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THE KOREAN WARS AND EAST ASIA IN THE SEVENTH CENTURY

by

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- a thesis submitted for the degree of
  Doctor of Philosophy of
  The Australian National University -

February, 1984
I declare that
this thesis is my original
research work.

Joseph Wong
February 1984
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Acknowledgments

My interest in the Korean Wars began when I did my Master Thesis at the Australian National University. The opportunity to probe into the subject came in September 1979 when I was kindly offered a post-graduate scholarship at the ANU. Research work was disrupted first in early 1981 when my father passed away, but resumed from April the same year when I enrolled at Kobe University as a research student under the sponsorship of the Japanese Ministry of Education. Work was again disrupted when I began my present employment at the University of Hong Kong from August 1982, but thanks to Dr. E.K.Y. Chen, director of the Centre of Asian Studies at the HKU, I was allowed to allocate part of my working hours for further pursuit of the subject. For the opportunity and the financial assistance I received in investigating an intriguing subject, I am indebted to the above institutions.

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Joseph Wong
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Hong Kong
Bibliographic Note

*A full bibliography is given at the end of the thesis. In the notes only the names of the authors and, if more than one publication is cited, the year of the publications are given.

*When dates are given with the year, or with the year and a numbered month, the Chinese lunar calendar is intended. The year number is that of the western year which corresponds to the greater part of the Chinese year in question.

*The pinyin system is used for the transcription of Chinese words, the Hepburn system for Japanese words and the Reischauer system for Korean words.

*The following abbreviations are used in the notes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Chinese Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFYG</td>
<td>Cefuyuangui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTS</td>
<td>Jiu-Tangshu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHSK</td>
<td>Nihonshoki</td>
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<tr>
<td>QT$</td>
<td>Quan Tangshi</td>
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<tr>
<td>QTW</td>
<td>Quan Tangwen</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGSG</td>
<td>Samguk saga</td>
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<td>SGYS</td>
<td>Samguk yusa</td>
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<td>SJ</td>
<td>Shiji</td>
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<td>SNHG</td>
<td>Shoku Nihongi</td>
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<td>SS</td>
<td>Suishu</td>
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<td>TDZLJ</td>
<td>Tang da-zhaolingji</td>
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<td>THY</td>
<td>Tang huiyao</td>
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<td>TD</td>
<td>Tongdian</td>
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<td>WYYH</td>
<td>Wenyuanyinghua</td>
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<tr>
<td>XTS</td>
<td>Xin-Tangshu</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZKZY</td>
<td>Zhenguanshengyao</td>
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<td>ZZTJ</td>
<td>Zizhitongjian</td>
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CHAPTER ONE  INTRODUCTION

Except for the first half of the 20th century, probably no period in
the whole of East Asian History ever saw confrontations between the various
countries in the region taking place on such a large scale and lasting for
such a long time as the "Korean Wars" in the 7th century (hereafter 'the
Wars'). The military conflicts began at the end of the 6th century, and
intermittent battles did not end until the last quarter of the 7th century.
Five Chinese rulers of three different dynasties — the Sui, the Tang and
the Zhou — took part, two of them actually commanding the troops in person.
Two of the three Korean states were eventually destroyed, and the political
map of the Korean peninsula and the region north of it was redrawn. Even
Japan was involved and sent large number of troops to the mainland of Asia,
one of the very few occasions before modern times in which this was done.

Some aspects of the Wars are well-known, though in different manners
to people of the countries involved. The Chinese have long regarded the
campaigns against Koguryŏ, the state covering the northern part of the
Korean peninsula and the region to its north, as one of the major reasons
for the fall of the Sui dynasty. The part played by Xue Renqui, one of
the Tang generals taking part in the expeditions against 'Liao' — the term
used by the Chinese for Koguryŏ which bordered the River Liao — has also
been a popular theme for novelists and dramatists of later periods. For
the Koreans, legends of the tragic end of Paekche, the state occupying the
south-western part of the Korean peninsula, are still current, whereas Kim
Yusin and Kim Ch'unch'u, the major architects of a strong Silla, the other
Korean state which finally triumphed over its neighbours, have also been
glorified by both past and modern historians for their role in the first
'unification' of Korea. Few Japanese have not heard of the Battle of
Hakusuki no E — the Japanese equivalent for River Paek where the Yamato
navy suffered defeat by the allied troops of Tang and Paekche — it was not
until the invasion of the Mongols in the 13th century that Japan had
another war with a foreign power.

Perhaps just because part of the story is so very familiar, other
parts of the historical scene have escaped the attention that they deserve
from historians. The fourth though abortive campaign by Sui Yangdi or the attempts by Tang Taizong to subdue Koguryó after his first expedition are often neglected.\(^1\) The events prior to the Chinese campaign against Paekche in 660 have seldom been examined.\(^2\) The alliance between Yamato and Paekche in the 650s\(^3\) and the roles of the Turks and Khitan are also overlooked.

As for those studies which have dealt with the subject, it is surprising how some conclusions could have been drawn and why many even at times have failed to grasp the basic facts. It has been suggested, for instance, that the decade after defeat of Yamato by Tang marked the beginning of a conspiracy by which the Chinese intervened in the internal affairs of Japan for over two centuries.\(^4\) Many historians have regarded the result of Tang Taizong's expedition in which the Chinese captured ten fortresses and a considerable amount of food supplies as a defeat rather than a failure to attain his goal.\(^5\) It has also been suggested that the Chinese had rarely succeeded by sea and that navigational skill was their outstanding weakness,\(^6\) when in fact the Koguryó capital was seized by the Sui navy in the third campaign under Yangdi and that the fall of Paekche was a feat of the Tang navy rather than the army.

A number of reasons explain the deficiency in our understanding of the Wars. The first problem arises from the nature of the material available. Although a majority of the sources were written by the Chinese, it should be noted that they tend to be biased and unbalanced even for the examination of Chinese historical events themselves. We know, for instance, more about Tang Taizong than his son Gaozong, as the former was glorified by eighth century historians as a model of rulers for the political needs of the time.\(^7\) We also suspect that a considerable part of records for Empress Wu's reign has been deleted because of the hostility of Tang and later historians for her unconventional rise to power.\(^8\) Though not necessarily a unique feature of the Chinese, many of their records tend to highlight the success of favourable figures and the failures of 'undesirable' persons, the former category best exemplified by generals such as Xue Rengui and other generals and the latter by Sui Yangdi.\(^9\) Perhaps due to historiographical accident, many military leaders, especially those of non-Han origins, also have records which do not seem to be in direct proportion to their contribu-
tion to the expansion of the Chinese empire.

The fact that Chinese records not only served as the major sources for China's relations with neighbouring peoples, but also for these peoples themselves as well gives rise to other problems. In the first place, Chinese historians tended to see most of their neighbours as uncivilized. The Khitan, Malgal and other small nomad groups, for instance, were usually depicted as volatile and dangerous barbarians, although in fact the Chinese often extended their empire at the expense of these small groups. The major concern of the Chinese historians in keeping a record of their neighbours was, therefore, to show the degree of success the Chinese had in bringing them into the Chinese civilized world. Not surprisingly, apart from some information on geography and social customs, Chinese records on their neighbours are basically chronicles of events when either they sent tribute to China or when they revolted against the Chinese. Little attention has been paid to the changes undergoing among these peoples, or to the periods when they remained neither friends or foes of China. The almost complete vanishment of the Khitan during the later half of the 7th century before their rebellion is a case in point.

To a certain extent, these flaws of the Chinese record on the Korean states can be rectified by Korean records. But neither are the Korean records themselves balanced or absolutely objective. In the major official historical record covering this period, Silla receives much more attention than it deserves whereas the roles of Koguryō and Paekche are relatively neglected. To a certain extent, this is probably due to the fact that the records of the victors have been much better preserved than those of the losers, especially when more than four centuries had elapsed by the time the record was compiled. Moreover, under the Chinese tradition of history writing, there is the tendency for the record compilers themselves to justify the fall of both Paekche and Koguryō in order to legitimize the emergence of Silla. In contrast to both Chinese and Korean sources, Japanese historical records of the period—results of the first attempt by the Japanese to compile an official history—were so brief that they are often open to different and diverse interpretations. Furthermore, the participation by Paekche descendents in compiling the records and the
fact that relations between Japan and Silla was hostile rather than friendly
when the records were compiled probably had considerable influence in much
of Japanese historical writing especially in the field of Japan's foreign
relations. One may also add that, in spite of Chinese influence, Korean
and Japanese records include much less biographical information than their
Chinese counterparts. As a result, our understanding of the background and
the personality of their rulers and officials are often limited.

If traditional records on the Wars were marked by ethnocentrism,
modern studies on the event have also been marred by the fact that the
views and interest of the historians are heavily shaped by their contemporary
political situation. This is again inevitable in most cases. Given the
political situation in the 20th century when the Korean peninsula and the
region north of it once again experienced foreign encroachment and that the
peninsula today remains politically divided, the nature of the subject must
be considered highly sensitive. The term 'unification wars', which so
often employed particularly by Korean scholars, signifies not only their
historical approach to the subject but perhaps also reflects their concern
for the present situation which offers some parallels with that in the 7th
century. The view that Japanese military involvement in Asia in the 20th
century was the result of external pressure perhaps has also prompted
Japanese scholars to explain their country's involvement in the affairs of
the Korean states in the 7th century as another response to the threat from
the 'west', which of course means the Chinese in this case. As for the
Chinese, the century-long experience of foreign encroachment probably
accounts for the fact that some scholars, especially those of Marxist
persuasion, tend to see the Koguryo campaigns not as glorious conquests
but as wars of imperialist aggression. Their interest in China's relation-
ship with Japan, however, remains to a large part in the events that
brought about 'friendship' between the two peoples.

It would be unjust, however, not to mention the serious works which
have already shed some light on the subject. Those by Ikeeuchi Hiroshi
before the Second World War remain indispensable today. He was probably
the first scholar to use Chinese, Korean and Japanese sources at the same
time in a meticulous as well as critical manner. Unfortunately, the political situation at the time when his research was conducted did not favour the making of more assertive conclusions on the political aspects of the Wars, and he was confined to subjects of a more historiographical nature. His contribution to the subject is also limited to the second half of the Wars, as he wrote little on the campaigns waged by Sui Yangdi or Tang Taizong. The other noteworthy study on the subject is probably that by John Charles Jamieson in 1969.\footnote{\textit{The Samguk Sag\i} and the Unification Wars,} his work mainly consists of an annotated translation of the relevant parts of the \textit{Samguk Sag\i}, the major Korean historical source for the Wars. As expected from the title, the main concern of the author is to see how Silla rose from the weakest peninsular kingdom to one which successfully repelled the Chinese from her territories. In short, it was essentially an investigation into just one of the many parties involved in the Wars.

There are other shorter studies which deal with only part of the Wars or do not directly deal with the Wars but nevertheless offer valuable insights for its study. The works by Japanese scholars in comparative institutional studies, the result of a growing awareness during the past two decades in the need to examine Japanese history from the larger perspective of East Asia as a whole, are particularly useful in the study of cultural relationship between the various countries. There is a need, however, to relate the findings of these studies to the historical development of the time, especially the foreign policies of the various countries involved.

It is then the purpose of the present study to fill some of these gaps and to provide a comprehensive account of the Wars. The major part of the thesis is a chronological reconstruction of the Wars themselves, suggesting the needs and fears, the common and the diverse interests of the countries involved, and how they reacted and interacted with each other. At the same time, the thesis examines the conflicts to see how they were related to each other, how they were shaped by the events of the time and in turn their impact on subsequent happenings. It is hoped that by putting
the Wars into a larger context, we can have a better understanding of the history of the international relationship in East Asia in the 7th century, when a East Asian cultural community of nations, if not simply a community of nations, began to develop for the first time in the region. 16

One of the most neglected aspect of the Wars is its origins. Chapter Two 17 traces events back to the sixth century which saw the first conflict between a newly united China and Koguryō. It shows that the scene was more complex than it appeared, as the conflict originated from a contention of control over some nomadic groups and the desire to contain the threat imposed by the eastern Turks. At the same time, it postulates that Sui Wendi's decision to wage an offensive was related to his concern over the succession question - that he needed an opportunity to test his beloved son's potential for leadership.

This chapter also examines the relationship between Yamato and its Korean neighbours. Doubt is cast on the conventional interpretation of the 'tributary relations' which denotes a hierarchic relationship with Yamato as the superior state, while attention is drawn to the phenomenon of providing military assistance in exchange for technology and 'culture', a traditional practice which often involved Yamato in the affairs of the Korean states. It is also noted that the relationship of Yamato with its neighbours depended much on its own readiness to respond, and the abortive campaigns at the turn of the century demonstrated that Yamato's interest in the Korean peninsula was not necessarily as military as her neighbours might have hoped.

The conflicts were confined to the Korean states and China at the second stage of the Wars. After the turn of the century, mounting pressure on the Korean peninsula as a result of the earlier abortive Chinese campaign gave rise to a series of wars among the three Korean states, but the major confrontation did not come until the three campaigns waged by Sui Yangdi from 612 to 614. The motive behind these campaigns and their precedent are contrasted in Chapter Three, where it is shown that Sui Yangdi was not necessarily the morally corrupt monarch traditional Confucian-minded historians have tended to depict, and that he had good reasons for his
decisions. The repercussions of the campaigns were larger in China than in Koguryo, as the campaigns has often been seen as the catalyst for the rising opposition against the government which led to the ultimate fall of the dynasty. It is argued, however, that the mistake of Yangdi was less in initiating the campaigns than in becoming obsessed with the idea. The contemplation of the fourth expedition prevented him from taking prompt measures to deal with the economy which was badly hit by waves of natural disasters, or from tackling the Turks whose power revived rapidly. It was this obsession which alienated him first from the peasants and then from his own followers, and which subsequently became responsible for the demise of a dynasty once noted for its great prosperity.

If the personal ambition of Sui Yangdi to rebuild the old Chinese empire of Han played a vital part in the decision to attack Koguryo, that of Tang Taizong had an equally if not more important part in the Tang expeditions of 645 and later. As in the case Sui Yangdi, national security could not have been a major reason for the campaigns. In spite of the example of the Sui and some fairly strong opposition from his officials, Tang Taizong led his troops in an attack on Koguryo when the country was still in a period of economic recovery. Some of the similarities and differences between the two rulers and their campaigns are dealt with in Chapter Four, bringing out the continuity and discontinuity of the Wars from stage two to three.

Taizong was never defeated, but neither did he attain his goal of reviving the Chinese empire. Nevertheless, the Tang victory and the possibility of further Chinese military intervention again had its impact on East Asia. As shown in Chapter Five, Silla began to explore the possibility of seeking external allies after being increasingly isolated for giving its assistance to the Chinese during the Sui campaigns. The cool response from Yamato, which had just experienced its own internal struggle in the court, however, prompted Silla to give allegiance to the Chinese. This in turn compelled Paekche to strengthen its ties with Yamato, whose leaders now seemed to see the establishment of external relations a valuable asset in bolstering their rule, especially when this court was
facing yet another crisis.

The events that ensued the development of these pacts are discussed in Chapter Six. First came an escalation of fighting between Silla and Paekche, with the latter emerging as the victor. Contrary to common belief, it was not the request for Chinese assistance by Silla that led to the Tang invasion of Paekche in 660. It was the failure of the Chinese, now under Gaozong, in their new attempts of attacking Koguryo from the northern side that they decided to occupy Paekche and start a southern front. Never clearly spelled out in the historical sources, the renewed Chinese interest in Koguryo was probably a result of the decision to pursue an unfulfilled dream by both the ruler and some of his officials. Partly because of its own miscalculations, Paekche was swiftly defeated and occupied, but the Tang effort in a concerted attack against Koguryo ended in failure, one which has been much underplayed by Chinese historians.

Part of the Chinese failure should be accounted for by the Paekche restoration movement backed up by the Japanese. It is contended that the so-called Taika Reform in Yamato in the mid-640s was not inspired solely by a desire to imitate China to establish a continental type of government. Furthermore, it is pointed out that there was a great deal of reluctance on the Japanese part to be treated as a tributary state as its Korean neighbours by the Chinese. The assistance given to the Paekche restoration movement did not stem from a fear of foreign encroachment, but was a calculated move by Yamato to establish a foothold on the Korean peninsula, one which they knew would incur the possibility of conflict with the Chinese. Confrontation eventually took place in 663, when the allied troops of Tang and pro-Tang Paekche groups defeated those of the Yamato navy and its protégé. Deprived of a competent leadership, the Paekche restoration movement was suppressed.

Chapter Seven examines the events which led to the fall of Koguryo in 668 and its aftermath. It is suggested that the retention of a Tang foothold in Paekche had not been the original intention of the Chinese court and that the return of the Paekche prince to his home country reflected Chinese policy, if only a temporary one, of non-intervention
in the affairs of the Korean states. The split in the leadership of Koguryŏ, however, provided the Chinese with an unexpected opportunity to fulfill their ambition of rebuilding an old empire. But the Chinese negligence of Silla's concern about instability in Paekche and the rapid Chinese success in Koguryŏ heightened Silla suspicion of Chinese intentions, and the alliance between the two countries which had been originally formed out of expediency soon broke down. Even before the fall of Koguryŏ, Silla took the initiative in rebuilding ties with Yamato, whose leaders now also felt the threat of the Chinese military presence. A restoration movement was organized in Koguryŏ as in the case of Paekche, this time with the support of Silla. Determined to set up its rule in Koguryŏ, however, Tang soon eliminated the insurgent elements both by force and by resettlement, with the exception of a Koguryŏ prince who found asylum in Silla where he was allowed to establish his own state in the territories of Paekche. Meanwhile, as the Chinese were engaged in combat with the troops of the restoration movement in Koguryŏ, Silla took advantage of the situation and began annexing Paekche territories.

Tang and Silla thus turned from allies to enemies, not because one was betrayed by the other as is often maintained, but because they could no longer find common interest to sustain their bond. Taking Koguryŏ to be part of its legitimate territories and Koguryŏ people its subjects, China could not tolerate any act that would infringe on its rights. Silla, on the other hand, saw China as a potential threat to its control of Paekche, which it was now determined to maintain. Confrontation broke out on more than one occasion. No longer having the support of an ally and not able to fully commit itself because of growing problems on its western frontier, the Tang dynasty ultimately had to abandon the conflict.

The return of indigenous leaders to Koguryŏ and the withdrawal of Chinese officials from Koguryŏ by Tang after 676 have generally been regarded as the end of the Korean Wars. The validity of this interpretation is questioned in Chapter Eight, which postulates the possibility of Koguryŏ opposition against Silla encroachment until the 680s. Moreover, it is pointed out that Gaozong still entertained the idea of further military action against Silla, though it was never translated into action because of
mounting problems on the northern and western frontiers and the growing support in court for a non-interventionist foreign policy.

This restraint in using force in Chinese foreign policy became more evident after Empress Wu came into power, but the Chinese nevertheless maintained an interest in Koguryo, where they attempted to sustain their influence by supporting members of the former ruling class. The policy appeared to succeed to some degree until the Khitan Rebellion in 696, when the disintegrated Chinese military proved to be so indefensible that the eastern Turks had to be enlisted in order to suppress the uprising. The incident became a turning point in the balance of power in north-east Asia as the Turks soon invaded China, replacing the Chinese as the dominant power in the region. At the same time, one nomadic group with close affiliations with Koguryo rebelled and succeeded in establishing a new state, forming the forerunner of Parhae and aggravating the unity among those residing in Koguryo. Facing increasing difficulty in defending its northern and northeastern borders, the Chinese could no longer maintain its rule or control in Koguryo, which fell under the Turks for a brief period until its subjects became absorbed by various neighbouring states, including China, after Turkish strength declined at the beginning of the eighth century.

The impact of the Korean Wars on Japan is examined in Chapter Nine, which rejects the hypothesis that Yamato's foreign relations was a deciding factor in shaping some of its internal political development, notably the Jinshin Incident. Nevertheless, the 663 defeat did serve as a catalyst in Yamato's attempt to build a bureaucratized state. A number of former Paekche officials were employed in the government. The close political relations with Silla also left some cultural imprint in Yamato. In spite of the absence of direct official contacts with China, Yamato also introduced some China-inspired institutions. It is argued that the Yamato aspirations to demonstrate itself as an advanced state continued, and this eventually prompted the Japanese to resume diplomatic relations with China at the beginning of the 8th century, marking the beginning of a period which saw cultural borrowing and perhaps trade playing a more significant part than military co-operations and confrontations in international relations.
In the light of this reconstruction of events, the significance of the Korean Wars as a whole is discussed in the final chapter. It is pointed out that to a large extent the Chinese were responsible for the outbreak of the conflicts. The Wars with the Korean states distinguished themselves from those the Chinese had with others first by the absence of a economic motivation, and then by the very nature of warfare, which accounted for the relatively lengthy Chinese involvement. At the same time, the degree of Chinese commitment in the Wars also depended much on the will of the Chinese rulers (rather than the officials) as well as on the other aspects of China's foreign relations (but not those of Koguryō or the other states). It is also argued that Koguryō and Paekche might have had different fates had they displayed more political shrewdness as did Silla, whose survival owed not to foreign support but to its own success in pursuing and protecting its interests. The Yamato experience in the Wars suggests that although the country was influenced in various degrees by the changing circumstances in the mainland, its internal affairs were nevertheless very much the result of its own development rather than a response to external factors. For the Malgal and Khitan, their disillusionment with giving allegiance to the Chinese in the Wars explained their attempts to become independent at the end of the century. Because of the revival of these two groups, the balance of power in northeast Asia at the beginning of the eighth century once again resembled the situation before the Korean Wars. However, peace prevailed and trade prospered in East Asia in the eighth century. The Korean Wars both promoted and hindered the process of cultural borrowing in East Asia, but overall they were a costly political exercise.
NOTES

1. I have not come across any discussion on the fourth campaign by Sui Yangdi. For examples which overlook the attacks on Koguryo by Tang after 645, see Han G. (1979), 241.

2. See, for instance, the recent works by Guisso (1978) and Kitō (1981).

3. The study by Yamao (1982) is probably the first work to touch on the subject, but his understanding of the original text is highly questionable. See discussions in Chapter Five.

4. See Suzuki O. See also the criticism by Takikawa (1973), who himself proposes another conspiracy theory – that the Chinese had intended to attack Yamato since the time of the Sui dynasty (1971 & 1973). See also my own comments (Huang, 1982) on the three works cited above.

5. The most notable example is of course Chen Yinke (1947), 147, and the same interpretation has been adopted by many scholars. Yet it seems necessary to distinguish between a failure to attain the goal and a military defeat.


7. The Zhenguan Zhengyao, compiled by Wu Jing (670-749) at the beginning of the Kaiyuan period (713-41), provides material not collected in the official histories on the Zhenguan period under Taizong's reign. Yet what is often overlooked is that the records were highly selective as they were to serve the didactic purpose of the compilers. (see, for instance, the recent study by Ju Lindong.) According to ZZTJ189/5912, Wu Jing in fact compiled another work on the same period by the name of Taizong Xunshi, The History of the Achievement of Taizong, apparently in order to glorify the second Tang emperor.

8. No in-depth study has been done on this subject, but the fact that records in the annals of the XTS is relatively more detailed than those in the JTS is a case in point.

9. The best example is of course Sui Yangdi; see discussion by Wright (1960).

10. For discussion of the compilation of the Samguk Sagi, the first Korean historical record, see Jamieson, 1-26; Gardiner (1970).

12. The only exception is the recent study by Kito (1981); see also my review (Huang, 1982).

13. See, for instance, Han (1957), 61-70. One suspects that there might have also been some impact from the Korean Wars of the 1950s when the American army and its allied troops were called the aggressors.

14. These have been collected in his Mansenshi Kenkyū, v.2, first published in 1960.


16. See, for instance, Inone (1980), 17, who suggests that by the first half of the eighth century, a East Asian Cultural Community was established. One can perhaps also suggest that a East Asian Community centered on China was established by the 7th century, as Koguryo and Paekche practised duplicity in their foreign relations as early as the 5th and arguably the 6th century before China was united (Sakamoto Y., 1978).

17. This is a revised version of an article with the same title which appeared in Papers on Far Eastern History 22 (September 1980).
The first Sui Expedition

In the 2nd month of 598, Sui Wendi sent an expeditionary force of 300,000 men against Koguryo. According to a Chinese record written by Tang historians, it was after the fall of Chen to Sui in 589 that Ko Yang, King P'yŏmwŏn of Koguryo, became fearful that Sui would also attack his country and adopted a defensive position by training soldiers and filling granaries. Sui then sent an official letter, alleging, inter alia, that Koguryo had been using force against Malgal (C. Mohe) and Khitan, two neighbours of Sui in the northeast, sending its cavalry across the border to plunder and kill, as well as conducting espionage in China. The message went on to warn the king that he should behave himself, otherwise Sui would have no hesitation in punishing Koguryo as it had done Chen. Before he could answer these threats and allegations, however, King P'yŏmwŏn died and was succeeded by his son King Yongyang, who continued to receive honorary titles granted by Sui. But in 598 the new king led a cavalry force of more than 10,000 Malgal to encroach upon Chinese territories in Yingzhou. The emperor was infuriated and ordered a full-scale expedition against Koguryo. In the eyes of the Tang historians, Sui would not have started the war had it not been for Koguryo's misdemeanours: Koguryo had been the first to act wilfully, and although Sui had diminished Koguryo, it had turned a deaf ear and continued its wicked ways, so Sui had had to resort to force.

Modern historians do not share these views. Some simply dismiss the expedition; others label it either a conquest or an invasion, implying that the Koguryo campaign was a war resulting from Sui expansionism. Taking into considerations the events preceding the campaign, it can be argued that this is true to a certain extent. In the first decade after its establishment in 681, Sui first took advantage on internal strife between the khanates and defeated the eastern Turks, a constant menace to China in the mid-sixth century, then succeeded in capturing Chen, the last of the dynasties which had based in the lower basin of the Yangzi. If Sui was to
extend its territories further, Koguryō was most likely to be the next target. Indeed, the large number of troops and the fact that they were under the command of a prince suggest some parallels between the conquest of Chen and the expedition against Koguryō. As the Tang historians themselves pointed out, the allied army of Koguryō and Malgal had already been defeated by Wei Chong, Governor-general of Yingzhou. Not many would have agreed that a second punitive action was necessary, let alone one of 300,000 strong. It is obvious that the border intrusion was no more than an excuse for the campaign.

A detailed examination of the relations between the different groups occupying the areas bordering both Koguryō and Sui sheds some light on the campaign. Understandably, the harsh climatic conditions of the area did not attract agrarian people, leaving Malgal and Khitan, two confederations of semi-nomadic people, as the major groups inhabiting the area. Like other pastoral peoples, they launched sporadic attacks on the cultivated areas when they were strong, but more often than not, they were subjected to attacks from their stronger neighbours, both nomadic or agricultural. In this case, the major powers interested in the area were Koguryō, Sui and the eastern Turks, who were often at odds with each other.

In 565, Koguryō successfully put up a defence in the north against the eastern Turks, but lost 10 fortresses in the south to Silla, who took advantage of the occasion. This threat coming from the Turks perhaps accounted for the relatively long span of peace between Koguryō and its southern neighbours, Silla and Paekche, in the Korean peninsula. The threat was not alleviated after the defeat of the eastern Turks by the Chinese, however, as the latter had several times attacked Koguryō in the distant past. Koguryō probably realized that it could hardly afford to defend itself on both the northern and the southern frontiers at the same time. The best it could do was to create a buffer zone occupied by Malgal and Khitan.

The threat from the eastern Turks also had an impact on Sui's defence. Yingzhou, the only Chinese bordertown on the northern side of the Great
Wall, was under the governorship of Gao Baoning, allegedly related to the imperial family of Northern Qi. In the later 570s, Khitan and Malgal troops helped Gao in his unsuccessful attempts to rescue Northern Qi from falling into the hands of Northern Zhou. After the establishment of Sui, Gao allied himself with the Turks, crossed the Great Wall and attacked Pingzhuo in 682. Gao was defeated, but soon returned with Khitan and Malgal aid. This time he was killed by one of his followers bought by Chinese bribes. The event suggests that the Northern Zhou must have regarded the new Great Wall, built in the mid-sixth century, as China's northern borderline, thus allowing Gao Baoning to occupy Yangzhou after the fall of Northern Qi. But the allied attack by Gao and the Turks in 582 prompted a review, if not a change, of Sui's policy towards the northeastern frontier. Although the main threat from the Turks did not come from this area, the encroachment demonstrated that the Turks could become a formidable menace when united with Khitan and Malgal. To further alienate and weaken the Turks and alleviate pressure from the northeast border, it was imperative for the Chinese to occupy Yangzhou and bring Malgal and Khitan under their control.

To some extent, the elimination of Gao made this possible. From 585 to 586, several groups of Khitan, including those who had been under the spheres of influence of Koguryo and the Turks, gave their allegiance to Sui. But if the relationship between Sui and Khitan improved, the opposite was the case with Malgal. Its tribute relations with Sui stopped and were not resumed until 591, when they were retained for four years. There seems to have been some correlation between the records of tribute by Malgal and by Koguryo, who paid tributes from 581 to 584, and again from 591 to 592. This can best be interpreted as a reflection of the reluctance of Koguryo to show its colour, consequently coercing Malgal to follow suit. It is also likely that while Sui was engaged militarily in the south, Koguryo made attempts to subdue Khitan, at least one of the tribes of which had been under its rule, as the record of Khitan also reveals a discontinuation of tributes from 587 to 589. The accusation in the official letter by Sui in 590 that Koguryo had been oppressing Malgal and confining Khitan was
therefore not without some justification, and the resumption of tribute by Sui's northeastern neighbours in the early 590s - Khitan also resumed its tributes in 590 and 593 - was due to the effect of this protest. However, Koguryŏ appeared to tighten its grip over its neighbours once more later, as the tributes soon stopped again.

Little is known of the population of Yingzhou. It was a place of settlement for exiled Chinese convicts as well as for surrendered foreign subjects. Despite the Koguryŏ effort to bring Malgal under its sway, at least one group of Malgal gave their allegiance to Sui and was settled in Yingzhou in the mid 580s. It would not be surprising if Han-Chinese were outnumbered by nomadic inhabitants. It is also possible that the attack on Yingzhou by the allied troops of Koguryŏ and Malgal in 598 was an attempt to punish or restore Koguryŏ rule over those who had defected to Sui. Whatever the case, as far as the campaign is concerned, if the border infringement was the immediate cause of conflict, rivalry between the two powers to exert influence over the tribal peoples was the term one.

Because of its geographical location, Yingzhou had also been a trading post for the Chinese and Khitan in the late 5th century, and it probably continued to be so in the Sui period for the different groups inhabiting the area, including perhaps the Turks and Koguryŏ. In fact, the submission of semi-nomadic groups to Sui without the use of force must have partly stemmed from their desire for whatever benefits they might gain from having contacts with the Chinese. One can also suggest that Koguryŏ's invasion in 598 was an attempt to occupy and monopolize the trade in Yingzhou, consequently bringing Khitan and Malgal under its control. However, it is unlikely that the Chinese would wage wars on Koguryŏ on economic grounds. While there were indications of government supervision in business between China and its central Asian neighbours, trade in the northeast region seemed to be conducted on a private basis rather than through government channels. Wei Yi, Governor-general of Yingzhou from 588/589 to 595, for instance, accumulated a considerable amount of wealth by trading with the 'northern barbarians' and aroused the jealousy of many.
It has been speculated that the fear of a close relationship between Koguryŏ and Hebei, the area covering the lower basin of the Yellow River which was previously under the rule of Northern Qi, might have prompted the ruling class of Sui, most of whom coming from the northwestern part of the country, to wage a war on Koguryŏ. Yet the assumption of a close relationship, economic or otherwise, between Koguryŏ and the Hebei region is not substantiated. If Sui had wanted to eliminate any potential element of internal insurgency, it probably would have first attempted to put its own house in order before moving against an outsider. It has also been suggested that a close ethnic bond existed between the royal families of Northern Qi and Koguryŏ, as both bore the same surname - Gao in Chinese and Ko in Korean. Even had that been the case and assuming Gao Baoning was a member of the ruling house, it is significant to note that Gao received no assistance from Koguryŏ in his attempt to rescue the collapsing dynasty, nor did he flee to Koguryŏ after his defeat. The argument of common lineage should not be overstressed.

The bone of contention in the 598 Koguryŏ expedition was thus more likely to have been the Yingzhou area than Hebei. Strategic considerations seems to have risen above all others as the major factor in generating interests. Trading opportunities and other benefits offered by Sui tended to make the semi-nomadic peoples accept its suzerainty, whereas the defensive policy of Koguryŏ necessitated an aggressive posture against the minority groups.

Internal Factors

In view of the conflict of interest between Sui and Koguryŏ over the Yingzhou area since the beginning of the Sui dynasty, one can assume, as the 590 official letter suggests, that there had always been the possibility of a military confrontation. Yet, despite the absence of tributes from Koguryŏ and its attempts to put Khitan and Malgal under its sway from the early 590s, no action was taken by Sui. The fact Sui found it necessary in 598 to send a large expeditionary troop to Koguryŏ even after the enemies had been driven out of Chinese territories suggests a break-away
from the established policy. The cause of the expedition was therefore not simply a disruption in the international order. A close examination of Chinese aspirations is also necessary.

It can be argued that if there was a delay by Sui in taking action against Koguryō, it should not be surprising. A man of cautious character, Yang Jian had so far preceded his military conquests by careful planning and preparation, resulting characteristically in brilliant tactics and timing. There was no reason why the move against Koguryō should be an exception. If there were to be a war against Koguryō, it would have to take place at the right time: a time when other neighbours would impose no threat; a time when the soldiers were not exhausted but were well-prepared for war; a time when the country could spare the financial resources for an expensive war. The time was not ripe until 598. Peace had finally prevailed in southern China after the conquest of Chen. The country also had built up considerable economic strength as indicated by the remission of the main agricultural tax in the previous year.

However, there is also evidence to suggest that Sui was not concerned in expanding its territories any further after the conquest of Chen. The army, for instance, was soon reorganised to form a force which now produced rather than consumed. In 593 the usually austere emperor ordered the construction of a new palace. Although he refused to perform the feng sacrifice, the ceremony symbolizing the consummation of an emperor's rule, Wendi nevertheless took a ceremonial hunting trip and worshipped the eastern Tai mountain, a rite only next in importance to the feng ceremony. It was in 594 that ancestral temples were built at four mountains located at the four sides of the empire. It is interesting to note that two years later, it was decreed that another ancestral temple to be built at Yingzhou. One may conclude that Yang Jian was very much conscious of the fact that he was now an emperor of a unified China and that Yingzhou was regarded as the northern limit of the empire.

Even if the political and economic conditions in 598 had favoured a confrontation with Koguryō, it did not necessarily mean that Sui had to go
to war. One Japanese historian had surmised that Yang Jian was under pressure by his belligerent generals who, in the long reign of peace, had been deprived of the opportunity to obtain awards and promotion from military victories, and that the army needed training by way of getting engaged in a real battle. Yet it seems that Wendi, thrifty through he might have been, was never sparing in awards of credit to his generals. Even if some of the generals might have urged a proclamation of war, it is noteworthy that Yang Jian appointed Gao Jiong, who had opposed the idea of the campaign at the outset during a court meeting, as Staff Officer (changshi) of the expedition. It is obvious that the appointment was made by Yang Jian himself, and more than anyone else, he was responsible for the expedition. The fact that a meeting was held implies that the expedition could not have been a result of fury and irrationality on the part of Yang Jian sparked off by the border raid. It was a conclusion reached after discussion with officials, a decision made after weighing the pros and cons of the proposed campaign.

Parallels can be drawn between the Sui campaign and that against Chosŏn, the forerunner of Koguryŏ, by Han Wudi (r. 140-188BC). Like Koguryŏ, Chosŏn was accused of obstructing the way for neighbouring peoples to pay homage to China and of not behaving properly as an 'external official' (wai-chen). But the similarities ended there. Whereas the Han emperor soon dispatched troops to attack Choson, the Sui emperor first sent a letter of warning and showed restraint for eight more years before ordering an expedition. The conciliatory rather than hostile attitude towards Koguryŏ before the expedition was the rule rather than the exception in his dealings with neighbouring countries. The image of a peace-loving monarch might have been accentuated by Wei Zheng, the Tang historian who was the chief-editor of the historical records of the Sui dynasty and who held the view that relations with foreign peoples were a burden which brought little practical advantage to China. But Wendi seems to have disdained force as an immediate means to achieve his goal in foreign relations. It has been pointed out that history was a powerful stimulus in Sui's adoption of institutions and rites, and Wendi also displayed both a knowledge of
history and a concern for his own image in history. However, there is little evidence to show how past examples could have inspired the Koguryo expedition, when they left little impact on other aspects of Sui's foreign policy. Wendi might have imitated Qin Shihuangdi in prohibiting the possession of weapons by common people, but he did not go as far as to order the burning of books and burying of scholars. History for him was more likely to have been a series of events from which lessons were to be learnt rather than a guidebook to be followed. The hypothesis that Yang Jian hoped to restore the former glory of the Han dynasty by trying to absorb Koguryo into Chinese territories is highly questionable.

In order to shed some light on the reasons for the Sui emperor to wage an offensive against Koguryo, it might be essential to examine the appointment of Prince Liang, the youngest son of the emperor, to the post of Chief Commander of the expedition. Little attention has been paid to Prince Liang by either Tang or modern historians. His career is eclipsed by those of his brothers the crown prince Yung, and his second eldest brother, Prince Guang, later to become the Yangdi. Partly because of his Confucian tradition and partly also perhaps because of his own prejudices, Wei Zheng depicted the former as the victim of a court conspiracy who lost his legitimate position to succeed the throne, and the latter as the chief villain behind the plot. However, one wonders if the Tang historians should be followed in focusing only on the two elder brothers, or if the struggle for the throne should not be seen as one embracing the other sons as well in an age of political opportunism.

Much has been written on the relationship between Yang Jian and Yang Guang. It has been pointed out that the prince resented his father because of his overbearing ways and because of a supposed Oedipus complex. On the other hand, one may simply suggest that Prince Guang was never his father's favourite. His performance as Chief Commander in the invasion of Chen and subsequently Governor-general of Yangzhou might have fulfilled the emperor's expectations, but there is no evidence to suggest that he had won his father's heart.
The case of Prince Liang is in sharp contrast. He enjoyed the privilege of living in the palace with his parents when he was young. When he was appointed Governor-general of Pingzhou (Taiyuan), the number of prefectures under his control increased to twice as before. Moreover, he was granted special permission to act on his own initiative by the emperor, who was well-known for his strict adherence to law. He was the first among his brothers to be granted the right to cast coins. If the events which took place after 598 are also to be taken into consideration, it appears that the emperor endorsed his youngest son to build up a strong army, which in fact revolted against the central army soon after the emperor's death. The revolt was indeed attributed to a secret pact between the emperor and Prince Liang.

Thus it is difficult to agree that Wendi was hostile to all his sons in their bid for the throne. The evidence above leads one to conclude that an unusually close relationship existed between the emperor and Prince Liang, one that was not paralleled by that between the emperor and Prince Guang or any of his other sons. If indeed the possession of a military reputation was a necessary qualification for the ruling class in the northern dynasties, a tradition which Sui inherited, it is not surprising that in 598, 300,000 men were put under a young and inexperienced prince. When the emperor already had doubts about the crown prince succeeding him; when his third and fourth sons had already left some undesirable impressions on him; when his second son had never really gained his affections, would not the emperor have pondered over giving his beloved youngest son some military training, and perhaps even a test of his potential for leadership of a state?

The Campaign

Physically, the campaign took some half a year for preparations. The imperial order issued in the 1st month of 698, which confiscated all large ships in the former territories of Chen, was likely to be a disguised attempt to recruit ships for the navy. The actual embarkation of the army and navy probably did not take place until the 6th month of the year, when
it was decreed that the official titles of the Koguryō king be divested.42 However, no later than the 9th month of the year the troops returned. Sui had lost a lot of men, but did not lose the war - there was little fighting or even no battle. The navy was caught in a hurricane and many of the warships capsized. On land, the troops only went as far as the Liao River, where they began to have difficulties with food supplies, then was caught in the rain and suffered from an epidemic. Accordingly, only 20 percent of the army returned home.43

Many ideas of Prince Liang were rejected by Gao Jiong. It is unknown if these disagreements should be responsible for the disaster that overtook the expedition. Yet the Sui leadership seemed to have been ignorant of the climate in Koguryō, where half the annual rainfall occurs during the summer season.44 Apart from the heavy rainfall, the difficulties in transportation was also caused by the mere distance of Koguryō from Sui. Zhuojun, the nearest military base for the army, was 700 li from Yingzhou, which was another 480 li from the River Liao.45 As will be seen in later campaigns, an abundant food supply was imperative for all military operations against Koguryō. It was a lesson first learned in the 598 campaign.

Despite the great loss of soldiers, it was a moral victory for Sui. Koguryō did not counter-attack. One suspects that despite the preparation made after the fall of Chen, the Sui attack was not anticipated. In addition, the fact that P’yŏngyang, the Koguryō capital, had been the target of the Sui navy also perhaps took Koguryō by surprise. To avoid more conflicts for the time being, Koguryō decided to subordinate itself once more to Sui, sending officials to apologise and using the most humiliating language to express penitence.46 Annual tributes to Sui were again paid; it seemed a return to the status quo ante.47

Yet there were many who were not satisfied with a moral victory, and there was growing demand for a second campaign.48 While Sui was preparing for war in the northeast, there were already signs of instability in one group of Turks along the northern border.49 One wonders if the tense situation in the north did not contribute in part to the rapid termination of
the Koguryō campaign. At any rate, the ageing emperor saw the real threat to his empire coming from the north rather than from the northeast. He gave another opportunity to his beloved son, whose failure in Koguryō was perhaps such a shock for him that he declined to take up the new assignment, which was now given to prince Guang. The Turks retreated, but still there was no more campaign against Koguryō, for the concern of the emperor for his beloved son now took the form of protecting him from his elder brother Guang, now the new crown prince, rather than giving him fresh opportunities to assert himself on the battlefield.

The Yamato Expeditions

While Koguryō was under the menace of Sui, Silla was also under threat of an attack from Yamato across the sea. According to the Nihonshoki, a force of over 20,000 troops was sent to Tsukushi in 591, and remained there until 595. In 600 another Yamato force was dispatched, this time capturing six 'castles' in Silla. However, the Yamato force soon withdrew, and the castles were recovered by Silla. Another expedition was made in 602, but the first commander died, and the attempt turned out to be abortive when the wife of the newly appointed commander also died.

It is generally agreed that many of the records of Nihonshoki concerning foreign relations for early Japanese history is highly unreliable. The chronicle claims, for instance, that Yamato received tributes from Imna (J. Mimana), one of the small states on the Korean peninsula, as early as the first century B.C., and that Empress Jingū conquered Imna in the 4th century A.D. While it is now accepted that both records are fabricated, it remains the conviction of many that Imna was under Yamato control from the 3rd century until 562, when Silla incorporated Imna and other states into its territories. This view has been rejected by many, and the issue has been a most controversial one.

The records concerning 'tribute relations' also require careful scrutiny. In Chinese records, 'tribute' was essentially a presentation of special products from a country culturally and materially inferior to a superior one, and sometimes was an acknowledgement of the latter's suzer-
ainty over the former. However, this was often not the case in the Nihonshoki. Both Koguryo and the southern dynasties of China, for instance, is recorded to have paid tributes to Yamato in the 5th century, when they were supposed to have received honorary titles from the Chinese kings. The kind of tribute referred to was more likely to be a form of trade between Yamato and its neighbours. If indeed Yamato had had settlement on the Korean peninsula, it probably functioned as a trading post. Attention has been drawn to the fact that Silla was a rich producer of iron. Since large-scale iron-ore excavation in Yamato did not take place until the 8th century, it can be surmised that the Korean states were the main suppliers of iron from the 5th century on. It is also noteworthy that the Korean states were referred to as the land of gold and silver in the story of Empress Jingu and in a few other places in the Nihonshoki, reflecting beliefs held in the 5th or 6th century. In short, the Korean states were the major trade partners or tributary states of Yamato.

What is significant about these tributes is that they sometimes took the form of remuneration rendered in exchange for military assistance from Yamato, the case of Paekche being most evident. It has been suggested, for example, that the introduction of Buddhism to Yamato by Paekche in 553 was motivated by a desire to seek Yamato military assistance. However, the failure of Yamato to respond swiftly resulted in the defeat of Paekche by Silla, who subsequently conquered Kaya, the region generally regarded as Imna. In spite of the difficulty in sending troops from Yamato to the Korean peninsula, it appeared that Yamato was often regarded as a potential ally by the Korean states.

The brevity of records on the 591 expedition leaves a number of intriguing problems open to interpretation. Taking into account the fact that in 592, soon after the troops had been dispatched, the central court witnessed a power struggle engineered by Soga no Umako in which the ruler Sushun was assassinated and replaced by a female monarch, known later as Empress Suiko. Some have postulated that the dispatch of troops was but a means of keeping the powerful clan chieftains away from the court by Soga
to facilitate the implementation of his plan, but others have suggested it was an attempt by Sushun to weaken the power of Soga no Umako whom he eventually failed to get rid of. Both explanations, however, fail to explain why the troops had to station in Tsukushi for such a lengthy period. Others have contended that the troops were either for attacking Silla or for protecting Yamato from an encroachment by Silla or perhaps Sui. This argument is also unsatisfactory, for had there been any real intention of Yamato attacking Silla, the troops would have taken more action. There is also little evidence to suggest a Silla attack, let alone one from Sui.

Yet it is possible that the military operation was related to the changing balance of power in east Asia. Since it had paid tributes to Chen, Koguryo understandably found itself in a precarious position after the fall of Chen. Internally, as already mentioned, Koguryo prepared itself for a possible invasion from the Chinese. Externally it began a new move to establish ties with Yamato. It was probably at this time that monks and technicians were sent to Yamato, in helping the construction of the Hoko Temple, the oldest temple in Japan, where Buddhism was allowed to flourish under the patronage of Soga no Umako. In return, Yamato would apply pressure on Silla, whom Koguryo was at odd with because of its absorption of Koguryo people during clashes between Koguryo and Paekche. Paekche also sent a number of monks and technicians in assisting the project, which was likely to be another consequence of the conquest of Chen by Sui.

If the dispatch of troops to Kyushu was a response to the mounting tension in the Korean peninsula, the withdrawal of troops was likely to be an indication of the dissolution of pressure felt by Koguryo, who now again suspended its tribute to Sui. By returning one of the warships drifted to the east after the conquest of Chen, Paekche was reassured by Sui that it had no intention of extending its empire to the Korean peninsula, and was even told that annual tributes were not necessary. The fact that Sui no longer was regarded as source of danger is also partly reflected by the fact that Koguryo sent a tribute mission to Sui in 597.
The second expedition to Silla in 660 raises a problem not of interpretation but of authenticity, partly because of the absence of any specific date and partly because of the pomposity of the language used. The swiftness of the expedition contrasts sharply with the careful preparations made both in 591 and 602. What is more striking is the facility with which the Yamato troops are alleged to have succeeded in conquering an area which had been in firm control of Silla.\textsuperscript{70} It is beyond comprehension why the Yamato troops were evacuated completely after their victory without some firm foothold being established. It is also puzzling why such an important battle was not recorded in Korean records: humiliating the defeat might have been, Silla nevertheless recovered its lost territories. It is highly likely that the record of the 600 expedition was wrongly dated, or was even a complete fabrication, like the tale of Empress Jingū's conquest of the Korean states, though the motivation remains an enigma.

The third recorded Yamato endeavour to attack Silla, probably more real than imaginary, poses even more questions than the preceding ones. One Chinese record notes that a Yamato mission was sent to Sui in 600,\textsuperscript{71} the Nihonshoki states that envoys were sent to Paekche and Koguryō respectively in 601. Korean sources have references to Silla being attacked by Paekche in 602 and by Koguryō in 603.\textsuperscript{72} It has been maintained by some that the conquest of Chen and the 598 campaign against Koguryō by Sui served as a stimulus to Yamato to assert itself. On the one hand, Yamato sent a mission to Sui hoping that the Chinese would recognise its interest in Silla. On the other hand, it formed an alliance with Paekche and Koguryō.\textsuperscript{73}

Doubts must be raised concerning the 600 Yamato mission to Sui, a mission very similar to that of 607. In 600 the Yamato envoy came as the messenger of 'the younger brother of Heaven and the elder brother of the sun', and in 607 as that of 'the son of Heaven in the land where the sun set'. In both cases, the envoy incurred the Sui emperor's displeasure for the presumptuous titles assumed by his master. One wonders why the Yamato envoy would displease Sui twice.\textsuperscript{74} Moreover, many events such as the granting of cap ranks, the appointment of local officials (iniki/inagi) in
charge of government warehouses (miyake)\textsuperscript{75} which did not take place in the 600s, are included in the extant record supposed to be the information on Yamato provided by the 600 envoy. While it has also been suggested that the mission came from some powerful group in Kyushu rather than from the central Yamato court,\textsuperscript{76} one wonders if the 607 mission was not recorded twice, perhaps due to the existence of two different sources.\textsuperscript{77}

Even assuming that the 600 mission was sent, it still seems far-fetched to claim that Yamato found it necessary to seek the recognition of Sui concerning its interest in Silla, especially when Yamato did not display an understanding of Sui's diplomatic practice. Doubts must also be raised against the possibility of any alliance among Yamato, Koguryŏ, and Paekche. Because Paekche pledged support for the Chinese in the 598 campaign against Koguryŏ, relations between the two countries broke down.\textsuperscript{78} While it is true that both countries attacked Silla later, they took place after Yamato had already abandoned its campaign and were likely to be operations of their own initiative.

It has often been argued that there was some rivalry between the leadership of Soga no Umako and Prince Shotoku, who was in fact related to the Soga family. Whether or not this was the case, the necessity for putting a female on the throne and having a prince as regent reflects some instability within the court. It has been argued that instability in the court prompted the leaders to re-assert their authority by seeking accomplishments in foreign affairs or, to be more specific, by re-establishing 'tribute relations' with Silla.\textsuperscript{79} However, it can also be argued that this internal crisis was more likely to curb Yamato interest in Silla than promote it. Indeed, events after the expedition - the granting of cap-ranks, the proclamation of a set of principles for government, as well as the patronage given to both Buddhism and indigenous beliefs - indicate that there was a need for unity and harmony.

Lack of stability, not only in the court but also in the regional areas, perhaps accounted in no small measure for the expedition's abortive end. Once again, Tsukushi was the base for any attacks on Silla. As
demonstrated by the Iwai Revolt of 527, the area around Tsukushi had always been a stronghold of powerful local groups. It has been suggested these groups were pro-Silla, as Iwai not only intercepted the 'tributes' from the Korean states but also obstructed the path of the army from the central government to Silla, after receiving bribes from Silla. After three-quarters of a century, the local powers in Kyushu did not necessarily retain their pro-Silla stand - in fact, a Silla spy caught in Tsushima was caught and exiled in 601 - but neither was it necessary that they now would support any military operations against Silla. The station of the central troops in Tsukushi in the early 590s was probably not welcomed by the local powers, as they had to provide supplies for them. It is doubtful whether the situation had changed a decade later.

A third factor in bringing an end to the military operations could have been the danger involved in the campaign. Danger encountered by later missions to China demonstrated that it was a tremendous task sending over 20,000 people across the sea. The death of the first chief commander and the wife of his successor could also have played a part. Both commanders were the brothers of Prince Shotoku, whose Buddhist beliefs could have prompted him to end the venture.

The ardent interest of the Yamato ruling class in Buddhism was also the initial motive in sending a mission to China in 607, the first time for more than a century. Inspired by the imperial patronage towards Buddhism in Sui, the mission was essentially a cultural delegation, as most of its members were Buddhist monks. However, the acquisition of first-hand knowledge of the situation in Sui must have extended the interest of the Yamato leaders, who now realized that Sui had more to offer than Buddhism. In 608, the Yamato envoy returned home with a Sui diplomat, who was received by the most ceremonious reception. Upon his return, the Sui diplomat was accompanied by another Yamato delegation, which included only one Buddhist monk but seven official cadres. In other words, Yamato's enthusiasm in Chinese culture was no longer confined to Buddhism, and government institutions were likely to be a new subject of interest to their ruling class.
The Korean States

Although the two Korean campaigns by Sui and Yamato did not witness any fighting, they nevertheless changed the situation on the Korean peninsula. For Koguryŏ, the Sui expedition confirmed its fear of an invasion from an expanding Sui, a fear reflected in the treatment of Chinese invasions as a major theme in the first five chapters of the Samguk sagi, presumably taken indirectly from the Yūgisinjip compiled in the early 600s. It is not difficult to imagine how this preoccupation led to the strengthening of defences within Koguryŏ in anticipating more Chinese invasion. Moreover, realising that any military moves along its northwestern frontier would only enrage its strong neighbour, Koguryŏ turned its attention to the south.

Soon after the Sui troops' withdrawal, Koguryŏ attacked Paekche for having offered assistance to Sui during the campaign. In 603 Silla was the target of Koguryŏ's attack. In 607 Paekche was attacked again, with 3,000 people being carried off. In 608 Koguryŏ again invaded Silla, capturing 8,000 men and one fortress. All these attacks were pre-emptive measures designed to remove the threat of a southern attack in the event of another invasion from China. At the same time, Koguryŏ sought to have a closer relationship with Yamato. In 605 Koguryŏ sent three hundred taels of gold to the Yamato court for the making of a giant statue to be placed in the Hōkō Temple. In 610 two monks were again sent to Yamato. Not only were they well-versed in Confucian classics, they also introduced the methods of making paper and ink as well as the manufacturing of water mill to Yamato. Again, it was a quid pro quo for securing the military assistance of Yamato, a potential ally which could threaten Silla by its strength as shown in the early 590s.

Defeated by Silla in 602 and 605, and by Koguryŏ in 607, Paekche desperately needed external allies. The abortive campaigns by Sui and Yamato were not altogether a disappointment. Although Paekche's relations with Yamato had once declined in the second half of the sixth century, signs of restoration emerged after the conquest of Chen by Sui. Not only
technicians were sent to Yamato in assisting the construction of the Hōkō Temple, a Buddhist monk was dispatched to help the administration of the temple in 595. After being defeated by Silla in 602, another attempt was made to draw closer the relationship with Yamato by introducing the newest calendar and the studies of geography, astronomy and other subjects to Yamato. On the other hand, the Koguryō expedition by Sui also demonstrated a common interest between Paekche and Sui in the form of a weak Koguryō. As in the 5th century, Paekche had an opportunity to exploit the common interest by encouraging and even inciting the Chinese to attack Koguryō. In fact, two missions were sent by King Mu to Sui in 607, the latter with a memorial from the King urging the Chinese to undertake another campaign against Koguryō.

The lesson was not lost on Silla. Because of its geographical position, Silla had had closer relations with Chen than with the northern dynasties. Even after the conquest of Chen by Sui, Silla did not feel the need to pay tribute to Sui. However, the stationing of a large number of Yamato troops across the strait in the early 590s imposed such a threat to Silla that it not only consolidated its defences by further constructing two fortresses near its capital but also paid tribute to Sui for the first time in 594. After the turn of the century, Silla faced encroachment from its neighbours. Although Silla defeated Paekche and Koguryō in 602 and 603 respectively and even counter-attacked Paekche in 605, the invasion by Koguryō eventually resulted in the loss of 8,000 people and one castle, forcing perhaps some to seek asylum in Yamato. The Silla defeat prompted the king to contemplate seeking the assistance of the Chinese for the first time in its history. To alleviate its pressure, Silla also seek to change its relations with Yamato, perhaps partly as the result of Chinese manoeuvres. In 610 and again in 612, missions were sent to Yamato, allegedly sending tributes not only from Silla but also from the former territories of Imna. In other words, diplomacy now became an important weapon of Silla's foreign relations.

In sum, after the Sui and Yamato expeditions, the balance of power in
the Korean peninsula was upset. Small-scale fightings broke out between the states, setting the stage for more and larger ones to come. Koguryo was the state most likely to be in an isolated position in the event of another attack from China, for it could be assumed that the Chinese would only take military action after having subdued the Turks. The Japanese might be of help, but they could only alleviate the pressure from Silla and their assistance was never assured as demonstrated in the case of 602. Neither would Paekche and Silla side with Koguryo, as both had started currying favour with China. However, it should be noted that the attitude of Paekche towards Sui was essentially an ambivalent one because of its rivalry with Silla, who now found diplomatic manoeuvres its best means of survival. Yamato emerged as a potential ally for the three Korean states, but its degree of involvement depended much on its own internal political stability. The country which held the key to war as well as to peace was China. The debacle of the 598 Koguryo expedition necessitated another campaign of vindication. The opportunity to launch one did not quickly arise because of a revived threat from the Turks and the increasing age of Yang Jian. But when the Turks became submissive to a younger and more ambitious emperor, further fighting would not be long delayed.
FOOTNOTES

1. SS81/1815-16. There are two mistakes here. First, the name of the Koguryŏ king should be Yang (陽) rather than T'ang (唐). Second, since the letter was addressed to the king before his death in 590, it was in 589 or 590 rather than in 597 that the letter was sent.

2. For the first category, see, for instance, Han G. (1979); for the second, see Fan W., 53.

3. SGSG19/198. SS84/1867 also records a defeat of the Turks by Koguryo and Malgal, but the date is unknown.

4. See Bei-Qishu 12/156-57; SS39/1148, 41/547.

5. SS1/22, 84/1881-82. The last of these is recorded to surrender at the end of the Kauhuang period (581-600). But since the event was supposed to take place when the Turks under Shabolue had just been appeared, the year was likely to have been in 586, the year before the Khagan died (SS1/25).

6. The Treatise of Koguryŏ in SS notes that Koguryŏ paid annual tributes without cessation, but this is a general statement without supporting evidence. Records of tributes are derived from the annals of SS and CFYG970/11395.

7. See the examples in SS41/1184 where an official was exiled to Liu-cheng, a county (Xian) of Yingzhou, and SS62/1484 where another official was exiled to Huaiyuan, presumably also a county of Yingzhou, see JTS39/1521.

8. SS81/1822. The event recorded here could not have taken place in the reign of Yangdi (605-17), nor could the group have surrendered to Sui during the second Koguryŏ campaign (612-14), settled in Yingzhou for a certain period and then fought beside the Sui in the second Koguryo campaign: the contradictions are obvious. However, in TD178/948, the event is recorded to have taken place in the reign of Wendi. Taiping huanyuzhi 71/547, quoting Beifan fengsuzhi, also records the event as having taken place in Emperor Wen's reign. For a critical study of this group of Malgal, see Hino (1949a, 1950).
9. Weishu 100/2223.

10. SS47/1629, JTS75/2632; in SS84/1883, it is noted that Koguryo supplied iron to Shiwei, another pastoral people, but it is not stated whether the trade was conducted at Yingzhou.


13. SS47/1269.


15. This is suggested by Tan Jixiang, in Miao Yue, 93-94. However, it should be noted that in the sixth century, it became difficult to distinguish the Koguryo Gao, the Xianbei Gao and the Chinese Gao of Bohai; see Holmgren, 98; see also the examples of various Gaos in the northern dynasties in Yao Wenwei, 134-37, 270-73, and 279-81.


17. Unrests continued in southern China even after the conquest of Chen, see Liu, 3-18.

18. SS24/672.


20. SS2/38.

21. SS7/140.

22. Miyazaki (1965), 149.

23. See SS2/41-42 for an example in 597, and also the comments by Wei Zheng in SS2/54.

24. SS41/1182. In SS40/1173, Wang Shiji was supposed to share the commandship with Prince Liang. Given the example in teh conquest by Chen, it is likely that Wang was a subordinate of the Prince.

25. See SJ115/2986; also Loewe.

26. For Wei Zheng's views on foreign relations, see JTS 8/2588; see also the comments he wrote after the treatises on the foreign peoples in, for instance, SS83/1860.

27. For Tuyuhun, see SS83/1843-44; for Dangxiang, see 83/1846; for the Turks, see 84/1866. There are other instances also of Wendi expressing concern for the physical risks taken by Paekche in paying tri-
butes (SS81/1819), and of his attempting to settle disputes between
the Khitan and their neighbours, first the Turks (SS84/1881) and later
Malgal (SS81/1822).
28. See Wright (1957), 87-91.
29. See the examples in SS41/1187 and 42/1235, and also the many admoni-
tions given to the princes in SS45, in which the past was often re-
ferred to as a source from which lessons were to be learned.
30. SS2/39, for its precedent, see SJ6/239.
31. Wright (1978), 182.
32. The episode of Prince Guang taking the place of his elder brother Yung
in becoming crown prince is narrated at length in SS45. There are
obviously some similarities in the way in which Sui Yangdi and Tang
Taizong, under whom Wei Zheng served, obtained the throne, as both
eliminated their elder brothers, the legitimate successors. It should
be noted that before serving Taizong, Wei was an official under the
crown prince. It would not be surprising if the lengthy description
in the SS of the power struggle within Sui were an implicit expression
of disapproval of the way in which not only Yang Guang, but also Li
Shimin ascended the throne.
33. Wright (1960), 54-55.
34. SS59/1435.
35. SS45/1244.
36. SS24/692.
37. SS45/1245.
38. JTS59/2320.
39. Wright (1979), 115.
40. This tradition deserves more detailed discussion, but two examples can
be cited. See the memorial by Lu Siling who complained that many of
the sons of the aristocratic class were often inexperienced in mili-
tary affairs (Weishu, 72/1619-20); see also how Gao Cheng, father of
Gao Yang, founder of the Northern Qi dynasty, was encouraged by one of
his subordinates to take a more active part in military affairs in
order to attain the reputation of a capable leader (Bei-Qishu,
24/344).
41. SS45/1239-44.
42. SS4/43.
43. SS65/1525, 81/1816, 40/1173. The percentage of deaths is again dubious, though another record in SS64/1510 suggests that the loss was no doubt considerable. In SS4/86, an imperial decree issued in 614 suggests that there were some fighting. But apparently it was an attempt by Yangdi to exaggerate the loss by his younger brother in order to direct attention away from his own severe loss in the previous two years.
44. See, for instance, the data provided by Chen Z., 28-29.
45. TD178/948. The distance from Zhuojun (Yuzhou) to Yingzhou (Lincheng) is calculated by taking the route through Yuyang and Beiping.
46. SS81/1816.
47. After the Koguryó campaign, only one record of tribute being paid in Emperor Wen's reign (in 600) is to be found in the SS(2/45). However, in Guanghongmingji 17/217, mention is made of Koguryó sending envoys to Sui in the Renshou period (601-604).
48. SS75/1721.
49. SS84/1872.
50. See Cen (1958), 71-85, for a chronicle of Sui-Turks relationships.
51. Tsuda Sokichi (1946); Ikeuchi Hiroshi (1947).
52. For a representative view of Japanese historians, see Suematsu (1956); for a 'revisionist' interpretation, see Inoue (1973); for an interpretation by Korean scholars, see Cheon (1973).
53. Yu Y., 36-64.
54. NHSK11/I, 413. According to modern Japanese historiography, the year should be 490 rather than 370. See also 14/I, 441.
55. Songshu 97/2304-06; Nan-Qishu 58/1012.
56. The word tribute in Japanese is rendered as mitsuki. It is interesting to note that fune no mitsuki means shipping tariffs. See the example of Wang Chinni (J. Wa Jinni) in NHSG19/II, 105. He was appointed to be incharge of shipping tariff in 553 and was succeeded by his brother in 574. At the same time, if trade was an important
element in the tributary system of the Han dynasty (Yu, 194-95) and
indeed the Hanshu and other Chinese dynastic histories frequently
served as models in the compilation of the Nihonshoki (Kojima, 322-
57) - it is plausible that the concept of tribute was endorsed by
Japanese historians to delineate a form of trade between Yamato and
its neighbours. The fact that Silla and Paekche were regarded as
tributary states was an 8th century development, see Suzuki, (1974).
57. Mun (1976).
60. Okamoto, 75.
64. Sakamoto T. (1979), 33.
66. Chenshu 3/54, 4/66, 5/79; 24/405 also notes that a Chen official was
punished for having received bribes from Koguryo.
68. SS81/1819.
69. SS2/42.
70. Sakamoto T. (1979), 52-56; Mishina (1971), 14-16, suggests that a
record going back to the 2nd or 3rd century was based on this event,
but one can argue it can be applied to another event which took place
in 622, when there was alleged to be another campaign against a Silla
plagued by internal revolts.
71. SS81/1826.
72. SGSG4/81, 45/708.
73. For instance, see Nishijima (1962), 250; Inoue M. (1971), 38; Umehara
(1981), 145-48, suggests that the alliance was first proposed by
Koguryo.
74. Based on the fact that the title of the Japanese ruler was recorded,
Kurihara, 206-36, suggests that there was an official letter from Sui
to regard himself as an 'external official' and thereby assume the
title son of heaven where the sunset' in 607. This hypothesis is
difficult to accept. First, it is uncertain where was an official
title of the Yamato ruler, he certainly did not see the Yamato ruler
as an equal. See also Sakamoto T. (1980) for further discussions.

75. Although there are records of miyake before the seventh century, it
seems that the buildings themselves were not actually constructed
until the first decade of the seventh century. See Yamao (1977),
116-32.


77. It is significant to note that the 600 mission was not recorded in the
annals, which did include a record of tributes from Koguryo and other
states. TD185/989 also record only one mission 600, but the later
part of the record suggests that the event took place in 607. Un-
fortunately, CFYG970/11395 has no record for tributes in the period
598-606.

78. SS81/1819.


80. Yoshida A., 50. The fact that Yamato did not necessarily have com-
plete control of the Tsukushi area is also reflected in the obser-
vation by the Sui diplomat later that Yamato was essentially a con-
federation of many states, see SS81/1827.

81. In Fudoki, 386, it is known that a shrine was built and a group of
'migrants' was settled in Tsukushi for making weapons.

82. Sakamoto T. (1980), 57; Umehara (1981), 155-57, further suggests that
Soga no Umako did not support the campaign.

83. See Wright (1957), 93-104; Lan, 260-67.

84. SS81/1827.

85. For the background of the diplomat and further discussion, see Ikeda
(1971).

86. Official cadre is more appropriate than student, a term probably not
introduced until the later half of the century when an institution of
learning was first established, see Chapter eight.

88. Reference to these are found in the Chronicles of NHSK rather than SGSG.

89. Again, references are from NHSK. It is possible that the calendar introduced was one compiled in Sui in 600, see Umehara (1981), 174-75.

90. Wei-shu, 100/2217-18.

91. SS81/1819.

92. It is often noted that in the latter half of the sixth century, Silla had occupied the former Koguryō territory on the Han River (e.g. Han W., 50, 75-76) and had driven a wedge between it and Paekche, thus making direct contact with China possible by way of the Han River and the Yellow Sea. However, since Koguryō was still able to attack Paekche in 607, it is doubtful whether Silla had occupied the lower basin of the Han River.

93. For their location, see Tongguk Yōji Sungnam, 21/356.

94. NHSK22/II193.

95. SGSG4/46. The record here needs some rearrangement. The undated first part probably should go after the two invasions by Koguryō.

96. References in NHSK.
CHAPTER THREE  THE EXPEDITIONS TO KOGURYŌ UNDER SUI YANGDI

A new foreign policy

In 604 Yang Guang ascended the throne after the death of Yang Jian. Prince Liang soon attempted a coup which received fairly wide support in the area formerly occupied by the Northern Qi, but the attempt failed before long.¹ For the next two years, the new emperor who was to be known as Yangdi took various measures to strengthen his rule.² Starting from 607, however, he paid increasing attention to foreign affairs. In the 3rd month a mission was sent to Liuqiu, an island-state off the southeast coast of China.³

What was more significant came two months later when, accompanied by half a million soldiers and 100,000 horses, he embarked upon the first of a series of annual inspection tours to the northern border. A mobile palace was specially designed and constructed, which so impressed the Turks who had been settled at the border at the end of the previous reign that they took the Chinese as godly beings, bowed in awe and dared not ascend their horses. Khan Qimin was so obsequious that he himself took up his sabre and led a cohort of tribal leaders to clear a pathway said to be of 3,000 li for the Sui emperor. Yangdi was most pleased with this submissive gesture of the Turks. He held a banquet for them, and awarded them with silk.⁴ This unprecedented treatment of the Turks brought about the criticism of some old officials who were more used to the frugal ways of the former emperor. Yangdi responded by having these officials executed and members of their family exiled.⁵

The description of the tour was probably exaggerated by Chinese historians. Yet the tour marked the beginning of a venture by Sui into Central Asia. Before the tour, the Chinese remained suspicious of the Turks, who possessed the potential for uprisings given their strength and volatile character. The subservience displayed by them in 607, however, removed much of the Chinese fear. In 608 Sui found its offensive target in Tuyuhun, the other major power in Central Asia which had supported a group of Turks hostile to Sui. The Sui army first captured two castles and drove
the Khan to the southern part of his country.\textsuperscript{6} But Yangdi's ambitions did not end there. In 609 he went to the border again ostensibly for a hunting trip. Although Tuyuhun sent a tribute mission as did Karakhoja, Hami and Tanguts, it was attacked on a larger scale than before. With its mighty power, Sui eventually subdued Tuyuhun. Four prefectures were established. Convicts were sent to open the region under Sui administration. The new Sui emperor had acquired an area extending 4,000 li east-west and 2,000 li north-south for his empire.\textsuperscript{7}

As far as foreign policy is concerned, one can thus readily discern a difference in the two Sui emperors: whereas Wendi exercised restraint in most cases, his son did not hesitate to exploit any opportunity when it came his way; while the father's military operations were usually a response to external threat, those of the son were often pre-emptive attacks; if the father seemed more concerned for the preservation of the status quo, the son was more interested in the expansion of the empire. In short, if the policy of the father was defensive, that of the son was aggressive, if not expansionist.

One might argue that the difference would be less distinct if the different circumstances were to be taken into account. It may also be surmised that the crush of Tuyuhun power in Central Asia was necessary for the national security of Sui. But Yangdi's interest in Liuqiu can hardly be accounted for by the same raison d'être. Envoys were sent not only in 607 but also in 608, whereas a troop was dispatched in 609.\textsuperscript{8} The initial motive was to inquire foreign customs, and yet the result was an invasion of the Liuqiu capital and the capture of several thousand local people. There is little evidence to suggest that any of Wendi's military operations were similarly based on personal curiosity or rooted in a desire for looting. One might give the example of 602 when an army was sent to suppress a rebellion which broke out in Jiaozhou, the most important Chinese border town at the southwest frontier neighbouring Champa. On a second order, the army went beyond the border into Champa, broke through the capital and got away with treasures of the royal houses.\textsuperscript{9} Yet given
that the army did not arrive in Champa until 605, the second order was most likely to be made in 604, when Yang Guang was actually running the government in place of his father.

It would be misleading, therefore, to emphasize the continuity in the foreign policy of the two Sui emperors. While Yangdi did not take part in many of the expeditions, he was no doubt responsible for giving the order and guideline for his generals' actions. The fact that Yangdi was pursuing a more active foreign policy is also partly reflected in the expansion of the *Honglusi*, a government department in charge of affairs for foreign visitors. Yangdi not only changed the name of the Office for Visitors (*Diankeshu*), a branch in the department, to the Office for Barbarians (*Dianfanshu*), he also founded a new office, the *Sifangguan*, specially for receiving foreign visitors. The latter was larger than all the other branches of the department combined, with thirty-two officials altogether responsible for matters concerning foreign visitors from etiquette to trade. Though it became only an interim agency eventually, there is no doubt that the Sui emperor had envisioned that there would be a constant flow of foreign visitors to the Sui capital.

There is other evidence to suggest that Yangdi began to prepare for a more active foreign policy soon after he ascended the throne. In 590, the year after Sui conquered Chen, it was decreed that former military households were to be disassembled and soldiers to be billeted in civilian households. This did not mean the complete dissolution of the army, but nevertheless reflected the declining importance of the military. However, the number of military units was increased in the first year of Yangdi's reign. At the same time, the central army was strengthened. It is also recorded that weapons for fighting the 'barbarians' were forged. In addition, Yang Guang's accession saw the emergence of a new groups of officials, all of whom shared the experience of having a high degree of military success in the battlefield.

One can in fact trace the differences of attitude between Yang Guang and his father before he was in power. After becoming the crown prince,
Yang Guang revealed in a letter how he envied the opportunity a former subordinate of his had in building a reputation for himself by conquering foreign peoples on the borders, while he himself had to lead the boring life of a crown prince. One can even go further back to the days when Yang Guang was only a prince. When the Turks were engaged in internal strife in the mid-580s, Yang Guang asked his father for permission to take advantage of the situation and attack the Turks. The request was turned down, but it marked perhaps the first instance when Yang Guang exhibited a different attitude from his father in dealing with the neighbours of Sui.

It has been noted that Yang Guang both openly and clandestinely cultivated habits of the sort his father despised, and he reversed many of his father's policies altogether. Apart from political and economic factors, one reason for the construction of a new capital in Luoyang where he spent most of the time was probably the desire to be physically remote from the city which his father had ruled. In a sense, the new foreign policy of Yangdi was also the reflection of the freedom of action coming to one whose mind was full of grand designs but hitherto had been deprived of opportunities to translate them into action. It was thus little wonder that Yangdi was generous perhaps to excess towards the Turks, and that he was intolerant of those who would remind him of his father's austere ways.

If Yangdi did not favour the policies of the immediate past, the same was not true for the distant past. In fact, many of his internal policies resembled those of Qin Shihuangdi. The issuing of a new civil and penal code, the adoption of jun as a unit in provincial administration, the introduction of a different system of weights and measures, occurred both in 607 and in 221BC, the year before the first emperor unified China. Carriageways for imperial tours, perhaps another innovation of Shihuangdi, were also constructed in 608. In foreign affairs, one cannot help wondering if Yangdi's initial intention in sending a mission to Liuqiu and later to Yamato in 608 was not inspired by Shihuangdi, who also sent people to islands east of the Chinese coast. After all, both were interested in searching for elixir of immortal life.
Many of Yangdi's policies can also be identified with those of Han Wudi, who made constant tours to different parts of the country, the border regions in particular. Yet no aspect of Yangdi's rule reminds one of Han Wudi more than his foreign policy. Both emperors adopted a positive policy towards the northern nomads by military and diplomatic means. Both also waged campaigns in the south, though whereas nine prefectures were established by Han, only three were set up by Sui. One might suggest that the similarities were coincidental, as in both cases a united China saw threats of nomadic peoples from north and central Asia. Yet the Sui ruler was most conscious of the similarities between his own time and that in Han dynasty. In fact, in a poem he composed in 607, Yangdi implied explicitly that his own handling of the Turks was more successful than Han Wudi's dealings with the Xiongnu.

That such a comparison was made is not surprising. The long centuries of partition of China must have made a united country the dream of many a ruler during the period of disunity, and past dynasties naturally became their sources of inspiration. Whereas Western Zhou became the idealized model for the development of many political and economic institutions, the Qin and the Han stood for periods of glory of the Chinese empire. Thus even the illiterate Shi Le, a non-Han Chinese ruler in the 4th century who controlled only part of northern China, would have the History of the Former Han read to him. After Northern Wei succeeded in uniting northern China, the nomad rulers and their Han officials continued to look back to past Chinese history for inspirations of ruling a united empire. Yangdi's also knew of no other history than that of his own people, and no other history than that of the Han could offer him a better guide from which he could draw lessons and which he could use as a yardstick to measure his own success.

Factors leading to the Koguryo campaign

In 612 Sui launched another campaign against Koguryo. In the 1st month an edict was issued denouncing Koguryo, which was accused of having
committed numerous crimes and alleged to be showing the ominous signs of a falling dynasty. The expeditionary force was dispatched to penalize Koguryō for its indiscretion.33

It is noteworthy that many of the accusations made against Koguryo in the official letter of protest sent in 590, in particular the part accusing Koguryō of border infringement, reappeared after 22 years. In a poem composed during the campaign in 612, Yangdi also mentioned the intrusion into Chinese territories made by barbarians, which presumably referred to Koguryō.34 Indeed, Yangzhou was subjected to a Khitan attack in 60935 and another by Malgal in 610/611.36 However, there was no sign of collaboration between these nomads and Koguryō. Neither is there any record of Koguryō itself invading Chinese territory. At about the turn of the century, Koguryō established a military outpost on the western bank of the River Liao.37 But with its wars with Silla and Paekche in 603, 607 and 608, it is doubtful if Koguryō was not taking a defensive rather than an aggressive position on its northern frontier. It is overstating the case to suggest that Koguryō possessed the potential to conquer and even occupy Chinese territories.38

A more important factor to be considered was the menace of the Turks. While the eastern Turks remained submissive after 607 and were settled by the Chinese on the borders in 608,39 and the western Turks also became Chinese clients after the Khan Chuluo was defeated by a rival chieftain in another plot maneuvered by Pei Ju two years later,40 there was still the possibility of an alliance between them and Koguryō, which came under increasing pressure as the Turks sided with the Chinese. Indeed in 607 Koguryō sent an envoy to the Eastern Turks, who hesitated to keep the diplomatic relations secret from the Chinese and reported the incident to the Sui emperor.41 It is controversial as whether or not this particular event triggered off Sui's fear or disapproval of a possible alliance between the Turks and Koguryō, thereby leading to the Koguryō campaign.42 In any case, the reluctance of the Turks to have secret relations with Koguryō meant that an alliance between the two was unlikely. In fact, Yangdi was so confident of his hold over the Turks that when the Koguryō
envoy was summoned to the Chinese court, he was told to inform his king that should the king not pay a personal visit to the Sui court in the following year, the Sui emperor would 'inspect' Koguryŏ with the Turkish khan. The emperor was of course indicating the possibility of military collaboration between Sui and the Turks. Indeed, the Khitan were defeated in 609 by the Turks under a Chinese commander. If there was to be an alliance, it was one between the Sui and the eastern Turks.

The Chinese need to 'inspect' Koguryŏ with the Turkish khan, however, reveals that the Chinese still recognized the strength of the Turks. It might be surmised therefore that the foreign policy of the Sui was based on the idea of isolating the eastern Turks. The campaigns against Tuyuhun and the development of a commercial interest in the north-west was part of a grandiose plan to prevent the revival of Turkish power, and the interest of Sui in Koguryŏ was but another aspect of the same scheme. Now that Sui had subdued Tuyuhun, the power second only to the Turks in Central Asia and one who had marital relations with the Turks,43 Koguryŏ was to be its next target.

However, the fact that the campaigns against Tuyuhun took place before that against Koguryŏ was accidental rather than planned. The final destination of the tour made by Yangdi in 607 was originally Zhuojun,44 the base for the later Koguryŏ expeditions. The increase of military units supposedly was for the purpose of an expedition not to Tuyuhun but to Koguryŏ,45 an idea which received wide support at the end of the previous reign.46 Yet the unexpected happened in 607 and again in 608 — first the welcome by the Turks, and then the defeat of Tuyuhun by the Tölüs — providing an excellent opportunity for Sui to extend its influence into central Asia. Delay in an expedition to Koguryŏ was caused by the need for improvement in communication from the central part of the country to the north-east, hence the construction of Yongji Canal in 608, linking the eastern capital to Zhuojun.47 The validity of the anti-Turks hypothesis must be questioned.

There is, therefore, no evidence to substantiate any claim that the campaign in 612 was motivated by a concern for national security. Given
the early interest of the emperor in Koguryǒ, the campaign was likely to be waged as one of vindication, especially after the Koguryǒ king had failed to oblige to the Sui order to visit the Chinese capital in person. As the decree itself spelled out, the expedition was of punitive nature.

Yet if Yangdi was prepared to take revenge for past Chinese losses on a Koguryǒ weakened by discord among its leaders, he was also keen on restoring the glory of a lost empire. Since he was so conscious of the Han that he compared himself with Han Wudi in 607, it seemed unlikely that he would have stopped looking back to the past thereafter. It might have been an exaggeration in 607 to suggest that the Sui emperor's accomplish-
ments had surpassed that of Han Wudi. But two years later, given an empire extending almost 10,000 li east-west and 15,000 li north-south and a military record with defeat virtually unknown, few would have challenged his claim. Yet Sui Yangdi probably realized he still had a blank record as far as Koguryǒ was concerned. Whereas the Han empire had included Chosǒn, the forerunner of Koguryǒ, Koguryǒ remained an unfriendly neighbour of Sui. It is interesting to note that in the four poems composed during the expedition by Yangdi and Wang Zhou, one of his officials, Qin Shi-
huangdi and Zhou Mudi were admired, Han Gaozu, Sima Yi and Zhuge Liang were mocked, and no mention was made of Emperor Wu.49 The reason is perhaps not difficult to find. If Yangdi was to demonstrate that his accomplishment had surpassed that of Han Wudi, it would be imperative for him to make Koguryǒ a more obedient vassal state, if not a colony.

Yangdi's desire to conquer Koguryǒ was by no means an isolated case in the court. Pei Ju, the Emperor's chief advisor on foreign affairs, in fact pointed out that Koguryǒ had been one of the fedual states during the Zhou dynasty and had been under Chinese rule during the Qin and Han. The attempt to conquer Koguryǒ in 598 failed because of the incompetence of Prince Liang. It was obligatory, he believed, for the emperor not to allow this land of civilisation to remain in the hands of the barbarians. It was he who in fact urged the emperor to demand the Koguryǒ King to pay homage to the Sui court.50
The formulation of Sui's foreign policy was attributed to Pei Ju by Tang historians. But Yangdi was probably too intelligent and ambitious an emperor to follow the advice of an official without having opinions of his own. As he pointed out himself, Pei was assigned the task of dealing with peoples in Central Asia because Pei's ideas often coincided with his own.\textsuperscript{51} The idea of a Koguryŏ expedition was not the brainchild of Yangdi, but there was no doubt that the Sui emperor was the major motivating force behind the whole project. He could have opposed the venture as his father probably had done after the 598 failure. However, not only did he insist on taking revenge on Koguryŏ, he also decided to take to the field himself against the wishes of his generals,\textsuperscript{52} for he must have been keen to have the last step of completing his grand empire unfold before his own eyes.

The first campaign

If the campaign against Tuyuhun was waged at a time when the enemy had just been defeated by the Tolos, the expedition against Koguryŏ was also launched at a time when the hostile neighbour of Sui apparently had internal instability. The Chinese were not ignorant of events in Koguryŏ, one of the few countries with a continuous record of paying tribute to China. Information came from Chinese diplomats themselves, and probably also from Silla and Paekche, who would have been pleased to instigate the Chinese to attack their enemy by providing whatever intelligence they possessed. It is interesting to note that one of the 'new crimes' allegedly committed by Koguryŏ in 612 was that the country had fallen into the hands of arbitrary officials and powerful clans, the result being factionalism, bribery and injustice. There was understandably some overstatement in this accusation, but there is evidence to suggest that at the turn of the century or even earlier, the Yŏn family, one of the most powerful clans among the ruling class, appeared to be expanding at the expense of others.\textsuperscript{53} On the other hand, records written at the beginning of the century also noted that the taedaero, the top position in the Koguryŏ government, was to be decided not by the king but by the strength of the contestants.\textsuperscript{54} For the Chinese, any government whose monarch did not possess strong power over his subjects was
regarded as illegitimate. The Sui might have thought that the internal strife within Koguryô was a sign of weakness which provided an opportunity for the Chinese to exploit.

The decision to attack Koguryô was officially announced at the beginning of 611, but military operations did not start until 12 months later. As mentioned already, the Yongji Canal was constructed, and a new palace was built at Zhuojun after the completion of the canal. While the new canal was used in later times for irrigation, its main object at its initial stage was probably to facilitate the transport of supplies from central China to the frontline, a difficulty encountered by the Sui troops in 598.

People from all parts of the country were mobilized, with those in the lower basin of the Yellow River playing the greatest part because of its geographical proximity to the battlefield. 55 It is recorded that over a million people took part in the construction of the Yongji Canal, though probably not at the same time but as a part of the annual corvée labour service to the state, and the shortage of men necessitated the recruitment of women as labourers 56 as in the construction of the Tongji Canal in 605. 57 People in Donglai, a port on the present Shandong peninsula, took up the task of building 300 warships, for which came 30,000 bowmen and 10,000 sailors from the area south of Yangdi. Another 30,000 specialists in using small spears were also recruited from the area south of the Qinlin mountain. 50,000 war-chariots for the transport of tents and armour were made by people inhabiting in the lower basis of the Yellow, the Yangzi and the Huai Rivers. 58

It was a campaign which involved people both rich and poor, the former paying special taxes for the purchase of horses 59 or as soldiers who would have to supply their own clothing and armour, and the latter as labourers in transportation. Except for a few who stayed behind in the eastern capital, all court officials bearing a ninth rank or above were ordered to accompany the troops to Zhuojun, where they were provided with residence. Perhaps for the purpose of transportation, some officials even brought along animals including camel. 60 There were also some non-Chinese
troops under their rulers, notably those from Karakhoja, Malgal and the western Turks, though they must have been small in number. The Chinese troop is recorded to have comprised 1,133,800 people, and claiming to be two million in number.

A campaign on such a large scale was unheard of in China, and was not to be found again too many times. It partly reflected the strength of Sui, an empire with almost nine million households and over forty-five million people. There is no sound reason to doubt that the Sui government would have difficulty in recruiting over a million soldiers. In fact, the strict control of the government over the people is reflected in the addition of more than half a million people in government registers after a new checking system was introduced. Apart from the six regiments under direct command of the emperor, there were 24 regiments, the names of most being those of administrative units established in Choson by Han Wudi, with each regiment likely to have had about 30,000 people. With a distance of 40 li between each of the troops, the whole expeditionary troop extended 1,040 li.

In retrospect, one doubts if it was necessary for Yangdi to wage such a large-scale offensive against Koguryo, which had only some 700,000 households. Yet the preparation for the campaign was in line with Yangdi's behaviour since coming to power. The entourage of boats when he toured Jiangdu in 605, for instance, extended over 200 li, not to mention the cavalry which accompanied on the two banks of the canal. Neither was it the first time that the emperor mobilized 24 regiments, as a precedent can be found in 607. Nevertheless, never before had the emperor and his entourage embarked for a trip so remote from the capital. A leader of the Buddhist order and a leader of a popular Taoist sect were invited to Zhuojun, perhaps as a means to pacify the soldiers, many of whom being followers of either one or both faiths. At the same time, the gods of mountains and rivers in various localities received official worship. In Sichuan, a monk was specifically asked to pray to the river god, and many similar but unrecorded events must have taken place in other parts of the country as well.
By 612, everything was ready. The Paekche King had sent an envoy earlier informing China of his intentions to support the Chinese, and a second envoy was now sent to ask for the plan of attack by Sui. At the same time, Silla also pledged support for Sui. On the 1st day of the 1st month of the year, an edict was issued spelling out the rationale of the campaign — to rescue the people of Koguryŏ from hardship imposed on them by their government. The guidelines to follow in case of a Koguryŏ surrender were even announced: the life of the Koguryŏ king was to be spared; the officials were to keep their official positions in the new administration without discrimination. Yet if Koguryŏ was to raise any opposition, then "appropriate punishment" was to be applied to extinguish the evils from the country.

It has been suggested that war might have been avoided had Koguryŏ submitted to the demand of the Sui emperor in 607 that the king pay a visit to the Chinese court. Indeed many examples are known in which leaders of neighbouring countries or their sons attended the Sui court personally. Yet it is doubtful if by following suit Koguryŏ could escape the invasion of the Chinese. The lesson of the Tuyuhun king should not forgotten — he sent his son to the Chinese court when Yandí came to power, but found himself attacked in 608; he sent a tribute mission to Sui in the following year, but only met an attack of a even larger scale. In fact, at the end of the 5th century, the northern Wei had ordered the Koguryŏ king or his son to go to China. Koguryŏ did not oblige, and the Chinese threatened to use force. No war occurred, however, and the two countries continued their tribute relations. Despite the military threat of Sui, Koguryŏ was unwilling to commit itself to an action which they regarded as humiliating. After all, Koguryŏ might not become subject to a Chinese attack if history was to repeat itself. Neither would Koguryŏ necessarily turn out to be the loser as the case in 598 had already demonstrated. In fact, Koguryŏ probably had mended its fences with Paekche in order to avoid attack from both the northern and southern frontiers, as fighting between the two countries ceased after 607. The capture of the Koguryŏ garrison town at the border in 611 by the Chinese only convinced the Koguryŏ ruling class that Sui was unlikely to stop its aggression, and might have even served to bring a
temporary truce among those who had been in discord.

Confrontation was now inevitable, awaiting only the right moment. The Chinese troops began to leave on the 3rd day of the 1st month for Yingzhou. The trip was as long one, and signs of unease were already beginning to show. In the 2nd month of the year, the emperor ordered his officials to give aid to those families which might be in distress as a result of their members taking part in the campaign. 80 The effect of the trip was also shown among the generals. In the 1st month of the year Yuan Shou died at the age of 63, 81 in the 2nd month Yang Xiong died at the age of 70 82 and the in the 3rd month Duan Wenzhen also died, aged unknown but unlikely to have been a young man as he had served under Northern Zhou. 83 All three were leading generals, the last being also the Minister of Military Affairs.

These deaths were not serious setbacks to the Sui army, as their positions could probably be filled by younger generals. But more than ever before, Yangdi must have realized that his enemies included nature over which he had no control. In fact, Duan Wenzhen had sent a memorial before his death to the emperor suggesting that the best strategy to take in fighting Koguryo was an early and surprise attack, for the rainy season and the difficulty in getting supplies could make the situation unfavourable for Chinese military operation. His ideas were shared by others. 84

The first battle, nevertheless, was conventional. On the 14th day of the 3rd month, 3 days after the death of Duan, the troops of Koguryo and Sui met, each occupying one side of the Liao River. The Sui army suffered severe casualties when they tried to cross the river after finding that the three 'floating bridges' that had been built were not long enough to take them to the other bank. The bridges were soon rebuilt, and the second attempt in crossing the river succeeded. In the 5th month, the troops under imperial command also crossed the river. Allegedly, several tens of thousands of the enemy were killed, with the Koguryo troops now retreating to Liaotung where they took up a defensive position. 85

Although the Sui troops had yet to capture a Koguryo castle, Yangdi was quick to seize the opportunity to show the military might of his troops to the rulers of Sui's strongest neighbours, as the king of Karakhoja and
Khan Chuluo of the western Turks were taken to inspect the frontline. At the same time, an amnesty was granted to celebrate the victory. Yangdi seemed so confident about winning the war that he might have appeared to be complacent, as no emperor had ever granted an amnesty when a war was unfinished and not yet won. But a closer examination of the edict of amnesty shows otherwise. Apart from setting free prisoners in the common categories, the edict gave tax exemption to those who had given service to transporting supplies for the campaign, the period varying from one to seven years, depending on the distance of transportation. The emperor must have realized that there were some discontent among the people and that some means of pacification was necessary. Indeed, one may also suggest that the taking the foreign leaders to the frontline was more than a mere display of Chinese military power. The mobilization of a large number of Chinese troops in the north-eastern part of the country meant that defence of the two capitals was weakened. One could not rule out the possibility of a Turkish revolt, a danger Duan Wenzhen had reminded the emperor in his memorial. One way to prevent any outbreak of unrest in the northern and western frontier of Sui would therefore be keeping the leaders of the Turks' potential allies, the western Turks and Karakhoja\textsuperscript{88} being the major ones with their marital relations, from their bases of power, at the same time impressing upon them China's strength.

Despite such pressures, Yangdi refrained from taking risks in his military operations. Before waging the new offensive, he reminded his generals that it was a campaign of a punitive nature, and cautioned them not to launch a surprise attack upon the enemy without adequate support, thereby hoping to win merit for themselves. He also ordered the troops be divided into three forward sections, who would have constant liaison among themselves and seek imperial approval before making any advance.\textsuperscript{89} The imperial order reflects that the idea of a surprise attack must have remained popular amongst many of his generals. If conjecture is allowed here, one wonders if Yangdi did not learn some lesson from the record of Emperor Wu's expedition against Chosön in the Han, when the Chinese had failed to take many chances in defeating Chosön because of mutual suspicions and distrust between the commanders.\textsuperscript{90} In order to avoid a
similar happening, Yangdi may have felt that concerted action was necessary, and that he himself should give the final order in all matters.

The result, however, turned out to be counter-productive. When the Koguryŏ army at Liaotung found themselves unable to hold on and decided to surrender, none of the Sui commanders was prepared to take the responsibility to accept the offer, and the decision was left to the emperor, who did not command from the frontline. By the time the imperial approval had been given and reached the frontline, the Koguryŏ troops had strengthened their defence and were ready to fight again. When the castle was going to fall once more, the same procedure repeated, a situation which continued for more than a month. The emperor was furious and went to the frontline in person. But the Koguryŏ defence was now so strong that all the Sui troops could do was to continue the siege.\(^9^1\)

The news of the delay for Sui advance on land apparently did not reach the navy. Embarked on a date unrecorded probably from Donglai where the warships had been made, the navy landed at a place some 30 li from the Koguryŏ capital P'yŏngyang, where they defeated the defending forces. However, if the strict observance of imperial orders led to indecision on land, the failure to follow the strategy laid down by the emperor ended in defeat for the navy. Taking 40,000 of his best soldiers, the Sui navy chief-commander Lai Huer insisted on an immediate attack on the Koguryŏ capital although his deputy suggested it might be better to wait for the arrival of the army. The Sui troops were then enticed by the enemy to go inside the P'yŏngyang castle, where they violated the military order against looting and were ambushed by Koguryŏ soldiers who had hidden in temples. Fewer than half managed to escape. Its attacking power having been destroyed, the Sui navy retreated, stationed somewhere along the coast, waiting for the arrival of the army.\(^9^2\)

Meanwhile, time was running out for the Sui army on land. Koguryŏ was a fairly mountainous country, where defenders could easily guard against their enemies by occupying fortresses, usually built at strategically important points well-protected by natural barriers.\(^9^3\) Yangdi must have abandoned the idea of capturing all Koguryŏ castles and fortresses and
changed his mind on having a surprise attack. Nine regiments were now ordered to advanced meet at the Yalu River, which meant that they would have to bypass the Koguryo defence line on the eastern bank of the River Liao where they had yet to capture a castle. To overcome the supply problem, soldiers were told to carry with them supplies and foodstuffs for three months. Finding the load too heavy, many secretly buried much of the foodstuffs underground in their tents. Before the Sui force reached their destinations, supplies ran low and opinions were divided among the commanders Yu Zhongwen and Yuwen Shu as to whether or proceed or to retreat. 94

Yangdi had one specific and secret order for his commanders — the chief commander of the Koguryo troops, Ulchi, and the Koguryo king, were to be captured. The Sui commanders must have been elated when Ulchi surrendered himself to the Chinese. But Ulchi was soon set free after strong opposition was raised by an official from the imperial entourage, who apparently had no knowledge of the secret order. Eager to make up their mistake, Yu Zhongwen now insisted to proceed. Well aware of the situation of the Sui army, Ulchi decided on a war of attrition. He allowed the Sui troops to cross the River Yalu, where they won all seven battles in day, and advanced until they were within 30 li of the Koguryo capital. Ulchi once again offered to surrender, promising even to hand over the Koguryo king if the Sui army would retreat. The Sui commanders now knew that they could no longer trust Koguryo's overtures for peace. It was impossible that they would complete their mission in time — the soldiers were exhausted, and P'yongyang was well guarded by its physical surroundings as other castles in Koguryo. They decided to retreat. 95

It was the opportunity the Koguryo troops had been anticipating. When the Sui soldiers were half way across the River Sal, they were ambushed by the Koguryo troops. After one of the commanders was killed, the Sui army collapsed and fled just as fast as they had come, leaving behind all their military supplies. The number of Chinese soldiers surviving is uncertain. 96 Many of them probably lost their lives, whereas others surrendered to Koguryo and became captives. All the expedition had achieved was establishing one Sui prefecture and one county on the western bank of the River
Liao. It was a catastrophe for the Chinese.

The troops returned home at the end of the 7th month, arriving at the eastern capital at the beginning of the 9th month. Apparently, the navy chief-commander was not penalized. Two months later, the official who had opposed putting Ulchi into custody was beheaded, and those commanders who were responsible for the defeat were dismissed. Yuwen Shu, whose son married a princess, was leniently disposed of. Accused by his colleagues of being responsible for the decision to penetrate deeply into Koguryó soil, Yu Zhongwen felt maligned and soon died of illness.

Indeed, the rashness of both Yu Zhongwen, Yuwen Shu and others in chasing the enemy was a key factor which brought about the disastrous result. Yet being the supreme commander, Yangdi could hardly escape criticism. While it is debatable if he should not have adopted the tactics of attacking the Koguryó capital as early as he could, it was his distrust in his generals which made them hesitant to capture Liaotung by themselves. His political style often gave rise to a fear of acting against imperial wishes or incurring the emperor's anger among his subordinates, and consequently prevented the generals from acting on their own initiative. He also failed to foresee that Yuwen Shu and Yu Zhongwen would fail to team up and form an efficient commandship, although both had served under him for a number of years. Ironically, it was in this case that Yangdi was on par with Han Wudi who had also chosen two commanders who did not always see eye to eye.

A number of other factors should also be considered. Difficulty in communication was a serious problem, best demonstrated by the lack of coordination between the army and the navy, making the original plan of a concerted attack impossible. On the other hand, the diplomatic effort of Sui in allying with its neighbours on the Korean peninsula was not as successful as it had intended. Paekche took a neutral position during the Sui offensive. Neither can any record be found on military operation against Koguryó by Silla. The failure of these two countries to join the attack enabled Koguryó to concentrate its defence efforts on the northern
front, putting up a tough resistance which perhaps the Chinese had not expected.

Koguryŏ should also be given credit for its intelligent tactics. After some losses in direct confrontation with the Chinese, they soon adopted a defensive position. It was their tenacity which finally gave them victory. The courage of their hero Ulchi Mundeok took him in and out of the Sui camp, enabling him to have a first-hand understanding of his enemy. It is interesting to note that as a Chinese captive, he composed a poem for Yu Zhongwen, in which he praised the brilliance of the Sui general but at the time noted that one should be content after attaining some victories.¹⁰² What happened later seemed to prove that there was some truth in Ulchi's poem, but for Yangdi who had not attained any real victory, the lesson was yet to be learned.

The second and the third campaigns

Even before the expeditionary troops returned to the eastern capital in 612, Yangdi was determined to launch a second campaign. In the 8th month of the year, Fan Zigai, Minister of Internal Affairs, was assigned to stay in Zhuojun the transport of grains and other supplies from the heart of the empire.¹⁰³ In the 1st month of 613 the old castle of Liaotung was repaired for storage of supplies.¹⁰⁴ In the following month, Yuwen Shu and other generals who had been sacked were restored to their former positions.¹⁰⁵

It has been surmised that had Yangdi ceased his military operations at this time, the fortunes of the dynasty might have been different.¹⁰⁶ Yet given his personality and experience, it is difficult to conceive that the emperor, or any of his generals, had ever had the idea of abandoning the campaign. Yangdi attainment of the position of crown prince and his accession to the throne had demonstrated that he was not one who would easily be discouraged so as to abandon a project. The Chinese could have won the battle in 612 had the army attacked the Koguryŏ capital earlier, or the navy succeeded in holding the castle, and had they had adequate food
supplies. It was their own mistakes rather than the strength of the enemy which brought about the disaster.

Changes were made by the Chinese in 613 to redeem their previous failure. More people were recruited to form a new cavalry, and others as labourers who would carry supplies as far as Yingzhou. Although no such record can be found, the total number of soldiers was probably reduced to lessen the need for supplies. The tactics employed in the second campaign were also different. Two days after crossing the River Liao in the 4th month, a troop led by Yuwen Shu and Yang Yichen was dispatched to lay siege on P'yŏngyang. The attack of the Koguryŏ bases near the frontier was now commanded by the emperor in person. For almost a month, ladders, tunnels and other means were employed in attacking Liaotung, but the effort ended in vain with a great number of deaths on both sides. In the 6th month of the year, a new offensive was ready. Allegedly over a million bags made of earth were prepared to be piled up against the castle, forming a road leading up to the top of the wall. Eight-wheeled-towers were also specially built so that archers could easily shoot into the stronghold.

The new offensive was never waged. On the 3rd day of the 6th month Yang Xuangan, the son of the late prime minister Yang Su, who had been responsible for the transport of food transport at Laiyang, turned against the government and was sieging on the eastern capital Luoyang within two weeks. Distance between the front and the capital made it difficult for the emperor to grasp the real situation. Two brothers of Yang Xuangan and a general in the expeditionary troops tried to join the rebels, and Hu Sizheng, a Deputy Minister of Military Affairs, also defected to Koguryŏ for fear of punishment because of his part in the rebellion. Yangdi had known Yang Xuangan as an intelligent young man, and he was obviously worried and alarmed. Not only was Luoyang in danger, but the survival of his troops depended much on supplies which might have been blocked. The emperor could not afford to take any more risks. The Chinese troops retreated secretly in the middle of the night, leaving behind all their military supplies once more. The Koguryŏ army dared not launch an counter-
attack until, as in the previous year, the Sui army crossed the Liao River, where several thousand of the Chinese were killed. 113

The initial success of Yang Xuan'an in rebelling against the government was much due to his prominent family background and the fact that most of the troops were on the frontier. Although his father was the most official at the time of Yangdi's accession and Yang Xuan'an himself had held a relatively high position in the government, his political base was fairly weak. The necessity to call upon his brothers - two from the battlefront and another from the old capital - to join him in the rebellion indicated partly his lack of support from many officials. His best known adviser Li Mi, though with a prominent family background and official career, did not hold any government position at the time. 114 Neither did Yang obtain the full support of the officials under him. Tang Yi, for instance, whom he appointed as the Governor of Huaizhou, soon fled to the government side. 115

Neither was the military strength of Yang Xuan'an adequate to counter that of the government troops. He did not have his own army when he started the rebellion. In fact, he only had some 10,000 people when he headed for the eastern capital. He did succeed in expanding the troops to allegedly over 100,000 people within a couple of days. Yet it is doubtful whether these people were really attracted to him by his cause or by the possibility of obtaining grainstock from an official in charge of transporting food supplies at a time of famine. 116 He made some vague promises about providing relief for the poor, but they were never realized. He might have established his own rule by capturing Changan and the Yongfeng Granary, but he failed to give heed to this advice of his followers. The expeditionary troops soon returned, crushed the rebellion and captured its leader in the 8th month of the year. As in the case of the rebellion by Prince Liang, an extermination of the rebel party followed.

Despite its brevity and defeat, the Yang Xuan'an Rebellion was highly significant. It indicates that political opportunism, which had brought about the changes in the ruling house in the past decades including the establishment of the Sui and the accession of Yang Guang to the throne, had
hardly died out. At the same time, the fact that Yang Xuangan attempted to
restore the names of official posts used during the previous reign suggests
that there was some discontent with the present rule and nostalgia for the
previous reign.

The swift success of the government troops in suppressing the rebellion
perhaps convinced Yangdi that as long as he had control of the military
power, his rule was unlikely to be seriously challenged, but he was not
most upset by the large number of peasants joining the rebels. Yangdi had
been aware of the sufferings brought about by a series of natural disasters.
More than 30 prefectures were affected by a flood caused by the change of
course of the Yellow River in 610,117 and drought followed in 611.118
Apart from exempting tax as mentioned, the emperor also had ordered
officials to give aid to those families whose members had joined the
expeditionary force in 612.119 Yet now his sympathy for the peasants was
gone. He no longer saw them as the human resources which he could enlist
for his Koguryŏ campaign but as a disruptive element for his plan to extend
the empire. He called the peasants a potential source of banditry, and
allowed the killing of over 30,000 men, many of them innocent.120

In spite of the lack of enthusiasm among officials and the low morale
in the army, the emperor launched the third campaign against Koguryŏ in
614. To appease the soldiers, a Buddhist temple was built at the frontier
to console the souls of those who had died. To impose discipline, deserters
were executed as warning. And to lift the spirit of the troops, the emperor
himself even put on his armour.121 The strategy adopted appeared to be
different again. Once more, expeditionary troops were sent both by land
and sea, yet the major attack came not from the army but from the navy
which landed not near P'yŏngyang but in modern Liaoning peninsula. The new
strategy proved to be a success. Lai Huer, the navy commander, soon broke
through the enemy's defence by claiming over a thousand lives, and proceeded
to lay siege on the Koguryŏ capital. Three successive years of fighting
must have exhausted Koguryŏ, which now resorted to delaying tactics. Hu
Sizheng, the defected Chinese official in the previous campaign, was returned
and Koguryŏ expressed a willingness to surrender. The tactic paid off.
Lai Huer had intended to capture the Koguryŏ king, but eventually gave up the idea after his subordinates insisted that the imperial order to withdraw was to be obeyed strictly.\footnote{122}

In view of his earlier determination in conquering Koguryŏ, Yangdi's acceptance of Koguryŏ's surrender and withdrawal of his troops is noteworthy. Apparently no demands were made on Koguryŏ — the Chinese soldiers previously captured by Koguryŏ were not returned; neither was the Koguryŏ king or members of the royal family ordered to pay homage to the Chinese court as a sign of his submission. The emperor's failure to capitalize on the situation remains a puzzle, since the Sui expeditionary troops stayed at the frontier for a week\footnote{123} in order to finalize some capitulation document.\footnote{124} He must have believed that now that he had subdued Koguryŏ, the enemy would subsequently follow his orders without question. This turned out to be wishful thinking, as the Koguryŏ king refused to visit the Chinese capital when the Sui emperor returned home and ordered him to do so. Despite the temporary submission of Koguryŏ, Sui gained nothing from the war except the return of a defecting official who was soon executed.

Peasant Uprisings and the Fourth Campaign

Despite the suppression of the Yang Xuangan Rebellion in 613, Sui continued to witness the outbreak of uprisings. Many of these anti-government activities have been labelled 'banditry' or 'righteous peasant uprisings' by historians of different persuasions, but all see the series of Koguryo campaigns as a catalyst in the eruption of accumulated discontent at the oppressive policies of Yangdi especially his large number of construction projects and conscription for foreign campaigns. But why did uprisings continue until the end of the dynasty when there were no more expeditions to Koguryŏ?

Even giving allowance to the inclination of Tang historians to paint a grim picture of the final years of a falling dynasty in order to legitimize the rise to power by the Tang ruling house, Yangdi probably imposed more hardship on the people than his father.\footnote{125} The burden was perhaps not so much as in the number of days of labour as in the time
consumed travelling to the destination of work. Given the large population of Sui, the fact that even females had to be recruited as labourers reflected the extent of the mobilization efforts. In the case of conscription, the time of service was not fixed and usually last much longer than corvee labour. The Koguryo campaigns were particularly demanding. In 613, for instance, peasants were recruited to open land for cultivation in Yingzhou.\(^{126}\) It was thus not surprising that anti-government activities intensified in the years 611-13, when preparation was made for the series of Koguryo expeditions. Indeed, most of the early revolts concentrated in the lower basin of the Yellow River which, because of its geographical position, played the most important role in the effort to subdue Koguryo.

Anti-government activities, however, did not start in 611. The Changbai Mountains, for instance, was already the base for several tens of thousands of bandits as early as 609.\(^{127}\) Douzigang, another base for anti-government activities in the early 610s, had never really been under government control since the fall of Northern Qi.\(^{128}\) Japanese record also noted that some Paekche monks in 609 could not land in Wu, presumably an area near the mouth of the Yangzi River, because of a local revolt.\(^{129}\) In short, despite the unification of China, insurgent elements remained active in certain parts in the former territories of Northern Qi and Chen, and they took advantage of the discontent in the early 610s to promote their cause. A certain Liu Yuanjin, for instance, called himself the son of heaven and established a government in Wujun in 613, and the discontent with the northern rulers partially accounted for the support of Liu gained from powerful local groups. In fact, the emperor had to send two of his top generals to put down this rebellion, which contrasted with the government's policy for the uprisings in the Yellow River Basin, where suppression of revolts was to a large part the task of local troops.\(^{130}\)

Whatever the cause or the background of the rebels, however, they had not have much success in 613 and 614. Victory in most cases belonged to the government troops, even though they were usually outnumbered by the rebels. The former was probably better equipped and disciplined than the latter, who were ill-organized and inexperienced in battles, and whose main
concerns were raiding and looting. What is significant to note, however, is that the victory of government troops did not bring about peace and stability. Unrest gradually extended to the upper basin of the Yellow River. In Fufeng, for instance, revolts broke out first in the 12th month of 613 and again in the 2nd month of 614.\textsuperscript{131} Some has explained the continuous spread of rebellions as a consequence of the government's unmitigating oppression, and an order to construct fortresses in provincial capitals in 615,\textsuperscript{132} has been given as example of further exploitation of the people by the ruling class.\textsuperscript{133} The explanation is not entirely satisfactory. Since labour would be recruited locally, the measure was unlikely to drive more people to rebel against the government than in the case of a conscription for a foreign campaign or a construction project at the frontier.

What often has been overlooked is the economic situation of the time. The conscription of soldiers and labourers must have meant a loss of manpower in agricultural production, and continuous natural disasters aggravated the problem in the early 610s. As already pointed out, signs of strain were already showing in the first campaign to Koguryo. The inadequacies of food supply was clearly demonstrated in the third campaign in 614, when disorder broke out among soldiers fighting for food, causing great delay for the arrival of the soldiers at the frontier. Furthermore, some disease began to spread among those who survived.\textsuperscript{134} Famine was becoming phenomenal. Prices of grain at Luoyang soared so much that one of the generals fighting insurgent groups in the Yangzi River Basin tried to take advantage of the situation and ordered his followers to grain for sale at the capital.\textsuperscript{135}

If the continuity of the uprisings was due to the oppressive policy of the Sui, it was the refusal to open its granaries to the public more than anything else which drove the peasants to rebel. The granaries were established during the reign of Wendi to store up grain stocks during years of good harvest, in anticipation of years of crop failure. Not only did they provide salaries for government officials, they also proved to be an effective means in mitigating the suffering of people afflicted by flood or drought.\textsuperscript{136} However, grain stocks in the major granaries were trans-
ported to Zhuojun in 611 and again in 612 to support the expeditionary troops to Koguryo. It was probably at this time that the government changed its policy of sharing its grain stocks with the peasants at times of crisis.

Although no more campaigns were launched after 614, it should be noted that after discovering that Koguryo's attitude remained just as hostile as before the third campaign, Yangdi contemplated on a fourth campaign. This obsession with conquering Koguryo probably perpetuated his policy of keeping the government grain stocks for the use of the expeditionary troops until as late as 616. Unfortunately, nature disaster did not end as appeared that around this time there was another serious flood, which no doubt aggravated the economic situation. Curiously enough, in depicting the last years of a dynasty losing the mandate of heaven, Tang historians had chosen to concentrate on the growth of uprisings and completely failed to provide information on the degree of damage caused by this flood. But the effect of the new natural disaster must have been a key factor in the emergence of a new wave of rebellions in 616 and 617.

Yang Xuangan had already demonstrated in 613 that anyone who had control of the large granaries was likely to attract a sizeable following. The case was again exemplified by Li Mi, whose strength reached it peak with the capture of not only the Luokou Granary but also the Huilo Granary, both near Luoyang, in 617. It was also these granaries that brought about the allegiance of at least five other rebel groups, including that headed by Du Fuwei, whose southward movement from the lower basin of the Yellow River to the Huai River Basin in 616 can perhaps be explained by the motivation of getting themselves fed rather than by the need of a new base for their activities. The Laiyang Granary soon also fell into the hands of the rebel groups, and the major granaries in fact became the bone of contention between the troops of Li Mi and the government troops led by Wang Shichong. At the same time, the capture of the Yongfeng Granary proved to be an equally invaluable asset for Li Yuan to establish his rule in Changan. Indeed, anyone who refused to open the granaries to feed the hungry, as provincial official Wang Rengong discovered in Mayi in
617,\textsuperscript{144} was likely to become the enemy of the people and get killed. In short, it was the refusal of the government to share its foodstock in face of a large-scale famine which alienated the peasant and turned them into the supporters of whoever could provide them with food.\textsuperscript{145}

The Military and the Fourth Campaign

If Sui-Koguryŏ relationship remained hostile after the successive campaigns by Yangdi, that between Sui and the eastern Turks also deteriorated. Whereas the Turks collaborated with the Chinese in defeating Khitan in 609 as mentioned earlier, another effort of concerted military action against Hami became abortive and the mission had to be completed by the Chinese alone in the end.\textsuperscript{146} There is no indication that the eastern Turks had joined the others the Koguryŏ campaigns in 612 or 613.\textsuperscript{147} On the contrary, it is known that some Turkish groups raided the Chinese border in 613. After the death of Khan Qimin, his son Khan Shibi did turn up at Yingzhou in 614,\textsuperscript{148} but he could have hardly impressed by the disorder of the Sui troops. His envoy, who allegedly paid tribute to the Chinese at the beginning of 615,\textsuperscript{149} must also have reported the chaotic situation in Sui to him. Perceiving a new danger from the Turks, Pei Ju adopted the familiar tactics of encouraging rivalry among the Turkish leaders. His scheme, however, failed to deceive the khan.\textsuperscript{150} Rebel groups in China now received support from the Turks,\textsuperscript{151} who saw an opportunity in regaining their dominant position in North Asia.

The relationship between the eastern Turks and Sui thus became hostile for the first time since the defeat of the former by the latter in the early 580s. Trying to find remedy for the situation, Yangdi in 615 made a trip to the north-west border against the advice of his officials, probably hoping that there would be an reenactment of what had happened in 607 when he was greatly welcomed. What happened was indeed as unexpected as the case had been in 607. Without prior warning, the eastern Turks ambushed the imperial entourage. Yangdi managed to escape after receiving intelligence reports from a Chinese princess married to the Turkish Khan, but he was still surrounded at Yammen, where 39 of 41 of the fortresses there had
fallen to the enemy.\textsuperscript{152}

Apart from their superior military power, the swift success of the Turks was due to the low morale of the Sui army, who abhorred the possibility of a fourth campaign against Koguryo. Apart from Lai Huer, who led the navy and laid siege on the Koguryo capital, few of those commanding the troops gained anything from the third campaign in 614. The Koguryo experience had been a traumatic one, and many of them must have thought that the submission of the Koguryo king in 614 would mark the end of the whole venture. Moreover, they probably saw the increasing number of uprisings within China a greater concern than Koguryo. Indeed, even Lai Huer had compared Koguryo as scabies and the rebellion of Yang Xuangan as a disease of the heart in 613.\textsuperscript{153} Some of the generals were already engaged in the suppression of the uprisings, and little did they share the emperor’s enthusiasm in another campaign, an idea which, if not for the growing menace of the eastern Turks, would probably have been translated into action in 615 as Koguryo failed to pay tribute as other neighbours of Sui. The only way to lift the spirit of the Sui army to fight against the Turks was to call an end to the Koguryo venture. Yet the emperor was so adamant about his decision that it took four officials, one of them his brother-in-law, to persuade him to announce that the plan for another Koguryo campaign would be shelved.\textsuperscript{154} Special promotions and lavish rewards were also promised if victory over the Turks was attained.

The promises were effective. The Sui army showed its tenacity by holding the remaining fortresses for almost a month before rescue troops, perhaps also attracted by the promised awards, arrived from nearby areas. Fearing of growing unrest in its own territories, a rumour spread by the Chinese wife of the khan, the Turks retreated. The Sui emperor was rescued, but his promises were not carried out in full. Only less than one-tenth of the 17,000 soldiers who had defended against the Turks received special credits for their efforts, and even those who did were not satisfied with what they obtained. Above all, the emperor revived the idea of a fourth Koguryo campaign.\textsuperscript{155}

The Yanmen Incident showed many that Yangdi was no longer the com-
petent and intelligent prince and emperor he used to be. Perhaps because of the disastrous result at Koguryô, he began to suffer from insomnia from 612. He also appeared to be neurotic during the Yammen Incident, when he could not pull himself together but hugged his eight-year-old son, crying until his eyes were swollen. His refusal to follow the advice of his officials to return to the old capital where a strong army could perhaps be reorganized probably led many to doubt his ability to make sensible decisions. One wonders if his tour to Jiangdu in 616 was less a result of the demand by the tense situation in the Yangzi valley as some believe, but simply a desire to seek refuge.

If the Yammen Incident saw a gradual estrangement between the Sui emperor and his officials, it was the failure to honour his promises more than anything else that alienated him from his supporters, especially the army, both the central and the provincial. These people had fought hard to save the life of the emperor, only to find that their own lives were now at risk because of the emperor's obsession with conquering Koguryô. At the same time, the emperor also increasingly distrusted his generals. In spite of his continuous success in suppressing revolts, Dong Chun was executed as a result of slanders against him by other officials. Holding a higher position, Yang Yichen had an equally impressive record, but was posted as Minister of Rites where he would have no opportunity to demonstrate his loyalty or military skills. One official in fact attempted to persuade the emperor to pardon the rebels should they agree to fight in Koguryô, but the proposal was turned down. In fact, after the death of Yuwen Shu in 616, few officials were trusted by the emperor. None understood the change of the imperial temperament more than Yu Shiji, the imperial secretary, who seemed to be convinced himself that it was futile to persuade the emperor to take action against the nationwide rebellions.

That the Yammen Incident and the subsequent Jiangdu tour by the emperor marked a turning point in the history of Sui is evident from the fact that a new wave of revolts broke out in 617, many of the leaders being military officers stationed in the border garrison towns who now allied with the Turks in order to boost their military strength. The best example of
course is Li Yuan, who eventually succeeded in uniting China. These people turned against the government not because of the shortage of food but because of the absence of a strong central leadership. The examples of Prince Liang in 604 and Yang Xuangan in 613 had already demonstrated that political opportunism remained in a unified China, and the situation after the Yanmen Incident provided a favourable climate for those with political ambitions. Neither were these uprisings unrelated with the Koguryo campaign. To take the example of Li Yuan once again, two of his top generals were deserting military officers who, along with thousands of others, sought refuge in Taiyuan where Li Yuan began his move. The fear of another expedition to Koguryo was also employed by Li Yuan and his followers to arouse anti-government sentiment.

Thus both the military people and the peasants opposed a fourth campaign against Koguryo, and in different ways, they were responsible for the ultimate fate of the Sui dynasty. The latter simply rebelled to fulfill their basic desire of getting fed at the beginning, but gradually they became organized or subdued by the former, many of whom possessing greater political aspirations. Yangdi seems to have abandoned the idea of another campaign eventually - granaries were ordered to open for relief, and an army stationed at Zhuojun, supposedly for a future Koguryo expedition, was also ordered to join in the fight against rebels. Yet the measures were too late. The country now entered a phase of civil wars. It was a period when even barks and leaves ran out as a source of food as chaos and famine continued to spread.

In one of the poems composed in Jiangdu, Yangdi remarked that the Koguryo campaigns were but an accident. Yet it was not a rational explanation for the motives of the expeditions but the lament of an emperor in distress regretting an irredeemable mistake. Signs of ambitions already showing in his early days, Yangdi had had high hopes in fulfilling his dream of extending the empire and surpassing the accomplishments of great emperors of the past. Yet he became preoccupied with the idea and list his bearing after encountering repeated setbacks, part of the fault he was to bear. The Sui emperor probably had never envisioned that the Koguryo
campaigns and its demand on economic and human resources would sow the
seeds of discontent among peasants and bring about widespread disorder for
such a long time. Neither had he anticipated that the campaigns would
become a major issue between him and his generals to the effect that they
would choose to rebel against the government. Above all, perhaps he had
never imagined that he would fail to follow the footsteps of Han Wudi in
pursuing his interest in the Korean peninsula, but instead would follow
those of Qin Shihuangdi whose dynasty also ended soon after his death.
FOOTNOTES

1. SS3/60, 67, 45/1245-46.
4. SS51/1336, 65/1528-29, 84/1874-75; ZTTJ180/5633-34.
5. SS3/70, 41/1184, 52/1346, 56/1389.
7. SS3/73, 61/1465, 83/1845. The last passage records the two campaigns as one, indicating the possibility of some missing record here.
8. SS81/1825, 64/1519. The second record dates the embarkation of the troop in 610, but according to SS3/74, the troop returned in the 2nd month of 610, with 17,000 captives.
10. SS3/64, 53/1358.
11. SS2/52.
13. SS29/792, 798.
14. SS2/34-5.
15. SS24/686. The event is undated. Judging from the order of events recorded, it probably took place after the construction of a new capital, or at the same time as the building of boats for the tour in 606.
17. SS61/1468, 68/1594.
18. After the accession Yang Guang, those who were promoted included Cui Peng (9th month, 604), Lai Wuer, Li Jing, Zhou Luohou (12th month, 604), Guo Yan, Yuwen Shu and Yu Zhongwen (1st month of 605). All were generals, see SS3/60-62.
19. SS63/1494.
20. SS84/1868.

23. See, for instance, an incident when Yangdi felt uneasy on returning to the old capital in 609 (SS3/72).


25. SJ6/239.


27. SS81/1827.

28. For Qin Shihuangdi, see SJ6/247. For Yangdi, see ZZTJ181/5658. It is also interesting to note that the places to which Qin Shihuangdi sent people for elixir of immortal life were in fact part of the scenery in one of the imperial gardens.

29. See M. Loewe, 67-122.

30. SS84/1874. The last two lines of the poem read, 'Am I not] better than the son of heaven in Han, who mounted the Chanyutai empty-handed?' It refers to an event in 110BC when the Han Wudi made an inspection tour to the border at Chanyutai, where he sent an official to the leader of Xiongnu, challenging him for a battle. The leader of Xiongnu was frightened, but there is no record of surrender (Hanshu 6/189). It is noteworthy that Yangdi in fact addressed the Turks as Xiongnu (SS51/1336).


32. It would be beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss this issue in detail here. A number of points can nevertheless be made. Chen Yinke (1974), 1-3, has pointed out that there were three major origins for the political and cultural institutions of Sui and Tang, namely those from the Han, Wei, Jin and inherited by Northern Wei and Qi, those from the Southern Dynasties, and those from the Hexi area. What may be added is that historical experience of Han and Zhou also seem to have played a significant part by being a source of reference in decisions concerning political matters, a fact easily discerned by going through the imperial decrees in the WeiShu. To what extent they shaped the formulation of foreign policy, however, deserves some in-depth study.

33. SS4/79-82.
34. See lines 17 and 18 in his poem in WYHY020/1036.

35. In JTS75/2631-32, it is recorded that during a certain time in Emperor Yang’s reign, Khitan plundered Yingzhou but was defeated by the Turks directed by Wei Yungqi. The event is dated to have happened in 605 in ZZTJ150/5621-22. As Cen (1958), 91, points out, there is no support for this dating, but he does not offer any answer. Several clues can be found. First, the incident took place after an official holding the post of Silijie was exiled as a result of a memorial by Wei. The post was created in 607 (SS28/793, 797). Second, the official was exiled to Mantou, Chishui, a place which became under Sui rule after 608 (SS3/71). The incident was therefore unlikely to have taken place earlier than 608. Third, the Turks directed by Wei is recorded to have been under Khan Qimin, who perhaps did not die in 608 (SS84/1876) but in 610, see Cen (1958), 96. One can suggest that the Khitan attack took place in 609 when Sui was launching a second campaign against Tuyuhun and therefore had to repel Khitan using Turkish soldiers. One further point can be made. Following the incident, Wei was promoted and he immediately made criticism of other officials, leading to his demotion. This event took place before the end of 614, see Cen (1979), 20, rather than 616 as dated in ZZTJ83/5715. Yet it is difficult to conceive that the Khitan attack came as late as 614 and was repelled by Turkish forces under a Chinese commander as Sui was launching its third campaign against Koguryo. The criticism made by Wei, in other words, did not take place right after his promotion.

36. SS70/1633. The incident took place after the defeat of Tuyuhun at Zhangye in 609 (SS3/73), and before the Koguryo campaign. In a later memorial submitted by Duan Wenzhen, it is mentioned that Malgal sided with Koguryo (SS60/1460).

37. This is known as the Wulicheng (萬利城) in SS65/1531 and Wuliluo (萬利路) in ZZTJ181/5666. It could have been built any time after the Sui conquest of Chen, though more likely after the 598 expeditions.

38. Zhao & Gao, 72.
40. SS84/1878.
41. SS84/1875.
42. Cen (1957), 69.
43. SS84/1877.
44. SS51/1336.
45. SS24/686.
46. SS75/1721.
47. SS68/1595.
48. Han shu 6/194.
49. See the three poems composed by Sui Yangdi and his official Wang Zhou in WYH201/998-99. The first two poems have been rendered by Wright twice (1957, 58; 1978, 194), but on both occasions he has failed to note the use of historical allusions by the Sui emperor. In the first poem, the 1st and the 2nd line refer to an act performed by Qin Shihunagdi (SJ6/263), and the 3rd and the 4th lines refer to another act by Zhou Wuwang after his conquest of Shang (SJ4/129). The last two lines refer to the futile effort of Zhuke Liang in re-establishing the Han Dynasty (Sanguozhi 35/925). It is uncertain whether any historical illusion is used in the 5th and 6th lines. In the poem by Wang, references are given to Sima Yi (line 11) and to Han Gaozu in the last two lines.
50. SS67/158.
51. Ibid.
52. ZTZJ181/5663.
53. From the epitaph of Ko Ja (663-696), it is known that his great-grandfather held the position of Mangniji, just like the great-grandfather of Yon Namsaeng (643-679). However, whereas the grandfather of Yon continued to hold the same position, that of Ko was gradually demoted. It can be that the Yon family had maintained its position at the expense of the decline of the Ko family. (Both epitaphs are formed in Luo Zhenyu.)
54. See Zhoushu 49/885. According to Shitong 3/46, much of the material of Zhoushu was based on an earlier work compiled by Niu Hung in the
Kaihuang period (581-600).

55. See the discussion by Gao Min (1965).
56. SS24/687.
57. SS3/63.
58. ZZTJ181/5654-56. Apparently the records of ZZTJ came from at least two different sources, presumably unofficial ones. It is likely that part of the passage (5655-56) depicts the situation in 613, when the first campaign had ended and a second campaign was being prepared.
59. SS24/687.
60. ZZTJ181/5654.
61. SS81/1822, 83/1847, 84/1878.
63. SS29/308.
64. Li Zifang, 104-05, finds the record in ZZTJ, one which derives from SS, difficult to accept. Yet his reliance on ZZTJ makes his conclusions dubious; see note 58 above. Rogers, 46, has suggested that Tang historians deliberately exaggerated the dynasty-breaking role of the Koguryō invasions in order to hammer their lessons home for later rulers. Yet this seems to be reflected more in the attention paid to the great number of rebellions at the end of the dynasty than in an exaggeration of the number of soldiers.
65. SS24/681, 67/1575.
66. SS8/160-162.
67. ZZTJ181/5659-60.
68. JTS199A/5327.
69. SS3/65.
70. SS65/1528.
72. SS81/1819.
73. SGSG4/46.
74. SS4/79-81.
75. Miyazaki,
76. See, for instance, those from Chifu (SS3/71), Tuyuhun (83/1844), Tanguts (83/1846), Karakhoja (83/1847) and of course the eastern and the western Turks (84/1870, 1878).
77. SS83/1844, 3/73.
78. *Weishu* 100/2216. It should be noted, however, a member of the imperial family was sent.
79. SS65/1531.
80. SS4/82.
81. SS63/1498.
82. SS4/82, 43/1217.
83. SS60/1457-60.
84. See, for instance, SS78/1768.
85. SS4/82, 6/1512, 68/1598.
86. ZZTJ181/5662.
87. *Wenguancilin* 669/5a-6a records the full edict. One suspects if the exclusion of this edict in the annals of the *Suishu* was but a deliberate attempt by Tang historians to cover up the more benevolent aspect of Yang Guang.
88. For Karakhoja, see SS83/1847.
89. ZZTJ181/5662.
90. ST115/2987-90.
91. ZZTJ181/5663.
93. See the description in Han Yuan, 35-39, for instance.
94. ZZTJ181/5664, SS60/1455, 61/1466.
96. SS61/1466 notes that only 2,700 people returned to Liaotung from a troop originally numbered 305,000, and this seems to form the basis of the record in ZZTJ181/5666. Yet it is difficult to conceive that 300,000 had all died or become captives of the Koguryo troops. The record is SS4/82-83 which notes that generals and commanding officers (not soldiers) who managed to return to Liaotung numbered over 2,000 people, is probably more reliable. Furthermore, it is also known at least one regiment remained intact in the withdrawal (SS63/1502, 65/1535), which means at least another 30,000 people returning safe. See also Li Z., 107-08, who suggests that those returned alive could have numbered 100,000.
97. SS81/1817.
98. SS4/82-83.
99. ZTTJ181/5666.
100. SS60/1455.
101. SS81/1819.
102. SS60/1455.
103. ZTTJ181/5666.
104. ZTTJ182/5668. This castle who presumably on the western bank of the Liao River.
105. SS4/84.
106. Bingham, 42.
107. SS4/83. The new troop is known as xiaoguo, probably a general term for cavalry units (see, for instance, a reference to the term in TD152/801). New commanding positions were created at the same time.
108. SS24/688.
109. SS4/84.
110. ZTTJ182/5677.
111. The major source of the rebellion is in SS70/1615-19.
112. SS70/1622, ZTTJ 182/5672. Bingham, 44, suggests that the news of the rebellion took almost a month of reach the emperor, and the idea has been apparently followed by Wright (1980), 195. This calculation is based on the record in SS4/84 that on the 3rd of the month Yang rebelled and on the 28th of the month troops returned. Bingham also follows SS81/1817 which notes that the imperial troops returned at once upon receiving the "Document of Rebellion" (fanshu). While the "document" might be understood as the news of the rebellion, at the same time it might have been the letter from Yang Xuangan to Fan Zigai, the official guarding Luoyang which was not attacked until the 14th of the month. In that case, it took less than two weeks for the news to reach the frontline from the eastern capital. In fact, the emperor probably had already been informed of the rebellion before receiving the "document", as it was his preparation to investigate the accomplices of Yang Xuangan in the expeditionary troops that prompted Hu Sizheng to flee to Koguryó on the 26th of the month (SS70/1622, 4/84). In short, it was probably the "document" which made the emperor realize the urgency of the matter.
113. ZZZJ182/5677-8.
114. SS70/1624. It has been pointed out that Li lost his official position because he had been a subordinate of the former Crown Prince. His role in the Yang Xuangan rebellion was not as important as it seemed, see Chen R., 40-41.
115. ZZZJ182/5673, SS70/1616.
116. ZZZJ182/5683-84.
117. SS3/76, SS24/688 gives a figure of over 40 prefectures.
118. SS4/83.
119. SS4/82.
120. ZZZJ182/5683.
121. SS4/86-87.
122. SS64/1516.
123. SS4/87-88. Koguryo surrendered on the 28th of the 7th month, but the Sui troops did not start its home journey till the 4th of the 8th month.
124. SS81/1817.
125. See Hu, 102-08.
126. SS24/688.
127. QTW915/12030.
128. JTS54/2235.
129. NHSK22/II, 193.
130. The only known central troops were those led by Fei Qingnu (SS4/85), a low-ranking general, Fang Xiaoci, who was defeated and killed by Zhang Jincheng in the 11th month of 613 (4/86), and Duan Da, who was dispatched presumably to take place of Fang at end of 613 or beginning of 614 (85/1899). Others known to have suppressed uprisings in 613 or 614 are Li Jing (65/1531), Dong Chun (65/1540), Zhang Xutuo (71/1645), Yang Shanhui (71/1647-48) and Song Yun (71/1658).
131. SS4/86-87.
133. Qi Xia, 55-56.
134. TD186/992; an abridged version can be found in SS81/1817.
135. SS64/1518.
136. SS24/683-85; for a general survey, see Wang Y., 465-71.
137. ZZTJ181/5654, 5666.
138. SS65/1531.
139. JTS67/2483. See also ZZTJ184/5752.
140. SS70/1627-29.
141. Qi Xia, 57-59.
143. JTS1/5.
144. SS65/1536, JTS55/2252-3.
145. Further examples of leaders of anti-government activities opening granaries to attract following can be found in JTS55/2245, 2256, 56/2278.
146. SS65/1533-34.
147. SS4/84.
148. SS67/1582.
149. SS4/88.
150. SS67/1582.
151. SS4/89, ZZTJ182/5697, XTS1/2.
152. ZZTJ182/5297-99.
153. ZZTJ182/5678.
154. The four were Su Wei (SS41/1188-89), Fan Zigai (SS63/1492), Yu Shiji (67/1572) and Xiao Rui (JTS63/2399).
155. ZZTJ182/5699-700.
156. ZZTJ183/5703.
157. ZZTJ182/5698.
158. SS41/1189.
159. Qi Xia, 58.
160. SS65/1540.
161. SS63/1500-01.
162. SS41/1189.
163. SS4/91.
164. SS67/1573. It should be noted that there is obviously some bias against Yu, who is portrayed here as one who failed to give sound advice and who prevented the emperor from knowing the truth.
165. To give some examples, Liang Shidu (JTS56/2280) and Liu Wuzhou (SS4/
92) revolted in the 2nd month, Li Yuan in the 5th month and Li Gui in the 7th month (SS4/92). Apart from them, Dou Jiane, Wang Shichong, Gao Kaidao all allied with the Turks (SS84/1876).

166. JTS58/2308-09, 57/2290.
167. JTS57/2291.
168. JTS 67/2483.
169. SS65/1534.
170. SS24/688-89.
171. ZZTJ183/5705.
The early years of Tang under Taizong

In 618 Yangdi was assassinated in Jiangdu. The following years saw a period of civil wars which lasted more than a decade, ending with Li Yuan emerging in triumph. A member of a powerful military clan in Northern Zhou, Li Yuan shared a similar background with Yangdi and was in fact related to the Sui ruling house as his mother was a sister of Yangdi's mother. However, Li turned against the Sui in 617, and became the founder of the Tang dynasty after seizing the Sui capital in the following year. But Li did not enjoy his position for long. In 626, after the country had barely been reunited, his second son Li Shimin engineered a coup in which the Crown Prince and his youngest brother were killed. Li Yuan abdicated and Li Shimin became the new emperor, known posthumously as Taizong.

Though now under a new ruler, China was beset by old problems which accounted for the fall of the previous dynasty. Since their ambushing of Sui Yangdi in 615, the Turks had been raiding Chinese territories and giving support to military leaders opposing first the Sui and then the Tang. The threat in fact prompted the Tang leaders in 624 to consider moving the capital which they had inherited from Sui to a more secure place. Trying to exploit the situation in China after the coup d'état of 626, the Turks sent an army of some 200,000, which penetrated deeply into Chinese territories and threatened the Chinese capital once again. The new emperor was forced to sign a truce with the Turks who demanded a considerable amount of gold and cloth. Remembering the incident as a personal insult later in his life, Taizong was reluctant to subdue to the Turks. The chance to counter-attack soon came in 628 when the eastern Turks were plagued by a series of internal struggles coupled with a large number of deaths of their livestock which led to a serious famine. As in the previous dynasty, the Chinese first weakened the enemy by supporting one of the lesser khans. Taizong then sent an army Taizong then sent an army and caught the enemy by surprise. Khan Jieli was driven out of his domain in 629 and was captured in the following year, whereas Tuli now capitulated to the Chinese as his grandfather Qimin had done.
The year 630 not only marked the end of the Turkish threat, but also saw the resumption of normal agricultural production, which had been disrupted for almost two decades because of preparations for the expeditions to Koguryó, natural disasters and civil wars. Although the country was relatively peaceful when Taizong took power, the first years of his reign continued to see serious natural disasters. In 627 there was drought in the Shandong area. In the capital area famine was so serious that people survived by selling themselves to the wealthy. As a remedy for the large number of people who went from one province to another in search of food, the government restored the system of 'voluntary granaries' as in the early Sui dynasty so that extra grain could be stored up for use in the years of famine. In both 627 and 628, top officials were sent to areas where people were under suffering to give assistance. In 629, four top officials were again sent to pray for rain in various parts of the country. The degree of the poor economic situation is reflected in the need to grant exemption from taxation in Shandong in 627 and 629 as well as in the capital area in 628 and 629. However, a good harvest was recorded in 630 and there was a gradual flow of people back to their own villages.

Unlike the threat imposed by the Turks, however, the problem of economic recovery could not be solved promptly. The emperor was well aware of the importance of the issue, in particular the need to make up for the loss of human resources in the years of turmoil. In the first year of his reign he ordered that all single males over twenty and single females over fifteen should get married by the arrangement of the provincial government. If necessary, affluent neighbourhood and rich relatives should also give financial assistance to the couple. The provision of state sources to pay ransom for those who had sold their boys both inside China or to the Turks in 628 and 631 respectively was also a measure on the same line. People who had fled to regions not under Chinese control in the period of civil wars also gradually returned on their own accord. In 629, for instance, those who returned from regions north of the Great Wall numbered almost one and a quarter million. However, the natural disasters which punctuated the first decade of Li Shimin's reign did not help. In 631, for instance, the lower basin of the Yellow River experienced an extremely wet autumn, and the same area again recorded floods in the following two
years. 28 prefectures were afflicted by flood in 636, and another flood destroyed the palace in Luoyang in 637, halting a plan to perform the feng ceremony. The total number of households under Tang in 639 was 2,896,692 as compared with 9,067,791 under Sui three decades earlier. If population figures can be taken as a barometer of the economic strength of the state, the early years of Tang was nowhere near as prosperous as the reign of Sui Yangdi.

The economic repercussions of the years of turmoil in fact became one of the key-factors in shaping events in the early years of Tang. Li Yuan had ordered that apart from military and security matters, agricultural production should be given top priority in the use of labourers during the harvest season, and to minimize the disruption of agricultural production, peasants were allowed to pay taxes in lieu of corvee service. To a certain degree, his son also adopted a thrifty policy after ascension. Government expenditure was cut. In 627 and 628, for instance, over 6,000 court ladies and servants were allowed to return home. Two years later, official reception for the emissaries from a number of central Asian states was cancelled on the grounds of exerting hardship on the people. The fear of overburdening the people was a major reason that the emperor refrained from performing the feng ceremony in 631 and 632.

If Tang Taizong was frugal in his early years, it was more a product of circumstances than his character, and the deeds of Yangdi provided an excuse for what the new ruler could not have possibly done, a kind of 'sour-grape' consolation and convenient justification for the policy of a government whose activities were heavily affected by its limited economic resources. In 628, for instance, Taizong commented that there was no need to store extra grainstock as the Sui had done so long as there was sufficient provision for the years of bad harvest. There is of course some truth in the statement, but one wonders whether the Tang government really had adequate stock for years of bad harvest since 'voluntary granaries' had just been set up.

It is well-known that constant references were made to Yangdi and his extravagance as counter-examples for a ruler in the discourses between Taizong and his officials. However, it may be suggested that Taizong in
fact had an ambivalent view of Yangdi. On the surface he denounced the policies of the Sui emperor which he believed accounted for his fall. At heart he admired, if not indeed envied, the prosperity which Yangdi had enjoyed and which Taizong had seen himself. On one occasion in 632, Tai-
zon in fact hailed Yangdi together with Khan Jieli of the eastern Turks and Khan Yehu of the western Turks as three of the mightiest rulers that he had ever witnessed.\textsuperscript{26} It was thus not surprising to find that Taizong showed increasing signs of similarity to the emperor he so often seemed to despise in the later years of his reign, especially when the economic situation of the country gradually improved. In 630, for instance, he agreed with Wei Zheng, one of his closest officials, that a ruler should not follow the example of Yangdi in indulging in construction projects for his own pleasures and so bring about discontent among the people.\textsuperscript{27} Six years later, the Tang emperor was accused of initiating many superfluous projects, the result being that the price of grain was getting higher than at the beginning of the reign despite some good harvest seasons.\textsuperscript{28} In 639 Wei Zheng further warned that the extravagant ways of the emperor was alienating the people from him.\textsuperscript{29} Indeed, in 641 some imperial guards almost assassinated the emperor in their abortive attempt to desert.\textsuperscript{30} In 642 the Sui practice of deliberately damaging one's arms or legs in order to avoid conscription was reported to have revived.\textsuperscript{31} It is evident that hardship was once again imposed on the people in order to realize the grandiose plans of the emperor.

Just as his internal policy was marked by thriftiness at the begin-
ning, Taizong's foreign policy was also noted for prudence from the start. In 630 he gave the examples of Fu Jian and Yang Guang to account for his reluctancy in sending an expeditionary troop to Champa.\textsuperscript{32} In the following year, he turned down the request for military assistance from the distant state of Kang in Central Asia on the grounds that it was not his intention to establish a fame for himself by sending people to remote regions.\textsuperscript{33} One suspects, however, whether the emperor was not again making a pretext for his inability to wage large-scale military operations at a time of economic difficulties. In fact, Taizong displayed an inclination for active and aggressive foreign policy soon after his accession. Having reluctantly
signed a truce enforced on him by the Turks in 626, he immediately started to train a troop which would overpower the Turks and revenge for him. In view of the depressing economic situation in 629, the despatch of a troop numbering over 100,000 men to fight the Turks must have been a fairly costly endeavour. Despite the internal strife among the Turks, it was probably a risky venture. The campaign was an undertaking which a ruler of lesser ambition and determination would have avoided.

Yet the emperor succeeded, and as time went by, his belligerency became gradually exposed. While the campaign against the Turks stemmed from a concern of national security, it is debatable if the one against Tuyuhun in 635 was motivated by the same necessity. Tuyuhun had been a source of unrest for China's border towns at the beginning of Taizong's reign, and in the summer of 635, Tuyuhun troops again intruded into Chinese territories. The Chinese then organized an alliance of Chinese, Turkish and Tangut soldiers to capture the horses and cattles reared by Tuyuhun, but did not seem to have the intention of waging a counter-attack. The conflict might have ended there if not for the fact that the ruler of Tibet sent an envoy to Tang, hoping to get an imperial princess in marriage. Realising that Tuyuhun was now in a precarious position as there were enemies on both its eastern and western fronts and power struggles within the court, Taizong ordered a large-scale attack on the pretext that a Tang diplomat had been retained. The Tang troops penetrated into Tuyuhun territories, drove out the king and his followers and established a pro-Tang regime with Fu Shun, a Tuyuhun prince who had resided in China for a long period as a hostage, as the new monarch.

Taizong did not establish a Chinese administration in Tuyuhun in 636, but his desire for extending Chinese influence was fulfilled when the Chinese sent another expeditionary troop to Karakhoja and succeeded in capturing the king and his officials in 640. The campaign was launched in spite of strong opposition within the court, and the setting up of Chinese administration in Karakhoja also prompted many officials, including Wei Zheng, to raise their voice against the idea. Yet the emperor was adamant.
He created a protectorate, the first of its kind by the Tang, as the ruling apparatus in the newly conquered land. 38

Thus step by step, the second emperor of Tang was expanding the Chinese empire just as the second emperor of Sui had done, and in a similar manner, Taizong was proud of his accomplishments. Even before his conquest of Karakhoja in 639, he noted that he was comparable to Qin Shihuangdi and Han Wudi in uniting the country and being triumphant over the barbarians. 39 In his opinion, Han Wudi gained very little for China in exchange for his expensive campaigns, but China was the benefactor in Tang as thousands of people brought along their tributes to the Chinese empire from afar. 40 It is not overstating the case to suggest that Tang Taizong was no less conceited than Sui Yangdi.

That similarities can be found between the internal and foreign policies of Taizong and those of Yangdi should not be surprising. The two came from the same family background, and both owed their position by court intrigues engineered by themselves. Their ardent interest in history made them take good care in preserving a good reputation for themselves, and at the same time generated in them a sense of mission to revive the glorious Chinese empire in the past, if not raise it to new heights as well.

Yet differences between the two can also be found. Before succeeding his father, Yangdi had spent one decade as a governor-general in southern China learning the skills of an administrator. On the other hand, Taizong led the life of a general for most of his younger days, commanding himself the troops under him. He later tried to make up for the training he had missed by establishing a Pavillon of Literature, where he often had discussions with his subordinates till early hours of the morning, a practice which continued after his accession to the throne. 41 Yet one doubts if Taizong really enjoyed his new role as an emperor much as he would like. No longer was he a general who had enemies to fight against on the battlefield, for he was to become an administrator in court facing new sets of problems and making new kinds of decisions. The new job was not neces-
sarily more difficult, as the emperor found for himself a lot of leisure
time, so much so that he spent days watching his chefs preparing dishes in
the 2nd year of his reign.\textsuperscript{42} He did not only read books of classics and
history, but also books on medicine,\textsuperscript{43} perhaps to keep himself occupied.
At the same time, he increasingly tried to channel part of his energy on
horseback in hunting trips against the constant criticism of his offi-
cials.\textsuperscript{44}

If becoming the greatest emperor that China had ever had was the dream
shared by both Sui Yangdi and Tang Taizong, its realization was far more
difficult for the latter because of the circumstances he was in. He did
not inherit a prosperous empire as Yangdi had done, and the economic situa-
tion became a setback in the pursuit of his plans. He intended first to
go to Luoyang in the 4th year of his reign, but it was only seven years
later that he could afford to do so.\textsuperscript{45} The design to extend the Chinese
empire was grand, but again costly. Although unrecorded, the death toll
for the Tang troops in the deciding battle between Tang and Tuyuhun in 636
must have been considerable, since the Chinese army had again to cross
the same barren desert region stretching 2,000 li and covering with snow
and with little to eat in summer.\textsuperscript{46} Taizong could ill-afford such ventures
too frequently, and he had to exercise restraint where necessary. In 641
the Xueyanto, the nomadic group which had become the dominant power in
north Asia after the decline of the Turks, attacked a group of Turks who
had given their allegiance to the Chinese. Taizong ordered a counter-
attack, in which over 3,000 enemies were killed and a large number of
cattles captured. When the Xueyanto sought peace in the following year by
requesting to many a Tang princess, Taizong could have refused and instead
sent another expeditionary troops to wipe out the nomadic group. On the
advice of one of his officials to give careful considerations to the cost
of such a campaign, however, he finally decided to spare a Tang princess
instead of employing military power in order to gain peace.\textsuperscript{47}

The policies of the Tang emperor in the second decade of his reign was
thus marked by the interplay of two forces. There were moments that the
emperor indulged in realizing his dreams of surpassing his predecessors by pursuing his grandiose plans, and there were also moments that he displayed the prudence that he had shown in the early years of his reign. The former force, however, was gaining increasing momentum. In 636 Taizong asked his officials, "Is it more difficult to build up an empire or to sustain one?" Opinion was divided, and the emperor observed that answers on both sides were justified.\textsuperscript{48} The same question was raised five years later, but the emperor commented this time that governing was an easy task as it required no more than the appointment of the virtuous and the talented in office and the acceptance of diminishments.\textsuperscript{49} What was implicit was that the emperor was looking for something exciting and challenging. In short, he was growing restive.

**International relations before the campaign**

Relationship between Tang and Koguryŏ in fact was established soon after the founding of the Tang. There are records of Koguryŏ paying tributes to Tang in 619 and 621 when Li Yuan had control of only part of the lower basin of the Yellow River. After defeating most of its enemies in 622, the first Tang emperor made a request to the Koguryŏ king to return the Chinese who had been captured or retained in Koguryŏ, and was most pleased when the Koguryŏ king soon complied by returning almost 10,000 people.\textsuperscript{50} Koguryŏ must have been exhausted and yearned for peace after incessant years of war, especially when 500 li of its territories were lost to Silla during the Sui attacks.\textsuperscript{51} The desire to bring an end to a hostile relationship probably accounted for a request to adopt the Chinese calendar by Koguryŏ in 624.\textsuperscript{52} A Chinese official was duly sent on the dual mission of presenting official titles and introducing the new state cult of Taoism to Koguryŏ, where he was well received when he gave discourses on Taoist classics and presenting Taoist icons to the court.\textsuperscript{53}

As an official in charge of transporting military supplies who saw how the country's resources were drained in the Sui campaigns,\textsuperscript{54} Li Yuan probably realized that the enforcement of a vassal relationship upon
Koguryō would demand a heavy cost on the part of China. In fact, he discussed with his officials the feasibility of establishing a relationship with Koguryō on an equal basis. The idea did not receive much support. The strongest opposition came from Pei Ju and Wan Yanbo, who argued that Koguryō had always been a part of China and Tang's relations with Koguryō should therefore always be based on this premise.⁵⁵ Pei of course was chief advisor on foreign affairs to Sui Yangdi, whereas Wan also had experience in dealing with Koguryō.⁵⁶ The emperor's proposal was not adopted as a result.

If the dominant attitude among Tang officials towards Koguryō remained basically unchanged from the past, peace was nevertheless maintained between the two powers. When Silla and Paekche complained that their land route to the Tang had been blocked by Koguryō when tribute missions were sent in 625,⁵⁷ Zhu Zishe, an official well-versed in the classics, was sent to the Korean peninsula presumably as a negotiator. As a result, Koguryō agreed to make peace with its southern neighbours.⁵⁸

The accession of Taizong did not witness any marked difference in the Tang policy towards Koguryō. Koguryō also continued to display a subservient attitude. After the Chinese defeated the eastern Turks in 629, Koguryō not only sent a mission to China to celebrate the victory, but also presented the Chinese with "a map of vassals", the exact content of which is unknown.⁵⁹ Whether or not the map covered the region previously held by the Turks but not under Chinese control, it was probably a demonstration Koguryō's admission of Tang's sovereignty in northern Asia, if not in Koguryō as well.

The amiable relations between Tang and Koguryō ended, however, in 631 when Taizong ordered that the remains of soldiers who had died during the Sui campaigns at the frontier be buried and that the burial mounds built by Koguryō be destroyed. A delegation was also sent to Koguryō to collect the remains of dead soldiers for burial in China.⁶⁰ This measure was in line with other orders starting in 628 to collect remains of those who had died in the battles with the Turks and in the civil wars,⁶¹ and was essen-
tially a means to placate the Chinese people. But the move triggered a fear of Chinese retaliation in Koguryŏ, the leaders of which who must have considered themselves the next target of Chinese aggression after the defeat of the eastern Turks. A 'great wall' was built from Puyŏ down to the coast, a project which allegedly took more than a decade to complete. Tribute missions to the Tang also stopped.

In retrospect, Koguryŏ was perhaps overreacting, for there was no sign of Chinese invasion for more than a decade. Ironically, it was not after the Chinese displayed its military power that Koguryŏ resumed relations with Tang. In 635 Tang defeated Tuyuhun. Five years later the Chinese conquered Karakhoja and captured its king. The news was a shock to Koguryŏ. None of China's neighbours shared more similarities with Koguryŏ and Karakhoja — both were sedentary rather than nomadic, both had been deeply influenced by Chinese cultural influence and had had a long record of vassal relations with China. If Tang was to extend its sphere of control after the fall of Karakhoja, it was obvious that Koguryŏ would be the next choice. This renewed fear of Chinese expansion prompted the Koguryŏ king to send first tribute in 639 and then the Crown Prince to the Chinese court in 640. By following the practice of the Chinese international order, Koguryŏ probably hoped that these measure would please the Chinese. When the Chinese sent an official Chen Dade to escort the Koguryŏ prince home, he was treated exceedingly well.

It is possible that, being an official whose duties included the supervision of military bases, Chen Dade was on a mission of gathering military information which might be useful in case of a future confrontation with Koguryŏ. In fact, when Chen reported his trip to the emperor and mentioned that he had come across large number of Chinese people, Taizong remarked that Koguryŏ had been part of China in the past, and that if not for the slow economic recovery of the Shandong region, it would have been quite easy for him to sent an army and a navy to take the place. The words of the emperor clearly illustrated that as early as 641 he had already considered the possibility of a campaign against Koguryŏ. As with Yangdi, his
rationale was that Koguryo was occupying what had formerly been Chinese territories. Indeed, in a work on Chinese geography completed in the following year, his fourth son commented that P'yongyang had been under Chinese rule in the Han dynasty. Yet as in the case of the Xueyanto, economic considerations stopped the Tang emperor from pursuing his goal. In spite of all the encouragement by the government to revive the economy, progress in the lower basin of the Yellow River, which would form the major region of support for a Koguryo expedition, remained very slow. The regions of Hebei and Henan maintained only about 10% of the population in Sui respectively according to a census conducted in 639. It was not surprising, therefore, that the emperor turned down a proposal to attack Koguryo again on economic grounds in 642 after a coup d'etat had broken out in Koguryo in the previous year.

The coup in Koguryo was engineered by Yon Kaeomun, who murdered the king and more than a hundred officials, appointing himself the Taemangniji, a post which gave him the top military and ruling power of the government. The nephew of the old king was now put in the throne. While he was reluctant to place extra burden on his people, Taizong obviously hated to miss the opportunity to take advantage on the change of power in Koguryo. Some months after he turned down the proposal to attack Koguryo, he suggested to his officials that Tang might request its nomad allies Khitan and Malgal to attack Koguryo. But his officials opposed and pointed out that Koguryo was likely to be on guard. In fact, Koguryo started to repair its Great Wall at the beginning of 642. A Chinese official, who had made a trip to Koguryo and noticed the country mobilizing its forces, also recommended that Tang should strengthen its border defence. Once again, the emperor decided to suppress his ambitious desire. Tang now recognized the legitimate position of the new Koguryo king by granting him the honourable titles which his predecessors had received.

Although peace was maintained between Tang and Koguryo, tension began to mount on the southern end of the Korean peninsula between Paekche and Silla over the issue of lost territories. Border disputes broke out
between the two in 616 and 618, and Paekche began a series of attacks at Silla in 623, prompting Silla to seek the intervention of the Chinese in 627, when an official was sent to the Korean states to settle the dispute. Paekche succumbed to the pressure, though sporadic fightings continued in 632, 633 and 636. But the policy of Paekche saw a marked change after the accession of their new king Uija in 641. In the following year, the king personally commanded his troops and waged an offensive upon its neighbour to recover lost territory. Within a month, over 40 Silla fortresses fell.\textsuperscript{72}

Desperate for external assistance, Silla sent a mission to Tang in 642 and at the same times ought alliance with Koguryò.\textsuperscript{73} No response came from the Chinese. Realizing that a strong Paekche and a weak Silla was in its own interest as it had lost some territories to Silla earlier, Koguryò also turned down the request of Silla and instead allied with Paekche, arranging a marriage link between the two royal houses.\textsuperscript{74} In the 9th month of 643, Silla once again tried to enlist the help of the Chinese. The Tang emperor this time offered three options. First, China would send its border troops together with Malgal and Khitan soldiers to attack the northern border of Koguryò in order to alleviate the state's pressure on Silla. Second, China would give some Tang military uniforms and flags to be used by Silla soldiers, who would put them on to frighten off the Paekche troops. Third, the Chinese would send a navy to attack Paekche and, after victory, a member of the imperial family to govern Silla until situations became stable again.\textsuperscript{75} It is obvious that Silla would not accept the second option, which was unlikely to succeed, nor the third, which would mean the loss of sovereignty on their own part. By deluding Silla into accepting the first option, Taizong was in fact trying to find a pretext to attack Koguryò without directly committing Tang soldiers. To his disappointment, however, the Silla diplomat failed to give a definite answer.\textsuperscript{76}

Taizong nevertheless tried to play the role of a negotiator in the affairs of the Korean peninsula by sending Xiangli Xuanjiang to Koguryò in 644. A letter was forwarded, warning Koguryò that the Chinese might attack
if its alliance with Paekche against Silla was not stopped. Yön argued, however, that Silla had been the aggressor and that Koguryó was merely trying reciever its lost territories. Xiangli attempted to refute then by saying that Koguryo had been under Chinese rule but now it was allowed to set up its administration, suggesting that Koguryó could do the same to Silla, but to no avail. The Chinese envoy left and reported the incident to the Tang emperor. Another official was sent but found himself imprisoned by Koguryó.

For Koguryó, this was a grave diplomatic error. If the Koguryó court knew the earlier coup had provided an opportunity for exploitation by the Chinese, it probably also realized that the refusal to follow the Chinese advice would only give another pretext for the Chinese to teach Koguryó their ideas of international order not simply by rhetoric but also by action. Koguryó left no ground for the Chinese to maintain their position as a third party with no direct involvement in the affairs of the Korean peninsula, and subsequently forcing the Chinese to take side with Silla.

Koguryó soon realized the consequence of this mistake. It appeared that the attitude of Koguryó had pushed the Chinese emperor over his limit of tolerance. In the 7th month of 644, Chinese border troops and armies of the nomadic peoples were ordered to wage an attack, but this was halted by the flooding of the Liao River. Hoping to remedy the situation, Yön Kaesomun sent some precious metal, "white gold", as tribute to the Chinese emperor in the 9th month. When the offer was rejected, the Koguryó diplomat further promised that fifty people would be sent to serve as guard soldiers at the Chinese court. Yet it was too late, as preparations for another expedition had already started two months earlier. The Koguryó diplomats were found guilty for having failed to protect their monarch and were kept in jail, perhaps as a means to keep them from bringing the news of a coming Chinese attack back home too soon.

It is a moot point whether Tang would have invaded Koguryó, or at least delayed its invasion, had Yön Kaesomun displayed a different attitude towards the Chinese diplomats. It is interesting to note that Koguryó and
Paekche were in a similar position in this case. Both had attacked and occupied its neighbour's territory and both were targets of Chinese offensive, though Koguryŏ was more likely to have been given priority. At the end, however, it was Koguryŏ rather than Paekche who became the target of Tang aggression. To a large degree, the difference in outcome was the result of their different strategy in foreign relations. Both countries sent tributes to China in 642, 643 and 644. But whereas Koguryŏ failed to follow the foreign policy of Tang – in this case, the preservation of Silla's status quo – Paekche displayed a more subservient attitude. Knowing that Silla was seeking the assistance of the Chinese, Paekche first stopped attacking its neighbour in 643. An apology was also sent when the Chinese envoy Xiangli Xuanjiang brought his letter of warning. In 645 the newly appointed Crown Prince was sent to pay homage to the Chinese court, disavowing the alliance with Koguryŏ and expressing willingness to give military support in the case of a Tang expedition against Koguryŏ. In other words, in order to avert the crisis of a foreign invasion, Paekche betrayed its ally Koguryŏ.

Taizong before the expedition

The diplomatic failure with Koguryŏ, however, was not the single factor which led the desire of the emperor for a punitive campaign to overwhelm his earlier efforts at establishing detente with an uncompromising enemy. It is significant that for the first time after coming to the throne, Taizong commanded the troops himself. His remarks at the beginning of the campaign in 645 shed some light on his motives. He maintained that Koguryŏ had been part of China but had been excluded from Chinese administration since the Wei dynasty. Not only did he imply that his campaign was aiming at recovering Chinese territories, he also claimed that it was a retaliation both for those Chinese who had died in the past wars and for Koguryŏ people who had lost their lives under the rule of Yŏn Kaesomun. The expedition was inevitable, as Koguryŏ remained the only unfriendly state among China's neighbours. Lastly, the emperor emphasized
the fact that it was necessary for him to accomplish the task himself before he became aged and while there was still a strong army in the country. Leaving the project uncompleted might give an opportunity for some ambitious figure to encourage a future ruler to wage an expedition and then take advantage of the chance to stage a rebellion within the country.85

The fear that an official might try overthrow the government probably came from the precedent set by the rebellion of Yang Xuangan under the last Sui emperor. One wonders if the emperor had already suspected someone plotting to stage a similar revolt. Li Shiji, being one who was known to strongly support the idea of the campaign86 and who was later suspected of conspiracy against the throne,87 could have been a likely candidate. In any case, the emperor was most cautious to ensure that no second Yang Xuangan would appear in his own time. During the campaign, he appointed two of his sons-in-law to be in charge of food supplies and transportation.88 Moreover, he did not take along all his officials with him, which would make the capital a vacuum. Fang Xuanling, a long-time associate, whose second son married an imperial princess, was given full power in dealing with state affairs in the capital,89 whereas Xiao Yu, another confidant whose son had also married a princess, was in charge of Luo-yang.90

The fear that somebody might usurp the throne in future also stemmed from the lack of confidence on the part of the emperor in his successor. In view of the incessant court struggles in the past and his own experience in gaining the throne, Taizong understandably had an obsession with the succession question.91 In 643 the then Crown Prince was stripped of his title, and another favourite son of the emperor, Prince Tai, was exiled. Li Zhi, the ninth son of the emperor, became the new heir to the throne.92 But Taizong was not satisfied with the performance of his newly designated successor, whom he found lacking a strong will and whom he even considered replacing at one stage.93 It might be suggested that it was this lack of confidence in the calibre of the new Crown Prince that accounted for the special concern of the emperor over the campaign. It perhaps also ex-
plained why the Crown Prince was not given any important part in the running of state affairs during the absence of the emperor during the expedition.

Taizong's comment that he wanted to accomplish the feat of conquering Koguryo before he became aged is equally noteworthy. Born around the turn of the century, the emperor was less than 50 years old in 644. Despite his energetic character, he had perhaps never enjoyed perfect health since he went into power. As early as in 628 it was suggested that a palace be constructed for his reposel as he suffered from some illness of the respiratory system. One wonders if the fact that he had to have books read to him in the same year had something to do with his health. The same disease in fact continued to affect him in 632 when he refrained from holding the feng ceremony. His personal absence from all the military operations after coming to the throne must be considered unusual for a military commander as competent as Li Shimin. One could even suspect that the remonstrations against his taking part in hunting trips by his officials, including one by a general of Turkish origin, was not only a concern for his negligence of state affairs but also for his health. At any rate, in 642 the emperor himself admitted that his health was already on the decline. In 644 he even ordered the construction of his own tomb. If one is allowed to speculate, the stern opposition of his officials against perhaps not so much the campaign itself as against his taking part in trip, and the sadness shown by the Crown Prince in parting with his father - he wept for a couple of days - might again have something to do with the physical situation of the emperor. In fact, as will be seen later, the emperor had to spend long periods resting after the campaign.

From hindsight, the determination of Taizong to command the troops personally in the Koguryo campaign was not only motivated by the need for personal action away from the court or belief in some active and absorbing enterprise, but it might have also had been due to the fact the emperor was indeed contemplating the Koguryo campaign as his swan song.
His adamant in waging this offensive himself was probably due to a reluctance to admit his age, the only cure being the attainment of achievement in the battlefield so that he would not only rebuild the grand empire of China in the past, but would also reenact some of his own youthful and glorious days.

The first Tang Campaign

When it is remembered that the Chinese were making another attempt at a venture which had repeatedly ended in catastrophe in the past, it can be expected that they must have been well-aware of the obstacles that they would have to overcome and be well-prepared for the risks involved. Indeed, in various ways, Taizong demonstrated that he was most aware of the mistakes made by his predecessor, and was determined to avoid them.

Two imperial edicts issued in the 10th and the 12th month of 644\(^{105}\) respectively spelled out the emperor's concern. Like those issued by Sui, these edicts denounced the 'crimes' committed by Koguryó, the major one being the heinous rule of Yon Kaesomun. The accusations, however, were generally brief, with no mention of border raids by Koguryó, indicating that frontier dispute was not an issue at stake. The first edict in fact was an endeavour to assuage people's fear and suspicious by differentiating the Tang campaign from those by Sui. It stated that the expeditory troops would not demand exceptional provisions on their way to the battleground as in the previous campaigns. It was the conviction of the emperor that the campaign would end in victory, and measures had been taken so that soldiers taking part in the expedition would not suffer as in the past. A feast was specially held for the gentry in the capital before embarkation. Once again the emperor denounced the wickedness of Yon Kaesomun to justify his military operations and promised to look after the young people taking part in the expedition. At the same thyme, he also generously granted rolls of cloth and grainstock to the gentry.\(^{106}\) The same practice was repeated in the next month on the way from Luoyang to the frontier.\(^{107}\) In short, the emperor was trying to appease the venerable and influential members of the community so that they would support his expedition, at least not voice opposition.
There are signs that these gestures succeeded. Those who responded to the recruitment drive were numerous than expected, the result being that many had to be turned away. Others supported the expedition by donating weaponry or machine designed to attack castles as they would be useful in campaigning against Koguryō. Yet it is doubtful if the enthusiasm was not really a legacy of the previous dynasty, when failure to make contributions could bring about penalty. In fact, when Taizong announced that it was unnecessary to given material support to the expedition, donations decreased sharply.  

Advice was sought from those who had experience in Koguryō or who were familiar with frontier situations. Wei Ting, for instance, was appointed not merely because of marital relations with the imperial family but also because his father was Wei Chong, who had driven away the attack by Koguryō and Malgal in 598 and who had left plans that he formulated for an offensive against Koguryō. Zheng Yuantao, for instance, was consulted by the emperor, although he had retired from official life. Cheng Mingzhen, a former official at Yingzhou, was also appointed a commander in the expeditionary troops.

Compared with that in the previous dynasty, the force involved in the expedition was much smaller. Apart from 40,000 strong men in the navy and 60,000 men in the army, there were some tribal troops under generals of Turkish origins and Khitan, Malgal and Tatabu (Xi) leaders, but they were unlikely to have been more numerous than their Chinese counterparts. While the small size of the expeditionary troops partly reflected the relatively weak military strength of the country, it also stemmed from the need to guard against the possibility of internal revolt as well as the menace imposed by China's neighbours on western border. When Taizong settled a group of Turks on the southern side of the Yellow River in 644, some officials worried that they might become a threat to the capital. The emperor rejected the idea, not only because he believed that the Turks would continue to be submissive, but perhaps also because he wanted the Turks to form a buffer zone against the growing menace of the Xueyanto.
It was after he had embarked for Koguryô that he sent one of his generals of Turkish origin who had joined the expeditionary troop to the western frontier to assist the Turks there to guard against the Xueyanto. He also deliberately challenged Khan Zhenzhu of the Xueyanto by asking him whether he dared to attack China. The Khan pledged support for the Tang expedition to Koguryô but the offer was turned down.

Taizong was now well-prepared for the campaign. Internally he had consolidated his empire by placing some experienced and trustworthy officials to take care of state affairs, and externally the country was well-guarded against the menace of its strongest neighbour. The emperor knew that he was not going to have an easy victory. When he left the capital, he told people that he would be spending a year or two away. He repeated the same statement when he parted with his officials and the Crown Prince. Despite the confidence he showed, Taizong was anticipating a prolonged campaign.

Because of the delay in transportation on land, it was only in the 4th month that the first Chinese troops crossed the Liao River, not by moving through the swampy lower basin, but by a new route over the upper valley. It was a surprise for the enemy who had probably set up their main defence on the flood-prone lower basin of the Liao River. The swift success of the Chinese in capturing a few forts prompted the Koguryô troops to go about defending their state in the conventional manner by staying within the castles. Fierce fighting commenced at Kaemo. One of the leading Chinese generals was killed, but the fortified town with a population of over 20,000 and over 100,000 shi of grain fell to the Chinese after 11 days of continuous attack.

Following the route taken by the Sui in its last campaign, the Tang navy also landed on the Liaodong peninsula, successfully captured the largest fortified town with a population of 8,000 people and continued to advance to the Yalu River in the 5th month. The Chinese success was a shock to the defenders of Koguryô, especially those in Liaotung, now the target of the Tang offensive. A force of 40,000 came to reinforce the
Koguryo troops, but was driven back by a Tang calvary allegedly only one-tenth of its size. The defenders now strengthened their resistance by forming nets and erecting planks to guard against the catapults of the Tang army. Meanwhile, the Chinese were also reinforced by the arrival of the emperor and his troops. To ensure that his men would fight to the very end, the Tang emperor removed the bridges once after crossing the Liao River and personally joined the soldiers in piling earth bags at the foot of the castle. Tunnels were dug, stones were thrown, buildings and towers of the castles were struck down. Fighting continued for 12 days in the summer rain. When a strong southern wind started and fire was lit on the 13th day, Liaotung turned into an inferno. Over 10,000 Koguryo soldiers died, and an equal number were captured. The castle with a population of 40,000 and a grainstock of half a million shi now was incorporated as part of the Tang territories.

Attack was shifted to another fortress after 18 days. There was severe fighting when another Koguryo relief troop of over 10,000 men arrived. Two leading Turkish generals were injured. But after merely three days the defending Koguryo general decided to surrender. He was re-appointed as the governor-general of the castle now renamed Yanzhou.

The Tang offensive now turned to Ansi on the lower basin of the River Liao instead of proceeding to the Yalu River to join the navy. Although the fall of Liaotung meant already a gap in the Koguryo defensive line, the relatively small Tang army could hardly spare a troop that could match the strength of its enemy let alone capture the enemy capital by itself. Laying siege on Ansi was probably the best strategy Taizong could have adopted. Sinsong in the north-east part of the Koguryo defensive line was already under assault. Capturing Ansi would mean the control of a large part of the lower basin of the River Liao. Before attack began, the Tang emperor declared that he would replace the strict laws of Yon Kaesomun by a system of more lenient codes.

Koguryo no doubt understood the importance of the battle at Ansi. An allied force of Koguryo and Malgal soldiers led by the heads of two of
Koguryŏ's five pu and numbering 150,000 was sent to rescue the castle. Realizing that his troops were outnumbered by the enemy, the Tang emperor decided to set a trap for the rescue troops. He was assisted by the commander of the Koguryŏ troops who was determined to have a direct clash with the Tang army rather than to try cut out the food supplies and isolate the enemy. Enticed by a small group of Turkish soldiers, the allied relief force advanced until they were 40 li from Ansi, finding themselves trapped and attacked in a valley. The battle was fought amidst thunders and lightning, in which at least one Tang general died and the Koguryŏ troops lost 20,000 men.122

With apparently only 30,000 men, the Tang troops had been in a precarious situation. Some of the generals, including the Chief-commander Li Shiji himself, had anticipated the likelihood of becoming captives of the enemy. In fact, the emperor himself was uncertain of the outcome of the battle, for after the fighting, he got off his horse, bowed to the heaven giving his thanks.123 The triumph gave the Chinese 36,800 prisoners, 50,000 head of horses, an equal number of cows as well as 10,000 suits of armour. Among the captives, 3,300 Malgal soldiers were buried alive, other Koguryŏ soldiers were sent home, but their commanders were to be deported to China. Taizong was both relieved and elated. He renamed the mountain where the battle took place Zhubishan, 'the mountain where the emperor stayed briefly.' Not only was a message of victory sent to the Crown Prince again, but a letter was delivered to the capital ostensibly asking the opinion of the officials on the war, but in fact flaunting his own feat. A record of the event was also inscribed onto a stele which was erected at the site in commemoration.

The defeat of this massive relief force was another shock to Koguryŏ. The defenders in a number of Koguryŏ fortresses nearby either fled or surrendered when the Chinese arrived. But the success of the Tang also ended here. The resistance at Ansi turned out to be exceptionally tenacious. Li Shiji's threat that if they did not surrender the people of the fortress would be buried alive only uplifted the morale of the de-
fenders. The emperor now faced two choices. He could bypass Ansi and advance to the Yalu River basin to join the navy, which meant that he might face the risks of being attacked both at the front and in the back. On the other hand, he could continue the assault in the Liao River Basin especially as Sinsŏng had yet to be taken. The former plan was advanced by his new Koguryŏ captives and was agreed upon by all generals except Changsun Wuji, who alone argued that the safer strategy should be adopted. One wonders if the suggestion by Changsun was not motivated by a self-interest. He was eager to see the emperor return safe from the expedition. His own position had been strengthened by becoming the uncle of the new Crown Prince,125 but his political future would become questionable should anything happen to the emperor.

Whichever the case, the emperor chose the cautious approach perhaps for the first time in his career. While age partly accounted for change in tactics, what struck the chord in the argument of Changsun was perhaps that an emperor should behave differently in the battlefield from generals. Li Shimin had been urged not to take the field himself before the expedition. After the victory at Zhubishan, the Crown Prince again pleaded him not to take too much physical risk, and he promised to do so in future.125 Yet Changsun’s remarks once more reminded the emperor of his unique position. The victory he just had could also have inflated his confidence. The idea of advancing south, after all, was proposed by someone who had been defeated. Ignoring the opinion of the majority of his generals, the emperor made a decision which changed the initial strategy of the expedi tionary troops, one that had been characterized by swiftness and imagination.

One wonders, however, if Taizong really wanted to continue the war. One suspects that the need to grant extra posthumous rankings to families of the dead soldiers in the 7th month of the year was an indication that the carnage on the Chinese side was considerable, to such an extent that there was a need to keep up the morale of the army.126 In fact, Taizong sent a set of his armour to Yŏn Kaesomun as a gesture for peaceful nego-
tations. The receipt of the gift was acknowledged, but no further response came. The attempt to bring an end to the war, in short, was in vain.

The assault at Ansi thus turned out to be protracted. As before, barricades were built by piling up earth bags against the castle wall in order to facilitate attack. The Koguryo defenders countered by building higher walls and replacing clay towers struck down by the Chinese with wooden ones. A surprise breakout was also planned, but it failed. The Chinese almost entered the capital when they built a barricade so high that part of the castle wall collapsed. But the barricade was soon lost to Koguryo defenders when the Chinese military officer released his guard. The Chinese resumed its attack again, but to no avail.

The offensive had now continued for 60 days, and it was approaching the later half of the 9th month. Finding that the soldiers could hardly adapt to the severely cold conditions, the emperor ordered a withdrawal. Part of the lower basin of River Liao had become a swampy area, making it impossible for horses and carriages to pass through, and the retreat was further delayed by a snowstorm. Although fire was lit for warmth along the way, some soldiers nevertheless died. In contrast to what had happened with Sui, however, Koguryo troops appeared to be so worn out that there was no counter-attack against the Tang army.

If the severity of the climatic conditions and the lack of supplies accounted for the withdrawal of the Sui troops in 612, there was little problem of food supply as far as the Tang expedition was concerned. Not only had cattle been taken along for consumption, the large number of cattle and grain supplies captured during the campaign must have helped to extend the stay of the Chinese troops. In fact, the Chinese still left behind one-fifth of the Koguryo stock 100,000 shi, after they had tried to transport everything back to China. It was the severe cold more than anything else that accounted for the withdrawal.

It has been suggested that the Tang retreat was caused by the threat imposed by the Xueyanto. Khan Zhenzhu had decided to preserve its power
by maintaining friendly relations with the Chinese, a policy reflected in his refusal to make an alliance with Koguryŏ after the Tang victory at Zhubishan. However, he died soon and his policy was not followed. His younger son usurped power and, believing that the major Chinese force was still in Koguryŏ, waged an offensive against Tang. Yet the attack did not take place while the Chinese were in the battlefield as when news of the death of the Khan reached the Chinese camp, it was already the 9th month of the year. In the 1st month of 646 that the Xueyanto invaders were defeated by the Chinese border defence army. The slow retreat of the Chinese troops from Koguryŏ and the fact that no expeditionary troops were despatched to the western frontier also indicate that the threat imposed by Xueyanto had was relatively small.

Despite the setback, the expedition was on the whole a victory for the Chinese. Ten castles were seized altogether; 70,000 people were sent to China; over 40,000 enemy soldiers were killed and a total of about 100,000 soldiers were captured and released. However, the death toll of the Chinese side is unknown, except for 2,000 who died on the return trip when a few thousand horses were also lost. Given that even some of the best generals were injured in the fightings, many soldiers must have died as well. The remains of those who had died in the expedition were gathered and a ceremony was specially performed for them at Yingzhou on the return trip.

For whatever price he might have paid, Taizong found enough justification to erect a stone to commemorate the triumph at a place named after the Han Wudi. The news was also made known to other neighbours, whose leaders welcomed him in the capital and the Tibetan king in fact sent a golden goose in the following year to congratulate the Chinese success. After his return, an attempt was made by the emperor to restore the tombstone of Wei Zheng, who had strongly opposed campaigns against foreign countries, which the emperor had tumbled down in a fit of anger. It is debatable if this was a reflection of emperor's repentence to launch the campaign or merely a regret over the decision to take to the field himself,
which put himself in close danger when faced with 150,000 enemies. He was not defeated as Yangdi in 612, but just as the Sui emperor, he had failed to accomplish his goal. It was scarcely surprising, therefore, that he followed the steps of Yang Guang in waging more campaigns.

Further expeditions

While Xueyanto did not impose such a serious threat as to necessitate the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Koguryo, it was nevertheless a formidable force to be reckoned with. Its defeat by the Chinese in early 646 exposed its weakness and provided another opportunity for Tang and neighbouring nomads to exploit. In the 6th month a major Chinese force crushed the enemy, killing over 5,000 men, capturing over 30,000 people. Most of the Xueyanto people followed their Khan in surrendering to the Chinese. 11 other T'u groups also gave their allegiance to the Tang. A commemorative stone was again erected to record the event. In the following year 13 Chinese prefectures were established in the region formerly under the control of the Xueyanto. 137

The success of the Chinese in North and Central Asia once again made Koguryo the only hostile neighbour of the Tang. Yet Koguryo was prepared to assume a subservient attitude. In the 1st month of 646, a tribute mission was sent to China. Perhaps as a result, Tang abandoned the Liao-zhou government-general and Yanzhou. In the intercalary 2nd month. Koguryo further attempted to rectify relations with Tang by sending two ladies to the Chinese emperor, but the emperor seems to have changed his mind and refused to accept the gesture of reconciliation. He returned the ladies and, using the pretext that Koguryo paid lip only service to the Chinese advice about stopping its attacks on Silla, declared that Koguryo no longer enjoyed the status of a vassal state. Above all, he brought up the subject of another campaign was again in a court meeting. 138

The idea received no enthusiastic support, but neither did it encounter direct opposition. It was pointed out to the emperor that the repercussions of the previous campaign could still be felt in Koguryo. It would be advisable that sporadic attacks were to be launched, because
Koguryō would have to divert its attention from agricultural production to defense. Within a few years, Koguryō would probably be in a chaotic situation; Yón Kaesomun's government would lose the support of the people and the Tang would be able to annex the area north of Yalu without fighting. The emperor accepted the proposal.

It was another victory for the Chinese, especially for those who had advocated the new policy of sporadic attacks. One may surmise that these officials were in fact against rather than for the war. Indeed, part of this is reflected in the effort by some officials in using the historical figure Fu Jian to demonstrate how a leader could put his empire on the block by engaging in some rash adventure. While few records are left concerning whatever hardships the Koguryō and other expeditions had imposed on the people, considerable efforts must have been made by the people to fulfill the desire of the emperor. One wonders if the emperor had not noticed discontent among his soldiers. Not only did he give additional merit rankings to those who distinguished themselves in the battle after announcing the withdrawal in 645, he even gave awards who did not have military distinction in the 2nd month of 646. At any rate, the Tang attack in 647 was markedly different from that of 645. In the 3rd month the army burnt down castles on its way and concentrating on sabotage activities. The navy also landed on Koguryō where they captured a few castles and killed several thousand enemy soldiers before returning. The army, though led again by Li Shiji, comprised mainly of soldiers stationed in Yingzhou with an addition of only 3,000 men from the central army. The navy, totalling over 10,000 people, was also smaller in size than before. Yet the Tang troops probably caused so much damage in Koguryō that at the end of the year the Koguryō king decided to send his second son to request for pardon, hoping to bring an end to the kind of guerrila warfare that had been launched by the Tang.

The Koguryō prince met an emperor whose health had been rapidly deteriorating. Taizong had fallen ill on his way back from Koguryō. Soon after his recovery, he had to give up the day-to-day administration for another four months starting from 3rd month of 646. The trip that he
took to the western border in the 10th month of that year to meet leaders of the Central Asian states proved too much for him as he was not yet fully recovered, and he had to have another three-month rest.\textsuperscript{146} In the 3rd month of 647 he was sick again, this time he did not recover until the 11th month when he could only hold audience once every three days.\textsuperscript{147} His sickness became a pretext for the construction of another palace which started in the 7th month of 647.\textsuperscript{148} Even a mink coat was inadequate to keep him warm now.\textsuperscript{149} Taizong perhaps realized that his days were numbered, as he was more interested than ever in making evaluations of his own achievements in 647,\textsuperscript{150} and wrote 'Model for a King' especially for his son in the following year.\textsuperscript{151}

It is interesting to examine some of the writings of the emperor in his work to his son. "Soldiers and armour are inauspicious instruments of a nation. A country may be large in size, but the people would be exhausted if they were fond of fighting. China may be secure, yet the people would be in jeopardy if they forget fighting. Exhausting the people is not the way of sustaining rule. Nor is jeopardizing the people the way to deal with invaders. A country should not, therefore, completely abandon its military power. Neither should it be used too often."\textsuperscript{152} As far as the emperor was concerned, he apparently did not believe he had used military power too often. In his own assessment of himself as an emperor, he admitted that he had committed a number of misdeeds: wearing silk and jewels, constructing numerous places and other recreational facilities, demanding dogs, horses and other playthings for his pleasure, making trips to differ parts of the country and expecting grand receptions from the people on the way.\textsuperscript{153} Extravagance might have been his shortcoming, but foreign policy was probably one area of which the emperor was most proud. When a large number of tribe leaders paid tribute to the Chinese court in the new year of 647, the year after the defeat of Tuyuhun, Taizong found himself superior to Han Wudi who, according to him, had achieved little in spite of continuous fighting for over thirty years.\textsuperscript{154} What was not said, was that his achievement had yet to include the extension of the Chinese empire into Central Asia and the Korean peninsula. Despite his deteriora-
ting health, his determination of fulfill this dream was not to be stopped. In the 12th month of 647 he sent an expedition to Kucha. Koguryo was the remaining unclaimed territory. Not surprisingly, the arrival of a Koguryo prince in the same month turned out to be a futile attempt in changing the emperor's mind.

In the 1st month of 648 another small-scale offensive was waged on Koguryo. Once again the navy landed in Koguryo territory. Numbering 30,000 men this time, the fairly strong Chinese troop crossed the River Yalu, burning down the castles and looting on its way, and defeated a Koguryo army of 30,000 people. Seeing another opportunity, Taizong proposed another large-scale expedition to Koguryo.\footnote{155}

It was clear to many that the emperor was repeating what Sui Yangdi had done. Fang Xuanling sent a memorial before his death in 648 pointing out that the Koguryo expedition was undesirable. He argued that there was no justification for attacking Koguryo as it had not violated the proper propriety of a vassal state, and neither had it caused any disturbance among the Chinese people in the short or long term.\footnote{156} In the same year, one of the court ladies also sent a memorial remonstrating against the emperor, urging him to change his foreign policy. The continuation of the present policy, she maintained, would bring about similar result as the Qin and the Jin dynasties, both ending abruptly inspite of remarkable achievements.\footnote{157} In both cases, the memorials won the emperor's praise but not necessarily his heartfelt approval.

It is doubtful if the emperor could have been dissuaded from waging his campaign. Well-knowing that the region in the lower basin of the Yellow River could hardly shoulder the demand alone, some officials suggested that the task of making warships be assigned to the people of Jiannan,\footnote{158} one of the few regions not affected by the Sui campaigns and one of the two regions which in fact witnessed an increase in population when compared with the previous dynasty.\footnote{159} Yet even the affluent people of Jiannan could hardly afford the high demands placed on them. Many had to sell their land and houses, some even their children, in order to pay for the levy that would hire people for the project. The prices of grain
soared, and a number of non-Han tribes revolted. In order to suppress the rebellion, a central army of 20,000 was sent, and the emperor had to promise to allocate funds for hiring people for the construction of ships in order to alleviate the burden on the people. 160

As in the case of Sui Yangdi, the realization that preparation for the Koguryō expeditions had caused hardship to the people did not stop the emperor from pursuing his goal. Nevertheless it prompted the emperor to look for his resources elsewhere. Judging from its alliance with some Malgal in the battles against the Chinese, Koguryō must have had some control over its nomad neighbours. But the Chinese decision to attack Koguryō prompted some of them to side with the Chinese as Khitan and Tatabi group were recruited as part of the Tang expeditionary army in 644. In fact, Khitan, Tatabi and Malgal all paid tributes to Tang in 645. 161

Apparently, Taizong took the opportunity to further extend Chinese influence over them. When he stopped over in Yingzhou from his expedition in 645, the Chinese emperor gave a generalship to a Khitan leader. 162 At least one Malgal group and another nomadic tribe Wuluohu are known to have joined the Chinese in attacking Xueyanto in 646. 163 In 647 Taizong arranged not only Chinese people but those of Malgal, Shiwei and Wuluohu who had been kept as subjects by the Tölüs, now a Tang protégé, to return home. 164 It is thus not surprising that in the 4th month of 648 one group of Khitan gave allegiance to the Chinese, 165 and that in the 11th month a number of Khitan and Tatabi groups followed. 166 Two governments-general, the Songmo and the Raole, were established with the leaders of Khitan and Tatibi as their heads respectively. Since a large part of the Tang army which attacked Koguryō in 647 must have been nomadic soldiers as only 3,000 men were sent in addition to the soldiers from Yingzhou, 167 there is no doubt that the emperor had plans to enlist military assistance from the two new governments-general in future expeditions against Koguryō.

Taizong not only paid attention to the northern nomads, he also showed more interest in the southern neighbour of Koguryō, Silla. As will be examined in more detail later, mounting pressure from Paekche as well as Koguryō prompted the new Silla government to seek foreign assistance, and
the experienced diplomat Kim Ch'unch'u was sent to Yamato in an unsuc-
cessful attempt to seek assistance. Silla now once again turned to Tang, and Kim was assigned the important mission. Taizong had been informed of the fact that Silla had lost 13 fortresses to Paekche in the 8th month of 648, 168 and he expressed concern over whether Silla was willing to adopt the Chinese era titles. His concern reflected the fact that he expected Silla to accept Chinese sovereignty, and consequently follow Chinese orders. When Kim Ch'unch'u arrived at the Chinese capital and expressed Silla's willingness to submit to the Chinese by requesting for a set of Chinese court clothes to be adopted for Silla officials, he found a most pleased emperor and was exceptionally well-treated. 109 Yet the Chinese emperor's interest in receiving Kim was perhaps less in finding a solution to solve the problem of Paekche for Silla than in finding one to solve that of Koguryo for himself. It was an opportunity for him to ensure that Silla would support Tang militarily in the case of a Koguryo expedition.

Whatever external assistance the emperor might have sought, it seemed that the social instability and economic disruptions within the country brought about by the preparation of Koguryo campaign were increasingly resembling the situation in the final years of the Sui. The fate of the Tang, however, was saved by the death of the emperor in the 5th month of 649. According to an announcement which was supposed to be part of the will of the emperor, the preparations for the Koguryo campaign, together with many construction projects which had been going on at the time, were all to be abandoned immediately. 170 If the will had indeed been written by Taizong himself, it illustrates once again the emperor's unfavourable judgement of the Crown Prince and the reasons behind his insistence on invading Koguryo. By specifically mentioning that his favourite son Prince Tai be excluded from attending his funeral, Taizong was trying to prevent the possibility of a coup from breaking out after his death. It was this lack of confidence in his successor which explained his wish to put an end to the preparations for the campaign, as the emperor was convinced that the project could only succeed under the command of an emperor of his own calibre.
On the other hand, it was highly likely that the will was a mere fabrication by Li Zhi, the Crown Prince who might not be as incompetent as his father had anticipated. Aware of the threat posed by Prince Tai, he took the opportunity to prevent his political rival from attending the funeral. At the same time, the new emperor also realized that he desperately needed something to establish himself and consolidate his rule. He therefore wisely chose a policy which would genuinely please the people. That he chose to end preparation work for the Koguryō campaign was therefore the best demonstration that the campaign had been against the wish of many. It was an unacknowledged, if not indeed abhored, policy of Taizong.

Thus ended the second attempt by an ambitious Chinese emperor to conquer Koguryō in the 7th century. As in the previous case, he was motivated by the desire to revive the Chinese empire and to become the greatest Chinese emperor of all times. The example of the Sui and the limited resources of the country served as hindering factors for further military actions at the beginning. But a diplomatic error of Koguryō provided a pretext for intervention by the Chinese emperor who was convinced that the task should be taken by himself shortly. He did not achieve his goal, but nevertheless had more success than his predecessor. Although the Chinese halted their offensive for internal reasons, their intention to impose control over Koguryō again brought under their sway many groups of nomads in northeast Asia, and the impact of the series of attacks was to remain in the Korean peninsula where tension increasingly mounted.
FOOTNOTES

1. JTS1/2.
2. JTS2/29.
3. For a detailed discussion of the incident, see Li Shutong (1979), 247-275.
4. The various sources on the event has been collected by Cen (1958), 175-93.
5. JTS2/32-33, CFYG105/1256.
6. JTS2/34, 49/2122-23, (cf. TD12/70) 70/2532-33.
7. CFYG144/1746, JTS2/33.
8. CFYG105/1256, JTS2/33-34.
11. ZZTJ193/6084-85. This passage is also recorded in ZGZY1/24, yet undated. Judging from the fact that it describe the situation after 629, it is likely the passage refers to situation in 630. It is uncertain, however, if the good harvest was a nationwide phenomenon or one limited to the capital area. From CFYG70/788, it is also known that it was a year of good harvest.
12. XTS2/27, CFYG147/1776.
13. JTS2/33-34.
14. XTS2/32.
15. JTS2/37.
16. JTS70/2533-34. According to THY30/551, the event took place in 629.
17. JTS3/43-44, CFYG105/1257, 144/1746-47.
18. CFYG105/1256, JTS3/48. An earlier example can be found in 632 (JTS23/881-82).
19. Hino (1961), 7, gives a figure of 2,896,692, which is followed by Kegazawa (1973), 473. TD7/40 notes a figure of less than 3 million in the reign of Taizong.
20. CFYG70/788.
21. JTS48/2088.
23. JTS71/2548.
24. CFYG35/384-85.
25. ZGZY9/256.
27. ZGZY6/186.
28. JTS74/2615-17.
29. ZGZY10/295-301. An abridged version is found in XTS97/3877-78.
30. CFYG113/1348. ZZTJ196/6165.
31. ZZTJ196/6176.
32. ZGZY9/261.
33. Ibid.
34. JTS2/31.
35. THY94/1699.
36. JTS198/5298, JTS196A/5221.
37. JTS198/5298-99. 3/44.
38. JTS198/5294-96.
39. XTS211A/6233.
40. CFYG19/211.
41. JTS2/28, CFYG58/647-8, 97/1163.
42. JTS2/35.
43. CFYG42/477.
44. ZGZY6/205, CFYG58/649. A more detailed record is found in CFYG-115/1376. For criticisms, see, for instance, ZGZY38/284-86.
45. ZGZY2/55, JTS3/47.
46. JTS198/5299.
47. JTS199B/5345-46.
48. ZGZY1/3.
49. ZGZY1/11.
50. JTS199A/5320-21. See also TDZLJ128/689.
51. XTS220/6188.
52. THY95/1704, CFYG977/11479.
53. JTS199A/5321.
54. JTS1/2.
55. Ibid. The event is dated as taking place in the 8th month of 635.
56. QTW150/1923. Apparently, he was the Sui representative in negotiating with Koguryó on the return of the Chinese defected official in 613 or 614.
57. JTS199A/5321.
58. Ibid. In Zhu's biography in JTS189A/4948, the event is recorded as taking place in the reign of Li Shimin, who told Zhu to conduct lectures on the classics. It is likely that Zhu went to the Korean peninsula twice, and the two trips were mixed up here.
59. JTS199A/5321.
60. Ibid.
61. JTS2/34. TDZLJ114/596. The earliest effort by the Tang to collect remains of dead soldiers in fact began in 619.
62. Scholars give different figures for the number of years taken to complete. Yi Pyondo (1979), 197, suggests 16, whereas Han W., 177, suggests 10.
63. JTS3/51.
64. ZZTJ196/6169.
66. See Kegazawa (1973), 473.
67. ZZTJ196/6181-82.
68. XTS220/6187-88. JTS199A/5322.
69. ZZTJ197/6202. It is uncertain if the datings for this and the record in note 67 are correct.
70. ZZTJ197/6198. It is possible that this official had left for Koguryó at the end of 642, see CFYG974/11442.
71. ZZTJ197/6202.
72. SGS5/52-53.
73. SGS5/53.
74. JTS199A/5330. The event is dated as the 11th month of 643 in SGS228/273.
75. In XTS220/6188 CFYG991/11639, it is recorded that the sending of troops and a member of the imperial family were two different options.
76. SGS5/54. It is possible that this comment was a later addition by Korean historians.
77. ZSZJ197/6206. It is more likely that Xiangli returned to China in the 2nd month of 644 rather than the 9th month as recorded in CFYG991/11639.

78. JTS185A/4801. It is uncertain if the emperor made the decision to attack Koguryo before or after the imprisonment of this official. One might suggest that this was a counter measure against the imprisonment of Koguryo diplomats later (see note 80), or vice versa.

79. ZSZJ197/6209. CFYG991/11640 gives the 7th month as the date.

80. ZSZJ197/6212.

81. CFYG970/11399.

82. SGSG28/273-74.

83. CFYG970/11399.

84. Wenguancilin 664/8b-10a. From the Tang edict issued in the 12th month of 644 (CFYG117/1400, TDZLJ130/704), it is known that Paekche apparently had agreed to side with the Chinese at the time.

85. CFYG117/1400.

86. ZSZJ197/6207.

87. ZSZJ199/6266-67.

88. One was Wei Ting (JTS77/2669-70), whose daughter also married a prince TDZLJ40/185), and the other was Xiao Rui (JTS63/2404).

89. JTS66/2462-63.

90. JTS63/2402.

91. See, for instance, ZGZY3/86, 4/115-6, 10/294, 302, in particular the 10th chapter.

92. ZSZJ196/6189-96, 6202. THYS5/58. See also Fitzgerald, 169-86.

93. ZSZJ197/6206.


95. JTS2/35, ZGZY6/186. In 633, the illness was mentioned again (ZGZY2/58).

96. ZGZY6/205.

97. CFYG35/385.


100. THYS2/395.

101. CFYG543/6511-12: an abridged version is found in ZSZJ197/6207.

102. CFYG157/1899.
103. Wechsler (1979), 233-34.
104. Fitzgerald, 107.
105. TDZLJ130/703-04. In CFYG117/139, the first edict was issued in the
11th month.
106. CFYG109/1304. (In 55/618 the month should probably be the 10th rather
than the 1st).
107. CFYG55/618.
109. CFYG511/6121. Many parts of the record here, especially those on the
negligence of duties by Wei, have been deleted in his own biography in
JTS77/2670-7.
110. ZTZJ197/6213.
111. JTS83/2784.
112. TDZLJ130/704, CFYG117/1398.
113. ZTZJ197/6215-16, CFYG46/524.
114. CFYG43/5153.
115. JTS199B/5346.
116. CFYG109/1304.
117. CFYG148/1788.
118. The major sources of the 645 expedition are found in CFYG117/1400-06,
of these is recorded in XTS220/6190-94. Unless otherwise stated, the
following account of the battles is based on these records.
119. JTS59/2334. CFYG453/5373.
120. JTS77/2671.
121. CFYG159/1920.
122. See TDZLJ130/708-09 for an imperial edict issued after the battle.
See also CFYG396/4698 for some descriptions of the battle.
123. SGS22/233 even noted that the emperor was frightened. Yet the record
apparently came from a presumably fictional work written by Liu
Guanquan (778-885), the reliability of which is dubious.
124. JTS65/2452-53. See also CFYG991/11640.
125. CFYG27/296-97.
126. CFYG136/1627.
127. CFYG985/11571; see also ZJTJ198/6241, but the dating is dubious.
   JTS199B/5345-47.
128. CFYG117/1405.
130. CFYG964/11339.
131. ZJTJ198/6234, CFYG991/11640.
133. CFYG135/1627.
134. JTS3/58.
135. JTS196A/5222. The date is given as the 3rd month of 646 in CFYG970/11400.
136. ZJTJ198/6230.
137. JTS199B/5347-49.
138. ZJTJ198/6236. 6241.
139. Rogers, 46-50.
140. TDZLJ130/704.
141. CFYG80/925.
142. CFYG985/11571, also ZJTJ198/6245.
143. CFYG980/11510.
144. ZJTJ198/6232. TD80/925.
145. ZJTJ198/6235, CFYG80/925, 109/1305, TDZLJ30/111.
146. CFYG136/1645, ZJTJ198/6241-44.
147. ZJTJ198/6246, 6250.
148. ZJTJ198/6248 notes that the construction of the Yuhua Palace was due to the increase of officials which the old Palace could no longer accommodate. Yet two edicts issued at the beginning and at the completion of the Yuhua palace suggest otherwise (TDZLJ108/559. See also TDZLJ66/369).
149. CFYG147/1777.
150. ZJTJ198/6247.
151. ZJTJ198/6251.
152. ZGY9/265.
153. ZJTJ198/6251.
154. ZTTJ199/6253.
156. JTS66/2464-66.
157. JTS51/2167-68. It is uncertain if the event took place in the 3rd month of 648 as recorded in ZTTJ198/6254.
158. ZTTJ199/6258. Judging from the tomb inscriptions of Qiang Wei (in Rao, 28), the official in charge of building warships, the venture in fact started in 647.
159. See Kegazawa (1973), 473.
160. ZTTJ199/6261-62.
161. CFYG970/11399.
162. XTS219/6168.
163. ZTTJ198/6237.
164. ZTTJ198/6248.
165. ZTTJ199/6256.
166. CFYG967/11374, 977/11480, ZTTJ199/6263.
167. ZTTJ198/6247.
168. ZTTJ199/6261.
169. CFYG974/11443, 109/1305.
170. TDZLJ11/67. The part concerning the abolition of the Koguryō campaign has been left out in ZTTJ199/6268 because of mispunctuation.
CHAPTER FIVE  YAMATO, SILLA AND PAEKCHE AFTER THE SUI AND TANG EXPEDITIONS

Yamato in the first half of the 7th century

If the dispatch of delegations to China in 607 and 608 signified an interest of the Yamato court in establishing cultural and political ties with Sui, it should not be surprising that Yamato also took an interest in the campaigns launched by Sui against Koguryo. In the 6th month of 614, a delegation was sent to China aiming perhaps at gathering information about the situation on the mainland. In view of the increasing chaos within China and the absence of a Chinese record of the visit, it is questionable if the Yamato emissaries ever reached Luoyang or Changan. But they undoubtedly witnessed the disorderly situation in China and subsequently reported them back home after their return in the 9th month of 615.

The report of chaos in China must have tarnished whatever positive image the Yamato ruling class had had of the Sui. The fact that Koguryo sent some Chinese captives and armour to Japan must have further weakened the Yamato belief that China was a prosperous and strong country. Understandably, the zeal to learn from the Chinese cooled down, and no more delegations were sent in the 610s or 620s. The Chinese cause, however, did not lack supporters. In 623, for instance, a group of monks who had managed to return from China under the escort of Silla diplomats urged the court to summon back others who had completed their studies but remained in China, and to resume contact with Tang which was a country with a 'comprehensive ruling system'. Having studied and witnessed the rebuilding of the administration by the Tang government, these monks were eager to apply to their own country what they had learned. But their enthusiasm did not meet equal support from the court. None of these monks were offered posts in an institution newly set up to administer the Buddhist order in 624. Neither a friend nor a foe, China remained remote.

It is debatable whether the Koguryo campaigns by Sui intensified Yamato's wariness of a Chinese attack and whether the sending of Chinese captives by Koguryo to Yamato marked the beginning of an alliance between
the two countries.\textsuperscript{3} It is noteworthy that Koguryŏ did not send Chinese captives to Yamato immediately after its success over their enemy in 612, nor at a time when they badly needed help to resist new waves of attack from the Chinese in 613 and 614. It came in the 8th month of 618, when the Koguryŏ court certainly had known of the assassination of the Chinese emperor, and presumably felt relieved that no further invasion was likely to come in the near future. By sending weapons of advanced technology and rare animals, Koguryŏ was perhaps trying to persuade Yamato to apply pressure on Silla because that country had seized Koguryŏ territories earlier. However, the continuation of diplomatic contacts between Yamato and Silla in 622 and 623 does not indicate hostility between the two countries. A record of dubious authenticity notes that Yamato staged an attack on Silla in the later half of 623, but Silla succeeded in bribing the leading Yamato commanders in delaying the attack.\textsuperscript{4} No mention, however, is made of the Koguryŏ connection. Any attempt by Koguryŏ to ally with Yamato against Silla probably failed.

Some cultural links nevertheless did exist between Yamato and Koguryŏ. In 625 a Koguryŏ monk arrived in Yamato and was soon appointed Head of a new institution to administer the Buddhist order, sharing the position with another monk from Paekche. Given the absence of amiable relations between Koguryŏ and Paekche at the time - it may be recalled that the latter complained to the Chinese that the former blocked its 'tribute route' in 627 - one wonders if the two Korean states were not competing to establish a friendly relations with Yamato by cultural means.

However, there is no sign that Yamato responded to these overtures in any significant manner. The adoption of a less active foreign policy should be attributed to the demise of a strong and powerful central leadership who had been responsible for the establishment of relations with China and Silla in the previous decade. In 622 Prince Shotoku died, followed by Soga no Umako in 626, and finally Empress Suiko in 628. The court now faced another crisis. The intensity of a power struggle among the clans within the court was illustrated by the fact that it took six months after the death of the Empress Suiko for the funeral to take place. The strife
finally ended in the assassination of Sakahibe no Marise, the younger brother of Soga no Umako. Triumph belonged to Umako's son Emishi and his group, who favoured the accession of Prince Tamura, a brother-in-law of Emishi. The new emperor was later known as Jomei.

Soga no Emishi and his son Iruka were depicted unfavourably by historians as ambitious officials conspiring to usurp the throne. It is most likely that even their names were changed and replaced by new ones made up of Chinese characters of a derogatory connotation. In spite of the scarcity of information on the political scene under Soga no Emishi, some differences in foreign policy are still discernible between the 630s and the previous decade. One of the new developments was the construction of residences for foreign envoys, including the Chinese, at Naniwa in 630, indicating that Soga no Emishi was prepared to take a more active foreign policy. Indeed it was in the same year that the first delegation to Tang was dispatched. Led by the monk who had favoured the resumption of relations with China in 623, a major objective of the 630 delegation could have been requesting permission to send official cadres to study in China. Two years later the delegation returned, accompanied not only by Yamato monks and official cadres who had gone to China at the beginning of the century but also Silla diplomats and a Chinese delegation led by Gao Biaoren. Gao received a great welcome, but later had argument with a Japanese prince over li, and subsequently 'failed to proclaim the order of the Chinese court'.

Having stayed in Yamato for more than three months, Gao was unlikely not to have made known the Chinese court order to the Japanese, whether through official or unofficial channels. Given the frequent conflicts between Paekche and Silla in the 620s and the failure of the Chinese attempt to settle their dispute, it may be speculated that Gao was assigned the task of persuading Yamato to act as a negotiator or to cooperate in other ways to solve the problem. Yet, as before, the Japanese probably had no intention of getting involved in the affairs of the Korean states. Nor did they want to be regarded as a vassal state of the Tang like the Koreans. It may be surmised that the argument over li was one
over diplomatic propriety stemming from the different views of the proper official status of Yamato. Whichever the case, Tang-Yamato relationship broke down as no Yamato official cadre was sent to Tang.

Although it turned down the Chinese request, the Yamato court did not necessarily reject everything Chinese. The astronomical observations included in Japanese historical records from 634 onwards could have been the work of those who had just returned from China. Although the role of the Tang-educated cadres and monks in the court is unknown, their knowledge must have impressed many. In 636 when a meteor crossed the sky from east to west with a thundering sound, the China-educated Monk Min did not propagate the common belief that it was a 'floating star', but explained the phenomenon as the movement of a Celestial Dog, an idea which he probably derived from *Hou-Hanshu*, a Chinese historical work. ¹⁰ Other newly returned monks and cadres also became teachers for their countrymen. Monk Seion was invited to give discourses on the Amitayu Sutra less that a year after returning home in 640. Among the many young people who had the opportunity to be exposed to Chinese learning was Prince Naka no Ōe, who studied under Minamibuchi no Shoan. ¹¹

Thus, unlike Chinese foreign policy, Chinese learning seemed to be better accepted by the Japanese, and Chinese cultural influence was gradually evident in various ways. It is interesting to note that in 639 when Silla envoys arrived in Yamato escorting two Japanese monks who had studied in China, they were given official ranks. Again, in the following year, when both Silla and Paekche envoys arrived together with cadres returning from China, a similar bestowal of ranks was made. The practice of granting official ranks to foreign envoys undoubtedly had its origins in China. It may be suggested therefore that while Yamato was pursuing a foreign policy independent of the Chinese one, it gradually began to implement its foreign policy in a Chinese fashion. By granting ranks to the envoys of Paekche and Silla, Yamato was making it clear to the two Korean states that Yamato regarded itself as the senior partner in its relationship with them.

As the number of China-educated Japanese official cadres and monks was still small and what they could offer was mainly limited to knowledge derived from classical studies, the Korean states continued to be a major
source of imported continental culture for Yamato. Without denying that there had been a long and close cultural relationship between Yamato and Paekche, there seemed to be a new wave of intensive cultural borrowing from the early 630s. What is noteworthy began in 631 when Prince Chang was sent to Yamato as a 'hostage'. Taking into account the fact that a Crown Prince was named later in 632 in Paekche, one may surmise that either there had been a court struggle among the princes in 631 when the loser fled or was exiled to Yamato, or that the Paekche king had arranged his younger son be sent to Yamato in order to avoid a possible power struggle. At any rate, a number of events taking place in the late 630s all showed the strong influence of Paekche. In 639 a palace was built near the River Paekche (J. Kudara). Apart from a nine-storey pagoda, a Paekche pagoda was also constructed. The official in charge of the whole project was of Paekche origin, though when he had gone to Yamato is unknown. When Emperor Jomei died in 640, one year after he moved into the Paekche palace, a Paekche ceremony was performed for the funeral.

The Yamato tie with Paekche saw a change after the death of Emperor Jomei, who was succeeded by his Empress, known later as Kögyoku, in 642. It was in the same year that news of the death of the Paekche King Mu reached Yamato. The change of power in Paekche probably did not take place as calmly, nor did the new King Uija show as much fraternal love for his brothers as the historical records note. Apparently a court struggle broke out, whereby another younger brother of King Uija was exiled together with his family and more than 30 officials. At the same time, the Paekche king requested Yamato to return his younger brother who had been sent as a hostage. Not only did Yamato fail to meet the request, but thanks to Soga no Emishi, the other brother of King Uija and his group were also settled in Yamato. The Paekche king was naturally not pleased that Yamato gave refuge to his political rivals, and the Paekche delegation sent to Yamato in the 5th month of the year was probably another attempt to have the Paekche princes sent back. The attempt was once more unsuccessful, further aggravating relations between the two countries. By chance or by design, the Paekche tribute mission did not bring along the goods that the Yamato had requested in the following year.
If the arrival of the Paekche prince earlier had brought about a new enthusiasm in Paekche culture, the arrival of members of the Paekche royal family also seems to have heightened the prestige of the Soga family. In 642 Emishi built a tomb for himself and another for his son Iruka, who succeeded as the prime minister in the following year. Hoping to consolidate his power by supporting Prince Furuhito as the heir to the throne, Iruka killed the other contender Prince Yamashiro, son of Prince Shotoku. To display the power of the Soga family, a castle and a temple were specially built. Yet the effort backfired. In 645 Soga no Iruka and his father were assassinated in another court power struggle.

What happened afterwards is a matter of controversy. According to those whose interpretations closely follow the historical record, 645 saw the emergence of a new leadership which carried out a series of reforms covering a wide range of subjects and marking a new epoch in Japanese history. The series of unprecedented events included the adoption of an era title, the establishment of a centralized government, and the introduction of a continental type of administration which would apply the systems of land tenure, taxation as well as local government.\(^\text{16}\) Above all, it has often been suggested that these reforms were made by the court in view of an increasing threat from China.\(^\text{17}\)

There is, however, no evidence to show that the changes in the government were a response to the Chinese menace in the Korean peninsula. It is interesting to note that half a year after the Chinese began their offensive on Koguryo in 645, the Yamato court ordered local governors to set up arsenals where swords, armour, bows and arrows were to be collected and stored. Officials were also sent to supervise the people in local areas in the use of weapons. Yet an external menace would probably prompted Yamato to mobilize their troops in a larger scale, and more reforms of a military nature would have taken place. One wonders if the order to set up arsenals and the supervision given in the use of weaponry were not simply attempts by the central government to build up a closer link with the provincial leaders by helping them to organize and strengthen their military power. One also doubts whether Yamato felt threatened in 645 by the presence of
100,000 Tang troops, which was only one-tenth the size of the Sui troops attacking Koguryó when Yamato had showed little response three decades earlier. The Yamato lack of response to the Tang attack on Koguryó was but a continuation of its reaction in the earlier years when Paekche captured over 40 fortresses of Silla and a series of fighting followed. The court was preoccupied with the struggle for power by the different factions. The new leaders were more concerned with consolidating their rule by whatever changes they saw necessary. Their attention, in short, was on internal rather than external affairs.

A careful scrutiny of the sources has also raised many problems on the extent of the 645 reforms. It is questionable if the era title Taika had actually been adopted, or if it was one which was not used for a brief period until the end of the country. The reference to the establishment of a hundred new offices in the central government is a gross exaggeration, and the authenticity of the decree concerning the settling up of local administrative unit is also dubious. In addition, many of the events recorded to have taken place in the so-called Taika era, 645-650, could well have actually happened a few years later. The accession of Emperor Kōtoku, for instance, did not take place until 649 according to Chinese record, four years later than is noted in Japanese sources. The attempt to reform, in short, may have been a fabrication by eighth century historians who, under the influence of the Fujiwara clan, attempted to justify the rule of an absolute monarchy. By providing historical evidence of the contribution of its ancestors to the monarchial system, the Fujiwara sought a justification of their position.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that a number of changes took place. There is increasing archaeological evidence to show that a new palace was built, at a date yet to be determined. Certain new court etiquette was introduced. The official ranking system which had been in use for more than three decades was modified. Attempts were also made to organize the people of the provinces into units for administrative purposes. Yet these changes were not necessarily a complete reversal of Soga policies. Too little is known of the policy of the Soga leadership to
provide a meaningful comparison. Given the more active foreign policy of the Sogas, they might have been open-mined leaders who had tried to reform the country by introducing elements of foreign culture. In fact, it is significant that Emperor Kotoku, who is often supposed to be a member of the 'reformists', had joined Soga no Iruka in the elimination or Prince Yamashiro, a fact deliberately omitted by later historians to show the autocracy of the Sogas.25 The so-called Taika reform was perhaps no more than another step taken by the new leaders of the Yamato court to continue in the direction laid down by their predecessors in establishing a continental type government with a bureaucratic administration.

To a large extent, the relations of Yamato with its Korean neighbours and the Chinese after the 620s were cultural rather than political. Yet with the gradual acceptance of Chinese ideas and consequently the Chinese concept of an international order, there was perhaps an increasing awareness that affiliation with foreign countries was both a political necessity and an asset. The patronage given by the Sogas to the exiled members of the Paekche court may have been motivated by a desire to import more advanced culture into Yamato, but Paekche's response clearly showed the Japanese that the event also had its political implications. When internal stability was achieved to allow more attention for external affairs, it might be expected that Yamato would strengthen its external ties with its neighbours once more, not only culturally but also politically.

Silla

In Yamato, 645 saw the fall of the Sogas; in Silla, 647 witnessed a change in the ruling group. According to traditional sources, a new prime minister rebelled with his followers, trying to replace the head of State, Queen Sonndok, who was accused of being incompetent. The queen was killed, but the rebel group was also defeated by a force led by Kim Yusin, who restored the monarchy by placing Queen Chindok, an aunt of Queen Sonndok, on the throne.26

A new interpretation of the incident has been offered recently. It is suggested that because of the mounting pressure from Paekche's attacks,
the new prime minister and his group decided to overcome the crisis by accepting the third condition laid down by the Tang Taizong earlier in 643 - that Silla would replace its head of state by a member of the Chinese imperial family in exchange for direct Chinese military assistance. Finding her position endangered, the queen opposed and resorted to force to maintain her position, leading to the outbreak of conflict. In short, it was the difference in opinion over foreign policy which resulted in the takeover of power by a new leadership.  

Although conflicts broke out between Silla and Paekche in the 620s and 630s, Silla was not under great pressure from Paekche until after the accession of King Uija in 642. Silla lost over 40 fortresses recaptured 7 in 644 but lost another 7 in 645 when its major force was engaged in attacking Koguryo in the north under a military alliance with the Chinese. Though the power struggle in 647 might be seen as strife between the clans associated with the capital area and those of the provinces from which Kim Yusin came, it is also possible that foreign policy was a major issue which led to the difference in opinion among the ruling class. It is perhaps not accidental that another female succeeded the throne, indicating that Kim Yusin and his group were probably anti-Tang. 

The foreign policy of the new Silla leadership was to ally with Yamato, and Kim Ch'unch'u, the brother-in-law of Kim Yusin, was assigned the task. Kim had been assigned on a similar mission to Koguryo in 642, which turned out to be a total failure when Kim refused to negotiate the question of Koguryo's territories captured by Silla, and Kim almost lost his life had it not been for the arrival of a rescue troop led by Kim Yusin. Further attempts to ally with Koguryo would certainly be futile, as Koguryo had now made a marriage alliance with Paekche. Yamato was thus the only choice left for Silla. Although the two countries had not had a close relationship in the past decade, Silla was probably aware that Paekche and Yamato did not necessarily see eye to eye with each after the settlement of exiled princes and officials in Yamato. It was an opportunity for Silla to exploit the conflict in its own interest just as it had used the conflict between Koguryo and Tang to promote its own cause. It was also a good
opportunity to establish closer relations with Yamato, which had sent a
delegation to Silla in 646, suggesting an interest in building new ties
with Silla. In 647 Kim Ch'unch'u was sent to escort the Yamato delegation
home. 30

Kim succeeded in impressing his hosts by his looks as well as his
manners, but his achievement did not go beyond that. It is uncertain if
Yamato regarded him as a 'hostage' as is recorded, but probably Yamato
adopted an attitude of a 'superior country' in dealing with this Silla
diplomat as it had earlier. Nor is it known if Kim actually requested
Yamato for military assistance. Whichever the case, the diplomatic effort
by Silla did not bring about any immediate result. Eager to consolidate
their power in court, the Yamato leadership did not necessarily understand
the problem of foreign encroachment faced by Silla. Yamato might have
wanted to ask the co-operation of Silla in resuming official contacts with
the Chinese and sending more official cadres to study in China. Indeed, a
letter was forwarded to the Chinese later by Silla diplomats. 31 But it was
unlikely that they felt an expedition against Paekche would serve their
cause.

Tension, however, mounted again on the Korean peninsula. In the 10th
month of 647 Paekche seized three fortresses of Silla. In the 3rd month
of 648, 13 more Silla fortresses fell. Apparently pressure also came from
Koguryo, leaving Silla once more isolated on the Korean peninsula. 32
Another mission was sent to Yamato 33 but again without visible results.
The fact that Yamato appeared more interested in establishing contacts with
the Chinese than rescuing Silla from its precarious position probably
prompted the Silla leaders to give second thoughts to the idea of seeking
Chinese assistance. In the 9th month a mission was dispatched to Tang,
informing the Chinese of Silla's desperate situation. 34 Whether or not as
a result of the favourable attitude of the Chinese reported by the mission,
Kim Ch'unch'u went to China with his son at the end of the year.

Given that Kim Ch'unch'u had sided with the presumably anti-Tang Kim
Yusin in the court strife in the previous year, the mission of 648 signi-
ified a major change in Silla's attitude towards the Tang. The past fai-
lures of Kim perhaps made him more cautious, and he succeeded again in impressing his hosts. He was taken on visits to the National College, attended the libation ceremony held for the students, and received the newly completed official history of the Jin when granted an imperial audience. Not to miss the opportunity, Kim painted a grim picture of his country being a victim of Paekche aggression, forewarning that tributes from Silla could not be expected unless the Chinese were to provide military assistance. In response, the Chinese emperor promised that Tang would send its soldiers to rescue Silla. Kim then further requested that Chinese official dress be granted so that Silla could adopt them back home in the court. Unlike the Turkish Khan in 607, his request was met and spectacular dresses and honourable titles were bestowed onto him and his followers. In order to show the subservience of Silla to Tang, Kim left behind his son and an official as 'hostages' in the Tang court before leaving.35

There is no doubt that Tang Taizong and Kim Ch'un'ch'u found some common grounds during their meeting, yet it is debatable whether any firm agreement between the two concerning the future settlement of the Korean peninsula was made. More than two decades later, Silla claimed that there had been a deal between the partners, that Taizong had agreed to grant the territories of Paekche to Silla once Koguryo and Paekche were conquered.36 Tang Taizong certainly was not ignorant of the intention of Kim's visit. He was eager to conquer Koguryo, but it is difficult to conceive that he would have given up Paekche in exchange for assistance from Silla, which did not impress him in 645. It should not be forgotten that he himself had entertained the idea of attacking Paekche when Silla made a similar request in 643, and he certainly did not see Silla as an equal partner, at least not until the Queen of Silla was to be replaced by a member of the Chinese imperial family. Neither is there any precedent in Taizong's record that suggests that he might pursue such a policy. One could surmise that at most he promised to let Silla keep whatever territories it had lost to Paekche.

Even if Taizong did promise to give military assistance to Silla, the success of Kim Ch'un'ch'u was limited. With or without Kim's petition,
Tang was going to send another expedition to Koguryó. Preparations for a large-scale campaign had already started. There was no marked change in Chinese foreign policy concerning the Korean states, as they continued to see Koguryó but not Paekche as their main enemy. Not even a note of warning was sent to Paekche to urge that state to stop its aggression against its neighbour. It is unlikely that the Chinese would have attacked Paekche had the campaign not been cancelled because of the death of the emperor in 649.

The meeting of the Tang Taizong and Kim Ch'unch'u was not totally insignificant. Kim probably pledged military support for Chinese military operations as Silla had done in 645. For the Chinese emperor, he was assured that Koguryó would have to combat both sides again as before in the forthcoming campaign. For Silla, Chinese preparations for another campaign seemed to halt Paekche attacks for the time being. However, two months after the death of Taizong and the consequent halt to the preparations for another expedition, Paekche launched a new offensive against Silla, taking 7 more fortresses. The fighting ended in a victory for Silla when almost 10,000 Paekche soldiers were killed. One suspects that the lack of concrete Chinese help and the renewed threat from Paekche must have caused some uneasiness within the Silla leadership. Once again Silla looked east in the direction of Yamato for assistance. A delegation of 37 people was sent to Yamato in 649.37

649 was also an eventful year in Yamato. In the 2nd month a new system of ranks was introduced and some new departments set up in the administration. In the 3rd month one of the two prime ministers died and a coup broke out within ten days ending in the assassination of the other prime minister and 40 other officials. Though details of the coup are unknown, the large number of officials involved suggests that the impact of the coup must have been considerable. It was probably at this time that the younger brother of Empress Kogyoku, later known as Emperor Kotoku, was enthroned. In the 5th month of the year a diplomatic mission was sent to Silla perhaps to inform the Korean state of the changes in the Yamato government. Despite the change of leadership, the Yamato court did not
change its foreign policy; it was still preoccupied with its own internal affairs. Had Silla asked for military assistance, Yamato failed to show any positive response.

Silla now had to fall back upon the Chinese, the only power prepared to muster the military power and take actions which would benefit Silla, though perhaps only indirectly. In 649 the Silla court adopted the system of Chinese official dresses. In 650 it even adopted the Chinese era title. To curry the favour of the new Chinese emperor, the eldest son of Kim Ch'un'ch'u was sent to the court at the beginning of 650, not only to report Silla's victory over Paekche but also to present a poem glorifying the achievement of the Tang which was embroidered in silk personally by the Silla Queen. In 651 the second son of Kim Ch'un'ch'u was sent to Tang as 'hostage'.

Internally, Silla also began to follow the Chinese more closely in its style of government. In 651 there was a reorganization of the central administration whereby a number of departments were expanded or set up, with changes most notable in those dealing with financial affairs. Much of the inspiration for the new administration probably came from the Chinese, as many new departments now divided their officials into four grades, a characteristic of their Chinese counterpart.

Although Chinese elements had been found in past Silla institutions, the 651 reform was the largest scale adoption of an administration in the Chinese fashion. That the reforms were implemented suggests that the new ruling group had consolidated their power. The reform was not necessarily an effort to curry favour with the Chinese - the adoption of the Chinese calendar, era title as well as official dresses would have adequately shown China that Silla was a subservient vassal state. It was a spontaneous effort by the new Silla ruling group which attempted to strengthen its rule by displaying not only flexibility in its diplomacy but also enlightenment in internal development. It was this characteristic of the ruling class of Silla which distinguished it from those of the other Korean states, and which account for much of its later success.
Paekche

As in the case of Silla, Paekche also maintained a close relations with the Tang at the beginning. Relations of the two countries was formalized in 624, and missions were sent frequently to the Chinese court under King Mu. However, the foreign policy of Paekche changed remarkably after the accession of King Uija, who successfully waged a series of offensive against Silla. When the Chinese intervened on behalf of Silla, Paekche skilfully avoided direct confrontation in 645. After the limited success of Tang in Koguryo, the support Paekche pledged to give to the Chinese soon gave way to more attacks on Silla and the resumption of relations with Koguryo. At the same time, tribute relations with Tang stopped. 41

Paekche was certainly aware of the fact that its actions would be considered as misdemeanor in the eyes of the Chinese. In 649 almost 10,000 Paekche people were killed by Silla. The close ties that Silla appeared to build up with the Chinese also must have created some uneasiness among the Paekche leaders. With the death of Tang Taizong and the abolition of the campaign against Koguryo, Paekche saw its opportunity for a rapprochement with Tang and a tribute mission was sent in 651. The Paekche envoy returned home with an official letter from the Gaozong. Should the Paekche king return the territories and fortresses that had been captured from Silla, the Tang emperor warned, the Chinese would see to it that Silla return the Paekche captives. Should Paekche refuse to comply, however, the Chinese would not dissuade Silla from attacking Paekche in order to solve the problem, and would hinder Koguryo from giving help to Paekche by attacking that state with nomad troops. 42

In spite of the threatening tone, it is evident that the new Chinese emperor Gaozong was trying to resume the traditional Chinese role of a negotiator. It was in the interest of the Chinese that no war broke out among the states, hence no commitment of Chinese troops. Although sending troops to attack Koguryo was an indirect form of assistance, it did not necessarily guarantee a victory for Silla. In spite of its intervention on behalf of Silla, Tang in fact tried to maintain the policy of a balance of
power on the Korean peninsula. There was no marked difference in the attitude of the Chinese in 651 from that in 625 when Paekche was admonished for its aggressions though no Chinese envoy was dispatched this time to the Korean states to settle the dispute.

From the Paekche perspective, however, the official letter was a clear indication that the Chinese had sided with Silla. Given the subservient attitude of Silla in adopting the Tang era title and in establishing an administration in the Chinese fashion, its support from Tang was likely to continue for some time. Having betrayed its alliance with Koguryŏ in 645 by siding temporarily with the Chinese, Paekche perhaps also feared that it might be treated in a similar manner in future by Koguryŏ. In fact, Koguryŏ had also taken advantage of the accession of a new Chinese emperor to attempt a reconciliation with the Chinese. It was advisable for Paekche to follow the example of Silla in seeking external assistance.

It is against this background that Paekche 'established friendly relations' with Yamato in 653. Despite the brevity of the record, the event must have been of great significance that it caught the attention of Paekche historians. Japanese historians also noted a tribute mission from Paekche in the same year. Although no mention is made of the 'friendly relations', it was probably as a result of this very mission that some kind of alliance was formed between Paekche and Yamato.

The new alliance revived the aggressiveness of Paekche. In 654 Queen Sindŏk of Silla died. Probably because of the backing of his powerful brother-in-law, Kim Ch'unch'u finally became king. Again taking advantage of the opportunity of a power change, Paekche launched an attack in alliance with Koguryŏ and some pro-Paekche Malgal, taking more than 30 forts of Silla in 654.

It should not be surprising that Paekche was determined to ignore the earlier warning from the Chinese and revive its invasion of Silla. There was no historical precedent of China crossing the sea to attack Paekche. Indeed, events did turn out as Paekche had expected and as the Tang emperor had warned. Showing that he did not merely intend empty threats to Paekche, Gaozong immediately dispatched a small force comprising mainly of nomads
led by Chinese commanders to invade Koguryo, burning down villages and
castles as they had done in the late 640s. No navy, however, was sent
to attack Paekche. But neither did Paekche make much advance in its inva-
sion of Silla. Nevertheless, the long period of celebration at the palace
which brought about the criticism of an official in 656 was perhaps a
reflection of Paekche victory over Silla in the previous year. Belie-
ving that he was immune to Chinese attack, King Uija waged another offen-
sive in 659. The Paekche aggression on Silla stemmed from a border dispute between
the two countries which had lasted for a century. The active foreign
policy of Uija in the 640s was perhaps owing to the backing of Koguryo, and
that in the 650s to Yamato. Yet without realizing it, the Paekche king was
leading his country on a path similar to that taken by Koguryo before 645.
Whether or not the Chinese knew about the Paekche alliance with Yamato,
Paekche's continuation of its old alliance with Koguryo meant that the
balance of power on the Korean peninsula was broken. Paekche's
attack on Silla in 654, just as that of Koguryo in 643, forced the Chinese
to commit themselves further to the cause of Silla. Paekche had skillfully
positioned itself in international politics in the early 640s, but King
Uija was now becoming more adventurous and chose to take more risks. It
was the path which had led Koguryo into conflict with the Chinese, and it
was pointing in the same direction for Paekche.

Yamato in the 650s

If Yamato had displayed an attitude of disinterest in getting involved
in the affairs of the Korean states throughout the first half of the 7th
century, why and how did it 'establish a friendly relations', if not an
actual alliance, with Paekche in 653?

Indeed, new signs of instability suggested that Yamato might continue
to adopt an 'inward-looking' attitude as in the past. In 653 the court
became literally divided. Whereas Emperor Kotoku remained in Naniwa where
the newly constructed palace was located, a number of members of the
imperial family and some officials decided to return to reside in Asuka,
which had been a power base for the Yamato ruling class. The group was led by Prince Naka no Ōe, the eldest son of Emperor Jomei and Empress Kōgyoku, and a nephew of the new Emperor Kotoku.  

The division within the court in 653 was different in nature from the past in that there was no bloodshed. In a song composed by Emperor Kotoku, he revealed not only love but a bitter feeling for the departure of his consort Empress Hashihito, who was the sister of Prince Naka no Ōe and had fled with her brother to Asuka. The song has been cited as a clue to suggest the existence of a triangular relationship between the Emperor, the Empress and her brother. It is speculated that the incestuous relationship between Prince Naka no Ōe and his sister prompted them to leave the emperor physically.  

However, it seems too simplistic to explain the breakup of the court merely by a triangular relationship of the Emperor, the Empresses and her brother. If indeed Prince Naka no Ōe had a relationship with his sister which was regarded as a taboo by their contemporaries, it is difficult to conceive how the Prince would have received support from other court officials. One wonders if there were not other issues at stake in the court, foreign policy being one of them. Under the influence of his Tang-educated advisors, the new emperor seemed fairly interested in Chinese culture. It was in 650, for instance, that Yamato began to adopt a era title in the Chinese manner. Not only did the Emperor order the construction of a palace, but like Tang Taizong, he exempted from taxation those whose land was taken by the government for the project.  

It was perhaps under his auspices that the Yamato court sent an official letter to the Tang though Silla diplomats in 648, indicating an interest in resuming diplomatic contact. Although no record of the Chinese response can be found, it is interesting to note that an order in fact was made in 650 for the building of two ships in Paekche style, which were probably used when Yamato dispatched two groups of people numbering 120 and 121 respectively to Tang in the 5th month of 653. The delegation, the first since 630, comprised mainly Buddhist monks and official trainees. However, the move might have given rise to opposition within the court, as some officials
still had an unfavourable impression of the Chinese because of the Tang
task which had arrived in 632. They did not want to see Yamato regarded
as another vassal state, sharing a status equal to the other Korean states.
The opposition to this foreign policy could have become one of the causes
for support for Prince Naka no Ōe who, though interested in Chinese learn-
ing, did not necessarily share the views of his uncle.

The decision of Prince Naka no Ōe to break with his uncle, however,
did not come suddenly. It was another step for him in the bid for power.
A contender for the throne himself, he had collaborated with his uncle in
overthrowing the Sogas, but was convinced by his followers that he was
not powerful enough to have his way over court officials or clan leaders
and supported his uncle's accession.\textsuperscript{56} He soon succeeded in eliminating
Prince Furuhito, his step-brother and main political rival,\textsuperscript{57} leaving his
uncle the only obstacle in his way to the throne. Perhaps because there
had been few precedents in Yamato that the head of the state himself was
assassinated, he dared not launch a large-scale coup. The best he could do
was to strengthen his power base. By returning to Asuka, he was sure that
he would be supported by many clan leaders who did not favour the move of
the court to Naniwa.

The return to Asuka was then a calculated move by Prince Naka no Ōe to
alienate and isolate the emperor. Yet it is an exaggeration for the
historical record to note that all the officials followed the prince. The
fact that the emperor was able to issue an order in the same year for the
construction of another palace, presumably for his retirement, implied that
he had considerable power. Monk Min, who had been an influential political
figure because of his learning, apparently stayed with the emperor without
following the defectors. There must have been others who followed the
example of Monk Min.

the death of Monk Min in the 6th month of 653, however, probably
weakened the strength of Kōtoku's rule. It was at this time that both
Silla and Paekche envoys arrived, the latter probably carrying the impor-
tant mission of establishing a close alliance with Yamato. In doing so, it
is likely that the Paekche envoy adopted a submissive attitude. Facing
mounting internal pressure, the Yamato emperor no doubt welcomed any
tie or alliance with the Korean states that might enhance his prestige. His other advisors certainly would have favoured the idea of an external tie which would bolster the emperor's rule. The political relationship of Yamato and Paekche thus entered a new phase.

The establishment of a close tie with Paekche, did not necessarily mean that Yamato had to end official contacts with Tang. It is significant that, without waiting for the return of the earlier delegation, another official delegation was sent out by the Yamato to China in the 2nd month of 654. One of the ships in the earlier mission was known to have capsized, but the new mission headed by China-educated Takamuko Genri was probably not meant to be a replacement. One may suggest that the mission was dispatched by Emperor Kotoku, who hoped to further heighten his prestige by having closer ties with Tang, and thus strengthen his position against the 'insurgent group' led by Prince Naka no Ōe. The mission did not reach the Chinese capital until the end of the year, and the aged Takamuko Genri died in China. It was not until the 8th month of 655 that his deputy returned to Yamato.

The schism in the court, however, had already ended with the death of Emperor Kotoku in 654. Probably as a compromise between the followers of the late emperor and the group led by Prince Naka no Ōe, Empress Kogyoku was restored to the throne. Understandably, the foreign policy of Yamato was restored under the new government. Firstly, relations with China cooled down. When Yamato envoys was granted an imperial audience in 654, they were advised by the Gaozong to take a more active part in the affairs of the Korean peninsula. If Silla was in danger, suggested the Tang ruler, Yamato should give assistance to rescue its neighbour. However, the new leadership in Yamato did not follow the Chinese advice when Silla was attacked in 655. Although some monks were allowed to go to China, no more official delegations were sent. On the other had, close relations with Paekche were maintained. In 655, for instance, 150 'tribute envoys' arrived from Paekche. There was no improvement in relations with Silla, however. In 655 Silla sent a group of artisans and an official allegedly as 'hostage', but the hope to please the Yamato vanished when the chief official died of
illness. Relations between Silla and Yamato in fact deteriorated to such an extent that in 657 Silla no longer allowed Yamato monks to board its ships going to China.\(^{60}\)

Within Yamato itself, Prince Naka no Ōe continued his drive for power. In 658 Prince Arima, son of Emperor Kotoku, and some other officials were accused of a conspiracy against the court by Soga no Akae whose daughters married Prince Naka no Ōe and his younger brother Prince Ōama. As expected, Prince Arima was killed and many of his followers exiled.

The Yamato political scene in the late 650s, however, was not only marked by power struggles. The most significant new phenomenon was the employment of force to expand the country. In the 7th month of 655 four representatives from different tribes inhabiting the border of Yamato were summoned to the court; and two of them were given official ranks. In the 1st month of 658 a fleet of 180 ships were sent to conquer the northern Emishi people, some of whom surrendered 6 months later. It was in the same year that another expedition was sent to fight against the Mishihase, another tribal people supposedly situated in the northern part of Honshu.

It is unlikely that the conquests of these neighbouring peoples by Yamato had stemmed from any concern for security. Rather, it appeared to be an imitation of the Chinese in fighting the surrounding 'nomads' and consequently subduing them and granting them official titles and ranks. It may be suggested that the Yamato government was trying to demonstrate that it was running an empire just as the Chinese did. While the Yamato ruling class refused to let their country be regarded as a vassal state of the Chinese, it did not fail to see the advantage of having more contacts with the culturally advanced Tang. To maintain its status as a power in east Asia and at the same time itw ties with the Chinese, it might have been perceived as essential for them to convince the Chinese that Yamato was a power to be reckoned with. It is interesting to note therefore that in 659 a Yamato delegation was sent to China, in which two Emishi people were included as 'tribute' to the Tang emperor, who was told that these Emishi paid annual tributes to Yamato.\(^{61}\)
The 659 Yamato delegation to China was then not a gesture of subservience but another effort by Yamato since the beginning of the century to seek recognition of its status as a power which was to be treated on equal terms by the Chinese. Although the envoy in 659 was less presumptuous than his predecessor in 607, it is doubtful if his mission was more successful. Yamato remained a remote nation, and could be of interest to the Chinese only when Tang's own interests were involved. In 630 and 654, the Chinese had tried to enlist the cooperation of Yamato when Tang did not want to commit itself to the affairs of the Korean peninsula, but Yamato adopted a neutral position. As will be seen later, when the Yamato envoys arrived at the Chinese capital, the Chinese were planning a new move to pursue their interest in the Korean peninsula. Having allied with Paekche, Yamato was an enemy rather than a friend of the Chinese.

Thus by the late 650s, two alliances gradually emerged in East Asia. On one side were Koguryŏ, Paekche and Yamato, and on the other side were Tang and Silla. Tang and Silla had already formed a friendly relations in the previous decade, but further threats from its Korean neighbours and failure to enlist Yamato assistance prompted Silla to build up a even closer tie with the Chinese. This in turn compelled Paekche to follow suit, and they found a partner in Yamato. Yamato responded, because their old leadership needed to strengthen its endangered position, and the new ruler seemed eager to build an extended empire. While the Chinese were not actively involved in the formation of these alliances, their role should not be neglected. To a large extent, it was their display of power in Koguryŏ in the previous decade which attracted Silla to their side; at the same time, it was their failure to show a more friendly attitude towards first Paekche and later Yamato which led the two to join hands together. The early 650s was a relatively peaceful period in East Asia because of the absence of Chinese involvement, but peace was unlikely to last long as the Chinese soon turned their attention to the region again.
FOOTNOTES

1. Unless stated otherwise, all records on Yamato are to be found in corresponding annals of the NHSK.

2. NHSK22/II, 201-203.


4. According to NHSK22/II, 207-08, Yamato staged an invasion because Silla had taken Imna. No conflict between Silla and Paekche can be found, however, in Korean records to substantiate the claim. Neither was there any military operation within Silla itself.


7. Various speculations have been made to identify the price, but few are convincing. See, for instance, Ishimoda, 57.

8. For a study of the various sources covering the event e.g. JTS199A, TD185, THY99, CFYG662, 664, and the background of Gao, see Ikeda On (1971).

9. Kim (1983) has even suggested that the Chinese requested military assistance from Yamato as a condition to take in Yamato students or monks, but the speculation lacks support.

10. Aston (II, 167) suggest, however, it was from the Classic of the Mountain and the Sea (Shanhaijing).

11. NHSK24/II, 255.

12. SGSG27/271.

13. See, for instance, JTS199A/5331.

14. All these events are not recorded in Paekche sources, but are found in NHSK24/II, 237, 241.

15. There is some confusion in the NHSK record here, as the name of the Paekche envoy shared the same name as the Paekche prince in a record dated the 4th month of 642. It is also interesting to note the new group of arrivals was not mentioned again after the fall of the Sogas later. ^

16. The representative work of this line are Sakamoto (1938), Kitayama Shigeo (1961); in English, see Sansom, 54-59. For a summary of the different viewpoints, see Nomura (1978), 3-15.
17. This is a widely accepted view among modern Japanese historians; see, for instance, Inoue M. (1975), 134-36.

18. Hara, 166-82.


20. See discussions by Yagi (1972), and Hara, 183-206.

21. XTS220/6208 records the accession of Kōtoku as in the beginning of the Yonghui (650-655) period.


23. See, Nakao, 165-173. Also Naniwaku to Nihon Kodai Kokka.


26. See also SGSG41/429.


28. SGSG41/429.

29. JTS199A/5330.

30. The record is found in NHSK25/II35. The career of Kim and the impression of him by his Japanese hosts all point to the fact that Kim was a diplomat. Miike argues that the record is a fabrication, for the official rank of Kim was mistaken and there was no motive for the mission. Yet there is no reason for Japanese historians to fabricate the event here. The ranking might have been wrong, as is often the case in NHSK, but it does not necessarily suggests that Kim did not go to Yamato. As Miike has not considered the possibility of an attempt by Silla to ally with Yamato, the argument is not acceptable.

31. JTS199A/5340. It is uncertain when this letter was forwarded by Yamato to Silla, though the Yamato mission to Silla in 646 was mostly likely to be the case. Neither is it known when the Chinese received the letter. It was likely to be in the 1st month of 648 (CFYG970/11401) as the letter was not mentioned in the mission led by Kim Ch'un-ch'u.

32. See a later letter written by the Chinese in 651, JTS 199A/5330.


34. ZZTJ199/6261.

35. Apart from Korean records, the event is also noted in CFYG974/11443.

36. SGSG7/77.
37. NHSK25/II, 311-13. No date is given for the event.
38. JTS199A/5336.
41. JTS199A/5330.
42. Ibid.
43. CFYG970/11401.
44. SGSG28/275. Yamato (1980), 207, suggests that the initiative was taken by Yamato, but judging from the wording, it seems that it was Paekche which made the move.
45. SGSG5/58. The record tells that most officials did not support. Kim but were after an elderly official at the beginning. However, the elderly official declined to become a 'regent' but instead recommended Kim to take up the kingship. What actually happened was probably a disagreement over the succession question.
46. The record is noted in 655 (SGSG5/59) when an envoy was sent to Tang to ask for assistance; cf ZZZTJ199/6287. The fighting probably took place in the previous year. In SGSG28/275, the record is dated 8th month of 655. Since the Tang had already sent its troop against Koguryo in the 2nd month of 655, the correct dating should probably be the 8th month of 654.
47. It is recorded in ZZZTJ136/4284 that in 488 a Northern Wei army attacked Paekche and was defeated. This was probably derived from Nan-Qishu 58/1011 which notes the event taking place two years later. The Chinese force is supposed to have 100,000 cavalry soldiers, but the Wei Shu is silent about the event. The event has been suggested by Best, 464-63, as an accidental affair of insignificant scale, perhaps a vessel being blown onto the Paekche coast and its company slaughtered.
48. CFYG986/11576; ZZZTJ199/6287-88. No evidence can be found to substantiate the claim that Koguryo promised to end its raids on Silla (Guisso, 110). According to CFYG995/11687, Silla reported to Tang the killing of 3,000 Paekche people in the 3rd month of 656.
49. SGSG22/275.
50. Ibid.

51. NHSK25/II, 319-21. The date of event is not given. But given the fact that when Monk Min died in the 6th month of the year, messengers were sent separately by the emperor and the group headed by his prince, the break up of the court no doubt had taken place before Monk Min's death.

52. See, for instance, Naoki (1973), 224-28. It is interesting to note that a record of incest does appear in NHSK 13-14, whereby a Prince Karu had an incestuous relationship with his sister. The affair was discovered, and became a key-factor for officials to support the younger brother of the prince to succeed the throne after the death of the emperor. The younger prince became Emperor Ankō, whereas his elder brother committed suicide. Prince Karu in fact was the name of Emperor Kotoku before his succession, and it has been suggested that the record was a fabrication to paint a negative portrait of Emperor Kotoku by the descendants of Prince Naka no Ōe and his younger brother Prince Ō no Ama, who both became emperors later. Yet, as a power struggle also broke out between the son of Prince Naka no Ōe and Prince Ō no Ama later, the fabrication could have been an attempt to paint a negative picture of Prince Naka no Ōe, who had actually committed incest.

53. See, for instance, TDZLJ108/559-60, XTS2/47.

54. JTS199A/5340. See footnote 30.

55. This is probably the mission recorded in JTS4/73. The record is dated 12th month of 654. Although it is possible that this could have been the feat of the later delegation, the fact that envoys of the 653 mission returned with considerable amount of gifts from the Chinese court seems to suggest otherwise.

56. NHSK25/II, 269.

57. NHSK25/II, 277-279. If one assume that Kotoku ascended the throne in 649, the event could have taken place later than is recorded here. But there is no doubt that it was Prince Naka no Ōe who was behind the plot to eliminate Prince Furuhito.
58. Yamao (1982), 208-09, has suggested that there was a difference in opinions in court over foreign policies, one between advocates supporting Paekche and advocates siding with the Tang-Silla camp. Both groups, however, wanted to obtain the 'tributes of Imna'. [It is often assumed, e.g. Kitö (1981), 116, that Paekche had recaptured the Imna region in 642, although only one place name is given in the annal Paekche and the extent of the newly occupied area is uncertain.] This suggestion is based on the assumption that the letter of the Tang court to Paekche in 651 had such an impact that all three Korean states as well as Yamato paid tribute to China as a consequence. This is questionable as tributes from the Korean states stopped in 653.

59. THY/99/1770.

60. NHSK26/II, 331.

61. Apart from the record in NHSK26/II, 339, the event is also recorded in CFYG970/11402.
Factors leading to the campaign

In the 11th month of 659 two Chinese generals were appointed commanders in a campaign against Paekche. Five months later the expeditionary troops embarked.¹

The Tang campaign against Paekche, the first in Chinese history, has been explained by past historians as the result of Silla's request for military assistance against the aggression of Paekche.² Indeed, Silla records note that after Silla was invaded by Paekche in the 4th month of 659, the Silla king sent an emissary to China asking for help. Paekche records, however, note that Silla lost only two fortresses on the occasion. Given that when Paekche captured 33 Silla fortresses in a concerted attack with Koguryŏ in 655 Tang only sent its border troops and nomad allies to wage small-scale attacks on Koguryŏ, the military action taken in 660 must be considered as an over-reaction.

An examination of the foreign relations of Tang in the years before 660 is necessary in order to shed some light on the motives behind the campaign. Although the hostility of Koguryŏ and Paekche towards Silla drew some attention in 655, the major concern of the Chinese in the mid-650s remained with the western Turks. In 651 and 652 the Chinese dispatched a troop of 80,000 men to drive out the western Turks who kept intruding across the Chinese border. In 655 another troop was sent to fight against Helu, the new khan of the western Turks, who rebelled against the Chinese and was captured two years later. The Chinese triumph resulted in a vast extension of the Tang empire to the borders of Persia, and two protectorates-general were established to govern the new territories in 658.³ The attainment of peace on the western frontier once again freed the court's attention to turn to the Korean Peninsula, but the focus was on Koguryŏ rather than on Paekche. In the 6th month of 658 a Tang force comprising border troops from Yingzhou and Khitan soldiers defeated a Koguryŏ army numbering 30,000, killing almost one-tenth of the enemy. Apparently the Chinese had resumed their old tactics of waging sporadic
attacks, hoping to disrupt the agricultural production of Koguryŏ and at the same time pave way for another major Chinese offensive. The major offensive came in the following year. The 659 expedition has often been neglected by most historians because of the scanty information available, but it was not insignificant. Unlike the expeditions in 655 and 658, the troops were not led by the governor-general of Yingzhou, but by Liang Jianfang and Xiebi Heli, two leading generals and a partnership which had been responsible in the first defeat of the western Turks in 651 and 652. Whether or not they again commanded an army of 80,000 men as before is uncertain, but their new appointment no doubt signified an escalation in the war against Koguryŏ.

The absence of detailed coverage of the battle in the Chinese sources may have been partly due to the lack of success. In fact, one of the generals under Liang and Xiebi is known to have been defeated by Koguryŏ. Part of the reasons for the Chinese failure seemed to be the rebellion of its nomad alliances. In 654 Koguryŏ had attempted to subdue Khitan without success. Khitan was still on the Chinese side in 658 as mentioned. Yet perhaps as a result of Koguryŏ's further maneuver, the new leader of Khitan decided to rebel against the Chinese, and he was joined by the new leader of the Tatabi. By the end of 659, in fact, one of the Tang generals Xue Rengui was not fighting against Koguryŏ but against Khitan troops.

It was this very lack of success in the 659 campaign against Koguryŏ which led to the subsequent 660 campaign against Paekche. The attack on Paekche was more than of punitive purpose, and was aimed at a complete control of the country so that the Chinese can open a new front on the southern side of Koguryŏ and Silla could have a free hand in assisting the Chinese. It was a part of a design in which Tang also sent another expedition to subdue the insurgent Tatabi and Khitan in the same year. The Tang attack in 658 and 659 were prior to the Silla request for military assistance. The Tang claim to be punishing Paekche in order to rescue Silla in 660 was no more than a pretext for a campaign which was essentially an extension of the Chinese attempt to pursue their interests in Koguryŏ.
The bond between Tang and Silla, therefore, should not be overstressed as a factor in the outbreak of war between Tang and Paekche.

What had rekindled the interest of the Chinese in Koguryo? A possible answer is the revived concern for border security. As noted already, new leaders of both Khitan and Tatabi turned against the Chinese, and Koguryo may have been the instigator. The expedition sent by the Chinese in the 5th month of 660 to subdue the two groups demonstrated that the Chinese found it necessary to regain their control of the regions immediately beyond the northeastern border. Yet the concern for border security could not satisfactorily explain the need to dispatch an expedition to Paekche, the ultimate goal of which was more likely to bring Koguryo completely under control.

The new interest in Koguryo cannot be fully understood without considering the changes taking place within the Chinese court. Li Zhi, who was given the posthumous title of Gaozong, does not appear to have been the indecisive or incompetent ruler his father had expected. Step by step, he succeeded in eliminating the influence of the older generation of officials who had predominated in the previous reign and who again played vital roles after his accession. Zhu Shuliang, for instance, was demoted to the provinces in 657. Two years later, it was the emperor's uncle Changsun Wuji who suffered from the same fate.

It is interesting to note that Zhu had raised opposition against the previous campaign against Koguryo, and Changsun, though not outspoken enough to oppose the idea of the campaign directly, nevertheless expressed reservations in 643. But Li Shiji, long known as an advocate of an aggressive policy towards Koguryo, continued to serve in court. Although he only held a post of advisory nature, one suspects that many court policies on military affairs were heavily influenced by him, since the emperor had virtually no experience in the area. At the same time, Xu Jingzong, another prominent official who became the Chief Secretariat in 658, was probably a supporter of a Koguryo campaign. He had in fact accompanied Taizong in the earlier campaign and had composed a poem to
harmonize with a composition of the emperor, in which he espoused the idea of subduing the 'eastern barbarians', undoubtedly referring to Koguryo. If the leading officials in the Tang court supported the idea of conquering Koguryo, the emperor was also likely to back the endeavour. Even had Gaozong had genuine hope of ending the hostility between Tang and Koguryo in his 651 declaration of an end to all preparations for war, Koguryo's attempt to gain control of Tang's nomad allies in 654 and later must have gradually changed his mind. In addition, there were indications that Gaozong tried to imitate his father's style of rule, at least in the early years of his reign. It is possible that he felt that he would always be subject to comparison with his father, a feeling which produced a need to prove himself. He might well have agreed that force was necessary in dealing with enemies. His interest in history might not have been as ardent as that of Sui Yangdi and his father, but he did favour the idea of taking tours to remote parts of the country as past emperors had done. One doubts if he did not equally promote the idea of expanding his empire as so many emperors also had attempted to do. After all, it was in his reign that Tang extended the empire to Central Asia.

Not only had court opinion and the attitude of the emperor changed, economic circumstances had also changed to favour a resumption of attack on Koguryo. With fewer natural disasters taking place, the Tang economy seems to have revived at a faster rate than before. The price of grain in Luoyang in 654 was in fact the lowest on record since the founding of the dynasty. There also seemed to be a steady growth in population, meaning a larger productive force. Moreover, military expeditions had become a lesser burden on the Han-Chinese, for the role of non-Han soldiers was becoming increasingly important, their number sometimes being even larger that of their Han counterparts. Among the 80,000 soldiers dispatched to attack the western Turks in 654, for instance, only 30,000 were Han soldiers. A renewed attack on Koguryo therefore would not necessarily commit the Han Chinese as heavily as before at least as human resources were concerned. In fact, the expeditionary troop sent to subdue Khitan and Tatabi constituted predominantly of non-Han soldiers.
The campaign against Paekche, in short, took place against a background whereby Koguryo created new problems of border security for the Chinese. With an expansionist leadership, an improved economic situation, new sources for mobilization and the stabilization of relations on the western frontier, the Chinese turned once more to the east. The lack of impressive wins against its old enemy prompted the Chinese to seek a new way to fulfil their goal, and Paekche fell victim as its territory had to become a springboard for the launching of a new concerted attack against its northern neighbour and ally.

The Campaigns against Paekche and Koguryo

The principal commanders of the campaigns against Paekche were Su Dingfang and Liu Boying. Very little is known about Liu, but Su could rightly be regarded as the most prominent general of the time. Although already 69 years of age, Su had remained active and had been Chief-commander in the two campaigns against the western Turks in 657 and 658 respectively. His appointment therefore was indicative of the determination of Gaozong to win the war.

Although Su and Liu were appointed in the 11th month of 659, the expeditionary troops did not embark until the 3rd month of the following year when the climate was more suitable for military operations. Given the short period of time between the appointment of the commanders and the dispatch of the troops, one suspects that preparations must have started much earlier. Nevertheless, the fact that the decision to wage an offensive against Paekche was not made until the 11th month of 659 is suggested by the Tang treatment given to by Yamato envoys. The Yamato envoys were granted an imperial audience at the end of the 10th month and were invited to take part in a court ceremony at the beginning of the 11th month. But some two weeks after the appointment of Su and Liu was announced, the envoys were sent to the western capital Changan where they were put under house arrest. The Chinese were obviously aware of the alliance between Yamato and Paekche, and the imprisonment of the envoys was likely to be a measure to prevent the envoys from leaking the piece of intelligence to
Paekche or taking it home, which might result in the military assistance from Yamato to Paekche in either case.

Su Dingfang had some experience in the Korean wars as he had taken part in a small-scale attack on Koguryo in 655. But the major part of his career had been spent in fighting the Turks, and much of his success should probably be attributed to the non-Han soldiers who comprised the bulk of his troops. There is no indication, however, that the 100,000 or 130,000 soldiers who served under him in the Paekche expedition were of non-Han origin, as nomad soldiers were not used in sea battles. Nevertheless, Su Dingfang retained his formidable reputation in Paekche. His troops successfully landed at the mouth of the River Paek, and occupied a hill before attacking their enemies from an advantageous position. Joined by their Silla allies, the Tang troops drove back the Paekche defenders and continued their advance on land, whereas the navy took advantage of the tidal current and advanced upstream, until they were less than 30 li from the western capital Sabi. Paekche lost over 10,000 men to the allied troops in another effort at resistance. The capital fell in the 8th month of the year. King Uija and his son Prince Yung fled, but were soon captured.

Part of the reason for the Chinese success must be attributed to the commandernesship of Su Dingfang. When he fought against the Turks in 656, he had refused to join his colleagues in looting as the enemy had yet to be eliminated. When one Silla troop arrived behind schedule on this occasion, he ordered that the general be executed. The order was eventually dropped due to the fear of causing unnecessary discontent among Silla generals, but the incident suggested that troops under Su must have been well-disciplined. In addition, he adopted the right strategy by choosing to attack the Paekche capital first. The decision meant a swift operation – the fighting lasted less than a month from the first attack until the fall of the capital – which minimized the problems likely to arise from transporting supplies. By capturing the Paekche king, he also destroyed the leadership which might effectively put up a stiff resistance against the allied attack, as had been the case in Koguryo.
Silla had its part to play. Numbering 50,000, its troops constituted an important part of the allied force. Some of its generals probably also served as advisers to the Tang commanders as they were more familiar with the situation in Paekche. Yet it should be noted that the number of Silla soldiers sent was not decided until the 7th month of 660, after the Silla king was informed of the size of its Chinese counterparts, and it might be suggested that Su Dingfang had planned his offensive without considering assistance from Silla. The failure of Silla troops in overcoming the resistance of Paekche so as to join the Tang forces on time only underscored their weakness.

While Su Dingfang might have been a good tactitian, Paekche must have itself to blame for the poor performance in defence. Despite the Chinese effort to keep the plan of attack a secret, the Paekche court were informed of the danger to their country. One official suggested that delaying tactics should be adopted in order to exhaust the stronger Tang troops, which would in due course be plagued by supply problems, while a direct clash with Silla was likely to end in a Paekche victory given past records of fighting between the two countries. Another official preferred a more cautious approach, and proposed that strong defence should be set up in strategic points both on land and along the coast in order to prevent possible incursions in whatever ways. Yet both proposals were rejected by King Uija, who seemed so confident of his military strength that he decided to attack the enemies only after they had entered on Paekche territory. It was a gross miscalculation. Had more than 5,000 men been sent to stop Silla invaders, it would have been doubtful whether Silla could still fight back after losing four battles. Had a strong defence put along the coast or the mouth of the River Paek, one also wonders if the Chinese could have landed on Paekche as easily as they did.

The misjudgement of the Paekche king turned out to be fatal for his country. The king, his princes, almost 100 of his officials and generals as well as over 12,000 people were deported in mainland China. Five governments-general were established, presumably superimposed on the five divisions (pu) of the former Paekche administration; they were to be
administered by local chiefs. The Tang general Wang Wendu was appointed as the Governor-general of Ungjin, the eastern capital of Paekche and probably the largest of the governments-general. The Chinese were to leave 10,000 soldiers to garrison the conquered territories under general Liu Renyuan, whereas 7,000 Silla troops remained to help them.

It is doubtful to what extent the new administration was set up or ever functioned. Although the allied armies now occupied the two capitals in Paekche, a strong opposition force remained in the provinces. Yet without eliminating the opposition forces, the Chinese troops began looting the country. Shortage of supplies may have been a reason that this was not stopped by such a strict commander as Su Dingfang, and probably a reason for the Chinese troops to return home in the 9th month of the year though anti-Tang activities remained active. For the third time in five years, Su presented the emperor with a foreign leader as a captive.

The emperor was certainly impressed by the success of Su, and set out to fulfil the goal that his father and Sui Yangdi had failed to attain. In the last month of 660 he appointed Su Dingfang and Liu Boying again as Chief-commanders in another campaign against Koguryō. He was well aware that Koguryō would not be as easily subdued as Paekche and called upon the service of the non-Han soldiers. Xiebi Heli was appointed as another Chief-commander, and he probably led soldiers of Turkish or Tōsō origins. At the same time, Uighur soldiers were to be commanded by Xiao Siye. To strengthen the Han forces, some 44,000 people were newly recruited. The emperor was so enthusiastic about the venture that he contemplated going to the front himself just as his predecessors had done. Yet opposition was raised by at least one of his officials as well as from Empress Wu, who might have had doubts about the physical condition of the emperor as he had suffered from such serious illness to the extent that he had to ask the empress to take over his work temporarily in the previous year.

In the 5th month of 661 the troops embarked. Su and his troops took the sea route, and laid siege on the Koguryō capital in the 8th month of the year. This relatively easy success was probably due to the con-
centration of Koguryo troops along the land route, where confrontation took place between troops led by Yŏn Namsaeng, the eldest son of Yŏn Kaesomun, and Xiebi Heli. The battles along the River Liao were not recorded, but fierce fighting must have taken place as by the time Xiebi arrived at the Yalu River, it was already the 9th month of the year. The weather was turning so cold that the river became frozen to facilitate the crossing of the Tang troops. Koguryŏ not only lost a natural barrier but also 30,000 men. Many of the soldiers surrendered, but Namsaeng was one of the few who managed to escape. Fortunately for Koguryŏ, Xiebi and his troops did not proceed further. Following an imperial order, the troops retreated.43

No reason was given in the historical record for the retreat, but it probably was related to the instability which occurred among the Tŏlŏs. One month after the retreat of Xiebi, a new campaign was launched against the Tŏlŏs. Although the new expeditionary troops was headed by Zheng Rentai44 who had not joined in the forces for Koguryŏ, some of his soldiers had probably just returned from Koguryŏ. Xiao Siye, for instance, apparently took part in both campaigns, and the Uighur troops that he commanded probably followed suit. Xiebi Heli was also appointed a special envoy to appease the insurgent groups, probably because of his special ethnic background.45 At any rate, the dispatch of at least four generals to fight against the Tŏlŏs suggests that a fairly large number of soldiers was involved, compelling the Chinese to halt their attack on Koguryŏ on the northern front.

The withdrawal of the troops under Xiebi Heli meant the weakening of Chinese attacking power and consequently enabled Koguryŏ to concentrate on its southern defence. Despite the arrival of the cold season, Su Dingfang and his troops continued their siege of the Koguryŏ capital throughout the end of the year. However, this time Su had little success. In the 2nd month of 662, one of the Chinese armies comprised of soldiers from southern China was completely destroyed, with over five thousand men killed.46 Another commander also died, though the cause is not recorded.47 After a snowstorm in the 2nd month of 663, the Chinese decided to withdraw.48
The impressive success of Su Dingfang thus ended in a disaster, which probably account for the fact that the campaign against Koguryo was mentioned only in passing in historical records, in fact completely dismissed in Su's own biography. Yet there is no doubt that the Chinese loss was considerable as noted in a Korean record. While Zheng Rentai had succeeded in suppressing the revolts of the T'olbs, new insurgency now arose among the Turks as well as the Uighurs. The Tibetans also began to attack the Tang protege Tuyuhun, and Zheng Rentai as well as Su Dingfang were dispatched to settle the matter. The court could now hardly afford to commit its limited resources at both the eastern and the western ends of the empire, and the campaign against Koguryo was once more brought to a halt.

The Tang failure in Koguryo proved once more the invulnerability of the Koguryo capital. The Koguryo Great Wall, which might have caused some delay in the Chinese attack, could not completely guard against the Chinese invaders just as the Chinese Great Wall could not keep Chinese territories immune from foreign encroachment. Yet the Koguryo capital held on for half a year and remained intact, turning out once more to be the most difficult obstacle for the Chinese invaders. It is of course a moot point whether the outcome would have been different had the troops under Xiebi Heli continued their advance. But their withdrawal in fact reflected the priority of the Chinese foreign policy. With an extended empire but relatively limited resources, Tang had to pay more attention to the nomadic groups on the northern and western frontier rather than its on neighbours on the Korean peninsula. Whatever problems Koguryo might create on the border, they were not comparable to those occurring on the western or northern frontier where it might mean disruptions of Chinese control over newly acquired territories in Central Asia.

The Paekche Restoration Movement

Apart from the stiff resistance put up by Koguryo defenders and the concern over instability in other parts of the empire, another factor
which indirectly led to the Chinese defeat in 662 was the restoration movement by the Paekche people.

The movement was headed by Poksin, allegedly a member of the royal family, Monk Toch'im and a former general Hukch'i Sangji. In the 9th month of 660 a Silla official was sent to Yamato to inform the Japanese of the anti-Tang and anti-Silla activities and request military assistance. In the same month, soon after the departure of Su and his troops, a counterattack was launched to recapture the western capital. The Paekche troops succeeded in destroying the outer walls of Sabi and capturing large quantities of military supplies. But a rescue troop came from Silla before the citadel could fall to the Paekche loyalists.

Meanwhile, the Chinese Governor-general of Ungjin, Wang Wendu, had died. His position was taken up by Liu Renyuan, whereas Liu Rengui was sent from the mainland to assist in the administration. Upon arriving in Paekche, Li Rengui discovered that his countrymen were again being surrounded. Realizing that his own troops were probably too small for the task, he requested assistance from Silla and succeeded in joining his colleague in the Paekche capital. The Paekche troops, however, launched another attack at Sabi at the beginning of 662 and repeatedly halted Silla attempts to rescue the beleagured Chinese. The Silla troops lost not only a considerable amount of weapons, but also had to face the problem of food shortage and were plagued by an epidemic disease at the same time, thus could supply the Tang troops only with basic necessities such as salt. Full support for its ally was also difficult for Silla, as it was being attacked by Koguryo first in the 11th month of 660 and later in the 5th month of 661. The Tang occupation troops now adopted a defensive position while the Paekche restoration movement continued to expand, with Poksin and Toch'im giving themselves titles of generals.

The success of the restoration movement stemmed from the hastiness of Su Dingfang in leaving without strengthening the Chinese rule in Paekche. Apart from encountering supply problems, Su may have realized that the task of eliminating all anti-Tang movements in Paekche would inevitably be
a protracted one, and it would be better for his reputation to turn to the attack on Koguryŏ, the ultimate target, leaving occupation troops to settle the matter. The relative ease with which he captured the Paekche capital perhaps also convinced him that he should adopt the same strategy in Koguryŏ, which meant that the original plan to attack Koguryŏ from the south was to be revised. But Silla would continue to play a role by giving support both in terms of manpower and supplies.

Yet it seemed that Su had underestimated the strength of the Paekche restoration movement and was overconfident of the ability of Silla to fulfill its role. Not only did the restoration movement forces immobilize the Tang occupation force for almost one year from mid-661 to mid-662, they also blocked the way for Silla troops to join the Tang forces in Koguryŏ. In the 6th month of 661, the Silla court was informed of the schedule for the concerted attack. The death of the Silla king understandably caused some delay in dispatching the army. But the blockades formed by Paekche groups continuously kept Silla troops from further advance. A special envoy was sent from the Tang forces urging Silla to speed up its transport of supplies at the end of the year. Yet it was not until the 2nd month of the following year, some sixth months behind schedule, that Silla succeeded in joining its ally troops who had now prepared to retreat.60

If Tang decided to abandon temporarily its plan to conquer Koguryŏ, it was not surprising that it also considered abandoning Paekche. Soon after the return of the expeditionary troops from Koguryŏ to mainland, the Tang emperor sent a letter to the commander of the occupation troops in Paekche, telling him to retreat to China or to station his forces in Silla in case Silla found it necessary.61 The Tang emperor was not without his reasons. The capitals of Paekche were the only regions under Chinese control, and to supply their garrisons from either mainland China or Silla was difficult. Now that the Chinese had stopped pursuing their interest in Koguryŏ, Paekche also lost its importance. The letter was welcomed by most of the occupation troops, who had depended much on the support from Silla and was still under the threat by enemy troops. Yet Liu Rengui was
not ready to concede defeat. A man of strong character whose determination to work things out his own way had led him to kill an army officer in his younger days, he had envisioned his assignment to Paekche not only as a step to restore his official position—he had been disciplined earlier for having failed to meet a military schedule—but also an opportunity to make himself rich. In fact, he had brought with himself a Chinese calendar to Paekche, hoping that he would one day be the governor-general and thereby adopt the calendar in the new territories acquired by his country. Knowing well that returning to China would mean an end to his dream, Liu was determined to change the minds of his colleagues. Although not the Chief-commander of the occupation troop, he succeeded in persuading the others to stay behind in Paekche. He argued that priority in military operations should always be given to the interest of the country and that maintaining a foothold in Paekche was performing such a virtue. He predicted that the division in the Paekche leadership would provide an opportunity for the Chinese to exploit. Furthermore, it would be undesirable for the Chinese troop to retreat to Silla where their activities would be restrained.  

The fact that Liu met little opposition from his colleagues and his superior suggests that not only Liu was articulate, but that there must have been some truth in his argument. While it is doubtful whether the interest of the country—in this case the maintainence of a base for further military operations in future—was really a concern of the military leaders, there was some discontent with the treatment they received from Silla among the Tang generals. For instance, on one occasion when the Chinese joined their ally in defeating enemies' troops, Liu Renyuan, now the Governor-general of Ungjin, was awarded rolls of cloth in the same manner as other Silla generals.  

In addition, the observation that there was some disarray among leaders of the movement also turned out to be true as Toch'Im was killed by Poksin.  

Aware of his own small number, the Tang general had sent a letter trying to convince leaders of the restoration movement that they were not
fighting for worthy cause. Well-knowing that they had the upper hand, the Paekche leaders refused to see the envoy, who was dispatched back with the message that the Paekche leaders would be pleased to escort the Tang troops should they return. Realizing that they had to fight for their survival and seeing that the opportunity had arrived with the split in the leadership of the enemy camp, the occupation troops counter-attacked and secured a path for communication with Silla.65

Assistance from Yamato

While the obsession of Tang generals with conquering Koguryó accounted partly for the rapid growth of the Paekche restoration movement, another factor which should not be overlooked was the assistance from Yamato, which had 'established a friendly relations' with Paekche in 653. As mentioned already, one and a half months after the fall of the Paekche capital, Paekche officials were already in Yamato reporting the incident. Another group of Paekche officials arrived a month later, bringing with them 106 Chinese captives and requesting Yamato for military support.66 In short, Yamato assistance was sought at the very beginning of the restoration movement.

The Chinese captives were soon settled in Ōmi no Kuni where they engaged in agriculture.67 Ōmi no Kuni was a region occupied mainly by a number of new migrants, especially those from Paekche.68 Given that Paekche had sent technicians of different skills to Yamato in exchange for military assistance on a number of occasions in the 6th century, it was possible that the Chinese captives served a similar purpose as those Paekche technicians who had arrived before.

The Yamato court immediately gave a positive response. Preparation started as warships were ordered to be built and weaponry was inspected. At the beginning of 661, an imperial entourage left for Kyushu. The fact that one of the consorts of Prince Ōama gave birth to a daughter on the way suggests that the entourage was relatively large. The group arrived in Kyushu in the 3rd month, but no further action was taken. After the
aged ruler Empress died in 7th month of the year. Prince Naka no Ōe now became the actual leader of the country although he did not officially succeed the throne.

The failure to honour its promise by the Yamato court must have disappointed leaders of the restoration movement in Paekche. One wonders if they had not already used the name of Prince P'ung to rally support for themselves. At any rate, in the 4th month of 661, another Paekche envoy arrived in Yamato, asking not for military assistance but only for the Prince.

Two possible reasons accounted for the delay in assistance from Yamato. One was likely to be the difficulties in organizing an expeditionary troop. The absence of large-scale wars within Yamato leaves scarce information on the Yamato army, which was essentially organized under various clans and did not have a sophisticated or centralized structure. Many scholars have pointed out that the army later sent to the Korean peninsula comprised more regional than central troops, but available information is hardly adequate to make any definite conclusion. One regional historical record of Bichū, a province in the part of Honshu facing western Shigoku, nevertheless sheds some light on the question. It notes that 20,000 soldiers were recruited by Prince Naka no Ōe during the trip to Kyushu, but no other record suggests that these soldiers eventually took part in the expedition, implying that the recruitment ended in failure. It may be surmised that the case was by no means an isolated one. If indeed the Prince tried to recruit 20,000 men from each province, then the 50,000 strong men being sent in the next three years to the Korean peninsula must be considered as very small, and the lack of full co-operation from the local powers must be a major factor. Indeed, it has been pointed out that many of the commanders of the expeditionary troops were people who had personal experience in sailing to the Korean states or who had records of being punished for opposing policies of the court. It was likely that ventures which involved travelling to the Korean peninsula were considered to be fairly dangerous. This probably accounted for the
fact that the expedition was commanded by the experienced and the convicted, the latter probably taking the opportunity to make up for their political errors.

A second factor which might have caused the delay of assistance from Yamato was the changing circumstances in the Korean peninsula. It should be noted that the Yamato envoys who had earlier been put under arrest house in the western capital of Tang were released after the fall of Paekche. Together with the Paekche captives, they were granted an imperial audience in Luoyang. As the Chinese decision to attack Koguryo was made soon after the return of Su Dingfang and his Paekche captives, it is almost certain that the Yamato envoys brought back the intelligence of a forthcoming Chinese attack on Koguryo when they returned home in the 5th month of 661.

Two different scenarios can be painted here. Knowing that the Tang troops were formidable, the Yamato leaders took great discretion in avoiding a direct clash with the Chinese. They probably knew that the Chinese had only a small occupation troop in Paekche, but they also had to consider the possibility of a second Chinese attack. Therefore, it was only after they were informed of the Chinese landing in Koguryo in the 7th month of 661 that Yamato sent two troops to Paekche.

This is of course based on the assumption that the Yamato troops were sent to Paekche to rescue Paekche. Yet it is equally if not more likely, that the troops were sent to Paekche to rescue Koguryo, in which case Yamato troops would also have to land on Paekche as Tang navy had control of the coastal waters on the western part of Koguryo. Indeed, the continuous invasion of Tang in 658 and 659 had prompted Koguryo to send two delegations to Yamato in the first half of 660, probably as a means to strengthen the tie between the two countries. There is, however, no record of Yamato resistance to Koguryo in Chinese historical sources, for there were probably no direct confrontations between Tang and Yamato troops. The Nihonshoki notes, however, that in the 12th month of 661 the Yamato troops had to light some fire after landing in Paekche. One suspects that they
had encountered difficulties just as their Chinese counterparts because of the wintry conditions in the Korean peninsula, and by the time they reached Koguryô, the Tang troops had already left.

Whether the Yamato assistance was aiming at rescuing Koguryô or supporting the Paekche restoration movement, it is beyond doubt that Yamato took a great interest in the affairs of the Korean states. Prince Naka no Ōe in fact moved to a palace closer to the coast so that any news from the Korean peninsula could reach him in a shorter time. No measures were taken to step up the Yamato coastal defence, and there is no evidence to substantiate the theory that the Yamato ruling class perceived a threat because of the Tang military presence on the Korean peninsula.74 On the contrary, the Yamato leaders must have considered the possibility of clashing with the Chinese before they promised to support the restoration movement. One is even tempted to speculate that the envoys returning from China might have brought back the warning that Yamato should refrain from interfering in the affairs of the Korean states. Yet the reluctance of Yamato to obey the warning or threat and its readiness to fight with Tang were demonstrated by the dispatch of troops to the Korean peninsula.

If the troops which left Yamato for Paekche in the 8th month of 661 were to rescue Koguryô, this does did necessarily mean that Yamato had failed to respond to the request of Paekche. One month later, Prince P'ung was escorted home by another Yamato navy numbering over 5,000 people. The treatment given to the Paekche prince should not be overlooked here. The highest court rank was granted and a daughter of a court noble was married to him before his departure. One might suggest that the Yamato court was adopting a practice which the Chinese often used in dealing with their neighbours by marriage to princesses, and that the Yamato move in 661 was also aiming at extending its influence in Paekche. The fact that the Yamato court showed favour to Prince P'ung in a way which it had not favoured him for some thirty years strongly suggests that the measure was a political investment. One might even postulate that some agreement may have been reached between the Paekche prince and his hosts concerning the
future of the country, provided of course the Paekche restoration movement succeeded.

The end of 661 and the beginning of 662 thus saw the presence of a large group of Yamato troops in Paekche. Although they had little to do with the retreat of the Chinese troops from Koguryō, there is no doubt that they played a part in holding or even recovering lost territories from the occupation troops in Paekche. While Korean records fail to note any fighting with Yamato soldiers, one suspects that the delay of the Silla troops in reaching their Tang allies was caused by the Yamato military presence. The Yamato support came not only in the form of human power but also of material supply. In the 1st month of 662, 10,000 arrows, 500 catties of silk, twice that amount of cotton, 1,000 rolls of cloth and 10,000 hides of leather were sent. In addition, there were also 3,000 koku of rice-seeds.

With the exception of silk, most of the material could be classified as military necessities. It is significant to note that rice-seeds were included, as it reflected the fact that agricultural production in Paekche had probably been severely hampered by the years of warfare. Yet the assistance given to Paekche and the need to support its own troops must have meant a great burden for Yamato. It was probably in mid-662 that the Yamato Chief-commander Azumi no Hirabu and his troops returned home. Before he left, however, he declared Prince P'ung King of Paekche, and bestowed an official title and a golden rod upon Poksin. On the surface, Yamato was trying to ensure co-operation between the restoration movement leaders and the prince. Yet by treating Poksin as a general under Yamato supervision and putting Prince P'ung in the throne, Yamato was in fact making an attempt to control the restoration movement by setting up its own puppet regime in Paekche.

The assistance from Yamato, however, did not completely solve the problem of food shortage in Paekche. At the end of 662, Prince P'ung suggested that the base of the restoration movement be moved to a more fertile region, but opposition was raised by his Yamato advisers who argued
that priority should be given to military rather than economic considerations. The move was nevertheless made, suggesting that the shortage of food was becoming a serious problem for the Paekche troops.

The Battle at River Paek

The situation in the Korean peninsula now turned into a deadlock as both the Tang and the Paekche troops were hampered by a similar problem. If any party profited, it was Silla. In the 8th month of 662 a Silla troop of 19 generals was sent to attack to Paekche. In the 2nd month of 663 four more Paekche fortresses were captured.\textsuperscript{76} It was not accidental that when the Yamato generals opposed the move of the base for the restoration movement, they urged Prince P'ung to base his troops at Churyu because defense was easier to set up. The Paekche troops, in short, could no longer take the initiative, and Silla was becoming the dominating force in Paekche.

In the 4th month of 663 the Silla king was appointed by Tang as the Major Governor-general of the Jilin (K. Kyerim) Commandery, which was supposed to be established in in Silla.\textsuperscript{77} One suspects that the Tang court had also realized its limitation in making active interventions in Paekche and this was a means to recognize the Silla military strength as a consequence of the earlier military operation in Paekche.

Paekche must have realized that it could hardly defeat its enemies without further reinforcement. In the 3rd month of 663 three divisions of Yamato troops totalling 27,000 men departed for the Korean peninsula in the name of attacking Silla, capturing two forts along the southern coast three months later. It was also around the 3rd or the 4th month of the year that a Yamato general was dispatched to Koguryó from from Paekche, presumably to persuade Koguryó to join in a new military operation against Silla and Tang troops.\textsuperscript{78}

Before assistance came from its allies, however, further disarray among the leaders aggravated the Paekche restoration movement. Prince P'ung had had disagreements with his Yamato generals earlier, and now he became suspicious of his fellow countrymen. At the same time, Poksin
attempted to assassinate the prince. Poksin had at one stage allowed the prince to perform only religious duties, perhaps due to the resentment that the movement was gradually becoming dominated by advisers from Yamato and that the prince's loyalty was not so much to the cause of the movement as to the interests of the country where he had resided for some thirty years. But the conspiracy was discovered, and the Prince killed Poksin, allegedly after being urged by other members of the movement. 79

The Tang commanders again took advantage of the split in the Paekche leadership. Perhaps using the need to counter the allied troops of Paekche and Yamato as an excuse, they succeeded in persuading the Tang government to send reinforcements. Although numbering only 7,000, the reinforcements nevertheless arrived in time to defeat an attempt by Paekche to seek assistance from Koguryo. 80

The scene was set for a major confrontation. Taking the advice of Liu Rengui, Liu Renyuan decided to wage an offensive on Churyu. They were joined by his Silla allies as well as a Paekche navy led by Prince Yung, who had earlier surrendered to the Chinese and gone to China but had now returned. Realizing the significance of the battle, Yamato also sent another navy which arrived at the mouth of the River Paek on the 17th day of the 8th month. Their immediate attempt to break through the Tang defence came to nothing. Hostilities resumed ten days later. After four bouts of fighting, the Yamato navy was defeated, with most of their warships set on fire. On land, the allied troops of Silla and Tang also defeated the allied troops of Paekche and Yamato, and Churyu fell at the beginning of the 9th month after ten days. With a number of Paekche people and one of the princes, the Yamato navy retreated to the Silla territory it had captured earlier, and finally withdrew completely from the Korean peninsula on the 24th of the month. The Paekche prince P'ung managed to escape to Koguryo, but his younger brothers and some of the Yamato forces surrendered. Hukch'i Sangji and another general continued their hold of some castles in the northern part of the country for more than a month, but eventually Hukch'i decided to surrender while his colleague fled to Koguryo. 81
A number of things can be said about this war. First, the decisive battle was fought mainly on water with little participation from the army. It was essentially a conflict between the Tang and Yamato navies, with no participation of Silla troops, though there were some pro-Tang Paekche troops under Prince Yung. A Korean source records that there were 122,711 Tang soldiers in 1900 ships in the campaign against Paekche in 660. Since the record seems reliable as the figure of the soldiers coincided with those found in Chinese sources, one Chinese ship would have carried about 65 people. A Japanese record notes that there were 190 Tang ships in 663, which implies that the total number of the Tang navy would have been slightly over 7,600, a number closely resembling that of the reinforcement troops. The Chinese troop which fought with the Yamato navy was not necessarily the reinforcement troop, but it was most likely that the ships used in the battle were those which had been boarded by those newly arrived. Even given allowance for the participation of some Paekche navy, it is doubtful if the Tang navy numbered more than 15,000 men. The number 20,000, given by one Chinese source is probably a round figure.

Chinese sources also record that there were 400 ships from Yamato altogether. The number has been dismissed as an exaggeration by Tang commanders as a means to claim military credits when they reported the event to the court, but there is no supporting evidence to substantiate this theory. Given that Yamato had dispatched 200 ships to fight against its neighbouring peoples earlier, 400 was certainly not a large number provided each ship carried 50 people. As far as Japanese record is concerned, it is uncertain if the Yamato navy was composed merely of those led by Inohō Hara no Kimi which had over 10,000 men, or if they were also joined by any of those who had been sent earlier to attack Silla which numbered 27,000. Yet it is known that that 5,000 strong soldiers who had accompanied the Paekche prince back to his country took part as their commander died in the battle. In short, the minimum number for the Yamato troops was 15,000, and most likely to have been larger.

What determined the outcome of the battle was therefore not the
difference in the size of the navy but the adoption of the correct strategy. Although without success on the first day, the Yamato navy did not seek any change in its tactics, but decided to have a head-on clash with the enemy. The situation could have been different had the Yamato navy been outnumbered by the Tang counterpart, and perhaps if they had a commander who was not known to have taken part in any fighting, land or sea. Apparently Prince P'ung and his Yamato generals failed to realize that there was a considerable difference in water level between periods of high tide and low tide in the estuary, for their fleet could not turn astern on low tide after having penetrating deeply into the river at high tide. The immobility of the fleet which went aground became a severe setback when the vessels were set alight by the enemy. Chinese records note that smoke filled the sky and the water became red, whereas Japanese source also records that many Yamato soldiers were drowned while trying to escape. Although some Yamato generals fought courageously until they were killed, their bravery could hardly make up for their ignorance of the geography of the battleground.

The defeat of the Yamato navy in 663, however, was not the sole reason for bringing an end to the Paekche restoration movement. If the Chinese first made the mistake of not thoroughly eliminating opposing Paekche elements after capturing the capital in 660, leaders of the Paekche restoration movement also committed the error of allowing the survival of the occupation troops in 661 when they probably could have driven out the Chinese, who had been cut off from supplies from their ally as well as from their own country. Not only had the Paekche leaders failed to exploit the difference between the Tang and Silla commander, they also weakened their own strength by fighting among themselves for power, allowing an opportunity for Prince P'ung to assert his authority. The experience of the prince, however, only qualified him for a puppet ruler but not one who could provide a leadership that could iron out the differences between the various groups. His incompatibility with Paksin eventually ended in the death of the latter, which meant that an important link was cut between the
Yamato-backed prince and the indigenous leaders like Hukch'i Sangji, who had played an important part in the early part of the movement but were not given opportunities to make a contribution later. The disillusionment of Hukch'i with the movement in fact could have been a factor that accounted for his final surrender to the Chinese.

While credit should be given to the support of Yamato to the movement both in economic and military terms, it can be argued that it was the very presence of Yamato troops which further alienated Prince P'ung from his countrymen and perhaps even prompted Tang to reinforce the occupation troop in Paekche. The Yamato experience in supporting the movement demonstrated once again the difficulties in overcoming the obstacle of physical distance by foreign powers, and the disastrous result for Yamato could mean that it was unlikely to interfere directly in the affairs of the Korean peninsula again despite its interest. Notwithstanding the fact that it turned out to be the victor in Paekche, Tang did not attain its goal of conquering Koguryo, where the Chinese encountered defeat for the first time in the Tang dynasty. Although a foothold was maintained in Paekche as a result of the perseverance of some generals, it is likely that the Chinese would restrain themselves, at least temporarily, from taking further military action against the Korean states. Having played an active part in the invasion of Paekche and the subsequent suppression of the restoration movement, Silla was now becoming increasingly instrumental in shaping the development of events in Paekche, if not in the Korean peninsula as a whole.
Footnotes

1. JTS4/79-80.
2. ZZTJ200/6320.
4. CFYG986/11577, ZZTJ200/6309. Guisso, 268, has suggested that Xue Rengui was also dispatched. This is probably incorrect, see note 10.
5. JTS4/79, 83/2781 (the year should probably be the third rather than the second of Xianqing as in XTS111/4140).
6. XTS215B/6061. The record here appears to be closer to the original than that in JTS194B, which give a figure of only 50,000, cf. ZZTJ199/6274.
7. JTS77/2671.
8. CFYG995/11686 (cf. ZZTJ199/6286).
10. JTS77/2671, 83/2781.
11. CFYG986/11577, ZZTJ200/6320.
12. See Huang Y., 81-89.
13. JTS80/2739.
14. JTS65/2455-56.
15. ZZTJ197/6202.
16. ZZTJ197/6207.
17. JTS82/2763.
18. See QTS35/463 for a poem entitled "Looking at sea on a spring day" (QTS31/7). Judging from the content of the two poems together with a third one by Yang Shidao (ZTS34/460), they were composed on the way to Koguryo in 645.
19. See, for instance, ZZTJ199/6275-76, when the emperor encouraged remonstrations from his officials.
21. ZZTJ201/6359.
22. ZZTJ199/6286.
23. ZZTJ199/6279 notes an increase of 150,000 in 652 and a total population of 3,800,000.
24. XTS215B/6061. Guisso, 109, has overlooked this fact and suggested that Tang relied solely on fubing troops.
26. JTS83/2778-80. Sijieque here is probably another form of Yasijieque as found in XTS215B/6061.
27. JTS4/80, CFYG986/11577.
28. NHSK26/II, 345.
29. ZZZ2199/6287.
30. For details of his 657 campaign against the Turks, see XTS215B/6060. At least five generals were under him, namely, Ren Yaxiang, Xiao Siye, Huige Porun, Yashina Ershe and Yashina Buzhen. Ren and Xiao were the Protector-general and the Vice-protector-general of the Yanran Protectorate-general, which was established in 647 to control the various nomadic groups along the northern Chinese border (JTS199B/5348-9, 195/5196-97). Huige was governor-general of the Hanhai Governorate-general, which was under the rule of the Yanran Protectorate-general. The Yashinas were Turkish generals. It is most likely therefore that most of these soldiers were non-Han Chinese.
32. JTS83/2779, CFYG986/11577, SGSG5/59-61, 7/78. There is no evidence to substantiate the claim by Guisso, 114, that it was Silla troops which first routed the Paekche defending forces. There were fightings before the Silla force met their Chinese counterpart, but obviously it was the Chinese who planned the whole operation.
33. SGSG28/276-77.
34. JTS199A/5331. According to JTS83/2779, however, six were set up.
35. SGSG7/78.
36. JTS109/3294.
37. XTS3/61.
38. CFYG986/11578.
40. JTS185A/4789-90.
41. ZZTJ200/6324, CFYG986/11578.
42. XTS3/61, CFYG986/11578.
43. XTS110/4109-20.
44. XTS3/61. ZZTJ200/6326 attributes the campaign to the revolt of the Uighurs, which was quite unlikely, see Cen (1958), 281.
45. XTS110/4109.
46. CFYG373/4441, cf. ZZTJ200/6327.
47. JTS4/83.
48. CFYG438/5199.
49. SGSG44/446.
50. XTS215B/6064, CFYG449/5324, JTS195/5197.
51. XTS216A/6074, ZZTJ201/6336.
52. XTS200/6200 recorded Poksin as a nephew of King Uija, whereas JTS19A/5331 recorded him as a former general. In NHSK26/II, 345, he is known as official with a second rank in a scale of 16.
53. JTS199A/5331.
54. JTS109/3294.
55. NHSK26/II, 345.
56. SGSG5/61, 7/79. It should be pointed out that the latter record is part of a letter arguing that Silla had played an important part in the military operations after its fall and tends to be exaggerating see also the study by Ikeuchi (1960), 105-06.
57. While JTS84/2790 suggests that he commanded the troops once under Wang, he did not inherit the position. According to CFYG366/4354, it was Liu Renyuan who held the position. The fact that Liu's biography is relatively detailed could have been due to the fact that he was assigned the task of compiling historical records later. One suspects that some of the material on Liu Renyuan, who might have had his own biography (see, e.g. CFYG366/4354), had been incorporated in the biography of Liu Rengui.
58. SGSG5/62, 7/78.
59. JTS199A/5331-32.
60. SGS42/434-36.
61. JTS84/2790, CFYG366/4354.
62. JTS84/2789-95.
63. SGS42/434.
64. JTS199A/5332.
65. Ibid., also CFYG366/4355.
66. NHSK26/II, 347.
67. NHSK26/II, 351.
68. See, for instance, NHSK27/363, 373. For further discussion, see Nagayama, 106-12.
69. See, for instance, Kishi (1966), 301-04.
70. Fudoki, 487.
71. NHSK27/II, 357 records that there were 27,000 men in three divisions of Yamato troops sent in 663, implying that each army comprised of 9,000 men. The two divisions sent in the 8th month were likely to have 18,000 men. Added to the 5,000-strong men who escorted the Paekche prince home, the total number of Yamato soldiers sent would have been 50,000 strong.
73. NHSK26/II, 345, 349, 351.
74. Inoue M. (1975), 159.
75. See the discussion by Ikeuchi (1960), 141-52.
76. SGS46/67.
77. ZZT4201/6335.
78. This is general Inakami, who returned to Paekche in the 5th month, see NHSK27/359.
79. According to NHSK27/II, 359, the event took place in the 6th month of 663. For more details, see JTS84/2791, 199A/5332.
80. According to JTS199A/5332, the request for reinforcement troops came after securing a path for contact with Silla (7th month, 662) and before the Paekche request for assistance from Yamato. JTS84/2790, on the other hand, notes that the arrival of the reinforcement troop took place after the assassination of Poksin (6th month, 663).
XTS3/62 records the order for departure of the troops as the 7th month of 662. It is highly likely that the correct date for this record should be 663 rather than 662.

81. The sources of the battle are from JTS84/2791-92, 199H/5332-33, NHSK27/II, 357-61, SGSSG42/436, ZTTJ201/6336.

82. SGYS1/48.

83. NHSK27/359.

84. CPYG358/4242.

85. JTS84/2791.


87. Takikawa has suggested that the Yamato troops numbered less than 10,000, yet he appeared to have overlooked the figures given for the troops under Inoho Hara no Kimiomi,(1971), 26.

88. There could have been a difference in the size of the warships and the weapons installed on them as suggested by Takikawa (1971), 28-29.
CHAPTER SEVEN  THE FALL OF KOGURYO AND ITS AFTERMATH

Relationship of Tang with Silla and Koguryo

As the policy of Tang towards Paekche after the late 650s was essentially an extension of its policy towards Koguryo, the strategic importance of Paekche understandably decreased for the Chinese after their lack of success in Koguryo in 661-62. In spite of the fact that a small reinforcement troop was sent to Paekche, the Chinese court hardly appeared to be concerned whether it could retain control in the Korean state. In fact, the increasing economic pressure on the Hebei region from preparation for the campaigns against Paekche and Koguryo not only prompted the court to call off the performance of the fang ceremony in the 12th month of 662,¹ but finally resulted in a decree ordering an end to all ship-building projects for future expeditions in the 8th month of 663.² It is significant that the decree was issued before the deciding battle at the River Paek was fought. In other words, the battle was fought and won by the Tang generals in Paekche at their own accord and against the policy of the court. It was hardly surprising therefore that when the Tang commander Liu Renyuan returned to the mainland, he was severely criticized by court officials, some whom even accusing him of conspiracy by retaining large number of soldiers in Paekche. Probably because of his success in suppressing the anti-Tang movement, however, Liu managed to escape punishment.³

After Liu Renyuan and the troops reinforcing him returned home, a small Tang occupation force was nevertheless stationed in Paekche under the commandship of Liu Rengui, who made efforts to re-establish order — those who died in the battles were buried, roads and bridges were constructed, household registers were compiled and agriculture was encouraged. Indeed, there was one castle which was named after him.⁴ Yet these measures were likely to be due to Liu’s personal initiative rather than the result of a court order. The lack of support for Liu’s efforts is evident in a memorial sent in the 10th month of 664.⁵ Liu complained that not only were his
soldiers old and weak, but many of them had failed to obtain awards they deserved or had been promised. There was a large number of deserters because many of the soldiers often had already served two or more times longer than scheduled. He argued that Tang should maintain a stronghold in Paekche as insurgent elements were still active, and that it was also necessary to keep guard on Yamato in spite of its remoteness. To ensure that the occupation force could carry out its mission effectively, he pointed out that there was a desperate need for new uniforms. Liu was by no means exaggerating his needs — it is known that Silla had to provide uniform for the Tang troops in the previous year.\(^5\) The personal petition of Liu succeeded in moving the emperor, who again dispatched Liu Renyuan to Paekche with replacement troops. But Liu Rengui insisted on staying in Paekche and his second petition was again approved by the emperor.

Liu, however, was not assigned the top position in the government set up by the Chinese. The Governor-generalship of Ungjin, the top military position previously held by Liu Renyuan who again returned home, was now held by Prince Yung,\(^7\) whose father, the late King Uija, had died soon after arriving in China. The prince returned to his home country sometime before the Battle at the River Paek and took a part in the battle himself.\(^8\) In view of the strong Paekche resistance put up by the restoration movement, the return of the prince was a typical Chinese policy whereby the rivalry between two potential leaders was often exploited in order to weaken the hostility towards China and in turn nurture a pro-China leadership.\(^9\) In the case of Paekche, making Prince Yung Governor-general of Ungjin meant in fact that the Chinese were returning the rule of Paekche to its royal household. It was probably the best solution the Chinese could afford to maintain a foothold in Paekche without heavily committing their own forces.

The arrangement of a peace treaty between the two Korean states was not based on the principle of 'playing one barbarian against another', for it is doubtful if the military strength of Paekche after the years of chaos
could match that of Silla, and there would not have been the necessity for having a peace treaty. It was a piece of diplomatic maneuver in which Tang attempted to bring an end to the animosity between two traditional enemies for over a century without resorting to force. Not only did the Chinese try to solve the problem of border disputes by drawing a borderline presumably agreeable to both parties, they also hoped to commit Silla to peace on its western front by using a treaty which both parties expressed willingness to observe. In short, the Chinese government was trying to resume the role of a peacekeeper on the southern end of the Korean peninsula. Yet bearing in mind the fact that Prince Yung had sided with Tang troops in fighting against his own people in the Battle at River Paek, it is doubtful to what extent he could find support, and this would again give rise to instability in Paekche. There was perhaps a small Chinese military presence, but not adequate to enforce observance of the agreement. In short, the Chinese solution was doomed to fail from the outset.

If the return of Prince Yung to Paekche signified a reluctance of the Chinese to get itself deeply involved in the affairs of the Korean states, it did not necessarily mean that Tang had completely abandoned its interest in Koguryo. As Liu Rengui had argued, the maintenance of a foothold in Paekche was important for future expeditions against Koguryo. In addition, as will be discussed in more details later, a peace treaty was signed between Paekche and Silla, which served to isolate Koguryo diplomatically. Whichever the case, Gaozong's interest in Koguryo is perhaps reflected by the fact that no individual was held responsible for the disastrous result of the Tang invasion of Koguryo in 662. On the contrary, the commanders seem to have been praised for their efforts rather than blamed for their failure in an imperial decree.

There were however, signs of increasing opposition against further campaigns within the court. Those who criticized Liu Renyuan and his keeping of Tang forces in Paekche probably belonged to this group. The lenient treatment of the generals in spite of their lack of impressive results also gave rise to dissatisfaction among some officials who expressed their
disapproval in a discretionary manner. In the 11th month of 662, Xu Yushi, one of the two prime ministers at the time, privately punished his son who had been found guilty of damaging some farmland of a rich peasant during a hunting trip. When accused of holding contempt for the law, Xu defended himself by arguing that, being an official in charge of civil affairs, he could hardly abuse the law like those who held military power or those who held positions in important garrison towns. The remark was obviously a reflection of discontent towards the military, perhaps because of their influential role in state affairs and their decisions to launch frequent expeditions. At any rate, Xu's comment not only aroused the wrath of Gaozong, but also brought about the criticism of Xu Jingzong, the other prime minister who had presumably supported the idea of an expedition against Koguryo, and Xu Yushi lost his ministership and was exiled as a result. One suspects that Xu was not alone in court in his opposition to the military men and their expansionist foreign policy.

Despite the continued interest in Koguryo among some members of the Tang court, the consensus for the time being was maintenance of the status quo. In 664 the idea of performing the feng ceremony was revived by the Empress Wu among others, and was duly accepted by the emperor. This time it was not called off again as had happened in the past, and the grandest ceremony ever since the founding of the dynasty was performed at the beginning of 666, with representatives and envoys from different places within the country and neighbouring states coming to Mount Tai. As far as the Korean states were concerned, Liu Rengui managed to take along with him envoys or members of the royal households of Paekche, Silla, Yamato and T'ama, a small island state to the south of the Korean peninsula, which had paid tributes to Yamato, Silla and Paekche. Yet the most noteworthy guest came from Koguryo, whose king sent his son to pay homage to the Chinese court and to attend the ceremony. It is unknown if this was a response to the Chinese invitation or a spontaneous move. Whichever the case, the Koguryo gesture was in sharp contrast compared to its negative response to the request of Yangdi half a century earlier. That it earned a special mention in Chinese historical annals also suggests that the
arrival of the prince must have meant much more to the Chinese than the large number of representatives from other neighbouring countries. There might even have been some who hoped that the event would mark the beginning of a new phase of friendly relations between Tang and Koguryo.

The change of attitude by Koguryo could have been due to a change in its leadership. In the last or second last month of 665, Yon Kaesomun died and was succeeded by his eldest son Namsaeng. Yon Namsaeng had been responsible for defending against Chinese invasion in 661, and the great losses of men he suffered might have caused him to find a new approach to the Tang-Koguryo relationship. Had his father died before the 10th month of 665, it was possible that he was instrumental in the rapprochement of the two neighbours. Yet the hope of a new friendship soon ended as internal struggle broke out again in Koguryo after Namsaeng embarked on an inspectional tour of the provincial areas. Namsaeng and his brother Namgon became suspicious of one another and the latter staged a coup d'etat in the capital, and Namsaeng was summoned in the name of the king to return to the court, presumably to receive punishment. Namsaeng refused and fled to Kungnae, where he joined with some Khitan and Malgal people after his son was killed. Unremitting pressure from Namgon, however, forced Namsaeng to seek military assistance from none other than the Chinese.

Even had he played a part in the rapprochement of Tang-Koguryo relationship, Namsaeng did not get an immediate response from the Chinese. Three delegations were in fact sent. The first was abortive because the emissary defected, and the second and the third had to be led by an official and one of Namsaeng's sons respectively. The delay in the Tang response may have been due partly to the holding of the feng ceremony, which ended in the 4th month of the year when the imperial entourage was heading back towards the capital, and also partly to Chinese suspicion of the request. The Tang leaders probably still had fresh memories of Namsaeng putting up stiff resistance in 661 which had caused considerable difficulty for the Chinese advance. It was after sending his son that Yon Namsaeng succeeded in convincing the Chinese of his sincerity and of the precarious position
he was in. In the 6th month of 666, an army under the commandership of Xiebi Heli, who had been responsible for Namsaeng's final defeat in 661, was dispatched, probably to ensure that Namsaeng would not turn against the Chinese easily once his own goals were fulfilled. Four other generals also took part, but two of them seem to have been in charge of supplies rather than fighting at the front. Thus the initial purpose of the Chinese mission may well have been limited to rescuing the ousted Koguryo leader rather than waging a full-scale attack on Koguryo.

The hesitation to launch a large-scale campaign against Koguryo, however, ended in the last month of 666 when Li Shiji was appointed the Chief-commander of a Tang expeditiousary force. Being the one of the few survivors who had contributed to the founding of the dynasty, he was now 68 years of age. He is known to have been ill in 658, and apparently did not accompany the court in the imperial trips to the eastern capital in the following years. When he had to take to the road in 665 as a special convenor for the feng ceremony, he fell from his horse. The special privilege he enjoyed which allowed him to enter the court on horseback was probably not only a reflection of his reverent position in court but also his difficulties in walking.

The appointment of the old, and perhaps crippled, Li Shiji, however, was not completely accidental. As early as 645 Taizong had lamented that his generals were aging and there were few prominent generals in the new generation of military men. The situation did not seem to improve much in the reign of Gaozong. Su Dingfang had to take up commandership repeatedly in the late 650s and early 660s, until he met his Waterloo in Koguryo with Xiao Siye, another general experienced in frontier fighting. Zheng Rentai, one of those who also had considerable success in dealing with neighbouring peoples, died in 663. Nobody else in the country had more experience and success in fighting with Koguryo than Li Shiji, who understandably became the emperor's first choice.

The imperial choice, however, would not have been accepted without the approval of Li Shiji himself. Li had requested to be relieved from
official duties as early as in 650, but nevertheless continued to serve in
the capacity of a senior advisor to the court. He must have been aware of
the significance of the appointment. It would be his last opportunity to
fulfill a goal that had been pursued by Chinese rulers for over half a
century. His ideas in dealing with the enemy were not fully accepted by
the previous emperor in the last campaign, but this time he would probably
have full power to carry out his plans. He certainly knew of the diffi-
culties involved, and that a few generals and commanders had died in
previous campaigns. His decision to take to the field himself therefore
must have been the outcome of great confidence and determination, a con-
fidence that came with the news of a Chinese victory in the 9th month of
666, \(^{26}\) three months before his appointment, and a determination that he was
willing to venture not only his reputation but also his life for the cause.

There is no record on court opinion on the campaign before the dis-
patch of expeditionary troops. However, with the emperor and Li Shiji
backing up the idea and Xu Yushi as an example for those who dared to voice
their difference in opinion, any effort to halt the expedition probably had
been in vain. Although no document giving the official explanation of the
expedition is extant, \(^{27}\) it is highly likely that the power struggle
within the Yŏn family was used as a pretext for what might have been
labelled an attempt to restore the sovereignty in Koguryŏ. In fact, at
the end of 666, Ch'ŏngt'o, a younger brother of Kaesomun, gave his
allegiance to the Chinese at the beginning but eventually fled to Silla,
probably because of its geographical proximity, along with 24 officials and
3,500 people. \(^{28}\) In any case, the situation in 666 was not entirely dif-
f erent from that in the early 640s when the old Chinese ambition of con-
quering Koguryŏ was revived once again by the internal political insta-
bility in the Korean state, except perhaps that the Chinese were more
ready to fulfill their goal.

The Campaign

If the first Chinese intervention in the 6th month of 666 is to be
taken as the starting point, the campaign against Koguryo must be considered as the longest battle the Chinese fought with a neighbouring country in the 7th century. The Koguryo capital did not fall until the 9th month of 668. In spite of and apart from the long span of the fighting, relatively little is known of the actual development of the campaign. There is no figure given for the size of the Tang troops. When they crossed the Yalu River, Li Shiji had 20,000 soldiers and Xiebi Heli allegedly led half a million soldiers. Yet the record of Xiebi's early encounters with the enemy seems to suggest that he was outnumbered most of the time, and the half a million soldiers he led were more likely to have been recruited at a later stage. Whichever the case, the appearance of only a few names of Han generals seems to indicate that it was likely that non-Han soldiers once again constituted the majority of the troops.

For the Koguryo side, the full strength of its army excluding the allied troops of Malgal is known to have been 300,000, with 150,000 defending at the Liao River region, a figure which interestingly coincided with that found in 645. One suspects, therefore, that there was no major difference in manpower as far as the troops were concerned, at least in the early stage of the confrontation. In fact, there were some seesaw battles in the first year of fighting. The first Tang troops sent to rescue Namjaeng, for instance, reported victory as early as the 9th month of 666, but the territories occupied by Namjaeng were not fully recovered until late 667. By the 2nd month of 667, a mere two months after his appointment, Li Shiji was already at the front, suggesting that he must have intended to bring the war to a victorious end before the arrival of the cold season. In fact, he had enlisted the assistance of Silla to wage a concerted offensive on the Koguryo capital in the 9th month of the year. Yet it was not until the 9th month of that year when Sinsong, one of the most strategically important castles on the frontier of Koguryo, fell into Chinese hands. Although nothing is known about the period in between, fierce fighting had obviously taken place. As indicated by the defection of his uncle, Yon Namgon might not have the full support of the court after he had ousted his elder brother, but the invasion by a foreign
power and a traditionally hostile neighbour was adequate to promote his leadership and rallying support for him. In fact, he was officially appointed to succeed his father to be in charge of military affairs of Koguryŏ in the 8th month of 666.38

In spite of the strong defence put up by Koguryŏ with the assistance of Malgal along the eastern bank of the Liao River, there is no evidence or historical precedent to suggest that the Chinese could have been completely blocked from advancing in the south, an operation which would expose them to larger risks of being cut off from supplies as past examples had demonstrated. In fact, by the 10th month of 667, Li Shiji had arrived at some 200 li north of the Koguryŏ capital, but he made no further advance.39 One suspects therefore that the failure of the Tang troops to proceed was not unrelated to logistical reasons. It is known that problems arose in supplies, as transport ships were wrecked on their way to the Koguryŏ capital. This seemed such an important piece of intelligence that it had to be coded and transmitted in the form of a poem, and had to be 'deciphered' by an official at the headquarters of the Chinese camp. Li Shiji was furious over the incident and he ordered the poet-general be executed.40 That Li found the interpretation an unnecessary delay and the loss of his temper were perhaps not only a reflection of his own character, but also an indication of the urgency of the situation. The inadvertent mention by a Tang official of the failure of Koguryŏ in guarding the Yalu River, the most important waterway which allowed big ships to enter into the heart of the country41, in fact also prompted Koguryŏ to step up its defence and cut the supply line by sea.42

If there was difficulty in the transport of supplies, there was also procrastination in the arrival of Tang troops stationed in Paekche led by Liu Renyuan. Communication was again a problem. Liu claimed that he had in fact sent over 40 messengers to contact the expeditionary troops in Koguryŏ.43 Whichever the truth, his performance did not please his superior and Liu Rengui was now appointed a deputy commander to Paekche at the beginning of 668, presumably to replace his former superior who was later exiled.44
Development of events so far followed a similar pattern to the past—the Chinese launched their offensive and encountered stiff resistance from Koguryŏ defenders, but nevertheless won and continued to proceed. Past examples had shown that Koguryŏ, despite its early defeats, still stood a good chance of winning by setting up its defence in castles or forts which were usually constructed in locations with well-protected natural barriers, while the enemy became gradually exhausted, its supplies running out and its morale eroded with the arrival of the cold season. Direct conflict with the Chinese, as the attempt to rescue Ansi in 645 had demonstrated, did not necessarily put Koguryŏ in a more advantageous position as the Chinese were more adept in tactical fighting. Yet Koguryŏ chose to play the game of the Chinese in 667. After part of the Chinese troops advanced southwards toward the Koguryŏ capital, Koguryŏ defenders in the north began a counter-attack to recapture Sinsŏng. The Koguryŏ decision was not completely beyond comprehension. Their military strength was not necessarily inferior, and past encounters had always ended in their triumph.

One suspects, however, that there were other factors for Koguryŏ to fight outside rather than inside the castles. The latter would have required an abundant storage of food supplies, but a Chinese official who made a trip to Koguryŏ during the campaign reported that the country had been enduring famine for years, and the situation was further aggravated by earthquakes. There was also considerable social unrest with people being robbed and others selling themselves for a living. The desperate economic situation was partly reflected in the condition of the twelve castles and fortresses ceded by Yŏn Ch'ŏngt'o to Silla—only eight were in good conditions. In addition, frequent occurrences of ominous portents also drove many to believe that Koguryŏ would come to an end soon as predicted in a book called Koryŏ Gogi.

The power struggle among the Yŏn brothers thus not only weakened the leadership of Koguryŏ, but also exposed the country to foreign encroachment at a time when it was plagued by a series of problems both economically and socially. What the Chinese benefited most from the struggle was
probably the intelligence provided by Yŏn Namsaeng on the situation in Koguryŏ, especially on military matters. His son first served as a guide for the Tang troops. But the situation at the front later became so critical that it demanded the knowledge of the father, who was appointed an advisor to the Chinese commanders and a general to fight against his brother. The contribution of Namsaeng was most evident in the final battle. After crossing the Yalu, the Chinese defeated the troops led by Namsan, the younger brother of Namgŏn, and soon proceeded to lay siege on the Koguryŏ capital. By the end of the 7th or the beginning of the 8th month in 668, P'yongyang was surrounded by the expeditionary troops, including those from Silla and the occupation troops from Paekche. In the 9th month, the Koguryŏ king decided to surrender by sending out Namsan and a few hundred officials to the Tang headquarters, expressing the wish to pay homage to the Chinese court. It is unknown whether this was another tactic of procrastination in order to give the defenders time to rest and repair its defences, or whether there was another conflict of opinion among Koguryŏ leaders, for the Chinese found the gates of the castles closed again after the officials returned. Attempts by Koguryŏ defenders to break the Chinese siege were driven back, but neither did the Tang troops have any further success. It was not until Namsaeng bought off a monk-general to open the gates that the allied troops were able to enter P'yŏngyang. Fire was lit all over the castle. Many Koguryŏ generals were killed. After an unsuccessful attempt at suicide, Namgŏn was captured together with his younger brother, the king, and the former Paekche Prince P'ung.49

The establishment of Chinese rule

In the last month of 668, the triumphant Tang troops returned to the Chinese capital with their captives. Yŏn Namgŏn was exiled to south-west China, and the former Paekche prince P'ung to south China. Yŏn Namsan, who had led a number of officials surrendering to Chinese troops during the siege of the Koguryŏ capital, and the monk-general who had played a key role in the fall of the castle were also assigned official posts.
accordingly.\textsuperscript{50} The Koguryô King Pojjang, however, was pardoned on the grounds that he did not really have power and therefore should not be held responsible for the unfriendly policy towards the Tang, and was given the post of the Head of the General Works Department.

The Koguryô king was not the first foreign leader captured by Tang, but he was the first captured foreign leader who was offered an official post not of military nature.\textsuperscript{51} Since another official was holding the post of the Head of the General Works Department at the same time,\textsuperscript{52} one suspects that the Koguryô king held the post only nominally. Yet it is also possible that the Tang court found the skills of the Koguryô people in building fortresses valuable in reinforcing the Chinese defence system, hence the creation of an extra post.

The late King Uija of Paekche also had received a post, but it was a posthumous one and with a court rank lower than that of his Koguryô counterpart.\textsuperscript{53} Yet the difference in Chinese policies towards Paekche and Koguryô was much greater than the ranks held by the two captured leaders. One such area was the setting up of a new administration. The population of Koguryô was slightly smaller than that of Paekche, the former being 697,000 households and that the latter some 760,000.\textsuperscript{54} However, whereas the new administration in Paekche was presumably built on the old one by establishing five new governments-general in 660, nine were set up in Koguryô where the old system had also five divisions.\textsuperscript{55} It is arguable whether the Chinese had less than half of the territories of Koguryô under their control in 668.\textsuperscript{56} What actually happened was more likely that the Chinese attempted to make a large-scale reorganization of the provincial administration so that they would have a stricter control of the people. It is noteworthy that apart from the setting up of governments-general which were essentially military units, Koguryô was also divided into 42 prefectures and 100 counties.

The Tang also made another unprecedented step in establishing its rule in Koguryô in the appointment of officials in the new administration. As in the case of Paekche and other newly acquired regions in central
Asia, the Tang usually gave a high degree of autonomy to the local people by appointing local leaders as officials in the Chinese administration. In the case of Koguryŏ, however, the local leaders had to share power with Chinese officials. Given the large number of officials required in the different levels of the new administration, it is doubtful whether recruitment from the local Chinese population could fill all the posts. In fact, it is known that some officials were sent from China to Koguryŏ to take up assignments in the new administration.

The different treatment received by Koguryŏ is also evident from the fact that whereas only 10,000 soldiers were stationed in Paekche after its fall, 20,000 soldiers were left behind in Koguryŏ. The difference was perhaps smaller if the larger size of Koguryŏ and the fact that Silla soldiers also stationed in Paekche are to be considered. Yet what is noteworthy in this case is the fact that in spite of its part played in the defeat of Koguryŏ, Silla was no longer requested to play a supportive role in the guarding of the conquered land. In other words, Tang was determined to have Koguryŏ as its monopoly.

It is thus obvious that Tang was much more enthusiastic in setting up its rule in Koguryŏ than in Paekche, where Prince Yung had now become the de facto ruler. The difference undoubtedly stemmed from the strong belief among the Chinese ruling class that Koguryŏ had been part of the Chinese empire and should continue to be so in the Tang. Gaozong in fact commented during the campaign that Koguryŏ people were also his people.

In a sense, the establishment of Chinese rule in Koguryŏ was similar to that in Karakhoja, which also had been occupied by the Chinese in the historical past, and where a fairly elaborate Tang administration was set up after 640. Judging from the records of the implementing of the well-field system, the Chinese had put made much effort in imposing control in Karakhoja. Yet the task for Tang in 668 was much greater than in 641, for Karakhoja had only a population of less than 7,000 households, one hundredth of that in Koguryŏ. After the Paekche experience, the Chinese were unlikely to have the illusion that Koguryŏ would succumb to
Chinese pressure more easily than its southern neighbour. In view of the fairly small military presence, it seemed that the Chinese hoped to exert its control through not simply by a military means but by thoroughly reorganizing the government structure and by employing Chinese administrators. The Tang policy was not accidental. Both during and after the campaign against Koguryo, there were large numbers of deserters in the army. The situation was so serious that even the Crown Prince proposed that the practice of exile be exempted from the punishment for the families of the deserters. In other words, Tang was not prepared to put a strong military presence in its newly acquired territories. However, without a strong military backup, doubts must be raised as to how long the Chinese could sustain their rule in Koguryo.

The Koguryo Restoration Movement

In the 4th month of 669, an order was made to transport 28,200 or 38,200 Koguryo households and resettle them in the southern and western peripheral regions of China. Also included were 3,300 head of cattle, 2,900 head of horses, 60 head of camels as well as 1,800 carriages. The families transported were the rich and powerful, all these groups capable of furnishing local leadership, whereas the poor and weak were left behind to guard their homeland.

It was not the first time that Tang resettled people of newly conquered neighbouring countries in China. The eastern Turks, for instance, were asked to move to the southern part of the Yellow River in the early 630s. After the fall of Paekche, over 10,000 Paekche people were also resettled in the Tang capital. Given the drastic decrease in population as compared to the previous dynasty, the importation of foreign people might have been part of the policy to bolster population growth. To a certain extent, the transportation of the Koguryo households served the purpose of developing the underpopulated areas of the Tang empire.

No enforced migration on such a scale, however, had ever taken place. One suspects, therefore, that there were other reasons for the move other
than purely economic factors, the most likely being that there was increasing instability in the former territories of Koguryŏ, which might develop into a similar anti-Tang movement as in Paekche. In fact, two months before the migration, 4,000 households had fled to Silla under the leadership of former Koguryŏ Prince Ansung. The migration therefore was likely to aim at moving the potential insurgent or power groups in Koguryŏ to China so that they would lose their base of operation. The swift response of the Chinese shows again the strong Chinese determination to impose their control in Koguryŏ, one which they failed to exhibit after the fall of Paekche.

The situation in Koguryŏ, however, did not improve and perhaps even aggravated in spite and because of the migration. In the 8th month of 669, the unstable situation in Koguryŏ was given as one of the reasons by an official in dissuading the emperor from making an inspection tour to the western border. A large-scale anti-Tang movement eventually broke out at the beginning of 670 when a former Koguryŏ official Kömmojam organized an army with the support of the Koguryŏ prince Ansung and backing from Silla. He enjoyed some brief success after defeating the pro-Tang Malgal troops, but his army in alliance with Silla was soon crushed by Han-Chinese reinforcement troops. Kömmojam fled south, killing Chinese officials and monks on his way, and restored Prince Ansung as the new king of Koguryŏ by giving allegiance to Silla in order to re-establish himself. Dispute soon broke out between him and the prince, ending in his own assassination. The prince once again became the protege of Silla, who declared him King of Koguryŏ and settled him at Kummajo, a place in the former territory of Paekche.

It is significant to note that the Chinese generals responsible for suppressing the Koguryŏ uprisings were Gao Kan, who had taken part in campaign against Koguryŏ but returned to the capital later, and Li Jinhang, a Malgal general whose group had given allegiance to the Chinese since the time of his father. It was not Liu Rengui, the old hand in Korean affairs who had also taken part in the campaign and who remained in
Koguryŏ presumably to take care of the administrative changes before returning to the mainland and retiring from officialdom in the 1st month of 670. Neither was it Xue Rengui, who had given a brilliant performance in the campaign against Koguryŏ and later succeeded Wei Zhe as the Andong Protector-general and who was the Chief-commander of another expeditionary troop leaving for a campaign against the Tibetans in the 4th month of 670.

The danger imposed by the Tibetans was indeed serious. While the Chinese were attacking Koguryŏ, the Tibetans raided the border frequently and put under their control 12 'loose-reign' prefectures established by Tang. In the 7th month of 669 Xiebi Heli was sent to give assistance to Tuyuhun, the Tang clients who served as a buffer state. However, the Tibetans remained active in Central Asia and compelled the Chinese to abandon not only the remaining 18 'loose-reign' prefectures but also the four major garrison towns under the Ansi Protectorate-general. The court was understandably eager to maintain its hold in Central Asia by driving out the Tibetans. After Li Shiji died in 669, there were probably other generals who could have equalled the task, but few of them enjoyed such prestige as Xue Rengui did after the campaign against Koguryŏ. His performance in the campaign was highly esteemed by one court official sent to the front. Having saved the life of the emperor on an occasion when the palace was flooded, he was also a favourite of the emperor.

In retrospect, the appointment of Xue Rengui to a new post was a gross miscalculation. It led to the jealousy and disobedience of one of his subordinates, contributing partly to the defeat of the Tang troops at the hands of the Tibetans. At the same time, the departure of Xue also had considerable repercussions for the development of events in Koguryŏ, where it meant the removal of a formidable enemy for those aspiring to restore the old royal household. It was not coincidental that the return of Xue to mainland China coincided with the outbreak or upgrading of activities by Kŏmmojam. In fact, Xue does not appear to have finished his work in Koguryŏ—he was planning to move the headquarters of the
Andong Protectorate-general from P'yŏngyang to Sinsŏng, but the move was not yet completed when he left. One suspects that Liu was in fact tired of serving in a foreign land. He might even have foreseen that remaining in Koguryŏ would mean a repetition of the traumatic experience he had had in Paekche. After all, he had become a chief minister and probably realized his dream of becoming rich. In any case, his record in fighting the Paekche restoration movement could have hardly been unknown among the Koguryŏ groups, and his mere presence would have served to check the anti-Tang movement and perhaps even discouraged Silla assistance to such groups from becoming too venturesome. His retirement, in other words, meant the loss of an official whose experience in dealing with the Korean states was unlikely to be matched by whoever was to succeed him.

Naturally, the Tang government lost no time in filling up the posts left vacant by the departure of Liu Rengui and the transference of Xue Rengui. It is likely that Liu was succeeded by Yang Mang, an official whose ensuing career we have but limited information; such as it is, this information suggests that his training was probably civil rather than military. Gan Kan, now promoted to the highest ranking of the military order and one experienced in fighting with Koguryŏ, probably took over the position of Xue Rengui. In any case, the two left for Koguryŏ soon after the report of a rebellion. The size of the reinforcements numbered 40,000. Excluding the Malgal soldiers who always stationed in the Yinzhou area and Chinese occupation troops in Koguryŏ, the troop under Gao must have been relatively small when compared with the expeditionary troop led by Xue Rengui which had numbered at least 50,000 but possibility three times larger. Although the priority of Tang foreign policy was Tibet rather than Koguryŏ, the readiness in putting down the restoration
movement demonstrated again a marked difference from the Chinese reluctance to get committed in Paekche. Certainly this prompt action was a major reason for the initial success in sustaining the Chinese rule in Koguryō for the time being.

The lack of a strong leadership among the Koguryō people themselves, partly because of the Chinese program of forced emigration, turned out to be a serious setback for the restoration movement. As in the case of Paekche which received support from a foreign power, the fact that Prince Ansung had to take residence in Silla meant that the possibility for the movement to revive also had to depend much on the will of Silla. It should be remembered that Silla had been an enemy for more than half a century, and its support for the Koguryō movement was likely to continue as long as it served its own interest. Although the Chinese could not fully devote its resources to sustain their rule in Koguryō, it is doubtful if the Koguryō restoration movement could last long as it was imbued with the same features of the Paekche restoration movement which had an initial success that its Koguryō counterpart did not enjoy.

The Breakdown of Tang-Silla Relations

Although Silla supported the Koguryō restoration movement, it did not favour the re-establishment of the former Paekche royal household to its west. As noted already, a peace treaty was signed between Silla and the newly-established and pro-Tang government of Paekche after the suppression of the restoration movement. Apparently, there had been some agreement between Tang and Silla that a truce would be made between the governments of Paekche and Silla. When the Chinese first sought to fulfill the agreement in 663, the idea was turned down by Silla on the grounds that unrest caused by the insurgent elements in Paekche might warrant the use of force. But the Chinese was keen to bring an end to the hostility between Silla and Paekche, as further conflicts might again commit the involvement of Tang resources. Under Tang arrangement, a truce was signed between the two Korean states in the 2nd month of 664, when Prince Yung
represented his government for the first time.\(^91\) One Silla record in fact labelled the prince a "fake king".\(^{92}\)

The refusal of Silla to sign a truce in 663 signalled that it was not exactly pleased with such an arrangement. Whereas a large number of members of the Paekche royal family and officials were transported to China after the fall of Sabi, Silla had also absorbed a number of former Paekche officials into its own administration.\(^{93}\) In the course of suppressing the restoration movement, Silla recruited even more surrendered Paekche officials.\(^{94}\) Silla had suffered from the aggression of its neighbour, and it had fought hard and was beginning to enjoy the fruits of its success. The revival of its old enemy who was to be put on an equal footing with itself by the Chinese was understandably a cause for resentment.

Thus although Silla did follow Chinese instructions in 664 by signing a peace treaty and had its borderline with Paekche redrawn, the Silla king complained later that the whole affair was forced upon him by the Chinese.\(^{95}\) Neither was it surprising that the peace effort was short-lived, as one month after the signing of the truce, Silla dispatched an army to Paekche supposedly to put down uprisings led by insurgent members. Silla perhaps had never completely withdrawn its troops from Paekche, as some of them joined other Silla troops in capturing a Koguryo castle in the 7th month of 664.\(^{96}\) Whether or not these should be considered as violations of the truce, the Chinese found it necessary to make a third attempt to arrange the signing of a peace treaty between the two neighbours. Liu Renyuan was specially sent to perform the rituals. Once more, a peace treaty was signed, in which the two Korean states agreed to overlook all past grievances and establish marital relations. Boundaries were again drawn, and the treaty was kept at a temple in Silla perhaps as a reminder of Silla's commitment. The agreement was solemnized by ceremonies in which the local deities were worshipped.\(^{97}\)

Relations between the two states, soon broke down again. In 668 Silla accused Paekche of violating the peace treaty by shifting and changing markers of the boundary, luring slaves and people of Silla without
returning them, and trying to steal the weapons of Silla through a lady married to a Silla governor-general. The governor-general was subsequently executed, and Silla sent its troops to occupy Paekche territories in 669. The move apparently caused great alarm to the Paekche Prince Yung, who fled to seek refuge in China.

If the departure of Xue Rengui and Liu Renyuan gave rise to the growth of the restoration movement in Koguryo, it also provided an opportunity for Silla to intensify its activities in Paekche. The Chinese court was aware of the military operations in Paekche by Silla, and detained a Silla envoy as warning at the beginning of 670. The measure, however, did not have much effect. In the 7th month of 670, Silla took swift military action against Paekche, capturing within a month 82 castles and fortresses, or more than a third of the total in the country. By the beginning of 671, Silla troops had already reached the southern side of Ungjin, the western capital of Paekche.

The support given to the restoration movement in Koguryo and the aggression in Paekche meant that Silla was turning from an ally to an enemy of Tang. Silla never tried to explain its support for the anti-Tang activities in Koguryo, which probably had not been planned as the Koguryo prince fled to Silla on his own accord but nevertheless later became part of the strategy to divert Chinese attention from Silla activities in Paekche. But Silla defended its activities in Paekche on two major grounds, one being that it was the violation of peace by Paekche which prompted Silla to take necessary measures, and the other being that Silla deserved the right to interfere in the affairs of Paekche according to a prior agreement between Tang Taizong and Kim Ch'un-ch'u and because Silla had contributed so much to the establishment of Chinese rule in the Korean peninsula.

The reasons given by Silla were not purely rhetoric, but neither were they the complete truth. No other evidence is available to substantiate the claim that Paekche was the first to violate the border arrangement, hence no verdict could be given on the issue. However, other claims by
Silla were highly suspicions. Silla probably did not seek the co-operation of Paekche in putting down the Koguryo restoration movement led by Komyojam, which in fact it supported. In addition, the conflict took place, as Silla pointed out, on Paekche soil. Even had it been Paekche who attacked first, it was likely to be a counter-attack by the provocative presence of Silla troops. In short, it was Silla but not Paekche who should be responsible for the outbreak of war.

Many of the allegations made against the Chinese were also questionable. It has already been pointed out that it was unlikely for Tang Taizong and Kim Ch'unch'u to agree on the future of Paekche in the circumstances of 649. While there is no denial that Silla had played a part in sustaining Chinese rule in Paekche and that Li Shiji, given his temperament, could have deprived some Silla generals their awards for failing to follow orders in the Koguryo campaign in 668, it should be pointed out that the men of Silla did not leave Koguryo empty-handed. Gold and rolls of cloth were sent to Silla by the Chinese emperor, and an invitation was extended to Kim Yusin to visit the Chinese court. Moreover, at least 7,000 Koguryo people were taken home by Silla as captives. Silla also accused the Chinese of an unfair border settlement, yet Silla troops were already in Paekche when the plans were brought back from China by a Silla envoy in the 7th month of 670. The alleged dissatisfaction with the border arrangement was no more than an excuse put forward to camouflage the real intention of Silla in Paekche.

The fact was that it was Silla who had deliberately chosen to break its alliance with the Chinese. A Korean record has noted that the Tang emperor Gaozong had entertained the idea of invading and incorporating Silla into the Chinese empire as early as soon after the fall of Paekche. The idea appeared to revive after the fall of Koguryo when it was rumoured that the Chinese were building ships for an invasion of Silla. Again no other records are available to substantiate these claims, but the fear of an invasion from Tang was not totally groundless in view of the expansionist foreign policy of China at the time. It is doubtful if Silla had
ever forgotten the proposal of Taizong to put a member of the Tang imperial family on the Silla throne, made at a time when the Chinese had yet to establish a foothold in the Korean peninsula.

In spite of the many concerted military operations, it must be pointed out that the military leaders of Silla and Tang had never been in really amicable terms. Both Su Dingfang and Li Shiji had tried to impose military discipline on Silla generals and consequently caused much discontent. The reluctance of Liu Renyuan to seek refuge in Silla also suggested that he did not exactly enjoy the company of his Silla counterparts. Whether or not the Tang generals were solely to be blamed, the lack of a co-operative spirit reflected to a certain extent the absence of a cordial relation between the two countries.

The most important factor for the breakdown of the Tang-Silla relations, however, was the failure to find a solution to the Paekche problem acceptable to Silla. After its fall, Paekche had never been able to produce a competent and strong government by its own people even with foreign support. The restoration of the former royal household was never really accepted by Silla, who chose to see its neighbour as constant threat to its own security as in the past century and who gradually became convinced that occupation was probably the best solution it could find.

Ironically, it was the Chinese who encouraged the occupation of Paekche by Silla in an indirect manner. The establishment of the Jilin government-general in Silla did not arouse Silla suspicions against Tang ambition in Silla for the first time as often maintained, for it did not make any real changes in the structure of the government or the army in Silla. In fact, the additional title was used by the Silla king in 671 when relationship between Tang and Silla had already broken down. Silla must have observed that the Chinese were not too enthusiastic in sustaining their rule in Paekche after the half-hearted efforts to suppress the Paekche restoration movement, and the establishment of the Jilin government-general only confirmed the fact that the Chinese were reluctant to commit its own forces in Paekche. Although the Chinese tried to resolve the
border dispute and hostility between the two Korean neighbours, Silla probably concluded that Tang was unable to enforce its own arrangement and decided to take the matter into its own hands.

The breakdown of Tang-Silla relationship thus was not a sudden development after the fall of Koguryo. It is noteworthy that a Silla envoy arrived in Yamato in the 9th month of 668, even before the allied troops had actually seized the Koguryo capital. The rapprochement with an enemy whom Silla had fought against only five years earlier suggests that Silla had already foreseen the likelihood of breaking its alliance with Tang and was endeavouring to prevent itself from falling into isolation. Silla might have wanted to do so earlier, but it could hardly afford to lose the alliance of Tang in order to eliminate its northern neighbour. Yet with the fall of Koguryo only a matter of time, Silla could end its expedient alliance with Tang and proceed to pursue its interest in Paekche. Interestingly enough, the encroachment in Paekche resembled much the Tang aggression against Koguryo. Silla detained a Paekche envoy, and claimed that it was compelled to take military action when it discovered that a rebellion was being conspired. After occupying Paekche, Silla sent Paekche captives back home as slaves. At the same time, it is significant to note that the bestowal of a kingship to the Koguryo prince was an unprecedented event in the history of the relationship between the Korean states. In short, no longer was Silla content in treating its neighbours on an equal basis. One might even suggest that not only Silla had adopted the court dresses and institutions of Tang, it had also imported the behaviour of Tang in treating its neighbours and was prepared to build its own empire on the Korean peninsula.

From Allies to Enemies

Although the Chinese were aware of Silla activities in Paekche as early as 669, no reinforcements were sent to Paekche immediately. As mentioned already, the Tang emperor retained a Silla envoy, hoping that the gesture would convey to Silla his displeasure with the presence of
Silla troops in Paekche and consequently lead to their withdrawal. The effort ended in vain, and fighting continued in Paekche. Yet the first help did not apparently come from mainland China as it consisted of Malgal soldiers. Fierce fighting broke out. The Malgal group lost 7,000 men as well as large quantities of military supplies, whereas Silla also had to retreat temporarily, causing some Silla generals to be disciplined.  

Fighting intensified in 670. Malgal soldiers, presumably those who had played a part in suppressing the restoration movement in Koguryo, launched an attack from the north but found little success when Silla defenders stayed within their castles. Apparently Silla had occupied such a large part of Paekche that they were now able to set up defence along the Paekche coast to prepare for a possible Chinese attack. The major battle broke out in the 6th month when 5,300 men were killed on the Paekche side and two Paekche generals and six Tang colonels were captured.  

The large death toll on the Paekche side suggests the defence troops, including some Chinese, must have had at least 20,000 men when it is assumed that one in four was killed. Yet the death rate was probably lower and the size of the defending troops much larger. As far as the Silla side was concerned, twelve Silla generals are known to have taken part in this expedition against Paekche, more than a third of the number of generals taking part in the expedition against Koguryo when less than 200,000 soldiers were dispatched. Moreover, judging from the list of generals known to have taken part in the earlier campaign, six of the nine regiments which had fought in Koguryo were again sent to Paekche, and the number of Silla soldiers engaged in the Paekche operation must have been considerable. One might also add that these generals were of high rank, which constrained sharply with the fairly low ranked general Silla sent to support the Koguryo restoration movement.  

It was in the 7th month that a Chinese fleet arrived under the commandship of Xue Rengui, who was now given another opportunity to re-establish himself in spite of his defeat by the Tibetans. A letter was first forwarded to the Silla King Munmu by a Silla Buddhist monk. Xue
reminded the king the vital role the Chinese had played in the development of his predecessor in following Tang orders. The mission of the expedition was to inspect the changing situation in the Korean peninsula, to see if Silla had indeed given asylum to the weak and callow Koguryö prince Ansung, an act too ridiculous to have been believed by the Tang emperor. Given its military power, the Tang troops could impose great menace on Silla. It would be in the interest of Silla, Xue argued, to give an explanation for what had happened, and the matter would probably be settled should Xue attest the loyalty of the Silla king to the Tang emperor.

Two important points in the letter should be noted. First, although Xue did accuse Silla of aggression, nowhere in the letter was the Silla encroachment upon Paekche mentioned. Instead, as Xue clearly stated, the major concern of the Chinese was to see to it that the support given to the Koguryö restoration movement be ended. The attitude of the Chinese once again demonstrated their preoccupation with Koguryö. While it might be far-reaching to suggest that the Chinese was prepared to abandon its interest in Paekche, Tang was much keener in maintaining its control of Koguryö.

Second, while Xue did mention the mighty military power of the Chinese, the tone of the letter was conciliatroy rather than intimidatory. Two explanations are possible; either Xue was confident that Silla would succumb to Chinese pressure, or that he was leaving some grounds for negotiations before resorting to force, and the latter was more likely to be the case. Although Xue had fought against Koguryö many times in the past three decades, Paekche was as foreign to him as Dafeichuan where he had just been defeated by the Tibetans. In spite of the support from land, his own troops was by no means large — there were only a few tens of thousands. Moreover, his letter suggests that he realized Silla was prepared for an attack from sea. In short, Xue was eager for success but was uncertain of his chance, which accounted for the fact that he chose to try and resolve the issue first by pen than by sword.
Xue succeeded in getting a response from King Munmu, who argued in a lengthy letter that Silla had fulfilled its role as an ally of Tang. Despite its assistance given to the Chinese, Silla claimed that it had been unfairly treated. It was compelled to sign a peace treaty with Paekche, deprived of its credit in the Koguryŏ conquest, and that its territories occupied by Koguryŏ was not returned as promised. Silla did not contemplate opposing the Chinese. However, finding the settlement plan arranged by the Chinese inadequate to solve the problem of border dispute with Paekche, Silla simply tried to fulfill the wish of the people by uniting Paekche and Silla as both were under Tang sovereignty.

The most significant point in the lengthy letter is that King Munmu was not exactly responding to the letter of Xue in which the Silla was asked to give an account for his support for the Koguryŏ prince. From the beginning to the end, the Silla king tried in every way to defend the behaviour of Silla in Paekche, while at the same stressed its loyalty to the Chinese. Very little attention was given to the Koguryŏ prince Ansung, the main concern of the Tang court. While Xue Rengui had probably looked forward to receiving a letter in which Silla would display repentance for the misdemeanor it had committed and beg for an opportunity to review its loyalty, Silla portrayed itself as a victim to the false accusation of Paekche, pretending that it was supporting the Chinese in Koguryŏ. The Silla king might have shared the desire of Xue to avoid an immediate military conflict, but his obsession with Paekche and the apparent evasion of responsibility over the question of giving asylum to the Koguryŏ prince made it unlikely that the letter could be acceptable to Xue, let alone the Tang emperor to whom the letter would have to be submitted if some kind of negotiations were to take place.

As King Munmu pointed out in his letter, Tang could have first attempted to find a solution to the Korean question - be it Koguryŏ or Paekche - by sending a diplomat without military back-up. The response of Gaozong also bore some contrast to that of his grandfather who had tried to negotiate and pacify and to that of his father who had resorted to force
only at a later stage in dealing with Koguryŏ. The change of attitude in settling the Korean question was partly the result of a growing expectancy of the Chinese court that its foreign policy be followed by other countries after a series of successful campaigns. Yet the point made by the king was not valid, as there had been an earlier Chinese mission which tried to stop Silla aggression in Paekche but ended in vain in 670. As the Chinese saw it, never had the balance of power on the Korean peninsula been upset to such an extent and border dispute was no longer the real cause of trouble as often the case had been in the past. In short, the situation demanded something more than a diplomatic approach.

The difference in the interests of the two countries having been exposed by the correspondence, confrontation was now inevitable. The Chinese had the upper hand at the beginning, but soon found its fleet for transport under attack. Knowing that his fleet was his only supply line, Xue retreated and lost not only 40 ships but also 1,000 horses and 1,400 men. He did not return to China despite the arrival of the cold season, however, and another offensive was being prepared. Before taking his move, Xue discovered that another 40 ships of his fleet were sunk and a number of his subordinates captured and drowned. After losing 4,000 more men in another series of battles, he finally retreated at the end of the year.  

The results confirmed what Xue might have suspected, that he would not enjoy the same success as Su Dingfang had done eleven years previously. The circumstances had changed. Not only were the Chinese troops in much smaller numbers than before, its enemy Silla was also well-prepared. In addition, having fought alongside with Chinese troops for more than a decade, Silla was well aware of the weak point of its enemy and adopted the correct strategy by attacking the supplyline of the Tang troops. On top of this, the Tang navy failed to launch a concerted attack from both land and sea as it must have planned. The failure should also be attributed to the fact the Chinese troops in Koguryŏ again became engaged again in fighting the restoration movement. In the 7th month of 671, the Chinese
general Gao Kan defeated a group of Koguryo troops in Ansi, suggesting that the anti-Tang movement was not only active, but had spread to northern Koguryo as well.

The defeat of the Chinese, however, not only meant that Tang failed to punish Silla as it had intended, but once more exposed its vulnerability in military operations in the Korean peninsula. Xue Rengui in fact confessed frankly in his letter to the Silla king that Tang had paid a heavy price in order to launch attacks in the Korean peninsula, and there is no doubt his defeat cost the Chinese even more. On the other hand, Silla probably had only aimed at diverting Chinese attention from Paekche by giving assistance to the anti-Tang groups in Koguryo, and it is doubtful if it had intended to build an empire which would include Koguryo at the beginning. However, now that even one of the best Chinese generals had been vanquished, Silla might have second thoughts about its plan in Koguryo.

Further Conflicts between Tang and Silla

The resistance movement by Paekche against Silla after 669 was by no means smaller in scale than that against Tang after 660. For more than three years, the people of Paekche continued to hold certain areas in their territory. Unfortunately very little is known about this movement. Judging by those who were captured by Silla, some of them the leaders of the movement had served under the new government backed up by the Chinese. Yet there were probably also others who did not necessarily favoured the Chinese rule but nevertheless joined in the movement. In fact, as will be discussed later, both groups attempted and failed to seek assistance from Yamato. Although Silla had to divert its attention to the Chinese expeditionary troops led by Xue Rengui in the second half of 671, attack on Paekche started again from the 1st month of 672 after the withdrawal of Chinese troops. The Paekche people fought hard to retain Karim, one of their most important bases, but it was not long before that the resistance movement was suppressed.
Meanwhile, the resistance movement in Koguryŏ against Tang continued to be active, and the Chinese effort to eliminate it also persisted. In the 7th month of 672, a 40,000-men troop proceeded to P'yŏngyang, the former Koguryŏ capital, captured two fortresses and laid siege to Paeksu, a base for the Koguryo troops. The defenders managed to drive back their enemies and kill several thousands of them after being joined by reinforcements from Silla. But the final victory went to the Chinese, who in turn killed several thousands of the allied troops and captured another 2,000.\textsuperscript{127}

The Battle of Paeksu was the largest confrontation between Tang and Silla in Koguryŏ. Eight Silla generals died, their ranks being from the 5th to the 8th.\textsuperscript{128} It is debatable if they should be categorized as low-ranked generals, but they probably formed the backbone of the Silla forces as suggested.\textsuperscript{129} Given the fairly large number of deaths of both generals and soldiers, it may be further surmised that the loss of Silla troops was considerable and that Silla was now under great pressure from the Chinese in the territory beyond its northern border. It was under such circumstances that Silla sent a diplomatic mission to Tang to return over 170 Chinese and Paekche captives captured in the previous year. Not only did the mission deliver a letter expressing penitence, but silver, copper, gold, special kinds of cloth and other goods were also presented as tribute to the Chinese court.\textsuperscript{130}

The tribute has been suggested as a price paid by Silla for annexing Paekche,\textsuperscript{131} and it is interesting to note that that in the accompanying letter, Silla confessed that it had committed many crimes out of the wish to survive and that it rightly deserved punishment. Once again, only Paekche but not Koguryŏ was mentioned in the letter. While it was unprecedented for any Korean state to use material goods as a means to end foreign menace, there was the Chinese precedent by Tang Taizong who had paid large sums of material goods to the Turks when the Chinese capital was on the brink of being raided by the Turks after his coup in 626.\textsuperscript{132} In 672, the Chinese turned out to be on the side of the recipient. But whether Silla was trying to make up its alleged misdeeds or simply trying to buy off the Chinese, the tribute was a means to end, or at least suspend
the Chinese attacks. The fact that the generals sent to support the Koguryō restoration movement were lower in rank was probably because the more highly ranked generals were still stationed in Paekche. In any case, Silla could hardly face pressure from both the northern and the western sides as before. It is not surprising that Tang accepted the tribute, for Tang soldiers in Koguryō were also preoccupied with the suppression of the restoration movement. It was not until the 5th month of 673 that the last insurgent group was driven out of Koguryō to Silla after they failed to defend P'yŏngyang, which had now been torn down after decades of war.133

Yet the issues between Tang and Silla had not really been solved. It is unclear whether Tang had recognized the sovereignty of Silla in Paekche as a result of the tribute in 672. In the following year, however, Silla organized its Paekche subjects into one military regiment.134 Furthermore, regulations were also set up to employ Paekche officials in the Silla government, though the treatment was no longer as attractive as in 660.135 In short, Silla openly declared Paekche its protégé, an act which Tang would have undoubtedly seen as an infringement of its interest if it had interpreted the tribute in 672 simply as a token of peace.

The major issue at stake between Tang and Silla as the Chinese saw it, however, was the asylum given to the Koguryō prince Ansung and the continuous absorption of anti-Tang elements. Although the exact number of Koguryō people fleeing to Silla is unknown, given that two of the nine regiments set up by Silla later were comprised of people from Koguryō people under Prince Ansung as compared to only three regiments of Silla soldiers,136 the size of the group must have been considerable. Although not yet formally incorporated into the Silla army at this stage, they certainly formed a force to be reckoned with, whether or not they were going to resume their anti-Tang activities or to ally with Silla in fighting against Tang. Silla no doubt saw the absorption of Koguryō defectors to its advantage. To some extent, they were allowed to retain their former official titles and even their old political and social institutions. Under the auspices of Silla, relations with Yamato was also resumed.137
It is beyond doubt that the Chinese found the support of Silla given to the Koguryo insurgent groups most repulsive and offensive.

The interest of Silla in Paekche was thus extended to not only supporting the Koguryo restoration movement but absorbing anti-Tang elements from Koguryo. Silla of course was not ignorant of Tang’s displeasure and knew that it might invoke further conflicts between the two countries. Indeed, Silla took advantage of the period of peace after 672 to strengthen its defence. A fortress near the capital and others along the border were constructed. A hundred warships kept patrolling the coastline, whereas a frontier guard system was re-introduced. In short, Silla was preparing for a forthcoming Chinese invasion. 138

Ensuing events proved the correctness of Silla’s foresight. As expected, a Chinese expedition was launched in 674 when Gaozong was so furious with the behaviour of Silla that he ordered that all the titles bestowed on the Silla king be stripped off and that Kim Immun, the king’s brother who had served in the Chinese court for over two decades, be sent back to his country to ascend the throne. Meanwhile, Liu Rengui was appointed Chief-commander of the expeditionary troops. As in the case of Li Shiji, the appointment of the seventy-two-year-old but experienced Liu epitomized the emperor’s determination to win the war. Although the official declaration of war is not extant, it seemed that the emperor approved neither the policy of Silla in Paekche nor that towards insurgent Koguryo groups.

Both Chinese and Korean records on the battle are highly unreliable as far as datings are concerned. 140 In addition, victories have been recorded in the sources of both countries. However, it seems far-reaching to conclude that the Chinese were defeated simply because the biographies of Tang generals do not have detailed records of the battles. 141 Nevertheless, it is known that the Chinese attempted to send part of their Malgal soldiers to land on the southern side of the peninsula in a typical Chinese tactic employed in fighting against the Korean states. The Silla defenders had some success in their resistance, killing some 6,000 enemies
on one occasion. At the same time, Xue Rengui was given another chance in
the expedition. He was most cautious this time as he enlisted the
guidance of one Silla student in China, whose father had been killed by
Silla rulers for dissent. However, Xue was once more defeated.

The Koguryo people under Prince Ansung who had been given asylum by
Silla were now allowed to form their own state, with Podok as the new
name. Judging from the name which means 'repaying the kindness', the
creation of the new state was less likely to be a gesture by Silla to
abandon its control of the Koguryo than a means to mobilize the Koguryo
people to fight against the Tang invaders. Realizing that Tang could
hardly afford to wage an offensive in a scale similar to the earlier cam-
paigns against Paekche or Koguryo, Liu Rengui decided to fight a war of
attrition. He returned to mainland China, leaving the commandership to Li
Jinhan, the Malgal general whose soldiers launched sporadic attacks that
turned out to be a nuisance for Silla peasants during the sowing season in
675. The Malgal side claimed three victories, but they were later
driven back by Silla, losing some 40,000 horses and a large amount of arms.
Silla attempted to reinforce some of its forts along the frontier, but the
large number of the nomadic soldiers — allegedly 200,000 according to one
account — continued to be a threat. Once more, Silla resorted to the
sending of a tribute and an apology to the Chinese court, and again the
policy succeeded. The Tang emperor returned the official titles to the
Silla king, though with lower rankings, and the relations of the two
countries were restored.

Peace thus was still not attained in the Korean peninsula in spite of
the fact that the Chinese had eventually fulfilled their ambition by con-
gruing Koguryo, where internal struggles among the leaders proved once
more to be fatal. Tang probably had anticipated some resistance from the
Koguryo remnants, but it perhaps did not expect support from Silla, which
also started into Paekche. Both Tang and Silla failed to understand the
concern of the other party, leading eventually to another series of con-
frontations. Yet the new antagonism was unlikely to last long. In the
first place, the major interests of Tang and Silla were not necessarily conflicting. Moreover, both countries must have been exhausted by the long years of fighting since their campaign against Koguryō, which accounted partly for the increasing important role of the Malgal and Koguryō soldiers in the confrontations. Hostilities probably would remain, but conflicts were unlikely to resume in the scale as large as those witnessed in the first three quarters of the century.
FOOTNOTES

1. ZZTJ201/6332.
2. ZZTJ201/6336. For the decree, see TDZLJ110/578.
3. ZZTJ201/6338.
5. JTS84/2792-95.
6. SGSG6/68.
7. The question whether Prince Yung held the position of governor-general of Ungjin is raised in ZZTJ201/6340, which notes that Liu Rengui was holding the position at the time. However, this is probably a mistake for Liu Renyuan as recorded in CFYG366/4354. The fact that Liu Rengui had never held the position is evident from the promotion he got later – he was raised from the position of Acting Governor of Daifang to become the Governor of Daifang (JTS84/2792). The record in Tangshilu including the Prince as a military officer (quoted in ZZTJ201/6332 and apparently recorded in CP981/11525) is obviously a mistake as the treaty states clearly that the Prince was a governor-general. The possibility that the prince was promoted at the time when the treaty was signed is slight as the post had been vacant since the departure of Liu Renyuan.
8. Although most sources (JTS84/2794, 199A/5332, ZZTJ201/6342) record that of the Prince returned home after the submission of memorial by Liu Rengui, he was in Paekche already in the 2nd month of 664 (SGSG 6/68) and Liu's memorial was not sent until perhaps the 10th month of the year according to ZZTJ.
9. See discussion in Chapter Four.
10. SGSG7/79, JTS199A/5333-34, CFYG981/11525.
11. XTS90/377. Since Xu did not become the Left Prime Minister until the 5th month of 662 (JTS4/83), the decree was issued after the return of the generals from Koguryo.
12. CFYG337/3984, ZZTJ201/6331-32; for the dating of the event, see JTS4/84.
14. CFYG36/393.
15. CFYG981/11526. This is probably the best record indicating the date of the departure of the envoys from Paekche. See also THY95/1711, ZZTJ201/6344.
16. NHSK26/I1349.
18. JTS4/87.
19. Kaesomun did not die in the 5th month of 666 as a record in ZZTJ201/6347 might have implied. As Ikeuchi (1960), 270-78, and Yi P.D. (1981), 476, have pointed out, he died in the later part of 665. It is uncertain whether the Koguryo prince brought along the news of his death.
20. CFYG986/11578-79 (cf. XTS110/4125), also his epitaph as in Ikeuchi (1960), 410-413.
21. Ibid.
22. CFYG986/11579, ZZTJ201/6350. The dating of 10th month in JTS5/90 is probably wrong.
23. JTS67/2487, cf. 82/2763.
24. JTS83/2780.
25. See his epitaph in Wenwu (1972-7).
26. CFYG986/11579.
27. From ZZTJ201/5353, it is known that such a document existed.
28. SGSG6/69. According to SGYS3/98, it was over 4,000 households rather than people.
29. JTS67/2487.
30. XTS110/4120. JTS109/3293. There is, of course, the possibility that the number was exaggerated as part of the psychological warfare against Koguryo.
31. This is suggested by the description that Xiebi had to 'muster courage and to attack' during the offensive.
32. JTS199B/5361.
33. JTS109/3293.
34. For a critical study of the battles, see Ikeuchi (1960), 325-86.
35. JTS199A/5327. XTS220/6196 dates the event in the 1st month.
36. SGSG6/70.
37. CFYG986/11579.
38. SGSG22/225.
39. SGSG6/70.
40. ZZTJ201/6353.
41. TD186/992.
42. ZZTJ201/6353.
43. CFYG447/5300. Ikeuchi (1960), 250-58, has failed to use this record and suggested that Liu has not moved his troops at all, which was unlikely to be the case.
44. JTS5/91.
45. ZZTJ201/6355.
46. ZZTJ201/6354, XTS220/6196.
47. SGSG6/69.
48. XTS220/6196. A slightly different version of the legend is also recorded in NHSK27/11,371.
49. CFYG986/11578-9.
50. XTS220/6197.
51. The Turkish Khan Tuli was probably the earliest captured foreign leader, but no record suggests he later became an official. The Karakhoja king was captured in 640 and appointed a general (JTS198/5296). The practice appeared to become institutionalized later in 658 (JTS4/78).
52. ZZTJ201/6356. The official holding the position at the time was Yan Liben (XTS61/1644).
53. JTS199A/5331. The ranking of the post for the Paekche king was junior third while that for the Koguryo king was senior third.
54. JTS199A/5327, 5331.
55. Ibid.
56. Yi P.D. (1981), 477-78, has failed to take into account the study by Ikeuchi (1960), 330-38, which shows that the record in SGSG37/386-7
was compiled before the fall of Sinsong and not after the collapse of P'yŏngyang.

57. JTS199A/5327.

58. This is indicated by the departure of such officials in 676 (ZTJ202/6379). Hino (1954), 63, fn7, suspects that Chinese officials were only assigned in the important towns.

59. JTS83/782.

60. ZTJ201/6355.

61. JTS40/1644-45.

62. Tobi (1975),

63. JTS40/1644-45. The figure is supposedly to be that of the reign of Taizong, see Hino (1961).

64. JTS86/2829. The event took place after the performance of the libation ceremony in the 2nd month of 668 and 671. ZTJ201/6357 dates it in the last month of 668.

65. JTS5/92 gives a figure of 28,200 whereas TD186/993 gives 28,300. The figure 38,300 in SGSG22/227 probably came from ZTJ201/6359.

66. SGSG6/71.

67. This is only noted in ZTJ201/6359.

68. JTS194A/5159, 5162-64.

69. SGSG28/277.

70. SGSG22/227.

71. ZTJ201/6359.

72. SGSG22/227, 6/73. XTS3/68, 220/2197-98. For a discussion of the events, see Ikeuchi (1960), 420-35.

73. For a biography of Gao, see Cen (1960), 28-30.

74. XTS110/4123. His biography here does not record his participation in the suppression of the movement.

75. JTS84/2795, 5/94.

76. Xue was not the first Protector-general of Andong as his biography (JTS83/2782) or the Treatise of Koguryo (JTS199A/5327) suggests. According to the epitaph of Wei Zhe (QTW194/2488), Wei was appointed either in 667 (provided that the protectorate-general had already
been established, which was possible) or 669 (assuming the epitaph leaves out the era title of Zongzhang). Wei died in the 3rd month of 669, after which Xue probably succeeded.

77. JTS5/94. The record here shows the date of the embarkation of the troops. It can be assumed that Xue left his post in Koguryo at the beginning of the year.

78. XTS216A/6075. The date for this event unknown, but since it was after the death of the Tibetan prime minister Mgar ston btsan, it was after 667. See Sato, 313.

79. The record in XTS216A notes that no action was taken. But according to the annals (JTS5/93, XTS3/67), Xibe was sent.

80. XTS216A/6076. See also Sato (1958), 319-25 for more discussion.

81. JTS67/2488.
82. ZZTJ201/6354.
83. JTS83/2780-81.
84. JTS83/2782, but the move apparently was not completed until 670 (XTS220/6198).

85. JTS84/2795.

86. The only records of Yang are found in XTS71B/2369 and 106/4047. He was referred to as a Secretariat of the Works Department when he left for Koguryo, but the post was probably the highest he held in his official career.


88. SGSG7/82.

89. JTS5/94 gives a figure of 50,000, but according to XTS216A/6076, it was over 100,000. The former was probably the number of Han Chinese soldiers while the latter included non-Han soldiers joining the expeditionary troop later.

90. SGSG7/79.
91. Ibid., SGSG6/68.
92. SGYS1/51.
93. SGSG5/62.
94. SGSG6/66.
95. SGSG7/79.
96. SGSG6/68.
97. CFYG981/11525.
98. SGSG7/81.
99. SGSG 6/73. This is known judging by the response of the Tang emperor who retained one Silla envoy at beginning of 670.
100. JTS199A/5334. The event is not dated, but took place after the return of Liu Renyuan and Liu Rengui to China. The latter is known to return to China in 669 (JTS84/2795).
101. SGSG6/73.
102. SGSG7/75.
103. See the letter by King Munmu to Xue Rengui, SGSG7/77-82.
104. See discussions in Chapter Five.
105. SGSG43/438.
106. SGSG6/71.
107. SGSG7/81.
108. SGSG42/433.
109. SGSG7/80. In the 2nd chapter of SGYS, an old record of Silla also notes Chinese intention in attacking Silla, but the dating is dubious.
110. For example, Kito (1981), 150-51.
111. SGSK7/82.
112. NHSK27/II371.
113. SGSG7/81. Same Nigun was apparently detained in the name of exchanging hostages (SGSG6/73). It is doubtful whether what is recorded here is actually what he said.
114. SGSG6/73.
115. Ibid. The "barbarian troops" referred to were probably Malgal soldiers.
116. SGSG7/75.
117. SGSG6/70.
118. SGSG44/446. The figure probably is a combination of Tang and Silla soldiers. According to SGSG22/227, Kim Inmun was dispatched from Tang as a deputy of Liu Rengui at the beginning of 668. The record
obviously came from Chinese sources which omitted the part played by Kim. Judging from his title in SGSG6/70, Kim was no doubt assigned as a Chinese general.

119. According to SGSG6/73, the general sent to Koguryo held a Sach'an, which ranked 8th in a scale of 17. The ranks of these sent to Paekche ranged from the 2nd to the 6th.

120. Contrary to the summary by Jamieson, 63, no demands were made for Silla to withdraw from Paekche, a word which did not even appear throughout the letter.

121. SGSG7/82, 84-85. See the critical study by Ikuichi (1960), 457-64.

122. ZZTJ202/6367.

123. Four officials and 170 military officials were returned to Tang in the 9th month of 672 (SGSG7/82). One of them could have been a Chinese official as Jamieson, 282, has suggested as he held a position in Laizhou, which probably referred to a prefecture in China (JTS38/1455). Inoue H. (1980), 246, has further suggested another official hearing the surname Wang as Chinese, but it should be noted that some Paekche people also bore a similar surname, the person who allegedly brought the Analects to Japan being one example. As for the other two, Nigun and Popch'ong, their surnames were not Sama as Jamieson, 282, has indicated. But their names and titles can be found in NHSK, the former accompanying a Tang general to Yamato in 665 and the latter escorting a Yamato envoy back to Tsukushi in 667 at the order of Liu Renyuan. The NHSK record, however, also has mistaken Sama as a surname but not an official rank.

124. This is suggested by the different groups of Paekche people going to Yamato for military assistance in 671. See NHSK27/II377. See also the next chapter for further discussions.

125. In JTS84/2791, Karim was considered one of the most strategically important town in Paekche. See also Ikuichi (1960), 457-64.

126. It is unknown when the resistance movement was completely suppressed. Judging from the fact that fighting ended in 672 and that Paekche people were organized into a regiment in the same year (SGSG48/416),
the movement probably ended in 672.

127. For Chinese records, see XTS220/6198, ZZTJ202/6370, CFYG358/4242, JTS5/97-98. For Korean records, I tend to agree with Ikeuchi (1960), 436-44, that one record which notes the arrival of Chinese in P'yongyang in the 9th month of 671 should have been one for 672 (SGSG7/82).

128. SGSG7/82.


130. SGSG7/82-83. This record is not found in Chinese sources.


132. Li Shutong (1979), 247-75.

133. ZZTJ202/6371, CFYG358/4242.

134. SGSG40/416.

135. SGSG40/420, see Murakami, 281-96, for further discussions.

136. SGSG40/416.

137. See Murakami, 248-50.

138. SGSG7/83. It is not necessary to follow Ikeuchi (1960), 470-71, who suggested that the set up of coastal defence was a record of the following year.

139. JTS5/98, XTS220/6204, CFYG968/11580.

140. As far as the Chinese record is concerned, nothing is known of the battles in 674. All important events concerning the battle—the defeat of Silla by Liu Rengui at Ch'ilchung, the transference of leadership from Liu to Li Jinhan and the sending of tribute by Silla—have been put together into one single record in the 2nd month of 675 (JTS5/100, ZZTJ202/6375, CFYG986/11580). One might suggest that the fighting ended here, but the Silla annal in SGSG noted that fighting continued until 676.

141. Jamieson, 63-76. It is certainly true that the lack of success but not necessarily defeat was a sufficient reason for part of the career of a general to be left out in his biography. The case of Su Dingfang as discussed in last chapter is one example. Yet this certainly was not the only reason for the fact that some generals have only very
short biographies and others no record at all. Zheng Rentai, who has no biography, and Xiao Siye, who has a very short biography, are two such examples. In other words, the length of one's biography does not necessarily correspond to his importance. At the same time, the brevity of a record on a certain battle also does not necessarily mean that the battle not insignificant. For the battles in 674-75, it seems evident that the Chinese won—at least until the 2nd month of 675—for it would be difficult to see how Liu Rengui could regain his prime ministership in the 8th month of 675 and why Silla would have paid tribute. If there were any exaggerations, it was that Liu was not promoted to a Kung because of his fact as his biography suggests, for he was merely a Hou when he resumed prime ministership according to JTS5/100.

142. Ikeuchi (1960), 461-62, suggests that Xue did not take part as he had been already exiled. However, Xue was exiled within the years of Shangyuan (674-676), suggesting that Xue was not exiled because of his earlier defeat in 671. While there are doubts over the arrangement of records in SGSG, it is possible that Xue led the navy again in 674 and was defeated again, resulting in his exile.

143. SGSG7/84.

144. SGSG47/470. Again, the event is not dated.

145. ZZTJ202/6375. CFYG986/11580. The three wins probably refer to those won by the Malgal troops alone rather than by the Tang troops as a whole.

146. It is uncertain whether the dating by the Chinese sources (see n. 145) is correct. SGSG7/84 has a record of independent origin, noting that Silla indeed had paid tribute to the Tang. At the same time, it also borrowed the Chinese record. One tends to suggest that the two tributes are actually referring to the same event which took place some time not in the 2nd month of 675, but perhaps in the later part of the year. See also the recent discussion by Furuhat, 9-12.
CHAPTER EIGHT  THE WITHDRAWAL OF CHINA FROM KOGURYÖ

The emergence of a new Silla

The resumption of relations between Tang and Silla in 675 marked the beginning of a long period which witnessed relative peace on the Korean peninsula. Never again did the Chinese send any expeditions by land or by sea. As will be shown later, Tang in fact moved the headquarters of the Andong Protectorate-general from P'yōngyang to Liaodong. Nor did the Japanese express interest in the affairs of the peninsula in the form of military intervention. It was not until the mid-eighth century that the idea of another expedition was revived and even then it did not eventuate.¹

On the Korean peninsula, Silla continued its expansion. By the early 680s, Silla had turned into a country of nine prefectures, three of which consisted of former Paekche territory and another three of former Koguryö territory.² While only the southern part of former Koguryo territory was annexed, all Paekche territory was now under Silla control. In addition, Silla also held sway over the island-state of T'amma.³

Unfortunately, the process of Silla's expansion into Koguryö is not well-documented. Owing to the assumption that the move of the Chinese Protectorate-general from P'yōngyang to Liaodong was a result of continuous resistance by elements of the Koguryö restoration movement, it has often been maintained that Silla had gained control of the Korean peninsula by 676.⁴ Yet one can also suggest vice versa, that it was the Chinese retreat which triggered Silla expansion into Koguryö territories. In spite of the fact that Koguryö people had fled to Silla when under pressure from Paekche and the fact that Silla had given asylum to a former Koguryö prince Ansung, it would be going well beyond the evidence to suggest that the Silla annexation of Koguryö territory did not meet any resistance from the indigenous people. It is significant that in 678 that a Minor Capital⁵ was established in Pugwön, in the extreme south-east of former Koguryö territory, which was probably a means to strengthen the military power of Silla.
in the district. In 681, 3,000 crack soldiers had to be sent to guard Piyŏlhol, a border town of the prefecture. It was in the same year that Jŏngch'ŏn, a country nearby Piyŏlhol, was first occupied by Silla. One suspects that Silla was still expanding at the expense of Koguryŏ in 681.

The resistance by indigenous Koguryo people against Silla occupation is also suggested by the fact that no Silla administration was set up in the former Koguryo capital P'yŏngyang. Neither was any set up in Imjon, one of the best-known bases for anti-Tang activities, and a number of other places in Paekche until the mid-eighth century. Nevertheless, despite whatever resistance movements there might have been, Silla gradually gained control of a large part of the Korean peninsula by the early 680s.

The northern expansion of Silla came to a halt in the 680s. The change is partly accounted for by the strong opposition of the Koguryo people, and at the same by a need for Silla to consolidate its gains, especially when signs of instability emerged within the country. In 681 King Munmu died. A month after the accession of the new king, a power struggle broke out in the court. A group of officials headed by Kim Hum-dol, the father-in-law of the new queen, was executed. Twenty days later, Kim Kugwan, a sangdaedung appointed in 680 suffered from the same fate. Kim Kugwan and one of the others who were executed had played an important role in the fall of Koguryo. Another had taken part in the war against the Tang navy in 671. Their fall from power must have meant a change of considerable degree in the composition of the ruling group. Since it was the common practice of the time that there was only one sangdaedung during one reign, one suspects that it was a power struggle between two groups headed by the two sangdaedung.

Whichever the case, the situation appeared to become stable again in 683, when the new king married the daughter of one of the officials who perhaps belonged to the group now in power. The court began to tighten its grip over its subjects. At the end of the year, the court summoned the King of Podŏk, who was in fact the former Koguryo prince Ansung, to pay homage to the Silla court. The king had married a royal niece in 680, and was now given the surname of the Silla royal household and was requested
to stay in the capital where he was given a residence and land. In other words, Silla was trying to isolate the Podók king from his subjects in order to pave way for an absorption of his state. The policy, however, backfired when a member of the Koguryó group revolted in 684. The attempt ended in failure with its leader killed by Silla troops. Further revolts broke out. The rebellion must have been fairly widespread as two regiments of Silla troops had to be sent and two commanders were killed as a result. The fact that the administration of the Yonsan Prefecture where the state of Podók was located had to be restored in the following year also suggests that the Koguryó people must have occupied a fairly large area. However, the success of the Koguryó people was short-lived as the movement was suppressed within two months. Many of the Koguryó people were migrated to the southern part of the new Silla where the Ch'ón Prefecture was newly set up to accommodate them, while others perhaps managed to escape to Yamato.

The new state of silla was also symbolized by the reorganization of its army. In 683, two regiments composed of Koguryó and Malgal people, presumably those from the newly acquired territories of southern Koguryó, were founded. In 686, two more regiments formed by people formerly of Podók were set up, followed by another regiment formed by the Malgal people. One may suggest that they were supervised by military officials of the western and southern Minor Capitals, established in the Ch'ón and Yonson provinces respectively. In addition, former Koguryó officials were given official ranks according to their previous positions. In short, both the military and civilian personnel of Koguryó were all absorbed into the new government of Silla. It is not surprising that diplomatic contacts between Yamato and Podók also ended in 685.

In many ways, the emergence of the new Silla resembled that of the expansion of the Tang empire. The granting of the surname of the imperial household to a foreign leader was not uncommon in early Tang, and examples could also be found whereby a foreign leader was ordered to take residence in the Chinese capital. The function of the Minor Capitals was not too different from that of the protectorates-general as both
served to protect the country's peripheral regions as garrison towns. The newly organized army of Silla which composed largely of troops of non-Silla origins could also have been an imitation of the new tendency in China where non-Han soldiers had begun to play a more important role than its Han counterparts after the accession of Gaozong.

It should not be surprising if so many similarities could be found. Even in the period of hostile relations, Silla continued to import Chinese cultural practices or imitate Tang institutions. The newest Chinese calendar was adopted in 674, and for the first time in recorded history, a military parade and an archery show were performed in 674 and 677 respectively. A palace for the crown prince was constructed and names given to the different gates of the palace rebuilt in 679. The cremation of King Munmu and the pronouncement of his will were also unprecedented events in 681. A state university was established to provide training for prospective officials in the following year. On top of these, a new system of land ownership for officials was instituted to replace the old fief system from 687 to 689, whereby the ruling class would have to carry out duties as officials in order to preserve their former privileges. The provincial administration was also reorganized into a three-grade system and its posts to be assigned from the central government. 22

This was not the first instance that Silla tried to transplant culture from China. It is perhaps controversial to argue that the effort was as large in scale as that in the late 640s and early 650s. Yet it would not be improbable to suggest that the attitude towards things Chinese and perhaps the Chinese themselves was again becoming more favourable. It is difficult to determine the degree of success in implementing these Tang-inspired institutions. The new land system, for instance, broke down in 757 when the old system was restored. Difficulties were also encountered in other areas. 23 Nevertheless, there is no question that the 680s was a decade which saw the new Silla attempting to build a centralized government along Chinese lines.
The restraint on Chinese expansionism

The Chinese policy of maintaining their hold in Koguryo rather than Paekche or Silla continued after 675. In the 2nd month of 676, the headquarters of the Andong Protectorate-general was officially moved from P'yongyang to Liaodong, and all Han Chinese officials were ordered to leave their posts. In addition, the Ungjin Government-general was also moved to Gonon in Koguryo, to where the people of Paekche who had migrated to mainland China were resettled. In the following year, both the Koguryo king Pojung and the Paekche prince Yung were dispatched to the former territories of Koguryo, where their subjects now resided.

To a certain extent, it can be argued that Tang tried to consolidate its rule by 'localization'. The move of the protectorate-general was necessary not only because P'yongyang was now devastated after years of warfare, but probably also because of the continuous pressure from Silla and the Silla-supported anti-Tang movement from the south. One also suspects that the number of people leaving Koguryo to escape Chinese rule was so large that it necessitated the implementation of a remigration programme. However, the return of the Koguryo king to his former territories was different from that of the Paekche prince to his country in 663, as he was accompanied by Yon Namsaeng. It can be suggested that Yon was considered a Tang official but not a member of the Koguryo ruling group, as he was assigned as a special commissioner alongside the king, and perhaps was also made the protector-general. By calling back other Chinese officials, nevertheless, the Tang government in fact admitted that it could not govern Koguryo in the same way as in mainland China, and that the Andong Protectorate-general was to assume a role similar to its counterparts in other peripheral parts of the Tang empire, that is, as a garrison town as well as a rallying point for different neighbouring peoples.

The new Chinese policy in Koguryo was not simply a product of the developments in the Korean state, but also a part of the Tang foreign policy at the time. As in the early 670s, the Tibetans had once again created pressure on the western frontier. Although the Chinese did not
dispatch expeditionary troops to drive out the Tibetans until the leap third month of 676, tension in fact had built up in the previous year when a number of border towns were besieged by the Tibetans. The need to strengthen the defence on the western front was so great that not only did soldiers have to be recruited to from a special unit, but the Malgal troops under Li Jinhang in Yingzhou had also to be transferred to fight against the Tibetans. Li was fighting against the Tibetans as early as in 676, and his troops probably stationed in the western border for almost a decade, meaning the departure of a significant part of pro-Tang forces in Koguryŏ.

It was this priority given to fighting the Tibetans that King Pojang was returned home to fill the leadership vacuum in Koguryŏ. Upon returning to his country, however, the former Koguryŏ king took the opportunity to organize another restoration movement with the support of anti-Tang Malgal. The plot was discovered by the Chinese, and the Koguryŏ king was exiled and his subjects once again resettled in mainland China, leaving behind only the weak and poor.

The swift success of the Chinese in bringing an early end to another potential uprising and resettling Koguryŏ subjects implied that Tang was still in control of at least the northern part of Koguryŏ. Yet it was this time that pressure on the western front mounted, and Silla gradually expanded northwards in the Korean peninsula, symbolized by the establishment of the Northern Minor Capital in 678. Whether or not the Tang government was upset by this Silla expansion, the emperor suggested another campaign against Silla in the same year. However, opposition was raised by Zhang Wenquan on the grounds that since the major forces of the country were stationed on the western front, any new campaign against Silla would become a burden on the people. Apparently, the ideas of Zhang were accepted.

The emperor was given few opportunities thereafter to make similar proposals. Until his death in 683, there was not one year which did not see attacks by the northern and western neighbours or counter-attacks by the Chinese themselves. In 678, a 180,000-men force was almost annihilated
by the Tibetans. The following year saw some Chinese success in defeating one group of western Turks, but further conflicts occurred when another two groups of Turks rebelled. The Chinese launched a few successful attacks against both the Turks and the Tibetans in 680 and 681, but raids especially by the Turks nevertheless continued in 682 and 683. Most available forces had to be mobilized for these campaigns. Thus in 679, when there were invasions by groups of Khitan and Tatabi, the governor-general of Yinzhou could only send one of his subordinates to stop the invaders because he himself was engaged in another larger expedition against the Turks. With incessant problems arising along the northern and western frontiers, the Tang government could hardly spare any efforts to attend to its interests in the Korean peninsula.

While food shortages caused by natural calamities was probably one of the major factors which prompted the Turkish raids upon Chinese border, the late 670s and the early 680s also saw the worst series of natural disasters within China itself, since the beginning of the dynasty. There was drought in the lower basin of the Yellow River in 677, giving rise to famine in the eastern capital in the following year. Floods in the Henan and Hebei regions caused famine again in 680 which lasted until the following year. The price of grain in the capital began to soar in 681, and some soldiers accompanying the imperial tour to the eastern capital were starved to death on the way in the following year.

It is difficult to estimate the impact of these depressing economic conditions on foreign policy. Yet it is noteworthy that court officials were asked to support the war against the Turks by donating a month of their salary in 680, suggesting the government's difficulties in meeting its military expenses. It was also at the end of the Gaozong's reign that troops stationed in frontier regions were encouraged to develop military colonies so that they could be self-sufficient. As Zhang Wenguans had argued in 678, it would be advisable for Tang not to intervene in the affairs of the Korean peninsula as Silla had not yet intruded into the heart of Chinese territory. It was not surprising, therefore, that in
spite of the gradual northern expansion of Silla in the late 670s and perhaps even the early 680s, the Chinese court still sent an envoy to bestow official titles upon the new Silla king Simmun after the death of his father in 681, though they were of lower ranking than before.\textsuperscript{44}

The official recognition of the new Silla king in 681 signified an increasing tendency for the Chinese to exercise restraint in their foreign policy on the whole. As noted already, there had been opposition to the idea of stationing Tang troops in Paekche in the early 660s, and the policy of minimum intervention in the affairs of foreign states continued to have supporters in the court. In a court meeting after the defeat of Tang troops by the Tibetans in 678, Gaozong not only had qualms about his earlier expeditions to the Korean peninsula, but also wondered if further action was necessary in dealing with Tibetans.\textsuperscript{42} The ideas expressed by the officials on this occasion are equally noteworthy. While there were some who supported the idea of another expedition, others proposed the establishment of marriage ties with the Tibetan royal family, and still others maintained that China should rest its troops for a few years in order to build up its economic and military power.\textsuperscript{43} One even argued that further military action would be of little benefit to the Chinese since the incursions of the Tibetans did not bring any humiliation to the Chinese.\textsuperscript{44} Court opinion was again passive in dealing with the Turkish invasion of 683 when it was suggested that Fengzhou, a strategically important garrison town on the loop of the Yellow River, should be abandoned and the Chinese people shifted inland.\textsuperscript{45} In short, by the end of Gaozong's reign, it was increasingly felt among officials that Tang should expand its territories no further as the empire was it more and more difficult to maintain its hold over its many outlying regions.

\textbf{China under Empress Wu}

This new policy to maintain the status quo rather than to further extend the Chinese empire gained further imperial support when Empress Wu took power after the death of Gaozong in 683. In a twelve-point memorial
submitted in 674, she had put the termination of warfare as the third most important item on the list. While sporadic fighting with the Turks continued during her early years, the nature of the military operation was essentially defensive. No major campaign was staged until 687 when a large troop was sent to fight the Tibetans.

A number of factors explain the continuation of the new foreign policy, one being the strain placed on the economy. Natural calamities did not end with the death of Gaozong. Famine, for instance, was frequent in the Shandong region between the years 686-88, at a time when many people had already suffered either from flood or the demands of military service for many years. Decreased production led to a severe inflation especially in the prices of agricultural produce. It was clearly advisable to confine military operations to the defensive during the economic crisis.

Political necessity may have been a second factor. While Empress Wu had been influential at court, she did not necessarily have the same degree of support in the provinces, as shown by the uprising led by Li Jingye, the grandson of Li Shiji, in Yangzhou in 684. Minimizing the scale of military operations and consequently lifting the heavy demand of military service would certainly gain wider support for the empress. In fact, in an amnesty in 684, the empress ordered the return of all Chinese officials and soldiers stationed in the protectorates. Although it is not known to what extent and for how long this measure was implemented, it may be suggested that the policy carried an objective not too different from the propagation of Buddhism or the encouragement of people to enter the civil service with less emphasis placed on their social origins, both for which Empress Wu's regime is justly celebrated. At the same time, one suspects the reluctance of the Empress in undertaking foreign ventures was also a measure to minimize opportunities for the ambitious to overthrow her power. Indeed, the importance of the army supervisors was restored soon after the death of Gaozong in order to ensure that the military people would not abuse their power.

The continuation of the new foreign policy is reflected in the favour-
able attitude that Empress Wu adopted towards Silla. In 686, a Silla
diplomatic mission made a request for written material on rites and rituals
as well as model passages for prose writing. The request was duly granted,
and Tang rituals for both auspicious and ominous occasions as well as
selections from the Wenguancilin, probably the best collection of Chinese
prose at the time, were specially copied and compiled into a book of fifty-
chapters for the mission. 62

The 686 mission was the first time that Silla officials were known to
have gone to China for a decade not as a mission of carrying routine re-
ports such as the death of the king. It may be suggested that the request
for Chinese books was a means to update the curriculum of the Silla State
University established four years earlier, and the interest in books on
rites seemed to be in line with the efforts in adopting Chinese practices
in Silla. Although the Chinese emperor was not pleased when Silla also
used the posthumous title Taizong (K. T'aejong) for their previous ruler
Kim Ch'unch'u, 63 relation between the two countries no doubt gradually
improved. To a certain extent, this is reflected in the sending of an
envoy by the Chinese to offer condolences and bestow official titles to the
new Silla king Hyoso after the death of his father in 692. 64

Meanwhile, Empress Wu did not neglect Koguryo as Gaozong had done in
his final years. The return of the former Koguryo king to mainland China
after 676 and the death of Yon Namsaeng in 679 65 probably meant that there
was a vacuum in the indigenous leadership in Koguryo. The situation was
not only exploited by the northern expansion of Silla, but also caught the
attention of some Chinese. It is significant to note that after his
failure in rebelling against the government in 684, Li Jingye planned to
flee to Koguryo to establish himself there. 66 As a remedial measure, Ko
Powon, the grandson of the former Koguryo king Pojang was dispatched back
to Koguryo in 686 to assume the role expected of his grandfather. Although
very little information has survived, Chinese soldiers apparently have been
sent to maintain the military colonies in the Andong protectorate. 67 In
addition, it is most significant to find that a daughter from the family of
Empress Wu was married to the governor-general of Liaodong who bore the surname Ko.\textsuperscript{68} It is uncertain whether the governor-general was a member of the former Koguryô royal household, but he must have belonged to the ruling class to be given the important position he was assigned by the Chinese. One is tempted to suggest that the Empress was so eager to maintain Chinese hold in Koguryô that she adopted a practice which had proved to be most successful in establishing close ties with Chinese nomadic neighbours but which had never found precedents in relation with Koguryô. One may also add that a consort of another member of the family of Empress Wu was from Paekche, though her social background remains obscure.\textsuperscript{69} It was possible that she also came from one of the great families in Paekche, and that the marriage served a purpose similar to that with the governor-general of Liaodong.

The priority in Chinese foreign policy, nevertheless, remained in the western frontier, where the policy of the Empress Wu had less success. As mentioned already, the Empress had ordered the return of Chinese from the protectorates. In 684-85, she also gave investitures to two leaders of the western Turks, whose fathers had fought loyally for the Tang, hoping that they too would protect Chinese interests.\textsuperscript{70} However, within a few years, not only was one of the Turkish leaders captured, but the Ansi Protectorate was also fallen to the Tibetans.\textsuperscript{71} Given that an earlier proposal to construct a new road to attack the Tibetans was shelved,\textsuperscript{72} the 687 expedition against the Tibetans was likely an attempt to recover than to extend Chinese control in Central Asia.

In 689, there was another expedition whereby 200,000 soldiers were sent to fight against the eastern Turks.\textsuperscript{73} Under Qutlugh, according to one historian, a surge of something like national sentiment emerged among the nomad group.\textsuperscript{74} They became a constant nuisance to the Tang border throughout the 680s, and they even raided the western Turks.\textsuperscript{75} It was probably at the end of the decade that Qutlugh died.\textsuperscript{76} The 689 expedition was likely, therefore, aiming at exploiting the instability caused by the succession question, since Qutlugh was succeeded not by one of his sons but by his brother Qapaghan.
The expeditions in 687 and 689 thus did not mark any changes in the foreign policy of the empress, but nevertheless reflected some changes in the military. The chief-commanders of both expeditions, it should be noted, were not experienced generals. Wei Daijia, who commanded the campaign against the Tibetans, was the son-in-law of Li Daozong, a member of a branch of the imperial household whose influence in court was found useful by the empress in rallying support for herself. Xue Hualyi, who commanded that against the Turks, was a monk and probably also the lover of the empress, his only remarkable accomplishment being the construction of a number of Buddhist temples and the Ceremonial Hall mingtang.

It should not be surprising that such seemingly inappropriate appointments were made. The shortage of competent generals had become such an acute problem that aged officials such as Liu Rengui and Xue Rengui had to command expeditionary troops at the end of Gaozong's reign. The reasons for this shortage were many. The emergence of a group of scholar-officials who were initially responsible for compiling literary works meant that the civil service was becoming increasingly attractive. On the other hand, as a student at the state university pointed out as early as 678, many military officers did not get awards that they deserved, whereas those who should be punished often managed to escape. Moreover, positions in the military were often given to the sons of the general and officers who did not necessarily have the calibre of their father or grandfather. Indeed, when two members of the imperial family were appointed chief-commanders to lead an expedition against the Tibetans in 676, they failed to carry out their assignments. The increasing reliance on non-Han troops meant also fewer opportunities for Han generals to gain experience. In addition, the long period of internal peace in China and the growing cultural influence of southern China where the pursuit of excellence in pen than sword was highly esteemed also had an impact. It is interesting to note that the son of Yoon Namsaeng commented in about 690 that many Tang officials of Han origin were ashamed of learning archery.

The shortage of competent generals was also partly the result of the
empress's bid for power. On the one hand, she showed no leniency in eliminating those she suspected of posing a threat to her rule, and many generals fell victim to her 'reign of terror' in the late 680s. On the other hand, to minimize the possibility of a mutiny and to strengthen her own power, many members of the Wu family were assigned posts in the army. Apart from Xue Huaiyi, there must also have been many others who gained positions in the military service because of their support for the empress rather than because of their performance on the battlefield. The need to gain popular support probably prompted her to award the number of honours to perhaps ten times more than the number given at the beginning of the dynasty. As such awards were no longer regarded as a sign of prestige, many bearers were treated no differently from petty officials when they were on duty, resulting in the low morale of the army.

The 696 Khitan Invasion

In 690 Empress Wu founded the Zhou dynasty. There were no major changes in the government or any of its policies, nor was any effort taken to improve the quality of the army. In the 5th month of 691, an expedition to Tibet ended abortively when the troops returned halfway. However, internal strife among the tribes themselves temporarily halted their expansion, and Zhou even succeeded in regaining control of the four garrison towns under the Ansi Protectorate it had lost. The Turks also became a lesser threat. Xue Huaiyi was given another opportunity to command an expeditionary troop to fight against the Turks in 694, but no offensive was launched as the Turks had allegedly retreated before the Chinese made their move. Nevertheless, in the 10th month of 695, the Turks under Qapaghan gave allegiance to the Chinese.

It is unclear why Qapaghan had to come to terms with the Chinese. Apparently, there was a new wave of famines in North Asia, and the border regions of Zhou now became highly unstable. One group of Malgal first rebelled, and a group of Shiwei followed suit in 693. Both rebellions were suppressed, but unrest seems to have spread to Khitan as well.
suppressing the Khitan revolt in 659, the Chinese appear to have restored one of the Khitan chieftains to the post of Songmo Governor-general. A marital relationship was established between two leading Khitan groups, who perhaps also felt a need to strengthen their power. The desire was fueled by the refusal of a Chinese Governor-general in Yingzhou to give them adequate food supplies, and rebellion broke out in 695. The Khitan Chieftain Li Jinzhong labelled himself the Supreme Khan, signifying a declaration of independence.

In the 5th month of 695 a Chinese expeditionary troop consisting of 28 generals was dispatched, but it proved to be no match of the Khitan as at least two commanders were captured. The near annihilation of the Chinese troops was a shock to the court. In the 9th month of this year, Wu Youyi was appointed chief-commander to lead another expeditionary troop to drive out the Khitan who had reached Yuzhou. A special recruitment was made to organize a new army by granting an amnesty to convicts and slaves. A calvary unit was also formed.

The Khitan desire for independence is partly suggested by the fact that the rebellious group did not advance further into Chinese territories after their first success. Instead, the nomad group turned east to attack the Andong protectorate. They probably realized that the Chinese would encounter difficulties in defending this remote region. Indeed, in order to alleviate pressure of the people, the Zhou court decided to recruit soldiers and obtain food supplies for the army not from Shandong but from the Yangzi River basin. Because of the distance from the front and consequently time for transportation, a Chinese counter-attack in the same year seemed unlikely. At any rate, the Khitan attacked the Andong protectorate and appear to have captured the Chinese garrison town. Probably as a result, the Chinese had to send a navy of 50,000 men under Xue Ne, son of the late Xue Rengui, to reinforce the Koguryo defence.

Meanwhile, the Chinese tried to weaken the Khitan by giving official titles to another Khitan leader. Official titles were also given to Qapaghan to prevent an alliance between the Turks and Khitan. Seeing an
opportunity to expand his power, Qapaghan sought the return of some Turkish tribes who had been settled in the Hexi region at the beginning of the Tang dynasty. Apparently the court met these requests and consequently the Turks ambushed the bases of the Khitan, who suffered some setbacks as their leader Li Jinzhong had just died.\textsuperscript{99} However, Li's brother-in-law Sun Wanrong managed to reorganize his tribesmen and waged another attack on Yingzhou, one of the most populated areas in the Hebei region with some 40,000 households, causing great fear among the people. Wang Xiaojie, who had been responsible for the recapture of the Ansi garrison towns, was appointed chief-commander of an expeditionary troop of 170,000 people, but he too was defeated in the 3rd month of 697. With little support from the force under Wu Youyi, Wang himself was killed.\textsuperscript{100}

The Chinese court had no alternative but to send another reinforcement force of 200,000 people under Wu Yizong, another member of the Empress' family, but there was no more desirable result. The enemy was allowed to penetrate as far as Jizhou and Zhaozhou, looting and killing on the way. The Chinese eventually succeeded in suppressing the rebellion in the 6th month of the year, but only after paying a high price to the Turks by giving more titles to Qapaghan and succumbing to his demands. The Khan this time asked that the Chinese send back Turks who had been settled in Fengzhou and other five prefectures as well as the territories formerly under the Chanyu protectorate-general. In addition, the Chinese court was to provide grain, rolls of cloth, agricultural tools and iron. A marriage was also to be arranged between the Khan's daughter and a member of the Zhou family. The Zhou court initially rejected this request, until Qapaghan put a Chinese envoy into custody. Realizing that Khitan continued to be a serious threat, the Chinese gave in. Joined by the Tatabi which turned against the Khitan, the eastern Turks attacked the base of the Khitan for a second time, causing much chaos among them. Sun Wanrong was soon killed by one of his subordinates.\textsuperscript{101}

The Chinese failure to suppress the Khitan rebellion without calling in outside help illustrated the incompetence of the Zhou military leader-
ship. Unlike Tang when it first came into conflict with the Turks, Zhou could mobilize a fairly large number of soldiers. Yet they did not appear to have sufficient personnel capable of commanding the troops. Neither was Empress Wu prepared to share the power which was highly concentrated in the hands of members of her family. Nor were the Wu generals themselves competent with other military leaders. The arbitrary execution of many who were accused of supporting the Khitan rebels, for instance, earned Wu Yizong a reputation of a mass killer, one which he was to share with one of the rebellion leaders.102

The Khitan rebellion once again exposed the weakness of the Chinese government-general system which was introduced in the reign of Tang Tai-zong. By giving the indigenous leaders titles and offices, the Chinese hoped to gain the subservience of neighbouring peoples without committing their own military resources. But what the Chinese succeeded in doing was to improve the administrative skills and technical sophistication of these peoples, as Silla had demonstrated in its absorption of Paekche and Koguryo territory and people. In the Khitan case, the Chinese again provided an apparatus for the people to organise themselves from an originally diverse grouping in a more coherent manner, giving rise to the emergence of a proto-nationalistic sentiment which accounted for the fact that the Khitan Sun Wanrong refused to surrender to the Chinese, the Turks or Silla in the end. This sentiment did not necessarily vanish because of the suppression of the rebellion, and it must be considered as a major element in accounting for the continuous conflicts between Khitan and the Chinese in the following two centuries until the establishment of the state of Liao at the beginning of the 10th century.

Despite its failure, the Khitan rebellion changed the balance of power in the region to the north-eastern frontier of the Chinese empire. Taking advantage of the chaos during or after the Khitan rebellion, a Khitan chieftain Qi Qi Zhongxiang103 and a Malgal leader Qi Si Biyu who had been settled in the Yingzhou area after the fall of Koguryo fled east and set up their own state. Empress Wu initially refrained from taking military action
and tried to subdue the two by granting them both official titles. Only when Qisi turned down the Chinese offer, did the empress resorted to force. Two rebel Khitan leaders who had surrendered were given an opportunity to show their loyalty, and Qisi was killed in the fighting. Qisi also died for unknown reasons. The new leader of the rebellious group was now Tae Choyǒng, who continued to defy Chinese rule and managed in fact to unite a force of Koguryǒ and Malgal soldiers to defeat a second Zhou expedition.104

The new uprising by Tae and his group suggests that in spite of their of the earlier Khitan rebellion, the Chinese did not necessarily have complete control of the region around Yingzhou. In fact, they did not seem eager to strengthen their rule there. The headquarters of the Yingzhou government-general and many of the prefectures under its control which had been moved to the Hebei region were not restored after the Khitan rebellion.105 Neither did the Chinese prepare to strengthen their hold in Koguryǒ. Apparently, Khitan did not succeed in holding their captured territory in Koguryǒ. The Chinese requested assistance from the ruling group in Koguryǒ, and there were reports of victories by this group early in 697 though it is unknown whether they had been reinforced by the navy of Xue Ne.106 Whichever the case, under their leader who married a Zhou princess, the descendants of Koguryǒ proved themselves no lesser fighters than their ancestors in driving out foreign invaders. Yet no more is known of them after the Khitan rebellion, when the Chinese seemed to further withdraw from the area. There is evidence to show that the headquarters of the Andong Protectorate-general was moved to Yuzhou inside the Great Wall107 and it was in the 6th month of 698 that the status of Liaodong was lowered to a government-general.108 Above all, it is significant to note that Ko Pówon, the grandson of the late Koguryǒ king Pojang, was returned home after being granted a title of King,109 suggesting an elevation of his status. The indigenous leaders of Koguryǒ, in short, was allowed to play a greater role in administering their own affairs as the Chinese retreated.

It is doubtful to what degree these measures were implemented. The alliance of the Chinese with the eastern Turks in suppressing the Khitan rebellion demonstrated the weakness of the Chinese defence on their north-
eastern frontier, one which was soon to be exploited by the Turks. In 698 when the Chinese were ready to meet the earlier Turkish demand by sending a member of the Wu family to marry the daughter of Qapaghan, the Turkish Khan claimed that he had wanted to marry a member of the Li family of the Tang dynasty. Using the pretext of having been deceived by the Zhou and restoring the Tang dynasty, Qapaghan waged an offensive in the 8th month of the year. For two months, the Turks killed and looted in Zhaozhou, Dingzhou and other towns of the Hebei region. Although two forces allegedly of 450,000 people were sent, many Chinese generals again dared not directly confront the enemy. By the time a new army was organized by appointing Li Zhe, the son of Empress Wu and the late Gaozong, as crown prince to boost morale and attract volunteers, Qapaghan and his army had retreated to their base in North Asia with the People and cattle they had captured.

The Turkish invasion was another blow for the north-east region of China. In contrast to the last Khitan invasion, people in the Shandong region were recruited to fight against the invaders this time. Many others were forced to fight under the Turks. At any rate, great disturbance was caused and the situation was aggravated when the court decided to punish those who had sided, though unwillingly, with the nomads. An amnesty was eventually granted, but the seeds of discontent had already been sown. The serious lack of competent generals also became more conspicuous, and the Zhou court finally decided to introduce an examination of military talents in its official recruitment program in 702.

The Birth of Parhae (Pohai)

The Turkish invasion also disrupted a second attempt by Zhou to subdue the rebellious group led by Tae Choyong. As the Chinese became engaged in military conflicts with the Turks, Tae was provided with an opportunity to establish the state of Zhen. Tae was described variously in different historical sources - in one record he is said to be of Malgal origin from a minor race of Koguryo, a member of one of the seven tribes of Malgal in another Chinese record, and a former Koguryo general in a Korean re-
cord. Given the close alliance between Koguryo and some Malgal in the past, Tae is most likely to have been a Koguryo general of Malgal origin. In any case, he succeeded gradually in attracting many Koguryo and Malgal as well as Khitan followers to his new state.\textsuperscript{118}

The revived power of the eastern Turks and the founding of Zhen prompted the Chinese to revise their policy in the defence of the northeastern border. The state of Chen became a potential threat to Chinese interests not only because of its occupation of part of Koguryo territory and the drain of Koguryo people, but also because Tae began to establish ties with the Turks. After the Turkish invasion in 698, the Empress Wu attempted to strengthen Chinese rule in Koguryo by sending Xue Ne and his navy to restore the Andong Protectorate. But the attempt failed because of a typhoon, and strong opposition was raised by Di Renjie, a confidant of the Empress. Pointing out that the plan to maintain a Chinese military presence in Koguryo and to subdue the Malgal group, presumably referring to the new state of Chen, was of immense cost and gave China little benefit, Di argued that the Andong Protectorate-general should be abandoned and that the Koguryo royal house should be restored.\textsuperscript{119} In other words, he seems to have advocated a return to the Chinese policy before the invasion of the Turks. Part of this suggestion was adopted, as Ko Tongmu, possibly an uncle of Ko Powon who had presumably died, was returned to Koguryo as the Governor-general of Andong in 699.\textsuperscript{120}

Di Renjie's ideas represented the general opinion in court that the prime source of threat at the time came from the Turks and the Tibetans, who had been labelled by officials as the two barbarians or two evils, and therefore priority should be given to defence against them rather than sustaining Chinese interest in Koguryo.\textsuperscript{121} Indeed, although the Tibetans imposed no direct threat on the Chinese in the 690s, they requested the Chinese to withdraw soldiers from the four garrison towns of the Ansi Protectorate-general and intended to claim part of the territory under the control of the western Turks. In a sense, the decision to restore the Koguryo royal house in 699 was a compromise between the Empress's ideas and prevailing court opinions. Although two generals were sent to eradicate
insurgent Khitan elements in 700, the empress made no further attempts to restore Chinese control in the Yingzhou area. It is significant to note that in the 3rd month of the same year, the Zhou court declared that together with Persia, Tibet, the Turks, Khitan and Malgal, Koguryo was to be an 'internal barbarian', whereas peoples and countries outside this boundary were to be considered 'exceedingly remote territories'. In short, Koguryo was no longer conceived as an integral part of the Chinese empire.

Not surprisingly, the Chinese rule in Koguryo was soon replaced by that of the Turks, now the dominant power in North Asia. When or how the Turks extended their control to Koguryo is unknown, but at the end of 703 the Chinese appear to have planned another expedition to Koguryo, perhaps to contest the area with the Turks. After the Zhou collapsed and the Tang was restored in 705, an attempt was soon made to establish contact with the new state of Chen, probably in order to weaken its alliance with the Turks. The expedition was abortive and the diplomatic venture also failed. With Turkish backing, the Koguryo people once more re-established a state. The new king, who also held the position of a mangniji, in fact married a grand-daughter of Qapaghan. Yet it is doubtful if the Koguryo people favoured Turkish more than Chinese rule. It is significant that when the strong leadership of Qapaghan declined in the mid-710s, one Koguryo 'chieftain' first submitted to the Chinese in 713. The king and mangniji followed in 715 together with another 'chieftain'. All three bore the Koguryo royal surname Ko, but the fact that they came in different groups and that people of the latter two groups were counted by 'tent' rather than by household suggests the former ruling structure of Koguryo must have been considerably and perhaps deliberately changed under Turkish rule.

Probably because of their early alliance with the Turks, the Tatabi gradually became such a powerful group that they jointed the Khitan as the source of nuisance on the Chinese north-eastern borders. In the 12th month of 710 the Tatabi attacked China with the Xi. In the 6th month of 712, it defeated a Chinese troop of 120,000 people. In alliance with the Khitan, the Tatabi raided Chinese borders at the end of the same year.
With the accession of Li Longji, known posthumously as Xuanzong, it was pointed out in 713 that destroying the power of Khitan and its associates and restoring the Yingzhou Government-general in Yingzhou would enhance the Chinese defence in the northeastern region, and as a result an expedi- tionary troop of some 60,000 people was sent under Xue Ne. The venture turned out to be a failure as the Tang army was almost eliminated. The Yingzhou region thus became a major issue in the defence policy of the Tang. The Chinese had tried to move the Andong Protectorate-general to Liaodong, but probably as a result of the 713 Khitan defeat, it was once more located in Pingzhou within the Great Wall. Although leaders of both Khitan and Tatabi soon surrendered to the Chinese after the decline of Turkish power, the Chinese seemed to realize that giving them titles as governors-general was not adequate to ensure their loyalty. Princesses were in fact married to both leaders before long. In short, as far as the northeastern border is concerned, the Khitan and Tatabi rather than Koguryŏ were the major problem of the Chinese starting from the second decade of the eighth century.

The expansion of Turkish influence and its alliance with Chen also had some impact on Silla. One suspects that the tribute mission of Silla to Zhou in 699 was motivated by a desire to have closer relations with the Chinese, as both found a new common interest in checking the power of the Turks. Having abandoned its interest in the Korean peninsula, Zhou was also prepared to further improve relations with Silla. When the Silla king Hyosó died in 702, not only were official titles granted as usual, but the Chinese stopped conducting court affairs for two days to express condo- lence. Interestingly enough, Silla first saw Zhen as a vassal state as it granted an official rank to Tae Chŏ Yong, perhaps trying to ally with the new state in order to alleviate pressure from the Turks. Yet with the Turks on his side, Tae probably had no need to submit to Silla. On the contrary, he continued his expansion by absorbing Koguryŏ and Malgal terri- tories and people. After 703 Silla became the country which sent tribute missions to China most frequently. While it can be suggested that this was partly due to an increase in the volume of trade conducted officially
between the two countries and a growing interest in Chinese culture - the writings of some Chinese literary figures, for instance, were eagerly sought after by Silla people - it was also partly the result of the increasing threat that Silla felt from its northern neighbour.

In spite of the decline of eastern Turkish power after the death of Qapaghan, Tang made no attempt to establish their own rule or restore a pro-Tang Koguryó leadership because of the emergence of the Khitan and Tatabi influence in the northeastern frontier of China. The descendants of the Koguryó royal household who surrendered to the Chinese in the mid-710s were not returned to their former territories but were settled in China. Some Koguryó people might have gone and settled in Japan, where they would enjoy a relatively high status. Others probably remained in their homeland. In fact, it is recorded that one group of Koguryó people paid tribute to China in 710. Yet it is dubious whether those who remained behind were in such strength as to constitute a small state and retain the name of Koguryó until the 10th century. Even had this been the case, it must have been of very little importance compared to its neighbours.

The failure to rebuild a pro-Chinese power in the former territory of Koguryó and the threat from Khitan and other groups in the Yingzhou area also prompted the Chinese to build up ties with Chen. Although the Chinese had often demanded its neighbours to pay homage to the court, it is interesting to note a mission was in fact sent in 713 to bestow upon the Zhen king a generalship and a kingship of Parhaе (Pohai). Now that the Turks had got weaker, Tae Choyöng accepted the offer and indeed adopted Parhaе as the new name of his state.

At the end of the following year the Parhaе king sent his son to request the right to conduct trade and other activities officially. The request was duly met and relations of the two countries improved, making Parhaе the most important northeastern neighbour of China until the end of the Tang dynasty. Indeed, trade opportunities seem to have attracted different groups of people in the region notably the various tribes of Malgal, to pay tributes to China. Meanwhile, the Chinese made no further attempt to impose its control over Koguryó by force. The Andong
protectorate-general, though not abolished, became a post to be held by those who were responsible for the defence and the military affairs of the northeastern region. The protectorate-general itself was moved once to somewhere near Yingzhou in 742, but was officially abolished after the An Lushan rebellion. The former territory of Koguryō were probably inhabited by a confederation of groups of Koguryō, Malgal, Paekche, some of whom apparently also went to Japan, or other descent. But they were under Chinese control only in name but not in practice.

To sum up, the last quarter of the seventh century saw China finding increasing difficulties in maintaining its interests in Koguryō which was preyed upon by its neighbours, first Silla, then the Khitan and finally the Turks. Silla had only limited success, and Khitan also encountered defeat. It was the expansion of the Turks which eventually led to the disintegration of the old Koguryō ruling group. Although the influence of the Turks soon demised, the Khitan and other nomad groups continued to assert their growing strength. Despite the end of Koguryō, a new ruling group with close association with Koguryō emerged, forming a new power in the region first by siding with the Turks and later with the Chinese, whose policy in the region was now defensive rather than expansionist.
FOOTNOTES

1. SNHG24/289.
2. Details of these are found in SGSG34-36. According to SGSG3/91, the last of the nine prefectures was established in 685. Yet judging by the arrangement of records in Chinese sources, one might suggest that by the time King Munmu died in 681, Silla already had nine prefectures. It is unknown, however, whether the record was inserted. See THY95/1711, XTS220/6204.
3. SGSG8/91. It might be more appropriate to describe the Silla move as one to conquer or to encroach upon rather than govern (Jamieson, 166).
4. For example, Han, 85; Inoue H. (1972), 218.
5. SS81/1820. According to Hanyuan, 42, this is a quotation from a Sui work.
6. For further discussions on the function of the Minor Capitals, see Im.
7. SGS7/85, 35/363. One may suggest that "established" (ㅈنفس) implies "put under control in the first time".
8. The place had been under Silla control many times in the past. The earliest one being in 556. It was lost to Koguryo later, but Silla regained it before the fall of Koguryo in 688 (SGSG6/70). The frontier appeared to be pushed back to Usu in 673 (SGSG40/416) again. See Suematsu (1954), 336-40 for a detailed discussion.
9. SGS35/365. Inoue H. (1980), 249, suggests that there were clashes between Silla and Tang armies in Jongch'on. One wonders if fighting did not take place also in Piyolhol.
11. The sangdaedung was not simply a rank as Jamieson, 167, suggests, but was also the most important post in the government. See Inoue H. (1974), 242-46.
13. SGS7/85. Although the records notes that the bride was either a younger sister of the king or the daughter of one of the officials,
Jamieson, 291, has rightly pointed out that she should have been a royal niece as referred to in both the King's letter and the response from Prince Ansung.

15. NHSK29/II473. The group probably returned with the Yamato envoys. (1954)
17. SGSG40/420. For further discussions, see also Murakami, 290-92.
19. See the example of one Turkish leader in JTS194A/5163 and a Malgal leader in JTS199B/5359.
20. The most notable example was of course the Karakhoja king, see JTS 198/5296.
21. The records are to be found in the Annals of Silla in the respective years. For further discussions, see Inoue H. (1974), 233-96. Yi P. (1979, II), 367-89.
22. SGSG9/104.
24. ZZTJ202/6378-79.
26. THY73/1318 notes that the Chinese continued to assign a Tu'jin as a commissioner (shih) to station in Andong. Tu'jin is a rank rather than a post (JTS42/1784), and one suspects that the name of a person has been omitted here. Judging from the epitaph of Yŏn Namsaeng, he was undoubtedly the tu'jin referred to here.
27. JTS5/101.
28. See YHZXTZ39/545-46. According to JTS5/101, Fangzhou was seized by the Tibetans in 676, but the record here suggests the event took place earlier.
29. JTS5/103.
30. XTS110/4123. There is a passage which describes Li fighting with the Tibetans before the record of his fighting in 676, and one may suggest he went to the western frontier as early as in 675.
32. JTS199A/5328, XTS220/6198. No date is given for the event.
33. JTS85/2815-16. Zhang died in the 9th month of 678 (JTS5/103) but not the year before as recorded here. ZZTJ202/6385 simply dates the event in the 9th month of 678, though it probably took place earlier.
34. The major sources for these events are in JTS5/103-111, 194A/5166-67, 196A/5223-24, XTS216A/6067-78.
35. JTS93/2978.
36. JTS5/105.
37. The Turks ambushed the Chinese carriages for food twice in 679, for instance, see JTS84/2803-84.
38. The major records for these are found in JTS5/102-11.
41. CFYG964/11341.
42. JTS84/2803-04 194A/5166, XTS215A/6043-44.
43. JTS196A/5244, XTS106/4052-53.
44. JTS87/2846-47. See also discussions by Furuhata, 12-13.
45. JTS93/2978.
46. XTS216A/6077.
47. XTS76/3477. It is obvious that the 12 points are arranged in the order of their importance. Guisso, 110, has suggested that the empress might have played a part in the Tang expedition in 655 which, as discussed in Chapter Six, was a Chinese punitive move in response to an earlier Koguryo attack on Silla.
49. JTS77/2672. The expedition did not return until the 5th month of 689 (JTS6/120 is probably wrong, cf. XTS4/98). The record in ZZTJ204/6457 refers to the return rather than the embarkation of the Tang force.
50. JTS90/2910.
51. QTW96/16a-22b, ZZTJ204/6446.
52. See Quan Hansheng (1947), 101-48.
53. JTS67/2490-92.
54. QTW96/146.
55. See Weinstein, 297-305.
56. See, for instance, Guisso, 135.
57. See Zhang Guogang, 79-80.
58. QTW211/2705-06. According to XTS107/4068-71, this was submitted at the beginning of the Chuigong reign (685-688) and before a campaign by the Turks against the Uighurs from 685-86.
59. QTW211/2705.
60. QTW209/2679-2682. The letter was written by Chen Ziang (QTW214/2740).
61. QTW211/2706-8. It is assumed that the memorials were submitted at about the same time as that by Qiao. For further discussions, see Cen (1958), 310-20.
62. JTS199A/5336 notes the request was made for a copy of the Tangli whereas THY36/667 records a copy of the Liji.
63. SGSGB/92 dates the record in 692, the last year of the reign of Simmun (681-92), and notes that the demand from the Chinese to change the title came from Zhongzong, who was in fact not in power at the time. SGYS1/52-53 records that the demand came from Gaozong, who of course had already died. It was not until 687 that Chinese-fashion posthumous titles appear in Korean record, and it may be suggested that the Chinese demand actually came in the late 680s when the Empress Wu was in power, which account for the confusion in the dating.
64. JTS199A/5336.
65. JTS199A/5328 notes that he died in Changan at the beginning of the Yifeng reign (676-679), which is probably incorrect. XTS110/4124 notes that he left Koguryo in 677, and his epitaph further adds that he died in the 1st month of 679.
66. JTS67/2492.
67. See the memorial by Di Renjie in JTS89/2890.
68. QTW14/2733. As the letter was written after the death of Sun Wanrong, probably sent before the 3rd month of 697. See also QTW209/2677.
69. According to XTS206/6839, Wu Yanxiu's mother was someone from Taifang, meaning Paekche (as seen in JTS84/2790). Wu Yanxiu was the grandson of Wu Yuanshuang, a step-brother of the empress Wu.

70. CFYG967/11372, 986/11577-78.

71. See Sato, 349-52.

72. ZZZTJ204/6455-56. As Cen (1958), 322, points out, however, the dating here is dubious.

73. JTS183/4741.

74. Grousset, 103.

75. ZZZTJ204/6469.

76. Pelliot, 206-07, has suggested that Qutlugh died in 691, but his evidence is highly suspicious; see Cen (1958), 326-27. One Chinese record (JTS183/4741) notes the Turks invading China in 689 were under Qapaghan, though ZZZTJ204/6460 states otherwise.

77. Li was in bad terms with Changsun Wuji and Zhu Shuliang, and consequently was evilled and died on his way. After Changsun and Zhu lost favour, the official titles of Li were restored. (See JTS60/2356). Since Changsun and Zhu had opposed the rise of Empress Wu, it may be suggested that their enemies were sought by the empress to increase her own influence.

78. JTS183/4741.

79. JTS83/2783, 84/2795.

80. See JTS87/2846.

81. JTS92/2945-2957. Another memorial is also found in CFYG991/11645.

82. JTS5/101.

83. XTS110/4124.

84. The annals of XTS have a long list of those who were executed or exiled.

85. At least four are known to have held military posts in 690, two of them being generals. Three other generals from the Wu family appeared in records of the early 690s (XTS206/5840, ZZZTJ205/6503, JTS183/4737).

86. JTS42/1808.
87. JTS196A/5225 dates the event in 690, where JTS6/121 dates in the 8th
month of 691 and XTS4/91 the 5th month of the year. See also
JTS170/2539.
88. This is suggested by the surrender of two Tibetan groups, one num-
bering 300,000, in 692 (XTS216A/6078, JTS196A/5225). See also Sato,
352-57.
89. XTS216A/6078. The war appears to have lasted until early 694, see
ZTZJ205/6493.
90. THY94/1691, XTS4/94, JTS183/4742.
91. THY94/1691, ZTZJ205/6503.
92. See, for instance, a memorial by Chen Zhang in 686 (QTW211/2706-8);
for dating, see Cen (1958), 310-20. See also the situation of the
Turks described by one Chinese official in JTS59/2329.
93. ZTZJ205/6493, XTS110/4125, 219/6177.
94. The major sources on this rebellion are found in JTS199B/5350,
XTS219/6169, ZTZJ205/6505-6522, CFYG986/11581-82.
95. For a discussion on the Khitan before their rebellion, see Ota,i,
Chapter two.
96. From the memorial submitted by Chen (QTW210/2701-02), it is known that
communication between the Chinese court and the Andong protectorate-
general was disrupted. But from ZTZJ205/6508, it is recorded that the
rebels laid siege on the headquarters of the Andong protectorate. See
also QTW243/3111, ZTZJ205/6508.
97. See the two letters in QTW214/2733-34. According to the first letter,
written after the death of Sun Wannong, the number of Han and non-Han
soldiers numbered 400,000 and that of the navy numbered 50,000. It is
uncertain if the figures were inflated.
98. CFYG964/1341. According to XTS219/6168, he was the son of the Sungmo
Governor-general captured in 660.
99. Judging from most sources, there were probably altogether two requests
from the Turks in the course of the Khitan rebellion. Some sources
(e.g. JTS194A/5168) have dated the second request in 698. However,
judging from the record in ZTZJ206/6516, the request was first made
before the suppression of the rebellion, i.e. before the 9th month of
697 (JTS6/126) and probably earlier. One can suggest that request was made when a Chinese envoy was sent to confer official titles in the 9th month of 696 (ZZTJ206/6516, CFYG964/11341) and probably to request further military assistance.

100. See JTS93/2977, QTW222/2389.
101. ZZTJ206/6521, JTS194A/5168.
102. ZZTJ206/6522.
103. For a discussion of the origin of Qi Qi Zhongxiang, see Jin Yufu, 390-91.
104. XTS219/6179, JTS199B/5360.
105. JTS39/1521-26. At least 11 of the 17 prefectures were moved. See also XTS39/1023, 43B/1128.
107. Xue Ne, who was the governor-general of Yuzhou from 699 to 712 (ZZTJ210/6672, JTS93/2983) was to be appointed as protector-general of Andong in 699 if not for the opposition of Di Renjie (see note 116). Tang Xiujing was appointed both posts at the same time in 704 (XTS4/104).
108. JTS39/1526.
109. JTS199A/5328.
110. JTS194A/5168. This was likely to be the third request of the Turks when further official titles were granted to the Khan as reward for his part played in the suppression of the rebellion. See also JTS6/127.
111. Ibid., ZZTJ206/6530/31.
112. JTS194A/5169, XTS215A/6046.
113. JTS89/2892.
114. TD15/83.
115. JTS199B/5360.
116. XTS219/6179.
117. SGYS1/31. For further discussion, see Toriyama, 19-32.
118. The exact region of Parhae in its early stage is unclear, see discussion by Toriyama, 42-50.
119. The complete memorial is recorded in TD 186/993. Judging by the fact that the appointment of Xue was not made after the invasion of the Turks (JTS93/2893), the memorial was submitted not in 697 as suggested in ZTZJ206/6524 or in Di's own biography in JTS89/2891.
120. JTS199A/5329.
121. For Di, see JTS93/2889-91. For others, see QTW219/2803 (dating in XTS216A/6078), 211/2701 (ZTZJ205/5607 dates the memorial in the 9th month of 696).
122. JTS89/2893.
123. THY100/1798.
124. ZTZJ207/6571 records that the appointment of commanders for a new campaign apparently to Koguryō. But nothing else is known later.
125. XTS219/6180.
126. CFYG964/11342, 974/11444, 11446, 977/11481; also JTS194A/5172-73.
127. ZTZJ210/6659.
128. ZTZJ210/6672.
129. ZTZJ210/6678.
130. ZTZJ211/6695, 6702-3, JTS93/2984.
131. For further discussion, see Pulleyblank, 20-22.
132. JTS39/1526.
133. JTS199B/5352, 55.
134. CFYG970/11403.
135. JTS199A/5337.
136. This is first mentioned in a memorial by a Silla official to the Tang emperor in 897, see Hamada, 342-53. The date of the event, is not clearly recorded.
137. See the record in CFYG970/11403-971/11405.
138. The existence of trade is suggested by the fact that the Chinese found the products of Silla the best among all imports, see THY95/1711-12.
139. See, for instance, JTS149/4024.
140. SNHG7/70, 717/11/8.
141. CFYG970/11404.
142. In his long series of articles, Hino (1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1962a, 1962b, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1971a, 1971b, 1972a, 1972b) postulates that a state of Minor Koguryo existed from 699 to 918. (The idea apparently has been followed by Henthorn, 54.) While the articles provide a lot of useful information and insights in the development of events in China and northeast Asia throughout the two centuries, there is very little solid evidence to substantiate his underlying argument. As Hino rightly points out, Koguryo appears in Chinese historical sources as a state only twice after 700 until the end of the Tang dynasty. It would be difficult to explain the absence of its record for such a long time when records for other neighbouring states remain fairly detailed. His suggestion that the 9 prefectures of Andong which appear in the Treatise of Geography of XTS but not JTS were part of the territories of Minor Koguryo (1960, 82-83) is highly questionable, for its seems that he has wrongly assumed them to be under the Andong government-general but not the Andong protectorate-general (1954, 1958), see XTS43B/1129.

143. XTS219/6180.

144. CFYG970/11405.

145. See also discussion by Hino (1958).

146. See the example of Zang Huaijiang, QTW265/3402; for further discussion, see Hino (1962).

147. JTS139/1526-27.

148. SNHG7/70.
CHAPTER NINE  THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW JAPAN

Yamato after 663

The disastrous result of the Yamato navy in the early 660s marked the end of direct Japanese military involvement in the Korean peninsula for a century. Despite its defeat at the Battle of River Paek, Yamato remained a power not to be ignored by its neighbours. In the 4th month of 664, half a year after the retreat of the Yamato troops from the Korean peninsula and four months after the end of the Paekche restoration movement, a diplomatic mission headed by Guo Wuzong, a Tang official stationed in Paekche, arrived in Tsushima.¹

Opinion is divided over the question if the mission was ordered by the Chinese emperor² or the general Liu Renyuan,³ who had sent a memorial to the court pointing out the important role of Yamato in influencing events in the Korean peninsula. Whichever the case, it is significant to note that the mission was sent soon after the first attempt by the Chinese to arrange a peace settlement between Paekche and Silla in the 2nd month of the year. While the Chinese were aware of the influence of Yamato, it seems overstating the case to suggest that they would have to seek the consent of the Japanese, who had just been defeated, concerning policy over Paekche.⁴ The mission was more likely to carry the purpose of reporting the earlier peace settlement between Paekche and Silla, and was thus an extension of the effort to isolate Koguryō diplomatically. It was in the interest of the Chinese to see that the new ruling group in Paekche resume the friendly relations which the old rulers of Paekche had had with Yamato, thereby ensuring that there would be no further Japanese intervention if another attack on Koguryō was to be launched. It was not accidental that the mission comprised not only 30 Chinese but also over 100 Paekche people, the latter being led by an official who later played an important part in the resistance movement against Silla encroachment in 670.⁵

The mission did not get the friendly reception the Chinese might have
expected. After being retained in Tsukushi for five months, they were told by the local officials that no court audience would be granted as they did not bear any documents from the Chinese court and therefore could not be regarded as an official mission. The Chinese probably would have returned home if not for the arrival of a monk from the Yamato court bearing gifts for Guo and his group, who apparently made a second effort to get a court audience but eventually had to leave after their request was again rejected by local officials with allegedly a court letter.

There are reasons to believe that there was a deliberate attempt on the part of Yamato to retain the mission in Tsukushi and not allow the envoys to visit the court. While foreign subjects travelling within China were required to bear documents issued by their own government, it is doubtful if a similar practice existed in Yamato. The title Major General which appeared in the court letter rejecting the request of a court audience was also likely to be a term coined on the spur of the moment in order to give authority to the letter. The reluctance of the Yamato court to receive the Chinese and Paekche mission is understandable. The Yamato defeat at the Battle of the Paek River had generated a fear of a Chinese attack, one which was perhaps aggravated with the peace settlement between Paekche and Silla. It was possible that Yamato would have to submit to Tang like its Korean neighbours, thereby putting itself on the same status as Silla which was supposed to be an inferior of Yamato. In order not to respond to any demand or settlement initiated by the Chinese, it was advisable to minimize and even avoid official contacts, hence the refusal to recognize the Chinese group as an official mission.

The fear of a possible Chinese attack was illustrated by the measures taken to strengthen the Yamato defences. It was in 664 that beacon fires and guards were installed on the islands to Tsushima and Iki as well as the coastal areas of Tsukushi and perhaps other parts of Kyushu. At the same time, a large defence system was constructed around Dazaifu, the capital of Tsukushi. In fact, one can suggest that the retaining of the Chinese mission was a strategic measure to keep the Chinese from going home before
the defence project was completed. Given their relatively long period of stay in Tsukushi, however, it may be assumed that the purpose of the Chinese mission was made known to the Yamato court through the local officials in Tsukushi. While the Chinese might have been friendly and peaceful, their past record of employing force against the Korean states did not easily convince the Japanese that the peaceful gesture would not be followed by military action in future. It is hardly surprising that in 665 three more castles were built along the western coast of Yamato, one supposedly at the western end of Honshu, overseeing the entrance of the Inland Sea, whereas the other two were in Tsukushi, one situated to the north and the other to the south-west of Dazaifu respectively.8

It was in the 7th month of the same year of 664 that another Chinese delegation arrived in Tsushima.9 While Guo Wuzong and Paekche officials were again included, this mission was headed by Liu Degao, an official from Yizhou. This mission was more successful. It is not known whether Liu had brought along a letter from the court, but he was granted a court audience. The purpose of this mission is not clear. As noted already, it was in the 8th month of 665 that Silla and Paekche signed another peace treaty under Chinese arrangement. It is unlikely, therefore, that the mission came to negotiate the role of the Japanese in Paekche,10 where the Chinese had already determined to restore the former royal household. Given the geographical proximity of Yizhou from the Tai mountains where the feng ceremony was to be held at the beginning of 666, it was located at the southwestern part of the Shandong peninsula — it is possible that the main purpose of the mission was to invite a Yamato delegation to attend the ceremony. Had that been the case, the mission must have failed its purpose, for Liu Degao did not embark his return journey until the last month of the year, which made it unlikely for him and the Yamato envoys to attend the ceremony in time. There were nevertheless Yamato representatives at the ceremony. They were taken to China by Liu Rengu soon after the signing of the peace treaty between Silla and Paekche,11 and are likely to have been captured Yamato leaders during the Battle at River Paek. In
any event, the mission led by Liu Degao was more successful than his predecessor, for Yamato sent a delegation escorting Liu's return, indicating the possibility of improvement of relations in future.

The fall of Koguryo and Yamato

Tension in the Korean peninsula mounted again with the Tang invasion of Koguryo in 666. Although Yamato had failed to give direct assistance to Koguryo in 661, its willingness to send troops to the Korean peninsula alleviated part of the pressure Koguryo found on its southern frontier. In the eyes of Koguryo, Yamato was a friendly neighbour, if not a potential ally. It is not surprising that one mission arrived from Koguryo at the beginning of 666, and another in the 10th month of the year. The first could have been to inform the Japanese of the death of Yon Kaesomun, and the second was likely to be requesting Yamato military assistance since the Chinese had decided to support Yon Namseong. In short, Yamato was asked to choose side in the Tang invasion.

It was not only Koguryo which saw Yamato as an ally. In the 4th month of 668, a Paekche mission also arrived in Yamato. Since the mission was not accompanied by any Tang officials, it may be surmised that the group came from Paekche loyalists who saw an opportunity to stage another uprising as both Tang and Silla were militarily engaged in Koguryo. As P'yongyang was besieged by the Chinese in the 7th month, another mission arrived from Koguryo, taking the Japan Sea route as the western coast of the Korean peninsula must have been under the control of the Chinese navy, and probably making further request for military support.

None of these missions succeeded. Apparently, Yamato did not appear to have fully recovered from its defeat in 663 and was reluctant to get involved again. At the same time, it was eager to defend itself. In the 11th month of 667 the Yamato mission which had accompanied Liu Degao to China now returned home via Paekche. Whether or not the Chinese had warned Yamato through the returning envoys against getting involved in the affairs of the Korean peninsula, it is significant to note that it was imme-
diately after return of the envoys that a castle was built in Asuka, where the court used to be located. At the same time, castles were built in Tsushima and in Sanuki at the eastern entrance of the Inland Sea. A number of other castles located at strategic places along the coastal areas of the Inland Sea not recorded officially were probably also built this time. On the other hand, war exercises were carried out in the province of Ōmi, where the new court was now situated. Large number of horses were to be grazed and 'burning earth' and 'burning water', probably coal and crude oil, were stored. In short, the defensive system of Yamato was further reinforced. Once again, Yamato saw itself a possible target of Chinese aggression.

Yamato was not alone in her fears. In the 7th month of 667, the island state of T'amna sent a mission to Yamato, and was granted rolls of cloth, axes and swords among other present. In the 3rd month of 669, another mission led by the T'amna prince arrived, and received grain from Yamato upon his return. It is most likely that these missions were attempts to seek the protection of Yamato from possible invasion by Silla or Tang. What is more significant, however, was the arrival of a Silla delegation in the 9th month of 668. As noted already, the Silla diplomatic initiative probably stemmed from the fear of falling victim to foreseeable Chinese aggression, a fear which was shared by Yamato and which brought the two together. It is not surprising that the Silla mission was well received. Two ships were sent to the Silla and another to Kim Yusin as gifts. Envoys were also sent to escort the Silla mission on its return. The close relations between the two countries is confirmed by the arrival of another Silla mission arrived in the 9th month of 669.

The rapprochement with Silla did not necessarily mean, however, that Yamato had to be hostile to Tang. Indeed, Silla being an ally of the Chinese, the possibility of a combined attack by Silla and Tang, or Silla taking a neutral position in case of a Tang invasion of Yamato could not be ruled out. It is noteworthy that it was in the 11th month of 669 that a Yamato mission arrived in China. It is unknown whether the mission was
dispatched before the fall of Koguryô. Whichever the case, the Chinese victory meant that it was imperative for Yamato to maintain a friendly relationship with Tang in order to avoid any direct conflict. In fact, another mission was sent to China, where it arrived in the 3rd month of 670, and its purpose was to congratulate the Chinese on their success in Koguryô.¹⁴

The ambivalent diplomacy of the Yamato court towards China and Silla was accompanied by further strengthening of its defences. In the 7th month of 668, Prince Kurukuma, a member of the imperial family,¹⁵ was appointed to be governor of Tsukushi. In the 1st month of 669, soon after the news of the fall of Koguryô arrived in Yamato, Soga no Akæ, a father-in-law and a confidant of Emperor Tenchi, was appointed to replace Prince Kurukuma, signifying the close attention the court paid to defence. The threat felt by Yamato, however, was probably assuaged to a certain extent, perhaps due to the return of the earlier mission from China, when Soga no Akæ was summoned back to the court at the end of 670.

The peace envisaged by Yamato, however, was again short-lived. As noted already the situation in the Korean peninsula did not calm down as might have been expected. In 669, Silla moved against Paekche militarily, and the Koguryô restoration movement also became active in the following year. The Paekche government under Chinese patronage was once more under serious threat. In the 1st month of 671, a Chinese envoy arrived from Paekche, and was followed by another Paekche delegation in the next month. The relationship between the two groups is uncertain, but it may be again suggested that both came to seek the military assistance of Yamato against the Silla invaders. Once more the Yamato court was forced to make a choice between siding with Tang or with Silla. Supporting the Chinese could lead in the long run the fall of Silla and consequently a direct threat from Tang, but refusal might antagonize the Chinese and lead to immediate confrontation. The delay of the court in giving a reply to the two missions no doubt reflected an element of hesitation on the part of Yamato.

Meanwhile, tension continued to mount on the Korean peninsula as the
Chinese general Xue Rengui led a navy and sailed down the western coast of the Korean peninsula. Yamato was probably informed of this as another mission arrived from Paekche in the 6th month, and fear heightened again with the close Chinese military presence. Prince Kurukuma was again appointed as the Governor of Tsukushi, and a decision was made on the request of military assistance. Although not clearly recorded, the decision was undoubtedly a negative one as the Chinese envoy and the other Paekche delegations all left Yamato empty-handed and without escort in the 7th month.

The Yamato decision was understandable. Now that Silla had turned against the Chinese, the Yamato court probably saw the continued existence of that state to its advantage as the first line of defence against any military moves from Tang. It was only natural for Yamato to enjoy being the senior partner in an alliance with Silla rather than the junior partner in supporting the Chinese. Indeed, the new circumstances justified the perception of the Yamato rulers. The Chinese navy suffered a severe defeat when many of its ships were sunk by the Silla coastal defenders. Silla turned out to be victor and, for the time being, the Chinese retreated.

Yamato's foreign relations and the Jinshin Incident

In the 11th month of 671, 600 Chinese and 1,400 Paekche people led by Guo Wuzong arrived in Tsushima in 37 ships. The large size of the group have led some to suggest that the arrival of Guo was an intimidatory diplomacy gesture by the Chinese who wanted to form a military alliance. This is reflected in the fact that the Chinese were granted weapons by the Yamato government when they eventually left in the 5th month of 672.

This theory is highly questionable. In the first place, the Chinese probably would not have sent Guo, who had failed his mission in 664, for such an important assignment. Moreover, there is no indication that any negotiations ever took place, as Guo and his group remained in Tsukushi throughout their stay. It should be noted that Guo seemed most cautious in trying not to provoke Yamato defenders by sending a Yamato monk to explain
the reason for their arrival. It is also known that Guo and his subordinates specially made a Buddhist status and prayed to it for Emperor Tenchi who was seriously ill at the time. In fact, they even performed a ceremony of mourning after his death. All these indicate that Guo adopted a cordial rather than an arrogant attitude towards the Yamato court.

A number of Yamato people were included in the group. Apart from monks, there were some students and captives in the 663 battle. Their inclusion would not have been necessary had the Chinese wanted to threaten Yamato in the first place. It has also been suggested that there had been a Chinese plan to attack Yamato after the fall of Koguryo; however, this plan was shelved after Silla turned against the Chinese and attacked Paekche; and in this view, the return of the Japanese captives was a way of demonstrating Chinese might and consequently seeking military assistance. Yet this hypothesis again fails to explain why as many as 1,400 Paekche people had to be included in the mission.

What is more likely is that Guo and his group were simply seeking refuge after the defeat of the Chinese navy. It is possible that the Chinese had again run out of supplies as many of their ships for transport were destroyed or sunk. Whereas their predecessors sought assistance from Silla, they could now only turn to Yamato for aid. In order to show the Yamato leaders their goodwill or as a means for exchanging assistance, they managed to take along with them Yamato captives who had been retained in Paekche and monks and students who were perhaps detained in Paekche because of the fighting.

Twice Guo sent letters to the Yamato court in the name of the Chinese emperor, and finally received in return over 1,600 rolls of silk, almost 3,000 rolls of cloth, 666 catties of cotton, together with some weapons. The fact that Guo had to send two letters was probably due to the death of Prince Naka no Ōe at the beginning of 672. Given the posthumous title of Tenchi, he was probably succeeded by his son Prince Ōtomo though the fact seems to have been deleted from official history. An any rate, the reign of Prince Ōtomo was brief, as fighting broke out six months later between
him and his uncle Prince Ōama. The latter was victorious and became ruler; he is known under the posthumous title Temmu. The power struggle - the most violent in the seventh century and which lasted about a month - is generally referred to as the Jinshin Incident.²¹

It was soon after Guo Wuzong and his group left Yamato that the power struggle broke out. This has led to the speculation that the issue at stake in the Jinshin Incident was foreign policy and that. It was probably Prince Ōtomo who granted the aid to the Chinese group, and his pro-Tang attitude gave rise so much opposition that it caused his demise.²² The anti-Tang policy of Temmu is suggested by the fact that no more missions were sent to China until the beginning of the following century.

There are, however, a number of debatable points in this theory. It is significant that the major part of what the Chinese received constituted material for military uniforms rather than weapons, which were nevertheless necessary for self-defence during their return. The compliance to the Chinese request did not necessarily mean that Yamato was willing to side with the Chinese. The Chinese were the losers but nevertheless the invader in their conflict with Silla, and it would still be unwise to provoke them by turning the group under Guo over to Silla. Yet allowing the group to stay in Tsukushi would certainly have adverse effects on its relationship with Silla. Sending them home was therefore the best solution Yamato could device. It was a measure which would not infuriate Tang, and at the same time it would please Silla.

Neither was the lack of official contacts with China necessarily a complete breakaway from the past by the new ruler. In spite of the fact that Tenchi had sent a mission to escort the Chinese delegation home in 665, there is little evidence to suggest that Tenchi had any desire to establish a close ties with the Tang after the fall of Koguryo. The last two missions sent to China in 669 and 670 were motivated by a need to alleviate the potential military pressure that Yamato faced after the fall of Koguryo. Nor did the Yamato court in the reign of Temmu see any point in continuing contacts with the Chinese. With their limited success in
their military conflicts with Silla in the affairs of the Korean peninsula, a Chinese attack on Yamato gradually diminished. Any close links with China could also have an adverse effect on the relationship between Yamato and Silla. It was in the interest of Yamato to be close to Silla and keep distance from the Chinese.

Apart from the absence of contacts with China, foreign relations in Temmu's reign are also marked by a very close tie with Silla. Within fourteen years, nine missions arrived from Silla excluding those from Podos, whereas four missions were sent from Yamato. This has been also linked with the Jinshin Incident, which is seen as a strife between a pro-Silla faction and a pro-Paekche faction, the former led by Prince Ōama and the latter first by Tenchi and later by his son. Such a division, however, is again too simplistic. While it is true that Tenchi gave a number of posts to former Paekche officials who fled to Yamato after the failure of the restoration movement, he did not necessarily continue a pro-Paekche foreign policy. As pointed out already, he rejected the request of both Tang and presumably Paekche loyalists for military assistance. In addition, it was during his first year after becoming ruler officially that he resumed friendly relations with Silla. Those close relations between Yamato and Silla later must be partly attributed to his response to Silla's diplomatic initiative in 668. On the other hand, there is no evidence to substantiate the claim that the position of Prince Ōama was undermined by the absorption of former Paekche officials in the government during the reign of Tenchi, or that he received any real support from Silla during the Jinshin Incident.

The Jinshin Incident should therefore be explained by factors other than foreign relations, and is probably best understood as another power struggle in the Yamato court. Perhaps because of his adoption of Chinese political theory, Tenchi had intended to make Prince Ōtomo his successor, an unconventional practice in Yamato where it was for a brother or a wife to inherit the position of the ruler after his abdication or death. Yet because the mother of Prince Ōtomo was a lady not of aristocratic bith, his
succession probably was not favoured by court officials and powerful clans. The decision of Tenchi to give the throne to his son could also have been due to the result of a personal grievance with his younger brother over the affection of a court lady that almost prompted Prince Ōama to kill his elder brother at a feast. 24 Tenchi had been ruthless in doing away with his political rivals Princes Furuhito and Arima, but he only forced his brother to quit politics and become a monk after his decision to let his son succeed him. Yet the fact that Prince Ōtomo did not hold an official position until fairly late meant that he did not have a strong political following, which explains why he failed to take the pre-emptive move to eliminate his uncle as his father had done to his opponents.

The success of Temmu in defeating his nephew had been partly attributed to the support of many middle and small clans. 25 However, no policy after the succession of Temmu gave special favour to the group. What exactly caused these clans to render their support is therefore uncertain. In fact, except in the move of the capital back from Ōmi to Asuka, no major differences can be discerned between the policies of Temmu and Tenchi. It can be argued that those of the former were essentially a continuation of those of Tenchi. In fact, even Temmu soon found the necessity to ensure that his own son would succeed him in 679. 26

The building of an advanced state

One of the major policies when Tenchi was in power was the transformation of Yamato's internal institutions, notably the building of a new and advanced bureaucracy. In the 2nd month of 664, it was decreed that the names of the official rank system would be modified and the number increased from 19 to 26. At the same time, swords were given to the heads of both large and small uji, whereas the heads of the tomo no miyatsuko were granted shields, bows and arrow. The status of the kakibe and yakabe were also certified.

There is still some controversy over the exact formation of the uji, clan leaders, tomo no miyatsuko, and the kakibe and yakabe, which con-
stituted the middle and lower social stratum of the society. And the brevity of the above record only gives rise to further problems of interpretation. But the decree probably can be better understood if it is taken into consideration with other institutional development of the time. It is most likely that new Departments of Ceremonies, Military affairs, Discipline and Internal affairs were established this time, combining with the already existing Departments of Finance and Punishment to form the Six Departments the major organ in the central administration for the rest of the century. The former three-grade system in the bureaucracy was also replaced by a four-grade one. With the expansion of the bureaucracy and the lack of a system of assessment, it was desirable for the government to have a better defined system of social status to be used as a standard of official employment. The granting of the swords was probably not a rejection of an attempt to mobilize troops to prepare for a Tang invasion, but a token of official recognition of the heads of the uji and tomo no miyatsuko, who were now to be chosen by their subjects and registered at the government.

The reign of Temmu saw the promulgation of a number of decrees which continued to aim at building a new and centralized administration but without significantly changing the social fabric of the country. On the one hand, it was decreed in 673 that ability was to be a basic requirement in the recruitment of imperial pages; and in 678, another decreed noted that officials who were fair and diligent should be given assessment for promotion annually. Yet in another edict issued in 682 it was stated that promotion of officials would have to depend on not only performance but also family lineage. Indeed, another decree in 684 created a series of surname titles (kabane) which provided a hierarchy of lineages with emphasis on kinship with the imperial family. The expansion of the bureaucracy is partly reflected in the need to enlarge the ranking system from 26 to 60 in 686. In other words, the former clan leaders were gradually transformed into bureaucrats carrying official rankings and positions. By bearing new surnames, however, their hereditary social status was preserved.
The establishment of a new administration was by no means easy. Through the officials and monks who travelled to China and the Korean states, Yamato had some knowledge of continental institutions. But difficulties abound in importing them. The most acute problem was probably that the running of continental institutions involved the keeping of documents such as decrees, reports, registers and other forms of record. This would require some knowledge of the Chinese written language, which not many possessed at the time. The lack of qualified and literate officials probably explained the fact that after the first nationwide census was conducted in 670, a second attempt was not made until 689.

Not surprisingly, the need for qualified bureaucrats was partly filled by the large number of former Paekche officials who fled to Yamato after the fall of their country. While some were assigned tasks of supervising the construction of castles or fortresses in preparation for a Chinese invasion, others joined the civil administration and were responsible for the reorganization of the central government during the reign of Tenchi. It is likely the Departments of Discipline, Military Affairs and Internal Affairs were established under their advice. It is also significant that the State University which was responsible for the training of administrators, was dominated by Paekche people. The Chancellor, the erudite in 677 and a group of students in 675 were all people from Paekche who had left their country after 663. In short, the activities of the former Paekche officials were closely associated with the development of the bureaucracy.

Given its close ties with Yamato after the fall of Koguryo, Silla also left some imprints on Yamato institutions. It was in the reign of Temmu which saw the adoption of a system of external ranks, one which closely resembled a system which Silla had used since the second half of the 6th century. Yamato also imported some rites and rituals which were observed in the Silla court. It is possible that the reorganized Ministry of Military Affairs was based on its counter part in Silla, and similarities can be found between the structure of the tajókan, the central decision-making body of the new Yamato government, and that in Silla. In addi-
tion, the new taxation system introduced in Yamato in the late 680s or early 690s was also based not on a per capita basis as suggested in the registrars but on a household basis as the case in Silla. The strong influence from Silla probably accounted for the fact that a number of Yamato monks who went to study in Silla were requested to quit priesthood and take positions in the government upon their return, as they were familiar with the operation of Silla institutions. In other words, the close political ties between Silla and Yamato were accompanied by a cultural affiliation.

The intermediary role of the Koreans in cultural import declined, however, as circumstances gradually changed. The former Paekche officials and their descendants were unlikely to have anything new to offer, and some of their knowledge probably became outdated and less stimulating as time went by. In fact, most of their descendants remained only as middle or lower ranked officials. They continued to be instrumental in the fields of medicine, sorcery, sculpture, the study of almanac, arithmetic and Confucian classics, but they never regained the importance their ancestors had enjoyed. On the other hand, with the declining threat of Chinese attack and the gradual restoration of relation with China on the part of Silla, the tie between Silla and Yamato also weakened. This is partly reflected in the end of missions from Podōk after its absorption by Silla, and the fact that the annual missions from Silla to Yamato in the 670s gradually became a biannual event in the 680s and more or less a triannual one in the 690s. Apparently, Yamato tried to negotiate a resumption of the tributes from Podōk, as the Yamato mission sent to Silla in 685 remained there for a relatively long period of time, but no concrete result emerged.

In spite of the absence of direct contacts with China, Yamato never abandoned its interest in Chinese culture. Traces of Chinese influence can be found in the reorganized administration even in the period of Tenchi, who himself is recorded to have written poems in Chinese. The Six Departments set up at this time was probably an imitation of its counterpart in the Sui or the Tang in structure though not wholly in substance. The
post of the Censor also borrowed its name directly from China, though the inspiration might have come from an office which had operated in the Qin and Han rather than that in the Sui and Tang.\textsuperscript{45} It should not be surprising that the former was taken as the model, as red, the colour used by Han Gaozu in his rise against the Qin, was adopted by Prince Ōama as the colour of his own flag, and it has been suggested that this was by no means coincidental as the prince was comparing himself with Han Gaozu who had attempted to overthrow the regime of a despot succeeded by his son.\textsuperscript{46} Though it would be difficult to ascertain to what degree the behaviour of the Yamato ruling class was shaped by an imitation of their Chinese counterparts, past or contemporary, it is not improbable that a decree issued in the 11th month of 685 ordering the submission of all weapons to the government was an imitation of the policy of Qin Shiguangdi or Sui Wendi, and that the creation of the eight surnames the year before was an adaptation of the Tang practice when a number of genealogical works were compiled to define the social standing of the lineages of the empire.\textsuperscript{47}

The cooling of relations with Silla and the realization that Silla itself was adopting institutions from China, in a sense, prompted Yamato to look more closely upon China as a model of cultural advancement. In 668 the Ōmi Code was issued, but there are still doubts to whether the Code was a comprehensive system of regulations or merely comprised a number of individual edicts. In the 680s, another effort was made to compile a new code. Although the penal part was probably never completed, there is little doubt that the civil code was finalized and implemented in 689, and is known generally as the Kiyomihara Code. As there is no evidence for the existence of a comprehensive set of codes in Silla, the Yamato endeavour was probably inspired by Tang than by Silla.\textsuperscript{48}

China now becoming also a model for Yamato to build an advanced state those with direct experience in China graudly received more attention. Dōshō, who had studied in China under the famous monk Xuanzhuang, was summoned to the capital where he was to teach disciples from different parts of the country.\textsuperscript{49} Two official trainees who had studied in China and
returned to Yamato in 684 probably played a part in the compilation of the
Kiyomihara Code. Iki no Muraji Hakatoko, who was also China-educated,
was one of the compilers of the Taiho Code, promulgated in 700, despite his
participation in the coup led by Prince Ōtsu in 686. Incidentally, the
interest in Chinese learning is also reflected in the fact that, upon his
death when he was to be executed after being caught, the prince composed
poem in Chinese.

From Wa to Nippon

With the diminishing fear of a Chinese invasion and a growing interest
in Chinese institutions, it is hardly surprising that the Japanese soon
showed intentions to resume direct contacts with the Chinese. The first
hint of such an intention came in 691, when two Chinese captives caught in
the battle of 692 were appointed to the State University as teachers of the
Chinese language, a course probably newly included into the curriculum.

One is tempted to suggest that the demand for a knowledge of the
spoken Chinese language was not only the result of a growing interest in
Chinese learning - the course could have been introduced much earlier -
but was in fact also the first step in paring the way for Yamato to resume
diplomatic relations with China. The demand came at a time when there had
just witnessed a change of dynasty from Tang to Zhou in 690, when an op-
portunity was offered for the Japanese to deal not with a regime by whom
it had been defeated but with a new government with which it could es-
establish a relationship on a new basis.

To a certain extent, Yamato had already taken some steps in giving
itself a national identity. The sending of a princess to attend to the
shrine of Amaterasu no Ōmikami in Ise might have its origins in showing
gratitude for the blessing received by Prince Ōama during the Jinshin
Incident, but it was soon turned into a regular practice and an attempt to
cultivate a national cult, one not too different from the imperial
patronage given to Taoism after the establishment of the Tang. The first
official endeavour to compile a national historical record was also made
in 681, the year that Temmu fulfilled the sexagenary cycle by turning sixty years of age. It was probably in the late 680s or early 690s that the title tennō was adopted for the Yamato ruler. The term was one with strong Taoist implications, and is likely to have been borrowed from China, where it was introduced in 674 against a background of increasing patronage given to Taoism. Furthermore, with the accession of the third daughter of Tenchi, later known as Jitō, in 686, the Chinese practice of a reign title was adopted. At the same time, it is also noteworthy that a Chinese reign title for the years 688-89 has been found on a Yamato tomb inscription dated 700.

The resumption of relations with China, however, was not formally announced until the first month of 701. The lapse of time can perhaps best be accounted for by the fact that Yamato found it necessary to take further steps to make itself a country of order and discipline. A new palace was completed in Fujiwara at the end of 694, and a set of court rituals were promulgated in 698. Yet it is equally worthwhile to note some of the events which took place before the embassy actually embarked in the 6th month of 702. In the 2nd month of 701 a libation ceremony was held for the first time in the State University. In the 3rd month new official ranking and dress systems were introduced. In the 4th month a new code was promulgated, and three months later a fief system modified according to the new code came into practice.

It has been suggested that all these events were not unrelated to the embassy leaving for China. Known as the Taihō Code following the new era title adopted in 701, the new code followed its Chinese counterpart fairly closely, at times verbatim with little adaptation. Nevertheless it revealed that Yamato now possessed a fairly refined system of government. It is highly likely that the Japanese took along a copy of their new code and reported all the rites and rituals to the Chinese, demonstrating that Yamato was a country which commanded respect because of its cultural advancement. In fact, the Japanese now adopted a new name for itself when its leaders began to relaeze that Wa, the name Yamato had been known to
its neighbours for a long time, was undersirable and demeaning since the
word denoted a people of small physique. Instead the name Nippon, meaning
the origin of the sun, was introduced. It is noteworthy that the new
name seems to have been reserved mainly for dealing with neighboring
countries since the country was referred to as Ōyashimaguni in an imperial
edict of 697. The origin of the name could have associations with the
traditional worship of the sungodness and might have been coined by the
people of Silla. But what is significant is the Yamato determination to
alter its own image and the desire to appear as a country of respectable
status.

It was in 703 that the Yamato mission arrived in China. The Chinese
provincial official whom the mission first met apparently knew the group
had come from Yamato but failed to understand the reasons for change in the
name of the country. The Japanese envoy did not give a direct reply, but
raised the question why Tang had become Zhou in China, implying perhaps
implicitly that a similar change had taken place in Japan. The pro-
vincial official appeared to be persuaded, and so seemed some of his coun-
terparts in the capital, for Wa and Nippon were to be treated as two dif-
ferent countries in some historical records.

The 703 Japanese mission to China also had its implication in East
Asia. In the first month of 701, a ceremony was held in the Yamato court
which was decorated for the first time according to the Chinese idea of
cosmology. Not only Yamato officials, but 'barbarian envoys', presumably
from Silla, were also present. The occasion was one which institutiona-
lized the Yamato view of Silla as a vassal state in a similar way as the
Chinese did. It is possible that when the Japanese went to China, they
tried to legitimize this relations with Silla, and that after the return of
the mission from China, Yamato tried to used Chinese recognition as a
pretext to overawe Silla. The Chinese response in this case is unknown.
At any rate, the frequent missions Silla sent to China after 703 were not
totally unrelated to the Japanese pressure. Indeed, it is generally agreed
that it was from the turn of the century that Silla-Japan relations gradu-
ally deteriorated.
On the whole, the 703 mission was a success for the Japanese, whose chief envoy impressed his host by his learning and etiquette so much that he was granted an audience by Empress Wu and in fact was offered a post in the Chinese court which he declined to accept.\textsuperscript{65} It would be difficult to believe that all the Chinese officials were ignorant of the fact Nippon was but the new name for Wa, or that the Chinese had completely forgotten that a military conflict had taken place between the two countries. But the old grievance did not prove to be an obstacle in forming a new relationship. Indeed, a few surviving Japanese soldiers who had been captured and had served as government slaves for the Chinese government were allowed to return home with the mission.\textsuperscript{66} In short, the mission marked a new phase in the relationship between China and Japan. While China continued to see Japan as a remote country, Japan no longer saw China as a potential enemy. The resumption of direct contacts with China increased the Japanese admiration of continental culture, signifying the beginning of a period of intense sinification for Japan which was to see more and larger missions going to China.
FOOTNOTES

1. According to NHSG27/II361, Guo arrived in the 5th month. According to 
Kaigai kokki quoted in Zenrin kokuhoiki (20-21), he arrived in Tsushima 
in the 4th month. See also NHSKII577-78. Ikeuchi (1960), 196, sug-
gests Guo was a Paekche official, but his official titles clearly 
indicate that he was a Chinese.

2. Ikeuchi (1960), 206.


4. Ibid.

5. He is Nigun, whose name appears in NHSK27/II, 365 and SGSG7/82.

6. See, for instance, the study by Ono.

7. According to NHSK27/II363, an embankment was built to collect water. 
Archaeological findings have shown that there were more than one 
embankment and more than one castle, see Kagamiyama, 70-79. The dates 
for the beginning or the end of the project are not given, but one may 
assume that it began after the signing of a peace treaty between Silla 
and Paekche.

8. See also Kagamiyama, 86-88, for the results of archaeological investi-
gations.

9. Kito (1975), 148, suggests the record in 665 was but a duplication of 
the record in 664. For the fallacy of the suggestion, see Suzuki Y. 
(1972), 306-07.


11. CFYG981/11525.


13. CFYG970/11402.

14. Ibid., also XTS220/6208.

15. Nihonkadai jimmui jiten, 726.

16. NHSK27/II373 has a record which dates the arrival of the group in 669. 
However, this is probably a duplication.


18. NHSK30/II517.

20. Ibid.

21. See Hoshino, 1-72, for a summary of various studies.

22. The hypothesis has been advanced by both Japanese and Korean historians, see again Hoshino, 302-04, for a summary. Apparently, the theory was first put forward in the early 1950s, but has received more support only recently. See, for instance, Matsuda, 116-26.

23. One representative work favouring this idea is Sasaki.

24. See the biography of Fujiwara no Kamatari, Nara ibun, 879.


26. This is suggested by the fact that the crown prince and two sons of Tenchi, all perspective candidates for the throne, were made to vow that they would comply with the imperial order, give each other mutual support and avoid contention, see NHSK29/II 435-37.

27. For discussions on uji and kabane, see Miller and Kiley. For kakibe and yakabe, see Takeuchi, especially 163-83.


30. See a court decree issued in 682, NHSK29/II 455. Also discussions by Inoue M. (1965), 491-525.

31. While there are different opinions concerning the social positions of the various groups, both Hara, 145, and Hirano, 524, suggest this part of the decree had strong military implications, whereas Osabe, 25-53, goes further and sees the whole decree as a response to foreign threat.

32. See Nomura (1970), 560-64.

33. Takeuchi, 85-104, also Miller and Kiley.

34. Inoue M. (1972), 262-75.

35. See note 28.

36. See NHSK27/II 377, 29/II 429.


41. See, for instance, an example in NHSK30/II, 519.
42. For a survey of this group, see Saeki, 103-26.
43. See Furuhata, 26-32.
44. See the Introduction of Kaifusō (Nara Ibun, 909), compiled in 751.
47. XTS95/3841-42.
49. SNHG1/5-6, 700/3/10; Nihon kodai jimmei jiten, 1180-81.
51. See his biography in Nihon kodai jimmei jiten, 133-34.
52. NHSK30/II, 511. The record is the first time these two appear as teaching staff - they could have been appointed earlier.
53. See Okada, 139-377.
54. Using circumstantial evidence, Hon’inda (1980, 1981) suggests that the term was used in Japan in the first half of the 7th century, a theory which has been advanced by Tsuda and others, though on different grounds. Yet the study by Tono (1977), which uses both circumstantial and material evidence and argues that not until the later part of the century was the term adopted, remains the most convincing.
55. See Fukunaga, 7-18.
56. JTS5/99.
57. See Okazaki, 389. It is also interesting to note that new Chinese characters invented by the Empress Wu were used.
58. See, for instance, the study by Niida.
59. For further discussions, see Kawasoe, 202-06.
60. JTS199A/5340, no date is given for the change. In SGSG6/74, there is a record noting the change, but as Inoue H. (1980), 204, ff 80, has pointed out, this is likely to be an incorrect insertion of Chinese record.
61. SNHG1/1; 697/8/17; see also Iwahashi, 48-57, for further discussion on the usage of the term.
63. SNHG3/21, 704/7/1.
64. For instance, JTS199A. THY99/1769-70, covers record of Japan in one Treatise of Wo, but there is a conspicuous absence of material between 670 and 777. On the other hand, the Treatise of Wo in TD185/889 covers record of Japan from 631 to 702 (which should be 703 as in JTS199A/5340).
65. JTS199A/5341.
CHAPTER TEN RETROSPECTIVE

It is possible to divide the Korean Wars in the seventh century roughly into six stages: 1) from 598 to 604 when tension began to mount after two abortive campaigns by the Chinese and the Japanese respectively; 2) from 605 to 618 which saw the launching of four expeditions to Koguryŏ by Sui Yangdi which led to his collapse; 3) from 619 to 649 when the Chinese started a new wave of offensives on a smaller scale but with more success; 4) from 650 to 668 when two alliances developed among the countries of East Asia, ending in the victory of Tang and Silla over Paekche, Koguryŏ and Yamato; 5) from 669 to 683 which saw the split of the Tang-Silla alliance and conflicts between the two countries and disappearance of Chinese control in former Paekche territory; 6) from 684 to 704 during which the Chinese encountered increasing difficulties in maintaining their rule in Koguryŏ and eventually retreated from the Korean peninsula and the region north of it.

The Korean Wars were basically a series of attempts by the Chinese to conquer and sustain their rule in Koguryŏ. The acquisition of Paekche was essentially a by-product in this process. There was no period in which the Chinese showed a real interest in Paekche; the decision to invade the country was abrupt, and the actual control of the control of the area was brief. The case of Koguryŏ was different. Beginning with the second stage of the Wars, the Chinese exhibited great determination in conquering the country. It was a commitment which induced four Chinese rulers to send their troops first to pursue and later to protect Chinese interests.

Although an element of commercial interest might have been behind other expeditions by the Chinese in the same period, there is no evidence to suggest that economic factors had at any stage prompted China to go to war with Koguryŏ. By the end of the seventh century, Koguryŏ was labelled as a land of barbarians by some officials to justify the withdrawal of direct Chinese rule. Yet even when the Chinese officially accepted Silla suzerainty over a large part of the Korean peninsula in mid-eighth century, the region to the north of the Taedong River which included P'yŏngyang was
intended to remain under Chinese control at least in name. In short, the ruling class in China in the seventh century seem to have genuinely believed that an extended Chinese empire should include Koguryo.

This Chinese conviction stemmed from a reading of past history, showing that Koguryo had been under Chinese rule during the Han dynasty but had been 'lost' during the centuries of political division. The idea took on the sanctity of a mission, and has been described as the Han Wudi syndrome of Tang Taizong. Yet if such a syndrome did exist, it was by no means limited to the second Tang emperor, for similar traits can be discerned in both his predecessors and successors. While the employment of history as a guideline does little to encourage the development of new ideas, it nevertheless was a common phenomenon in policy formulation, particularly in the case of political decisions, during the seventh century, the Korean Wars being a case in point. In fact, it can be argued that the use of historical precedents as reference point was more than a matter of rhetoric, and that it perhaps explains the absence of intellectual breakthrough and new political ideology in the first half of the Tang.

If the Korean Wars distinguished themselves from other expeditions made by the Chinese in motivation, they also differed from the others in the way the military operations were conducted. Where most battles on the north and west borders were fought on steppeland and on horseback, those in Koguryo were fought on a more mountainous region where victories would require the capture of castles and fortresses often well protected by natural barriers. This sort of contest not only demanded a different kind of skill, which the Chinese might have acquired in the years of internal political division, but more importantly, they meant that the battles were usually more time-consuming. Indeed, although the cold weather seems to have been a major factor in accounting for the retreat of the Chinese under Taizong in 645, the attacks launched by Gaozong in 661 and 666 both demonstrated that wintry conditions did not necessarily bring military operations to a halt. But even if the Chinese were prepared to fight in the cold, the relatively lengthy period of fighting meant that they needed
a large amount of supplies, not only for the cavalry force and army but also for the navy. This explains the facts that extensive preparations had often to be made, and that the economic repercussions of the Korean campaigns appear to have been more adverse than those of expeditions to the north or the west. The fact that the Chinese fighting against a essentially sedentary rather than a nomadic people also resulted in the more persistent resistance from the enemy as the Koguryō or Silla defenders could not retreat to re-establish their base elsewhere, thus making the Korean Wars one of the major issues in the foreign relations of the period.

Despite continuous Koguryō resistance, the Chinese kept on pursuing their goal. Not everyone agreed at all times, however, that the territory of Koguryo should be incorporated into the Chinese empire. Sui Yangdi's first and second campaigns received almost unanimous support from the court — even the hostile Tang historians failed to discover a person who raised direct opposition. Sui Yangdi's third and fourth campaigns, however, did not get the same degree of approval. Despite the advice by his officials to treat Koguryo as a subsidiary state, the first emperor of Tang adopted a policy of reconciliation. The roles were changed in the following reign, when it was Taizong who advanced the idea of a campaign and the officials who, though sharing his convictions, opposed direct action. Court opinion was again divided under the third Tang emperor, who at first favoured the expeditions but became penitent over his decisions by the final years of his rule. Although the structure of the Tang government may have given considerable power to top officials, the Korean Wars reveal that it was the emperor who held the highest authority in making the final decisions, especially in military or foreign policy matters. The ideas of some officials were adopted at times, the maintenance of a Tang military presence in Paekche being one example. But as far as the Korean Wars are concerned, not only the foreign policy towards the Korean states but also the tactics adopted in the battles, especially in the second and third stages, reflected the ideas of the rulers more than
anybody else. In this sense, the Sui and Tang not only marked a political unification of China, they also saw the restoration of the imperial system.

There were, of course, different personal factors at work in the launching of the various campaigns, but all show that a strong military tradition continued in China despite the unification and the change of dynasties. One can in fact argue that the Chinese withdrawal from active intervention in the affairs of the Korean peninsula in the sixth stage of the Korean Wars was not merely brought about by the adoption of a policy based on pragmatism; it was also a change in the political leadership in China itself with the rise of the Empress Wu. The sixth stage differs from all the earlier ones. The establishment of a marital relationship with local leaders in Koguryo was unprecedented in Chinese policy towards its Korean neighbours, and the willingness of Empress Wu to bring an end to the hostilities with Silla without making demands also displayed a political adroitness not found in her predecessors. Ironically, the attempts by the Empress to bring peace to China's northeastern border did not really succeed, as it was in her reign that the Khitan and other nomad groups became a major threat to China. By the time the Tang dynasty was restored, the military character of the empire had already been greatly weakened.

If internal politics shaped the policy of China towards the Korean states, economic factors also played a part. China felt no strain when Sui Wendi launched the first campaign at a time when the country was fairly affluent. Neither did his son experience much difficulty in his first two expeditions. Yet the economic situation rapidly deteriorated not only because of the campaigns themselves but also because of natural disasters, resulting in the calling off of the fourth campaign. From an economic viewpoint, the first campaign by Tang Taizong was probably the least justified, but he was quick to perceive the limits and indeed his tactics changed from large-scale expeditions to almost a guerilla type of warfare. The economic situation improved under his successor, nevertheless Gaozong had to call off the campaigns twice for economic reasons.
before he actually brought Koguryo under his rule. Indeed, the cost involved in maintaining a strong Chinese military presence eventually led Empress Wu to abandon control over Koguryo altogether.

One historian has suggested that the Chinese used the tributary system to define their relationship with the Korean states. China would receive missions from its tributaries and in turn grant investitures whenever a new king succeeded, and violations of the system would give rise to punitive action by the Chinese. With the exception of the period under Sui Yangdi, however, no evidence has been found to support this thesis. Before confrontation broke out in the 640s between Tang and Koguryo, the former had been receiving tributes from the latter. It is obvious that China wanted more than ceremonial submission from its vassal states, and that it demanded obedience and, if necessary, assistance in the execution of its foreign policy, even though the latter did not necessarily comply with the interests of its neighbours. The fall of Paekche was not only due to its failure to follow Chinese orders in foreign policy, but because it formed an obstacle in the implementation of that policy. One can argue that the demand by Sui Yangdi for the Koguryo king to send his son to the Chinese court was not only as part of the duties of a tributary, but also as a gesture to show that Koguryo was on the side of the Chinese rather than the Turks. The relations between China and the Korean states, therefore, were much more dynamic that can be explained by the static institution of the tributary system.

Another historian has described the foreign relations of Tang as one of interlocking nature. In other words, the rise and fall of China's foreign relations with its neighbouring countries should be understood in the multilateral relations of those states. Yet this explanation applies only in the first and final stages of the Wars, when the decline of Turkish power saw what seemed to be an expansion of Koguryo in the last decade of the sixth century, and when the revival of the Turks effectively replaced Chinese control over Koguryo territory at the beginning of the eighth century. For the seventh century, the relations between China and the
Korean states are probably best understood in terms of the multilateral relations of China itself. In short, they hinged in a large part upon Chinese relations with other neighbouring peoples. The Chinese would pursue their interest in the Korean peninsula after they had achieved security in her borders, but the interest soon declined when tension mounted on other frontiers.

In this manner, war and peace on the Korean peninsula throughout the 7th century were very much the consequences of the Chinese policy towards the different states. The long span of peace the Korean states enjoyed in the second half of the sixth century was first broken by the expedition of Sui Wendi. Although there was subsequent fighting between Paekche and Silla, the peninsula was relatively peaceful after the futile campaigns of Sui Yangdi. The new aggression by Tang Taizong, however, brought about tension once more. Despite a brief period of rest after his death, peace did not resume until the Chinese adopted a more pragmatic attitude towards its Korean neighbours.

From the Korean perspective, then, the Korean Wars were a story of a struggle for survival. Koguryo did make some efforts to make up for the error committed by its new leadership in arousing the displeasure of the Chinese emperors, but the country was never forgiven. The threat from the Chinese drove Koguryo to side with its once hostile neighbour Paekche and build up ties with remote Yamato. For more than a half a century, the country lived under tremendous pressure not only politically, but probably economically and socially, leading eventually to its collapse.

Paekche also fell victim to Chinese expansionism. The border dispute between Paekche and Silla had in no way had directly infringed upon Chinese interests. But suddenly it became a pretext for an invasion from the Chinese after they had become frustrated at their own lack of success in subduing Koguryo. Despite later Tang attempts to restore an indigenous leadership in Paekche, the experience of Chinese occupation had already split the country into two camps, with the support for the Chinese protege understandably low because of the part he had played in fighting against
his own people. This allowed an opportunity for Silla to exploit the
disagreement, especially when the Chinese seemed reluctant and perhaps were
able to provide the military backup necessarily to strengthen the role
of their puppet regime. Throughout the century, the Chinese hardly showed
any concern for Paekche, except when it was felt that the assistance from,
or conversely the annihilation of, the country might facilitate the pur-
suit of their interest in Koguryo.

It would be overstating the case, however, to suggest that the small
Korean states had been completely deprived of the opportunity to decide
their own fate. Had Koguryo shown more flexibility in its dealings with
both Sui Yangdi and Tang Taizong, one wonders if the pressure imposed
would not have been less. The lack of unity among the ruling class also
served as one of the factors which tempted Sui Yangdi and Tang Taizong to
launch their attacks. For Paekche, the military misjudgement appeared to
be crucial. The collapse of the Paekche coastal defence was a sharp
contrast with the success which Silla later countered Chinese attacks. As
Chinese aspirations in Paekche were much smaller than those in Koguryo, one
can also surmise it could have been possible for Paekche to put itself in
the position of an ally rather than an enemy of Tang, had it once again
expressed willingness to co-operate with the Chinese in the fourth stage
of the Wars as it had done in the third stage. But obsession with its
dispute with Silla and the complacency over its immediate success perhaps
blinded Paekche from seeing its own position from a larger perspective.
The mistake proved fatal.

Both Paekche and Koguryo also had the opportunities to restore their
independence, and foreign assistance was enlisted in both cases. In
Paekche, this resulted in a split among the leaders and consequently
weakening of the restoration movement. In Koguryo, the dependence on its
traditional enemy, Silla, also proved to be detrimental to its cause.
Neither was the allegiance given to the Turks after the turn of the cen-
tury a success for the restoration movement. King Pojang was probably the
leader who could have restored Koguryo. Yet he rebelled immediately
when he was returned to his country. He failed, however, apparently for
not having rallied enough support for himself. One is tempted to speculate
that he might have had more success had he waited until a more appropriate
time as indeed had the founders of Parhae.

The dexterity of survival by a small state was aptly demonstrated in
the case of Silla, which distinguished itself from the other Korean states
on four counts. Firstly, Silla was perseverant in its diplomatic efforts
to break out from its isolation on the Korean peninsula. Delegations were
sent to all its neighbours at one stage or another with the exception of
Paekche. The lack of active responses from China and Japan did not dis-
courage Silla. Although the Chinese perhaps did not really recognize the
role Silla could play in the Korean peninsula until after their own military
weakness was exposed, the dedication showed by Silla certainly accelerated
the establishment of a close tie with the Chinese.

Secondly, Silla exhibited a high degree of adaptability in its foreign
relations. Silla made no complaints when its king was granted the title
of a governor-general, although this implied that Silla was to be part of
the Chinese empire. Silla even gave in and signed a truce with Paekche,
unwillingly as it confessed later, in order to show that it was submissive
to the orders of the Chinese. The restraint exercised by Silla in pursuit
of a foreign policy independent of China was the price it was prepared to
pay for further Chinese assistance in eliminating Koguryo. It was also
this willingness to sacrifice its pride and interests in the short term
that led to the different outcome for the three traditional Korean states –
Koguryo and Paekche were punished, Silla rewarded. Indeed, Silla was once
more ready to adopt a submissive gesture when it could no longer counter
the might of the combined army of Chinese and Malgal after it had given
asylum to Koguryo refugees, thus overcoming a crisis which might have put
an end to the country in the same way as its former neighbours.

Thirdly, Silla chose excellent timing when it decided to pursue or
protect its own interests. To a certain degree, its assistance to the
Chinese troops situationed in Paekche after the fall of that state was not
only an observance of the duties of an ally but also a measure to extend its influence in an area vital to it. The rapprochement with Yamato was carried out at the height of the fear of a Chinese invasion and when the Chinese were preoccupied with the seizure of P'yŏngyang. The encroachment upon Paekche probably also caught the Chinese by surprise while they were still recovering after the long campaigns against Koguryŏ. In a similar way, the northern expansion of Silla and its absorption of the puppet state Podôk was executed when the Chinese were militarily engaged on other frontiers.

Lastly, Silla also displayed a high degree of success in adopting and adapting Chinese institutions. The success in transplanting the highly sophisticated Chinese administrative skills is best reflected in the fairly smooth process whereby Silla incorporated not only the territory of Paekche and its subjects but also a large number of Koguryŏ refugees. To a certain extent, it was also this cultural advancement that served as an attraction that led to the close bond between Silla and Yamato in the last decades of the century.

While the relationship of the Korean states with China depended on China's own external relations, that with Japan hinged upon Yamato's internal political situation. There is increasing acceptance among Japanese historians that a unified Yamato did not appear until the 6th century. Perhaps because of the strength resultant from this unification, Yamato was often looked upon as a potential ally not only by the Korean states but also by the Chinese in the seventh century. In most cases, however, Yamato showed little or no enthusiasm because of its own political problems at home. The only case Yamato responded was in the alliance with Paekche and the subsequent military intervention. But they were not simply responses to the requests of the Korean states, as the alliance was prompted by an internal political crisis and the military intervention by a desire for further expansion. With the exception of the brief period after the fall of Koguryŏ, Yamato was never seriously affected by the battles going on in the Korean peninsula or the region north of it because of its own insulated position.
To a large extent, then, the involvement in Korean affairs by Yamato was a decision taken by itself rather than a result of external pressure. When Yamato did adopt a positive foreign policy, it is noteworthy that it displayed a marked consciousness of being a big country, a fact first reflected in the first official contact with the Sui. It was this consciousness which led Yamato to regard the Korean states, especially Paekche and Silla, as its vassal states but at the same time made it refrain from accepting a position as a Chinese tributary. It was probably also this awareness that drove Yamato to intervene militarily in the Korean peninsula and risk the danger of clashing with the Chinese. Despite the defeat, the Japanese ruling class did not appear to change their view. What is significant is that only on few occasions was this Yamato self-image received reciprocally by its neighbours. For China and the Korean states, the strength of Yamato was to be reckoned with, but the country was not recognized as a real power perhaps because of its cultural backwardness. In fact, it was the reluctance of Silla to be regarded by Yamato as a lesser state which eventually brought about the breakdown of relations between the two in the following century.

Despite its inflated self-image, Yamato no doubt realized that it was not a country of cultural advancement. Understandably, there was great Yamato interest in continental culture throughout the seventh century. Contrary to common belief, it was the Korean states, especially Paekche and Koguryo, which served at the beginning of the century as the major sources of continental culture. Yet Yamato soon established direct contacts with China, and interest in China soon extended from Buddhism to government institutions, and perhaps to political theory as well. However, the geographical remoteness of China meant that only a very small number of Yamato people were able to have first-hand contact. Despite the fact that efforts were made to establish a bureaucracy with the advice of some China-educated officials and that some political concepts such as the Chinese international order were gradually being accepted, the Yamato ruling class probably did not really realize the full extent of the strength of the
Chinese, especially as China encountered continuous setbacks in the Koguryo venture. On the one hand, the self-image of the Yamato ruling class prevented them from seeing Yamato as a lesser state than China; and on the other hand, they probably believed that, as in the case of their relations with the Korean states, cultural superiority did not necessarily imply political and military superiority. It was thus not surprising that the Japanese determination to confront the Chinese was undertaken at a time when in fact they were learning, both directly and indirectly, from China.

It is thus not difficult to see that there was a discrepancy between the continental countries and Japan in their relationship with one and other. The interest of China and the Korean states in Yamato was political, but that of Yamato in the continental countries was both cultural and political. In a sense, the involvement of Yamato in the Korean wars was the only occasion in the seventh century when the interests of the Korean states and Yamato met, not on the cultural level but on the political one. It follows then the impact of the 663 defeat should be political rather than cultural. Indeed, the attempts to build a bureaucratized state, the adoption of era titles, a special term for the monarch and a new name for the country, though only for external usage, can be interpreted as the means of remoulding Yamato into not only a 'civilized' country, but also a political power. Indeed, the objectives of these changes were to regain a respectable position for Yamato in the international arena. In other words, Yamato appeared to regard cultural progress as a necessary element in achieving political superiority, and it advances in the last decade of the seventh century must be considered remarkable.

It is interesting to note, however, that although measures were taken to reinforce the defence system, Yamato did not make any attempt to turn itself into a military power that would equal or surpass the continental countries. Yamato again showed some hostility towards Silla in the eighth century, but by and large, it remained culturally extroverted but politically introverted in international affairs. What prevented Yamato from becoming more assertive was perhaps that the country simply did not have
the military power or cultural superiority that could coerce Silla or Parhae into an inferior political position. Furthermore, continuous political struggles within the Japanese court itself sometimes formed an obstacle for the pursuit of an active foreign policy. In short, the factors which helped shape the foreign policy of Yamato for a large part of the seventh century persisted.

The various groups of semi-nomadic people, in particular the Malgal and Khitan, also had a part to play in the Korean Wars. In fact, perhaps with the exception of the first stage, the Malgal and Khitan were involved in all stages of the Wars, siding either with the Chinese of Koguryo. With the decline of the eastern Turks at the end of the 6th century, these groups submitted either to China or Koguryo hoping to lead a life with more security and less oppression. Yet the sedentary powers seemed no less belligerent than the nomads. The lesson was obvious. Chinese foreign policy was formulated most of the time according to China's own interests, and with little regard to those of its allies. The best these nomad groups could do was to organize themselves into a political entity. Ironically, the Chinese system of governors-generals was turned into a self-defeating institution by serving as a catalyst in the process. Two large-scale attempts were made by the nomad groups at the end of the century when the Chinese showed increasing reluctance to impose direct control in Koguryo. But the first by the Khitan turned out to be unsuccessful, and it was at the expense of the Khitan failure that Parhae was founded.

The leaders of Parhae learnt at least two lessons from the Chinese aggression in Koguryo in the seventh century—it would be advisable for their capital to be located beyond the immediate reach of the Chinese, and it was preferable to maintain an amicable relationship with the Chinese. Fortunately for Parhae, the Chinese preoccupation with sustaining their rule in Koguryo had prevented them from containing the growth of the Khitan or stopping the revival of the eastern Turks. It was this failure to check the expansion of the two nomad groups, especially that of the Turks, which led to the rise of Parhae and the loss of Chinese control in Koguryo. To a certain extent, it was enthusiasm for the idea of restoring Chinese rule in
Koguryo in the earlier part of the century which gave way to disenchantment and eventual neglect of the defences on the northeastern frontier in the last quarter of the century. Indeed, the repercussions of the Khitan rebellion at the end of the century were far more damaging than the Chinese had expected. The inability of the Chinese to suppress the nomad insurgents became a catalyst for the further expansion of the eastern Turks and marked the beginning of further conflicts between China and the Khitan. Indeed, the northeastern region outside China's frontier was to become an increasingly serious problem.

The balance of power in northeastern Asia at the beginning of the eighth century thus bore close resemblance with the situation in the region at the end of the sixth century. It may be suggested that Koguryo was located in a region which was constantly contested by the agarian and the nomadic peoples. In this sense, the Korean Wars in the seventh century took place in a period when the agarian powers gained the upper hand, and were essentially an extension of the events in the sixth century which saw the unification of both China and Japan, as well as the growth of Silla. With the revival of the eastern Turks and the rise of the Khitan and other small nomads, the region was once more the ground for conflict between agarian and nomad peoples.

To a certain extent, it may also be suggested that the international order in east Asia in the eight century was not much different from that at the beginning of the previous one. The political map of the Korean peninsula was redrawn, but Silla and Parhae, though often at odds with one another, nevertheless paid tribute to China while at the same time maintained contacts with Japan. Japan also sent delegations to China, but the relations between the two countries were never a tributary one. The Japanese also maintained a superior attitude towards the Korean states, but this was not necessarily accepted by Silla and Parhae.

What should not be overlooked, however, is the fact that from the eighth century onwards a east Asian international community gradually emerged. The affiliations were cultural more than political. Conflicts
occurred less frequently, whereas trade between the various states pro-
spered. Only on rare occasions did China attempt to use force to impose
its will on other east Asian countries, though China was nevertheless
regarded by the other states as a model. Not only was Chinese the common
written language in the region, but the adoption and adaptation of Chinese
culture became a major feature in both international relations as well as
national development.

The development of such a community was not unrelated to the Korean
Wars. Although it is uncertain to what extent the adoption of Chinese
institutions contributed to the success Silla had in the Wars, the fact
that Silla again set up institutions along Chinese lines in the last de-
cades of the century reflects that its leaders must have found it both
advantageous and necessary to learn from China in building and ruling a new
nation. One way these reforms differed from the earlier ones is that they
were no longer confined to the court, the reorganization of the provincial
administration being one example of this. In this sense, it may be argued
that the Wars, which brought much of the Korean peninsula under one rule,
enabled the establishment of Chinese institutions much more extensively and
perhaps ensured their implementation without great disruptions. Indeed,
the emergence of a strong Silla also meant that the Chinese and Japanese
would have fewer opportunities to exploit than in the past, when conflicts
between the various Korean states often provided pretexts for military
intervention. In short, the emergence of a new Silla facilitated the
flourishing of cultural interchange and trade.

Similarly, the Korean Wars also had some impact on the process of
cultural borrowing in Japan, which absorbed some former Paekche and perhaps
Koguryo officials into its government after the fall of the two Korean
states. The failure of Yamato to uphold its political and military interests
in the Korean peninsula probably convinced the leaders there that develop-
ment of the nation should proceed internally rather than externally, but
that inspiration for development should be sought from abroad rather than
from within the country. Indeed, Yamato willingness to learn from Silla
in the second half of the seventh century was partly due to the fact that while the only direct involvement by Yamato had ended in defeat, Silla had eventually emerged from the wars victorious. In addition, the defeat also changed the tarnished image of the Chinese among the Japanese leaders, who now became fully aware that China was a power to be reckoned with not only culturally but also politically. Although Yamato made no further attempt to challenge the political might of the Chinese, it made greater efforts to import continental culture, the purpose being not to make itself a replica of China per se, but to transform Yamato into an advanced state. In this respect, the Yamato defeat certainly was an accelerating factor in promoting continental culture.

On the other hand, since Chinese culture had already been accepted in different degrees by the Korean states before the Chinese rulers took an interest in Koguryō, it may be suggested that the Korean Wars in fact delayed the process of cultural borrowing by these states as aspirations for a higher culture were often overtaken by the concern for national security. Moreover, but for the internal chaos of Sui after the Koguryo campaigns and the early Tang efforts to get Yamato politically involved in the affairs of the Korean peninsula, cultural delegations from Yamato to China might have been larger and more frequent. In this manner, it can also be argued that the Korean Wars were detrimental to the process of cultural borrowing.

In the final analysis, the outcome of the Korean Wars did not turn out exactly as those who started the fighting and others who joined in had anticipated. China was regarded as a power in east Asia, not because of its military might but because of its cultural supremacy. The Chinese gained little in the Wars except for brief moments of success for some members of the ruling class. Some Koguryō captives became slaves in official families and others were organized into Chinese military units, but their number was undoubtedly far smaller than that of the Chinese who had died in campaigns against the Korean states. The Chinese also failed to establish their rule in Koguryō; above all, the problem of instability
among the nomads in the northeastern region was aggravated rather than improved. Neither did Yamato succeed in extending its influence over the Korean peninsula. On the contrary, the country's cultural development was much shaped by those who had close relations with the Asian mainland. After the Wars, a large part of the Korean peninsula was brought under one rule for the first time in history, paving the way for the eventual unification of the Korean people, many of whom were now under the rule of Parhae. Yet the process was a painful one — hundreds of thousands of Korean people were killed or separated from their homes, either voluntarily or through force. Given the geography of the Korean peninsula, one wonders if what has been often labelled as 'the unification' could not have been achieved at a smaller price, by a more peaceful means, though perhaps over a longer period. In this sense, the Korean Wars in the seventh century were a costly political exercise.
FOOTNOTES

1. The best example is probably the 640 campaign against Karakhoja. Shimazaki, 81-112, has suggested that the expansion of the western Turks prompted the Chinese to impose control in Karakhoja, which controlled the trade route of Central Asia to China. The China motive in this case is also fairly clearly spelled out in an edict issued before the campaign; see TDZLJJ130/702-03, also CFYG985/11567-68.

2. See the memorial sent by the Silla king to Tang Xuanzong in 736 (CFYG971/11410), though it is possible that the Chinese official recognition took place much earlier.


4. One is often amazed by the fact that in works on history of ideas in China, few figures in the earlier half of the Tang dynasty have gained any attention.


6. The thesis put forward by Nishijima in fact has been criticized by some Japanese scholars. See, for instance, Kikuchi, 16-77.


8. Japanese historians in the past have maintained that the political unification of Japan first took place in the later half of the 4th century, Inoue M. (1960) being a leading advocate. However, as indicated by a seminar held in 1979, many leading historians, Inoue M. included, now agree that the event is unlikely to have taken place earlier than the 6th century. See Matsumoto (1980).

9. To quote Sansom (1963), 62, "...the political development of Japan in the seventh century was...dominated by Chinese political ideas and practices.....Indeed the history of the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries might well be written as description of the building up of institutions after a Chinese model..."

10. A recent article by Sakayori (1983) has discussions on the development of this idea of Chinese international order in Yamato as well as in the other Korean states.
11. For the continuous political struggles in the Japanese court in the eighth century, see the study by Nakagawa (1979). The best example whereby the implementation of a foreign policy being disrupted by internal political problem is that in 764, when a campaign to Silla became abortive as a result of the fall of Fujiwara no Nakamaro.

12. A number of articles have been written on international relations in East Asia in the 8th century; for a general discussion and further references, see Suzuki Y. (1982).

13. One example would be that in 733 when a conflict took place between Silla and Parhae as a result of Chinese manipulation (JTS1998/5361).

14. Because of the Confucian tradition of historiography, trade apparently has not been given the attention it deserves in the historical records of the various east Asian countries in this period. Nevertheless, a series of articles recently suggests that considerable commercial activities could have taken place in East Asia in the 8th century. For a general discussion and further references, see again Suzuki Y. (1982).

15. See, for example, ZZTJ209/6648.

16. Da-Tangliudian 5/19a (also JTS43/1834) notes the existence of Koguryo soldiers in six prefectures mostly in the western part of the country. Gao Xianzhi, a famous Tang general in the period of Xuanzong (JTS104/3203-07), was also of Koguryo descent.
routes taken by Sui/Tang army
routes taken by Sui/Tang navy
routes taken by Silla army
routes taken by Yamato navy

The Korean Wars in the first three quarters of the 7th century
Yamato in the 7th century

sites of fortresses possibly built after 603
-----→ route taken by the Yamato navy in the early 660s
The Khitan and Turkish Invasions 696-98

KHITAN
KORE

EASTERN TURKS

Yingzhou
Zhaozhou
Pingzhou
Dingzhou
Yuzhou

Chinese counter-attacks

Turkish settlements now under Turkish control

Khitan invasion routes
## THE KOREAN WARS - A CHRONOLOGY

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Notes:
- KH: Khosrow
- S: Sasanian
- Tang: Tang Dynasty
- Yumato: Yamato
- KH: KH: Khosrow
- S: Sasanian
- Tang: Tang Dynasty
- Yumato: Yamato
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CHSJ = Chunghua Shuju
YGKBK = Yoshigawa kōbunkan

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GLOSSARY

Amaterasu no Ōmi 天照大神
Andong 安東
Ansi 安市
Ansi (Protectorate) 安西
Ansung 安壇
Arima 阿里馬
Asuka 飛鳥
Azumi no Hirabu 阿曽比羅夫
Bichu 徳川
Changan 長安
Changbai 長白
Chang, Prince 濟
Changshih 長史
Changsun Wuji 長孫無忌
Changyu 章甫
Chen 陳
Chen Dade 傳大德
Cheng Mingzheng 程明綸
Chindok 錦德克
Ch'ŏn 質
Ch'ŏngt'ŏ 池水
Choson 高韓
Chuluo 鄭縣
Churyo 倉留
Da feichuan 大峰川
Daizai 大宰府
Dianfashu 銀鸞書
Diankeishu 帝 ArgumentException
Dingzhou 定州
Dong Chun 東淳
Donglai 東萊
Doshou 道守
Dousigang 杜士航
Du Fuwei 杜甫威
Duen Wenzhen 甄溫照
Emishi 伊勢
Fan Zigai 樊粹
Fang Xuanling 房玄齡
Fangzhou 淮州
Feng ถนน
Fengzhou 淮州
Fu Jian 傅堅
Fu Shun 伏順
Fufeng 傅風
Fujiwara藤原
Furuhiito 藤原
Gao Baoning 高寶寧
Gao Biaoren 高表仁
Gao Jiong 高君謨
Gao Kao 高遜
Gaozong 高宗
Guo Wuzong 郭哲宗
Hakusuki no E 山村江
Han Gaozu 漢高祖
Han Wudi 漢武帝
Hebei 河北
Helu 銷毒
Henan 河南
Hoko 河曲
Honglusi 洪驃於
Hou Hanqushu 侯漢書
Hu Sizheng 斛斯政
Huazhou 懿州
Huiluo 回洛
Huch'i Sangji 黑狐山志
Hyosho 孝昭
Ikeuchi Hiroshi 池內宏
Imjŏn 伊域
Imma (Mimana) 伊那
Iniki/Inagis 染生
Ino Hara no Kimi 藤原
Isei 伊勢
Iwai 岩井
Jiangdu 江都
Jiannan 創南
Jiaozhou 蕉州
Jieli 賈利
Jilin 靖林
Jin 金
Jingu 神功
Jito 濟徳
Jizhou 萊州
Jomei 舒明
Jonch'ón 井泉
jun 郡

kabane 姑
Kaemo 賤母
kakibé 息脚
Kang 康
Kaya 加耶
Khitian 喜田
Kim Ch'unch'ú 金春叔
Kim Humil 金鉉君
Kim Kimmün 金任聞
Kim Kugwan 金菊官
Kim Yusin 金原信
Kiyomihara 建部原
Ko Powon 高寶元
Ko Tongmu 高德武
Ko Yang 高陽
Koguryó 高麗
kokú 可可
Kommojam 前岑
Koryó goqi 高麗古記
Kotoku 古德
Kummae 高馬海
Kungmae 龍馬
Kurukuma 瀧根
Kyushu 九州

Laiyang 樂陽
Lai Wuer 樂悟
li 里
li (propriety) 礼
Li Dazong 李道宗
Li Longji 李隆基
Li Jingye 李敬業
Li Jinhang 李景行
Li Jinzhong 李遵志
Li Mi 李密
Li Shiji 李世基
Li Shimín 李世民
Li Yuan 李淵
Li Zhi 王治
liang 蒙
Liang Jianfang 梁建方
Liao 廖
Liaoatung (Liaodong) 遼東
Liaozhou 遼州
Liu Boying 劉伯英

Liu Dégao 劉德高
Liu Renqiu 劉儼秋
Liu Renyuan 劉仁願
Liu Yuanjun 劉元俊
Liuqiu 露邱
Luokou 露口
Lucyang 洛陽

Malgal 麥格
Mayi 麥邑
Min 明
Minamibuchi no Shoan 南海豊安
Mingtang 明潭
Mishihase 蒙順
miyake 能や
Mu 武
Munmu 文武

Naka no Oe 中大內
Namgon 藩建
Namsaeng 藩生
Namsón 藩人
Naniwa 龍波
Nihonshoki 日本書紀
Nippon 日本

Oama 海自
Omi 江
Otsu 大津
Oyashimaguni 大八島國

Paek 白
Paekche 白滄
Paeksu 白水

Pei Ju 濟矩
Pingzhou 平州
Pingzhuo (Taiyuan) 平州
Piyöhol 比宜洪
Pojang 諧蔭
Podok 諧德
Poksín 諧信
pu 部
Pugwón 北原
P'ung Puyó 北岳
P'yóngyang 北京
P'yönwón 北原
Xue Rengui
Xueyanto
Yakabe
Yalu
Yamashiro
Yamato
Yang Fang
Yang Fuang
Yang Jian
Yang Su
Yang Xiong
Yang Xuanan
Yang Yichen
Yangdi
Yangzhou
Yanmen
Yanzhou
Yehu
Yingzhou
Yichou
Yon Kaesomun
Yongyang
Yongfeng
Yongji
Yonsan
Yu Shiji
Yu Zhongwen
Yuan Shou
Yugi shinjip
Yung (Sui prince)
Yung (Paekche prince)
Yuwen Shu
Yuzhou
Zhang Wengan
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Zhenghu Shulang
Zhu Zishe
Zhubishan
Zhu Liang
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