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MELAYU:
HIERARCHIES OF BEING IN RIAU

Vivienne Wee

A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
of the Australian National University

October 1985
All information presented in this thesis is derived from my own research, unless otherwise stipulated and listed at the end of the work.

Vivienne Wee
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ABBREVIATIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY
To the memory of my late father

WEE SWEE LEE

born 7 March 1921, Singapore
died 15 April 1981, Singapore
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Gunung Bintan lekuk di tengah,
Gunung Daik bercabang tiga;
Hancur badan dikandung tanah,
Budi baik dikenang juga.

(Mount Bintan dips in the middle,
Mount Daik forks into three;
The crushed body is enclosed by earth;
But kindness is remembered forever.)
ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that the phenomenon known as Melayu is not a solidary unit, but rather, in its very nature, a hierarchical gradation of being. In this study, I explore the implications and consequences of such hierarchisation. I argue that in Riau the basis of hierarchy is the sultanate. Even without the existence of the sultanate as an institutional reality, an ideology of statehood seems to suffice. Such an ideology derives from the mythologised past when the sultanate did exist institutionally.

Such mythologising is not value-free: it is a means of expressing vested interests in motivated forms. I will draw out contrary views and examine the perspectives of the specific informants concerned. Such differences are not just interpersonal but also intercommunal. I explicitly acknowledge the active role of an ethnographer in putting together the different bits of information into one coherent picture. In this respect, Bateson's information theory has been of relevance to me. (See Bateson 1973, 1980.)

Of primary concern to me is the hierarchy of contexts encapsulating infinite levels of text-context relationships. Adopting a reflexive principle, the writing of this thesis is also hierarchically organised. I begin with the discussion of the larger context in space and time; I move on to the mythologised past that is contextualised in the present; I then discuss the realisation of this mythologised past in the everyday present. I end by re-contextualising the ethnographic reality in Riau in the worldwide pattern of change that I shall refer to as 'the civilising process'.
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MAP 1 SUMATRA AND THE MALAY PENINSULA
PART ONE

PEOPLE, PLACE AND TIME:

'MALAY', RIAU AND ZAMAN
CHAPTER ONE

WHERE DOES ONE BEGIN?

1.1 Preconceptions
1.2 Explorations
1.3 Preliminaries
1.4 Inter-contextual Transformations
1.5 Textual Organisation
1.6 Argumentation
1.7 The Intertextuality of Alternative Constructions
1.1 Preconceptions

...It is the recipient of the message who creates the context. This power to create context is the recipient's skill.... The recipient must be, in some sense, ready for the appropriate discovery when it comes.... Readiness can serve to select components of the random which thereby become new information.

(Bateson 1980:56-57).

The preconceptions I had prior to fieldwork may be regarded as my readiness for information, which enabled me to contextualise and thereby understand as new information what I learnt from my informants. One preconception was the idea of a 'Malay people' with a 'Malay culture'. Another was the idea of typicality — that is, of people who could be typed as representative 'Malays' and from whom one could discover 'Malay culture'. Let me explain these two preconceptions.

As a Singaporean, I was aware that many of those called 'Malays' in Singapore and Malaysia were actually people of migrant descent — Javanese, Baweanese/Boyanese, Arab, Indian, and others. The identification of such migrants and their descendants as 'Malay' implies a process of assimilation to a host culture that is 'ur-Malay'. Yet the presence of such large numbers of migrant recruits would, presumably, distort the character of any 'ur-Malay' host culture. My reading of the literature reinforced this awareness of the migrant presence among the 'Malays' of these two countries. For example, many ethnographies of 'the Malays' are of migrant recruits, such as Javanese, Batak, and Minangkabau.²

This situation made me curious about what 'ur-Malayness' might be without the intrusion of migrant recruits. Since the overwhelming majority of these migrant recruits had come during the era of British
Malaya, I inferred that whatever 'ur-Malayness' might be, it should be sought in the context of the pre-colonial era. Looking into the histories of the area, my attention was drawn to a succession of polities that various historians have identified as 'Malay' -- namely, Srivijaya, Melaka, and Johor. (See Wolters 1970, Sandhu and Wheatley 1983, and Andaya 1975.) These three chronologically successive polities seem to have occupied much the same territory -- that is, parts of the Malayan coasts including the island known as Temasik/Singapore, the Riau and Lingga islands, and parts of the east Sumatran coast. This territory is now divided among three different nation-states -- namely, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Since I was then looking for a place where I could do original fieldwork, I became interested in that part of 'Malay' territory that now belongs to Indonesia, hoping thereby to provide a counterpoint to 'Malay' studies done in Singapore and Malaysia.

I decided to work in Propinsi Riau 'Riau Province' in Indonesia for two reasons. First of all, the territory of that province includes parts that may be identified as 'Malay' -- that is, parts that had belonged to the 'Malay' polities of the pre-colonial era. The second reason for my choice was the sparseness of the population in Riau Province. The 1971 census indicated a density of only 17 persons per km². (See Auda Murad 1977:6.) I inferred from this sparseness in population that the area had not been attracting much immigration. Therefore, it seemed possible that unlike the situation in Singapore and Malaysia where there have been large numbers of migrant recruits to 'Malayness', 'ur-Malayness' might perhaps persist in Riau Province in a form relatively undistorted by migrant intrusion. Indeed, Auda Murad (personal communication) and Mochtar Naim (personal communication) subsequently informed me that this
province was losing so much population to Malaysia through emigration that it was beginning to worry the central government in Jakarta.

So I went into the field with a preconception of 'ur-Malayness', a phenomenon that I associated with the pre-colonial polities of Srivijaya, Melaka, and Johor, and that I hoped to find in Riau Province in a form undistorted by migrant intrusion. With such a preconception, I was ready, in Bateson's sense, for information about 'Malayness' since that was what I had set out to find. However, neither Srivijaya nor any other such kingdom is extant in the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, even though I associated 'ur-Malayness' with these earlier polities, I could not expect to find it unchanged through time. Nevertheless, I had the expectation of finding historical continuity, of discovering a persisting if not immutable 'Malay' culture. The way I intended to discover this was to ensconce myself in a typical 'Malay' village in traditional ethnographic fashion.

This brings me to the second preconception I started with — typicality. I had the notion that I could study a single community as a representative microcosm from which I could generalise about the macrocosm of 'Malay' culture. Thus in my preconception, 'Malayness' was a phenomenon that persisted through time and that was shared by many people in many different places. The corollary of this is that by studying one typical 'Malay' village I could tap 'Malayness' in its larger temporal and spatial context. Consequently, when I first began fieldwork in 1979, my attention was focussed upon the problem of finding the typical village where I would derive my information.
1.2 Explorations

My very first informants in Riau Province were people in Pekanbaru, the provincial capital where I had to go to obtain visa clearance. At that time I did not yet know in which community I would conduct my field research. So while I was in Pekanbaru, I tried to get advice on this matter from academics in Universitas Riau, from the military officers who interviewed me about my intended research, indeed from anyone I happened to talk to. I explained that I was interested in 'Malay history and culture' (sejarah dan kebudayaan Melayu); so I asked my informants which places in Riau Province would be considered as 'Malay places' (tempat Melayu).

To this line of questioning, they responded by advising me to visit certain 'historical places' (tempat sejarah); the places they mentioned were mostly the capitals of former sultanates in the area -- Siak Sriindrapura, Rengat, Daik, Penyengat, and a few others (see Maps 2 and 3). While this response seemed to confirm my association of 'Malayness' with the pre-colonial polities, I was nevertheless surprised when my informants told me that the 'historical places' are considered Melayu 'Malay' because these are the sites of 'palace ruins' (bekas istana) and 'royal graves' (makam raja-raja). Instead I had expected them to say that a place was Melayu because the people there were Melayu. But when I asked whether the present inhabitants of these 'historical places' were Melayu, I was even more surprised when my Pekanbaru informants could not give definite answers. They were not sure whether some of these 'historical places' were still inhabited, and if so, whether the inhabitants were Melayu. This was new information indeed -- that it should be considered possible to have Melayu places without Melayu inhabitants.
I was, however, left with the problem of finding a community to study. So I stressed to my Pekanbaru informants that my intention was not just to view the material remains of the former sultanates, but to do research in a living Melayu community. To clarify my point, I said that I was particularly interested in the 'true Malays' — that is, those who were not of migrant descent. The term I used for 'true Malays' was orang Melayu jati, a term used in Singapore and Malaysia to differentiate indigenous 'Malays' from those of migrant origins.

However, my Pekanbaru informants understood the term orang Melayu jati as a synonym for suku Melayu asli 'original Malay divisions', under which rubric they listed several ethnonyms, divided into 'land people' (orang darat) and 'sea people' (orang laut). The following is a composite list derived from several informants:

the 'land people' mentioned were
- the Talang Mamak in Rengat
- the Sakai in Duri and Bengkalis
- the Akit in Bengkalis, Rupat, Tebingtinggi, and Pulau Padang
- the orang asli, orang dalam, or orang hutan in Rempang
- the orang Ungar in the Riau islands

the 'sea people' mentioned were
- the Air Jong
- the Mantang
- the Tambus, all in the Riau-Lingga islands
- the Bintan
- the Penaungan
- the orang laut in Indragiri
This was again surprising new information, because in Malaysia such ethnonyms would refer not to 'Malays' at all, but to various indigenous communities who are constitutionally defined as (non-Malay) 'Aborigines'. But as indicated by Major Williams-Hunt (1952), the former Colonial Adviser on Aborigines, the difference between 'Malays' and 'Aborigines' was by no means definite or rigid in British Malaya.\textsuperscript{14} In contemporary Malaysia, however, 'Malays' and 'Aborigines' are legally differentiated into two distinct categories in the amended Federal Constitution of 1981, Article 160(2). This indicates that the view of my Pekanbaru informants is comparable not to that found in contemporary Malaysia, but to an earlier period in Malaya when 'Malays' and 'Aborigines' were not yet clearly differentiated into mutually exclusive categories.

As we shall see further below, it is clear that 'Malayness' in Indonesia is indeed different from 'Malayness' in Singapore and Malaysia. This difference is directly related to the perceptions of the respective governments. The Singapore government regards 'Malays' as a 'race', a genetically engendered category in the state-imposed system of ethnicity. (See Benjamin 1976a.) In Singapore, a Christian English-speaking 'Malay' is still legally considered 'Malay'. Indeed there is apparently a sufficient number of Christian 'Malays', that they are considering setting up a Malay Christian Association. (See Nurliza Yusuf forthcoming.)

In Malaysia, however, 'Malayness' is constitutionally tied to Islam, such that a 'Malay' convert to Christianity would no longer be legally considered 'Malay'. This was stated to me categorically by Anwar Ibrahim, a Minister in the Malaysian Cabinet. But not all Malaysian Muslims qualify as 'Malays': the constitutional category 'Malay' includes only Muslims who speak Malay, conform to Malay
custom, and who were born in Malaysia or born of Malaysian parents. (See Siddique 1981.)

In contrast to the governments of Singapore and Malaysia, the Indonesian government evidently has no interest in giving a legal definition of 'Malayness'. In Indonesia, 'Malay' or Melayu is just one label in the loose array of regional identities that people may profess. In other words, from the Indonesian government's point of view, anyone who wants to identify herself/himself as Melayu may do so; conversely, if she/he does not want to do so, then she/he may choose practically any other regional identity. The Indonesian government's laissez-faire attitude towards the ethnic labelling of the population is evident in the identity cards issued to all citizens. Whereas the identity cards issued by the Singapore and Malaysia governments stipulate the respective ethnic labels of their citizens, the Indonesian identity card does not include any ethnic labelling. So in Indonesia, 'Malayness' is a matter of subjective self-identification, rather than an objective category belonging to a legally imposed set.

Such a comparison is, however, the benefit of hindsight. At the time I began my fieldwork, I was merely aware of the difference between my Pekanbaru informants' perception of Melayu and the current view of 'Malayness' in Malaysia which specifically excludes the 'Aborigines' (Orang Asli). My efforts simply to find a Melayu community to study was already making me realise that whatever Melayu may mean in Riau Province, it was different from 'Malayness' in Singapore and Malaysia. My Pekanbaru informants' talk of palace ruins, royal graves, and aboriginal people was new information to me. However, I was not sure whether this was a general attitude or just one peculiar to those Pekanbaru informants I had happened to meet.
Moreover, I was still anxious to find a Melayu community I could study; I was hesitant about accepting my informants' suggestion of studying the orang Melayu jati/suku Melayu asli they had named, because I was not convinced that these were the only 'Malays' around. I wanted to find a community that could be considered 'Malay' even from a Singaporean or a Malaysian perspective.

So I tried another line of questioning: I asked where I could find a kampung Melayu 'Malay village' where I could stay. My informants responded by advising me to go to Penyengat in the Riau archipelago and to Daik in the Lingga archipelago. (See Map 3.) Significantly, both these places are the former capitals of the Riau-Lingga sultanate, which was the polity that succeeded the Johor sultanate. Even at the time, I thought it strange that when I asked for the location of a 'Malay village', my Pekanbaru informants named me two former capitals. Having been to Penyengat many years before as a tourist, I knew that there were many aristocrats on the island. An aristocratic community did not fit in with my preconception of typicality. So I stressed to my Pekanbaru informants that I wanted to do research among ordinary Melayu people, not aristocrats. But no, I received no other suggestion from them.

So at the end of my brief stay of about two weeks in Pekanbaru, I received the impression that there are mainly two kinds of Melayu people in Riau Province -- the tribal suku Melayu asli at one extreme and the aristocrats of former sultanates at the other. But who are the people in the middle? To this question I did not receive an adequate answer in Pekanbaru. In this context, it is significant that none of my informants there ever suggested that I should stay in Pekanbaru to do my research. Instead, when we talked about things Melayu, it was as if we were talking about some phenomenon located out
there in the not quite modern world, in the world of the bygone past, of palace ruins, royal graves, and aboriginal people. Pekanbaru itself does not seem to produce Melayu people; its inhabitants seem to identify themselves either as orang Indonesia 'Indonesians', orang Riau 'Riau people', or as orang Pekanbaru 'Pekanbaru people'.

Geographically, Pekanbaru lies within the territory of the former Siak sultanate, which was centred along the Siak river. Pekanbaru itself is sited upstream of this river, while the former capital of the Siak sultanate, Siak Sriindrapura, is sited a little downstream. (See Map 2.) However, my Pekanbaru informants could not or would not tell me whether there were any Melayu people in the vicinity of Siak Sriindrapura, which was mentioned to me only as a 'historical place', and not as a 'Malay village'. Since I eventually did not go there, to this day I still do not know whether there are any Melayu inhabitants there. But supposing there are, and I now think that likely, it is significant that my Pekanbaru informants chose to present the place to me as Melayu only in terms of its historical association, and not in terms of an ongoing Melayu settlement. The significance probably lies in the geographical proximity between Pekanbaru and Siak Sriindrapura: the Indonesian-ness of Pekanbaru is perhaps not sufficiently secure for its citizens to feel unswayed by the pull of an alternative, albeit bygone, capital.

But who were my Pekanbaru informants? They included a Javanese, a Sundanese, three Minangkabau, and seven others who identified themselves as Melayu. These Melayu informants were from different areas — Palembang, Kampar, Indragiri, Siak, and Pulau Tujuh.17 (See Maps 1 and 2.) Despite this self-identification they nevertheless seemed to downplay their own Melayu-ness, while highlighting their Indonesian-ness. For example, not one of them suggested that I should
go to study his or her home-village. Their attitude is, I think, related to their social position. Because of the brief period of time I spent in Pekanbaru, I could only interview a very small sample of informants, most of whom were known to each other. These informants I would consider as belonging to the elite of Pekanbaru society; they included two university students, four university lecturers, a school-teacher, a provincial military commander, a medical doctor, and three civil servants. Even those among them who identified themselves as Melayu, seemed to owe their social position not to their Melayu-ness, but to their Indonesian-ness. Since these Melayu informants were themselves neither tribal nor aristocratic, they would seem to belong to the middle. Yet they were the ones who tried to draw my attention away from themselves, towards the tribal and the aristocratic Melayu. Such being the case, I could only go to those 'Malay villages' they had suggested, since I did not know of any other. So I started with Penyengat because it is nearer to Pekanbaru than is Daik.

During the voyage, I tried to sight from the boat, villages that I could possibly study, apart from aristocratic Penyengat. I was quite taken by house-clusters I saw along both banks of Selat Tiung (Tiung Strait), on the islands of Rempang and Galang Senyantung. (See Map 4.) When I arrived in Tanjungpinang, I went to meet a man whose name and address had been given to me by my Pekanbaru informants. After I had explained my purpose to him, I asked him about the feasibility of studying one of the villages located along Selat Tiung. He responded by saying:

Kampung itu tak boleh mewakili penghidupan masyarakat Melayu; penduduknya orang laut yang mendarat.

(Those villages cannot represent Melayu social life; their inhabitants are sea people who have come to land.)
So I encountered this perception of 'representative' versus 'unrepresentative' Melayu. In the view of this informant, the 'sea people' are 'unrepresentative', even after they have settled on land. I asked him which communities he considered 'representative'. He named Penyengat. This informant is himself an aristocrat bearing the title of raja, and an inhabitant of Penyengat. I explained that I knew Penyengat to be largely inhabited by aristocrats, and that I was perhaps more interested in ordinary commoners. After some consideration, he named four communities of commoners that he regarded as 'representative' -- Pangkil, Pengujan, Kampung Melayu, and Tanjung Unngat. (See Maps 4 and 5.) He then kindly spent two days bringing me to these four 'representative' communities, so that I could choose one from among them. At the end of our tour, he advised me to choose Pangkil because its 'headman' (penghulu), Raja M, was his kinsman. Since at that time I had not yet secured a social footing in the area, and was dependent on this informant, Raja H, to introduce me to the various communities, I could not afford to ignore his opinion. And so I picked Pangkil as the Melayu community I would study.

Even though I did finally find my one Melayu community for the purpose of ethnographic fieldwork, the preconceptions I had started with were already severely shaken. I was beginning to doubt the existence of a homogeneous 'Malay people' with a 'Malay culture' at least in Riau Province; and the typical community from which I wanted to generalise about 'Malayness' was evidently so rare a phenomenon that I did not even know what it was supposed to be 'representative' of. If in Raja H's opinion, the villages of Selat Tiung cannot 'represent' Melayu social life as exemplified by Penyengat and Pangkil, then surely the reverse is also implied. Whatever it is that Penyengat and Pangkil 'represent', that does not include the villages of Selat Tiung. Since Raja H could name the grand total of only five
'representative' communities, then what is it that the other hundreds of villages in the Riau archipelago are supposed to 'represent'?

The final blow to my preconceptions came in Pangkil. My informants there started to tell me voluntarily that they were Melayu yang totok 'pure Melayu', as 'pure' as the people of Penyengat, unlike their neighbours on the island of Karas who were Melayu yang tidak totok 'impure Melayu'. Previous to this, I did not even know that Karas was inhabited. Nor were the Penyengat and Karas communities the only two that my Pangkil informants measured themselves against; others were mentioned and evaluated as being 'pure' or 'impure', and to what degree.

It gradually became clear to me that my Pangkil informants perceived a continuum of Melayu-ness that was not some dislocated abstraction, but rather, a social interpretation of specific people in specific places. My informants saw themselves as occupants of a particular position on that continuum with other people occupying other such positions. When I realised that this was the self-perception of my Pangkil informants, I could hardly go on pretending blithely that they were typical 'Malays', when they quite plainly thought of themselves as exemplifying only one particular type -- namely, 'pure' Melayu of the commoner variety. This put paid to my original intention to study a single typical 'Malay' community, and on that basis, to make statements about 'the Malays doing this' or 'the Malays believing that'. From the perspective of my Pangkil informants, it seems that there is no such phenomenon as 'the Malays'; instead there are only types of Melayu, various degrees of Melayu-ness.
So I decided to turn my attention towards the larger social context in which my informants located themselves. As a result, the focus of my research shifted away from the internal doings of a single community towards the perceptions and cross-perceptions of Self and Other in a cluster of communities. Consequently, the present study is not a village ethnography in the traditional sense of the word; it is, rather, a discussion of the patterning of Melayu-ness in a relatively larger geographical area.

1.3 Preliminaries

What I discovered through my field experience was that Melayu-ness is not a timeless, placeless, automatically persistent tradition, existing in some abstract form, dislocated from actual people, places, and events. On the contrary, my informants saw themselves and others as named individuals located in particular places in particular frames of time. They related to each other in terms of these social, spatial, and temporal specifics. Whatever Melayu may mean to them, that meaning is to be found in the patterning of these specifics. So the questions that are asked in this study and, I hope, answered are: How do my informants perceive Melayu-ness? What different points of view are there on the matter? Why do they differ? What is the significance of these perceptions? In this light, Melayu-ness may be considered as a field of discourse within which different individuals communicate with each other about certain topics of mutual concern.

Such being the case, the term Melayu must be treated not as a presumed given, but as a problematic to be analysed. Therefore, in the rest of this study, I will leave the term untranslated. To use the English gloss 'Malays' would only obscure the issue, especially since that word is variously used in quite other ways. For example,
it is used by some to refer to all Muslim indigenes in Southeast Asia. Or for example, in the context of Malaysia, it is used to refer to those citizens who are constitutionally so defined. Most ethnographers working in Malaysia seem to have accepted this constitutional definition implicitly. Whether there is indeed any connection between my informants' usages of the word *Melayu* and the various usages of the word 'Malays' is another problematic to be analysed, and not a given that may be arbitrarily presumed. So in this study I will not speak of 'the Malays' but only of 'my informants' and their usages of the term *Melayu*.

Even Wilkinson's (1959:755) dictionary explanation of the word *Melayu* indicates several distinct shades of meaning:

Malayan; Malay; (occasionally) Moslem, e.g. masok Melayu (to turn Mohammedan). In early times the word did not cover the whole Malay world; and even Abdullah draws a distinction between anak Melaka [Melaka native] and Orang Melayu (Hikayat Abdullah 183). It would seem from one passage (Hang Tuah 200) that the word, limited geographically to one area, became associated with a standard of language and was extended to all who spoke 'Malay'. The Malay Annals speak of a sungai Melayu [Melayu river]; I-ting speaks of Sri Vijaya conquering the 'Moloyu' country; Minangkabau has a 'Malayu' clan (suku); Rajendracola's conquests (A.D. 1012 to 1042) covered Melayu and Sri Vijaya as separate countries; the Siamese records claim Malacca and Melayu as separate entities. Rouffaer identifies *Melayu* with Jambi.

It would appear from Wilkinson's explanation that in historical usage, the word *Melayu* was alternatively associated with Islam, with a specific category of people (namely, the orang Melayu), with a particular standard of language and with the speakers of that standard language, with a river, with a country, with a Minangkabau clan, and with Jambi. As we shall see below, in my informants' usage, the first three of these associations are still relevant — that is, the associations with Islam, with a specific category of people, with a
particular standard of language and the speakers of that standard language.

However, because of this association with a particular standard of language and not with a whole language, I will keep the word 'Malay' for referring to the Malay linguistic domain as a whole. My informants do talk of a bahasa Melayu 'Melayu language' -- but this refers specifically to the formal and standardised variety which is used in writing. Other informal varieties are also used, but these are referred to not as bahasa but as cakap 'talk'. These informal varieties are toponymically labelled -- cakap Galang 'Galang talk', cakap Gelam 'Gelam talk', cakap Bintan 'Bintan talk', cakap Mantang 'Mantang talk', and so on. These various 'talks' differ somewhat in pronunciation and vocabulary, and may be considered as inter-related dialects.

Therefore, following Benjamin (1984:9), I shall use the word 'Malay' to refer to an Austronesian dialect-continuum that is 'wide enough to include such varieties as Orang Hulu, Minangkabau, Iban and the language of the 7th-century Srivijayan inscriptions, but narrow enough to exclude such languages as Javanese, Batak and Acehnese'. Such a dialect-continuum parallels to some extent the continuum of Melayu-ness on which my informants locate themselves. But while they do use a particular term -- namely, Melayu -- to refer to this continuum of being, they do not use any one term to refer to what is recognisably a continuum of dialects. For this reason, it is necessary to introduce the foreign term 'Malay' as a label for such a dialect-continuum, ranging from informal local varieties of toponymically labelled cakap to the formal standardised bahasa Melayu.

To complicate the linguistic situation, the national languages Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Brunei are all recognisably
dialects that may be located on this same continuum. That is to say, they are all varieties of Malay. So the population of Malay-language speakers should number some two hundred million, including not only the Malay-speaking peoples of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Brunei, but also the relatively small pocket of Malay-speakers in South Thailand. The Malay language has such a wide geographical spread, because it has been a regional lingua franca for several centuries, used first for trade, then for classical literature, then for colonial administration, and finally for nationalist politics. Thus to generalise about the culture of the Malay-language speakers is as futile a task as it would be to generalise about the culture of all speakers of the English language. Indeed, in this sense, Malay is as international a language as English, being one of the official languages of the United Nations. My few informants in Riau can in no wise represent the other two hundred million Malay-speakers: they can only represent themselves. Therefore, whatever is said in this study with regards to the Malay language or dialect-continuum must be understood as pertaining specifically to my informants' usages. However, references to other usages elsewhere will be made where relevant.

The Malay words that appear in this study are primarily transcribed in the Penyengat-Pangkil pronunciation. This is because I did most of my fieldwork in these two communities. However, I also did fieldwork in Bintan, Karas, Sembur Laut, Nanga, and Teluk Nipah, where different dialects are spoken. For ease of comparison, I will transcribe words derived from these latter communities also in the Penyengat-Pangkil pronunciation. Because I spent more time in Penyengat and Pangkil, that is the dialect of Malay I speak myself. Consequently, my informants speaking other dialects tended to adjust to my dialect, so that I could understand them. As a result, certain
words derived from these other informants may also be in the Penyenyat-Pangkil pronunciation, because they were so pronounced in an adjusted form for my benefit. I will transcribe my informants' statements in the syntax they actually used, even if that syntax does not agree with conventional grammar.

As it happens, the Penyengat-Pangkil dialect is a standardised lingua franca among all my informants, because of its historical association with the former court at Penyengat, and because it is the basis of the written form. Significantly, I have found quite a close correspondence between certain Penyengat-Pangkil usages and those explicated by Wilkinson (1959) in his dictionary. I will therefore refer to these dictionary explications where relevant.20 As Wilkinson (ibid.:ii) explains in his preface, one method he used for the compilation of his dictionary was to submit 'bare lists of words (without meanings)...to a committee of three Malays from Singapore, Johore, and Riau respectively'. Since the resulting explications were jointly agreed upon by all three committee members, this suggests that a certain common dialect prevailed in Riau, Singapore, and Johor. The correspondences I have found between these dictionary explications and certain Penyengat-Pangkil usages thus suggest that the Penyengat-Pangkil dialect is found not only in Riau, but also in Singapore and Johor.

It is indeed this particular dialect that my informants refer to as bahasa Melayu 'Melayu standard speech'. Its existence does not, however, obviate the co-existence of other dialects such as cakap Bintan 'Bintan talk' which is used by my Bintan informants, cakap Galang 'Galang talk' which is used by my informants in Karas, Sembur Laut, and Nanga, and cakap Barok 'Barok talk' which is used by my informants in Teluk Nipah. Because the Penyengat-Pangkil dialect is a standardised lingua franca, I am transcribing it in the standard
orthography that is currently used for the national languages of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore.

Where Arabic words are concerned, I am adhering to the romanised transcriptions given in Wehr (1976). Words and phrases in non-English languages other than Malay will be specified. These include Arabic, Dutch, and Chinese. As for the romanised transcription of Muslim names from the Arabic original, I shall follow Matheson and Andaya (1982) for those historical personages mentioned in the text Tuhfat al-Nafis. However, some later historical personages did have their names romanised; in such cases I shall follow their own usages. If an historical personage's name has not been romanised by Matheson and Andaya (1982), nor romanised by himself or herself, I shall adhere to the transcription given in the relevant text where it is mentioned. There will thus be some inconsistencies in the spelling of the same Muslim names. Where my informants' names are concerned, I will adhere to their own romanised forms. Where such a form is not available — for example, in the case of a non-literate informant, I will provide my transcription of his or her name.

As mentioned above, I had started my fieldwork on Pangkil, and it was only later that I decided to expand my field of vision to include the other communities. Since the Penyengat community was regarded by my Pangkil informants as representing a standard of 'pure' Melayuness, against whom others were to measure themselves, it was to Penyengat I went after Pangkil. The greater proportion of my fieldwork time — the whole of 1979 — was thus spent between Penyengat and Pangkil. In 1980, for further comparisons, I went to Bintan, Karas, Sembur Laut, Nanga, and Teluk Nipah, in that order. My first phase of fieldwork in Riau ended in the middle of 1980.
My choice of these other communities was very much guided by the perceptions of my Penyengat and Pangkil informants. From their everyday conversation, it was quite clear that they regarded the people of Bintan and Karas as significantly different others — that is, as people who were Melayu but different. As for Sembur Laut, Nanga, and Teluk Nipah, that choice was guided by the perceptions of my Karas informants who, in their turn, regarded these people also as Melayu but different. In addition, I also made brief visits to various places in the company of my informants. These places included Hulu Sungai Riau, Kampung Melayu, Tanjung Unggat, Senggarang, Sebauk, Tembeling, Benggayan, and Pulau Panjang. (See Maps 4 and 5.)

Beyond Riau itself, I also visited Medan where I interviewed a few informants; that came about rather fortuitously because I had to go there on matters regarding my research visa. The views of one Medan informant, Tengku Lockman Sinar, were particularly relevant and are therefore cited in this study. My Pangkil informants also drew my attention to the island of Seking, which is within the political territory of Singapore, as a place where the inhabitants have particularly close ties with the people of Pangkil, several inter-marriages having taken place between the two populations. (See Map 3.) So after my return to Singapore from Riau, I continued with my research there; prior to what my Pangkil informants told me, I had not known anything about Seking.

In addition to fieldwork, I also spent a few weeks in July 1983 reading the Factory Records held at the India Office in London. In December 1983 and January 1984, I made a field trip to Tanjungbalai in Karimun, Dabo in Singkep, Daik in Lingga, all of which I had not previously visited; I also re-visited Penyengat. (See Map 3.) This trip was made together with Virginia Matheson of the Australian
National University, with whom I currently have a joint project on the ethno-bibliography of Riau-Lingga. This project grew out of my first field trip, when I learnt that some of my informants have extensive private collections of manuscripts including old letters, diaries, photographs, land-grants, genealogies, religious texts, and histories. I thus invited Virginia Matheson to work with me in compiling an ethno-bibliography of these texts. On our initial trip in 1983/84, we filmed 1,512 exposures of documents or two full reels of microfilm. A copy of the microfilm is kept at Menzies Library, Australian National Library. These documents await our analysis. (See Wee and Matheson forthcoming.) In the present study, I will be referring to some of these texts, particularly those written by my informants. For a description of our trip, see Matheson (1985). And for the historical analysis of one of the texts we collected, see Matheson (1984).

Finally, shortly before I finished writing this present study, I visited Penyengat in April 1985 to check a few details.

The time taken for this study is thus not neatly bifurcated into two distinct periods — 'fieldwork' and 'writing'. Instead, I have actively sought to maintain a feedback relationship between both activities. Not only have I checked my informants' statements in relation to one another, but I have also obtained some of their responses to my writing. In September 1979, I presented a preliminary report of my field research in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia at the 'International Conference of Malay Studies' (Persidangan Antarabangsa Pengajian Melayu). (See Wee 1979 in backpocket.) On my return to the field after this conference, I showed my paper to two informants who could read English. Their comments and criticisms helped to clarify my understanding of the situation. In August 1984, I presented another paper on my research at a conference in Ann Arbor, Michigan. (See Wee 1984 in backpocket.)
1.4 Inter-contextual Transformations

If my perceptions about 'Malayness' made me ready for what I learnt from my informants, then conversely, my informants' preconceptions of the categories into which they fitted me, readied them for interaction with me. I was identified primarily as an orang Singapore 'Singapore person', as a mahasiswa 'university student', and only secondarily as an orang Tionghoa 'Chinese person'. The reason for such an identification was that my interaction with my informants did not follow the usual pattern of their dealings with the local Chinese, such dealings being mostly of a commercial nature. I was regarded as a different type of 'Chinese person', with this difference described in terms of my being a Singaporean and a university student, and one affiliated to an Australian university at that.

Consequently, it was my non-Indonesian-ness that was highlighted; I believe it was this perception that enabled my informants to make certain comments about Indonesia to me. If they had been interacting with an Indonesian academic, it is very likely that they would not have uttered these comments. I found my informants more than willing to talk to me and to help me in my research. In a large part, their enthusiasm was motivated by a sense of wanting to tell their story to the outside world; indeed such a motive was explicitly stated by some of them. I was thus dealing not with any unconscious structure, if such is even possible. On the contrary, what I apprehended was a consciously structurated rhetoric that was very much audience-orientated. My informants seem to have considered a non-Indonesian person as an appropriate audience, for the story itself is quite evidently non-Indonesian in both form and content. In form it is relevant only to Riau and not to Indonesia as a whole; and in content it derives from a pre-Indonesian era, from zaman sultan 'the era of
the sultan'. This story, if I may term it such, constitutes the central theme of my study.

I use the word 'story' in Bateson's (1980:22) sense:

A story is a little knot or complex of that species of connectedness which we call relevance. Any A is relevant to any B if both A and B are parts or components of the same 'story'.

Although I have spoken of my informants as having a story to tell, that story is by no means an unchanging, standardised tale. The story-tellers are not mere transmitters of information, but are indeed protagonists in their own story. Thus, they have different perspectives on the same events. However, I do not promise to treat each perspective in equal detail, because I did not spend an equal amount of time with each and every informant. As mentioned above, I did most of my fieldwork in Penyengat and Pangkil. Therefore, in this study I am presenting as primary the perspectives of my Penyengat and Pangkil informants, to which I add as secondary the perspectives of my other informants. Even so, I did not interview each and every inhabitant of Penyengat and Pangkil; therefore the views discussed pertain only to those who did act as my informants.

Such a bias does not, however, imply that the Penyengat-Pangkil view is the right and normal view, in contrast to which we have other wrong and deviant views. Contrary to any such positivistic claim, what the bias indicates is that there is no single reality that one may term 'Malay culture' or 'the Malay worldview' which one can tap in one's capacity as a 'pure visitor'. In my opinion, there are and can only be multiple constructions of reality; there is no construction that can transcend the multitude, as it were, and be isomorphic with reality as such. This applies reflexively to this
study which is and can merely be a description of my understanding of some informants' ideas in the context of my relationship with them. The general value of such a relativist understanding is to be found not in any sweeping pronouncements about 'Malay culture' or 'the Malay worldview', but in the resonances of other related situations occurring at other times, in other places.

As stated in the opening epigraph of this chapter, 'it is the recipient of the message who creates the context' (Bateson 1980:56-57). The story, the 'little knot of connectedness' (to use Bateson's phrase), is thus based essentially on my understanding of what my informants told me. It is I who have knotted together the various threads of their narratives. Since one person cannot become another, one cannot speak as another; one can merely speak of one's own understanding of others. In this sense, therefore, the story is as much a creation of the listener as it is that of the teller. So if what my informants told me may be considered as consciously structurated rhetoric that is audience-orientated, then my telling of what I understand of their tale may also be similarly considered.

Following Perelman (1982:5), I regard rhetoric as 'discourse addressed to any sort of audience'. In this approach, truth is not regarded as self-evident and therefore cannot be disengaged from argumentation. (See ibid.:5-8.)

As in any other case of communication, the relationship between text and context is crucial to this study. If my informants' story may be considered a text to be understood in the context of their interaction with me, then this written study itself is, quite literally, a text to be understood in the context of the interaction between writer and reader. As Bateson (1980:4) has stated, 'without context, words and actions have no meaning at all'. There is no text
without context. The regularities within the text and the complementary regularities outside the text proper, together constitute a meta-message -- namely, the context.

It is important to see the particular utterance or action as part of the ecological sub-system called context and not as the product or effect of what remains of the context after the piece which we want to explain has been cut from it.

(Bateson 1973:309).

This study mediates between two contexts of discourse -- the first context being my informants' discourse with me as audience, and the second being my discourse with the reader as audience. What integrates both contexts is a meta-context, or what Bateson (1980:128-129) terms 'metacommunication'. It is within this meta-context that we may discern the significant differences between the two contexts of discourse. The first context -- which we may term 'field communication' -- is temporally transient because it is situated in the flow of everyday life. The second context -- which we may term 'text communication' -- is temporally permanent because it is situated out of the flow of everyday life.

'Field communication' is oral; 'text communication' is written. As Goody (1977) has argued, two different modes of consciousness are generated by speech and by writing. As he has noted (ibid.:11), 'writing arrests the flow of oral converse'. Writing thus lends itself to atemporal syllogism, while oral converse necessarily occurs as a temporal event that is, to use Goody's phrase (ibid.:13-14), 'now or never'.

Although some of my informants are literate, the fact remains that their discourse with me was oral and not written. The difference between 'field communication' and 'text communication' is evident in the objectification of the latter as this written text, whereas the
former remains as intangible fragments embedded in the flow of everyday life. Because of this fundamental difference between the two contexts of discourse, the relationship between them cannot be that of a one-to-one isomorphic correspondence. Atemporal art can neither duplicate nor reproduce temporal life.

The relationship between the two contexts can only be that of 'transformation', to use Bateson's term (1973:102-106; 1980:122-126). The integrative meta-context is thus one where such transformations between contexts are possible. Bateson argues that inter-contextual transformation is posited upon code — that is, the rules which give meaning to the transformation itself. It is this code that constitutes the meta-context.

One rule of the code is that although this written text derives from the unique field experience of the author, it must nevertheless be considered not only in its own terms, but also as part of the literature of other written texts derived from other sources. This rule presumes mutual comparability in 'text communication', over and above the uniqueness of the 'field communication'. The effect of this rule upon inter-contextual transformation is that the particular events of 'field communication' are transformed in 'text communication' into general types of events, which can be compared with other such types found in other texts.

This rule of textual comparability is related to another rule which says, as it were, that in life nothing happens in isolation, or at least is not supposed to. According to this rule, everything must be linked to something else. Based on this premise, the task is to trace what is linked to what, and to discover the nature of that linkage. It is this rule of linkage that enables the grouping of particular events into organised patterns. The effect of this rule
upon inter-contextual transformation is that particular events in 'field communication' that had occurred at different times and in different places are transformed into groups of linked events that are discussed on the same page at the same moment within the written text. Despite such a rule, however, linkage is not immanent within the particular events themselves. Linkage is logical, and hence has to be argued.

The rule of linkage is in turn related to the rule of argumentation which proposes that it is possible to persuade another person to see what one sees. According to this rule, even if a person cannot directly apprehend the object of vision, she/he can indirectly apprehend it through argumentation — that is, a logical construction of another person's perception of the object in question. The effect of this rule upon inter-contextual transformation is that one's description of perception must be so logically ordered as to be enable another person to construct a mental image of what she/he does not directly perceive.

There are many other discernible rules in the code of inter-contextual transformation from 'field communication' to 'text communication'. The three mentioned above seem to me to be the most significant. The reading of this text would perhaps be facilitated by the reader bearing in mind these three rules of coding — that is, intertextual comparability, logical linkage, and interpersonal argumentation.

1.5 Textual Organisation

It is, I believe, of prime importance to have a conceptual system which will force us to see the 'message'...as both itself internally patterned and itself a part of a larger patterned universe....

(Bateson 1973:105).
I have organised this text with the aim of presenting my informants' story both as an internally patterned 'message' and as a part of a larger patterned universe. In the rest of Part One, I will discuss the larger universe of which my informants' story is a part. The telling of their story occurs within configurations of space and time, space which extends beyond the location of the story-teller, and time which extends beyond the actual moment of utterance. They are themselves conscious of this larger context, for it is the context that gives meaning to their tale. So I will discuss these configurations of space and time in terms of what my informants themselves perceive as significant.

The significant spatial configurations are those that are referred to as 'Indonesia', 'alam Melayu', 'Riau'. Apart from these politically defined configurations, the island world of sea and land is an ecologically significant configuration of its own. The significant temporal configurations are also politically defined -- that is, in terms of the governing authority. So following my informants' usage, I will discuss five zamans 'eras', each defined in political terms -- namely, the era of the local chief, the era of the religiously legitimated king, the era of Dutch colonisation, the era of Japanese conquest, and the era of Indonesian nationalism.

In Parts Two and Three of this study, I shall present my informants' story as an internally patterned 'message'. In Part Two, I will use the metaphor of a rear-view mirror to describe my informants' perception of their past. Like the image in a rear-view mirror, a rear-view image of the past is a partial imaging of the scene behind one, that is yet located in front of one's vision. The resulting image depends on the angle of the mirror, as well as the angle from which one views it: what one sees depends on one's perspective.
From the Penyengat-Pangkil perspective, the relevant past is zaman sultan 'the era of the sultan', when derajat 'rank' and keturunan 'descent' figured importantly. I will discuss how my informants express a vision of a hierarchy which prevails from generation to generation, and in which everyone is to be ascribed a rank. Within this hierarchy, there are interactions of domination, submission, and resistance. So basically, what I try to describe in this part of the study are my informants' representations of power relations in their rear-view image of zaman sultan.

In their perceptions, the past is relevant not for its own sake, but for its effect upon the present. In Part Three, I will show how they relate their rear-view image of the past to their view of the present in such a way that they perceive a particular figure in the ground of their everyday present. The metaphor of the rear-view mirror is again useful in this context. When one drives a vehicle on the road, one glances now and again at the rear-view mirror so as to orientate the moving vehicle in the desired direction. What appears in the rear-view mirror is part of the total view before one's eyes, such that one perceives a figure comprising both front and rear. What happens in front is thus to be evaluated in terms of its relation to what is happening behind. So to apply this metaphor to my informants' integration of past and present, what is happening in their everyday present is not taken simply as it is; instead the present is transfigured in terms of certain events of the past.

The bygone past, being past, cannot change; one can therefore regard one's image of it as being equally constant and unchanging. The everyday present, however, is in an unpredictable flux, from hour to hour, day to day. While one may try to control this unsettling flux by such means as planning and routine, the best-laid plans and
the most regular routines can be all too easily disrupted by unexpected events.

There seem to be at least two possible responses to this situation. One can abandon oneself to the flux and, as is colloquially described in English, take each day as it comes. Such a strategy is, however, not suitable if one is concerned with maintaining the image of a past-in-the-present. To focus on an unchanging past in a changing present requires a differentiation of everyday experience into figure and ground. In this context, a more suitable strategy would be to stabilise the flux of the present, by treating time as place and place as time. We move, time flows, the weather changes, but the ground stands still. It is possible that such a proposition would not be plausible in an area where there are earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. In Riau, however, there is no such violent disruption of the ground. Instead, the contrast between the tidal sea and the unmoving islands would lend plausibility to the proposition that the ground is terra firma.

But human beings themselves also constitute part of the flux of everyday experience. Our moods, behaviour, and social interactions with one another can be quite unreliable. Our perceptions and opinions of ourselves and of others can be quite changeable. To stabilise this inter-personal flux, concepts of 'indigeny' and 'purity' are used as important means to typologise people — that is, to fix people to specific social definitions.

However, the transfiguration of the everyday present in terms of the bygone past is plausible only if it seems real — and thus inevitable — to enough people. The quality of reality that is generated by this process of transfiguration may be understood as a 'social phantasy system' — that is, a phantasy that is communicated
and shared among many different people. For those who do share the phantasy, this is likely to give a feeling of inward-looking cosiness. However, it is also likely to make them highly suspicious of others who do not share the phantasy, and who therefore pose a cognitive threat. The opposite tendencies of centripetalism and centrifugalism are thus generated in Self-Other relations.

But both these tendencies presuppose a larger context wherein exist centre and periphery. Such a context transcends the immediacy of the local community, encapsulating it in a supralocal imagined community. Willingness to belong to this supralocal community is expressed through Islamisation — that is, a process of joining a worldwide congregation of believers. Those who have joined regard others who are unwilling to do so, as apostates capable of witchcraft. The shift in orientation from local immediacy to supralocal transcendence may be understood in terms of a worldwide historical pattern — namely, the civilising process, whereby local self-sufficiency is increasingly replaced by supralocal other-dependence. In this context, the strength of the rear-view image derives from precisely this — that it focusses attention away from the everyday present towards what is not present. It is thus the pervasiveness of the civilising process that gives plausibility to such a mode of orientation.

1.6 Argumentation

The underlying argumentation of this text concerns relations of power. I use the word 'power' in Foucault’s (1980a:92-95) sense of the term, as referring to the 'force relations' immanent in the divisions, inequalities and disequilibriums that take shape and come into play in any society.26 Such relations are basically mobile,
local, and unstable. Any pattern of power that appears to be 'permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-producing, is simply the over-all effect that emerges from all these mobilities, the concatenation that rests on each of them and seeks in turn to arrest their movement' (ibid.:93).

The play of power thus arises from difference; it begins with at least two opposing forces. So as Foucault has pointed out, power is inherently dynamic, and any appearance of permanence derives from the alignment of multiple oppositions through time. Such a process may be described as 'stochastic' — that is, 'a sequence of events [that] combines a random component with a selective process so that only certain outcomes of the random are allowed to endure' (Bateson 1980:245). In this sense, therefore, the various spatial and temporal configurations that constitute the context of my informants' story, are stochastic patterns of power, emerging and fading through space and time.

If my informants' text is part of such a context, then it should manifest the same kind of regularities. This indeed is the case. The contextual fabric of power relations runs through their text, such that without this context, the text would have no meaning at all. My informants' tale has to be understood, therefore, in the larger universe of the spatial and temporal configurations mentioned above. Of these, the configuration referred to as Indonesia/zaman Indonesia is perhaps the most relevant, since the stochastic pattern of power it represents is currently the most systemic, the most institutionalised, and the most hegemonic. My informants are all willy-nilly participants in this pattern of power: they are all citizens of the Republic of Indonesia and subject to its law. Nevertheless, in their discourse, they prefer to draw the contents of their story from three
other configurations, particularly *alam Melayu*, Riau, and *zaman sultan*. So the contents of my informants' discourse on power do not concern the sovereignty of the Indonesian republic, the form of Indonesian law, or the over-all unity imposed by the Jakarta government. Instead, they talk about power in a local context, in the context of unequal relations in their own hierarchy of ranks as derived from a bygone sultanate. Their focus upon a past-in-the-present is thus a means of bypassing the current present.

Yet ontologically, the Indonesian reality is a reality, even if epistemologically, one does not talk about it as such. The old philosophical debate about epistemology and ontology, about knowledge and the knowable reality, is of relevance to our discussion. As Bateson (1980:37; 1973:429) has pointed out:

> The map is not the territory, and the name is not the thing named.

> What is on the paper map is a representation of what was in the retinal representation of the man who made the map; and as you push the question back, what you find is an infinite regress, an infinite series of maps. The territory never gets in at all. The territory is Ding an sich and you can't do anything with it.

In other words, talking about the ontological reality is itself an epistemological activity; it is not the ontological reality as such. In this sense, therefore, to talk of my informants' ontological reality is really to talk about the epistemologies of other people, such as politicians, academics, and businesspeople.

Following Foucault (1980b), I would argue that knowledge and power are so dialectically and inextricably related, that there exists no power relation which does not imply a particular field of knowledge, and vice-versa. So certain people's epistemologies can be raised to the status of ontology, depending on whose epistemology it
is. Or to put it another way, ontology is the epistemology of the relatively more powerful.

So if Indonesia is an ontological reality because it exists in the epistemologies of the relatively more powerful, then my informants' focus on a non-Indonesian story in which Indonesia is irrelevant, may be considered as the epistemology of the relatively less powerful. They thus live in two epistemological realities, an other-imposed one that derives from a particular patterning of power, and a self-constructed one that eludes the other-imposed reality and therefore the domination of certain significant others.

As I have mentioned above, the contents of my informants' story are derived from a pre-Indonesian past which is, however, talked about not as the there-and-then, but as the here-and-now. The present is transfigured as the past-in-the-present, or alternatively, as the present-in-the-past. The self-constructed reality thus manifests itself as other-derived, in that it derives from the actions and circumstances of dead people in a given past. Such an other-derivation in temporal terms is a counterpoint to the other-imposition of the Indonesian present. The other-imposed reality of the present is eluded, therefore, by means of escaping into a self-constructed past.

Such a strategy may indeed be understood as 'elusion', a term I have borrowed from Laing (1969:47-48):

Elusion is a way of getting round conflict without direct confrontation, or its resolution. It eludes conflict by playing off one modality of experience against another. To live in the past or in the future may be less satisfying than it is to live in the present, but it can never be as disillusioning. The present will never be what has been or what could be.... To be sustained, elusion requires virtuosity: it can lead to enchanting nostalgia. It must never break down. If explicit, it becomes ugly.... It is an attempt to live outside time by living in a part of time, to live timelessly in the past, or in the future.
1.7 The Intertextuality of Alternative Constructions

The past is precisely that which is not present. Though one may project one's consciousness into the past, one cannot physically live there. One can merely construct a past-in-the-present. Such a construction of the past may be described as nostalgic, rather than historical. An historical construction may perhaps be regarded as one that is concerned with the past as such, whereas a nostalgic construction is one that is concerned with the past-in-the-present. Both modes of construction may draw from the same stock of events, yet because of their different concerns, the respective past that is constructed would differ.

We are dealing here with the modality of imagination. It is possible to imagine what you know, as it is to imagine what you do not know. Knowledge is objective, imagination subjective. In knowing something, we extend our consciousness outwards towards the object of knowledge. In imagining something, we draw our consciousness inwards to absorb the phenomenon of not-self into self, the imagining subject. This implies the following oppositions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>objective knowledge</th>
<th>:</th>
<th>subjective feeling</th>
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<tr>
<td>history</td>
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<td>nostalgia</td>
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<tr>
<td>knowledge</td>
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<td>imagination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fact</td>
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<td>artefact</td>
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</tbody>
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It is my argument in this study that my informants' construction of their past is nostalgic, rather than historical, since they are interested in the past for its relevance to their present situation. So I will not attempt to give an historical reconstruction of the past as such; I will discuss only what is relevant to an understanding of their constructed past-in-the-present.
However, in order to appreciate the quality of their nostalgic constructions, it is necessary to refer to alternative constructions. I will refer, in particular, to two indigenous texts. One is the Penurunan Segala Raja-Raja 'The Genealogy of Kings', which is also known as Sulalatus Salatin and as Sejarah Melayu. The other text is the Tuhfat al-Nafis 'The Precious Gift'. These are the two texts most relevant to the present study, because they contain the same topics of discourse as those discussed by my informants. Since these two texts date from different periods, they will provide different temporal perspectives from that of my informants.

The Penurunan Segala Raja-Raja -- henceforth referred to as the Penurunan -- exists in several versions. According to Roolvinck (1970), the earliest of these versions dates from 1612; this consists of two manuscripts known as Raffles 18 of the Royal Asiatic Society. Roolvinck (ibid.:xxvi-xxvii) describes the relationship between Raffles 18 and the later versions thus:

The Raffles 18 text is dated 1612, i.e. the beginning of the seventeenth century.... In the course of the eighteenth century this text was edited in Riau at the court of the Buginese Viceroy, who had brought it with them from Goa in Celebes. The result has come down to us in two versions, a longer version and a shorter version, which are closely related. Both the shorter version...and the longer version (and this includes the Shellabear text) are late texts. The most plausible inference is that they date from the second half of the eighteenth century, when the Buginese Viceroy's court had firmly established itself in the Malay world.

The Tuhfat al-Nafis -- henceforth referred to as the Tuhfat -- also exists in several versions. I am relying primarily on the critical edition translated into English by Matheson and Andaya (1982). Both the Penurunan and the Tuhfat are intimately connected with Riau. In the case of the Penurunan, two later versions of the 1612
manuscript were edited at the Riau court. In the case of the Tuhfat, the entire text, from beginning to end, was written in Riau. What is particularly significant to my study is that the Tuhfat's authors, Raja Haji Ahmad and his son Raja Ali Haji, were Penyengat rajas, from whom some of my informants can trace direct descent. Raja Haji Ahmad probably drew up the first drafts of the work, while Raja Ali Haji completed it. (See Matheson and Andaya 1982:5–6.)

It is thus no mere coincidence that these two texts should contain the same topics of discourse that are discussed by my informants. There is a common denominator -- Riau -- which is, in this sense, not just a place on the map, but a field of discourse wherein alternative constructions of the same topics may be found. The scattering of these alternative constructions over a temporal range of some 370 years -- that is, from 1612 to 1985 -- indicates the relative stability of this field of discourse through time.

By the word 'stability', however, I do not mean 'stasis'. Following Bateson (1980:114), I use the word to mean the active maintenance of the status quo ante through constant adjustment to changes. My informants' focus on the past-in-the-present may be understood precisely as an active effort to maintain the stability of the field of discourse under the impact of the winds of change.

The Penurunan and the Tuhfat belong to the genre of Malay writing known as hikayat. As Errington (1979:38) has pointed out,

...The hikayat does not so much record the past as bring it into being or perpetuate it. The fleeting, one might almost say random, events of individual lives and kingdoms are transformed by ordered sounds into what, it is true, is not permanent, but is the only perpetuity which this world offers. One begins to feel in reading hikayat, that the idea that the world is real and words or language artificial, is reversed in traditional Malaya where, if anything, bahasa [language] was real, solid, present and almost palpable, while the world was something which would not endure.
It would thus seem that my informants have inherited a tradition of re-constructing the past into an always contemporary form. Even though they no longer write hikayats, they do nevertheless express in their oral accounts, the impulse that informs the hikayat. Such a cultural continuity cannot, however, be understood as mechanical historicism: after all, that which has been need not always be. On the contrary, any such continuity has to be understood in the context of present relevance. In other words, what has been remains, only because it is actively maintained by the inhabitants of the present.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE


2. I shall cite as examples three ethnographies of 'Malays' in Malaysia, which are indeed about immigrant populations. These are Wilson (1967), Provencher (1971), and McKinley (1975). Wilson's ethnography, A Malay Village and Malaysia, is about the village of Jendram Hilir which, he admits, has a high proportion of immigrants from Sumatra, including the Mandailing, Ramba, Kepunohan, and Minangkabau. Provencher's ethnography, Two Malay Worlds: Interaction in Urban and Rural Settings, is about two communities, one in Kuang and the other in Kampong Bahru. He notes (ibid.:44) that the members of both these communities, like 'most West Coast Malays[,] were either born in Indonesia or have some Indonesian ancestors.' Thus the Kuang community consists of Minangkabau, Korinch and Javanese, while the Kampong Bahru community consists of Javanese and Minangkabau, with, however, the inclusion of some Melaka Malays. Indeed, Provencher (ibid.:21) mentions that it was not until 1935 that the Javanese immigrants were 'brought within the official definition of the term "Malay".' McKinley's ethnography, A Knife Cutting Water: Child Transfers and Siblingship among Urban Malays, is also about Kampong Bahru. Although he does not mention it in his study, he has, through personal communication, told me that most of his informants are either Javanese immigrants or the children and grandchildren of such immigrants, who have maintained ongoing links with kinsfolk in Java.

3. I have not been able to find much written about the Talang Mamak, apart from Wilkinson's (1959:732) comment that the 'Orang Mamak' (as he refers to them) are

   a Protomalayan community in Sumatra. Its culture is high compared with that of the Kubu or Akit.

   Elsewhere, Wilkinson (1959:1154) says that Talang is a name 'given to a number of Proto-Malayan communities on the East Coast of Sumatra'. This would seem to confirm the location of the Talang Mamak in Rengat, as mentioned by my Pekanbaru informants, since Rengat is indeed near the east Sumatran coast. Geoffrey Benjamin (personal communication) says that the name Talang Mamak may be translated as 'people of the mother's brother'. He further suggests that there may be some historical connection between these people and the Minangkabau, since mamak is itself a Minangkabau word.

4. Tideman (1935) mentions that a group of forest people in the interior of the island Bengkalis are known by outsiders as orang sakai, but call themselves orang batin. However, he does not name Duri as another location for them, Duri being the other sakai habitat that my informants mentioned. The word sakai itself means
subject; dependent. Of subject people in contrast to the ruling race; therefore somewhat contemptuous and usually replaced by terms like rayat and biduanda except in the Riau-Lingga archipelago where the sakai rank above the rayat.

(Wilkinson 1959:1002).

The word batin, on the other hand, means 'Protomalayan headman' who is subject to the sultan (Wilkinson 1959:91). Therefore the implication is that the orang sakai or orang batin were subjects of the sultan. The terms sakai and batin will be further discussed below.

5. Newbold (1839) referred to a group of people called the 'Orang Akkye', a name which does not seem to appear elsewhere in the literature, but which Skeat and Blagden (1906(1):87) have interpreted as 'Akit', a form sufficiently close to the name Akit. Newbold names three places on the Sumatran coast where the 'Akkye' may be found: 'Akit' (?), 'Murabu' (the island of Merbau, off the east coast of Sumatra), and 'Ratas' (?), all evidently in the Siak area. The Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indie (vol. 3:175-6) mentions the orang Akit as a small group living on the Mandan (now the Mandau), a left-bank tributary of the Siak River, near Panasa (now Penasa); these people were described as inhabitants of floating houses called rakit 'raft', from which it appears they got their name. Tideman (1935:797) mentions other groups of raft-dwelling people at the mouth of the Siak river where it enters Selat Panjang, and along Selat Morong between Pulau Rupat and Pulau Medang. Kähler (1960:16), on the basis of research conducted in 1939, wrote that the orang akit -- that is, the 'raft people' -- are to be found in the village of 'Utan Haiya' in Selat Morong on the island of Rupat off the east coast of Sumatra. He said that they are divided into two 'sibs' (Sippen) -- namely, the 'akit' and the 'xatas' ('x' denoting a voiceless velar fricative). These two names are identical to Newbold's place-names, 'Akit' and 'Ratas', the only difference being that of phonetic transcription. The documentary evidence thus appears to corroborate my informants' list of place-names for the Akit people. Three Akit habitats named by them are Bengkalis, Pulau Padang, and Tebingtinggi, which are islands located immediately off the Siak coast. Newbold's 'Murabu' (if interpreted as Merbau) and the confluence of the Siak River and Selat Panjang named by Tideman as Akit habitats are both located within this same general area. My informants' mention of Rupat as an Akit habitat is directly corroborated by Tideman and Kähler.

6. Schot (1882) mentioned the suku orang dalam as one of the high-status sukus in the Riau-Lingga islands. However, he did not name a specific location for them; nor did he use the term orang asli and orang hutan as alternative names for them, as did my informants. Schot wrote also that the suku orang dalam were believed to be latecomers to Riau-Lingga, being of noble Johor descent. If this was so, it would explain why Schot did not use the two alternative names my informants mentioned, since the term orang asli literally means 'original people', and the term orang hutan literally means 'forest people'. The term orang dalam literally means 'people of the interior'. From my research it appears that there are two distinct interiors being referred to
-- the interior of the forest and the interior of the palace. The interior referred to by my Pekanbaru informants was the former, whereas the interior referred to by Schot appears to be the latter. In my subsequent fieldwork in the Riau archipelago, I came across no existing group called the orang dalam, in either sense of the word dalam. When I asked a Penyengat informant about this term, he said that the only orang dalam he could think of were the serving people who were privileged to enter the sultan's palace. But since there is no longer a sultan in Riau, there are also no more orang dalam. This informant's understanding of the term orang dalam seems to agree with the information presented by Schot. But these orang dalam are evidently not the same orang dalam that my Pekanbaru informants were referring to. The former seem to have been palace retainers, whereas the latter were apparently forest-dwellers. According to a Pekanbaru informant, it is more polite to address the orang hutan 'forest people' as orang dalam; however, they are usually referred to simply as orang hutan. Used as a synonym for orang hutan, the term orang dalam thus appears to be a non-pejorative label, probably because of its association with palace retainers.

In the course of my fieldwork in the Riau islands, I did come across mention of the orang hutan in Rempang, although I did not have the opportunity to visit them. These people seem to be the same as those that Kähler had studied in Rempang in 1939. He described them (1960:3) as nomads who are referred to by outsiders as orang darat 'land people' or orang benua 'people of the landmass'. These may perhaps be regarded as classificatory labels which identify people as belonging to one category and not another. Therefore, the term orang darat identifies the orang hutan as people of the darat 'land' and not of the laut 'sea'. The term orang benua identifies them as people of the benua 'landmass' and not of the pulau 'small island'. The term orang dalam identifies them as people of the dalam 'interior hinterland' and not of the pantai 'coast'. And the term orang hutan identifies them as people of the hutan 'forest' and not of the kampung 'village' or bandar 'town'. In each case, there are people identified as belonging to the opposite category: Thus there are indeed people referred to as orang laut 'sea people', orang pulau 'people of small islands', orang pantai 'people of the coast', orang kampung 'people of the village' and orang bandar 'people of the town'.

The term orang asli 'original people' appears to be a relatively recent coinage. It is not mentioned by any of the nineteenth-century ethnographers and it is identical to the term invented by the Malaysian Government to label the aborigines of the Malay Peninsula, the majority of whom are forest-dwellers. Many Riau people are well-informed about events in Malaysia through receiving Malaysian radio and television broadcasts, and visiting Malaysia. Therefore it is not improbable that they should have borrowed the term orang asli from Malaysia to use for labelling their own forest-dwellers.

Apparently, the orang hutan are also to be found in Batam. Kähler (1960) considered the Rempang and Batam orang hutan to be culturally similar; this too was what I heard from my informants. Another community of orang hutan I came across in my fieldwork in Riau are the orang Bintan asli 'original Bintan people', who will be discussed in Chapter Seven.
7. According to my Riau informants, the orang Ungar are the people of the island known as Ungar or Onggar, off the southeastern coast of Kundur. Whereas my Pekanbaru informants had listed the orang Ungar as orang darat 'land people', my informants in the Riau islands consider them orang laut 'sea people'. The word ungar appears to be the name of a fish. So it may be possible that there is a connection between the fish-name and the name of this people. But there has been no previous mention of them in the literature. (See Map 3.)

8. Although the Air Jong mentioned by my Pekanbaru informants are supposed to be found in the Riau-Lingga islands, this name is not known to my informants in the Riau islands. Nor have I come across any such reference in the literature. The words Air Jong literally mean 'Junk Water'; this suggests the intriguing possibility that these people were perhaps the carriers of fresh water to the junks sailing through the Riau-Lingga islands.

9. Of the orang laut groups named, the Mantang and the Tambus are perhaps the best known; indeed they are so well-known that their names are often used, both by nineteenth-century and present-day natives, as generic terms for all orang laut.

The Mantang were apparently named after Mantang Island to the south of Bintan, but had spread far beyond this.

(Sopher 1977:94).

According to Schot (1884), there was a 'Kampong Tambus' in the southern part of one of the Galang islands, where the Tambus were said to have originated.

10. Of all the groups named above, the only one I had any direct experience of was the Bintan. However, contrary to my Pekanbaru informants' classification, I found the Bintan not to be nomadic sea people in any sense of the word, but to be cultivators well-settled on land. Nor did I ever hear my informant in the Riau islands mention any other nomadic boat-dwelling Bintan people. My research on the Bintan people will be discussed in the subsequent chapters.

11. I have concluded that the Penuangan mentioned by my Pekanbaru informants are the same as the orang penaung mentioned by my informants in the Riau islands. The former version I heard used only in Pekanbaru, whereas the usage in the Riau islands in the latter version. These are supposed to be migrants from Palembang in southern Sumatra who had settled in Bintan a long time ago. They will thus be discussed together with the Bintan people in the subsequent chapters.

12. The orang laut in Indragiri mentioned by my Pekanbaru informants seem to include more than one distinct group. According to what documentary evidence I have been able to discover, these are the suku Nam (Newbold 1839 and Schot 1882), the orang laut Bugis (Schot 1832), the orang kuala (Tobias 1861), and the 'Orang Lahut' (Adam 1928). It seems that the suku Nam are to be found inhabiting the strand stretching from the Kampar river mouth southwards to Tanjung Datuk in the Amphitritte Bay. The orang laut Bugis seem to be a boat-dwelling people located near the mouth of the Kateman river, on Burung island, and along the delta
of the Indragiri river, particularly around Tanjung Basu. The orang kuala apparently are also boat-dwellers, who are to be found in the tidal channels and distributaries — that is, kuala — of the Indragiri and neighbouring rivers. The 'Orang Lahut' (that is, orang laut) mentioned by Adam seem to be nomadic boat-dwellers who were nevertheless in contact with river-mouth settlements such as Kuala Tungkal. I have not yet been to Indragiri and so cannot say whether these groups still exist or whether they are still to be found at these locations.

13. Of the ethnonyms mentioned by my Pekanbaru informants three are used in Malaysia — namely, sakai, orang asli, and orang laut. (See, for example, Williams-Hunt 1952 and Benjamin 1980.)

14. What Major Williams-Hunt (1952:10) has to say about the difference between 'Malay' and 'Aborigine' is relevant to our understanding of the situation, because as the then British Colonial Adviser on Aborigines in the Federation of Malaya, he was in a position of some authority:

There are thousands of Chinese children adopted by Malays who are regarded as Malays, there are Malays from Java, from Sumatra, from the Celebes and a hundred other places all differing slightly in their customs but all placed under the heading Malay. The term is thus a social or religious distinction and not a racial one. Many Malays are of direct Aboriginal descent and from the earliest stock in the country. The problem then is which of the Aboriginal Malays who are converts to Islam are to be regarded as Malays and which are Aborigines. No one seems to agree on this point and in the 1947 Census some local authorities recorded them as Malays including Aboriginal Malays who were not Muslims whilst other local authorities recorded them as Aborigines. My own view is that any community of Aboriginal descent which is converted but which retain any elements of Aboriginal social organisation should be regarded as Aboriginal until all traces of its Aboriginal origin has disappeared.

15. An exception to this may be the case of Indonesian citizens of Chinese ethnicity. Leo Suryadinata (personal communication) has told me that in Jakarta, a special coding system is used on the identity cards of the ethnic Chinese to differentiate them from other Indonesians: this is indicated by the digit 0 at the beginning of the registration number. But it is not clear whether this coding system is used elsewhere in Indonesia.

16. Following indigenous convention, the name of the sultanate depends on the location of its capital. So when the capital of the sultanate was located on the Johor river, it was known as the kerajaan Johor 'kingdom of Johor'. When the capital was located on the Riau river, it was known as kerajaan Riau 'the kingdom of Riau'. When the capital was moved to Lingga, it was known as kerajaan Lingga-Riau 'the kingdom of Lingga-Riau'. In the last days of the sultanate, the capital of sultan was shifted back to Riau; so it ended as kerajaan Riau-Lingga 'the kingdom of Riau-Lingga'. Since that was the last name of the sultanate, that is what I will use in this study. See Wee and Matheson (forthcoming) for the usages of these names in the documentary sources.
17. Palembang, Kampar, Indragiri, and Siak were all former sultanates. (See, for example, Raja Ali Haji 1982.) Pulau Tujuh -- which includes the Anambas, Natuna, and other islands in the South China Sea -- was part of the Riau-Lingga sultanate. (See ibid. and Map 2.)

18. See, for example, Johns (1980:163) who states:

The 'Malay' world of Southeast Asia represents one of the most remarkable extensions of the domain of Islam.

In this 'Malay' world, he includes all the Muslims of Malaysia and Indonesia, a population he estimates at approximately 150 million.


20. I will be referring to Wilkinson's dictionary rather than to more recent ones, because the latter tend to explain only usages within the standardised national languages of Malaysia and Indonesia. In these standardised forms of the language, many of the older connotations are lost, but these connotations are still relevant to my informants.

21. See Gellner (1964:105-110) on the philosophical concept of the 'pure visitor'.

22. Coming from a polytheistic background myself, I find no difficulty with the idea that truth, like a deity, can be refracted in diverse manifestations and still be one.

23. Such an audience would include

a crowd in a public square or a gathering of specialists, a single being or all humanity. [This mode of analysis]... even examines arguments addressed to oneself in private deliberation, or in what is now commonly referred to as 'intrapersonal communication'.... The theory of argumentation, conceived as a new rhetoric or dialectic, covers the whole range of discourse that aims at persuasion and conviction, whatever the audience addressed and whatever the subject matter.

(Perelman 1982:5).

24. Bateson (1980:5) explains the relationship between text and context thus:

The messages cease to be messages when nobody can read them. Without a Rosetta stone, we would know nothing of all that was written in Egyptian hieroglyphs. They would be only elegant ornaments on papyrus or rock. To be meaningful -- even to be recognised as pattern -- every regularity must meet with complementary regularities....
25. Goody (1977:3) states:

...The absence of writing means that it is difficult to isolate a segment of human discourse...and subject it to the same highly individual, highly intense, highly abstract, highly critical analysis that we can give to a written statement.

26. Foucault (1980a:92-93) argues:

The sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination...are only the terminal forms power takes.... Power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organisation; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.

27. Wang's (1979:1) modification of Marx's dictum seems relevant in this context:

The historians have only perceived the past in different ways: the point is to use it.

Regarding this use of the past, Wang (1979:4) states:

...The most obvious feature that emerges is that there was in the Southeast Asian tradition no interest in the past for itself. What was encouraged was what Oliver Wolters calls a 'forward lookingness', or at least as James Fox puts it, the past 'perceived for its relevance to the present'. And in more recent times, there has been a recalling of the past, conscious efforts at reconstruction, which has clearly been made to influence the present if not the future as well.

The difference between the nostalgic and the historic modes of constructing the past may indeed be interpreted in Wang's terms as the difference between using the past in the context of the present and perceiving the past for its own sake.

28. Regarding the title of the work, Brown (1970:x) has pointed out that 'Sejarah Melayu' is a misnomer, which is found neither in Raffles 18 nor in the later Riau versions. The origins of this title are obscure, though it is used for the editions by Shellabear (first published 1896), Winstedt (1938), and Brown (first published 1953). Brown (1970:x) explains the title Sejarah Melayu thus:
The work is generally known as the *Sejarah Melayu*, but this description is not found either in this or the Shellabear text: and 'Malay Annals' is a popular mistranslation. For *Sejarah* means 'genealogical tree' and the royal command to the author was ... 'to write a story (setting out) the descent of Malay Rajas with their customary ceremonial'.

My interpretation is that this particular text is regarded by those concerned with Melayu-ness as an articulation of Melayu historicity. Hence it is generally known as *Sejarah Melayu*, even though this term is not found in the various manuscript versions of the text. However, this does not necessarily mean that this text is therefore the one and only objectification of Melayu historicity; it is merely one manifestation of it. Matheson (1984:6) also notes that the term *sejarah Melayu* may not necessarily refer to just one particular text 'but could equally mean "Malay history".'

In contrast the title *Sulalatus Salatin* is indeed found in both Raffles 18 and the Riau versions of the text. But this is an Arabic title which is translated into Malay within the text as *Penurunan Segala Raja-Raja*, which Brown (1970:2) translates as 'The Genealogy of Kings'. I have chosen to use the Malay title rather than the Arabic one. The reason is that there is another edition of the text by A. Samad Ahmad (1979) published under the Arabic title. This Samad Ahmad recension is also a hybrid redaction based on yet another three manuscripts found in Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka. So to make it clear that I am referring to the overall text in its various versions, I shall use the title *Penurunan Segala Raja-Raja* which, as Roolvinck (ibid.:xviii) points out, is borne by all the known versions without exception. Roolvinck (ibid.:xviii-xix) also notes:

...Instead of *penurunan segala raja* we find *peraturan segala raja*, an error of a copyist who misunderstood an original *pertuturan segala raja* still found in several manuscripts. In Raffles 18, too, the transcription *peraturan* is wrong, the manuscript clearly reading *pertuturan*. The word *tutur*, not found in Malay any longer, still has here the same meaning as in present-day Toba-Batak: relative, family relation.

29. Winstedt (1938) edited a romanised version of Raffles 18, which Brown (1953; 1970) subsequently translated into English. In my study I will refer to Raffles 18 in these two published editions. Another important published edition is the one known as the Shellabear recension (first published in 1896; latest edition 1967). According to Roolvinck (1970:xxiii), this is a hybrid redaction derived from a long version and a short version, which are both late texts.

30. This critical edition is a hybrid redaction based on four manuscripts dating perhaps from 1890 to 1930. (See Matheson and Andaya 1982:9.) I have also used the Malay recension by Matheson (1982), which is based mostly on the shortest of the four manuscripts mentioned above — namely, the van Hasselt MS dating from 1896. (See ibid.:xix-xxv).
31. Bateson (1980:74) explains this through the following example:

The acrobat on the high wire maintains his stability by continual correction of his [or her] imbalance.... The statement 'The acrobat is on the high wire' continues to be true under impact of small breezes and vibrations of the wire. This 'stability' is the result of continual changes in descriptions of the acrobat's posture and the position of his or her balancing pole.

32. Errington (1979:26) also notes:

Some of the most distinguished and enlightening works by Western commentators concerning Southeast Asian culture and thought have addressed the question of the relation between the events of the past (generally termed 'history') and the numerous writings from Southeast Asia dating from before the nineteenth century. Much of the commentary has assumed that the impulse which brought forth these texts was to write history, and the failure of these texts as history is therefore at first glance inexplicable.... It seems to me that the consciousness which informs historical writing and that informs Classical Malay hikayat...are profoundly alien to one another, in impulse as well as in artifact.
CHAPTER TWO

SPATIAL CONFIGURATIONS

2.1 Indonesia

2.2 Alam Melayu

2.3 Riau

2.4 The Island World of Sea and Land
2.1 Indonesia

The area in which I did my fieldwork is part of a spatial configuration known as 'Indonesia'. This particular configuration is derived from Dutch colonisation, which by 1911 had conquered the whole territory, thereby unifying it under one government. Prior to unification under Dutch rule, there were diverse indigenous kingdoms, the Riau-Lingga sultanate being one of these. The territory of the Riau-Lingga sultanate was one of the last areas to come under direct Dutch administration. The spatial configuration known as 'Indonesia' is thus not just a geographically inherent phenomenon, but rather, the historical result of certain temporal events. In other words, there would not even be such a spatial configuration, if the Dutch had not colonised the territory as they did. So as a spatial configuration, Indonesia is almost identical to the Netherlands East Indies of post-1911. The difference is in the governing personnel.

On the morning of 17 August 1945, Sukarno read the declaration of independence before a relatively small group outside his own house.

As news spread of the declaration of independence, many Indonesians far from Jakarta disbelieved it. It was only well into September 1945 before the fact that independence had been declared was known in remoter regions.

(Ricklefs 1981:202).

The people of Riau-Lingga were among those in the remoter regions to whom news of the declaration slowly spread. They were thus not among the initiators of independence in Jakarta.

It was, however, easier to declare independence than to realise it, for the Dutch came back and tried to resurrect their pre-War empire. Five years of bloody struggle ensued, during which the Riau-Lingga area was under Dutch control. It was not until 1950 when the Indonesian nationalists achieved their final victory over the Dutch
colonialists, that the Riau-Lingga area finally came under direct Indonesian administration.

So twice in history, once in 1911 and again in 1950, Riau-Lingga was one of the last areas to become officially part of the spatial configuration. This is no mere coincidence but a direct indication of the peripheral status of this area in relation to the configuration as a whole. Batavia/Jakarta is the centre of both the Netherlands East Indies and Indonesia. Similarly, in both the Netherlands East Indies and Indonesia, Riau-Lingga is peripheral. As we shall see below, my informants are very much aware of the Java-centricity of the spatial configuration in which they are located.

Within the bureaucratic structure of Indonesia, the area in which I did my fieldwork is located at the very lowest administrative levels, far removed from the political centre in Jakarta. Most of my time was spent in four particular kepenghuluan 'headman-doms' -- namely, Kepenghuluan Penyengat, Kepenghuluan Pangkil, Kepenghuluan Bintan, and Kepenghuluan Karas. (See Map 4.) These 'headman-doms' are part of a higher-level administrative unit known as Kecamatan Bintan Selatan 'Sub-district of Southern Bintan', the administrative centre of which is located in Tanjungpinang. This kecamatan 'sub-district' is, in turn, part of a higher-level administrative unit known as Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau 'District of the Riau Archipelago', the administrative centre of which is located also in Tanjungpinang. The area included in this kabupaten 'district' more or less comprises the former territory of the Riau-Lingga sultanate. This kabupaten is, in turn, part of a higher-level administrative unit known as Propinsi Riau 'Riau Province', the capital of which is located in Pekanbaru on Sumatra. (See Map 2.) The province is, in turn, subordinate to the national capital, Jakarta, located in Java. There are thus four intervening administrative levels between Jakarta and my
fieldwork area, which is thereby politically very peripheral in the context of Indonesia. My informants are themselves very aware of these administrative levels. Indeed to illustrate how far away from Jakarta they are, they often enumerate these levels one by one, as I have done so above.

According to the 1977 Population Registration figures issued by the Bureau of Statistics in Tanjungpinang for the Sub-district of Southern Bintan, the four 'headman-doms' which constitute my main fieldwork area have the following population:

- **Kepenghuluan Penyengat** - 1,643 persons in an area of 23.3 km²
- **Kepenghuluan Pangkil** - 1,021 persons in an area of 150 km²
- **Kepenghuluan Bintan** - 1,160 persons in an area of 75 km²
- **Kepenghuluan Karas** - 3,311 persons in an area of 787 km²

The total of 7,135 is about 10% of a population of 71,205 in the Sub-district of Southern Bintan. (See Appendix 11.) According to *Penduduk Indonesia 1980* 'the 1980 Population Census of Indonesia' (Seri: L no.2), the District of the Riau Archipelago has a population of 422,712, and Riau Province as a whole has a population of 2,168,535 in an area of 94,562 km². This means that whereas Riau Province constitutes 4.93% of the total land area of Indonesia, its population constitutes only 1.47% of the total population of 147,490,298. Indeed, although Riau Province now has the ninth fastest growing population in Indonesia, with a growth rate of 3.11%, its population density rate of 23 persons per square kilometre is still the lowest in
Sumatra and seventh lowest among the twenty-seven provinces in Indonesia.

As noted by Kato (1984:10):

Partly related to low population density is the lack of notable urban centres. Riau's only substantial city is Pekanbaru, the provincial capital, which is comparatively newly urbanised... Other than Pekanbaru, noticeable cities are...Tanjung Pinang, Tembilahan, Rengat, Dumai, Duri, and Bangkinang.

Of these cities, Tanjungpinang is the only one located in the Riau archipelago. It is thus the main local centre for the people living in that district.

The discussion above points to an important characteristic of the relationship between centre and periphery in this spatial configuration: the centres were historically founded upon foreign interest. Batavia was the centre of the Dutch empire. Pekanbaru became an important port town under the Dutch, particularly after Caltex discovered oil in the vicinity. It subsequently became the provincial capital. Tanjungpinang was the site where the Dutch garrison was stationed in the late eighteenth century, which later became the capital of the Dutch Residentie Riouw en Onderhoorgheden 'the Residency of Riau and its dependencies'. Nor are the days of Dutch rule so distant from the present that nobody can remember any of it. For example, in Tanjungpinang many of the offices of the Indonesian bureaucrats are located in buildings dating from the Dutch era, including, for example, the mansion of the former Dutch Resident, which is still remembered as such.

The lack of urbanisation in Riau Province, as noted by Kato (see above), is thus due, at least in part, to the relatively late date of Dutch colonisation. The association of foreign-ness with the urban centres seems to continue to the present. Most of the migrants to
Riau Province are attracted to the towns and cities where they can find ready cash employment. In the District of the Riau Archipelago, the towns attracting migration would include Tanjungpinang, Tanjunguban, Tanjungbalai, and Sekupang. (See Map 3.)

Speare (1975:67) noted that based on the 1971 census, the lifetime migration rate in Riau Province was only 9.9%, which was much lower than the corresponding rates for other Sumatran provinces such as Lampung (with 35%) and Jambi (with 12.9%). This low migration rate may perhaps be taken as an indication that Indonesians in the other provinces view Riau Province as peripheral and hence not worth migrating to. Despite this relatively low migration rate, there is nevertheless continuing in-migration by people from elsewhere. My informants differentiate between penduduk asli 'native inhabitants' and orang dari luar 'people from outside'. They generally put themselves in the former category, although as we shall see in the subsequent chapters, who is native and who is from outside is by no means a clear-cut issue. Nevertheless, for first-generation migrants at least, it is possible to differentiate between who was born in Riau Province and who was not. The blurring of the issue begins from the second generation onwards.

Auda Murad (1977:18) mentions three kinds of migrants in Riau Province — Minangkabau men who merantau 'emigrate to seek a living', transmigrants from East Java, and seasonal migrants from Sulawesi. It seems to me, however, that the migration from Sulawesi is more than just seasonal. In the Sub-district of Southern Bintan, for example, there is a Kampung Bugis 'Bugis Village' situated near Tanjungpinang where newcomers from Sulawesi congregate. (See Map 4.) My informants divide the Sulawesi migrants into two distinct categories — the Bugis people and the Buton people. In addition to all these, I also came across a number of migrants from Flores.
These first-generation migrants in Riau consist almost entirely of Indonesian citizens from other provinces. There are hardly any migrants from foreign countries. In the course of my fieldwork, I met with only one or two such cases of the latter. For example, one was a Chinese man from Singapore, who had gone to Riau during the Second World War, in order to escape from the Japanese. He never returned to Singapore. Most of the Chinese in Riau Province were, however, born and bred there. My informants do not consider these local-born Chinese as *orang dari luar* 'people from outside'; instead they are referred to as *bangsa lain* 'other stock'. They are regarded not as outsiders, but rather, as familiar strangers or perhaps as strange familiars. According to my informants, there were formerly many Chinese residents even on the smaller, more remote islands of the Riau Archipelago; but after 1959, no Chinese person was allowed to reside outside certain designated administrative centres such as Tanjungpinang. Consequently, the number of Chinese residents on the other islands decreased dramatically, and the urban centres became correspondingly more Sinicised.

This has further polarised the duality of *kampung* 'village' and *kota* 'town'. The villages are inhabited by the indigenes of the Riau Archipelago, whereas the towns are inhabited by the non-indigenes, including both 'people from outside', as well as those of 'other stock'. However, this duality is not politically symmetrical. A town is an administrative centre for either a district or a sub-district, whereas a village is not even an administrative unit in itself, but merely part of a 'headman-dam', which is in turn part of a sub-district. The consequent pattern is that the indigenous villagers are administered by non-indigenous townspeople. The awareness of this duality is clearly indicated by language usage. In town, one speaks *Bahasa Indonesia*, the Indonesian national language; in the villages,
however, one speaks the linguistically unstandardised and officially unrecognised dialect of the place.

Because all the district and sub-district offices are located in the towns, commercial activities also tend to be concentrated there. As a result of the cash employment that these generate, the population density in the towns tends to be much higher than that in the villages. If we look at the Sub-district of Southern Bintan, of which Tanjungpinang is the administrative centre, we find a cline in population density such that the nearer a village is to Tanjungpinang, the more densely populated it is likely to be, and the farther away it is, the more sparsely populated it is likely to be. Tanjungpinang is itself so densely populated that it is sub-divided into several kepenghuluan 'headman-doms' — that is, into so many different wards. (See Appendix 11.)

With regards to the four 'headman-doms' where I did my fieldwork, it is quite clear that the one closest to Tanjungpinang is the most densely populated, whereas the one farthest is the most sparsely populated. Thus Kepenghuluan Penyengat is the most densely populated, being close enough to Tanjungpinang to serve as a suburb of the town. Kepenghuluan Bintan is the next most densely populated, being farther away, though with the advantage of being connected by road to Tanjungpinang. Kepenghuluan Pangkil is still more sparsely populated, being separated from Tanjungpinang by a good two hours' ride in a motor-boat, longer if propelled only by wind and oar. Kepenghuluan Karas is the most sparsely populated, being located at the very limits of the Sub-district of Southern Bintan. The same geographical cline in population density is discernible in the other 'headman-doms' as well. So it would be possible to draw a series of concentric circles, radiating outwards from Tanjungpinang as the most densely populated area, to the periphery of the sub-district as the most sparsely
The duality of centre and periphery is thus a recurrent motif in the spatial configuration known as 'Indonesia'. It is found at different administrative levels — at the national, provincial, district, sub-district, and even 'headman-dom' level. What Gottman (1980:15-16) says about centre and periphery is of relevance to our discussion:

Centrality must be perceived by the people using the 'central place' as such. That perception is not the simple result of physical design apparent in the field; it is influenced by historical knowledge, political organisation, economic functions, and so on.... The peripheral position seems easier to recognise because it is more diffuse, more widely distributed. It would seem that any area or location depending on a centre outside it for services or decisions affecting the life of its population feels itself to be on the periphery. In geographical terms the periphery is what surrounds the centre, a geometrical relationship; the farther away a point is from the centre, the more peripheral it would be. But the political relationship is different: peripheral location means subordination to the centre. In a stable, orderly situation the subordination is accepted even if somewhat deplored and resented. A lack of resignation to such subordination would obviously lead to conflict and instability.

It is my argument that this tension between centre and periphery is one of the contextual regularities informing the text of my informants. As shown above, they are located in the periphery of Indonesia, indeed on the very edge of the national boundaries, next to the nation-states of Singapore and Malaysia. Provincially, they are also peripheral, being located far from the provincial capital at Pekanbaru. (See Map 2.) Even on district and sub-district levels, they are peripheral, being located outside Tanjungpinang, the local administrative centre.

My informants' discourse on Melayu-ness seems to express a recognition of their peripherality in Indonesia. To begin with, Melayu-ness is perceived as a phenomenon that pertains not to the towns, but to the villages. There are thus kampung Melayu 'Melayu
villages' but no kota Melayu 'Melayu towns'. The patterning of Melayu-ness is seen as stopping short of Tanjungpinang, which is clearly identified by everyone not as a tempat Melayu 'Melayu place', but as an Indonesian ibukota 'capital city'. So taking Tanjungpinang as the centre in relation to which every other place in the sub-district is peripheral, what I found was a spread of Melayu-ness that extended from the inner edge of the periphery to the outer peripheral limits. Kepenghuluan Penyengat is thus located on the inner edge, whereas Kepenghuluan Karas is located at the outer peripheral limits. Kepenghuluan Bintan and Kepenghuluan Pangkil are in-between.

As noted by Gottman (see above), peripherality is not merely geographical distance but also political subordination, which may be either accepted or resisted. So if my informants' discourse on Melayu-ness expresses a recognition of their peripherality in Indonesia, then by implication, it would also express their acceptance or non-acceptance of their peripheral and hence politically subordinate position. In this light, it is highly significant that their discourse on Melayu-ness is framed not in the here-and-now of Indonesia, but in the there-and-then of a bygone sultanate. As mentioned in Chapter One, this strategy may be understood as elusion, whereby one modality of experience is played off against another, such that conflict between two opposing parties is eluded. This further implies that my informants' discourse on Melayu-ness expresses covert resistance to their political peripherality in Indonesia. To push the argument one more step, Melayu-ness seems to be a phenomenon that is identified as not just peripheral but also non-Indonesian.

The identification of Melayu-ness as such a phenomenon was articulated not only by my peripherally located informants in the 'headman-doms' of island Riau. Even the relatively more Indonesia-oriented bureaucrats of Pekanbaru share this perception. As I have
noted in Chapter One above, the latter talked about things Melayu as though referring to some phenomenon located out there in the not quite modern world, in the world of the bygone past, of palace ruins, royal graves, and aboriginal people. The insider's perspective thus seems to dovetail nicely with the outsider's perspective. From the perspective of the Pekanbaru bureaucrats, Melayu-ness is perceived as non-Indonesian and hence peripheral. From the perspective of the villagers of island Riau, however, Indonesia is seen as non-Melayu and is thus considered peripheral. It depends on one's perspective, whether it is Melayu-ness that is construed as peripheral, or whether it is Indonesian-ness that is so considered. To put this another way, one person's centre may be another person's periphery. Indeed, in my informants' discourse on Melayu-ness, there is a symbolic reversal of political reality. Penyengat island is perceived as the Melayu centre of the area, not Tanjungpinang, nor Pekanbaru, and certainly not Jakarta. Peripherality is thus reversed into centrality.

Perhaps ironically, this vision of Melayu centrality is not incompatible with Indonesian national ideology. The national motto bhinneka tunggal ika is officially translated into English as 'unity in diversity'. The official view from Jakarta is that while Indonesia is a single polity, it is nevertheless a country peopled by diverse sukus 'divisions', such as Suku Jawa, Suku Minangkabau, Suku Batak, Suku Bugis, and indeed, Suku Melayu. Ethnic diversity is thus officially recognised as a historical given, over and above which political unity is supposed to transcend. Such a recognition would seem to be historically valid since, as shown above, 'Indonesia' itself is a spatial configuration derived, not from the territory of any pre-existing nation, but from the Netherlands East Indies of the Dutch colonialists.
The basis of Indonesian unity is supposed to be non-ethnic. No suku of the Indonesian population is, in theory, supposed to be more important than any other suku. Instead, an abstract creed known as the Pancasila 'Five Principles' is supposed to be the means whereby a supra-ethnic unity is to be achieved.

The ethnic situation in Indonesia may be usefully compared to that of Malaysia. Siddique and Suryadinata (1982) have shown that both in Malaysia and Indonesia, there is a legal differentiation between indigene and non-indigene, such a differentiation being based on the government's wish to compensate for the perceived economic deprivation of the former. Thus there are special rights and privileges instituted in favour of the indigenes of both these countries. However, whereas there is a strong identification of the Malaysian bumiputra 'indigene' as 'Malay', there is no clear definition of the Indonesian pribumi 'indigene'.

So unlike the Malaysian situation where the 'Malays' are the dominant category of indigenes, in Indonesia the category Suku Melayu is merely one of the many categories of indigenous people. Such being the case, the Indonesian government has no special interest in defining Melayu-ness as such, so long as it does not develop into secessionist separatism. Within the political limits of national unity, Melayu-ness in Indonesia remains very much a local matter to be understood in local terms.

2.2 Alam Melayu

Apart from these local terms, however, we must also consider an alternative spatial configuration, other than that known as 'Indonesia', within which Melayu-ness may be perceived as meaningful. This alternative is generally referred to by my informants as alam
Melayu 'the Melayu world', by which they refer to the territory of a network of genealogically related kingdoms, located in the Malay Peninsula including Singapore, the east coast of Sumatra, the coast of Borneo from Brunei westwards to Banjarmasin, and of course the Riau-Lingga archipelago itself. These kingdoms, some extinct and others extant, are currently divided into five nation-states -- namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Thailand. The 'Melayu world' thus transcends the boundaries of these nation-states. So apart from a nationally bounded spatial configuration, there is also a cosmopolitan alam Melayu that transcends the boundaries of Indonesia.

Of the nation-states mentioned above, perhaps the one most relevant in the context of alam Melayu is Malaysia, because it incorporates the greatest number of extant sultanates in the area. In the order of their genealogical proximity to the Riau-Lingga sultanate, these are Johor, Selangor, Pahang, Trengganu, Perak, Kedah, Kelantan, and Perlis. Although Melaka and Penang are Malaysian states, they are not extant sultanates.

As I have shown above, the spatial configuration known as 'Indonesia' is not just a geographically inherent phenomenon, but rather, the historical result of certain temporal events -- specifically, Dutch colonisation and Indonesian nationalisation. Similarly, the spatial configuration referred to as alam Melayu is also historically engendered. My informants are themselves very much aware of this historicity, for which the term sejarah is used. When my informants first talked about sejarah Melayu, I initially thought that they were referring to the text, the Penurunan, that has been published in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur under the title Sejarah Melayu. (See Chapter One.) Later, I realised that what they were referring to extended beyond this particular text and could perhaps be understood as a sense of Melayu historicity, which manifests itself in
different forms, including both the textual and the oral.

I have discovered that my informants' sense of Melayu historicity is very much bound up with a particular genealogical tree — to be specific, a particular genealogy of kingship. In their oral tradition, this genealogy began in Palembang with Seri Teri Buana, a ruler whose title is interpreted as meaning Raja Tiga Benua 'King of Three Lands' — namely, Palembang, Bintan, and Temasik/Singapore. These 'three lands' are so connected through a myth which relates that Seri Teri Buana first reigned in Palembang, then in Bintan, and finally in Temasik/Singapore. According to the myth, it was a descendant of this founding ruler that eventually established and ruled Melaka. Branches of this genealogical tree then spread to other places, such as Perak, Pahang, and Indragiri. After Melaka fell to the Portuguese, the main ruling branch in Melaka moved southward to Johor and Riau, eventually establishing close connections with yet other places such as Trengganu and Selangor.

These places are thus genealogically related to each other through this myth. The places mentioned above are just some key examples; there are many other places related in this way. As the names that can be included on a genealogy are limited only by one's knowledge and memory, so the list of places that can be genealogically related is also theoretically unlimited. Alam Melayu is thus not a bounded territory but rather, an expandable network of genealogically related places. All that is needed to add a place-name to the list is to demonstrate that the rulers of that place were related by kinship to what is literally sejarah Melayu 'the Melayu genealogy' of kingship. This may explain why my literate informants have such a keen interest in collecting and drawing up genealogies.
What is particularly striking is that these places are genealogically related only through their rulers, and not through their common subjects. The implication is that those places that did not have kingly rulers cannot possibly be related in this way. Only rulers can be related to rulers; and only states can be related to states. As an informant noted:

*Raja baru ada sejarah, rakyat mana ada sejarah.*

(Only the rulers have genealogies/histories; the subjects have no genealogies/histories.)

Therefore to claim that a particular place is part of *alam Melayu* is to imply that it was the site of a *Melayu* kingdom. It is perhaps clearer at this point how it is possible for my informants to perceive Penyengat as central and not peripheral, for that was indeed the last capital of the Riau-Lingga sultanate. Thus to continue to perceive Penyengat as a *Melayu* centre is to continue to perceive the existence of that sultanate. It is indeed the aim of this study to show how this perception is sustained.

Spatially, *alam Melayu* does not coincide with Indonesia. On the one hand, it expands beyond the Indonesian national boundaries to include such places as Singapore, Johor, Selangor, Perak, Pahang, and Trengganu. And on the other hand, it does not include within Indonesia such places as Java, Bali, and the other more easterly islands. At it widest extent, *alam Melayu* spans the area that is unified by the body of water formed by the Melaka Strait, the South China Sea, and the numerous straits extending as far south as Bangka and Billiton. The various places mentioned above as comprising *alam Melayu* may perhaps be described as being situated on the rim of a bowl of water, with the west coast of the Malay Peninsula and the east coast of Sumatra making a double rim.
As noted by Benjamin (1980:48):

...Malay states did not arise solely within the Malay Peninsula: the same processes were occurring simultaneously in Borneo, the Sumatran mainland and in the Riau-Lingga archipelago. Their marine interconnections were such that the consciousness of a Malay world (alam Melayu) has been shared by them all for several hundred years.

It is precisely this 'consciousness of a Malay world' that my informants still sustain. As pointed out by Benjamin, the formation of such a 'world' resulted from the rise of a certain type of state. Genealogical connections posited between such states may thus be understood as an expression of their structural relations to each other.

So the myth that links Palembang, Bintan, Temasik/Singapore, Melaka, and other places in genealogical terms, may be interpreted as a statement of historicity. The implication would be that a certain type of state was established in these places, in the order given in the myth. Wolters (1970:ix) has indeed taken this myth seriously as 'a rendering of Malay history originally seen from a Palembang and Malacca point of view and subsequently assimilated to Malay historical tradition.' From a Riau perspective, a myth that recounts the genealogical connections of kingdoms within alam Melayu would identify Riau-Lingga itself as one such kingdom, and hence heir to a political tradition going all the way back to Palembang, the ancestral state.

Following Geertz (1963:39-41), I shall use the term pasisir 'coastal' to label the type of state that arose in alam Melayu. What appears to have been the most distinctive characteristic of the pasisir state was 'an orientation to marketing activities' (ibid.:39). Apart from this, the economy was evidently quite unspecialised. It was trade that served as the unifying economic principle of an otherwise ecologically diverse area. Geertz (ibid.) characterises the
pasisir state as a 'general, quite distinctive type of political and social system', wherein the population was divided into 'a supralocal ruling class, a commoner class, and a dependent group of slaves.'

However, her description (ibid.) of the pasisir area is much wider than alam Melayu, including not only

the entire eastern half of Sumatra,...the Malayan Peninsula itself,...the islands between Sumatra and Borneo (e.g. Riouw, Lingga, Banka, Billiton), and...the coasts and river valleys of Borneo, but also Atjeh, South Celebes, Gorontolo in North Celebes, Ternate, Tidore, the Batjan islands, the Goram islands, West Java, Madura, Sumbawa, and small pockets on the other lesser Sunda Islands.

Alam Melayu thus constitutes only one part of Geertz's pasisir area. If we accept her geographical definition as valid, then we may ask: what is it that differentiated alam Melayu from the rest of the pasisir area? It is perhaps in this context that we can appreciate the full significance of my informants' concern with genealogy: alam Melayu was unified by sejarah Melayu -- that is, a particular genealogical tree of kingship. The other, non-Melayu, pasisir areas would thus be those where the rulers did not claim to belong to this particular genealogical tree. For example, Aceh is located on the northern tip of the Sumatran mainland, yet the rulers evidently did not claim to belong to the Melayu genealogical tree. And indeed Aceh is generally not regarded as part of alam Melayu. On the contrary, both the indigenous and foreign texts indicate that Aceh was an historical enemy of alam Melayu. (See, for example, Andaya 1975.)

So the implication is that alam Melayu was a geographical network of kin-related allies. In other words, what differentiated alam Melayu from the rest of the pasisir area was politics, rather than any geographical or ecological factor. Indeed, in those cases where two potential allies were not already related, the alliance was usually sealed by a marriage. What the genealogical tree known as sejarah
Melayu portrayed was thus a serial patterning of political alliances based on kinship. Alam Melayu was the spatial configuration that resulted from this political patterning. Hence to locate oneself within alam Melayu is to claim membership in a specific network of political alliances.

From this perspective, both Indonesia and alam Melayu may be understood as stochastic patterns of power taking shape in space, such that particular spatial configurations are formed. As I have shown above, the patterning of power that created Indonesia is quite different from the patterning of power that created alam Melayu. There is thus an inherent tension in my informants' situation, for they live in Indonesia as Indonesian citizens, yet project their consciousness beyond to an alam Melayu wherein the existence of an Indonesia as such is irrelevant. In so doing, they distance themselves from the present by focussing their attention on the not-present. This results in the implicit question: so what is reality after all, the present or the not-present? This leads in turn to fuzziness in one's perceptions. Indeed, even so basic a question as 'where is Riau?' can elicit a range of semantic complexity. After all, where Riau is would depend on the spatial configuration in which one locates it. Riau in Indonesia would thus be very different from Riau in alam Melayu.

2.3 Riau

In official Indonesian terminology, the name 'Riau' is used in two different senses — Propinsi Riau 'Riau Province' and Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau 'District of the Riau Archipelago'. As noted by Kato (1984:9),
It is conventional to divide the Province of Riau into two regions: inland Riau (Riau daratan), the land mass belonging to Sumatra including its offshore islands, and island Riau (Riau kepulauan), the sea area with its innumerable islands.

My informants are indeed aware of these Indonesian usages, both the official and conventional ones. However, in their own everyday usage, the name 'Riau' has more precise referents.

The most precise referent is the river known as Sungai Riau. My informants in the 'headman-dom' of Karas say, aku nak ke Riau 'I am going to Riau', when they mean that they are going to Tanjungpinang. They call Tanjungpinang 'Riau' because it is located on Sungai Riau. So by this reckoning, they are themselves not even in Riau. Indeed, most of these informants would rather say that they are in Galang. So in this usage, the name 'Riau' refers to a place that is perhaps equivalent to the status of Galang. What the name 'Galang' itself refers to will be explained below.

Apart from my Galang informants, the other informants also emphasise the importance of Sungai Riau, without, however, restricting the usage of the name 'Riau' to that river alone. In their usage, 'Riau' refers to the islands extending as far west as Karimun and Kundur, as far east as Bintan, and as far south as the Abang islands. The Lingga archipelago and the Tujuh islands are excluded from this labelling. So although this latter usage is wider than the Galang usage, the area it refers to is nevertheless still smaller than the Indonesian 'District of the Riau Archipelago' which does include the Lingga and Tujuh islands. (See Map 2.)

At first sight, it may seem somewhat paradoxical that my informants should regard Riau as central and not peripheral, and yet include a smaller area under that name than does the Indonesian Government. However, this paradox is easily resolved when one
realises that it is not territorial size that matters, but rather, geographical location. To understand this, let us consider the most precise referent of the name 'Riau' — that is, Sungai Riau. According to some of my informants, the name 'Riau' was derived from the Portuguese word for river — rio. The suggestion is that the river Sungai Riau was called rio by the Portuguese, hence its Malay name.

Interestingly, there is another name for this river — Sungai Carang 'Branching River'. Indeed the river is actually a confluence of two separate streams. (See Map 5.) The more northerly stream is historically the more important; this is known as Hulu Sungai Riau 'Headwaters of the Riau River'. The more southerly stream which seems to have played no historical role is called Hulu Sungai Carang 'Headwaters of Carang River'. This implies that the Portuguese word rio was associated only with the more northerly stream.

Another opinion among my informants is that the name 'Riau' derived from the Malay word riuh 'clamour, hubbub, noise, festivity'. The story is that when Opu Daeng Cellak got married, there was such a festive celebration that the noise could be heard from miles away. People from all around commented to one another — sana riuh 'it's noisy there'. Consequently, the place that was riuh became known as Riau.

Although there is no linguistic evidence that such a sound shift did occur, this folk etymology has certain significant aspects. First of all, this story dates the usage of the name as occurring after the marriage of Opu Daeng Cellak. According to the Tuhfat, this marriage occurred immediately after Opu Daeng Cellak's elder brother, Opu Daeng Marewah, was installed as Yang Dipertuan Muda 'Underking'. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:64.) Netscher (1870:59) gives the installation date as
4 October 1722. The dating implied in my informants' story is significant because it associates 'Riau' with the Bugis rulers of the area, of whom Opu Daeng Marewah was the very first. Moreover, it is significant that the event taken as the landmark is Opu Daeng Cellak's wedding and not Opu Daeng Marewah's installation, for in this famous wedding, the woman that the former married was Sultan Sulaiman's sister, Tengku Mandak. In other words, what this wedding symbolises is the political alliance that was forged between Sultan Sulaiman, the Melayu ruler on the one hand, and Opu Daeng Cellak, the Bugis adventurer on the other. The Bugis rulers thus married into sejarah Melayu.

Another significant aspect is that the palaces of Opu Daeng Marewah and Opu Daeng Cellak were located in Hulu Sungai Riau 'Headwaters of the Riau River'. Their graves are still to be found there. Hence it is debatable whether the river became known as Riau because the Bugis rulers made it riuh, or whether the name 'Riau' came to be used for the whole archipelago because the rulers of the area had their political centre on the banks of the Riau river.

The textual evidence indicates that the latter explanation is the more likely. In at least three of the indigenous histories, the name 'Riau' is first mentioned in connection with the establishment of a political centre shortly before 1677/8. Significantly, 1678 was the year when the Dutch Governor of Melaka, Balthasar Bort, first mentioned 'Riau' as a competitor of Melaka:

Songujongh and Calangh produce yearly about 400 bhaers of tin, whereof Malacca gets a very small share, since most of it is taken to Aatchin and Bencalis, also to Pahangh and Riouw.

(Quoted from Winstedt 1979:46).
Winstedt (ibid.) also remarks that from 1678 onwards, 'the Dagh-Register...begins to record a small trade between the Dutch and Riau.'

So the textual evidence indicates quite strongly that the name 'Riau' was known before 1722 when the Bugis adventurers established themselves as rulers of the kingdom, and that a political and trading centre had already been established there some forty-four years earlier, about 1678. The textual evidence further suggests that the Bugis rulers were not the first ones to make Riau riuh. In 1687, the Dutch Governor of Melaka, Thomas Slicher, reported to Batavia the following news:

The number of ships going to Riau is so great that the river is scarcely navigable as a result of the many trading vessels in it...traders are attracted to Riau because of its menagierse aequipage. Here the tin traders are paid half in contant [specie] and half in cloth; whereas, in Malacca they are given whatever cloth available and not the newest styles as in Riau.

(Quoted from Andaya 1975:38).

Such an atmosphere of vigorous trade could aptly be described as riuh.

We must thus question why it is that my informants choose to identify Opu Daeng Cellak as the man who made Riau riuh, and that too as the result of his wedding. This question may be answered in terms of the identity of my informants themselves. Many of them claim descent from the Bugis rulers who had established themselves as a force in the kingdom in 1722. So it is not surprising that they should date the very origins of the name 'Riau' from the coming of one of their ancestors. As pointed out above, the particular significance of Opu Daeng Cellak is that he was the first of the Bugis adventurers to marry into the Melayu genealogy of kingship.

In contrast to this Bugis-biased view, in a book written by an informant who is himself not of Bugis descent — Tengku Ahmad bin
Tengku Abubakar (1972) -- Opu Daeng Cellak is not mentioned at all in connection with the supposedly riuh atmosphere of Riau. So it would seem that in the view of this non-Bugis informant, the Riau that was riuh does not necessarily date only from the Bugis period. This informant, however, lives in Lingga, and as we shall see below, there is a significant difference between the perspectives of Riau and Lingga.

The point is, the name 'Riau' seems to be used to refer not only to a geographical site but to a certain political reality. For my informants of Bugis descent, it refers to the political reality that began with the coming of the Bugis rulers. For others, it may refer to an earlier political reality. Therefore, one must ask not only 'where is Riau?', but also 'whose Riau is it we speak of?'

Furthermore, even if it is the case that the name 'Riau' refers specifically to the Riau river, and if it is the case that this river was the site of a political and trading centre from the seventeenth century onwards, the question nevertheless remains: how did the name come to be attached to the archipelago as a whole? The answers to these questions may perhaps be couched in terms of the historical development of political territoriality.

From 1677 to 1804, there seem to have been six distinct 'Riaus', each referring to a different political reality:

Sultan Ibrahim's 'Riau' (1677-1683) referred to the then ruling Melaka-derived dynasty.

Sultan Abd al-Jalil's 'Riau' (1708-1716) referred to his promotion from bendahara to sultan.

Raja Kecik's 'Riau' (1719-1722) referred to his pretensions to the throne as the alleged descendant
of the Melaka dynasty founded by Sultan Abd al-Jalil.

The 'Riau' of 1722-1787 referred to the coalition established between the Bugis conquerors and the descendants of the bendahara dynasty.

The 'Riau' of 1787-1795 referred to Dutch colonisation.

Finally, the 'Riau' of 1795-1804 referred to the rivalry that developed between certain members of the Bugis faction and certain members of the bendahara dynasty.

One similarity shared by these different political realities is that they were all located along the Riau river. So until 1804, the name evidently did refer to settlements built on the banks of that river.

Such an usage changed in 1804 when the name 'Riau' came to be applied to a wider area beyond the immediate reaches of the river. What seemed to have precipitated this generalised usage was Sultan Mahmud's gift of 'Riau' to the Bugis. The name 'Riau' then seemed to refer not just to the Riau river, but to the territorial extent from which the Bugis rulers at Penyengat derived their revenue. This was a clearly demarcated territory, differentiated from Bulang to the west, and Lingga to the south. Bulang was the fief of the temenggung's faction led by Engku Muda, the contender of the Bugis. (See Trocki 1979:4.) Lingga remained under the sultan. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:212.) So it would seem that from 1804 to 1911, the name 'Riau' came to refer to an internal division of the kingdom in a political reality which was divided into three zones of domination -- 'Riau' under the Bugis yamtuan muda, 'Lingga' under the sultan, and 'Bulang' under the temenggung.
The next significant event occurred in 1824 when the British and the Dutch governments signed between themselves a treaty which divided Southeast Asia into their respective spheres of influence. The dividing line was the Main Strait flowing between Singapore and Batam. (See Map 3.) This cut right through the temenggung's dominion. The Dutch decided to bestow that part of his dominion that fell under their influence to the Bugis yamtuan muda instead. After a short civil war between the Bugis faction and the temenggung's faction, which ended in October 1827, the yamtuan muda consolidated his control over the post-1824 'Riau sphere' which had been newly expanded by courtesy of the Dutch. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:252-255,394.) The western and southern extent of this post-1824 'Riau sphere' included Karimun, Buru, and Kundur in the west, and Pintu and Duyung in the south. The northern extent of the 'Riau sphere' was marked by the Main Strait.

An eastern boundary seems to have been instituted sometime during Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Ali's reign (1845-1857). According to the Tuhfat,

One of the achievements of the Yang Dipertuan Muda's reign was that princes were forbidden to take deliveries to the Tujuh Islands and to question people engaged in trade. Instead he instituted a system of tribute from the sea-people of the Tujuh Islands.

(Ibid.:286).

My reading of the passage above is that he decided to legislate the Tujuh island-groups out of the 'Riau sphere' directly under his control, by making them into a separate tributary area instead. The result is a post-1824 'Riau sphere' bounded on four sides. (See Map 3.) As we have seen above, the four boundaries in question are the consequences of political action; they are not the result of geographical circumstances, pure and simple. Even though there are
indeed navigational difficulties in travelling to the Tujuh islands-
groups, the yantuan muda nevertheless had to legislate to take these
island-groups out of his 'Riau sphere'.

This situation apparently continued until 1911 when the Dutch
forced the last sultan into abdication and established Residentie
Riouw en Onderhoorgheden with its capital at Tanjungpinang. This
comprised afdeeling Riouw Archipel and afdeeling Inderagiri, with the
island territory of the former Riau-Lingga sultanate included in the
former. In 1938, afdeeling Bengkalis was added to this Residentie;
and in 1942 more areas of the Sumatran east coast were included —
that is, all the former territories of the kingdoms there, such as
Siak, Pelalawan, and Rokan. (See Muchtar Lufti et al 1977:380-386.)
In this period the name 'Riau' referred to a political reality which
encompassed an area much wider than the Riau-Lingga kingdom ever
controlled, an area unified through Dutch colonisation.

From 1942 to 1945 Residentie Riouw was replaced by the Riau Syu
of Japanese colonisation, which included only the Sumatran part of
Residentie Riouw, together with its immediate off-shore islands. The
island territory of afdeeling Riouw, which had formerly belonged to
the Riau-Lingga kingdom, now came under the military administration
centred on Syonanto (Singapore). (See ibid.:407.) So in this period
the name 'Riau' became totally detached from the Riau-Lingga islands,
and became attached instead to a part of Sumatra.

After the Second World War, 1945 to 1950 was a period of
conflicting interests. The Dutch wanted to reclaim their former
colonies including Residentie Riouw. But some aristocrats wanted to
exploit the power vacuum to re-institute the former Riau-Lingga
kingdom. And the nationalists wanted to form a new nation-state —
Indonesia — comprising all the former Dutch colonies in the area. In
this period it was unclear what the name 'Riau' referred to. Eventually, the conflict was resolved in favour of the nationalists, who then decided to form provinces that were even larger than the Dutch residencies. (See ibid.:625.) So Residentie Riouw was incorporated into the province of 'Central Sumatra' (Sumatra Tengah), with the name 'Riau' used only for Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau. This district was based on the island territory of the former Riau-Lingga kingdom. In 1958, the name 'Riau' was once again applied to a wider area, when a Propinsi Riau 'Riau Province' was formed with the same territorial shape as the former Residentie Riouw. (See ibid.:667-672.) This is still the situation at present.

Such being the semantic complexity implied by the name 'Riau', which 'Riau', whose 'Riau' is it that constitutes the field of this study? To answer this, let us consider the view of my informants in the Galang area who say, aku nak ke Riau 'I am going to Riau', when they mean that they are going to Tanjungpinang. Such an usage reverts to a pre-1804 frame of reference when the name 'Riau' was used specifically for the capitals that were actually located on the Riau river. Significantly, the Galang area was part of the temenggung's dominion centred on Bulang; it did not become part of the Bugis-dominated 'Riau' sphere until after the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. According to my informants, the Galang people refused to submit to the Bugis yamtuan muda, and became 'political pirates' (perompak politik) who sought to make trouble for the Bugis rulers. With such a tradition of rebellion, it is perhaps not surprising that my Galang informants are still using the name 'Riau' in a pre-1804 frame of reference. Such an usage may be understood as an attempt to de-recognise the post-1804 'Riau' that was the sphere of Bugis domination.
But such is not the view of my Penyengat and Pangkil informants. Their usage of 'Riau' may be understood in a 1824-1911 frame of reference — that is, including the islands as far west as Karimun and Kundur, but excluding the Lingga archipelago in the south and the Tujuh islands in the north. That was the maximum extent of the Bugis yamtuan muda's dominion, and significantly, many of these informants are themselves of Bugis descent.

This is not to say that they are not aware of the present situation. Indeed, they are; but they regard the post-1911 'Riaus' as exogenous forms imposed, in turn, by the Dutch, the Japanese, and the Indonesian governments. Following my Penyengat and Pangkil informants, I have chosen the 'Riau' of 1824-1911 as the field of this study. The pre-1804 'Riau' of my Galang informants is not quite suitable as it does not even include Galang. As for the post-1911 'Riaus', while my informants are aware of their existence, they do not seem to refer to them as frames within which they may define their own Melayu-ness. And that indeed is the issue. When my Galang informants refer to a pre-1804 'Riau', they are referring to a certain political reality, to a certain patterning of Melayu-ness. And when my Penyengat and Pangkil informants refer to a 1824-1903 'Riau', they too are referring to a certain, though different, political reality, as well as a different patterning of Melayu-ness.

In the rest of this study, when I use the name 'Riau' without any other qualification, I am referring to the 1824-1911 'Riau', which is sometimes referred to by my informants also as Kepulauan Riau 'Riau Archipelago'. To refer to the other usages of 'Riau', I shall qualify with such terms as propinsi 'province' and kabupaten 'regency'. I shall use the phrase 'the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands' to refer to the entire spatial configuration so designated.
There is thus a distinct contrast between Indonesian administrative usage and my informants' usage. As mentioned above, in Indonesian administrative usage, the names 'Penyengat', 'Pangkil', 'Karas', and 'Bintan' refer to four kepenghuluan 'headman-dams'. The first three of these kepenghuluan each includes several islands in its territory. In my informants' usage, however, the names 'Penyengat', 'Pangkil', and 'Karas' each refers to only one pulau 'small island'. The respective territory covered by my informants' usage is thus much smaller than that included in the kepenghuluan by the same name.

So Kepenghuluan Penyengat includes Penyengat and the Soreh Reefs, whereas Pulau Penyengat refers only to the island itself. Kepenghuluan Pangkil includes Pangkil, Soreh, and half of Tapai, whereas Pulau Pangkil refers only to the island itself. Kepenghuluan Karas includes Karas and a host of other islands -- namely, Karas Kecil, Mubut Darat, Mubut Laut, Galang Senyantung, Semukit, Panjang, Sembur Darat, Sembur Laut, Nanga, Batu Belobang, Tanjung Dahan, half of Galang Baru/Galang Kandap, and several other smaller islands. In contrast, Pulau Karas refers only to the island itself. (See Map 4.) Unless otherwise specified, I will follow my informants' usage with regards to the three place-names 'Penyengat', 'Pangkil', and 'Karas' -- that is, I will use these names to refer to the specific island in question.

The closest correspondence between Indonesian administrative usage and my informants' usage occurs in the case of Kepenghuluan Bintan. The area included in this 'headman-dom' is approximately the same as that referred to by my informants as 'Bintan' -- that is the area located on the banks of the Bintan river, in the shadow of Gunung Bintan 'Mount Bintan'. It is this area that I shall refer to in all subsequent mention of the name 'Bintan'. For referring to the island as a whole, I shall use the phrase 'Bintan island'. (See Map 6.)
In my informants' usage, there is a term that has no equivalent in Indonesian administrative usage — that is, the name 'Galang'. When they say 'Galang', they refer not only to the islands known as 'Galang Senyantung' and 'Galang Baru/Galang Kandap'. They refer to a much larger area that includes the entire island-cluster ranging from Tanjungsau in the north to the Abang islands in the south, from Karas in the east to Petong on the west. This is the habitat of the people known as the suku Galang 'Galang division'; all my informants from Kepenghuluan Karas belong to the population of this area. Following their usage, I will use the word 'Galang' to refer to the area described above.

2.4 The Island World of Sea and Land

Varied as the political usages of the name 'Riau' may be, they do not change the fundamental environmental conditions to which they refer — that is, the island world of sea and land. The Riau islands are so numerous that my informants describe them as 'a measure of black peppercorns' (segantang lada hitam). The Indonesia Pilot (1975:I,116) confirms that in this area there are indeed 'a great number of islands and islets with numerous reefs among and around them'. For Riau Province as a whole, the figure of 3,214 islands has been mentioned. (See Muchtar Lufti et al 1977:29.) Perhaps more than half of these are located in the Riau archipelago.

The small islands and islets of the Riau archipelago greatly outnumber the larger islands. In my informants' perceptions, island size is regarded as important. Such a differentiation is ecologically significant indeed, because large islands and small islands provide different kinds of habitat. This ecological difference is evident in the semantics of my informants' word-usage.
Some of them seem to have difficulty understanding the geography of the Malay Peninsula. For example, they wonder why it is that Mecca is so far away when they have heard that Mecca and Malaysia are 'conjoined by land' (setanah). In their own everyday experience, even the biggest islands can be traversed in a matter of days. In another case, a Pangkil couple showed me a letter that they had received from their nephew who had gone to Malaysia to work. This nephew told them that he had recently moved from Johor to Selangor. My informants did not know where Selangor was, whether it was 'conjoined by land' to Johor. When I told them it was, they said with relief:

Itulah, macam sini ke Budos -- dekat.

(Indeed, it's like going from here to Budos -- very near.)

I tried to explain that although Johor and Selangor were 'conjoined by land', the distance between them was much greater than that between Tajur Kait (the 'here' of my informants) and Budos. As Map 4 indicates, Tajur Kait and Budos are parts of Pangkil island and are perhaps less than a mile apart. It takes only half an hour or forty-five minutes to walk from the one place to the other. But my attempt to explain to my informants the greater distance between Johor and Selangor was not successful.

This is not to say that my informants have no idea of distance. Most of them are fishermen or petty traders who undertake long sea voyages, sometimes spanning several weeks. But in their experience, it is the sea that is large and 'free' (terlepas, bebas); land, on the other hand, is always bounded. Every piece of land they have experience of is surrounded by water: ergo, all land is island. Such a perception is perhaps the diametrical opposite of that held by people who live far inland and who have only seen pools and rivers, but never the wide open sea. Most of my informants are people who have no experience of a continental land-mass.
Such being the case, it does not make sense for them to differentiate between island and continent. The important difference is between small island and big island, between that which is small enough to be directly experienced as an island and that which is too large to be directly experienced as such. The former is referred to by the word pulau, the latter by the word tanah 'land' or bahagian 'parts'. The distinction is between land that is perceived as bounded and land that is perceived as spreading out.

Although the Malay word pulau is generally translated into English as 'island', in my informants' usage it refers only to a small patch of land bounded by the sea, small enough to be experienced as such, either visually from a hilltop, or behaviourally by walking around it in a short space of time — say, a few hours. Islands that are bigger than this do not seem to be referred to as pulau — that is, as self-contained pieces of land. Instead, they are known only in terms of their particular parts. To give a specific example, when my informants use the place-name 'Bintan', they are not referring to the whole island, but more specifically, only to the area through which the Bintan river flows. The use of the name 'Bintan' to refer to the whole island seems to be an European-derived usage. In my informants' usage, 'Bintan' is not a higher-level term; it is only of the same order as, say, 'Senggarang', 'Tanjungpinang', 'Tanjunguban', and the names of other parts of the island. But for the island as a whole, there seems to be no indigenous name.

This usage of pulau is concordant with Wilkinson's (1959:919) explanation of the word:

Isolated patch; island.... Of patches of land in the sea (waterless rocks are tokong); islands in rivers; dry land surrounded by swamp; patches of forest (pulau hutan) surrounded by ricefields. Very large islands (such as Bali or larger) are tanah.
When one is on a pulau, what one sees is a piece of land bounded by water all around. One's attention is thus focussed on the coast-line, the line where two different substances -- land and sea -- meet, yet remain separate. Wilkinson (see above) says that the word pulau is also used in the term pulau hutan, which refers to a patch of forest surrounded by ricefields. I did not come across this usage in Riau, but then my informants are not rice-farmers; they do not have any rice-fields, and they are therefore not that interested in the contrast in land vegetation.

Nevertheless, both usages of the word pulau seem to have similar connotations. In both cases, pulau refers to the relationship between two perceptibly different substances -- land and sea in the one case, forest and ricefields in the other. This is not, however, a symmetrical relationship of equal parts: in the one case, land is surrounded by sea, and in the other, forest is surrounded by ricefields. I suggest that the stress in the word pulau is not the 'landness' of the island or the 'forestness' of the patch of forest, but rather, the perceptible 'surroundedness' of both by something else. Sea and ricefields are thus, respectively, the contexts of pulau and pulau hutan.

Moreover, just as the ricefields are the source of subsistence and not the patch of forest, so for most of my informants, the sea is the source of their subsistence and not the pulau itself. This is particularly significant in the context of my study, for the overwhelming majority of my informants are inhabitants of pulaus. The sites of my fieldwork -- Penyengat, Pangkil, Karas, Sembur Laut, Nanga, and Teluk Nipah -- are all pulaus. The only exception is Bintan -- that is, the banks of the Bintan river. (See Map 4.)
It is no mere coincidence that most of my informants dwell on pulauas. What these informants prefer is a mode of sedentism that is orientated towards the sea and not the land. The pulau is evidently the most suitable land-form for such a mode of sedentism. As a small island, the pulau may be understood as a halfway house between land and sea. There is enough land to live on, to provide a refuge from the sea. At the same time, one has easy access to the sea in all directions, in all seasons of the monsoon.

Because this mode of sedentism is intermediate between sea and land, it is related to sea-orientated nomadism, as well as to land-orientated sedentism. In the Riau archipelago, the people who identify themselves as Melayu in one sense or another, may be divided into the following four categories according to their mode of habitation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEDENTARY</th>
<th>NOMADIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAND-ORIENTATED</td>
<td>orang kampung ('village people')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(on river banks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA-ORIENTATED</td>
<td>orang kampung ('village people')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(on pulaus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>orang hutan ('forest people')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>orang sampan/orang laut ('boat people/sea people')</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1 Indigenous Modes of Habitation

My informants in the four 'headman-doms' I am studying may be differentiated in terms of their respective mode of habitation. My informants in Kepenghuluan Penyengat are all orang kampung living on a pulau. So are my informants in Kepenghuluan Pangkil. Those in Kepenghuluan Bintan are orang kampung living on the banks of a river. And those in Kepenghuluan Karas are the most varied: they range from orang kampung living on pulauas (namely -- Karas, Sembur, Nanga, and Teluk Nipah) to orang sampan/orang laut living on boats. My
informants in Nanga and Teluk Nipah are, however, only recently sedentary, having changed their mode of habitation from boat-dwelling to land-dwelling a generation or two ago. Some of their boat-dwelling kin still visit them. I have no informants who are nomadic orang hutan, although I have a few Bintan informants who are said to be the descendants of the formerly nomadic, forest-dwelling orang Bintan asli 'original Bintan people', whose way of life is apparently now extinct. In any case, there are only a few islands in the Riau archipelago large enough to have substantial forests.

The mode of habitation is directly related to the mode of subsistence. To examine the relationship, I shall compare three fishing techniques used by my informants -- spear, line, and net. Spear fishing is the main fishing technique of the nomadic boat-dwelling orang laut. Spear fishing is, to put it simply, the spearing of fishes in clear shallow water. A variety of spears and harpoons are used. One is, for example, the serampang 'trident', which has been described by Wilkinson (1959:1080) thus:

The two outer spikes of this fish-trident are barbed on the inside only; the central spike is shorter and barbed on both sides. All three meet in a common base, attached firmly to the wooden shaft by a ferrule or band.

The 'shaft' (gagang) may also be made of bamboo. The serampang is used for the relatively smaller fishes. For larger prey such as dugong, the tempuling 'single-pronged harpoon' is used. Although the single prong is also attached to a wooden or bamboo shaft, it is, in addition, affixed to a line and float. After the prey has been impaled, the shaft is detached from the prong and the line is played out; the reason is that unlike the smaller fishes, the larger prey can be pulled in only after it loses the tug-of-war.
To find the relatively smaller fishes, the spear fishers' boats are usually moored a short distance from the shore, just when the tide is going out. Their prey are the fishes being carried out by the tide. Such fishes are usually medium in size, small enough to be swept in and out by the tide, yet large enough to be seen by the naked eye and speared. Apart from these fishes, they also hunt turtle and dugong.

Although the spear fishers' catch is not without commercial value, and although they do occasionally sell it to obtain some cash, for the most part they subsist on what they catch. If they were to sell their catch regularly and live on bought food, they would soon starve, for spear fishing is too inefficient a method for obtaining a sufficient quantity for sale. So if they were to decide to live off the sale of their catch, they would have to change their fishing technique.

This is indeed the point: people who use spear fishing as their main technique do so not because they are ignorant of other methods of fishing, but because this method is the most suitable for their economy of subsistence. A few medium-sized fishes would be sufficient provision for a family for one day. Since fish is most certainly a perishable that does not last beyond a few hours particularly in the tropics, any other method of fishing that would obtain a greater quantity of fish would be counter-productive for an economy based on day-to-day subsistence.

In my field observations, I have noticed that only net fishers practise fish preservation, usually by various means of salting. This is further illustration of the spear fishers' orientation towards a material economy of day-to-day subsistence, for they do not appear to be interested in preserving excess fish for future consumption.
Consequently, it is not unusual for them to go to a Chinese grocer at times to trade excess fresh fish for salted fish.

Despite the boat-dwellers' commitment to the sea, even they need certain land resources, especially fresh water and wood. When they need to repair or build their boats, they come ashore for a short period, building themselves a pondok 'small hut' for shelter. When their boats are ready, they abandon these huts and return to the sea. These short periods of dwelling on land provide an opportunity to compare the advantages and disadvantages of land and sea. If it is felt, in certain circumstances, that living on land is more advantageous, the boat-dwellers may come more and more to 'live in houses' (diam rumah) than to 'live on boats' (diam sampan). Those who eventually give up boat-dwelling altogether are said to have 'come ashore' (mendarat).

But what is it that motivates boat-dwellers to become land-dwellers? A Penyengat informant said that in his opinion, it is the Chinese tauke 'merchant' who induces the boat-dwellers to come to land. He implied that it is the trading relationship between the Chinese merchant and the boat-dwellers that motivates them to become land-dwellers. After all, if fresh fish can be exchanged for salted fish, it can also be exchanged for almost anything else. In other words, fish and other marine products can become a medium of exchange. If the goods for which they are exchanged become valued above the marine products as such, and if these goods are obtainable only through trade, then at that point, it would seem more advantageous to participate in an exchange economy rather than to subsist on fish alone. In such a situation, the sea is no longer regarded as an all-encompassing environment. Instead, it becomes merely a resource for obtaining marine products to be exchanged for non-marine goods. Direct consumption is thus replaced by mediated exchange.
The move from sea to land is a shift from nomadism to sedentism. Living on relatively small boats, the nomadic boat-dwellers tend to wander around sheltered coasts and straits. These include Bulang Strait, Tiung Strait, Kijang Strait, Penyabung Strait, and the many other smaller straits between nearby islands. So if and when they should come to land, either temporarily or permanently, they are likely to do so in those particular areas. They are not likely to settle on an island in the middle of the high seas, such as Pangkil, for example.

Indeed, in my fieldwork area, the places where nomadic boat-dwellers can be found are all located in Galang — in Tiung Strait, Penyabung Strait, and the many straits in the cluster of small islands to the east of Galang Baru/Galang Kandap. As mentioned above, my informants on Nanga and Teluk Nipah are former boat-dwellers who have come ashore recently, in the last generation or two. This shift is still recent enough to be remembered. So they are still identified as orang laut, both by themselves and by others. Moreover, they still have ongoing kin ties with the boat-dwelling orang laut who have not shifted to land, and who visit them from time to time. The Nanga and Teluk Nipah people are known as orang laut yang diam rumah 'sea people who live in houses', in contradistinction to their boat-dwelling kin who are known as orang laut yang diam sampan 'sea people who live on boats', or more succinctly, orang sampan 'boat people'.

Both communities of orang laut use spear fishing as their main fishing technique. So both still operate in what is basically a day-to-day subsistence economy. However, as I have pointed out above, even spear fishers do occasionally sell their catch for cash. So to say that the spear fishers tend towards material self-sufficiency does not mean that they have no access to trade goods whatsoever.
Indeed they do obtain trade goods, but only on a casual basis. For example, they may wish to acquire, say, a radio; for this, they need cash which may be raised in a number of ways — through selling marine products such as fish, crab, dugong, sea-slug, seaweed, and so on, or through hiring themselves out as temporary labour for cutting wood or for any other job. When sufficient cash has been accumulated, the radio would be bought, and that would be the end of the cash-earning activity. They would then revert to their self-subsistence, until such time when another trade good is desired. In terms of their involvement in the cash nexus, there is a discernible difference between the house-dwelling spear fishers and their boat-dwelling kin. The former tend to place a higher value on the accumulation of trade goods, even if these are obtained only on a casual basis.

In this context, it is significant that on Nanga and Teluk Nipah there are no fishers using other fishing techniques; there are instead two Chinese merchants, one on each island, who are involved in sundry trading activities. These merchants buy whatever saleable product may be offered to them by the inhabitants of the area, and sell in turn whatever product that may be in demand. The products that are bought and sold cover a very wide range indeed, including marine products, forest products, and consumer goods. Thus, they may buy, for example, sea-slug and seaweed from a particular person, and in exchange, sell a pair of Western-style leather shoes to him or her. For the house-dwelling spear fishers to live in proximity to such merchants means that they have easy access to the cash nexus, if and when they choose to enter it. Indeed it would seem that this easy access to the cash nexus is still a major incentive for shifting from a boat-dwelling to a house-dwelling way of life. So as my Penyengat informant suggested, in island Riau, house-dwelling spear fishers are almost always clustered near some such sundry merchant.
In contrast to spear fishing, line fishing is carried out by dropping baited hooks on weighted lines into relatively deep water. Fishing rods are not used; the line is simply held in the bare hand. The kind of fish that is obtained by this method is the relatively large deep-water fish, favoured by Chinese buyers, especially restauranteurs. While line fishers also consume the fish they catch, the economy in which they operate is based not on day-to-day subsistence, but on trading fish for other goods. Since line fishing is carried out in relatively deep water, the fishers usually do not return to their home base after obtaining their catch, but instead take it straightaway to the market. Those who fish further away from urban centres used to sell their catch to intermediaries known as peraih, who would wait for them at appointed meeting-places on the sea at an appointed time, usually at dawn before the market in town opens. But this happens rarely now, partly because many of the line fishers now have motor-powered boats which can speed them to the markets in time.

In contrast to the spear fishers, the line fishers are much more committed to the cash nexus. Among my informants, those who are line fishers live on the islands of Karas and Sembur Laut. (See Map 4.) So they are sedentary pulau-dwelling orang kampung. According to my Penyengat and Pangkil informants, these people also have orang laut origins. But if so, their move from a boat-dwelling nomadism to a house-dwelling sedentism seems to have happened long ago, long enough for them to have lost all kinship ties with boat-dwelling nomads. Indeed, my informants in Karas and Sembur Laut do not describe themselves as orang laut, but as orang berniaga 'people who trade', for whom fish constitutes only one resource among many.

They are very active traders, whose trade route extends from Singapore to Jambi in Sumatra. (See Map 1.) Practically every able-
bodied man on Karas island goes off on regular trading expeditions. For someone who wishes to start with no capital, one way of doing so would be to borrow a line and hook, go fishing, sell the fish in town, then with the cash that is acquired, collect some goods that would sell at the Barter Trading Station in Pasir Panjang, Singapore. The goods that are brought to Singapore may include sea-slug, seaweed, copra, rubber latex, and wood. The goods that are brought back home may include textiles, crockery, and electronic goods. Those who trade in Jambi are not beginners, but people who have already accumulated a substantial capital. For the Jambi trade, they go to Sungai Jodoh in Batam where there is a centre for traders who have just returned from Singapore to off-load their goods. Although prices there would be more expensive than they are in Singapore, they are still cheaper than in Jambi. One of my Karas informants prospered so much from the Sungai Jodoh–Jambi trade that he was able to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Perhaps because the Karas people are not dependent upon the conversion of a single product into cash, they are flexible in their attitude towards available natural resources. They are not adverse to going to the forest to gather wood, or to attend to their fruit trees, or to collect marine products. In short, they use just about any means available to keep their petty entrepreneurship going. Nevertheless they are absorbed into the exchange economy, and like the people of Pangkil, Bintan and Penyengat, the bulk of their daily food is bought.

Unlike the house-dwelling spear fishers who have access to the cash nexus only by living near an individual sundry merchant, the line-fishing 'people who trade' participate in the cash nexus by travelling to urban centres. However, like the former, the latter's involvement in trade is still very much a matter of choice. They can
still choose when and where they want to go, and what they wish to trade. Their material economy is still very mixed and therefore relatively unspecialised.

In contrast to this situation, the people in the 'headman-doms' of Pangkil, Bintan, and Penyengat have a much more specialised economy. To discuss Pangkil first, net fishing is the main source of income for the people, supplemented for some by the sale of coconuts. Of the three fishing techniques under discussion, net fishing is the most capital-intensive. The construction and maintenance of nets requires so much time and money that they have to be acquired ready-made. The prices of the nets vary depending on the kind of fish they are designed to catch. Prawning nets, for example, are so expensive that they are owned by the fish dealers and contracted out to individual fishers. The condition of the contract is that all the catch has to be sold at a fixed price to the particular fish dealer who owns the net. The contract is enforced by the existence of an agreement between the dealers themselves, such that if a contracted net fisherman were to sell his catch to anyone other than the owner of his nets, he would subsequently be boycotted by all the other dealers in the market. So the contracted net fishermen are, in effect, the employees of the fish dealers, drawing their wages, like salesmen, on a commission basis, depending on the amount of their catch. In the case of nets for catching *ikan tamban* 'herring', however, the nets have to be bought outright by the fishers. Both the nets for prawns and herring last only for a few months - perhaps six to eight months. So a periodical capital outlay is necessary on the part of both fisher and fish dealer.

Almost every able-bodied man on Pangkil is contracted to a fish dealer in Tanjungpinang, to whom he is obliged to sell his catch. Despite this contractual burden, the Pangkil people are fairly
prosperous, the sea being sufficiently full of fish that they are able to bring in a good catch most days. With the money they obtain from selling their fish, they buy such things as rice, vegetables, fruit, sugar, and salt. While it is true that they cannot themselves produce rice, sugar and salt, it is nevertheless possible for them to grow vegetables and fruit. Since Pangkil is less densely populated than Penyengat, and has its population concentrated only at Tanjung Budus and Tajur Kait, there is a lot of land available for plant cultivation.

But strangely enough, apart from some coconut groves, nobody makes any effort at growing vegetables or fruit. The only people who do so on the island seem to be a lone Chinese family who live by themselves on the eastern coast, somewhere between the two settlements; they grow brinjal/eggplant for sale in Tanjungpinang. The reason my informants gave me for their lack of interest in plant cultivation was as follows: To make a kebun 'garden' one must attend to it by living nearby. This would, however, result in one feeling sunyi 'isolated', since one would be separated from the neighbours by one's 'garden'. So in order to be ramai 'joyously crowded' one must live in proximity to one's neighbours; hence no 'garden' is possible for lack of space.

Apart from this stated reason, there is another ecological one: When people on Pangkil wish to clear some land from the inland scrub to build a house, they clear the land so completely that the soil is left bare, uncovered by even a single blade of grass. After the rains fall a few times, the topsoil is washed away and all that is left is sand and gravel. The new house that is build thus stands in a sandy yard devoid of all vegetation. Pasir bersih 'sand is clean', my informants say. It is true that compared to dark soil, sand is whiter and it drains better; in that sense it is cleaner. Evidently, where
soil is concerned, my Pangkil informants prefer cleanliness to fertility.

This hostility towards vegetation is also discernible in their attitude towards the forest which is said to be 'dirty' (kotor) and full of 'spirits' (hantu). Some secondary forest and scrub separate the two settlements on Pangkil -- that is, Tanjung Budus in the north and Tajur Kait in the south. First of all, there is little social interaction between the two settlements. Second, if people want to get from the one place to the other, they prefer to use their boats, rather than walk through the forest and scrub, even though that is only a half-hour's journey.

The only crop that the Pangkil people grow with any serious intent is coconut, which, as it happens, thrives even on sandy soil. Moreover, as mentioned above, the coconuts are sold. So although the owner of the coconut trees may keep a certain portion of the fruit for her or his own use, the rest constitutes a sales item to be converted into cash. The focus is on cash and not subsistence.

As the Pangkil example clearly illustrates, although the inhabitants of the pulaus are sedentary land-dwellers, their orientation is towards the sea and not the land. However, they lack the full commitment to the sea that the nomadic boat-dwellers manifest. Instead, these pulau dwellers seem to have an ambivalent attitude towards the sea: the sea is the source of their livelihood yet is not their living habitat. This ambivalence may perhaps be discerned in the location of their kampungs 'villages', which are usually sited along the strand. As Sopher (1977:2-46) has pointed out, the strand alone does not provide a sufficient ecological niche for human use, being only an intermediate zone between the sea without and the forest within; it is hence limited in its flora and fauna by
these environmental pressures. Yet that is the zone the pulau dwellers choose for siting their kampungs. This is true of all the pulaus where I did research. The Pangkil people's habit of stripping the vegetation around those houses which are built further inland may thus be interpreted as an effort to reduplicate the environment of the strand.

The ecological insufficiency of the strand tends to dispose the pulau dwellers favourably towards the cash economy. Being sedentarists, they are not in the flexible position of the boat-dwelling nomads, who can move from area to area, depending on the plentitude of the resources. The pulau-dwelling fishers are more constrained in the distances they can travel to fish, due to the necessity of returning to a fixed home-base everyday. So unlike the nomads who follow the marine resources, the sedentary fishers have to wait for the marine resources to come to them. Thus my pulau-dwelling informants speak of a prawning season, an ikan tamban season, and so on, depending on the species which comes within their area of the sea. So in a good season, the sedentary fishers have to catch as much as possible, then quickly convert the surplus into some other foodstuff which can be stored. A most suitable foodstuff for that purpose is rice.

The eating of rice as a staple by the pulau-dwellers further expresses their ambivalence towards the sea. Rice is, after all, not a marine product. Furthermore, it is not grown at all in the Riau and Lingga archipelagoes. In recent years, a rice-planting experiment has been conducted by the Indonesian government in one of the Tujuh islands — Natuna. But that seems to be the only incident of rice-growing in the island world of Riau, Lingga, and Tujuh. There is indeed rice grown on Sumatra, even in the mainland area of Riau Province, such as Indragiri and Kampar. But the province as a whole
is not self-sufficient in rice; it has been estimated that it needs to
import 60,000-100,000 tons per year. (See Hendra Esmara 1975:31.)

Certainly for the inhabitants of the island territory, rice is
necessarily a trade item. Anyone who eats rice as a daily food must
therefore be involved in the exchange economy in one way or another.
The pulau-dwelling fishers are indeed regular rice-eaters, whereas the
spear-fishing orang laut subsist on the marine products that they
obtain themselves, eating rice only as an occasional exotic food.

The three fishing techniques — spear, line, and net — thus
exist in three different economic configurations. At one level of
comparison, there are important differences between spear and line
fishing on the one hand, and net fishing on the other. Both the spear
and the line fishers own their means of production, whereas the net
fishers do so only partially. Although the spear fishers buy the
metal spear-head and prong they use for their trident and harpoon, as
well as the nylon line they use for the latter, they make the wooden
or bamboo shaft themselves, including also the float for the harpoon.
Their equipment is thus a mixture of self-sufficiency and other­
dependence, with a potential for complete self-sufficiency, since the
most rudimentary fish-spear would simply be a sharpened wooden shaft.
Although the equipment of the line fishers — that is, nylon line and
metal hook — has to be entirely bought, this is relatively cheap, and
once a stock of lines and hooks has been acquired, the line fishers
are self-sufficient. In contrast, the net fishers are not even able
to own their means of production completely, and are dependent on the
fish dealers to whom they are contracted.

At another level of comparison, however, there are similarities
between line fishing and net fishing, for both line fishers and net
fishers are pulau dwellers who are well ensconced within the exchange
economy. Interestingly, among my informants, only the net fishers
refer to themselves as nelayan 'fishers'; the line fishers refer to themselves as orang berniaga 'people who trade', whereas the spear fishers are referred to both by themselves and by others as orang laut 'sea people'. In this context, the phrase orang laut is used not as an ethnonym, but rather, as a descriptive label.

Both the nelayan and the orang berniaga look down upon the orang laut as being primitive: the orang laut are said to be 'dirty' (kotor) because they 'eat anything that is available' (makan sebarang). Subsistence on natural resources is thus despised by those who are involved in the exchange economy. This derogatory attitude is known by the spear fishers, prompting one of them to say to me:

So what is wrong with being an orang laut? Doesn't everyone in Riau live by the sea? Doesn't everyone depend on the sea? So isn't everyone an orang laut [a sea person]?

In this informant's usage, the term orang laut is also used not as an ethnonym but as a descriptive label. From the perspective of the nelayan and the orang berniaga, however, they themselves are not orang laut because while they are fishers, they also eat rice as their staple.

There is hence an economic duality of self-subsistence versus other-dependence. The latter is aggravated particularly by a national economy which is regulated by discretionary controls. To enter the cash nexus in the context of such a national economy is to be subjected to numerous forces beyond one's control. The nelayan and orang berniaga in Riau who enter the cash nexus can do so no more than as ordinary citizens. Therefore, they can have no control over the value of the rupiah, the prices of rice and kerosene, the prices of imported goods, or access to bank credit. Even as the sellers of fish, they have no control over the fish market, being dependent on the fish dealers for marketing the fish to the ultimate consumers,
both in Tanjungpinang and Singapore. In the case of the net fishers, they are even dependent on the dealers for their very means of production — namely, the prawning nets.

Such being the case, people who can subsist independently of the cash economy may be regarded as materially self-sufficient, whereas those who are drawn into the cash nexus may be regarded as materially other-dependent. The three fishing techniques discussed above illustrate the continuum between the two poles of this economic duality. The spear-fishing orang laut are almost entirely self-subsistent, while the net-fishing nelayan are almost entirely other-dependent. The line-fishing orang berniaga are in-between. On the one hand, like the spear fishers, they use a labour-intensive technique. On the other hand, like the net fishers, they are involved in the exchange economy. Since the number of fishes that one can catch with a line is rather limited, this constrains the profit that can be derived from line fishing. And indeed, the line fishing communities usually do not trade in fish alone, but are also involved in the trade of other products they can collect, such as sea-slug, shellfish, and seaweed.

The division of labour differs in these three fishing techniques. In spear fishing, both men and women participate in the activity of getting their daily food. For example, a married couple may set off with one partner rowing and the other spearing. Or if a whole family is dwelling on the boat, then spear fishing would be a family activity. In contrast, line fishing is done mostly by the men, although occasionally women may accompany them, especially if the catch is for home consumption. The collection of sea-slug, shellfish, and seaweed is done usually by the women in the line-fishing communities. So there is a sexual division of labour in the collection of natural products for trade, which contrasts with spear
fishing on the one hand, and net fishing on the other. Whereas spear fishing is carried out as a family activity in which male and female may both participate, net fishing is an exclusively male activity. Thus it is only of the net fishers that we may speak generally of fishermen. In the net-fishing communities, the women do not go to sea with the men; nor do they collect natural products for trade. Widows are the only women supposed to earn money for their own living — for example, by selling cooked food, mending nets, or weaving thatch.

The economic duality of self-subsistence versus other-dependence is thus expressed also through gender: in the former mode, there is economic commonality for both sexes, whereas in the latter mode, there is economic differentiation based on gender. The other-dependence of the net-fishing community as a whole is symbolised by the other-dependence of the women who are domesticated right out of economic production, becoming totally dependent on the men. The other-dependence of the men, however, is disguised by their social role as sole economic provider. (See Plate 1.)

An interesting contrast to these fishing communities is Bintan, where people who live by a river, not too far from the sea, do no fishing whatsoever. The Bintan people describe themselves as orang darat 'land people' or petani 'cultivators'. Used in this context, these are also descriptive labels, rather than ethnonyms. My Bintan informants evidently take this description so seriously that they would only buy fish but do no fishing themselves. Even though the fish is very often stale by the time they buy it, they nevertheless persist in their abstinence from fishing. Their main source of income is rubber-tapping. Although the rubber trees are owned by only a few of the wealthier individuals in the community, everyone does tapping. They also grow some coffee bushes, some cassava, and a few desultory fruit trees, such as papaya, jackfruit, and mangoes. But no
Plate 1. Bolong and Jeri of Nanga form a regular working partnership, usually with Bolong spearing the fishes and Jeri rowing the sampan 'small canoe'. The village of Sembur Laut is seen in the background of the picture.

Plate 2. Most of my informants live in stilted houses perched at the edge of the strand. The village of Sebauk depicted above is typical of Riau. The coconut trees constitute a buffer zone between the village on the strand and the inland forest. A stand of densely growing coconut trees is thus an indication of human habitation.
vegetables are cultivated. Like the Pangkil net fishers, the Bintan rubber-tappers use the money they earn to buy food, instead of trying to obtain their food directly from available natural resources. Sometimes they will cook the unripe fruit from their trees as a kind of vegetable; but that is only an occasional thing.

They grow no rice, even though they, like the line fishers and the net fishers, also eat it as a staple. In order to obtain the cash with which to buy rice, they tap and sell rubber latex. Therefore, the cultivators of Bintan are as other-dependent on the town as are the net fishers of Pangkil, despite the possibility of self-sufficiency through the cultivation of more food crops.

Interestingly, my Bintan informants told me that shortly before my own arrival, there had been a man from Indragiri (on the east coast of Sumatra) who had come to Bintan with the idea of cultivating rice by using the marshy swamps of the Bintan river. But my informants were unenthusiastic about the idea, considering it newfangled and untrustworthy. So it was never taken up.

There is, quite discernibly, a symbiotic relationship between the rural hinterland of Pangkil and Bintan on the one hand, and the urban centre of Tanjungpinang on the other. In their single-minded devotion to a cash income, the people of Pangkil and Bintan may perhaps be regarded as peasants who supply raw materials to the urban centre, and who obtain in turn their daily necessities from there. But if Pangkil and Bintan are symbiotically related to Tanjungpinang, Penyengat may be considered as one of its suburbs.

The proximity of Penyengat island to Tanjungpinang allows a substantial proportion of the island's population to work as pegawai 'salaried employees' in town — mostly, as minor civil servants and as employees of private companies. Only a small sector of the population
derive their income from net fishing. In addition, a supplementary source of income for those with boats is to provide a ferry service between Penyengat and Tanjungpinang. This regular ferry service means that the people of Penyengat can get to Tanjungpinang very easily, not only for work, but also for shopping, schooling, and entertainment. In short, the Penyengat population are effectively urbanised and almost fully integrated into the material economy of Tanjungpinang. The island produces almost nothing for itself. The small amount of fish that is caught by the few net fishers on the island is brought directly to Tanjungpinang and sold there. The few coconut trees on the island are owned by a few individuals who sell the fruit not to the other islanders, but at the Tanjungpinang market. So of the four communities that we are discussing, the Penyengat community is the most other-dependent.

In the four 'headman-doms' under discussion, we can thus find a range of economic activities. Given the implications of these activities, as discussed above, it is clear that the different communities are involved in the cash nexus in varying degrees. Such being the case, we can perhaps locate the four 'headman-doms' in terms of their material economy thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Penyengat</th>
<th>Bintan</th>
<th>Karas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>towards greater other-dependence</td>
<td>towards greater self-sufficiency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 Self-Sufficiency and Other-Dependence

The respective location of the different communities on this continuum is in accordance with their relative involvement in the cash nexus.
As the discussion above suggests, important roles are played by individual merchants who service the rural population, as well as those who are in the trading and employment sector of urban centres such as Tanjungpinang, Jambi, and Sungai Jodoh in Batam. It is through entering into a relationship with one or several of these people that one may enter the cash nexus. Such a relationship may be based on exchange, contract, or employment. The existence of these merchants and employers is thus an important fact in the everyday lives of my informants.

Apart from these, there is another category of people whose existence is also an important everyday fact. These are the people referred to as pegawai pemerintah 'government employees', whose duties impinge upon the movement of the material economy, particularly if they are employed in the police force, the army, the navy, or Customs and Excise. The last-mentioned is perhaps the most relevant of all.

Every fishing boat that goes to Tanjungpinang, even on a daily basis, must get official clearance to enter and leave the port. Every trading vessel that enters and leaves Indonesia must similarly get official clearance to do so. Since to obtain such official clearance, one usually has to pay heavy fees for the licenses and heavy duties on the goods imported, many people try to evade this bureaucratic hurdle. Smuggling thus occurs as a consequence of tax evasion, the taxes being disproportionately onerous. For my informants, the centre from which government control emanates is Tanjungpinang. So both commercially and administratively, the importance of Tanjungpinang in their everyday lives is not to be under-estimated indeed.

As the discussion above indicates, the various communities we are discussing differ significantly from each other in material terms. Not only that, they have almost nothing to do with one another in the
context of their material economy. They all trade with Tanjungpinang but not with each other. The people of Pangkil and Bintan do not trade fish for rubber. Nobody goes to Karas island to buy the goods of the traders there. It is the Karas traders themselves who bring their goods into Tanjungpinang, Jambi, and elsewhere to sell. The bosses of the salaried employees of Penyengat are in Tanjungpinang. Even the spearfishing orang laut come to Tanjungpinang occasionally — for example, when they want to sell a dugong that they have caught, or when they want to buy some article not available from the sundry merchant near them.

If we were to consider these communities solely in terms of their material economy, we would perhaps picture them thus:

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 3 The Material Nexus**

In such a picture, Tanjungpinang is the urban centre to which the various places in the periphery are related, each separately and in varying degrees of closeness. This picture would seem to be an appropriate one in the context of transport logistics. For example, I myself, as someone without a boat, found it easier to go from one island to another, by hitching rides to and from Tanjungpinang, rather than try to catch a ride with someone going from, say, Pangkil to Karas island. The former route — that is, to and from Tanjungpinang — is an everyday occurrence. Fishing boats travel to Tanjungpinang...
daily; but people on one island visit those on another island only on special occasions, such as weddings and funerals.

This gives us a clue to the nature of relations between the various island communities: these are not material but symbolic relations, having to do less with fishing and more with weddings and funerals. Indeed, it is only in terms of a symbolic economy that we may talk of these communities as being inter-connected. In doing so, I follow the usages of my informants in these communities. In their perceptions of Self and Other, they were concerned with relating themselves not to the merchants and bureaucrats living in Tanjungpinang, but rather, to each other in the different island communities. This relationship is couched in terms of being Melayu, such that one can be 'pure' or 'impure', 'indigenous' or 'foreign' in one's Melayu-ness. Thus in the everyday discourse of the people living in these island communities, we discover a symbolic economy that is markedly different from their material economy. It is this symbolic economy that is the main topic of the present study. 47
1. The very name 'Indonesia' is indicative of Dutch colonisation. To quote Anderson (1983:110) on the matter:

...As its hybrid pseudo-Hellenic name suggests, its stretch does not remotely correspond to any precolonial domain; on the contrary, at least until President Suharto's brutal invasion of ex-Portuguese East Timor in 1975, its boundaries have been those left behind by the last Dutch conquests (c.1910).

Moreover, the present capital of Indonesia, Jakarta, is on the same site as the previous administrative centre of the Dutch empire, Batavia. An earlier name of the place was Sunda Kalapa; at that time it belonged to the inland Javanese state of Pajajaran. In 1527 it was conquered by Demak, a coastal Javanese state, and renamed 'Jayakerta or Surakarta (synonymous Javanese names of Sanskrit origin meaning 'Victorious and Prosperous')' (Ricklefs 1981:34). In 1619 the Dutch VOC conquered Jayakerta, and on 12 March 1619, it was renamed 'Batavia' after an ancient Germanic tribe in the Netherlands. (See ibid.:28.) The place was renamed 'Jakarta' by the Japanese conquerors in the Second World War, as part of their propaganda campaign aimed at destroying European influences and persuading the Southeast Asian indigenes that they and the Japanese were brothers-in-arms. (See ibid.:189.) So even the name 'Jakarta' derives from military conquest.

2. The declaration of independence has been translated thus:

Proclamation:

We the people of Indonesia hereby declare the independence of Indonesia. Matters concerning the transfer of power, etc., will be carried out in a conscientious manner and as speedily as possible.

Jakarta, 17 August 1945

In the name of the people of Indonesia,

[signed] Sukarno Hatta

(Quoted from Ricklefs 1981:198).

The key phrase in this declaration is 'the transfer of power'. What was being sought was not a change in the spatial configuration as such, but merely a transformation of the force relations that held the spatial configuration together. In other words, some of the colonised sought to take the place of the coloniser, but they did not seek to change the shape of the colonised territory.

3. Gaung, Kateman and some other eastern parts of Sumatra belonged to the Riau-Lingga sultanate. (See Map 1 and Appendix 12.)
4. Kato (1984:10) describes the history of Pekanbaru thus:

It initially developed as a riverside market town in the late eighteenth century. During the Dutch period it grew to be an important port town which accommodated steamships relatively deep in the interior of inland Riau. However, Pekanbaru was still a small town of 2,990 souls in 1930. Its fortunes dramatically turned upward when large reserves of oil were found by Caltex near it in 1939; the exploration of these reserves began soon after the Second World War. In 1960, the capital city of the still young Province of Riau was moved from Tanjung Pinang in island Riau to Pekanbaru.

5. See Mochtar Naim (1974) on merantau. He explains it (ibid.:18-19) as implying the following six elements:

   (1) to leave one's home village (for rantau)
   (2) voluntarily
   (3) for a short or long time period
   (4) with the aim of earning a living, seeking further knowledge or experience
   (5) normally with the intention of returning home....
   (6) Merantau is a culturally patterned social institution.

6. Transmigration actually began under the Dutch colonial government, when in the early years of the twentieth century, it instituted what was described as a 'colonisation' policy, with the aim of establishing 'colonies' of Javanese settlers in the other islands. Apparently, what had spurred this action was the 1905 Dutch census which showed that whereas there was a population of some thirty million in Java and Madura, there was only a total of some seven and a half million in all the other islands combined. (See Hardjono 1977:16.)

   The arrival of the Japanese in...1942 put an end to all colonisation projects.... In the years immediately following the end of the Second World War, while Indonesia was still involved in the war of independence against the Dutch, thoughts were already being given to plans for the resettlement of people from Java and Bali in other parts of the country.

   (Ibid.:21-22).

Since then, the transmigration policy has been carried out extensively. According to Hardjono (ibid.:63), there are three transmigration projects in Riau Province, all located in the Sumatran part of the province, with two in the Indragiri area. (Also see Meyer and MacAndrews 1978:97-99 on these particular projects.)

7. From my field research, I would agree that the migration from Sulawesi is largely seasonal. Travelling in sailing ships, the all-male crews sail west from Sulawesi during the northeast monsoon, stopping and trading at various places along the way, including Kampung Bugis opposite Tanjungpinang. (See Map 4.) They may continue on to Singapore and the Malay Peninsula. In Singapore, they usually dock at the Barter Trading Station in...
Pasir Panjang. They may then stay on for a few months, working as contract labourers — for example, on construction sites — until the winds change to a southwesterly direction and they can sail home eastwards. Those who stay on permanently in the western part of the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago tend to be men who marry local women.

8. Some of these Chinese are warganegara Indonesia 'Indonesian citizens'; others are warganegara asing 'foreign citizens'. (See Suryadinata 1978:113-127) on the complications of citizenship for the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. The 1980 census gives us an indication of the number of ethnic Chinese in Riau Province who are 'foreign citizens': under the sub-category 'Taiwan, China or stateless', the figure of 11,858 is given. Of these 4,867 reside in the District of the Riau Archipelago. In the classification of the population by religion, however, there are 97,098 Buddhists, of whom 39,729 reside in the District of the Riau Archipelago. (See Penduduk Indonesia 1980.) Most of these Buddhists are likely to be ethnic Chinese. Therefore, indications are that the majority of the Chinese in Riau Province are Indonesian citizens. Since the Indonesian census does not classify the population by ethnicity, it does not indicate the number of Chinese who are Indonesian citizens.

9. Suryadinata (1978:135) confirms that in May 1959, a regulation was issued 'banning alien retail trade in rural areas and requiring the aliens to transfer their businesses to Indonesian citizens by September 30 1959. ...In the outer islands, some military commanders declared rural areas closed to aliens (read: alien Chinese) before the September deadline.' This situation was aggravated after the failed coup in 1965:

...the overseas Chinese were held responsible for the alleged role of the PRC in the abortive Coup.... Regional authorities took independent action against them. For instance, the military authorities in early 1967 prohibited alien Chinese from trading in East Java and parts of Sumatra.

(Ibid.:138).

10. While 'unity in diversity' may be a laudable ideal, the two terms 'unity' and 'diversity' do not seem to be equivalent in status. Ethnic diversity is regarded as historically given and hence inherent in the Indonesian situation. Political unity, however, had to be fought for through revolution and therefore needs to be maintained through conscious effort. The implication is that the diversity will be there, whether or not there is unity; but the reverse may not be true. So to have 'unity in diversity', emphasis has to be placed on unification, rather than on diversification.

11. This creed prescribes belief in:

1. Ke-Tuhan-an Yang Maha Esa
2. Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab
3. Persatuan Indonesia
4. Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/perwakilan
(Quoted from Dardji Darmodihardjo et al 1978:17).

(1. A Supreme Godhead
2. A humanism that is legal and proper
3. The one-ness of Indonesia
4. A citizenry that is led by wise guidance through consultation/representation
5. Social justice for all the Indonesian People.)

(My translation).

Adherence to these 'Principles' is supposed to generate the desired political unity among the ethnically diverse citizenry. These 'Principles' seem to be so broadly worded that they can be interpreted with sufficient flexibility to accommodate the range of ethnic diversity. Indeed they may be more significant in terms of their negative implications, rather than their positive prescriptions. Of these, the most important seem to be the following. Adherence to 'A Supreme Godhead' implies that atheism is un-Indonesian. 'Atheism' is, in this context, a code word for communism; indeed adherence to a recognised religion is considered official proof that one is not communist. Adherence to 'the one-ness of Indonesia' implies that secessionism is un-Indonesian. Adherence to 'a citizenry that is led by wise guidance through consultation/representation' implies that political dissension is un-Indonesian.

12. As Siddique and Suryadinata (1982:677) have pointed out, the only public definition of pribumi is the following:

[In 1974] President Suharto issued an instruction requiring foreign companies to initiate joint ventures with indigenous Indonesians, not just with Indonesian nationals.... No public definition of 'indigenous Indonesians' was given, although it was believed that some kind of guideline existed. On 24 March 1976, however, the leading Jakarta newspaper Kompas published Bank Indonesia's 'secret circular' -- 'a practical guide to the definition of pribumi'. According to this circular, pribumis are people who are not foreign citizens, who do not belong to the categories of 'European' or 'Foreign Orientals' (i.e. Arabs, Indians, Pakistanis, etc.), and who are not Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent. The circular further stated that pribumis are members of indigenous Indonesian society ('masyarakat Indonesia asli) who include, among others, the following ethnic groups ('suku-suku'): Aceh, Ambon, Batak, Irian, Jawa, Dayak, Madura, Minangkabau, Minahasa, and Sunda.

13. See, for example, Andaya and Andaya (1982:37-113) on the historical relationships between the sultanates listed above.

14. As noted by Brown (1970:x), the word sejarah means 'genealogical tree'; Wilkinson (1959:1036) also explains the word as 'family-tree; genealogy'. Indeed, in speaking of Sejarah Melayu as the title of the Penurunan, Wilkinson (ibid.) describes the text as 'a book of the nature of an anecdotal family history'.

15. For a full analysis of these written genealogies, see Wee and Matheson (forthcoming).
16. This bowl of water was and is an important crossroad for sea-borne trade — for example, between the Indian sub-continent, the Chinese mainland, and the Southeast Asian islands in the south such as Java, Bali, and Sulawesi. I suggest that the spatial configuration known as alam Melayu was historically unified by this sea-borne trade, from the past to the present. I further suggest that my informant's perception of such a spatial configuration is shared by others within and without that configuration. In other words, the existence of such a spatial configuration would seem not to be phenomenologically unique to my informants, but rather, an historically established objectification accessible even to outsiders. (See Appendix 2.)

17. Geertz (1963:40) describes the pasir economy thus:

That is to say, within a single narrow area many different environmental possibilities are exploited, from fishing and coconut-grove tending near the shore to wet-rice paddies, permanent gardens, and swidden farming in the near interior.

18. Geertz (1963:40) describes pasir politics thus:

In these kingdoms...the level of status was tied to actual political power, so that the kings needed constantly to prove their charisma and wealth in order to maintain the personal loyalty of their followers, and there was...sharp competition for positions of prestige at all levels.

19. There is textual evidence that a political network of kin-related allies did indeed exist. For example, after the fall of Melaka to the Portuguese, the defeated ruler, Sultan Mahmud I, and his entourage escaped to Pahang, which was then ruled by a collateral line of the same descent. (See, for example, Brown 1970:89,90,136,145,164 and 183.) There are numerous other such instances of kin-related allies.

20. The territory of the Lingga archipelago is approximately equivalent to the area covered by the Indonesian 'sub-districts' of Lingga with its administrative centre, Singkep with its administrative centre at Dabo, and Senayang with its administrative centre at Senayang. (See Riau Dalam Angka 1975:32.)

21. The territory of the Tujuh islands is approximately equivalent to the area covered by the Indonesian 'sub-districts' of Bunguran Timur with its administrative centre at Ranai, Bunguran Barat with its administrative centre at Sedanau, Siantan with its administrative centre at Terempa, Jemaja with its administrative centre at Letung, Serasan with its administrative centre at Serasan, Tambelan with its administrative centre at Tambelan, and Midai with its administrative centre at Midai.

This means that the territory of the Riau archipelago includes only the area covered by the Indonesian 'sub-districts' of Batam with its administrative centre at Belakang Padang, Bintan Selatan with its administrative centre at Tanjungpinang, Bintan Timur with its administrative centre at Kijang, Bintan Utara with its administrative centre at Tanjunguban, Kundur with its
administrative centre at Tanjungbatu, Moro with its administrative centre at Moro Sulit, and Karimun with its administrative centre at Tanjungbalai. (See Riau Dalam Angka 1975:32.)

22. In the Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor (written perhaps during the 1750s), it is said:

The Laksamana was told by Sultan Abdul Jalil to go to the island of Bintan and build a settlement on the Carang River, which was called Riau.

(My translation of the Kratz recension 1973:43).

This seems to be the very first textual mention of the name 'Riau'. The same information is repeated in the Hikayat Negeri Johor (written perhaps in the early 1800s). (See Ismail Hussein 1979:191). The Tuhfat (completed in perhaps 1866) also repeats the information but goes on to date the event:

The Laksamana was commanded to establish a settlement on Riau, on the Carang River, and to make ready a fleet to attack the Portuguese should they come... When Sultan Abd al-Jalil died, Raja Ibrahim...became king.... Sultan Abd al-Jalil died in the year of the hijra of the Prophet one thousand and eighty-eight, the Muslim year Dal-akhir 1088 [that is, 1677/8]. Then Sultan Ibrahim moved to Riau.

(Raja Ali Haji 1982:19).

23. As Tengku Ahmad (1972:3) wrote:

NAMA RIAU. Dari mana asal nama Riau? Apakah makna yang tepat dari kata "riau" itu? Kitab-kitab sumber sejarah tidak memberikan jawaban yang memuaskan tentang hal ini, karena itulah para cerdik-pandai dibidang ilmu sejarah dan orang-orang yang berminat besar pada sejarah Riau terus berusaha menelusurnya.

Tapi pendapat yang paling mengendap (dominant) ialah yang mengatakan bahwa nama itu berasal dari kata "riuh": konon disebabkan ramainya negeri yang berpusat pada tempat yang kini dikenal dengan nama Hulu Riau, sangat kentara sekali perbedaanya jika dibandingkan dengan daerah-daerah disebelah luar.

(THE NAME RIAU. What is the origin of the name 'Riau'? What is the precise meaning of the word 'riau'? The historical sources do not give a satisfactory answer to this question. Because of this, historians and others interested in Riau history have continued their efforts at unravelling this problem.

But the most dominant opinion is that the name originated from the word 'riuh'. It is said that this was caused by the hustle and bustle that was going on at the political centre situated at the place now known as Hulu Riau. This noise and clamour made the place obviously different from the other areas in its periphery.)
24. Sultan Ibrahim who came to the throne in 1677/8 was apparently the very first sultan to have had his court located on the banks of the Riau River. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:19.) He reigned there until 1683 when he moved his capital back to the banks of the Johor River on the Malay Peninsula. (See Andaya 1975:115.) However, Governor Slicher's report of 1687 indicates that even after that, traders still frequented 'Riau' as a trade centre. Sultan Ibrahim's son, Sultan Mahmud Syah II, reigned in Johor until 1699 when he was assassinated. This assassination is of great historical significance because it ended the Melaka-derived dynasty that had begun with Seri Teri Buana. The various indigenous histories that deal with this period all discuss this event at length, mostly trying to justify the assassination in one way or another. (See Andaya 1975:186-191.)

25. The successor to the assassinated Sultan Mahmud Syah II was his bendahara 'prime minister', who became Sultan Abd al-Jalil. It was in his reign that 'Riau' again assumed prominence, for in 1708/9 he moved his capital there. Captain Alexander Hamilton writing in 1727 described this move in the following way:

In 1708 the King's brother persuaded him to leave Johore Lami, and reside at Rhio on the island of Bintang, about three leagues off the River of Johore, because he thought he could act his Tyranny with more Security than on the main Continent, and so at Rhio he engrossed all Trade in his own Hands, buying and selling at his own Prices, and punishing those who dared to speak against his arbitrary Dealings. At last, in 1712 a Rebellion broke, that nothing could stop but a Revolution, which dissolved the State into Anarchy.

(Quoted from Winstedt 1979:52).

(Also see Raja Ali Haji 1982:43.) In 1716, however, the capital was once again moved back to the banks of the Johor River. (See Andaya 1975:241.)

26. In 1718, the Johor capital was conquered by Raja Kecik, a Minangkabau pretender who claimed to be the posthumous son of the assassinated Sultan Mahmud Syah II. (See Andaya 1975:250-273.) However, after driving Sultan Abd al-Jalil away from Johor, Raja Kecik himself returned to Siak where he had already established himself. But in the middle of 1719, he was chased out of Siak by an usurper and by December of the same year, he had apparently 'selected Riau as his place of residence' (Andaya 1975:287). He stayed there until 1722 when he was driven out by the Bugis adventurers, led by the five Opu Daeng brothers, one of whom was Opu Daeng Cellak.

27. To legitimate their conquest, the Bugis conquerors decided to recognise as sultan Raja Sulaiman, the son of Sultan Abd al-Jalil who had been defeated and who was subsequently murdered by Raja Kecik. They reserved for themselves the office of 'underking' (yang dipertuan muda or yamtuan muda). Both the sultan and the yamtuan muda had their capitals on the Riau river, though at different locations. This was the case until 1787 when to escape from the Dutch, the then reigning Sultan Mahmud III moved his capital to Lingga. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:62-186.) The move to Lingga will be further discussed in Chapter Four.
28. From 1784 to 1795, 'Riau' was under the control of the Dutch who stationed a garrison at Tanjungpinang. (See Appendix 5.)

29. In 1795 because of the Napoleonic conquest of the Netherlands the exiled Stadhouder authorised the British to take charge of all the Dutch settlements in Southeast Asia. (See Matheson and Andaya 1982:377.) One action that the British took in their newly bestowed position of authority was to withdraw the Dutch garrison at Tanjungpinang and restore 'Riau' to Sultan Mahmud III. The sultan decided to stay on in Lingga. As a result of this power vacuum, 'Riau' became the arena of rivalry between Engku Muda, a descendant of Sultan Abd al-Jalil, and Raja Ali, the Bugis 'underking' who had abandoned 'Riau' in 1784. In 1804, Sultan Mahmud III intervened in favour of the Bugis faction, and gave 'Riau' to them, while Engku Muda and his followers ensconced themselves in Bulang. (See Winstedt 1979:71-73.) This episode will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four.

30. Turnbull (1977:29) has summarised the main conditions of the 1824 treaty thus:

Among its territorial stipulations, the Dutch ceded Malacca to Britain, withdrew objections to the British occupation of Singapore and undertook not to make any establishment in the Malay peninsula, while the British agreed not to interfere in the islands south of Singapore.

31. This is how the territorial enlargement of Bugis-dominated 'Riau' is described in the Tuhfat:

A messenger from the Governor-General came to Riau, the astute young man called Angelbeek. He visited the Yang Dipertuan Muda, and informed him that the English and Dutch governments had agreed to divided the lands below the winds between Sultan Husain and Sultan Abd al-Rahman, with each having his own boundaries. [Sultan Husain was the sultan that the English had installed in Singapore in 1819, while Sultan Abd al-Rahman was the sultan at Lingga who was recognised by the Dutch.] The land of the Malays...which lay to the starboard of Indiamen bound for Chinese was the legal allocation of the Dutch government, while that on the port side was allocated to the English government.... Angelbeek had also come to increase the Riau revenues which went to the Yang Dipertuan Muda.... The islands of Karimun, Buru, and Kundur were included in the jurisdiction of Sultan Abd al-Rahman and the Yang Dipertuan Muda of Riau. However, the Yang Dipertuan of the Straits (that is, Sultan Husain), Temenggung Abd al-Rahman, their dependents and their people still acted according to the old customs .... The Yang Dipertuan of the Straits...still continued to exercise his authority in the Riau sphere, in places like Pintu, Serah, Rampai, Duyung, and Galah. He even ordered the tin on Karimun Island to be developed for export.

(Raja Ali Haji 1982:244-245.)

(Sultan Hussain of Singapore and Sultan Abd al-Rahman of Riau-Lingga were both sons of Sultan Mahmud III, who competed with each other for the throne after their father's death.)
Further on in the Tuhfat (ibid.:252), there is mention of some other places that were newly included in the post-1824 'Riau sphere' --

places close to Karimun such as Ungaran, Buru, Mundur, as well as areas frequented by the sea-people, like Moroh and the Terung Islands.

(Ibid.:252).

32. In a footnote to this passage, Matheson and Andaya (1982:404) said that they found the meaning unclear. My reading of it is that the Yang Dipertuan Muda found that he was losing revenue to the Tujuh islands through princes taking deliveries there. The Tujuh islands -- or better, island-groups -- are not easily accessible. Indeed my informants warned me off from making a trip to the Tujuh island-groups, telling me that if I went there, I would not be able to return until at least six months later.

Apparently, travel to the Tujuh island-groups is feasible only during the transitional periods at the beginning and end of the monsoon seasons; otherwise, during the full blast of the monsoon seasons, the winds are too strong for small craft. This information is confirmed by the Sailing Directions for Soenda Strait (1949):

The Pulau Tujuh in the open waters of the South China Sea are accessible only with difficulty during either monsoon season, because of the heavy surf on the rocky and reef-bound coasts, and the absence of fair weather in the offing during most of this time. Conditions in the transition period, however, are quite different.

(Quoted from Sopher 1977:30.)

Therefore, if there were princes taking deliveries to the Tujuh island-groups, it would have been extremely difficult for the yamtuan muda situated at Penyengat to keep track of these deliveries.

33. In cartographic convention, Galang Senyantung is known simply as Galang. There is a reason for this. This island is where the Galang river is located. According to my informants, this river -- known to them as Galang Tua 'Old Galang' -- was the very first site to which the name 'Galang' was attached. Since the cartographic convention for the Riau archipelago is derived from the Admiralty maps of the British and Dutch colonial administrations, it is the usage of the time that has been preserved in the maps. Nowadays, however, my informants tend to refer to the island in association with another river -- that is, Sungai Senyantung -- because that became the site of a later settlement.

In cartographic convention, Galang Kandap is known as Galang Baru. But my informants tend to refer to it as Galang Kandap. The reason for their usage is not clear.
34. According to Coope (1976:77), 1 gantang is equivalent to 5 katis in weight. Since 1 kati is $1 \frac{1}{3}$ lb. (see ibid.:125), 1 gantang is equivalent to $1 \frac{1}{3}$ lb. x 0.4536 kg. x 5 = 3.024 kg.

35. In modern Bahasa Malaysia and Bahasa Indonesia, the word benua is used for continent, so that in these modern varieties of the Malay language, the word pulau has come to assume the English meaning of 'island'. But, as Wilkinson (1959:122) has pointed out, 'to the old Malays even a large island like Java was a benua'. In my informants' usage, the word benua does not refer to 'continent'. For example, as I have mentioned above, the title of the mythical founder of the Melaka dynasty, Seri Teri Buana, is interpreted as meaning Raja Tiga Benua 'King of Three Lands' — namely, Palembang, Bintan, and Temasik/Singapore. The three words are of Sanskritic origin. According to Wilkinson (1959:1085), seri is an honorific prefix to:

(i) the names or descriptions of royal personages;
(ii) honorary non-royal titles of the highest rank.

Teri means 'three' (ibid.:1210); and buana means 'world; the earth as a whole' (ibid.:155). So Wilkinson (ibid.) explains the title Seri Teri Buana as meaning 'Light of the Three Worlds', the Three Worlds being Earth, Heaven, and Earth. Wilkinson (ibid.) points out that benua can also mean 'empire'. The three benua may thus refer to the kingdoms of Palembang, Bintan, and Temasik/Singapore, and not to the islands on which these kingdoms were located. This would indeed seem to be the case, since it is Palembang, and not Sumatra, that is named as one of the three benua.

36. If Bintan was indeed considered a benua in bygone days, whether in the sense of a large island or a kingdom, it does not seem to be so termed at present. The island is instead referred to tanah 'land' or bahagian 'parts'. The word tanah is used in three ways in this context — tanah ini 'this land', setanah dengan sini 'land continuous from here', and tanah Bintan. These terms are more likely to be used when the speaker is herself/himself on the island. Tanah thus refers to the ground beneath, with the implication that it extends beyond the spot where the speaker is standing at the moment. But where the extension of ground ends does not seem to be the prime concern here; instead the focus is simply on the expanse of ground spreading outwards from one point.

Wilkinson (1959: 1162) explains the word tanah in the following way:

land i.e.
(i) state, country
(ii) surface of soil, especially with regards to ownership...;
(iii) surface of soil with regards to its character...;
(iv) soil itself and its character....

Wilkinson's explanation in (iii) above is closest to my informants' usage of the word tanah, by which they refer to the surface of the soil, particularly with respect to its...
spreading character. The phrase setanah dengan sini 'land continuous with here' makes this focus on expanse explicit, for it refers to a relationship between two localities — here and beyond — joined by the same surface of the soil. But this is not a symmetrical relationship, for 'here' is specific, being where the speaker is, and 'beyond' is vague, undefined.

However, the one point from which the surface of the soil radiates may not be where the speaker is; if the phrase tanah Bintan is used, the single point referred to is the Bintan river. Therefore, the 'Bintan' of tanah Bintan is really of a quite different order from the 'Bintan' in the English phrase 'the island of Bintan'. Tanah Bintan does not mean 'the island of Bintan'; rather, it refers to the spread of the soil from the Bintan river. As would be logically expected, the phrase tanah Bintan may be used, even if the speaker were not on the island itself, since the river would constitute an objective, fixed point of reference.

37. The word bahagian 'parts' is more vague than tanah. In contrast to tanah, bahagian is more likely to be used when the speaker is not on the island but elsewhere. It may also include an area larger than the island itself. How much territory the term includes depends on how far the speaker is from the island. For example, if she/he is on, say, Pengujan, then bahagian Bintan would not include Pengujan itself, but would refer primarily to the island of Bintan. But if she/he is on Pangkil, then bahagian Bintan could well include Pengujan. If she/he is even further away, say, on Temiang, then even Pangkil might be included. (See Map 4.) There are, however, limits on the maximum area that may be included as bahagian Bintan; these limits seem to be the Riau Strait on the west, Telang and Merodong Straits on the south, the South China Sea on the east, and the Singapore straits on the north. These are all relatively wide stretches of sea which have served as major shipping lanes since ancient times. Bahagian Bintan at its maximum extent thus seems to be demarcated by the trade routes surrounding it.

Bahagian may be understood also as 'island-cluster', for each of the larger islands is surrounded by numerous small islands and islets. The word bahagian could thus refer to the island-cluster as a whole, including the smaller surrounding islands and islets. What separates one bahagian from another would be the wide stretches of sea, which serve as major shipping lanes for the trade vessels of the world.

A contrast may be drawn between the terms tanah Bintan and bahagian Bintan. The former has a 'here' orientation, whereas the latter has a 'there' orientation.

38. The island is simply too big to see the sea all around from any one point, not even from Gunung Bintan which has an elevation of 347 m (1138 ft). (See Map 3.) It is also too big to circumscribe in a few hours. The island can be directly viewed as an island only from an aeroplane and that is a perspective not easily available to my informants. This is not to say that they are unaware that this piece of land is an island surrounded by water on all sides. They do know that it is possible to sail around it, even though that may take days. But then in their experience, all land in Riau is surrounded by the sea; all are islands.
39. There are evidently very few orang hutan in the Riau archipelago. There are said to be some on the relatively larger islands of Rempang and Batam. Kähler (1960) worked on the language of the orang hutan of Rempang. And Øyvind Sandbukt (personal communication) witnessed how a group of them were brought to Tanjungpinang in the late 1970s by some district government officials for conversion to Islam. But I have heard from my informants that these converted orang hutan have since abandoned the huts built for them by the government and have returned to a nomadic way of life in the forest. See note 6 in Chapter One.

40. As Sopher (1977:233) has pointed out, spear fishers:

have no means of taking some of the gregarious migratory fishes like the Engraulidae and Clupeidae, resembling the anchovies, sardines, herrings and shad of northern waters, and only take a few individuals from the schools of the larger fishes, like the mackerels and Spanish mackerels, or the flying-fish.... The oceanic pelagic kinds like skipjack, tunny and bonito, as well as porpoises,...appear to be quite disregarded by the sea nomads. ...Their hunting techniques require them to concentrate on large, slow-moving surface fish, such as an individual Spanish mackerel, dorab or mullet and in the neighbourhood of coral reefs, the parrot fish, constituting a brilliantly coloured and delicately flavoured prey, easily seen in the clear water near the face of the reef. In addition, sharks and rays, whose capture is always dangerous, are occasionally caught by the sea nomads, partly for food, but also for their commercial value.

41. In connection with this, Sopher (1977:234) has commented:

...Only small amounts of food are available to them from day to day and...they have few means of preserving and storing an occasional large surplus. Thus, none of the sea nomad groups practise any of the methods of preserving fish by fermentation or marination which are common among a seaboard people of the Malaysian high cultures. An economic factor which is of significance here is the cost either of manufacturing salt, an essential ingredient, in terms of effort, time, and equipment, or of obtaining it in trade.... Smoking and drying of fish over a wood fire are hardly known in the western part of the archipelago, but are very common methods in Celebes and the Moluccas. In the absence of this method, and without the use of considerable amounts of salt, preservation of fish by simple means become difficult in the area of the Strait of Malacca, the east coast of Sumatra and the Pulau Tujuh, because of climatological reasons which make sun-drying often impracticable. The same climatological reasons, namely the continual raininess and heavy cloud cover, also make the production of salt from sea water a long and relatively expensive operation, particularly in the Strait of Malacca where the discharge of fresh water and salt is enough to reduce salinity considerably.
42. Like the rest of Southeast Asia, the Riau archipelago is dominated by two monsoon seasons — the north-east and the south-west monsoon. My informants refer to these, respectively, as musim utara 'the northern season' and musim selatan 'the southern season'. The north-east monsoon blows in from the South China Sea, beginning from what my informants call bulan yang ber 'the ber months' — that is, September, October, November, and December. (The names of these months are pronounced in a similar way in Bahasa Indonesia.) The 'northern season' continues until March, followed by a short transitional period, when the winds die down before shifting to a southerly direction. During the 'northern season', the nomadic boat-dwellers are likely to be found not in the Riau archipelago, but in the straits of the Lingga archipelago where they may find shelter from the northern winds. It is generally not until the transitional period in March that they would return to the straits of Riau. The 'southern season' begins in April and continues till August, followed by another transitional period. During this second transitional period, the boat-dwellers would return to the Lingga archipelago.

43. Sopher (1977:2) differentiates between four types of strand in insular Southeast Asia:

   It is convenient to recognise four distinct elements of the coastal landscape of this region, each of which may be characteristic of long stretches of shore line. These are (1) low land or swamps with shallow waters offshore covering more or less extensive banks of mud and sand, (2) well developed shelving beaches of sand, (3) steep or rocky faces and sea cliffs, with or without narrow shingle beaches, (4) coral reefs.

   The strand environment of my pulau-dwelling informants belong to the second type. (See Plate 2.)

44. As Booth and McCawley (1981:17-18) have pointed out:

   Prices are fixed by regulation for a number of important items such as rice, fertilizers and kerosene and the government attempts to inhibit the appearance of black markets by directly controlling supply. Licensing arrangements are common for a wide range of imported goods, and bank credit tends to be rationed according to the rather arbitrary imposition of credit ceilings rather than through interest rates... Discretionary controls of this sort have been found to be unsatisfactory in many countries, and the experience in Indonesia does little to suggest that there is more justification for using them there than elsewhere. In Indonesia they have often been rather ineffective in controlling market forces and the arbitrary nature of the controls which allows administrators room for discretion in applying the regulations encourages corruption.

45. According to Kato (1984:12), Indragiri is indeed one of the major rice-farming areas of Riau Province:

   About forty-four percent of the so-called sawah in the official statistics of 1979 are located in the District
of Indragiri Hilir. Sawah under tidal irrigation is cultivated in this district by the Banjarese and Buginese settlers. These people have been migrating respectively from Kalimantan and Sulawesi since the late nineteenth century. Rain-fed sawah (sawah berbandar langit or sawah tadah hujan) are found in some areas near the Bukit Barisan mountain range, while sawah ranah or sawah bencah, which makes use of flooded areas for sawah, is common along some parts of riverside regions.

Kato (ibid.:51) clarifies these terms thus:

Ranah or ronah means meadow and low-lying valley, while bencah or bancah means swamp. Although both involve transplanting of rice, they are more commonly called ladang ranah or ladang bencah and can be conceived of as an agricultural form halfway between sawah and ladang.

These terms are not known to my informants in the Riau archipelago. It is significant that even in Indragiri, the people involved in rice-farming are not the indigenes of the area, but Banjarese and Buginese settlers from Kalimantan and Sulawesi.

46. In April 1985, a 'Presidential Instruction' (Inpres 4) was announced, aiming at 'a wholesale regulatory clean-up of Indonesia's ports' (Far Eastern Economic Review 25 April 1985:118). Some of my informants are optimistic that the intended changes will make life easier for them, in that they will face fewer problems with the bureaucrats. But it is still too soon to tell whether this is really so.

47. In Wee (1984, see backpocket), I used Bourdieu's (1977) theory of symbolic misrecognition to explain the inverse relationship between the material economy and the symbolic economy. In the present study, however, I am contextualising the symbolic economy within relations of power — in particular, the elusion of socio-psychical domination on the part of the dominated party. Economy and politics are of course related aspects of the same social situation. There is thus no inherent incompatibility in the two terminologies I am using. What I am referring to in both cases is an ideological structuration that has at least two valencies — to the material economy and to political power. The choice of words depends on the aspect that is being highlighted.
CHAPTER THREE

TEMPORAL CONFIGURATIONS

3.1 Zaman

3.2 From Zaman Batin to Political Centralisation

3.3 Zaman Sultan and the Palembang-Temasik-Melaka-Johor Dynasty

3.4 Zaman Belanda

3.5 Zaman Jepang

3.6 Persatuan Melayu Riau Sejati

3.7 Zaman Indonesia
3.1 Zaman

My informants use the term zaman to denote certain patterns of political domination. They speak of five zamans:

- zaman batin 'the era of the chief',
- zaman sultan 'the era of the sultan',
- zaman Belanda 'the era of the Dutch',
- zaman Jepang 'the era of the Japanese'
- zaman Indonesia 'the era of the Indonesia'

Of these, zaman sultan and zaman Indonesia are the two most significant to my informants, for they live in zaman Indonesia yet focus their attention on zaman sultan.

I stated in Chapters One and Two that my informants elude their present experience of being Indonesian citizens by escaping into the pre-Indonesian past. One way they have achieved this is by listing both zaman sultan and zaman Indonesia as phenomena of the same type: Both are zamans, both are political eras, both are temporal objectifications. Their equivalence as similar phenomena is enhanced by the inclusion of three other zamans -- namely, zaman batin, zaman Belanda, and zaman Jepang. By listing the present as merely one era in a sociocentrically defined temporal series, the reality of the present is relativised in terms of the not-present. Zaman Indonesia is thus bracketed within a larger temporal context. So even though my informants acknowledge that they are currently existing in zaman Indonesia, it is nevertheless possible for them to elude the experience of the present by locating themselves in this larger encompassing context.

The large scale of this encompassing context may be discerned not only in the number of zamans listed, but also in the length of time
that is included. **Zaman Indonesia** began with the independence of Indonesia as a nation-state. As pointed out in Chapter Two, this was unilaterally declared by Sukarno on 17 August 1945, even though it was not formally achieved until 1950. So **zaman Indonesia** has been in existence for only some thirty-odd years. Where my informants are concerned, **zaman Jepang** and **zaman Belanda** were also relatively short. The former lasted for only three years (1942-1945), while the latter commenced in 1911 with the abdication of the last sultan and lasted until 1942, a total of thirty-one years.

In contrast, **zaman sultan** is perceived as an immense stretch of time that originated, to translate an informant's words, 'from Melaka, from Bukit Si-Guntang, from Palembang'. What he was referring to was the founding myth of kingship which exists not only in the various versions of the Penurunan, but also in the oral traditions of my informants. With regards to the dating of this stretch of time, some of my literate informants do know that Melaka fell to the Portuguese in 1511. They do not say when Melaka was founded, but the founding date would obviously have to be earlier than 1511. Moreover, before Melaka was founded, the kingdom was supposedly sited at Palembang, with an ever earlier derivation from Bukit Si-Guntang. So, taking 1511 as the minimal base-line, a **zaman sultan** that derives from Bukit Si-Guntang would have had a duration of more than four hundred years.

Such being the case, it is plausible for my informants to perceive **zaman Indonesia** as a mere episode in the larger historical context of **zaman sultan**. There is thus a mutual bracketing of **zaman sultan** and **zaman Indonesia**: The institutionalised present of **zaman Indonesia** brackets **zaman sultan**, and the mythologised past of **zaman sultan** brackets **zaman Indonesia**. The term **zaman** thus refers not to an unilineal progression of time, but rather, to a multiple layering of temporal conditions. A particular sense of time is expressed whereby
the experiences of the present are relativised in the larger context of the past. Hence a way of perceiving the past entails a way of perceiving the present.

My informants seem to perceive a fundamental difference between zaman sultan and the three subsequent zamans: that is, during zaman sultan, the centre of political power was located within Riau-Lingga, whereas during the three subsequent zamans, power was located elsewhere. My informants seem to view the three zamans following zaman sultan as externally caused happenings in which they and their predecessors became involuntarily implicated. In the words of an informant:

(The Dutch came. The Dutch went, and the Japanese came. The Japanese went, and Indonesia came.)

These three zamans thus seem to have been brought about by the coming and going of various outsiders. The listing of the zamans refers to more than mere temporal succession; it refers to an institutional shift from the endogenous power of zaman sultan to the exogenous power of the following three zamans.

Zaman Indonesia is thereby typed as a zaman of exogenous derivation, like zaman Belanda and zaman Jepang. The relationship between zaman sultan and zaman Indonesia may therefore be understood also in terms of endogenous power versus exogenous power. This gives a spatial dimension to the idea of zaman. The originating context of zaman sultan is Riau-Lingga and the rest of alam Melayu (including Melaka, Palembang, and Bukit Si-Guntang), whereas the originating context of the three subsequent zamans is the world beyond. We may correlate these temporal and spatial relations in the following way:
In my informants' perceptions, time and space seem to be out of joint, with correlations of here-and-then and there-and-now. Zaman sultan is in the here-and-then, and zaman Indonesia is in the there-and-now.

It is in this context that we may discuss the zaman that precedes zaman sultan -- namely, zaman batin -- for it also entails a spatial dimension. In my informants' usage, the word batin refers to the chief of an autonomous local community. As one informant described this zaman:

In the beginning, people did not want to follow the raja and the sultan, except that they were forced to do so. Force came through the use of the sword. The people previously had their own batin, different from the raja and the sultan. The rajas caused disturbance and unrest. This one wanted to rule, that one also wanted to rule. Later on, when there were no longer any rajas, there arose the government, the communists. But they are also the same: they cause disturbance.

(My translation).

In this description, zaman batin is portrayed as an era of inward-looking tranquility, undisturbed by power-seeking outsiders, be they raja, sultan, government, or communists.

The word batin could be derived from the Arabic batin meaning 'internal', since, as Wilkinson (1959:91) has explained, the Malay word has the meaning of 'esoteric, secret'. Such a connotation is known to my informants. Hence the term zaman batin 'the era of the chief' may be alternatively translated as 'the inward-looking era', in contrast to which the succeeding zaman sultan may be considered an outward-looking era. Indeed, orientation would seem to be the crucial difference between zaman batin and the four subsequent zamans. The batin was not the government of Riau as a whole, in whatever manner
that whole may be defined. The batin was the chief of a local community, and hence each community had a different batin. The term zaman batin thus refers to an era of uncentralised power, prior to the subsequent situation of political centralisation, first under the raja/sultan, then the Dutch, the Japanese, and finally, the Indonesian government. So if the contrast between zaman sultan and the three subsequent zamans is between endogenous power and the exogenous power, then the contrast between zaman batin and the four subsequent zamans is between uncentralised power and centralised power.

The spatial implication is that in zaman batin one cannot even speak of Riau-Lingga, since without political centralisation the various islands would not have constituted a single territory. In such a situation, there would have been neither centre nor periphery. There would have been merely different localities related in spatial but not political terms. Such a context is locally immanent, requiring no further definition in relation to a centre, whether endogenous or exogenous. The five zamans that are mentioned in my informants' discourse imply a process of change, first from uncentralised localism to a centralised state, then from an endogenous government to exogenous colonisation.

3.2 From Zaman Batin to Political Centralisation

The centralised politics that emerged in the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands were founded upon a mobile population of boat-dwelling nomads. For the rise of such a state however, sedentism is perhaps a necessary precondition, without which it would not have been possible to establish a fixed political centre. And without such a centre, the political groupings would have remained fragmentary. But in an island world of sea and land, a political centre located in one place must
combine sedentism with mobility, if it is to exercise any centralisation of power. The point is: it is ecologically not easy, even now, to institutionalise political centralisation in an archipelago of small islands where there are definite ecological constraints on population size and density. There are inherent centrifugal tendencies in such a sparsely scattered island population of self-sufficient communities, a significant proportion of whom are nomadic. Any political centre that developed in such a situation would have had to establish an expansive network of alliances with the various far-flung communities. Under these ecological constraints, the state could not have become strongly institutionalised. To employ a maritime metaphor, the state merely floated on top of the local currents and eddies of an open sea.

In the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands, one of the ways in which this expansive network of alliances was maintained was through the institution of vassalage. Bloch (1932:204) discusses a similar situation in Carolignian and post-Carolignian Europe, where he draws a linkage between vassalage on the one hand, and on the other hand, the existence of a weak state, a political incapacity for hegemony on the part of government, and the less than thorough monetisation of the economy. These conditions are exactly those that had prevailed and still prevail in the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands. So even though vassalage no longer exists at present, its derivative conditions are still extant. As we shall see in the subsequent chapters, the idea of vassalage is still important to some of my informants, though the practice of it is extinct.

What the weak state structure implies is that even after the development of political centralisation, community leadership at the local level remained important. So even though zaman batin may have preceded zaman sultan chronologically, political centralisation did
not occur for all in toto. This process was perhaps most relevant to those who claimed centralised leadership over others, and least relevant to those who ignored such claims. In this light, it is significant that not all my informants mentioned zaman batin. The ones who did so are those still associated with a tribal orang laut identity.

Wilkinson (1959:91) also associates the title batin with the 'Protomalayan headman', illustrating this association with the following saying:

Adat negeri itu tiada beraja, batin sahaja penghulu-nya (the law of that country recognised no king, the Chiefs were only batin).

This saying is compatible with my informants' view that zaman batin was marked by uncentralised power: hence no raja 'king' was recognised, and the penghulus 'headmen' were merely batins 'chiefs'.

In this context, Benjamin's (1968b) differentiation between headmanship and leadership among the Temiar of the Malay Peninsula is of relevance to our discussion. In his usage (ibid.:1), headmanship refers 'to those positions of authority that are held to be legitimate in relation to some locus of higher authority situated outside' the local community; in contrast, leadership refers 'to those positions of authority that gain their legitimacy by virtue of their place within the nexus of internal social relations that constitute' the local community. In other words, headmen are appointed from without, whereas leaders emerge from within.

It is thus significant that my informants do not speak of a zaman penghulu, but only of a zaman batin, for it does seem to be indeed the case that the penghulu was a headman appointed by a higher outside authority, whereas the batin was a leader emergent from within the
local community. So if the title batin is a remnant of a previous political situation, then it would seem that this previous situation was marked by a network of alliances formed by local chiefs who were emergent from within their own respective community, and who were perhaps approximately equal in status to one another. This network of equal allies was subsequently replaced by a hierarchy, where penghulus were appointed by a higher central authority.

This difference between the penghulu and the batin is currently still relevant, for the present-day penghulu is indeed appointed by the Indonesian government, whereas the title batin is not even officially recognised within the Indonesian system of administration. As pointed out in Chapter Two, the Indonesian kecamatan 'sub-district' is divided into kepenghuluan 'headman-doms', each of which is under a government-appointed penghulu.

Where the orang laut are concerned, although they are aware of being Indonesian citizens, it is nevertheless their own local community that is of paramount importance to them. In several cases, they still have their own local batin. Even those that no longer have batin can still remember the identity of the various batins just a few generations back. So for these people, zaman batin is still a reality, or at least a recent memory, co-existent with zaman Indonesia.

3.3 Zaman Sultan and the Palembang-Temasik-Melaka-Johor Dynasty

The opposition between zaman batin and the other four zamans is, however, relevant only to a minority of my informants. Since the majority of my informants happened to be those who are not associated with any tribal orang laut identity, the crucial opposition for them
is between zaman sultan and the three subsequent zamans.

As I have mentioned above, for my informants, zaman sultan began not just in Riau-Lingga, but long before that, from the time of Melaka, Palembang, Bukit Si-Guntang. However, they are rather vague about the calendrical date of this beginning; it is located simply in the dulu-dulu 'long, long ago'. But the end of zaman sultan is very definite; it happened in 1911 when the last sultan of Riau-Lingga abdicated his throne. My informants are well aware that elsewhere in alam Melayu, specifically in Brunei and the Malay Peninsula, there are still reigning sultans in existence. Some of them are even aware that in Medan, northern Sumatra, the sultan of Deli was ceremonially installed in recent years to serve as the symbolic figurehead of the four former sultanates of the area -- Langkat, Asahan, Deli, and Serdang. Whereas my informants may acknowledge that zaman sultan still continues in those places where there are reigning sultans, they regard the era as having reached its end in 1911 in Riau-Lingga. So their interest in zaman sultan is very much from a Riau perspective -- that is, in terms of their own situation.

As I have shown in Chapter Two, the name 'Riau' came to be attached to that particular groups of islands, only as a result of the political demarcation of territory, a process that my informants seem to date as beginning from the time of Opu Daeng Cellak's wedding which occurred in 1722. So that wedding may be interpreted as a means of dating the period within zaman sultan that is most relevant to my informants. Some of my literate informants, who are aware of calendrical dates, do indeed talk of the year 1722 as the beginning of the Bugis presence in Riau. (See, for example, a book written by my informant Raja Hamzah Yunus n.d.(b).)
On the other hand, the Riau segment of zaman sultan is not regarded by my informants as wholly separate from the earlier period which had begun from Melaka, Palembang, and Bukit Si-Guntang. After all, the significance of this temporal segment resides in its continuity from the farther past. I will discuss the 1722-1911 period in detail in Part Two. For the present chapter, I shall deal only with the farther past preceding 1722.

As I have pointed out above, the mention of Bukit Si-Guntang derives from the founding myth of Melayu kingship, as known in the Penurunan and in my informants' oral tradition. Wolters (1970:7) argues that this myth contains 'a Malay perspective for what today we call "the history of Srivijaya"'. He further argues (ibid.:77-107) that the origins of the Melaka kingdom are to be found in the kingdom of Srivijaya, the capital of which he locates at Palembang.

The evidence indicates that, like other Southeast Asian kingdoms of the time, this was an Indianised state, based ideologically on Sanskritic and Buddhistic civilisation. So the term zaman sultan 'the era of the sultan' is quite clearly anachronistic. The word sultan refers to an Islamic title and Srivijaya-Palembang was evidently not Islamised.

Despite the religious discontinuity, however, there seems to have been political continuity from pre-Islamic to post-Islamic times. Srivijaya spanned those areas which are even today considered as part of alam Melayu 'the Melayu world'. Moreover, it seems to be the case that like the later sultanates, Srivijaya was also a pasisir 'coastal' state, composed of a federation of trading ports sited on important trade routes but without any significant agricultural base. Such a characterisation would fit the coastal kingdoms that directly succeeded Srivijaya -- namely, Melaka, Johor, and Riau-Lingga.
This kind of political structure meant that the capture of a capital was not necessarily the end of the kingdom. Another capital was usually set up at another port. What linked the old capital to the new capital was evidently the king himself. Wolters (1970) argues that the connection between Srivijaya and Melaka was indeed provided by the very person of the king: the founder of Melaka was the former ruler of Palembang driven out by Javanese forces in 1391.

In the founding myth told in the *Penurunan*, the connection between Palembang and Melaka is indeed personalised, though not in one ruler, but in a line of rulers connected through descent. In this myth, three Indic princes appear magically on Bukit Si-Guntang. They each become the ruler of an area in Sumatra. One of them becomes the ruler of Palembang, and it is from him that the dynasty of Melayu kings are descended. He establishes this dynasty by leaving Palembang, staying briefly in Bintan, then settling in Temasik/Singapore, where he is succeeded by four generations of descendants. In the reign of his great-great-grandson, Seri Sultan Iskandar Shah, Javanese forces attack Singapore. The defeated ruler escapes and makes his way northward until he reaches Melaka where he establishes a new capital for himself. (See Brown 1970:11-42.)

The mention of Bintan in this context is particularly significant in our discussion. According to the description given in the *Penurunan*, it is quite clear that the 'Bintan' mentioned therein refers to the same place that is still known as 'Bintan' — that is, the banks of the Bintan river. Furthermore, in the *Penurunan*, Bintan is said to have been ruled by a queen by the name of Wan Seri Benian, also known as Permaisuri Sakidar Shah. (See Winstedt 1938:59.) The implication is that Bintan was already the site of an
established polity, even prior to the arrival of Seri Teri Buana from Palembang. According to the Penurunan, upon his arrival, Seri Teri Buana was anointed as the heir of the Bintan queen. But before he could succeed to the throne, he left Bintan and founded himself a new capital on Temasik/Singapore. However, according to the Shellabear version of the Penurunan (1967:31-37), after the death of the Bintan queen, it was not any of her descendants, male or female, who succeeded to her throne. Instead, Bintan came to be ruled by the son of Seri Teri Buana's chief minister, who was appointed as his deputy.

So even though Bintan may have started off as an independent polity by itself, it was brought into the same genealogical network founded by the ruler from Palembang. This was done, evidently, by replacing the indigenous Bintan queen's line of descent with a male regent appointed by the Palembang king reigning at Temasik/Singapore. Significantly, it is mentioned in the Penurunan that the Bintan queen had female descendants. In the earlier 1612 version, she is said to have had two grand-daughters, both of whom married the two sons of Seri Teri Buana. (See Brown 1970:20.) In the later Shellabear version, she is said to have had a daughter who married Seri Teri Buana. (See Shellabear 1967:31.) In other words, instead of becoming rulers themselves, the Bintan queen's female descendants became merely the wives of male rulers. The mythology of kingship in the Penurunan thus tells of a shift from female rule to male rule. The significance of this, as we shall see below, is that the association of gender with political power is still a controversial matter among my present-day informants.

In this context, it is interesting that my informants in two communities said that the founder of their respective settlement was female. In Pulau Seking, the female founder was identified as Mak Meleking or Yang Leking, by whose name the island itself came to be
known -- namely, Si King 'the one known as King'. My information tallies with that obtained by Normala Manap (1983:190) who did a detailed study of the Seking community:

...Mak Meleking or...Yang Leking...is held by many to be the founder of Seking.... She is said to be a Selat woman of Seking, who was...quite unlike other normal women. She was very big and had great strength and courage to the extent that she was able to counter the attack of pirates singlehanded.

Such a description corresponds closely to that given my informants in Pulau Panjang of their female founder, who was known as Tipah. According to them, 'Tipah was trusted by people' (Tipah dipercayai orang); so she became the 'village elder' (ketua kampung). They claimed that she died at the age of 150, and that although she was so old, she still had all her teeth. They said:

Biar datang baik atau jahat, dia yang menentang.

(Be it good or ill that came, she was the one who faced it.)

What is particularly significant in the context of our discussion is that both these communities are still associated with a tribal orang laut identity. So even in the oral tradition, the mythology suggests that prior to political centralisation at a supra-local level, political organisation at the local level was possibly under female leadership, at least in some communities. Oral myth thus corroborates the written myth of the Penurunan which tells of a female-ruled local polity in Bintan, prior to its incorporation in a larger regional network that included Palembang, Temasik/Singapore, and later Melaka. Upon such incorporation, however, local female rule was replaced by a supra-local patrilineal dynasty of male rulers.

The implications of this mythology are compatible with Benjamin's (1983:39-45) ethnological analysis of the Malay Peninsula, where he discusses matrifocality and patrifocality as modes of orientation. He
argues that the former 'serves to organise centripetal "inward" relations (which, by implication, are more homogeneous and familial in feel)', while the latter 'organises centrifugal, "outward" relations (which, by implication, are more heterogeneous and politico-jural in feel)'. In the case of the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands, both the oral and written forms of mythology suggest that the former preceded the latter.

Furthermore, there is a suggestion in the Penurunan that the shift from female rule to male rule was legitimated by the ideology of Indianised kingship, for the founder of what eventually became the Melaka dynasty is depicted as the son of an Indian king. (See Brown 1970:12-15). The significance of this is perhaps that the ideology of Indian kingship quite unquestionably allocated political power to males alone. There is indeed some evidence that Hindu-Buddhist ideas were used to legitimate the institutionalisation of male rule. Islam subsequently came to play this ideological role. As we shall see below, Islam continues to be important in this respect for my present-day informants.

There was also a temporal dimension in the institutionalisation of male rule. Whereas the female leaders in mythology are characterised as charismatic individuals, -- for example, in the way that my informants described the female founders of their settlements (see above) -- the male rulers routinised their charisma in the form of a patrilineal dynasty. I will discuss the process of such routinisation in detail in the subsequent chapters.

The institution of a divine, or at least super-human, king was particularly significant in the ecological context of Riau-Lingga, Sumatra, and the Malay Peninsula. As I have stated above, it is difficult to maintain a strong state structure under such ecological
conditions. As Bloch (1932:204) has argued, in a weak state, relations of domination and submission tend to remain personalised. I would suggest that this was true of the kingdom that was based first in Palembang, then in Melaka, then in Johor, and finally in Riau-Lingga. In such a state, historical continuity was preserved purely in the person of the king who had inherited his office through by descent. Legitimation was thus genealogical in nature.

This mode of legitimation is clearly evident in the events that occurred after Melaka was conquered by the Portuguese in 1511. The defeated Sultan Mahmud escaped to the interior and eventually settled on Bintan island. (See Andaya and Andaya 1982:56.) The ex-Melakan court was able to re-establish itself successfully in Bintan, apparently by providing the necessary continuity in the person of the ruler himself. But the success of the newly re-established court led the Portuguese to send a punitive expedition to destroy the settlement in 1526. This resulted in another exodus which ended in the upper reaches of the Johor river, where the court was again re-established, thus beginning the history of the kingdom of Johor. (See ibid.:56–57.)

It is perhaps significant that the earliest version of the Penurunan has been dated to 1612 by Roolvinck (1970). The Penurunan is basically a genealogy of kings that legitimates power on the basis of patrilineal descent. (See Bowen 1983.) So the implication is that this text was written at the Johor court for the purpose of legitimating the Johor rulers by tracing their patrilineal origins to Melaka, to Palembang, and to Bukit Si-Guntang.

However, this mode of legitimation through descent seems to have been a double-edged sword. A crisis of power arose in 1699 with the assassination of Sultan Mahmud II, the sole legitimate descendant of the Melaka patri-line. This meant the end of legitimate power. So
when the bendahara 'chief minister' succeeded to the throne as Sultan Abd al-Jalil, his political position was so precarious that he was easily defeated in 1718 by a pretender who claimed to be the posthumous son of the assassinated sultan. Moreover, this pretender was not even a native of Johor, but someone from the Minangkabau court at Pagar Ruyung in West Sumatra. It was in the ensuing contest for power that the Bugis adventurers came and established themselves as a force in the kingdom, by installing Sultan Abd al-Jalil's son, Sultan Sulaiman, as their candidate for the throne. (See Andaya 1975:198–323.) The aristocratic rajas of Penyengat who are my informants, are directly descended from these Bugis adventurers of the eighteenth century.

As we shall see below, the assassination of Sultan Mahmud in 1699 is still a significant event in my informants' perceptions. To this day, some of them are still trying to justify why the last legitimate descendant of the Melakan dynasty was killed, an act which broke the rulers' line of descent. So rather paradoxically, it is the assassination that provides the 'genealogical' linkage between the zaman sultan of Riau-Lingga and the earlier period which extended back to Melaka, Palembang, and Bukit Si-Guntang.

As mentioned above, legitimation through descent was particularly important in the context of personalised power. But after the assassination of the last legitimate descendant of the Melaka dynasty, whatever genealogical claims the post-1699 rulers could make, they could not claim that they were descended from the founding god-king of Melaka, or the god-king of Palembang. Yet in the Riau-Lingga sultanate, relations of domination-submission remained personalised. So, without the appropriate genealogical links to the Melaka dynasty, how was this personalised power legitimated?
The clue to this alternative mode of legitimation may be found in the writings of Raja Ali Haji -- both in the Tuhfat and elsewhere. In these works, he puts forward the view that rulers are appointed by God; if they are dethroned, that is because they have failed to obey God's commands. (See Chapter Five below; also Andaya and Matheson 1979.) God thus replaced genealogical descent as the source of political power.

Interestingly, this mode of legitimation was not unknown in the earlier period of zaman sultan, prior to 1722. As Milner (1981:56) has argued:

Two strands of Islamic thinking...appear to have appealed to the Malay Raja: Persianised kingship, and the mystical concept of the Perfect Man. The preoccupations of the Malay Raja through time are evident; they are distinctly consistent. The ruler of the raja-centred kerajaan, who had once been portrayed as a bodhisattva, found attractive in Islam those ideas which enhanced kingship, and which permitted and assisted the monarch to fulfill the central role in the spiritual life of his subjects.

So just as Hindu-Buddhist ideas had been used to legitimate the power of the king, so Islamic ideas were subsequently used for the same purpose. Indeed, as Andaya (1975:48-50) has pointed out, the rulers of Melaka and Johor could lay claim to being the heirs of kingly power, only because that power had been religiously invested in the founder of the dynasty in Palembang. So after 1699, since the new rulers could no longer claim to be heirs of such a power, their alternative claim was that they were religiously sanctified by God himself.

There is, however, one important difference in the way the two religious ideologies legitimated political power. Whereas Hindu-Buddhist ideology legitimated the ruler by making him a devaraja 'god-king', Islamic ideology legitimated him by making him a mediator between his subjects and God. The further implication of this is that
whereas there can be only one individual god-king in the kingdom, there can be a whole class of Islamic mediators in the sultanate, among whom the sultan himself is just primus inter pares. As we shall see in the subsequent chapters, the latter view is still held by some of my informants. Such a shift from the authority of the one unique devaraja to the authority of the mediative ruling class would be a logical extension of the very process of Islamisation itself. As McKinley (1979:315-321) has argued, the Islamisation of the Indianised kingdoms in Southeast Asia involved a shift in orientation from the inward-looking view of 'one kingdom, one universe', to the outward-looking view of what I would paraphrase as 'one Mecca, many sultanates'.

With regards to the process of Islamisation in Southeast Asia, Milner (1981) makes the salient point that the political significance of Islam in the converted kingdoms lay more in its ideological influence, than in its institutional presence. He couched this argument in the context of rebutting Gullick's (1965) contention that Islam was politically insignificant in the nineteenth-century sultanates of the Malay Peninsula, because it did not figure prominently in the public institutions of the state. Milner (1981:46-48) points out that to gauge the political significance of Islam, one cannot consider merely such institutional aspects as the role of the kadi 'Muslim judge and registrar', or the importance of the Islamic court of law, or the observance of Islamic rituals. Instead, he argues (ibid.:49-58) that one must consider the role Islam played as the legitimating ideology of kingship.

Interestingly, even at the present time, among my informants, it seems to be the case that the significance of Islam may be gauged in terms of a legitimating ideology, rather than in institutional terms. Although at the present time, it is no longer kingship that is being
legitimated — for the simple reason that there is no longer a king — Islam is still more important to my informants as an ideology that justifies existing social practice, rather than as an autonomous institutional domain. As we shall see in the subsequent chapters below, Islam among my informants consists not only of rituals such as going to the mosque or praying five times a day. It also concerns other non-ritualistic matters, such as rules regulating marriage, descent, inheritance, social interaction, and so forth. As we shall see below, these rules do indeed concern current relations of power. So even in the absence of institutional kingship, Islam can still be an ideological legitimation of power relations.

Although the term zaman sultan is anachronistic when used for the pre-Islamic era, there is nevertheless an implicit logic in such usage. The term highlights the role of the sultan as a religiously sanctified ruler. The implication is that zaman sultan is more than just a chunk of time; it is, to use McKinley's term (1979), an 'epistemological age', an age of religious justification for the events and actions of this world.

3.4 Zaman Belanda

As mentioned above, in my informants' perceptions, zaman sultan came to an end in 1911 when the last sultan of Riau abdicated and the Riau-Lingga archipelago came under the direct administration of the Dutch colonial government. The date of the abdication — 1911 — indicates that Riau-Lingga was one of the last areas to come directly under the government of the Dutch East Indies. But this does not mean that there was no earlier Dutch presence in that area. Indeed, except for 62 years at the beginning of the Riau sultanate (that is, 1722-1784), and 23 years during the Napoleonic Wars (1795-1818), there was
actually a Dutch Residency co-existing with the sultanate since 1784. (See Appendix 4.)

By the early twentieth century, however, the Dutch government in Batavia felt that there was little need to continue to share their power with the traditional rulers of Riau-Lingga. According to my informants' oral accounts, about 1911, the Dutch tried to make the then reigning Sultan Abdul al-Rahman sign a treaty of total submission that would have stripped him of all effective power, leaving him only a pensioner. He refused to put his signature to this treaty. So the Dutch decided to oust him by another means. At that time, apparently, the sultan had a small armed force, serving mainly as his bodyguard. The Dutch trumped up a charge that the sultan was plotting armed insurrection, and wanted to bring him to Batavia to answer this charge. But the sultan and his court managed to escape to Singapore the night before. The Dutch tried unsuccessfully to lure him back. He eventually died in 1930 in Singapore and was buried in the graveyard of the Johor State Mosque in Telok Blangah, Singapore. (Also see Matheson 1984:1.)

My informants' perception of 1911 as the beginning of zaman Belanda is significant, because it dates this era as a very recent occurrence, whereas Dutch presence in Riau had begun as long ago as 1784. However, if we consider only the views of my informants, when they talk about zaman sultan, the Dutch are hardly mentioned at all. Zaman sultan existed only within its own terms, or so it seems in my informants' articulations.

As I have mentioned above, although the zaman sultan that my informants are most concerned with is the situation that resulted from the re-establishment of the bendahara dynasty through Bugis military aid, this situation is itself seen as a continuation from Melaka,
Palembang and Bukit Si-Guntang. From such a perspective, external powers seem to be cast in two alternative roles, either as supporters or as disruptors of such continuity -- in other words, as allies or as enemies. The Dutch in zaman Belanda are evidently regarded by my informants as enemies who disrupted the continuity of zaman sultan. Consequently, even though zaman Belanda is chronologically nearer than zaman sultan, my informants have a lot to say about zaman sultan, but hardly anything to say about the Dutch in zaman Belanda. When they do talk about zaman Belanda, it is not about the Dutch they speak, but about the various local personalities who were appointed as amir 'deputies' of the colonial government.

There was, apparently, a system of indirect rule which operated through the following chain of command:

Dutch Resident at Tanjungpinang

- Dutch Assistant Resident at Daik.

- different Dutch controleur variously located

- 'local deputies' (amir)

- population at large

Figure 4 The Dutch System of Regional Administration in Riau

(See Muchtar Lufti et al 1977:334-338.) Thus, arguably, the Dutch Resident replaced the sultan at the top of the local hierarchy. So it would appear that in my informants' perception, zaman Belanda is marked by this replacement and not by the mere presence of the Dutch in Riau. Hence zaman Belanda is dated as beginning in 1911 and not 1784. However, although the replacement of the sultan by the Dutch Resident is recognised by my informants as an historical fact, it was
evidently not legitimated at all in indigenous terms -- either in terms of descent or Islam.

According to a raja informant the Dutch never let a native of an area be amir of that area; they always posted him to be amir somewhere else. This was their kepandaian 'cunning'. They were afraid that ties of kinship and friendship would prevent the amir from being tegas 'firm'. So at every level, the people of Riau were ruled by non-indigenes.

3.5 Zaman Jepang

The Dutch were themselves replaced by the Japanese during the Second World War. Interestingly, the Japanese in zaman Jepang are regarded by my informants as allies who provided some hope that zaman sultan might be resuscitated. As mentioned in Chapter Two, under the Japanese military government, the island territory of afdeeling Riouw was amalgamated with Syonanto (Singapore). From my informants' perspective, this seems to have been a decision that met with approval, for it erased the line of demarcation imposed by the Anglo-Dutch Treaty, and re-unified what had been the territory of a single polity.

According to some informants, the Japanese commander at Tanjungpinang 'had an attitude of sympathy' (bersikap simpati), expressed through his initiative in forming a battalion consisting almost entirely of the indigenous inhabitants of the Riau-Lingga archipelago. Those of my informants who were in this battalion still talk of it with fond memories. Apparently, the officers were mostly aristocrats and others who could claim a relatively high status through reference to the political hierarchy of zaman sultan. The rank-and-file, on the other hand, were mostly commoners who could only
claim a relatively lower status in such a hierarchy. (This traditional hierarchy will be discussed in detail in Chapters Four and Five.)

There is documentary evidence that the Japanese did indeed form native battalions not only in this area but also elsewhere — for example, in Singapore and the Malay Peninsula. According to Muchtar Lufti et al (1977:419–420), in November 1942, recruits from the native population in the Riau-Lingga archipelago were sent to Singapore/Syonanto for military training. On their return, they became *gyu tai*, a Japanese rank that Muchtar Lufti et al (ibid.) translated as *tentara pengawal pulau-pulau* 'home guard of the islands'. My informants corroborated this explanation; they also added that there was another higher rank for them — that of *hei ho* — which meant that they were *pembantu tentara Jepang* 'troops assisting the Japanese'. According to Muchtar Lufti et al (ibid.), by 1945 the indigenous battalion had grown to a strength of some 600 soldiers, all fully armed. My informants told me that this battalion, known as *Batalyon Kepulauan Riau* 'Battalion of the Riau Archipelago', was headed by a Penyengat *raja* — Raja Haji Muhamad Yunus, who held the rank of major. Apparently, the existence of this indigenous battalion lent some military substance to the hope that the Riau-Lingga sultanate could be revived.

So although the Japanese occupied the area for only three years, their political impact upon the Riau-Lingga inhabitants was considerable. Indeed, as Andaya (1977) has pointed out, the political significance of Japan to Riau dates from a period much earlier than the Second World War. For example, in 1914 — that is, after the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905, and after the abdication of the last sultan in 1911 — a Penyengat *raja* by the name of Raja Khalid Hasan, better known as Raja Hitam, went to Japan in an attempt to
solicit Japanese aid against the Dutch. He died in Tokyo in the course of his political activity. My informants claim that he was poisoned by the Dutch consul in Tokyo, but Barbara Andaya (personal communication) says that there is no documentary evidence that he died of poisoning. In her paper (1977:154), she states:

On March 11, 1914, after a brief period in a Japanese hospital, Raja Hitam died, apparently succumbing to the bitter cold of Tokyo's winter.

Her statement is based, however, on a letter (dated March 14, 1914) addressed to the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, written by the Dutch consul in Tokyo, who can hardly be considered a disinterested party, in the face of my informants' allegations.

Whatever the case may be, the Japanese nevertheless seem to have been astute enough to realise the importance of Raja Hitam to the people of Riau-Lingga. According to my informants, when the Japanese forces entered Tanjungpinang in 1942, they had with them a picture of Raja Hitam, dating from his visit to Tokyo. This picture they used as evidence to demonstrate the long-standing relationship between Japan and Riau-Lingga, thereby winning the people to the Japanese cause.

My informants said that before the Japanese troops arrived, they sent agents in advance to tell the people not to be afraid because the Japanese had come to free them from their Dutch masters. Apparently, these agents even claimed that many of the Japanese had become Muslims— but that, my informants said, was of course a lie. After the Japanese had ensconced themselves in Riau, they asked the Penyengat people who they wanted as the amir 'local deputy'. The Penyengat people proposed Tengku Ibrahim, the oldest son of the last sultan, who did indeed return to Riau to serve as amir under the Japanese.
3.6 Persatuan Melayu Riau Sejati

A five-year hiatus separates zaman Jepang from zaman Indonesia. After the war, the Dutch government re-took the island territory of what had been afdeeling Riouw, while the Indonesian nationalists were ensconced in Sumatra. The Indonesian Revolution was thus waged primarily by those living in areas that were free of the Dutch. According to my informants, those living in the Dutch-controlled areas played both sides of the game — that is, they negotiated with the Dutch colonialists for a resurrection of the traditional kingdoms but at the same time, they allied themselves with the Indonesian nationalists. Probably, they felt that it was safer for them to hedge their bets, as it was not at all clear at that time which side would eventually win. While some of them went to Sumatra to join the revolutionary forces, others went to British-controlled Singapore to organise for the re-establishment of a sultanate. Apparently, those prominent in both these spheres of activity were the very same people who had achieved some military rank under the command of the Japanese. As mentioned above, these people were, moreover, aristocrats and others who could claim high traditional status. (For other details of this period, see Muchtar Lufti et al 1977:509-534.)

According to my informants, for the purpose of re-establishing the Riau-Lingga sultanate, an organisation was formed in Singapore with the name Persatuan Melayu Riau Sejati 'Union of True-born Riau Melayu'. My informants said that the words Melayu Riau Sejati 'True-born Riau Melayu' meant that only people who were truly of Riau Melayu origins could join this organisation. However, they did not explain why it was considered necessary to make this ethnic distinction, since it implies the political interference of non-Melayu Riau inhabitants on the one hand, and on the other hand, Melayu people who were not of Riau origins.
I have since found out from Yong Mun Cheong (personal communication) that there was indeed a rival Riau group which was formed by certain people described in the Dutch documents as niet-Riouwers 'non-Riau people'. Apparently, these included Minangkabau, Javanese, and Batak. The leader of this group was one Iljas, who was a pro-Republican Minangkabau. The aim of this group was to bring about the inclusion of the Riau-Lingga archipelago within the political structure of Republik Indonesia. This group formed various interlinked organisations, one of which was the Badan Kebangsaan Indonesia Riau 'Organisation of the Indonesian People of Riau'. It is interesting that my informants made no mention of this rival group at all.

The office of the Persatuan Melayu Riau Sejati was located on High Street, then a prestigious area in Singapore. Funds for this organisation came from several prominent Chinese merchants, who were promised contracts and monopolies after the re-establishment of the sultanate. One of the merchants named by my informants was a certain 'Babi' Lee of the Keppel Bus Company, who advanced the Persatuan a sum of forty-five thousand dollars in the British currency of the time. In return for this, he was promised the monopoly of the building and construction industry in the pending Riau-Lingga sultanate. Two other merchants who were mentioned were Lim Choo Seng and Hoe Chap Teck.

However, Yong Mun Cheong (personal communication) says that according to the Dutch documents he has read, the Chinese merchant prominently involved with the Persatuan was a certain Koh Peng Kuan of Geylang, who was promised the monopoly of tin-mining in return for his sponsorship of the sultanate. Yong Mun Cheong has also pointed out that this Chinese merchant was sponsoring the rival Republican group led by Iljas at the same time. Koh was apparently backing both rival groups, in the calculation that one of them would eventually win.
A son of the last sultan, Tengku Ibrahim (also known as Tengku Besar), was chosen as the sultan-to-be. As mentioned above, he had previously been amir under the Japanese. Apparently, there was some dissension about this choice. Major Raja Haji Muhamad Yunus, who had been the Japanese-appointed commander of Batalyon Kepulauan Riau, was also a contender for the throne, on the basis of his military position, particularly since the indigenous troops still had their arms. My informants' account and the documentary evidence tally on this point concerning the two pretenders to the throne. However, my informants mention another candidate by the name of Tengku Endut of Pahang; it is not clear on what basis he made his claim.

According to my informants, the faction which favoured Tengku Ibrahim prevailed. Major Raja Haji Muhamad Yunus went to Sumatra with his followers to join a republican group known as the Persatuan Merah Putih 'Union of the Red and White', these being the colours of the Indonesian flag. The royalist movement thus lost its military wing. Tengku Endut apparently also disappeared from the scene.

Having settled on their candidate for the throne, the royalists now began negotiations with the Dutch. My informants said that General van Mook was the Dutch authority with whom the Persatuan carried out its negotiations. Dr H.J. van Mook, Lieutenant Governor-General, was indeed then in charge of managing some kind of compromise between Indonesian republicanism and Dutch colonialism. (See Schiller 1955:19-21.) In 1946 he proposed the formation of 'a federal Commonwealth of Indonesia, which...would become a member, along with Holland, Curacao and Surinam, of the Kingdom of the Netherlands' (ibid.:19). In this scheme, Republik Indonesia would be merely one state in the federal Commonwealth of Indonesia with its territory limited only to certain areas of Java and Sumatra.
Moreover, in this scheme, Riau-Lingga would not belong to Republik Indonesia. And indeed in 1947, the Dutch set up three 'neolands' in the three island-groups of Bangka, Billiton, and Riau-Lingga, appointing three local councils to represent the respective population of each of these areas. (See ibid.:111.) Apparently, to gain some political leverage in the Riau-Lingga local council, some members of the Singapore-based Persatuan had returned to Tanjungpinang to form another organisation, known as the Jawatan Kuasa Pengurus Rakyat Riau 'Authority of the Representatives of the People of Riau', with the explicit purpose of 'restoring kingship in Riau' (mengembalikan kedaulatan Riau). According to Yong Mun Cheong (personal communication), the rival group led by Iljas had also sent members back to Tanjungpinang. Apparently, it was the latter group that eventually gained the upper hand, for when the local council was formed by the Dutch, only three out of the fifteen members were drawn from the Jawatan Kuasa Pengurus Rakyat Riau; the others were from the Iljas-led group.

An informant who said that he was the President of the Persatuan Melayu Riau Sejati — Raja Daud Abubakar — is proud of the role he personally played in getting the Dutch to change the Dutch name of the local council from Riouwraad 'Riau Council' to its Malay equivalent, Dewan Rakyat. The reason put forward was that the local council should not have an alien Dutch name which could not be understood by the people the council was supposed to represent. After the change of name, the Persatuan apparently held a celebration in Singapore. But this seems to have been the only victory achieved by the Persatuan.

By 5 January 1949, the Dutch forces fighting the revolutionary forces had accepted a UN call for a ceasefire. (See Ricklefs 1981:219.) Later that year, the Dutch colonialists and the Indonesian nationalists met and agreed on the formation of a Republik Indonesia.
Serikat 'Republic of the United States of Indonesia', which was to be loosely united with the Netherlands, under the Dutch queen as symbolic head. (See ibid.:220; Schiller 1955:337.)

Republic Indonesia Serikat comprised seven states, nine constitutional units of lesser status, and several minor areas of lower rank.

(Schiller:ibid.)

Negara Republik Indonesia was one of the seven states; the 'neo-land' of Riau was apparently one of the several minor areas of lower rank. (See ibid.:337,432.) But during the next few months following its inception, Negara Republik Indonesia gradually incorporated the other political units, eventually forming the single unified polity of Republik Indonesia. Significantly, the last areas to be incorporated were those in the western part of the archipelago.

These areas became known as the 'recovered regions' (daerah-pulihan).

(Ibid.:338).

Among the very last areas to join Republik Indonesia was the 'neo-land' of Riau, which was not incorporated until 4 April 1950. (See ibid.:432.) It was thus one of the last 'recovered regions'. There were apparently no plebiscites conducted in any of the 'recovered regions'. Only in four instances did the existing assembly take action. In the other cases, 'exceptional means', to use Schiller's term, were employed by the federal government, whereby political autonomy was withdrawn from the existing local authorities. (See ibid.:338.)

With incorporation into Republik Indonesia, there was not much of a chance left to resuscitate the Riau-Lingga sultanate. The raison d'etre of the Persatuan was gone, and with it the Persatuan itself. From my informants' accounts, it seems that some of the members who
were still in Singapore then returned to Tanjungpinang, and joined the new Indonesian civil service at the regional level. Evidently, these royalists wanted to be in a position of authority in Riau, be it in one guise or another.

3.7 Zaman Indonesia

From my informants' perspective, it seems that zaman Indonesia may be divided into three distinct periods -- the period of duty-free trade, Konfrontasi 'Confrontation with Malaysia', and Orde Baru 'The New Order'. From 1950 to 1963, Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau -- namely, the Riau, Lingga, and Tujuh islands -- was a duty-free trade zone within Republik Indonesia. This was no innovation; it was merely a continuation of Dutch policy during the colonial era, when the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands were designated buiten de tolgebied 'exempt from taxation'. So, as before, imports into the zone were not dutiable; tax was levied only when these imports were brought into other parts of the republic.

Moreover, the currency in use in this duty-free zone was not the Indonesian rupiah but the dollar of British Malaya. (See Muchtar Lufti et al 1977:631.) Consequently, imports were cheaper and more accessible to the inhabitants of this zone than they were to other Indonesians. Indeed, my informants remember this period as a time of economic plenty.

From 1950 to 1958 the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands formed the administrative unit of Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau, which was incorporated into Propinsi Sumatra Tengah 'Province of Middle Sumatra', with the provincial capital located at Bukittinggi in West Sumatra. (See ibid.:625-626.) In 1958, Propinsi Riau 'Riau Province' was differentiated out of Propinsi Sumatra Tengah, with the provincial
capital of the former located at Tanjungpinang. (See ibid.:667-672.) Tanjungpinang was thus not only the hub of regional trade; it was also the administrative centre.

Such a situation, however, led to considerable regional autonomy, both economically and politically. So action was taken by the Indonesian Government to alter this situation and enhance the integration of the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands into the national context. One such alteration occurred in 1960 when the provincial capital was shifted from Tanjungpinang in the insular part of the province to Pekanbaru in inland Sumatra. (See ibid.:696-697.) Tanjungpinang was thus demoted from being the provincial centre to being part of the provincial periphery.

The next important event was Konfrontasi. In 1963, President Sukarno declared that Indonesia was in a state of military 'Confrontation' against the newly formed nation-state of Malaysia, which incorporated the territories of Malaya, Singapore, and British North Borneo. Diplomatic ties and trade links between the two nations were broken. As noted by Muchtar Lufti et al (ibid.:703-705), Riau was the area of Indonesia most severely affected by the consequences of Konfrontasi, because of the total severance of the international trade on which the people of the area depended. The central government's efforts to make up for the loss of international trade were unsuccessful. Consequently, there was an increase in smuggling and the growth of the black market.

The central government also banned the use of Malaysian currency in Riau, and introduced instead a new currency for the area called rupiah Kepulauan Riau 'rupiah of the Riau Archipelago', with the acronym of KRRP. Because at that time, the market rate of exchange was one thousand ordinary Indonesian rupiah to three Malaysian dollars
(Rp 1000 = M$3), this also became the market rate of exchange between the ordinary Indonesian rupiah and the newly introduced KRRP. Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau was thus an economically isolated area, cut off from international trade, yet also separated from the rest of the republic, including the Sumatran part of Riau Province, which used the ordinary Indonesian rupiah. (See ibid.: 704.) My informants remember Konfrontasi as a period of economic hardship when even rice was scarce, and when they had to engage in smuggling just to obtain the necessities of life. Many of them sneaked regularly into Malaysia via Pengerang on the southeastern tip of the Malay Peninsula, which became a major trading centre for them. (See Map 1.)

Even more interesting is what some informants told me about their personal role in Konfrontasi. Apparently, the Indonesian Government had formed a government-in-exile of what they termed Republik Malaya 'Republic of Malaya', complete with what were supposed to be its own forces — the Tentara Nasional Malaya (TNM) 'National Forces of Malaya'. This supposed government-in-exile was based in the Riau area, specifically in Belakang Padang on Bulan, and Tanjungbalai in Karimun. The TNM had their military training on Batam. Muchtar Lufti et al (ibid.: 705-706) confirm that Riau did become the Indonesian military base for confronting Malaysia, with troops occupying the islands and coastal areas nearest to Singapore and the Malay Peninsula. As the authors describe it, the Riau area had the atmosphere of being in a state of war, with the inhabitants being forced to give provisions to the troops. The majority of the troops were volunteers drawn from the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) 'Communist Party of Indonesia'. Apparently, these volunteers included some ethnic Chinese who were used as secret agents operating in Singapore.
According to my informants, several prominent Melayu aristocrats in Riau were recruited into this government-in-exile, so as to boost its ethnic Melayu component, the other members being largely Minangkabau people both from Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. Those of my informants who were involved in this government-in-exile said that they had little choice but to join when asked to by the Indonesian Government. Had they refused, they would have been accused of un-patriotic treason. My informants said that the members of the Malayan Communist Party were also involved in the TNM; most of these were apparently ethnic Chinese from Malaya and Singapore, including both men and women. My informants stressed that they themselves had no sympathies with the Communists, and were involved only because they were forced to serve as token figureheads.

However, they subsequently had a chance of secretly expressing their reluctance. The Indonesian government decided that an invasion of Malaysia should be launched by paratroopers landing in Johor. As it happened, it fell to the lot of some Melayu members of the government-in-exile to pick the paratroopers who were to participate in this invasion. My informants said that those of them who had this responsibility conferred among themselves saying: why should we help the Javanese to fight our own kin in Malaysia? Consequently, they took care to pick only Javanese names for the paratrooper force. Then they secretly radioed the Malaysian government to inform them of the time and place of the invasion. As a result, the Malaysian army was waiting for the paratroopers when they landed.

Then came the failed coup d'etat attempted by the Communist Party of Indonesia. This is now officially referred to as 'G30S', an acronym for Gerakan 30 September 'Movement of 30 September (1965)'. My informants who were in the Malayan government-in-exile said that they were very quick to issue a public declaration denouncing the
Communists for having misled them. They said that others who did not do so immediately were subsequently either imprisoned or executed. Despite having been the military base during Konfrontasi, Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau was evidently not regarded as a Communist stronghold by the anti-Communist elements who were now in political and military ascendancy in Indonesia. Consequently, my informants said, the people of Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau were spared the horrific massacres of Communists that occurred elsewhere in Indonesia.

The Orde Baru 'New Order' followed 'G30S'. This is still the order of the day. The label refers to the Suharto government which came to power after the attempted coup, sometime in 1966. (See Muchtar Lufti et al ibid.:11-752.) Although there have been periods of uneasiness at various time under the 'New Order', for Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau this has generally been a period of relative stability, particularly in comparison to the turbulence of Konfrontasi and 'G30s'. The full economic integration of the kabupaten into the Indonesian economy also dates only from this period: the Indonesian rupiah has replaced the KRRP.

But to date, this period of relative calm has been in existence for only some nineteen years. Given the brief time-span, it is perhaps understandable that my informants still regard zaman Indonesia as a recent phenomenon, the permanence of which they are still not quite certain. After all, who knows how long the 'New Order' will last and what will replace it? In this context, it is just as plausible for my informants to bracket zaman Indonesia within zaman sultan, as it is to bracket zaman sultan within zaman Indonesia. Indeed, it is perhaps psychologically more secure to construct a worldview on the rock of the unchanging past, rather than on the shifting sands of the unknown future, particularly since people like
my informants have very little, if any, say in the making of this Indonesian future. As I have pointed out in Chapter Two, Kabupaten Kepulauan Riau is both geographically and politically peripheral in the context of the Indonesian nation-state. National politics are decided upon by the powerful in Jakarta, not by the powerless in Riau.
1. See Appendix 3 for an explication of *zaman*.

2. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:

[Dulu-dulu] orang tidak ikut raja dan sultan kecuali terpaksa. Kalau paksa, ini pakai keris.... Orang...dulu ada batinnya sendiri, lain daripada raja dan sultan. Raja-raja buat kacau, gadoh. Dia nak perintah, dia pun nak perintah.... Belakang tak ada raja lagi, naik pemerintah, naik komunis. Tapi sama jugak, buat kacau.

3. See Appendix 4 for a discussion of the prehistory of boat-dwelling nomadism.

4. Such a pattern of political organisation would have been quite in keeping with the rest of Southeast Asia. Wolters (1982:16-33) describes the formation of the state in Southeast Asia in terms of the Sanskritic concept of the *mandala* 'circle of kings'.

   In each of these *mandalas*, one king, identified with divine and "universal" authority, claimed personal hegemony over the other rulers in his *mandala* who in theory were his obedient allies and vassals. In practice, the *mandala*...represented a particular and often unstable political situation in a vaguely definable geographical area without fixed boundaries and where smaller centres tended to look in all directions for security. *Mandalas* would expand and contract in concertina-like fashion. Each one contained several tributary rulers, some of whom would repudiate their vassal status when the opportunity arose and try to build up their own networks of vassals.

   (Ibid.:16-17).

   In this situation, the king would have been merely a glorified chief. The main difference between such a king and a local chief would be the former's claim to personal authority over other chiefs. This would accord with Service's (1975:xii) general argument with regards to state formation, that 'the origins of government lay essentially in the institutionalisation of centralised leadership'. The stability of state government would thus depend on the extent to which centralised leadership could be institutionalised. In the case of Southeast Asia, it seems that centralised leadership was, as a whole, rather weakly institutionalised, being founded not upon unquestioned hegemony, but rather, upon a network of alliances that were, at least to some extent, voluntaristic. (See Wolters 1982; Hall 1976:1-24.)

5. Bloch (1932:204) describes feudalism in Carolignian and post-Carolignian Europe thus:

   In the absence then of a strong state, of blood ties capable of dominating the whole life and of an economic system founded upon money payments, there grew up in Carolingian and post-Carolingian society relations of man to man of a peculiar type. The superior individual
granted his protection and divers material advantages that assured a subsistence to the dependent directly or indirectly; the inferior pledged various prestations or various services and was under a general obligation to render aid. These relations were not always freely assumed nor did they imply a universally satisfactory equilibrium between the two parties. Built upon authority, the feudal regime never ceased to contain a great number of constraints, violences and abuses. However, this idea of the personal bond, hierarchic and synallagmatic in character, dominated European feudalism.

6. Sopher (1977:267) notes that 'the preservation of titles like batin and panglima is actually an archaic feature which distinguishes the Orang Laut from the civilised Malays.' He also offers the following suggestion (ibid.:268) for the origins of the title batin:

...A possible antecedent of the term is to be found in the province of the Lampongs in Sumatra, at the southern end of the broad eastern lowland of that island. In this area of Sumatra Malay high culture, the title batin is in use, denoting 'chief' or 'headman'; specifically, in the Lampong dialect the word has the meaning of 'rich', so that the title is equivalent to the Malay 'Orang Kaya'. This suggests that the title batin among the primitive peoples farther north may not be an indigenous one, but an obsolete Malay term; its retention and extension among the forest and sea nomads together with its disappearance from civilised Malay hierarchies is of culture-historical interest, suggesting centuries-old usage among the former.

7. See Reid (1979) on the demise of the sultanates in North Sumatra.

8. With regards to the archaeological evidence for the existence of Srivijaya, Bronson (1979:398-399) has pointed out:

Only in the seventh century do objects begin to appear...whose age is not open to serious doubt.... Before that we are in a dark age. As far as we know now, Srivijaya sprang fully formed within one or two decades from antecedents which, although perhaps progressive and complexly organised, are singularly hard to find.... Nothing we now know about the historical and archaeological Srivijaya of the late seventh century forces us to assume a long period of indigenous development. Yet still we may feel that a certain implausibility inheres in the idea that the development of states and civilisation in Sumatra (and for that matter in Java and Borneo) lagged so as far as this behind the same process on the South East Asian mainland.

As I have mentioned in the text, state formation in Southeast Asia as a whole may perhaps be dated to the second century A.D. (See Mabbett 1977b:143.) So as Bronson (ibid.) has pointed out, if we can firmly date Srivajaya only from the seventh century onwards, then that would indicate that this was a relatively late kingdom that arose only after other kingdoms had been established in the area. Bronson (ibid.) finds this relative lateness implausible. And perhaps so does Wolters (1970:1-2, 181-183),
for he suggests that Srivijaya was preceded by another kingdom located also in south-eastern Sumatra. Chinese records of the fifth and sixth centuries refer to this earlier kingdom as Kan-t'ô-li, a name which Paranavitana (1966:4-5) has interpreted as derived from the Sanskrit word kandara, meaning 'torn away or broken by water. A name with such an etymological connotation could be interpreted as referring to Sumatra, a piece of land torn away by the Straits of Melaka. But even if we accept Wolters' suggestion of a preceding Kan-t'ô-li, this would still mean only a dating going back to the fifth century. The implication would still be that Srivijaya was a relatively late state, patterned after the other earlier kingdoms.

There is, however, an alternative explanation for the relative paucity of archaeological evidence. As Kumar (1974:148) has argued:

The explanation of this probably lies in the different nature of the empire of Sri Vijaya; it was primarily a maritime empire, based on sea-borne trade. The Javanese kingdoms, with their more substantial agricultural base and denser population, had a more settled society with a labour surplus which could be used for the construction of great monuments.

There are nevertheless some thirty seventh-century stone inscriptions found in Palembang; these constitute the majority of such finds in the whole of Sumatra. Between ten to sixteen statues have also been found in the Palembang area, dating from the first millennium. (See Bronson 1979:400-401.) This archaeological evidence may be regarded as supportive of Coedes' (1918) location of Srivijaya in southern Sumatra, and also Wolters' (1970) identification of Srivijaya with Palembang. But whether or not Srivijaya and Palembang are indeed one, Palembang itself was evidently an important place.

9. The first written account of the place comes from the Chinese pilgrim I-Ching, who had set out from China in 671 A.D. on a journey to India.

He embarked on a Persian ship and his first port of call was Palembang, where he stayed for six months to learn Sanskrit.

(Kumar 1974:143).

I-Ching reported that there were over one thousand Buddhist monks there. At the end of his six-month stay, he sailed to India in a ship belonging to the king of Palembang. (See ibid.)

This little account already gives a good depiction of the place. By the seventh century, it seems to have been a cosmopolitan port visited by ships from many countries, including China and Persia. The king of Palembang owned ships which sailed to India. Palembang was evidently an important Buddhist centre, perhaps even more Buddhistic than China was at the time, since a Chinese pilgrim journeying to India was apparently impressed by the number of monks in residence and the facilities for studying Sanskrit.
I mentioned above that the early Southeast Asian king was often only a glorified chief. Archaeological and historical evidence indicates that for the region as a whole, the trappings of such glorification were first derived from Sanskrit and Buddhistic civilisation. The rise of the early Southeast Asian kingdoms was thus also the beginning of the process known as 'Indianisation'. (See Mabbett 1977a and 1977b.) The establishment of Palembang as an important centre of Buddhist studies was evidently part of this process. The archaeological finds found in Palembang include inscriptions in an Indic script, statues of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, and the remains of a stupa. (See Bronson 1979:399-402.)

10. Wilkinson (1935:12) suggests that Srivijaya was 'a sort of federation of trading ports on the fringe of a large area of forest'. Wolters (1970:9) concurs in this opinion:

The territories under the Maharaja's control comprised a number of often distant settlements on the estuaries of the eastern coast of Sumatra, on the numerous and important islands off this coast, of which the largest were in the Riau and Lingga archipelagoes, and in the Malay Peninsula.

I have mentioned in Chapter Two that the coastal states were based not on agriculture, but on trade. (See Geertz 1963.) As a coastal state, therefore, Srivijaya was not likely to have an agricultural base of any significance. Indeed, in 1225, a Chinese visitor noted that rice was imported into Srivijaya, while another Chinese visitor fifty years earlier had noted that the population of the surrounding area did not pay taxes, thus hinting that the ruler obtained revenue from elsewhere. (See Wolters 1970:8.)

Wolters (ibid.:8-9) describes its ecological conditions thus:

The mangrove swamps on the south-eastern coast of Sumatra, safeguarding the survival of groups of sea-nomads and forest dwellers, were the major reason for a lack of agricultural development and the absence of a concentrated population close to the ruler's capital.

The federation of ports which constituted such a state changed through time. Some ports were newly founded, while others fell into disuse; still others were conquered and occupied by foreign powers. For example, Palembang was conquered by the Javanese about 1391 (see Wolters 1970:115), and Melaka was conquered by the Portuguese in 1511 (see Andaya and Andaya 1982:56). But although the network of alliances changed its shape through time, so long as there was enough to keep trade going, the kingdom was able to survive. Statecraft in such a situation may perhaps be compared to guerilla warfare. It expanded and contracted according to circumstances. As in the case of guerilla warfare, such states could be crushed only when all avenues of escape were totally cut off. This evidently happened only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Western colonisation completely swamped the political ecology of the region.
11. In the Penurunan, Bintan is described as located near Tanjung Rungus at the western extremity of Pengujan. Tanjung Rungus is thus the western point of entry to Teluk Bintan or Bintan Bay, into which the Bintan river flows. (See Indonesia Pilot 1975:I,132; also see Map 4.)

12. According to Wolters (1970:128-135), there are numerous hints in the Penurunan suggesting that the founder of the Melaka dynasty was consecrated as the god-king of Palembang in an abhiseka ceremony, which ritually identified him as a manifestation of the bodhisattva Avalokitesvara. However, Wolters does not mention what is peculiarly significant about such an identification. The point is, in Buddhist mythology, Avalokitesvara is a bisexual bodhisattva, who, by the seventh century A.D. (the earliest dating we have for Sriviyaja), was already iconographically represented in both masculine and feminine forms in many parts of the Buddhist world, including China and Japan. (See, for example, Boisselier et al 1978.) Icons of Avalokitesvara in present-day Chinese Buddhism and Japanese Buddhism still depict her/him in both sexes, indeed more often as female than male. She/he is popularly known as Guanyin in Chinese, Kannon in Japanese. (For more details of the present-day significance of Avalokitesvara/Guanyin, see, for example, Wee 1977.) Andaya (1975:49) suggests that the abhiseka ceremony invested in the god-king of Palembang a spiritual power that may be termed sakti. Such a suggestion is also significant with regards to the relationship between gender and power, for in Hindu mythology, sakti or shakti is 'the female personification of power' (Hinnells 1984:293). (See also Wilkinson 1959:1004.) Furthermore, this female spiritual power is supposed to be actualised only through complementarity with the male principle. (See, for example, Mookerjee and Khanna 1977.) Such a dualistic logic was of course very suitable for setting up a patrilineal dynasty of male rulers, each of whom would inherit this sakti in succession. Interestingly, there is a suggestion by Wolters (ibid.:131) that the consecrated ruler of Palembang was possibly also known as Siva, who is indeed the mythological personification of the male principle in conjunction with Sakti. (See Mookerjee and Khanna 1977.) This association of sakti with political power is still found in Java, where it is known as kesakten. (See Anderson 1972:4.)

An interesting passage (Ht. Pasai 26) tells the story of a context between the sakti of a Hindu ascetic and the keramat of a Moslem king; victory, of course, went to the accepted religion. But Islam only triumphed by putting a veneer of orthodoxy over old beliefs; even in the Nineteenth Century there was a Yamtuan Sakti in Minangkabau and the Negri Sembilan; and the Mustika Adat (p. 1) speaks of warriors who are sakti at the present day.

(Wilkinson 1959:1004).

13. After Islamisation, sakti was converted to daulat, a word which Wilkinson (1959:261) explains as denoting 'the divine element in kingship; the divinity that hedges a king.' Despite Islamisation, however, daulat continued to be a quality which
could be held solely by males, since only males could be rulers. But as we shall see below, the reason for male rule in Islamic legitimation is quite different from that of the Hindu duality of male ruler and female sakti.

14. In this regard, it would be relevant to consider Service's (1975) general argument about the development of states from chiefdoms. As mentioned in note 4 above, he argues (ibid.:xii) that the origins of the state as a political form lies 'essentially in the institutionalisation of centralised leadership'. He further argues that an important means of such institutionalisation was the routinisation of chiefly charisma in the hereditary office of kingship. To this I would add that the emergence of such a hereditary office was possibly linked to the institutionalisation of male rule.

15. Milner (1981:49) discusses the nature of this personalised power in the following terms:

Every Malay considered himself to be living not under a divinely revealed law but under a particular Raja, an institution which...had deep roots in the Malay world's animistic and Indian-influenced past. The Malay word often translated as 'state' or 'government', kerajaan, means literally 'the condition of having a Raja'. The Raja, not the Malay race or an Islamic umma (community) was the primary object of loyalty; he was central to every aspect of Malay life.

16. There are four distinct 'Sultan Mahmuds' in the history of alam Melayu: Sultan Mahmud I was the ruler of Melaka who was defeated and driven out by the Portuguese in 1511. After eventually setting up court in Bintan, he was again attacked by them. He escaped to Kampar where he died. (See Brown 1970.) Sultan Mahmud II was the last direct descendant of Sultan Mahmud I; he ruled at Kota Tinggi on the Johor river, where he was assassinated in 1699. (See Chapter Five.) Sultan Mahmud III belonged to the succeeding bendahara dynasty; in 1787 he moved his court from the Riau river to Lingga. (See Chapter Four.) Sultan Mahmud IV was Sultan Mahmud III's son's son; he was deposed by the Dutch in 1857. (See Chapter Five.)

17. In her analysis of the concepts of state articulated in the Tuhfat, Matheson (1975:21) notes:

...I can find in the Tuhfat no evidence for the existence of the state as a concept, an abstract ideal about and beyond the ruler, which was to be sustained and protected. What does seem to have existed was a complex system of personal loyalties, which it was in the ruler's interest to maintain.

18. In the Penurunan, it is explained that 'a just prince is joined with the Prophet of God like two jewels in one ring. Moreover, the Raja is as it were the deputy of God. When you do your duty to the Prophet of God it is as though you were doing your duty to God himself' (Brown 1970:111).
19. It is not clear when the proselytisation of Islam reached Southeast Asia. Fatimi (1963) suggests a date of the eleventh century, based on the discovery of two Islamic monuments in Indochina. Johns (1981) also points out another indication of Islam at about the same time — that is, the tombstone of one Fatimah in East Java. But there seems to be no firm evidence about Islamised communities until much later, with the rise of the sultanates of Pasai and Melaka. It is not clear when Pasai became a sultanate, but according to Johns (1981:67), certain Chinese accounts recorded in 1416 that the people and the ruler in Melaka were Muslims. Furthermore,

according to a Portuguese source, the first ruler, or his successor, accepted Islam upon marriage to a princess from the long-Islamised port city of Pasai, across the straits.

(Johns 1981:67).

So Pasai was evidently Islamised before Melaka. However, as Johns (ibid.:68-69) has pointed out, the degree of Islamisation in these sultanates is ambiguous. It is questionable how far Islam spread beyond the court and the community of foreign Muslim traders. (As we shall see in the chapters below, the degree of Islamisation is still a relevant issue in the context of present-day Riau.) But be that as it may, Melaka did indeed become a sultanate. So the term zaman sultan may be considered as properly applicable to the Melakan period — that is, from about 1400 to 1511 — and thereafter. (For more details about the Melaka sultanate, see Sandhu and Wheatley 1983, Vols. 1 & 2.)

20. According to the Encyclopaedia of Islam (1934:IV, 543):

The word [sultan] is of frequent occurrence in the Kur'an, most often with the meaning of a moral or magical authority supported by proofs or miracles which afford the right to make a statement of religious import.... In the literature of the Hadith, sultan has exclusively the sense of power, usually governmental power...but the word also means sometimes the power of Allah. The best known tradition, however, is that which begins with the words al-sultan zill Allah fi 'l-ard, 'Governmental power is the shadow of Allah upon earth'.... The word Sultan...became the highest title that a Muslim prince could obtain....

In this context, it is significant when the ruler of Pasai was converted to Islam, he received the title sultan and was proclaimed 'God's Shadow on Earth' (zill Allah fi l-alam). Furthermore, 15th-century Melaka coinage proclaimed the ruler as sultan, shah, and 'Helper of the World and of the Faith' (Nasir al-dunya wa 'l-din). (See Milner 1981:52.)

21. He is still alive and well and living in Johor Baru, where he is well-known as a bomoh 'traditional healer', whose patients include the sultan of Johor. He was one of my informants.

22. This event greatly encouraged Asian nationalism because it demonstrated that an Asian nation was capable defeating a 'white' nation. See, for example, Hall (1981:767).
23. Raja Hitam was the fourth son of Raja Ali Haji, the compiler of the Tuhfat, and was himself a royal scribe. (See Matheson and Andaya 1982:321.)

24. Yong Mun Cheong is currently researching on the history of this period.

25. These documents consist largely of Dutch official correspondence held at the Royal Archives at the Hague. Yong Mun Cheong has kindly given me access to his notes on these documents.

26. As Ricklefs (1981:274) describes the situation after the abortive coup:

From Java and Bali particularly, there came news of mass graves and of streams choked with bodies. No one knows who many died in late 1965 and early 1966, for no one counted. Most scholars accept a figure of 500,000 deaths, but this can only be an estimate.

The failed Communist coup is still remembered as an important event in Indonesian history. Indeed, on one of the bureaucratic forms I had to fill for obtaining my research visa, there was the question: Where were you and what were you doing during 'G30S'? Even as a foreigner who was not in Indonesia at that time, I had to provide an alibi for myself with regards to an event that had occurred more than ten years ago.
PART TWO

THE PAST IN THE PRESENT:

A REAR-VIEW IMAGE OF ZAMAN SULTAN
Like the image one sees in a rear-view mirror, a rear-view image of the past is necessarily a selective one shaped by the perspective of the present. In this part of the study, I will describe a rear-view image of zaman sultan 'the era of the sultan', as it appears from the perspective of my informants.

From such a perspective, the different events of the past tend to merge, like distant mountains, into a single horizon. The most striking landmark on the horizon may not be the nearest low hill, but a farther high mountain. In the same way, from my informants' perspective, the most significant event of the past may not be the most recent, but rather, the one of greatest consequence. Therefore, the description of this rear-view image of the past is ordered not chronologically, but instead in terms of a metaphorical single horizon on which protrude certain prominent landmarks.

I adopt this perspective because my informants are themselves interested in the past not out of historical curiosity, but for its significance to them in the present. So my primary concern is not with a reconstruction of the past as such, but with an explication of its significance to my informants. The rear-view image is thus an image of the past-in-the-present, which is located not in the bygone past but in the ongoing present. Like a rear-view mirror which reflects what is behind us yet presents this image in front of us, the past-in-the-present is a bracketed part of the present that is nevertheless connected to the past. (Because of this overlapping between past and present, the grammatical tense of the following discussion will also shift to and fro.)

In Chapter One I pointed out the difference between history and nostalgia as modes of discourse, the difference being that in history one attempts to reconstruct the past as a knowable object out there,
whereas in nostalgia one attempts to reconstruct the past by living it, by making the past present. So in the historical mode of discourse, one is interested in the past as past, whereas in the nostalgic mode of discourse, one is interested in the past-in-the-present. Which type of past is to be considered more 'real' depends on the values one holds. If one values the past precisely because it is past, never to return, then one may consider as inauthentic any attempt to recreate this bygone past. On the other hand, if one values the past because of its consequences for the present, then one may consider as relevant only that part of the past that lives on in the present. I suggest that my informants hold the latter value. So from their perspective, the past-in-the-present is more 'real' than an extinct, and hence irrelevant, past. Indeed, they often concluded the stories of the past they told me with the following punch-line:

_Ini bukan dongeng. Ini benar. Sekarang masih ada._

(This is not a myth. This is true. It is still so at present.)

So the status accorded to the past-in-the-present is that it is 'real' precisely because it is still present.

In this part of the study I will thus focus on those portions of the past that my informants consider still present. In so doing, however, I must also mention other portions of the past that are extinct and therefore do not belong to the past-in-the-present. So I shall treat this past-in-the-present as a text to be contextualised in the larger past, which has been discussed in the last two chapters above. In this part of the study I will introduce topics of discussion that will be further elaborated upon in Part Three.

The rear-view image transcends the present by bracketing a part of the present in an unchanging past-in-the-present. This also means
that it transcends the unique life-experiences of individuals existing in the present. So the past that is relevant and existent is not the personal past of an individual but what is supposedly the collective past of the community.

Perhaps the most significant portion of the larger past that is absent from the past-in-the present is the existence of the sultanate as an institutional reality. As mentioned above in Chapter Three, the sultanate became institutionally extinct after the sultan was forced to abdicate in 1911. Despite this, however, I have found that among my informants, an image of the sultanate exists as an ideological construction. There is thus an ideology pertaining to a traditional state but without the institutional existence of such a state. On the contrary, this ideology is encapsulated by the institutional framework of a modern nation-state.

There are two key concepts in this ideological construction — derajat 'rank' and keturunan 'descent'. In my informants' usage, the word derajat refers to the hierarchy that had prevailed in the bygone zaman sultan 'era of the sultan', and the word keturunan refers to the inheritance of rank through descent, such that this hierarchy of inherited ranks persists even in presentday zaman Indonesia 'the era of Indonesia'. To borrow a term from Dumont (1972), my informants' usages of derajat and keturunan point to a notion of homo hierarchicus — that is, 'hierarchical personhood'. It is precisely in the opposition between this notion and the notion of homo aequalis — 'equal personhood' — that I found a patterning of difference in the perceptions of my various informants.

What de Tocqueville (1961:II,92) said more than a century ago is still of relevance:
Aristocracy has made a chain of all the members of the community, from the peasant to the King; democracy breaks that chain and severs every link of it.

Indeed, among my informants, I found that the idea of hierarchy is strongest among those who can claim aristocratic rank, and that the idea of equality is strongest among those who are ascribed lowly ranks in the hierarchy. So this ideological construction is itself hierarchised, with more adherents among those who can claim high rank, than among those who can make no such claim. My Penyengat and Pangkil informants are among the former. Since my fieldwork was conducted primarily among these informants, the image of zaman sultan that I shall describe is basically theirs.

However, my Penyengat and Pangkil informants' claim to high rank is responded to by some of my other informants with a counter-claim to equality with the former. Perhaps because of the bias in my research, these counter-claims to equality appear to be responses to the prior claim of hierarchy, and not first principles in themselves. From such a perspective, it would seem that one attempts to break loose from the chain of hierarchy, only because one is indeed held by such a chain. Because this is the picture that has emerged from my research, I am treating these counter-claims to equality not as an alternative ideology, but as part of an internal struggle within the context of hierarchy.

The image of hierarchy is indeed so publicly and collectively held that it has become an objectification that impinges even upon those who do not adhere to it. It has thus become a phenomenon that others must deal with in one way or another. The inherent contradictions between the claimants to high rank and the non-claimants to rank, feed back into the rear-view image, such that it contains within itself information concerning patterns of domination,
submission and resistance, which in turn become the means of explaining away the contradictions of the present. Thus even though the rear-view image of zaman sultan is a collective objectification, it is nevertheless more relevant to some than to others. It is not a monolithic structure uniformly shared by all.
CHAPTER FOUR

DERAJAT AND KETURUNAN

RANK AND DESCENT

4.1 Derajat

4.2 Keturunan

4.3 Mas Kawin

4.4 Raja Gelaran and Raja Keturunan

4.5 Keturunan Raja and Keturunan Tengku

4.6 Raja Hamidah's Mas Kawin

4.7 The Male Monopoly of Political Office

4.8 'Sultan' Fatimah
4.1 Derajat

When talking about zaman sultan, a term that is invariably mentioned by my informants is derajat. Wilkinson (1959:259) translates the word as 'step; scale; grade; rank.' These derajat are indeed ranked in a single top-to-bottom hierarchy thus:

raja, tengku 'princes'
tuan said 'descendants of the Prophet Muhammad'
encik datuk 'local chiefs'
encik keturunan 'personages of honourable descent'
keturunan Bintan 'descendants of Bintan'
orang biasa 'ordinary people'
hamba raja 'serfs'
hamba orang 'slaves'.

This mode of hierarchisation is referred to as tingkatan 'vertical layering', by which is meant that each derajat formerly had a specified ceremonial 'seating place' (tempat duduk) in the sultan's 'pavilion' or 'hall of audience' (balai). There were apparently three 'levels of seating places' (tingkat tempat duduk): Di atas tingkat 'on the platform or raised dais' was the highest point in the pavilion. Di tengah 'in the middle' was at the middle level -- that is, on the floor below the sultan's platform. Di luar pintu 'outside the door' was the lowest level, since those outside would have been on the ground itself, below the floor of the stilted pavilion.

Apparently, only the sultan, raja, tengku, and tuan said had the right to sit on the dais. The encik datuk, encik keturunan, and keturunan Bintan had the right to sit on the floor of the pavilion. And the orang biasa, the hamba raja, and the hamba orang could only sit or stand on the ground outside the pavilion.
There is no longer any sultan's pavilion in existence in Riau. So the description of tingkatan given above by my informants is in the realm of mythology, which depicts the hierarchy in structural relations that were supposed to have been physically expressed:

- high -- low
- inside -- outside

I term these 'structural relations', not 'structural oppositions', because the focus of my informants' discourse on hierarchy is integration and not disjunction: The hierarchy integrated the different ranks within one system of relations. The entire polity was supposed to have been encompassed in this hierarchy. So the physical arrangement of the court, in terms of the structural relations described above, was supposed to have represented the polity at large. The court was thus a symbolic microcosm of the political macrocosm.

My informants further divide the derajat named above into the following categories: The raja, tengku, and tuan said were orang bangsawan 'aristocrats'. The encik datuk, encik keturunan and orang biasa were orang merdeka 'free people'. The keturunan Bintan and hamba raja were orang kerahan 'vassals'. And the hamba orang were orang hamba 'slaves'. The free people, vassals and slaves are further subsumed under an umbrella category -- orang kebanyakan 'the masses'.

The description of these categories carries certain implications. The term orang bangsawan may be literally translated as 'people of breeding'. This emphasises the element of heredity for this category of people. In contrast, there is no such emphasis in the labels of the other three categories -- namely, the orang merdeka 'free people, the orang kerahan 'vassals', and the orang hamba 'slaves'. Instead, the description of these three categories implies interactions of a
certain nature with some Other. Slave implies master; vassal implies feudal lord; and free person — that is, not-slave, not-vassal — implies freedom-granting patron. These are thus relational terms, implying the interactions of the three lower categories of people with the aristocrats who were thereby the masters of the slaves, the feudal lords of the vassals, and the freedom-granting patrons of the free people. Orang kebanyakan 'the masses' is also a relational term implying that the aristocrats were a minority, an elite. These relational implications indicate that the hierarchy was not just an arbitrary ranking, but a scale of power with the aristocrats as the most powerful and the slaves as the least powerful. The hierarchy of derajat was thus the political structure of the sultanate itself, with the ruling elite on top and the ruled masses at the bottom.

This divide was further marked by the use of a title to prefix the personal name and the patronym of certain people. There were basically two kinds of titles — hereditary titles and bestowed titles. The hereditary titles were raja, tengku, and said/syarifah. Said is the title for males; syarifah is the title for females. The other two titles, raja and tengku, are the same for either gender. All members belonging to the three respective derajat had the right to bear these titles. Those bearing the title raja were, however, also known as engku, a title which implies that they were a little less than tengku; those bearing the title said/syarifah were also known as wan. My aristocrat informants still maintain their right to bear these hereditary titles.

The bestowed titles were those conferred upon individuals belonging to the lower derajat. These titles were non-hereditary and each title-holder had to be appointed anew. The phrase datuk kaya 'rich grandparent' was the common element in these titles which otherwise varied with each individual title-holder. Some examples of
such titles were Datuk Kaya Mepar, Datuk Kaya Sang Ir, and Datuk Kaya Indrajaya. The individual title-holders were thereby promoted from their own derajat to that of encik datuk. The derajat of encik datuk thus consisted of individuals elevated from the lower derajat.

The children of an encik datuk could be called encik as a matter of courtesy. But this was more of an honorific than a title, the difference being that a title denoted nobility, office, or distinction, whereas an honorific merely signified respect. The three lowest derajat — namely, the 'ordinary people' (orang biasa), the 'serfs' (hamba raja), and the 'slaves' (hamba orang) — were not privileged to be termed encik as a mark of respect.

This usage of titles thereby differentiated the ranks of the hierarchy into the orang yang bergelar 'people bearing titles' or the orang yang berpangkat 'people holding office' on the one hand, and the orang kecil 'small people' on the other hand. Among the former, only the aristocrats bearing hereditary titles constituted a self-perpetuating ruling class, whereas the individual datuk kaya, the honourable encik, and the orang biasa 'ordinary people' constituted the orang pertengahan 'middle people' who mediated between the ruling aristocracy and the ruled 'small people'.

While my informants unanimously agree that derajat did exist in zaman sultan, they nevertheless differ in their opinions concerning its relevance in the present. These differences are directly related to the rank they can claim on the hierarchy on the basis of descent. For example, an informant who can claim to be a raja on the basis of descent is more likely to see the present-day relevance of derajat, than another informant who can only claim to be a hamba orang. Since those who are more interested in a particular matter generally know more about it and are more ready to comment on it, the description of
derajat in this chapter cannot help but be coloured by the opinions of interested parties.

4.2 Keturunan

From the perspective of my Penyengat and Pangkil informants, the Melayu people of Riau still belong to different derajat, even though there has not been a sultanate since 1911. By their reckoning, derajat persists because keturunan exists. As they explained, derajat menurut keturunan 'rank goes with descent' and keturunan ikut sebelah bapak 'descent follows the father's side'. One informant, a male raja, explained the connection between derajat and keturunan to me in the following way:

Keturunan atau zuriat ikut sebelah laki-laki. Kalau ikut Islam, laki-laki yang membawa keturunan; perempuan tak bawa.... Jadi, tengku perempuan dan raja perempuan tidak mau kawin sama orang biasa, kerana takut hilang darah.

(Descent or zuriat follows the male side. If we follow Islam, it is the male who carries descent; the female does not carry it.... So female tengku and female raja do not want to marry ordinary people, for fear of losing their blood.)

However, the idea that keturunan is patrilineal is not limited to the aristocrats alone, but is shared by people of the other ranks. For example, an informant who belonged to the rank of orang biasa 'ordinary people' said:

Keturunan dari bapak, kerana darah dari bapak. Perempuan lemah.

(Descent is from the father, because blood is from the father. The female is weak.)

Significantly, however, among some informants who belong to the rank of hamba raja 'serfs', keturunan does not seem to be regarded as exclusively patrilineal. One such informant said:
Keturunan kuat dari sebelah bapak. Keturunan lemah dari sebelah mak.

(Descent is stronger from the father and weaker from the mother.)

Another informant from the same rank said:

Payah nak sebut keturunan orang kerana bapak satu keturunan, mak satu keturunan lagi.

(It is hard to state people's descent, because the father is of one descent, and the mother is of another descent.)

In this light, it is significant that my raja informant cited above specially mentioned Islam to support the case for patrilineality. As he put it, 'if we follow Islam, it is the male who carries descent; the female does not carry it'. So the implication is that if one does not follow Islam, then even the female can carry descent. As we shall see below, in the context of Riau, the aristocrats may be perceived as the most Islamic of my informants, and those belonging to the rank of 'serf' as the least Islamic. So there is a connection between Islam and patrilineality, such that the most Islamic are the most patrilineal and the least Islamic are the least patrilineal. Indeed, I would suggest that there is an inherent tension between patrilineal descent and bilateral filiation within the hierarchy, a tension which is manifested in the rear-view image of zaman sultan.

Even my aristocrat informants recognise bilateral filiation, for they differentiate between anak gahara and anak gundik. An anak gahara is a child born of an aristocrat father and an aristocrat mother. An anak gundik is a child born of an aristocrat father and a commoner mother. An anak gahara ranks higher than an anak gundik, the former being high-born on both sides, whereas the latter is high-born only on the father's side. Thus even among the aristocrats, patrilineal descent can be further qualified by matrifiliation. The
child of an aristocrat mother and a commoner father, however, is not considered aristocratic at all. So even though matrifiliation can qualify patrilineality, the former is not supposed to supersede the latter. As we shall see below, some of my informants think that it was precisely the supersession of matrifiliation over patrilineality that led to the demise of the sultanate.

I am using the terms 'filiation' and 'descent' in Fortes' sense (1969:250-310) — that is, where filiation refers to the parent-child relationship operative primarily in the familial domain, and where descent refers to the ancestor-descendant relationship operative primarily in the extra-familial domain of political and jural institutions. Complementary filiation is significant in this context, for that is the emphasis on filiation with the parent who does not transmit descent. Fortes (ibid.:254) points out that this is an important mechanism for segmentation within the descent category. So the anak gahara and the anak gundik of the aristocrats may be understood as the consequences of segmentation through complementary filiation — namely, the mother who does not transmit keturunan.

In the context of natural demographic proliferation, such a means of segmentation would have been strategically useful for the male anak gahara — that is, the male aristocrats who were high-born on both sides. On the one hand, they would be differentiated from their gundik brothers who were born of commoner mothers. And on the other hand, they would be differentiated from their gahara sisters, who were high-born but were not able to transmit their patrilineal descent. This dual differentiation would have marked out the male anak gahara as the true descendants of their patri-line.

According to my raja informants, during zaman sultan the distinction between anak gahara and anak gundik was formerly so
important that they were not even supposed to eat together. They said that it was Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Ali [1845-1857] who eventually banned this practice of commensal segregation, because he considered it un-Islamic. Even so, as a raja informant put it,

Anak gahara tinggal di Penyengat; anak gundik dibuang keluar.

(The anak gahara lived on Penyengat, whereas the anak gundik were thrown outside.)

As mentioned in the preceding chapters, Penyengat was the yamtuan muda's capital. Apparently, the aristocrats born of commoner mothers often had to leave Penyengat to settle elsewhere. My informants mentioned Ketir near Bintan as an example of a settlement that was founded by a gundik aristocrat from Penyengat - namely Raja Haji Umar, also known as Raja Endut. (See Map 4.)

Patrilineal descent was thus modified by complementary filiation through one's mother. Following Sheffler (1973:756-765), I think it is useful to make a differentiation between kinship ideology and descent ideology. The major difference between these two ideologies is their respective focus: the categories of kinship ideology are egocentrically derived; those of descent ideology are derived sociocentrically from at least one apical ancestor. The categories bapak 'father' and mak 'mother' are egocentrically derived in relation to the anak 'child'; so these are categories pertaining to kinship ideology. But the categories raja, tengku, tuan said, and so on are sociocentrically derived from apical ancestors; so these are categories pertaining to descent ideology. The tension between these two ideologies is intensified by the bilateral kinship terminology which makes no linguistic differentiation between the mother's kin and the father's kin. The kinship terminology thus contradicts the
descent ideology where the father's kin is the more important by virtue of keturunan. The result of this ideological tension is the opposition between matrifiliation (that is, the filiation that does not transmit descent) and patrilineal descent.

The importance of matrifiliation was apparently enhanced by the residence rule that marriage should be uxorilocal. My raja informants said that this rule was strictly observed by the Penyengat people in zaman sultan. If a man had several daughters, he would extend his house so as to accommodate all his daughters and their husbands. However, such an arrangement was likely to last only so long as the male head of the household was still alive. After his death, disagreement might break out between the different daughters' husbands as to who should head the household. In such a case, the old house was likely to be demolished, and the site used for building separate houses for the different daughters' families.

At first sight, this combination of patrilineality and uxorilocality may seem curiously dysharmonic, in that it poses a structural contradiction between descent and residence. However, following Benjamin (1983:39-43), I would argue that it is precisely this combination that kept male inter-relations within the politico-jural domain.

In a 'matri' regime, the locally co-residential males have no consanguineal bonds of kinship through which to mediate their relations with each other: their links are supra-kinship in character, and this tends to lead to the emergence of an administrative structure.

(Ibid.:40).

In such a situation, a sociocentrically derived descent ideology would have been important in the structuring of relations between the male affines.
At the present time, marriages in Penyengat and elsewhere in Riau still tend to be uxorilocal. But this rule is not so strictly observed to the extent that a house would be extended to accommodate all the daughters and their husbands. Where houses are concerned, uxorilocality is combined with neolocality. With regards to village residence, however, uxorilocality is still the rule. In other words, the couple may build a new house but in the wife's village. This indicates the continuing importance of descent ideology in male inter-relations, particularly among the aristocrats whose very status as such depends on the maintenance of this ideology.

My raja informants refer to their apical ancestors as *sumbe* 'springs; watery sources welling up from the earth'. This metaphorical usage of water is consonant with the word *keturunan* itself. The root form of *keturunan* is *turun*, the fundamental meaning of which is 'to descend physically from a higher position to a lower one'. The extension of this word to refer to 'descent from generation to generation' implies that the movement from an ascendant generation to a descendant generation is structurally analogous to the movement from hill to valley, from interior to coast, from 'windward' port to 'leeward' port, from sky to earth, from spirit to human — in short, from high to low. Such movements are unidirectional; rain, for example, descends unidirectionally from sky to earth. In the case of inter-generational descent, what passes down unidirectionally, like rain from sky to earth, is the transmission of *derajat* from past to present.

What this implies is that the people of the present can no longer achieve rank, they can merely inherit it. Indeed, with the demise of the sultanate, there is no longer a *sultan* who can bestow titles of distinction upon individuals from the lower ranks of the hierarchy. So no individual from these lower ranks can be elevated to the rank of
Only the hereditary titles of the aristocrats can be passed down through the principle of descent alone. Rank has thus become purely ascriptive in the present time, whereas in zaman sultan it was possible to achieve rank without being born to it. But the principle of descent is important to my aristocrat informants, precisely because it links each and everyone of them, on a personal basis, to the bygone past. In this sense, the past-in-the-present is realised in them. Fortes (1969:309) has noted the significance of descent with regards to social continuity over time. However, whereas he seems to have accepted such continuity as an objective 'fact' of any society, I would argue instead that at least where my informants are concerned, social continuity is a phenomenon that they are subjectively constructing, for personal motivations of their own.

I should, however, stress that although my informants adhere to the principle of descent, they do not form descent groups in the sense of these being corporate groups. There is thus lineality, but no lineage. The sole 'corporate property' that they presently share as a consequence of descent is their derajat, which is not materially realised in any way, but remains a purely symbolic rank that is meaningful only in relation to other such ranks. For the aristocrats, their common membership in their respective derajat is expressed in the right to use hereditary titles -- namely, raja, tengku, or said/syarifah. So even though the aristocrats do not constitute either one or several corporate groups, their right to use hereditary titles does nevertheless mark them as members of specific descent categories. Thus those with the right to use the hereditary title raja identify themselves as keturunan raja 'of raja descent'. Those with the right to use the title tengku identify themselves as keturunan tengku 'of tengku descent'. And those with the right to use the title said/syarifah identify themselves as keturunan tuan said 'of
tuan said descent'. Because the titled aristocrats manifestly exist as specific descent categories, then in their perceptions at least, the other derajat also exist as descent categories, even if only negatively defined -- that is, as people without the right to use hereditary titles.

But to what extent do the people assigned to the other derajat see themselves as members of descent categories? To answer this question, let us consider whether they would use the word keturunan as an identifying label for themselves, in the way that word is used for the keturunan raja, keturunan tengku, and keturunan tuan said. To progress down the hierarchy, I have found that my informants who can claim descent from the next two derajat do indeed identify themselves, respectively, as keturunan encik datuk 'of encik datuk descent', and keturunan encik 'of encik descent'. The next derajat down on the hierarchy is explicitly labelled as a descent category -- namely, the keturunan Bintan 'of Bintan descent': my informants who can claim descent from this derajat do indeed identify themselves as such. Similarly, my informants who claim descent from the derajat of orang biasa identify themselves as keturunan orang biasa 'descended from ordinary people'.

But the next derajat down -- namely, the hamba raja 'serfs' -- I found the word keturunan used in a very different way. My informants who are descended from this derajat do not identify themselves as keturunan hamba raja 'of serf descent'. Instead they combine the word keturunan with a toponym (place-name) -- for example, keturunan Gelam, keturunan Galang, and keturunan Ladi. These toponyms evidently refer to specific places in the Riau-Lingga islands. My informants identified Gelam as a place known as Gelam Tua 'Old Gelam' located on the southern tip of Bulan island. (See Map 3.) Galang, in this context, was identified as Galang Tua 'Old Galang', which is on the
upper reaches of the river Sungai Galang Batang on the island of Galang Senyantung. (See Map 4.) Both Gelam Tua and Galang Tua are said to be uninhabited at present. Ladi was identified as a place near Daik in the Lingga archipelago. (Its location will be discussed further in Chapter Five.)

My informants said that these places were the original places known by these particular names; all other places known by the same names were given those names subsequently by migrants from the original places. So the keturunan Gelam are supposedly descendants of the original inhabitants of Gelam Tua. The keturunan Galang are supposedly descendants of the original inhabitants of Galang Tua. And the keturunan Ladi are supposedly descendants of the original inhabitants of Ladi. I will discuss in Chapter Five why the hamba raja are labelled toponymically in this way.

As for the lowest derajat on the hierarchy — the hamba orang 'slaves' — I found only one family who admitted to being descendants from this derajat. However, they too did not identify themselves as keturunan hamba orang 'of slave descent'. Instead they referred to themselves as keturunan Hapsi 'of Abyssinian descent', their slave ancestor having been Abyssinian.

There is evidently a distinct contrast in the usage of the word keturunan as an identifying label. Whereas the descendants from the higher-ranking derajat use the word in conjunction with their titles or honorifics, the descendants from the lower derajat use it in conjunction with their ancestral place-names. The latter includes the keturunan Bintan, who still live in Bintan. The keturunan Bintan are, however, unusual in that they do not belong to the derajat of hamba raja, but constitute a derajat by themselves. The reason for this will be made clear in Chapter Five.
Moreover, while many of my informants of raja and tengku descent could trace their genealogical origins back to their apical ancestors, my informants from the other derajat generally could not do so. The latter includes the keturunan tuan said, who are supposedly the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad; they generally leave their claim undemonstrated. In contrast, many of my raja and tengku informants are only too eager to demonstrate exactly how they have been descended from their apical ancestors. Some of them even hang silsilah 'genealogical charts' in their living rooms as part of the wall decorations. (See Genealogical Chart 3 as an example of one such wall chart.) Even those who do not display their genealogies so prominently usually have charts tucked away in a drawer, ready to be pulled out at a moment's notice. Indeed some of them are so conversant with their genealogies that they can sketch one out on the spur of the moment, showing the relationships between the different people present on any particular occasion. (See, for example, Genealogical Chart 5 which was drawn by a raja informant expressly for my education.)

These genealogies obviously mean more than just a memory test. They constitute proof of descent. Such proof is evidently taken seriously not only in Riau, but elsewhere in alam Melayu. For example, when travelling to Singapore and Malaysia, my raja and tengku informants often take care to prepare genealogical charts showing their relationships to specific royal houses there. At least one of my raja informants has been able to gain admittance to the palace of the sultan of Selangor, on the strength of his genealogical connections. Quite obviously, genealogical knowledge is an asset. Therefore, this interest is not an antiquarian pursuit confined only to the older aristocrats. The younger ones often spend time copying out the charts, particularly to add their own names. Male aristocrats
are, however, more concerned about their genealogies than are the female aristocrats. This is not surprising given that rank can be transmitted only through patrilineal descent.

My raja informants said that during zaman sultan, there was an official genealogist on Penyengat, whose job was to record the births, deaths, marriages, adoptions, and other such matters relating to all the rajas. After zaman sultan ended in 1911, some individuals privately took up this task of documentation, the difference being that they had to do so on through their own knowledge of events, rather than have people come to report goings-on to them. (See Wee and Matheson forthcoming.) This implies that during zaman sultan, there was a clearly defined membership of the raja rank, which possibly constituted a corporate lineage and not just a descent category, as it is at present. As we shall see below, this would have been particularly so with the existence of a particular political office as corporate property.

Among my informants from the lower derajat, I have only one informant with a written genealogy. (See Genealogical Chart 6.) He is of encik datuk descent. According to him, the title encik datuk is also hereditary and those of encik datuk descent are also orang bangsawan 'aristocrats'. The implication is that only the aristocrats have silsilah 'genealogical charts'. So if someone of encik datuk descent were to claim aristocratic status, then he/she must also have a genealogical chart to demonstrate that.

My other informants do not draw genealogical charts for themselves. However, I found a bias in the oral genealogies that I obtained from them. The higher the derajat is, the stronger is the patrilineal bias. The lower the derajat is, the more bilateral the genealogy is. (Compare Genealogical Charts 7 to 12.) The reasons
for this bias will be further discussed below. For the moment, suffice it to note that among my informants, I found descendants from all the different derajat who identified themselves as such. So even though the various ranks of the hierarchy pertain to a defunct sultanate and are hence institutionally hollow, they nevertheless still exist as descent categories to which my informants belong.

### 4.3 Mas Kawin

Our discussion of derajat and keturunan is not complete without a consideration of mas kawin. On every occasion my informants talked to me about derajat, they would also mention mas kawin -- literally, 'marriage gold'. There are different amounts of mas kawin specified for the various derajat of the hierarchy. The following is a list of these specified amounts, as derived from my informants:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DERAJAT</th>
<th>MAS KAWIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>raja, tengku</td>
<td>400 ringgit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tuan said</td>
<td>25 ringgit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encik datuk</td>
<td>101 ringgit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encik keturunan:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mak inang</td>
<td>88 ringgit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dayang, khadam</td>
<td>66 ringgit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>orang biasa</td>
<td>44 ringgit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keturunan Bintan</td>
<td>44 ringgit + mas 1 paha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hamba raja</td>
<td>44 ringgit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hamba orang</td>
<td>22 ringgit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is some variation of opinion among my informants concerning the specified amounts of mas kawin for the different derajat. But the list given above is the most comprehensive composite list I have been able to compile on the basis of different informants' opinions. But
all agreed that mas kawin was so important a matter in zaman sultan that it had to be regulated by state law.

The present-day significance of mas kawin has, however, diminished. As a raja informant explained the current practice:

This is only an utterance, a kind of respect given to the female side. It is usually in the form of jewellery. The price is not certain; it is not calculated. Sometimes it is not stated in ringgit but in rial. 16

(My translation).

At the marriage ceremonies I managed to witness at close range, although the specified amounts of mas kawin were publicly announced and accepted, no money was transacted. Instead it was agreed by both sides that the specified amount -- for example, 400 ringgit -- would be in some other form -- for example, a ring. I found this to be the case in a range of derajat.

What seems to remain fixed is the number itself. So, for example, the mas kawin for the rajas and tengkus is always 400, whether it is in ringgit or rial, and in whatever representative form. The word rial refers to the 'old Spanish real, i.e. dollar or piece-of-eight', whereas the word ringgit refers specifically to 'milled or serrated' coinage. 17 According to my older informants, in the last generation, these silver coins were still used for mas kawin, especially on Penyengat. A few individuals kept a store of these as antique money, and people getting married would borrow the appropriate amounts from them for the duration of the ceremony. So previously the mas kawin was not just an 'utterance' (sebutan), as it is now; there was an actual transfer of silver coins. But even then such coinage was already no longer circulated as everyday currency, so the transfer was purely symbolic. After the wedding, the silver coins were returned to their original owner, and reimbursement would be made to
the bride, either in the form of real currency, jewellery or some other representation.

Nowadays, however, these individually kept stocks of antique coinage no longer exist. Instead the various specified amounts of ringgit or rial are most commonly represented by simple gold rings, which do not vary significantly in price. So rings in the same price-range may represent mas kawin of different specified amounts. This is what my informant meant when he said that the actual price of the mas kawin is not calculated. Nevertheless, the specified amount of mas kawin in ringgit or rial must be formally uttered during the marriage ceremony.

The institution of mas kawin is evidently derived from the mahr stipulated by Islamic law. In the al-Fiqh or Corpus of Islamic Jurisprudence, it is stated that marriages are valid only when mahr is given to the bride by the bridegroom. As Fyzee (1964:126-138) has shown, the canonically prescribed mahr is intended for the bride to keep for herself permanently. It is thus not a bride-price in the conventional sense of being a payment from the bridegroom to the bride's consanguines. Among my informants, the bridegroom's payment of mas kawin is indeed kept by the bride herself as part of her personal property. This is why jewellery is the most prevalent representative form of mas kawin at the present time.

But while Islamic law prescribes payment of the mahr as an essential part of the marriage contract, it specifies neither the amount nor the form of payment. To understand the specification of the various amounts and the various forms which payment takes, we must therefore look beyond the prescriptions of Islamic law. Hooker (1976:30) points out that in Malaysia, the amount 'normally depends on the rank of the bride's father'. (See Appendix 6.) In other words,
it depends on her *derajat* inherited from her father. If, in the words of my informant cited above, *mas kawin* is 'a kind of respect given to the female side', what it acknowledges is the rank of the bride and her agnates.

And what would happen if *mas kawin* were not paid? In that case, my informants said, any child that issues from the sexual union would be an *anak haram* 'illegitimate child' who would not be considered as the father's child and so would not belong to the father's *derajat*. The father's transmission of *derajat* is thus Islamically valid only through the payment of *mas kawin* to the mother of the child.

But why is the bride's own *derajat* considered so important that different amounts of *mas kawin* are specified for the different ranks? I suggest that *mas kawin* may be interpreted as a contractual settlement, the acceptance of which signifies the agreement of the bride not to transmit her own *derajat* to her child, thereby allowing the bridegroom to become the sole transmitter of *derajat* to the child. *Mas kawin* thus seems to be essentially about the transmission of rank. So although *mas kawin* is apparently derived from the Islamic *mahr*, the linkage between *derajat* and *mas kawin*, as found in Riau, is a local adaptation that extends beyond the prescriptions of Islamic law. Furthermore, this linkage seems to be found elsewhere in alam Melayu -- for example, in Malaysia. (See Appendix 6.)

Because the idea of *mas kawin* symbolises the surrender of women's rights to transmit *derajat*, it also symbolises the limits of the *derajat* -- that is, by closing off one whole channel of transmission. The relative standing of a *derajat* is thus indicated by the amount of wealth that a bride from that *derajat* would have to be paid, so as to prevent matrifiliation from overriding patrilineal descent. This would have been particularly relevant in inter-*derajat* marriages that
are hypogamous for the bridegroom, and hypergamous for the bride. In such cases, if the higher-ranking ranking groom wishes to have his children in his own derajat, then it would be necessary indeed to block the transmission of their mother's lower-ranking derajat to them. The maintenance of keturunan as patrilineal descent is logically possible only through such blockage.

As I have stated above, the hierarchy of derajat is not just an arbitrary ranking but a scale of power. My informants' seeming focus on the limits of derajat suggests that the various derajat may be regarded as limited political shares in the sultanate, with the different specified amounts of mas kawin as the nominal values of these limited shares. To put it another way, the political standing of the males in relation to each other was indicated by the amount of mas kawin for the females of their respective derajat. The nominal values of the mas kawin should thus signify the relative power of the various derajat.

I would suggest that the larger the nominal value specified as mas kawin, the more powerful would have been that particular derajat. In other words, there would have been a positive correlation between the specified amount of mas kawin and the power of that particular derajat. This would explain why the figures vary the way they do: the hierarchy of derajat from top to bottom correlates significantly with the specified amounts of mas kawin from the largest to the smallest amount.

This correlation may also be read as a comment on the nature of power in the sultanate: the existence of power depends on the acknowledgments made to it. To use Batesonian terms of analysis, power-acknowledgment would form one complementary pattern of interaction. (See Bateson 1973:62-79.) If we translate derajat as
'power', and mas kawin as 'acknowledgment', then the hierarchy of derajat and mas kawin listed above may be understood as a ranked series of power-acknowledgment complementary patterns.

There are, however, three significant exceptions to the correlation between derajat and mas kawin:

first, the meagre sum of 25 ringgit specified for the derajat of tuan said, who rank second in the hierarchy;

second, the peculiar sum of 44 ringgit + mas 1 paha specified for the derajat of keturunan Bintan;

third, the same figure of 44 ringgit specified for the three derajat of keturunan Bintan, orang biasa, and hamba raja, which are themselves mutually ranked vis-a-vis each other.

As we shall see below, these exceptions are significant indeed.

Nowadays, however, despite the different specified amounts, the mas kawin is 'only an utterance' (sebutan aja). During the marriage ceremony, although the specified amount of mas kawin is formally uttered, it is usually represented by some form of jewellery, most often a ring. As I have noted, simple gold rings of about the same price are used to represent different specified amounts of mas kawin.

This implies that although my informants still acknowledge the different nominal values of the political shares, they consider their real values to be the same. This makes sense in the context of a defunct sultanate. Since there is no longer even a sultanate, how can there be different political shares in it? Therefore, the linkage between derajat and mas kawin seems to be a phenomenon that fundamentally pertains to zaman sultan. If it still seems currently relevant to my informants, then the implication is that the ghost of
the defunct sultanate is still haunting the present.

4.4 Raja Gelaran and Raja Keturunan

To understand how the various derajat may have originated in the very first place, let us consider the differentiation my informants make between two kinds of rajas — the raja gelaran 'ruler by designation' and the raja keturunan 'ruler by descent'. In the most general sense of the word, raja denotes 'king, prince or administrator' (Wilkinson 1959:934). This general usage is certainly found in Riau, in co-existence with the specific usage of the word as a hereditary title. In this section of the discussion, I am focussing on the general usage of this term. So I include not only those people who bear the hereditary title of raja, but also others who may be considered 'kings, princes, or administrators' in a general sense.

Some of my informants, for example, even refer to Lee Kuan Yew, the current Prime Minister of Singapore, as raja Cina 'the Chinese ruler'. Such a usage is not without precedent: in the Tuhfat al-Nafis, the Dutch and British residents of Melaka were referred to as raja Melaka. However, not all foreign administrators were so termed in the Tuhfat: the Dutch Resident at Tanjungpinang was called Residen Riau, and was not, for good reason, called raja Riau. Then and now, Riau has always had its own raja keturunan.

So in my informants' usage, Lee Kuan Yew and the former Dutch and British Residents of Melaka would be raja gelaran — that is, people who are rajas only because they are so called. The aristocrats who ruled Riau-Lingga were, however, raja keturunan by virtue of their inheritance of political authority. These included not only those who bore the title of raja, but also those who bore the other hereditary titles of tengku and said/syarifah. Only the raja keturunan
constituted a derajat; the raja gelaran were merely individuals who
were called raja because of the role they happened to play at a
particular moment.

But Lee Kuan Yew and the former Residents of Melaka are not the
only examples of raja gelaran. According to my informants, in the
past there were pirate chiefs who may be so considered. These were
apparently powerful and charismatic individuals who could command
their followers so effectively, that they began to rival the rule of
the legitimate rulers — namely, the raja keturunan. I suggest that
it is precisely in these charismatic individuals that we may discern
the source of the raja keturunan as a derajat. I would further
suggest that the raja keturunan could be institutionalised as a
derajat only when, to use Weberian terms of analysis, the charisma of
the founding raja gelaran was routinised.

In the absence of the sultanate as an institutional reality,
there are no ruling rajas of either kind. However, as we shall see
below, there are still claims to some kind of authority made by my
aristocrat informants on the basis of their hereditary position. Such
claims do not rest on individual charisma, for they clearly see
themselves as raja keturunan, not raja gelaran. Most of my informants
who perceive themselves in such a light are those who bear the
hereditary title of raja. So in the rest of this section, I shall
focus my attention mainly on these hereditary rajas. I shall thus be
discussing how the general usage of the word raja as meaning simply
'king, prince or administrator' is related to the specific usage of
the word as a hereditary title.

When my raja informants trace their patri-line backwards to the
founding ancestor, they invariably end with one Opu Tendriburang Daeng
Rilaga and his five sons. (See, for example, Genealogical Charts 2
and 3.) My informants' story of their founding ancestors do not differ significantly from the version that is told in the Tuhfat. So in the following section, I will give a summary of the account in that text. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982.)

According to the Tuhfat, Opu Tendriburang Daeng Rilaga and his five sons left Bone in Sulawesi 'to embark on a journey to the west' (ibid:45). Matheson and Andaya (1982:324) suggest that this event occurred sometime before 1715. Opu Tendriburang died shortly after he left Sulawesi, but his five sons continued to wander around in the western part of the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago, until Raja Sulaiman of the Johor-Riau sultanate who had lost his father's throne to Raja Kecik, requested these raja Bugis, as they were known, to help him recover the throne. According to Matheson and Andaya (ibid.:328), this event occurred sometime in late 1721. The raja Bugis agreed to help Raja Sulaiman against Raja Kecik, and they eventually drove the latter away to Siak.

This military success established the charismatic power of the raja Bugis, to the extent that they were in a position to invest sovereignty upon Raja Sulaiman and install him as sultan. In return, the newly installed sultan created the office of yang dipertuan muda or yamtuan muda -- literally, 'he who is made junior lord' -- as the political monopoly of these raja Bugis. The establishment of this office seems to have been the means whereby the charismatic power of the raja Bugis was routinised into legitimate authority, thereby converting them from mere raja gelaran to the founding ancestors of the raja keturunan of Riau.

The transition from raja gelaran to raja keturunan is evident in the use of titular prefixes. Although the five sons of Opu Tendriburang were referred to as raja Bugis in the Tuhfat, their names
were prefixed not by the title raja, but by the title opu daeng. According to Wilkinson (1959:821) opu denotes 'district-headman (in Celebes)', whereas daeng was 'a title borne by any Bugis of good family' but was 'in no sense a princely title though often represented as such by descendants of the Bugis leaders'. The five Opu Daeng brothers thus seem to have been the Bugis equivalent of the datuk kaya in Riau. So if they were considered as raja, then they would have been only raja gelaran and not raja keturunan. To this day, my informants do not refer to these five Opu Daeng brothers as Raja So-and-So, but only as Opu Daeng Parani, Opu Daeng Menambun, Opu Daeng Marewah, Opu Daeng Cellak, and Opu Daeng Kemasi.

The patrilineal descendants of these Opu Daeng brothers, however, have since acquired the prefix of raja as a hereditary title. The Opu Daeng brothers were thus raja gelaran, whereas their children and subsequent generations of patrilineal descendants were and still are raja keturunan. With the exception of a few rajas who have immigrated to Riau from elsewhere — for example, from Rengat in Sumatra — all my raja informants are raja keturunan descended from these five Opu Daeng. (The few other rajas from Rengat and elsewhere are completely unrelated to the Riau rajas.)

I did not encounter any raja gelaran in the course of my fieldwork, although I did hear stories of a few pirate chiefs in the past who were called raja. However, the charisma of these piratical raja gelaran was evidently not routinised into a derajat of raja keturunan, probably for lack of a political office that they and their descendants could hold in perpetuity. In Weberian terms, the routinisation of charisma does indeed require the devolution of individual power onto institutions.
An example of a piratical raja gelaran is Raja Alang Laut of Galang, who is said to have lived sometime in the nineteenth century. My Galang informants often speak of him; one described him thus:

Raja Alang Laut -- dia bukan raja betul. Dia merajakan diri. Kerana dia terlebih ganas, digelar anak buahnya 'raja'. Anaknya bukan raja; dia orang Galang.

(Raja Alang Laut -- he was not a true raja. He made himself a raja. Because he was so fierce, he was called 'raja' by his followers. His children were not rajas; they were Galang people.)

Interestingly, my raja informants on Penyengat have a different version of Raja Alang Laut. They said that he was a relative of Sultan Sulaiman, and that his full name was Tengku Takdir Raja Alang Laut. He did not get on with the Bugis rajas; so he went off to the Galang area to found his own territory. But because he was a relative of Sultan Sulaiman, the Bugis rajas left him alone and did not try to suppress him.

This second version about Raja Alang Laut describes him not as a charismatic raja gelaran, but as a renegade raja keturunan. By identifying him as a relative of Sultan Sulaiman, my raja informants achieve the dual effect of categorising him as a raja keturunan, but one who was not related to themselves. It appears that my raja informants would rather have a renegade raja keturunan than a charismatic raja gelaran -- that is, better a bad raja through ascription than a powerful raja through achievement. They thus seem to value the routinised over the charismatic, and institutionalised authority over individual power. From their perspective, such an attitude is indeed not surprising.

On the other hand, my Galang informants who belong to the rank of hamba raja 'serf' evidently prefer to have the opposite -- that is, to describe Raja Alang Laut as a raja gelaran rather than as a raja
keturunan. From their particular perspective, this attitude is again not surprising. The documentary evidence of Raja Alang Laut will be discussed in the subsequent chapter.

Whatever the case may be concerning Raja Alang Laut, it is clear that he left no raja descendants behind. If he was indeed a charismatic raja gelaran, his charisma was evidently not routinised into a derajat. As mentioned above, only the raja keturunan constitute a derajat; the raja gelaran are merely charismatic individuals of the moment, who do not belong to the derajat of raja. This differentiation again highlights the importance of the transmission of derajat. In order to belong to the derajat of raja, one must inherit one's raja-hood through patrilineal descent. It is not enough merely to be raja-like and thereby become a raja gelaran.

If the Opu Daeng brothers had not routinised their charisma though the office of yamtuan muda, they would not have been more significant than any of the piratical raja gelaran who had not been able to transmit their individual power to their patrilineal descendants. The Opu Daeng brothers are significant precisely because they did manage to do this successfully, thereby founding a derajat of raja keturunan. Derajat thus seems to be not a static thing, but rather, in its very essence, an intergenerational transmission of power.

This idea of intergenerational transmission was expressed by a raja informant in the following terms:

Yes, it belongs to the past — descent from the Bugis people.... Among us Riau rajas, many are of Bugis descent. At one time in the past, the Melayu raja was at war...; [because of this] he requested the aid of the Bugis from Sulawesi. So the Bugis came here to help the Melayu raja at war. So they won. Consequently they married the people of the Melayu raja, the females of the Melayu raja. Thus they produced many children who became rajas. All those bearing the title of raja are considered Bugis, similarly in
Malaysia — they are thus keturunan Bugis. Indeed in this archipelago, Bugis descent has spread. What this means is that it is like a drop of indigo dye in a bowl of coconut cream. As a result, all follows the single drop. Because the indigo dye is blue, all the coconut cream that is white also becomes blue. So it is also with the blood of the Bugis, beginning with one drop and spreading out until it has become thus plentiful.

(My translation).

In my informant's metaphor, the Bugis males were the one drop of indigo dye colouring the white coconut cream. By implication, the many children they produced from marrying the Melayu females were the white coconut cream, and these females were presumably the bowl containing the white cream that was coloured blue. My informant locates this coloration as an event that occurred in the past: there was but one drop of indigo dye that dropped but once into the bowl of coconut cream. So, according to him, the Bugis from Sulawesi contributed the one metaphorical drop of 'blood' (darah) to the Melayu people of Riau and Malaysia. The substance of intergenerational transmission is identified as darah 'blood'; so those who belong to the same derajat share the same 'blood', which originated from the metaphorical first drop.

It is also clear in my informant's statement that matrifiliation is important. The implication is that as a reward for their military victory, the Bugis from Sulawesi were able to marry the females of the Melayu raja, thereby producing the Riau rajas who are considered thus as keturunan Bugis. The charisma of the Bugis was thus routinised through marriage and matrifiliation, such that their children would have been anak gahara — that is, high-born on both sides.

In Chapter Two, I have already mentioned the importance of Opu Daeng Cellak's wedding to Sultan Sulaiman's sister, Tengku Mandak. In the Tuhfat, this marriage is given as much emphasis as the installation of Opu Daeng Marewah (also known as Opu Kelana Jaya
Putera) as the *yamtuan muda*. Not surprisingly, after the death of Opu Daeng Marewah, it was Opu Daeng Cellak who succeeded as *yamtuan muda*.

Opu Daeng Cellak was evidently not the only one to have contracted such a strategic marriage. Opu Daeng Parani also married a sister of Sultan Sulaiman, Tengku Tengah, though not as his first wife. Furthermore, he had no sons by her. Nevertheless, after the death of Opu Daeng Cellak, it was Opu Daeng Parani's son by his first wife -- Daeng Kamboja -- who succeeded as *yamtuan muda*. Significantly, the next *yamtuan muda* after that was the son of Opu Daeng Cellak and Tengku Mandak -- Raja Haji. (See Genealogical Chart 1.) As we shall see below, in my informants' rear-view image of zaman sultan, Raja Haji figures very importantly indeed.

The Opu Daengs' charisma was thus routinised not only through the monopoly of the political office of *yamtuan muda*, but also through the establishment of a political alliance with Sultan Sulaiman and his agnates through strategic marriages with his sisters. These marriages of alliance would have been particularly significant at the time because both the Bugis and the Melayu patri-lines were still incipient. Indeed, descent was not yet established as a principle, because in both these patri-lines only the second generation had emerged.

On the one hand, the Opu Daeng brothers were merely the sons of Opu Tendriburang Daeng Rilaga, who was eventually recognised as the apical ancestor of his patri-line. And on the other hand, Sultan Sulaiman and his siblings were merely the children of Sultan Abd al-Jalil, who was also eventually recognised as the apical ancestor of his patri-line. Since both these apical ancestors were already dead by 1722 when Sultan Sulaiman and the Opu Daeng brothers came to power,
patrifiliation alone was probably insufficient as a legitimating principle.

When Sultan Abd al-Jalil was still alive, he was not even able to legitimate his own rule, to the extent that he lost his throne to a Minangkabau pretender. (See Chapter Three.) Indeed he was murdered on the orders of this pretender. (See Andaya 1975:280-281.) With such a record, it would have been highly unlikely that his son could have legitimated himself through patrifiliation alone. Opu Tendriburang Daeng Rilaga, the father of the Opu Daeng brothers, had nothing whatsoever to do with Riau. So in this case too, it is very unlikely that his sons could have legitimated themselves through patrifiliation alone.

Alliance was hence more important as a mutually legitimating contract. On the one hand, Sultan Sulaiman's position as yang dipertuan besar or yamtuan besar -- literally, 'he who is made senior lord' -- was legitimated through recognition by the Opu Daeng brothers who had put him on the throne in the very first place. And on the other hand, the military power of the Opu Daeng brothers was legitimated through Sultan Sulaiman's recognition of the office of yang dipertuan muda or yamtuan muda 'he who is made junior lord' as their political monopoly. This mutual recognition of the two most powerful forces in the newly re-established state of 1722 was evidently contractualised through the two strategic marriages mentioned above.

Once such a marriage alliance was established, it allowed the transmission of legitimate authority through time, from the preceding generation of the original few to the subsequent generations of the succeeding many. Indeed, in the context of this study, the marriage between Opu Daeng Cellak and Tengku Mandak may be considered
particularly significant, because many of my raja informants trace direct descent from that particular marriage, which took place more than two centuries ago.

What is interesting is that both in my informants' genealogies and in the genealogies given in the Tuhfat, the children of this ancestral couple bore different titles in accordance with their gender. Thus their sons bore the title raja, and their daughters bore the title tengku. As we shall see below, the title raja was subsequently inherited by the Opu Daeng brothers' descendants, both male and female, whereas the title tengku was restricted to those in Sultan Sulaiman's patri-line, also both male and female. But such a rule was evidently not yet established at the time of the first marriage of alliance.

This may also be discerned in the relative location of the graves of these personae. The graves of the two patri-lines are generally found in quite different sites. In Sungai Riau, for example, there is an upstream site, at Hulu Sungai Riau, where the graves of the first two yamtuan mudas are located; and there is a downstream site, at Kampung Melayu where Sultan Sulaiman and some of his descendants are buried. (See Map 5.) Interestingly, however, at the latter site, located in the same compound are the graves of Tengku Mandak (Sultan Sulaiman's sister) and Tengku Putih (the daughter of Opu Daeng Cellak and Tengku Mandak). This suggests that both these women were perceived as members of Sultan Sulaiman's descent unit, rather than that of the Opu Daeng brothers.

When I questioned my raja informants about this, they said that it was only natural that Tengku Mandak should have been buried with Sultan Sulaiman because she was his sister. As for Tengku Putih, they said that she bore the title tengku and was buried in that compound,
because she was her mother's daughter and that was the practice at that time. However, my informants do take note that according to the rule of patrilineal descent, Tengku Putih should have borne the title raja and should have been buried with other rajas. The significance of these graves to my informants will be discussed further below. For the moment, suffice it to note that frequent ritual visits are still made to these graves, and as I shall show below, these visits are an important way of realising the past-in-the-present.

In the argument above, I am thus suggesting that in post-1722 Riau, the inheritance of derajat through patrilineal descent was established gradually, and that prior to such a principle, marriage alliance was more important. Following the first two strategic marriages, there were several others. Significantly, the most important of these occurred in periods of political crisis when the alliance between the two factions needed to be renewed. One such marriage was between Sultan Mahmud III on the Melayu side and Raja Haji's daughter, Raja Hamidah, on the Bugis side. The other was between Sultan Mahmud IV's daughter, Tengku Embung Fatimah, on the Melayu side and Yamtuan Muda Raja Muhamad Yusuf on the Bugis side. As we shall see below, the consequences of those two particular marriages are regarded by my informants as weighty indeed. (See Genealogical Chart 1.)

4.5 Keturunan Raja and Keturunan Tengku

The two patri-lines, Bugis and Melayu, that were allied through marriage still exist as the keturunan raja and the keturunan tengku — that is, respectively, the rajas' line of descent and the tengkus' line of descent. As shown above, the rajas and the tengkus are ranked as one derajat in the hierarchy. Significantly, however, my Riau
informants from this derajat were almost entirely rajas. This was due not to any omission on my part, but to the fact that there are indeed very few tengkus to be found in the Riau archipelago. In the course of my fieldwork I encountered only two there, and of the two, only one was a resident; the other was a visitor from the Lingga archipelago in the south. The tengkus are localised in the Lingga archipelago, which I was able to visit only in December 1983. Conversely, there are very few rajas in Lingga.

So although the rajas and the tengkus are ranked as one derajat, they are territorially differentiated, such that the former are localised in Riau and the latter in Lingga. They are thus located in complementary distribution to each other. Even the titles of raja and tengku are used in complementary distribution, although as pointed out above, this seems to have been a gradual development. The eventual result was:

The title raja was taken by members of the family of the Yamtuan Muda of Riau, while those of the house of the Yamtuan Besar took the title of tengku.

(Wilkinson 1959:934).

This complementary distribution harks back to 1722 when Raja Kecik was ousted by the Opu Daeng brothers, and the newly installed Sultan Sulaiman created the office of yang dipertuan muda or yamtuan muda for them. In the Tuhfat, it is said that he did this to reward them for their service to him. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:62-63.) It is also possible that, as Andaya (1975:293-296) has suggested, the Bugis adventurers decided to install Sultan Sulaiman, almost as an afterthought, following their conquest of Riau.

But whatever the circumstances might have been — whether it was Sultan Sulaiman who had asked the Opu Daeng brothers to help him, or whether it was the Bugis who had fortuitously decided to install him
what is certain is that the post-1722 sultanate was the result of violent military conquest. Again, whether or not the military campaign was justifiable, is quite another matter. The point is: the post-1722 sultanate was the booty of a military conquest by a new force who had hitherto not been part of the sultanate at all. This new force was none other than the raja Bugis.

So the division of spoils was an important issue right from the establishment of the post-1722 sultanate. The basic line of division was evidently between those who were already members of the pre-1722 sultanate on the one hand, and on the other, the newcomers who had fought their way into the sultanate in 1722. It was this division that produced, respectively, the keturunan tengku and the keturunan raja.

The sultan's office of yang dipertuan 'he who is made lord' was effectively divided into two: the post of yang dipertuan besar 'senior lord' was to be the political monopoly of the pre-1722 faction, and the post of yang dipertuan muda 'junior lord' was to be the political monopoly of the post-1722 faction. The establishment of these two posts may thus be understood as the institutionalisation of a 'spoils system', whereby public offices are divided among the victorious parties. However, the division of spoils continued to be a controversial issue right to the end of the sultanate.

So there was an intra-derajat rivalry between the tengkus and the rajas, a rivalry inherent from the very beginning of the post-1722 sultanate. The complementary distribution of the two factions may thus be understood as a controlling factor used to restrain this intra-derajat rivalry. The division of the office of yang dipertuan was evidently the first step towards such a distribution.
In the *Tuhfat*, Raja Ali Haji (1982:64) describes a symbolic contract established between the two factions:

...Sultan Sulaiman installed Opu Kelana Jaya Putera as Yang Dipertuan Muda to govern the kingdom of Johor and Pahang and Riau and all the subject territories with absolute authority.

In return for this bestowal of absolute authority, the yang Dipertuan Muda swore an oath of loyalty to the Yang Dipertuan Besar. In Raja Ali Haji's description (ibid.), this exchange of declarations was then sealed by the marriage of Opu Daeng Cellak and Tengku Mandak.

What this symbolic contract seems to have signified was a differentiation between sovereignty and authority. The yang dipertuan besar retained sovereignty but bestowed absolute authority upon the yang dipertuan muda. The latter, in turn, acknowledged the sovereignty of the former and pledged to use his authority in the service of the yang dipertuan besar, who was generally known as sultan. So only a tengku could become sultan; a raja (or engku) could merely become yang dipertuan muda.

However, this initial complementary distribution evidently needed increasing differentiation, eventually reaching full realisation in 1804, when there was a territorial division between the two factions. The pre-1722 faction took Lingga and the post-1722 faction took Riau. Hence to this day, there are very few tengkus in Riau and very few rajas in Lingga. The territorial division that occurred in 1804 is of such significance that we shall discuss it separately below.

4.6 Raja Hamidah's *Mas Kawin*

According to my raja informants, the territorial division between the keturunan raja and the keturunan tengku was effected by means of
the mas kawin that Sultan Mahmud III gave to his bride, Raja Hamidah, the daughter of Raja Haji. (See Genealogical Chart 1.) Penyengat island was apparently used to represent the mas kawin. And it was Penyengat that subsequently became the political base of the yamtuan muda and his faction.

Although the event of territorial division is described in the Tuhfat, Raja Ali Haji does not mention that Penyengat was Raja Hamidah's mas kawin. Yet the details of the event as he describes them suggest that my informants' interpretation is plausible. To appreciate its full significance, we must first discuss the political situation during that period. The following is a summary of the important events recounted in the Tuhfat.

According to the Tuhfat (see Raja Ali Haji 1982:178-212), at the time of the territorial division, Sultan Mahmud III was the yamtuan besar and Raja Ali was the yamtuan muda. Shortly after the latter had been installed, a crisis arose when a Dutch force from Melaka came and attacked Riau.

The Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Ali left with all those of Bugis descent, whoever could avail themselves of the opportunity.... [He]...took with him only two daughters of the late Raja Haji (that is, Raja Hamidah and Raja Sitti). Their mother was his sister and for this reason he took them with him when he left Riau and sailed to Mempawah and Sukadana.

(Ibid.:179).

His departure apparently allowed Sultan Mahmud's second cousin, Engku Muda, to rise to power. (See Genealogical Chart 1; Trocki 1979:29.) As we shall see below, this led to such a struggle for power that the sultanate was eventually to divide along that particular break.
According to the Tuhfat (see Raja Ali Haji 1982:180-186), after Yamtuan Muda Raja Ali's departure, Sultan Mahmud stayed on in Riau and put up with having a Dutch agent in Tanjung Pinang. However, his threshold of tolerance was soon exceeded. So he invited Ilanun pirates from Tempassuk in Sabah to attack the Dutch. The raid was successful, but Sultan Mahmud became so nervous of Dutch retaliation that he and his followers moved to Lingga.

This chain of events apparently occurred between the years 1784 and 1787. (See Matheson and Andaya 1982:370-372.) Then from 1787 to 1795, the Dutch held Riau, while the sultan stayed in Lingga, and Engku Muda based himself in the Bulan area. (See Map 3; Matheson and Andaya 1982:372-377; Trocki 1979:28-31.) What changed this situation was Napoleon Bonaparte's conquest of the Netherlands, which led to the British take-over of Dutch possessions in the East, including Riau. (See Matheson and Andaya 1982:377). According to the Tuhfat, 'the English Company...restored Riau to Sultan Mahmud' (Raja Ali Haji 1982:196). Sultan Mahmud, however, continued to live in Lingga, while Engku Muda was sent 'to guard Riau' (ibid.:197).

Shortly after, the former yamtuan muda, Raja Ali, returned to Riau. This led to a civil war between Engku Muda's faction and Raja Ali's faction. So Sultan Mahmud had to leave Lingga to intervene between them. (See ibid.:203-204.) He apparently decided to favour Raja Ali over Engku Muda. Sultan Mahmud and Raja Ali met and 'renewed the oath of loyalty made between Bugis and Malay' (ibid.:205). Immediately afterwards, 'Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Ali married His Majesty Sultan Mahmud to Raja Hamidah, that is, to Engku Puteri, daughter of the late Raja Haji' (ibid.).

After the marriage, the couple lived at Tanjung Unggat on the Riau river where Raja Ali's settlement was located. This would have
been in accordance with the rule of uxorilocality. In the meantime, Sultan Mahmud ordered that Penyengat island be cleared and built up as a political capital. Then --

...in the presence of several princes,...Sultan Mahmud said to his wife Engku Puteri, 'Raja Hamidah, I have built up Penyengat Island into a settlement complete with a palace and fortifications. I now make it your property Raja Hamidah. Riau and its revenues and so forth will belong to you and to your brothers and sisters, the children of the late Raja Haji.... I will no longer interfere in the slightest way with anything. As for Lingga, that will belong to Komeng (that is, my son Raja Jumat, Tengku Abd al-Rahman) and you and your family must henceforth make no claim to its revenues or tribute'. Those versed in oral tradition say that this initiated the division of income, revenues, and taxes between the Yang Dipertuan Muda and the Yang Dipertuan Besar. This all took place in the hijra year 1218 [A.D.1804].

(Ibid.:212).

Significantly, Sultan Mahmud himself then returned to Lingga where he resided for the rest of his life. Nor did Yamtuan Muda Raja Ali move to Penyengat, even though it was now declared the seat of government. Instead the latter built himself a palace on Bayan Island in the Riau river. It was only after his death when Raja Hamidah's brother, Raja Jafar, succeeded to the office, that Penyengat became the actual seat of the yamtuan muda's government. (See ibid.:212-215.)

The significance of this detail has to be understood in the context of my informants' statement that Penyengat was Raja Hamidah's mas kawin. As I have shown in the preceding section, mas kawin is given to and kept by the bride as her personal property. So if Penyengat was Raja Hamidah's mas kawin, then it would make sense that both her husband and her mother's brother would not have wanted to live there. Raja Hamidah's brother, however, shared her patrifiliative status as a child of Raja Haji and hence had greater right to live on his sister's mas kawin. This would have been
especially the case since mas kawin symbolises the acknowledgment of a woman's rank inherited from her father.

In view of my informants' statement about Raja Hamidah's mas kawin, it is not clear to me why Raja Ali Haji omitted any mention of it in the Tuhfat. Perhaps he wanted to downplay Raja Hamidah's ownership of Penyengat. However, if Raja Ali Haji omitted mention of the mas kawin, what my informants omit mention of is the European presence in Riau at that time and the significance of Engku Muda's role. Instead of portraying the territorial division of Riau and Lingga as a political compromise struck between two rival factions, they talk about it simply as a domestic matter, a mere transfer of mas kawin from bridegroom to bride. However, in the Tuhfat's account of events, as presented above, it is clear that the territorial division occurred at a very critical point of the kingdom's history.

Significantly, the division of Riau and Lingga as the respective territories of the yamtuan muda and the yamtuan besar occurred in a newly reconstituted sultanate, restored quite unexpectedly by the English. Unlike the situation in 1722, the post-1795 sultanate was not the spoils of war but, rather, lost property suddenly returned by an outside benefactor. Indeed, by 1787, Sultan Mahmud had already seemed quite resigned to making his home in Lingga, having abandoned Riau to the Dutch. By 1784, with the departure of Raja Ali from Riau, there was no longer a yamtuan muda in the sultanate. 1795 thus marked the reunion of the already fragmented sultanate.

At this juncture, since the Bugis had already withdrawn themselves from Riau, Sultan Mahmud could have decided to abolish the office of yamtuan muda altogether, thereby giving a de jure recognition to the de facto situation. Alternatively, he could have appointed someone from his own faction — for example, Engku Muda —
to the post, thereby keeping the Bugis out of the sultanate. He could have justified his action by blaming the Bugis for failing to defend Riau against the Dutch and thereby failing to keep the symbolic contract that had been set up.

Instead, he apparently chose to restore the 'spoils system' established in 1722, this time allocating specific territories to the two respective factions. There is a likelihood that he did this in order to check the ambitions of someone within his own faction — namely, Engku Muda, who had even taken to calling himself 'Sultan of Riau'. (See Trocki 1979:28.) In other words, Sultan Mahmud may have felt that it was better to share his newly reconstituted sultanate with the Bugis faction, than to lose his own throne to someone within his own faction.

This raises another point concerning keturunan: not only are different keturunan 'lines of descent' ranked in relation to each other, but individuals within the same keturunan are also ranked vis-á-vis one another. My informants use another word — pangkat — to refer to individual ranking within the same keturunan.

Interestingly, my informants also use the word to refer to generational level. Within the same keturunan, the old generally rank higher than the young, presumably because of the former's greater proximity to the source of descent. Unlike keturunan which befalls one, pangkat is more amenable to self-manipulation.

First of all, everyone grows old. So everyone who manages to survive an early death, will naturally attain the pangkat of a senior vis-á-vis a junior within the same keturunan. Apart from natural aging, one can also naik pangkat 'claim the ranks' through the assertion of one's superiority over lesser fellows, by one means or another. There seem to be two ways of doing this: One could receive
recognition from someone of a higher rank; this person could be a member of a higher-ranking derajat, or else, someone of superior pangkat within the same keturunan — for example, an older kinsperson. The second way would be to exude sufficient charisma to awe one's peers.

In this context, we can see how vulnerable Sultan Mahmud's position was to the ambitions of Engku Muda. They were second cousins; so the generational rank of both within the keturunan was equal. (See Genealogical Chart 1.) Indeed, in terms of relative age, it seems that Engku Muda was the older by about twelve years. (See Trocki 1979:27-28.) Although Sultan Mahmud was already on the throne, his right to it was not really that much stronger than Engku Muda's. Indeed, the former's only claim to a greater right would have been that his father's father — Sultan Sulaiman — was a sultan 'ruler', whereas the latter's father's father — Bendahara Tun Abas — was only a bendaraha 'treasurer'. However, Bendahara Tun Abas was the oldest son and an anak gahara, whereas Sultan Sulaiman was a younger son and an anak gundik. Apparently, the latter became sultan only because he was born after their father became sultan; before that, their father was merely a bendahara under Sultan Mahmud II who was subsequently assassinated. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:19-20.)

What further weakened Sultan Mahmud's position was that his own father was not a sultan, because the latter had died before he could be installed. So Sultan Mahmud had inherited his throne not from his father, but from his older brother Sultan Ahmad, thereby setting a precedent for succession within the same generation. (See ibid.:122.) To make matters worse, it appears that Sultan Mahmud had himself aided Engku Muda in his ambitions to naik pangkat, for in 1795, after the English had restored Riau to him, the former had sent the latter 'to guard Riau while the position of the Yang Dipertuan Muda was being
determined and the organisation of Johor was being completed' (ibid.:197). Engku Muda thus received recognition from a higher-ranking person, the sultan himself.

Particularly in a time of flux, while the sultanate was being reconstituted, it would have been very easy to include a change of sultan as part of the 'organisation of Johor'. Under these circumstances, it is understandable why Sultan Mahmud chose to favour the return of the Bugis. What he did may thus be understood as sacrificing the power of his keturunan for the sake of preserving his own pangkat.

Although Engku Muda failed to naik pangkat, he nevertheless seemed 'to have held his following intact' (Trocki 1979:29). According to my informants, his base was located along the narrow Bulang strait, specifically on the two small islands of Bulang Lintang and Bulang Gebang. (See Map 6.) From this base, he evidently ruled a large dominion that included the Galang area, the Bulan area, and the Johor area (with Singapore in it). Engku Muda thus manifested the charisma of a raja gelaran.

He appeared eventually to have achieved the routinisation of his charisma. His brother's son and his successor, Engku Abd al-Rahman, subsequently became the temenggung who founded the ruling house of what is now the Malaysian state of Johor. So not only can the routinisation of charisma found a new keturunan, it can also bring about the branching off of a divergent keturunan from the mainstream keturunan, while still acknowledging the same river-head as source. The fact that Engku Abd al-Rahman was not Engku Muda's son, but the son of his brother Daeng Kecil, demonstrates that the acknowledged source of this divergent keturunan was still Sultan Abd al-Jalil.
Significantly, this divergent keturunan derived from another marriage of alliance between the Melayu and Bugis factions. Both Engku Muda and Daeng Kecil were born of Temenggung Abd al-Jamal on the Melayu side and Tengku Maimunah on the Bugis side. Tengku Maimunah was the daughter of Opu Daeng Parani and Tengku Tengah. (See Genealogical Chart 1; Raja Ali Haji 1982:20,28.) The use of the nominal prefixes daeng by Daeng Kecil and tengku by Tengku Maimunah further illustrates that at that time the complementary distribution of titles between the two factions had not yet been systematised. My raja informants are aware that their connection to the present ruling house of Johore is through the matrilineal link of Tengku Maimunah to her sons. (See Genealogical Chart 2.)

This discussion enables us to identify more clearly the keturunan tengku of Lingga: They are the descendants of Sultan Mahmud and his followers within the mainstream keturunan, which derived from yet another marriage of alliance - that is, between Raja di-Baru Abd al-Jalil on the Melayu side and Tengku Putih on the Bugis side, who was herself the daughter of Opu Daeng Cellak and Tengku Mandak. (See Genealogical Chart 1.)

So when Sultan Mahmud III presented Penyengat to Raja Hamidah in 1804, there appeared the cracks along which the sultanate eventually fragmented. There are five names associated with the five fragments into which the sultanate eventually broke:

Raja Haji with Riau;
Sultan Abdul Rahman (Komeng) with Lingga;
Sultan Husein (Tengku Long) with Singapore;
Temenggong Engku Abdur-Rahman with Johor;
Bendahara Tun Abdu'l-Majid with Pahang.

(See Genealogical Chart 1.)
Significantly, Raja Hamidah was also known as Engku Puteri, a title which may be translated as 'Royal Daughter'. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982.) She is still referred to as such by my informants. The emphasis is thus on her filial status as a child of Raja Haji. Indeed, after the death of Yamtuan Muda Raja Ali in 1805, all subsequent yamtuan mudas were the patrilineal descendants of Raja Haji. In other words, this was another divergent keturunan, established not through the founder's own efforts in his own lifetime, but through posthumous recognition given by a higher-ranking person — namely, Sultan Mahmud III. One can thus naik pangkat even posthumously. What makes the establishment of this divergent keturunan even more interesting is that Raja Haji was Sultan Mahmud III's mother's brother. (See Genealogical Chart 1.) So Sultan Mahmud's action may be interpreted, alternatively, as a decision to favour his matrifiliative kin over his patrilineal agnates.

Another significant part of Sultan Mahmud's speech as reported in the Tuhfat is his special mention of Komeng (Tengku Abd al-Rahman) as his intended heir. After the death of Sultan Mahmud in 1812, there was a struggle for the throne between two of his sons, Komeng and his older brother Tengku Long. (See Genealogical Chart 1.) The yamtuan muda's faction supported the former while Engku Muda's faction supposed the latter. By that time Engku Muda's nephew, Engku Abd al-Rahman, was already temenggung and very much in control of the area spanning from Galang to Johor, including Singapore. So in 1819 he was able to arrange for Tengku Long to be installed in Singapore as Sultan Husein, with recognition given by the English. (See Turnbull 1977:8-9; Winstedt 1979:74-77.)

By the late nineteenth century, the temenggung in Johor and the bendahara in Pahang had declared themselves sultans in their own territories. (See Trocki 1979:150-151; Winstedt 1979:117.) That
completed the break-up of the sultanate, a process that had begun with the territorial division of Riau and Lingga in 1804.

My informants' discourse on this event is thus significant not only for what it mentions, but also for what it omits. While they are very much aware of the historical events discussed above, they choose to focus is on Raja Hamidah's mas kawin. They still regard Penyengat as her personal property; she is still referred to as Tuan Puteri 'Master Princess'. This attribution of ownership is quite in keeping with the idea of Penyengat as her mas kawin. Indeed, there is no mention either in the Tuhfat or any other text that Penyengat was inherited by anyone else after her death. According to the Tuhfat, she died on 5 August 1844. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:279.) But that raises the question: how can a dead person own an island? The answer to this will be discussed in Chapter Six.

4.7 The Male Monopoly of Political Office

If, as my informants say, the territorial division of 1804 was effected through the payment of mas kawin, it would imply that the increased power of the keturunan raja came via the mediation of a female member of the keturunan — namely, Engku Puteri Raja Hamidah. If a female member of the keturunan could mediate in the transfer of power in this way, could she not also hold power directly? If Engku Puteri Raja Hamidah could own Penyengat as a political capital, could she not also be the political ruler of the territory?

There is evidence that the ownership of Penyengat did give her considerable political influence. According to the Tuhfat, she was able to intervene and bring to an end a factional fight that had broken out between her brother Raja Idris and a newcomer from the Bugis homeland. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:222.) Moreover, after the
death of Sultan Mahmud her husband, she was in possession of the royal regalia and was thus in the position of being kingmaker.

That, however, raises the question: if she was kingmaker then could she not have become king as well? It seems that her role as kingmaker caused a rift between herself and her brother Yamtuan Muda Raja Jafar. She was apparently in favour of Tengku Long as successor to her husband, the late Sultan Mahmud, whereas her brother was in favour of Komeng. Matters came to such a head, that eventually the latter had to enlist the help of the Dutch in taking the regalia from her by military force. So if her role as kingmaker was so unacceptable to her brother, then it would have been extremely unlikely indeed that he would have permitted her to ascend the throne as sultan. That brings us to the topic of the male monopoly of political office.

Quite a few of my informants felt it necessary to tell me voluntarily that the sultan was always a male, because the dominant Islamic school in Riau was Madzhab Shafi'i which disapproves of female political leaders. Such an attribution is rather surprising. As pointed out by Sharon Siddique (personal communication), it is not just the Madzhab Shafi'i that disapproves of female political leaders; so would any other Islamic school. The reason is that the leader of an Islamic polity is also its imam 'the religious guide'. Since the polity constitutes a mixed jemaah 'congregation', the imam must be male: no man is allowed to pray behind a woman. Sharon Siddique has suggested to me that my informants may have mentioned Madzhab Shafi'i because that is the school to which they themselves belong, and is hence the only one that they would know about.

It is therefore significant that my informants should have even felt it necessary to justify to me the male monopoly of the office of
sultan, by attributing it to the particular school of Islam that they happened to belong to. Such an attribution seems to be another instance of extra-Islamic modification, in this case, used as an ideological lock to maintain the idea that the political office of ruler must always be a male monopoly. I suggest that after the payment of Penyengat as Raja Hamidah's mas kawin in 1804, there was an intensified use of Islam as an ideology of male dominance.

In this context, it is significant that it was during the reign of Yamtuan Muda Raja Jafar, Raja Hamidah's brother, that an Islamic revival was actively encouraged on Penyengat, such that the island became known as the regional centre for Islamic reformism. It was one of Raja Jafar's brothers, Raja Haji Ahmad, who was 'the first prince from Riau to perform the haj' (Andaya and Matheson 1979:112). It was Raja Haji Ahmad and his son, Raja Ali Haji, who compiled the Tuhfat Al-Nafis. The latter was himself 'a religious scholar, who actively recruited Islamic teachers for Riau and was consulted on points of doctrine by members of the royal family' (ibid:112). According to the Tuhfat, Yamtuan Muda Raja Jafar was himself a very pious man who 'liked religious scholars and was dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge' (Raja Ali Haji 1982:221). Interestingly, there is no mention of the Islamic piety of Engku Puteri Raja Hamidah in the Tuhfat.

4.8 'Sultan' Fatimah

The male monopoly of political office was subsequently broken, but only to benefit the yamtuan muda's own son. I refer to the case of 'Sultan' Fatimah, the daughter of Sultan Mahmud IV. (See Genealogical Chart 1.) It was from her that the last sultan of Riau inherited his political office matrifiliatively.
The following passage on 'Sultan' Fatimah is translated from a book written by my *tengku* informant in Lingga, Tengku Ahmad (1972:26-27):

RAJA PEREMPUAN [QUEEN]

Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Alam Syah did not have any son at all, since Tengku Besar (the Crown Prince), whose name was Tengku Daud, had died long ago. Because of this, for a period of two years, the political power of Lingga Riau was held by Tengku Embung, also known as Tengku Fatimah, whose husband was Raja Muhammad Yusuf, the tenth Yang Dipertuan Muda of Riau, successor to the ninth Yang Dipertuan Muda, Raja Abdullah.

Tengku Embung Fatimah was a child of Sultan Mahmud Muzafar Syah who had been dethroned by the Government of the Dutch Indies on 23 September 1857. She was the only Raja Perempuan [Queen] in the history of the kingdom of 'Johor, Pahang, Riau and Lingga', which had become the kingdom of 'Lingga-Riau'. A harmonious administration was attained because of her care and ability, together with the close cooperation and intercession of the Yang Dipertuan Muda Riau (her own husband)....

After two years of holding political power in Lingga-Riau, Queen Tengku Embung Fatimah, in consultation with the Yang Dipertuan Muda of Riau, surrendered her power to their child Raja Abdul Rahman.

(My translation).

It was Tengku Ahmad himself who suggested that I translate the term *raja perempuan* (literally: female ruler) as 'queen'. He also supplemented the information from his book, by telling me that Sultan Sulaiman II had intended his brother's son's son, Tengku Husain, to succeed him. This would have kept the office of yamtuan besar in the hands of a male descendant of the patri-line that had originated from the founding ancestor, Sultan Abdul Jalil. (See Genealogical Chart 4.)

Instead, it seems that the throne went to Sultan Mahmud IV's daughter, Tengku Fatimah, and then via her, to her son, Raja Abdul Rahman. The office of yamtuan besar thus passed to a female descendant of the patri-line and then to her son via matrifiliative
succession. Since the father of her son was Yamtuan Muda Raja Muhammad Yusuf, this meant that the son had inherited the title of raja. So he still remained in the patri-line of the keturunan raja. Nevertheless, through matrifiliation, he became sultan, an office that should have been occupied only by the keturunan tengku. So by bringing complementary filiation to a logical extreme, the office of yamtuan besar was thereby shifted from the keturunan tengku to the keturunan raja. What 'Queen' Fatimah's son gained, her own patri-kin lost.

This major historical shift was evidently achieved through breaking the male monopoly of political office. Without the elevation of 'Queen' Fatimah to the throne in the first place, the matrifiliative succession of her son would not have been even possible. My informant Tengku Ahmad is of the opinion that it was Yamtuan Muda Raja Muhammad Yusuf who had orchestrated the whole sequence of events, for the benefit of his own keturunan. Tengku Ahmad said that the reason why I should translate the term raja perempuan as 'queen' was that a female political leader is a phenomenon known only to the Europeans and alien to Islam and the Melayu world.

Significantly, this informant is himself a direct descendant of Tengku Husain, who was, according to him, the intended successor of Sultan Sulaiman II. So if there were still a sultanate in existence at present, Tengku Ahmad would himself be in line for the throne, particularly since his only brother died in 1966. He gave me a copy of a genealogical chart demonstrating his right to the office of yamtuan besar, if this were still extant. (See Genealogical Chart 2.)

According to him, the sultanate fragmented because people did not want to recognise as legitimate the female succession to office and
the resulting matrifiliative transmission. As a result, the temenggung decided to secede and make himself sultan of his own territory -- that is, what is now the Malaysian state of Johore. Similarly, the bendahara seceded and made himself sultan of his own territory -- that is, what is now the Malaysia state of Pahang. So according to Tengku Ahmad, it was because of the 'queen' and her son, that the Sultanate of Johor, Pahang, Riau and Lingga, became reduced to Lingga-Riau. In the genealogy he gave me, it is stated:

Sultan Sulaiman II adalah sultan yang terakhir yang memerintah Lingga Riau keturunan dari Sang Nila Utama.

(Sultan Sulaiman II was the last sultan of the keturunan from Sang Nila Utama to rule Lingga Riau.)

It thus appears that from the viewpoint of the keturunan tengku in Lingga, at least as expressed by one particular informant, the sultanate effectively ended in 1883 when Sultan Sulaiman II died and a raja perempuan mounted the throne.

Tengku Fatimah's son become yamtuan besar in 1884, with the title of 'Sultan Abdurrahman Maadlam Syah'. (See Muchtar Lufti et al 1977: 334.) In 1903 he moved his political capital from Lingga to Penyengat in Riau. (See Tengku Ahmad 1972:27.) Thus the mas kawin of Raja Hamidah became the seat of the yamtuan besar. According to Tengku Ahmad, this was an infringement of the contractual arrangement whereby Riau was to be the territory of the yamtuan muda, and Lingga the territory of the yamtuan besar.

Moreover, after the death of Tengku Fatimah's husband, Yamtuan Muda Raja Muhamad Yusuf, in 1899:

jabatan yang dipertuan muda ditiadakan lagi dan kekuasaannya dipegang oleh Residen Belanda.

(The office of yang dipertuan muda was abolished and its authority was held by the Dutch Resident.)
(Quoted from Tengku Ahmad's genealogy).

As a result, the territories of Riau and Lingga were both ruled by a male member of the keturunan raja, who had now become the sole yang dipertuan in the sultanate.

'Queen' Fatimah and the matrifiliative succession of her son, the last sultan of Riau, seem to be an issue that embarrasses my raja informants, particularly the males. My female raja informants did not articulate their opinions about this matter, whereas my male raja informants were quite vocal about it. Interestingly, the latter do not attempt to justify the event, even though it did benefit their keturunan in the short run. Indeed some of them seem to agree with my tengku informant that the demise of the sultanate was due to the supersession of matrifiliation over patrilineal descent.

This view was expressed in an unpublished essay written by a raja informant:

But in Riau something happened that brought about a drastic change to custom and tradition — that is, Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Alam Sah died in 1883 without leaving any descendants capable of succeeding him. For two years the throne of the Riau sultanate was vacant. During this period, efforts were made to shift the office of Sultan of Riau from the hands of the keturunan Melayu to the Bugis, efforts which eventually achieved their purpose. The method was sufficiently cunning. In the beginning the vacant office of the sultan was represented by Tengku Embung Fatimah. She was the wife of Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Muhamad Yusuf and she was a direct descendant of the sultans of Riau-Johor. But this was a strange situation. In the constitution of the Melayu kingdom — since the era of the Melayu kingdom at Melaka up to the sultanate of Riau — no woman had ever been allowed to be sultan, because according to the teachings of the Shafi'I School to which the Melayu people adhere, the Prophet has ordained: Any community that is governed by a woman will suffer loss. Because of this rule, Tengku Embung Fatimah could not exercise her duties as the official occupant of the office of sultan. So she represented the office in the name of her son, Abdul Rahman. This was the case until the time when Raja Abdul Rahman began to govern as sultan together with his father Raja Muhamad Yusuf, the Yang Dipertuan Muda, both of them of Bugis descent. This deviation from traditional custom was closely observed by
the representatives of the Dutch Government in Riau. Eventually, in 1910, when the Dutch Resident pressured Sultan Abdul Rahman Muazam Sah to sign a new treaty which would severely restrict his power, and he refused, the problem of this deviation from traditional custom had already become a worrying controversy.

(Raja Hamzah Yunus n.d.(a):5).

In contrast to this view, however, there is another view among my raja informants: they deny that Tengku Fatimah was ever a 'queen', so to speak. They said that there is no record of there ever being a 'Sultan' Fatimah; itu hanya cerita 'that is only a story', they said. According to them, after Sultan Sulaiman II died, there was a majlis kerajaan 'ruling committee' consisting of Yamtuan Muda Muhammad Yusuf, his wife Tengku Fatimah, and others. So Tengku Fatimah was, in this account, merely a committee member, and not the ruler. As for her son's promotion to the office of yamtuan besar, this is how some of my raja informants explain it: Because the temenggung and the bendahara had crowned themselves sultans of Johor and Pahang respectively, so the Bugis decided that an orang Bugis 'Bugis person' could also become sultan. So what my tengku informant construed as effect, my raja informants construed as cause.

Despite the fact that the office of yamtuan muda was abolished after Yamtuan Muda Raja Muhammad Yusuf's death in 1899, my raja informants still think of themselves as pertaining to the yamtuan muda's faction. They do not seem interested in laying claim to the office of yamtuan besar, which my tengku informant seems to be interested in doing indeed. And despite the fact that the keturunan tengku had already lost the office of yamtuan besar and hence their share of the sultanate, my raja informants still rank them as their equals in derajat. So the implication is that even though the matrifiliative transmission of political office did benefit the keturunan raja in the short run, not even my raja informants are
willing to justify it as a legitimate mode of transmission. Consequently, the image of the sultanate that they have in mind is still that which had prevailed from 1722 to 1883, rather than that which came about after that, even though they take the year 1911 as the end of *zaman sultan*.

It would seem from this discussion that the sexual division of power was so important to the political structure of the sultanate, that the occupation of the throne by a woman for a brief span of two years was enough to destroy its legitimacy. This is evidently the view of my informants, particularly the male *rajas* and *tengkus*. An expression of this view may be discerned in their attitude towards 'Queen' Fatimah's grave, which is, significantly, located not on Lingga with her patri-kin, but on Penyengat with her husband's patri-kin.

In recent years, the *Kantor Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan* -- the Indonesian Department of Education and Culture -- has been putting up metal plaques on the historical graves of the area. On 'Queen' Fatimah's grave, a plaque with the words *'Sultan Embung Fatimah'* was put up. One day, the word *'sultan'* was mysteriously cut out of the plaque by some anonymous vandal. (See Plate 3.) Some of my *raja* informants said, whoever did the deed was expressing a refusal to acknowledge that Tengku Embung Fatimah was ever the *sultan*. They regarded it not as an act of vandalism but merely as a correction of what they consider as an historical error.
Plate 3. Tengku Embung Fatimah's grave lies neglected on the side of a road on Penyengat. Even the plaque made by the Indonesian Department of Education and Culture was simply placed on the ground without a proper stand. Nevertheless, someone objected to the title 'Sultan Embung Fatimah' and cut out the offending word sultan. But the description of her as a sultan perempuan 'female sultan' still remains on the plaque, which also mentions that she was the wife of the tenth yang dipertuan muda of Riau.
1. The word derajat exists in three forms: derajat, darjat, and darjah. Darjat and darjah are more prevalent in the Malaysian variety of the Malay language, whereas derajat is more prevalent in the Indonesian variety. My informants' use of the Indonesian form seems to highlight the fact of their situation — that is, as holders of traditional ranks in a non-traditional state.

2. See Dumont (1972:70-103) on integration within the caste hierarchy.

3. Wilkinson (1959:81) derives the word bangsawan from bangsa, and explains bangsa thus:

Race; descent; family;... In ancient Malaya of 'caste' (still so in Bali); cf. (Negri Sembilan) the title Bangsa Balang (of the warrior-caste); in modern Malaya of racial and family distinctions, e.g.: bangsa China (Chinese)....

4. The names of my Muslim informants take the following format — a personal name followed by the word bin 'son of' or binti 'daughter of', followed by the father's name. In Indonesian usage, the bin/binti is usually omitted. So for official purposes, my informants tend to drop the bin/binti, whereas among themselves they tend to keep it.

5. Wilkinson (1959:303) explains the term encik thus:

a titular prefix to the names of persons of good position who are not entitled to any other distinction.

6. Zuriat is the Arabic word for 'seed; offspring; the scattering of the seed; fecundation' (Wilkinson 1959:295). Geoffrey Benjamin (personal communication) suggests that it is probably cognate with the Hebrew zera.

7. Darah 'blood' and keturunan 'descent' are often used synonymously. However, my informants do not go on to associate other bodily parts — such as bone, flesh or hair — with other social relations.

8. Such a differentiation accords with standard Malay usage. As Wilkinson (1959:317) has explained the term gahara:

Sanskrit. Of royal birth on both sides. Etymologically, 'having parity'.... Anak gahara, raja yang gahara: a prince's child by a royal mother,... such offspring having precedence over children by commoner wives.... Anak gahara should not be translated 'legitimate child'. An anak gundek may be fully legitimate under religious law.

Gundek, on the other hand, denotes:

Secondary wife. Usually a lady of non-royal rank married to a royalty but not as his principal wife, or wedded to him by some irregular form of marriage such as marriage to his kris; in Java a prince's wife who is not his
regular 'consort'...and who bears no princely title as a wife; (Minangkabau) a wife acquired by seizure or purchase and not by marriage on a footing of equality....

Anak gundek: a prince's child by a secondary wife; not illegitimate but for purposes of succession ranking after children by a royal consort (anak gahara).

('Gundek' is the old spelling of 'gundik'.)

9. As Fortes (1969:266) has explained:

Filio-parental relations are intrafamilially generated but are also invariably encapsulated in a hierarchy of extra-familial structural contexts.

10. Raja Haji Umar Endut was a brother of Raja Ali Haji. (See Genealogical Charts 3 and 5.)

11. Wilkinson (1959:1254) explains turun thus:

Not used of a fall (jatoh) nor or a drop by the mere force of gravity (terjun); but covering a traveller's descent of a hill, or his journey from the interior to the coast, or (more figuratively) from 'windward' to 'leeward' ports, or (more figuratively still) descent from generation to generation. The word also covers the fall of rain (which is not regarded as due simply to gravity); and the 'descent' of the spirit in spirit-possession.... Turun temurun: continuous descent, whether of rain...or of an ancient family.

These are not obscure connotations, but current usages in the Malay language, including the speech-forms of my informants.

12. As Sheffler (1973:761) has pointed out,

[There are indeed] descent units that are not groups.... In many such cases the sole 'corporate property' of the unit is its name, and, aside from the right in rem to the use of this name, rights conferred by membership of such a unit are entirely rights in personam over other members...and consists largely in claims to hospitality and other services of the same general sort.

Sheffler (ibid.) suggests that the term 'sodality', as explained by Service (1962), may be usefully applied to such non-corporate units. Service (ibid.:13) explains the term as meaning:

a nonresidential association that has some corporate functions or purposes. Thus sodality is close in spirit to Gesellschaft and 'special-purpose group', but it has the advantage of not implying either voluntary membership or, necessarily, a single special purpose and thus is a somewhat broader concept, and it is explicitly defined as nonresidential whereas the others are nonresidential only by implication or expectation.

13. Gullick (1965) talks about lineages in the nineteenth-century sultanates of the Malay Peninsula that he discusses. But he adds a caveat in the preface:
The use of the term "lineage" is dictated by lack of a suitable alternative. Malay aristocrats were more conscious of their individual descent. But...they were on occasion united in group solidarity against others when the political office which was the basis of their status was in jeopardy.

The sultanates that Gullick discusses were extant and functioning polities, with the different 'lineages' holding certain political offices as their corporate property. In the absence of such political offices, as is the case in present-day Riau, there is no corporate lineage to speak of.

14. As Sheffler (1973:761) has noted,

Relations of common descent...necessarily relate or oppose sets of individuals to one another or to other sets of the same structural order.... Thus one's jural status as a member of a descent category is necessarily a status shared with or by others descended from the putative founder of the unit in the same way as oneself.

15. I have chosen male genealogies for comparison, because derajat and keturunan are primarily male concerns. So the differences in derajat tend to show up more in male genealogies than they do in female genealogies which are generally bilateral.

16. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:


17. Wilkinson (1959:971,975) explains rial and ringgit thus:

...Rial beringgit = milled or saw-edged Spanish dollar; and the name ringgit in contrast to the old unmilled rial. Nowadays the old meaning has been lost sight of and the rial is obsolete, so ringgit may be used of any dollar.

The reported mention of rial in the utterance of mas kawin suggests that these particular specified amounts were fixed at a time when Spanish coinage was made available. This would date the fixing of the various amounts to the beginning of the sixteenth century when the Spanish began their conquest of South America, and discovered immensely productive silver veins, thereby making Spanish bullion the main currency of the world for the next three centuries. (See Parry 1966:65 and Roberts 1980:610-611.)

18. A Muslim marriage must be performed with what is referred to as the 'affirmative proposal' and the 'acceptance'. The bride's father is the one who makes the 'affirmative proposal' by saying:

I give in marriage to you my daughter named ____ for a mahr amounting to ____ on the condition of what Allah has ordered.
The groom responds by saying:

I accept the marriage with her for the said mahr and I am satisfied with it and with her.

(See Moulavi 1978:99.)

19. According to Fyzee (1964:126-127), the Islamic mahr was historically derived from a pre-Islamic situation, when two kinds of marital payments were prevalent. One was the sadaq; this was given in a certain type of marriage, known as beena, 'where the husband visited the wife but did not bring her home, the wife was called sadiqa or female friend', and the payment made to her at marriage was called sadaq (ibid:126). The second type of marriage payment in the pre-Islamic situation was the mahr, which pertained to the marriage of dominion, known as baal, 'where the wife's people part with her and have to be compensated' (ibid.).

Now mahr in the baal form of marriage was used by the Prophet to ameliorate the position of the wife in Islam, and it was combined with sadaq, so that it became a settlement or a provision for the wife. In Islamic law, mahr belongs absolutely to the wife.

(Ibid.).

20. Indeed, in Islamic law,

The custody of illegitimate children appertains exclusively to the mother and her relations.


21. 'Hypogamy' is marrying downwards, and 'hypergamy' is marrying upwards. I am not using the convention of describing marriages as hypergamous or hypogamous from the perspective of the woman alone. For an example of this convention, see Dumont (1972:159,346) where he describes 'hypergamy' as the marriage of a woman into a superior family, and 'hypogamy' as the marriage of a superior woman and an inferior man. I shall, instead, refer to both spouses, for an unequal marriage is hypergamous for the one but hypogamous for the other.

22. I am following the word-usage of my Pangkil and Penyengat informants; my other informants pronounce these words as gelar and keturun. Benjamin (1984:24) argues that nominalisation is a feature of formal Malay.

23. The Dutch Resident at Tanjungpinang was not, however, the only foreign administrator who was not called raja. The Governor-General of Batavia, for example, remained the Gubernor-Jeneraal Betawi, and was not raja Betawi. Perhaps this variation in usage is linked to the historical relationship of the administered place in question to the former Melaka Sultanate. The territory of Dutch and British Melaka was, of course, that of the old Melaka Sultanate itself. The territory of present-day Singapore used to be part of the old Melaka Sultanate and, after 1511, part of the Johor-Riau Sultanate, until 1819 when the British took over the island. Batavia, on the other hand, was certainly not part of the Melaka Sultanate. So it seems to me that the
underlying idea is that the territories of the old Melaka Sultanate require rajas. When there are no indigenous candidates for the post, then even foreign administrators are acceptable as rajas.

24. The name Raja Alang Laut may be literally translated as 'the raja who is the obstruction of the sea'. Alang, however, is also a birth-order name signifying a middle position, which is neither the eldest nor the youngest of the siblings.

25. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:


The transmission of derajat is thus not merely intergenerational, but unidirectional, flowing from the past to the present. The word used by my informant -- mengalir -- is particularly significant, for its literal meaning is 'to flow', or 'to float downstream' (Coope 1976:6). This usage fits in very well with the connotations of the word turun, as discussed above. The past is thus upstream, as it were, and the present is downstream. Therefore, whatever is in the present must have flowed downstream from the past.

This logic seems to have been applied in the Tuhfat even to the five Opu Daeng brothers. As I have mentioned in the text, my raja informants identify Opu Tendriburang Daeng Rilaga as their founding ancestor; they do not bother to go back further beyond him. In the Tuhfat, however, Raja Ali Haji (1982:25-27) provides him with so illustrious a genealogy that it includes the Queen of Sheba, King Solomon, and even various spirit-beings such as Patotok, the dispenser of human fate, and his son Batara Guru, who came to earth 'on a rainbow in a piece of bamboo' (Matheson and Andaya 1982:317). Apparently, Raja Ali Haji thought that even the charismatic power of the Opu Daeng brothers needed legitimation through descent.

26. In the Tuhfat, it is stated:

According to the story, as a result of His Majesty Sultan Sulaiman's discussions with Kelana Jaya Putera and all the Opus, Kelana Jaya Putera was confirmed in his appointment as Yang Dipertuan Muda, because he had no commitments or ties, and Opu Daeng Cellak was to be married to Tengku Mandak. When all the princes were of the same mind, His Majesty Sultan Sulaiman began preparations to install the Yang Dipertuan Muda and to
marry Opu Daeng Cellak to his sister Tengku Mandak.

(Raja Ali Haji 1982:63-64).

27. According to the Tuhfat, Opu Tendriburang Daeng Rilaga never even went to Riau at all. After he left Bone in Sulawesi, he travelled to Batavia, Siantan, Johor, Melaka, Cambodia, and finally died in Siantan. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:45-46.)

28. As Andaya (1975:293-296) has pointed out:

Only after five days of looting and killing did the Buginese finally install Raja Sulaiman as Sultan of Johor. From...Dutch reports it appears that installing Raja Sulaiman as ruler of Johor and asking for the position of Raja Muda were not acts which had been carefully pre-arranged between the Raja Sulaiman and the Buginese, but acts which had suggested themselves after the Buginese had quite suddenly become conquerors of Riau.... If the Buginese had come for the express purpose of rescuing Raja Sulaiman and installing him as their puppet lord, they would not have acted in the way they did.... Surely they would not have gone on a rampage against a country they intended to rule!

29. In the Tuhfat, it is stated:

Be assured, Sultan Sulaiman Badr al-Alam Syah, that I the Yang Dipertuan Muda shall govern your kingdom. If what is lengthways before you is not to your liking, I shall lay it crossways, and if what lies crossways before you is not to your liking, I shall lay it lengthways. Whatever is overgrown and thorny in your path, I will clear.'

(Raja Ali Haji 1982:64).

30. According to Matheson and Andaya (1982:369), however, 'Raja Ali did not leave Riau at this time but later, in November 1784, when faced with defeat by van Braam's squadron, he fled to Sukadana' in Borneo.


The Dutch took possession of Tanjung Pinang on 1 November 1784 and Sultan Mahmud then signed an eight-clause treaty of capitulation. The following day a twenty-six-clause contract was signed with the VOC. Its main points were that the Sultan held his territory as a fief of the VOC, that he could not make decisions without consulting his four Malay ministers, that a Dutch garrison be established at Tanjung Pinang and that never again would a Bugis be appointed as Yang Dipertuan Muda.

(Also see Surat-Surat (1970:3-31) for both the Malay and Dutch versions of these treaties.)

32. According to the Tuhfat,

Engku Muda was administering Riau at this time, but when the Yang Dipertuan Muda came to Riau, all the Bugis
presented themselves before him, and the people of Riau were divided, waiting for orders from both princes.


The civil war between the two factions may be dated by the report of Dutch Resident of Palembang in December 1800, who stated that 'about forty or fifty lives had been lost in the fighting' (Matheson and Andaya 1982:380).

33. According to the Tuhfat, he sent an envoy to Raja Ali, saying:

'Abdullah, take this message to my cousin Raja Ali. I now wish to take upon myself the heavy and exhausting burden he bears, up hill and down dale, through swamps and morasses'.... ...When Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Ali heard Sultan Mahmud's message, he roared with laughter, saying, 'Abdullah, I give thanks to Allah Almighty for His Majesty Sultan Mahmud's proposal. It is clear that he really does intend to protect and care for all of the locally born Bugis. And there is a veiled hint in this message that he wants to marry Raja Hamidah, daughter of the late Raja Haji....'

(Raja Ali Haji 1982:204-205).

34. According to contemporary Dutch reports,

the oath of loyalty was made on 3 September 1803.... On 21 December 1804....the pledge was renewed and Raja Ali was formally installed as Raja Muda.

(Matheson and Andaya 1982:380).

35. Matheson and Andaya (1982) have translated this place-name as 'Ungkat Point', but it is known to my informants and to Indonesian cartographers as Tanjung Unggat.

36. In the Tuhfat, it is stated:

Sultan Mahmud sent Punggawa Bakak to fell and clear the Island of Penyengat Indera Sakti, because Punggawa Bakak was himself a resident of Penyengat. (There were already four or five houses there.) When Penyengat Island had been cleared, His Majesty had a palace built there with fortifications, a mosque, and audience hall.... It was not long before the work was finished, and Penyengat Island then became the seat of government. His Majesty moved his wife, Engku Puteri (that is, Raja Hamidah) as well as the nobles and princes to the palace on Penyengat.

(Raja Ali Haji 1982:211).

37. According to the Tuhfat:

When His Majesty had finished setting up the administration of Riau, he left to reorganise Lingga, collect the revenue from the tin on Singkep Island, and arrange the division of apanages for the Lingga dignitaries and nobles.
38. Wilkinson (1959:842) translates the word *pangkat* as tier; stage; floor; grade; rank; school-standard. Of the tiers in a roof; the rings or crowns in a tiered diadem.

39. Indeed it is mentioned in the *Tuhfat* that Sultan Sulaiman and his sisters were born of a non-aristocratic mother — Encik Nusamah, the daughter of an Acehnese. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:19-20.) However, he was born after his father had become sultan, whereas his gahara siblings were born when their father was still merely a bendahara.

40. The response of the thwarted Engku Muda illustrates clearly his feeling of being equal in rank to Sultan Mahmud. According to the unpublished *Hikayat Kerajaan*, he refused the title of temenggung 'territorial minister' and said to his brother's son, Engku Abd al-Rahman [Engku Abdu'r-Rahman]:

> If I can't be Raja Muda, I don't want a title. But all the islands and islets and Johore are under me and certainly Pahang belongs to my 'father', Dato' Bendahara Abdu'l-Majid: for today the Sultan no longer heeds Malays but lives at Lingga and gives Riau to the Raja Muda. Look at our case. WE OUGHT TO OWN THE COUNTRY BECAUSE WE ARE CO-INHERITORS WITH THE SULTAN. WHY SHOULD HE DO AS HE LIKES? LIKE HIM WE ARE DESCENDED FROM SULTAN ABDU'L JALIL AND CUSTOM ORDAINS WE RULE THE COUNTRY AND HOW CAN HE STOP US? ALTHOUGH I AM NOT INSTALLED, WHO SHALL OBJECT TO MY RULE? If Engku Abdu'r-Rahman wants to be called Temenggong, let him seek audience at Lingga. I won't. If I die, you, Engku, will rule the islands and never lose Johore because to my mind if the Sultan behaves like this we've got to look after ourselves or be worsted.

(Quoted from Winstedt 1979:72; my emphasis).

This suggests a clear distinction between legal authority and charismatic power. Furthermore, it is implied in the passage cited above, that legal authority comes from above through seeking audience with the sultan. Charismatic power, in contrast, wells up from below.

41. The divergent keturunan which still rules the Malaysian state of Johor, took the title of ungku, a variant form of engku. They thus became the keturunan ungku, in contradistinction to the keturunan tengku and the keturunan raja. The present yang dipertuan agung 'paramount lord' of Malaysia, Sultan Mahmood Iskandar, is a direct descendant of Engku Abd al-Rahman. Sworn in on 26 April 1984, he is Malaysia's eighth king.

42. Trocki (1979:44) has compiled the following table of the temenggung's dominion:
The Temenggung's Maritime Following, c. 1823

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island</th>
<th>Suku</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Boats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karimun</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buru</td>
<td>Buru</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galang</td>
<td>Galang</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moro</td>
<td>Moro</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batam</td>
<td>Terong</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugi</td>
<td>Sugi</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulang</td>
<td>Pekaka</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temiang</td>
<td>Temiang</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>....</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<td>Johor</td>
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10,030 84

43. As noted by Matheson and Andaya (1982:387):

Engku Puteri Raja Hamidah...was one of the most influential nobles in Riau and also one of the wealthiest, enjoying the income from several islands. Begbie [writing in 1834]...described her as a 'fine, intelligent old lady'.

44. According to Matheson and Andaya (1982:387), in 1820 Engku Puteri tried to leave Riau for Singapore. Since she was then in possession of the royal regalia, this meant that she would have been able to invest legitimacy in Sultan Husain of Singapore. The Tuhfat records that she was forced off the boat by her male relatives. (See Appendix 5.) Nevertheless, she still retained possession of the royal regalia until the Dutch took them off her:

...In October 1822 the Governor of Malacca, Timmerman Thyssen, accompanied by Adriaen Koek went to Pulau Penyengat, where finding no argument would prevail, they marched, it is said, a body of troops with their pieces loaded into the presence chamber and took the regalia from Tengku Putri Hamidah by force. Sultan 'Abdu'r-Rahman was then invited to return at once to Riau.... From fear of the Tengku Putri His Highness delayed, until a Dutch brig took the Yamtuan Muda to Trengganu to fetch him.

(Winstedt 1979:84).

45. See Appendix 8 on the religiosity of the post-1804 yamtuan mudas.

46. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:

RAJA PEREMPUAN. Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Alam Syah tidak berputera seorangpun sedangkan Tengku Besar yang bernama Tengku Daud lebih dahulu telah meninggal dunia. Karena itulah untuk waktu selama dua tahun kuasa atas kerajaan Lingga Riau dipangku oleh Tengku Embung atau Tengku Fatimah yang suaminya Raja Muhammad Yusuf menjadi Yang Dipertuan Muda Riau kesepuluh menggantikan Yang Dipertuan Muda IX Raja Abdullah.
Tengku Embung Fatimah adalah anak dari Sultan Mahmud Muzafar Syah yang dimakzulkan (dipecat) oleh Pemerintah Hindia Belanda pada tanggal 23 September tahun 1857. Beliau ialah satu-satunya Raja Perempuan dalam leretan sejarah kerajaan "Johor dan Pahang dan Riau dan Lingga" yang telah mencipt jadi kerajaan "Lingga-Riau" itu. Keharmonisan pentadbiran dapat dicapai karena cermat dan cerdiknya dan berkat kerjasama yang sebati dengan Yang Dipertuan Muda Riau (suaminya sendiri)....

Setelah selama dua tahun memegang kuasa kerajaan Lingga-Riau Raja Perempuan Tengku Embung Fatimah dengan mufakat Yang Dipertuan Muda Riau menyerah kekuasaannya kepada anak mereka Raja Abdul Rahman.

47. In this context, it is interesting that Yamtuan Muda Raja Muhammad Yusuf had the word sultan drawn on his crockery. (See Plate 4.)

48. There is some documentary evidence that the abolition of the office of yamtuan muda was opposed by some members of the keturunan raja themselves, notably the older brother of Sultan Abdurrahman, Raja Ali Kelana, who was born of a different mother. This evidence includes a handwritten draft of a letter that Raja Ali Kelana wrote to his sultan brother, distancing himself from the abolition of the office and warning of the dire consequences of such an action. This letter is in the private collection of a raja informant. (See Wee and Matheson forthcoming.)

49. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:

Tapi di Riau terjadi suatu hal yang melicinkan jalan bagi perobahan-perobahan kanun dan istiadat, yaitu mangkatnya Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Alam Sah pada tahun 1883, tanpa meninggalkan zuriat yang mampu menggantikan dirinya.


Tapi timbul pula suatu hal yang pelik. Karena dalam komposisi kesultanan Melayu - sejak dari zaman kerajaan Melayu Melaka s/d kesultanan Riau tidak diperbolehkan seorang wanita menjadi sultan, karena oleh ulama-ulama Mazhab Syafi'i yang dianut oleh orang2 Melayu ada ketentuan Nabi: KHASIRA QAUMUM ALLAZINA WALLAU UMURAHUM RATAAN. (Rugilah suatu kaum apabila yang menjadi pemegang kekuasaannya ialah perempuan).

Plate 4. This dish cover is part of a large dinner set that had previously belonged to Yamtuan Muda Raja Muhammad Yusuf. It is now in the possession of a Penyengat raja, Raja Haji Abdul Rahim Mansor. The typewritten label on the cover says:

'Seat Service'/sic/. Specially commissioned by Sultan Mohd. Yusuf (the tenth Yang Dipertuan Muda of Riau) for his meals, in the year 1859, from France.
(Note the logo SMY on each dish.)

'SMY' stood for 'Sultan Mohd. Yusuf'. So it seems to be the case that Yamtuan Muda Raja Muhammad thought of himself as sultan.
Penyimpangan adat istiadat ini diikuti dengan saksama oleh wakil Pemerintah Belanda di Riau. Kelak pada tahun 1910 waktu Residen Belanda mendesak sultan Abdul Rahman Muazam Sah untuk menanda-tangani kontrak baru yang sangat membatasi kekuasaan dan Menterinya ditolak Sultan, masalah penyimpangan adat itu telah dijadikan argumentasi yang menggejutkan.

50. Interestingly, the grave of her husband, Yamtuan Muda Raja Muhammad Yusuf, is itself located not on Penyengat but in Daik, Lingga. But it is not placed with the graves of the sultans and tengkus, and is instead in a remote site by itself. He had apparently spent most of his life in Daik, which was the capital of the yamtuan besar, not the yamtuan muda. But he may have been able to reside there because of the rule of uxorilocality, his wife being the sultan's daughter.
CHAPTER FIVE

DOMINATION, SUBMISSION AND RESISTANCE:
A DISCOURSE ON POWER

5.1 The Imposition of Hierarchy
5.2 Orang Bangsawan and Orang Kebanyakan
5.3 Hamba Orang
5.4 Hamba Raja
5.5 Orang Galang and Orang Ladi
5.6 Violence and Legitimation
5.7 Orang Pertengahan
5.8 Orang Biasa
5.9 Keturunan Bintan
5.1 The Imposition of Hierarchy

Even though the idea of hierarchy looms larger for those who can claim high rank, than for those who can make no such claim, the hierarchy itself must necessarily include the latter. A hierarchy in which all are high-ranking cannot, by definition, be a hierarchy. It must thus include the low-ranking, regardless of whether they are receptive to the idea. It is in the very nature of a hierarchy to reach out and include even those who do not adhere to it. So a hierarchy tends to be imposed by the top upon the bottom. This implies that the bottom of the hierarchy is crucial, for without the bottom there can be no top.

In such a situation, tension is likely to occur between top and bottom, for the latter must choose whether to submit or to resist the former's domination. In the following discussion, I shall be concerned with patterns of domination, submission and resistance as they appear in the rear-view image of zaman sultan. These will be analysed in terms of a discourse on the dynamics of power.

As I have stated in Chapter One, following Foucault (1980a:92-94), the play of power arises from difference; it begins with at least two opposing forces. And difference is the very crux of hierarchy. I pointed out in Chapter Four that the hierarchy of derajat is not just an arbitrary ranking, but a scale of power. I must now add that this is not a static scale but a dynamic one generated by the cross-tensions of opposing forces.

Bateson's (1973:35-46) concept of schismogenesis is useful in this context. This may be briefly explained as follows. Schismogenesis is progressive differentiation between any two interacting parties that leads eventually to the breakdown of
interaction. Bateson (ibid.:41-42) discusses two types of schismogenesis — symmetrical and complementary. In the former, the two parties have similar aspirations and behaviour patterns; so in a situation of progressive differentiation, they become competitive rivals, trying to outdo each other in doing the same thing. In the latter case of complementary differentiation, however, the two parties are fundamentally different. Progressive differentiation in this case will lead to the excessive exaggeration of their respective qualities. However, breakdown can be avoided if there are restraining factors to prevent schismogenesis from exceeding certain limits.

Some of the issues we have discussed in Chapter Four may be analysed in these Batesonian terms. For example, the intra-derajat rivalry between the keturunan tengku and the keturunan raja may be seen as symmetrical schismogenesis. The complementary distribution of the two factions in the usage of titles, the divide between sovereignty and authority, and the territorial division may be considered as restraining factors which slowed down the process of schismogenesis. The eventual takeover of the sultan's office by the Bugis faction may be considered as the culmination of schismogenesis, which led to the breakdown of the entire system.

If intra-derajat rivalry may be understood as symmetrical schismogenesis, then inter-derajat interaction may be understood as complementary schismogenesis. The relationship between any two derajat in the hierarchy is, by definition, a relationship between a social superior and a social inferior. The two parties are thus fundamentally different in rank. A progressive differentiation of their respective qualities would mean that the superior party would become increasingly superior, while the inferior party would become increasingly inferior, until interaction becomes impossible to
As mentioned in Chapter Four above, the basic divide in the hierarchy is between the rulers and the ruled, the elite and the masses. What this means is that while the *derajat* are progressively gradated on the one hand, on the other hand, they also break into two opposing categories — the *orang bangsawan* 'aristocrat' versus the *orang kebanyakan* 'commoner'.

The interaction between two such unequal, yet opposing, parties is likely to lead to complementary schismogenesis, with the aristocrat becoming increasingly dominant and the commoner becoming increasingly submissive, in reaction to each other. My informants seem to be explicitly aware of this complementary interaction of domination—submission. For example, a Karas informant said:

Kalau dulu, siapa yang kuat menang; siapa yang kalah mati.

(In former times, whosoever was strong would win; whosoever lost would die.)

Thus the weak not merely lost, they perished. This statement implies the process whereby domination—submission could lead to ultimate breakdown. It implies that death is the ultimate submission. Therefore, according to this logic, in any single instance of domination—submission, there would be one surviving winner and one dead loser; this winner would then have to be matched against someone else. The cumulation of such encounters would be a series of progressive eliminations, such that the final winner would be the sole survivor. In that case, domination—submission would no longer be possible, for the simple reason that there would be no one left to dominate.
The same informant went on to say:

Kalau dulu, siapa yang kuat boleh menjadi raja di hati, sultan di mata; tidak ada yang berani lawan pada dia.

(Formerly, whosoever was strong could become a raja in his mind and a sultan in his eyes; nobody would dare challenge him.)

The phrase *raja di hati, sultan di mata* is one that is used by other informants too. It may be explained thus. The *hati* — literally, 'liver' — is considered the seat of one's emotions. So to be a *raja* in one's *hati* means that one can do whatever one feels like doing; *raja*-hood is thus construed as the unrestrained indulgence of one emotions. A *sultan di mata* is someone who can take whatever it is that his eyes happen to see, because 'everything belongs to him anyway. So according to this logic, a *raja* is someone who can do anything he feels like doing, and a *sultan* is someone who owns everything he sees — that seems to be a fair characterisation of the unchallengeable ultimate winner of domination-submission!

The view articulated by this Karas informant is certainly not unique to him. Another informant who shares his view made the statement:

*Raja-raja -- kerjanya cuma memeras.*

(As for the *rajas* — their only work is to oppress.)

Both these cited informants are commoners. The first is a Galang person, and the second is a former resident of Penyengat now living in Tanjungpinang. Others who have voiced similar opinions are also commoners.

So from the commoners' point of view, the hierarchy can be construed in terms of the opposition between strength and weakness, victory and defeat, oppression and suffering, even life and death.
But as I have pointed out above, this kind of complementary interaction can lead to breakdown, with the ultimate victor left with no one to dominate. For the continuation of the interaction there must be some restraining factor to prevent the complementary schismogenesis of domination-submission from progressing to its stark relentless end.

One way of restraining such a situation would be to diffuse the opposition such that it would no longer be just the interaction between two parties. As pointed out above, the hierarchy may be understood both as an opposition and as a series of gradated ranks. The gradation of multiple ranks, one on top of another, divides the force of the primary opposition between ruler and ruled into a complex criss-crossing network of secondary interactions between the different derajat. For example, the encik datuk are inferior to the rajas, tengkus, and tuan said, but superior to the other ranks. Similarly, the keturunan Bintan are inferior to those above, but superior to those below.

So except for the very top and the very bottom, every rank has some above it and others below it. The purest form of domination-submission is thus to be found in the relationship between the very top and the very bottom. This is, in other words, the relationship between the aristocrats at the very top and the slaves at the very bottom.

5.3 Hamba Orang

The two lowest derajat in the hierarchy are termed hamba 'slaves'. The very lowest derajat is hamba orang 'slaves of people'; the second lowest is hamba raja 'slaves of the raja'. According to my informants, the difference between the two is that the former were
milik peribadi 'personal property', and the latter were milik pemerintah 'government property'. The hamba orang were said to have been acquired through piratical raids or through commercial sale. In contrast, the hamba raja were said to have been always there, and were neither kidnapped nor bought. The former were foreigners to Riau; the latter were indigenes of Riau.

Let me first discuss the hamba orang, the foreigners imported to Riau as slaves. As an example of bought slaves, my informants cited the 'negro' [their word] slaves acquired by Raja Haji Ahmad in Mecca in the nineteenth century. As mentioned in Chapter Four, he was the first raja from Riau to go on the haj. According to the Tuhfat, on his return from Mecca,

Raja Ahmad presented his elder brother the Yang Dipertuan Muda with two black slaves, one a Nubian and the other an Abyssinian...[together with many] blessed things from Mecca the Exalted.

(Raja Ali Haji 1982:256).

The 'two black slaves' were evidently included among the 'blessed things from Mecca.' This Islamic association with slavery is significant, for it implies that the relationship of domination-submission is one may be perceived as being sanctified by God himself. The legitimation of submission thereby legitimates domination.

Raja Haji Ahmad's 'negro' slaves seem to be particularly noteworthy to my informants, because they were apparently the first historical example of this sort of legitimated submission. According to my informants, there were other subsequent 'negro' slaves apart from Raja Haji Ahmad's 'Nubian' and 'Abyssinian'. There seem to have been also 'short and dark' slaves identified by my informants as 'Hottentot'. There is said to be one family, presently residing in
Tanjungpinang, who are descended from 'Hottentot' slaves. Unfortunately, I did not manage to meet them. I have, however, met in Singapore the descendants of a female Abyssinian slave, who was bought in Mecca by the late father of a raja informant. This is the family mentioned in Chapter Four, who identify themselves as keturunan Hapsi 'of Abyssinian descent'.

Apart from the 'negro' slaves bought in Mecca, there were also the slaves bought from Ilanun pirates based in the Philippines. My informants say that these consisted of victims captured from other parts of the Indonesian archipelago, and included, for example, Balinese and Minangkabau. According to them, if the Ilanun captured any Riau indigenes for slavery, they would be sold not in the Johor-Riau area itself, but in Betawi and Banten in Java. My raja informants say that there was an agreement established with the Ilanun pirates, which ensured that no indigene of Riau would be sold as a slave in his or her own home territory. According to my informants, not all the hamba orang 'slaves of people' were bought; some were captured through piratical raids launched by the Riau people themselves in areas outside Riau. The two areas named as notable sources of kidnapped slaves were Bangka island and Lampung in southern Sumatra.

Apparently, only the aristocrats in Penyengat and Daik owned slaves. But ownership was of a private nature. That is to say the slaves belonged to individual aristocrats and not to the aristocracy as a class. My informants claim that these slaves were branded on their faces to indicate whose property they were.

But there are of course no longer any such slaves in present-day Riau. As mentioned in Chapter Four, although my informants living in the present-day still rank the various derajat in a top-to-bottom
hierarchy, ranging from raja and tengku at the very top, to hamba orang at the very bottom, this differentiated ranking seems to be rather nominal in character. In terms of the existing here-and-now, the differentiation does not seem to be plausible. It is only in the context of the rear-view image of zaman sultan that the role of the hamba orang appears to loom significant.

As I have shown in Chapter Four, my raja and tengku informants do take their rank seriously. For them to do so, however, they must contextualise their rank in a hierarchy that includes other ranks. As pointed out above, a one-rank hierarchy is, by definition, not a hierarchy. Therefore, even though slaves are no longer owned in Riau, 'slaves' must nevertheless remain as a category in my informants' consciousness. To put it another way, for the keturunan raja and the keturunan tengku to exist as such, there must be a category of keturunan hamba orang, even if it is only an empty category. A rank in a hierarchy thus has an inherent valence for other ranks. So to perceive oneself in terms of such a rank implies that one must perceive others also in terms of rank. In the following discussion, we shall consider some of these other ranks.

5.4 Hamba Raja

As mentioned above, my informants say that whereas the hamba orang were the personal property of individual owners, the hamba raja were 'government property' (milik pemerintah). Moreover, whereas the former were foreigners to Riau, the latter were indigenes. My informants also made it a point to tell me that whereas the hamba orang were branded, the hamba raja were not.

These differences help explain why the hamba raja ranked above the hamba orang. The former's master, which was the government
itself, was more powerful than the latter's individual masters. The former belonged to Riau, their home territory, whereas the latter were homeless. The former were not owned in terms of their bodies, whereas the latter were physically owned.

Wilkinson (1959:391) has translated the term hamba raja as 'debt-slaves of the ruler'. This explication is indeed consonant with my informants' usage. According to them, the debt they owe the ruler was kerahan 'corvee'. As my informants explained, kerah means to 'summon people to work' (suruh orang kerja); kerahan, they said, is 'an obligation on the part of those who have been summoned' (satu kewajiban orang yang dikerah). This implies that the hamba raja were hamba not in the sense of being owned bodily, but in the sense of being obligated to perform certain services for the rulers. For this reason, the hamba raja were also known as orang kerahan 'people of the corvee' -- that is, vassals.

At this stage of our discussion, we can perhaps extend our translation of the term hamba to include a connotation meaning 'submissive one'. The hamba orang would thus be those submissive to dominant individuals, while the hamba raja would be those submissive to a dominant class. The word raja in this context would appear to refer not only to the yamtuan besar and the yamtuan muda, but to all those in a legally legitimated position of commanding submission.

It seems that the hamba raja were the indigenous people in the political periphery whose submission was claimed by the power holders at the political centre. So when these hamba raja were 'summoned to work' (dikerah), they were obliged to make a pilgrimage from the political periphery to the centre to render the required services. My informants told me that the hamba raja were divided into different suku 'divisions' on the basis of specific duties assigned to them.
Because of this, they were also known as the orang persukuan 'people of the divisions'.

For example, the suku Gelam were supposed to build boats. The suku Galang were supposed to launch boats. The suku Ladi were supposed to grind spices in the palace kitchen. The suku Kopit were biduan 'musicians' who were supposed to perform inside the palace. And the suku Bintan had the duty of carrying alat-alat 'various articles', such as candles, into the palace and to make the bed of the ruler.

The various sukus were apparently ranked according to the symbolic value of the task. Thus, those who worked inside the palace were ranked higher than those who were not even permitted inside. So of the five sukus listed above as examples, the suku Ladi, suku Kopit and suku Bintan would have ranked higher than the suku Gelam and suku Galang. Among the palace sukus, those whose duties had to do with the person of the ruler and which had to be carried out in the private chambers of the palace, were ranked higher than those whose duties were less personal. So the suku Bintan would have ranked higher than the suku Kopit. (However, as we shall see below, the position of the former was somewhat ambiguous.)

Among the outdoor sukus, those whose duty required skill were ranked higher than those whose duty merely required strength. So the suku Gelam ranked higher than the suku Galang. The work of the suku Ladi was in the palace kitchen; so their rank would have been intermediate between the suku Kopit above them and the suku Gelam below them. These five examples by no means exhausts the list of sukus, each with its specified kerahan.

Since it was the power holders at the political centre who wished to claim the submission of the politically peripheral indigenes, it
was also they who were interested in institutionalising this submission in the form of kerahan. So the specification of duties was the prerogative of the orang bangsawan 'aristocrats', according to the number of sukus into which they wished to divide the politically peripheral indigenes. Apparently, once a suku 'division' was established on the basis of the specified kerahan assigned to it, a territorial definition was concurrently imposed on that suku. The result was thus a classificatory fragmentation of the politically peripheral indigenes imposed by the power holders at the political centre.

Whether this imposition of classificatory fragmentation had any effect on the indigenes themselves would have depended on how seriously they regarded the view of the political centre. The consequence is that it is practically impossible to obtain a comprehensive list of sukus because it all depends on who one asks. For example, I found my aristocrat informants telling me about sukus which my hamba raja informants deny even knowing about. Suku Kopit is an example; only my aristocrat informants on Penyengat seem to have heard of their existence.

This process of classificatory fragmentation seems to be something that my aristocrat informants seem to be explicitly aware of, for they talk about certain sukus as the suku induk 'mother division' of various smaller sukus. For example, a raja informant told me that the suku Mantang was the suku induk of the following:

suku Mantang Limas
suku Mantang Teluk Air
suku Mantang Sekapur
suku Mantang Asli di Kundur
suku Mantang Pekaka
suku Mantang Aijong

suku Mantang Dasi

After considerable investigation, I have managed to trace the supposed whereabouts of only two of these smaller branch sukus. The suku Mantang Limas seem to have been territorially associated with a place called Petai on the island of Galang Baru; but it is said that they have all left this place which is now apparently deserted. (See Chapter Eight.)

The other suku Mantang I had some information about was suku Mantang Pekaka. I happened to meet three fishermen from Pulau Terong while I was doing fieldwork on Seking island south of Singapore. Terong is a small island off the southwest coast of Kepala Jernih island. (See Map 3.) These Terong informants told me that in the old days, they were called Pekaka, but they did not use the term suku Mantang Pekaka. The term they used instead was Melayu Pekaka, which they said was equal in rank to the suku Gelam. But when I subsequently asked an old Gelam informant living on Seking island about the relative rank of Pekaka and Gelam, he said he had never even heard of the former. The Pekaka people are, however, mentioned in the 9 Tuhfat. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:243).

Another ethnographic example I shall cite with regards to the suku Mantang are the people who now live on the small island of Nanga, off the east coast of Galang Baru. Their neighbours on the opposite island of Sembur Laut have identified them as suku Mantang, but when I went to ask the Nanga people this, they vehemently denied this label and insisted that they were suku Galang. The evidence clearly suggests that people do not like to be labelled Mantang. (The identity of these people will be further discussed in Chapter Nine.)
I suggest that this aversion to the name Mantang has to do with the kerahan assigned to them by the aristocrats, which would have been indicative of their estimation in the eyes of the power holders at the political centre. While not even my aristocrat informants can remember the various specialised duties assigned to the small Mantang sukus, it seems that the kerahan of the suku induk, the mother suku, was to serve as the boat rowers of the rulers, and as such they were not even allowed to step on the land of the political capital. This apparently meant that the suku Mantang were regarded as very lowly indeed.

But why should this have been so? Why should the suku Bintan have been ranked higher than the Kopit, who were in turn higher than the Ladi, who were in turn higher than the Gelam, who were in turn higher than the Galang, who were in turn higher than the Mantang? The answer, I suggest, is again power. Those labelled as Mantang were apparently non-piratical sea nomads who lived by means of fishing and the gathering of other marine resources. The Galang, Gelam, and Ladi were pirates who had the means of raiding foreign ships and foreign places. As for the suku Kopit, not even my aristocrat informants knew their asal 'origins'; nor did I meet any informant who identified himself or herself as belonging to suku Kopit. However, there are apparently some people on Penyengat itself who are of Kopit descent. This territorial association is indeed indicative of the suku Kopit's high rank, since Penyengat was the capital where the Bugis rajas resided. But it must remain a mystery why the suku Kopit were ranked so highly. Finally, with regards to the suku Bintan, as we shall see below, they have been credited with playing a pivotal role in the transfer of power from the Melaka dynasty to the Johor dynasty founded by Sultan Abd al-Jalil.
The non-piratical sea nomads were not likely to have posed any threat to the power holders at the political centre; not only that, they very likely had no such political ambitions. Therefore, they were quite safe to despise. The various piratical groups were, however, a different story altogether. They were capable of threatening the power holders; in the Galang case, as we shall see below, they went so far as to consider themselves autonomous of the centre. Such people therefore had to be treated more seriously as potential rivals.

The relative ranking of these piratical groups may thus be considered as their relative power vis-a-vis each other. That is one possible interpretation. Another possible interpretation is that classificatory fragmentation was an attempt by the power holders at the centre to divide and rule the periphery. In support of the latter explanation, I offer the following detail.

While in the aristocrats' classification, Galang and Gelam are regarded as separate and distinct sukus with separate and distinct kerahan, some of my non-aristocratic informants talk about Galang Gelam as a single suku. Not even my informants who claim to be Galang or to be Gelam could clearly differentiate between the two in terms of speech, custom, or any other criterion, apart from their specified kerahan and their supposed territorial origins.

As noted in Chapter Four, the Gelam people are supposed to have originated from Gelam Tua 'Old Gelam', whereas the Galang people are supposed to have originated from Galang Tua 'Old Galang'. But both these sites are said to be uninhabited at present. The Galang people and the Gelam people are now found over a wide territory, often in the very same places. In Karas, for example, there are both Galang and Gelam people. My present informants there claim to be either
keturunan Galang or keturunan Gelam, depending on which suku their father or father's father was put into. But they all speak the same dialect and they inter-marry with each other. So far as I can tell, the differentiation between Galang and Gelam seems to be the product of the different kerahan assigned by the rulers.

This suggests to me a possible contrast between the Mantang case and the case of the Galang Gelam. It seems possible that in the former case, all the various bands of sea nomads may have been lumped together, simply on the basis of their shared position of political weakness vis-a-vis the centre. The supposed suku induk would thus have been a fictive type. In the latter case, it seems possible that a single piratical community was split into two sukus, Galang and Gelam.

As I have shown above, even though the names Gelam and Galang have territorial connotations, that does not mean that the people toponymically so labelled were limited only to the specific places known as Gelam and Galang. On the contrary, I would suggest that such toponymic labelling was also politically derived: it was characteristic of the people inhabiting the territories peripheral to the political centre. By the word 'peripheral', I do not mean insignificant, but rather, that these territories surrounded the political centre. What I am proposing is that the relationship between the orang bangsawan and the hamba raja was also a spatial relationship between centre and periphery.

But whereas the political periphery does not lay claim to the political centre — or at least is not supposed to — the political centre does lay claim over the periphery. The toponymic labelling of the people of the periphery thus implies the limits of their territorial rights. So whereas the keturunan of the hamba raja are
defined toponymically -- for example, keturunan Gelam and keturunan Galang -- the orang bangsawan are identified not toponymically, but terms of their hereditary titles -- namely, keturunan raja, keturunan tengku, and keturunan tuan said. This implies that the territorial rights of the latter were relatively unlimited, at least in theory. After all, despite the toponymic labelling, whether or not the hamba raja were indeed territorially bound in this way is quite another matter. As I have mentioned above, the Galang and Gelam people are found over a wide territory. This is also true of the other sukus. The toponymic label should therefore be regarded merely as an ideological statement, rather than as an accurate description of the relationship between people and place.

What is particularly significant about at least some of the toponymic labels is that they are semantically associated with the particular suku's kerahan. For example, gelam is the name of a seashore tree, Melaleuca leucodendron, with bark (kulit gelam) used for caulking boats.

(Wilkinson 1959:337).

As I have mentioned above, boat-building was indeed the kerahan of the suku Gelam. Similarly, the word galang denotes the following:

framework supporting a boat in a slipway; cf. bergalang (to be in dock); galangkan perahu (to lay up a boat for repairs); and galang gemalang (to be constantly in dock).

(Ibid.:320).

As mentioned above, the suku Galang's kerahan was indeed to launch the ruler's boats. The semantic connotations of these toponyms indicate that the kerahan assigned to a particular suku probably preceded its toponymic labelling.
But while the rulers may have had an interest in assigning kerahan to the different sukus, the latter may not necessarily have had an interest in complying with the former's assignment. A Bintan informant explained the word dikerah to me as meaning dipaksa 'to be forced'. He said that when they were dikerah 'summoned', a letter would be sent from Penyengat to the ketua kampung 'village elder', saying, for example, mau tujuh orang anak gadis yang cantik 'seven pretty unmarried females were required'. Jadi dipaksa pergi 'so they were forced to go'. My informant's late mother was one of the seven who were forced to go and serve at the wedding of the sultan's daughter to the sultan of Trengganu; this apparently occurred shortly before the abdication in 1911. My informant said his mother told him that it was very exhausting:

Duduk salah sikit, orang marah -- kepalanya [yang marah].

(If she sat a little incorrectly, she would be scolded by the leader.)

My informant said that it was up to the village elder to evade the kerahan. He could, for example, say that many of his people had died; or he could say that the people were stupid and did not want to go. Pandai dialah 'It was up to his wits'. My informant said that the elder had to protect his people. This informant is himself presently a ketua kampung 'village elder'. If such was the attitude of the highest ranking suku, we can well imagine what the attitudes of the lower sukus would have been like.

In contrast to this view, however, my raja informants said that, of course, the hamba raja wanted to come to Penyengat to do kerahan. How else would they have been able to come and see the splendour of the capital, particularly during festive occasions, which were the times when their services were required? But such an inducement was evidently not considered sufficient by all the hamba raja. Indeed,
according to some informants, in the reign of the last sultan -- namely, Sultan Abdurrahman Maadlam Syah who had inherited his office matrifiliatively -- so few of the hamba raja were willing to come to the political centre to render kerahan, that he had to hire 'wage-labour' (orang upah) such as Boyanese labourers to row his boat. These hired labourers had to be given living quarters in a Kampung Boyan located on Penyengat itself. This is further evidence that when my informants talk about zaman sultan, they are talking about the sultanate in its heyday (that is, from 1722 to 1883), when the hamba raja were still willing to come to the political centre to render kerahan.

5.5 Orang Galang and Orang Ladi

According to my informants, the Galang people were notorious for their rebellion against the Bugis rulers. In Chapter Four, I have already mentioned their leader Raja Alang Laut as an example of a charismatic raja gelaran. Apparently, the Galang people refused altogether to submit to the rule of the Bugis rajas; so they did not perform the kerahan that had been assigned to them. Instead, they roamed about the archipelago as independent buccaneers. According to my Karas informants who say that they are the descendants of these Galang pirates, Raja Alang Laut's base was located in Galang Tua 'Old Galang', where he had a palace known as Gedung Melanau 'the Melanau Building'. After his death, the Galang pirates shifted their base to Karas island.

My Karas informants told me that the Galang pirates used to raid places located outside the Johor-Riau area -- for example, Kedah, Perak, and Patani. Captives were brought back to Riau, to a small uninhabited island called Pulau Penyabung, which was used as an arena
for gladiatorial combat. \textit{(Penyabung literally means 'a place for combat').} The male captives were pitted against each other as gladiators. Those who won the fight were recruited into the pirates' gang and treated as peers, not as slaves. Those who lost were killed and tossed into the sea.

According to my Karas informants, it was very unfortunate for a pregnant woman to be captured by the pirates. To quote an informant who was himself an old pirate:

If a pregnant female was captured, the Galang warriors would place bets on her, guessing whether the child was male or female, then they would split her belly open to look at the child inside. 

(My translation).

But female victims who were young, pretty and not pregnant were, to use an informant's words, dipelihara betul, jadi dikawinkan secara Islam, 'nurtured properly, then married in the manner of Islam'.

Evidently there was a worse fate than to be made into an aristocrats' slave. My informants' accounts suggest that if the Galang pirates had been taaluk 'submissive' to the 

\textit{yantuan muda's} rule, then they would have surrendered their captives to the aristocrats on Penyengat to be made into slaves. This was apparently what the Ladi pirates did. The Galang pirates themselves had no use for slaves; they wanted the captives only as fighting recruits, as wives, and as the toys of cruel sport.

As I have argued above, the creation and maintenance of a bottom derajat in the hierarchy is an issue of particular relevance to the orang bangsawan, because without that bottom, there is neither top nor middle. The ironic consequence is that although the hamba orang are ranked as the lowest of the low in the hierarchy, they seem to have co-existed with the orang bangsawan in the political centres, and to
have existed nowhere else in that capacity. So if one is to regard Penyengat island as the former capital of the yamtuan muda, then it seems that one must equally regard it as the former centre of slavery. But, as I have illustrated above, it was perhaps better to be enslaved and alive, than to be captured by the Galang pirates and dead.

According to my Karas informants, the raids of the Galang pirates were conducted almost for sport. Apart from kidnapping people from the villages they raided, they also accumulated coinage from the people they robbed. But the money was useless to them because there was nothing they could buy from each other. So the pirate chief merely doled out the coins as playthings to his followers, using a brass bowl as ladle.

This story indicates that the Galang pirates were not integrated into the exchange economy, and so had nothing to buy with their loot. This gives us a clue to the advantage of being taaluk 'submissive' to the rulers. Trade -- and hence the exchange economy -- was centred in the political capital. Political submission may thus have been a means for the territorially peripheral hamba raja to gain access to the exchange economy. Such access may even have led to eventual integration with the community at the political centre.

Indeed, this seems to have been the case with the Ladi people who were said to have been taaluk to the yamtuan muda. Apparently, they were located territorially near, and later at, the capital itself. According to my informants, Ladi is a place in Lingga, located near Daik, the former capital of the yamtuan besar. I have not been able to locate such a place in Lingga on the maps I have consulted; I have, however, found several places in Riau that are called 'Ladi'. When I questioned my informants about these places, they said that these were
secondarily named 'Ladi', because the Ladi people went and settled there. But the one original place called 'Ladi', they said, was in Lingga.

As pointed out in Chapter Four, Lingga was the territory of the yamtuan besar; so one would have expected the Ladi people to be his hamba raja, rather than those of the yamtuan muda. According to my informants, there was a migration led by one Datuk Kaya Mepar, also known as Datuk Kaya Montil. According to an informant who is of Ladi descent:

Datuk Kaya Mepar, also called Datuk Kaya Montil -- he was the one who brought the Ladi people here. He settled here permanently; the Ladi people were his followers. From Daik of course. None went back to Daik; they all stayed here.

(My translation).

The 'here' mentioned by my informant is Penyengat island, where there is still a Kampung Ladi. Apparently, as a result of this defection, the Ladi people from Lingga came to be the hamba raja of the yamtuan muda instead. There is indeed a grave located in Kampung Ladi on Penyengat that has been identified to me as Datuk Kaya Mepar's grave.

The name 'Mepar' in Datuk Kaya Montil's alternative title -- Datuk Kaya Mepar -- is significant, for Mepar is a place which is indeed located near Daik. (See Map 3.) This implies a connection between Mepar and Ladi, a connection which may be explicated thus. In his general report of 14 August 1826, Christiaan van Angelbeek noted:

The two principal piratical chiefs of the Malay empire are; the Panghulu Hamba Raja of Mapar who is obeyed by all the so-called Rayats or Orang Laut of the islands situated in the waters of Linga; -- and the Rajah Lang, in the island of Bulang, under whom are all the Rayats of Gallang....

(Quoted from Logan 1849:634).
So there is documentary evidence that there was indeed a pirate chief based in Mepar in Lingga, referred to as the 'Panghulu Hamba Raja' by Angelbeek, and as Datuk Kaya Mepar by my informants. Furthermore, Angelbeek said in his report that he had met him both at Riau and at Mepar, these meetings having been arranged by two of the leading aristocrats of the time. (See ibid.:635.)

Eighteen years after Angelbeek's report, the Governor General of India and the Governor of the Straits Settlements obtained 'positive proof' that some piracies in 1843

had been promoted by Linga nobles, in particular by the Tomungong of Mapar, a descendant of the ancient kings of Linga. His son Inchie Montol had fitted out several prahus and had also made some voyages... Serious remonstrances were addressed to the Sultan of Linga, who at last delivered up these chiefs, and ten other famous piratical chiefs. (Logan 1850:743).

If there is some accuracy to my informants' claim that it was Datuk Kaya Montil who had led the Ladi people in their migration from Lingga to the yamtuan muda's capital at Penyengat, the information from Logan (1850) allows us to date the event and to guess the reason for it. It would be quite plausible to speculate that the migration occurred in 1843/44, because 'Inchie Montol'/Datuk Kaya Montil wanted to escape from being delivered to the British by the yamtuan besar at Lingga. I suggest that because 'positive proof' had been obtained of his involvement in piracy, it would have been politic for him to rename his followers from Mepar, orang Ladi 'the Ladi people'.

It is not clear what the word 'ladi' means or from where it is derived. However, according to the Indonesia Pilot (1975:I,82), there is a landmark on the north-east coast of Bangka island called Ladi Hill (Bukit Ladi), 200 metres high with 'a conspicuous tree on its summit'. A landmark that is so easily sighted from the sea that even
a single tree is noticeable, would surely have been known to the Mepar pirates in Lingga, located not so far away. (See Map 2.) It is not impossible that they took the name 'Ladi' from this hill on Bangka. Significantly, according to my informants, Bangka was not part of the Riau-Lingga sultanate. On the contrary, it was one of the foreign parts where the pirates went raiding. So 'Ladi' would have been a foreign name that could not have been traced to any area within the sultanate. This implies that those places in Riau that are now known as Ladi acquired this name only after the migration of the Mepar pirates from Lingga to Riau.

The reconstruction given above derives primarily from my Penyengat informants, particularly those who claim Ladi descent. However, I subsequently met an informant in Daik, Lingga, who said that he is a direct descendant of Datuk Kaya Montil, and who has a written genealogy to prove it. (See Genealogical Chart 6.) Indeed this informant is himself known to the people of Daik, including the tengkus and tuan said there, as Datuk Kaya Mepar or Datuk Kaya Mohamad Isa. According to him, Datuk Kaya Montil is buried in Mepar, but his son Datuk Kaya Awang is buried in Kampung Ladi, Penyengat. The latter's son, Datuk Kaya Abdul Kahar, then moved back to the Lingga archipelago, where he died at Senayang. Datuk Kaya Mohamad Isa is himself the son of Datuk Kaya Abdul Kahar.

So his suggestion is that it was not Datuk Kaya Montil who moved to Penyengat, but his son Datuk Kaya Awang. Unfortunately, my informant was unable to enlighten me about the Ladi people, beyond saying that he has no connections with them, although he still has connections with the Mepar people. Apparently, a process of segmentation has been going on, such that the one community has become two, each located in a different area, with a different ethnonym.
The contrast between the Galang people and the Ladi people is that although both were pirates, the former were independent buccaneers, whereas the latter were, more literally, hamba raja who raided on behalf of the aristocrats. So the aristocrats could keep their hands clean, because the dirty work was done by the hamba raja. Willingness to do dirty work for the rulers was thus one way for the hamba raja to have expressed their political submission. It was apparently this that the Galang people were not willing to do. If there was any dirty work to be done, they were going to do it for themselves, it seems, and not for the aristocrats at the political centre. In other words, their objection was not to the doing of violence, but to the doing of it for others.

Therefore, although the Galang people were defined as hamba raja by the rulers, they evidently refused to play that designated role. In contrast, the Mepar/Ladi people were apparently willing to do so, possibly because they were given a larger share of power, to the extent that they were allowed to establish a settlement at the political centre itself. So it seems that whereas the latter went along with the idea of hierarchy because they felt that they had some upward social mobility, the latter denied hierarchy because they wanted equality with the aristocrats. This contrast is evident in the different ways their captives were treated. The Mepar/Ladi pirates offered them up as slaves to the aristocrats so that they themselves would obtain even greater social rewards, whereas the Galang pirates either recruited them or killed them, there being no room for slaves in an egalitarian context.
5.6 Violence and Legitimation

Even though the aristocrats kept slaves, they were nevertheless able to present themselves as the arbiters of civilised adat 'custom', because in comparison to the brutality of the Galang pirates, slavery could be construed as positively humane. The basis of the sultanate would thus appear to be not brute force, but rather, sublimated violence. In this context, the role of the hamba raja seems quite crucial. As mentioned above, the aristocrats could keep their hands clean, because there were others to do their dirty work for them.

Apart from distancing themselves physically from brute force, the aristocrats also had to be able to claim that any force that was exerted on their behalf was legitimate, and that any other kind of unsanctioned violence was illegitimate. In this regard, there is a significant myth that my raja informants tell about the Galang pirates and Islam. According to them, the Galang pirates hated the tuan said. (As mentioned in Chapter Four, the tuan said are Arabs who are reputed to be the descendants of the Prophet Muhamad.) One day, they happened to capture a tuan said called Syeikh Saipol Hady Lah. They brought him to Pulau Penyabung and ordered him to fight the other prisoners there. He refused. So he was killed by the pirates. But before he died, he cursed them, and the whole island caught fire. His curse stipulated that for seven generations, the pirates and their descendants could not go to Mecca, and that their territory could not become a negeri 'state'. His grave then 'manifested itself' (menjelma) on the island. Since then, the pirates could no longer use the island as their arena. My raja informants say that the island still catches fire spontaneously every so often.

So according to this myth, the brutal practices of the Galang pirates were stopped by a curse pronounced by a descendant of the
Prophet Muhamad. Furthermore, he prohibited them from fulfilling the Islamic prescription of going on the pilgrimage, thereby preventing them from becoming good Muslims. Lastly, he ensured that Galang could not become an alternative state to the existing one. In short, this myth implies that the violence of the Galang pirates was not legitimated by Islam, and therefore Galang could not become a state. So conversely, the sultanate was a state because the force it exerted was indeed legitimated by Islam.

Although my Karas informants do know of this myth, they claim instead that the Galang pirates were 'very fond of' (sukā) the tuan said. Whenever a tuan said was captured, they did not make him fight as a gladiator. On the contrary, they asked him to teach them to read the Quran. Indeed, my Karas informants deny that there is a tuan said's grave on Pulau Penyabung or that the island periodically catches fire by itself. They even made it a point to stress that when the Galang pirates married the female captives they brought back, the marriage was conducted 'in the manner of Islam' (secara Islam).

When a raja informant brought me to Pulau Penyabung to show me the place, we could not find the tuan said's grave. I was told that it is the characteristic of this grave to disappear at times or to manifest itself in different parts of the island.

Even though my raja informants and my Galang informants have opposite views about whether the Galang pirates hated or loved the tuan said, they nevertheless seem to agree that Islam is the source of political legitimation. By telling me that the Galang pirates married their female captives in an Islamic manner, my Galang informants seem to imply that that somehow legitimated the other brutalities that were practised.
My informants generally describe the *tuan said* as *suci* 'clean, pure, holy'. To *sucikan* would be to cleanse, to purify, to sanctify. The use of Islam as political legitimation thus seems to involve the sublimation of violence, the cleansing of dirty work. In this regard, it is perhaps significant that when Angelbeek met the Penghulu Hamba Raja/Datuk Kaya Mepar, as he reported in 1825, one of the two aristocrats who had arranged and witnessed the meetings was a *tuan said* — Tuan Said Engku Sharif Muhammad Zain al-Kudsi. Such an association possibly illustrates the legitimacy of this pirate chief in the context of the sultanate.

Interestingly, Angelbeek did not seem to be aware of the aristocrats' implication in piracy. For example, he did not seem to realise that the *hamba raja* led by the Penghulu Hamba Raja were the rulers' *hamba*, and not those of the Penghulu himself. He even concluded a treaty with the Penghulu, on the assumption that the latter was an independent chief. It seems that he did not suspect the aristocrats' involvement because he was impressed by their civilisation. For example, though Tuan Said Engku Sharif Muhammad Zain was evidently associated with the Penghulu Hamba Raja, Angelbeek nevertheless lauded him for his 'zeal for the good cause' (ibid.), and elsewhere, 'praised him as a "civilised and clever man" who had great influence on the Malay princes and recommended him as an agent for the Dutch government' (Matheson and Andaya 1982:383).

The discussion above indicates the basis on which Islam may be used as a means of political legitimation: that is, Islam provides an ideology of civilisation, covering the social reality of the moment with a veneer of cosmopolitan sophistication that can be appreciated even by a non-Muslim foreigner. Such a means of legitimation evidently became more important after the territorial division of the sultanate into Riau and Lingga as the respective zones of the *yamtuan*
muda and the yamtuan besar.

As mentioned in Chapter Four, it was during the reign of Yamtuan Muda Raja Jafar, Raja Hamidah's brother, that an Islamic revival was actively encouraged on Penyengat, to the extent that the island became known as the regional centre for Islamic reformism. It thus appears that the Bugis rajas made intensive use of Islam for the political legitimization of their power. To understand why they did this, we must recount the story of the Bugis presence in Riau.

As mentioned in Chapter Four, the post-1722 sultanate was instituted through the military conquest effected by the five Opu Daeng brothers over Raja Kecik, who was then the ruler. Indeed, my raja informants justify their Bugis ancestors' entry into Riau in terms of their needed military prowess. But while this may have been initially the case, the situation of the Bugis in Riau evidently underwent an important change. The last Bugis raja to manifest military prowess seems to have been Raja Haji, who fought the Dutch both in Riau and at Melaka from 1782 to 1784. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:167-176; Matheson and Andaya 1982:366-368; Netscher 1870:189.) My informants are indeed very aware of Raja Haji's military exploits; they even claim that he was one of Indonesia's first revolutionaries.

After Raja Haji died in June 1784 while fighting the Dutch in Melaka, the latter continued their military offensive against the sultanate, and in November 1784, sent a squadron to Riau. As mentioned in Chapter Four, in the face of impending defeat, Raja Ali, who had succeeded Raja Haji as the yamtuan muda, fled from Riau and took refuge in Sukadana in Borneo, taking all his Bugis followers with him. This exodus ended the first phase of the Bugis presence in Riau.

The second phase began after the British gave Riau back to Sultan Mahmud III in 1795. About 1800 he invited Raja Ali back to Riau to be
re-installed as the *yang dipertuan muda*. As discussed in Chapter Four, the sultanate was subsequently divided into the *rajas'* Riau and the *tengkus'* Lingga via the institution of Raja Hamidah's *mas kawin* — Penyengat. Unlike the first phase, this second phase of the Bugis presence could not plausibly be justified in terms of military prowess, given the evidence of Dutch victory. And indeed my informants do not attempt to make any such justification. Raja Haji is the last of their ancestors that they remember as a military hero.

After Raja Haji, the *rajas* considered worthy of attention are remembered not for any military prowess, but for religious piety or for literary achievement. As noted by Andaya and Matheson (1979), it is historically significant that it was the Bugis court on Penyengat, and not the *sultan's* court in Lingga, that became the centre of a religious and literary renaissance in the nineteenth century. I suggest that this renaissance may be understood as the establishment of a new justification for the Bugis presence in Riau. I suggest that deprived of the role of military saviours, the Bugis *rajas* now presented themselves in the role of the spiritual saviours of the sultanate, rescuing the people from moral decay. In short, moralism began when militarism ended.

This mode of legitimation is evident in the *Tuhat*, where Raja Ali Haji cites as examples of the perfect ruler, not any of the indigenous *sultans*, but his own Bugis forebears, such as Opu Daeng Kemboja and Raja Haji. He asserts that it was Allah himself who had appointed the Bugis *rajas* to guide their subjects towards him, for such divinely appointed rulers were able to set a holy example for all to follow. (See Andaya and Matheson 1979:117-118). This implies that the Bugis *rajas* were to mediate through example; they were to guide their Muslim subjects towards Allah by presenting themselves as exemplars of good Muslims. 

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This holier-than-thou stance was evidently more than just rhetoric; it took on political substance in October 1857 when, in collusion with the Dutch, the Bugis rajas deposed of Sultan Mahmud IV (1823-1864) on the grounds that he was an un-Islamic playboy. (See Genealogical Chart 1. Also see Matheson 1972; Andaya and Matheson 1979:124-126.) And their justification? -- they were simply complying with the commands of Allah Almighty who gives sovereignty and takes it away, with the implication that anyone who would be a good Muslim must necessarily obey these same commands.

I paraphrase below a significant remark made to me by a Penyengat raja with regards to the deposition of Sultan Mahmud IV:

What is true? Who knows? Those who are keturunan Melayu would no doubt tell their side of the story. But I am keturunan Bugis; so of course I tell the Bugis side of the story.

This informant is certainly aware that one's view is relative to one's situation. Indeed, another informant in a different situation did present the story of the deposition in quite other terms: In his book, Tengku Ahmad bin Tengku Abubakar (1972:22), who is the deposed Sultan Mahmud's brother's son's son's son, portrayed his great-grand-uncle as an anti-colonial hero, an 'enfant terrible' (to use his words), who was persecuted by the Dutch, because he showed an interest in the system of administration that prevailed in Singapore under the British. This is a very different picture from the Bugis description of Sultan Mahmud as an un-Islamic playboy. (See Chapter Four on the identity of Tengku Ahmad.)

The point is, once Islam was used as the basis for political legitimation, then it became possible to declare that if Islam legitimates, then lack of Islam de-legitimates. The means of legitimation can thus become the very basis of power itself. In this
context, the collaborating role of the tuan said would have been quite crucial. The Bugis rajas actively sought to recruit them to Penyengat, and 'in the 19th century there was a steady stream of religious teachers attracted to Riau' (Andaya and Matheson 1979:110). Despite their importance, however, no political office was institutionalised for them. This omission may have been an attempt to limit the role of the tuan said to legitimation, without allowing them to extend to the actual assumption of power. After all, if the tuan said were regarded as being capable of legitimating power, then in comparison with the raja and the tengku, they should have at least equal, if not greater rights to political office.

What is more, the very office of sultan 'ruler' is itself based on Islamic legitimation, for the sultan is supposed to be the imam 'guide' of the total jemaah 'congregation' that constitutes his polity. That being the case, would not a tuan said with berkat 'God's blessing' be a better imam and hence a better sultan? The political use of the tuan said as legal legitimator thus seems to have been a double-edged sword. This danger of being outranked by the tuan said seems to be an issue that my raja informants are well aware of.

The use of Islam as political legitimation thus contains the seed of symmetrical schismogenesis. To paraphrase Bateson, if more Islam is the reply to Islam, then there is the danger of the breakdown of the whole system, to the advantage of the Islamic legitimator, who can thereby assume political power himself, by cutting out the previously legitimated and hence less Islamic political ruler. In other words, instead of merely teaching Islamic lore to a ruler and thereby legitimating his power, a tuan said could accuse the ruler of being un-Islamic and assume power himself. The absence of a political office pertaining to the tuan said as a derajat may thus be interpreted as a restraining factor instituted to prevent such an
eventuality developing. Without the institution of a corporate political office, the charisma of any one individual tuan said could not be routinised.

Despite this institutional depoliticisation, the tuan said were nevertheless classified as an aristocratic derajat on the hierarchy. Unlike the rajas and tengkus, however, the basis of their aristocracy was not the corporate possession of any political office, but their reputed descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Following Siddique (1979:7), I would argue that the tuan said's claim to power rested on berkat, which 'derived from their status as direct descendants of the Prophet, and constitutes a sort of spiritual inheritance.' She variously explains berkat (ibid.) as 'God's blessing', 'spiritual force', 'a gift from God', 'a special blessing', and a 'blessing' that can be both acquired and inherited. The concept will be more fully discussed in Chapter Six.

My informants explained berkat to me as mediation between God and human being, such that human desires can be attained through this mediation. The 'blessing' that Siddique speaks of, may thus be interpreted as the power to mediate between God and human being, a power that is bestowed by God, and hence is not an achievement but a blessing. I would thus argue that the power of the tuan said in the sultanate rested on berkat, on their reputed capacity to mediate between God and human being. Since in Islam the Prophet Muhammad was the one great mediator between God and human beings, who could be better living mediators than his reputed descendants? Since the sultanate was constituted as a religious kingdom wherein political power was legitimated through reference to a particular body of religious doctrine, the presence of the tuan said as mediators between God and human beings would have symbolised that particular doctrine of legitimation.
Significantly, according to my informants, the tuan said who came to Riau resided only at the capitals and nowhere else. The localisation of the tuan said at political centres still seems to be the case at present. All my tuan said informants in Riau reside either in Penyengat, the former capital, or in Tanjungpinang, the present Indonesian administrative centre. I encountered not one tuan said in the politically more peripheral communities where I also did fieldwork. But my informants in these communities did tell me of a few individual tuan said who had visited them in the past to mengajar ugama 'teach religion'. These, however, appear to have been temporary visits by tuan said who were normally resident at the political centres. The permanent presence of the tuan said at the political centres was thus a vivid representation of political legitimation.

Indeed so integrated, apparently, were the tuan said, that one non-Arab informant took pains to tell me that they were not what the Dutch called freemde Oosterlingen 'foreign Orientals'; they were inlanders 'natives'. The reason, he said, is because the tuan said have been present ever since the sultanate began. In the sense that the kingdom had been Islamised since the era of Melaka, it is true that the Arab presence is not a recent phenomenon. But although there are still many Penyengat people of tuan said descent, there is hardly any who can speak Arabic or who can trace kinship links to living people in Arabia. The descendants of the tuan said have been integrated fully into the community, perhaps in order to incorporate their berkat as well.

This integration is indicated by the specification of a fixed amount of mas kawin for the derajat of tuan said. As I have pointed out in Chapter Four, although Islamic law prescribes payment of the mahr as an essential part of the marriage contract, it does not specify the amount. So it is also an extension beyond Islam for the
tuan said to have a fixed amount of mas kawin specified for all of them.

In Chapter Four, I raised the following question: if the tuan said rank second in the hierarchy, then why do they have only the meagre sum of 25 ringgit specified as their mas kawin? This may be explicated thus. To begin with, the term tuan said refers only to males. The discussion above concerning the tuan said as political legitimators is solely about the males. The female syarifah does not have a share in this. For example, whereas there are sacred graves of tuan said, there seems to be no female equivalent. Whereas there are tuan said who are said to be famous religious teachers, there seems to be no syarifah known as a religious teacher. The derajat of tuan said is thus sexually more differentiated than the derajat of raja and tengku.

Indeed, some of my informants stress to me that in the old days, it was quite impossible to see the face of a syarifah, because it would be veiled; this is described as something that is hebat 'terrible, awe-inspiring'. One of my older informants gave me a graphic description of what it was formerly like to visit the home of a tuan said on Penyengat. According to him, when one arrived, the only person one saw was the male host himself. After receiving the guest, the host would clap his hands, and food would be laid out in another room, to which the male host and male guest would go to share a meal by themselves. During the entire visit, the guest would neither hear nor see any of the female members of the household. Not even his refreshments would be served directly by a female. And in the presence of the guest, the host would himself communicate with the hidden female members of his household only by means of hand-claps.
There was evidently such a distinct sexual division of social spheres that the males monopolised the public sphere, and all the females were relegated to the domestic sphere. It is perhaps this gross disparity between male and female that may explain why it is that only the meagre sum of 25 ringgit has been specified for the derajat of tuan said. As mentioned in Chapter Four, this is an exception to the correlation between derajat and mas kawin, according to which, the higher the derajat ranks, the larger would be the amount specified as mas kawin. I have also argued above that mas kawin may be interpreted as a contractual settlement, the acceptance of which signifies the agreement of the bride not to transmit derajat to the child.

But what if the female is not even considered as part of the derajat? Whenever my informants list the hierarchy of derajat, they always use the term tuan said for the derajat in question; never do they say tuan said dan syarifah 'tuan said and syarifah'. There seems to be indeed a sound historical reason for such usage, for the Arab migrants who came to Southeast Asia were all males; Arab women did not migrate (Sharon Siddique: personal communication). So the daughter of a tuan said in Riau was patrilineally Arab but matrifiliatively Melayu, and who could certainly not transmit any Arab descent to her children herself. As my informant cited above had said:

If we follow Islam, it is the male who carries keturunan; the female does not carry it....

In the case of the derajat of tuan said this idea seems to be so strictly adhered to, that it even becomes questionable whether the syarifah are members of the derajat. That being the case, it would hardly be necessary to settle a large amount of mas kawin on the syarifah, so as to contract her into not transmitting derajat to her offspring. Moreover, if Islam was used to legitimate the
patrilineality of keturunan, and the male monopoly of political office, and if the tuan said were the living symbols of Islam qua political legitimation, then it would make sense to institutionalise the maleness of this derajat by means of devaluing the mas kawin allotted to the syarifah.

What seems particularly significant in this context is my informants' mention of Madzhab Shafi'i as the justification for the male monopoly of political office (see Chapter Four), for it was the founder of this school al-Shafi'i (died A.D. 820), who

more than any other jurisprudent...left the most telling impact on the development of Islamic jurisprudence on the basis of the Qu'ran and Hadith.

(Farah 1970:191).

So my informants' reference to Madzhab Shafi'i as the justification for male dominance may be understood as an attempt to give a legal validity to such dominance. Islam thus seems to have constituted the basis of legality, legitimating and sustaining the various institutions of male dominance, including mas kawin, patrilineality, and the male monopoly of political office.

5.7 Orang Pertengahan

In the discussion above, I have attempted to show how a pattern of domination-submission may be transformed into legal governmental authority through legitimation by a body of religious doctrine. Once such a transformation has been effected, the particular pattern of domination-submission from which government authority is derived, should no longer be disturbed. For example, it should no longer have been questioned whether the office of yamtuan muda was desirable, whether it should have belonged to the Bugis faction, whether
political office should have been occupied only by males, whether political office could be matrilineally transmitted, whether the hamba raja should have performed corvee for the rulers, and so on. Yet, as we have seen, these questions have been and are still asked. This indicates that governmental authority in the sultanate was not very strongly institutionalised. The situation was fluid enough to allow the basic pattern of domination-submission to be disturbed and changed.

In this context, Bourdieu's (1977:159-171) idea of doxa, orthodoxy, and heterodoxy is relevant to our discussion. By doxa he refers to the universe of the undiscussed and therefore the undisputed; this contrasts with the universe of discourse or argument, wherein there is a field of opinion ranging from orthodoxy to heterodoxy.

The dominated classes have an interest in pushing back the limits of doxa and exposing the arbitrariness of the taken for granted; the dominant classes have an interest in defending the integrity of doxa or, short of this, of establishing in its place the necessarily imperfect substitute, orthodoxy.

(Ibid.:169).

It seems to me that in the situation in Riau, a doxa could not be imposed, and the dominant ranks had to try to establish the next best thing, orthodoxy, in the face of the competing claims of heterodoxy. To consider why this was so, we must discuss the middle ranks of the hierarchy -- that is, the orang pertengahan 'people in the middle'.

As shown above, the purest form of domination-submission that had existed in the sultanate was the relationship between the very top and the very bottom of the hierarchy -- that is, between the rulers on top and the slaves at the bottom. The former owned the latter bodily and was thus in a position of total domination vis-a-vis the latter.
However, as we have seen, even the relationship between the ruling aristocracy and the second lowest derajat -- the hamba raja -- was already much more complicated. The latter related to the former not as isolated individuals but as territorial groupings -- for example, the orang Galang and the orang Ladi. So unlike the bodily-owned slaves who were kept in the homes of the aristocrats at the capital, such groupings were territorially located outside the political centre. They were thereby far from direct political control and had to be ruled through mediation. The people who performed this role of mediation were thus crucial to the body politic. Without them, the political centre would have lost its periphery and would hence no longer be a centre. As we have seen above, this did indeed happen in the case of Raja Alang Laut who led the orang Galang, not on behalf of the ruling aristocracy, but independently of them.

I suggest that it was the middle ranks who mediated between the top and the bottom of the hierarchy -- these were, namely, the encik datuk, encik keturunan, and orang biasa. Let us first consider the encik datuk. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the term encik was an honorific prefixed to 'the names of persons of good position' (Wilkinson 1959:303). The 'good position' in question appears to have been a situation of some authority within the government. Wilkinson (1959:269) explains the term datuk as denoting:

Head of family; elder. ...Used (i) as a term of relationship to or of a grandfather...; (ii) as a term of distinction to or of any great non-royal Chief....

Therefore the term encik datuk may be understood to mean someone appointed to exercise governmental authority in the capacity of a grandparent. This implies a peculiar mixture of formal structure and informal interaction, of politics and kinship, and of the supra-local and the locally communal. Such a mixture would seem to derive
from the mediative role played by the *encik datuk*.

The use of the idiom of kinship is further evidenced by the term for the followers of the *encik datuk* -- that is, *anak buah*, (literally: 'children of the fruit'). The asymmetry of the pairing -- *datuk : anak buah*  
*grandparent : children* -- indicates perhaps that the kinship idiom was really used for what was essentially non-kinship-based politics.

The people who were the *anak buah* of the various *datuk* were the *hamba raja*. Apart from Datuk Kaya Mepar and the *orang Ladi* mentioned above, there was apparently also a *datuk* appointed over the *orang Bintan*. According to my Penyengat informants, the last of the Bintan *datuks* was called Datuk Kaya Indrajaya. Significantly, my Penyengat informants were able to provide more details about the Bintan *datuk* than were my Bintan informants themselves. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the *datuk*-ship was non-hereditary. Even if the son of a *datuk* was also appointed *datuk*, as in the case of Datuk Kaya Monti, for example, that was considered a new appointment, and not inevitable inheritance. In the case of the Bintan *datuk*, the one preceding Datuk Kaya Indrajaya was evidently not related to him at all. According to my Penyengat informants, the penultimate Bintan *datuk* called Datuk Kaya Sang Ir was drawn from among the *orang Bintan*. The last Bintan *datuk*, however, was an *orang kaya angkatan* 'a person of means through appointment', and not a Bintan person himself.

It is clear that the number of *encik datuk* that even my Penyengat informants could tell me about were very few indeed. There were apparently only a few individuals who mediated between the ruling ranks on top and the subject ranks at the bottom. This may be because towards the end of the sultanate, only a few of the *hamba raja* groups
were still willing to perform corvee for the rulers. As mentioned above, the last sultan even had to hire foreign labourers to row his boats. It is thus significant that the two datuk-ships mentioned by my informants were the datuk of the Ladi people and the datuk of the Bintan people. These two groupings seem to have been among the last that remained faithful to the aristocracy to the very end.

As mentioned in Chapter Four, the encik datuk were individuals promoted from their own lower derajat to that of encik datuk. The title was conferred by the rulers and not inherited through descent. However, although the datuk-ship was non-hereditary, the children of a datuk were nevertheless respected as encik keturunan 'encik through descent'. The honorific encik was applied to them not as an indication of office, but merely as a matter of courtesy to acknowledge the status of their father.

As my Penyengat informants explained, encik tidak ikut keturunan 'the title encik does not follow descent'. In their opinion, whereas a datuk's son would still be termed an encik, a datuk's son's son would not have been termed as such, unless either he or his father were independently appointed datuk. So from my Penyengat informants' perspective, there is no keturunan encik 'encik line of descent' in the same way as there are keturunan raja, keturunan tengku, and keturunan tuan said.

From this description, it looks as if the establishment of a separate derajat consisting of the children of the encik datuk was meant to express the idea that the appointed power of the encik datuk was not hereditary. The datuk's children and grandchildren each dropped one successive rank. So in the absence of further appointments, the encik datuk's children became encik keturunan 'encik by descent', and the encik keturunan's children became orang biasa.
'ordinary people'. The implication is that both ascent and descent through the ranks of the hierarchy were processes that had to be strictly regulated.

The power of the datuk-ship was thus limited by its non-hereditary nature, for it remained merely an appointment to office that was assigned by the ruling aristocracy. On termination of the datuk's occupation of office, its power reverted to the rulers until it was again delegated to another appointed datuk. So far as I understand, these appointments were for life and termination was through death. I have not heard of any resignations or expulsions, though that would seem to have been theoretically possible.

The non-hereditary nature of the datuk-ship and the regulated descent of the datuk's children and grandchildren through the ranks indicate that there was an uneasy tension between the central authority of the rulers and their decentralised mediators in the political periphery. On the one hand, the loyalty of these mediators had to be sustained through the bestowal of sufficient rewards, such as status and respect. On the other hand, these mediators had to be prevented from building up alternative power bases that would eventually threaten the centre.

Interestingly, this picture of the datuk-ship that I obtained from my Penyengat informants was contradicted by an alternative picture presented by my informant who is the great-grandson of Datuk Kaya Montil, the nineteenth-century leader of the orang Mepar/Ladi. According to him, the encik datuk were orang bangsawan, orang yang berbangsa 'aristocrats, people who were of noble stock'. He said that the encik datuk was known as datuk kaya 'rich datuk' for the following reason:
Dia kaya orang, bukan kaya uang.
(He was rich in people, not in money.)

That is to say, the datuk kaya had many followers — anak buah. The implication is that so long as he kept his following, he remained a datuk kaya. So according to this interpretation, the datuk-ship was not an office imposed from above, but rather, a position of leadership that was supported from below. However, this informant admitted that the datuk was both a menteri 'official' and a kepala suku 'head of his division'. Thus even he recognised the mediative role of the datuk between the rulers and the subjects. As mentioned above, the datuk kaya's followers were the hamba raja. They were also known as rakyat, a term which essentially means 'subject'.

At this stage of our discussion, we can perhaps recast the hierarchy in terms of the following categories:

- rulers  
  (raja, tengku)
- legitimators  
  (tuan said)
- mediators  
  (encik datuk, encik keturunan, orang biasa, keturunan Bintan)
- subjects  
  (hamba raja / orang kerahan / orang persukuan / rakyat)
- slaves  
  (hamba orang).

Interestingly, among some of my informants who are the descendants of hamba raja, the word hamba is still used as a first-person singular, sometimes pronounced as ambo. This implies a wider generalisation of what was a particular relationship of domination-submission, to the extent that all I-You interaction can be interpreted in such terms. In such usage, the 'I' of hamba is paired with the 'You' of encik, datuk and tuan.
To demonstrate the significance of this generalisation of hamba, let me contrast it with two other first-person singulars: sahaya or saya, and beta. The word sahaya/saya is the first-person singular used by my informants who are not keturunan hamba raja. As Wilkinson (1959:999) points out, a sahaya ranked higher than a hamba. Who then were these sahaya? From what I understand, they were the orang pertengahan 'people in the middle' and that included all the ranks below the tuan said and above the hamba raja. These were, namely, the encik datuk, the encik keturunan, the prang biasa, and the keturunan Bintan. Wilkinson (ibid.) claims that the Europeans were the ones who regularly used sahaya as a first-person pronoun. This implies that they learnt the language from the people belonging to these middle derajat, rather than from the top or bottom derajat, especially since this was a pronoun that was considered 'polite but not obsequious'.

Beta is explained by Wilkinson (1959:132) thus:

As a pronoun beta is used only by people of rank (beta = I; sahabat beta = you) writing to one another as equals; whence membeta (to use the word beta) was an offence when done by a commoner under the old regime.

While I cannot say whether the pronoun beta is still used in private correspondence between my aristocrat informants, its reported existence in former times suggests the possibility of distinguishing interaction between the aristocrats themselves, from the other modes of interaction. This may be illustrated in the following way:
| orang bangsawan | EQUAL SELF | .. | .. | EQUAL OTHER |
| 'aristocrats' | beta | | | sahabat beta |
| orang pertengahan | SUBSERVIENT SELF | | | |
| 'people in the middle' | sahaya | | | |
| orang hamba | SUBMISSIVE SELF | | | |
| 'serfs and slaves' | hamba | | | |

Figure 5  The Hierarchical Interaction of Self and Other

The hierarchy was thus expressed linguistically in the personal pronouns for 'I' and 'you'. In this prominal hierarchy, the pairing of hamba 'slave' for 'I' and tuan 'master' for 'you' illustrates most clearly the underlying pattern of domination–submission. Apart from these hierarchical pronouns, there are also the egalitarian ones — aku 'I' and engkau 'you'. But these are generally considered as crude precisely because they are non-hierarchical.

In this hierarchy, the orang pertengahan 'people in the middle' were located in an ambivalent position, for they were supposed to be submissive to the aristocrats, but dominant over the serfs and slaves. The English word 'subservience' seems to be particularly apt for describing the role of the orang pertengahan in the hierarchy. The 'Panghulu Hamba Rajah of Mapar'/Datuk Kaya Mepar seems to have been subservient in this sense, for he apparently mediated between the domination of the orang bangsawan and the submission of the hamba raja. Raja Alang Laut apparently refused to be subservient in this sense, preferring to attribute dominance to himself, and therefore to work for his own ends, rather than be someone else's instrument. So he was a raja gelaran 'raja by designation', whereas the 'Panghulu
Hamba Rajah of Mapar'/Datuk Kaya Meper/Tomungong of Mapar' seems to have had the various titles of penghulu, datuk, and temenggung.

Significantly, when my informant Datuk Kaya Mohamad gave me his genealogy, he prefixed all his patrilineal ancestors' names with the word cek, which is the shortened form of encik. Both the encik datuk and the encik keturunan were thus encik. As my informants had explained, to be an encik was to be a pegawai pemerintah 'instrument of administration', in contradistinction to the hamba raja who were milik pemerintah 'government property'.

According to Wilkinson (1959:887) the word pemerintah is derived from the root form perintah, which has the basic meaning of 'sway, direction'. A directionality is implied, passing from source via instrument to goal. The domination of the top and the submission of the bottom was thus mediated by the subservience of the middle ranks of the hierarchy. However, it seems to be the case that the association of the term encik with the middle ranks was a gradual development. According to the Tuhfat, Opu Daeng Marewah's son and granddaughter prefixed their names with the term encik. (See Genealogical Chart 1; Raja Ali Haji 1982:30.) Since Opu Daeng Marewah was the first yamtuan muda, this implies that at that time, encik was considered a title lofty enough for the ruler's own son. It is possible that the term encik later came to be associated with the middle ranks, because the people in these ranks were supposed to serve the rulers, as sons would their fathers.

If the subservience of the middle ranks was so crucial, then it would have been politic to institutionalise it in some way. The amounts of mas kawin specified for the two encik ranks are significant. In the list of mas kawin given above (see Chapter Four), different amounts are specified for these two ranks thus:
DERAJAT

MAS KAWIN

table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encik Datuk</th>
<th>101 Ringgit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Encik Keturunan</td>
<td>88 Ringgit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mak Inang</td>
<td>66 Ringgit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayang, Khadam</td>
<td>66 Ringgit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The mas kawin for the daughter of an encik datuk was thus 101 ringgit, significantly higher than that for the daughter of an encik datuk's son who was not himself an encik datuk. However, the two different amounts specified for the daughters of the encik keturunan need to be explained.

To do so, we must first explicate the terms mak inang, dayang, and khadam. These terms refer to various female attendants of the aristocrats. The mak inang was the duenna of a young female raja or tengku; the dayang was a female court attendant, and the khadam was a female domestic in the palace. The implication is that these female posts were the prerogative of the daughters of the datuk. Indeed when my Penyengat informants told me about the last Bintan datuk, they also took care to mention his two daughters, Bedah and Halimah, who were encik keturunan. At least some of the mak inang, dayang, and khadam seem to have become the wives of the aristocrats. While I was collecting the genealogies of my aristocrat informants, I found that a significant number of their female ascendants were these encik keturunan.

Since derajat is transmitted patrilineally, that would mean that the children of a female encik keturunan would be aristocrats. Furthermore, an affinal relationship would be set up between her aristocrat husband and her encik brother. In short, an inter-derajat marriage alliance would be established. Through this asymmetrical marriage alliance between the ruling aristocracy and the encik ranks,
the loyalty of the latter to the former could be institutionalised through kinship and thereby ensured. The honorific encik thus carried not only the connotations of being a chief or a chief's child, it also implied the status of being an affine of a ruling aristocrat.

Significantly, in this context, my Penyengat informants told me that when the hamba raja came to the political capital to perform their obligatory services, they had to be addressed as encik so as not to make them feel 'insulted' (dihinakan). But these people were merely 'called' (dipanggil) encik, my informants said, so that they would not use their ilmu sihir 'sorcery' on the aristocrats in revenge for being insulted. But being called encik apparently did not move them up to the derajat of encik datuk 'or encik keturunan; they remained where they were on the hierarchy. Interestingly, my Penyengat informants seem to have the idea that those who were members of the higher ranks had to be extra polite to the hamba raja who might otherwise feel insulted: kerahan seems to have been regarded as so much an insult that it had to be disguised with undue courtesy on the part of those for whom kerahan was performed.

This extended usage of the term encik may be understood as an example of what Bourdieu (1977:191) calls 'euphemisation':

When domination can only be exercised in its elementary form, i.e. directly, between one person and another, it cannot take place overtly and must be disguised under the veil of enchanted relationship, the official model of this is presented by relations between kinsmen....

So when the hamba raja came to the capital to do corvee for the aristocrats, the pattern of domination-submission normally mediated by the encik ranks, suddenly became nakedly blatant, and had to be euphemised by calling the hamba raja 'encik', pretending that they were just affines who had come visiting.
However, no matter what term of courtesy was used for the hamba raja, there was a crucial difference between them and the encik. The latter were 'free people' (orang merdeka), whereas the former were hamba, people in bondage. Even though unlike the hamba orang 'slaves', the hamba raja 'serfs' were not bodily owned, their services were nevertheless claimed by the ruling aristocracy. So what the orang merdeka were free of was slavery on the one hand and corvee on the other. But within the hierarchical structure, what that freedom seems to have rested on was the willingness to serve as the instrument of the rulers in the enslavement and bondage of others.

5.8 Orang Biasa

Apart from the encik, there was another category of 'free people'. These were the orang biasa 'ordinary people' — an odd name for a derajat in a highly differentiated hierarchy. What was the character of this supposed 'ordinariness'? Apparently, anyone who was not a member of any of the other derajat would be an orang biasa, which implies that this derajat was a social rag-bag to which extraneous individuals could belong. The use of the word biasa 'ordinary' in this context thus seems somewhat ironic. I have already mentioned above that a datuk's son's children would be orang biasa, if they were not themselves also appointed to office. However, these were not the only type of recruits to the derajat of orang biasa. From what my informants say, it appears that there were three other types of recruits:

those descendants of the hamba raja who managed somehow to erase from public knowledge all memory of their original keturunan;
the bekas hamba — that is, freed slaves and their
descendants;
and significantly, foreign migrants employed by the
government of the sultanate.

There appear to have been a loose assortment of individuals
employed for specific jobs by the aristocrats. Apparently, these
individuals could be recruited from almost anywhere. So capable
individuals among the hamba raja were potential candidates; so too
were capable foreign migrants such as Chinese, Indian, Javanese,
Bugis. The latter included also people from other sultanates such as
Asahan in Sumatra Utara.

For example, my informants said that during the reign of the
teninth yamtuan muda, Raja Muhamad Yusuf, there was a man called Yakob
from Asahan who was hired to train some military volunteers. A
Javanese man was also hired to take charge of the royal gardens on
Penyengat, it seems. And much earlier on, there was, during the time
of Raja Hamidah, a kapten Cina 'Chinese captain' who was apparently
ordered by her to build the tomb of Habib Syeikh Syakaf, a prominent
Arab of the time. The last sultan's Boyanese boat-rowers were also in
this category.

In my informants' discourse about the orang biasa 'ordinary
people' and the orang hamba 'people in bondage', it is striking that
one difference between these two categories is that the former is
territorially undefined, whereas the latter is indeed so defined. As
I have mentioned above, this territorial base, usually located far
from the political centre, allowed the hamba raja the possibility of
being independent of the centre. In contrast, the orang biasa have no
such territorial base, and were instead dependent on the employment of
their capability by the aristocrats.
This suggests that the character of 'ordinariness' had to do with the Marxian idea of the freedom to sell one's labour power. It would seem to be the case that the so-called 'ordinary people' constituted what Giddens (1971:32) calls 'a "floating", mobile group, separated from their means of production, and thrown onto the market as 'free' wage-labourers'.

The types of recruits to the derajat of orang biasa suggest that 'ordinariness' was associated with the loss of rank. A datuk's son's children who were not themselves appointed to office, would have had to earn a living through employment for specific jobs — for example, playing in the sultan's band. A descendant of a hamba raja who managed somehow to erase from public knowledge all memory of his or her keturunan, would necessarily have had to lose membership in the original territorial group, thereby losing access to the original means of production and becoming dependent on paid employment. A liberated ex-slave would no longer have been fed and clothed by the master, no matter how poorly. A foreign migrant moving into the area without property or territory would have had to depend on paid employment for his livelihood. The dependence on paid employment thus seems to have been the common element in these different types of recruits to this particular derajat.

But why was the word biasa 'ordinary' used as a label? It seems to me that there is an implicit opposition in this case between biasa 'ordinary' and luarbiasa, literally, 'outside the ordinary' — that is, extraordinary. To explicate this, let me examine the ways in which the recruits to this derajat became orang biasa. The datuk's son's children did not inherit the power of the datuk; they thus became 'ordinary' by virtue of their non-inheritance of power. The descendants of the hamba raja who managed to erase public memory of their keturunan became 'ordinary' by virtue of their public loss of
descent. The ex-slaves were set free from their original derajat and thereby became 'ordinary'. The foreign migrants came in from the outside, and became a peripheral part of the sultanate, thereby also becoming 'ordinary'.

These processes seem to be exactly the reverse of those that were operative for the aristocrats, who were supposed to inherit power, whose keturunan was public knowledge, who remained in their original derajat, and who were supposed to be the integral core of the sultanate itself. By describing the reversals as biasa 'ordinary', the implication is that the aristocrats were luarbiasa 'extraordinary'.

Such an opposition derives from the very nature of hierarchy. As Dumont (1972) has pointed out, hierarchy is the perception of people as being essentially different, whereas equality is the perception of them as being essentially similar. Consequently, in a hierarchical mode of perception, the concern is with the classification and ranking of what are considered inherent differences, whereas in an egalitarian mode of perception, the concern is the elimination, or at least minimalisation, of existing differences. With regards to the implied opposition between 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary', the two modes of perception yield different evaluations. In an egalitarian mode of perception, what is 'ordinary' would be considered as the norm in relation to which the 'extraordinary' is but a rare deviation. In a hierarchical mode of perception, however, one begins with the premise of difference. So one accepts that both the 'ordinary' and the 'extraordinary' necessarily coexist. The task then is to rank them in terms of their relative superiority and inferiority. I suggest that in such a situation, the extraordinary is more likely to be ranked as superior.
This would relate directly to Weberian ideas of charisma and charismatic authority. As discussed in Chapter Four, the charisma of Opu Daeng brothers who had founded the Bugis rajas' line of descent, was routinised through the establishment of a specific political office and through marriage alliances contracted with the yamtuan besar's line. The political authority that ensued from this routinised charisma remained nonetheless charismatic, albeit routinised. I would thus suggest that the maintenance of the routinised charisma of the Opu Daeng brothers was supported by a process of labelling. By this means, the loss of keturunan and hence derajat was labelled 'ordinary', in contradistinction to which the preservation of keturunan and hence derajat was deemed 'extraordinary' and therefore charismatic. The derajat of orang biasa seems, in this light, to have been established as a class of not-bangsawan, to contrast with the aristocratic orang bangsawan.

This may perhaps give us a clue as to why the same figure of 44 ringgit has been specified for the three derajat of orang biasa, keturunan Bintan, and hamba raja. It may be because they are all categorised as orang kecil 'small people', who can have no claim to any charisma, be it spontaneously generated or inherited through descent.

5.9 Keturunan Bintan

Before we close this chapter, we must discuss an ambiguity that has appeared in the pages above. As shown in Chapter Four, the amount of mas kawin specified for the keturunan Bintan is 44 ringgit + mas 1 paha. Paha, it seems, was a measurement of weight, equivalent to approximately 1/4 tahil, which was in turn equivalent to the weight of half a Spanish dollar. (See Wilkinson 1959:744,1149.) But
nowadays, this too is sebutan saja 'just an utterance'. Nevertheless why is there this utterance of an additional mas 1 paha when the mas kawin specified for the hamba raja is 44 ringgit only? This implies that the keturunan Bintan ranks higher than the hamba raja. Yet they too performed kerahan, and are therefore, by definition, hamba raja.

My informants are indeed aware of this ambiguity. For example, a Pangkil informant said:

Keturunan Bintan dan encik kurang lebih, tapi keturunan Bintan dipakai raja, encik tidak.
(The keturunan Bintan were more or less the same as the encik, but keturunan Bintan were used by the raja, whereas the encik were not.)

Another informant, a Penyengat raja said:

Keturunan Bintan boleh masuk ke dalam istana, tandanya selepang kuning. Tapi dia pun sebagai orang kerahan.
(The keturunan Bintan could enter the palace, their mark of status being a yellow shawl. But they too were a category of the people of the corvee).

Interestingly, my Bintan informants themselves referred to the former kerahan of their derajat, as penjawatan 'office, post'. They said that only the keturunan Bintan had this penjawatan; the other orang kerahan were merely under suruhan 'orders, commands'. Only the keturunan Bintan wore yellow shawls and could sit near the throne, whereas the other orang kerahan could not even enter the balai 'hall of assembly'. They said that all this showed that the keturunan Bintan were dimuliakan 'honoured'.

So the implication is that on the one hand, special privileges were given to the keturunan Bintan, such that they were 'more or less the same as the encik', but on the other hand, like the hamba raja, they were nevertheless still obliged to perform kerahan for the aristocrats. The keturunan thus seems to have constituted an area of
overlap between the *orang pertengahan* 'people in the middle' and the *orang hamba* 'people in bondage'.

But why were they singled out for such special treatment? To explicate this, we must consider another aspect of the *keturunan Bintan* that my informants often mention. It is said that if anyone who is of the Bintan line of descent, were to go to Kota Tinggi in Johor, they would immediately vomit blood and die. The cause for this, my informants say, is the Laksamana Bintan. The most detailed account I have of the story was given by my tengku informant from Lingga, Tengku Ahmad bin Tengku Abubakar:

This is the story of the Bintan people. There was a Bintan person who was a hamba raja, under the raja. Laksamana Megat Seri Rama was his name. Well then, this is also the story of the Sultan Mahmud. Sultan Mahmud -- he belonged to the *keturunan sultan* which had come from Palembang, yes, and then gone to Johor, to Melaka, then back to Johor. Sultan Mahmud had no child. He had a wife, but he did not like to sleep with her, preferring to seek the company of the *orang halus* [literally: 'delicate people' -- that is, a class of invisible beings who can make themselves visible and pass for human beings].

Well then, Megat Seri Rama mentioned just now had a wife. (Yes, the title *megat* means 'military leader' who guards kingdom and all the seas, like a warrior.) One day this *megat*'s wife was pregnant, and she craved to eat some jackfruit. At the back of the *raja*'s house was a jackfruit tree. So when the keeper of the garden saw that the *raja* was still sleeping, he gave a bit of a rotten jackfruit to the *megat*'s wife. Then the *raja* woke up from his afternoon nap; the palace servant -- that is, the keeper -- presented some jackfruit. But he said, 'Just now there was one that was rotten, which I gave to the *megat*'s wife, because she is pregnant and wants to eat jackfruit.' Then the *raja* angrily said, 'Before I have eaten, you have given the food to people. Call that person; I want to see whether the child in the belly is really eating the jackfruit.' So he really had the woman summoned, and he really split open her belly, to see whether the child within was really eating the jackfruit.

This is a Melayu story. If madam does not believe, ask about it. Everyone will tell you.

So the *megat* was of course angry. He had returned from sea, where he had all the pirates in his charge. He was angry to this degree: If all be well, then rest content; but if things are vile, then rest not for an instant. The meaning
is: If we want to be good, then let us be truly good; but if we want to be bad, then be bad all at once, and do not be good again. So he said in the following manner, 'I have been good to the raja by ensuring the peace, but the raja repays me in this way. Therefore, the good I've done is of no value to the raja. Therefore, let me be bad at once.' So the megat returned, found that the raja had killed his wife, and said, 'Just let there be one occasion, and I will kill this one that is raja.' Because of this, the raja became very cautious. For going to Friday prayers, he had himself carried aloft. Then, on arrival, when the raja had descended in order to pray, the megat took a keris and stabbed the one that was raja. He was finished. But the one who was raja was able to take out the keris and throw it at the one who was megat. He died. Then the one that was sultan swore, 'The Bintan people -- for seven generations, they are not allowed to come to Johor; if they reach Johor, they will vomit blood and die.'

True, madam. But now I don't know if it is still so. Ten years ago, if the native Bintan people went to Johor, they would vomit — in Kota Tinggi, because the grave is in Kota Tinggi. It is called Makam Tauhid [Tomb of God's Oneness].

So that was the end of the keturunan sultan from Melaka, madam; do you know? That was the true, the real sultan, who had descended from generation to generation, from grandfather, to child, to the child of one's grandchild.... Well then, in the time of this sultan, he had not one child. All he had was a bendahara [treasurer]. According to the kanun [canonical law] about succession as raja, take me for example; it was also the child of a raja who became bendahara, but from a different father; it's not the same. Now if I did not have a child, it is only then that the succession moves to the bendahara. And if the bendahara did not have a child, then the succession moves to the temenggung. This is the rule, according to the canonical law. So at that time, the bendahara also was of raja descent but he did not inherit it strongly; do you understand, madam? So that which had descended and descended, from Melaka, from what, from Bukit Si-Guntang, from Palembang, so now this had turned aside, madam, to one who could become raja, but whose inheritance was not that strong. So at that time, Sultan Mahmud had no child, and the succession moved to Abd al-Jalil. At that time he was the bendahara.

(My translation).

I have cited this informant's account at such length because, as mentioned in Chapter Four, he is himself a direct descendant of Abd al-Jalil, the bendahara, to whom the succession had moved. (See Genealogical Chart 4.) So what had started as a relatively objective story about the suku Bintan and Megat Seri Rama and Sultan Mahmud,
eventually developed into one of direct personal interest to my informant himself. From his perspective, the story is about how his own keturunan came to power. If there had not been a cruel sultan, if he had not killed the megat's pregnant wife, if the angry megat had not killed him in revenge, and most importantly, if he had not been childless, then the bendahara and his keturunan would not have risen in power.

So from the point of view of the bendahara's keturunan, the assassination of Sultan Mahmud marked a shift from less power to more power. And one particular person evidently played a pivotal role in this shift — namely, Megat Seri Rama, for by killing the childless sultan, he made the throne lawfully available to the bendahara. It is noteworthy that my informant stressed the legality of the bendahara's succession to the throne. Although he acknowledged that Sultan Mahmud was the 'true' and 'real' sultan because he belonged to the keturunan sultan which had originated from Bukit Si-Guntang and Palembang, the story also implied that the abrupt end of this keturunan was to be blamed on Sultan Mahmud's own wickedness which incited the megat to kill him, and what is more, his own refusal to sleep with his wife and his penchant for the 'delicate people', which resulted in his childlessness.

The accounts I obtained from other informants do not differ significantly from that of my tengku informants; if anything differs, it is that they are less detailed and are focussed on explaining why it is that the keturunan Bintan cannot go to Kota Tinggi, rather than on explaining why Sultan Mahmud was killed. This brings us to a significant discrepancy between my various informants' accounts on the one hand, and on the other hand, the various written accounts, both indigenous and Dutch.
Not once did my informants mention the word *derhaka* 'treason, betrayal', which is a word that figures importantly in the written accounts. According to Andaya (1975:49), *derhaka* committed against the ruler was supposed to be so serious an offence 'that transgressors received unusual punishment from a special force surrounding kingship (*timpa daulat*).' In the 'Siak Chronicles' and the *Tuhfat*, the killing of Sultan Mahmud by Megat Seri Rama is described as *derhaka*; the 'Siak Chronicles' further describes Megat Seri Rama's death as *timpa daulat* 'being struck by the power of kingship'. Not only that, according to this latter source, the megat's death was tortuous and prolonged: 'a wound inflicted on the foot of the traitor remains unhealed for four years and grass grows in the wound itself' (quoted from Andaya 1975:49).

None of all this was ever mentioned by any of my informants. Indeed, when I naively mentioned the word *derhaka* in this context (because I had previously read Andaya 1975), I met with either an embarrassed silence or a direct denial — *itu bukan derhaka, itu kerana sumpahan* 'that was not treason, that was because of a vow, a curse'. That initially confused me until I eventually realised that the point of my informants' accounts was to explain the taboo against the *keturunan Bintan* going to Kota Tinggi. Even my *tengku* informant's account, for example, started with the words, *ini cerita suku Bintan* 'this is a story of the Bintan people'. And instead of describing the megat's action as *derhaka* 'treason', my informants described it as repaying *jahat* 'evil' with *jahat* 'evil'. Moreover, in my informants' interpretation, this repayment of evil for evil was initiated by Sultan Mahmud himself who 'repaid' (*balas*) evil for the 'good' (*baik*) that the megat had done for him. Nor did my informants described the megat's death as *timpa daulat*; instead it happened merely because the sultan was still *sempat* 'able, had the time' to pluck out the *keris*
and throw it at him.

Significantly, my informants even use the term keturunan Bintan interchangeably with the term keturunan Laksamana Bintan, the 'Laksamana Bintan' in question being none other than Megat Seri Rama. What is striking is that when my informants talk about how the keturunan Bintan would vomit blood if they went to Johor because they are descended from the Laksamana Bintan who killed Sultan Mahmud, they do not do so in an incriminatory fashion. On the contrary, the taboo against going to Johor is used as proof in identifying someone as keturunan Bintan.

For example, one of my raja informants told me, almost with pride, that his wife and her family dare not set foot in Kota Tinggi, Johor, because they are keturunan Bintan. This raja's wife is not an orang bangsawan; her derajat thus ranks below his. Nevertheless, by claiming that she and her family cannot go to Kota Tinggi and are thus keturunan Bintan, my raja informant was trying to make it clear that she is an orang pertengahan and not an orang hamba.

This was not an isolated case. Indeed the overall impression that I received from my informants is that for a non-orang bangsawan, it is a desideratum to claim fear of going to Kota Tinggi and thereby to claim keturunan Bintan. Some informants even told me that a few years back, two young men from Riau went to Kota Tinggi, without knowing that they were of Bintan descent. When they reached Kota Tinggi, it seems that they vomited blood and died; and it was only after their death, that their relatives in Riau discovered that they were keturunan Bintan after all. A Karas informant who claimed to be keturunan raja Bugis nevertheless said that he was hampir-hampir keturunan Bintan 'very nearly keturunan Bintan', and because of that, dares not go to Kota Tinggi. To this informant, keturunan Bintan
seems to rank only slightly lower than keturunan raja Bugis.
Significantly, despite his claim, he does not bear the title of raja.
Expressing a fear of going to Kota Tinggi thus seems to be almost the
next best sign of high rank.

It seemed odd that so many of my informants were willing — nay,
even eager — to claim descent from a regicide. I therefore tried to
discover why it was a desideratum to be keturunan Laksamana Bintan.
My enquiries along this line led me back to the mas kawin specified
for the keturunan Bintan, comprising not only 44 ringgit but also mas
1 paha.

My informants said that this mas kawin was a mark of the high
status of keturunan Laksamana Bintan. To explain the origins of this
high status, my literate informants referred me to the founding myth
of the Melaka dynasty told in the Penurunan. In that text, it is
stated that on the day that Wan Empuk and Wan Malini climbed up Bukit
Si-Guntang and discovered the three brothers who had magically
appeared there, they also 'saw that their padi had golden grain,
leaves of silver and stems of gold alloy' (Brown 1970:14).

According to my informants, the one paha's weight in gold
specified in the mas kawin of the keturunan Bintan is meant to
represent the padi which had turned to gold as a result of the magical
appearance of the three brothers. In addition to this, my informants
said that the nasi adab-adab 'ceremonial rice' displayed at the
wedding of a keturunan Bintan must have on its puncak 'peak',
setangkai padi mas 'a stalk of rice made of gold', as further
representation of Wan Empuk's and Wan Malini's golden padi on Bukit
Si-Guntang. So all this gold, my informants said, is to remind them
of Wan Empuk and Wan Malini on Bukit Si-Guntang.
This implies that the keturunan Bintan are supposed to be the descendants of Wan Empuk and Wan Malini. Indeed, my informants explicitly say as much: they claim that the present keturunan Bintan are not the descendants of the original Bintan inhabitants, but rather, keturunan pendatang dari Palembang 'descendants of the migrants from Palembang'. These informants also identify the migrants from Palembang as orang penaung 'people who give shade or shelter'.

To explicate this complex of elements, we must turn to the founding myth itself. As noted in Chapter One, there are several textual versions of this myth. Bowen (1983) has compared and traced the genealogical differences between a pre-1699 and a post-1699 version of the Penurunan. Whereas in the former, the relationship between the king and the bendahara is depicted as a marriage alliance, in the latter version, it is depicted as siblingship, with the bendahara as 'junior royalty by descent, rather than as a pre-eminent subject by alliance' (ibid.:171). The purpose of this shift, he said, was to provide the bendahara with 'a textual basis for a claim to the royal daulat' (ibid.). I suggest that the complex of elements in my informants' discourse on Bintan may indeed be understood in terms of the strategy of legitimation used by the bendahara's descendants after their ascent to power in 1699.

The details of their account tally significantly with the post-1699 version of the Penurunan edited at the Riau court. (See Shellabear 1967:20-40.) In that version, the founding myth is as follows. In the upstream area of the Melayu river, there lived two women called Wan Empuk and Wan Malini. They had a rice-field on the hill Bukit Si-Guntang. One night, they saw from their house that the hill was aglow as if on fire. They climbed the hill the next morning to investigate. Upon arrival they saw three youths, one seated on a white cow, the other two standing beside him, holding the sword and
spear of kingship. When Wan Empuk and Wan Malini asked who they were, the three youths said that they were the descendants of Alexander the Great and that their names were Nila Pahlawan, Kerishna Pandita, and Nila Utama. Wan Empuk and Wan Malini asked what proof they had of their claims. And the youths answered that their crowns were the proof, as well as the padi on the hill which had been transformed into grains of gold, leaves of silver, stems of gold alloy, with the soil itself turned into a golden colour. So Wan Empuk and Wan Malini believed the youths and brought them back to their house. The two women then harvested the padi and became very rich, as a result of the prince Nila Utama whom they named Sang Sapurba.

When the ruler of Palembang, Demang Lebar Daun heard of how Wan Empuk and Wan Malini had met the three princes, he went to meet them in order to pay homage. He was honoured by Sang Sapurba. The other rulers of Sumatra also went to pay homage to the prince. After this, Sang Sapurba wanted to marry. He married the daughters of the Sumatran rulers. But whenever he slept with one of them, she would become afflicted with chloasma, whereupon he would cast her aside.

Wan Empuk and Wan Malini then told Sang Sapurba that Demang Lebar Daun, the ruler of Palembang, also had a daughter by the name of Sendari. He commanded them to approach her father on his behalf. Demang Lebar Daun responded by saying, 'If the Lord takes my daughter to wife, she will surely be afflicted with chloasma. However, if the Lord will make a covenant with me, then will I surrender my daughter to him.'

When Sang Sapurba asked what Demang Lebar Daun had in mind, the latter said: 'All my descendants are willing to be hamba submissive to you the Yang Dipertuan, if they are treated well by your descendants. And if they do wrong, no matter how grave the wrong, do not disgrace
and insult them with evil words. Even if their crime is punishable by death, that should be dealt with according to the laws of the Syariah.' Sang Sapurba agreed to this condition and set one of his own in return: 'Let it be until the end of time that your descendants should never commit treason against my descendants, even if any one of my descendants is unjust and evil.' Demang Lehar Daun in turn agreed and said, 'So be it, Lord. But if your descendants were to break this covenant first, then my descendants will break it too.' Sang Sapurba agreed, swearing that whosoever were to break this promise, would have his house uprooted.

After this covenant had been firmly established, Demang Lebar Daun's daughter, Wan Sendari, and Sang Sapurba married, without the former becoming afflicted with chloasma. They had four children, one of whom was a son named Sang Nila Utama.

Subsequently, Sang Sapurba set off on a journey with his fleet, eventually reaching Bintan, which was at that time ruled by a female queen by the name of Permaisuri Iskandar Syah. She adopted Sang Sapurba as her brother, while his son, Sang Nila Utama, was married to her daughter, Wan Seri Beni. Sang Sapurba then left Bintan, leaving his son behind. Demang Lebar Daun stayed on in Bintan, because he was very fond of his grandson Sang Nila Utama.

Sang Nila Utama eventually also left Bintan and founded a new kingdom in Temasik/Singapore. After the death of Permasuri Iskandar Syah and Demang Lebar Daun, Sang Nila Utama appointed the latter's son as the ruler of Bintan, with the title of Tun Telanai. Tun Telanai's descendants were the ones who subsequently bore the title of Telanai Bintan, and who had the right to eat rice and betel-nut in the sultan's audience-hall, while wearing a silk kerchief.
In the context of this version of the founding myth, at least two details of my informants' discourse on Bintan are significant -- the remembrance of the golden padi of Wan Empuk and Wan Malini on Bukit Si-Guntang, the special privileges accorded to the keturunan Bintan and the claim that they are descended from Palembang migrants. What further amplifies this significance is that my informants refer to the Palembang migrants as orang penaung 'people who give shade or shelter'. As mentioned above, in the founding myth told in the Penurunan, Wan Empuk and Wan Malini did indeed provide shelter for the three princes they encountered on Bukit Si-Guntang. Furthermore, they became rich through harvesting the padi that had been turned into gold by the three princes. This suggests a reciprocal exchange of shelter for gold, and vice-versa. The remembrance of the golden padi of Wan Empuk and Wan Malini may thus be interpreted also as a reminder of the shelter that they provided for the three princes.

As my tengku informant had put it, kalau baik berpada-pada, kalau jahat jangan sekali, a saying which he interpreted thus: if all is well, then rest content; but if things are vile, then rest not for an instant. This reciprocity of good for good and evil for evil is made explicit in the founding myth told in the Penurunan -- that is, through the covenant established between Demang Lebar Daun and Sang Sapurba. The former's descendants are to submit to the latter's descendants, on condition that they are never to be abused. Furthermore, Demang Lebar Daun specifically states that if Sang Sapurba's descendants were to break this covenant first, then so will his own descendants.

The claim that the keturunan Bintan are descended from the Palembang migrants thus implies that it was their ancestor who had established the covenant with Sang Sapurba, the founding ancestor of the Melaka dynasty. This further implies that when the Laksamana
Bintan rebelled against Sultan Mahmud and assassinated him in 1699, he was only repaying the latter's perfidy for breaking the covenant first. It was thus quite plausible for the bendahara's descendants to legitimate the bendahara's succession in terms of a combat between Sultan Mahmud and Megat Seri Rama, which had resulted from the former's breach of the social contract. My informants' discourse on Bintan may thus be interpreted in the context of a strategy of legitimation based not on descent alone, but also on a covenant, a social contract that had been established between ruler and subject in Palembang.

But the question arises: why were the keturunan Bintan singled out as the focus of such a strategy? I do not know whether there is any historical validity to my informants' identification of Sultan Mahmud's murderer as an orang Bintan. None of the written sources seems to have recorded this. Indeed, according to the Dutch Governor's missive to Batavia concerning this event, most of the orang kaya were involved, and although one particular orang kaya launched the attack, thirty to forty other armed men followed by stabbing the sultan to death. Not only that, according to this source, it appears that the bendahara was himself implicated in the plot.

In contrast, both the indigenous sources and my informants describe the event not even as the work of a solo assassin, but rather, as a one-to-one combat between 'the one who was raja' and 'the one who was megat'. But even the indigenous sources do not mention that the megat was an orang Bintan, or that the keturunan Bintan are not allowed to go to Kota Tinggi. That detail comes only from my informants. The evidence thus suggests that the identification of Sultan Mahmud's murderer as an orang Bintan was a singling out that was done post facto, so as to accord with the attempt to legitimate
power in terms of a social contract supposedly established on Bukit Si-Guntang.

The construction of such a justification would have required a detailed knowledge of the founding legend told in the Penurunan. Indeed, my aristocrat informants are the ones who can trace most explicitly the intricate linkages in this myth. Significantly, since the amount of mas kawin specified for each derajat was a matter that was decided upon by customary law, this suggests that the one paha's weight in gold and a stalk of golden grain were intended by the rulers who were the bendahara's descendants, to figure as a vivid representation of the social contract enacted in Palembang.

But would this intended message have been correctly interpreted by the mostly illiterate orang kebanyakan 'masses' of the time who had no access to the written sources? Another detail I have been told by my informants suggests that certain practices were deliberately institutionalised to amplify the message of legitimation through social contract. Various informants told me that unlike other people elsewhere, the keturunan Bintan were dimuliakan (in Bintan pronunciation, demelia) 'honoured' by the rulers through the bestowal of special privileges such as the right to enter the istana 'palace', and the right to wear a yellow or white tetampan 'an embroidered kerchief of silk worn ceremonially on the shoulder by court attendant' or selepang 'shawl thrown on and over the shoulder'. Yellow and white are considered royal colours that were the prerogative of the orang bangsawan in zaman sultan; yellow was the colour of the keturunan raja and keturunan tengku, and white was that of the keturunan tuan said. These privileges are particularly significant in the context of the founding myth. As mentioned above, the post-1699 version of the Penurunan specifically states that Demang Lebar Daun's son Tun Telanai and his descendants were privileged to eat rice and betel-nut in the
Another bestowed right of the keturunan Bintan was, to use my informants' term, mati berjulang 'to be borne aloft on death'. This was explained to me in the following way: after death, the corpse of a keturunan Bintan can be borne aloft with the bearers stretching out their arms high. In other words, the stretcher on which the corpse lies, is not merely carried on the shoulders of the bearers, but is lifted higher, at the height of outstretched arms. As my informants said, raja baru boleh berjulang 'only rulers had the right to be borne aloft in this way'. In the context of Sultan Mahmud's murder supposedly by a Laksamana Bintan, this bestowed right is particularly significant, because the murdered sultan's posthumous title is Mangkat Dijulang 'He Who Died While Being Borne Aloft', a title by which he is still referred to at present. (See Winstedt 1979:50.)

A kind of structural symmetry may thus be discerned between Sultan Mahmud's mangkat dijulang and the keturunan Laksamana Bintan's mati berjulang. This is a symmetry of opposite movements: The posthumous title implies that Sultan Mahmud died while being borne aloft, and consequently fell from his lofty perch. Mati berjulang, however, means that the keturunan Laksamana Bintan die and are then lifted up on high. Thus the sultan fell downwards, while the keturunan Bintan are lifted upwards. The symmetry between mangkat dijulang and mati berjulang may thus be read as a symbolic statement on the supposed events and consequences of 1699. I say 'supposed events' because although there is relatively firm evidence that Sultan Mahmud was indeed murdered, there is no firm evidence that it was by a Laksamana Bintan.

Whether or not the murderer was a Laksamana Bintan in historical fact, in mythological interpretation at least, there seems to have

sultan's audience-hall, wearing a tetampan.
been an upward social move for the keturunan Bintan after 1699. In my tengku informant’s account given above, for example, he started out by identifying Megat Seri Rama as a 'hamba raja, under the raja'. But by the end of his account, he was referring to itu raja 'the one who was raja' and itu megat 'the one who was megat', speaking of them as equal opponents in a one-to-one confrontation. The logic of gladiatorial combat implies that the megat who killed the raja should have become the new raja; but in the story, this logical outcome is forestalled by the megat's own death. Nevertheless, this implication seems to have been worked out among his keturunan, who appear to have been socially uplifted. Indeed some informants rank the keturunan Bintan as a higher derajat than the encik. Others even say:

Keturunan Bintan bukan raja tapi hampir raja.

(The keturunan Bintan are not raja but are very nearly raja.)

Perhaps it is now clearer why so many of my informants were willing and even eager to claim descent from a regicide. To make such a claim is to acknowledge the relative power of the keturunan Bintan, as inherited from an orang kuat 'strong person' who was able to kill a raja. As a Seking informant said about kekuatan 'strength':

Kalau zaman dulu, siapa yang lebih kuat bunuh yang kurang kuat.

(In former times, whosoever was the stronger killed whosoever was weaker.)

This statement is comparable to that made by my Karas informant cited above:

Kalau zaman dulu, siapa yang kuat menang; siapa yang kalah mati.

(In former times, whosoever was strong would win; whosoever that lost would die.)
The underlying logic is: to kill is to win, to lose is to die. So the megat and the raja killed each other; therefore they both won and lost. This implies that they were equally kuat.

However, both died. So even though the keturunan Bintan may have been 'very nearly raja', they were nevertheless not so. Instead, they had to remain subject to the third party to whom the throne went — namely, the bendahara. Therefore the special privileges bestowed on the keturunan Bintan merely served the purpose of lifting them into an honorary position of being orang pertengahan, which was apparently only an honorary position, because in spite of being so uplifted, the keturunan Bintan were still treated as a suku to whom was assigned a specified kerahan. So those who tried but failed to be raja must still remain hamba.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. Bateson (1973:42) gives the following example of symmetrical schismogenesis:

...If boasting is the reply to boasting,...each group will drive the other into excessive emphasis of the pattern, a process which if not restrained can only lead to more and more extreme rivalry and ultimately to hostility and the breakdown of the whole system.

2. Bateson (1973:42) gives the following example of complementary schismogenesis:

...It is likely that submissiveness will promote further assertiveness which in turn will promote further submissiveness. This schismogenesis, unless it is restrained, leads to a progressive unilateral distortion of the personalities of the members of both groups, which results in mutual hostility between them and must end in the breakdown of the system.

3. Wilkinson (1959:391) translates the term hamba in the following way:


4. The other 'blessed things' from Mecca included:

a carpet from Istanbul; two rings set with large stones, one a glowing emerald and the other a rich ruby; a Turkish rifle chased with gold and two or three bolts of cloth to be made into jackets...and various kinds of gold brocade from Mecca the Exalted, as well as water from the well of Zamzam, toothpicks and even dried camel meat.

(Raja Ali Haji 1982:256).

The term that Matheson and Andaya (1982:256) have translated as 'blessed things' is berkat. Wilkinson (1959:128) translates it as 'God's blessing working through his favoured ones'. This concept will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six.

5. Although Islam certainly does not advocate slavery, it does nevertheless recognise its existence. As noted by Muhammad Ali (1973: 543):

Slavery was an institution recognised by all people before Islam. To Islam belongs the credit of laying down principles which, if developed on the right lines, would have brought about its ultimate extinction. But it was not the work of a day, and therefore, as long as the institution remained, provision had to be made for slaves which should make them as good citizens as the free men.
There are indeed many injunctions in the Quran about how slaves should be treated; see, for example, Chapter 24, verses 32 and 33. A. Yusuf Ali (1983:906) notes:

The law of slavery in the legal sense of the term is now obsolete. While it had any meaning, Islam made the slave's lot as easy as possible. A slave, male or female, could ask for conditional manumission by a written deed fixing the amount required for manumission and allowing the slave meanwhile to earn money by lawful means and perhaps marry and bring up a family. Such a deed was not to be refused if the request was genuine and the slave had character. Not only that, but the master is directed to help with money out of his own resources in order to enable the slave to earn his or her own liberty.

6. The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1976:230) explains the word 'corvee' as denoting a 'day's work of unpaid labour due by vassals; labour done in lieu of taxes; onerous task'. This is quite close to the meaning of the Malay word kerahan.

7. This accords with Wilkinson's (1959:565) translation of the word kerah as 'calling people together for public service; corvee; conscription'. Sopher (1977:90) also explains kerahan as the provision of 'traditional service to the Malay lords' in lieu of a head-tax, which he describes (ibid.:269) as:

the system by which the Orang Laut of the Riou-Lingga Archipelago and the adjacent coasts and islands are arranged in feudally organised territorial groups, sukus, with various kinds of obligations of service, kerahan. Such feudal clans were most characteristic of the Riou-Lingga Archipelago, but the same pattern of social organisation was found among the Sekah of Billiton, though not of Bangka, and among most of the boat people on the east coast of Sumatra. In the Pulau Tujuh, the suku organisation had become very much blurred, but each island group had kerahan obligations to the local ruler, who was himself a vassal of Bintang or Lingga. This geographic area corresponds with that in which the title of batin is in use among the Orang Laut.

8. Wilkinson's (1959:391) own elaboration of the term hamba seems to be supportive of such a connotation:

Also of Indian convicts (hamba kompeni, benduan); and (fig.) of the humble generally, as God's slaves or God's poor (hamba Allah). Descriptively of birds that seem to work for others, e.g. the drongo as the monkey's attendant (hamba kera), the osprey that warns the shellfish when the tide is coming in (hamba siput), etc.

Of humble service generally with no direct suggestion of slavery; cf.: kehambaan yang khas (services entailing no dishonour)...; the knave (hamba) at cards; the first person singular as "your humble servant"; and an offer of marriage (minta perhamba) as a promise of devoted service.

The Pekaka people on Bulang numbered about 1,050. [They]...were known as pirates, although they also carried out some fishing.

Significantly, Terong is indeed in the Bulan area. (See Map 3.)

10. My analysis of the importance of kerahan is supported by Logan's (1847:336) description of what he terms 'the ethnology of the Johor archipelago':

This archipelago, embracing several hundreds of islets, besides the considerable islands of Battam, Bintang, Krimun, Gampang, Gallat, Linga and Sinkep, is thinly inhabited by several interesting tribes.... The more important tribes are those termed collectively Orang Pesuku-an, literally the people divided into tribes. They are all vassals of the King. Those of the highest rank, to whom distinct services are appropriated when the King goes to sea or engages in war, are the Orang Bentan under an Ulubalang, the Orang Singgera, under a Batin, the Orang Kopet under a Jinnang, the Orang Bulo and the Orang Linga. The other tribes, some of the land and some of the creeks or sea, are the Orang Gilam, Orang Bekaka, Orang Sugi, Orang Muro, Orang Tambus, Orang Mantang, Orang Kilong, Orang Timiang, Orang Mau, Orang Pulo Boya and Orang Silat. Besides these, there are some wild tribes in the interior of the larger islands.

As we can see, some of the names listed by Logan in the nineteenth century are still mentioned by my informants:

the 'Orang Bentan'/suku Bintan
the 'Orang Kopet'/suku Kopit
the 'Orang Gilam'/suku Gelam
the 'Orang Bekaka'/suku Pekaka
the 'Orang Mantang'/suku Mantang

The words orang and suku are indeed used interchangeably by my informants in this context. Apart from the abovementioned, they also talk about the orang/suku Moro, the orang/suku Temiang, and the orang/suku Selat, which are on Logan's list. Significantly, Logan says that the 'Orang Bentan' and the 'Orang Kopet' were of a higher rank than the others such as the 'Orang Gilam', the 'Orang Bekaka', and the 'Orang Mantang'. This description is not unlike the impression I have derived from my informants. Furthermore, Logan mentions that the highest sukus were those engaged in expeditions and war. This supports my argument that the higher-ranking sukus were also the more powerful ones.

11. A letter by Captain Francis Light written in 1790 contains the following passage:

Among the Various Modes of imposing Taxes on the people, there is none the Malays will so readily Comprehend and Submit to as a Capitation Tax, or to call it by a name more agreeable to a British Ear, a Royal or General Tax, by which the Subject is released from all feudal Service. By frequent Conversations with the Malays, I learn that
the Services required by the King are attended with much grievance, from the great loss of time, & the Vexatious extortions of his inferior officers. They would gladly compound to pay 4, or even 6, Dollars per annum for their freedom.

(Factory Records, Straits Settlements 4, 1790-91:40-41).

12. These Boyanese were migrants from the island of Bawean, off the north coast of Java. Since my informants use the term orang Boyan, rather than the term orang Bawean, I shall follow their usage. See Vredenbregt (1964) on the migration patterns of this island population.

13. According to nineteenth-century European records, the Galang people were indeed known to be highly active pirates. (See, for example, Logan 1849:584-585; and Begbie 1967:270-272.) Moreover, it was noted by Christiaan van Angelbeek, head of the Dutch Bureau of Native Affairs, in his general report of 1825 that one of 'the two principal piratical chiefs of the Malay empire' was 'Rajah Lang, in the island of Bulang, under whom are all the Rayats of Gallang, of Bulang and some other islands situated at or near to the entrance of the straits of Malacca' (Logan 1849:634). So there is documentary evidence that there was indeed a Raja Alang Laut who led the Galang people, as claimed by my informants. In the context of the power struggle between Engku Muda's faction and Raja Ali's faction, as described in Chapter Four, it is possible that Raja Alang Laut was a follower of the former, especially since his territory evidently lay within the temenggung's purview. (See note 42 in Chapter Four.) Indeed, Sopher (1977:105) even suggests that 'a half-brother of the Viceroy, Tengku Long of Bulan', with whom Raffles negotiated about Singapore, was 'possibly a relative of the notorious Raja Lang of Bulan, who came into prominence a few years later as panglima of the rayats of Galang'. This Tengku Long was, of course, none other than the Tengku Long who became Sultan Husain Syah of Singapore. He was the half-brother of Komeng/Tengku Jumat who became Sultan Abd al-Rahman. (See Genealogical Chart 1.) As mentioned in Chapter Four, my raja informants claim that Raja Alang Laut belonged to Sultan Sulaiman's keturunan. If that were so, then he would indeed have been related to Tengku Long. It is significant that Raja Alang Laut apparently rose to prominence a few years after Raffles' negotiations with Tengku Long. As I have pointed out in Chapter Two, under the terms of the London-Dutch treaty of 1824, the Galang and Bulan areas were transferred from the temenggung to the yamtuan muda in Penyengat. Such a foreign-imposed act evidently met with resistance among the Galang people.

14. Interestingly, in a letter written from Kedah in 1787, Captain Francis Light had noted that that part of the Malay Peninsula was 'very thinly inhabited...[with] only 5 or 6 villages situated 3 or 4 miles from the sea shore; between the villages and the sea is thick jungle, left to prevent the Malay pirates from making incursions to their habitations' (Factory Records, Straits Settlements 2 1786-87:545).
15. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:

Kalau dapat orang betina yang ngandung, panglima Galang bertaruh sama dia, sangka anaknya jantan atau betina, jadi dia belah perut orang perempuan itu, nengok anak ada perut.

This is not standardised Malay syntax, but is literally what was said.

16. Logan (1848:360), for example, noted the number of slaves kept by the Riau aristocrats at that time.

17. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:

Datuk Kaya Mepar, jugak dipanggil orang Datuk Kaya Montil -- dia yang bawa orang Ladi ke sini. Dia netap sini; orang Ladi anak buahnya. Dari Daiklah. Tidak ada yang balik ke Daik; semua tinggal sini.

18. Apparently, this Penghulu Hamba Raja, a title which may be translated as 'Chief of the Ruler's Vassals', and his brother, the Orang Kaya Lingga, were the leaders of the pirates in Lingga.

These offices were not inherited and were given at the ruler's discretion. ...The then Orang Kaya of Lingga was an opium addict and left most of the government of the orang laut to his brother.

(Matheson and Andaya 1982:391).

The two leading aristocrats who arranged the meetings between Angelbeek and the Penghulu Hamba Raja were, respectively 'Tunku Said Mahomad Zein' or Tuan Said Engku Sharif Muhammad Zain al-Kudsi, and 'Ibrahim, the Selawatang of Lingga' or Suliwatang Ibrahim. (See Logan 1849:635; Raja Ali Haji 1982:328; Matheson and Andaya 1982:383.)

19. One such place is located in the northern entrance of Riau Strait, the main trade route of the area. This is Malang Ladi, which is 'a group of rocks always above-water' (Indonesia Pilot 1975:I,133). Another is Pulau Ladi, which is located off the southern extremity of Bulan island. (See ibid.:151 and Map 3.)

20. Concerning the organisation of these government-sponsored raids, Matheson and Andaya (1982:391) have noted:

These...chiefs supplied ammunition and provisions to...captains who actually commanded the pirating expeditions. After a successful raid the profits were shared among the various chiefs with a large percentage allotted to the Sultan.

21. The relationship between violence and the state has been commented upon by Weber (1919):

'Every state is founded on force', said Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk. That is indeed right. If no social institutions existed which knew the use of violence, then the concept of 'state' would be eliminated.... The
relation between the state and violence is an especially intimate one.... A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.... The right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the 'right' to use violence.

(Quoted from Gerth and Mills 1958:78).

22. This was Tuan Said Engku Sharif Muhammad Zain al-Kusi. He was the anak gundik of an Arab, Abd al-Rahman al-Kusi, and a Siamese slave.

...He had been born at Palembang but had moved to Lingga as a young man because of his commercial interests. He became very wealthy and with Sultan Mahmud's permission, married Tunku Saripa, the daughter of another Arab, and whose mother was Sultan Mahmud's cousin or niece.... After her death, he married her half-sister.

(Matheson and Andaya 1982:383).

23. In his report of 1825, he made a comparison between the pirates and the aristocrats, referring to the former as 'Rayats' or Orang Laut, and the latter as 'Orang Malayu':

The Rayats or Orang Laut do not appear to belong to the Malay race; there is, at least, a great difference between an Orang Malayu and a Rayat. The language is, with trifling exceptions, the same; it is in the character of these two people that the principal difference is found. This fact may be explained by saying that this arises from the Orang Malayu having attained a higher degree of civilisation....

(Quoted from Logan 1849:634-635).

(Rayat is the old spelling of rakyat 'subject'.)

24. As pointed out by Andaya and Matheson (1979:110):

It was Penyengat, the seat of the Yamtuhan Muda, which provided Riau with its religious and secular leadership, and it was Penyengat, rather than the sultan's residence on Lingga, which was the real heart of the kingdom.

25. This Islamising attitude is also evident in Raja Ali Haji's Thammarat al-Mahammah 'The Benefits of Religious Duties' which, according to Andaya and Matheson (1979:116),

bears a close resemblance to al-Ghazali's Nasihat al-Muluk (Counsel for Kings), the [Persian theologian's] famous treatise on Islamic statecraft. Both works reflect the view that the function of the state, and the principal duty of society, is to provide a climate conducive to proper observance of religion, so that every man can fulfil his spiritual obligations and prepare himself for the Day of Judgement. For this reason God
has appointed kings, who are to set an example of righteous behaviour and assist men in their preparations for the world to come. Rulers have a special responsibility in the maintenance of religion, for they, above all others, have been granted knowledge and the capacity to use it. Able to differentiate between right and wrong, it is they who set the standards for society's moral conduct.

26. Concerning this deposition, Raja Ali Haji wrote in his Tuhfat:

This action was in accordance with the command of Allah Almighty in the glorious Koran. 'Thou givest sovereignty unto whom Thou wilt and Thou withdrawest sovereignty from whom Thou wilt. Thou exaltest whom Thou wilt and Thou abasest whom Thou wilt. In Thy hand in the good. Lo! Thou art able to do all things.' [from the Quran, Surah 3-25.]


The deposition of a reigning sultan evidently offended many in the sultanate. A rebellion on behalf of the deposed Sultan Mahmud broke out in Retih, but it was quickly and bloodily quashed by the Bugis rajas who fought side by side with the Dutch. (See Map 1.) As Andaya and Matheson (1979:125) have pointed out, there is probably a direct link between Sultan Mahmud's deposition in 1857, the Retih rebellion in 1858, and Raja Ali Haji's Thammarat al-Mahammah which was completed in 1859. I suggest that this link may be understood in terms of the Thamarat being a Bugis justification for deposing Sultan Mahmud and quashing the Retih rebellion.

27. Significantly, my informant Tengku Ahmad gives a contrary view of this event in his book by totally ignoring the role of the Bugis in dethroning Sultan Mahmud IV, instead putting the blame entirely on the Dutch. (See Appendix 7.)

28. This identity between political and religious leadership began with the Prophet Muhammad and was institutionalised after his death in the form of the caliphate, from which the sultanate later derived. (See Farah 1970:154; Rauf 1964:56,68,76.)

29. My informants still talk about the sultanate of Siak as an object-lesson illustrating how kuasa kerajaan jatuh kepada tuan said 'political power fell to the tuan said'. This 'fall' is mentioned repeatedly in the Tuhfat, one such mention being the following:

...the kingdom of Siak fell into the hands of Sayid Ali, son of Uthman, son of Syahab who was of another race, the Lord Sayids.


According to the Tuhfat, Sayid Ali's appropriation of political office was achieved through treachery and deceit. (See ibid.:207-210.)
30. In Islam the Prophet Muhammad may be regarded as a mediator in that God's message to humanity was revealed through him. Indeed, conversion to Islam involves the public recognition of Muhammad's role as the sole messenger of God. (See Chapter Seven.)

31. These were categories that the Dutch colonial government had used to differentiate the coloured population; whites could not, by definition, be either of these. Under Dutch classification, the Arabs were generally lumped with the Chinese and the Japanese as freemde Oosterlingen. (See Anderson 1983:112.)

32. The Syari'ah 'Islamic law' is therefore basically Shafi'ite in character. And the political leader of an Islamic community, such as the caliph, sultan or amir, is supposed to govern the community according to the tenets of the Syari'ah. (See Farah 1970:194.)

33. With regards to this phenomenon of mediation, the Weberian analysis of traditional states is relevant:

Political organisations in traditional states are of an 'estate' character, in which the means of administration are controlled by the officialdom. But such decentralised systems of political power typically exist in an uneasy balance with the centralised administration of an overlord or monarch. The monarch normally attempts to consolidate his position by creating a staff which is materially dependent upon him, and by the formation of his own professional army. The greater the degree to which the ruler succeeds in surrounding himself with a propertyless staff responsible only to him, the less he is challenged by nominally subordinate powers. (Giddens 1971:180).

34. Although Wilkinson (1959:269) has translated the word datuk as 'grandfather', in my informants' usage, the term is not gender-specific, a further qualification being needed to differentiate between datuk laki-laki 'male grandparent' and datuk perempuan 'female grandfather'. My informants generally do not use the term nenek for 'grandmother'. Indeed Wilkinson (1959:802) derives nenek from the Minangkabau ninik and the Javanese nini.

35. Milner (1982:28) has observed that in the nineteenth century, wealth implied 'political influence in the form of a sizeable personal following'. And Anderson (1826:268) noted that in East Sumatra, a man was 'accounted rich or respectable according to the number of his followers'.

36. Wilkinson (1959:955) explains the word rakyat thus:

Arabic: = "herd at pasture", i.e. the subjects of a shepherd or king... peasant; private soldier; the humbler people in a state,.... the masses; the plebs. In a military sense rayat means militia or conscripted troops in contrast to professional soldiers (hulubalang). Orang rakyat are also specifically the Proto-Malayan subjects of a Malay Chief or Sultan, in contrast to his own civilised Malays. They rank, however, higher than his orang Sakai or non-Malayan 'aborigines', except in the
Riau Archipelago where all are Proto-Malayan and are styled sakai and rayat, 'Sakai' being the higher.

But my informants use the term sakai only for a Sumatran community of jungle-dwellers. (See Chapter One.) They are, however, acquainted with the word rakyat as a synonym for the hamba raja/orang kerahan/orang persukuan. But it is rarely used in this sense, probably because in the present context, the word rakyat is used more frequently to refer to the Indonesian masses.

37. Wilkinson (1959:391) has noted:

As a pronoun of the first person hamba is in common use among Malays who are on friendly but not familiar terms. It is more formal than aku; less respectful than hamb-enche', hamba-dato', hamba-tuan; less ceremonious than di-perhamba; and not as specialized as beta, kita, sahaya, patek, pachal, kerichal.

38. Wilkinson (1959:999) translates sahaya thus:

Humble servant; follower; domestic; your humble servant; I (in polite but not obsequious language). Usually pronounced sahaya or saya. In regular use among Europeans as the pronoun of the first person. Cf. also sahaya tuan and sahaya dato' (your lordship's servant).

As a slave a sahaya was a household worker and ranked higher than a hamba who worked in the fields. Hamba sahaya (serfs and slaves) represented slaves of all sorts;... sahaya permerdehekaan (libertinus, freed slave)...;

39. In this context, it is significant that the sultan was usually addressed as tuanku 'my master', with the implication that he was the master of each individual subject, irrespective of the latter's rank. It seems to me that the various terms used for the aristocrats were derived from tuanku - for example, tengku, engku, and wan. Of these, tengku is phonemically closest to tuanku, and indeed the aristocrats bearing this title were regarded as a little higher than the other aristocrats, for they had the right to become sultan. The loss of the 't' in engku may be linguistically significant. As Benjamin (1984:46-47) has argued,

Insofar as [the verbal prefix] ter- cancels the sense of 'in-progress', it possesses the 'perfected-state' meaning that Winstedt saw as underlying its varied uses.

I suggest that the contrast between tengku and engku is the result of a backformation which treated the 't' in tengku as if it were a ter-. When I questioned my informants about the difference between tengku and engku, my raja informants said that the presence or absence of a 't' is insignificant but my tengku informants in Lingga stressed that only they had the right to be called tengku. Indeed, despite my raja informants' disclaimer, they do not ever use the term tengku for themselves.

As for the term wan, this too seems to have resulted from the loss of the 't' in tuan. This makes sense since wan is used as a
term of address for the **tuan said**. Significantly, the -ku 'I' suffix is missing. This implies that whereas the **tuan said** may be **tuan 'masters'** in a general sense, they were not specifically the masters of each individual subject in the realm.

40. To be subservient is to be 'serving as means, having merely instrumental relation, (to); subordinate to' (**The Concise Oxford Dictionary** 1976:1150).

41. According to Wilkinson (1959:861), the word **pegawai** denotes a tool, an instrument, a 'person who carries out a duty'.

42. The term **khadam** may also be applied to a male palace domestic. But the male **khadam** is irrelevant in the context of **mas kawin**.

43. In his analysis of the Raffles MS.18 recension of the **Penurunan**, Bowen (1983:165-166) states:

> The chapters of the text present the creation of the Malay polity as the union of a sacred line of kings with an indigenous people. The mediator of this union, the local Malay chief, is, I believe, the prototype for the later office of Bendahara, which thereafter preserved by an alliance with the royal line the original compact between rulers and subjects... From the generation of Iskandar Syah to the time of the kingdom of Johor, the relation between the royal descent-line and the line of the Bendahara is portrayed as an asymmetrical marriage alliance.

I would like to suggest that this asymmetrical marriage alliance was not limited only to the king and the **bendahara**, but that it constituted a general pattern of relations between the ruling aristocracy and the ruled lower ranks.

44. The prefix **encik** does not seem to be used at all in Riau at present, probably because there are no longer appointments to good positions within the sultanate, since there is no longer any sultanate. Interestingly, in contrast, in Malaysia, where there are still Melayu sultanates, the word **encik** is in regular use as a polite honorific for almost anyone. When I first arrived in Riau, I was asked by my Pangkil informants what they should call me; so I said just the normal would do. When they asked what that was, I said that in Malaysia and Singapore, we call everyone **encik**. To my subsequent embarrassment, I became the only person that they called **encik**. Fortunately, I learnt enough about the intricacies of derajat in time to save myself from making the same mistake with my other informants. However, it appears that during the time of the former sultanate, the term **encik** was widely applied in extended usage, almost in the way that is still used in Singapore and Malaysia. It appears that the term **encik** is applied in extended usage only when its proper usage does exist in the first instance. In other words, it seems to be the case, at least in Riau, that only when there really are **encik datuk** and **encik keturunan**, that one can apply the term to others who are really non-**encik**, and by such extended application, accord to them the courtesy of treating them as if they were **encik** indeed. This would perhaps explain why the term **encik** is no longer used by my informants, even if in the past, the term itself could be used in an extended sense: there is now no original to extend from.
45. To use Giddens' words (1971:162):

Charisma may... be treated as a quality which is passed on through heredity, and is consequently possessed by the closest relatives of the original bearer.... When charismatic domination is transmuted into a routine, traditional form, it becomes the sacred source of legitimation for the position of those holding power; in this way charisma forms a persisting element in social life. While this is 'alien to its essence', there is still justification, Weber says, for speaking of the persistence of 'charisma', since as a sacred force it maintains its extraordinary character.

46. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:


Jadi, Megat Seri Rama yang tersebut tadi, dia ada isteri. (Ya, itu megat macam panglimalah, menjaga kerajaan, menjaga laut-laut semua sekali, macam perwiralah.) Jadi pada satu hari isteri Megat mengandung, ingin mahu makan nangka. Di belakang raja punya rumah ada pohon nangka. Jadi penjaga kebun dia tengok raja lagi sedang tidur, itu ada nangka busuk, kasi sikit sama isteri Megat. Jadi, raja bangun dari tidur siang itu; orang istana, yang pengkebun itu, dia sembahkan nangka. Tapi dia bilang, 'Tadi ada satu yang busuk, saya kasi sama isteri Megat kerana isteri Megat itu mengandung, mahu makan nangka.' Jadi raja marah bilang, 'Aku belum makan, engkau kasi sama orang. Panggil orang itu, aku mahu lihat anak dalam perut, betul tak itu makan nangka.' Jadi dia panggil betul-betul dia belah perut isteri Megat, lihat betul anak didalam perut itu makan nangka.

Itu cerita Melayu. Kalau nya tak percaya, tanya itu; semua orang bilang.

Jadi Megat tentulah marah. Dia balik dari laut; dia juga perampok-perampok itu semua. Dia marah begitu macam; kalau baik berpada-pada, kalau jahat, jangan sekali. Artinya, kalau kita baik, baik betul-betullah; tapi kalau mau jahat, jahat satu kali, jangan bikin baik lagi.

matilah; jadi itu sultan sumpah, 'Itu orang Bintan, sampai tujuh keturunan tidak boleh pergi ke Johor; kalau naik ke Johor, muntah darah, mati.'

Betul, nya. Tapi kalau sekarang saya tak tahulah. Tapi kalau sepuluh tahun dulu orang Bintan asli, kalau pergi Johor, muntah -- Kota Tinggi, sebab dia punya makam ini ada Kota Tinggi. Makam Tauhid itu.


47. There is documentary evidence to indicate that the killing of Sultan Mahmud was an actual historical event. The following is Andaya's (1975:186) translated summary of a missive from Gov. van Hoorn of Malacca to Batavia (17 Oct. 1699, fols. 126-7):

In October 1699 a Moor recently arrived from Johor told the Dutch at Malacca that Sultan Mahmud had been murdered with the complicity of most of the Orang Kaya in Johor. The main reasons given by the Johorese for the assassination of the ruler were his unbearable tyranny, his growing numbers of arbitrary murders, and his outrageous behaviour towards the wives of the Orang Kaya. His practice of forcing the wives of the Orang Kaya to come to him and then mistreating them horribly finally provoked one of the Orang Kaya to commit derhaka [treason]. With the assistance of thirty to forty armed men and the acquiescence of the other Orang Kaya, this person attacked Sultan Mahmud one morning when he was riding through the market on the shoulders of his servant. Sultan Mahmud offered little resistance and fell to the ground after being stabbed by this Orang Kaya. He was then descended upon by the other men who stabbed the sultan to death. The corpse was dragged naked to the front of the Bendahara's balai where the body lay exposed until the afternoon. After the Bendahara had been proclaimed ruler with the consent of the assembled populace, he ordered that Sultan Mahmud's naked corpse be draped with eight ells of linen and taken away. The body was then perfunctorily buried with little ceremony.

This event is also mentioned by Captain Alexander Hamilton writing in 1727. (See Winstedt 1979:49-50.) Andaya (1975:3-17,186-191) notes that the post-1699 indigenous texts substantiate the European reports of Sultan Mahmud's murder.
Indeed, the account given by my tengku informant accords essentially with the descriptions given in the Tuhfat al-Nafis and in the eighteenth-century text that Andaya (1975) calls the 'Siak Chronicles'.

When Tengku Ahmad told me the story, it was in the context of a wide-ranging conversation which covered many other topics; and he certainly was not referring to any text at that moment. Indeed, before he told me the story, he even checked with me to see if I had heard it already from others. If so, he said, there was not much point in his repeating it. I had to convince him that although I knew something of the story, I wanted to hear him tell it. So it is interesting that an oral account that was told on the spur of the moment should accord so well with written accounts of the same event in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century indigenous texts.

48. See note 11 in Chapter One.

49. According to this post-1699 version of the Penurunan, Sang Nila Utama had two sons. The older one, Raja Kecil Besar, married an Indian princess, while the younger one, Raja Kecil Muda, married a grand-daughter of Demang Lebar Daun. After Sang Nila Utama died, Raja Kecil Besar became the king, while Raja Kecil Muda became the bendahara.

The myth continues with such events as the fall of Temasik/Singapore and the founding of Melaka. But in the context of our present discussion, the section above will suffice. Bowen (1983:171) points out that only in the post-1699 version of the Penurunan, is the first ever bendahara portrayed as the younger brother of the ruler:

The Bendahara now figured as junior royalty by descent rather than as a pre-eminent subject by alliance, and thus had a textual claim to the royal daulat [sanctity].

The later sections of the post-1966 text also consistently imply that the line of bendaharas derived from Bukit Si-Guntang. (See ibid.:172.) Moy (1975:vol.48,p.68) notes that in the Tuhfat, the first bendahara is also described as the brother of the ruler:

He was, therefore, the vital source of royal blood for the Bendahara lineage, ranking it second to the rulers' line. This is particularly significant when we recall that it was a Bendahara who succeeded the childless Mahmud II in 1699 A.D.

50. As Andaya (1975:190-191) has pointed out,

The overt act of regicide in 1699 with the participation of the Orang Kaya meant not only the death of a ruler, but the demise of a set of values which had been maintained with regard to the sacredness of the ruler, the depth and extent of loyalty which should be accorded him, and the special nature of his position within the society. If the ruler were no longer 'the sacred lodestone' around which the community evolved and gained its meaning and purpose, he was then just a primus inter pares secure in his position only with the mutual consent
of the society and not by some supernatural force. Thus the relationship was valid as long as there was a recognition of the benefits accruing to the parties involved.

51. See note 47 above.
PART THREE

TRANSFIGURATIONS OF THE EVERYDAY PRESENT:

KERAMAT, MELAYU, AND ISLAM
From my informants' perspective, the significance of the past lies in its effect upon the existent present. This effect may be understood as a transfiguration of the present in terms of the past, such that a particular figure may be perceived in the ground of everyday existence. But such a figure is not a Ding an sich; it is a perception that emerges from the ground only in the eye of the beholder. A figure is discerned as such when one can hold it in focus for some length of time. It is perceived as being relatively stable vis-a-vis the ground of everyday flux. Such a perception has to be maintained through the continual differentiation of multifarious elements into figure and ground. But a figure remains nevertheless a perception in the eye of the beholder, nebulously discernible and easily lost from sight. The perceived stability of a particular figure depends on the continuation of a particular mode of differentiation, such that the multifarious elements in one's total view can all be sorted out in the same way. The rear-view image of a constant and unchanging past can be used as a key to such a mode of differentiation. The result is the transfiguration of the existent present in at least three important aspects — place, person, and what I shall term 'a social phantasy system'.

In Chapter Six, I will try to show how time is translated into place through the gestalt of sacred graves where the there-and-then and the here-and-now are fused. Because each such grave is identified with a particular persona who had existed in the past, either historically or mythically, the events associated with that particular persona are thereby localised in that grave. Such graves are known as keramat 'blessed'. To make a ritual visit to a keramat grave is to move through time, as it were, to a spatially accessible past.

If a keramat site may be regarded as a terresterial realisation of the past-in-the-present, then the non-keramat space in which one
dwells may be regarded as the present in an unchanging past, localised in an unchanging terra firma. This is expressed particularly in the toponymic identification of people, whereby each person is identified as belonging to a particular place, and different places are associated with different segments of the past. This will be discussed in Chapter Seven, where I shall be concerned with my informants' concepts of 'indigeny' and 'purity' as ways of identifying and evaluating people in Self-Other interaction. The concept of 'indigeny' refers to the connection of people to place, primarily through descent, and secondarily through birth. If one has no such connection to any place outside Riau, then one may be considered Melayu asli 'Melayu by origin'. If, however, one's origins from places outside Riau are known and remembered, then one is considered dagang 'foreign'. This usage of the concept of 'indigeny' is found particularly among my lower-ranking informants.

My higher-ranking informants use instead the concept of 'purity', by which is meant the fulfilment of three criteria -- Islam, prescribed custom, and standard speech. Thus one may be considered Melayu murni 'pure Melayu' if one can demonstrate that one is Muslim, polite, and well-spoken. Those who fail to meet such criteria are regarded as being in varying degrees of 'impurity'.

The concepts of 'indigeny' and 'purity' thus stabilise the perceptual and interactional flux of Self and Other in two different ways: People are identified as 'indigenous' or 'foreign' to Riau, and thereby evaluated as close or distant in Self-Other interaction. Alternatively, people are identified as 'pure' or 'impure' in their being, and thereby evaluated as desirable or undesirable in Self-Other interaction.
In Chapter Eight, I will discuss two opposite modes of orientation — centripetalism and centrifugalism, as expressed in Self-Other relations. In the centripetal mode of orientation, one's focus of attention shifts away from one's immediate local context to a supralocal centre located at a distance. From the perspective of those at the supralocal centre — in this case, Penyengat — people who are orientated away from the centre are centrifugal. Centripetalism leads to the construction of a social phantasy system shared by a supralocal imagined community. Within the local community, however, the interactional basis of this social phantasy system is the bond of siblingship. Others may also be drawn to participate in the imagined community; new members may be recruited through adoption. Such recruitment is a desideratum from the perspective of the centre, for centripetalism is seen as good and centrifugalism as evil.

In Chapter Nine, I will show how centripetalism and centrifugalism are expressed through Islamisation and witchcraft accusations. Islamisation in Riau occurs in at least two distinct contexts — the local umat 'congregation', and the worldwide umat. Penyengat may be perceived as the religious centre of the local context; it is thus the supposed centre of religious centripetalism. Witchcraft accusations are directed against those who are perceived as being centrifugal — that is, those who do not acknowledge the centrality of Penyengat. Such accusations are plausible because they are shared. The communality of such perceptions may be understood as collusion. This can lead to a close bonding of insiders and, conversely, a paranoid anxiety towards certain outsiders who are regarded as apostates.
But there is a centripetal attraction in converting to Islam. This attraction derives from the civilising process, which is an historical pattern engulfing the entire world. Consequently, notwithstanding the witchcraft accusations of the Penyengat people towards certain people who are perceived as centrifugal, Islamisation is occurring even in the periphery. I will end this study by discussing Islamisation in Galang to illustrate how the shift in orientation from the local to the supralocal may be understood in terms of the civilising process.
CHAPTER SIX

KERAMAT GRAVES: THE TEMPORAL PAST IN THE SPATIAL PRESENT

6.1 The Keramat Gestalt

6.2 Royal Graves

6.3 The Graves of the Tuan Said

6.4 Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini

6.5 Keramat Datuk Bujuk

6.6 Place and Persona
6.1 The Keramat Gestalt

The temporal past is spatially realised and thus rendered existent in the present. From this perspective, the different places in Riau may be regarded as the spatial realisations of different times and events. As mentioned in Chapter One, even my informants in Pekanbaru associated Melayu with *tempat sejarah* 'historical places' — that is, sites of 'palace ruins' (*bekas istana*) and 'royal graves' (*makam raja-raja*). It is the latter that is of particular significance to my informants in island Riau. These graves are known as *keramat*. As Endicott (1970:93-94) has pointed out for *keramat* graves in general, the person in such a grave is considered not really dead. I suggest that the idea of this living death is indeed the very means whereby the temporal past can be spatially realised in the existent present. The *keramat* grave may thus be understood as a spatial symbolisation of the past-in-the-present, of death-in-life.

In her study of *keramat* graves in Singapore, Siddique (1979:7-8) says that these graves are considered to have particular power because they contain the bodies of certain individuals who are regarded as having been specially blessed by Allah, when they were alive. These 'special blessings' (*berkat*) are supposed to remain with their bodies when they die; so their graves become powerful sites from which people can obtain blessings.

My informants explained *berkat* to me as mediation, intercession. In the words of a Pangkil informant, the linkage between *berkat* and *keramat* is as follows:

If we ask people to help us attain our wishes, and if our wishes are thereby realised, that is *berkat*. *Berkat* comes from God via people. So we express our wishes at *keramat* graves, because those who are *keramat* are nearer to God.

(My translation).
From my informants' perspective, keramat graves are considered as an Islamic phenomenon to be understood in religious terms. Thus Penyengat, the most Islamic of the communities I studied, has the highest incidence of keramat graves. In his analysis of the keramat phenomenon in the Malay Peninsula, Endicott (1970) explains it in terms of a non-Islamic animism. In the case of Riau, however, such an explanation seems to be more applicable to puaka 'habitat of a local spirit', rather than to keramat. As we shall see below, keramat and puaka are not unconnected phenomena. However, for the moment, we shall consider keramat primarily in Islamic terms. In her analysis of keramat graves in Singapore, Siddique (1979) regards such graves as derived from Islamic folk-religion, which are therefore viewed negatively from the perspective of orthodox Islam. In the context of Riau, however, I shall follow my informants in viewing keramat graves as derived from canonical Islam.

Such a perception seems to be canonically quite justifiable.

According to Dusuki (1976:168) the word keramat denotes extraordinary things which happen to Allah's servant who are faithful to him and obedient to His commandments. Such people are also able to perform extraordinary deeds. Nevertheless such people cannot claim to be God, His Prophet, or God's representative.

(My translation from Malay).

Wehr (1976:822) translates the original Arabic word karama thus:

Nobility; high-mindedness, noble-heartedness; generosity, magnanimity; liberality, munificence; honour, dignity; respect, esteem, standing, prestige; mark of honour, token of esteem, favour; ...miracle (worked by a saint)....

We shall see below how the basic meaning of 'generosity' has been expanded to denote 'miracle'.
In my informants' usage, keramat evidently refers to a process with three phases to which the word berkat seems to be equally applicable. In the first phase, 'special blessings' (berkat) are bestowed upon certain individuals by Allah. In the second phase, these specially blessed individuals have the 'power to mediate' (berkat) between ordinary people and Allah. In the third phase, through such intercession, the ordinary people are able to achieve the 'attainment of their wishes' (berkat). A keramat person is thus one who manifests a blessed state, power to mediate between ordinary people and Allah, and the willingness to help the former attain their wishes.

Such an interpretation is not dissimilar to Gellner's (1969:74) discussion of agurram and baraka among the Berbers of Morocco, where an agurram is 'visibly a recipient of divine blessing, baraka' and is thus able to mediate between human beings and God. This comparison is not as arbitrary as it may seem at first sight. There is a common element — Sufism, which has been historically important both among the Berbers of Morocco and the Southeast Asian Muslims. Moreover, Penyengat itself was a well-known centre of Sufism in the nineteenth century. Hence it is more than a coincidence that the Berber agurram and my informants' keramat should seem so similar.

In the Sufi tradition, the word karama is used as a religious term to denote a favour from God. Subhan (1960:109-112) gives a detailed discussion of karama, as one of four types of extraordinary events known in Sufism. Karama apparently is the manifestation of the 'divine power which a saint has acquired through his union with God' (ibid:109). Al-Attas (1963:46-48) also explains keramat in the context of Sufism, particularly as it was practised in Malaya.
However, even if the Berber agurram and my informants' keramat share a common historical origin in Sufism, there is nevertheless a striking difference between the two terms. Whereas the former denotes a living person, the latter usually denotes a non-living yet existent persona in a grave. The application of the word keramat to a living person is not unknown to my informants. Such a person would be known as a keramat hidup 'living keramat'. Without the qualifying adjective hidup 'living', the unmarked term keramat invariably refers to a grave.

However, unlike the Berber situation as reported by Gellner, my informants evidently do not regard any living person at the present time as keramat. Van Papendracht (1924:22) notes that Raja Haji who died in 1784 fighting the Dutch in Melaka, had been regarded as a keramat hidup even in his own lifetime. My raja informants also say that he was indeed so regarded when he was alive. However, the last keramat hidup known to them is one Raja Tua, also called Engku Yod, who had lived in Penyengat. He was the last sultan's father's brother. He gave charms to people for warding off evil.

The absence of any keramat hidup in Riau at the present time is interesting. The implication is that the manifestation of berkat was a phenomenon pertaining specifically to the past, and therefore can exist in the present only as the past-in-the-present. Such an implication seems to be borne out by the case of the tuan said. In Chapter Five, I stated that in the rear-view image of the past, the tuan said served as political legitimators on the basis of the berkat they had inherited as the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. At the present time, however, although there are still living people who bear the titles said (for males) and syarifah (for females), none of them seems to be regarded, either by themselves or by others, as the possessor of berkat and hence a keramat hidup. Nevertheless, there
are many keramat graves in Riau which contain tuan said with berkat. Indeed the only tuan said who are considered keramat are those in graves.

What is even more noteworthy in the Riau case is that keramat is a quality that pertains not only to the descendants of the Prophet Muhamad, but also to individuals who had belonged to the top three derajat of the hierarchy. Apart from the tuan said, these include the rajas, the tengkus, and the encik datuk. Indeed some of my commoner informants said quite explicitly:

Kalau orang bangsawan, semua kuburnya boleh jadi keramat.
(In the case of the aristocrats, all their graves can become keramat.)

This suggests that keramat is a quality that is regarded as pertaining not only to certain individuals, but also to a certain class of individuals --- that is, those who had occupied dominant positions in the hierarchical structure of the sultanate. This does not mean, however, that the grave of every individual in that class is keramat. So while the graves of all individuals in that class may have the potentiality of becoming keramat, only a few have that potentiality realised. It is therefore important to understand which particular individuals have been (to coin a word) 'keramatised', and why so.

Before we consider specific keramat graves, however, let us first discuss the keramat gestalt in general. To begin with, how does one tell between a keramat grave and an ordinary one? Although a few keramat graves are particularly long and are hence known as keramat panjang 'long keramat', most are of the same length as ordinary graves. Like ordinary graves, keramat graves are placed in the proper Islamic orientation --- that is, in such a way that the corpse which is
laid on its side, can face the kiblah — that is, the direction in which Mecca lies. (See Wilkinson 1959:597.) Since Mecca is to the west of Riau, this means that all Muslim graves in Riau are aligned lengthwise along a north-south axis, so that the corpse laid on its side faces west.

An Islamic grave is marked by either one or two nengsan 'gravestones'. If only one is used, this is placed at the head of the corpse. The gravestones are referred to as kepala 'head' and kaki 'foot', according to their respective location in relation to the corpse. Although keramat graves may sometimes have big elaborate gravestones, this is not always the case. Nor is it the case that all graves with big elaborate gravestones are thereby keramat.

What marks a keramat grave from an ordinary one is, quite simply, labelling: a keramat grave is that which people regard as keramat. Such labelling is primarily an artefact of discourse which is not necessarily manifest in the physical structure of the grave as such. The fundamental difference is in the attention that people pay to a keramat grave, relative to an ordinary one. Sometimes, although it is not necessarily so, this attention is made manifest in elaborate structures built around the keramat grave.

I stated above that my informants view keramat graves in Islamic terms. This is quite evident in their ritual behaviour at the sites of such graves. They say that they berniat or bernazar at keramat graves. The expression of this niat 'wish' or nazar 'vow' is expressed through the chanting of certain verses of the Quran and certain set prayers. A selection of these may be chanted in a sequence; for example, the surah yassin, the doa arwah, and the tahlil form a sequence frequently used by my informants.
But an individual's niat or nazar is not articulated in the words of these set verses and prayers. One is supposed merely to think of one's wish or vow while chanting. So it remains an unspoken thought that one merely harbours but does not articulate. The terms berniat and bernazar may thus be interpreted semantically as middle-voice inflections meaning 'to be wishful', rather than 'to make a wish', and 'to have a vow' rather than 'to make a vow'.

This form of ritual behaviour applies in particular to my Penyengat informants. But since the keramat gestalt is associated most with Penyengat, the implication is that in Riau this is generally considered the proper mode of ritual conduct at grave-sites. A comparison with ritual behaviour at keramat graves elsewhere will illustrate just how Islamic is the Penyengat mode of ritual conduct. Mohamad Nahar Ros (1985:39-45) gives a detailed description of what he terms 'keramat worship' in Singapore: For example, it includes making such offerings as bunches of bananas, turmeric rice, eggs dyed in red, and limes, as well as releasing or symbolically slaughtering animals, and burning incense. All these non-Islamic elements are absent in the Penyengat mode of ritual conduct.

Instead there is only the chanting of certain Quranic verses and set prayers, which are not just arbitrarily chosen but are specifically those that had been recommended by the Prophet and later religious leaders for recitation at grave-sites. In my informants' discourse on keramat, they explicitly locate the phenomenon in the context of ziarah 'the visiting of graves', which is a sunnah 'recommendation' of the Prophet himself.

However, this sunnah is not based on concepts of keramat and berkât. In canonical Islam, the purpose of visiting a grave and chanting verses and prayers at its site is not for the attainment of
one's own niat or nazar. On the contrary, it is for the purpose of
making supplications to Allah on behalf of the dead and thereby
earning Allah's forgiveness for one's own sins. 17 So ziarah 'the
visiting of graves' is a perfectly proper act in canonical Islam in
general, and is not just peculiar to Sufism alone.

Significantly, making supplications to Allah on behalf of the
deceased is referred to in canonical Islam as niya (in Arabic) or niat
(in Malay). 18 Such a niya or niat to benefit the dead is a purely
subjective intention that is borne in the mind of the doer. It does
not change the objective actions of the deed as such: the very same
verses and prayers are chanted in the very same way, whether they are
intended for oneself or for the benefit of the dead. The difference
lies only in intention.

At this stage of our discussion, we can see why my Penyengat
informants locate the keramat gestalt in the context of Islam. All
the essential canonical elements are there: the recommendation to
visit graves, the recommendation of certain verses and prayers to be
chanted at the graves, the recommendation to make supplications on
behalf of the dead, and the recommendation to make such supplications
through 'intention' (niat). To shift from the ziarah recommended in
canonical Islam to the berniat in the keramat gestalt requires only a
very subtle adjustment in niat, from an intention on behalf of the
dead to a wish for oneself. Such a shift is essentially subjective;
the objective behaviour need not change at all. 19

My informants visit graves for both purposes. On the one hand,
they perform ziarah in the sense of visiting the graves of their near
kin in order to make supplications on behalf of the dead. And on the
other hand, they also berniat in the sense of visiting the graves that
are regarded as keramat in order to express their own wishes.
Sometimes, both purposes can even be combined, especially if the grave of one's kin is considered keramat. As we shall see below, this is often the case for my raja and tengku informants.

But the point is: from the observation of ritual behaviour alone, it is not possible for an outsider to tell whether the visitor at a grave is doing ziarah in the canonical sense or berniat in the keramat sense. Such a differentiation can be discerned only through discourse, and then only if the person concerned is willing to reveal her/his intention. Some of my informants articulate the difference in the following way: In the case of ziarah, they 'chant prayers to bestow mercy so that the dead would feel comfortable' (baca doa memberi rahmat, untuk mayat merasa sedap). But in the case of berniat at a keramat grave, my informants say that although they also say the same prayers, it is the persona within the grave who transmits their prayers to Allah: yang berkat mendoa untuk kita 'those who are berkat pray for us'. It is through such intercession that their 'wishes can be fulfilled' (niat dapat sampai).

Apart from the chanting of the set verses and prayers, my informants carry out two other ritual actions at the sites of graves, both keramat and non-keramat graves. One involves pouring water on the grave, and the other involves wrapping cloth on either or both of the gravestones. (See Plate 5.) These two ritual actions are not specified in canonical Islam, but are evidently only customary practice. My informants explain the water as 'mercy for the dead' (rahmat untuk mayat), and the cloth as a 'sign of our intention' (tanda niat kita).

The practice of pouring water seems to be derived from the idea of the grave being a hot place. Mariam Mohamad Ali (personal communication) told me that this is an idea common even in Singapore
Plate 5. Raja Jantan and Raja Haji Abdul Rahim are wrapping a piece of white cloth around the 'head' gravestone of Raja Ali Haji, the author of the *Tuhfat al-Nafis*. The two of them are not, however, his direct descendants, and are instead his brothers' descendants. (See Genealogical Charts 3 and 5.) But Raja Ali Haji's grave is not generally regarded as keramat, so few people berniat there. The niat that was being signified by the cloth pertained to me, because of the length of time I had taken over the thesis. My informants felt that having been a writer himself, Raja Ali Haji would understand. So they recited a doa 'prayer' and wrapped the cloth on my behalf.
and Malaysia, and that there is at least one Malay movie which portrays a corpse drinking the water that was being poured on its grave. She also suggests that the cloth wrapped around the gravestone of a non-keramat grave is often interpreted by Muslims in Malaysia and Singapore as indicative of the filial piety of the children of the deceased, because it is a sign that the grave is visited and that the deceased is prayed for by the anak yang saleh 'pious children'. However, since one can have a niat for the benefit of either the deceased or oneself, what niat that cloth is supposed to represent, is a matter between God, oneself, and the persona in the grave.

My raja informants on Penyengat visit their family graves regularly. The following is my description of one such ziarah. Raja J, his daughters, and their children set out at subuh 'dawn', about 5 a.m., arriving at their family graves at about 6 a.m. On arrival the first thing that Raja J did was to water the graves; he did this by pouring some water he had brought for this purpose on the foot of each gravestone. The whole party then sat beside the grave of Raja J's wife. (See Plate 6.)

There are some thirteen graves, laid out in a row, all belonging to various deceased members of the family. All of them have the 'head' gravestone located farther north than the 'foot' gravestone. The 'head' gravestone is also the one that is likely to be covered with white cloth.

Raja J passed two prayer booklets to his daughters, retaining another one himself. The three of them started declaiming the prayer in the booklets. This was the surah yassin. The children sat on the low cement wall surrounding the graves; they watched the adults and chatted quietly among themselves. The three adults finished reciting the prayer. One of the two women, Raja D, left her prayer booklet at
the grave of her mother's brother's. (She later told me that her mother's brother had looked after her when she was a baby; so this gesture of leaving the booklet at his grave was to give comfort to him.) Raja J continued with another prayer, recited from memory — namely, the doa arwah. This ended with the tahlil, which is the repeated declamation that there is no God but God. His two daughters join in the tahlil. When they ended, they held their hands out, palms up, in supplication to God. The children did this as well. The booklets were then collected, including the one left by Raja D at the grave of her mother's brother.

The whole party left, stopping on the way home to pick some jambu air 'Eugenia jambos' from a tree. (See Plate 7.) For this particular family, the ziarah is a weekly event, but members who attend may differ from week to week; menstruating women, for example, do not come because menstruation is considered ritually polluting in Islam.

During the ziarah, both kinds of niat can be combined: that is, one can say the prayers with a niat that they would benefit the dead, as well as with a niat concerning one's personal welfare. For example, Raja D mentioned above was worried that she might be pregnant again, because her menstrual period was late. So as she said her prayers, she had the niat that her menstrual period would come soon. She also 'made a vow' (bernazar) that if her niat were to be fulfilled, she would cover the gravestones with cloth. What this meant was that she would return to say some more prayers for the benefit of the dead. When her menstrual period did come eventually, she visited the graves again to pray, after which she wrapped cloth around the gravestones, both as an indication that her own niat had been realised and as a sign that prayers had been chanted on behalf of the deceased.
Plates 6 and 7. These two pictures show a contrast in mood: the solemnity experienced at the recitation of prayers for the dead, gives way to the carefree relaxation of trying to shake down some fruit from a tree. There is thus an easy modulation from the 'key of death' to the 'key of life'.

Plate 7
This combination of a dual niat expressed at family graves is quite common on Penyengat. For example, another informant wanted to visit Batam. Being fearful of the journey, she visited her son's grave and said some prayers there, while harbouring the niat that she would be able to go and come back safely. She also 'made a vow' that on her return, she would visit her son's grave to pray for him and to cover his gravestone with cloth. This she duly did.

In both these cases, the gravestones were covered as a kind of repayment for the realisation of one's personal niat. This may perhaps be understood in terms of an exchange of niat for niat. The fulfilment of a niat for the benefit of oneself is repaid by a niat for the benefit for the deceased. In such cases, covering the gravestone with cloth after the fulfilment of one's personal niat, may be understood as symbolising this exchange of niat for niat.

However, this manner of repayment is not the same for all graves. In other cases, the gravestone is covered during the first visit while expressing one's personal niat. Whether one covers the gravestone before or after the fulfilment of one's niat seems to depend on the degree of trust one has in the capacity and willingness of the deceased to intercede with Allah on one's behalf. Significantly, in the two cases cited above, the graves in question were not considered very keramat, being graves of the informants' own kin. Indeed it is even questionable whether other, unrelated, people would have considered these graves keramat at all.

In the cases of graves that are indeed considered keramat by everybody, the practice is to wrap the cloth during the first visit when one's niat is being expressed. In such cases, when one's niat is realised, repayment does not take the form of niat for niat, as described above -- that is, by returning to the grave to pray on
behalf of the deceased. Instead, one gives a feast at the mosque; this is referred to by my informants as a selamatan 'a religious meal' or as a kenduri doa selamat 'feast for chanting the prayer of safekeeping'.

To give a specific example of a selamatan, a bank employee in Tanjungpinang visited and prayed at a keramat grave on Penyengat, with a personal niat of his own. His niat was realised. So he presented a goat and some money to the Penyengat mosque, asking that a selamatan be prepared for the people praying there. The mosque officials duly made preparations, hiring some people in the village to cook the meal, the menu consisting of sop kambing 'mutton soup' and bread. On the chosen evening, after the maghrib prayers, the worshippers at the mosque left the prayer hall and sat themselves in the two 'pavilions' (balai) outside. The men sat in one pavilion, while the children, both male and female, sat in the other. No adult woman was seated in the pavilions, although some women were ladling out the food in the kitchen of the mosque. One of the men read a statement that the donor of the feast was giving sedekah 'alms' (that is, the food) to the faithful, as an expression of thanks to God. The imam 'religious leader' started chanting the doa selamat, joined by the other men. After the prayer, they ate the mutton soup and bread. The women ate in the kitchen. (See Plates 8 and 9.)

This form of repaying a niat by donating alms contrasts significantly with the other form of repaying niat for niat. Apparently, the reason one does not return to a keramat grave to pray on behalf of the deceased is because the persona in such a grave does not need one's prayers. In the case of non-keramat graves, it is the living who pray for the dead. In the case of keramat graves, however, it is the persona with berkat within the grave who transmits the prayers of the living to God. So in the latter case, the expression
Plates 8 and 9. These two pictures show another contrast in mood: while the men, dressed in their ritual best, are sitting stiffly, waiting for their food, the women in the kitchen, who are dressed casually, are ladling out the food in a relaxed manner. The man in the background is waiting to serve the food to the men outside, as the women are not supposed to interact with men in the formal zone of the mosque.
of one's gratitude takes the form of giving charity to others. The help of the keramat persona is gratis.

In this context, the literal meaning of the Arabic word karama is significant. As mentioned above, it denotes such qualities as high-mindedness, generosity, and munificence. So there seems to be an implication that these are the qualities that one would expect from a keramat persona. Interestingly, these are the very qualities that Gellner (1969:74) says that the Berber agurram is supposed to have: 'an agurram...is uncalculatingly generous and hospitable.' Apparently like living people, the personae in graves differ in their generosity. In this regard, it is interesting that a derived form of the Arabic root-word karama has the meaning of 'competing with one another in being generous' (my translation from Mahmud Yunus 1972:372). This implies that the personae in the graves that are considered keramat by all, are those who have won this 'competition in generosity', so to speak, and are therefore unquestionably generous and hospitable. Therefore the appropriate way to express one's gratitude to such personae is to imitate them by giving alms to others.

My usage of the phrase 'the keramat gestalt' is thus intended quite literally in the sense of Gestalt psychology — that is, as the subjective perception of an object embedded in a larger field. In other words, one sees something not simply because it is there; but rather, the thing is there because one sees it as a figure emergent from the ground. Furthermore, the clarity of the figure is affected by the number of people who discern it. As Gellner (1969:74) has suggested in the case of the Berbers, the greater the number of people who share their perception of an agurram, the more definitely is that person one. Similarly, in my informants' case, the greater the number of people who consider a certain grave keramat, the more definitely is that a keramat grave.
Given that certain graves are perceived as more keramat than others, the question remains: how is it that the non-living personae within can nevertheless help the living? As mentioned above, the person in a keramat grave is considered not really dead. So what is the nature of this living death?

I mentioned above that there are a few especially long keramat graves known as keramat panjang. Some of my informants interpret this length as an indication that the persona within the grave is still existent and growing. Stories about other keramat graves also describe aspects of this living death within the grave. For example, with regards to a keramat grave on Pangkil, my informants say that the tuan said in that grave goes to Mecca to pray on Friday. So it is futile to berniat there on Friday because the grave would be vacant. Another example would be the grave of the tuan said who is said to have died at the hands of the Galang pirates, and whose grave is supposedly located on Pulau Penyabung. As I have mentioned in Chapter Five, it is difficult to find this grave; my informants say that this is because the grave manifests itself on different parts of the island. This supposed movement of the grave is imputed to the tuan said himself, who is thereby still existent. In the case of the keramat graves of Yamtuan Muda Opu Daeng Marewah and Sultan Sulaiman, these personae are said to be able to leave their graves and walk around. Furthermore, the sound of merry-making can sometimes be heard as they and their followers gather together for a feast.

At first sight, it may seem that this idea of an existence in death is not quite Islamic. However, there is in canonical Islam an alam barzakh, which is the world intermediate in time and space, between alam fana, the finite this-world, and alam baga, the infinite other-world. When one dies, one leaves alam fana, but alam baga will not come into existence until hari kiamat 'resurrection day'. For
example, Al-Ghazali, the twelfth-century Sufi theologian, made quite categorical statements about this intermediate alam barzakh. (See Al-Ghazali 1973:1065.) These words barzakh, fana, and baqa, have indeed become part of the Malay language and can be found in any standard Malay dictionary. (See, for example, Wilkinson 1959.)

In canonical Islam the experience of existence in death in this intermediate world is known as siksa kubur 'the tribulations of the grave'. These, however, do not affect everyone equally. The degree of suffering depends on the moral worth of the person concerned. While the grave is purgatory for evil-doers, for the good it is a cradle from which they can even smell the fragrances of heaven. So for the good, the grave is not a torture-chamber, but a bedroom where they can sleep and from which they can arise. There is, moreover, a tradition in Sufism that states:

The saints of God die not, but merely depart from one habitation to another.
(Subhan 1960:107).

Therefore to regard a grave as keramat is indeed to give a moral evaluation to the persona within that grave. The implication is that these keramat personae can grow in their graves, leave their graves, walk around, have feasts, go to Mecca to pray, even move their graves about, precisely because they are good and saintly people who are blessed by Allah and who are thereby not shackled by their graves. So another manifestation of berkat seems to be freedom from the 'tribulations of the grave'. One informant said explicitly:

Keramat people die from the world but are still alive. However, we do not know where they are. They grave is one of their sites of habitation. Maybe there are houses below, but we do not know.

(My translation).
So a keramat grave contains a persona who is, paradoxically, free of that grave. The degree to which that grave is considered keramat depends on the number of people who regard that persona as berkat. A grave that is definitely keramat is thus one at which many people berniat, not just the kin of the deceased. As a result of the number of visitors, its gravestones tend to be thickly wrapped in many layers of cloth, each being the sign of an individual's niat. While white cloth is generally used, yellow cloth may be used for royal graves, yellow being the traditional colour of royalty.

Apart from having cloth wrapped around the gravestones, a keramat grave may also have a pavilion erected over it. In that case, it would no longer be referred to simply as kubur 'grave', but as makam, an Arabic word meaning 'abode'. (See Wilkinson 1959:727.) This transformation of kubur into makam further implies that the persona within is free of siksa kubur, and dwells instead in a makam. I would say that while not all keramat graves are makam, all makams are keramat. My Penyengat informants said that these makams were formerly so important that some people even gathered there for their Friday prayers. Apparently, this practice was put to a stop by the eighth yamtuwan muda, Raja Ali, who reigned from 1844-1857, because he considered it un-Islamic. However, the pavilions built around these graves are still there and kept in constant good repair. In the rest of this chapter, I shall discuss some of the most publicly recognised keramat graves in Riau.

6.2 Royal Graves

As mentioned above, although my informants regard all royal graves as having the potentiality to become keramat, they do not actually treat all of them as keramat. Even among royal graves, some
are more keramat than others. In this section, we shall examine the reasons why.

Perhaps the most important of all keramat graves in Riau, both royal and non-royal, is Makam Tuan Puteri Raja Hamidah 'Abode of the Master Princess Raja Hamidah'. This grave is evidently regarded as keramat not only by the Riau inhabitants, but even by other Indonesians from elsewhere. I was myself told of this grave almost immediately after my arrival by, of all people, the Immigration officer who stamped my research visa. It was almost as if it was part of his duty to advise me to minta izin 'ask permission' at her grave if I wanted to stay and do work in Riau. This Immigration officer was himself Javanese.

He told me that it was the custom for any Indonesian official coming to take up duties at Tanjungpinang, the district capital, to minta izin first at the grave of the tuan daerah 'master of the area' — namely, Tuan Puteri Raja Hamidah. He too did this when he first arrived. He even used Islam to justify the custom, saying orang Islam harus percaya kepada hal-hal yang ghaib 'Muslims must believe in occult matters'. He also said that although there is but one God, there are also hantu yang punya daerah-daerah 'spirits who own areas'. He told me about a Dutch couple who had recently died on Penyengat island, because they went and stayed there without first asking the permission of the tuan daerah. (I subsequently found out that there had indeed been a Dutch couple who had died on Penyengat shortly before I arrived.) The Immigration office even warned me against staying on Penyengat if I was not prepared to ask for the permission of the tuan daerah.

So almost immediately after my arrival in Riau, I was told that I had to fit into my new social context through the authorisation of
Tuan Puteri Raja Hamidah. What is particularly interesting is that it was another newcomer, a Javanese Immigration officer working for the Indonesian Government, who told me this. So there we were, two outsiders to Riau society, talking about how to fit into our new social context through the authorisation of a keramat grave which I had not even seen at that time!

Such a perception of Raja Hamidah is of course very significant in the context of our discussion in Chapter Four. As I have shown in that chapter, my informants say that Penyengat was given to Raja Hamidah as her mas kawin. I also stated that they still regard Penyengat as her personal property. I then raised the question how a dead person can still own an island. As we can see now, this is made possible by means of the keramat gestalt. So although Raja Hamidah is known to have died long ago (in 1844, according to the Tuhfat), she is regarded as still existent though not alive in an everyday sense. It is thus as a persona in a keramat grave that she still owns Penyengat and is hence the tuan daerah of Riau. (See Plates 10 and 11.)

What is particularly significant is that such a perception has spread beyond the Penyengat rajas even to outsiders such as Indonesian bureaucrats from elsewhere. Although these outsiders may not know the reason why Raja Hamidah is the tuan daerah, they nevertheless consider her so, to the extent that they would go to minta izin 'ask for permission' at her grave. The implication is that even an Indonesian bureaucrat cannot administer the district without her authorisation. Apparently, other outsiders (like me, for example) are also supposed to be so authorised if they wish to work in the area.

The act of asking for Raja Hamidah's permission takes the same ritual form as is performed at other graves. As I have described
Plate 10 and 11. According to my informants, Makam Engku Puteri 'Tomb of The Royal Daughter' used to have a tiled roof like that of a Chinese temple, because Chinese craftsmen were hired to build it. It has since fallen into disrepair and is now replaced by zinc. The plaque on Engku Puteri's grave inside the tomb states:

Raja Hamidah (Engku Puteri)
Died 12.7.1844
Trustee of the Royal Regalia.
above, this involves the recitation of certain Quranic verses and set prayers. The request for permission is not articulated as such; it is merely a niat that one harbours silently while praying aloud. As a sign of this niat, one usually ties a piece of cloth on one of the gravestones. Since this kind of niat is for the relatively long term, one can simply assume that permission has been granted if one can stay and work in Riau peacefully without the occurrence of any disaster.

Another ritual act that outsiders are supposed to perform is to cast one gram of gold into the sea in the area of Pulau Paku, which is 'a reef of sand and stones with some low bushes' located half a nautical mile south of the eastern end of Penyengat island (Indonesia Pilot 1975:I,131). Significantly, Pulau Paku is a landmark easily sighted from Raja Haji's grave on Penyengat. And indeed, according to my informants, the one gram of gold is a tanda niat 'sign of a wish' made in the presence of the persona of Raja Haji in his keramat grave. Apparently, when Raja Haji was still alive, he had once said that misfortune would befall those who come to Riau to trade without first getting his approval. Since the persona of Raja Haji in his keramat grave is considered existent even if not alive, his declaration is considered still valid.

So outsiders such as Indonesian bureaucrats and traders from elsewhere perform this ritual act so that they would be able to take away with them the harta-harta 'wealth, goods' that they accumulate for themselves in Riau. Otherwise, my informants told me, some disaster may happen to these possessions when their owners try to bring them out of Riau. For example, they may catch fire or sink into the sea.

It seems to me that the one gram of gold may be interpreted as a capital levy on the accumulation of wealth by foreigners in Riau. The
persona of Raja Haji in his keramat grave may accordingly be regarded as a mythical 'yamtuan muda' still governing Riau. Significantly, the ritual action directed towards the persona of Raja Haji is supposed to be performed not on Penyengat island, but at sea, at a distance of half a nautical mile from his grave. This apparently has to do with the ownership of Penyengat by the persona of Raja Hamidah, his daughter. The island is her mas kawin and is hence her personal property.

Apparently, the boatmen often return to the spot where the outsiders have cast their gold to dive down and recover the gold. But my raja informants said that this does not matter: niatnya yang penting 'it is the intention that is important'. In other words, it is the subjective state of the person casting the gold that counts.

From my raja informants' perspective, the subjective state concomitant with the ritual focus on these two keramat graves is one of submission. The willingness to 'ask for permission' to stay and work in Riau signifies an acknowledgment of the symbolic authority of the personae of Raja Hamidah and Raja Haji. Sultan Mahmud's bestowal of Riau upon Raja Hamidah and her siblings, 'the children of the late Raja Haji', in 1804 is thus regarded as still valid. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:212.) By implication, the present-day descendants of Raja Haji are still the 'owners' of Riau. Indeed, many of my raja informants on Penyengat trace their ancestry to Raja Haji.

As shown in Genealogical Chart 1, Raja Haji was born of a marriage alliance established between Opu Daeng Cellak, representing the Bugis faction, and Tengku Mandak, Sultan Sulaiman's sister. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the very name 'Riau' is said to be derived from the word riuh 'festive', which was supposedly the adjective used to describe their wedding. Raja Haji's descendants are thus also Opu
Daeng Cellak's descendants. Although my raja informants are indeed proud of being the latter's descendants, we see a marked difference in the attention paid to the graves of these two ancestors. The ritual attention paid to Raja Haji's grave seems to be in inverse proportion to the ritual neglect of Opu Daeng Cellak's grave. This is quite understandable. From my informants' perspective, the persona of Opu Daeng Celak is evidently perceived as pertaining to the pre-1804 context, before Penyengat and Riau were given to the keturunan raja, whereas the persona of Raja Haji is evidently perceived as pertaining to the post-1804 context, after their ownership of Penyengat and Riau had been contractualised through Raja Hamidah's mas kawin.

So if my raja informants wish to claim present 'ownership' of Riau, it would indeed make more sense for them to focus on the post-1804 context, rather than on the pre-1804 context. The ritual complex focussed on the personae of Raja Hamidah and her father Raja Haji may thus be understood as a symbolisation of this claim. To the extent that outsiders such as Indonesian officials and traders from elsewhere are willing to accept the persona of Raja Hamidah as tuan daerah, and the persona of Raja Haji as 'yamtuan muda', to that extent at least are my raja informants taken seriously.

However, this does not mean that my informants are trying to forget Opu Daeng Cellak altogether. On the contrary, as I have mentioned above, those who can claim to be his descendants are very proud of such a descent. They still tell stories about his charisma and prowess. But it appears that he figures more as a sumber 'source' that was important in the past, rather than as a keramat that is still existent in the present.

This gives us a clue as to why even among royal graves, some are more keramat than others. It seems to be the case that keramat graves
belong to those individuals who played pivotal roles in the making of
the present. That is to say, these are the people without whom the
present would not be what it is perceived to be. So without Raja
Hamidah and her mas kawin, Penyengat — and hence Riau — would not
belong to the keturunan raja. And without Yamtuan Muda Raja Haji,
there would not have been Raja Hamidah and all his other descendants
to whom Riau is supposed to belong.

Significantly, Raja Haji was neither the first nor the last of
the yamtuan mudas. Indeed, he was not even alive at the time
Penyengat was given to Raja Hamidah, having died in Melaka in 1784
fighting the Dutch. (See Matheson and Andaya 1982:368.) It was not
even his son who succeeded him as yamtuan muda, but his brother's
son's son, Raja Ali. It was only after 1804, after Raja Hamidah
became the owner of Penyengat, that all the subsequent yamtuan mudas
of Riau were drawn from Raja Haji's keturunan. (See Genealogical
Chart 1.) As I have pointed out in Chapter Four, Raja Haji may thus
be regarded as the node of a divergent keturunan branching off from
the main line. Furthermore, this came about not through his own
efforts but through posthumous recognition by the sultan.

As noted above, Raja Haji had died in Melaka before Penyengat was
given to his daughter Raja Hamidah. So how is it that his grave is
located on Penyengat? According to the Tuhfat:

Raja Haji's body was buried within the fort of Malacca,
behind the Company's garden. That is how things were.
Later his sons took it back to Riau and buried it on the
hill on the southern side of Penyengat Island.


Presumably Raja Haji's corpse was brought back to Riau only after
1804, after Penyengat had been given to Raja Hamidah. He had died in
1784. So for some twenty years or more, his descendants did nothing
about his corpse buried 'behind the Company's garden'. In this case, we see a clear example of a grave that has been deliberately 'keramatised', since this was not even a grave that had previously existed on that site.

To illustrate further my argument that keramat graves belong to those who are regarded as having played pivotal roles in the making of the present, let us consider the grave of Opu Daeng Marewah. As pointed out above, the ritual attention given to Raja Haji's grave contrasts with the ritual neglect of Opu Daeng Cellak's grave. But this does not mean that all the graves of Raja Haji's predecessors are also ignored. Opu Daeng Marewah's grave stands out as being significantly keramat.

To appreciate the significance of this, let us compare the graves of Opu Daeng Marewah and Opu Daeng Cellak. The former's grave is enshrined as a makam 'abode', whereas the latter's grave is so neglected that it is surrounded by overgrown grass. Not only that, the first time my raja informants wanted to take me to see Opu Daeng Cellak's grave, they had to ask a Boyanese settler living in the area to guide us through fallen tree trunks and thick undergrowth, for fear of getting lost.

Significantly, these particular informants were themselves descendants of Opu Daeng Cellak. Yet they were more familiar with the location of Opu Daeng Marewah's grave than they were with that of their own ancestor, Opu Daeng Cellak. To appreciate this contrast, it must be realised that these two graves are located quite near each other, indeed on the same site where the former capital of the yamtuan muda once was. According to my informants, this former capital was known as Kota Raja 'The Raja's Fort' or Kota Repah 'The Crumbling [?] Fort'. The burial titles of the two brothers indicate their grave
sites: Opu Daeng Marewah is Marhum Sungai Baharu 'He Who Died at the Baharu River'; and Opu Daeng Cellak is Marhum Mangkat Di Kota 'He Who Died in The Fort'. The fort referred to is Kota Raja/Kota Repah, which is located on the west bank of the Baharu river (which, according to my informants, was a canal leading off from the Riau river, that was dug by Opu Daeng Marewah). So the 'Sungai Baharu' in Opu Daeng Marewah's burial title and the 'Kota' in Opu Daeng Cellak's burial title both refer to the same area — that is, upstream of Riau River, on the north bank of this river, and on the west bank of the canal known as the Baharu river. (See Map 5.)

This area is at present quite uninhabited. The land on which Opu Daeng Marewah's grave stands presently belongs to a Chinese merchant in Tanjungpinang, who has buried his deceased parents in the same area. At the time of my first visit in 1980, the only inhabitants there were a couple — a Chinese employee of this merchant, living there with his Melayu wife and tending a smallholding. The land on which Opu Daeng Cellak's grave stands does not seem to belong to anyone; it is in the middle of an abandoned rubber plantation, said to have belonged to the former penghulu 'headman' of the area. As mentioned above, there is a Boyanese settler there.

It is therefore significant that of two graves both located in the same generally deserted area, my informants should be familiar with the one and not with the other. Their attitude implies a deliberate focussing of attention on the one and a deliberate neglect of the other, deliberate in the sense that it seems to be not the inadvertent outcome of geographical circumstance, but rather, the result of active choice.

The appearance of the two graves is also strikingly different. Opu Daeng Marewah's grave is more than three and a half metres in
length, and sheltered by a wooden roof built over it, with a low cement wall surrounding the grave, and cement steps leading up this wall. The two tombstones at the head and foot of the grave are covered with white cloth, which have to be regularly changed to maintain their whiteness. Once a year, on the Friday before Ramadan, the fasting month, crowds of people come to visit Opu Daeng Marewah's grave, clean the place, chant prayers, and berniat.

In contrast, very little ritual attention seems to be given to the grave of Opu Daeng Cellak. As mentioned above, it is surrounded by overgrown grass, and access to it is choked by fallen tree trunks and thick undergrowth. The grave itself is no more than the normal length — that is, about two metres or less in length. It is not sheltered by any construction built over it, and so is exposed to the elements. The first time I visited it, which was in 1979, the gravestones were covered only with white plastic sheets, which already looked old and faded, unlike the fresh and clean white cloth covering Opu Daeng Marewah's gravestones. The last time I visited Opu Daeng Cellak's grave, which was in 1984, the gravestones were completely uncovered. Evidently, very few people berniat at Opu Daeng Cellak's grave; so there are hardly any tanda niat 'signs of intention'. (See Plates 12, 13, and 14.)

The difference between the two graves is all the more striking because Opu Daeng Marewah has apparently left no surviving keturunan in Riau. According to the Tuhfat, 'most of Daeng Marewah's descendants are in Selangor' (Raja Ali Haji 1982:30). Indeed in the course of my own field research in Riau, I encountered not one informant who claimed to be descended from Opu Daeng Marewah. All my raja informants in Riau belong either to Opu Daeng Parani's keturunan or to Opu Daeng Cellak's keturunan.  (See Genealogical Chart 1.)
Plates 12 and 13. Makam Ymtuan Muda Opu Daeng Marewah is a relatively recent construction. It is well-maintained and the weeds growing around the tomb are regularly cleared, as the man in red is doing in Plate 12. The many pieces of cloth covering the gravestones indicate the number of people who go there to berniat.
Plate 14. In contrast to Opu Daeng Marewah's grave, Opu Daeng Cellak's grave lies in the open, unsheltered. The absence of even a single piece of cloth on the gravestones shows that hardly anyone goes there to berniat. In the background of the picture is one of the Penyengat rajas who had brought me there.
It thus needs to be explained why the grave of Opu Daeng Marewah is keramat. As I have argued, keramat graves belong to those who played pivotal roles. So Opu Daeng Marewah's grave is keramat because he was the first yamtuan muda. Even though he has no surviving keturunan in Riau, his grave is nevertheless 'keramatised' because of his pivotal position, in this case, between the pre-1722 context and the post-1722 context. As pointed out in Chapter Four, before 1722 the Opu Daeng brothers were not even a part of the sultanate at all; they became part of the sultanate only after 1722 when they had fought their way in, chased Raja Kecik out, installed Sultan Sulaiman on the throne, and obtained the office of yamtuan muda as their political monopoly. Therefore the office of yamtuan muda may be understood as a symbol of the Bugis presence in Riau. So if my raja informants wish to claim to belong to Riau, it would make sense for them to focus their attention on the first yamtuan muda, regardless of whether he has any surviving keturunan.

That the 'keramatisation' of Opu Daeng Marewah's grave is a deliberate action is evident in the following account. According to my informants, there was once a man who wanted to lessen the number of steps of the wall surrounding the grave; he wanted to reduce the steps from five to three. Why he wanted to do this, my informants do not know. Nor are they able to identify the man. In any case, they told me that when this man wanted to start work on reducing the number of steps, he felt that someone was behind him. When he turned around, there was no one there. In the end, he did not change anything. The point of this story, as I read it, is that no one should reduce the elaborate-ness of Opu Daeng Marewah's keramat grave, not even in so apparently trivial a matter as reducing the number of steps. In contrast, I never heard any story of anyone being punished for neglecting Opu Daeng Cellak's grave.
That the 'keramatisation' of a grave has to do with shifting contexts, rather than with surviving keturunan, may be further illustrated by the case of Opu Daeng Parani. Even though he still has surviving keturunan in Riau, my informants never mention his grave. According to the Tuhfat, he died in Kedah while fighting Raja Kecik (see Raja Ali Haji 1982:67-68); but not even this event is discussed by my informants, who do not seem to have any idea where his grave is located in Kedah. Nor is it just because the grave is located outside Riau that there is this lack of interest.

The contrastive case is that of Raja Haji. Although he has received a secondary burial on Penyengat, my informants still talk about how he died fighting the Dutch in Melaka, how he was buried there, and how he was transported back to Riau. No one, however, has ever expressed any interest in looking for the grave of Opu Daeng Parani in Kedah, and giving him a secondary burial in Riau. His grave simply seems to be irrelevant.

Again, as in the case of Opu Daeng Cellak, this is not to say that he is forgotten as the sumber 'source' of a transmitted keturunan; indeed his name is frequently mentioned in the recounting of genealogies. And some of my informants proudly claim to be keturunan Opu Daeng Parani, as opposed to others who equally proudly claim to be keturunan Opu Daeng Cellak. Yet it is the descendants of these two keturunan who revere the keramat grave of Opu Daeng Marewah, as well as those of Raja Hamidah and Raja Haji.

The graves of Opu Daeng Marewah, Raja Hamidah, and Raja Haji are thus keramat because of shifts from one political context to another. The shift in all three cases involves moving from a context of relative powerlessness to a context of relative power. As pointed out above, the persona of Opu Daeng Marewah stands in a pivotal position
between the pre-1722 context and the post-1722 context. Before 1722, the Opu Daeng brothers were not even part of the sultanate; so no matter how charismatic they may have been in terms of military prowess exercised elsewhere, they had no power in the context of the sultanate. Similarly, before 1804, although the office of yamtuan muda was in existence, Riau was not legally demarcated as pertaining to the yamtuan muda's faction. So in the context of Riau, there was, in 1804, an intensified concentration of what was previously a more diffuse form of power.

But who are the people concerned with these shifts from less power to more power? They are the keturunan raja whose present position is inherited from the past. 1722 and 1804 are temporal benchmarks of significance to them in particular. (However, from the perspective of other parties such as the keturunan tengku, other years and other events may be of greater significance.) So the 'keramatisation' of certain graves may be understood as a justification of the present in terms of the past.

To apply once more the riverine metaphor used in Chapter Four, if keturunan is the downstream flow from past to present, then keramat is a large boulder in the river, the presence of which diverts the course of the flow from one direction to another. So if the present-day keturunan raja of Riau were to consider themselves simply as belonging to a downstream flow from past to present, then they would focus only on belonging to the keturunan transmitted from Opu Tendriburang Daeng Rilaga as the sumber 'source'. However, if they were to justify their present symbolically in the context of the sultanate, then they would focus on the various large boulders which have diverted the flow of their keturunan into positions of relative power.
But it should not be thought that the graves discussed above are the only keramat graves in Riau. They certainly are not; there are others even on Penyengat island itself. In a book published by one of my informants listing the historical sites on Penyengat, four makams are mentioned. (See Raja Hamzah Yunus n.d.(b):9-16.) These are, to use his words:

Makam Engku Puteri Permaisuri Sultan Mahmud [Abode of the Royal Daughter, Queen of Sultan Mahmud];

Makam Raja Haji Marhum Teluk Ketapang [Abode of Raja Haji, He Who Departed at Teluk Ketapang];

Makam Marhum Jaafar, Yangdipertuan Muda Ke VI [Abode of the Departed Jaafar, the Sixth Yangdipertuan Muda]

Makam Marhum Kampung Bulang [Abode of He Who Departed at Kampung Bulang].

The first two makams have been discussed above. It is significant that Raja Hamzah calls attention to Raja Hamidah's status as Engku Puteri 'Royal Daughter' and Permaisuri Sultan Mahmud 'Queen of Sultan Mahmud', and to the location of Raja Haji's death — namely, Teluk Ketapang in Melaka. These aspects are indeed directly related to the 'keramatisation' of their graves. In addition, Raja Hamzah mentions two other makams. One is that of Raja Hamidah's brother, Raja Jafar, who was the first yamtuan muda to rule from Penyengat as his capital. It is significant that Raja Hamzah should call attention to Raja Jafar's position as the sixth yamtuan muda of Riau. The other makam is that of Raja Abd al-Rahman. It is significant that Raja Hamzah does not mention even the name of this yamtuan muda, but instead calls attention to the site of his death — Kampung Bulang. As he explains in the text (ibid.:14), this yamtuan muda was 'the builder of the mosque of the Riau Sultans, that is so beautiful and grand' (pembangun misjid Sultan Riau yang indah dan agung itu). It is rather ironic that this mosque should be referred to as 'the mosque of the Riau Sultans', when the sultan's capital was located mostly in Daik, Lingga, and
Penyengat was merely the yamtuan muda's capital, becoming the sultan's capital only during the brief reign of the last sultan. The mosque still stands as one of the major landmarks of Penyengat, located indeed in Kampung Bulang, where Yamtuan Muda Abd al-Rahman died.

Apart from these, there are still other keramat graves on Penyengat. Each of them, however, is keramat for a different reason: each is a different pivot for shifting between different contexts of symbolic power. This argument applies even to royal graves that do not belong to the keturunan raja. As mentioned in Chapter Four, there is a complex of graves on the Riau river belonging to the keturunan tengku. Within this complex, the most keramat of the graves is that of Sultan Sulaiman, the first sultan of the post-1722 sultanate. (See Plate 15.) The graves of his son and grandson which are located within the same complex are hardly ever mentioned by my informants. The significance of Sultan Sulaiman is quite clear: it was during his reign that the Bugis yamtuan mudas first established themselves in Riau.

There is, however, a question about the royal graves left unanswered. Given that my informants regard the keramat gestalt primarily in Islamic terms, then why is it the case that all royal graves have the potentiality of becoming keramat? The clue to the answer is perhaps to be found in the name by which Raja Haji's grave is known: Makam Raja Haji Fisabilillah 'Abode of Raja Haji, Defender of the Faith'. (See Plate 16.)

The key word fisabilillah is an Islamic term applied only to those who die in a jihad 'religious war'. (See Muhammad Ali 1973:450-493.) Raja Haji's death in Melaka fighting the Dutch is thus interpreted in religious terms. Indeed the Tuhfat makes this quite explicit. It is said that Raja Haji was intent on going to fight the
Plate 15. The perception of Sultan Sulaiman's grave as keramat is evident in the structure built to shelter it, the pieces of cloth covering the gravestones, and the sheet of now-faded yellow cloth hung up to signify royalty.

Plate 16. Raja Jantan stands outside the tomb of his ancestor Raja Haji Fisabilillah 'Raja Haji, Defender of the Faith'.
Dutch because, among other reasons, he had 'hoped for the merit which would come from waging a holy war in Allah's cause' (Raja Ali Haji 1982:172). According to the Tuhfat, he died with a dagger in one hand, and a holy book in the other. (See ibid.:175.)

The Quran (3:169) states explicitly:

Think not of those who are slain in God's way as dead. Nay, they live, finding their sustenance in the Presence of their Lord.


So if Raja Haji was a fisabilillah who had departed from this world while fighting in defense of Islam, then he is, by Quranic definition, not dead but alive. Hence it is only logical to regard his grave as keramat.

In Chapter Five, I discussed how Islam provided an ideology of legitimation for the Bugis rajas, particularly after 1804, when they could no longer use military prowess to justify their authority. I pointed out that Raja Ali Haji even claimed that it was Allah himself who had appointed the Bugis rajas as religious guides for their subjects. Also as mentioned above, in the Tuhfat, all the yamtuan mudas from Raja Haji onwards are described as pious and devout Muslims. (See Appendix 8.) As I shall show below, this claim to religious superiority is still held by my Penyengat informants, constituting a public proposition which others must either accept or reject. It is the acceptance of this claim, I suggest, that has led some of my commoner informants to say that all royal graves have the potentiality of becoming keramat.
6.3 The Graves of Tuan Said

If Raja Haji is considered fisabilillah and hence keramat, then on what religious basis is Raja Hamidah keramat? As mentioned in Chapter Five, the Tuhfat makes no mention of Raja Hamidah's religious piety. However, my informants say she was the one who ordered that a tomb be built for Habib Syeikh Syakaf, a prominent Arab ulama 'theologian' who had lived in Penyengat. Furthermore, they say that when outsiders go to Raja Hamidah's grave to ask for permission to stay and work in Riau, they should also visit Habib Syeikh's grave, known as Makam Ulama 'Abode of the Theologian'. This is the only keramat grave belonging to an Arab that is located on Penyengat. It is thus significant that it should be specially linked to Raja Hamidah's grave. The two graves are indeed located near each other. This linkage implies that the indubitable sanctity of the ulama's grave legitimates Raja Hamidah's grave as keramat. Indeed in justification of this linkage, a raja informant said:

Habib Sheikh seorang ulama alim; dia hidup semasa dengan Engku Puteri.

(Habib Sheikh was a learned theologian; he lived at the same time as Engku Puteri.)

The linkage is thus based on coevality.

According to the Tuhfat, there was such a historical person. He is mentioned as one of the religious teachers of Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Jafar, Raja Hamidah's brother. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:279.) Interestingly, however, my informants link him not to Raja Jafar, the yamtuan muda who was his pupil, but to Raja Hamidah who, it seems, was merely his coeval. As mentioned above, Raja Jafar's grave is also on Penyengat and also considered keramat. It is noteworthy too that of the multitude of religious teachers who were evidently resident in Penyengat at that time (see ibid.), only Habib Syeikh's grave has been
singled out as keramat. My informants' reference to his grave simply as 'Abode of the Theologian' suggests that he may have been singled as the most representative of the company of theologians, because he may have been the most illustrious.

This is indicated by his name and title. Syakaf indicates that he was a member of the al-Syakaf family from Hadhramaut in southern Arabia, which 'later became one of the wealthiest families in Singapore' (Matheson and Andaya 1982:390). Habib was a title used in particular by the Hadhramaut tuan said, who had 'established a sort of religious aristocracy in southern Arabia' (Wilkinson 1959:386; also see Matheson and Andaya 1982:413). And syeikh indicates a leader in Sufi mysticism. (See Trimingham 1969:310.)

As I have argued in Chapter Five, the presence of the tuan said, the reputed direct descendants of the Prophet, was a vivid representation of the Islamic legitimation of the sultanate. Such a role was evidently played by the tuan said, not only when they were alive, but even after they died. So it seems that in life Habib Syeikh Syakaf legitimated Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Jafar's rule, and in death he is still legitimating Raja Hamidah's grave as keramat.

As mentioned above, Makam Ulama is the only Arab grave that is keramat on Penyengat. The other Arab graves that are keramat are located elsewhere, mostly as isolated single graves. One such grave exists on Pangkil -- or perhaps more accurately, off the island. There are two stones in the sea off Tanjung Keramat, the uninhabited southern end of Pangkil island. These are said to be the gravestones of a tuan said's grave.

The establishment of this keramat grave was described to me in this fashion. About eighty or ninety years ago, a grave 'manifested itself' (menjelma) on the island; perhaps it came of its own accord,
or alternatively, it may have been built by the dewa-dewa 'celestial spirits'. There were three gravestones -- kepala 'head', pusat 'centre' and kaki 'foot'. The middle one could be lifted out and placed somewhere else. The next day, it would return to its original position by itself. Two animals used to 'wait' (nunggu) at the grave: a 'three-legged tiger' (rimau kaki tiga) and a buaya katak 'frog-crocodile' (that is, a broad-bodied variety of crocodile). When people approached the grave, these animals would disappear. When people left, they would reappear. Later on, because the land became 'dirty' (kotor), due to the defaecation of people and animals, the grave moved itself to the sea.

One day, a man from the village went to Tanjung Keramat to tap some nira 'palm-sap' for making gula melaka 'palm sugar'. When he returned that night, he had a dream. It was he who dreamt that the orang keramat 'keramat person' was a tuan said known as Said Asin.

In his dream he learnt that Said Asin was the son of Habib Noh (the tuan said of a well-known keramat grave in Singapore), and that Said Asin was sailing from Daik in Lingga when his ship sank and he departed from the world. His arm floated on the sea until it reached Pangkil. So it was his arm that 'became' (menjadi) keramat.

It was further dreamt that Said Asin is not in the grave on Fridays, for he goes to Mecca to pray. So people should not visit the grave on Fridays to berniat because there is no one there. Said Asin also revealed that he has a total of three graves -- one off Pangkil, another on Soreh, and the third on an islet off Pengujan. He moves between these three places.

One day, there suddenly 'appeared' (jelma) a white chicken in that vicinity. On one occasion, this chicken was wounded and its blood was seen to be white. So people knew that this chicken was
keramat. It was then cared for by people until eventually, a raja from the Sulit area acquired it and took it away with him. He then became a dukun 'healer'. The acquisition was carried out by means of his throwing 100 ringgit (in coins) into the sea; this was belanja 'expenses', macam kawin 'as in marriage'.

The account I have presented above is translated almost verbatim from my informants' description. It is meant to illustrate how significantly different this tuan said's grave is from the other keramat graves discussed above. Whereas the other keramat graves belong to personae who were evidently historically real, not even my Pangkil informants claim that anyone knew this 'Said Asin' or that 'he' had visited Pangkil when he was alive. Nor is it even his whole body that is in the supposed grave; only his arm is there, it seems. The stones in the sea that are purported to be his gravestones are, as far as I can see, only stones. They are underwater at high tide, and only just visible at low tide.

Such being the case, it is perhaps more appropriate to treat my informants' account of this grave as a symbolic allegory, rather than as a realistic reconstruction of actual events. There are several noteworthy points. First of all, there is no claim that the grave was built by the islanders themselves. The grave is said to have 'manifested itself' (menjelma) on the island. So it was originally not there, but appeared at a certain point in time, either of its own accord or built by the celestial spirits. The establishment of the grave is thus construed as an event of the past that happened to the people of the island, quite independently of their own wishes and actions.

This grave had first manifested itself on land. From my informants' description, it did not appear to have been an Islamic
grave at this stage, since they suggest that it could have been built by the celestial spirits. Moreover, it had three gravestones instead of two, and it was guarded by two strange animals — a three-legged tiger and a frog-crocodile.

Later on, however, the occupant of the grave found the land dirty, and therefore moved his grave into the sea. It was not until then that he revealed his identity through a dream to one of the islanders. This revelation was thus also an event that happened, but this time to one member of the population. The islanders had evidently not sought to know the identity of the grave's occupant. It was up to the occupant himself to reveal to them that he was a tuan said.

In the tuan said's revelation, connections are made to certain urban centres — Singapore, Daik, and even Mecca. These connections demonstrate the tuan said's cosmopolitanism. However, the importance of the Pangkil grave is diminished by the revelation that only the tuan said's arm is in that particular grave. Apparently, he inhabits two other graves in the area where, presumably, some other parts of his body are located. Significantly, the graves are sited on three islands that are very near, if not adjacent, to Penyengat — namely, Pangkil, Soreh, and Pengujan. So by implication, the parts of the tuan said's body are scattered westward of Penyengat in a line from Pengujan in the north, through Soreh in the middle, to Pangkil in the south. (See Map 4.)

Also significant in the account is the manifestation of a keramat chicken with white blood. The phrase darah putih 'white blood' is the Malay equivalent of the English phrase 'born in the purple'. (See Wilkinson 1959:257.) In the allegory, the phrase is taken literally as signifying the colour of blood. At any rate, the message is that
the chicken was royal and hence keramat. However, the significance of this royalty is diminished by its manifestation in a mere chicken, and not a human person.

Nevertheless it is a raja who ultimately benefits from the royal keramat chicken. But interestingly, this raja came not from nearby Penyengat, but from faraway Sulit in the western part of the archipelago. (See Map 3.) He bought the chicken by 'marrying' it; the 100 ringgit he threw into the sea constituted his wedding expenses, representing perhaps mas kawin. The chicken enables him to become a healer.

My informants' date of eighty or ninety years for the grave locates it temporally around the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. The suggestion is that it dates from the era when there was still a sultanate, yet is not ancient in provenance. I found this allegory particularly meaningful in the context of what my informants told me about Pangkil in zaman sultan.

According to them, the island was formerly called Panggil—literally, 'To Hail', because its hill was used by the Galang people as a sighting post from which to hail ships travelling along Riau Strait. These ships would be 'summoned' (diundang) to call at the port. Those which complied with the summons would be guided to the port, while those which refused would be raided. The port at that time was located in the Riau river. After Sultan Mahmud moved his capital to Lingga, however, this state of affairs changed. The Galang people then no longer summoned ships to port, but simply raided all ships that came their way. They continued with this indiscriminate piracy even after the Bugis rajas established their capital on Penyengat.
To protect the shipping along Riau Strait, the Penyengat rajas sent some 'military officers' (hulubalang) to 'take over' (ambil) the island Panggil. My informants identified Engku Puteri Raja Hamidah as the one responsible for this take-over; she is thus said to be the one who 'opened up' (buka) the place, and subsequently 'held' (pegang) it. After the takeover, the Penyengat rajas changed the name 'Panggil' to 'Pangkil', by the simple device of dropping the dot from the Malayo-Arabic letter ـ:f", thereby changing it to kaf ـ. This change of name signified a break with the Galang past. From then on, there was a 'boundary' (batasan) between Pangkil and Karas, whereas Pangkil and Penyengat were 'regarded as one place' (dianggap sebagai satu tempat).

Certain other changes also took place. Raja Hamidah had a 'palace' (istana) built on the island as her 'place for relaxation' (tempat kelah), which she visited from time to time. The hill on which this palace stood is hence known as Bukit Puteri 'Hill of the Royal Daughter'; certain stone remains on there have been identified by my informants as belonging to the ruins of her palace.

The coast to the west of Bukit Puteri became known as Pangkalan Besar 'The Big Landing Point', because that was where Raja Hamidah landed to get to her palace. Furthermore, Pangkil was used as a checkpoint for examining the ships that were bound for Penyengat — macam bea dan cukai 'like customs and excise', my informants said. Apparently, only after the ships had been checked at Pangkil could they proceed to Penyengat. The harbour of this checkpoint was located in Tajur Kait (see Map 4); certain remains of poles in the sea in that area are said to have been used for mooring the ships which called in at Pangkil. The name Tajur Kait 'Hook Reefs' refers specifically to a line of reefs off the southeastern coast of the island, which runs into the sea in a hook-like shape. As my informants said, dia tangkap kapal 'it traps the ships': that is, the ships being checked could not
easily slip away. Furthermore, as my informants explained, the ships could not dock close to shore, because of the karang 'coral bank'; so they had to berlabuh di laut 'be moored at sea'. Tajur Kait was thus merely an anchorage and not an alternative port. The anchored ships were checked by the hulubalang 'military officers' who had been sent to take over the island.

Pangkil was thus 'taken over', 'opened up' and 'held'. What is particularly interesting about the image of this process is that the place so described was already considered territorially part of the polity. Such a process may perhaps be understood as the internal colonisation of an existing territory. In other words, what my informants seem to be talking about in this case is not the conquest of a foreign place, but rather, the re-ordering of a relationship between centre and periphery, such that the previously peripheral place comes under the direct control of the centre.

It is significant that it was Raja Hamidah who was identified as the 'holder' of Pangkil, for she was also the owner of Penyengat, having received it as mas kawin from her husband, Sultan Mahmud. Interestingly, however, whereas my informants say that she 'owned/owns' (punya) Penyengat, they merely say that she 'held' (pegang) Pangkil. As I have shown above, my informants still regard as the 'owner' of Penyengat, the persona of Raja Hamidah manifested through her keramat grave. In contrast, in the case of Pangkil, my informants listed a succession of five rajas who were said to have 'held' the island. The names they mentioned were: Engku Puteri Raja Hamidah, Engku Besar Raja Sitti, Raja Dollah, Raja Hitam, and Raja Ali Sambang.

I have not been able to discover any documentary evidence to confirm or refute this story of Pangkil. So there is little choice
but to take it at face value. In any case, it is what my informants believe did happen, and as such it represents their attempt to present a realistic reconstruction of actual events. If we map the symbolic allegory of the tuan said's grave onto this realistic reconstruction, the results are interesting.

To begin with, the location of the grave off the southern end of the island is significant, because immediately south of Pangkil is Karas where the Galang pirates were said to have been based after they were driven out of 'Panggil'. As my informants said, after Pangkil was taken over by the Penyengat rajas, there was a 'boundary' (batasan) between Pangkil and Karas. I suggest that the tuan said's grave in the sea symbolises this boundary.

The movement of the grave from the land to the sea may perhaps be interpreted as an allusion to the changing roles of the island. At first, its hill was used as a sighting post for the purpose of hailing ships. Later, its harbour became important as an anchorage for ships going to Penyengat.

In the symbolic allegory, during the period that the grave was on land, it was not an Islamic grave. It had three gravestones, with the third non-Islamic gravestone in the middle referred to, significantly, as pusat 'centre'. Furthermore, my informants said that this 'centre' could be lifted out and placed elsewhere, but it would always return to the grave. Two strange animals also 'waited' (nunggu) at the grave.

It is perhaps not too far-fetched to interpret this part of the allegory as an allusion to Pangkil island itself before it was taken over by the Penyengat rajas. It was then non-Islamic, it had its own 'centre' (pusat), it had Galang pirates lying in wait for their prey. And no matter how far the pirates roamed, they always returned to
Panggil as their centre.

After that, in the allegory, the occupant of the grave found the land dirty and moved his grave to the sea. He then revealed his identity as a tuan said. The sudden prominence given to the occupant of the grave at this point may perhaps be interpreted as an allusion to the occupation of the island by the Penyengat hulubalang 'military officers'. The grave, which may be taken as a symbol for the island itself, now becomes an Islamic habitation. The forcible take-over of Pangkil by military officers suggests violence and bloodshed. The pollution of the land in the allegory may have been an allusion to this.

In the allegory, the tuan said reveals his cosmopolitan connections to Singapore, Daik and even directly to Mecca itself. This may be interpreted as an allusion to the cosmopolitan ties of Penyengat, and perhaps even to the direct control of Pangkil by Penyengat the centre. Whereas previously on land the grave had its own pusat 'centre', it now had only two gravestones. Its centre had apparently shifted to Mecca where the tuan said still goes every Friday to pray.

However, important though the grave was, it contained only the arm of the tuan said. I interpret this as an allusion to the secondary role that Pangkil played in relation to Penyengat. It was an anchorage for ships going to Penyengat, but not a competing alternative port. So Pangkil was an 'arm' of Penyengat, equivalent to other 'arms' located in Pengujuan and Soreh. The parts of the tuan said's body thus inhabit three strategically located islands that could have guarded entry to Penyengat. As pointed out above, these three islands are located just west of Penyengat, constituting a line from Pengujuan in the north, through Soreh in the middle, and Pangkil
in the south. This may perhaps be interpreted as Penyengat's line of defense against the Galang pirates, since the latter's territory did indeed span westward of that line.

The allegory then makes an allusion to royalty in the form of a chicken with white blood. This chicken is identified as female, because a male raja from the Sulit area comes and 'marries' it, giving 100 ringgit as 'mas kawin'. The significance of this part of the allegory may be explained thus.

As mentioned above, in the realistic reconstruction of Pangkil's past, five rajas were said to have held the island. The first two were female -- namely, Engku Puteri Raja Hamidah and Engku Besar Raja Sitti. We have already discussed the importance of Raja Hamidah's mas kawin. According to the Tuhfat, Engku Besar Raja Sitti was Raja Hamidah's younger sister. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982.) The royal chicken with white blood may perhaps be interpreted as an allusion to the female rajas who held Pangkil.

As to why female royalty should be symbolised by a chicken, we may perhaps refer to an animistic fowling ritual in the Malay Peninsula discussed by Skeat (1900:132-141), where he points out that the fowl to be snared must be called puteri 'princess'. Although I did not come across such a ritual in Riau, it is quite possible that a similar practice did exist and perhaps still does in certain parts.

In the allegory, the raja from the Sulit area becomes a dukun 'healer' by 'marrying' the royal chicken. If it is plausible to interpret the chicken as a symbol of the female rajas from Penyengat who had held Pangkil, then this would imply that the Sulit raja who had also originated from Penyengat, married a female raja from within his own keturunan. As shown in Chapter Four, Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Jafar's authority in Riau rested upon the mas kawin of his
sister, Raja Hamidah.

In this context, the figure of 100 ringgit mentioned in the allegory may be significant. It constitutes one quarter of the 400 ringgit that is specified as the mas kawin of the derajat of raja. Penyengat, and hence Riau, was given to Raja Hamidah as mas kawin in 1804. But at that time, 'Riau' did not include the Karimun-Kundur area. As shown in Chapter Two, that area did not become part of 'Riau' until after the London Treaty of 1824. Prior to that, it had come under the temenggung's purview. So Raja Hamidah's mas kawin did not include the Karimun-Kundur area. I suggest that the 100 ringgit that the raja from Pulau Sulit is said to have thrown into the sea may be interpreted as an addition to Raja Hamidah's mas kawin — namely, Riau.

If it is valid to interpret the symbolic allegory concerning the tuan said's grave by mapping it onto my informants' realistic reconstruction of Pangkil's past, as I have done above, then the question arises: since they do make the attempt to present a realistic reconstruction of actual events that had occurred in the past, why should they bother to mystify these events by shrouding them in a symbolic allegory focussed on a tuan said's grave? I would answer that the realistic reconstruction is about the past, whereas the symbolic allegory is about the present. The tuan said's grave exists in the present. Pangkil may have once been a non-Islamic 'Panggil' which was subsequently Islamised by the Penyengat rajas. That was an event of the past. But the tuan said still goes to Mecca every Friday, and the present-day living people of Pangkil still berniat at his grave any day of the week except Friday. The implication is that so long as Pangkil has the keramat grave of a tuan said, it will surely not slip back into being a non-Islamic Panggil.
The tuan said's grave of Pangkil thus symbolises the extension of political control by an Islamic and Islamising centre. Although one may date Islamisation as a historical event of the temporal past, it is nevertheless also an ongoing process which needs to be located in the spatial present. What Islam represents in this context is not just a canonical religion pure and simple. It is, as argued above, a means of religious legitimation which converts raw power into legal authority.

The tuan said's grave of Pangkil is thus very similar to the tuan said's grave of Penyabung discussed in Chapter Five. Both these tuan said seem to be purely fictitious personae, deliberately constructed for the purpose of political legitimation. Both their 'graves' -- one under water and the other invisible -- seem to symbolise the outward spread of religiously legitimated political authority from Penyengat, both in the past and in the ongoing present.

In this light, it is interesting that whereas my Galang informants deny the existence of a tuan said's grave on Penyabung, as mentioned in Chapter Five, my Pangkil informants fully accept the existence of their tuan said's grave. This indicates the relative degree to which they accept Penyengat's authority over them. If such is the use of keramat graves -- that is, as symbols of political legitimation -- then it is understandable indeed why my Penyengat informants regard the keramat gestalt in Islamic terms and why they keep the mode of ritual conduct at such graves as Islamic as possible. To permit animistic practices at keramat graves would defeat the very purpose of 'keramatisation' as legitimation.
6.4 Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini

Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini in Bintan seems to be a clear example of legitimation through 'keramatisation'. This is a keramat complex located on a low hill called Bukit Batu. There are six graves on the sites, all Islamically laid out with the proper orientation of gravestones — that is, in a direction from which the corpses within can face Mecca. According to my informants, the personae within these graves are:

Dang Pok Dang Marini, also known as Wan Empuk and Wan Malini;
Orang Tua Besar 'The Great Elder';
Puteri Melor 'Royal Daughter Of The Jasmine';
Puteri Cempaka 'Royal Daughter Of The Cempaka Tree';
Datuk Hilir 'The Datuk Located Downstream';
Datuk Telanai 'The Datuk with the title Telanai'.

The name 'Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini' highlights that particular grave over the others. Significantly, my informants identified Dang Pok Dang Marini as synonymous with the Wan Empuk and Wan Malini who figure importantly in the founding legend of the Melaka dynasty. According to my informants, the other personae in 'Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini' also figure importantly in this founding legend. Thus, Orang Tua Besar has been identified to me as the female ruler of Bintan in that legend; the two Puteri were identified as her daughters, and the two Datuk identified as ministers of Bintan. Furthermore, my informants identified Dang Pok Dang Marini and Datuk Telanai as orang penaung, and the others as orang Bintan. We shall see the significance of this identification in the discussion below.

I have shown in Chapter Five how relevant the founding legend told in the Penurunan is to the keturunan Bintan. It is thus all the more significant that there should be a keramat complex built around
the characters in that legend. There are, however, some significant discrepancies between this keramat complex, and the founding legend told in the Penurunan. My informants themselves seem to be quite aware of these discrepancies.

These discrepancies may be understood, I suggest, in the context of the attempt to legitimate Sultan Mahmud's assassination in 1699 in terms of a social contract established in Palembang. (See Chapter Five.) Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini thus represents an ongoing attempt to legitimate the temporal past in the spatial present. Let us examine this proposition in detail by comparing the personae in Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini with those in the Penurunan, both in the earlier pre-1699 version and the later post-1699 one.

First of all, the names and titles differ. 'Dang Pok Dang Marini' differs significantly from the names Wan Empuk and Wan Malini, as given in the Penurunan. My informants know both sets of names; they explain the former as the Bintan pronunciation of the latter. But what is even more intriguing is that whereas they would mention 'Wan Empuk' and 'Wan Malini' as two separate names, they always pronounce as one name 'Dang Pok Dang Marini'. This suggests that 'Dang Pok Dang Marini' is a singularisation of the two separate names.

Moreover, there is only one grave for the two of them. My informants are aware that Wan Empuk and Wan Malini in the legend are two distinct people, but they could offer no explanation for the single grave. This may be taken as further evidence of the singularisation of the two otherwise distinct identities.

But why have Wan Empuk and Wan Malini been singularised in name and site, such that there is but one grave 'Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini' for the two of them? In Chapter Five, I argued that Wan Empuk and Wan Malini played the role of penaung 'protector' to the three
Indian princes who appeared on top of Bukit Si-Guntang. I further argued that it was this role that has been highlighted in the attempt to legitimate Sultan Mahmud's assassination in terms of a broken social contract -- hence the special mas kawin of the keturunan Bintan to remind them of Wan Empuk and Wan Malini on Bukit Si-Guntang. It seems to me that Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini is yet another variation on the same theme but spatially realised.

The interest in this case is not in the two distinct identities of Wan Empuk and Wan Malini. What is highlighted instead is their common role as the penaung of the raja. Both versions of the Penurunan make it quite clear that the two women shared a house and that it was to this house that they brought the Indian princes. I have shown above in the section on the keramat gestalt that in my informants' view, keramat people are not dead but still existent; an informant even stated explicitly that the keramat grave is merely a place of habitation, perhaps even a house. In this light, I would interpret the single grave of Dang Pok Dang Marini as representing the single house of Wan Empuk and Wan Malini, which was the naung 'shelter' of the raja. The singular form of the name 'Dang Pok Dang Marini' thus represents their shared single role of penaung.

The second point concerns the title Orang Tua Besar 'The Great Elder' which my informants use to refer to the female ruler of Bintan. But in both versions of the Penurunan, she is referred to as Raja Besar 'Great Ruler'; the title Orang Tua Besar does not appear. My informants, on the other hand, do not refer to her as Raja Besar.

The term orang tua (literally, 'old person') denotes head of the family; adult in contradistinction to child; a member of the senior generation; parent.

(Wilkinson 1959:1237).
In the pre-1699 version of the Penurunan, the female ruler of Bintan adopts the Indian prince from Palembang as her son. (See Winstedt 1938:59.) In the post-1699 version, she first adopts him as her younger brother, and then becomes his co-parent-in-law, when her daughter Wan Seri Beni marries his son Sang Nila Utama/Seri Teri Buana. (See Shellabear 1967:31-32.) It thus appears that it is her role as parent that is highlighted in the keramat grave in Bintan. So instead of being referred to as Raja Besar 'Great Ruler', as in the text, she is referred to as Orang Tua Besar 'Great Parent'. The implication is that she was the 'great parent' of a 'great child' — namely, Sang Nila Utama.

What is even more intriguing is a detail offered by my informants about a related persona whose grave is not in the keramat complex. This is Orang Tua Besar's husband who, they say, was called Laksamana Raja Andak, also known as Asykar Ayah. The suggestion is that the Laksamana Bintan who murdered Sultan Mahmud in 1699 came from a long line of such laksamanas, beginning with Orang Tua Besar's husband. In the post-1699 version of the Penurunan, the female ruler of Bintan was a widow by the time the Palembang prince reached Bintan. So her deceased husband could not possibly have played a parental role to Sang Nila Utama/Seri Teri Buana. There is no mention in the text about the identity of her husband. But it seems that my informants have taken it upon themselves to fill in that detail. The name or title Asykar Ayah may be translated literally as 'Father-Soldier'. So even in this case, there is an allusion to a parental role, however, in relation not to Seri Teri Buana himself, but to all those who later became laksamana and asykar. So if Orang Tua Besar was the adoptive parent of Sang Nila Utama/Seri Teri Buana, and her husband Askar Ayah was father to the laksamana line, then by implication, Laksamana Bintan was structurally related to Sultan Mahmud as 'sibling'. It is
thus understandable why the female ruler of Bintan is referred to as Orang Tua Besar and not as Raja Besar.

In the post-1699 version of the Penurunan, there is a Tun Telanai who was the son of the former Palembang ruler, Demang Lebar Daun, and who was 'made ruler' (dirajakan) of Bintan after the death of its female ruler. (See Shellabear 1967:37.) The pre-1699 version does not mention any Tun Telanai in this context; its first mention of a Tun Telanai crops up in the context of Melaka. (See Winstedt 1938:98.) Nor does this latter version mention who succeeds the female ruler of Bintan; it does, however, state that she 'died, leaving two grand-daughters: they were married to the two sons of Sri Tri Buana' (ibid.:20). Although in the post-1699 version there is a Tun Telanai who was made raja of Bintan, the Datuk Telanai whose grave is in Bintan is, however, identified by my informants not as a raja but as a menteri.

However, it is significant that my informants do not mention that Datuk Telanai was 'made raja' (dirajakan); instead they referred to him as menteri 'minister'. If he was merely a minister, then that implies that someone else was raja. As mentioned above, in the post-1699 version of the Penurunan, Tun Telanai is described as Demang Lebar Daun's son. Demang Lebar Daun was the Palembang raja who had established the social contract between ruler and subject with Sang Sapurba, one of the three Indian princes who had appeared in Bukit Si-Guntang. As mentioned in Chapter Five above, this was done through a marriage alliance between Sang Sapurba and Demang Lebar Daun's daughter Wan Sendari. This version of the Penurunan goes on to relate that after the marriage ceremony was fully completed, Demang Lebar Daun abdicated his throne in favour of his son-in-law and instead became mangkubumi 'prime minister'. In contrast, in the pre-1699 version, Demang Lebar Daun abdicated first, and then as minister,
established the social contract through marriage alliance.

The subtle difference is that in the post-1699 version, Demang Lebar Daun's demotion from raja to mangkubumi hinges entirely on the social contract he had established with Sang Sapurba. If the latter had not agreed to the terms of the contract the former had proposed, no marriage alliance would have taken place and Demang Lebar Daun would not have abdicated his throne. In the pre-1699 version, since he had abdicated his throne first, the social contract served merely to consolidate an already existing relationship of ruler and subject. In the context of the post-1699 version, my informants' stress on Datuk Telanai's role as menteri rather than raja, implies the social contract set up by his father, on which the relationship between raja and menteri was based. This would seem to be the relevant textual context indeed, since as pointed out above, the pre-1699 version does not even mention any Tun Telanai or Datuk Telanai in Bintan.

This discussion of the three main personae in Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini demonstrates that what is being highlighted through 'keramatisation' is the social contract between ruler and subject, even though the figure of the ruler is conspicuously absent from the keramat complex itself. But what have the personae of Datuk Hilir and the two Puteri, who are not mentioned in the Penurunan, to do with the social contract?

Another discrepancy between the keramat complex and the founding legend is that there is no mention of a Datuk Hilir of Bintan in either version of the text, yet his grave is in the keramat complex. With regards to the title Datuk Hilir 'The Datuk Located Downstream', I suggest that the significance lies in the word hilir 'the lower reaches of the river'. The river in question is Sungai Bintan. In the Penurunan it is said that when the Palembang fleet was in the
vicinity of Bintan, the female ruler sent out two of her ministers to
meet the Indian prince and to guide him to Bintan, a journey that
seems to have involved going upriver.

I suggest that the Datuk Hilir in the keramat complex is a
representation of the two Bintan ministers sent to guide Sang Sapurba
up Bintan River. The direction of this journey is made all the more
evident by the location of Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini itself, which
is not in the hilir, but is fairly far upstream at Bukit Batu. (See
Map 6.) According to my informants, the site of the keramat complex
was the habitation site of the keramat personae when they were alive.
The presence of a Datuk Hilir's grave in this upstream keramat complex
thus symbolises an upriver journey — in particular the guided journey
of the Palembang prince.

The Penurunan does not mention that the female ruler of Bintan
had two daughters. The pre-1699 version states that Wan Seri Benian
had two grand-daughters who were married to Seri Teri Buana's two
sons. In the post-1699 version, the female ruler Permaisuri Iskandar
Syah had only one daughter, Wan Seri Beni, who married Sang Nila
Utama/Seri Teri Buana. Wan Seri Beni and Seri Teri Buana then begot
two sons, one of whom married an Indian princess, and the other a
grand-daughter of Demang Lehar Daun, who was Tun Telanai's father.
Yet in the keramat complex in Bintan, there are two graves said to
belong to the two daughters of the female ruler of Bintan.

I suggest that they symbolise the wives that Bintan provided for
the ruling house. As mentioned above, in both the pre-1699 and the
post-1699 versions of the Penurunan, the Bintan females married the
male rulers from Palembang. This is significant indeed in the context
of the social contract established in Palembang, which was based upon
the marriage alliance between Sang Sapurba and Demang Lebar Daun's
daughter. If that social contract was validated by a marriage in which Demang Lebar Daun played the role of wife-giver to Sang Sapurba, then by implication, a similarly valid social contract holds for the Bintan people who were wife-givers to the ruling house. What further strengthens this argument is that in the post-1699 version, it is mentioned that Seri Teri Buana's son married a descendant of Demang Lebar Daun, thereby repeating the marriage pattern initiated by his grandfather Sang Sapurba. (See Bowen 1983.)

In the context of the discussion above, it is significant that the informants who could provide me with the greatest detail about Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini were not my Bintan informants living in the immediate area, but my raja informants in Penyengat. These latter were the ones familiar with the legend as told in the Penurunan and who therefore referred me to that text. (See Plate 17.) While my Bintan informants did appear to know the founding legend, they said that they 'did not know very much and were not able to organise the story' (tak tahu sangat, tak boleh susun ceritanya). Most of my Bintan informants are illiterate and none has read the Penurunan; so that source of information is closed to them. What they know about the founding legend seems to be what has been condensed into the gestalt of Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini. Even if they cannot, as they said, 'organise the story', this keramat complex is for them very much a part of the ongoing present.

Every year, on the twenty-seventh day of the Islamic month Rejab, people from Bintan and other parts of Riau come ramai-ramai 'in crowds' to Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini to pray and berniat. Rejab is the seventh month of the Islamic calendar and is, significantly, a month in which war is prohibited. (See Dusuki 1976:280.) It is perhaps ironic that a month of peace has been chosen to commemorate a keramat complex that legitimates the assassination of Sultan Mahmud
Plate 17. Raja Hamzah of Penyengat recites a prayer for the occupants of the graves at Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini.
II. Perhaps even more interestingly, Rejab is commonly called bulan kawin 'the month of weddings', because it is considered an auspicious time to get married. (See Coope 1976:228.) This is significant indeed in the light of a social contract that was established through a marriage alliance.

6.5 Keramat Datuk Bujuk

There is another keramat complex in Bintan that is of relevance to us. This is known as Keramat Datuk Bujuk and is located in Kota Kara. (See Map 6.) There are four graves in this complex, located in an enclosure fenced by low bushes. My informants identify all four graves as pertaining to Datuk Bujuk, without a further individuation of the graves in terms of different personae. The stones marking the graves are big, crude, irregularly shaped, granite blocks, quite unlike any other gravestone that I have seen in Riau, or even elsewhere, for that matter. The position of these un-Muslim looking gravestones is also quite telling. Two pairs of the gravestones are placed along a north-south axis, such that it is possible for the corpses within, if there are indeed any, to have their faces orientated towards Mecca. The other two pairs of gravestones are, however, placed in such random positions that there is no possibility that the corpses are facing Mecca.

Rather incongruously, however, a Muslim informant in Bintan, the ketua 'elder' of Bukit Batu, told me that Kota Kara in Bintan was originally supposed to be 'Mecca'; the kiblah was supposed to be located there. But later, the tuan said came, he said, and moved 'Mecca' to tanah Arab 'Arab-land'. As mentioned above, the kiblah is the direction where Mecca lies, towards which all Muslims must orientate themselves when they pray and when they die. (See Moulavi
1978:42,107). Significantly, in Malay the word kiblah may also be used in a general sense for 'goal' or 'aim' (Coope 1976:143).

In the context of Islam, what my Bintan informant said may simply be considered wrong. In the context of semantic analysis, however, we may discern a particular significance in what he said. If we translate his usage of the word 'Mecca' as 'centre', and kiblah as 'orientation', we may perhaps interpret his statement thus: Kota Kara in Bintan was originally the centre towards which people were orientated; later, after the Arabs came, people became orientated towards the Mecca that is in Arabia. Since this informant was himself speaking from the perspective of Bintan, it would appear that he was referring to a shift in orientation in the history of the Bintan people -- that is, from an inward orientation towards Bintan itself to an outward orientation towards a centre located far from Bintan.

According to this informant and several others, Kota Kara was a tempat raja 'raja's site', a negeri 'city' which pre-dated the founding of Bukit Batu, which is where Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini is located. The raja of Kota Kara and the raja of Bukit Batu were said to be lain-lain 'separate and different'. My informants described Kota Kara as being so big that the cats and the birds could not finish circling it in one month! They also said that during the time of Kota Kara, there was an iron-working foundry located on Sungai Dua, where one may still find tahi besi 'bits of scrap iron' (which I did find indeed). Koboh was mentioned as the tempat penjagaan 'site for defense', and Kopak as the pelabuhan 'anchorage'. (See Map 6.) In the absence of any archaeological evidence, I cannot say whether there was indeed an ancient kingdom located at Kota Kara, but my informants' statements suggest such a possibility. Not only that, they imply that it was a pre-Islamic kingdom.
The site at Kota Kara is also referred to by the name 'Bujuk', about which there is a story. The following account is from the penghulu 'headman' of Bintan:

Concerning the name Bujuk, it is the name of a fish. Well then, in that bygone era, so the story goes, there was a raja there. His son asked for an image, an image of a fish, a fish of gold. When this was done, the child played with it in a pool; mysteriously, the image was transformed into a [real] fish. The fish was a bujuk 'freshwater murrel'. The name of that fish is the reason why the place is named Bujuk. That bujuk, it began as an image, but after it was played with, it became a fish of gold.

(My translation).

This legendary fish seems to be regarded as the genius loci of the place, terus sampai sekarang 'continuously up to the present'. The Datuk Bujuk 'Grandparent Bujuk' in the complex of keramat graves thus refers to this fish. So the site in Bintan that is said to have been the original 'Mecca' where the kiblah was to have been, is marked by a complex of un-Islamic looking graves that is associated with a genius loci who is a golden fish transformed from an image made for the raja's son.

The penghulu also told me that the raja who built Kota Kara had originated from Palembang and that the present-day Bintan people are descended from the Kota Kara population. He estimated that twelve generations separate the present from the time of Kota Kara. The penghulu went on to say that while contact between Bintan and Palembang was maintained during zaman raja 'in the era of the raja', there is no longer any such contact at present.

So a Bintan-Palembang connection is also associated with Keramat Datuk Bujuk. The difference is that, in this case, there is no reference whatsoever to the founding legend of the Melaka dynasty. Instead the picture that is presented is relatively simpler: the Palembang raja came to Bintan with his followers, established a
settlement at Kota Kara, and the present-day Bintan people are descended from that founding population.

Significantly, whereas my raja informants in Penyengat were the most knowledgeable about Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini, the views I have presented concerning Kota Kara and Keramat Datuk Bujuk have been derived, not from the Penyengat rajas, but from my Bintan informants themselves. And whereas my Bintan informants had said that they could not 'organise the story' of Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini, in the case of Keramat Datuk Bujuk, my Penyengat informants were the ones who claimed ignorance.

In this light, it is perhaps significant that the ketua of Bukit Batu and the penghulu of Bintan were among my informants who told me about Kota Kara as a political centre. For if there were still a centre at Kota Kara, then, logically, the 'elder' and the 'headman' would be power-holders at this centre. Therefore, for my Bintan informants to claim that they are descended from the Palembang raja who built Kota Kara, is to imply that they are themselves of raja descent and thereby deserving of political authority. In contrast, if they were to claim a Palembang descent via Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini, then the implication would merely be that they are of penaung 'protector' descent, relative to someone else who was raja. It is, of course, more prestigious to be raja, than to be merely a 'protector' of the raja; consequently, it is more ambitious to claim raja descent than to claim penaung descent.

Another important point of contrast is that whereas people from outside Bintan also visit Keramat Dang Pong Dang Marini, Keramat Datuk Bujuk seems to be attended to only by the people of Bintan. In the case of the latter, the annual pilgrimage takes place in the Muslim month of Syawal, which begins with hari raya puasa 'the great feast at
the end of the fast'. It is perhaps significant that Syawal is the month from which commences the period of the haj to Mecca. In the context of my informant's claim that Kota Kara in Bintan was the original 'Mecca' where the kiblah was to have been located, it would appear that the annual pilgrimage of the Bintan people to that area in Syawal is a temporal enactment of such a claim.

6.6 Place and Persona

The keramat gestalt in Riau has certain ramifications which need to be explicated. As shown above, the existence of certain keramat graves in particular places contextualises those places in particular time-frames. For example, the existence of the keramat graves of Raja Hamidah and Raja Haji on Penyengat contextualises Penyengat itself in a post-1804 time-frame, spanning from the bestowal of the island as mas kawin. Similarly, the existence of Opu Daeng Marewah's keramat grave in Sungai Riau contextualises that place in a post-1722 time-frame, spanning from the arrival of the Bugis adventurers. The existence of the tuan said's grave off the southern coast of Pangkil contextualises Pangkil itself in a time-frame that spans from the time of its takeover by the Penyengat rajas. The existence of Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini in Bukit Batu, Bintan, contextualises that place in a time-frame that spans from the first establishment of the social contract between ruler and subject in Palembang. The existence of Keramat Datuk Bujuk in Kota Kara, Bintan, contextualises that place in approximately the same time-frame, but alternatively interpreted in terms of a migration from Palembang to Bintan in a pre-Islamic era when Kota Kara was supposedly the original 'Mecca'.

If the temporal past is spatially realised, then it is also the case that territory is temporally contextualised. The distance
between different territories is thus to be reckoned not just in spatial terms, but also in temporal ones. For example, the spatial distance between Penyengat and Bintan approximates the distance between Penyengat and Pangkil. (See Map 4.) In temporal terms, however, Penyengat and Bintan are much farther apart than Penyengat and Pangkil which are located basically in the same time-frame. The relative temporal distances between these places are indicated by the degree of social interaction between their respective communities. Social interaction between the Penyengat and Pangkil communities is much denser than that between the Penyengat and Bintan communities. Indeed only a few of my Penyengat informants have ever been to Bintan, whereas many of them frequently visit Pangkil and even marry the people there.

If a keramat grave contextualises a place in a particular time-frame, then what is the temporal context of places without keramat graves? Such places are contextualised, I suggest, in the immediate present. The most prominent example of such a place is Tanjungpinang, the urban centre. So it is not just the temporal past, but also the temporal present, that can be spatially realised. It is thus possible to move through time in space, as it were, by passing from Bintan as the most ancient past, to Penyengat and Pangkil as the more recent past, to Tanjungpinang as the current present. So these are not just place-names but also time-names.

Bintan and Penyengat, in particular, are regarded as tempat sejarah 'historical places'. Indeed they abound with keramat graves. However, whereas Penyengat has keramat graves of rajas, Bintan only has those of datuks. In this context, it is noteworthy that the Penyengat grave of Datuk Kaya Mepar, the leader of the Ladi pirates, is not regarded as keramat, but is treated like any other ordinary grave. (See Chapter Five on Datuk Kaya Mepar.) I suggest that this
is because Penyengat is the territory not of the datuks, but of the rajas as symbolised most prominently in the personae of Raja Hamidah and Raja Haji. It would therefore have been quite inappropriate to 'keramatise' a mere datuk in such a situation.

Bintan, on the other hand, is evidently regarded as the territory of the orang pertengahan 'the people in the middle' and is thus symbolised by the personae of various datuks. Apart from those mentioned above, there are several others such as the following:

- Datuk Pandai Bergendang 'The Datuk Skilled at Drumming'
- Datuk Panta 'The Datuk at Panta'
- Datuk Uka 'The Datuk at Uka'
- Datuk Serah 'The Datuk Who Surrendered'.

There is even a keramat grave of a slave in Bintan known as Budak Kecik 'The Small Slave'.

On the one hand, the keramat grave contextualises the place in which it is located. On the other hand, the grave itself is identified in terms of the particular persona who inhabits it. This implies that places are not just temporally contextualised, they are indeed symbolically personified. For example, Bukit Batu in Bintan is not just the place associated in abstract terms with the Palembang social contract; it is much more vividly identified as the place of Dang Pok Dang Marini and the other personae in that keramat complex. So the temporal past is not just spatially realised; it is brought to life, so to speak, by particular personae who are symbolically existent in graves.

It is the existence of these keramat personae that enables the living people of the present-day to relate directly to the temporal past. For example, Raja Hamidah personifies the post-1804 time-frame which contextualises Penyengat. Yet a living person of the present
time can still communicate a personal niat to her in her grave. No niat is too mundane or too trivial to bring to her attention. In this way, the temporal past is experienced not just as a vague abstraction, but as a concretised reality relevant to the everyday present with all its mundane and trivialities.

The personification of a place in this manner is not Islamic. It is one thing to regard a persona in a keramat grave as existent because he or she has been so blessed by God. As we have seen above, one can indeed find a canonical basis for such a perception. It is quite another thing, however, to then regard the keramat persona as the tuan daerah, the symbolic lord of the place where his or her grave is located. In terms of canonical Islam, the latter perception can even be considered syirik — that is, to believe in more than one God. (See Muhammad Ali 1973:121-128.) This is canonically the most serious of sins.

Yet it is logically very easy to slip from the first Islamically acceptable perception of keramat graves to the second Islamically unacceptable perception. My informants themselves are aware of this slippage. When talking to me about keramat graves, the more Muslim of them always take care to note that everything ultimately comes from God, even if it is mediated by keramat personae. This indeed points towards the crucial difference between the two perceptions. In the first perception, the keramat personae are merely mediators who facilitate the prayers of ordinary people to God. In the second perception, they are more than mediators, assuming instead the role of independent spirits. The first is a more passive role, the second a more active one. But the shift from the one to the other is very slight and subtle indeed.
Furthermore, such a shift of perception is plausible in the context of an indigenous animism which pre-dates the coming of Islam. This indigenous animism is still very much alive in Riau. Indeed, to turn the argument around, we may say political legitimation through the 'keramatisation' of strategic graves succeeds precisely because of a pre-existing local animism. There are many similarities between the animism indigenous to Riau and the animism of the Malay Peninsula. (See Skeat 1900 and Endicott 1970.)

In the context of animism in Riau, every place is inhabited by a genius loci, referred to alternatively as puaka, jembalang puaka, angkar, hantu tanah, or penunggu. The usage of a particular term depends on the aspect to be highlighted. The terms puaka and angkar tend to be used for the particular places which the spirits inhabit. One can say, for example, pokok itu puaka 'that tree is puaka', meaning that that tree is the habitation of a genius loci. A jembalang puaka refers to the spirit that inhabits a puaka. Such a spirit, however, belongs to a larger category of spirits, including those who are free-ranging; so the term hantu tanah 'earth spirits' differentiates the localised ones from the free-ranging ones such as the hantu penyakit 'spirits of sickness'. The term penunggu 'the one who waits' refers to the potential harm that the genius loci can do to those who trespass on its territory. A precaution my informants take when they are passing through uninhabited territory is to call out:

_Baik, Datuk, anak cucu nak lalu._

(Hail, Grandparent, your descendant wishes to pass.)

A similar greeting, with the appropriate change of verb, is used if one wishes to bathe, urinate or defecate in uninhabited territory. Such a precaution is taken even by the more Muslim of my informants.
The use of the word *datuk* 'grandparent' in this animistic context is significant. As we have seen above, there are *keramat* graves such as those of Datuk Telanai and Datuk Hilir, where the word evidently refers to a rank on the hierarchy. On the other hand, the word also carries an animistic connotation such that it becomes a double entendre, referring on the one hand, to a rank on the political hierarchy, and on the other hand, to an animistic genius loci.

Both references are, however, quite compatible. In the animistic context, the way to neutralise the potentially harmful *penunggu* lying in wait is to set up a quasi-kin relationship of

\[
\text{datuk} : \text{anak cucu}
\]

\[
\text{grandparent} : \text{descendant}
\]

Such a relationship parallels that between the political *datuk* on the hierarchy and his *anak buah*, as discussed in Chapter Five. It is perhaps the case that the *keramat* graves of *datuks* were historically derived from this semantic parallelism. In other words, a *datuk* who is an animistic genius loci can be converted into a *datuk* inhabiting a *keramat* grave, with the implication that the latter was once a living *datuk* on the political hierarchy and who is now buried in that grave. I suggest that *Keramat Datuk Bujuk* in Kota Kara, Bintan, is indeed an example of such a conversion, especially since my informants could give no detail about the inhabitants of the four graves or the *datuk* as an historical personage.

Moreover, it seems possible that a *datuk* who is a genius loci can be converted not just into a *datuk keramat*, but even into a *tuan said*. The *tuan said*'s grave off Pangkil seems to be a case in point. In my informants' allegory, it is said that there were formerly two strange animals who 'waited' (*nunnggu*) at the grave. They were thus the
penunggu 'the ones who waited'. In the allegory, however, they are portrayed as relatively harmless, for they disappeared whenever human beings approached. Indeed they disappear altogether from the story after the grave is revealed as the habitation of a tuan said. Hence they are not portrayed as datuks 'grandfathers' to whom living people related as anak cucu 'descendants'. It seems to me the reason why the genius loci of Pangkil has been converted into a tuan said and that of Kota Kara into a mere datuk keramat is that Pangkil is more Islamised and is indeed generally regarded as more alim 'pious' than Bintan. So there is a keener awareness among my Pangkil informants of the difference between the keramat grave of an Arab tuan said and that of an animistic local datuk.

The conversion of a genius loci into a keramat persona also implies a change in the perception of time. An animistic genius loci inhabiting a territory is as old as that territory itself. In other words, the spirit of the place has always been in existence. Its origin is not a problem. It simply exists. In contrast, a keramat grave contains a persona who was once a living person in alam fana 'the finite this-world' and who is now existent in alam barzakh 'the intermediate world'. There is thus an irreversible temporal passage from the one state of existence to the other, a passage from past to present. The ahistorical immediacy of the animistic genius loci thus becomes, on conversion to a keramat grave, an historical persona who had lived in the past but is now still existent in the grave. The 'keramatisation' of animistic genii loci thus involves a shift in orientation from the perception of time as the always present, to the perception of time as a linear and irreversible flow from past to present.
I would therefore argue that keramat graves are essentially inter-contextual pivots, which enable one's perception to shift between contexts, whatever those contexts may be. Perhaps a musical metaphor may be used to elucidate the meaning of an inter-contextual pivot. In harmonic progression, there are pivot chords which facilitate the modulation from one key to another. Their pivotal role derives from their occurrence in more than one key, such that there is an inherent ambiguity through which one key can slip smoothly into another.

At the most basic level, the keramat graves are the pivotal points between the 'key of life' and the 'key of death', to borrow Levi-Strauss' terms (1966:194). At another level, they are the pivot through which the past modulates into the present. At yet another level they allow a shift from animism to Islam. At another level still, they are the fulcrum of a change in orientation from temporal immediacy to temporal linearity.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

1. This concern with the dead may be understood as part of Southeast Asian animism. As Reid (1984:15) has pointed out, the most striking feature of Southeast Asian animism is 'the continuing involvement of the dead in the affairs of the living'. He further argues (ibid.:16) that in this context, 'Islam demonstrated to the Southeast Asians that it had its own ways of ensuring that the spirits of the dead were at peace and even of invoking those spirits for the well-being of the living'.

2. Wehr (1976:54) translates the original Arabic word baraka thus:

...To kneel down...to invoke a blessing...to bless...to be blessed. Tabaraka...God bless...!

3. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:


Ideally, an agurram is one who is descended from the Prophet,...and is thus a sherif, is visibly a recipient of divine blessing, baraka, mediates between men and God and arbitrates between men and men, dispenses blessing, possesses magical powers, is a good and pious man, observes Koranic precepts,..., is uncalculatingly generous and hospitable and rich, does not fight or engage in feuds..., hence turns the other cheek.

5. My comparison of my Riau informants with the Moroccan Berbers is not without anthropological precedent. Geertz (1968) compared 'religious development in Morocco and Indonesia'. His comparison, however, is primarily between Islamised Javanese mysticism and what he terms 'Moroccan maraboutism', both of which, he notes (ibid.:48), can be accommodated under the rubric of 'Sufism'. He argues (ibid.):

Despite the otherworldly ideas and activities so often associated with it, Sufism, as an historical reality, consists of a series of different and even contradictory experiments...in bringing orthodox Islam (itself no seamless unity) into effective relationship with the world, rendering it accessible to its adherents and rendering its adherents accessible to it.

According to Geertz (ibid.), this underlying Sufi aim of realising Islam in the experiential here-and-now is manifest in different ways in different places, but nevertheless is still the same motivation. Such an underlying theme may indeed be discerned in the different practices of Sufism in Morocco and Southeast Asia.

The presence of Sufism in Southeast Asia is well-documented. See, for example, Johns (1957,1961), Al-Attas (1963), and Reid (1984).

7. As Subhan (1960:110) has shown:

A close examination of Sufism shows that the thaumaturgic element in it belongs to the period of its later development, and that it has been introduced by the followers of different religious orders in their attempts to vie with one another in proving the superiority of the saints of their respective orders.

The other three types of extraordinary events are: mu'jiza (that is, miracles worked by prophets), ma'unat (that is, wonderful works by mere accident), and istidraj (that is, the amazing deeds of the magician). The difference between mu'jiza and karamah is that the former is supposed to be exhibited by a prophet as a demonstration of his prophetic office, whereas the latter is immanent in a saint simply as a result of his union with God. (See Subhan 1960:109.)

8. Al-Attas notes (1963:48) that the leaders or syaikh of the various Sufi orders known as tariga were almost all characterised by the possession of keramat:

The workers of miraculous feats are known generally to Malay Muslims and to the disciples and followers of the Shayks of the Tariqahs as keramat. The word keramat is derived from the word -- karamah -- which is identical in meaning with the charismata of the early Christian Church. It means 'the exhibition by Allah of His generosity, favour, or grace' -- God's gift or grace to whom He favours.

The Arabic word karama is thus cognate with the Greek root charis meaning 'favour, grace'. Interestingly, the English word 'charisma' is indeed derived from this root. (See the Concise Oxford Dictionary 1976:167.)

9. According to my informants, this last keramat hidup was known as Raja Tua 'The Old Raja' or as Engku Yod. It was his practice to give out charms called surat, on which he had written out the Quranic verse known as ayat nasrun. These charms were given to Penyengat people during the month of Safar, which is the second month of the Islamic year. On the last Wednesday of this month, the mandi Safar 'Safar bath' ritual was conducted by those who had received the charms. The surat was 'soaked' (direndam) in a big pail of water, which was then used for the ritual bath. The purpose was to 'avert disaster' (tolak bala) by 'protecting oneself' (selamatkan diri).

10. According to my informants, there are two famous keramat panjang 'long graves' in Riau: one is on Pengujan, the other is in the Karimun area.

11. Gravestones for female corpses are flat in shape and hence known as nengsan pipih 'flat gravestones'. Gravestones for male corpses are tubular in shape and hence known as nengsan bulat 'rounded gravestones'.
12. Interestingly, Gellner (1969:74) says of the Berber agurram:

An alternative outsider's definition must be offered: An agurram is simply he who is held to be one. One attains agurramhood by being held to possess it. Agurramhood is in the eye of the beholder. But that still isn't quite right: agurramhood is in the eyes of the beholders — all of them squint to see what is in the eyes of other beholders, and if they see it there, then they see it also.

So even though the Berber agurram denotes a living person and my informants' keramat denotes a grave, the process is evidently similar. What is agurram/keramat is that which is labelled as such.

13. These include the surah yassin, surah al-fatihah, surah al-ikhlas, surah al-falag, surah an-nas, ayat al-kursiy, the doa arwah, the doa selamat, and the tahlil.

14. The tahalil or tahlil is the act of 'praising God by repeating the first words of the Creed, la ilaha illa Allah [there is no god but God].... This may be chanted either as a hymn of praise...or, as a mystic exercise' (Wilkinson 1959:1149). As the latter, the tahalil is also known as zikir; the prescribed number of times it is to be chanted, both aloud and silently, is evidently of numerological significance. (See Al-Attas 1963:46.) Reid (1984:18) notes that in Southeast Asia, the tahalil is often used as a chant for the dead.

15. See Benjamin (1984:39-42) on the prefix ber-.

16. As noted by Hughes (1896:713):

Although it is held by Wahhabis and other Muslim puritans that the Prophet forbade the visitation of graves for the purposes of devotion, the custom has become so common, that it may be considered as part of Muhammadan religion.... We see, therefore, no reason to doubt the genuineness of the following traditions, which we translate from a manuscript of the Mishkat, belonging to the Library of the India Office (Arabic MSS., No.2143, New Catalogue 154), and which the compiler of that work has taken from such authorities as Muslim, Ibn Majah, at-Tirmizi, &c.

...Ibn 'Abbas related: The Prophet passed by some graves in al-Madinah, and he turned his face towards them and said: 'Peace be upon you, O ye people of the graves; may God forgive us and you; ye are the van of us and we (following) in your steps.' ...Ibn Mas'ud related, the Apostle of God said: 'I had forbidden you to visit the graves, but now ye may visit them, for they detach for this world and remind of the world to come' (Ibn Majah).

(Also see Salim Bahreisj 1979:484).

17. The following tradition is also found in the Mishkat (see note 16 above):
Muhammad ibn Nu'am related, the Prophet said: 'He who visits the grave of his father and mother, or of either of them, on every Friday, his sins are forgiven, and he is written down as one pious' (Baihaqi).

(Hughes 1896:714).


It is a sunnah, for a doer of such charity for a deceased person, to intend (i.e. to do a niyyah) about that charity being done for the deceased, for instance, for his parents, for Allah will then reward his parents and He will not reduce anything from his ([the] doer's) own reward.

But niya has a wider meaning which extends beyond the visitation of graves. As stated in the Encyclopaedia of Islam (1936:III,930):

The acts of ceremonial law, obligatory or not, require to be preceded by a declaration by the performer, that he intends to perform such an act. This declaraton, pronounced audibly or mentally, is called niya.... The niya is required before the performance of...washing, bathing, prayer, alms, fasting, retreat, pilgrimage, sacrifice. 'Ceremonial acts without niya are not valid', says Ghazali.... Further the niya must immediately precede the act, lest it should lose its character and become simple decision ('azm). It must accompany the act until the end.... Its seat is the...intellect and attention. Lunatics, therefore, cannot pronounce a valid niya.

19. Such a shift in niat is not a unique innovation on the part of my informants:

As in other aspects of Sufi thought and practice there is an essential difference between the way in which the genuine Sufi approached a saint's tomb and the practice of the people. The mystic carries out a ziyara for the purpose of murqaqa (spiritual communion) with the saint, finding the material symbol an aid to meditation. But the popular belief is that the saint's soul lingers about his tomb and places (magams) specially associated with him whilst he was on earth or at which he had manifested himself. At such places his intercession can be sought.

(Trimingham 1971:26).

Reid (1984:17) has pointed out that this form of a 'holy-man Islam' was very prevalent in Southeast Asia:

The seeking of the berkat of holy men at their tombs has of course been a very marked feature of Southeast Asian Islam in modern times, wherever a stricter spirit of modernism has not taken root.

20. The term maghrib literally means 'the west', thus denoting sunset time. This is when the maghrib prayers are held. There are five prayer-times in a day, following the path of the sun:
waktu subuh 'the dawn interval'
wakta zohor/lohor 'the midday interval'
waktu asar 'the afternoon interval'
wakta maghrib 'the evening interval'
waktu isya 'the night interval'.

The precise time of these waktu, in terms of hour and minute, varies from place to place and is hence determined by some religious authority. Plate 18 show the prayer-times that have been determined for Riau.

21. However, this is not the only interpretation of the after-life in canonical Islam. For example, fana can also be interpreted as the end of an individual's life and baqa as eternity through union with God; in this case, there is no barzakh. The implication is that upon the good live on for ever as part of God, whereas the evil become extinct. (See for example, Seyyed Hossein Nasr 1965:77.) In another tradition, that of Sufi mysticism, the consequences of death can be pre-empted in this life through tariqah 'the path of self-cultivation'. This 'path' passes through several 'stations', leading one finally to fana — that is, mystic union with God while still in this life.

22. There are religious books in Malay which give graphic descriptions of the contrastive experiences of good people and evil people in the grave. In one such book, for example, it is said that when a good person dies, two angels will come and say to this person, 'Sleep you then the sleep of the newly wed.' Then they will enable the deceased to see its former home, as well as its place-to-be in heaven. (See M. Ali Chasan Umar 1981:63.)

23. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:


24. According to Trimingham (1971:307), in Sufism the Arabic term maqam means:

(a) stage or degree on the Sufi path...;  
(b) place of manifestation where a saint has revealed his occasional presence and at which he can be communicated with.

25. In Singapore, the erection of such structures have been forbidden by the central Islamic body, the Majlis Ugama Singapore. See Siddique (1979:14).

26. The Tuhfat records that Engku Puteri Raja Hamidah died on a Monday morning, 28 Rajab in the year 1260 — that is, 5 August 1844:

Her brother Engku Haji Ahmad and his family buried her in her Fort and a vault was made.

According to Begbie (1967:80), she had been living in Melaka in the last years of her life.
27. Non-Muslims like me who are unable to recite the Quranic verses and set prayers can request Muslims to do so on their behalf.

28. Perhaps as an indication of this, the Penyengat people do not seem to pay property tax on their houses to the Indonesian government.

29. The Hikayat Abdullah confirms that the grave had remained at the back of the Dutch Company's garden in Melaka for twenty or thirty years before it was transferred to Riau. (See Hill 1970:60.) Maxwell (1890) discusses several reports concerning the positive identification of Raja Haji's body before its burial in Melaka, thereby indicating that there was some doubt about the authenticity of the body that was subsequently re-buried on Penyengat.

30. According to my informants, after the sultan's abdication in 1911, a court secretary by the name of Muhammad Medar was left in charge of the tanah lelohor 'ancestral land' in Hulu Sungai Riau, where the graves of Opu Daeng Marewah and Opu Daeng Cellak are located. Towards the end of the Second World War, however, he abused this trust and sold the land to a Chinese merchant in Tanjungpinang. My informants said that the land was certainly not his to sell; he was merely the trustee holding it for all the keturunan raja. Anyway, they said, any land with kuburan lelohor 'ancestral graves' cannot be sold. To do so is to mengarak daka 'march on top of the burial ground' — that is, oppress the dead. Such an act will 'bring misfortune' (membawa sial). My informants said that this was indeed what happened to Muhammad Medar: all the money he had obtained from the sale of the land became worthless after the war because it was in Japanese currency. Moreover, one of his sons was eaten by a crocodile in Riau River. Since then, the land has been inherited by the son of the Chinese merchant who had bought it from Muhammad Medar. The graves of this merchant and his wife are also located there, by the river, not too far from Opu Daeng Marewah's grave. But people who want to berniat at the royal graves on the site can go freely. The Chinese family themselves are respectful of these keramat graves.

31. Trocki (1979:11-12) refers to Opu Daeng Parani's keturunan as 'the lesser of the two lines', and Opu Daeng Cellak's keturunan as 'the more illustrious line', presumably because the latter produced more yamtuan mudas. However, as I have pointed out in Chapter Four, Sultan Mahmud's presentation of Riau to 'the children of the late Raja Haji', established a divergent keturunan emanating from Raja Haji. The last five yamtuan mudas, as well as the last sultan, were drawn from this divergent keturunan, which was also the keturunan transmitted from Opu Daeng Cellak, because Raja Haji was his son. So the greater 'illustrious-ness' of Opu Daeng Cellak's line really derived from the posthumous establishment of Raja Haji's divergent keturunan.

32. Buried in the same complex are Raja di-Baroh Abd al-Jalil and his son, Sultan Ahmad. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982 for their biographical details.)

33. In the Tuhfat, the following description is given of Raja Haji's battlefield conduct:
He constantly recited devotional texts from the Koran and unceasingly read the holy work, Indications of Virtues, which was never out of his hands. Nor did he fail to celebrate the birth of the Prophet Muhammad every Thursday night, just as if he were not living under difficulties.


34. Significantly, the Malay word asin means 'salted', rather an appropriate name indeed for a tuan said whose grave is in the sea.

35. See Siddique (1979:8-10) on Keramat Habib Noh in Singapore.

36. The third raja to hold Pangkil was male — namely, Raja Dollah. The name 'Dollah' is a diminutive form of 'Abdullah'. The identity of this raja is perhaps best clarified in terms of a genealogical chart that was drawn for me by an informant himself. (See Genealogical Chart 4.) On this chart, there are two Raja Abdullahs: one was the ninth yamtuan muda, Raja Abdullah bin Raja Jafar, and the other was Raja Abdullah bin Raja Haji Ahmad, described by my informant as yang buka Tanjungbalai Karimun 'he who opened up Tanjungbalai Karimun'. Significantly, the latter's descendants are said to be found still in that area, especially on the islands in the Sulit strait. (See Map 3.)

According to the Tuhfat, the Raja Abdullah who became the ninth yamtuan muda, was also associated with that part of the archipelago — that is, the Karimun-Kundur area. The whole of Karimun and half of Kundur was apparently given over to Raja Abdullah by his brother Raja Ali who was then the yamtuan muda. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:286-287.)

However, my informants' reference to a Raja Dollah is suggestive: their usage of a diminutive form of the name 'Abdullah' implies that it was the lesser Abdullah who held Pangkil. The mention of a raja from Pulau Sulit coming to Pangkil may thus be interpreted as an allusion to a connection between the two places as a result of Raja Dollah/Raja Abdullah.

37. According to the Tuhfat, Raja Abdullah bin Raja Haji Ahmad did indeed marry his cousin Raja Zubaidah, daughter of Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Jafar. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:37.)

38. Islamic injunctions about burial are clearly about placing only one corpse in each grave. (See, for example, Hughes 1896:44-47.) It is therefore questionable whether it is Islamically permissible to have two corpses in one grave.

39. In the pre-1699 version of the Penurunan, she is Wan Seri Benian, also known as Permaisuri Sakidar Syah. (See Winstedt 1959:59.) In the post-1699 version, the female ruler is Permaisuri Iskandar Syah who had a daughter called Wan Seri Beni. (See Shellabear 1967:31.)

40. The relationship between co-parents-in-law is known as besan. This is a relationship which is supposed to be marked by alliance and mutual support.
41. The journey is described thus in the pre-1699 version of the Penurunan:


(Shellabear 1967:31).

(Thereupon Sang Sapurba set out for Bintan. Upon reaching Bintan, he then entered the interior of the country.)

(My translation).

42. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:


43. To quote Muhammad Ali (1973:434):

Shawwal, Dhi-qa'd and ten days of Dhi-1-Hijjah are particularly spoken of as months of hajj, so that a man can enter into the state of ihram [purity] for hajj only in these months, while the actual devotions of hajj are limited from the 8th to the 13th Dhi-1-Hijjah.

44. The Quran (4:48) states:

God forgiveth not that partners should be set up with Him; but He forgiveth anything else, to whom He pleaseth; to set up partners with God is to devise a sin most heinous indeed.


But some kind of syncretism seems to have occurred in the context of the formation of Islam. Even in so sacred a ritual as the haj, there are discernible elements of pre-Islamic animism. As Long (1979:5) has argued:

...There appears to be sufficient evidence to conclude that the principal rites of the Hajj -- ritual purifications, circumambulation, vigil, feast, and sacrifice -- all had their origins in pagan cults practiced in Makkah from very early times and that some of them go back to ancient Semitic practice.

Perhaps because of these syncretistic origins, there seems to be an implicit ambiguity in Islamic rituals which allow people to interpret them one way or another. An informant told me that when he went on the haj, he was very moved when he saw the Kaabah -- that is, the stone structure in the centre of the Haram Mosque in Mecca. The reason, he said, was because he finally saw what he was supposed to have been facing, when he said his prayers all
through the years of his life. (The Kaabah marks the point towards which all Muslim are supposed to face when they pray.) My informant went on to say that he was not the only one to feel this way. Everyone around him was also overcome by emotion. They all rushed forward to touch the stone. But there were Arab guards with whips, beating away the crowd, shouting 'syirik, syirik' — that is, 'idolatry, idolatry'.

45. As mentioned in note 34 in Chapter Five, in my informant's usage, the word datuk is not gender-specific. This applies even to spirits.

Plate 18. This board in the Penyengat mosque shows that the five prayer-times in a day. The times are to be read from top left to top right, then from bottom left to bottom right. So the first prayer-time according to this reckoning is the midday interval — zohor/lohor or, as spelt on the board, zuhor. And the last prayer-time is the dawn interval — subuh or, as spelt on the board, shubuh. The sixth hour shown on the bottom right-hand corner — syuruk or squruk — is the end of the subuh prayer-time. According to a Muslim informant, prayers are not supposed to be done at the precise moment of sunrise or sunset. So if a Muslim were to wake up late — that is, after 6.05 a.m. — then she or he would have missed the subuh prayer-time. The other words on the board say:

Penyengat Mosque, Tanjungpinang
The Schedule of the Five Prayer Intervals
Donation from the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Tanjungpinang.

(The Nahdlatul Ulama is a nation-wide Muslim organisation.)
CHAPTER SEVEN

'INDIGENY' VERSUS 'PURITY'

7.1 Melayu Asli versus Melayu Murni

7.2 Toponymic Identification and Territorial Connotations

7.3 The Door of 'Indigeny'

7.4 The Door of 'Purity'
   7.4.1 Islam
   7.4.2 Adat
   7.4.3 Bahasa

7.5 The 'Pure' and the 'Impure'
7.1 Melayu Asli versus Melayu Murni

_Melayu_ is a term that my informants use for the identification of themselves and others. Although they are by no means agreed among themselves about what the term means or should mean, they generally do identify themselves as belonging to _Suku Melayu_ 'the Melayu Division', in contradistinction to other such _Sukus_ — for example, _Suku Bugis_ 'the Bugis Division', _Suku Minang_ 'the Minang Division', _Suku Batak_ 'the Batak Division', _Suku Jawa_ 'the Javanese Division', _Suku Bali_ 'the Balinese Division', or _Suku Flores_ 'the Florese Division'. These are quite evidently 'divisions' of the Indonesian population. So it is quite clear that my informants see themselves as constituting one particular ethnic 'division' in Indonesia.

But within _Suku Melayu_ itself, there are internal differences. In a conference paper I wrote in 1979 (see backpocket), I had put forward the following classification:

- the people of Penyengat and Pangkil were _Melayu yang totok_ 'pure Melayu';
- the people of Karas were _Melayu yang tidak totok_ 'impure Melayu';
- the people of Galang had _baru masuk Melayu_ 'just entered Melayu-dom';
- and the _orang sampan_ 'boat people' were _bukan Melayu_ 'not Melayu'.

When I returned to the field after the conference, I showed this paper to two informants who could read English; both were Penyengat rajas. They objected to my identification of the Galang people and the _orang sampan_ as not quite _Melayu_. They said that these people were the indigenes of Riau and were hence _Melayu asli_ 'indigenous Melayu'. So being already _Melayu_, they could not possibly _masuk Melayu_ 'enter
Melayu-dom’, as I had claimed in my paper. My two critics said that only those people who were not Melayu to begin with, could 'enter Melayu-dom'; these included, for example, the Chinese, Javanese or Florese. As for the Minang people, it seems that if they want to call themselves Melayu, nobody can bantah 'deny' them this right. My informants felt that because Minang history has been intertwined with Melayu history, the Minang people can, with justification, call themselves Melayu. 

Significantly, however, my two informants did not object to my identification of the Penyengat and Pangkil people as Melayu yang tolok 'pure Melayu'. On the contrary, they confirmed this by offering further examples of people who were not as tolok or murni 'pure' as themselves. For example, they pointed out to me how ancient were the origins of the Bintan people, going back as far as the time of Sang Nila Utama. The Bintan people are thus to be regarded as unquestionably Melayu, evidently by virtue of indigeny alone. But be that as it may, they are not regarded by my raja informants as Melayu murni 'pure Melayu'.

Why is this so? To quote one of the two rajas:


(The Bintan people were also included in corvee, even though they were not a division of the boat people. Their duties were to guard the audience-hall, and to carry the sireh-boxes and the candles. As people of the corvee, they are not pure Melayu; there is some difference.)

The duties cited above by my informant were meant to illustrate the high rank of the Bintan people. (See Chapter Five.) The point was, no matter how highly they ranked, they were not orang Melayu murni, because they were orang kerahan. This implies a mutual exclusivity between these two terms. Nevertheless, the Bintan people are regarded
by my Penyengat informants as Melayu asli 'indigenous Melayu', because they are indigenous to the area.

So the implication is that Suku Melayu contains two sub-categories -- the Melayu murni 'pure Melayu' and the bukan Melayu murni 'impure Melayu'. The latter are 'impure' because they are orang kerahan 'people of the corvee'. Nevertheless they are Melayu asli 'indigenous Melayu'. This inner differentiation of Suku Melayu is not unique to my raja informants alone.

For example, in Sembur Laut in the Galang area (see Map 4), I was told that when the nomadic suku sampan 'boat division' people come on land to get fresh water, villagers there would call out to them: Awak Melayu apa? 'What kind of Melayu are you?' This was explained to me as meaning the same as awak suku apa 'what division are you in'. But awak Melayu apa is used, apparently because it is considered a more polite form of questioning. It seems that the Melayu Oyol/suku Oyol and the Melayu Tambus/suku Tambus are the kinds of 'boat people' who go most frequently to Sembur Laut.

Indeed my informants in the Galang area use the word Melayu as a synonym for suku not only for identifying others, but also for identifying themselves. They refer to themselves as suku Galang or as Melayu Galang. These informants are not nomadic 'boat people', but settled land-dwellers. The synonymous use of Melayu/suku is thus applicable also to settled communities, other examples derived from my Galang informants being Melayu Rempang/suku Rempang and Melayu Temiang/suku Temiang.

If it is the case that in my Galang informants' usage, suku = Melayu, then how do they identify the Penyengat people? Are those Melayu Penyengat/suku Penyengat? No. My Galang informants refer to the Penyengat people as Melayu dagang 'foreign Melayu'; this term is
also applied to the Pangkil people. As one Galang informant in Karas put it, *Melayu dagang bergaul dengan kota* 'the foreign Melayu mix socially with the town', the town in question being Tanjungpinang. The *Melayu dagang* are thus perceived as different from the *Melayu/suku* who are identified in terms of such place-names as Galang, Rempang and Temiang. The latter are not *Melayu dagang*, they are *Melayu asli* 'indigenous Melayu'.

At this stage, we can set up an equation between the two points of view discussed above:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GALANG VIEW</th>
<th>PENYENGAT VIEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Melayu dagang</em></td>
<td><em>Melayu murni</em> [or]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Melayu/suku + place-name</em> [or] <em>Melayu asli</em></td>
<td><em>bukan Melayu murni</em> [or]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>orang kerahan</em> [or]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Melayu asli</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 6 The Galang View and the Penyengat View*

The two sets of terms arise from the two points of view. From my Penyengat informants' point of view, they are themselves *Melayu murni*, in contradiction to the *bukan Melayu murni*, the latter being *orang kerahan*, who are yet *Melayu asli*. From my Galang informants' point of view, however, the Penyengat people are not *murni* 'pure' but *dagang* 'foreign', in contradistinction to themselves, the *Melayu asli*, who are differentiated into *Melayu/suku* of distinct places.

*Melayu asli* is the one term common to both sets. This indicates that the indigenous origin of the *Melayu asli* is indeed not in doubt. What is debated, however, is the evaluation of indigeneity as superior or inferior. From the Galang point of view, the *Melayu asli* are implicitly regarded as superior to *Melayu dagang*, because the former are native to the various parts of Riau, whereas the latter are *pendatang* 'newcomers' associated with the town.
Indeed my Galang informants joke about the manners of the Melayu dagang, which they said make no differentiation between familiars and strangers. As some of them said:

Semua dia pun pakai wai-wai.

(For everyone they use wai-wai.)

They explained wai-wai to me as meaning awak 'you', which they said was a pronoun one should use only for strangers. So one can say awak Melayu apa 'what kind of Melayu are you', when one does not know that person's identity at all. But when one has made the acquaintance of that person, one should no longer 'use wai-wai'; one should use instead either a kin term or a birth-order name. Although my informants did not explain how awak translates into wai-wai, it seems possible that wai-wai is derived from wahai 'ho there', a relatively formal greeting which marks the term of address used in conversation. (See Wilkinson 1959:1276.) As for the word awak, its root-meaning is 'body; trunk of body' which, as a pronoun, can be used either for 'I', 'we' or 'you' (ibid.:53). So a literal translation of awak Melayu apa would be 'what kind of Melayu body would this be'.

So it seems that my Galang informants view the Melayu dagang's usage of 'town manners' (pergaulan kota) as stilted, in contrast to which their own 'village manners' (pergaulan kampung) are said to be macam satu keluarga 'like within one family'. The implication is that the Melayu asli belong, whereas the Melayu dagang do not. Indigeny is thus seen as conferring a sense of belonging which 'newcomers' do not share. My Galang informants' reference to the people of Penyengat and Pangkil as Melayu dagang thus implies that the latter do not really belong to Riau.

As shown by Wilkinson (1959:246), the word dagang does essentially mean 'foreign, alien'. To call someone dagang is thus to
indicate that he or she is of foreign origin. Such an appellation is indeed apt for the Penyengat rajas, since their keturunan is Bugis-derived. However, that Bugis derivation dates from 1722, more than two hundred and fifty years ago. By now there is hardly any Bugis-ness left in the Penyengat rajas, except for keturunan. Nobody on Penyengat knows the Bugis language; nobody there has any contact of even the most superficial nature with Sulawesi. So even if my Galang informants object to the Penyengat people's use of wai-wai, that objection is nevertheless made with reference to the latter's Malay speech and not to any foreign language that they may speak. In other words, essentially the only aspect of the Penyengat rajas that is dagang is their keturunan.

As I have shown in Chapter Four, keturunan may be understood as patrilineal descent flowing from founding ancestor to present-day descendant. This principle seems to be accepted even by my Galang informants. They thus consider the Penyengat rajas as Bugis and hence dagang, because the founding ancestors of their keturunan were indeed Bugis. Even the commoners in Penyengat and Pangkil are labelled dagang because their ancestors were mostly people working for the Bugis rajas in one capacity or another. Furthermore, as I have pointed out in Chapter Five, many such employees were themselves of Bugis or some other 'foreign' origins -- for example, Javanese or Balinese. So it is keturunan, one's patrilineal descent from the past, that determines whether one is Melayu dagang or Melayu asli in Riau.

By the same logic, it is keturunan that determines whether one is Melayu murni or bukan Melayu murni. According to my raja informants, the orang Bintan are bukan Melayu murni because they are orang kerahan. But kerahan is a thing of the past; no suku still comes to Penyengat to perform corvee. As I have mentioned in Chapter Five, by
the reign of Sultan Abdurrahman Maadlam Syah (1883-1911), kerahan was already on its way out. According to some of my informants, the very last performance of kerahan took place shortly before the sultan's abdication in 1911, at the wedding of his daughter to the sultan of Trengganu.

So a temporal distance of some seventy years separates the last known performance of kerahan and the present time. Yet when my raja informant said that the suku Bintan are not orang Melayu murni because they are orang kerahan, he was referring to the living present-day people of Bintan, who have certainly never guarded an audience-hall, nor carried sireh-boxes and candles for anyone. So the only sense in which the present-day people of Bintan are orang kerahan is through keturunan. That is to say, they are orang kerahan only because their ancestors were so.

The idea of kerahan seems to be significant not only among the Penyengat rajas, but even among those who are orang kerahan through keturunan. As mentioned above, my Galang informants consider the question awak Melayu apa as a more polite form than awak suku apa. Why is this so? I suggest it is because that in zaman sultan, a suku 'division' was established on the basis of the specific duty assigned by the court. (See Chapter Five.) The word suku thus implies kerahan, which in turn implies submission. In contrast, the word Melayu carries no such connotation. To be identified as a Melayu person of a particular place merely indicates that one is an indigene of that place. So it appears that whereas the Penyengat rajas emphasise kerahan through keturunan, the people who would be so labelled de-emphasise it by opting for an alternative label -- namely, Melayu + place-name.
Even though there are two sets of words arising from two points of view, as we have seen above, there is basically one mode of perception of the same phenomenon. It is, rather, the difference in perspective that accounts for the difference between the two views. In other words, the view of my Penyengat informants is a view from the top, whereas the view of my Galang informants is a view from the bottom. But top and bottom are nevertheless part of the same social reality — namely, the hierarchy of inherited ranks.

So from the Galang perspective, it is a desideratum to be *Melayu asli*, because that implies the right of indigeny, the native's right of belonging to Riau. From the Penyengat perspective, however, it is not a desideratum to be *Melayu asli*, because that implies *kerahan* 'corvee', which in turn implies the obligation of the dominated to serve the dominant. So there is a debate about which is the more desirable condition of being *Melayu*.

There are certain implicit questions of identity stirred up by this debate. Is it sufficient to be *Melayu* simply by being native to Riau? Is it good enough to claim that one is *Melayu* because one belongs? An affirmative answer would be given to such questions by my informants who are indeed indigenes of Riau. Indeed my Galang informants say explicitly:

*Kalau Melayu asli, dia Suku Melayu sejati.*

(The *Melayu asli* are the true-born *Suku Melayu*.)

So for them, it is quite enough simply to be born *Melayu*.

From the Penyengat perspective, however, this congenital condition of being *Melayu* is insufficient. Indeed, as we have seen above, using congenital *keturunan* as the basis of their identity would lead them not into *Melayu*-dom in Riau, but rather, out to the land of
their ancestors' origins -- namely, Sulawesi. On the one hand, their claim to aristocracy is based on keturunan. On the other hand, that keturunan is of foreign origin.

Bateson's (1973:178-179,242-249) concept of what he terms a 'double-bind situation' is relevant to our analysis in this context. In such a situation one is subjected to two mutually conflicting negative injunctions. One is damned if one does, and damned if one doesn't. So to apply this logic, the Penyengat rajas would lose their claim to aristocracy if they were to give up their keturunan. On the other hand, by keeping their Bugis-derived keturunan, they lose their claim to belonging as indigenes of Riau.

My raja informants seem quite aware of their situation. As one of them said to me: There are two kinds of Melayu in Riau -- the Melayu asli and the keturunan Bugis. But this keturunan Bugis, he said, is 'a thing of the past' (dulu punya). He also noted that the 'recent newcomers' (pendatang baru), who include Bugis, Butonese, Javanese, and Florese, are not to be considered Melayu. On the contrary, they are of 'other stocks' (bangsa lain). When I asked him how it is that the keturunan Bugis are Melayu whereas the pendatang Bugis are not Melayu, he said that the former are regarded as Melayu because their ties with Sulawesi have been 'broken' (putus). But then he went on to say:

Bukan putusnya macam mana: bahasanya Bugis pun tak ada lagi.

(It is not a complete break, however: it is just that their Bugis language is no longer used.)

Bateson (ibid.) argues that if escape from a double-bind situation is blocked, schizophrenia can develop. However, if escape is possible, one can transcend the double-bind and attain a higher level of innovation. In the case of the Penyengat rajas, I would
argue that escape to a higher level is possible for them. That is indeed what 'purity' is about.

If the Melayu asli are Melayu by virtue of being born indigenous, the Melayu murni are Melayu by virtue of moral superiority. The difference is, respectively, between being Melayu and doing Melayu. From the latter perspective, it is not sufficient for one to claim to be Melayu because one belongs as a native of Riau. Instead one must demonstrate that one is morally fit to be Melayu. So whereas the Melayu asli's claim to Melayu-ness rests on congenitality, the Melayu murni's claim to Melayu-ness rests on morality. There are thus two different claims to being Melayu: One says, 'We are Melayu because we belong'; the other says, 'You may be Melayu because you belong; but we are Melayu because we are 'pure', we are better.'

Although the same word Melayu is used in both cases, there are actually two different types of Melayu-ness in question. The first type of Melayu-ness may be understood as 'indigeny' — that is, a congenital state of existence, a passive state of being. The second type of Melayu-ness may be understood as 'purity' — that is, a moral state of existence, an active state of doing. We shall see below what this latter process of doing Melayu involves.

However, these mutually countervailing claims of 'indigeny' versus 'purity' comprise a single ongoing debate about what Melayu-ness in Riau should mean. Both types of Melayu-ness co-exist and compete in the same field of communication, within a common social reality. The term Suku Melayu may be understood as referring to this larger context. My informants themselves seem very aware of this, for neither the Melayu asli nor the Melayu murni would deny the existence of the other as Melayu. So while the Melayu asli may claim that they are Suku Melayu sejati, they would also include the Melayu dagang as
part of Suku Melayu, albeit not sejati. Similarly, while the Melayu murni may claim that they are murni, they would also include the Melayu asli as Suku Melayu, even though they may be bukan Melayu murni.

It is perhaps now clearer why my two raja critics reacted the way they did to my 1979 conference paper. I had evidently conflated the sub-category Melayu murni with the larger context Suku Melayu. I had thought that since the Galang people (including those of Karas) were considered less than murni by the Penyengat and Pangkil people, they were therefore also less than Melayu. Hence I had described them as 'just entering Melayu-dom' (baru masuk Melayu). But this is apparently an inappropriate description, for to 'enter Melayu-dom' is to enter the larger context Suku Melayu from outside, and not just become more 'pure' within the context itself.

7.2 Toponymic Identification and Territorial Connotations

It is one thing to assert that the people of a particular place in Riau are 'pure Melayu' or 'impure Melayu', or alternatively, 'foreign Melayu' or 'indigenous Melayu'. It is quite another, however, to identify a particular individual in such terms. To identify unique individuals, each with a different life-history, in terms of distinct Melayu types, an intermediate step must be taken -- namely, toponymic identification or the identification of individuals in relation to places.

Lyons' (1977:13-14) explanation of the concepts 'type' and 'token' is relevant to our discussion at this juncture:

The relationship between tokens and types...[is]...one of instantiation; tokens...instantiate their type.... Tokens are unique physical entities, located at a particular place in space or time. They are identified as tokens of the same
type by virtue of their similarity with other unique physical entities and by virtue of their conformity to the type they instantiate.

The relationship of a particular token to a particular type thus depends on pattern-imposition. Since the perception of any such pattern is a phenomenon in the eye of the beholder, the type-token relationship is necessarily ambiguous. (See ibid.:15-16.) As a consequence of this, the token-token relationship is also ambiguous.

In the context of our discussion, the unique physical entities perceived by my informants as particular tokens instantiating particular types, are themselves and other people around them. The particular types they are concerned with are the various types of Melayu-ness -- 'pure' and 'impure', 'indigenous' and 'foreign'. But there is an inherent ambiguity in trying to determine which particular individual instantiates which particular Melayu type. Such ambiguity is a cognitive threat, for unless one can fix individuals as particular instances of particular types, the whole typology may be scrambled, leaving oneself dislocated and unplaced.

The toponymic identification of individuals is thus an important means of fixing their identity as instances of particular Melayu types. As shown above, the Penyengat and Pangkil people are considered 'pure Melayu' or, alternatively, 'foreign Melayu', and the people of Galang and Bintan are considered 'impure Melayu' or, alternatively, 'indigenous Melayu'. Such being the case, in order to identify an individual as Melayu in those terms, that individual must first be toponymically identified in relation to the places in question. In other words, a person must be identified as an orang 'person' of a particular place -- that is, an orang Penyengat 'Penyengat person', an orang Pangkil 'Pangkil person', and so on -- before he or she can be identified in terms of Melayu-ness. So the
Melayu-ness of an individual can be determined only if he or she is first identified as a member of a specific Melayu community localised in a particular Melayu place. This process of toponymic identification is necessary for determining the Melayu-ness not only of others, but also of oneself.

There are certain criteria for such identification. Keturunan has been mentioned above. Indeed one can inherit membership in a local community through keturunan. For example, if one's father is an orang Penyengat, one can also claim to be an orang Penyengat, even if one were born elsewhere. This implies an expectation that one should belong to the same place as does one's father. Given that marriages in Riau are customarily uxorilocal, this further implies that endogamous marriages within the community are preferred, as indeed they seem to be. However, one's claim to identity as an orang Penyengat would be much stronger if keturunan were to be confirmed by two other criteria -- birthplace and residence. Indeed, if birthplace and residence do not accord with keturunan, one's identity can be regarded as ambiguous.

To give a specific example, one of my informants in Penyengat is sometimes identified by others as an orang Pulau Tujuh 'Pulau Tujuh person', because he was born on Midai, one of the islands in that archipelago. (See Map 2.) However, this informant himself rejects such an identification, considering it a detraction of his status. His counter-claim is that his father is an orang Penyengat of Raja Haji's keturunan, and that he himself grew up on Penyengat, even though he happened to be born somewhere else. So, for these reasons, he identifies himself as an orang Penyengat.

Different criteria of identification are being used in this case. My informant himself uses keturunan and residence as the criteria of
toponymic identification, whereas his detractors use birthplace as the criterion. But why should it be considered a detraction to be identified as an orang Pulau Tujuh rather than as an orang Penyengat? To answer this, let us consider the relative ranking of Penyengat and Pulau Tujuh as places.

My informants generally regard Penyengat as a tempat sejarah 'historical place', the former pusat kerajaan 'political centre' of the yamtuan muda. In contrast, Pulau Tujuh is associated with various groupings of orang laut 'sea people', who were under the authority of seven datuks — hence the place-name Pulau Tujuh 'Seven Island-Groups'. These 'sea people' of Pulau Tujuh were divided into different sukus, each with a different kerahan. According to the logic of keturunan as discussed above, the present-day descendants of these orang kerahan are also regarded as orang kerahan and hence not Melayu murni. So to be identified as an orang Penyengat is to be associated with the political centre of zaman sultan where the 'pure Melayu' dwell, whereas to be identified as an orang Pulau Tujuh is to be associated with the political periphery where the 'impure Melayu' dwell.

But it is not always the case that people wish to disown their birthplaces as the basis of identification. Another Penyengat informant was born in Benut, Johor. However, he is not ashamed of this Johor connection, apparently because the place-name 'Johor' is associated with the former pre-1722 sultanate before it was reconstituted in Riau in 1722. (See Chapter Three.) In this case, the identity of this individual as an orang Penyengat is also ambiguous. But the ambiguity in this case seems to favour the person concerned, because it hints at an association with an earlier aristocracy, predating the arrival of the Bugis rajas.
A toponymic identification carries certain connotations that would apply to everyone similarly labelled. So the population of a place would tend to be homogenised in terms of these connotations. In other words, because different places symbolise different significant events and conditions of the past, the respective population of each place comes to be associated with those events and conditions. Toponymic labels such as orang Penyengat, orang Pangkil, orang Galang or orang Bintan, thus carry certain connotations as a consequence of what those places symbolise.

As we have seen above, one's birthplace is an important criterion of toponymic identification. One is said to be the anak 'child' of one's birthplace which is, interestingly, referred to as tempat tumpah darah 'place where blood is spilled'. One is thus the child not only of one's parents, but also of one's birthplace. Accordingly, one's identity is derived not only from keturunan, but also from tempat tumpah darah.

Indeed, an individual's identity may be understood as the intersection of time and space in terms of keturunan and birthplace. This is an effective way of fixing the identity of a person, for these criteria of identification can be perceived as immutable facts unaffected by the vicissitudes of life, such as aging, differences in material wealth, or migration. So at the moment of birth, one already acquires an identity derived from keturunan and based on one's birthplace.

As shown above, one's identity is clearly defined if one's keturunan and birthplace coincide. Ambiguity arises when they are different. To clarify such ambiguity, residence may be used as another criterion of identification. For example, despite the ambiguous status of the two Penyengat informants cited above, the fact
that they are residents on the island would tend to reinforce their identity as orang Penyengat. However, even residence is not, by itself, a sufficient criterion of identification. Residence may be perceived as permanent or temporary. If one is resident somewhere other than one's birthplace, one's residence there may be considered less than permanent. Some of my informants who have lived for more than ten years in a place other than their birthplace, still say that they are 'squatting in someone else's place' (tumpang tempat orang). So the idea seems to be that one's birthplace and residence should be the same place.

It is, however, difficult to expect that the three criteria of identification would always coincide. Apart from the two Penyengat examples mentioned above, there are many more such cases. For example, if people from outside Riau -- say, from Jawa or Sulawesi -- were to have children in Riau, how would their children be considered? Using birthplace as the sole criterion of identification, these children would indeed be regarded as anak Riau. Significantly, my informants have a particular term to describe such people: they are known as peranakan -- literally, 'in a state of being anak'. So there are, for example, peranakan Jawa, peranakan Flores, peranakan Cina, peranakan India, and most significantly, peranakan Bugis. The term peranakan thus refers to someone who is born in Riau and is hence an anak Riau, but whose keturunan derives from elsewhere -- for example, Jawa, Flores, China, India, and Sulawesi.

However, my raja informants do not identify themselves as peranakan Bugis. They use that term to apply only to the children of recent migrants from Sulawesi -- for example, the people living in Kampung Bugis in Senggarang, with whom the Penyengat rajas have no connections. Instead, as we have seen above, my Penyengat informants describe themselves as Melayu murni 'pure Melayu' who are, however,
In this context, it is significant that Raja Ali Haji writing in the nineteenth century differentiated between the raja-raja Melayu on the one hand, and the raja peranakan Bugis on the other. (See Matheson 1982:125.) For example, in his Silsilah Melayu dan Bugis dan Sekalian Raja-rajanya 'Genealogy of the Melayu and Bugis and All Their Rulers', there was a clear distinction drawn between the Melayu and the Bugis, as indicated by the very title. Furthermore, in this text, there is a differentiation made between the Bugis yang jati and the Bugis yang peranakan. (See Arena Wati 1973.) Wilkinson (1959:27) explains these terms as meaning 'Bugis born in Celebes' and the 'Bugis born in Malaya'. The term Bugis yang jati may thus be translated as 'true-born Bugis', whereas the term Bugis yang peranakan may be translated as 'foreign-born Bugis'.

As mentioned above, the Melayu asli are identified as the Melayu sejati/jati 'true-born Melayu'. If we combine my informants' usage with Raja Ali Haji's usage, we would obtain the following distinctions:

Melayu jati

Bugis peranakan

Bugis jati.

The link between the Melayu jati and the Bugis jati would be the Bugis peranakan, who would thus be 'foreign-born' from both perspectives. From the perspective of the Melayu jati in Riau, the Bugis peranakan would be a foreigner born in Riau. From the perspective of the Bugis jati in Sulawesi, the Bugis peranakan would be a Bugis born in a foreign land.
As noted above, the word peranakan is still used by my raja informants, though not for referring to themselves, but for referring to the descendants of outsiders who have been born in Riau — for example, Cina peranakan/peranakan Cina or Jawa peranakan/peranakan Jawa. The word-order seems to be reversible, depending on which aspect one wishes to emphasise — for example, whether the person in question is a peranakan type of Chinese (Cina peranakan) or a Chinese type of peranakan (peranakan Cina).

If a person of an alien keturunan who is born in Riau can be considered an anak Riau, this implies that this person is also an anak of the particular place where he or she was born. This further implies that even a peranakan can be toponymically identified as an orang 'person' of a particular place, such as Penyengat, Pangkil, Galang or Bintan. If such a toponymic identification can be made, does it mean that even a peranakan can be considered as Melayu in one sense or another?

From my ethnographic examples, this does indeed seem possible — on condition, however, that such a person hilang keturunannya 'loses his or her descent'. In other words, for a peranakan Cina, a peranakan Jawa, or even a peranakan Bugis for that matter, to be regarded as Melayu asli, he or she must dispose of his or her keturunan from public knowledge and memory. We shall see below how keturunan may be disposed of.

According to my informants, the worst insult one can use in a quarrel is to accuse one's opponent of being the keturunan of some non-Melayu origin: For example, one could say kau keturunan Cina 'You are of Chinese descent'; or kau keturunan Flores 'You are of Florese descent'; or kau keturunan Bugis 'You are of Bugis descent'. Apparently, such utterances are considered insulting because they
imply that the person so accused is really not Melayu at all, but an outsider to Melayu-dom. Interestingly, even my raja informants agreed that it was terrible to utter such insults. However, they dissociated themselves from the keturunan Bugis mentioned as an insult, by specifying that they are themselves not just keturunan Bugis, but keturunan raja Bugis. Moreover, they stress that their Bugis ascendants came ever so long ago and that they themselves no longer have any contact with Sulawesi.

So whereas the nineteenth-century rajas had identified themselves as raja peranakan Bugis or as Bugis yang peranakan -- that is, as foreigners born in Melayu-dom -- the present-day rajas now identify themselves as Melayu murni keturunan Bugis 'pure Melayu of Bugis descent'. This implies that a process of re-definition has occurred since the nineteenth century, such that the term Melayu has come to refer not just to origins, but to a certain standard of behaviour that may be morally adjudicated as 'pure'. So by this means, those who could formerly just claim to be anak Riau by virtue of birth, can now claim to be more than that. A door has been opened allowing those who were born merely peranakan to become Melayu murni.

The Bugis rajas are apparently not the only ones to have entered Melayu-dom by opening up a door of 'purity'. As mentioned in the chapters above, there are also those who bear the Arab titles of said (for males) and syarifah (for females). Like the keturunan Bugis, these keturunan Arab have lost all ties with their place of origin, they no longer speak Arabic, and they are indeed Arab only in their claim to keturunan. As pointed out in Chapter Four, the titles said and syarifah denote putative descent from the Prophet Muhammad himself. Consequently, not only can the said and syarifah exhibit 'purity' in behaviour, they can also claim an Islamically 'pure' descent.
This brings us to another aspect of the situation that deserves consideration. My Penyengat informants explicitly acknowledge that many of their female ascendants were Melayu. In my collection of informants' genealogies, I did indeed find this to be the case, not only for those claiming keturunan Bugis, but also for those claiming keturunan Arab. Thus they are patrilineally Bugis or Arab but matrifiliatively Melayu.

It is significant that the keturunan Bugis and the keturunan Arab should choose to highlight their non-indigenous patrilineality, at the expense of their indigenous matrifiliation. The reason for such a choice becomes clear when we realise that most of the marriages between foreign men and indigenous women involved a higher-ranking man and a lower-ranking woman. The marriages are thus hypogamous for the man and hypergamous for the woman. In my informants' genealogies, apart from more-or-less isogamous (equal-ranking) marriages between the aristocrats themselves, there were many cases of male aristocrats marrying female commoners, in particular, women of the encik rank. If the child of an unequal marriage were to claim to be Melayu through matrifiliation, then he or she would be claiming the lower derajat of the mother, rather than the higher derajat of the father. It is therefore not just Melayu identity, but also derajat that is at issue.

The distinction between filiation and descent is again important in this context. As I have noted in Chapter Four, filiation refers to the parent-child relationship operative primarily in the familial domain, and descent refers to the ancestor-descent relationship operative primarily in the extra-familial domain of political and jural institutions. The former pertains to egocentrically defined kinship categories, whereas the latter pertains to sociocentrically defined descent categories.
So my aristocratic informants' choice to remain keturunan Bugis and keturunan Arab through patrilineality may be understood as a preference to identify themselves in terms of an sociocentrically defined descent ideology that is operative in the extra-familial domain, rather than in terms of an egocentrically defined kinship ideology that is operative in the familial domain. Their choice is thus not between patrifiliation and matrifiliation, but rather, between descent ideology and kinship ideology. Such being the case I will restrict the use of the term 'ancestor' to their temporal predecessors in the context of descent ideology; I will use the term 'ascendant' for their temporal predecessors in the context of kinship ideology. Since keturunan is defined by my aristocratic informants as patrilineal, their temporal predecessors who confer keturunan are ancestors, whereas those who do not confer keturunan are merely ascendants.

So although the keturunan Bugis and the keturunan Arab in Riau are also anak Riau, who can indeed claim to be Melayu asli, they have evidently preferred to forego their claim to indigeny for the sake of preserving their claim to aristocracy, albeit foreign-derived. However, as mentioned above, despite their 'foreign-ness', they are nevertheless accepted as Melayu even by the Melayu asli, though only as Melayu dagang. The Melayu asli do not regard them as totally foreign, evidently because most of them were born in Riau, are hence peranakan, and furthermore, are residents of Riau. So in terms of birthplace and residence, most of the foreign-derived aristocrats do qualify as anak Riau, orang Riau.

Keturunan, birthplace and residence are thus three independent criteria of identification, any of which may be highlighted over the others, depending on the advantage it confers. If a peranakan of
commoner rank wants to be identified as Melayu, his or her foreign keturunan would only be a hindrance and hence better disposed of. In this case, it is much better to highlight birthplace and residence while downplaying keturunan. On the other hand, keturunan is indispensable to an aristocratic peranakan. So the foreign keturunan has to be kept even though it contradicts one's claims to being Melayu. In that case, what one tries to do then is to re-define Melayu-ness in such a way that it would allow a native-born permanent resident of foreign descent to be considered Melayu.

Interestingly, these criteria of identification — descent, birthplace and residence — are those that are normally used by the government of any state to classify its population into such categories as citizens by birth, naturalised citizens, permanent residents, foreign visitors, and so on. That gives us a clue as to what Melayu-ness in Riau is about. It seems to be about the classification of the Riau population, though not in the context of the existing Indonesian nation-state, but rather, in the context of a defunct Melayu sultanate.

The debate between my informants about the different kinds of Melayu-ness may be understood as competing claims to symbolic citizenship in that bygone political order. There is thus a symbolic Melayu-dom to which one may belong as a citizen, a permanent resident, a foreign visitor, or even a new immigrant. However, as we have seen above, it is a matter of debate which type of Melayu constitutes, symbolically, a citizen, and which does not.

From the Melayu asli point of view, the symbolic citizens would be those who are indigenous in terms of keturunan, birthplace and residence; the symbolic permanent residents would be the peranakan — that is, those of foreign descent who are born and resident in Riau.
From this viewpoint, the way to convert one's symbolic status from permanent resident to citizen would be to lose one's foreign keturunan by expunging it from public memory. So according to this logic, the Penyengat rajas and tuan saids who are stubbornly clinging on to their foreign keturunan, would be peranakan and hence only permanent residents in a symbolic Melayu-dom that is so defined.

From the Penyengat point of view, however, Melayu-dom has been re-defined in such a way that someone can be both peranakan and Melayu at the same time. As we shall see below, this is done through establishing standards of behaviour that are defined as 'pure'. Through this means, the foreign-derived aristocrats are able to maintain a Melayu identity that differentiates them from two other categories of Riau residents. On the one hand, it differentiates them from the Melayu asli who are indigenously Melayu in terms of keturunan, birthplace and residence, but whose behaviour falls short of 'purity'. On the other hand, it also differentiates them from other peranakan whose behaviour also does not meet the standards of 'purity' and who are thus not Melayu in any sense at all. In a symbolic Melayu-dom that is so defined, the peranakan 'pure Melayu' would be first-class citizens, the indigenous 'impure Melayu' would be second-class citizens, while the other 'impure' non-Melayu peranakan would be permanent residents. According to this logic, the way for the second-class citizens and the permanent residents to become first-class citizens would be to modify their behaviour so as to fulfill the standards of 'purity' established by the foreign-derived aristocrats, the peranakan 'pure Melayu'.

The two perspectives thus generate two different conceptions of a symbolic Melayu-dom to which one may belong. Accordingly, there are two different modes of entry to full citizenship in Melayu-dom. The first mode involves fulfilling the criteria of birthplace and
residence, while expunging all traces of a foreign keturunan from public memory. The second mode involves fulfilling the standards of 'purity'. There are thus two separate doors whereby one can masuk Melayu 'enter Melayu-dom' -- namely, the door of 'indigeny' and the door of 'purity'.

7.3 The Door of 'Indigeny'

As mentioned above, my informants generally regard the indigenes of Riau as Melayu asli 'indigenous Melayu'. But who is a Riau indigene? Obviously, a Riau indigene must be someone born in Riau and permanently resident there. As we have seen above, birthplace and residence are indeed important criteria of identification.

But if birthplace and residence can be used as the criteria of identification, then anyone who was born in a particular place in Riau and who is permanently resident there, could be considered an anak and orang of that place. This would include even people of non-Melayu origins, such as the peranakan Cina and the peranakan Jawa. For example, someone of Chinese parentage born in, say, Galang, and permanently resident there could be considered an anak Galang, an orang Galang. Does this then mean that a peranakan Cina born and permanently resident in Galang could also come to be regarded as Melayu asli? As mentioned above, this is conditional upon the loss of one's foreign keturunan. We shall see below how this is done.

When I was doing fieldwork in Karas in the Galang area, I found great difficulty in obtaining genealogies from my informants, because of a taboo some of them have against mentioning the names of ancestors beyond their grandparents' generation. The way this taboo works is very significant.
Let me illustrate with one particular ethnographic example. The following genealogy was obtained from a Karas informant Daud:

'Saya tahu tapi saya tak boleh bilang'!*  

![Genealogy Diagram]

Figure 7 *'I know but I cannot say!'

This was all that I was able to get from him, because when he wanted to tell me the names of Ake's parents — that is, his noyang 'great-grandparents' — he suddenly started weeping. He said that he knew their names but was unable to 'utter' (bilang) them.

This phenomenon of weeping when one wants to utter one's noyang's name is known as datang keturunannya 'the coming hither of one's descent'. (In Galang speech, keturunan is usually referred to as keturun.) As Daud put it, dia datang sendiri 'it comes of its own accord'. What the pronoun dia 'it/he/she/they' referred to, I could not get him to elaborate, particularly since he was on the verge of breaking into tears again. Nor could I get any other Karas informant to elaborate beyond simply saying datang keturunannya. Yet this phenomenon was of such significance to them that within the first hour
of my arrival on Karas, I was informed of its existence.

But not all my Karas informants broke into tears when they tried to utter their great-grandparents' names. Among those who did not, there were some who simply said that they did not know their great-grandparents' names. Thus it looks as if ignorance may be one factor inhibiting 'the coming hither of one's descent'. What one does not know, one cannot even attempt to utter. There is thus no psychical conflict between knowledge and secrecy, and hence no impulse to resolve this conflict through traumatic weeping.

This phenomenon of datang keturunannya is not unique to Karas. I also encountered it in Tembeling on the southern shore of Bintan Bay, which I visited briefly while doing fieldwork in Bintan. (See Map 4.) However, there seems to be one difference between the two manifestations of this phenomenon. My Karas informants said that when they experience datang keturunannya, although they weep, they are nevertheless 'still conscious' (masih sadar). In contrast, my Tembeling informants told me that when they are visited by datang keturunannya, they 'fall in a faint' (pengsan) and are 'not conscious' (tak sadar). Not surprisingly, my efforts to obtain genealogies in Tembeling were even more unfruitful.

So what are we to make of this phenomenon called datang keturunannya? In this respect, the comments of some other Karas informants are relevant. Daud was the first such case I encountered. After that rather unnerving interview, I mentioned his weeping to two other Karas informants. Interestingly, they were rather surprised and started conversing between themselves. One said to the other, 'But he's not really Galang asli, is he?' The other replied, 'Of course, he's not. He's just pretending.' They then turned around and explained to me that only the orang Galang asli 'indigenous Galang
people' are visited by datang keturunannya'; others do not experience this. In their opinion, Daud was not an orang Galang asli; so they thought that he was just pretending to be indigenous by manifesting datang keturunannya.

But who are these non-indigenous Galang people? As mentioned in Chapter Five, the present-day inhabitants of Karas say that they are the descendants of the Galang pirates who used to go raiding in far places, bringing back captives they had kidnapped. According to my informants, the 'non-indigenous' people of Galang are the descendants of the surviving captives who had been kidnapped from afar. The orang Galang asli are, however, the descendants of the original Galang pirates.

Among my Karas informants, there is some tension concerning their individual identity relative to each other. The questions relevant to them are: Who is the descendant of an original Galang pirate and hence an orang Galang asli? And who is the descendant of a kidnapped victim and hence 'non-indigenous' to Galang? The former is evidently regarded as superior to the latter, because the former's ancestor was not a victim but a victimiser, and also because the former belongs to Galang as a native and is hence a Melayu asli of Riau. In this light, the latter would be merely a peranakan of foreign descent, though born and resident in Galang.

So if my two other Karas informants were right about Daud's antecedents, then it would appear that he was trying to move himself from peranakan status to asli status in Galang, by means of datang keturunannya. While he may have succeeded with me for the simple reason that I was totally ignorant of the subtleties of the situation, he evidently did not manage to convince his two compatriots who later heard about the event from me. Apparently, knowledge of his non-
indigenous keturunan had not yet been expunged from public memory.

The implication is that datang keturunannya is regarded as authentic only when it occurs among those whose antecedents nobody can remember. In other words, what is required is not positive proof but negative proof. An orang Galang asli does not have to prove that his or her ancestors were indeed orang Galang asli, since he or she is not supposed even to utter their names. What he or she needs is to have no known foreign antecedents.

But not all my Karas informants claimed to be orang Galang asli. A number of them admitted to having non-indigenous antecedents, the place-names mentioned most being Perak and Kedah on the Malay Peninsula. For example, one informant stated explicitly that she was descended from the pirates' captives. She said that her ancestors were lucky to be looked after by the pirates macam anak angkat 'like adopted children'. According to her, on Karas the true descendants of the Galang pirates are few, whereas the descendants of the captives are many. She herself has a bit of Galang blood through some of her ancestors' marriages with the orang Galang asli. She felt that it was unnecessary for many of her fellow islanders to be 'ashamed' (malu) of their non-indigenous origins, because it is true that they are indeed not indigenous. Her noyang 'great-grandparent' joined the pirates as well. She said that once he even went back to visit his home village in Perak; his kin there did not want him to return to Karas. But his wife and children were in Karas; so he returned.

Such details of an individual's antecedents are likely to be known only within the community. Even though it may be generally known in Riau that some of the Karas people are the descendants of foreign captives, unfamiliar outsiders such as those in Penyengat or Bintan are not able to identify specific individuals in Karas, with
whom they are not acquainted, either as the descendants of Galang pirates or as the descendants of the pirates' captives. Such being the case, from an outsider's perspective, the descendants of foreign captives are lumped into the category of orang Galang. So where outsiders are concerned, the captives' descendants have successfully expunged knowledge of their foreign keturunan; they have become orang Galang and hence Melayu asli in Riau.

If it is the case that my Karas informants weep to hide their descent from the non-indigenous captives of pirates, then what is it that my Tembeling informants are hiding when they faint at the thought of their ancestors' names? There is not the slightest hint that the Tembeling people have anything to do with piracy. The relevant difference in that context is apparently not between indigenous pirate and non-indigenous captive. Instead, what I found confusing during my brief visit there was trying to identify who was Chinese and who was Melayu. Several Chinese-speaking people I met there identified themselves as Melayu, and several non-Chinese-speaking people were said to be Chinese. Nor was I able to differentiate on the basis of physical appearance.

Islam seemed to be the only reliable criterion, since all those who declared themselves Melayu were Muslim, and all those who declared themselves Chinese were non-Muslim. But even this was not a hard-and-fast barrier, as several people in the community had evidently moved to and fro a few times across the barrier. For example, two Melayu women married Chinese husbands and therefore ikut Cina 'followed the Chinese'. After their husbands died, they balik Melayu 'returned to being Melayu'. Some of the children from these mixed marriages were Chinese, while others were Melayu. When I asked what was involved in being Chinese or Melayu, my informants, both Chinese and Melayu, pinpointed pork-eating as the single most important difference: the
Chinese eat pork, the Melayu do not. So the two Melayu women who had 'followed the Chinese' apparently ate pork when they were Chinese, then abstained from pork when they 'returned to being Melayu'. Conversely, there were Chinese individuals there who had masuk Melayu 'entered Melayu-dom' by converting to Islam and abstaining from pork, thereby becoming Melayu. So there were cases where, within the same family, some were Chinese and others Melayu.

But why is there such a strong Chinese presence in a Melayu community? The clue to this puzzle is the location of Tembeling within what was an old Chinese kangkar -- that is, a plantation-cum-settlement -- where there were formerly many Teochiu workers. According to the penghulu 'headman', Tembeling has been in existence for only four generations. The penduduk asli 'indigenous inhabitants' were the Melayu asli who were formerly living on Ketir, the small island opposite Tembeling. (See Map 4.) In addition to these, however, there were many settlers from among the Chinese workers on the kangkar. Even though some of the latter have converted to Islam and thereby 'entered Melayu-dom', their non-indigenous origins are nevertheless known and remembered. So they remain peranakan Cina despite having become Melayu.

This situation is not unlike that of Karas. Again in this case, there is a small core of indigenous inhabitants mixed with non-indigenous migrants, in this case, those of Chinese stock. So the relevant difference in this situation is indeed between asli and peranakan -- that is, between the descendants of the 'original inhabitants' and the descendants of the non-indigenous settlers. I would thus suggest that, as in the case of Karas, whereas there are some who are willing to admit to their non-indigenous origins, there are others who are trying to move from a peranakan to an asli status. I would further suggest that the latter are those who faint at the
thought of their non-indigenous ancestors' names.

Apart from weeping and fainting to hide one's non-indigenous keturunan, there is yet another way to lose it, and that is, by simply not taking it into account. Let me illustrate with a specific example. In Teluk Nipah in the Galang area, I have some informants who identify themselves as Melayu Budha 'Buddhist Melayu', or alternatively, as Melayu Kong Hu Cu 'Confucianist Melayu'. They are people with Chinese fathers and non-Muslim Melayu mothers. The penghulu of the area explained the situation to me by saying:

Sukunya ikut mak, ugamanya ikut bapak.

(Their suku follows their mothers'; their religion follows their fathers'.)

When I asked why these people had not inherited their fathers' Chinese keturunan, he said that when the marriage is not 'official' (sah), the child inherits the mother's keturunan. By 'official' he meant that these marriages were not registered either with the civil registry or the religious registry.

There is, however, a more subtle point to this situation than the mere absence of a marriage certificate. Since the marriages are not Muslim, there was no transfer of mas kawin from groom to bride. As I have argued in Chapter Four, mas kawin may be interpreted as a contractual settlement, signifying the agreement of the bride not to transmit keturunan to her child. The penghulu cited above is himself a Muslim Melayu who does know of the institution of mas kawin. So his acceptance of the matrifilative transmission of Melayu-ness in these non-Muslim marriages would make perfect sense in the logic of keturunan and mas kawin. So ironically, it is the non-Muslim Melayu women who can transmit keturunan to their children, whereas the Muslim Melayu women lose this right through the institution of mas kawin.
What we see in this situation is a re-definition of keturunan, such that one can inherit keturunan from one's mother instead of one's father. The non-indigenous keturunan of one's father is thereby disregarded in favour of the indigenous keturunan of one's mother. According to this reckoning, the Melayu Budha and/or Melayu Kong Hu Cu of Galang are thus Melayu asli not only in terms of birthplace and residence, but also in terms of keturunan.

But as I have mentioned above, not all my informants are eager to claim 'indigeny' in Riau. There are some who are quite willing to admit to non-indigenous origins -- for example, some of the captives' descendants in Karas and the peranakan Cina in Tembeling. There are also others who are proud of their non-indigenous origins because of the aristocratic status that such origins confer. Such people include the Bugis-derived rajas and the Arab-derived tuan said discussed above. There is another relevant example of the latter we can discuss -- that is, the orang Bintan who claim keturunan Palembang.

The penghulu of Bintan volunteered the following statement to me:

Penduduk asli tak ada lagi, tapi ada ada jugak, macam Mat Arsad, dia keturunan orang Bintan asli.

(There are no longer any of the indigenous inhabitants, but there are nevertheless a few such as Mat Arsad, who is descended from the indigenous people of Bintan.)

It seems that the original inhabitants of Bintan were afraid of the raja from Palembang. So they ran away; it is not known where. The raja that the penghulu was referring to was the raja of Kota Kara. (See Chapter Six.) He said that before that raja came to Bintan to build Kota Kara, it is possible that the indigenous inhabitants of Bintan lived in the forest, cari-cari 'by means of gathering'.
At the time of my fieldwork, the abovementioned Mat Arsad was no longer alive. I did, however, meet his son Awang Sah, who acknowledged that he was a descendant of the orang Bintan asli 'indigenous Bintan people'. He pointed out that not everyone who is born in Bintan is considered an orang Bintan asli. He said that the orang Bintan asli were the first inhabitants of Bintan. They were satu suku 'one division of people' with their own language. But Mat Arsad no longer knew this cakap Bintan asli 'original language of Bintan'; perhaps not even his father knew it. Now there are only pendatang 'newcomers'. Even the keramat graves are keramat pendatang 'the newcomers' keramat sites'; there is none of the orang Bintan asli.

Awang Sah said that the orang Bintan asli ran away during the time of Kota Kara because they did not want to be ordered about:

*Orang suruh ke sana, ke sini, orang Bintan asli diam aja, tak mau ikut orang bilang.*

(When people ordered them hither and thither, the indigenous Bintan people just kept quiet, refusing to follow what others said.)

Awang Sah said that his father had told him that there were now no other descendants of the orang Bintan asli, except for their family. The others are said to have died out, though for what reason my Bintan informants did not elaborate. In this connection, it may or may not be significant that some of my Penyengat raja informants said that there are many kelip-kelip 'fireflies' in Bintan, because mungkin banyak orang dibunuh di sana 'many people may have been murdered there', fireflies being regarded as manifestations of murdered people. I was told this just before I left Penyengat for Bintan; and furthermore, I was warned by my Penyengat informants not to ask the Bintan people direct questions about these fireflies.
However, it is also possible that the orang Bintan asli may not have died out, and that apart from the late Mat Arsad's descendants who live in Kampung Bukit Batu, there may still be other orang Bintan asli elsewhere. According to the ketua 'elder' of Bukit Batu, there was, in his grandparents' generation, an orang Bintan asli called Mak Gewang 'Mother Mother-of-pearl', who occasionally came out of the forest to visit the village. Sometimes she was accompanied by her husband. The ketua said that since then there has not been any such visit by another orang Bintan asli.

Awang Sah said that his father had told him:

Orang Bintan asli tak mau langsung ceritakan ke anaknya asal-usulnya, kerana pantang. Kalau sendiri tahu, sendiri tahu aja.

(The original people of Bintan did not want to tell their children explicitly about their origins, because it is taboo. What one knows, one keeps to oneself.)

In contrast to this taboo, my other Bintan informants who claim Palembang origins say that they can trace their twelve generations of ancestors to the time of Kota Kara. However, when I tried to obtain their individual genealogies, I found that they were unable to go beyond their great-great-grandparents' generation -- that is, only four generations back. They explained this discrepancy by saying that they cannot each remember twelve generations individually, but 'only if there are a lot of people to remember together' (ramai-ramai baru boleh ingat). Unfortunately, no such communal occasion of genealogical tracing occurred during my stay in Bintan. Nor did I obtain any genealogy that mentioned either Palembang or Kota Kara as the birthplace or deathplace of any ancestor.

So in Bintan we have once again a situation where a small group of indigenous inhabitants are mixed with more numerous inhabitants of non-indigenous origins. Also in this situation, the indigenes are the
ones who cannot tell of their antecedents, whereas the non-indigenes can. However, there is a crucial difference between the Bintan case and the other cases we have discussed above: in Bintan, the non-indigenes are considered superior to the indigenes. In Karas, for example, the inhabitants of non-indigenous origins are said to be the descendants of pirates' captives, and hence symbolically inferior to the descendants of the indigenous pirates themselves. In Bintan, however, the indigenes are said to be the descendants of shy forest-dwellers, and hence symbolically inferior to the descendants of the Palembang settlers at Kota Kara who had frightened them away.

I suggest that this difference arises from derajat. As we have seen in Chapters Five and Six, the keturunan Bintan are a separate derajat in the political hierarchy, ranking above the hamba raja and hamba orang. As mentioned above, some of my informants, who are themselves not Bintan people, stated that the keturunan Bintan are 'very nearly raja'. As I have shown above, this evaluation has to do with the 1699 assassination of Sultan Mahmud by the Laksamana Bintan and the legitimation of this act through reference to a social contract established in Palembang. I have also shown above how this Palembang-Bintan connection is spatially symbolised by Keramat Dang Pok Dang Marini and Keramat Datuk Bujuk. In this context, my Bintan informants' claim to Palembang ancestry fits as snugly as the last piece of a jigsaw puzzle.

Again in the Bintan case, we can discern a difference between the insider's perspective and the outsider's perspective. Only those within the community know of the one family of orang Bintan asli, and the twelve generations which supposedly link the rest to the Palembang settlers who had established Kota Kara. From the perspective of unfamiliar outsiders, including the Penyengat rajas, the Bintan people
are considered the indigenous inhabitants of Bintan, even if it is generally known that there is some Palembang connection somewhere, since there is no knowledge of anyone else who is even more indigenous than they are.

But who then are the one family of orang Bintan asli known only within the community? Despite the taboo on telling of one's origins, Awang Sah was nevertheless able to give his genealogy going as far back as his great-grandparents' generation, without weeping or fainting. (See Genealogical Chart 10.) In that genealogy, there are three ancestors whose birthplaces are unknown. Apart from one affinal connection with Tembeling, the others in the genealogy were all born in Bintan, either in Nau village or Bukit Batu village.

Such a genealogy does not look so very different from those of other Bintan informants (see, for example, Genealogical Chart 9). All these genealogies have a combination of some ancestors immigrating from elsewhere and others born in Bintan. All of them show a combination of Islamic and non-Islamic names. Possibly the only appreciable difference is that in Awang Sah's genealogy, his patrilineal ancestors are the ones with non-Islamic names -- that is, Rejab, Ta'ang, Ajab, and Penoh. In the other Bintan genealogies, the non-Islamic names tend to appear among the informants' matrifiliative ascendants. Awang Sah himself stressed: keturunan ikut bapak 'descent follows the father'; he considers himself a keturunan orang Bintan asli only on the basis of his patri-line.

I would thus suggest that there has been some mixing in the Bintan population between a relatively more Islamised sector and a relatively less Islamised sector. It is possible that the former were of Palembang derivation, while the latter were indigenous to Bintan. I would further suggest that, as in the case of the keturunan Bugis
and the keturunan Arab, the keturunan Palembang may be people who are patrilineally non-indigenous but who are matrilineally indigenous. So the factor that differentiates Awang Sah's family from the other Bintan people may be that the former are patrilineally indigenous, whereas the latter are only matrilineally so.

In all other respects, there is little difference between Awang Sah and his family on the one hand, and those who claim Palembang descent on the other. Awang Sah and his siblings seem to be well-integrated into village life in Bukit Batu. In whatever way their ancestors may have lived, Awang Sah and his siblings were certainly not living in the forest by means of gathering. In short, I could discern no detail of appearance, behaviour, or way of life that seems to set them apart for the other Bintan people. This is why I think the differentiation being made between the orang Bintan asli and the 'newcomers' from Palembang should be understood more as an expression of descent ideology, rather than as a statement of actual difference.

If such is the case, the Bintan situation would contrast significantly with the Teluk Nipah case in Galang, where the Melayu Budha/Kong Hu Cu have chosen to be indigenous through their matrilineation, rather than be non-indigenous through their patrilineal Chinese keturunan. But the keturunan Palembang, like the keturunan Bugis and the keturunan Arab, seem to have chosen to be non-indigenous through patrilineality, rather than be indigenous through their matrilineation. Quite plainly, the reason for this difference is derajat.

The Melayu Budha/Kong Hu Cu can claim no derajat at all through patrilineality; but matrilineation does at least bestow the status of indigeny, even if it allows them only the derajat of hamba raja, which is the rank of the orang Galang. These informants do indeed show
awareness of such a situation. For example, one of them took pains to explain to me that he was descended from a **panglima Galang** 'Galang warrior', to the extent of tracing the genealogical connections all of which were, significantly, matrifilial. (See Genealogical Chart 11.)

Given that such matrifilial reckoning is considered as un-Islamic by my more Islamic informants, it is noteworthy that the Bintan community is much more Islamised than the Teluk Nipah community in Galang. We shall see in Chapter Nine what Islamisation means in Riau. For the moment, however, suffice it to note that whereas my Bintan informants all declare themselves to be Muslim, my Teluk Nipah informants do not identify themselves as such. On the contrary, as we have seen above, they even claim allegiance to other religions -- namely, Buddhism and Confucianism -- following their non-indigenous Chinese fathers.

The door of 'indigency', like all doors, is thus double-sided: it allows both entry and exit. In some cases, a non-indigene can enter this doorway and become indigenous. In other cases, an indigene can exit through this doorway and become non-indigenous. In yet other cases, someone with one foot in and one foot out -- that is, someone who is both indigenous and non-indigenous -- can choose simply to remain in the doorway without entering or exiting further. In other cases still, someone can enter and exit through this door several times -- that is, to **masuk Melayu** 'enter Melayu-dom', **keluar Melayu** 'leave Melayu-dom', then **balik Melayu** 'return to Melayu-dom', as was the case with the two Tembeling women mentioned above.

Before we leave this discussion, let me describe a phenomenon in Penyengat that is not unrelated to the **datang keturunan**ya of Galang and Tembeling. This is known as **berkembar** 'to twin'. The following
account was told to me by a female raja informant, whose late mother-in-law was susceptible to 'twinning' (kembaran), especially when she was 'weak in spirit' (lemah semangat). When this happened, she would behave like a Bugis man. She crossed her legs. She ate raw eggs, which had to be washed clean. She would crack the egg a bit, then put the whole egg in her mouth, spitting out the shell later. She would also ask for minyak Makassar 'oil from Makassar'. However, she did no healing, unlike another female raja who was also susceptible to 'twinning'. Of the three or four cases of 'twinning' that my informant knew about, only this latter did any 'healing' (mengubat). When this healer was in a state of 'twinning', three 'limes' (limau) would come out of her mouth, 'incense' (dupa) would come out of her ear, and when she pressed her fourth finger, there would be 'oil' (minyak). She would put on masculine clothes and behave mannishly. She would speak Bugis, with a 'translator' (jurubahasa) to mediate between her and her patients. The translator was a female commoner also from Penyengat. The translator would explain to the 'twinning' raja that the people in Penyengat 'were not clever in the Bugis language' (tak pandai cakap Bugis). The 'twinning' raja would get angry and scold the patients, but she would begin to speak in halting Malay, satu-satu 'word by word', like someone just learning the language.

Interestingly, 'twinning' is said to have disappeared with the last generation. My raja informants say that they do not know of anyone living who is still susceptible to 'twinning'. Nor did I witness any such case myself. However, the translator mentioned above is still alive. And I have heard several different accounts of berkembar, of which the one given above is the most detailed. From these accounts, it is quite clear that 'twinning' was a phenomenon that was associated specifically with female rajas, especially when
they were 'weak in spirit'. But once 'twinning' occurred, they would behave like Bugis men who were not even able to speak Malay.

My informants explained to me that the kembar 'twin' who entered the body of a 'weak' female raja was one of the Bugis ancestors. However, they were rather vague about the identity of such an ancestor. They would only say that these ancestors bore the title daeng. When I asked whether these were the five Opu Daeng brothers, my informants were non-committal -- 'possibly', they said. What they were definite about was the intermittence of 'twinning'. Apparently the ancestral 'twin' was not present all the time; he would 'come' (datang) only when his female descendant was 'weak in spirit'. She then became him through 'twinning'. The other people present who wished to interact with her after she had 'twinned' would thereby be interacting with the Bugis ancestor manifest in her.

In such an interaction, the attention of the people would have been orientated out of Penyengat where they were no longer 'clever in the Bugis language', towards Sulawesi where the Bugis-speaking ancestor came from. Indeed, my informants said as much when I asked about the identity of the 'twinning' ancestors; they hinted that the daeng in question were those even more ancestral than the five Opu Daeng brothers who had come to Riau. This gives us a clue to the reason why 'twinning' is no longer an occurrence in Penyengat: 'twinning' implied an orientation out of Riau towards Sulawesi. Whereas such a centrifugal orientation may have befitted a Bugis peranakan, it does not befit a Melayu murni claiming cultural centrality in Riau. As I have pointed out above, my raja informants no longer refer to themselves as Bugis peranakan, a self-identifying label that we find in some nineteenth-century texts. I therefore suggest a correlation between the loss of the term Bugis peranakan as a self-identifying label and the disappearance of 'twinning' among my
present-day informants who now identify themselves only as Melayu murni.

But why was it the case that 'twinning' was a phenomenon associated particularly with female rajas? I suggest that this has to do with the definition of keturunan as patrilineal. Although a female raja is also a descendant of the Bugis rajas, she is not able to transmit this descent to her children. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter Four, some of my male informants interpret the non-transmission of descent by the female as a sign of her weakness; as one of them put it:

Keturunan dari bapak.... Perempuan lemah.

(Descent is from the father.... The female is weak.)

I suggest that 'twinning' may have occurred as an attempt by some female rajas to compensate for their structural weakness in the descent ideology, by becoming men -- and moreover, their own Bugis patrilineal ancestors -- even if only intermittently. What I find very striking is that even now, although the phenomenon no longer exists, my female raja informants would talk about it in a serious tone of voice, whereas my male raja informants tend to deride it, treating it as a hoax. For example, one of the latter said:

Orang itu -- siang dia tak tahu cakap Bugis, malam baru dia tahu.

(Those people -- in the day they did not know how to speak Bugis, only at night did they know.)

But then neither does this particular informant know any Bugis himself.

I mentioned above that berkembar is not unrelated to datang keturunannya. Indeed, in both cases, there is the coming hither of an ancestor. However, in the case of datang keturunannya, the ancestor
comes and forbids mention of his name, whereas in the case of berkembar, the ancestor comes and explicitly manifests his presence through speech and manners. But in both cases, it tends to happen to people who are in positions of structural weakness in the descent ideology — that is, people who have to prove their keturunan one way or another.

7.4 The Door of 'Purity'

'Indigeny' is not the only door in and out of Melayu-dom; there is an alternative door — that of 'purity'. As mentioned above, the difference between 'indigeny' and 'purity' is between Melayu-ness as a congenitally derived identity and Melayu-ness as a moral condition derived from certain actions. Although there are ways and means of manipulating even a congenitally derived identity, as we have seen above, choice is nevertheless more overtly important in Melayu-ness as a moral condition of 'purity'. So whereas a Karas informant could say that there is no need to be ashamed of being non-indigenous because one cannot help it, it would be less plausible to put forward the same argument for being 'impure', precisely because 'purity' is supposed to be a state that one can attain through one's actions. It is furthermore implied in this logic that 'purity' is to be desired and 'impurity' to be rejected. So when my Penyengat informants identified themselves as Melayu murni or Melayu totok, in contrast to others who were identified as bukan Melayu murni or Melayu yang tidak totok, that identification should be understood not as a neutral description, but rather, as a moral evaluation, with the implication that the latter somehow lack the sincerity or ability to choose to become 'pure'.

Such a choice is, however, constrained by the given alternatives between which one can choose. As I understand from my informants,
there are certain criteria to be fulfilled if one is to be evaluated as Melayu murni or Melayu totok. These criteria may be presented in the form of a Guttman scalogram thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria of 'purity'</th>
<th>bukan Melayu murni or Melayu yang tidak totok</th>
<th>Melayu murni or Melayu totok</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adat</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bahasa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8 Scale of Melayu types

1 indicates fulfilment of a criterion; 0 indicates its non-fulfilment. The scale of Melayu types is derived from the cumulative scores resulting from the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of the listed criteria. So Type 0 has not fulfilled any of the three criteria. Type 1 has fulfilled one criterion -- namely, Islam. Type 2 has fulfilled two criteria -- namely, Islam and adat 'custom'. Type 3 has fulfilled all three criteria -- namely, Islam, adat and bahasa 'language'. We shall see further below who are the people perceived as tokens instantiating these four types. The scalogram above implies a certain order of priority in the fulfilment of the listed criteria, the most important being Islam, followed by adat, then bahasa.

7.4.1 Islam

If the door of 'indigeny' hinges upon keturunan, it would seem that the door of 'purity' hinges upon Islam, such that even those of non-indigenous origins can bypass keturunan as a criterion of Melayu-ness and become Melayu by virtue of becoming Muslim. A non-indigene
who is not already Melayu can thereby 'enter Melayu-dom' through the portal of Islam. That gives us a clue as to who are the people who can 'enter Melayu-dom' by converting to Islam. They are indeed the non-indigenous, non-Muslim inhabitants of Riau — that is, those who are dagang and peranakan, those of non-Melayu keturunan.

In Islam there is a clear-cut division of people into believers and non-believers. As my Penyengat informants explained to me, a person is either a Muslim or a non-Muslim. They said that according to Islamic law, for a non-Muslim to convert to Islam, he or she must 'pronounce the two statements of the testimonial creed' (menguapkan dua kalimah syahadat), in the presence of two Muslim witnesses. After that pronouncement, the person is already Muslim, 'officially so' (sah). Nothing more is needed. Even if he or she does not subsequently abide by Islamic prescriptions, he or she would still remain Muslim. As one informant put it, to eat pork or not to pray five times a day are simply 'sins' (dosa), for which one is personally responsible; but 'sins' do not turn a Muslim into a non-Muslim. Once a person has been converted to Islam, even if he or she were to die the day after conversion, he or she must be given a Muslim burial. My informants said that according to hukum negeri 'laws of the country' (that is, Indonesian law), new converts have to be registered at the Kantor Ugama 'Department of Religion'. But even without doing so, they said, the Department would recognise the conversion through 'pronouncement of the creed' in the way they described. (See Appendix 10 for a copy of the Department's certificate of Islamic conversion.)

My Penyengat informants' explanation of conversion seems to be Islamologically quite accurate. Such conversion can, however, occur only among discerning adults. According to a tradition in canonical Islam, 'every child is born with a pure nature, a Muslim' (Muhammad Ali 1983:280), for Islam is supposed to be the 'primordial religion'
This aspect of canonical Islam carries certain implications for my informants' usage of Islam as a criterion for being 'pure Melayu'. It implies that it is natural to be Muslim and un-natural not to be so. Since one must be Muslim in order to be 'pure Melayu', this further implies that it is natural to be 'pure Melayu' and un-natural to be 'impure Melayu'. 'Impurity' may thus be understood, in this sense, as a falling away from original grace, rather than as an original condition from which everyone begins. So the orientation may be described as anti-apostatic rather than as salvationist. That is to say, the concern is with safeguarding one's state of original grace, rather than with saving all from original sin. We shall see below how such an orientation is expressed in social interaction, both individually and communally.

So important is Islam as a criterion of being 'pure Melayu', that the terms masuk Islam 'to enter Islam' and masuk Melayu 'to enter Melayu-dom' are often used by my informants as synonyms. It was this usage that initially confused me about the categories Suku Melayu and Melayu murni. Because many of the Riau indigenes are not Muslim, I thought that they were therefore not Melayu at all. Therefore in my 1979 conference I described them as 'entering Melayu-dom' should they convert to Islam. However, as I have shown above, my Penyengat informants said that these Riau indigenes cannot masuk Melayu because they are already Melayu asli; they can merely masuk Islam. As I have also shown above, they are Melayu asli through keturunan. The synonymous usage of the terms masuk Islam and masuk Melayu is applicable only to the conversion of a non-indigene.

Ironically, as a mode of entry which bypasses keturunan as a criterion of Melavu-ness, Islam can create a situation where a non-
indigenous Muslim would be placed further along the scale of 'purity' than an indigenous non-Muslim. The former would instantiate Type 1, whereas the latter would instantiate only Type 0. In a context where 'purity' is regarded as natural and hence superior, and 'impurity' is regarded as un-natural and hence inferior, this would mean that a non-indigenous Muslim would be perceived as being in a state of original grace, from which an indigenous non-Muslim would be excluded. The former would thus be morally superior to the latter. Such a logic makes perfect sense in the context of Islam being used as the legitimating basis of the Bugis rajahs' authority, as discussed in the chapters above.

7.4.2 Adat

Once a person has entered the door of 'purity' through Islam, he or she can become more Melayu murni through adat 'custom' and bahasa 'language'. The Arabic word adat means simply 'habit, custom' (Mahmud Yunus 1972:251). As a loan-word in Malay, however, adat covers a wide semantic range, including personal habits, social conventions, rules and laws. In my informants' usage, adat refers more to prescribed custom than to law. It is not regarded as a uniquely Melayu characteristic that other non-Melayu people do not possess. As stated by my informants, lain bangsa lain adatnya 'people of other stocks have other kinds of adat'. So whereas every people is said to possess an adat of their own, there is a difference between adat that is Melayu and adat that is non-Melayu. Therefore, it is not the practice of just any old adat that would suffice as a criterion of being Melayu murni: only the practice of adat Melayu would do.

An aristocrat informant explained adat Melayu by quoting the following sayings:
Melayu bersendi adat. Adat bersendi kitab Allah.

(Melayu-ness is framed by adat. Adat is framed by the book of Allah.)

Ada raja, ada adat. Tiada raja, tiada adat.

(Where there is a ruler, there is adat. Where there is no ruler, there is no adat.)

Although adat Melayu is said to be framed by Islam, my informants nevertheless differentiate between adat and ugama 'religion', with the implication that adat is not religiously prescribed. As the second saying implies, adat is prescribed by the ruler of the state; Islam is thus merely the framework within which such prescriptions are made. My informant said explicitly that the ruler was acknowledged as the ketua adat 'elder of adat', who arbitrated if there was any dispute.

If such is the case, now that there is no longer a sultanate in Riau, does that mean that adat Melayu is no longer extant? That does not seem to be my informants' perception. To them, adat Melayu evidently persists as traditional forms of behaviour inherited from the past. In other words, adat Melayu is not an open-ended phenomenon that can be arbitrated upon anew, since there is no longer an arbitrator. It is merely a closed stock of conventions that has already been decided upon in the past. So the implication is that the propriety of an act hinges not upon its rightness or wrongness as such, but upon its accordance with known convention. Any dispute that arises would hence be about the accuracy of one's knowledge of past ways.

This means that the basis of adat Melayu is knowledge — knowledge of fixed conventions and prescribed codes of conduct inherited from the past. Only those who know can behave in a manner that is 'in accordance with the conventions of adat' (menurut adat
istiadat). Those who do not know must therefore be taught. For example, adat must be taught to children by adults, to juniors by seniors, and to the illiterate by the literate. Adat is what some of my informants voluntarily taught me, so that I would not embarrass them too much with my ignorance. A person whose conduct is considered unmannerly is said to be 'unschooled' (kurang ajar). So people are not expected to know by themselves how to behave in an approved manner. They are supposed to be taught by those superior in such knowledge.

Significantly, among my informants, the Penyengat rajas were the most interested and most knowledgeable about adat. To indicate the importance of adat, some of them are fond of quoting the following proverb:

Biar mati anak jangan mati adat.
(Rather let your child die than let adat die.)

Another version has mak 'mother' instead of anak 'child'. According to this saying, one should put in more effort to keeping adat alive than keeping alive one's kin. To my informants, adat thus seems important enough to maintain as an end in itself, as a self-sufficient justification.

The underlying premise of adat is that there is a prescription for each detail of everyday life — how to sit, how to eat, how to dress, how to greet each other, how to take leave, how to walk, what to say, and so on. One's behaviour is thus supposed to be completely regulated, down to the most minuscule specification. Everyday examples derived from my field experience illustrate that adat has much to do with social interaction between Self and Other, whether as host and guest, senior and junior, or as social equals. The list of do's and don'ts is practically endless, as the examples below will
Among my informants, when visiting someone at home, it is considered adat to call out the greeting of assalamu 'alaikum 'peace be with you', while one is still outside the house; and it is adat for the host to respond from within with wa'alaikumus salam 'and with you be there peace'. This is known as beri salam.

When two people greet each other, their relative rank and status must be taken into account. If both are of the same rank and status, they should greet each other with a simple hand-clasp: that is, one extends one's right hand to meet the right hand of the other party, then withdraws it to touch one's own chest lightly with the fingers of that hand. This is known as salam 'peace', to be differentiated from beri salam 'giving peace' as described above.

When two people of unequal rank and status greet each other, the social inferior must show greater respect to the social superior in the following way. The former must assume a stooped position and clasp with both hands the latter's right hand. The former must then cium tangan 'inhale the fragrance of the hand' of the latter. This involves bringing the hand to one's nose, then withdrawing one's own hands to wipe one's face with a downward gesture.

The above is a description of the full expression of respect. Partial respect may be expressed in various ways. For example, after cium tangan, the social inferior may simply touch his or her chest lightly with the fingers of both hands, instead of performing the wiping gesture. Alternatively, one may clasp the social superior's hand not with both hands, but only with one's right hand. One may then proceed with cium tangan, and after that, touch one's chest with the fingers, as in salam.
My informants have many other adat prescriptions for the regulation of public behaviour. When someone is espied walking past one's house, it is adat to call out: Nak ke mana 'Where are you going'? Tak singgah 'Not dropping in'? It is, of course, adat to respond to such greetings.

It is adat to remove one's shoes before entering the house, so as not to bring dirt in. When sitting on the floor, it is adat for females to keep their legs together, bent at the knees and curved around one side of the body; this is known as bersimpuh. It is adat for males to sit cross-legged with knees bent; this is known as bersila. It is not adat for anyone to sit with their legs out. When walking past someone who is sitting, it is adat to sidle through in a stooped position, with the right side of one's body forward, and one's right arm held stiffly at a forward slant as if to slice a path through with one's fingers. This is to tumpang jalan 'walk in somebody else's path'.

When someone visits the house, it is adat for the host to serve refreshments consisting of 'pastries' (kuih) and a sweet drink. If there are no pastries in the house, it is adat for the host to apologise for serving only a 'solitary drink' (air bujang). It is adat to provide a finger-bowl and a hand towel together with any food that is served. It is adat for the person eating to dip the first three fingers of the right hand into the water and to dry them on the towel, before partaking of the food. After eating, it is adat to clean the right hand either by dipping it into the finger-bowl again, or by pouring some of the water over one's hand into one's plate.

There is an opinion held by some people that pouring water into one's empty plate after eating is an auspicious act that would magically guard against putus rezeki 'losing one's livelihood', for a
completely empty plate would be the sign of such a loss. Other informants who are not inclined towards such a view explain the practice in terms of kindness to the person who has to wash the plates later: that is, the plate would not be coated with dried bits of food that would be hard to remove.

It is adat for a guest not to partake of any food that has been served until the host says jemput 'you are invited' or silakan 'please help yourself'. It is adat for the guest not to refuse any food that has been offered once he or she has been invited to partake of it. My informant in Daik, Datuk Kaya Mohamad Isa, is well-known with regards to this prescription. The story oft repeated by my other informants about him is as follows: If a guest has been invited thrice to partake of food that has been served, and if that guest is slow to do so, he, the erstwhile host, would rescind his invitation by having the food brought back to the kitchen. The implied moral of the tale is: non-adat may be repaid by non-adat.

My informants said that a guest should not refuse any food that is offered:

Kalau hidangan ditolak, nanti kempunan.

(If refreshments are refused, misfortune will come above as a result of frustrated desire.)

For example, the guest may subsequently hurt himself or herself by falling down the stairs when leaving the house. Such an accident may occur due to a subconscious niat 'wish' to eat the food that was offered. As one of my Penyengat informants put it, kalau ada niat, harus sampai 'if one has a wish, one must realise it'. Otherwise, the wish may try to express itself in all sorts of ways beyond one's control. The involuntary expression of an unfulfilled wish is referred to as kempunan. This idea is explicitly expressed by my
informants when they offer food to their guests. They may say, for example, 'eat up; otherwise kempunan will arise'.

Another adat prescription that has to do with hospitality is that if the host and guest are sharing a meal, it is adat for the host to re-fill the guest's plate before it is empty. It is adat for the guest to eat a second helping of rice. It is adat for the host to allow the guest to finish eating first. If the host has only one morsel of food left, that morsel must be moved around the plate until the guest has finished eating. Only then can the host swallow his last morsel.  

Adat as the public display of codified manners is perhaps most evident during weddings when it is elaborated into a form of ceremonial theatre. The examples above indicate the concern with the interaction between host and guest. Such interaction is indeed the focus of attention at a wedding, including the interaction between the bride's family hosting the wedding and the bridegroom who comes as a guest to the bride's home. Significantly, the bridal couple are said to be raja sehari 'king and queen for the day', and are indeed dressed in lavish costumes that would be appropriate to such a status. (See Plate 19.) In this light, the coming of the bridegroom as a guest to the home of the hosting bride may perhaps be understood as a re-enactment of the primordial marriage alliance, when a prince of foreign origins -- for example, Sang Nila Utama -- comes and marries an indigenous princess. (See the Penurunan.) The ceremonial adat that prescribes for the behaviour of each and every participant at a wedding is too complex to describe here. So suffice it to note that the wedding constitutes a public occasion when the hosting family's knowledge and practice of adat can be communally judged.

This is indeed the point of adat Melayu: it is supposed to be a universally applicable code of behaviour, on the basis of which all
may be judged as being well-mannered or ill-mannered. According to this logic, those whose manners fall short of such an etiquette cannot be considered Melayu murni. Since adat is supposed to be framed by Islam, the implication is that in Riau, those who are the most Islamic are also the most knowledgeable about adat. They are thus in a position to judge their less Islamic fellows as vulgar and uncouth.

For example, my Penyengat informants make comments about how truncated and skimpy the weddings of other island communities are, because the people there do not know the proper wedding adat. According to these informants, the most barbaric are the Mantang 'boat people', who are said to practise a ceremony where the bridegroom chases the bride around a busut 'ant-hill' on the beach, then makes off with her in a boat. I have no evidence that this is indeed what happens. Nevertheless, such a description is significant simply as my Penyengat informants' perception of those who are less civilised than themselves.

Apart from my raja informants on Penyengat, however, not all my informants are as favourably disposed towards adat. For example, one of them, a school principal in Tanjungpinang, said that in his opinion, adat Melayu is 'not spontaneous, too rigid' (tidak spontan, terlalu pasti); this induces people to be 'hard-hearted' (hati keras). According to him, this 'hard-hearted' interior is 'not exposed' (tidak terbuka), but is 'hidden' (sembunyi) by the codified manners prescribed by adat.

7.4.3 Bahasa

Let us now turn our attention to bahasa 'language', which is indeed connected to adat. There is a phrase used by my informants that illustrates this connection — budi bahasa. Budi, it seems, is
intention, and bahasa is the expression of this intention. I paraphrase below an informant's explanation of budi bahasa.

Let's suppose you see on the road an old woman struggling with a heavy burden. You wish to help her. That wish is budi. But you cannot just rush forward to relieve her of the burden; she may think you are a robber. You must first greet her, saying: Mak Cik nak ke mana 'Where are you going Auntie?' That is bahasa. Only after you have conversed with her may you then help her with her burden.

This informant went on to remark that although the word budi precedes the word bahasa in the phrase budi bahasa, in acting out budi bahasa, there must first be bahasa before there can be budi. The implied moral of the tale is: even good intentions require proper forms of expression, and the proper forms are prescribed by adat.

Among the examples of adat I have cited are some stock greetings and pleasantries (of which the abovementioned Mak Cik nak ke mana would be one example). The utterance of these adat idioms is generally referred to as bahasa. As my informants explained, bahasa is 'fine speech' (cakapan halus); 'coarse speech' (cakapan kasar) is not bahasa, because it is 'not beautiful' (tak molek), 'not pure' (tak totok). This implies that 'fine', 'beautiful', and 'pure' speech is speech that accords with adat, with the conventions of etiquette. It follows then that bahasa, like adat, is a prescriptive code designed to regulate behaviour — in this case, speech behaviour.

Bahasa may perhaps be compared to 'the Queen's/King's English', a term which refers to 'the English language as correctly written or spoken' (Concise Oxford Dictionary 1976:343). There are three significant points that may be drawn from this comparison. First, there is the idea that there is one particular form of the language that is 'correct'; the corollary to this is that all other forms are either less 'correct' or downright 'incorrect'. Second, there is the idea that there is some figure of authority controlling the
'correctness' of the language; the corollary to this is that those who are not in authority cannot possibly do this. Third, there is the idea that the 'correct' form may be both written and spoken, and that 'correct' writing and 'correct' speech should mirror each other; the corollary to this is that speech which has no written equivalent is 'incorrect'. (See Goody 1977 on the impact of literacy on consciousness.)

Among those informants who identify themselves as murni/totok 'pure', bahasa does indeed seem to be regarded as the one 'correct' form of the language. These murni informants indeed regard themselves as arbiters of the 'correctness' of the language. So if 'correct' English belongs, so to speak, to the British Queen or King, then 'correct' bahasa belongs to the 'pure' Melayu, the Penyengat rajas in particular. Like the Queen's/King's English, bahasa is the raja's Malay. Furthermore, speech that has no written equivalent is regarded by them as 'coarse', 'ugly', and 'impure' — hence not bahasa. There are certain words in Riau vocabulary which they often cite as the markers of non-bahasa; these are words not found in the written language. People who use these 'impure' words are themselves considered 'impure' — hence bukan Melayu murni or Melayu yang tidak totok. As shown in the scalogram above, the line that divides the 'impure' Melayu from the 'pure' Melayu may be drawn between the non-fulfilment and the fulfilment of bahasa as a criterion of 'purity'. After one has fulfilled the other two criteria, one must cross the crucial threshold of bahasa: one must learn to speak as a literate.

The words often cited as the markers of non-bahasa are listed below, together with their bahasa equivalents:
This word-list is relatively short, but nevertheless sufficient as a means of categorising people. Among my murni informants, one need only say orang sana pakai auk 'the people over there use auk', and those people may already be identified as 'impure'. The non-bahasa words listed above are derived from more than one community; my murni informants are quite aware of this heterogeneity. However, for them what counts is that the 'correct' bahasa forms are not being used, but replaced instead by certain 'incorrect' forms, whatever these latter may happen to be. So, while they may be aware, for example, that musak is used in Galang, and kok adèk in Bintan, this difference is relatively insignificant to them; what is important is that both forms differ from the bahasa form and are hence 'incorrect'. Furthermore, there are many other words in Bintan and Galang speech, to use the same two examples, that are similar, if not identical, to the bahasa forms. But these are downplayed; instead the relatively few differences are highlighted.

Of some sociolinguistic significance is my subsequent discovery (in December 1983) that in Lingga, even the tengkus use non-bahasa
forms such as auk and mikak in their everyday speech. They were aware that such forms might be considered 'impure' and consequently felt impelled to justify these words as pertaining to bahasa lama 'old bahasa'. In striking contrast to this, the Penyengat rajas never -- and I state that categorically -- use these non-bahasa forms in their own speech, even though they evidently know about them, to be able to cite them as markers of non-bahasa.

On this basis, we may perhaps speculate that bahasa Riau was an historical creation of the Bugis rajas, who attempted and, to a large extent, succeeded in establishing new standards of 'correctness' in the language, thereby becoming its new arbiters. By 'new' I mean post-1722, in contrast to the 'old' pre-1722 situation in Johor. However, if such was the case, then it may seem strange that the non-bahasa forms are also not found in those texts which purportedly date from the pre-1722 Johor era, such as the Penurunan and Hang Tuah. At least two explanations are possible. First, there may have been indeed a difference between writing and speech, but people then may not have felt the need to unify the two. This seems to be still the case in certain states in the Malay Peninsula -- for example, Kedah and Kelantan -- where people are evidently content to write in one way and speak in another. This implies that the innovation of the Bugis rajas was to speak what was hitherto only written. The second explanation is that the copyists censored out the non-bahasa forms from the early manuscripts. To take the Penurunan as an example, Roolvink (1970:xvi) has pointed out that although the date of 1612 is found in one of the twenty-odd manuscripts of the text,

yet we should bear in mind that almost all these manuscripts are late copies dating from the nineteenth century.

And by then, bahasa Riau would have been well-entrenched.
However, as a criterion of 'purity', the focus of bahasa is not on writing but on speech, the crucial difference being between speech without writing and speech with writing. Writing itself is, by definition, bahasa; there can be no 'impure' writing, in the same way as there can be 'impure', or non-written, speech. Supportive of this argument is my Penyengat informants' attitude towards bahasa Indonesia, the Indonesian national language, which they regard merely as different, not 'impure'. The reason, I suggest, is because Indonesian is written as well as spoken: it is a literate language.

Literacy is of course crucial to Islam, a self-proclaimed religion of the Book. An illiterate individual may be able to learn some religious tenets and prayers by rote, if he or she were to belong to a community that is on the whole literate. There are indeed such individuals in Penyengat and Pangkil, where the communities are largely literate. But in wholly non-literate communities without access to canonical knowledge, what can the practice of Islam possibly mean? I shall attempt to answer that question in Chapter Nine.

The three criteria of 'purity' discussed above illustrate that to be 'pure' is to adhere to a world religion (Islam), to have refined manners (adat), and to be literate (bahasa) — in short, to be civilised. So the term Melayu murni refers not only to a kind of Melayu-ness, but to a kind of civilisation among the civilisations of the world. Unlike the door of 'indigeny', the door of 'purity' leads to Melayu-dom not through local connections, but through cosmopolitan links. In this context, the foreign derivations of the keturunan Bugis and the keturunan Arab may even be construed as an advantage.

In Chapter Five, I argued that though the sultanate claimed the sole legitimate use of physical force, this force was sublimated by various means. In this chapter, we see the contents of this
sublimation in the form of 'purity' -- that is, a moral code of
behaviour whereby all may be judged as 'pure' or 'impure'. Elias'
(1978) discussion of 'the civilising process' is of relevance to our
analysis. His description (ibid.:50) of the bourgeoisie in
eighteenth-century France seems applicable to the Melayu murni in
present-day Riau:

They see themselves as bearers of an existing or finished
civilisation to others, as standard-bearers of expanding
civilisation. Of the whole preceding process of
civilisation nothing remains in their consciousness except a
vague residue. Its outcome is taken simply as an expression
of their own higher gifts... And the consciousness of
their own superiority, the consciousness of this
'civilisation'...serves those...[who]...have become colonial
conquerors, and therefore a kind of upper class...as a
justification of their rule.

7.5 The 'Pure' and the 'Impure'

If it is the case that the Penyengat rajas see themselves as the
standard-bearers of Melayu civilisation, then who are the uncivilised
people who fall short of such a standard? Interestingly, in such a
context, the focus is not on non-Melayu people such as the Javanese,
Chinese or Europeans. Instead, the focus is on those who are Melayu
but 'impure' -- that is, the Melayu asli who are bukan Melayu murni.
As mentioned above, my raja informants identify the 'impure Melayu' as
orang kerahan. Indeed in their discourse, derajat translates into
Melayu-ness in a way that may be depicted thus:
DERAJAT

orang bangsawan: 'aristocrats'
raja, tengku
tuan said

orang merdeka: 'free people'
encik datuk
encik keturunan
orang biasa

orang kerahan: 'vassals'
keturunan Bintan
hamba raja

orang hamba: 'slaves'
hamba orang

SUKU MELAYU

Melayu murni
type 3

Melayu murni
type 3

bukan Melayu murni
type 2

bukan Melayu murni
type 1, type 0

non-existent at present

Figure 9 Derajat and Suku Melayu

So rank translates into type, at least from the perspective of those who consider themselves murni. As shown in Chapter Four, these ranks pertain to a defunct sultanate, and as such, are not experienced in themselves. A keturunan raja living in the present is not experiencing the life led by rajas in zaman sultan; indeed in many cases, there is hardly any difference in the physical quality of life led by, say, a keturunan raja and a keturunan hamba raja. There is, after all, no sultan, no court, no Riau-Lingga sultanate, no state revenue, no stipend for aristocrats, no state employees, no warriors, and no slaves. In other words, the material basis of rank is gone. Nevertheless, the sultanate is still extant as an ideology which enables the hierarchisation of Self and Other, at least for some of my informants.

In the context of an institutionally extinct sultanate, how is one to identify people as pertaining to the different derajat, since the aristocrats no longer rule, the people in the middle no longer
mediate, and the vassals no longer serve? This is where toponymic identification figures importantly as a means of fixing the identity of individuals in relation to particular places in Riau. As a result, people are ranked in terms of the territorial connotations of their toponym. With reference to the examples given above, Penyengat was the yamtuan muda's capital in zaman sultan; it carries the connotation of being the place of the rajas. Its inhabitants, the orang Penyengat, are thereby associated with the derajat of raja, which in turn translates into Melayu murni. In contrast, Galang was the area of the Galang pirates during zaman sultan, who belonged to the derajat of hamba raja, albeit rebelliously so. The present-day inhabitants of the area, the orang Galang, are thereby associated with that derajat, which in turn translates into bukan Melayu murni. So the hierarchy of derajat derived from zaman sultan is being realised in the present through territoriality, whereby people are identified toponymically in terms of places, and places are ranked vis-a-vis each other.

Consequently, the translation of derajat into Melayu-ness is extended to a hierarchisation of local communities, and thereby of people as members of these communities. From the perspective of my informants who identify themselves as orang Penyengat 'Penyengat people', the local communities in their immediate vicinity may be hierarchised thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUKU MELAYU</th>
<th>SOME INSTANTIATING LOCAL COMMUNITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Melayu murni type 3</td>
<td>Penyengat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bukan Melayu murni type 2</td>
<td>Pangkil, Pengujan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bukan Melayu murni type 1</td>
<td>Bintan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bukan Melayu murni type 0</td>
<td>Tembeling, Dompak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Galang</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10  A Hierarchisation of Some Local Communities
It is significant that Tanjungpinang, which is just opposite Penyengat, is not included in this hierarchy. As the former Dutch base, and as the current capital of the Indonesian 'district' (kabupaten) and 'sub-district' (kecamatan), it is not regarded by my Penyengat informants as a Melayu locality. On the contrary, to call someone an orang Tanjungpinang is to indicate that she or he is not Melayu at all, but of some foreign origin outside Riau. In other words, my Penyengat informants do not view Tanjungpinang as part of Melayu-dom such as it is instantiated in present-day Riau. (The places listed above do not represents the full extent of Riau; see Chapter Two on the territorial extent of Riau.) Interestingly, some non-Melayu Indonesians in Tanjungpinang, for example, Javanese, have been known to say that they regard the Melayu of Riau as 'fanatics' (fanatik) — that is, people living in a reality of their own.

If it is the case that Melayu-dom in present-day Riau is founded upon the bygone sultanate of the past, then what is the relevance of the three criteria of 'purity' — namely, Islam, adat, and bahasa? Is it not possible for someone associated with a low derajat to fulfill these criteria and thereby achieve 'purity'? After all, if 'purity' is not a congenitally derived identity but a moral condition derived from certain actions, then it is not an ascribed state but an achieved state. Yet to identify people in terms of territorial connotations is surely ascription. How is this contradiction to be resolved?

The answer, I suggest, may be described as the ascription of actions to Self and Other. In other words, people are judged on the basis not of what they actually do, but of what one perceives them as doing. So what is matched against the criteria of 'purity' are not necessarily actual actions, but only perceived actions. For example, although my Penyengat informants perceive themselves as fulfilling all the three criteria, there are of course all kinds of actions in their
everyday life which do not accord with Islam, adat and bahasa. These actions are nevertheless ignored as irrelevant and therefore not affecting the 'purity' of the Penyengat people. In contrast, the actions ascribed to the 'impure Melayu' are never good enough to fulfill the criteria of 'purity', regardless of what their actual actions may be. We shall see in the following chapters what some of these actions are and how the ascription of actions to others can lead to witchcraft accusations.

It must be realised that the Melayu types ranging from 'impure' to 'pure' exist only in the eye of the beholder. That is to say, if one is not concerned with categorising people in this way, then there would not be any such differentiation. So these should be understood primarily as categories in my informants' consciousness rather than as objective differences that are simply just so. However, categories of consciousness are socially real, even if only as ideology and not necessarily as institution.

Although the ideology of 'purity' emanates from the vantage point of the Penyengat rajas, as we have seen above, it is not limited to them alone. Quite understandably, it is shared by others who would qualify as Melayu murni -- for example, the people of Pangkil and Pengujan. Not only that, even the bukan Melayu murni, the 'impure' ones, can come to hold this view.23

Indeed, I have some informants who would view themselves from this murni perspective, even though in so doing, they would be adjudging themselves as 'impure'. This implies that they see themselves as an Other in relation to the Self of the Melayu murni, through a process of vicarious transference — a sort of 'If I were murni, which I know that I am not, this is how I would view me.' The murni perspective can thus become a dominant ideology subverting the
consciousness even of the disadvantaged. It is in this sense that the gradation of Melayu-ness may be understood as a morality, an ideology of universally applicable values which can be adopted by all, including those adjudged 'impure'. We shall see in the following chapters why some people are willing to trade their self-respect for an Other-derived ideology, in which they may be evaluated as inferior.

But as mentioned above, it is also possible for people to repudiate such Other-given rules. Thus, for example, the schoolmaster in Tanjungpinang who was critical of adat Melayu may be regarded as someone unwilling to fulfill this criterion and hence uninterested in the translation of derajat into a particular standard of 'purity'. However, this does not mean that he is forsaking Melayu-ness altogether. He is, after all, a Melayu asli with no foreign keturunan that needs to be offset by self-righteous 'purity'. Indeed, he was quite rude in his comments about the rajas, saying for instance:

Kalau raja, walaupun darahnya murni, tapi otaknya kalah.

(As for the rajas, even though their blood may be pure, their brains are inferior.)
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

1. See, for example, Koentjaraningrat (1975) on some of the sukus of Indonesia.

2. The intertwining between Minangkabau and Melayu that my informants mentioned was a reference to at least two episodes in sejarah Melayu -- namely, the founding of Melayu kingship and the involvement between Johor and Siak. The myth of kingship in the Penurunan tells of how the three Indic princes each went his own way, each becoming the ruler of a different country.

The eldest of the princes was taken by the people of Andelas to their country and was made Raja of Menangkabau....

(Brown 1970:15).

After the 1699 assassination, this myth seems to have been significant, for the pretender to the throne, Raja Kecik who claimed to be the posthumous son of Sultan Mahmud III, had the support of the Minangkabau court at Pagar Ruyung. Since Sultan Mahmud III was the last descendant of the line that had begun with the three Indic princes on Bukit Si-Guntang, the implication is that it was the duty of the Minangkabau royal house, as a collateral line, to continue the original Melayu line of kingship by sponsoring the assassinated sultan's posthumous son. After Raja Kecik was defeated by the Bugis adventurers, he founded his own kingdom of Siak. (See Andaya 1975:250-273.)

3. Unfortunately, at the time I was there -- in the early part of 1980 -- it was not the season for the 'boat people' to visit the Galang area; they were said to have gone to Pulau Buluh in the Bulang area. So I did not have the opportunity of witnessing such an exchange of question and answer.

4. When addressing someone of the older generation, it is polite to call them pak + name (for males) and mak + name (for females). The use of these familial terms pak 'father' and mak 'mother' would imply that the interaction between the two parties is not between strangers but between kin. Indeed, in accordance with this logic, it is even more polite to address someone of the older generation as pak + birth-order name or mak + birth-order name. As one of my informants instructed me, when one addresses an older person in this way, that person would be pleased; and he or she would say, 'What a knowledgeable child this is!' The implication is that only someone intimate would know about such one's birth order within the family. (See note 6 in Chapter Eight on birth-order names.) The use of these kin terms extends also to those of one's generation -- for example, abang 'older brother', kakak 'older sister', and adik 'younger sibling'.

5. This may be compared to the English usage of the word 'body' as meaning 'human being, person' -- for example, 'good sort of body', 'anybody', 'a home body'. (See the Concise Oxford Dictionary 1976:108.)

6. As Wilkinson (1959:246) has explained the word dagang:
foreign; alien. Usually of metics or resident aliens, = anak dagang or orang dagang; also of imports of foreign merchandise (dagang, dagangan). Etymologically, not necessarily of foreign traders.... But since foreigners and foreign things are associated usually with trade dagang has the secondary meanings of (i) merchandise...; and (ii) the merchant himself. Still, the root-meaning is independent of trade; even a mystic is expected to berdagang, i.e. to travel, so as to get over his home-ties.

7. See notes 21 and 32 in Chapter Two.

8. Wilkinson (1959:27) explains the words anak and peranakan thus:

Child; young (of animal); native (of a country); one (of a party, set or series); important component part; smaller of two.... Peranakan (born, native).... For anak = 'native', cf. anak Melayu (Malay), anak Minangkabau (Minangkabau Malay). Anak implies Malay blood; peranakan Melayu means 'born in Malaya', especially of foreigners. Jawi peranakan: Malay of Indian descent.

9. Wilkinson (1959) refers to this text as the Hikayat Bugis.

10. This particular informant is interesting in that she belongs to an achieved gender, not an ascribed gender. What I mean by this is that she was born biologically male, rejected her ascribed gender of being male, and decided to become socially female, thereby achieving a different gender identity from her biological sex. She dresses in female clothes and identifies herself as a woman to the extent of adopting and bringing up a child who calls her mak 'mother'. Becoming female to such an extent may have helped her in coming to terms with her ancestry from pirates' captives. Since keturunan is both patrilineal and ascriptive, one may expect males who have remained males to be more concerned about this matter, as indeed they seem to be.

There are enough individuals in Riau who want to move out of their ascribed gender to an achieved one, to render this phenomenon familiar and, at least to some extent, socially acceptable. However, there seem to be more males who want to become females than vice-versa. This imbalance may perhaps be explained thus. Since males generally have greater personal autonomy than females, it may be the case that males who want to change their gender have more opportunities to express such a desire, whereas females who harbour a similar wish in the opposite direction would have to suppress themselves. Such an unequal situation is evident in my informants' idiomatic usages. Males who express a desire to become female are called pondan, a word that seems to have no other meaning than 'effeminate male'. A female who expresses a wish to become male is, however, called budak, a term which generally means 'prepubertal child'. So whereas the former's desire is at least recognised, even if disapproved of, the latter's wish is not even recognised as such.

11. The Teochiu people are speakers of a Southern Min dialect from Guangdong Province in China. For further details of the Chinese in Riau, see Ng (1976). See Trocki (1979:90-91) on the kangkar in Johor, which was derived from the earlier cultivation system in Riau.
12. Wilkinson (1959:549) explains the word kembar thus:

Forming a match or a pair. Not of two who supplement one
another, e.g. bride and bridegroom; but of mere equality
or similarity, e.g. of twin-children (anak kembar) or a
twin-brother (saudara sa-kembar...) or a worthy foe.

13. The Guttman scalogram 'is designed to ensure that there is only
one (unique) combination of responses for each different scale
score.... [It] is cumulative in the sense that the combination
of responses required to make a particular score includes the
responses to all questions required to make the next lower score,
plus the response to one additional question, in a stepwise
fashion' (Bailey 1982:366).

14. Farah (1970:103-104) explains the dua kalimah syahadat 'two
statements of the testimonial creed' thus:

The one prerequisite for becoming a Muslim is to profess
the shahadah (open testimony): la ilaha illa'l-Lah...
("there is no god but God").... The open profession of
belief in one God...is accompanied by the second
important pronouncement in the shahadah: wa Muhammadan
rasul al-Lah... ("and Muhammad is the messenger of God").
By uttering the first part of the shahadah one becomes a
muslim, submitter to God; but when he pronounces the
second part of the same, he becomes a Muslim, an adherent
to the religion of Islam.

15. As stated by Muhammad Ali (1973:105):

The dividing line between a Muslim and a kafir, or
between a believer and an unbeliever, is confession of
the Unity of God and the prophethood of Muhammad — La
ilaha ill-Allah Muhammad-un Rasulu-llah. A man becomes a
Muslim or a believer by making this confession and as
long as he does not renounce his faith in it, he remains
a Muslim or a believer technically, in spite of any
opinion he may hold on any religious question, or any
evil which he may commit; and a man who does not make
this confession is a non-Muslim or unbeliever
technically, in spite of any good that he may do.


Every child that is born conforms to fitra...and it is
his parents who make him a Jew or a Christian or a
Magian.

Fitra may be translated as 'primordial nature' (Seyyed Hossein

17. According to Wilkinson (1959:5),

adat covers:

(i) a man's personal habits...;
(ii) the ways of the world...,
(iii) the conventions of society which decide what is
    proper...or rude...;
the operation of natural laws...;
rules governing games or sports...;
the laws of war...;
fines, fees and penalties fixed by custom...;
common law or customary law in general, whether local... or as divided by Malay jurists into:
the law of the autocratic sultanates (adat temenggong)...; and
the democratic adat perpateh or adat lembaga best known as the patriarchal law of Minangkabau.
The term adat does not in its strict sense cover religious law (shara', hukum), statute-law (undang-undang), conventions (muafakat) or European law. In theory, customary law and religious law were equally in force...; in practice they often overlapped...;
loosely, all law....

18. On the Malay Peninsula, the arbitration of adat was evidently also the prerogative of the ruler; see Hooker (1970;1972).

19. These detailed prescriptions for everyday behaviour are not without some Islamic foundations. For example, salam is a word 'of frequent occurrence in the Kor'an as a salutation... Salam 'alaikum 'peace be with you' is found... at the beginning of a message which the Prophet has to deliver to the believers....' (Encyclopaedia of Islam 1934:IV,89).

As shown in the text, among my informants, the word salam is extended in usage to apply to the hand-clasp. This mode of greeting is, however, generally limited to those categories of people who are Islamically permitted to touch each other. In other words, the hand-claps is supposed to be used only in same-gender interactions and in interactions between people who are muhrim — that is, Islamically unmarriageable. [The Arabic word muhrim means 'that is which is forbidden' (Wehr 1976:172).] (See Khadduri 1961:169-170 on the muhrim relationships.) So this is an instance of adat being framed by Islam. Interestingly, when my Muslim informants interact with non-Muslims, they may not observe the Islamic injunction against touching a non-muhrim. So they would treat the salam hand-clasp as a form of the Western hand-shake.

Other connections between adat and Islam may be discerned, for example, in the 'manners for eating' that are prescribed in the Mishkat-Ul-Masabih (a compilation of al-hadis 'sayings of the Prophet'). (See Fazlul Karim 1939:119-166.)

20. Such a development may be discerned, for example, in the literary output of Raja Ali Haji (c.1809–c.1870), who was the leading Penyengat writer of the period. (See Andaya and Matheson 1979.) He compiled the first known grammar in Malay of the language, the Bustan al-Katibin 'Garden of Writers', at the behest of his cousin Yamtuan Muda Raja Ali.

Somewhat later, Raja Ali Haji commenced a dictionary of Malay usage, the Kitab Pengetahuan Bahasa (Knowledge of Language), designed to guide those interested in improving their understanding of language, religion and correct behaviour. Unfortunately, this work was never
completed, but it stands as evidence of Raja Ali Haji's desire to help his fellow men who wished to lead a righteous life and act according to Malay tradition [sic].

(Andaya and Matheson 1979:113).

The [sic] is added because it seems to me that there is no evidence that this so-called 'Malay tradition' was anything but Bugis inspired. In the Kitab, Raja Ali Haji advocated that the 'language' (bahasa) should be modelled on Arabic syntax, and that it should be purged of all non-Arabic accretions, the importance of Arabic being that it was 'the chosen vehicle of God's ultimate message' (Andaya and Matheson 1979:122). As Andaya and Matheson (1979:110) have noted:

"...It is remarkable that the bulk of the literature coming from Riau during this period was written or sponsored not by the Malay Sultan and court on Lingga, but by members of the Bugis Yamtuan Muda family and those closely associated with it.

21. As stated in the Quran:

Those to whom We have sent the Book study it as it should be studied: they are the ones that believe therein: those who reject faith therein, -- the loss is their own.


22. Elias notes (1978:xvi) that the monopolisation of force by any state structure may be understood as the centralisation of social interconnections such that 'the whole apparatus which shapes the individual, the mode of operations of the social demands and prohibitions which mold his social makeup, and above all the kinds of fear that play a part in his life are decisively changed.'

23. See Appendix 9 for a comparison with the situation in Malaysia.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE SOCIAL PHANTASY SYSTEM:

CENTRIPETALISM AND CENTRIFUGALISM IN SELF-OTHER RELATIONS

8.1 Centripetal Transitivity and Centrifugal Disjunction

8.2 The 'Janus Effect'

8.3 The Imagined Community

8.4 The Social Phantasy System

8.5 Siblingship and the Axiom of Amity

8.6 Recruitment through Adoption
8.1 Centripetal Transitivity and Centrifugal Disjunction

In Chapter Seven, we discussed two doors to Melayu-dom — 'indigeny' and 'purity'. As shown in the discussion above, the relative sizes of these two doors differ. The door of 'indigeny' merely allows one to become a locally defined Melayu person belonging to a particular place in Riau. In contrast, the door of 'purity' is much broader: it allows one to become a civilised Melayu person with cosmopolitan links to the wider world.

Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter Seven, there is a certain implied morality in the latter: 'purity' is supposed to be a natural and hence desirable state of being, to which all should aspire. According to this logic, those who are not interested in doing so would be considered somewhat un-natural. Thus the terms Melayu murni and bukan Melayu murni refer not to static categories, but to a process of transitivity whereby an individual is supposed to transit from 'impurity' to 'purity'. Following Benjamin (1984:41), I use the term 'transitivity' to refer to 'the condition or process whereby something passes from one domain to another, especially when those domains are thought of as source to goal.' In the Melayu context, the 'something' which passes from source to goal is, I suggest, the orientation of the people involved in this process. This passing from an 'impure' state as source to a 'pure' state as goal implies a unidirectionality that may be described as centripetal. Let me explain this in the following way.

As shown above, my Penyengat informants consider themselves Melayu murni, in contrast to the bukan Melayu murni who they defined as orang kerahan 'people of the corvee'. Such a definition is significant in this context. In Chapter Five, I suggested that the idea of kerahan implies the integration of political centre and
political periphery within Riau. To be dikerah was to be summoned from the political periphery where one normally lives, to go to the political centre to perform a specific duty for those at the centre. So if kerahan implies political integration, then a further implication is that this integration was effected through centripetal movement from periphery to centre.

As pointed out in Chapter Seven, kerahan is an extinct practice; the labelling of present-day people as orang kerahan should thus be understood not as a statement of historical veracity, but as a motivated form of mythical significance. The key word is 'motivation'. When the Penyengat rajas refer to present-day people as orang kerahan, they are setting up a particular analogy between past and present, in order to express a particular motivation. They are presenting a motivated form wherein the bukan Melayu murni are related to the Melayu murni, as the orang kerahan were related to the rulers in zaman sultan.

As evidence of this motivation, let me cite a conversation between two Penyengat rajas which took place in my presence. Raja A told Raja B that there was a proposal from the provincial government in Pekanbaru for the establishment of an additional sekolah menengah pertama (lengkap) 'junior secondary school (fully equipped)' in Kecamatan Bintan Selatan 'The Southern Bintan District.' As noted in Chapter Two, Penyengat is itself located in this district, with Tanjungpinang as its administrative centre. Raja B immediately suggested that they should try and lobby the district government at Tanjungpinang for the new school to be built on Penyengat. This seemed to be what Raja A had in mind himself, for he readily agreed and said that with such a school on Penyengat, the surrounding kepenghuluan 'headman-doms' such as Pangkil, Pengujan, Cata, Karas, and Bintan would be, to translate his words, 'orientated towards here'
The two rajas then discussed how to go about lobbying the district government. One raja proposed going to the surrounding kepenghuluan to get the support of the respective penghulu 'headmen' before approaching the district government. The other raja thought that this was a good idea, adding that the penghulu could go to Tanjungpinang to tell the district government that more children from their respective kepenghuluan would attend the new school if it were located in Penyengat rather than in Tanjungpinang, because these children could stay with 'family' in Penyengat. The two rajas went on to discuss the various penghulu, in terms of their allegiance to Penyengat. The penghulu of Pangkil was said to be all right, because he was orang kita 'one of us' (being himself a raja of Penyengat descent). The penghulu of Pengujan had a son married to a Penyengat raja and was thus considered to be amenable to persuasion. The penghulus of Cata and Bintan were thought likely to follow majority opinion. The penghulu singled out as the one likely to be uncooperative was the penghulu of Karas.

The conversation took place in April 1980; at the time of writing this (in June 1985) there is still no 'junior secondary school' on Penyengat, though for what reasons I do not know. But that is not the point. The significance of the conversation reported above lies not in the mere building of a new school, but more crucially, in the explicitly expressed motivation to attract the orientation of the surrounding kepenghuluan towards Penyengat. The two rajas' assessment of the various penghulus' relative degree of allegiance to Penyengat is telling indeed.

As I have shown in Chapter Six, during zaman sultan, Pangkil and Pengujan were evidently the outer 'arms' of the rulers at Penyengat. And as mentioned in Chapter Five, the Bintan people were one of the
last sukus to have continued coming to Penyengat for the performance of kerahan. Cata is located on the island of Rempang. (See Map 4.) Never having been there myself, I do not know why the penghulu of Cata should be perceived as being amenable to the persuasions of the Penyengat rajas. But the penghulu of Pangkil, who is indeed a raja from Penyengat, did once tell me that the penghulu of Cata was his friend. As for the penghulu of Karas, he is of course in charge of a major part of the Galang area. And as we have seen above, the Galang people have a long tradition of resistance against Penyengat rule.

The contradistinction between the terms Melayu murni and the orang kerahan is perhaps more understandable at this point. The former see themselves as located at the centre, in relation to which the latter are peripheral. The present-day orang kerahan are thus so-called, not because they still perform corvee, but because, as in zaman sultan, their centripetal orientation is still desired by those at the centre. Indeed, without such centripetal orientation, there is effectively no centre, in which case Penyengat would simply be a small insignificant island among the numerous islands of Riau. To identify oneself as central, others must be identified as peripheral.

So whereas Penyengat is geographically only one island among many others, in ideological terms it presents itself as a supra-territorial centre, located on a higher level than the other places in Riau. As I have shown above, such an ideological presentation derives primarily from the perspective of the Penyengat rajas. The centripetal orientation of those in the periphery is thus merely attributed to them as a desideratum on the part of the rajas. But are those in the periphery willing to be centripetally orientated in this way? To answer this, let us consider the opposite orientation.
As I have shown in Chapter Seven, through the door of 'indgeny' people can become Melayu asli by belonging to a particular place in Riau. The crucial difference in this case is between those who belong as indigenes and those who arrive as newcomers. As mentioned above, the logic of 'indgeny' implies the superiority of the former in the local context. This further implies an inward orientation whereby one's Melayu-ness can be justified by belonging to the place where one lives.

For example, a Karas informant said to me:

Pendatang baru ada Bugis ada Flores; yang asli hanya Melayu Galang.
(The recent newcomers include Bugis and Florese; the indigenes consist only of the Melayu Galang.)

As I have shown in Chapter Seven, there is a distinction in the Galang area between the descendants of the original Galang pirates and those of the captives. In the context of the quotation above, however, that was not the distinction my informant wanted to highlight; she merely wanted to tell me that there are recent newcomers to the area who do not belong as indigenes. In this case, her usage of the word pendatang baru 'recent newcomer' is not synonymous with the term Melayu dagang 'foreign Melayu', as discussed in Chapter Seven. For example, if a person who may be identified as Melayu Temiang were to settle in the Galang area, she or he would be regarded not as a Melayu dagang, but as a pendatang whose place of origin is Temiang. But if a Penyengat person were to settle in the same area, he or she would be regarded not only as a pendatang but also as a Melayu dagang whose antecedents derive from outside Riau altogether. So if a pendatang is considered alien to Galang, then a Melayu dagang in Galang would seem to be doubly alien. The connotations of these terms thus imply that what my Galang informants are concerned about is the inclusion of
certain people as insiders and the exclusion of others as aliens.

From the perspective of the Penyengat rajas, such an inward orientation may be interpreted as centrifugal, a movement away from the centre to the periphery. In this connection, it is perhaps relevant to describe what was said to me by Raja X, who is the one Penyengat raja who has settled in Karas. He declared that Melayu is a Javanese word meaning lari 'to run'; therefore he was of the opinion that the orang Melayu were orang yang lari 'people who ran away'. To support his statement, he cited a Chinese term commonly used by the Hokkien and Teochiu people in Riau to refer to the natives of the area: this is the term hoan kia^n, which my informant translated as meaning orang yang takut 'frightened people'. The inference he drew from this is that the Melayu ran away because they were frightened. He then went on to say:

The newcomers are better off economically than those who are native to this place, those who are Melayu. They progress, we stagnate. The Flores, Sumba, Java, or Bugis people — they are all courageous. But the characteristics of the Melayu are selfishness, cruelty, jealousy, and envious hatred.

(My translation).

I remember being surprised at the time by these spontaneously uttered statements, and what is more, the tonal intensity of the utterance. For example, the words hasad dengki 'jealousy and envious hatred' were pronounced more than once. Now from hindsight, I think I understand the significance of these statements. As a Penyengat raja in Karas, this informant was, in Galang terms, both pendatang 'newcomer' and dagang 'foreigner'. His statements imply that his rebuttal to such an identification is to re-define the Melayu as frightened runaways who are selfish, cruel, jealous, and enviously malicious. So his further implication is: who wants to be Melayu anyhow? Indeed, this informant did seem to speak of the Melayu as
though he were not one himself. Nevertheless, at another point in the conversation, he included himself as Melayu, which suggests that despite his attempted rebuttal, his own identity has remained ambiguous to himself.

This raja's peers in Penyengat also regard his identity as ambiguous. As one of them put it,

That Karas island is an island that pulls people there. Like Raja X, for example, he was pulled there, to the extent that he's married a Galang person.  

(My translation).

Significantly, Raja X himself denies that his wife is an orang Galang, saying that she is keturunan orang Daik 'of Daik descent', and that her ancestors were encik-encik who went to Karas during zaman sultan. He explained encik-encik to me as an istilah Riau untuk pegawai-pegawai sultan 'a Riau term for the sultan's retainers', a statement which indicated that he was well aware of the nuances of derajat. I should perhaps point out that it is by no means certain whether Raja X is in Karas wholly voluntarily; apparently he was first posted there more than ten years ago by the Indonesian district government to be headmaster of the local school, a post which he still holds.

Before we leave Raja X, some comment should be made about his etymologising. Raja X's mention of the Chinese term hoan kiaⁿ derives from a southern Min word 畏畏 which may be literally translated as 'barbarian children'. The term thus has a derogatory connotation which Raja X seems to have caught. However, he has confused kiaⁿ 'children' with kiaⁿ 'to be frightened'. Raja X's mistake is one that no native speaker of southern Min is likely to make, since hoan kiaⁿ meaning 'barbarian frightened' is not only non-existent, but not grammatical. This suggests that Raja X's etymologising of hoan kiaⁿ is derived not from any Chinese informant, but from his own
effort to set up a motivated form — that is, a myth.

I have met with such folk-etymologising on several other occasions, the most notable of which was when a Javanese settler in Seking said that the Melayu are orang Jawa yang lari 'Java people who ran away' and that tanah Melayu 'Melayu-land' is where they have run to. In Javanese the root form layu does mean 'running pace' (Horne 1974:324). But there is no evidence that the Malay word 'Melayu' is derived from this source.

An alternative explanation of the word melayu came from an aristocrat informant. Speaking to me in English, he translated it as meaning 'humble'. He said that in the Javanese language, melayukan diri means 'to humble yourself'. He went on to say: Melayu people must thus sembah 'give obeisance' to somebody, even if it is ridiculous, theatrical; they must do it because that is their identity. But as a Malay phrase, melayukan diri would mean 'to make oneself Melayu'. I have found no evidence that it means 'humble yourself' in the Javanese language. Nevertheless, regardless of my informant's etymological accuracy, the point he was making was that the essence of Melayu identity is a centripetal orientation towards some higher authority.

At this point of the discussion, we can perhaps abstract the patterns of two motivated forms, one derived from the Penyengat point of view, and the other from the Galang point of view.
THE PENYENGAT VIEW:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>We</th>
<th>centripetal transitivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Penyengat rajas at the centre | They
| Galang people plus a plurality of others at the periphery |

THE GALANG VIEW:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>We</th>
<th>centrifugal disjunction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Galang people as insiders | They
| Penyengat people plus a plurality of other outsiders |

Figure 11 Centripetal Transitivity and Centrifugal Disjunction

Whereas the Penyengat rajas are evidently concerned with drawing the centripetal orientation of others towards themselves, the Galang people seem to be concerned with the disjunction between insider and outsider so that they can disconnect themselves from Penyengat as a centre. The two views are thus diametrically opposed. In the rest of this chapter I shall be focussing on the polarity between these two views, with the implication that there are other views intermediate between these two extremes.

As pointed out above, from a Penyengat perspective, the Galang orientation may be considered as centrifugal and hence a reversal of the right direction of transitivity. Centrifugalism is thus a reversed transitivity whereby orientation moves, wrongly, from goal to source. But source and goal are figures that emerge in the eye of the beholder. As mentioned above, Penyengat is geographically only one small island in the archipelago; it is only in ideological terms that it may be perceived as a supra-territorial centre surrounded by its
terриториal periphery. The Galang area is much bigger than Penyengat alone. As mentioned in Chapter One, it includes the relatively large islands of Setokok, Rempang, Galang Senyantung, Galang Baru, Nguan, Abang, and Karas, as well as the many small islands nearby. (See Map 4.) There is no a priori reason why the Galang area or one of its islands cannot also constitute the goal of centripetal orientation. Such a logical possibility would be quite acceptable to a disinterested observer.

To interested actors such as the Penyengat rajas, however, this possibility poses a cognitive threat. If one's self is already located at what one has identified as the goal of centripetal orientation, to re-label this 'goal' as 'source' would be to re-locate oneself from goal to source. So if Penyengat were to be re-labelled as 'source' and Galang as 'goal', the implication would be that the Penyengat rajas should be centripetally orientated towards Galang. Galang would thereby become the supra-territorial centre, and Penyengat would become merely part of its territorial periphery. Such a reversal would have serious consequences indeed, for we should then be talking about the 'Galang rajas' and the 'suku Penyengat'! The logical possibility of such reversals is thus a danger to be socially guarded against by those who see themselves located at the goal. Indeed, with regards to Raja X of Karas, his peers on Penyengat seem wary of him for precisely this reason: they fear that he has been turned about 'to the extent that he's married a Galang person', an accusation which he denies.

There is a moral implication in this evaluation of directionality as right or wrong. It is but one step further to identify right as good and wrong as bad. So a source-to-goal directionality may be evaluated as right and good, and a goal-to-source directionality may be evaluated as wrong and bad. Morality can thus be used as a
psychological inducement to maintain the desired directionality. Furthermore, good can be identified as safe, and bad as dangerous. So those of the periphery who accept such a mode of evaluation would have their choice made for them, if they were to accept such a mode of evaluation: their only logical choice of orientation would be centripetal transitivity as prescribed by the centre.

This would be an impellent mode of morality, for it would impel the orientation of those at the periphery towards the centre, thereby generating the following patterns of transitivity:

periphery \[\rightarrow\] centre
source \[\rightarrow\] goal
'impure' \[\rightarrow\] 'pure'
undesired \[\rightarrow\] desired.

Figure 12 Patterns of Transitivity

For those located at the periphery, this would be an Other-centred morality, whereby the existing condition of Self at source would be considered intrinsically inferior and therefore to be despised. For those at the centre, this would be a Self-centred morality, whereby the existing condition of Self at goal would be considered intrinsically superior and therefore to be valued. What mitigates this Self-centredness would be a larger context wherein those at the centre would themselves be peripheral to another, higher, centre. I suggest that it is Islam as a world religion that provides this larger context; I shall discuss this in Chapter Nine.

But it is also possible for those at the periphery to repudiate this Other-centred morality, establishing instead a morality that is derived from their own perspective. The Galang differentiation between 'indigene' and 'newcomer' may be considered a moral evaluation too, for it implies that 'indigeny' is superior and hence to be
valued, whereas alien-ness is inferior and hence to be despised. This would be an expellent mode of morality concerned with expelling from one's orientation elements of Other-centredness focussed elsewhere. Self is thus located in the local context which is both source and goal. So like the impellent mode of morality for those at the centre, this too is a Self-centred morality, but with the crucial difference that it does not seek to impel the orientation of others towards Self.

In other words, unlike the Penyengat rajas, the Galang indigenes are not interested in trying to attract the centripetal orientation of outsiders. Whereas centre and periphery may be integrated through centripetal transitivity from the latter towards the former, centrifugal disjunction does not integrate the local context with any other place, either as centre or periphery: it merely marks out the local context from the rest of the world.

So what we have is an opposition of moralities -- an impellent mode versus an expellent mode. But this is not an equally pitted opposition, for the odds are weighted against centrifugal disjunction. By turning inwards upon itself as a self-contained whole, Galang merely resists the pull of Penyengat; it does not compete with Penyengat as an alternative centre of Melayu-dom in Riau. My Galang informants offer no alternative scheme that would integrate the different local communities in Riau into a supra-territorial whole. It is precisely this that is the great strength of the Penyengat view: it offers the vision of a supra-territorial Melayu-dom, even if that is a vision very much biased in favour of Penyengat itself. Whereas the Galang people can merely talk about Melayu-ness in terms of separate local contexts -- for example, in terms of the Melayu Galang, the Melayu Temiang, the Melayu Bintan, and so on -- the Penyengat people can talk about Melayu-ness at a higher, more inclusive level. Consequently, the latter are the ones providing the challenge of
appropriation, in response to which the appropriated can only choose whether to submit willingly, accept grudgingly, evade elusively, or resist defensively.

It is in this supra-territorial context that the rear-view image of zaman sultan is crucial. Without that image, all those who identify as Melayu in Riau would merely be, as my informants put it, penduduk di pelusuk-pelusuk 'inhabitants in remote corners'. Without that image, there would be no integrating ideology to hold together the far-flung local communities as one Melayu whole.

8.2 The 'Janus Effect'

However, the Penyengat vision of Melayu unity and the Galang view of Melayu localism must both be considered in the context of Indonesia. After all, both the Penyengat rajas and the Galang people are Indonesian citizens. Their alternative views of Melayu-ness are framed by the larger context of Indonesian politics. Their position in that context is perhaps not unlike that of other Outer Islanders, such as the Minangkabau in West Sumatra. Kahn (1982:97), for example, notes:

...In the period of the regional rebellions in the late 1950s the solidarity of the Minangkabau was a constant theme of discourse. ...solidarity was directed against the cultural domination of the Javanese, as well as Javanese economic and political hegemony. In contrast to this it was the splits within Minangkabau, rather than ethnic solidarity, which received greater emphasis in the period leading up to the abortive communist uprisings of mid-1920s.

But in contrast to Kahn's observations of Minangkabau ethnicity, my observations of the situation in Riau indicate that both solidarity and internal differentiation co-exist at the same time. On the one hand, the Penyengat view offers a vision of Melayu unity through the integration of centre and periphery. On the other hand, the
alternative view of Melayu-ness as 'indigeny' differentiates the Suku Melayu qua indigenes of particular places in Riau. How is this co-existence of solidarity and internal differentiation to be explained?

What Koestler (1967:65) has to say about 'parts' and 'wholes' is relevant to our discussion:

A 'part', as we generally use the word, means something fragmentary and incomplete, which by itself would have no legitimate existence. On the other hand, a 'whole' is considered something complete in itself which needs no further explanation. But 'wholes' and 'parts' in this absolute sense just do not exist anywhere, either in the domain of living organisms or of social organisations. What we find are intermediary structures on a series of levels in an ascending order of complexity: sub-wholes which display, according to the way you look at them, some of the characteristics commonly attributed to wholes and some of the characteristics commonly attributed to parts.... The members of a hierarchy, like the Roman god Janus, all have two faces looking in opposite directions: the face turned towards the subordinate levels is that of a self-contained whole; the face turned upward towards the apex, that of a dependent part. One is the face of the master, the other the face of the servant. This 'Janus effect' is a fundamental characteristic of sub-wholes in all types of hierarchies.

I suggest that the co-existence of solidarity and internal differentiation of Melayu-ness in my informants' usage may precisely be understood as a 'Janus effect', where the inward face is that of the master looking at subordinates, and the outward face is that of the servant looking at a larger encompassing whole. The Penyengat view of Melayu unity is thus the view of the master looking at centripetally orientated subordinates. However, each of these perceived subordinates is itself a sub-whole that is orientated ambifacially both inwards and outwards. Each is itself both master and servant. As shown above in the case of Galang, there is resistance to turning the servant's face towards Penyengat; instead attention is wilfully turned inwards to Galang itself as a self-contained whole.
The 'Janus effect' is repeated at a higher hierarchical level in the context of Indonesia. As mentioned above, in my informants' usage, *Suku Melayu* contrasts as a 'division' of the Indonesian population with other 'divisions', such as *Suku Jawa*, *Suku Minangkabau*, *Suku Bugis* and so on. Such a usage is indeed compatible with the official ideology of 'unity in diversity'. So my informants see themselves as constituting one part of the larger whole, where *Suku Melayu* is but one of many other such *Sukus*.

For its part, the Indonesian Government evidently regard the *Penyengat rajas* as the representatives of *Suku Melayu*. When foreign dignitaries visit Tanjungpinang, they are brought by officials of the regional government to Penyengat to be given a traditional reception by the *rajas*. When the *Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan* 'Department of Education and Culture' made a film on the traditional costumes of the different *Sukus* in Indonesia, the *rajas' costumes were filmed. When teams from Jakarta come to Riau to do research on various aspects of *Melayu* tradition, their destination is Penyengat. When I myself began preliminary enquiries in Pekanbaru among university lecturers and government officials, it was to Penyengat that they directed my attention. (See Chapter One.) It is thus the Penyengat view of Riau that is the most effectively transmitted to the Indonesian Government and to other outsiders.

In contrast, other perspectives on Riau — such as the Bintan view or the Galang view — are far less accessible to government officials and other outsiders, whose occasional visits to these other places are almost always arranged and conducted by the Penyengat *rajas*. (My first visits to many places in Riau were undertaken in the company of one *raja* or another; it was only for subsequent visits that I was able to make my own arrangements). As a consequence, an outsider visiting a place in Riau for the first time, is likely to
derive his or her superficial impression of the place, filtered through the interpretation of the raja guide. Since most outsiders visit these places only once, this superficial impression is likely to remain unchanged. By playing the role of guide to outsiders who are either from the the government or from a foreign country, the rajas are thereby able to project an image of themselves as mediators between Riau and the outside world.

This mediative role is enhanced by the employment of many Penyengat rajas in the civil service of the regional government. The favoured departments are 'Customs and Excise', 'Education and Culture', 'Forestry', 'Health', 'Justice', 'Religion', and the police force; however, I know of no Penyengat raja, or any other Riau informant for that matter, who has joined the armed forces, even though there is a major naval base in the area. In my 1979 conference paper (19-20), I mentioned that my Riau informants were not very interested in participating in the politics and administration of the Indonesian nation-state, and that hardly any of them held high government positions. As I have pointed out in Chapter Two, Riau in indeed peripheral in the Indonesian context, both geographically and politically. Such being the case, what interests my raja informants is how the resources of the Indonesian nation-state may be employed in ways that they, as mediators, consider beneficial to the Suku Melayu in Riau. For example, they pointed out that whereas the national government seems remote, the regional government is, in contrast, quite relevant, both at kecamatan 'district' and kabupaten 'regency' levels, because it is the regional government that takes charge of the day-to-day administration of Riau, the rajas' own patch, or so it seems to them.

As pointed out in Chapter Three, the Riau archipelago was one of the last areas to become part of the Indonesian republic. After the
Second World War ended in 1945, Riau was re-occupied by the Dutch colonialists. As shown above, during this period, the Riau aristocrats made an attempt to re-constitute the sultanate, an attempt which failed because the Dutch handed over the occupied areas to the Republic of Indonesia in 1950.

Although my informants do not make much reference to this episode, they are nevertheless aware of the still existing possibility of not being part of Indonesia. Such an awareness is voiced not only by my Penyengat informants, but even by others such as my Galang informants. Some say, for example, that they do not know what they are doing in Indonesia, when all their relatives and friends are in Singapore and Malaysia. Whereas many of them have been to Singapore or Malaysia at least once in their lives, either for trade, work, or leisure, hardly any has ever been to Jakarta or any other part of Java. When I asked the reason, they said that they have no reason to visit Jakarta, since they know no one there. Their radio and television sets are almost always tuned to programmes broadcast from Singapore and Malaysia, and hardly ever to the Indonesian programmes. This has brought about an awareness among my informants that the Malay language used in Singapore and Malaysia is more similar to bahasa kita 'our language' than it is to Bahasa Indonesia. There is thus a sense of dissociation from the institutional reality of Indonesia.

Nevertheless, such a sense of dissociation can be accommodated within the Indonesian ideology of 'unity in diversity'. As pointed out above, despite the dominance of the Javanese in Indonesian politics, in terms of the national ideology, political unity is construed of in non-ethnic terms. So the ideology of 'unity in diversity' allows the existence of a distinct Suku Melayu as part of the inherent diversity of the nation, without the necessity of governmental intervention in defining Melayu-ness as such. At the
same time, however, there is a constraint on the degree of particularity that Melayu-ness is allowed to develop: it must not threaten the third principle of the *Pancasila* -- namely, the 'one-ness of Indonesia'. There is thus a fine distinction to be drawn between being part of the ethnic diversity of Indonesia on the one hand, and on the other hand, being a separable whole. The former involves a centripetal orientation, the latter a centrifugal orientation. In other words, as a sub-whole in the Indonesian whole, Suku Melayu manifests the 'Janus effect' -- that is, with the face of the servant turned outwards to the rest of Indonesia, and the face of the master turned inwards to Riau itself.

The tension between the Penyengat view and the Galang view of Melayu-ness is thus located within the smaller context of Riau. The master's face of Penyengat that is turned inwards includes within its purview not only Penyengat itself, but also all the other places that were formerly in the jurisdiction of the bygone sultanate. What is perceived is thus a supra-territorial Melayu-dom. But the master's face of Galang is turned inwards to the Galang area itself, without a servant's face that is turned concurrently towards Penyengat. As we shall see in Chapter Nine, any servant's face that is displayed by the Galang people is orientated not towards Penyengat, but to some other centre elsewhere, including such possibilities as Singapore and Mecca.

8.3 The Imagined Community

The title of this section is borrowed from Anderson (1983); following his definition, in an imagined community,

the members...will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.
The people in a supra-territorial *Melayu*-dom do not have to know each other. But they each know that there are many of them, enough to constitute an imagined community that is larger than their own immediate local community.

Significantly, Anderson (1983) uses the term 'imagined community' to refer to the sovereign nations of the present time. Although most of the nations he refers to are institutionalised as states with independent governments, he does extend his argument to include incipient nations that are not yet institutionalised as states. I suggest that the imagined community constituted by those who share the vision of a supra-territorial *Melayu*-dom, may indeed be regarded as just such an incipient nation, one that draws its inspiration from the golden age of *zaman sultan*. Such an inspiration is perhaps understandable, since the republican ideal has already been pre-empted by the Republic of Indonesia. Apart from the image of a bygone sultanate, another possible non-Indonesian image available for communality is that of the 'nation of Islam', the *umat*. As we shall see in Chapter Nine, these are indeed the two images relevant to those informants interested in belonging to an imagined community larger than the immediate local community — that is, an alternative imagined community other than the Indonesian nation.

My informants are aware of the political danger of trying to translate phantasy into reality, of turning imagination into institution. They said that even though it may be true that they view the Indonesian government as an external authority that is quite remote from them, they have no wish to 'rebel' (*berontak*). The institutional presence of Indonesia is recognised as an undeniable reality. This is, however, matched by its ideological absence which is replaced instead by my informants' own imagined community. There is an inverse relationship that may be illustrated thus:
As noted above, this imagined Melayu-dom pertains to the Penyengat perspective, rather than to the Galang perspective. But even if it is the case that to my Penyengat informants, Indonesia is institutionally present but imaginatively absent, why should they find it necessary to replace it with an alternative imagined community? Why cannot they simply adopt the Galang alternative and concentrate on the immediacy of their own local Penyengat community?

As mentioned above in this chapter, without the image of a bygone sultanate, all the Melayu in Riau would merely be 'inhabitants in remote corners' (penduduk di pelusuk-pelusuk), with the implication of being uncivilised tribals. Such an implication is evidently unacceptable in the context of a world where modernist civilisation is engulfing isolationist tribalism. In this context, if one cannot claim to be modern, one can at least claim to be civilised. According to this logic, isolationist tribalism is political weakness. For this reason, I suggest, it is insufficient for my Penyengat informants simply to concentrate on the immediacy of their own local community. For this reason they find it necessary to belong to an alternative imagined community other than that of the Indonesian nation.

8.4 The Social Phantasy System

But how can a community seem real in the absence of institutional props? One way is to locate it outside the present, thereby suspending the premisses on which everyday reality is founded. This
may be understood as 'phantasy', a term that Laing (1969:7) explains as 'an operation of mapping, from any domain of experience to any range of experience'. The rear-view image of zaman sultan is precisely located in a bracketed part of time, in a past-in-the-present, whereby the imagined past is mapped onto the everyday present. The reality of zaman sultan is thus of a supra-mundane quality, sustained with virtuosity and leading to enchanting nostalgia.

The reality of this phantasy is further enhanced by communication and sharing. This is no mere private phantasy, but a social phantasy system. People are thus drawn into what is essentially someone else's phantasy, in which they play given parts, losing their own perspective in the process. Those who resist being drawn in such a way pose a cognitive danger, for their intransigence threatens to 'de-realise' the phantasy, to expose its un-reality. (See Laing 1969:37-43.) This is precisely the significance of the social phantasy system. As Laing has noted (1969:42):

The quality of reality experienced inside the nexus of phantasy may be enchanting. Outside it is cold, empty, meaningless, unreal.

To remain within a phantasy, one must be constantly aware of one's stream of consciousness, which must not be allowed to wander off in random directions, but must be channelled towards the maintenance of that phantasy. Moreover, in a phantasy that is projected into a social phantasy system, one must also monitor the consciousness of others who share or are supposed to share that phantasy. When two or more persons think that they do indeed share the experience of a common phantasy, this can lead to a close bonding, a sense of belonging, a feeling of communal warmth. This warmth increases in heat to the extent that people participate in the phantasy. So the
more people there are involved in the phantasy, the colder it is for those individuals who stubbornly remain outside. Not only that, the more participants there are in a phantasy, the more grandiose and the more real does that phantasy become.

But it is alright if outsiders to Riau, such as other Indonesians and foreigners, are not drawn into the social phantasy system. They are not expected to participate; the phantasy makes no claim on them. In contrast, those who are perceived as belonging to Melayu-dom in Riau are expected to share this phantasy of endogenous power, for without their participation there is no endogenous power, even if only in phantasy. In other words, for someone to experience as real the phantasy of being a raja, someone else must be willing to phantasise being a hamba raja. There is no domination without submission, even if only in phantasy.

In the social phantasy system of zaman sultan, people are ranked; each rank translates into a Melayu type; and each type is instantiated by certain local communities. The phantasy is thus hierarchically distributed according to rank, type, and local community. In such a phantasy, it is only right that the Penyengat rajas should phantasise about Penyengat as the centre of endogenous power in Riau. But if the Pangkil people, for example, were to phantasise about Pangkil in such terms, they would, in Penyengat terms, be phantasising above their station, and would consequently upset the hierarchical order. This is indeed what the Galang people are perceived as doing.

Significantly, some of my Karas informants claimed that formerly, when outsiders came to the island, they vomited blood on the beach and died. My informants attributed this to the daulat of the island. As mentioned in Chapter Three, daulat refers to 'the divine element of kingship'. So the implication is that Karas was a kingly centre.
There are thus at least two different social phantasies in operation: one emanating from Penyengat, and the other from the Galang area, specifically from Karas.

It is striking that Karas is supposed to manifest its daulat by keeping away outsiders, in contrast to Penyengat which is supposed to manifest its daulat by attracting those in the periphery. As mentioned above, this difference may be couched, respectively, in terms of centrifugal disjunction and centripetal transitivity. These two social phantasy systems differ in a way that may be explained through a musical metaphor. The Galang (or more specifically, Karas) phantasy is monodic, whereas the Penyengat phantasy is contrapuntal. The former consists of only a single line, whereas the latter has a texture of different complementary parts. So the former is, as it were, a voice separated from the rest of the choir and singing by itself, whereas the latter is a choral whole where the separate voices sing their different parts together. The question is: who is to sing with whom?

This is indeed a key difference between the Galang phantasy and the Penyengat phantasy. The scale is different: they are, to use the musical metaphor above, a lone voice and a chorus. The Penyengat phantasy extends beyond one particular local community to include other local communities, such that they may be considered as constituting a supralocal imagined community.

8.5 Siblingship and the Axiom of Amity

In both social phantasies, there is a strong tendency towards the homogenisation of the local community. In the Galang phantasy, there is emphasis on people belonging to the Galang area as indigenes. In the Penyengat phantasy, there is emphasis on the local community as an
instance of a particular Melayu type and hence a particular rank. In both cases, similarity between co-members of the local community is perceived as a desideratum.

I have discussed in Chapter Seven, how one acquires membership in a local community by being the anak 'child' of one's parents, and being the anak of one's birthplace. Ideally, this should enable one to belong to a generationally continuous set of similar members, sharing a common locality. However, as we have seen above, problematic cases of ambiguity can arise. It is thus important to decide who belongs and who does not.

Significantly, someone who belongs is described as bukan orang lain 'not an other person', whereas someone who does not belong is described as orang lain 'other person'. For example, to indicate their close-ness to one another, my informants would say sini tak ada orang lain 'there is no other person here'; or to indicate how close a certain person is to them, they would say dia bukan orang lain 'she or he is not an other-person'.

Such a terminology gives primacy to Other-ness, with Self defined as not-Other. Those who are close to one's self are hence bukan orang lain 'not-others'. In a world that is so divided into 'others' and 'not-others', the question 'Who are we?' is answered by 'We are not they'. This may be illustrated thus:

```
  C orang lain
     /     \
    /       \     B bukan orang lain
   /         \    
  D orang lain
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**Figure 14  Orang Lain and Bukan Orang Lain**
As illustrated above, A and B are social intimates whose relationship is defined through the intermediacy of 'others', C and D. From the perspective of A, B's status is inherently ambiguous, being neither wholly Other nor wholly Self. Someone who is described as bukan orang lain is not an other, and yet also not one's own self.

In my informants' perception, an ideal local community is one where there is no orang lain. Such a perception seems to be common to both phantasies. So 'others' (orang lain) should logically be those who belong to other local communities. In contrast, one's co-residents should logically be 'not-others' (bukan orang lain) in that sense.

If it is the case that one belongs to a set of similar members by virtue of being the child of one's parents and the child of one's birthplace, then the implication is that the co-residents of a place are siblings, both literally and metaphorically. Indeed, this is explicitly stated by my informant: the expression sini tak ada orang lain 'there is no other person here' is often followed by semua saudara 'all are siblings'. The archetypical bukan orang lain who is not an other and yet not oneself, is one's sibling, one's saudara. So generally is siblingship used as a paradigm for social proximity that if someone were to describe someone else as saudara, one would not be sure whether the usage was literal or metaphorical. To ascertain this one would have to ask whether this saudara was a 'true sibling' (adik-beradik betul), a 'sibling of the same womb' (adik-beradik sekandung).

Even when the answer to this question is negative, its negation is likely to be mitigated by a substitute kin term. For example, the answer might be dia bukan adik-beradik betul, dia pupuan saja 'she or he is not a true sibling, she or he is merely cousin-like'. When the word pupuan is used, it implies that the degree of kinship can no
longer be calculated. When the degree of cousinship is still known, then the answer might be dia saudara sepupu 'she or he is a sibling of the first-cousin degree' or dia saudara dua pupu 'she or he is a sibling of the second-cousin degree'. If the person described as a bukan orang lain is not related at all by kinship, then at the very least, she or he may be said to be macam saudara 'like a sibling'.

According to my informants, siblings are said to be close because they are sepangkat 'of one generation or individual ranking'. As I have mentioned in Chapter Four above, the word pangkat refers, alternatively, to generation and to one's individual rank within a specific derajat. To signify their equality in such terms, siblings are often given similar sounding names. I give three sets of sibling names as examples in Figure 15 below. My informants say that siblings are given such similar sounding names so that everyone would know that they are siblings.

The importance of siblingship is further highlighted through the use of birth-order names. My informants said that it is 'polite' (berbudi-bahasa) to address people by their birth-order names (or fraternyms), rather than by their personal names (or autonyms). They said that some people 'are reluctant to mention their own personal names, for fear that people may cast a spell on them' (payah nak sebut namanya, kerana takut dibikin orang). The implication is that personal names individuate the person, thereby singling him or her as alone and hence vulnerable in a crowd of strange others. In contrast, birth-order names label the person as a member of a sibling set who is hence secure in the company of like-selves.

What Koestler (1967:65) terms the 'Janus effect' seems to be evident in such a sibling relationship, with both turning their attention inwards to each other, yet at the same time defining their
Figure 15. Similar Sounding Sibling Names
siblingship through the intermediacy of 'others'. This situation is
strikingly similar to that described by Benjamin (1980:34) in his
discussion of Malay kinship in the Malay Peninsula:

The Malay social world is very Other-cathected; it is
constituted primarily of 'they's, in opposition to whom the
more intimate 'we' relations are defined.... The basically
conjunctive character of Malay siblingship helps to generate
this structure, for it sets the siblings facing socially
inwards away from the 'they' of the wider social world
towards the 'we' of each other.

The 'Janus effect' in Melayu siblingship is thus to be found not only
in Riau, but also elsewhere in alam Melayu. (Also see McKinley 1981.)

I suggest that at the most basic level, the social phantasy
system is shared by siblings striving to be each other's equal. What
Fortes (1969) refers to as the 'axiom of amity' in kinship is of
relevance to our discussion in this context. Among my informants, it
is siblingship that is highlighted as the kin relation that is
supposed to manifest amity.

Siblingship figures prominently in mythology. For example, my
Galang informants speak of the various places in Galang as adik-
beradik 'siblings'. To quote a Karas informant:

Galang sebagai suku induk. Anak dia ada Galang Rempang,
Galang Pecom, Galang Karas, Galang Sembor.

(Galang is a 'mother division'. Her children include Galang
Rempang, Galang Pecom, Galang Karas, and Galang Sembor.)

The origin myth of Galang explains why these places are siblings
to each other. The following is a version of this myth obtained from
a Karas informant: The Galang people came from Kelang on the Malay
Peninsula. However, they were not originally known as orang Galang.
Only when they came to Galang did they become orang Galang. Before
they came, Galang was uninhabited. There were seven 'siblings' (adik-
beradik) from Kelang. They divided the Galang area among themselves,
with each sibling taking one portion:

--- Bulang (including Pecom)
--- Setokok (including Galang Rempang)
--- Galang Kandap (also known as Pengalap)
--- Galang Besar
--- Temiang
--- Daik
--- Senayang.

What had happened was that in Kelang, during the launching of the lancang kuning 'royal ship' (literally, 'yellow ship'), women who were pregnant for the first time were laid in its path as 'rollers' (galang). Because of this, the seven siblings, who were all warriors, felt that the raja was cruel. So they 'ran away' (lari) and came to Galang. My informant claimed that knowledge of these seven siblings' names and deeds would make one 'strong' (kuat) and 'invincible' (tahan). If their names are uttered, one's hair would stand on end. The 'descendants' (keturunan) of the seven siblings include the Galang Pekaka, the Galang Pesaka, the Galang Gelam, and the Galang Asli. Kelang was the place of origin, where the 'kingdom' (kerajaan) was located; even Johor was derived from Kelang.

At least four themes are evident in this origin myth -- that is, centrifugalism, indigeny, siblingship, and keturunan. The seven siblings were described as runaways from a cruel raja in Kelang; Galang was the area they ran to. Galang was previously uninhabited; so the seven siblings were the first indigenes. They divided the area into seven portions, each belonging to one sibling. These seven portions are thus in a relationship of equality to each other. Their indigenous inhabitants are the keturunan 'descendants' of the seven siblings, and are thus also in a relationship of equality to each
other. As shown in Chapter Seven, the experience of trauma when uttering the names of one's ancestors is taken as evidence of one's indigency in Galang.

It is striking that there is not one mention of the name 'Riau' in this myth. Although the theme of centrifugalism is articulated, it is not Penyengat or the Riau river that is mentioned as a centre from which the seven siblings ran away. Instead, the postulated centre is a mythical kingdom in Kelang, which supposedly pre-dated even Johor, which in turn, as all my informants know, pre-dated Riau-Lingga.

Another striking feature is the mention of pregnant women being used as 'rollers' (galang) for the launching of the royal ship. As pointed out in Chapter Five, the ethnonyms of hamba raja were derived from their kerahan. So the orang Galang were thus named because their corvee duty was to provide 'rollers' (galang) for launching the ruler's ship. In the origin myth of Galang, however, women 'pregnant for the first time' (yang bunting sulong) were used as rollers. Why was there this special emphasis given to the destruction of such women? Why was there no inclusion of other pregnant women or those who were not pregnant or even men?

To answer this, let us rephrase the quotation given above: Galang is like a mother, and her children are the various places in Galang. To destroy a woman pregnant for the first time is to destroy her as a mother and all the children who could otherwise have issued from her womb. If the mother of the seven siblings had been used as a galang in this way, they themselves would not even have existed. Thus, according to this interpretation, the orang Galang could be orang 'people', because their mother was not used as a galang 'roller'.

Interestingly, my raja informants have an alternative version of this Galang origin myth. According to one informant's version, there
was once a big ship being built for the ruler. When the carpenter was working on it, a boy came to play nearby. This made the carpenter angry. So he threw his axe at the boy, who ran away cursing: *Kapal ini tak akan turun ke laut* 'May this ship not descend into the sea'. Indeed, after the ship was completed, it could not be launched at all. No matter how many men pushed and pulled, it did not budge in the least. The carpenter then remembered the boy's curse and told the ruler about it. The boy was found and commanded to release the curse. He said that this was possible only if seven women who were pregnant for the first time were laid in the ship's path as *galang* 'rollers'. This was done and the ship was duly launched. After the launching, the seven pregnant women did not die but gave birth to seven sons, who grew up and became *panglima Galang* 'Galang warriors'.

In the *rajas'* version of the Galang myth, the seven founding ancestors of the Galang people were used as *galang* 'rollers' while in their mothers' wombs. Furthermore, they were not related to each other as siblings, since each of them was a first-born child. In contrast to the Karas version of the myth, in the *rajas'* version, it was not the cruelty of the ruler, but the mischief of a boy in the local community, that had caused the pregnant women to be used as rollers. There is, moreover, no mention of Kelang as the site of an ancient kingdom or even of Galang as a place. Instead, the focus is specifically on the building and launching of the ruler's ship. So if the Karas version of the myth is concerned with expressing the equality of the *orang Galang* using the paradigm of siblingship, the *rajas'* version of the myth is concerned with defining the *orang Galang* not as a sibling-set, but as unrelated people sharing a common rank because of their common *kerahan* -- that is, as the launchers of the ruler's ship.
In explaining their own origins as a **derajat**, however, my raja informants use siblingship as a paradigm of equality. As pointed out in Chapter Four above, when tracing their individual genealogies, they invariably go back to the five Opu Daeng brothers as the founding ancestors. Strictly speaking, in terms of genealogical descent, it is not necessary for any individual informant to mention all five brothers as his or her ancestors, since he or she would be descended from only one of them — for example, Opu Daeng Cellak or Opu Daeng Parani. Yet all five are always mentioned. I suggest that the purpose is to express the sibling-like equality of all rajas. In other words, as the descendants of a sibling-set, the rajas themselves constitute a sibling-set, if not literally so in all cases, at least metaphorically so.

**Derajat** 'rank' is thus inherited through *keturunan* 'descent', but maintained through siblingship. Inequality between the different **derajat** is complemented by equality within any one **derajat**. The axiom of amity is thus supposed to be expressed within the sibling-like **derajat**.

Among my informants, the idea of equality among siblings is supposed to be materially expressed. In terms of wealth, siblings are supposed to be equal. As an informant explained to me, if both siblings are equally well off, they feel at ease with each other. But if one is more successful than the other, then relations between them are often bad. On the one hand, the less successful sibling would be shy of visiting the more successful sibling. On the other hand, the more successful sibling would find it difficult to help the less successful sibling without shaming him or her.

I myself encountered several cases where serious quarrels broke out between unequally successful siblings. What is more, the sibling
who is more successful may even begin to worry that the less successful sibling may hire a bomoh 'magician' to 'fix him/her' (bikin dia). So if the more successful sibling were to fall ill, this may be blamed on a spell cast at the behest of a less successful and hence envious sibling. Such an assignment of blame may be undertaken even by others in the same community.

For example, in one case I encountered, it was not the sick person herself who blamed sorcery as the cause of her asthma, but some other people in the community who took it upon themselves to blame it on a spell supposedly cast at the behest of her envious sister or sisters. Significantly, the sick woman was a commoner married to a relatively well-to-do raja. Her sisters who married less successfully were said to be angry with her because they felt that she had become 'proud' (sombong).

When two siblings are unequally successful, the more successful one is often perceived as 'proud' (sombong), while the less successful one is often perceived as 'ashamed' (malu). The equality of being sepangkat is thus upset. To restore the equality that is supposed to be, either the less successful one would have to be pulled up or the more successful one would have to be pulled down. As a raja informant said, it is difficult to help a less successful sibling. He added:

Kalau kita nak tolong dia, nanti boleh jadi musuh.

If I were to try helping him/her, we might end up being enemies instead.

Indeed, the accusation of being sombong 'proud' is often levelled at a more successful sibling when he or she tries to help a less successful sibling. Such help is often perceived as patronage; and a patron-client relationship is not that of equals. Since it is difficult to pull up a less successful sibling without being accused
of patronage, the implication is that it might be somewhat easier to pull down a more successful sibling through sorcery, or so it seems.

The fear of sorcery by one's envious sibling indicates that the supposed equality between siblings is not a static given, but a dynamic situation that has to be constantly monitored by the parties concerned. In such inter-sibling interaction, one has to ask oneself such questions as: Would my behaviour be construed as proud? Am I making my sibling ashamed? Is he or she going to cast a spell on me? A certain morality is thus involved: siblings must strive to be equal.

The desired equality of siblings has economic consequences. My raja informants pointed out that they are different from the Batak who have marga 'clans'. It is said that when a Batak man enters a certain section or department of the civil service, he will soon pull in his own clansmen until the entire section or department ends up by being staffed with people from that particular marga. It is apparently not so with my informants, who try instead to avoid being in the same department as their siblings. The reason is that they do not want to be in a situation of open rivalry with their siblings or in a situation where one sibling would be officially senior to another sibling. On the contrary, siblings try to be in different sections or departments, so that their supposed equality in office can be presumed, without too detailed a comparison. For example, if one sibling is in 'Customs and Excise' and the other is in 'Education and Culture', their equality in office may be presumed in that they are both civil servants, without bothering too much about their specific positions within their respective departments. It is, however, acceptable if a senior kinsman such as one's bapak saudara 'uncle' were to be one's senior at work: the combination of generation as pangkat and office as pangkat would be harmonic.
In their discussions of siblingship with me, my informants drew comparisons between their own economic behaviour and Chinese economic behaviour. A favourite topic for comment is the Chinese family business which has the eldest brother acting as boss. My informants regard such an arrangement as impossible for themselves, since it would immediately upset the equality of the siblings involved, lead to mutual ill-feeling, and result in the closure of the family business. Their observations of the Chinese are indeed valid, for Chinese siblingship is supposed to be disjunctive in character, with the elder sibling equated with parent and the younger sibling with child. (See, for example, Freedman 1957:60.)

The stress on equality between siblings, however, threatens that all could be pulled down to the level of the lowest. If outstanding success upsets equality, then so does outstanding failure. For example, a raja informant told me that she was ashamed of her brother who she felt was living in a manner beneath his station. Nevertheless she found it difficult to make him change his ways. The only remedy she felt she could offer was to ask him to help himself to the coconuts in her share of the coconut grove inherited from their father.

My other raja informants confirmed that almost the only way to help a sibling who was badly off was to allow him or her to pegang 'hold' their shares of whatever kebun pusaka 'inherited plantation' they might collectively have. Such help seems to be acceptable because the 'inherited plantation' is received from one's parents, not from one's siblings. It is also arguable that to manage the plantation by 'holding' one's siblings' shares is to them a favour, since all plantations need some tending. Most of these are 'inherited plantations' of fruit trees such as coconut, durian, jackfruit, mangoes, rambutan, and so on. (See Plate 20.) As another raja
informant explained, the other siblings still have the right to go to
the plantation to pick the fruits for their own consumption. But
money from selling the produce belongs to the one managing the
plantation.

This informant also mentioned that it is not always the poorest
sibling who gets to manage the plantation; sometimes it may be a
matter of convenience. She gave me the example of an 'inherited
plantation' managed by a woman who is rich enough to hire a number of
employees. This woman distributes the money from the sale of the
produce among her siblings. Those who are poor get more, those who
are well-off get less. One rich brother in Pekanbaru does not get any
of the money, but receives fruit from the plantation. This
arrangement is apparently acceptable to all her siblings, since they
regard this money not as a gift from her, but as their rightful
inheritance from their parents. My informant who told me about this
case said that this was the closest example she could think of that
approximated a family business, but she also noted that it is not like
a Chinese family business because the siblings are not actually
working together.

As the common inheritance of a sibling set, the kebun pusaka
'inherited plantation' symbolises equality through the sharing of a
common descent. However, I do not think that the sibling set thereby
constitutes an agnatic descent group, for they do not own the
plantation as a corporate group. Instead, they divide the plantation
into individual shares, which may be disposed of according to the
wishes of each individual sibling. So the plantation may not be kept
as one whole in the next generation, because some parts of it may have
been sold, other parts kept by individual siblings, and still other
parts inherited by the siblings' children. Consequently, those of my
informants who have kebun pusaka, tend to have several plots, perhaps even on different islands. These plots would be the remnants of different shares of 'inherited plantations' which have passed down through various genealogical lines of descent. The largest plot would tend to be that established by their parents, and not those that their parents had inherited themselves.

Another aspect of the 'inherited plantations' is that they are usually located some distance away from the residential area, perhaps even on an uninhabited island such as Terkulai, Basing, or Soreh. (See Map 4.) So to have the poorest sibling in the sibling set manage such a plantation is also to remove him or her from the local community for extended periods of time, thus saving the other, better off, siblings the daily embarrassment of inequality.

My informants are of the general opinion that female siblings and cross-sex siblings get on better than male siblings. This may be because a greater ideological onus is placed on the maintenance of equality between brothers, since keturunan is essentially a male affair. So any inequality between brothers becomes more intolerable than between female or cross-sex siblings. Consequently, the former relationship is less easy-going than the latter: equality requires as much effort to maintain, as does hierarchy.

If siblings are supposed to be equal, then it follows that their offspring are also supposed to be equal to one another. The children of two brothers are called sepupu kuat 'strong first cousins', because they share the same patrilineal keturunan and hence the same derajat. The children of two sisters or a brother and a sister are called sepupu lemah 'weak first cousins', because depending on who the sisters' husbands are, the cousins may not belong to the same keturunan or derajat.
So whereas equality between the 'strong first cousins' can be presumed, no such assumption can be made for the 'weak first cousins'. The words 'strong' and 'weak' are used in an ideological sense, to refer to the ideal state of cousinship. Ideally, two brothers' children should be 'strong first cousins' because they should have inherited their fathers' equal brotherhood. But, just as there is tension in the relationship between brothers, because of the ideological onus to maintain equality, so there is tension between 'strong first cousins' for the same reason. As a result, relationships between 'weak first cousins' tend to be more relaxed. In this light, it is significant that marriage between 'weak first cousins' is preferred among my informants, particularly if the cousins belong to the same derajat. As an informant put it:

Kalau sepupu kuat boleh kawin, sepupu lemah lagi boleh.

If the strong first cousins can marry each other, then the weak first cousins can do so even more.

The implication is that marriage would confirm the equality of the 'weak first cousins', whereas the presumed equality of the 'strong first cousins' would need no such confirmation. As mentioned above, such cousin-marriages are more likely to occur if they are isogamous — that is, if the 'weak first cousins' belong to the same derajat. In the case of hypergamy or hypogamy where two derajat are involved, cousin-marriage is more likely to occur if the male cousin is of the higher derajat. If it is the female cousin who is of the higher derajat, then cousin-marriage would result in a loss of rank for her offspring. In other words, cousin-marriage is preferred only if the match is isogamous or hypergamous for the female.

Nevertheless, I do know of at least two cases where female rajas have married their commoner cousins. In both these cases, the female
rajas were significantly poorer than their other raja cousins. Their consent to marry down and have commoner offspring seems to have been influenced, at least in part, by their economic position which has apparently made them unacceptable to their raja cousins. This is another way whereby equality is maintained within the derajat: the women who are unable to meet the standard of equality being maintained, marry down and produce children for a lower derajat. In both cases of female hypogamy mentioned above, the female rajas left Penyengat to live in their commoner husbands' communities elsewhere. As a result, the richer cousins could quite happily maintain their local standard of equality.

The principles underlying cousin-marriage may be extended beyond the first-cousin degree. The same informant cited above went on to say that it is important to marry fourth cousins in order to keep them as saudara:

If [fourth cousins] are not married, they will be lost. Once you reach the degree of fifth cousins, they are no longer counted, they are already lost. The Melayu people do not like losing their saudara, they want to keep their saudara relations going, so that they would be able to remember. 12

(My translation).

This informant, a 'headman' of commoner status, was referring to isogamous cousin-marriages, which would thereby enable keturunan and derajat to be remembered through their realisation in an ongoing, intra-marrying cluster of cousins.

But what one can try to remember, one can also try to forget. As I have mentioned in Chapters Four and Seven, my informants' genealogies show a number of inter-derajat marriages between male raja and female encik or even female hamba raja. The result of such a marriage is a cousinship spanning two derajat or more. Such a
situation goes against the grain of equality. To remedy it, the cousins of the lower derajat are sloughed off through genealogical amnesia.

To give an example, I did not know that a particular raja informant was second cousin to some other commoner informants until the latter told me so. When the raja informant gave me his genealogy he omitted mention of such a relationship, even though they were all living near each other in the same community. When I subsequently queried him about this, he dismissed the matter by saying, itu sudah jauh, tak boleh kira lagi 'that [relationship] is already distant, it can no longer be counted'. Indeed, it was not until some years after this initial dismissal that in the presence of his second cousin's son, he was willing to admit to the relationship: the raja's mother's mother was a commoner, and the second cousins in question are the descendants of her brother. Even so, this raja informant's other raja cousins do not seem to know about the relationship, or perhaps they do not want to recognise it, since that would implicate them as well.

In this context, it is significant that an ideal marriage is one where husband and wife are like abang 'elder brother' and adik 'younger sister' in relation to each other. The paradigm of siblingship as equality thus extends even to marriage. This fits in with the implication of the derajat as a sibling-set. If all within the derajat are equal to one another, as siblings are supposed to be, then the ideal marriage is one that occurs within the derajat. Indeed, in the case of an inter-derajat marriage, the paradigm of siblingship may not be used to describe the relationship of husband and wife, since that is patently an unequal relationship. To give a specific example, in a particular marital relationship between a raja husband and a commoner wife, he sometimes refers to her as anak 'child' and she sometimes refers to him as bapak 'father'; he also
refers to her siblings as his anak buah 'followers'. This marriage is thus disjunctively structured, in contrast to that which is conjunctively structured on the paradigm of equal siblingship.

The ideal is clearly to have intra-generational, sibling-like conjunction within the derajat and inter-generational disjunction between different derajat. If derajat is translated into local community, then this further implies conjunction within the local community and disjunction between different local communities. One's social world is thereby structured into a complementarity of equal selves and different others. This theme is common to both the Galang and the Penyengat phantasies. The contrast between them lies in the way difference is construed. In the Galang case, the essential difference is simply between insider and outsider. In the Penyengat case, this difference between insider and outsider is also relevant in the internal structuration of a local community, but with the added difference that the various local communities are related to each other hierarchically as superior and inferior. To translate this contrast into kinship terms, whereas conjunctive siblingship is the sole paradigm in the Galang case, in the Penyengat case, conjunctive siblingship is combined with disjunctive filiation to express the dual concern with intra-derajat equality and inter-derajat difference. Indeed, whereas Galang keturunan is an un-utterable secret and hence an implicit negation, the rajas' keturunan is an explicit affair, often drawn up on charts and displayed publicly.

8.6 Recruitment through Adoption

In the Penyengat case, the use of disjunctive filiation as a paradigm of connected difference is expressed through adoption of the children of orang lain 'other people'. Significantly, it was in
Penyengat that I found the greatest prevalence of such adoptions. To adopt is called *angkat* — literally, 'to lift or elevate'. The word *angkat* is, interestingly, the root form of *pangkat* 'generation or individual ranking' (Wilkinson 1959:842). So an *orang lain* adopted as an *anak angkat* is someone granted honorary membership in the community through social elevation, with the implication that what has been lifted can also be dropped. The adopting parent 'lifts' (*angkat*), and the adopted child is 'lifted' (*diangkat*).

A significant number of Penyengat *rajas* have adopted daughters who have been either sold or given away by their Chinese parents. My informants considered it a good thing to adopt these Chinese children because in so doing, one recruits new members to *Melayu-dom*. These adoptees are thereby said to have 'entered *Melayu-dom*' (*masuk Melayu*). But even though they have been adopted by *rajas*, the adoptees themselves remain commoners. They do not bear the title *raja*, as that is not their *keturunan* by birth.

Since one can only lift what is low to start with, the implication is that the *anak angkat* is of inferior origins. So even if the *anak angkat* has been adopted from babyhood and has grown up with one's *anak betul* 'true children', the adopted child's implied inferiority remains right up to adulthood. Consequently, while my *raja* informants seem to regard the adoption of a Chinese daughter almost as a status symbol, the adopted daughter herself is usually reluctant to admit in public that she is adopted. The position of such an adoptee is thus ambiguous, for she grows up as a commoner in a *raja* family. She is a familiar *orang lain*, who belongs and yet does not belong simultaneously. So whereas the adoptee wishes to define herself as one who belongs by hiding the fact of her adoption, her *raja* family wish to define themselves as superior insiders in relation to her as an inferior outsider.
I know of at least one case where the adoptee has found this imposed ambiguity intolerable. Instead of trying to belong to the community by hiding the fact of her adoption, she took the opposite tack of proclaiming herself an outsider, an anak angkat keturunan Cina. So determined was she to dissociate herself from her raja family that she left Penyengat and made her way to Batam, where she found a job on which she was able to support herself. Her raja family consider her jahat 'bad'. When she met me, she said to me:

*Kita ugama lain, tapi darah sama.*

(You and I are of different religions, but the same blood.)

She thus considers herself a Chinese Muslim, rather than a Muslim Melayu.

The adoptive angkat relationship is thus inherently disjunctive, implying not just the inter-generational gap between parent and child, but also the inter-derajat gap between a high-ranking adoptor and a low-ranking adoptee. Indeed people of the same derajat generally do not angkat 'lift' each other's children; to do so would imply a social disjunction between them. This is particularly the case since all within the local community are supposed to be saudara 'siblings'. So it follows that the children of one's co-residents are one's anak saudara 'children of siblings' (that is, nieces and nephews), if not literally so, then at least metaphorically so. Since they are already anak in one sense, there is no further need to make them anak in another sense. To angkat one's anak saudara would be like trying to adopt one's own children; it would be a redundant and hence meaningless act.

But this is not to say that children born into a local community are never brought up by adults other than their own parents. Indeed it is quite common to find that grandparents and parents' siblings
play important nurturant roles. However, in such cases, the children are said to be **dipelihara** or **dibela** 'cared for' by these adults; they are not said to be **diangkat** 'lifted' by them. The pejorative connotation of **angkat** may be illustrated by a case I encountered in Pangkil, where a man who openly declared that he did not like his own father, went about claiming to be the **anak angkat** of several different people in the community, even though he had not been brought up by them. Although nobody in the community took this claim seriously, his message was clearly understood: he was implying that he and hence his father were socially inferior to his supposed adoptors.

As this example indicates, there are cases where the adoptees themselves want to be **diangkat** 'lifted'. Apart from the special situation of the Pangkil informant mentioned above, most of these are adults who voluntarily ask to be adopted so that they would belong more closely to the local community. Such people are usually **orang lain** who are already residents in the community -- perhaps members of the local Chinese shopkeeper's family. This has indeed happened to a few Chinese individuals living on Penyengat. One of them explained to me, half in Malay and half in Teochiu, that as a result of her 'social interaction' (**pergaulan**) with the Penyengat people, she had a 'desire' (**niat**) to 'enter and be one of them' (**入侵他們的人**). She had felt that the situation would be 'more comfortable if beliefs were to be united' (**lebih senang kalau kepercayaan dapat disatukan**). Consequently she became the **anak angkat** of a Melayu family who then arranged for her conversion to Islam.

This is how she described her conversion ceremony: She was first **disunat** 'circumcised' by the local midwife, after which the people present 'recited a prayer of safekeeping' (**baca doa selamat**). There was a 'feast' (**kenduri**) with various kinds of **kuh** 'pastries' and with **pulut kuning** 'yellow glutinous rice' made into a **nasi adab-adab**
'ceremonial rice-dish'. It was 'like a wedding' (macam kawin) but without the ritual of tepuk tepung tawar — literally, 'dabbing on plain rice-flour'. A Muslim name was conferred on her by the ustaz 'religious teacher'. He asked her whether she truly wanted to 'enter Islam' (masuk Islam); she replied 'yes' and signed a register. My informant also mentioned the names of some of the people who were present at the ceremony. It is quite clear that her concern was to join the community of people that she already knew; her interest was not in becoming a Muslim in an abstract sense. If Islam was a portal to Melayu-dom, then she would enter Islam in order to enter Melayu-dom as she knew it in the form of Penyengat.

As Laing (1969:38) has noted,

We are all prone to be drawn into social phantasy systems, with loss of one's 'own' identity in the process....

That my informant had entered the social phantasy system is evident in the subsequent remarks she made in the same interview. Immediately after telling me about how she had had the desire to be integrated into the Penyengat community, she proceeded to discuss another Chinese person who had also 'entered Melayu-dom', but who had, according to her, been adopted by a Javanese man and his Bugis wife. Her implication was that he had not truly entered the community, because his adoptive father was himself of a non-Melayu keturunan. My informant then went on to talk about a man I had never met in a place I had not visited — a certain G in a place called Tanjung Setengah, which seems to be located somewhere in Bulang Strait. (See Map 7.) What my informant found noteworthy about this man was that he had married a perempuan orang hutan 'a female of the forest people'. The orang hutan 'forest people' are generally so despised by my informants that even though they are recognised as Melayu asli, they do not qualify for even the lowest derajat of the hierarchy. By alluding to
these two cases of questionable keturunan and derajat, my informant
seems to have been trying to affirm her own status within the phantasy
of zaman sultan.

The voluntary entry of non-Melayu 'others' to Melayu-dom is
welcomed, indeed even expected, by my Melayu murni informants. As a
Pangkil informant said: when orang lain such as the Chinese live in a
Melayu community for some time, they will be 'pulled' (tertarik) by
adat Melayu in their 'social interaction' (pergaulan). This informant
stated explicitly that she expected the two Chinese brothers who had a
local grocery store to 'enter Melayu-dom' sooner or latter. As it
happened, the elder of these brothers had only recently eloped with a
Pangkil Melayu woman to Tanjungpinang. This had caused a furor in the
community because the couple did not marry properly, either in the
civil registry, in the Islamic registry, or even according to Chinese
rites. There was hence considerable pressure exerted by members of
the Pangkil community on the couple to 'follow procedure' (ikut
aturan) by choosing either to masuk Melayu or to ikut Cina 'follow the
Chinese'. If the woman chose to ikut Cina, then she would be
considered as 'departing from Melayu-dom' (keluar Melayu) and
consequently ostracised.

As far as I know, the couple have still remained in unmarried
cohabitation. Some time after the elopement, which had occurred in
1980, the younger brother, who was already married to a Chinese wife,
quitted Pangkil and moved to Tanjungpinang. His wife explained the
move to me thus: If one lives too long among the 'barbarians' (番人),
one will become like them; one will 'enter barbarism' (入番),
as her brother-in-law was in danger of doing. So she had begun to
worry about her four children growing up in Pangkil, even though the
family had already lived there for more than ten years. Although she
was sad about leaving, she felt that they had to because 'what the
barbarians like best is to have our people become their people'
(他們最喜歡的，就是我們的人變成他們的人。)

But be that as it may, it is also clear that newcomers to Melayu-
dom are considered socially inferior, by virtue of not belonging by
birth. This demonstrates the dual concern in the Penyengat phantasy
-- that is, a desire to draw people in as social inferiors and a
desire to keep people out as social equals. This is thus another
manifestation of the 'Janus effect' discussed above, where an inward-
looking orientation co-exists with an outward-looking orientation.

From the perspective of an orang lain, entry into such a Melayu-
dom can become a 'double-bind', where one is damned if one does, and
damned if one does not. There are two conflicting injunctions. The
first is: You are not one of us; you should become one of us. If the
orang lain takes this message seriously and enters the community, the
second injunction emerges: You are still not one of us; you'll never
become one of us. If the confused recruit then wishes to withdraw,
the first message then comes on again, and so on ad infinitum. The
conflict between these two injunctions may be resolved by reading the
higher-level meta-message which contains them: You can't win in
either case, because you are who we say you are. In other words, the
meta-message is about domination and submission. That is indeed what
the phantasy is about. To enter such a Melayu-dom is thus to enter a
social phantasy system, where the mutual identification of Self and
Other has been constructed in terms of symbolic power. To enter as a
social inferior is thus to submit to the definition of Self by a more
powerful Other. In Chapter Seven, I asked why some people are willing
to trade their self-respect for an Other-derived ideology in which
they are evaluated as inferior. The answer, I suggest, is that the
desire to belong to a larger whole is greater than the desire to keep
one's self-respect by ignoring the definitions of Self by others.
NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

1. A comment on myth by Barthes (1956) is useful to our discussion:

Motivation is necessary to the very duplicity of myth: myth plays on the analogy between meaning and form, there is no myth without motivated form.... Motivation is unavoidable. It is nonetheless very fragmentary. To start with, it is not "natural": it is history which supplies its analogies to the form. Then, the analogy between the meaning and the concept is never anything but partial: the form drops many analogous features and keeps only a few.

(Quoted from Sontag 1982:112-113).

2. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:


3. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:

Pulau Karas itu pulau yang menarik orang ke sana. Macam Raja [X], dia ditarik ke sana, sampai dia kawin dengan orang Gângal.

4. See Embree (1973:91,133). I include the languages commonly referred to as 'Hokien' and 'Teochiu' under the rubric of southern Min.

5. See note 11 in Chapter Two on Pancasila.

6. There are eight or so birth-order names among my informants, usually used in the following order:

- long (sulong) for the eldest
- anjang (panjang) for the second
- ngah (tengah) } for the third and fourth
- lang (alang) } in whichever order
- tam (hitam) } for the fifth and sixth
- teh (putih) } in whichever order
- cik (kecik) for the second youngest
- ucu (bongsu) for the youngest.

Whereas the birth-order names of the oldest and the youngest are generally fixed, there is variation in the usage of those in the middle. For example, in one family, tam may precede teh, and in another, vice-versa. Where there are more than eight siblings, the additional siblings may have gelaran 'nicknames'. Where there are fewer than eight, some of the birth-order names in the middle may be dropped; but long (sulong) and ucu (bongsu) are nevertheless always kept.

For a comparative example of the use of birth-order names, see Benjamin's (1968a) analysis of Temiar names.
7. To use Freeman's (1973:109) explanation:

Amity here refers to the 'mutual support' that kinsfolk habitually offer to one another, this being an expression of a 'rule of prescriptive altruism'. This kind of behaviour, according to Fortes, is intrinsic to the relations of close kin.

8. These place-names are presented in the way my informant uttered them. 'Bulang (including Pecom)' refers to the island-cluster of which the biggest island is Bulan island itself. His inclusion of Pecom on the west side of Bulan island was meant to illustrate that he was referring not just to Bulan Strait but to the whole island-cluster. (See Maps 3 and 7.) 'Setokok (including Galang Rempang)' refers to the islands in the area of Setokok and Rempang. 'Galang Kandap' refers to the islands in the area of Galang Baru, extending to Pengelap (or 'Pengalap' in my informant's pronunciation). 'Galang Kandap' is itself an alternative name for Galang Baru. 'Galang Besar' is an alternative name for Galang Senyantung; it thus refers to the islands in that area including Karas. 'Temiang' refers to the islands in the area of Temiang Strait. 'Daik' refers to the islands in the Lingga and Singkep area. And 'Senayang' refers to the Sebangka and Bakung area. (See Map 3.)


10. As Freeman (1973:117) has pointed out:

'Latent hostilities' are often 'as intrinsically built into' the bonds of kinship as is 'amity'.

11. Lienhardt's (1951:317-318) comment on bewitchment is perhaps relevant in this context:

A man who thinks himself bewitched is interpreting what he takes to be intentions of his neighbours towards him. If he thinks himself envied, hated or frustrated, then he readily thinks himself bewitched.

12. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:


13. As Hughes (1896:8) has noted:

Circumcision is not once alluded to in the Qur'an. The omission is remarkable and the Muslim writers do not attempt any explanation for it. It is held to be sunnah [optional], or founded upon the customs of the Prophet (Fatawa 'Alamgiri, vol.iv p.237), and dating its institution from the time of Abraham... It is recommended to be performed upon a boy between the ages of seven and twelve, but it is lawful to circumcise a child seven days after his birth. In the case of a convert to Islam from some other creed, to whom the operation may be an occasion of great suffering, it can
be dispensed with, although it is considered expedient and proper for all new converts to be circumcised. In all cases, the adult is expected to circumcise himself, as it is a shame for an adult person to uncover himself to another. The circumcision of females is also allowed, and is commonly practised in Arabia.

In the case of my informant described in the text, she was circumcised by someone else, even though she is an adult. This is true also of some other converts I met, both male and female. Female circumcision in Riau evidently does not involve clitororodectomy. But it is not clear what is actually done; one opinion has it that a small cut is made in the labia majora. In most cases, this is done when the female is still an infant. Female circumcision in Riau seems to carry less risk than male circumcision. Whereas a few males have been known to die from post-circumcision infection, I have not come across any such case with regards to females. This suggests that no significant wound is made.

14. In this ritual, a mixture of rice-flour water and leaves of the setawar plant is dabbed on the person. As Wilkinson (1959:1093) has explained setawar, it is a 'descriptive name (si-tawar [the flavourless one]) for plants like Costus speciosus that are regarded as spiritual antiseptics, i.e. that keeps off demons of disease'. This ritual is quite clearly animistic. In his analysis of 'Malay magic' in the Malay Peninsula, Endicott (1970:136-137) describes the tepung tawar 'rice-flour mixture' as a 'boundary weakener', which weakens boundaries between categories, thereby facilitating the passage of essences between them.
CHAPTER NINE

ISLAMISATION AND WITCHCRAFT ACCUSATIONS:
CONVERSION AND APOSTASY

9.1 The Local Umat
9.2 Witchcraft Accusations
9.3 Islamisation in Galang
9.4 Epilogue: The Civilising Process
9.1 The Local Umat

Islam is an important means for effecting the centripetal orientation of those in the periphery towards the centre. But if the Melayu people at the periphery are supposed to be centripetally orientated towards those at the centre, then are those at the centre also orientated towards some other higher authority? Yes; this is precisely why Islam is so important to the Melayu murni.

The Arabic word islam literally means 'submission, resignation, reconciliation (to the will of God)' (Wehr 1976:426). The higher authority towards whom the Melayu murni see themselves as being centripetally orientated is thus none other than God himself. This implies that there are two distinct contexts of centripetal orientation: One is the context of the world-wide Islamic umat 'congregation of believers' or 'nation of Islam', where all are supposed to be centripetally orientated towards God. The other context is the local umat in the shape of the bygone sultanate, with Penyengat as its centre.

As mentioned above, the sultanate constituted a regional congregation headed by the sultan who is the imam 'religious guide'. Ever since the institution of the caliphate after the Prophet's death, it has been an established principle of Islamic organisation that the Muslim ruler is also the religious leader of the congregation that constitutes his polity. So the basis of political authority within an Islamic state is religious legitimation through God's sanction. As I have shown in Chapter Five, the significance of this was not lost on the Bugis rajas who did indeed legitimate themselves through Islam. Since Riau was under the yamtuan muda, not the yamtuan besar, it was the former who acted as the imam of the local umat. Indeed, from the time of Raja Haji onwards, all the yamtuan mudas seem to have been
particularly pious. (See Appendix 8.)

At the present time, despite the absence of a yamtuan muda to act as imam, Penyengat nevertheless remains a religious centre for the area in at least two important respects — as the location of a major mosque and as a place where Muslims can get married. The mosque, painted in bright yellow, is a clearly visible landmark from the sea. (See Plates 21 and 22.) When I first began my fieldwork in 1979, it was still white in colour; it was repainted yellow only in 1982. Perhaps an interpretation may be given of the colours used: My informants generally consider white as the colour of 'cleanliness, holiness', and yellow as the colour of 'royalty'. The shift from white to yellow may thus mark a greater emphasis on the royalty of the Penyengat mosque, particularly in relation to the other major mosque located in Tanjungpinang, which is, interestingly, in blue and white.

As mentioned in Chapter Two, Penyengat is only fifteen minutes away from Tanjungpinang by motor-boat. Because of the proximity of the two places, their respective mosques are equally available to both populations. However, whereas there are Indonesian bureaucrats and other people from Tanjungpinang who regularly come to the Penyengat mosque to pray, especially on Fridays, there are very few, if any, Penyengat people who go to the Tanjungpinang mosque to pray.

According to a canonical tradition, mosques are Allah's houses on earth. Some mosques may thus be perceived as more favoured dwelling-places of Allah, than are other mosques. Those where his presence is supposed to be more evident would be described as berkat 'blessed'. The Penyengat mosque seems to be so considered.

One informant even used the word daulat 'divine kingship' to describe its aura. According to this informant, aeroplanes should not 'cross over' (langkah) the Penyengat mosque; if they do, they would be
struck down by daulat. (As it happens, Penyengat does not lie in any aeronautical flight path.)

However, although people from Tanjungpinang do go to the Penyengat mosque to pray, other islanders hardly ever do so. So as a focus of centripetal orientation, it seems to attract only the former. Where the latter are concerned, Penyengat is significant primarily as a centre for Muslim marriages. In the whole of Kecamatan Bintan Selatan, there are only three marriage specialists authorised to marry Muslims: two of them are on Penyengat; the other one is the head of the Department of Religion in Tanjungpinang. So anyone who wishes to be married in an Islamic manner has to make a pilgrimage to either Penyengat or Tanjungpinang. Such a situation seems to have been derived from zaman sultan.

As a Penyengat raja explained to me:

In the era of the sultan, wherever his deputy was, there would be a marriage specialist. The deputy could marry people, because he was the representative of the sultan. The sultan was the head of government, the head of culture, and the head of religion.... The one who has the right to marry people is actually the woman's guardian. The sultan and his deputy also had to perform the marriage ceremony in the name of the guardian. According to religious law, people do not need to come to Penyengat to get married. The guardian of the woman can marry off his daughter in his own village. But according to state law, governmental law — that is, kanun or adat — marriage must take place in the presence of the marriage specialist, even if this specialist merely sits there saying nothing. State law was made by the sultan.

(My translation).

The 'sultan's deputy' (amir) that my raja informant was referring to was the yamtuan muda in Penyengat. So even though canonical law in Islam does not require Muslims to go to the political centre to get married, state law or governmental law required and still requires such a pilgrimage. Islam is thereby centralised such that the political capital is also the religious centre. Indeed I found that
most of my Muslim informants outside Penyengat have visited the island at least once in their lives — that is, when they went there to get married. Islam is thus an important means for effecting the centripetal orientation of those in the periphery towards the centre.

9.2 Witchcraft Accusations

As shown in Chapter Eight, from the Penyengat perspective, the inward orientation of the Galang people is interpreted as centrifugal, as a turning away from the proper directionality. As mentioned above, an impellent mode of morality is implied in centripetalism, such that it is right, good, and safe for those in the periphery to be orientated towards the centre. So according to this logic, the reverse orientation would be wrong, evil, and dangerous. Indeed my Melayu murni informants — that is, those in Penyengat, Pangkil and Pengujan — do explicitly regard the Galang people in such terms. The latter are said to pakai ilmu 'use witchcraft' and main racun 'play with poison'. Any visitor to Galang is thought liable to fall victim to witchcraft and poisoning.

The term I have glossed as 'witchcraft' is ilmu, an Arabic-derived word which has the primary meaning of 'knowledge'. My Melayu murni informants in Penyengat and Pangkil differentiate between good 'knowledge' and bad 'knowledge'. Good 'knowledge' is that revealed by Allah; bad 'knowledge' is that derived from hantu, spirits other than Allah. In between these moral poles is neutral 'knowledge' — for example, ilmu pengetahuan 'scientific knowledge' that is derived from outsiders.

Such being the case, it follows that only the Muslim Melayu can have good 'knowledge', whereas the non-Muslim Melayu would necessarily have bad 'knowledge'. Indeed, the evil of the Galang people and the
sea nomads is said to derive precisely from their 'lack of religion' (kurang ugama). In this connection, it is significant that the Karas community is said to be 'getting gradually better' (beransur baik). This improvement is indeed attributed to the increasing presence of Islam there — sekaranugama disana lebih kuat 'now religion there is stronger'. In other words, a Muslim Melayu is regarded as intrinsically good, whereas a non-Muslim Melayu is regarded as intrinsically bad. As a consequence, only the good can have good 'knowledge'; the bad would have access only to bad 'knowledge'.

I have glossed this bad 'knowledge' as 'witchcraft' because the evil is attributed not to the act of knowing, but to the person who knows. In this usage I am following Evans-Pritchard (1937) differentiation between 'sorcery' where evil is attributed to the act, and 'witchcraft' where evil is attributed to the person. Such a differentiation is applicable to the situation in Riau.

To illustrate this, let us consider the bomoh 'healer/sorceror' who exists even in the communities that are considered murni 'pure', indeed even in Penyengat itself. The kind of 'knowledge' that a bomoh has is generally referred to as ilmu sihir. (See Wilkinson 1959:421.) The 'knowledge' of such sorcerors is considered acceptable if these sorcerors are themselves acceptable as Muslims. For example, a raja from Penyengat who is a well-known bomoh, proudly announced to me that he had studied his ilmu sihir in Mecca; to prove it, he brought out Arabic books that were supposedly about ilmu sihir. (See Wee and Matheson forthcoming.) Another raja, also a bomoh, told me that he only uses Quranic verses in making his spells. Ilmu sihir is thus supposed to have an Islamic derivation, even though it is evidently not part of Islam as such.
Because of this supposed Islamic derivation, a bomoh's ilmu sihir is not regarded as intrinsically evil; it is a matter that can be safely discussed in public. In contrast, the bad 'knowledge' of witchcraft is an evil mystery to which my murni informants feel they have no direct access. So whereas the bomoh's 'knowledge' is regarded as capable of curing illness, the bad 'knowledge' of witchcraft is regarded as only dangerously malevolent. So although I have informants who are very willing to acknowledge that they are bomohs, I have yet to meet a self-confessed 'witch'.

However, my informants who are not themselves bomohs, do show some ambivalence towards the bomoh's 'knowledge'. Some of them even said that a bomoh may deliberately cause someone to fall ill, just so as to earn a fee by curing that person. Indeed it is generally held by my informants that the bomoh's ability to cure illness can be turned into an ability to cause illness. Such an opinion is quite openly expressed.

For example, something was once stolen from one of my raja informants who is a bomoh. His friends urged him to 'fix' (bikin) the unknown thief by casting a spell. He refused, saying that what he had lost was not that valuable. But if he were to 'fix' the thief, the result would be an illness that would cost the thief a huge sum of money to cure.

The way he expressed his reluctance is very interesting. He did not say that he was not able to 'fix' the thief; to do so would be to declare the limits of his power. However, if he had agreed to 'fix' the thief, that would imply that he could 'fix' others as well, and the next illness that occurred in the community could well be blamed on him. So the best strategy was indeed to refuse, ostensibly out of the kindness of his heart -- that is, by saying that he did not want
to cause the thief to squander a huge sum of money disproportionate to the cost of the article that had been stolen.

This demonstrates the perceived difference between the bomoh's ilmu sihir as sorcery and the Galang people's ilmu as witchcraft. The difference lies in the perception of their respective intentionality. A bomoh may be powerful but he or she is not regarded as intrinsically evil. Even a bomoh who is said to cause illness just to earn a fee by curing the illness, is perceived as eventually curing it. So what my bomoh informant said about refraining from harming the thief, fits in nicely with the public perception of bomohs in general. To explain why bomohs are acceptable, an informant who is a haji -- that is, a returned pilgrim from Mecca -- said that bomohs are able to cure illness only because God allows them to do so: semua Tuhan punya kuasa 'all is in God's power'.

The logic of monotheism does indeed imply that if God has the monopoly on good, then anyone who does not submit to God is, by definition, evil. This was explicitly stated by a raja informant. He described the Galang people as orang liar 'wild people', who have no idea of dosa 'sin'. He said that they think they are Tuhan 'God':

Dia sangka yang dia mau semua boleh jadi.

(They think that whatever they want can be.)

The implication is clear: It is a 'sin' to be Self-orientated; only a self-existent God has that right, it seems. So the way not to 'sin' is to be Other-orientated, specifically towards the one supreme Other -- God.

Although the whole Galang area is considered by my Penyengat informants as dangerous, a few communities were mentioned as being particularly bad. The people of Pulau Melor were said to be the
worst, and the people of Pulau Panjang almost as bad. The witchcraft of the Karas people was said to have been so powerful that it could kill a visitor the moment he or she stepped on their shore; there and then he or she would vomit blood and die. As mentioned in Chapter Eight, my Karas informants have an alternative explanation for this supposed power, attributing it instead to the daulat 'divine kingship' of the island.

According to my Penyengat informants, Karas is said to be 'getting gradually better', but is still not wholly safe. Apparently, in such places, even if a visitor were to be given a show of welcome, he or she may still be poisoned by the food and drinks offered by the host. According to a raja informant, even if one's host were to slice a loaf of bread in one's presence and to partake of that same bread, one could still be poisoned, because the knife used for cutting would have a poisoned side and an un-poisoned side. The slice on the poisoned side would be offered to the guest, while the un-poisoned slice would be taken by the host.

This fear of being bewitched and poisoned by the Galang people does not, however, mean that the rajas themselves never visit the Galang area. As mentioned above, there is even a raja who lives in Karas, and who is still alive and well after more than ten years on the island. But this fact does not seem to deter the accusations of witchcraft and poisoning levelled against the Galang people by the Penyengat rajas. On the contrary, as I have indicated above, this particular raja is regarded by his peers as a turncoat of sorts; he is said to have been 'pulled' (ditarik).

Still, my first visits to Karas, Nanga, and Pulau Panjang were all undertaken in the company of a Penyengat raja. (See Map 4.) Before we went, I was warned of the dangers of witchcraft and poison
that might be encountered in these places. I was instructed not to partake of the food and drinks offered to me there, unless I saw my raja guide eating and drinking first. In the case of Karas, he said that he knew the safe houses; these were the houses of the local 'headman' and Raja X the headmaster. We made only a brief visit to Nanga, and did not eat or drink anything there. In the case of Pulau Panjang, the raja's wife prepared all the food and drinks in her own home the previous night, which we then took with us and ate on the boat while it was moored next to the jetty. Significantly, on these trips, we went 'in a crowd' (ramai-ramai). Apparently, there is strength in numbers. Apart from the raja and myself, the party to Karas and Pulau Nanga included some ten people from Pangkil. The party to Pulau Panjang was even more numerous, because we went with the soccer team from Pangkil that had gone to play against the Pulau Panjang team. Nor was the raja the only one wary of eating and drinking in these places; the other members in our party were also very cautious.

I asked my informants from Penyengat and Pangkil what they thought would be the Galang people's motive in killing their visitors through witchcraft and poison. Would it be for monetary profit, for example? The consistent answer I received was that the Galang people 'want to test their witchcraft' (nak cuba ilmunya). The purpose, it seems, is to measure their 'witchcraft' (ilmu) against the 'strength' (kekuatan) of the visitors. After trying their 'witchcraft' on a certain person, they will know whether that person is 'strong' (kuat) or 'weak' (lemah). If that person is 'strong' and is able to withstand their witchcraft, then the next time they would not be brave enough to try again. My informants stated categorically that material wealth was not the purpose of witchcraft.
No one in our party to Karas, Nanga, and Pulau Panjang succumbed to either witchcraft or poison. So everyone had evidently passed the test of 'strength'. However, it is not always the case that people can pass this test. The death of a young man in Pangkil, for example, was blamed on the witchcraft of the Galang people. He had been a member of the Pangkil soccer team and had gone to various places in the Galang area to play against their local teams. Apparently, after one of these matches, he had returned home ill. At the time I met him, he was already ailing. He never recovered; his death was consequently blamed on his opponents' soccer witchcraft.

My Penyengat and Pangkil informants are of the opinion that witchcraft is used against them at the soccer matches to which they send their local teams. The Pangkil people, in particular, mention this often, more so than do the Penyengat people; the former are keener on soccer than are the latter. (Since soccer involves the combat of equal opponents, it is perhaps not surprising that the Penyengat rajas are less interested in playing the game. The Penyengat team consists mostly of commoners.)

My Pangkil informants seem to blame every injury on the playing field or subsequent illness that befalls a Pangkil player on the other side's witchcraft. Such accusations seem to be made regardless of whether the Pangkil team has lost or won. If they have lost, their defeat may be blamed on soccer witchcraft. Even if they have won, and even if no one was injured on the playing field, there may still be talk of the opposing team's attempt to use witchcraft. For example, it may be said that a member of the other team was sighted muttering an incantation over a lime in front of the goal, before the match began, in order to prevent the ball from entering. So even when the Pangkil side wins, their victory is construed as a triumph of 'strength' (kekuatan) over 'witchcraft' (ilmu).
Indeed when I asked my Pangkil informants why they continue to have these soccer matches if they consider them so dangerous, they answered that the young men want to test their 'strength'. This 'strength' does not seem to include the use of any counter-magic. To cite an informant:

*Kita tidak pakai ilmu, kita cuma ada kepandaian.*

(We do not use witchcraft, we only have skill.)

Or as another informant said:

*Orang Pangkil tak pakai syarat-syarat. Kalau orang lain nak pakai ilmu, itu terserah kepada dialah.*

(The Pangkil people don't use protective amulets. If others wish to use witchcraft, that's up to them.)

Such statements and others made by my informants express an almost cheerful willingness to assume an attitude of vulnerability, with regards to others, for better or for worse. Counter-attack is not even considered as a possibility, the implication being that good people do not use witchcraft; only bad people do. To claim vulnerability to other people's witchcraft is thus to announce that oneself is not a witch, hence not evil, hence good.

Douglas' general characterisation of witchcraft (1970:xxvi) is relevant to our understanding of the situation in Riau:

*The witch is an attacker and deceiver. He uses what is impure and potent to harm what is pure and helpless. The symbols of what we recognise across the globe as witchcraft all build on the theme of vulnerable internal goodness attacked by external power. But these symbols vary according to local patterns of meaning and, above all, according to variation in the social structure.*

She goes on to differentiate between two types of witchcraft -- (i) where the witch is an outsider, and (ii) where the witch is an internal enemy. My Penyengat and Pangkil informants' perception of
witchcraft clearly fits into Douglas' second type. After all, they felt it necessary to warn me, a total outsider who is neither Melayu nor Muslim nor an inhabitant of Riau, of the witchcraft of the Galang people who are indeed acknowledged as Melayu asli, the indigenous inhabitants of Riau.

Furthermore, in the course of my fieldwork, I did not hear a single accusation of witchcraft levelled against 'newcomers' (pendatang), such as the Javanese, Chinese, Indians, Europeans, and so on. I raised this matter with some of my Pangkil informants who said that what they had told me about witchcraft applied only to the Melayu: people of 'other stock' (lain bangsa) have their own different kinds of witchcraft. These people of 'other stock' are also said to be immune to the effects of Melayu witchcraft. For example, according to one informant, if a 'white person' (orang putih) or a Chinese person were to go to Karas, he or she would not vomit up blood on the beach and die; only a vulnerable Melayu person would suffer such effects.

Since I am myself Chinese, how does this explain the dietary precautions I was told to observe, when I went to Karas, Nanga and Pulau Panjang with my informants from Penyengat and Pangkil? Apparently, Chinese people who are involved in Melayu 'social interaction' (pergaulan) become vulnerable, or are regarded as such. These include the Chinese families who have established groceries on the various islands. The implication is that Melayu-dom is a particular sphere of social interaction. So Melayu witchcraft affects only those who are involved within this sphere.

Douglas (1970:xxvii) further differentiates internal witchcraft into three sub-types --
(i) where the witch is a member of a rival faction;
(ii) where the witch is a dangerous deviant;
(iii) where the witch is an internal enemy with outside liaisons.

I suggest that the kind of internal witchcraft that disturbs my Penyengat and Pangkil informants is of the first sub-type. According to Douglas (ibid.), the function of this sub-type of internal witchcraft is 'to redefine faction boundaries or realign faction hierarchy or split community.' Such a characterisation seems particularly apt with regards to the situation in Riau, where we find a certain sector of Melayu-dom -- that is, the self-defined 'pure' ones -- trying to sustain the image of a hierarchy with themselves located at the top of that imagined hierarchy.

In such a context, alternative forms of Melayu-ness would be perceived as threatening, because they offer alternative ways of being Melayu, without necessarily taking the route of becoming Melayu murni as defined in Penyengat terms. These alternatives are perceived by my Melayu murni informants as centrifugal because they focus attention away from Penyengat. Such a perception is expressed, for example, in the following accounts.

According to my Melayu murni informants, the nomadic orang laut 'sea people' also have powerful ilmu. So one should take care not to 'insult' (menghina) them, because if they are offended, they would cast a spell, inducing to 'follow' (ikut) and become one of them. In a case cited by my informants, a man bought some 'prawn paste' from an orang laut woman, but he was hesitant about giving her the money, because her hands were dirty. The offended woman then cast a spell on him, inducing him to follow her and become an orang laut himself. The moral of this story is that one should avoid interacting with the orang laut -- for example, by buying 'prawn paste' from them; otherwise, one is liable to be inducted by them into an orang laut way
Interestingly, this fear of being induced to join the nomadic orang laut is not unique to my Melayu murni informants, but is shared perhaps by all the Melayu sedentary villagers, including those who may be evaluated as 'impure'. It is quite clear that what is feared is nomadism as an alternative to sedentism. According to my village informants, the nomadic orang laut lack sufficient water with which to bathe; so they are 'smelly' (busuk). Moreover, they live on fish alone; so they smell fishy. However, if one meets an orang laut, one must pretend not to notice this smell, for if one shows one's disdain, then the orang laut would take out a bottle containing dugong's tears, sprinkle some tear drops on the disdainful one, and thereby induce that person to leave kith and kin to join the orang laut. This inducted recruit would consequently lose all memory of origins. According to my village informants, the orang laut collect the tears of the dugong expressly for such a purpose.

I have found no evidence that this sort of induction actually happens. What is interesting is that my sedentary informants, particularly the 'pure' ones, should impute a desire on the part of the orang laut to recruit outsiders to their way of life. This may perhaps be understood as a projection of one's own desire onto others, for it is quite clear that my Melayu murni informants are the ones who desire to recruit others to their own supposedly 'pure' way of life.

Apart from the nomadism represented by the orang laut, other alternative forms of Melayu-ness are also perceived as threatening. To illustrate this further, I cite below a story told by an informant, Raja H, to his friends:
Once I brought a drama group to participate in a competition for the whole of Riau province. I was the leader of the troupe. The groups from Pekanbaru, Bengkalis, Kampar all brought their own magicians. Awe-inspiring indeed! I only brought ordinary people such as S.H. and S.T. When we arrived in Pekanbaru and were about to perform, there came Pak T.M.

'Hey, Pak Raja H, is everything ready?'
'Yes, ready.'
'Are your amulets ready?'
'What amulets?'

[Raja H's listeners chuckled.]

'Eh, are you not using any amulets?'

'So, in this Pekanbaru competition, one has to use amulets.'

'Of course,' he said, 'you have to use amulets.'

'Wait, I'll find some.'

I went to get some limes, only because I was forced to. I got the biggest I could find. I merely played with the limes, striking at them. In the afternoon, he came.

'You are not behaving properly; I was not joking,' he said.

'This is the case. I did not bring any amulets. But if you wish to help, then help me indeed. How would it be if we use the magician from Bengkalis? Please help.'

'If we make a proper request, it is possible,' he said.

That evening was the first evening of the competition; the Bengkalis people who performed that evening were safe. We were to perform the second evening. The Bengkalis magician helped us. He used all sorts of things. He helped us; we were grateful. We were merely trying to evade evil, because we had been warned. After completing the ritual to evade evil, the magician came and said to me, 'Pak, don't let anyone enter the room; I wish to help you, but I am not capable.' 'If that is the case, so be it,' I said. I told my troupe members, 'Don't let anyone enter, hear?' 'Outsiders,' I said, 'Watch out for them.' About five minutes before we were to perform, there came a person. 'Pak H called me just now. He asked me to bring something. I've brought it,' said the visitor. So my troupe members gave him admittance and went to look for me.

'If Pak H is not around, I'll see Pak S.T.,' said the man.

'If you want to see Pak H, he's inside; go straight in.'
While the man was entering, he uncovered a tray. Thus and thus he sowed, like, you know, washing bananas. He uncovered and he scattered around — well — green beans. On everything he scattered green beans. Then it was time for us to begin our performance. The Bengkalis magician came; he opened the door and saw that everything was covered with green beans. 'You have been struck!' he said, 'Just be careful! There is nothing more I can do! Just perform with care!'

I was feeling very uneasy, was I not? But we went on to perform. When the play had gone on for only ten minutes — it so happened that we had brought the story 'Hang Jebat in Melaka' — after only ten minutes, during the swordfighting scene, the actor's sword slipped, straightaway pierced his leg, and was stuck in it. The Provincial Governor mounted the stage. He did not know the whole story, did he now? The curtains were drawn. The Governor mounted. Thus. Ah, he was furious. 'What is this, no amulets! How long have you people been playing about like this! Now that you are struck like this, what is to be done? What kind of leadership does this troupe have?'

In the beginning when the incident had happened, I had said to the troupe, 'Who is it who is wounded? Shut the door. Don't let anyone enter. Don't panic. Carry S.H. to one side,' I said, 'Ask Pak S.T. to help. Look for some medical people. We do not want to create confusion.' Somebody shut the door. Shut it was. From the front came two persons who wanted to enter. Well, the bleeding was not profuse; the wound was only minor. The door was being knocked from the outside.

'Don't open it.'

'Hey, open up.'

I said, 'Hey, go away; no one is allowed to enter.'

'Eh, this is the Governor.'

'Eh, Pak Governor, please come in.'

[The listeners chuckled.]

He entered angrily. He called doctors of the province to give medical treatment, which they promptly did.

After listening to Raja H's story, one of the listeners commented:

So in Pekanbaru it is still like that; the witchcraft there is still strong.

And Raja H replied:

It's still like that.
I have presented Raja H's story in verbatim translation from a taped transcription, in order to illustrate the following points. From a disinterested observer's point of view, the 'real' event that occurred was that an actor had accidentally stabbed himself in the leg during a swordfighting scene in a play, an accident which may be considered as no more than an occupational hazard. But in Raja H's telling of the tale, the accident is no accident, but almost an inevitability. Indeed, the focus of the story is not on an actor stabbing himself in the leg, but on the potency of other people's witchcraft. So according to the way that Raja H had built up his story, if the actor had not stabbed himself in the leg, some other disaster was bound to happen (the stage might have collapsed, for example). So incidental is the stabbing to the whole story, that at the end of it, a listener's comment concerns not the actor's misfortune, but the potency of witchcraft in Pekanbaru.

The listeners were interested to know that in Pekanbaru 'it is still like that'. Pekanbaru is the capital of Riau Province, and as such symbolises for my Riau informants the modern ethos of the Indonesian nation-state. This symbolling is evident in Raja H's references to the Provincial Governor and 'doctors of the province'. Indeed the drama competition itself was organised by the provincial government; so the overall context of Raja H's story is unmistakably a modern Indonesian setting.

Yet the people who are perceived as dangerous are not those who may be identified as non-Melayu Indonesian, but rather, those who may be identified as Melayu in one sense or another. The three places that were named -- Pekanbaru, Bengkalis, and Kampar -- all belonged to former sultanates, separate and different from the Riau-Lingga sultanate. As mentioned in Chapter One, Pekanbaru is located on Siak River and is hence within the territory of the former Siak sultanate.
However, as pointed out above, it is the provincial capital and is hence regarded as more Indonesian than Melayu. Indeed its name literally means 'New Town'. Bengkalis, on the other hand, was an older part of the Siak sultanate, that was of some historical significance. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:23,48; Matheson and Andaya 1982:325,359.) Kampar was a sultanate by itself. The indigenous inhabitants of these areas are thus referred to by my informants as, respectively, Melayu Siak and Melayu Kampar.

Raja H's choice of the Bengkalis magician to help him out suggests that the Melayu Siak are perceived as being closer to the Melayu Riau, and are hence safer. Bengkalis is indeed geographically closer to Riau than Kampar is. (See Map 2.) Geographical proximity may thus figure importantly in the determination of social familiarity. Whereas a few of my informants have been to Bengkalis, none that I know of has been to Kampar. So although my informants know that the people of Kampar are also Melayu, they are unfamiliar with this form of alternative Melayu-ness.

Significantly, I have heard them say in some other contexts that Kampar is a very inaccessible place, because the Kampar river has violent currents and is almost impossible to navigate without a native guide. But, according to them, the people of Kampar are able to ride the turbulent waters of this river, by bobbing up and down in their sampans. One informant told me that there are three dangerous things in Kampar: the currents of the river, the crocodiles, and the inhabitants' ilmu 'witchcraft' which is said to be so powerful that spells can be 'sent' (kirim) at great distances.

There seems to be some validity to my informants' perception of the dangers of the Kampar river. According to the description of the river in the Indonesia Pilot (1975:I,148):
Owing to the tidal bore which takes place and the strong tidal streams, local knowledge is necessary.

In my informants' perception, however, geographical danger seems to be translated further into social terms, probably because geographical inaccessibility is a barrier which produces social strangeness. This strangeness is evidently construed as more than just tolerable difference. On the contrary, it is regarded as dangerous, because the strangers are not clearly defined outsiders such as the Javanese, Bataks and Chinese; they are, rather, strange Melayu.

Douglas' (1970:xxv) statement about the relationship between community and witchcraft is relevant to our discussion at this point:

People are trying to control one another, albeit with small success. The idea of the witch is used to whip their own consciences or those of their friends. The witch-image is as effective as the idea of the community is strong.

Indeed, following Douglas, I would argue that among my informants, witchcraft accusations arise precisely because of the attempt to forge a communally integrated Melayu-dom. As shown above, an impellent morality of centripetalism is put forward as the means of integrating the periphery with the centre. All alternative forms of Melayu-ness that do not refer to this designated centre are likely to be perceived as competing centres and are hence dangerous. The people who represent these alternative forms of Melayu-ness are likely to be accused of being witches and are hence to be avoided. Barriers to social interaction are thereby erected, symbolically sealing off one particular form of Melayu-ness as the only safe and proper Melayu-dom in Riau.

According to Douglas (1970:xxxiii), 'where there is witchcraft there is usually witch-cleansing'. But I have not found this to be the case among my informants in Riau. Although witchcraft accusations
abound among them, there is evidently no such phenomenon as the cleansing and confession of witches. Apparently, no one has ever confessed to being a witch, no one has ever been brought to any kind of trial for witchcraft, and no one has ever been punished for being a witch. As mentioned above, not even counter-witchcraft is considered possible.

To return to Raja H's story as an example, the implication is quite clearly that one can only suffer one's vulnerability to dangerous strangers. As Raja H had said to the Bengkalis magician, 'If that is the case, so be it!' At no point in the story did Raja H express regret that he did not bring along a magician. Neither he nor his audience seemed to think that it was foolhardy not to have gone well-equipped with amulets. Moreover, there was no attempt after the actor's misfortune to trace the identity of the supposed evildoer. There was evidently no concern with retribution. Instead, the story seems to have been aimed at generating surprise at how much evil there still is in the world. At worst, one has to suffer it; at best, one can try to evade it -- for example, by not allowing dangerous strangers to enter one's private zone.

When I asked my Melayu murni informants about what possible means there were for countering witchcraft, they said that one can merely ask Allah for protection -- for example, by reciting the doa selamat 'prayer for safekeeping' in order to 'repel evil' (tolak bala). All else, they said, is in God's hands, including retribution. In other words, the perceived opposition of forces is not between one's own vulnerable self and the powerful witch, but between a good God and an evil witch. One is thus supposed to shield one's vulnerability to witchcraft not with protective amulets, but with an alternative vulnerability to God through voluntary submission. To put it another way, a centripetal orientation towards God is sufficient by itself as
protection against centrifugal evil, the assumption being that a person can only be orientated in one direction at any one time — that is, either centripetally or centrifugally, but not both ways at the same time.

In this context, we may look for comparison to Brown's (1970) analysis of witchcraft accusations in the Late Roman Period. Douglas (1970:xxvii) mentions this case as an example of the sub-type of internal witchcraft where the person accused of witchcraft is a member of a rival faction. According to Brown (1970:21-22):

Late Roman society was dominated by the problem of the conflict between change and stability in a traditional society. It is here that we find a situation which has been observed both to foster sorcery accusations and to offer scope for resort to sorcery. This is when two systems of power are sensed to clash within the one society. On the one hand, there is articulate power, power defined and agreed upon by everyone (and especially by its holders: authority vested in precise persons; admiration and success gained by recognised channels. Running counter to this there may be other forms of influence less easy to pin down — inarticulate power: the disturbing intangibles of social life; the imponderable advantages of certain groups; personal skills that succeed in a way that is unacceptable or difficult to understand. Where these two systems overlap, we may expect to find the sorcerer.... In this situation, the accuser is actually the man with the Single Image. For him, there is one, single, recognised way of making one's way in the world.... The sorcerer, by contrast, is seen as the man invested with the Double Image. There is more to him than meets the eye. He has brought in the unseen to redress the balance of the seen. His achievements may be admired, but they are, essentially, illegitimate.

Although in this passage Brown refers only to sorcery, I shall generalise his remarks to include witchcraft.

His description of the situation in the Late Roman empire (A.D.300-600) sounds peculiarly consonant with the situation I have found in twentieth-century Melayu-dom in Riau. Of course I am not suggesting that there is any direct historical connection between the two; what I am pointing out is a similarity of patterning. Indeed the
dominant problem confronting my informants is the conflict of change and stability. There are, however, more than just two systems of power clashing in this situation. First of all, there is the political structure of the Indonesian nation-state, within which the Suku Melayu constitutes one division of the total population. Second, within Riau, there is the Melayu murni view of Melayu-dom as a social preserve inherited from zaman sultan. Third, within and without Riau, there are alternative forms of Melayu-ness represented, for example, by the Galang people, the nomadic orang laut, and the Kampar people.

Significantly, the accusers of witchcraft discussed above are those operating within the second system, with their accusations directed against those perceived as being in the third. The institutional power-holders in the Indonesian political structure are, however, left out of what I would term 'the circle of bewitchment'. Why is this so? In this regard, Laing's (1969:47) idea of 'elusion' is useful. I would argue that for my Melayu murni informants, the conflict between change and stability mentioned above may be understood as the inherent contradiction between the institutional presence of a modernising Indonesian nation-state and the ideological presence of a bygone, and hence unchanging, Riau-Lingga sultanate. Direct confrontation between these two contradictory social realities would be of no benefit whatsoever to my informants themselves, since they are in no position to translate ideology into political institution. So instead they elude this irresolvable conflict by shifting to another modality of experience.

My informants' circle of bewitchment may thus be understood as a phenomenon that belongs to the realm of phantasy, a realm where the non-Melayu Indonesians are perceived only as incidental outsiders, as extras playing bit parts. So in this phantasy, the main dramatic interest is in the conflict between different forms of Melayu-ness,
with my Melayu murni informants regarding their own perspective as natural and hence good, in contrast to which the alternative forms are regarded as deviant and hence bad.

In contrast to Late Roman society as described by Brown (see above), for my informants in Riau, the clash between the two systems of power occur not within institutionalised society, but in the realm of social phantasy. It is perhaps debatable whether these constitute systems of power. As mentioned in Chapter One, I follow Foucault (1980a:92-93) in arguing that power should be understood not only in terms of such terminal forms as 'the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination':

Power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organisation.

(Ibid.)

In their most rudimentary form, these force relations may be conceived of as the interaction of will, whether it is the will of Self for Self, or the imposition of Self's will upon Other, or the imposition of Other's will upon Self, or the interplay of will between both. So as a process of identifying Self and Other, Melayu-ness may be construed as an expression of will. The contradiction between alternative forms of Melayu-ness may therefore be seen as a conflict of will. It is in this processual sense that these alternative forms may be understood as systems of power.

Brown (ibid.) argues that the accuser of sorcery — and, I would add, witchcraft — is usually one who adheres to what he terms 'the Single Image' of power, whereas the sorcerer — and witch — is one who is seen as being 'invested with the Double Image' of power. To apply Brown's terms, the Melayu murni are those who adhere to the
'Single Image', for they see only one valid way of being 'pure'; they accuse those 'invested with the Double Image' of exercising illegitimate power which bypasses this one route to 'purity'. There is thus a contradiction between the one 'pure' form of Melayu-ness and the many 'impure', and hence polluting, alternatives. The power of the latter to pollute the former is acknowledged: For example, an orang laut may sprinkle some dugong's tears on a Melayu murni and thereby contaminate him or her, hence transforming the 'pure' into the 'impure'. This power is feared by those who consider themselves murni (and fear is a kind of admiration), but it is condemned as evil and is hence illegitimate.

Brown (1970) notes that the Late Roman period saw the rapid rise of Christianity; he further states that the more Christianised the Roman population became, the more were the remaining non-Christians condemned as evil. In such an advanced situation of conversion to monotheism, it becomes no longer acceptable as mere difference that some should be converts while others are not. By then, non-conversion is construed not just as ignorance or as choice, but as wilful apostasy, as volitional centrifugalism from the 'Single Image' of legitimate power, as the abandonment of identity.

This is particularly significant as a comparison with my informants' situation, for twentieth-century Melayu-dom in Riau is still undergoing Islamisation. As mentioned above, there are non-Muslim Melayu people in Riau. Because the encompassing political context is Indonesia, which is essentially a secular nation-state, the Islamisation of Melayu-ness is not receiving the political fillip that could otherwise spur the process to full development. This contrasts with the situation in Malaysia where Islam is indeed the official state religion. In Riau, however, the Islamisation of Melayu-ness is not so far advanced that only the Muslim Melayu are recognised as
Melayu, even though such a tendency is implied by the definition of Melayu-ness as 'purity'.

What is perhaps most significant in this comparison is that both Christianity and Islam are both monotheisms where God is the repository of all good. If God monopolises good, then all that is not-God must necessarily be evil. In a Christianising or Islamising situation, the application of this polarised morality to the population would divide people into good and evil, converts and non­converts, sheep and goats. It is in such a situation that witchcraft accusations become plausible, for in this logic, those who would not convert cannot be good and are necessarily evil. The monotheistic character of Islam and Christianity contributes specifically to the 'Single Image' that Brown speaks of. So witchcraft accusations directed against those 'invested with the Double Image' are just the other side of the monotheistic coin. The more fervently one adheres to the singularity of the 'Single Image', the more one fears the contamination of those 'invested with the Double Image'. In other words, it is the perception of good as being in only one particular form, that engenders the perception of evil in its multiple forms. Good is thus one small isolated island located, as it were, in a sea of evil.

However, as pointed out above, a caveat must be added to the effect that among my Melayu murni informants, this logic is evidently applied only to those whose allegiance is claimed by Melayu-dom. For example, the existence of many non-Muslim non-Melayu Indonesians does not seem to disturb my informants to the extent of making witchcraft accusations. Even the presence of many Christian Bataks, Javanese and Flores in Riau seems quite acceptable; I have not heard any witchcraft accusation directed against these people. Furthermore, in almost every Melayu community, there is at least one non-Muslim
Chinese family, serving as the all-purpose economic intermediary. Not only that, most of the major towns in Riau have large non-Muslim Chinese populations. Again, there is quite clearly no witchcraft accusation against these people.

My Melayu murni informants would even quite comfortably eat and drink at Chinese-owned coffee shops, so long as pork is not served to them. It is evident that they do not fear being bewitched or poisoned by these non-Melayu people. The people they fear are other Melayu who are perceived as being centrifugally orientated from all that is good and 'pure'. This is indicative of the relatively limited degree to which the 'Single Image' of monotheism imbues their worldview. It seems to be limited to the purview of Melayu-dom. So of the two Islamic contexts mentioned above -- the world-wide umat and the local umat in the shape of the bygone sultanate -- it is quite clear that the latter is of greater importance to my Melayu murni informants. As pointed out above, to them the significance of Islam lies in its capacity to serve as an ideology of legitimation. In the absence of an actual sultanate, what is being legitimated is not institutionalised authority but symbolic power within an elusive phantasy.

The accusations of witchcraft and poison are significant in the context of phantasy. Laing (1969:39) notes:

A person in an alienated false position within a social phantasy system, who begins partially to apperceive his position, may give 'psychotic' expression to his partial apperception of the actual phantasy state of affairs by saying that he is being subjected to poisons concealed in his food, that his brains have been taken from him, that his actions are controlled from outer space, etc.

I suggest that the existence of alternative forms of Melayu-ness is sufficient to trigger off among the Melayu murni a partial apperception of 'purity' as actually a phantasy that is not rooted in
authentic experience. The defence of the realism of this phantasy is thus expressed through accusing those who adhere to the threatening alternatives, of being witches and poisoners. This defensive fear of bewitchment and poison is not, however, the 'psychotic' expression of a lone deviant, but the 'normal' expression of those who identify themselves as 'pure'.

'Purity' is thus not just the phantasy of an individual but a social phantasy system. It is the sharing of the phantasy — or to borrow another term from Laing (1969:108-124) — it is 'collusion' that makes the accusations of witchcraft and poison seem real, normal, and acceptable. Such collusion is more likely to arise when people interact in the same context. So the more people there are interacting within the same context, the more complete is the collusion, and the more real, normal and acceptable is their shared phantasy.

9.3 Islamisation in Galang

A local umat based on the shape of a defunct sultanate is not, however, the only context in which Islamisation can occur. Although my Galang informants quite clearly reject the vision of a Penyengat-centred Melayu-dom, favouring instead a Galang-based indigeny, there is evidence that at least some of them aspire to belong to an imagined community larger than their immediate local community. The alternative imagined community to which they aspire is, interestingly, the cosmopolitan Islamic umat. So the perception of a need to belong to a larger, more powerful imagined community is evident even in Galang. Such a perceived need may be understood in terms of the civilising process, whereby people are supposed to justify their existence in terms of their membership in a supralocal imagined
No matter how proud a Galang person may be of Galang identity, when he or she travels out of Galang to, say, Tanjungpinang, Singapore or Palembang, such a territorially specific identity is not just irrelevant to outsiders; it even carries connotations of being tribal. Outside Galang, even a Galang indigene needs a supralocal identity that would serve as the emblem of being civilised. Outside the country -- say, in Singapore or Malaysia -- perhaps even an Indonesian identity would do, no matter how un-seriously one takes such an identity within Indonesia itself. Inside the country, however, if one rejects both a Jakarta-centred Indonesian-ness and a Penyengat-centred Melayu-dom, then another way of being civilised is to opt for a Mecca-centred Islam. Such an alternative would be a strategic choice indeed, being compatible both with an Indonesian identity and a Melayu identity.

As a prophylactic against Communism, Indonesian law requires every citizen to profess one of the recognised religions -- for example, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, or Hinduism. So a Galang person's adherence would be, in this sense, only an adherence to Indonesian law. In the context of Melayu identity, Islam is the first step towards becoming a Melayu murni in the Penyengat scale of values. So in this sense, a Galang person's adherence to Islam may be construed as an adherence to Melayu 'purity'. However, though Islamisation in Galang may be understood in both these senses, my Galang informants themselves evidently do not see their Islam as inspired by either Jakarta or Penyengat. Instead, they see it as directly transmitted from an Arab source in a cosmopolitan context.

I have shown above that my Penyengat and Pangkil informants accuse the Galang people of witchcraft because they are said to lack
Islam and even to regard themselves as God. So persistently did the former express their fear of being bewitched and poisoned by the latter that I felt I had to go to Galang to find out whether there was any truth to these allegations. After my first visits to Karas, Nanga, and Pulau Panjang, undertaken in the company of my Penyengat and Pangkil informants, I subsequently managed to make my way to Karas alone by catching a ride from Tanjungpinang on board the boat of a Chinese fish-dealer who resides on that island. Since I was then acquainted only with the 'headman' and Raja X, I was still somewhat wary in case the allegations of poisoning might be true, even though I gave no credence to the witchcraft accusations.

At one of the very first houses I visited, a glass of milk was offered to me. I was rather slow to drink it. My Karas host, whom I had only just met, noticed my hesitation and said: Jangan khuatir, tak ada racun 'Don't worry, there's no poison in it.' That broke the ice; I drank the milk. My host went on to assure me that in his experience, there is no truth whatsoever in the allegation that the Karas people poison visitors. He had never seen anyone do that. He said that when people happen to fall ill while visiting the island, they tend to blame their Karas hosts. He ventured to guarantee that from Tanjung Marau to Langkang on Karas island, nobody poisons visitors. But west of Tanjung Marau, he dared not guarantee because he seldom goes there himself. (See Map 4.) I mentioned that the Penyengat and Pangkil people also feared being poisoned by the people of Pulau Panjang. My Karas host replied that this fear was unwarranted, as he had himself visited Pulau Panjang many times without having been poisoned. I then asked him whether he thought that there were indeed communities who poison their visitors. He said that possibly in the small islands near Daik where there are orang laut, such things might happen. He mentioned Pulau Duyung and Pulau
Posik as possibilities. (See Map 3.)

My subsequent field experience in Karas confirmed this point: Although the Karas people may be aware that the Penyengat and Pangkil people accuse them of being witches and poisoners, they do not counter with similar accusations directed against the latter. Instead, they tend to transfer those accusations to others who they perceive as being even less Islamic than they are themselves. As for the Penyengat and Pangkil people, while a Karas person may make fun of them for being dagang 'foreign', they are also acknowledged as being alim 'religiously tutored, learned'. Sometimes such an acknowledgment is voiced in a sarcastic tone: *Sana memang lebih alim* 'there it is undoubtedly more religious'. Nevertheless it is an acknowledgment.

So from the Karas perspective, there is an Islamic sliding scale with the Penyengat and Pangkil people located at the more 'religious' end, the Karas people themselves located at the middle, and the orang laut located at the less 'religious' end. Indeed, in contrast to the relatively simple but Islamically correct method of conversion described in Chapter Seven, I found in the Galang area an elaborate sliding scale of more Islamism and less Islamism. There seem to be fourteen significant steps, presented below in order of increasing magnitude:

1. circumcision
2. observing the food taboo on pork
3. burying the dead in an Islamic manner
4. pronouncing the two statements of the testimonial creed
5. getting married in an Islamic manner (*nikah*)
6. to be ritually purified (*tobat*)
7. learning how to pray
8. living in a village which has a mosque
9. praying communally on the two major festivals of the Muslim calendar — namely, Hari Raya Puasa and Hari Raya Haji
10. praying communally every Friday
11. observing the fasting month — namely, Puasa/Ramadan
12. giving zakat and fitrah, two types of alms
13. praying privately five times a day
14. going on the haj, the pilgrimage to Mecca.

From a strictly Islamic perspective, those located on the first two steps would not be considered as Muslims at all; however, on this Galang sliding scale, they are Muslim, albeit minimally so. Indeed, many Islamising orang laut are precisely in this position. The question is: how does a non-literate non-Muslim orang laut begin to Islamise himself or herself? Even if he or she were desirous of becoming Muslim, how is this volitional transformation of Self to be achieved? It is significant that on the Galang sliding scale of Islamism, the least degree is marked by circumcision, for without access to the Arabic canon and hence without the means of a proper conversion, circumcision is surely the most apparent way of effecting a transformation of Self.

The Islamic sliding scale found in Galang is reminiscent of the Penyengat view of hierarchy. Indeed, as pointed out above, my Penyengat and Pangkil informants said of the Karas community that it is 'gradually getting better' but is not wholly safe. There is an evident equation: 'getting better' = Islamising = adopting a view compatible with that of a Penyengat-led hierarchy. But why is Karas merely 'getting better'? Why is it still not wholly safe?

The answer has to do with perspective. The Penyengat and Pangkil people locate themselves in the top ranks of the hierarchy. From such a vantage point, they look down from the top, and see a 'Single
Image'. In contrast, the Karas people are located in the middle of the Islamic sliding scale. From such a vantage point, they look both ways, both upwards and downwards, and see a 'Double Image'. What the 'Double Image' offers is alternative — that is, more than a single way of being Melayu. So the Karas people can look upwards and see the Penyengat and Pangkil people as models of religiosity, and they can also look downwards and see the orang laut as models of freedom.

To illustrate this latter point, let us consider two opinions about the orang laut expressed, respectively, by a raja informant and by an Islamising informant located in the middle of the sliding scale. The raja informant said:

> The sea people's religion is uncertain — they just imitate, especially the festivals. If they meet with Muslims, they profess to be Muslims. But they still keep pigs. If they are asked, they answer, 'This is not a babi; this is a celeng, nangoi'.

(My translation).

Babi is the standard bahasa word for 'pig', whereas celeng and nangoi are non-bahasa words for the same animal. So the implication is that the orang laut try to evade the Islamic taboo against pork through word-substitution.

The key phrase in the raja's statement above is *tak tentu* 'uncertain': ambiguity disturbs the singularity of the 'Single Image'. This ambiguity was, however, evaluated quite differently by an Islamising informant who said:

> The sea people — when the Chinese new year comes around, they celebrate the new year; when the Islamic festivals come around, they also celebrate them. They are free.

(My translation).

For those who adhere to a 'Single Image', ambiguity is disturbance; but for those who perceive a 'Double Image', ambiguity is freedom.
In the Galang area, this ambiguity in religious identity is manifest in practically every degree of the sliding scale, ranging from those whose Islamism consists only of circumcision, to those who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca. In the rest of this chapter, I shall illustrate the various manifestations of such ambiguity, by comparing the four Galang communities I studied — Karas, Sembur, Nanga, and Teluk Nipah. (See Map 4.) Of these four communities, Karas is generally acknowledged by the Galang people as the most Islamic. Nevertheless, my Karas informants can still remember the 'coming of Islam' (kedatangan Islam) to the island.

As mentioned in Chapter Five, according to them, in zaman sultan, the Galang 'warriors' (panglima) were already 'subservient towards Islam' (patuh kepada Islam). However, they 'did not know how to pray' (tak tahu sembahyang). So if during their piratical raids, they happened to capture someone who knew how to 'recite the Quran' (mengaji), that person would be spared from having to fight the other prisoners in one-to-one 'combat' (sabung), but would be brought straightaway to the village to teach Islam to the Galang people.

Despite this story, however, my Karas informants admit that up to the end of zaman sultan in 1911, there was still no mosque on the island. Apparently, the mosque was not built until after the coming of a Singapore Arab by the name of Said Usman. (See Plate 23.) My informants said that he arrived in a fishing boat, sometime during the Dutch period, before the Second World War. Apart from Karas, he visited Penyengat — only these two places, my informants stressed. According to them, he visited Karas about five times altogether, each time for four or five days. During his visits, 'he taught the rituals of prayer, and explained the stories of religion' (dia ngajar sembahyang dan terangkan kesah ugama). Said Usman pointed out to the people the un-Islamic things they were then doing, and substituted
more Islamic rituals in their stead. One of the un-Islamic rituals he did away with was 'the nurturing of the village' (bela kampung).

Some of my informants can still remember this village ritual vividly. They said that it was performed twice every year, when the wind was about to change its direction, from north to south, and from south to north. Forty-four wooden 'images' (patung) were carved for this ritual; these consisted of twenty-two male and twenty-two female images, paired to form twenty-two couples. Twenty-two were 'land spirits' (hantu darat) and twenty-two were 'sea spirits' (hantu laut). These images were depicted with painted faces but naked bodies. The male images were bald, but the female images had hair in the shape of a 'bun' (siput) drawn in by means of charcoal. The male images had penises, and the female images had breasts. The men of the village made the male images, while the women made the female images. A 'dinghy' (jongkong) was also constructed, of the length of a depa 'span from finger-tip to finger-tip of the outstretched arms'.

Offerings were prepared; these included the following:

- seven kinds of 'pastries' (kuih);
- a chicken cut into half, with one half raw and the other half cooked;
- one raw egg and one cooked egg;
- rice in four colours — green, red, yellow, and white;
- yellow glutinous rice;
- two candles.

The images and the offerings were placed in the dinghy thus:
By means of 'incantation' (jampi), a ritualist known as the pawang would take on the role of being tuan 'master' over the spirits of land and sea; he would summon them to eat the food and inhabit the images. The dinghy laden with images and food was then sent out to sea, thus banishing from the village those 'sickness-causing spirits' (hantu penyakit). After this, for three days, the whole village had to observe the following 'taboos' (pantang) -- no digging of holes, no cutting of wood, no plucking of leaves, no entry of outsiders into the village, no exit of villagers from the village, no going out to sea, no public socialising, no visiting of houses. Through this direct expression of boundary maintenance, the village as a whole was 'nurtured' (dibela).

According to my informants, Said Usman stopped the performance of this un-Islamic ritual on Karas and replaced it with what he considered a more Islamic form -- that is, tolak bala 'banishing evil' by means of a doa selamat 'prayer for safekeeping'. This new ritual was to be held every Friday at the mosque. The 'pastries' (kuih) were to be brought to the mosque; after 'reading' (baca) from the Quran, the blessed 'pastries' would be eaten by the men at the mosque. In this mediated way the village was to be protected -- that is, by some
male representatives of the 'Friday congregation' (jemaah) eating food imbued with Quranic power. This prophylactic ritual is still performed every Friday at the mosque.

However, in some parts of the island, bela kampung is still being performed, though in a simplified manner without the use of images or dinghy. Instead, the food offerings are left on the ground — near the foot of a big tree for the 'land spirits' and on the shore for the 'sea spirits'. Since images are no longer used, the 'land spirits' are instead invited to inhabit the tree, usually one that is located some distance away from the cluster of houses. The 'sea spirits' are simply asked to eat the food and go away to the open waters. The three days of taboo are also observed, though to a milder degree, with people sometimes entering and leaving the village. In some other parts of Karas, where the members of a village can no longer agree about bela kampung, those who still want to keep the ritual have had to reduce it to the mere protection of their own houses; the 'nurturing' of the village as a whole has thus been fragmented into the 'nurturing' of a few individual houses.

What this indicates is that the people of Karas are not all Islamising at the same rate. Indeed my Karas informants are themselves aware of their differential rate of Islamisation. According to them, this is due to the fact that while certain of their members went to Singapore to continue their religious studies with Said Usman, others did not. Consequently, some were ahead of others. Since Singapore is a good distance away from Karas, I asked my informants why they had to go all the way there to study religion, when Penyengat which is such a well-known Islamic centre, is so much nearer. (See Map 3.) My informants replied that they did not know of a single person from Karas who went to Penyengat to study religion; people only went there to 'get married' (nikah). In any case, they
said, people from Penyengat also went to Singapore to learn from Said Usman. Although he died about ten years ago, Said Usman remains such an important figure to my Karas informants that even those who had never visited him in Singapore could reel off his former address -- Woo Mon Chew Road, Lorong Abu Talib, Siglap batu tujuh 'seventh milestone'. There is indeed such an address in Singapore.

Prominent among Said Usman's Karas students was one Awang Cik, who travelled back and forth between Karas and Singapore for two years. He became the imam 'religious guide' of the first surau 'small mosque' founded on Karas. Furthermore, he went to Sembur to 'teach Islam' (mengajar Islam). According to my Karas informants, at that time the Sembur people were already Muslim, but they did not 'carry out the stipulations [of Islam]' (kerjakan syarat-syarat). Only the taboo against pork was observed. My Sembur informants confirmed this. Awang Cik visited Sembur often, sometimes once a month, sometimes once in two or three months. Between his visits, his Sembur students went to Karas to learn from him, while staying in his house.

Before Awang Cik went to Sembur, there was no one to teach religion -- orang sini belum tahu sembahyang 'the people here did not yet know how to pray'. Nobody could 'recite' (mengaji) the Quran -- ngaji mulai daripada dia 'the recitation commenced from him'. According to my informants, Awang Cik first went to Sembur about 1949; but it was not until 1962 that they built themselves a surau with their own funds and through their own effort. Before the mosque was built, those who had learnt to pray had to travel to Karas every Friday. My informants said that even before Awang Cik came, the Sembur people were already practicing sunat 'circumcision' and nikah 'the Islamic form of marriage'. Everybody went to Penyengat for nikah, as they still do.
As in Karas, certain un-Islamic practices were Islamised. One of these was the feeding of the dead. Formerly, the Sembur people fed their dead by offering food at the graves. A Sembur informant explained: this was a 'sin' (dosa) because it was like having two 'Gods' (Tuhan). Now, the 'feast' (kenduri) for the dead is held only at home. The food is eaten by those people who are invited to come. I asked my informants: if it is human beings who eat the food, how then can the dead be fed? They told me that this is done through the recitation of the doa arwah 'prayer for the dead', whereby the dead would receive rahmat 'mercy'. The taste of the food at the feast would be brought to the dead through the prayer, and when the people present eat the food after their prayer, it would no longer be tasty. My informants said that without the prayer, they would not know where to bring the food. The more people who join in the prayer, the better it is, because Tuhan 'God' is more likely to listen to the petition of many people — lebih berkenangkan 'there would be more loving thoughts'. To coordinate the praying, a lebai 'prayer leader' is appointed.

My informants then asked me how the Chinese feed the dead. I told them that we offer the food to a picture of the dead person, after which the food is just sisa 'remains' to be finished off by human beings. My informants said that in their case, the food also becomes sisa, the eating of which is a sedekah 'charity' for those who have come to pray. One of my informants commented that the food for kenduri arwah 'a feast for the dead' never tastes as good as the food for kenduri kawin 'a wedding feast'. They stressed that it is Tuhan who distributes the food to the dead — Tuhan punya kuasa, dia yang kasi 'It is under God's control; it is he who gives out the food'.

I asked my informants how often they feed the dead. They said it depends on their dreams. Apparently, the dead manifest themselves in
dreams to tell the living that they are hungry. But the dream is 'authentic' (asli) only if it occurs between 12.00 a.m. and 1.00 a.m. At other times, such dreams are merely the 'games of sleep' (permainan tidur) brought about by the iblis 'evil spirits'. I asked my informants what would happen if a feast were to be held in response to a dream that had occurred at the wrong time. They said in that case, they would not know where the rahmat 'mercy' would go, but it is all under 'God's control'; possibly the 'evil spirits' might get the benefits of the feast.

In Sembur, the village as a whole is 'nurtured' by a pawang through the ritual of bela kampung conducted without images. Unlike Karas, this ritual has not been replaced by the doa selamat 'prayer for safety', one possible reason being that despite the existence of the village mosque since 1962, Friday prayers are seldom held. Apparently, there has been some backsliding. When Awang Cik was still alive, his students used to travel to Karas every Friday for communal prayers. After his death in 1963/4, however, enthusiasm for the Friday prayers seems to have dropped. Now, the village mosque is used mainly for communal prayers on the two hari raya 'festivals' of the year.

Nevertheless the people of Sembur are still regarded, both by themselves and by others, as being more Islamic than the people of Nanga. My informants in Karas and Sembur are divided in their opinion about the Islamism of the Nanga people. One Karas informant said that since the Karas people would consent to marry only the Sembur people but not the Nanga people, this must indicate that the latter are not yet Muslim. Another Karas informant said that perhaps one or two among the Nanga people may have 'entered Islam' (masuk Islam), but the rest are still orang laut. A Sembur informant was the opinion that the Nanga people have not yet 'entered Islam' because although they
practise circumcision and they seem to refrain from eating pork, nevertheless they still hunt and sell pigs to the Chinese. Another Sembur informant described the Nanga people as being tengah-tengah 'in-between', neither Muslim nor un-Muslim. However, a Sembur informant who was a former student of Awang Cik, stated that he thinks that the Nanga people have 'entered Islam' because they are circumcised, and they marry in an Islamic manner by going to Penyengat. He admits that they 'do not yet know how to pray' (belum tahu sembahyang lagi), but he is of the opinion that people who 'follow the customs of religion' (ikut adat ugama) should be considered Muslim.

Another Sembur informant disagrees. He said that although the Nanga people go to Penyengat to be married in an Islamic manner, they have not been 'ritually purified' (ditobat); they are therefore still unclean. He explained cara tobat 'the procedure of ritual purification' thus: First, one is washed with air tanah 'water mixed with clay'. Then the Quran is 'placed on one's head' (dijunjungkan kepala), because the Quran is the 'most important' (terbesar) thing in the world. This informant said that he once brought a female orang laut from Pulau Buluh to Penyengat to 'enter Islam' through this method of ritual purification. This was done so as to enable her to marry a Muslim man in Lobam. (See Map 3.)

Significantly, this informant is himself the pawang in charge of 'nurturing' Sembur through the ritual of bela kampung. But he does not see any contradiction between his Islamism and his animism; instead he seems to have syncretised them neatly. For example, he chooses to conduct his bela kampung ritual at four or five o'clock on a Thursday afternoon. The significance of this is that in Muslim reckoning, malam Jumaat 'Friday night' begins on what would be Thursday night in the Western calendar. So to have bela kampung
taking place on a Thursday afternoon just before the Islamically important *malam Jumaat* is to symbolise the pre-Islamic nature of the 'nurturing' ritual.

It is perhaps fair to say that in Galang, what one person thinks of as Islamism may well be thought of by another as animism, and vice-versa, depending on their relative perspective. Despite what their Karas and Sembur neighbours think of them, the Nanga people regard themselves as having 'entered Islam'. In their particular case, we can discern how the process of Islamisation is directly related to the process of sedentary settlement and village formation. I present below the story of the Nanga settlement as told by my informants.

According to a Sembur informant, at the time he himself was born, the ancestors of the present-day Nanga people were still living on board their boats; they were 'boat people' (*orang sampan*). At the time when my informant was himself about fifty-five years old, these *orang sampan* came ashore to live, thereby building their present village on Nanga. This was after the Second World War, after the emergence of Indonesia, but before Confrontation -- that is, sometime between 1945 and 1963. The 'elder' (*ketua*) of these *orang sampan* was called Bubong; in his time they were still living on boats. After he had been dead for a long time, his son Apong, who was the next 'elder', moved ashore to live.

A significant incident occurred before the move to shore: Apong's older sister, Cahaya, married a Sembur man called Liku. Although the couple eventually divorced, the significance is that both the marriage and the divorce were carried out in Penyengat. Apparently, it was through this marriage and its subsequent divorce that these *orang sampan* first became involved with Islamism. Because of the importance of this event, both my Sembur and Nanga informants can still remember
where it was that Cahaya and Liku first met and began their romance, even though both of them are now long dead. It was when Cahaya was still married to Liku that her younger brother Apong moved ashore to live.

Apong's son Bolong is the present 'elder' of Nanga. According to him, the other siblings of Apong and Cahaya did not move ashore; they went off to other places. As a result, Bolong himself does not even know them. The present Nanga population consists of eight of Apong's children and their families, with the addition of three Florese immigrants and their families. Another two of Apong's children have left the community. Where they have gone is interesting.

One of them, Din, has rejected living on land, and has gone back to the sea to live on board a boat. He occasionally visits Nanga. The other sibling, Meri, left Nanga for Tanjung Wangkang, also known Tiang Wangkang, located on the southern coast of Batam. (See Map 3.) This is also a settlement formed by orang sampan who have moved to land. There is, however, an important different between the two communities: the Tanjung Wangkang community is not Islamising, it is Christianising. So out of Apong's ten children, eight are Islamising, one is Christianising, and another one has reverted to indigenous animism. (See Genealogical Chart 12.)

As noted by my Karas and Sembur informants, the Islamisation of the Nanga community is still in its preliminary stages. Nevertheless, my Nanga informants are self-consciously Islamising. Circumcision is very important to them; this is done at a pre-pubertal age, always by an outsider who is a specialist at the job. The first mudim 'circumciser' they had, which was during Apong's time, was from Mantang Besar. (See Map 3.) After this mudim died, they began going to Karas to be circumcised by the Tanjungpinang doctor who goes there
for that purpose. Alternatively, when the Sembur people call in a mudim, the Nanga people can also make use of his services.

Another aspect of Islamisation may be discerned in the small cemetery on Nanga where Apong, his wife and some others are buried. The graves are aligned lengthwise on a north-south axis, which is indeed a properly Islamic position. The wooden gravestones also look Islamic — that is, they are in the general shape of flat ones for females, rounded ones for males. However, the dead are still fed food-offerings at the grave sites. Since the Nanga people have 'not yet learnt to pray', they can hardly feed their dead through the recitation of prayer, as the Sembur people are doing. Moreover, my Nanga informants talk of each grave as having a tuan 'master'. Apparently, when the dead person in a particular grave is hungry, he or she appears in a dream to the tuan whose responsibility it is to feed that dead person. Bolong, the present 'elder', is the tuan of his father's grave, which, interestingly, has a small shed built to shelter it. (See Plate 24.) His younger brother Cen Con is the tuan of their mother's grave. Therefore, each dreams of his respective parent. My Nanga informants told me that even the nomadic orang sampan have to look after the graves of their dead; the tuan of a particular grave must remember the location of that grave and visit it regularly to feed the dead.

The Nanga people's syncretism was commented on by the Sembur pawang mentioned above. He said: those people over there go to Penyengat to get married, yet they do not even have Muslim names. Despite my Sembur informants' own syncretism, they seem to be disturbed by the Nanga people's ambiguity. When I wanted to go from Sembur to Nanga, I was first of all discouraged from going; when I insisted, I was then warned by my Sembur informants not to spend the night on Nanga, and also not to eat or drink what the Nanga people
offered me for fear of poison. So the best I could do was to make day trips to Nanga. A Sembur informant rowed me over in his boat; he accompanied me to the house of the 'village elder' (ketua kampung), but did not partake of the drink that was served. He was also unwilling to step into the other houses there. The presence of a Sembur person naturally inhibited my interaction with the Nanga people.

Ironically, the saving grace was his unwillingness to enter the other houses, apart from that of the village elder; this gave me a measure of privacy in conversing with my Nanga informants inside these houses. When it became known on Sembur that I entered these other houses in Nanga, I was said to be 'brave' (berani). When my Sembur informants further learnt that I actually partook of the refreshments offered by the Nanga people, they started calling me (in English) 'Wonder Woman', after the American television character who is portrayed as having magical powers. The 'wonder' in this case was what my Sembur informants perceived as my ability to survive the supposed poison of Nanga. It was beginning to be difficult to do fieldwork on Nanga and still maintain my status as a neutral outsider among my Sembur informants.

Not only was the Nanga people's Islamism perceived as ambiguous, their Melayu identity was also controversial. While it was not disputed by anyone that they were Melayu asli, it was unclear exactly what kind of Melayu they were in terms of suku identity. My Sembur informants said that the Nanga people were suku Mantang; my Nanga informants denied this, and asserted that they were suku Galang. When I asked my Sembur informants about this claim, they said that the Nanga people were lying. My Nanga informants, however, made a counter-suggestion about the Sembur people's identity, saying that the ancestors of both the Sembur and the Nanga people originated from the
same place — namely, Petai in Galang Baru. (See Map 4.)

A Sembur informant admitted that many of the Sembur people derived from Petai ancestry; he further informed me that the people in Petai were known as suku Limas. Significantly, this particular informant said that he himself has no connection with Petai or the suku Limas because his father had come to Sembur from Karas. Both my Nanga and Sembur informants said that Petai is no longer inhabited, and that the place has since reverted to jungle.

The suku identity of the Nanga people was made a bit more certain when a Nanga informant dropped a heavy hint by telling me that I was not to use the word Barok to refer to them. This hint was confirmed by my informants in Telok Nipah across the water where the Barok Sekak live. This is the community where I found the Melayu Budha and the Melayu Kong Hu Cu. (See Chapter Seven and Genealogical Chart 11.) I was told by these informants that the Nanga people and the Teluk Nipah people were of 'the same stock' (sebangsa), there being three sub-types of Barok people — Barok Limas, Barok Kungki, and Barok Sekak. My Teluk Nipah informants acknowledged that the Barok people of Nanga were 'more Islamic' (lebih Islam). They could hardly have claimed otherwise, since they themselves were either Melayu Budha, Melayu Kong Hu Cu, or else were unaffiliated to any formal religion.

Indeed, whereas my Karas and Sembur informants were at least willing to consider the Islamism of the Nanga people, they categorically dismissed the Teluk Nipah community as being completely un-Islamic. The Sembur guide who had rowed me to Nanga was even more cautious on Teluk Nipah. He did not enter a single house in Teluk Nipah. As another Sembur informant explained, the Teluk Nipah people are still orang laut who 'have no religion, except to worship the capes and bays' (tak ada ugama, cuma sembah tanjung teluk). I asked
him what he meant by 'capes and bays' (tanjung teluk). He answered: puaka itu 'the puaka'. I asked him what he meant by puaka. He answered: keramatlah 'the keramat of course'.

As I have mentioned in Chapter Six, the term puaka refers to a site inhabited by a genius loci, the jembalang puaka. For the orang laut, many of these puakas are apparently located at particular capes and bays, where food offerings are given by the orang laut passing by that way. It is interesting that in order to clarify the meaning of the term puaka, my Sembur informant translated it into the Islamic term keramat. In so doing, he demonstrated the feasibility of a syncretism that is both an Islamised animism, as well as an animistised Islamism. (See Chapter Six.)

I suggest that this syncretism is bonded by an inverse relationship between Islamism and animism, a relationship which may be illustrated thus:
Figure 17 Increasing Islamism and Decreasing Animism
In Figure 17 above, both Karas and Sembur are marked, respectively, at two points of the line representing Islamisation. This is to indicate the differential rates of Islamisation within these two communities. The gap between a1 and a2 is much greater than the gap between b1 and b2. This suggests a greater dissonance between Islamism and animism within the Karas community than there is within the Sembur community.

The Karas gap widened to its present span in 1982, when the 'headman' became the first person from Karas to complete the haj to Mecca, thereby breaking the seven-generation curse. But at the same time, some people on Karas are still continuing to 'nurture' their respective villages through bela kampung. Even in 1980 when I first visited Karas, there was already a long-standing antagonism between the more Islamised 'headman' and the various less Islamised pawang. Significantly, the more Islamised people of Karas are those who set forth most frequently on trading expeditions to Singapore and Batara in the north and to Jambi in the south. The Islamising 'headman', for example, is one of the most active traders on the island, with a trading expedition almost every other week.

In contrast, the gap between Islamism and animism is not as wide in the Sembur community. On the contrary, as we have seen above, the Sembur pawang seems to be also one of the more Islamised individuals in the community, perhaps even more so than Awang Cik's former students. Because the differential rate of Islamisation in Sembur is relatively small, the contradiction between Islamism and animism is not so acutely felt as it is in Karas.

If we may generalise from this -- the greater the degree of Islamisation a community attains through some of its members, the more likely are we to find religious differences within the community. For
example, while it is possible for some people to pursue religious studies, it is impossible, or at least improbable, that a whole community can attain exactly the same standard of religious education. Again for example, while it is possible for a few people to save enough money to go to Mecca, it is quite impossible for a whole community to become hajis at exactly the same moment. Therefore, increasing Islamisation is likely to produce a pattern of dualism, whereby the more Islamised sector of the community would adhere to the 'Single Image' of Islam, while the less Islamised sector would be 'invested with the Double Image' of syncretism. In such a situation, we would be likely to find witchcraft accusations within the community, with the more Islamised accusing the less Islamised of being witches, at least potentially. This was indeed the tendency I found in Karas.

It is only at this point of the discussion that we can understand the import of what my first Karas host had said when he urged me to drink the glass of milk: He ventured to guarantee that from Tanjung Marau to Langkang on Karas island, nobody poisons visitors. But west of Tanjung Marau, he dared not guarantee because he seldom goes there himself. On an island that one can walk around in a day, it is very odd for someone to say that he seldom goes to a part that is no more than half an hour's walk away. My host was implying, although I did not realise it at the time, that the people living from Tanjung Marau to Langkang are more Islamised than those living to the west of Tanjung Marau. The more Islamised and the less Islamised sectors of the Karas population are thus socially estranged, with the former suspecting the latter of possibly being poisoners and witches.

Indeed, my Karas informants did comment on the way I walked all over the island, criss-crossing all the various 'villages' (kampung). One of my less Islamised pawang informants said to me: obviously you
also have ilmu 'magical knowledge'; otherwise you couldn't have travelled so far and survived. So that I could defend myself even better, he gave me a belantan 'truncheon' made of a hardwood called kayu mentigi (Pemphia acidula) and taught me the proper way of killing a human being.

The differential rate of Islamisation can also lead to hierarchisation, as the more Islamised sector would tend to identify themselves as superior to their less Islamised fellows. Although the Sembur community is internally quite homogeneous in its rate of Islamisation, it is externally quite differentiated from its two neighbouring communities -- namely, Nanga and Teluk Nipah. It is significant that these three communities are located so near each other in the same island-cluster, practically within hailing distance. (See Map 4.) It is also significant that, as mentioned above, claims are made, at least by some informants, that all three communities originated from the 'same stock'.

It is perhaps not impossible that what we now see as three separate communities resulted from the hierarchical fission of one original community. Both my Sembur and Nanga informants identified Petai as the place from which their two communities derived. A Sembur informant said:

Petai was the first.... Petai had a lot of boat people; but many of their descendants converted to Islam, and refused to do bad things -- stealing, eating dirtily. Because it was crowded, those who were already Muslim moved to Batu Licin; later they moved to Nguan, Sembur, and Air Lingka .... Those who were in Petai were suku Limas, the boat people of Limas.

(My translation). 23

According to my Nanga informants, Petai formerly had a 'crowded village' (kampung ramai), which dispersed sometime during the Dutch period before the Second World War. The people from Petai moved to
Tanjung Malang, Nguan, Petung, and Nanga.

This information suggests that there were two patterns of dispersal: The former pattern, mentioned by my Sembur informant (see above) was apparently followed by the more Islamised sector of Petai. The latter pattern, mentioned by my Nanga informants (see above) was apparently followed by its less Islamised sector. The name 'Nguan' appears in both lists of places, implying that the community there is relatively mixed. Air Lingka also seems to have drawn members from both sectors of Petai. Although my Nanga informants did not mention Air Lingka as a place to which the Petai people went, nevertheless there have been one or two marriages between the Nanga people and the Air Lingka people, which suggest a certain commonality between the two communities. There are also some connections that can be traced between the Teluk Nipah community and the long abandoned Petai.

If it is indeed the case that the Sembur, Nanga, and Teluk Nipah communities all share the same Barak stock, it is significant that they are not all equally willing to own up to such an identity. The people most willing to identify themselves as Barok were my informants in Teluk Nipah; in contrast, the Nanga people and the Sembur people were ashamed to identify themselves as anything else but Melayu in a general sense and suku Galang in a more specific sense.

According to my Karas informants, the only true suku Galang are those whose ancestors had lived in Galang Tua located on the banks of Sungai Galang Batang. (See Map 4.) That was the original hideout of the Galang pirates, they said. Whereas I did find genealogical links between my Karas informants and Galang Tua, I could find no such links for my Sembur and Nanga informants. It is perhaps due entirely to Awang Cik's proselytisation among the Sembur people, that the Karas people are now willing to accept them as Muslims, to the extent of
inter-married with them. By my Sembur informants' own account, before Awang Cik came, their state of Islamism was about the same as the present Nanga people's Islamism, extending only as far as nikah in Penyengat.

It is a fundamental tenet of Islam that within the umat 'congregation of believers' all are equal in the sight of God. Such being the case, how is it possible that Islamisation can give rise to hierarchisation? I suggest that this can occur through the control of admission to the umat. After all, someone has to answer the question: who is to be included as a believer, as an equal member of the congregation? The process of Islamisation may thus be understood as the attempt made by people who are outside, to enter and join the congregation. In such a situation, the advantage lies with those who are already inside the congregation, for they can decide who belongs and who does not. It is this question of deciding membership that enables hierarchisation to arise from Islamisation. In this case, the ones who are hierarchised are not those who already belong, but rather, those who do not yet belong and who are trying to belong. In other words, while there is equality in belonging, there is also a hierarchisation of not-belonging: one can not-belong in various degrees of proximity. The Islamic sliding scale in Galang that we have discussed above seems to express precisely the various degrees of not-belonging to the congregation of equal believers.

9.4 Epilogue: The Civilising Process

Finally, we must ask the question why people should be motivated to Islamise. As I have shown in the examples discussed above, Islamisation involves a radical shift in consciousness, which may be illustrated in the following way:
from the literal -------------- to the metaphorical
from the material -------------- to the abstract
from what is direct -------------- to what is mediated
from the inward-orientated ------ to the outward-orientated
from the self as tuan ---------- to Other as Tuhan
from the particularism of ------- to the universalism of
a bounded community  -------- the 'nation of Islam'

Figure 18  A Radical Shift in Consciousness

In pre-Islamised animism, one feeds the dead in a literal manner
by bringing food to the graves. Through Islamisation, however, one
feeds the dead through the metaphor of prayer; the taste of the food
is now referred to as rahmat 'mercy'. In pre-Islamised animism, one
literally banishes the 'sickness-causing spirits' by means of trapping
them materially in wooden images. Through Islamisation, however, one
'banishes evil' in a general sense through abstract prayer. In pre-
Islamised animism, one feeds the dead directly and one banishes the
spirits directly. Through Islamisation, however, all such actions
have to be mediated through Tuhan. In pre-Islamised animism, one
communicates with the spirits when they manifest themselves through
dreams in the privacy of sleep. Through Islamisation, however, one
communicates with Tuhan through a set prayer chanted aloud in public.
In pre-Islamised animism, one can become the tuan 'master' of spirits.
Through Islamisation, however, one submits to Tuhan, the sole
spiritual Other. In pre-Islamised animism, the particularism of a
community is bounded by the ritual of bela kampung. Through
Islamisation, however, one is immersed in the universalism of the umat
'the congregation of believers', 'the nation of Islam'.

As I have noted above, there are differential rates of
Islamisation within a community, for example, in Karas where the
'headman' is more Islamised than the various pawangs who still
maintain the ritual of bela kampung. Interestingly, in Nanga, it is also the ketua 'elder' who seems to be keener on Islamisation than are the others. He is the one who decides when the children are to be circumcised. He is the one who deals with the circumcisers who are hired. He is the one whose house my Sembur guide considered safe to enter. His younger siblings seem less keen on Islamising.

One day, while I was in Nanga, the younger brother Ce^n Co^n called me to his house, saying that he wanted me to meet a visitor. This turned out to be Meri (the Christianising sibling) who had come visiting from Tanjung Wangkang. Bolong the 'elder' was not present. Ce^n Co^n and Meri then told me the story of Tanjung Wangkang. There was a Chinese man called Ce Ha who was a charcoal-burner at Tanjung Wangkang; because of his charcoal works, the place is known as Dapur Baru 'New Kiln'. One day, Ce Ha adopted an orang laut boy called Atong, and brought him up as his son. Atong's own father, Dengkis, often visited Tanjung Wangkang. When Ce Ha died, Atong inherited his Chinese father's charcoal works. He thus became a tauke 'merchant'. Because he could speak Chinese, the orang laut in the area regarded him as both Melayu and Chinese. His presence began to attract those orang laut who were looking for a place to settle. That was how the settlement on Tanjung Wangkang was formed. Later on, in 1973, a ship called 'Hosanna' came calling from Tanjung Uban. This was sent by the Majelis Jemaat Gereja Protestan di Indonesia 'Parish Committee of Protestant Churches in Indonesia'. The people at Tanjung Wangkang decided to become Christian, because they could thus become 'civilised' (maju) without becoming Muslim. And that was how the Tanjung Wangkang community became Christian.

That day on Nanga, by calling me to his house so that he could tell me about Tanjung Wangkang, Ce^n Co^n seemed to want to make a certain point -- that it is possible to become 'civilised' without
becoming Muslim. Yet after telling the story of Tanjung Wangkang, both Cen Con and Meri said of themselves that they had 'entered' (masuk) their respective religions only because of marriage. Cen Con's wife is a woman from Air Lingka where the people are 'more Muslim' (lebih Islam). Meri's husband is a Christian convert at Tanjung Wangkang. So Cen Con and Meri 'followed' (ikut) their respective spouses' religion, because if they did not, it would have been 'difficult' (payah). However, what would be best, they said, was to be 'free' (bebas): masing-masing sendiri pilih yang dia mau 'each choosing what each wants.'

Thus, to convert to Christianity or Islam is to become 'civilised', or so it seems to some. Both religions are exogenously transmitted by outsiders. To convert to such a religion is to declare a willingness to join the outside world through membership in a supralocal community of believers. The cost of such membership seems to be the 'freedom' that one had hithereto enjoyed in one's own particular territory. To be 'free' or to be 'civilised' — that is the question. The choice is whether it is better to be the tuan of one's own small world, or to belong as a part of a larger, more powerful Other-given world.

Such a choice is by no means unique to my informants. It is found in all areas of the world where 'civilisation' is in process, where some form of supralocal system claims the allegiance of otherwise 'free' people. Such a system would perhaps seem most relevant to the people concerned when their consciousness of the outside world is heightened — for example, when outsiders encroach upon their territory, or when they themselves travel out of their own particular territory to other places beyond. The meeting of two worlds — inside and outside — tends to make one feel the inadequacy of being merely the tuan of one's own small world, when it is
perceived that the outside Other–given world is larger and more powerful.

There is a further material dimension to this perception. As indicated above, conversion to a world religion seems to follow a shift from boat-dwelling nomadism to house-dwelling sedentism. And as noted in Chapter Two, such a shift implies a greater involvement in the cash nexus, a greater degree of other-dependence. It is this material change, I suggest, that gives plausibility to the symbolic dominance of Other over Self.
NOTES TO CHAPTER NINE


2. To quote Farah (1970:154):

   The caliph was not only ruler but also amir al-mu'minin (commander of the faithful) and the imam (guide) of the community.

   The Seljuk Turks who first bore the title of sultan also adopted this role, as have most, if not all, Muslim rulers after them.

3. The Penyengat mosque is described thus in a book written by an informant Raja Hamzah (n.d.(b):9):

   Misjid yang layak dibanggakan sebagai cermin keagungan agama Islam - dengan kubah-kubah, menara dan mimbar yang serba indah - didirikan pada tanggal 1 Syawal tahun 1249H (1832 M) atas prakarsa Yang dipertuan Muda ke VII, Raja Abdul Rahman (Marhum Kampung Bulang).


   (The Penyengat mosque that is rightly proud of being the mirror of the greatness of Islam -- with its beautiful domes, minarets and lectern -- was built on the first day of the month Syawal in Hijrah year 1249 (1832 A.D.), at the order of the seventh Yang Dipertuan Muda, Raja Abdul Rahman (posthumously known as 'He Who Departed at Kampung Bulang').

   The mosque, which is 19.8 metres long and 18 metres wide, is supported by four concrete pillars. In each corner of the mosque is built a minaret where the muezzin can call for prayers.

   Apart from the minarets, there are thirteen domes. They are variously square, hexagonal, and octagonal.

   Altogether they number seventeen minarets and domes, equivalent to the number of times obeisance is made in obligatory prayer by the Muslim congregation during the span of a day and a night.)

   (My translation).

4. According to the Tuhfat, the mosque was not yet finished when Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Abdul Rahman died in 1844; it was completed by his successor Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Ali. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:283.) Nineteenth-century accounts by Europeans described it as white in colour. (See, for example, de Bruyn Kops 1855:96,98; Thomson 1847:71ff.)
5. As noted in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (1936:III,325), mosques are generally known as *Bait Allah* 'house of God'.

As places for divine service, the mosques are primarily 'houses of which God has permitted that they be erected and that His name be mentioned in them' (Sura, xxiv. 36).

(Ibid.:327).

According to Moulavi (1973:146)

The Prophet...said: 'Allah the Lofty sayeth, Verily the Mosques are my Houses on earth and verily those who frequent are my visitors.'

6. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:


7. The weddings of my informants are generally divided into two parts -- namely, nikah and bersanding. As explained in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (1936:III,912-914), the Arabic word nikah means 'marriage (properly: sexual intercourse, but already in the Kur'an exclusively of the contract)'. In the context of Riau, nikah is indeed the Islamic part of the wedding, when the marriage contract is established between the groom and the bride (the latter represented by an older relative); this is usually held in the evening. It is on this occasion that mas kawin is given and accepted. Bersanding is usually held on the following day. As Wilkinson (1959:1014) has explained the word, it means 'to sit side by side...but limited in use to the ceremonial 'enthronement' of the bride and bridegroom at the wedding reception after the actual religious marriage (nikah)'. Among my informants, this is the occasion when adat is displayed. (See Chapter Seven and Plate 19.)

8. Wilkinson's (1959:421) explanation is relevant, because he provides a list of the different kinds of 'knowledge' that the word ilmu refers to:

Knowledge; solid learning; science; magic; any branch of knowledge or magic.

(1) Etymologically, ilmu = 'to know; knowledge'. In this way it may be used of any branch of knowledge; cf. ilmu chochok tanam: 'the art of planting; agriculture'.
(ii) By early Moslem writers it was specialized in the sense of 'solid knowledge', in contrast to mere worldly accomplishments (adab, q.v.). Such 'solid knowledge' was based on Divine Revelation and on the Arabic language in which the Revelation was given to humanity. Ilmu includes: Arabic grammar (ilmu nahu); word-building (ilmu saraf); dialectics (ilmu bahas); logical exposition (ilmu mantik); letter-writing (ilmu terasul); Canon Law (ilmu fakih, ilmu pikhah); theology (ilmu tauhid) and mysticism (ilmu batin, ilmu salek, ilmu sufii, ilmu suluk, ilmu tarekat, ilmu tasawufi). It covers also psuedo-sciences such as alchemy (ilmu kimia), astrology (ilmu nujum), prosopology (ilmu firsat), the interpretation of dreams (ilmu tabir mimpi), spiritualism (ilmu ghiaib, ilmu rohani, ilmu wasitah) and the Moslem Black Art (ilmu seher).

(iii) Through European influence the word has now been applied to our own sciences: anatomy (ilmu tashrikh); astronomy (ilmu bintang); chemistry (ilmu kemi, ilmu kimia, ilmu cherai); geography (ilmu dunia); mathematics (ilmu kira-kira); etc.

(iv) In popular speech ilmu is used with a special suggestion of magic; cf: ilmu panas (black magic); membacha ilmu (to recite magical formulae); membuat ilmu (to use sorcery). Branches of this ilmu are very numerous.

9. The Arabic word sihr does indeed mean 'bewitchment, beguilement, enchantment, fascination; ...sorcery, witchcraft, magic, charm (of a woman)' (Wehr 1976:400).

10. Lime is considered by my informants as a fruit of magical significance. This is similar to the situation in the Malay Peninsula described by Skeat (1900). Such a perception seems to be of historical derivation. For example, Wilkinson (1959:692) cites from the Hikayat Mashhudu'l-hakk the usage of the term 'mandi berlimau (to rub oneself down with split limes in ceremonial ablutions)'.

11. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:


'Ano, Pak Raja H., sudah siap-siap semua?'

'Sudahlah.'

'Sarat-sarat awak sudah?'

'Sarat-sarat apa?'

'Ek, awak ini tidak pakai apa-apa ini?'
'Jadi pertandingan di Pekanbaru ini nak pakai sarat-sarat?'

'Ya lah,' katanya.

'Nak pakai sarat, nanti saya carilah.'

Saya cari limau, terpaksa aja, saya cari sebesar-sebesarnya. Saya pukul aja, main-main. Jadi petang dia datang.

'Awak itu tak betul. Saya tak cakap main-main,' katanya.

'Begini aja. Saya ini tak bawa sarat-sarat itu. Tetapi kalau Bapak nak tolong, tolonglah saya. Bagaimana kami pakai dukun dari Bengkalis aja. Tolonglah.'

'Kalau minta betul, boleh,' katanya.

Malam itu, nak main, dia malam pertama, kalau pertama, selamat dia. Malam kedua, itu kami. Dia tolonglah. Pakai macam-macamlah! Dia menolong kita, kita terima kasih; cuma kita tolak bala aja, karena sudah ada peringatan-peringatan ini tolak bala. Sudah selesai kami tolak bala, jadi dukun dia datang. Sama saya dia bilang, 'Pak, jangan kasI orang luar masuk; saya nak tolong, tetapi tak mampu saya.' 'Kalau begitu, baiklah,' kata saya. Saya kasI tahu anak-anak buah, 'Jangan nanti satu orang pun masuk, nanti uh?' 'Orang luar,' saya bilang, 'Jagalah orang itu.'

Jaga lepas kira-kira lima minit kami nak main, mari satu orang.

'Pak H panggil saya tadi. Suruh antarkan barang. Ini saya bawa,' kata orang itu (yang) mai.

Jadi, oleh anak-anak buah kita itu, kan, kasi masok, kan, nak dari saya.

'Kalau Pak H tak ada, saya cari Pak S.T.,' kata orang itu.

'Jika cari Pak H, dia ada dalam; masuklah.'


'Awak kena aja,' katanya,

'Hati-hati ajalah. Saya tak boleh buat apa-apa lagi. Main hati-hati ajalah.'
Saya tak sedap hati ku itu, kan? Mainlah kami.
'Apa ini, tak ada sarat, sudah lama macam main-main ini Apa kena begini, bagaimana? Bagaisiapakah pimpinan pertunjukan malam ini?'

Kita tak mau bising-bising.' Ada orang tutup pintu. Tutup. Dari depan ada dua orang yang mau masuk.
Jadi, tak banyak, luka sikat aja. Jadi pintu diketung.

'Jangan buka.'
'Oi, bualah.'

Saya bilang, 'Oi, keluar. Tak ada yang bisa masuk sini!'

'Eh, Pak Gubenor itu.'

'Eh, Pak Gubenor masuklah.'

[The listeners chuckled.]

dia masuk marah-marah. Dia panggil itu dokter propinsi itu, suruh merawat siki jab itu.

[After listening to the story, one of the listeners commented:]

'Jadi di Pekanbaru itu masih; ilmunya masih kuat itu.'

'Masih,' [replied Raja H].

12. As Douglas has argued (1966:113), 'pollution is a type of danger which is not likely to occur except where the lines of structure, cosmic or social, are clearly defined'.

13. As Brown (1970:35-36) describes the situation in the Christianising Roman Empire:

Most important of all, perhaps, a man's conscious identity was now deeply linked with his Christianity. In Christian popular opinion, the sorcerer could no longer be tolerated in the community on condition that he recanted his art: for he was now considered to have abandoned his identity; he had denied his Christian baptism.... Significantly, the Jew plays a part..., not only because he is an outsider, but, more particularly,
because he had always denied Christ -- he was the 'apostate' par excellence.

14. In other words, I am suggesting that 'psychosis' derives from isolation, from the failure to find enough people to collude in the same phantasy.

15. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:


16. The word celeng seems to be of Javanese derivation. (See, for example, Horne 1974:634). According to Dahl (1981), *±angui is a Proto-Austronesian word meaning 'to swim'. According to my informants, the type of pig known as nangol usually swims in a herd from island to island.

17. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:

Orang laut -- kalau tahun baru Cina, dia tahun baru juga; kalau hari raya Islam, dia ikut juga. Dia bebas.

18. Sembur Darat and Sembur Laut are connected by a sandbar which is covered by the sea at high tide. At low tide, one can thus walk across. My informants said that the village was originally on Sembur Darat; later on it was moved to Sembur Laut. Sembur Darat is now uninhabited. I shall thus refer to Sembur Laut simply as 'Sembur'.

19. The word hari raja literally means 'big day'. Hari Raya Puasa is the celebration of the end of Ramadan, the fasting month. Hari Raya Haji takes place during the period of the haj, and is supposed to be an expression of the spirit of sacrifice. During this occasion, people kill goats to distribute the meat to the other villagers as charity.

20. The word tobat or taubat means 'repentance; abjuring; forsaking; abstaining from' (Wilkinson 1959:1176). According to my Penyengat informants, this is related to sertu 'ablution (after touching a pig or a dog)', these animals being considered polluting in Islam. They said the only reason why tobat should be performed for a new convert to Islam is that this person would have previously had contact with these ritual pollutants, and hence would need to be purified.

21. It may be the case that the Barok Limas and the Mantang Limas are one, particularly since the name Mantang is often used as a generic label for all orang laut. (See Chapter Five.)

22. According to this informant, the proper way of killing a person is in accordance with the location of the roh 'soul' and the location of the sun. The roh of a woman is in the left side of her body; the roh of a man is in the right side of his body. When the sun is high, one hits the victim at
the back of the neck just below the hairline — on the left side, if it is a woman, on the right side, if it is a man. When the sun is going down, one hits the victim at the waist, just below the rib-cage — again on the right or the left, depending on gender. These are the positions of the roh at these times. My informant said that when one holds the belantang 'truncheon', one becomes kebal 'invincible' and can withstand even a cannon-ball. (See Plate 25.)

23. The original quotation in Malay is as follows:

Petai terlebih dulu.... Petai banyak orang sampan; tapi keturunannya sudah banyak masuk Islam, tak mau kerja lagi yang buruk — mencuri, makan kotor. Kerana ramai, sebahagian yang sudah Islam itu pindah ke Batu Licin; kemudian ke Nguan, Sembur dan Air Lingka.... Yang di Petai itu suku Limas, orang sampan Limas.

24. For example, Arifin's wife's father's mother is said to have lived in Petai; her own mother died in Tanjung Malang. (See Genealogical Chart 11.)
Plate 19. This scene is typical of a bersanding -- that is, the ceremonial enthronement of bride and bridegroom. The wedding depicted above took place on Penyengat. While the newlyweds, Taufik and Zauyah, sit shyly on their pelamin 'bridal thrones' with downcast eyes, Raja Dara (dressed in purple) and another woman prepare for the ritual known as suap-suap -- literally, 'mouthful by mouthful'. During this ritual the bride and groom feed each other symbolically with small mouthfuls of rice. First the groom brings a small rice-ball to the bride's mouth; then the bride does the same to him. This reciprocal action is repeated three times. They do not actually eat the rice but merely bring it to each other's mouth in a symbolic gesture. The rice comes from the nasi adab-adab 'ceremonial rice-dish' placed on the low table in front of the couple. Yellow glutinous rice is used for this dish. Hard-boiled eggs dyed in red are stuck on the rice to signify fertility. (The other woman on the left side of the picture is the Mak Andam 'Mother Dresser' -- that is, the ritual specialist in charge of the ceremonial dressing of the bride.)
Plate 20. This is part of a kebun pusaka 'inherited plantation' in Sebauk. The first time I went to such a 'plantation' with my informants, I could not even see 'it'. I had to ask them. 'But where's the kebun you speak of?' They answered by saying, 'Well, there's the rambutan tree, and there's the durian tree, and there's the jackfruit tree', and so on. (Rambutan is 'a fruit with a hairy integument', known in Latin as Nephelium lappaceum (Coope 1976:223). Durian is the pungent fruit known in Latin as Durio zibethinus.)

A kebun pusaka is thus not a neatly bounded parcel of land with orderly rows of trees. On the contrary, it consists of the specific fruit trees that had been planted by one's predecessors. So to keep a kebun pusaka going, one must plant new fruit trees for future generations. The end of the fruit trees would be the end of the kebun pusaka itself, since all that would be there would be uncultivated forest.
Plates 21 and 22. These two views -- front and back -- give an idea of the size of the Penyengat mosque. Indeed the words on the front arch proudly proclaim:

The Great Mosque of the Riau Sultan of Penyengat.

The colours of the mosque -- yellow and green -- signify the two important themes of royalty and Islam.
Plate 23. In contrast to the great royal mosque of Penyengat, there are numerous village mosques of humbler proportions. The picture above depicts the recently renovated Karas mosque. The well in front is used specifically for ritual ablutions before prayer.
Plate 24. Apong's grave on Nanga is sited on a hillock overlooking the house of his son Bolong. A few fruit trees have been specially planted near the grave for the deceased. (Unfortunately, I do not have a better print of this grave.)
Plate 25. Abubakar -- more popularly known as Pak Andak Abuk -- strikes a pose to show how he used to fight as a Galang pirate in his younger days. The belantam 'truncheon' in the picture was subsequently given to me for my protection.
APPENDIX 1

GENEALOGICAL CHARTS
NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 1

I have derived this genealogical chart from Raja Ali Haji (1982), Matheson and Andaya (1982), and Tengku Ahmad (1972). The two patriarchal lines -- namely, keturunan tengku and keturunan raja -- are descended from the two founding ancestors -- respectively, Sultan Abd al-Jalil and Opu Tendriburang Daeng Rilaga. These two keturunan constitute, respectively, the pre-1722 faction and the post-1722 faction. Several strategic marriages occurred between the two factions:

between Tengku Mandak and Yamtuan Muda Opu Daeng Cellak;
between Tengku Tengah and Opu Daeng Parani;
between Raja di-Baruh Abd al-Jalil and Tengku Putih;
between Temenggung Tun Abd al-Jamal and Tengku Maimunah;
between Sultan Mahmud III and Raja Hamidah Engku Puteri;
between Sultan Mahmud IV and Raja Maimunah;
between 'Sultan' Embung Fatimah and Yamtuan Muda Raja Muhammad Yusuf.

As we have seen in the discussion above, the descendants from these particular marriages played very significant roles in zaman sultan. Compare this chart with Genealogical Chart 2.
GENEALOGICAL CHART 2
This is a photocopy of a genealogical chart drawn up by my informant Raja Haji Abdul Rahim for the purpose of general distribution. It is noteworthy that he has affixed his signature at the bottom of the chart, even though he himself does not figure directly in this genealogy. Significantly, the relevant relationships highlighted in this genealogy are those linking the Riau rajas with two extant sultanates in alam Melayu — namely, Johor and Selangor. So even though no living Riau raja figures in this chart, the implication is that they are related to the current royal houses of Johor and Selangor. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the reigning sultan of Selangor Raja Abdul Aziz is mentioned. This is indeed the informant mentioned in Chapter Four, who was able to gain admittance to the palace of the Selangor sultan, apparently through the demonstration of genealogical connections.

The linkage between the Riau rajas and the Selangor sultans is patrilineal, since they share a common ancestor in Yamtuan Muda Opu Daeng Cellak ('D. Celak' in the chart). The linkage between the Riau rajas and the Johor sultans is matrilineal, since the latter are descended from the marriage between Tengku Maimunah, the daughter of Opu Daeng Parani, and Tun Abd al-Jamal, grandson of Sultan Abd al-Jalil ('T. Maimunah' and 'T.A.Jamal Bulang' in the chart). Interestingly, Tun Abd al-Jamal's patrilineal descent from Sultan Abd al-Jalil is ignored; only his father, Tun Abbas, is mentioned. Moreover, it is not mentioned that he was the temenggung 'local minister' at the time. So the implication is that his descendants who became Johor sultans derived their royalty from their matrilineal Bugis ascendants.

Certain other strategic marriages are noted in this chart, for example:

- between Raja Fatimah ('R. Fatimah') and Yamtuan Muda Opu Daeng Kemboja ('D. Kemboja');

- between Raja Hamidah ('R. Hamidah') and Sultan Mahmud III ('Sultan Mahmud Lingga').

As discussed above, Yamtuan Muda Opu Daeng Marewah evidently has no patrilineal descendants in present-day Riau. In this chart, his daughter Raja Fatimah is mentioned; furthermore, her marriage to Opu Daeng Kemboja is highlighted, thereby linking his descendants to Opu Daeng Marewah matrilineally. As for the significance of Raja Hamidah's marriage, that has been discussed in Chapter Four.
NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 3

I copied this from my informants' own genealogical chart hanging on the wall of their living room. They are, namely, Raja Jantan and his children. The spelling of the names follows their usage.

As the chart indicates, they are patrilineal descendants of Yamtuan Muda Opu Daeng Cellak ('Daeng Celak') and Yamtuan Muda Raja Haji ('Raja Haji'). Their next ancestor, Raja Haji Ahmad ('R.H. Ahmad'), was the first author of the 

Tuhfat al-Nafis. The brother of Raja Haji Abdullah ('R.H. Abdullah) was Raja Ali Haji ('R. Ali Haji') who completed the Tuhfat. This is the Raja Haji Abdullah who may have 'held' Pangkil, after Engku Besar Raja Sitti. (See Chapter Six.) He apparently went off to the Karimun area; his son Raja Ishak also went with him. According to my informants, Raja Ishak left some tanah pusaka 'inherited land' at Meral near Tanjungbalai on Karimun Besar; Several siblings of my informant, Raja Jantan, have therefore gone to the Karimun area to live. Raja Jantan's father's brother, Raja Mohamad Som, is also living in that area, in Tanjung Batu in Kundur, 'where he has a plantation' (dia berkebun di sana).

Interestingly, Raja Jantan's father, Raja Haji Ali, also known as Engku Haji, had two wives, both of whom bore the honorific encik. Raja Jantan's mother was the senior wife; she was from Igalmanda in Sumatra. His siblings are all born of the junior wife, who was the daughter of a court retainer. They are thus all anak gundik. But Raja Jantan himself married a raja, Raja Jamilah; so his own children are anak gahara. These marital connections are not, however, displayed on the chart itself, even though they are evidently still known to my informants.
GENEALOGICAL CHART 4

1. Sultan Abdul Jalil Riayat Syah
   Johor 1699-1719

2. Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Alam Syah
   Riau, Lingga, Johor, Pahang
   Dilantik 1722 Mangkat 1761
   (Installed 1722 Died 1761)

3. Sultan Abdul Jalil Muadzam Syah
   Raja di Baroh Riau
   Mangkat 1761
   (Died 1761)

4. Sultan Ahmad Riayat Syah
   Riau, Mangkat 1761
   (Died 1761)

5. Sultan Mahmud Riayat Syah
   Lingga
   Dilantik 1761 Mangkat 1812
   Pindah Lingga 1807
   Makam di belakang Masjid Daik
   (Installed 1761 Died 1812
   Moved to Lingga 1807
   Tomb behind the Daik mosque)

6. Sultan Abdulrahman Muadzam Syah
   Lingga, Dilantik 1818 (Installed 1818)
   Mangkat 1832, Bukit Cengkeh, Daik
   (Died 1823)

7. Sultan Muhamad Muadzam Syah
   Lingga 1830-1841
   Makam Bukit Cengkeh
   (Tomb at Bukit Cengkeh)

8. Sultan Mahmod Muadzam Syah
   Lingga 1835-1857
   Dipecat 23 September 1857
   Mangkat 1864 di Pahang
   (Deposed 23 September 1857
   Died 1864 in Pahang)

9. Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Alam Syah
   Lingga Riau 1857-1883
   Makam Bukit Cengkeh, Daik
   (Tomb at Bukit Cengkeh)

Tengku Usman

Tengku Hussin

Tengku Abubakar

Tengku Ahmad
   (EGO)

Tengku Muhd Saleh
   1901-1960

Tengku Fatimah

Raja Muhd. Yusuf
   Yang Dipertuan Muda Riau X

Raja Abdulrahman

Sultan Lingga Riau 1885-1911
   Dipecat 3 Feb 1911 Mangkat
   1930 Singapura
   (Deposed 13 Feb 1911
   Died 1930 Singapore)
NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 4

This is excerpted from a large and extensive genealogical chart drawn by my informant Tengku Ahmad bin Tengku Abubakar. The entire chart includes not just this portion showing Tengku Ahmad's patrilineal descent, but also connections linking him with the descendants of the sultan of Singapore, the sultan of Indragiri, and the sultan of Siak, and more importantly, also with the current sultans of Selangor, Trengganu, Pahang and Johor. Significantly, the entire genealogy has a title: 'Djadual Salasilah Pertalian Antara Radja-Radja Yang Mendjadi Sultan-Sultan' (Genealogical Chart of Connections between Rajas Who Have Become Sultans). Whereas Tengku Ahmad's connections with the sultans of Trengganu, Pahang, and Johor are patrilineal, his connection with the sultan of Selangor is matrifilative, being made through the marriage of Tengku Mandak, the sister of Sultan Sulaiman I, to Yamtuan Muda Opu Daeng Cellak.

As this excerpted portion of the genealogy indicates, Tengku Ahmad is patrilineally descended from Sultan Muhammad ('Sultan Muhamad Muadzam Syah'), the father of Sultan Mahmud IV who was deposed by the Dutch. Sultan Sulaiman II, the brother of Sultan Muhammad, succeeded his deposed nephew. As mentioned in Chapter Four, Sultan Sulaiman died childless, and was succeeded by Sultan Mahmud IV's daughter, Tengku Fatimah, who then passed the throne to her son matrifilatively. My informant Tengku Ahmad contends that Tengku Husain ('Tengku Hussin') should have been the rightful heir, not Tengku Fatimah who was a woman. The implication is that if that had happened and if there were still an extant sultanate, then my informant would now be 'Sultan Ahmad', equal in status to the reigning sultans of Selangor, Trengganu, Pahang, and Johor.
NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 5

This is derived from a chart that was drawn by my informant, Raja Haji Abdul Rahim, for the purpose of showing me his precise genealogical location. The numerals indicate the succession order of the various yamtuan mudas. So on his father's side, he is descended from two yamtuan mudas -- namely, Yamtuan Muda Opu Daeng Cellak and Yamtuan Muda Raja Haji. His mother, however, is descended from four yamtuan mudas; in addition to the abovementioned, her ancestors included also Yamtuan Muda Raja Jafar ('R. Jaafar') and Yamtuan Muda Raja Abdullah ('R. Abdullah').

In this chart, I make a differentiation between the names that my informant had written down himself and those that I subsequently obtained from him as additional information. The former is enclosed in inverted commas; the latter is not. It is significant that whereas he had written down the names of his mother's illustrious patrilineal ancestors, he had omitted her humbler matrilineal ascendants -- namely, the hulubalang 'military officer' from Gaung in Sumatra who was sent to take over Pangkil, and his wife who was the bidan raja 'rajas' midwife' also from Gaung. As mentioned in note 3 in Chapter Two, Gaung was formerly part of the Riau-Lingga sultanate. (See Appendix 12.)

Another piece of oral information included in this genealogical chart is the connection between Raja Haji Abdul Rahim and Raja Jantan. (See Genealogical Chart 3.)
GENEALOGICAL CHART 6

ASAL USUL ORANG KAYA
(DATOK KAYA) MEPAR-LINGGA

I. Megat Mata Merah berasal dari Kota Kandis - Pangkalan Lama (Jambi-Sumatra). Dari Jambi pindah ke Limbung - Lingga, dari Limbung pindah ke Tembok - Jelutong (Lingga) dari Tembok - Jemutong ke Sungai Lingga (Lingga).

II. Megat Raden Kuning kuburnya di Bukit Mur - Bukit Kerawat - Lingga.

III. Datok Kaya Inn kuburnya di Mepar (Lingga).

IV. Datok Kaya Djamalu’ddin - kuburnya di Mepar (Lingga). Bergelar Temenggung pada kala itu ketibaan Sultan Mahmud I dari Johore (Malaysia) pada tahun 1215 (H).

V. Datok Kaya Montel kuburnya di Mepar (Lingga).

VI. Datok Kaya Awang kuburnya di Pulau Penyengat (Tandjung Pinang).

VII. Datok Kaya Moehammad Seman kuburnya di Mepar (Lingga).

VIII. Datok Kaya Abdul Kahar (E. Hitam) kuburnya di Senayang.

IX. Datok Kaya Mohamad Isa (E. Awang)

Daik, 16 Desember 1979
Yang membuatkannya

[Signature]
GENEALOGICAL CHART 7
NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 6

This is copied from Datuk Kaya Mohamad Isa's own genealogical chart. (Compare with Genealogical Chart 7.) The title may be translated as 'Origins of the Orang Kaya (Datuk Kaya) of Mepar-Lingga'. As discussed in Chapter Five, the orang kaya/datuk kaya -- literally, 'wealthy people'/ 'wealthy grandparent' -- were local chiefs who mediated between the rulers at the political centre and the subject people at the periphery. This genealogical chart is thus of the local chiefs who commanded the subject people of Mepar in Lingga.

The genealogy begins with one 'Megat Mata Merah' who 'originated from' (berasal dari) a place known as 'Kota Kandis - Pangkalan Lama' in Jambi, Sumatra. He was thus not a native of Lingga. Indeed, the stages whereby he 'moved' (pindah) from Jambi to 'Sungai Lingga' (Lingga River) is recounted in detail. He moved first to Limbung in Lingga, then to Tembuk Jelutong, and finally to Lingga River.

The second Datuk Kaya of Mepar was 'Megat Raden Kuning'. All that is said of him is that his grave is at 'Bukit Mur - Bukit Kerawat' in Lingga. According to Wilkinson (1959:754), megat is a hereditary title derived from the Sanskritic magadha, meaning 'son of a Vaisya father and a Kshatriya mother'. Coope (1976:181) also explains it as 'a hereditary title borne by men of royal descent on the mother's side'.

According to this genealogical chart, the title datuk kaya was not used until the third generation with 'Datuk Kaya Inn', whose grave is at Mepar. This is also the very first mention of Mepar. So the implication is that the position of the Datuk Kaya of Mepar was established only at that time. The title megat was, however, dropped.

'Datuk Kaya Djamalu'ddin' succeeded to the position. He obtained the additional title temenggung 'local minister', for it was during his time that 'Sultan Mahmud I' arrived from 'Johore (Malaysia)' in the Islamic year 1215 -- that is, 1800/1. What is significant about this date is that it is mentioned in the Tuhfat as the year when Sultan Mahmud III invited the Illanun pirates to attack the Dutch at Tanjungpinang. According to Matheson and Andaya (1982:372), however, the attack had actually occurred in 1787. Following this, Sultan Mahmud and his court then moved to Lingga, in anticipation of Dutch retaliation. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:185-186.) So the 'Sultan Mahmud I' that is mentioned in the genealogical chart is evidently the 'Sultan Mahmud III' in our discussion. And 'Johore (Malaysia)' is evidently 'Riau' in the sense of the Riau River, for that was where Sultan Mahmud had his capital. (See Chapter Four.)

The next successor to the position was 'Datuk Kaya Montel'. According to the genealogical chart, his grave is in Mepar in Lingga. As discussed in Chapter Five, my Ladi informants give contrary information, saying that his grave is on Penyengat, because he had led his followers there.
According to this genealogical chart, however, it is the next datuk kaya 'Datuk Kaya Awang' whose grave is on 'Pulau Penyengat (Tandjung Pinang)'. His successor 'Datok Kaya Moehammad Seman' evidently then returned to Mepar, for his grave is said to be in Mepar. However, 'Datuk Kaya Abdul Kahar' who succeeded to the position died in Senayang, for his grave is there. This datuk kaya was also known as Encik Hitam ('E. Hitam'). It was probably during his time that the last sultan of Riau abdicated. The last datuk kaya named in the genealogical chart is my informant himself 'Datuk Kaya Mohamad Isa', also known as Encik Awang ('E. Awang'). He is living in Daik, Lingga, where this chart was drawn on 16 December 1979.

NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 7

This is an oral genealogy that I obtained from the same informant Datuk Kaya Mohamad Isa. It is noteworthy that in this oral genealogy, he has omitted several ancestors whose names appeared in Genealogical Chart 6. First, he could not remember beyond 'Encik Montil' ('Datok Kaya Montel' in Chart 6.) So the four ancestors preceding Datuk Kaya Montil are omitted. Second, 'Datok Kaya Moehammad Seman', who is mentioned in Chart 6, is also omitted. Instead, there is a telescoping of the generations, such that 'Encik Awang' ('Datok Kaya Awang' in Chart 6) is named as my informant's father's father.

In the oral genealogy, my informant names his mother, who is omitted from his written genealogy. He was also able to give some information about his wife's ancestors, who were encik in Daik. The implication is that 'Encik Muhammad' has himself moved from Senayang to Daik, due to the rule of uxorilocality. There is a further implication in the oral genealogy: his wife's ancestors seem to have been more Islamic than his own ancestors, for both her parents, as well as her father's father, had been on the pilgrimage to Mecca. My informant also told me that her father's father, Encik Haji Yusuf, was of Bugis descent, and that he was the datuk laksamana 'admiral' in Sultan Abd al-Rahman's time. According to Matheson and Andaya (1982:442), this sultan's reign occurred between 1812 and 1831. My informant and his wife, Encik Halimah, are now perhaps in their sixties. There seem to be too few generations spanning from 1812-1831 to 1983-1984. Perhaps even in his wife's case, Encik Muhammad was telescoping the generations. He himself hinted at this by saying that during the time of Encik Haji Usman, members of the family no longer held the position of datuk laksamana, thereby implying that there had been more than one holder of the office.
NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 8

This is an oral genealogy obtained from a Pangkil informant Jamaluddin. Even though he is not an aristocrat, his genealogy is patrilineally skewed. He identified himself as being of pangkat encik, bangsa encik 'of encik status, encik stock'. He said that in zaman sultan, the people of encik stock did not have to work; they just sat down and ate. He claims to be keturunan Bugis 'of Bugis descent', although he does not know the name of the first ancestor who came to Riau from Sulawesi. His genealogical memory of names begins with Yusuf I of Penyengat. But he does not know anything else about Yusuf I. About Karim, however, my informant knows that he was the bilal in Penyengat; the bilal is the muezzin who calls the faithful to prayer. Karim's son, Ahmad, was also the bilal. Salleh, however, had a different job: he was a court musician who played the violin and performed in mendu 'a theatrical performance of Bornean (Pontianak) origin' and joget 'a two-person dance'. (See Wilkinson 1959:475 and 761 for an explication of these terms.) My informant said, 'therefore he had many wives', implying that musical and theatrical performance was associated with sexual promiscuity. According to the genealogy, he had a total of seven wives. My informant said that sometimes, he changed wives after only three months. Apparently, Salleh also smoked opium.

About his own father, Yusuf II, Jamaluddin did not have a great deal to say, except that he moved from Penyengat to Pangkil and married a Pangkil woman Lesot. According to Jamaluddin, Lesot's mother's father Ola and her father Ribut were among the early inhabitants of Pangkil. Ribut was apparently the jaga 'guardian' of the keramat grave. It was after his death that the grave moved to the sea. (See Chapter Six.)

Jamaluddin then said something rather significant about Ola and Ribut: they 'did not use bin' (tak pakai bin). Bin is an Arabic word meaning 'son of' (see Coope 1976:34). As noted in Chapter Four, my Muslim informants arrange their names in the following order: personal name + bin + father's name. First of all, the names Ola and Ribut are clearly not Muslim names, and second, they were not affixed to patronyms in an Islamic manner. My informant hastened to add that Bilal Ahmad, Bilal Karim and Anip (his father's mother's father) all used bin. There is thus a very strong hint that Ola and Ribut were not quite Islamic. But when I asked Jamaluddin whether they knew how to pray, he said: 'Ola was very good at praying; he died whilst praying' (Ola pandai sembahyang; dia mati tengah sembahyang). Even if that were so, the implication is that they were first-generation Muslims, perhaps about the Islamic level of the present-day Sembur inhabitants.

Both Ola and Ribut were said to be keturunan Gelam 'of Gelam descent'. So Jamaluddin may be patrilineally Bugis, but he is matrilineally indigenous. Interestingly, although his first wife was a Pangkil woman, his two subsequent wives were from Karas and Dompak, both of which are areas identified with the derajat of hamba raja. So his two later marriages were hypogamous for him.
GENEALOGICAL CHART 10
GENEALOGICAL CHART 12
NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 9

This is an oral genealogy obtained from my informant the penghulu 'headman' of Bintan. Penghulu Abidin identified himself as keturunan Palembang 'of Palembang descent', but he was not able to name any ancestor from Palembang in his genealogy. (See Chapter Seven.) Penghulu Abidin was born in Nau village in Bintan; he moved to Buyu only after his marriage to a Buyu woman, Dayang. He then succeeded his father-in-law as penghulu 'headman'. He owns a plantation of rubber trees and fruit trees. He is also the pawang 'village magician'.

NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 10

This is an oral genealogy I obtained from my informant Awang Sah of Bukit Batu, Bintan. He identified himself and is identified by others as an orang Bintan asli 'indigenous Bintan person'. This informant has been discussed in Chapter Seven. He was quite careful to specify who on this genealogy was an orang Bintan asli and who was not. Thus whereas Mat Arsad and his ancestors were described as orang Bintan asli, Konah was described as bukan orang Bintan asli, keturunan dari tempat lain 'not an indigenous Bintan person, of descent from elsewhere'. Her ancestors were thus not indigenous to Bintan.

NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 11

This is an oral genealogy obtained from my informant Arifin/ Suan Tin/A Keng of Teluk Nipah. He identified himself as Melayu Kong Hu Cu 'Confucianist Melayu', because his father is Chinese and his mother is Melayu, suku Barak. Through matrifiliation he belongs to the derajat of hamba raja. 'Suan Tin' is his formal Chinese name; but he does not know his Chinese surname. 'A Keng' is his informal Chinese name. 'Arifin' is his Melayu name. It is quite clear that he knows much more about his mother's kin than about his father's kin. This informant has been discussed in Chapter Seven.

NOTE TO GENEALOGICAL CHART 12

This is an oral genealogy obtained from my informant Bolong of Nanga. He identified himself as suku Galang, though there are other suggestions that he and his siblings are really suku Barok. In either case, he would belong to the derajat of hamba raja. This informant and his siblings have been discussed in Chapter Nine. It is noteworthy that this genealogy indicates another marriage between a Chinese man Kim Lai and an orang laut woman Nen. The name of the place where they live — Dapur Enam 'Sixth Kiln' — suggests that it is the site of charcoal works, for there are many such places known as dapur in that area of Riau.
APPENDIX 2

ALAM MELAYU AS A TRADE AREA

As long ago as the second and third centuries A.D., Chinese traders were aware of this area. They referred to it as Nanhai 'Southern Sea'. Indeed the Chinese sources provide one of the earliest textual references of the word Melayu. (See Wang 1958.) Apart from the China trade, alam Melayu was also visited by other historically important traders, such as the Indians and the Arabs. (See Wolters 1970.) What these foreign traders seem to have wanted were indigenous products such as gharu wood, ebony, ivory, rhino horns, tortoise shells, cowries, laka wood, pandan matting, cardamon, rattan, coconut, benzoin, damar, camphor, betel nut, kingfisher feathers, pearls, and so on. (For a full list, see Dunn 1975: 111-112.) The significance of these products is that they were not manufactured artefacts, but natural commodities that had to be gathered either from land or from sea. In return for these, certain manufactured goods such as Chinese pottery and Indian textiles were traded. These manufactured goods constituted an economic resource for the indigenes of the area, but not, however, equally available to all.

There was unequal access to the traffic of trade due to the location of the different territories. As a rule, those who were downstream had greater access than those who were upstream. Similarly, those who lived on the coast had more access than those who lived in the forest. And those whose territory was located along the major shipping routes were more involved in foreign trade than others located some distance away from such routes. Between those who had greater access and those who had less, there was established an exchange economy, such that the former became middlepeople mediating between the foreign traders on the one hand, and the more remote
The indigenes who had less access to trade became the suppliers of the natural commodities desired by the foreign traders, while those who became the mediators had no need to supply through their own efforts, either natural commodities or manufactured goods. (See Dunn 1975, Bronson 1977, and Benjamin 1983.)

This led to a pattern of economic differentiation among the various indigenous communities, as a result of which, an inter-communal hierarchy developed, with the mediating community becoming the elite. The ideological legitimation for such a hierarchy was provided by the Indianised kingship system, possibly with caste as a model for such hierarchisation. (See Coedes 1968:22-27.) The mediating elite community now became a relatively stable court, fringed by relatively mobile subjects in the periphery. However, there seem to have been more than one such mediating community that could potentially develop into a court. As noted by my Medan informant, Tengku Lockman Sinar: in former times, every kuala 'river mouth' had a raja 'ruler'; the strongest of them became the maharaja 'great ruler'.

A raja had to attract the indigenous collectors bringing in their supply of natural commodities, thereby attracting in turn more manufactured goods from the foreign traders. Thus the more indigenous collectors and the more foreign traders a chief or ruler could attract, the richer that chief or ruler would have been. There were thus several competing centres of trade, each trying to attract the indigenous collectors and the foreign traders.
What is this Time? What is the evidence for a Time that is not mortal as a leaf in autumn, then the answer is, That which asks the question is out of the world's time....

(Lessing 1971:58).

My informants are aware that they are living in the twentieth century, in the 1980s. But they are also aware that such a temporal description is but one way of talking about time. In their vocabulary, there are certain words used specifically for referring to time in a way that is radically different from mere calendrical computation. There is one word in particular that is of relevance to this study -- namely, zaman 'era'.

To explicate its significance, I shall compare it with four other words for time -- namely, saat, ketika, waktu, and masa. The connotations of these words vary in such a gradated manner that it is possible to plot them thus:

![Figure 19 Time and Human Existence](image-url)
I have derived the opposition between 'egocentricity' and 'sociocentricity' from Benjamin's analysis (1979:13,19) of the situation in the Malay Peninsula:

...The Malay cosmos is in no sense a projection of egocentred conceptions; rather it has a quality of givenness which... I shall refer to as sociocentric.... Malay cosmology views the individual as sharply differentiated from, and acted upon by, the rest of society, and it views man as sharply differentiated from the rest of creation.

Among my informants in Riau, however, this differentiation between the individual and the cosmos is not as sharp and abrupt as characterised by Benjamin for the Malays of the Malay Peninsula. Instead, as Figure 19 above indicates, there is a gradual progression outwards from egocentric time to sociocentric time. However, what is consonant with Benjamin's argument is that for my informants, it is evidently sociocentric time that encompasses egocentric time. We shall see below how the usages listed above express this notion.

The word saat may be translated as 'moment'; saat ini is thus 'this very moment'. This word refers to precise points in time where person and event are located; so saat is a short duration of time that is egocentrically defined. The word ketika refers to time that is somewhat longer than saat. It may be translated as 'a while'; so seketika lagi is 'in a while'. The word implies that time has a certain momentum of its own; it thus refers to a less egocentric definition and hence a longer duration of time.

The word waktu may be translated as 'interval'. It refers specifically to lima waktu sembahyang 'the five prayer-intervals' in a Muslim day. Since these 'prayer-intervals' are fixed, waktu refers to a sociocentric definition of time. However, an element of egocentricity is still implied, since the individual must choose whether or not to pray, and when exactly to do so. The word may be
applied in extended usage to refer to the location of individual action in a sociocentrically fixed interval of time. For example, someone who is unpunctual is said to be tidak menurut waktu 'not keeping to the fixed interval of time'.

The word masa may be translated as 'period'. Like waktu, masa refers to time that is sociocentrically defined. But unlike waktu, it refers to time not divided into regular intervals, but marked by certain social events, for example, war. Masa Perang Dunia Kedua is thus 'the period of the Second World War'. Such periods provide the context for individual experiences. For instance, one can say:

Masa Perang Dunia Kedua saya masih kecil.
(During the period of the Second World War, I was still young.)

The word umur may be translated as 'the duration of one's life'. For example, it is used by my informants when saying farewell:

Kalau saya ada umur, kita dapat berjumpa lagi.
(If I continue to live, we may meet again.)

This usage carries the connotation that one's life is of uncertain duration. It refers not to time as such, but to one's existence in time. Other usages make this clear: seumur hidup is 'the duration of one's life', and panjang umur is 'the length of one's life'. One's umur includes many saat, ketika, and waktu, but is encompassed by masa.

The word zaman is perhaps in diametrical contrast to umur. Whereas umur refers to one's personal experience of time, zaman refers to time as a long, continuous flow that is totally transcendent over an individual's life-span. For example, the word is used in the phrase akhir zaman 'the end of time'; this usage implies infinity
because the end of time itself is an event far removed from the present. The word zaman may thus be used to express a relation of temporal remoteness from the personal experience of the individual. For example, the phrase zaman dahunu kala 'aeons of long ago' refers to a very distant past. So when the term zaman is applied to certain social events, it implies that these events are removed from immediate experience. Such usage may be translated as 'era'. One can even speak of zaman sekarang 'the current era'; this usage implies that the speaker is taking the stance of a disinterested observer and not that of an interested participant.

Of the six words discussed above, zaman is the one that denotes the most sociocentric relationship between time and human existence. A zaman is Other-given, not Self-derived. What McKinley (1979:313) says about zaman and masa in the context of his research is relevant to our discussion:

If, in everyday understanding, a masa is a way of knowing, lifted out from the events and structures of political life, then a zaman, or religious age, is a way of knowing which can encompass these same events and structures. Since it refers directly to the religious views predominant at a given time, the zaman starts as a way of knowing and is imposed on the rest of history. It is the epistemological age par excellence. Though less immediate than the political masa, the religious or philosophical zaman has greater magnitude.

Unlike McKinley's informants in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, my informants in Riau, Indonesia, do not use the word zaman to denote a religious age, while reserving the word masa to denote a political epoch. However, the contrast that McKinley draws between greater immediacy in the case of masa and greater magnitude in the case of zaman does seem to apply. To my informants, zaman seems to be a more objectively marked era, whereas masa seems to be a more subjectively experienced period.
So if an informant were to say, *masa sultan masih ada di Riau* 'when the sultan was still in Riau', she or he would be referring to an event that occurred within immediate experience. On the other hand, if she or he were to mention *zaman sultan* 'the era of the sultan', the reference would be to an era that extends backward in time, beyond one's immediate span of experience. It is even possible for my younger informants to speak of *masa sultan* from the point of view of, say, their grandparents. Through projection, they can extend the usage of the term *masa* beyond their own immediate experience. Nevertheless, there is a discernible difference between a more sociocentrically given *zaman sultan* on the one hand, and on the other hand, a more egocentrically experienced *masa sultan*, even if the experiencing ego is not the speaker's own self, but the projected self of a temporal predecessor.

So in my informants' usage, the words *zaman* and *masa* can be attached to the same phenomena -- for example, *sultan*, *Belanda*, *Jepang*. The difference lies in the relationship between these temporal events and the experiencing ego in the way described above. There is, however, one notable exception: While my informants do talk of a *zaman Indonesia*, they do not seem ever to refer to a *masa Indonesia*. Instead, there are only *masa Revolusi* 'during the period of the Revolution', *masa Konfrontasi* 'during the period of the Confrontation', *masa 'G30S'* 'during the period of the attempted coup of 30th September 1965', and so on. These particular *masas* refer to events that were experienced by my informants themselves.

Their omission of a *masa Indonesia* may be explained in terms of the semantics of *zaman* and *masa*. As stated above, *zaman* seems to denote the sociocentric marking off of eras of time, whereas *masa* seems to denote the egocentric locating of oneself in a period of time. This aspect of my informants' usage seems to agree with that of
McKinley's informants. As he notes (1979:309,313), *masas* are 'intersections of biography and history', whereas *zamans* 'are only indirectly linked with the individual's place in history'. He regards both as epistemological ages:

My point...is that the different eras and periods...are not strictly a matter of historical time in a linear sense. Rather, like the eras of myths and like religious beliefs themselves, these historic ages represent different ways of knowing what is possible in human affairs. They are epistemological ages. Moreover, the assumptions they contain regarding human knowing and acting are part of the present. They remain permanently available and access to them is conditioned by current contexts of religion, social relations, and art.

(Ibid.:306).

I would agree that what is at issue is not merely the calendrical computation of time, but rather, ways of 'knowing what is possible in human affairs'. Hence to talk of the present as a *zaman*, like the other *zamans* of the past, is to articulate a particular way of knowing the present. Since *zaman* denotes sociocentric time that is remote from immediate experience, the implication is that *zaman Indonesia* is as remote from one's immediate experience as the other bygone *zamans*. One thus distances oneself from the present by relating it vis-a-vis the not-present. The present is thereby contextualised and hence defined by the past.

NOTES TO APPENDIX 3

1. According to Wilkinson (1959:993) the word *saaat* is of Arabic derivation, and is used with special reference to auspicious or inauspicious times: *al-saat* (the Fateful Hour; the hour of judgement); *saat yang nahas* (inauspicious time); *saat yang sempurna* (most favourable hour),....

*Saat* thus refers to time as a collection of brief moments, some auspicious, others inauspicious, from which to pick and choose. This further implies an egocentric relation between human existence and time, such that the individual is interested in time merely for the purpose of the moment.
2. According to Wilkinson (1959:587), the word ketika is of Sanskritic derivation. Like saat, ketika also carries connotation of time as auspicious or inauspicious. But it refers to lucky or unlucky phases, which are perhaps comparable to English notions of 'a winning streak' or 'a run of bad luck'. The term ketika seems to be used especially in divination. Technical terms in divination include ketika lima 'the phase of five', ketika tujuh 'the phase of seven', ketika langkah 'the phase of approach' (ibid.). The implication is that through divination, individual purpose can fit the momentum of time. Ketika is thus less egocentrically defined than saat.

3. According to Wilkinson (1959:1277), the word waktu is of Arabic derivation, with the meaning of 'appointed time'. See note 20 to Chapter Six on the appointed prayer times.

4. According to Wilkinson (1959:745) the word masa is of Arabic derivation, with the root meaning of 'month'.

5. According to Wilkinson (1959:1256), the word umur is of Arabic derivation, with the meaning of 'age' or 'duration of life'.

6. According to Wilkinson (1959:1290), the word zaman is of Arabic derivation, with the root meaning of 'space of time, long or short'.
In my informants' discourse, the term zaman batin may be understood as referring to an era of uncentralised power that preceded the formation of kingdoms. Indeed archaeological evidence indicates that Indianised principalities did not emerge in Southeast Asia until the second century. (See Mabbett 1977b:143.) Prior to that, there were evidently only local groups living in self-sufficient units with minimal political organisation. (See Mabbett 1977a:3.) For the Sumatran region, archaeological evidence indicates that the seventh century A.D. is the earliest dating for the emergence of a centralised polity -- namely, the kingdom of Srivijaya, with its political centre located in south-eastern Sumatra in the Palembang area. (See Bronson 1979:398-402.) Riau was possibly one part of this Srivijayan empire. (See Wolters 1970:9.)

So prior to the seventh century A.D., the social situation in Riau was possibly characterised by the existence of local groups living in self-sufficient units with minimal political organisation. If the term zaman batin carries the connotation of being the inward-looking era, then we may perhaps use it to label this prior situation of indigenous localism. To construct a plausible description of this earlier era, we shall have to draw on more general research done in the Malay Peninsula, in Sumatra and island Southeast Asia as a whole, there being a paucity of archaeological research on the prehistory of the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands.

Benjamin (1983:19-20) characterises the prehistoric situation on the Malay Peninsula thus:
The picture that thus emerges of early Malayan society, is of a series of demographically relatively stable populations having available to them a variety of subsistence modes, each of which could be followed integrally or partially without in any way disturbing the subsistence activities of neighbouring populations. Moreover, with no pressure to develop trade-based complementarity between populations nor occupation-based complementarity (such as between herdsman and farmer) within populations, the degree of social complexity — the division of labour — would have remained virtually unchanged from what it had been in Paleolithic times, when the only subsistence mode was hunting and gathering.

As pointed out in Chapter Two, in the Riau archipelago, there are only a few islands large enough to have substantial forests. In the case of the smaller islands which constitute the majority, the greater part of their land-area is coastal. In other words, the smaller islands are very largely strand. So for the Paleolithic hunters-gatherers in this archipelago, marine resources would have been more important than land resources.

Such ecological conditions would have supported only a sparsely scattered, non-sedentary population. This would have consisted of small communities, each specialised in the utilisation of particular local resources in what Sopher (1977:46) terms 'an extensive and diversified world of islands'. I use the term 'non-sedentary' rather than 'nomadic', because the kind of population movement involved may have been more of island-hopping in a cluster of small islands, rather than long-distance sea voyages. This would have been the case particularly during the earlier Paleolithic when seafaring technology was limited.

But how did the island populations get there in the first place? In this context, the conjectural prehistory outlined by Dunn and Dunn (1984:264–267) is of relevance. Between 22,000 and 18,000 BP, the sea level was low and the land masses were merged into one large Sundaland. At this time, seafaring technology was limited at best,
including perhaps rafting only. Open sea or coastwise travel was infrequent. And navigational skills were very little developed. The coastal subsistence zones were relatively small, defined by the limits of foot travel rather than travel by water. The exploitation of marine resources was probably limited to intertidal and shallow subtidal waters, involving primarily techniques of food-gathering. Marine fishing technology and skills were simple and limited.

At about 9,000 BP, the sea levels rose to within 10 – 15 metres of the modern level, thereby submerging most of the shelf, and reducing the Sundaic land surface area. Under these ecological conditions, the population density perhaps doubled, because a slightly enlarged population now occupied a land mass only 57 per cent as large as that of the earlier period. The subsistence zones were not as widely dispersed as before, and a substantial proportion of the population subsisted in the coastal areas, as a consequence of the disappearance of vast areas of non-coastal lowland, together with a near-doubling of coastline length. Seafaring became more developed, including probably boats as well as rafts. Some coastwise travel and reef exploration became possible, as well as visits to mangrove, swampy, and riverine habitats with the aid of small craft. But open sea voyaging was probably still limited, both by technology and by lack of navigational skills.

In a broad cultural evolutionary sense the terminal Pleistocene adaptive threshold associated with flooding of the Sunda shelf, contraction and dissection of the land masses, and lengthening of the coast-lines may have served as a stimulus (although certainly not the only one) to the development of more effective seafaring.

(Ibid.:266).

The exploitation of marine resources now included bolder exploration of off-shore reefs and neritic waters. Many subsistence zones were probably enlarged by coastwise boat travel. And marine fishing skills
improved as boating skills opened new habitats to exploitation.

At about 5,000 BP, the sea level reached the modern level, and the Sundaic land surface areas and coastlines were roughly the same as those of today. Population conditions remained stable. The major difference with the earlier period was the development of truly 'effective' and 'competent' seafaring, with advances in boat technology and navigational arts permitting controlled (rather than 'accidental') open sea voyaging.

An important consequence of more effective seafaring was the extension of marine exploitation out to sea. Undoubtedly this outreach served to stimulate further improvement in marine fishing technology and in techniques for exploitation of deep benthic and nektobenthic species, and of pelagic species in deep neritic and oceanic waters.

(Ibid.:267).

In the context of such a scenario, it would seem plausible to suggest that the various small island communities did not migrate from some unchanging mainland, but rather, that they were the descendants of former lowland populations who were stranded as a result of the dissection of the land masses by rising sea levels. This implies that the predominantly maritime way of life, characteristic of an island population, was an adaptation that evolved in response to the profound environmental changes which had engendered the emergence of these very islands themselves.

Interestingly, my informants say that the nomadic land-dwelling orang hutan 'forest people' are the most asli 'indigenous' of the inhabitants in Riau, apparently even more so than the boat-dwelling orang laut. In the light of the discussion above, this statement may be interpreted to mean that boat-dwelling nomadism was a secondary development out of an original land-dwelling nomadism. Based on the dates proposed by Dunn and Dunn, one can speculate that boat-dwelling
nomadism did not emerge as a feasible way of life until 5,000 B.P., with the development of effective and competent seafaring.

The date of 5,000 B.P. is significant indeed, for it tallies with other sources of information on the prehistory of the region. Based on glottochronological calculations of linguistic change in the Mon-Khmer languages of the Malay Peninsula, Benjamin (1976b:83; 1985:18) suggests a date of between 4,900 BP and 4,470 BP for 'the advent of Austronesian(?) mariners from the south' to the Malay Peninsula. What is significant in the context of our discussion is that the area immediately south of the Malay Peninsula is none other than the Riau-Lingga archipelago.

So the implication we may draw is that the advancement of maritime technology on the part of the islanders at about 5,000 BP enabled them to extend their subsistence zone beyond their immediate locality to include the Malay Peninsula. I would further suggest that as a result, the islanders became even more specialised towards maritime adaptation, to the extent of totally abandoning the marginal land resources of the small islands. One may thus speculate whether it was at this time that a nomadic boat-dwelling way of life first became viable and sufficiently attractive, and that from then on until the rise of centralised polities, this became the dominant way of life in the Riau-Lingga-Tujuh islands.

NOTE TO APPENDIX 4

1. Sopher's characterisation (1977:45-46) of this situation is relevant to our discussion:

   In evaluating the strand as a habitat of primitive man, the special characteristics of small islands should be considered. These small islands are different from the coastal areas of large islands and the continental mainland in several ways that are significant for people of simple cultures.
The terrestrial fauna and flora of such islands are characterised by very much less variety than is the case within an area of comparable size on the mainland, the number of animal species, in particular, usually decreasing with greater distance between island and mainland coast. The biotic strand forms!of the mainland, adapted to their special environment and often depending on the sea for transport, would, on the other hand, be well represented, depending on the particular geomorphic character of the island and its shores....

Secondly, depending in part on the lithology of the particular island and the seasonal distribution of rainfall, the small surface area might often be inadequate to collect and retain enough rainwater, so that people would find it difficult to remain there for long periods....

Finally, the small island or the archipelagic cluster of small islands, accessible only by sea, will usually constitute the Lebensraum of a single group, undisturbed by conflicting cultural attitudes and economic interests, and separated by the sea from other groups....
APPENDIX 5

THE DUTCH PRESENCE IN RIAU (1784-1857)

To date earlier Dutch presence, 1641 would seem to be a significant year, for it was then that the Dutch conquered Melaka from the Portuguese. During the time the Dutch were in Melaka, they considered Riau a trade rival. Matters came to a head in 1784, when war broke out between the Dutch in Melaka and the Bugis rajas in Riau. The Dutch attacked Riau but were beaten back. In retaliation, the Riau forces attacked Melaka, under the leadership of the Bugis yamtuan muda Raja Haji, who subsequently died in battle. The Riau forces retreated, pursued by a Dutch squadron. In the ensuing battle, the Bugis were driven away from Riau, leaving only the sultan and his followers. (For further details of these historical events, see Matheson and Andaya 1982:365-370, Netscher 1870:179ff, Papendracht 1924.)

The Dutch took possession of Tanjung Pinang on 1 November 1784 and Sultan Mahmud [III] then signed an eight-clause treaty of capitulation. The following day a twenty-six clause contrast was signed with the VOC. Its main points were that the Sultan held his territory as a fief of the VOC, that he could not make decisions without consulting his four Malay ministers, that a Dutch garrison be established at Tanjung Pinang and that never again would a Bugis be appointed as Yang Dipertuan Muda. (Matheson and Andaya 1982:370; also see Surat-Surat 1970:3-31.)

On 19 June 1785, the first Dutch Resident took up office. So by the late eighteenth century, the kingdom was effectively colonised. However, certain events occurred, which allowed the colonial yoke to be thrown off. In May 1787, the sultan called in Ilanun pirates from the Philippines to attack the Dutch at Tanjung Pinang. The Dutch were defeated; so they retreated to Melaka. (See Netscher 1870:212-215.) Fearing Dutch retaliation, the sultan and his entire court then moved
from Riau to Lingga. Indeed, by December 1787, the Dutch were back in Riau. But they found the place deserted and was faced with 'the task of repopulating the area, encouraging Chinese settlement, and re-establishing trade' (Matheson and Andaya 1982:373).

As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Dutch held on to Riau only until 1795, when all their Dutch possessions in Southeast Asia were handed over to the British for safekeeping, to prevent them from falling under the control of Napoleonic France which had conquered the Netherlands. The British then gave Riau back to Sultan Mahmud III who was still in Lingga. In 1815, after the Napoleonic Wars, the Netherlands became independent of the French. In 1818, the Dutch renegotiated a new contract with the sultan:

The main points were that Riau-Lingga would be protected by Batavia; that there would be a Dutch Resident and garrison; all Riau-Lingga ships would carry passes to be issued by the Resident; Riau and Lingga were to be the only 'free ports' in the area; the only European ships allowed elsewhere were to be Dutch.... (Matheson and Andaya 1982:386).

This contract made the British anxious about their position in Southeast Asia and precipitated their establishment of a trading factory on Singapore island in 1819, which was then under the control of the Riau-Lingga temenggung 'local minister'. By supporting and installing one of the two brothers who were then contending for the throne of sultan, the British were able to sign a treaty with an indigenous government of their own making. The rivalry between the Dutch and the British in Southeast Asia was on.

From this point the Dutch assumed greater control over Riau's government, not only building a fort at Tanjung Pinang but also taking over the distribution of Riau revenues, claiming that the Raja Muda was oppressing the people.

(Ibid.:387; also see Netscher 1870:259-262).
This evidently caused so much bad feeling between the Dutch and the Bugis, that in December 1819 and January 1820, fighting broke out between the two factions in Tanjungpinang. (See Raja Ali Haji 1982:230-231; Matheson and Andaya 1982:387.) The Bugis were defeated; the survivors of the battle fled to Singapore. Apparently, most of the Bugis aristocrats who were then living on the island of Penyengat were also prepared to flee to Singapore. Among them was Engku Puteri Raja Hamidah, wife of Sultan Mahmud III:

She was at this time in possession of the Johor regalia, necessary for the installation of a legitimate successor to Sultan Mahmud. It was in the interests of both Dutch and Bugis leaders that she did not leave Riau. According to Engku Sayid's own account, not only Engku Puteri but all the Bugis inhabitants of Penyengat had made ready to sail to Singapore, fearing reprisals for Arung Belawah's rebellion. Engku Sayid informed the Dutch and it was later he and Raja Ahmad, using an unloaded pistol, who was responsible for persuading Engku Puteri and the other Bugis to return. (Matheson and Andaya 1982:387; also see Surat-Surat 1970: 310-312).

The rivalry between British and Dutch thus became tied to the rivalry between two factions within the sultanate — that is, respectively, the temenggung's faction on the one hand, and the Bugis yamtuan muda's faction on the other. At the crucial moment, when the conflict between Bugis and Dutch in Riau threatened to throw the advantage over to the temenggung's faction in Singapore, by giving them the royal regalia necessary for legitimate succession, some members of the yamtuan muda's faction chose to side with the Dutch, their erstwhile enemy.

Subsequently, in 1824, in order to control their escalating rivalry, the British and the Dutch agreed between themselves to demarcate their respective spheres of influence. As pointed out in Chapter Two, the Anglo-Dutch Treaty that was signed in London had a significant effect on the political reality of Riau. The yamtuan
muda's faction was evidently in favour of this treaty, for it transferred the southern part of the temenggung's dominion to Bugis control.

The collusion between Dutch and Bugis interests was expressed most clearly in 1857, when they jointly decided to depose the then reigning Sultan Mahmud IV, and install his father's brother, Sulaiman, in his stead. (See Appendix 7.)
Hooker's (1976:30) description of the Malaysian practice of mas kawin shows that the situation in Riau is not unique:

Mas kahwin...is...either paid to the bride herself or deferred and paid on divorce or on the death of the husband. The mas kahwin is ordinarily paid by the husband or his representative to the wife or her representative in the presence of the person solemnising the marriage and at least two witnesses. This is an express enactment of the law of Islam, for the mahr is an essential part of the marriage contract.... Although the mahr in Islamic law may be anything that may legally be sold, Malay custom has fixed this mahr or mas kawin in the form of money. It is only with the wife's consent that a husband may substitute articles for money. If articles are given they cannot be regarded as part of the mas kahwin in the absence of proof of such consent, and the burden of proof is on the husband. Under the Shafi'i school of law there is no fixed legal minimum for the mahr. However, under Malay adat the amount of the mas kahwin is fixed. The amount varies in each state of West Malaysia, and normally depends on the rank of the bride's father. In Negri Sembilan the traditional amount of the mas kahwin is 20 dollars. In Perak the amount varies with the status of the father of the bride, ranging from 50 dollars for the daughter of a commoner to 1,000 dollars for the daughter of the ruler. In Naning and Alor Gajah in Melaka the mas kahwin is fixed at 60 dollars for an unmarried woman and 40 dollars for a previously married woman.

Hooker mentions three examples of Malaysian states with different specified amounts of mas kawin -- Perak, Negri Sembilan, and Melaka. Let us consider those three examples in the light of our discussion on mas kawin in Riau. Of the three, only Perak is a sultanate historically derived from the old Melaka sultanate which fell to the Portuguese in 1511. The Perak sultanate and the Johor-Riau sultanate thus have a common antecedent. Indeed, it seems that the first rulers of Perak and Johor were both sons of the last sultan of Melaka.¹

Historical evidence indicates that the establishment of an administrative hierarchy was one of the major achievements of the
Melaka sultanate. (See Zainal Abidin 1983; Muhammad Yusoff Hashim 1983.) So by implication, the linkage between derajat and mas kawin was first instituted in the old Melaka sultanate. It is thus significant that in Perak, there seems to be an institutionalised linkage between derajat and mas kawin, as there is in Riau. However, the amounts specified are different: for example, in Riau, the largest amount is 400 ringgit for a raja or tengku, whereas in Perak, the largest amount is 1000; and in Riau, the amount for a commoner ranges from 101 to 22 ringgit, whereas in Perak, the amount seems to be fixed at 50. Nevertheless, within the specific context of each, the amount specified does depend on the bride's rank in the hierarchy.

The linkage between derajat and mas kawin does not seem to be found in Negri Sembilan or in present-day Melaka. This absence is significant. The Negri Sembilan confederacy was established in 1773, and comprised the Minangkabau rantau 'areas of migrant settlement' on the Malay Peninsula. As is well-known, the Minangkabau in Sumatra have a matrilineal kinship system; so indeed do the people of Negri Sembilan. (See, for example, de Jong 1951.) In such a matrilineally organised society, there would be no need to contract the bride into not transmitting derajat to her child. In fact, quite the contrary would be desired. Moreover, there is a Minangkabau insistence on negari 'democracy', there being no ranking in the Minangkabau highlands, and only a rudimentary hierarchy in the Padang lowlands. (See ibid.) Therefore, it is not surprising that in Negri Sembilan, there is no linkage between derajat and mas kawin, and a flat rate of 20 dollars is specified for everyone. That the mas kawin is still paid at all may be explained simply as a fulfilment of the requirements of Islamic law.

As for present-day Melaka, the situation may be understood as the result of historical discontinuities brought about by the Portuguese
conquest in 1511, the Dutch conquest in 1641, the British take-over from 1795 to 1815, reversion to the Dutch from 1815 to 1824, then the British re-take-over from 1824 until the Second World War. In other words, there has not been a sultanate at Melaka since 1511. Perhaps because of its long history of European control, particularly under the Roman Catholic Portuguese, the relevant issue in mas kawin seems to be the virginity of the female. Consequently, the mas kawin for an unmarried woman is 60 dollars, whereas for a previously married woman it is only 40 dollars.

These examples thus provide circumstantial evidence confirming that in Riau, the mas kawin should indeed be understood in terms of its linkage to derajat.

NOTE TO APPENDIX 6

1. Sultan Muzaffar Syah, the first ruler of...Perak, was a son of Sultan Mahmud Syah, the last ruler of Melaka. Muzaffar had been designated Raja Muda, or Heir Apparent, by his father in Melaka, but in later years the latter had favoured a younger son of another wife whom he accorded the title Sultan Muda. This Sultan Muda then succeeded his father and became Sultan Alauddin Riayat Syah, the first ruler of Johor.... The reign of Sultan Muzaffar Syah (1528?-1549?) brought to Perak not only members of the Melaka court, but also its customs and traditions.... And Sultan Muzaffar and his son Mansur are credited with creating a hierarchy of chiefs of varying ranks of the whole kingdom, generally reflecting that which had existed in Melaka.


2. Dating the hierarchy back to the old Melaka Sultanate (c.1400-1511) would fit in quite well with the dating of the Spanish silver dollars. There is a description of the Melaka hierarchy in the Penurunan.

3. Benjamin (1980:26-27) has argued that the overseas Minangkabau were able to 'form a segmentary matrilineal society only in Negri Sembilan', and not in other rantau areas, because the male Minangkabau settlers met with and married the already matrilineally biased indigenes of Negri Sembilan -- the Temuan, as they are called today.
The earliest Minangkabau settlers..., by marrying 'Biduanda' (i.e. Temuan) women, were enabled not only to lay claim to land but also to set up a matrilineal system of land ownership (which would otherwise have been meaningless).

(Benjamin 1980:27).
APPENDIX 7

ALTERNATIVE VIEWS ON THE DEPOSITION OF SULTAN MAHMUD IV

According to Tengku Ahmad (1972:22), Sultan Mahmud IV was deposed of by the Dutch for the following reasons:

THE SULTAN WHO WAS DETHRONED BY THE DUTCH. Sultan Mahmud Muzaffar Syah who was installed when his father was still alive was a sultan who was considered as an enfant terrible for the government of the Dutch Indies. He would always leave the country without notifying the Resident and he had no respect for the representatives of the Dutch government. This was reported to the highest authorities in Batavia. Probably the sultan was attracted to the British form of administration as he displayed great interest in this administrative form in Singapore which was then under British influence. The Dutch Indies certainly could not allow this. On 23 September 1857 (18 Syafar 1274), the Dutch Commissioner in Singapore read the official notice of dethronement to Sultan Mahmud Muzaffar Syah. The Dutch also intended to send the sultan to Batavia. Because of this, the deposed sultan secretly went to Lingga to gather all the treasures he could and took them to Singapore with him. From there, he travelled to Pahang, Trengganu and Siam. In Siam, one of his sisters by the name of Tengku Syafiah married the Siamese king.

Although this tie between Riau-Lingga and Siam was a personal one, it opened up new opportunities for establishing other links. For example, one of the royal kinsmen, Tengku Putera (T. Muhammad), received the Star of the 'Knight of the White Elephant and the Crown of Siam', which he was given permission to wear by the Queen of the Netherlands in a letter dated 6 July 1903.

(My translation).

In this interpretation, Sultan Mahmud is portrayed as a good ruler who was keen on administrative affairs, who did not want to submit to the Dutch, and who was consequently dethroned by them.

A different interpretation of the deposition is given in Raja Ali Haji in the Tuhfat (1982:287-288), where Sultan Mahmud is described as being un-Islamic:
...He joined a Christian religious society called Freemasons and became friendly with a Parsee called Cursetjee who was not a Muslim. ...He built a residence which was just like the home of a white man. .... He also kept several large dogs there and cared for them as would a white man. [One of the manuscripts of the Tuhfat adds: 'There is nothing wrong with having a European house as long as this does not entail a change in religion.' (See Matheson and Andaya 1982:405.)]

But the reasons for Sultan Mahmud's deposition seem to lie deeper than his supposedly un-Islamic behaviour. According to Matheson and Andaya (1982:401):

In 1857 the [Penyengat] nobles listed three reasons for their opposition to Sultan Mahmud; he had defied the Dutch government and ignored Article 3 of the 1830 treaty, which made Riau a vassal state within the Netherlands Indies; he had consistently refused to take advice and had failed to observe the Malay-Bugis oath of loyalty; he ignored all Islamic injunctions, going so far as to marry a wife of his deceased father (i.e., his stepmother) in 1842. This had never been reported to the Government because, the nobles said, they were afraid of trouble.... However, his attempt to have the position of Yang Dipertuan Muda abolished...was probably the deciding issue.

After his deposition, Sultan Mahmud wandered about the Malay Peninsula, trying to look for another throne. As Matheson (1972:125) has put it,

Deprived of the Sultanate, he was forced to find a niche for his royal authority elsewhere. Mahmud did not cease to exist as a Sultan merely because the Dutch had withdrawn their recognition of his position. In Malay tradition nothing could rob him of a social status which was his by birth and he remained a powerful figure. Despite extreme Dutch, and later British, opposition, this Sultan of an isolated and dismembered kingdom managed to extend his influence and activities throughout the east coast of Malaya and ultimately to Bangkok.
NOTE TO APPENDIX 7

1.


Hubungan yang sudah ada antara kerajaan Riau-Lingga dengan kerajaan Siam inilah - walaupun secara peribadi - yang membuka jalan untuk hubungan-hubungan lainnya sehingga salah seorang kerabat diraja ialiku Tengku Putera (T. Muhammad) menerima bintang "Knight of the White Elephant and de Crown of Siam" yang izin pemakaiannya diberikan oleh Ratu Nederland dalam suratnya bertanggal 6 Julai 1903.
APPENDIX 8

THE RELIGIOSITY OF THE POST-1804 YAMTUAN MUDAS, AS DESCRIBED IN THE TUHFAT AL-NAFIS

The fifth yamtuan muda, Raja Ali (re-installed 1804, died 1805) studied religion and fulfilled devotional obligations. 'His teacher was a man from Madura, named Sheikh, Abd al-Ghafut, of the Khalwatiyyah order (that is, the Sammaniyyah) ...' (Raja Ali Haji 1982:212; also see Matheson and Andaya 1982:382.)

The sixth yamtuan muda, Raja Jafar (installed 1805, died 1831), was...very fond of the Lord Sayids, both those from Arabia and those born locally.... He liked religious scholars and was dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge. He read books in Malay like the Fundamentals of Religion and the Mir 'at al-Tullab with his teacher, Haji Abd al-Wahab, a prominent religious scholar of the time. He also enjoyed listening to the Lord Sayids relating stories of kings of olden times..., and he welcomed people who excelled in the recitation of the Koran. If a skilled Koran reader came to Riau he was invited to stay for two or three months to recite, and the Yang Dipertuan Muda ordered his sons and officials to study with him. When the recitation had been completed, the Koran reader would be given hundreds of dollars. Furthermore, the Yang Dipertuan was not above asking for things from those who were below him, or from the young. He even questioned children about the law, what was invalid, what was permissible, what was forbidden.

(Raja Ali Haji 1982:221).

The seventh yamtuan muda, Raja Abd al-Rahaman (installed 1831, died 1844), had a brother Raja Abdullah, who went on the haj. The yamtuan muda himself pursued doctrinal studies with learned men, such as those he had made his teachers. He enjoyed the company of scholars and Lord Sayids like Habib Sheikh Syakaf, Sayid Hasan al-Hadad, and hajis such as Lord Klia Beranjang, Haji Syahab al-Din, the Bugis Haji Abu Bakar, Sheikh Ahmad Jibrati, and others, particularly his relative Raja Ali Haji. He was inseparable from them day and night, questioning them about those laws which had been classified as religious laws, as well as other matters. He helped each of them with as much money as he could, and as was appropriate.

(Ibid.:279).
The eighth yamtuan muda, Raja Ali (installed 1845, died 1857), met a learned man from Banjar, Haji Hamin, whom... he now brought back with him and to whom he paid an allowance. The Yang Dipertuan Muda revered the wise Lord Haji and would not walk in front of him. He never missed the Friday prayers, remaining humble before Muslim scholars... In the same spirit he was not comfortable sitting on a chair... If Lord Sayids were present.... During his reign he upheld the Islamic faith, attending the mosque on Fridays and ordering women to be veiled. He completed the construction of the mosque, left unfinished because of the death of Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Abd al-Rahman and later had a bridge constructed of wood and stone, so that the faithful could walk there in comfort when the tide was out.

In the time of Yang Dipertuan Raja Ali, many religious scholars came... He paid their expenses and order all state officials to study religion, recite religious books, and improve their recitation of the glorious Koran. He himself loved the quest for knowledge. His cousin, Raja Ali Haji, selected several learned men, like Sayid Abdullah of Bahrain and others, to settle on Penyengat and teach for a year. When they left they were given 400 to 500 dollars. Yang Dipertuan Muda Ali prohibited the wearing of gold or silk; he exiled all miscreants and would no longer tolerate pastimes like gambling or cock fighting which were forbidden.... Furthermore, Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Ali abhorred those who indulged in pleasures which led to loose behaviour between men and women.... All this was done because he benefited from the company of learned men, liked to hear their moral instruction and advice, and took pleasure in listening to moralising work. ...The Yang Dipertuan Muda entered the Naksyabandiyyah brotherhood and all the princes of Penyengat studied mysticism. They recited the Khatam tawajuh each Friday and Tuesday, and daily prayed as a community.

(Ibid.: 283-284).

According to Matheson and Andaya (1982:403),

the Dutch mentioned the strict manner in which behaviour between the sexes was controlled. A women who had allowed a youth into her home in her husband's absence was summarily found guilty of adultery and put to death by strangulation the following day, despite appeals from her husband and family.
The ninth yamtuan muda, Raja Abdullah (installed 1857, died 1858), went on the haj. In Riau he performed all the devotions and recitations of the Naksyabandiyyah, and it was he who became leader of the brotherhood on Riau.


Every Tuesday and Friday he said the weekly liturgy, and pursued his studies in the audience hall. The books he used were about law, concerning what was proven, not proven, permitted or forbidden, and from the book The Revitalisation of the Religious Sciences he read the three sections which deal with social customs, social behaviour and those human qualities which lead to perdition. He upheld the Friday prayers, sometimes reading the sermon himself and sometimes acting as a leader for the congregation.

(Ibid.:297-298).

The tenth yamtuan muda, Raja Muhamad Yusuf (installed 1857, died 1899) is not described in the Tuhfat, because his reign occurred after the book was almost completed. My informants said that he succeeded his predecessor as the Al-Ahmadi Master of the Nashbandiyyah in Riau.
APPENDIX 9

MELAYU MURNI IN RIAU = CONSTITUTIONAL MALAY IN MALAYSIA

It is significant that the three criteria of 'purity' discussed in Chapter Seven are also found in Article 160(2) of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia which states:

Malay means a person who professes the Muslim religion, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom and --

(a) was before Merdeka Day born in the Federation or born of parents one of whom was born in the Federation or is on that day domiciled in the Federation; or

(b) is the issue of such a person.

The original wording is in English as given above. This constitutional definition quite evidently accords with the Riau definition of Melayu murni:

'the Muslim religion' = Islam
'the Malay language' = bahasa
'Malay custom' = adat.

As pointed out by Siddique (1981:77):

The most striking feature of this constitutional definition of Malay is the fact that it makes no mention of race or ethnic origin.... Another feature...is the fact that it sets a territorial boundary to the definition of Malay -- hence an Indonesian who is Muslim, speaks Malay, and observes Malay customs would not be Malay under the constitutional definition unless he fulfils the residence requirement stipulated in (a) and (b).

This residence requirement is significantly similar to the toponymic identification of Melayu-ness in Riau.

However, as pointed out by Siddique, ethnic origin is left out of the constitutional definition. Thus according to Mohammed Suffian (1972:247):
An Indian is a Malay if he professes the Muslim religion, habitually speaks Malays and conforms to Malay custom. Conversely even a genuine Malay is not a Malay for the purpose of the constitution if for instance he does not profess the Muslim religion.

So the Malaysian constitutional definition of 'Malay' does not include those who my murni informants in Riau might describe as 'Melayu by origin but not pure Melayu' (Melayu asli tapi bukan Melayu murni). In other words, if the Riau definition of Suku Melayu were to be applied in Malaysia, then all those indigenes who neither 'profess Islam', nor 'speak the Malay language', nor 'conform to Malay custom', would also be considered Melayu, albeit 'impure'. In terms of the Malaysian constitutional definition, however, the non-'Malay' indigenes of the Malay Peninsula are known officially as Orang Asli 'Aborigines'. (See, for example, Benjamin 1979 and 1980 on the Orang Asli.)

Conversely, if the Malaysian constitutional definition of 'Malay' were to be applied in Riau, then all the bukan Melayu murni, such as the Bintan people and the Galang people, would be excluded from 'Malay-dom'. Such a definition would convert the gradation of Melayu-ness ranging from 'impure' to 'pure', as shown in the Guttman scalogram in Chapter Seven, to a clear-cut either-or proposition of inclusion versus exclusion. In other words, the Malaysian constitutional definition has no room for the 'impure Melayu'; only the Melayu murni would qualify as 'Malay'.

The Malaysian constitutional definition of 'Malayness' is hence not gradated but disjunctive. Disjunction is called for when there is an attempt to mark out a certain domain from the rest of the world, so as to keep the insiders in and the outsiders out. But such disjunction is not necessarily initiated only by the insiders; it may also be imposed by outsiders who wish to contain the insiders. A comment by Benjamin (1980:47) is relevant to our discussion:
Professor Wang Gungwu has suggested to me that the addition of Islam to the defining features of Malayness resulted from the Treaty of Pangkor, drawn up between the Sultan of Perak and the British in 1874. This rather one-sided 'agreement', which effectively stripped the Sultan of all his powers except that of administering Islam in his state, led to the definition of the Malays -- the Sultan's subjects -- as those people who followed Malay custom, spoke the Malay language, and acknowledged themselves to be Muslims. Other Peninsular state constitutions later took this definition of 'Malay' as a model, as eventually did the Malaysian Constitution. The new element was Islam. Previously there would have been no legal necessity to define 'Malay' at all, and many of the non-Muslim populations of the time were as 'Malay' as the Muslims. The post-1874 notion of Malayness, however, had the effect of converting those populations, virtually overnight, into the 'Aborigines' they are considered to be today.

It thus appears that the nineteenth-century British colonisers imposed a legal disjunction between 'Malay' and 'non-Malay' in order to contain the powers of the Sultan of Perak. If our understanding of the present situation in Riau may be applied as a clue to the past, it would seem that by dis-enfranchising the peripheral sector of the indigenous population from 'Malay-dom', the British colonisers effectively cut off the power base of the Sultan. The centripetal orientation of those at the periphery is essential to centrality as such: without the periphery, there is no centre. The British thus decentralised the indigenous rulers by isolating them from their periphery.

While we may understand why the British colonisers should use this means of containment, it may seem strange, at first sight, that the Malaysian government should want to maintain a colonially derived disjunction in the constitutional definition of 'Malayness'. The answer to this puzzle is suggested by Siddique and Suryadinata (1982:668-669):

Malay nationalism in prewar British Malaya...served as a rallying point for Malay indigenes who felt threatened by the increasing numbers of non-indigenous (Chinese and Indian) immigrants to the country.... Because the Malays...considered themselves to be a homogeneous,
indigenous group, the term 'Orang Melayu' (The Malay people) was used to reinforce the position of the Malays as the indigenes of Tanah Melayu (the Land of the Malays).

As I have pointed out in Chapter Eight, disjunction indicates an attempt to mark out a certain domain from the rest of the world, keeping the insiders in and the outsiders out. While the British colonisers had wanted to contain the 'Malays', the Malaysian government, it would seem, wants to keep certain 'non-Malay' outsiders out.

In the case of Riau, however, if my Melayu murni informants were to adopt such a disjunctive definition of identity, they would find themselves numerically even more outnumbered than they are at present. As I have shown above, there are very few communities in Riau that would meet the criteria of 'purity'. So if the Melayu murni were to be considered the only kind of Melayu there is, my aristocrat informants would find themselves in the position of being moral exemplers to a very limited audience indeed. In Riau, the Melayu murni do not constitute a sufficiently large population who can thereby be internally differentiated into centre and periphery. It is thus not to their advantage to define the 'impure' indigenes as non-Melayu and thereby cut off their own power base. After all, without the bottom, there is no top; without the periphery, there is no centre.
On the following page is a photocopy of the certificate of conversion to Islam, that was given to me by the Head of the Department of Religious Affairs at Tanjungpinang. This certificate illustrates clearly how bureaucratic such a conversion is, involving standardised beliefs and promises, to which all converts are supposed to adhere. A translation of it would be as follows:

CERTIFICATE OF CONVERSION TO ISLAM

I, the undersigned, a male/female Indonesian:

- Name:
- Age/date of birth:
- Place of birth:
- Occupation:
- Address:

hereby declare that I possess understanding/belief to a greater or lesser extent about the religion of Islam, and that it is from my own desire, in the presence of two witnesses and a few others, that henceforth, from this very moment and the date of this certificate, I leave my former religion -- namely, the religion of... -- and move to embrace the religion of Islam, by reciting the KALIMAH TAUHID which is as follows.

"Bismillahirrahmanirrahiim"
"Asyhaduallaailaahaillallaahu Waasyhaduannamuhhammadarrasuulullahi

(I give testimony that there is no God to be worshipped but Allah and I give testimony that the Prophet Muhammad is Allah’s Messenger).

I consequently promise to Allah the following:
A. I BELIEVE AND ACCEPT:
1. That there is but one Allah and Muhammad (may he rest in peace) is His last Prophet and Apostle.
2. That all His Prophets and Apostles are true.
3. That the Holy Book that was bestowed by Allah upon His Apostle, which is the last Holy Book, is the Quran of the Prophet Muhammad (may he rest in peace).
4. That I believe in His Angels.
5. That the day of judgement is definitely coming.
6. That I believe in the teachings of the Liturgy of Islam and their power.
B. I PROMISE THAT:
1. I declare openly the KALIMAH LAAILAAHAAILLALLAAHU MUHAMMADARRAASUULULLAHT.
2. I will observe the five prayer times that are obligatory for me.
3. I will observe and pay the tithe.
4. I will observe the obligatory fast during the month of Ramadhan.
5. I will observe the pilgrimage to Mecca when I am able to do so.

C. I WILL SUBMIT TO ALLAH AND HIS APOSTLE by carrying out His commands and teachings, and renouncing all that He has forbidden.

Thus I utter this holy confession in sincerity and truth, as well as full awareness and realisation, in the hope that the One Great God will bless and assure my faith. AMEN!!!
SURAT PERNYATAAN MASUK AGAMA ISLAM

Saya yang bertanda tangan dibawah dibawah ini, seorang laki/laki/perempuan bangsa Indonesia :

Nama :
Umur/tgl. lahir :
Tempat lahir :
Pekerjaan :
Alamat :
dengan ini menyatakan bahwa saya mempunyai sedikit sebanyaknya pengertian/kepercayaan tentang Islam dan menyatakan dengan kemauan saya sendiri dihadapan dua orang saksi dan beberapa orang lainnya, bahwa saya mulai dari saat sekarang dan tanggal surat ini diperbuat, menenggalakan Agama saya yang lama yaitu Agama dan berpindah memeluk Agama Islam, dengan mengucapkan KALIMAH TAUHID sebagai berikut:

"Bismillahirrahmanirrahiim"
"Asyhaduallaailaillaailaahu Waasyhaduannamulhammaddararrasulullah"
(Melirik saksi ata cukaca Tanda Tangan yang disertakan melainkan Allah dan Melirik saksi ata cukaca Nabi Muhammad adalah Ussrun Allah).
dan kemudian saya berjanji kepada Allah sebagai berikut :

A. Saya Percaya dan Yaqin :
1. Bahwa Allah itu satu dan Muhammad s.a.w. adalah Nabi dan Rasul-Nya yang akhir.
3. Bahwa Kitab Suci dari Allah yang diturunkan kepada Rasul-Nya yang terakhir Kitab Suci adalah Al-qur'an kepada Nabi Muhammad s.a.w.
5. Bahwa harlah qamatur pasti akan datang.

B. Saya Berjanji Bahwa :
1. Saya menyatakan dengan terus terang akan KALIMAH LAAILAAHAAILLALLAAHU MUHAMMADARRASUULULLAHI,
2. Saya akan mengerjakan Sembahyang lima waktu yang dwajlbkan kepada saya
3. Saya akan mengerjakan dan membayar zakat.
4. Saya akan mengerjakan puasa wajib pada bulan Ramadhan.
5. Saya akan mengerjakan Haji ke-Mekah bila kuasa.

C. Saya Akah Taat Kepada Allah dan RasulNya dengan jalan melaksanakan perintah dan ajaran-ajaranNya serta meninggalkan semua larangan-laranganNya.
Demikianlah pengakuan saya ucapan dengan lurus dan benar serta penuh rasa kesadaran dan ke-insyafan, semoga Tuhan Yang Maha Esa memberkahi dan menetapkan ke-imanan saya. AMIN !!!

Pernyataan ini disaksikan :

1. ____________________________ (__________________________)
2. ____________________________ (__________________________)

Diperbuat di Tanjung Pinang,
pada hari ____________________________
tanggal ____________________________

Saya yang memberi pernyataan :

______________________________

MENGETAHUI:

KEPALA KANTOR URUSAN AGAMA
KECAMATAN BINTAN SELATAN

______________________________
# APPENDIX 11

**BIRO PUSAT STATISTIK**

'CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS'

**REGISTRASI PENDUDUK TAHUN 1977**

'POPULATION REGISTRATION FOR THE YEAR 1977'

**PROPINSI**: Riau  
**KABUPATEN**: Kepulauan Riau  
**KECAMATAN**: Bintan Selatan

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<th>Dewasa 'Adult'</th>
<th>Anak-anak 'Children'</th>
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| Jumlah 'Total' | 2845.03 | 13208 | 21378 | 19985 | 15094 | 14578 | 36872 | 34533 | 71205 |

**Tanjung Pinang 30 Jun, 1977**  
Bintan Selatan  
[Signature]  
**Mantri Statistik Kecamatan**: .................

'The Sub-district Official in Charge of Statistics'
When I asked my informant, Raja Hamzah, about the territorial extent of the former sultanate, he referred me to a 1905 treaty, a copy of which is in his possession. This is the Contract onder nadere goedkeuring der Regeering van Nederlandsch-Indie gesloten tusschen den Resident van Riouw en Onderhoorigheden en het Zelfbestuur van Lingga-Riouw en Onderhoorigheden 'Contract subject to the approval of the Government of the Netherlands-Indies drawn between the Residency of Riau and its dependencies and the Autonomous Administration of Lingga-Riau and its dependencies'. This contract lists the harbours of the sultanate under the following title:

List of the Harbours of the Lingga-Riau Kingdom, referred to in Article 21, Paragraph 2 of the political contract of 18 May nineteen hundred and five.

A copy of this list is on the following page. Article 21, Paragraph 2 referred to in the title gives permission to traders to stay in these harbours without prior warning or permission, for as long as three months, on condition that they do not disturb the peace.
Dolfijnen, met name de haringdolfijn, een bijzondere soort vissen, worden vaak gezien in de omgeving van de eilanden Penjingat, Galang, Groot Karimou, en de eilanden van de Mandah, Igal, Gaeng, Goentoeng, Kidjang, en de eilanden van het vasteland van Sumatra. De dolfijnen leven in de kusten van deze gebieden en zijn belangrijk voor de lokale economie.

Een van de belangrijkste soorten dolfijnen in deze omgeving is de haringdolfijn, die voornamelijk te vinden is in de oceaan nabij de kust van Sumatra. Deze soort is bekend om zijn bewegingsaard en zijn vaak te zien bij het vissenvissen bij de kust. De dolfijnen spelen een rol in de voedselketen van de zee, en zijn een belangrijk onderdeel van de ecologische balans van de oceaan.

De eilanden en vastelanden van Sumatra zijn bekend om hun onderwaterleven en de diversiteit van de dolfijnen die er leven. De dolfijnen zijn een belangrijke toeristische trekpleister voor de eilanden van Sumatra en worden vaak geobserveerd tijdens zeevaarttochten en andere toeristische activiteiten. De dolfijnen zijn een belangrijk onderdeel van de specifieke ecologie van de eilanden van Sumatra en zijn een belangrijk onderdeel van de culturele en economische voedingsketen van de lokale bevolking.
ABBREVIATIONS


JMBRAS Journal of the Malayan/Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.

JSBRAS Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.

JSEAH Journal of Southeast Asian History.

JSEAS Journal of Southeast Asian Studies.

MBRAS Malayan/Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.

TITLV Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde.
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