ASPECTS OF AUSTRALIAN FAMILY STRUCTURE:
A FIELD STUDY OF A SAMPLE OF URBAN FAMILIES.

Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Australian National University.

Harold J. Fallding,
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PART I.

AIM, METHOD AND THEORY.
Chapter I

THE AIM

Perhaps nothing is more important for a proper appreciation of the study to be reported in this thesis than a clear understanding of its aim. Anyone who ventures to report social facts runs a risk of drawing the critics' fire for not achieving what he never intended, for each person has his own idea about what is important in accounting for human behaviour. I will try to make as plain as I can, therefore, the limits of the research I undertook.

The first point which it is necessary to make is that it was not a survey. There is a popular expectation that a social fact will be something which is true of a population. This arises from what might be called, without prejudice, the elementary view of society, the notion that society is a sum of repeated units; so that no fact is considered social unless it says something about the aggregate or a distribution across it. Such facts are valuable and take much labour to secure, but if they are specifically social at all it is not because they refer to populations but because they give the incidence in a population of something which, by implication at least,
refers to a structure. For the sophisticated view of society, of course, is that it is an organized endeavour or structure in which each individual fulfils a differentiated part or role. Social facts describe the properties of these relationship structures, and are equally social whether they refer to one case or many. The fact that a certain soldier died for his country is no less social, for instance, than the fact that a certain proportion of the population volunteered for the armed forces. It was facts of the former kind which I was primarily aiming to discover in this study. I was seeking to find out something about the structural properties of a small number of families to which I was able to gain access in the city of Sydney, Australia, rather than to report on the incidence in the population of particular family characteristics.

Secondly, I was aiming to give an account of these families which would be specifically sociological. I would accept as the field of sociology that which Durkheim (1938, pp.1 to 13) defined for it, viz. behaviour governed by rule, or principled behaviour. The stiffening which makes permanent roles out of human performances comes from the feeling people have that they ought to behave in that way. Also their roles are means to ends which they believe they ought to pursue. Ends which are concrete achievements
of joint activity, such as the provision of food and shelter, may be called "functions" of the structure; ends which secure desired states of satisfaction for the individual may be called "values" of the actors. It is ends and means such as these which are the elements of social structure, so that sociological facts in their purest form concern the ends of action (whether these ends be of the order of values or of functions) and the roles played by those who, through their association, seek to give effect to them. To make the account complete I believe that we have to add certain psychological assumptions about the nature of the actors, particularly about their motivation. This can be taken into sociology without it turning into psychology. Any science builds into its flooring something of the science which deals with phenomena at the order of abstraction which is preparatory to its own. As psychology makes assumptions about the physiological nature of its subjects, and physiology makes assumptions about the chemical nature of its material, each without merging into the science over which it builds, sociology may and must use some psychological concepts without reducing to psychology.

However, I strove not to let my wish for a sociological treatment lead me into what I consider to be the rather
needless bedevilment of attempting to distinguish individual from group characteristics, with the object of confining sociological enquiry to the latter. This is shown to be largely an unreal problem, I think, if we remember the more sophisticated definition of society which was given earlier. The individual, regarded as a role bearer, is a social phenomenon, and so is any characteristic or activity of his which is regarded from the point of view of its involvement in social structure. If individuals are abstracted from society there is, of course, nothing left, so it is paralyzing to exclude anything from sociological study because it is a property of individuals. Whether individual characteristics are relevant or irrelevant to sociological inquiry depends entirely on how they are regarded. Most of my data, of course, would concern the behaviour of individuals.

1 The whole complex of roles which the individual bears can be designated his social personality, or simply his person, as Radcliffe-Brown states (1952, pp.193 and 194). However, Radcliffe-Brown's dismissal of the "individual" from society altogether because it is conceptually distinguishable from the "person", and his assignment of it to physiology and psychology, is only verbal; and, besides, it is false. After all, physiology and psychology don't study individuals either, but bodies and minds. "The individual" is an abstraction which can be conveniently used by all three disciplines to designate the unity that possesses, simultaneously, body, mind and social personality.
A critical property of principled behaviour, and one which makes empirical sociological study difficult because of unwieldiness, is that it is molar. For principle implies weighted preferences between alternatives, and alternatives imply a total field of selection in which they lie. To explain principled behaviour, therefore, one needs to hold the universe of the actor in view. An anthropologist is better able to do this because he can study the whole of a simple society. A sociologist cannot study the whole society, but he must at least hold the totality of the universe of his subjects in mind. He is entirely free to take a particular problem and focus his study on a small segment of the social process, e.g. on the family, but he must at least view it in broad context. I had therefore to study the family within the society as well as the members within the family if I hoped to contribute specifically sociological data to the growing fund of knowledge on Australian families. As a result, the body of the thesis falls into two main divisions,

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Borrie (1948, pp.67 to 98, and 1953, pp.23 to 43) has presented demographic data on Australian families, as well as some sociological impressions. Oeser, Emery, Hammond, and their collaborators (1954), have included a psychological treatment of some aspects of Australian families in their studies on social structure and personality.
concerned respectively with the families' external and internal relations. The very definition of the family was made problematical by its having these two aspects. For that reason, defining it precisely was something which I preferred to leave till the end of the investigation, taking as my working definition the minimum requirement of parents and their offspring living together, and seeking to gain a fairly comprehensive picture of the activities of them all, both within the home and outside of it.

This broad approach entailed its own severe limitations, of course, for whatever was gained in comprehensiveness was won by loss of detail. While it would have been possible, as well as absorbingly interesting, to design a piece of work on the family which was narrowly focussed, say on some problems of personal relations or the effects of crises, I considered that something much more general would be more appropriately attempted in this early phase of Australian sociology. For the sake of gaining a rounded view I had therefore to discipline myself against allowing

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1 As has been done by Koos (1946), for example, in his study of 109 cases of financial or personal trouble experienced by families in a New York tenement; and by Hill (1949) in his study on the effects on 135 families of war separation and reunion; and by Cavan and Ranck (1938) in their study of the effects of the depression on 100 Chicago families.
particular problems which just loomed into view becoming problems in their own right. There were few things which I could afford to explore exhaustively in the time which I was able to spend with any family. Development, for instance, was only sketchily filled in, so that the pictures of the families which I obtained are largely static. As it is, I cannot claim, either, that the study does anything more than remotely approach the comprehensiveness for which I aimed. Sexual matters were not dealt with, because of the special competence and confidence their treatment requires. The careful study of children would also have required much more time than I could give to it. Partly because of this, but also because the broader sociological factors with which I was concerned are more influenced by the parents, I gave the parents most of the interviewing time, and the greater part of the analysis will be given to them also. There are a number of stages in the development of children and these could not be differentiated in the analysis. I was only able to consider family members at three broad age phases - the adult, the adolescent, and the child from about the time of commencing school up to adolescence. Very young children and infants are not considered in the analysis at all. They make a special study and, besides, there were too few cases of children
at this age in the sample for me to gather much information about them.

With these limitations acknowledged, what I was aiming to do was, first of all, to identify what the sociological factors in the internal and external relations of families are — a purely descriptive aim. After this I aimed, by taking a number of families and comparing them (I was able to compare thirty-eight in all) to discover what were the main dimensions in which they were alike or varied, and so group them under types along each dimension. This is purely and simply classification. I expected to bring the examination of the material to a focus with this typological analysis, and to report the material in terms of it. For it is not feasible to report descriptive data for thirty-eight cases separately. That was done in the case studies themselves, one of which is reproduced in Appendix B for the sake of illustration. What I have called the first aim, the descriptive aim, will, so far as the reporting is concerned, be swallowed up in the second, comparative aim.

In stating that one of the aims was to work out typologies and that the material would be reported in those terms, mention of two further limitations of the study should be made. It is plain that my typologies can make no pretence of being exhaustive. For they can only cover such types of family as I chanced upon in a small number.
As I shall show when discussing the selection of the families, I tried to minimize this limitation by choosing families which were diverse, but the limitation remains. It is in order, however, to make a typology from any set of data so long as there is enough variety within it to do so, and discovering differences in a small number is a way of sharpening vision for observations on a wider scale, when these can finally be made. Secondly, describing data through the medium of types means that they have already passed through a filter of abstraction. It is always a problem to know how to strike a balance between concrete description and generalization in reporting observations, but the balance is already turned in the direction of abstraction when the aim is typological. For this reason it is inevitable that some of the data should appear to be rather drained of blood. This development cannot be escaped when a discipline strives to be scientific, since sciences move increasingly towards concern with purely formal relations, expressible in their ultimate rarefaction as mathematical equations. It is unrealistic to take a definite step in this direction and expect to retain the concreteness of direct description at the same time. The impossibility of having both advantages could be vividly demonstrated if we compared an account of modern American society given
by Margaret Mead (1943), with one given by Robert Merton (1949, pp.125-149). Merton's account, just because it seeks to be scientific, is quite deficient in the colour and feeling of Mead's. Of the two styles of presentation, that of this thesis will lie closer to Merton's. Perhaps it should be mentioned here, also, that having a classificatory aim has exposed me quite inordinately to the temptation of perpetrating neologisms, the besetting sin of the student, since there were so many things to be differentiated. I have tried to meet this by using common sense designations as much as possible.

If I had only been able to fulfil this second aim, simply to type families in their important dimensions, I should have considered my labours well rewarded. But I hopefully entertained besides a third aim - to discover, if I could, what sort of things went together. I had no hypotheses in mind about connections between factors when I commenced the study: some suggested themselves while the research was proceeding. But the scope for testing any of these hypotheses was very limited, due to the fact, of course, that the number of cases in which the factors of interest occurred were prone to be fewer than the total number of cases in the sample, and often a good many fewer. This simply means that anything which began in my mind
as a hypothesis remained still hypothetical when the analysis was over. But such insights are the pinnacle of scientific endeavour, and they may well be true whether or not means are immediately at hand to prove them. If any such insights were to come out of the investigation I should have regarded them as its most important results by far. In particular, if, after the analysis of the separate factors, it was found that certain clusterings of factors were recurring with some constancy the identification of family master types would be possible. Although it was not expected that every factor identified could be absorbed into such a typology, if a number of the more important factors could be, that would afford a distinctly sociological classification of families as families, in addition to the simpler classifications by separate factors. But, because the invariance of the connections in the clusterings would be hypothetical such master types would themselves be entirely hypothetical.

It should be emphasized from the beginning that I did not expect more than this, and that I conceived the study to be entirely exploratory. Scientifically speaking, my aim was a modest one.

If I say that typological analysis is simply classification along particular dimensions in which variation
occurs, I am obliged to add some comment on the fact that in sociology actual cases only ever approximate more or less to the type. This means that sociological dimensions are themselves composite, binding together like strands in a cord subordinate dimensions in which variation can occur with a limited independence, so that any type is really a cluster of factors. The master types to which I have referred only illustrate what is just as true of the simple types when they are looked at closely. The perfect type is the case in which all factors of a defined cluster are present. There are two ways of deciding what factors make a perfect type in sociology, but they need not be exclusive of one another. Clusters of factors can be discovered empirically and the combination which actually occurs most frequently can be made the perfect type. This is a statistical type, and it can be used for the description of other phenomena besides aim-directed behaviour. The other type, the ideal type of Max Weber (1949, pp.90 to 112), is only applicable to the description of aim-directed behaviour. It enumerates the elements of a perfectly coherent system of behaviour by stating what practices are rationally entailed by a particular end under certain conditions. Thus Weber (Gerth and Mills, 1947, pp.196 to 244) catalogues, for example, all that is essential for bureaucracy - the
ordering of officials in a definite hierarchy, the definition by rule of their jurisdictional areas, a large staff of clerks to deal with records, and so on - and so defines it as an ideal type. Weber holds that the rationality of this ideal type is purely arbitrary, and justifies it only on the grounds of its having heuristic value in throwing irrational behaviour into relief. I would not agree that it has this arbitrariness, nor that its use could be justified if it had. But I would hold that it is justifiable to use it for four reasons: because rationality is a requirement of successful aim-directed action, because aim-directed action consequently shows a tendency to rationality, because particular cases can be compared by the degree to which they approach perfect rationality, and because, most important of all, particular cases can be classified together under one type provided they are complexes of behaviour which hold the same end in view, and the best way to give a summary description of them is to describe the ideal case in which the end is successfully realized, the ideal type. If any statistical type reveals items of behaviour which are parts of an organization of activity towards an end, and if we are interested in it because of its aim-

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1 I mean by rationality no more than the fitness of means to ends.
directedness (which we are in sociology), we may build an ideal type with the help of it by making inferences about what activities the end entails under the circumstances, and discounting the residue of inconsistency in the statistical type. Both the simple and master types to be identified in this study will be ideal types, arrived at by building on statistical types in this way.

Finally, although I have insisted that the research was not primarily designed as a survey, it was inevitable that some limited application of the findings to a wider population should be possible. Also, it was desirable to gain some impression of how homogeneous each family was with other families of the society in certain respects, e.g., in the values they held. In order to make the most out of the opportunity, therefore, and in order to know with what confidence any hypothesis could be entertained, care was taken over the selection of the families, and statistical tests of significance will always be applied when pronouncing on the meaning of distributions or on connections between isolated pairs of variables. It is only at the level of the clustering of factors into master types that statistical cautions will be abandoned. The safeguards taken to ensure the greatest possible reliability for the findings will be set out in the course of the next chapter.
As for the validity of my raw data, there must be some margin of error in them. "As far as I could judge," ought to be appended to every assertion of fact in the thesis, although I strove for impartiality of judgment to the limit of my ability. My observations could not be highly refined. They were not highly standardized, either, as they might have been if I had made the same response from each person mean precisely the same thing, as is done in objective tests. This method did not suit the nature of the data I was collecting and, furthermore, I doubt whether the objectivity achieved by it is not sometimes illusory, since it is a method which may only register formal likenesses. It suited my purpose better to come close to the material with every sense awake, and take in everything I could, depending for objectivity on seeing myself with the transparency I strove for in seeing others.

My view about bias is that it is a matter over which social scientists can be too touchy when it is seen in themselves and too incensed when they detect it in others. It is ineradicable and no fault, and if it were to be eradicated the observer might well lose his sympathetic understanding of the importance to his subjects of the biases in their own lives, and that would impair his powers considerably. Provided one is conscious of it, it is not
a thing to be regretted for it sharpens vision, and if people having different biases see different things that does not necessarily cast doubt on the reality of what each one sees, but may simply mean that each is equipped by his bias to see some things especially clearly. The worker who is researching into principled behaviour, more than anyone else probably, cannot help the fact that he approves some of the things he sees more than other things. He can only be charged with "bias", in the blameworthy sense of the word, if he is not sufficiently conscious of the way his judgment is falling on the things he says to be able to separate it out, and refrain, before a scientific audience, from speaking his judgment also.

1 The general tenor of the discussion on the values of the anthropologist (Tax, 1953, pp.332-341), which followed papers read by Bidney and Northrop at the International Symposium on Anthropology, is in agreement with this position. The statement with which Redfield brought the discussion to its conclusion is particularly in sympathy: "We do not want an anthropologist so balanced that his neutrality sterilizes him for observing, but we want a balanced body of world anthropologists." (p.341)
Chapter II

SELECTING THE SAMPLE

1. **The Requirements for Selection**

   Although I have said that I hoped to embrace much variety within the sample of families, it is desirable in any sample that it be as uniform as possible for certain of the things not being studied. It was therefore necessary to determine what variables might be kept constant.

   One thing which will obviously influence a family's way of life is the occupational status of the breadwinner. My dilemma seemed to be that I would fail to gain knowledge about the nature of the influence of this altogether, either because I would have to eliminate its effect by taking a sample uniform for it, or allow it to mix its influence anonymously with other variables by taking a sample more or less random for it. This dilemma was resolved by deciding to divide the sample into two strata, in each of which occupational status would be uniform. I therefore chose two groups, in one of which all the breadwinners were skilled tradesmen, and in the other of which all were professional workers.
These two occupational groups were more or less arbitrarily decided upon, but they were preferred to others for definite reasons. One was that they could be expected to include people who were of fairly high general intelligence, and who would be well enough informed to understand what I was attempting to do. I believe that nothing is gained in a study of this kind by being distant or secretive with the subjects. I expected to tell them all I could about my aim and method, and I expected that their co-operation would be greater according as their capacity to understand these things was greater. This was an expectation which I think was amply justified by my experience.

It should be mentioned at this point, however, that I probably underestimated the difficulty which most of the trades people seemed to have in understanding what I was about, and I think this difficulty may explain why the number of tradesmen's families which declined to participate was twice as great as the number of professionals' families which did so. Tradesmen's families were definitely harder to enlist in the study than professionals'. On the other hand, it can be pointed out that once their confidence and entry into their homes were gained, they were definitely less reserved. Speaking generally, as a class of persons,
they took themselves much more for granted, and were much less anxious about measuring up to other people's notions of propriety, and were therefore less prone to inhibit their spontaneous reactions by anticipations about the approval or disapproval which they might excite.

Another reason for choosing these two occupational groups was that it seemed likely that their separate ways of life, though distinct, might be sufficiently alike to make a comparison of them more interesting. With the general prosperity which has continued fairly evenly since the depression of the early thirties lifted, with the increasing solidarity and bargaining power of tradesmen's unions and increasing wages for workers, and with free secondary education for their children and so many social services available to them; and with, at the same time, the heavier taxation imposed on the higher incomes of professionals, there seems to have been some economic convergence, at any rate, of the tradesmen with the professionals, who had traditionally been more widely separated from them. In view of this fact, and in view also of the fact that the class structure of Australian society seems generally to be a matter of great equivocation, it seemed that it would be interesting to discover what actual social and cultural community existed between the two groups, and how each regarded its place in the total society.
The definitions of professional and tradesman which I used for making the selection were fairly conventional, common sense ones, and I was not concerned with the sort of refinements that occupational associations or official examiners might quibble over in deciding anyone's professional or trade status. One main distinction I used was that a professional has done tertiary training separate from his work, while the tradesman's training has been very largely through his work, although not entirely. But that I did not follow this distinction slavishly will be evident from the fact that I included a professional photographer among the professionals, where I believe he belonged, although in Australia he could do no independent training. This was largely justified by the other main distinction I made, that a professional's work requires predominantly intellectual, aesthetic and personality abilities, while the tradesman's work, though using these, requires predominantly manipulative abilities. I did not lean so heavily on the other fairly conventional distinction that the professional's work is less routine, and allows more scope for individual initiative, because this is a distinction which some professional roles seem to be losing.

A second factor which influences the character of a family's life is the stage of its history. A family's
character changes radically when children are first born into it, and again when their period of extreme dependence has passed and they can be packed off to school, and again when, in adolescence and young adulthood, they are both dependent and independent, and again when they are largely independent and have left home. It seemed best to try to keep families of the sample within one of the stages, and, although it was not in fact possible to do so entirely, I aimed for families where at least one child had entered the adolescent stage. In the sample of thirty-eight families which I finally obtained, the number of families in which the oldest child was fourteen or over was thirty-one. Of these, seventeen were professionals' families and fourteen were tradesmen's. No oldest child was under nine.

I decided on this stage, not only because the problems of adolescents' adjustment to their families are interesting and crucial, but because I wanted to look at families whose members had been living together long enough for their ways to be established. Also, there was another uniformity which could be achieved by taking families at the same stage - they would have lived through much the same period of the nation's history, the social changes to which they would have been subject as families would be similar. Thus all of the parents had experienced the de-
pression after leaving school and did not marry until the economy had made some recovery. Only one marriage occurred before 1933 (it was in 1931). Also, only seven marriages occurred after the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, and these took place very early in the war with the exception of two (which occurred in 1943 and 1944). This means that most of the families lived through the whole of the war as family units, and all of them lived through a part of it.

Also, for the sake of preserving uniformity in historical factors immigrant families were excluded. All of the families were what might be called old-Australian, in the sense that they have all lived in Australia since the marriage of the parents, although a few of them have made trips abroad, one staying for as long as three years in New Zealand. 84% of the parents were themselves Australian-born, and of those that were not only one was born outside of Great Britain and the Dominions, and he was a Swede who immigrated during childhood. Seven of the twelve parents who were not born in Australia came in their own childhood, and four of the others lived here for at least six years before they were married. Only one case occurred in which both parents were born outside of Australia. Both of these were born in Scotland, and both lived in Australia for twelve years before their marriage.
Another factor affecting family life, of course, is the size of the family. With such an aim as I had in mind it seemed that I would learn most from families in which there was at least a fair degree of interaction. I therefore excluded childless marriages and families where there was only one child. These families present unique problems which I thought might be better left aside. As two- and three-child families have become very popular in Sydney, and as Borrie (1948, Ch.7) has shown that the average size of the Australian family is about midway between these, I decided to make two children the lower limit for any family included in the study. But as I wished, if I might, to observe some of the effects of variation in the number of children I did not set any upper limit.

Table IIa shows the number of families in the sample having each number of children.

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<tr>
<th>Number of children</th>
<th>Number of tradesmen's families</th>
<th>Number of professionals' families</th>
<th>Total Number of families</th>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total number of families</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>38</td>
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Table IIa
Within the sample taken the average number of children for a professional family was 3.5, which was greater than the average for a tradesman's family, which was 2.8. This reverses what one might expect from Borrie's figures for differential occupation (1948, p.117), and indicates a bias in the sample for the factor of size in relation to the father's occupation.

The number of children in all the families I saw totalled 121. If we add the 76 parents, 197 persons were covered by the study, and if we subtract the only case of a child who was under four (a baby of two who could scarcely talk), 196 individuals remain with all of whom I had both group and private interviews.

Another uniformity which necessity imposed on the study should be mentioned. As I wished to interview every member of every family, I could only accept families in which every member was living at home at the time the study was being made. In some families, prior to the study, children had been away at school or a parent had been away for some reason, but at the time of the study, all members of all the families were living at home.

2. The Size of the Sample

Having decided on the requirements of families for the sample, the next step was to determine the number in
the sample. However, this was less a matter of free choice than a determination imposed upon me by the limits of time.

John Madge (1953, p.213) pokes fun at some quaint popular notions about how big a sample should be. Two ideas that he pillories are that it ought to include about 5% of the population, or that it ought to be about 2,000. He reminds us that there is no rule of thumb about the size of a sample. The rules apply rather to the level of accuracy which any sample will yield us in making extrapolations from it. And it is, perhaps, well to remember that no sample ever gives anything but more or less probable information about things outside of it. Because, as has been said, the aim was to describe and classify and, if possible, to develop hypotheses about connections, the degree of probability demanded was not comparable with what would be required if the aim were to establish proof. One was therefore more disposed to consider it worth while to engage in a study which would, of necessity, have to limit its data to a small sample. Moreover, small samples have their own statistics to deal with the unreliability inherent in them. And finally, there is much to be said for taking as few cases as necessary when sampling rather than taking as many as possible, for the reliability of larger samples is not significantly greater unless they are many times
greater. A person working alone for a limited period on a problem of the type undertaken could not hope to use a very large sample.

After a pilot study of ten families, I reckoned that, if I included these ten by going back to them for more information, which I did, I could cover about forty families in the time available to me. As the sample was to be stratified by two occupational groups, whose total populations were not known, I aimed to take twenty families in each group. I have finished up with twenty in the professionals' group and only eighteen in the tradesmen's; and the reason for this is simply that arrangements on which I was counting with two families toward the end of the time fell through. It was then already too late to start looking for more, and I had to be content. Nothing of real importance has been lost through this, however; it only means a loss of symmetry.

Of more importance than sample size is the method of obtaining the sample, of course. Ideally, it should be random. But this was plainly impossible. First of all, it was not possible to identify that population of families which met all the requirements which have been set out, and from which the sample would be extracted. But even had it been identified and a random sample made, the families chosen would still have the option of participating or not.
Should some refuse, and some almost certainly would, the sample, after all one's fantastic labours, would lose randomness. It is therefore only sensible to be more realistic.

It seemed that the most one could do to minimize bias, once the uniformities of the sample were defined, was to open up a variety of sources for obtaining cases, and to keep a watch on cases as they accumulated, to see that they were diverse in respect to certain things in which they were not required to be uniform. I therefore tried to secure variation in political and religious representation in the sample, in the actual profession or trade followed by the breadwinner, in residential area, and in the number of children. In order to show the precautions I have taken to minimize bias in this way I give a brief account now of the way I went about obtaining the families.

3. Enlisting Co-operation

The task of obtaining a sample of families which met the requirements and were willing to co-operate without reservation was a major one in itself. It took a great deal of time, and the route by which any particular one was reached was often quite labyrinthine. I needed a continuous supply of families for the whole fifteen months
of the field work, so that I had to be tapping sources all the time, making arrangements with new families as I was completing the investigation of others. I wanted to start with any family fairly soon after it had agreed to take part, while interest was aroused, so that I had to try to keep the work of making contacts just one pace ahead of the actual visiting. It was very hard to synchronize these two things, and time was sometimes lost through my being unable to do so.

Some families recommended to me were not followed up, because, on the face of it, they were so like families already included that, if I had accepted them, I would have forfeited a chance of making the sample more varied. Thus, for the sake of including representatives of other professions, I could not make use of a number of recommended medical practitioners and solicitors; and at the time when I was trying to secure representation from Roman Catholic families I passed over some Protestants recommended to me. It should also be realized, in connection with the matter of recommendations, that most people who recommended a family to me did not know how fully the family met the requirements of the sample. Most recommendations, therefore, could only be of probably suitable families, I myself being left to determine their suitability as well as their willingness to participate.
I began by two approaches. I told many of my Sydney friends and relatives what I was doing, and asked whether they could make any recommendations; and I approached the Labour Council of N.S.W., asking for introductions, either to families or people whom they thought might be interested to help me. The Labour Council of N.S.W. (which is the State Branch of the Australasian Council of Trade Unions) left me in the hands of their research officer, who contacted officials of a number of skilled unions, and these, in turn, made recommendations of certain families. Through one of these recommendations I came into touch with a person who became a key contact man. He introduced me to an influential member of the Hospital Employees' Association, who, in turn, recommended other families, and who, at my request, introduced me to two Roman Catholic unionists. These then recommended further families. The contact man also introduced me to an influential member of the Boilermakers' Union, who made recommendations, and to an officer of the Railway Workers' Union, who asked me to write a paragraph for the union paper, requesting co-operation in the research.

I then had the idea that the same paragraph might be printed in the church denominational papers, and sent it to the editors of the Anglican, Presbyterian, Methodist, Congregationalist and Baptist papers, and of the Catholic
Weekly. All of the Protestant papers acknowledged it and printed it; the Catholic Weekly did not acknowledge it, and whether it was ever printed I do not know. As a result of the paragraph in the Congregationalist paper, the Convenor of the Public Questions Committee of the Congregational denomination asked to meet me, and personally recommended a family. I then approached the Catholic Welfare Bureau, which is sponsored by the Legion of Catholic Women, and the director of this organization circularized a number of parish priests and arranged for me to meet two parish priests in industrial suburbs, as well as the secretary of the senior division of the Newman Society, with a view to securing recommendations.

I approached the secretaries of the Law Institute, the British Medical Association, the Radio Employees' Institute and the Musicians' Union, and an officer of the Teachers' Federation, with the object of securing introductions to members of the professions protected by them. The Teachers' Federation suggested that I approach individual headmasters, and I later did this in one case. The secretary of the B.M.A. preferred not to make direct introductions himself, but referred me to an interested medical practitioner who recommended families.
Professor Elkin gave me permission to appeal to the two Anthropology classes at the University of Sydney. The secretary of the New Education Fellowship expressed interest in my work and recommended several families. I also contacted two out of several families recommended to me by the assistant secretary of the Workers' Educational Association. I approached the Family Welfare Bureau in Sydney (whose function is to help families in all kinds of difficulties), and also the Child Guidance Clinic at "Yasmar", which deals with delinquent boys, and I asked if I might have permission to make a search of their files for suitable families. This permission was given and, after searching through several hundred files, I collected a mere half-dozen from each place, which, from the information recorded there, seemed as though they might meet the requirements of the sample. The Bureau and Clinic, of course, decided that it would be unwise to approach some of these, but wrote to the others asking for their co-operation.

Finally, the one kind of source for contacts which yielded more families for the study than any other kind was personal recommendation from families which had themselves already taken part in the study. Twelve of the thirty-eight families were secured in this way. There, again, I aimed for variety, by preferring families which
were described to be different in some major respect from the family making the recommendation.

The sources which were opened up varied tremendously in their fruitfulness, and some were not fruitful at all. Table IIb sets out the number of families of each occupational type which were obtained by any channel which proved fruitful.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel of approach</th>
<th>Number of tradesmen's families</th>
<th>Number of professionals' families</th>
<th>Total number of families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader of the father's occupational association</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of research worker's own family</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic trade Unionist</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph in three separate denominational papers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthropology Class</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An interested but unsuitable family</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Welfare Bureau</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Education Fellowship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convenor of Public Questions Committee of Congregational Denomination</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families already contacted in the above ways</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table IIb

Fourteen different suburban districts were represented by the tradesmen's families, and fifteen by the professionals'. The occupational, religious, and political variety embraced within the sample is shown in Tables IIc, IID, and IId.
respectively. (The political and religious views of the individual parents are used here.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profession of father</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Trade of father</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Boiler-maker</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cabinet-maker</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General practitioner of medicine</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fitter and turner</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical specialist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Linotype operator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial chemist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Male nurse</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of religion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Painter</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Panel-beater</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photographer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pattern-maker</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio educationist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tailor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research scientist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solicitor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table IIc
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious position</th>
<th>Number of tradesman parents</th>
<th>Number of professional parents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahá'í religion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of England</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plymouth Brethren</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaker</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Day Adventist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indefinite, pro-religious</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive, anti-religious</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent, non-religious</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table IIId

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political position</th>
<th>Number of tradesman parents</th>
<th>Number of professional parents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Labour Party</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Liberal Party</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Communist Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely non-party</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-party but mainly pro-Liberal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table IIe
Of the families recommended to me as probably meeting the requirements of the sample, there were about twenty representing various professions, and a special list of solicitors of about the same number, which I did not follow up. I followed up every recommendation to the families of tradesmen, and still finished with two less than the number I hoped for. I was able to identify fifty-nine families altogether which met my requirements, and of these thirty-eight agreed to take part in the study and twenty-one declined; seven of those declining being professionals' families and fourteen being tradesmen's. When one considers all the claims on the time and attention of city dwellers, and all the reservations which people must feel about accepting a stranger into their home to examine their family, the proportion of refusals does not seem surprising. It was only by gracious invitation that I was able to obtain the data for this study at all, and I am more grateful than I can say to those who gave me so much of their time and hospitality.

Of the twenty-one families who declined, five expressed sincere disappointment over the fact that circumstances, which they described, made it impossible for them to take part; and three others gave convincing explanations of their inability to participate, although not expressing regret.
Finally, it is necessary in this discussion of the sample to anticipate a possible objection. It might in all fairness be asked why I preferred to take families in this scattered fashion from different suburbs, rather than from one neighbourhood. Those who would favour a neighbourhood study would do so, presumably, because in this way more knowledge could be gained about the external relations of the family. But in a large urban community like Sydney, neighbourhood relations tend to be tenuous and insignificant, and the real community setting, such as it is, of any family, is the whole city. I suspected that this would be so before embarking on the study, and my findings have supplied overwhelming evidence that it is the case. When the aim of an urban study is to study families (and not neighbourhoods specifically) the advantages of selecting families in one neighbourhood are, therefore, to a large extent, illusory.

4. The Wider Application of the Findings

It remains to identify what are the unavoidable biases of the sample, and estimate what qualified application can be made from it to other families. The point has now been made that the sample is not extracted from Sydney's population at large, but from a very definite segment of
it which is bounded by the required uniformities. If the findings are to be applied with precision to any wider population it can only be to families of this kind. Also, it is a fact that the sample is weighted in the direction of good quality families (using that term for the moment without anything more than its common sense meaning), presumably because the families who would be most disposed to co-operation in the research were those who least felt that they had anything to hide or be ashamed of. There are, however, sufficient poorer quality families in the sample to allow comparisons to be made.

But there is the question of whether the voluntary participation principle is even more specifically restrictive than this? Does the mere fact of voluntary participation distinguish these families in quite definite ways from others who have declined, or who might have declined to take part had they been approached? Are they more open, to respond to the approaches of a stranger as they have? Are they more hospitable, or even sacrificing, to give so much time and attention? Are they more socially responsible? It is hard to know how to answer any of these questions, but some guidance might be obtained by noticing the attitude which people showed to the research.

It would be a mistake to think that everyone who took part was enthusiastic from the word go - although there
was not one family in the sample whose members did not become genuinely and unanimously enthusiastic about it before it was over. This was probably due to some cathartic effect of gaining distance on oneself and the family, through having to talk and think about them. But at first it was not generally so. There was often some member, if not several, who had some reticence, caution, distrust, amusement, resentment, irritation, or self-consciousness about the whole thing. I would say that, whatever may have been their motives for inviting me into their houses, in at least six families in each occupational category there was considerable resistance to overcome. This is roughly a third of the cases. On the other hand, in ten cases (six professionals' families and four tradesmen's) I was welcomed with quite embarrassing devotion. I identified several distinct reasons for this positive interest in the research. Two of the professional families placed a high ideological value on sociology, a third had a business interest in it, and the fourth an academic interest. One had a family tree which it thought would be of sociological interest. One acknowledged a need for help in personal problems, and apparently thought I might be able to give it. This was embarrassing, because I have no qualification to do this, nor did I ever depict myself in that role. Among
the four tradesmen's families with a high positive interest there was also one which welcomed me, believing that I might give this kind of help, although this family placed a high ideological value on sociology besides, as did two of the others. The fourth felt constrained by a strong religious responsibility to assist social science.

The remaining sixteen had no marked resistance to the research nor any special interest. And this distribution of three distinct types of attitude to the research within the sample does suggest that the sort of selection which voluntary participation has exercised in regard to family type might not be highly specific after all.

One of the thorniest problems connected with the wider application of the data concerns interpretation of distributions of specific factors within the whole sample or amongst the two occupational groups, or any other sub-populations, for that matter. Can it be assumed, to take an example, that the greater political support for labour amongst the trades people of the sample indicates a similar leaning towards labour amongst all trades people? If the sample had been randomly selected one could have assumed this to be so, provided, of course, that the difference in the distribution for the two groups satisfied the test for statistical significance. But when the sample has
been deliberately picked to include variety, can the same assumption be made?

I have chosen to meet this situation in a manner which might be called *negative*. First of all, when I say that I aimed to make the cases diverse in respect to things in which they were not required to be uniform, I do not mean any artificial diversity. I did not aim to secure representation from *every shade* of religious opinion, for example. I simply meant that I had some such thought as this: I must include *some* Roman Catholics as well as *some* Protestants. I did not deliberately aim either to balance the numbers or secure a representation which would correspond to the incidence of each in the population. Secondly, it was only in regard to the few, stated, simple, overt factors (size, politics, religious denomination, residential area and occupation) that this diversity was engineered; and, except for some factors related to politics, the actual incidence of these factors was never made the matter of analysis. Thirdly, I applied a certain rule to meet this admitted defect in the data, wherever I could. It was a rule which seemed restrained, but not so over-cautious as to suppress differences between the two occupational (or other) groups which the data might be throwing up. It was that I would take a statistically significant sample
incidence of any factor as a measure of its incidence in the parent population, and any statistically significant difference in the distribution of a factor between two groups (calculating as if the sample were randomly selected) as being an objectively determined difference, unless I had definite reason to suspect that these measurements might be a function of the sampling. This was a crude rule, and admittedly not perfectly satisfactory, but it was one by adhering to which practice could be made consistent and explicit.

Although I allowed myself to generalize from any simple distribution or difference between distributions in sub-samples as insight led me (and by insight I simply mean a sense of fitness with other known factors), wherever it was possible and important to do so I applied tests of statistical significance as a check. As the generalizations made throughout the thesis are being regarded as entirely hypothetical I have considered that probability levels of \( \leq 15\% \) are worth commenting on; although, of the seventy

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1 Hagood and Price (1952, p.335) are two authors who encourage one to believe it is not worthless to apply tests of significance to non-random samples, provided biases have been guarded against.

2 Fisher (1955) is one statistician who considers the arbitrary rejection of findings at confidence levels coarser than 1% or 5% absurd, and recommends that whatever confidence level obtains be simply stated.
or so tests used only ten are significant at a confidence level coarser than 5%, and only four of those ten are significant at a confidence level coarser than 10%. The mention of numbers in the thesis sometimes simply makes a part of reporting what was found and no significance is attached to it. Wherever statistical significance does attach to it this is indicated by conventional signs, and Appendix C will explain what test was used to obtain the significance level in every case. Snedcor's (1946, p.226) convention will be used of indicating \( \cdot 01 > P \) by two asterisks (\( XX \)) and \( \cdot 05 > P > \cdot 01 \) by one asterisk (\( X \)); and in addition \( \cdot 1 > P > \cdot 05 \) will be indicated by two dots (\( \cdot \cdot \)) and \( \cdot 15 > P > \cdot 1 \) by one dot (\( \cdot \)).

Finally, one further word can be said about over-caution. I have stated that the findings of this study cannot be applied with precision to any save families of the kind on which it was undertaken. But it is not always requisite to apply findings with precision, particularly if they are themselves of a hypothetical kind. There is some imperfection in all knowledge, but scepticism because of it finds a special opportunity in social science, where the field is vast, complex and uncontrollable. However, while admitting the healthiness of perpetual scepticism, I would lay stress rather on the positive nature of knowledge.
Some knowledge is better than none, and it is best to structure an ambiguous field with visible contours, however hypothetical they may be. Because society so greatly transcends the private perspective which any individual can command, it is an ambiguous field to us all, and the sociologist's task is still largely that of setting up bold profiles which will bring it more sharply into view.

In the absence of cause for believing otherwise, then, there is no reason why some things found true of the families of this sample should not be supposed true of families much more generally.
Chapter III

THE METHOD

1. The First Approach

I should have preferred my first contact with every family to take the form of a personal visit, during which, in the presence of all members, I could explain what I wanted to do. Then I would leave them to consider the proposal for several days before contacting them again. But considerations of time and convenience made this impossible in all except five cases.

Those five were all tradesmen's families. Of the remaining thirteen tradesmen's families, eight were first contacted by calling on the father at his place of work, two by telephoning the father there, and three by telephoning the mother at home. Of the professionals' families, fourteen were contacted by telephoning the mother at home, in two other cases both mother and father were at home when I rang and I spoke to both, in one case I visited the father at his place of work, and in three cases the mothers contacted me by telephone in response to the paragraph printed in the church papers.
At this first contact I explained to whichever person or persons I was in touch with that I would need at least four full evenings with the family. Proceeding sometimes by informal discussion, and sometimes through a list of questions, I would be seeking information about the activities of family members - what they all did, both at home and away from home; about the things which interested them most; and about their ideas, attitudes, opinions and beliefs. I would also want to know something about the history of the parents, but only in its broader aspects, such as where they had lived, the kind of schooling they had had, and the type of work they had done; and would ask for some slight information about the family's economic arrangements. I gave them the opportunity to question me. I explained the nature of the research project, and that it was to embrace families in two occupational groups. I guaranteed that any information given would be held in confidence, and never published except in a form which preserved their anonymity.

I explained that I was working as a student under the supervision of the Australian National University. At my request, Professor Nadel had given me a reference, stating that I was a bona fide student, but I did not ever use this. No-one seemed to doubt the honesty of my claim.
After this first contact I gave each family the opportunity to discuss the proposition among themselves for several days, and then got in touch with them again.

2. The Interviewing

Of the thirty-eight families into whose homes I was invited, twenty-two were visited four times, two five times, twelve six times, and two seven times. Twenty-one invited me to the evening meal as a regular thing during the visits, and three others invited me to at least one meal. All of them treated me to supper.

The method of gaining the material for the study, then, was one which might be classified as interviewing, but it included more because it entailed some social intercourse with the family, and because it afforded opportunity for direct observation of their personal reactions to one another. In most of the families all of the members were together for a part, and usually the longer part, of each visit, but there was some time during the course of the visits in which I also saw each person alone. I also had the opportunity to observe a few activities, such as putting the children to bed, washing up after the meal, doing homework, working at hobbies, and so on. I read bed-time stories to some of the children or perhaps played with their trains or meccano sets.
It is possible to discuss rapport in sociological interviewing as if it were a shrewd art of getting everyone to tell you everything you want to know. For myself, I can say I did not think it good or needful to try any clever ruses. More importance seems to me to attach to quite general personal qualities than to techniques, and I strove rather for these; although I did not achieve much competence in them. Genuine simplicity, sincerity, humility, approachability, unfeigned concern for people and delight in them, these seemed to be the things which inspired people to reveal themselves. There was one principle, however, in which I consciously strove to discipline myself. It was that the subject must be sincerely given absolute discretion as to whether or not he will give any piece of information, and it must be made plain to him that he has this discretion. I noticed that if this was not done, rapport which had already been won could be instantly lost, and information, which otherwise might well be given, could be withheld.

There was one fairly common idea about interviewing which I found I could only accept with strong qualification, the idea that the interviewer must reserve his own judgments. Zweig (1948, pp.1 & 2), for instance, is one of the research workers who have stressed this. In so far as holders of
this view mean that the interviewer must be permissive, and not shocked, surprised or personally critical, I am in agreement with them. But in so far as they mean to imply that an interviewer should not express values, beliefs or judgments of his own, or that the good social scientist is a person too superlatively sophisticated to have convictions of his own, I couldn't disagree more. It is certain that we define ourselves to others by expressing ourselves, and there would seem to be a great deal of evidence from social science itself to show that a person is acceptable and approachable largely in so far as he is defined. Nothing is more likely to make prolonged rapport impossible than for the interviewer to sit before his subject like a great cipher, smooth but empty. I was prepared to give information about myself, and to give my own views, beliefs and judgments, not obtrusively, but certainly when they were invited, and I believe that doing this was indispensable.

1 One thinks, particularly, of prejudice studies which indicate that certain minorities are unacceptable, e.g. Jews or other immigrants, largely because the objective character of the individuals comprising them is not well known. Such findings are reported, for instance, by Duncan (1933, pp. 500-503), Jahoda, Deutsch and Cook (1952, p. 369), and Oeser and Hammond, editors (1954, Ch. 8). One might also refer to the practice by which primitives accommodate themselves to anthropologists by assigning them to familiar kinship positions.
to rapport. Dr. Jean Craig makes the same point in her unpublished thesis on the "Assimilation of European Immigrants" (1954). She writes:

"Amongst the immigrants whom I came to know well, I found that it was constantly necessary to indicate my own judgment on important issues, and indeed the relationship would have become impossibly artificial from my own point of view had I not done so." (p.21)

Besides this, it seems to me there are many advantages in being defined as different from another. A great deal that I know about the subjects of the research I learned by argument with them, and through expressing disagreement.

The plunge was made by having whatever member of the family seemed to be the most communicative give an account of his or her normal day in the presence of the assembled family. Everyone was invited to interrupt with comment or contradiction. I wrote continuously, recording the comments as well as the account. I also interrupted with comment and questions myself, in order to help fill out the significance to the person of the activities he related. It was usually not long before everyone had plenty to say, and mother or father had to start putting some one or other in his place. After the normal day we covered variations in the days, and then the weekend, and Public Holidays, and the annual holidays. In the course of time, this was done for every member of the family.
In doing this I was following the first section of the interview schedule, by which I sought to obtain comparable information from each of the families. The whole schedule is reproduced in Appendix A, to which the reader is referred, and there is no need to detail further items from it. From accounts of routines and external activities, given in group interviews, the bare bones of each person's role skeleton were assembled. Other sessions, with the parents jointly and each member separately, were designed to clothe them with flesh.

At some time during the visits, both parents, and whatever children were of senior school age or above, were asked to work through the Allport-Vernon Study of Values. At the last visit I also left, usually with the father, a copy of the "Family Economy" form, which I prepared for the study. This could be forwarded on to me through the post, and I pointed out that it was an optional rider to the study, and that no family was obliged to fill it in because they had been generous enough to give the other information. Some filled it in in my presence, others forwarded it on. There were only five in each occupational group who did not complete it at all.

It will be apparent, then, that the way in which I gained material for the analysis was by report from the
person concerned, and indirectly from his family members, each of whom, in a sense, was made an informant concerning the others; and I had direct observation of interaction between them. The vast majority of things they reported to me and which are basic to my analysis lay quite outside of my own observation. Is the method valid then? Was I told the truth?

In reply to this question I can only say that I relied on the presence of others to be a check on the things that each one told me about his more public activities. To see others around adopt their customary attitudes to one's own activities, when these are mentioned, constrains a person to be faithful to his own. Protests came quickly if a person distorted his outside or family roles. The disingenuousness of the children was particularly important in betraying any artificiality which might have been assumed for the occasion of my visits, and it had the function of putting everyone at ease fairly quickly. I also checked what each one told me about his personal feelings with my own observations and with what others told me about him. I relied on my disinterestedness and unwillingness to judge to disarm the pretender. In some cases I had not the confidence of every member till the second or even third visit, but once I had, I believe
each person was almost as honest with me as he was capable of being with himself. If he had practised distortion in the meantime, and it had passed unchallenged, I then saw it for what it was; and it provided me with some information about his values and aspirations, anyway. The great advantage of personal interviews, especially if they are renewed after intervals of time, is that one can return to any point and probe further, if one is not satisfied. The interviewer can question till he is sure that the subject has accepted the precise challenge of his question, so that evasion is minimized. He can also express surprise and doubt, and ask to be convinced of anything which seems to him unlikely.
Chapter IV

BASIC THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS

1. Three Orders of Facts

As an observer's facts are constituted by his theoretical categories as much as by experience, it is desirable to have some acquaintance with the lens through which his world is seen. I therefore give brief definitions now of the basic theoretical concepts which were used to order my observations, and state the theoretical connections which are presumed to exist between them. This theoretical scheme was not elaborated to the point of its present refinement before I embarked on the study, but developed with it. I have forced a certain completeness on it finally for the sake of having a framework for analysis of the data. It should be understood that it is all assumption and has no command over the material except what it can earn by lending it some intelligible simplicity; and it will itself be under testing by the analysis.

I postulate this framework extremely conscious of the conventional element in knowledge. Whether one adopts one concept or another, one theory or another, one method or another, is a matter of convention. Not all conventions
of thought are equally useful, but to discriminate between their usefulness requires both prolonged theoretical dis-
cussion and a wide application of them to various empirical
data. The former cannot be undertaken in a report of an
empirical study, while the study is itself only one instance
of the latter. I am conscious, then, of having at this
point to arbitrarily barricade off many avenues which would
lead back to discussion of unsettled theoretical questions,
by simply adopting a position. One is more compromised
by this necessity in a young science than in those longer
established. The alternative is to omit altogether the
treatment of matters whose theoretical state is controversial,
but I believe that course is unwise. First of all, it
could make empirical research superficial and trivial, and,
secondly, it is a course which fails to appreciate that
the clearing of theoretical confusions is assisted by
bringing empirical data into juxtaposition with them. Four
matters whose treatment in the thesis will illustrate how
I have had to strike a position without being able to
justify it exhaustively are social class, values, the
primary group and the self. But the same expedient con-
ventionalism is found throughout the whole theoretical
framework. It is hoped that the merit of its defect will
be simplicity.
It seemed that what was needed of a theoretical framework for the analysis of social behaviour was that it should posit some hypothetical connections between three orders of events: individual need, individual aim (or choice, goal, purpose or value), and social structure. Needs motivate behaviour involuntarily, so that the individual is in disequilibrium until they are satisfied. Aims (or values) guide voluntary behaviour in order that needs may be satisfied under a variety of conditions, or their satisfaction postponed, if need be, until the occasion is opportune; and thus they give the individual motivation (in a secondary sense) for controlling both the environment and his own reactions. Aims (or values) are products of conscious reflection. They are grounded in judgments about what one's own needs are and about the capacity of the environment to meet them. If an individual errs in these judgments the very fulfilment of his aims (or values) will leave his needs unsatisfied. In order to be satisfied he must guide his action by realistic choices. Finally, social structure, by which I mean the organization of roles in a joint endeavour, is a major part (if not the main part) of the environment within which the individual's needs are met. As roles imply an acceptance of sanction and restraint and not merely a division of tasks, social structure, just
like needs and values, has its sentient existence within the individual and he has to deal with it there. But it is external or environmental to him in that it does not arise out of his own constitution, like his needs, nor out of his volition, like his values, but out of the collective life in which he is immersed. So, although it lies within him, it is felt as a thrust from without which bears authority in it - a point which Durkheim (1933, pp. 70 to 85) expounded with such great mastery. Because of this, certain of the individual's values will express his judgments about what he takes to be his needs and the fitness to them of the constraint placed on him by his location in a social structure. Both the attainment of his values and, consequently, the satisfaction of his needs, will therefore depend in part on his strivings in relation to groups and society.

Although I can offer no very exact analysis of the data of this study in terms of the relationships existing between these three orders, it will appear, I think, that I continually found myself observing and analysing at the three levels. They supplied the primary categories of my thinking, and I believe that the significant problems of a dynamic sociology are those concerned with the fitness to one another of individual needs, individuals' values and social structure.
2. The Needs of Individuals

The needs which motivate individuals can be considered at different levels of the individual's personality organization. Like Murphy (1947, pp.105-124), one can classify motive patterns into the visceral, activity and sensory drives and the emergency responses, thus modulating through degrees in conscious awareness. Or, like Nadel (1951, pp.333-354) one can consider the generic action potentials, such as the seeking of pleasure and avoidance of displeasure, which pervade all kinds of striving. But of greater usefulness for comparing individuals in their social setting are those needs bearing on personality organization; such as the needs for personal response and long-term security which Linton (1945, pp.5 to 11) has postulated, the need for an individual security system postulated by Kardiner (1939, pp.83 to 89), the need for ego-identity assumed by Erikson (1950, pp.207 to 218, 227 and 228), the need for ego-involvement in membership or reference groups accepted by Sherif and Cantril (1947, pp.113 to 115), or the need for an unfolding of powers, or

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The third need which Linton postulated, a need for novelty of experience, seems to lie nearer the generic action potentials however. Linton appears to have adapted these needs from those postulated by Thomas (1951, pp.111 to 144).
for a conscience to recall one to oneself, postulated by Fromm (1949, p. 45, and pp. 141 to 172). These have greater usefulness in comparing one individual with another because one can describe in fairly specific terms the habitual strivings through which each seeks to satisfy them. For this reason I adopt for this thesis three needs on this higher level of personality organization, each of which has affinities with the needs postulated by one or more of the second group of writers above. I will assume that the necessity of organizing their behaviour in the face of their own complexity and that of their natural and social environments, produces needs in individuals for security, freedom and an identity.

By security I mean a defined and stable place in a system whose expected effective operation gives an individual confidence that the provision of any or a number of desired satisfactions is guaranteed; for example, the provision of food, comfort, relaxation, artistic expression, sexual consummation, personal appreciation, and so on. His security stems from two sources: from his confidence in the effectiveness of the system, and from his confidence that his position within it is defined and fixed. This need arises because an individual's exertion in isolation is seldom, if ever, sufficient to secure the satisfactions he desires,
so that he finds himself overwhelmingly dependent on support. By freedom I mean both liberation from the determining power of natural and social forces (i.e. self-determination) and the opportunity to exert initiative and control. These two abilities can be subsumed under one concept because they are psychologically similar, for they both contribute to an individual's being unobstructed in influencing the objects of his field (which includes himself) to change. Basically, this need arises out of the fact that the banking up of tensions demands relief in expression, understanding that word in a sense wide enough to include such various self-originating activities as impulse-expression, acts of decision and creativeness.

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1 Gillin's argument (Kluckhohn and Murray, 1948, p.172) that security from such "external props" is not indispensable and that it can be replaced by security from "inner resources" such as adaptability, capacity to analyze new situations, a sense of the relativity of norms and a knowledge of what is needed for personal and social integration, is stated rather too wishfully to be convincing. I am inclined to think that these "inner resources" are themselves the fruits of a security derived from "external props", and that an individual can only adjust to the relativity of systems with any feeling of security if he gains perspective on them by a secure anchorage in a more comprehensive system. As for the requirements for personal and social integration - what if they should include a need for "external props"? To know of such a need in the total absence of means to supply it would not conduce to well-being.
Finally, by identity I mean a conception of who one is. The individual needs to be at least relatively unified in order to be recognizable to himself. This is a need which arises from having to maintain some inner consistency in order to be able to act effectively in a variety of situations and over time.

3. Social Structure

The connection which I am presuming to exist between these individual needs and social structure is that certain properties of social structure provide possibilities for supplying them. Concrete social structures are one, although not the only kind of system in which individuals can seek secure anchorage. There are more abstract systems, such as religious systems or naturalist or historicist systems, and the part which these play in an individual's experience should be considered alongside the part played by groups. And one can, indeed, deal with them by the same analytical methods, for these abstract systems operate quite analogously with social structures, in that they picture some social or quasi-social universe in which the individual takes a role. Thus, for example, the Christian takes such roles as the child or servant of God; the Marxist takes the role of a precursor of the inevitable unfolding of history, and
so on. Both abstract systems such as these and concrete social structures supply frames of reference in which the individual can locate and securely anchor himself.

Chapman and Volkman (1939, pp.225-238) and Hyman (1942) used the concept of the frame of reference to assist in the explanation of individual behaviour. Sherif and Cantril (1947) have described as the "reference group" the particular case in which the frame of reference is a group. Sherif has written (1953, p.215) that, "The concept of reference group can be advantageously used to denote groups to which the individual relates or aspires to relate himself as a part"; and stated in the same essay (p.214) that "reference groups might just as well be called anchoring groups". The gist of the theory of which Sherif is a main proponent is that as an individual comes to have a

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psychologically functioning membership in any formal, in-

\[1\] I am indebted to Newcomb (Rohrer and Sherif, 1951, p.48) for this neat way of expressing the fact that a reference group can be one in which an individual actually has membership or one in which he has no membership at all, although thinking of himself as if he had and defining himself with that group as his frame of reference. Of course, I am thinking here only of the way in which Sherif and Newcomb use this term. It has been used by various workers in their own independent ways, much to the confusion of us all. Elizabeth Bott (1954, p.264) has recently given a summary of its variants.
formal or symbolic group by accepting its aims, norms, values or attitudes, he finds an anchorage there. This finding anchorage by involvement in a group will convey a large part of what I mean by finding security through a place in a system. But I would add something.

Relating oneself as a part to any system or group means to assume a role in it, the role giving one a defined, fixed and legitimate place. A role sets bounds to the initiative which one may and need assert, and guarantees support in all matters bearing on the purpose of the system or group which lie outside the area of one's personal exertion. In this way assuming a role can confer security.

But accompanying every role is status. As Linton (1945, pp. 76 and 77) has pointed out, role and status are quite inseparable. If role defines the task which the group imposes, status defines the position of influence from which it is executed. Status can perhaps be best thought of from the three aspects of right, rank and recognition. The right which comes to a person with his role is a certain freedom from determination by others together with a defined area of initiative in running the enterprise. It is a limited freedom because it is ranked in relation to the freedom allowed to others, the exercise
of each subordinate's initiative, for example, being
dependent to some degree on the discretionary initiative
of a super-ordinate. Also, one is recognized by other
participants in the system to have this rank and right.
He receives deference (or prestige) accordingly, and by
this deference the exercise of his initiative is facilitated.
In such ways as these the status attaching to an individual's
role can help to satisfy his need for freedom.

Finally, his role gives the individual a definition
of himself in relation to a frame of reference so that
he gains a sense of identity from it. This self-conception
in terms of a role is what I shall call identity, or
person, or, alternatively again, following the sense used
by George Mead (1937, pp.135-144), a self. Also following
Mead, I shall distinguish between the elementary selves
(or identities) and the complete self (or identity) of
an individual. His elementary selves are those different
identities which he has in different groups; his complete
self (if he achieves one) is the organization of these
elementary selves into some sort of unity. It is one
problem of this thesis to examine the place which the
subjects of the study gave to the family in their strivings
to achieve a complete self.
The above will indicate sketchily how ego-involvement in a frame of reference (of which concrete social structures make one class) may simultaneously satisfy an individual's needs for security, freedom and identity. But this is a very idealized statement of the case. One of these needs may be met at the expense of the others, so that an individual remains dissatisfied and restless. For example, an occupation which an individual values because of its security, may deprive him of the opportunity to exercise initiative in the way he desires, or it may compromise him by fixing an identity on him which is not agreeable to him. He is presented not merely with the problem of satisfying the three needs but of satisfying them jointly. Much entering of groups and relinquishment of memberships, and many changes in group structure can be explained by the linkage between these needs. Also, the way of seeking to satisfy these needs by taking a role in a system is by no means uncomplicated with alternatives. In seeking a sense of identity, for example, one may identify with the character ascribed or with the actual exertions made. Thus there can be a positional identity and an experiential one, and they may converge or diverge. Another possibility is for an individual to extend his identification beyond his own role by also identifying vicariously with the
roles and positions of others in the structure, until his identity is enriched by approaching the comprehensiveness of the system itself. In employing this theoretical framework all such possibilities as these had to be kept in mind.

4. Values

The term "values" can be used in a broad sense which simply means "things valued". But that is to define the term so broadly that it loses point, and it would, in fact, confuse the whole subject. It is better to restrict the term in the way Nadel (1953, p.270) has suggested, to refer not to ends of practical or specific utility, but to the more autonomous worth-whileness which is believed to reside in certain classes of objects, and which consequently gives rise to principles which rule over behaviour. For the purpose of this thesis values will be defined as generalized ends, or principles, which guide behaviour towards uniformity in a variety of situations with the object of repeating a particular self-sufficient satisfaction. While it is admittedly seldom easy to decide what satisfactions are self-sufficient and what are instrumental, a meaningful comparison of the values of different individuals or groups is impossible unless we attempt to
do so. For it is precisely in this that a difference of values lies. In the case of different families, for example, we will find that while they "value" many of the same things, e.g. money, food, knowledge and entertainment, they differ simply because they "place a value" on any one of them which is different from the value placed on it by others. Questions of what value is placed upon a thing are the important questions in the study of values, and not simply questions of what things are valued. That requires that all desired things be somehow viewed together and the weight given to each estimated. Vernon and Allport (1931, pp.232 to 248) worked out the Study of Values which they based on Spranger's types (1928) with that fact in mind.

One can gain some idea of what stands highest to a person in a scale of self-sufficiency from his preferences in choice situations where, though a number of things are directly available, some limitation dictates that fewer than all can be availed of. It is on the individual's responses to hypothetical situations like these that the first part of the Allport-Vernon Study (Appendix A) is based. But not all value preferences are of the type in which to have B one must forgo A. There are other situations (and possibly more of them) in which to have either
A or B one must have both, one being a means without which the other is unattainable. These are those situations in which the charge is sometimes brought against a person that he is "making too much" of a thing, when what his critic thinks should be a means is made an end in itself; but it is never imagined that he can do without it. The question of value then becomes which of the two the person will regard as a means and which he will regard as more self-sufficient. Questions concerning which of several things is "the most important" are roughly equivalent to this, and the second part of the Allport-Vernon Study uses questions of that kind. We cannot answer these questions by trying to find out which of two or more things a person is willing to forgo, because to forgo one may entail losing all. The fact that so many value preferences are of this type warns us against working out any simple "objective" measures of values which conceive of human values by analogy with the economic conception of value, that is in terms of the use of limited resources. Such tests would be likely to assume, for instance, that a person values more what he forgoes more time, money or pleasure for. But differentials in these respects are determined more by contingencies of circumstance than by values. If a person spent most of his day at work it need not mean that he
valued work most, it may be that work was purely instrumental to the satisfaction of earning money, while money may have been purely instrumental to other satisfactions. If he spent more money and time on food than books it need not mean that he valued food more than literature. The philosophy of the popular song that "the best things in life are free" implies a belief that the best things in life do not require that other things be exchanged for them but that other things should be so ordered as to facilitate their attainment, or at least not impede it.

This ordering of ends into a hierarchy means that a person will desire not only one thing, but everything which he believes its attainment depends upon; but it is still entirely realistic to say that he values only one thing, if he permits himself to desire only whatever other things he believes are necessary for it, making many ends instrumental to one autonomous end. There is all the difference in the world between two persons who desire the same things, if an end which is instrumental to one is self-sufficient to another. Values, as they will be treated here, are such organizing ends, organizing precisely because they make many other satisfactions and actions subordinate to them; and they are more realistically identified by noticing certain consistencies in behaviour.
achieved through effort, and the correspondence with these of principles which the person confesses to follow, than by any economic balance sheet of how much he gives for the various things he gains. Self-sufficient ends or values are what a person desires most of, not what he pays most for. One could even define them as what one desires without limit - a point which was recently made by Riecken and Homans (Lindzey, 1954, p.786). Because values, as defined, have this nature - satisfactions pursued without limit and never subordinated to others - to entertain more than one is to invite almost certain conflict. A sovereign end to which no limits are set is so comprehensive in what it claims in its service that any other end with the same status is likely to be a deadly enemy; and this, presumably, is the force of the proverb that no man can serve two masters. For this reason the study of values leads directly to the study of conflict.

It should, perhaps, be emphasized, however, that because values are being identified as self-sufficient ends consciously pursued, and because following more than one such satisfaction may invite conflict, it does not at all mean that the pursuit of any one type of satisfaction will exclude the possibility of enjoying satisfactions of other kinds, incidentally and unsought. Thus the pursuit of
altruism, for example, frequently brings egoistic satisfactions gratuitously; a fact often formulated in the principle that to save one's life one must lose it. The idea expressed by this maxim is that self-enhancement is best secured when not sought as self-sufficient. The suggestion is that if things are rightly ordered all will be gain and nothing lost at all. But this incidental realization of different kinds of satisfaction is quite different from deliberately pursuing each of them as a self-sufficient end.

I have said that the autonomous satisfactions which I am calling values are generalized. This is an empirical generality, not one which an observer imposes for the sake of ordering his observations. People themselves develop a general conception of the type of satisfaction they seek, and look for it from a variety of objects and in a variety of situations; and it is only because they do this that we are entitled to say they have values at all. This is what Nadel (1953, p.270) had in mind when he limited the term value to the worth-whileness which is believed to reside in classes of objects. Cantril and Allport (1933, pp.259-273) demonstrated that such generalized tendencies do exist. Murphy (1947, pp.272-279) has written of values as canalizations with a conditioning through
which the goal object is connected with a symbol, so that the expectation of satisfaction is relatively detached from particular, concrete situations. Using an analogy of the neural network, but implying more even than an analogical connection with it, Northrop (Tax, 1953, p. 330) has asserted that value is simply a conceptual system, thus conveying that it is a way of making categories out of the types of satisfaction that life offers. It is precisely because people have this habit of generalizing their desires that it is important to identify values in the study of behaviour, because they summarize so much.

But, obviously, if the satisfactions actors desired were generalized to the ultimate limit they would all become the same thing, they would all reduce to satisfaction. People are not in the habit of stopping at this ultimate reduction of their desires, however, although many frequently assert simply that they seek "happiness", and impute the same motive to others. The narrower question people put to themselves is whether this or that general mode of behaviour will bring happiness, so that their values become modalities at a level of generalization which might be called penultimate. The problem for an empirical classification of values is to identify what these penultimate modalities are which people judge to be intrinsically satisfying.
Some recent statements by anthropologists about the empirical classification of values are mainly valuable as historical reviews, but they tend to be admissions of bankruptcy so far as positive direction for empirical study goes. I refer to the paper read by Bidney at the International Symposium on Anthropology (1953, pp.682-699) and the discussion which followed it (Tax, 1953, pp.332-341), and the Marrett Lecture given by Firth in 1953 (1953, pp.146-153). Bidney's paper was more concerned with removing the obstacle which cultural relativism has put in the way of developing universal norms for society, than with the question of the empirical study of people's values. The ensuing discussion did recognize that both questions were pressing, and maintained a distinction between them, but did not offer guidance for empirical study. Firth, in his paper, identified "value elements", viz. technological, economic, aesthetic, normative and ritual, but he acknowledged that they are of different orders. This type of classification comes from thinking of values in the sense of things valued, and can only be expected to introduce different orders. Firth comes nearer to the conception of value which I am adopting when, towards the end of the paper, although without making connection with the classification of value elements proposed earlier, he
refers to the fact that what is agreeable or disagreeable to have in close association, what he calls "companionship value" or "sharing value", sometimes becomes the issue of greatest importance in making a value choice. This has some affinity with what I will call "membership" values in the classification attempted below.

Some help towards a classification of values comes from another direction. Prompted less by an immediate need to classify empirical data than to explore the logical possibilities which are inherent in what we know about behaviour from general experience, Parsons (1952, pp.24-67) has identified five alternatives which one may have to face when striking a value orientation. One of these alternatives, that of deciding between the welfare of one's own person and that of one's group, has some correspondence with a certain difference in empirical values which I observed, and which makes the major division in the classification of values which I propose as a result of my observations in this study.

The self-sufficient ends which were followed by the subjects of the research seemed to fall into two main categories according to whether the subjects were habitually aiming to find satisfaction by being involved within a frame of reference more inclusive than themselves or to
find satisfaction by some form of direct self-enhancement. The satisfaction sought through the former of these modes appeared to be the exhilaration of being released from restricted and, perhaps, inhibiting self-consciousness, through fixing attention and devotion on a wider system - the thrill of "losing oneself" or "transcending oneself" which is often called "spiritual". Patriotic and religious experience are examples of such spiritual values, and cognate with them are all those principles which enjoin altruism, service, loyalty, truth, reasonableness, sacrifice and forgiveness, and all the associated behaviour by which one's own position and the position of others within a system is strengthened, and maintained in spite of strains. Satisfactions and principles of this kind I classify as spiritual values. The satisfaction sought through the second mode was some heightened self-awareness, as distinct from self-abandonment, to be realized by attaching something to one's self, either to extend it, as in accumulating property, or to concentrate it, as in cultivating a passion for music. Aims of this kind I call egoistic values.

Spiritual values subdivided further into two categories according to whether one aimed to stand in membership relation with as many things and people in one's field of experience as possible (at least excluding none by choice),
or whether one definitely aimed to be included by excluding, barring certain others from the system in which one found one's own anchorage, and even perhaps opposing them. The former I call membership values, and the latter partisanship. Choosing the former is to value reconciliation, choosing the latter is to value a cause. Egoistic values divided in a similar fashion, according to whether they were comprehensive or exclusive. The comprehensive values are those which seek to expand the ego by attaching a variety of things to it as acquirements, whether it be purely sensory gratifications, such as are to be derived from food and drink, or such things as intellectual or athletic achievement, or property and wealth. This is the manner of valuing which values things as possessions, and I call it self-expansion. The exclusive kind of egoistic value aims to concentrate the ego by selecting one thing in which to be absorbed completely, such as a profession, hobby or sport, deliberately excluding other claims from consideration. It is the mode of valuing which values things as passions.

All of these four types of value are real in the sense that satisfaction is sought in real experience; in actual involvement in the case of the spiritual values and in actual achievement in the case of egoistic values.
But residual to these four types of real value is a fifth type which values things as appearances. Unsure of the possibility of attaining real satisfaction in any of the four modes, the individual seeks the satisfaction of appearing to have done so. Thus, for instance, he will studiously assume conventions of respectability or appearances of conviviality or ability, or display badges of financial, moral, intellectual, artistic, manual, physical or other kinds of achievement, by virtue of which he hopes to justify himself to himself and to others. Thus we have pretence, hypocrisy, ostentation and vanity: samples of a category of values which has long been recognized in sociology. Veblen (1908, pp.22-101) identified it as "ostentation"; more recently Eisenstadt (1951) has called it "symbolic value". When thinking of these as making up a moiety of values which stands in opposition to all of the real values, I call them face values; thinking of them simply as one of the five types of value I call them self-justification.

By dividing values into these five types or classes I am, of course, adding an observer's conceptual generalization to the already existing generalization of aims of the subjects. To speak of values is to refer to generalized aims, but to speak of types of value is to go further and
refer to a generalization about generalized aims. But some values were, in themselves, more generalized than others. Thus partisanship and self-concentration values tended to be more specific by their very natures than self-expansion and membership values. But, abstract though they are, these types seem to give recognition to the differences which are significant in regard to value. They define what value is placed upon things and not simply what things are valued. They take account of the nature of a person's interest in things, and do not commit the error of lumping people together simply because they are interested in the same thing, without having regard for the type of satisfaction they expect from it. That was something which proved to be particularly important in this study, especially in relation to certain objects of valuation such as recreation, art, culture, truth and religion. All of these could be valued from an aspect of sharing and communication, leading to intensified membership, in which case they constituted membership values; but they could just as easily be regarded as forms of sheer self-expression or self-improvement, when they would constitute self-expansion values; or as distinctions to be worn, then constituting self-justification values. To fail to notice distinctions of this kind, I believe, is to fail to grapple
realistically with the question of values. For this reason, although the Allport-Vernon Study of Values was used for collecting data, I did not accept the Spranger classification of values on which it is based. The Study helped me to identify what were a person's interests, but from that point I had to ask what was the nature of the satisfaction he was seeking in electing to follow them.

I would also mention that Becker's (1950, pp.3-92) dichotomy of sacred and secular values, which has actually been applied to the study of the family (Becker and Hill, editors, 1948), was not used here for a similar reason. "Sacred" and "secular" scarcely apply to the kind of generalized ends which I was looking for. They seem to refer rather to questions of the conservation of values than to types of value. A sacred mode of behaviour is one which is cautious about allowing new means to be substituted for achieving old but still desired ends, because the ends are so highly valued that untried means appear to threaten the certainty of procuring them. Secular behaviour, on the other hand, is ready to question the precise appropriateness of persisting means for achieving the same satisfactions in new circumstances, and is willing to learn about new means. The dilemma about following a sacred or secular mode of behaviour appears to be resolvable
by having the ability to distinguish means from ends and to appreciate that the same ends can be achieved by variable means; that is, by taking a middle course. This requires a fair degree of sophistication; in fact, it probably makes up a large part of what we mean by sophistication in the more complimentary sense of the word. In the absence of that sophistication two unrealistic courses may be taken, and it is these which mark the extreme poles of the dichotomy: the extreme sacred reaction is to categorically deny variability to the means because one is overwhelmed by the sense of a threat to the end in a different means; and the extreme secular reaction denies fixity to the end because one is overwhelmed by the present lack of fitness between an end and the persisting means. All of these are important distinctions to make, but they bear more on the matters I discuss under "responsibility attitudes" in Chapter VI than on self-sufficient values. Any of the five types of value I have identified might be stultified by sacred taboos, or be in jeopardy through secular doubt, or be made reasonably certain of procurement through a middle course of adaptation of means, all according to the sophistication of the persons concerned.

These value types relate to needs and social structure in a fairly obvious manner. The spiritual values serve
to guide individuals into involvements for the satisfaction of their needs. The egoistic and face values guide them into other courses, but may still make use of social structures. Self-concentration gratifications, for example, may be derived from an occupational role, and face values may depend on the imitation of status characteristics. Each type of value in itself indicates a certain disposition to association or dissociation. In addition to this, whether one shares values with others or follows values which differ from theirs will facilitate or impede association with them.