

**STATE, IDEOLOGY AND  
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION:**  
THE SYMBOLIC POLITICS OF INDONESIA'S  
SOUTH–SOUTH COOPERATION

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## **DECLARATION**

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university. To the best of the author's knowledge, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text.

Miranda P. Tahalele

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## ABSTRACT

The changing landscape of foreign aid has both stimulated and acknowledged the re-emergence of Southern countries as donors and providers of aid and knowledge in global development cooperation. This research explored how Indonesia, as a Southern state, has constructed the idea of 'giving' in South–South Cooperation (SSC) within the globalised world of foreign aid. It argues that Southern cooperation has two structures: the symbolic narratives of partnership and solidarity, and the state institutional framework. This thesis used contemporary development studies, related social theories and the symbolic structures of giving to examine and analyse the concepts of giving and sharing in the social relations of SSC. The histories and roles of Indonesia in SSC were mapped to explore its evolution from the origin of giving, the Bandung Conference 1955 to the current politics of SSC. A qualitative research approach was applied to answer the research question specifically within the context of Indonesia's SSC.

To maintain its Southern cooperation legacies, Indonesia shaped its SSC based on its ideology and ritualised symbols of the Asian–African Conference. Based on fieldwork in Indonesia and Myanmar, the meanings and interpretations of Southern cooperation policy were explored to determine how it is practised and implemented. Perceptions of and motivation for the reciprocal process of Southern cooperation were analysed to understand the process of giving and sharing as captured in Indonesia–Myanmar Cooperation. When Indonesia institutionalised SSC, its government played significant roles in shaping the national model of cooperation and projecting the country's international position in development cooperation. Further, this study theorises the politics of giving in SSC by examining how Indonesia has maintained the state's symbolic narratives to distinguish its development relations and construct institutions to build better partnerships and cooperation. This structure distinguishes the debates surrounding global development cooperation between North and South, which have become more interlinked in recent years.

**Keywords:** South–South Cooperation, Indonesia, Development studies, Government and policy, Southern aid, International Development Cooperation



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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action
AAC	Asian–African Conference
ABC	<i>Agencia Brasileira de Cooperacao</i> (Brazilian Cooperation Agency)
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AI	Artificial Insemination
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
APBN	<i>Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara</i> (State Budget Mechanism)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BAPA	Buenos Aires Plan of Actions
BAPPENAS	<i>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional</i> (National Development Planning Agency or Ministry of National Development Planning or Ministry of Planning)
BBIB	<i>Balai Besar Inseminasi Buatan</i> or Centre for Artificial Insemination
BLU	<i>Badan Layanan Umum</i> (Public Service Agency)
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (a political grouping that consists of these five Southern countries)
BUMN	<i>Badan Usaha Milik Negara</i> (state-owned enterprises)
CEACOS UI	Centre for East Asian Cooperation Studies - Univesity of Indonesia
CEAPAD	Conference on Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development
CGI	Consultative Group on Indonesia
CIVETS	Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa
CLMV	Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam
CONEFO	Conference of the Newly Emerging Force
DAC	Development Association Committee (under the OECD)
DAG	Development Assistance Group (before changed to DAC)
DG	Director General
EC/TC	Economic cooperation / technical cooperation
FERD	Foreign Economic Relations Department, Ministry of Planning and Finance, Republic of Myanmar
GFC	Global Financial Crisis
GIZ	<i>Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</i> (German Cooperation for International Development)
GOI	Government of Indonesia
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
HLM	High-level meeting
IsDB (or IDB)	Islamic Development Bank
IGGI	Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia
IMF	International Monetary Fund

IORA	Indian Ocean Rim Association
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KSS	<i>Kerjasama Selatan-Selatan</i> (South–South Cooperation)
KSST	<i>Kerjasama Selatan-Selatan dan Triangular</i> (South–South and Triangular Cooperation)
LDKPI	<i>Lembaga Dana Kerjasama Pembangunan Internasional</i> (Indonesian Agency for International Development–Indonesian AID)
MDB	Multilateral development banks
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MIC	Middle-income countries
MINT	Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MP3EI	Master Plan for Acceleration and Expansion of Economic Development of Indonesia
NAAPS	New Asian–African Partnership Strategy
NAM	Non-Alignment Movement
NAM–CSSTC	NAM Centre for South–South Technical Cooperation
NCT	National Coordination Team
NCT–SSTC	National Coordination Team on South–South and Triangular Cooperation
NEIO	New International Economic Order
NGO	Non-governmental organisations
NSE	New structural economics
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
OLDEFOS	Old Established Forces
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PIS	Project Information Sheet
PNPM	<i>Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat</i> (National Program for Community Development)
ROI	Republic of Indonesia
RPJMN	<i>Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional</i> (National Medium-Term Development Plan)
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SSC	South–South Cooperation
SSTC	South–South and Triangular Cooperation
TCE	Third Country Expert
TCTP	Third Country Training Program
TT–SSC	Task Team on South–South Cooperation

UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDCF	United Nations Development Cooperation Forum
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Committee
UNOSSC	United Nations Office for South–South Cooperation
UNRWA	United Nations Relief Agency for Palestine Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UUD	<i>Undang-Undang Dasar</i> (National Constitution)
WP–EFF	Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (under the OECD–DAC)



## INTRODUCTION

In the changing landscape of foreign aid, South–South Cooperation (SSC) has re-emerged and been reshaped as an important study in global development cooperation. It examines the performance of Southern countries in supporting other Southern countries, especially in development and aid relations. In recent years, there has been global debate on how SSC changes the setting of development studies and how it challenges the model and system of traditional aid<sup>1</sup> (Escobar, 2012; Kilby, 2012, 2018; Lin & Wang, 2017a; Mawdsley, 2012a, 2018, 2019; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012; Watson, 2014). Based on the Bandung Conference in 1955,<sup>2</sup> the conceptualisation of SSC is still perceived as a social relation rather than as charity-based cooperation (Kilby, 2017a, 2018; Mawdsley, 2012a). Weber (1947) argued that the subjective meaning of social relations is ‘dynamic political relations of diverse actors’ behaviour, that begin with mutual understanding of each other, and develop into meaningful actions within a specific degree of continuousness’ (p. 109). Therefore, the content of SSC is framed in the context of political and socio-cultural conditions in global development cooperation as well as within its own domestic affairs. Consequently, SSC is also constantly shaping the interactions and directions of Indonesia as a Southern state, and it is increasingly being argued that relations within global cooperation are political, as explored further in this thesis.

The framework of this research is based on global debates exploring the rise and re-emergence of Southern countries as donors (Kilby, 2018; Lin & Wang, 2017a; Mawdsley, 2012a; Watson, 2014). The debates work within two dichotomies: the relations between Southern countries, and the process of giving and receiving in SSC that is internalised within the countries’ government system. This research investigates the idea, narratives and policy of giving in a Southern state that have shaped the meaning, understanding, motivations, norms and policy of its aid relations with other Southern countries, and that directly and indirectly affect relations with northern donors. The debates have led to the exploration of Southern states’ ideologies, which are symbolised through rituals and language performed

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<sup>1</sup> In this thesis, the terms ‘traditional aid’, ‘traditional donor countries’ and ‘traditional donors’ are used interchangeably with ‘Northern donor countries’ and ‘Northern donors’, which refer to a country’s aid policy and system, in line with the OECD–DAC framework.

<sup>2</sup> The terms ‘Asian–African Conference’ and ‘Bandung Conference’ have been used interchangeably by scholars (Acharya, 2016b; Hongoh, 2016; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2015), but were first recognised by Appadorai (1955). ‘Bandung Conference’ identifies the location of the Asian–African Conference in 1955.

within Southern cooperation (Mawdsley, 2011, 2012b; Shimazu, 2014). According to Cohen (1974, p. 5), symbolism can be enhanced within the institutions and social relations that help to maintain discourses over time. Therefore, SSC is politically constructed based on the necessity for Southern countries to expand within global development cooperation and at the same time engage with national development conditions and state institutional settings.

This thesis explores the development and insights of Indonesia's SSC, which is a non-BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) country, in terms of how it defines SSC within global development cooperation. Indonesia's SSC, or *Kerjasama Selatan-Selatan* in *Bahasa/Indonesian* and in government nomenclature, is ideologically driven and narrated within robust historical legacies and ritualised symbolism. This thesis specifically studies the ideas and processes of giving and sharing, which are narrated, ritualised and institutionalised by the policymakers (in this case, bureaucrats and government officials) within the country development cooperation agenda and the framework of global development cooperation. State philosophy, moral values, politics and economic struggles, as well as cultural and social settings, have directed the ways in which the meaning of aid and giving has been developed, institutionalised and implemented by Southern countries. Therefore, this thesis also explores how these aspects have affected relations between Southern countries—specifically, between Indonesia and Myanmar—compares to how Northern countries' constructed aid cooperation in the South.

An Indonesian senior official described Indonesian SSC as 'a sharing process of Indonesian development experiences, knowledge and best practices to other Southern countries' (Senior Official 5 [interview], 2016).<sup>3</sup> Similarly, the interpretation of Southern cooperation and its relations is being contested within theoretical and practical debates of development studies and other social studies that move beyond the amount of aid. Subsequently, Southern countries' ideas of giving are set within different political, social and cultural dimensions that alter the motivations and modalities of aid from those of traditional donors. This relates to how Southern states recreate and maintain the idea of giving and its relations within the current globalised world of development cooperation, which is considered almost a tale in the

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<sup>3</sup> To identify interviewees, pseudonyms such as 'Official 1' and 'Official 2' are used. This will be further clarified in Chapter 5.

sense that SSC works beyond the global aid system and creates its own structure within the state system (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Mawdsley, 2018).

### **South–South Cooperation: Definitions and Debates**

As presented in the 1955 Asian–African Conference (AAC), SSC was perceived by scholars and Southern leaders who attended the event as a development concept that cannot be separated from Southern countries’ historical struggles with colonialism (Abdulgani, 1964; Appadorai, 1955; Fifield, 1958; Fitzgerald, 1955; Kahin, 1956; Romulo, 1956). Current analysis of the relevance of Southern cooperation is also rooted in the history of the South as a colonial subject, and the foundation of Southern ideology largely derives from the Bandung Conference (or AAC) Spirits and its principles<sup>4</sup> (Amin, 2015; Awan, 2015; Keethaponcalan, 2016; Mackie, 2005). Despite being shaped within different domestic settings, the Bandung Conference resulted in the evolution of Southern global institutions such as the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), G77 and the establishment of related United Nations (UN) agencies (Abraham, 2008; Alden, Morphet, & Vieira, 2010; Amin, 2015; Appadorai, 1981; Braveboy-Wagner, 2009; De Renzio & Seifert, 2014; Janus, Klingebiel, & Mahn, 2014; Keethaponcalan, 2016; Schaufelbuehl, Bott, Hanhimäki, & Wyss, 2015). Thus, debates surrounding Southern institutions and cooperation are not new; indeed, they have continued to be reproduced within the state system and global development institutions (De Renzio & Seifert, 2014; Lin & Wang, 2017a; Quadir, 2013).

The relevance of the Bandung Conference Principles, which became the foundation and norms of cooperation, have shaped perceptions of giving and sharing among Southern countries and in the global institutions of the South. The role of the South in global development cooperation has been identified as an alternative model of development cooperation that has different

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<sup>4</sup> The 10 basic principles of the ‘Bandung Spirits’ are:

1) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purpose and principles of the Charter of the UN; 2) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; 3) Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small; 4) Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country; 5) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively in conformity with the UN Charter; 6) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve particular interest of the big powers and abstention by any country from exerting pressure on other countries; 7) Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country; 8) Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties own choice, in conformity with the UN Charter; 9) Promotion of mutual interest and cooperation; 10) Respect for Justice and international obligations. (Indonesia, 1955a)

forms and trajectories. This has stimulated debate on moral and ideological identity in the construction of the dual roles of recipient and provider held by Southern donors (Chandy & Kharas, 2011; Mawdsley, 2015; Zimmermann & Smith, 2011). Therefore, it can be challenging to define and understand SSC, despite the general conception of cooperation among developing countries and Southern countries (Davies, 2010; South Centre, 2005). Generic definitions attempt to define SSC based on the different features of cooperation presented by Southern countries, which can be recognised from two perspectives: practical empirical definitions and scholarly definitions and debates.

First, the empirical definition of SSC is structured by international organisations or multilateral institutions. The United Nations Office of SSC (UNOSSC) defines SSC as a form of partnership in political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical aspects that involves two or more Southern countries through the sharing of knowledge, skills, expertise and resources to achieve development goals. The guiding principles of SSC are solidarity, non-interference, national ownership and sovereignty, collective self-reliance and initiatives that are divined by Southern countries (UNOSSC, 2018). Cooperation is based on common objectives<sup>5</sup> in accordance with the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA)<sup>6</sup> for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, which was endorsed in 1978 (UNOSSC, 2018). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Task Team on SSC (TT–SSC) acknowledged the changing landscape of global aid architecture and moved from a North–South paradigm by defining the aim of effective SSC implementation as ‘knowledge and resources sharing between Southern countries’ (OECD, 2018). These broad definitions of SSC include all forms of cooperation among Southern countries, those within

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<sup>5</sup> The common objectives of BAPA are:

(1) fostering self-reliance of developing countries to enhance their capacity to find solutions to their development problems based on their own values, aspirations and needs; (2) promoting collective self-reliance through the exchange of experiences, including sharing of their technical resources and development of their capacities; (3) strengthening capacity to identify their development issues and formulate strategies; (4) increasing quantity and quality of international development cooperation through pooling of capacities; (5) strengthening technological capacities in developing countries to improve capacity to adopt technology and skills to meet development needs; (6) increasing and improving communications among developing countries to tackle development problems and access to available knowledge and experiences; (7) responding to problems in least developed countries, landlocked and small island developing countries; (8) enabling developing countries to achieve greater participation in international economic activities and expanding international cooperation for development (<https://www.unsouthsouth.org/about/about-sstc/> [accessed 26 September 2018]).

<sup>6</sup> The establishment of the BAPA cannot be separated from Zou Enlai’s identification of China’s aid principles in 1963.

the framework of knowledge sharing or technical cooperation and those that acknowledge the expansion of South–South trade and foreign direct investment. Further, these definitions recognise the guiding principles of SSC in the applied contexts of Southern relations, which then leads to the scholarly definitions and debates.

The second exploration of the definition of SSC relates to scholarly definitions and debates, which are built within a specific theoretical context. Mawdsley (2012a, p. 3) argued that SSC is shaped within the context of the rising power of MICs as re-emerging donor countries.<sup>7</sup> Southern cooperation is expected to move beyond aid to mixed types of cooperation such as improving trade, sharing knowledge and resources, constructing political identity among Southern states and strengthening power relations (Mawdsley, 2012a, 2019). Chaturvedi (2012a, p. 5) viewed SSC as a historical narrative in the broader concept of development cooperation, including trade, investment and technology transfer. The characteristics of self-reliance, self-help and complementarity are included in SSC's fundamental principles of non-intervention, mutual respect, equality and a win–win solution (Chaturvedi, Fues, & Sidiropoulos, 2012, p. 485). The re-emergence of Southern countries' cooperation has also stimulated debate on economic expansion linked to aid within the international relations and geopolitical context (Watson, 2014, pp. 82–83). Further, as discussed in Chapter 1, the SSC debate has explored the perspectives of China in relation to the new structural economics (NSE) program.<sup>8</sup> NSE has also been explored to capture the current debate linking trade and infrastructure projects with aid in SSC (Lin & Wang, 2017a, p. 24). The exploration of Southern countries' performance in global development cooperation indicates that debates on the roles of the state in establishing the current settings of SSC are significant in constructing the state agency in global development cooperation.

These definitions move the discussion to the 'great aid debate', which has been observed from the perspective of Northern donors to understand the effect of cooperation in the South but overlooks Southern perspectives. Therefore, this thesis will critically observe and analyse these SSC definitions from both practical and scholarly perspectives. Both definitions provide

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<sup>7</sup> The term 're-emerging donor countries' is used because, since the 1970s, Southern countries such as China and OPEC countries have been significant donors to other Southern countries (Kilby 2017a, 2018; Mawdsley, 2012a).

<sup>8</sup> NSE is a way for developing countries to expand their comparative advantages in development sectors through structural transformation processes and by expanding equal learning processes among other development partners (Lin & Wang, 2017a).

significant understanding on how SSC has been interpreted and implemented over the years by Southern countries. With the wide variety of approaches that SSC covers, this thesis focuses its debate on scholarly interpretations based on empirical data gathered that intertwines the political, economic, international relations, socio-cultural and historical perspectives of Southern Cooperation. However, the discussion might also link with empirical definitions to understand the broader meaning of SSC.

For many years, Southern countries have been neglected in the identification of the modern aid system and global development cooperation. Northern countries' development cooperation, or their aid programs, originated from the Marshall Plan as a way to support European countries after World War II and rebuild economic institutions and military capacity (Agheny & Barker, 2012; Kilby, 2017a). The expansion of Northern aid to Southern countries has been analysed using different sets of theoretical perspectives and frameworks. For example, from a development–anthropology point of view, Northern aid has been considered part of the obligation within postcolonial responsibility or, in the case of Japan, part of post-war reparations (Escobar, 2012; Kilby, 2017a; Six, 2009). Aid has also been defined within the framework of power relations and tools for domination (Hattori, 2003; Mosse, 2011). From an economic perspective, aid has been provided to stimulate growth and support poverty reduction programs in Southern countries (Collier, 2007; Gore, 2013; Kharas, 2007). However, Western aid has also been criticised for being ineffective and segmented in its implementation (Easterly, 2006; Easterly & Pfitze, 2008). Further, aid has been provided from an international geopolitical viewpoint, especially during the Cold War, signifying rivalry between the Communist Bloc and the Western Bloc in providing aid to their respective allied countries (Hindley, 1963; Mawdsley, 2012a; Watson, 2014). Consequently, specific aid modalities have been used in the relations of the Soviet Union with its recipient countries, including soft loans and barter arrangements (Kilby, 2017b; Mawdsley, 2012a), leading to further discussions on aid from non-Western countries.

The contestation between North and South countries began shortly after the AAC was held in 1955 (Parker, 2006, p. 871). Leaders and representatives from 29 African and Asian countries<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> A total of 30 countries were invited to the AAC in 1955, and 29 attended. Asian–African attendees included the five main sponsors: Burma, Ceylon (later Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia and Pakistan. Other Asian countries included

were brought together to provide a united voice for the South in relation to development, anti-colonialism and decolonisation, which had constructed an ideological setting for Global South cooperation (Parker, 2006, p. 872). The debate on Southern roles presented and acknowledged specific features and dynamics, from Southern terminologies and states' ideologies to the provision of different approaches, mechanisms and institutions relating to aid and giving (De Renzio & Seifert, 2014; Manning, 2006; Mawdsley, 2012a; Quadir, 2013). For example, in addition to the particular state institutional setting of aid, the discussion led to the identification of specific approaches to cooperation that were symbolised and ritualised within particular notions to celebrate cooperation (Mawdsley, 2011, 2012b; Shimazu, 2014).

The re-emergence of Southern donors has also been contextualised as a challenge to the existence of North–South Cooperation or the traditional model of development cooperation (Chandy & Kharas, 2011, p. 740). The increased aid from Southern countries over the past few years has led to 'new donors' or 'emerging powers' terms that have reconstructed the setting of global development cooperation and aid relations by establishing their own aid structure (Bracho & Grimm, 2016; De Renzio & Seifert, 2014; Gore, 2013; Gray & Murphy, 2013; Manning, 2006; Quadir, 2013). These debates have led to further discussions on the roles of international development institutions in deriving global aid architecture with the re-emergence of southern donors, including how relations between Northern and Southern donors remain relevant within this global structure (Alden, Morphet & Vieira, 2010; Mawdsley, 2012a; Watson, 2014). Therefore, the current context of global development cooperation cannot be separated from the relations of North–South cooperation and South–South cooperation that have been embedded in southern state relations.

The issue of aid as a development policy tool became important for both Southern and Northern countries in the 1950s (Parker, 2006, p. 883), but it has been understood using different terminologies and from different perspectives. For example, Indonesia's experiences in development cooperation have contributed to the debate around international development cooperation—especially relating to how the history of Indonesian development

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Afghanistan, Cambodia, China, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, North Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam), South Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam) and the Kingdom of Yemen. Other African countries included Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast (later Ghana), Liberia, Libya and Sudan. Further, observers were invited from Cyprus and the African National Congress (Acharya, 2016; Mackie, 2005).

cooperation, as a recipient of aid from traditional donors—and pointed to specific narratives regarding political relations within the country and with other countries (Agung, 1973; Chowdhury & Sugema, 2005; Grenville, 2004; Hill, 1996; Hindley, 1963; Miyamoto, 1974; Sukma, 2006; Van Der Eng, 1988; Weinstein, 1976; Winters, 2012).

The discussion has also acknowledged social and cultural perspectives in analysing Southern countries' models of cooperation by exploring their narratives and institutions (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Carmody, 2013). The internal institutional arrangement based on a country's experiences shows that the implementation of Southern cooperation is varied and fluid. It is also politically driven based on domestic and international factors perceived by the country, as discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. The terminology used in SSC is also distinct—for example, 'partnership' and 'cooperation' are utilised rather than 'aid' and 'assistance' (Mawdsley, 2012b, p. 257). These expressions are used by Southern countries such as India, China and Indonesia to recognise horizontal relations between providers and recipients—for example, in Zhou Enlai's aid principles<sup>10</sup> of mutual benefit and equality for China (Kilby, 2017a; Quadir, 2013). Therefore, despite countries' unique features that are perceived in SSC, the political narrative of Southern cooperation must be acknowledged to understand the identity and ideology, as well as the power structure established from cooperation.

Referring to these theoretical debates, Indonesia's SSC has been analysed intensively within several approaches and perspectives of social sciences as a case for the expansion of the Southern state in SSC. Indonesia has a strong historical narrative of SSC, starting from the Bandung Conference 1955 and continuing into the current context of development cooperation (Engel, 2017, 2019; JICA & CEACOS, 2010; Madwsley, 2012; Winanti & Alvian, 2019). The impact of the Bandung conference on current debates about SSC, including on its symbolic nature and narratives, has also been explored as to how it affects Southern countries' cooperation and how its symbolic nature remains embedded in the relations

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<sup>10</sup> Zhou Enlai's aid principles, which were stated in 1964 during a visit to Africa, are based on the principles of: equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other nations; never attaching any conditions or asking for privileges; helping lighten the burden of recipient countries; helping recipient countries to achieve self-reliance and independent development; developing aid projects that require less investment but with quick results; providing best quality or equipment and materials of its own manufacture; personnel of the recipient country fully master the techniques; and China's experts are not allowed to demand special treatment. ([http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-08/13/content\\_11149131.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-08/13/content_11149131.htm); <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121560.pdf?v=7842ff83b1fa6e84a7b0e483012dfe15> [accessed 19 September 2018]).

(Acharya, 2014, 2016; Assie-Lumumba, 2015; Hongoh, 2016; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2015; Shimazu, 2014). Further, the expansion of Indonesia as a MIC and its re-emergence as a new wave actor and donor country has also been acknowledged and explored in SSC (De Renzio, 2014; Engel, 2019; Mawdsley, 2012, 2019; Quadir, 2013; Schultz, 2010). However, Indonesia's expansion as Southern donor cannot be separated from challenges that have appeared, including in its institutional and implementation arrangements (Engel, 2017; Hosono, 2016, 2018; Muhibat, 2016; Sato & Awidya, 2019; and Shimoda & Nakazawa, 2012; UNDP, 2015). Looking at the literature, discussion on historical narratives has shaped the symbolism, implementation and structure of cooperation of Indonesia's SSC until recent years. These explorations also identify the narratives and debates that appear within its internal institutions, in its relations with other Southern countries and in global development cooperation.

Furthermore, the current setting of global development cooperation has expanded the debate around aid and development from the previous focus on traditional donors to include the perspective of Southern countries, in the case of Indonesia. This thesis argues that there are several dimensions to this critique. First, the development of aid identity has been challenged with the re-emergence of Southern countries in development cooperation with their own ideological perspective (Kilby, 2018; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012). Second, the expansion of the roles of the state and its institutions in the SSC structure is referred to as the 'beyond-Keynesian model' of Southern development cooperation (Lin & Wang, 2017a, p. 136). Third, the rhetoric of partnership, solidarity and mutual benefit in the language and narrative of cooperation is used to identify the shared idea and Global Southern norms of cooperation (Mawdsley, 2012b, p. 260). Fourth, the models of Southern cooperation are varied based on the indication of reciprocal social relations of SSC that are defined through the sociocultural context of knowledge and cooperation rather than power relations per se (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Muhr, 2016). These points contextualise the broader dynamic to understand SSC that is interlinked with the creation of political and economic capitals through the symbolic act of cooperation, as well as the institutional buildings of the state. Therefore, the narratives and implementation of Southern cooperation have unique approaches embedded

in the idea and ontology<sup>11</sup> of ‘giving’ from the perspective of Southern countries and are signified in the debates in this thesis.

### **Research Question, Purposes and Methodology**

This thesis aims to rebuild the theoretical structure of SSC perceived by Southern countries—in the case of Indonesia—that contributes to debates in international development cooperation studies. It examines the idea of giving and sharing in SSC, which Southern countries have expanded in the setting of aid relations. With the long history and strong narratives of Southern cooperation, Indonesia’s SSC is continuously being reshaped and developed through a dynamic process of giving and sharing in Southern relations. The relations are also shaped within specific structures to remain relevant within domestic and international development contexts. Further, this leads to the main research question:

How does Indonesia, as a Southern state, construct the idea of giving and sharing in SSC within the globalised world of foreign aid?

In the context of this research question, the objectives of the research are to:

1. Analyse the idea of giving and sharing in Indonesia as a Southern country and the effect of current global development cooperation, including North–South relations.
2. Study the features of institutional settings and symbolic narratives that have shaped the process of giving and sharing in SSC, using the case of Indonesia.
3. Debate the reciprocal meaning of the Southern model of relations in contemporary development cooperation, in the case of Indonesia-Myanmar.
4. Reconstruct the theoretical structure of SSC within the globalised world of foreign aid and international development cooperation.

This thesis recognises gaps in studies of SSC and analyses them from the perspective of Indonesia as a state. It specifically focuses on meanings and perceptions that have evolved in Indonesia’s SSC, as well as the creation of political relations that led to Southern cooperation. Giving and sharing are interpreted within the context of development studies theories and related social sciences theories. One dimension of a theoretical perspective is insufficient to

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<sup>11</sup> The ontology of SSC refers to the content of identity of Southern states and cooperation, which is attached in their roles and reshaped within global development cooperation (Mawdsley, 2015, 2019).

identify the current setting of re-emerging Southern countries; therefore, understanding the evolution of the idea of giving and sharing in Indonesian SSC, as well as exploring motivations and moral conscience within broader social sciences theoretical frameworks, can contribute to current development cooperation debates. Thus, this thesis also aims to address theoretical gaps relating to defining the current setting in development cooperation with the emergence of other Southern countries besides BRICS.

For Indonesia, the process of giving to and sharing with another country is constructed by state machines, with bureaucrats and government officials as policymakers. Their interpretation of the meaning of giving and sharing led to the identification of the political and social relations that created, capitalised on and materialised in SSC through specific symbols, rituals and approaches. Thus, the settings of cooperation are politically driven, including maintaining the legacies of the Bandung Conference that continuously recount Southern cooperation using specific terminologies and languages. Debates on motivation and reciprocal acts of sharing and giving also cannot be separated from the national interest and its norms. However, there are several characteristics that define cooperation, including how bureaucrats translated the meaning of SSC within the state policy of development cooperation. These interpretations of SSC have affected the mechanism and modalities of cooperation and relations with other Southern countries. The state system has also shaped different features of SSC. Southern countries are not necessarily dependent on the global governance system, and they do not identify with specific global development agendas. Therefore, state systems and development targets need to be analysed. Government mechanisms and institutional settings can indicate how SSC is framed, as well as the rationale for implementing SSC policy. Thus, this indicates the difference between North and South donor mechanisms and the challenges faced by Southern governments within the global aid system and regulations.

To answer the research question and identify gaps in the literature, the present study explores and contrasts the theoretical debates of contemporary development studies theories and social theories on aid with empirical findings gathered during fieldwork in Indonesia and Myanmar. The study examines arguments that are based on empirical research findings on Indonesia's SSC in the literature, as well as theoretical explorations of global development cooperation and SSC debates. It also explores how policy on SSC has been developed and implemented by bureaucrats as policymakers. A qualitative research method was used to

gather data over a period of seven months. Empirical data were gathered by exploring perspectives and opinions through in-depth interviews with 81 people, including government officials/bureaucrats/policymakers at junior to senior levels, donor officers, non-governmental organisation (NGO) staff, and development experts in Jakarta, Indonesia, as well as Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. Further, government-published reports, speeches, studies, concept notes, regulations and donors' published documents were gathered, as well as participants' observations from government meetings and other activities related to Indonesia's SSC were attended by invitation. Based on these data, analysis was conducted to obtain findings that both challenged and contributed to the overall discussion of SSC and current Global South development cooperation.

### **Thesis Outline**

This thesis highlights the theoretical and empirical analysis of SSC that is politically and socially constructed within Southern state history, narratives, institutions and relations. The key findings examine the setting of Southern cooperation from the Indonesian Government's perspective and experiences as structured in its policy within the context of Indonesia's SSC. Accordingly, this thesis is separated into nine chapters, which are preceded by an introduction and followed by a conclusion.

Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical debates to explain the current setting of SSC from the perspective of Southern countries. Debates on the context of giving, sharing and providing aid among countries cannot be separated from the studies of development cooperation or other social sciences studies, including international relations theories and the gift theory of cultural anthropology. Therefore, examining the theoretical genealogy of development cooperation leads to a vigorous examination of how the current setting of global development contests the existing theoretical debates, especially of development studies, that have affected South–South and North–South relations. This will help to identify the multidimensional approaches used in this research, as well as the empirical findings and conditions that appear in the research, because a single theoretical analysis will not be sufficient to explain the current situation.

Chapter 2 explores the history of SSC to provide the background to this research. The idea of SSC cannot be separated from how the Bandung Conference in 1955 shaped the framework

of Southern development cooperation. However, the acts of giving to and cooperating with other Southern countries have evolved over time, from the pre-colonial era to post-World War II to the current setting of development cooperation. Chapter 2 also identifies the link between SSC and development cooperation, especially in terms of relations with Northern donors, and it illustrates Southern countries' bilateral cooperation and leaders' dynamic relations. The evolution of SSC is divided into five stages: the origin of Southern social relations of giving; the Bandung Conference in 1955; the development of Global South institutions; the re-emergence of Southern development cooperation; and the post-2015 politics of SSC.

Chapter 3 investigates the history of Indonesia's SSC since the *Sriwijaya* era, around the seventh century, to the current period of President Joko Widodo. It also discusses cooperation from the colonial era until Indonesia achieved independence in 1945, and since the Bandung Conference in 1955. The chapter contextualises SSC within the relations of northern donors after the Bandung Conference until the end of Soeharto's era. The discussion also incorporates the Asian financial crisis at the end of 1999, which affected political and economic conditions in Indonesia. Further, the chapter also explores President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's period of development cooperation.

Chapter 4 examines the evolution of the narrative of Southern cooperation by analysing symbolism in the political context of development cooperation and Southern relations. It begins with an exploration of the Indonesian ideological stand that is rooted in the Bandung Principles as shared norms of Southern cooperation and continues to be ritualised through Asian–African commemoration celebrations. Indonesia maintains the legacies of the AAC by conducting celebrations every 10 years. Chapter 4 also explores the rituals that are performed and analyses leaders' speeches, documents and participating countries to derive the meaning of Southern cooperation. It provides an understanding of how Southern narratives and social relations have been applied and maintained among Southern countries, as well as how the practical meaning of cooperation has been symbolised, capitalised and materialised in SSC.

Chapter 5 outlines the methodology used to gather data for the research, as well as the analysis used to develop the theoretical construction of SSC based on the available empirical data. The qualitative method with grounded theory and a case study approaches is used to interpret and present the data gathered in Indonesia and Myanmar. Further, the chapter

explores the three stages of fieldwork: the pre-fieldwork phase involves ethics clearance, managing contacts and collecting preliminary primary and secondary data; the fieldwork phase involves conducting in-depth interviews with bureaucrats and other stakeholders in Indonesia and Myanmar, obtaining participants' observations and gathering primary data on development and SSC policy; and the post-fieldwork phase involves analysing the data collected during the first two stages and conducting the writing process.

Chapter 6 explores the findings based on interviews conducted with bureaucrats, government officials and development partners in Indonesia and Myanmar. It maps the roles and responsibilities of the institutions involved in Indonesia's SSC. The discussion includes six broad topics: meaning and norms; motivations and narratives of partnership; policy and governance of SSC; modalities and implementation of cooperating; a case study on artificial insemination; and the Myanmar Government's perspective on development cooperation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the framework of Indonesia's SSC. This chapter is restricted as it contains sensitive data and materials based on the results of fieldwork.

Chapter 7 analyses the reciprocal meaning of giving and sharing that structures the content of Southern cooperation in the case of Indonesia–Myanmar relations. The context of cooperation is based on how Indonesian and Myanmar bureaucrats perceive SSC within the current setting of development cooperation. Given that state motivations to cooperate are politically driven, the chapter also explores particular aspects of cooperation, including defining the meaning and characteristics of reciprocal SSC.

Chapter 8 examines the effectiveness of the national institutional settings of Indonesia's SSC and the Indonesian Government's role in Global Southern and development institutions. It analyses the particular setting that Indonesia has developed to institutionalise SSC, including within the state structure and policy development. It also interprets the effectiveness of SSC within the state system based on the development plan document. The coordination mechanism within the government and with its partners is explored to understand specific features of Indonesia's SSC. Further, the chapter analyses how Indonesia has expanded its SSC policy within the context of the Global South and global development cooperation.

Chapter 9 debates the structure and construction of SSC by exploring the link between theoretical perspectives, the historical context and the findings chapters, as the analysis develops Southern cooperation and relations in the case of Indonesia. The chapter attempts to theorise the social relations that construct the political and social settings of giving and sharing in SSC. Chapter 9 also analyses the structures of symbolic narratives and institutions in established cooperation. Further, it recognises specific mechanisms and characteristics of the state's cooperation that move beyond the context of aid in SSC and its effects on North–South Cooperation.

The introduction and conclusion discuss the nuances and settings of the overall debates surrounding SSC in global development cooperation from the perspective of Indonesia. Multidisciplinary explorations and analyses from the perspectives of Southern countries, which are constituted by history, ideas, narratives, identity and motivations, are interpreted and interplayed within state policy and the state bureaucrats' perceptions that must be acknowledged. These perspectives are used to explore the meanings of giving and sharing among Southern countries. Therefore, this thesis contributes to research on the theoretical construction of Southern countries' development practices, international relations and sociocultural studies, as well as policy debates of global development cooperation in the case of Indonesia's SSC.



# Chapter 1 Theoretical Debates in the Globalising World of Development and Aid

## Introduction

The study of Southern countries has become an essential discourse in social sciences since World War II, including in the context of relations with Northern countries. Studies link the debates to Southern countries' roles in global development (Kapoor, 2008; Kothari, 2005a), in relation to power and knowledge (Kothari, 2005a; Mawdsley, 2015), as well as in relation to norms and mechanisms of South–South Cooperation (SSC) (Acharya, 2014, p. 405). Since the growth of China and other Southern countries, and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, the contemporary structure of global development cooperation has changed, thereby also challenging the theoretical debates around the Global South (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009; Kilby, 2012; Mawdsley, 2012a, 2019). Southern relations also stimulate discussions around the significance of contemporary social theories in identifying the current SSC model. To examine the link between SSC and development cooperation, this chapter explores and analyses the multidimensional theoretical debates of contemporary Southern relations, looking particularly at Indonesia's SSC experiences.

Given that this thesis examines Indonesia's perception of Southern cooperation, this chapter draws its analysis from three theoretical aspects: development studies, international relations and the social theory of giving. The chapter also reflects the experiences and paradoxes of giving in SSC in relation to how Southern states have negotiated, narrated and implemented policy by their bureaucrats in domestic and global development structures (Bräutigam & Xiaoyang, 2012; Breslin, 2013; Dubash & Morgan, 2012; Marcondes & Mawdsley, 2017; Murray & Overton, 2011). This debate raises the question of how theoretical perspectives can explain the structure of SSC in the case of Indonesia, in the global development cooperation context. To answer this question, this chapter is divided into three sections: contemporary literature debates; identifying the genealogy of global discourse on development theories in relation to aid and SSC; and exploring the theoretical construction of Indonesia's SSC.

## Contemporary Literatures Debates

In contemporary literature on Southern countries and their development experiences, the debates have extended the understanding of development and international discourses from political-economic perspectives to include social and cultural perceptions (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Kothari, 2005b; Mawdsley, 2012a). These debates go beyond arguments on the nature of international development, by acknowledging the dynamic discourse perceived by developing countries, including their increasing rate of economic growth, their roles as re-emerging donors, and the increasing disposition of state policy in international cooperation (Grabel, 2010; Lin & Wang, 2017a; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012). As globalisation brings new dimensions and variables to cooperation, it also structures the roles of Southern states in development that link to their position in international institutions and as new global economic forces (Carmody, 2013, p. 1). Further, the donor–recipient relations shaped within North–South relations in development are now challenged by Southern models of cooperation (Kilby, 2018, p. 2). This re-emergence of Southern countries has contested the idea of aid and cooperation that was contextualised in the traditional model of aid (Manning, 2006; Mawdsley, 2015). These conditions also help development agencies of re-emerging donor countries to expand their unique platforms, models and ideas of cooperation in the politics of global development (Mawdsley, Savage, & Kim, 2014; Mawdsley, 2019).

The global trend of cooperation among Southern countries has also emerged with specific terminologies, including the identification of post-aid actions (Eyben & Savage, 2013; Mawdsley, Savage, & Kim, 2014; Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018; Schulz, 2010; Sumner & Mallett, 2013) and beyond-aid perspectives (Gore, 2013; Janus, Klingebiel, & Paulo, 2015; Lin & Wang, 2017a) that emerged from debates in the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (OECD–DAC’s) Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011. Lin and Wang (2017a, p. 2) coined the term ‘beyond-aid’ to explain the modalities of SSC in the case of China that focus on structural transformation and financial mechanisms as the New Structural Economics (NSE) through infrastructure projects that go beyond the regular aid effectiveness agenda. They also explained the cultural dimension of giving in the Chinese tradition, which focuses on mutual benefit, or *hutong youwu*, as ‘exchanging what I have with what you have’, which helps explain the motivation of the country’s aid and trade policy in SSC (Lin & Wang, 2017a, p. 91). This cultural context, which is rooted in the traditional idea of exchange, has helped to

identify the formulation of aid modalities of SSC that differ from the Northern model of cooperation, also utilised in this thesis. For example, Indonesia sets its cooperation within the traditional cultural setting and its state philosophy of *Pancasila*, which motivates its cooperation with other Southern countries, as explored in Chapters 3 and 4. This philosophical-cultural idea is expressed through language, rituals and narratives that symbolise the setting of the relations. Therefore, these notions help determine the communal political position of Southern countries and form significant tools for differentiating cooperation with the North.

Constructing the relation between aid and development in SSC debates based on multi-layer theories helps to identify the unique features of Southern social relations, in the case of Indonesia, including the political, social and cultural aspects of its development cooperation. For example, southern development cooperation is built upon the ideas, ideology and norms of state institutions and the agency of bureaucrats to define their acts and practices as recipients or providers of aid (Acharya, 2011; Adler & Pouliot, 2011; Esteves & Assunção, 2014; Hattori, 2003; Kothari, 2005b; Mawdsley, 2015, 2019). Moreover, the construction of North–South relations and SSC have expanded from development studies theory and practices (Kilby, 2012, 2018; Mawdsley, 2012a, 2015). These explorations on development and aid can stimulate further discussion on the significance of theory-building in defining the meaning of development cooperation through its genealogy. The debates also point out the specific structure of relations among Southern countries and with Northern countries, including the characteristics that have emerged and been affected by the global system, as discussed in the next section.

### **Genealogy of Southern Development and Aid**

Genealogy, as defined by Foucault (1978, p. 152), is a way to record the history of morals, ideals and concepts that have shaped human ideas and practices. It also emerged from different interpretations to create knowledge that covers specific content in the human system (Foucault, 1978, p. 162). Furthermore, South–South and North–South aid relations cannot be separated from the historical lineage of theoretical discourse that developed based on the Northern and Southern development relations contexts. Since the end of the 1940s, North–South relations in the context of development have been shaped from a ‘Westernised’

development perspective to solve Southern problems (Kothari, 2005a, 2005b; Lancaster, 2008; Six, 2009). The history of development cooperation and its relations has also been constructed using social science approaches to study the complex political, social, economic and cultural dimensions that are continuously changing in society (Harriss, 2005; Kothari, 2005b; Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018). In the history of development cooperation, theoretical perspectives have been established and structurally linked with countries' approaches, relations and institutions within development practices. Thus, it is necessary to explore and trace the theoretical debates in studies of Southern countries.

In the aftermath of the Great Depression of the 1930s, Keynes (1936, p. 224) recognised the significance of state institutions in developing and building mechanisms to improve economic development, the financial system and employment. This theory highlighted state functions in achieving economic growth by defining the method, theory and policy through rigid monetary policy and fiscal policy (Grabel, 2010; Keynes, 1936; Marglin, 2018; Rapley, 2009). Post-World War II, Keynes became an important figure in the development of the IMF and GATT to support countries affected by the war, including recommending creating an international financial mechanism and trading system (Rapley, 2009, p. 13). Later, the Keynesian theoretical approach influenced the thinking of leaders from developing countries, especially those educated in the west (Rapley, 2009). Furthermore, this theory also expanded to influence the evolution of modernisation theory (Rapley, 2009) and beyond-Keynesian perspectives on aid relations (Lin & Wang, 2017a).

Modernisation theory emerged from the development debates of the South, especially in the context of postcolonialism, in the 1950s to the 1970s (Escobar, 2012; Kothari, 2005a, 2005b; Lancaster, 2008; Mawdsley, 2012a). Modernisation theory was based on analysis of the capacity of societies to modernise themselves through industrialisation, leading to economic growth, foreign investment and poverty reduction, mediated by politics and institutions of state (Bräutigam, 2000; Kothari, 2005b; Leys, 1996), also inspired by Keynesian perspectives (Rapley, 2009). Modernisation theory was also structured within Western perspectives of universality that objectified the targeted aid countries with specific values, norms and ideologies that produced similar settings to the neoliberal approach to development (Brohman, 1995; Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018).

Looking further at the practices of modernisation theory, the dichotomy of power relations of traditional (Southern) and modern (Western) countries in development was shaped from Western norms without measuring the social and cultural capacities of the traditional society in the particular country (Andrews & Bawa, 2014; Brohman, 1995; Robertson & Lechner, 1985). The Bretton Woods Institutions, the Marshall Plan and the United States (US) Agency for International Development (USAID) were robust in exploring aid relations from the perspective of modernisation theory (Brohman, 1995; Lancaster, 2008; Riddell, 2007). The problems with this theoretical approach were its top-down approach to development, which was reflected in the relations between developed and developing countries in their aid relations, and the focus on economic growth and poverty reduction at the expense of other considerations (Black, 1999; Mawdsley, 2012b; Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018). Furthermore, the Bandung Spirit, and the NAM from the Southern perspective, were also influenced by the debate on modernisation theory, with both acknowledging the role of the state at the time in creating and stimulating economic growth (Nesadurai, 2005, p. 7).

From the 1970s to the 1990s, dependency theory was the theoretical driver framing relations between the North and South, in contrast to the Bandung Conference ideology of neutralism, anti-colonialism and nationalism (Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018). The theory emerged and raised critiques of hegemonic relations in the world system that were shaped based on colonial attitudes and inequality, leading to the creation of capitalist market economies (Agbebi & Virtanen, 2017; Black, 1999). Global capitalist economies formed the perspective of the centre and the periphery—that is, the reliance of ‘elites’ in the peripheral countries in the South, on the ‘elites’ in the centre or main providers in Northern countries (Black, 1999; Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018). However, some Southern countries did not grow into capitalist or industrial state as expected (Rapley, 2009). Dependency theory argued that the political and economic dependencies of Southern countries and the capitalist North created an unequal relationship and an expansion of Northern capitalist ideas and policy (Black, 1999; Larrain, 1989; Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018). Nevertheless, dependency theory could not solve the dependency problems of the North–South despite the intention of aid to help countries solve development problems and become independent (Leys, 1996; Yue, 2015).

Despite the relation between the North and South in development aid, relations among Southern states began to develop specially to increase economic growth by trading with each

other with equal bargaining power. Southern trade relations were established and developed,<sup>12</sup> including through UN agencies facilitated by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the G77, with the aim of obtaining similar opportunities and creating a balance in economic power relations (Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018, p. 872). Using the arguments of dependency, critiques on dependency theory reappeared in the 2000s in the analysis of the massive expansion of China's economic cooperation with Africa (Agbebi & Virtanen, 2017, p. 441). However, others have argued that China's role can be considered a catalyst in African development rather than the new 'centre' because of their shared ideology and cooperation principles (Bräutigam, 2000, 2011). Consequently, the roles and approaches of Southern countries are also examined in critical debates of dependency–independency that are continuously narrated in global development cooperation (Kilby, 2017a, p. 16).

In addition to the perspectives of development studies theories, international relations theories are also debated in North–South foreign aid relations. From the perspective of realism, aid is a tool for gaining hegemony driven by national interests, leading to the creation of power relations between provider and recipient countries (Hattori, 2001; Mawdsley, 2012a; Morgenthau, 1962; Watson, 2014). The concept of foreign aid has expanded beyond development and is viewed as an instrument of foreign policy, especially by Western countries (Lancaster, 2008; Riddell, 2007). Morgenthau (1962, pp. 301–304) categorised the significance of foreign aid policy into six types,<sup>13</sup> including foreign aid for economic development, which functions as the political driver of the donor government (in this case, the US Government). Morgenthau's argument on the nature of economic development of aid was linked to the power and interest of the provider state in transforming the political conditions of the recipient. Given that realism focused on the power relations of international aid policy, the substantial role of donor interest led to the use of aid as a political tool (Hattori, 2001; Lancaster, 2008). These power relations can also lead to the emergence of alternative regimes and networks to avoid global domination by particular institutions (Watson, 2014). Watson

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<sup>12</sup> In 2011, the Global South covered 60% of global production outputs. From 1980 to 2010, Southern countries increased their share of the global trade of merchandise from 25% to 47%, as well as their share of world economic output from 33% to 45% (UNDP, 2013).

<sup>13</sup> According to Morgenthau (1962), the six types of aid are humanitarian foreign aid that is considered non-political, military foreign aid, bribery, subsistence foreign aid, prestige foreign aid and foreign aid for economic development.

noted that ‘the rising power [countries] show a desire to consolidate their power and avoid conflict by creating its own network and alternative regime in international institution that affected smaller nations in choosing their alignment’ (p. 70). Thus, re-emerging Southern countries can create new global systems or potentially lead global hegemony using an alternative mechanism. For example, the rise of China and other Southern countries, or the growth of the Global South in current international relations, has led to countries’ own structures and networks of cooperation beyond the established set of cooperation of the OECD–DAC.

From the 1980s to the early 2000s, the neoliberal approach gained momentum, with the market-led model of development cooperation influencing the way aid was delivered from the North to the South (Murray & Overton, 2011; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012) and affecting the way the South conducted its own development cooperation. For example, the failure of the New International Economic Order (NIEO)<sup>14</sup> to stimulate equal economic and trade cooperation among Southern countries, which emphasised sovereignty and the politics of solidarity, raised a question of the roles of Southern institutions in global development. These institutions could not tackle the Southern economic and debt crisis in the 1980s; thus, they were challenged by global neoliberal institutions (Gray & Gills, 2016; Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018). The Northern driver of financial capitalism remains significant in the world economic system, including the approach to transform Southern states through aid policy promoted by Bretton Woods Institutions and the achievement of the DAC’s official development assistance (ODA)<sup>15</sup> targets (Easterly & Pfutze, 2008; Gray & Gills, 2016; Murray & Overton, 2011; Zimmermann & Smith, 2011). North–South cooperation also reflects the top–down relations of donor–recipients in imposing specific models, leading to the creation of the free market and ‘good governance’, which is the Western model of democratisation (Brohman, 1995; Riddell, 2007). Neoliberalism has also contributed to unequal relations because some Southern countries are incapable of competing economically in the free market system—for

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<sup>14</sup> The NIEO was established in 1970 by the G77 and was supported by China to address structural inequality in the political–economic order of North–South and build upon a strong Keynesian framework (Kilby, 2017a; Nesadurai, 2005).

<sup>15</sup> ODA refers to member countries’ aid programs that promote specific economic development and welfare targets of developing countries, as well as DAC recipients and multilateral development institutions, in the form of concessional (e.g., grants and soft loans) and administered government programs to promote economic development (<https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/What-is-ODA.pdf> [accessed 30 April 2019]).

example, by lessening the position of the state in creating comparative economic advantages (Gray & Gills, 2016; Murray & Overton, 2011).

Given that the Northern aid system was structured on the neoliberal approach of the Washington Consensus<sup>16</sup> (Williamson, 1993), the modalities of development cooperation are ideological and cannot be separated from the global capital interest, free market system and specific issues that are globally constructed (Brohman, 1995; Easterly & Pfütze, 2008; Murray & Overton, 2011; Riddell, 2007). However, with the shifting conditions and roles of the South, the neoliberal attempt to structure SSC and its expansion in development cooperation has narrated the idea of Southern development cooperation as encapsulated in the Beijing Consensus<sup>17</sup> (Ramo, 2004; Williamson, 2014). However, Southern donors do not attribute their aid philosophy to either the Washington Consensus or the Beijing Consensus (Kilby, 2017b, p. 1). This raises a question regarding the relevance of both consensus documents in understanding current SSC in the global development context (Carroll, 2012; Gray & Gills, 2016; Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018). Both the Beijing Consensus and the Washington Consensus did not fulfil their purpose beyond the rhetoric; instead, they only reinforced the ‘one-size-fits-all’ model of development, including generalising the ideas of development, which the Southern states tried to avoid in their cooperation (Kilby, 2012; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012).

This genealogy of aid relations theories and debates suggests two dimensions of globalised development cooperation. The first dimension is the role of the state in positioning itself in global economic and market structures that affect how it relates to other countries (Gray & Gills, 2016; Kilby, 2012; Murray & Overton, 2011). The state, especially in the Global South, plays a pivotal role in defining and positioning the global development agenda and policy. Second, the Southern states have often been neglected in analysis—especially in relation to how they define their own development models and cooperation styles, including the need to serve the global capitalist system (Nederveen Pieterse, 2012; Six, 2009). Southern countries


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<sup>16</sup> The Washington Consensus defines the market-based model of foreign aid to stimulate recipient countries to serve the Western capitalism model of markets (Williamson, 1993).

<sup>17</sup> The Beijing Consensus focuses on the financial autonomy of the Southern states—especially China—in developing and deriving their economic strategy and policy engagement from global institutions and other countries (Ramo, 2004). It was considered an alternative to the Washington Consensus, but it failed to properly identify the current setting of China’s political–economic reform and the expansion in global development cooperation (Kennedy, 2010; Kilby, 2017b). Thus, the settings of SSC cannot only focus on or refer to cooperation in general of China’s model or the Beijing Consensus.

have a unique feature of experiencing and responding to development in SSC, including in relation to themselves (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Kilby, 2018; Zimmermann & Smith, 2011). The model of cooperation perceived by SSC is often considered generic in relation to maintaining models' capacity-building and knowledge sharing. However, trade, development finance and grants (Chaturvedi, 2017, p. 21), with their interpretations and motivations in domestic policy and relations with Northern donors or Southern states, are different. Southern experiences have led to the need to explore cooperation in other social sciences such as international relations, anthropology and sociology. The current development context has changed global power relations (Eyben, 2006; Mosse, 2013); therefore, it is important to explore specific perceptions of identity derived from particular Southern cultural constructions, ideologies and social norms (Barker, 2008; Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Cesarino, 2012; Mawdsley, 2012a). These debates point to the latitude of the Southern countries perceived within their cooperation, as they identify the social conditions that differ from those of traditional donors. To understand the specific timeframe and contents, Figure 1 outlines the theoretical genealogy of development and aid that historically cannot be separated from the empirical conditions of South–South and North–South relations.

Figure 1: Theoretical Genealogy of Development and Aid



Source: Author's own compilation from various sources.

### Theoretical Construction

As discussed earlier, North–South and South–South relations in aid and development have been contested in relation to the global development cooperation setting, especially regarding how development studies theories can capture the evolution and expansion of development cooperation in recent years (Escobar, 2012; Kilby, 2012, 2018; Quadir, 2013; Wenxing, 2016). Despite similar historical experiences, the approaches, paradigm and ideological stand of Southern relations have been shaped within different development experiences and perspectives (Mawdsley, 2015; Richey & Ponte, 2014; Six, 2009). Southern countries have shown that their capacity to shape national policy within specific political attitudes and attributes is based on their perceptions of and experiences with development cooperation. Theoretical debates on SSC identify the position of the state in shaping the global norms of aid—especially evolving the content of giving into domestic and international policies. As global development architecture and paradigms have continued to advance, the

debate on Southern roles has been presented with specific features and dynamics from the discourse on partnerships, as well as different institutional models and ideologies of aid (De Renzio & Seifert, 2014; Manning, 2006; Mawdsley, 2012a; Quadir, 2013). Thus, analysis of the Southern model of cooperation, including the terminology used, the modalities and the paradigm to identify SSC, have been expanded beyond regular development studies theories of modernisation or dependency, as well as international relations theories.

It can be argued that relations among Southern countries do not create a dichotomy in the same way as North–South relations, and they do not carry the postcolonial historical burden that has constructed the hierarchical structure of these relations (Kilby, 2018; Kothari, 2005a). However, these relations raise an issue regarding the nature of the cooperation that has developed—specifically, identifying theoretical perspectives to understand the context of development and aid relations in SSC. To frame the debates, in the case of Indonesia’s SSC, the meaning of giving and the construction of Southern cooperation in domestic and international settings are observed from three theoretical frameworks. These are the state-centred perspectives of development studies, including understanding state practices, bureaucrats’ perceptions and policy development; Mauss’s (1970) gift theory, to understand the symbolic meaning of giving and receiving in the social relations of SSC; and the ideas of shared norms of Southern cooperation in international relations. These three theoretical approaches play a significant role in defining the concepts and positions of the state in global development relations, the giving and exchange process, and the diffusion of ideas, ideologies and norms of Southern cooperation. The next section explores and constructs these theoretical components that have evolved in SSC, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Theoretical Constructions



### **Southern State-centred Approach in Development Studies**

As a result of high levels of economic growth in Southern countries, contemporary development debates have emerged concerning the roles of the market or state in global development cooperation. For example, the success of the so-called 'Asian Tigers' of Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan in the early 1990s stimulated the discussion on the acknowledgement and expansion of markets in Asian countries (Carroll, 2012; Carroll & Jarvis, 2015; Gore, 2013; Gray & Gills, 2016; Smith, 2009). When trade and economic cooperation became the primary drivers for the growth of SSC and were linked with the capacity to provide aid, these deliberations led to the contestation between Keynesian policymaking and neoliberal perspectives in development (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009; Brohman, 1995; Chaturvedi, 2017; Lin & Wang, 2017a; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012).

Neoliberalism provided the mechanism to support the free market, growth, competition and modernisation with less consideration of the roles of government intervention in global development policy (Hansen & Wethal, 2015; Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018; Nederveen Pieterse, 2009), as well as its critiques within the context of SSC (Engel, 2019; Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018). As discussed earlier, the Washington Consensus led the way as the central model of the neoliberalism movement in foreign aid to drive Northern donor policy (Marangos, 2009; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012; Riddell, 2007). However, it overemphasised the role of international institutions in providing development support with market-led policy as

reflected in the Washington Consensus, despite analysts viewing the current Southern model of cooperation as a state–market hybrid model (Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018, p. 884). Thus, Southern states have greater agency in structuring their internal economic conditions, determining their aid policy and responding to global issues, including dealing with foreign aid agendas and other forms of development cooperation (Lin & Wang, 2017a; Mawdsley, 2012b; Murray & Overton, 2011; Watson, 2014). An example of this can be found in the development of SSC policy based on priorities from the planning documents in the case of Indonesia, which will be explored further later in Chapter 8. Responding to the critiques of neoliberal approaches in aid and development cooperation, the Paris Declaration in 2005 acknowledged the role of Southern states in development, but with Northern oversight (Carroll, 2012; Murray & Overton, 2011). State institutions that had been minimised during the neoliberal era then tried to be acknowledged through reciprocal participation of the provider–recipient states in the global development cooperation agenda.

Further, neo-structuralism recognises the role of the state in aid cooperation and argues that the state plays a significant role in creating competitive advantages in global economics through its institutions, governance and civil society (Lin & Wang, 2017a; Murray & Overton, 2011). Given the strong notion of core–periphery in global development architecture, the reality of power relations between Northern and Southern states, as well as between market and society, remains a barrier to development (Murray & Overton, 2011, p. 311). When examining the characteristics of the neo-structural paradigm, the structure of Southern cooperation cannot be separated from global capital and the Western market model of cooperation (Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018, p. 870). Nevertheless, the settings of SSC have moved beyond the regular aid mechanism and global market system towards stronger Southern state roles in constructing the development agenda.

Consequently, Keynesian theory gained momentum in identifying the significant roles and unique features of Southern countries in global development (Andrews & Bawa, 2014; Grabel, 2010; Harcourt & Kriesler, 2015; Lin & Doemeland, 2012; Marglin, 2018; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012). Keynes acknowledged the expansion of state capitalism (including through infrastructure cooperation) that cannot be separated from the current model of SSC applied by many Southern states, especially China (Lin & Yang, 2017a) and Indonesia. This debate signifies the Southern state evolution and expansion, leading to the construction of the

Development–Keynesian perspective. This reflects the state’s need to expand its role in the global setting, including the construction of aid debates in development cooperation. Therefore, the implications of Keynesian theory in twenty-first century development, especially in SSC, explore four main elements, which are outlined below.

### *Creation of the State Model*

The specific functions of Southern states in domestic and global development discourses have stimulated the creation of specific approaches in development policy to expand and capture the process of knowledge exchange (Hosono, 2018; Lin & Wang, 2017a). This model has advanced state capacity and empowered states’ roles when creating new approaches and interventions in the development program (Mazzucato, 2015, p. 4). The key components that have been neglected by neoliberal development theories are how knowledge, technology and industrialisation have expanded and how they are perceived in Southern countries in the creation of a creative development program (Hansen & Wethal, 2015; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012). These first notions of the current behaviour of MICs working in development cooperation emphasised knowledge sharing and creative technology expansion, with the extension of state institutions as the main agent (Chaturvedi, 2017; Danby, 2002; Grabel, 2010; Lin & Wang, 2017a). Thus, the current setting of cooperation cannot neglect the significant roles of the state rather than global development institutions in setting agendas and priorities, especially within the state’s own development cooperation.

### *National System as a Development Tool*

State institutions are the core actors in shaping the setting of development by materialising concepts and ideologies into policy and practices in Southern cooperation (Grabel, 2010; Lin & Wang, 2017a; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012)—for example, through national planning policies. State planning can be associated with Keynesian arguments on the methods of development used by governments in structuring and leading the direction of policy and economic welfare (Toye, 2006, p. 991). State institutions are also necessary to develop the concept of social and economic resilience and shape the content of development policy (Grabel, 2010; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012). Keynesian arguments in the twenty-first century also critiqued the neoliberal market view that shaped the policy as a short-term and unpredictable development policy that contributes to more poverty (Grabel, 2010; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012). This notion helps

to construct, for example, the case of Indonesia's institutionalisation and strategising of its SSC within government development planning priorities. Therefore, the relevance of state institutions in the policy development of Southern countries indicates a more predictable strategy in their development target and priorities. This notion acknowledges the construction of the current settings of SSC, which affects cooperation policy and relations among countries.

### *Reshaping the SSC Modalities of Cooperation*

Southern cooperation uses a specific model of cooperation with particular approaches to development. Lin and Wang (2017a) argued that the mechanism of China's infrastructure policy and program is to tackle slow growth in developing countries and expand employment opportunities. This argument is highlighted as 'beyond Keynesian' to identify the role of the state in deriving the economic development agenda through global institutions (Lin & Wang, 2017a, p. 124). Lin and Wang (2017a) refined the Keynesian theory and explored new structural economics (NSE) in SSC by identifying the importance of expanding global infrastructure projects facilitated by the state to stimulate employment and growth and solve financial problems, especially among Southern countries (Lin & Wang, 2017a, 2017b). This reflects the approach taken by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) established by China, which included an expectation of increased Southern countries' voices, compared with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank, which are viewed as having more neoliberal approaches (Wang, 2017). These modalities are also in line with Southern countries' domestic approaches in expanding their development programs, including through infrastructure programs, trade and investments, as well as other forms of development finance (Chaturvedi, 2017, p. 22). For example, in the case of Indonesia, the domestic development approach is refocusing on infrastructure programs, as reflected in the country's cooperation with other Southern countries.<sup>18</sup>

### *State Philosophy and National Culture*

State philosophy and national culture have influenced the ideology and identity of the state in development cooperation (Danby, 2002; Grabel, 2010; Kilby, 2018; Lin & Wang, 2017a; Yue, 2015). Keynesianism in development studies debates of SSC has seen the rise of state-based

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<sup>18</sup> <https://en.antaranews.com/news/118023/president-encourages-state-firms-to-participate-in-namibias-projects> (accessed 12 April 2019).

policy with an industrialisation model to create wealth and growth, but also acknowledges the cultural context of the country (Grabel, 2010; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012). This approach affects the use of specific terminology and language from the country's cultural and social experiences in development. Therefore, the cultural experiences of the state influence how cooperation terminology and language (including the term 'solidarity') are perceived in the politics of Southern cooperation (Mawdsley, 2012b, p. 257). Language not only sets the symbolic political movements within the hegemonic system, but also builds the state's identity as a reflection of past knowledge of positions and relations among Southern countries. State political standpoints of Southern cooperation are also structured within specific narratives to define the position of the South and challenge Northern capitalist economic approaches (Mawdsley, 2012a; Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018). Further, post-Keynesian theory acknowledges the diversity of institutions that enable more social and cultural explorations of the shape and process of aid and giving in social relations (Danby, 2002, p. 33). Therefore, to understand the narrative of giving and sharing of the state within SSC, the next section examines gift theory and analyses the process of giving and receiving that is conducted by state institutions. It also theoretically explores the perception of the state agency that materialised through specific terminologies and modalities of cooperation.

### **The Idea of Giving: Gift Theory and South–South Cooperation**

The analysis of values and motivations borrows from social anthropology to explore the nature of giving in SSC from the perspective of Mauss's (1970) gift theory. Mauss pioneered the analysis of gift-giving in society based on Malinowsky's ethnographic research in 1922, which was followed by studies by anthropologists and philosophers such as Sahlins (1972), Bourdieu (1977, 1990), Derrida (1991), Graeber (2001), and Hénaff and Morhange (2010). Mauss (1970, p. 3) argued that gift theory is the act of giving voluntarily, with an associated sense of obligation. He debated that the social phenomenon of gift-giving is defined in the roles of reciprocity, giver and receiver in relation to the process of institutionalisation of the system within group relations (Mauss, 1970, p. 4). This theory highlights cooperation as reciprocal with an unidentified set of return obligations that should be conducted between the recipient and the provider, including the economic transaction behind the process of the gift exchange (Mauss, 1970, p. 9). Mauss (1970) defined exchange relations as 'total service and counter-services committed voluntarily to present and gift, that end in compulsory and reciprocal

obligatory manners in private or public spheres' (p. 7). Moreover, Mauss (1970, p. 15) used Maori law, which states that 'what enforces an obligation in the receiving and exchange processes, is not inactive', to perceive that actors who are involved in the gift-giving exchange process are not passive but active agents in reciprocal relations.

Sahlins (1972) interpreted Mauss by noting that the components of gift organisation, economic value and process are segmented and not within a corporate model, but they create social relations among people. He also noted that the aspects of a gift are solidarity, communion and alliance to create peace, with a different process in the political sphere of organised society, whereby the 'gift was [a] model of social contract' (Sahlins, 1972, pp. 169–170). The social contract of the gift highlights its moral value among the parties involved, and institutions are developed from the gift exchange process. However, Derrida (1991) challenged Mauss's rationale of gift-giving in terms of the terminology and language used. He argued that acts of giving occur without direct reference to or mention of the economic value of the gift (Derrida, 1991, p. 24). His critique of Mauss's theory defined the meaning of 'gift': it should not be bound by an obligation to be pure, and the giver's intention to give should be genuine (Derrida, 1991; Furia, 2015; Kapoor, 2008). Derrida (1991) pointed out that once the gift process is institutionalised within a regular setting, it cannot be considered a pure gift (Derrida, 1991, p. 137). Kapoor (2008, p. 90) highlighted that Derrida's notion of the promise that comes with the giving of foreign aid seems to contradict the idea of gift-giving because it is closely related to the perception of explicit or implicit conditions attached to the gift.

Given these understandings of gift exchange, the institutions and actors involved in the process are constructed within specific moral values that cannot be separated from the norms developed in societies (Mauss, 1970, p. 3). Hence, the exchange process leads to the creation of specific relations that note the value of the gift (Mauss, 1970, p. 4). Gift theory points to development cooperation as a foundation for developing social relations that lead to further economic cooperation (Graeber, 2001; Mauss, 1970; Sahlins, 1972). Sahlins used the idea of 'economics is politics' to show that the process of gift exchange builds societal relations in 'primitive groups' (Sahlins, 1972, pp. 132–134). Sahlins's argument produced a social theory of economic relations that facilitates understanding of the role of the state in the public policy of exchange, especially from a Keynesian perspective, by defining the concept of 'balance reciprocity' in larger communities (Danby, 2002, p. 24). Even though Mauss explored gift-

giving within a small group of societies,<sup>19</sup> Sahlins observed that within international development settings, relations among states were still relevant in recognising the moral setting of cooperation within the process of exchange (Danby, 2002, p. 24). The relation among states constitutes the motivation to give, receive and reciprocate on a voluntary basis, even as a set of unstated obligations. Therefore, the notion of reciprocity in gift theory outlines the essential components in analysing the motivations and moral perceptions behind SSC, as well as the scope of cooperation.

Bourdieu (1977, 1990) further examined the nature of giving and sharing and noted that symbolism is the essence of elucidating the long tradition of the act of solidarity in gift exchange. The tradition of the gift-giving process can be interpreted as 'it goes without saying because it comes without saying' (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 161). Bourdieu (1977, 1990) recognised that the tradition embedded in the symbolism of gift-giving can be unidentified and silent because it moves beyond the structure of the market system. Symbolism is also proposed within the social structure of capital, which can lead to domination and be reproduced continuously between the giver and the receiver (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990; Hattori, 2003; Mawdsley, 2012b). Symbolism appears in the statements, language and rituals of countries that share the same notion of tradition or act of giving that constitutes SSC. Symbolism in SSC can also be placed within the evolution of ideas, including in political speeches about cooperation and relations among actors. Therefore, gift theory clarifies the nature of SSC by providing a framework to understand the symbolism of the social relations that emerge in cooperation (Mawdsley, 2012b, p. 268).

#### *Gift Theory and International Development Cooperation*

The features of gift theory also lead to the identification of moral values and motivational aspects of foreign assistance (Hattori, 2003, p. 232). Gift theory has been discussed within foreign aid in global and more specific contexts (Dillon, 1968; Eyben, 2006; Furia, 2015; Gray, 2011; Hattori, 2003; Kapoor, 2008; Kowalski, 2011; Silk, 2004), including in the context of SSC (Mawdsley, 2012a, 2012b). These theoretical and analytical perspectives are explored through different lenses to understand the nature of SSC. The components of the giver, receiver and

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<sup>19</sup> Field studies followed the relations and systems of societies in the areas of Polynesia, Melanesia and the US Northwest and were compared with other societies based on document studies, including in Europe and Papua (Mauss, 1970).

reciprocity that are embedded in gift theory are intertwined with notions embedded in development cooperation, including in SSC (Furia, 2015; Kowalski, 2011; Mawdsley, 2012a, 2012b). Further, gift theory identifies with the two sides of voluntary, but also obligatory, mechanisms that are attached in the established relations (Silk, 2004, p. 232). The relation between the recipient and provider country, as well as the systems that build upon the relationship, including reciprocity and obligation, point out the logic of how cooperation is established and developed.

The moral value and relations that materialise in cooperation are reflected in how recipient and provider countries perceive the cooperation that is established. This perspective cannot be separated from the structure and nature of the cooperation that has been developed over many years. SSC is established through interactions among Southern countries by providing and obtaining within a spirit of mutual benefit and solidarity, with a strong sense of identity narratives, as well as historical and moral notions of reciprocity (Kowalski, 2011; Lorenzana, 2015; Mawdsley, 2012b; Nel & Taylor, 2013). These moral senses and principles of SSC are the main motivations for cooperation among countries. The motivational act or moral views of Southern countries can be considered as two sides (recipient and provider) of a story, as explored further in Chapter 7. Gift theory also recognises the relationship beyond the social facts established in the current cooperation setting (Adloff & Mau, 2006, pp. 118–119). Therefore, the use of gift theory to identify SSC remains relevant in understanding how and why cooperation elements evolved in relationships among Southern countries.

The global context of development cooperation notes the relations that emerged between recipient and provider countries in foreign aid regimes in terms of building power relations (Groves & Hinton, 2004; Mosse & Lewis, 2005). Mauss (1970, p. 4) noted the power of social relations within gift theory as occurring in the process of giving and receiving and suggested that they were based on specific objects that circulated. Power relations cannot be considered linear because they comprise multilayered issues and contexts for giving and receiving within processes and objects (Adloff & Mau, 2006, p. 105). Power relations in gift-giving regimes might not be considered direct and tangible but are perceived as an indirect form of power relations. The relation points to a different set of cooperation narratives and symbolism that is reproduced over time and creates a specific structure. This social structure evolves within specific relations across agents and results in unconscious actions that represent knowledge

obtained over time (Giddens, 1984, p. 4). Given that SSC is derived from multiple layers of structure in formal and informal settings, the social system is controlled by agents' understanding of the issues, including knowledge, ideology and belief (Chaudoin, Milner, & Pang, 2015; Giddens, 1986). Therefore, it can be understood that gift exchange is also a social fact that arguably surpasses all of these social dimensions (Adloff & Mau, 2006, p. 120). Gift-giving is part of building social relations among countries rather than building material relations (Graeber, 2001; Hattori, 2001). Aid has often been analysed as a model of giving within countries; therefore, the notion can work better within SSC, whereby cooperation is derived with less conditionality. SSC can be contextualised as similar to North–South cooperation, but these conceptual motives point to significant differences with the cooperation model.

Furia (2015, p. 6) argued that the challenge of analysing the foreign aid motivation is that cooperation is often viewed as technical, policy based and apolitical. However, the indirect results and effects that benefit countries (Mawdsley, 2012b, p. 262) show that cooperation is created from political acts. In SSC, the motivation of actors to be involved is significant in understanding how cooperation among states is developed and shaped. There is an understanding that if cooperation is not likely to provide a direct result to the recipient country, then the social interaction among the countries is essential. Relations that have evolved among recipients and providers in SSC are perceived as partnerships rather than a hierarchical donor–recipient relationship (Mawdsley, 2012b, p. 260). The value of equality between the giver and the receiver, which Zhou Enlai emphasised in China's aid principles, is contextualised within the identity narrative that has evolved within cooperation over many years. Thus, understanding the context of cooperation from the perspective of Southern countries can help in understanding the mechanism that is used.

The motivation for cooperation is also unattached and may not directly benefit the provider of a gift, especially in terms of intention and purpose. Given that the nature of cooperation can be referred to as the understanding of potlatch in Mauss's gift theory, the forum or regional setting embodied in the institution of SSC captures this idea of indirectness. It is understood that reciprocity might not directly be returned by the receiver, but a return gift may be perceived, as expected, by a third party (Adloff & Mau, 2006; Hénaff & Morhange, 2010). Further, the reciprocity of cooperation may not result in a direct benefit to the provider

country. Therefore, reciprocal relationships are constituted not only between the two countries, but also within a wider group of countries. The notion argues for a deeper philosophical understanding of the paradoxical meaning of reciprocity and obligation (Hénaff & Morhange, 2010, pp. 122–123). It is important to acknowledge the social relations—and especially their effect on economic relations—that evolve in the idea of giving in SSC. This highlights the significance of social networks or group values within the gift-giving process, as countries understand their obligations behind the meaning of the gift-giving process. This is a different perspective of the understanding of cooperation within the North–South mechanism.

### *Gift Theory and Southern Solidarity*

Mauss's gift theory shows that social relations in reciprocity emerged within a spirit of voluntariness and obligation contextualised in the narrative of solidarity (Adloff & Mau, 2006, p. 97). Durkheim (1984, p. xiv) developed the concept of solidarity in the development of organic cooperation and relations within the economic, administrative and governmental functions of a society. Further, Wilde (2007) defined solidarity as a 'reciprocal understanding and sentiment with the sense of responsibility in group relations that are directed to mutual support' (p. 171). The meaning of solidarity also conveys the social understanding of modern society by pointing out collective action based on identity and individuality in the social democratic state (Giddens, 2000, p. 51). In contrast, solidarity in terms of international relations is conceptualised within the role of the state as an agency that provides value to the political institution in how it reacts to specific conditions (Weber, 2007, p. 698). Therefore, solidarity in the context of cooperation cannot be separated from the mutual relations and collective acts that the agents perceive in the cooperation.

These theoretical debates on solidarity highlight an understanding that created particular structures that distinguished the Southern linguistic characteristics of cooperation. Derived from Bourdieu's (1977, 1990) idea of symbolic capital, the understanding of language and narrative distinguished Southern cooperation from Northern cooperation (Mawdsley, 2012b; Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018). Upon examining the debates in dependency theory to neoliberalism and beyond-Keynesian perspectives, the dichotomies in the application of specific languages cannot avoid the identification of structure in development cooperation—for example, languages used in the context of development relations, including cooperation

and competition, as well as in North–South, centre–periphery, rich–poor and state–market discourses (Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018, p. 887). These languages create the structure of social relations that derive the global development discourse by challenging development hegemony. A further examination provides a deeper understanding of the conceptualisation of southern languages as more than a political narrative of cooperation that is rooted in the ideology of non-intervention, mutual benefit and respect to others, which further enhances the structure of cooperation (Mawdsley, 2012b, p. 257).

The obvious identification of SSC is that the term ‘solidarity’, which is attached to the narrative of bureaucrats, is linked to the national interests and network building processes that have been historically and culturally shaped in SSC (Hongoh, 2016, p. 381). For example, as Kilby (2017a, p. 10) noted, the motive for China to cooperate was based on building solidarity that led to long-term political and economic relationships. The paradox of giving is also interconnected with the intention to create capital, which is expressed as economic, political, diplomatic and cultural/social benefits. Further, the notion of solidarity identifies the set of goals that demonstrate the common sense of experiences embedded by Southern countries (Hongoh, 2016; Nel & Taylor, 2013). According to Mawdsley (2012b, pp. 266–268), solidarity in SSC is contested in three issues that constitute Southern donors: the decision-maker’s prognosis on its national interests; the notion of solidarity as the Southern identity captured in the narrative of the cooperation; and the rejection of a social hierarchy within the cooperation and the view to rebalance the reciprocity within the aid system. Thus, the context of solidarity is specifically constructed in the language of cooperation, which helps to distinguish the SSC model of relations.

Another element that identifies relations within gift theory is that the norms of the giver are attached and materialised in the process of giving (Graeber, 2001; Mauss, 1970; Mawdsley, 2012b). The norms of givers can be captured in the object that is used to materialise the giving, as it identifies the identity of the giver (Mauss, 1970; Mawdsley, 2012b). For example, in the case of Indonesia, the priorities program in SSC is based on the government’s best practices program in development, including programs of artificial insemination and budget planning. Further, the interest of the giver is also part of the reciprocal process of giving (Adloff & Mau, 2006, p. 104), as interest to give also cannot be separated from the identity of the giver. For example, Indonesia conveys an identity as the largest Muslim country perceived to be in

cooperation with other Southern Muslim countries, including its commitment to Palestine and Afghanistan as part of Muslim solidarity, also referred as interest-based solidarity (Winanti & Alvian, 2019). Thus, the platform of SSC is political because the interest and identity of the state is attached to the cooperation, which sets the profile of the government within domestic politics and the wider geopolitical discourse of cooperation. Given this shared Southern identity narrative, the next section explores the notion from the perspective of international relations, specifically in relation to how norms and shared identity have evolved in the international relations of Southern countries.

### **International Construction of Southern Cooperation Identity and Norms**

Several theories on international relations have analysed relations, models and debates in foreign aid and SSC (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009; Mawdsley, 2012a; Watson, 2014). As explained earlier, realism focuses on the relations in foreign aid parts of foreign policy and power relations (Morgenthau, 1962; Watson, 2014). Theories of idealism and functionalism consider the role of international organisations and institutions in shaping the economic and relations order of Southern countries (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009; Mawdsley, 2012a; Watson, 2014). Historical viewpoints of international relations have highlighted the critiques and significance of SSC in the current context by identifying the shared identity among Southern countries developed from the spirit of the Bandung Conference in 1955 (Assie-Lumumba, 2015; Cheru, 2011; Devetak, Dunne, & Nurhayati, 2016; Gosovic, 2016; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2015). The historical notions of identity also recognise content from the perspective of diplomacy and rituals in SSC that analyse the meaning and effect of the Bandung Conference in 1955 on the global diplomacy of Southern countries (Shimazu, 2014, p. 231), as discussed further in Chapter 4.

Further, rituals and narratives are used to preserve ideology as part of modern political life (Kertzer, 1988, pp. 1–2), including in relations among states. Political rituals through speeches, celebrations and commemoration capture the historical momentum that binds the agents involved through symbolic and existing ideological narratives. Therefore, ideology can be imagined throughout the history and timeline of the politics of a country through symbolic acts by its leaders, including through language and speech that they narrate, and through rituals. However, the identification of ideology derived from symbolism and perceived

through notions of rituals and speeches repeated over time cannot be separated from the internal and external structures that shape leaders' political agendas and perspectives. Thus, within a specific structure, ideology can change its forms and narratives based on the economic and political capital perceived by its leaders that symbolised the action (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 170), including in foreign aid (Hattori, 2003, p. 246) and SSC (Mawdsley, 2012b, p. 268). These analyses point to specific effects and results, including the symbolism of norms and ideology in rituals and language used, motivation and reciprocity in relations among actors, and the structure of the institution and its capitals in SSC. Therefore, norms, identity and state philosophical stands are important in analysing SSC, as seen in the evolution of the idea of the South as perceived by Southern countries within the global context, which leads the exploration to constructivism theory.

### Constructivism

This thesis focuses on the identity and norms of giving that are structured within the SSC narratives of bureaucrats' political discourses in international relations. Constructivism, which examines social relations and theories in international relations, helps to identify and understand the roles and agencies of the state in domestic and international structure and policy (Bigo, 2011; Franke & Roos, 2010; Leander, 2011; Mabee, 2007; Wendt, 1987, 1999). Constructivism works using three layers of concepts to help structure SSC: philosophical stance of reality; social theory on how knowledge and its agency structure social relations; and how theoretical and empirical perspectives in international relations can be described within the other two layers of 'social ontological and epistemological foundations' (Adler, 2013, p. 114). These layers have created a social assumption that enables theorists to use a more basic and realistic approach to current situations. For example, in analysing SSC, it is necessary to understand the social construction of the state based on the attributes that the bureaucrats perceive and contribute. That is, how and why Southern countries perceive, respond and react to their relations over a period highlights how the state and its bureaucrats identify themselves within their domestic and international political and cultural settings.

Accordingly, the significance of constructivism is also found in relations between agents and structure in shaping the identity and ideological perspectives of the Southern state. Constructivism highlights the link with the internal context of the state as a structure to

understand the local social context. Internal structure can be defined through the culture in people's thoughts, identity, discourse and interactions, and through their implementation of their belief system (Adler, 2013, p. 126). It affects interactions conducted through leaders' decisions, as well as the ideas and knowledge of policymakers in structuring specific issues (Adler, 2013, p. 126). Agents or actors—in this case, bureaucrats as policymakers—have the perceptions and capacity to interpret knowledge to rationalise actions and activity in responding to their state international position within a specific structure, which is continuously changing or evolving (Giddens, 1984; Wendt, 1987). For example, leaders' descriptions of SSC differ according to internal political conditions and how they value the cooperation that motivates and narrates their foreign policy (Mielniczuk, 2013, p. 1078). Therefore, the setting of social relations in international relations indirectly affects the state in recognising the state's identity and motivation, which signifies a common understanding in defining cooperation in SSC.

State interests are also cannot be separated from state identity in perceiving the state's foreign policy agenda, but they are not necessarily developed from the international structure perceived by traditional approaches to international relations (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001; Mielniczuk, 2013). Identity is also observed in the continuous social relationships among countries that have created dynamic interactions, and in the shaping and reshaping of the state's identity (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001; Wendt, 1999). Anderson (2006, p. 6) argued that the imagination of the nation state must be linked with cultural ideas embedded in the society. It then expands as a result of the expansion of nationalism through the use of acceptable language, especially in print, within the wider society (Anderson, 2006, p. 134). The reimagining of state identity is used to justify the setting of the cultural context and helps to define the ideological and identity stance of state cooperation (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 410). This leads to an interaction on what notions are and the types of identity that the state want to perceive among other states with similar notions. For example, in the case of China, identity is perceived and shaped in the state's political system and constructed through leaders' political needs based on domestic conditions (Mielniczuk, 2013, p. 1084). Thus, in addition to being resulting from international values, the setting of identity is nationally constructed based on internal factors that are developed by leaders and policymakers.

## Conclusion

This chapter explored the theoretical debates around development and aid that have shaped Southern cooperation since the 1950s. The debates question how social relations expand the theoretical focus of global development cooperation, not only in development studies theories and practices, but also in the symbolic structure created from the giving process, building from the case of Indonesia's SSC. Explorations of the theories of Keynesian, modernisation and dependency, as well as realism in international relations and neoliberalism, considered the content of aid as a tool to engage with the development cooperation process of Northern and Southern countries and extended in SSC. These development aid theories have provided a relevant framework to understand the roles of the state in development cooperation, including in the case of Indonesia. In the context of giving among Southern countries, the narratives and acts of cooperation are built within specific patterns that have derived from the understanding of gift theory. Further, given the peculiar setting of Southern cooperation, the role of the state and its bureaucrats in the process of giving and receiving is significant in shaping the structure of relations domestically and in influencing the international aid agenda. Therefore, constructivism is utilised to construct the specific social relations that build upon Southern states, including the experiences of state agents. These theoretical structures are used to analyse the context of Indonesia's SSC to understand the practical meaning of the idea of giving and to capture its specific structures in relations among countries.

The globalised world has made the meaning of aid more fluid and involving many actors, with purposes of giving that cannot be separated from political, economic and cultural contexts. These conditions have challenged existing theoretical approaches to understand the current conditions of Indonesia's SSC. These theoretical approaches have been utilised to untangle the layers in SSC from state perspectives with a foundation of Keynesian and neo-structuralism philosophical understanding. Gift theory and constructivism help to understand the process of giving that is narrated and implemented by the state. Therefore, these unique features and interlinks highlight the Southern countries' performance in SSC, which leads the theoretical debates in studies of international development cooperation. These notions also point to the exploration of how history, narratives, and implementations of Indonesia's SSC

capture the extension of the Southern cooperation structure in global development cooperation that will be explored in the next chapter.



## **Chapter 2 Blast from the Past: History of South–South Cooperation**

### **Introduction**

The previous chapter explored the theoretical construction of South–South Cooperation (SSC), including in the case of Indonesia, within the globalised world of development cooperation. As discussed, the history of SSC cannot be separated from the Asian–African Conference (AAC) held at Bandung in 1955 that extended the idea of cooperation among former colonised countries. The conference shaped the content of giving and sharing that has continued to be symbolised among Southern countries and has been internalised in the state’s political, economic and sociocultural system (Gore, 2013; Kilby, 2017a). At the same time, the history of Southern countries’ cooperation has been linked to relations with Northern donor countries, which has redefined the context and definition of aid and development in general. Traditional donors constructed how aid had been conducted, with a sense of altruism motivating aid to other countries (Kowalski, 2011; Riddell, 2007). Although the form of cooperation might appear similar, the history, ideology, philosophical stand, institutions and motivations projected by SSC are rooted differently. Therefore, this chapter aims to analyse the historical context of SSC, including in North–South relations, by exploring its timeline, narrative and experiences of how cooperation has been restructured and evolved. This chapter also maps the history of development cooperation by addressing the question of how the idea of giving evolved and affected the internal and external conditions of Southern countries over the years. It argues that the idea of giving is historically, politically and socially constructed in SSC based on state relationships and has created specific patterns in global development cooperation.

### **From North to South: The Background of Aid in Development Cooperation**

The structures and perspectives of development relations among Southern countries cannot be separated from the historical experiences that evolved from their foreign aid and development practices (Harriss, 2005; Mawdsley, 2015; Richey & Ponte, 2014; Six, 2009). These notions have formed the political–cultural concepts of SSC and were established at the AAC in 1955. Southern cooperation was also shaped through the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) and UNCTAD to BRICS and has continuously evolved within the context of cooperation and political narratives. Appadorai (1981) argued that the historical context helps countries

identify themselves publicly. However, this cannot sustain the substance of the concepts, because states must adapt to changing domestic and international political conditions (Appadorai, 1981, p. 10). Given that the language and terminology used in SSC are explicit and distinct, including solidarity, non-intervention and mutual benefit, their interpretation and use in state narratives and institutions are politically driven and continuously evolving, as will be further explored in Chapter 4 in the case of Indonesia.

Despite the examination of domestic ideology and political stances in SSC, the cultural dimension of the Bandung Conference 1955 on its political–economic approaches cannot be ignored (Chakrabarty, 2005; Nesadurai, 2005). Nor can they be separated from the debate on how colonialism and postcolonial perspectives influence ideology and revolutionary acts of Southern cooperation (Harriss, 2005; Kothari, 2005b; Six, 2009). However, the anti-colonial sense perceived in the early years of Southern cooperation slowly shifted to a different context based on how states responded to domestic and global political–economic agendas. For example, one effect of the Bandung Conference was the idea of pan-Africanism, in responding to the anti-colonialism and economic liberation that stimulated nationalist movements in Africa (Hongoh, 2016, p. 384). Another example is that the scenario of global South cooperation developed from anti-colonialism notions but became intermingled between Northern and Southern countries, especially in the performance, interests and models of development cooperation in recent years (Mawdsley, 2018, 2019). Thus, tracing these changes in SSC is significant in understanding how cooperation and relations progressed in global development cooperation.

As mentioned earlier, development studies theories have captured the historical and sociocultural identities that evolved in the Southern countries (Andrews & Bawa, 2014; Gills, 2017; Scholte & Söderbaum, 2017; Sen, 2001; Yue, 2015), including the construction of the politics of solidarity and state-driven philosophy (Kilby, 2018, p. 6). The debate on national interest and identity in the South has also led to scholarly debates on the setting and norms of Southern aid in global development cooperation (De Haan, 2011; Janus, Klingebiel, & Paulo, 2015; Woods, 2008). Furthermore, the ontological meaning of giving is often contradicted when analysed from Western perspectives. For example, a different set of values and identities is attributed to the debate on how institutional settings evolve and how Southern state actors are involved in restructuring global development cooperation (Braveboy-Wagner,

2009; De Renzio & Seifert, 2014; Gore, 2013; Mawdsley, 2015, 2019; Wenxing, 2016). These institutional mechanisms acknowledge that links between national political identity and economic structures are formed within national norms. Therefore, the examination cannot be separated from the specific ideology that has shaped the setting of cooperation among Southern countries and how it has been narrated throughout history. Given that Southern countries have also established relations with Northern donors, the debate also examined whether cooperation has influenced existing conditions. Thus, each Southern country's experiences are unique based on their internal dynamics and development needs, which are continuously evolving. However, there are 'red lines' that navigate and frame the history of SSC within a specific context, as explored further below.

Historical experiences and narratives can be analysed through several stages that are linked with Southern relations and the position of Southern countries within the global development structure (Engel, 2017, 2019; Eyben, 2013; Mawdsley, 2012a, 2019; Morais de Sá e Silva, 2010). Mawdsley (2012a) recognised five stages of historical lineage in relation to the emergence of Southern donor countries. These are: the politics of socialist development cooperation; the NAM; the UN and SSC; the creation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and Gulf donors; and the new EU states (Mawdsley, 2012a, p. 48). Further, Eyben (2013) identified three phases of the SSC historical timeline in the context of aid and development relations of traditional donors and Southern countries: phase one (1960–1990) is the emergence of the postcolonial world and the Cold War; phase two (1990–2005) is the end of the Cold War, with strong ideological contestation of North–South; and phase three (2005–present) is the financial crisis and re-emergence of Southern countries (Eyben, 2013, p. 1). Morais de Sá e Silva (2009, p. 41) noted that there are three phases in the SSC based on the political and economic values of the South in response to global conditions: phase one is self-reliance and political strengthening (1949–1979); phase two is demobilisation<sup>20</sup> (1980–1998); and phase three is best practice transfer (1999-current). This historical timeline views Southern activism as being able to contest global social injustice and

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<sup>20</sup> Demobilisation in SSC is defined as a transition period or the political–economic changes of Southern countries from the Cold War to Keynesian economics to neoliberal policies. It occurs when Southern countries are occupied with major domestic problems, including economic recessions, which make them dependent on and indebted to international financial organisations and their structural adjustment programs. This affects the relevance of the NIEO of SSC and brings about changes in Southern cooperation (Morais de Sá e Silva, 2009).

strengthen the context of solidarity (Morais de Sá e Silva, 2009, p. 41). Mawdsley (2019) also acknowledged three historical stages of Southern cooperation: stage 1 (1950 to late 1990), whereby Southern cooperation was overlooked by international development cooperation; stage 2 (2000–2015), which explored the significant growth of Southern countries in global development cooperation; and stage 3, which captures the remarkable shift of Southern countries as global political-economic powerhouses (Mawdsley, 2019, p. 1).

These historical timelines indicate specific characters and situations, including within the broader context of cooperation among Southern countries. To understand the current context of SSC, mapping the historical framework helps to apprehend the evolution and perspective of the Southern idea of giving within the state institution and through its relations among Southern and with Northern countries. Pointing to the historical timelines of SSC and the ontological meaning of giving and sharing, this section is divided into five stages of development cooperation: origin of giving; Bandung Conference and emergence of the Southern idea of cooperation; development of global institutions of the South and North; re-emergence of Southern donor countries; and political era of SSC.

### **Origin of Giving**

The history of giving in the context of cooperation among Southern countries can be traced back to the pre-colonial era. For example, China's expansion of its infrastructure projects cannot be separated from the history of the Silk Road during the Song Dynasty in the ninth to twelfth centuries, which expanded from Asia to Europe (Kilby, 2017a; Lin & Wang, 2017a). The origin of relations and cooperation among the kingdoms and countries in this geographical location undoubtedly influenced the evolution of the political and social constructions of civilisation, as well as the state foundations<sup>21</sup> of cooperation between these countries, even until recent years (Kahin, 1952; Lin & Wang, 2017a; Wicaksana, 2016). Thus, tracing the narratives of giving and receiving cannot be separated from the model of cooperation that has been established throughout the centuries.

During the Western colonial era in the early 1900s, the idea of Southern cooperation emerged and evolved through the embryo of the anti-colonial and solidarity movement among

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<sup>21</sup> For example, the idea of *Pancasila* in the case of Indonesia (Kahin, 1952; Wicaksana, 2016), and Confucianism, which focuses on cultivating social harmony and learning, in the case of China (Lin & Wang, 2017a).

colonised countries (Eslava, Fakhri, & Nesiah, 2017a; Kilby, 2017a; Petersson, 2017). It began at the Conference of Pan-Africanism in London in 1900, where several Southern leaders of Asia stimulated the idea of solidarity politics with the African countries (Hongoh, 2016; Kilby, 2017a). Further, to convey the idea of multilateralism, the 1926 Peace Conference and the 1927 First Congress against Imperialism and Colonialism in Brussels were held in response to the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 on the establishment of the League of Nations (Acharya, 2016b; Hongoh, 2016; Kilby, 2017a; Petersson, 2017). These meetings developed into a social movement of anti-colonialism not only across Europe, but also in Asia and Africa, where the notion was nourished and propagated. The nationalist ideology of the Southern countries was also nurtured through several preliminary conferences<sup>22</sup> that directly and indirectly built upon the common ideas and norms of Southern cooperation. These international movements also inspired the content and context of cooperation between countries, especially former colonised countries in the South, and resulted in a broader discussion among leaders regarding liberty and independence from colonisers.

The idea of Southern cooperation was further fostered during the Asian Conferences in Delhi in 1947 and 1949, which manifested some of the ideas for the AAC, including an agreement on the Southern ideological stance (Acharya, 2016b; Braveboy-Wagner, 2009; Pauker, 1956). These preparatory meetings were conducted to build a sense of connection and network among countries, including creating public awareness of the idea of Asian–African collaborations (Acharya, 2016b; Appadorai, 1955; Eslava, Fakhri, & Nesiah, 2017a; Mackie, 2005). Then, initiated by five countries of Indonesia, Ceylon, Burma, India and Pakistan, the Colombo Conference in 1954 refined the idea of an AAC and included the program that was expected to be delivered and presented during the conference in 1955 (Acharya, 2016b; Kahin, 1956; Mackie, 2005). This meeting enabled countries to express their concerns, ideas and interests regarding the establishment of the AAC (Acharya, 2016a; Chakrabarty, 2005; Jansen, 1966; Kahin, 1956; Mackie, 2005; Romulo, 1956). However, the Colombo Conference was also a response to the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was initiated

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<sup>22</sup> The preliminary conferences included the League against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression in Bienville in 1926, the New Delhi Conference in 1945, the Asian Relations Conferences in New Delhi in 1947 and 1949, the Baguio Conference in 1950, the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954, the Peking Conference in 1954, and several small preparatory meetings for the conference, including the Bogor Meeting in 1954 (Abdulgani, 1964; Acharya, 2016b; Appadorai, 1955; Eslava, Fakhri, & Nesiah, 2017b; Fifield, 1958; Kahin, 1956).

by the US to block communism in the region, with the participation of Thailand and the Philippines (Kilby, 2017a, p. 12). This meeting also resulted in a strong sense of anti-Western hegemony, including its response to SEATO being dominated by a Western agenda (Acharya, 2016b; Kilby, 2017a).

### **Bandung Conference in 1955 and the Emergence of Southern Cooperation**

Building upon the idea of solidarity and anti-colonialism, the Asian and African leaders finally conducted the Asian–African Conference on 18 to 24 April 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia. With preparation organised including the Bogor Conference in 1954, the five Colombo countries that initiated the Bandung Conference agreed to invite around 30 postcolonial countries in Asia and Africa (with 29 countries attending) and was successfully held given the participants’ internal political conditions and the international situation of the Cold War. The conference resulted in the ‘Bandung Principles’ as cooperation norms, with 10 basic principles constituting the meaning of international cooperation among Asian and African countries to maintain and promote peace and cooperation (Agung, 1973; Government of the Republic of Indonesia [GOI], 1955a). As a result of strong lobbying from China and India, the 10 Bandung Conference Principles were also drawn from the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, or *Panchsheel* (five principles),<sup>23</sup> between India and China, which were composed during the ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ conference in 1953.<sup>24</sup> These principles also mimicked Indonesia’s state ideology of *Pancasila*, which was developed and announced by Soekarno and Hatta on the country’s Independence Day in 1945 (Anderson, 1990; Devetak, Dunne, & Nurhayati, 2016; Fifield, 1958; Vitalis, 2013).

As Wright (1956) noted, the conference was represented by various colours, religions and new countries, which constituted a narrative of segregation and contestation against Western colonial countries and ideology (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2015; Wright, 1956). The conference highlighted the importance of understanding the needs and equal rights of newly decolonising nations and resisting the hegemony of the Cold War blocs (Agung, 1973; Eslava, Fakhri, &

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<sup>23</sup> The principles were based on Nehru’s idea of ‘mutual respect of each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence’ (Fifield, 1958).

<sup>24</sup> Although the conference was held in December 1953, the treaty between India and the People’s Republic of China and Tibet was signed in 1954 and given the name ‘Sino–Indian Treaty’ (Devetak, Dunne, & Nurhayati, 2016; Vitalis, 2013).

Nesiah, 2017a; Mawdsley, 2012b; Nesadurai, 2005). The Bandung Conference's commitments on political issues were more appealing than the economic and cultural issues (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2015; Nesadurai, 2005), but the results led to common commitments of cooperation within these three spheres of politics, economics and culture. The AAC and its principles created a strong sense of 'political vision' because the ideological principles and norms were expected to continue into future forums (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2015, p. 6). The narrative resonated with the Southern cooperation framework and focused on human rights, promoting world peace and dealing with problems relating to colonialism, which were the essence of cooperation. Behind these narratives, SSC was stimulated from the strong sense of solidarity that appeared later in the conference, as noted:

South–South Cooperation materialised with two rationales; first, for the solidarity among Southern countries and enhancing its political power against Northern countries, including restructuring the global economic system; and second, extending the potential of other Southern countries, including by reaching out to others that have been segregated because of the previous colonial system. (Senior Official 2 [interview], 2016)

Nevertheless, the Bandung Conference results were set within two dichotomies (Eslava, Fakhri, & Nesiah, 2017a). First, as concepts, the Bandung Conference results were difficult to translate and implement into real action (Eslava, Fakhri, & Nesiah, 2017a; Kahin, 1956), as the Bandung Principles did not define the institution's arrangement and structure of anti-colonialism (Acharya, 2014; Hongoh, 2016). Second, the Bandung Conference results asserted and acknowledged new norms of the international system, which gave states the flexibility to self-govern without being directed by other nations (Eslava, Fakhri, & Nesiah, 2017a; Nesadurai, 2005). These initiatives helped the Southern countries to identify the outcomes of the conference within specific narratives. The common ideology of the Bandung Conference revived the Keynesian perspective of state authority in economic development, which expanded through the Southern institutions (Kilby, 2017a; Nesadurai, 2005). Therefore, the nature of SSC cannot be avoided in the exploration of state institutions that are run by bureaucrats and policymakers, because it is attached and rooted within the ideology that is continuously reiterated in the countries' relations.

The Bandung Conference also established social relations among Southern countries with a set of unique features (Hongoh, 2016; Kahin, 1956; Kilby, 2017a; Mawdsley, 2012b). It can be identified as a political movement because it brought together societies with similar experiences and specific social conditions (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 17). The interaction of the Southern countries was constructed based on agreed-upon underlying political ideologies, including solidarity, which were acknowledged through symbolism and the narrative of Southern cooperation ideas, as indicated by the leaders' speeches, rituals performed and communiqués. However, the dynamic relations among the leaders that appeared before and during the conference signified the debates on cooperation, including the concern of some leaders regarding the substance of the conference<sup>25</sup> (Kahin, 1956; Mackie, 2005; Vitalis, 2013). For instance, many leaders were sceptical of Zhou Enlai's communist ideology and intention to drive the agenda of the conference towards China's political agendas (Kilby, 2017a, p. 14). Another issue was the ongoing division between Nasser of Egypt and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, despite the latter's absence from the Bandung Conference in 1955, regarding regional hegemony and new independent states in Africa (Hongoh, 2016; Vitalis, 2013). These diverse political stands and ideologies of the Southern leaders led to the creation of a specific dynamic in the process of identifying the agenda for the next AAC meeting, which was influenced by member countries' political agendas (Kilby, 2017b; Weinstein, 1965). For example, reflecting on Soekarno's ideological position, the relation between Asian–African members was not always coordinated and aligned, as its members had both dynamic and diverse ideological attitudes that often conflicted (Kilby, 2017a; Pauker, 1956). As Indonesia tried to initiate the second AAC from 1956, conflict between members increased, especially between China and India (Bunnell, 1966; Kilby, 2017b; Weinstein, 1965).

As a result of the different concerns and political agendas perceived by the leaders, the contrasting objectives and ideas regarding the content of Southern cooperation continued to be contested. However, the familiarity of the people involved, as well as the common experiences of the countries, led to a better understanding and common goals among the

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<sup>25</sup> The differences among the leaders continued during the conference because they came from different spheres and mindsets, which led to substantial debates. One example related to the political term 'co-existence', which was considered China's perception rather than a general agreement on anti-colonialism. Further, a more personal matter occurred between Carlos Romulos of the Philippines and Nehru of India (Chakrabarty, 2005; Pauker, 1956).

participating countries. As a result, the conference achieved a critical milestone towards the Southern identity and movement (Parker, 2006; Pauker, 1956). The idea that anti-colonialism and Southern ideology cannot be separated from the notion of domestic political movements led to an international movement of Asian and African countries (Shimazu, 2014, p. 226). Despite the varied conflicts of interest between Southern countries as perceived by leaders in SSC, common perspectives have thrived on the idea and ideology of Southern development cooperation (Nesadurai, 2005, p. 7). Thus, the humanising of Southern ideas and principles was shaped through social interactions among the Southern states, which brought their state ideology and leaders' perceptions into the cooperation.

### **Development of Global Institutions of North and South**

Networks and bilateral development cooperation among Asian–African countries were expanded after the conference, including the Southern countries' aid program, which began after the Bandung Conference. For example, China's first aid program was to Egypt in 1956 through the establishment of a trade office in Cairo and military support for the Suez Crisis (as well as Indonesia, as explored in the Chapter 3). In return, China acquired Egyptian cotton and established a training program, which emerged from personal relations between Zhou Enlai and Gamal Abdel Nasser (Kilby, 2017a, p. 18). Since then, China's aid program has expanded to other African countries, including Yemen, Guinea, Ghana and Mali (Kilby, 2017a, p. 18). The expansion of China and other Southern countries after the Bandung Conference was significant in relation to the evolution of Southern cooperation and its principles, as well as on the approaches and modalities to not only other Southern countries, but also within its regional cooperation setting. Further, from 1956, the geopolitical construction of the Southern countries shifted following the initial meeting of the establishment of the NAM between Nehru of India and Nasser of Egypt, with the addition of Tito from Yugoslavia, who was not part of the Bandung Conference and who identified as European (Schaufelbuehl, Janick, Bott, Hanhimäki, & Wyss, 2015).

In 1961, the NAM was formally established in Belgrade and included countries such as Indonesia, Ghana, Cuba and Mali, as well as countries from Latin America and the Middle East, but not China (Abraham, 2008; Engel, 2017; Schaufelbuehl, Janick, Bott, Hanhimäki, & Wyss, 2015). Although not all Southern countries were invited or wanted to participate (Abraham,

2008; Kilby, 2018), the NAM used the idea of political neutrality to organise the South–South movement, which led to the emergence of other international organisations, including the UNCTAD and the G77 (Amin, 2015; De Renzio & Seifert, 2014; Janus, Klingebiel, & Paulo, 2014). The difference between the two conferences was that the Bandung Conference derived moral power from bringing the different blocs together, while the NAM defined active political engagement in the international system by taking a stand outside the power blocs and using the UN through the G77 (Abraham, 2008; Schaufelbuehl, Janick, Bott, Hanhimäki, & Wyss, 2015). The NAM brought the same level of nuance of the Southern countries’ social movement to challenge the global hegemony. Acharya (2014, p. 414) noted that the norms, including non-intervention and universalism, that were shaped at the Bandung Conference were also relevant to the NAM. The NAM became a quasi-resistance group to the Western colonies and the Cold War, despite the fact that Latin American countries invited to the meeting had a different set of ideological viewpoints from the Asian and African countries (Abraham, 2008; Weinstein, 1965). The agreements of the Asian–African Forum and the NAM showed that the forums had become essential political spaces that stimulated the institutional development of Southern cooperation (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009; Mawdsley, 2012b). However, the NAM did not focus specifically on the setting of Southern aid, but on reforming Northern aid to the South through the establishment of UNCTAD (Kilby, 2017a, p. 22).

At first, the establishment of the NAM did not hinder the plan to hold a second AAC, which was initiated by China, Indonesia and Pakistan after the initial idea was proposed in 1956 (Abraham, 2008; Pauker, 1965; Weinstein, 1965). After preparation and planning were conducted in 1965, the second AAC in Algeria was postponed two weeks before the event, and later cancelled (Abraham, 2008; Kilby, 2017b; Pauker, 1965), because of the constrained political relations between India and Pakistan, and between India and China,<sup>26</sup> as well as the Indonesia–Malaysia Confrontation (*Konfrontasi*) and India’s desire for the Soviet Union to attend (Abraham, 2008; Weinstein, 1965). There was also competition between the second AAC and the NAM meeting during the preparations because India continued to ask for specific conditions and negotiations between the countries on issues related to the conference that were not agreed upon, which pushed back the location and date of the meeting until after the

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<sup>26</sup> Despite their good relations in 1955, in 1962 India and China fought in a war over the borderline of Tibet. Further, India and Pakistan have been engaged in an ongoing dispute over the Kashmir region (Abraham, 2008).

NAM meeting in 1965 in Africa (Abraham, 2008; Schaufelbuehl, Janick, Bott, Hanhimäki, & Wyss, 2015; Weinstein, 1965). The relations among the Southern countries could not overcome the political constraints of their leaders in coordinating the communal acts of cooperation. Further, the NAM brought the same level of nuance of a social movement and maintained the independence of the Southern countries within the contestation in global hegemony.

Following the Cairo Conference in 1962, the problems of economic development through SSC were clearer (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009; Kilby, 2017a; Mawdsley, 2012a). Then, the focus on strengthening the Southern global economic system became the foundation for the formation of the UNCTAD and G77 in 1964 (Kilby, 2017a; Matthies, 1985; Mawdsley, 2012a; Nesadurai, 2005). Through the G77, the UN passed a resolution to establish the New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974, which had a strong Keynesian ideological approach that was intended to expand Southern roles in economic development (Kilby, 2017a; Nesadurai, 2005). Further, the UN General Assembly, UNECOSOC and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) developed a framework of technical cooperation among Southern countries, which was articulated in 1978 in the Buenos Aires Plan of Actions (BAPA) for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (UNDP, 1978). Thus, these settings and the framework of Southern economic order, technical cooperation and institutions' arrangements have contributed to debates around Southern development as an alternative to the global development context, despite the massive expansion of Western-led neoliberal economic approaches in the 1980s.

To manage the framework of global aid cooperation and to counter the Soviet Union's growing foreign aid, the Eisenhower administration of the US established the DAG (Development Assistance Group)<sup>27</sup> in 1960 with a strong political objective that was detailed in the Resolution on the Common Aid Effort (Kilby, 2017a; OECD, 2006; Scott, 2015). Then, during the third meeting of the DAG, the group decided to set up the OECD Development Centre. Thus, in 1961, the DAG was restructured as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to consolidate the aid data and information of its member countries and encourage them to

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<sup>27</sup> The member countries of the DAG were Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the UK, the US and the Commission of the European Economic Community. The Japanese Government and the Netherlands were invited later in the year (OECD, 2006).

expand their aid programs<sup>28</sup> (OECD, 2006). From 1962, the DAC also provided regular reports, including aid reviews, the chair's report and statistical reporting on aid (OECD, 2006). While the UNCTAD focused on Southern aid and development from a Keynesian perspective, the OECD–DAC leaned towards a Western free market ideology (Kilby, 2017a, p. 23). Further, the OECD–DAC was recognised as the platform and reference for global aid mechanisms and systems by publishing aid guidelines for its member countries (e.g., the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 and the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008) (OECD, 2005), and through the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation in 2011 (OECD, 2011a). Despite the mention of other non-DAC donor countries in their annual reports, the organisations did not invite non-Western countries (except Japan and Korea) as members until 2007, when they invited several Southern countries as key partners of the OECD.<sup>29</sup>

As global development architecture continued to evolve, non-DAC actors introduced different sets of motivations, institutions and modalities that have expanded the modern settings of aid and development cooperation. Other important and lesser-known players in aid and development cooperation appeared in the 1970s, including OPEC, Middle Eastern countries and Gulf countries, which provided large amounts of aid following the oil boom in the 1970s (Mawdsley, 2012a). Based on reports from 1972 onwards, the OECD–DAC started to acknowledge OPEC countries and their multilateral organisations as growing non-DAC donor countries and organisations in global development cooperation (OECD–DAC, 1972). In more recent years, the significance of OPEC and Middle Eastern countries in stimulating the global economic market in the midst of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008 should also be acknowledged (Kilby, 2017a; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012). OPEC countries have been the most significant providers of non-DAC aid<sup>30</sup> since the GFC, despite fluctuations in oil prices between 2011 and 2015 (Rouis & Shomakhmadova, 2018; Young, 2015). Specifically, Gulf Cooperation

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<sup>28</sup> OECD–DAC members are traditional Northern donor countries including the US, European Countries, South Korea and Japan, as well as international financial Institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and other multilateral development banks (<http://www.oecd.org/dac/> [accessed 18 September 2018]).

<sup>29</sup> Based on the reviews, Southern countries as aid donor countries have been identified in the DAC's president reports since at least 1970 (OECD–DAC, 1972–1981). Key partner Southern countries (Brazil, China, Indonesia, India and South Africa) have only recently been invited to participate and contribute to the OECD's work (<http://www.oecd.org/global-relations/keypartners/> [accessed 13 November 2019]).

<sup>30</sup> OPEC countries' aid peaked at US\$19 billion in 2014 and US\$10 billion in 2015 from around US\$1 billion in 2000 (Rouis & Shomakhmadova, 2018). In comparison, Chinese foreign aid increased by 24% from 2001 to 2011 and was estimated at around US\$7.2 billion in 2013 (Kitano & Harada, 2016), including grants, zero-interest loans and concessions (Bräutigam, 2011).

Council countries and the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) have focused their aid programs on supporting other developing and underdeveloped countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Given that most OPEC and Middle Eastern donors are Islamic countries, their rationale for giving is found in the Islamic teaching of *Hadith*<sup>31</sup> in the *Quran* and in *Shariah* (Islamic Law) (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2003).

The politics of religion and oil in OPEC countries' aid is a unique feature that has shaped motivations, targeting countries and program priorities as well as modalities, which outweigh economic priorities. Further, the strategic approaches of the aid program can be observed in the countries and program priorities implemented by member countries (Young, 2015, p. 45), including Indonesia. Despite the generous amount of aid given and the different philosophical grounds of the donor and recipient countries, the relevant aid mechanism links humanitarian and foreign aid within the foreign policy agendas of these countries. In addition to giving aid grants and humanitarian support, OPEC countries provide in-kind oil, program support and training program (Young, 2015). The financing mechanism in Islam should be based on solidarity, including in the context of its *Shariah* banking system, in which charging interest is prohibited and capital gains from loans should be provided as specific funds, including for humanitarian aid (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2003; Shushan & Marcoux, 2011).

Despite the strong Islamic ethical and political notions, the aim of OPEC countries is to create alliances and stronger ties with recipient countries. Thus, the solidarity notion of aid in the Islamic aid system recognised by OPEC countries has become its moral value shared with other Southern countries. The present-day interpretation of the norms of *Zakat*<sup>32</sup> and *Fitrah*<sup>33</sup> have also shaped and motivated aid-giving within these belief systems based on the *Wakaf*<sup>34</sup> (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2003, p. 29). However, the Islamic modality and institution of giving has been fragmented based on the Arab empire's policy needs and has divided the giving culture as well. For example, the Qatar Fund for Development institutionalised its aid

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<sup>31</sup> *Hadith* is the actions and judgments of the Prophet that guide Muslim practices (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2003).

<sup>32</sup> *Zakat* comes from the verb *Zaka*, or purification, and is a moral value in the act of giving. By offering wealth, one has purified oneself to confine their self-interest and greed and solidify others' grief (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2003).

<sup>33</sup> *Fitrah* is the requirement to give a small amount to the needy at the end of *Ramadhan* (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2003).

<sup>34</sup> *Wakaf*, or *waqf*, is the Islamic historical religious foundation that motivated *zakat* and shaped the institutions that were equivalent to charitable foundations or *hubs* (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2003).

agency to be a modern organisation in line with international aid mechanisms, but it is also derived from its bureaucratic political needs (Lestra, 2017, p. 89). Throughout this period, the expansion of OPEC countries and other Southern countries using philosophical notions of cooperation was relevant to the countries' evolution and the re-emergence actors onto the world stage of development cooperation.

### **Re-emergence of Southern Donor Countries**

In early 2000, Jim O'Neill from Goldman Sachs Asset Management introduced the BRICS terminology to identify Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as newly emerging power countries. This identification was widely debated because these rising global powers had also been re-established as donor countries with expansive aid and development cooperation portfolios (Armijo, 2007; Mielniczuk, 2013; Wilson & Purushothaman, 2003). As a result of the similar historical narrative of the Southern countries, and despite differences in their domestic politics and economic systems, these countries took the debate seriously. The idea of grouping initiatives cannot be separated from the initial discussion in 2003 between the Foreign Ministers Summit of India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA)<sup>35</sup> to form trilateral relations. Although the countries discussed the possibility of expanding their cooperation within a formal setting, the complexity of the trilateral relationship could not be avoided (Vieira & Alden, 2011, p. 508). The performances of IBSA have been analysed within their strategic position in global development cooperation—especially in relation to attaining more bargaining relations in international organisations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF)—to facilitate increasing competition among Southern countries (Nel & Taylor, 2013; Vieira & Alden, 2011). However, their intention and roles in navigating power relations and facilitating regional cooperation within neighbouring countries and among other Southern countries were questioned. For example, competition with other Southern countries (including China) concerning trade and economic opportunities and political influence in Africa led to scepticism of the group's legitimacy and partnerships (Vieira & Alden, 2011, p. 508).

Then, the institutionalisation of BRIC was first discussed and consolidated in 2006 as a political group (Mielniczuk, 2013, p. 1075). In 2009, BRIC as a structure was formalised as an emerging

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<sup>35</sup> Ministerial meetings were conducted in New Delhi (2004, 2007 and 2008), Cape Town (2005), Rio de Janeiro (2006) and Brasilia (2009). Summits were held in Brasilia (2006 and 2010), Pretoria (2007) and New Delhi (2008) (Vieira & Alden, 2011).

economic grouping in global cooperation at its first annual summit of leaders in Yekaterinburg in Russia (Mielniczuk, 2013; Stuenkel, 2014). In 2011, when Jacob Zuma, President of South Africa, was invited to the BRIC Summit in 2011, South Africa joined its membership and the IBSA's agenda continued through BRICS (Mielniczuk, 2013; Vieira & Alden, 2011). The discussion then revolved around the international roles of BRICS and its position within the global development debate (Mielniczuk, 2013; Muhr, 2016). The debate focused on the influence of BRICS in global economics (Armijo, 2007; Bond, 2016; Ünay, 2013; Wilson & Purushothaman, 2003), as BRICS has conveyed different political and economic dimensions in global development cooperation (Armijo, 2007; Bond, 2016; Ünay, 2013; Wilson & Purushothaman, 2003). The significant increase in the economic growth of Southern countries—especially China—has also led to debates on the countries' capacity to expand their aid budgets to contribute within the wider development cooperation program (Mawdsley, 2012a; Mawdsley, Savage, & Kim, 2014).

Despite the establishment of BRICS as a global institution, the setting of cooperation still worked within the countries' government priorities and did not necessarily depend on the structure of global development cooperation. The debates were structured in two settings: the modalities of cooperation, which stimulated the amount of aid given; and the motivations to give, including how they reflected the state's aid policy within the cooperation (Mawdsley, 2019; Mielniczuk, 2013). These two notions also affected the dynamics of internal BRICS countries and led to competition within state institutions that had divergent approaches to cooperation (Muhr, 2016, p. 636). Further, their economic power led to the establishment of development banks to support other developing countries (e.g., the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – AIIB initiated by China) and to obtain support from other global economic countries (Bond, 2016; Reisen, 2015; Wang, 2017).

The expansion of Southern institutional roles beyond BRICS as a group shows that the setting of Southern cooperation evolved within the global development context. This led to studies of Southern countries other than BRICS. There was a discussion regarding the emergence of a second layer of Southern countries, including Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa (CIVETS) (Guerra-Barón & Méndez, 2015; Yi, Qi, & Wu, 2013). The economic discussion then expanded as a result of other emerging economies such as Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey (MINT) (BBC, 2014; Elliott, 2014). However, these groups did not move

beyond their abbreviation because no institutional settings or formal forums were formed. For example, economic explorations of Southern countries were conducted on how each country performed, but not as a donor country (Durotoye, 2014, p. 105). Debates regarding the groupings of Southern countries show diverse approaches to what Southern countries recognise and develop within their SSC policy. This highlights the unique features of Southern countries and helps analyse the modalities and motivations perceived in their position in global cooperation.

The single-country approach to SSC shows that China's model is one among many, and the country is widely considered the leading country in SSC (Bräutigam, 2011; Hsu, 2015; Kilby, 2017a; Lancaster, 2007). China's model of aid cooperation tends more towards concessional loans, including zero-interest loans and grants through projects, cash transfers and training (Bräutigam, 2011; Bräutigam & Xiaoyang, 2012; Hsu, 2015; Woods, 2008). China's aid is differentiated from that of other OECD–DAC countries because it applies loose conditionality. It has not imposed development strategies on donors' political needs, and it conducts direct bilateral negotiations with local governments regarding their needs using a specific approach to infrastructure projects (Bräutigam, 2011; Lin & Wang, 2017a). Given the significant financial resources required to support China's economic and aid cooperation, combined with the strong drive of the state's political ideology based on Zhou Enlai's peaceful coexistence, China's roles in SSC and in global development cooperation have expanded beyond the aid modalities debates (Kilby, 2017a, 2018; Lin & Wang, 2017a). Each Southern country has different state philosophical orientations; therefore, the features of China's model of aid cooperation cannot be generalised to other Southern countries.

Despite being rejected by leading emerging Southern donors, including China (Eyben & Savage, 2013; Kilby, 2018; Mawdsley, Savage, & Kim, 2014), the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation document (or the Busan Outcome Document) noted that SSC complements North–South cooperation (OECD, 2011a). The Busan High-Level Meeting in 2011 followed the 2005 Paris meeting, which established the Paris Declaration, and the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008 was enacted to bring about significant change in how OECD–DAC members delivered their aid. Although the content of SSC had been widely discussed before the 2000s, the Task Team on SSC (TT–SSC) of the OECD–DAC was only established in 2008 and

was hosted by the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF).<sup>36</sup> The Task Team was established 30 years after Southern countries had first been identified in the OECD–DAC’s Chairman’s reports in 1972, and it aimed to bring SSC under the umbrella of the DAC (OECD–DAC, 1972–1981). Clauses in the Busan Outcome Document were expected to improve connections between South and North partners, despite the debates that emerged (Eyben & Savage, 2013; Mawdsley, Savage & Kim, 2014). Given the different ideological stances of the North and South in relation to the meaning of aid in development cooperation, the debate over aid and development continued to evolve beyond the contestation of international development institutions.

### **Politics of South–South Cooperation Post-2015**

Post-2015 is significant in debates regarding Southern countries and their institutional advancement, which drives how the functions and opportunities of Southern cooperation are perceived in global development and how the countries have developed their own structures to surpass Northern cooperation (Mawdsley, 2015, 2019). For example, the AIIB, which was established by the Chinese Government in 2014, has stimulated debate regarding how it has contested existing multilateral development banks, including the ADB with its leading country of Japan, and the World Bank with the leading country being the US (Andersen, Hansen, & Markussen, 2006; Hamanaka, 2016; Wang, 2017). Membership of the AIIB consists of countries beyond BRICS, including other Southern countries and European, Pacific and Latin American countries. The establishment of the AIIB is linked to the current SSC framework, as justified by Lin and Wang’s (2017a, p. 136) argument on the need for a beyond-Keynesian framework by expanding the state’s role to the global level of the structural adjustment program in infrastructure. The infrastructure model of cooperation has also expanded to ‘One Belt, One Road’ (i.e., one Silk Road economic belt and one Maritime Silk Road) across Asia. This program refers to the ideology of a shared prosperity vision based on Zhou Enlai’s peaceful coexistence and the moral vision of Confucianism (Kilby, 2017a; Lin & Wang, 2017a). These cooperation frameworks and their philosophical foundations underpin the policy of the state in SSC and international cooperation. Thus, the discussion leads to how Southern

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<sup>36</sup> The Task Team on South–South Cooperation at a Glance (<http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/45539861.pdf> [accessed 2 January 2019]).

countries form their SSC policy within state philosophy to identify themselves in their relations with other countries, which will be discussed in the case of Indonesia in Chapter 3.

The emergence of the AIIB and the increase in Southern countries' financial capacity have led to debates on current approaches to foreign aid structure. More Northern donor countries are using Southern methods of cooperation and narratives in their aid programs, including mutual benefit and win–win cooperation (Mawdsley, 2018, p. 175). The massive expansion of Southern countries, which has resulted in economic and trade agendas as well as infrastructure programs, has returned the debate to the similarity of the old model of traditional donors (Mawdsley, 2018, p. 175). Consequently, Southern approaches and narratives of aid have become more blended with Northern countries' approaches, and vice versa, highlighting the debate regarding the politics of development relations (Mawdsley, 2018, 2019). The expansion and visibility of Southern countries have also challenged and stimulated competition with traditional donors (Chaturvedi, 2017; Horner, 2016; Mawdsley, 2019; Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018; Ray & Kamal, 2019). As a result of the creation of the AIIB, debates on Global South institutions have also included Southern-led development banks that were previously less well known, including the Islamic Development Bank, the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the Development Bank of Latin America (Ray & Kamal, 2019, p. 192). Although each has unique institutional settings and approaches, the model of cooperation recognises horizontal relations and focuses on the representation of its member states, which brings different dimensions to development cooperation (Mawdsley, 2019; Ray & Kamal, 2019). This points to issues of selection, which have stimulated further debates on Southern countries' options in financing their development programs from multiple entities and institutions.

The modalities of Southern state institutions have also expanded and developed based on the countries' needs and their ability to remain relevant within an internal institutional setting and global development cooperation (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; De Renzio & Seifert, 2014). The manifestation of Southern countries' institutions and approaches that are more substantial has led to debates on the structure and motivations perceived by the country, as they will be varied and different. The diverse setting of domestic institutions, as well as the mechanism and approaches to Southern development cooperation, is also stimulated by how Southern governments prioritise their development cooperation within their foreign and

internal domestic policies. Therefore, the next chapter will further examine the case of Indonesia in relation to how the history and evolution of its SSC expands beyond the Southern narrative of solidarity and its pragmatic approach to Southern cooperation.

## **Conclusion**

The historical exploration in this chapter showed how the idea of giving combined with the content of cooperation has evolved and been articulated within the timeline of the Southern development context. This notion aligns with Weber's (1949, p. 22) argument that historical experiences can provide direction to current empirical work. The history of aid and development cannot be separated from the relations between and among Northern and Southern countries and within international aid institutions, which have continued to evolve. Relationships and cooperation are also shaped within the political, social, economic and cultural spheres of domestic and international settings. Therefore, Southern donor countries have specific features and experiences in their aid relations that differ from those of Northern countries, and from which they have derived particular approaches to cooperation. This has led to debates on the social relations of aid, which raises questions of how to distinguish Northern and Southern cooperation in the current global setting of aid relations and whether there is a specific pattern that links Southern countries in the cooperation that has evolved.

In general, aid relations have affected the idea and process of giving and sharing, leading to debates on perceived effectiveness in achieving overall development agendas (Easterly & Pfütze, 2008; Riddell, 2007). Countries experience and are influenced by different processes of aid relations and development that affect how their aid policies are shaped. These cannot be neglected, and they are not always persuasive and linear. However, the main contents that are reflected and that have reappeared in debates regarding Southern cooperation relate to the nature of representation and equal opportunities, which are symbolised and institutionalised within development cooperation, as explored further in Chapter 4 and Chapter 8. The content of Southern cooperation gives different meanings to the content of aid effectiveness as perceived by traditional donors. Southern relations are politically constructed within various models of cooperation and experiences that are established not only to provide spaces to challenge the global development agenda and hegemony, but also to expand Southern cooperation within the state's own approaches and agendas. Therefore,

the idea of giving in SSC is continuously evolving and being reshaped within international dynamic structures of global development cooperation and domestic political contestation, as experienced by Indonesia and explored in the next chapter.

## Chapter 3 Bandung Conference and the Footprints of Indonesia's Development Cooperation

### Introduction

As examined in the previous chapter, the history of South–South Cooperation (SSC) has been constructed by the state in its domestic approaches and foreign policy narratives to development. The evolution of SSC cannot be separated from the roles of Southern leaders, the state's ideology and institutions in deriving the development agendas linked with SSC policy. To further examine the significance of state philosophies to foreign policy and regional Southern cooperation, Indonesia's historical narratives of the Bandung Conference are important in analysing the meaning of SSC. The meaning of SSC cannot be separated from Indonesia's identity and narratives on development cooperation, as reflected in its bilateral and regional cooperation with other Southern countries and its relations with traditional donor countries. The challenge for Indonesia in SSC is how to maintain a balance between domestic development policy and the expansion of the idea of giving and receiving in its development cooperation. This chapter will explore the footprint of Indonesia's development cooperation, which is reflected in the timeline of Indonesia's leaders and their political approaches to development policies. It will also explore the effect of the state's ideology in directing Indonesia's SSC and development cooperation policy throughout the various periods. Further, the examination will recognise how ideology, narratives and the content of cooperation have been expanded by Indonesian leaders and how they have appeared in its development and aid relations within the contestation of global cooperation during this period.

### The Conception of Cooperation

During the time of Indonesia's independence in 1945, Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta, Indonesia's first President and Vice President respectively, developed the philosophical concepts of Indonesia's nation state. They identified the state philosophy of *Pancasila* and the foreign policy ideology of *Bebas–Aktif* (free/independent and active), which was also being developed as the foundation for Indonesia's position on external relations and within global cooperation (Hermawan & Habir, 2015; Sukma, 1995; Wicaksana, 2016). The conception of *Pancasila* as Indonesia's nation state cannot be separated from the sociocultural context of

Indonesia, especially the Javanese culture that was strongly embedded in its leaders,<sup>37</sup> which will be explored further in Chapter 4. Nonetheless, Indonesian foreign relations should be contextualised within the *Bebas–Aktif* ideology, which directed not only the positions and relations of Indonesian leaders with other countries, but also its bureaucrats, in developing related foreign policies and relations based on Indonesia’s philosophical stands and development needs.

These national philosophical stands became an important framework to understand the agency of Indonesia as a state, as well as bureaucrats’ positions in developing the country’s conception of SSC within national and foreign policies. The agency of the state refers to the capacity and the roles played by the state in directing issues on SSC that affect internal policy and are related to international norms (Mawdsley, 2012a, as cited in Alden et al., 2010). The concept of agency identified in this thesis captures the roles, capacity and significance of state apparatuses, especially bureaucrats, in forming SSC into development policy and global cooperation. According to Giddens (1979, pp. 2–3), the agency of the state relates to how the people that run the state—in this case, leaders and bureaucrats—are related to the specific actions of a subject and situated within a specific time and space of actions within the government. Therefore, how the state constitutes its position in SSC can be explored throughout the historical timeline, which is reflected in the leaders’ roles. The agency of the state also needs to be captured, especially in the social interactions that affect the national and global structures of development cooperation as played out by bureaucrats as policymakers in more recent SSC development.

As identified by Engel (2017, 2019), Indonesia’s SSC timeline can be divided into three stages: SSC from the independence era to Sukarno; SSC under the New Order until the post-Soeharto regime; and the re-emergence of SSC. However, this chapter expands the analysis from these three stages and identifies Indonesia’s SSC history in five phases. These stages are expected to explore the narratives, policy and positions of Indonesia during each presidency within its national political conditions, including the evolution of its relations with Southern and Northern donors. The identification and exploration of these five stages of the historical

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<sup>37</sup> This was despite the fact that many leaders/policymakers from other ethnic groups were involved in the process.

narrative are also structured and shaped within the evolution of the idea of giving, sharing and receiving in Indonesian SSC and its development cooperation, which mimics the SSC timeline identified in Chapter 2. The first stage is the evolution of giving, which began in Indonesia before the post-independence era, whereby the processes of giving and receiving were acknowledged as political tools to support the anti-colonial idea of solidarity and as part of the foreign policy narrative with its nationalistic view (Hatta, 1953; Mawdsley, 2012a; Winanti & Alvian, 2019). The second stage is the Bandung Conference, which made the idea of SSC important but struggled to translate the narratives into real action within the context of cooperation during the Soekarno era (Engel, 2017, 2019; Eyben, 2013). In the third stage, the Soeharto New Order shaped Indonesia's regional position, including through the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) and its dynamic relations with traditional donors (Acharya, 2014; Engel, 2017, 2019; Hermawan & Habir, 2015). The fourth stage is the transitional era of post-reformation and post-Asian Financial Crisis to the era of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Acharya, 2015; Engel, 2017, 2019). The fifth stage is the expansion of Indonesia's international and global development roles that defined its political cooperation, including restructuring the narrative and institution of SSC during Joko Widodo's presidency (Acharya, 2015; Engel, 2017, 2019; Rosyidin, 2017; Sato & Santikajaya, 2019).

### **The Notion of Giving, Nationalism and the Fight for Independence**

As explored in Chapter 2, the relations of Southern countries (including Indonesia) with other countries in the region can be traced back to the eighth century. Around the ninth century, relations in the Southern hemisphere, especially among kingdoms, had already been established in the Indian Ocean region<sup>38</sup> and had been shaped through both cooperation and conflict. Archaeological artefacts show significant relations between *Sriwijaya* in Indonesia and *Chola* in India through the process of exchange.<sup>39</sup> Cooperation was not only built through trade cooperation, but also through political expansion and other non-material processes—for example, through the spread of India's cultural and religious ideas throughout the

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<sup>38</sup> During this period, the region acknowledged as the 'Maritime Silk Road' connected kingdoms and countries in the locations now known as India, China, Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, including Indonesia and Singapore (Kulke, Kesavapany, & Sakhuja, 2009).

<sup>39</sup> One significant finding was the contribution of King *Balaputradewa* from *Sriwijaya* Kingdom, who built a Buddhist school or monastery in Nalanda, India, as part of his religious obligation. This religious act of giving led to the creation of social relations within the *Chola* Kingdom in 860 AD that existed beyond the context of trade and politics (Susanti, 2009).

Indonesian archipelago (Agung, 1973; Kulke, Kesavapany, & Sakhuja, 2009; Van Niel, 1963). India's influence on Indonesia's culture and religion can still be seen in temples' relicts and artefacts, as well as Indonesia's ethnic culture and belief system.

The expansion of the Indonesian Kingdoms of *Sriwijaya* and *Majapahit* had raised Hinduism and Buddhism as the main religions since at least the 12<sup>th</sup> century, before their decline with the rise of Islam in the 15<sup>th</sup> century (Susanti, 2018; Wanandi, 2002). Buddhism<sup>40</sup> and Hinduism<sup>41</sup> left profound religious teachings in the society, which assimilated with local religious beliefs in animism (Susanti, 2018). With the restraint and peaceful extension of Islam through trade since the 12<sup>th</sup> century and with the conversion of *Majapahit's* King into Islam, Islamic teaching became more accepted in society, including with its flexible acculturation of the teaching with animism, Hinduism and Buddhism (Wanandi, 2002). As mentioned in Chapter 2, Islamic teaching notes the importance of giving based on *Hadith* in the *Quran*. This dogma has continued being the basis of practices in Indonesian Muslim society. Further, two major Muslim groups established in the early 1900s of *Muhammadiyah* (in 1912) and *Nahdatul Ulama* (in 1926) have provided references to the teaching of Islam in Indonesia (Wanandi, 2002). Despite the different goals of purifying the teaching of Islam of these two groups, its interpretation of *Zakat* as the moral value of giving remains similar and important as a religious practice.

During the colonial era, cooperation with India had expanded since the beginning of Indonesian political leaders' campaign for independence from the Dutch in the 1940s (Agung, 1973; Kahin, 1952). Relations with India were also established based on the idea of anti-colonialism, for instance, as discussed between Hatta and Nehru when they were students in the Netherlands/Holland.<sup>42</sup> The personal relations stimulated further cooperation between the two countries, especially in the context of the struggle for independence and nationalism,

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<sup>40</sup> Buddhism's soteriological goals of *Dana* conceptualise the importance of giving with pure intention to be properly conducted as a precondition for rebirth as a human being (Egge, 2002, p.1).

<sup>41</sup> *Daan* teaching in Hinduism focuses on the act of giving selflessly, with the Hindu scripture *Bhagavad Gita* highlighting that 'there should be no motive and no aim in charity directly or indirectly' (Meier & Murphy, 2011, p. 7).

<sup>42</sup> As most Indonesian political leaders and elites were educated in Holland, including Hatta and Ali Sastroamidjojo, the influence of Western political thought reflected in the framework of nationalism, civil liberty and democratic ideas (Kahin, 1952). Hatta was the first Indonesian Vice President and Sastroamidjojo was the Prime Minister from 1953 to 1956. Both contributed to the Indonesian independence movement and post-independence government.

as both had experienced colonisation in their countries (Agung, 1973; Kahin, 1952). Further, the idea of a nation state was nurtured by Indonesian political leaders and elites with a Western-educated and multilingual background, who envisioned an outward-looking cosmopolitan orientation to foreign cooperation during the independence era (Hermawan & Habir, 2015, p. 179, as cited in Elson, 2012).

During the campaign for independence, and to gain *de facto* status through international negotiations with the Dutch, the Indonesian Government sent special envoys to several countries, including India, to obtain acknowledgement for its *de jure* position. In a symbolic gesture to gain international recognition for Indonesia's independence, 500 tonnes of rice aid were sent to India (MOFA, 2019; UNDP, 2015; Winanti & Alvian, 2019). At that time, India faced similar political problems with British colonisation in 1946, so both countries (India and Indonesia) agreed gaining its independence by building alliances with other countries. Therefore, in return, India sent clothes, medicine, machine and food to Indonesia in 1946 as part of a reciprocal act of giving to achieve wider international recognition (Agung, 1973; MOFA, 2019). This symbolic act was intended to build alliances and cooperation to support each other's political situation. The reciprocal act was also identified as part of a social movement of self-determination among Southern countries as a way of breaking colonialism and other global hegemony. Further, the shared ideological notions of anti-colonialism between the two countries led to discussions and meetings that introduced the Southern solidarity narrative, which was extended to relations among Southern countries, as discussed in Chapter 2. In addition to this, to expand cooperation with other Southern countries, a diplomatic relationship with China was established in 1950 and this continued with the signing of its trade agreement in 1953 in Beijing (Sinaga, 2018, p. 2). This relation led to an aid relation where Indonesia received aid from China that will be discussed further.

Relations with Western countries cannot be separated from Indonesia's campaign to achieve independence from the Dutch from 1945 onwards. In the post-independence era, relations with the Dutch were structured from one negotiation forum to another, with the aim of achieving a solid agreement regarding reparations for damage and exploitation during the Dutch colonial era. These led to relations with the US and other Western donors to reach a consensus on providing aid to Indonesia, in-line with the Marshall Plan created for Europe post-World War II. One of the first instalments of the agreed peace agreement between

Indonesia and the Dutch was to finance Indonesian infrastructure development, textile industries and rice projects taken from the Dutch's Marshall aid allocation of US\$100 million (Hindley, 1963; Van Der Eng, 1988). However, the situation did not work out as planned. The negotiation process with Indonesia often resulted in a deadlock, with no common terms agreed, and there were also internal problems in the Dutch and Indonesian governments. The Dutch were pressured by the US to withdraw from Indonesia in 1949 if it wanted to be granted more meaningful access to Marshall Plan funds (Agung, 1973; Kahin, 1952; Van Der Eng, 1988). Given the US's interest in keeping Indonesia away from communism, part of the agreement with the Dutch involved soft loans to Indonesia to rebuild the agriculture and textile sectors using a total of 4.9 billion guilders or US\$53 million (Hindley, 1963; Van Der Eng, 1988).

The roles of these two major powers of the Western and Eastern countries in Indonesia's political and economic development undeniably affected the government's development policy agenda. This was connected to the continuing debate on aid and dependency that affected Indonesia's foreign policy platform (Riddell, 2007; Weinstein, 1976). The paradox of foreign aid is that it is often politically directed by leaders to justify the act of receiving for political and economic agendas (Riddell, 2007; Weinstein, 1976). For the Indonesian Government, building a new country post-independence was costly; thus, the idea of funding its development from foreign aid was placed on the agenda despite the recognition of dependency and independency notions (Abdulgani, 1957; Agung, 1973; Nesadurai, 2005; Weinstein, 1976). In 1950, the Korean War affected the price of raw materials as well as the world economy, including the value of the Dutch currency, which affected the amount of Dutch aid to Indonesia and its political commitment. Thus, Indonesia's economic recovery through aid support<sup>43</sup> during 1949–1961 was reinforced by Western countries and institutions such as the US, West Germany, France, Australia,<sup>44</sup> Canada and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with total aid of US\$1540 million, and by Eastern European countries such as the USSR, East Germany, Hungary and Poland, with total aid of US\$1,043 million (Hindley, 1963; Moon, 2009; Van Der Eng, 1988). This is an example of foreign aid being politically directed by donor leaders to justify the adoption of their political and economic agendas (Riddell, 2007;

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<sup>43</sup> The aid included loans, gifts and agricultural supplies, as well as a military support program (Van Der Eng, 1988).

<sup>44</sup> Australia gave through the Colombo Plan, which Indonesia joined in 1953 (Hindley, 1963).

Weinstein, 1976). This was also the beginning of long and winding relations of foreign aid between the Indonesian Government and Northern donors, which were constructed and framed within Indonesia's political and development policy.

### **Bandung and its Implications for Indonesia's Development Cooperation**

The preparatory meetings and conferences in the lead-up to the Bandung Conference, as explored in Chapter 2, were important for Southern leaders because it enabled the leaders to establish a position within global cooperation. The Asian–African Conference (AAC), as it is also known, became the leading international event of the time and was a diplomatic apex that put nationalism and anti-colonialism from Southern perspectives on the global map (Jansen, 1966; Shimazu, 2014; Wicaksana, 2016). For Indonesia's leaders at that time, the Bandung Conference signified their effort to position Asian and African countries between the two major powers with the notions of anti-colonialism (Hermawan & Habir, 2015; Wicaksana, 2016). The leadership and strong articulation of Soekarno in his opening speech conveyed the substantial content of the Bandung Conference, as reflected in the resulting documents and the Bandung principles, which further stimulated the nationalist movement among the Southern countries (GOI, 1955b; Wicaksana, 2016). Hatta's philosophical stance on Indonesia's foreign policy also provided a substantial foundation for the content of the Bandung Conference (Hermawan & Habir, 2015, p. 179). Both of these Indonesian leaders, as well as other Southern leaders, developed and expanded the narratives of Southern development cooperation, including perspectives on nationalism, solidarity, equality and neutrality, beyond Asian–African cooperation.

After the Bandung Conference, the Indonesian Government began providing support to other Southern countries. Along with China, Indonesia sent its first peacekeeping mission of 590 military personnel to Egypt during the Suez Crisis in 1956 (MOFA, 2019). For Indonesia, the action was part of the solidarity spirit among Asian and African countries—especially with Egypt, which was the first country to acknowledge Indonesia's independence (Abdulgani, 1957; Agensky & Barker, 2012; Agung, 1973). Technical cooperation from Indonesia to other Southern countries began in 1960, when the Indonesian Government signed an agreement with the Guinea Government for an exchange of experts (Engel, 2016 referred to Hindley, 1963, p. 110). However, the reciprocal aid agreements seemed to be more about the

symbolism of Indonesia's political and national identity rather than projecting power relations or financial capacity. At that time, the idea of giving remained subsidiary in comparison with the notion of political identity of nationalism and Southern solidarity within the Indonesian Government's foreign policy agenda.

Comparably, Indonesia's development cooperation with Southern countries continued to flourish, including by receiving aid from China in the form of credit of US\$15 million in 1956, a loan of US\$20 million in 1958 and a loan of US\$30 million in 1961 (Hindley, 1963, p. 108). The Indonesian Government also received a significant amount of aid from the 'non-aligned' countries after 1955, especially from Yugoslavia, Saudi Arabia and India (Hindley, 1963; Mawdsley, 2012a). Despite receiving aid from other Western countries throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the amount of aid from communist bloc countries increased significantly and made Indonesia the largest recipient outside the Soviet bloc. Cooperation between Indonesia and the Soviet Union also evolved—for example, with the signing of the first trade agreement and numerous aid programs, including building the national sports complex of *Gelora Bung Karno* in Jakarta in preparation for Indonesia to host the 1962 Asian Games (Mawdsley, 2012a; Moon, 2009; Murphy, 2009). These relationships were built upon President Soekarno's views, which leaned towards the communist group in the late 1950s (Bunnell, 1966; Murphy, 2009; Tan, 2007). Therefore, cooperation with China's Zhou Enlai cannot be separated from the closeness of Indonesia's Soekarno with the Communist Party in Indonesia (Agung, 1973; Bunnell, 1966).

This resulted in a meaningful friendship between the two leaders, which shaped alliances during Soekarno's Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*) in the early 1960s (Bunnell, 1966; Ricklefs, 2008). Soekarno's nationalist ideology, which leaned towards the Communist Party, also challenged relations with other Asian and African countries, including India and other Muslim Southern countries, and affected Indonesia's relationships with Northern donors (Weinstein, 1965, 1976). For example, relations between Soekarno and Nehru were challenged by Indonesia's growing relations with China and the Eastern bloc in the early 1950s, and by Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia in the 1960s (Abraham, 2008; Agung, 1973; Hindley, 1963; Shekhar, 2018; Weinstein, 1976). Further, to balance the geopolitical influences, the US offered Soekarno economic aid under the condition that Indonesia needed

to follow the IMF's economic plan<sup>45</sup> (Murphy, 2009, p. 67). However, the aid program did not go as planned, including its intention to influence Soekarno's political agenda. This led to Soekarno's famous reaction and statement of 'Go to hell with your aid', as he wanted the US to leave Indonesia, and he accused that the US had dictated Indonesia's economic and political reforms agendas in the early 1960s (Hill, 1996; Murphy, 2009).

Soekarno's notion of Southern nationalism remained rhetorical, without a clear implementation strategy for a Southern relations program, but rather building on an aggressive rhetoric of 'Confrontation' (Bunnell, 1966, p. 39). Given Soekarno's strong intention in his political narrative on nation-building, human resources appeared to be the biggest problem in producing and implementing an SSC program. This paradox navigated Indonesian policy towards countries that appeared to align with Soekarno's policy and political agenda. For example, the confrontation with Malaysia and Soekarno's closeness to the Communist Party shaped Indonesia's foreign policy, which led to the idea of the establishment of NEFOS, or New Emerging Force. Further, Indonesia left the UN in 1965 as a result of the confrontation (*Konfrontasi*) with Malaysia in 1963 and its rejection of Malaysia's appointment as a member of the Security Council (Bunnell, 1966; Livingstone, 1965; Shekhar, 2018). This led to the establishment of the Conference on New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) by Soekarno as an institutional framework to compete with the UN (Tan, 2007; Weinstein, 1965). Soekarno expected to establish CONEFO with support from China to compete with the UN and the old established forces (OLDEFOS), promising a new way of cooperating (Bunnell, 1966; Engel, 2017; Hadiwinata, 2008). However, the institution did not expand beyond the expectation, as it was only supported by some countries, including China. Thus, Soekarno's nationalism ideological viewpoint affected the dynamic and content of Indonesia's foreign policy, including relations with other Southern countries, which extended beyond the Bandung Spirits until the end of his presidency.

### **The New Order of Soeharto: Non-Aligned Movement, Technical Cooperation and Debt**

In the early part of President Soeharto's New Order regime, the government prioritised building stronger alliances with Western countries through their aid programs. Soeharto also

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<sup>45</sup> The amount of US aid was US\$545 million between November 1949 and the end of 1961, compared with Soviet and East European aid, which was US\$593.7 million in economic loans and US\$450 million for arms purchases since 1955 (Hindley, 1963; Mawdsley, 2012a).

tried to limit cooperation with China, which still had a strong connection with the Indonesian Communist Party. Further, Indonesia supported the establishment of a regional cooperation institution through the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was established in 1967 to align Soeharto's political interest in regionalism with the country's foreign policy priorities (Engel, 2017; Murphy, 2009; Shekhar, 2018). Soeharto's government shifted its policy on the SSC program to focus more on regional cooperation and its development policy to support its own national economic recovery program. However, through participation in NAM and UN forums, the government responded to the establishment of the technical cooperation framework laid out in the Buenos Aires Plan of Actions (BAPA) for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries in 1978.

In 1981, the government started to focus again on SSC and established the Indonesia Technical Cooperation Program (ITCP), or *Kerjasama Teknik antar Negara Berkembang*. This program was institutionalised through the Coordinating Committee of International Cooperation under the Cabinet Secretariat (currently State Secretariat), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Finance, and it was enacted by Presidential Decree no. 60/1981 (Engel, 2017; Hosono, 2018; Muhibat, 2016), with the aim of supporting SSC activities and institution. Indonesian technical cooperation involved cooperation with the Asia, Africa and Pacific regions through training programs, exchange of experts and study visits (Engel, 2017, p. 162). The implementation details remained unknown to the public, but it was managed by the ITCP and implemented by related ministries, including some support through Triangular Cooperation,<sup>46</sup> including the first with JICA in 1982 (Engel, 2017; JICA, 2013). The narrative of Indonesia's SSC was reiterated as technical cooperation based on the needs and interests of Southern countries in global development (CEACOS UI, 2010). However, SSC still made limited contributions to the country's development cooperation discourse and its national development policy.

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<sup>46</sup> UNOSSC defined Triangular Cooperation as activities involving collaboration between Southern countries and traditional donors or multilateral agencies through funding, training, management and technology support in Southern cooperation platforms (<https://www.unsouthsouth.org/about/about-sstc/> [accessed 22 March 2019]). The OECD–DAC described Triangular Cooperation as building complementary partnerships through horizontal coalitions that support South–South and North–South Cooperation within the specific context of knowledge and multi-stakeholder participation (<http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/triangular-cooperation.htm> [accessed 22 March 2019]).

After its establishment in 1961 at the Belgrade Summit, where Indonesia also became its founding country, throughout the 1970s and 1980s the NAM provided economic, social and cultural assistance to its members that was based on their needs and free from external influence (Abraham, 2008; Hermawan & Habir, 2015; NAM, 1961; Schaufelbuehl, Janick, Bott, Hanhimäki, & Wyss, 2015; Sukma, 1995). The NAM became a forum of exchange that highlighted economic and technical cooperation among non-aligned countries that facilitated countries' interests and liberation from world hegemony (Kumar, 1983, pp. 449–450). In the mid-1980s, President Soeharto began showing interest in the Asian–African movement by campaigning to be the NAM's chairman to restore the image of Indonesia as a founding country of the organisation (Sukma, 1995, p. 313). However, Soeharto's intention to lead the NAM was not supported by other NAM countries (e.g., India) (Sukma, 1995; Suryadinata, 1996).

Through long diplomatic and negotiation processes, in 1992, President Soeharto was finally elected as the chairman of the NAM. Indonesia's determination to lead the NAM was considered part of Soeharto's goal to play a more significant role in international affairs, especially in terms of tackling developing countries' problems by building stronger economic relations with industrial nations (Fels, 2017; Murphy, 2009; Sukma, 1995; Suryadinata, 1996). The NAM conference in 1992 issued the Jakarta messages, which highlighted the importance of establishing economic and development cooperation, including inclusive and non-confrontational approaches to cooperation among member countries to shape a new world order (Hermawan & Habir, 2015; Suryadinata, 1996). Following the NAM's 1992 conference, Soeharto represented NAM countries at the UN General Assembly. In his speech, Soeharto reiterated Soekarno's speech of 1960 on the importance of restructuring the UN Security Council and accommodating emerging economies such as Indonesia as members of the council (Suryadinata, 1996).

Soeharto took the NAM leadership seriously by initiating a South–North dialogue with Japan and the US at the G7 meeting in 1993 (Hermawan & Habir, 2015; Smith, 2000; Suryadinata, 1996). In 1995, Indonesia hosted the fortieth anniversary celebrations of the AAC as a joint event with the NAM Ministerial Meeting, which will be discussed further in Chapter 4. The outcome of the conference led to the expansion of SSTC with other Northern donors and within Indonesia's targeted activities. To commemorate this event, the Indonesian

Government initiated the establishment of the NAM Centre for South–South Technical Cooperation (NAM–CSSTC) in Jakarta (NAM-CSSTC, 2019). The centre aimed to promote and accelerate development in developing and underdeveloped countries—especially members of the NAM. After the end of the Cold War, NAM member countries questioned the NAM’s position and relevance in world politics (Suryadinata, 1996). However, Indonesia believed in its significance in voicing the importance of economic cooperation, especially among developing countries, rather than political matters (Hermawan & Habir, 2015; Suryadinata, 1996). As an institution, the NAM has brought meaning to developing countries, especially by facilitating development and raising other economic issues among Southern countries in international forums, including inviting China to a NAM meeting in 2000 (Kilby, 2017a, p. 22).

Further, the New Order in the Soeharto era introduced a different narrative to North–South relations. Soeharto attempted to restore relations and gain more financial access to Western donors that were at risk during the end of Soekarno’s Guided Democracy era (Hindley, 1963; Murphy, 2009; Weinstein, 1976). Consequently, during Soeharto’s era, the amount of foreign assistance to Indonesia increased significantly<sup>47</sup> (Chowdhury & Sugema, 2005, p. 188). In February 1967, an international aid group for Indonesia was established, known as the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) (Anwar, 1994; Weinstein, 1976). This group was led by the Netherlands and consisted of major creditor countries and international financial organisations such as the US, European countries, the IMF and the World Bank. The relationship between IGGI and the Indonesian Government expanded and flourished until 1991. During the 1991 East Timor crisis, the chair of IGGI commented on and criticised the Indonesian Government’s policy following an East Timor demonstration and the Dili shooting incident<sup>48</sup> (Anwar, 1994; Murphy, 2009; Sukma, 1995). Hurt by the comments and criticism, the Indonesian Government dismissed the IGGI in 1992 and replaced it with the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), with the World Bank as chair of the group (Anwar, 1994; Shekhar, 2018).

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<sup>47</sup> The projection of ODA during Soeharto’s era from 1968 to 1998 was identified at US\$151 million (compilations from different sources, including national newspapers).

<sup>48</sup> The Dili incident happened in November 1991 when Indonesian soldiers opened fire on group of political demonstrators and killed thousands of people. This raised strong criticism from the Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation who was also the chair of IGGI at that time (Anwar, 1994; Murphy, 2009).

The relationship with donor agencies became stronger through the CGI, especially with the World Bank and the IMF. During this period, the government received an unconditional Trade Adjustment Loan from the World Bank, which was provided in 1987 (Chowdhury & Sugema, 2005; Mosley, Harrigan, & Toye, 1995; Murphy, 2009). This was heavily debated in Indonesia and made the country more heavily dependent on foreign assistance to fund its development program. Thus, the question of Indonesia's dependence on foreign aid became a significant debate in national political issues during Soeharto's era. The close relations between donors and the government raised many questions, especially regarding the identification of corruption issues in the government (Chowdhury & Sugema, 2005, p. 187). The conditions worsened with the Asian financial and economic crisis in the late 1990s. Conditions deteriorated again in 1997, when President Soeharto signed a bailout package with the IMF of US\$43 billion to support a structural adjustment program (Chowdhury & Sugema, 2005; Murphy, 2009). Soeharto's policy to seek IMF loans without conducting proper economic assessments caused significant national political turmoil (Grenville, 2004; Murphy, 2009). The failing Indonesian economy led to strong critiques from the public, as well as political demonstrations across the country regarding major issues such as corruption, nepotism and cronyism. These events triggered the resignation of Soeharto as president in 1998 (Freedman, 2005; Murphy, 2009; Robison & Rosser, 1998).

### **Transitioning Development Cooperation: Asian Financial Crisis to the Jakarta Commitment**

With the end of New Order regime and following the Asian Financial Crisis, Indonesia was heavily in debt and dependent on foreign assistance.<sup>49</sup> During Habibie's short presidency (1998–1999), the government was placed under immense pressure to deal with economic and political reforms including negotiating its foreign assistance and IMF bailout loans (Chowdhury & Sugema, 2005; Murphy, 2009). Several loan programs had been signed by the government, including the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) to support financial institutions system such as the banking system. However, the IMF bailout program was not classified as development assistance because it was not recorded in the state budget; rather, it was an additional fund or bailout mechanism under the Bank of Indonesia (BI) (Chowdhury & Sugema, 2005, p. 188). Therefore, conditionality attached to the IMF bailout program in support of development

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<sup>49</sup> Asian Financial Crisis in Indonesia, <https://www.indonesia-investments.com/culture/economy/asian-financial-crisis/item246> (accessed 22 May 2018).

programs cannot be justified without transparent validation to the state financial system (Chowdhury & Sugema, 2005; Suryadinata, 2004). Habibie's foreign policy also focused on the East Timor diplomatic meltdown and rebuilding international trust in Indonesia's economic conditions after the 1998 financial crisis (Fels, 2017; Nabbs-Keller, 2013). Furthermore, Indonesia's interests in developing countries' issues remained high, and the country hosted the G77 summit of developing countries in 1998 (Smith, 2000).

Throughout the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Dur, who led the country from 1999 to 2001, Indonesia's foreign policy towards developing countries, especially through the NAM, remained unchanged (Smith, 2000; Weatherbee, 2005). However, Gus Dur had an interest in building stronger relations with Middle Eastern countries and advocating Palestinian independence that included opening dialogue between Palestine and Israel (Smith, 2000). Indonesia's interest in advocating Palestine's independence continued to be voiced within the Asian–African and SSC frameworks in global forums. Following national critiques related to its aid policy program, several actions were undertaken by subsequent governments to better manage foreign assistance. For example, an aid management regulation was developed in 2000 by incorporating the aid policy and priorities into the National Development Planning Documents (Senior Official 4 [interview], 2016). Further, the domestic economic and development problems remained unresolved as a result of the Indonesian aid programs—especially the IMF program—which were widely criticised.

In relation to its aid policy, the President Megawati government (2001–2004) made the decision not to extend the IMF loan program in 2003 (Muhibat, 2016; Suryadinata, 2004) as a symbolic gesture to minimise criticism of its aid policy. However, the government still received loans from others, including from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) as well as bilateral donor agencies including Korea, Japan and European countries. During the Megawati presidency, SSC was not a priority for Indonesia's foreign policy. Her foreign policy approach was different to that of her father, Soekarno, which had focused on stronger cooperation with Southern countries. Megawati has been criticised for not being sufficiently engaged with international politics. However, she increased the number of trade agreements with the US and other Southern countries such as Pakistan, China and Thailand (CEACOS UI, 2010). Megawati's foreign policy was also overshadowed by the US's 'war on terror' doctrine and domestic problems with the rise of Islamic extremism (Fels, 2017) including the 2002 Bali

bombings (Suryadinata, 2004) that resulted to her decision to restore military cooperation with the US (Fels, 2017, p. 707). Therefore, security matters increasingly became more important than the country's SSC program.

As the predecessor of President Megawati, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) (2004-2014) focused on Indonesia's foreign policy and its concepts of 'navigating on the turbulent ocean' and 'thousands of friends, zero enemies' (Acharya, 2015; Fels, 2017; Shekhar, 2018). SBY's foreign policy also indicated an emphasis on 'regional power with global interest and concerns' (Acharya, 2015; Rosyidin, 2017); thus, SBY actively participated in major global forums. During SBY's presidency, Indonesia's foreign policy focused on projecting its smart power (Natalegawa, 2015) and becoming involved in various global development cooperation forums by building stronger relationships with ASEAN, the Pacific and Middle Eastern countries—especially Palestine (Hermawan & Habir, 2015; Wicaksana, 2016). The identification of 'emerging power' also placed the Indonesian Government in global settings, including membership of the G20 (Hermawan & Habir, 2015; Muhibat, 2016) and active participation in the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) (Acharya, 2015; Janus, Klingebiel, & Mahn, 2014). Indonesia's involvement in these groups led to more significant expectations—especially in relation to the country's global contributions to aid, development and SSC.

In 2005, when the Paris Declaration was enacted, it was expected to lead to significant changes in how effectively OECD–DAC members delivered aid. It also introduced a new perspective on aid management for the Indonesian Government in relation to working with donors in Indonesia. At the same time, hosted by OECD-DAC, Indonesia also became the co-chair of Task Team on South–South Cooperation (TT-SSC) in 2008 that brought Southern Knowledge Sharing as a narrative and content to its development effectiveness program (Engel, 2019). By 2007, the government had paid all of its IMF debt from the previous presidencies. Following this, President SBY officially terminated and closed the CGI and brought the responsibility of aid management back to the national government (Winters, 2012, p. 326). The government observed the ineffectiveness of the CGI and identified the need for the national government to handle its own aid and foreign assistance management within its state system (Pollard, 2009; Winters, 2012). Following the enactment of the Paris Declaration and the repayment of the IMF debt, the government and 26 development

partners signed the Jakarta Commitment,<sup>50</sup> in January 2009, which contributed to the new arrangements of aid and development policy in Indonesia (Indonesia, 2009).

The Jakarta Commitment was established as a foreign partnership roadmap to be achieved by the government and development partners by 2014 based on agreed indicators that drew on the spirit of the Paris Declaration. It also established a set of indicators for Indonesia to effectively manage aid, including using the country system, transparency, accountability and the predictability of foreign aid, in line with national priorities and government ownership of its foreign aid project/program (GOI, 2009). The document enabled Indonesia to move forward by outlining its significant role in development cooperation as a provider country, especially through participation in global forums such as its membership in the G20 (Hermawan & Habir, 2015; Muhibat, 2016; UNDP, 2014). It also signified the government's intention to shift the structure of donor–recipient relations from top–down to a more equal setting by changing the narratives from 'assistance' to 'partnership', including in all official government documents in Indonesia (Senior Official 4 [interview], 2016). The document also directed the government in how to expand its SSTC programs, including reforming its policy and institutional settings within national development policy. Thus, the Indonesian Government still considered traditional donors their significant partners in SSC programs.<sup>51</sup> However, the term 'SSTC' was changed to 'SSC' in 2018, as suggested by MOFA, to mark the transition period for strengthening the national management of SSC that was embedded into the state system (NCT, 2018).

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<sup>50</sup> The Jakarta Commitment observed that the link between aid policy was in line with Indonesia's national documents plan and priorities documents (GOI, 2009). Based on the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, the Jakarta Commitment identified Indonesia's ability to deliver aid effectively as an MIC. It highlighted three main indicators:

1. strengthening country ownership over development by (a) strengthening capacities and using stronger government systems and (b) improving international governance of aid and strengthening SSC
2. building more effective and inclusive partnership for development through (a) developing a new partnership paradigm and (b) strengthening existing aid instruments and shaping new ones and (c) expanding dialogue to include new actors
3. delivering and accounting for development results through (a) strengthening the focus on and capacity to manage by development results and (b) working together to review progress across the development partnership (GOI, 2009).

<sup>51</sup> Indonesia acknowledged cooperation with traditional donors in its SSC through Triangular Cooperation, which is discussed further in Chapter 6. The support conducted through the Triangular Cooperation program included establishing a National Coordination Team (NCT) on SSTC, which also facilitated Triangular Cooperation with traditional donors (NCT–SSTC, 2015, 2016).

One of the critical milestones of the SBY presidency regarding SSC was hosting the 50 years commemoration of the 1955 AAC to be covered as the Asian–African Summit in 2005 (Assie-Lumumba, 2015; Hermawan & Habir, 2015; Weatherbee, 2005). As will be described further in Chapter 4, this summit detailed a new agenda to strengthen cooperation between Asian and African countries through a New Asian–African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) declaration. The declaration reiterated the Bandung Spirits as the main principles and initiated the renewal of the partnership by building a bridge between Asia and Africa in political solidarity, economic cooperation and socioeconomic relations (Assie-Lumumba, 2015; Engel, 2017, 2019; Indonesia, 2005). However, in regard to the NAM, SBY’s foreign policy was questioned because he showed little interest in attending the NAM’s high-level events throughout his presidency (Hermawan & Habir, 2015, p. 187).

Since the enactment of the Jakarta Commitment in 2009, the government’s internal initiation of the SSC program has been scaled up by developing institutions, developing a strategic model of cooperation and linking it with the national development planning program (Engel, 2017, 2019; Hosono, 2018; Muhibat, 2016). Despite the grand narrative of the Asian–African Conference, Indonesia’s SSC started to materialise into tangible institutional arrangements, including defining the setting and position of its SSC in 2011 with the establishment of the National Coordination Team on SSTC (NCT–SSTC, 2019), as explained further in Chapter 8. The government also tried to identify and consolidate the amount of aid given since 2000 (Hosono, 2018; Muhibat, 2016; UNDP, 2014). For example, in 2015, the NCT–SSTC reported that between 2006 and 2014, Indonesia spent US\$49.8 million on its SSC program (Muhibat, 2016: NCT–SSTC, 2015). However, it was observed that the data may be underestimated from the official numbers that appear in the government’s financial system (Senior Official 6 [interview], 2016). Given that a proper monitoring and evaluations system was not in place, relevant details and significant materials relating to the program’s implementation might have been missing from the system because the government has not properly developed the required soft infrastructure (including state institutions and funding mechanisms) in its aid mechanisms. This internal challenge has created continuing dialogue within government institutions to expand and develop a cross-ministerial consolidated mechanism for SSC activities and the institutional setting (Official 5 [interview], 2016).

## Accelerating the Politics of South–South Cooperation

In 2014, Jokowi was elected as the president of Indonesia and was supported by the Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan—PDI-P*), whose political identity is rooted in former President Soekarno’s nationalism. In his presidency’s vision and mission, Jokowi identified scaling up SSC as one of the Nine Development Priorities Agenda (*Nawacita*)<sup>52</sup> under Security, Protection of Citizens and Foreign Affairs (Muhibat, 2016; Tahalele, 2015). He also identified Indonesian foreign policy as ‘strengthening regional and global engagement including improving South–South Cooperation’ (Muhibat, 2016; Widodo & Kalla, 2014). Although Widodo’s foreign policy shows a subtle approach to global relations, his approach is to examine foreign affairs from a domestic perspective (Muhibat, 2016; Rosyidin, 2017). Rosyidin (2017, p. 181) characterised Widodo’s foreign policy into four areas:

1. restructuring the notion of nationalism
2. reshaping relations beyond ASEAN and expanding the Indo–Pacific region (as reiterated by Shekhar, 2018)
3. prioritising national competencies for economic development
4. reducing the national interest narrative but emphasising bilateral diplomacy to support economic growth.

Widodo’s development program is at the core of his presidency, and relations with other countries are also focused on financing Indonesia’s economic development program. In the

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<sup>52</sup> Widodo’s Nine Development Priorities Agenda (*Nawacita*) of his first-term presidency (2015–2019) were as follows (Hafidz, 2017; Widodo-Kalla, 2014):

1. To maintain and provide security to all citizens through active-free foreign policy, reliable national security and integrated defence based on national interests and strengthening of identity as a maritime country.
2. To create an effective government by establishing clean and reliable governance and restoring the public’s trust in democratic institutions by continuing to consolidate democracy through party system reform.
3. To build Indonesia by strengthening border areas and specific regions and villages within the framework of a unitary state.
4. To reform system and law enforcement so it is free from corruption, and to maintain dignity and trust.
5. To improve the quality of human life through education and training, and to improve people’s welfare by, for example, encouraging land reform and providing subsidised low-cost housing and a social security program.
6. To increase people’s productivity and competitiveness in international markets.
7. To create economic independence by mobilising domestic strategic sectors of the economy.
8. To revolutionise the nation’s character through a national education curriculum.
9. To strengthen diversity through education and inter-community dialogue.

Medium-Term Development Plan (RPMN) 2015–2019, the government’s policies identified the possibility of obtaining foreign loans to support development programs, specifically in the areas of infrastructure, energy, education and health (Indonesia, 2015a).<sup>53</sup> These priorities expanded from SBY’s development strategies as stipulated in the Master Plan for Acceleration and Expansion of Economic Development of Indonesia (MP3EI), especially in relation to infrastructure and climate change programs (Negara, 2016; Warburton, 2016). The rationale for the program’s expansion was based on the government’s priorities and capacities to support the Eastern part of Indonesia as the main regional development focus, which Jokowi pointed out in his presidential visions. To achieve the country’s economic development targets, the Jokowi presidency has started to open up more foreign investment and explore alternative financing—in particular, to finance ambitious targets such as building mega infrastructure programs (e.g., ports and highways) to scale up economic development (Negara, 2016; Warburton, 2016). Thus, within several months of the start of Jokowi’s presidency, the government had signed several infrastructure investments projects—in particular, with China—for industrial complexes, fishery industries and the high-speed train between Jakarta and Bandung under the ‘One Belt, One Road’ program.<sup>54</sup>

In the first term of Jokowi’s presidency, the nationalistic tone was continuously highlighted in relation to the notion of building stronger economic development and national political contestation, which continues to be challenged by radicalism (Warburton, 2016, p. 315). In the context of SSC, an important initiative of Widodo’s foreign policy was for Indonesia to host the sixtieth anniversary celebration of the AAC on 22–24 May 2015 in Jakarta and Bandung. The forum highlighted the importance of a new economic international order that is open to emerging powers and that challenges the old way of cooperation by Bretton Woods and DAC groups,<sup>55</sup> as will be further explored in Chapter 4. The sharp criticism of the international

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<sup>53</sup> Book 1, Chapter 7 of Medium-Term Development Program (*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional/RPJMN*) 2015–2019 (Indonesia, 2015a).

<sup>54</sup> RI, China to strengthen economic cooperation, *The Jakarta Post*, 28 January 2015, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/01/28/ri-china-strengthen-economic-cooperation.html> (accessed 23 July 2018); Jokowi between BRICS and a hard place: The Jakarta Post columnist, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/jokowi-between-brics-and-a-hard-place-the-jakarta-post-columnist> (accessed 22 May 2018); Indonesia forecasts multibillion-dollar belt and road investment in four growth regions, <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/3008036/indonesia-forecasts-multibillion-dollar-belt-and-road> (accessed 14 November 2019).

<sup>55</sup> Asian, African nations challenge ‘obsolete’ world order, 22 April 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/22/us-asia-africa-idUSKBN0ND09820150422> (accessed 14 July 2018).

financial institution appears to be paradoxical to the overall context of financing Jokowi's economic development program through international finance mechanisms. Relations with donor countries remain significant in Indonesia's development cooperation, as observed in the government officials' narratives during conversations with the author, which will be analysed in Chapter 6.

During Widodo's first term, the government supported the continuation and finalisation of mosque building in Afghanistan as part of SBY's commitment. This reflects Widodo's interest in expanding foreign policy relations with other Muslim countries beyond the narrative of SSC. Towards the end of Widodo's first term, the government announced the establishment of the Indonesian Agency for International Development (Indonesian AID) on 18 October 2019 and launched by Vice President Jusuf Kalla.<sup>56</sup> The specific agency in the form of a public service body (BLU) was established to manage the endowment fund for international assistance under the Ministry of Finance, and pledged to manage US\$212 million (or Rp 3 billion) until 2021 (Pinandita, 2019). During the press conference at the launch of Indonesian AID, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi stated that:

The amount will be increased gradually over the years, [but] the government will use the interest from it for funds that are to be disbursed to countries in need [that the sum and use of funds would be catered to fit the needs of each country] (Pinandita, 2019).

The establishment of Indonesian AID followed years of discussion in government-related ministries, as will be further explored in Chapter 8. This is also linked with the challenges faced in the implementation of SSC, including the context of the SSC strategies and priorities that shape and motivate the implementation of activities.

During Widodo's second term (2020–2024), the strong development narratives of nation-building continue to be heard. During his second-term inauguration presidential speech in the parliament, Widodo pointed out five development priorities (Rahma, 2019):

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<sup>56</sup> Indonesia launches Indo-AID international assistance agency, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/10/19/indonesia-launches-indo-aid-international-assistance-agency.html> (accessed 19 October 2019).

1. building infrastructure by connecting production regions with distribution regions to provide better tourist destinations, create new job opportunities and increase economic value
2. human development, including by improving sciences and skilled human resources, as well as mastering technology and science through the establishment of the endowment fund
3. simplifying all regulations, as well as deregulation to encourage micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and create more jobs
4. bureaucratic reforms to attract more investment by simplifying bureaucracy
5. economic transformation from dependency on natural resources to competitive manufacturing.

These development focuses are a continuation of Widodo’s first-term development priorities program, including continuing the development of major infrastructure programs and focusing the country’s foreign priorities on economic diplomacy. The policy also reflects Widodo’s foreign policy approach to other Southern countries, as well as internal arrangements to scale up Indonesia’s SSC platforms and programs. Further, to capture the phases of Indonesia’s SSC, Table 1 identifies the issues of each presidency by presenting the policies, activities, modalities and narratives that have been constructed over the years.

Table 1: Phases of Indonesia’s South–South Cooperation

Leaders/ Issues	Independence (before 1955)	Soekarno (1945–1967)	Soeharto (1967–1998)	Transition (Habibie, Megawati, Gus Dur) (1998– 2004)	SBY (2004–2012)	Jokowi (2014–2019, 2020–2024)
<b>Doctrine</b>	Struggle for independence	Anti-colonialism and sense of independence	Economic cooperation and accommodating emerging economy in Security Council		Better partnership for prosperity	Economic development program—economic diplomacy
<b>Narrative/ context</b>	Independence and identity	Social justice and national identity	Regional power	Security and financial crisis	Smart power diplomacy	Nationalism and economic diplomacy
<b>Modalities</b>	Humanitarianism and struggle for independence		Technical cooperation through Triangular Cooperation	Technical cooperation	Technical cooperation, knowledge sharing	Knowledge sharing, technical cooperation, humanitarian Support

<b>Appr. identification of activities/ amount</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• School in India</li> <li>• 500 tonnes of rice sent to India</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 590 military personnel sent to Egypt</li> <li>• Experts exchange with Guinea</li> </ul>	Not available	Not available	Total of US\$49.5 million, including US\$5 million Hospital in Palestine	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• US\$6.7 million (2013) (including six schools in Myanmar &amp; US\$2 million for mosque in Afghanistan)</li> <li>• US\$212 million for Indonesian AID until 2021 (specifically for five south Pacific Island countries of Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, Fiji, Nauru and Kiribati, as well as Myanmar and the Philippines)</li> </ul>
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Source: Author's own compilation.

## Conclusion

Southern countries are experienced and influenced by different processes of aid and development relations that are reflected in how their policies are shaped and constructed within domestic conditions and needs. A further question is how SSC evolved within the state's and its leaders' aid and development agendas. This historical timeline showcases how Indonesia's foreign development relations have extended the idea of giving and sharing, from the early years to the independence era, and to the process of nation-building and the country's development cooperation policy. Indonesia's history of aid and development cannot be separated from the national identity and political needs reimagined by its presidents. The idea of giving and sharing in Indonesia's SSC is also linked with the state's ideology and the philosophical notions established by its leaders' political stands, especially in the relations among Southern countries and with Northern countries that evolved throughout the timeline. For instance, Hatta's narrative on free and active (*Bebas-Aktif*) foreign policy, which resulted in more neutral approach between the two major powers of the Eastern and Western blocs during the Cold War, remain significant in analysing leaders' foreign policy narratives, which are linked with the national ideology of *Pancasila*. These settings of aid relations have also structured national development policy and the country's SSC policy within the political, social, economic and cultural spheres of domestic and international affairs. Therefore,

Indonesia's development cooperation enables specific features to be analysed in relations with Northern and Southern donor countries, which create a particular structure of cooperation in aid and development.

The dynamic relations established among states and experienced by their leaders and policymakers (bureaucrats or government officials in the case of Indonesia), including with external donor partners, have influenced the idea and perspectives of giving and sharing, and cannot be ignored in the debates on Indonesia's historical footprint in SSC. How the state reflects the idea and process of giving and sharing leads to an exploration of social and symbolic relations in the development of aid relations. The exploration will reconstruct and contextualise the Bandung Conference and its commemoration within the symbolic acts and narratives of Southern cooperation. It will also show how Indonesia has ritualised the events within the modern setting of international development cooperation, as explored in the next chapter.



## **Chapter 4 Relationship Context: Symbolic Meaning of Indonesia's South–South Cooperation**

### **Introduction**

Chapter 3 discussed the history of Indonesia's South–South Cooperation (SSC) and mapped the evolution of the country's development cooperation. The legacy of the Bandung Conference in 1955 has shaped the modern context of Indonesia's development cooperation and its cooperation with other Southern countries. The debate now focuses on how the Indonesian Government is maintaining and preserving the legacy of Bandung Conference, which is considered the foundation of its Southern cooperation including through its ideology, language, narratives, statements and rituals. This chapter begins by exploring the state's ideology, which became the foundation of Indonesia's SSC. The cooperation is manifested by state institutions and apparatuses in defining how the norms, values and patterns of the relations have shaped the current cooperation. The debate explores how the Southern state has perceived the philosophical idea of 'aid' or giving that is associated with the state's norms and values. The celebration of the legacy of the Bandung Conference through diplomatic acts, events, leaders' speeches and commitment shows how Southern cooperation is being practised (Acharya, 2014, 2016b). Therefore, it is important to distinguish these symbolic acts in Southern cooperation—in this case, Indonesia—as a way to maintain social relations which cannot be separated from the state's philosophical stance. Given that ideology has become a central component of Indonesia's SSC, this chapter argues that symbolism emerges from the concepts and practices, including the performance of rituals, that the state uses and presents to maintain and preserve the idea and norms of cooperation especially presented in AAC 1955. This symbolic meaning is also linked to the debate on the nature of the social relations that evolve in development cooperation. Thus, the symbolism in cooperation can be constructed within the practical meaning of Southern relations in global development cooperation.

### **National Foundations**

According to Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA, 2018), within the framework of SSC, from 2000 to 2016 the Government of Indonesia (GOI) budgeted US\$57.4 million for 783 technical cooperation activities and programs. These programs involved 5,091 participants from 66 countries in the Pacific, Asia, Africa and Latin America in three flagship programs of

economics, good governance and development (MOFA, 2018). In an example of an Indonesia's SSC activity, in Jakarta on 29 August 2018, the MOFA received five representatives from the Ministry of Infrastructure from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to participate in an infrastructure training program that involved the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing staff as trainers. This technical cooperation was part of a knowledge sharing activity and followed the Indonesian president's visit to Afghanistan in 2017, which aimed to strengthen SSC and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The MOFA (2018) also highlights *Pancasila*, or the five principles, as the foundation of Indonesian SSC, including within this framework of cooperation.

To revisit Soekarno's ideas of Indonesia's Southern cooperation, the framework cannot be separated from an understanding of the state's ideology as the philosophical concept in Indonesia's nation state, including its position in external affairs. The philosophical groundwork was constructed within the idea of nationalism and anti-colonialism based on the perceptions of the Indonesian founding fathers (Soekarno and Hatta) of the concept of nation-building, which laid the foundation for all Indonesian national policy to date (Devetak, Dunne, & Nurhayati, 2016; Kahin, 1952; Sukma, 1995). Overall foreign and development policy is based on *Pancasila* and the 1945 National Constitution, as acknowledged in the MOFA's foreign policy framework (Hadiz, 2004; Soemardjan, 1963; Sukma, 1995). The idea of *Pancasila* was first raised by Soekarno and Hatta during the final years of Japan's occupancy of Indonesia (the period before Indonesian independence in 1945) that was developed as a modern state philosophy of Indonesia (Geertz, 1964; Kahin, 1952). This was further established and enacted in 1945 and laid the foundation for Indonesian policymaking, including the country's political narrative. The five principles of *Pancasila*<sup>57</sup> are divinity to God (pluralism of monotheism), humanitarianism or internationalism, national unity (nationalism), representative democracy and social justice (social welfare) (Kahin, 1952; Prawiranegara, 1984). As with any form of ideology, Indonesia state ideology also employs a utopian notion of political life to highlight the self-identification of the group over the global system (Williams, 2002). This ideology is tacitly understood by state apparatuses to be the foundation of developing government policy.

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<sup>57</sup> The five principles have been renumbered into the order stated.

Indonesia specifically perceives *Pancasila* as the basis of the national philosophy that navigates the political, economic, social and cultural life of the nation including its foreign policy (Hadiz, 2004; Hatta, 1953; MOFA, 2018; Prawiranegara, 1984). The basic principles of *Pancasila* are translated into foreign relations through the principles of equality (better partnership for prosperity and equality), respect for each other (non-interference and non-conditionality) and cooperation (mutual benefits, opportunities and sustainability) (MOFA, 2018), which set the norms of the state in conducting Indonesia's SSC. The influence of *Pancasila* in the development of Southern norms is also shared among Southern countries (as discussed in Chapters 2) and was historically formed around the cooperation principles of the AAC in 1955. Further, the definition of *Pancasila* was important in understanding relations in SSC. This notion points to Indonesia's philosophical stance, which continues to be reimagined by bureaucrats to maintain the relevance of SSC in national policy development. These political manifestos recognised the national identity and the state's philosophy but were also used for political indoctrination during Soeharto's era (Hadiz, 2004, p. 150). They guided the setting of national and foreign policy as well as the president's political agendas within national and international contexts. This not only constitutes the sense of a nationalistic view, but also navigates the country's policy through agreements with the state system and the policy direction of bureaucrats (Hadiz, 2004, p. 155). Indonesia's response and motivation to cooperate within the international context are strongly contextualised within these ideological stands, as well as Hatta's foreign policy objectives. Therefore, it is important to understand the current relation between political philosophy and the cultural concept of cooperation that drives the meaning of Indonesia's SSC.

To signify the value of Indonesian SSC, besides referring to *Pancasila*, national policy can also be based on *Undang-Undang Dasar (UUD) 1945* (National Constitution) (Senior Official 4 [interview], 2016; Senior Official 6 [interview], 2016). Thus, the National Constitution is also the basis of the normative values of the government in developing relations with other countries. The first paragraph of the National Constitution 1945 states that:

Whereas independence is the inalienable rights of all nations, therefore, all colonialism must be abolished in this world as it is not in conformity with humanity and justice.

*(Bahwa sesungguhnya Kemerdekaan itu adalah hak segala bangsa dan oleh sebab itu, maka penjajahan diatas dunia harus dihapuskan, karena tidak sesuai dengan peri-kemanusiaan dan peri-keadilan).*

Further, the fourth paragraph states that:<sup>58</sup>

Subsequent to it, to form a government of the state of Indonesia ... and to participate toward the establishment of a world order based on freedom, perpetual peace, and social justice.

*(Kemudian dari pada untuk membentuk suatu Pemerintah Negara Indonesia ... dan ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan, perdamaian abadi, dan keadilan sosial).*

These two national philosophical stances led to the view that foreign policy must serve and support national interests based on Indonesian values and culture, as well as ideologies and principles, within the notion and spirit of political and sociocultural diversity (Sukma, 1995, p. 305). This concept lies within the principles of the *Politik Luar Negeri Bebas–Aktif*, or independent or free and active foreign policy, as the main framework shaped by Soekarno and Hatta in 1945 (Hadiwinata, 2008; Shekhar, 2018; Sukma, 1995). Free and active foreign policies have reflected Indonesia’s history, political and cultural experiences within the two layers of foreign policy notions (Shekhar, 2018; Sukma, 1995). The free (*bebas*) component states that Indonesia is independent of the great power bloc and promotes non-interference in cooperation with other nations. The active (*aktif*) component drives the role of Indonesia in global cooperation and international affairs (Murphy, 2009; Shekhar, 2018; Sukma, 1995). Therefore, the notion of foreign policy cannot be separated from the national interest. It carries the state’s values, principles and foundations that are shared by all Indonesians (Sukma, 1995, p. 306). Given the generic nature of *Bebas* and *Aktif*, the concepts have been used in various political interpretations (Shekhar, 2018, p. 4). For example, the concept of *Bebas* (freedom) can also refer to relation-building in terms of choosing alliances based on national values.

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<sup>58</sup> The National Constitution and *Pancasila* have been the basis of all president and government policy developments to date.

Linked to the notion of *Bebas–Aktif* (free and active), in Hatta’s famous manifesto ‘Rowing between two reefs’ (*Mendayung diantara dua karang*), Hatta discussed Indonesia’s international position of not choosing sides between the two major powers of the Eastern and Western blocs during the Cold war, and of advocating neutrality to actively determine the country’s own position within international cooperation (Hermawan & Habir, 2015, p. 179). His manifesto explained the position of Indonesia in global cooperation of being neutral and not taking sides within the contestation of global hegemony for years to come. Hatta also identified four principles of Indonesian foreign policy: *Pancasila*, which is the main ideology for Indonesia’s foreign policy; national interests within the constitution should be protected; national interests should be assisted independently; and Indonesia’s foreign policy must be directed in a pragmatic manner (Hadiwinata, 2008; Hadiz, 2004; Moon, 2009; Sukma, 1995). Specifically, Hatta (1953, p. 441) recognised six foreign policy objectives:<sup>59</sup>

1. to defend the freedom of the people and guarantee the safety of the state
2. to obtain everyday items from overseas to increase the standard of living, including rice, medicine and consumer goods
3. to obtain capital and equipment for infrastructure building, agriculture and industry
4. to strengthen the principles of international law and to aid in achieving social justice on an international scale in line with the UN Charter
5. to emphasise initiating good relations with neighbouring countries that have experienced similar conditions
6. to seek networks and communities among nations through the realisation of the ideals enshrined in *Pancasila* as the basic Indonesian philosophy.

These notions shaped the way Indonesia negotiated foreign cooperation to support its development cooperation and further initiation into SSC, especially in relation to the idea of giving. For example, Hatta stated that Indonesia should not only receive aid to support national development, but also assist and aid other countries in conjunction with the principles of social justice in the spirit of solidarity and anti-colonialism (Hatta, 1953, p. 441).

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<sup>59</sup> This manifest was written in the 1950s by Hatta (1953), who was the first vice president of the ROI. These objectives remain important for Indonesian foreign policymakers, as noted by former foreign minister of GOI, Senior Official 1, during an interview in Jakarta on 19 May 2016.

Indonesian national ideology has also acknowledged the postcolonial sense within the politics of the newly independent country and reiterated the previous notion of traditional Indonesian values. This notion linked *Pancasila* and the national cultural context of *gotong royong*, or mutual cooperation to help each other (Moon, 2009, p. 258). Soekarno highlighted *gotong royong* as the fundamental characteristic of Indonesian culture (Hadiz, 2004, p. 152). This cultural concept of helping and giving in Indonesian society cannot be separated from values that are embedded in the narratives and practices of the local communities, especially in the Javanese village (Geertz, 1973; Guinness, 2009; Moon, 2009)—for example, active participation when a village community builds a road together or takes part in the village's celebration of a communal social event. These types of activities were a form of social justice according to Soekarno, and they were translated by Hatta as mutual help, thereby building upon the notion of family or *kekeluargaan* (Moon, 2009, p. 260). According to Soekarno, the distinction of social justice that was shaped from *gotong royong* was reimagined within the context of state relations based on the economic notion and politics of solidarity, which solidify relationships with other nations (Moon, 2009; Soemardjan, 1963). Therefore, the translation and notion of solidarity cannot be separated from the concept of *gotong royong*, which exhibits characteristics of the state in the cooperation. However, Guinness (2009) critiqued the concept as a top-down approach that is institutionalised rather than owned by the community. Hence, this social justice norm cannot be separated from the expression of the structure in the Indonesian normative concept of modern cooperation.

The state's philosophy and ideology have constructed the moral value of national policy, which has shaped the ideology of giving and sharing in the case of Indonesian SSC. The narrative of a shared Southern ideology in SSC is also acknowledged because it is embedded in the construction of leaders' political narratives and rooted in the relations that are established. As Geertz (1964) argued, ideology is constructed between the reality it perceives and how it should be implemented within a specific structure. To maintain ideological stands, rituals were often performed to define the meaning and substantial content in understanding the position of a specific issue, including SSC, whereby performance is also a form of envisioning society's position (Geertz, 1964, p. 168). Therefore, celebrations of the Bandung Conference are continuously presented to showcase the deeper meaning of Southern cooperation and its ideological stands. However, Giddens (1979, p. 6) argued that the notion

of ideology is not only as a symbol of the system, but also as a tool of the dominant group to give meaning and create social relations. These notions raise questions regarding the rituals performed by Indonesia in maintaining the idea of Southern cooperation and how the celebrations recognise the ideological stand of SSC relation-building.

### **Celebration of Ideas: Between Ritual and the Narrative of the Asian–African Conference**

The norms and ideology of Southern cooperation that are embedded in the cooperation has been continuously symbolised within specific narratives that have often been neglected in the study of foreign aid, and especially SSC (Hattori, 2003; Kilby, 2018; Mawdsley, 2012b). The idea of giving as symbolism complemented the political identity of nationalism as stated in the government’s foreign policy agenda. Hence, the shape of cooperation can differ from what Northern donors perceive within the setting of foreign aid relations. Given that Southern ideology was considered a moral context created by its leaders, the reflection and reimagining of the practices needed to be acknowledged within the social setting of the group (Acharya, 2014; Apter, 1964). Foreign aid becomes not only a policy tool (Lancaster, 2008, p. 5), but also a symbol of social cohesion among countries in SSC that is performed by member states. For Indonesia, the AAC was considered the leading international event that symbolised and placed Southern perspectives and celebrations of the ideas of nationalism and anti-colonialism on the global map. Therefore, the Asian-African Conference’s norms and values were expressed and signified by the Indonesian state within three main settings of non-verbal behaviour or rituals and verbal or political statements/commitments to anchor Southern relations and to maintain their relevance in the current context of cooperation.

First, to showcase the unity of Asian and African people, celebration conferences were organised every 10 years as specific events and in the same location—for example, using the original location of Bandung Conference 1955, *Gedung Merdeka* (Freedom Building), and the performance of the Freedom Walk. These non-verbal or action-oriented settings were chosen to ritualise the event and maintain the political status quo and power relations of the movement and among the countries involved (Kertzer, 1988; Shimazu, 2014; Turner, 1969; Whitehouse & Lanman, 2014).

Second, to identify the narrative expressed by leaders—especially Indonesian presidents’ speeches—specific language and terminologies were used by the host of the conference. Shimazu (2014, p. 231) noted that the Bandung Conference was a significant diplomatic event to showcase the commonality of Asian and African countries. However, the speeches were a manifestation of the leaders’ political thinking and rhetoric that encapsulated their views of SSC and positioned themselves and their state within the global southern cooperation debates.

Third, the results of the conference, which were concluded in the communiqué and New Partnership Documents, provided an understanding of the meaning of the politics of Southern cooperation (Acharya, 2016b; Assie-Lumumba, 2015; Devetak, Dunne, & Nurhayati, 2016; Kilby, 2018). In addition to maintaining the legacy of the Bandung Conference, the results documents help to define the plan, priorities and expectations of Southern countries as a group within the current context of development cooperation. Given that the documents defined the Asian-African countries’ commitments and targets, an understanding of these points reveals the political meaning behind the events and also of SSC. Thus, the cooperation in the current setting can be interpreted, preserved and modernised. These three sets of contexts of Southern cooperation clarify the meaning and symbols behind the rituals and their narratives, as does the political implication behind the discourse and narratives that demonstrate Indonesian commitment to SSC.

### **Ritual-making of the Bandung Conference**

An understanding of the conference has been acknowledged within historical moments and reflected upon in the transformation of ideas rooted in the ideology, state philosophy, sociocultural and moral values of the cooperation. The event’s celebrations have given meaning to the social relations of solidarity politics represented in the re-emergence of Southern countries in global development (Shimazu, 2014, p. 231). The strong representational meaning of the Bandung Conference transformed the idea of the conference beyond contestation with the Western hegemony (Acharya, 2016b; Assie-Lumumba, 2015; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2015). The events were also structured to showcase a series of images that symbolised the meaning of the first conference, which was ritualised until recently. The location, venue, choice of actions, participant countries and other presentations and events

during the conference and commemorations highlight the symbolic meaning of Southern cooperation. Therefore, it is important to explore these actions, which are performed every 10 years to celebrate the Bandung Conference.

The physical landmark of the AAC in 1955, the 'House of Freedom' (or *Gedung Merdeka*) and its museum,<sup>60</sup> blends in with the modern city of Bandung and remains significant in symbolising the heritage and memory of the conference. The building was used as the main venue for the AAC celebrations in 1985, 1995,<sup>61</sup> 2005 and 2015<sup>62</sup> (the 1975 celebration was conducted at the newly opened *Taman Mini Indonesia Indah* Cultural Park in East Jakarta).<sup>63</sup> During the commemoration celebrations of 2005 and 2015 beside the Freedom Building in Bandung, events were also held in Jakarta because of the large number of participants and the need for suitable facilities that could meet the standards required for an international meeting.<sup>64</sup> Therefore, the historical value of the Freedom Building has become the monument and backdrop to symbolise Southern cooperation that cultivate ideas and the common ideology of Southern countries and their relations.

### *The Freedom Walk*

One of the most important rituals performed during the AAC is the 'Walk'. The '*Merdeka*' Walk, or Freedom Walk in 1955, was conducted by the heads of state before the conference and became the central event to showcase the new actors from new nations in Asia and Africa (Shimazu, 2014, p. 226). Shimazu noted that during the 1955 Freedom Walk, each president walked to the Freedom Building one by one, as in the 'delegation format of walking'. Each leader left their hotel with their entourage and waved to the cheering crowd as the media captured the moment. Southern leaders were almost unknown to the world before the 1955 conference, and the Freedom Walk placed them on the international political map of Southern

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<sup>60</sup> The main venue of the AAC has become the AAC museum. A field visit to the House of Freedom was conducted in Bandung on 29 September 2016.

<sup>61</sup> The 1995 Commemoration was conducted at the same time as the NAM Ministerial Meeting (GOI, 1995).

<sup>62</sup> The commemoration celebration was not conducted in 1965 because of the strain between the main leaders of the Asian–African countries as a result of the establishment of the NAM, as identified in Chapter 2.

<sup>63</sup> <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/04/23/asian-african-conference-timeline.html> (accessed 19 March 2019).

<sup>64</sup> Asian African Commemoration 2015 (<https://isstc.setneg.go.id/index.php/news/1-news-1/184-asian-african-conference-commemoration-2015>, accessed 23 April 2018); 77 countries, 34 leaders to attend Asia–Africa conference commemoration (<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/04/16/77-countries-34-leaders-attend-asia-africa-conference-commemoration.html> [accessed 23 April 2018]).

movement<sup>65</sup> leaders (Shimazu, 2014, p. 243). This provided an international introduction to the new Southern countries. The effect of this 10-minute walk was significant because it produced a powerful image of the Asian and African leaders with the background of the Freedom Building and cheering crowds. It also demonstrated the power of the subtle symbolism of diplomacy, which unintentionally built upon the introductory act of Southern countries to the world (Shimazu, 2014, p. 247).

Following the importance of the Freedom Walk in 1955, the moment became a vital representation of Southern countries and was repeated during the commemorative ceremonies in 2005 and 2015 at the same place and with the same background of the Freedom Building (GOI, 2016). However, the 2005 and 2015 Freedom Walks were performed in a different formation than the 1955 Freedom Walk. For example, the 2015 commemoration of the Freedom Walk shows Indonesian President Widodo standing next to Chinese President Xi Jinping and Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak.<sup>66</sup> The 2015 Freedom Walk was performed not as individuals, but as a group with other Southern leaders, their spouses, political representatives and other dignitaries. 'The Walk' filled Asia Africa Street and was viewed as 'an assembled performance' rather than the one-by-one 'delegates walk' that was performed during the Bandung Conference in 1955. This showcased a different message to the broader audience—one of harmony and unity among Southern leaders rather than a mere act of pageantry and introduction as separate delegates (Shimazu, 2014, p. 248). The symbolic act of the group walk is performed within the context and meaning of Southern solidarity, as the term was only employed towards the end of the 1955 conference. Therefore, the walk has displayed the symbolic politics of the leaders' political agendas and visually presented a strong message of unity and political representation of Asian and African countries as a community within the globalised world of development cooperation, as captured in Picture 1.

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<sup>65</sup> The identification of this social movement is derived from the identification of the modern political movement, as argued by Giddens (1991). This helped identify the AAC as the pinnacle of the Southern countries' movement that was built upon events that were held several years earlier.

<sup>66</sup> Asian African Commemoration 2015 (<http://jakartaglobe.id/eyewitness/asian-african-conference-commemoration-2015/> [accessed 23 April 2018]).

Picture 1: Merdeka Walk at the 2015 Asian–African Commemoration Celebration in Bandung



Source: <http://jakartaglobe.id/eyewitness/asian-african-conference-commemoration-2015/> (accessed 23 April 2018)

In comparison, the commemoration ceremonies in 2005 and 2015 also included a group photo of the leaders (GOI, 2016). During the researcher's previous assignment as a joint committee member for the High-Level Meeting toward Country-Led Knowledge Hub in 2012, a staff member from the MOFA noted the importance of the leaders' position in the group photo:

We have to understand the politics and the dynamic relations behind each leader. If they hate each other, don't put them next to each other in the photo group. However, if they want to put a strong emphasis on the cooperation, they should be put next to each other. There is some formula for this group photo because it will give a strong visual meaning. (Personal communication, 2012).

The group photo of the Asian–African Commemoration in 2015 showed President Widodo, as the host of the event, standing in the middle of the Asian and African countries beside Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. These two countries are

Indonesia's important partners—especially in terms of achieving Indonesia's economic and development targets. This supports the argument that robust Indonesian relations with other major powers in the Asia–Pacific region—especially China and Japan (beside ASEAN)—are central to its bilateral and regional cooperation (Acharya, 2015; Fels, 2017). The picture also highlights a deeper meaning of cooperation that goes beyond this conference and is perceived strongly by bilateral alliances.

Picture 2: Group Photo of the Leaders at the Asian–African Summit 2015



Source: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-africa/asian-african-nations-challenge-obsolete-world-order-idUSKBN0ND09820150422> (accessed 3 April 2019)

### Events and Participants

For Indonesia, the 2015 commemoration ceremony set the tone of the country's political position among the other Southern countries during Widodo's first year as president. The commemoration was the first international event hosted by Widodo, and it had the theme of 'strengthening SSC to promote world peace and prosperity' (GOI, 2015d). It was an opportunity to showcase Indonesia's international agenda to a broader audience in line with Widodo's approach to expressing symbolic meaning behind his political acts (Lane, 2015, p. 6).

In addition to the leaders' meetings, ministerial meetings and business meetings, as well as the establishment of the New Asian–African Strategic Partnership (NAASP), the GOI initiated the 2005 and 2015 commemorations as a Summit of Asian–African Countries (GOI, 2007). Thus, the ceremony and event provided a deeper meaning of coexistence among the original member countries, despite the challenges and successes experienced by each Southern country beyond the 1955 conference. Further, to maintain the tradition by reiterating its principles, a recital of the *Dasasila* Bandung (or 10 principles of the Bandung Conference, based on the 1955 conference outcomes) was also performed by an Indonesian representative as part of the opening ceremony.

The 2015 commemoration raised concerns regarding the relevance of SSC within the global development setting because only 21 leaders participated from 109 countries<sup>67</sup> (the 1955 meeting was attended by 21 leaders from only 29 participant countries), as presented in Table 2. The commemoration celebration aimed to maintain the importance and legacies of the original events and showcase the group's continuation. In addition, it provided Indonesia with a platform to identify its political stances within global development and its need to maintain the historical narrative of the AAC. These celebrations also showed the relevance of the conference in the current setting of global cooperation conditions. The debate regarding the number of participants—especially leaders—became significant in assessing the success of the event, but the historical political meaning that the conference intended to showcase also gained momentum. It aimed to commemorate the history of the event and acknowledge the relevance of Asian–African cooperation that continues within current global development cooperation. These rituals effectively encapsulated the symbolic meaning of group harmony and the group's significance within the global development setting.

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<sup>67</sup> Only 21 leaders attended the 2015 commemoration ceremony (<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-africa/asian-african-nations-challenge-obsolete-world-order-idUSKBN0ND09820150422> [accessed 23 April 2018]).

Table 2: Asian–African Conference and Commemoration Events<sup>68</sup>

	<b>Bandung 1955</b>	<b>Jakarta and Bandung 2005</b>	<b>Jakarta and Bandung 2015</b>
<b>Participant countries</b>	29 countries from Asia and Africa (5 sponsor countries, 6 from Africa and 23 from Asia)	106 countries (54 Asian countries, 51 African countries) and 18 international organisations	109 Asian and African Countries, 16 observer countries and 25 international organisations
<b>Prominent leaders</b>	President Nehru (India), President Zhou Enlai (China), President Nasser (Egypt) and President U Nu (Burma)	Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (India), President Hu Jintao (China) and Kofi Annan (Secretary General UN)	President Xi Jinping (China), Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (Japan), Prime Minister Najib Razak (Malaysia) and President Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe)
<b>Event activities</b>	Conference in Bandung, Freedom ( <i>Merdeka</i> ) Walk in Bandung	Summit in Jakarta, Anniversary of Golden Jubilee (50 years) and Freedom ( <i>Merdeka</i> ) Walk in Bandung	Conference/Summit in Jakarta, Freedom ( <i>Merdeka</i> ) Walk in Bandung and South–South Exhibition <sup>69</sup>

Source: Author’s own compilation.

### **Speeches: From Anti-colonialism to Southern Partnership**

Another important feature in the AAC and commemoration celebrations is the leaders’ political speeches, which guide the political position of the AAC. The conference was not only a staged performance of its leaders, but it also involved interpreting the verbal language of the leaders’ political narratives. Speeches help to identify the position of the group and their ideological beliefs among other movements (Giddens, 1991, p. 214). Therefore, the narrative of symbolism identified the movement through speeches and the specific language used by leaders to officially represent the group. It is important to analyse the meaning of the speeches of the conference to understand the context of Southern cooperation. The speeches identify how the narrative of the Bandung Conference in 1955 was replicated or restated in

<sup>68</sup> Matrix information compiled from multiple sources including Museum Asia African Conference Booklet 2007, (<https://dinmerican.wordpress.com/2015/04/27/bandung-2015-a-short-walk-but-with-giant-steps/>; <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/04/16/77-countries-34-leaders-attend-asia-africa-conference-commemoration.html> [accessed 19 December 2017]; [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/23/c\\_134178625.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/23/c_134178625.htm) [accessed 9 October 2018]). The Matrix only compares the original meeting of 1955 with the 2005 and 2015 commemorations to capture the expansion and the scales of the commemoration celebrations.

<sup>69</sup> The South–South Exhibition was the ‘marketplace’ in which countries and their partners that were participating in the 2015 summit presented, promoted and showcased their flagship programs and activities to other Southern countries. For example, Indonesia exhibited the hand tractor industry for agriculture, *Batik* tools and the artificial insemination program. Indonesia’s aims for the exhibition were to promote the country’s SSC program, show Indonesia’s commitment and partnership to Asian and African countries, and introduce the NCT (NCT–SSTC, 2016).

Indonesia's presidential speeches during the commemoration celebrations in 1985, 1995, 2005 and 2015. The set of narratives used during the conference pointed out specific features of the political agendas while simultaneously maintaining the ideological stances of the AAC in 1955.

### *Soekarno's Anti-Colonialism and Nationalism Ideas*

The Bandung Conference stimulated the transformation of Southern states from survivors of Western colonial hostility with common experiences and ideology to an expansion of their political relations and development network. Therefore, the idea of Southern cooperation expanded as response to the geopolitical position of Southern countries during the Cold War and its anti-colonial liberation movement idea (Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018, p. 871). These notions led to an evolution in the study of development because they stimulated debate over global hegemony and the social movement of Southern countries within North–South relations (Black, 1999; Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018). This conscious social movement signified the Asian–African movement in a broader setting of global cooperation. As Soekarno stated:

The last few years have seen enormous changes. Nations and States have awoken from a sleep of centuries. The passive peoples have gone, the outward tranquillity has made place for struggle and activity. Irresistible forces have swept the two continents. The mental, spiritual and political faces of the whole world have been changed, and the process is still not complete. There are new conditions, new concepts, new problems, and new ideals abroad in the world. Hurricanes of national awakening and reawakening have swept over the land, shaking it, changing it, changing it for better. (GOI, 1955b, p. 6)

The context of breaking away from isolation and uniting as Southern countries was perceived beyond the setting of any single Southern state. Soekarno's speech also pointed out the ethical position that stimulated the construction of Southern social and development settings (Chakrabarty, 2005; Devetak, Dunne, & Nurhayati, 2016). Soekarno linked identification with the sense of independence of the Asian and African countries:

In 1945, the first year of our national revolution, we of Indonesia were confronted with the question of what we are going to do with our independence when it was finally attained and secured—we never questioned that it would be attained and secured. We knew how to oppose and destroy. Then we were suddenly confronted with the necessity of giving content

and meaning to our independence. Not material content and meaning only, but also ethical and moral content, for independence without ethics and morality, would be indeed a poor imitation of what we sought. The responsibilities and burdens, the rights and duties and privileges of independence must be seen as part of the ethical and moral content of independence. (GOI, 1955b, pp. 4–5)

Soekarno's speech resonated with Indonesia's perception of its independence, which introduced ethical and moral duties to the freedom to cooperate. Independence should be a moral agreement to give value to the freedom attained by many other Southern countries. Agreements around the Southern movement for independence challenged global hegemony as a result of the South's philosophical stand on nationalism and against postcolonialism and imperialism (Awan, 2015; Barker, 2008; Braveboy-Wagner, 2009; Kahin, 1952; Keethaponcalan, 2016). Anti-colonialism is also shown in the substantial narratives of Indonesia's Southern cooperation and embedded in the current political position of the Southern countries. As Soekarno pointed out:

Colonialism has also modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skilful and determined energy, and it appears in many guises. It does not give up its loot easily. Wherever, whenever and however it appears, colonialism is an evil thing, and one which must be eradicated from earth. (GOI, 1955b, p. 9)

Within the wider context of colonialism, Southern cooperation is not only constructed within the political relations among states, but also within the economic and sociocultural settings of the cooperation. Therefore, the ideology and philosophical settings of SSC are structured in the political–economic–cultural context that signifies ideas of cooperation within current development stances. The fact that these ideological stances are difficult to implement does not diminish them within the global ideology of development cooperation (Acharya, 2014; Hongoh, 2016). The conference led to new opportunities with common interests and expansion (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2015, p. 5), which are continuously being reimagined within Southern cooperation and in Indonesian foreign policy. Soekarno's vision of Southern ideas of cooperation has been reflected in the narrative of Indonesia's SSC because it was and continues to be ideologically and culturally driven by the state's experiences.

Soekarno's speech also established the nationalistic identity of a Southern ideology that cannot be separated from Indonesia's own political agenda (Barker, 2008, p. 525). As presented by Indonesian presidents during the various commemoration speeches, the narrative of Soekarno's ideological notions was re-identified and restructured within the meaning and moral content of the country's national political agendas. The importance of leaders' speeches during the 1955 conference was acknowledged by other Southern leaders to point out their national narrative in Southern cooperation. The speeches not only identified the nationalistic views shared among Asian and African countries, but also showcased the state's philosophical views as narrated by their founding fathers and presented at the 1955 conference. For example, the Minister of India (External Affairs), Sushma Swaraj, and the Minister of State (External Affairs), Gen (retd) VK Singh, were criticised for their 2015 AAC commemoration speeches because they failed to mention the crucial role of Nehru in the Bandung Conference in 1955.<sup>70</sup> The narrative of the Bandung Principles is continuously used as a force to challenge Western hegemony in economics, politics and cultural orders with a spirit of win-win, mutual learning and promotion of peace in global forums. For example, this notion was reiterated by President Xi Jinping in his speech to the UN General Assembly in 2015, which placed a particular focus on Africa.<sup>71</sup> Thus, the leaders' speeches highlighted the importance of the Southern narrative, as recited throughout the commemoration events, to keep the memory of the 1955 narrative alive.

### *Interpretation of the Presidents' Speeches*

In the context of the Indonesian presidents' speeches in particular, the narratives can be analysed according to three aspects that defined the event. The first aspect involves identifying the consistency of the language and terminology used and how the leaders interpreted the speeches. The terms 'solidarity', 'anti-colonialism' and 'peaceful coexistence' were regularly used in the presidents' speeches. These terms have strong symbolism that is connected to the philosophical stances of Asia and Africa. The contents of non-intervention, solidarity and anti-colonialism brought meaning to Asia-Africa as a movement using terms

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<sup>70</sup> The Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, did not attend the 2015 AAC commemoration celebration, and he also has a different political affiliation with the Nehru/Gandhi Clan in India's current political contestation (<http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/bandung-conference-nehru-missing-from-indias-speeches/> [accessed 19 December 2017]).

<sup>71</sup> This was identified during President Xi Jinping's speech at the UN General Assembly in 2015 ([https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/70/70\\_ZH\\_en.pdf](https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/70/70_ZH_en.pdf) [accessed 20 December 2017]).

that link the politics, culture and society of the countries (Abdulgani, 1964; Acharya, 2011). The history of the movement also conveyed the ideas and ideology of Southern countries' nationalism. However, the definitions of the words have been modified or restructured within the current context of the government. For example, Widodo redefined the term 'solidarity' to connect the importance of trade, interregional cooperation, infrastructure needs and maritime linkages among Southern countries<sup>72</sup> (GOI, 2015d). The definition of 'solidarity' has shifted from the context used by Soekarno in 1955 and has been redefined by Widodo within his own political narrative. Thus, the definitions of 'solidarity', 'non-intervention' and 'anti-colonialism' are fluid and politically driven by the interpretation of Indonesia's leaders.

The second aspect is national interest, which is included in the presidents' speeches. The 1955 conference did not provide specific operational guidance (Kahin, 1956; Shimazu, 2014; Weinstein, 1965); therefore, the leaders' statements have been rephrased and restructured to further interpret the 1955 results and conditions that appeared during the commemorations. For example, in 2005, SBY's opening speech highlighted the issues around tackling global disasters such as the 2004 tsunami, which struck several countries in Asia, including Indonesia (GOI, 2005b). In contrast, in 2015, Widodo identified several new issues that were in his national policy, including maritime security and illegal drugs, as well as the issue of radicalism, which had become a global concern over the past decade (GOI, 2015a, 2015b). These reflected the leaders' specific political positions in directing the national agenda through their performance in international forums.

The third aspect relates to how the presidents interpret global and national political relations in their speeches using new terminology or by restructuring old messages. The Southern philosophical stances in 1955 have resulted in multiple interpretations that have been modified within the specific objectives of leaders' political agendas. For example, in 1955, to symbolise and acknowledge the different colours and religions of Asian and African nations, Soekarno stated: 'This is the first intercontinental conference of coloured peoples in the

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<sup>72</sup> Widodo contextualised economic cooperation within the solidarity notion as follows:

Second, solidarity. We must grow together, by increasing and expanding trade and investment between us. We must develop inter-regional economic cooperation between Asia and Africa, by helping each other in strengthening connectivity among us, by building infrastructure that connects our ports, our airports, and our roads. (GOI, 2015d)

history of mankind!’ (GOI, 1955b; Kahin, 1956). In comparison, at the commemoration celebration in 1985, Soeharto stated:

Thirty years ago, Southern countries demonstrated unity from differences [in their] political ideologies and social economies. They united because of their willingness to be together, as experienced by Indonesia. Thus, our country’s ideology states ‘*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*’ or ‘Unity in Diversity’ to acknowledge the differences within unity (GOI, 1985).

This is contextualised within the subjective background of Indonesia’s national ideology and its different ethnic groups, religions, languages and customs. On the other hand, it also reiterated Soeharto’s intention to play a bigger role in Southern cooperation.

In comparison, Widodo’s speech identified the concept of ‘peaceful coexistence’ as projected in Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda to maintain peace in Palestine.<sup>73</sup> These interpretations show how the narrative has been modified within specific political agendas that the presidents have perceived and interpreted, but not necessarily with the agreement of other Asian and African countries. Further, Widodo continued to reiterate the challenges faced by Southern countries within the global economic order by criticising global economic hegemony. He observed the importance of building stronger economic cooperation among Asian and African countries, and he criticised the unequal global economic order that is dominated by particular international financial institutions (GOI, 2015d). Widodo noted that:

We also feel the global injustice when a group of established nations are reluctant to recognise that the world has changed. The view that the world economic problems can only be solved by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the ADB is an outdated view. I am of the view that the management of the global economy cannot be left only to the three international financial institutions. We must build a new global economic order that is open to new emerging economic powers. We push for a reform of the global financial architecture to eliminate the domination of one group of countries over other countries. The world needs a collective global leadership, which is exercised in a just and responsible manner. Indonesia as a newly emerging economic force, as a country with the largest

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<sup>73</sup> This illustrates Widodo’s foreign policy agenda of projecting an image of Indonesia as ‘moderate Muslim’ to support other Muslim countries.

Muslim population on earth, and as the third largest democracy, stands ready to play a global role as a positive (influence) to fulfil the noble goal (GOI, 2015d).

President Jokowi also reiterated the importance of SSC and the Bandung Spirit in three core objectives: 1) strengthening cooperation to achieve prosperity by eradicating poverty, improving education and health, promoting science and technology, and providing jobs; 2) creating solidarity among Asian–African countries through interregional economic cooperation and supporting connectivity by building infrastructures; and 3) creating internal and external stability through respect for human rights and conflict resolution (Indonesia, 2015b). These narratives also include building and renewing a model of cooperation within an international economic system that has been dominated by international economic regimes (GOI, 2015a). Furthermore, these narratives were fairly consistent with Widodo’s vision and mission that he reiterated in *Nawacita*, or nine development priorities, which focus development on infrastructure building and improving economic cooperation, as discussed in Chapter 3. Widodo’s rigorous domestic development agendas pointed out the new form of developmentalism that expanded within Indonesia’s politics sphere (Warburton, 2016, p. 298). These points were also strategically used in the President Widodo’s speeches to identify the government’s political gains and positions regarding particular issues of interest, especially in development and economic cooperation. Thus, the subjectivity of the speeches expanded to form the agendas and interests of the Indonesian Government, including targets to achieve throughout the summit and commemoration celebrations. Table 3 compares the contents of the speeches and the results throughout the years.

**Table 3: Contents of Indonesian Presidents' Speeches and Results of the Asian–African Commemorations**

Issues	Soekarno (1955) <sup>74</sup>	Soeharto (1985, 1995) <sup>75</sup>	SBY (2005) <sup>76</sup>	Widodo (2015) <sup>77</sup>
<b>Speech theme</b>	Nationalism and anti-colonialism in Asia and Africa (Abdulgani, 1964).	Joint celebration of Asian–African conference commemorations and the opening of the NAM conference.	Reinvigorating the Bandung Spirit: Working toward a new Asian–African strategic partnership. <sup>78</sup>	Strengthening SSC to promote world peace and prosperity.
<b>Speech content</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Importance of creating moral values to create peace.</li> <li>• Colonialism in various forms, including economic control, intellectual control and physical control, should be eliminated.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reiterate the Bandung Principles as the Asia–Africa commitment.</li> <li>• Create a new priority and restructure old priorities.</li> <li>• Respect authority and non-intervention.</li> <li>• Provide support to achieve social justice without military intervention.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ten principles as the ethics of international relations.</li> <li>• Support the UN and the NAM to support social and economic development.</li> <li>• Create a dialogue and a peaceful resolution.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Power inequality and global injustice, including demand for UN reform and reform on global financial architecture.</li> <li>• War against radicalism and illegal drugs.</li> <li>• Maintain the safety of the sea and ports and increase maritime cooperation.</li> </ul>
<b>Speech issues</b>		Nuclear weapons and their proliferation.	Establish a new Asia–Africa strategic partnership to pool resources.	Independence of Palestine and special connection with the Islamic world.
<b>Special contents in speech</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rephrase Indonesia's national ideology of 'unity in diversity' as the core value.</li> <li>• Use ASEAN as the example for regional cooperation.</li> </ul>	Joint leaders' statement on the tsunami, earthquake and other disasters.	Three core objectives: prosperity, including poverty eradication; solidarity linked with trade, interregional cooperation, infrastructure and maritime bridges; and internal and external stability and respect for human rights.

<sup>74</sup> GOI, Soekarno's Opening Speech at the AAC, 1955.

<sup>75</sup> GOI, Soeharto's Opening Speech at the AAC Commemorations, 1985 and 1995.

<sup>76</sup> GOI, Susilo Bambang Yudoyono's Speech at the Opening of the AAC Commemoration, 2005

<sup>77</sup> GOI, Joko Widodo's Opening Speech at the Asian - African Summit (AAC Commemoration Ceremony), 2015.

<sup>78</sup> Pamphlet, 'Museum of the Asian–African Conference', Directorate of Public Diplomacy, Department of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta 2007.

Issues	Soekarno (1955) <sup>74</sup>	Soeharto (1985, 1995) <sup>75</sup>	SBY (2005) <sup>76</sup>	Widodo (2015) <sup>77</sup>
<b>Final declarations/ conference results document</b>	Communiqué and ten Bandung Principles.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nine principles of Bandung.</li> <li>• Established the NAASP.</li> </ul>	Bandung message: Strengthen SSC to promote world peace and prosperity. Declaration on reinvigorating the new Asia–Africa strategic partnership (cooperation in economic, health, food security, education and others).
<b>Content and commitment of commemoration declaration</b>	Economic cooperation, cultural cooperation, human rights for self-determination, colonies’ problems, world peace and international cooperation, and others.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support Palestinians.</li> <li>• Support multilateral, interregional and subregional cooperation.</li> <li>• New framework in political solidarity, economic cooperation and social–cultural relations.</li> </ul>	Strengthen cooperation among Asian and African countries. Closer and more inclusive SSTC.
<b>Other documents</b>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Joint declaration on Asian–African business community.</li> <li>• Joint ministerial declaration.</li> <li>• Joint NGO declaration.</li> <li>• Capacity-building for 1,000 Palestinians.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NAASP capacity-building for Palestine with commitment to support 10,000 Palestinians.</li> </ul>
<b>International background</b>	Cold War.	Cold War.	Post-Cold War.	New re-emerging donor countries/Global South.
<b>Southern/ international forums</b>		NAM, G-77.	NAM, G77.	G20, BRICS/IBSA, AIIB, UNDCF, GPEDC.

Source: Author’s own compilation.

These three points of analysis of the Indonesian presidents’ speeches show that the subjectivity of the presidents’ national agenda was reflected in each speech. The speeches were used as political tools to recognise Soekarno’s ideas, but also showcase each president’s agenda to a broader audience. Some of the issues did not reflect the notion of Bandung in 1955 and were more about how the president perceived the political momentum for his national targets. In contrast, issues such as economic hegemony and political colonialism continued to be discussed and reconceptualised within current global cooperation. These

themes have changed little in relation to the benefit and commonality of Southern countries. For Indonesia, upon examining the speeches by presidents SBY and Widodo, it can be observed that the Asian–African commemoration celebration pointed to the presidents’ political and national positions among the Southern countries. However, their vague points on the intended implementation of the AAC celebration also signified the meaning of Southern cooperation and affected relations throughout the continued narratives of the concept of ‘solidarity’ driven by the leaders’ political position. Thus, it is also important to explore the Asian–African commitment documents to identify the empirical priorities of Southern cooperation that expand beyond the narratives and symbolic acts.

### **From *Dasasila* Bandung to the Renewed Partnership: Behind the Symbolic Politics**

The AAC and commemoration celebrations were formed using specific symbolism and rituals that are narrated through the walks, the presidents’ speeches and the language used. These rituals and speeches signify the social movement aspects of Asian and African nations in a way that maintains the historical narratives and social relations among the countries. Although the Asian–African Countries did not go to Bandung with the same objectives (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2015, p. 10), every commemoration event has resulted in communiqués and leader agreements or other related documents. Abdulgani (1964) noted that results such as communiqués are tangible products of the conference and powerful tools of its existence. Referring to *Dasasila* Bandung, the NAASP 2005 and 2015 outlined the meaning behind the symbolic acts performed during the conference. The results of the AAC and the commemoration signified the continued debates and legacies of SSC in global development cooperation (Acharya, 2016b; Devetak, Dunne, & Nurhayati, 2016; Kilby, 2018). Three frameworks of Southern cooperation can be reiterated to identify and capture the significant results from the perspective of Indonesia’s policy on cooperation.

First, the partnership documents reiterate the norms and ideological stance of Southern cooperation in *Dasasila* Bandung. Indonesia is responsible for maintaining the AAC norms as conducted in Bandung. The cooperation acknowledges human rights, the state’s self-determination and independence from colonialism, and these issues continue to be narrated and supported within the cooperation (Acharya, 2016b; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2015). The 10 Bandung Principles adopted by the Southern countries and translated into the global policy

setting, including by the UN, continue to be reiterated within the NAM and by the Southern leaders, as well as in the NAASP of the AAC commemorations (Assie-Lumumba, 2015; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2015). For Indonesia, the Bandung Spirits are embedded in its foreign policy priorities linked with the state's ideology. For example, the importance of campaigning for Palestinian freedom and the peace process is reiterated in the new partnership document. Further, the document is committed to supporting Palestine through the capacity-building of 1,000 Palestinians in 2005 to 10,000 Palestinians in 2015 (GOI, 2005a, 2015a). The program and narrative around the Palestine issue is one of Indonesia's main foreign policy priorities that continue to be supported, including through Indonesia's SSC capacity-building program (NCT-SSTC, 2015a). Thus, the principles are contextualised within the country's policy and agenda priorities to remain relevant in the global development cooperation framework.

The second framework is relations with Northern countries and other partners. Although these results have challenged the global development debates of Western ideology and the global norms of cooperation (Acharya, 2016b; Devetak, Dunne & Nurhayati, 2016), cooperation with Western countries was not built in the context of competitiveness. For example, the communiqué and result documents of the NAASP acknowledge the setting of cooperation with Western countries as 'peaceful coexistence' (Assie-Lumumba, 2015; Kilby, 2017a; Nesadurai, 2005). Further, SBY rephrased the term as 'new Asian-African partnership' (GOI, 2005a) to observe the renewed direction of the AAC in 2005 and its aim to remain relevant to conditions in the Global South (Assie-Lumumba, 2015, pp. 7-8). For example, in 2015, the NAASP stated that SSC is an alternative to Northern cooperation, and the triangular relationship with Northern partners was also acknowledged (GOI, 2015b). Further, the results point to the expansion of the actors involved in building cooperation between people, businesses and NGOs (GOI, 2005a). This issue remained significant in the 2015 documents and amid the broader involvement of stakeholders in the cooperation (GOI, 2015a, 2015b). The inclusive partnership is acknowledged in expanding and facilitating cooperation with different actors and settings. Thus, the broader collaboration with Northern countries and non-state actors is considered significant and substantial for policy development in SSC.

Third, the contents of the NAASP restated that Southern cooperation is shaped within political, economic and cultural cooperation, as noted in the 1955 final communiqué (Assie-Lumumba, 2015, pp. 7-8). The cooperation sits within politics, economics and cultural settings

that have continued to be renewed and restructured over time. For Indonesia as the host country, the setting of the cooperation has continued to acknowledge these three aspects linked with the cooperation. For example, the theme of the 2015 Asian–African Summit showed that the narrative of ‘prosperity’ facilitated an understanding that cooperation had resulted in wealth creation among the member countries (GOI, 2015b). Despite the implementation being understood within different contexts and settings, SSC is not merely about economic cooperation, but also about political and cultural cooperation, which have continued to be renewed and reiterated within current conditions.

The results of the Bandung Conference—especially its partnership commitment in one way or another—are expected to drive the direction and position of Southern countries within contemporary global development cooperation. The results reiterate the direction of Indonesian policy setting for SSC—in particular, the mechanism and priorities program. The conference results and the renewed partnership help state agencies to shape their cooperation. The patterns and practices of maintaining the idea of SSC through rituals and commitment documents signify Indonesia’s position, which was negotiated within development cooperation. Thus, the meaning that is symbolised and ritualised through the celebration performances reveals a political narrative and maintains the power relations of cooperation. This leads to two questions: What is the practical meaning of symbolism in Southern cooperation? And why do Southern states—in this case, Indonesia—deem it necessary to maintain and preserve these symbolic patterns of SSC?

### **Practical Meaning of Symbolism**

As discussed earlier, to celebrate the idea of SSC, Indonesia has continued to perform the tradition through the narrative of ideology, speeches, rituals and joint commitments of the AAC. These values, norms and practices have become essential settings that have shaped the narrative of Indonesian SSC. The patterns create symbolism for the collective act of cooperation and distinguish Southern cooperation from Northern cooperation. This aligns with Cohen’s (1974) definition of symbolism as ‘the object, concept, or linguistic formations that gave meaning to human actions through systematised performance including ritual, ceremony and gift exchange’ (p. ix). These symbolic interpretations help to define the discourses, languages and rituals used to perform the narrative of SSC. However, symbolism

cannot stand on its own because it is shaped through a structure that contextualises the symbolism (Bourdieu, 1989; Cohen, 1974). This raises the question of how symbolism is assembled within the structure of relations in SSC.

### **Structure of Symbolism**

The exploration of symbolism cannot be separated from the presence of habitual behaviours of the agent and its institution, as well as social relations and the practices that create patterns that engage within shared common beliefs (Bourdieu, 1989; Leander, 2008). Symbolism can be performed by agents as individuals and groups within specific structures or institutions to build social relations (Cohen, 1974, p. xi). Wendt (1999) noted that the state has agency to react and respond to conditions, especially in relations with other countries (Hattori, 2003; Wendt, 1999). Agents share a common meaning in values, norms and vocabulary as they interact in the field. Therefore, the agency of the state is able to create particular acts to nurture the shared images, narratives and vocabulary or languages (Esteves & Assunção, 2014; Mawdsley, 2012a). Further, the acts or habits of the agent are linked with the *doxa* or value implemented within specific rules or ideologies (Leander, 2008, p. 17). These notions help to understand the role of the state in preserving the sentiment of Southern cooperation within the international context, and they signify the modernisation of cooperation in specific rules and roles that interplay within the relations. Therefore, the symbol is maintained and structured within government narratives and policies of cooperation, including in development aid.

Analysis of the agents' perspectives and institutional frameworks leads to an understanding of the symbolic meaning performed by political actors and the model of cooperation established in Southern countries. In contrast, the agency of state leaders also signifies the narratives in understanding specific roles, or *doxa*, because rules that are perceived are also commonly accepted by others in the same field in responding to their surroundings (Bourdieu, 1989; Esteves & Assunção, 2014). For example, Southern leaders' narratives of solidarity, despite the fluid political meaning perceived, can be understood within the context of Southern cooperation and are structured within the leaders' political agendas to reflect their domestic policy (Mawdsley, 2011; Strauss, 2009). Therefore, common languages and

narratives help to shape the structure of relations that actors demonstrated in the Southern cooperation.

Two types of actors in the state construct the setting of the symbolism: political leaders and bureaucrats. Politicians have the agency to play out symbolic power through political discourse in public (Cohen, 1974, pp. xi–xii). Bureaucrats are the regulators of the state who define the leaders' policies. A domestic power struggle is contested in how the state frames cooperation and builds the discourses, narratives and rituals reflected in the state's policy, including how it shapes relations with Southern countries (Mawdsley, 2011; Strauss, 2009). In the presidential state system, bureaucrats play a role in constructing ideas of cooperation in policy implementation. However, the position of political leaders and bureaucrats depends on their social–political views, which affect their decisions. Thus, rhetoric and language that continue to be reiterated by state apparatuses provide a way for the government to remain relevant within its sphere in SSC and in the global development cooperation context (Strauss, 2009, p. 793). Further, this dynamic symbolic relation can create unique features that might be similar or different to the processes that other states experience.

Common perspectives on cooperation perceived by Southern countries also lead to the concept of cooperation that they share within the international institution of cooperation. This 'field' is a social space that is structured so that agents can articulate their activities and purposes (Leander, 2008, p. 17). However, the setting of Southern cooperation is also structured at the national level of the institution represented by the agent, which is consciously able to navigate its acts and positions within wider society (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 14). As the 'field' in the structure of Bourdieu's symbolism, an institution is recognised as a social group that is structured as a social class. For example, the domestic institutions of Southern countries struggle to establish the narrative of SSC within the domestic setting and fit the narrative into their development target priorities (Esteves & Assunção, 2014, p. 1783). Further, the international institutions of the South are also recognised within the UN system and the OECD–DAC, which are shaped within the context of the Northern partners (Esteves & Assunção, 2014, p. 1779). These two fields of institutions are connected within the dynamic relations of the agents that can create, constrain or sustain cooperation. The structure of institutions raises the question of how symbolism contextualises and constructs power relations in SSC.

## **Symbolism and Social Relations in Development Cooperation**

As discussed in Chapter 1, gift exchange in Southern countries is defined within the context of Mauss's gift theory. It is defined as a symbol that indicates specific moral relations that the actors perceive. Bourdieu (1990, p. 126) identified that the nature of giving and receiving creates symbolic power relations among the actors involved in the process of recognition. Power relations are always 'a two-way control perceived by both agents in a field' or within the development of cooperation (Giddens, 1979, p. 6). Therefore, an agent can perceive power relations as asymmetric/unequal or symmetric/equal within symbolic relations based on their values, norms and practices (Bourdieu, 1989; Carmody, 2013; Esteves & Assunção, 2014; Mawdsley, 2012b). Symbolism also induces the creation of the politics of cooperation with specific conditions, whereby an exchange relation that is shaped within equivalent or reciprocal conditions and that endures the broad autonomy of agents may lead to a lasting and reliable relationship (Bourdieu, 1997; Silk, 2004). Therefore, these perspectives have been debated within two contexts of aid cooperation: North–South relations (Furia, 2015; Hattori, 2003) and South–South relations (Eyben, 2006; Mawdsley, 2012b). Differences can be seen in how symbolic meaning is perceived within the cooperation. These notions help to define the power relations that emerged in development cooperation between North–South and South–South, and that Southern countries perceived within the two elements discussed below.

The first element is the power relations that are shaped between North–South countries within the narratives of aid cooperation. These relations indicate an unequal context of cooperation whereby power relations are derived from the symbolic structure of dominance (Esteves & Assunção, 2014; Hattori, 2001). This vertical relation is affected by the perception that North–South cooperation is based on charitable acts of giving, as well as postcolonial relations and the neoliberal context of aid (Carmody, 2013; Hattori, 2003; Mawdsley, 2012b; Silk, 2004). In this narrative, the North and the South had different perceptions of the relationship. The position of the recipient country in donor–recipient relations was often considered passive, and the agent lacked the ability to react to specific situations (Silk, 2004, p. 230). For example, the narrative did not acknowledge how the agent or recipient country shaped relations within this setting, including how the *doxis* (structural relations among agents) aligned with the values, norms and institutions of the cooperation (Esteves & Assunção, 2014; Leander, 2008). Then, symbolic violence was formed in a move away from

the misrecognition of the other agent (Leander, 2008, p. 19). Therefore, the setting of SSC was established as a response to asymmetric relations as well as symbolic domination or symbolic violence to North–South relations (Carmody, 2013; Esteves & Assunção, 2014; Silk, 2004). Consequently, SSC was considered a social movement and a response to experiences with Northern donors that reflected on the way they formed relations among Southern countries.

The second element is power relations among Southern countries, which are demonstrated by the symbolic partnership within the cooperation (Esteves & Assunção, 2014; Mawdsley, 2012b). Power relations are considered horizontal because Southern countries share prevailing narratives of cooperation, including shared experiences, shared ideology and shared identity with articulation of partnership, win–win and mutual benefit (Carmody, 2013; Esteves & Assunção, 2014; Mawdsley, 2011, 2012b). This symbolic cooperation has been continuously ritualised through speeches, statements, performances and high-level meetings and has created a symbolic regime of Southern countries (Mawdsley, 2012a), including those mentioned earlier. These diplomatic and cooperation values are distinct from North–South cooperation and identify the social relations within SSC. Thus, to maintain unity and harmony, this symbolism continues to be presented within Southern countries. Bilateral relations among Southern countries and with Northern donors also cannot be detached from continued consensus-building and power relations (Esteves & Assunção, 2014, p. 1779). For example, the relation between China and Africa is maintained through its leaders using symbolic narratives of Southern cooperation (Carmody, 2013; Strauss, 2009). This relation is also influenced by the domestic structure of Southern countries, which creates and maintains specific symbolic narratives to support the state’s political agendas.

Identifying power relations and symbolic relations between North–South and South–South countries provides an understanding of how states position themselves within these narratives of relations. Symbolic relations are established to give meaning to the current development cooperation, and its policies are created by state agents and institutions. Existing institutions and the role of agents in defining themselves in global cooperation indicate the symbolic nature of aid and development. SSC signifies the politics of cooperation modelled as a horizontal social relation, but also as a social movement from the vertical relations model of North–South relations (Carmody, 2013; Esteves & Assunção, 2014; Mawdsley, 2011). This notion is reflected in two perspectives. The first is a communal act of

cooperation within the setting of Southern institutional cooperation in the international and domestic spheres. The second is bilateral Southern cooperation, whereby leaders identify their narrative of political–economic ideas of cooperation within the narrative of partnership. These symbolic relations cannot be separated from the power relations that are shaped in cooperation because symbolic meanings in cooperation can also stimulate the configuration of specific structures. Therefore, these symbolic meanings are significant in the exploration of the state in defining its position and policy in SSC within the overall debates on development cooperation and in relation to other Southern countries, as will be explored further in this thesis.

## **Conclusion**

On the significance of ideology, Geertz (1983, p. 143) argued that although the structure and expression in society changes, the inner necessities that animate perceptions do not change. In globalised aid relations, the ideological content of Southern cooperation remains relevant in indicating the Southern setting of relations. The norms and values that are maintained and preserved through conference celebrations remain significant in bringing Asian and African countries together and identifying the legacy of SSC. Although each country has evolved both politically and economically, the contents of the Bandung Conference have been maintained and preserved. The verbal and non-verbal rhetoric of the AAC that are ritualised and narrated produce a distinct meaning of social relations of Southern Cooperation within global development cooperation. The ideological stand also leads to a debate on the implications of Southern cooperation. Therefore, the fundamental settings of cooperation in the current development cooperation between Northern countries and among Southern countries are constructed in different power dimensions and structures.

The content of Southern cooperation indicates the practical meanings of development cooperation in which the symbolic acts of cooperation can be considered two sides of the same coin. On one side is the symbolic partnership and horizontal relations that are maintained among Southern countries. The partnership model and narratives have defined Southern cooperation until recently. On the other side, Southern cooperation is constructed to disrupt the vertical relations that have evolved and been upheld in North–South relations. These two consequences of Southern cooperation have resulted in the content and

progression of the idea of giving in SSC. The agents, field and institutions that will be explored in the following chapters have structured the narrative and implementation of the process of giving within different sets of social relations, despite the substance of ideology always being attached to cooperation. Therefore, the symbolic interpretation of Southern cooperation signifies the different ideas of giving that appear in the development cooperation analysis between North–South Cooperation and SSC. This leads to the question of how symbolic cooperation can be interpreted and implemented by state institutions and their agents to construct the structure of Southern cooperation and global development cooperation.



## Chapter 5 Research Methods

### Introduction

Chapter 4 explored the ideology, statements, norms and rituals that symbolise the structure of South–South Cooperation (SSC) in the case of Indonesia. This chapter aims to outline the research methods used to answer the research question, including data gathering and analysis in the public policy setting to explore the case of Indonesia’s SSC. Despite the definitions and experiences of other Southern countries, SSC in Indonesia has been largely dominated by discourses and interpretations by the government (especially bureaucrats and officials). This chapter shows how the qualitative methods used in this research are appropriate for identifying and exploring the perceptions, understanding and meaning of the narratives and symbolism of SSC as perceived and maintained by bureaucrats as policymakers, and other development actors, including through primary government documents (Aldiabat & Navenec, 2011; Ritchie & Spencer, 2002; Tummers & Karsten, 2012). To obtain a deeper understanding of the discourse and the idea of giving understood by bureaucrats, grounded theory with a single case study is used as a systematic methodology to gather and analyse data linked with the case. Further, this chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the qualitative method used in the research, including the design and methodology. The second section explores the research stages from preparation to the data gathering and collection process in Indonesia and Myanmar, as well as the data analysis procedure. It will also identify the rationale and challenges in the research and analysis process, which will contribute to broader knowledge and debates in the study of development cooperation.

### Qualitative Research Methods

Qualitative methods have been used to obtain more details and nuances to understand, explain, explore and interpret the social behaviour of the actors involved in SSC. These methods help to analyse the expressions of the stakeholders and symbolism in the narratives, speeches and policy documents in the government’s development cooperation policy (Aldiabat & Navenec, 2011; Ercan, Hendriks, & Boswell, 2017; Kennedy, 2014; Leander, 2011; Ritchie & Spencer, 2002; Stewart, 2012; Tummers & Karsten, 2012). The purpose of this qualitative research is also to comprehend the uniqueness of the public policy setting and identify detailed stories, information and characteristics of SSC at the state level.

In qualitative research that depends on face-to-face interviews with respondents, gaining access to respondents in a public policy setting (i.e., government officials, policymakers and bureaucrats) can be challenging (Wedel, Shore, Feldman, & Lathrop, 2005, p. 41). Given that this research involves government officials as key informants in interviews and observations of Indonesia's SSC meetings and activities, the researcher also used anthropology of public policy literature as a framework to understand the nuances of research in government settings and offices. However, this thesis is not anthropological research *per se* because the angle and presentation of writing has its foundation in development studies research. My six years of experience as a UNDP consultant for the Indonesian Government on the issue of development cooperation and SSC enabled me to approach and gain access to government offices, especially Government offices working on Indonesia's SSC. Using my networks and previous experiences, I was able to identify key informants and establish early correspondence before starting the fieldwork in Indonesia. My familiarity with the field site, the language and Indonesian office culture assisted in the process of data gathering, including obtaining information that helped develop the context of the study, such as access to government-published data, and attending meetings. Given that SSC is not categorised as a dangerous issue, a senior staff member at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) allowed me to conduct interviews with key government officials in Myanmar (Official 9 [interview], 2016). Further, with permission from senior officials at the Indonesian embassy in Myanmar and the embassy of Myanmar in Indonesia, the interview process in Myanmar was conducted.

In a public policy research setting, interactions between the interviewer and respondents—especially with bureaucrats and policymakers—involve a certain degree of power relations. The interviews also involved ethical notions related to conducting research in government offices and institutions (Conti & O'Neil, 2007; Marshall, 1984; Wedel, Shore, Feldman, & Lathrop, 2005). Consequently, the research in the public policy setting was conducted in formal settings. For example, the interviews with officials were conducted in government offices and adhered to a strict schedule based on formal request letters. Participant observations were also conducted upon receiving an invitation or permission from related government officials. The primary government documents were collected based on official published and open access documents. Further, to identify and analyse the data, the research methodology, design and tools used are outlined below.

### **Grounded Theory as Methodology**

Grounded theory is used to construct specific or common experiences to generate a substantive theory that will be explored in research (Aldiabat & Navenec, 2011; Charmaz, 2014; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2012; Ralph, Birks, & Chapman, 2015). In grounded theory, data are collected through primary interviews using systemic and interpretative procedures that enable the theory and procedure to be developed. Procedures in grounded theory are recognised by an inductive set of analyses whereby continuous comparisons of data and analysis are conducted with other primary data to evolve information, concepts and theories. Theories then emerge from the data, but are not enforced by data collection or analysis. Further, explanatory theories are developed based on the data analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Tummers & Karsten, 2012). The conception of grounded theory that is explored in this thesis is the phenomenon and implementation of SSC, especially in the case of Indonesia. It identifies causal situations and perceptions of the context, such as the definition, process or activities of giving and sharing that are narrated and symbolised in Indonesia's SSC. This methodology helps the researcher to identify the significance of the strategies used and the conditions applied within specific contexts—in this case, identifying and interpreting definitions and exploring relations among SSC stakeholders and policy development.

Grounded theory can also be used to explore gaps in SSC, especially in historical, ideological, cultural and policy contexts (Charmaz, 2014; Tummers & Karsten, 2012). It identifies the discourse that has emerged in Indonesia, especially among decision-makers, bureaucrats, implementing agencies, development partners and experts. In this case, grounded theory examines the theoretical context and situations that have evolved in SSC in Indonesia. This study specifically examines the narratives in the context of Indonesia's SSC and the perceptions of another country (in this case, Myanmar) regarding Indonesia's SSC. The study also assesses how internal or domestic politics and external factors have affected development policy in Indonesia's SSC, including the roles, relations and experiences of each stakeholder in the government offices involved in SSC. Thus, grounded theory enables the researcher to be imaginative in managing and interpreting the data, and to find appropriate alternative solutions including managing any problems throughout the research process.

## **Research Design of Case Study**

A case study method was applied in this research to generate a specific context and provide a detailed assessment of the interpretation and meaning of SSC. The case study method is used when exploring a smaller case in a detailed manner using multiple sources of information, problems drawn from in-depth interviews, government documents and participant observations (Stewart, 2012; Yin, 2012). Case studies are also used to obtain a deeper understanding of specific issues to support arguments by identifying the thorough implementation of specific activities (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Klotz, 2008; Yin, 2012) and gaps in theory and generalised themes (Siggelkow, 2007, p. 21). This case study compares specific relations of Southern cooperation with the literature on SSC, including the presentation of case studies in other Southern countries (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Siggelkow, 2007).

This research specifically focuses on the Indonesian aid program to Myanmar as a case study on Indonesia's SSC. Myanmar was chosen because it has a long history of relations with Indonesia and was also one of the leading countries of the Asian–African Conference 1955. The Indonesia–Myanmar case study helps to develop the interpretation of theories and construct a theoretical generalisation (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2006). The case of Indonesia's SSC is identified from the government's narratives on SSC, the policy on SSC and activities and modalities that are conducted and captured from the relationship developed with Myanmar and its international role in development cooperation. The purpose is to analyse specific characteristics of the notion of giving, including the rituals, narratives and practices of Indonesia's SSC. Thus, the data gathered through this case study can provide content and analysis to the research within a particular interpretation of the theoretical debates on SSC.

## **Research Tools and Data Resources**

### **Key Informant Interviews**

To build the case for Indonesia's SSC, the main research tool used was key informant interviews. The selection of informants was important to obtain substantial insights and perspectives into how the state constructs SSC policy (Myers & Newman, 2007; Tongco, 2007).

Kothari (2005a, p. 47) noted that the narratives of administrators and government officials can help provide the context and meaning of policy within contemporary development settings. Therefore, the actors interviewed during the fieldwork were defined based on the positions of the officials, their roles in policymaking in relation to issues of Indonesia's SSC, their experiences and expertise, as well as their knowledge of the issues (Marshall, 1996; Wedel, Shore, Feldman, & Lathrop, 2005). Bureaucrats' knowledge—including on SSC and development cooperation—was obtained, including through their established networks and understanding of the domestic and foreign policy context of the issue during their specific assignment in the Government office (Dezalay & Garth, 2002, p. 43). The challenge in this public policy research relates to impartiality and objectivity in analysing the issues, because senior officials in the government have added a degree of subjectivity to the meaning of SSC. However, they also enriched the analysis—for example, their perspective on specific events compared with the information provided by news outlets, which often did not present all of the information.

In addition to the network I had established before conducting the fieldwork, key informants were identified based on recommendations from stakeholders who had been interviewed. This process is referred to as the 'targeted snowball technique' because it recognises or captures information based on key informants' nominations of relevant stakeholders (Conti & O'Neil, 2007; Farquharson, 2005; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). Based on these suggestions and recommendations, I conducted interviews with relevant stakeholders who were significant to the research. This process expanded the sample size and provided important information. As the officials of the government institutions changed over time, suggestions to meet specific people supported the identification of additional key stakeholders in the data gathering process. This method helped to expand and deepen the data gathering process by providing broader knowledge and evidence of the topic under investigation.

For the central data collection process, one-on-one in-depth interviews were conducted with selected key informants using guiding questions (see Annex 1), and the interview process was noted and recorded using audio tools. The semi-structured interviews were conducted using open-ended and semi-closed guiding questions, as well as improvised questions in response to interesting issues and answers (Myers & Newman, 2007, p. 4). All stakeholders were asked the same questions, but the exploratory questions differed based on the dynamics of the

interview, including responses to questions, knowledge and experiences. These additional probing questions were asked to obtain more detailed facts and information (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Yin, 2012). Before conducting the interviews, a primary assessment was conducted of the participants' background and their role or position within the government structure or institution to prepare specific questions if necessary. Thus, at times, the discussions went beyond the specific notions and interpretations of the stakeholders based on their knowledge and experiences of SSC.

All interviews with government officials in Indonesia were conducted in *Bahasa Indonesia*, and interviews with non-Indonesian expatriates were conducted in English. All interviews with stakeholders in Myanmar were conducted in English without an interpreter, because the respondents spoke English very well, even though their first language was not English. Given that the research topic of SSC was not considered a politically sensitive issue, and given the availability of a formal letter, there was no rejection or resistance from the government in conducting the interviews. In some interviews, the key informants or high-level officials brought related staff members to help answer questions and provide additional information and data. Interviews with the key partners were conducted twice at the most to obtain more insights and extra details regarding specific information. The decision to conduct no more than two interviews with important interviewees was also based on consideration of their availability, especially because most of the senior staff members were very busy. Once the interviews with the designated officials had been conducted, junior staff members were more than willing to provide additional information.

All scheduled interviews with senior-level officials were conducted in government offices and in a formal setting. The settings for interviewing government officials—particularly in places where I had not established a network, and especially in Myanmar, where the government was previously a military government and the setting of the government remains top-down—were formal and reserved. To enter and request an interview with an official, a process had to be followed, which involved sending a formal request letter and related documents to the designated officials. Thus, a formal request letter was prepared and sent to the highest-level structural officials in the department. The letters had to include full names, correct titles and

departments, and the name of the country had to be acknowledged clearly and correctly.<sup>79</sup> The request letter also included the project information sheet (PIS) as agreed upon by the Australian National University (ANU) ethics office, as well as the list of questions to be asked in the interview. These documents helped the interviewees to identify and prepare related materials, data and information relating to their tasks and responsibilities.

Interviews with junior staff members were conducted in a more informal setting to provide background or insights into situations. However, in the case of Myanmar, it was impossible to request an informal meeting with staff members or more junior-level officers without the approval of senior-level staff or their superior. All junior staff members declined to use their names in the research, and the answers given were considered informal responses to the questions. Interviews with staff were conducted in various places, including restaurants, coffee shops and office cafeterias. The locations indicated the formality of the information and the level of information gathered, as interviews with senior officials were always conducted in their office or a government meeting room. As a female researcher in the male-dominated offices of a public policy setting,<sup>80</sup> power relations can be experienced. For example, in some cases, junior staff members were present during the interviews with male senior officials. In contrast, interviews with female senior officials were conducted in a more relaxed manner, and some without the presence of additional staff. The formal letters also helped to maintain formality and protect the researcher from any unnecessary interactions. In another unique experience, I was offered positions or jobs before and during the fieldwork, which I had to decline.<sup>81</sup> This resulted in a backlash because the officials who offered the jobs did not want to provide any information after their offers were declined.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> During an interview with the director general of international organisations of the MOFA in Myanmar, he said that he accepted the interview request because I had acknowledged the correct name of Myanmar as a country. If the letter had identified the country as Burma, he would have disregarded the letter and considered it disrespectful to the state.

<sup>80</sup> Around seven female senior officials (director level) were interviewed, compared with around 20 males.

<sup>81</sup> Before conducting the fieldwork, I was offered an internship position in a government office in Indonesia, but upon consultation with the supervisor, I rejected the offer before the fieldwork was conducted.

<sup>82</sup> During the fieldwork in Indonesia, I was offered a new position as a long-term consultant for the government. I rejected the offer because, ethically, it was not appropriate to work full time and conduct research at the same time and in the same organisation (Marshall, 1984). Further, given that it was a full-time position, it could have hampered my fieldwork and challenged my position as I tried to balance the sensitivity and neutrality of the research. After I declined the job offer, the senior official who had offered the job was reluctant to be approached for further interviews or questions.


### Participant Observation

In addition to the in-depth interviews, participant observations were conducted to enable the researcher to observe people's interactions with others in specific situations (Gans, 2010, p. 2). During the fieldwork, I was allowed to attend several meetings, workshops and events related to SSC that were conducted by the government and donor countries, as well as conferences and events related to SSC in Indonesia (see Annex 4). During the observations, notes were made, photographs were taken if necessary, and informal discussions were conducted before and after the meetings with related stakeholders. To maintain impartiality and positionality in the research, I only conducted observations and did not take part in discussions. The purpose of the observations was to obtain insights into the context of SSC within the internal government discussion process. The government discussed several opinions that were considered confidential, and which I was prohibited from mentioning in the thesis. As mentioned earlier, observations of meetings, workshops and related events could only be conducted if I obtained permission or received an invitation from officials. The observations could not be conducted if authorisation had not been granted.

### Primary Data Collection

To help answer the research questions, information was also gathered from government documents. Primary data and documents included rules and regulations, government reports, concept notes, policy study backgrounds and other related documents (see Annex 3). The primary data collection process was conducted by analysing the detailed information collected during the in-depth interviews. Some primary documents could be accessed directly on the internet because they were open access; however, some data were in the form of hard and soft copies that were obtained from staff members and could be used in the research. To use government documents in the research, I referred to the existing regulation, Government Regulation no. 14/2008 on Accessibility to Government Documents and Information (GOI, 2008) and only used official government-published documents that were accessible and available to the public and researchers as primary sources.

Figure 3: Interlinked Data Resources



## **Research Stages**

### **Pre-fieldwork Preparation**

Several activities were conducted during the preparation phase, including undertaking literature reviews, developing a research proposal and understanding the ethical content in the public policy setting. The literature review and secondary data collection began in February 2015, and ethics clearance was obtained in November 2015. The first step was to develop a broad framework of questions for the semi-structured interviews (see Annex 1) and identify the key informants and policymakers to be interviewed. Identification of respondents was based on their capacity and position in the policy setting within the government. It also included related development partners from donor agencies, experts, consultants and NGOs who directly and indirectly contribute to the decision-making process of SSC. Junior staff members were also identified and targeted because they could provide background and detailed perspectives on situations in the office. Primary government data sources and documents were also listed to be collected during the fieldwork.<sup>83</sup> The preparation also involved listing several possible fieldwork scenarios and potential risks that might appear

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<sup>83</sup> An understanding of Indonesia's regulations on access to government data is essential to avoid any misleading information and to avoid breaking the law regarding public information.

during the fieldwork, especially given that Myanmar was proposed as the second fieldwork location and given my lack of previous experience in Myanmar.

### **Fieldwork and Data Gathering**

Once I had started the fieldwork and conducted preliminary discussions with my former colleagues in the government, I was able to re-identify and recognise key personnel and policymakers among the senior officials involved in Indonesia's SSC. This allowed me to gain access to and classify the published official and government data and documents. My prior knowledge and understanding of the culture and language used by the bureaucrats helped me to understand the government's mechanism and system. However, as my role changed from consultant to researcher, it affected the relations established with the officials. Ethically, it is important to maintain impartiality and distance, but also to balance empathy with respondents. Therefore, an ethnographic method was not used, because I did not work and stay at the government offices for the extended period of the fieldwork; instead, I only visited the offices for scheduled interviews and observations based on invitations from the government to SSC meetings and workshops.

Marshall (1984) stated that 'going native' in the qualitative public policy research setting is ethically prohibited because it can hamper the objectivity of results. 'Going native' in a public policy setting is when the researcher uses their power to deliver information or knowledge, including participating and behaving like a policymaker (Marshall, 1984, p. 244). Although this definition was published in 1984, Marshall's (1984) argument is still relevant in the context of the current research.<sup>84</sup> However, this is a different condition to building networks, as discussed by Wedel, Shore, Feldman and Lathrop (2005, p. 39), who highlighted that the relations between the researcher and policymakers should be uniquely developed (Wedel, Shore, Feldman, & Lathrop, 2005, p. 39). Thus, the positionality of the researcher in public policy research remains important and significant from an ethical perspective to maintain an objective balance within the overall research process. Understanding the context and background conditions of the political and cultural aspects of the countries was also essential

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<sup>84</sup> Marshall's (1984) paper was a reference for the 2017 American Anthropology Association ([http://asap.americananthro.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ASAP\\_NewBibDraft\\_Dec2017.pdf](http://asap.americananthro.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ASAP_NewBibDraft_Dec2017.pdf) [accessed 5 October 2018]).

to identify specific patterns and concepts. The data gathered in this stage were developed into a matrix and short reports to be coded and analysed.

The timeframe for conducting this stage of the research in Indonesia and Myanmar was almost eight months, from mid-February 2016 to the end of September 2016. The fieldwork in Indonesia was conducted over a six-month period from February to May 2016 and then continued from July to September 2016 in Jakarta. The fieldwork in Myanmar explored Indonesian SSC from the perspective of the Myanmar Government and identified relevant activities that were implemented by both countries. It analysed how the recipient Myanmar Government viewed and interpreted Indonesia's SSC and the program that was implemented in Myanmar. I also interviewed relevant stakeholders related to cooperation with Myanmar in Jakarta and gathered primary data. The timeframe for this stage of the research was one month in Yangon and Naw Pyi Taw<sup>85</sup> from early June to early July 2016 based on the limitations of the visa granted by the Embassy of Myanmar in Jakarta. A risk identification process was also conducted to manage potential problems during the data gathering process—for example, responding to delayed or cancelled interview appointments as a result of unforeseen problems.

I interviewed senior government officials such as director generals and deputy ministers, former senior officials, as well as directors and deputy directors from central ministries, including members of the National Coordination Team on South–South and Triangular Cooperation (NCT–SSTC), consisting of the MOFA, State Secretary, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of National Development Planning, as well as implementing ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture and its training department. I also interviewed experts/scholars, donor representatives from multilateral agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs. During the in-depth interviews, the ethics and interview protocol were presented and explained to the interviewees, and permission was sought to write, record and quote the results of the interviews for research purposes. All formal interviewees signed consent forms to clarify whether the data could be utilised in this research. However, given the current political conditions, it is important to protect the informants; therefore, pseudonyms such as 'Senior

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<sup>85</sup> Yangon is a major city in Myanmar in which all international organisations are based, while Nay Pyi Taw is the capital, in which the government offices are based.

Official 1' and 'Official 2' are used to identify interviewees, and detailed information about the interviews is presented in confidential Annex 2 for examiners. In relation to recording, interviews were recorded after obtaining consent from the respondents, and the interviews were transcribed verbatim and stored in a safe place. A total of 81 stakeholders were interviewed during the period of the fieldwork, as outlined in Table 4.

Table 4: List of Participants Interviewed

<b>Countries/ Stakeholders</b>	<b>Indonesia</b>	<b>Myanmar</b>
Government officials <sup>86</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ambassador: 1</li> <li>• Former Minister/Ambassador: 2</li> <li>• Deputy Ministers/Director General: 6</li> <li>• Directors: 11</li> <li>• Deputy Directors: 12</li> <li>• Staff: 7</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ambassador: 1</li> <li>• Director General: 1</li> <li>• Deputy Director General: 1</li> <li>• Deputy Director: 2</li> <li>• Staff: 1</li> </ul>
	Total: 39 people	Total: 6 people
Dev. partners/ donors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Head of Agencies: 3</li> <li>• Team Leaders/Program Managers: 5</li> <li>• Program Officers: 4</li> <li>• Consultants: 11</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Team Leaders/Program Managers: 3</li> </ul>
	Total: 23 people	Total: 3 people
Others	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NGO: 1</li> <li>• Parliament Member: 1</li> <li>• Researchers/experts: 4</li> <li>• Private Sector: 1</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NGO: 1</li> <li>• Researchers/experts: 2</li> </ul>
	Total: 7 people	Total: 3 people
<b>Total</b>	<b>69 respondents interviewed</b>	<b>12 respondents interviewed</b>

<sup>86</sup> The social background of the bureaucrats, especially the senior officials and officials (deputy directors and above) who were interviewed during the fieldwork in 2016 were urban, mostly from Javanese ethnic groups and well educated, with a minimum of a post-graduate or Master's degree (some had graduated from top Western universities such as Harvard, Yale, Columbia and others). Thus, the elite government officials do not necessarily speak for the lower-level groups in general society. However, the exploration and analysis of Indonesia's SSC will not be specifically based on the social background of the interviewees, but on their understanding of the issues and roles within the institutions.

## **Data Analyses**

### *Coding and Analysing the Data*

Based on the data gathered from the three resources (see Figure 3), three types of datasets were produced: selected fieldnotes based on formal and informal discussions with respondents and observations; interviews recorded with consent and transcribed verbatim; and primary documents collected. The datasets were coded according to themes related to the research to make sense of the data and the information provided (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Yin, 2012). In the broader context of the research, data mapping was developed based on the collected data to help analyse and identify connections between the conditions that appeared around the central phenomenon to build upon the theoretical framework (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Yin, 2012). This process assisted in the framing process and supported the exploration of specific stories and content captured. In the mapping and coding process, processes of thinking and detaching from the technical literature and personal experiences were necessary to expand the exploration and analysis of existing data and practicality to the new data by developing lists of concepts or issues (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 538). In this research, the most challenging part was detaching from previous experiences and personal sentiments with the respondents so I could identify and examine the findings clearly. Further, the data analysis process led to the identification of emerging issues and specific content and themes based on the data mapping.

In line with Corbin and Strauss (2008), the process continued with a comparison of the themes to identify connections between the data and the theoretical perspectives. This was followed by a decoding process to understand the meaning of the context throughout the interviews (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 553). This enabled data identification to be conducted in an inductive research process, despite the fact that a deductive process and practice also emerged as part of linking the data and findings with the literature. Based on the data selection process, seven issues were identified: mapping of government roles in SSC, meaning of SSC and development cooperation, norms in development cooperation, motivation and narratives of partnership, policy and institutional arrangements, modalities and implementation, as well as case studies on artificial insemination and Indonesia–Myanmar

Cooperation. Further, the mapping of data and issues was based on the conversations and interviews with government officials, as explored in Chapter 6.

### *Integrating Findings with Concepts, Context and Theory*

After coding and identifying the data, the process continued with the analysis of data for conceptualisation and theorisation (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 604). During the data integration process, the exploration worked in line with the analysis to be linked and contrasted with the philosophical ground, theoretical perspectives, concepts in literature and debates on SSC. This process helped in the identification of knowledge gaps in the areas of study being explored in this research. Therefore, the justification of data, the interpretation of symbols and narratives, and the link between the agent and its structure cannot be separated from the researcher's subjectivity. Within this procedure, five analytical themes were developed into chapters: the history of SSC including on Indonesia's SSC, the symbolic relations of Indonesia's SSC, the meaning of reciprocity in Indonesia–Myanmar relations, the global and national institutional settings of Indonesia's SSC, and the political structure of development cooperation.

These themes identified the unique concepts and contexts within the setting of Indonesia's SSC. They also defined specific meanings, characteristics and representation attached to the cooperation. The integration procedure led to theory-building based on identification and analysis linked with findings and theories. Throughout the drafting process, the themes were interchanged and evolved from descriptive to conceptualisation and the analytical process of writing. The writing and rewriting were conducted as workshop process until the specific context were shaped within the theoretical and conceptual perspectives of SSC using variations of data. Therefore, integration of the issues was continuously conducted to link the data and theories to develop new theories. This process also shaped the dialogue between the data and theories, which evolved throughout the thesis writing until the theory was developed and the overarching argument of the thesis was identified and recognised.

## **Conclusion**

Corbin and Strauss (2008) argued that qualitative research supports the creative and flexible examination of meaning, narratives and perceptions of the topic of study. This allows the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of a phenomenon by expanding the research using participants' experiences and knowledge, as well as the researcher's interpretations (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 172). Understanding, participation and relations between the researcher and their research are necessary to complement the data that are gathered and analysed. Further, throughout the three stages of the data gathering process, the researcher's explorations in the fieldwork were developed and expanded. The outcomes of the research led to practical and contextual considerations and findings of the narratives, processes, practices and relations of the stakeholders within the public policy setting of the research.

The research also resulted in a greater understanding of the narrative and symbolism behind the context of SSC in state-level analysis. The methodology assisted in understanding the idea of giving that has evolved and developed within the government settings and discourses that contribute to the study of development cooperation. It provides a reflective mechanism to critically understand and examine the narratives and meaning behind the rigidity of government and public policy settings. This analysis and exploration of SSC reveal different and unique settings as well as specific content that contributes to knowledge debates and a philosophical understanding of global development cooperation discourse. Thus, the findings signify the relevance of the method in capturing, exploring and analysing the narratives, relations and experiences of the agents within the broader structure of SSC, as explored further in Chapter 6.



## **Chapter 7 Reciprocal Meanings of Southern Cooperation: The Case of Indonesia–Myanmar**

### **Introduction**

The exploration of and conversations with bureaucrats and stakeholders in Indonesia and Myanmar regarding South–South Cooperation (SSC) and development cooperation were discussed in Chapter 6. The conversations reflected the perspectives, experiences and interpretations of state actors on the notions and the meaning of giving in SSC. To further determine how cooperation is translated and applied, the case study of Indonesia–Myanmar is examined in this chapter, which explores the symbolic meanings and implementation of giving in SSC based on the relations established between the two countries. The case study of Indonesia–Myanmar was chosen because the historical and current relationships of both countries are significant within the framework of SSC. It was also selected because Myanmar is one of the focus countries of Indonesian foreign policy, especially in relation to ASEAN, and also a priority country for Indonesian AID. Thus, it is important to understand the relations from the perspective of the two southern countries in SSC.

The analysis highlights the bureaucrats' narratives on the relations between the two countries to reveal the meaning constructed in the cooperation. It explores how the symbolic cooperation evolved and developed within the dynamic relations that led to reciprocity. This chapter argues that to understand the significance of Indonesian SSC, relations with other Southern countries should be explored and analysed. It raises questions of how cooperation develops and what shapes the meaning of mutual relations of both countries. Thus, cooperation between Indonesia and Myanmar is examined to obtain insights and understand the meaning of the discourses, narratives, practices and language established within the symbolic partnership and social relations in SSC. Further, based on the case study of Indonesia–Myanmar, the analysis highlights the definition of Indonesia's SSC and the reciprocal meanings of Southern cooperation.

### **Social Relation of Indonesia–Myanmar**

After almost 50 years of a military regime (since the 1960s), in 2011, during the Thein Sein Government, Myanmar embarked on new political and economic reforms, including by

transitioning the government and replacing the militaristic government, as well as ending Western sanctions and integrating to a global system (Goldstein, 2013; Rieffel & Fox, 2013). This opened up the country to a significant number of international aid agencies and NGOs, which increased the amount of foreign aid received by the Government of Myanmar. However, China and ASEAN, including Indonesia, have been supporting Myanmar for longer, especially during the military regime (OECD, 2016; Rieffel & Fox, 2013), and remain relevant partners in Myanmar development.

When a Senior Official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in Myanmar (interview, 2016) was asked how cooperation with Indonesia had been established, he replied 'Garuda Indonesia'.<sup>107</sup> He recalled that in the 1950s, the government of (then) Burma helped the newly independent state of Indonesia to start its flagship air carrier company<sup>108</sup> (Senior Official 12 [interview], 2016). This support expanded the cooperation between the two countries during the postcolonial era (Senior Official 12 [interview], 2016). Further, the discussion led to the significance of the Bandung Conference in 1955 and its principles as the foundation for Indonesia–Myanmar cooperation. Both leaders—U Nu from Burma and Soekarno from Indonesia—were members of the Colombo Powers, which initiated and planned the conference. The familiarity of the nature of the cooperation shaped the relations and understanding of both countries. A discussion with Myanmar's historian, Prof. Khin Maung Nyun, noted that *Dasasila* Bandung (10 principles) based on *Pancasila* or the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (equality, respect territory, sovereignty, non-interference and peaceful coexistence) were accepted and adopted by the South East Asian countries, including the Myanmar Government. He also observed that the ideas produced a sense of commonality and familiarity among Asian–African countries, even though they had different cultures, languages and political systems (Nyun [interview], 2016).

Given the long history of relations between Indonesia and Myanmar, as recognised throughout the interviews, Indonesia considers Myanmar its strategic partner. Maintaining

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<sup>107</sup> Garuda Indonesia is the national airline of Indonesia and is named after the holy bird of Hinduism, taken from Indonesia's national insignia (<https://www.garuda-indonesia.com/id/en/corporate-partners/company-profile/about/index.page> [accessed 17 February 2019]).

<sup>108</sup> The initiation acknowledgement from the Government of Burma (Myanmar) helped in the establishment of the Indonesian aviation industry by flying in the first commercial flight from Calcutta to Rangoon (Yangon) in 1949. This became the initial undertaking before it was launched as Garuda Indonesia Airlines and was followed by the company's gift of an airplane to the Burmese Government in the same year.

cooperation with Myanmar is necessary for Indonesia because they are both in the ASEAN community, and Indonesia has been considered to have an 'older brother' status to Myanmar, as identified by an Indonesian bureaucrat (Official 8 [interview], 2016). For many years, Myanmar's military government (*Tatmadaw*) referred its government system to Indonesian Soeharto's militaristic government, including mimicking the decentralisation mechanism of Indonesia's local government system (Senior Official 3 [interview], 2016). Myanmar's *Tatmadaw* government controlled the country from 1962–2011, and especially around 1988 the government attempted to follow Indonesia's state-led development process by extending the roles of its military<sup>109</sup> in the political and economic spheres of society (Tun, 2011, p. 70). Given the common historical narratives, especially when Myanmar re-entered the Non-Alignment Movement in 1992 with support from Indonesia (Thuzar, 2012, p. 214), its SSC also continued to be defined within the context of the Southern spirit of shared cooperation norms, solidarity, mutual benefit, win-win and non-intervention. These narratives often appeared in discussions about cooperation and were continuously reiterated by both countries' bureaucrats (Senior Official 12 [interview], 2016; Senior Official 4 [interview], 2016). These discourses explored the meaning and norms of Southern cooperation that signified the elements of the Asian-African Conference (AAC) and were implemented by bureaucrats in the cooperation. These symbolic relations are not only structured with narratives of shared principles that have become norms but are also based on the national interest of each party, resulting in dynamic relations that are constantly negotiated.

This close relationship was not extended during the post-new order regime era in Indonesia, as Indonesia focused on rebuilding its democracy including strengthening its civil society (James, 2004). Thus, relations between the two countries took a different path as the military government in Myanmar still controlled the government, which also controlled its civil society movements (James, 2004). The relations between the two countries continued to evolve during the SBY era, especially within ASEAN including developing the Myanmar-Indonesia Joint Commission after the ASEAN Summit 2014 (Thuzar, 2012, p. 214). The relationship continued to be maintained until Joko Widodo's presidency, with Myanmar identified as a priority country within Indonesian foreign policy, including in the government cooperation

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<sup>109</sup> It mimicked Soeharto's dual functions (*dwifungsi*) doctrine of the military which were to control development inside society and to defend the country (Tun, 2011).

focus on ASEAN and as a target country of Indonesian AID (Pinandita, 2019). Although the perspectives appear to be mutual, several gaps and problems were identified throughout the interviews. In addition, as relations developed and were shaped within the common and mutual meaning of cooperation, the dynamics of political relations have tested the bilateral cooperation. For example, during the 2017 crisis in Rakhine State, Indonesia's Muslim group strongly criticised Myanmar and organised demonstrations in front of the Myanmar Embassy in Jakarta. This led to responses from Joko Widodo's Government, which placed strain on the relationship between the two countries.<sup>110</sup>

During the problems in the Rakhine State, the Government of Indonesia did not directly interfere with the situation but engaged in high-level dialogue among foreign ministers and sent humanitarian support<sup>111</sup> despite the major demonstrations in Jakarta. These glitches could not be avoided because the government's political focus has evolved based on domestic political and international pressures. The principle of non-intervention was strongly argued in the process of Myanmar's response to this issue. Non-interference is based on the principles of the Bandung Conference, which outlined how Southern countries should cooperate with each other without interfering in domestic problems (Engel, 2019; Lancaster, 2007; Mawdsley, 2012a; Quadir, 2013; Tan-Mullins, Mohan, & Power, 2010). Furthermore, the government of Indonesia standpoint on the issue in Rakhine state also cannot be separated from the domestic political conditions of the government of Myanmar. The Indonesian government's decisions are often only based on political needs rather than on human rights principles or other ethical notions that should be addressed in response to the conditions. Therefore, the non-interference principle has often become a political term to maintain the countries' bilateral cooperation, unrelated to the real conditions.

Given that many Southern countries face problems in their internal domestic politics and development issues, non-interference enables social relations to grow without the addition of political conditionality that is often embedded in development cooperation. Non-

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<sup>110</sup> <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/09/06/-thousands-of-muslims-protest-outside-myanmar-embassy.html> (accessed 27 November 2018).

<sup>111</sup> Thousands of Indonesians join anti-Myanmar rally in Jakarta, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-indonesia/thousands-of-indonesians-join-anti-myanmar-rally-in-jakarta-idUSKCN1BH0T6> (accessed 28 April 2018); Islamist groups protest in Jakarta against prosecution of Myanmar's Rohingya Muslims, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-09-06/islamist-groups-protest-in-jakarta/8879452> (accessed 28 April 2018).

intervention has provided unconditional norms for the support given between Southern countries, despite problems in the domestic situations of the recipient countries. However, Mawdsley (2019, p. 10) argued that the current setting of SSC is becoming less 'non-interference' because Southern countries have started to negotiate and consider their domestic and international political positions to successfully implement their development aid programs. Therefore, the cooperation settings between Southern countries have been pursued through different political trajectories and have become more pragmatic in constructing development cooperation approaches.

During an interview with staff from the MOFA in Myanmar, the discussion on the institutional settings and the level of support given by Indonesia to Myanmar over the years showed that it is difficult to accurately identify the amount given. One reason for this is that Indonesia does not have a designated institution that manages its foreign assistance, and most of the support received is in the form of capacity-building programs and in-kind. The support provided by Indonesia has also come from several different ministries. The same questions were asked of the staff at the Ministry of Planning and Finance (Myanmar), who said that the level of aid given by countries can be seen on their aid management website,<sup>112</sup> which referred to US\$1 million from Indonesia for the 'education sector' but did not provide any details. It was clear that the real figure was much higher than that, as pointed out by one of the MOFA Indonesia officials during the interview (Senior Official 6 [interview], 2016). For example, the training programs and workshops are not captured clearly within the Myanmar aid system that instead become part of Indonesia's contribution. This incomplete identification of data and information in the case of Indonesia shows that there are different valuations of SSC activities.

Referring to existing data and information from the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia (ROI) for Myanmar, Indonesia's SSC conducted several activities in Myanmar including 12 capacity-building programs (specifically trainings and workshops), that were implemented from 2013 to 2015. From 1999 to February 2016, a total of 73 programs were conducted and attended by 232 participants, with most of the programs co-financed by other donors through Triangular Cooperation (Embassy of ROI, 2016). The themes of the training and workshops

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<sup>112</sup> <https://mohinga.info/en/profiles/organisation/GovINDO/> (accessed 10 December 2018).

included disaster management, renewable energy, rural development, planning and budgeting, and public health. Training programs were also implemented within the framework of ASEAN cooperation and specific bilateral cooperation. These regional forums, especially ASEAN, have become mechanisms that structure the relations between the two countries and expand the cooperation.

Picture 4: Planning Budgeting Training to the Myanmar Government (Jakarta, 31 October 2015)



Source: author's fieldwork documentation

A senior official (interview, 2016) noted that cooperation with Indonesia is essential, not only through technical cooperation to improve capacity, but also in know-how that can be linked with economic cooperation. Indonesia's practical knowledge can help Myanmar's citizens and companies to access Indonesian markets (Senior Official 12 [interview], 2016). Institutional settings are expected to be developed to support this mode of cooperation. However, Indonesian bilateral cooperation in the context of SSC or technical cooperation activities related to development relations were not set in a specific arrangement and were conducted on an irregular basis. The less formal nature of cooperation makes it difficult to compare it with the Northern model of aid cooperation because much of the assistance is in-kind, training programs and not formally accounted for in financial statements. Despite Myanmar often

appearing passive, there is an expectation that regular meetings should be conducted to establish and develop better communication and institutional arrangements with Indonesia, for example, encouraging more high-level visits and meetings to improve cooperation with Indonesia at the working level and through technical visits (Senior Official 12 [interview], 2016). Although bilateral Indonesia–Myanmar agreements, or MOUs, are acknowledged, given the lack of a permanent institutional setting, cooperation continues to be ad hoc and arranged within the informal setting of relations, with no clear expected results or effects being identified.

This relation between Indonesia and Myanmar led to discussion on the social relations established among Southern countries, with the content of cooperation stimulated by the political and economic agendas of its leaders. Despite not having a formal arrangement, this relation has structured the cooperation based on the trajectory of its political relations, including its position within the regional cooperation of ASEAN. As acknowledged by policymakers from both countries, the form of cooperation presents Southern ideological stances with the peculiarity of the state's political standpoint. It is also based on their domestic conditions and foreign policy agendas. Despite SSC being criticised for being ineffective, to understand the meaning and narratives of SSC, the political, economic and cultural manifestations, as well as historical notions of both countries' relations, need to be taken into account. In contrast, Myanmar's relations with Northern donors have created a different dynamic, as noted in Chapter 6. The motivation is often unspoken by the provider country, which leads to misperceptions and misinformation, resulting in constraints on the relationship. As both recipients and providers have significant roles in constructing the aims and institutions of cooperation, the results of the implementation of cooperation have led to debate on the meaning of its development cooperation.


### **Definition of Indonesian Southern Cooperation**

In the case of Indonesia–Myanmar, unintended consequences resulting from Indonesia's implementation of Southern cooperation have shown particular applications of SSC. Indonesia's SSC nomenclature and modalities have recognised technical cooperation and knowledge sharing as the applications of SSC activities. However, Indonesia's training and workshop programs have not been identified within the Myanmar aid system or as part of

Indonesia's aid contribution, and other aid components are considered bilateral cooperation. For example, political aid based on the president's response and interests to support the Rakhine State is considered part of managing the internal issue of Islamic solidarity within domestic politics. Further, economic cooperation has not been identified as part of Indonesia's SSC, but it was identified during interviews with the Myanmar Government as part of Indonesia's SSC, with evidence shown of the trade relations between Indonesia and Myanmar. Trade cooperation is separate from the context of Indonesia's SSC and works within a different stream of cooperation. Although the narrative to associate both remains the same, the implementation and coordination are differently managed by the Indonesian Government. These various interpretations indicate that the meaning of relations in SSC activities cannot be generalised based solely on aid for development. It is also constructed within the political and economic context of the state agencies that signify the meaning of giving and sharing.

Discussions during the fieldwork showed that different meanings, interpretations and definitions in the scope of Indonesia's SSC contribute to complications, including identifying the focus of SSC works, the amount spent, and contributions achieved in other countries. This had implications for the model of SSC applied by Indonesia and accepted by Myanmar. Despite the narrative to link all foreign cooperation with promoting its political-economic targets, Indonesia's SSC program in Myanmar still lacked content, even though Indonesia has huge market potential according to one of Myanmar's Senior Officials (Senior Official 12 [interview], 2016). Indonesia's SSC policy also often became 'business as usual' activities of its foreign policy, and collaboration with other related partners including the private sector was very limited. This bureaucratic led process was often difficult to extend beyond regular SSC activities and programs as it rarely engaged with creative development based on solid research of its development cooperation program. To help understand these problems, the mapping of Indonesia's SSC practices identified three different areas of cooperation: technical cooperation or SSC, economic cooperation and political cooperation. These different interpretations show that SSC activities are not necessarily linked with each other or with formal definitions, as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Map of Indonesian South–South Cooperation Definition



According to the Indonesian Government (in this case, the National Coordination Team - NCT), the initial understanding of SSC is technical cooperation and knowledge sharing within the scope of Indonesia’s SSC, including activities such as training, workshops and expert-based knowledge sharing. This acknowledges the modalities within triangular cooperation, as noted during the interviews and in the 2014 and 2015 reports on Indonesia’s SSTC (NCT–SSTC, 2015, 2016). In the case of Myanmar, Indonesia’s SSC is conducted through technical cooperation or knowledge sharing activities. However, a challenge arises when triangular cooperation interacts with traditional cooperation, because triangular cooperation is not necessarily interpreted as part of South–South relations by the recipient Southern country (Senior Official 11 [interview], 2016). With traditional donors, cooperation is constructed with a different dynamic of relations, because traditional donors are not considered to have the common shared norms and values that structure SSC. With Indonesia’s government facilitating Triangular Cooperation in SSC, relations with Myanmar became a formality as it cannot be acknowledged as SSC. For example, when a training program was conducted and facilitated by a donor country, Myanmar’s government would only send its junior staff to the program (as observed during the fieldwork, 2016).

The interviews also recognised the importance of linking economic cooperation with technical cooperation and trade initiatives to increase Indonesia’s SSC profile (Senior Official 7

[interview], 2016; Official 2 [interview], 2016). However, the context of economic cooperation is set within the different arrangements for trade cooperation in Indonesia's SSC. Integrating trade cooperation with Indonesia's SSC remains a challenge because both models of cooperation have different sets of mechanisms, regulations and arrangements. The current SSC started to explore economic cooperation in 2011 as a pilot project in selected countries. This included the AI for Cattle or Hand Tractor for Agriculture Project, as well as business partners that have been involved with the government's SSC program. However, trade cooperation with Southern countries is not identified within the framework of Indonesia's SSC. For example, a senior official in Myanmar discussed Myanmar's rice exports to Indonesia and his intention to gain more knowledge about expanding the rice market in Indonesia by supporting a special training program (Senior Official 12 [interview], 2016). Several agreements have been made between the two countries, but they address different areas of cooperation. Agreements between the ministries of foreign affairs are considered by Indonesia the basis for its SSC, but Myanmar also acknowledges other agreements as SSC, including the trade agreement between the ministries of trade. At this stage, the link and identification between technical cooperation in SSC and economic cooperation is limited to several pilot activities, despite the presence of other trade-based activities. Paradoxically, the economic program linked with technical assistance is the program that has been conducted for several years within the trade agreement between the two countries; thus, trade and economic cooperation stand within their own mechanisms and do not have direct links with Indonesian SSC mechanisms.

The third type of support is Indonesian contributions or assistance, which was termed 'bilateral cooperation' or 'political cooperation' by the interviewees. Political cooperation such as assistance and contributions provided by Indonesia to the Myanmar Government to build three schools in Rakhine State has not been identified as part of the SSC but as bilateral cooperation (Official 9 [interview], 2016; Official 11 [interview], 2016).<sup>113</sup> Bilateral cooperation recognises the commitment and interest of the government and presidents in issues that are specified within the government foreign policy agenda and allocated in the

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<sup>113</sup> This was also identified in the president's response to the crisis in Rakhine State in Myanmar (Widodo, 2017; <https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2017/09/04/055905955/President-Jokowi-All-out-in-Helping-Rohingya> [accessed 28 November 2018]).

state or national budget. Thus, bilateral cooperation is considered more politically driven and is not necessarily constructed within the government's SSC nomenclature. This cooperation symbolises the president's commitment, in which activities and in-kind materials can be identified, but the amount of commitment is rarely mentioned, as was the case of building schools in Rakhine State. This priority can change with different presidential agendas. Thus, bilateral cooperation is very political in terms of the type of activities and is intended to be delivered based on the political needs of the president.

These differences in the application of SSC often complicate the identification and meaning of 'aid' in SSC. It was acknowledged that specific elements and unique features of SSC should be acknowledged but are often missed in its identification (De Renzio & Seifert, 2014, p. 1870). For example, Bräutigam (2011, p. 755) identified the characteristics of China's aid as concessional loans with grant components that combine diplomacy, development and business. Similarly, the concept and application of Indonesia's SSC cannot be directly compared with the OECD's model of DAC that has been applied by traditional donors. The DAC refers to ODA as the flow of financial help from donor to recipient countries to promote economic development, and that has significant grant elements (Bräutigam, 2011; Lin & Wang, 2017a; Watson, 2014). These definitions do not apply in the setting of Indonesia's SSC, which specifically defines SSC in relation to its technical and knowledge sharing activities (Senior Official 5 [interview], 2016; Senior Official 6 [interview], 2016; Senior Official 7 [interview], 2016). 'Giving' is perceived to have different meanings in Indonesia's SSC. It has also shifted and evolved over time within the political agendas of leaders, but the ideological foundations remain significant in justifying existing cooperation. For example, the context of Indonesia's SSC has shifted, and cooperation is the process of 'sharing' development experiences, as identified in the concept of knowledge sharing (Senior Official 5 [interview], 2016). 'Sharing' in Indonesia's SSC cannot be separated from Indonesia's interests in expanding its experiences and knowledge of development. Thus, the meaning of cooperation has been redefined by the government to expand the context of aid to include knowledge narrative.

The fluid meaning of SSC highlights that cooperation cannot be separated from the understanding and interpretations of policymakers or bureaucrats and leaders. This notion signifies the importance of the political content of 'aid' both in bilateral cooperation and SSC

without referring to a general definition. For example, the building of schools and hospitals in Myanmar is considered bilateral aid, but scholarship programs to other developing countries are considered SSC. These views cannot be separated according to how the position of the knowledge has structured the meaning of Indonesian SSC. The understanding of giving or sharing has become politically constructed and has also become diverse. Aid gives a different meaning to SSC because it is not intensely perceived as a power tool of government foreign policy, but as the representative nature of giving to develop relations. The symbolic meaning of partnership and solidarity that is attached to Southern aid also indicates the symbolic nature of cooperation that is maintained and expanded. Aid is seen to stimulate social relations with other Southern countries. The scope of cooperation acknowledges that the content of aid is part of the process of cooperating, but it also notes different meanings of giving. These differences point to the characteristic of Indonesia's SSC that gives meaning to reciprocity. Therefore, based on the case of Indonesia–Myanmar, it is important to examine how practices and models of cooperation are being interpreted and conducted by various agencies within the reciprocal motives of cooperation.

### **Unfolding the Reciprocal Meaning of Southern Cooperation**

As seen in the case of Indonesia–Myanmar, the Southern model of cooperation highlights the symbolism of Southern narratives and is displayed through norms and traditions such as sharing a common history, identity and interests (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Hattori, 2003; Mawdsley, 2012b; Silk, 2004). Notions of equality, partnership, solidarity and mutual cooperation regularly emerged throughout the interviews with the policymakers in Indonesia and Myanmar. These discourses referred to the symbolism of giving that highlights the common opportunities, solidarity, expert-based knowledge and mutual benefits within reciprocal acts of cooperation (Mawdsley, 2012a, 2012b). For instance, the giving process in cooperation is materialised through an invitation and a request to learn based on Indonesian development best practices. Consequently, reciprocity constitutes a symbolic structure that is more or less equal to that which is conceptualised within the notion of partnership. In Myanmar, this was demonstrated through the narrative of win–win solutions, which reiterated the model of cooperation and highlighted mutual learning.

For instance, Graeber (2001, pp. 160–161) referred to Mauss and noted that reciprocity is identified through relations that do not solely rely on giving and receiving, but that are expressed through long-term commitments. In the case of Indonesia–Myanmar, the historical dimension signified the relationship-building that emerged, evolved and was acknowledged by both countries as showcasing their commitment to their relations beyond their formal agreement. Therefore, the partnership recognised and acknowledged the agency of the actor’s motivation in developing discourses of cooperation, which help to identify the symbolic meaning of the social relations. Reciprocal motives in SSC cannot avoid an examination of the unintended consequences resulting from the process of giving based on the interviews and observations. The intention in the process of giving in the cooperation between Indonesia and Myanmar is mainly to maintain relations. Thus, meaning, understanding and motivation to cooperate cannot be separated from the perception of the recipient country (in this case, Myanmar) in helping to analyse the notion of reciprocity with Indonesia.

As discussed in Chapter 1, scholars have constructed the symbolic meaning of gift-giving from practices and narratives that are characterised through an obligation to return, moral conscience, social power relations and the creation of capital (Bourdieu, 1990; Hénaff & Morhange, 2010; Mauss, 1970; Sahlins, 1972). Specifically, in identifying the motives of aid relations, a reciprocal process has emerged with a specific structure. In the case of Myanmar, the interviewees stated that the obligation to return the aid was clarified, as well as the importance of dialogue to expand the cooperation beyond the regular content, as mentioned in Chapter 6. For Indonesia, the motivation to support Myanmar was also part of the state’s obligation to support other countries, as well as part of its regional cooperation as an ASEAN member. These narratives identify the nature of SSC and challenge the structural hierarchal boundaries of donor–recipients by perceiving the notions of partnership and mutual interests to break down unequal relations (Mawdsley, 2012b; Quadir, 2013). Thus, these features distinguish SSC from North–South cooperation, especially in identifying the motivation and nature of the cooperation (Jerve, 2007; Kragelund, 2008; Manning, 2006; Mawdsley, 2012b).

The process of giving and receiving has a unique characteristic in SSC as a result of the inadvertent results of the cooperation. This has led to further questions such as: What characteristics of Southern partnerships are developed based on the narrative of reciprocal

giving? The answer cannot be separated from the unintended consequences that appear in the analysis, which in turn cannot be separated from the symbolic nature of SSC (Mawdsley, 2012a, 2012b). There are four unintended consequences that build the characters of cooperation: languages and shared norms; indirect expansion of capitals and network building; indirect results that lead to economic capital, national interest and identity; and the symbolic knowledge of giving and sharing.

### **Between Languages and Shared Norms**

The narrative of solidarity, mutual benefit, non-intervention and win–win solutions were reiterated during the interviews with the bureaucrats in Myanmar and Indonesia as the main foundation of the cooperation among Southern countries (Senior Official 12 [interview], 2016; Senior Official 4 [interview], 2016). These principles have become the norms, or *doxa*, that have shaped SSC. However, these narratives are also framed within state ideology as the state’s obligation to support other countries. This notion points to the knowledge that solidarity cannot be separated from the national interest of Southern countries. For example, the concept of solidarity includes the concept of helping others. The exploration identified the relations that are bound within the historical narratives of Southern cooperation and that expand the meaning of its social relations. Nonetheless, the narratives are structured within the state’s aim to cooperate, including within its context of diplomacy and the creation of capital.

The meaning of this terminology and language often does not translate consistently into government policy and its implementation. For example, the main challenges in identifying solidarity within the narratives of bureaucrats is that the political meanings and motivations behind the context of cooperating are revealed, as identified in the terminology used in the government documents. As the term ‘solidarity’ becomes a pillar of SSC, it is necessary to reveal the interpretation that was constructed based on the government’s political interests. This symbolic meaning constitutes fluidity and its context of social relations in cooperating with other Southern countries. In the case of Indonesia, solidarity has become a substantial language that is reiterated within the narratives of SSC or general terms of cooperation with other Southern countries. Thus, the term ‘solidarity’ can be identified to be used in Indonesian political narratives. To understand the meaning in terms of Southern cooperation, Table 7

identifies the context of the language. For example, in responding to relations with other Southern Muslim countries, the discourse recognises Muslim solidarity as political solidarity, as mentioned earlier in the case of Indonesia’s support to the Rakhine State in Myanmar with the intention of buying into domestic politics that derive its national conditions. In contrast, in the general context of SSC, solidarity is used to give meaning to knowledge sharing or technical cooperation activities.

Table 7: Meaning of Solidarity

<b>Activities—Program—Location—Year</b>	<b>Term of Solidarity</b>
Mosque building in Afghanistan in 2017	Muslim solidarity (political)
Hospital building in Palestine in 2012	Muslim solidarity (political)
Schools and hospital building in Myanmar/Rakhine State 2014–2018	Muslim solidarity (political)
1,000 Palestinian capacity-building program in 2005–2015 (GOI, 2005a)	Muslim solidarity (political/technical SSC)
10,000 Palestinian capacity-building program in 2015–2025 (GOI, 2015b)	Muslim solidarity (political/technical SSC)
Scholarships programs in African countries since 2000	South–South solidarity (technical)
Training for AI and other technical cooperation programs in various Southern countries until 2018 (IsDB, 2017)	South–South solidarity (technical)
Timorese road program through triangular cooperation with the JICA in 2010–2012 (JICA, 2013)	South–South solidarity (technical)

Notes: Existing data are compiled from interviews with government officials and donors working in Indonesia, as well as published documents.

Solidarity in social relationships is identified within four scopes: identification of other agents, social space, motives of the relationship and reciprocity among members of the group (Komter, 2005, p. 195). These highlight the relations between solidarity and motivation in the process of giving as the nature of human relations. These aspects of social relations can be analysed as consequences of the gift-giving process that are encapsulated in Indonesia’s SSC. The language of solidarity is used as a political term to distinguish Southern cooperation. The content of solidarity is also constructed as a motivation to give to other countries because the content of solidarity also justifies the government’s act. For example, in the case of Muslim cooperation, as mentioned earlier, the term ‘solidarity’ is also used to shape aid relations (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2003), but at the same time it also points out domestic political

conditions that need to be 'entertained'. Thus, the term 'solidarity' can be widely understood by the public in Indonesia, especially if the government uses it to obtain support for its political cooperation program. Although the meaning can often be interpreted differently, it is politically sound and straightforward to the public and in relations among Southern countries.

The meaning of solidarity is also fluid and cannot be considered within a rigid definition. It cannot be compared with the indicators of the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness, which are defined and measured using sophisticated monitoring–evaluation mechanisms. Therefore, the intention to identify Southern terms such as 'mutual benefit' and 'demand-driven' (Bry, 2017, p. 164) might mislead the meaning itself and miss the content of cooperation. The Southern terminologies should be constructed within the context or the conditions that appear when the language is used, as shown in Table 7. Therefore, Southern language in this context is considered pliant because it can serve different conditions and situations within cooperation based on the political needs of the Southern state and its leaders. The content of solidarity also refers to the norms of cooperation that have motivated the reciprocal meaning of giving shared among Southern countries. Thus, as norms, the meanings are embedded subconsciously within the relations and are understood collectively among Southern countries, and they have evolved based on the political interpretation of Southern cooperation.

### **Indirect Expansion of Capital and Network**

SSC was meant to build networks between countries A and B or via country C within the region (Senior Official 2 [interview], 2016). This clarifies delicate matters that often cannot be referred to within the modern model or system of cooperation. For example, the effect of a program in Indonesian SSC cannot be easily identified—especially if it is modelled through knowledge sharing or technical cooperation—except in infrastructure projects that produce a tangible form of material. In contrast, as noted by a Myanmar official, regional cooperation recognises the meaning of SSC within the common culture and familiarity of its neighbouring countries, and the expansion of the cooperation is expected to be advanced (Senior Official 12 [interview], 2016). As part of ASEAN, Indonesian technical cooperation prioritises member countries; however, the identification cannot be separated from the overall priorities of Indonesia's foreign policy, which include ASEAN, the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC),

the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the NAASP (Sato & Santikajaya, 2019, p. 24). In part, the scope of cooperation aims to maintain these networks among Southern countries, including cooperation among its regional priorities. This highlights an indirect extension of cooperation, which builds upon these networks and is constructed within the model and values attached in the cooperation to develop the meaning of social relations in Southern cooperation.

Cooperation is also identified in the 'invisible hand' of gift exchange (Douglas, 2002, p. xviii) and how SSC creates a complex network and meaning of social relations that build upon the reciprocal mechanism of giving. Consequently, SSC is constructed within the development of economic opportunity and is structured to a specific region and political agenda (Horner, 2016; Vieira & Alden, 2011). As stated, 'Indonesia's SSC combined two approaches of the sense of solidarity and also the need to benefit from the cooperation without exploitation' (Senior Official 6 [interview], 2016). This duality implies that the notions of symbolic cooperation are not spontaneous but are related to the creation of political and economic capitals (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 118). Developing political capital through cooperation results in economic and political benefits as well as the expansion of networks. Therefore, SSC can be seen within different layers of cooperation depending on how Southern countries perceive and situate the cooperation within their foreign and development policies.

Gift exchange creates a social bond (Mauss, 1970, p. 17); therefore, regionalism and network building in SSC is part of building long-term partnerships. The social bond itself is a long-term investment that results from the obligatory sense of returning a gift (Mauss, 1970). The Indonesian Government's view of SSC is that cooperation is built on the belief of long-term investments. The modalities that built the Southern cooperation through technical cooperation and knowledge sharing, as defined by Haq in 1980, can aim to create long-term interests attached to the Southern countries' cooperation (Haq, 1980, p. 750). Long-term investments are a characteristic of SSC because they create connections among Southern countries through cooperation, even though the results of the cooperation cannot be verified within a few years. While the intention of the Bandung Conference was to develop a network among Southern countries, the results of the cooperation might not be directly recognised because the implementation of SSC is subtle and not intended to stimulate direct results. For modern governments, development programs and priorities aim to be measurable and

identify tangible results. Indonesian bureaucrats understand the notion of indirectness, but within the political priorities of government programs, the different meanings and goals often contradict and challenge relations in the policy development of SSC.

### **National Interest**

For Southern countries, national interest is the rational motive of cooperation, while solidarity distinguishes the position of Southern countries within the context of global development cooperation (Mawdsley, 2012b; Six, 2009). Solidarity is part of Indonesia's national interest, whereby the process of sharing is not viewed as competition, but as a soft-power investment to achieve appreciation, respect and good relations (Senior Official 1 [interview], 2016). State interest in cooperation cannot be separated from the president's agenda in delivering foreign policy to other countries. For example, President Widodo aims to build Indonesia's image as a moderate Muslim country by giving aid and focusing on cooperation with other Muslim countries. Given that Islam also engages in cooperation as part of religious solidarity (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2003), this is a distinct meaning from regional solidarity, as in ASEAN relations. Muslim cooperation includes support to build a mosque, a clinic complex<sup>114</sup> and community development in Afghanistan, a hospital in Palestine and capacity-building to 10,000 Palestinians (GOI, 2015b), as well as schools and hospitals in the Rakhine State in Myanmar.<sup>115</sup> Widodo's visits to these countries, including Afghanistan<sup>116</sup> and the border of Myanmar–Bangladesh,<sup>117</sup> have surpassed those of his predecessors, with the intention of gaining domestic support for his political agenda. SBY was more interested in global forums, as evidenced by Indonesia's active role in international forums during his presidency (Acharya, 2015; Shekhar, 2018). Thus, the meaning of national interest cannot be separated from the identity that the countries or leaders intend to promote within Southern or international cooperation that also link with the leaders' political purposes and domestic agendas.

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<sup>114</sup> <https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/indonesia-build-islamic-center-in-kabul-afghanistan.370782/>; <https://www.kemlu.go.id/en/berita/berita-perwakilan/Pages/Indonesia-Islamic-Centre-in-Afghanistan-Indonesia's-Real-Presence-Voiced-Peaceful-Islam.aspx> (accessed 30 April 2018).

<sup>115</sup> <http://global.liputan6.com/read/3078396/bantu-rohingya-indonesia-dirikan-2-sekolah-dan-1-rumah-sakit> (accessed 30 April 2018).

<sup>116</sup> <http://jakartaglobe.id/news/historic-visit-afghanistan-jokowi-promises-support-peacebuilding/>; <https://www.kemlu.go.id/en/berita/Pages/President-Joko-Widodo-Indonesia-Support-Peace-Building-Process-in-Afghanistan.aspx> (accessed 30 April 2018).

<sup>117</sup> <https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2018/01/26/indonesian-president-joko-widodo-coming-to-bangladesh-to-see-rohingya-plight> (accessed 30 April 2018).

For Indonesia, the national interest attached to relations with other Southern countries is linked with its ideological standing. Senior Official 1 (interview, 2016) noted that Indonesia is part of the 'village community' (as he described the global and regional communities). There is an obligation to be part of the global community, including in the act of giving with the notion of solidarity, whereby Indonesia is an integral part of the international community (Senior Official 1 [interview] 2016). This notion is structured from Indonesia's foreign policy ideology of *Bebas-Aktif* (free and active), which is also within the context of Indonesia's relations with other countries (Acharya, 2015; Rosyidin, 2017; Sukma, 1995), including in SSC (Engel, 2017, 2019). These global positions are perceived by the government as a responsibility to scale up Indonesia's SSC through effective policy, institutional management and programs (Senior Official 5 [interview], 2016). Despite the cooperation being politically driven by Indonesia's foreign policy ideology, the context of cooperation highlights the context of national identity in the foreign policy agenda, including in SSC. This example implies that the reciprocal process cannot be separated from the identity of the giver and the receiver (Mauss, 1970, p. 25). Thus, identity and interest are linked to the policy development of Southern relations, including the content of national ideology, which is perceived as the identity of the state.

Therefore, the focus of SSC is on establishing a sense of identity among Southern countries rather than on power relations, which is in line with the character of reciprocity in gift theory (Mawdsley, 2012b, p. 264). National interest can be associated with the sense of identity of the giver and projected in cooperation with an ideological stance constituted by the Southern country. Conversely, this identifies the unique features that the country perceives of the activities that differ among Southern countries (Quadir, 2013, p. 333). Thus, a country's priorities and interests may often conflict with those of partner countries (Mawdsley, 2012b; Six, 2009), but with Southern principles that are embedded in the cooperation, and the motivation to cooperate can be identified by recipient countries. This is identified based on the understanding that the motivation is often discreet and remains understated in terms of the incentive attached to the aid given. For example, Indonesia's interest in expanding SSC through knowledge sharing is derived from its motivation to expand its development knowledge in a specific field, which might not always suit the recipient country's needs. The Myanmar Government may expect more training programs in certain vocational areas, but

Indonesia may provide other content in its vocational training programs. This might lead to an expansion of its social relations of Southern cooperation. Equally, Myanmar's preference for working with other Southern countries is also stimulated from its knowledge of the motives attached to the aid given and its agency in choosing partners for its development. Therefore, the motivation to give and receive is constructed from the state's national interest in building social relations and cooperation with other countries.

### **Symbolic Southern Knowledge**

The selection of a technical cooperation program is based on Indonesia's best practices in development and its interests in expanding its knowledge (Senior Official 5 [interview], 2016; Senior Official 6 [interview], 2016; Senior Official 7 [interview], 2016). This is evidenced in Indonesia's support to Myanmar, with SSC activities focusing on providing training programs based on Indonesia's experiences in development. For many years, knowledge of development was exclusively owned by Northern countries (Kilby, 2018, p. 2). This knowledge gap implied superiority, which SSC aims to decrease. The meaning of Southern knowledge and expertise sharing recognises the symbolic structure of Southern cooperation breaking from the mould of the structure of Northern knowledge. Southern countries have the capacity to generate their own knowledge from their experiences, as identified in the case of Indonesia. Technical cooperation signifies the political and cultural identity of Southern development cooperation that generates and differentiates the idea of cooperation. The Southern models of cooperation are also constructed in their social relations through the symbolic power of giving and sharing (Mawdsley, 2012b, p. 260). Thus, the process of sharing technical knowledge aims to reduce isolation by constructing knowledge and capacity based on countries' interests.

Linking technical expertise and national interest points to the notion of Southern countries' comparative advantages in development. As Lin and Wang (2017a) noted, development is the process of learning and innovating. Consequently, the setting of cooperation should be constructed alongside the accumulation of knowledge and learning by identifying comparative advantages. The process of learning among Southern countries in development experiences helps to navigate the creation of new political and economic capitals and networks (Lin & Wang, 2017a, p. 14). As noted by Indonesian bureaucrats with more than 50

years' involvement in development, Indonesia has enough knowledge to share based on the best practices of its development experiences (Official 1 [interview], 2016). The Indonesian Government has noted several other development areas of best practices for SSC, including family planning, agriculture and good governance programs. In addition to these programs, Indonesia has increased its acquisition of other development programs to be the flagship of its SSC program.

Development experiences are unique to each country because government systems as well as political and cultural conditions affect the process of knowledge accumulation. Hence, knowledge becomes a symbolic idea to intensify the agency of the state within the context of cooperation. In many ways, knowledge and the process of learning create a structure and stimulate growth and learning to present knowledge to the state (Hosono, 2018; Stiglitz & Greenwald, 2014). This notion shows that the process of learning in SSC cannot be separated from the process of development and its trajectory. The structures that are constructed within different settings as the process of knowledge transfer occurs in Southern cooperation sit within the context of partnership and solidarity. Despite the criticism that power relations identified by several Southern countries imitate the North–South setting (Mawdsley, 2015, p. 2), knowledge can also create a structure on its own through specific relations. Southern knowledge enables countries to adapt the experiences of others based on the country's conditions. For example, the Indonesian Government shared its experience in planning and budgeting a development program with the Myanmar Government within the framework of a government-to-government cooperation program to support Myanmar's policy development based on the process of exchange (Official 1 [interview], 2016). Thus, Southern knowledge is important in identifying symbolic relations in development cooperation. The process of knowledge sharing perceived by Southern governments has continued to expand beyond the content of financial aid as a way to give meaning to the equality and reciprocity of Southern cooperation.

## **Conclusion**

The Southern idea of giving is built upon the values and perceptions of bureaucrats based on the country's identity and interest in development policy. The capacity and position of the actors involved in the cooperation can be recognised by analysing the relations between

Indonesia and Myanmar, which created a specific understanding and structure in SSC. Experiences in cooperation and development, including the act of giving, identify the context of reciprocity in creating value in Southern relations. Therefore, the identification of cooperation was often not linked with the general definition of SSC and was perceived differently by the recipient countries. However, the motivation of the countries involved was acknowledged within the context of SSC. As Weber (1947, pp. 98–99) argued, motive should be identified not only within the current narrative, but also in terms of action, the broader context and history, to make it scientifically meaningful in social relations. Motivation influences reciprocal acts in SSC and is constituted by four characteristics in the case of Indonesia–Myanmar: languages and discourse, the concept of indirectness to develop capital and networks, national interest and identity, and symbolic knowledge in cooperation. Without generalising or specifying the context of giving and sharing from Indonesia’s SSC experiences, this chapter elaborated on the meaning behind the narratives and implementation. It also characterised Indonesia’s SSC by pointing out the symbolic meaning of Southern cooperation, which has appeared more subtly in the relations that have evolved over time.

Giving symbolises the cooperation and structure of the partnership more than the context of domination in SSC, as shown in the case of Indonesia–Myanmar. The terminology has been used since the Bandung Conference in 1955 and continues to be narrated within the context of equal benefits, win–win solutions and common acts of solidarity. Conversely, the knowledge and expertise modelled in the cooperation are also the result of the process of sharing, because giving is considered a process of exchange and sharing rather than building supremacy or power agreements. Reciprocity defines the meaning of cooperation, especially in terms of identifying the political and economic dimensions perceived in the motivation of giving. Consequently, the meaning and understanding have affected the way in which institutional settings and policy have developed within the bureaucrats’ understanding of the normative pragmatism of cooperation, as explored further in the next chapter.

## **Chapter 8 Challenges of Effectiveness in Indonesia's South–South Cooperation: Between National Institutions and Global Development Platforms**

### **Introduction**

Chapter 7 analysed the application of reciprocal values illustrated by Indonesia's South–South Cooperation (SSC) by examining its relationship with Myanmar. Reciprocal acts of sharing reveal the significant meaning of the symbolic relations that the state has developed, which are part of the politics of cooperation. This chapter explores the institutions developed by Indonesia for SSC, because they form the structure of cooperation and were frequently mentioned during the interviews conducted with policymakers and bureaucrats. The chapter examines the empirical meaning of institutions as a way for the government to remain relevant and be effective in the implementation of SSC. The development of the SSC institutional setting is derived from the internal process of the bureaucratic reform process, including its intentions to respond to the international narrative of development cooperation. The context of effectiveness was also part of the discourse and was formed within the understanding of the government's institutional settings at the state level. This chapter aims to analyse how Indonesia restructured the effective institutional settings of its SSC within the broader context of national governance and international development. Further, it examines issues within Indonesia's SSC policy and institutions. This chapter is divided into a discussion of the literature on Southern institutions and Indonesia's current SSC institutional settings, including effects on relations with its partners and within the global south development institutions.

### **Southern Institutions and Development Effectiveness**

The tales of Southern cooperation have been widely discussed, because the rituals, symbols and narrative within the SSC history and languages of win–win, solidarity and mutual benefits are substantial (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Mawdsley, 2012b, 2018). However, cooperation is also structured within specific models and institutional arrangements. For Indonesia, SSC is more than just cooperation among developing countries; it has also been embedded in the historical narrative and shaped within the national ideological stance so that

the content of the cooperation is centred in the process of sharing development knowledge with others. Consequently, the state institutions in this setting become important in the implementation of SSC. In addition, the context of effectiveness is attached to the modern aid management system that is necessary for Indonesia's SSC institutional settings. North (1990) and Sen (2001) argued that institutional settings within broader society provide a firmer structure for human relations and long-term growth; however, it is not guaranteed to be effective.<sup>118</sup> Thus, the question is: How do Indonesia's SSC institutional mechanisms and arrangements interpret the meaning of effectiveness?

The exploration of the Southern institutional settings in this chapter is constructed within a Keynesian perspective of the developing state, which is the significance of state institutions in deriving the policy of Southern cooperation. The current framework of the Southern institutional setting has structured the policy of sharing, giving and cooperating among Southern countries within the immense roles of the state, which for many depends less on the international free market system (Arestis & Sawyer, 2010; Kilby, 2018; Lin & Wang, 2017a; Marglin, 2018; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012). SSC in Indonesia, as in many other Southern countries, is limited to executives and is negotiated within executive bodies as part of broader national foreign and development policies, and the parliament is rarely aware of or consulted on the process. In comparison, Northern donors' aid policies are institutionalised and regulated by legislation, including agendas, incentive systems, organised interests of the state and implementation monitoring by the executive body (Lancaster, 2008, p. 6). Therefore, it can be debated that Southern cooperation aims to meet the needs of national interests while simultaneously avoiding comprehensive public debate (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Bracho & Grimm, 2016; Braveboy-Wagner, 2009; Cheru, 2011).

Southern states play a significant role in directing their policy, including development cooperation, as evidenced by discussions on national priorities as a framework for a Southern agenda (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Lin & Wang, 2017a). National policy is also reflected in the setting of Southern cooperation, which conveys issues that move beyond the traditional aid agenda and philosophical stances (Kilby, 2018; Lin & Wang, 2017a; Mawdsley, 2018).

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<sup>118</sup> In this case, the institution refers to the state agency involved in developing and restructuring the regulations and systems that benefit their own development agenda (Arestis & Sawyer, 2010; Marglin, 2018).

Therefore, Keynesian approaches have influenced two settings of the development of internal state institutions and regulations on SSC, as well as the internationalisation of Global South institutions.

First, the rise of Southern countries in global development cooperation, with different methods, agendas, policies and approaches, has generated further debate on the development of state institutions, regulations and systems (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; De Renzio & Seifert, 2014; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012; Quadir, 2013). This notion is linked to Keynesian theory, which recognises the state as the main actor in constructing development policy and negotiating the country's system and policy within international institutions (Gabel, 2010; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012). In addition to reinforcing the state's macroeconomic strategy, including control over labour and fiscal policy, state roles are also contextualised within state ideology and the separation of the National Development Plan from external influences (Kilby, 2018, p. 6). The significance of the state's role also expands to its comparative development advantages, which are implemented through SSC activities (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Lin & Wang, 2017a). In the case of Indonesia, state regulators play a role in developing SSC policy, as discussed in Chapter 6. The notions of state regulation and control become important in analysing Southern states' institutional settings in international and national contexts. Therefore, the provision for the state to adjust its Southern policy highlights specific features that lead to the effectiveness narrative of the Southern institutions.

Second, the Keynesian paradigm has evolved within the construction of global south institutions, including the UN, since the 1970s (Kilby, 2017a; Nesadurai, 2005). The failure of the Washington Consensus financial institutions to acknowledge Southern countries as active agents in development led to the current re-emergence of Southern states' institutional practices (Kilby, 2018; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012). The current set of global south institutional settings and agendas has been restructured within country policy and reshaped within international institutions. For example, the development of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) are viewed as challenges to the current setting of global development cooperation as constructed by the OECD–DAC (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee) (Kilby, 2018; Lin & Wang, 2017a; Vieira & Alden, 2011). Thus, re-evolving

Keynesian perspectives cannot be disregarded in understanding the Southern cooperation system, which also influences and acknowledges the context of effectiveness in the state's system and mechanism.

However, empirical and theoretical debates on institutional settings show that the discussion cannot be separated from the notion and definition of effectiveness. Development effectiveness is defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as the influence of aid institutions to produce change and sustainable results in the recipient country (UNDP, 2001). Further, the content of effectiveness is linked with the Paris Declaration principles, which indicate the coherence of aid with the recipient country's capacity and ownership, including the process of monitoring and evaluating Official Development Assistance (ODA) activities (OECD, 2005). The great aid debates construct the context of the effectiveness of traditional donors within notions of aid ineffectiveness, knowledge gaps between recipients and providers, and the content of aid to reduce poverty and stimulate growth in Southern recipient countries (Easterly, 2006; Engel, 2014; Howes, 2011; Lin & Wang, 2017a; Riddell, 2007). The debate on Southern development effectiveness emerged from the High-Level Forum of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness in Busan when the China delegation was confronted with the concept of the effectiveness of its aid (Eyben & Savage, 2013; Mawdsley, Savage, & Kim, 2014). The discussion highlights China's argument around its aid modalities, which focused on existing recipient country systems and not on transforming the system, as the idea of aid and giving induced from the concept of helping and building the community together (Eyben & Savage, 2013, p. 462).

Despite the intention to change the paradigm from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness to acknowledge more actors in aid (Mawdsley, Savage, & Kim, 2014, p. 27), the context of effectiveness in Southern countries, including Indonesia, is constructed differently. Effectiveness in Southern cooperation arises from the context of the solidarity and partnership of horizontal relations rather than by imitating the structure of the DAC model (De Renzio & Seifert, 2014; Quadir, 2013). Effectiveness can also indicate the domestic context of the governance mechanism within a state setting that holds different meanings from the DAC's meaning of effectiveness and that does not necessarily refer to Paris Declaration indicators. In the case of Indonesia, effectiveness often refers to aligning internal government institutional settings with the country's own policy and regulation system, as well as being

able to identify its programs and priorities (Senior Official 5 [interview], 2016). Thus, the context highlights Southern aid management and cooperation as being structured within the domestic political–economic spectrums, and it is in these senses that notions of effectiveness are being developed.

### **Indonesia’s Institutional Settings and Challenges of Effectiveness**

As part of the second wave of Southern countries,<sup>119</sup> Indonesia is perceived to have conducted several approaches to cooperation within its institutional settings (De Renzio & Seifert, 2014). However, Indonesia’s SSC has often been criticised as uncoordinated because of a lack of obvious institutional arrangements (CSIS, 2014; UNDP, 2013). Muhibat (2016) argued that the main challenges for Indonesia to scale up its SSC are its national coordination mechanism, regulation set-up and institutional setting for SSC activities (Muhibat, 2016, pp. 127–128). Nevertheless, there is an understanding among Indonesian bureaucrats that institutions, strategies and policy need to be improved in development cooperation, especially in SSC (Senior Official 5 [interview], 2016; Senior Official 7 [interview], 2016). As the narrative of Indonesia’s SSC has developed, the government’s perspectives and expectations of SSC have also evolved. The complex Southern institutional setting in defining SSC modalities was also noted by Indonesian bureaucrats, in addition to the critique from Quadir (2013, p. 328). Therefore, the government observes three approaches as part of its reforms, considering them effective and a way of strengthening its SSC policy: strategic documents and national governance; between pledging, in-kind and the amount of aid; and partnership setting.

#### **Strategic Documents and Governance**

Given that SSC is often considered symbolic and ideologically substantial, the rhetoric of SSC is often considered very normative and difficult to translate in government policy documents (Quadir, 2013, p. 328). The challenge embedded in SSC ideas and ideology is to translate them into current Indonesian public policy discourse. This raises questions about whether government pragmatism to acknowledge the cooperation can be identified within the policy narrative. As discussed in Chapter 6, the Indonesian Government outlined the importance of its development priorities in the National Medium-Term Development Plan, or *Rencana*

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<sup>119</sup> The first wave of Southern countries was identified as BRICS (De Renzio & Seifert, 2014).

*Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional*,<sup>120</sup> which is based on the president's vision, national constitution and national ideology. As a senior bureaucrat from the Ministry of Planning reiterated, the Indonesian Government considered the importance of bridging the ideology of SSC, which is embedded in Indonesia's national constitution and national ideology, with its national development priorities (Senior Official 7 [interview], 2016). Therefore, strategising the SSC program is essential within the government's structure and mechanisms, especially in being identified within the government's priorities development program—particularly the national development plan. By being identified in the National Medium-Term Development Plan, the SSC policy is acknowledged as the national policy, which is: (a) a priority program within the national development strategy; (b) eligible for national budget allocation; and (c) monitored within overall development targets (Senior Official 7 [interview], 2016; Official 6 [interview], 2016).

The significance of the Medium-Term Development Plan as a policy framework and guideline helps policymakers identify the direction of the program and monitor activities such as programs and financial management. These documents also become reference documents for donor partners working in Indonesia regarding foreign cooperation. For example, the UNDP's work in Indonesia refers to its five-year priorities being based on Indonesia's development priorities.<sup>121</sup> In comparison, the National Medium-Term Development Plan is also mainstreaming global development agendas. For example, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and SDGs were priorities benchmarked within the National Medium-Term Development Plan's focus areas and targets. The national plan document is bound under the National Law of Presidential Regulation. Therefore, the document has become a guideline for the Ministry of National Development Planning to monitor the progress of development targets implemented by ministries and local governments.

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<sup>120</sup> The National Medium-Term Development Plan of 2010–2014 (Presidential Regulation No. 5/2010) can be accessed at [https://www.bappenas.go.id/files/5113/5022/6066/rpjmn-2010-2014\\_\\_20121105135059\\_\\_0.pdf](https://www.bappenas.go.id/files/5113/5022/6066/rpjmn-2010-2014__20121105135059__0.pdf) and the National Medium-Term Development Plan of 2015–2019 (Presidential Regulation No. 2/2015) can be accessed at <https://www.bappenas.go.id/id/data-dan-informasi-utama/publikasi/rencana-pembangunan-dan-rencana-kerja-pemerintah/> (accessed 25 April 2018).

<sup>121</sup> The UNDP Country Program Action Plan and UNDP focus on works in Indonesia in line with the national priorities stated in the National Medium-Term Development Program (<http://www.id.undp.org/content/dam/indonesia/docs/legal/CPAP%202011-2015.pdf> and [http://www.id.undp.org/content/indonesia/en/home/operations/about\\_undp.html](http://www.id.undp.org/content/indonesia/en/home/operations/about_undp.html) [accessed 25 April 2018]).

In the 2015–2019 National Medium-Term Development Plan (Chapter 5—Book II), SSC was outlined within President Widodo’s vision (Widodo & Kalla, 2014). Its objective was to improve Indonesia’s role in SSTC. This included developing sound SSC policy, the national and international promotion of Indonesia’s SSC, improving the capacities and capabilities of state stakeholders, and developing an incentive program for the implementation of SSC activities (IsDB, 2017; GOI, 2015c). To achieve these three priorities, the focus was on developing better financing, regulatory and institutional frameworks (GOI, 2015c):

1. The financing framework described the financing modality of SSC as part of the foreign policy strategic activities that are funded from the national budget (pp. 5–46).
2. The regulatory framework defined the need to shape Indonesia’s SSC within the political and economic cooperation that supports the national development program (pp. 5, 49–50).
3. The institutional framework identified two strategies: the need to strengthen the NCT and the need to establish a single agency of Indonesian SSC (pp. 5, 54–55).

The development of the Medium-Term Development Plan should be apolitical and more of a technocratic process. However, the finalisation and enactment of the document must be consolidated and translated with the president’s vision and priorities (Senior Official 5 [interview], 2016). Identifying these targets within the national policy framework is necessary because the strategies of Indonesia’s SSC do not sit within the global development cooperation agenda but are grounded in government priorities of development cooperation and SSC. The process and final decision for the national development plan is a state-based process, and donor countries have no say in or influence on the final results. However, the SSC policy as presented in the plan is very broad and does not include details of specific goals. As interpreted by several bureaucrats (interviews, 2016), the policy is varied and creates debate around the scope of cooperation. A challenge still remains in delivering sound policy on SSC based on Indonesia’s development strategies and urgencies in SSC. The important target of SSC was institutional development, which focuses on the development of a single or centralised agency as identified in the National Medium-Term Development Plan 2015–2019 (GOI, 2015c, pp. 5, 54–55). Given that President Widodo cited SSC as part of his vision, there was immense pressure to formulate a suitable structure.

This debate was taken to the next stage on 9 January 2018, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that Indonesia would establish a single entity for Indonesian aid.<sup>122</sup> The idea of creating a single entity has been discussed for several years among Indonesian institutions and bureaucrats. The single agency is expected to mainstream and manage all aid provided by Indonesia to other countries, including within SSC (Sato & Santikajaya, 2019; Sheany, 2018), and to synchronise this assistance, including humanitarian support. The minister pledged Rp 1 trillion (around A\$100 million) in 2017 as initial funding for the institution (Sheany, 2018). Further, on 18 November 2019, on the last day of Jusuf Kalla's vice presidency, he announced the establishment of Indonesian AID (Agency for International Development or *Lembaga Dana Kerjasama Pembangunan Internasional*—LDKPI). The abbreviation might look similar to the name of other Northern donors, such as USAID, but the institutional arrangements that are being developed refer to a national mechanism. The role of Indonesian AID is to manage the government's endowment funds that are allocated for international development cooperation. This fund will be utilised as a grant to other government or international institutions based on the government's development priorities and policy. The agency is also expected to increase Indonesia's participation to reach the UN's SDGs, including addressing climate change and reducing poverty and social inequality between developed and developing countries (GOI, 2019; Pinandita, 2019).

The agency is managed under the Ministry of Finance and coordinated with the NCT–SSC in the form of the Public Services Body (*Badan Layanan Umum*—BLU) based on Government Regulations no. 48/2018 and no. 57/2019. At the same time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the strategic approach to the utilisation of the fund. During the launching ceremony, the Minister of Foreign Affairs also announced a pledge of Indonesian AID of US\$212 million (or Rp 3 Trilyun) until 2021, with a focus on seven countries across the Pacific (Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, Fiji, Nauru and Kiribati) and South East Asia (Myanmar and the Philippines) (Pinandita, 2019). Despite the internal challenges faced during the process of developing the institution (as identified in Chapter 6), the establishment of Indonesian AID showcases the intention of Indonesia's SSC to expand its aid relations. However, this raises a

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<sup>122</sup> Bentuk *Indonesia Aid*, RI Rencana Anggaran Rp. 1 Trilyun (Forming Indonesia aid, Government of Indonesia plan to budgeted Rp 1 billion), <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20180109185239-106-267714/bentuk-indonesian-aid-ri-rencana-anggarkan-rp1-triliun> (accessed 15 April 2018).

question of whether this institutional arrangement can be an effective instrument for managing Indonesia's SSC.

### **Between Pledging, In-Kind and the Amount of Aid**

There was also pressure from external agencies such as the G20 Development Working Group<sup>123</sup> for Indonesia to reveal the amount of aid and SSC activities given to other developing countries (Official 7 [interview], 2016). This led to the government attempting to identify its disbursement of aid to other countries. However, for many years, this could not be done properly. First, the aid was not acknowledged in a particular government budget line. Each government agency has the authority to allocate foreign spending to other countries, but it may not be identified clearly as aid or SSC activities but rather enclosed within activities such as travel, training or experts' fees. Second, reporting mechanisms were not established and linked to the existing system to enable the government to identify the budget spent on overall activities. Third, most activities were co-funded by traditional donors and the Indonesian Government through triangular cooperation using a co-sharing mechanism. Thus, it became important to acknowledge SSC in the National Development Plan within the government's system and policy to be able to link it to the government's monitoring and financing/budgeting system (Official 5 [interview], 2016). The challenge is to be effectively organised in budget documents, which cannot be separated from the mechanism and system that the government develops, and which is not necessarily linked to the international aid system.

The budgeting system in Indonesia is based on the budget allocation identified in the National Development Plan that flags priority programs. As the institutional and financial system is still being developed and constructed, the current mechanism is carried out manually and is monitored by the NCT, whereby only limited activities of technical cooperation and knowledge sharing are identified as SSC (as discussed in Chapter 7). Therefore, it is difficult to identify the exact amount spent on Indonesia's SSC activities. The budget commitment can be on a case-by-case basis—for example, the commitment for programs and support to Palestine through international organisations. Another problem is that activities under the president's priorities and commitments to other countries cannot be identified as SSC because they are considered

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<sup>123</sup> The Development Working Group was established during Korea's chairmanship of the G20 in 2010.

political commitments. In Table 8, Indonesia’s SSC is defined as bilateral cooperation, including the president’s commitment, SSC and Triangular Cooperation.

Table 8: Scope of Indonesia’s South–South Cooperation

<b>Indonesian SSTC</b>		
Bilateral Cooperation	South-south Cooperation	Triangular Cooperation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 3 School Buildings in Myanmar (USD 1 Million)</li> <li>• Mosque building in Afghanistan (USD 1 Million)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Scholarship program for developing Countries.</li> <li>• Agriculture Training Program and Farmer exchange program in Tanzania.</li> <li>• +1000 Palestinian Training Program – completed +1300 participants.</li> <li>• \$ 6 Million USD for Timor-Leste – 3 years period.</li> <li>• \$ 20 Million USD for Pacific Islands (with \$10M USD for Melanesia Spearhead Group).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP/Norway Aid Triangular Cooperation between Indonesia-Myanmar on Planning Budgeting training</li> <li>• South-south Knowledge Exchange with World Bank on Disaster Risk Management</li> <li>• IDB – Indonesia – Member Countries River Linkage on Artificial Insemination</li> <li>• JICA – Indonesia – Timor-Leste Road Project</li> </ul>

Source: Author’s own compilation.

The table shows that the activities of Indonesian Southern cooperation can be interpreted beyond the definition of SSC, but they sit within government pledging, in-kind and training programs. Bilateral cooperation has specific characteristics in addition to being considered a presidential commitment to other Southern countries as part of the political or foreign policy agenda, and it is perceived within specific modalities, including through infrastructure building programs. Activities that are considered to be SSC focus on technical cooperation, knowledge sharing and exchange. Pledging for specific countries is also shown—for example, for Timor-Leste and the Pacific. Activities under government pledging also vary from technical cooperation to infrastructure building but are only conducted on a case-by-case basis. For example, cooperation with the Pacific was pledged by the Indonesian Government for three years, which consisted of a small amount of support for hand tractors for an agriculture project and other activities. SSC also acknowledged the activities through Triangular Cooperation, which is typically conducted within technical cooperation or knowledge sharing activities. The mapping of these activities points to the Government of Indonesia identifying its activities without specifying regular pledges or other allocations of its aid. Therefore, it is

difficult to predict or produce definitive estimations of how much Indonesia has given or spent on its aid activities in total.

Referring to the aid effectiveness agenda, based on the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), member countries are expected to allocate 0.7% of gross national income to their aid programs. The context of aid pledging becomes significant for traditional donors and OECD–DAC members, but not for Southern countries. It remains difficult to identify the definitive number of projects or the amount pledged or spent on SSC, including by countries such as China and India, which rarely disclose the amounts disbursed by their aid programs (Bräutigam, 2011; Kragelund, 2011). There are two settings for the financial and monitoring arrangements of Indonesia’s SSC.

First, the pledging of aid in the SSC program is arranged according to the needs and agendas of the government, as discussed earlier. The amounts of SSC spending and proposed allocation depend on the country’s overall development budget, including the internal development budget available in a particular year, and the activities should reflect Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities (Official 5 [interview], 2016).<sup>124</sup> Therefore, aid budgets cannot be predicted because they depend on domestic political conditions rather than global commitments to aid targets. An example of this is the US\$212 million that was pledged during the announcement of Indonesian AID, which showed that the government had started to provide details of pledges in specific countries. Further, Indonesia’s SSC documents often identify only the forms of support given, such as the number of people trained or the number of schools built, but do not clearly identify the amount spent on them, as shown in Table 8.

Second, the monitoring of aid and SSC has started to become embedded in the government’s budget mechanism (*Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara*—APBN). As a result of its identification in the national development plan, the context of the financing and monitoring aid program is constructed and structured within the state system. The identification of amounts spent has become significant in the aid monitoring system because they are set within the state’s capacity to spend and the availability of funds. The monitoring system is developed to be embedded within the government’s monitoring mechanism, which produces

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<sup>124</sup> Interviews were conducted with senior staff at the Ministry of Finance on 27 April 2016.

yearly monitoring reports that indicate the policy directions of Indonesia's SSC, activities and programs conducted, organisations and countries that participated in SSC programs, and specific issues raised during the period (NCT–SSTC, 2015, 2016). However, these only cover technical cooperation and knowledge sharing activities, but not other government aid models of commitment and spending that identify as political cooperation, for example, the president's commitment to build a mosque in Afghanistan.<sup>125</sup>

Picture 5: Launching Ceremony of 2015 South–South and Triangular Cooperation Monitoring Report (Jakarta, 12 August 2016)



Source: author's fieldwork documentation

The transparency and accountability of budget allocation cannot be separated from the lack of dialogue and communication with the parliament.<sup>126</sup> The difficulty in identifying the support given to wider audiences, including parliamentary members, is related to the question: 'Why do we need to give while there is still so much poverty in our country?' The

<sup>125</sup> <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20180112112226-113-268385/as-salam-masjid-indonesia-di-afghanistan> (accessed 24 February 2019).

<sup>126</sup> The notion that Indonesia still faces many problems in domestic affairs, and especially in unequal development results in many areas, is still acknowledged by Indonesian politicians (based on an interview with the head of the Sub-Directorate of Bilateral Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture, in Jakarta on 13 September 2016).

complex relationship between executive and legislative in Indonesia's SSC is also acknowledged to challenge the institutional arrangement of Indonesia's SSC (Muhibat, 2016). In this case, parliamentary members may be unaware of SSC issues and that Indonesia assists other countries,<sup>127</sup> because the policy and activities of SSC are considered only by the executive institutions of the Indonesian Government. The problem of transparency in giving to other countries is also being experienced by other Southern countries—for example, Brazilian aid to Haiti was scrutinised by local politicians (Bergamaschi & Durán, 2017, p. 311). A member of Indonesia's parliament noted that:

We might not know all of the government's budget, as the budget proposal from the government only identified the overall number and not all of the details. Thus, some specifics or details of allocations might not appear in the reports. Also, there are some president executive decisions that do not need to go through parliament's approval (Parliament member from Commission 1 [interview], 2016).

This shows that the government's priorities or the president's programs were often not delivered, or they had to be clearly defined to the parliament. This differs from the system in some Western countries. The lack of communication with the public is also problematic because it cannot be separated from the constellation of domestic politics. However, the bureaucrats also understand that if SSC is expanded, there will be a need to communicate the activities to the public (Senior Official 5 [interview], 2016).

### **Partnership Mechanisms**

One substantial result in the Fourth Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness was the need for an inclusive partnership with Southern countries and non-state actors, including NGOs and the private sector (Eyben & Savage, 2013; Mawdsley, Savage, & Kim, 2014). Three main external partners identified in Indonesia's SSC are from the private sector, including state-owned enterprises, traditional donors and NGOs. As the government expected its SSC to be linked with the government's economic diplomacy, the role of the private sector is part of this. The private sector, without trying to compare it with China or India, is viewed by the government as a future collaborator in Indonesia's SSC. The need for the government to collaborate with private companies is considered a goal of expanding Indonesia's SSC.

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<sup>127</sup> Based on an interview with a member of parliament from Commission 1 in Jakarta on 3 May 2016.

However, the problem highlighted during the interviews with the Indonesian chamber of commerce (KADIN)—CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam) Division—was that the relevant SSC had not been appropriately linked with other private sector organisations (KADIN Members [interview], 2016). The private companies involved are those that had previous relations with the government program or state-owned enterprises that worked under specific ministers that conducted technical cooperation programs.<sup>128</sup> For example, CV KHS—Quick Tractor, a hand tractor company, provided equipment to Fiji under the MOFA SSTC program, which helped to promote and introduce the product to markets in other Southern countries.<sup>129</sup>

Another essential stakeholder in Indonesia's SSC is traditional donors or Northern donors. The roles of Northern donors in Indonesia's SSC were identified by the national institution of NCT—SSTC in supporting their activities. The Jakarta Commitment of 2009 (GOI, 2009), the National Medium-Term Development Plan 2010–2014 (GOI, 2010) and the Asian–African Summit 2015 in Jakarta (GOI, 2015a) acknowledged the roles of traditional donors through triangular cooperation in Indonesia's SSC. Within the international context, the Indonesian Government also referred to the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation in 2011 in its partnership with traditional donors (OECD, 2011a). Traditional donors have been involved in the development of Indonesia's SSTC program since the 1980s, including through Triangular Cooperation. The significance of this approach to SSC was part of the Indonesian Government's response to the BAPA on Technical Cooperation in 1978, which acknowledged the triangular cooperation model. However, the mechanism of triangular cooperation in Indonesian SSC is part of the donor or development partner's pledge of aid or commitment to the Indonesian Government. Consequently, the program that is implemented has to be continuously negotiated between the GOI and the donors because it often refers to the donor or development partner's agenda rather than Indonesia's SSC priorities.

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<sup>128</sup> Other private companies linked to Indonesia's SSC are CV KHS—Quick Tractor, Bio-Farma, *Bank Rakyat Indonesia* (Indonesian People's Bank) and numerous state-owned training and research centres in the areas of trade, industry, microfinance, marine and fisheries, health and population, industry, pharmaceutical, agriculture, appropriate technology, transportation, planning and budgeting, and technical vocational training (IsDB, 2017; NCT—SSTC, 2015, 2016).

<sup>129</sup> The CV KHS—Quick Tractor director presented their work with Indonesia's SSC during the launch of the 2015 Monitoring Report of Indonesian SSTC in Jakarta on 12 August 2016. They had previously worked under the agricultural program with the Ministry of Agriculture in Tanzania to provide training for seven Asian and African countries (IsDB, 2017).

Based on Indonesia's SSTC report of 2015, several international organisations and northern donors have implemented SSTC activities, including the JICA, UN agencies (UNDP, UNFPA and UNIDO), Colombo Plan, USAID, ASEAN, GIZ and IsDB in Indonesia. The report also identified the total SSTC activities in 2015: 62% were Triangular Cooperation activities and 38% were SSC (NCT–SSTC, 2015). Triangular Cooperation is set within the sharing power between traditional and Southern donors (Abdenur & da Fonseca, 2013; Hosono, 2012; Kumar, 2008; Langendorf, Piefer, Knodt, Müller, & Lázaro, 2012; McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012). McEwan and Mawdsley (2012a, p. 1186) described Triangular Cooperation as Trilateral Development Cooperation that captures the development relationships among DAC donors as partner and pivotal partner countries in the South to work with other Southern countries as third-party recipients. SSTC can also be expanded beyond North–South Cooperation and SSC to achieve common development goals despite different principles, including through horizontal relations among those involved and sharing similar development agendas (Bergamaschi, Tickner, & Durán, 2017; McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012). However, Southern countries have unique interpretations of the implementation of Triangular Cooperation. For example, Indonesia has acknowledged the model of Triangular Cooperation within its SSC as a way to fill resources or financial gaps in its SSC (Engel, 2017, 2019; Muhibat, 2016). Conversely, an Indonesian official identified the significance of Triangular Cooperation in expanding Indonesia's SSC network of countries by using traditional countries or multilateral agencies' networks (Senior Official 6 [interview], 2016). The context of Triangular Cooperation is also related to expanding SSC based on experiences and relations with Northern donors (Bergamaschi, Tickner, & Durán, 2017; McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012). Therefore, the significance of triangular cooperation remains debatable in Indonesia's SSC, especially with the launching of Indonesian AID.

The partnerships that have developed in the case of Indonesia's SSC indicate the government's intention to involve other stakeholders as much as possible. However, these modalities and the scope of activities are still limited to pilot projects. A few programs have direct relations with the private sector, but the selection of private sector organisations has focused on the government's own enterprises, government training centres and government partner companies (NCT–SSTC, 2015, 2016). Further, the interpretation of partnerships with traditional Northern donors has also been reconfigured with the idea of equal relations in cooperation being recognised, including using more Indonesian knowledge and capacity in the

program. Thus, the position of Indonesia in the Global South and other global development institutions is relevant in how the structure of Southern cooperation develops and expands from the state's interpretation and how it is reimagined from its domestic system and experiences.

### **Indonesia and Global Development Institutions**

The phenomenon of emerging 'new' but old Southern donors with different features has been widely recognised because it has shifted the global development architecture in recent decades (Abdenur & da Fonseca, 2013; De Renzio & Seifert, 2014; Gore, 2013; Manning, 2006). The nature of SSC, especially in relation to aid mechanisms, cannot be separated from the exploration of the ideology and narratives of the idea of cooperation, which expand beyond the traditional model of aid cooperation (Bergamaschi, Tickner, & Durán, 2017; Mawdsley, 2012a). Conversely, the increase in global development cooperation has been identified as a challenge to the traditional setting of global development cooperation (Bergamaschi, Tickner, & Durán, 2017; Manning, 2006; Mawdsley, 2012a), and has become more blended and pragmatic in recent years (Mawdsley, 2018, 2019). Southern donors have developed mechanisms that suit their national ideology and needs, and that are often perceived as a different paradigm within the international context. The debate on the roles of Southern countries in global cooperation can be identified from their roles in the UN towards new (and old) Southern international institutions such as the G77, UNCTAD and NEIO in the 1970s and 1980s to the UNDCF in 2007 under UNECOSOC. These Southern-led institutions have identified their preferences and need to expand their political and economic relations alongside specific notions of expanding aid or development cooperation (Alden, Morphet, & Vieira, 2010; Braveboy-Wagner, 2009; Esteves & Assunção, 2014). The exploration of institutions of the global south helps to capture the Southern model of cooperation that is framed within government priorities and is not necessarily dependent on the structure of the global development system.

The increase in economic growth of some of the BRICS countries has led to a discussion of the capacity of the countries to expand their aid budgets within new aid modalities that the countries bring to the wider development debate (Jerve, 2007; Mawdsley, 2012a; Mawdsley, Savage, & Kim, 2014). The establishment of development banks to support other developing

countries is a response that Southern countries have perceived in recent years to global development cooperation, especially through the AIIB<sup>130</sup> initiated by China and supported by other global economy countries (Bond, 2016; Reisen, 2015; Wang, 2017). For instance, Indonesia has been a member of the AIIB since 14 January 2016 and has a total subscription of US\$3,360.7 million or a 3.50% shareholder split.<sup>131</sup> Mr Luky Eko Purwanto, a former Indonesian senior bureaucrat, has been appointed as the vice president/chief administrative officer of the AIIB.<sup>132</sup> The participation of Indonesia and other Southern countries in this new 'Southern-led bank' highlights the content of representation of development voices and diverse selections in development financing, which for many years were dominated by multilateral development banks such as the World Bank and the IMF, with mechanisms and systems that often neglected the voice of the South.

The formation of BRICS extended the debate on the performance of other Southern countries. The initiation of the second 'BRICS' group was seen to stimulate economic exploration on a country's performance in addition to its role as a donor country (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; De Renzio & Seifert, 2014; Durotoye, 2014). For Indonesia, a discussion on the need to establish the 'MINT' group was raised by government officials and with Nigeria during the 2013 Co-Chair Meeting of the GPEDC in Abuja, Nigeria,<sup>133</sup> but it has not expanded further into a new form of Southern institution. The alternative group of Southern countries point to the diverse approaches that can be developed among Southern countries. However, the

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<sup>130</sup> The AIIB was created by the Chinese Government in 2014 and has stimulated much debate as to how it is challenging the roles of existing MDBs (Wang, 2017). In contrast, members of the AIIB, which consist of countries beyond BRICS, including other Southern countries and European, Pacific and Latin American countries, have recognised the expansion of its cooperation. The new bank framework was justified Lin and Wang's (2017a) arguments on the need for the beyond-Keynesian framework by expanding the role of the state to the global level of a structural adjustment program in infrastructure. The infrastructure model of cooperation also expands to 'one belt, one road' (one Silk Road economic belt and one maritime Silk Road) across Asia. This program refers to the ideology of the shared prosperity vision based on Zhou Enlai's Peaceful Co-existence and Confucianism's moral vision (Kilby, 2017a; Lin & Wang, 2017a).

<sup>131</sup> Compared with Australia's subscription of US\$3,691.2 million or 3.85% of shareholder split. Australia became a member on 25 December 2015 (<https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html> and [https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/basic-documents/\\_download/AIIB-Presentation.pdf](https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/basic-documents/_download/AIIB-Presentation.pdf) [accessed 5 December 2018]).

<sup>132</sup> <https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/senior-management/index.html> (accessed 5 December 2018).

<sup>133</sup> I was assigned to provide consultation and assistance to the Indonesian Co-Chair Office for GPEDC (under the Minister of National Development Planning) during the period of Indonesian Co-Chairmanship in 2012–2014.

importance of a new institution also rests on the state's political strategy and position within the global development institution.

The emerging global development institutional platforms, for example Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation – GPEDC, were expected to collaborate in the sense of identifying the results and achievements of MDGs and leading to SDGs, including collaboration between Northern and Southern donors (Esteves & Assunção, 2014; Eyben & Savage, 2013). However, GPEDC failed to meet expectations because the coordination between the old and new donor countries was weak and set within different frameworks. The Southern involvement within these global cooperation platforms was limited because the Southern countries preferred their bilateral mechanisms (Esteves & Assunção, 2014; McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012). Further, some Southern donors avoided being aligned with the OECD–DAC framework. One reason for this was the different partnership visions perceived by India and China that emerged during the Busan Fourth High-Level Meeting in 2011 (Eyben & Savage, 2013; Mawdsley, Savage, & Kim, 2014). Despite the challenges and rejection of China and India (among others) in the Busan Outcome Document, the meeting established the GPEDC to replace the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP–EFF) in 2011.<sup>134</sup> The Steering Committee for 2012–2014 was co-chaired by Indonesia, Nigeria and the UK (Abdel-Malek, 2015; Janus, Klingebiel, & Mahn, 2014). The results of the Busan Meeting and the GPEDC were expected to accommodate new actors and diverse mechanisms within the negotiated development cooperation mechanisms to achieve the MDG/SDG goals (De Renzio & Seifert, 2014; Eyben, 2013; Li, Gu, Leistner, & Cabral, 2018). They were also intended to construct the global development agenda and end the intellectual debate (*'doxic battle'*) on traditional and Southern aid systems through aid effectiveness and the development cooperation concept, as well as facilitating a partnership by these two sides in one forum (Esteves & Assunção, 2014; Gomes & Esteves, 2018). However, this model has been questioned in relation to finding alternative solutions to global development issues by minimising the North–South aid

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<sup>134</sup> The roles of the OECD–DAC and UNCTAD competed with each other to bring their own political stands of member countries (Kilby, 2017a).

debates<sup>135</sup> (Abdel-Malek, 2015; De Renzio & Seifert, 2014; Esteves & Assunção, 2014; Gomes & Esteves, 2018; Gore, 2013).

Indonesia, as one of the co-chairs of GPEDC, used the platform to promote a framework of knowledge sharing in SSTC within the framework of the OECD–DAC. The framework was intended to enhance Indonesia’s agenda in the process of sharing development experiences among Southern countries and with traditional donors (Abdel-Malek, 2015; Janus, Klingebiel, & Mahn, 2014). The Steering Committee was to meet every three months with weekly co-chair office meetings. However, the mechanism and process of dialogue between traditional and emerging donors are often perceived as weak and artificial because not all countries are willing to participate. For example, Indonesia was pressured by other members to approach the Chinese delegation to participate in the GPEDC meetings, but it failed. China’s lack of interest in the group and the platform was obvious. Compared with China’s interest in G20 meetings, as one Indonesian senior official pointed out, ‘they [China] always come in full team and fully prepared in G20’ (Official 7 [interview], 2016). This pointed to the preferences of China, which cannot easily be changed by other countries, including Indonesia.

Indonesia also used the Multilateral Development Banks’ (MDB) platform to expand the concept of knowledge sharing in SSC. As touched on earlier, it used the Reverse Linkage program of the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) to expand Indonesia’s network among other IsDB member countries. Indonesia also became a participant in the High-Level Meeting on Country-Led Knowledge Hub together with the World Bank<sup>136</sup> and several other international development organisations. The first meeting was held in Bali in 2012. The platform was used by Indonesia to expand the framework and programs of knowledge sharing to other member countries and international organisations (NCT–SSTC, 2015). The Indonesian Government indicated its position with traditional donors as partners; thus, the international platforms of the OECD and MDBs were used to expand knowledge sharing in SSC. Likewise, on the issue of Palestine, as an example of political content for Indonesian SSC, has also been advocated within international forums, including the Conference on Cooperation among East Asian

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<sup>135</sup> The GPEDC is currently being co-chaired by the Minister of Finance, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Parliamentary State Secretary to the Federal Minister for Economic Co-operation and Development of Germany, and Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Development of Uganda (<http://effectivecooperation.org/about/leadership/> [accessed 23 January 2019]).

<sup>136</sup> <https://www.knowledgesharingfordev.org> (accessed 7 December 2018).

Countries for Palestinian Development (CEAPAD)<sup>137</sup> and the International Islamic Organisation<sup>138</sup> (NCT–SSTC, 2015). The Indonesian Government pledged US\$2 million in aid for Palestinian capacity-building through CEAPAD<sup>139</sup> in 2018 for a three-year period (2019–2021). Despite global development agendas, these two main issues of knowledge sharing about development issues and Palestine matters became issues that symbolised Indonesian SSC contributions within global development cooperation, especially within the global Muslim community and its institutions.

The influences of re-emerging Southern donors in SSC have contributed significantly to the dynamic of international development cooperation (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; De Renzio & Seifert, 2014; Gore, 2013; Manning, 2006). As the performance of these global platforms continued to be questioned, the domestic institutional settings of Southern countries were restructured within their domestic governance arrangements. The effectiveness of aid activities within development cooperation was often indicated by how much money had been delivered to achieve DAC targets (Esteves & Assunção, 2014; Hughes & Hutchison, 2012). This contradicts the historical and ideological narrative perceived by Southern countries, whereby the quantity of aid given has never signified the effectiveness of their priorities (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Mawdsley, 2012b). Southern institutional mechanisms cannot be generalised within specific modalities: there are various actors involved, including modalities and platforms for cooperation, which have continued to expand within state domestic conditions. As most Southern donors are not members of the OECD–DAC, the institutions and management of their aid do not align with the OECD’s system or agenda. Therefore, these differences should be acknowledged, as in the case of Indonesia.

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<sup>137</sup> CEAPAD was established in 2013 and initiated by Japan to support Palestinian independence, with participating countries and organisations including Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, Vietnam, Egypt, Brunei, IsDB, UN Relief Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), Arab League, the World Bank and the Office of the Quartet ([https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/field/2012/130319\\_02.html](https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/field/2012/130319_02.html); <https://www.kemlu.go.id/en/berita/Pages/To-Host-CEAPAD,-RI-Reaffirms-Commitment-to-Support-Palestinians-Self-reliance.aspx>; [https://www.mofa.go.jp/me\\_a/me1/palestine/page3e\\_000879.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/me_a/me1/palestine/page3e_000879.html) [accessed 7 December 2018]).

<sup>138</sup> <https://www.oic-oci.org/home/?lan=en> (accessed 17 December 2018).

<sup>139</sup> <https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-commits-2m-aid-support-capacity-building-palestine/> (accessed 7 December 2018).

## Conclusion

With its changing position as a Middle-Income Country (MIC) within global development cooperation, the Indonesian Government has worked to stay relevant by reconstructing its SSC institutions. The concept of effectiveness in Southern cooperation is considered within a different setting. In the case of Indonesia, effectiveness is considered when the implementation of SSC activities aligns with the government's systems and mechanisms. However, the challenges in developing and maintaining institutional arrangements set within specific regulations and modalities are substantial for the current government's system and priorities and are not within the specific global development system. Therefore, the Keynesian perspective of the state as the regulator and main agent helps in identifying the significant roles of Southern states in shaping and structuring their own institutions and agendas of SSC as a way for the government to be effective in its implementation. The identification of SSC within Indonesia's National Medium-Term Development Plan Document clarified the strategy to materialise the government's foreign and development policy. The institutional setting also faced a transformation to identify the need for extensive and effective coordination in the program's implementation. This arrangement led to the setting of financing and monitoring modalities in line with the overall government mechanism.

Further, relations with partners, including Northern donors working on SSC, were affected when the Indonesian Government applied its priorities. These institutional modalities are constructed in the current process of changes in the re-emergence of Indonesia's SSC. Indonesian participation in global development institutions is considered important in implementing its SSC agenda, which is linked with its foreign and national development policy priorities. Participation in the OECD–DAC's model of institutional setting (e.g., the GPEDC) and Global South institutional initiatives (including membership in the AIIB) are significant in enabling Indonesian policy and position to be an active agent in international forums. Thus, it is important to understand the structure of symbolic politics of cooperation in the application of Southern state development cooperation, which has shaped the substance and implementation of the partnership in global development cooperation, as further explored in the next chapter.



## **Chapter 9 Symbolism of Southern Cooperation:**

### **Politics of Development Cooperation in the Globalised World of Foreign Aid**

#### **Introduction**

Southern cooperation, in the case of Indonesia, was explored in the previous chapters to define and understand its meaning, implementation and effect on development cooperation debates and narratives. One particular feature identified in Indonesia's case is that the reciprocal process in South–South Cooperation (SSC) cannot be separated from the politics of giving, receiving and sharing that are framed within the state's ideology and policies to expand the network and capital of cooperation. Each Southern state has also developed unique features in constructing SSC policy and activities based on ideas of state identity as well as political and economic needs, which cannot be generalised but can be compared to identify their uniqueness (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Carmody, 2013). There is also a particular point at which Southern cooperation differs from North–South Cooperation, which lies in the structure of the relations established. Therefore, this chapter intends to unpack the meaning of the symbolic languages, institutional settings and models of Indonesia's Southern cooperation and how the relations affect North–South relations.

This chapter theorises SSC and addresses the question of how Southern countries (in this case, Indonesia) construct the idea of giving in a global development cooperation. Southern social relations have constructed the idea of giving and sharing, as in the case of Indonesia's SSC, which is shown in its narratives and implementation. This relation is also affected by the intersection between politics, economics, social and cultural issues in SSC, as demonstrated in how Southern states have shaped their cooperation. Further, the dichotomy of Southern cooperation and its relations with Northern countries have been influenced by the internal and external relations that have been established for many years. Thus, the debates have led to the content and paradox of SSC, which is intersubjective to the state's development policies. Therefore, the construction of ideas and the politics of giving are also based on perceptions and practices of bureaucrats as policymakers, which are being restructured and reimagined in the globalised world of aid and development relations.

## **Political Institution of Indonesia's South–South Cooperation**

The development of the current model of Indonesia's SSC cannot be separated from its historical, political, socioeconomic and cultural discourses. It is shaped by notions and content that are ideologically influenced by state philosophy and the modern governance system in Indonesia. As noted in Chapter 7, the idea of giving in Indonesia's SSC can be analysed from the construction of Mauss's (1970) gift theory to help show the symbolic nature of giving based on bureaucrats' narratives and the values of Southern cooperation. This links to the current settings and model of cooperation as explored by international relations theories, including realism and constructivism (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Mawdsley, 2012a; Wendt, 1999). Conversely, the Keynesian perspective of development (Lin & Wang, 2017a; Kilby, 2017a; Nesadurai, 2005; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012) also constructs a definition of state roles in SSC that can be identified through the state and its institution of SSC. These theories identify the evolution of ideas and narratives that are expanding in Southern countries and determine how they have shaped Southern cooperation relations. These theoretical frameworks also support the identification of the ontological meaning and motivations of giving and further examine the immaterial capital of the role of the state, which is translated by bureaucrats to define the narratives, policy and implementation of SSC.

Many researchers have analysed the continued expansion and preference of the Southern states' approaches, positions and roles in global development cooperation—for example, within multilateral and regional agencies (Alden, Morphet, & Vieira, 2010; Braveboy-Wagner, 2009) and global governance (Gore, 2013; Mawdsley, 2012a), as well as with specific modalities of cooperation (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Chaturvedi, Fues, & Sidiropoulos, 2012). For example, in the case of Indonesia, Widodo's government expands SSC within a framework of cooperation that focuses on closeness to ASEAN as well as specific regions of Islamic Southern countries—especially Palestine and Afghanistan (Shekhar, 2018). These outlooks support debate on how the leaders perceived their government bureaucrats as policymakers to prioritise certain approaches and focus on SSC to retain their position in global cooperation. Therefore, despite various mechanisms, roles and strategies of Middle-Income Countries (MIC) in development cooperation, the narratives of SSC articulated by leaders and bureaucrats also need to be pointed out. Based on the interviews conducted in this study, Indonesia's SSC has captured the characteristics of sharing development experiences with the

spirits of solidarity and mutual benefit. These notions highlight the discussion of the foundation and narratives of Southern countries in developing their SSC within their national agenda and development priorities, including those reflected in the country's institutional arrangements (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; De Renzio & Seifert, 2014).

In the experience of Indonesia, the idea of giving and sharing cannot be separated from the development of SSC symbolised in relations with Southern and Northern countries. For example, solidarity is the narrative that has symbolised the foundation of Indonesia's SSC since the Bandung Conference in 1955 (Mawdsley, 2012b; Muhibat, 2016). As noted in Chapter 3, Indonesian development cooperation is structured from a depiction of anti-colonialism with respect to Northern countries, and in the nature of its partnership with other Southern countries. Indonesia views Southern cooperation through a narrative of solidarity linked with its national ideological stand of *Pancasila* and the Javanese concept of *gotong royong*, or working together, as explored in Chapter 4. These philosophical notions and values have been continuously reiterated by the Indonesian senior bureaucrats from central ministries who were interviewed during the fieldwork, as identified in Chapter 6. At the same time, these notions cannot be separated from Widodo's political narratives that, for example, have highlighted the importance of reiterating *Pancasila* as a national ideology and for his cabinet ministries to work together (*gotong royong*) to tackle Indonesian development issues. These narratives have attained the significance of Indonesian values as narrated within the country's domestic and foreign policies—especially in relations with other Southern countries.

It should be analysed that in the case of the Indonesian Government's system, bureaucrats as policymakers have the capacity and responsibility to develop and implement policies within their scope of work and under the direction of the president. Therefore, the policy of Indonesia's SSC reflects a particular position of foreign policy with strong content around development issues and approaches. The framework of Indonesia's SSC cannot be separated from the effects of the neoliberal approach of the global aid system that has been interpreted by the bureaucratic system and policy. The debate on how Indonesia can still be relevant in current global development, but also still significant for any meaningful analysis of state-led national policy, is a key argument. For example, the trajectory from the establishment of the NCT in 2011 to the establishment of Indonesian AID in 2019 shows how the government has expanded and developed the content of its SSC within its foreign and development policies. It

also points to the intention of the Indonesian Government to position itself and be relevant as a leading Southern country in global development cooperation.

An institutional framework is argued to be a precondition for the effective implementation of a development program (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013; Sen, 2001) and consequent economic growth (North, 1990); therefore, it is important to develop systems within the national system. However, Lin and Wang (2017a, p. 26) argued that institutional reform—especially if it is copied from the West—cannot become the precondition for market and economic growth because it is necessary to change domestic structural conditions first (i.e., by creating jobs). Institutional reform often goes beyond the ideas of market creation, for example, but is often considered a political disposition towards the realisation of government agendas, including the development cooperation agenda. Thus, in comparison with Northern partners, which organise their aid policy within specific institutional settings, Southern countries such as Indonesia started to develop their aid management systems within specific settings and approaches, as identified in Chapter 8. The institutional model of a specific aid agency that had previously been the central institution of Northern aid started to be developed by Southern countries with specific arrangements that fit with the state's domestic mechanism. This setting was produced as a result of significant expectations that new (re)-emerging donor countries would provide transparent information on support given, both within their domestic governance settings and in international cooperation. Further, this development is in line with Mawdsley's (2018, 2019) arguments on the shifting approaches of Southern and Northern countries that have become more similar and blended in the current setting of global development cooperation.

With the rise of developing countries such as BRICS, and followed by other Southern countries since early 2000, debates around development cooperation have indicated the need to reassess the theoretical framework to analyse SSC from the perspective of the South (Kilby, 2018, p. 5). An examination of the theoretical exploration of SSC shows that analysis was often shaped within Western perspectives of development cooperation and missed the voices of Southern countries in defining their cooperation (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Muhr, 2016). An exploration of SSC from global (Alden, Morphet, & Vieira, 2010; Acharya, 2016a) or neoliberal perspectives (Engel, 2019; Morvaridi & Hughes, 2018) is insufficient to identify the significant meanings and perspectives of the Southern states in shaping SSC. The exploration

throughout this thesis has led to multidimensional approaches to recognise the capacity of Southern states and bureaucrats to regulate and shape their development through strategies, policies, institutional and social relations, and state systems, including their understanding of the state's ideology as the foundation for development and foreign policies. This leads to distinguishing the applied meaning of symbolism in SSC. The link between the agent and structure, with its institutions and surroundings, help navigate the concept of social relations in SSC that relate to the politics and symbolic nature of the cooperation and partnership, which differs from the symbolic power of North–South Cooperation. Therefore, examining Indonesia's perspectives and the application of its SSC policy can facilitate an understanding of the politics and symbolic structures of SSC that have shaped the current context of development cooperation.

### **Structure of Southern Cooperation**

The exploration in the previous chapters—especially in Chapter 4, on the symbolic relationship of SSC—showcased the context of Southern relations in SSC in the case of Indonesia. The relations are politically constructed, with countries performing their roles symbolically in SSC. Besides these symbolic acts, which have been performed regularly in the commemoration of the AAC—for example, through rituals that are repeatedly performed, and language that is continuously reiterated—institutional settings have also contributed to the content of SSC in the form of specific structures or patterns, as analysed in Chapter 8. Therefore, based on the case of Indonesia's SSC, it can be argued that the actions or interventions of Southern states are shaped within two structures.<sup>140</sup> These are the construction of Southern principles, which are narrated by leaders and bureaucrats to identify the symbolism and norms of social relations in SSC, and the institutions or systems that are constructed within the domestic governance system—especially by bureaucrats as policymakers.

Southern principles are expressed through language and specific terminologies such as 'solidarity', 'win–win' and 'mutual benefit', which are used to create identity and dialogues between Southern policymakers and to differentiate SSC from North–South Cooperation

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<sup>140</sup> Two structures refer to Giddens's (1984) duality of structure, which explores relations between the agency and the structure that is shaped through language and relations and developed into institutional settings.

(Mawdsley, 2012b, p. 265). These principles are often used as political rhetoric<sup>141</sup> by leaders to recognise their cooperation with other Southern countries, as identified in Chapter 6. These narratives cannot be separated from the context of Southern history, whereby the AAC created the principles that became the norms of SSC. Further, these narratives and ideology have been frequently proclaimed, which gives meaning to the collective identity and agency of the Southern countries and SSC political actions (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Mawdsley, 2012b, 2018). In the case of Indonesia, the Southern ideology is also shaped by the state's ideology and its cultural values, which are embedded in the narrative of SSC. Therefore, the Southern principles cannot be considered indicators or definitions because their meanings are fluid and assembled within specific conditions and situations. These terminologies signify the cooperation that binds the Southern countries and is also politically constructed.

The Southern identity of giving that is ontologically constructed gives meaning to relations and derives a different construction of relations from the Northern context of donor relations (Mawdsley, 2015, 2019). Thus, the meaning of these rituals also celebrates the identity of Southern relations shared by leaders through common languages and historical narratives that are maintained to position themselves within globalised development cooperation. In the international relations context, the act of solidarity is also structured in bilateral cooperation among Southern countries, as explored in Chapter 7. Further, the field of cooperation has evolved within the understanding of roles that is embedded in actors to mutually respond to the act of giving in Southern relations.

The need to modernise SSC policy, strategy and institutional settings is significant as a result of the need to remain relevant within the governance system. For Indonesia, the policy and strategy of SSC are intentionally regulated within the national system developed by its bureaucrats, as discussed in Chapter 8. This is necessary to justify the activities of the government's priorities program, which explores the targets and substantial content of SSC, and to enable activities to be financed from the national budget. The modalities and general policy in SSC have not changed from existing practices that focus on foreign policy priorities but have expanded to be linked to the government's development priorities (IsDB, 2017;


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<sup>141</sup> Rhetoric is identified as linguistic features that are shaped from socio-theoretical approaches of cooperation rather than the persuasive speech of policymakers (Laclau, 2005; Muhr, 2016).

Hosono, 2018; NCT–SSTC, 2016). As the priorities are being formalised within the government’s system and institutional mechanisms, SSC targets in the National Medium-Term Development Plan recognise the improvement and later the establishment of an Indonesian aid agency (Pinandita, 2019; Sato & Santikajaya, 2019; Sheany, 2018). This system and the institutional mechanism will be implemented differently in other Southern countries because they are shaped within each country’s needs and government–political system. Consequently, the systems established for SSC in Southern countries can be diverse; however, some similarities can be found. Therefore, the political context of giving and sharing develops its institutional setting based on the state’s development discourse and policy.

The link between narratives and policy implementation is important in understanding the setting of Indonesia’s SSC. These two structures give meaning to Indonesia’s SSC in relation to how the capacities of the Southern state and its policymakers have constructed SSC at the country level. The structure interrelates through the negotiation process among the state’s apparatuses and institutions, as well as through relations with other Southern countries. The narratives point to action and policy being rooted in state ideologies that need to be negotiated through dialogue, despite the obvious power relations among the institutions as captured in Chapter 6. The policy also needs to be shaped for Southern narratives to be articulated and implemented. Figure 6 outlines the setting of Southern structures based on the Indonesian case of SSC, which can be further compared with the implementation of SSC in other Southern countries.

Figure 6: Southern Structures



SSC cannot be separated from the historical discourse that is observed within Global Southern norms, as identified in Chapter 2, but it is often overlooked in identifying the evolution of the state’s institution and Southern narratives of Southern countries (Alden, Morphet, & Vieira, 2010; Awan, 2015; Braveboy-Wagner, 2009; Gray & Gills, 2016; Webb, 2016). As Southern norms are identified within the Global South, the state is often perceived within a different

context that cannot ignore the domestic political and economic circumstances. Therefore, these two structures intend to reveal the meaning and understanding of Southern relations and cooperation. The next section explores how the state has modified and structured narratives on the idea of giving within the political structure of Southern countries, and how a Southern state has developed a mechanism within its government system for SSC. These two structures of state symbolic narratives and state institutions are analysed for Indonesia to determine how the content of SSC is contextualised and represented by the state within the concept of development cooperation, as well as the effect on relations with Northern countries.

### **How Has the State Shaped the Policy and System of Development and Aid in South–South Cooperation?**

The peculiarity of SSC can be identified through country-level approaches to interpret SSC within government systems and policy. The experiences of Southern countries are also reflected in institutional settings, which often undergo challenging processes to develop suitable mechanisms (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; De Renzio & Seifert, 2014). Given that this thesis focuses on bureaucrats' experiences and state-level analysis of a case study, the development of the SSC system cannot be separated from how the policy and system are structured within the context of development studies. The significant roles of the state in shaping SSC policy and programs justify the state-led development approaches rather than the neoliberal mechanism that has shaped traditional donors' policy.

As explored in Chapters 6 and 8, Indonesia's SSC institutions have been developed within a context of national needs and discourses in recent years. It also cannot be forgotten that relations between presidents and parliaments, especially in decision-making processes around aid policy both as recipient and provider, the impact of development policy, and bureaucratic practices and perspectives have shaped the construction of Indonesia's SSC policy. The details are also contextualised within SSC in explorations of rituals, roles, institutions and topic areas on the capacity of state to shape policy beyond the global structure system. Therefore, five components signify the scheme of SSC in the case of Indonesia—especially in relation to the state's roles of giving, providing to and sharing with other Southern countries.

## 1. Identity Politics of Southern State

Southern countries' development cooperation is politically structured in relations among Southern countries. Competition and cooperation become two sides of the same coin in Southern cooperation, which is presented by the state both to achieve its development agenda and to maintain its Southern identity. However, Southern countries also share the common nemesis of global hegemony, which is challenging the structure of domination built by Northern countries. These notions highlight that the political identity of Southern states cannot be neglected in development cooperation and the relations that are developed. For example, Indonesia's SSC policy towards Palestine and other Muslim countries cannot be separated from the government's commitment to the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), as well as Widodo's foreign policy in expanding Indonesia's image as a moderate Muslim country. In contrast, relations among Southern countries have historically not always been smooth, as in the case of India and China's trade competition (Jain & Marcondes, 2017; Vieira & Alden, 2011). Nevertheless, the Southern share of identity has helped navigate Southern relations for many years. This distinct story appeared as the essence of the Southern identity because it was constructed and shared through the state's performance in the rituals of cooperation and giving on the world stage, as contextualised in Chapter 4. The agency of the state also led to an exploration of a Southern identity that shaped its social relations and its structure of cooperation.

The expansion of Southern cooperation highlights the larger roles of the state and its leaders in development cooperation as more of an active agent that understands its roles and capacities, and that extends beyond the traditional setting of Southern rituals. This notion also points out the significance of the narrative of solidarity in understanding the cooperation established, especially how it is entangled with the Northern donor ideologies that Indonesia has been exposed to for many years (Engel, 2019; Muhibat, 2016). The current interactions among Southern states' leaders encapsulate the agency of representation, participation and contribution to their own and global policies of development cooperation. For example, in the case of Indonesia, the setting of Indonesia's SSC can be recognised through the narratives of its national identity and the interests of Southern principles and ideologies that are continuously reiterated by its Presidents. The government has also showcased particular acts of cooperation to preserve its Southern identity within an idea of giving that is narrated from

its development needs and also based on the president's political needs and national interests. However, national interests are not always linked with economic interests, but indirect political capital is gained according to the government's needs. For example, in the case of Indonesia's SSC program, Joko Widodo's foreign policy and his domestic political agenda focus on rebuilding and strengthening cooperation with other Muslim countries, compared to SBY's policy that focused on the global cooperation. These notions highlight how leaders' political ambitions influence the policy that lead the country to perform in international relations and to expand their cultural, economic and political powers within specific approaches. This also highlights that current development cooperation has become political because the process of negotiation has expanded among the countries involved in development cooperation to include their leaders' and state identity, and philosophical stance. It also helps in escalating the definition of aid between Southern and Northern countries and their social relations, which challenge the theoretical construction of development theories (Mawdsley, 2015, 2018).

## 2. Between Sharing, Giving and Reciprocity

The case of Indonesia shows that the notion of sharing in the context of SSC seems to be more profound in the narratives and implementation of activities than in the process of giving itself. This notion can be linked with the horizontal structure of Southern relations, as explored in Chapter 4, which give meaning to the content of sharing and giving. The structure enables Southern countries to interact more equally as the provider and recipient. As identified in Chapter 7, Mauss (1970) defined the meaning of a gift as not free and requiring reciprocity. The provider of a gift also becomes the receiver because the favour could be returned. The concept of aid does not view giving as a one-sided act but as a process of reciprocal acts of giving and sharing. Thus, the acts of giving–receiving–sharing between the two sides will continuously evolve and develop over time as an active act, especially in the context of SSC. This act also moves beyond the ritualised process but is understood by actors involved in the process (in this case, bureaucrats), as explored in Chapter 6.

The consequence of the horizontal structure of Southern relations is building the process of giving as an active act. With the return process of giving, the relations signify the act of sharing. Sharing becomes a symbol of a more equal or horizontal structural process of giving and

receiving without trying to define the process as pretentious. Thus, the context of sharing or knowledge sharing is also used by Southern states as a narrative in SSC, especially in the current setting. In the case of Indonesia, knowledge sharing and the process of sharing in Indonesia's SSC was clearly narrated during interviews with officials, as well as in SSC reports (NCT–SSTC, 2014, 2015, 2016). The content of SSC is motivated by relationship-building rather than just 'giving', as the term is often defined by Northern donors. Giving and sharing, in the case of Indonesia, cannot be separated from the form of solidarity and '*gotong royong*', or working together, which determines the meaning of cooperation as a communal act of giving and sharing, as explored in Chapter 4. Despite the terminology being rooted in the Javanese context, it has been widely used and is often reiterated by Widodo in his political narrative and understood by the wider Indonesian community. Therefore, the meaning of sharing also encapsulates the content of giving through a reciprocal process that involves an active context of relations among the actors involved.

### 3. State Institutions and Resources

In expanding and using the governance of state organisations and resources to implement SSC activities, state institutions in Southern countries have significant knowledge of development mechanisms that are often neglected. As discussed in Chapter 6, Indonesia managed its SSC through the NCT, which consisted of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Finance, State Secretariat and Ministry of National Development Planning (NCT–SSTC, 2014). The team prepared and shaped the modality of the new Indonesian aid agency and the priority activities as targeted in the National Medium-Term Development Plan (GOI, 2015c). The substantial functions of the state's ministries (including their training centres) and state-owned enterprises in implementing the SSC should also be acknowledged in this process. Their capacity in the implementation of development activities was embedded and expanded through the national development program that built most Indonesian SSC activities. This identification was emphasised in the publication of Indonesia's resource centres, which refer to government-based institutions (IsDB, 2017; NCT–SSTC, 2014). The use of government institutions reflects a reimagining of the state's capacity and experiences in development cooperation, as well as the notion of control over the state's national interest.

An example occurred during the visit of President Hage Gottfried Geingob of Namibia to Indonesia on 30 August 2018. President Widodo announced at the Bogor Presidential Palace that the Indonesian Government, through PT Wijaya Karya<sup>142</sup> (an Indonesian state-owned enterprise), had agreed to build 2,000 units of social housing in Namibia (Sofia, 2018; Widodo, 2018). This was also in line with the Indonesian Government announcement on an intention for Namibia to support the ‘Indonesia–Africa Infrastructure Dialogue’, which was intended to be conducted in August 2019. These examples show that SSC is not necessarily reflected in the global system but refers to the state’s capacity, needs and experiences to share and expand cooperation with others, especially with other Southern countries and not necessarily only on aid relations. Thus, the field of bilateral cooperation or regional cooperation among Southern countries continues to evolve to negotiate state symbolic positions in development cooperation.

#### 4. State Regulation and Policy

State regulation and policy that were shaped within the national development plan produced an operational planning framework for development activities. States have control over priority programs that are constructed within their national policy. Development policy is formed by government bureaucrats as part of their tasks and responsibilities, as well as being the result of the government’s assessment and experiences. For example, Indonesia’s SSC strategies, including intended development programs and budgeting, must be acknowledged in these documents to justify government action, as discussed in Chapter 8. The recent announcement on establishing a single agency for Indonesian AID is also rooted in the SSC policy target, as identified in the National Medium-Term Development Plan 2015–2019 (GOI, 2015c). This shows that the state depends on its national regulation system, while references to the international policy of development aid became secondary.

The implication of having a national development plan is also political—to point the ownership of the government to its development program. For example, the monitoring and evaluation

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<sup>142</sup> PT Wijaya Karya is a state-owned enterprise established in 1960 in the sector of engineering and infrastructure (<http://www.wika.co.id> [accessed 12 September 2018]). The minister of Public Works and Public Housing, Mr Basuki Hadimuljono, identified that the Indonesian state-owned infrastructure company had experience in building 5,000 social houses and renovating the presidential palace in Algeria (<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/08/30/15152771/indonesia-akan-bangun-2000-rumah-rakyat-di-namibia> [accessed 12 September 2018]).

of Indonesia's SSC activities must also refer to the National Medium-Term Development Plan and its operational documents established by the government, rather than the global monitoring of aid shaped by international organisations such as the OECD–DAC. The significance and relevance of planning documents enables state regulators and bureaucrats to regulate and define development activities. This shows that Indonesian development policy, including notions of giving, does not necessarily depend on international or global development norms. Development policy is locally and ideologically driven rather than based on international organisations and unregulated notions of 'free market' mechanisms. However, Indonesia's SSC policy is also considered too broad and needs to be developed into a synchronised strategy that can advance state agencies and their activities. Therefore, developing a sound strategic document for Indonesia's SSC remains a challenge for the government.

#### 5. Focus of Cooperation

For many years, Indonesia's SSC used a technical cooperation model with knowledge sharing narratives to support other countries by sharing Indonesia's best practices and experiences in development. Indonesia's SSC focuses on three flagship programs: development (including poverty reduction program, agriculture and education); good governance and peacebuilding; and economics (including macroeconomic management and public financing) (JICA, 2012a; NCT–SSTC, 2014, 2017, 2018; UNDP, 2014). These themes and the model of cooperation are also expected to expand the level of cooperation, but whether it fits the criterion of effectiveness in the context of traditional development aid has become a secondary consideration. For example, as mentioned during the interviews, one of the bureaucrats acknowledged the Poverty Reduction Program (PNPM)<sup>143</sup> as one of Indonesia's successful development or flagship programs that was shared with other Southern countries, including Afghanistan with assistance from the World Bank (Official 1 [interview], 2016). The Indonesian

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<sup>143</sup> PNPM (*Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat*), or the Poverty Reduction Program of the National Program for Community Empowerment Urban Self Reliance Project was developed and supported by the World Bank and began as a pilot program on cash-transfer activity of PPK (*Program Pengembangan Kecamatan* or Regions Development Program or *Kecamatan* Development Program – KDP) in Indonesia in the late 1990s. The program was then expanded nationwide with a national budget during the SBY era due to national criticism of increasing poverty in Indonesia in 2006. The program expanded from 33,000 villages in 2007 to 61,000 villages in 2011, focusing on village infrastructure projects. Further, PNPM was claimed to be the backbone of an Indonesian poverty program that met the UN–MDG targets, but it is debatable whether it decreased poverty levels in Indonesia (Engel, 2010; Li, 2015).

Government modified and applied the PNPM, influenced by the *Bolsa Familia* in Brazil,<sup>144</sup> as a model of cash transfer and extended it into a national development program developed by the World Bank in the 2000s (Official 1 [interview], 2016). Thus, it can be identified that Indonesia's Southern cooperation program still cannot be separated from the development and expansion of its Northern aid program, but also reflects some similarities with other Southern country programs.

Despite the success of PNPM as one of Indonesia's development programs, the essence of the program lay in narratives on how Indonesia had successfully transformed the initiation of its Northern donor support program and expanded it within the sociocultural context of Indonesia. In regard to this notion, the narrative materialised the capacity of Indonesia to modify and expand the program to fit with Indonesia's development priorities and needs. However, the program was criticised as creating specific structures within the government and communities that portrayed the project as more important than the policy itself (Li, 2016, pp. 90–91). This occurred during the development process in Indonesia, with the footprint of Northern donors in Indonesia's development program being replicated within Indonesia's SSC activities. With the narrative that recipient countries need to modify the program within their own context to enable the program to be implemented, the relevance of the program remains a challenge because it can create similar problems, especially with the structures created in the North–South aid program. Therefore, the criticisms of Northern aid programs can be repeated in SSC, despite the Southern relations that have been established.

### *Comparing with Other Southern Countries*

Upon examining the above five characteristics of the state in development and SSC, the Indonesian case can be compared with those of China, Brazil and India, especially in their national approaches to implementing SSC. China's model has been widely discussed as one of the leading countries in SSC (Bräutigam, 2011; Hsu, 2015; Kilby, 2017a; Lancaster, 2007). China's model of aid cooperation includes concessional loans such as zero-interest loans and grants through projects, cash transfers and training (Bräutigam, 2011; Bräutigam & Xiaoyang,

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<sup>144</sup> The *Bolsa Familia* or Family Grant program (BFP) is a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program as part of the social safety net program for poor families in Brazil that provides financial support on the condition that the family guarantees school attendance, health care, and nutrition for children and women in the households. The program was developed in the 1990s under the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) and expanded under President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva (2003–2011) (Bohn, 2011; Hall, 2008), and is still in place.

2012; Hsu, 2015; Woods, 2008). What differentiates China's aid from that of other OECD–DAC countries is the application of loose conditionality, with certain strategies driven by the donor's political needs.<sup>145</sup> The Chinese Government also conducts direct bilateral negotiations with local governments according to its needs, with a focus on infrastructure projects (Bräutigam, 2011; Lin & Wang, 2017a). With massive financial resources to support its economic and aid cooperation, combined with the strong drive of the state's political ideology, China's roles in expanding SSC in global development cooperation extends beyond the modalities of cooperation debates and the philosophical content of cooperation based on Zhou Enlai's eight principles of foreign economics and technical assistance (Kilby, 2017a, 2018).

From India's perspective of SSC, the model of cooperation is also distinct in that it focuses on the expansion of its development program (Abraham, 2008; Chaturvedi, 2012b, 2017; Kumar, 2008). For India, the meaning of Nehru's ideology of non-alignment has affected how India views its SSC policy, which has been in place since 1949 (Appadorai, 1981; Chaturvedi, 2012b), despite domestic political conditions that have emerged. Currently, India's cooperation policy is based on the concepts of partnership, solidarity and non-intervention, and it has a strong anti-Western narrative (Abraham, 2008; Wojczewski, 2017). India focuses its SSC on political and economic purposes in the areas of hydropower, health and information technology, including through training programs, exchange of experts, scholarships, NGO support, trade and finance, and program-based approaches (Chaturvedi, 2012b, 2017; Jerve, 2007; Kumar, 2008). In 2012, India formed a specifically designated aid agency through its Ministry of External Affairs as India's Development Partnership Administration. This can be compared with China, which established the China International Development Cooperation Agency in 2018 (Mawdsley, 2019, p. 11). India has also expanded its SSC through regional and bilateral institutional mechanisms, a special agreement and regular meetings with targeted countries and regions (Chaturvedi, 2012b, 2017).

Until the election in 2018, the Brazilian model of cooperation was based on the principal foundation set by José Maria da Silva Paranhos Jr – Baron of Rio Branco and minister of foreign affairs from 1902 to 1911 (Saravia, 2012). Referring to his principles of 'Raising the Country's

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<sup>145</sup> One political condition that had to be applied was China's rejection of Taiwan.

Profile’, in 2003, President Lula restructured and scaled up the country’s foreign policy guidelines on South–South Development Cooperation (Bry, 2016; Burges, 2014; Durán & Chichava, 2017; Saravia, 2012). Brazil’s SSC framework, like that of Indonesia, also aligned with its foreign policy agenda and national priorities of development, as identified in Brazil’s National Plan and Programs (Saravia, 2012). The policy framework was similar to Indonesia’s SSC policy and was based on Hatta’s (1953) foreign policy objective and the acknowledgement of SSC through its National Development Plan, as explored in Chapter 8. Brazil’s SSC priorities focused on cooperation with South American countries, West Africa and BRICS countries in the areas of science, technology, military and agriculture through technical cooperation (Burges, 2014; Durán & Chichava, 2017). Earlier than other BRICS countries, Brazil formed a specific agency for SSC and aid cooperation—the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (*Agencia Brasileira de Cooperacao*—ABC)—in 1987 under the Ministry of External Relations (Burges, 2014; Durán & Chichava, 2017).

As these examples show, the study of Southern countries’ features is important (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; Carmody, 2013) because it signifies the diversity of approaches that are influenced by internal conditions and external relations. These examples also highlight both the similarity and diversity of mechanisms and institutional settings applied by Southern countries. The similarity is that SSC has comparable narratives of solidarity, win–win and mutual benefit that cannot be separated from state philosophies and foundations. This notion leads to the question of how state ideology is relevant in shaping Southern cooperation compared with the Western ideological stand of aid cooperation (Kilby, 2018; Mawdsley, 2018). Table 9 explains how the states’ instruments are used in SSC by comparing Indonesia, China, India and Brazil.

Table 9: State Instruments of South–South Cooperation (in Indonesia, China, India and Brazil)

Countries/Instruments	Indonesia	China	India	Brazil
<b>Narratives</b>	Solidarity, partnership, non-intervention, mutual benefit, win–win solution			
<b>State philosophy</b>	Soekarno’s <i>Pancasila</i> and <i>Bebas–Aktif</i> foreign policy	Zhou Enlai’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence	Nehru’s non-alignment concepts	José Maria da Silva Paranhos Jr’s foreign policy foundation

<b>Policy directions/regulations</b>	National development planning		National planning	National planning document
<b>Coordinating institutions</b>	Single agency or Indonesian AID	China International Development Cooperation Agency—under China’s State Council <sup>146</sup>	Development partnership administration under Ministry of External Affairs <sup>147</sup>	ABC—under Ministry of External Relations
<b>Focus areas</b>	Agriculture, education, religion, decentralisation	Infrastructure	ICT, health	Agriculture, forestry

Source: Author’s own compilation.

The matrix provides a broad picture for comparison, with the understanding that each Southern country has specific approaches to SSC. The case of Indonesia, as identified in Chapter 8, also has specific approaches to the governance of Southern cooperation. From the heavy relations of North–South Cooperation to the renewed approaches to SSC, the institutional set-up of Indonesian development cooperation is seen in the different narratives and approaches but is in line with the current trend of a Southern model of institutions. This shift cannot be separated from how Indonesia’s Government governs its development relations to remain relevant within the context of domestic and global development cooperation. Nonetheless, the meaning of cooperation also shifts based on its increasing roles in SSC. However, with the notion of learning from its aid projects and a long history of experiences in development cooperation and its relations, the perceptions of Indonesia’s bureaucrats about development cooperation have led to specific narratives of development with a more pragmatic approach to cooperation.

With the current performance of Southern states, especially Indonesia, the reshaping and discourse of development cooperation have improved cooperation among Southern states and affected relations with Northern countries. With the expectation of Southern countries’ agencies, bargaining power in the processes of aid negotiation has become more equal. Ethics in development cooperation have also become invested in the structure in the cooperation that has evolved, but not necessarily within the ‘motivation to help’. The notions of

<sup>146</sup> <http://en.cidca.gov.cn> (accessed 9 March 2019).

<sup>147</sup> <https://www.mea.gov.in/development-partnership-administration.htm> (accessed 9 March 2019).

partnership and a win–win solution, for instance, have shifted from being the sole narrative of cooperation to become the norms of relations, including by Northern donors (Mawdsley, 2018, p. 178). Thus, the discursive changes that have been applied in development cooperation have affected relations in North–South Cooperation. This ethical application of cooperation explores the question of the theoretical debates of current North–South Cooperation. Further, the debates continue to highlight the consequences of SSC for North–South relations in globalised development cooperation from the perspective of Indonesia.

### **How Have Current Settings Affected the Relations with Northern Countries?**

With the changing and expanding roles of Southern countries in global development cooperation, the context of development that was previously dominated by the transfer of knowledge and power from the North to the South has changed (Kilby, 2018, p. 4). Southern countries have shown their capacity to expand their development experiences through cooperation with other Southern countries to break away from the development hegemony that was long dominated by Northern countries (Mawdsley, 2015, 2019). The settings of development cooperation were framed in the West from modernisation to neoliberalism and driven by an assumption of a lack of agency of Southern states, which were only ‘the recipients’ of aid and development. The current flow of materials and knowledge of development cooperation has highlighted the narrative that it was not only owned by Northern countries, but also by Southern states. Thus, this raises the question of how it has affected relations between the North and South in this globalised era.

Despite Southern countries in some ways still facing numerous development issues, the position of Southern countries as new MICs with material and non-material capital has challenged the setting of development cooperation (Mawdsley, 2015; Sumner & Mallett, 2013). It also highlights the effect of current development geography and how it leads to the Southernisation of global development cooperation,<sup>148</sup> including the alignment of Southern narratives and modalities of cooperating with Northern countries and vice versa (Mawdsley, 2018, 2019). These consequences of SSC also indicate a blending of meaning of development cooperation and suggest the changing paradigms and content of the state in North–South

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<sup>148</sup> Mawdsley (2018) defined Southern effects in development cooperation through the expansion of Southern narratives of win–win solutions and national interest, the return of poverty alleviation programs to economic growth policy and the blurring agenda of trade and the global financial agenda (Mawdsley, 2018).

Cooperation (Mawdsley, 2018, p. 180). The structural meaning of development relations has been expanded (un)intentionally to recognise the roles of Southern countries. As the states' perspectives on developing relations have progressed within their experiences with Northern donors, the countries' understanding of development has also developed and advanced. Indonesian relations with the North and the South, for instance, were constructed within the country's long history of development and shaped within Indonesia's political, economic and sociocultural settings. The structure of the relations was also developed within the country's domestic political trajectories, which expanded beyond development, and in its political context of relations. Further, the nature of SSC, including the creation of (in)direct political capital and the symbolic meaning of solidarity and partnership, indicate the significance of cooperation that differentiates the relations from North–South Cooperation. Upon further examination of Southern perceptions, four characteristics of relations can be identified based on Indonesia's experiences and narratives on the convergence that has affected development cooperation.

#### 1. Equal Partnerships rather than Hierarchy

The first is more partnerships and less hierarchy as the norms in development cooperation. As identified in the case of Indonesia, the paradigm of development cooperation in current conditions has shifted from assistance to partnership (Eyben & Savage, 2013; Mawdsley, Savage, & Kim, 2014). Historically, relations between the Indonesian Government and Northern donors could be identified as dynamic within a paternalistic relationship that often led to the rejection and banning of development aid activities from particular donors by the Indonesian Government. With the current global development cooperation and domestic conditions, the government has gained momentum to indicate the changing structure of its aid relations. The norms that previously only applied in the context of cooperation among Southern countries now also pertain to North–South Cooperation. The hierarchical relations of North–South Cooperation that indicated the dichotomy of top–down (from donor to recipient) led to the development of power relations. This notion has been applied in Indonesian relations with Northern donors—for example, in the changing language, from 'assistance' to 'partnership', in government cooperation documents.

Further, it has affected aid and development policy because all indicated donor activities must align with Indonesia's national priorities or development priorities. The relations signify a 'bottom-up' process of the development program, which derived cooperation as a partnership and corresponding structure in the development cooperation. This change resulted in a more collaborative process of partnership in development. Thus, for several traditional donors, Triangular Cooperation is used to stimulate SSC programs, and the program, model and targeted countries are negotiated with the countries involved to expand their cooperation. Despite the fact that some Triangular Cooperation only covers the financial gaps of Southern countries, the financial components are more or less equal between the two main donor countries involved. However, the politics behind the cooperation are more relevant to the meaning of Triangular Cooperation, including for traditional partners to be relevant in the current setting of Southern development and for Southern countries to expand their networks of cooperation.

## 2. Ownership of the State

The old setting of cooperation has created power relations within a continuous negotiation process between 'our way' and 'their way' of conducting development. As a recipient country during the period of Soeharto's government, for example, Indonesia's aid policy was driven by the schema of donor countries and was not necessarily based on Indonesia's needs. The relations were also developed based on 'their way' of conducting development, with the designated program to be implemented by donors. For example, as noted in Chapter 3, the IMF program in Indonesia during the Asian financial crisis was predetermined to be applied to Indonesia without considering the conditions of the country at that time. This leads to a debate on what model of Northern cooperation would fit with a Southern country like Indonesia. This top-down approach to aid relations became a lesson learned for the current government in deriving its approaches to development cooperation and SSC. Donors' programs working in Indonesia are expected to contribute to the achievement of its development priorities rather than working on the donors' agenda, which often did not suit the country's development needs. Therefore, more recently, 'our way' of development has become significant in pointing out the roles of the state in negotiating aid programs and challenging the donor-recipient structure by developing several government mechanisms to manage aid activities and implementation.

The Washington Consensus and its neoliberal approaches to development are known to be constructed within 'one-size-fits-all' models (Chaturvedi, Fues, & Sidiropoulos, 2012; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012). This notion has also been strongly rejected by many Southern policymakers, including Indonesians, during the fieldwork interviews (Senior Official 7 [interview], 2016; Official 2 [interview], 2016). The notion of knowledge sharing examines development as diverse and having 'no one-size-fits-all' model. Development cooperation has often generalised the approaches and interventions in developing countries and failed to address development problems; therefore, the identification of a development strategy could not suit 'one-size-fits-all' models (G20 Development Working Group, 2011; OECD, 2011b; USAID, 2016). As a strategy, the idea of acknowledging diversity in development experiences and needs is perceived in the implementation of aid within a collaboration setting of development cooperation (Chaturvedi, Fues, & Sidiropoulos, 2012; Hosono, 2018). The link to knowledge sharing is contested in terms of stimulating innovative governance within Keynesian perspectives (Mazzucato, 2015; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012), which can also stimulate growth and a learning society (Hosono, 2018; Stiglitz & Greenwald, 2014). Thus, the agency of the state in SSC is significant in innovative processes of development in which the content of state ownership in development programs appears. However, this intended innovative program does not necessarily link to efficiency or measurable changes in development. The process of sharing knowledge is structured to be acceptable within the enabling capacities of government officials in shaping and reconstructing their development needs based on their best practices in development.

### 3. Southern Countries' Development Cooperation Platforms

The options of Southern countries to expand their development cooperation platforms also sit within various bilateral and multilateral agencies, such as the UN and the Global South platform of the AIIB. With various donors available to provide aid and development platforms, Southern countries have more options to support their development programs. For instance, Indonesia has contributed to the AIIB to expand its development options, in addition to its membership in the World Bank, ADB and IsDB. The options to expand development have enabled Southern countries to advance their national programs to cooperate with like-minded donors. This has affected the relations and negotiation processes of Southern countries in development cooperation, as well as the position of traditional donors, especially in

constituting their work in development cooperation and perceiving their influence in Southern countries.

Participation in global development institutions has also been expanding. A Southern country has more options to participate in Global South and Global North institutions because both provide significant space for countries to participate. This option is also directed by the country's preferences and political strategy, as well as its understanding of the importance of the institution to its domestic development process. Thus, Southern countries can choose between the Global South institutional set-up and that which is facilitated by traditional donor institutions. For Indonesia, options are now available for the government's development agenda to be showcased and used within the global development platform as necessary. Further, participation in the traditional Global South institutional framework remains significant in Indonesia's SSC. Therefore, the selection of partners and global platforms indicates the government's development needs and agenda, which are in line with its domestic development policy and priorities.

#### 4. Content of Aid

The content of aid stimulates cooperation and the development of knowledge. With the economic conditions of Southern countries, aid cannot necessarily be identified as the only source of development financing. The link between aid with trade and other financial components, including the national development budget, drove the expansion of debates on the function of aid (Mawdsley, 2015, 2018). The process of giving in current development cooperation, as perceived by Indonesia, for instance, is stimulated to develop cooperation and create symbolic capital for the relations that have been developed. Given the experiences with its aid programs, Indonesia understands that aid is not intended to solve the recipient country's development problem, but to create and stimulate political–economic–cultural relations among countries. As the state interprets its aid cooperation based on previous experiences, the motivation of giving can be politically accelerated in its position and in that of the recipient country. The process of negotiation is continuously evolving based on internal political conditions and needs, which highlight the importance of capitalising the knowledge content of the cooperation in addition to the amount of aid.

As noted by Lin and Wang (2017a), it is important to acknowledge the comparative advantages that Southern states have in Southern development knowledge and their capacity to contribute to development (Lin & Wang, 2017a, p. 24). Southern states have had many years and numerous experiences in development programs and, as in the case of Indonesia, most have been articulated within national and local systems. This indicates that the country's knowledge of development can be a lesson learned that should be acknowledged in defining the meaning of development. Given this notion, Northern programs and knowledge in development then only become a catalyst to cooperation. Thus, the identification of Southern development means that the knowledge construction of development must acknowledge the local system and its content.

## **Conclusion**

One aspect that is often neglected in the context of SSC is the political context that structures and restructures the relations and roles of Southern states. With the material, ontological and ideation of Southern cooperation, as argued by Mawdsley (2015, 2019), current development relations are derived from discussions on theorising development within a new set of development perspectives. Therefore, the two structures are linked to the materials, norms and ontological meaning of cooperation. Relations have been constructed through narratives or rhetoric, as well as governance or institutions within the context of giving and sharing in SSC. In the case of Indonesia, the relations led to the analysis of the SSC structure and how SSC can be re-examined within the current globalisation. These two structures have focused further exploration on Indonesia's perceptions of the socio-political relations of Southern cooperation, knowledge sharing as a development approach and the narratives of solidarity and partnership in global development cooperation. Thus, the duality of structures signifies the unique features of SSC that are not only perceived within the creation of cooperation for capital and material, but also within symbolic politically structured debates on the meaning of giving in development cooperation.

Further, the construction of SSC also affects the narrative of North–South Cooperation. The position of Southern countries—in this case, Indonesia—indicates that their position within cooperation is expected to be more equally structured and to acknowledge the capacity of the state. The renewed relations characterise notions of partnership, ownership of the

development program, options in development and the changing setting of the politics of aid. It has become the model of current development cooperation that perceives the narrative as blurry to distinguish Northern and Southern cooperation, because both have assimilated the idea of cooperation within relations and norms to cooperate. Thus, the meaning of development cooperation has also shifted with the changing natures of states in perceiving power and knowledge relations in the globalised world of aid relations.

## CONCLUSION

This thesis has identified, explored and analysed the idea of giving in South–South Cooperation (SSC) using Indonesia as a case study. It developed the debate on how the idea and the meaning of giving and sharing from theoretical and historical perspectives are perceived and maintained in the current government system of the Southern state of Indonesia. SSC cannot be separated from the construction of relations among Southern countries that have stimulated the process of aid. This study analysed the symbolic meaning of cooperation because SSC has become a political term that is continuously narrated in the development cooperation context. The agency of Southern state—especially Indonesian bureaucrats—was explored in the cooperation, as well as how it is being constructed with states’ reciprocal acts and narratives. The relation and cooperation process that emerged created different characters, including state institutions, models of cooperation and aspects of development, including economic cooperation, training and education, and infrastructure building. Further, the relations cannot be separated from the meaning of sharing in Indonesia’s SSC, which is politically driven based on the state’s interests. However, the notions of mutuality and reciprocity shaped in the idea of giving by Southern countries were bound in the idea of building better relations, which can be traced back to the history of the cooperation. These notions cannot be generalised to understand Southern countries but can stimulate further debates in the study of SSC.

### **Prospects of Southern Collaborations**

The evolution of global foreign aid has become significant in debates on the current construction of development theory. There are three sets of debates involved in understanding SSC in the case of Indonesia: the definition of cooperation within development, the relations that are established and developed, and the modality of the aid or the process of giving that is perceived by the Southern country. In Chapter 1, development debates from modernisation theory to neoliberalism were explored to analyse how the aid and development context is shaped within South–South and North–South relations. These theories were structured from the Northern way of the development process to a global market system that affected the way aid relations were conducted between the North and the South (Hart, 2010; Mawdsley 2015). However, with the recognition of Southern countries

in global development cooperation, narratives of development relations are also changing. This challenges the norms and ideology to cooperate within global aid debates.

Indonesia has been used to showcase the dynamics of SSC, which can contribute to the debate on Southern perspectives of global development cooperation. As analysed in Chapter 9, two structures signify SSC: within state narratives and state institutional settings of cooperation. This exploration of the narratives and the policy implementation of Indonesia's SSC articulated the significance of viewing Southern cooperation within the different lenses of a framework. Despite the numerous explorations of SSC and emerging donor countries, the examination culminated in multiple debates of social relations and, according to Weber (1947, pp. 118–120), as a political relation that shaped the fluidity of meaning and the model of cooperation. These perspectives enriched the debates of SSC within the global context and determined how relations were shaped among other Southern countries. In the case of Indonesia's SSC, economic cooperation was only recently prioritised; however, Indonesia has expanded its global roles through knowledge sharing on development cooperation. Therefore, this research captured the relations of development, aid and knowledge that cannot be separated from the interpretation and priorities of the government's national agenda in SSC.

The expansion of cooperation also cannot be separated from history and the Bandung Conference, which created the principles as norms of Southern cooperation, as explored in Chapter 2, with the link to Indonesia's SSC history in Chapter 3. The process of giving among Southern countries helps to stimulate the development of social relations, leading to the expansion and creation of capital. One way to preserve the historical value and legacy of the Bandung Conference is for Indonesia to celebrate through its rituals and make a renewed commitment to Southern countries every decade, as identified in Chapter 4. However, the celebration does not develop or create new Southern norms; it merely reiterates the principles of the Bandung Conference within new Global South conditions. This celebration symbolises the cooperative natures of Southern countries, which remains relevant within the current development cooperation setting. The inferences of this research can be further divided into three propositions, which can be explored to contribute to debates around SSC.

## Agencies and Structure of Southern States and Cooperation

As explored in Chapter 6, the substantial debates of this thesis draw upon the perspectives of bureaucrats in the state in defining the meaning of SSC and development cooperation, which has led to policy development and the implementation of programs. The agencies of Indonesia and some Southern States as recipients and providers of aid were often not acknowledged within the debate on development cooperation (Kilby, 2018; Silk, 2004; Six, 2009). The process of development only indicated the agencies and superiorities of the Northern countries with power and knowledge in development and aid (Kapoor, 2008; Kothari, 2005a; Mawdsley, 2015; Silk, 2004). Thus, to respond to the Northern domination and postcolonial setting of cooperation, SSC has evolved and developed as a space to symbolise the partnership of its member countries and to challenge the Northern donors' hegemony.

The state's roles in SSC embodied the Keynesian narratives (looking beyond the context of fiscal and labour policies), especially in terms of how it defined and governed the national policy that suited its own needs and agendas in the case of Indonesia. The state embodied the bureaucrats' experiences in and knowledge of development cooperation within their policy of SSC, which was relevant within the current setting of development. Their perceptions of relations among countries within the context of development also evolved and were nourished through domestic political conditions. In addition to referring to the Bandung Conference and its principles, the foundation of Indonesia's SSC is embedded in its state ideology and national philosophy of *Pancasila*, or the five principles. This study also highlighted Indonesia's sociocultural structure of *gotong royong*, or mutual help. These notions are articulated within the Indonesian foreign policy framework of *Bebas–Aktif* (free and active), its participation on the international stage and in its relations with other countries, as identified in Chapter 4. These political and social frameworks became the norms that directed the development and sustained the SSC policy within government–political stands despite the absence of strategies and priorities.

The meaning of giving and sharing in SSC also signified the difference from North–South Cooperation. The idea of giving is shaped within different state philosophies, motivations and ideologies. Giving in Southern countries is not based on charity or altruism but is strongly embedded within national interests and identity (Kilby, 2018; Mawdsley, 2012b). For example,

in the case of Indonesia's SSC, cooperation aligns with the government's priorities and targets. However, the approach of partnership and solidarity was derived from cooperation within the process of dialogue and negotiations among Southern countries. The process of giving does not proceed within a top-down or donor-recipient context, but with the understanding that the recipient country also has agency and needs to negotiate their interests, as discussed in Chapter 7. Thus, power relations are equally shared and understood among Southern countries because each party has roles and capital within cooperation.

Within the current government setting, as outlined in Chapter 8, the Indonesian president's vision and National Development Plan became important for policy direction, and these documents indicated the importance of SSC for Indonesia's development. The National Medium-Term Development Plan constructed the government's substantial development targets and systems of effective implementation of SSC. However, the main challenges were constituted in the institutional arrangements because the governance of SSC was scattered between several ministries. Although the internal discussion of Indonesia's SSC budget to other countries has never been formally raised in the parliament, the government has continued its SSC activities. The formalisation of the SSC mechanism and activities is signified in the government's mechanisms to facilitate cooperation with North and South partners in development cooperation.

Conversely, the strategy embedded in the development plan recognised the institutional arrangements and targets but not the overall targeted program or implementation. The institutional arrangements were important in indicating the effectiveness of the government's system. This notion is also constantly discussed by bureaucrats as a way for the government to be reliable and transparent in its implementation of SSC. Further, since the Busan High-Level Meeting in 2011 and the enactment of the SDGs in 2015, the discussion of SSC has expanded to include the effectiveness of its activities (Mawdsley, 2012a, 2019; Watson, 2014). Using a different set of frameworks and perceptions, this thesis has argued that the effectiveness of aid within SSC cannot be constructed within the Western setting of aid management. Therefore, the meaning of effectiveness also becomes nationally constructed by the state and is not necessarily based on the identification of meaning derived from the OECD-DAC or other global institutions.

With the norms and institutional framework within Indonesia's state ideology, the meaning of SSC also becomes nationally constructed. This highlights that the policy depends on state norms and the interpretation of the leaders and bureaucrats rather than international norms or ideology. Southern norms were (un)intentionally shared, especially among the Bandung Conference participants. Thus, as discussed in Chapter 7, the understanding of the motivations and intentions of giving and sharing in Indonesia's development cooperation are subtle. Despite the different ideological stands of Southern countries, the meaning of Southern cooperation is understood as values of the relations among Southern countries and is shaped within the reciprocal meaning of cooperation.

### **From the Symbolic Power of Solidarity to the Politics of Partnership**

The robust notions of solidarity and partnership in SSC, which are argued by the West to be material, are attributed to the attitude of the Southern state towards others rather than tangible and measurable indicators, as explored in Chapter 7. This notion highlights the communal character of Southern states rather than the individualistic notion of the idea. The history of cooperation was also constructed as a reciprocal act of giving. Through the history of SSC, the notion of solidarity constituted the idea that bound the Southern countries. However, the dynamic relations among the Southern countries cannot be separated from their leaders' political stance within domestic and Global South development cooperation settings, as discussed in Chapter 2. This is reflected in the model of social relations symbolised within the Southern principles, with the case of Indonesia explored in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, which constructed the reciprocal model of giving that was shaped within the meaning, shared interests and ideology, as well as political disposition of the countries through their historical timeline.

The relations of SSC are illustrated within a different set of perceptions and contexts. Indonesia's history of SSC shows that the idea of giving was constructed as a mechanism to support the politics of independence among Southern countries. The reciprocal idea of giving was used to develop the mechanism to show the networks established with other countries and to create symbolic cooperation among Southern states as well as symbolic power or violence towards Northern partners (Bourdieu, 1990; Carmody, 2013). The setting of giving is constructed within the narrative and norms of solidarity that created social movements of the

Southern countries. With relations among Southern countries shaped within the context of sharing a common idea, identity and ideology, the relations were also constructed as a social movement in international relations. Therefore, the narrative might be constructed within a subtle context of power relations and building a social group to stimulate the movement to break the global hegemony. This movement leads to the establishment of a different mechanism and provides an alternative model of cooperation that enables Southern countries to interact with equal power relations.

The power that solidarity perceived in gift-giving might appear abstract, but a philosophical narrative that highlights the reciprocity of countries can be recognised among countries involved in building alliances (Hénaff, 2014). According to Mauss (1970), the product of exchange is also symbolic and is not perceived as material but as a social constitution of obligation and solidarity within society, including political and diplomatic structures (Mauss, 1970; Moore, 2011). As a social relation, SSC cannot be separated from the political dynamic of the relationship established among countries that often progress differently. Further, as a symbolic form, the model of cooperation reflects countries' preferences for giving that are not established upon the notions of the effectiveness agenda and expand beyond the amount of aid given. This reflects the intention and capacity to create cooperation with others that indirectly creates an economic process of exchange, as reflected by the gift exchange in archaic societies. However, the similarity in Southern values and ideologies has shaped alliances and created a social movement that challenges the global political hegemony and economy of capitalism.

There is also another mechanism of giving that Indonesia perceives to expand its national interest. SBY's era, which had a foreign policy principle of a 'thousand friends, zero enemies' (Engel, 2017; Rosyidin, 2017; Shekhar, 2018) led to broader interest in SSC, which was linked to the definition within multilateral organisations including the G20 and Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC). Therefore, the idea of sharing in SSC was socially constructed based on national interest and national political–ideological stands, as identified throughout the debate (Bergamaschi & Tickner, 2017; De Renzio & Seifert, 2014). National interest was used in a subtle way to define cooperation because it also led to political implications of Southern cooperation. Thus, aid and sharing between Southern countries are

used to stimulate cooperation through a symbolic form to create government capital within domestic and international politics.

National interest in SSC can challenge cooperation and often contradicts leaders' political stands or needs, as noted in Chapter 9. Despite Widodo's criticism of global economic hegemony and the capitalist system in his opening remarks at the 2015 Asian–African Commemoration (GOI, 2015d), Indonesian relations with international organisations and traditional donor countries were not affected by this narrative. Conversely, with his economic targets including the expansion of infrastructure, resources to finance the development program were obtained from international loan agencies, Multilateral Development Banks (MDB) and other partners, as identified during the interviews in Indonesia. These paradoxes in perceiving the national interest and identity show the accumulation between the historical value and negotiating national needs. The construction of relations between countries is derived from specific national needs and images that the president intended to perceive. The separation of the president's political aid and SSC are seen as a paradox that can complement each other but also challenge cooperation with external actors and domestic politics. As political aid tends to implement or entertain domestic political needs, the idea of solidarity might also become politically ambiguous.

Like most Southern countries that face domestic challenges with economic growth and other development issues, the possibility to expand and provide equal opportunities in economic partnerships was recognisable among Southern countries. Recent evidence has shown that economic components are the main attraction of cooperation but are not necessarily perceived within direct definitions of SSC. Economic cooperation in SSC was indeed the capital gain from cooperation, but not the primary purpose of the cooperation in the first place (Kilby, 2017a, p. 2). For Indonesia, the link between SSC and economic cooperation has never been subtle, as identified in Chapters 6 and 7. Economic cooperation is considered different from the process of giving because the aim of giving, in the case of Indonesia, is also to build relations; although the result leads to economic cooperation, this has never been set as the primary goal of cooperation. Recently, the idea has shaped Indonesia's SSC with the direct result of economic cooperation being explored by other Southern countries, or in this case, China. On a practical level, programs are developed and conducted by government institutions through the process of sharing with a robust notion of the substance of partnership. Thus, the

context of solidarity has slowly evolved to mean partnerships within Southern countries as well as with Northern counterparts.

### **From Technical Cooperation to Knowledge Sharing of Development Approaches**

Indonesia's intention to expand its SSC policy and discourse cannot be separated from the government's commitment identified in the Jakarta Commitment in 2009 (GOI, 2009) and its membership and participation in global development institutions, as identified in Chapter 8. The relations that are intended to be built are shaped within the dual roles of Indonesia as a recipient and provider of aid. The use of Triangular Cooperation in Indonesian SSC is intended to close the resources gap (Engel, 2019; Muhibat, 2016) and expand the network of cooperation with other Southern countries and with traditional donors, based on the interviews with Indonesia's officials. Therefore, the global platforms from the World Bank, IsDB, UNDP and JICA are used by Indonesia to promote its SSC (Hosono, 2018, p. 25). In another example, the government uses traditional donors' capacity to assist in the mapping of Indonesia's SSC activities and capacities (IsDB, 2017) and to conduct institutional studies on strategies for SSC (CEACOS UI, 2010; CSIS, 2014; UNDP, 2014). Northern donors have also pointed out the importance of collaborating with Southern donors in development cooperation (Mawdsley, 2018; Schulz, 2010). Within the national government nomenclature, SSC is defined as Technical Cooperation, including Triangular Cooperation with other traditional donors within Technical Cooperation modalities. Although the notion of giving cannot be separated from the political context of cooperation, the formalised Indonesia's SSC is intended to be shaped within impartial notions of cooperation.

The model of Indonesia's SSC includes many activities of Technical Cooperation that are identified as knowledge sharing (JICA, 2012b; NCT-SSTC, 2016). This signifies the debates on how the knowledge of development experiences can stimulate the scaling up of SSC activities. The notions of knowledge sharing in Indonesia's SSC cannot be separated from the agreement of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation Documents (OECD, 2011a). With the role of Indonesia as co-chair in the GPEDC, the concept of knowledge sharing has become more significant in Indonesia's SSC (Fues & Klingebiel, 2014; Janus, Klingebiel, & Mahn, 2014). The plan is not to replace technical cooperation but to capture the meaning of the learning process and partnership within the same token. For example, the Indonesian

Government's notions of 'best practices' and 'best fits' in the process of knowledge sharing in Indonesia's SSC (UNDP, 2014). Therefore, the process of knowledge sharing also implies how development approaches cannot be generalised or fit within one model or structure, and it signifies the function of the state in stimulating innovative approaches to development.

The understanding of the need for different approaches in development leads to notions of developing the state and its policymakers' agencies and capacities in constructing development programs. In the case of Indonesia, the development system and mechanism have restructured and rematerialised within government institutions for many years, enabling them to cultivate specific development interventions based on these experiences. The government's cycle (of learning, developing and expanding) also leads to an improvement in its regulations and authority related to the development program and SSC, including funding allocation and financing activities based on development priorities (IsDB, 2017). The knowledge of Southern countries in development experiences is also necessary for shaping their approaches to SSC and has never been fully acknowledged within North–South relations (Hosono, 2018; Kilby, 2018). Therefore, the principles of Indonesia's SSC perceived in scaling up knowledge sharing are based on the notion of sharing rather than teaching, and on mutual benefits and partnership narratives (JICA, 2012a).

Creative and innovative roles of the state within Keynesian perspectives are significant in development (Lin & Wang, 2017a; Mazzucato, 2015; Nederveen Pieterse, 2012). Therefore, there is a need to identify the significant roles of the state in developing SSC models of cooperation. This mechanism indicates a substantial understanding of the recipient country's needs, in addition to narratives of the national capacity of the provider for Southern countries. The challenge comes from the process of negotiating the idea to the partner country because the process is derived from mutual benefits and partnership notions—for example, the setting that appeared in the case of Indonesia–Myanmar was based on government-to-government cooperation. The cooperation and implementation of the knowledge sharing program often took longer to implement because the process of negotiation and discussion between two countries requires time to reach an agreement on the development cooperation. An important factor is also the participants' capacity to contribute to expanding the mechanism or methods based on their country's needs. Therefore, to achieve the development of social relations among countries, implementation might be attained with a specific target. However,

to achieve the policy changes in the government, the sharing mechanism still needs to be developed and expanded through a substantial and practical approach to accomplish the targeted development priorities.

## **Contributions and Implications**

### **To Theory and Knowledge Debates**

Examining development studies theories and practices, the logical evolution cannot be separated from the global context of development cooperation. Debates on modernisation to dependency to neoliberal approaches appear to be ambiguous regarding the recognition of developing countries as donor countries. As this thesis explores, the state denotes its policy of SSC from its philosophy to develop the necessity to direct its national interests and needs. Keynesian theory is used to identify the state's development cooperation policy within the current context of development cooperation. However, debates on the state have evolved beyond the internal agreement of employment and monetary considerations and expanded to the context of the agency of the state in the cooperation between Southern countries. The meaning of development cooperation from Keynesian theory also has gaps in the analysis of SSC, so the expansion of other theoretical approaches is needed and used. Therefore, the debates led to the need to reconstruct the theoretical framework for development studies and practices.

With the substantial roles of Indonesia as Southern state in defining and shaping their cooperation among Southern countries, the politics of Southern countries in the relations among them cannot be neglected. This perspective of development comes from Indonesia's interpretation, context and agenda, which lead to different sets of motivations and models of cooperation. The strong perception of historical motivations affected the dynamic of SSC, which differs from that of North–South Cooperation. Political relations are stronger where cooperation among Southern countries began with a collective force to fight colonialism, leading to the sharing of knowledge in development expertise within the states' geopolitical conditions. The setting and framework of cooperation have moved beyond the understanding of the global setting of cooperation because the analysis should be identified at the country level. States identify their development based on their development and political needs rather than the international setting and agenda of development cooperation. Therefore, a

multidimensional approach of theoretical construction is also indispensable to analyse and construct the current setting of SSC.

The idea of SSC leads to the identification of how the ideas of giving and sharing have evolved, as seen in the case of Indonesia. The setting of Southern cooperation from anti-colonialism to the state's geopolitical structural adjustment program affected the expansion of the meaning. From the symbolic narrative to the institutional set-up, the process of sharing identified in the state policy and behaviour cannot be separated from the culture and state philosophy that are embedded in their belief system and narratives. The reciprocal act of giving and the understanding that gifts are never free helps to justify the identity and interest of the givers. As the capital of giving might not be directly received, the process of sharing becomes part of the social relations and political cooperation of Southern countries. Thus, the setting of cooperation cannot be set within the idea that Northern cooperation is perceived in aid relations, but substantial differences in the Southern ideology, context and mechanism are recognised through its narrative and institutions. Conversely, this highlights that the meaning of knowledge and power within the politics of development cooperation are continuously reproduced within the theoretical construction of Southern cooperation.

### **Methodology and Theme of the Southern Research**

With the set of sociocultural approaches in the SSC, this research identifies the need to explore and analyse the policymaking process and implementation of SSC at the country level, as identified in Chapter 5. Each state has unique features and stories that differ from one another based on their experiences, history, politics, ideological standpoint and sociocultural context. Southern states have had significant roles in managing their development policy in recent years. For example, Indonesia's development policies have affected the agenda and priorities of its SSC, thereby understanding of how they have shaped narratives, perceptions and opinions based on their experiences and roles is necessary. To understand the relevance between state policy and implementation is also significant when exploring the meaning behind their imagined position in global development cooperation. Defining the meaning of policy also requires an investigation of the narratives of the leaders and bureaucrats who construct the development policy and it projected within the global development cooperation.

As noted in Chapter 6, the state consists of and is shaped by bureaucrats' perceptions and ideas on development policy, and their interpretation of cooperation within domestic and global development cooperation. Bureaucrats become the primary resources to be analysed, because their understanding of the development issue is linked with the need to shape political needs, the national interest and their experiences in development cooperation. The literature on the perceptions of Southern states in global development is often insufficient in interpreting the meaning behind their actions. This research helps to reveal the deeper meaning and unique features of cooperation by investigating and studying government perceptions, experiences and meanings of SSC. Conversely, this study highlights how Southern states interpret cooperation within their scope of work, and it further defines their position and policy towards other Southern countries. Thus, the meaning of cooperation can be interpreted and defined beyond the text and documents to understand the significant position of the Southern state in global development cooperation.

This research is limited to debates within development theory and its ideological stance that sits within the politics of relations among Southern countries. As interpretative analysis is used to frame the research, this research can be expanded, for example, to explore Indonesia's position as a recipient of aid, linked with the amount of aid given and received. This research could also be extended within public policy approaches to include a cost–benefit analysis or the economic value of cooperation, including its global chain content. Further studies from a positivist standpoint or a detailed ethnography of development could be applied to explore the significant relations between aid and development within specific areas of SSC. The expansion of this research to other approaches is also possible, including the sociocultural aspect of giving within specific communities that are reimagined within the context of the state. In addition, future studies could explore the specific relationship meaning and narratives of development cooperation among Southern countries that are now raised as MICs with massive economic growth. An examination of the context of SSC and the interpretation of Southern countries in development cooperation would be extensive in meaning and understanding and would enrich the study of Southern states' roles in global development cooperation.

## **To Policy Approaches**

For many years, the policy of Southern cooperation has been exclusively dominated by the executive or leaders' political agenda, which is manifested in the national ideology and state philosophy. Therefore, SSC policy is often framed within national and state interests to develop cooperation and capital with other Southern countries. However, the scale of the cooperation will also depend on leaders' intention to expand their political agenda—especially their foreign policy agenda. This was reflected in the case of Indonesia, especially during SBY's era, followed by the Widodo era. The setting of SSC was shaped within their foreign policy agendas and was expanded to serve the purpose of domestic image building and geopolitical needs. For example, in the case of Indonesia's support to Myanmar, it can be identified within several layers of interests, including the need for the government to showcase its apprehension towards Muslim solidarity in the Rohingya case or maintain its technical cooperation program that has been embedded in the SSC program for many years. Thus, despite the narrative of SSC being framed within the technical cooperation and knowledge sharing setting, cooperation among Southern countries is politically constructed.

SSC capitalises on cooperation that has been established over many years. Similarities in the history, ideology and perceptions of giving, as well as the sociocultural backgrounds of Southern countries, have stimulated and expanded the cooperation in recent years. With the improvement in economic conditions in Southern countries, the Keynesian perspective signifies Southern governments' policies in constructing cooperation, including expanding infrastructure projects and increasing labour in other Southern countries. However, the narrative of the partnership is significant within cooperation—for example, expanding equal relations in the implementation of activities by involving more partners. The state agency set the mechanism of cooperation using state-owned institutions, and its cooperation is based on Indonesian best practices. Thus, the state-led process is significant in deriving development cooperation, and the market mechanism is controlled by the government.

When examining the future setting of development cooperation, it is important for future researchers to define the effect of the state's development policy on specific programs in other Southern recipient countries. In the current global development setting, North–South and South–South relations remain significant as cooperation among countries rather than

within the framework of donors and recipients. Therefore, future Indonesian policy and development cooperation should be driven within these two spheres of cooperation in the context of aid and development. Aid will signify the process of giving, especially through humanitarian action, knowledge sharing and technical cooperation projects. Further, technical cooperation or knowledge sharing will not only contribute to the expansion of cooperation developed by the government but will also highlight links with other components of development cooperation to help expand and enrich the cooperation. Thus, collaborative studies among other Southern scholars on the Southern countries' policy perspectives are needed to expand the theoretical and policy perspectives on the effect of Southern cooperation for development studies.

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## **ANNEXES**



## Annex 1: List of Questions

### To Indonesian Government Policymakers:

1. What are the basic policy principles in developing the Indonesian SSC Policy?
2. What kind of authority does your ministry have over SSC?
3. How is the decision-making process developing?
4. How does the dynamic among government ministries evolve?
5. How does the consultation process emerge?
6. Why does the number remain small, despite its long history?
7. What factors affected the government's decisions in SSC?
8. What are the main issues that emerge in SSC and what are the challenges?
9. How effective the policy implemented in SSC to build the position of Indonesia in development cooperation?
10. Why is Indonesian SSC different from North–South relations?
11. What is the main focus of government cooperation modalities?
12. What model of cooperation is considered effective within SSC activities?
13. How the coordination mechanism in implementing SSC projects applied?
14. Who can implement SSC activities? Who are the central agencies for SSC that should be coordinated?
15. Who does the planning of SSC activities?
16. How is the monitoring and evaluation conducted? By whom?
17. Is the cooperation based more on promoting Indonesia or gaining power?
18. Why does the name remain technical cooperation and not South–South Cooperation?  
And why use South–South Triangular Cooperation?

### On Indonesia–Myanmar Cooperation

1. What are the main activities of the cooperation between Indonesia and Myanmar?
2. Who conducted the activities? Where are the activities mostly being conducted?
3. Who coordinates the program?
4. Who are the main counterparts?

5. What is the blue book of Indonesia–Myanmar Cooperation? Has it been implemented and monitored?
6. What are the main challenges of the cooperation?
7. How are the activities and reporting mechanism monitored?

To Development Partners:

1. How long has the organisation supported SSC activities? What are the models implemented?
2. How is coordination with the government developed? Who decides the support given?
3. What strategy and mechanism are used to support the government's SSC project?
4. What is the main objective of implementing the SSC project?
5. How effective is the organisation's strategy in supporting stronger relations with the GOI in SSC activities?
6. What are the issues in implementing SSC activities?
7. Who does the monitoring and evaluation of the project's implementation? How does the flow work?
8. What are the main challenges in implementing SSC activities?
9. How does your institution capture lessons learned from SSC activities?

### Annex 3: List of Government Documents Collected

1. Rules and Regulation on Indonesia South–South Cooperation.
2. Official Speeches of Presidents of Indonesia related to South–South Cooperation, Bandung Conference in 1955 and Asian–African Conference Commemorations.
3. Asian–African Conference Commemorations results, communiqués, and agreed documents.
4. Published government report, studies and monitoring result on Indonesian South–South Cooperation.
5. Program and activities descriptions and leaflets of Indonesian South–South Cooperation.
6. Government documents and press releases from official government websites related to Indonesian South–South Cooperation.



#### Annex 4: List of Meetings/Workshops Attended

1. Workshop of Planning Budgeting for Myanmar Government in Jakarta on 31 October 2015.
2. Workshop on the Identification of Priority Countries for Indonesian Technical Cooperation in Bogor on 23 February 2016.
3. Regular Meeting of the National Coordination Team in Jakarta on 14 March 2016.
4. National Coordination Team Retreat on Institutional Setting of Indonesian South–South Cooperation in Jogjakarta on 15 April 2016.
5. Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) Annual Meeting in Jakarta on 17–19 May 2016.
6. Launching of Indonesian South–South Cooperation Monitoring Report 2015 in Jakarta on 12 August 2016.
7. General observations on office situations in Ministry of Planning and State Secretariat during interviews with key respondents from February to September 2016.