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CHANGING PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORGANISATION IN THE
EXPLORING ISLANDS OF NORTHERN LAU, FIJI

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Australian National University

October 1971
Except where otherwise acknowledged in the text, this thesis represents the original research of the author.

Michael A.H.B. Walter
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ORTHOGRAPHY

Throughout the thesis the 'Missionary' system is employed except for the phonetic spelling of 'Tonga' (i.e. instead of Toga). Pronunciation is as follows:

B is pronounced 'MB' as in 'number'
C is pronounced 'TH' as in 'that'
D is pronounced 'ND' as in 'end'
G is pronounced 'NG' as in 'sing'
Q is pronounced 'NG' as in 'finger'

In practically all Fijian words the accent is on the penultimate syllable.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
E.K. Fisk's study, 'The Political Economy of Independent Fiji', was, in the euphoria of approaching independence, a timely warning to Fiji's leaders of the dangers inhering in an economic policy that made increase in national income an end in itself regardless of the social and political milieu. There is nothing complex in Fisk's appraisal of the Fijian situation. It is a simple, direct, common-sense approach which insists that in a plural society such as Fiji's, the widely differentiated involvement of ethnic groups in the advanced (monetary) sector of the economy should be the prime factor in the ordering of priorities of economic objectives. Any concept of economic advancement that ignores this could only be advancement into an ever deepening shadow of political and racial strife.

The proposals Fisk makes are, in sum, aimed at obscuring the ethnic divisions of Fiji society by providing a foundation for the classical class framework of common economic interests. The hidden premise is that class conflict, still hindered to some extent by cross-cutting cultural affinities, is less likely to traumatis the new state than racial hostility. The experiences of Guyana, Mauritius and more recently Malaysia, the new states most often compared with Fiji when its multi-ethnic character is discussed, suggest this is well-founded, though Fisk, himself, exhibits an optimistic faith in the rationality of economic man which in another context he gives warning

---

1 Published in 1970 by the Australian National University Press.
against (op.cit. 58). However, with any alternative so full of the menace of internecine strife the optimism justifies itself.¹

Of the existing obstacles to the implementation of his proposals, Fisk clearly sees the position of the indigenous Fijian community as presenting the greatest difficulties. A minority, but a large minority, in their native land, the Fijians are the least diversified economically, the least committed to a cash economy.²

For Fisk, the principal cause is the affluence of the Fijians' subsistence economy together with the security of a traditional way of life it helps engender:

For all practical purposes the subsistence sector, however affluent, is essentially stagnant. The economic advancement of the Fijians therefore is confined to that relatively smaller part of their activities that reaches out into the exchange sector. It is for this reason that, whilst the other racial groups in Fiji are taking part in the vigorous growth of the advanced sector of the economy, the Fijians are being left behind, and the more rapid the rate of growth achieved, the more rapidly will the Fijians fall behind.

¹

The seed of a class community was discerned by some observers in the discontent of Fijian and Indian oil workers that led to the Suva Riots of 1953 (v. West 1960; Nayacakalou 1963) though the riots themselves might be termed racial in that they were essentially an attack on European property - a lasting shock for that community. (For the official report on the riots v. Lowe 1960). More recently the activity of the Airport and Catering Workers Union (now deregistered), especially in its prolonged dispute with QANTAS, could be regarded as a healthy sign of an embryonic class structure. Not unnaturally it was regarded as anything but 'healthy' by the Government, dominated numerically by Fijians and led by high-ranking Fijian chiefs. Thus, in part, reveals the dilemma of the conservative, chiefly leaders. Politically, they have everything to lose by the creation of the loss of society envisaged by Fisk and others.

²

Fisk provides the latest statistics (derived from the 1960 census) for the population:

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---
Fisk advocates that as far as the Fijian community is concerned the objective of economic policy should be a drastic re-orientation of Fijian attitudes, not only to vitalise the Fijian sector of the rural economy, but also to involve Fijians on a permanent basis in secondary and tertiary industries and encourage their more effective urbanisation.

Prognostications such as these of Fisk, of the dangers that await Fiji if planning for at least a degree of economic integration of indigenous Fijians with the rest of the community is ignored, are not new. On the other hand their history is short.

From the inception of British rule (in 1874) policy has been to govern the Fijians as a separate administrative unit, preserving the cultural values and institutions of a traditional Fijian way of life, that is as interpreted by the colonial power. This policy naturally favoured insulating the Fijian from the tradition-vitiating experiences of contact with a cash-oriented, outside world (itself introduced into Fiji, it should be remarked, by Europeans). Until the 1950s this administrative structure and quasi-traditional version of Fijian society went uncriticised by commentators. Indeed it was lauded.¹ There was no query to the validity and implications of such conclusions as, for example, those of Geddes' regarding the villagers of Dauba:

² (cont'd from previous page)
Economically Active Population by Racial Group and Main Industrial Categories (Fisk:1970:40).

¹ E.g. Geddes (1945); Roth (1951), Stanner (1953).
'And, in the meantime, their state as reviewed here is a fortunate one in a world in which individualism and aggression so often over-ride human values.' (Geddes: 1945:65). Moreover, as a corollary, and in a magnificent confusion of cause and effect, the high rate of failure of those attempts by Fijians to become involved in cash enterprises was put down to an innate conservatism in the Fijian. His was a custom-bound outlook determined by the need of chiefly leadership, by the priority of kinship obligation, by an addiction to the 'communal system'\(^1\) of life in the village.

The first effective criticism of the Fijian establishment came in 1959 with the publication of Spate's official report 'The Fijian People: Economic Problems and Prospects' (Spate:1959). Compared with past eulogies, Spate's approach was ruthless in the way it stripped and laid bare the plight of the captive

\(^1\) In the Fijian literature, the term is most often used in a very loose way to denote a kind of ethos or way of life in the village. It seems to reflect more faithfully past official notions of what life in the village should be, notions which were duly incorporated into the administrative policy. This communal ethos is best conveyed by the idea of the subservience of the individual's time and labour, his productivity, to the interests of the community. The vagueness of its precise character, however, has led to much misunderstanding - epitomised for me by the blurb for a 1968 Australian television production on rural Fiji life which commenced with the pronouncement that all property is held in common in the Fijian village. Bolshaw, in a chapter headed 'The Ambiguity of Communalism' effectively deals with the term (v. Bolshaw:1964:123-5).
Fijian villager treading the revolving wheel of his 'Fijian way of life'. A Commission of Enquiry into the Natural Resources and Population Trends of the Colony of Fiji (Burns:1960) quickly followed on the heels of Spate and, within the limits of its terms of reference, its proposals fully endorsed and supported his conclusions. Though the most important of these proposals were immediately rejected or their implementation postponed (v. F.L.C.P. No. 31 of 1960), the official and chiefly representation of the nature of Fijian rural society clearly lay considerably compromised under the impact of these two officially initiated reports. Further assaults followed. Most notable among them was Belshaw's 'Under the Ivi Tree' (1964), an examination of Fijian economic enterprise in the Sigatoka region of south-west Viti Levu. More recently there has appeared the geographer Watters' comparative study of four villages in different areas of Fiji (Watters:1969).

These shocks to the system from the observations of outside experts could not fail to bring about some reappraisal of the relevance of the administratively maintained institutional framework of Fijian rural society, not only by colonial officials but by the Fijian chiefly leadership. Furthermore, during the 1960s the internal political situation grew more tense with the ever-widening gap between the demands of the leaders of the majority Indian community and the conservative

---

1 A reference to the title of G.K. Roth's book (1953).
2 Fiji Legislative Council Paper.
3 Chosen by Watters to represent different levels of economic development and social change (op.cit. xv). Watters main fieldwork was carried out in 1958 and 1959 with further brief periods in 1961, 1964 and 1965. Belshaw's fieldwork was in the Sigatoka in 1959; the Burns' Commission's in Viti Levu in 1960 and 1961.
stand of the Fijian leaders. As the prospect of independence became a reality, not merely a platform for Indian orators, the Fijian leadership was obliged to consider a post-independence situation in which an Indian-dominated administration might come to power and 'liberate' the Fijian community by legislation. Thus the economic plight of the Fijian villager, brought to light by such studies as those of Spate and Belshaw, had an immediate political significance for the vested interests of the established system of leadership of the Fijian community. It was a significance of some ominous proportion for them when viewed in the light of the small but increasing degree of organised activity, political and economic, of those urbanised Fijians who had shaken off traditional leadership and direction.

Within a few years of its unfavourable reception of the Burns proposals of reform, Fijian chiefly leadership had accepted the need to dismantle the separate Fijian administrative framework. Administratively the foundations were laid for an eventual single system of local government with the creation of elected provincial councils. Economically the habitation of the rural

A feature of political life in the Colony in the 1960s has been the ability of the main Indian opposition party, the Federation Party, to attract support from the urbanised Fijian sector of the population. The National Party, the largest of the minor indigenous Fijian political parties, formally amalgamated with the Federation Party in 1968. Two high officials in the National Federation Party organisation are from senior chiefly Fijian families.

The councils were not completely elective, provision being made for the nomination of chiefs by the Secretary for Fijian Affairs - in the Lauan Provincial Council, for example, there were 14 elected members and 4 nominated chiefs.

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Fijian community was spearheaded by increased emphasis on the development of the Co-operative movement and community schemes, while the economic awareness and growth thus achieved came to be regarded as the foundation of a kind of village self-help approach through communal projects 'enabling the local community, from its growing resources, to strengthen and enrich its own social provision, in education and housing and health and recreation - in a word, to develop itself.' (From the official report on rural development, v. Hunter:1969: cap.57.)

In itself this acceptance of the political and economic realities of the need to identify the rural Fijian community with the developing nation's aspiration for economic growth, seemed to demonstrate a real shift in attitude on the part of Fijian leadership. And yet in terms of the aims and effects of the policies of rural development adopted, how real has been this shift? The observations of outside commentators, and of many officials in Suva, are that traditional social organisation within the village persists as the major obstacle to economic growth.

Against this general background of post 1945 developments, the Lau Islands presented an interesting situation for a study of socio-economic change as well as promising to provide further understanding of the strength and persistence of traditional attitudes in rural Fiji. The Lauans possess a long acquaintance with the coconut as a crop, reaching back beyond the beginning of this century. The coconut villages are now among the richest in Fiji in terms of cash income. Their capacity for capital expenditure is probably the highest of all
villages by virtue of the compulsory cess (of F$20 per ton) which since 1951 has been laid on all copra. Local consumer-marketing Co-operatives are firmly established throughout the archipelago. Finally, Lauan villages are regarded as being among the most tradition-oriented in Fiji.

Not only did Lau seem to present for analysis an ideal case of the persistence of traditional values in face of economic change, it also offered the attraction of complementing in different ways the major examinations of socio-economic change in Fiji that had already been made (that is up to 1967), namely those of Spate (1959) and Belshaw (1964).

Both Spate and Belshaw were concerned with the inhibitory effects on economic growth of the Fijian institutional framework, traditional and administrative, as a factor in the Fijian's ability to adapt to new sets of values and rationalise his behaviour towards the attainment of cash-oriented goals. Spate, obliged by circumstances to sacrifice depth for breadth, ranged widely, sampling villages almost throughout the Colony.\(^1\) Among the areas he did not visit were the Moalan Group and the Lau Islands. Belshaw, on the other hand, localised his fieldwork, concentrating it within the administrative Province of Nadroga & Navosa and for the most part in areas linked to markets by road and river communication. Here the wide range of emergent enterprises, attended with varying degrees of success

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\(^1\) For a quick reference to Spate's field visits see the map i. his report (Spate:1959:vi).
and lack of success, provided him with an abundance of comparative material for determination of the variables involved in the Fijians' adjustment to economic changes.

While the studies of Belshaw and Spate relate to customary social organisation primarily in terms of its encumbrance of economic growth, my own approach was intended to be, in a sense, the inverse. It would be seeking to understand the viability of customary social organisation, the successful incorporation of cash resources within a framework of traditional values and behaviour. This focus, in turn, differentiated it from Sahlins' study of Moalan society \(^1\) (Sahlins:1962) where his emphasis reflects, in his own words, 'a greater interest in traditional facets of Moalan culture than in those characteristics that manifest a century of European dominance.' (op.cit. 3).

Lau, then, offered the possibility of a comparative set of material which in particular contrasted a situation of successful assimilation of economic development with the stress-loaded social scene which Belshaw discovered not so thoroughly hidden behind a canvas of serenity in Nadroga & Navosa Province. By also seeking to isolate the variables determining the individual's adaptability in the Lauan situation, it appeared possible not only to enhance but to extend

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\(^1\) Moala and islands of Totoya and Matuku comprise the Moalan Group, 'Yasayasa Moala', which is within the administrative Province of Lau. My own references to Lau/Lauan are to the Lauan archipelago only.

Sahlins' fieldwork on Moala was from October 1954 to August 1955.
Belshaw's theoretical discussion. Furthermore, in a more immediately applicable context, an understanding of the social background to the establishment and working of Co-operative societies in Lau would be of particular value. Here the significant question to be answered would be to what extent Lauan Co-operatives could be regarded as a genuine medium of economic growth within a traditional social framework, the kind of socio-economic phenomenon which Pitt (1970) and Lockwood (1971) describe for Samoa. If this was in fact so for Lau, then in view of the high priority given the Co-operative form of enterprise in present policies of rural development in Fiji, it is clearly important to have some idea of the potential for furthering this independent economic growth of the Fijian community. This is all the more pressing in light of the urgency for economic integration felt by, for example, Fisk and Watters. Making specific comparison with Samoa, Watters (1969:2) has commented:

Many competent observers think social change should be accelerated in Samoa to permit much needed economic development. Yet the rate at which Samoans change is above all the Samoans' own business: if they should be forced to close their schools, shut up their hospitals and halt any or all of the various appurtenances of a modern state, the decisions are entirely theirs. But in Fiji, although the rate at which they change is primarily the Fijians' business, it is not only their business: it effects the future happiness and prosperity of other communities living in the same land. This does not mean that I recommend

1 I use an initial capital for Co-operatives/Co-operation to avoid confusion. Similarly, an initial capital will be used for 'Societies' when the term is used on its own to refer to Co-operatives.
that changes be imposed on the Fijians, but it
does mean that every effort must be made to
secure the acquiescence of all of them in
measures that will no longer insulate society
against change.

Belshaw rejected the village as a basic unit of
study and comparison despite his original intentions of
using it. He did this when he realised the widely
varying nature of association involved in same and
different forms of enterprise he came across or heard
of. He settled instead for the individual cases of
enterprise regardless of their social basis, - whether
they were undertaken by individual, family, group or
community, - without, however, disregarding the
environmental effects of village social organisation
(v. Belshaw:1964:24-6). My own interest in the
persistence of traditional social organisation, together
with the absence in Lau of that wide range of emergent
enterprise with which Belshaw was dealing, did point to
the village as the appropriate unit for study. Bearing
in mind Spate's warning on the diversity of Fijian
villages I resolved not to limit my attention to a single
village. In the event I made the Tikina, the administrative
District, which in this case reflected a much older
political division, the bounds of my fieldwork.

Having to select an area within Lau means
having to choose an island. I was influenced in my
decision here by the location of fieldwork already
carried out by anthropologists in the past - Hocart on
central Lau, pre-1914 (mostly on the island of Lakeba,¹
though he appears to have visited all the islands in the
archipelago), and Laura Thompson on southern Lau in the
carly 1930s (mostly on the island of Kabara). Though

¹ Hocart held the post of headmaster at the school in
there are clear advantages for the student of social change in making a follow-up study of an area, there exist equally obvious attractions of carrying out fieldwork in a new, relatively unknown area. Moreover, Lau is sufficiently homogeneous for Hocart's and Thompson's works to present useful comparative material for a study in a fresh area. A fresh area meant, in effect, northern Lau and a choice between the islands of Cicia and Vanua Balavu. Chance contacts in Suva helped to decide in favour of Vanua Balavu where my fieldwork was concentrated upon the eight villages of the northern District,¹ MUALEVU.²

Once I was in the field³ it was not long in becoming apparent that the image of an essentially tradition-oriented, conservative society was an ill-fit for MUALEVU. It was also apparent that as a consequence my theoretical design would have to be refashioned.

The decade following the end of the Second World War seems to have been a watershed in the history of MUALEVU following which a shift in social attitudes and values steadily gained momentum. This change was

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¹ The presence of a large Tongan village (the origins and organisation of which have been studied by the Lessings (1970)) adjoining with the chiefly village of the southern District presented sufficient additional complications, including the learning of Tongan as well as Fijian, for me to exclude this southern area from the main body of my fieldwork.

² Capital letters are used to distinguish the District from the village and from the social unit which carry the same name.

³ A total of 19 months was spent in the field in two periods: September 1967 - September 1968, and July 1969 - January 1970. Both my wife and I had acquired a fair command of the language by the sixth month. From the fourth month we were both using the vernacular most of the time.
readily associated by the villagers themselves with the individual's growing commitment to a cash income. It is notable that it was during this period that MUALELU experienced a rapid rise in the potential of cash income from what is virtually its sole source of cash, namely copra. This was the time, assert the villagers, that 'the money path', isala vakailavo, began to gain dominance over 'the traditional path', isala vakavanua (lit. 'the path in the way of the land'). Reconstruction and analysis of the socio-economic organisation of the pre-1940 society\(^1\) underlined the radical quality of the post-1945 change. As the people themselves succinctly put it: 'Before men were important, but now it is land that is important.'

This is not to say that the 'traditional path' now lies neglected and lost sight of. Custom has not been swept away overnight, but even the attenuated version, the compromise which most villagers feel the obligation and need to settle for, is no longer evaluated simply in customary terms. The individual's acquaintance with the rationale of the cash sector has meant the values and behaviour programmed by recurrent traditional situations have become susceptible to the results of the more calculated computation of immediate returns and benefits relative to time, labour and money expended. The ceremonial and kinship-based, distributive economy characterising MUALELU society prior to 1940 has contracted.

\(^1\) The reconstruction was based on the information of the older villagers and aided by my access to the Evidence Books of the various Land Commissions that have visited MUALELU.
Its organisational framework is becoming increasingly peripheral in the redeployment of resources that is occurring under pressure from new needs and opportunities presented by the cash sector.

And yet, despite the villagers' pursuit of 'the money path' at the acknowledged expense of customary institutions, their conversion to its tenets is not complete. The logic they apply to countenance the diminished efficacy of custom, itself falters as a directive to action in the cash sector of the village economy. The apparent paradox of economic development and social change in MUALEVU is the mode of operation of the Co-operative societies and its acceptance by the majority of the villagers.

In MUALEVU (and elsewhere in Lau) the Co-operative works on principles which are antithetical to any idea of the maximisation of individual income - in the sense of maximum cash return for outlay. The advantages of economy of scale to the individual are swallowed up in the subjection of his own interest to that of the communal interest: he who puts most in is by no means he who takes most out. In an economic context, the Co-operatives have a levelling effect: but the Co-operative has become more than a form of economic enterprise. As the traditional socio-economic organisation, savage by the values of a cash-conscious society has retreated upon itself, the Co-operative has filled the vacated areas to become new medium of village socio-economic organisation.

The paradox of the successful establishment of the Co-operatives now disappears. Their success is to be
interpreted not in terms of the encouragement of economic growth and of the individual's commitment to it, but in terms of a new medium of social organisation that offers the villager some resolution of the stress generated by his involvement with cash and disengagement from custom. Or, perhaps, one should say respite, not resolution, for the present signs in the villages are that cash demand is increasing and, as money becomes dear, the Co-operative is commencing to generate its own conditions of stress.

The Co-operatives certainly represent an interesting socio-economic development at a time of accelerated change. This can be well illustrated by way of Belshaw's distinction of the contexts of 'economy' and 'economic growth'. In a discussion of the 'economic' role of Fijian ceremonial, he comments (1964:127) that ceremonial custom may be considered to hinder the growth of the economy since, 'by diverting resources into such [ceremonial] uses, the growth of the resources themselves is unduly hindered and their use for increased satisfactions is prevented.' But the notion of economy Belshaw asserts (op. cit. 126-7):

... strictly implies that a person or group of persons behaves in such a way as to maximize satisfaction with minimum effort and expenditure of resources. Marriage and allied customs have not only resisted alien pressure and attack, but have inflated with the growth of wealth. We must assume, therefore, that economic demand for such activity is highly valued, and that resources directed to this goal represent valid economic judgements in terms of Fijian life and interests.

1 In the event Belshaw's conclusion is that its effect is neutral (Belshaw:1964:152).
What is interesting about the role of the Co-operatives in MUALEVU is that here is a form of emergent, and emphatically non-traditional, enterprise which ordinarily would be placed in the context of 'economic growth' (and, in fact, is by both Fijian officials and economist observers), but in reality is functioning within Belshaw's context of 'economy' on the basis of the same tenets of fulfilment and satisfaction as Belshaw characterises for the 'economic' role of ceremonial. There is, moreover, a further contrast with Belshaw's area, where a cash inflation of ceremonial exists side by side with a considerable range of emergent enterprise. In MUALEVU ceremonial activities have dwindled considerably in both size and incidence because of the villagers' reluctance to involve themselves in anything but the minimum cash outlay.

It is clear that my original (preconceived) notions as to the complementarity of the processes of social change in MUALEVU with those observed by Belshaw in Nadroga & Navosa Province, are not tenable. As far as the survival and continuing relevance of a customary

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1 As in other underdeveloped countries, the Co-operatives movement was welcomed in Fiji as the form of cash enterprise ideally suited to the 'communal' ethos of traditional society. Thus Stanner remarks: 'The communal system is admirably suited to co-operative development and the idea appeals strongly to the Fijians' (1953:228); a series of assumption without basis. To-day it is more readily realised by the policy makers of the under-developed countries, largely by painful experience, that 'Co-operation' is a relatively sophisticated, Western form of enterprise that has no inevitable appeal in 'simple' societies (v. also Finney's comments on Co-operatives in French Polynesia - Finney:1968:67,84).
socio-economic organisation is concerned, MUALEVU could not be regarded as a tradition-bound society.

But there is evident another form of complementarity, in terms of the dilemmas and frustrations and the stress generated in the individual as he seeks to adjust to the pressures and demands of a cash economy, that exists by virtue of the endorsement of the kind of conclusions reached by Belshaw. For contrary to the reasons underlying Belshaw's choice of Nadroga & Navosa as an area for fieldwork, MUALEVU was selected for study on the basis of the well-supported assumption of the persistence of the traditional ethos of its society.

I hope this study of social change in MUALEVU will have a wider relevance. I am thinking here of the general issues and problems of economic growth for rural Fiji outlined in the earlier part of this introduction. If it only persuades some qualification of the facile generalisations about the innate 'traditionalism' of the Fijian, it will have achieved a great deal. There are two specific points which from the evidence of this study will need reappraisal. One is Fisk's emphasis on the deterrent effect upon the Fijians' integration into the vague society of what he terms the 'affluence of the subsistence economy'. The idea that the Fijian who does not succeed in the town 'is merely faced with the need to abandon the bright lights and to move back to the subsistence sector, where a remarkably comfortable, secure and adequately provided living, with many fewer hours of work remains accessible to all' (1970:45. My italics). The other is the belief, implicit in government policy, that the successful establishment of
Co-operatives is an indication of the value of the movement as the spearhead (if not the whole spear) of planned economic growth in the Fijian village.

The thesis falls into two discernible parts dealing with MUALEVU society from the 1860s to 1945 and what I shall term 'modern' MUALEVU. I give a specific year for convenience, what is really significant is that the decade after the end of the Second World War was the period during which were established the premises for the commitment of MUALEVU society to a cash-oriented economy. The chronological division is not, however, to facilitate a comparison of a 'traditional' with a 'modern' society. Indeed, it was the harvest of assumption and misinterpretation which usage of the term 'traditional' bountifully yields that has partly dictated the historical approach, since it was clear that over the past hundred years MUALEVU society had experienced some considerable changes. Much that has been tagged 'traditional' would be more appropriately described by 'innovatory'.

These changes had relatively small effect on the existing framework of socio-economic organisation and this enables a more considered isolation of variables affecting the processes of change in the 'modern' period. But a further fact that I wish to underline by means of the historical approach is that the potential for the kind of changes taking place in MUALEVU to-day, had become implicit in the institutional configuration established by the turn of the century. The re-orientation triggered off by the post-1945 cash intrusion was the result of a change in emphasis in the relative priority of organisational features of MUALEVU society and not the consequence of a violent upheaval in a society that was (supposedly) innately conservative.
CHAPTER TWO

THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
A glance at the map of Oceania (v. overleaf) reveals Fiji's central position in the south-west Pacific. When the map portrays communications, the eye is straightaway drawn to Fiji as the hub of innumerable spokes of sea and air routes. There is no doubt that the Group fits its modern description as the cross-roads of the area. Historically, too, though in a different sense, Fiji has earned this description.

Invariably included in the great ethno-geographical division of Melanesia, Fiji is yet distinctly march country where Melanesian and Polynesian ethnic and cultural traits meet and blend. In the interior of Viti Levu, the principal island, the peoples are somatically and culturally closer to the Melanesians while on the coastal areas and in the islands to the east Polynesian traits are more evident. In the latter areas are found that complex of chiefly institutions and high degree of social stratification associated with the Polynesian cultures and these are absent in the interior of Viti Levu.

Polynesian influence is most apparent in the Lauan archipelago, the eastern boundary of the Group (v. Map 2, p. 21), as a consequence of a long history of continuous contact, certainly over the past three hundred years, with the sea-faring Tongans. The Lau islands (v. Map 3, p. 22) stretch from 17°S in the north (the island of Naitauba) to 21°S in the south (the Tuvana islands), a distance of some 300 miles. In the south, the archipelago veers towards Tonga and the southern outlier, Ono-i-Lau, is, in fact, closer to the main Tongan

1 Map 1 is based on Taylor:1965:facing p.692.
2 The discovery and dating of the distribution of Lapita pottery suggests the Fiji maritime areas were settled by a proto-Polynesian race prior to settlement in west Polynesia (v. e.g. Groube:1971).
3 The literature on these peoples is slim: Brewster's account (1922) is the fullest.
Map 2. The Fiji Islands
Map 3. The Lau Islands
islands than it is to the Fijian capital, Suva. The islands are enclosed within 180° and 178°E longitude and Derrick gives the total sea area that they cover as 44,000 square miles (1965:296). The islands number in the hundreds but the majority are merely outcrops of limestone ranging from a few feet to a few miles in length. Only 27 of the islands are inhabited and they represent an aggregate land area of 132 square miles (ibid). Of the inhabited islands only two, Lakeba and Vanua Balavu, exceed 20 square miles.

With the exception of the island of Yacata in the north-west, the entire archipelago, together with the islands of the Moalan group, form the administrative Province of Lau. The Province is subdivided into 13 Districts.

There are two Districts in northern Lau. MUALEVU District is situated entirely within the Exploring Group of islands (v. Map 4, p. 24) and consists of the northern half of the island of Vanua Balavu, the islands of Avea and Cikobia and the European-owned freehold island of Adavaci. There is a total of eight villages in the District. The other District, LOMALOMA, has ten villages. There are seven in the southern half of Vanua Balavu, one on the island of Susui, another on the island of Namalata, and one on the island of Tuvuca which lies outside the Exploring Group almost 20 miles to the south. But LOMALOMA also includes the islands of Kanacea, Katafaga, Mago, Naitauba, Vatu Vara, and, within the Exploring Group, the islands of Yanuyanu and Munia, all of which are European-owned freeholds. Apart from Vatu Vara and Yanuyanu, these islands have settlements of Fijian and Indian labourers and their

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1 Derrick is including the Moalan group which is administratively part of Lau but lies to the west of the archipelago.
2 I have subtracted the area of the Moalan group from the figure given by Derrick.
families working the coconut plantations.

In the proceeding description I shall confine myself to the Exploring Group and give particular attention to the area included within MUALEVU District.

The Exploring Group lies between $178^\circ 42' W$ and $179^\circ 5' W$ longitude and $17^\circ 4' S$ and $17^\circ 25' S$ latitude. The islands of the Group are within a large barrier reef, approximately 75 miles in circumference, which encloses an area of about 200 square miles. There are four principal passages through the reef: The Tongan Passage (30 fathoms) and the American Passage (106 fathoms) are situated in the south-east and north-east respectively and the shallower Qilaqila and Adavaci Passages are in the north-west and west. In the north, there is the Sovu series of smaller passages which are avoided by the Suva-based inter-island traders.

Easily the largest island of the Exploring Group is Vanua Balavu with an area of 21 square miles. Regarded from the sea, the island has the prospect of a large land area which belies its long, narrow, boomerang shape (the name means 'long land'). Its total length is about 14 miles with a maximum width of three miles. It is situated at the western end of the lagoon, close to the barrier reef. The island is surrounded by a fringing reef varying in width from a few to several hundred feet; in the south it merges with the barrier reef. The waters outside the fringing reef abound in submerged reeflots which make navigation a hazard for even small outboard-motored punts and have necessitated the emplacement of a beacon system for the guidance of larger vessels.

Vanua Balavu is of a composite geological structure comprising both volcanics and limestones. The two are

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1 Technical details of the rock structure and geological history of the Exploring islands can be found in Ladd & Hoffmeister:1945:14-58.
almost neatly separated into the southern and northern arms of the island, though the limestone is present at the southern tip of the island where it then disappears into the sea to reappear as the island of Namalata. The volcanic, southern arm is dominated by a central ridge that commences in the area where the two arms of the island meet and which includes the highest peak on the island, Korobasaga (930 feet). The ridge runs the length of the southern arm in a sweeping curve and for the most part at a height of 300 to 500 feet. In the south it rises higher to the 560 feet of Koroniivi peak (west of Narocivo village) before meeting with the limestone area. At intervals in its length the ridge rises 50 or so feet to form individual peaks. Spurs emerge on either side of this central ridge often producing their own minor peaks. Where these spurs reach to the sea they terminate in rounded coastal bluffs. Between the spurs are valleys, some with permanent streams in them, many with well-defined water-courses which carry water only in times of exceptionally heavy rainfall.

From a distance, the central ridge and the spurs seem to present an easy climb and access, but their yellowish colour is provided by a tall (up to seven feet) indigenous, reed-like grass, *gasau*, which is extremely difficult to penetrate without a bush knife of some sort. Here and there the monotony of the yellow is broken by small patchworks of gardens and sometimes by much larger, blackened areas, the result of uncontrolled burning for garden clearance. The valleys between the spurs, and the coastal flats into which they broaden, are filled with the green of a flourishing vegetation which is almost entirely coconut palm. Mangrove occurs in a few sheltered places on the eastern, windward coast, but is very much more in evidence on the leeward side of the island.

The appearance of the northern arm is in striking
contrasted to the southern arm and, indeed, the dimorphism of the two types of country, volcanic and limestone, enables them to be instantly recognized throughout the Group. The limestone area is far more rugged and except for the occasional rocky pinnacle is covered with a vegetation of trees and shrubs with extensive coconut groves in the interior. At the eastern end of the northern arm, the hills reach 700 feet or more and there is a more complex pattern of ridges, peaks and valleys than that found in the southern arm. Except at Vutuna, where there is a narrow flat extending for a few hundred yards inland, the coastal cliffs along the western half of this northern arm drop almost perpendicularly into the sea with a pronounced overhang near the sea surface.

There are 13 villages on Vanua Balavu. All of them are sited on the coastal flats of the volcanic region. Six are in the northern District, MUALEVU, with three on either side of the island.

The chiefly village of the District, Mualovu (population 337)\(^1\) is on the windward coast in a wide shallow bay opposite a break in the fringing reef. The coastal flat, here, stretches inland for over a quarter of a mile before merging into the lower slopes of the valley formed by the vertebral spurs to the south and north of the village. The high central ridge with its gasau covering dominates the background of the village; but moving a half-mile south, the ridge suddenly dips to less than a 100 feet, and between it and a coastal ridge there is a wide plain dotted with patches of gasau and scrub. This area has a wasteland appearance that distinguishes it from the gasau areas of the higher slopes. (The Fijian term, talaga, is used officially to

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\(^1\) Population figures for the villages of MUALEVU District are from my own census made in 1969; figures for LOMALOMA District are those of the 1966 Census (v. Zwart:1968:24).

Sketch Maps of Mualovu, Mavava, Dalironi and Cikobia villages have been included in Appendix 3.
denote this particular type of poor, infertile country which is quite common on the two main islands of the Fiji Group.

A network of permanently flowing streams to the north of the village provides a liberal water supply which is piped from a small concrete reservoir under pressure sufficient to serve half a dozen tap and shower outlets in the village.

Less than a mile to the south, separated from Mualevu by the most extensive mangrove swamp on this side of the island, is the small village of Boitaci (population 77). This village is in a much smaller bay than is Mualevu and with deeply jutting headlands at both ends of the bay and an independent coastal ridge stretching directly behind the village to the southern headland, there is a claustrophobic atmosphere which is accentuated by the cramped space of the village itself. There is no supply of running water close to the village, which has to rely upon a well and a concrete rainwater tank, though many of the householders have their own smaller, corrugated-iron water tanks.

Two and a half miles north of Mualevu is Mavana (population 340), the largest village in the Exploring Group. Although here, as in Boitaci, village space is at a premium, there is none of the shut-in feeling of the latter village. Mavana is situated in a wide crescent-shaped bay with the ridges of two enclosing spurs curving behind and around it to reach up to the highest point of the island, Korobasaga. The uniform concavity of the slope in this pronounced curve hints at its volcanic origin. On the seaward side, a large part of the horizon is shut out by the bulk of Avea island. A stream which runs through the village has been dammed to form a small, artificial lake in which women wash clothes and the children play. Water is piped from a small concrete reservoir in another stream south of the village. Mavana suffers the inconvenience of an extensive sand flat which is completely uncovered at low tide.
On the western side of the island, there are two small villages in the south of the District, Muamua (population 111) and Malaka (population 70). They are about a mile and a half apart. Both are situated by breaks in the mangrove swamps, which extend along much of the western coast of the southern arm of the island. Muamua is backed by the steeper, western slopes of the central ridge, but Malaka, while having these slopes to the immediate north and south, lies opposite the low point of the central ridge south of Mualevu. Both villages are served by permanent streams and have piped water.

Daliconi village (population 204), a mile to the north of Malaka, is the third largest village of the District. It is in a very narrow crescent coastal flat, no more than a hundred yards at its widest. It is backed by small steep slopes and cliffs behind which there soars the complex of hills and ridges of the Korobasaga area. Directly to the north-west and to the north is the limestone region of the northern arm of the island. There is a mud and sand flat exposed at low tide, but it is less than half the width of that at Mavana. The village has expanded from its original site into the hinterland to a valley lying between the limestone and volcanic ranges of hills. The stream in this valley is permanently flowing and opens to a small mangrove-filled bay to the south of the main village site. Since 1969, the stream has provided the village proper with a piped supply of water, saving an arduous climb and walk for a wash and bathe.

The barrier reef is quite close on the western side of the island and at its maximum distance it is only four miles away. All three villages lie opposite the Adavaci Passage.

The island of Auea lies north-east of Vanua Balavu, a mile offshore from Mavana. It is one and three quarters miles long by just over a half a mile at its widest and has
an area of just under 550 acres. It is surrounded by a fringe reef which joins with the barrier reef at the northern end of the island. The island is mostly limestone, with a narrow volcanic region in the south-west and another, smaller area in the south-east. There is a long, narrow coastal flat occupying most of the north-eastern coast and another flat, small and wedge-shaped, in the south-western corner where the sole village (population 135) of the island is situated. The north-west coast and the northern tip of the island have the plunging cliffs and overhang characteristic of the limestone areas. The interior is dominated by a central ridge running north-south and varying in height between 400 and 600 feet. The country in the northern half of the island is extremely rugged and mostly covered with a tree and shrub vegetation; beneath this cover is exposed a good deal of bare weathered rock of a knife-like sharpness that, in places, presents a barrier even to the thick-soled feet of the villager. Coconut groves are concentrated in the southern half of the island and on the north-eastern coastal flat. In the central and northern regions, gardening is limited to the scattered small gullies and basins, which have the only good cover of soil. The only running water supply for the village is a small spring half a mile away.

Cikobia is eight miles east of Mualevu village and at the nearest point just over a mile away from the barrier reef. It is approximately one square mile in area. A high ridge, volcanic in the south and limestone elsewhere and varying in height between 400 and 500 feet, forms an encircling rim that from any aspect gives the island the appearance of a high plateau. The rim, however, hides the central volcanic depression of the island. This depression is characterized by steep undulations broken by rocky outcrops of limestone. The area is filled with coconut groves, interspersed with gacau patches, and a large patch of talagita. On the coast,
there are narrow sandy beaches and coastal flats contained in a series of small, scalloped-shaped bays hidden from each other by headlands, the limestone standing out more precipitously than the volcanic. These flats are backed by steep tree and shrub covered slopes in the limestone coastal areas of the west and north, but the gentler slopes of the volcanic coast in the south and east carry thick groves of coconut which are halted inland only by the steeply rising limestone rim. There is a fringing reef around the island which is interrupted in a few places by the jutting limestone headlands. There is one village (population 90) on the island, which is sited in a tiny protected bay in the south-west corner. There are no streams on the island and the village has to rely upon rainwater and when the tide has ebbed, upon a few small springs in the coastal flats close to the village.

Five and a half miles south-west of Cikobia, bordering the barrier reef, lies the European-owned freehold island of Munia. Seen from north of Mualevu village, Munia seems to have a shape and size similar to Cikobia. It is, in fact, almost twice the area of Cikobia with a shape closer to that of Aavea's. It is a volcanic island, supporting dense vegetation in the areas not occupied by the flourishing coconut plantation.

Three and a half miles further west is Susui, a long, narrow island, half the area again of Cikobia. It has a peculiar outline, with the hilly areas occupying the western half (limestone) and eastern end (volcanic) of the island separated by a flat extending right across the island. On this flat the village (population 109) is situated. The western half of the island presents the rugged aspect typical of the limestone regions and this is reproduced in neighbouring Namalata. A narrow channel separates the two islands. On the western side, the equally narrow strait between Namalata and the southern tip of Vanua Balavu is easily fordable at low
There is the one village (population 84) on Namalata.

In the southern half of Vanua Balavu, in the District of LOMALOMA, there are seven villages. The six on the eastern side (with their populations) are: Narocivo (57), Naqara (48), Sawana (205), Lomaloma (173), Uruone (131) and Levukana (126). On the western side is Dakuilomaloma (102).

The climate of northern Lau has the wet and dry, seasonal division found throughout Fiji. Between 1967 and 1970, the pronounced seasonal variation in rainfall gave it more in common with the climate of the 'dry', north-west areas rather than that of the 'wet' areas, of the two largest islands. Official figures for the average monthly rainfall for the islands of Muni, Kanaea, Naitauba and Mago are shown in Table 1 (v. overleaf). This gives an idea of local variation, though the area is too small for any pronounced system of mini climates. The data in Table 1 say nothing, of course, of annual variation which can be considerable.

The dry season extends from May through to October or November. October 1967 in MUALEVU was very wet with heavy rain on 14 days of the month, but October 1969 was dry with only an occasional thunderstorm. The year 1969 was, in fact, a notably dry year, with drought conditions in southern Lau (and elsewhere in Fiji) necessitating the provision of outside water supplies by the Government. While there was no actual water shortage in MUALEVU, the villagers' gardens did suffer and many households were compelled to supplement their food supply, in some cases heavily, with what could be found in the bush.

The villagers expect the heaviest rainfall in the months December to February/March and this was borne out in 1967/8 and in 1969. The prevailing winds are the trades from the east/south-east. When the winds change and come from the north-west/north, the villagers prepare to hatten down for this
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of station</th>
<th>Mago</th>
<th>Munia</th>
<th>Kanacea</th>
<th>Naitaua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of years (to 1955)*</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>59/60</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inches</td>
<td>inches</td>
<td>inches</td>
<td>inches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>8.97</td>
<td>7.84</td>
<td>8.47</td>
<td>9.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>8.74</td>
<td>7.47</td>
<td>8.35</td>
<td>9.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>10.28</td>
<td>8.98</td>
<td>9.92</td>
<td>10.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>8.44</td>
<td>7.05</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>9.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>7.07</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>7.32</td>
<td>7.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>4.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>4.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>4.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>5.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>6.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>7.06</td>
<td>6.54</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>8.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual average</td>
<td>77.72</td>
<td>66.75</td>
<td>72.93</td>
<td>83.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Average Monthly Rainfall at Selected Stations in Northern Lau

* Data has been taken from Twyford and Wright: 1965: Table XII facing p.74. 1955 was the last year in which records were kept at the stations indicated in Table 1 (personal communication, Natau: 1971).
is the direction from which the hurricanes come. The hurricane season is from December to April. The last hurricane to pass close to the Exploring Group was at the end of 1964 and it caused considerable flooding of the villages. At the end of 1965 there was another hurricane in the general area, but the centre was further away and much less damage and inconvenience was caused. Prior to 1964, there was a hurricane in January 1958 which passed just west of the Exploring Group and there was another violent hurricane which affected the entire Fiji Group in 1948.¹ The most drastic effect of these hurricanes is on copra production. It is felt not only immediately by the premature fall of nuts and uprooting of palms, but also for the next six or seven years that it takes the palms to return to full nut bearing.

Temperature variation is relatively small. It is in the 70s or 80s during the day, in the low 70s or sometimes sinking into the 60s at night. During the wet season, the higher humidity can make a slight rise in temperature uncomfortable for the villagers, while during the dry 'winter', a drop in temperature at night can sometimes make it chilly enough for a villager to wear a sweater if he possesses one.

There is no uniform pattern of soil cover either

¹ Previous hurricanes (since 1840) to have affected the Exploring Group, were: December 1942; April 1941 ('severe'); February 1941 ('severe'); January 1936 ('severe'); February 1931 ('violent'); December 1929 ('severe'); March 1923 ('very disastrous' - the centre passed through the Exploring Group); February 1921; February 1920; March 1919; March 1914; April 1913; March 1910 ('severe'); January 1908; December 1899 ('severe'); January 1895 ('severe'); March 1866 ('severe'); January 1883; March 1871 ('severe'); March 1864; March 1856. (Information from New Zealand Meteorological Services [nd], supplied by the Fiji Meteorological Office, Suva.) Only the dates of (officially defined) hurricanes have been given; lesser storms and cyclones, which nevertheless, are capable of causing as great a damage and destruction within their path as a near miss by a hurricane have not been detailed.
in the Exploring Group as a whole or in Vanua Balavu. However, in general terms, the soils of the limestone areas and of the coastal flats and valleys of the volcanic areas seem to supply the most nutrients on the evidence of the large population of palms they support. In these areas there is little of the original forest cover now left. In the volcanic areas, only the poorer, converted (by burning) soils of the higher slopes, which are under gasau, and the talasiga patches remain available for cultivation. Little can be done with the talasiga land, but the gasau areas proper are cultivable for root crops. What nutrient value they have, however, quickly diminishes and after the first or second year it offers little nourishment to a permanent tree crop such as coconut.

The expansion of coconut planting has created a vicious system of soil deterioration on the medium and steeper slopes. The forest cover is cut down and the area burned and then planted with gardens. After two or three years the garden is left unweeded, except perhaps around the individual coconut plantings, and the gasau and other grasses begin to invade the area. Once the gasau has taken over, the area becomes an easy victim of the fires (mostly caused by uncontrolled burning of new garden lands) that annually sweep the hillsides. Apart from the deleterious effects on the soil of repeated burning, there is the added factor of soil erosion caused by the deforestation. In the gasau areas, it is not uncommon to come across what, at first sight, appear to be first or second year coconut seedlings, but which, in fact, are (according to the owner) plants of four, five or six years old. Where burning occurs after the coconuts have become established, the trees, though they may survive, never fully recover. Their nut capacity remains permanently impaired and, indeed, they may never bear fruit again. There is one grove of such trees owned by a Mailema villager. He planted

1 Soil samples taken have been analysed by Dr Peter Stevens, Department of Forestry, Australian National University.
the palms some 30 years ago and they have yet to provide him with a single nut. In size, they resemble palms of about 12 years old, but they have a much smaller crown.

The palm is the most ubiquitous and obvious plant in the islands. Its importance to-day is as the sole marketable crop, but it has always been important to the MUALEVU villager. It still supplies him with food, drink, oil (for personal use and cooking), drinking vessels, twine (sennit), house-building materials and carrier-bags. But apart from the palm,¹ there exists a wide range of flora of which every villager knows the names, the properties and the potentiality for human use.

In the past, many of these plants had some domestic use. There were even separate plants for use as 'toilet soap' and '(clothes) washing soap'; but most have now been superseded as a result of new practices or new goods introduced via the European. Among the few still in regular use, three are particularly important: the coconut, the paper mulberry, from which the massi and gatu native bark cloths are made, and the pandanus which provides the material for the floor and sleeping mats, ihe. There are other plants whose properties and uses are not so widely known or publicly acknowledged. These are the plants used by the practitioners of the traditional medicine, drau ni kau (lit. 'plant leaves').²

¹ There are several varieties of coconut palm to be found in the group. Easily the most common are the Fijian Talls, the varieties of which are distinguished from each other by the colour of the nuts, which are green, yellow or orange. Malay and Pigi dwarf varieties are also found. Niu Drau, a tall variety with a very large number of small nuts, is occasionally seen.

² Capell's dictionary definition is misleading in that it focusses upon sorcery to the exclusion of remedial medical treatment. v. Capell:1957:66.
There is a wide range of domesticated food plants. Root crops include many varieties of large and small yams, dry and wet taro, sweet potato and a few varieties of cassava, which since the beginning of the century has been the principal staple crop. The native greens most commonly eaten are the bele (Hibiscus manihot) and taro leaves. Non-indigenous vegetables grown by some, but not all, gardeners, include Chinese and English cabbage, tomatoes, lettuce, onions, spring onions and radish. Sugar cane and maize are sometimes favoured, though never as a crop. The kava plant, piper methysticum, called vagona in Fiji, is grown where conditions are favourable, as is tobacco. I have also come across individual plants or plots of coffee, cocoa, arrowroot, ginger, groundnuts, water melon and pumpkin.

There is a wide variety of edible fruits, the seasons for which, accommodatingly enough, more or less succeed each other. Those cultivated include sweet and cooking bananas, breadfruit (more commonly found around the house-site in the village than in the gardens), pink and yellow fleshed pawpaw (papaya), pineapple and the coconut. Fruits commonly found wild include half a dozen varieties of citrus fruit, the dawa (Pommetia pinnata), mango, wi (Spondias dulcis) and two varieties of the Malay apple.

The range of foodstuffs grown or available wild to the MUALEVU villager is clearly extensive. The cooking of most MUALEVU housewives reduces to a minimum the advantages of this diversity, but the men appear conditioned to this and traditionally most, if not all, emphasis is placed on quantity,

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1 But the largest are not more than three feet in length with a weight of about 25 to 35 pounds, which hardly bears comparison with New Guinea prize yams.

2 I shall refer to it as 'kava'.
for which the land only rarely fails to provide.

The *fauna* is less extensive. The domesticated animals are the horse, pig, cow, an occasional goat, chicken, a few ducks, a large number of dogs and a lesser number of cats. Of these, the chicken, dog and cat can also be found wild in the bush. Since the last wild pigs were hunted out ten to 15 years ago, there has been no animal in the bush likely to cause injury to man, though some villagers are now expressing anxiety about the increase in the numbers of wild dogs that roam in the interior of the northern arm of Vanua Balavu, fearing they may be a danger should they form up into packs.

There are two species of hawk, both of which help to keep down the young chicken population in the villages. An unknown number of those chicks which escape the hawks fall foul of the holes of the land crabs which infest the villages, or are taken by rats. There is one species of land snake, which is non-poisonous. It can reach a length of six feet and would undoubtedly play a greater part in restricting the massive rat population that infests many of the copra groves were the villagers to be persuaded not to kill it on sight. Flying foxes are common and their liking for mature fruit makes them a pest, though not on the same scale as the rats. The villagers eat both the flying fox and the land crab, though not regularly and not at all by the Seventh Day Adventists. Wild duck and a species of large pigeon may often be seen, but can be brought down only by gun and there is just the one villager in MUALEVU who possesses one. In Dauliconi, domestic fowls (cocks) which have gone wild are ingeniously trapped by the younger boys using a decoy tame cock.

The paucity of the *fauna* is contrasted by the teeming life in the sea. Here there is found that vast range
of species common to tropical and sub-tropical waters, from
the tiny, brightly coloured coral fish to the immense mass
of the whale. It seems that all are edible to the Fijian,
even 'poisonous fish' such as the stone fish and the porcupine
fish.¹

Apart from the all-important classification of
size, fish are broadly divided into four main categories:
coloured fish - these are the soft-fleshed fish, such as the
members of the cod family; white fish - the hard-fleshed fish
with large silvery scales, the most common in MUALEVU waters
being the tuna, mackerel, trevally and barracuda; a small fish
the tara (it resembles the herring), which is sometimes found
in huge shoals; and the shark. The coloured fish are the
most frequently caught with a still line, whilst the white
fish are more often taken when trolling from an outboard or
canoe. Sharks are as likely to be taken by either method.

Only women usually engage in net fishing,² using
either the small, individual net or the long net. With a
long net, which requires the co-operation of at least five
or six women, and particularly in conjunction with a large
stone-dyked fish trap, fish of all kinds may be caught. The
women also fish with a light hand-line, casting from the shore.
Spear-fishing on the fringing reef with the local multi-
pronged fish-spear, and underwater-fishing with a 'rubber'
and steel shaft, are confined to the men. The turtle is
plentiful and the men catch it with the aid of a special,
large-meshed net, 200 feet or more in length.

At custom, the eating of the turtle was restricted

¹ The only cases of fish-poisoning that I heard of occurred
in another part of Lau and was the result of eating shark
liver, which is considered a great delicacy.

² Men may sometimes fish with a net and benzene pressure
lamp at night.
to persons of chiefly rank, but this tabu has lapsed to-day. The villagers relish turtle eggs, raw or boiled, but to be certain of finding a nest in the season they have to visit the islets of Sovu or Kibobo.\(^1\) (The taking of turtle eggs is forbidden at law.)

In addition to fish, large sea-crabs, king prawns and octopus are occasionally caught and, at low tide, the shore offers a large supply of molluscs to be collected by the women. Eels can be caught in the mangrove swamps and also a type of crab of medium size. Crayfish abound in the streams and a skilled woman can collect a couple of dozen in half-an-hour.

Two species of insect have an important effect on life in MUALEVU. The importance of the first lies in its absence. The government has taken stringent measures to prevent the spread of the rhinoceros beetle which has already ravaged the coconut on Viti Levu and practically wiped out the copra industry there. So far it has failed to establish itself in the main copra producing areas of Vanua Levu and Lau, but it does seem likely to spread eventually to these areas unless an effective parasite or predator control is introduced.

The other insect that merits a mention is the mosquito, which is the vector of the filaria worm in Fiji. Filariasis produces a recurrent fever, but one which is milder than malaria. The disabling quality is the permanent swelling of the limbs that in severe cases is termed elephantiasis. I saw no examples of this advanced, grotesque stage of the disease in MUALEVU, but a few individuals in each village had swollen arms and/or legs and several more suffered from the fever bouts which might last for a period of anything from a few minutes to a few days. The MUALEVU mosquitoes are of two

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1 The three Kibobo islets are situated outside the barrier reef, about nine miles north-west of Mavana village.
species, one of which is common during the day, the other at night. The latter is absent from Cikobia, but elsewhere in MUALEVU the villagers consider mosquito netting essential at night.

Leaving aside filariasis, the most common diseases are skin infections of different kinds, and the young children seem particularly susceptible to these. During both field trips there were local epidemics of flu, one lasting for more than a month and seriously upsetting the daily work routine of the villages. A few men suffered from leprosy, for which they had received, or were still periodically receiving, treatment at the Fijian leper colony at Makogai island. There is one resident qualified nurse in the District. She has her dispensary at Mualevu village where she is married to one of the villagers. At Lomaloma, there is a small cottage hospital with a resident Fijian doctor. In 1968, the government provided him with a sea-going launch to enable him to make regular rounds of the islands in the area. There are no facilities for X-rays or operations at the hospital and any serious cases (those that do not respond to penicillin jabs) have to be taken to Suva.

In the small island environment of the Exploring Group, the weather is of primary importance in communications, both within the Group and in its contact with the outside world. On Vanua Balavu, all the villages are linked to each other by small, well-defined, coastal tracks and by less obvious, cross-country footpaths. When the ground is firm, it is possible to walk a circuit of the island taking in all the villages in the one day. After several days' continuous rain, however, the tracks and paths become quagmires and the tree-trunks over the numerous streams and ditches, greasy poles from which even the most sure-footed Fijian youngster may plunge.
On the eastern side of Vanua Balavu, it is possible to walk along the coast from MAVANA to LOMALOMA, but on the western side, access to much of the coast is prevented by the virtually impenetrable mangrove swamps. Given a quiet sea, the easiest way of travelling along either side of the island is by powered boat. This means a punt (up to 26 feet length) and outboard motor (1½hp. to 22hp.), or a low powered, inboard-motored launch. In MUALEVU, such a trip requires some organising since there are few powered boats. It is also expensive and generally undertaken only in emergencies or when a group of villagers club together. A few villagers own horses which they ride bare-backed. Where punts are available, men with coconut groves some distance from their village, but close to the coast, may transport their nuts to the village by poling and paddling along the coast. This practice is more common in Daliconi and MAVANA where there are a relatively large number of punts available.

The demise of the native outrigger canoe is the most outward expression of a turning away from the sea by the people of Vanua Balavu. Though a few small one-man canoes are to be found in LOMALOMA, there remains only one in MUALEVU and this is owned in Cikobia. It is a relatively large vessel capable of carrying 10 or 12 people. Its presence in Cikobia seems to signify the greater consciousness of the sea and of its importance in daily affairs that is encountered in this small village where the crash of the surf on the barrier reef to the east is a constant background rumbling to all activities.

Though an attractive sight at sea, and for sailing on a welcome change from the noisy, oil-smelling outboards, it would bear no comparison with the former double canoes, dura. These huge canoes were complete with large, roofed deckhouses and were able to carry a hundred men or more. A sketch of one can be found in Im Thurn:1925: facing p.41.
Sometime in the 1940s an overhead telephone link was established on Vava Balavu that linked Mualevu and Lomaloma villages. But this was at a time when the highly organised official administration of Fijian village life was at its height and the majority of MUALEVU villagers had good reason not to want instant communication between their own District and the magisterial powers centred at Lomaloma. Frequent cut lines kept the link severed, until it was knocked totally out of commission by the 1958 hurricane.

The most frequent contact of the Group with the outside world is by means of the radio receiver at Lomaloma: this is open for an hour every day except on Sundays. At intervals of between one and three weeks, one of the inter-island trading vessels (motor vessels of between 150 and 300 tons) arrives, passing through the western passages if coming direct from Suva, or through the Tongan Passage if coming north from central Lau. To-day the villagers use these ships to travel any distance outside the Exploring Group.

Passengers are a secondary consideration for the ships whose main job is to land trade goods and pick up copra cargos. The ships also carry the mail and, generally, a few tourists. Suva is 36 hours away by the direct northern route, but via central Lau, the voyage as a rule takes four or five

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1 A battered, old-fashioned magneto telephone set still survived in the temporarily abandoned thatch house of the Chief in Mualevu village.

2 Outboard and launch trips to Kanacea are not uncommon; they are less frequent to Naitauba and rare to Tuvuca. During my two periods of fieldwork, there was one outboard trip to Nayau, two thirds of the way to Lakeba, in central Lau. The last occasion of a small boat trip between Lakeba and MUALEVU was by canoe, in the 1950s. It ended in disaster when the canoe broke up. Three people were drowned or taken by sharks, the remaining two men of the party swam for two days and two nights eventually to reach Cicia island.
days. In 1969 the price of a deck passage with food was from F$10 to F$13, according to which trip and which ship was taken. The cost of freighting copra was F$9.50 per ton.

A once weekly air service was introduced in 1969, with an amphibious Mallard (12 seater) craft flying between Suva and Lomaloma. The journey was 50 minutes flying time and the cost of the ticket for the one-way journey was F$20. The service was interrupted several times by faults in the aircraft and was then discontinued early in 1970 as it was uneconomic.

The Exploring Islands do not fail to live up to the popular image of South Sea islands, with their beautiful island scenery, generally genial climate, but most of all in the promise of easy living, a promise of plenty in a benevolent environment which can bring fence-posts bursting into life and leaf. Even in the pre-Christian past, which the villagers term the 'dark ages' (gauna butobuto), when man the carnivore stalked bush and reef, the inhabitants of the Exploring Islands derived considerable advantages from their natural environment. The terrain provided a wide choice of settlement sites, all with the advantages of being easily defended and yet within easy access of food resources from land, shore and sea. Moreover, the position of the Exploring Islands, relatively remote from the lanes of sea communication between the principal warring confederations, enabled the Group to escape, though not entirely (v. infra p.51n.), the devastation and massacres inflicted on areas less

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1 Fiji converted to the decimal system in 1969: F$1 = F$2.
2 Cf. Freightage from Suva to London at approximately F$19 per ton.
3 All the old village sites which I visited (v. infra p. 54) were cluttered with seashells.
fortunately placed.

To-day, this remoteness is a remoteness from markets, a remoteness which mocks the fertility of the land. The plenty provided in the past and still available to the present is a cornucopia that no one wants. New needs, cash needs, which only copra can satisfy, have introduced a new scale into village horticulture in which the cultivator needs to assess his resources in terms of tens of acres of coconuts, rather than in hundreds and thousands of yams and taro. At the same time, a burgeoning population intensifies pressure upon an area of land which has suddenly become inadequate to meet the demands of the people living off it. The benevolence of the environment is apparent only to the outsider blinkered by a bank account: a society, once wealthy and familiar with abundance, is now impoverished and knows need.
CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
TRADITIONAL SOCIETY
MUALEVU has come under two alien influences which have had a permanent effect on its culture - Tongan and British. Though the full effect of the latter was not felt until MUALEVU experienced colonial administration at the cession of the whole of the Fiji Group in 1874, it was preceded by a period of contact with Europeans. While the initial contact with Europeans was unrelated to the Tongans, succeeding contacts were closely connected with them.

In 1840, the Porpoise, Lt Commander Ringgold, the third ship in the small fleet of the United States Exploring Expedition led by Commodore Wilkes, entered the lagoon through the south-east passage and anchored at Munia. The small Group had already been sighted 43 years before by Captain Wilson of the London Mission Society's ship, Duff. Wilson, however, tacking round the northern side of the Group, had failed to find an opening in the reef and had continued west (Wilson:282-3).1 Ringgold was the first European to make a landing in the Group2 which he immediately named 'The Exploring Group' after Wilkes' Expedition. Ringgold made two separate visits in the same year but on neither occasion was much land exploration carried out (Wilkes:iii/177-9, 250). So far as the history of the Exploring Islands was concerned, the visits were of little consequence. Of a far greater impact was the visit, the following year, of James Calvert, Wesleyan missionary, for Christianity was to be the medium of

1 Wilson is credited as the European discoverer of the Group (Henderson:1933:196). His chart (v. Wilson:op.cit:facings p.181) was the first of the area.

2 It is possible that European beachcombers had already visited the Group. The Wesleyan missionaries, Calvert and Williams, make separate reference to an American being clubbed in northern Vanua Balavu in 1841 by an irate young Fijian husband. The nationality of the man and the date does mean he could have been a deserter from the Porpoise, though Wilkes makes no mention of any of the crew boarding ship.
Tongan dominance of northern Lau.

Vanua Balavu and its satellite islands were at this time divided politically into two districts (vanua), \(^1\) LOMALOMA and YARO, \(^2\) which approximate geographically to the present administrative Districts (Tikina) \(^1\) of LOMALOMA and MUALEVU. The two districts, while independent and rivals of each other, both gave tribute to, and recognized the suzerainty of, the paramount chiefly clan of Cakaudrove. Cakaudrove was a political confederation of villages and districts with its 'capital' at Somosomo on the western coast of Taveuni, 70 miles to the north-west of the Exploring Group.

There is no reference in either the MUALEVU or LOMALOMA oral traditions \(^3\) to any conquest of northern Lau by Cakaudrove; however, they do indicate that many of the peoples of both Districts, and they include the chiefly Semimoli people of MUALEVU, migrated from the island of Taveuni and Laucaha, and from the eastern region of Vanua Levu. \(^4\)

The Official Tales of Origin give the names of the

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\(^1\) Where the term 'district' is written with a small 'd', it refers to the pre-Cession political grouping; a capital 'D' indicates the post-Cession administrative unit.

\(^2\) Where reference is to the district, and not to the village, the names will be written with capitals. The name of the northern district, YARO, was changed to MUALEVU after the Cession.

\(^3\) I am referring here both to the tales recounted to me by informants and to those officially recorded at the Native Lands Commission Enquiry held at Vanua Balavu, 1938-40. The latter tales are termed the 'ipukutuku Raraba', which I shall translate as the 'Official Tales of Origin'. They are written in Fijian and kept in the archives of the Native Lands Office in Suva.

\(^4\) Some of the peoples came from Moala, and these included the Yaro chiefs who were later deposed by the Semimoli people.
leaders of these migratory groups and supply details of their successors, indicating (explicitly) those alive at the time of the arrival of Christianity. Relying on these lines of succession, the migrations would appear to have occurred in the first half of the 18th century. Yet the Fijians of northern Lau do not retain long genealogies. It is rare, even for a person recognized as knowing about such things, to have knowledge beyond the fourth ascending generation, though various names may be permuted and juggled to fill in the more distant ancestors. It is therefore a possibility that the genealogies and lines of succession in the official record are telescoped.

From the entries in the Journal of the missionary, Thomas Williams (Henderson (ed.):1931), who was resident at Somosomo from 1843 to 1847, it is apparent that the tributary position of northern Lau to Cakaudrove was well established. But both Williams and his fellow missionary, Calvert, also make it clear that there was a long-standing contact between northern Lau and central Lau, where another large political confederation was centred on the island of Lakeba. Moreover a particular connection existed between Yaro and the island of Oneata. This was the relationship of tauvu, an indication that two peoples were of the same place of origin and possessed the same ancestral god. 1 Calvert (1858:94) states there was a

1 Tauvu also involved a joking relationship. Peoples/persons who are tauvu can insult each other and take each other's moveable property. Well into the 20th century, a village could still be devastated by a visit from their tauvu (the practice is officially forbidden). Sahlin has given details of a Moalan example in the 1920s (1962:430-2). These visits do not occur to-day but other aspects of the joking relationship are maintained. The Wesleyan minister of MUALEVU in 1968 was from Moala, which is reckoned tauvu with MUALEVU, and there was much good-natured joking and funny-story telling with him which never occurred with his predecessor. It should be noted that while only a few of the peoples of MUALEVU originated from Moala, the tauvu relationship is extended to the entire district. Tauvu (cont'd on next page)
good deal of intercourse for trade between the two places. Consequently it was not surprising that the news and influence of Christianity should reach Vanua Balavu soon after it had been brought to central Lau.

Christianity in Fiji was associated, from the time of its arrival, with the Tongans as much as with the Europeans. There was a long tradition of trade between central and southern Lau and Tonga, strengthened by marriage alliances between the chiefly families. The principal attraction for the Tongans lay in the huge double canoes that the Lauans were skilled at building, the timber for which was lacking in Tonga. These canoes could take anything up to four years to complete and this encouraged the establishment at Lakeba of a permanent Tongan settlement (though with a shifting population). Another attraction, particularly for the young bloods, was the constant warfare in Fiji. This made their services desirable to the Fijian chiefs of the Lakeba confederation (which was weaker than its rivals) and enabled the Tongans to live as mercenaries, fighting not planting.1 Once the Wesleyan church had been accepted in Tonga itself and the Mission had turned its attention westward, it was inevitable, given the protection of the Tongan king, that the Fijian campaign would begin at Lakeba.

The first European missionaries arrived at Lakeba in 1835. By 1839, according to Calvert (who had himself arrived at Lakeba in December 1838) an 'important chief' of Lomaloma had already converted and had fetched a Tongan teacher from

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1 (cont'd from previous page) 
only occurs where the peoples concerned are settled some distance from each other, out of range of frequent contact. Marriage alliances are customary among Lauans.

1 Visiting European naval commanders commonly referred to the Tongans as parasites.
Lakeba. Calvert made his own first visit to northern Lau in 1841 and followed it with further visits to consolidate the foundation of a mission there. From the accounts of Calvert and Williams, Christianity seems to have spread quickly in the next few years, though more so in LOMALOMA and in the smaller islands than in YARO. It was during these years that the rivalry of the two districts once more broke out into open warfare, this time with the added complication of a cross-cutting opposition between pagan and Christian.

The traditional rivalry of the two districts originates from the time the Senimoli people overthrew the Yaro chiefs. Some of the latter escaped with the daughter of the Senimoli leader and took refuge with kin in the south. Faced with the hostility of the southern district, the Senimoli leaders were energetic in integrating northern Vanua Balavu more fully as a political unit. This was achieved partly by force, the Senimoli employing the warrior clans, bati, who had betrayed their former Yaro chiefs, and partly by satisfying the requests of the different villages for a chief, that is a member of the Senimoli clan, to lead them. The climax of this policy was the consecration of the Senimoli leader, who held the title 'Sau Mualevu', with the new title 'Tui Mavara', as the acknowledged overlord of the peoples of northern Vanua Balavu.

The following details of the history of the Exploring Group are from Calvert (1858), Williams' Journal (in Henderson:1931) and from the Official Tales of Origin.

This is, admittedly a rather general term, but I have failed to find of another that has no misleading connotation.

Hocart has recorded some of the details of the consecration ceremony (1929:228-9), but to-day little is remembered of it by the villagers.
As with the larger Fijian political groupings of the 19th century, YARO was notable for its instability. Member villages were often fighting against each other, or, led by their Senimoli chiefs, were rebelling against the Tui Mavana.\(^1\) In the early 1840s, one of these rebellions, led by a Senimoli chief, broke out amongst the Daku peoples of the western side of the island. An alliance was made with the heathen chiefs in Lomaloma thus renewing the conflict between the two districts.

The Christians in both districts endeavoured to keep out of the war and many of them made a new settlement on the coast of Munia where they were able to live unmolested. That this was possible, Calvert attributes to the involuntary respect the pagans were obliged to grant the new religion. Probably it had more to do with the respect the Lomaloma chiefs felt for the 'Tongan Chief of rank and influence' whom Calvert had brought with him on a visit, in 1844, 'hoping to succeed in establishing peace'.\(^2\) When their Daku allies, now residing at Lomaloma, ambushed and clubbed the Fijian missionary teacher at Yaro, the Lomaloma chiefs, anticipating the consequences of the act, immediately professed Christianity and sent off the chiefly leader of the Christians to intercede for them at Lakeba.

As Christianity spread among the peoples of northern

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1 It is recorded in the Official Tale of Origin of the Senimoli people that the experiences of one Tui Mavana eventually decided him to discontinue the policy of allowing the subordinate villages to have resident Senimoli leaders.

2 It was probably above all a respect for the superior fire-power of the Tongans. Neither Ringgold nor the missionaries refer to possession of muskets by the northern Lau peoples. The original Munia village had experienced Tongan retribution when about 60 of its inhabitants were massacred by Lakeba-based Tongans as payment for having destroyed a Tongan canoe and consumed its crew (v. Wilkes:111/177-8).
Lau, the new political polarization became more evident. The Cakaudrove paramount, the Tui Cakau, who was opposed to Christianity, endeavoured to persecute the Christians in northern Lau though without openly trying to annihilate them. For their protection, the Christians in both YARO and LOMALOMA looked to Lakeba where the Tongans were based, nominally under the authority of the Fijian paramount there, the Tui Navau, and where the headquarters of the Lauan mission was established. This contention between Cakaudrove and Lakeba over the northern Lau islands was finally resolved with the arrival at Lakeba of the great Tongan leader, Ma'afu.¹

Ma'afu, a very high ranking Tongan chief, was sent to Lakeba in 1848 by his uncle, the Tongan king, to organise and provide a firm leadership for the Tongans. Possibly King George and/or Ma'afu were from the beginning planning to conquer Fiji. Ma'afu, making use of the bible to wield the sword, was soon able to gain control of the Moulan islands and displaced the chiefs there with his own Tongan and Fijian nominees. In 1854, a massacre of Christians at Lomaloma (v. Calvert:105) provided him with the excuse for imposing the Pid Tonga upon the Exploring Islands. The same year he visited the new paramount of Cakaudrove (the old Tui Cakau had died at the beginning of the year) who formally transferred to him the right to levy tribute over the Group. Ma'afu now made Lomaloma his headquarters and from here organised his campaign to gain control of the whole of the Fiji Group.

With Ma'afu and his Tongan followers in residence, Vunua Balava attained the peak of its significance in Fijian affairs during the next 20 years. Europeans were attracted by the offer of sales and leases of lands, and began planting

¹ For brief biographies of Ma'afu and of his great rival, the paramount chief, Cakau, see: 1970a:95-126.
cotton to take advantage of the boom in prices caused by the American civil war. Lomaloma grew into a cosmopolitan trading centre and, with ships calling in direct from America, rivalled Levuka in the west as Fiji's busiest port. Ma'afu set up an administrative system on European lines with magistrates and police to ensure his laws were observed. The 'state religion' was, needless to say, Wesleyism.

One of the major effects of the spread of Christianity was its weakening of the structure of Fijian chiefly authority. Christianity not only effectively mocked the abilities of the Fijian priests and their gods, the sanction of the Chief's power, it commanded converts not to fight when warfare and the threat of force was the principal medium for achieving some degree of integration of the unstable political federations and confederations. While Ma'afu continued to employ the chiefly hierarchical framework in the administration of his Lauan possessions, the basis of chiefly authority had now changed. It would, perhaps, be incorrect to say that it had been secularized, for the Wesleyan god, Jehovah, was now called upon as its sanction, but certainly many of the trappings of

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1 Among those Europeans who settled at Lomaloma were the German Hennings brothers. Their trading concern became the most important in Fiji (Derrick:1968:162). They were very friendly with Ma'afu and acquired ownership of the islands of Naitauba, Adavac and Yalanana, together with the leaseholds of Nabavatu (about 450 acres) - which later became a freehold - and Tota (about 500 acres) on Vamous Balavu. Kanacea, Mago and Natafaga were also sold during this period. Many of the Fijians from these lands re-settled in Vamous Balavu. The peoples of Munia were moved to Avea and Munia was also sold. Other leases, apart from Nabavatu and Tota, were granted on MUALEVU lands by Ma'afu. They were: Kanidama (130 acres); Soso (about 200 acres) and the confiscated territories (700-800 acres) of the Daku peoples (the inhabitants of the present-day Daku communities) who had unsuccessfully rebelled against Ma'afu's rule in the 1860s. They were 99 year leases, confirmed in 1870 and expiring with a year's grace in 1879. The Daku territories were abandoned by their leaseholders in the 1880s and 1890s and were re-settled by the government or, in some instances (they had been settled by the Ma'afu government) by their original occupants (see supra, chap 4, p. 24).
divine chiefship appear to have fallen away. Significantly, the formal consecration of the MUALEVU chief, the Tui Mavau, ended with Ma‘afu’s assumption of control of the Exploring Group.

A further profound change effected by the spread and success of Christianity was in the pattern of settlement. The missionary, Thomas Williams, commenting on the position of a village in Kanacea, observed (this was in 1846): 'It is common with the people of low rank to select the most difficult part of the island and the most easily defended on which to build their town or towns.' (Henderson: 1931:363-4). Inaccessibility to attackers and accessibility to good garden lands were the two important criteria in the selection of village sites.

These old village sites are to be found everywhere in MUALEVU, situated on and around the peaks of hills; that they are so common is expressed in the great frequency with which the names of the hilltops are preceded by the word 'koro', the Fijian word for a settlement or village. The MUALEVU common name for these sites is 'ancient village' or 'war village'. The house foundations in the three sites which I examined, though they were overgrown with trees and shrub were

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1 As opposed to the 'capitals' of paramount Chiefs, for example, Semesemo in Taveuni and Tupou village in Lakeba, which were sited on flats near the coast. They were, however, protected by palingades and sometimes by moats, as at Tupou. An important chief would gather around him a veritable Versailles court with clans possessed of different offices and occupations. The size of such a village would preclude it being sited upon some hilltop.

2 Williams, sailing past the entrance to Rasemo Bay (west of the modern village of Mavau) noted 'one or two villages like nests in the cliffs' (Henderson: 1931:132). There are many references to the inaccessibility of the villages in northern Lau by Williams and Calvert who had to visit them to spread the gospel. Williams gives a detailed description of such a site on the island of Tanua, which he visited in 1847 (op.cit. 382).
still apparent and gave an idea of the size of the former villages. The foundations were much smaller than those found in the modern villages and they were very closely packed together, almost merging into each other around and on the top of the hill. In one case there were the remains of a stone rampart around one side of the hill with a sheer drop on the other side. In the three sites mentioned, there were respectively 12, 16 and 18 house foundations. From references in the evidences given to the visiting Lands Commissions, from the details in the Official Tales of Origin, and from the observations made by missionaries in the 1840s, it is clear that the number of villages in the Exploring Group was much greater in the 1840s than it is to-day.¹

The first notable achievement of Christianity in the Exploring Group was to found a thriving village on the coastal flat at Munia (v.supra p.51). 'It was [also] without precedent in Fijian history, that a tribe should leave an impregnable fortress in wartime, as these Munians had done, and reside on the open coast.' (Calvert:100). The population of the new village, moreover, was composed not just of the Munia people, but of people from both YARO and LOMALOMA. The establishment of these coastal villages seems to have been part

¹ Lt Ringgold, for example, counted 'several villages' on the island of Susui, where there is now only one. Both Calvert and Williams refer to the large population of Vanua Balavu. Williams writes of 'the thickly populated district of Yaro'; Calvert of 'the large populous island', giving the population of Vanua Balavu at 'about 3,000', but without saying how he arrived at this figure. (Since official records commenced in 1874, the population of the Exploring Group has never reached 3,000 - v.infra Table 17 p.258). It should be noted that the number of war village sites that are in evidence to-day does not of itself give an indication of the number of villages existing at any one time since the MUALEVU peoples were continually shifting their village sites.
of Mission policy, for the missionaries make reference to them elsewhere. On the island of Vatu Vara, for example, the pagan village was at the top of a rocky promontory while the Christian village was in an open valley, and there was a similar difference in the situation of the pagan and Christian villages on the island of Ono in the far south of Lau.

Clearly if perpetual war was a thing of the past there was little advantage in living at the top of a mountain. The pax Tonga gave the movement momentum. All the Official Tales of Origin of the peoples of both MUALEVU and LOMALOMA state that the present day coastal sites of the villages had been settled prior to the cession to Britain (in 1874). ¹

I have found no evidence to suggest that Ma'afu forced along this change in the pattern of residence. It does seem likely, however, that it was encouraged by his introduction into the Exploring Group of a new system of land usage, designed to assure for himself and his administration a regular cash revenue in place of the existing system of tribute. Existing coconut groves and other lands considered suitable for planting coconut were divided into strips named magimagi after the sennit string by which they were measured. Each resident adult male was provided with at least one of these strips and from the coconuts which he grew he had to produce the oil in which Ma'afu's taxes were paid. The holders of magimagi included not only the resident local villagers, but also the Tongan and some Fijian followers of Ma'afu's who decided to settle in the Group.

The new divisions of land completely ignored existing territories and boundaries. They were mostly situated on, or

¹ The Official Tales of Origin give, in each case, details of shifts in village sites from the time of the people's original migration to the Group.
close to, the coastal flats where the most suitable soils and established coconut lands were to be found. The residue of lands after the magimagi had been apportioned were considered to be 'government lands' - for future magimagi division, lease or sale to Europeans, or in whatever way Ma'afu wished to dispose of them.¹

Thus, by the time Fiji was ceded to Britain, the peoples of the Exploring Group were already familiar with and committed to both a new pattern of settlement and a new system of land tenure and usage.

In contrast with the instability of the other Fijian confederations, Ma'afu's administration of his Lauan dominions gave them something approaching the ordered regime of a state. With the help of his European secretary, he drew up both a constitution and a code of laws. He formally broke his ties with Tonga and had his position as a Fijian paramount endorsed when the assembled Lauan chiefs bestowed upon him the newly created title, Tui Lau. The Exploring Group was now part of the 'United Chiefdom of Lau', of which Ma'afu was the ruler. As such, it was also included within the great political confederation Ma'afu had arranged, consisting of Lau and the federations of Cakaudrove and of Bua (in western Vanua Levu), known as the Tovata (lit. 'of one party') and led by Ma'afu.²

The Exploring Group's renown as the centre of what had become the greatest political power in Fiji was to be short-lived. By the early 1870s the market had dropped out of cotton and the leading Fijian paramount of the west,

² An English translation of the 'Constitution and Laws of the Tovata o Viti' (drawn up in Fijian in 1869) was published in Sydney in 1871 (v. Tovata:1871). The name 'Tovata' is still current in Fiji, expressing a generally dormant political division existing between Viti Levu on the one side and Lau and Vanua Levu on the other.
Cakabau, in order to escape defeat and subjection at Ma'afu's hands, had acceded to the plan to offer the whole of the Fiji Group to Britain. Even so, it was only with great difficulty that his European advisers were able to persuade Ma'afu that it would be foolish to measure his strength against a European naval power. Obliged to forget his grand design of empire, Ma'afu finally accepted the post of administrative chief (Roko Tui)\(^1\) in the Province created out of his own former dominions.

While Ma'afu was alive, both MUALEVU and LOMALOMA, now administrative Districts, continued to recognize him as their paramount Chief. After his death in 1881 the title of Tui Lau fell into abeyance. LOMALOMA now accepted the Tui Nayau, at Lakeba, as paramount, but in MUALEVU a distinction was made between 'the way of government/of law', by which the Tui Nayau was acknowledged, and 'the way of the land', by which the Tui Cakau was acknowledged. The allegiance of MUALEVU has remained a matter of minor dispute between these two chiefly houses. As recently as 1969, at the funeral ceremony for the Tui Cakau, the MUALEVU Chief was rebuked by the Tui Nayau for not attending with the Lauan delegation.

Under British rule MUALEVU became a unit in a colonial administration operating from the premises of that policy of Indirect Rule and paternalism which Lugard was to make better known to the world in Nigeria.\(^2\)

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1 As Nayacakalou (1964a:30) rightly points out, 'the Government does not create chieftainships', however the term 'administrative/government chief' is convenient in reference to administrative posts created for, and held by, indigenous Fijians, and avoids confusion with the discrete range of Colonial Service posts (e.g. administrative officer). Nevertheless, I agree with Nayacakalou, this application of the term 'chief' can be misleading.

2 Legge (1959) provides a detailed argument in support of the view that the British colonial policy of Indirect Rule was initiated in Fiji.
The Fijian administrative structure was arranged hierarchically in a series of levels of councils and government 'chiefs': the village, with its village headman, turaga ni koro; the District Council, presided over by the District government chief, the Buli; and the Provincial Council, presided over by the Provincial government chief, the Roko Tui. At the apex of this structure was the Great Council of Chiefs, attended by all the more important paramounts and by all the Roko Tui. Ordinances and regulations applying to the Fijian administration were made by a Native Regulations Board (later the Fijian Affairs Board) with its executive head, the Secretary for Native/Fijian Affairs, responsible directly to the Governor. The Governor was also advised on all matters relating to Fijian affairs by the Great Council of Chiefs and this advice has generally been decisive.¹

Within this structure the life of the Fijian villager was organised down to such minutiae as how many bananas he should plant each year.

The architect of this administrative edifice was Sir Arthur Gordon, the first Governor of Fiji. He maintained his work reflected indigenous institutions, but while it was true that the different administrative divisions largely reflected existing political groupings,² the different councils in their various actions had little root at custom. Moreover the posts of government chiefs, while they were most often


² The number of Districts was later reduced by amalgamation and the new larger Districts in many cases brought together traditionally hostile groupings.
filled by traditional chiefs, were essentially civil service positions sanctioned by the authority of the colonial power.

Gordon's most difficult task, though one which he initially regarded as being without complication, was to determine and codify the indigenous tenurial system to provide for registration of all Fijian lands. The identification of this system, which Gordon saw as the simple exercise of requesting the details from the assembled Great Council of Chiefs, proved far more elusive than he had bargained for. The Chiefs could agree neither upon the different rights involved in 'land ownership', nor upon the identity of and Fijian terms for those social units in which different rights were vested. While they were more than willing to advise Gordon on what they regarded as the best way for administering the lands for the future, they could not provide him with a neat, tidy memorandum on what constituted the customary system of the past.

The confusion which followed in the drawn out endeavour over the next 30 years to identify the system of land tenure, derived partly from the pre-formed desire to establish a uniform pattern throughout Fiji. It was compounded

1 V. Scarr's article on 'The Question of Legitimacy in the Fijian Administration' (1970b).

2 Though the colonial officers who actually carried out the enquiries in the field make it clear from their reports that they were well aware of the complexity of their work.

Basil Thomson, for example, makes this abundantly clear in his 'General Reports' on the existing practices of land usage in the Rewa and Tailevu Provinces (Thomson:1893a, 1893b). He asks rhetorically: 'what native institution is ever regular unless Nature compels regularity.' (1893a:8). He read to a specially convened meeting of the Rewa Provincial Council the 'rulings' of the Governor 'to secure uniformity in decisions relating to land tenure' (op.cit. 18); but shortly afterwards he is acknowledging the difficulties of the task: 'What is to form the basis of settlement in disputed claims when both sides rely upon traditions some five generations old?' (1893b:6).
by a failure to make allowance for the effects of a new pattern of settlement and by a failure to grasp the operating principles of Fijian social grouping. In 1911, the new Governor, Sir Ernest May, impatient with the protracted labours of the Lands Commission enquiries, appointed a new commissioner, Maxwell. Unlike his predecessors, Maxwell was not overburdened by inconsistencies in the information he gathered. By 1913 he had presented a definitive report on the nature of Fijian social organisation and of the system of land tenure. But though the government accepted Maxwell's model of Fijian social organisation, concern for the exigencies of administrative and financial expediency caused it to settle upon a more inclusive unit of land ownership than that he had recommended.

The first Lands Commission Enquiry to come to the Exploring Group arrived in 1904,¹ a full 30 years after the Cession. This and the Enquiry that followed in 1906-7,² were really no more than preliminary investigations, though some disputes over coconut groves were settled. Maxwell was the next to conduct an enquiry in the Group, in 1913, and as he makes clear in his Report (Maxwell:1914), his concern was to ascertain the system of land usage extant in the pre-Ma'afu era; no disputes were heard.

Not until the Enquiry of 1938-40 was the administrative model of land tenure introduced to MUALEVU and the existing social organisation accordingly adjusted ³ (v. Sakuma:1938-40). Its work was still not completed in respect of the settlement of the many disputes it had called into being, when World War II forced an indefinite adjournment.

¹ V. Native Lands Commission Enquiries (Vulini Vamu): Evidence Books for Lau: Seniloli:1904. Future references to Evidence Books will be made under the name of the principal commissioner only, e.g. Seniloli:1904.
² Allardyce:1906-7.
³ Sakuma:1938-40.
Finally, the 1965-6 Enquiry (v. Thomson, J.S.: 1965-6) confirmed for the now somewhat bewildered villagers the decisions of the previous Enquiry and dealt with practically all outstanding disputes, as well as with new disputes.

The period of the establishment and consolidation of the administrative model in MUALEVU (that is, between 1938 and 1966) embraces the post-War period of the accelerated involvement of MUALEVU society in a cash and market economy. An assessment of the changes that have occurred therefore, has to commence with an analysis of the nature of the pre-1938, pre-administrative social organisation, and has to treat of the administrative model as itself a factor in change, rather than as an established background against which change has taken, and is taking, place.

The next Chapter consists of a brief summary of the difficulties involved in an understanding of the pre-administrative social organisation. The subsequent four Chapters are concerned with the principal features of that organisation.
Plate 1

1. Basalt-covered volcanic slope, near Mallevi village

2. Limestone country, west of Mayani village
Plate II

1. In line with a still line

2. A good catch, take the long net
CHAPTER FOUR

PROBLEMS ATTENDANT UPON THE ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMARY SOCIAL ORGANISATION IN FIJI
There has been considerable disagreement and confusion in the literature over the nature of customary social organisation in Fiji. In part this has arisen from the existence of what Sahlins has termed the 'dual system' that has resulted from the imposition of a simplified, administratively modelled version which was at considerable variance locally with the pre-existing customary organisation.

Unlike the island of Moala of the mid-1950s, where Sahlins (1962) has shown the people to be operating within distinct systems, social and administrative, MUALEVU of the late 1960s lacks the complexity of this dual system. There is a single version of formal organisation acknowledged and activated by the villagers as 'the customary form of organisation', nai vakarau vakavanua. It soon becomes apparent to the investigator, however, that this 'customary' organisational framework is a relatively recent innovation. Moreover, it is impossible to account for and define technically the present-day 'customary' social groupings without reference to the formerly established system of organisation and the administrative adjustments made to it.

The form of 'customary' social organisation in the villages of MUALEVU to-day is similar to that found throughout Fiji. This is an effect, not of cultural homogeneity, but of the past demands of colonial governments for uniformity in the officially recorded native system of land tenure. The problem of identifying this system appears to have been solved by dealing with it back to front. Since tenure varied locally, the administration fixed upon the social unit, or rather the term for a social unit, which seemed to be common to most areas and made it designate the official corporate land-owning group.

The term, 'matagali', was fixed in the social context most familiar to the administration, that of the system, or what was purported to be the system, of social organisation
of the politically predominant island of Bau in south-west Viti Levu. It was a model that portrayed a series of increasingly inclusive levels of social grouping. Each level incorporated and buttressed the concept of a ranked stratification, giving clear indication of the emplacement of authority and leadership with the groups interrelated through common ancestry. A single principle of grouping and authority thus embraced the whole society neatly and inclusively. This organisational schema came to be imposed upon MUALEVU when the Lands Enquiry Commission sat at Vanua Balavu between 1938 and 1940.

![Diagram 1: The Official Model of Fijian Customary Social Organisation](image)

The administrative model can be described as a three-tiered pyramid (v. Diagram 1). The most inclusive level of localized grouping is the yavusa, the leadership of which generally carries the title of 'Tui'. The yavusa is divided into matagali which are the land-owning units and which are also ranked in relation to each other. Some or all of the component matagali may be further differentiated by hereditary occupations and offices. The head of the matagali has the official title of turaga ni matagali (lit. 'matagali chief'). The matagali are subdivided into itokatoka which are also ranked. There is no official title for the head of itokatoka as such, though the head of an itokatoka may, of course, carry a title as head of a more inclusive unit.
That the rationalisation of the interrelationship of these social groups is descent, is made explicit in the Official Tales of Origin of which there is one for each yavusa. These tales are of an obvious, stereotyped layout, each commencing by giving the name of the founder of the yavusa, its totems, war cry, and then near the end providing the details of the yavusa sub-division into matagali and itokatoka.

Official recognition of an individual's membership of groups at the different taxonomic levels and of the recruitment of future members to these groups is by the registration of the individual to an itokatoka. For the majority of the administrative Provinces, registration is by the rule of patrilineal descent, but for the Provinces of Lau, Cakaudrove and Macuata, registration is optative within a restricted range of cognatic descent.

That the official model did not entirely reflect established custom is evident from the observations of field-workers that many Fijians apparently do not know the names of the social units to which they have been recruited or registered. When asked for the name of, for example, his itokatoka, a Fijian was as likely to reply with the name of what was officially recorded as his matagali or yavusa. Data recorded by McArthur in the 1956 Census (McArthur 1958) confirmed that these were not isolated or localized cases.¹ Yet the Fijians

¹ Data were collected on the indigenous Fijian population showing numbers identifiable to matagali and yavusa (op.cit Table 15, p.212). Details of itokatoka identification were not requested. Having made allowance for the ignorance of children in the recording of the data, and even treating as correct specification all incidences of transposition between the matagali and yavusa names, McArthur indicates that only 66 per cent of the total Fijian population knew the names of both their matagali and their yavusa (p.37). Moreover, she adds: 'Suva City and surrounding provinces apart...knowledge of the matagali name appears to be independent of residence in, or away from, the province of registration.' (p.38).
apparent inability, in the eyes of the European observer, to get straight the details of his customary social organisation was by no means a phenomenon that post-dated the imposition of the administrative model. The failure of Fijians to attach terms, such as *yavusa* or *matagali*, exclusively to a particular taxonomic level was a common experience of all those colonial officers investigating the system of land tenure, from the 1880s on (cited in France:1969:145).

In the literature, discussions of Fijian customary social organisation tend to have four interrelated yet distinct aspects, namely: (1) determination of the customary rules governing recruitment; (2) determination of the principles ordering the customary association or social groups; (3) identifying which indigenous terms have which kind of groups as referents; (4) technically defining these groups.

In some cases the official model is proposed without qualification as the indigenous or traditional form of organisation. This is true of Roth's works (1951, 1953): but it is, perhaps, not altogether surprising that Roth, who held the top post in the administration of native affairs, should have been a champion of the official interpretation. Others, less committed, have also endorsed the applicability of the official model. Capell (1957:341) gives as the definition of *yavusa*:

...the largest kinship and social division of Fijian society, consisting of the descendants of one originator (*vu*), and recognising one *kalou-vu*, originating spirit [normally the father of the *vu*] and one set of totems [*i cayuti*, i.e. war cry (*vakacaucau ni valu*). The *yavusa* is subdivided into *matagali* and *itokatoka*. . . .

This is more or less the definition anyone would give from a reading of the set preamble to the Official Tales of Origin of the administrative *yavusa*. *Matagali* Capell (ibid:167) defines as:
...the primary social division in Fiji, larger than tokatoka and smaller than yavusa (q.v.). It appears to have sprung from the sub-divisions of naturally increasing families, the sons of an original ancestor, being the heads of the resulting mataqali.

And he then proceeds to give the 'functions', the occupational differentiation, or the component mataqali of a yavusa as being 'chiefs', 'warriors', 'priests' and 'heralds'.

Probably the most important variable involved in conflicting accounts is whether or not an area had already had the official model imposed upon it and if so, for what length of time. This certainly accounts for the polemic that arose between Laura Thompson and Capell & Lester, the former having carried out her fieldwork in an area which had not yet been 'reorganised'. This did not escape Thompson's notice and she was able to redirect at Capell & Lester (and my knowledge of the official records for MUALEVU District fully supports what she has to say) the very criticism that they themselves had aimed at her, namely: 'In a number of other points noted...

Laura Thompson's work is at variance with the findings of the N.L.C. [Native Lands Commission] on such easily ascertainable matters as groupings of yavusa, mataqali, etc.' (Capell & Lester:1941:29, footnote 34; also cited in Thompson:1947:212).

Later fieldworkers have shown greater awareness of the existence of a 'dual system', official and indigenous, but they have also exhibited a correspondingly greater reluctance to engage in definitions of either groups or terms. Milner, for example, having surveyed the literature deliberately avoids the issue, preferring the employment of the non-committing terms, 'group', 'unit' and 'family', to denote levels of segmentation (1952:348). Nayacakalou (1955:46, no.7) is even more canny:

In view of the nature of Fijian social structure, it is not possible at this stage to give a precise
interpretation of "lineage group". No agreement has yet been reached among the various writers on Fijian social structure as to an unequivocal translation of the terms yavusa, matagali and i tokatoka. From the point of view of kinship, however, "lineage group" may be defined as a number of persons of both sexes who consider themselves to be patrilinearly descended from a known or unknown common ancestor. Such a group may or may not coincide with any one of the above three Fijian terms.1

Finally there is Sahlins who in his work on the island of Moala, which like MUALEVU is included within the administrative Province of Lau, has provided the literature with the most intensive technical study of Fijian formal social organisation. He concludes:

...frankly, I do not know of any groupings or organisation precisely comparable to the Moalan. The Oceanic-historical basis of Moalan local society is quite clear. The kin units have points of resemblance to Polynesian ramages, Oceanic non-unilineal residential kin-groups, and Manguian "stem lineages". Whether common descent, co-residence, aspects of rank, the existence of core lines, or other features of Moalan local groups should be used to label them is debatable; indeed, what is decisive at one level is not decisive at another level of local organisation. A theoretical perspective beyond any I am prepared to defend or to advance myself is necessary to classify these groups. (1962:240).

My material on MUALEVU social organisation prior to the administrative adjustment of 1938-40, fully endorses a major, and fundamental, point made by Sahlins. Much of the confusion about the nature of Fijian social organisation has arisen from an initial concern with names and labels of groups rather than with persons and the principles of their association.

1

Thus in the MUALEVU material there can appear the following complications: the indigenous name by which a group of people is called may vary; the indigenous term applied to a particular named group of people may also vary; a particular local group name can have a more or less inclusive group of people as referent; some indigenous terms can have a less or more inclusive group as referent. However, whereas Sahlins stresses the variability of the principle of association according to different levels of local organisation (v. quotation above), I would substitute as the variable for MUALEVU the operational context of association, which does not limit organisation to a single hierarchy of levels as Sahlins describes for Moala.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE SYSTEM OF DESCENT IN MUALEVU
MUALEVU is settled by various peoples acknowledging different origins. These peoples migrated to MUALEVU independently and settled there at different times. A distinction can be made between those immigrant peoples who arrived in the more remote past, establishing original settlements, and those who immigrated more recently and generally attached themselves to established settlements.

In Moala and in Southern Lau¹ the different immigrant peoples are referred to as yavusa. Sahlins uses the term 'stock' to denote what he emphasizes as these 'categories' of people, which possess a common name and recognise patrilineal descent from a common ancestor, and yet do not form corporate, local bodies. Groves (1963: 272) points out that the employment of this term for a patrilineal body of people diverges from Radcliffe-Brown's original usage which refers to all of a man's descendants: my own intention is to follow Thompson's usage of 'phratry'.

The term 'yavusa' is not applied in MUALEVU to the dispersed phratries, or, at least, if this was a practice in the past there is no trace of the usage to-day. They are referred to simply as 'X people' or 'Y people'. Acknowledgement of their existence as separate entities, moreover, is not obvious. Localised groups of the same phratry are described as being 'related', or as being originally 'one people together', but the more evident properties of the phratries - the common ancestral spirit and the ancestral leader of the migrating people, and the tree/fish/animal trilogy of totemic species - have been officially taken over by the

¹ Moala data are from Sahlins (1962), Southern Lau data from Thompson (1940a, 1947).
localised, tertiary level, *yavusa* of the administrative model. In MUALEVU, too, there is no indication that the phratry is ideally, or otherwise, reckoned as a patrilineally determined category of people.

The phratries were dispersed in a category of descent groups termed *matagali*, a term that means class or category. These groups were distinguished by name (generally they were named after the original locality or site that they had settled as a *matagali*), by the identity of their founding ancestor and often (if not always) by hereditary occupations and offices. Thus the application of the term *matagali* to named groups implies the differentiation of 'kinds' of people, in this case a differentiation in terms of descent and residence combined. I shall translate the term *matagali* in this context as *clan*, but I stress that I am not employing 'clan' as a referent to a unilineal descent group. The clan comprised one or more descent units of a category termed *yavusa*, which were named after their ancestral house-sites - the term *yavusa* is derived from *yavu*, meaning house-foundation/site. I shall translate the term *yavusa* in this context as *founder-lineage* (this anticipates my analysis of the MUALEVU principle of descent, v. infra p. 74 et seq).

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1 'Mata' indicates a specimen, a representative of a kind or class of things. Thus: *(e dua na)* *mata ni masese* = (a) matchstick. With a plural qualifying base it indicates a homogeneous grouping. For example: *mata voivoitatang* = a grouping of same-sex siblings. *Qali* means 'twisted together', as the coconut fibres are twisted together to make the sennit string. Thus 'matagali' is literally 'a grouping of (things) twisted together' and is used with the sense of a class or category of things (or of people). If, out of context, I request a MUALEVU villager for a 'poni', his likely response, since 'poni' can refer to money, pen, bire and pencil, will be to ask 'matagali cava ni poni?', lit. 'which poni category?'.

The oral traditions are full of accounts of the division and amalgamation of clans.\(^1\) The multi-clan hamlets and the small-scale local association of hamlets which developed were more a reflection of political movement than kinship connection. These residential and political associations possessed their own designations, \(i\) cavuti levu (lit. 'great name'), and were referred to as matagali, or kai, 'people'.\(^2\) Their leaders possessed titles, itutu,\(^3\) commonly Tui, though I have also recorded Tu, Ramasi, Sau, Rasau, Takala, and Ravunisa (there is no order of precedence necessarily implied in the titles themselves). These titles might, or might not, be followed by the designation of the political association.

The political history of MUALEVU was, as I have indicated above in Chapter 3, a process of the consolidation of these small local associations into some kind of political confederation. This was partially achieved under the leadership of the Yaro chiefs and more fully effected by the Senimoli chiefs. Ultimately there emerged the unified administrative unit of coastal, amalgamated villages under the rule of Ma'afu.

Many clans were associated with hereditary occupations and offices which were a kind of collective group status. For example, an individual member of a priestly or carpenter clan might never practise, or

\(^1\) A process leading to the formation of new groups which do not recombine is termed 'gemmation' by Firth (1957).

\(^2\) Thus matagali Daku, or kai Daku, refers to the Daku people (v. supra p. 51) but not to a clan Daku.

\(^3\) A duplication of the base 'tu' = to stand, to be in a particular place. V. also Hocart's discussion of the word (1938a: 409).
indeed know anything about, being a priest or being a carpenter, yet he was still a 'priest/carpenter person'. Similarly a person was chiefly because he was a member of the chiefly clan, but he need not have attained the position of the Chief. Clans could be referred to by their occupational designation: thus 'the clan of the talking-chiefs', 'the clan of the chiefs', or simply 'talking-chiefs' and 'chiefs'.

Occupational status was a medium of political attachment and interrelationship based on the services that politically subordinate clans could offer. Where this leadership was chiefly, as with the clan Mualevu in Mualevu village, there was a considerable proliferation of this occupational diversity and a corresponding proliferation of the number of clans which were associated.

Clans which possessed the same hereditary occupation or office were not thereby regarded as being of common ancestry. Every village to-day has its 'talking-chiefs', but they are not reckoned to come all from the same phratry. Conversely clans which were related did not necessarily possess the same occupation or office. In Mualevu village, clan Nayaqona was the talking-chief clan. It shared a common ancestry with the clan Valika, but the latter was resident in Mavana village where the leading clan had its own talking-chief clan. However, Valika joined with Nayaqona in acting as talking-chiefs for the entire district and in dressing the candidate in the Chiefly cloth, masi vakaturaga, in the ceremony of

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1 In the MUALEVU context, I shall use the term 'chief' (i.e. with a small initial letter) to refer to members of the clan which holds the offices of customary leadership of the District, namely Tui Mavana and Bau Mualevu: 'Chief' (i.e. with a capital initial letter) will refer to the head of this clan.
the consecration of the district Chief in Mualevu village.

It is clear that the Bauan model (v. Roth: 1953: 60; Geddes: 1945: 36) which depicts specifically five clans of different hereditary occupations claiming common ancestry, was not applicable to MUALEVU. Some of these occupations imply so basic a difference in hereditary status that the concept is ridiculed by the MUALEVU villager.

Unlike the reported social organisation for many other areas in Fiji\(^1\), MUALEVU social organisation is not characterized by a patrilineal ideology. However, since ancestral origins are intimately related to exploration and migration and the original settlement of new lands, and it is always men who initiate and lead such movements, there is an emphasis on the male origins of kin groups. This is immediately revealed in the villager's own model of their descent organisation:

A man finds and settles a site. He is the founder of the original hamlet site (vavutu). He is the founding ancestor (Vu). His sons are the founders (Vu) of the clans; the eldest leads, the others follow.

The agnatic relationship of the founders of related clans is stressed in the emic model and this has been reproduced in the Official Tales of Origin of the administrative vavusa; but outside these contexts, the villager neither makes this explicit nor does he imply it. In reference to actual clans\(^2\) acknowledged to be related, the villager will state simply that they are 'related', yeawokani. This is a generic term for any

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\(^1\) Quain (1948) and Hocart (1952: 229-60) are notable exceptions.

\(^2\) I am using the ethnographic present. Where reference is to the post-1938 period, for clan should be read administrative matasali. To avoid being caught up prematurely in an explanation of the changes effected by the administration (v. next chapter), I have continued to use clan. The sense and relevance of the points made are in no way affected.
kind of kin relationship, but it also refers to the mutual relationship of siblings of opposite sex.¹ My experience in these instances has been that while the villager readily acknowledges the male origins of descent groups, he will not assert that progenitors were brothers, though at my own insistence he will concede it as a possibility.

Within the clan, members are referred to collectively as being in a same-sex sibling relationship with each other, veitacini,² but it should be noted that the sibling terms in Mualevu do not distinguish between parallel and cross cousins.

Recruitment to the clan - that is qualification for the rights and obligations of clan membership - is concurrent with membership of a kava, which I shall term 'founder-line', of the clan. A clan member (male or female) starts a founder-line when kin are recruited through him/her to the clan. At the same time this clan member belongs to the founder-line of the clan member through whom he/she has been recruited, and also to the founder-lines established in the clan by ancestors and ancestresses of previous generations. For example, in Diagram 2, 'D', 'E' and 'F' have established founder-lines, but 'D' is also a member of the founder-line of 'B', while 'E' and 'F' are members of the founder-line of 'C'. All individuals depicted are members of 'A's founder-line.

I shall term the founder-line established by an individual his or her exclusive founder-line. A founder-line of which an individual is a member but not the founder will be termed his or her inclusive founder-line.

¹ Details of the Mualevu kinship system are given in Appendix 1.

² Occasionally opposite-sex siblings are referred to as veitacini, but this appears a casual usage and corrected to the opposite-sex sibling term if questioned.
These qualifications will be employed only where the context demands that the distinction be made.

Possible membership of a founder-line is demonstrated in Diagram 3 which depicts a hypothetical genealogy of the cognatic descendants to the fourth descending generation of a male clan member 'A'. Membership is possible for the children of a member and for the patrilineal descendants of the male children of members, whether or not these children are themselves members. Diagram 3 can be compared with Diagram 4 which details the membership of the founder-lineage Yatusawana, in Mualevu village.

In Diagram 3 it may seem that there is no 'cut-off' point in recruitment; in fact, it is subsumed in the qualification to possible recruitment at (in this particular example) the fourth descending generation (v. key to Diagram 3). The location of the cut-off point becomes clearer from the viewpoint of the individual to be recruited. He or she may be recruited to the founder-line and clan of either parent, or of any patrilineal ancestor, or of the mother of any patrilineal ancestor (including the father's mother).

Possibilities of recruitment through a woman are indicated in Diagram 5. Ego (male or female) can be recruited through one of the women 'a', 'b', or 'c'. Recruitment through Ego's FFFM, FFFFM, etc., would theoretically not be excluded. It would be possible, say the villagers, but unlikely for these women have been dead a long time and a person does not even remember their names, and kinship links with their clanspeople will no longer be close.

Where the founder is a woman, the founder-line is referred to as a 'female founder-line', 'Kawa yalewa'. The founder-lines established in subsequent generations

KEY: Continuous line denotes recruitment affected.
Broken line denotes recruitment possible.
Dotted line denotes recruitment is not possible at the 4th descending generation unless the mother has been recruited.

Continuous line indicates parent-child relationship.
KEY: Continuous line denotes recruitment and parent-child relationship.  
Dotted line denotes parent-child relationship only.  
Where spouse is depicted, it indicates that some or all children have been recruited to the spouse's clan.

KEY: Continuous line denotes recruitment. Broken line denotes parent-child relationship.

Diagram 5, Recruitment through Women.
by any member, male or female, of this female founder-line will also be female founder-lines. For example, in Diagram 2, the children who are recruited through their father, D, are members of his founder-line which is a female founder-line because of S's own recruitment through his mother, B. Where known recruitment links are exclusively male, the villagers refer to 'male founder-lines', 'kawa tagane'. Since the genealogical memory of MUALEVU villagers rarely reaches back further than the third or fourth ascending generation, a female founder-line will 'become' a male founder-line with the elapse of time when the identity of the recruitment link at the limit of genealogical memory changes from 'female' to 'male'.

Tables 2 to 7 provide a breakdown of recruitment and founder-line membership. Tables 2 to 5 deal with Mualevu village only, Tables 6 and 7 with the District of MUALEVU. A comparison is made of Mualevu village in 1937, the year prior to the arrival of the major Lands Commission Enquiry already mentioned, and in 1969, the year of my second field trip. In each case, namely Mualevu village 1937 (Tables 2 and 3), Mualevu village 1969 (Tables 4 and 5) and MUALEVU District 1969 (Tables 6 and 7) data in one table refer to the total membership of founder-lineage groups /itokatoka/, while a second table concerns only members resident in the village. It should be noted in reference to Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 that since the 1938 Lands Commission, recruitment has been officially endorsed and recorded by the procedure of registration.

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1 Some members of chiefly founder-lines are exceptions and their knowledge may extend to the sixth or seventh ascending generation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of group</th>
<th>Total Membership</th>
<th>PATRIFILIATED</th>
<th>NON-PATRIFILIATED</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Membership of male founder-lines</th>
<th>Membership of female founder-lines</th>
<th>F-L. membership</th>
<th>No. of female F-L. progenitorines</th>
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* Breakdown of non-patrililicated membership: 10 persons recruited through the mother.
  2 persons recruited through the father's father.

Table 2. Nua Levu Village, 1977: Total Membership of Founder-Lineage Groups.

81
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<th>Name of group</th>
<th>Resident membership</th>
<th>PATRILATED Married Unmarried</th>
<th>NON-PATRILATED Married Unmarried</th>
<th>Total non-patrilated Married Unmarried</th>
<th>Membership of male founder-lines Married Unmarried</th>
<th>Membership of female founder-lines Married Unmarried</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

- Breakdown of non-patrilated membership: 9 persons recruited through the mother.
- 2 persons recruited through the father's father.

Table 2: Mualevu Village, 1937: Village Resident Membership of Founder-Lineage Groups.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of</th>
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<th>NON-PATRIFILIATED</th>
<th>Membership of male</th>
<th>Membership of female</th>
<th>Total male</th>
<th>Total female</th>
<th>F-F membership</th>
<th>Total F-F membership</th>
<th>No of female F-F</th>
<th>Male (F-F)</th>
<th>Female (F-F)</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
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<td>73</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Breakdown of non-patrilifiliated membership: 24 persons recruited through the mother.
  2 persons recruited through the father's mother.
  1 person recruited through the father's father.

Table 4. Mualevu Village, 1969: Total Membership of the Administrative itokatoka.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Itokatska</th>
<th>Non-Patrilocal Membership</th>
<th>Patrilocal Membership</th>
<th>Membership of Male Founder-lines</th>
<th>Membership of Female Founder-lines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Unmarried</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Unmarried</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentimo</td>
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<td>Vuanisoli</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Mara</td>
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<td>11</td>
</tr>
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<td>Nabureto</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td><strong>Percentages</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>44.5</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Breakdown of non-patrilocal membership: 12 persons recruited through the mother.
2 persons recruited through the father's mother.
1 person recruited through the father's father.

Table 5. Mualevu Village, 1969: Village Resident Membership of the Administrative (Tokatska).

Notes to Tables 2 to 5.
1. V. infra Diagram 6 p.
2. Descendants of a Tongan immigrant given land by Ma'a'n.
3. Data are taken from genealogies collected in the village.
4. V. infra Diagram 9 p.
5. The more familiar, phonetic spelling is given. For details regarding this administrative group see the note to Diagram 9.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Village</th>
<th>Total No. of Groups</th>
<th>PATRIFILIATED Membership F M</th>
<th>NON-PATRIFILIATED Membership F M</th>
<th>Total membership F M</th>
<th>Membership of male founder-lines F M</th>
<th>Membership of female founder-lines F M</th>
<th>No. of female s.f.l. memberships</th>
<th>Recruitment of village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>78 67 143 121</td>
<td>46 50 92 67</td>
<td>409 255 21 23</td>
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<td>65 73 182 144</td>
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<td>57 63 122 100</td>
<td>24 17 65 46</td>
<td>342 152 19 11</td>
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<td>334 18</td>
<td>46 42 81 51</td>
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<td>4 2 6 2</td>
<td>129 14</td>
<td>17 27 31 11</td>
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</table>

* Breakdown of non-patrililiated membership: 97 persons recruited through the mother.
8 persons recruited through the father's mother.
2 persons recruited through the father's father.
1 person recruited through the father's father's mother.

Table 6: MUALEVU District, 1960. Total Membership of the Administrative i7okatoka, by Village.
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<td>Doitaci</td>
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<td>Avea</td>
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<table>
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<table>
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<table>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

- Breakdown of non-patrililated membership: 56 persons recruited through the mother.
  4 persons recruited through the father's mother.
  2 persons recruited through the father's father.

Table 7. NUALEVU District. 1969: Village Resident Membership of the Administrative iTokatoka, by Village.
The majority of the cases of non-patrifiliation (recruitment through persons other than the father) are of recruitment through the mother and for convenience of spacing I have sub-classified these figures in a note at the foot of each Table and not in the Tables themselves.

In the Tables for Mualevu village (1937 and 1969), the figures for unmarried males are sub-divided into males over twenty years of age (approximately assessed) and those under twenty years.

Members recruited through the father (columns 3 to 6, 25 to 29, 11 and 35) will, of course, include members of both male and female founder-lines.

Column 23, headed 'No. of progenitrices of female founder-lines' is the only reference to deceased as well as living individuals, all other data refer to members alive in the year concerned (1937 or 1969). Column 23 is provided to give perspective to the female founder-line membership of a particular group by stating the number of instances in which it is known that a female member of the founder-lineage group/itokatoka has had individual(s) recruited through her. It should be noted that the figures refer to the number of such women and NOT the number of individuals so recruited, hence the somewhat contrived column heading. Column 2, headed 'Recruitment out of village' appears in Table 6 only. It states the number of instances (not the number of children) in which the children of male members of itokatoka have been recruited through individuals.

---

1 Note that 'female' qualifies 'founder-line' and not 'membership': to avoid confusion inverted commas have been used in column headings.

2 This was necessary since it did not suffice to say merely 'No. of female founder-lines' - each of five brothers commence new founder-lines though all five may be recruited through the same individual.
(generally mothers) who are members of *itokatoka* in other villages (in the majority of cases in other Districts).

In a strictly unilineal system descent has to be the sufficient condition of recruitment to a descent group. In a non-unilineal system the particular principle of descent which is operative can only be a necessary condition of recruitment to a descent group and additional criteria will determine in particular cases which one of the recruitment possibilities available will be realised. Any statistical bias in favour of a particular form(s) of recruitment will reflect the differential influences of such additional criteria. In MUALEVU, place of birth and residence determine original recruitment ('re-recruitment' is discussed below) and it is therefore the considerations influencing parental residence which are the variables affecting the form of recruitment.\(^1\) Such considerations include the availability of land, access to coconut groves and less explicit factors of an individual's contentment, or discontentment, with a social environment.

Unless there are particularly pressing reasons (such as those listed above) husbands are not enthusiastic about permanent residence with their wife's people, among whom they remain as foreigners, dependent on their wife's jural status for the exercise of rights of descent group membership, particularly those of access to land. A husband's preferred residence is with a descent group in which he can act on the authority of his own jural status as either a recruited member or as a potential member (discussed below). Easily the most common form of residence in MUALEVU is with the

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\(^1\) Cf. Goodenough (1955: 78): 'The so-called patrilineal clans of Lau are definitely kin groups in which membership is based on parental residence.'
husband's natal descent group and this is reflected in the very high percentage of recruitment through the father revealed in Tables 2 to 7.

The interrelationship between place of birth and upbringing and recruitment supports the interpretation of the passage rites of social birth as the act or declaration of recruitment. These rites are carried out on a larger scale for the first-born child who, regardless of sex, is called the ulumatua, 'the eldest-head'. To-day the rites are little more than a commensal meal which is attended by kindred and members of the parents' clans on the occasion of the child's first birthday. Few of the customary elements of Fijian rites of passage remain. Nevertheless, the idea of 'recognition' survives. People come to see the child and the child is on view, is 'shown' to people. Thereafter, the clan and founder-line membership of the child can be changed only by a further ceremony called lakovi.

The literal meaning of 'lakovi' is 'the going to', the relevance of which becomes readily apparent in the context of the ceremony described below. Essentially it implies the transfer of a member from one descent group to another, a process which I shall term re-recruitment. Re-recruitment can occur in three kinds of situations: (1) when a descent group needs to

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1 MUALEVU men do not follow the practice of continual shifting residence that Quain (1948: 182-3) describes as characteristic of Nakoroka, in western Vanua Levu. A man's decision on his permanent residence, asserts Quain, 'frequently requires long trial and error until he eventually discovers what his true blood ties are.' (the place where a man is happiest?).

2 Barnes (1962) has used the term 'cumulative patri-filiation' to describe the effect of a constant and heavy statistical emphasis on recruitment through the father in a society that lacks a dogma of unilinear descent. Nayacakalou (1963:96) employs the term for Fiji.
recruit new members to avoid extinction - I include here cases of childless members who wish to recruit children; 1

(2) when the kin of a dead man wish to claim from his widow (if she has resumed residence with her own clan) children born just before or after his death; (3) when a man desires to recruit to his founder-line his 'path-child', his child from a woman whom he has not married. 2

All three occasions demand the support and agreement of both clans that become concerned - the recruiting clan and the clan from which the new recruit is to be taken. Without this agreement the re-recruitment cannot be effected. A food offering, magiti, and the traditional ceremonial valuable of whale teeth, tabua, are presented by the recruiting clan to accomplish the transfer. The person through whom the subject is to be re-recruited may bear the 'cost' of the ceremony, or it may be borne jointly by his close kin or by the entire clan. In cases of path-children, the father generally arranges and carries out his side of the ceremony. But whoever are the actual participants, they act in the name of the clans involved.

Although a request for re-recruitment may be rejected, this has never been an easy thing to do. It is always difficult to refuse a whale tooth and the request that accompanies it. It is especially difficult where affinal or maternal kin are involved. Affinal kin relationships are reckoned to be the most 'heavy',

1 The villagers distinguish between the adoption of a child who is also recruited to the descent group and the adoption of a child who is not recruited.

2 A path-child resides with its mother for at least the first few years of its life.
bibi, of relationships. The villagers apply the term both to brothers-in-law, between whom there exists an institutionalised joking relationship which is accompanied by rights of appropriation of each others' moveable property, and to parents-in-law, where the relationship is usually characterised by extreme social tabu, with avoidance in the case of opposite sexes and respect between same sexes. Any formal request, kerekere, from affines would be difficult to refuse outright. This does mean, however, that such requests tend to be given serious consideration before they are made.

The descent qualification for re-recruitment of the descendants of female members of the clan, is identical with the qualification for a special relationship and status vis-à-vis the clan, namely that of 'vasu'. The vasu is the MUALEVU (and Fijian) equivalent of the so-called mother's brother/sister's son' ritualistic relationship that has been reported for many parts of

1 In discussing behaviour associated with any particular category of relationship, it seems necessary to distinguish (1) the villagers' representation of the culturally endorsed, ideal form of behaviour, (2) what they assert is the norm of behaviour, and (3) the perceived behaviour in individual cases.

The relationship of mother-in-law and daughter-in-law can be used as an example. Ideally, the latter should always obey her husband's mother and show great respect; but all villagers acknowledge, and expect, that quarrels will occur between the two women. In some relationships these quarrels may never amount to more than a minimal verbal exchange and the daughter-in-law going into a brooding silence for a few days. In other relationships the quarrelling may become more extreme. In one incident, the daughter-in-law tipped a bowl of hot broth over her mother-in-law and called her 'a filthy old woman'. For the concept to be of any use, 'norms of behaviour' should refer to the empirically determined range of behaviour exhibited in a particular category of relationship. This enables the identification of those forms of behaviour which can be labelled 'extreme'. 
the world. In MUALEVU, any individual (male or female) who can be re-recruited to a clan through a female link can also have acquired the vasu status to that clan.

Vasu cannot be recorded as a synonym for the kinship terms for sister's child since there are involved different ranges of kin as referents. Vasu is further distinguished by the fact it always denotes a relationship with a group of people, a clan, and never with a particular person. An individual can be vasu to 'X' clan, or 'X' people, or 'X' place. He/She is 'their' vasu, or 'our' vasu, or 'his' vasu. Furthermore, the vasu status is held corporately in the founder-line. Thus, in Diagram 5, if Ego's patriline is considered the founder-line of Ego's ancestor, male X, (treat the dotted line as a continuous line), Ego (male or female) may be vasu to all three clans, C, B and A. I say 'may', since vasu status vis-à-vis the mother's clan has to be acquired in the first place by the mother's eldest child, it is not ascribed by (physical) birth.

The ceremony of vasu endowment is similar to that of social birth in that it is clearly a 'passage' ritual. The mother returns to her clan and 'shows' her first-born child. The husband's clan (in effect, it may be only the husband's close kin, but they are regarded as representing their clan) provides the wife's clan with

1 Rivers (1914: 290) describes the vasu as 'the highest known manifestation' of this relationship.

2 V. Appendix 1, Table 1 p.353-4.

3 And by extension, to other clans, villages and districts that are politically subject to that clan. The vasu to a paramount chiefly clan is called a vasu levu, 'a great vasu'.

4 Genealogical memory and whether kinship ties are maintained will determine the genealogical depth to which the vasu relationship will be maintained.
a feast and present whale teeth. The child is then recognised 'is known', as vasu by the mother's clan. The term 'vasu' seems to be derived by contraction of 'va(ka)su(cu)', lit. 'to cause to be born'\(^1\) - the ceremony may be referred to as the laki vakasika, lit. 'the going to bring about the birth'. A ceremony is not performed for subsequent children of the women, nor for the members of her children's (exclusive) founder-lines.

The vasu possesses the rights of appropriation of property (=vasutu, i.e. 'to vasu') which are characteristic of the so-called MB-ZS relationship in other areas of the world. The vasu's rights are acknowledged to refer to the property of the clan and not to the property of a particular person (such as the actual mother's brother). The lack of constraint in their exercise, referred to variously in the general literature as, for example, 'ritual stealing' (Evans-Pritchard: 1939:193), 'stealing' (Radcliffe-Brown: 1952: 16), 'snatching' (Goody: 1959: 70) was also evident in MUALEVU.\(^2\)

The vasu's rights of appropriation are limited to moveable property, they do not extend to land. However, the non-recruited child of a female clan member can acquire

\(^1\) The equivalent, Tongan term, 'fahu', is of similar derivation. 'Faka-' corresponds to the Fijian causal prefix 'vaka-': 'hu' is the Tongan for 'enter' or 'insert'. The duplicated form 'huhu', means 'breast' or 'milk', which corresponds to the Fijian 'sucu'. The Tongan 'fahu', like the vasu, is a corporate status.

\(^2\) Hocart has written extensively on vasu, e.g. Hocart (1915), (1923), (1926), (1938b). The exercise of vasu rights has been made illegal by the administration and it is now of rare occurrence, a consequence of the ban being used as an excuse by the villagers for not countenancing the vasu's appropriation rather than respect for the law itself.
rights to land belonging to the mother's clan and these rights are held corporately in the child's founder-line. The rights are acquired through the mother to whom the original grant is made, though it is possible for an adult man, whose mother is dead, to approach her clan and request a tract of land 'because of his mother'. The nature of rights to land are discussed more fully in Chapter 8.

When a child is recruited matrilaterally it does not undergo the vasu ceremony. Furthermore, when a vasu is re-recruited through a female clan member the appropriated vasu rights are lost or not practised. This would suggest that the status and rights of vasu mark an individual as a potential recruit to the clan. Yet the vasu is more than a potential recruit. He or she is a potential perpetuator and saviour of the clan, its 'reserve' link with posterity. The extraordinary privileges attached to the vasu status are not, in effect, asymmetric; they are balanced by the equally extraordinary obligations which a vasu may be called upon to fulfil.

There is no attempt to hide the fact of non-patrifiliation; indeed, villagers do not hesitate to comment upon those incidences of non-patrifiliation which were for obvious personal advantages. Non-agnatic cognate members of a clan are under no disability vis-à-vis agnate co-members: jurally no distinction is made between them and this is endorsed by the kinship terminology. A further social correlate of this equality is the status of MUALEVU women (relative to men). The MUALEVU women do not possess the inferior jural position which Nayacakalou (1955: 47) so sweepingly attributes to Fijian women (v. Appendix 1, p.349) In MUALEVU there is no differentiation according to sex in the determination of rank and the respect afforded rank. Where a resident female clan member is the most senior ranking, men will say without question
or hesitation that she 'leads' (v. Chapter 7). Female clan-members, moreover, possess acknowledged rights to clan lands though it is true these rights are not so readily apparent since the division of labour and predominantly virilocal residence reduce the opportunity of their exercise.

In Moala, Sahlins (1962) distinguishes between 'agnatic' and 'cognatic' matagali (matagali in my context of 'clan'), a distinction which he bases on the relationship of the component itokatoka. Groves (1963) dismisses this and like remarks, and I would agree with him, as merely some unsophisticated doodling with statistical distributions. He accuses Sahlins of relating 'ideological norms to statistical modes without adequate analysis of the social process' (op. cit.).

What Sahlins, in fact, is endeavouring to emphasize is that when a woman marries and continues to reside in her natal group, segmentation within the clan, if it occurs, is likely to be between the 'line' she founds and what Sahlins terms the 'nuclear' (or core) line. Sahlins' preoccupation here with the processes of segmentation leads him to stress, not the residence of the woman, but the 'intrusion' of the husband. The husband founds 'an intrusive line' within the clan. In MUALEVU, the husband never gains membership of his wife's clan. His children, on the other hand, can, by being recruited matrilaterally. The line (i.e. the founder-line) that comes into being can be termed an intrusive line only within a (etic) theoretical framework of patrilineal descent. The MUALEVU villagers, as it has been explained above, call such a line 'a female founder-line', orienting from the clan membership of the woman.

Groves' criticism may have been taken into account by Sahlins when he later formulated his general viewpoint that it was 'unwarranted to read principle from membership' (1963: 41) and propounded the thesis that ideological
preferences and statistical trends differ because ideology and action are independent. This then became the platform from which he launched his own criticism of Murdock (1960). (Sahlins elaborates further in his paper of 1965).

While the statistical distribution of recruitment in MUALEVU certainly reveals a pronounced bias in favour of patrifiliation, I cannot see the justification of regarding patrifiliation as the 'reality', 'practice', or 'action' level in contradistinction to an 'ideal' or 'norm' represented by the MUALEVU descent (recruitment) rule. What is the norm of an ideology or rule which is 'optative', that is a rule which presents a range of options? As long as actual choice does not exceed the bounds of the range delineated, then regardless of any particular bias in the statistical distribution of choices made, it is not possible to postulate any distinction of the ideology/action kind.

A distinction which can be made in an optative system is between the bias in the recruitment rule, which is reflected by the particular ranges of possible options delimited, and the bias in the statistical distribution of the ways in which persons are recruited. In the literature this distinction is often made implicit since the first bias is defined in the technical term applied to the recruitment or descent rule. For example, one might speak of an ambilateral system with a heavy bias to patriliny. Whether the two biases are commensurable is another matter. Ambilaterality, for example, reflects a generational bias which resists a comparison with a lineal bias.

1 Firth's term (v. Firth: 1957).

2 In which recruitment is restricted through either parent in any one generation (op. cit.).
If the bias in the rule is not defined by the technical term applied to the rule then an explicit statement needs to be made to identify that bias. To talk, for example, of 'an optative system with a major emphasis on patriliny' (Freeman: 1964:554) is an ambiguity since we do not know from this (definitional) statement if the 'major emphasis' is within the rule, or within the statistical distribution, or equally within both.¹

Strathern (1966, 1968) has posited for the New Guinea Highland societies that rather than separate levels of ideology and action there are separate ideologies at two distinct levels, viz. those of group unity (and of the formal relationships between groups) and of recruitment. But here, too, the MUALEVU situation is not relevant. It is true that the ancestral founders of clans are always male, that the members of a clan are placed in a sibling category (veitacini), and that in their own model² villagers subscribe to the idea that related clans are founded by brothers. But these facts do not justify the isolation of an agnatic ideology vis-à-vis the optative ideology of recruitment. The male sex of the founding ancestors reflects the constant movement and migration that is the historical background of the peoples of MUALEVU. Related clans are not described by the kinship term for same sex siblings, nor do the villagers readily acknowledge the ancestral progenitors of related clans to have been brothers.

¹ I am not saying that the ambiguity extends to Freeman's analysis of the Samoan descent system: he makes clear the subject of the emphasis, distinguishing between the 'de jure situation' and the 'de facto emphasis on patriliny' (v. Freeman: 1965:1535).

² It is impossible to determine whether this is, in fact, their own model or the one they have accepted from the administration.
Furthermore, the sibling term does not distinguish between parallel and cross-cousins.

I would say that in MUALEVU there is but the one ideology, which is clearly of a cognatic type, but a particular cognatic type. There is a specific range of recruitment possibilities delimited by a specific cut-off point. How to designate this range and the bias it reflects is a more difficult task than describing it. It does appear impossible to categorise the bias with the anthropological terms available.¹ 'Agnatic bias', or 'a major emphasis on patriline' would be not merely inadequate, but erroneous, qualifications to apply to the MUALEVU range of recruitment possibilities (v. supra Diagram 3). To use terms such as 'bilateral' and 'non-unilineal' is to define a phenomenon by what it is not, as Keesing points out (1968: 453). Such terms are too-embracing to be of real analytical use and they can be downright misleading - Freeman (1965) indicates the absurdity of placing the Iban and the Samoan descent systems in the same category. In the absence of an established term, I shall install the phrase 'cognatic founder-line' to describe the MUALEVU recruitment rule, though I shall refer simply to the MUALEVU system of descent.

The proceedings of the 1938 Lands Enquiry Commission modified the customary system of recruitment by instituting the recording of itokatoka membership lists.² Recruitment has, in effect, to be confirmed by 'registration'. A man who has been recruited, for example, through his mother.

¹ Cf. 'The Samoans happen to have evolved a descent system of some subtlety that defies classification in terms of simple categories, like unilineal and non-unilineal.' (Freeman: 1965:1536).

² The individual is registered to an itokatoka and so, as a 'registered land owner', to a matagali.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Village</th>
<th>Resident membership</th>
<th>Migrated membership</th>
<th>Total membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Married Unmarried</td>
<td>Married Unmarried</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>M F M F</td>
<td>M F M F</td>
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<td>124 117 235 188</td>
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<td>81 80 187 146</td>
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<td>34 16 65 40</td>
<td>69 65 133 85</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12 9 15 10</td>
<td>26 38 54 25</td>
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<tr>
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<td>18 6 33 29</td>
<td>32 31 52 59</td>
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<td>Avea</td>
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<td>20 2 35 25</td>
<td>44 31 79 85</td>
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<td>Malaka</td>
<td>12 6 22 21</td>
<td>8 3 17 10</td>
<td>23 24 39 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muamua</td>
<td>21 3 23 29</td>
<td>4 3 14 6</td>
<td>25 13 39 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>214</strong> <strong>96</strong> <strong>407</strong> <strong>261</strong></td>
<td><strong>190</strong> <strong>88</strong> <strong>350</strong> <strong>242</strong></td>
<td><strong>424</strong> <strong>399</strong> <strong>818</strong> <strong>655</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentages</strong></td>
<td><strong>50.5 26.6 49.8 55.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>44.8 24.8 42.8 37.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 100 100 100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Resident, Migrated and Total Registered Membership of Administrative Mataqali, by Village.

1. Percentages are of the total in the appropriate column under 'Total membership' (columns 10-13)
may be said 'to count with his mother', using the verbal base, 'will', or he will be described as being 'written to his mother', using the base 'vola', to write.

From villagers' past practice, it does seem that registration, itself, needs subsequently to be confirmed by the matagali at a Lands Commission Enquiry. At least this was the form followed at the 1965 Commission hearing in MUALEVU and the villagers accept that this will be so in the future.\(^1\) Thus in 1965 there were cases of registration being rejected on the challenge of a matagali or itokatoka member, with consequent registration of the person elsewhere. It should be noted though that these were cases of re-recruitment. Villagers do not conceive of challenging cases of original recruitment.

The interrelationship of residence and upbringing with recruitment has been weakened with the institution of registration. All Fijians are supposed to be registered as land-owners, which thus includes the children of those MUALEVU villagers who have migrated to the larger islands, most of them to become permanently or semi-permanently urbanised. The data in Table 8 show that the percentage of villagers involved in migration\(^2\) is considerable, and this has resulted in a new kind of emphasis on patrifiliation. This, in turn, by creating a large non-resident population with potential claims to land, has sharpened the resident villagers' awareness of the pressures of a growing land shortage.

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\(^1\) There is an assumption by all villagers that the Lands Commission Enquiries will continue to visit Vanua Balavu at irregular intervals.

\(^2\) My use of the term 'migrated' in Table 8 refers to those absentee villagers whose residence is not established by kin or affinal ties in other villages. The majority in this category live and work in urban centres in Viti Levu, though a few have leased land which they are farming. The data in Table 8 therefore, do not refer to the total number of absentee villagers in the District (which can be calculated from the data in Tables 6 and 7)
CHAPTER SIX

THE FEAST ORGANISATION AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE MODEL OF CUSTOMARY SOCIAL ORGANISATION
The last chapter focussed on an analysis of the nature of descent groups. Reference was also made to phratries and to political associations of clans and of settlements. It was also explained that the indigenous term 'matagali' had more than one referent. It could indicate a clan and a residential association of clans in the one village and it might also refer to a political association of settlements. A different (proper) name might or might not be applied with the term according to the particular referent. The generic meaning of matagali, as a class or category, I believed could be literally applied in social contexts to denote categories of people. Since there is more than the one context, the principle of categorization clearly changes, though the effect of categorization, of dividing people into matagali, does not.

I intend differentiating the category of clan as a 'descent grouping'. I use the latter phrase to refer to groupings (= localised categories of people) whose identity (the members' concept of their unity) is determined by a principle of recruitment through parental and ancestral links, but with no necessary association of a unilineal ideology.  

1 Firth (1963) argues that descent be equated with the principle of recruitment. Firth (e.g. 1957), Kaberry (1967) citing Notes and Queries (1951: 71), and others have proposed (contra Portes et alia) that the term should not be limited to unilineal descent groups. I am not intending to survey the many aspects of the theoretical argument about descent (Strathern 1968) makes a useful survey of the literature up to 1967) but there appears to be enough disagreement among established anthropologists (Leach 1961), for example, wishes to abandon altogether the use of the term descent) for me to apply my own definitions to the terms I am using.
The clan may be called a 'descent group' since corporate decisions were made by the clan. These were exercised, for example, in the choice of a leader where there was no clear successor, and again in cases of re-recruitment (though, in effect, a few clan members might be acting in the name of the clan). Moreover, clans with hereditary offices might act corporately on ceremonial occasions (for example, Nayagôna and Valika clans in the ceremonial consecration of the MUALEVU chief as Tui Mavana). However, it became evident in reconstructing the pre-1938 MUALEVU social organisation that a further principle of categorisation was extant and the descent groupings were not the most commonly evoked form of corporate group organisation.

In the Fijian literature the term 'bati ni lovo' generally has been assumed to be the Lauan equivalent for the Viti Levu term for the sub-division of the 'matagali', namely the itokatoka. Thus Sahlins comments:

The term tokatoka, which evidently means (fittingly) a "place to stay", is central Fijian and official usage. The Lauan phrase, bai ni lovo, "side of the oven", is also heard in Moala. (1962: 241).

The earlier Lands Commissioners, who reconstructed the pre-Ma'afu MUALEVU social organisation from their knowledge of Viti Levu, saw the bati ni lovo as the sub-division of undifferentiated matagali (e.g. Maxwell: 1914: 4). In the Official Tales of Origin six of the ten administrative yavusa in MUALEVU District have the

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1 I am bearing in mind here the discussion in the general theoretical literature on when is a descent group 'a group'. Davenport (1963:181) points out that while membership of a descent group may bestow a status with rights and obligations upon the individual, 'mutual action', or the 'making (of) decisions', is not thereby entailed. Scheffler (1966:543) develops this, asserting the sociological value of the concept 'corporate'/ 'corporate group' is diluted if applied to other than mutually acting, decision-making groupings.
sub-divisions of their mataqali recorded as bati ni lovo; in the remaining four they are recorded as itokatoka (in LOMALOMA nine of the eleven yavusa have their mataqali sub-divisions recorded as bati ni lovo). Hocart (1929:12) also treats bati ni lovo and itokatoka as equivalent terms. Only Laura Thompson (1947: 223) provides a hint that the referent for the sub-division of 'mataqali' was not unequivocally bati ni lovo or itokatoka: 'As the clan group [mataqali] expanded, it divided into sub-clans, the senior branch being called itokatoka, the junior ones mbatchi [bati] ni lovo, or else all the sub-clans were simply called mbatchi ni lovo.'

Remarks made by older villagers, that is those actively involved in the pre-1938 social organisation, made it clear that a categorising principle other than descent was also in operation. Thus a man of itokatoka Likusogea, in Mualevu village, asserted that prior to 1938 Likusogea was a mataqali. He also consistently maintained that pre-1938 Likusogea was a bati ni lovo in mataqali Mualevu. Similarly, a man from itokatoka Wailailai stated that Wailailai used to be both a mataqali and a bati ni lovo.

The head of itokatoka Vusaratu, the leading itokatoka of the administrative mataqali Tota, in Mavana village, insisted that while Vusaratu was never a mataqali, it also was never a bati ni lovo nor an itokatoka, but it had been a yavusa. A similar assertion was made by the

1 An observation by Basil Thomson for Tailevu Province, Viti Levu, not only partially endorses Laura Thompson’s remarks, it also suggests the bati ni lovo division was customary to the Bauan organisation. 'The divisions of the people', he writes, 'are 1. Matanitu; 2. Mataqali; 3. Tokatoka ni Mataqali; 4. Bati ni Lovo.' (Thomson: 1893b:6-7). Matanitu described the large, political confederations, such as those of Cakaudrove and of Lakeba referred to in Chapter 3.
MUALEVU Chief, of *itokatoka* Senimoli in Mualevu village. In the context of a discussion on the customary organisation as determined by the administration, he had no hesitation in describing and accepting the status of Senimoli as an *itokatoka*. In separate discussions on the 'old' form of organisation in Mualevu village prior to the imposition of the administrative model, he would become indignant at any suggestion that Senimoli was either an *itokatoka* or a *bati ni lovo*.

The apparent contradictory nature of these statements - and there were many more in like vein - was resolved by taking the term *bati ni lovo* at its literal meaning, namely 'oven-side', or 'oven-edge', that is to say a division of an 'oven'. The *bati ni lovo* was a co-operative unit that made and shared a common oven, *lovo*. (The *lovo* is the earthen oven in which formerly food was always baked). Since the feast was the invariable accompaniment of any ceremonial occasion - a passage rite for a village member, the welcoming of an important chief or official, the various stages in an important building project, etc. - the *bati ni lovo* was the most regularly convened corporate group of the village. It was, in effect, the basic village labour or work unit.

Given the irreversible nature of descent group division in MUALEVU, the existence of a distinct basis of association ordering the organisation of labour should not be unexpected. Gemmation will invariably give rise to an inequitable distribution of population in terms of group labour resources. Such an effect, moreover, might be quite sudden and unexpected, as, for example, in the event of large scale losses in warfare; or, of more relevance during the past one hundred years, from the effects of epidemics.¹

¹ For the effects of the great measles epidemic of 1873 on the MUALEVU population, v. infra Table 17 p. 258.
Reversible descent group division does not present this kind of dilemma. An optative principle of descent also has been posited as a mechanism for the adjustment of population distribution. While I would not necessarily disagree with this, in terms of the equitable distribution of labour resources it would be a relatively long-term solution.

The feast, magiti, was the foremost social mechanism of cooperativeness and unity, a periodic call for the individual's and sub-group's acknowledgment of the primacy of the bonds of co-residence and of the ties of political loyalty. At village and District level, it was also a demonstration of the prevailing political hierarchy and organisation.

I call the magiti, 'feast', for convenience, but it is not a commensal affair, through the latter may be included in a ceremonial programme involving magiti. The villagers refer to a commensal meal, and any meal for that matter, as kakana, lit. 'food'. The basic referent of the term magiti is a collection of foodstuffs which is formally presented. The foodstuffs must include meat which to-day may be of any kind and form, including tinned meats. The following description of the village feast is made from my own observations, the referents of corporate group terms are therefore those of the post-1938 administrative model.

The village feast is an accumulation of contributions of foodstuffs presented by individuals and groups of individuals to the ceremony organisers. The identity of the latter depends on the occasion.

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1 The period of reference is the twenty years preceding the arrival of the Lands Commission in 1938. That is the period within the recall of the older MUALEVU villagers. Where I employ the present tense I am specifically indicating relevance to the time of fieldwork as well as to the pre-1938 period.
Where, for example, a passage rite of a village member is involved, the organisers will be his administrative matagali and the initial presentations would be to his matagali leader who functions as the group's representative. The food contributions fall into two categories: vegetables only (which are brought by individuals) are uncooked and are not formally presented; and meat, with or without vegetables, which is generally brought by groups and which may be baked, raw, tinned or alive, and is always formally presented.

A contribution of foodstuffs containing meat which is intended for presentation is termed a lovo. The term 'lovo' will be used to indicate a food contribution. The term 'oven' will be used to refer to the actual earthen oven in which food is baked, and also in narrative references to it. For example, 'oven-side', and not 'bati ni lovo', will be used in reference to separate groups of persons designated in the Fijian bati ni lovo.

The ceremony organisers prepare their own oven which those individuals attending the ceremony, but not contributing to another lovo, add their vegetables. The contents of unbaked lovo are also added to this oven. Finally, all food contributions which have been presented

Primarily the root crops, taro and yam.

Plus, the most common meat contribution, are presented alive or baked. Cattle are always presented dismembered and raw. Vegetables are baked if the meat that they company is baked.
are gathered together with their own lovo by the organisers, who then lead the other contributors in bringing the food before the Chief (in Mualevu village) or the village titled headman (in the other villages). The organisers offer whale teeth and present the food as a feast.

The feast is acknowledged by the Chief, or headman, in the name of the Tui Mavana, and the Chief's, or headman's, talking-chief then gives a speech of acceptance. Assuming it is a village or District feast, that is, it is not to be re-presented to someone else who will take it out of the District, the Chief or headman will then formally 'give back' the feast to 'the people', itaukei. The talking chief will then request the Chief or headman that he give permission for the feast to be divided. When this is given the talking chief informs the leader of the organising matagali. The latter, or if he is aged, a younger man, will then set about dividing the food into portions which should contain both meat and vegetables. The portions are placed in coconut-leaf carrier-bags that have been made for the occasion. In addition to food, there may be other kinds of contributions (given with the lovo): artefacts, most commonly native mats, but perhaps also tapa cloth (of two kinds, masi and matu), tabua, and sometimes European manufactured goods, generally cloth and four-gallon drums of fuel. These, too, are divided out and are placed with the food portions.

In this context itaukei is the antithesis of chiefly/chiefs. When the chiefly matagali are the organisers, they present the accumulated magiti to the rest of the village, who are again referred to as itaukei. It is accepted by the old men of the village and then following the same procedure as described above, returned to the chiefs for division. Formerly, the Chief possessed his own dividers of the feast, a commoner clan who held the title of Tui Rara. To-day, the Tui Rara is a lay officer of the Wesleyan church.
At every feast in the District, no matter what village it is held in, the first portion, the *rau ni magiti*, is supposed to be put to one side to be delivered to the Chief's house. The names of the owners of the other portions are then called out by the divider of the *magiti*, who strikes each portion with a switch as he calls them out. The name called out may be the name of a group of persons, or of an individual, or of the office or function carried out by a person or persons ("the grave-diggers, or 'the ladies who went on the early morning fishing"). One individual can acquire more than one portion and/or a share in more than one portion. The portions are delivered to their owners, or to their owners' compounds by the helpers. Later, after the end of the ceremony, those which have been received in the name of a group, are divided out to the component sub-groups and/or individuals, the sub-groups in turn dividing out their sub-portions.

The purpose in giving this outline of a typical village feast occasion has been to focus attention upon the mechanism ordering the feast, the manner of accumulation and redistribution of foodstuffs or other goods. It is this mechanism which I term the *feast organisation*. For an understanding of the pre-1938 customary social organisation, it is essential to maintain the separate identities of the descent organisation and of the feast organisation.

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1. At the many *magiti* I have attended, the divider of the feast or the leading organiser has kept note with pencil and paper of the people who attend, what they bring and whether they carry out any ceremonial function.

2. More appropriately it might be termed the 'work-group organisation', for it was also mobilised on occasions which did not involve feast, the most frequent being for the purposes of the 'village work programme' that was imposed on each village by administrative policy.
The primary division in the village feast organisation, the grouping which presented (to the feast organisers) a common lovo, was called matagali, which I shall term the oven-division\(^1\). The lovo which it presented was an accumulation of other, smaller lovo's, each contributed from the common oven of a smaller, more exclusive, sub-division of people, which was called the oven-side.

The accumulation of the lovo of an oven-division centred around the lovo of the leading founder-lineage group of a clan, the latter giving its name to the oven-division. All resident members of the founder-lineage group together with any co-resident non-members, contributed to the production of this lovo. It was termed the lovo tu, 'foundation of the lovo', the contributors being the matagali tu, 'the foundation of the oven-division'. The other, contributory lovo of the oven sides were brought and added to the lovo tu in the house compound of the leader of the founder-lineage group.\(^2\) Thus the lovo tu together with the contributory-lovo made up the lovo of the oven division, while, analogously, the 'foundation of the oven-division' together with the oven-sides constituted the oven-division.

The composition of the oven-divisions expressed the immediate political alignment of the founder-lineage groups and clans of the village. In adding its own contributory-lovo to the lovo tu, an oven-side indicated its membership of the oven-division, but the action of carrying its lovo to another compound also implied its

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1 As is indicated by its description of 'matagali', it is a category. It becomes a group when the category is particularised with a name. Thus: 'oven-division', matagali, is a category; 'oven-division Valika', matagali Valika, is a corporate group.

2 Since this was the leading founder-lineage group its head would be the titular head of the clan.
political subordinacy. The lovo tu was not, as such, carried anywhere, and the leading founder-lineage group which organised its production never constituted an oven-side or the nucleus of an oven-side. Where the oven-sides were based upon junior founder-lineage groups their political subordination was understandable in terms of the internal division of the clan. But the nucleus of an oven-side could also be a clan.

In terms of their involvement in the village feast organisation, some clans were distinguished as 'small-clans', matagali lalai, (indicating smallness of membership), which were said to 'lean upon', or 'hang from', other clans. The relation of dependency was supported by some other tie of association - common ancestry, intermarriage, or through the provision of services. A small-clan did not accumulate a lovo for presentation, that is it was not the nucleus of its own oven-division. It produced a contributory-lovo which

1 There is an analogy here with the political concept of tributary status, which is marked by the conveying and/or offering of food supplies and goods as in pre-Ma'afu times, MUALEVU (YARO) and LOMALOMA districts offered their collective tributes to their paramount, the Tui Cakau, Thomas Williams writes in his Journal (Sept. 19th 1843):

The King (Tui Laila) left Somosomo for Vanua Balavu accompanied by 20 canoes; so that, with those that have preceded him and those that are to follow, this fleet will number upwards of 30 canoes not one of which measures less than 12 yards long, and carries, on an average, not less than 25 persons.

The King's business at Vanua Balavu is to receive a large quantity of property in the shape of cynet, native cloth, mats and whales' teeth, part of which has been waiting for him this past twelve months.... Pigs have long been tabu on the island to which the king has gone; but he has taken with him people sufficient to devour the hundreds of such animals as will be cooked for him... (Henderson: 1931: 189).
it took, as an oven-side, to place with the lovo organised by the clan upon which it was dependent. It was possible for more than one small clan to form a single oven-side.

Referring back to my opening remarks to the chapter, that where there is a definitive, or irreversible, segmentation of descent groups, an additional form of organisation of labour resources would appear necessary, it is evident that the feast-organisation fulfilled this function in MUALEVU. But while the taxonomy of the feast-organisation was distinct from that of descent grouping, yet it was clearly not divorced from it. The units and sub-units which associated and combined each had as a nucleus a descent group, or was a descent group. Basically there were three criteria operating in harness - descent, co-residence and the distribution of labour availability.

It is notable that the rigidity of the definitive segmentation of descent groups was balanced by the flexibility of the segmentation of the 'feast groups'.

The practical, work-a-day disadvantages of the rule 'once a clan always a clan', was overcome by the fact that a clan could shift from one taxonomic level to another within the feast-organisation of the village, according to its labour resources. Segmentation within the feast organisation was reversible. Firth (1957: 7 ) seems to suggest the likelihood of this kind of situation, though he phrases it in terms of an organisational/structural distinction and refers to land pressure as the activating force:

Segmentation... is not an automatic process but is related to the available resources. The relation cannot be simple but it would appear that increasing pressure of population upon land is likely to lead to a speeding-up of the segmentation process for operational purposes, though not necessarily in terms of the structural frame.

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Cf. Geddes' interpretation of Fijian descent organisation in terms of the segmentary processes of 'fission and fusion' (1934.97 et seq). But while he says a lot about 'fission' he says nothing of 'fusion'.
For the period under review there was no pressure on land for the cultivation of food crops. The evidence for this is in the recorded hearings of the various Lands Commission Enquiries in which disputes were invariable over coconut groves, and in the stated opinions of the villagers themselves. Even to-day, with a greatly increased population, there is no pressure on land in terms simply of food gardens. However, the distribution and availability of land is a point which I take up later, what I wish to indicate here is that given ready land availability, labour resources (productivity), per se, were an activating force in the segmentation processes within the feast-organisation of village society.1

Before proceeding to an examination of Mualevu village social organisation, I will comment upon the usage reported by Laura Thompson for Southern Lau, to which I have referred above. Thompson, who analyses southern Lau social organisation in terms of a descent principle only, states that a leading 'sub-clan' might be distinguished as an itokatoka while junior 'sub-clans' were hati ni lovo. It seems probable that the term itokatoka was introduced to the Lauan archipelago from the west; its meaning is 'a site of residence'. The term is closely affiliated with the Lauan 'itikotiko', which has the same meaning. Thus some of the MUALEVU villagers described past segmentation of clans in terms of members leaving the original settlement to establish their 'itikotiko' elsewhere. I suggest that in southern Lau the term itokatoka was applied, whether as an original

1 Any percentage increase in labour resources would have been more likely to generate a pressure of population upon land in the small, war-village pattern of settlement of pre-Ma'afu times, than it would have in the larger, amalgamated villages of the pax Tonga and pax Britannica era.
or introduced usage, to the division of people to whose compound area the contributory-lovo of an oven-division was carried.

The Mualevu chief's indignation at the idea of his founder-lineage being an itokatoka, undoubtedly arose from the administrative interpretation of MUALEVU customary social organisation, which had identified all sub-divisions of the matagali as bati ni lovo and then labelled them itokatoka. As long as I was not questioning him within the context of the official model - when he always strenuously upheld its framework as the 'true and proper' one - he was naturally averse to the implication that his own founder-lineage held a politically subordinate status.

The manner in which the official model of 'customary social organisation' was derived can be understood only in terms of the complexity of the 'customary social organisation' that preceded that model. In Diagrams 6, 7, and 9, I demonstrate this with regard to Mualevu village. Diagram 9 is included to demonstrate the range of hereditary occupations and offices that cluster around a Chief.

One division that I have yet to refer to and which I have included in Diagram 6 is the Tabana. This division was found only in Mualevu, the chiefly village of the District and was a function of the great difference in status between the titled leadership of the three political associations which came to co-reside in the village: the Sau Mualevu, the chiefly title; the Tui Viro, the chiefly title before the victory of the Senimoli people; and the Ramasi Nadave, the leadership title of a low status, warrior people. The peoples of each association shared the relative status of its 'title of leadership'. For example, the people of the clan Nabureto, Tabana means 'part' or 'division'. 
Title of leadership of tabana division

Name of lineage (where known)

Name of clan

Name of founder lineage group

Sau Mualevu

Tui Yaro

Ramasi Nadave

Senimoli

Yaro

Nadave

Senimoli

Mavana

Nadave

Losaji

Mualevu

Likusoea Nabireto

Wailailai Natuvu

Nayona

Sau: Mualevu -

Vuniivi

Vatubaba Yatusawana Nayalava Namajiu

Vatubaba Rara Qalimaca


KEY: Horizontal line denotes common origin. Broken vertical line denotes tabana division. Names of 'empty' units are not included.
As opposed to the 'distant warriors', which are the clans in neighbouring Boitaci village.

KEY: The boxes contain the occupation or office designation.
Names without boxes refer to clans.
Continuous lines identify clans with their occupations and offices, which in turn establish the clans in 'service' relationships with the chiefly clan.
Where a clan has no occupation or office designated, this is because there are none remembered; it does not necessarily mean that the clan had never possessed one.

Diagram B. Occupation and Office Identities of Clans in Mualevu Village.
NOTE TO DIAGRAM 9

The *yavusa* Tonga was created in 1938 to include all Fiji-born Tongans who were disinclined, or were unable, to register in (Fijian) *matagali*.

In Mualevu village, there are two unrelated Tongan descent lines. The ancestor of one had married a Nayalava woman, and his children (two sons) had been recruited through her. With the introduction of official registration to *itokatoka* and administrative *matagali* at the 1938 Lands Commission Enquiry, one grandson (ySyS) registered through this woman to *itokatoka* Nayalava in *matagali* Nayagona. One other grandson registered through his mother (of the clan Rara) to *itokatoka* Rara in *matagali* Mualevu. The surviving son and the rest of the grandchildren registered to *matagali* in the *yavusa* Tonga. To-day, these Tongans still co-operate with Nayalava (whose membership now consists solely of descendants of the Tongan who was recruited to it in 1938) and they are referred to as 'Nayagona people' as well as being called 'Tongan people'.

The other Tongan family is registered with a *matagali* in the *yavusa* Tonga. It co-operates with *itokatoka* Qalimaca for feast and communal work purposes.
though their 'office' was not 'chief's', were yet of chiefly status vis-à-vis the Nadave or Yaro peoples and they might be referred to as 'chiefly' by the latter. The statuses of 'chiefly' and of 'ex-chiefly' were unique in the District while clearly distinct from each other, and as clearly distinct from the low, commoner status of the Nadave peoples. Such great difference in group status did not occur in the other villages.¹

The administrative 'descent' model (Diagram 9) is plainly not based on the customary descent group organisation (Diagram 6). The administrative vavusa in Mualevu are the Tabana divisions, (v. Diagram 6), which originally (post-Ma'afu) were co-resident, hamlet divisions of the village. In the other villages, the administrative vavusa constitutes the entire village. The administrative matagali and itokatoka more or less faithfully reproduce the organisation of feast units, but an exception was the clan Rara which contributed to the oven-side Lomaji (v. Diagram 7). This case is discussed elsewhere (v. infra p.228). As far as the organisation of the villagers into co-operating work units was concerned, the administrative model was really no great innovation. What was innovatory was the three-tiered, quasi-descent framework into which it was fitted. The administrative model, in effect, compounded elements from the existing different forms of social organisation into a single organisational frame.

¹ It should be noted that the Tabana divisions, with their leadership titles, have been included in Diagram 6 (depicting the descent organisation of Mualevu village) merely from the convenience of not having to provide a separate Diagram. It is not intended that the Tabana divisions should be regarded as part of the organisation of descent groups.
'When the Lands Commission Enquiry came to Mualevu in 1938', recall the villagers, 'Ratu Sukuna [the Fijian Chairman of the Commission] stated there were too many mataqali in the village.' This is a statement, often heard in connection with the changes effected in 1938, which casts some light on the Commission's reasons for these changes. The main purpose of the Commission was to make MUALEVU land tenure conform with a pre-determined colony-wide system in which land ownership was vested in a corporate unit called a 'mataqali' and in which every Fijian would be registered as a land owner by his membership of a 'mataqali'. This meant that every named unit officially recognised by the administration as a 'mataqali', had to possess lands and every Fijian had to belong to such a land-possessing mataqali.

The facts of MUALEVU social organisation and land usage were in conflict with the pre-determined aims of the Commission. For well over fifty years the MUALEVU

1 It must be remembered that the 1936 Lands Commission Enquiry had as its active chairman, a Fijian, Ratu (later Sir) Lala Sukuna. While it is undoubtedly true that the colonial administration's land policy was based upon over-simplified interpretations and erroneous assumptions, it is hard to believe Ratu Sukuna was not well aware of this. I would say that in his position as senior civil servant his concern was to ensure that the officially determined system was established in the local context. In his identity as a Fijian and the undisputed leader of his people, he appeared to be concerned to temper the effects of policy inflexibility with local arrangements for the overall benefit of the villagers. I should also add that my comments on the administrative policy for the systematisation of land tenure are intended analytically, not critically. While criticism can certainly be made, this is an unjust criticism that does not take into account the many exigencies of administration, particularly financial stringency, which were a considerable bridle to the efforts of colonial officers and tended to make expediency a principle of action, sine qua non.
villagers had been operating within a system in which ancient territorial boundaries had little relevance. Some 'matagali' had no tradition of territory possession, while others that did might be represented by no more than one old woman. While it was possible for the Commission to arrange compromises with the existing practices of land usage, for the policy of codification to mean anything, 'matagali' lands and boundaries had to be delineated and officially confirmed. Clearly, too, the referent for any particular, named 'matagali', 'needed to be unambiguous and exclusive with regard to membership as far as official usage was concerned.

The composition of the administrative matagali appear to have been dictated by a combination of three major considerations. In the first place, the facilitation of demarcating territorial boundaries. In Mualevu, there were not only many clans relative to the other villages, but several of them, namely Mualevu, Likusoge, Nabureto and Rara, had no tradition of pre-Ma'afu territory possession. By combining these four clans into the one administrative matagali, only one land holding had to be created instead of four. Small-clans that did have a tradition of territory possession were also included as sub-divisions in administrative matagali, thus further reducing the number of matagali holdings that were needed. 1

The second consideration was the identification of the administrative matagali with pre-existing corporate

1 The practical difficulties in determining and recording boundaries with no attendant professional surveyors was one of the Commission's biggest problems. The boundaries of the five matagali holdings that emerge from the Commission's deliberations, for the most part either followed major topographical boundaries of the landscape, such as ridges and river beds, or created straight lines between topographical points, guided by earth-mounds which, evidently, rapidly disappeared.
groupings in order to entail the minimal disturbance to the established system of association and co-operation. The observation has already been made with regard to the named groups in Mualevu village that the administrative model largely reproduced the feast organisation. As far as membership of these groups was concerned, there was some interchange of personnel between descent groups and some individuals employed the necessity of registering as an opportunity for being re-recruited. The motivation in these cases was generally higher status and/or land rights. The number of such transfers, however, was quite small.

The third consideration appears to have been the need to make viable units of the administrative matagali in order to ensure that control of the matagali holdings did not fall out of the hands of the local villagers. This consideration was dictated by a clause in the Native Affairs Regulations which made rights to the lands of 'extinct' matagali reversible to the Crown as ultimus haere. According to the older MUALEVU villagers, Ratu Sukuna was much opposed to this ruling and was disinclined to accept the creation of land holdings for 'matagali' which were threatened with extinction.  

1 This is the official wording. MUALEVU villagers describe descent units without members as 'empty' (= laala), not 'extinct' (= boko) - a correlation of the irreversibility of descent group segmentation.

2 It is impossible, at this distance in time, to determine the degree to which the Commissioners demanded particular measures and the degree to which they persuaded or directed villagers to accept the same. It would have been exceedingly difficult for any villager to have openly opposed the stated wishes of a Chief of such high status as Ratu Sukuna. In MUALEVU, to-day, there is only one villager who has ever defied or challenged leading Fijian Chiefs in open confrontation.
The same kind of changes were effected in the other villages of the District. In Boitaci village, for example, the five existing clans were formed into two administrative mataqali, with three small-clans associating with the leading clan in one of these mataqali. The customary headman of the village, the Tui Salia (who was also the head of the leading-clan) endeavoured to include the entire village in one mataqali. It is difficult to ascertain whether this was his own design (perhaps with the object of controlling all the lands of the village), or whether it had been officially encouraged to provide a more equitable distribution of land (the territory of the second mataqali is by far the smaller in area).

It is clear from some of the arrangements ordered or induced by the Commissioners that they were not following a rigid line of procedure. In Cikobia village, for example, one villager had planted up coconut groves on land which the Commission decided was part of the former territory of the empty clan, Navuera. According to the man's son, his father was advised by Ratu Sukuna to register to this clan, which he was able to do through a female link. The clan was then recorded as a mataqali with the man as its official head and in control of its lands and, of course, of his own coconut groves.

In what appeared a similar case in Mualevu village, the area associated with the former territory of a recently empty clan was included in the mataqali holding of the members of a related clan, Vuniivi, who were using the land. In fact, there was a difference in the two cases. According to the Cikobia villagers, some descendants

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1 The headman had died in 1964. I should add that Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna died in 1958.
of Navuera clan members who had resided at Namalata village (in LOMALOMA District) were seeking to acquire control of the Navuera lands by registering to the *matagali*. This was forestalled by Ratu Sukuna's advice to the man who was 'working' (*vakacakacakataka*) these lands and who stood in danger of losing his coconut groves.¹

The situation may well have been more complicated than this, but it was difficult to unravel: moreover, these kinds of 'arrangements', preliminary to the actual hearing of the Enquiry, were made unofficially and were not recorded in the Evidence Books. What was certainly involved in this Cikobia case was a conflict of principles of two, chronologically discrete modes of land usage.

But before I proceed to an examination of the system of land usage in pre-1938 MUALEVU, there is one further aspect of social organisation which needs to be discussed and which has had an important bearing on socio-economic developments in MUALEVU. This is the nature of the pronounced stratification of MUALEVU society.

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¹ By registering to the clan Navuera and becoming the clan head, the Cikobia villager was able to refuse the re-recruitment request of the Naroeivo villagers. The Cikobia villager had a large number of children - four sons and five daughters. The eldest today is almost 50: only the last two daughters had not been born at the time of the Lands Commission's visit.
CHAPTER SEVEN

RANK AND AGE STATUS: LEADERSHIP AND SUCESSION
'Rank' and 'status' are terms which are often used synonymously. In the MUALEVU context, it is convenient to distinguish the referent of 'rank' as one particular kind of status. Where I employ simply the term 'rank', I imply 'rank status'. Rank is a hereditary status derived from a parent and ascribed by order of birth, hence it is a medium of stratification only between those persons acknowledging descent from some common ancestor or ancestress. There can be no relative rank between persons lacking common descent. For example, a member of the clan Mualevu (itokatoka Senimoli and Vuanimoli) is of a superior ascribed status to a member of the clan (matagali) Vuni Ivi by reason of the superior, hereditary occupational status of his clan as 'chiefs' and not by any criterion of rank.

In terms of rank, and within the stated delimitation of kinship, each person has a unique status in a fixed hierarchical arrangement. The relative rank of two persons can only be altered (or be questioned) by manipulation of the record of past events (i.e. births), the principle of rank determination is itself immutable. A simple demonstration of rank precedence is given in Diagram 10.

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1 I am using the ethnographic present: however to avoid a source of confusion, I shall place the post-1938 administrative designations of social units in parenthesis where a named group is first mentioned. Reference can be made to Diagrams 6, 7, and 9 in Chapter 6 for further clarification.
Key: Continuous line denotes parent-child relationship. The order of birth of the children of any particular parent reads from left to right. Numerals 1 to 14 denote precedence of rank.

Diagram 10. Determination of Order of Rank Precedence

Should female no. 3 have children, they would be of higher rank than her brother, male no. 4. (It should be noted that the position in the rank hierarchy of any of the fourteen individuals depicted in Diagram 10 is irrelevant to their rank relative to kin traced through the other parent). The first child is distinguished by the appellation 'ulumatua', lit. 'eldest-head'. Where in successive generations the eldest child is recruited through a parent who is the eldest child, the villagers speak of an 'eldest-head founder-line' (kawa ni ulumatua). Thus in Diagram 10, assuming female no. 3 and male no. 4 have been recruited through their mother and the latter has been recruited through her father, these four individuals constitute an 'eldest-head founder-line'. Should the

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1 Same sex siblings and same sex siblings of parents in both cases are distinguished by relative age in the kinship terminology, v. Appendix 1, Table 2, p. 354.
children of female no.3 be recruited through their mother they will continue this line, but the children of male no.4 will not.

The relative rank of two persons of the same generation is described by using a common grammatical construction for comparison. To indicate that a woman 'a' is of higher rank than a kinsman 'B', the villager will say 'sa gase ko "a", sa gone ko "B", lit. '"a' is older, "B' is younger'¹. In address or reference, relative rank may be indicated by the use, or non-use, of respect titles: 'Adi' to a female and 'Ratu' to a male. The titles are used by lower-ranking kin in address or reference to higher-ranking kin. At the age of about four years a younger child will/may be instructed by his parents to prefix 'Adi' or 'Ratu' to the names of his older siblings in address.² Often this usage of respect titles is not (no longer?) followed, but it is more strictly maintained by persons who are chiefs or who trace common-descent with chiefs.

This usage of the respect titles has to be distinguished from usage of the same titles in other contexts, the principal of which is as an indication of chiefly (occupational) status. Thus all members of the chiefly clan Mualevu have the right to use these titles and be addressed and referred to by them by members of clans of lower hereditary status (in effect all the other clans of the District). This rule applies even between spouses. The wife of the present Chief is from the clan (matagali) Nautu and addresses her husband as

¹ Cf. 'Suva is wet, Nadi is dry' = 'Suva is wetter than Nadi'.

² Opposite sex siblings begin to observe the tabu of their relationship at about 11 or 12 years (that is, when both have passed this age), though there is some variation according to the relative age of the siblings involved.
'Ratu' (with one of his personal names). A man of clan (itokatoka) Wailailai, who has married the younger daughter of the present Chief's predecessor, addresses his wife as 'Adi'. The rule also applies between a parent and children. Thus the Chief's wife uses the titles in address and reference to her own children, but since she is not a chief, the children do not give her the title, Adi, in return.

As occupational status titles, Ratu and Adi are acquired by recruitment to the chiefly clan. The Chief's wife, for example, employs the titles for the children of her eldest three sons, all of whom have been recruited to the chiefly clan; but she does not use them for the children of her eldest daughter since they have not been recruited through their mother.

Since statistically there is an emphasis on recruitment through the father, the children of an 'Adi' tend not to acquire the titles while the children of a 'Ratu' generally do acquire them. However there are inconsistencies of usage that appear to be symptomatic of some weakening of the status title system. For example, while the head of Vuanimoli is addressed with 'Adi' and the group's active leader with 'Ratu', other members of Vuanimoli rarely have the status titles bestowed upon them by the villagers.

The chiefs are the most consistent in their use of the titles amongst themselves. The children of chiefs are taught from the moment they start talking

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1 I distinguish between 'head' and 'active leader' of a social group where the person acknowledged 'to lead' is resident in the village but does not command the organisation of the group's corporate activities. In the Vuanimoli case alluded to here, the 'head' is a woman who resides virilocally and whose attention and energy are for the most part focussed upon her husband's and children's interests in the matagali Nayaqona.
to say 'Ratu' to their father and 'Adi' to their mother, instead of the 'tata' and 'nana' used for non-chiefly parents. The Chief is called 'Ratu' by everyone in the District including (in reference) his two elder sisters. In turn, the Chief always employs the status titles for those who are prior to him in rank and are of chiefly status. This includes his two older sisters, his elder brother's children and those of his brother's grandchildren who have been recruited as chiefs. He may or may not use the status titles for chiefly persons of lower rank. Whether or not he does, is indicative of his mood and of his personal relationship with, and esteem for, the individual at the time.

Of considerable consequence in the organisation of MUALEVU society is that rank in itself does not determine succession to leadership at any political level. According to 'the way of the land', succession is a function of age-seniority. In other words custom endorses an ideal of sibling succession, veitaravi vakaveitacini. Like rank, age is a status determinant between persons acknowledging common descent, but it bears particularly upon those who share membership of the same kin group. The precedence of status which age seniority orders, however, is clearly different from that established by rank.

Diagram 11 depicts a hypothetical example of age-seniority and sibling succession to leadership of a

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1 Both sisters say they would not address their brother as 'Ratu', on the other hand nor would they address him by name. They both uphold the taboo relationship with their younger brother, which means they would rarely, if ever, speak directly to him except in private. To refer to him using the title Ratu appears to me to have an element of insisting upon chiefly respect from the third party, analogous, say, to referring to a famous friend by his title and name rather than by a Christian name or nickname before others who are of only slight acquaintance.
a descent group. It assumes the children of older siblings are born before the children of young siblings and that siblings die in the same order in which they are born. The children of female no.3 are recruited through their father, hence they do not appear in the line of succession and are not included in the Diagram. It is also assumed that the son of male no.8 is older than the son of male no.6. All members of the descent group are resident in the village. Female no. 3 is residing

![Diagram]

Key: Continuous line denotes parent-child relationship and recruitment. Order of birth in any one generation reads from left to right. Numbering refers to the order of succession to the leadership of the group.

Diagram 11. Age-status and Succession - the villagers' model.

virilocally, but is still resident in the village and this entails a distinction between headship (nominal leadership) and leadership (active leadership).¹ For example, if the group was involved in the preparation of a lovo, other things being equal, it would be male no.4 who would direct and take charge of its organisation.

¹ I shall also use the term leadership where nominal and active leadership are united in the same person.
The same terms 'gase' and 'gone' and the same grammatical construction are used to describe relative age-status as are employed for relative rank-status. This can be confusing (for the fieldworker) unless the context of a remark is clear. On being questioned further, an informant may elaborate upon a case of relative status by reference to a higher generation. Thus for a woman 'a', who is said to be 'senior' to a man 'B', the elaboration might be that the woman's FF and the man's FF were siblings and that the former was older than the latter and hence was of higher rank. Consequently, the woman 'a' ranks senior to the man 'B', though whether she is the older then requires further investigation.

The villagers assert that the line of succession should eventually return to the highest ranking founder-line. This in correlation with age seniority can ultimately exclude from succession lower-ranking collateral lines. In practice, rank seniority can be more influential than age seniority in determining succession, but whether it is may depend on other criteria, in particular residence and the relative 'abilities', rawata, of the candidates involved.

In the background of this conflict between the principles of rank and succession (rank status and age status) is the relationship between male siblings. The villagers' idealised version of this relationship is that male siblings should stick together, they should support and have affection for each other, have understanding of each other's interests and always follow the direction and command of the eldest. But they also acknowledge that the reality of the relationship does not live up to this expectation. The pronounced antipathy of male siblings is the rule rather than the exception.¹ This

¹ Within the extreme range of behaviour there is a good deal of variation.
antipathy carries over between brother and brother's children.

Diagram 12 provides details of the membership of the male founder-line of SOVEA, Ramasi Nadave at the time Ma'afu settled in Vanua Balavu. His eldest child and only son, LAISENIA, became Ramasi Nadave and may or may not have succeeded him. LAISENIA was the last title-holder to undergo a consecration ceremony (= bulia, lit. 'to be formed'). He was succeeded by his eldest son RADIKE.

Meanwhile, the membership of the clan Vuniivi had become drastically reduced. By 1920, RADIKE and his younger brother, MEREKE, were the only adult male members left. When RADIKE died some time before 1938, he was succeeded as Ramasi by MEREKE, the title being changed to Tui Nadave at the 1938 Lands Commission Enquiry.

MEREKE died, quite an old man, just prior to the 1965 Lands Commission Enquiry. It is evident that during his later years there was increasing friction between him and RADIKE's only son, ISEMELI. In the ordinary way this relationship of father's brother and brother's son is 'difficult'. The latter 'respects' the former.

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1 Cf. mandrai = bread, buli mandrai = a loaf of bread.

2 The villager differentiates between the types of inter-relationship he may have with a person (but note these are not hard and fast categories, those adjoining may overlap): forbidden; difficult (avoidance is practised but it is possible to talk); conversation is possible; story-telling and yarning is possible; joking, Fiji-fashion, is possible (swearing and sex jokes). These are translations of the Fijian terms. Another category, 'heavy', bibi, is frequently referred to by villagers, but cannot be placed in the above progression since it alludes to the obligations in a relationship, rather than the case of acquaintance. Thus both mother-in-law and brother-in-law (man speaking) are 'heavy' relationships, though one is characterised by strict avoidance and the other by what is technically termed a 'joking relationship', though this does not include joking 'Fiji-fashion'. 'Difficult', dredge, may also be used synonymously for 'heavy'.
Diagram 12. Succession to the Position of Ramasi Nadave/Tui Nadave.

KEY: Numbers after names indicate order of past succession to the position of Ramasi Nadave/Tui Nadave. Underlining indicates village residence; where residence is also virilocal, the husband is depicted. Continuous line denotes parent-child relationship and path of recruitment. Order of birth of children of a particular parent reads from left to right where names of children are indicated. Names of individuals under 20 years old with no children are not indicated (S = Son; D = Daughter). d = deceased.
He will tend to avoid him and speak only for information and not for conversation. But ISEMELI grew increasingly restless and impatient under the leadership of MEREKE and he began speaking of his own rights to leadership as the son of RADIKE. This rebelliousness led to a great deal of verbal quarrelling between the two men.

As MEREKE became increasingly old and enfeebled in mind, his eldest son, PITA, who had returned to the village in 1957, began to influence and guide him. PITA is the local boy who nearly made good. He managed to obtain a good education and was taken up by Ratu Sukuna and trained as his personal assistant. In this way he came to know many of the high status chiefs in the Administration in Suva. However, PITA fell to the temptation of helping himself to the goods that invitingly lay around and was caught diminishing the Administration's supplies of tabua. But prison does not lessen a man's prestige in MUALEVU, though it may prevent him acquiring further prestige outside his village or District. With little effort on his own part, PITA cannot help but be a leader in yavusa Nadave. At the moment, indeed, as the elected MUALEVU representative and spokesman to the Provincial Council, he is a leader of some standing in the District as a whole.

Apart from his education, administrative experience and contacts in high places, PITA has other accomplishments and advantages. He has no sons to take over his land, which is likely to revert for division among his brothers and their sons (assuming his daughters marry virilically). Probably because of his lack of sons, his division of the family coconut and land holdings was in no way favourable to himself, a fact which has played a considerable part in his ability to retain the compliance and respect of his younger brothers. His wife is a further strength to his position. She is from Kadavu and is the MUALEVU
District nurse. She remains slightly aloof from the other women of Nadave and more important, aloof from their quarrels, yet without incurring their resentment.

Consequent upon all these factors, PITA is one of the exceptions to the rule that brothers quarrel. His younger brothers may occasionally grumble about him, but they follow his advice and they obey him. Perhaps I am making this too strong, PITA is also a diplomat. He gauges the time to make his appearance and his authority felt. If one of his brothers is drunk, PITA will wait until he is sober before he remonstrates with him for whatever trouble may have been caused. PITA, himself, no longer drinks 'the white man's kava'. As any other man who strives to be a respected member of the community, he is a 'man of the church', an appointed lay preacher to whom alcohol is tabu. Even in his drinking of kava he exercises great moderation (within the District at any rate).

MEREKE died in November 1964 and it was PITA who organised the funeral feast, "a truly great affair". But in the settlement of the succession to MEREKE, there was no dispute, no challenge to ISEMELI's right as the next eldest male in the founder-line and eldest in the line of ulu matua to replace him. All PITA's abilities and accomplishments stood for nothing here in face of ISEMELI's clear seniority in both years and in rank.

ISEMELI is the present Tui Nadave, but he has neither the prestige nor the numerical support in Nadave which is PITA's and he cannot compete with the superior accomplishments of his rival. Soon after the accession of ISEMELI an event of major importance occurred, the

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1 The point here is that as MEREKE's successor ISEMELI should have been the main organiser. PITA took command probably to ensure that the feast was as splendid as he desired it to be.
arrival of the Lands Commission Enquiry of 1965-6. But it was PITA, not ISEMELI, who acted as the representative (mata) for yavusa Nadave and for the matagali Vuniivi. Two years later when the District was due to elect its first elected representative to the Provincial Council of Lau, it was PITA whom the Chief urged to stand against the candidates already put up, and against both of whom the Buli was opposed. When ISEMELI damaged his knee and was sent to hospital in Srva, PITA automatically assumed the position of 'acting' (vakatawa) Tui Nadave. After an absence of two years, ISEMELI returned to Mualevu with his leg amputated at the knee. He is now more or less permanently confined to the Nadave area of the village, at least until he learns to use his crutches with more dexterity.

"ISEMELI is a difficult man" asserts PITA, 'the matagali should work and act together, but ISEMELI makes this impossible. Always he puts his own interests and those of his family first.' PITA, is prepared to lay the blame on ISEMELI's wife, a woman from matagali Nayagona: 'A bad woman always causing trouble and dissension and speaking intemperately. A wife should help her husband in "going straight" but she is always there "leading to the left".' But PITA condemns ISEMELI for being weak in following her advice and urging.¹

Between the accession of LAISENIA and that of ISEMELI there has been no dispute involved over succession to the position and title of Tui Nadave; but there has

¹ The villagers (including the women) lay the blame for the discrepancy between their idealised version of the relationship between male siblings and the reality upon the acquisitive and quarrelsome nature of the wives. Though I would say this is by no means the whole truth, it is certainly a sizeable part of it.
also been no serious conflict between rank and age status. When MERÈKE succeeded RADIKE he was considerably older than his elder brother's son, ISEMELI. On the death of ISEMELI, however, rank and age status are going to be in conflict (assuming that PITA, who is about fifteen years the junior of ISEMELI, and his brother LEDUA have not died in the meantime). ISEMELI has no brothers, thus the next eldest in the eldest-head founder-line will be ISEMELI's eldest son, WAQA. But within SOVEA's founder-line, the eldest after ISEMELI is PITA, some seven years older than WAQA. After PITA is LEDUA, who is two years older than WAQA.

There is no unanimity within the matagali\(^1\) as to who will succeed ISEMELI. I am not certain whether WAQA actually believes he will follow his father, but he certainly considers he should do so. Both his father and mother state quite firmly that he will precede PITA.\(^2\)

PITA avoids committing himself (at least he does so to me) on the question of the succession. In answer to my inquiries he agrees that age-seniority and accomplishments are influential in determining succession, though adding that it would be incorrect at custom for accomplishments such as education and experience of government office to have any weight. In our conversations on the subject he would invariably conclude by saying that on the death of ISEMELI it was his intention to hold a meeting of the members of the matagali to discuss and determine the succession (this appears to have been customary practice

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1 The membership of SOVEA's founder-line coincides with the membership of itokatoka Vatuvara and of the matagali Vuniivi.

2 But I suspect that the confidence with which they made their assertion was for my own benefit.
in Lau and Cakaudrove when a succession was in doubt).\footnote{Cf. The missionary Williams' account of the succession to the title of Tui Cakau. The old king was buried (and Williams leaves us in no doubt that he was, in fact, buried alive) and his eldest son, a man of strong character and a large following, was consecrated as the new Tui. A few days later the fence of the new Tui's house was struck violently with a club, indicating that the succession was opposed. The new Tui was counselled by his 'advisers' to yield to this threat and a few days later they arranged for the dead Tui's younger brother to be consecrated and installed as Tui Cakau. Note Williams' conclusion on this affair: 'Ralulu [the yB] will have the name, I suppose, and Tuilaila [the eBeS] will have the power'. (Henderson: 1931:II, 316-22).}

PITA steadfastly endeavoured to prevent me gaining the impression that he expected to be the next Tui Nadave.

Most villagers when comparing the two men will maintain something to the effect that WAQA is a weaker man and that he has not accomplished anything. General opinion is that PITA will follow ISEMELI if he wants to. PITA will certainly be the popular candidate of the matagali and it is likely that only WAQA himself will be in opposition. WAQA's mother will no longer have influence in the matagali once her husband has died: she is a member of another matagali and she is also highly unpopular. WAQA's brothers, though often only luke-warm in their support of PITA, have intense grievances against and rivalry with their eldest brother. WAQA, with his father's support, is trying to keep the family coconut lands for his own use and he has already forced two of his brothers to leave the village for Suva. These two brothers have now been replaced in the struggle by another, ANARE, who has so far managed to withstand WAQA's onslaught and, indeed, has managed to score off him in
various ways.1

The interplay of rank and age-status with its correlation of sibling and avuncular antagonism is demonstrated in the past succession to the position of Tui Yaro (v. Diagram 13). The title is held by the founder-line of TAVUTU, the membership of which now constitutes the itokatoka Navusaga. The title passed from JIUA to each of his sons in order of age seniority, except for the youngest who had gone to Tonga as a young man (and was alive there in 1969). When SAIRUSI died in the late 1950s both TANIELA and JIMI were absent from the village and LIESA became the acting Tui Yaro. TANIELA returned to Mualevu before the arrival of the Lands Commission Enquiry in 1965. During the preliminary arrangements to the Enquiry LIESA endeavoured to have himself confirmed in the title, but this was rejected by the members of the yavusa Yaro and TANIELA was officially recorded as the Tui.

TANIELA is uncertain who will follow him (JIMI died in 1966). He states that if his eldest son, FILIPE, had been registered to matagali Nautu, then he would undoubtedly have succeeded him: but FILIPE has been registered to his mother's matagali in Cikobia. Sometimes TANIELA would say that LIESA would probably succeed him, at other times he would claim that VALE, his second son, would do so.

Most of the older men in the village agree

1 Just prior to my arrival, a fight occurred between the two. WAQA, urged on by his father, attempted to throw ANARE, family and baggage out of the latter's house (built by ISEMELI). ANARE won the physical bout that followed and hostilities have since been less open. Prior to this event, ANARE had been aggravated by his father and had knocked him down. On ISEMELI's initiative this had gained ANARE a five pound fine in the local court.
Diagram 13. Succession to the Position of Tui Yaro.
with TANIELA that if FILIPE had been registered to matagali Nautu he would have succeeded his father as Tui Yaro (despite the fact that FILIPE is younger than LIESA). FILIPE himself accepts this, though he insists that he would still have had to pay 'respect' to LIESA as his elder and as his 'little father'.

LIESA appears to have been a man of some accomplishment in the village. He took a leading part in the formation of the Dakuwaga Co-operative and has served as one or other of its officers at different times. He was the government village headman for a while and has been a member of the village school committee. His position vis-à-vis VALE, however, is weakened by the fact that he has been resident in Suva for the past four years and is unlikely to return to the village in the near future, unless he is prepared to face the wrath of the villagers. While serving as treasurer on the Village School Committee, he 'ate' the monies (school fees) provided by the villagers as their share of the government appointed headmaster's salary. LIESA left for Suva before his crime came to light and was then protected from the villagers' desire for retribution by the Chief, his brother-in-law.

TANIELA and his sons showed a keen antipathy for LIESA and his sister, the Chief's wife. They maintained, for instance, that LIESA should have been taken to court for his offence. This ill-feeling reflected the relationship that had existed in the previous generation between the brothers PAULA and JONE.

1 They were also inclined to joke about it since they are 7th Day Adventist and subscribe to a separate school.
a 7th Day Adventist missionary, had spent many years in Tonga accompanied by his son. They had returned to Mualevu prior to the 1938 Lands Commission Enquiry and a prolonged quarrel had then broken out between PAULA and his younger brothers over possession of the Tui title and control of the family coconut lands. The Commission settled the dispute in PAULA's favour but the quarrelling between the two families has continued.

Susana, LIESA's elder sister and the Chief's wife, is now the only representative of the junior collateral lines who is resident in the village. She is a woman of very strong personality, not frightened to speak out at village meetings. She is also highly unpopular among the villagers: her voice is 'loud and bad'. On TANIELA's death, LIESA is unlikely to gain re-acceptance and recognition through her influence with the matagali, and it seems probable that VALE, a quiet, industrious, young man of about 30 years, will be accepted by the matagali as successor.

Young men who hold leadership positions, whether titled or not, invariably evoke comment from the villagers on their youthfulness. Hocart cites a Lauan informant as saying that older men were preferred as Chiefs since

1 Though TANIELA will accept no other description of his 'small fathers' than that of 'bad, stupid men', he still maintains the source of all the quarrelling was JONE's wife who was continually urging her husband to oppose his eldest brother. The old lady is still alive and resident in the village to-day and is still as heartily disliked by TANIELA.

2 Any influence that her husband, the Chief, might have had, is negated by his own unpopularity among the members of the matagali Nautu. The majority of the latter are close kin of the Chief's principal enemy in the village and/or are 7th Day Adventists, who regard their Wesleyan Chief as a persecutor.
their actions were more temperate and less hasty and 'the land' therefore benefited; whereas a man 'with all his teeth' might bring ruin on the land with his ventures. Certainly there can be disadvantages in having a relatively young man as a leader, as the Cikobia villagers were able to point out to me.

In Cikobia, the first Tui Cikobia was consecrated at about the time Christianity came to the Exploring Group. The title was held by a chiefly founder-line from the clan Rara, in the village Lomaji. Ratu SAILUSI ¹ was offered the title after his eldest sister had refused it. He was succeeded in turn by his elder and younger sons, JONE and PITA (v. Diagram 14). They were then followed by JONE's younger son TUKANA (the older daughter and son predeceased PITA). The latter was succeeded by PITA's son, JEKE.

When JEKE died, the position of Tui remained vacant until the arrival of the 1938 Lands Commission. TUKANA's son, ISIRELΙ, who was the government village headman, was then chosen as Tui at a village meeting. The 7th Day Adventists in Cikobia, a small minority in the village, assert SOVEA, the representative of the ulumatua founder-line, was passed over because he was a 7th Day Adventist. The Wesleyans, that is the rest of the village, maintain ISIRELΙ was the 'stronger', the more 'accomplished' man.

ISIRELΙ died in 1961 and was succeeded by the eldest child of his marriage, BOLE. (The eldest child, LUTU, a 'path-child', had long been resident in Suva). There was no meeting of the matagali or the village to

¹ All individuals mentioned by name in the following discussion are given status titles (as members of a chiefly founder-line) by the Cikobia villagers. For the sake of the appearance of the text (the titles have to be underlined) I shall omit these titles in the discussion.
Diagram 14. Succession to the Position of Tui Cikobia.

KEY: Numbers after names indicate order of past succession to the position of Tui Cikobia. Underlining indicates village residence; where residence is also virilocal, the husband is depicted. Continuous line denotes parent-child relationship and path of recruitment. Order of birth of children of a particular parent reads from left to right where names of children are indicated. Name of individuals under 20 years with no children are not indicated (S = Son; D = Daughter). d = deceased.
decide this succession; BOLE organised his father's funeral magiti and assumed the title and the villagers acknowledged him. BOLE, however, was a young man still in his twenties and knew little about 'traditional and ceremonial things'. Moreover he was clumsy in his speech making, an enormous handicap to any Fijian who seeks or is obliged to be in the public eye. The villagers became more 'shamed' with each public demonstration of his ineptitude. To make matters worse he began keeping company with the youths of the village, drinking kava and sometimes beer with them.

The younger Tui had already alienated himself from many of the older villagers, including his uncles, the children of JEKE, when in a quarrel in the village Co-operative Society he had sided with the 7th Day Adventist storeman and joined the latter in leaving the Society. A further dispute then broke out when the two men demanded their share of the Society's cess funds, to which they had contributed in the past. The two men took the dispute to Suva. The entire cess fund of the Society was subsequently placed in cold storage until an agreement could be reached between the disputants - which was not effected for five years. Having left the Society, BOLE joined with the few 7th Day Adventist men of the village and two other disaffected ex-members in forming a new Co-operative.

The Tui's unpopularity with a majority of the village was completed in 1964. Under the influence of his 7th Day Adventist friends he changed his religion. Among other things, this entailed changing his day of sabbath observance and forsaking both alcohol and kava. While this meant that BOLE had to give up his young drinking companions, it also made it more difficult than ever for him to preside as Tui. Any MUALEVU ceremonial occasion, whatever its degree of importance, is always accompanied by kava-drinking.
Probably it was forewarning of the coming of another Lands Commission Enquiry that spurred JEKE's children to action. With their eldest sister, Seini, as spokesman, they formally approached BOLE and, offering whaleteeth, requested that he might yield up the title to MARA. Seini asserted that it was right that he should do so for he was still only a young man. Her brother was a mature man and BOLE's 'little father' and it was 'shameful' for him that he was not the Tui. BOLE surrendered his title without objection and MARA was recorded as the Tui Cikobia by the Lands Commission.

After several years of being a staunch 7th Day Adventist, BOLE has now returned to old pursuits, drinking kava and sometimes beer with the village youths. Also he has ceased attending church. He left the smaller Co-operative after a quarrel with the other members who refused to advance him more money to finish building his house.

One night, when very drunk, BOLE badly beat up his wife, who promptly left him to stay in a 7th Day Adventist household. The men shake their heads and say he does not act in a chiefly way. They make fun of him behind his back. They point out that he now has only half a house and no wife. Had not his sisters been visiting the village, they assert with a smile, he would have had no one to cook for him. Meanwhile the village women gossip and claim his wife is having an affair with her host. Added to BOLE's troubles is the fact he has

1 Seini was residing patrivrilocally in Mavana village.

2 BOLE justified his action to me on the grounds of his religion's tabu on the drinking of kava. He cited chapter and verse to the effect that it was better to be an ordinary man and not sin, than be a prince and sin.
no children. Many of the villagers attribute this to his marrying 'too close' (he married his mata ni veiwa'i, v. Appendix 1 p. 358) and they hint at divine retribution.

MARA, the new Tui, is semi-permanently resident (with his family) on the American owned estate of Naitauba island and rarely visits the village. His younger brother, VOLO, is the acting Tui Cikobia. The villagers are of the firm opinion that it will be VOLO who will succeed his elder brother as Tui on the latter's death. The only dissentient is BOLE, now deeply regretting his action of giving up the title.

The interplay of age-status and rank-status is epitomized in the past succession to the Chiefship. Moreover, it has survived the administration's attempt to establish a pre-determined principle of succession.

Succession to the Chiefship has been dominated by the rivalry of two related founder-lines in the chiefly founder-lineage Senimoli (now itokatoka Senimoli). I have reconstructed the genealogy of these founder-lines (v. Diagram 15) by supplementing the knowledge of informants with the details provided in the Official Tale of Origin of the administrative yavusa Senimoli.¹ Two customary

¹ The Tale was based upon the deliberations of a meeting(s) of the chiefly clan members in 1937 or 1938 - though as I have already pointed out all such tales were adapted to a master plan of administrative origin. The information it offers has to be accepted with reservations, not only on account of this master plan, but also because individuals were clearly concerned to promote their own interests. The genealogical information that is given in the Senimoli Tale of Origin probably comes from the then Chief, Ratu TOMASI, a man in his late sixties or older. There was little agreement among my own informants as to the chronological order of precedence of named ancestors beyond Ratu TEVITA and Ratu VILIAME (v. Diagram 15) and it is possible (though not necessarily so) that the genealogy has been telescoped at further ascending generations.
Diagram 15. Succession to the Positions of Tui Mavana and Sau Mualevu and Appointments to the Office of Buli MUALEVU.
titles are involved: Sau Mualevu, the leadership title of the clan Mualevu and Tui Mavana, the leadership title of the D(d)istrict. The only occasion on which the titles have been held contemporaneously by different individuals was at the time of the creation of the Tui Mavana title. The title was refused on grounds of old age by the then Sau, Ratu Kaba, in favour of his younger brother, Ratu ROI. Since the Cession the office of government District Chief, Buli, has also been the object of this chiefly rivalry and has, in fact, played a considerable part in determining succession to the customary leadership.

I was able to discover little about QORINIASI,1 the Tui Mavana at the time of Ma'afu and the first Buli MUALEvu to be appointed, beyond the fact that he had Ma'afu's confidence and was predeceased by his immediate patriarch and children (possibly a result of the measles epidemic of 1875). On his death he was succeeded as Tui Mavana by SEKOPE, who was also appointed Buli. (SEKOPE's father was still alive at the time but he was an old man stricken with leprosy and was being cared for in Boitaci village). A strong rivalry developed between SEKOPE and his 'little father', APENISA.

APENISA's father's father had been the Chief in Kanacea. The sale of the island, however, had obliged the inhabitants to migrate and APENISA's father had first taken up matrilocal residence in Boitaci and then had settled with the Daku peoples (in the Daliconi area). Later he moved to his wife's village, Mualevu. APENISA was not born in Mualevu but through his mother he had the

1 Status titles will be omitted in the discussion that follows.
status of 'great vasu' to the District (the villagers disagree as to whether or not he was re-recruited to the chiefly clan Mualevu). His influence in the District was enhanced by several years as a Wesleyan catechist in different parts of Fiji and, on his return to Vanua Balavu, by his appointment as local magistrate. Thus he became a formidable rival to SEKOPE.

SEKOPE's only son, LEPANI, predeceased him and when sometime after the death of APENISA SEKOPE was retired from the office of Buli, 1 his eldest son's son, MATAI, was still a boy and unable to challenge Ratu APENISA's eldest son, CAMA (classificatory grandfather to MATAI), for the appointment of Buli. CAMA, who was suffering from some debilitating disease, died shortly after taking this office and was succeeded by TOMASI.

When SEKOPE then died there was no rival to dispute TOMASI's acceptance in the District as Chief.

TOMASI brought up the children of LEPANI in his own household. Whether it was by design, or by the relative aptitude of the two youths concerned, his own eldest son, MUA, received a far better education than MATAI, the eldest son of LEPANI. While MATAI remained in the village, MUA qualified as a school teacher, receiving appointments in various areas of Fiji before returning to Mualevu a few years prior to the arrival of the 1938 Land Commission. When TOMASI retired as Buli, it was MUA, not the older and more senior ranking MATAI, who was appointed in his place. It was MUA, moreover, who acted as the official representative of the yavusa

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1 SEKOPE was retired, on the complaint of a 7th Day minister, for his constant disruption of the 7th Day Adventist services. He was replaced as Buli by a man from Lakeba who was then followed by PAULA, the Tui Yaro. CAMA and TOMASI conspired successfully to bring about the latter's rapid dismissal.
Senimoli at the hearings of the Commission. (His father declined on the grounds of old age).

At the 1938 Lands Commission Enquiry, MATAI made a determined bid to secure the Chiefship. He was naturally obliged to rest his bid on grounds of legitimacy and he based his argument on the priority of rank. He bolstered it with the assertion that his grandfather, SEKOPE, had made a will leaving to him 'everything that was his'. But MATAI was at a great disadvantage in contention with the superior education and experience of Ratu MUA (abundantly clear in their speeches recorded in the Evidence Books). He was, moreover, endeavouring to oust a rival (TOMASI) who had not only been respected as Chief, but had also served 'honourably' for a long period as an administrative official (i.e. Buli).

The Commission pronouncing upon the 'correct', customary mode of succession to the Chiefship, asserted it to be by seniority of age within the chiefly founder-lineage group Senimoli, and that the rightful 'Leader', iliuliul, of the District was TOMASI. According to this ruling, MATAI became heir apparent. Thus, if his challenge had not been a success, he had at least ensured his precedence in succession over MUA, the Buli. But MATAI's fortune quickly improved. TOMASI died immediately after the departure of the Commission, which in the minds

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1 The position of his rivals had been strengthened by MUA's marriage to Ratu MATAI's sister, Sara, a marriage very much opposed by MATAI and one which, indeed, was much gossiped about in the District for it was inter-generational - Sara used to call MUA, 'little father', - and furthermore the two had been brought up in the same household. However, MUA had then been absent from MUALEVU for some years as a schoolmaster. (This pre-marital absence of one of the partners is common in close kin marriages).
of many villagers was no coincidence and amounted to a more meaningful legitimisation of Ratu MATAI's position. Within a year of his father's death, MUA was reported to the Suva authorities by a revenge seeking Tui Voro (v. supra p.150 n.1) for embezzling the communally collected village provincial tax. He was deprived of his office of Buli and was replaced by MATAI.

MATAI retired as Buli in 1957 and his younger half-brother CATI was appointed in his place. MUA died the following year. When MATAI died in 1963, the inadequacy of the 1938 Commission's ruling became apparent for the first time. CATI's attempt to have himself accepted as Tui Mavana was challenged by his arch-enemy, MAIKELI, the youngest brother of MUA. MAIKELI cited the 1938 ruling and insisted that his brother's widow (and CATI's eldest (half) sister) was the rightful successor.

MAIKELI is a man who by sheer force of character commands considerable respect in the District and not less from those who most dislike him. He began arrangements for a meeting of the chiefs and the masi, the titled headmen of the villages of the District, in order to discuss and determine the succession. Perhaps

Witnesses had to give evidence on oath. Ratu Sukuna himself, clearly did not have the greatest confidence in what witnesses had to say. His favourite remark (according to the older villagers) was to invite the witness to 'come along and dream here', 'tadra mai'.

To forestall the consequences of another case of embezzlement according to many villagers.

MAIKELI is a man who has ingeniously taken advantage of imported democratic procedures to reveal to his fellow villagers, at the expense of the dignity of high status Fijian Chiefs, just how chiefly his spirit (valo) is. Not surprisingly he is a bête noire of the Native Lands Commission officials.
sensing his impending defeat, CATI hurried off to consult the Native Lands Commission authorities in Suva. He returned to Mualevu shortly after Sara had been chosen as the next Tui Mavana. With MAIKELI providing the lead, there was even talk of reviving the consecration ceremony for her. CATI's message from Suva was to the effect that women were not eligible to succeed and that he was to be accepted as the Chief.

Amongst the villagers to-day, there is no agreement as to who is Tui Mavana - Sara or CATI - or, indeed, whether there can be a Tui Mavana without formal consecration. (The villagers will make the distinction between 'in name only' and 'consecrated in the customary way'). It is noticeable that CATI uses only the title of Sau Mualevu. He tells me that he must arrange to be formally consecrated, but as far as I know he has never made any attempt to have this accomplished. Sara now resides in Suva and rarely visits MUALEVU and it is CATI who is acknowledged by the resident villagers as Chief. His authority as an administrative official has gone, however: the office of Buli was abolished at the beginning of 1968 in the re-organisation of the Fijian Administration.

The ruling of 1938 has not provided the clear principle of succession that Ratu Sukuna had hoped of it. This had been apparent in the disputed succession of 1963 and is likely to be again so on the death of CATI. Those Mualevu chiefs who might qualify for succession on the basis of age, patently disqualify themselves on other grounds.

The oldest of MUA's surviving sons, JOSEFA

1 The oldest son, LEPANI, a leper and long resident in Suva, died in 1969 during my second field trip.
and ILA, have both been very long resident (more than twenty years) in Suva and with little land or cash income available to them in Mualevu they show no inclination to return. CAGI and SEPETI (v. Diagram 15) are both resident in the village, but in terms of land and material possessions they are two of the poorest men in the village, while in terms of the (Fijian) qualities of leadership and organising ability the personalities of both men are as bare as their houses.

In other circumstances, the obvious male successor to CATI, by reason of both his rank and age statuses and his capabilities and strength of character, would have been his arch-enemy, MAIKELI. But MAIKELI was registered to his mother's clan, Rara (now itokatoka Rara) and is excluded from the line of succession.

When CATI is absent from the village, his elder brother's eldest son, KOLI, assumes the Chiefship. On these occasions he is often to be seen in CATI's

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1 I have never heard either man given the respect title in reference or in address.

2 MAIKELI has kept up a long standing tradition of the rival chiefly families by continually writing notes of complaint about the incumbent Chief and Buli to the authorities in Suva.

I should point out that this rivalry does not completely polarise the two families into political blocs. The antipathy between brothers, as existed between MATAI and CATI, and between Ratu MUA and Ratu MAIKELI, was extremely bitter and led to sympathies cross-cutting the rivalry of the family leaders. The antipathy is evident in the younger generation, particularly between Ratu DELAI, SEPETI and KISO, as well as between generations, particularly between MAIKELI and DELAI and to a lesser extent between CATI and KOLI. In most of these cases the wives have played a prominent part in the quarrels.
and sometimes he takes meals with CATI's family. On these occasions he sits at the head of the table and receives the respectful clapping (cobo) at the end of his meal.

The majority of villagers think KOLI will succeed CATI.¹ They refer to his rank and point out that he is the eldest-head of the eldest-head founder-line of VILIAME. They also refer to his residence and age-status, but here the villagers emphasize the fact that he is the eldest of LEPANI's grandchildren and while many state that he is also older than MUA's only resident child, DELAI, little or no mention is otherwise made of the descendants of APENISA.

Although the villagers are fairly unanimous that KOLI will become the next Chief, they also do not hesitate to observe how ill-fitted he is for the position. Their favourite allusion is to his large chiefly house. This is in such disrepair and leaking so badly that KOLI has had to abandon it and squeeze himself and his family into a small wooden house, while his widowed mother is obliged to take refuge in the tumbledown kitchen. 'Ratu SHEEP',² they chuckle, 'will be one big joke of a chief'. But though he is an incompetent organiser and a lazy, inefficient gardener, KOLI is not without the dignity and tone of command that is recognised as 'chiefly'. Moreover he is well acquainted with ceremonial custom and is well-practised in public speech-making. He is by no means another BOLE and no challenger has disputed the claim he is establishing to succeed CATI.

¹ After CATI, CAGI and SEPETI, KOLI is the eldest resident member of the chiefly itokatoka Senimoli.

² KOLI is a lay preacher and the sobriquet reflects the familiarity of the Districts' Wesleyan congregations with his somewhat limited repertoire of sermon texts.
The examples that have been provided in this Chapter illustrate the fact that succession in MUALEVU does not follow any order of precedence pre-determined by an ascribed status. Even when an official ruling was made designating a principle of legitimate succession, this served as a further consideration, not the consideration, in the determination of succession.

The ascribed statuses of descent, rank and age certainly operate as principles of exclusion in restricting possible candidancy for a position of leadership, but they do not necessarily pinpoint a particular successor. The variables of personal qualities, accomplishments and capabilities also come into play, interrelating with the particular circumstantial considerations. Yet the importance of personal attributes and capabilities is in itself a reflection and support of the strength of the claim of age-status over that of mere rank status.

There is in MUALEVU a pronounced cultural bias towards the precedence of age over youth. Age is wisdom and experience, 'Youth is foolishness'. The fact that a man is older implies that he does, or should, possess the superior capability of leadership that comes with greater maturity. A younger man may resent the respect that his culture demands he should pay to an older 'little father', but he nevertheless recognises that it has to

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1 This needs some qualification in reference to the pre-colonial era. There are a few instances in which junior status founder-lineages have acquired and retained leadership titles. Navusaga, the itokatoka that now holds the title of Tui Yaro, is possibly an instance, at least there are some stories in the village to the effect.

2 The Fijian word is matua; it is not derived from the English.
given and self-consciousness of his own youth and inexperience plays a major role in his genuine acquiescence

BOLE's self-awareness of his own inadequacies for the role of Tui epitomizes this situation.

But there is another aspect: it is not possible to play the mature man during the day and the youth at night. Sooner or later a man has to make the decision to abandon youthfulness. I am not speaking here of gradual processes and intangibilities. It is a real decision that is made, marking a genuine change of life.

Though there is no formal passage ritual, there are pursuits and a way of living associated with maturity and there are those associated with youth: between them they demarcate a great divide.

When LEDUA (the government village headman, and also the village's best singer and one of the better fighters around the home-brew pot) decided to become a lay preacher, a special drinking party was arranged. Friday was to be his final fling, the alcoholic menopause that all male villagers recognise as an inevitable event in their lives. The laughing, singing, sweating LEDUA of that Friday night was in marked contrast to the sweating LEDUA in jacket, white shirt, tie, best sulu and sandals, who two months later strained and stuttered

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1 As opposed to the formality of observance.

2 The younger brother of PITA, v. supra Diagram 12.

3 When a specific drinking-session is arranged there are always elaborate precautions taken to hide the home-brew beer (wives may arrange for someone to drop salt in it or someone else may steal it) and keep in restricted circulation, though generally unsuccessfully, the details of time and place of the session.

4 The Fijian wrap-around 'skirt'. For formal wear, it is made of European suiting cloth and has pockets fitted.
a way through his *viva* examination on the Bible before the assembled, and clearly critical, Wesleyan lay preachers of the village. But men enjoy the freedom of youth and are not over-eager to yield it for the respectability of maturity. They will take the path to church, eventually, they say, but not now, later.

It is within the descent unit of siblings and their children that the principle of fraternal succession is most patently subscribed to by the villagers. Here the chances are that the range of difference in rank status will be at its smallest, while that of age-status will be at its greatest. The 'generation gap', in other words is at its most pronounced.

In a group of classificatory siblings and their children, such as that now constituting *matagali* Vuniivi (v. Diagram 12), the difference in the intergenerational range of rank status increases, while that of age-status is most likely to decrease. Thus, WAQA, the eldest-head of the eldest-head founder-line, is older than his little father, JOSA and only a year or so younger than LEDUA. While WAQA is at a distinct disadvantage in

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1 This was followed by the greater ordeal of preaching a sermon at the regular evening service.

2 'Youth' (*cauravou*) is not delimited by a particular age-limit and in this way is similar to the English usage; however it does cover a wider age-range. Men in their late thirties, with a half-dozen children, may be called 'youths'; they are still immature according to MUALEVU values. In the stricter, relative usage, anyone can be compared as a youth (again like the English usage).

3 Youth is in no way a shameful episode in life; middle-aged (*ua bula*) and old (*gase*) men boast with pride of their prodigious feats as young men.

4 Which may or may not constitute a named social unit of a particular taxonomic level.
in any challenge he might make to PITA's claim to succession as Tui Nadave, he will be in a much stronger position vis-à-vis LEDUA, assuming that in the meantime WAQA breaks with the wild ways of youth and his 'attitude', yalo, becomes 'mature'.

Even should LEDUA succeed PITA and should WAQA outlive LEDUA, WAQA is not assured of succession. There is also in MUALEVU support for the idea that succession, once it has passed to a younger sibling, should then pass to the remaining resident siblings before returning to the eldest-head founder-line of the younger generation. In other words, even where seniority of age-status and of rank-status coincide, there is no assurance of precedence in succession. Though I have no example to offer, this does suggest one way in which a senior ranking founder-line, unless it resists, can lose right of a title of leadership. WAQA, who is intent on driving out from the village all his brothers to give himself a monopoly of access to his father's and mother's coconut groves, is also driving out the support he will probably need in the future to secure the title for himself.

Where a titled leadership is at stake, the bias towards age-status in determining succession is not so developed. This appears to have been particularly

1 Old age that becomes senility loses the impact of its status and in the past has been a not infrequent reason for exclusion from succession to a title.

2 This could occur in Mavana village. The present Tu Kebuka (the title of the village headman) is a youngest brother. He succeeded an older brother (in 1964) although his eldest brother's eldest son had been long resident in the village and is probably five or six years his senior. In Cikobia, it is probable that the title of Tui will pass from brother to brother in a junior collateral line.
true of pre-colonial days, both in MUALEVU and in other areas of Fiji, and is not so evident in MUALEVU to-day. Especially where a chiefly title was involved, there was as much likelihood of succession from father to son, as brother to brother. This, I think, can be understood partly in terms of privileged upbringing and partly as a result of the much wider political arena involved in such succession.

Chiefly children are brought up in chiefly homes. Apart from the formal instruction they would receive, they would be continual witnesses of custom and ceremonial, of the command and style of the Chief and of the deference of the people. And this was a deference in which the Chief's children, too, would be obliged to join. In Mualevu village, to-day, the chiefly household is detected not by the size or style of the house, nor by the richness of its interior, but by the formalities of custom at mealtimes. As far as knowledge of the 'customs of the land' valavala vakavanua, and familiarity with the ways of leadership and command were concerned, a Chief's son was unlikely to be placed at great disadvantage by the superior age-status of a little father.

But there is another factor in the uncertainty of chiefly and titled succession. The more inclusive the unit acknowledging a particular office of leadership, the greater the possibility of factional division over a question of succession. Though much may still depend on the relative strengths of rival candidates themselves, the issue can be taken out of their hands and settled by an interested non-candidate. Thus the powerful TUILAILA, newly consecrated as the paramount Chief of Cakaudrove in succession to his father, was obliged to withdraw in favour of the weak-willed younger brother of his father (v. supra p. 138 n.1). Similarly
the Buli, Ratu CATI, was obliged to hurry to Suva to seek powerful allies in order to secure his Chiefship and prevent his enemy acquiring the influence of kingmaker.

So far this chapter has been involved with an examination of the mode of succession to leadership and with the statuses, attributes and capabilities demanded of eligible candidacy. My principal concern had been to draw attention to the co-existence of two, opposed features. There is a pronounced cultural bias in favour of sibling succession which is based on the precedence of age-status. There is also a cultural accentuation of the eminence of the 'eldest-head', that is of primogenital 'seniority', which orders rank-status. This cultural dual emphasis on distinct orders of ascribed status has been a considerable factor in the inability of customarily determined leadership to adjust to economic developments in the modern period.

The substance of leadership is the command of resources. In MUALEVU, this meant command of men and of their labour and production. The villagers make this implicit in their assessment of the authority of customary chiefly leadership of the past. The Chief did not need land because he had people: 'The Chief... they comment, 'just sat and food was brought to him'. This command over production was not merely the hallmark of chiefly authority, it was integral to customary leadership regardless of the exclusiveness of the

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2 There is a degree of literal truth in the statement but it is primarily a figurative expression. Meanan usage is the same (v. Sahlins: 1962: 342).
political or social group. Correlated with it was a
cultural obsession with the social significance of
food.

With an environment which, apart from occasional
hurricanes and short drought, smiled benignly on
horticulture (and so on pig husbandry) and supplied a
permanently available harvest from the sea, returns
of large surpluses of foodstuffs in MUALEVU have been
attainable with relatively little effort. As an
exploitable social asset, however, food was of a limited
value. It is true that in a few forms it could be stored,¹
but mostly it was highly perishable. In addition, its
very abundance meant that others were not in need and
that there was no market of exchange, factors discouraging
the individual's accumulation of an asset through saving
(i.e. storage).

Discouragement of saving and lack of a market
demand limited the disposal worth of food to the less
tangible returns from giving it away. That is to say
the contractual emphasis was placed on the act of giving
rather than on what was given. I am not implying that
what was given² was irrelevant to the transaction, this
was far from the case. To take an example which, while
not exactly parallel, is sufficiently illuminating. The
villagers say that a whale tooth is 'merely a whale tooth',
regardless of its size, type, weight, colour, sheen.
Furthermore, they assert that several whale teeth

¹ Yams can be stored for at least a year, probably longer.
In the past era of warfare, Fijians often kept within the
village, communal stores of fermented breadfruit (the
breadfruit was buried in order to ferment in the ground)
in the event of having to withstand a siege.

² V. Nayacalou's account (1955a:440-50) of kerekere,
'requesting', as a system of individual, as opposed to
group, exchange.
are the same as a single whale tooth. But in reality the villagers are highly conscious of the differences in whale teeth, including quantity, and will praise particular qualities.¹ What, perhaps, epitomizes the villagers' keen eye for these qualities is the fact that whale teeth on sale in a village store carry different price tags.

With the contractual emphasis on the giving combined with this subjective evaluation of the gift, a strong bias towards a system of continuing prestations is likely to develop. A gift must not be exactly 'repaid' to do this would be to shift the contractual emphasis from the giving to an evaluation of the gift. For a MUALEVU villager to reply to a gift of twelve taro with twelve taro of the same size and quality would carry, even after an elapse of time, the plainest implication that he wished to be absolved, not only of any obligation, but of any relationship with the original donor. 'Repayment' means termination of contract and since taro still belongs to the 'customary path' in modern MUALEVU, the contract terminated would be that involved in the giving, not that involved in what is given.

Food was in a sense, a kind of currency, a medium of establishing, representing or consolidating ties and obligations of social relationships. Its cultural significance is reflected in idiomatic usage, particularly in reference to the land. A person working a piece of land is said to 'eat' that land; persons who together work the land are said to 'eat together'.

¹ On one occasion a less common type of whale tooth, with two pointed ends, appeared in the village. The owner resolutely refused to make a 'swap' with me pointing out that this kind of whale tooth was unusual.
Where abundance of supply devalues, rarity can only occur with sheer quantity.¹ In the past, communal ceremonial occasions (which include the life-crisis ceremonies of individual villagers) have involved relatively² huge amounts of foodstuffs being accumulated and redistributed. Where 'sides' were involved (such as in marriage feasts), the occasion took on a potlatch-like character. The Tu Kobuca of Mavana village described to me one of these marriage feast exchanges between two villages (it took place sometime in the 1930s):

Yes, that was certainly a great occasion. It was an enormous feast that was divided. Everyone in the village ate and ate until even the children could hardly move and even the dogs wanted no more. And then the men filled their pig pens with yam and taro and the pigs ate, but they could not finish the food. The next day the people began eating again, but now they were not so hungry. The men went to put more food in the pig pens, but there was still food there. The next day the food began to smell and men and women took the food and threw it into the sea. But at each tide the food returned and was left rotting on the beach. The smell in the village was very bad for many days. It is true, I suppose that it was certainly a big waste of food.²

¹ That is, collective quantity. Size of the individual specimen also governs rarity, and exceptional size is valued by the villager. However, this is a rarity which like that, for example, of individual shape (thus peoples of the Sepik area of northern New Guinea induce their yams to grow into particular, culturally valued, shapes), derives from a more restricted supply.

² Relative to the amount that recipients in the redistribution could consume.

³ Cf. Thomas Williams' description of the Fijian feast at Somosomo:

On these occasions profusion is always aimed at; waste is the consequence, and want follows. At one public feast, I saw two hundred men employed for nearly six hours in collecting!

(cont'd on next page)
The amounts of food involved in such ceremonial distributions were beyond the productive capacity of the individual. In addition, the food was generally prepared and cooked prior to presentation, and certainly prior to distribution, necessitating the co-operation of a labour force. The fact that the food was cooked also meant that it had to be eaten or wasted: there was, in other words, no opportunity to replenish resources with the returns from distribution. The individual was thus involved in an economic system of ceremonially oriented expenditure necessarily as a member of a co-operating group, the scale of expenditure exceeding the means of the individual. This scale, moreover, ensured the participation of the individual since the latter had to assure himself of support for future commitments of expenditure in which he would be most closely involved, such as the births, marriages, and deaths of close kin, the 'great burdens', leca levu, which trouble the personal horizon of every Fijian.

3 (cont'd) from previous page)
and piling cooked food. There were six mounds of yams, taro, vakalolo [the Fijian pudding], pigs, and turtles: these contained about fifty tons of cooked yams and taro, fifteen tons of sweet pudding, seventy turtles, five cart-loads of yagona [kava], and about two hundred tons of uncooked yams. One pudding at a Lakeba feast, measured twenty-one feet in circumference.
(Williams: 1859:148-9).

1 I am referring particularly to non-perishable items such as pigs, turtles and yams, but most root-crops will keep for a few weeks. The non-edible, non-perishable items - the various native artifacts and whale teeth - are stores for future ceremonial needs. In a modern KALEBU household for every mat serving a household function there will be at least three stored for ceremonial requirements.

2 'Lega' refers to trouble of any kind, with the implication that assistance, or something additional, is required; in other words resources fall short of requirements.
The organisation by which labour resources were mobilised for the assemblage of large quantities of food at any one time has been described in chapter 6, where it was termed the feast organisation. While the taxonomy of the feast organisation differed from that of the descent organisation, its basic units of combination were founded upon descent groups and descent was a necessary qualification for leadership of the unit. Since the feast units were associated hierarchically, this applied to leadership at any taxonomic level.

Control of economic resources was the *sine qua non* of effective customary leadership. Within the framework of the feast organisation, this control was made operative by a devolutionary kind of system in which the control of a leader of a more inclusive unit depended upon the control of leaders of the component, less inclusive units. At the apex of the structure, the command of the Chief was supplemented by some rights of a more direct nature, such as the right to lay temporary tabu on the harvesting of a particular crop, and the right to summon labour for particular works. ¹ These rights, too, ultimately depended for their effect on the same devolutionary system of organisation.

The authority of leadership over economic activities at the D(d)istrict level and below was founded primarily upon the sanctions of culturally approved and ritually endorsed behaviour. This was most readily apparent in the authority of the Chief which was draped in the ritualistic trappings and paraphernalia associated with divine kingship. ² The Chief was no feudal lord:

¹ This was the Chiefly right of lala.

² Hocart has produced a mass of data on divine kingship in Fiji, (e.g. Hocart: 1915, 1919, 1925a, 1925b, 1926, 1927, 1929, 1936).
commoners, not the chiefly, 'owned' the land. A similar potential weakness in the command of leadership was evident at the extended-family level of socio-economic co-operation, the grass-roots level of the accumulative-distributive organisation. The family head controlled the production of the group as the group's accepted representative and not as the proprietor of its lands, which were held corporately by the group or by sub-units of it. Thus the control of the leader depended on a combination of his personal qualities and authority and the degree with which individual members of the group were willing or felt the need to contribute to and co-operate for mutual interests.

This potential weakness in customary leadership constituted no threat to the viability of the traditional socio-economic organisation as long as the individual was not distracted by the opportunities of an alternative, more gainful investment and return elsewhere. The enhanced attractiveness of the copra market after 1945 provided just this opportunity. It was a challenge from a rival economic system with which the established organisation could not cope, either by incorporation or by adaptation. The accumulative-distributive procedure was inoperable with a commodity i.e. cash and cash-equivalents, that was both scarce and in demand for the consumption needs of the individual, while adaptation was undermined by the divorce of customary leadership from control of the cash resources, i.e. coconut groves.

From an examination of the land usage system extant prior to 1938 it becomes apparent that the basis for the post-1945 developments had already been laid with Ma'afu's land policy and with the new patterns of settlement that had been established under the Pax Tonga and maintained under the Pax Britannica.
1. The tree

2. "MIVI" in the village at the time of the Land Provisory Council
The peoples of MUALEVU traditionally have been horticulturalists. They have practised a shifting cultivation, growing food crops for subsistence and for ceremonial distribution. In MUALEVU, this type of agriculture has never been hampered by land shortage or restricted accessibility to land. But while abundance of suitable gardening land can be regarded as a necessary condition of the feast-oriented ceremonial life which reflected the wealth of customary society, land was of itself not a deployable asset in capitalist terms; it could not be put to use through hoarding and accumulation. The value of land lay in what it produced; the value of unused land lay in its potentiality for producing, a potentiality which could only be realised by the labour a man was able and willing to devote to it.

The source of all customary rights in land in MUALEVU has been past settlement or cultivation. Customary rights, in other words, are derived from labour. This is aptly illustrated by the nature of rights to wild yam. Regardless of where it is growing, a wild yam may be put up by the finder as long as it has not already been weeded and tended by someone else. Weeding a wild yam constitutes a process of domestication, an assertion of rights. Once this labour has been accomplished another person can only 'steal' the yam.

Clearing bush to plant and cultivate a garden constitutes a similar process of domestication. A man expends his labour to replace wild plant growth with crops which he himself plants and nurtures. This expenditure of labour establishes his rights to the area he has cleared and used, and these rights the cultivator retains for himself and his descendants. However the customary system of shifting

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1 As opposed to cases reclassified by Mu'atu and by the Rural Administration.
cultivation meant that a tract of land was used continuously for no more than two or three years and was then allowed to revert to bush for a considerably longer period; thus it was not difficult for rights to be lost sight of or to be disputed and MUALEVU gardeners often planted a few fruit trees to act as 'markers' of areas they cleared. The tree most commonly planted was coconut, which combined longevity with the advantages of a ready provision of food and drink and in MUALEVU, to-day, old solitary palms and scattered small stands are a common sight on the higher slopes (though not in areas taken over by the gasau reed).

When another man wished to use land that had previously been cleared, the correct procedure was for him first to seek permission from the cultivator, or the descendants of the cultivator, who had made the original clearing. In practice, this might not be done. Rights pertaining to original cultivation might not have been maintained, or later cultivators might merely carry on with their clearing and dispute the existence of such rights if a claim was brought forward. Where a later cultivator successfully cleared and planted land without being obliged to recognise any pre-existing rights, he established rights as though he was the original cultivator.

What is significant about these rights is that while the original cultivator or his descendants might claim first option, so to speak, on later usage of the land, the rights could not be exercised to reserve land for his future use. If the original cultivator (or his descendants) did not wish to use the land, he was obliged to let others have access to it, though he could protect his rights for the future
by insisting that no fruit-trees be planted by other cultivators.¹

These rights do not fit into the category of either 'proprietary' or 'usufructuary'. At any time, the holder's access to the land is assured only in conjunction with usage, yet the rights exist independently of usage: they can be retained by the original cultivator and acquired by his descendants even though the land is not being used. Basil Thomson (1908:359) has sought to portray (for Viti Levu) the nature of such rights by placing them in an intermediate category: 'The owner of the nkele [=nkele, land that previously has been cleared and cultivated] had over his land a little less than dominium and a little more than usufruct'. But the essence of the rights seems to be the holder's first option of usage of the land and for this reason I intend to use the term rights of prior access - the holder has priority over other men for the opportunity of re-cultivating the land.

¹ Nineteenth century Fijians were mystified by the earlier European purchases of large acreages of land, particularly when the purchaser failed to cultivate the land (which the Fijians, unacquainted with cash crops, probably thought an impossible task anyway). Consequently upon this failure, the land was deemed to have 'reverted', vakalutu talo, and (parts of) the land was re-cultivated by the Fijians. Though hundreds of thousands of acres of the best agricultural land were alienated to Europeans, the policy instituted by the first Governor, Sir Arthur Gordon, protected the Fijians from the far greater losses suffered by indigenous populations in other parts of the Pacific: for example, Kalkoa (1971:219) gives a figure of 75 per cent for the New Hebrides, and Epstein a figure of 30 per cent in the Tolan area of the Cagelle Peninsula (Epstein, T.S: 1971).
Any cultivator of a land who does not hold rights of prior access I shall call a secondary cultivator. The rights which he establishes are simply to the product of his labour, they do not extend to any control over the potentiality of the land in the future once this product has been finally harvested. The rights of the secondary cultivator I shall term rights of usufruct. These rights, too, are acquired by a man's descendants. For example, should a secondary cultivator make a yam garden but die before the yams are harvested, his son retains the rights of usufruct. It should be noted that the son does not 'inherit' these rights. He already possessed the rights while the father was alive and gardening, by virtue of being a (recruited) descendant of his father. A man establishes (customary) rights in land not as an individual but as the head of a founder-line, and the rights established are held jointly by members of that founder-line. For this reason I refer to rights being acquired by descendants. In the example given above what the son does inherit, that is succeed to, is control of his father's usufructuary rights. (This is further discussed below).

Rights of prior access were a factor in binding individuals in co-residence and polity through attachment to a particular locality. But rights to the area with which this polity was identified, that is, its territory, vuma lova, lit. 'great land', were qualitatively distinct from those of prior access (or of usufruct).

When the colonial administration commenced its recording and codifying of land ownership (in Viti Levu), it found the task much complicated by situations in which social groups long established in territories in one locality nevertheless claimed as 'their' land, areas in other, and frequently distant, regions. The claims were based on ancestral settlement of those areas from which the people had
subsequently migrated, voluntarily or through force. The vast network of criss-crossing claims and counter-claims that began to take form soon obliged the administration to abandon its investigations into the more remote past and to establish the year of Cession as a kind of zero point. However, the fact of these claims remains. Pison (1881:12) asserts:

It is certain that, though the taukei may be driven from their lands by a stronger tribe, they do not acknowledge the most crushing defeat as an extinction of their title. In fact they consider their title to be inextinguishable as long as they themselves are not extinguished. It may be held in abeyance, but it cannot be destroyed.

Since the administration was to equate what I shall term these territorial rights with 'ownership' of land,¹ a closer examination needs to be made of the nature of this title to which Pison refers.

'Taukei' or 'kai vanua', 'land people', refers to the original settlers or aborigines of a locality.² It is true these people exercised what appears to have a de jure endorsement of the occupation of successors, for it was the 'land representatives', mata ni vanua,³ who conducted the ceremony of formal consecration of their titled headship. These consecration ceremonies reflect the emphasis on the ancestor's power over the land, which was deeply embedded in Fijian culture. In Lau and Vanua Levu, at least, the

¹ At the time of Cession there was disagreement among officials as to whether or not 'every inch' of land in Fiji had its owner.

² A modern extension of the usage of 'itaukei' distinguishes the indigenous Fijian race from the other races now settled in Fiji.

³ I have given here the literal translation of 'mata ni vanua', where elsewhere, in the context of hereditary office and of hereditary, possession, the title 'talking-chief' (Mecurt 1924) is used.
ceremonies were accompanied by entreaties to the ancestors to let the land flourish and its products abound, together with admonishments to the candidate to be a wise and generous leader. Yet, the land people assumed their vital role of consecrators of the headship of an immigrant ruling (and so chiefly) clan even when they remained on their territory and continued to enjoy their rights of access to their lands. This occurred, for example, in the consecration of the Lali Mavana by the land people of the Mavana locality, led by their titled head, the Takala (the word is derived from the base, 'taka', to originate from). The status of land people thus appears to relate to territory without any implication of rights of access to land for cultivation.

To understand the implications of the 'title' on which the claims of non-resident land peoples were...

Thus the 'land people' Korozau (v. Hocart:1952:91) consecrated the Tui Cakau with the following words (which admittedly reveal an erosion of ancestral beliefs under Christian influence): 'Let the fish keep coming landwards; let the trees bear; let the land keep flourishing; may you always live; let the work of God grow; may our land be blessed; may our soil be blessed' (op. cit.p.94). The representatives' role as talking-chiefs to a chiefly vila continued to assume an increased significance when seen in the context of ancestral power over the land. In Cakaudrove the headman and the talking-chief/land representatives clan was strangled with the Tui Cakau on the latter's 'death' (v. Benson:1931:327).

Thus now constitute maragali Nayona, in Mualevu village, and maragali Valika, in Mavana village. Their original territory is now divided by the village boundary (v.infra Map 1, p. 193). Nayona was the leading land clan: it stood as land representatives/talking-chiefs first to the chiefs and then to the Senimoli chiefs.
rested, an analysis of the rights of the originating ancestor is necessary. This, in turn, leads to a distinction between territorial rights pertaining to physical dominion and to spiritual dominion.

The originating ancestor controlled what might be termed the radical title of sovereignty over a territory for he was the first leader to settle the particular locality. He retained this control, or rather its spiritual counterpart, by virtue of his deification and continued residence in territory (hence the sacred nature of the vavutu, the original settlement site of the Vu). In the physical world, control of the radical title was inherited by the ancestor's successors as leaders, that is 'representatives', of the members of the ancestor's founder-line, in other words of the land people. In the consecration ceremony, the land people supplicate the ancestor to sanction and approve the succession. He is asked to act in his own sphere of dominion, the spiritual, to cause things to grow. At the same time the representative holder of their sovereignty is warned that he will abuse the power of his position, or not fulfil the expectations of his role, at the risk of the ancestral wrath upon the prosperity of the land.

In the consecration ceremony of an immigrant leader, the same conditional legitimisation procedure takes place. The situation has changed, however, in that control of the radical title to the territory in the physical world has passed to, and is succeeded to within, a founder-line that does not derive from the ancestor. As far as dominion over the territory (not rights in land) is concerned, the land people are left merely with their identification with the

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*Note: The text contains a reference marked with an asterisk. It likely refers to a previous section or chapter in the same document. The full context is not provided in the image.*
ancestor's territory. ¹ This is the 'title' to which Fison refers.

While this identification certainly implies the ability of mediating with the ancestral god of a territory, there is no implication of rights of sovereignty.² Territorial rights, inter-polity, existed only in so far as they could be enforced. In a situation in which a land people had relinquished its land, its power to mediate with the spiritual holder of sovereignty would come into this category of enforcement.

The territorial area was a function of inter-polity relations and not of past labour on the land.³

¹ Where the land people continue to reside on their territory, it is the chiefs who supervise the consecration and installation of their headman.

² It did give a land people some influence in the politics of the people occupying its original territory. Since the 'true' consecration ceremony could be carried out only by the land people, a Chief or headman who remained unconsecrated was vulnerable to political enemies. Erskine (1853: 215) cites the case of the people of Verata island, the land people of Levuka on Ovalau island, who refused to consecrate the Tui Levuka candidate (this was about 1850). The latter complained to his powerful neighbour and ally, Cakabau (of Bau), and even requested him to carry out the consecration, which Cakabau refused to do.

³ The location of a territory was certainly determined by the same process as that which established rights of prior access, namely the expenditure of labour. In this case it was the labour of the 'originating ancestor', Vu, in founding a settlement and cultivating new (unclaimed) lands. But as the English usage of the term connotes, territories belonged to the political order. The area claimed by a settlement as its territory, while its location was oriented by the lands that had been used or were being used by the inhabitants of the settlement, was in its entirety not a function of past labour in the land. Cf. OED definition of 'territory': 'A tract of land, or district of undefined boundaries'.
Basil Thomson indicates in reference to Fiji in general that the territorial boundaries of settlements were continually shifting in accordance with military strength, and in areas usually not required for cultivations. Only in a boundary dispute was it likely that a contestant, desirous of enforcing its claim, would cultivate the fringe areas of its territory (1908:360).

Territorial rights were, then, of a political order: they were held by the commonalty for the commonweal. As such they were an encumbrance upon the establishment of rights of prior access. The capability of a man to clear unclaimed land and thereby establish rights of access was restricted by the political dictates of territoriality. To clear land in a territory other than one's own was an act of aggression, a political act with political consequences. But, in addition, the fact that the lands to which a man held acknowledged rights of prior access lay within a territory gave thoroughfare to fellow 'territorials', who could, for example, hunt (e.g. wild pig) and gather (e.g. wild yam) without molestation.

The relationship between descent and customary land rights is emphasised by the explicit acknowledgment given to the joint rights of women, who, as I have already mentioned, have nothing to do with any stage of gardening and generally reside virilocally. A woman's inability to establish her own gardens is allowed for by her rights to the produce of the labour of her father and brothers. Furthermore, at her request the latter are obliged to make land available for the use of her husband and/or her children.

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Once a distinction is made between land rights and territorial rights, the question of whether or not every inch of land had its owner at the time of Cession becomes ambiguous.
and should she reside patrilocally her husband and children, in fact, are able to establish rights on her behalf, though these rights can only be held by her children (and retained after her death) if they became members of her founder-line.

Formerly, when a woman married and resided virilocally she might request that a tract of her clan lands be reserved to her (where the woman married some distance away the request was not made). This tract was called her covicovi ni draudrau, lit. 'leaf-taking land', which I shall refer to as dowry land. The giving of a dowry land represented the delegation to a woman of the control of rights of prior access to the land in question. The term 'leaf-taking' implies the taking of leaves of non-domesticated trees for domestic purposes (such as use as plates or as a floorcovering in the house) which in terms of the MUALEVU division of labour identifies the land as a woman's portion.

A man had to request permission from his wife before he could cultivate her dowry land; on the other hand her children did not necessarily have to do so. The rights of prior access were acquired by members of what I shall term the woman's vasu founder-line, that is those descendants of her husband who acknowledged her as their progenitrice and were recognised as vasu by her clan. If the correlation between descent and rights of prior access holds, then the vasu initiation/birth ceremony amounted to a form of recruitment to the clan and the vasu qualified to acquire rights of prior access to its lands (i.e. dowry lands) by virtue of this vasu-descent status. 1

1 The oldest child, or 'oldest-head', who actually undertook the vasu initiation, represented or 'led', at the time, all future members of the vasu founder-line and so controlled (future) joint rights. The sex of the oldest child did not matter in these circumstances.
The parallel in behaviour and rights between vasu and tauvu appears to endorse the interpretation of vasu as a quasi-descent status. Persons/peoples who are tauvu ('origin/ancestor together') are recognised as being of common descent; but like the vasu, the tauvu cannot appropriate land, that is they cannot establish rights of prior access to land. But also like the vasu they can appropriate the produce of the land. I suggest that this right of appropriation constitutes for both vasu and tauvu a form of compensatory right to the ancestor's benediction and largesse, in the same way that a female member of a founder-line has a right to the produce of the gardens of her father and brothers.

The rights of future appropriation of property and of receipt of tribute by a people victorious in battle seemed to have been derived in the same way. Sometimes when a people was defeated and sued for peace, it made an 'atonement offering' of a basket of earth to the victors. This offering was called the 'soro ni gele'. The 'earth atonement' was made only when a people faced the prospect of being massacred: if accepted, it gave the victors the right to take produce from the land in the future.

I would say that the earth atonement represented an offer by the defeated side to establish a relationship of common origin, a kind of simulated tauvu relationship. The offering did not symbolise the transfer of the ancestor himself (i.e. a transfer of sovereignty). The basket of earth was simply what it was, a pile of earth to which the ancestor held the radical title.

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1 The vasu acquires, but does not establish, such rights.
The earth, if accepted, was subsequently taken by the victors and buried in their home settlement in the house foundation of their headman or Chief. This depositing of the earth established for the defeated people's ancestor joint rights to the lands of the victor's ancestor, and joint title to land entailed membership of the same ancestral founder-line. In this somewhat paradoxical manner (and by a procedure that inverted the development of the real tauvu relationship), the victors acquired their appropriated rights by virtue of common ancestry (as, of course, did the defeated; but the latter were less likely to exercise their rights).¹ A young woman from the defeated side was always presented with the earth atonement and this was a further endorsement of the relationship being established for it opened the way for another ancestral connection, the establishment of a vasu founder-line.²

¹ The Ramasi Nadave at one time led a raid on the island of Cicia and defeated the Lomaji people from whom he accepted the earth atonement. On his return to Vanua Balavu the earth was buried in the ancestral foundation site, yavutu, of the Nadave people. To-day, the people of matagali Vuniivi recognise kinship with Lomaji in Cicia: the people of matagali Lomajivanua recognise specifically a tauvu relationship. Though the individual members of Lomajivanua are hazy about their origins, I would hazard that the clan Lomajivanua originated in the migration of some of the Lomaji people of Cicia.

² Chiefs of the powerful, expanding confederations, matanitu, of the nineteenth century, sought earth atonements and vasu connections for political purposes of alliance and for increasing resources of the supplies necessary to their war policies.
One further correlation is evident. I have already indicated that the appropriatory rights of the *vasu* are balanced by the potential obligation of ensuring the survival of the ancestral founder-line (v. supra p.94).

For example, when at the beginning of this century the LOMALOMA Chief, the *Rasau*, disappeared and left his clan 'empty', the Lomaloma people went with whale teeth to Daliconi village and formally recruited the *Rasau*’s eldest sister’s eldest child (a man), who was *vasu* to the *Rasau*’s clan and consequently to LOMALOMA District. This man then succeeded as *Rasau*. The point here is that the man was unable to reject the request, for this was the obligation conferred with his quasi-membership status of the *Rasau*’s founder-line. The victors acquired their kinship with (and appropriatory rights over) the defeated according to the same rationale, but by a procedure which inverted that of the establishment of *vasu*: the victors first ensured the survival of the ancestral founder-line and they then acquired the descent status of common origin. The earth atonement was made only when the defeated were faced with the prospect of being annihilated.

While customary rights to land were held jointly by a descent group, the 'control', *lewaa*, of these rights was exercised by the leader, 'the representative', of the group. Political divisions within the group could cause this control to be divided, resulting in a division of the lands.

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1. Literally - his body was never found.

2. Though I shall continue to refer to the 'division' of control, 'delegation' would be a more appropriate, though less familiar, term. The leadership of the head of the clan was still recognised by the leaders of its sub-groups, and the clan continued to act corporately in matters affecting the clan's lands as a whole, as demonstrated in the *vasu* ceremony and in assigning control over dowry lands. As far as the practical purposes of cultivation were concerned, the land itself was divided.
to which the group held rights. Maxwell (1914:4) states that prior to the arrival of Ma'afu the bati ni lovo, the oven-side, was the 'proprietary unit' of land in Lau, that tenure of land was corporate in this unit (op. cit. 6). It is probable that the division of lands did reflect to a large degree divisions within the feast organisation, that is a division according to labour availability and political disputes where surplus of labour made division into separate feast units feasible. However, Maxwell appears to be in error in ascribing (for Lau in general) joint rights in land to a feast unit, or as is more likely, (since he recognises joint rights are held by descent groups) in assigning a feast unit term to a descent group. In MUALEVU, two terms were used to describe how lands were divided: vakayavusa, 'by founder-lineage group'; and vakawa, 'by founder-line', that is by descent, the principle from which the membership of the founder-lineage group was derived.

This is not to say that in the earlier Lands Commission Enquiries (which like all the Enquiries were preceded by preliminary discussions in the District) the villagers did not agree that title to lands could be held by the 'bati ni lovo'. Sominoli (1904) and Allardyce (1906-7) recorded many lands to be held by bati ni lovo. On the other hand, Ratu Sukuna (1938-40) recorded many lands to be held by matagali and there is nowhere in his Evidence Books any mention of the title of bati ni lovo. France (1969:171) notes: 'Maxwell sent his clerks to each area [in Fiji] well in advance to assist the bemused Fijians, reporting that "the people are absolutely incapable of classifying themselves without assistance"'. There was, however, an inducement for them to do so, as the Governor made plain in 1914 in his opening address to the Council of Chiefs:

Though not all lands and not all villagers.
If a matagali or tokatoka fails to appear and give proper evidence before the Native Lands Commission it will be considered to be landless. And if a piece of land cannot be proved before the Native Lands Commission to have an owner, it will be counted as government land.¹

Three developments of particular significance for the system of land usage accompanied the establishment of the pax Tonga under Ma'afu: the amalgamation of settlements into coastal villages; the introduction of magimagi tenure; and the planting of coconut as a crop.

Ma'afu treated the disposal of rights to all lands as being at his pleasure and all customary rights were deemed abrogated.² Ma'afu's main concern was to use his title to land in order to raise a produce tax which he could turn into cash to finance his own military expansion in Fiji³ and to provide for the necessities of an established polity after

¹ Translated and quoted by France (1969:178) from 'an unpublished printed paper in Fijian' in his possession.

² The basis of his title is not clear since Ma'afu became involved in a 'legal' wrangle with a European over a sale of the Exploring Group and had his 'lawful ownership' confirmed in 1863 by the findings of enquiry of the British Consul (who became involved through the European's claim). Six years later the Group was included in the territory of the United Chiefdom of Lau. The question of Ma'afu's title raised some thorny problems for the Commissions of Enquiry, among them the need to decide whether the customary rights to all lands, particularly those lands unallotted by Ma'afu, had been abrogated. A summary of events and evidence relevant to Ma'afu's title is given by [France] in a typescript paper [nd] entitled 'Ma'afu and Vanuabalavu', which was part of the preparation for the 1965-6 Lands Commission Enquiry at Vanua Balavu.

³ Cf. the Fijian paramounts' reliance upon tribute and other customary rights to produce, v. supra p.110n.
the European model. To this end he introduced into the Exploring Group a system of tenure based on Tongan practice and ordered the planting of coconut as a crop (it was the only cash crop available and understood by the Fijians and Tongans). All adult males (i.e. males over sixteen years) resident in the Group were allotted magimagi tracts, the area of which appears to have varied, but was generally between four and ten acres.

The actual status of the magimagi holder's title, both during Ma'afu's rule prior to the Cession and during his lifetime after Cession (he died in 1881 - Derrick:1941:115), is uncertain, but it certainly possessed more of a feudal character than customary titles. The title seems to have been held at Ma'afu's will with the cultivator's protection laying in a reciprocity of interest. From references to the pre-Cession period in the Evidence Books of the Lands Commission Enquiries, it could be concluded (though only negatively from lack of contrary evidence) that neither Ma'afu nor a deputy was called upon to authorise or endorse inheritance or transfer of a cultivator's title.

In MUALEVU, Ratu QORINIASI (v. supra Diagram 15 p.148) supervised the initial apportioning of the magimagi (which was effected in 1862-3): 'Ratu QORINIASI called together the heads (liuliu) of the vavusa that they might together divide out the land that was to be divided'(Evidence of MEREKE [v. supra Diagram 12 p.133] in Sukuna:1938-40:iii, 528). However, by no means was the whole area of MUALEVU divided. The majority of magimagi were situated in the

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1 The discussion of the Beagleholes (1941: passim) and Niyacakalau (1959) on the modern tenurial system of Tonga are an aid to the understanding of Ma'afu's land policy.
fertile coastal flats where the coconut would be easiest to grow. In the allocation, reference was clearly made to locality of residence and only in a few instances was a man's magimagi in an area inconvenient of access from his own settlement. Within eleven years of the initial magimagi division, the constitution of the Chiefdom of Lau was dissolved by the act of Cession to Britain. When Ma'afu died seven years later there had still been no action taken to determine the status of either the magimagi or the unallocated lands.

It is apparent from the Evidence Books of the Lands Commissions that the holders of magimagi came to regard their title as giving them unencumbered rights of disposal of both land and trees. This was particularly evident in the case of non-MUALEVU people, both Fijians and Tongans, who wished to leave the District and it was patently a great shock to Maxwell to discover that Fijians 'have even gone so far as to sell lands to each other'(1914: 26). According to Maxwell (op. cit. 32) the Tongans specifically claimed that the magimagi allotment was an absolute grant and that they had the right to dispose of the land as they pleased "in European fashion" (ibid.).

In the case of the indigenous inhabitants, however, this assessment of their rights was subordinated by the influence of the customary system of land rights which made membership of the holder's founder-line (including the quasi-

1 A remark that probably reflects the paternalism characteristic of the administration and its philosophy that any change in custom (=break with custom) would, ipso facto, be harmful to the natives' interests, rather than revealing a double set of values, i.e. the implication that there was nothing wrong in Fijians having sold land (in the past) to Europeans.
membership of individuals belonging to vasu founder-lines) a necessary condition for acquisition of land rights. But usage of magimagi lands had introduced a new feature for rights of usufruct to coconut groves amounted to rights of a permanent usufruct. The coconut, moreover, was (still) a valued crop in that it was the sole source of a necessary cash income to pay taxes, for Ma'afu's tax had been succeeded by a colonial administrative tax.

The customary system of land rights similarly affected usage of the unallotted lands, though the official legal title of the lands remained undetermined. The unallotted lands were a tabula rasa, an area wiped clean of pre-existing rights of prior access and available for the establishment of new rights by the (individual) cultivator. Furthermore, the establishment of these rights of prior access was not encumbered by considerations of territoriality. Not only had Ma'afu's sovereign ruling abrogated the former system of territories, the new pattern of settlement ensured there would be little inducement to resurrect them. There was no pressure on land for cultivation, for after the establishment of the magimagi groves there was little further planting of coconut, while in political terms the old territories had become dysfunctional with the amalgamation of former settlements in coastal localities.

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1 Cf. the following remark, made in 1957, by a European agricultural officer who appears otherwise to have accepted the 'communal' identity of Fijian society:

An extraordinary point about the Fijian in agriculture is that it is the one activity in which he is and was an individualist. Any average Fijian can show where his father or grandfather had gardens, but one hears little or nothing of communal plantings. Such communal activities are and were for specified public purposes only.... (Parham:1937:17).
The holding of the official enquiries into land tenure and land ownership¹ as an event, during which evidences and rights were to be placed on permanent record ('written in the book') with no allowance for flexibility with the elapse of time, itself invited disputes, or rather evoked their instant crystallisation. This was further encouraged by the villagers' uncertainty as to the official attitude that would be adopted towards the transfer of magimagi titles, for the villagers' concern in disputes was with coconut lands and not with 'empty land', land not under cultivation.

The villagers, while uncertain of the official attitude, were themselves unsure of the rights involved in the magimagi title. Here the system of customary rights appears to have taken over, for all the disputes on magimagi recorded by Ratu Seniloli (1904) and Allardyce (1906-7) concern titles which have passed out of the founder-line of the original holder. Plaintiff's claims are based upon either membership of that founder-line or upon rights of prior access established before Ma'afu's rule. This produced complications for the two earlier Commissioners, themselves without any official ruling on magimagi title to guide them, which resulted at times in a pronounced adhoc element characterising their decisions. (Summaries of some of the disputes heard and the decisions made are given in Appendix 2 - the summaries are based upon my own translation of the relevant evidences in the Evidence Books).

¹ I have intentionally made use of the term to contrast the purpose of the administration, which was to determine a tenu- rial system, and the intent of individual villagers, which was to establish their rights to particular lands.
More than thirty years after Allardyce's Commission of 1906-7, the Native Lands Commission's clerks arrived at MUALEVU to make the preliminary arrangements for the visit of a further Commission. This time plans were in hand for an official reorganisation of the established system of land usage that was as sweeping in its effects as that accomplished by Ma'afu.

The principal features of the administrative model as far as land usage was concerned was the establishment of the matagali as a corporate 'land-owning' unit and the provision of matagali blocks of land with fixed recorded boundaries (they were not, in other words, the equivalent of the pre-Ma'afu territories). Since for the previous seventy-odd years the MUALEVU villagers had not been operating according to this system, certain difficulties were posed. The basic problem was the question of existing titles to lands. This was interconnected with the fact that no matter how the existing social units might be manipulated, it was not possible to arrange villagers' lands in integral blocks (except by making the whole village a matagali, or alternatively making the village the unit of land ownership).\footnote{In exceptional cases this was done in other parts of Fiji, though not in northern Lau. There was a plan to establish a single matagali in Boitaci village, but this fell through (\textit{ibid}, supra p.123). Titles to some Mavana and Daliconi lands which were remote from the village, were recorded in the name of the village. Titles to the major wet taro (irrigated) areas in the villages of Mualevu, Mavana, Daliconi and Malaka (there is no wet taro cultivation in Cikobia and Avea) were treated as though held by the village (any villager can establish rights of prior access in a taro strip, solovo) but have not been officially recorded as such. The wet taro areas are shown in Sketch Map 1, p.193.}

The procedure officially adopted was first to record the land boundaries of the administrative matagali. The determination of these boundaries was based upon a combination of the results of village discussions, expediency and sheer invention. The matagali was then given what I shall term the proprietary title to all land within its area(s), other than those tracts to which an existing title was held, or was disputed, by a person not a member of the matagali. This joint proprietary title reflected elements of customary, pre-Ma'afu territoriality, in that it identified its corporate holder with a particular locality and in effect, provided unclaimed lands for the future use of and establishment of rights of prior access by the members of that corporate body. It differed, however, in that it provided control over a specific area with fixed boundaries as though rights of access had already been established throughout. I shall term this area the 'matagali estate', employing the term 'estate' simply to emphasise the distinction with the pre-Ma'afu 'territory'. The matagali estate was not a function of political relations between or within settlements: its boundaries were determined 'according to the law', vakalawa, and not 'according to the custom of the land', vakavanua.

While a member's pre-existing rights of usufruct and prior access to lands which were included within the estate of his own matagali were not affected, they were now held through the matagali's joint title of proprietorship and could no longer be held by title of magimagi or of dowry land. Future rights of prior access to the lands of the matagali estate were reserved for holders of the title to the estate, that is for members of the matagali.
Any persons who maintained that they held a title, or wished to claim a title, to lands within the estate of a matagali other than their own, were obliged formally to 'make a dispute', in order for the Commission to record the title. If no dispute was made, the land reverted (lit. 'fell') to the matagali. These lands were referred to as being 'enclosed'. Only two kinds of title to enclosed lands were recognised; that of magimagi and that of dowry land. Pre-established rights of usufruct and prior access were not sufficient of their own to retain a title.

The 1938 Commission was much better prepared than its predecessors to deal with the question of the magimagi. Their task was facilitated by the revival of the title 'Tui Lau', and its bestowal on the Chief who was the Commission's chairman, namely Ratu Sukuna. Sukuna laid down a retrospective ruling on the correct transmission of the magimagi title. It could be inherited, he asserted, only in the patriline of the original holder, passing from father to eldest child until inherited by a daughter. When the latter married, or gave birth, or lived with a de facto spouse, the title passed to her nearest patrikin (younger sibling, or failing this, a younger sibling of the father). Should the patriline die out, the magimagi land would then revert to the Tui Lau who would determine its disposal.

The last clause caused considerable agitation and resentment in the MUALEVU District since many magimagi, though

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1 While both magimagi and dowry lands are described as being 'enclosed', the term 'enclosed land', kovukovu, is applied only to dowry lands by many villagers. To-day, the term 'covicovi ni draudrau' is not often heard in MUALEVU.

2 Sukuna refers only to the magimagi and not to the 'control' of the magimagi.
they had been held by father and son for fifty years or more, would still have reverted to the Tui Lau. The discontent eventually influenced Sukuna in adding the rider that after the reversion of the land the Tui Lau would at once 'confirm' (the title of) the person who had been habitually 'using' the land. It is probable that Sukuna's original intention was to assign as many as possible of the magimagi to members of the matagali in whose estates the magimagi were enclosed, so reducing the number of enclosed lands which the imposition of the new boundaries would create.

Though the mass planting of coconut as a crop had rapidly lost impetus after the establishment of the magimagi groves, the number of enclosed coconut lands in 1938 was

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1 One cause of general resentment among the Fijian villagers was the rumour that the newly created yavusa Tonga, which included all registered Tongans in the Lau Group, would be allotted the magimagi lands. The rumour was given strength when the Tongan community in Lomaloma disputed most the magimagi lands it had knowledge of, so preventing many from being incorporated into matagali proprietorship. Few of the magimagi disputes were settled at the Enquiry; the notification of the disputes were recorded, but the hearing of evidence and/or the giving of judgment was made pending to a later date. Sukuna qualified his ruling on magimagi in December 1939 and the following January the Enquiry was suspended because of the War. It was left to Thomson's Commission to give judgment on the majority of the magimagi disputes. The reason for the MUALEVU Tongans not registering with 'Fijian' matagali in 1938, was the promise of magimagi lands held out to them by the Tongan leader in Lomaloma.

2 The ruling on the transmission of the magimagi title is to be found in Sukuna:1938-40: iii. A typescript copy of the ruling, and a typescript copy of a rephrasal of the ruling, entitled 'Na Lewa Ni Kena Dewa Na Magimagi' ('The Rule Of Inheritance Of Magimagi'), is enclosed in Thomson:1965-6.
still considerable. Male villagers returning to MUALEVU after the magimagi division had to obtain 'tax lands' whether they needed to pay the taxes to Ma'afu or (later) to the Province. If they were unable to obtain in some way a magimagi, they were obliged to plant a coconut crop themselves. Furthermore, in the 1920s a few men in each village, mostly men with the advantage of European advice or example, had recommenced planting coconut as a crop in their food gardens.

In Daliconi village there was a particularly large number of enclosed coconut lands that were not magimagi. This came about as a result of Ma'afu's removal of the people of Vutuna (v. supra p.53n) and his subsequent lease of their lands to Europeans. The latter had planted a large part of the area with coconut but had subsequently left Fiji. With Ma'afu dead and the British in power, the people had returned to the area and settled the present site of Daliconi village. 1 Ratu QORINIASI, the then Buli and Chief, proceeded to apportion the coconut estate to individual adult males after the fashion of the magimagi division.

Since the only titles to enclosed lands that were recognised by the Commission were those of magimagi and of dowry land, the majority of villagers find themselves obliged to change the status of their title in order to retain possession of their groves. They did not have the benefit of Sukuna's later qualification to the eventual disposition of magimagi and therefore their task was made more difficult by the ruling that magimagi was inheritable only in the patriline and not in the founder-line. This

1 The abandoned site of one the European homesteads. There were three European leaseholders altogether in this area.
often made a dowry land title preferable, but meant, in turn, tracing the origin of the title to a female ancestor of a member of the administrative matagali in whose estate the enclosed land was situated. Alternatively, it was possible to retain rights to an enclosed land by, so to speak, un-enclosing it; that is by being recruited and then registered to the enclosing matagali.\(^1\) Inevitably there was a great deal of private arrangement over the status of titles. In Daliconi, for example, the administrative matagali agreed to recognise each others' enclosed lands as dowry lands.\(^2\) In some cases in the District, agreements were reached by individuals to exchange lands enclosed in their respective matagali estates. Where an amicable agreement was not possible, then claims to titles were often adjusted and it was left to the Commission to sort out conflicting evidences in order to make a decision.

The large number of enclosed lands that the imposition of the matagali boundaries created was testimony to the break up of the territorially oriented pattern of localised land usage that had existed prior to Ma'afu. Sketch Map 1 on p.193 gives some intimation of this dispersal with regard to coconut lands. It is, however, by no means a complete representation. It depicts the post-1966 situation and therefore does not take into account any of the unofficial arrangements regarding lands that preceded the actual hearing of the Commission (including the amalgamation of customary units into administrative units); nor does it

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1 This was done only in a few instances.

2 In Daliconi, the titles of all the dowry lands are recorded as being held by matagali.
Map 1. Administrative Matagali boundaries and individual coconut groves in MUALEVU District.
(a) Vanua Balavu  (b) Avea  (c) Cikobia

Legend: Map 1. Administrative Matagali boundaries and individual coconut groves in MUALEVU District.
(a) Vanua Balavu  (b) Avea  (c) Cikobia

Legend: Map 1. Administrative Matagali boundaries and individual coconut groves in MUALEVU District.
(a) Vanua Balavu  (b) Avea  (c) Cikobia

Legend: Map 1. Administrative Matagali boundaries and individual coconut groves in MUALEVU District.
(a) Vanua Balavu  (b) Avea  (c) Cikobia
Notes to Sketch Map 1.

1. The locality of the estate of the administrative mataqali Mualevu was determined by the area in which were situated most of the individual tracts of land, veitiki ni gele, to which the intended members of the mataqali had established rights of prior access.

2. I have no data on the boundaries of the estate of the administrative mataqali within the leasehold of the Muamua village land area.

3. The outline of all islands except Cikobia has been traced from: Sketch Map - Exploring Islands (Reference no. T 43), Dept. of Lands. Fiji. 1958.
take into account lands which changed hands as a result of the decisions of the 1938-40 and the 1965-6 Commissions. 1 Finally, details are provided of only four villages, viz. Mualevu, Mavana, Cikobia and Daliconi. 2

The introduction of the proprietary title of the matagali did not interfere with the customary principle that control of rights of access was exercised by the leader of the exclusive founder-line of the person establishing the rights. 3 The authority of the official title of 'turaga ni matagali', that is 'matagali head', did not embrace control of rights already established within the matagali estate, though it did contain the power to adjudicate access (and so the establishment of rights of prior access) to the empty lands of the matagali estate. 4 The corporate title of the matagali neither confirmed nor introduced, nor for the villagers did it imply, a 'collective' or 'communal' access to and usage of the lands within the matagali estate by members of the matagali.

Ma'afu's rulings on land had an ultimate 5 effect analogous to establishing each cultivator in the status of

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1 The pre-1938 situation in Mavana village in particular is misrepresented.
2 My data on the lands of the other four villages of the District are incomplete and have therefore been omitted from the map. One feature of note is that the estate of matagali Marama, in Avea island, is composed entirely of enclosed lands.
3 At law, as opposed to custom, intra-matagali land rights in the matagali estate are not recognised. The only mechanism for settling intra-matagali disputes is a customary one, though Native Lands Commission officials may use their influence to effect a 'solution' to a dispute, if only along lines laid down by King Solomon.
4 The 'matagali head' is still a representative (responsible) leader. Though he can, and often will, put his own interests first, he is unable flagrantly to ignore the interests of other members of the group.
5 That is, after Ma'afu's death had occurred without any official determination of the status of titles to MUALEVU lands.
an originating ancestor (vu) in relation to the lands he worked, since all previous rights of prior access to MUALEVU lands had been abrogated. Ma'afu's division of the magimagi without reference to pre-existing rights, together with the new pattern of settlement, gave the new situation a permanency it might otherwise have lacked. Each cultivator separately established rights of prior access to the lands he worked and with plenty of 'unclaimed' land available, he was no longer restricted by the pre-Ma'afu pattern of territorially. In subsequent years he was not obliged to cultivate lands to which rights of prior access were controlled by his descent group leader.

This division of control was in no way unprecedented at custom. But at custom such a division expressed the political independence of the sub-group which was dividing and consequently its ability, through possession of the necessary man-power, to provide its own lovo or contributory lovo. This correlation did not exist in the immediate post-Ma'afu period. The individual cultivator controlled rights of access to lands, on the other hand, he still contributed to the lovo supervised by his descent group leader. The latter thus maintained a considerable political control over the labour of the members of his group, but his control over the total resources of the group was more tenuous, for the proceeds of the coconut crop were not incorporated into the lovo. The fact that resources in the form of tax-money, were now leaving the District by the hands of individuals affected the political organisation of the District at every level, not least at the level of the Chief. But coconut was still of a restricted importance. Though essential to the individual villager, the cash income from coconut had a limited use.
Land rights acquired by descent now included rights of usufruct to coconut lands. Since the coconut was a permanent crop and the source of a necessary income for each individual, MUALEVU villagers for the first time began to find themselves sharing with others on a **continuing** basis rights of usufruct to the same tract of land. Despite the pronounced rivalry of siblings in MUALEVU this new phenomenon became an established feature of the system of land usage. To explain this, reference has again to be made to the restricted importance of coconut.

The old men say, to-day, that coconuts were needed only to pay their taxes and to buy, specifically, kerosene, soap and sugar. That this is not a romanticised picture of 'the good old days' is borne out by the fact that the majority of men were not planting coconut, apart from a few nuts here and there to serve as future 'markers' of gardens they had cleared. As all villagers now sadly affirm: 'If only our fathers had planted coconut the District would now be full of palms'. A number of older villagers are more scathing about the 'darkness' of their fathers and ridicule their actions in burning down established palms and uprooting coconut crops planted in the gardens (by the sons) because they would affect the growth of the yam. ¹

The coconut groves established in the last third of the previous century sufficed the needs of the pre-1945 generations. Inducements and attractions for planting more

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¹ While villagers assert that a yam crop is adversely affected by the interplanting of coconut, the point made by these informants concerns the relative priority and importance of yam and coconut crops.
coconut were simply not there. It is true that the statistics for the Colony-wide copra industry show that tonnages steadily increased from the turn of the century to the end of the 1920s (though prices were more erratic, v. Table 9). These figures, however, cannot be broken down into yields from plantations (most of them owned by Europeans) and from groves (the coconut lands of the Fijian villagers). Moreover, the London price of a ton of copra gives no indication of the cash return to the MUALEVU villager. The latter was dealing for the most part in 'green copra' (i.e. the undried coconut flesh) or in nuts, first with an Australian marketing firm based at Lomaloma, and then from the early 1920s with Chinese and Indian middlemen, itinerant or settled in the villages. The procedure often adopted was to permit the middleman to send his gang of workers (generally Solomon islanders) to collect the nuts from the groves in return for cash (for tax-money),¹ or credit at the middleman's store (of which three had been established in MUALEVU District in the 1920s - one, belonging to a Chinese in Mualevu, the largest village, and two belonging to Indians, in the Doliconi area, where the former European plantations were yielding the largest concentrated supply of nuts). The great world depression in the 1930s which immediately affected the Fijian coconut industry, brought about a rapid decline in prices which reduced the demand for European goods (v. Laura Thompson: 1940:92-4), rather than increasing the incentive for planting coconut crops.²

¹ The administration, with the practice of 'tabu' as a traditional precedent, made it illegal to collect nuts for sale during the first four months of the year in order to ensure that villagers would have the wherewithal for paying their head tax.

² The few men who were planting coconut in their gardens continued to do so.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Average annual copra production to nearest 500 tons tons</th>
<th>Average price per ton for copra exported £'s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1875-1881)</td>
<td>(4,000)</td>
<td>(12.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882-1891</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892-1901</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902-1911</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-1921</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922-1931</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-1941</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942-1951</td>
<td>27,500</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-1961</td>
<td>36,500</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. 10 Year Averages for Copra Production and Prices, 1882-1961.  

1. This is the London price.
In a few indicated cases only did joint rights to coconut lands lead to a division of the control of these rights. Like Ma'afu's division this division of coconut lands bore no relation to the political feast organisation. It reflected a conflict of interests over a new economic resource and a range of returns and rewards that lay outside the embrace of the customary form of social organisation. But the fact that the division of the control of rights to coconut lands remained an isolated phenomenon is further evidence of the limited economic importance of the coconut as a crop at the time. In the modern period, the conflict of interests of the holders of joint rights both to coconut groves and to empty lands becomes an established feature of MUALEVU society, reflecting the effects of new economic forces and epitomising the decline of old forms of social organisation.
CHAPTER NINE

THE GROWTH OF INDIVIDUAL CASH COMMITMENT
AND PRESSURE ON LAND
I described in the last Chapter how Ma'afu's design for individual title to coconut holdings fell into the embrace of the customary system of land rights. Rights of usufruct to coconut groves came to be held jointly by the descendants of the man originally planting or otherwise acquiring them. As far as the exercise of rights was concerned, the coconut, in a sense, was treated like any garden crop. The individual independently harvested the produce to which his rights gave him claim. He satisfied any personal needs and contributed from the surplus to any corporate needs of his kin group. The distinctive feature about the coconut as a crop, however, was its permanence and this effected some qualification to the customary practice of individual harvesting. Where demands on the individual holders of joint rights were equally felt, as for example in group ceremonial outlay and in the need to pay the annual head tax, the fact that rights of usufruct were held jointly enabled joint harvesting, or an arrangement that was its equivalent. The system of continuing joint rights of usufruct to coconut groves enhanced the authority of the leader of the descent unit in which these rights were held, so long as there was a minimal differentiation of individual needs of consumption and a level of production that exceeded the sum of these needs. Once cash needs and opportunities for cash expenditure began to proliferate then both preconditions disappeared.

This process gathered momentum in MUALEVU in the 1950s and 1960s. An initial stimulus was the return to

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1 An agreement was often made with the local Indian or Chinese middleman whereby the latter did the actual harvesting and in turn gave cash (if taxes were due), but more often credit at his store.
their villages of ex-servicemen, who had spent several years on a regular wage in a 'cash' society. The basic economic factor, however, was the recovery of the Colony's copra industry from the great slump in the 1930s. By 1950 the London price of copra had returned to pre-Depression levels and in 1951 an agreement was reached with Unilevers in London which brought some stability to the price paid for Fijian copra. This agreement was accompanied in Fiji by two important developments for the economy of the Fijian 'coconut villages': the establishment of a cess deduction on Fijian copra as a means of compulsory capital accumulation; and the commencement of a policy aimed at establishing local Co-operatives in the villages.

I shall discuss the economic effects of both cess and Co-operatives in detail in the next chapter, but it can be mentioned here that the Co-operatives were consumer-marketing Societies in which income from the marketing of copra was utilised for the setting-up and running of a Co-operative store. Thus in each village there appeared a ready supply of western consumer goods to attract back into the Society that increased amount of cash return for product that constituted the Co-operatives' original benefit to the majority of villagers. Not surprisingly, the Co-operatives became the principal medium of the MUALEVU villagers deeper commitment to the demands of a cash economy. Indeed, the villagers themselves frequently declare, though with conscious exaggeration, that the need for cash began with the founding of the Co-operatives.

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1 In comparison with the cash returns they had received through the Indian or Chinese middleman.
The nature and extent of the MUALEVU villagers' present cash commitment are demonstrated by Tables 10 to 16. Much of the data are based upon the books of the different local Co-operative societies. From my own acquaintance with the operation of these Societies and with the officers responsible for the books, I believe them to be reliable. The secretaries of all the Societies concerned have attended a six-week course in simple book-keeping (held regularly in Suva by the Co-operative Department) and all have become competent in the work in which their office involves them. But the reliability of the data stems ultimately from the way the Societies operate. Since an annual bonus is paid on both the green copra sold by a member and upon the goods which a member purchases, members can be relied upon to deal exclusively, or almost so, with their own Societies, and, moreover, to ensure that their sales and purchases are recorded.

This still leaves a few possibilities for the records to misrepresent the individual's sales and purchases, particularly in the event of the collusion between storeman or copra weigher and a member. (This, in fact, did happen one year in Nadave Society.) I can only affirm that to my knowledge and to the knowledge of members and officials of the Societies, this did not occur in the trading year October 1968 to November 1969. Credit at a store, though it is not entered into the daily sales book, will also disguise the individual's consumption of cash goods relative to income, when it is not repaid. Three of the four Societies with which the Tables are concerned are strict in not giving credit; the other, Nadave, is more lenient. The store expenditure figures for any member who becomes storeman do not reflect accurately his own expenditure
since a high percentage of non-members' purchases will be placed to the storeman's number.¹

Some men who do not market their copra independently are also not members of a Co-operative. These individuals nevertheless regularly use a particular Co-operative and have their sales and purchases recorded to the number of a fellow household member. This does mean that in an extended household where the heads of the nuclear families do not have individual Society numbers I have not been able to separate out the income and expenditure data of these families.² Details of all copra marketed independently (and through the Societies) from MUALEVU were easily and reliably traced through the cess accounts held by the Fijian Development Fund Board.

The same kind of data on income and expenditure were gathered for all eight villages of the District, though household inventories, details of meals and daily income and expenditure were collected only in the villages of Mualevu, Mavana, Daliconi and Cikobia. Mualevu was the village with which I was most acquainted and it is the data on this village which are presented in the Tables. The only considerable variation (relatively) from this data to appear in other villages, was in Daliconi which contained a higher proportion of men who regularly marketed their own copra and thereby derived increased cash returns. In 1968-9, only two Mualevu men were occasionally sending their own copra to Suva.

¹ One of the 'perks' of the job, though in each Society there is a number for non-members to which such purchases should be placed. Most of these non-member purchases are made by persons passing through the village; they also include some of the purchases made by the fieldworker.

² This was attempted by other means but was then abandoned since there was no way of checking the reliability of the data produced.
The known cash incomes of Mualevu village households are broken down into their component sources in Table 10. The type of household and its constituent membership and the store expenditure of each household are also indicated.

It is clear from these data that in the great majority of households the main source of income is from copra, directly by sale and indirectly from wages paid by the Co-operatives. Details of the wages paid in the Co-operatives are given in the next Chapter (v. infra Table 21 p.280). It suffices to note here that the largest wages are paid to the secretaries and storemen and that these wages constitute a considerable boost to the total cash income of their households. All other members earn a much smaller, occasional wage from their employment (on a rota system) as copra-dryer operators. In almost every case, store expenditure amounts to a considerable percentage of the total known income of the household. This indicates a heavy

1 The bonus issued by each Society at the end of the 1967-8 trading year was greater than normal, a consequence of the high world copra prices prevailing in 1968.

2 I have excluded the households of the three village school-teachers, the two religious ministers and the agricultural field assistant: the heads of all these households have become members, or secondary members, of one of the Societies in the village in order to derive the benefit of the annual bonus on their store purchases. The nuclear household of one man of matawali Nayagona is also not included. This man did not belong to a Co-operative society nor did he market his copra independently. He and his family divided their time between Boitaci village, Mualevu village and a 'bush' house on his land close to Navana village. He sold his green copra to whichever Society was the most convenient and this made it difficult to obtain reliable data on his income and expenditure.
## Table 5.1: Description of Marital Status and Number of Children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Age of Husband</th>
<th>Age of Wife</th>
<th>Number of Children</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Marital status includes married, widowed, single, and divorced. Age ranges from 20 to 60 years old, with a step size of 5 years.

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### Description of Marital Status

- **Married**: husband and wife living together and legally married.
- **Widowed**: husband or wife deceased.
- **Single**: never married or divorced.
- **Divorced**: legally separated from a previous marriage.

### Age Ranges

- **Husband**: 20-60 years old, in steps of 5 years.
- **Wife**: 20-60 years old, in steps of 5 years.

### Number of Children

- Range: 0-5

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#### Source

- Census data for 2020.
commitment to western-style goods. Tables 11 to 16 reveal the nature of this commitment. (The numbers of households in all these Tables refer to the enumeration in Table 10.)

The household inventories in Table 11 give an idea of the extent to which individual households are involved in the purchase of (and/or are familiarised with the use of) western domestic utensils and other consumer goods and also domestic animals. The range of goods readily available for purchase is indicated in Table 12 which lists the stock of the largest of the Mualevu village Co-operative stores. Prices of goods are included to demonstrate the purchasing power of the dollar. These prices are considerably higher than the Suva wholesale prices (which are five per cent below retail prices for foodstuffs and ten per cent below in most other cases) as is indicated in Table 13 which reproduces a fairly typical Store order. This Table also gives an idea of the kind of goods most frequently in demand.

While canned and other manufactured foodstuffs are attractive to the Fijian's palate, they remain near-luxury items, beyond regular daily purchase by most incomes. This is evident in Table 14 which supplies details of the daily meals of selected, identified households over a period of two weeks. The selection made is intended as a representation of both size of income and type of household.

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1 While it was possible to check all these goods without giving cause for offence, it was not possible to check one important source of irregular but necessary expenditure, namely clothing. A description of villagers' clothing is added as a note (v. p.209) to Table 11.

2 Cows, goats and horses have to be purchased; pigs and chickens are generally, though not always, requested. Pigs have, in fact, shifted to a position interjacent between formal request (with a whale tooth offering) and cash.

3 The selection given in Table 14 was from a wider sample of sixteen households in Mualevu village; in the three other villages the sample is between eight and twelve households.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantities</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tableware</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cups</td>
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<td>Table linens</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cutlery</td>
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<td>Glassware</td>
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<td>Cooking pots</td>
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<td>Baking pans</td>
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<td>Cooking pots</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seasoning</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Housekeeping</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. T1 = Thatch house; T2 = Thatch house with iron roofing; C = Concrete block house; W = Wooden house
2. sm = small amount - a few table knives, teaspoons, and serving spoons
3. lm = large amount - up to a dozen or more knives and spoons of different kinds
4. ss = small set - old metal pans and plates
5. lw = large set - metal and china dishes, cups and plates for everyday use and a china set for special use.
Note to Table 11

Principal items of dress:

1. Men. Everyday wear in the village: the wrap-around printed cloth sulu (two yards of untailored material) or khaki shorts or occasionally long trousers, sometimes briefs, singlet and short-sleeved sports shirt (generally not worn together in the daytime), and rubber thongs.

   For the garden: khaki shorts with or without briefs, singlet, and/or shirt – these working clothes are invariably in very bad condition.

   Church or 'best attire': tailored sulu (the 'pocket sulu'), briefs (generally?), singlet, white shirt (often with long sleeves), tie, jacket (which may or may not make a suit with the sulu), leather sandals or rubber thongs, and occasionally a handkerchief.

2. Women. Everyday wear in the village: a sulu of the same type as a man's but worn long (near the ankle) 'Tongan-fashion', panties (?), sometimes a brassiere, blouse and sometimes rubber thongs. 'Mother Hubbard' dresses are also worn, though less often than the sulu/blouse ensemble. The dress may be worn over a sulu.

   Church or 'best attire': always a dress worn over a sulu, the two in contrasting or matching colours and designs and made of materials more expensive than that used for everyday wear; underclothing as for everyday wear.

3. Teenage children, they dress similarly to adults, though girls take more trouble over their daily appearance than do married women.

4. School children. School wear: children are invariably dressed well and tidily for school. The boys wear khaki shorts and short-sleeve white shirts. The girls wear frocks in a special school colour (this varies in the four local schools of the District) and each girl has at least two. The frocks may or may not be cast-offs from older sisters, but only rarely will a schoolgirl be seen wearing a dress obviously ill-fitting or in a bad condition.

   Everyday wear: outside of school most children dress in older and more tattered clothes.

5. Young children: Most small children are dressed in tattered cast-off shorts or frocks, or in nothing at all. They are smartened up for occasions like church attendance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Price $ c</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Price $ c</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Price $ c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yeast, 1 lb</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>Hurricane lamp</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.95</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeast, 1/2 lb</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>Thermos</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.75</td>
<td>Tablespoon</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.20</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kava</td>
<td>30 lbs</td>
<td>.60 lb</td>
<td>Razor blades</td>
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<td>Vaseline, 1 oz</td>
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<td>.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>.45</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baking powder</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>Wool</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.15</td>
<td>Salpeter</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soap, 24 oz</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pickle soup sauce</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>Sugar mixture</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Curry powder</td>
<td>15 lbs</td>
<td>.40 lb</td>
<td>Health salts</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tinned fish, 14 oz</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>Trip water</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matches, blaze</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>After-shave lotion</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>56 lbs</td>
<td>.25 lb</td>
<td>Napkin material</td>
<td>10 yds</td>
<td>.25 yd</td>
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<td>Veneer tablets, ply</td>
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<td>Drums</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Veneer powders, boxes</td>
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<td>Iron benzene tank</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.80</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea, 1 lb</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>Prizes rubber</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cigarettes, plts of 12</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>Toilet soap, lux</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plum, tobacco</td>
<td>10 lbs</td>
<td>1.80 lb</td>
<td>* * , * lifebuoy</td>
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<td>.95</td>
<td>Rhiro, small</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marigold, 1 lb</td>
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<td>.15</td>
<td>Black, large</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tinned fish, 5 oz</td>
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<td>.13</td>
<td>Steel wool</td>
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<td>.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chewed gum, small</td>
<td>720 pkts</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>Starch, 12 oz</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cracker biscuits</td>
<td>480 lbs</td>
<td>.15 lb</td>
<td>Black hair dye</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trip</td>
<td>900 lbs</td>
<td>.06 lb</td>
<td>Washing blue</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>900 lbs</td>
<td>.06 lb</td>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>112 lbs</td>
<td>.05 lb</td>
<td>Scrubbing brush</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Onza</td>
<td>49 lbs</td>
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<td>Bathing brush</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>516 lbs</td>
<td>.15 lb</td>
<td>Table fork</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.18</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakfast crackers</td>
<td>47 lbs</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Baby soap</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>Table knife</td>
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<td>.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
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<td>Teaspoon</td>
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<td>.15</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hair vails</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>Skirt</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lamp grease, 1 lb</td>
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<td>1.25</td>
<td>Daily can</td>
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<td>1.20</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>* * , * small</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>Saucepan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.70</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap, water</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>* * , * small</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matches</td>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>* * , * small</td>
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<td>.90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lamp mant</td>
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<td>.20</td>
<td>20c sewing powder</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>* * , * small</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>Two washing powder</td>
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<td>.05</td>
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<td>Talcum powder</td>
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<td>Tide washing</td>
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<td>Excelsior</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.25 gal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rags</td>
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<td>.55</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
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<td>.78 gal</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tocking cotton</td>
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<td>.80 lb</td>
<td>* * , * small</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toothpaste</td>
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<td>.18</td>
<td>Dye</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baby cream</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>Paint brush (1&quot;)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.50</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baby oil</td>
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<td>.45</td>
<td>Paint brush (2&quot;)</td>
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<td>1.70</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotch balls</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>Spade</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washing soap</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>Fork</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Purchase price $</th>
<th>Selling price $</th>
<th>Estimated return $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brown sugar</td>
<td>3 x 160 lbs</td>
<td>21.84</td>
<td>.06 lb</td>
<td>28.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>2 x 150 lbs</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>.07 lb</td>
<td>21.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian rice</td>
<td>1 x 56 lb</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>.14 lb</td>
<td>7.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tinned fish, 14 oz</td>
<td>2 x 48 tins</td>
<td>15.50</td>
<td>.20 lb</td>
<td>19.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothes soap</td>
<td>2 x 28 boxes</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>.30 lb</td>
<td>16.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard biscuits</td>
<td>2 x 40 lbs</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>.15 lb</td>
<td>12.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerosene</td>
<td>1 x 44 gallons</td>
<td>18.01</td>
<td>.60 gall</td>
<td>26.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philips batteries</td>
<td>3 dozen</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>4.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powder milk</td>
<td>1 dozen</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cigarettes, Ascot</td>
<td>100 x 10</td>
<td>10.78</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>14.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Consulate 100 x 10</td>
<td>11.24</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>14.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Pall Mall 100 x 10</td>
<td>10.78</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>14.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kava</td>
<td>28 lbs</td>
<td>23.80</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>28.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>24 x 1/2 lb</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baby powder</td>
<td>24 tins</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>5.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gents handkerchiefs</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boxes of fish-hooks,</td>
<td>12 x 100</td>
<td>7.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>12.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>various sizes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aspirin powders</td>
<td>24 boxes</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>6.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Totals: 179.33  241.28

Insurance: $1.82  Freight: $10.97  Total landed cost: $193.92

Table 13. Co-operative Society Order to Suva, May 1969
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAT</th>
<th>Household no. 6</th>
<th>Store Purchases</th>
<th>Meals (Breakfast, Lunch, Dinner)</th>
<th>Household no. 13</th>
<th>Store Purchases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1A7</td>
<td>B. Biscuits, lemon leaf tea, sugar, cassava, breastfruit, small fish, lemon leaf tea, sugar,</td>
<td>biscuits 15c</td>
<td>B. flour boiled in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar,</td>
<td>flour 10c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>breastfruit, small fish, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td>sugar 10c</td>
<td>breastfruit, small fish in kota,</td>
<td>kerosene 5c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>breastfruit, cassava, small fish, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td>acap 10c</td>
<td>breastfruit, small fish with greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar,</td>
<td>benzene 7c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>breastfruit, cassava, small fish, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td>cigarettes 13c</td>
<td><em>lolo = coconut cream.</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>breastfruit, cassava, small fish, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>kota = grated coconut left to soak in the sea</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1BN</td>
<td>B. root cassava, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td></td>
<td>B. biscuits, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>breastfruit, cassava, taro, roast pig, small fish with greens in lolo</td>
<td></td>
<td>breastfruit, small fish with greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cassava, taro, small fish with greens in lolo</td>
<td></td>
<td>cassava, small fish with greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td></td>
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<td>CAT</td>
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<tr>
<td>1CN</td>
<td>B. taro, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td></td>
<td>B. taro, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>breastfruit, cassava, cassava, seaweed in kota</td>
<td></td>
<td>cassava, small fish with greens in lolo, selenium,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>breastfruit, cassava, small fish with seaweed in kota</td>
<td></td>
<td>cassava, small fish with greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1TF</td>
<td>B. flour boiled in lolo, rice, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td>flour 12c</td>
<td>B. cassava, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td>sugar 10c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>breastfruit, small fish with greens in lolo, cassava, cassava small fish with seaweed in kota,</td>
<td>sugar 12c</td>
<td>cassava, small fish with greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td>kerosene 5c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>breastfruit, small fish with greens in lolo, cassava, cassava small fish with seaweed in kota,</td>
<td>sugar 12c</td>
<td>cassava, small fish with greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td>kerosene 5c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1WD</td>
<td>B. cassava, seaweed in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td></td>
<td>B. cassava, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td>sugar 10c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cassava, small fish with seaweed in lolo</td>
<td></td>
<td>cassava, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td>kerosene 5c</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cassava, small fish in lolo, shellfish in lolo</td>
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<td>cassava, small fish in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar,</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1TF</td>
<td>B. breastfruit, small fish in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td></td>
<td>B. cassava, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td>sugar 10c</td>
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<td>cassava, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
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<tr>
<td>1BC</td>
<td>B. breastfruit, small fish in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
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<td>breastfruit, cassava, taro, small fish in lolo,</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>6AM</strong></td>
<td>FIsh, tobacco 10c</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. yam, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. breakfast, taro, yam, curried shellfish, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B. fried cassava, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
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<td>B. cassava, small fish with greens and lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
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<td>B. cassava, small fish in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
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<td>B. cassava, small fish in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
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<td>B. yam, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
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<td>B. yam, taro, yam, fried pork with greens.</td>
<td>B. cassava, small fish in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
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<td>B. yam, taro, yam, fried pork with greens.</td>
<td>B. cassava, small fish in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
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<td><strong>10AM</strong></td>
<td>Tinned fish 20c, soap 10c</td>
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<td>B. yam, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. yam, greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B. cooked bananas, tea, sugar</td>
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<td>B. yam, greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B. cassava, small fish in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
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<td>Flour 18c</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. yam, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
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<td>B. yam, greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B. cooked bananas, tea, sugar</td>
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<td>B. yam, greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B. cassava, small fish in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. yam, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. yam, greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B. cooked bananas, tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. yam, greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B. cassava, small fish in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. yam, greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B. cooked bananas, tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. yam, greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B. cassava, small fish in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. yam, greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B. cooked bananas, tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. yam, greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B. cassava, small fish in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. yam, greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B. cooked bananas, tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. yam, greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B. cassava, small fish in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
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<td>Household no. 1, 2 continued</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 A</td>
<td>1. flour, bread, leaven, leaf tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 B</td>
<td>2. sweet potato, rice, small fish with greens in lolo, leaven, leaf tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 C</td>
<td>3. leaven, bread, turned fish, small fish with greens in lolo, leaven, leaf tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 D</td>
<td>4. leaven, bread, turned fish, small fish with greens in lolo, leaven, leaf tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 E</td>
<td>5. leaven, bread, turned fish, small fish with greens in lolo, leaven, leaf tea, sugar</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 F</td>
<td>6. leaven, bread, turned fish, small fish with greens in lolo, leaven, leaf tea, sugar</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 G</td>
<td>7. leaven, bread, turned fish, small fish with greens in lolo, leaven, leaf tea, sugar</td>
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<td>1 H</td>
<td>8. leaven, bread, turned fish, small fish with greens in lolo, leaven, leaf tea, sugar</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 I</td>
<td>9. leaven, bread, turned fish, small fish with greens in lolo, leaven, leaf tea, sugar</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 J</td>
<td>10. leaven, bread, turned fish, small fish with greens in lolo, leaven, leaf tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 K</td>
<td>11. leaven, bread, turned fish, small fish with greens in lolo, leaven, leaf tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 L</td>
<td>12. leaven, bread, turned fish, small fish with greens in lolo, leaven, leaf tea, sugar</td>
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<td>1 M</td>
<td>13. leaven, bread, turned fish, small fish with greens in lolo, leaven, leaf tea, sugar</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 N</td>
<td>14. leaven, bread, turned fish, small fish with greens in lolo, leaven, leaf tea, sugar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Household no. 20 continued</td>
<td>Household no. 34 continued</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: yam, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td>B: cooked banana, milk, tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: breakfast, yam, small fish with greens in lolo</td>
<td>B: cassava, small fish with greens in lolo, milk, tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: yam, greens with lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B: bread, milk, tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: yam, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td>B: cassava, milk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: yam, greens in lolo, boiled eggs</td>
<td>B: cassava, small fish, tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: yam, greens in lolo, lemon leaf tea, sugar.</td>
<td>benzene 14c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: yam, lemon leaf tea, sugar</td>
<td>B: bread, milk, tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: yam, fish in lolo, tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B: taro, tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: yam, fish in lolo, tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B: taro, yam, chicken soup, pork, tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L: yam, tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B: biscuits, milk, tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L: taro, fish in lolo, pork</td>
<td>B: taro, greens boiled in chicken stock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L: taro, fish with greens in lolo, tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B: cassava, sauce, or cornbeef and yam, tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L: rice, tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B: biscuits, milk, tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: breakfast, greens in lolo</td>
<td>B: taro, yam, tinned fish with greens in lolo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: yam, fish with greens in lolo, tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B: taro, yam, tinned fish with greens in lolo, tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L: rice, tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B: biscuits, milk, lemon leaf tea, tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: sweet potato, taro, fish with greens in lolo</td>
<td>L: cassava, sweet potato, taro, fish in lolo, boiled crabs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L: sweet potato, taro, fish with greens in lolo, tea, sugar.</td>
<td>B: cassava, sweet potato, taro, fish in lolo, boiled crabs, tea, sugar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Meal ingredients involving cash expenditure have been underlined.
Also included in Table 14 are details of the domestic purchases made by the households during this period. By 'domestic' I refer to purchases decided upon primarily by women of the household, generally the spouse of the male head of a household, and it does not include details of other purchases (i.e. cigarettes, tobacco, kava) made independently by males of the household.

Tables 11 to 14 make evident the nature of the Mualevu households' cash commitment to western goods. The goods can be divided with some over-simplification into the classes of regular necessities, e.g. basic food ingredients (such as sugar, salt, flour), cleansing substance (toilet and washing soaps and powders) and fuels (kerosene and benzene); occasional necessities, e.g. mosquito netting, medicines, gardening tools, clothing, fishing equipment; regular luxuries, e.g. canned foods, rice and other foodstuffs; and occasional luxuries, e.g. furniture, radio, benzene lamps. Expenditure on capital goods or equipment in Mualevu village is restricted to domestic animals. In Daliconi, Mavana and Cikobia villages, this category would include punts and engines (outboard and inboard).

3 (cont'd from page 207)
The same households in Mualevu village were checked for a shorter period (eight days) in October the same year - this revealed little variation from the data obtained for the longer period.

1 House-building expenditure in Mualevu village is restricted to corrugated iron roofing for Fijian-style houses. Western-style concrete block and wooden houses are built from Co-operative funds. Three villagers in Cikobia were engaged in building their own block houses.
An important correlation to the data on the type of goods to which expenditure is committed is the pattern of household income and expenditure. This is shown in Tables 15 and 16, both of which cover the same seventeen-day period. The pattern of more or less daily income and expenditure which these Tables reveals is typical of the whole year. However, it should be noted that the months of July and August (and September) are the period in the year in which the nut production of palms is at its lowest and this has an effect on the size of both daily income and daily expenditure.

It is demonstrable that Mualevu households (and in the few instance of extended households, the nuclear family sub-units) are involved in a regular expenditure throughout the year that leaves them only a small cash surplus to meet extra cash needs. The villagers are well aware of this fact, but the majority of adult males candidly admit their inability to save cash from current (i.e. daily/weekly) income. They accept fatalistically this inability as a characteristic of Fijians. In the last four years villagers have made some attempt to acquire the saving habit by using Post Office Savings Accounts. In most cases these accounts are opened for their children (and in their children's names). Deposits are both small and irregular as far as I was able to ascertain. Unfortunately, though understandably, the authorities in Suva decided that it would not be permissable to divulge details of individual accounts and therefore I have been able to indicate (in Table 10) only the fact that one or more members of a household possess an account.

1 While this time of the year is the nadir of nut production, higher than average copra London prices often prevail (though this was not so in 1969).
Table 13 - Daily Income of Maleva Households from Green Copra, 25 July - 10 August, 1966

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Prevailing buying prices of the different Co-operatives were as follows:

- Dakawa Society (D) - 10 cents per 10 cts, $1.20 per cwt green copra
- Tovilea Society (D) - 10 cents per 12 cts, $1.20 per cwt green copra
- Mawale Society (M) - 10 cents per 12 cts, $1.50 per cwt green copra
- Maleva Society (N) - 10 cents per 12 cts

No dried copra was marketed independently from Maleva village during this period.
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Table 16: Daily Store Expenditure of Malevu Households, 25 July - 10 August 1969.
Most villagers notably support the idea of enforced saving through the medium of cess deductions, but as notably they would prefer the deductions to be on a sliding scale, which would maintain their daily income at a higher level when the Suva price for copra drops. In the same vein the villagers adopt an ambivalent attitude towards the bonus system. They say it is a 'good thing' to receive a lump sum of cash at the end of the year, but they also point out that this is often spent quickly and foolishly and it would be better to have higher prices for their green copra regularly throughout the year. In their attitudes to both cess and bonus the villagers make apparent the pressure of daily expenditure upon cash resources. One result of this pressure is that any other cash demand on the individual, even when it is a regular demand that can be anticipated, tends to become an 'emergency', laga, the size of which in the villagers' calculation, is in proportion to the lump sum of cash that is in demand.

Regular demands on most household incomes are church tithes, the Provincial tax and local village school fees (for primary education). The Wesleyan church tithe is four dollars per household. This is paid at a few cents a time (at church services) throughout the year, but some villagers still fall behind in their payments and have to scrape together a lump sum at the end of the year. The 7th Day Adventist tithe is ten per cent of all income and produce and is payable to the local minister. In this case I found it impossible to confirm what tithes were being paid and whether these did amount to ten per cent of income.

Currently, only two Mualovu villagers have their own cess accounts; all other cess deductions on Mualovu copra are placed to the accounts of the Co-operatives marketing the copra.
Local village school fees are one dollar per child per term in Mualevu village school, which takes children to the fourth grade (about 12 years old), and one dollar fifty cents per child per term at the Mavana village school, where children attend for fifth and sixth grades. Every term there are cases of parents with two or more children at school defaulting on the fees and subsequently being threatened by the school-teachers and/or by the local village school committee with the removal of their children from the school. The fees are then duly paid off by the parents over a period of some weeks.

The Provincial tax is an annual head tax of thirteen dollars a year on males over twenty one, though this reduces to six dollars fifty cents for a man with six or more children. Payment of the tax which falls due every May caused great consternation to the majority of tax payers in 1968 (when I was in the village) and a large number of them had to play hide and seek with the Provincial constable (from Lomaloma) after the tax was due. Most managed to find the money before they were summoned, by working for a month on the nearby plantation of Kanacea. Eight ultimately were hauled off to court in Lomaloma, but by then they had the necessary money in their pockets to pay their tax along with the small fine imposed. Three of the men fined were in the higher income range of the village.

These 'emergencies' are considered to be relatively minor, however, compared with the two sources of major expenditure which trouble the horizons of most male

The additional expenses of uniforms and writing materials are included in store expenditure.
adult villagers. One is the death of very close kin, which can involve a man in personal expenditure of up to a hundred dollars (the implications of the ceremonial cash expenditure are discussed in Chapter 12). The other is the intermediate and secondary education of children.  

Villagers have become pronouncedly education-conscious 2 within the last decade. Most men are now concerned that their children should be able to proceed beyond the primary level of schooling. Their enthusiasm originates in part from their knowledge that formal schooling is a necessary qualification for prestigious jobs with good pay, in government and commerce, 3 and here the examples of local boy makes good are ample evidence for the opportunities

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1 There are three levels of school education that principally concern the MUALEVU villager: primary, intermediate and secondary (a diagrammatic representation of the education structure is given in Sherlock:1970:58). The primary and intermediate levels are catered for by the village schools, but secondary education has always involved sending away children to schools outside Lau. In 1969 plans were in hand to establish a secondary school at Lomaloma. Many MUALEVU fathers stated a preference to send their children (particularly at the intermediate level and above) to schools in Viti Levu and Vanua Levu if at all possible. This attitude stems from the villagers' high opinion of the old-established colonial schools and of the Indian schools and from their low opinion of Fijian schools. The 7th Day Adventist Church has its own schools in Fiji and church members invariably send their children to those schools. The government intends in the near future to pay in full the salaries of village school teachers and thus abolish fees at the primary school level (v.FLCP No.19 of 1970).  

2 In the sense of formal schooling and learning. I quickly lost my initial high status as a European in the villages, but I was never able to lose the prestige that stuck to me as a man 'who had schooled well', as evidenced by all the paraphernalia of 'education' in my house. I was once startled by a villager asking whether an Oxford Master of Arts was 'better' than a London doctorate.  

3 Urbanized Fijians rarely become involved in trade and commerce on their own account (unlike the urbanized Indians).
that education provides. During my second field trip (1969) this enthusiasm was demonstrated by the outlay of cash ($1,500) and unpaid labour which the two villages of Mualevu and Boitaci devoted to the building of a new, concrete block village school. At the same time the villagers were contributing cash and labour towards the establishment of a secondary school at Lomaloma.

But the villager's enthusiasm for education does not stem merely from a knowledge of the opportunities it brings to his children. An awareness of present and future limitations upon cash resources gives rise to a concern that these opportunities will be the only opportunities for his children's escape from an impoverished existence, whether the children remain in the village or migrate to the urban areas. This concern approaches a desperation in fathers already engaged in, or about to engage in, the arranging of

1 I am referring to children reared in the villages and not to children of urbanized MUALEVU migrants. One young man from Mualevu had obtained his B.A. and M.A. from Auckland and is now a rapidly rising official in the Education Department. Another young man, from Mavana, obtained a B. Comm. in New Zealand and is progressing at a similar rate in the Department of Co-operatives. These are outstanding examples, but other locally born villagers have obtained employment as school-teachers and minor public servants, and as clerks in the large commercial organisations in Suva. If members of migrated families are included, the list swells considerably and resident villagers are well acquainted with the progress of these migrants.

2 The Government contributed $1,500 on the condition that the villagers raised the same amount. This they did mostly by Co-operative contributions, but aided with minor sums raised by the village women's club through collections and fairs. The concrete blocks (which were contributed by the administration) each had to be shouldered one mile from the village to the new school site.
their children's intermediate and secondary education. The cost of this education makes demands to which their cash resources in the village simply are not equal.

The level of school fees varies from school to school and according to the educational level and whether a child is a day pupil or a boarder. From data gathered from four villages, the fees paid by villagers appear to be mostly in the range of $16 - $25 per term for a day pupil (intermediate or secondary), rising over $40 per term for a boarder. Fees, of course, do not constitute the total cash expenses involved in a child's schooling. There are, in addition, school uniforms, everyday clothing, school equipment, board and lodging and bus fares (if a day pupil), and pocket money.

Using the Mualevu household incomes as an example (v. Table 10), it is evident that the expense of educating just one child becomes a considerable charge on income. Moreover, it is burden which is carried alone within the village. The individual's customary avenue of relief, the social insurance of kin organisation, is here closed to him. There does not exist the necessary surplus of the goods in demand, namely coconut and cash. His kin, themselves, have or anticipate having a similar burden. A man is thus obliged to turn from the village, from his local kin organisation, to the outside, to migrant, urban settled kin, who are more favourably placed in terms of cash income and physical accessibility to schools.

1 Mualevu, Mavana, Daliconi and Cikobia.
As far as the cash expenses are concerned, the arrangements which the parents make vary considerably. The father may pay the school fees while his urban kin pay all other expenses; or, for example, the father may pay the fees for one term and his urban kin for the next term. Where the child is a day pupil (and this is more often the case), he becomes a member of the urban household. One feature is common to all of these arrangements. The father contributes from those resources of which he does not lack a surplus: home grown foodstuffs and coconut oil. At intervals throughout the year he will send by means of a returning visitor or a resident villager leaving MUALEVU on a visit (or often by agreement with a member of the ship's crew), whatever foodstuffs are in season\(^1\) and whatever amount that he believes he can persuade these persons to take.\(^2\) Despite the help received from urban kin, a man with more than one child schooling away from northern Lau is sooner or later obliged to work a period or periods of wage-labouring, either on one of the nearby coconut estates or in Suva. If his cash resources in the village are relatively small, this temporary absence is likely to develop into a semi-permanent or permanent one.

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1 Rootcrops, particularly yam, wet and dry taro, and sweet potato, and fruits, particularly sweet and cooking banana, mango and (husked) coconuts. Since Suva fresh food prices are high, these contributions represent a considerable cash saving to the receiver. A coconut in the Suva market was between five and eight cents in December 1969; wet taro was 25-30 cents for eight (fairly small). Yam earlier in the year was 40 cents a small bag, say about 12 pounds weight. Scented coconut oil was around 50 cents for a small tomato ketchup bottle size.

2 Any visitor returning to Suva is loaded down with foodstuffs from a dozen or more sources, destined for a dozen or more recipients. Since the inter-island traders on arrival at Suva are met by any urban Lauans with nothing else to do, the despatch of the different gifts presents no problem.
Concern with the education of their children is now involving villagers in a self-perpetuating cycle of increasing cash demands and decreasing cash resources. The more the villager seeks an escape (for his children) from the latter, the more he becomes subject to the former. The situation is aggravated rather than eased by the nature of the sole cash crop the villager is able to plant, namely the coconut. 1

The MUALEVU villager has been unable to expand his coconut holdings at a rate fast enough to match his increased, and increasing, cash needs. Not only do the newly planted coconut seedlings need from five to seven years (with good soils and drainage) before they begin to bear nuts, 2 they also utilize a much larger area of land, and thus initially demand a larger expenditure of labour, relative to most (all?) other cash crops for the

1 Some kava is grown for the local market, but production is restricted almost entirely to Mavana village and here only three villagers regularly earn in excess of $50 a year from their kava. A scheme was initiated by the Department of Agriculture to persuade the villagers to plant ground nuts, but this failed from what appears to have been a breakdown in communication between the Department and the villagers over a guaranteed market.

2 The majority of villagers did not begin to plant coconut as a crop until the late 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. This reflects in part the influence of the establishment of Co-operatives and in part a response to the initiation (in 1964) of a British Government subsidy scheme for improving and extending coconut holdings in the Colony. This scheme was introduced following the recommendations of the Silsoc's Report (Silsoc:1963); for a report on the achievements of the scheme, v. Selby:1968.
same cash return. But the villagers' troubles with coconut do not end here. The fact that the coconut does take up so much land and is, moreover, a permanent crop has made the villagers aware that their potential cash resources in land (the empty lands in which they can plant more coconut) are very much limited. With the regular planting of coconut as a crop by all villagers, a pronounced pressure on land has rapidly developed which has been intensified by the inequitable distribution of land imposed by the system of mataqali estates.

The general absence of concern for land, as such, that was evident during the hearing of the 1938-40 Lands Commission Enquiry is a reliable indication of the MUALEVU villagers' relative lack of involvement in a cash economy at the time. While rights to established coconut lands were clearly valued, there was yet no pressure upon land which might otherwise have been expected had most villagers been regularly planting coconut as a crop. During the preliminary discussions and arrangements, the Commission's clerks experienced little trouble in gaining unanimous agreement to the mataqali boundaries that were decided upon, as long as rights to coconut lands were not involved. Indeed, in one area the boundaries of mataqali estates of two villages (Muallevu and Malaka) proved not contiguous and the intervening

McPaul (1962:9) refers to 'good yields' of 'around 10 cwt of dried copra per acre' from 'many properly managed estates [on Taveuni]'. The Burns Commission (Burns:1960:53) estimated the average dried copra yield from plantations ('estates') to be 5 cwt per acre and from Fijian groves to be 4 cwt per acre - an estimate which McPaul (1963:13) cites and uses. The 1968-9 copra yield from Muallevu village groves was just under 4 1/2 cwt per acre, but yields from individual groves varied between 8 cwt and less than 2 cwt per acre.
area became crown land by default (v. supra Sketch Map 1). One incident in particular epitomised this lack of concern with empty land.

Rara was a chiefly clan which had originally been founded by one of the Senimoli chiefs in the village Lomaji. Subsequently the Lomaji peoples (Rara and Lomaji-vanua) co-resided with the Nadave peoples in a single settlement which eventually amalgamated with Mualevu village. The influence of the clan Rara had presumably weakened for it never acquired the leadership of the Nadave political federation. For the 1930s I was able to trace only one adult male member of the clan Rara and he was residing exorilocally in the island of Koro. In 1938, however, three men took an opportunity to be re-recruited to the clan Rara. They were attracted by the prospect of chiefly status and more specifically by the chiefly office of Mataki Cakaudrove.

The opportunity was offered as a result of the enlisting of three persons: the head of the clan Rara, an elderly woman named Sera, her husband the chief, and their eldest son, the government District Chief (both of the clan Mualevu). The three were anxious that rights of access to Sera's coconut lands should not be lost on her death and for this reason they planned for a younger son, MAIKELI, to be re-recruited and registered to Rara. However, it was intended officially to include clan Rara, which was almost 'empty', within the low status matagali Lomaji, in the administrative vatuca Nadave. In order that MAIKELI should not lose his chiefly status, his parents and brother

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1 This is the son that TANIELA referred to in dispute no. 7 Appendix 2.
planned to establish an independent administrative vavusa Lomaji in which the clan Rara would lead. To accomplish this design it was necessary to swell the membership of the clan Rara since official policy was that 'small clans' should not become administrative matagali. For this reason they approached Sera's non-member cognatic kin to persuade them to be re-recruited, tempting them with the prospects of chiefly status. Three resident villagers agreed to be re-recruited (the present head of household no. 5 and the fathers - now dead - of the heads of households no. 8 and no. 18). ¹

The plan appeared to have been near to complete success for the prepared Tale of Origin of the administrative vavusa Lomaji was officially recorded (v. N.L.T.B.: 1938b). However, it went partly awry when the clan Lomajivanua performed a volte-face and insisted on retaining their association with Nadave people (now reduced to the membership of the clan Vuniivi) in the administrative vavusa Nadave. This action was probably a result of Ratu Sukuna's original ruling on magimagi which gave the clan Lomajivanua a real prospect of acquiring some of Sera's coconut lands and this would have been lost if they had joined an administrative vavusa Lomaji. Since Rara was officially considered too small to exist as an administrative vavusa, its members agreed that it should be included as an itokatoka in the 'chiefly' administrative matagali Mualevu. One of the re-recruited men in Rara subsequently took the title of Mataki Cakaudrove.

¹ V. supra enumeration of Mualevu village households in Table 10, p. 206.
To-day, the sons of the re-recruited men ruefully admit to the foolishness of their fathers in yielding up rights to the large areas of empty land in the estates of those administrative matagali in which their former clans had been included. While it is true they had thereby acquired rights to the empty land in the estate of the administrative matagali Mualevu, this land was much smaller in area while matagali Mualevu always (i.e. since 1938) has been easily the largest in membership of all the administrative matagali of Mualevu village. The other villagers derisively make fun of these miscalculations and refer ironically to those who 'are now indeed, true chiefs, for they have no land.' At the 1965 Lands Commission Enquiry, one of the re-recruited men plaintively requested the Commissioners that he should be allowed to return to 'matagali Natuvu' (Natuvu was his former clan), only to be refused, rather drily, with the reply: 'There is no longer a matagali Natuvu' (Thomson, J: 1965-6:10-11).

This new concern for empty land reflects the pressure that has developed upon the principle cash resource, coconut holdings, as the MUALEVU villagers have become increasingly involved in a cash economy in the years following the departure of Ratu Sukuna's Commission. 'The coconut eats up the land', remark the villagers, and this is, indeed, an appropriate metaphor to convey the relative

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1 The next Enquiry after that of 1938 and the last to date.

2 In their decision the Commissioners added that it would have been a different matter if matagali Nautu, in which Natuvu was now an itokatoka, had sought or agreed to his re-recruitment, 'lakovi mai vakavanua', (ibid.).
rapidity with which land is now being planted with coconut and withdrawn from further cultivation. Planting coconut as a crop has become an integral part of the horticultural cycle.

According to their own reasoning, the villagers plant coconut in the lands they clear as much to ensure they retain control over these lands, as to secure the future cash benefit from enlarged holdings: 'If you do not plant coconut in your garden, then when you go to garden in another place some other member of the matagali will come and plant coconut in the land and then it is lost'. Rights of prior access to land are still recognised, but as in the past they do not enable lands to be accumulated and held without being used, which now means without being used for planting coconut. The holder of such rights is vulnerable to the requests (or disputes) of other prospective cultivators if he does not plant coconut himself. With the knowledge that the coconut is a permanent crop, he is well aware of the threat of losing access to the land to other members of the matagali. One man of Mavana village who earns as much as ten times the cash income from kava as he does from copra yet continues to plant coconut every year in his new gardens. He is obliged to do this in order to retain control of the lands he has cleared. If he did not do so, then, as he explains himself, he would eventually be left without any land.

While the villagers do not imply they would not plant coconut should there be no pressure on land, it is significant that the need to plant coconut is so often expressed in terms of land pressure. The villagers abruptly have been made aware that there is a finite amount of land available for cultivation. There is a quite explicit
recognition by the individual that he is in competition with other cultivators for the control of scarce and ever diminishing resources. The imposition of matagali estates in 1938 has meant that this competition is essentially intra-matagali.

The villager does not clear land specifically for planting coconut, rather the coconut crop has been brought into the established horticultural cycle. This cycle is followed by all cultivators with little or no variation from year to year. Where unused bush is available, a man will mark out an area for his garden (he is supposed to surround it with a cleared path of twenty feet to minimize the risk of fire spreading) and either burn it off immediately, or first raze the vegetation, using an axe on the trees, and then burn the area. Particularly if his chosen area is covered with thick bush and is difficult to clear, the cultivator may either organise or join a 'team of helpers', halebale. The term can apply to a group of relatives and affines and friends specially requested for the occasion, or it may refer to a formally constituted 'gang' that attends in rota to the areas of all its members. During the last few years these gangs have been associated with Co-operative societies, but prior to this they have been based variously upon the administrative matagali, the administrative yavusa and upon the village.

The size of a cleared area, were, is fairly standard when carried out by a gang and is about half an acre. Only one day is devoted to each member. A man wishing to have a larger area cleared will have to rely on his own efforts or on his influence with and ability to feed his relatives and friends. The villagers recognise that the
balebale is not the most efficient work system. Men who are clearing other persons' gardens like to talk and joke and have cigarette breaks and they eat too much at lunch. In MUALEVU, the villager who wants to make a large garden is by definition the man who relies most upon his own efforts. Such a man will make a single, large clearing, or two or three smaller clearings, which in size can amount to an acre.

After an area has been burned, it is cleaned up (caracaramaki) preparatory to planting (laulau) the yam. There are a large number of varieties of yam known to the MUALEVU gardener, certainly in excess of thirty, but the primary division as far as horticultural practice is concerned is based upon size - yams are large or small.

The task of planting the large yam is considered 'very heavy work' by the villagers. A pit to accommodate the intended, or hoped for, size of the yam, has to be excavated and then over-filled with fine, broken soil to form a mound, pukepuke, in which the portion of yam tuber is planted. Even the strongest of workers find it difficult to make more than fifteen of these large pukepuke in one day. The later stages of cultivation also require much work and attention. The soil in between the mounds has to be turned (cukivovo) and if necessary small drainage channels (na tova ni wai) have to be made to carry away any surface water. When the shoot (kadre) has reached a length of about two feet it is lifted up on crossed sticks (nagasagavi).  

1 laulau is the planting preparation. The actual planting is 'kca'.
2 I have referred to this process as 'crotchng', v. Plate V.2.
and thereafter prevented from touching the ground in order to avoid the effects of both excessive heat and damp. None of these measures are required for the small yams, which are planted in shallow, quickly made mounds that are hardly more than a turning of the soil. Weeding, too, is given much less attention.

The older villagers say that there is no longer the same pride in yam gardens as formerly and it is true that many of the younger men either do not bother at all with the large yam or they plant very few of them. Men who make large garden areas almost always plant the large yam, as do the more active of older villagers. The latter, particularly, are proud of both the appearance of their yam-gardens and of the size of their yams and they talk of re-introducing a formerly held competition (they say it finished six or seven years ago) to determine the widest and the longest yams. But the younger men appear more impressed by the number of yams planted and by the size of the garden.

1 There is no evidence to say whether concern with the yam ever reached cult proportions, but certainly at all times in the past the large yam occupied a position of greater cultural import than it does to-day. In aboriginal times the yam first fruits ceremonies, igayu, where yams were successively accumulated by increasingly inclusive political units for ultimate presentation to the Chief, were an important demonstration of both the existing order of political power and alignment and the ritualistic associations of divine chiefship upon which it was founded. All that remains of this to-day is the pride of the older men in growing and producing large yams and the annual presentation of yam first fruits to the Methodist church by methodist gardeners (though not all of them, and the yams are not strictly the first fruits), v. Plate XIV.1.
Other crops are interplanted with the yam, the most common combination being via kava (where the ground is suitable and the slips are available), banana (generally the indigenous cooking variety, yudi), often a few pawpaw (papaya) and coconut. Bele, a native green, cabbage (English and Chinese) and melon may be grown on the sides of the yam garden. In a few gardens I found spring onions planted around the perimeters of large yam mounds. At what stage this intercropping takes place depends on the personal views (and concern) of the gardener as to the effects it may have on the growth of the yams. Older men, as I have said, tend to be more concerned about their yams and will delay any interplanting until the yams have well taken. Many younger gardeners, however, will introduce the other crops as soon as the planting of the yam has finished.

The former method of planting coconut was in a sense to 'sow' the nuts. After the yams have been lifted, the ungerminated coconuts were tossed out in different directions for different distances until the garden area was covered. The villagers have planted on a more scientific basis since the inception of the coconut subsidy scheme (v. supra p.226 n.2) which has brought them expert advice. Germinated nuts are individually planted in lines at roughly the twenty-eight foot intervals recommended for tall (as opposed to dwarf) varieties by the Department of Agriculture. (This spacing provides between fifty and sixty palms per acre.)

Actual planting of the yam may begin as early as May and straddle June through to September. Yam planted in

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1 A giant-leafed plant related to the taro but which does not need irrigation. It is a common foodstuff in the MUALEVU household, more common than the taro but not as favoured.
in July and August will be lifted around March the following year. The crops which are then most commonly planted in the rotation cycle are cassava and sweet potato, though *via* and *dalo ni tana* (both varieties of taro that do not need irrigation) are also popular. In the third year cassava alone is planted and this may be continued within a fourth year depending on the soil and on the land available.

Where a cultivator has little land available for gardening then this rotation is dispensed with. The cultivator retains an area for garden use and does not plant it up with coconut. With his limited resources he is obliged to divide up his garden area and rotate the land, generally planting yam in the same plot for two years running. Cassava plots situated within established coconut groves are a sure sign of land shortage (v. Plate VI.1).

The mounting pressure upon available empty land has brought a fresh consideration to the choice of a new garden site. The cultivator endeavours to secure as strategic a position as possible in terms of the consolidation of his existing coconut holdings and their expansion in future years. This *strategic gardening* involves consideration of the position of coconut holdings relative to that of neighbouring groves and gardens and of the surrounding topographical features. The degree of manoeuvring and jockeying for position that may ultimately be incurred depends almost entirely on the amount of land available and the number of cultivators seeking access to it. This in turn varies from one *matamali* estate to another.
Of all the administrative matagali in Mualevu village, matagali Mualevu suffers most from shortage of land: it has the largest resident membership and the smallest estate. To-day only a small area of empty land remains to be brought under cultivation. Sketch Map 2 (overleaf) illustrates the situation for the cultivators concerned in one part of this area. The numbers in parenthesis after the names in the proceeding narrative refer to the cultivators of the gardens enumerated in the Sketch Map.

TAWAKE (2), a married man in his late thirties, is a strong and energetic gardener who makes a large clearing every year under the supervision of his father, CORA.\(^1\) The latter is a man in his sixties who through illness is no longer capable of the work involved in making his own garden. In 1969 their new clearing threatened to cut off, partially at least, the advance of Ratu CAMA\(^2\) (1), a younger son of the Chief.

Ratu CAMA, a young married man of about twenty five, is not a strong gardener and he now faced the possibility that CORA's and TAWAKE's clearing of the following year (1970) would effectively restrict his expansion to one small corner of the remaining available land. He was reasonably certain that this would happen since CORA and TAWAKE themselves were being headed off and pushed in Ratu CAMA's direction by FINAU\(^3\) (3).

FINAU is a married man about fifty years old and is another strong gardener. His intention was plain enough and acknowledged by everyone in the village. He made his clearing veer sharply over to meet that of CORA and TAWAKE while entirely ignoring the possibilities of expansion in the other direction, not even making an equal advance on both sides. His action was calculated to maximize the area to which he

\(^1\) Head of household no. 20.
\(^2\) Head of household no. 29.
\(^3\) Head of household no. 18.
Sketch Map 2. Gardening strategy in Nalanji Maleya Maleya village.
might gain access in succeeding years. He was able
to concentrate on cutting off CORA and TAWAKE
without concern for his other flank and for
suffering the same treatment himself, since he
was well aware of the low capability of this
neighbour.

URAIA 1 (4) is what the New Guinean literature
would describe as a 'rubbish man'. He is thirty
and a bachelor. Purposeless rather than lazy, he
is treated as and acts the village clown. He
stays with whomever will feed him and provide
him with somewhere to sleep. He does very little
gardening on his own account. In the land (4)
next to FINAU he has a small grove of coconut
trees (about one third an acre) situated in a
narrow and steep valley, the upper reaches of
which effectively separate FINAU from MOSESE 2
(5). These trees were planted by URAIA's
father. The only gardening URAIA himself has
accomplished here consists of a small plot of
cassava.

Ratu CAMA escaped the pressure developing
against him by not making his now clearing a
continuation of his established garden.
Instead, he cleared land above the bottleneck
that had formed (v. Sketch Map 2). By doing
this he effected an exchange of situation with
CORA and TAWAKE who now were the gardeners
faced with the bottleneck. At the same time
Ratu CAMA had considerably increased the
potential amount of land he might bring under
his control. Ratu CAMA was already planting
yam in his finished garden clearing when he
was presented with an opportunity for consolidat-
ing even further his position. The Department of

1 Temporary member of household no. 40.
2 Head of household no. 5.
Agriculture in Suva had sent two field assistants to the Group to provide the villagers with the services of a chain saw. When these men arrived at Mualevu village, Ratu CAMA quickly arranged to have two acres of bush cleared (for which he paid the official fee of $2.00 an acre). The area worked was the new bottleneck between his own and CORA and TAWAKE's and FINAU's gardens. By this action Ratu CAMA had, so to speak, stopped CORA and TAWAKE and had also halted FINAU's advance; at the same time he had gained a position which promised to reserve for him an even greater amount of the available empty land. (Note: Ratu CAMA did not plant a garden in the area cleared by the chain saw. 'Cleared' in fact, is misleading since the area remained as the men with the chain saw left it - the felled trees lying where they had fallen).

There is a kind of informal set of rules or guidances which govern the clearing of garden sites and the expansion of coconut holdings. These appear to have grown up ad hoc with the process of re-orientation of cultivation practices and objectives. Thus in the Mualevu case given above, the prevailing opinion in the village was that FINAU's action was 'sharp', unaccusable, yet it was not to be condemned for he was a hard-working man and did not have much coconut. It was by dint of his own labour that he was enabled to get so far across to be in a position to head off CORA and TAWAKE. This was not the case with Ratu CAMA, however, who in siting his new garden had jumped a tract
of uncleared land and this showed that he was not a strong gardener. But like FINAU, Ratu CAMA gained sympathy because he had little coconut compared with CORA's. Indeed, his 'cunning' in employing the chain saw was much appreciated in the village.

The use of the chain saw, in fact, had introduced a new element into the gardening scene. There was not only the speed and efficiency of the chain saw's operation (two were in use), but also the fact that land had been cleared with the intention not of immediate planting but of reserving the land for future use. The situation was unprecedented. Men never cleared land for the gardens for future years; it was clearly irrational in a system of slash and burn, shifting cultivation. And this was the system to which MUALEVU horticultural practices were still oriented, not withstanding the planting of coconut as a crop. Moreover, there was an additional factor. Ratu CAMA had not cleared the land by his own labour, he had contracted others to do it by cash payment. This investment of cash seems to have strengthened Ratu CAMA's position where otherwise such a flagrant attempt to control empty land might have been brushed aside. Both CORA and TAWAKE were puzzled about what action to take. FINAU, who still had room to manoeuvre on his other flank, was more decisive in his reaction to the innovation. He began to talk of paying for five or six acres of bush to be cleared to provide himself with control of an area right up to the
main boundary with Daliconi village. (This never
eventuated).

For CORA, the situation had other complications
which needed to be taken into consideration. CORA and
the Chief were not only brothers-in-law (a joking relation-
ship 'heavy' with obligation), they were also quite friendly,
CORA invariably giving the Chief his public and private
support. This support had only recently been reciprocated.
The Chief had found in CORA's and TAWAKE's favour over a
coconut grove boundary dispute within the matagali. It is
possible that Ratu CAMA had calculatedly taken all this
into account, though it was more probable, as many villagers
intimated, that the Chief had advised his son's actions.
Certainly what Ratu CAMA had succeeded in doing was to put
the onus of further action, which would be judged friendly
or unfriendly, upon CORA and TAWAKE. Their dilemma was
clear and they implicitly acknowledged it. While TAWAKE
was privately critical of Ratu CAMA, neither he nor his
father would be drawn as to what action they intended to
take the following year. It would be necessary, they both
individually asserted, to talk the matter over with the
Chief and Ratu CAMA when the time came.

1 When they had finished their work for Ratu CAMA, the men
with the chain saws moved on to Mavana village. Soon after-
wards the senior of the two departed from Vanua Balavu
leaving his youthful assistant with a single chain saw
that quickly fell out of repair. I left the field in
December, that is well before the start of the new yam
season, and was thus unable to witness further 'tactical'
developments. I later heard that the following year CORA
and TAWAKE 'jumped' the area cleared by the chain saw, but
without causing any actual dispute. The chain saw remained
out of commission and was eventually returned to Suva, but
some of the Co-operatives began to discuss possibilities
of purchasing and operating one.
The type of manoeuvring I have depicted is now clearly a basic skill in this strategy of gardening that has evolved with land pressure. Cultivators attempt, with varying degrees of determination and success according to their own energy and resourcefulness, to position new gardens in such a way as to reserve for themselves control over the maximum possible area of empty land while excluding their fellow matagali members.

MACIU and his youngest unmarried son, SANAILA, provide a classic example of strategic gardening in Mavana village (v. Sketch Map 3). They have extended an established grove of coconut, area (1), first by clearing and gardening in areas (2) and (3), thus blocking the expansion in their direction of their neighbour at (7), and then in area (4). In this way they now have their coconut growing in the areas which were most likely to have attracted other cultivators from their matagali (Valika). With the common boundary with matagali Vatulami a secure defence on the uncleared side, they have succeeded at the same time in encircling and cutting off the remaining vacant land. MACIU and SANAILA are now able to clear and plant this land at their leisure. In 1969 they had only a small garden of yams here, area (6), and their main garden was situated to greater advantage elsewhere in the matagali estate.

Area (5) is still vacant and should be available to any matagali member who wishes to garden there. MACIU unhesitantly admitted this when I asked him and then added, with a grin, that there would be a good deal of trouble if anyone did try to push in.

But no one intends to contest MACIU's and SANAILA's control of this piece of land. There is general agreement among the villagers that where these enclosed areas are small it is not worth incurring enmity and a dispute by attempting to insist on one's rights to cultivate the land.
Sketch Map 3. Gardening strategy in Matagali Valika, Mavana village.
as a member of the matagali. What constitutes 'small' or 'large', however, depends on certain variables, primarily the pressure on land within the matagali, and the energy and strength of character of the cultivators involved. In some cases a cultivator may misjudge a developing situation and seriously err in the reaction which he anticipates from a neighbour.

MARAU and his younger brother, TEMO, hold joint rights to a large coconut grove of about thirty-five acres. The grove is situated in a long valley, flanked on one side by a ridge which is also the boundary with matagali Valevono (v. Sketch Map 4).

MARAU is an above average gardener, but TEMO is one of the most energetic gardeners in the whole District. Between them they are very rapidly bringing the remaining uncleared areas within the valley under their own cultivation and control. They have already isolated against the Valika boundary a grassland area (11) of about twelve acres. In 1968 they were concentrating on scaling off the head of the valley. TEMO continued his clearing and gardening in area (2) while MARAU decided to clear area (3), thus cutting off a long strip of vacant land that was situated between the outcrop of rock and the path which ran through the valley. This tract of land was very steep and studded with small rocks on one side, though flat on the side closest to the outcrop of rock. It was clearly not an easy or attractive proposition for cultivation.

Another member of the matagali, SIGA, had a grove of young palms (between three and five years old) at area (4) and a small established grove of coconut at area (6). He was then working in Suva, to pay for his children's school fees, but his younger brother, FIFITA, was gardening at area (5). The total coconut resources of these two brothers was slight, amounting to no more than seven or eight acres
Sketch Map 4. Gardening strategy in Matagali Vatulagi
Navana village.
of bearing trees. FIFITA had only been back in the village for a year after a long period of working on one of the nearby European plantations.

MARAU did not commence his clearing immediately up against the boundary of area (4) but left an intervening piece of land of about one and a half acres and began clearing in the direction towards the foot of the valley. To his surprise (or so he states), FIFITA started to make a clearing (7) below him. MARAU now changed direction and began clearing towards area (4).

In the following year (1969), MARAU continued clearing in the same direction. FIFITA became very angry at this and in the ensuing argument MARAU agreed that he would not clear beyond a certain point and would leave the rest of the area (8) for FIFITA. TEMO, however, now sent the teenage son of an Avea man who was staying in the village to make a clearing and plant a garden immediately below FIFITA. The youth was soon discovered by FIFITA and before his anger and threats to beat him he fled back to the village. TEMO, himself, now went to clear the same area (9). There occurred another confrontation, with FIFITA threatening to thrash TEMO for blocking his expansion along the vacant strip of land. TEMO, though a resourceful and independent-minded man, is physically no match for FIFITA, moreover he is undoubtedly scared of him. A compromise was reached. FIFITA accepted TEMO's explanation that he merely wished to make a yam garden and had no intention of planting coconut and he went off to make his own clearing in the remaining area of vacant land (10) at the top of the valley.

One further development in the dispute took place that year. After the quarrel between FIFITA and TEMO, MARAU sought the advice of the matagali, head as to whom had claim on the vacant land in the valley.
He received the stock reply that the land 'belonged' to whichever matagali member planted coconut in it. The reply, of course, did not take into account the intricacies of claims on land arising from strategic gardening and in this sense avoided the appearance of being a decision on the dispute. However, MARAU regarded it as implicit support from his matagali head and proceeded to expand his garden clearing to include almost all the remaining vacant land that he had previously agreed to leave to FIFITA. This time there was no response from FIFITA.

The last time I was in Mavana, in November 1969, TEMO had yet to plant any coconut in his garden (9). He was non-committal about his plans for the following year though loquacious enough in making derogatory remarks about FIFITA as a 'foolish, temperamental man'. He justified his own action by saying that FIFITA was in the wrong since there was still vacant land at the head of the valley for him to clear and plant in. FIFITA, too, would not say what his intentions were for the 1970 planting season, though he seemed to recognise that he might have difficulty in insisting that the strip of vacant land within the valley should be reserved for his use. He continually referred to the brothers as men 'greedy for land'. He pointed out the large groves they already possessed and compared these with the small amount of his own coconut. There was little vacant land left in the matagali, he said, so it was right that these two men should have 'regard' for other members, instead they tried to keep all the land for themselves.

1 'Whoever plants the coconut, then the land is his.'

2 I later heard that TEMO did not plant coconut in his garden (9) and that FIFITA resumed clearing along the strip of land below it.
This reservation of vacant land is a development that has arisen from the re-orientation of objectives in gardening, it has no foundation at custom. It reflects directly the competition between matagali members for acquiring land under the continuing and increasing pressure of land shortage. In this situation, common membership of a matagali is an indication of incipient rivalry rather than of an obligation of co-operation. The individual cultivator is well aware that he has to look after his own material interests and that these interests do not include the prosperity of his fellow matagali members. Their gain is ultimately his loss.

Even affinal relationships, which are traditionally 'heavy' with mutual obligation are not proof against this attitude, as indicated by Ratu CAMA's actions at the expense of CORA and TAWAKE. In another case involving affines (and again involving CORA and his sons) the antagonism was demonstrably more explicit, as was the insistence of claims over vacant land.

Ratu BOGI and his younger son, ISA, (both of matagali Mualevu, itokatoka Vuanimoli) requested CORA (matagali Mualevu, itokatoka Likusogeia), ISA's father-in-law, if he would mind their clearing and planting in a tract of vacant land above the garden area recently cleared by CORA's younger son, SEKONIA. They had no coconut or gardens adjacent to this area themselves. CORA said he had no objection as long as coconut was not planted and the garden was maintained just for the year.

Ratu BOGI and ISA duly cleared an area and planted small yam. Some months had passed when SEKONIA noticed that coconut had been recently planted in the garden. He claimed to me that he had been on the watch for this and this is probably true for Ratu BOGI is notorious as the most 'land greedy' (and consequently dispute prone) man in the village.

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1 Head of household no. 27.

2 This was in 1967 - the piece of land in question was situated in area (6) indicated on Sketch Map 2. SEKONIA is head of household no. 25.
Disregarding the obligations of his brother-in-law relationship with ISA, SEKONAIA pulled out the geminated nuts and left them lying on the ground (a customary way of indicating a dispute). No further attempt was made by Ratu BOGI and ISA to plant coconut and the following year they abandoned the garden which was then included in SEKONAIA's new clearing.

Holders of enclosed lands are also, in a sense, involved in this strategic gardening. At the 1938 Lands Commission, the issue in dispute over enclosed lands was the title to existing coconut groves. Where an enclosed land was confirmed the details of the boundaries were officially recorded. However, no surveying was carried out and the boundaries were described in terms of topographical features and the local names of surrounding tracts of land, which themselves were without fixed boundaries. This made the boundaries of the enclosed lands open to varying interpretation. But in 1938 the interest of most villagers was in established coconut groves and not in boundaries and land. Holders of enclosed lands continued to garden in the empty land that bordered their groves and as pressure on cash resources and on land developed, they began to plant coconut in these gardens. This extension of enclosed groves is halted only by the groves or gardens of neighbouring cultivators.

Land shortage has now made matagali members concerned with this expansion and anxious to determine fixed boundaries. They complain that the expansion is not justified at custom and they hope not only that the boundaries of the enclosed lands will be properly surveyed and determined, but in the case of dowry lands, that the area enclosed will be cut down to a uniform one acre.
The latter figure seems to have been officially inspired, but I was unable to confirm this. At the moment the villagers are awaiting the official surveyor who is expected 'soon'.

It is feasible that the grant of dowry lands could have served as one medium for an adjustment of local pressure on land; but though this pressure is unevenly distributed between matagali, its range of differentiation is not great enough. Members of a matagali with a relatively large area of empty land available are very much aware of their own and their children's future needs and in the background there is always the knowledge that the large number of absentee members of the matagali can decide to return and resettle in the village. No dowry land has been granted since the 1938 Enquiry and it appears highly improbable that any will be granted in the future. Even a formal request for land in another matagali for food gardens is now rare. In Muailevu village in 1969, for example, only seven men were cultivating land in a matagali estate other than their own. In four instances these

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1. Lau is the only Province that has not been surveyed.

2. A land rate has already replaced the head tax in some Provinces and it will be introduced into Lau within the next few years. Members of matagali with small memberships and large estates are worried about the increase in tax they will have to pay (a Kadavu man, residing uxorilocally in Daliconi village, received a demand for $50 which caused consternation all round). Tax on land could make empty lands available for lease to matagali non-members, but all the drawbacks of planting coconut as a cash crop will be a considerable obstacle. A villager will not wish to pay for a lease when he will not receive any worthwhile cash return for at least ten years.

3. There was a similar pattern in Mavana, Daliconi and Cikobia villages (I did not check Boitaci, Malaka, Muamua and Avea). This can be contrasted with the considerable interpenetration (cont'd on next page)
gardens were not the main food gardens of the cultivator concerned (three were small, cassava plots and one was a small yam garden). In another instance a man of Lomaji-vanua was enabled to plant a garden in Nayaqona matagali estate since he was taking care of his fatherless young grandchildren who were members of Nayaqona. The remaining two cases were both of Tongans who no longer possess any empty land of their own. One man had access to the empty land of Nautu matagali through his wife who was a member. The second man had been given permission to plant food gardens in Nayaqona estate, but not to plant coconut (which nevertheless, he was doing).

One effect of the growing land shortage has concerned recruitment to the administrative matagali. Meggitt (1965:266) has postulated for the New Guinea Highlands: 'the degree to which social groups are structured in terms of agnatic descent varies with pressure on available agrarian resources.' In the period for which I have data (since the 1930s) there has never been a high incidence of non-patrification in Mualevu and there has been no dramatic change in the percentage of non-patrified membership. Nevertheless, emphasis on patrification appears to be reflected at times by the expressed opinions

3 (cont'd from previous page)
of food gardens in matagali 'holdings' in the village which Ward states to be 'certainly representative of the copra producing areas of Vanua Levu and Taveuni' (1965: 285. The interpenetration is depicted in Map A. 13 on p. 287). It should be noted that Ward made his survey of this village at the beginning of 1960.

1 V. supra Tables 2 to 7 pp. 81-6. The higher percentages of non-patrified (9%, 6%) in Mualevu village 1937 results from the inclusion of the Tongan line (ibid. Tables 2 and 3).
and actions of MUALEVU villagers. For example, in Mualevu village just prior to the 1965 Enquiry, the heads of the Tongan households no. 15 and no. 28, sought to have themselves and their children re-recruited to matagali Nayagona (through their father's mother), but the head of the matagali refused the request. He explained to me that he did so since to have acceded would have meant less land available for the existing members of the matagali. Other villagers tended to stress that he was thinking more of his own interests than those of his fellow matagali members, but no one put forward an alternative reason for his action (such as a personal quarrel).

On closer scrutiny, however, the correlation between patrifiliation and land pressure in MUALEVU is not so straightforward. In Daliconi village, two young married brothers criticised their father for registering to their matagali the two young sons (twins) of their elder sister. Their father, they asserted, was not looking after their interests; his action meant that in the future there would be less land and coconut for themselves. But the brothers' real complaint was not against the act of registration. Their sister's children had been born in Muamua village, but quite shortly after birth their father had died and their mother returned with the children to Daliconi. When the father's kin later came to re-recruit the children their request had been refused by the mother's father. It was against this refusal that the latter's sons so strongly objected. In other words, they were not opposed to the children's registration as such, but they were opposed to what they regarded as the unnecessary retention of personnel.
It is a more general element of opportunism rather than opposition to non-patrifiliation, which pressure on land has brought into play. In Mavana village, a path-child, the eldest son of an eldest son, was brought up in the household of his father's younger brother (the child's father had been recruited through his mother to a village in central Lau); he was, however, never formally recruited to his father's clan (now matagali Valika). He was an energetic gardener and was early aware of the importance of planting coconut, which he commenced to do around 1950. His relations with his little father were never easy and open quarrels occasionally broke out over the younger man's fondness for home-brew beer. Just prior to the 1965 Enquiry, his father's brother informed him that he was opposed to his being registered to matagali Valika. He was subsequently registered to his mother's matagali, Tota. The palms which he had been planting since 1950 were in the estate of matagali Valika and he now lost his rights to these groves, which were taken by his father's brother.

There have been other instances in which the same kind of opportunism has been shown and in which opposition to non-patrifiliation was not necessarily or primarily involved. Members of a matagali oppose recruitment where it constitutes an economic threat, but not otherwise. A childless married man in Cikobia arranged with his PyBD, who was residing patrivially in Maalevu village, to recruit to their matagali one of her younger sons (originally recruited through his father) in order for him to be raised in the man's household and succeed to the control of his coconut lands.1 The members of their

1 The boy's father had no objection since his own coconut resources were not large.
matagali raised no opposition: the boy would not be gaining any rights of access to their coconut groves and it would be many years before he would be seeking empty land to make his own gardens, by which time there would be no empty land anyway. Two other men in Cikobia have arranged the re-recruitment of children for the same reason.

Many villagers, however, do imply an emphasis on patrifiliation when discussing their coconut resources and the future prospects of their children. In assessing these prospects a father divides his resources by the number of sons only, no allowance is made for daughters. Even then the calculation all too clearly shows in many cases that some of the sons, also, will have to seek their sustenance elsewhere. If rights of usufruct to coconut groves had been held corporately by the administrative matagali, it is probable that re-recruitment of personnel would have ceased in the last decade.

Kelly (1968:63) has criticised Meggitt's thesis as an over-simplified generalisation: '... societies may differ in their response to demographic pressure due to the possibility of functional alternatives for resolving local imbalances in population distribution.' In MUALEVU, the principal medium of easing land pressure has been not by a local re-distribution of population but by migration.

Migration to urban areas, particularly Suva and its environs, but also to other centres in both Viti Levu and Vanua Levu, is not a recent feature of MUALEVU life. There has been, however, a pronounced increase in the rate of migration. Comparative data on the numbers and percentages of absentees of members of Mualevu village in 1937 and 1969

\[\text{Members residing outside the village; this is a more inclusive category than 'migrated members'.}\]
can be obtained from Tables 2 to 5 (v. supra pp. 81-4).
In 1937, 30 per cent of all villagers were absentees; this percentage rose to 33 per cent for married male villagers. In 1969, 59 per cent of all villagers and 56 per cent of married male villagers were absentees. For the District in 1969, 53 per cent of all villagers and 55 per cent of all married male villagers were absentees. These percentages are inflated by persons who are residing with kin and spouse (particularly by married female villagers), nevertheless the percentage increases between 1937 and 1969 for Mualevu village are considerable: almost 100 per cent in the case of total absentees and almost 70 per cent for married male absentees. The 1969 percentages for the District are sufficiently close to the Mualevu village percentages to suggest increases of similar order have occurred in all the villages. The data in Table 8 (v. supra p. 99) show that for the District (Mualevu village) 38 (41) per cent of all village members and 45 (47) per cent of married male villagers have migrated.¹ (These percentages exclude village residence with kin or spouse.)

Urban migration is without doubt the principal medium of easing pressure on coconut and land resources in the village, but by no means are all urban migrants willing ones. Many of those I have talked with, particularly the younger married men with several children and who have no training or education for any work other than labouring, have stated a preference for returning to the village - if it were possible. But as they point out, it is not possible. There is not enough coconut, not enough land.

¹ This appears to be around the average for Lui: v. Table 17 note 4.
If they return, then both they and their resident kin will be in trouble.  

Despite the large percentage of villagers siphoned off by migration, the resident population of the villages has continued to increase and to maintain the pressure on land. Table 17 gives population figures from the time records commenced. The figures for the year 1969 are of my own census.  

The Fijian population as a whole was in a decline until the early 1920s, since then, however, it has steadily and rapidly increased. Percentage increases for the Fijian population of the villages of MUALEVU District since 1936 have been as follows: 1936-46, 6 per cent; 1946-56, 25 per cent; 1956-1966, 19 per cent; 1966-9, 13 per cent.

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1. Diagrams 12 to 15 (v. supra, Chapter 7), in which resident and non-resident kin have been distinguished, provide particular illustrations of this fact; but see also Table 18 p. 265-8.

2. An official census population figure is a record of how many persons were at midnight of one particular day. Such statistics can distort the size of the regularly resident populations of small units such as Fijian villages (on the day of the Census a large number of the villagers may be elsewhere - working on a plantation, for example, as was the case with Avea village in 1956 - or there may be an influx of visitors to the village). The distortion is generally rectified by other information which the Census Commissioner seeks, but for Fiji the individual village has still been too small a unit for the relevant material to be collated and published in the Census Reports. My own census of the District was carried out over several months in 1969. Residents who were temporarily absent (for a period of no more than a few months) were counted, visitors were not. Fijians, Indians and all others on plantations in the District, were not included.

3. It should be noted that the data in Tables 2 to 7 refer to recruited personnel not to total village populations.
### Table 17: Population Figures, 1972-1979

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<td>820</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The difference between the sum of individual totals for villages and the district total is accounted for by the category 'Viljeds in Miscellaneous Localities'.

2. The island of Tuam is included to give the aggregate population of the two Districts of MAILEF and LOMOAL (excluding freehold islands).

3. 'Non-Resident Laians'. This refers to the number of lani enumerated outside Lai given as a percentage of the total number of lani enumerated.

4. 'Non-Resident male Laians'. This refers to the number of male lani enumerated outside Lai given as a percentage of the total number of male lani enumerated. In 1975, the number of male lani over 15 years old enumerated outside Lai given as a percentage of the total number of male lani over 15 years was 4.7%.

5. The 1979 Census was taken in December before the great measles outbreak. The 1975 Census was taken in June after the epidemic had started.


7. Population figures give total for laniets.

**References:**
- 1974 = Reference 1974
- 1975 = Reference 1975
- 1976 = Reference 1976
- 1977 = Reference 1977
- 1978 = Reference 1978
- 1979 = Reference 1979

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*Note:* The table provides a snapshot of population figures for various years, with specific counts for males and females for each village or district. The data includes percentages of non-resident lanians and non-resident male lanians, with a notable exception in 1975 where the data points to a 4.7% figure for males over 15 years old outside of Lai.
The relatively high rate of increase represented for the period of 1966 to 1969 may be a result of a distortion in the figures of normal residence made by the 1966 Census.

The rapid increase and diversification of individuals' cash needs in the last ten years or so has effectively undermined the system of continued joint usufruct to coconut holdings which had developed out of Ma'afu's original measures for the planting of coconut. As a man becomes older, marries and has children, his cash needs multiply, but he can now no longer rely upon the support and understanding of his fellow resident holders of joint rights in his struggle to meet these demands. 'Different men have different needs (lega)', point out the villagers. One man summed up the situation simply with the following illustration: 'A man may wish to allow the (fallen) coconuts to accumulate because, perhaps, he wants to save the money for paying his son's school fees. But if he does this then along will come a brother and collect all the nuts for himself, for his own needs'. A man is, in other words, in competition with his kin for access to inadequate resources and he is obliged to look after, and fight for, his own interests.

The solution that has emerged has been the customary response within MUALEVU social units to internal pressures, political and economic, namely a division of the control of resources. The level at which this division now occurs or threatens to occur is at the level where dissension and conflict of interests is most apparent, that is between adult married brothers with children. The rivalry and antipathy of male siblings that has always been a characteristic of Fijian culture has in the modern
MUALEVU village burst its confining cords of mutual interests as men strive for some assurance of their own and their children's survival.

Invariably it is the eldest brother who effects the division of the coconut lands and as invariably reserves for himself the biggest (or best) portion. The few exceptions to the latter case have been where the eldest brother has had no children (or no sons) of his own, when a more equitable division has resulted. Even where a pronounced antipathy between brothers is lacking, and this is generally where one of the brothers is without sons/children (e.g. PITA and his brothers, v. supra pp.134-5) and/or there are much larger than average coconut and land resources (e.g. MARAU and TEMO, v. supra pp.245-7), an elder brother is under a compulsion, in the future interests of his children, eventually to divide the coconut holdings. Should he die without making a division, control of the groves and jurisdiction over any division is most likely to pass to his next youngest brother. The latter will most certainly put the interests of himself and his own children before those of his nephews, at least to the extent of making an equitable division of resources.

When I asked younger sons who should divide the coconut lands, the reply was always that it was the father's duty. Eldest sons tended to be non-committal in their reply or simply stated that the eldest son should do so. The argument of the younger sons was that it was right for the father to divide for then there would be an assurance of equitable portions and that this would not be the case if it was the eldest brother's decision. Villagers throughout the District commented that there were bound to be disputes and quarrels between the sons if
the father should die before effecting a division. But just as commonly found was a contrary sentiment of fathers. Fathers did not want to divide their coconut holdings: 'It is good thing for all of us to be considerate of each other and together to eat the land and the coconut', was a stock reply of fathers with adult married sons.

While there are instances of genuine affection between a father and a son, as there are between brothers, they are exceptional. The relationship is equivocal. The father is an authoritarian figure towards whom the son for the first twenty years of his life endeavours to act, or react, with restraint and respect. As the son grows older, and presumably as his father's weaknesses as a man become more apparent (particularly when the son has a wife to point them out to him), the son's respect for his father's authority diminishes and at times he may find it difficult to act with restraint. In some instances infrequent quarrels break out, though for the most part these stop short of actual bodily violence, but often only at the very brink. Adult sons, and married sons particularly (because of the influence of their wives) become impatient of their father's authority and leadership, with their overriding concern for their own individual needs, this impatience is centred on his control of their joint rights to lands.

1 But not of a man and his big/little father.

2 There were a number of instances during my fieldwork periods in which father and son threatened and chased each other with cane knives.
I have given this brief summary, of the father-son relationship to indicate that the father's typical wish to continue 'eating together the land' does not derive exclusively from any emotive attitude. The father, like the son, is looking after his own interests. As a brother (or as a son), it is in a man's interests that coconut holdings are divided. As a father it is not - it would amount to an abdication of the remaining elements of his control over the resources of his own exclusive founder-line group. It would also be an invitation to penury in his old age. Fathers have no sentimental illusions about their sons. On one occasion when talking to a young married man who was playing with his small son, I was taken aback when the man gave the boy a gentle kick and called him a 'nasty little fellow'. I queried the statement with some compliment about the child 'When he grows up,' the father said, 'he will not want to look after me.' Another villager, an elderly father, who has built his own large and attractive block house, has informed his three married sons that he intends making a will in which he will leave the house to one of them. He will not however tell them to which son he intends leaving it. Apart from the three sons, who make no positive comment, the rest of the village considers this to be a 'very cunning trick', which in MUALEBVIU is a great compliment to man's abilities.

1 What I have given is, of course, a synchronic assessment of the stages of the relationship between father and son. Moreover, I have had to generalise this relationship: the inner range of behaviour is quite extensive, much more so than, for example, that of siblings.

2 Though divided equitably as far as a younger brother's interests are concerned.

3 Since rights to land and crops are held jointly by a man's exclusive founder-line, coconut holdings could not be included in a will: this is a distinction which is explicitly recognised and stated by most villagers.
The apparent paradox of a father's attitude - his reluctance to 'eat together' with his own brothers while expecting his sons to do just this - is, in fact, no paradox. The attitude of the father is in both cases consistent with looking after his own interests. Sons, naturally enough, never admit recognition of this fact. They want the division of coconut lands in the same way as their fathers had wanted it. The kind of specific reasons they give are eminently rational in terms of the situation they find themselves in: 'Sharing is good while there is mutual regard for each other's need (veilomani). But where is this mutual regard to-day?'; 'if one brother is ill then the other brothers will bring food for him and his family. But they won't bring any money or coconut. They will go off to the coconut groves and pick up all the nuts and the one who is ill will be left without; 'a man wants to know what is his. It is no good that a man decides something and then another comes along and takes all the coconuts'. These and similar statements make self-evident the villagers' acknowledgment of the conflict of individual interests.

Table 18 refers to the distribution of established groves and cultivable land in Mualevu village.

1 Literally: 'love/regard for each other'.
(data are also available for Mavana, Daliconi and Cikobia villages). To give an idea of the pressure on resources resident and absent males with rights of access to groves are identified (by their relationship with the head of a household) and listed separately. A comment is then added on whether or not a division of the holdings has been effected. Coconut acreages do not necessarily refer to single groves and in many cases they will include enclosed lands situated in the estates of a matagali other than that of the head of the household. Households have been grouped according to the matagali membership of the head of the household.

As the data in Table 18 demonstrate, the division of coconut holdings often is impossible because of their small size. Men affirm they would like to divide the holding(s) because then there would be an end to disputes with their brothers, but they acknowledge division is not feasible. In these cases, if some brothers do not voluntarily leave the village to work elsewhere (as generally happens), then a struggle develops to see who can evict whom and there flourishes an open antagonism, liable at any time to flare into public quarrelling.

Only in matagali Yatunakoro (Cikobia village), matagali Valevono (Mavana village), and matagali Jelema and matagali Lorunikoro (both in Daliconi village) is there no pronounced shortage of land suitable for coconut planting, (in Aave all suitable gardening land is now in use and the villagers have stopped planting coconut). Several leaseholds were due to expire at the end of 1970 and this will relieve land pressure in Mavana (excluding matagali Valika), Muamua village and Boitaci village (excluding matagali Cauceorega), and further extend the estate of matagali Nayaqona (in Malievu village). In all cases, members of a matagali to which leasehold land will be reverting wish for the groves and land to be divided by household.
### Natural Males

Most members have little (i.e., less than 2 acres) or no land left for further planting of coconut. The last large area of empty land (about 20 acres) was divided between the inukata (except Nabureto) by the Chief in 1965. The divisions were immediately subdivided between households. Altogether about 15 acres of this area now remains to be cleared. Many members with little land available for further planting also have only small established groves. Extreme land shortage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Youth</th>
<th>Child</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Unmarried</th>
<th>Comment on division of lands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 35</td>
<td>HH1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>yB</td>
<td>4yBS</td>
<td>6yB</td>
<td>Lands divided by F of HH17 to himself, his yB (HH12) and his FyBSS (HH11). HH12 has now subdivided to himself and to yB. The latter have access (through M) to the groves of HH29; they also 'request' their MFeBS (HH35).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 8</td>
<td>HH2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2yB</td>
<td>eB</td>
<td>eSS</td>
<td>These lands are reckoned too small to divide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 7</td>
<td>HH2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Given the use of this land by HH2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 1</td>
<td>HH2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Given the use of this land by HH2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 7</td>
<td>HH22</td>
<td>2yB</td>
<td>2yB</td>
<td>eB</td>
<td>eSS</td>
<td>Given the use of this land by HH22.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 15</td>
<td>HH1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2yB</td>
<td>eB</td>
<td>eSS, 2yB</td>
<td>Given the use of this land by HH1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 7</td>
<td>HH17.yB</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2yB</td>
<td>2yB</td>
<td>2yB, 2yBS</td>
<td>Given the use of this land by HH17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 26</td>
<td>HH1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2yB</td>
<td>eB</td>
<td>eSS, 2yB</td>
<td>One brother using land, no married sons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 8</td>
<td>HH2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2yB</td>
<td>eB</td>
<td>eSS, 2yB</td>
<td>One brother using land, no married sons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 9</td>
<td>HH2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2yB</td>
<td>eB</td>
<td>eSS, 2yB</td>
<td>One brother using land, no married sons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 7</td>
<td>HH2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2yB</td>
<td>eB</td>
<td>eSS, 2yB</td>
<td>One brother using land, no married sons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 6</td>
<td>HH2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2yB</td>
<td>eB</td>
<td>eSS, 2yB</td>
<td>One brother using land, no married sons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 4</td>
<td>HH2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2yB</td>
<td>eB</td>
<td>eSS, 2yB</td>
<td>One brother using land, no married sons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 2</td>
<td>HH2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2yB</td>
<td>eB</td>
<td>eSS, 2yB</td>
<td>One brother using land, no married sons.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sons want land divided.
### Table 10, continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2m2, eBeS</td>
<td>ye</td>
<td>e2eSS</td>
<td>eS</td>
<td>eSS</td>
<td>Considered too small to divide.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ratari: Nautu.** The estate of Ratarai Nautu is divided into two blocks: Nautu no. 1 and Nautu no. 2. Much of Nautu no. 2 is forest covered and more suited to growing cocnut than the large areas of fire-prone gaana in Nautu no. 1. The groves of members of the Ratarai Navasa are concentrated in Nautu no. 1; the holdings of other members of the Ratarai are in Nautu no. 2. Resident membership is small and there is no shortage of land, but the total area of members' established groves is not large (apart from those of the head of the Ratarai, HH3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>M3, 2yS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>ySS</td>
<td>PyBS, c1.B</td>
<td>3, ySS</td>
<td>HH35 divided these lands between himself and his PyBC (P of 29a). Sons of HH35 want land sub-divided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23a</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>MeBeS2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>4yB</td>
<td>See under Household 35, immediately above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3eB, Fcl.B, Fcl. BS</td>
<td>5eBS</td>
<td>One brother using land, no married sons.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>eB, 2yB</td>
<td>4eBS, 2yBS, 6PyBS</td>
<td>One brother using land, no married sons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>yS</td>
<td>2yS</td>
<td>eS, yB</td>
<td>2S, eSS, 2PyBS</td>
<td>One brother using land, no resident married sons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28a</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>WPB2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5S, 2yB3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28a is a very old man and lives with his eBDH (HH28) who has the use of his lands.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Nataqali Vuali.** There is a considerable area of empty land, most of it covered with fire-prone mana. Many of the established groves are encroached on and nearly all acreage is small (apart from that of the head of the mataqali, HH32). A large leasehold (180 acres) expires in 1970 and most of this area (including about 60 acres of one very old palm) will revert to the mataqali. Members suspect that the head of the mataqali will try to keep this area for himself and his brothers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>E3.2yB -</td>
<td>3S.2yB -</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2yB of HH33 returned to village in 1969. HH33 intends dividing the lands when Nayaka leasehold expires.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21a</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>eS.2yB -</td>
<td>3S -</td>
<td>eS,yS</td>
<td>Considered too small to divide.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>E4 -</td>
<td>3S -</td>
<td>eS</td>
<td>An 'only' brother using land, no married sons.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>EHI,eS yS</td>
<td>yS,eSS 3yS</td>
<td>yS,2yS</td>
<td>Land reverts to mataqali Malevu in 1971. See under &quot;Tongans&quot;.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nataqali Vuli.** There is only about ten acres of empty land left and this has already been divided between households 11, 23, 24 and 40. Households 31 and 32 have in their division an area of five acres which is densely covered with wai (indigenous chestnut tree) that makes it very difficult to clear; however, they also hold an enclosed land in the estate of mataqali Nautu (no. 2) which provides access (for the moment) to a large area of empty land. A large block of enclosed lands (about 120 acres) held by HH38 straddles the estates of mataqali Vuli and Lomajivana. Members are aware that they will exhaust their available land within the next few years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24.24</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>EHI,6yS -</td>
<td>2S,2yS 3yS</td>
<td>4yS</td>
<td>The division of HH31's F, when latter divided the holdings to himself and his yB (for HH40). yS wants land divided.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>E3 -</td>
<td>3yS -</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>These lands were divided by HH40 between himself and his yB. None of the brothers have married sons.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>E3 -</td>
<td>2yS -</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>E3 -</td>
<td>3yS -</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>EHI,6yS 3yS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>ySer</td>
<td>The divisions of two absent brothers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nataqali Vuli.** There is a considerable area of empty land, but it is of a very poor quality soil in which coconuts are extremely rare. Very small areas are held by HH38 and HH48, but these are small and apart from those of the head of the mataqali. There is a notable area of land enclosed for 2yB.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>H8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>e2S</td>
<td>eSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>H9</td>
<td>ys</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>eSS</td>
<td>eSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>H14,</td>
<td>2yS</td>
<td>2yS</td>
<td>2yS</td>
<td>FeS,</td>
<td>FeS,PyS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PyS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>H16,</td>
<td>eSS,</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>e2S</td>
<td>ys, 2ySS, 2ySS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lands divided by HH16 between himself, 2FySS (HH30, HH37) and a c1.B (H of HH1). None have resident married sons.

Lands will revert to her mataqali on death of HH3.

**Comments:** The Tongas have only enclosed lands (and in one case, HH37, a freehold). They have no land of their own available for further coconut planting and apart from HH39 their coconut holdings are small. However HH28 has access to groves and land through his wife, while HH13 has requested gardening land from mataqali Nagaqona.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>H11,</td>
<td>yS</td>
<td>2yS</td>
<td>e2.2yB</td>
<td>D2ySS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>H14,</td>
<td>yS</td>
<td>2yS</td>
<td>e2.2yB</td>
<td>D2ySS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>H13,</td>
<td>2yS</td>
<td>3yS</td>
<td>e2.2yS</td>
<td>y2.2yS, 3yS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lands divided by HH 28 to himself, 2yB (HH14 HH15) and PeS (HH5).村民们视土地将被分为死亡时。HH39.

**Notes:**
1. Refers to groves of cut-bearing palm.
2. This is the relationship to the head of the person’s household; other kin are identified by their relationship with the person and not with the head of the household.
I have referred to villagers pursuing their own individual interests, but lest in any way it be inferred that I am reiterating (by comparison) the 'communal' view of customary social organisation - i.e. as a kind of collectivism - let me stress that I do not see this as the dynamic element of organisational changes in the modern period. I think one can safely generalise and say that MUALEVU villagers always have pursued their own interests. The difference in the modern period is that the opportunity of co-operative activity for common interest has greatly narrowed as a result of the extension and diversification of individual material needs beyond the scope of available necessary resources.

A man who is ill will not starve, but nor will his young daughter obtain her new school uniform. The more completely a man is able to fulfil his own cash needs, the less completely will his kin be able to. To assert there is a struggle for existence within the village would be to exaggerate and overdramatize the situation extant (but the future?), but there is certainly a struggle of individuals - of kin and of neighbours - for gaining an advantage which is necessarily over and at the expense of each other. The villagers are conscious, of what is happening and have no difficulty, and show no hesitation, in putting it into words: 'To-day, there is a competition (sominivi) of each man with the other.' The fact that this abstraction is put into words is what is significant, .

---

1 Strictly speaking, not of the individual, but of the nuclear family unit.
for villagers prefer to talk of solidarity and mutual consideration: personal rivalries are the skeletons in the kin cupboard.

In the next Chapter, I examine an introduced form of economic organisation, the Co-operative societies. I seek to determine whether their successful establishment in MUALEVU can be accounted for as a logical development of the pressures on the individual villager to maximize his cash income from inadequate resources.
Plate A

A large clearing planted with small yam

etching the large yam (note the sprouting top left)
1. Land shortage - cassava planted in a coconut grove

2. The reed (arrowed) and the coconut leaf in VI.1 (above) are warnings against taking food
Plate VII

Cattle are excellent for weeding...

...if you can afford to buy them.
1. Established groves on the coastal flats.

2. Struggling for growth on poor soils.

3. 150 year old grove yet to bear nuts.
1. Uncontrolled burning ...

2. and some of its effects
CHAPTER TEN

CO-OPERATIVES IN MUALEVU: PROGRESS AND CONSTRAINT
From the time of Cession rural Fiji was caught up in a system of administration that misinterpreting customary organisation kept the Fijian villager incarcerated within a type of chiefly, communal social system, alien to his nature, but ultimately upheld by the British as being for his own good. In the last decade of colonial rule there was increasing doubt, within and without the Colony, as to the wisdom of this paternalistic approach which had sought to protect and immure the rural Fijian from the harsh realities of the outside world. With an increasing agitation for independence (for the most part from a large section of the Indian community but kept company by a growing number of Fijians) there arose considerable official apprehension for the fate of the Fijian should he be left in a position of political subordinance to the Indian, so greatly his superior, apparently, in the spheres of agricultural and commercial enterprise. The Fijian, it was decided, should be prepared for his coming-out day and something of a crash-programme was eventually launched to make him ready for his ordeal. Co-operatives had from the beginning an important role within this programme (the Co-operative Societies Ordinance was enacted in 1947 and the first Society founded in the same year), but it was only in the late 1950s and early 1960s that official encouragement and support promoted co-operation to a position as the spearhead of a policy of economic advancement for the rural Fijian.¹

After the Second World War, the NUALEVU villagers' interest in acquiring cash quickened, but the majority still

¹ By 1959, there were eighty seven Societies in existence in Fiji; during the next nine years the number expanded to five hundred and eighty three (Fiji Parliamentary Paper no. 3 of 1971:2).
were excluded, or they were excluding themselves, from the profits of marketing their own produce. Ratu Sukuna, now Secretary for Fijian Affairs, commented in his Report for 1946 (F.L.C... No. 18 of 1948) : 'There was an increase in copra production by Fijians in 1946.... About 90 per cent of this copra was sold "green" to local traders.' The Fijian leader was determined to end this local exploitation of villagers and allow them to reap the increased cash benefits to be obtained in the favourable, post-1945 world copra market. In the same Report, he adds (ibid. paras. 88-9):

Plans are in hand for organising the industry along lines which will put Fijian producers into direct touch with buyers, thus reducing the green copra that is being sold at very low figures and improve materially, it is hoped, both quality and prices.

The administration now embarked, though hesitantly, on the task of providing the rural Fijian with the guidance and know-how to acquire a full share of the fruits of his resources and labour. The Co-operatives Ordinance was the first major step in the campaign as far as the coconut islands were concerned. Some villagers in MUALEVU, however, needed only the encouragement of higher copra prices to use their own initiative in setting out on the 'money-path'. Notably the first Fijian 'businesses' in the District were started in Daliconi, where the marrying-in of some part-Europeans with knowledge of the 'money-path' had never permitted the Chinese and the Indian traders to acquire the same domination as was exercised by the trader in Mualevu village, and in Mavana, where the absence of a trading store now became a decided advantage. ¹

¹

The villagers of Daliconi and Mavana are still singled out in MUALEVU as people who 'like money too much', who 'are accustomed to buy and sell and not to give'.
In 1951, an Ordinance (no. 14 of 1951) was enacted which established a cess of £10 a ton on all copra produced by Fijians. The cess was to be credited to the account of the producer. The Ordinance explicitly prohibited the sale of 'green' copra. The last clause, together with the growing official encouragement of village Co-operatives, became the first severe restriction on the activities of the resident traders. Several small businesses and embryonic Co-operatives were set up in Mualevu and Daliconi villages, while in Mavana the Fijian store now expanded rapidly to embrace most of the village in a single Co-operative society. This Mavana Society was the first in MUALEVU (and in the Exploring Group) to be given official recognition. In Mualevu and Daliconi, the businesses were formed on the initiative of individuals, but some possessed a Co-operative form with membership based exclusively on administrative matagali. All of these Societies, however, failed sooner or later through peculation or the raids and ravages of kinship obligation.

A surge of official enthusiasm for Co-operatives appears to have had its first effects on MUALEVU in 1958-9. The government District Chief (he was the younger brother of the Chief) was given instructions to encourage the formation of 'village' Co-operatives, that is Societies on a larger scale than had hitherto been accomplished (except in Mavana). Though he was unable to achieve these aims in Mualevu, his exhortations did result in the immediate founding in the village of Dakuwaqa and Nadave Societies. Facing bankruptcy, the Chinese sold up his stock and buildings to the newly-formed Dakuwaqa Society and left for Suva. The remaining trader in Daliconi had already pulled out leaving the field to a local Fijian entrepreneur. On the formation of the second Society in Daliconi in 1966, his business also collapsed.
Background details of these Societies and of the other Societies established in the four villages with which I was most acquainted, are given in Table 19.

The effect of the establishment of Co-operatives on the copra production of individual and entrepreneurial marketers is demonstrated in Table 20, which uses Daliconi village as an example. In 1955 producers nos. 1 to 4 were independently marketing their copra. Producer no. 5 was the business (which included a store) of a local entrepreneur. This man also controlled the finances of producer no. 6, styled a Co-operative society, whose members included among others producers nos. 7, 8 (a younger brother of the entrepreneur) and 9, and whose cess funds were used to build European-style wooden houses for its members. The two businesses were kept separate: producer no. 6 dealt only in the coconut produce (mostly green copra) of its members, producer no. 5 dealt in the copra (green and dried) traded by all other producers, which included most of the Daliconi villagers as well as villagers of Maluka and Muamua. Producer no. 10 was an early Co-operative which never succeeded in becoming established (as its production figures show). Producers nos. 11 and 12, founded in 1960 and 1966 respectively, are the two Societies currently operating in the village.

The trade of producer no. 6 began to decline when one of its members, producer no. 8, having had his house built, left the Society to commence marketing independently his own copra. The remaining members subsequently quarrelled with the entrepreneur over the control of the Society's finances and the order in which members' houses were to be built, while the entrepreneur, in turn, accused the members of selling their copra to the other Society (producer no. 10)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>337</td>
<td>Society</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Registered</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Village</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vaiava</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Registered</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Administrati6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Vooruva</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>1968</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>Tokobain</td>
<td>90</td>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>Village</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Village</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1,195</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Not recognised</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7th Day Adventist Church</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>318</td>
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<td>140</td>
<td>Valika</td>
<td>1952</td>
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<td>1957</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>5,540</td>
<td>87</td>
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<td>Daiticon</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Wakti</td>
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<td>Probationary</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Original-ly matanali</td>
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<td>59</td>
<td>1,539</td>
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Table 19. Background and Size of Co-operative Societies in Selected Villages.

1. Referring to members who regularly 'sell' green copra to the Society as well as purchasing goods at the store. The total membership includes secondary members.

2. Not including secondary members.

3. These are fictitious names.

4. For the period January 1967 to January 1968.

5. One shareholder resigned in 1968; he is included in the total in the last column.

6. For the period July 1966 to August 1967. In the case of the Delana Society, the figure for the amount of copra marketed is not an indication of the total copra marketed by its members of the Society. At any time members can market their copra through the Society or independently.

7. Three shareholders resigned in 1968; they are included in the total in the last column.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>Total production</th>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>17.4</td>
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<td>7.5</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>43.6</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>1966</td>
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<td>4.8</td>
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<td>2.9</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>113.8</td>
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</table>


Figures are derived from producers' cess accounts held in the office of the Fijian Development Fund Board.
newly established in the village. The members left the Society one by one and it eventually folded. The trade of producer no. 5 was successively affected by the establishment of the two Co-operatives in Daliconi village in 1960 and 1966 (as well as by the setting up of village Co-operatives in Malaka and Muamua villages). By 1967 most of the copra it was marketing was the produce of its founder, while the store had dwindled to a single cupboard to serve the needs of the nearby households of the three village schoolteachers. The village Co-operatives also caused a reduction in the amount of copra marketed by the four independent producers (nos. 1 to 4). In each case the head of the family which constituted the production unit did not join a Co-operative while one or more of his sons did, thus channelling off part of the unit's produce. (The fathers, moreover, are oldish men and they are no longer capable of the same productive effort as formerly.)

There is nothing to prevent any group of villagers from forming a Co-operative type of association, but official recognition (from the Department of Co-operative Societies) and supervision will not be extended in those cases where the number of shareholders is less than ten. The minimum age of qualification for membership is eighteen. The individual holdings of shares will vary, but generally those of the founding members (that is the persons who originally put together the capital to start the Society) are much greater than those of members who have joined later. In most cases the latter invest no more than a nominal £1 (£2) to £3 (£6).  

1 Recognition is in two stages: probationary and registered, v. Ordinance No. 28 of 1962, section 2.  
2 Official encouragement to increase the capital of the Society is always ignored.
The principal officers of a Society are the chairman (and there may be a vice-chairman), the secretary and the treasurer. Together with four or five other members they form the Committee, which makes routine policy decisions at regular meetings held at least once a month. More serious matters, including any considerable expenditure of cash, are discussed at a preliminary meeting of the Committee and are then referred to a general meeting of the Society. Here motions which are in dispute may be resolved by a simple majority rule.

The secretary is by far the most important of all the officers in the running of the Society. He is responsible for maintaining the books, ordering for the store (in consultation with the storeman) and keeping the chairman informed of the financial position of the Society. On him more than any other officer or member rests the obligation to keep an eye on the general health of the Society. Among the qualifications that he certainly needs is an education that has progressed beyond the primary, village-school level. In all eight Societies observed, the secretary was a younger man, in his 30's or below, and possessed this above average education. All were men who had spent some time outside the village. When a Society finds a dependable and competent secretary, the members will tend to favour re-appointing him each year. In the councils of the Society, the voice of the secretary is invariably heard more often than any other and even if his advice is sometimes ignored, it is always given consideration.

The composition of the Committee is changed annually, as the treasurer.

As I have mentioned above (p.203), the secretaries of all the Societies in the District had undergone the six-week training course at the Department's Co-operatives Education Centre in Suva.
It was difficult for me to arrive at any general conclusion regarding the influence of the chairman. He is in charge of all meetings, but while in some cases the position was little more than an honorary one, in other cases the chairman, in harness with the secretary, took an active part in directing the business of the Society. However, only in Waitui Society (in Daliconi) had the chairmanship been held by the same man for any length of time (and he was the founder of the original, much smaller, matagali-based Waitui Society). In the other Societies the chairmanship changed every year or two years. The degree of influence which a chairman might wield in the Society depended on his personal abilities and initiative rather than on an inherent authority of the chair.

The paid employees (who are always members) of the MUALEVU Societies are described in Table 21. The Table does not include the 7th Day Adventist, Delana Society, which apart from the 15/- ($1.50) a week to the operator of the dryer, pays no wages and gives no honoraria.

All officers (including the storeman) are elected (with formal proposing and seconding) by a show of hands at a general meeting of the Society. This meeting is held prior to the Annual General Meeting which marks the end and beginning of the financial year. This will be somewhere between October and November according to the order in which the annual balance sheets of the different Societies are made out by the resident Co-operative assistant.¹ The

¹ This official serves both MUALEVU and LOMALOMA Districts.
meeting is always addressed by a visiting official from the Department in Suva, who gives the summary of the past year's trading and offers words of advice, encouragement, or praise accordingly, before announcing the bonus for the year.

From the meetings I have attended, and from reading the minute books (stretching back over a period of five or six years in some cases) it was clear that the running of the Societies and the actions of their members were not indiscriminately

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Range of wage per annum</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td></td>
<td>£39 to £130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storeman</td>
<td>Changed annually or more frequently as circumstances demand</td>
<td>£39 to £156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copra weigher</td>
<td>Generally the treasurer</td>
<td>£26 to £52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copra dryer</td>
<td>Changed every week</td>
<td>£104 to £208 (for one man) (for two men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Honorarium at end of financial year</td>
<td>£5 to £15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Honorarium at end of financial year</td>
<td>£5 to £7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21. Employees and Wages

hindered or inhibited by notions of customary status. Democracy, it could be said, prevails within the Society.¹

¹ The Co-operative Societies Regulations provide the means for the dismissal of officers and for the voice of the mass of members to make itself heard at any time.
It was especially noticeable that the strict ranking order of seating arrangements which holds for all formal, traditional gatherings was entirely ignored in Society meetings. Moreover individual members, whatever their customary status (and whatever the size of their coconut groves) showed no hesitation in speaking out and stating opinions. As I have mentioned above, all resolutions in the general and committee meetings might be voted upon, whenever, and this was not infrequent, there was failure to obtain consensus. The only occasions which I know of when motions were steam-rollered against the known majority feeling (though not 'vote'), occurred as a result of visits of officials from Suva who wished particular decisions to be made and followed.

The Co-operative does not, strictly speaking, 'buy' green copra since this is illegal; rather it acts as its members' agent and provides them with advance payments for their produce. This is something of a legal quibble and for convenience I shall continue to refer to the Co-operative 'buying' and members 'selling' green copra. All the MUALEVU Societies have the rule that members are obliged to sell all green copra and coconuts to the Society. On the rare occasions a member has been discovered marketing copra independently, he has been expelled from the Society. (There have been two instances, both in Daliconi village.)

A price per hundredweight of green copra, or of so many nuts per shilling, is fixed in the store and this price is directly affected by the Suva price for dried copra (announced on the radio) which changes every month: there does not appear to be any specific ratio between the two prices.
From the trading accounts given in Appendix 3, it is possible to calculate the average prices for green and dried copra for the financial year October 1966 - October 1967 and these are given in Table 22. In 1967-8, the Suva price for dried copra varied during the year between a low of about £40 a ton '3rd' grade, and a high of nearly £100 a ton, '1st' grade, while in the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Average store price per cwt of green copra purchased*</th>
<th>Average Suva price per cwt of dry copra sold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valika</td>
<td>14/9d.</td>
<td>27/-d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakuwaqa</td>
<td>12/-d.</td>
<td>25/-d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitui</td>
<td>15/3d.</td>
<td>26/-d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22. Price of Green and Dried Copra, 1966-7

* Calculating that a ton of green copra produces 55 per cent its own weight of dry copra at 6 per cent moisture (v. McPaul:1962:90).

Local societies buying prices for green copra ranged from 10/- to 25/- a cwt.

1 Since there is a cess of £10 ($20) on a ton of copra, the weight of dried copra sold by the society can be ascertained and the average price obtained easily calculated. The average store buying price (in shillings) per cwt of green copra is obtained by converting the number of tons of dried copra sold to an estimated equivalent of green copra and dividing this figure into the sum of 'purchases' plus 'opening stock' minus 'closing stock'.

2 For example: May–June 1968 - Fiji (Grade) 1 £97.10.0
               Fiji (Grade) 2 £92.10.0
               CAS £81.15.0

CAS = Commerci ally Acceptable Sub-standard
The cess of £10 ($20) a ton (dry copra) is deducted in Suva and placed to the Society's account. The funds so accumulated may not be withdrawn in the form of cash and may only be used for purposes duly approved by the Fijian Development Board. In the case of the MUALEVU Societies, those purposes were exclusively the building of houses for members and the purchase of copra dryers and copra storage sheds. More recently considerable funds have been withdrawn for purchasing shares in the Maritime Shipping Co-operative Association, established in 1966 by the Province of Lau with the encouragement and blessing of the Department in Suva. In 1968, the two 'Wesleyan' Societies in Muallevu and the Society in Boitaci village made withdrawals as contributions towards the building of a new school to serve the two villages, and in 1969 the Daliconi Societies withdrew money to contribute to funds for a new secondary school at Lomaloma.

On the consumer side, the ordering of goods is the responsibility of the secretary in consultation with the storeman. Most goods are marked up 25 to 55 per cent on the

A wooden house, 36 foot by 20 foot, now costs about $1,100; a concrete block house of about the same size (the blocks are made in the village) will be nearer $1,200. These prices include the local carpenter's fee ($40-$120). There is no payment made for the labour of the Society members.

The price varies according to type, fittings, and size. The most expensive in MUALEVU was a dryer (60 ton capacity) belonging to the Valika Society which cost about £400. The cheapest of the Society dryers was about £160.
price paid to the Suva firms (v. supra Table 14 p.212-5). Since these firms do not offer credit to the Co-operatives, the consumer and marketing sides are of necessity intertwined and the Society has to consign copra to these firms before it can take delivery on the beach of its ordered goods.

The trading accounts and balance sheets in Appendix 3 will fill in the details of the finances of the Societies, but there is one point that needs a little more elaboration. This concerns the reserves of a Society. The Co-operative Societies Regulations Ordinance (No. 11 of 1947, section 31.1) states:

At least one-fourth of the net profits of a society entitled by its constitution to make a profit shall be carried annually to a reserve fund: Provided that in the case of a society with limited liability the Registrar may permit such lesser sum as he may deem expedient to be carried to the reserve fund.

In MUALEVU, only in the case of the Valika Society has it been deemed expedient to reduce to five per cent of the net profits the sum to be carried to the reserves. These reserve funds are indivisible. On the liquidation of a Society and the satisfaction of creditors, any surplus remaining '...shall be available for use by the Registrar for any co-operative purpose at his discretion.' (ibid. section 46).

Table 19 shows that of the four villages in the survey, three contain more than one Co-operative. This is a situation which the Department has endeavoured to discourage on the grounds of needless increase in overheads and capital expenditure. At present the divisions in Mualevu, Cakelava and Daliconi villages seem insurmountable.
In two instances the division is founded upon religious grounds. The 7th Day Adventist Church observes a different sabbath to the Wesleyan Church\(^1\) and since all MUALEVU villagers observe a very strict sabbath this has created practical problems in the running of a Co-operative in which both churches have their followings. These problems are further aggravated by the food, drink and smoking tabu's of the 7th Day Adventists. The difficulties which have arisen in the Societies are, in fact, but one aspect of the strained relationship between the 7th Day Adventist and Wesleyan villagers.

In Cikobia, the 7th Day Adventist storeman of Cikobia Village Co-operative, after a series of disputes which climaxed in his refusal to take delivery of a cargo on a Saturday, left the Society in 1963 accompanied by the Tui Cikobia (v. supra p.145). They were soon joined by the other 7th Day Adventist members of the Society. There subsequently arose further animosity between the two sides over the division of goods, equipment and funds. In 1966, under the false impression that they would be able to market their copra collectively only through a Co-operative type of association, the 7th Day Adventist villagers formed their own small (and still officially unrecognised) Society. The following January, the 7th Day Adventist villagers in Hailevu followed their co-religionists' example (and advice) and broke away from the Dakuwaqa Society to set up a new Society, Tovolea. (They were joined by the single 7th Day

\(^1\) These are the only churches represented in MUALEVU.
Adventist member of the Nadave Society.) This division was followed by disputes similar to those which had occurred in Cikobia.

Understanding the difference of religious doctrine, the particular causes of the disputes and the general anti-pathy prevailing between Wesleyan and 7th Day Adventist villagers, the division as far as Co-operation is concerned seems a final one indeed. It constitutes a firm refutation of the practicability of the Co-operative universal which dictates that a Society will not be founded upon racial, political or religious grounds.

The other type of division which exists in Mualovu and Daliconi villages is based upon traditional social and political divisions. In Mualovu there are two commoner mataqali which originally formed a separate village and now constitute a spatially distinct hamlet within Mualovu itself. When Dakuwaga Society was being established in Mualovu in 1958, the Nadave people (the administrative vavusa Nadave) declined to join though they were invited to do so. Instead

---

1 'Division', perhaps, is not an appropriate word to use here since special provisions are made necessary by Ordinance (No. 28 of 1962, section 20B) for the 'division' of Societies, including the approval of the Registrar and a resolution passed by a three-fourths majority of the members present at a special general meeting of the Society held for the purpose... (ibid.). In neither case, did the 7th Day Adventists, nor the Wesleyans for that matter, realise at the time there was such a procedure.

2 Outside the villages of Mualovu and Cikobia there are few 7th Day Adventists. There was until 1969 one family in Avoa, and there are three families (including a school-master from Cikobia) in Daliconi. In both these villages, though there is some good-natured (and some not so good-natured) joking at each others' expense, there is none of the obvious hostility which exists in the other two villages.
they decided to form their own Society. They maintained (individually to me) that this action had been to their advantage since they possess greater coconut holdings than do most of the Dakuwaqa members and that with their own Society they were enabled to build more houses for themselves than would otherwise have been possible. Though I do not doubt this was the primary consideration, it appears to have been related to some apprehension at the time of being dominated in a single Society by the higher-status and numerically greater membership of the other mataqali of the village.

The Co-operative division in Daliconi village is based upon old and thriving inter- and intra-clan rivalries. The second Society (Daliconi Village Society) was formed in 1966 by those people who had been refused entry, and others who did not want entry, to the original, recognised Society of the village, Waitui. While this social-based division of the Co-operatives is not so fundamental an obstacle to Co-operative unity as the religious division, there is no belief in the Daliconi Societies (or in Nadave Society) of any overall advantage in amalgamation.

Other obstacles to the more efficient running of the MUALEVU Societies in their present form are probably widely known in most other developing countries where attempts have been made to establish Co-operatives. As European administrators have reluctantly and ruefully been compelled to admit (though Fiji still retains more than her fair share of recalcitrants), there is no 'natural' identification of (so-called) primitivism and (so-called) communism. There are no grounds for regarding Co-operation as the obvious form of economic association to encourage in non-industrial societies. The MUALEVU villager, like the English
or the Iranian or the Spanish villager, does not happily and instinctively labour for the benefit of his neighbour, though he will certainly get the neighbour to labour for his benefit if he can manage to do so. The secretaries of the MUALEVU Societies are full of complaint of the way members shirk the Society work; of the fact that a steady supply of firewood for the copra dryer can only be assured by paying for it at 30/- a long ton; of the debts which members run up at the store and their reluctance to pay the bill, and then their indignation when no bonus is forthcoming; of the difficulty of finding a storeman who can resist the cash and cornbeef. From reading the impassioned appeals of chairmen and secretaries in the minutes of past years, it is evident that these are problems which always have been a feature of MUALEVU Societies. Whether they will remain so it is difficult to say. Peculation and bad debts might be stamped out by recourse to court action, but most villagers regard this as an ultimate sanction from which for all their grumbles and quarrels with kin and neighbour, they still shrink with 'shame' (madua). In some Societies progress has been made, credit is at a minimum and a reliable (?) storekeeper has been installed. Even so the threat of minor disaster is never too far distant.

Several persons on hearing that there were Cooperatives in the Exploring Group have asked me the question: 'Are they successful?'. It was a question which I found great difficulty in answering since different sets of criteria demanded different evaluations of 'success'. If an assessment is made according to criteria of economic incentive and economic growth then the answer must be decidedly negative.

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1 For example: '(Motion). I propose that before the storeman goes out on his customary nightly jaunt with the drunkards of the village, he should hand over his key to the chairman.'
When he established the cess on Fijian copra, Ratu Sukuna saw as one of its principal objectives the acquisition of European-type housing for Fijian villagers. Fijians were officially encouraged to pool their cess deductions, initially in village accounts and later in Co-operative accounts, in order that a building programme could be started as soon as possible. In MUALEVU (and probably elsewhere in Fiji) this scheme held great attractions for the villagers. These did not constitute simply the individual pride of ownership of a European-type house. There was a real desire on the part of all villagers to rid themselves of the onerous obligations imposed by the administration's communal system. One of the most annoying and time-consuming of all those obligations was the need to maintain (thatch) houses in the village in good repair and to erect new houses whenever the authorities deemed they were required.

All Co-operatives established in MUALEVU have had as their major aim the building of houses for members. According to their size, year of foundation and financial stability they have followed this aim with varying success (v. Table 23). The system of selection of members for whom houses are to be built differs only slightly between Societies. Generally there is a discussion in the committee and its recommendations are then further discussed in a general meeting until one name is unanimously agreed upon, or at least no objections are raised. In some Societies the field of potential candidates for any house is narrowed down by a

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1 There is some disagreement over the question of 'ownership' of Society-built houses. Society members believe that once an occupant has been nominated and the house built, the Society ceases to hold any rights. Co-operative Department officials informed me in Suva that the Society maintains ultimate rights of disposal over houses which are built with its funds.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Society</th>
<th>No. of active members</th>
<th>Houses built by Society</th>
<th>Year in which Society began to build houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wooden</td>
<td>Block</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dakuwaqa</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lauvu</td>
<td>Nadave</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tovolea</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikobia</td>
<td>Cikobia</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deluna</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wuitui</td>
<td>Valika</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maloni</td>
<td>Waitui</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daliconi</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 23. Details of Houses Built by the Societies

1. Two of these houses are 'owned' by men who have now left the Dakuwaqa Society and joined Tovolea.

2. These houses were built with the help of 'grants' from the society that cover only partial costs.

*Note: This table gives no indication of the total distribution in villages of the various types of houses. Daliconi, for example, has the largest proportion of European-type houses, which, additionally, are larger, of more varied design, and generally more 'impressive' in appearance than the houses of the other villages.*
rota system in which the fortunate member is chosen successively from the different administrative matagali represented in the Society. 'Fortunate' is the operative adjective here, for in all cases the factors governing selection have not included the size of the financial contribution made by a member. Consideration may be given to the existing housing of a member, or to the length of time a man has been a member, but the amount of produce a member is selling to his Society (and so the amount of profit he is enabling the Society to make) in no way determines his chances of obtaining a house.

From their inception the Societies have clearly not been founded upon any principles of prolonged economic growth, as their aims and methods of operation reveal. A vastly disproportionate expenditure of profits on a non-capital, luxury item - housing - is combined with a system of operation that offers the individual no incentive of a return proportionate to his investment and effort. The major return that is made (i.e. housing) is selective and even this acts as much as a deterrent as an incentive to further economic effort (the individual who has obtained his house has nothing more to look forward to from his Society).

The villagers are fully cognisant of these disincentives to effort and the plain economic disadvantages that are involved in membership of a Co-operative society: 'The Society is good for poor villagers, because in the Society all men are the same.' Other villagers take this a step further: 'There are three types of villager: the hard-working man, the poor man and the lazy man. In the Society they all become the same - poor and lazy.' And men will admit that they joined a Co-operative because it is 'easier', it saves them inconvenience and hard work. On the other hand,
the co-operatives are also criticised for the small cash
returns on members' produce: 'When we have a sudden need of
cash, what is the use of the Society? We don't get enough
money for our coconut there. It is better that my husband
sends his own copra to Suva.' There is a certain frustra-
tion exhibited by the individual member, who aware of the
relatively large sums of money which his Society accumulates,
cannot himself obtain a share of it for his own purposes:
The Society enables us to have large sums of money in the
village, but what is the use of this money to me? It belongs
to everybody, not to one man. If I ask for some of this
money in order to buy some cows, the Society will not give
it to me.'

As the root of the MUALEVU villagers' discontent
with the co-operatives is the fact of what happens to the profits
earned over and above the expenditure on housing.
Reserves are indivisible; the copra cess is accumulated
to the advantage of the richer members, while the
poorer members are subsidising the poorer members
in their own disadvantage. And yet at present about 90 per
cent resident, male villagers in MUALEVU who are eligible
members or are what I have referred to as secondary
members of the co-operative societies. The appeal of the
co-operatives without doubt has been overwhelmingly success-
ful in view of the decided lack of emphasis on economic
incentive the question is begged - why? Why did villagers join and why have they persisted with their membership?

One ready answer to the second part of this question is simply that it is difficult for a member to leave his Society. This is one of the most frequently voiced criticisms of the Co-operative: 'The Society is like a pig compound. While it is easy for the pig to get in [i.e. to be put in], it is very difficult for the pig to get out.' All villagers recognise that men with large coconut holdings financially are better off as independent producers and marketers of their own copra. Specifically how much better off they are is shown in Tables 24 to 26. But a Society member who because of increasing cash needs or merely a straightforward desire to maximise his income wishes to leave his Society is hamstrung. He is confronted with the prospect of having to abandon all the 'investment' he has made in the Society, in particular his 'share' of cess monies. At the same time by leaving the Society he loses his chance of obtaining a Society-built house. If he already possesses such a house his position, in a sense, may be even worse, since it becomes difficult to leave without alienating the other members, who are also his fellow-villagers. This is not to say that it does not occur; but the action speaks of the man, or of his situation. Members who have withdrawn and, so to speak, have taken their Society houses with them, or who have raised disputes over cess shares, are either men

There is no legal provision for the division of cess monies where they are entered to a single account. The Fijian Development Fund Board recognises only the person or body in whose name the account is established. In the case of the Cikobia Village Co-operative, the members who 'withdrew' from the Society did not officially resign and were able to contest any intended usage of the cess funds of the Society. The decision to put these funds into cold storage until the internal dispute of the Society was settled seems to have been an unofficial ruling to provide for an 'amicable' settlement.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Society</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Actual for Jan '67 to Sept '67</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Total Income</th>
<th>Income for Jan '67 to Sept '67</th>
<th>Total Income</th>
<th>Range of Total Income from Copra</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nakauii</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1-39</td>
<td>2-65</td>
<td>12/-</td>
<td>3/9</td>
<td>0-7</td>
<td>1-46</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40-89</td>
<td>67-140</td>
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<td>8-17</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>6/10</td>
<td>0-13</td>
<td>1-52</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40-89</td>
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<td>14-30</td>
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<td>2-73</td>
<td>10/9[1]</td>
<td>6/1[1]</td>
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<td>1-39</td>
<td>1-55</td>
<td>14/3</td>
<td>3/-</td>
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<td>1-45</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>1-53</td>
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<td>1-39</td>
<td>1-51</td>
<td>15/3</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>1/9</td>
<td>1-39</td>
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<td>40-89</td>
<td>52-117</td>
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<td>106</td>
<td>139</td>
<td></td>
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<td>114</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1-56</td>
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<td>129-156</td>
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<td>NIL</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 24. Actual Peniants from Copra Sales of Society Members, 1966-67

1. These figures refer to the period January 1967 to November 1968, but calculations for November 1967 to January 1968 have been based on them in Tables 5, 6 and 7. Note that both figures were, in fact, higher during this period and this has not been allowed for in the calculations made.

2. Unfortunately I have mislaid much of the statistical information I have on this Society.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Society</th>
<th>No. of workers</th>
<th>Weight of green copra cwt</th>
<th>Equivalent weight of dried copra cwt</th>
<th>Average selling price of dried copra s.d.</th>
<th>Range of cess deduction (10/- per cwt) dried copra £</th>
<th>Freight, insurance and other charges (5/- per cwt) £</th>
<th>Range of total income £</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dabawna</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2-65</td>
<td>1-36</td>
<td>50/-</td>
<td>1-18</td>
<td>0-9</td>
<td>2-63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>67-149</td>
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<td>18-41</td>
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1. In making the comparison between actual and potential total income, no allowance is made for initial old age of the society which would have to be made by the individual for a copra dryer and for the extra labour involved in processing and marketing his own copra.

The fourth column is relevant since the cost of an independent producer is credited to the individual's account, whereas in the society it is credited to the society's account and the individual loses all control over his copra.
who are anyhow not bothered about the convivialities of village life, or are members of a sub-grouping within the village, whose support and sympathy they retain.\(^1\)

There have been equally valid economic reasons in the past for men to join the Co-operatives. When the cess on copra was introduced in 1951, the MUALEVU villagers were confronted with the fact that they could no longer dispose of their produce at the local Chinese or Indian store. For the great majority the prospect of individually marketing their own produce carried serious disadvantages. These were primarily involvement in the paper-work and organising that accompanies regular commercial transactions (and which become magnified where the producer is remote from his market) and lack of ready cash to satisfy the small but regular needs of European-goods, which to obtain from Suva would require ordering in bulk to offset freight and other charges.\(^2\) The attraction of marketing produce, rather than selling locally to the few men who were prepared to tackle the mysteries of 'business', was the compulsory cess saving and with it the opportunity of European-type housing for which the villagers' enthusiasm had been fired by Ratu Sukuna. The cess, therefore, remained a continual

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\(^1\) In the second case I am referring specifically to Society members who belong to the 7th Day Adventist church. Two of the men who withdrew from Dakuwaga Society possessed Society-built houses. The 7th Day Adventist member who resigned from Naduca Society at the same time had just returned from a six-week secretary's course in Suva for which all his expenses had been covered by the Society. The 7th Day Adventist members who withdrew from Cikobia Village Society prevented the Society from building any houses for a period of five years.

\(^2\) Suva firms do not send cash for the copra they receive unless specifically requested to do so: even then they show extreme reluctance and will delay sending the money or forward solicited their own selection of goods in lieu.
incentive to villagers to form or join any marketing association which was capable of relieving them of individual responsibility for running a business while at the same time providing the advantages of economy of scale and on the spot access to needed cash goods in return for produce.1

In the first years after the introduction of the cass the attempts at establishing such associations uniformly failed2 through peculation and simply inexprience and lack of advice and guidance. Most villagers for most of the time were selling their coconut produce to those of their fellows who had been turned entrepreneur (though their 'businesses', too, had a high failure rate). These men marketed the copra in their own name and thereby retained the cash money for their own account. Once the administration embarked on a more concerted policy of educating the villagers in basic commercial practices and, what was as important, began to provide extension services of advice and supervision, the Co-operative societies were rapidly established throughout the District.

To-day, the economic rationale of the MUALEVU Co-operatives' established mode of operation has ceased to be relevant in the changed economic situation within the villages.3 Throughout the 1960s the individual's cash needs have diversified and increased and the members, with a greater confidence born of their new commercial experience,

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1 The villager has difficulty with saving and storing and prefers to budget on a more or less daily basis (v. supra Chapter 9).

2 Apart from Mavana which had the advantage of a traditional chairman who combined an authoritarian character and a capability of running a business, with an altruistic interest in the progress of his village. The only serious case of (apparent) peculation in the Society's history involved the chairman's younger brother.
readily voice their dissatisfaction with safeguards for financial stability which reduce potential income at the same time that they raise the cost of goods, and with a policy of cess expenditure/investment that offers no benefit for individual expenditure or investment requirements.\textsuperscript{1} Again and again I have heard villagers distinguish between money and 'Society money': money is 'what belongs to a person, what he buys things with'; 'Society money' is 'not real money at all.'

But it is evident that the Co-operatives are not mere economic appendages to village society. While their successful establishment can certainly be related to economic motivation, their continued existence in present form must be linked with their integration into village society. Members who are well aware that financially they would be better off outside the Co-operative ultimately will reject the idea of resigning, even should they be able to obtain compensation for lost investment: 'It would be no fun (\textit{lasa}) being on one's own on the outside; it's just good to be together in the Society.'\textsuperscript{2}

In the next and concluding Chapter, I shall discuss the progress of this integration has reflected the increasing irrelevance of customary principles and forms of social organisation in MUALEVU.

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\textsuperscript{1} I include the costs of educating children in the category of investment.

\textsuperscript{2} There were exceptions to this attitude. Some men rued their 'stupidity' of the day on which they had joined their Co-operative society.
1. Typical copra dryer of the independent producer

Co-operative hot-air dryer (on left), store (on right) and sun-drying racks (on extreme right), Maleva village.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

CO-OPERATION AT THE EXPENSE OF CEREMONIAL
The notable disregard of criteria of economic growth exhibited in the operation of the MUALEVU Co-operatives gives some credence to the notion of the Lau Islands as a 'tradition-bound' society. Commitment to the cash-cropping of coconut is in itself in no way contradictory to that notion. Ward (1965:205) pointed out in reference to the late 1950s that long familiarity with the crop meant that 'production of copra is more deeply embedded in the "traditional" system of socio-economic organization than are more recently-introduced forms of commercial agriculture.' Customary leadership was thus in an advantageous position to retain control over 'sporadic'\(^1\) cash returns from copra production, as happened, for example, in the Gilberts (v. Lambert: 1966; Lundsgaarde:1967). Among the Tola of the Gazelle Peninsula, New Britain, the very nature of the coconut as a crop has proved to be a force of conservatism until the last decade. A.L. Epstein (1963:211) writes that the coconut, because of its longevity, could be planted only on lands to which a man held 'title' (i.e. not merely rights of usufruct), with the effect that 'participation in the cash economy buttressed the traditional system rather than disrupted it' by

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perpetuating the political authority of the Elders which was based on their control and administration of descent group lands.  

Prima facie, the fact that the copra-marketing/consumer Societies have continued to flourish need suggest no radical change in the form of social organisation which characterised the coconut villages of Lau in the 1950s. At that time Ward (1965:205-6) saw the 'strength of traditional ways' as the reason for the small number of independent farmers in Lau relative to other parts of Fiji: 'Where tradition is strong, as in Lau, it is much harder for an individual to remain independent than it is in an area where individualism is more widely accepted as a valid way of life'. He cites official sources to the effect

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1 But this is a judgment that might need qualification. The planting of coconut as a crop may have affected a pre-existing, traditional flexibility of access to lands, such as has occurred in MUALEVU in the 1960s and signs of which were present in Moala in the 1950s, cf. Sahlins (1962:130): 'This particular man has an extremely possessory attitude toward land. He alone, of all Keteira men, refuses to use the great wet taro complex of the village, "owned" by another kin group, because, he says, it is not his land.'

2 Ward's fieldwork in Fiji was in three periods between January 1958 and January 1961; official source material which he uses refers mainly to the second half of the 1950s.

3 Called galala. These men paid a commutation fee to be exempted from communal duties in the village; the status lapsed with the abolition of the village work programme at the beginning of 1968.

4 Ward does not make clear what he exactly means by 'individualism' here - 'independent farming'? or something less specific? Putting this aside, the

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that this 'individualism' was not the way of life in Lau in the 1950s where 'the group remains dominant as the working unit' (v. F.L.C.P. No. 40 of 1958:54) and where the group's 'capacity for achievement is limited, because the incentives available to its members are limited' (ibid). Ward continues (p.206):

"... the individualism noted in land holding (as distinct from de jure land ownership) in other regions does not apply to the same extent in the coconut districts. This is particularly true in the case of coconut cultivation where most of the palms have been planted for many years and are now in the possession of the descendants of the original planters. In some instances the groves have been divided between the individual descendants, but frequently they are held as group property.

Clearly the kind of society Ward has depicted here for Lau of the 1950s no longer characterises NUALEVU of the late 1960s. Descent remains important as far as rights to land are concerned and, in fact, it has acquired greater importance with the confirmation of the matagali estates in 1965 and the inclusion of coconut as a regular part of the horticultural cycle, since this has resulted in the disappearance of the former flexibility of the system of land usage. This in turn has ensured that the administrative matagali retain considerable significance in the lives of the villagers. Two features which figure prominently in village life to-day and which most convincingly set

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Introduction of the term 'individualism' into a discussion on Fijian society is unfortunate in its connotations of a polarity with the idea of a traditional communalism. Cf. Barker (1951:273) on collectivism: 'Individualism and collectivism are not the banners of two separate armies, opposed of two separate bodies of men. All of us fly the Loth, and we all serve under Loth.'
MUALEVU apart from the description given by Ward are the break-up of the extended family unit and the fragmentation of coconut and land holdings. These are developments which appear to be regular concomitants of a radical change in the socio-economic organisation of many rural areas in the South Pacific, if not more generally, that has resulted from the double impact of proliferation of cash needs and a rapidly increasing shortage of cash resources. In MUALEVU their appearance represents no less

One result of this has been that the lay-out of the village no longer adheres so closely as formerly to the pattern of distinct matagali localities (v. Sketch Maps in Appendix 5).

Sahlins (1957) correlates the two phenomena, suggesting that the type of family unit (nuclear or extended) is a function of the work system best adapted to exploit resources. Where land resources both close to the village and at a distance are exploited, the extended family (in Moala) ensures a 'uniform distribution of the diverse produce' (p.459) since it can adjust to working spatially separated resources. Where only land close to the village is exploited 'the traditional extended family has no longer any raison d'etre. Nuclear families can effectively undertake all necessary exploitative and distributive activities' (p.462). Sahlins supplies convincingly contrasting data for two Moalan villages, which certainly substantiate his hypothesis for Moala of the 1950s. But he appears to have omitted mention of some important variables.

He refers to an extended family pattern 'almost certainly of great antiquity'; but in respect of 'land use' his hypothesis implies that in aboriginal times when the Moalans lived in inland villages (which would have been more suitably and centrally positioned for access to land resources) the nuclear family household would have predominated. But Sahlins' argument is unaffected if the restriction of 'land use' is removed. In the war village sites in MUALEVU there were considerable amounts of sea-shell evident, and I assume the Moalans were similarly harvesters of the sea and seashore (this would also place a greater emphasis in Sahlins' argument on the importance of the labour of women). Sahlins' correlation does not hold in MUALEVU to-day, possibly as a result of the socio-economic developments associated with increasing pressure on resources.

Finney (1964:175,205) related similar changes in French
A shift away from customary forms of socio-economic co-operation, which do not cope with or fulfil the new needs and expectations of the individual participants.

Once important categories of goods and services cease to flow through customary channels then the established political framework of the society is undermined. However, this is only one side of the coin - the fact that goods and services are, or can be, diverted, itself reflects a weakness in the established structure of that political framework. In MUAILWU the lack of resilience of customary socio-economic organisation must in part be attributed to such a weakness.

The solidarity of kin groups has always been threatened by a basic fault line - the conflict between the principle of a preferred, fraternal succession to leadership (and thus 'control' of the group's resources) and the principle of primogeniture which determined relative rank status. This has meant in practice that succession often germinated the seeds of conflict and dissension within the kin group. In the past, when social cooperation was organised primarily in terms of the contribution and availability of man-power, any challenge to the leader's authority over the group's members and control over its resources (termed 'stewardship' by Sahlin) needed to be economically feasible in these terms in order to effect a division of the group. The conflict between these principles of ascribed statuses is endorsed

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(Cronia to a copra boom. Crocombe (1964:149) and Ward (1961, 1964) have observed the same developments in the Cook Islands and Rotuma, and they are preaged the Tela'i of New Britain by T.S. Epstein (1968: 4, 176).
by the categories of personal relationship involved: the varying degrees of antipathy and hostility between siblings on the one hand, and the relative solidarity of father and offspring on the other.

A further weakness of customary leadership was the nature of its power over resources. The leader was the representative of the group, he exercised 'control', loka, over its resources on behalf of all members. He did not 'own' these resources - the co-members of his descent group were not tenants who could be threatened with eviction, they were co-holders of joint rights. A disaffected member thus could make a legitimate challenge to leadership in terms of a demand for delegation of this control, that is, a 'division' of lands, without contesting the leader's de jure status as head of the group. But, as the villagers say, 'formerly people were important' and the dissident had to assess the strength and numerical support of his political following to ensure it was a viable unit within the accumulative-distributive organisation that was the medium of all major economic effort. Even when a local division of the kin group was effected, the feast organisation and status system ensured the headship of the original group would retain an inherent authority and control over the economic activities of the secessionist group.

The combined effects of the amalgamation of settlements into coastal villages and Ma'afa's land policy divorced kin group leadership from its control of the group lands, and from control of the new cash resource, the coconut crop, which Ma'afa had introduced. But Ma'afa's land policy was not persevered with after...
his death\textsuperscript{1} and this coupled with a rapidly decreasing population ultimately produced a consolidation of coconut holdings which were now enclosed within the fold of the customary system of corporate rights controlled by the kin group leader. Coconut wealth, moreover, never advanced to a level of importance that was anything more than subsidiary to the subsistence economy; individual control of magimagi groves did not impair the effectiveness of the feast organisation as the primary medium of socio-economic co-operation. Nevertheless, the fact that the original introduction of cash-cropping was accompanied by measures instituting individual control of resources provided an experience and established a precedent of considerable import for villagers of a later age in which cash earning had shifted from the periphery to the centre of economic activity.

With a proliferation of cash needs and inadequate resources, an increasingly larger part of a villager's productive effort has ceased to be oriented towards the acquisition of customary prestige through the

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. Rogers (1969:216) on modern Tonga: 'Every male Tongan is entitled, on reaching the age of sixteen years, to receive a grant of eight and a quarter acres as an "ahi tukuhaʻu "tax allotment", and a grant of up to one rood twenty-four perches in a village or town as an "ahi kolo "town allotment"...tenure is for life and is usually realllocated to the eldest son.'
medium of distributive procedures. Men have become aware of the advantages of controlling their own income in catering for their own individually felt needs and activities associated with cash-earning have ceased to be programmed by the customary framework of kin group co-operation. As pressure upon available resources developed, a situation arose in which the differentiation of needs and work capacities rapidly acquired prominence as a cause of conflict between kin group members and this led to demands for the division (i.e. further delegation of the control of) the group's resources. These demands were evidence of the significant shift in values that had occurred in the village. The process of division of the group's resources was no longer linked with the availability of labour resources: in the MUALEVU idiom, "land and coconuts, not persons, [were] now important". In these circumstances the potential weakness of customary kin group leadership has been fully realised.

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For example, when the government offer of a cash subsidy for weeding coconut groves was announced, most of the weeding in MUALEVU in the first year (1964) was carried out by matagali or by village and the proceeds were then divided out to individual members (though in most cases the Provincial tax appears first to have been deducted by the head of the group). Those involved were aware of the inadequacy of this system as far as the differentiation of coconut holdings was concerned, on the other hand the boring prospect of weeding was enlivened by the idea of working in a group. But in the first year all the obvious inadequacies of this work system were experienced and it was not continued with in succeeding years (the weeding subsidy was paid for three consecutive years).
In other Pacific societies kin group leadership has been able effectively (so far) to counter pressures for the division of resources. For example, the authority of the Tolai elders of Matupit over land is buttressed by their control of a customary system of prestige and status which retains considerable significance for the individual and to which he is still prepared (though less so than in the past) to subordinate his cash values. Similarly in Samoa the continued vitality of the customary social organisation in which the aiga kin group is the basic unit, endorses the matai's continued command over the resources and labour of the group and disposition of its lands. Furthermore, cash is an acknowledged path to the acquisition of customary status titles. It is true that both Nayacakalou (1960) and Lockwood (1971) also note developments towards a more individual type of control of lands, but this is balanced by the administrative and legal endorsement of the matai's authority, and as Lockwood (op. cit. 32) points out:

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1 Nayacakalou (1960) observes: '... to have no matai is to be an asocial entity.'

2 'Economic ability in cash earning activity is the most important criterion for obtaining a title, or rank and prestige generally' (Pitt:1970:263).

3 The right of pule over the produce of the aiga’s lands (and this includes cash contributions), and the right of tautua to the labour service of the aiga members. These invite comparison with the Fijian tahu and lala; however both the latter were rights belonging to the chief and which could be exercised by him over the area under his political suzerainty. The government District chief, lala, was also given the lala right to labour sources. The kind of distinction which Pitt (1970:115n.) notes between 'personal rights (pule, matai) and rights delegated to the Chief by the aiga or village (pule aiga etc.)' also held for the lala of the Fijian Chief.
... no one, not even a matai, has security of tenure (a matai can be voted out), and no one, for example, can develop a block of land, put in fences and so on, and be certain that he and his immediate family will be allowed to receive the full benefits of this labour and investment, or even to continue to use the particular piece of land for very long.

What distinguishes the elders of Matupit and the matai of Samoa from kin group leaders in MUALEVU, is that in the former societies it is in the interest of customary leaders that the corporate rights which they control are maintained and that the land resources of the kin group are not fragmented. In this way, though the persons occupying the positions of leadership change, the economic basis of the power and authority of leadership - ultimate control over the group's resources - remains intact. In MUALEVU the reverse holds. It is the kin group leader who takes the initiative in dividing the group's resources, generally using his position to effect an apportionment as advantageous as possible to himself and so to his children. This is more than a reflection of the change in economic values. It is motivated by the leader's knowledge that succession to his position will almost certainly not be to his own children. Thus once individual cash needs began to outstrip available resources, it was in his children's interests, if not in his own, that he should use his jurisdiction to ensure their future well-being by securing permanently for them as large a share of the group's resources as was possible. Cultural stress on fraternal succession has thus come to be a source of considerable weakness for the viability of the customary socio-economic structure under the impact of an increasing commitment
to a cash economy. It has resulted in the capitulation of customary kin group leadership to the rationale of individually controlled incomes. By divorcing this leadership from control of members' cash resources it further has been instrumental in undermining the hold of customary co-operative kin group activities over the attention and involvement of the individual member.

The divorce of kin group leadership from resources had a cumulative effect through the higher reaches of the hierarchical structure of MUALEVU society that proved disastrous for customary authority at the apical level, that of the Chief. Yet the decline of Chiefly authority and influence does not stem entirely from socio-economic developments in what I have termed the modern period, rather these can be seen as having an accelerative effect which put restoration beyond retrieval.

The customary authority of the MUALEVU Chief rested upon the same politico-economic syndrome that was the basis of Chiefliness certainly in all Polynesian societies and which Malinowski (1922:97) has described for the Trobrianders: 'the main symptom of being powerful is to be wealthy, and of wealth is to be generous.' Power, wealth and generosity were the inseparables of Chiefly authority in MUALEVU; their combination reflected the central position which the Chief occupied within the economic life of the society. All major flows of goods passed through his hands: he was the stimulator of productive effort and the focal point of its activity, the entrepot of the community's wealth and the pivot of the accumulative-distributive processes.
His economic powers were enhanced, and his political authority endorsed, by particular commands over the resources of the District, principally the lala, tabu and rights to the first fruits of all crops.1 There were other, minor economic privileges: for example, a share of any large catch of fish had to be presented to the Chief, and any turtle or large fish was also his by right.

But while his access to wealth was considerable so were the Chief's obligations to dispense that wealth. The turtle-fisherman was a commoner, he had no use for the turtle, which only the chiefs might eat; on the other hand he did have use for the return, commonly a whale tooth, which he expected when he presented his catch. Similarly the man who presented a feast might be 'rewarded' immediately with a whale tooth, or might later receive a portion of cooked pork.2 The Chief's yam gardens were always very large since he was able to command the labour of the entire District, but the produce of the gardens was also available to any individual in the District:

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1 V. Geddes' discussion (1948:134-42) of these powers of the Chief as a 'director'.

2 There was a system of food tabu between certain groups of persons which identified a group with 'land food' (primarily pork) and 'sea food' (primarily fish). These groups could present or exchange their food with each other, but not eat their own food in each other's presence: the chiefly clan, for example, could present fish, but not pork, to the Nadave clans. While in the past these food tabu enhanced the distributory processes within the community, this is not so to-day in the case of the 7th Day Adventist food tabu. A 7th Day Adventist fisherman who catches a shark is more likely to throw it back into the sea (having killed it or slit its mouth) than keep it to present later to a Wesleyan.
When a man was in need it didn't matter that he was a commoner of the lowest status (kaisi), he could come to the Chief with a whale tooth and request help.

Yet here again the process of redistribution operated. The Chief had to be approached with a whale tooth, the open sesame to his generosity and help. The whale tooth was 'a very heavy valuable of the land which cannot be refused', it was an assurance and guarantee of the aid and support of others should the future need arise and an essential currency for all ceremonial activity. Since the Chief was both the keystone of the latter and the most obvious source for the former, the whale teeth of the District tended to gravitate to and issue from him, enhancing his prestige and further facilitating the processes of distribution of goods and services.

The establishment of the administrative post of District 'chief', Buli, had a seriously eroding effect upon the authority of customary Chiefship, even though in NUALEVU, the two positions were generally, though not always, held by the same person. The authority of District chief operated according to different principles and was endorsed by different sanctions. In his bureaucratic role, the Chief was answerable, not to the opinions and feelings of his people, 'the breath of men' (Wilson: 1959), but to the Provincial chief and the administration. His rights of command over resources, particularly to labour services, carried no obligations of generosity, they were emoluments of his job, part of a contract with his employers: there were no conditions of conscientation oath to fulfil. There was thus considerable temptation for the Chief to prefer the more autocratic
role of a civil servant with its self-centred privileges and possibilities (the job was salaried) to the role of customary Chief with its traditional obligations. But while the Chief was able to change roles and maintain his authority and economically privileged position, there was little incentive for him to counter the weaknesses in customary leadership which became apparent as the distributory mechanism of society suffered the corrosive effects of contact with cash values. When the office of District chief was abolished at the beginning of 1968, the inefficacy of customary chiefship was revealed in full degree.

In many chiefly societies in Africa and Polynesia involvement with cash-cropping and a market economy has served to bolster, not to undermine, customary chiefly authority and leadership. A Chief might utilise an existing tribute collecting machinery as a marketing organisation (v. Gluckman:1943) or simply collect his tribute in cash (v. Dorjahn:1966; Fallers:1966). The facility with which Chiefly leadership in such societies has been able to adapt to economic developments derives primarily from a recognition that rights in land reside ultimately in the Chief. In MUALEVU the absence of this vital link between political authority and economic resources has been a fatal weakness to the adaptability of Chiefly leadership and institutions in

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1 And in many cases from an aboriginal heritage of a machinery of centralised government.
a cash-oriented economy.¹ 'The wealth (iyau) of men', say the villagers, 'is land, the wealth of the Chief is men.' The fact that the Chief was obliged (in 1968)² to labour for several days on his own in putting a new roof on his house because he could not, or did not want to, afford the cost of paying or feeding labour does not give the lie to the maxim, but it does indicate that the Chief had ceased to be the tribal banker.

In MUALEVU the 'money path' has become virtually an economic by-pass, drawing goods, energies and activities away from the network of accumulation and distribution that marks the customary sector of the economy.³ To-day there is little incentive to divert a man often or for long from the new highway.

¹ Cf. Nuyacakalou (1964:271): 'Traditional leadership... is structurally unsuited to an exchange market economy.' Watters (1965:497) is optimistic about the emergence of leaders who can be effective because they combine traditional and progressive qualities, but Nuyacakalou (1964:271) is more doubtful: 'Some have thought that it [traditional leadership] can be "adapted" to suit modern needs, but it seems that this is a questionable view. The two types of leadership ["traditional" and "modern"] are... geared to different types of situation and their different jurisdictions must be recognised.'

² When he had ceased to hold the office of District chief.

³ Couper (1965:62) estimated the annual copra cargo from Vanua Balavu [Exploring Group] for the period 1966-70 would be 1,300 tons, making it the largest copra-producing area in Liu (cf. 1,200 tons for Lakeba, 620 tons for Ono, 440 tons for Kabara).
Douglas (1961:5) states that among the Lele, bridewealth is paid in raffia and that nearly all prestigious positions in society follow on marriage. Yet no matter how much raffia a bachelor may secure he has no guarantee thereby of obtaining a wife: he first has to 'pull the kinship wires' and show that he is of the clan of the girl's grandfather. In this way, asserts Douglas, the political and economic hegemony of the old men is maintained. The established socio-economic system is self-perpetuating, in other words, because it holds a monopoly over the provision of certain desired returns: a man has to have a wife, and the raffia has to be fed through the system.

In MUALEVU the customary system offers little in the way of desired social or economic returns. There are no prestigious customary statuses attainable to invite, or oblige, the investment of the individual, whether his investment is in cash or converted into some other form of 'currency', such as raffia, shell-money or foodstuffs. Chiefly status, for example, cannot be 'purchased' by commoners. The villagers will remark the poverty of their chiefs and deride chiefly status for this reason, but they will never describe a rich commoner, a man with large coconut holdings and plenty of 'belongings', vava, or a commoner of 'accomplishment', well-educated or versed in 'business', as a chief. It is not even feasible for a man to lay out his wealth and energies in ceremonial expenditure and distribution to improve his chances of acquiring the leadership (and perhaps a title) of his kin group. Since this leadership is divorced from control of the group's resources, the
returns, in terms of either tangible wealth or the intangibilities of prestige, are not worth the expenditure. In any case for the 'investment' to make any impression a customary cash outlay would be required which would make the whole process self-defeating since it would eventuate in the impoverishment of the investor.

To use the Tolai idiom (of a pre-cocoa era), 'coconut is majesty' in modern MUALEVU, or at least the cash significance of coconut is 'majesty'. The debilitating effect upon the customary form of socio-economic organisation of the separation of leadership from resources has its concomitant in the individual's assessment in cash equivalent terms of the prestigious value of the goods which are invested, displayed, consumed and received. These two developments fully complement each other in reducing most ceremonial occasions to what are virtually the bare essentials. The most massive display of goods leaves the feast participant unmoved if the goods have no implied cash value or sacrifice of a cash value. Vegetable foodstuffs and mats are 'nothing' (na nean e du na ku); there is no market for them that is accessible to MUALEVU. Any form of meat generally 'counts', however, because meat, whether chicken, pig, cow or canned, has a local market value. This is not simply a question of the

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1 There would be a cash return from the rents of any of the group's lands which were leased; for details v. Nayaacakalou:1971:216. In MUALEVU all such rents are from 99 years leases which are just now expiring; the same involved (fixed by Ma'afu in the early 1870s) are (now) negligible in the eyes of the villagers - 'just a few pennies'.

2 Between 1967 and 1969 there was no sign of any inflation of prices, with a small pig remaining at $4, a chicken $1, and a cow between $50 to $60 (a calf was $25 and up).
transference to a modern idiom of the customary emphasis on the meat content of a feast. At one ceremony two large cows were presented (a rare event in MUALEVU), but while the meat was enjoyed at the time, the prestige value of the presentation was nil. The cows had been killed on the nearby island of Kanacea on the orders of the owners who wished to replace their herd and had been given to the villagers who subsequently presented them in Mualevu. 'The cows are nothing', commented the villagers, 'they were not paid for.'

Cattle are not described as 'customary food' ('food of the land'), being a relatively recent introduction. When the accumulated feast is arranged for presentation, it is always the pigs which take pride of place in the front centre and the quarters of the slaughtered cow are placed at the sides (v. Plate XII.1). But the cow is nevertheless the centre-piece of the feast and no feast of any importance, by definition, can lack a cow. Probably a large enough number of large enough pigs would serve as a substitute, but the accumulation of pigs in such numbers is now beyond the capacity of the feast organisation and, indeed, of village pig resources. The only pigs which survive long enough to grow to any size are sows and these are an acknowledged capital investment.

1 Practically everyone in the village was sick during the night.
2 The island is freehold belonging to a large Australian firm that trades in Fiji. The entire herd of about 300 head was exterminated by Army marksmen. The cattle were given away as meat to whomever took the trouble to collect, but the owners refused to allow the cattle to be taken away alive.
which are rarely disposed of. The largest numbers of pigs I have seen accumulated was eleven, all of them small.

As I have already stated, pigs are moving into the cash sector of the economy. It is still possible to request a pig with a whale tooth but a pig owner always prefers to be paid cash: 'What is the use of a whale tooth to me?', was a common reply to my queries. 'Have you tried eating a whale tooth? The whale tooth is not a heavy thing these days. I cannot go into the store and use it to get corned beef.' However, $4 makes a small but an expensive purchase for the villager. A procedure that is often followed is for the person making the request to offer the alternatives of a whale tooth and a promise to give a pig in return at a later date (when, for example, his own sow, if he has one, will have littered). In these cases (which constitute the majority) the latter alternative has always been accepted to my knowledge. Sometimes a whale tooth and cash (a sum less than $4) is offered.

Significantly for the emphasis on cash values, when an old man cannot offer cash for a pig he has 'shame', murum, and it is his wife who takes the whale tooth and goes to take the request. The request is never made formally. The woman may simply toss the whale tooth on the floor, place it on a chair or cupboard and state her mission; discussion may be made then and there or later carried by word of the house.

In Mavuna, the villagers insist that these days cash is acceptable for a pig: 'We follow the money here. The traditional ways are for the time of darkness. If a man wants a pig, then he has to pay for it. If a man has no money, then he will not get his pig.' I did not witness any transactions, so
I am not sure whether a person is able in reality to circumvent the demand for cash. However, the villagers were adamant that this was not so: 'Even a son has to pay cash for his father's pig',¹ and they were genuinely proud of their cash-consciousness as a sign of their 'enlightenment', varama.² A further sign of the decline of the customary values of the feast was evident in 1969 when the villagers of both Mavana and Daliconi began to abandon the practice of cooking the vegetables that were to be distributed at a feast. The decision was made on the sound economic reasoning that it generated waste, whereas uncooked vegetables might be used over several days and, in the case of yams, even kept for planting.

Instead of the cash values of goods being converted to customary values as in the past in MUALEVU and as in some of the societies cited in this Chapter,

¹ I confirmed the single case which they cited: but cash transactions of this kind between members of the same household were exceptional in all villages. An incident in Mualevu in which a man insisted that his stepson (eBes) should pay cash for his English cabbage like any other villager was often used by the villagers (of Mualevu) as an example of the extremes to which pursuit of money could lead.

² This was evident at the regular, nightly, informal salesman sessions in the village 'hotel' (i.e. the copra shed). In the other villages different men on different nights would purchase 10 or 20 cents worth or more of kava at the store prior to joining the session. In Mavana, one of the local growers would have a supply with him in the 'hotel'; as the kava was used up, a member of the group would toss a five or ten cent piece on to the floor in front of the supplier who would then hand out more kava.
the customary values of goods, and services, are now converted into cash equivalents and found wanting and not worth 'sensible' consideration of any serious investment. While a man may lay out goods of a cash value on a ceremonial occasion, the return which is redistributed to him rarely has such a value. A pig is a pig or is $4, but even should the 'donor' be so exceptionally fortunate as to receive by return all the separate joints of a pig,\(^1\) all he has is a lot of cooked pork which can only be eaten (and it has to be eaten quickly). On rare occasions cash goods are received in return and where a kin group has invested, say, a single pig, a 'profit' may be made. These occasions are rare because they need the involvement of urbanised Fijians for the introduction of cash goods (such as domestic fuels, manufactured cloths and tinned foods in a quantity large enough for a genuine distribution). When these ceremonies occur they rate a much greater significance than local feasts for the villagers. Thus the final mourning feast for the previous Chief, who

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\(^1\) He would be very fortunate indeed. The paucity of meat portions in the feast redistribution contrasts graphically with the tales of the feasts of ten years ago. I had no means of checking the veracity of these accounts, but even allowing for considerable exaggeration, present day feasts appear to be on a far smaller scale. One evening I was returning with a Mualevu villager from a feast at Boitaci; we were both carrying the small coconut leaf carrier-bags in which the feast portions are always placed (v. Plate XII.2). While we were walking along the beach, my companion opened his bag and rummaged around inside. Finally he brought out a small piece of pork. With a typical Fijian exclamation of disgust, he then tossed pork and bag into the sea.
had died in 1963 was delayed for more than three years until late 1967 because of difficulties in organising contributions from urbanised MUALEVU villagers (mostly in Suva).

The diminished support for the customary economic procedures of accumulation and distribution appears to have had a considerable effect both on the general level of food production and on the production of prestige crops of taro and yam in the District. It is impossible to judge exactly how great an effect without comparative data and I have had to rely for the most part on comparisons with the past made for me by villagers. There are some independent indications, however, and the most obvious one is that cassava, which is not a 'customary' food and is never involved in the feast, is now the principal staple crop.¹ the great reliance on cassava (which is not seasonal) can be gathered from the comments of the villagers during the drought conditions that had developed in mid 1969: the degree to which a man was adjudged hard up for food was in terms of the amount of cassava he had in his garden. The invariable reference made of a man who was known to be spending all his time looking for wild yam in the bush was that he had little or no cassava (i.e. ready for harvesting).

¹ The old people (60 + years) say they remember when cassava was eaten only as a pudding (similar to the English tapioca pudding, made of the starch globules squeezed from the tuber).
Villagers in Mualevu and Navana unhesitatingly declared that wet taro cultivation had declined considerably in the last five years or so and this seemed to be borne out by large deserted taro areas in both villages (v. Plate XIV.2). The decline can be attributed in part to a disease that was attacking the corms, but many men maintained that they no longer thought it worthwhile to have more than one or two beds, solove, while others had given up taro cultivation altogether. Individual yam production varied enormously, but again there was unanimous agreement that the level of production as a whole had declined considerably and that of large yams quite drastically. In a few instances individuals explicitly commented on the 'uselessness' of producing large quantities of yams which they would never be able to eat themselves. The yam gardens of these men were,

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In the three large taro areas in Mualevu (v. Sketch Map), the one situated in Lomajivana estate was entirely abandoned, while less than half the area in Litoa Mualevu estate was in use. The third area, situated within Nayagona estate, is used by the canoe people. In 1968 more than half the area was not cultivated, but it was almost deserted in 1969. The area in Navana village itself was fall.
not surprisingly, small: however most men with small yam gardens merely stated that they were 'sufficient'.

The shift of emphasis in the villagers' participation in the ceremonial sector of the economy, from such considerations as prestige, kinship solidarity and political support to an assessment of the more tangible returns to the individual relative to his investment, must be related to the scarcity of the resource most in demand, namely cash. To-day, the villager is not only less prepared, he is also less able to divert cash-value goods into the customary sector of the economy. Moreover divorce of customary leadership from control of resources ensures he is not committed against his own judgment and decision. Paradoxically this process of withdrawal does mean that on infrequent occasions any individual is liable to a relatively hefty cash expenditure within a ceremonial context.

In the past all significant social events in village life involved the accumulation of a feast; without a feast, the occasion would have been, so to speak, a non-event, for the feast was the established medium of gathering people together. The axiom still holds in modern Mualevu. To give an occasion social significance, people have to be gathered together and persuaded

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'Small' in the villagers' eyes appeared to constitute less than about 150 small-yam mounds, whereas the largest yam gardens contained between 1,500 and 2,000 mounds. More than 50 or 60 large-yam mounds was considered a respectable achievement.
temporarily to stay together to mark the occasion\(^1\) and the feast remains the primary medium for achieving this. But to-day the infiltration of cash values into the customary sector means that at the same time that kin and neighbour invest less of their own resources, they nevertheless judge the significance of the occasion and the prestige of the organiser in terms of the equivalent cash investment that has been made.

This outlay does not stop simply at the feast. All of those participating have to be fed regularly (in the past, for several days)\(^2\) and the villagers' liking for European foodstuffs now makes the provision for kakana, the commensal meals that always accompany feasts, the major cash commitment. This involves cash that has to be found by the organiser, unlike possibly his contributions for the feast itself, which are generally provided for by the sacrifice of his domestic animals. The morning meal, in particular, involves considerable cash expense for the guest does not expect to eat cassava or breadfruit at a feast occasion.

\(^1\) A person may attend a feast occasion in a strange village and though uninvited and not contributing anything, will still merit a food portion in the feast redistribution simply by reason of his presence.

\(^2\) The efficacious number of NUALEVU numerology is four. It seems in all major rituals people were gathered together for four days before the feast was divided. Further celebrations then continued until the tenth day, for those who remained when another, but smaller feast would be divided. In the so-called hundredth day celebrations of some rites, the 'hundred' seems to indicate the elapse of a long period of time rather than specifically a hundred days.
Pancakes, buns, cakes, scones, bread, butter, jam, tea and cocoa, all cash goods, bear clear witness to the alien nature of the meal and the effect of European values (and to the sweet tooth of the Lauans). With all this cash expense to cope with, the organiser of the feast is very much on his own. He can expect little support beyond his immediate family, and even this will often be reluctant or non-existent except where all are equally involved (as in the case of the death of a father). Furthermore, though the expenditure and organisation is his, overall direction of the operation may still be assumed by his kin group leader (since the context is customary), even though the latter is no longer capable of effecting, or willing to involve himself in, corporate responsibility for the expenditure commitment.

An inevitable consequence of these economic pressures on the organiser has been a drastic pruning of the incidence, size and duration of ceremonial occasions. The individual's responsibility for the expenses involved has sloughed off the social significance of many such events. Occasions of major passage rites such as those of social birth and circumcision and marriage, have declined into commensal meals which often involve only immediate kin, a kind of 'family party'. Lesser rites have in many cases disappeared entirely, though there is some variation here. For example, when the Chief returned to his village (Mualevu) after several weeks absence, at custom an occasion for the District or at least the village to make a feast, the only indication that traditional was still alive was the donation of a chicken by his father's sister's son. On the other hand, when the Tui Nadave returned from hospital in Suva, a pig
was killed and the members of the matagali held a commensal meal, though no feast was made.

The celebration of marriage is undoubtedly the best barometer of the declining social significance and economic relevance of customary forms and values of co-operation, for marriage involves two separate (separable) groups of kin. This introduces a competitive element that in the past commonly developed into a solevu, the Fijian potlatch, with enormous investments of foodstuffs and goods.

During my periods of fieldwork twelve marriages took place in the villages of Mualevu, Cikobia, Daliconi and Mavana. They were all preceded by elopement, vakadrotaka, a procedure which obviates the necessity for the series of presentations of goods by the boy's side and the culmination of the feast-exchanges and riotous celebrations that mark the marriage 'in the way of the land'. The last marriage of this nature to have taken place in the District was in 1961. Elopement has become in fact, a convenient arrangement, which while

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1 The boy takes the girl to his own or his father's house, or to the house of another kinsman where they spend the night. This generally, though not necessarily, indicates they will get married, which involves registration at Lomaloma followed by a short service conducted by the minister (Wesleyan or 7th Day) at Mualevu village at which the couple appear with their marriage tapa (masi) around them. Once the couple have announced to the boy's parents their intention of getting married, the boy's kin group leader makes a formal presentation, hulu, of whale teeth both as an 'atonement' for the elopement and for 'tying the string of relationship.' The whale teeth should number four: on two occasions when a whale tooth has been lacking I have known close kin refuse to act on an informal request for one, even though they had some in their possession.
not actually encouraged by fathers, is certainly connived at by them (though girls' mothers appear more genuinely hostile). The girl's parents and kin are always 'angry' and temporarily refuse to have anything to do with the couple. Hence any kind of formal celebration is out of the question. Later on, the girl's parents relent and the mother brings the marriage tapa cloth (of the gatu variety) and the bed mats she has been preparing and storing for her daughter.

With elopement, the event of marriage is celebrated by a single commensal meal on the day of the registration and church service. The size of this meal varies considerably, but it is most often nearer the category of a non-event in terms of social significance, attended only by the boy's immediate family and with only a chicken or some tinned food to denote anything out of the ordinary. At one of these meals I attended in Mualevu (household no. 27) there were present the boy's parents, his elder brother and wife, his own wife, and another young couple who had eloped on the same night as he had done. The highlight of the meal was three chickens, which, the young husband informed me, he had caught and killed when his parents were not looking and which was the reason why they were so angry with him at that moment.1

1 At the couple's request to take photographs of them in their tapa cloth, I had also attended the church service. There were a few villagers present but their varying degrees of kinship with the couple made no sense of any pattern of formal invitation. I later discovered that most of the village, like myself until my invitation, simply did not know the ceremony was taking place. They did not appear concerned in any way about their ignorance nor did they exhibit any curiosity (apart from a desire to see the photographs).
On another occasion in Mualevu, the marriage meal was a much grander affair. The meal was organised by the father (HH no. 21) and eldest brother of the young husband. Members of 36 Mualevu households and one Boitaci household attended the meal and food was also taken to three other Mualevu households not represented. Two 'sides' were made up principally at the instigation of Ratu MAIKELI who was kin with both the boy and the girl, and also with the husband (HH no. 13) of the girl's classificatory sister (both were from Daliconi). This man is Ratu MAIKELI's classificatory son (PyBSys). He has very little coconut himself and is constantly dependent on access to the very large groves of his 'big father'. It was this man who provided the small pig of the lovo which the girl's side led by Ratu MAIKELI brought to the meal. Ratu MAIKELI's only contribution to the occasion was on the boy's side, a whale tooth which had been presented as 'atonement' to the girl's kin. All members of the girl's side were Mualevu village residents (plus some members of one Boitaci household) and all of them were distant kin, vaiyawaki.

The contributors and their contributions are indicated in Table 27. It is evident that the organisers of the meal, the father and eldest brother of the groom, bore practically the entire weight of the cash and cash-equivalent expenses involved. This is now characteristic of all ceremonial occasions centring around the passage rites of the individual. Only when the entire village or district comes under corporate ceremonial obligations, rare occasions such as the death of the District Chief
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributors</th>
<th>Contributions</th>
<th>Cash value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boy's side</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>1 large pig, 5lbs flour, 2 whale teeth</td>
<td>12.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>1 chicken</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eldest brother</td>
<td>24 tins corned beef, 4 tins condensed milk, 1 tin powdered milk, 5 bottles pick-me-up sauce, 5 tins margarine, 10lbs sugar, 2 pkts tea, 1 tin milo, 1 pkt cocoa, 1/2lb curry powder, 2lbs onions, salt, 6lbs hard biscuits, bread.</td>
<td>23.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16 baskets yams, 2 baskets taro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Girl's side</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH38</td>
<td>1 whale tooth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH13</td>
<td>1 small pig, 1 basket taro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH29 (Dakuwaqa storeman)</td>
<td>3 tins corned beef, 2lbs hard biscuits, 2 bottles pick-me-up sauce</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W of HH13</td>
<td>1 tapa cloth (gatu)</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W of HH37</td>
<td>1 tapa cloth (masi)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W and SW of HH27</td>
<td>1 mat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W and SW of HH20</td>
<td>1 mat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W of HH9</td>
<td>1 mat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W and M of Tui Boitaci</td>
<td>1 mat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rest of village</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male members of 19 households</td>
<td>15 baskets yams, 12 baskets taro</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W of Wesleyan Minister</td>
<td>2 tins butter, 4 tins jam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>$36.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>$6.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>$1.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 27. Contributors and Contributions to a Mualevu Wedding Meal.
and consecration or death of a paramount Chief, \(^1\) are the expenses equally spread among all participants according to a set rate decided for the occasion.\(^2\)

The inevitable result of the combination of the nature of MUALEVU social organisation and the scarcity of desired resources has been the decline of ceremonial activities. But the individual cannot entirely shrug off customary obligations and the heavy cash expenditure they now involve him in. His greatest burden, \(loqa\), is death, the death of close kin. There is no elopement with death, no substitute. In a small-scale, still closely-knit village society, it is difficult for death not to have a social significance and the close kinsman, bound fast by his 'shame', cannot escape its consequences and the dollar sign that precedes them. Cash expenses

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\(^1\) In the event these all occurred during my time in MUALEVU. The final funeral ceremony of 'taking off the mourning clothes', \(vakataraaisulu\), for the previous Chief took place a few weeks after my first arrival; in the second period of my fieldwork, the consecration of the Tui Nayau was celebrated at Nayau and Lakeba, and the 'taking off the mourning clothes' for the former Tui Cakau (who had died during my first field trip) was held at Somosomo. A party from MUALEVU, led by the Chief, attended both the latter occasions.

\(^2\) In the cases mentioned in note 1 above, contributions were determined partly on a matagali basis, each matagali then making its own internal arrangements to supply the set quota, and partly on an individual basis. The latter applied to the women's contributions of mats and bottles of coconut oil, though \(tapa\) cloth (\(gatu\) and \(masi\)) was also on a matagali basis. Redistribution of goods received was initially on a village basis: these divisions were subsequently sub-divided to matagali and households by the respective units concerned.
are pared drastically in the only way it is socially feasible to do so - by reducing the duration of the mourning. No funeral assembly, somate, is permitted to last over more than one breakfast. Nevertheless the organiser is still involved in heavy expenses. He must provide a cow for the feast, and it should be a large one. And to the fifty or sixty dollars of the worth of the cow, he will have to add forty or fifty more dollars for the kind of food which the multitude expects to eat. And yet despite his outlay of resources which now are scarce, and despite the fact that he bears this 'burden' alone, he is not thereby gaining in return any prestige or standing in customary terms. Indeed, this is not even an aspiration. The organiser's concern is simply to maintain his status in face of those customary demands he is obliged to acknowledge, and escape with the minimum amount of cash expenditure. In MUALBVU, the presence of cash in the customary sector of the economy is the source and sign of the weakness of the old forms of socio-economic organisation.

The idea of being in an age of major transition is a comment frequently expressed by villagers. 'We are at a half way stage', one man stated to me, 'half way between the "path of the land" and the "money path". It is difficult time for us: we cannot go back to our old customs, yet we don't know very well the money path. We are not yet like the European; we do not know how to put our money here, and here, and here, and then make it grow (tubu)\(^1\).' This is also one example of many

\(^1\) As a noun base tubu is used to indicate (cash) 'interest'. 
assertions I have heard from villagers concerning their lack of knowledge of 'money matters', of the 'way of business'.

The Fijian is still a beginner in the know-how of economic progress. As with any novice failure has had a more blighting effect upon him than on those more experienced. But in the past the effects of failure have been of a much greater adverse consequence than necessary. Primarily this has been the result of a lack of opportunity to learn from his failures. Not only has a paternal administration maintained a sanctuary from the realities and values of a cash-oriented world, it appears to have used the existence of this sanctuary as a disaster-proof environment for economic projects in which the Fijians have been no more than, to use Spate's terms, 'pawns' or 'guinea-pigs'.¹ And pawns they certainly have been: gaining little knowledge of the rules, the moves, the play and the stakes involved.²

¹ Spate's criticism (1959:78-9; 1965:52) was directed specifically at a community development scheme on the island of Moturiki - the scheme is described in Hayden; 1957. The scheme organiser, himself, referred to the project as an 'experiment'. The cocoa project at Lutu (about which Watters was quite optimistic, v. Watters:1970:94-5) is another example.


The village was fortunate in being chosen by the Administration (presumably because its soil was suitable [it turned out not to be] and Ratu Edward Cakabau, the Economic Development Officer for this area and an eminent chief in his own right, saw that the planting was carried out. In 1956, 12,000 seedlings were brought... and planted on 50 acres of hilly land.... The work took the entire village labour force (about 100 men) about six months to complete.... In spite of the great potential of this source of wealth [Watters estimated £3,000 to £4,000 p.a.], few men in 1959 were aware of the value of the new crop to the village.

(cont'd on next page)
The Fijians have too often been given little opportunity to rationalise their failure and profit from their mistakes (or the mistakes of others). The resulting lack of self-confidence in their own ability to follow new ways has nurtured in the past a strong streak of fatalism in the Fijian's make-up, producing a resignation which has often been misinterpreted as apathy. 1

2 (cont'd from previous page)

When I left MUALEVU the villagers officially were being encouraged to plant pine on their poorer lands (the Department of Agriculture field assistant had already planted up a small area as a showpiece) in anticipation of a timber industry being established on Vanua Balavu. When I inquired in Suva about the prospects for such a scheme, it was admitted by a high placed official that freightage costs would probably never make the industry a feasible proposition for Lau. 'Still', the same official added, 'it gives them something to do'. 1

The image of the typical Fijian villager sat under a tree waiting for his lunch to happen for the most part has been vanquished to the popular press and media; however, a recent exception was Coulter (1967 - especially chapter 3), a case of misrepresentation which is serious in that the publicaton appears to be intended as a textbook. Fatalism, of course, is not apathy. A good illustration of the fact is provided in the observations of missionaries and other commentators on aboriginal Fiji of the submissiveness with which a prisoner might wait his turn to be clubbed and consigned to the oven. The knowledge of no escape and insensitivity to the possibility of escape are clearly to be distinguished.
Correlated with the Fijian's lack of self-assurance in his endeavours to make money 'grow' has been a lack of self-esteem. In the past there was a heavy cultural emphasis on quantity: the qualities of a finely-woven, supple, well-decorated mat might be admired, but a mat did not make a show (nor could it be divided). Prestige came from plenty and from its distribution. A benevolent environment and the customary form of social organisation ensured that both were of regular occurrence. Even the poorest, least imaginative, lowest status man was able to identify with the feast gathered on the village green, no matter how small his own contribution or expected return. But customary procedures were undermined by the intrusion of cash into the economy. Cash remained a scarce resource while at the same time devaluing customary wealth. Having recognised the superiority of the values of a cash-dominated economy, the mass of villagers were obliged also to acknowledge the impoverishment of their society and their own inferior status in the eyes of the outside world.

In MUALEVU, the social significance of the establishment of the Co-operatives was the avenue which they opened up for the mass of the villagers to identify with the cash sector of the economy, to become involved with European values and ways in a manner which was prestigious in terms they understood - an emphasis on quantity and display. While 'old customs' are 'foolish' or 'to be forgotten', scraping around for shillings and
pennies (cents now) is hardly a morale-boosting substitute. Membership of the Co-operative has involved the poorest of the villagers in a flow of cash and cash goods amounting to thousands of dollars a year, sums which are known to have some significance in the European's book. Spate rightly indicated that a major contribution of Co-operation has been as a medium of economic education, but he failed to spell out this social (and psychological) corollary of a degree of self-respect and assurance which Fijians have also derived. For this reason, Spate's criticisms of the priorities of Sukuna's programme for the economic development of rural areas, specifically the emphasis placed on European housing, need some qualification.  

As I have stated in the previous Chapter, the introduction of the cess on copra provided the MUALEVU villagers with an ever-present incentive for combinations that could provide an economy of scale. By linking cess savings with the prospect of European housing, Sukuna

1

The villagers are not simply being traditionalist when they compare unfavourably the tiny one cent piece with the old, British-sized, penny. The former is a new and constant reminder of the insignificance of individual cash earnings.

2

The previous Chapter has indicated that the economic dangers and shortcomings of an emphasis on housing investment, which Spate perceived and warned against (v. Spate: 1959: 28-9), have all too plainly come to be realised. However, I am concerned here with an necessary social and psychological outlook that must be the foundation for any economic progress of the rural Fijian. I would say the local village Co-operatives have been eminently successful in establishing this foundation, while, on the other hand, projects more closely programmed to accepted criteria of economic development have tended to skip it altogether.
presented the villagers with a tangible, uncomplicated return of considerable incentive. The wooden or concrete block house was (and is) one of the more obvious signs of a European way of life, and being expensive it was also an object of considerable prestige: moreover, despite its internal discomfort, it had a solidness and permanence that provided a good return in display value. It was not likely to stop functioning, or sink, or wither away, and as long as it was built with reasonable care (which the expenditure anyhow demanded) it was likely to last a long while. To-day, European housing represents the self-respect of the villagers, an indication that they have been able to acclimatise to new conditions, operate within an alien but superior system of values, and do so with some success. There is no particular individual status to be derived by the owner of a Co-operative house for he has not built it from his own resources, the prestige attached belongs to the Co-operative as a whole and to its members as individuals and indeed to the entire village.

In a sense the Co-operatives have utilised customary techniques of organisation. With cash a scarce resource, the only possibility of a prestigious display of the new wealth is by accumulation. Sukuna's programme provided both the medium of accumulation and an object of display that was most able to capture the villagers' imagination and fire their enthusiasm. But it is an accumulation with a difference from that of the customary sector. European-style houses are not made of gingerbread and sponge sugar; they are, in other words, not to be divided into portions and carted away once they have been erected.

The NUALEVU villager is no fool: he is well
aware that he is contributing materially to prestigious displays, and to the prestige of his society in general, without receiving any immediate material returns for his own benefit (excluding the fortunate minority who obtain a house). But balancing this debit side is the reassurance of being part of an organisation that has relevance to the new values that have entered his life and the satisfaction that the outside world is no longer passing him by. Through his Society he is involved in the rapid social and economic changes that are taking place in his country and involved, at least in his own estimation, to some significant degree.

Clearly the confidence and self-assurance that the Co-operatives have engendered among the villagers stems from the fact that (once given official advice and guidance) they have been successfully established. Though the store may suffer losses and though at times no annual bonus is paid, a Society nevertheless endures. The Societies have become an organised way of life in the village, an institution, because it is difficult for their survival to be threatened by economic reverses. The Burns Report, (Burns:1960:96) refers to the problems of earlier attempts to establish Co-operatives:

There is no need to record at length the difficulties encountered in the attempt to develop co-operatives in Fiji... The important thing to emphasize is that those difficulties spring from the conflict between, on the one hand, an essentially democratic movement in which success is measured by financial solvency and, on the other hand, a hierarchical political and economic system.

In MUALEVU, once the administration had formulated a design which guaranteed the financial solvency of the Co-operatives, the conflict ceased to exist: the weak-
nesses of the customary socio-economic organisation immediately materialised and the latter, disabled, was cast within the gloom of an increasing social and economic irrelevancy.

Financial solvency of the Society, however, was only achieved through individual financial sacrifice by its members. While this was a necessary safeguard for the survival of the Society, it was also made a feasible proposition by the small cash demands to which the individual villager was obliged. The sacrifice was in terms of a potential income not an actual income, the individual suffered no cut in his standard of living. With the increase in the individual's cash needs the words of the Burns Report have gained an ironic twist which most MUALEVU villagers would be able to appreciate in full. The Societies have certainly remained solvent, but their members are increasingly not so. As one member pithily put it: 'The Society is thriving, the members are dying (sa bula na sogoso, sa mata na tamata).'

As cash needs and opportunities proliferate, and with an increased sophistication garnished from their experience, members have begun to desire, and to expect, some return for their continuing sacrifice. 'The Society should help me', is the attitude of the member. It is a reasoned view that the Society is under some obligation to give a return for investment. But the Society still stuck with all the stringent measures for ensuring solvency, is limited in what it can do unless it sacrifices its housing programme, which no member is prepared publicly to propose. But pressure for the Societies to respond is mounting, particularly from the richer members. A few are able to market some of their copra independently
through a son or a father who is a non-member; and
many more talk of dividing their holdings in order to
market the produce of one area through the Co-operative
and the produce of the other independently (the
officials of every Society insisted that such an
arrangement would not be permissible).

Between 1968 and 1969, the new attitude of
members had made sufficient headway for all the
Societies in the District to have passed resolutions
(against the advice of the Department of Co-operatives'
officials) for the provision of financial help to those
of its members who incurred the expenses of a funeral
feast and meal (20 dollars seems to have been made the
standard grant). In a few instances loans were given
to a member (against his annual bonus) to help him
with his children's secondary school education, and in
some Societies, at least, it seems likely in the near
future educational expenses would also attract a grant.
But while the Co-operatives are now beginning to fulfil
some of the distributive, as well as the accumulative,
functions of the customary form of organisation, they
still do not operate according to that basic premise
of economic incentive, a return proportionate to
investment. The poor and the lazy of course benefit;
the more wealthy and go-ahead members are now increasingly anxious to combine their membership with a greater
economic freedom.¹

¹ For example, in 1969, the Tui Boitaci, who has easily
the largest coconut groves in his village (and also
possesses a large wooden Society house), informed his
fellow members that unless he was given the job of
storeman he would be obliged to leave the Society and
market his copra independently in order to raise funds
for his children's secondary school education.
Silsoe's remark (1963:39): 'The formation of a co-operative seems to suit Fijians so well that it should be operated over all groves' (my italics), seems ominously close to an earlier naivete of the 'natural' suitability of Co-operatives to non-industrialised societies. Yet he was correct in his observation as the extensive adoption of Co-operatives in Lau bears out. But Silsoe (who was conducting an official survey of the Fiji coconut industry) was concerned exclusively with means of improving copra production. His focus was upon the better quality and increased production of copra accomplished by the Co-operatives, and not upon how the Co-operatives operated and the nature of their appeal to the villager.

His assumption was that because Co-operatives, 'suited' Fijians in 1963, they would go on suiting them. This was a simplistic approach that was a dangerous encouragement of unilateral action by an enthusiastic government to impose Co-operation upon rural Fijians, without the necessity of seeking to understand why the Co-operatives were suitable - that they were successful was enough.

In the event, the Co-operatives are now seen by the government as the only suitable vehicle for the economic advancement of the coconut villages. Un fortunately for the villagers, officialdom is not willing to credit

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1 For example, capital loans which it is intended will be made available to villagers through the newly established Fijian Development Bank, are to be issued (at least in Lau) through Co-operative societies which will then assume sole responsibility for them. Thus an applicant will not only be obliged to be (or become) a member of his local Co-operative, but also he will have to market his produce through the Co-operative.
them with the ability or the desire to make any further advancement on what they have already achieved. Having provided the villager with an initial education, sound and sure enough for him to use it as a base for forays deeper into the territory of the cash sector, the teacher has changed the textbook and is demanding the students should either forget what they have learned or at least not put it to any use. The new textbook bears a disturbing resemblance to an older, discredited one, though its dustjacket seems attractive and à la mode enough to the casual observer.

In the official emphasis on Co-operatives as the medium of economic development, there appears to inhere a marked unwillingness to initiate or encourage the emergence of individual interests for fear of weakening the economic hold that Co-operation possesses over the villages. Co-operation has become an end in itself at the same time that, in its present form, it is ceasing to provide for the new needs of the villagers. The local Society, supposedly the agent of its members, has become in reality the principal, to which the economic interests of the individual members are now being subordinated. In MUALEVU, to-day, Co-operation seems designed not for the further economic advancement of the area, stressing incentive and initiative, encouraging the individual example, providing a return equal to effort, but rather to keep the villagers entwined in a new, more up-to-date web of control exercised by the administration.

It is sadly ironic that the Co-operatives, which achieved so admirably that difficult, initial task of acclimatising the villager to an alien environment, should
now have earned the description of 'compound' or 'enclosure' with the same implications with which the old communal system was vested when it was referred to as a 'prison', that is a means of confinement, of curbing freedom. But the words of the Burns Commission (v. supra) echo even more ironically as the MUALEVU villagers seem in the process of exchanging their old socio-economic imprisonment of the communal system for a new, more straightforwardly economic one. Each member of a MUALEVU Co-operative is now at the base of a pyramidal structure of ever more inclusive Co-operative associations, the equal of any chiefly, hierarchical system of the past. And, as in the past, the orders come from the top and those at the other end are expected to follow them. 'Democracy', where Fijian Co-operation is concerned, stretches only to the bounds of the local Society. There is no better illustration of this guise of old attitudes in new form than the policies and procedures spawned by the recently established (1966) Maritime Shipping Co-operative Association (for details v. Appendix 3), which threaten to set for Co-operation in Fiji a precedent for what is little less than administrative exploitation of the villagers' resources.

1 At the macrocosmic level the Co-operatives structure may be seen in a different character by the outside observer. Couper (1967:206), for example, saw the establishment of a wholesale Co-operative on a Fiji-wide basis as the 'countervailing power' against the highly integrated companies that the Burns Commission had called for (v. Burns:1960:95).
The great danger in the present emphasis of policy on Co-operatives is not the brake on economic progress, which by forcing hare and tortoise to continue in their three-legged race is bound to occur. It is the very real possibility that the Co-operatives, as a meaningful form of social organisation, at the best will rapidly acquire the same kind of irrelevancy which the customary social organisation presently exhibits, and at the worst will totally disintegrate. Either way the villager will lose a medium of social articulation which has been able successfully to perpetuate the mystique of village life while familiarising the villagers with the contractual conventions of a commercial world, and which with some care in adaption could continue to do so. When a villager dismisses Suva and all its attractions with the comment: 'In Suva you need money or you die. Here in the village you don't have to have money', he does not intend to be taken literally. He is well aware, and everyone else is well aware, that to survive in the village you need money. What he is saying is that his village is for him the most pleasant place in which to live. And though the objective often appears to be lost sight of, that is what economic progress is supposed to be about, making life more pleasant to live.
Plato XI

1. Receiving a lava

2. Kava-drinking prior to the division of the feast
Plate XII

1. The accumulated feast

2. The division

3. The Chief's share
Plate XIII

1. A Laman Feast in Siva, part of the accumulated feast ...

2. ... and one of the divisions
1. Yam First Fruits presented to the Wesleyan Church, Maleva village

2. Decline of taro cultivation - an unused taro area, Maleva village
Plate XV

1. Poor man, chief

2. Rich men, commoners
Plate XVI

1. A Chieftain's house (for dry weather only)

2. A commoner's house (double-storey with electric lighting)
Plate XVI

1. A carpenter...

2. ... and his chiefly labourer
Plate XVIII

1. Fashioning an iron roof to a traditional shape, Mualevu village

2. Building a concrete-block house, Tikobia village
Plate XIX

1.

2.

3.

House styles, Malev1 village
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I

The MUALEVU System of Kinship

In his paper on Fijian kinship and marriage, Dr Nayacakalou states an initial though not large qualification: 'Fijian kinship terminology' he asserts, 'varies considerably with locality; but the basic principles underlying the kinship structure vary in comparatively small degree' (FSKM:44). He footnotes reference to other published material on Fijian kinship without stating or implying that the information to be found there might prove contradictory to the results of his own structural analysis which he then proceeds with. The title of his paper is unequivocally: 'The Fijian System of Kinship and Marriage'.

I am not endeavoursing any headlong opposition to Nayacakalou's analysis of his material (and experience). My quarrel is with the statement that the basic principles of the structure 'vary in comparatively small degree' (ibid) (my italics) and the accompanying assertion that there is a single system of kinship and marriage in Fiji. And this is, indeed, an assertion, for he gives no indication of the yardstick he employs in determining that variation is small enough to warrant such a claim. It is a fair example of that unscientific method that establishes peripheral lay-bys to accommodate facts anomalous to the generalisation or theory in hand, and which then proceeds to label such facts inconsequential because they are peripheral. It is

1 Nayacakalou:1955: The Fijian System of Kinship and Marriage, JPS vol.64, no.1. Here on referred to as 'FSKM'.
not that there are no previous published grounds of disagreement with the assertion that Nayacakalou is making. Rivers (1914:262-297), Fison (v. Stern:1930:420-1) and Hocart (1952:passim) have provided evidences of systems that would not appear to reflect the analysis Nayacakalou offers. Furthermore, the data provided by Rivers and Fison together with details of other 'variations' based on their own fieldwork were collated and published by Capell & Lester (1945, 1946a, b, c). While it is true that the major ethnographies on Fiji, Hocart (1929), Thompson (1940), Quain (1948), Geddes (1945), Sahlins (1962), support Nayacakalou's analysis\(^1\), this is hardly reason for ignoring those works that do not. There is one reference to Capell & Lester's findings, in a footnote on page one: "While my treatment of the subject is different\(^2\) and based upon direct study, I am grateful to these authors for increasing my insight into the system as a whole" (FSKM:44). Yet throughout the paper there is not one allusion to the extent of variation of the systems that Capell & Lester describe.

The implication of Nayacakalou's remark about 'direct study' is presumably that Capell & Lester were never in the position to observe the operation of the 'variant' systems which they were recording (in the field). My own fieldwork in MUALEVU did place me in this position for the MUALEVU terminological system and marriage rule appear to have much in common with at least some of the 'variant' systems described by Capell & Lester, and by Hocart (1952). Details provided by Cakaudrove informants

\(^1\) Though I am not so sure about Geddes (1945) whose data are limited.

\(^2\) A reference to the linguistic analysis on which Capell & Lester based their interpretations.
Map A1.1. The Fiji Islands
resident in MUALEVU make it clear that MUALEVU and Cakaudrove share the same system, though there are some differences with the Cakaudrove data recorded by Hocart (1952:106-8) about the year 1910.

I should add that the only mention of the MUALEVU kinship system that I know of in the literature is a one-line reference by Laura Thompson (1940:58). 'It is reported that the Tongan system of making no distinction between parallel and cross-cousins of opposite sexes is found upon Vanua Balavu'.

Nayacakalou uses as a specific referent for the purpose of his analysis his home village of Tokatoka in Tailevu Province, Viti Levu. Here, as he states, he is 'one of the persons who sustain its kinship system'. (Of the other authors on Fijian kinship he has footnoted, Quain's fieldwork was inland in western Vanua Levu, Geddes' was at Deuba, a village close to the coast in southern Viti Levu, while Capell & Lester made a detailed survey purporting to cover the whole of the Group.) The Tokatoka kinship system is of the type known as Dravidian. Since Nayacakalou's analysis, which I summarise, is a lucid explanation of the operation of this type of system I will avoid repetition by not giving a separate explanation of it.

The purpose of my own analysis is to show that the 'variation' in the MUALEVU system of kinship and marriage is of a degree that evades any attempt to impose

1 Lorimer Fison says of Tonga that actual cross-cousins are distinguished from parallel-cousins but more distant cousins are not (Morgan:1871:579). Thompson's comment, however, is in line with Gifford's data on the Tongan kinship system (Gifford:1929:27-9).

2 Quain's area will be referred to as Nakoroka.
on its data the analytic scheme that Nayacakalou proposes is common to all Fiji. It has already been demonstrated in chapters 5, 6 and 7 that a low status of women and an ideology and application of patrilineal descent as excluding principles in the determination of local descent group membership, which for Nayacakalou are essential social correlates of the Tokatoka (and 'Fijian') kinship structure, are not relevant to MUALEVU. I therefore concern myself here with showing the absence in MUALEVU of the Tokatoka type lineal/cross classification of kin and its replacement by a concept of relative kin distance. I have added a concluding section in which I stalk the problem of the identification of the MUALEVU system, whether or not it is a development of the Tokatoka type (Dravidian) system.

II

Summary of Nayacakalou's analysis

Nayacakalou isolates 'two fundamental unifying principles within the total kinship structure' (p.46). (All page references in this sub-section are to FSKM). The first, common descent, binding together the members of the lineage group: 'Membership of this group is automatically determined by the principle of patrilineal descent... children must, obviously, belong to the group of their own fathers.' The second is common parentage binding together the members of a sibling group and which by extension enables all members of a generation within a lineage group to be classified as siblings. He further isolates 'certain principles of differentiation within the system', viz. generation and sex (e.g. in the lineage group all male members of the first ascending generation are fathers, females are fathers' sisters).
Siblings are distinguished by age and sex. And he remarks on the importance of age and sex for seniority and leadership within the sibling group, adding:

The fact that there is no term to express age distinctions between siblings of opposite sex may be correlated (although no causative relation is necessarily implied) with the social fact that age distinctions are important only between siblings of the same sex. (p.47)

For this reason, he explains,

The female members of the sibling group need not come into consideration of seniority at all, as they will sooner or later all marry outside the lineage group, and their children will be classified for seniority in their own patrilineage. Over and above that, women are considered socially inferior to men in Fiji, and any claim they might have had to seniority on the basis of age is thus automatically shelved. This leaves seniority a matter entirely for the male sibling group only, with few, if any, exceptions. (ibid)

The internal structure of the sibling group is governed by Radcliffe-Brown's principle of the unity of the sibling group, though modified in that it covers siblings of the same sex only (e.g. FZ falls into a different kinship category to F and FB, similarly MB ≠ M, MZ). Sex distinction within the sibling group is 'the most fundamental cleavage in the Fijian kinship structure' (p.48). It affects that structure by 'reacting upon lineage unity in the first descending generation' (p.49). He relates this action to the brother-sister taboo:

Even the suggestion that the children of a man are veitatacini or classificatory siblings with his sister's children is regarded as putting the man and his sister in the category of spouses, and is an insult to the brother-sister taboo. Hence the children of two persons who stand in the relationship of brother and sister to one another must never be ranked as classificatory siblings; but must be separately
aligned as cross-cousins or veitavaleni. This relationship is at the root of a major cleavage in lineage procreation...

(A cross-parent - opposite-sex sibling of Pro's parent - is the parent of a cross-cousin.

The cross-parent, cross-cousins and cross-children of an individual constitute to him a linear unity similar to that of the lineage group. The children of a cross-parent are always cross-cousins; the children of a cross-cousin of the same sex are always cross-children; one's own children are cross-cousins to one's cross-children, and so on down through the generations. (p.50)

Thus two major types of relatives are distinguished: 'lineal' and 'cross', and this is the basis of determining marriageable relationships within the kinship structure. Marriage is with cross-cousins and this is the only permitted type of marriage between genealogically related persons. (p.51)

Whether they are cross-siblings or cross-cousins depends primarily upon the relevant relationships in the first ascending generation. Thus if they are respectively descended from two parents who are siblings of the same sex, real or classificatory, or from parents who are cross-cousins of opposite sex, they are classificatory siblings. If, on the other hand, they are respectively descended from two parents who are cross-siblings, real or classificatory, or who are cross-cousins of the same sex, they are cross-cousins and are therefore marriageable. The relationships in the parental generation will of course, depend in turn upon the relevant relationships in the second ascending generation, and so on ad infinitum. (p.52)

Comparison of MUALEVU and Tokatoka Kinship Systems

Nayacakalou's demonstration of the operation of the kinship and marriage system in Tokatoka,
certainly holds for Nakoroka (Quain), for Moala (Sahlins),
for central Lau (Hocart) and southern Lau (Thompson), with
the qualification that there is a tabu on first cross-
cousin marriage in Moala, while in Quain's area such a
marriage was a prerogative of chiefly persons and even
when of rare occurrence. In both these areas, however,
cross second-cousin marriage is acceptable. In MUALEVU
(far, Cakau, Lovalu) not only are these types of cross-cousin
and cross second-cousin marriages tabu, but the relationship
categories are not treated as cross.

The set of kinship terms in usage in MUALEVU

The English term 'second cousin' is clearly ambiguous
when dealing with distinctions of parallel and cross
(v. accompanying diagram) and its use by Capell & Lester
(1942), and others is confusing. Furthermore, in the present
context of examining the MUALEVU system in terms of the
Dravidian type, Tokatoka system, it is convenient to
distinguish types of cross-cousin (according to the
relationship in the first ascending generation) that are
found in the latter (v. 'A' and 'B' in diagram).

![Diagram]

The usage I introduce I shall confine to second cousins
to avoid confusion, but I believe it could be easily and
logically extended. Second cousins the children of
opposite sex classificatory siblings will be termed cross
second-cousins ('A' in diagram); second cousins the
children of same sex cross-cousins will be termed second
cross-cousins. Cross-cousin in the MUALEVU context will
refer to actual cross-cousin.
is very similar to those of Tokatoka and the other areas of Fiji already mentioned. I list them below comparing references in MUALEVU and in Tokatoka (v. Tables 1 and 2).

It is obvious from the Tables that the clear-cut and formal division into 'lineal' and 'cross' relatives which the Tokatoka (Dravidian type) system effects is not operative in MUALEVU.

The absence of this lineal/cross division may be plainly seen in reproducing Nayacakalou's Table IV (FSKM: 53) that illustrates 'the manner in which the sex principle operates on succeeding generations to determine kinship relationships, and hence marriageability...' and comparing the appropriate MUALEVU relationships (v. Diagram 1).

Diagram 1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>MUAEVU and Fagasa Ancestral Kinship Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Note:</em> The MUAEVU terms are retained in the table. The Fagasa terms are provided for comparison. All terms are based on the maternal line.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MUAEVU Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kinship Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Togaliede</td>
<td>Male grandparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-grandparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-granduncle/great-grandaunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-grandcousin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-great-grandparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-great-granduncle/great-great-grandaunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-great-grandcousin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-great-great-grandparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-great-great-granduncle/great-great-great-grandaunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-great-great-grandcousin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaliede</td>
<td>Male great-great-great-great-grandparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-great-great-great-granduncle/great-great-great-great-grandaunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-great-great-great-grandcousin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Fagasa Ancestral Kinship Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kinship Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Togaliede</td>
<td>Male grandparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-grandparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-granduncle/great-grandaunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-grandcousin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-great-grandparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-great-granduncle/great-great-grandaunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-great-grandcousin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-great-great-grandparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-great-great-granduncle/great-great-great-grandaunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-great-great-grandcousin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaliede</td>
<td>Male great-great-great-great-grandparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-great-great-great-granduncle/great-great-great-great-grandaunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togaligoliday</td>
<td>Male great-great-great-great-grandcousin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### Introduction

- The MUAEVU terms are retained in the table. The Fagasa terms are provided for comparison. All terms are based on the maternal line.

### Key Terms

- **Mutual relationships:** Where both male and female kinship terms are used interchangeably.
- **Opposite sex:** Kinship terms that have a direct opposite in both male and female lines.
- **Cross-cousin:** Kinship terms that refer to kinship relationships across generations and lines. For example, a male cousin in one line is a female cousin in another line.

---

### Examples

- **Mutual relationships:** Fagasa uses direct opposite sex terms, whereas MUAEVU terms are gender-specific.
- **Opposite sex:** Fagasa terms like *tugaliede* (male grandparent) have a direct opposite in MUAEVU terms.
- **Cross-cousin:** Terms like *tugaligoliday* (male great-granduncle/great-grandaunt) refer to kinship relationships across generations and lines.

---

### References

- [MUAEVU](#) | Applied as the opposite sex equivalent for Fagasa terms. |
The text appears to be discussing Tokelauic terms and relationships, with a table comparing terms and their meanings. The text contains a mix of English and Tokelauic language and includes a table with entries such as:

**Table 1: Tokelauic Terms and Their Meanings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference Term</th>
<th>Mutual Term</th>
<th>Tokelauic Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vatina</td>
<td>valwati</td>
<td>Spouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baiwana</td>
<td></td>
<td>HZ, NZ, (ve)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daku</td>
<td>valakapu</td>
<td>Spouse's same sex sibling, same sex sibling's spouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavale</td>
<td>valayale</td>
<td>VB, ZH, (ve)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerapan</td>
<td>valakapu</td>
<td>Spouse's same sex sibling's spouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vagana</td>
<td>valvagani</td>
<td>Spouse's parents, child's spouse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. The third person singular form is given, indicated by the suffix -ve.
3. The term is modified for higher generations. Thus, lekefa is valayale (valakape) + grandchild.
4. The titles 've' and 've' are commonly used.
5. 'Ve' and 've' are used to indicate the relationship.
6. Excluding from calculation those female links generically opposite e.g., NFZC would include only one "intervening female link.
7. Informants seem often to apply the term in the case of opposite sex relationships, where there occur no "male" links (the person concerned are not valakape, valayale, etc.
8. As in the case of sex, sometimes referred to as "vagana.
9. Inconsistencies a speaker may correct his statement, but is unlikely to say that "vagana" and "vagana" are the same.

---

The text also contains a table with entries such as:

**Table 2: Tokelauic and Tokelauic Terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference Term</th>
<th>Address Term</th>
<th>Mutual Term</th>
<th>Tokelauic Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vatina</td>
<td>valwati</td>
<td>Spouse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baiwana</td>
<td></td>
<td>HZ, NZ, (ve)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daku</td>
<td>valakapu</td>
<td>Spouse's same sex sibling, same sex sibling's spouse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavale</td>
<td>valayale</td>
<td>VB, ZH, (ve)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerapan</td>
<td>valakapu</td>
<td>Spouse's same sex sibling's spouse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vagana</td>
<td>valvagani</td>
<td>Spouse's parents, child's spouse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

The text contains several other notes and explanations, such as:

- The use of 've' and 've' to indicate relationships.
- The inclusion of 've' and 've' in the Tokelauic context to denote degree of relationship.
- Sometimes a person is called 've' or 've'. Furthermore, 'grandchildren' are often referred to the same term.
- Excluding from calculation those female links generically opposite, e.g., NFZC would include only one "intervening female link.
- Informants seem often to apply the term in the case of opposite sex relationships, where there occur no "male" links (the person concerned are not valakape, valayale, etc.
- As in the case of sex, sometimes referred to as "vagana.
- Inconsistencies a speaker may correct his statement, but is unlikely to say that "vagana" and "vagana" are the same.
Yet, in MUALEVU, non-marriageable and marriageable (avunculate) women are designated by the linear and cross terms applied in Tokatoka. The cross-linear dichotomy is apparent, and the marriageable/non-marriageable categorisation of young generation females is not that of parallel cousin/cross-cousin, then how does the MUALEVU system operate? What are the rules? The key to the questions lies in the frequently expressed notion of the village and its kinship; the topic of marriage that should 'retain' (preserve) kinship, maroroya na veiwekani. This is achieved by not marrying, or by not permitting children to marry, with the kin one wants to 'retain'.

'Veiwekani' is a generic term for kin, covering all related persons, but it may also be used on its own to indicate (context understood) a particular inclusive degree of kinship. For instance, I have heard it used in reference to the rauvuvu (v. supra p.178). On the other hand, it may be used to emphasise a very close kin relationship. When it is qualified, it can be used to pinpoint that distance. The term is the 'mutual' form of weka (this is the root without the suffixed personal pronoun), meaning 'sister', 'as a sister'. What is pertinent here is the fact that veiwekani can be qualified, that the MUALEVU villager is interested in expressing degrees of kinship distance.

The primary sub-division of kin-distance made in MUALEVU is between 'near kin', veiwekani veivolekati (= 'kin close to each other') and 'distant kin', veiwekani veivawakici (= 'kin distant from each other'). Marriage with 'near kin' is tabu, marriage with distant kin is 'easy'. To marry near kin, and those 'marriages' occasionally do take place, carries the implication that kinship in the parental generation is not 'near', that is relations (social, in this context) are distant enough for the obligations of
It will even appear in an individual’s reference, on separate occasions, to a single relationship. When inconsistency is pointed out villagers will often explain it in terms of outside influence, the effects of which are readily acknowledged in the village. There is, for example, a high degree of consistency in applying a sibling term to the cross-cousin, but some younger men who have spent time away from the village (generally wage-labouring in Viti Levu) may sometimes use the term.

There was, in fact, one case I came across of inconsistency in a lineally determined relationship. This was of a young boy, about eight years old, who called his parents by grandparental terms of address. This came about (so I was told) through his constant companionship with the children of his eldest brother. He picked up their mode of address to his own parents. His parents are rather amused by it. They say they will correct him when he gets older.
veitavaledi. Nevertheless they continue to refer to cross cousins as velivekani, no contradiction being necessary involved since the latter term can be employed in the more inclusive sense (v. Table 4). Moreover, there is not an attempt to transcend the strong social tabu on the female cross-cousin relationship or use tavaledi as a name or address to a male cross-cousin (as it may be used towards a brother-in-law). In cases involving the cross-parent/cross-child relationship, villagers may refuse to countenance they are being inconsistent and assert that, my child (luveku) and, my nephew (luegug). On mother (gana) and 'aunt' (nei) may be used indifferently that the terms are synonymous. Despite these inconsistencies perhaps even more so because of them, the MUALEVU system of kinship and marriage is a far cry from that of Tokatoka and from Nayacakalou's pronouncement that even to suggest the children of a man and of his sister be referred to as 'classificatory siblings' is an insult to the brother- sister tabu.

Clearly, in MUALEVU, actual cross-cousins are non-marriageable. This also holds for Moala (Sahlins:1962:160) but otherwise Moala follows Tokatoka custom and maintains the cross/lineal opposition in the terminology. That is, it applies a cross term and not a sibling term to the cross-cousin relationship. In Quain's area, as mentioned above, first cross-cousins marriage was permitted only to chiefs. A compounded lineal-cross type of term is applied there, which Quain translates sister-cousin.¹ (Quain:1948:268). This compound term, I imagine, is the same as that used in MUALEVU to refer to the mutual relationship of the children of opposite sex cross-cousins.

¹ Quain does not give the Fijian term.
in such relationship in MUALEVU may be referred to as mata ni weiwatini, and marriage is permitted. There is no 
agreement on that such a marriage should be admitted to 
chiefs' circles, in fact chiefs informants suggest that it 
be commoners if anyone who practises such marriage, but 
though an easy going social relationship is not frowned 
upon, marriage is not favoured within the community. 
People say 'the kinship is too close'. Why then the special 
term mata ni weiwatini?

The referent of 'mata' as a category or group, 
or an individual representative of a category or group, 
has already been discussed (v. supra, p. 11). 'Veiwatini' 
is the mutual form of 'vate' and indicates the relation-
ship of 'spouse to each other'. Quain's literal 
translation of the phrase comes out as: 'face of marriage', 
but he gives no reason for this particular translation. 
A more exact and meaningful translation, though not so 
exact a one as Quain's, would be: 'Representatives of a 
category (of kin) characterised by intermarriage' - in 
the sense that two categories of kin, who intermarry would 
form a single category of 'intermarrying kin'. There is 
certainly a distinct connotation of a preferred marriage 
category and yet in MUALEVU usage this is far from 
being its reference.

The MUALEVU villagers affirm, though I know of

1. There is no separate opposite sex equivalent of this 
term.

2. Quain mentions coming across this term which he reckons 
originated in eastern Vanua Levu, where, he claims, it 
denotes a 'group from which a preferred wife is selected' 
(p. 273).

3. Quain defines it as a preferred marriage group.
In the actual case, that if a man cannot find a wife then
(with the suggestion of a last resort), his parents, can
approach the parents of his mata ni veiwatini partner and
demand her as spouse for their son. This request from
close kin the parents of the girl cannot refuse to consider.
Any request from close kin is the same, whether male or
female on the person requested. In this case the request
is particularly heavy since in agenest this is the ultimate
request for consent entails breaking the MUALEBU commandment
that kinship should be preserved; that is marriage within kins
should be avoided. Without exception, however, the villagers stress
that marriage of mata ni veiwatini is "difficult", though
they are no longer close kinship yet exists.

Veikekami tuko ga. It is in the generation after mata ni
veiwatini that marriage is "easy" and encouraged. Kinship
still exists in the parental generations, but it is no longer a thing of importance, obligations are not felt, kinship is distant.

Where the children of opposite sex cross-cousins
are of the same sex their own children are regarded as,
being in a close enough kin relationship for marriage to
be discouraged, but beyond this generation no formal rule
necessarily governs marriageability. The passage of
generations, attenuates the ties and feelings of kinship.
The MUALEBU people do not retain long genealogies, rarely.

1 These days, say the villagers, it is the girl who has
the final say.

2 The social relationship between mata ni veiwatini is
uninhibited, but I was not able to discover whether there
was any idea of the man possessing rights of sexual access
to the woman as has been described for cross-cousins in
parts of Fiji. Rivers, for example, remarks that such
rights were often used as a court defence in cases of
rape (p. 296).
Remembering further back than paternal grandfather, or great grandfather, and therefore rely on knowledge of kinship transmitted from one generation to another? Where two persons who are not close kin genealogically, have lost sight of the genealogical path between them, they are likely, though not necessarily, to be less concerned with kinship obligations and less concerned about their children marrying. The villagers state that this 'break-off' point is at the fifth or sixth (descending) generation from a common ancestor.

This introduces an element of personal choice in how a particular relationship is to be determined which is not the same in the Tokatoka system where recourse may be had to tracing an alternative genealogical path by the method of classificatory extension. Nor does the action of this personal choice necessarily result in confusion of terminology, since the commonest way to refer to kin is by use of the term veliwekani, and kin who are closer laterally may be justified as more distant generationally. Contradictions and of confusion generally occur when the question is asked 'What category of relationship are these people to each other?' (vaičavani = lit. 'what to each other?') rather than enquiring of the degree of kinship.

But here is the crux of the issue, of the comparison between the MULEBU and Tokatoka systems. The MULEBU data refuse to fit into the Dravidian scheme, and I use this term in order to differentiate and oppose distance determined solely by the number of intervening female links in the genealogical path with a concept of distance relating to the number of generations covered by that path. It is, perhaps not a very satisfactory usage, but a more appropriate term does not occur to me at the moment.
this, I think, is amply demonstrated in Table 1. Instead of the sharp demarcation outlined by Nayacakalou for Tokatoka with an individual’s ‘cross-relatives’ constituting to him a ‘lineal unity-similar to that of the lineage group’ (FSKM:50), differentiation of kin in MVALEVU is based upon a concept of kin distance, with marriageability a function of that distance.

The villagers’ concept of kin distance, and the manner in which this operates the marriage rule, I have endeavoured to express in Diagram 2. Kin distance can be calculated from the number of female links in the genealogical path relating two persons, although excluding from the calculation those females generationally opposite (e.g. sisters). The husbands of these women are described and described themselves as being ‘like close kin’, and a close kin term veikaruahi (karua) is applied to them. For the benefit of the formal consistency of the rule for calculating kin distance one can say that generationally opposite females should be treated as generationally opposite males, but I will treat more fully of this case in the next paragraph. Where persons are distant kin, veiyawaki, a villager will allude explicitly to such calculation: ‘Raica, Pita na velewa, see here how many women there are’. Where there is considerable generational depth involved in a relationship, this may be referred to in classifying (and generally in the context of justifying) middle distance kin as distant kin – where kinship, but not close kinship, still exists.

The fact that there is excluded from the calculation of kinship distance those female links which
**Diagram 2: Marriageability and Lateral Kinship Distance in MUALEVU**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MUALEVU term expressing degree of kinship distance</th>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Marriageability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MUALEVU terms of reference</td>
<td>English translation</td>
<td>Closest genealogical relationship (m/s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veivekani dina sara</td>
<td>Most true kin (Immediate kin)</td>
<td>Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veivekani dina</td>
<td>True kin (Immediate kin &amp; 1st cousins)</td>
<td>e.g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veivekani</td>
<td>Kin</td>
<td>e.g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veivekani tiko ga</td>
<td>Kinship still exists</td>
<td>e.g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Veivekani) veiyavači</td>
<td>Distant kin</td>
<td>e.g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yulagi</td>
<td>Strangers</td>
<td>e.g.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Closest kin** (veivekani veivolekati)
  - No more than one female link
  - Two female links
  - More than two female links

- **Non-kin**
  - Kinship still exists
  - Strangers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village of origin</th>
<th>Origin of spouse</th>
<th>Same clan village</th>
<th>MAILEVU District</th>
<th>Exploring Group</th>
<th>Lau</th>
<th>Fij</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mualevu</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avea</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaka</td>
<td></td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boitacir</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muamua</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mavaka</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dacicor</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cikobia</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Marriages by Village, Showing Distribution of Place of Origin of Spouse.

1. Repetitions have been eliminated from the figures in these columns. Except for column 4 (MAILEVU District) all columns are mutually exclusive.
2. The island of Tuyoqa is included.
3. This refers to the administrative Province of Lau and so includes the Moala Group of islands.
4. This is an ethnic category referring to non-Fijians.
have termed 'generationally opposite' is an indication from a formal point of view that sexual differentiation (or non-differentiation) of kin in the parental generation is structurally active in determining the relationship of children. But it is so within limitations imposed by the MUALEVU concept of kinship distance. It is clear that this sexual differentiation cannot have the pervasive significance it possesses in a Dravidian ordered society since the MUALEVU distinction of sex of siblings does not divide society into the quasi two-section system effected by the Dravidian.

In MUALEVU, only where related parents are middle-distance kin is sex a variable in determining the kinship relationship at the next generation. Even where it is of limited effect for beyond a depth of five or six generations, kin ties of middle-distance kin tend to become weakened and children of same sex middle-distance kin may classify themselves as distant kin. In the case of more distant, cognate lines, the MUALEVU preference for patrilocality and the extensive circle of kin with whom marriage is tabooed means these lines become spatially distant, i.e., which when in harness with great generational depth will accentuate the tenuousness that comes to kin ties. This is not to say that the ties are forgotten. They are always carefully conserved, they are the villager's social investment; his caravanserai in foreign places. But the nature of the ties is lost. A person is kin with another 'because of my father/mother', and this suffices. As far as the field situation is concerned, it means two persons are rarely found in a kin relationship where the total number of female links (including opposite) exceeds five or six. The odds are 1. such persons are not co-resident in MUALEVU; ii. if they are, the genealogical details of the relationship are anyhow lost; iii. there is a closer and shorter, alternate genealogical relationship which is preferred.
As endorsement of Diagram 2 a marriage rule\(^1\) can be written. Preferred marriage is with distant kin or non-kin. Marriage is acceptable with middle-distance kin where parents are of opposite sex; beyond a genealogical depth of five or six generations this may be extended to middle-distance kin of same sex parents. Note: inter-generational marriages are prohibited.\(^2\)

MUALEVU villagers often express a correlation of kinship distance and marriageability by a metaphorical usage. It is a usage found in other parts of Fiji referred to in this paper, and a comparison reiterates the distinctive interpretation placed in MUALEVU on 'retaining one's kin'.

Though Nayacakalou makes no reference to it for Tokatoka, both Quain and Sahlins make it apparent that the peoples they were studying expressed concern for the 'blood', dra, of descent. Moreover in both Nakoroka and Moala there is concern that the blood of descent is not, so to speak, diluted by marriage. Sahlins explains:

A man's sister gives his 'blood' (dra), his 'descent' (kawa), to her children. A man's father's sister carries his 'blood' also, and gives it to her children. A man, again, carries the 'blood' of his mother's brother, carries the 'descent' (kawa) of that man through his own mother. 'My sister's son', said Taka of Kateira, 'is very "serious" (dradre). It is my blood; my sister went to give rise to that.

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1 From the villagers' point of view, more a 'guide' than a 'rule': a guide to social acceptability with varying degrees of social reaction and censure according to the degree of transgression deemed. The appeal of transgression as a line of action will in most cases relate inversely to the social censure it will arouse. The latter itself will vary as social organisational changes affect the consequences of marriage as an institution.

2 An alternative genealogical path will be traced by potential spouses who are in an otherwise inter-generational relationship.
Sexual intercourse with own cross-cousins is not condoned and is considered 'vakasesekawa' ('confusing descent') by many, but 'Childhood betrothal of the offspring of men standing as cross-cousins is said to have been common in the old days, and it is occasionally followed today. In this way alliances between particular families may be maintained for generations' (ibid). At Nakoroka, the preferred commoner marriage is the one that will 'keep the blood from scattering' (Quain:273). For chiefs there is ancestral approval for marriage with the first cross cousin, a marriage which will 'bind the blood together' (ibid). Hocart writes that in Lakeba the descendants of a chief may marry one another 'if they are distantly related according to Lauan custom. An informant says, 

The nobles decided to confound the descent (vakasese kawa) that nobles may arise. Common people cannot confound the descent, but can marry for love. That will be their own concern; they marry in their wilfulness, because they like one another, but they do not tell the folk, but it is known that they are brother and sister. (1929:34)

Lakeba follows Moala practice of marriage alliances: 'Once two families have intermarried there is a tendency to continue the practice generation after generation' (ibid).1

In MUALEVU, too, there is concern with the blood of descent, but the concern takes a decidedly different form to that expressed in the areas mentioned above, though it starts with the same premise. Marriage with close kin; it is asserted, will cause the founder-line to go astray.

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1 He states that it 'does apparently occur'. (ibid:160)
2 'Marriage occurs even between first cousins'. (ibid)
be confused, vakasese na kawa. Because of this close kin should marry (with non-close kin) in order to weaken, not strengthen the blood of kinship, in order to scatter the blood, not prevent it from scattering. The eldest son of a former traditional Chief of Mualevu village told me:

Chiefs marry with care, as they please (vakaveitalia). When the blood is becoming watery then is the time to thicken it again. But this is only after several generations and then another generation. Only after a long time is it then possible.

This idea of 'watering down the blood', finally to thicken it again, is one which is expressed by any villager, chiefly or commoner, when talking on the subject of kinship and marriage. A 'kin marriage' ties together, buki, the blood of common stock. This then thickens, sosoko, restores in fuller measure, the original blood of the founder-line in the progeny of the marriage. Marriage in the immediate descending generations is not now possible because the founder-line blood is too thick. A man's (e.g.) sister, sister's children, father sister's children (cf. Sahlins' comment) are 'forbidden blood', dra taku. Only when the blood has become diluted, wai cala, by marriage elsewhere over the generations is marriage again possible and indeed desirable.

This reference to the blood of kinship is often coupled with that of the 'strength' of kinship. Marriage of close kin would '(over-)strengthen kinship', vakukauwataka na veiwekani, since 'blood together still remains', dra vata sa tiko sa mai.1 Alternatively a person may be described as having lost (kinship) 'strength'.

1 This reference to the persistence of 'common blood' is often made to emphasise that the relationship of mata ni veiwatini is really too close for marriage.
Thus in the relationship represented in the diagram opposite, the young boy 'V' calls the man 'K', father, but K 'counts, willi, totally with his father'. He is small here; the strength (kaukauwa) of his kinship with 'V' is finished.

Diagram 3.

Can the MUALEVU kinship system be regarded as a variant form of the Dravidian? The evidence, historical and contemporary, suggests it cannot. The historical evidence is admittedly scanty and circumstantial with no direct reference to MUALEVU, but it is supported by Capell & Lester's linguistic analysis. The latter is concerned to show that much of Fiji was originally an area of 'second cousin' rather than cross-cousin marriage rule. Cross-cousin marriage, they state, has only more recently spread in the wake of the political expansion of the peoples of south-east Viti Levu (they include Tokatoka) and even later as a result of the wide diffusion of their culture which the colonial authorities have held up as the

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1 That is the strength, not kinship as such, was finished. Though 'V' and the daughter of 'K' would not be socially tabu to each other, veitabui, yet the father of 'V' is conscious enough of his own close kinship with 'K' not to wish their children to get married. This sentiment was shared by 'V's father's mother, but not so apparently by 'V's father's father, who before he was contradicted by his wife, reckoned that 'V' and 'K's daughter could 'probably' marry. 'V's father's father, however, is not close kin with 'K'. His wife became quite indignant, saying that such a marriage would 'look very bad' and that they were mata ni veiwatini.
administrative model for the Fiji Islands.\textsuperscript{1} Second cousin marriage as such, does not, of course, rule out the operation of a Dravidian system. A type of second cousin marriage had already been commented upon for Moala, but Capell & Lester make it clear that (for at least some of the areas they are referring to) they mean by second cousin the children of opposite sex actual cross-cousins, who are in a parallel category according to the Dravidian rule.

A glance at the lists of kinship terms that Capell & Lester provide show clearly the irrelevance to many of the societies they are discussing of the Dravidian system and of the kind of analysis that Nayacakalou is able to make with his Tokatoka material and experience. A feature in two instances is the MUALEVU custom of applying sibling terms to cross-cousins. This occurs in areas of both the larger islands of the Fiji group in Macuata, Vanua Levu (\textit{v.} Capell & Lester 1945:197) and in Tavua, Viti Levu (the details are in Rivers:1914:288, 399). In Macuata, there are, apart from a term for mother's brother, no separate terms in use for cross kin (which have lineal terms applied to them thus, FZ = M; MBD/FZD = Z; ZC = C). This is the same as MUALEVU usage, moreover the terms themselves are common to both areas. In both Tavua and Macuata, the cross term \textit{tavalena} is applied only to affines. Information from Fison, though scanty, suggests similar usages were found in Ba (north-west Viti Levu): 'In the Ba system we see the new term \textit{tavale} coming in and taking its place side by side with brother and sister. The first \textit{veitavaleni-veitacini} may not

\textsuperscript{1}Capell & Lester relate the presence of different types of marriage rule to the sequence of migratory waves they believe to have affected Fiji.
marry but their children may'. (Stern:1930:420-1)

There does emerge the probability that a distinct MUALEVU-type kinship system, distinct that is from both the kind of system that Nayacakalou is portraying as the Fijian system and from those other variants in western and inland Viti Levu which Capell & Lester describe, was extant in widely separated areas in Fiji prior to the expansion of the culture of the south-east Viti Levu peoples.

That it is, a distinct system is supported by the suspicion that the areas concerned share a further feature, in common - a lack of the matrilineal moieties which Capell & Lester show to have been common in Fiji. This is certainly true for MUALEVU and for Cakaudrove (Hocart:1952:83 et seq.): it seems likely for the other areas. It is true that Capell & Lester write of Macuata. The available information does not disclose whether this was.

1 He continues: 'And even in that tribe I find that if those first cousins are bent on marriage, they carry out their purpose, though the elders grumble and protest. The young men say "Tabu..." meaning "Our fathers could not do it, but we can".' (ibid)

2 This point is also made to forestall the suggestion that the MUALEVU kinship system is an isolated case that has fallen under Tongan influence, which the comment of Laura Thompson (v. supra), for example, implies. Cultural and somatic evidence of Tongan influence in the Exploring Islands is undoubtedly (v. supra Chapter 3). Its kinship system, however, appears quite different from that of MUALEVU (for example, kin in the first ascending generation are distinguished, according to Gifford, laterally with no distinction made for sex). Furthermore, Tongan influence is far greater in central Lau, where the kinship system is Dravidian, whereas in Tavua, in particular, and in Macuata, I imagine Tongan influence to be slight, if not non-existent.

3 With other evidence for individual societies from, for example, Hocart (1952:229 et seq.), Quain (1948), Spencer (1941).

4 An odd phrase, but they do imply they did fieldwork in Macuata.
a region of matrilineal moieties, like the neighbouring
dreketi valley, but it seems likely according to the
terminology that it was (op.cit. 190). I do not,
however, understand the gist of their argument here, and
it should be noticed that their diagrammatic representation
of the closest possible genealogical marriage would place
the spouses in the same moiety. Whatever, Capell & Lester,
are using the past tense and we can infer that there are
surely no moieties in Macuata today or in the remembered
past.

They are similarly not very conclusive in regard
to Ba:

Little seems to be known regarding the dual
marriage divisions, but from the meagre
information available on the subject the
conclusion is that while the sanctions of the
dual system are rapidly waning in Vuda and
Lautoka, they have already disappeared in
Ba. (op.cit. 79)

In their discussion of Tavua, Capell & Lester (and Rivers,
too) make no reference at all to moieties. The lack of
moieties as far as the regulation of marriage is con-
cerned, would fit in with the MUALEVU emphasis on the 'retention
of kin' (by non-marriage) and the use of sibling terms for
all close kin.

The contemporary evidence in MUALEVU suggests
that what has happened, and is happening, there, parallels
the kind of change that Fison perceived for Ba. The

1 Described by Hocart (1952). Macuata is also not far
from Quain's area.
2 Areas nearby.
3 Cf. Fison's comment (v. supra). The children of the
first veitacini-veitavaleni would be in the same moiety.
MUALEVU kinship system is being influenced by the Dravidian systems of south-east Viti Levu and central Lau, a result of the impact of greater ease of communication and the greatly increased social intercourse that has been its consequence. I am persuaded in this particularly by the villagers' preference for delineating kin in terms of kinship distance and the inconsistencies in terminology which arise when they do apply categories of lineal and cross terms. There is also the usage of the cross term veitavaleni, which is similar to Macuata custom, being more frequently heard in MUALEVU in reference to affines. In fact, I have never heard 'tavale' used as a form of address between two villagers who are other than affines.

There is, moreover, the virtual non-usage (though the Viti Levu term is known) of an opposite sex equivalent for 'veitavaleni', and the complete absence of an opposite sex equivalent term for 'veitacini-veitavaleni'.

I would say all the indications are that features of a Dravidian system are in the process of being incorporated into, not lost from, the MUALEVU kinship system. This is, of course, no answer to an argument that suggests in the distant past the MUALEVU-type of kinship system originated from a Dravidian type. But here we are entering a speculative range beyond the scope of the present examination.

In conclusion, I refer back to the comments with which I introduced this discussion. A comparative study of the 'variations' of 'The Fijian System of Kinship and Marriage' promises more insight into the principles of Fijian social organisation than an analysis, no matter how competent and clear, which starts from an initial premise that the principles are basic to all the 'variations'.
APPENDIX 2

Summaries of Selected MUALELU Disputes Heard at the Earlier Land Commission Enquiries


Disputants: SAMUELA (Clan Nabuna, Huamua village) and MARIKA (clan Vuci, Pakomi village)

Summary: SAMUELA stated that he was related to the clan Vuci through his father’s mother, Vakabala. He was recruited to Vuci from Huamua village by the presentation of whale’s teeth. He resided in the clan Vuci with his kin, namely, SUNI, who was his (clan) brother, and MARIKA, to whom SAMUELA was related through his father. After the death of SUNI, the land was divided among various kin and a portion was given to SAMUELA. He kept this land for 4 years, after which time he returned to Huamua village. He had informed MARIKA that after he had collected the necessary data for his tax, then MARIKA could take the land. But, MARIKA did not maintain that SAMUELA had already taken the nuts and had refused to allow him to plant more. SAMUELA had then taken the matter to the Provincial Court at Lomaiviti where he was fined. MARIKA asserted that since SAMUELA had returned permanently to Huamua village and thereby forfeited his rights to the land.

Decision: In favour of MARIKA, and that the land was held by the clan Vuci.

Reference: Senioli, 1903:26-33. Name of disputed land: Nauri (Huamua village)

Disputants: MAIKELI (clan Vakalaveno, Nakamua village) and LEPANI (clan Tota, Nakamua village)

Summary: MAIKELI states that in the time of Ha’afu’s division of the land, Tokasa, a woman of the clan Vakalaveno, requested SAVARAI (the leader of her clan) for land to be given to her for the use of her husband, MALANAI, of clan Tota. The land, Nauri, was given and on Tokasa’s death was taken by her son LEPANI. MAIKELI asserts that the coconut trees in Nauri, which are now bearing fruit, were planted by a man of the clan Lovaivavu in Nakalava village together with a man from Vakalaveno. MAIKELI insists that neither MALANAI nor LEPANI planted any trees.

Decision: The land remains with the clan Tota, but everything that grows and stands in the land is for the use of MAIKELI.


Disputants: Clan Nautu (Wakabad village) and clan Likusanga (Malalevu village)

Summary: AFETE, the leader of the clan Nautu, states that the land Solovosa was divided to VILIAVE and not to the clan in Ha’afu’s time for tax purposes. Before VILIAVE died he
gave this land to his wife's brother, APIASALONE, who was a member of his household ('Iron na vaka') but not of his clan, he being a member of the clan Likusoge (or clan Nambatu - the witnesses are not unanimous). After APIASALONE's death the land went to his son, LAITIVA. APOLO, of clan Nau, the son of VILANU's daughter, Morevuka, insists the land was given to him by his mother. The woman Nau asserts the land could have been given to APIASALONE for 'use only' and that the true title (leatu dina) is in the clan Nau.

Decision: The land is held by the clan Nau, but LAITIVA (clan Likusoge) is to have use of it until his death.

Disputants: Lavonqi (clan Mualova, Mualova village) and FINAU (clan Nayaqona, Mualova village).
Summary: Adi Lavonqi says this land was her father's and before that her father's father's but she and her father were in Tonga when Ha'afu divided the land and FINAU (clan Nayaqona) took it as his segiingi. On FINAU's death the land passed to his sister's (HAU) and then to her daughter's son, FINAU and AKAU.

 Decision: The land belongs to FINAU in the clan Nayaqona.

Disputants: SIMELE (clan Nayaqona, Mualova village) and ApeniSA Clan Mualova, Mualova village).
Summary: SIMELE states this land was the next division of his father who planted the coconut. When his father died he was only a boy and APENISA took the land; APENISA had made no formal request, nor has he ever planted a crop or a single tree in the land.

APENISA says the land was given to him by his [classificatory father, SAKULU. After ten years, Ha'afu divided the land, and gave Nacokakalala to APENISA as his segiingi. The land already contained the coconut planted by SAKULU and there were also some old palms which had been planted by SIMELE's father's father, whose land it was formerly. NIKOTINO (clan Mualova) asserts the land was not divided by Ha'afu and that only a small section of it named Nauvunini is APENISA", this piece having come to the clan Mualova as the dowry land of a girl who married the son...
(viz. SAULU) of the Ratu. Ratu TORO [the Chief] states that his father went for APENISA's father, ILAITIA, who was in Daku [what is now the Baloumi area] at the time of the uprising against Ma'afu. ILAITIA came to reside with his wife's brother, SAULU, who gave the land Naokacala to him. But at the time of the Ma'afu's division of lands, says TORO, the father of SIMELI was using the land.

Decision: The land is Ratu APENISA's.


Disputants: RADIKE (clan Vunivivi, Mualevu village) and Ratu APENISA (clan Mualova, Mualevu village).

Summary: RADIKE says that this was his father's land. When his father, LAISENIA went to reside temporarily with the Chief, Ratu TEVITA, in the clan Mualova, TEVITA weeded the land one year but when the garden crops had matured he did not use the land again and

Nadava

Vunivivi

Nagara

Mualova

LAISENIA

LOTI

TEVITA

RADIKE

APENISA

merely employed the chiefly way and took the land, but he had the right to use it only while he; LAISENIA, was residing with him. After Ma'afu's division, APENISA began using the land and planting fruit-trees, coconut and broadfruit. APENISA asserts that the land is his because of his mother's father, TEVITA, who requested the Nadavu people for land for a garden clearing. This was given on account of kinship (potyakai), by LOTI of the clan Nagara ['empty' in 1938] - 'these Nadavu people', states APENISA, 'they are our men, (lit. 'porena'). Ratu TORO states the land was given by Ma'afu to Ratu CORINASI, who gave it to APENISA as his village (Koro). When APENISA went away as a teacher, CORINASI retained title to the land ('MA KA WA NI Ratu CORINASI NA VANUA OI', LAISENIA adds.

Decision: The land is Ratu APENISA's.


Disputants: TEVITA (clan Mualova, Mualevu village) and Sera (clan Rara, Mualevu village).

Summary: JOGATEKI, of the clan Rara, originally used this land, but it was then divided as a marginoi to SARIASI (Sera's FFYB) also of clan Rara. When he died, MITIILI (Sera's FFYB) took the land, and after him it was used by PAULIAGI, a man from Mau island, who stayed with Sera's father in Rara. After PAULIAGI, TANIELA, the son of JOGATEKI, had the land. TEVITA claims that [when TANIELA left Vanua Balavu to reside unilocusly in Koro island] JOGATEKI then approached TEVITA, who was the husband of his daughter Tanivini, in order to recruit his grandchildren and persuade TEVITA to reside with him.
TEVITA agreed to this and the land Mataikavula was given to TEVITA to use as his own, his wife's and his children's land. When Taraivini died, JOSATEKI asked TEVITA not to return to his own clan but to remain in Rara. JOSATEKI then again gave the land Mataikavula to TEVITA. TEVITA (who with his children had not resided in Rara since JOSATEKI's death) says that he has planted coconut and yam in Mataikavula and has been using the land for ten years. The Bull, Ratu Togo, asserts the lands in NUALEVU are held by the founder-lineage group (vakavuvu) and that Mataikavula could not be TEVITA's land.

**Decision:** The land is Sera's, but TEVITA and his children are to have use of the fruits for twenty years.

**Key to accompanying diagrams:** Continuous line denotes recruitment and parent-child relationship. Broken line denotes parent-child relationship only. Dotted line denotes classificatory kin relationship.
APPENDIX 3

A 'Maritime' Disaster

The intention behind the founding of the Maritime Association was the admirable one of providing competition to the European companies on the Vanua Levu and Lau shipping routes (that is in the 'copra trade'). The ultimate objective was to exclude them altogether. The plans were put into motion with the support of politically active, Fijian high chiefs. By the Province of Lau, or rather the Provincial council. To finance the purchase of a ship, all the Lauan Co-operatives were called upon to buy shares in a new Co-operative association that was formed with the advice of the Department of Co-operatives in Suva. The response of the Lauans, which from the villagers' opinions of the European companies, I would say, was nothing less than patriotic, was overwhelming, and the venture was, in the event, oversubscribed.

A 300-ton ship was purchased in January for £45,000. In its first year of operation, the ship made a profit of £3,000.

The gratifying response to the subscription for the first ship encouraged its initiators to press forward with ideas for the purchase of another, larger ship. The idea was that the new ship would not only participate in the copra trade, but could also enter the tourist trade. The latter, together with the promise of refrigerated cargo space, was the specific appeal on offer. Thus, the Lauans were given the prospect of participating in a trade, which from their observations of European and Indian enterprise in Viti Levu, they well knew to be profitable.
Because of its suitability for carrying tourists (40 cabins, bars etc.) it was decided to purchase a Norwegian coastal ferry. Though originally intending to pay £40,000 plus for the second ship, the price rapidly spiralled to the £70,000 mark. Mismangement by the agents, delays in the shipyard, the devaluation of sterling, a greater cost than expected for alterations, inflated the price first to £120,000, then to £160,000. By the time the ship made its belated arrival in Suva, its estimated cost was around £180,000.

Unfortunately for the promoters, the new venture was decidedly under-subscribed, even though purchase of shares was now opened to Societies in the rest of Fiji. In MUALEVU, the Societies purchased further shares reluctantly and only at the instigation of visiting Departmental officials, complaining that "their" own funds were intended for providinghouses for members. The Directors, ha lava ni Mataiviti e kaiviti. Having borrowed heavily from the Fijian Development Fund and with advance sums of interest to be reckoned with, began putting further pressure on the Societies.

The 2nd Annual General Meeting of the MUALEVU Association was held in Suva, in July 1968, and all the MUALEVU Societies that were shareholders (viz. all the Societies except the two Seventh Day Societies, Tavaloa and Delana) sent their representatives. Soon announcements

1 Though I am not a competent judge, I would hardly have thought that they were all that extensve. Pillars quickly learned, presumably, what was the Norwegian for 'Men' and 'Women', but the graffiti on the walls they probably found more difficult.

2 Notably, no MUALEVU individual, inside or outside the societies, has bought a share.
came over the radio that these men wished to talk with their chairmen and the members in the village gloomily, and quite correctly, predicted that the Societies were being called upon to make further investment.

The peripatetic, Departmental official (a B. Comm. whose natal village was Mavana) duly arrived and the Societies were informed of the amount that it was considered in Suva they could further invest. Despite their previously avowed opposition, the members, still unable to overcome the inhibitions of 'shame' (madua) agreed with little protest. The blow was softened by an

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Society</th>
<th>Shares purchased as at 30th June 1968</th>
<th>Total of Shares purchased and committed to purchasing after 30th June 1968</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dakuwaga</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daliconi</td>
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<td>£800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valika</td>
<td>£1,900</td>
<td>£1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. MUALEVU Co-operative Societies' Investments in the Maritime Shipping Association Limited

In some cases, at least, the amounts will be higher; however, since I have not at hand the exact figures, I have given the minimum known.

1

By radio telephone, situated in the chiefly village of the southern District.
arrangement whereby the investment might be made from Societies' reserves and by committing future cess earnings to be paid directly to the Maritime Association's account with the Fijian Development Fund (that is, instead of the cess being paid first into the Society's cess account with the Fijian Development Fund). 1 Meanwhile an optimistic Chairman's report was circulated by the Maritime Association that helped obscure the depressing facts of the Balance Sheet that accompanied it on its rounds. Neither from the Maritime Association, understandably enough, but nor from the Department of Co-operatives in Suva, were the investing Societies given any hint that the Association, even if all went as planned, would be running at a considerable loss for some years and that no dividend was in sight in the near future.

The final developments were the most ironic. It was soon discovered that to avoid making a loss the new ship would have to carry a full cargo each trip and at the same time shorten the duration of its voyage. Consequently, instead of 'wasting time' by picking up cargo at each village, as had been the customary practice of the European companies, central loading points were established in all the Lauan islands. In MUALEVU, these were established at Mualevu and Daliconi villages. Since there are no roads in the island, the Societies in the other villages were obliged to ferry their copra to

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1 One villager, not a member of a Society and so not obliged to invest, jokingly pointed out that the Maritime Association and the Department were breaking the law since the Fijian Administration had some years previously forbidden Fijians to 'request' from each other any sum of cash exceeding 5/-.
At the time I left the island, the new arrangement was threatening to put out of livelihood a few enterprising, independent producers who had settled themselves on their lands some distance from any village.

What benefit there was from the tourist trade was, anyway, for the most part acquired by the Lomaloma village where the ship anchored the night and where tourist entertainment was arranged.

This occurred after I had left Fiji. The ship was insured though its full cost was not recovered. There are now firm plans for purchasing a new ship.
Trading Accounts and Balance Sheets of Selected Co-operative Societies for 1966-7

Dakuwaqa Society pp. 382-4
Valika Society pp. 385-7
Waitui Society pp. 388-90
### DAKIWAQA CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD

#### STORE TRADING ACCOUNT FROM 22/10/66 TO 23/10/67

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Opening Stock</td>
<td>596.3.4</td>
<td>By Sales</td>
<td>2,358.5.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purchases</td>
<td>1,846.16.9</td>
<td>By Surplus Stock</td>
<td>31.14.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freight &amp; Insurance</td>
<td>128.10.10</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Less Closing Stock</td>
<td>2,571.10.11</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>636.3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cost of Goods Sold</td>
<td>1,935.7.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross Profit c/d</td>
<td>455.12.10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£2,391.0.4</td>
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<td>£2,391.0.4</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Wages</td>
<td>140.0.0</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Expenses</td>
<td>36.17.6</td>
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<td>Bad Stock</td>
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<td>Discount</td>
<td>15.7.4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Licence</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Trading Surplus transferred to P &amp; L a/c</td>
<td>235.5.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>£455.12.10</td>
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#### COPRA TRADING ACCOUNT FROM 22/10/66 TO 23/10/67

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opening Stock</td>
<td>364.0.0</td>
<td>By Sales</td>
<td>3,092.3.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purchases</td>
<td>1,054.17.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freight &amp; Insurance</td>
<td>309.9.7</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Less Closing Stock</td>
<td>1,720.7.4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7B4 Nuts at 14 for 1/- = 2.16.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 cwt at £20 15.0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>In Transit:</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.0.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ton 15 cwt at £20</td>
<td>52.16.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cost of Goods Sold</td>
<td>1,675.11.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross Profit c/d</td>
<td>1,416.11.9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£3,092.3.1</td>
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<td>£3,092.3.1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gross Profit b/d</td>
<td>1,416.11.9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cess Fund</td>
<td>619.15.3</td>
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<td>School Cess</td>
<td>61.17.5</td>
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<td>Provincial Cess</td>
<td>61.17.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Wages</td>
<td>177.10.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Expenses</td>
<td>48.16.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Licence</td>
<td>2.0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trading Surplus transferred to P &amp; L a/c</td>
<td>444.15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£1,416.11.9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£1,416.11.9</td>
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**PROFIT & LOSS ACCOUNT FROM 22/10/66 TO 23/10/67**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>22/10/66</th>
<th>By Store Surplus</th>
<th>23/10/67</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Expenses</td>
<td>12.16.11</td>
<td>235. 5. 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary's Wages</td>
<td>115. 0. 0</td>
<td>&quot; Copra Surplus</td>
<td>444.15. 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Fees</td>
<td>50. 0. 0</td>
<td>&quot; Cash Surplus</td>
<td>1. 8. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travelling</td>
<td>5.10. 9</td>
<td>&quot; Sundry Earnings</td>
<td>21.18. 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fridge Expenses</td>
<td>12.16. 3</td>
<td>&quot; Bank Interest</td>
<td>38.11. 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stationery</td>
<td>5. 5.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Licence</td>
<td>1. 5. 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegrams</td>
<td>4. 1. 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspense</td>
<td>1.10. 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honorarium</td>
<td>10. 0. 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Expenses</td>
<td>4. 7. 0</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan</td>
<td>50. 0. 0</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Tax</td>
<td>10.16. 0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation</td>
<td>58.10. 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disposable Balance</td>
<td>399.19. 1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>£741.19. 4</strong></td>
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<td><strong>£741.19. 4</strong></td>
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**APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT AS AT 23/10/67**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>23/10/67</th>
<th>By Disposable Balance</th>
<th>23/10/67</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>99.19. 9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Add N/M Bonus</td>
<td>3. 2. 4</td>
<td>103. 2. 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dividend</td>
<td></td>
<td>4. 1. 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Divis. with H/Tax</td>
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<td>4. 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Store Bonus at 1/-</td>
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<td>101. 7. 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Copra Bonus at 3/9</td>
<td></td>
<td>191. 5. 0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>£399.19. 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>£399.19. 1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Liabilities</td>
<td>Current Assets</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Curr. Liabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. R. Carpenters</td>
<td>Store Stock</td>
<td>636.3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commissioner of In.</td>
<td>Copra Stock</td>
<td>53.16.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>Empty Drums</td>
<td>12.0.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonus Payable</td>
<td>Empty Bottles</td>
<td>5.16.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Members' Fund</td>
<td>Cash on hand</td>
<td>257.15.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capital Reserve</td>
<td>Bank of N.Z.</td>
<td>45.1.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Add 1967</td>
<td>A.N.Z. Bank</td>
<td>13.17.10</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Suva Co-op. Assn.</td>
<td>88.8.2</td>
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<td>Fiji National Provident Fund</td>
<td>29.6.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rupeni V.</td>
<td>34.2.7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jone T.</td>
<td>17.12.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morris Hedstrom Ltd.</td>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>1195.2.10</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Share - Suva Co-op. Assn.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vanuabalavu Union</td>
<td>10.0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern Marketing Union</td>
<td>10.0.0</td>
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<td>Maritime Shipping</td>
<td>1061.11.10</td>
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<td>Reserve Investment (BNZ)</td>
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<td>Fixed Assets</td>
<td>Furniture &amp; Fittings</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Less Depreciation</td>
<td>1.0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counter Scale</td>
<td>16.0.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less Depreciation</td>
<td>11.0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Copra Shed</td>
<td>335.2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less Depreciation</td>
<td>17.2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refrigerator</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less Depreciation</td>
<td>1.0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Block Machine</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less Depreciation</td>
<td>1.0.0</td>
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<td>Money Safe</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less Depreciation</td>
<td>1.0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Copra Dryer</td>
<td>336.18.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less Depreciation</td>
<td>33.18.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Punt</td>
<td>8.0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less Depreciation</td>
<td>1.0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>10.0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less Depreciation</td>
<td>1.0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

£3,714 8.9

[Note: The document contains financial information and appears to be a balance sheet for the Dakua Co-Operative Society Ltd as at 23/10/67.]
## Valma Co-operative Society

### Store Trading Account from 14/10/66 to 17/10/67

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To Opening Stock</td>
<td>849.3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purchases</td>
<td>4,055.1.6</td>
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<td>Freight &amp; Insurance</td>
<td>269.10.10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,374.1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss Closing Stock</td>
<td>983.14.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cost of goods sold</td>
<td>4190.7.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross profit c/d</td>
<td>950.12.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8,314.19.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wages</td>
<td>104.6.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expenses</td>
<td>28.0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discount</td>
<td>10.4.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Licence</td>
<td>6.0.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bad Debt</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading profit b/o</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transferred to P &amp; L a/c</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>950.12.0</td>
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### Copra Trading Account from 14/10/66 to 17/10/67

<table>
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<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To Opening Stock</td>
<td>230.9.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purchases</td>
<td>2,904.6.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freight &amp; Insurance</td>
<td>426.1.2</td>
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<td>3,360.7.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loss closing stock</td>
<td>72.0.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>60 cka. = 1 ton at £24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cost of copra sold</td>
<td>2,700.9.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross profit c/d</td>
<td>1,940.2.0</td>
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<td>4,640.11.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loss deduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provincial fees</td>
<td>865.1.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>School fees fees</td>
<td>86.17.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wages</td>
<td>320.12.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expenses</td>
<td>86.10.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Licence</td>
<td>2.0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading profit</td>
<td>455.2.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>transferred to P &amp; L a/c</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,910.2.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
To Purchases
  " Freight & Insurance"  161. 8. 6
  " Wastage"  8. 9
  " Trading profit transferred to P & L a/c"  16. 10. 10
  " Closing stock"  91 lbs. at 6/-
£ 195. 14. 6

To Income Tax
  " Secretary Wages"  140. 10. 0
  " Audit fees"  56. 0. 0
  " General expenses"  32. 8. 9
  " Stationery"  6. 8. 4
  " Travelling"  24. 0. 0
  " Honorarium"  2.18. 6
  " Telegrams"  12. 6
  " Payroll tax"  14. 2. 0
  " Depreciation;"  18. 0. 0
  " Store buildings"  13. 0. 0
  " Copra shed"  46. 0. 0
  " Copra dryer"  1.1. 0. 0
  " Counter scale"  4. 0. 0
  " Shellite building"  807. 4. 4
£1,314. 2. 9

By Store profit
  706. 0. 4
  " Yagona profit"  16. 10. 10
  " Copra profit"  456. 2. 8
  " Bank interest"  52. 11. 9
  " Cash surplus"  3. 9. 7
£ 1,314. 2. 9

Appropriation Account

To Reserve 40-7-2
  " Add N/M 34-9-6"  74. 16. 8
  " Dividend"  13. 0
  " Dividend W.Tax"  19. 10. 0
  " Prov. D/Debts"  22. 10. 0
  " Income Tax"  418.15. 0
  " Store Bonus 1/8"  257. 2. 0
  " Copra "  2/4
£ 807. 4. 4

By Disposable bal.  807. 4. 4

Profit and Loss Account from 14/10/66 to 17/10/67

To Purchases
  " Freight & Insurance"  161. 8. 6
  " Wastage"  15. 19. 8
  " Trading profit transferred to P & L a/c"  16. 10. 10
£ 195. 14. 6

PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT FROM 14/10/66 TO 17/10/67

To Income Tax
  " Secretary Wages"  140. 10. 0
  " Audit fees"  56. 0. 0
  " General expenses"  32. 8. 9
  " Stationery"  89.10. 0
  " Travelling"  24. 0. 0
  " Honorarium"  2.18. 6
  " Telegrams"  12. 6
  " Payroll tax"  14. 2. 0
  " Depreciation;"  18. 0. 0
  " Store buildings"  13. 0. 0
  " Copra shed"  46. 0. 0
  " Copra dryer"  1.1. 0. 0
  " Counter scale"  4. 0. 0
  " Shellite building"  807. 4. 4
£1,314. 2. 9

By Store profit
  706. 0. 4
  " Yagona profit"  16. 10. 10
  " Copra profit"  456. 2. 8
  " Bank interest"  52. 11. 9
  " Cash surplus"  3. 9. 7
£ 1,314. 2. 9

Appropriation Account

To Reserve 40-7-2
  " Add N/M 34-9-6"  74. 16. 8
  " Dividend"  13. 0
  " Dividend W.Tax"  19. 10. 0
  " Prov. D/Debts"  22. 10. 0
  " Income Tax"  418.15. 0
  " Store Bonus 1/8"  257. 2. 0
  " Copra "  2/4
£ 807. 4. 4

By Disposable bal.  807. 4. 4

VAGON TRADING ACCOUNT FROM 14/10/66 TO 17/10/67

To Purchases
  " Freight & Insurance"  161. 8. 6
  " Wastage"  15. 19. 8
  " Trading profit transferred to P & L a/c"  16. 10. 10
£ 195. 14. 6

PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT FROM 14/10/66 TO 17/10/67

To Income Tax
  " Secretary Wages"  140. 10. 0
  " Audit fees"  56. 0. 0
  " General expenses"  32. 8. 9
  " Stationery"  89.10. 0
  " Travelling"  24. 0. 0
  " Honorarium"  2.18. 6
  " Telegrams"  12. 6
  " Payroll tax"  14. 2. 0
  " Depreciation;"  18. 0. 0
  " Store buildings"  13. 0. 0
  " Copra shed"  46. 0. 0
  " Copra dryer"  1.1. 0. 0
  " Counter scale"  4. 0. 0
  " Shellite building"  807. 4. 4
£1,314. 2. 9

By Store profit
  706. 0. 4
  " Yagona profit"  16. 10. 10
  " Copra profit"  456. 2. 8
  " Bank interest"  52. 11. 9
  " Cash surplus"  3. 9. 7
£ 1,314. 2. 9

Appropriation Account

To Reserve 40-7-2
  " Add N/M 34-9-6"  74. 16. 8
  " Dividend"  13. 0
  " Dividend W.Tax"  19. 10. 0
  " Prov. D/Debts"  22. 10. 0
  " Income Tax"  418.15. 0
  " Store Bonus 1/8"  257. 2. 0
  " Copra "  2/4
£ 807. 4. 4

By Disposable bal.  807. 4. 4
## Balance Sheet as at 17/10/67

### Current Liabilities:
- Sight depositors: 94.2.11
- Bonus payable: 669.14.8
- Commissioner of Inland Revenue: 14.15.0
- Savanaca Salmani: 2.0
- Marama Building Fund: 95.19.2
- Provision for doubtful debts: 19.10.0
- Provision for income tax: 22.10.0
- **Total Current Liabilities**: 936.13.9

### Current Assets:
- Store Stock: 983.14.4
- Copra Stock: 72.0.0
- Yagona Stock: 27.6.0
- Cash on hand: 228.1.9
- A.N.Z. 'Bank': 993.5.3
- Jone Tawake: 19.10.0
- Bank of N.S.W.: 55.19.7
- Govt. Savings Bank: 59.7.6
- Suva Co-op. Assn. Ltd.: 11.13.7
- W. R. Carpenter: 113.5.5
- Empty Drums deposit: 47.10.0
- **Total Current Assets**: 1,711.13.5

### Investment:
- Share: Pacific Co. Ltd.: 100.0.0
- Suva Co-op. Assn.: 119.0.1
- Vanualevu Union: 10.0.0
- Eastern Co-op. Marketing: 25.0.0
- Reserve Investment (ENZ): 838.5.6
- Maritime Co-op. Shipping Co.: 1,573.14.3
- **Total Investment**: 2,665.19.10

### Fixed Assets:
- Store Building: 180.0.0
- Less: Depreciation: 18.0.0
- Copra Shed: 150.0.0
- Less: Depreciation: 15.0.0
- Copra Dryer: 478.0.0
- Less: Depreciation: 48.0.0
- Counter Scale: 10.0.0
- Less: Depreciation: 1.0.0
- Shellite Building: 40.0.0
- Less: Depreciation: 41.0.0
- **Total Fixed Assets**: 55,149.13.3
## WAITUI PROB. CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LIMITED

### STORE TRADING ACCOUNT FROM 13/10/66 TO 11/10/67

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<th>Amount</th>
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<td>£248.10.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purchases</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freight &amp; Insurance</td>
<td>£4.0.0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Closing Stock</td>
<td>£1,527.5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of Goods Sold</td>
<td>£1,310.1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross Surplus c/d</td>
<td>£306.17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages</td>
<td>£52.0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licence</td>
<td>£10.0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bad Stock</td>
<td>£16.10.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stock Deficit</td>
<td>£50.0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trading Surplus transferred to P &amp; L a/c</td>
<td>177.10.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£306.17.1</td>
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### COPRA TRADING ACCOUNT FROM 13/10/66 TO 11/10/67

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<td>104.0.0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purchases</td>
<td>1,102.3.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freight &amp; Insurance</td>
<td>184.15.9</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Loss Closing Stock:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock on hand -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ton 6 cwt. 1 qr. at £26 = 34.2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>In transit:</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 tons 15 cwt 1 qr. 20 lbs at £26 = 181.5.1</td>
<td>215.7.7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,175.11.9</td>
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<td></td>
<td>714.1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£1,889.12.9</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cash Fund Deduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provincial Cash</td>
<td>361.18.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>School Fees Cash</td>
<td>361.12.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Licence</td>
<td>361.12.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drier</td>
<td>2.0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trading Surplus transferred to P &amp; L a/c</td>
<td>144.15.7</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>£714.1.0</td>
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PROFIT & LOSS ACCOUNT FROM 13/10/66 TO 11/10/67

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>General Expenses</td>
<td>£125.11.9</td>
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<td>Passage</td>
<td>£29.10.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio Licence</td>
<td>£1.5.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Audit Fees</td>
<td>£44.0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honorarium</td>
<td>£12.0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary's Wages</td>
<td>£52.0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basic Tax</td>
<td>£5.17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Depreciation:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Store Equipment</td>
<td>£1.0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Store Building</td>
<td>£31.0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Punt</td>
<td>£1.0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copra Equipment</td>
<td>£1.0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Copra Dryer</td>
<td>£13.13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Safe</td>
<td>£4.0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Disposable Balance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Expenses</strong></td>
<td><strong>£364.8.1</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Store Trading Surplus</strong></td>
<td>£127.10.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cobra Trading Surplus</strong></td>
<td>£124.15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Punt Earning</strong></td>
<td>£32.10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bank Interest</strong></td>
<td>£9.11.6</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Income</strong></td>
<td><strong>£377.18.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>£741.9.6</strong></td>
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</table>

APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT

<table>
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<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>£10.12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov. for D/Debs</td>
<td>£24.19.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bonus c/f</td>
<td>£6.18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>£42.10.8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disposable Balance</strong></td>
<td><strong>£42.10.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Waithi Prob. Co-operative Society Limited

**Balance Sheet as at 11/10/67**

### Current Liabilities:
- Morris-Bedstraw Ltd.: 16.12. 10
- W. R. Carpenter: 138. 0. 9
- Sava Co-op. Assn.: 103. 9. 10
- Prov. for D/Debs: 24. 19. 9
- Registrar of Co-op. Societies: 20. 0. 0
- Commissioner of Inland Revenue: 756.13. 0

### Current Assets:
- Copra Stock: 215. 7. 6
- Store Stock: 217. 4. 3
- M. T. Drummond Stock: 3. 0. 0
- Cash on Hand: 26. 10. 6
- Bank of New Zealand: 5. 50. 0
- Members' Debt: 19. 19. 0
- Test T: 75. 0. 0

### Investment:
- Share Sava Co-op Assn.: 135. 0. 0
- Maritime Shipping Co. (Share): 200. 0. 0
- Vascular Union (Share): 10. 0. 0
- B/New Zealand (Rd) Investment: 220. 2. 8

### Fixed Assets:
- Store Building: 5. 0. 0
- Less Depreciation: 5. 0. 0
- Store Building: 10. 0. 0
- Less Depreciation: 7. 0. 0
- Copra Equipment: 7. 0. 0
- Less Depreciation: 7. 0. 0
- Copra Dryer: 131. 13. 8
- Less Depreciation: 17. 13. 8
- Money Safe: 10. 0. 0
- Less Depreciation: 10. 0. 0
- Counter Scale: 1. 0. 0

### Total Assets:
- £1,504. 4. 2

---

**Other Notes:**
- Cash on hand: £26.10.6
- Members' debt: £19.19.0
- Test T: £75.0.0
- Investment: £565.3.8
- Fixed assets: £1,504.4.2
APPENDIX'S VILLAGE SKETCH-MAP
**LEGEND**

- Concrete-block house with iron roof
- Wooden house with iron roof
- Concrete-block house built onto wooden house
- Local materials with iron roof
- Local materials only
- Kitchen
- Tap and shower outlet
  (latrines have not been depicted)
- Church. Wesleyan wooden with iron roof
- Church. Wesleyan stone with iron roof
- Church. Wesleyan concrete block under construction
- Church. 7th Day Adventist concrete-block with iron roof
- Co-operative store
- Copra-shed
- Copra-dryer
- Path
- Bridge
- Streams and drainage ditches
- Freehold boundary
- (u/c) Under construction

*On side of house symbol denotes a 7th Day Adventist household. All other households are Wesleyan.*
Sketch Map A5.1, Nalevu village
Sketch Map A5.2. Navana village

X in house symbol denotes villagers from Ava and Taveua temporarily settled in Navana for their children's schooling.

Co-operative
V Valika

Maharaj
I. Valubam
K. Valka
I. Tela
V Valevano

0 300 feet

N
Sketch Map A5.3, Daliconi Village
Sketch Map A5.4. Cikobia village
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1967

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<tr>
<td>Koskinen, A.A.</td>
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