would also create a solid basis for the unified development of the national language in a situation where the language in South Korea was viewed as having lost its national characteristics and purity. Vocabulary management in North Korea was expected to stimulate South Koreans to endeavour to restore the nationalistic character of their language (Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 9).

In terms of method, vocabulary management was undertaken through three processes – discarding words, modifying words and coining words: (1) the process of ‘discarding’ was the active and intentional elimination of words, accelerating the extinction process of undesirable words; (2) the ‘modifying’ process was a selective adoption of loan words; and (3) the ‘coining’ process referred to replacement of old words which were to be discarded with new words and creation of new meanings for old words. In the sections below, vocabulary management in the *Munhwae* period is presented following these three processes.

3.3.1 Discarding of Words

Words which were considered to be in conflict with the nationalistic, democratic and socialist principles of *Munhwae* were targets for discarding. These included loan words of Chinese and non-Chinese origin, and native Korean words which were regarded as

carrying feudalistic and bourgeois ideology. Sino-Korean words, classified as social and political terms, which were fully assimilated as native words, having completely different meanings from the original Chinese ones, and having additional meanings that their native counterparts did not have, were excluded from the category of Sino-Korean words to be discarded.

3.3.1.1 Words of Chinese Origin

Discarding words of Chinese origin, which had native equivalents, was the first task in the construction of a nationalistic language directed by the principle of self-reliance (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 284, 285). These words were seen as the main cause of a lexical hierarchy, in which native Korean words were conceived to be less cultured and less polite than their Chinese counterparts. The existence of these words had prevented common people from being masters of their own language and had deprived them of national pride in using their own language. Thus, thorough exclusion of these Sino-Korean words was indispensable for developing a unified vocabulary system based on native words and for enhancing national pride in language use. The managing process could be carried out with ease, since there was no need to make alternative words. Some examples of words targeted in this reform are:

Sino-Korean Word	Native Equivalent	Gloss
하복 <i>hapok</i>	여름옷 <i>yelumos</i>	summer clothes
화단 <i>hwatan</i>	꽃밭 <i>kkochpath</i>	flower garden
금일 <i>kumil</i>	오늘 <i>onul</i>	today
오침 <i>ochim</i>	낮잠 <i>naccam</i>	siesta
부친 <i>puchin</i>	아버지 <i>apeci</i>	father
상전 <i>sangcen</i>	뽕밭 <i>ppongpath</i>	mulberry field
석교 <i>sekkyo</i>	돌다리 <i>toltali</i>	stone bridge

Sources: Choy and Mwun 1980: 62, 63; Choy Ceng-Hwu 1983: 169; Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 14, 55

Sino-Korean words which were difficult to understand, due to their infrequent use in everyday communication, were also directed to be eliminated. These words were regarded as weakening the communicative function of language and as damaging the purity of the national language. The word, *palsa* (발사 拔絲) is a good example. The first syllable *pal* in Chinese character means 'pull out' and the second syllable *sa* means 'a thread'. Being combined, *palsa* means 'spinning yarn'. 拔絲 (*palsa*) is in

homonymous relation with a word which consists of different Chinese characters, 發射 (*palsa* - shooting a bow, gun or rocket). In everyday conversation, *palsa* is usually understood as meaning 發射. Therefore, only when the word is written in Chinese characters as 拔絲 do people understand the meaning as 'spinning yarn'. Other examples are *yenkwuki* (연구기 燕口期), *kwusa* (구사 舊射), *cikopyeng* (지고병 支枯病) and *swukun* (수근 鬚根). These words were to be replaced with native expressions in the form of circumlocutions. For example, *yenkwuki* was replaced by the expression 'a period when a leaf starts to be open, resembling a swallow's beak', *kwusa*, 'a person who is an expert in shooting an arrow', *cikopyeng*, 'a disease of a tree, which causes the boughs to shrivel' and *swukun* 'a root resembling a human beard' (Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 57-60).

Of those widely used Sino-Korean words which did not have native equivalents, some were abolished, while others were retained. The criterion to differentiate the former from the latter, which was developed by North Korean linguists, was the 'degree of nativisation'. As there were no clear guidelines to measure this degree of nativisation, however, it was very hard to determine where the boundary of nativisation was, and how flexible the criteria should be. Words such as *hakkyo* (학교, school) and *samkakhyeng* (삼각형, triangle) were to be preserved, whereas words such as *kachwuk* (가축, domestic animal) and *salyo* (사료, feed) were to be abolished, due to their different degrees of nativisation (Choy and Mwun 1980: 20, 29). However, *kachwuk* and *salyo* do not appear to show a clear distinction from *hakkyo* and *samkakhyeng* in terms of the degree of nativisation. They may be easily understood and widely used, so that a native Korean speaker may wonder why *kachwuk* should be discarded, whereas *hakkyo* should not. This lack of clear criteria brought about confusion. It was reported that some schools replaced *samkakhyeng* with a native word, 세모꼴 *seymokkol* (triangle), and later were urged to reverse their previous decisions (Park, Lee, Ko 1986: 36). Some examples proposed for maintenance or replacement are:

Sino-Korean Words to be Replaced with Native Words			Sino-Korean Words to be Maintained	
Original Words	Revised Words	Gloss	Words	Gloss
가축	집짐승	domestic animal	삼각형	triangle
<i>kachwuk</i>	<i>cipcimsung</i>		<i>samkakhyeng</i>	
사료 <i>salyo</i>	먹이 <i>meki</i>	feed	학교 <i>hakkyo</i>	school
입장권	나들표	entrance ticket	계급 <i>kyeykup</i>	class
<i>ipcangkwen</i>	<i>natulphyo</i>			

Sino-Korean Words to be Replaced with Native Words			Sino-Korean Words to be Maintained	
Original Words	Revised Words	Gloss	Words	Gloss
괘도 <i>kwayto</i>	걸그림 <i>kelkulim</i>	a wall map	법칙 <i>pepchik</i>	law
승차 <i>sungcha</i>	차타기 <i>chathaki</i>	getting on a car	공업 <i>kongep</i>	industry
저예망 <i>ceyemang</i>	바닥끌그물	dragnet	갱도 <i>kayngto</i>	tunnel
박피 <i>pakphi</i>	<i>patakkulkumul</i> 껍질벗기기 <i>kkepcilpeskiki</i>	skinning, peeling	과학기술 <i>kwahakkiswul</i>	scientific technology

Sources: Choy and Mwun 1980: 29; Choy Ceng-Hwu 1983: 171; Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 18, vol.20: 287; Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 107

Of several books dealing with vocabulary management, 우리나라에서의 어휘정리 (*Vocabulary Management in Our Country*, Park, Lee and Ko 1986) seems to present a clearer criterion for the degree of nativisation. To synthesise the authors' view, the guideline is whether, in order to understand the meaning of a Sino-Korean word, the meaning of each syllable in the word has to be consciously figured out or whether the meaning can be grasped without analysing each syllable. The authors suggest that these different processes of understanding are related to the degree of integration of the words into everyday communication. The more deeply the Sino-Korean words are integrated into people's everyday communication, the less conscious effort would have to be made to analyse the meaning of each syllable in a word (Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 65-66). Their opinion, which seems to be clear and simple at first glance, however, is not tenable in some cases. For example, according to their claim, when a person hears the word, *kachwuk*, which was to be discarded, he or she would analyse the meanings of *ka* (house) and *chwuk* (animal) separately, and only then would arrive at the meaning of the word as 'domestic animal'. On the contrary, when a person hears *samkakhyeng*, a word which was to be kept, he or she does not need to think consciously of the meaning of individual elements, *sam* (three), *kak* (angle) and *hyeng* (shape) in order to obtain the whole meaning as 'triangle'. However, it is unlikely that native Korean speakers process the meanings of *kachwuk* and *samkakhyeng* in the ways the authors predict. Of the examples in the table above, only the words *ceyemang* 'dragnet' and *pakphi* 'skinning, peeling' would seem to require the syllable by syllable analysis, which is suggested by the authors.

One of the reasons for the inconsistency and ambiguity in differentiating words for

elimination from those for retention might be that Sino-Korean words were so deeply embedded in the Korean language that some of these words could not be easily distinguished from native words. In these circumstances, a clear solution for managing vocabulary in line with the nationalistic development of *Munhwae* was likely to stick to a simple principle, namely, eliminating all words which were recognised as being adopted from Chinese. This option, however, could not be taken by North Korean linguists, because it would be disruptive to everyday conversation due to the large number of these words. Furthermore, Kim Il Sung had ordered nativised Sino-Korean words to be treated differently from 'non-nativised' words. This conflict seems to have been a factor which led linguists to make a compromise in their treatment of Sino-Korean words. Instead of suggesting clear guidelines for differentiating nativised from 'non-nativised' words, they tried to replace Sino-Korean words with native words, while excluding those words, which Kim identified as being nativised, from vocabulary management. As the criterion was not clearly made, the selection of words for replacement was done arbitrarily. Some widely used Sino-Korean words became targets of elimination, while others did not.

3.3.1.2 Loan Words of Non-Chinese Origin

Loan words of non-Chinese origin were classified into two sub-categories: first, those which were detrimental for the development of *Munhwae* and second, those which were necessary for the development of science and technology and for communication with other countries (Choy and Mwun 1980: 22). The words in the first sub-category were supposed to have been introduced first by the bourgeois intelligentsia, who admired imperialist countries, and later by Japanese colonialists in their attempt to destroy the Korean language. Thus, discarding these loan words and replacing them with suitable native or nativised words was a prerequisite for the establishment of linguistic *Juche* (self-reliance). Some examples of these words are:

Loan Word (Origin of Word)	Gloss	Native or Nativised Word
클라스 <i>khullasu</i> (English)	class (lesson)	학급 <i>hakkup</i>
플랜 <i>ppulan</i> (English)	plan	계획 <i>kyeyhoyk</i>
템포 <i>theympho</i> (Italian)	tempo	속도 <i>sokto</i>
아코데온 <i>akkoteyon</i> (English)	accordion	손풍금 <i>sonphungkum</i>
아이스크림 <i>aisukhulim</i> (English)	ice cream	얼음보숭이 <i>elumposwungi</i>
카텐 <i>katheyn</i> (English)	curtain	창가림 <i>changkalim</i>

Loan Word (Origin of Word)	Gloss	Native or Nativised Word
에이치형주 <i>eyichihyengcwu</i> (English)	a rolled steel column having a shape of an H	ㄱ형태 <i>ayhyengthay</i>
제트형강 <i>ceythuhyengkang</i> (English)	shaped steel in the form of a Z	ㄷ형강 <i>luhyengkang</i>
티형강 <i>thihyengkang</i> (English)	shaped steel in the form of a T	ㄱ형강 <i>wuhyengkang</i>
우와기 <i>wuwaki</i> (Japanese)	western style coat	양복저고리 <i>yangpokcekoli</i>
즈봉 <i>cupong</i> (Japanese)	western style trousers	양복바지 <i>yangpokpaci</i>

Sources: Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 20; Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 14, 38, 71, 104

The first three words, *khllasu*, *ppullan*, *thempho* are examples of loan words whose native or nativised Sino-Korean equivalents already existed. Management of these words did not involve creating new words, but only restoring the original ones. The next three words, *akkoteyon*, *aisukhlim*, *kathelyn* came with the introduction of the items they referred to, had no native equivalents and so words needed to be coined to replace them. For example, *sonphungkum* (hand organ – *son* ‘hand’, *phungkum* ‘organ’), *elumposwungi* (ice lump – *elum* ‘ice’, *poswungi* ‘soft lump’), and *changkalim* (window cover – *chang* ‘window’, *kalim* ‘cover’) were coined respectively. In the case of the next three words, English letter names (H ‘*eyichi*’, Z ‘*ceythu*’, T ‘*thi*’) were combined with Sino-Korean words, *hyengkang* (shaped steel) or *hyengcwu* (rolled steel column). To replace these, Korean symbols which had a similar shape were adopted: H was replaced by ㄱ, Z by ㄷ and T by ㄱ. In the last two examples, loan words from Japanese, *wuwaki* and *cupong*, were replaced respectively by *yangpokcekoli* (western coat – *yangpok* ‘western clothes’, *cekoli* ‘coat’) and *yangpokpaci* (western trousers – *yangpok* ‘western clothes’, *paci* ‘trousers’).

3.3.1.3 Words in Conflict with Socialist Ideology

Words which were seen as carrying feudalistic and bourgeois ideas, old-fashioned customs, and the hierarchical social system of the old society were to be eliminated for the democratic development of *Munhwae* (Choy and Mwun 1980: 8). Some examples of these words are:

Terms of Address		Gloss
나으리	<i>nauli</i>	master, sir
마님	<i>manim</i>	madam, master, your excellency
도령님	<i>tolyengnim</i>	young master
아가씨	<i>akassi</i>	young unmarried female
할아버	<i>halapem</i>	old man, a shortened form of 할아버지 <i>halapeci</i> (grandfather)
할머니	<i>halmem</i>	old woman, a shortened form of 할머니 <i>halmeni</i> (grandmother)
아범	<i>apem</i>	elderly manservant, a shortened form of 아버지 <i>apeci</i> (father)
어멈	<i>emem</i>	elderly maidservant, a shortened form of 어머니 <i>emeni</i> (mother)

Source: Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 32

The first four were address terms used by the lower classes to the upper classes in pre-modern Korea. These terms survived the official abolition of the feudal system at the end of the Cosen dynasty, but were used, although less strictly and less widely than before, throughout the Japanese colonial period. As the class system which underlay these terms was suppressed and abolished in North Korea, discarding of these terms was enforced to speed up the process of natural extinction.

Halapem, *halmem*, *apem* and *emem* were terms of address which were used by the upper classes to the lower classes in general, and to their servants in particular. These are abbreviated forms of indigenous kin titles: *halapem* from *halapeci*, *halmem* from *halmeni*, *apem* from *apeci* and *emem* from *emeni*. The shortened forms connote a lack of the respect which is normally conveyed by the original forms, and create an effect of downgrading the person who is referred to. For instance, *halapem* is devoid of respect for an elderly male, which is implied in the original form, *halapeci*.

Other address terms to be discarded included 노인장 *noincang* (an esteemed elder, an elderly person), 노형 *nohyeng* (you, literally means 'old brother') and 씨 *ssi* (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 33). The reason for eliminating these terms was not because they were personal titles based on hereditary class membership, but because they were used in South Korea, where bourgeois and reactionary language usage was thought to be practiced widely.

Having abolished personal titles used in feudalistic and capitalist society, North Korea claimed to have developed socialist and democratic terms representing harmonious social relations. 동지 *tongci* and 동무 *tongmu*, literally meaning 'comrade' or

'colleague', have become the most general terms of address to express mutual respect, autonomy and group unity (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 98).

Words representing sexist ideology were also thought to be in conflict with the socialist spirit which saw women as revolutionary comrades of men. These words were to be rooted out completely and new terms reflecting the enhanced status of women were to be promoted.

Typical examples of linguistic sexism are found in the way terms of address were used in conjugal relations as in 바깥랑반 *pakkathlyangpan* (husband) and 안사람 *ansalam* (wife) (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 176). *Pakkathlyangpan* is composed of *pakkath*, meaning 'outside' and *lyangpan*, indicating the two hereditary upper classes in the Cosen dynasty. *Ansalam* is from two words, *an* and *salam*. *An* literally means 'inside' and *salam* means 'people'. The application of *lyangpan* for male and *salam* for female shows gender hierarchy aligned with social status: a husband was designated by a term for higher classes, while his wife was indicated by a word meaning a 'person'. Spatial terms, *an* and *pakkath* also represent the feudalistic ethics which confined women's domain to the domestic area and permitted outside social activities only to men.⁴ What was recommended instead in *Munhwae* was the reciprocal use of the same terms of address between men and women. The term *tongmu* or *tongci* (comrade or colleague) was proposed to be used for both sexes, highlighting the 'equality' and 'sameness' in relations (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 170, 175).

3.3.1.4 Dialects

The construction of the new standard language, *Munhwae*, required dialect levelling where variations existed. Non-standard varieties of language were regarded as a residue of the old society, and thus became a target for linguistic revolution (Kim Pyeng-Cey 1975: 96).

First, dialect words which had different meanings from *Munhwae* were to be discarded.

⁴ A critique of gender-based language use in *Munhwae* is presented in the section reviewing the *Munhwae* period in chapter 5, as sexism, which was claimed to have been eliminated in North Korea, seems to be present in *Munhwae*.

These words were considered to be a barrier for communication between different regions (Kim Pyeng-Cey 1975: 22-23). For example, 고추 *kochwu* meaning 'chilli' in *Munhwae* could mean 후추 *hwuchwu* (pepper) in some dialects; 싸다 *ssata* meaning 'cheap' in *Munhwae* had the opposite meaning, 비싸다 *pissata* (expensive) in the Northwest region; and 맛스럽다 *massulepta* meant 'tasteless' in *Munhwae*, while had the opposite meaning, 'tasty' in the Northeast region (Kim Pyeng-Cey 1975: 60-62; Choy and Mwun 1980: 41).

Second, dialect words representing old fashioned customs were also to be discarded. Terms indicating socio-economic relations between landowners and tenants in pre-modern Korea are good examples. In some dialects, there were several terms indicating a 'cow' depending on the nature of its borrowing contract between landowners and tenants: (1) 일이소 *iliso* for a borrowed cow for which repayment was to be made by labour; (2) 돈메소 *tonmeyso* for a borrowed cow for which repayment was to be made with money; (3) 쌀메소 *ssalmeyso* for a borrowed cow for which repayment was to be made with rice; and (4) 멧소 *meyso* for a borrowed cow for which repayment was to be made in a way to be decided (Kim Pyeng-Cey 1975: 73).

3.3.2 Maintaining of Words

3.3.2.1 Words of Chinese Origin

As was discussed above, it was decided that some words of Chinese origin would be retained. The first group of these were those words which were hardly recognised as having originated from Chinese. Such words as 수염 *swuyem* (beard), 비단 *pitan* (silk), 양말 *yangmal* (socks), 별안간 *pyelankan* (suddenly), 여전하다 *yecenhata* (be as usual) and 골몰하다 *kolmolhata* (be absorbed in) belonged to this group, and were thought to be indigenous words by ordinary people (Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 64).

Secondly, there were Sino-Korean words which had been incorporated into the Korean language system with completely different meanings and sounds from the original Chinese source. A good example is 천상 *chensang*. It came from 천생 *chensayng* which consists of 天 *chen* (heaven) and 生 *sayng* (be born, birth or life), and originally meant 'ability given by birth'. Later, the original pronunciation changed to

chensang and its meaning also shifted to 'approximately, alike'. *십상 sipsang* also underwent a similar process. Its original form, *십성 十成 sipseng*, meant 'a very high degree of achievement in a certain field', while the changed form *sipsang* means 'most suitable' (Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 64).

Thirdly, there were Sino-Korean words which had the same basic meaning as native equivalents, but had an additional socio-political meaning. This is due to the fact that Sino-Korean words have been frequently used in a political context, while native ones have not. As the socio-political meaning conveyed by the Sino-Korean words was considered instrumental to the achievement of the political objectives, these were ordered to be retained. Some of such examples are:

Sino-Korean Word	Native Word	Basic Meaning	Additional Meaning of the Sino-Korean Word
심장 <i>simcang</i>	염통 <i>yemthong</i>	heart	an important centre (of revolution, politics, etc.)
지하 <i>ciha</i>	땅속 <i>ttangsok</i>	underground	clandestine, illegal (in political context)
려명 <i>lyemyeng</i>	먼동 <i>mentong</i>	dawn	a time heralding the beginning of a new era
백색 <i>payksayk</i>	흰 <i>huyŋ</i> , 흰빛갈 <i>huyŋpichkal</i>	white colour	the reactionary force's suppression of revolutionaries

Sources: Choy and Mwun 1980: 64; Choy Ceng-Hwu 1983: 170; Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 55-56

The Sino-Korean word, *simcang* (heart), has an extended meaning of 'a centre of something', as in the sentence, 평양은 혁명의 심장(*simcang*)이다. (Pyongyang is the heart of revolution). It would be odd to use the native equivalent, *염통 yemthong* instead of *simcang* in this context, although the basic meaning of the two words is identical. Of the pair meaning 'underground', *ciha* and *ttangsok*, only *ciha* is used in a political context as in 지하투쟁 *ciha twucayŋg* to mean 'underground political resistance' (Choy Ceng-Hwu 1983: 170). For the pair, *lyemyeng* and *mentong*, meaning 'dawn', the former is used for a wider range of applications than the latter. For example, *lyemyeng* is used to mean abstract time which 'breaks the darkness and heralds the coming of a new history' (Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 55-56), while *mentong* mostly indicates natural time. In the case of *payksayk* and *huyŋ* meaning 'white', only the former is correct in a collocation in a political context as in 백색테로 (white terror – political violence of the ultra-right against the left) (Choy and Mwun 1980: 63).

Combining with the native term, *huyŋ*, ‘*huyŋ* terror’ does not have the same idiomatic political meaning. It may mean literally ‘terror caused by the colour, white’.

Another group of Sino-Korean words was maintained because their native counterparts were not combined with certain other words, due to people’s habits of language use. Some examples are:

Sino-Korean Words	Native Words	Gloss	Words Combined only with Sino-Korean Words
국가 <i>kwukka</i>	나라 <i>nala</i>	country	독립 <i>toklip</i> (independence)
주택 <i>cwuthayk</i>	살림집 <i>sallimcip</i>	dwelling house	문화 <i>munhwa</i> (culture)
일기 <i>ilki</i>	날씨 <i>nalssi</i>	weather	예보 <i>yeypo</i> (forecast)

Source: Choy and Mwun 1980: 63, 64

Only the Sino-Korean words, *kwukka*, *cwuthayk* and *ilki* are combined with *toklip*, *munhwa* and *yeypo* as in the phrases, 독립국가 *toklipkwukka* (independent country), 문화주택 *munhwacwuthayk* (modern dwelling house) and 일기예보 *ilkiyeypo* (weather forecast). Although native equivalents of these words, *nala*, *sallimcip* and *nalssi* might be used in such cases, 독립나라 *toklipnala*, 문화살림집 *munhwasallimcip* and 날씨예보 *nalssiyeypo* were regarded as awkward combinations (Choy and Mwun 1980: 64).

This does not mean that the native words could not be used with certain words with which Sino-Korean equivalents were usually combined. In some cases the native words were permitted to be used interchangeably with their Sino-Korean equivalents. Such uses of native words are: (1) ‘socialist country’ can be written as either 사회주의국가 *sahoycwunykwwukka* or 사회주의나라 *sahoycwunynala* (*sahoycwuny* ‘socialism’ + *kwukka* or *nala* ‘country’) and (2) ‘non-aligned country’, as 불려불가담국가 *ppullekpulkatamkwukka* or 불려불가담나라 *ppullekpulkatamnala* (*ppulekpulkatam* ‘non-alignment’ + *kwukka* or *nala*). In the same way, ‘rural dwelling house’ is written as either 농촌주택 *nongchoncwuthayk* or 농촌살림집 *nongchonsallimcip* (*nongchon* ‘rural area’ + *cwuthayk* or *sallimcip* ‘dwelling house’) (Choy and Mwun 1980: 64).

The proposed criterion for deciding whether some collocation is awkward or proper was people’s habits of language use. However, an ordinary native Korean may wonder why 문화살림집 *munhwasallimcip* (modern dwelling house) was deemed to be

awkward, whereas 농촌살림집 *nongchonsallimcip* (rural dwelling house) was not. Arbitrariness seems to have been exercised in this process of admitting or denying some combined words, as was seen in the criteria for discarding or maintaining words of Chinese origin.

Finally, those words which Kim Il Sung specifically mentioned as suitable to be retained were all maintained. Words for social science and politics belonged to this group. Kim proposed that these words be maintained on the ground that there were “no suitable words to replace them [socio-political terms] right now. ... [thus] difficult to replace them” (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 287). Following this directive, most socio-political terminology relating to the Party, state policy and political ideology were exempted from removal or replacement. Military terms were also included in this group. Kim Il Sung asserted that replacing these with native words would be premature (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 290), thus, military terms were excluded from the Eighteen Subcommittees for Revising Technical Terms which covered comprehensive fields of study.

3.3.2.2 Loan Words of Non-Chinese Origin

As Kim Il Sung stated in his *kyosi*, not all loan words of non-Chinese origin were suppressed in the vocabulary management. It was “impossible to avoid using words of foreign origin, ... and some new ones may even have to be introduced” (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 20), although he added that “We should screen the loan words ... [and] use them as little as possible” (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 21). Some loan words were to be retained, but after being adjusted to the North Korean pronunciation system. The first group of these loan words are those which had been widely used and did not have native equivalents. A few examples of these words are ‘ink’, ‘radio’, ‘necktie’ and ‘piano’, which are pronounced as *ingkhu* 잉크, *lacio* 라지오, *neykthai* 넥타이 and *phiano* 피아노 respectively. The second group is made up of loan words which were introduced through scientific, technological and cultural exchange. Some words belonging to this category include: tractor (트랙토르 *ttulakttolu*), film (필름 *phillim*), television (텔레비죤 *theyleypicyon*), rocket (로케트 *lokheythu*), aluminium (알루미늄 *allwuminiwum*), metre (메터 *meythe*), gram (그램 *kulam*) and program (프로그램 *phulokulam*). Names of chemical elements and musical terms were also

prescribed to be maintained (Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 67-69; Choy and Mwun 1980: 22-24). These words were adopted as *Munhwae* vocabulary because they were thought to be instrumental in increasing the capacity for expression and in providing favourable conditions for effective communication between countries. From this point of view, these words were different from those which were claimed to have been introduced by aggressive foreign powers to encroach on the indigenous language (Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 67-69).

It should be noted that the same arbitrary measures were taken in the process of selecting loan words of non-Chinese origin for retention and elimination, as were in managing Sino-Korean words. A good example is the case of 'ice cream', 'curtain' and 'accordion' which were recommended to be replaced by native words. It is not clear why these words should be abolished, whereas 'ink', 'radio' and 'piano' should be retained. In this respect, the vocabulary management for loan words was not as consistent as it was envisaged.

3.3.2.3 Dialects

Kim Il Sung instructed linguists to "trace good words in our [North Korean] dialects and use them [to develop *Munhwae*]" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 285). Although rapid and total extinction was the basic approach to the treatment of dialects because they were considered a hindrance to the construction of *Munhwae*, it was ordered that some dialect words be accepted to enrich *Munhwae* vocabulary. They were viewed as a rich pool of indigenous words and a concrete basis for linguistic democratisation, as they had been created and maintained by the populace in a certain area, thus, remained intact from foreign influence. By exploiting dialects, the nationalistic and democratic principles in developing *Munhwae* could be demonstrated.

The first criterion for retention was whether dialect words contained nuances different from their *Munhwae* counterparts. Such words were adopted into *Munhwae* after being modified to the standard pronunciation and to socialist ideas (Kim Pyeng-Cey 1975: 24). Words such as 자란이 *calani* and 반찬 *panchan* entered into *Munhwae* in this way. *Calani* (grown-up person) denotes an adult aged between 20 and 30, whereas its *Munhwae* counterpart, 어른 *ehun* (adult) covers a broader age group. In the same

manner, *panchan*, specifically meaning ‘side dishes made of fish’, was incorporated into *Munhwae*, as its *Munhwae* counterpart, 부식물 *pusikmul* indicates ‘side-dishes of all kinds’. The second criterion for adopting words from dialects was whether or not there were corresponding *Munhwae* words. This case included words such as 어벌 *epel* and 불개 *pulkay*. *Epel* meaning ‘extraordinary boldness or courage for one’s age’ and *pulkay* indicating ‘beans laid underneath rice when boiling rice’ entered into *Munhwae*, because there were no equivalent *Munhwae* words (Choy and Mwun 1980: 39-40).

Through this process, about 3,100 dialect words became incorporated into *Munhwae* by 1977. Of those incorporated into *Munhwae*, a considerable number came from the dialect of Hamkyeng province. Synthesising the claim that the basis of *Munhwae* was the language that Kim Il Sung had used to teach guerrilla soldiers during his partisan struggle and the fact that the majority of the immigrants in the Yenpien district, where Kim’s partisan struggle took place, had come from Hamkyeng province (Kumatani 1990: 104), it is quite certain that the selection of dialect words was skewed by political consideration.

3.3.3 Coining of Words

The invention of new words and semantic cultivation of some old words in order to represent socialist ideology and institutions were a major part of the *Munhwae* vocabulary management.

3.3.3.1 Personal Names

In response to Kim Il Sung’s *kyosi* that “our ancestors caught by toadyism made names of children using Chinese characters” (Choy and Mwun 1980: 105), efforts were made to encourage parents to name children in new ways.⁵ Newly proposed children’s names were based on native words or nativised Sino-Korean words. When Chinese characters

⁵ Giving a baby girl a name including the Chinese character, 자 *ca* (子) in the second syllable of the given name was also proposed to be abolished (Choy and Mwun 1983: 109). The pattern was one of the prevalent ways of naming a baby girl from the Japanese colonial period, following the Japanese customs of naming girls.

were used, the two syllables for a given name were proposed to be selected to have a whole meaning as a word. For example, the name, 영광 (*Yengkwang* 榮光) which consists of *yeng* (splendid, prosperous) and *kwang* (light) has the meaning of 'honour' and 'glory'. This is in sharp contrast with the practice in the former days in which the meaning of each syllable in a given name was not necessarily connected to constitute a word (Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 281). For example, in 일성 (*Il Sung* 日成) as in 김일성 *Kim Il Sung*, the first syllable, *il* means 'the sun' and the second syllable, *sung* means 'success', but the combination 'Il Sung' does not form a word.

From the semantic point of view, new names carried a certain ideological disposition which the North Korean regime tried to enforce on the people. Names expressing devotion and loyalty to the leader and the Party were most recommended such as 충성 *Chwungseng* (loyalty), 충실 *Chwungsil* (faithfulness), 충복 *Chwungpok* (faithful servant) and 충신 *Chwungsin* (loyalist or loyalty). Names conveying gratefulness to Kim Il Sung were also common as in 은덕 *Untek* (favour), 은혜 *Unhyey* (indebtedness), 은정 *Unceng* (benevolent affection), 영광 *Yengkwang* (glory) and 행복 *Hayngpok* (happiness). Names symbolising the proper qualities required for a fighter in the socialist construction were used as in 혁신 *Hyeksin* (innovation), 선봉 *Senpong* (vanguard), 세찬 *Seychan* (vigorous, energetic), 철이 *Cheli* (steel-like), 억척 *Ekchek* (being unyielding) and 전진 *Cencin* (progress). Pure native words were also actively appropriated as a source of children's names such as 달이 *Tali* (the moon), 달순 *Talswun* (as gentle as the moon), 별녀 *Pyelnye* (star girl), 새별 *Saypyel* (new star), 빛날 *Pichnal* (to be bright), 억세 *Eksey* (tough), 참이 *Chami* (genuine) and 한길 *Hankil* (one way). These names were said to display the parents' wish for their child to be loyal to the leader and the Party (Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 284-288).

The adoption of native words as a source of names contrasted with the former practice in which native words were rarely employed. Even in such rare cases, native names were given only to a child of the lower classes, thus functioning as a symbol of class distinction. Semantically, these were named after the work responsibility of the person referred to or the situation when the child was born. For example, the name 마당쇠 *Matangsoy*, literally meaning 'yard-boy', was given to a male servant cleaning yard. 부엌녀 *Puekhnye*, literally meaning 'kitchen woman', was given to a kitchen maid or a baby girl who was born in a kitchen. The name 길남이 *Kilnami*, literally meaning

'person born-on-the-street', was given to a child who was born in such a situation (Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 289). The adoption of native terms for personal names in *Munhwae* was claimed to be in parallel with its nationalistic and anti-feudalistic ideas.

3.3.3.2 Place Names

It was a common practice to use Sino-Korean words for naming places in pre-modern Korea. Names which were favoured in the old society included: (1) those which were copied from place names in China; (2) those which praised feudal dynasties and kings; and (3) those which were taken after names of landowners, bureaucrats and the rich. During the colonial period, native place names were massively replaced with Sino-Korean words. For example, 붉은바위 *Pulkunpawi* (Red Rock) was replaced by 적암 *Cekam* (赤岩), 선돌 *Sentol* (Standing Stone) by 입석 *Ipsek* (立石) and 다리골 *Talikol* (Bridge Hamlet) by 교동 *Kyotong* (橋洞). The colonialists also introduced Japanese style place names. North Korean linguists criticised these conventions as being contrary to the people's disposition and to the state's nationalistic and socialist orientation, and as jeopardising national pride and dignity (Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 264-276).

To replace old names or to name new places, native and nativised Sino-Korean words were actively employed. From the semantic point of view, names were chosen in line with the following principles. The first was to incorporate people's admiration of the virtue of the leader, and loyalty to him and the Party into place names, thus 은덕군 *Untekkwun* (Favour District), 영광동 *Yengkwangdong* (Glory Village), 붉은거리 *Pulkunkeli* (Red Street) and 충성동 *Chwungsengdong* (Loyalty Village)⁶ were introduced. The second principle was to commemorate Kim Il Sung's visit to a place or his and his eldest son's revolutionary achievements and activities. Names such as 개선동 *Kaysentong* (Triumph Village – to commemorate Kim's first speech after returning from asylum to the Soviet Union), 구오동 *Kwuotong* (Nine Five Village – to remember the day of Kim's visit to the place on the fifth of September), 구월동 *Kwuweltong* (Nine Month Village – to honour Kim's visit to the place in September),

⁶ *Si*, *Kwun*, *Tong* and *Li* are administrative units referring to city, district, village and hamlet respectively.

and 장자동 *Cangcatong* (Cangca Village – taken after the name of the mountain ‘Cangca’ where Kim Jong Il played in his childhood) were some of those. The third principle was to reflect the development of North Korean society under the guidance of Kim Il Sung. 락원군 *Lakwenkwun* (Paradise District), 문화리 *Munhwali* (Cultured Hamlet), 혁신리 *Hyeksinli* (Renovation Hamlet), and 새날리 *Saynalli* (New Day Hamlet) were some examples. The fourth principle was to name places after revolutionary heroes and Kim Il Sung’s close relations, such as 김정숙군 *Kimcengswukkwun* (Kim Ceng Swuk District – the name of Kim Il Sung’s first wife), 김책시 *Kimchayksi* (Kim Chayk City – the name of the vice president in the first cabinet), 김제원리 *Kimceywenli* (Kim Cey Wen Hamlet – the name of a soldier who died in the war against Japan) and 리수덕리 *Liswutekli* (Li Swu Tek Hamlet – the name of a soldier who died in the war against Japan). The fifth principle was to name places after geographic and other environmental characteristics such as 금산리 *Kumsanli* (Gold Mountain Hamlet), 온천리 *Onchenli* (Hot Spring Hamlet), 리목리 *Limokli* (Pear Tree Hamlet) and 로동자동 *Lotongcatong* (Workers’ Village – indicating that the majority of residents are workers) (Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 276-278; Senwu Lyong-Hwa 1987: 203-227).

Unlike the naming of children, which depended on an individual’s decision, renaming or naming places was carried out by an official body. The National Place Name Screening Committee was established in 1966 to investigate and rectify old place names (Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 33).

3.3.3.3 Product Names

It was a common practice to use Sino-Korean words, Japanese style Chinese words and other loan words to name products in pre-modern Korea and the Japanese colonial period. This practice was criticised as linguistic flunkeyism and a new direction was taken to use more native and nativised linguistic resources. The table below lists some examples.

Original Name	Revised Name	Source of Revised Name
조생옥 <i>Cosayngwuk</i>	팔월 <i>Phalwel</i> The Eighth Month	A type of apple named after its harvest time, August
국광 <i>Kwukkwang</i>	북청 <i>Pukcheng</i>	A type of apple named after its producing place, Pukcheng
진유 <i>Cinyu</i>	누른배 <i>Nwulunpay</i> Yellow Pear	A type of pear named after its colour
렉스 <i>Leyksu</i>	자산토끼 <i>Casanthokki</i> <i>Casan</i> (place name)+ rabbit	A type of rabbit named after the place of cultivation, Casan

Source: Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 302-304

For naming North Korean products, the place of production and characteristics such as taste, colour, form and smell were recommended. A yellow bean which is produced in a place, *Hoylyeng* was given the name 회령누른콩 *Hoylyengnwulunkhong* (Hoylyeng Yellow Bean). A breed of black chicken which came after three stages of improvement was named as 검은닭 3호 *Kemuntalk 3ho* (Black Chicken no.3). Names reflecting the socialist spirit were also recommended: 자주호 *Cacwuho* (Self-reliance) and 승리호 *Sungliho* (Victory) were given for a North Korean brand of car; 건설 *Kensel* (Construction) and 강철 *Kangchel* (Steel) for cigarettes; 평양 *Phyengyang* (Pyongyang) and 소나무 *Sonamu* (Pine Tree) for television; and 천리마호 *Chenlimaho* (Excellent Horse) and 충성호 *Chwungsengho* (Loyalty) for tractors (Choy and Mwun 1980: 119-123; Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 302-308).

3.3.3.4 Technical Terms

Management of technical terms was regarded as a particularly difficult task to tackle. Loan words were especially prevalent in such terms and there were almost no native equivalents. North Korean linguists argued that the development of science and technology had been suppressed by imperialists and their lackeys, and this technical backwardness has urged the use of loan words without adapting them to the native system. This gave birth to a situation in which coining technical terms with native or nativised words was not only an unfamiliar, but a somewhat improper idea. This attitude brought about a wide cleavage between technical terms and the ordinary language of the common people (Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 159-162). This was certainly contradictory to the principle of *Munhwae* which aimed at constructing a language for the peasants and workers. Linguists and scientists turned to native linguistic resources to rectify this inconsistency and to promote the linguistic *Juche*.

The Seventeen Subcommittees for Revising Technical Terms were organised in 1966 and the result of their deliberations was published in newspapers two or three times a week (Nam and Ceng 1990: 88-89). Fields of study which were included in the subcommittees were: medical science and pharmacology, metal engineering, biology, agriculture, natural science (physics, chemical science, mathematics), construction and repair, electricity and communication, machinery, light industry, product names, literature and arts, social science, physical exercise, fishery and oceanography, transportation, geology and mining, and forestry.

Complying with Kim Il Sung's directive that "Foreign terms coming in through scientific and cultural exchanges with other countries should be immediately given equivalents in our language" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 287), technical terms made up of difficult Sino-Korean words and other loan words were replaced with common native or nativised words. Some technical terms were completely replaced with common native words. Others were partially nativised, so that a portion of original words was retained to be combined with native or nativised words. Some examples of fully nativised words are:

Original Word	New Word	Gloss	Field of Study
대화 <i>tayhwa</i>	서로말 <i>selomal</i>	dialogue	art
비공 <i>pikong</i>	코구멍 <i>khokwumeng</i>	nostrils	medical science
동면 <i>tongmyen</i>	겨울잠 <i>kyewulcam</i>	hibernation	biology
크라이막스 <i>khulaimaksu</i>	큰마루 <i>khunmalu</i>	climax	art
프롤로그 <i>phulolloku</i>	머리이야기 <i>meliiyaki</i>	prologue	art

Source: Nam and Ceng 1990: 89-101

The first three examples show total nativisation of Sino-Korean technical terms. *Tayhwa*, *pikong* and *tongmyen* were replaced with native words: *selomal* (*selo* 'each other', *mal* 'a talk' – each other-talk); *khokwumeng* (*kho* 'nose', *kwumeng* 'hole' – nose hole); and *kyewulcam* (*kyewul* 'winter', *cam* 'sleep' – winter sleep). The next two English loan words were replaced respectively with native words *khunmalwu* (*khun* 'big', *malwu* 'peak' – big peak) and *meliiyaki* (*meli* 'head', *iyaki* 'story' – head story).

Some examples of partially nativised technical terms, which are a combination of native and foreign elements, are:

Original Word	Revised Word	Gloss	Field of Study
포유동물학 <i>phoyutongmulhak</i>	짐승학 <i>cimsunghak</i>	mammalogy	biology
전기용량 <i>cenkiyonglyang</i>	전기들이 <i>cenkituli</i>	electric capacity	physics
멸균 <i>myelkyun</i>	균강그리죽이기 <i>kyunkkangkulicwukiki</i>	sterilisation	biology
레코드 <i>leykhotu</i>	소리판 <i>soliphan</i>	record	art
아치 <i>achi</i>	무지개형 <i>mucikayhyeng</i>	arch	construction

Source: Nam and Ceng 1990: 89-101

The first three new words are cases of partial nativisation of Sino-Korean words. *Phoyutongmulhak* (*phoyutongmul* 'mammal', *hak* 'science') is revised to *cimsunghak*. The Sino-Korean word meaning 'science', 학 *hak* is maintained in the new word, while *phoyutongmul* is replaced by the native equivalent, *cimsung*. *Cenkiyonglyang* (*cenki* 'electricity', *yonglyang* 'capacity') is replaced by the new word, *cenkituli*. The Sino-Korean word *cenki* is retained, while *yonglyang* is replaced by a common native word, *tuli* which is a measure unit for a bottle. In the derivative noun phrase *kyunkkangkulicwukiki* which replaces the Sino-Korean word *myelkyun* (*myel* 'destroy', *kyun* 'germ'), the original element, *kyun*, is retained and a circumlocution, *kkangkulicwukiki* (killing completely) is used to express the meaning of *myel*. *Kkangkuli* is a slang meaning 'completely, all' and *cwukiki* is a noun derived from the verb, 죽이다 *cwukita* (kill). The last two words in the table show partially nativised English loan words. *Soliphan* (sound board), a combination of the native noun, *sol* (sound) and the Sino-Korean word, *phan* (a board), replaces the word *lekotu* (record). *Achi* is replaced by *mucikayhyeng* (rainbow shape) which is made of a native word, *mucikay* (rainbow) and a word of Chinese origin, *hyeng* (shape).

When the original technical terms are non-Chinese loan words, new terms were not always made by adopting native or nativised words, but by using alternative Sino-Korean words, indicating that Sino-Korean words were tolerated in a greater degree than other loan words.

Original Word	New Word	Gloss	Field of Study
라지오드라마 <i>laciutulama</i>	방송극 <i>pangsongkuk</i>	radio drama	art
씨나리오 <i>ssinalio</i>	영화문학 <i>yenghwamunhak</i>	scenario	art
플라스크 <i>phullasukhu</i>	실험병 <i>silhempyeng</i>	flask	chemical science
알콜램프 <i>alkhollamphu</i>	알콜등잔 <i>alkholtungcan</i>	alcohol lamp	chemical science

Source: Nam and Ceng 1990: 89-101

The three English loan words, *laciutulama*, *ssinalio* and *phullasukhu* are replaced with Sino-Korean words, *pangsongkuk*, *yenghwamunhak* and *silhempyeng* respectively: *pangsongkuk* (*pangsong* 'broadcast', *kuk* 'play' – broadcast play); *yenghwamunhak* (*yenghwa* 'film', *munhak* 'literature' – film literature); and *silhempyeng* (*silhem* 'experiment', *pyeng* 'bottle' – experiment bottle). The last word, *alkhollamphu* is revised to *alkholtungcan* in which the original word *alkhol* (alcohol) is retained, but the English loan word, *lamphu* (lamp) is replaced by the corresponding Sino-Korean word, 등잔 *tungcan*.

3.3.3.5 Socio-political Terms

To designate socialist ideology and institutions and the people's new way of living, new coinage, semantic extension or semantic change of established words were employed.

The first kind of new coinage was related to Kim Il Sung's political ideology and Party policy. Words such as 주체사상 *Juchesasang* (the *Juche* idea), 유일사상체계 *yuisasangcheykyey* (Monolithic ideological system) and 붉은기사상 *pulkunkisasang* (Red banner idea) are some examples. The word, 주체 *Juche* became a key word upon which other expressions were built up: for example, 주체형의 피, *Juchehyenguy phi* (*Juche* type blood), 주체형의 공산주의혁명가 *Juchehyenguy kongsancwuyhyekmyengka* (*Juche* type communist revolutionary), 주체의 조국 *Juchey cokwuk* (*Juche* fatherland), 주체농법 *Juchenongpep* (*Juche* agriculture), 주체체육 *Juchecheyyuk* (*Juche* physical exercise), 주체음악 *Jucheumak* (*Juche* music) and 주체로동 *Juchelotong* (*Juche* labour). *Yuisasangcheykyey* is the principle that the Party should be guided and united by one ideology, the *Juche* idea.

Pulkunkisasang is known as Kim Jong Il's governing principle which has succeeded and developed the self-reliant spirit of the *Juche* idea. These words were regarded as the most complete and refined Korean words because they were created and enriched by Kim Il Sung and were the most important linguistic weapon serving the revolution. It was claimed that not only all North Koreans but all the revolutionary people in the world could learn Kim's revolutionary ideology only by means of these words (Choy and Mwun 1980: 153-154).

The second kind of new coinage was related to the Party's methods of ruling. Words such as 3대혁명 *samtayhyekmyeng* (Three-pronged revolution), 군중로선 *kwuncwunglosen* (Mass line), 령도레술 *lyengtoyeyswul* (Leadership art) and 속도전 *soktocen* (Speed battle) are some examples (Choy and Mwun 1980: 25, 154). *Samtayhyekmyeng* is a method of revolutionary guidance which combines ideological, technical and cultural revolutions. *Kwuncwunglosen* is the Party's principal method for mass mobilisation. *Lyengtoyeyswul* is an expression indicating that educating and organising the people for the revolution is similar to the creation of art, which should be subtle but bold. *Soktocen* means socialist fighting strategy to direct the people to carry out their working responsibility as much as, and as best as they can do within a limited time. There are also expressions derived from the word, *soktocen*, such as 속도전의 불바람 *soktocemy pulpalam* (fire wind of speed battle), which urges the people to work harder.

The third kind of new coinage was related to socialist institutions. These were the linguistic reflection of the people's life in North Korea, because they revealed the way the society was constructed and how the people were organised. Words such as 붉은 청년근위대 *pulkunchengnyenkunwitay* (Red youth guard), 3대혁명소조 *samtayhyekmyengsoco* (Three-pronged revolution squad), 밥공장 *papkongcang* (Rice factory) and 중앙공급대상 *cwungangkongkuptaysang* (Central supply group) are some examples. *Pulkunchengnyenkunwitay* is reserve troops consisting of high school students. *Samtayhyekmyengsoco* is a task force dispatched to promote the 'Three-pronged revolution' to every corner of the country, offices, factories and cooperative farms. *Papkongcang* is a place where people get cooked rice with ration tickets. It was made to free women's labour power from housework and to mobilise it fully for the development of national economy. *Cwungangkongkuptaysang* indicates a special group of people for whom the state provides a better salary, medical care and daily necessities,

compared to the 일반공급대상 *ilpankongkuptaysang* (General supply group) (Nam and Ceng 1990: 135-157).

There is also a group of words which were recognised as new words, not because they were newly coined, but because the meanings of the established words underwent semantic changes or semantic extension in order to accommodate the socialist ideas. Some words belonging to this group are listed below.

Words	Original Meaning	Newly Acquired Meaning
수양 <i>swuyang</i>	to cultivate one's mind	ideological struggle
궁전 <i>kwungcen</i>	palace	a big building used for revolutionary cause
로동 <i>lotong</i>	labour	mental and physical activities of human being to create social wealth
천리마 <i>chenlima</i>	excellent horse	revolutionary spirit of the people
승냥이 <i>sungrayng</i>	wolf	cunning, ferocious and cruel imperialist invader
어버이 <i>epei</i>	a parent	Kim Il Sung

Sources: Choy and Mwun 1980: 9; Choy Ceng-Hwu 1983: 299, 300; Kim Ceng-Swuk 1989: 237, 238

For the first three words, 수양 *swuyang*, 궁전 *kwungcen* and 로동 *lotong* whose original meanings were negatively defined in North Korea, new meanings favoured by the regime were created, while the old meanings were denied. *Swuyang*, which referred to a kind of idle escapism of the privileged class in the old society, namely "spending time on reading books in seclusion" (Choy and Mwun 1980: 9), became a new *Munhwae* word by acquiring a 'revolutionary meaning', that is, "ideological struggle to object to distorted and obsolete things and to establish a revolutionary world view" (Choy and Mwun 1980: 9). The meaning of *kwungcen* was changed from 'a place for the feudalistic ruler' to "a grand building used for political and cultural education of children and workers" (Kim Ceng-Swuk 1989: 237), and the meaning of *lotong*, from 'working torturing one's body' to "human being's mental and physical activities to create social wealth" (Choy Ceng-Hwu 1983: 299). Many new words were built upon the changed meaning.⁷ Some examples are: 소년궁전 (Boys Palace), 학생궁전 (Student Palace), 문화궁전 (Culture Palace), 예술궁전 (Art Palace) and 과학궁전 (Science Palace). For the next three words, new meanings were made by semantic

⁷ Regarding the word, *kwungcen*, there is an indication that the prolific use of the word was an influence from the Soviet Union where a word meaning 'palace' in Russian, *Dvorech* (palace), was commonly used to indicate public buildings (Park Ken-Sik 1989: 187).

extension from the original meanings. The new meanings became salient in the North Korean socio-political situation and new expressions were productively derived from them. For example, words such as 천리마운동 *chenlimawuntong* (*Chenlima* movement) and 천리마의 혁명정신 *chenlimay hyekmyengcengsin* (*Chenlima* revolutionary spirit) were derived from the word, *chenlima* (*Chenli* horse). ‘*Chenlima* movement’ was a mass mobilisation campaign for increasing the productivity of the workers. People were required to work hard like the legendary horse, *Chenlima* which was said to have run *chenli* (400Km) a day. The process of changing and extending the meaning of established words was appraised as the revolutionary refinement of language and as an act of restoring the genuine meaning of words by redefining them from the working class point of view (Choy Ceng-Hwu 1983: 300).

3.3.4 Implementation of Vocabulary Management

Vocabulary management was implemented as a part of national policy. The National Language Screening Committee was organised to guide and exercise social control over language use ensuring that state organs used language correctly in all documents. Under this committee, the ‘Eighteen Subcommittees for Revising Technical Terms’, which were responsible for revising new terms for 17 specific technical fields and for one general terms, were formed. The ‘National Place Name Screening Committee’ was created in September 1966 to investigate and change place names in accordance with the spirit of *Munhwae* (Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 28-33).

As for the proper method for carrying out vocabulary management, North Korean planners proposed a gradual and careful revision of vocabulary over a long period of time, as it was considered that disposing of many words at a time would hinder people’s everyday communication. Kim Il Sung disapproved of a proposed draft for “revising and putting into public use 20,000 words at a time” (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 290). Instead, he recommended that 5,000 to 6,000 words be revised first, and about the same number be considered only after the first batch of words would become widely accepted in the society (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 290). In this process of gradual management, priority was given to frequently used Sino-Korean words and other loan words.

The people's participation in vocabulary management was thought to be crucial to the success of the project. Based on Kim Il Sung's emphasis that "Language needs to go through the appraisal of the masses" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 289), North Korean linguists put forward a somewhat extreme proposal that they would "discuss widely with the people and accept their appraisal to change even a single loan word" (Choy Ceng-Hwu 1980: 175). People were called on to give opinions on the revised words through newspapers.

Considerable efforts were made to implement the vocabulary reforms through various channels. Firstly, the Party and government organisations were directed to take the initiative in using revised words in their activities. Then, every organisation in the smallest administrative units and every individual in each family were encouraged to follow the direction of the Party and the government.

Secondly, it was emphasised that educational bodies, especially schools, were strategic outposts to circulate the revised words into the entire society. Directed by Kim Il Sung's statement that "To spread our indigenous words, primary school is a springboard" and "New words should be introduced first to the first year pupils" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20), national language education, especially at lower grades, was strengthened. The national language curriculum was used as a primary source for implementing vocabulary management, so that the proposed new words were first introduced in national language classes. Words decided to be discarded were removed from school textbooks, and only words recognised as *Munhwae* found their places in the texts. In accordance with the progress of the vocabulary management, textbooks and teaching materials were revised every few years.

Teachers were instructed to use words which were important for developing *Munhwae* as a socialist and nationalistic language and to stimulate students to practice new words actively. Students were encouraged to play a leading role in spreading the revised words by practicing the words at home to encourage adults to change their old linguistic habits (Kim Pyeng-Cey 1975: 94-97). High school students were organised to participate in extra-curricula activities for the promotion of vocabulary management such as the *Haksayngmunhwawisayngkunwitay* (Student Guard for Cultural Hygiene), the *Munhwaesoco* (*Munhwae* Squad) and the *Maltatumkisoco* (Vocabulary Management Squad). The activities of the 'Student Guard for Cultural Hygiene' were

to promote the use of newly revised words in places such as factory, stores, theatres, bus and railway stations where students could draw public attention. The '*Munhwae* Squad' was a student club which organised activities such as debates, contests for memorising new words and making wall newspapers for the explanation of newly revised words (Ceng Kyeng-II 1989: 50).

Thirdly, mass media was called on to take the responsibility for the rapid and successful implementation of vocabulary management. Kim Il Sung ordered that newspapers and broadcasters adopt new words in a timely fashion so that their activities could be used as a channel for the wide distribution of *Munhwae*. Just after Kim's May 1966 speech, which directed the mass media to contribute to the implementation of vocabulary management, *Lotong sinmun* (Work Newspaper – major organ of the Party) contained a regular *Munhwae* column in which ten to fifteen revised words were introduced. The column also gave an account of readers' questions and the editor's explanations for the newly introduced words. The revised words were adopted as broadcasting terms, and special broadcasting hours were allocated for their promotion and explanation (Ceng Kyeng-II 1989: 52-53). Journalists and editors were warned not to show any liberal tendencies in their vocabulary use, and to be alert to the movement so that the new words could speedily appear in their publications. In addition, writers were forced to put newly sanctioned words in literary works, films and plays. Literary expressions which were seen to violate the guidelines for vocabulary use were harshly criticised as liberalistic and bourgeois. Special directions were given to scientists and technicians, that they should get permission from the National Language Screening Committee before coining and using any new terms (Choy and Mwun 1980: 139-146). A draft glossary of technical terms made in this manner were instructed to be used first in the Party and the state organs so that the terms could spread to lower units gradually (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 290-291). For the popularisation of the vocabulary management, *Munhwaehaksup* (Cultured Language Study) was founded in 1968 as a major organ of the 'Linguistics Research Centre' in the Academy of Social Science and has been playing a central role since that time. Also, these revised words found their place in the national language dictionaries published in the *Munhwae* period.

3.4 Dictionary Compilation

Dictionaries published in the *Munhwa* period were direct offspring of Kim Il Sung's 1964 and 1966 speeches. In the two speeches Kim strongly proposed that a dictionary should be a direct reflection of government language planning, guided by the idea of *Juche*. Dictionary compilation was to codify *Munhwa* prescriptions, such as rules for orthography, pronunciation, word spacing and punctuation, and standardised vocabularies. It aimed at regulating the language use of the people, not describing the actual language that people used. Kim ordered the linguists to undertake 'vocabulary screening' to "determine which of the words borrowed from Chinese ideographs we [North Koreans] will have to continue to use, and which of them we can discard" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 23) and to "boldly delete them [the words decided to be discarded] from the dictionary" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 23). The strong regulating function of the dictionary over the people's vocabulary usage was presented in Kim's statement that "you can hardly criticise someone for using words that are in the dictionary" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 23).

Major national language dictionaries included *Hyentaycosenmalsacen* (Modern Korean Dictionary) of 1968, *Cosenmunhwaesacen* (Cultured Korean Dictionary) of 1973 and *Hyentaycosenmalsacen* (Modern Korean Dictionary – 2nd edition) of 1981. These dictionaries adopted the rules about orthography, pronunciation, word spacing and punctuation which had been prescribed in the 1966 'Prescription'. As for the selection of words, revised native words were listed in large quantities, reflecting the vocabulary management directed by the nationalistic principle of *Munhwa* development. Words representing social and political institutions were specially highlighted as the most important *Munhwa* asset, so that the national language dictionary played a pivotal role in the political indoctrination of the public. Kim's speeches were extensively quoted, wherever possible, as the ultimate source to explain these socio-political entries. The quotations from Kim were so many in number and so long that the national language dictionaries of the *Munhwa* period appeared to be the selected works of Kim Il Sung. This shows that Kim's monopolisation of power in politics, after his successful purge of political opponents by the early 1960s, and the transformation of the *Juche* idea into a means of furthering his personality cult from the mid-1960s, granted him the power to define the world of words in his own way, and to urge the people to learn his interpretation of the world.

Hyentaycosenmalsacen (Modern Korean Dictionary – MKD), the first *Munhwae* dictionary after Kim's proclamation of North Korea's linguistic *Juche* in 1964 and 1966, was published in 1968. The MKD was compiled according to the new principle manifested in the two speeches. It aimed at incorporating the change in the language after the initiation of the *Munhwae* movement, and thus reforming workers' language usage. The self-reliant spirit of the time is also seen in the preface to the dictionary which expunged the phrase praising the Soviet Union's influence on the compilation of the 1962 'Korean Dictionary'.

The guiding principle for the selection of entries, was to exclude words in conflict with the nationalistic and socialist development of *Munhwae*, and to list only words which had been revised in the vocabulary management. Loan words were discarded and only 50,000 basic *Munhwae* words, including phrases and proverbs which were widely used among workers, were contained. For example, revised native words such as 짐짐송 *cipcimsung* (domestic animal) and 끌힘 *kkulhim* (gravitation), which replaced the Sino-Korean words, 가축 *kachwuk* and 인력 *inlyek*, were represented as entries. Exceptions to this principle of self-reliance were some widely used socio-political terms, most of which were Sino-Korean words. For these entries, however, origin was not specified and a broad term, *oyley* (foreign origin) was noted. Technical terms, which had been extensively introduced in the 'Korean Dictionary' of 1962, were excluded in the MKD, unless they were frequently referred to in the everyday conversation of ordinary people. Words which were viewed as pertaining to feudalism and moral decadence, obsolete expressions, and difficult Sino-Korean words were totally excluded.

In the explanation of entries, it was claimed in the preface to the dictionary that a special effort had been paid to solidify the Party's Unitary Thought System, which recognised the *Juche* as the single principle of the state and theorised the personality cult of Kim Il Sung. Providing Kim's speeches, bold-typed and asterisked, for the explanation of entries reveals such effort. Only word meanings which were currently used in North Korea were recognised, while old or rarely used meanings were abandoned. However, where the meaning of a word which was considered invalid in the society was listed in the dictionary, notes limiting the use of the word such as 'in the old society', 'in exploiting society', 'in capitalist society', 'in myth', 'in Buddhism' and 'in the past' were added, as in the 1962 'Korean Dictionary'.

In 1973 *Cosenmunhwaesacen* (Cultured Korean Dictionary) was published. As the dictionary was an extended revision of the MKD, the major direction of the dictionary compilation was maintained: it aimed at contributing to the development of the national language based on the idea of *Juche*, the revolutionary language practice of the people and the enhancement of workers' knowledge and cultural level.

In the selection and explanation of entries, efforts were made to fully reflect the Party's Unitary Thought System and to establish firmly the working class viewpoint. Six thousand seven hundred words which were chosen from Kim Il Sung's works and people's everyday language were listed as entries. It should be noted that not only were Kim's speeches used for explaining dictionary entries but also words Kim used in these speeches were adopted as entries in this dictionary. Although it was the dictionary's guiding principle to record revised words only, Sino-Korean words and other loan words which were widely used in socio-political life were taken as entries and were noted as *oylay* (foreign origin) as in the MKD. Some technical terms which had been totally excluded in the MKD were allowed in a limited fashion, if they were regarded as contributing to the development of science and technology. The defining notes which limited the use of some words, were also used in this dictionary: 'in the old society' 'in exploiting society', 'in capitalist society', 'in feudalistic society', and 'in old-fashioned customs'.

Hyentaycosenmalsacen (2nd edition), published in 1981, reveals a change in the direction of dictionary compilation. The number of dictionary entries was considerably increased to 130,000 and the range of entries was also broadened, compared to the previous *Munhwae* dictionaries. The change was urged by Kim Il Sung who had acknowledged that linguistic revolution could not be accomplished suddenly and had ordered the reintroduction of loan words in the national language dictionary in 1974 (Lee Sang-Hyek 1991: 27), while maintaining the broad principle announced in 1964 and 1966 speeches.

Entries were selected from Kim Il Sung's works, Party documents, revolutionary literature, school textbooks, popular scientific books, dialect and archaic words, and from frequently used Sino-Korean words. Commonly used South Korean words were also included, unless they were contradictory to the developmental principles of

Munhwae. Although the principle for selecting entries was to list revised words only, old words were also listed in some cases, if they were considered necessary for the understanding of books published before the beginning of vocabulary management. In these cases, however, definitions were not provided under the old words themselves, but only under the revised words, so that people had to look up the revised words if they wanted to find the meaning of the old words. A change from the previous *Munhwae* dictionaries is also found in the arrangement of word meanings. Not only the widely used but also old and rarely used meanings were included. The device of adding notes which limited the use of certain words, such as 'in exploiting society', was abolished. Explanations about pronunciation and grammar for the entries were also provided in detail.

These changes may render the impression that the puristic force in *Munhwae* language planning was somewhat eased in the MKD-2nd edition. The dictionary, however, further strengthened the ideological orientation introduced in the previous *Munhwae* dictionaries. As was proposed in the preface to the dictionary, the principle of explanation was to define the essence of words based on the *Juche* idea. The function of the dictionary as a medium of political indoctrination was highlighted to induce unconditional loyalty to Kim Il Sung and the Party. With this orientation, "every effort was made to quote every word and phrase from the classic works of the reverent great leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung and our Party documents" (Preface to the dictionary). The importance of political indoctrination, in fact, was a factor which pushed Kim to make a policy shift in dictionary compilation, ordering the reinstatement of loan words in the national language dictionary in 1974, in that socio-political terms which played a pivotal role in the ideological education were mainly Sino-Korean words.

To summarise, the language planning of North Korea since 1964 entered a new age of self-reliance in accordance with the immense changes in the political and ideological orientation of the state: the proclamation of political independence from its powerful neighbours, the Soviet Union and China, and the subsequent declaration of *Juche* as the guiding ideology of the state. Kim Il Sung's two speeches in 1964 and 1966 opened the period of linguistic *Juche* in a declarative sense, and this grand scheme for the language planning has been unaltered up to the present with only minor changes. Linguistic *Juche* viewed language as a durable bond which united the divided nation and as a crucial element in maintaining national pride and independence. In status

planning, linguistic *Juche* was realised as a form of the new standard language, *Munhwae*. In the corpus planning, radical purism, which condemned foreign words and praised indigenous words, was formulated to represent the self-authenticating spirit of the time. This trend was most clearly manifested in lexical purism, although it was also visible in other areas such as prescription of language rules and compilation of dictionaries.

Chapter 4

***The Munhwae* Period (1964~present): Standardisation of Language Usage and Recent Directions in *Munhwae* Planning**

This chapter deals mainly with the application of the linguistic *Juche* to the socio-political grammar of the North Korean society. The focus of the discussion is on the question: 'what is proper linguistic behaviour in North Korea?'. Two contrasting varieties of language usage: language of deference for the leader, Kim Il Sung; and language of contempt for the enemies of the state, are scrutinised. In the last section of this chapter, recent trends in *Munhwae* planning are briefly examined.

4.1 Standardisation of Language Usage

An important part of language planning in the *Munhwae* period was the development of standardised language usage. When speaking about or referring to Kim Il Sung, people were required to use language in a prescribed way in order to show their utmost respect to him. At the extreme opposite end of the spectrum to polite language, there was also a pejorative language which was designated to be used for certain groups of people categorised as enemies of the working class and the state. Negative emotions, such as hatred, anger and contempt, should be overtly expressed using this pattern of language. These language styles for the highest respect and hatred were the main linguistic repertoire strengthening the centripetal forces that "serve to unify and centralise the verbal-ideological world" (Bakhtin 1981: 271 cited in Shapiro 1988: 27). The ritualistic use of pejorative language, which constantly reminds the people of the wickedness of the world outside the state, could also lead the people to give thanks to the leader who has saved their lives from such destructive powers and has provided shelter from them. In the following two sections, these typical patterns of language

usage in *Munhwae* are presented, as they showcase the unique characteristics of language planning in North Korea, by integrating the state ideology, *Juche*, into language planning activities.

4.1.1 Language Use for Kim Il Sung

As the *Juche* idea places Kim Il Sung in the highest position among revolutionaries, a set of special language rules was developed for him. These rules were made different from the language etiquette governing ordinary people's everyday speech, and were intended to be exclusively used for him. It is claimed that these rules were promulgated due to the people's desire to show the highest respect to their leader.

The purpose of this section is to examine the language rules developed for Kim Il Sung. Various linguistic resources which were mobilised to make the language etiquette for Kim distinctive, including grammatical, lexical and syntactic devices, are discussed. It is argued that elements, which were claimed to be feudalistic and reactionary, and thus were to be expelled from *Munhwae*, were reinstated for developing this special form of language. It is also argued that there is a contradiction between the policy of adopting egalitarian language use between socialist comrades and the unequal language behaviour prescribed for the leader. This contradiction is, however, a linguistic realisation of *Juche*, in that the unequaled role of *swulyeng* (the supreme leader), who is conceptualised as the brain of the socio-political body, is central to the *Juche* idea.

4.1.1.1 Grammatical Means

In order to show respect in *Munhwae*, the suffix, 시 *si* is added to a predicate (verb, adjective or copula) describing the behaviour, condition or characteristics of a superior person. If more than one predicate is used in a sentence, *si* is not attached to every predicate but only to the final one (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 77). In the example below, *si* may be attached to such verbs as 타다 *thata* (take), 가다 *kata* (go) and 보았다 *poassta* (watched), but is added only to the last predicate, changing the verb into the honorific form 보셨다 *posyessta* (보 'po(see)-verb stem' + 시 'si' + 았 'ess-past tense' + 다 'ta' - statement).

할아버님은	기차를	타고	평양에	올라가서
<i>halapenimun</i>	<i>kichalul</i>	<i>thako</i>	<i>pyengyange</i>	<i>ollakase</i>
grandfather	train	take-and	Pyongyang-to	go-and

혁명이극까지 보냈답니다.

hyekmyengkakukkkaci *posyesstapnita*
 revolutionary play-even watch-si-past- is said

(Grandfather is said to have taken a train, gone up to Pyongyang and even have watched a revolutionary play.)¹

When Kim Il Sung is the subject, *si* should be attached to every predicate (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 115-117): *thasita* 'tha(take)-*si*-ta' and *kasita* 'ka(go)-*si*-ta' in addition to *posyessta* (watch-*si*-ed).

위대한	수령님께서는	기차를	타시고	평양에
<i>witayhan</i>	<i>swulyengnimkkeysenun</i>	<i>kichalul</i>	<i>thasiko</i>	<i>Pyengyange</i>
great	leader	train	take- <u>si</u> -and	Pyongyang-to

올라가서서 혁명이극까지 보냈답니다
ollakasyese *hyekmyengkakukkkaci* *posyesstapnita*
 go-si (and) revolutionary play-even watch-si-past-is said.

(The great leader is said to have taken a train, gone up to Pyongyang and even have watched a revolutionary play.)

Although this repetitive use of the honorific suffix, *si* in one sentence is not foreign to South Koreans, it has been used in limited contexts only: for example, when someone tries to flatter others.

A similar trend is found when a noun is qualified by an honorific modifier. In *Munhwae*, *si* can be added to modifiers of human nouns as in 다정하신 선생님 *tacenghasin sensayngnim* 'tacengha(kind)-si-n teacher'² and 돌아가신 아버지 *tolakasim apeci* 'tolaka(passed-by)-si-n father', while it is not attached to a modifier of non-human nouns as in 뜨거운 사랑 *ttukewun salang* (warm love) and 너그러운 마음 *nekulewun maum* (generous heart). This rule, however, changes when something

¹ Examples in this chapter are from Kim Tong-Swu (1983) and Lee Sang-Pyek (1975), but the pages in the original sources are not quoted. For the purpose of clear presentation, some of the examples are modified.

² The morpheme '-n', following the honorific suffix -*si*-, attaches to a verb or adjective modifying nouns.

related to Kim Il Sung (personality, appearance or parts of his body) is concerned (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 78, 119). For example, 뜨거우신 사랑 '*ttukewu^{sin} salang*' '*ttukewu* (warm)-*si-n* love [of Kim Il Sung]' instead of *ttukewun salang* and 너그러우신 마음 *nekulewu^{sin} maum* '*nekulewu*(generous)-*si-n* heart [of Kim Il Sung]' instead of *nekulewun maum* should be used. When there is more than one modifier referring to something related to Kim, each of these should be followed by *si* as in 크시고도 넓으신 마음 *khusikoto nelpu^{sin} maum* '*khu*(large)-*si-ko*(and)-*to*(also) *nelpu*(broad)-*si-n* mind [of Kim Il Sung]'.

Another measure used to mark the highest possible level of respect is to add a particle, 읍/오 *op/o* after *si* (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 120) as in the following example.

하루라도 <i>halwulato</i> one day even	한시라도 <i>hansilato</i> one hour even	편히 <i>phyenhi</i> comfortably	쉬시옵기를 <i>swisiopkilul</i> rest- <i>si-op</i> -wish-objective marker
수령님 <i>swulyengnim</i> dear leader	수령님 <i>swulyengnim</i> dear leader	인민들은 <i>inmintulun</i> people	바라옵니다 <i>palaopnita</i> wish- <i>op</i> -polite ending

(Dear leader, leader, people wish you to rest comfortably for even one day, even one hour.)

The addition of *op/o* is used exclusively for Kim and, by providing alternative expressions, it enlarges the repertoire of respectful expressions for Kim. This concomitant use of honorific particles, *op/o* and *si* is also found in South Korea, but in limited contexts only: for example, when someone prays to God or composes a poem.

In Korean, four particles such as 은/는/이/가 (*un/mun/i/ka*) and one honorific subject marker, 께서 (*kkeyse*) are generally suffixed to a subject. *Kkeyse* is sometimes followed by the particle, 는 *nun*. Although the degree of respect expressed by *kkeyse* and *kkeyse^{nun}* would be the same, the latter is more frequently used in a formal situation and, as a small pause is normally placed after pronouncing *kkesenun*, it sounds more polite. Terms of reference for Kim Il Sung may be followed by either *kkeyse* or *kkeyse^{nun}*, but the form *kkeyse^{nun}* is almost exclusively reserved for Kim. In subject position, then, the structure which is adopted to show the highest respect for Kim consists of a referential term, an honorific title (*nim* or *tongci*), the honorific subject case (*kkeyse*) and the particle, *nun*:

김일성동지께서는
KimIlSungtonckikkeyse~~nun~~
 Kim Il Sung-comrade-*kkeyse-nun*

수령님께서는
swulyengnimkkeyse~~nun~~
 leader-nim-*kkeyse-nun*

As *kkeyse* or *kkeyse~~nun~~* may be applied to ordinary people, an additional measure is taken to make the mode of referring to Kim distinctive. Referential terms for Kim rarely appear without a modifier, which contains semantic properties of 'grandeur', 'greatness' and 'genius'. Accordingly, when one wants to refer to Kim, a long phrase is required, as in the example below:

경애하는	김일성동지께서는
<i>kyengayhanun</i>	<i>KimIlSungtonckikkeysenun</i>
respected and beloved	Kim Il Sung-comrade- <i>kkeyse-nun</i>

위대하신	수령님께서는
<i>witayhasin</i>	<i>swulyengnimkkeysenun</i>
great	leader-nim- <i>kkeyse-nun</i>

The maximisation of contrast in the degree of respect accorded to Kim is also achieved by prohibiting the application of the usual polite language forms to those who are mentioned in the same sentence as Kim (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 130). For example, *kkeyse* is usually attached to grandfather and grandmother, who are seniors to a speaker. However, when grandfather is referred to together with Kim, the plain particles suffixed to a subject, *ka* or *nun* replace the honorific subject marker, *kkeyse*.

우리	할아버지께서	이야기하시는데...
<i>wuli</i>	<i>halapecikkeyse</i>	<i>iyakihasinuntey...</i>
our	grandfather- <i>kkeysse</i>	say- <i>si</i> ...

But:

우리	할아버지가	이야기하는데	김일성	장군님께서는...
<i>wuli</i>	<i>halapecika</i>	<i>iyakihanuntey</i>	<i>KimIlSung</i>	<i>cangkunnimkkeysenun ...</i>
our	grandfather- <i>ka</i>	say	Kim Il Sung	general-nim- <i>kkeyse-nun</i> ...

(Our grandfather said dear general Kim Il Sung ...)

In the above example, this way of elevating the degree of respect for Kim Il Sung, is also applied to the honorific suffix *si* in the predicate. In the first example, *si* is added to the verb, 'say', whereas in the second, *si* is deleted to elevate the degree of respect

towards Kim. A similar effect is also obtained when derogatory terms of reference are used to designate oneself in relation to Kim (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 130-131).

어버이수령님	이	늙은게	무엇이길레	은정을	베풀어주십니까.
<i>epeiswulyengnim</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>nulkunkey</i>	<i>muesikilley</i>	<i>uncengul</i>	<i>peyphulecwusipnikka.</i>
dear parent leader	this	old thing	what like	favour	bestow-give-si-nikka.

(Dear parent leader! How come you bestow favour to this old thing.)

This example shows the extreme end of lowering the status of the speaker to convey the highest respect to Kim Il Sung. The speaker who is an old person uses an address term, 'dear parent leader' for Kim, while he (or she) calls himself (herself) 'this old thing'.

4.1.1.2 Modes of Referring to Kim Il Sung

The suffix, 님 *nim* is attached to terms of address to deliver respect for a person referred to. In *Munhwae*, the application of *nim* to an occupational title was considered an inappropriate language practice for a revolutionary country, because the use was seen as a reflection of feudalistic and reactionary social relations (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 98). The use of *nim*, however, has not disappeared completely in *Munhwae*, but the occasions where it is used have been restricted. *Nim* is frequently used when referring to Kim. However, as *nim* can be used for ordinary people, additional measures are employed to make the mode of referring to Kim distinctive. Firstly, when his name is mentioned, his full name is obligatorily used, followed by a title and *nim* as in 김일성장군님 *KimIlSungcangkwnnim* (dear general, Kim Il Sung), 김일성원수님 *KimIlSungwenswnim* (dear chief of the state, Kim Il Sung). Secondly, nouns such as 우리 *wuli* (our), 어버이 *epei* (parent) and 아버지 *apeci* (father) are required to express the "endless pride and dignity of having the great leader as a real parent" (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 129) as in 우리 수령님 *wuli swulyengnim* (dear our leader) and 어버이수령님 *epeiswulyengnim* (dear parent leader). Thirdly, adjective(s) such as 위대하신 *witayhasin* (great), 경애하는 *kyengayhanun* (respected and beloved) and 영명하신 *yengmyenghasin* (sagacious) are commonly added to enhance the degree of respect toward Kim Il Sung. As more than one adjective can be used together, one can refer to Kim in a quite complicated way.³

³ Other expressions referring to Kim Il Sung are: 'wise creator and builder', 'genius of thought',

위대하시고 영명하신 김일성원수님
witayhasiko *yengmyenghasin* Kim Il Sung + *wenswu* + *nim*
 great-*si*-and sagacious-*si*-n Kim Il Sung-chief of the state-*nim*
 (great and sagacious, dear chief of the state Kim Il Sung)

4.1.1.3 Lexical Means

One of the ways to show the highest respect by lexical means, is to reserve certain words only for Kim Il Sung. Another method is to select words which have been rarely used in ordinary conversation, and to apply them only to Kim. The table below presents examples of verbs which can be labelled as 'words for Kim Il Sung only'. As the honorific suffix, *si* always accompanies the verbs used for Kim, basic verb forms in the table are presented in honorific form.

Basic Verb Form Used for Kim	Gloss	Plain Form Without Honorific Suffix - <i>si</i> -	Native Counterpart
교시하시다 <i>kyosihasita</i>	teach	교시하다 <i>kyosihata</i>	가르치다 <i>kaluchita</i>
친솔하시다 <i>chinsolhasita</i>	guide in person	친솔하다 <i>chinsolhata</i>	몸소 이끌다 <i>momso ikkulta</i>
현지지도하시다 <i>hyencicitohasita</i>	guide on the spot	현지지도하다 <i>hyencicito-hata</i>	-
령도하시다 <i>lyengtohasita</i>	lead	령도하다 <i>lyengto-hata</i>	이끌다 <i>ikkulta</i>
통솔하시다 <i>thongsolhasita</i>	lead, command	통솔하다 <i>thongsol-hata</i>	이끌다 <i>ikkulta</i>
선물하시다 <i>senmulhasita</i>	give a present	선물하다 <i>senmul-hata</i>	-
심려하시다 <i>simlyehasita</i>	concern	심려하다 <i>simlyehata</i>	걱정하다 <i>kekcenghata</i>
보살피시다 <i>posalphisita</i>	take care of	보살피다 <i>posalphita</i>	돌보다 <i>tolpota</i>

Source: Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 124

The first two examples in the table are cases in which infrequently used verbs in everyday speech are appropriated for Kim Il Sung. The others are words which are

'peerless patriot', 'supreme brain of the nation', 'leader of the third world', 'the red sun of the oppressed people of the world', 'lode star of our times', 'ever victorious and wise general', 'hero of the 20th century', 'the sun of the world' and 'the greatest leader in a 1000 years' (McCormack 1981: 55).

used in everyday speech, but are reserved only for Kim. One common characteristic regarding these verbs is that all but the last, *posalphisita* are words of Chinese origin. This may be due to the fact that such words have been used mostly by the learned and, accordingly, retain connotations of respect and politeness. As the use of these verbs is specified for Kim, their native equivalents are used for common people. In addition, these verbs have the common semantic feature of 'guidance' and 'care'. These properties are what the North Korean regime has tried to establish as the image of Kim, 'the benevolent ruler', so that by being repetitively heard and spoken, these images could be unconsciously inscribed on the people's hearts and minds.

A similar rule of using Sino-Korean and native words separately, is applied to several nouns related to Kim Il Sung, so that 안광 *ankwang* instead of 눈빛 *nwunpich* (the eye light), 안색 *ansayk* instead of 얼굴빛 *elkwulpich* (complexion), 존함 *conham* instead of 이름 *ilum* (name) and 저택 *cethayk* instead of 집 *cip* (house) are used for Kim Il Sung (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 127). As is the case for verbs, the former in each pair is a Sino-Korean word, while the latter is a native counterpart.

Usage of some words was changed to express the highest respect for Kim in *Munhwae*. An honorific transitive verb, 모시다 *mosita* (take, put) is a good example. In everyday conversation, *mosita* is used only when its object is human, so that one can 'mosita (take) one's parents to the garden' but cannot 'mosita (take) one's dog to the garden'. This rule changes when things related to Kim are involved. *Mosita* should be used to refer to taking or putting Kim's photo, statue, portrait, or monument in a certain place (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 93, 94, 125) as in the example below:

그들은	집들이날	위대한	수령님의	초상화를	정중히	모시였다.
<i>Kutulun</i>	<i>ciptuli nal</i>	<i>witayhan</i>	<i>swulyengnimuy</i>	<i>chosanghwalul</i>	<i>cengcwunghi</i>	<i>mosiyessta</i>
they	new moving day	great	leader's	portrait	politely	<i>mosi-past</i>

(They politely put the great leader's portrait into the new house on moving day.)

4.1.1.4 Syntactic Means

Korean is a SOV language, and in ordinary Korean sentences the subject normally comes first. The language etiquette for Kim Il Sung prescribes that expressions related to Kim should come first, irrespective of whether or not the new sequence conforms to

this general principle of Korean word order (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 130). Switching words from the canonical order is permissible for the purpose of focus or emphasis in Korean, as in many languages. However, the new word order principle in *Munhwae* is not related to communicative purposes but to the need to show the highest respect for Kim. For example:

위대한	수령	김일성동지께	그이의	탄생	70 돌을
<i>witayhan</i>	<i>swulyeng</i>	<i>KimIlSungtongcikke</i>	<i>kuiuy</i>	<i>thansayng</i>	<i>70tolsul</i>
great	leader	Kim Il Sung-comrade- <i>kkey</i>	his	birth	70th anniversary

맞으며	여러나라	지도자들	축전을	삼가	드리였다.
<i>macumye</i>	<i>yelenala</i>	<i>citocatuli</i>	<i>chwukcemul</i>	<i>samka</i>	<i>tuliyessta</i>
meeting,	many country	leaders- <i>i</i>	congratulatory message	respectfully	presented

(To the great leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung, leaders of many countries respectfully presented congratulatory messages on his 70th birthday.)

In ordinary speech, the example should be written as:

여러나라	지도자들이	그이의	탄생	70 돌을	맞으며	위대한
<i>yelenala</i>	<i>citocatuli</i>	<i>kuiuy</i>	<i>thansayng</i>	<i>70tolsul</i>	<i>macumye</i>	<i>witayhan</i>
many country	leaders- <i>i</i>	his	birth	70th anniversary	meeting,	great

수령	김일성동지께	삼가	축전을	드리였다.
<i>swulyeng</i>	<i>KimIlSungtongcikke</i>	<i>samka</i>	<i>chwukcemul</i>	<i>tuliyessta</i>
leader	Kim Il Sung-comrade- <i>kkey</i>	respectfully	congratulatory message	presented

(Leaders of many countries respectfully presented congratulatory messages to the great leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung on his 70th birthday.)

In the example, syntactic, grammatical and lexical means are used to conform to the respectful language usage for Kim Il Sung. First, the subject, 'leaders of many countries', appears only after constituents carrying messages about Kim: a term of reference for him, 'great leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung' and a constituent containing a message related to him, his birthday. Second, the highest respect for Kim Il Sung is marked by a differential application of honorific and non-honorific grammatical case morphemes: the honorific dative case, *kkey* for Kim compared to the plain subject case, *i* for the leaders of other countries. Third, vocabulary items are selected to show the highest respect: 삼가 *samka* 'respectfully' conveys a message that the agent is of lower-status than Kim; and 드리다 *tulita* 'present' is an honorific Korean verb, describing an action politely. In addition, the vocabulary selected to refer to other countries' leaders, *citoca*, literally means a 'person who leads' and contrasts with the

word used for Kim Il Sung, *swulyeng*, literally meaning a 'head leader'. In this way, the contrast also conveys the supremacy of Kim Il Sung over other national leaders. Although none of the words, *swulyeng* or *citoca* are native Korean, the latter is more nativised than the former and is commonly used for ordinary cases. *Swulyeng* 'the supreme leader' had been used only for Lenin or Stalin, but began to be applied exclusively to Kim Il Sung from the late 1960s (Suh Dae-Sook 1988: 167).

Overall, the sentence seems to give two messages. An explicit message is that leaders of other countries sent congratulations to Kim Il Sung on his 70th birthday. An implicit message is that leaders of other countries, who are Kim's inferiors, pay great respect to him. At an unconscious level, this kind of language usage over a long period of time has the potential to create the image that Kim Il Sung is superior to leaders of other countries, and is leading the world. As such, this pattern of discourse appears to be one way of justifying the leadership cult of Kim Il Sung in North Korea.

A further example of this syntactic manipulation is:

위대한	수령	김일성동지를	모시고	회의가	열렸다.
<i>witayhan</i>	<i>swulyeng</i>	<i>KimIlSungtongcilul</i>	<i>mosiko</i>	<i>hoyuyka</i>	<i>yellyessta</i>
great	leader	KimIlSung-comrade-lul	have-with	meeting-ka	held

(Respectfully in the presence of the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, the meeting was held.)

In this example, the object noun phrase 'the great leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung', precedes the subject. As the object marker, *lul* does not have an honorific form, politeness and respect for Kim are shown by the term, 'the great leader' and the polite verb, 모시다 *mosita* (have ...with).

At a surface level, this syntactic manipulation is a means of conveying the highest respect toward the leader. At a deeper lever, however, this seems to be an attempt to remould the Korean language structure, and to perpetuate the social hierarchy of the state, by changing language structure to convey political messages. Although it is not easy to determine how far this new word order is observed in actual language use, the existence of such a rule itself is very important for understanding the characteristics of language planning in North Korea.

4.1.1.5 Written language

The *Munhwae* etiquette prescribed that honorific linguistic means were to be removed from the written language, except for a few cases, such as private correspondence or dialogues in literature (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 148). This is because the relative matrix of social position and age, by which people adjust their rank as a linguistic superior or inferior, is ambiguous in writing and the audience is diverse and unknown. "Even an elderly person of a high social position, who can be considered a superior in a general sense, is not a superior in relation to the general public. The person can command such a superior position only in a certain group of people" (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 148). This rule does not apply to Kim Il Sung who is the absolute superior to all North Korean people. Accordingly, a writer should "thoroughly express respectful language etiquette to a person [Kim Il Sung] for whom the greatest respect should be paid" (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 148). This respectful language is also demanded for Kim's parents and his eldest son, Kim Jong Il.

4.1.1.6 Media Language

The media was another field in which language was used to show respect and admiration toward Kim Il Sung.⁴ The primary mission of the North Korean broadcast media was to explain and promote Kim's works and speeches. An announcer delivering Kim's works and speeches should present him/herself as a genuine communist moulded by the *Juche* idea, who would willingly sacrifice his/her life for the leader (Lee Sang-Pyek 1975: 356). Therefore, explaining Kim's ideas and reporting his activities properly were the most important goal of broadcast activities in North Korea. In broadcast language, prescriptions to report anything related to Kim Il Sung covered not only the use of the respectful language, but pronunciation, voice quality, speed and pausing.

First, Kim's name should be pronounced slowly, politely and carefully. A pause was required just before, and after pronouncing his name. When quoting Kim's speeches, a similar approach was required. A long pause (two or three beats) should be made

⁴ This part on the media language etiquette for Kim Il Sung is based on Lee Sang-Pyek (1975) in which a number of recommendations about how broadcasters should treat Kim Il Sung is presented.

before beginning, and after finishing the quotation from Kim, in order to differentiate Kim's speech from the announcer's talk. This pause was also to be observed, even where the quotation comes in the middle of a sentence. Second, an alternating use of the two modes of speaking – speaking style and reading style – was recommended. If 'reading style' is appropriate for delivering the quotation from Kim, the preceding message should be done in 'speaking style' and vice versa. Third, modification of voice pitch and voice quality should be fully utilised. For instance, changing the voice to a lower or higher pitch separates the quotation from Kim from previous sentences. Different voice quality was recommended in accordance with the kind of message contained in the quotation: a low and clear voice for messages conveying his guidance and directions for a certain field; a thick voice for messages containing his strong revolutionary will; and a deep voice for messages concerning his parental love and care for the people. Finally, slowing down the speed of speech was utilised, as a low speed was thought suitable to show respect and politeness while faster speed showed contempt and hatred. Words of respect and admiration for Kim should be pronounced slowly all the time to highlight the significance of the message and to express reverence toward him (Lee Sang-Pyek 1975: 355-375).

4.1.1.7 The Role of Education in the Dissemination of the Special Language for Kim Il Sung

The language of the highest respect for Kim was systematically instilled through formal education. The teaching of honorific expressions designated for him was clearly perceived as not only a medium for ideological education, but also an excellent tool for cultivating loyalty to Kim Il Sung.

The ultimate aim of education in North Korea was to raise the future generation as loyal soldiers of Kim. Therefore, the most important part of national language curricula was ideological education, with the intention of establishing the leadership cult of Kim Il Sung by teaching his political ideology, *Juche*. Kim's speeches and writings which admired his family heritage, his childhood, his personality and his revolutionary background were used as major materials in national language classes. The honorific language used for Kim was to be thoroughly observed in teaching these materials and students were required to practice it without fail. Also, conversations between students

and their teacher about Kim Il Sung and the teacher's instruction about Kim should demonstrate 'endless care and respect' (Pyongyang Teachers' College (PTC) and Haycwu Teachers' College (HTC) 1973: 190-195, 199-208).

Vocabulary and expressions describing Kim's revolutionary ideology, wise leadership and lofty morality, and expressions implying the people's loyalty and respect for him were instructed to inculcate 'everlasting loyalty' to Kim, and these were taught separately from words for general use. A distinction should also be made between reading Kim's speeches and writings and those of ordinary people. Kim's works should be read with utmost politeness, modulating speed, tone of voice and pause, while these were not required for other people's works. Literacy was regarded as a solid tool for ingrainning unconditional respect and loyalty. Teachers were ordered to remind students at all times that they should learn to read and write only to become faithful children of the 'dear parent leader'. In addition, teachers were to instill happiness for reading and writing the leader's honourable name and for learning his revolutionary ideas (PTC and HTC 1973: 77, 81-83).

4.1.2 Pejorative Language Use

A separate form of language was developed to refer to the enemies of the working class and the state in *Munhwae*. Although enemies could be anyone whom the North Korean regime regarded as being against its policy, the most frequently referred to were "American and Japanese imperialists, the puppet South Korean regime and its reactionary forces including capitalists, landowners and bureaucrats" (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 180). The active use of words and expressions displaying North Koreans' strong negative attitude towards these enemies was seen as playing a pivotal role "in maintaining a working class viewpoint and stimulating their fighting spirit against hindrance in completing the socialist revolution" (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 180).

A group of transitive verbs describing violent action was exclusively used in relation to 'enemies'. Some examples of these verbs are: 때려부시다 *ttaylyepusita* (smash up by hitting), 까부시다 *kkapusita* (smash up by kicking), 족치다 *cokchita* (destroy completely or force someone to do something), 후려치다 *hwulyechita* (hit with a whip), 박살내다 *paksalnayta* (beat a person to death), 까눕히다 *kkanwuphita* (kick

a person down), 쳐죽이다 *chyecwukita* (crush to death) and 각을뜨다 *kakulttuta* (cut something into parts) (Lee Sang-Pyek 1975). These action verbs were most commonly used to display North Koreans' resolute will to fight against their enemies.

Words indicating negative human nature and aggressive behaviour were extensively used to describe enemies. Some examples of these words are 야만적 *yamancek* (barbaric), 파렴치한 *phalyemchihan* (shameless), 간악한 *kanakhan* (wicked), 악귀와같은 *akkwiwakathun* (devil-like), 독살스럽다 *toksalsulepta* (venomous), 사납다 *sanapta* (fierce, violent), 살벌하다 *salpelhata* (brutal, warlike), 교만하다 *kyomanhata* (arrogant), 간살스레 *kansalsuley* (deceitfully), 간교하다 *kankyohata* (cunning, sly), 학살하다 *haksalhata* (slaughter), 침략하다 *chimlyakhata* (invade), 교살하다 *kyosalhata* (strangle a person to death) and 교란하다 *kyolanhata* (throw into confusion) (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 96).

The semantic domain of these words is categorically dissimilar to that of the 'flowery and grandiose' words which were exclusively used for referring to Kim Il Sung's personality and behaviour. There should not be any semantic overlap between the words used for enemies and those used for Kim, because these words are linguistic projections of the North Korean regime's dualistic conceptualisation of the world, where Kim is the finest emblem of the 'good' and his enemies are at the heart of evil. In the semantics of *Munhwae*, the dichotomy of good and evil is clear, and there is little deviation from expressing the completeness of the leader's good and the enemies' evil.

Words with derogatory connotations are an especially rich source for pejorative language use. For example, the English word, 'face' can be represented by different Korean words according to the speaker's attitude towards the person referred to: 얼굴 *elkwul* with neutral nuance, while 낯짝 *nacccak* or 상판 *sangphan* with despising and hateful nuance. People who abide by the social rules of North Korea should express contempt and hatred to enemies by using derogatory terms. This language usage has become so typified that there is little room for an individual to manoeuvre these in their public language use. Some examples of these pejorative words are:

Neutral Word	Pejorative Word	Gloss
머리 <i>meli</i>	대가리 <i>taykali</i> , 대갈통 <i>taykalthong</i> , 골통 <i>kolthong</i> , 대갈뺨기 <i>taykalppayki</i>	head
이마 <i>ima</i>	이마뺨기 <i>imappayki</i>	forehead
입 <i>ip</i>	아가리 <i>akali</i> , 주둥이 <i>cwutwungi</i>	mouth
목 <i>mok</i>	모가지 <i>mokaci</i>	neck
눈 <i>nwun</i>	눈깔 <i>nwunkkal</i>	eye
턱 <i>thek</i>	턱주加里 <i>thekcwukali</i>	chin
다리 <i>tali</i>	다리갱이 <i>talikayngi</i>	leg
말하다 <i>malhata</i>	아가리질하다 <i>akalicilhata</i> , 씨벌리다 <i>ssipellita</i> , 혀바닥을 놀리다 <i>hyepatakul nollita</i> , 지껄이다 <i>cikkelita</i>	speak
먹다 <i>mekta</i>	쳐넣다 <i>chyenehta</i> , 퍼넣다 <i>phenehta</i>	eat
죽다 <i>cwukta</i>	웨지다 <i>tweycita</i> , 때드리지다 <i>ppetulecita</i>	die

Source: Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 94-96, 106

To refer to enemies, North Koreans should use swear words such as *놈* *nom* and 새끼 *saykki* (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 99), which can be roughly translated as 'bastard'. Some examples of this mode of language use are: 왜놈 *waynom* (Japanese bastard), 족발이왜놈 *ccokpaliwaynom* (cloven-footed Japanese bastard), 미국놈 *mikwuknom* (American bastard), 미제놈 *miceynom* (American imperialist bastard), 미제승냥이 *micesungnyanginom* (American imperialist wolf bastard), 선교사놈 *senkyosanom* (missionary bastard), 지주놈 *cicwunom* (landowner bastard), and 자본가새끼 *caponkasaykki* (capitalist bastard).

As is the case of the language of respect for Kim Il Sung, the pejorative words are combined with each other to express the strongest contempt and hatred for the enemies. A good example is:

간악한	미제	승냥이놈의	대갈통을	때려부시자!
<i>kanakhan</i>	<i>mice</i>	<i>sungnyanginomuy</i>	<i>taykalthongul</i>	<i>ttaylyepusica</i>
wicked	American imperialist	wolf bastard	head	smash up by hitting!

(Smash up the head of the wicked wolf, American imperialist bastard by hitting!)

Because the words and expressions to describe the enemies were provided as a fixed format and any violation of this prescriptive language use would place the speaker in the position of an enemy, there is no room for speakers to think reflectively to evaluate the nature of their enemies. Teaching the pejorative language, therefore, has been a part of ideological education for cultivating anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist

consciousness. Teachers are instructed to take every opportunity to make students practice this particular language in national language classes (PTC and HTC 1973: 192-193, 196-197).

In the sections above, the two contrasting varieties of *Munhwae* which are at the ends of the dichotomous world view of the North Korean regime have been presented: the language of the highest respect designated for Kim Il Sung and the pejorative language specified for the enemies of the working class and the state. Linguistic means including lexical, grammatical and syntactic devices to show respect in the Korean language were fully mobilised to express people's loyalty toward Kim as highly as possible, whereas pejorative terms conveying contempt, anger and hatred were actively employed for the enemies. Regarding formal characteristics, abundant use of Sino-Korean words and honorific grammatical means for Kim are sharply contrasted with a lack of those elements for the enemies. In the semantics of *Munhwae*, therefore, the leader is perfectly good, while his enemies are perfectly evil. At the same time, expressing strong hatred towards evil enemies is thought to be as righteous and beautiful as expressing the highest honour to the leader, who guides the people to victory in the sacred battle of 'good and evil'. In this manner, the language of respect and hatred could strengthen the centripetal forces of the state. The official stimulation of hatred and contempt against the world outside the system contributed to the unity of the state, just as the reverence and loyalty toward the leader did.

So far, the major part of the *Munhwae* period, from its beginning to peak has been discussed. This part can be called a heyday of language purism, which stuck to the developmental principle of the national language proposed by Kim Il Sung in his 1964 and 1966 speeches. In the following section recent changes in the language planning of North Korea are briefly discussed.

4.2 Recent Directions in *Munhwae* Planning

Recent language planning in North Korea shows several changes. First of all, there is a noticeable increase in acknowledging Kim Jong Il's contribution to language planning since the mid-1980s. Second, the relationship between language and nation is more strongly emphasised as the single most important symbol of the nation than before.

This emphasis accorded with Kim Il Sung's statement that the nation was more important than revolution and ideology, and was further reinforced by Kim Jong Il's advocacy of 'the Supremacy of the (North) Korean Nation' (*Cosenmincokceyilcwuuy*) (Lee Cong-Sek 1995: 110-115). Thirdly, the strong purification drive seems to have somewhat lessened since the publication of a collection of *Revised Words* (1986), although *Juche* has maintained its role as the fundamental principle guiding language planning.

Lexical purism, which was initiated in earnest after Kim Il Sung's two speeches in 1964 and 1966, produced a series of collections of revised words in 1977, 1978, 1982 and finally in 1986. What was noticeable in the final collection of revised words was that almost half of revised words, which had reached to 50,000 by 1986, was removed (Choy Yun-Kap 1994: 267-278). Some Sino-Korean and other loan words, which had been replaced with native words or had been revised into nativised words, were reinstated. Both revised and original words were recognised in some cases, while some revised words were further modified.

This change was supported by Kim Jong Il, who pointed out that "there are no small number of ambiguous and awkward native circumlocutions as a result of unnecessary replacement of nativised Sino-Korean words" (Choy Yun-Kap 1994: 268). He enumerated several examples of such revised native circumlocutions: 나오는 사람들 *naomun salamtul* (people appearing) for the Sino-Korean word, 배역 *payyek* (cast); 책찍은날 *chaykccikunnal* (the day when a book was printed) for 인쇄날짜 *inswaynalcca* (printing date); and 책찍은곳 *chaykccikunkos* (the place where a book was printed) for 인쇄공장 *inswaykongcang* (printing factory).

The selective acceptance of previous outcomes of lexical purism was clearly seen in the new Korean language dictionary published in 1992. In some cases, nativised words contained in the *Revised Words* (1986) were discarded and the original words were reinstated, as was the case for 아이스크림 *aisukhulim* (ice cream) instead of 얼음보숭이 *elumposwungil* (ice-lump). In other cases, both original and revised words appeared as entries, as was the case for 레코드 *leykhotu* (record) and 소리판 *soliphan* (sound board), and 카텐 *khatheyn* (curtain) and 창가림 *changkalim* (window cover). In addition, some revised words were further modified, as was the case for 어머니 *emeni* (mother) which was further modified from 어미 *emi* which

had been proposed to replace the Sino-Korean word, 모 *mo* in the 1986 *Revised Words* (Ceng Yu-Cin 1997: 138; Ceng and Hwang 1997: 258, 259).

This adjustment of lexical purism shows that many of the revised words had not been well accepted by the public, that it was much more difficult to change people's linguistic habits than it was to revise words. This led to a critical evaluation of previous language planning activities and an adjustment in the purism movement. This does not mean, however, that the purification policy itself was abandoned. The outcomes of lexical purism were generally evaluated positively with the claim that lexical purification enabled people to read and understand official documents and publications, that it prompted native words to be used in every field of linguistic life and that it enhanced the function of language as a powerful weapon of socialist revolution (Sim Pyeng-Ho 1991: 15).

A new orthographic revision, *Cosenmalkyupemcip* (The Korean Language Prescription), was proclaimed in 1987. Overall, it was a partial amendment of the 'Korean Language Prescription' of 1966. A change was introduced in the rules for word spacing: some words which had been regulated to be written without a space in the 1966 'Prescription' were now to be written with spaces. For example, the number 86,365, which had been written without a space as 팔만륙천삼백예순다섯 *phalmanlyukchensampaykyeyswuntases* (eighty six thousand and three hundred sixty five), should be written as 팔만 육천 삼백 예순다섯 *phalman lyukchen sampayk yeyswuntases*. The name, 'Archeology and Folklore Research Institute' was now to be written as 고고학 및 민속학 연구소 *kokohak mich minsokhak yenkwuso*, rather than 고고학및민속학연구소 *kokohakmichminsokhakyenkwuso*. It seems that the 'Prescription' of 1966 could not achieve what Kim Il Sung had expected, that is, an increase in the efficiency in reading by reducing spacings (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 296). In parallel with the abandonment of some revised words, this change in the rules for spacing is an adjustment of language planning to actual language use.

In 1992, the most comprehensive Korean language dictionary, *Cosenmaltaysacen* (Comprehensive Korean Language Dictionary – CKD) was published. The dictionary has several characteristics which show the changing direction in some aspects of language planning. First, its preface acknowledges Kim Jong Il's leadership in the dictionary compilation, in particular how he directed the selection of entries, the

process of defining them and the publication. This reflects his widening influence in North Korean politics and heralds the opening of his era in language planning. Second, it not only contains revised words but obsolete and non-standard words, differing sharply from previous *Munhwae* dictionaries of 1968 and 1973 in which only revised words were listed. Third, the order for presenting the definitions of a word is modified. Whereas meanings of political and ideological importance appeared first in the previous dictionaries, the new dictionary lists the most frequently used meanings of a word first (Lee Ceng-Sik 1997: 215-231). These changes imply that the actual language practices of the society, which had been disregarded in the compilation of the 1968 and 1973 *Munhwae* dictionaries, is now seriously taken account of.⁵

The practice of using the language of deference for Kim Il Sung has continued since his death in 1994. Some aspects of this language use have also come to be applied to the new leader, Kim Jong Il. The way of referring to Kim Jong Il has changed from 친애하는 지도자 김정일동지 *chinayhamun citoca Kim Jong Il tongci* (dear leader, Comrade Kim Jong Il) to 위대한 령도자 김정일동지 *witayhan lyengtoca Kim Jong Il tongci* (great leader, Comrade Kim Jong Il). In these expressions, the literal meaning of the two Sino-Korean words, *lyengtoca* and *citoca* is similar to 'the person who leads', but the former is rarely used in ordinary conversation. As had been the case with 수령 *swulyeng*, which was used to address Kim Il Sung, the adoption of rarely used Sino-Korean words, such as *lyengtoca* for Kim Jong Il, gives an aura of uniqueness to him. The politics of language, however, point out that Kim Jong Il has not yet achieved the same power and authority as his father once had, in that the term, *swulyeng* is still reserved for Kim Il Sung.

⁵ This does not seem to imply that the role of a dictionary as a medium of political indoctrination has been abandoned, since many examples of word usage are taken from Kim Il Sung's works.

Chapter 5

Review of the *Munhwae* Period

In this chapter, the overall development of *Munhwae* which has been presented in chapters 3 and 4 is reviewed. The achievements and limitations of language planning in the *Munhwae* period are discussed in relation to the three criteria for developing *Munhwae*, namely the nationalistic, socialist and democratic principles. It is argued that these principles have not been applied consistently in developing *Munhwae*, but discriminatively in accordance with the priorities of North Korean politics.

5.1 Nationalistic Development of *Munhwae*

It has been argued by North Korean language planners that the history of the Korean language is a process of replacing words of foreign origin by native words, and that *Munhwae* has accelerated the trend (Park, Lee and Ko 1986: 53). The nationalistic development of language was a primary goal for the construction of *Munhwae* since the proclamation of linguistic *Juche* (self-reliance) in 1964.

Foreign elements in the national language were regarded as not only disruptive to the establishment of linguistic self-reliance, but also as detrimental to the development of national pride and autonomy, and to the success of the socialist revolution. Language cleansing was necessary, as the purity of the national language was perceived as a barometer of national autonomy. Language purism in the *Munhwae* period was, therefore, pursued more vigorously than in the previous periods, as a part of *Juche* national policy. Although purism was mandated in all areas of language planning, it has been most clearly demonstrated in the vocabulary management movement. Rectifying people's old ideas that Sino-Korean words were proper tools for expressing decency and for dealing with science and culture, and implanting a new attitude that those who

use their own language well are learned and cultured, were considered prerequisites for the successful implementation of vocabulary management.

Approximately 50,000 Sino-Korean words and other loan words were replaced by native ones during twenty years from the declaration of linguistic *Juche* in 1964. Thousands of dialect words from all over the country were incorporated in *Munhwae*, native words which had once been replaced by Sino-Korean counterparts were revitalised, and thousands of indigenous words were coined. The purification movement covered many areas including academic terms, everyday language, and personal, product and place names.

The table below, which shows changes in the proportion of dictionary entries according to their origins, is indicative of the positive achievement of the purism movement in the *Munhwae* period. Samples in the table cover the entries from 'm' to 'maum' from major North Korean dictionaries published respectively in the Transitional (1954~1963) and *Munhwae* (1964~1986) periods: the 'Korean Dictionary' of 1962 and the 'Modern Korean Dictionary' of 1981.

Table 5-1. Comparison of Entries between Dictionaries

Origin of Words	Published Year	
	1962	1981
Sino-Korean Words (%)	217(38)	96(18)
Compound: Sino-Korean + Pure Korean (%)	81(14)	96(18)
Pure Korean (%)	202(36)	291(54)
Dialect (%)	11(2)	2(0.4)
Old Words (%)	12(2)	0(0)
Foreign Words (%)	38(7)	37(7)
Compound: Sino-Korean + Foreign Words (%)	5(1)	14(2)
Total (%)	566(100)	536(100)

Modified from Kumatani 1990: 102¹

The table indicates that pure Korean words have been considerably increased through the purification movement from 36 percent in the 'Korean Dictionary' to 54 percent in the 'Modern Korean Dictionary', and simultaneously the proportion of Sino-Korean words has dropped from 38 percent to 18 percent.

¹ The original table in Kumatani (1990) includes data from a South Korean dictionary, *Kwuke Taysacen* (Comprehensive Dictionary of the Korean Language) published in 1982.

The nationalistic principle, however, has not been applied indiscriminately to all sections of vocabulary. Notable exceptions were military and socio-political terms, following Kim Il Sung's directions in his 1964 and 1966 speeches that these words should not be revised for the time being. Considering the claim that socio-political terms were the most important component of *Munhwae*, representing the voice of the North Korean regime and functioning as keywords to define the society, and the fact that these words formed a high proportion of neologisms produced in the *Munhwae* period, the exclusion of these words from the nativisation movement was an important limitation in fulfilling the nationalistic principle fully.

The development of language for Kim Il Sung was also opposed to the spirit of *Munhwae*, which aimed at fostering national pride by means of promoting easy and common native words. Those words prescribed to be used for this special variety were mainly of Chinese origin, and were difficult and rarely used. This shows that the discriminative lexical selection preferring Sino-Korean words to native words as a vehicle for expressing respect and politeness was not abolished in *Munhwae*, and people were ordered to master these words as a means of expressing their highest reverence and politeness.

It seems that the language planners faced problems in the implementation of language purism, namely the difficulties in changing people's linguistic attitudes and practices thoroughly and rapidly, as Sim Pyeng-Ho (1984: 24) observed, "there are still many people who prefer to use difficult Sino-Korean words and loan words under unlawful excuses that the revised words are not able to be understood easily, and are crude to use". This observation reflects the dichotomy between policy and actual practice, and indicates that even thorough-going and strongly enforced language policies do not always lead to immediate changes in language use.

5.2 Socialist and Democratic Development of *Munhwae*

North Korea claims that it has eliminated language use stemmed from feudalistic social structure, antagonistic class relationships and the gender inequality which pervaded pre-modern Korea and, instead, has developed the language to represent socialist

comradeship, mutual autonomy and gender equality (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 33-34).

Several measures were undertaken to develop *Munhwae* in accordance with these socialist and democratic principles. First, convergence of written and spoken language in the direction of the latter was set as a goal, since the wide cleavage between the two varieties was regarded as an outcome of manipulation by the upper classes, who had appropriated written language as their sociolect to serve the privileged few and to strengthen their class basis in the Cosen dynasty. Narrowing the gap between written and spoken language was seen as necessary for the socialisation and democratisation of language to serve the majority of the people. For this, difficult Sino-Korean words were replaced by common native words, and colloquial and dialect words, many of which had been regarded by the literati and the upper classes as vulgar and uncultured, had been given a new positive status. Some examples of such words are: 까부시다 *kkapusita* (smash up by kicking), 후려치다 *hwulyechita* (lash a person with a whip) and 족치다 *cokchita* (press a person to do something or destroy) (Choy and Mwun 1980: 7, 35-39).

The elevation of a low class variety into the standard language is claimed by North Korean linguists to be a firm establishment of the revolutionary spirit that the working class is the owner of the language, and to be a reflection of their increasing participation in national affairs (Choy Ceng-Hwu 1983: 129-130). This standardisation of colloquial words was also strategic for organising and mobilising workers and peasants for the Party policy (Choy and Mwun 1980: 37).

Second, the socialist and democratic principles led to semantic purism, which approved word meanings representing the ideological orientation of the North Korean regime, and redefined or excluded words in conflict with the ideas of the regime. Vulgar, swear words and sexual words representing bourgeois social trends, slang, superstitious and unscientific words in the old society were ordered to be removed completely (Choy and Mwun: 1980: 8). Many words were also subjected to 'semantic cultivation', so as to allow these to embody the working class viewpoint. Religious terminology provides good examples: 교회 *kyohoy* (church) is defined as 'a stronghold of Christian dogma, brainwashing workers and paralysing working class consciousness under the shelter of politics'; 선교사 *senkyosa* (missionary), 'an invader's stool pigeon sent to other countries under the excuse of Christian mission'; 성경 *sengkyeng* (Bible), 'a book

about the fraudulent and deceptive Christian religion'; 십자가 *sipcaka* (the Cross), 'a hypocritical philanthropic camouflage of the Christian religion'; 절 *cel* (Buddhist temple), 'a parasitic place for Buddhist monks who wear the mask of religion in order to deceive and exploit people'; and 종교 *congkyo* (religion), 'blind worship of God with a belief that he/she exists' (Nam and Ceng 1990: 128-130). These examples show how the government tried to imprint its hostile attitude toward religion in language by semantic refinement. The pejorative language is another example. This politically motivated language use, which is considered a reflection of the working class viewpoint, was designed to construct a language serving the regime's political objectives by fostering animosity toward the opponents of the regime.

However, there are many counter examples revealing that the socialist and democratic principles have not been consistently applied in developing *Munhwae*. Feudalistic features of the Korean language have not been eradicated, but have survived and in some areas, have even been strengthened.

First of all, the linguistic inequality between the privileged few and the majority has not been levelled off in *Munhwae*, as had been planned. Although it was claimed that all people are comrades, the comradeship has not cleared away the social and linguistic hierarchy in North Korea. Age, social position and kin relationships are maintained as variables in adjusting one's level of politeness. Linguistically, social positions as a 웃사람 *wussalam* (a superior, literally means 'person above me'), an 아랫사람 *alayssalam* (an inferior, person below me), or as an equal seem to remain an important factor in using *Munhwae*. Those who are in a high political position such as Party officials, Kim Il Sung's associates and relatives, and those who work in the field of science, education and health are considered social superiors. People are told to use honorific language toward these socialist 'workers', even if the 'workers' are younger than them (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 135-139). In this regard, language use in North Korea does not show considerable differences from the language practices in pre-modern Korea, which were criticised by North Korean language planners as feudalistic and reactionary.

A close similarity between the Cosen dynasty and socialist North Korea is also found in the way of rationalising hierarchical language use. In North Korea, the act of showing respect to social superiors is explained in the framework of 의리 *uyli* (the right way

that human beings should follow) (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 137). The same mode of justification had been used by feudalistic Confucian literati to maintain the socio-political structure benefiting the privileged few in the Cosen dynasty, where the class hierarchy was regarded as the natural law to which people should conform.

Second, the linguistic inequality between the powerful few and the powerless majority has been widened in terms of distribution of linguistic resources: consolidation of a special variety of language for the leader and the exclusion of the majority of the people from it. This language etiquette, prescribing reverence and admiration for one particular individual, was a reflection of the hierarchical socio-political structure of the society, although it was claimed that comradeship was the basis of social relations (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 33-34). The language for Kim Il Sung is an essential social grammar which North Korean people have to acquire in order to live within the system as competent *Munhwae* speakers. This also deprived the common people of the right to use the rules for themselves, and thus was contradictory to the principle of *Munhwae*, namely, the creation of a language for workers and peasants (Choy Ceng-Hwu 1980: 140).

The *Juche* idea, which highlights the role of the leader in the socialist revolution, provides a key for this unequal distribution of language resources. For the perpetuation of Kim Il Sung's supremacy in North Korea, loyalty and filial piety were required, not only toward Kim, but to his son, Kim Jong Il. "Fidelity to the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, who is a genius of revolution and the sun of the nation, and the glorious Party Centre (referring to Kim Jong Il)" (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 34) was the principle of the *Juche* outlook on life. In this regard, it seems that the morality which governed the relationship between Kim Il Sung and North Koreans reflected language use between a king and his subjects. In the Cosen dynasty, there was a system of verbal and non-verbal etiquette specified for the king who was projected as the head of a national family. The hierarchical system of the dynasty was compared to that of the family, and the central ethic of *chwung* (loyalty) to the king was thought to be a conceptual extension of *hyo* (filial obedience) to one's parents. This same image can be seen in the idea of Kim as the 'parent leader' of North Korea, and the basis for special treatment of the Cosen king seems to have become the basis for special treatment of the leader in socialist North Korea.

Third, the claim that *Munhwae* has been modeled after Kim Il Sung's personal use of language, raises the problem of maintaining the democratic and socialist principles of *Munhwae*, which aimed at being based on the real language of the common people (Choy Ceng-Hwu 1983: 140). North Korean language planners rationalised this standardisation based on Kim's idiolect, by promoting him as the ultimate paragon of nationalist and socialist language use. In order to unite people under Kim's guidance, and to make them think and behave in accordance with his ideas, people should be instructed to "follow the model of great leader's language use, even a word or a sentence" (Lee Sang-Pyek 1975: 7).

Dictionary compilation in North Korea, which attempted to list every word from Kim's works and speeches as entries and to define these entries by his words, is a clear index of the *Munhwae* standardisation based on Kim's idiolect. As a result of this, it was claimed that "every word in publications and official writings is based on and enriched by the great leader's actual language usage" (Choy and Mwon 1980: 131). The reinstatement of Sino-Korean words in the national language dictionary of 1981 was also justified as an effort to list Sino-Korean words used in Kim's works.

Fourth, North Korea had criticised unequal language use based on gender in the Cosen dynasty and in South Korea as feudalistic, claiming that women were now enjoying revolutionary language life representing their equal status with men in North Korea (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 31-33). The language use in *Munhwae*, however, does not seem to be so egalitarian in that it does not entirely remove linguistic discrimination based on gender. The asymmetric language between marital partners is a good example. In the Korean language, politeness is most commonly expressed by 'speech level', involving different types of sentence ending. The table below shows the *Munhwae* speech levels:

	Degree of Respect			
	High	<—————>		Low
Type of Sentence	ㅂ니다	요	오/소	다/라
Ending	<i>pnita</i>	<i>yo</i>	<i>o/so</i>	<i>talla</i>

Modified from Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 71²

In the table, the honorific ending, *pnita* represents the highest degree of respect. The

² The original table in Kim Tong-Swu (1983) contains various linguistic means to adjust one's degree of respect including speech level, pronouns and referential terms.

plain sentence ending, *o/so* is used in equal relationships while the *ta/la* ending is used by a superior to an inferior.

In *Munhwae* the husband uses the lower degree of the honorific ending, namely the 'yo' type to his wife, while the wife uses the very polite *pnita* ending to her husband. As the couple becomes older, the husband lowers the degree of his linguistic politeness by using the non-honorific ending, *o/so* to his wife, while she uses the 'yo' type honorific ending to her husband (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 175).

In addition, terms of address recommended for marital partners also reveal the feudalistic aspect of language use. 안해 *Anhay* (wife), 애기어머니 *aykiemeni* (baby's mother), a child's name + 어머니 *emeni* (child's name + mother), 집사람 *cipsalam* (*cip* 'house', *salam* 'person' – house person) were recommended as terms of reference for a wife by her husband. 남편 *Namphyen* (husband), 주인 *cwuin* (owner, master), 세대주 *seytaycwu* (the head of a household), 애기아버지 *aykiapeci* (baby's father), a child's name + 아버지 *apeci* (child's name + father) were recommended as terms of reference for a husband by his wife (Kim Tong-Swu 1983: 175). Such terms as *cipsalam*, *cwuin* and *seytaycwu* are feudalistic and sexist in that these confine women's domain to the domestic area and regard men as the owner or master of a family.

This asymmetric use of speech levels and sexist terms of address show that the unequal language practices used by marital partners in pre-modern Korea and in South Korea are also found in North Korea. In this regard, gender related language use in North Korea does not show a clear distinction from that of the Cosen dynasty and South Korea.

So far, the achievements and limitations in the development of *Munhwae* have been reviewed in relation to nationalistic, socialist and democratic principles. Around 50,000 Sino-Korean and other loan words were revised to make *Munhwae* a nationalistic language, many colloquial words were standardised, and semantic refinement was made to construct *Munhwae* as a socialist and democratic language. However, the development of *Munhwae* also embraced elements which are incompatible with these principles. Appropriation of many difficult Sino-Korean words as a vehicle for the highest respect to Kim Il Sung and the promotion of Kim's idiolect as the basis of

Munhwae standardisation pose major limitations in maintaining the principles. In addition, military and socio-political terms were exempted from the nativisation movement, and linguistic inequality based on social position and gender has continued.

Chapter 6

Concluding Remarks:

Language Planning and State Building in North Korea

In everyday interaction, language is a medium by which people's identity is expressed. The use of specific words and phrases or ways of pronunciation can show the people's political, ethnic, and religious affiliations and socio-economic status. Shared linguistic features clarify the boundary of a group and are used as social resources to forge the consciousness of sameness, and to strengthen internal cohesion.

This function of language has been demonstrated in the process of building modern nation-states. Language was accepted as the most important defining characteristic of nationality, as Fichte summed up "those who speak the same language are linked together, ... they are by nature one indivisible whole. ... [Thus] wherever a distinct language is found, there also exists a distinct nation" (Fichte 1808 cited in Coulmas 1988: 7). Although Fichte's statement is somewhat extreme and exaggerated, his point of view has been utilised by anti-colonial and separatist movements, or alternatively by the nationalists of newly-independent countries whose territorial boundaries were arbitrarily fixed by the colonial authorities.

The discussion in the preceding chapters has shown how language has been used by the North Korean regime as a political resource for nation building. The Korean language, which was suppressed under Japanese colonialism, was actively promoted immediately after independence in order to enhance its status as the national language. Subsequent language planning has been formulated to make the language a means of symbolising national autonomy, strengthening solidarity and ultimately consolidating political legitimacy.

Due to the importance of language, the regime has tried not to lose its tight grip over

language planning. It has constantly made regulations and exercised its power to steer the direction of language use. This does not mean, however, that the language planning for the last half-century has been consistent and 'well-planned'. Some earlier policies were abandoned, while others were refined, and still others were replaced by later ones.

Given that these changes in language planning were induced more by political motives than by linguistic factors, in this thesis I have divided developments of North Korean language planning into three periods in parallel with major shifts in the political environment: the first phase began with the independence of Korea from Japanese colonial rule in 1945; the second, with the end of the Korean War; and the third, with North Korea's proclamation of political independence from the Soviet Union and China in the mid-1960s and the subsequent development of *Juche* as the North Korean brand of communism.

6.1 The First Phase of State Building and Language Planning

The creation of two Koreas was a consequence of political manipulation by external powers at the end of the Second World War. The monoethnic and monolingual Korean people, who had shared the same socio-historic identity as a unified nation, were divided into two states. The founding of a socialist system in North Korea was made under the direct supervision of the Soviet Union. The regime overtly praised the Soviet Red Army as a liberator and benefactor of the Korean people, and set up the Soviet Union as a model to be emulated in building the state.

An important part of state building in this phase was self-authentication via decolonisation. To this end, a series of policies which sharply differed from those of the Cosen dynasty and Japanese colonialism was introduced. In the field of language planning, the status of Korean was promoted, becoming the national language in order to represent the political independence of the nation. This was an anti-imperialistic reaction to the Japanese who had institutionalised Japanese as the official language of the colony. This symbolic measure to enhance the prestige of the Korean language was followed by the demotion of Chinese characters and the promotion of the indigenous Korean script, *Hangul* as the exclusive literacy code. The regime implemented a policy to enhance intelligibility in language use by replacing difficult loan words with simple

native words. The regime also initiated a literacy movement of a massive scale in order to make *Hangul* accessible to all people.

The socio-political impact of these policies could be comparable to that of land reform, which confiscated land from landlords and distributed it freely to the landless. By redistributing linguistic resources to those who had not had access to written language in the pre-modern and colonial period, the regime could broaden its base, which in turn provided a secure basis for disseminating communist ideology and for organising and mobilising the predominantly illiterate population for the socialist cause.

Language planning at this period was puristic in that it aimed to get rid of foreign elements in language use. In spite of this, the regime could not push this purism to its logical extreme, namely the total expulsion of loan words. As the intelligibility and communicative function of language was a central concern of language policy, due to the urgency to mobilise people for the political objectives of the regime, an abrupt removal or introduction of linguistic rules could not be made easily.

6.2 The Korean War and its Impact

The Korean war deepened inter-Korean confrontation and animosity. North Korea ascribed the cause of the war, and the difficulties it was facing in the reconstruction of its war-torn society, to the United States and the South Korean regime (Khil Young Whan 1984). National division was, therefore, an important political factor strengthening centripetal forces within the system, by providing a legitimate way of undermining its external opponent, the South Korean regime, and of reinforcing the authority of the state leader.

Post-war reconstruction aimed to transform the society into a fully-fledged socialist state. Socialist economic planning was implemented from 1954 on, and agricultural and industrial collectivisation had been completed by 1958 (McCormack 1981: 52). In the political field, Kim Il Sung purged his real and potential rivals by employing the notion of *Juche* (independence, autonomy and self-reliance). When he had firmly consolidated his authority by the mid-1960s, *Juche* had fully developed into a North Korean brand of communist ideology.

Despite the rising interest in the issue of a standard language, there was no noticeable policy change regarding the status of language. Instead, several corpus planning activities were carried out as a part of the post-war reconstruction projects. Efforts were made to nativise difficult Sino-Korean and Japanese words and to unify the spoken and written language. Orthographic reform was undertaken in 1954, and dictionaries containing linguistic and social changes introduced under the socialist regime were compiled. These signaled the internalisation of national divisions in the linguistic field, in that the newly nativised words, the orthography and the dictionaries diverged from their South Korean counterparts, and thus foreshadowed the emergence of two Korean languages. One of the points worth noting in this period was a rapid increase in publications admiring Kim Il Sung and his partisan activities. This anticipated the coming of the personality cult of Kim Il Sung, and the invention of a series of linguistic measures which would legitimise his absolute position in North Korea.

6.3 The Second Phase of State Building and Language Planning

State building after the mid-1960s was characterised by self-reliance rather than dependence on external powers, pride and confidence in its own ability rather than admiration of external powers, and absolute loyalty to the leader rather than equality of all North Koreans. Political stability achieved as a result of purging political rivals gave a favourable condition for Kim Il Sung to fortify his power base, while the competition between the Soviet Union and China gave him more autonomy to manoeuvre for his own cause.

The idea of *Juche* as a guiding principle in every facet of life has developed into a xenophobic nationalism detesting everything non-North Korean and admiring everything North Korean. The rhetoric of self-reliance and autonomy became a firm basis for claiming North Korea's legitimacy and superiority to South Korea, while the policies of the South Korean regime were propagandised by the North to be against the national interests of all Koreans.

This extreme self-authentication led to the leadership cult of Kim Il Sung. Kim was

identified with the Party, the state and the North Korean 'Self', so that empowerment of the leader was equated to that of the Party, the state and all North Koreans. Independence and self-reliance of the common people within the frame of the *Juche* idea, thus, meant absolute dependence on and loyalty to the leader.

Status planning of language in this period began by replacing the term *Phyocwune* (Standard Language) with *Munhwae* (Cultured Language) to refer to the standard language of North Korea. This change of name has a significant import in the overall direction of language planning. *Phyocwune*, which had been used to refer to the standard language of both Koreas, originally meant a variety of language cultivated in Seoul from the 15th century on. The continuous use of the term, *Phyocwune*, thus could give an impression that the Pyongyang *Phyocwune* was sub-standard Seoul *Phyocwune*. In this respect, the replacement of the name manifested the North Korean regime's strong will to differentiate its standard language from that of South Korea.

The creation of *Munhwae* shows a North Korean variant of linguistic nationalism in which a linguistic division is a necessary step following the political division of a monolingual nation. This is a reversal of the idea of proto-typical linguistic nationalism in which a distinct language is exploited as an ideology for demanding political autonomy (Coulmas 1988). In the North Korean case, a separate political entity, which had inherited the same language as its competitor, consciously desired to develop a distinct language as a marker of its separate existence (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.20: 288-289).

To make *Munhwae* distinct from *Phyocwune*, efforts were made to purify the language and these were most prominent in the field of vocabulary management. The ultimate goal of lexical purification was to nativise the whole system of Korean vocabulary. The initial focus was placed on eliminating words of both Chinese and non-Chinese origin, as these were regarded as being in conflict with the nationalistic orientation of *Munhwae*. Some native Korean words which were thought to carry feudalistic and bourgeois ideology were also discarded. Dialects were also a target of purification in that these were considered to be a residue of the old society. This process of elimination was carried out side by side with restoring, refining and coining native words. These newly installed words were thought to be pure, free from feudalistic and capitalist influences.

The linguistic purity in *Munhwae* has been exploited by the regime as a source of its superiority and legitimacy in inter-Korean relationships, on the grounds that the purer the language is, the more nationalistic the language community is. The regime maintained that the South Korean language had been 'bastardised' by foreign languages, due to the South Korean regime's submissive stance toward external powers, and had thus lost purity as the national language.

While North Korea has attempted to create its own language as a marker of its separate identity from South Korea, it has not disregarded the function of language as a common bond of divided Korea. The Korean language was believed to be the most durable symbol of the nation, and thus the most reliable means of preserving the nation, as Kim Il Sung stated "Though our country is now split into north and south ... our nation is one. [because] At present, Koreans both in the north and south speak the same language and use the same alphabet" (Kim Il Sung 1984, vol.18: 13). In this respect, Kim did not want to develop *Munhwae* to such a degree as to damage the function of language binding the two Koreas. For him, the Korean language could be a symbol of pan-Korean identity, unifying the nation irrespective of political and social divergence.

These double layers of unifying and separating functions of language reveal a dilemma for language planning in a divided nation which has never abandoned national reunification as its political objective. An emphasis on solidarity and identity at the state level would inevitably decrease the degree of integration at the pan-Korean level, and vice versa. Given that the interests of the political leadership of the two Koreas are antagonistic, the North Korean regime could not easily pursue policies of homogenising language use. However, the reunification of Korea could not be abandoned since pan-Korean identity could provide a useful rationale for justifying the regime's legitimacy. The way in which North Korea has attempted to escape this dilemma has been to highlight its political and economic dominance over South Korea, whether this be real or not. As North Korea is thought to embody everything that Korea should be, the development of *Munhwae* in its own way can be equated with that of a would-be standard language for a unified Korea (Kim Il Sung 1982, vol.20: 288; Lee Sang-Pyek 1975: 3; Park Swu-Yeng 1991: 21-23).

It is not yet clear whether, as is claimed by North Korean linguists, *Munhwae* has been purified to embody the spirit of self-reliance in language use. However, it seems that there are elements which contradict the principles of *Munhwae*. The special variety of language usage developed for Kim Il Sung is a good example. Many words prescribed to be used for Kim were difficult and rarely used Sino-Korean words. This was precipitated by the urgency to magnify the absolute position of the leader. Sino-Korean words which had been used by the learned in pre-modern society and had accordingly retained connotations of respect and politeness, provided a pool of readily-available and efficient lexical sources of deference. Other examples include military and socio-political terms which were instructed by Kim Il Sung to be exempted from lexical purification for the time being. Given that socio-political terms are an important component of *Munhwae* and constitute a high proportion of neologisms, the exception of these words from the nativisation was a serious set-back. These examples imply that political factors, though having been the central motivation of language purification, were the very cause that overrode the achievements of language purification.

In spite of these limitations, what the last fifty years of language planning in North Korea has attempted to achieve cannot be underestimated. Thousands of words were revised into native or nativised words. What is more remarkable is the intensity with which the instrumental perspective of language is applied to language planning in North Korea. The North Korean regime, believing that language conditions or determines the way people perceive the world, has constantly tried to intervene in, and control every facet of linguistic life. It prescribed not only how to refer to the political leader and his family members but how to address colleagues, spouse, relatives and even strangers. It also specified words and expressions which should be used to show one's respect and hatred. Grammatical rules, the manner of speech and even the speed of speech were stipulated.

This thesis has attempted to show that the all-inclusive thorough-going prescriptive language planning found in North Korea cannot be separated from other policy goals of the North Korean regime, which has intended to mobilise the whole nation for state construction. All language policy was inherently ideological and political, in that language has been the essential means of shaping and preaching state ideology in the interests of political power. What is most remarkable for language planning in North Korea is that the regime not only consistently pursued language policy with this

orientation, but clearly manifested its standpoint that the language and language life of the people should be subordinated to such non-linguistic goals. The regime has tried to make people identify their use of language in a prescribed way as a patriot and revolutionary act for the victory of North Korean socialism. This overt emphasis on the ideological and political functions of language is a reflection of the ideological and political intensity in North Korean state building.

It is not certain whether what the regime has tried to implement has been actualised or not. Although lack of data makes any balanced judgment impossible at this stage, it is unlikely that the diversity in actual language use in North Korea has been affected as such ideological indoctrination does not easily lead to an homogenisation of the ways people think. The massive and exhaustive intervention in language use in North Korea, however, may not find its counterparts in other countries, and the North Korean case gives us a good chance to see how language can be engineered for ideological causes.

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Appendix

Yale Romanisation System

ㅍ	p	ㅣ	i
ㅍ	ph	ㅍ	wi
ㅍㅍ	pp	ㅍ	ey
ㅌ	t	ㅍ	yey
ㅌ	th	ㅍ	wey
ㅌㅌ	tt	ㅍ	oy
ㅅ	s	ㅍ	ay
ㅅㅅ	ss	ㅍ	yay
ㅅ	c	ㅍ	way
ㅅ	ch	ㅡ	u
ㅅㅅ	cc	ㅍ	e
ㄱ	k	ㅍ	ye
ㄱ	kh	ㅍ	we
ㄱㄱ	kk	ㅍ	a
ㅁ	m	ㅍ	ya
ㄴ	n	ㅍ	wa
ㅇ	-ng	ㅍ	wu*
ㄹ	l	ㅍ	yu
ㅎ	h	ㅍ	o
		ㅍ	yo
		ㅍ	uy

* ㅍ (wu) is abbreviated to u after p, ph, pp, m and y.