

INDONESIAN JIHADI THINKING¹*Greg Fealy and Ken Ward*

Indonesia, like many other Muslim countries, is a lively marketplace for jihadi ideas. The shelves of 'Islam' sections in large bookstores freely display a remarkable array of jihadi literature. In recent years, the works of Indonesian jihadis such as Imam Samudra and the two brothers Ali Ghufron (better known as Mukhlas) and Amrozi Nurhasyim, who advocated continuing violent struggle and were executed for their role in the Bali bombings of 2002, have often taken pride of place. Samudra's *Aku Melawan Teroris* (I oppose terrorists)² has sold more than fifteen thousand copies, making it the most popular jihadi text on the market, and the trilogy of final writings from the executed terrorists has also sold well.³ On the other hand, works critical of terrorism can also be found

¹ We would like to thank Michael Feener, Anthony Johns, Sidney Jones and Nelly Lahoud for their helpful comments on drafts of this text.

² Imam Samudra, *Aku Melawan Teroris*, (Solo: Jazera, 2004). The 'terrorists' mentioned in the title refer to Western governments, which Samudra accuses of waging ruthless and indiscriminate violence against Muslims around the world.

³ The trilogy was sold in a package entitled *Goresan Pena Trio Mujahid: Seri Kafilah Syuhada* [Pen-sketches of the jihadist trio: the martyr's caravan series] (Jakarta: Ar-Rahmah Media, 2008). The trilogy contained one work each by Imam Samudra, Mukhlas and Amrozi, and was published shortly after their execution by firing squad in November 2008.

alongside these books. Foremost among these is another bestseller, Nasir Abas's *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah* (Exposing Jemaah Islamiyah), which not only recounts details of his life as a jihadi in Afghanistan, Malaysia (his homeland), the Philippines and Indonesia but also attacks Samudra's jihadi arguments.⁴ Other works critical of jihadi Salafism, including several by non-jihadi Salafis opposed to terrorist bombings, are also widely available.⁵ There are also in these sections translations of major works by well-known Middle Eastern jihadi thinkers such as 'Abdalla 'Azzam, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Imam al-Sharif (Dr Fadl), 'Abd al-Mun'im Mustafa Halima and 'Umar Bin 'Abd al-Rahman. These books are well-produced and relatively cheap (usually ranging in price from \$4 to \$12). The fact that such works are found in mainstream bookstores, most of which are owned by non-Muslim conglomerates, attests to their market appeal.

In addition to such formal publications, there is also a rich discourse on jihadi thinking to be found on Indonesian websites, in underground publications, at public lectures and in closed religious discussion groups. Here one finds translations and explanations of new jihadi texts from abroad, discussion of contemporary developments in the Muslim world (particularly relating to attacks on Muslims or recent jihadi operations) and practical guidance on waging jihad, including technical data on weaponry, assassination techniques and covert organisational structures.

This breadth of material indicates not only Indonesia's growing connectedness with international jihadi discourses but also an ongoing debate within local jihadi communities about how best to respond to the rapidly changing situation in Indonesia. When Indonesia's largest terrorist attack (the 2002 Bali bombings that killed 202 people) took place, public awareness of the presence of home-grown jihadi groups was low, and security agencies' responses were at best fitful. Since 2002, however, the Indonesian state has launched massive crackdowns on jihadis, arresting approximately 400 individuals on terrorism offences and convicting more than 300, including six death penalties.⁶ This has

⁴ Nasir Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI* (Jakarta: Grafindo, 2005).

⁵ The best known of these Salafi rebuttals is al-Ustadz Luqman bin Muhammad Ba'abduh, *Mereka Adalah Teroris: Bantahan Terhadap 'Aku Melawan Teroris': Bantahan Terhadap Buku 'Aku Melawan Teroris'*, (Malang: Pustaka Qaulun Sadida, 2005). Ba'abduh is a Yemeni-educated Salafi of Arab descent and was a former commander of the Laskar Jihad paramilitary forces. His book was later attacked by a pro-Imam Samudra author, Abduh Zulfidar Akaha, in *Siapa Teroris? Siapa Khawarij?* (Jakarta: Pustaka al-Kautsar, 2006).

left jihadi groups in considerable disarray and sparked heated arguments among their ranks over future strategies. Some jihadis remain committed to the al-Qaeda model and advocate further mass casualty attacks, while others regard the bombings as counter-productive to achieving their declared jihadi aims—that is the establishment of an Islamic state and thorough implementation of Islamic law.⁷

This chapter will examine the origins and character of jihadi ideologies in Indonesia, with particular emphasis on the discourse over the past decade. We will consider a number of inter-related questions. First, what is the nature of the interaction between local and international jihadi thinking? To what extent can Indonesian jihadis be said to have distinctive or original veins of thought regarding the conduct of violent struggle? Second, where Indonesian jihadis draw on external doctrines, is this largely a process of straight adoption or is there a process of adaptation leading to hybridised or innovative thinking?

This chapter will posit that much of Indonesia's jihadi literature is derivative in nature, drawing heavily upon the work of Middle Eastern ideologues. Not surprisingly, this has produced a discourse based largely upon foreign works, with only limited attempts to contextualise or indigenise ideological concepts from abroad. We further argue that Indonesians have selectively adopted particular strains of new jihadi thinking, based not only on their perceived scholarly merits but also on their suitability to rapidly changing local circumstances. Therefore, the process of borrowing is an active one designed to render the best outcome for the jihadi struggle, however defined. The following pages consist of a brief survey of contemporary Indonesian jihadism, looking at the development of different strands of ideological thinking. We will then consider which foreign authors have been most influential before discussing the main local jihadi works. The latter part of the chapter is devoted to an analysis of one of the most sophisticated texts written by local jihadists: *Menabur Jihad, Menuai Teror* (Sowing jihad, reaping terror).

Indonesian jihadism

Indonesian jihadism has become synonymous in the public mind with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the group established in 1993. But JI is just one piece in a com-

⁶ 'Polri Yakini Dulmatin Siapkan Kader Perakit Bom', *Jawa Pos*, 11 March 2010.

⁷ Sidney Jones, 'Arrested Development: Jemaah Islamiyah Down but Not Out', *Janes Intelligence Review* (August 2007), pp. 22–5.

plex jihadi jigsaw. Historically, JI's roots can be traced back to Darul Islam (DI), an organisation formed in the late 1940s by a charismatic Muslim politician S. M. Kartosuwiryo in opposition to the newly independent 'secular' Republic of Indonesia.⁸ More than any other movement, DI has been the well-spring for much of Indonesia's subsequent jihadism.

In August 1949 Darul Islam declared an Indonesian Islamic State based on the *shari'a* and for the next thirteen years waged a violent rebellion against the Republic. At its height in the early to mid-1950s, DI was a large movement spread across five provinces with an estimated fifteen to twenty thousand armed fighters and tens of thousands more supportive non-combatants.⁹ Most of its activities fell into the category of guerrilla insurgent attacks against Republican forces, but DI also used terror. This included assassination squads targeting senior officials (one such squad almost succeeded in killing President Sukarno in 1957) and attacks on public places such as markets, offices and cultural performances, as well as on Islamic schools which refused to support DI. DI characterised its actions as an 'Islamic revolution or holy war (*perang suci*)... which would not cease till all the enemies of Allah had been driven out'.¹⁰ DI's conceptualisation of jihad drew heavily upon classical teachings but appears not to have been highly developed. There were few *'ulama* in DI's senior ranks and Kartosuwiryo himself was a failed medical student with little command of Arabic or Islamic jurisprudence.¹¹ The rebellion lingered on until the early 1960s, eventually coming to an end with Kartosuwiryo's capture, trial and execution in 1962. The DI movement largely collapsed after its founder's death: some units surrendered and swore allegiance to the Republic, while others went underground.

⁸ Although regarded by DI as secular, the Republic of Indonesia is better characterised as a religiously neutral state. The first principle of the five national principles (*Pancasila*) is 'Belief in One Almighty God'; and Indonesia also has a large department of Religious Affairs, mainly devoted to administering Islamic affairs.

⁹ For a very careful and balanced account of DI's history, see Cees van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: VKI, 1981).

¹⁰ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Proklamasi Berdirinya Negara Islam Indonesia', 17 August 1949.

¹¹ Holk Dengel, *Darul Islam dan Kartosuwiryo: 'Angan-angan yang Gagal'* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995); and Greg Fealy, 'Half a Century of Violent Jihad in Indonesia: An Historical and Ideological Comparison of Darul Islam and Jema'ah Islamiyah', in Marika Vicziany and David Wright-Neville (eds.), *Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia: Myths and Realities* (Annual Indonesia Lecture Series, number 26, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, 2005), pp. 15–31.

In the early 1970s, DI activists began reviving the movement. In the absence of effective leadership, it became highly factionalised but nonetheless succeeded in recruiting new members and resuming ideological and some military training. Two important recruits in the late 1970s were Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who would later found JI. Both men were born in Indonesia but were of Yemeni extraction. They had gained a following in Islamist circles as teachers and preachers with uncompromising views and soon became influential figures in DI's Java-based operations. They fled to Malaysia in 1985 to escape prosecution on sedition charges. Sungkar in particular used his new base to connect DI to the growing international jihadi struggle. Exploiting contacts and funding from the Middle East and South Asia, he began arranging for hundreds of Indonesians to go to Pakistan and Afghanistan for training. Sungkar and Ba'asyir were increasingly drawn to Salafi jihadi ideas during this period, particularly those of Shaykh 'Umar Bin 'Abd al-Rahman, Sayyid Qutb and 'Abdalla 'Azzam, and grew disillusioned with the Indonesia-centric, more traditional views of jihad and the Islamic state prevailing within DI.¹² They left DI in late 1992 and formed JI early the following year. Much of JI's initial membership came from disaffected DI cadres, particularly those who had trained as *mujahidin* in Afghanistan.

JI's primary ideological statement was set out in its 'General Struggle Guidelines' (commonly known by the acronym PUPJI) of 1995–96.¹³ This document declared JI to be based on Salafi principles and to have the aim of creating a regional Islamic state prior to re-establishing the global caliphate. It prescribes the setting up of 'safe Islamic bases' in which Islamic law is fully observed. From these bases, predication (*da'wa*) and armed jihad (*jihad musalla*) can be used to bring down the sinful and un-Islamic (*thoghut*) government.¹⁴ The PUPJI borrowed key aspects from the charter of Egypt's Gama'a Islamiyah, *Mithaq*

¹² For a good discussion of DI during the Soeharto regime and the DI-JI split, see Quinton Temby, 'Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah', *Indonesia*, no. 89 (April 2010), pp. 1–36; and Martin van Bruinessen, 'Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Soeharto Indonesia', *South East Asia Research*, vol. 10 no. 2 (2002), pp. 117–54.

¹³ Majlis Qiyadah Markaziyah al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah, 'Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah', 30 May 1996.

¹⁴ For translations and discussion of the PUPJI, see Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (eds.), *Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), pp. 362–70; and Elena Pavlova, 'From Counter Society to Counter State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI', RSIS Working Paper no. 117, November 2006.

al-'amal al-Islami, a work later published in Indonesian by the JI-affiliated press al-Alaql.¹⁵

JI appears to have remained ideologically cohesive until Osama Bin Laden issued his 1998 *fatwa* calling on Muslims across the globe to attack Islam's foes, commonly taken to mean the United States and other 'far enemy' Western governments as well as pro-US states in the Muslim world.¹⁶ For sections of JI, especially those in its first territorial command (Mantiqi I) led by Hambali, this *fatwa* was galvanising: they argued that JI needed to change its focus from organisation-building and consolidation to mounting operations against Islam's enemies. This view was opposed by other parts of the JI community, particularly those in the second territorial command (Mantiqi II) based in Java, who contended that the near enemy should take precedence over the far one and that violent operations were premature as JI lacked the necessary military capacity, social support and organisational strength. Sungkar, as JI's Emir, sided with the latter view and held in check those who were impatient for action. His death from heart disease in late 1999 and his replacement by Ba'asyir, a far less disciplinarian leader, effectively freed the militants to begin operations. In 2000 JI members undertook a series of bombings, mainly against Christian churches, costing twenty-three lives. In 2002, the Mantiqi I group led the Bali bombing operation, the first attack on Westerners, without the knowledge of most of JI's leadership and membership.

The Bali bombings deepened the cleavages within JI. For those with an al-Qaeda orientation, the attack was a stunning success and won Indonesia acclaim within the global jihadi community. For those opposed to terrorist methods, the bombings were a disaster, bringing the full wrath of Indonesian and international security services down upon JI and quickly destroying much of what had been so carefully built up over the past decade. These more moderate elements took control of the organisation following Ba'asyir's arrest in November 2002. A succession of Mantiqi II leaders assumed the acting emir-ship and sought to reassert control over the hardliners. This led to the breakaway of JI's most militant elements during 2003 under the leadership of two Malaysians, Noordin Mohammad Top and Azhari Husin. This group came to be known as the Noordin network though it used a variety of names, including most recently, the Indonesian al-Qaeda Organisation. This network has been respon-

¹⁵ *Pedoman Amal Islami*, (Solo: Pustaka al-Alaql, 2000).

¹⁶ For the text of this *fatwa*, see [<http://www.lib1.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/wif.htm>].

sible for the last four terrorist bombings in Indonesia: the Marriott hotel in 2003, the Australian embassy in 2004, the second Bali bombing in 2005, and the Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotel bombings in 2009.¹⁷ Azhari was shot dead in a police raid in November 2005, and Noordin met a similar fate in September 2009.

At present, there would appear to be a trifurcation of the jihadi community. First, JI itself has withdrawn from violent activities and is seeking to rebuild, with little success, its membership and organisation after the ravages of the police counterterrorism campaign. Second, there are the remnants of the Noordin network which remain committed to mass-casualty terrorism. And third, and most recently, there has arisen a 'middle-stream' group that was under the leadership of Dulmatin (another senior JI operative) and Abu Tholut, which criticised both JI's rejection of physical jihad and the Noordin network's resort to large-scale bombings with their attendant risk of high Muslim casualty rates. This Dulmatin-Tholut group sought to establish a 'safe base' in the northern Sumatran province of Aceh in early 2010, but it was uncovered by police and many of its members have either been killed or arrested. Dulmatin was shot dead by police in March 2010, and Abu Tholut was arrested several months later.¹⁸ Ba'asyir was arrested in July 2010 on charges of helping to establish and fund the Dulmatin-Tholut group.

The influence of Middle Eastern thinkers

Despite the long history of near-continuous militant activity and the particularistic local factors that have shaped the development of jihadi groups, Indonesian jihadi thought is derived largely from Middle Eastern sources. Works by Arab authors dominate the reading lists of terrorist training courses, the references cited by prominent Indonesian jihadi writers and preachers on their websites and in speeches and sermons, and the catalogues of jihadi publishers. The most popular thinkers in recent years have been 'Abdalla 'Azzam, Imam al-Sharif (often known in the West as 'Dr Fadl' but most commonly referred

¹⁷ International Crisis Group, 'Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks', Asia Report no. 114 (5 May 2006); and 'Indonesia: Noordin's Support Base', Asia Briefing no. 95 (27 August 2009).

¹⁸ International Crisis Group, 'Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh', Asia Report no. 189 (20 April 2010); 'Polisi Buru Abdullah Sonata', *Republika*, 14 May 2010; and 'Top Terrorist Suspect Arrested in Klaten', *The Jakarta Post*, 24 June 2010.

to in Indonesia by his other alias, Abdul Qodir bin Abdul Aziz) and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.

'Azzam's works have been available in Islamist circles in Indonesia since at least the 1980s, but it has only been in the last decade that his books have become more broadly accessible.¹⁹ In 2002, the JI-linked press al-Alaqa published a translation of his twelve-volume series *Tarbiyah Jihadiyah* (Jihadi training), followed shortly afterwards by *Hijrah dan I'dad* (Flight and preparation).²⁰ *Tarbiyah Jihadiyah* is the most studied work in JI circles, a reflection of its perceived authority and comprehensiveness on matters of doctrine, theology, Islamic history and strategy. 'Azzam, a Palestinian *shari'a* academic, was personally known to many senior Indonesian jihadis through his Maktab al-Khidamat (Bureau of Services) in Peshawar, which assisted and supervised foreign recruits who sought jihadi training in Afghanistan. Various JI leaders not only acknowledge the influence that 'Azzam's writings had on them but also express their admiration for his career as a jihadi. Mukhlas, for example, placed 'Azzam near the top of the list of figures who most influenced him, making particular mention of 'Azzam's elevation of jihad as the paramount activity for Muslims and his scholarship on jihadi jurisprudence (*fiqhul jihad*).²¹ Samudra praised 'Azzam as one of the '*ulama* *abluts tsughur*' (*ulama* of the frontier), whom he regarded as the most authoritative among Islamic scholars because they had engaged directly in holy war.²²

Over the past five years, 'Azzam's influence has been somewhat eclipsed by that of the controversial jihadi ideologue Dr Fadl. Fadl had been a senior figure in Egypt's Islamic Jihad and a close associate of al-Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri, but following his arrest in 2001 he recanted his earlier jihadi views and criticised terrorist attacks in a succession of writings. Extracts from his seminal work, *al 'Umda fi 'i'daadil 'Uddah* (The essential guide to preparation [for jihad]) have been published in Indonesia, including *Rambu-Rambu Jihad* (The signs of jihad), and a more extensive roneoed version under the title, '*Panduan*

¹⁹ International Crisis Group, 'Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry', Asia Report no. 147 (28 February 2008), p. 3; and Sidney Jones, 'International Influences on Jihadist Movements in Indonesia', unpublished conference paper, May 2006, p. 3.

²⁰ 'Abdullah 'Azzam, *Tarbiyah Jihadiyah* and *Hijrah dan I'dad*, (Solo: Pustaka al-Alaqa, 1994–1999). A second revised edition of the entire *Tarbiyah Jihadiyah* set was published in 2002 by al-Alaqa, indicating the strength of its appeal in jihadi circles.

²¹ Aly Ghuftron Nurhasyim, 'Tokoh-Tokoh yang Berpengaruh Terhadap Diri dan Kehidupan Saya', handwritten text, Denpasar, no date (probably late 2003), p. 57.

²² Imam Samudra, *Aku Melawan Teroris*, pp. 68–9.

Fikih Jihad' (Guide to jihadi jurisprudence) is also in circulation in jihadi circles.²³ Fadl's other major jihadi work, the thousand-page *al-Jami' fi Thalab al-'Ilmi As-Syarif al-Imam wa al-Kufr* (The compendium in pursuit of divine knowledge), has been translated in part and published, most notably as *Kafir Tanpa Sadar* (Unwitting infidels), *Murtad Karena Hukum* (Apostate due to law), and *Melacak Jejak Thaghut* (Tracing the trail of un-Islamic rulers).²⁴ His main recantation text, *Rationalising Jihad in Egypt and the World*, has been translated in full into Indonesian and published as *Menggugat al-Qaidah* (*Accusing al-Qaeda*), though it appears to be much less discussed than his earlier works.²⁵ The wide availability of Fadl's works in recent years may well be due to a perception in jihadi communities that they are more universalistic than 'Azzam's writings, which focus on Afghanistan.²⁶

The Jordanian-Palestinian scholar, al-Maqdisi, has, like Fadl, been an increasingly popular author for jihadi presses to translate and publish. At least six of al-Maqdisi's works have been published in the past five years, including a sharp critique of the Saudi Arabian government entitled *Saudi di Mata Seorang Al-Qaidah* (Saudi according to an Al-Qaeda person), *Salah Kaprah Salafi* (The mistakes of Salafis) and *Demokrasi Sejalan dengan Islam?* (Is democracy compatible with Islam?).²⁷ Perhaps the most significant work is *Mereka Mujahid tapi Salah Langkah* (They are mujahideen but acting wrongly), a text al-Maqdisi wrote in jail, in which he censures his former follower and leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, over the latter's extreme violence towards Iraqi

²³ Syaikh Abdul Qodir bin Abdul Aziz, *Rambu-Rambu Jihad: Kiat Mengenali Sifat & Karakter Jihad* (Solo: Syam Publishing, 2009); and Syaikh Abdul Qodir bin Abdul Aziz, '*Panduan Jihad fi Sabi'ilillah*', trans. Hasaan Muhaajir As-Syyaari, Mecca (2005).

²⁴ Syaikh Abdul Qodir bin Abdul Aziz, *Kafir Tanpa Sadar* (Solo: Media Islamika, 2006); *Murtad Karena Hukum* (Klaten: Kafayah, 2008); and *Melacak Jejak Thaghut* (Klaten: Kafayah, 2007).

²⁵ Dr Fadl, *Menggugat al-Qaidah: Rasionalisasi Jihad di Mesir dan Dunia* (Jakarta: Sabili, 2009).

²⁶ For an excellent discussion of Fadl's life and recantation, see Nelly Lahoud, 'Do Jihadi Recantations Matter', presented to the International Security Program at the Belfer Center, Harvard University, 22 April 2001, and *idem* *The Jihadis' Path to Self-Destruction* (London: Hurst, 2010).

²⁷ Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, *Saudi di Mata Seorang al-Qaidah*, (Solo: Jazera, 2005); *Demokrasi Sejalan dengan Islam?* (Jakarta: ar-Rahmah Media, 2008); and *Salah Kaprah Salafi: Membongkar Syubhat-Syubhat Murji'ah Masa Kini* (Solo: al-Fajr Media, 2009).

civilians.²⁸ *Mereka Mujahid* has recorded strong sales.²⁹ Many of al-Maqdisi's works have been translated by Aman Abdurrahman, an Indonesian jihadi scholar and Arabist of considerable accomplishment who was jailed for his role in leading a jihadi group that was preparing bombs.³⁰

While the above three authors appear to be the most widely published and read, there are many other authors on jihad available in Indonesia. These range from 'classical' writers such as Ibn Taymiyya to more contemporary writers such as Sayyid Qutb, Sa'id Hawwa, Nashir Bin Hamid al-Fahd, Yusuf Bin Shalil al-'Uyayri and Abu Bashir 'Abd al-Mun'im Mustafa Halima.³¹ Curiously, some famous jihadi texts have not been translated into Indonesian, even though their contents are well-known to Indonesian militants. The best example is 'Abd al-Salam Faraj's *al-Farida al-ghaiba* (The neglected duty), which has never to our knowledge been published in Indonesia.

It is apparent from the foregoing that Indonesian jihadis exercise agency in the selection and promotion of foreign texts, and this process is often influenced by both international events and domestic circumstances. Sidney Jones has noted how Indonesian perceptions of near and far enemies have been shaped by this internal-external nexus. In the 1970s and 1980s works from thinkers within Egypt's Gama'a al-Islamiya which emphasised the necessity of overthrowing their own 'hostile' government struck a chord with DI leaders such as Sungkar and Ba'asyir, who viewed the Soeharto government as 'occupying' the Islamic State declared by Kartosuwiryo in 1949. The experience of Indonesian *mujahidin* in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s heightened awareness of global Islamic issues and the threat posed by far-enemy forces. Bin Laden's 1998 *fatwa* and the 9/11 attacks gave further stimulus to those Indonesian jihadis intent upon attacking Islam's external foes.³² Most recently, the depletion of and disarray within jihadi groups following the 2002 bombings has driven a search for new paradigms and strategies. In each of these

²⁸ Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, *Mereka Mujahid Tapi Salah Langkah* (Solo: Aqwam, 2007).

²⁹ ICG, 'Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry', p. 7.

³⁰ International Crisis Group, "Deradicalisation" and Indonesia's Prisons, Asia Report no. 147 (19 November 2007); and 'Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry', p. 7.

³¹ For further details on some of these publications, see ICG, 'Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry'.

³² Jones, 'International Influences on Jihadist Movements in Indonesia', p. 4–7.

phases, Indonesian jihadi leaders have sought justification for their approaches in the works of foreign *'ulama*.

Indonesian jihadi literature

The number of serious ideological texts by Indonesian jihadis is limited. Many of the popular published books, such as Samudra's *Aku Melawan Teroris* or fellow Bali bomber Ali Imron's *Sang Pengebom* (The bomber),³³ are works of mixed content, combining autobiographical sections with accounts of jihadi operations and somewhat aphoristic doctrinal discussion. Samudra's *Jihadku* (My jihad), a rejoinder to former JI member Nasir Abas's criticism of *Aku Melawan Teroris*, does offer a lengthier and more focussed exposition of his jihadi ideology, but the style tends to be polemical and vituperative rather than thoughtful or scholarly.³⁴ While Samudra adduces numerous Qur'anic quotations to support his case, the verses cited are standard jihadi references, and there is little sign of engagement with the broader literature or debates on jihad among leading *'ulama*. The only other published work which provides an extended discussion of jihad is *Apa Itu Jihad?* (What is jihad?), by one of the leaders of the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta, Rois Abu Syaukat (Iwan Darmawan).³⁵ Rois draws on a wider array of sources than Imam Samudra, but the style of the text is, for the most part, didactic in its explanation of categories of jihad, the obligation for Muslims to wage war under certain circumstances and the nature of military preparations.

There are no precise figures on the sales of jihadi books, partly because many jihadi publishers do not keep reliable sales data or are reluctant to release them. While top-selling works such as *Aku Melawan Teroris* can exceed ten thousand sales, most of the works mentioned above probably sell less than eight thousand copies. The standard production run for Islamist publishers in Indonesia is between two and four thousand, and not many jihadi works make it into multiple reprints. Raw sales figures, however, are not a particularly reliable guide to readership in Indonesia, as many people borrow books from friends and often make cheap photocopies for their personal use. Thus, each published copy of a book may have many readers. Some of the most popular works by

³³ Ali Imron, *Sang Pengebom* (Jakarta: Republika, 2007).

³⁴ Imam Samudra, *Jihadku: Buku Bantahan 'Melawan Pemikiran Aksi Bom Imam Samudra & Noordin M. Top' Karya Nasir Abas* (no place: Kafilah Syuhada, 2009).

³⁵ Rois Abu Syaukat, *Apa Itu Jihad? Kupas Tuntas Kewajiban & Pelaksanaan Jihad* (Jakarta: Shoutul Haq, 2009).

well-known figures such as Samudra and Ali Imron attract a broader readership among Muslims curious to know of the views of notorious terrorists; but most of the consumption of jihadi materials is confined to militant Islamic circles. It is not uncommon for *ulama* and members of mainstream Muslim organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah to have little knowledge of this literature.

Arguably, the most interesting and intellectually sustained treatises are unpublished. A number of works deserve mention in this category. Mukhlās's *Jihad Bom Bali* (The Bali bomb jihad) is a 130-page handwritten explanation and justification of the 2002 attack.³⁶ It is impressive in its detail, citing not only scripture and *hadith* but also Islamic history and classical and contemporary scholars of jihadi doctrine. There is a rigour to Mukhlās's argumentation, as he anticipates criticism of the bombing and presents a defence of his actions, but he also puts the case for continuing use of violence against 'far enemy' targets. Another interesting work, of uncertain provenance, is *Indonesiaku Sayang, Indonesiaku Malang* (My dear Indonesia, my unlucky Indonesia), a 120-page typescript written by 'Usyakul Huur', almost certainly a *nom de plume*. The exact identity of Huur remains a mystery and the author may possibly have come from a non-JI group, such as the militant Islamist 'welfare' organisation Kompak.³⁷ *Indonesiaku Sayang* is Faraj-like in its tone, condemning the Indonesian government as 'apostate' and 'infidel' and calling upon Muslims to destroy it. Despite its focus upon the un-Islamic nature of the Indonesian state, the text confines itself to a passing consideration of the Republic's democratic and multi-religious basis, offering little detail regarding conditions within Indonesia. Moreover, nearly all of the many sources cited are non-Indonesian. The most significant of all the Indonesian jihadi texts is *Menabur Jihad, Menuai Teror*, which will be examined in the following section.

It is notable from the above that no Indonesian author has produced what might be regarded as an original or distinctively localised ideological manifesto. While there are works displaying intellectual engagement and a com-

³⁶ Ali Ghufon bin Nurhasyim (Mukhlās), *Jihad Bom Bali: Sebuah Pembelaan*, Bali Police District Jail, 25 March 2003. For translated extracts from this work, see Fealy and Hooker (eds.), *Voices of Islam*, pp. 377–87.

³⁷ 'Usyakul Huur, *Indonesiaku Sayang, Indonesiaku Malang?!!!*' (no place, no date, but probably from 2005). We are grateful to Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group for making available this and numerous other jihadi primary sources cited in this chapter.

mand of foreign jihadi concepts, the tendency is to apply faithfully the ideas and precepts of external ideologues to Indonesia with minimal variation or adaptation. This derivative character of local jihadi thinking is acknowledged by Mukhlās in a website discussion of prominent jihadi writers. After listing the names and works of thirty-three Middle Eastern and African *ulama*, he writes under the heading of 'South East Asia', 'Why have we not produced any *ulama* of international calibre?'³⁸ Mukhlās does not provide an answer to this question, but it is interesting to speculate on the reasons for Indonesia's and South East Asia's unexceptional jihadi discourse. One factor is that Indonesia has not had a vibrant intellectual culture within its jihadi groups. Darul Islam had few serious scholars in its leadership during the 1950s and 1960s, and much of DI today holds to a simple, and often nostalgic, view of its Islamic state struggle and is not receptive to new jihadi ideas. Furthermore, a much lower proportion of the JI leadership is tertiary-level educated or of professional background than that of other major jihadi groups in the Muslim world. Indonesian jihadis who are of a scholarly disposition seem more intent on mastering the works of eminent Middle-Eastern *ulama* than in producing innovative, indigenised thinking. This jihadi dependence on foreign ideology stands in contrast to the generation and embracing of new ideas found in many other sections of Indonesia's Muslim community. Even transnational Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood-influenced Prosperous and Justice Party (PKS) have shown considerable creativity in modifying Middle Eastern doctrine for an Indonesian political setting.

An analysis of Sowing Jihad

On 1 October 2005 three suicide-bombers blew themselves up in cafes near the Balinese capital of Denpasar. Noordin Mohammed Top, by then the best-known jihadi in Indonesia, organised this second Bali bombing from the middle of 2005 onward. During the Bali II investigation, the police unearthed a hard disc carrying a text entitled *Sowing Jihad, Reaping Terror* (hereafter *Sowing*) in Semarang, Central Java. This text aims at justifying three attacks: Bali I, the Marriott hotel bombing of 2003 and the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta's Kuningan district in 2004, all of which targeted foreigners. *Sowing* is thus intended as a defence of the anti-foreigner strand of the

³⁸ Ali Ghufon bin Nurhasyim, *Mencari Sosok Ulama Panutan*, on the Anshar website, available at [<http://www.anshar.net>].

Indonesian jihad. It also seeks to justify the 'collateral' deaths of Muslims that occurred in those attacks. On the other hand, it ignores JI's bombing of Indonesian churches in 2000 and the participation of its operatives and other radical Muslims in sectarian conflict in Maluku and Central Sulawesi.

Sowing has circulated since 2005 as a 300-page document sub-titled *The Bali, Marriott and Kuningan Bombings from the Perspective of Islamic Law and of Benefit to the Muslim Community*.³⁹ Surprisingly this is still one of the most comprehensive defences of jihad written in the Indonesian language.⁴⁰ *Sowing* appears to have been the work of two of Noordin Top's followers: Lutfi Hae-daroh (alias Ubeid) and Parmin (who used several aliases including Sastro, which we will call him here).⁴¹ Ubeid was arrested in July 2004 with the writing project incomplete. Sastro survived over two years on the run, was arrested in 2008 and later received an eight-year jail sentence. Born in 1980 and educated at Darusy Syahadah *pesantren* (Islamic boarding-school) in Central Java, Sastro gravitated towards the Noordin network in 2004. Sastro met Noordin himself for the first time in April 2005 and was asked to translate jihadi texts into Indonesian and later to finish *Sowing*.

The authors of *Sowing* had scholarly aspirations. Their text is not one that prospective recruits to the Indonesian jihad are likely to read in its entirety. It is armed with 400 footnotes and lists over 200 sources, the vast majority of

³⁹ *Bom Bali, Marriott dan Kuningan dalam Timbangan Syariat dan Maslahat*. The author is given as Sulaiman ibnu Walid Damanhuri. This text remains unpublished. For typical coverage by a jihadi website, see [http://aisyahazzahro.blogspot.com/2008/08/fase-fase-turunnya-jihadoleh-sulaiman.html], which reproduces *Sowing*'s four stages of jihad. This chapter can only offer a preliminary analysis of this lengthy and complex document and will not attempt to assess its overall influence as against the most popular texts of Arab writers on jihad.

⁴⁰ As noted earlier, the three Bali I bombers executed in November 2008 each produced memoirs while on death-row. The earliest book to appear was Samudra's *Aku Melawan Teroris*.

⁴¹ See the prosecution statement in Sastro's trial, *Surat Tuntutan, An. Terdakwa Parmin alias Yaser Abdul Baar alias Aslam alias Sastro alias Putra Sanjaya* (Jakarta, January 2009), p. 9. We have used the information in this dossier to assemble Sastro's bio-data. An Indonesian researcher interviewed Ubeid and Sastro respectively on our behalf in February and May 2009. Ubeid denied any role in writing *Sowing* and attributed its authorship to Sastro. He may have been trying to protect himself or to preserve the fiction inherent in the use of the pseudonym Sulaiman ibnu Walid Damanhuri, namely that there was only one author. Sastro, by contrast, confirmed much of what he had said in his trial testimony. Ubeid was arrested by police in early 2010 for alleged involvement in the Dulmatin-Sunata network.

which are in Arabic. Strikingly, there are no references to any Indonesian religious texts. This testifies to the Indonesian jihad's failure to throw up any clerical authorities of its own with international standing. Sungkar, for example, left no corpus of writing on jihad, or indeed on any other subject. Ba'asyir has published some books since his return from Malaysian exile, but none solely concerned with jihad.⁴²

The authors of *Sowing* marshal a wide range of arguments, both political and theological, to legitimise anti-foreigner bombing. We make no claims here for the originality of their arguments, most of which will be familiar to observers of the global jihad. The text opens with a condemnation of the US military presence in the Arabian Peninsula, which it attributes not to any specific trigger, such as Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, but to a longstanding American strategy. The Arabian Peninsula is the key to dominion over the whole world. The 'Crusader countries' have known since before oil was discovered, the authors assert, that whoever controls Arabia commands the world because of the Peninsula's role as the transport hub of the globe and the meeting-place of continents. The British were the most successful of the powers seeking to dominate Arabia until supplanted by the United States after the Second World War. Thirty years later, the Carter Doctrine spelled out how vital the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf were for America.⁴³

Beyond these geo-strategic and resource-driven motives, the United States and its allies are also waging a war against Islam. That Muslims are defending themselves against an American onslaught, the authors assert, is sufficient proof that this is a religious war, but further confirmation lies in the US attempt to impose its values, namely democracy, secularism and its decadent culture. America is leading a 'Crusader-Zionist-Pagan-Communist international alliance' against the Muslim world. Muslims who resist this alliance are called 'terrorists', but what is terror, the authors ask? A terrorist is simply a person who makes somebody else afraid, who intimidates somebody. All countries in fact use this tactic. Just by maintaining armed forces, nation-states seek to intimidate their potential adversaries. America and its allies have practised terror by imposing sanctions on Saddam Hussein's Iraq, supporting Israel's disposses-

⁴² A representative example of Ba'asyir's writing is *Catatan dari Penjara, untuk Mengamalkan dan Menegakkan Dinul Islam* (Depok: Mushaf, 2006). In this work, Ba'asyir acknowledges that bombing operations in which the participants have died are martyrdom operations rather than suicide actions, but condemns them nonetheless as mistaken because Indonesia is a country at peace (*ibid.*, pp. 282–3).

⁴³ *Sowing*, pp. 7–17.

sion of the Palestinians, overthrowing the Taliban and massacring Muslims in Kashmir, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya and the conflict-riven Indonesian provinces of Central Sulawesi and Maluku (where the reader is presumably expected to believe that they worked through local Christian allies). In short, the real terrorists are to be found in the Crusader alliance.

Abrogation

The authors now broaden their case by turning to the concept of the abrogation (*naskh*) of Qur'anic verses and reports attributed to the Prophet (*hadiths*). This holds that verses were revealed to Muhammad in response to how his mission was evolving and that on occasion later verses or *hadiths* abrogated earlier verses that applied to the first stages of his prophetic career.⁴⁴ One of the Qur'an's most famous verses, 'after the sacred months, kill the infidels wherever you find them...' (9:5) is alleged by some scholars to have abrogated more verses than any other.⁴⁵ As the Qur'an was not compiled in the chronological order of its revelation, abrogating verses may come before the verses that they have abrogated, rather than after them, and both abrogating and abrogated verses may appear in the same chapter.⁴⁶ Drawing as it must on detailed knowl-

⁴⁴ See the general discussion, J. Burton, 'Naskh(a) or al-Nasikh wa 'l-Mansukh', in *Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition*, available at [http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=Islam_SIM-5832]. See, for an account of *naskh* specifically in connection with jihad, Reuven Firestone, *Jihad, The Origin of Holy War in Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 48–65. See also David Bukay, 'Peace or Jihad? Abrogation in Islam', *Middle East Quarterly*, vol. 14 no. 4 (2007), pp. 3–11.

⁴⁵ The authors do not discuss Muslim writers who have sceptical views of *naskh*. See, for example, the views of the Egyptian scholar Mahmud Shaltut in Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam* (Princeton: Marcus Wiener, 1996), especially pp. 80–1, where he is quoted as rejecting the view that verses on fighting had abrogated verses on forgiveness and pardon. But they list Shaltut nonetheless as one of the 'secularist or nationalist Muslims or pupils of Western orientalisks' who only accepts the legitimacy of jihad when Muslims are themselves under attack. *Sowing*, p. 119.

⁴⁶ Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence* (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 2003), p. 224, observes that Muslim jurists of the second century after Muhammad's migration to Medina 'considered war as the norm, rather than the exception, in relations with non-Muslims, and they were able to do so partly because of a certain exaggeration in the use and application of *naskh*'. There was a need, he writes, 'to be in a state of constant readiness for battle in order to protect Islam'. *Sowing* argues that the same need exists today.

edge of copious sources, this mode of argument cannot avoid a scholarly, even arcane, air which may limit its potency in popular debate or advocacy of jihad.

Sowing outlines four stages in the Prophet's mission. The first is the Meccan period of the thirteen years following the first revelation, when Muslims were considerably weaker than the pagan Meccans and infidels around them and were therefore forbidden by God to wage war and commanded to be patient in the face of infidel harassment as they spread the message. *Sowing* quotes as applicable in this period the Qur'anic verses 3:186⁴⁷ and 2:109⁴⁸ and cites a *hadith* in which Muhammad says that he was commanded by God to forgive infidels, forbidding his followers to battle them. In short, during this time there is no violent jihad, only the peaceful spreading of the message of Islam. In the following period beginning in Medina, it was permitted but not obligatory for Muslims to wage war on infidels. The authors cite here the Qur'anic verse 22:39, in which God permits people to wage war when war is being waged on them.⁴⁹ The next period was a time in which it was obligatory to wage war but only if Muslims had been attacked. The text refers to Qur'anic verses 2:190⁵⁰ and 4: 90–91.⁵¹ In the fourth stage in the final years of Muhammad's life, when he had established a state, Muslims were commanded to wage war on all infidels until they converted to Islam or paid a poll-tax, even in their homelands and even if they had not declared war on Muslims. It was then that verse 9:5 was revealed. *Sowing* sums up the four stages by quoting Ibn al-Qayyim, who wrote that jihad was initially forbidden, then permitted, then

⁴⁷ 'You will surely be tested in your possessions and in yourselves. And you will surely hear from those who were given the Scripture before you and from those who associate others with Allah much abuse. But if you are patient and fear Allah—indeed, that is the matter (worthy) of resolve.'

⁴⁸ 'Many of the People of the Book wish they could turn you back to disbelief after you have believed, out of envy arising within them after the truth has become clear to them. So pardon and overlook them until Allah delivers his command...'

⁴⁹ 'Permission (to fight) has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged. And indeed Allah is competent to give them victory.'

⁵⁰ 'Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed, Allah does not like transgressors.'

⁵¹ 4:90, '...So if they remove themselves from you and do not fight you and offer peace, then Allah has not made for you a cause (for fighting) against them'. And 4:91, 'You will find others who wish to obtain security from you and [to] obtain security from their own people. Every time they are restored to [the influence of] disbelief, they fall back into it. So, if they do not withdraw from you or offer you peace or restrain their hands, then seize them and kill them wherever you find them...'

commanded to be undertaken against those who had attacked Muslims and finally commanded against all infidels.⁵² The authors conclude their discussion of abrogation by drawing on Ibn Taymiyya's reasoning to say that what was abrogated was the idea that it was sufficient to spread the message orally and to resist only when Muslims were under attack (defensive jihad).⁵³ New verses made it mandatory to make war on infidels even if they had not attacked Muslims, but spreading the message of Islam and defensive jihad were still valid.

The authors acknowledge that Qur'anic verses urging peace pose a problem for their analysis so far. They refer, for example, to verse 8:61, which says that if infidels incline towards peace Muslims should do likewise. Their response is that scholars developed three arguments concerning this and similar verses. The first was that this verse had been abrogated by verses in the ninth chapter, including verse 9:5. The second was that verse 8:61 only covers those People of the Book (principally Christians and Jews) who are prepared to pay the poll-tax. It does not advocate peace at any cost but instead submission on the part of infidels to Islamic law and their obligation to pay. A third interpretation is that this verse is valid only when Muslims are in desperate straits and peace will bring them concrete benefits (*maslaha*, also translated as 'the public interest'). *Sowing* does not come down in support of any one of these opinions but nonetheless denies that this verse proves that Muslims and infidels are not at war. Similarly, saying 'there is no compulsion in religion', such as in verses 2:256⁵⁴ or 10:99, can be explained as either having been abrogated (since Muhammad converted the Arabs to Islam, offering them a choice of war or conversion) or as relating exclusively to People of the Book, who have the choice

⁵² Quotations are from *Sowing*, pp. 71–5. Richard Bonney, *Jihad, From Qur'an to bin Laden* (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), pp. 25–6, quotes Shamseddin al-Sarakhsi's version of the four-stage process, in which Muhammad was first commanded to spread the message of Islam peacefully without direct confrontation with infidels, then confrontation by means of argumentation was allowed, then armed resistance was commanded but not during the four forbidden months of the year, and finally war was commanded unconditionally. Bonney also provides a useful discussion of modern interpretations of abrogation theory in relation to jihad. Samudra, pp. 125–33, offers a four-stage scenario: 1) self-restraint; 2) war permitted; 3) war of a limited nature mandatory; 4) mandatory war against all infidels. He attributes this to the scholar Ibn Kathir.

⁵³ *Sowing*, p. 79.

⁵⁴ 2:256, 'There shall be no compulsion in religion...' And 10:99, 'And had our Lord so willed, those on earth would have believed—all of them entirely. Then (O, Muhammad), would you compel the people in order that they become believers?'

of war, conversion or paying the poll-tax. In short, the authors say, jihad aims to bring infidels under the sway of the Muslims and Islamic law, not to force each individual among them to change his or her religion.

Who deserves protection?

Having justified violent jihad in terms of abrogation, the authors move on to discuss which categories of infidels deserve to be protected during jihad. In answer to the charge that JI bombing has killed 'civilians', they claim that Islam divides infidels into those who can be fought and those who cannot, but that the 'military' versus 'civilian' distinction is a false dichotomy.⁵⁵ Whereas males over the age of puberty can be killed, have their property confiscated and be enslaved, this cannot be done to women, children, the elderly, the blind or paralysed, priests or workers, unless any of the latter help the infidels' war-making in any way. These categories of infidels are protected even in the absence of a specific guarantee of their security. If it is proved, however, that they are participating in war-making in some way, they may be killed. Other infidels may enter the category of protected people through a security agreement. Infidels living in a Muslim country who obey Muslim laws and pay the poll-tax receive guarantees of their safety in return. Other non-Muslims who merely visit Islamic countries for limited periods of time can enjoy the same benefit. An Islamic state may also enter a truce with an infidel country for a specific time. During the life of the truce, the lives and property of infidels affected by it are guaranteed. The authors note that scholars have been divided over how long such a truce might last, some suggesting a mere four months and others saying longer than ten years.⁵⁶

Now the authors distinguish between jihad as a collective responsibility (*fard kifaya*) and as an individual one (*fard 'ayn*). This distinction is related to the difference between offensive jihad waged against infidels in their own country and defensive jihad waged when infidels attack and occupy a Muslim country. All countries and religions accept the legitimacy of war in self-defence.⁵⁷ *Sowing* says that, according to the majority of scholars, jihad in the former case is a collective responsibility but in the latter all the inhabitants have an individual obligation to resist. If their efforts are unavailing, Muslims in neigh-

⁵⁵ *Sowing*, p. 104.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

bouring countries have that obligation and, if that is inadequate, the responsibility falls upon the global Muslim community. *Sowing* quotes 'Azzam as saying that a Muslim child can go off to join such a jihad without his parents' permission, a woman without her husband's and a debtor without paying his debts.⁵⁸

The authors now turn to the vexed question of what justifies the killing of innocent 'civilians', even though they have already asserted that the military-civilian distinction has no value in Islamic thought. They identify several conditions in which such killing is legitimate, the first occurring when infidels first kill Muslim women, children and so on. In the years before the Bali, Marriott and Kuningan attacks, the US killed an estimated 150,000 Iraqis in the first Gulf War, and then 1.5 million others died because of the US-imposed embargo on Iraq. Thousands more men, women and children died in Afghanistan under US fire. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims have been killed by Israel (backed by the US), and more in the Philippines, Sudan, Somalia and Indonesia. Compared to this cumulative toll, jihadi operations in Indonesia have been a 'small token of solidarity' not even equal to 1 per cent retaliation for all those Muslim deaths, the authors write. The killing of infidel women and children is legitimate when infidels use them as shields or when such civilians aid their own side. The authors claim that the people of the US, Australia, UK and other allies have participated in the decisions of their leaders to attack Muslim countries by having voted them into office and that therefore the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have won majority support. Likewise, when an electorate opposes war, it can force its government to conclude the war, as when the American people insisted that the US withdraw from Vietnam and Somalia.⁵⁹ The authors go on to make the inaccurate claim that because the US and its allies all practise mandatory national service all citizens, male or female, are really military personnel, either on active service or in reservist ranks.

Accidental killing of Muslims

At this point, *Sowing* acknowledges that the deaths of Muslims in jihadi bombing operations have attracted widespread condemnation in Indonesia.⁶⁰ They acknowledge that the criticism requires a detailed rebuttal. Their arguments

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 159 and 163–5.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

are as follows. The Bali bombers surveyed their target but committed a 'human error' (in English) by mistakenly predicting that few Indonesians would be there on the night of the attack. Given that the Balinese are Hindus, there was, they thought, a very small possibility that Muslims would be present. This turned out to be wrong. Similarly, some taxi-drivers and Muslim passers-by were killed in the Marriott and Kuningan bombings, circumstances that were 'blown-up' [sic] by the mass media. (In fact, only one foreigner was killed in these last two bombings.) This is clearly a case of infidels using Muslims as shields because they deliberately build their embassies and offices in the midst of Muslims.⁶¹ Infidels employ Muslims in their offices because they know that *mujahidin* will not target their co-religionists:⁶² the presence of Muslim employees will make *mujahidin* think twice before attacking. In response, jihadi operations in countries with Muslim-majority populations have to be carried out with the utmost caution. Otherwise, jihad will inflict greater harm as opposed to the weakening of the strength of the US and its allies and of boosting the morale of Muslims under direct US attack. It is particularly important for jihadi operations to continue in Indonesia, since this country has been the most important South East Asian country in the international Crusader alliance: Bush had no sooner called on the world to be 'with us or against us' than former President Megawati met him face-to-face and committed Indonesia to fight against terrorism.

In the concluding sections, the authors rebut other arguments against jihadi operations in Indonesia. To the criticism that *mujahidin* are too few in number and are unduly influenced by their emotions, they respond that history shows that Muslims usually won against more numerous infidel opponents. In the Mu'ta war against Byzantium, for example, three thousand of the Prophet's Companions defeated two hundred thousand of the enemy. Another criticism is that the *mujahidin* are only seeking vengeance. If a Muslim sees robbers killing a member of his family, how does he react? What if robbers kill two million members of his family and displace seven million more? If he sees infidels coming to impose infidel teachings such as democracy, capitalism, liberalism and moral decadence, how is he to react? And what if the advantages

⁶¹ Given that Muslims comprise 88 per cent of the Indonesian population, how infidels might avoid locating their offices in the midst of Muslims is not easy to grasp, unless they were prepared to set up shop in one or another outlying non-Muslim-majority provinces such as North Sulawesi, Bali, Papua or West Irian Jaya.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 186. Similarly, the presence of Muslims in the offices of infidels seems unavoidable in practice, unless discriminatory employment practices are adopted.

that jihad provides are outweighed by the disadvantages? The response to this is that such comparison can only be undertaken from the perspective of Islamic law. Maybe, the authors concede, jihad has not yet shown a substantial material benefit, but the spiritual benefit is obvious. The upholding of *tawhid* (the oneness of God), the drawing of a line between the *tawhid* army and the infidel army, the separation of the faithful from the hypocrites, the rejection of giant infidel projects—these are spiritual benefits that no amount of other Muslim actions such as *da'wa* (outreach) and education could achieve. Jihad alone can bestow these benefits.⁶³

Conclusion

Jihadism is, in many ways, intrinsically ideological, and Indonesian jihadi groups have certainly been driven by specific worldviews, goals and understandings of valid methods for achieving these, particularly through the use of violence in either the short- or long-term. The very idea of a 'holy war' against the enemies of Islam, however defined, has had a galvanising effect on successive generations of militant Islamists, and Indonesian jihadis have had a continuing concern to find religious sanction for their actions. Thus, jihadi texts usually abound with Qur'anic quotations, references to the practices of the Prophet Muhammad or examples from famous events in more recent Islamic history to justify and buttress their views and operations.

However, in qualitative terms, Indonesian jihadi literature is thin. Nearly all of the key concepts and methodologies are drawn directly from Middle Eastern sources with little attempt to develop particularistic local expressions of jihadi thought.⁶⁴ This is not so much due to an intellectual failure on behalf of Indonesian jihadis as it is to a deeply entrenched cultural and scholarly deference to Arab *'ulama*. Despite this, Indonesian jihadis have been selective in their choices of foreign ideological literature, often favouring those sources that appear most suitable to the circumstances in their own country.

It should be noted, however, that neither thin content nor a derivative approach has created major obstacles for recruitment to the jihadi cause in Indonesia. The most recent proof of this is the discovery of a terrorist training

camp in Aceh in February 2010 where tens of potential jihadis were upgrading their skills only four months after the killing of Noordin Top had spawned the expectation of a prolonged lull in jihadi activities. On the other hand, we still lack adequate data to assess how necessary a close study of jihadi texts is before Indonesians choose to take up jihad. Family ties, school connections, particular social circumstances plus an easy acceptance of the claim that the West is at war with Islam may all be more important 'drivers' of recruitment than such study. Specifically with regard to *Sowing*, we cannot claim that it has had the wide impact on Indonesian jihadi thinking that analysis of its sophisticated content would lead us to expect: its authors may have been too ambitious for the readership at which they were aiming. But why it has not yet been published remains a mystery. For this reason, perhaps, no critic of jihad, not even a Salafi critic like Ba'abduh, has challenged the text on its account of *naskh* and jihad. The authors hope in the future to interview a wider range of Indonesian jihadis than has so far been possible in order to clear up unresolved issues concerning *Sowing's* impact.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 278.

⁶⁴ One version of *Sowing* includes references to various Indonesian heroes of resistance to Dutch colonialism as pioneers of jihad in Indonesia. It mentions, for example, Diponegoro, leader of the nineteenth-century Java War resistance forces. This constitutes an interesting if underdeveloped attempt to provide some local context.