ASPECTS OF AUSTRALIAN FAMILY STRUCTURE: A FIELD STUDY OF A SAMPLE OF URBAN FAMILIES.

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PART III.

INTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE FAMILIES.

those affected took towards it. If, in describing roles, I refer sometimes to a practice and sometimes to a belief in the fitness of a practice, it will be for economy of reporting. It should be understood that I have regarded nothing as role-behaviour which has not exhibited both of these elements and a certain correspondence between them.[1] Also, in describing a role it is uneconomical to refer every time to the reciprocal performances it entails for others; as when a parent's command entails a child's compliance, for instance. Reciprocal roles will usually be taken to be summarized in a role which implies them both, except where each merits special mention.

Because role differentiation is fundamental to the nature of the group, and is, indeed, what we mean by group structure,[2] its place in a description of families is cardinal. The account of it is therefore undertaken now, at the centre of the thesis. It follows and will summarize relevant matter from the preceding part, which dealt with

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[1] Parsons (1952) makes much of the fact that role expectations are saturated with standards, as, for example, in his definition of role on pp.38 and 39. Homans (1951, p.124) even reduces the role to a particular kind of norm.

[2] See Parsons (1952, p.114).

the way families function in their external relations; and it stands before the chapters which are concerned with the families' internal life.

Because a role is a performance discharged on behalf of a group, a particular role is only defined if we understand what social boundary contains it. The roles dealt with in the present chapter are those which have the whole family for their perimeter. In the previous chapter the convention was adopted of describing as "family functions" those activities which family members discharged amongst themselves alone. This was done in order to separate these activities from those which could only be accomplished through association with people outside. That enabled us to see what are the functions which remain to the city family to perform within itself. But now it is necessary again to consider family activities in their fullest extension, for the ends to which _family roles_ are the means, are all of those things for which family members depend on one another or are in some way implicated with one another, irrespective of whether their achievement requires additional co-operation from outsiders.

The ends which have to be realized in order to maintain the family in itself and in the society fall into four major divisions. Two of these divisions are concerned

with maintaining the family in itself. The first embraces the productive activities which secure the family's physical and material welfare. Earning an income, working to maintain the household or to produce food and clothing, and efforts devoted to the care of the person are examples of the sort of things which fill this division. The second division comprises activities which are concerned with managing and controlling the family as such, and securing its effective and continued operation.[1] The remaining two divisions are concerned with the family's external obligations. One is the group of external liaison operations, such as making public, business, legal or financial representation for the family, or keeping in touch with relatives and friends. The other covers the supervisory and training activities by which children are socialized; for it should be remembered that, though much latitude may be allowed the family as to what style it shall rear its children in,

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[1] The existence of this division of activities is evidence that the family, on its microcosmic dimension, exhibits a distinctive machinery of controls which is apart from the self-regulation that is secured by various agencies; for instance, by the normativeness or the reciprocity of role expectations, to which I have referred. Nadel (1953, p.266) has emphasized the importance of this separate machinery in societies, and has (1951, p.136) adapted the term <u>regulative</u> (from Becker-Weise) to refer to the institutions whose function is to effect control.

that they shall be reared is a public requirement, and the society claims them for itself. Notwithstanding all the voluntary aspects of parenthood and all its intrinsic satisfaction, parents are in a sense the keepers of wards. Children are destined to be independent adults with family responsibilities of their own, and their parents are required to make them socially agreeable for the time being, foster their development, and fit them to move out. In the following account, the roles of family members will be described according to which tasks are allocated to them from each of the four divisions of activity: production, family management and control, external liaison and socialization.

Finally, in addition to these four divisions of activity concerned with the family, there are other activities which families reserve as the personal right of each role-bearer. For families operate as if taking account of the fact that some personal space is due to each member. Personal space will also be included then, in this account of roles.

Depending on the nature of the group, of whose structure they are the units, roles may be ephemeral or permanent, single or complex. Because the family is an enduring group, family roles tend to be permanent, repetitive performances.

And at the same time, a complex of specific performances accrues to each member, due to the fact that he plays diverse parts. This is a feature which roles only develop in groups which are many-sided, or which somehow contrive to make the roles which their members play elsewhere relevant to themselves. These are both properties which are found in the family particularly, as was pointed out in the last chapter.

When this role-accretion takes place, one performance is usually adopted by which the whole complex is named. For instance, the terms "father" and "mother", "son" and "daughter", in their originality, refer simply to biological parenthood or issue. The terms can be used in relation to other animal species as well as humans, and they are applied figuratively to ideas, movements, and so on. But, in regard to the human family, common speech has made the terms shorthand for the complex of social functions which has accrued to the biological function. "Father", it may be, comes to include the discrete roles of breadwinner, admonisher of the children, lover of the mother, business executor for the family, economic manager, and adviser in the ways of the world. I will proceed by comparing the subsidiary roles which families assembled into the cardinal roles of father and mother, son and daughter. Also, as

the roles assigned to son and daughter alter with age, these will be considered at the two stages of childhood and adolescence.[1]

2. Production

In the sample, the father was always the income-earner for the family. Families attached their expectation of continuing welfare to the hope that the father would continue in employment. To secure this regular income was regarded as quite exclusively his responsibility, and in cases where the mothers did part-time work, their contribution to income was regarded as additional, and was never required. Adolescents who were in employment were required to support themselves by paying board, or, if their earnings were small, to make some contribution towards it. School children of tradesmen who did part-time work kept their earnings for themselves, and divided them between savings

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[1] Although adolescence is known to commence at different ages for the two sexes and for different individuals, the convention was adopted of classifying as adolescents, children of fourteen and over. Fourteen tradesmen's families included adolescents, seven of these including sons and eight including daughters at that stage; seventeen professionals' families included adolescents, eight of these including sons and eleven including daughters. Fifteen tradesmen's families included pre-adolescent children, eleven including sons and ten including daughters at that stage; nineteen professionals' families included pre-adolescent children, sixteen including sons and thirteen including daughters.

and pocket-money for spending. In three professionals' and two tradesmen's families, where the father's practice or business was attached to the home, the mothers were recognized to be making an indirect contribution towards income through giving assistance. Although the sample included no families in which the mother was working full-time at the time of the study, several wives in both occupational groups had done so earlier in married life to help establish the family financially. The attitude taken to the practice of wives working was fairly uniform. It was that there was "nothing wrong with it", that adversity could render it necessary, and that, if there were no children to consider, it could be a financial benefit. But, while ever there were children still at school or of pre-school age, it was believed to be the mother's place to be at home with them. No wives considered that accepting employment would mean loss of social status for the family.

Mothers made clothing for themselves, their daughters and younger sons, occasionally made shirts or pyjamas for the father, and darned, repaired and altered old clothing; and it was only a few (professionals' wives) who felt altogether free from pressure to assist economically in this sort of way. Mothers also made curtains, cushions, covers and similar effects for decorating the home. They

prepared the meals, baked cakes and pastry. Sometimes they produced vegetables in the garden, but gardening was more often allocated to the father; and the growing of vegetables was made his responsibility, even if the cultivation of flowers was left to the mother. Families who kept fowls divided the care of them amongst members, mothers or children often feeding them and the father cleaning their yards. Most of the tradesmen, but only a few of the professional men, made useful equipment for the home. They built furniture, constructed cupboards, laid paths, designed gadgets, and so on; and two were building week-end cottages. A large proportion in both occupational groups did some part of the mending of the shoes of family members.

The services needed to maintain the household divide into those inside the home and those which are more external. The former lay predominantly in the mothers' field, the latter in the father's. Mothers did nearly all of the repetitive cleaning, and the washing and ironing, and the shopping to stock the home with provisions. Tradesmen's wives had no outside assistance in these tasks, but nearly one half of the professionals' wives had part-time assistants to help them.[xx] None had full-time or resident housemaids, although several recalled a time when they had done so. They said that they preferred not to do so any longer,

not only because assistance was hard to secure, but because it was expensive and the standard of work was not worth the money.

While these internal household tasks fell predominantly to the mother, all of the tradesmen, but only half of the professionals,[xx] made a deliberate point of giving their wives some form of petty assistance. They would wash or wipe the dishes, stir the porridge, make morning or evening cups of tea, and so on. These tasks were never extensive, but were undertaken as a gesture towards "lightening mother's load", and were felt to be especially called for in the evenings. It was essentially mother's load that was being shouldered, however, and the fathers did not think of the tasks as belonging properly to them. The professionals who gave no assistance of this kind to their wives were extremely busy, and were mainly the husbands of those wives who were making use of outside help.

Four fathers in each occupational group departed from this conventional pattern of token help, by taking, as their due obligation, a larger share of the internal household maintenance; although the bulk still fell to the mother. These men did some of the heavier work, such as scrubbing, sweeping, polishing and strenuous washing; occasionally some uncomfortable task, such as hot cooking; or external work, such as shopping or weekly marketing.

External household maintenance was regarded as the father's work. Such matters as repairing and painting the house, keeping the grounds tidy, chopping wood, cleaning and overhauling the car, were the man's work. A third of the professionals, however, had to excuse themselves from most of these tasks, either because of incompetence or over-busyness, and engaged tradesmen to do them. Two professional families which owned large grounds engaged regular part-time help to keep them in order.

Personal care was understood to be the mother's responsibility. It was hers to see that all members were fed and clothed properly, that they kept healthy and were generally comfortable, or received medical attention if sick. Most mothers were expected to know when anyone was in need of new clothing and either do the buying or supervise it. A few fathers accepted responsibility for keeping themselves equipped with clothing, but most of them depended on their wives either to buy it for them, or, if they were willing to make their own choice, to inform them of the appropriateness of the time. Personal care was needed most for very young and very dependent children, who applied to their mothers for it continuously; but the older children and the father were certainly not less confirmed in their expectation that the mother would make their lives comfortable.

A few fathers in both occupational groups relieved the mother of some of the personal care of the dependent children, particularly in the evenings, perhaps by bathing them and putting them to bed.

Some adolescents in both occupational groups were assigned regular tasks, but there were nine (out of fourteen) tradesmen's families and four (out of seventeen) professionals' families in which adolescents gave either only very occasional help or almost none at all. In no case was the work required heavy, and all of them were excused from greater responsibilities because of the claim made on their time by study or daily occupation. The core of the duties which fell to an adolescent consisted of looking after himself and his own part of the house, such as making his own bed, tidying his own room, preparing his own breakfast. Beyond this, any regular work on behalf of the family was usually confined to petty help, such as taking a turn at laying the table for meals or washing the dishes. Some daughters made clothing for themselves and did occasional cooking, washing, ironing and cleaning in association with their mothers; some sons assisted their fathers in their external tasks of keeping the lawns, cleaning the car, and so on. Families with four or more children depended on their adolescents for more extensive services, such as doing

part of the heavy cleaning or house repairs, and their duties often included some care, control and supervision of the younger children.

It was predominantly sons who made up that group of adolescents who were without regular household tasks. These were inclined to disdain such responsibilities, leaving them for their mothers and sisters - or fathers. There was a feeling in these families that young men should be free from domestic obligations to their families in a way quite unshared by their sisters.

In a similar manner most children were allotted regular small tasks to do, but again there were families (six of fifteen tradesmen's and three of nineteen professionals) in which there were children who did only the most sporadic tasks, and who had no sense at all of being depended upon by the family for help. The tasks mostly undertaken by children were small things to help mother or father, such as sweeping up the mown grass, tidying a room, stirring a cake mixture, or small things connected with their own personal care or part of the house, like cleaning shoes or making beds.

3. Family Management and Control

The families were fairly uniform in the way the productive tasks were allocated, except for the minor variations

noted; but they were less uniform in matters of family management. In twelve of eighteen tradesmen's families the fathers could be said to be in effective control; in three the mothers were in effective control, and in the remaining three something like a partnership in management was found. In nine of the twenty professionals' families the fathers were in effective control, in one the mother was in effective control, and in ten there was partnership. The overall picture is one of patriarchy being challenged by a pattern of partnership.[1] But this surface classification masks the variety of forms which control or partnership took, and it is necessary to examine these to understand what factors could be responsible for either condition. Especially does it mask the fact that certain forms of control were much weaker than others in the normative element, which, I have said, is part of the constitution of roles. This tendency in some cases for control activities to evade the restraints of family sanction will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter.

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[1] This picture is much the same as that which Hill (1947, p.129) draws for America. He says, "If there is any modal type of family in America, it is the semipatriarchal form in which a dominant husband 'brings in the bacon' and a submissive woman plays a traditional wife and mother role." And he adds (p.130), "The so-called 'companionship' family appears to have much in common with the beautiful ideal of the 'Brotherhood of Man' as a millenial goal."

In fourteen of the twenty-one families in which patriarchy was found (eight tradesmen's and six professionals') there was no element of forced domination. In these families the fathers exercised control by a principle of legitimate authority with which their wives were in accord. By legitimate control I mean control exercised by the consent of those concerned, and done on principle, there being believed to be reasons in which the practice is grounded.[1] The wives believed that the father was the rightful head of the family and ascribed that rank to him. Most of them were well satisfied with the arrangement. They said things seemed more natural and proper that way, that they felt greater confidence, that the family had a stable basis, and that the father exercised his right with discretion and only after consultation, and in fact, left a large area of initiative to them.

The usual practice was to leave the current organization of the household activities and the supervision of the children almost entirely to the mother. The father reserved the initiative in allocating the overall finances, but

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[1] In distinguishing in this way between control which is legitimate and that which is not I am making the same distinction as the one made by Lasswell and Kaplan (1952, pp.133 to 141) between authority and naked power.

apportioned a certain amount to the mother for household expenses, and of this she had full control. The father also expected to initiate major changes, or to be consulted for a final decision in any changes his wife might be contemplating. Many of these projected changes were those which would affect the use of material and financial resources; such questions, for example, as the purchase of expensive clothing, new carpets or furniture or labour-saving devices, or a car. Major decisions affecting the children, such as the school they should attend, the clubs they should join, the holidays they should have, the company they should keep, the time they should be home, whether they should have bicycles or watches, and so on, were also the father's to make, either in agreement with his wife, or, if their views differed, in ascendancy over her.

Generally speaking, the wives were free from interference, and felt at the same time that they had someone to whom they could appeal to take responsibility for major decisions. Final authority for the father on the family's boundary, requiring decisive intervention at the turning points, coupled with final authority for the mother in domestic organization and child supervision, along a fairly closed boundary within it, and calling for continuous small decisions and adaptations, seems to have given sufficient satisfaction to both partners to make this arrangement stable.

Legitimate patriarchy was believed to have a number of grounds. Families varied in which of these they emphasized, but the one most commonly accepted was a belief that authority was a right that went with the acceptance of responsibility for earning the income. "After all, he earns the money," it was said in justification of the father's primacy. And most of the income earners did, in fact, find the family's financial dependence upon them an ultimate resource for power, whether or not the patriarchal form of control was used. Indeed, where it was not used the power was the more valued, being something which enhanced the father's competitive position. In a way oddly suggestive of the move by which the British House of Commons assumed the real power of government,[1] the fathers retained the budget. There were only six fathers (two professionals and four tradesmen) who did not exercise the right to allocate their incomes according to their own judgment, allotting the mother a fixed portion to spend at her own discretion on the household.[xx] A number invited their wives' participation in this budgeting, although keeping the leadership for themselves; but amongst the tradesmen there was a tendency to be more autocratic, and several clung

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[1] Mackenzie (1950, pp.147- 166) describes how this was done.

Chapter VIII

ROLE DIFFERENTIATION BY AGE AND SEX

1. The Concept of Role

It is common knowledge that the nature of society is largely constituted by a division of tasks between members, and the fact has been vividly in the awareness of modern sociology since Durkheim's "The Division of Labour in Society" appeared at the turn of the present century. This division of tasks is effected by giving a performance to each individual which will contribute to some end of the group, and be reciprocal with tasks given to others. Such a performance, imposed by the expectation of a group, supplies the simplest definition of a role, as was pointed out in Chapter IV. The role, as was also said there, develops a normative aspect, for the expectation is not simply an anticipation that a certain task will be done, but an implication that it ought to be.

In attempting to identify the roles taken by family members, I looked for performances which were accompanied by a regulative expectation. This would either be expressed verbally or verbally implied, or it would be implied in the way an activity was performed or in the attitude which

tenaciously to a certain power over their wives derived from keeping them ignorant of the actual amount of their earnings. The two professionals excepted above offered their wives entire equality with themselves in the determination of the budget. The four excepted tradesmen surrendered the right of budgeting to their wives completely, handing over their unopened pay envelopes. Two did so as a gesture of respect and confidence, and two because of a confessed incompetence in handling money.

The other grounds for legitimate patriarchy regarded the father's authority as a responsibility entailed in the natural advantages which men enjoyed over women. It was thought to be against nature and a matter for shame if opportunity was not made for the father to use his advantages for the family's benefit; and in three cases it was believed as well that it would be an infringement of the divine law which made the father the family head. It was further accepted that, because of these natural advantages, the society had made the father responsible for the family's conduct and welfare.

The natural advantages imputed to men were not usually catalogued with precision; and some people thought it proper to allude to them darkly, as things known instinctively and not in need of justification. But, if such hints

are interpreted in conjunction with the more explicit statements that were made, four kinds of male advantage seem to have been acknowledged by parents of both sexes. The first is freedom from the periodic physiological restrictions imposed on women by menstruation, pregnancy and lactation, and from any social dependence they entail. The second is a greater capacity for muscular exertion. The third is a psychological capacity for emotional control, which is believed to equip men to make a more objective assessment of situations, to endow them with a sense of limits which women (more hysterically disposed) need to have supplied, and to make them more decisive than women, whose labile feelings cause them to vacillate. And the fourth advantage (which, if the third is real, might be supposed to be a consequence of it) is the man's capacity to deal with and find access to a wider field of experience, and a greater resulting competence in the affairs of the world.[1]

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[1] When men were asserted to have such natural advantages by the subjects of the research, nice scientific questions were not meant to be either raised or settled concerning their genesis: whether they were inherited, or acquired, for example, in response to the roles conventionally assigned to men. They were simply taken for the traits which both qualify and oblige the fathers of families to assume authority.

Further, because, by sex, men are believed to have this seniority over women, it is thought to be wrong for a man to forfeit his advantages by matching with a woman who is either older or better educated than himself, and who, therefore, may have counter advantages. This age and education relationship were norms that were nearly universally acknowledged by the parents of the sample, whatever the form of family government. And the actual ages of husbands were greater than those of their wives in all save the cases of one tradesman and three professionals.[xx] Reference to Chapter V (pp.110 & 111) will also show that, as a group, wives were not better educated than their husbands. (A small number of tradesmen's wives, however, had had slightly more schooling than their husbands.)

Parents who followed legitimate patriarchy believed themselves to be in line with the most standard and traditional arrangement. They did not feel it needed any defence as a method of family government, although they knew that it was being challenged by an arrangement more like partnership. Some of the professional people who preferred it to partnership thought of partnership as a doctrinaire fancy; some trades people took it for an indication of weakness in the man, in letting the family, and his wife in particular, slip out of his control.

The division of functions for family control was a central differential by which other activities and traits became appropriate to man or wife. The father relinquished the management of the household and supervision of the children to the mother largely because he was choiceless, being so much outside of the home discharging his own responsibilities. It was for him to do battle with the world and for his wife to stand beside him as a helper. The mother's obligation, therefore, was to be a home-maker, while it was the father's to supply the family with its bearings and steer its course through political, economic and social perplexities. Fathers felt an obligation to acquaint themselves with a knowledge of affairs for the family's sake no less than mothers felt an obligation to make a home. Fathers were depended upon to advise in the ways of the world and to inform the family of its position in society. I have said (Chapter VI, p. 184) that family members adopted the same class self-inclusion as one another in all families except one. They did so largely because they depended on the father to define the situation for them.[1] Fathers' social responsibility attitudes were

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[1] Some wives' views about social class were much more highly elaborated than their husbands', showing that it was a matter which they had thought about more. But if they were disposed to diverge from their husbands in their theories, they tended to feel they had to defend them, and in fact were inclined to strike their husbands' attitudes at the same time, as if that were the "official" family position in the face of which they were helpless.

also copied, and their politics were usually assumed. I have said (Chapter VI, p. 184) that in all save six families, husbands and wives agreed in their social responsibility attitude. In most of those where there was uniformity the father assumed leadership. Where there was difference, in all except one case, the father's attitude dominated the family, the mothers considering it both prudent and proper to "keep their thoughts to themselves" whenever an attitude was being brought to focus in decision. I have also said that parents had divergent political convictions in only four families (Chapter VI, p. 184). Where they concorded it was the fathers who were politically informed and exercised leadership, excepting only in the case of three professionals' families.[xx] In these the spouses could be said to have achieved agreement with one another through fairly independent thinking.

The mother, in her turn, was left to organize the family. She was expected to keep an eye on the activities of every member and co-ordinate them, to inform each of the other's needs, to define the family situation (as the father defined the public situation) and preserve understanding. A father was often not very well informed of the state of internal affairs and had to be "told the whole story" if the mother had to appeal to his adjudication in a disputed matter.

A striking concomitant of the division of internal and external authority between the father and mother was the different expectation placed on them to be adaptable within the home. It was definitely expected, by both partners, that mothers would be more adaptable. Fathers were less obliged to make personal adaptation to other members, and were more conditioned to being accommodated to than to fitting in. This is what some mothers alluded to when, in a peevish mood, they alleged that all men were spoiled. Generally, though, in families which practised legitimate patriarchy at any rate, this difference was kept within limits and was not a cause of discontent. A number of mothers positively embraced the obligation to be a "stand-in" or "back-stop", or the one who "could be put out most easily". They believed that families could not do without a specialist in absorbing inconvenience, and saw that role to be rightly theirs. The rationale which parents of both sexes indicated for this was the greater commitment of the father to rigid external expectations, which allowed him less scope for an adaptation of plans, and the greater strain suffered by him in external adaptation, which diminished his psychological tolerance for further frustration at home. "He has enough to put up with outside," it was said.

Also, because the father was required to grapple with the harsher, coarser and even, it may be, seamier side of life, it remained to the mother in her more protected position, to be the guardian for the family of finer things: religion, morality, culture and manners. This did not necessarily mean that the father neglected these matters in his own person, but simply that the mother had the greater responsibility for directing them so far as the family was concerned. Also, because of his preoccupation with principles and issues, the father could not take a great deal of interest in personalities. That too was required from the mother. And, because his orientation was broad and public, the father could not spare patience for details or ornamentation; but these were left to the mother's painstaking care. Besides, it was believed that women had a natural superiority over men in refinement, intuition and carefulness for detail, which equipped them for these special tasks. Thus partners following this form of family control believed themselves to be respecting and utilizing the specific natural superiority with which each sex had been endowed, in such a way as to increase their dependence on one another.

The allocation of rights of control, supervision or direction which I have outlined above, makes a kind of ideal

type of legitimate patriarchy, to which any family only approximated of course. Families using other methods of control incorporated some of the same features and excluded others. Also, they were aware that the style they had adopted was a departure from the more traditional form; although those adopting partnership believed theirs to be the most popular form at present. For these reasons the description of other forms will be facilitated if they are presented largely through comparison with legitimate patriarchy.

In the remaining seven families (four tradesmen's and three professionals') in which the fathers exerted effective control, they did not do so legitimately in the sense defined. Theirs was an assertive patriarchy. It is interesting that in six of these cases, the wives believed that the final control of the family should be vested in the father. Their complaint was simply that their husbands exercised it arbitrarily and oppressively. The seventh wife believed that the proper form of family control was partnership. It is also interesting that one of these fathers, blind to the fact that he was practising assertive patriarchy, rejected any principle of patriarchy outright in favour of partnership; although his wife favoured legitimate patriarchy and desired him to follow it.

Three elements common to these cases made the fathers' control assertive. There was little or no consultation with their wives in taking decisions; even though, in many larger matters, their wives were willing to believe that the father's opinion should have greater weight and finality. These fathers simply took the decisions independently and informed their wives of them; and they were remarkable for their capacity to "turn a deaf ear", to seem preoccupied, or to make a masculine virtue of silence and withdrawal, when their wives tried to open discussion. Secondly, there was an exaggeration to the point of egoism of that right of the father to be less adaptable in the home, to which I have already referred. The mothers, and even the children, complained that these fathers were intolerable and detestable in their selfish expectation that, when they were in it, the home should revolve around themselves. It was said that they never expected that they should have to fit in with anyone else in the slightest degree. And, thirdly, there was no legitimized division of areas of final initiative. The effect of this in five families (the three professionals' and two tradesmen's) was arbitrary and unpredictable interference by the father in those areas of activity which the mother believed should be given to her, specifically matters of household management and supervision of the children.

The effect in the other families (both tradesmen's) was evasion by the fathers of certain decisions which the mother believed the father should take; particularly decisions about expenditure on furniture and household equipment, repair of the property and the more serious misdemeanours of the children. Thus they coerced their wives to take these matters on themselves by their own default.

These developments which made patriarchy assertive were abuses to which legitimate patriarchy was open. I have said that all of those who adopted legitimate patriarchy found it satisfactory; but they recognized how it could be distorted, and some had had experience of one or both parties transgressing legitimate bounds, such as the father being too dogmatic or the mother too jealously possessive of her own domain. Two mothers particularly (both tradesmen's wives) expressed extreme frustration at having no appeal against certain measures which their husbands imposed: in implementing methods of child discipline which were unacceptable to the mothers, and in one case, in curtailing the mother's outside activities. But, apparently, neither these nor any other parents who adopted legitimate patriarchy, found the incidental strains and abuses cause for calling it in question. Their guarantee for its workability was a confidence in one another's intention to abide by the limits in principle.

In two of the families (both tradesmen's) in which mothers were in effective control, their control was assertive. Even in these the fathers decided the ultimate disposition of the money. But beyond that, practically all of the major decisions which have been described above as falling to the father in legitimate patriarchy, fell to the mother. The fathers and mothers alike were embarrassed to admit this, as though they believed it not normal and it was plain that in both cases neither partner was satisfied with the arrangement. The fathers had their rationale to explain it and the mothers their explanation to excuse it, and they were much the same in both families. The fathers believed that in every family there is domination, either of an overt or covert kind, and that it is a matter of chance which parent will dominate, according to which one turns out to have the more dominating personality. In this way they both explained their wives' ascendency over them. The wives, on the other hand, said that "hen-pecked husbands" had only themselves to blame for refusing to accept responsiblity, because those who accepted responsibility took authority with it. They complained that their husbands were exasperatingly evasive whenever they tried to involve them in discussion about the home, the children or the future, with the object of leading to joint decision, and that everything was left to them.

One can be excused from undertaking to adjudicate this debate, especially as the data are not conclusive. One can simply put on record that where assertive matriarchy was found, there was a combination of mother dominance with incompetence and evasion of responsibility on the part of the father. As far as I was able to judge, this defect of the fathers did appear to be a personality matter: in the one case a compulsive over-dependence, and in the other, a cyclic moodiness. But whether these defects were aggravated or even largely produced by the difficulty of reaching agreement with unyielding women, and whether the wives' intransigence developed to cope with their partners' waywardness, are open questions.

It remains to deal with the form of control which I have designated partnership, as well as two cases of control by the mother which were not assertive, and so have not been dealt with under that heading. As these were developments within partnership they will be treated in the course of discussion of that form of control.

Partnership was legitimate, being based on consent and principle. I have said that legitimate patriarchy was believed to be a privilege attaching to the father's acceptance of responsibility for earning the income, and a responsibility attaching to his possession of some natural

advantages. Partnership differed from it because it regarded these things differently; but it differed from patriarchy only very slightly in the actual allocation of responsibilities. I have also said that those who practised partnership believed themselves to be departing from the traditional form of family government, but believed they were in keeping with the most popular present form. Most of them assumed it to have a greater vogue than this study suggests. One father, for instance, said categorically of the manner of family control described above as legitimate patriarchy: "Families just don't live like that these days."

The basic reason for adopting partnership was a strong feeling for equality. To most of these people the very notions of authority, superordination and subordination were repugnant. Secondly, there was generally a feeling of being in the stream of the reform movement which gives recognition to the equality of women with men, and seeks to liberate women from subordination to men. Within the family, this took the form of a reaction to those abuses which are possible to patriarchy, and there was a tendency always to think of patriarchy after the assertive stereotype. Assertive patriarchy and partnership appeared to most of those who chose partnership to be the only alternatives; there was little conception of what male authority based on consent and

principle could mean. Thirdly, biological or psychological knowledge, or some personal experience, disposed these people to question the supposed natural differences between the sexes, which make part of the rationale of legitimate patriarchy. If they did not question the general truth of these differences, they at least questioned their truth for all cases, and they were more willing than others to admit individual variability. They believed that not all individuals find the socially approved sex types equally congenial.

What remained, as the basis for the distribution of control between husband and wife, when the above three influences had worn upon the patriarchal type, was <u>actual competence</u>. Each partner, it was believed, should assume the right of direction in any matter in which he or she had the greater competence. It was believed that if an equalitarian arrangement were followed in principle, with plenty of open discussion about <u>everything</u>, agreement would either be reached, or the person less competent to judge would appreciate the greater competence of the other and defer to it.

In practice the conscious attempt to apply partnership in family control produced some different results. In six families (two tradesmen's and four professionals'), which is about one half of the cases, the arrangement had achieved a stability with which both partners were thoroughly satisfied. Two factors distinguished the relationship between the parents

in these families. First, all of them were very conscious of like-mindedness with their spouses, and were confident that in most matters the independent decisions of their partners would be entirely acceptable to them. From what one was able to reconstruct of the personal development of these spouses, this harmony of thought seems to have been present from before marriage itself. In particular, not merely did they show a broad religious and political affinity, but all of them had very clearly elaborated political views and precise religious or anti-religious views, in which they were in agreement with one another, and on the basis of which they had largely been attracted. Presumably, this pre-existing agreement has played some part in the achievement of their present consensus. Secondly, these spouses had a very marked sense of dependence on one another. Each was conscious that a demarcated area of prerogative had been assigned to him or her, and that other matters could be left to the other partner. "That's left to me," or "that's something I leave to my wife (or husband) of course", were statements of a kind very often made. But apart from the fact that some of the fathers were amongst those who undertook a greater share of internal household activities, and the fact that a couple of them took a slightly larger part than other fathers in issuing directives to the children,

the areas which fell to the partners were scarcely different at all from those given to them under legitimate patriarchy. The mother's role, as there, was to supervise domestic organization and the children; the father's to earn the income, determine the budget and be consulted about major changes relating to the household and children. The belief that, on the occasion of a major disagreement, final decision did not revert automatically to the father, but to the person most competent to decide, came to mean no more in practice than each partner being thought most competent in his or her area of prerogative. And, as all but one of the fathers retained either leadership or exclusive right in determining the budget, they still preserved a final mandate. All of this means that the only important _real_ difference between stable partnership and legitimate patriarchy was the dismissal from the former of _the idea of authority_, and the insistence that the difference of roles could give neither partner prior nominal status. In addition to this, in minor disagreements, arising from differences of taste or personal preference, it was observed that these parents made a greater conscious attempt than some others to achieve a balance, by allowing each person to have his or her own way as often as the other.

In none of the remaining nine families which sought to implement partnership did the parents exhibit the combination of precise consensus and mutual dependence which was found in the families just described, and only two of them showed a comparable stability. Five variations were found.

In the two stable families (one of which was from each occupational group), the equalitarian principle of right by competence had led to *de facto* control by the mothers, due simply to the fact that the mothers had such a combination of qualities (personal stability, intelligence and capacity for organization) that they were able to assume much more responsibility than their husbands. In the process of assuming responsibility they assumed authority, and their right to it was not questioned. These mothers took many of the decisions taken by the father in legitimate patriarchy. Thus we find a form of matriarchy developing within legitimate partnership, which is different from both matriarchy by assertion and matriarchy by principle, which might be described as permitted matriarchy.

In one of the families characterized by unstable partnership (a professional's family) there was continuous bickering and quarrelling between the parents, and any disagreement, however trivial, precipitated a crisis. Both partners

were over-sensitive of a threat to their interests and dignity whenever a disagreement appeared to be developing. They were then more concerned to stake their claims and save their faces than to reach agreement. Each questioned whether the other was assuming a due proportion of responsibility, and whether the advantage was not falling too often to the other partner. Each at the same time felt that he or she had done more than a fair share, even helping in the province proper to the other partner, but without receiving appreciation for it. Each felt that he or she had put up with a lot more than the other.

In another family (also a professional's family), the competition was more soberly calculated, and was not without magnanimity in allowing the other partner concessions, such as the right of one to spend occasional week-ends away from home with the children, or the right of the other to engage in much voluntary work. But the dominating idea was for each to be allowed as much of his or her own way as possible, by not outraging the other one's sense of justice.

Four further families (three professionals' and one tradesman's) which adopted partnership, were subject to strain, due to the fact that one parent or the other continually sought to dominate. They did this because they were more or less helplessly dominating, even though they approved

the practice of equal partnership in principle. Two of the parents frankly recognized their propensity to do this. One mother said, "They always have to keep an eye on me, I'm a bit domineering." In two of the cases, the children and father consistently resisted the mothers' domination. In another, whenever disagreement occurred, the mother consistently gave in to the over-riding father, "for the sake of preserving peace"; but she did so confident that her greater competence and self-control left her a certain command over her husband and children. In the final case, whenever disagreement occurred, the father withdrew, not considering it worth-while to pursue it. He judged that, in view of the fact that he had more external satisfaction to turn to in his work and in systematic study, he could afford to do with fewer satisfactions than his wife in the management of the family.

This last reaction of a father to domination was similar to the reaction which another father exhibited to disagreement with his wife. His family is the last of the families which, being committed to partnership, proved unstable. The disagreement between the mother and father was acute, particularly in regard to what were the correct ways to organize the household and to discipline the children; but it was unaccompanied by any desire for dominance. Here again, the

father withdrew, because he claimed that he could find more than enough satisfaction in his work, and could afford to leave the family to the mother. He retained the right to budget the income, however, and exercised it rather autocratically, in compensation for what he had forfeited. Both parents of this family were deeply discontented. They obsessively expressed the view that the thing indispensable for happy family life was that the parents should achieve agreement about what they desired from life.

I have said that this second group of families which practised partnership lacked the conscious consensus as well as the clearly marked areas of separate control for mother and father which were seen in the first group. Actually, the core of responsibilities which fell to the separate parents was not dissimilar from what fell to each in the first group, and, therefore, was not dissimilar either from the arrangement in patriarchy, although the division of functions was less definite and less established by habit. Departures were simply in the direction of mothers expecting a greater right of intervention in determining the budget and in deciding household and discipline policies, and fathers expecting a greater right of intervention in the day-to-day organization of the household and supervision of the children. Thus, not only did the lesser consensus of the parents in

this group of families make the reaching of agreements a greater problem than in the other families adopting partnership, the fact that there was a greater area in which both partners could intervene meant that there were more matters which depended upon agreement being reached, the parents not being prepared to delegate the determination of them to one individual. Thus the sheer task of reaching agreement became a problem of several-fold greater magnitude. Might it be that the various reactions to this situation (habitual quarrelling, permitted matriarchy, dominance and withdrawal) were defences against an intolerable burden of accommodation?

A conspicuous feature of the management and direction of the families studied was the exclusion from them of children and adolescents in most of the cases. Only in seven families[xx] (four tradesmen's and three professionals') were sons and daughters admitted to the parents' confidence concerning matters of policy, the parents giving the reasons for their decisions and inviting the expression of the children's wishes. And only in two[xx] (both professionals') were family conferences held and adolescents allowed to exert influence in deciding such family matters as the ordering of household routine, which members should take

holidays and for how long, how members should be disciplined, and how much money the family should save.[1]

4. External Liaison

I have already shown how their control roles required the father and mother to have supervision of the more public and personal matters respectively. They also had certain specific tasks to perform in the public and personal fields.

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[1] The types of husband-wife relationship which were identified in Melbourne in a study reported by Oeser and Hammond, editors (1954, pp.164 to 179, and 244 to 248) are of a different order from the control types which I have identified in this chapter, and so cannot be compared with them. It would be misleading, for instance, to take their terms, autocratic and syncratic as equivalents of patriarchy (whether legitimate or assertive) and partnership. Their method has not allowed them to have regard for the parts which principle, consent and delegation play in constituting control relationships. Consequently, they have not been able to give due acknowledgment to the fact that antecedent decisions determine the meaning of current decisions. For example, they describe as autonomic any occurrence in which only one partner (say the husband) both decides on an action and carries it out, and they have not inquired whether he does so because his wife has agreed that he shall take decisions of that kind on behalf of them both. This means that what they have classified as autonomic behaviour will make up a large part of all of the types which I have identified since it can indicate mutual dependence as much as independence. Secondly, these workers have not based their types on a consideration of specifically control activities, as I have sought to do, but on the ratio of the simple arithmetical sums of the different decision-action combinations in all areas of family activity (pp.136 and 137). It is hard to understand what diffuse items of objective reality such ratios represent, but it is not to be expected that they would yield the sort of control types which I have been dealing with.

Fathers were required to discharge financial, business and legal matters for the family. They paid bills, consulted landlords, bankers and solicitors, arranged for insurance policies, bought shares and so on. This was regarded as a norm in both occupational groups, although there was departure from it amongst as many as one half of the tradesmen's families. Where departure was made, however, and the mother took over these functions, there was a feeling that it was an irregularity arising from necessity, which was in need of excuse or explanation. The reasons given by those tradesmen whose wives performed these tasks were the realistic ones that their wives had more free time in business hours than they had themselves, and it was said of some of the wives that they were more capable managers or (of a couple) that they were better educated and therefore better qualified for that sort of thing. There was only one professional's family in which the fathers did not assume practically the sole responsibility for these tasks, and there they were shared by the parents. The higher incidence amongst them of the assumption of these tasks may also be partly explained by the fact that their own occupations give them more experience of the type of transaction needed than the tradesmen's do. Some specific tasks of a related kind which certain fathers in both groups undertook were to see that

family members were not charged extortionate prices for professional or trade services, and to see that their children received fair treatment and reward in their full-time or part-time employment.

On the other hand, it was the mother who had to keep up personal associations, whether with relatives or friends, and whether the relatives were on her own side of the family or the father's. As has been said, the rationale for this assignment to the mother of the care of personal relationships was related to the facts that the father was preoccupied in more public responsibilities, and that the mother was believed to have a natural gift of intuition which enabled her to be more insightful in dealings with people.

The mother's assumption of these responsibilities meant that she had to arrange for visits, either way, with relatives or friends, to make the necessary preparations, such as doing special cooking, and to do most of the entertaining. Mothers supervised some of their husbands' sociability activities as well as their own and joint activities, especially those of their husbands' engagements which affected the family's public standing. They kept an eye on what invitations were received for instance, saw that none were treated carelessly, and saw that they were duly reciprocated. It

also usually fell to the mothers to maintain most of the correspondence with relatives, friends and acquaintances. Some wives claimed that their husbands would be owned by neither friends nor relatives if it hadn't been for their own regular correspondence on their husbands' behalf.

Children and adolescents were encouraged by their parents, but by mothers particularly, to make friends of their own and, in most cases, to invite them home. Perhaps they would be allowed to invite them to a party. There were few parents who felt they could be careless of supervision over the friendships which their children formed, and a number had had to intervene at some stage to discourage a child from associating with an "undesirable" companion. They felt that inviting friends home was the best way of screening them, as well as being a way of consolidating the friendships.

The extent to which children and adolescents were expected to associate with adults who were guests of their parents was arrestingly different for the two occupational groups. Tradesmen's children were seldom expected to do much of this, unless inclination led them to. But professionals' children, except for those who were very young and would be restless, were usually expected to spend some time with the guests, to greet them and converse with them, and perhaps help to offer food and drinks to them.

5. Socialization of the Children

The families of the sample were much the same in the areas they allotted to each parent for the socialization of the children, but they varied in their methods for doing it. I will deal first, then, with the allocation of areas of activity; and afterwards with the precise definition of the parental roles.

As the mother was at home much more constantly than the father, whose work took him out of the family circle for the greater part of the active day except at week-ends, time and place dictated that the mother should play the leading part in the socialization of the children. I have said that the mother was mainly concerned with the personal care and supervision of the children. But her close contact with them for these reasons was almost continuously accompanied by a socializing purpose, as she trained them to care for themselves, and as she trained them in skills, manners and good behaviour. Thus it was predominantly the mothers in all families who gave the children their detailed directions and their moral instruction. In most families the fathers were content to leave these matters to the mothers except in situations when they were alone with the children and direction became inescapable. Six professionals and three tradesmen, however, voluntarily undertook a larger

share of the direction and moral instruction of the children during their time at home; and two further tradesmen actually rivalled their wives in this sphere, due to each of them holding a special theory about child-training. This closer association of the mother with the children in the process of their training probably accounts for the fact referred to earlier (Chapter VI, p. 184) that, where the parents' responsibility attitudes or values diverged, the children adopted those of the mother, except in some of the cases where the father had a greater share than was usual in their direction.

But, although fathers were largely exempt, because of absence, from issuing the routine directions, they were required when at home to support the mothers, to uphold their rulings if a child questioned or resisted them, and to share with the mothers the admonition and punishment of offenders. Most mothers liked to feel they had someone to whom they could appeal for an expression of stronger disapproval or the exertion of more severe punishment in the event of serious misdemeanours or repeated commissions of the same offence. In all of the families the fathers accepted the role of supporting the mother in the discipline of the children, and most of them accepted as well the part of the stronger and sterner arm of the family law, and

became the parent whose intervention the children feared most. This was so whether their intervention took the form of physical punishment, non-physical punishment or merely verbal reproof.

Parents of both sexes gave several reasons to justify this arrangement. One was that the mother needed some relief from the constancy of correction. Another was that the mother in question simply could not cope emotionally either with severe punishment or admonition; she tended to lose control or become hysterical and was more upset by the whole situation than the children themselves. A third reason was that it was desirable to balance the amount of frustration and unpleasantness which the children suffered at the hands of each parent. Otherwise, with the mother executing the routine punishments and corrections, the father would take an undeserved appearance of benevolence in the children's eyes and become more popular with them in comparison with the mother.

Now for the more variable features of the parental roles. Just as there were traditional and more experimental forms of family government, so there were traditional and experimental methods for the rearing of children. But even though such differences were apparent, <u>all</u> of the parents felt that they were in a new era so far as this question

was concerned. They were all self-conscious about their approach to their children, believing that children were under a new dispensation, and that the treatment now considered appropriate to them was very different even from that which they had experienced themselves one generation previously. It was according to which features of this new approach the families elected to adopt and which they left aside that differences between them had taken shape.

There were four main elements to be distinguished in the ideal type of the new approach to children. The first was the belief that one needed to equip oneself with knowledge in order to deal with children effectively. Merely to imitate others, or to repeat the methods of rearing one had experienced in childhood, as had been done in the traditional approach, would not suffice. There was a need to know something about the psychology of children, and their different stages of development, and to observe and respect their individual differences. The second element was a belief that parents should be companions to their children, and not the remote authorities they had been in earlier generations. They should associate intimately with the children and show as much equality with them as possible; specifically, they should let the children see that the things which they are doing both at home and away from home

are noticed, they should give the children help in achieving whatever goals they choose for themselves, they should be careful to demonstrate affection for them, and they should make occasion to amuse and entertain them. The third and fourth elements had to do with a different conception from the traditional one, of what one was aiming to produce as a socialized child. While it was thought that the traditional aim had been to produce an obedient child, the modern aim was to produce a self-regulating child. Children, it was believed, would be socialized, not by suppression of their inclinations, but by expression of them in social situations which, they would learn to realize, set the limits for them. Also, while it was thought the traditional aim had been to produce a child prepared for duty, the newer aim was to produce a child with every potentiality developed.

It was in the professionals' families much more than in the tradesmen's that parents were psychologically informed about children.[xx] There were only two amongst the forty professional parents who had not discussed, read or theorized about child development, and who had not observed their own children to discover their individual characteristics and needs. About one half of the parents of the tradesmen's families had done the same, but the remainder were fairly ignorant of the needs and natures of children. In most of

the cases where parents exhibited this psychological ignorance, they did so together with their spouses, but three fathers (one tradesman and two professionals) exhibited ignorance in association with very thorough knowledge on the part of their wives. These men had deliberately remained ignorant, believing that it was not "the man's concern" to seek instruction in these matters.

There were thirteen families (six tradesmen's and seven professionals') in which the parents had so consciously formulated and applied theories of child development that they themselves regarded their methods of training as experimental.[**] The fact that only two of these were families which adopted legitimate patriarchy suggests that conservative husband-wife relations may be associated with more conservative parent-child relations.[x] Except for two cases, in different ways these parents were seeking to avoid for their children certain deprivations or personality defects which they believed themselves to have been burdened with, sometimes as a result of mistaken training. The particular aspect of personality which they hoped to foster, or the deprivation they hoped to obviate, depended on the particular thing from which they were reacting. In nine families where one or both parents had suffered severe repressive discipline and what seemed to them arbitrary

restriction of thought or behaviour, the dominating idea was to give the children ample freedom of expression, and rights of self-determination and self-development. These parents gave their children few directives and little direct punishment. In two cases the theory of child training was very fully developed. In one of these it was believed that through discussion the children would learn that the family itself (and not the parents) was the source of authority, and that they would curb their inclinations out of respect for it. In another, it was thought that the child should suffer no resistance to his will except when he came up against someone else who desired something different; then it became a trial of strength, and it was desirable sometimes to deliberately give in to the child so that he would not feel impotent. This latter theory was applied by a father who was fervently attached to the belief that his method of rearing would eradicate guilt, and consequently "the neuroses from which 90 per cent of modern people suffer."

Parents in several of these families confessed to finding their theories inadequate, and were returning to traditional methods. A number of the children complained about the state into which the methods had brought either themselves or their siblings. One daughter of fourteen said, "I absolutely must be organized and no-one will organize me

here." A son of another family, aged eighteen, said, "Dad won't control us. I'd rather have a father who'd take more control. I'd like to see more organization in the running of the family itself; there's no organization here at all: we kids get too free a run. The set up I'd like is where you could more or less look up to your parents, and not see them degraded by the children. The father ought to be the dominant person in the household, and the children, and the mother too, ought to obey him."

In one of these families which emphasized great freedom of expression, and in two others whose experimentalism was reactionary, the parents had aimed to rear the children "by love", meaning by that the avoidance of direction and punishment, and dependence for direction and correction on example and the evidence of hurt suffered by the parents as a consequence of the children's misbehaviour. Both parents of two of these families and one parent of the third expressed disillusionment about the method, and confessed to returning to more conventional methods of punishment and the issue of direct instruction. All of the children expressed dissatisfaction, indicating a wish to have been moulded more firmly, or showing strain at having been subject to an excessive burden of moral responsibility.

The two cases in which experimental child training did not take a reactionary form were that of one family whose parents believed themselves to have been over-corrective with one child earlier and were seeking ways to redress this, and that of another family in which one physically defective child had strongly focussed the mother's attention on the general need to have regard for children's individuality.

The ideal of parents as the companions of the children had been adopted by all of the families. In three (two tradesmen's and one professional's), it had developed into over-familiarity, the children being constantly disrespectful and presumptuous towards their parents. In three tradesmen's families and four professionals' on the other hand, the parents sought to preserve respect for themselves by balancing intimacy with occasional distance. They did this mainly by placing certain of their decisions beyond appeal, in order to convey to the children that there was more in the scope of their understanding than the children could appreciate. In about one half the families of each occupational group the parents implemented companionship by striving to give the children equal rights with themselves, by considering their wishes and plans.[1] The other half of the families

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[1] This respect for what a child himself wanted stopped short of the child's being encouraged to take a total view of the family and assist, according to the capacity his age allowed, in making responsible decisions which would affect the whole family.

did not consider equal rights necessary, and, while maintaining companionship and showing the children consideration, they strongly impressed on the children their subordinate importance to the parents.

Taking notice of the children and their activities and demonstrating affection towards them were things which both parents of the greater number of families consciously strove for. But there was one tradesman's family and three professionals' where both parents excused themselves on the grounds that they were undemonstrative and unemotional "by nature", and so unable to fulfil that aspect of the role. In four other families (two from each occupational group) the father relinquished this function to the mother almost entirely; the professionals largely unwillingly and because of the demands of their professions on their time; and the tradesmen largely voluntarily, believing their role to be principally that of provider for the children, while it was for the mother to "be closer" to the children, and show them personal interest and love. The one matter excepted for these fathers was taking an interest in the children's schooling. For that was a matter in which all parents of the sample showed intense interest, particularly from the aspects of the child's academic or sporting progress, and his adjustment to class-mates and teachers. All parents offered

rewards for school achievement, and parents of both sexes interested themselves in choosing schools for the children and in seeing that the children kept up some sort of creditable performance there. Both parents encouraged children of both sexes to think about their future careers and communicated their own aspirations to them. A marked difference was found in the two occupational groups in the role played by the parents in storing the children's minds with general encyclopaedic information, as distinct from knowledge of personal and practical matters. It is the sort of difference which might be expected, however, in view of the different educational standing of the parents of the two groups. In nearly all of the professionals' families, informal education of this kind was something which both parents undertook continually. Amongst the tradesmen's families it was much more commonly regarded as the father's qualification to be able to answer questions, and mothers were regularly depended upon to do so in less than one half of the families. "That's something you had better ask your father," tradesmen's wives would say, almost reflexly.

The parents of one half of the families of each occupational group conceived it to be part of their parental role as a companion to give the children help in their own activities. Thus they assisted in building cubby-houses,

made equipment for games, helped with hobbies or assisted in sports, or put themselves at the children's service in other ways. The remainder did practically nothing of this kind, some because of extreme busyness, but most of them because they did not conceive such assistance to belong to the parental role.

It remains to consider the measures taken by parents to ensure that the products of their moulding would be self-regulating and developed children. All of the parents believed that children should develop freely and be allowed a certain amount of their own way and expression. They firmly rejected what they took to be the older view that children should be suppressed. But at the same time, with the exception of most of those whose child-training methods were distinctly experimental, the parents were cautious about extreme departures from traditional methods either of directing children or correction.

Some of the parents were extremely careful to see that the children were not hemmed in with restrictions, and that they had opportunity to make choices of their own. They were encouraged, for example, to decide for themselves when they would do certain things, what food they would prefer, what clothes they would wear, what form they would prefer their own recreation to take. Parents saw that the children

were amply supplied with opportunities to express themselves; in play, in art, and conversationally in discussion. And a number of them were careful not to be too insistent on exact or prompt compliance with orders, especially if the children were very young. In doing these things they were applying principles which might be described as non-direction, expression and permission. But, at the same time most of them strove to balance these with direction, control and authority. They told children plainly, firmly and repeatedly what they must do, and punished disobedience. They gave them to understand that there were limits to their freedom of expression, especially when in company. They plainly showed that they themselves were in authority, and were responsible for directing the family, and would curtail the activities of any individual if they considered it necessary for the general good.

Corrections were enforced by punishment, but there was no attempt to motivate good behaviour by rewards in any except three tradesmen's and one professional's family; and even there it was admitted guiltily as if regarded as wrong, and only resorted to where it was extremely difficult to secure obedience, such as getting a child to leave for school on time in the morning. Children were quite frequently rewarded for specific tasks, such as mowing a lawn

or cleaning windows, but not for behaving well. Most parents aimed to minimize punishment, and tried to suit it to the child's stage of development and individual temperament. Physical punishment was mainly for small children or for boys up to adolescence, and was used by parents of both sexes in both occupational groups. The deprivation of some pleasure, or severe scolding, were the commonest forms of punishment, and were used in both occupational categories for children of all ages. Exclusion from the family's company was employed in only a couple of families in each occupational group. The practice of making amends for the wrong done, such as repairing damage, was an idea which some of the professional parents tried to implement, but it required too much thought and time for any of them to do so consistently.

Finally, the assignment of responsibility to children as a factor in their development to maturity was conspicuously neglected as a principle of training, except in the case of a few of the larger families. But there was instead a strong belief that the children should develop their physical and mental capacities to the fullest extent. For this reason, parents excused children from work in the home, and encouraged them to study, achieve sporting prowess, and develop artistic skills. Although the families had

relinquished formal education to the schools, the parents dwelt continuously on the children's school achievement, so that for children and adolescents success in school (or college or university) became a dominating obligation, and it seemed to a number as well to be the only measure by which they would be ranked or be acceptable - even at home. The parents also encouraged the children to join clubs which were appropriate to their ages, in order to learn to mix with other children and have expressive activities. While both parents interested themselves in these aspects of their children's lives, it was the mothers almost exclusively who had to supervise the children's participation in school and their various groups, and see that they were regular, on time, had the requisite equipment, and so on.

6. Personal Space

Families expected that their members would follow their own inclinations in certain spheres, and guarded the opportunity for them to do so. There were a number of parts to this freedom. It included the members' right to enjoy sport, entertainment and sociability appropriate to their age and sex, and to pursue individual interests and support movements, as well as their right to simply relax, and, in some cases, to have privacy. It would be wrong to

suppose that these were activities in which family members necessarily asserted themselves against the family by divesting themselves of their family roles and responsibilities; for, although that sometimes happened, most commonly these activities were engaged in with the family's sanction and knowledge and were limited by its necessities, even though some of them brought a temporary release from the family's presence. We would gain a more correct picture if we realized that family members enjoyed their islands of personal space less by conquest than by the family's mandate. Such activities were written into the roles of father and mother, son and daughter, by the expectations of the group not less than the activities already described.

However, these were matters in which a family could scarcely be as uniform with others as it could be in matters concerning production and control, for example; simply because members elected to use in different ways the freedom granted to them. There was uniformity in the fact that much the same kinds of liberty were believed to be due to the bearers of a particular family role, but each family had to settle for itself what actual activities on the part of any member would be acceptable to it. There were some families where the freedom which an individual felt in need of exceeded what the family was willing to allow. Then

there was a struggle to settle the boundary of legitimate freedom. In a few cases the struggle was settled by deciding to tolerate a large degree of autonomy for members, to put up with it and make the best of it. In others the struggle was scarcely settled at all. It was only in these latter families, where the precise extension of anyone's free-space was in dispute, that members enjoyed a part of their free space by assertion against the family. Thus in some families there was independence by assertion, just as in some there was control by assertion. But these are developments which will be considered together in the course of the next chapter.

All parents had freedom to engage in sport if they chose, except that a small number claimed that commitments to the family made it too inconvenient to make the effort. Some did not wish to take part. Of those who did take part, much the greater proportion did so separately from their spouses. All parents were free to enjoy such entertainment as cinema, theatre, concerts, dancing, and so on, but they were expected to take the greater proportion of it in company with their spouses or children. Mothers were free to take a trip to town or to a friend's place. Fathers who did not themselves choose against it were free to spend some time drinking in hotel bars, usually before coming in to the evening meal, although their wives insisted on a norm

of moderation. Parents were free to take part, according to their wish, in such educational groups and parents' movements as were referred to in Chapter VII (pp 221 to 232), and, the parents of professionals' families particularly, in the progressive movements and beneficial organizations also referred to there, and in the alumni groups of their old schools; and in all of these they took part separately from one another much more often than they took part together. Parents were free to engage in political and religious activities if they chose, although there was one case in which a father's freedom to engage in political activities had been denied him because his wife was not in agreement with his politics.

Within the home parents were free to relax: glancing through the newspaper or a magazine, listening to the radio or records, playing cards, reading a book, gardening, working at a hobby - the wives sewing, perhaps, and the husbands at work in their workshops. Many wives made opportunity for relaxation in the course of their working day, so that they could be at the command of other members at the week-end. Fathers and some school children engaged in sport at week-ends, and fathers who did not do so looked for an extended period of relaxation. Fairly generally, it was expected that fathers would take their relaxation

in longer stretches than their wives. They were thought to be more in need of a "complete break" at week-ends especially.

Children and adolescents enjoyed freedom to take part in sporting clubs and neighbourhood games, and to seek entertainment, particularly in the cinema; but all within whatever limits parents prescribed. They were, for the most part, free to engage in religious activities, although some differences were found with respect to this. Most parents who were themselves religious expected their children to follow their own religious activities as a model and to adopt the denomination and religious style they themselves favoured. Those parents who were not religious were generally tolerant of any kind of religious interest which their children showed. They hoped it would not last and believed that freedom to ventilate the interest was the best way to exhaust it. Within the home children and adolescents could count on a great deal of free time for playing games and following hobbies.

7. Fixity of Roles

A certain difference was noticeable in the fact that some families held the outlines of their roles rigidly fixed and, indeed, sought to make differences conspicuous, while

others allowed roles elasticity and kept differences subdued. I refer, particularly, to the sexual differentiation, the roles given to males and females. What I discuss now as fixity of role differentiation is a different thing from definition or lack of definition in role demarcation. The roles can be quite clearly defined as belonging to husband or wife, for example, but if there is not very great fixity, one will take the other's role occasionally without self-consciousness, but nevertheless quite without confusion, still realizing that it is the other person's part one is now playing.

I have said that those who adopted partnership as the principle of family management were more disposed to recognize that individual variations made conventional roles less congenial to some people than others, and that this type of family management was more prevalent amongst professional families. This may be connected with the facts that in professional families sexual differences were not highlighted, that only in six did husband and wife think it a matter of honour to confine themselves to their own sphere,* and only in two of these did the husband feel it necessary to conspicuously exhibit masculinity,[xx] in a way shortly to be described.

In all other professional families, while the areas of responsibility for husband and wife might be distinctly drawn, the division was regarded as a conventional arrangement for economy and efficiency, and it was felt that one simply had to leave certain things to one's partner. There was not much feeling that the things left to the person of the other sex were improper to one's own sex, and that it was a shame to be found doing them. So husbands and wives had little compunction about trespassing on one another's roles, if disposition, interest or need led them to do so. There seemed to be little sex-role anxiety, little compulsion to assume an appearance which was not deeply rooted in inclination, simply for the sake of seeming a regular man or woman.

On the other hand among trades people there was a tendency to invest the sexual division of functions with a symbolic or diacritical aspect, beyond that of real usefulness; although it was husbands rather than wives who did this. Not merely did these men leave certain activities to their wives, but in two thirds of the cases they felt it necessary as well to conspicuously demonstrate masculinity.* This demonstration (and it was the same in the case of the two professionals referred to earlier) took the form of completely dissociating oneself from those matters allocated to the

mother, of affecting ignorance of them, lack of interest in them, inability to understand them, or even contempt for them. Thus these fathers affected incompetence, forgetfulness or ignorance about matters of domestic organization, contempt for detail and exactness, forced casualness, insensitiveness to personality, and awkwardness about religion, culture and manners, as marks of authentic masculinity.

On the other hand, there were six professionals' and three tradesmen's families in which the role adherence of husbands and wives was very elastic. These parents stressed the fact that they were not the type of people who felt that one kind of work was definitely the woman's work and one kind the man's; although their statements that they were willing to "take over" the other's jobs, or to "help" the other, convey the fact, for which there was additional evidence, that they observed a quite clear demarcation of the ownership of tasks. However, the fathers' own roles tended to include more than token domestic help and more than the customary small amount of child direction.

Amongst adolescents and children, concern to make sexual roles fixed by symbolic elaboration was more universal, and was about equally prevalent in both occupational groups. Nearly all parents also felt some concern to see that their sons and daughters developed traits appropriate to their sex,

although a few of the adolescents themselves found the type uncongenial and almost impossible to accept.

Smaller boys were "boys" largely in so far as they found restraint irksome and resisted it, and were boisterous, violent and even cruel, and unmethodical and roving. They strove for physical prowess and muscular control, and they repressed sensibility. With quite precocious vehemence some of them exceeded adult males in exhibiting many of the signs of symbolic masculinity catalogued above. This was especially so amongst the sons of tradesmen, presumably on account of imitation of the models supplied by their fathers.

Adolescent males strove for extroversion, clean-cut decisiveness and straight-forwardness and a hard repression of feeling. They were scornful of enthusiasm and demonstrativeness, some of them ridiculing these traits in girls and women; and the more generous in feeling having to adopt some inverted trick for the admission of sentiment, such as joking, teasing or flattery. They were deliberately unsympathetic to others and did not invite sympathy for themselves, having an easy adaptability to inconvenience. They took knocks lightly and appeared tough and independent. Given the chance they would be bossy in a sadistic style, especially over younger brothers. While profoundly uneasy about girls and unfamiliar with their mentality, they assumed a swagger of being successful with them.

Small girls were encouraged in modesty, and were supposed to be less boisterous or noisy than boys. Generally speaking, they were under closer supervision, and so they were more restricted in what they could do and where they could go. They were considered very feminine if they exhibited marked fondness for dress, ornamentation and self-display.

An expectation to be socially decorous fell upon adolescent girls much more heavily than on boys of like age. A large part of their femininity was believed to consist in their social competence. They needed to be able to entertain and behave graciously as guests, to bear themselves with poise and be consistently and continuously careful of manners, even the most occasional lapse in an unguarded moment being thought "most unladylike." They were expected to be dress-conscious, and to study physical and personal charm. While modest, and never forward, they were expected to be taking an interest in boys. Perhaps their most essential femininity was thought to lie in the preservation of their natural refinement and sensibility, by the avoidance of coarseness.

<u>Conclusion</u>

We have examined how the family itself imposes expectations on its members according to the position they occupy within it because of their generation, age and sex. It

assigns them performances which divide roughly into those having to do with production, control, external liaison, socialization and personal space. The subsidiary roles from these different areas of activity are brought together into the cardinal roles of father, mother, son and daughter, each person having diverse tasks to perform.

Some of these tasks the members discharge simply by co-operation amongst themselves, for some they separate to co-operate with other people. But the family makes <u>all</u> of the tasks relevant to itself, in such a way that they are part of the person's <u>family</u> role. It may not be immediately apparent how certain external roles are made relevant to the family, but they are so because family members impose the expectation that the person shall engage in them, and this is done either because they feel that the person owes it to the family <u>or because the family owes it to the person</u> to see that he does so. While it is usually clear that activities sanctioned in the first way are attached to the family, the connection which activities sanctioned in the second way have with the family is often not so plain; but they are just as much performed under the constraint of family expectations. Thus the father's external activity in his occupation is something which is due to the family from the father, and it is not hard to see the connection of this

with the family. The child's attendance at school, on the other hand, may appear to be something quite external to the family. But this detachment is illusory. The child is at school and, it may be, works hard there because his parents believe that an education is due to the child from the family, and because they send him and expect him to do well. He is at school because of the nature of parental and filial roles, and is fulfilling part of his filial role there. Similarly, sport and entertainment are undertaken by family members because it is believed to be due to them from the family. Other members may put themselves out to see that a mother has a day at golf, she pays her expenses from family funds, the children encourage her to keep up her practice and her husband questions her about her performance at the end of each day's play. Children are sent to the cinema because the parents wish to see them enjoy themselves, perhaps, and are willing to give them the price of admission.

In a similar way it could be shown how all the external engagements referred to in this chapter are made relevant to the family for one of the two reasons - whether the activity be the father's efforts to earn an income, to equip himself with a knowledge of politics, the economic situation and international affairs, to assimilate himself to some

class type, to strike some workable attitude of social responsibility, to engage in business, financial and legal transactions, or to make opportunities for sport and entertainment; or the mother's continual shopping excursions and going out to visit friends and relatives, entertaining adult guests or friends of the children, or recreation; or the children's and adolescents' school or university activities, their clubs and neighbourhood gangs, their personal friendships, and their leisure pursuits. These activities belong to the family by a very forcible restraint; not simply because they are engaged in by individuals who are at the same time members of the family, nor because they are known about by all members of the family, but because they are believed to be due either to the family or its members, and are consequently carried out within the leash-hold of the family's expectations.

The fact that all the internal activities of family members are made relevant to the family for the same reasons is equally important, but because it is more self-evident it does not need labouring. And, as I have shown, various activities from both internal and external spheres are selected for each person and bound together into the cardinal role of father, mother, son or daughter. I choose to call these roles cardinal not to indicate that they are the most

attractive or absorbing to the individual who bears them, but because they are <u>hinges</u> which cause the other roles which the individual carries to turn upon them, by making his subsidiary roles relevant or even necessary to themselves - while the reverse connection does not apply. Thus there is a sense in which a father is an engineer, a golfer, a disciplinarian, a dahlia expert and a church deacon on account of being a father; but there is no sense in which he is a father on account of being any of those things. It is an individual's own perception of his cardinal role which I will now call his whole identity. For I am presuming that it is a cardinal role which, because it organizes all an individual's separate parts into one, gives him some sense of unity, to which he attaches the first personal pronouns.[1]

Of all the individuals in the sample studied, except perhaps one parent and a small proportion of adolescents, one would feel confident in saying that their family roles were their cardinal roles, and that they regarded themselves as mothers, fathers, sons or daughters fundamentally. It was their part in the family which gave order and unity to their

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[1] It will be apparent that by cardinal role I mean something more complex than that fusion of roles in which the bearing of one role becomes the qualification for bearing another, e.g. when only a bachelor may be a priest.

whole lives; and there was no part which they played in any other form of social organization which came anywhere near the family role in including other roles within itself. This suggests that the family may play a unique part in securing personality organization. It is widely recognized that individuals who are deprived of family life (orphans, rejected children, unmarried men and women, widows and divorcees, for example) have special problems of adjustment. It would be interesting to inquire in what social contexts they seek for cardinal roles and what success they achieve in finding them; and whether, in fact, cardinal roles do exist anywhere outside of the family. Also, it would be interesting to explore further the cases of those adolescents who cannot accept their family roles and so cannot make them their cardinal roles. These adolescents will tend to have more than one centre of organization (one in a peer group, say, as well as one established earlier in the family) and so be divided in themselves.

Precisely because the family role is a cardinal role, the ushering of children through adolescence into parenthood is difficult. They need to be led within their families of origin to the point where they can commence to be independent husbands and wives, and subsequently fathers and mothers. Even after that they need to retain some footing in the

families from which they have sprung, as the data on kinship relationships show. This means that their family roles must constantly change by small increments in the direction of decreasing dependence and subordination and increasing responsibility and authority. If an individual's cardinal role is to have continuity, and if it is to be undivided, what seems to be necessary is that it should be constantly modified until the individual is ready to slip from the bosom of one family into that of another, and still retain some place in the first. The small amount of responsibility and almost negligible amount of authority given to adolescents in most of the families studied suggests that this condition is not being met in most of the cases, and not only in those where the adolescents' family roles have become definitely unacceptable to them. But the discussion of this must be postponed.

When I say that the family role was the cardinal role of nearly all individuals in the study, I do not mean at all to convey that all members of all families did in fact comprehend every activity without exception in their family role, for that is not implied. I am writing rather of the structural possibility within the family role, which the comparison of a number of cases helps to make plain. Families varied greatly in the degree to which the entirety of their

members' activities was stored into family roles or eluded that regularization by being autonomous; and, indeed, this appeared to be the most striking sociological difference between them. That difference is the basis for the typology of families undertaken in the following chapter. I have already intimated that this evasion of regulation occurred in family control and personal space, and the typology makes use of that fact.

The obligatory character of expectations suggests that it is not a matter of indifference what subsidiary tasks are attached to each cardinal role which the family carries. One may be tempted to think, particularly in view of the variation between the role differentiation of similar groups, that division of functions is a matter of convention simply, and leave it at that. But it is not impertinent to inquire why certain tasks are attached to the bearers of others. I have said that the subjects of the research themselves believed in the appropriateness of some tasks, because they made use of presumed biological or psychological capacities of the individuals to whom they were given. Are any major principles discernible by an observer, by which tasks with common elements have been clustered in the same cardinal role?

The answer to such a question could be voluminous, but it is only appropriate to make a few points briefly. First of all, it was interesting to notice how uniform most families were in the main lines of demarcation of sex and age roles, and that differences were much less striking than likeness. The differences noted were mainly of a kind in which certain activities, customarily undertaken, were undertaken to a less or greater degree than usual. Where there were more extreme divergences, as in the assertive relationships between husband and wife, the accompanying dissatisfaction was partly expressed in the fact that at least one partner felt that the "proper" arrangement was not being observed, the conception of what was proper being based on an idea of what was customary.

This likeness is interesting because it exists in conjunction with differences, already demonstrated, in social class, responsibility attitudes, values, and outward or inward orientation, as well as differences even in which principle of family control was consciously followed. This suggests that there is something fairly standard about family roles for the society, which is independent of the influence of those other matters in which families are permitted to vary, perhaps radically, from one another. If that is so it may be because there is a value for adjustment

in conforming to the conventional pattern, which families who believed themselves to be deviating from type needed more than they knew. It may also be because the roles _have_ certain principles of consistency which make it economical to adopt them _in toto_ if one adopts them in part, due to the presence of common elements in the different tasks. For instance, given the fact that the father's ability to pursue constant work is greater than the mother's, on account of the mother's handicap in pregnancy and lactation, the family will be disposed to depend on him to earn the income. It has tended to add to this any tasks which depend on experience in associating more widely outside of the home, except those connected with maintaining the quality of personal relations, in which the mother is more adept. The mother, having to bear and care for infants, and not going out to work, will be assigned the tasks of continuing to care for the growing children, and supervise and train them. There has been a tendency to add to this all domestic tasks, except the heavier ones demanding a man's muscular exertion; and to add, as well, tasks requiring an understanding of personalities. One scarcely needs to inquire into the scientific truth of the grounds for role differentiation which the subjects advance (although those are complex matters which should be inquired into) in order to discern a degree of _rationality_

in the parental roles, in the sense that tasks requiring the same capacities, experience, mobility, knowledge and skills are clustered in the same cardinal role. Given the human fact of the protracted dependence of children, and the modern fact of urban, industrial society in which occupations are highly specialized and generally carried out away from the home, the arrangement seems highly adaptive.

It remains to say a word about the way in which family roles are related to one another. One of the things which forces itself on an observer of families, is that a family faces a unique problem because it maintains great intimacy in the presence of great differences - the difference of age between the generations and of sex between the parents and siblings, and all the differences of reaction, temperament, experience, categories of thought, knowledge and need which those differences imply. <u>If these differences are to be respected and not suppressed for the sake of a spurious ease of operation</u>, some provision has to be made to <u>bridge</u> distance; since it cannot be abolished, however much convergence may be achieved in matters in which it is possible for individuals of different sex or age to agree. It would seem from this study that <u>self-assumed authority</u> is the only means by which to regulate relations between older, experienced and responsible parents and children who have not yet learned

responsibility and are yet unable to appreciate the need for it. This is always true, even though the need for authority lessens with the maturity of the child. It is significant that in all except a few families, the parents felt a need to impress upon the children that it was they who were in control, however companionable they may have been in the process; and that most of those who practised methods of discipline which lacked the element of authority confessed them ineffective. Similarly it would appear that delegated authority is needed to bridge the distance between the sexes. A delegation of final authority to one parent was found in a number of families, and in all except the most unstable families there was at least a delegation of spheres of authority to each parent. Thus we find that relationships are steeped in authority in the group which is the most intimate in human experience, because of unremovable distance.

In view of this fact it is particularly important that we appreciate the distinction between authority and autocracy, and realize that when observers distinguish, for example, between autocratic and democratic family "atmospheres", as Lewin (1948, pp.84 to 102) has done, democratic should not be construed as implying an absence of authority. It refers rather to the fact of differences and the need for measures to see that differences receive consideration, such as by

mutual consultation. The present data suggest that authority itself arises out of the same necessity, so that a firm authority structure may itself be indispensable to a democratic family.

Chapter IX

FAMILY TYPES

1. Three Types of Family

In the previous chapter I stated that families differed from one another in the extent to which the whole of their members' activities was made relevant to the family by being written into their cardinal roles, or evaded regulation by being autonomous. I also pointed out how actions concerned with family control and personal space varied in these ways. The behaviour of the parents in these domains showed three typical developments. To each of these developments other factors appeared to be closely connected, so that three family master-types could be identified, by using for an index the combination of a certain type of control and a certain use of personal space. These types can be described as ideal models, to which, of course, any real family only approximated. All families of the sample could be classified by the type to which they approximated most nearly, but any actual family might contain some factors which were more characteristic of other types. The boldness with which the types can be drawn will be partly due to the fact that they are fictional. But when factors are depicted

as hanging together it is only because they have been found to do so. Appendix D summarizes the simple types by which the families have been classified so far. Appendix E gives the classification of the families as master-types, and shows the clustering of factors on which the ideal models have been built.

The indices of the family types will be given first, in order that their likeness and difference may be sharply drawn. After this a fuller, illustrative account will be attempted, and in the course of it the factors which cluster together to constitute each type will be itemized. Some of these factors are concerned with family roles or external relations which have been discussed earlier. Some are concerned with the personal relations between the family members, discussion of which is introduced now for the first time.

The first type of family can be called the <u>adaptation</u> type, because in it the relationship between husband and wife is characterized by a marked difference in the satisfactions which they seek, and by measures which they take to adapt to one another in the face of the difference, which is frankly admitted. Principally, the difference is dealt with by granting a certain charter of independence to each. The parents scarcely think in terms of <u>legitimate</u> personal

space at all, but claim instead a large area of personal independence, for which they do not wish to be particularly responsible to the family; and this is acquiesced to by one's partner on the more or less contractual basis of receiving equal consideration. In this situation, with the parents separately turning away from the family, principle in family control is neglected. Control activities shrink to expedient intervention for the sake of keeping things going. It becomes a matter of indifference which partner exercises the control, and it is usually left to that one whose personality makes him most given to organizing. As family control only affects activities which are pretty well residual to the parents' more satisfying activities outside, it is seldom frustrating, even though it might be assertive due to one partner's feeling he[1] has to do something in the absence of any settled arrangement. Thus independence replacing legitimate personal space, combined with control in the form of expedient intervention (perhaps with an assertive character) provides a ready index for recognizing the adaptation type of family.

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[1] Where I refer to either one of the two partners of a marriage, the sex being indifferent, I will simply use the pronoun "he" for the sake of avoiding clumsiness, although it should be understood that "he (or she)" is the sense.

The second type of family makes a polar opposite to this. It can be called the identification type, because in it husband and wife seek the same satisfactions and believe that they will be realized through the quality of the family's life and not through independent activity, so their separate interests are identified with the family. Both of them willingly accept the limits of sanctioned personal space, for all of which they acknowledge full responsibility to the family, and in some cases all but the smallest amount of it is voluntarily surrendered. Parents in this type of family are not without differences, but they are not differences in the satisfactions sought, as is the case in the adaptation type. They are irremovable differences, such as those due to sex, experience, temperament, judgment and knowledge. These differences are acknowledged willingly, but they are dealt with by a delegation of areas of authority and not by independence from the family. Each partner is given the scope his individuality demands by being placed in final charge of an area of the family's life and not by being independent of it. This means that control is legitimate and strongly marked by delegated authority. The index of the identification type of family, then, is the combination of a spontaneous acceptance of the limits of legitimate personal space (which is, perhaps, even voluntarily

curtailed) and legitimate control marked by delegated authority.

Intermediate between these two is a third type which is probably best designated false identification because of the way in which any admission of differences into the parents' relationship is suppressed for the sake of a spurious ease in regulating the family's corporate life. The partners tie their personal interests to the family, but either each one's interests are confused and conflicting or each lacks confidence that the other partner is aiming for the same kind of satisfaction. The result is a form of control which is suppressive, and, very probably, assertive. This entails much personal frustration and the partners are deeply dissatisfied, because, having tied their personal interests to family life, they sustain a high expectation of satisfaction from it, only to be constantly disappointed. In consequence, they both experience a pressure to move out of the family circle and so press for the legitimization of a greater amount of personal space. They do not ask for independence, as do the partners in the adaptation type, because of their deep sense of involvement in the family. At the same time, in order to be sure that the family does not suffer through lack of support from the other partner, each keeps a jealous watch to see that the other's personal space is restricted.

The upshot is that the boundaries of the partners' legitimate personal space are perpetually in dispute. The index of this type of family is a combination of repressive control and constant pressure towards more personal space.

It will be seen that these types reduce basically to three ways of dealing with difference between the partners. The adaptation type grants an area of independence outside the family, the identification type grants an area of authority within the family so that external independence is unnecessary, and the false identification type attempts to prevent differences from appearing, and both independence and authority are repugnant to it. However, the nature of the differences which the three stratagems attempt to deal with are not altogether the same. The difference which the adaptation type tries to cope with is a basic difference of aim. The identification type, on the other hand, is only found where a basic community of aim is presupposed, and the differences it attempts to deal with are those irremovable differences of sex, experience, temperament, taste, judgment, and so on. The false identification type tends to find both kinds of difference embarrassing and takes repressive measures against both, without discriminating much between them.

In assigning the families of the sample to the type which they approached most closely, the distribution of types was similar in the two occupational groups. Table IXa gives the incidence of the three types in the two groups.[1]

Family Type	Number of tradesmen's families	Number of professionals' families	Total number of families
Adaptation type	2	2	4
False Identification type	5	6	11
Identification type	11	12	23
Total number of families	18	20	38

Table IXa

[1] In the introduction (Chapter II, p. 41) I stated that no distribution of factors would be made the subject of analysis if there was any reason for supposing it to be a function of the sampling. There is some reason to suppose that the distribution of these types could reflect a differential degree of interest in a research project on the family. Members of identification type families would, perhaps, be more interested in family research than those of false identification type, and these in turn might be more interested than those of adaptation type families. It is unlikely that the distribution reflects this differential interest simply, but it has possibly been affected by it in part. For these reasons no use is made of the sample incidence of the types. I simply compare their character.

2. <u>The Adaptation Type of Family</u>

In this type of family the parents' values were patently divergent. They may have shared some values, but the allocation of their time and the interests with which they were preoccupied showed that the things they valued most led them apart. They may even have followed the same <u>type</u> of value, for instance partisanship or egoistic values, but these values are by their nature divisive unless those holding them are committed to precisely the same concrete end. In these families membership was either not valued at all, or only weakly valued in competition with other values, except that in one case it was pursued in a very rigidly restricted area which was exclusive of the family itself.

In one of the four families approximating to this type the mother valued membership, but only expected to realize it in her own family of origin. Her life still revolved around the home of her own parents, with whom she spent a great deal of time and to whom she gave a great deal of service. Her husband, on the other hand, minimized his contact with these in-laws, and sought his main satisfaction in egoistic leisure activities. He spent most of his non-working time following sport, reading, drinking in various hotels, studying form guides and backing race-horses. This

man had married in his late thirties and had been unwilling to modify his former manner of life. He expected to continue unchanged and permitted his wife to do the same. In another of these families both parents were strongly committed to partisanship values: the father to the Labour Movement, the mother to feminism, coupled with a utopian interest in socialism. The father's non-working time was engaged in activity in support of the Labour Movement, in reading political literature or in drinking in hotels. The mother enjoyed a similar reprieve from too great a family commitment, and passed time in diverting part-time occupations, in women's movements, and in reading political and feminist books and fiction. In a third family the mother was occupied with activities for the Labour Movement, in the study of Fabian socialism, feminism, and political and economic problems, and in promoting educational movements. She was so steeped in one of these movements as to describe it as her "way of life". These activities took her away from home a great deal during the day and evening, and for a number of week-ends and longer periods throughout the year. Her husband was in possession of a comparable independence, spending his time in photographic and scientific societies, in cultivating an appreciation of music, in fishing and boat-building. Finally, in the fourth family of this kind

the father's non-working time was intensively devoted to classical studies in language and literature, and to music. These studies were pursued within the home and sometimes within the circle of the assembled family, but the father's continual withdrawal to a world with which his wife and children were completely out of contact meant that his independence was no less real than that of the other fathers mentioned above. His wife, similarly, enjoyed a certain independence, though perhaps less willingly than that of the other mothers mentioned here, as she was considerably more absorbed in her children. She strove for a cultural distinction of her own in reading modern literature, in a theatre movement and in giving support to the kindergarten movement.

It will be evident that these families all belonged to the kind which has been described as positively out-going, for it was the attraction of the parents' external, independent activities which weakened the importance of the family to them. In their external activities members of this type of family tended to seek voluntary association rather than primary relations. As would be expected, what primary relationships were cultivated were cultivated apart from the family circle. None of these families evinced good-neighbourly relations. There was a propensity for members

of this type of family to adopt utopian or distrait responsibility attitudes.

Their external activities were regarded by the actors themselves, as well as by other members of their families, in a way quite peculiar to this family type. They were thought of as being independently one's own, an opportunity to slip out of the influence or supervision of the family and responsibility to it, and to act, to a large degree at least, without the knowledge or concern of the others. Because their expectation of satisfaction was mainly attached to independent activities such as these, and because ample opportunity was allowed for them, the parents were generally reasonably well contented with one another and the family. The satisfactions of children and home were regarded as more or less _added_ satisfactions which strongly independent individuals, having other satisfactions to draw upon, might contract together to supply, by contributing either an income or domestic service.

These parents were all conscientious in discharging their part of the contract, especially in those more public aspects which others would notice, and they were even disposed to drawing their relatives' and friends' attention to the fact. Wives would point out, for instance, that they always prepared the meals on time or that they had

done everything possible for the children's health and education, husbands that they had always brought in the money and that no member of the family had ever been in want or trouble. But the contract was fulfilled in the spirit of contract; family roles were clipped to a bare minimum, and there was no effort, such as was observed in some other families, to abound in service towards the other partner. Each was expected to do as much for himself as possible. If the contractual dependence was felt to be a tie, partners comforted themselves with the cold economic thought that they got something in return for what they gave. Of the functions that I have called fringe functions, these families freely surrendered recreation and religion (if they valued religion at all) to the external society, not caring to make any provision for these things amongst themselves. Family members rarely spent holidays together, for instance. As for production, the third fringe function, although there were only four cases within the sample of this type, a clear difference appeared between them in respect to it. In two of them productive activities were severely curtailed to the barest minimum, neither parent having time to spare from external engagements "to do anything about the place" at all. In the remaining two, quite a large amount was done directly by both parents towards

maintaining the house and keeping the family fed and clothed, as this material help for one another was understood to make a definite part of the contract.

Under these contractual conditions, taking decisions for the whole family became an irksome responsibility. In the two tradesmen's families of this type control was "left to chance", in the two professionals' families there was a faint-hearted assent to the partnership principle. But what happened in fact in all four families was that management took shape more under the influence of personality factors than under the influence of principle. In the tradesmen's families assertive patriarchy and assertive matriarchy had developed, the father and mother in the respective cases being the less accommodating partners, and quicker to sum up a situation and express themselves about it. The partnerships of the professionals' families were unstable. In one the mother was compulsively dominating and more or less took charge. The family tended to act on her directions where they seemed convenient organizing measures, but ignored them otherwise. In the other family the parents competed to see how much overall family responsibility could be foisted on the other one.

Control measures were weak in the element of principle in the false identification type of family, just as in the

adaptation type, but there was a difference. Unprincipled control in the adaptation type of family did not entail the personal frustration which it brought in its train in the other type. This is because it was not suppressive, although arbitrary. For control measures were usually taken with regard to a tacit agreement on maximum independence for each partner, and they were impersonal, directed against the situation rather than the person. Thus, for example, an assertive mother in an adaptation type of family would decide that no breakfast would be served on Sundays - and everyone could adjust themselves to the fact as they chose. An assertive father would decide that the children might be excused from punishment, but the mother was free to deal with them as she saw fit.

Relationships between parents and children in these families took on something of the same character of distant, calculating adaptation as obtained in the relationship between the parents. There was, for instance, a marked tendency towards segregation of the generations. The children and adolescents did not have a great deal of association with their parents, and the parents did not believe that the children should be allowed to make too great a claim upon them. The children spent much time in their own part of the house, perhaps having their meals

separately from the parents and perhaps having their own radio sets. They were encouraged to live a life of their own, and both parents and children in these families sometimes confessed to being unable to enter into the mind of the other generation. It was in families of this type (as well as in some of the false identification type) that parents were prone to excuse themselves from showing affection towards their children, on the grounds that they were not emotional by nature.

On the other hand, in spite of this ungenerous withholding of attention or affection from the children, these parents were prone to claim affection _from_ them and strove to outmanoeuvre one another to win it. This could take the form of concentrating indulgence on one child while neglecting another, indulgence not meaning lavish affection, but excusing a child from punishment, being lax about correction or the insistence on standards which would be to the child's ultimate benefit, or favouring the child unduly with gifts and privileges. The consequence in the children's attitude to their parents was a shrewd watchfulness, as they waited to see which way the wind would blow; whether the parent's approach would be determined by affection-seeking or the avoidance of bother. They would respond with compliance or disobedience, according to which they thought would best

further their own interests and put the parent more in their power. The consequence in the children's relations to one another was jealousy, quarrelsomeness, lack of consideration and selfishness, and rivalry for achievement, approval and attention.

It was in these families, as well as in certain families of the false identification type, that the parents' methods of child-rearing were radically experimental. In these families also, where there were adolescents, they were in revolt against their parents' values, specifically opposing some non-membership value of the parents by a membership value of their own, as was pointed out earlier (Chapter VI, p. 186). The adolescents of these families were also inclined to make their peer groups of greater importance to them than the family.

3. The Identification Type of Family

In this type of family the parents were unanimous in their values, seeking much the same satisfactions from life, and expecting to find them very largely through the medium of the family itself. Membership values were highly prized in all of them; and all the families with pure membership value were of this type. Face values, except in two of the less typical cases, were not only absent but strongly renounced.

The parents had the feeling that their own interests could be so surrendered to the family that if the family itself flourished their own greatest good would be secured. The good life appeared to them to crystallize in family life, in the sense that all that was worth living for could be practised concretely there. They regarded the responsibility of the parental roles as the indispensable requirement for completing character and personality. Besides this, the constant companionship of one another and the children, the charm and grace of childhood and the awakening of adolescence were intrinsically satisfying. These parents looked for a stable, orderly, sociable existence which their own industry and thrift would insure, with a gradually improving standard of living to be secured through the father's improvement in his trade or profession. They desired some leisure, to be spent mainly in moderate and simple pleasures which could be shared by the family, and this, perhaps, made it desirable to own a car, so that the family could move around as a unit; and they desired comfort and grace in the home.

A premium was placed on certain personal qualities which were believed to be necessary for preserving this kind of family atmosphere. "Naturalness" was placed very high, and all family members were expected to be unpretentious

and open. If anyone got "uppish" he was made a joke of till he desisted, and if it looked like developing into a habit he could be pilloried mercilessly. No one was allowed to think that private endeavour and personal achievement could take prior place to the quality of personal relations, and that was what anyone who took himself too seriously was believed to be in danger of doing. Members were made to see that they should be genuinely considerate and unselfish, which meant being able to drop one's task at any time to help another person in his. One had to learn to be fair, kindly, sympathetic, tactful, courteous and interested in everyone else. A number of the parents in families of this type had consciously formulated the principle that life was only satisfying if lived for someone else, and said that in the family one always had one's partner and children to live for. Most of the parents were convinced that membership values such as these were only to be realized by struggling against egoistic alternatives, and they strongly disciplined themselves and the children and challenged one another with that fact in mind.

For the greater number of families classified with this type, these personal qualities were required not only for preserving a high standard of family life but for facilitating the realization of membership in wider contexts still.

Thus, through the external activities of its members, the family could be included in something larger than itself, just as its members were included in the family. Members of the most typical of these families exhibited a strong sense of public responsibility and decency, and a desire to do good to others where they could. Knowledge, culture and religion were gravely respected, and usually cultivated. Of the twenty-three families approximating to this type the parents of one were opposed to religion. Those of fifteen were actively involved in church life, and the parents of the remaining seven appreciated the value of religion for personal and social life, and sent their children to church or Sunday school. Experiences of music, literature and drama, and a knowledge of science and current affairs were shared by the members of a considerable proportion of these families. Again, the membership value of these things was stressed. They were to be regarded as experiences which assisted to locate one realistically in the world, in history and in society. In the face of the things they communicated one was expected to be humble and companionable, and not puffed up with the pride of having scored fine acquisitions. Parents were constantly trying to adjust their children's attitudes to these things, especially when sometimes their school experiences had caused them to value such things

egoistically. (Although, where this had occurred, the children and the schools were hardly alone to blame, for the parents themselves had encouraged the children to regard their school activities from the aspect of success. By doing this while placing a membership value on the same things at home, they were imposing ambivalent expectations on the children.)

I hope it will begin to be apparent what I mean when I say that in this type of family the parents identified their personal interests with those of the family. It is not mystical, but means simply that the satisfactions they desired seemed to be largely derivable from the quality of family life itself, so that was a primary end to which they committed themselves; and any independently derivable satisfactions, such as those to be found in one's occupation or friendships, for example, were incidental to the family's welfare and had in some way to be made relevant to it.

This should not be taken to mean, however, that the members of these families did not enjoy personal space. It does mean that whatever personal space they did enjoy was entirely legitimate, having the sanction of the family behind it and the interest of the family in it. Some members of these families enjoyed a large amount of personal space indeed, giving service, for example, in many voluntary

associations, and keeping up a number of friendships. On the other hand, the parents of some of the families had voluntarily surrendered practically all of their personal space to "doing things for the family", and experienced no sense of constriction through having done so. They would say, "Well, I don't suppose I do ever have a minute to myself, but I never notice it. I certainly don't mind, because I've made the family my life." This means that a family of this type could show one of two quite distinct external orientations. It was either positively out-going under the constraining influence of external goals (as opposed to the negative out-going due to internal pressures, which was found in families of the false identification type), or it was withdrawing, its members moving out of the family very little. It was only in the identification type of family that this withdrawal occurred.

It will be remembered that it was difficult to find any factor in the families' external relations which appeared to have a constant connection with family withdrawal. (Chapter VIII, p. 242). The fact that it was only found in the identification type of family, where personal satisfaction with the family is high, suggests that it may have resulted from a readiness to relinquish external relations if they proved difficult for any reason at all, on account

of the certainty of finding satisfaction at home. There is some evidence that this had occurred. A mother of one of the families, for instance, stated that she had given up any active participation in the women's groups at the church, because there was always squabbling and competition for dominance within them. Fathers said that it had been difficult to "make headway" in lodges, occupational associations and parents' associations, so that their membership in these things had become nominal. Others claimed that what you did for other people was too often not appreciated, much as you liked doing it for them. Some said that being involved in external activities had been too demanding on their time or too distracting to allow them to take the interest in their families which they had wished. Others found their external activities becoming distasteful when they assumed a partisan character. For example, it was said, "We don't mind going up to the church, but when they start saying they're better than the others, that's the end of it all, as far as we're concerned." The intensified association of family members with one another on account of their turning inwards to the family itself had produced an exceptionally close family atmosphere. Members were greatly interested in one another's personalities and reactions, quickly noticed and commented on changes in anyone's outlook

or attitudes, and parents were highly occupied with the children's development. They were absorbed together in the building, decorating, renovating or furnishing of the home, in fitting it up with appliances, in the garden or car, and seized every opportunity to take recreation together. One father's comment expounds this style of life tersely, although its momentary ruefulness does not do justice to his more habitual complacency. "Some people would say we are too close. If one of us is miserable we are all miserable. No one can be happy about his own task for worrying about what the other one is doing."

If the impression which I have gained of these families is correct, they appear to be "withdrawing" families in an almost exact sense of the word, in that they have drawn back from an outward orientation which they were once developing; and their members could, perhaps, be described as _too_ close. The sense of public responsibility, which I have said, was characteristic of the most typical families of this kind, was weakening in them, but that it had once been alive was evident in persisting sentiments and interests which were no longer matched in activities. Thus, for instance, it was in these families that the parents, while appreciating the value of religion, and sending the children to church or Sunday school, were not themselves church

attenders. Membership inclusion in the family being assured to them, and membership involvement outside of it being difficult to realize, they were content to make the family itself all-sufficient. While I have classed together under the identification type all families whose parents surrendered their personal interests to the family, I have not meant to imply that in placing the family before themselves they necessarily placed the family first of all. For the type includes two major sub-types: those where the family was made self-sufficient, and those where an effort was made to include the family in wider frames of reference still. The membership valued by withdrawing families was in process of turning into partisanship[1] in a manner analogous to the transformation by which the membership of patriotism turns into the partisanship of jingoistic nationalism, by neglecting wider obligations. Besides, in only one of the seven families of this kind was there any effort to follow membership values singly. In all but that one, membership was in competition with comfort and leisure and the accumulation of material securities. The gracious way of life and improving standard of living which were incidental to good

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[1] Their values were still patently enough membership, however, to classify them as membership values in Chapter VI, for they lacked the oppositional sentiment that goes with partisanship.

personal relations in other families of the type, had become ends in themselves in these. The result was an extreme family self-absorption which resulted in a restricted, rather parochial outlook, of which family members were usually themselves aware, and sometimes a bit ashamed. Some said, "We only live for ourselves, really; I suppose some people would say we were selfish." Others said, "We get quite out of touch with what's going on in the world in this house: but does it matter when we knock so much fun out of life amongst ourselves?" When I say it was perhaps true that the members of these families were _too_ close, I refer to their exaggerated preoccupation with one another rather than to any suppressive element in their relationships, such as will shortly be described in the false-identification type of family.

The withdrawing family represented the identification type of family matured, so to speak, to the point of over-ripeness; and by this stultification it lost some of the features which were distinctive of the identification type in its external relations. But it served to show that this type of family, in the course of its development, has to face a dilemma. Having placed the family before themselves, the parents have further to decide whether anything comes before the family, and whether it is in turn to be included

in something greater, or is to be sufficient in itself. Those who chose the former alternative, by being positively out-going, included all save one of those families which followed pure membership values, as well as some others who valued membership highly, although in conjunction with other values.[1]

In their external activities members of families of the identification type engaged in voluntary association and primary relations with about equal incidence. They cultivated their friendships within the family circle, seeking to make their friends "friends of the family". Only a small proportion of these families evinced good neighbourly relations, and in this, considered as a group, they were scarcely dissimilar from the other types. Out-going families of this type were quite predominantly conservative or liberal in their responsibility attitudes, but three of the seven withdrawing families were utopian or distrait.

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[1] Homans (1951, pp.108 and 109) cites from Chester Barnard, "The Functions of the Executive", Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1938, p.40, to suggest that the internal system of a group may be elaborated in such a way as to jeopardize the efficiency of its external system in effecting a dynamic adaptation to its environment. The withdrawing family may be approaching such a condition. For instance, its loss of touch with affairs impairs its ability to prepare its children to deal with them.

Whether they had few or many external activities, members of these families regarded them very differently from the way members of the adaptation type regarded theirs. Instead of thinking of them as an opportunity for escape, these people thought of external activities as being arms of the family, something in which one represented the others, of which the others were well informed, and to which one knew they gave support. This applied to obligatory external activities undertaken as part of one's family role as well as to personal space. Parents of these families took great pride and interest in the school life of their children, for example, and the children, similarly, took pride in their father's occupation. In the same way, both parents and the children were informed and expansive about one another's friends and voluntary and sporting activities. In their separate roles they identified with one another vicariously.

The reason for this attitude to external activities being found in this type of family but not in the others appears to have been threefold. It lay partly in the nature of the ends which were being pursued outside of the family, partly in the unanimity with which those ends were supported, and partly in the tacit understanding that no such activities would be engaged in if they entailed any suggestion of neglect of the family's prior needs.

For the most part it was membership values which were being pursued outside, family members aiming to give service to the community by assuming public responsibility or furthering religion or culture, or aiming to develop friendships, or through sociability, to secure the family's standing in the community's good-will. Provided these activities were not detrimental to the achievement of similar values in the closer domain of the home (where charity was emphatically believed to begin) family members felt they could entirely support them, because they were cognate with the values they were accustomed to practising in the family, and because through such activities on the part of any member the family's membership inclusion was extended beyond itself. The only important ends other than membership which were followed outside of the family by parents of families of this type were certain partisanship values of political or religious denominational allegiance, in which the parents were in firm agreement. I have said (Chapter VIII, p. 280) that in all those families where control by stable partnership was found there was precise agreement between the parents in their political and religious beliefs, and all families of that group were included in this type.

In a family of the identification type, if any member's outside activities, such as his sport or evening class or

work or religion, were assuming an egoistic value, that member was charged with "making too much" of the thing, and he would be challenged to remember what it was for, and to demonstrate the worth of it by some improved quality in his family relationships.

Parents of these families were well contented with one another and the family, but for different reasons from those causing the parents of the adaptation type of family to be satisfied. Their expectation of satisfaction from the family itself was high; and, indeed, as I have stressed, it was largely in the family that their hopes of satisfaction reposed. They were satisfied because their expectations of the family were realized to a high degree.

In these families roles were clearly demarcated and long established by habit. Members, and parents particularly, were not in doubt about the type of thing the family depended on each of them for, and most of them took pleasure in measuring up to the expectation and even, for a surprise at times, exceeding it. Thus a mother would do some special cooking, a father go in the car to meet a child after an evening function, or a child give some additional help in the house. This clear demarcation of areas of responsibility led to a strong sense of organic dependence on one another. It was interesting that it was mainly in families of this

type that the father's role included more than token domestic help or more than the usual small amount of child direction. And it was only in families of this type that elasticity of role adherence occurred, the parents being willing to take over one another's tasks quite without compunction if it seemed indicated. It was predominantly in these families that the fringe functions were maintained to any degree. Recreation was a thing the members reserved as much as they could for themselves, striving to be together, if at all possible, for outings and holidays. Parents were enthusiastic over their productive activities, continuously "making things" for the home and family. In a small number of cases domestic religious practices were observed.

Family management was mainly a matter of giving each parent "a say", and avoiding undue intrusion on the area of authority which belonged to one's partner. All except one of the twenty-three families which approximated to this type were controlled by legitimate patriarchy or stable partnership, and I have already pointed out (Chapter VIII, p.280) that in both of these forms of control clearly marked areas of authority were delegated to the mother and father, each being given the prerogative not only to act separately but to take final decisions in a certain field. A marked feature of the relationship between these parents, and it contrasted

with what existed in the false identification type of family, was that the parents were not over-dependent on reaching detailed agreements, nor were they over-concerned about doing so. There was a certain robustness in the relationship which seemed to take it for granted that precise agreement in details could rarely be expected between persons of different sex and experience, and that, for a considerable part of life, it was not supremely important. Presumably because of their fundamental and very pervasive agreement in values, aims and interests of a distinctly family kind, they felt free to admit differences on other levels. It was the function of the delegation of authority to regulate interaction in the presence of these differences by allowing each partner to submit to the judgment of the other in turn.

At the same time, delegated authority afforded a stable structure within which to achieve convergence or agreement by consultation, wherever it was felt to be possible and important. But in many matters it was thought sufficient to make a divergence plain rather than persist in flogging out agreement. Once it was public knowledge how everyone concerned felt about a matter, all were confident that the person with whom the decision rested would not act without showing some consideration to their wishes, along with whatever consideration was due to other factors. For example,

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in one family the eldest son had appealed to his father to buy him a car; the mother agreed to him having it, but the father opposed it. There was no expectation that agreement would be reached by prolonging discussion of the matter, but mother and son were satisfied that their point of view, having been made known, would not be ignored in the father's weighing of the matter. We would gain a wrong impression if we thought that consultation necessarily meant decision by agreement which was alternative to the exercise of authority. Just as often it was employed to make authority benevolent in matters where no one expected that agreement would be reached, and which it was thought wiser not to worry with protracted discussion that might only serve to widen the breach.

Relationships between parents and children in this type of family were marked by sympathy and understanding, loyalty, affection, interest and mutual respect, which contrasted with the distant relationship in families of the adaptation type. The parents' approach was marked by a principled sense of responsibility to the child. They regarded the child with an objective distance, which was a different thing from the careless distance shown by the parents of the adaptation type of family. At the same time the warmth of their affection was a different thing from the suffocating

closeness which parents of the adaptation type of family were prone to cultivate for their own gratification. As the children's affections were not being exploited for the parents' own gratification, the children were rarely indulged, favoured or rejected. Their parents conscientiously strove to be fair and impartial, and watched themselves if they felt any greater attraction to one child because of his likeableness or because of temperamental affinity with him. They were not inhibited, through fear of losing favour with the child, from consistently applying in an impersonal way the standards of behaviour which they believed were needed for the child's own good. On the other hand they did not coercively constrain compliance, except with very young children. They hoped to see the child develop his own conscience and judgment, and they gave opportunity for this by allowing the children's inclinations to diverge from their own in the same manner as their own frequently diverged from one another's. Thus they strove to respect their children's moral autonomy. A fact which may be connected with this is that in nearly all the professionals' families approximating to this type (although it was not so in the tradesmen's) the parents had no aspiration to project their children to a higher social rank.

These children's attitude to their parents was one of pride and confidence in them, respect, affection and loyalty towards them, and a fair amount of consideration for their wishes and compliance with their directions. The relationship between siblings was friendly, generous, co-operative and considerate. There were, of course, departures from the pattern in the way of quarrelling and selfishness, but these things had not the habitual hold they had over children in the adaptation type of family.

Only in four of the twenty-three families approximating to this type were definitely experimental methods of child-training adopted. Only in two of the twenty-one in which there were adolescents was there revolt against the parents' values. It took the form, in both cases, of adolescent sons reacting to their parents' hard-headed business interests by a genuine membership engrossment in literature. In most of the twenty-one cases adolescents regarded their peer groups as being of about equal importance with their families, and in five they were regarded as of less importance.

4. The False Identification Type of Family

It is difficult to delineate this third type in a way which sets it apart from the other two, because it has certain elements in common with each of them, and yet it is distinct. Perhaps its position in relation to the other

types is best depicted as a state of indecision between them. Having both adaptation or identification as possible developments, it is arrested from developing into either. It cannot develop into the identification type because either one or both partners cannot decide what place the family, and perhaps membership values generally, are to take in relation to their other interests. They are thus unable to wholly identify their personal satisfaction with the family's welfare, although they do maintain a high expectation of some kind of satisfaction from family life. On the other hand, it cannot develop into the adaptation type because the partners will not allow the intrusion into their relationship of the critical differences of interest which would, very probably, manifest themselves, if they were faithful to their deeper promptings. These are suppressed because it is realized that if they are admitted the expectation of satisfaction from family life itself would have to be forfeited. This is a crude way of putting the matter and, because it is stated in hypothetical terms of what might be, it is not very sensible; but it helps to show that the false identification type of family is essentially one which is impaled on a dilemma. For this reason, personal dissatisfaction, and personal or inter-personal conflict and tension abound in it, and are amongst its distinguishing characteristics.

The conflict of aims in these families need not be focussed as a conflict _between_ the partners. The same state of affairs can eventuate if there is a conflict within one or both partners, and the partners may possibly share the same conflict. There was even a suggestion in some cases that it was on the basis of their _shared conflict_ that the partners felt affinity and had been attracted to one another. In comparison with the more ordinary, pedestrian people with whom they saw themselves surrounded, they felt themselves to be two of a type who could take a broader view of things and manage to eat their cake and have it. They also found in one another the special sympathy which they felt in need of to keep their conflict sheltered from being challenged, as would have occurred had they associated too freely with people otherwise minded. One of these couples, for instance, strongly adhered to membership values in religious and church activity and were also strongly attached to egoistic values in the accumulation of property and in sport, and they had desired as well, as if it were something written into the inevitable course of events for two people so like-minded in all matters, to marry and acquire a family. Another couple followed membership values in religion and the church but exploited a strongly egoistic value in their religious activities as well, and found in marrying one

another a welcome refuge from being severely misunderstood. A third couple desired to pass an aesthetic style of existence, living rather lawlessly but graciously, enjoying literature, drama and photography, being sentimentally humanitarian and politically radical, and pictured a home as the decorative setting for their diversions. A fourth couple desired wealth, success and much stimulating sociability, and a family to give them standing. In all these and similar cases family life was only faintly, and always ambiguously, invested with membership value, and its real importance in relation to other interests was almost deliberately left unclarified. Because the family was instrumental to other satisfactions a certain quality was expected from it. But whether it was instrumental to this end or that had never been allowed to become clear.

So far as one was able to reconstruct the development of the relationship between some of the partners in this type of family, the conflict originally shared by them was becoming the conflict between them, due to the fact that each was partially resolving the conflict by giving greater weight to one alternative, while it was the opposite alternative that was being settled on by the partner. This, of course, is a particularly easy development between two people in close association, because the first person can

project onto the second the hostility which is due to himself for being in a state of contradiction, if he fixes on the partner the alternative which he finds most difficult to justify in himself. The second person, similarly, welcomes the opportunity to have someone other than himself to blame, and is therefore disposed to champion the other alternative, even though, originally, it may have been forced upon him by his partner, and not particularly preferred at all.

Thus in the third example above the confusion of aims resolved itself in the following way. The mother, to her husband's complete surprise, for the sake of having some simplified identity, reverted to an earlier religious position which she had held before marriage, although it was now much moderated and did not include church affiliation, selecting for expression in this way her humanitarianism and desire for gracious living. The desire for gracious living entailed social ambition to improve the family's class status. The father, on the other hand, elected to concentrate on political radicalism. This entailed atheism and opposition to social ambition, both of which caused acute disagreement with his wife. These matters became the subject of many heated, obsessional debates, but these were only epiphenomenal to the real conflict, which was the question of into which of these directions the corporate life of the

family should be turned. It was characteristic of the false identification of this family, and of all families of its type, that the real conflict was never recognised as such, however. It was only alluded to under the guise of the much less threatening, abstract topics, argument about which was bravely declared to be something of a game, and even an evidence of intellectual tolerance.

Not always in the false identification type of family had the internal conflict become transformed into a fixed external one, however. But where this had not occurred, each partner would, on occasions, project one part of his conflict on the other partner and attack the partner for it; and perhaps they would change sides at different times. And there were other reasons why the relations between the partners involved conflicts. A person who was himself in conflict vacillated, and the attitudes he would strike could not be predicted. Thus in the second of the above families neither partner could be sure when the other would regard religion from its membership aspect and so, possibly, be led to surrender personal claims in its name, or when he would regard it egoistically and make claims upon the family because of it. Internal conflict also could lead to a person imposing conflicting expectations on a partner. Thus a wife who had strong aspirations for social improvement

would reproach her husband, on the one hand, for not earning enough money; and on the other hand, because her concern for the state of the family caused her to feel that he did not spend enough time at home, she reproached him for not doing anything with his life except work.

It will begin to appear that in this type of family the evaluation given to the family itself is distinctly different from that given to it in either of the other types. While in the adaptation type it is something added, to enjoy which two partners fulfil a contract, and in the identification type it is something compelling to which two partners surrender all personal claims, in the false identification type it is something instrumental, which is believed to be entirely necessary for the fullest realization of other personal satisfactions. However, its instrumental status is equivocal, because there is no single end decided on by both parents, which the family is to serve. Besides being instrumental, then, it is also something to be captured, and each parent wants to have the family on side. Not sure of himself or not sure of his partner, because of the confusion of aims, each feels that the imperative thing is to have the family entirely one's own way. But there were more ways of doing this than by simple, overt dominance.

This point leads directly to the matter of family control. I have said that an open acknowledgement of differences was not allowed to intrude into the family's life. I should say rather that every desperate effort was made to hold it back, for it was usually impossible to keep it out completely. These efforts took an infinite number of forms, from unconscious intonations of the voice implying that only agreement with an expressed opinion would be acceptable, to compromising situations, faits accompli, threats and insults and shaming; and the whole of a family's life could be saturated with these stratagems. Thus it came about that in these families where the parents' fundamental aims were divided and confused there was a premium on detailed agreements, an urgent anxiety to force likeness, or a feeling of betrayal if one's partner diverged, which contrasted with the latitude parents permitted one another in the identification type, where there was a broad community of aim centred in the family itself. But, although these stratagems were everywhere, it was in the mechanisms of control that they were most concentrated and visible. Of the eleven families approximating to this type seven were found to have what I have described as assertive forms of control, involving interference by one partner in matters which the other believed were not properly his, or evasion

of matters which were believed to be his by right. The remaining four exhibited what I have described as unstable forms of partnership, marked by compulsive quarrelsomeness, competitiveness, withdrawal or dominance. But patriarchy or partnership counted almost nothing, for, whatever the principle assented to, allegiance became nominal. In all these families the method of family control was the same. The common feature of them all was the suppression of differences of attitude, opinion, or any difference in plans, for the sake of achieving a spurious ease of operation in the corporate life of a group whose two most influential members diverged or were confused about their fundamental aims. It was control which would commonly be called suppressive, coercive or autocratic - provided we do not take that to mean something which is necessarily overt, or necessarily all one-sided.

A way of uncovering the common element in these power stratagems is to notice the nature of the communication between the partners. These partners were singularly inaccessible to modification by one another - and yet at the same time they felt a greater compulsion to persuade their partners of the exact rightness of their point of view than partners in either of the other types of family. Whenever communication was opened, it was instantly assumed that one's position had to be defended and one's opponent repulsed.

There was no real expectation that mutual persuasion could affect a convergence of views, and coercion became the object of communication. In those families which had come under assertive control it was customary for the same partner to resolve the deadlock by fiat. Some of those families which assented to a principle of partnership were less one-sided, but they were not less coercive. For instance, consultation and discussion occurred frequently, but they could be quite exacerbating experiences. They merely served to convince both partners of the inevitability of someone's acting coercively (and, perhaps, of someone's "putting up with it") if they were "to get anywhere".

It should be realized that the coercive suppression which was practised in families of this type did not only take the form of one partner suppressing some inclination in the other. Just as frequently, and perhaps at the same time, one would repress some inclination of his own which would appear to be on the way to becoming too difficult to deal with if it were admitted. Also there was a practice of mutual consenting to repression, which carried something of the sanction of taboo. There were parents who were most emphatically agreed about what emotionally disturbing disagreements would not be traversed. By silence, perhaps, one partner would give the other to understand that, so far

as he or she was concerned, a certain problem or practice had no existence and would never be alluded to, or, if unguardedly raised, only its most superficial aspects would be commented on, until it could be gently dropped. Thus, for example, in one family, if either partner was so unfortunate as to mention the bad school behaviour of one of the children, which appeared to have resulted from lack of unanimity in the child-training practices of the parents, and which in turn resulted from disagreement over whether the family should serve the end of better social standing or the educational cultivation of its members, some well-considered remarks would be made about the relative merits of the different schools from which the child had successively been expelled, until both partners could make their escape with dignity.

Rarely did communication by these parents invite a free reaction from the person addressed. Communication carried with it a presupposition of agreement, and there was a tendency for this to be generalized in these parents' communications with their children and even, it appeared, with outsiders. This was, perhaps, the most economical and surreptitious of all their means of coercion. Remarks were seldom of the kind which conveyed the fact that what was said was the opinion of the speaker, who would be interested

to compare the other person's reaction. Instead they were of the kind which implied that the other person must surely see things the same way - if, at all, he be a person with taste, judgment, maturity, humanity or kindness, or some such merit. By emphasis, inflection or other subtlety the person indicated the presupposition which set limits to the sort of response that would be acceptable to him, and thus deprived his partner of his freedom of response. The crudest examples of such presuppositional communication are questions of the kind, "Have you stopped beating your wife yet?" An actual example was a remark, charmingly delivered, "Mother's coming for dinner on Thursday, John", the stress on Thursday being all that was needed to imply that the only possible doubt which John might legitimately entertain about mother's coming (or even about mother herself) was on what day she would come. Similar communications about mother, habitually repeated, gave John to understand that there was only one possible attitude or view about his mother-in-law which would be acceptable - that of his wife.

These are cold-war tactics and are doubly wounding, because they leave the person who has suffered violence without excuse for retaliation, there being no declared state of war. He is not only deprived of freedom but of redress also. To take action is to appear to be an unprovoked

aggressor and most people's self-respecting sentiments inhibited them from being so unflatteringly compromised. Sometimes, however, the tension became intolerable, and they behaved in ways which they were ashamed of. Much apparently uncaused irritability and spitefulness in this type of family arose from tensions such as these. It only worsened the vicious circle that they were indignantly condemned as reprehensible by that partner who, on the most searching exposure of the facts, could be shown to have given cause for them. And life could be made well nigh insufferable for a victim if the partner's friends and relatives joined the attack, on the basis of their superficial, outside assessment of the situation. There was one husband, whose wife was given to this presuppositional kind of communication, who took great pleasure in subduing her spirit by derating her domestic achievements. He gave her to understand that no job of dusting or polishing or cleaning was up to standard, although, in fact, it was perfectly satisfactory. It was, of course, displaced aggression on his part, for the particular matter on which he vented it was not directly connected with the matter in which he himself suffered restriction. That matter was the question of class aspiration, he being given by his wife to understand that, although it would never be discussed,

no attitude to the question of social advancement would be acceptable in him, except the ambitious attitude of his wife. Her relatives despised him for his treatment of so capable a wife.

The tensions generated in all these ways, through attempting to control the family by suppressing differences, sought their outlet in restless efforts to extend the boundaries of personal space. These parents were obsessed with a need to "get out", "get away", and "have a complete break" from the family. Their pressed mentality differed plainly from both the relaxed exercise of independence seen in parents of the adaptation type of family, and the unthinking acceptance of restriction seen in the parents of the identification type. But this need for more personal space was viciously aggravated, due to the fact that each partner kept a close watch on the other to see that he did not neglect the family for the sake of personal satisfaction. Thus the boundaries of the members' legitimate personal

space were perpetually in dispute, a thing which only occurred in families of this type.[1]

A common pattern was for the father to escape into his work, using over-busyness as an excuse for being away from the home; while the mother escaped into some sport, perhaps golf, and might engage in this as often as three days a week. Fathers also might spend time in sport or in hotels, or withdraw into their workshops. Some mothers were prone to a compulsion to go to town and "buy something new", irrespective of whether or not it was needed, just for the sheer "let down" of it. They would let anything go in the home and change their routine for a chance to get out to a tea-party or a charity function. Some confessed

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[1] The isolation of these family types lends support to Lewin's hypothesis that "an insufficient space of free movement leads to tension" (1948, p.93), and at the same time helps to set limits to it. In the adaptation and identification types of family respectively the parents find their space of free movement in external activities and their domains of authority within the family, and tension is low, while in the false-identification type opportunity for free movement in both these ways is deficient, and tension is high. But it is also possible to think of the matter otherwise, noticing how the need for space of free movement varies. The need is higher in the false-identification type of family, where tension exists due to the attempt to pursue conflicting values in a state of association, and it is lower in the identification type of family (some parents forgoing it almost entirely in any form save their authority rights, without any sense of constriction), where like values are being pursued.

themselves completely unable to screw themselves down to a systematic programme of housework any longer. One mother developed a habit of elusiveness, going away from home for short strolls with the children or into neighbours' houses, without informing her husband of her movements. Parents of both sexes in some of the families, and even some of the adolescents, felt a need to spend hours "just sitting" in the home and doing nothing. For taking any of these liberties one had to put up with a certain amount of reviling, and one usually felt guilty about it anyway, but felt helplessly driven.

While some of these parents went out of the family for other reasons, under the positive attraction of external loyalties, the phenomenon I have just been describing is what I referred to earlier (Chapter VIII, p. 241) as negative out-going. In all families of this type this pressure to move out in order to seek relief from intolerable family tensions was present, whether it was additional to more positive external activities or existed apart from them. And it was only in families of this type that any marked negative out-going was found. In these external activities family members might seek either voluntary associations or primary relations; and, as might be expected, any friendships made were cultivated quite apart from the

family circle. The parents of a few of the families evinced good-neighbourly relations, having been driven to seek from their neighbours the satisfactions denied them in the home. Amongst professionals' families of this group social responsibility attitudes were mainly conservative or liberal, while there was a tendency to utopianism amongst the tradesmen's families.

As the parents in these families continued to expect satisfaction from the family in spite of the deterioration in their relations they were liable to be profoundly discontented. Their discontent with one another expressed itself most commonly as rejection. One blamed the other for the unsatisfactory state of affairs and for having frustrated his expectations, and consequently refused to support the partner's endeavours or give emotional satisfaction. At the same time, since it was impossible to evade association with the partner, the partner was used instrumentally for one's own ends. One husband, for instance, constantly tried to coerce his wife to give assistance in his business, which was attached to the home. One of the commonest things which these parents alluded to in confiding their disappointment was their sense of loneliness in their own homes. Presumably this had something to do with their persistent hankering for detailed agreements and their

persistent failure to reach them. They did not have the trick for keeping companionable in the face of differences, which parents of identification-type families employed, of genuinely submitting and being agreeable, though not agreeing. To do that was something which they felt involved too great a sacrifice of integrity.

In these families roles were not clearly demarcated, so that interference and evasion were common. It was not agreed what tasks belonged to whom, or one felt that he could not trust the other to do a particular thing and took a hand himself, or it was felt that one needed the assurance of the partner's support and so had to compel him to come into everything, or it was felt that agreement never would be reached so that for the sake of "getting on with it" it was better for one of the two to withdraw. For these and similar reasons the members of these families failed to develop the sense of organic dependence on one another which had grown up in the identification type. The fringe functions were generally relinquished, although a few families retained some religious activities. It is already plain that very little recreation was taken together, and holidays together were either positively avoided or anticipated without relish. In a large proportion of these families productive activities tended to a minimum. It was

one way some of the parents had of expressing their disappointment in the family to punish it by not "doing anything" for the home or members.

Relationships between parents and children showed similar characteristics to those described for the adaptation type of family. But the competition between parents was more for the children's loyalty than for the personal gratification of having their affection; it was a power over their wills which the parents sought. Both wanted the children on side for the sake of running the family the preferred way. To do this they used mainly the presuppositional type of communication I have described, exploiting to the full the suggestibility of children. Even into their sons' and daughters' adolescence parents ruled over them by the innuendo that there was no alternative in the world to attitudes and beliefs which they themselves held, and which every good child would adopt. By this practice they stifled the children's moral autonomy. As both parents vied in this sort of behaviour, the children of any family might be divided amongst themselves, due to the fact that one group of them had coalesced with one parent and one group with the other. More commonly, the dominating parent succeeded in capturing the loyalty of all the children, and the children then took over that parent's attitude to the

other one. This could mean that the children rejected one parent through clinging to the other. In the particular case where a child rejected a parent of the same sex through clinging to a parent of opposite sex it was noticed that the child inclined to feeling that there was something repugnant about the roles or symbolic characteristics of its own sex.[1] Any rejected parent might reciprocate by rejecting a child, but might, on the other hand, redouble his efforts to win the child's affection. Possibly connected with this practice of rejection is the fact that in some of these families, as in some of the adaptation type, parents excused themselves from demonstrating affection for their children on the plea that they were unemotional by nature.

Disciplinary measures taken by a parent were weak, carrying little conviction. Correction of a child was delivered as if the parent were having to rebuke something in himself first, and so only served to betray the parent's conflicts. Experimental methods of child-training were common in this type of family, as in the adaptation type. In most of the families of this type where there were adolescents, they were in revolt against some value of their

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[1] This may indicate the source of one type of homosexual propensity.

parents. Their revolt was more difficult and caused them more guilt than the revolt of adolescents in adaptation-type families, presumably because under the hypnosis, as it were, of a parent's stifling influence, they had involuntarily internalized earlier many of the things which they now voluntarily opposed. If adolescent revolt was mild or lacking one felt that it was only postponed. Sudden temper, irritation and intolerance of his father or mother indicated that there was something of the adolescent's father or mother internalized in him which he rejected, and into the power of which he angrily realized he had been given. For some adolescents of these families peer groups were of greater importance than the family, for some they were of about the same importance, and for some they were of less importance. One felt that these positions indicated three stages of liberation from the internal oppression.

Conclusion

The chapter preceding this illustrated how the family confers on its members a role which is cardinal in that it is one which takes their activities in other groups into itself. I suggested that such a role would play an important part in personality organization and that it might be rare to find groups other than the family which could confer

roles of that kind on their members. This chapter has shown that some families were better able than others to give a cardinal character to their members' roles.

In the chapter on external relations I took continuity and many-sidedness as the distinguishing features of the primary group. The quality of many-sidedness, in families at any rate, can now be further refined. The special importance of many-sidedness in families lies not simply in the fact that several or a number of disconnected aspects of the individual's life can be included in his role there, but that there is a possibility of absorbing all his activities into his family role, thus providing him with an opportunity to connect them and organize them into a unity, and so achieve some unified feeling and perception about who he is. One feels that it is some such property as this which Cooley had in mind in making a firm distinction between primary groups and groups of other kinds. But whether that property should be made the *sine qua non* of primary groups, or whether those having it make a primary group of a special kind, would be a matter to be decided by conventional definition. It is important, however, to understand that this study suggests that the "primariness" of families lies largely in this property. And the types identified in this chapter are significant because they

throw into relief differences in the "primariness" of families - or, one might almost say, the "familiness" of families. Thus, at one extreme, there were families where the parents included practically all of their activities within the family role, in the sense that they were expected of them by the family, and other members identified with them vicariously. At the other extreme there were those families in which the parents agreed to exempt each other from responsibility to the family for a definite section of their lives, so that certain of their activities were not written into their family roles at all, being discharged quite independently of expectations from the family, and without other members identifying vicariously with them at all. Control activities in these families were desultory and meagre, and were also external to role expectations. Intermediate between the two were families which strove for the former kind of life, but which lacked what appear to be the necessary conditions of having parents who were agreed in their fundamental aims and in a belief about the place of the family in securing them. In these, roles were ill-defined, there was dispute about what outside activities members' roles should include, and the actions taken to control the family were themselves arbitrary, being exercised without family sanction. We can say, then, that the

identification type of family was strongly primary; the adaptation type was scarcely primary at all and had little pretension of being; and the false identification type strove for a primary quality, but without success.

This difference seemed to be the most important sociological difference between the families. In a sense it was <u>the</u> sociological difference between them. Durkheim (1938, pp.1 to 13) defined the province of sociology by arguing that it was the regularity of facts which made them social, meaning by this that social facts were events which took place under the constraining influence of human principle, not merely that they were recurring events which could be summarized in natural laws like the facts of all sciences. However, in case his formula should lead us to exclude from sociology any events which escape regularization, such as the anomic behaviour which Durkheim himself described (1949), it might be better to say that social facts are those which, because they take place between people, <u>pose a problem of regulation</u>, so that the crucial sociological question is whether regulation is achieved, or the degree to which it is achieved. The full account of sociological facts states this, as well as describing the pure content of the regularized behaviour; and it does not leave unregularized behaviour aside as merely residual. Regularization of

individual behaviour is a desideratum because it effects solidarity or cohesion in the life of groups. Differences in the degree to which it is present, then, mean differences in degree of cohesion; so that asking questions concerning regulation or cohesion are simply alternative ways of presenting the crucial sociological problem.

The three types of family which I have identified differ from one another because they differ in the degree to which regularity is achieved in the relations between their members. In the identification type it is achieved to a high degree. In the adaptation type it is achieved only in a limited area because parents recognise that the conditions for achieving it on a wider basis are lacking. In the false identification type regularization is attempted on a wider basis than the conditions existing will allow, and consequently it is not achieved with any degree of stability at all. Comparison of the three types of families, then, brings some faint light to bear on the immense problem of social cohesion. Especially does it help to ease some of the knots in the question of what is the order of the likenesses which are needed, and what the order of the differences which can be permitted, for conditions of cohesion to exist.

First of all, as has already been pointed out, there are certain differences in families which are irremovable,

arising out of differences in sex and age, individual temperament and experience. Since these differences cannot be removed they need to be respected and provided for, and the interaction between persons differentiated by them needs to be regulated. This was done in the identification type of family by legitimizing authority; that is to say by a general acceptance that members shall submit to one another in certain defined provinces of the family's life, since precise agreement cannot be expected. Thus there is a division of control; albeit granted on the condition that persons will exercise authority benevolently by allowing free discussion, inviting consultation and showing consideration for those who express wishes and judgments which are opposed to their own. This suggests that the differences which are permissable to cohesion may include such irremovable differences as the persons involved are willing to acknowledge as irremovable, and on the basis of which they are willing to take turns in holding their own judgments in abeyance, out of deference to the authority granted to another. Groups equipped with agreement about the division of legitimate authority have a firm structure which cushions other disagreements about opinion, procedure, practice and taste, so that these do not become critical; there is a high tolerance for them, which contrasts strikingly with the

anxious preoccupation with detailed agreements found in families which lack it.

But this division of authority and tolerance of disagreements are grounded in a fundamental confidence, shared by the members, that they are aiming for the same type of satisfaction as one another and that their co-operation as a group is necessary to its realization, that only by distributing certain tasks amongst them can it be achieved. Where members were divided in themselves or between themselves regarding the satisfaction for which they were aiming, so that the place of the family in reaching it was equivocal, neither a division of authority nor tolerance of disagreement was found.

All this suggests that the likenesses which are necessary for cohesion are:

(i) an agreement of aim;

(ii) an agreement about the necessity of the group for achieving the aim;

(iii) an agreement about the rational division of tasks which will secure it;

(iv) an agreement about what differences in the members of the group are irremovable;

(v) an agreement on an allocation of tasks which suits the members' different capacities and is acceptable to them; and

(vi) an agreement about the allocation of areas of authority arising out of the acknowledged, irremovable differences, and purposing to regulate the interaction of individuals who are differentiated by them.

The differences which are allowable in the presence of these agreements are those which I have called irremovable, and which are recognized as such. They include:

(i) differences of reaction, taste, knowledge, experience, understanding, habit, judgment, opinion and proposed plans; and

(ii) the differences in personal capacity which are utilized in assigning specialized tasks to each member.

A divergence of aims is not permissable within the family arena if a family is to remain cohesive. The aims must be excluded from the family and pursued by the members apart from one another in other groups, leaving the group in which they have common membership restricted in its function and limited in the degree of allegiance which it can claim from them. This is what the adaptation type of family does, as it narrows the family towards co-operation for simple economic and biological purposes. The factors involved in cohesion in these families are the same agreement

in aim and same belief in the necessity of a division of tasks for achieving it, as are present in the identification type of family. The aim is less comprehensive, however, and because it requires only a partial allegiance from the members, many of the irremovable differences can be kept out of the group altogether and allowed free expression elsewhere, so that the provision of an authority structure to regulate these differences can be largely ignored. Those irremovable differences which are allowed to enter into this type of family (such as a father's income-earning capacity and a mother's child-bearing capacity) are mainly those which can be utilized in the division of tasks. The false identification type of family strives for cohesion in the presence of divergent aims and can only achieve it coercively, by suppressing the admission of both the divergent aims and the differences which cannot be removed.

These findings suggest that Durkheim's (1949) two principles of social cohesion, mechanical solidarity based on likenesses in belief and sentiment, and organic solidarity based on a division of functions and the dependence it entails, are not alternative but complementary conditions for cohesion; so that at all stages of social development both may be necessary. The essential thing seems to be a shared aim and a belief in the necessity of a certain

division of tasks for realizing it, and that implies both the likeness of the first principle and the differentiation of the second. And it is, in fact, hard to imagine any society, however primitive, in which the social bond is not partly due to the dependence entailed in a division of tasks, while the possibility of anomic conditions developing in highly differentiated societies suggests that a division of tasks can create no bond unless it is accompanied by certain shared beliefs and sentiments about the end of the enterprise and the place of each one in it.[1]

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[1] A number of authors continue to believe that likeness of belief and sentiment, or consensus, is the sine qua non of "social organization" in any kind of group or society. Finch (1952, p.473, note), in one place, refers us to some of these. He writes, "That the breakdown of consensus is the essence of social disorganization is indicated by E.B. Reuter (with supporting quotations from E.T. Hiller, W.I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki), and Kimball Young in: "Handbook of Sociology", New York, Dryden, 1941, pp.112-113; and by Mabel Elliott in H.P. Fairchild (ed.), "Dictionary of Sociology", New York, Philosophical Library, 1944, pp.280-281. Mowrer's use of the term seems to be based principally upon this conception: "Family disorganization represents the ... process in which the family complex breaks up and the ambitions and ideals of the individual members of the family become differentiated... Family disorganization is the loss of common aims and of harmonious organization of effort in the family... " (E.R.Mowrer "Family Disorganization" (2nd ed.), Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1939, pp.4, 34-35.) A somewhat similar view is expressed in: Margaret Redfield, "The American Family: Consensus and Freedom", American Journal of Sociology, 52 (1946), 175-83."

Chapter X

FAMILY TYPES AND INDIVIDUAL NEEDS

1. The Evidences of Need Satisfaction

The observations made and data collected in this study were too gross to afford a precise measure of need satisfaction. But, persisting in the belief that some knowledge is better than none, and that the impossibility of perfect knowledge should not inhibit us from learning what we can, I will examine the material for whatever hints and suggestions it contains. Behavioural data, such as those already recorded, are all we have to go by, but these are not negligible since they reveal much striving which would appear to be prompted by the needs for security, freedom and identity which were postulated in Chapter IV.

Since these are needs which persist we cannot assume that the evidence of their being satisfied is that striving has ceased. Rather, I take the evidence for satisfaction of these needs to be the fact that striving is continuing _in the same direction_ without frustration, and that the person acts as though _conscious_ of a sense of identity, and a feeling of security and freedom. The evidence of consciousness of identity I take to be an individual's

acting consistently and in character, as if controlling his behaviour to conform to a defined conception of himself. Evidence for a feeling of security I take to be the confidence that one can count on support from external sources, so that the individual is not in a state of tension because anxiously preoccupied with thoughts of keeping the external situation in his own command, or of measuring up to its demands or of escaping from it altogether.[1] Evidence of freedom I take to be the sense of satisfaction in doing things, and an absence of feelings of inability, constriction or irksome restraint and compensatory behaviour which is assertive or retaliatory.

2. The Needs of Parents

The parents of adaptation type families found a limited security in the family itself, in that they confidently

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[1] Examples would be lack of social ease, fretting over humiliation, avoidance of unpleasantness, shrinking from making a complaint or admitting an undetected fault, being over-apologetic about discovered fault, intolerance of criticism, painful self-consciousness, lack of concentration, perseverence or committal, derogatory self-estimation, avoidance of public prominence, and so on. These are similar to the behavioural indices of insecurity used by Maslow (1945) in his Security-Insecurity Test, and also to indices of anxiety used in a test which Halmos (1952, p.95) has published in a study of social isolation.

expected it to supply them with certain specific satisfactions, and their position within it was defined and fixed. Through association with others outside the family they gained further securities, and a tendency to enter voluntary association in preference to primary relations indicates that these securities were of a specific kind. A disposition to adopt utopian or distrait responsibility attitudes to the total society shows, further, a general unreadiness to be involved in real society with any total commitment. These people were marginal, obtaining various specific securities from various sources without being able to lose themselves in any many-sided group which could be expected to supply them with many satisfactions. Their need for freedom was mainly gratified apart from the family. In their external activities they were preoccupied with achievement or influence, striving eagerly for status and wanting, particularly, to be leaders in the voluntary associations which they entered.

These parents tended to have a number of fairly discrete elementary selves, one for each of the groups in which they appeared, and would adopt at different times attitudes and opinions which belonged to one or the other. Consequently they did not give evidence of a great deal of consistency. If any role was cardinal in organizing their behaviour it

was their family role in all but one case, but, as I have stressed (Chapter IX, p.337) their family roles were not strongly cardinal, and it was activities which were separate from them that were the most compelling. Thus, although their method of satisfying their needs for security and freedom through a number of partial involvements brought reasonable satisfaction, it left the problem of achieving an identity unsolved. Consequently, these people looked for a unified identity less from the _comprehensiveness_ of a cardinal role than from the _dominance_ of a subsidiary one. Their values were mainly partisanship or self-concentration values and, guided by these constricting values, they sought to be unified more by narrowing than by organization. They relied on the singleness of the causes or passions to which they surrendered themselves to give them a sense of identity, more than on anything else. This left them with certain residual selves; and the symbolic values, which they also followed, served for "keeping up appearances" in those other contexts in which they had interests invested but in which they desired not to be too much involved.

In identification type families parents found a comprehensive security in the family itself, losing themselves in this many-sided group which they relied upon to supply them with their main satisfactions; and their clearly

defined roles made their positions in the structure sure. Also, they entered primary relations as much as voluntary association, and this, together with their tendency to adopt conservative or liberal responsibility attitudes to the larger society, suggests that they may have had a fairly general readiness to identify with actual groups with a total commitment. They appear, in a quite general way, to have been involved rather than marginal individuals. In their case, the need for freedom was largely satisfied by exercising initiative in the area of authority permitted by the family. Outside of the family their voluntary activities were mainly modest roles in which they could give some form of service. These activities were not marked by status striving, although some of these parents were popularly chosen to make leaders of a certain type, apparently on account of a combination of competence and freedom from self-seeking. Thus, according to the amount of responsibility they were willing to accept, extra initiative fell to them.

The sense of identity of these parents was derived basically from their strongly cardinal family roles. They showed a high degree of consistency from one time to another, and it appeared, from what evidence could be gathered, that in all contexts they reacted fundamentally as the father

or mother of their family. But their sense of identity was richer than that. For it was not according to their distinctive part in the family that they thought and acted, but rather _as if they were the family itself_. By the vicarious identification with other members, which was a distinguishing feature of this type of family, each person became the whole organized structure, by sympathetically taking the position of the others. His own identity became something like a drama and his own overt behaviour was a reaction to the others in himself. Thus, not only was the identity of parents in these families unified through being cardinal in the sense defined, i.e. through their roles in other groups being made relevant to this one, but it was unified through a second factor, in that the whole system of which this cardinal role was a part was taken into themselves: they internalized the organization of the family.[1]

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[1] George Mead (1937, p.144) has said that this reflection in the individual of the completeness of the social process is the basis of the organization and unification of the complete self. I would grant that it is a part but not all of what takes place, for I think that I have added something in the idea that a cardinal role is necessary as well, wherever the social process is differentiated into many groups over which the individual distributes himself. Mead has also recognized (1937, p.297) the special quality both of group life and individual identity which arises from what I have called "vicarious identification". He describes it as the "religious attitude", and contrasts it with the "economic attitude", by which an individual is related to another only for the sake of obtaining something which the other does not want, and by which he always stands out from the other in some opposed or independent identity.

While this development of a global identity depended, in the first instance, on a marked division of labour and authority, so that vis-a-vis the other each was distinctive, fathers and mothers in these families approached the condition of having identical identities. Many differences could therefore be allowed, since each one's identity included the other. This fact may explain, for example, the acceptability and legitimization of status difference between the partners which occurred in a number of these cases. It will be remembered that in legitimate patriarchy the father was ranked above the mother, and all families with that form of control were of this type. It was rare for any of these mothers to feel habitual constriction or resentment because of having a subordinate place. Presumably this is because if one _person_ includes both _roles_, it is no deprivation to allow prior place to one role, since it does not mean yielding prior place to a second person.[1] The fact

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[1] This function of sympathy or vicarious identification in making status differences tolerable is something which some psychologists have failed to appreciate, e.g. Faris (Sherif and Wilson, 1953, p.174). Faris even suggests that status differences in primary groups place a strain on the sympathetic basis of relations; but my observations suggest that a reverse influence may obtain, and that a sympathetic basis to relations can be the condition which makes status differences agreeable.

of identical identity can also be used to explain the occurrence of exchange of roles in these families.

It seems that the possibility of this sort of global identity emerging rested on the comprehensive security which these parents found in the family. And this, in turn, rested on their shared conviction that they were striving together to achieve the same membership values there. There were signs that some of these parents were willing to suffer inwardly rather than lose, or allow another to lose, position and support in the bosom of the family; because they understood love, marriage and family mainly in terms of a task of embracing others in membership. This gave them opportunity for personal development; for if, in spite of fault, one could be held in membership, catharsis could proceed. They could count on the support and permission which are its first conditions.[1] The members of these families were

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[1] Parsons (1952, pp.297-320) has given support and permission, along with non-reciprocation of distorted expectations and the inducement of sanctions for acceptable behaviour, as the essential elements of psychotherapy. It was noticeable that certain families of the other types failed to supply these conditions because the faults of one or several members had become an offence to the others, and were no longer patiently borne or lovingly endured. The demand of husband or wife or child that another member should be free from a fault, which he was powerless to control, was the source of the worst kind of family unhappiness which I witnessed.

not remarkable for their freedom from fault. Some were eccentric, trying, a disturbance or a nuisance, or very psychologically ignorant, and some had to be handled with humour and tact; but they were remarkable for their attitude to fault, in not being offended by it and in making allowance for it through studied forbearance and consideration. Because they conceived of happiness in terms of abandonment and self-forgetfulness in securely rooted membership, they were unwilling that anyone's personal faults should threaten it. Presumably, the spontaneity, which also distinguished them, was due to their release from inhibiting self-consciousness through fastening their attention on the frame of reference which included them. This spontaneity was a resource for satisfying the need for freedom which was not available in families of the other types. It contributed to the ability these parents showed for satisfying their security, freedom and identity needs simultaneously.

In families of the false identification type one or both parents showed marked evidences of insecurity. The family was the main frame of reference in which they hoped to anchor themselves, but they were in doubt about the way in which its life related to their personal aims, and doubted whether it could be bent in the direction they preferred. Furthermore, their anchorage within the family was not firmly

fixed by a clearly differentiated role. In a similar manner their relationships external to the family largely took the form of a search for anchorages, but, whether they were primary relations or voluntary association, they tended to be unstable. Some of these external relations were complicated by the parents' seeking relief there from family tensions, and that, presumably, would be likely to introduce some element which would be foreign to a group's aims and make their position in it precarious. If the evidence suggests a generalized marginality in parents of the adaptation type of family, and a generalized capacity for involvement in parents of the identification type, it could be said that parents of families of the false identification type showed a generalized unsuccessful seeking after involvement.

It has been stressed how much these parents suffered from a sense of constriction. Within the family their areas of legitimate initiative were poorly defined, and their control activities lacked regulation. Outside of the family few of them had sufficient control over social relations to gain a sense of achievement through continuous activity in them. They were so much under pressure for "let-down" that it was hard to apply themselves to the effective participation in groups which would afford the satisfaction

of exercising initiative responsibly. The assertiveness and coerciveness of their relationships with others in the family can be regarded as compensatory. But while it may have been compensatory for one partner to get his own way with the other it only aggravated the other's sense of constriction, of course, and was bitterly resented. It was in families of this type that status differences were unsettling. Wives who were the victims of assertive patriarchy, for example, harboured a number of rankling grievances.

Parents of these families were subject to such fluctuations of attitude and point of view that they were often an annoyance to one another because of their extreme inconsistency. It was said of some of them, either by their partners or themselves, that their main problem in life was to know themselves. One can infer from these evidences a poor sense of identity. Their values were mainly self-expansion, self-concentration and symbolic, and, guided by these, they restlessly sought a sense of consistency by investing their identity in the permanence of what they possessed, by narrowing themselves in single passions or by wearing a distinctive appearance. One of the main devices for gaining a feeling of identity, which is related to symbolic values, was preoccupation with their ideal of

themselves and a tendency to take this for the real self - although even their ideal of themselves might vary from time to time. They were given to instructing others in "what sort of person" they were, and expected to be treated accordingly, even though it might have little resemblance to what one found them to be. Their coercive tendencies were associated with this, for it added to their sense of identity, as it did to their sense of security and freedom, to impose the same character on a partner or child as they conceived to be ideal for themselves. Thus they stood at an opposite pole from the parents of the identification type of family who gained an expansive identity by identifying vicariously with all that was different in the other members of the family. By contrast, these parents strove to fix their own identity by making others conform to their own ideal selves. By this false identification they gained a false security, and the coercive action through which they achieved it amounted to false freedom.

3. The Needs of Children and Adolescents

The most striking feature about the need satisfaction of the children and adolescents studied was the fact that their sense of security rested in the expectation that the family would supply satisfactions for them fairly inde-

pendently of co-operation from themselves, while the main satisfactions to be secured outside of the family (chiefly at school) were to be won by their own efforts, fairly independently of co-operation from others. Thus neither the family nor the external society provided any system in which they could achieve an anchorage of such a kind that their sense of security was associated with a freedom derived from personal exertion in association with others. And their sense of identity, such as it was, was likewise dual. They had a family identity in a very dependent, diffuse role, coupled with a school identity in an achievement role. For most of them the family role was weakly structured and had little concrete content. It was defined more in terms of what could be expected to be done for them than in terms of what regular tasks were expected of them. Their school role was defined mainly in terms of what they could do for themselves in study and, perhaps, sport and leadership. They were expected to be able "to adjust" to teachers and other children, to be sure, but the class-room situation was such that this carried scarcely any implication of working _with_ them.

The two sources of security on which children depended, unconnected by any bridge of social organization they were aware of, and supplying securities in very different ways,

continued to divide their world and identity right through adolescence. Save in very exceptional cases, there was no provision, as the children passed into adolescence, to ensure that the security given them in the family should be increasingly based on co-operation from themselves, either by their producing for the family or taking some responsible part in its control. On the contrary, most of them were excused from this precisely because the demands for achievement in their external roles, either at school or in their occupational training, had now become more exacting. The result was that development towards adult stature within the family was slight. Even well into adolescence sons and daughters defined themselves, on the one hand, as dependent, not on co-operation but bounty; and, on the other, as independent and thrown very much on their own resources to "make the grade" in a competitive world. The sources of security were continually seen to be not any firmly structured system in which they enjoyed a place - _but, separately, their parents and themselves_. They placed an exaggerated expectation on their parents for perfect emotional and material provision, and had an exaggerated idea of how much depended on themselves when separated from their parents. The status attaching to the dependence role was slight, so that the only important freedom children gained in the family was the fictional kind that came with

play and recreational activities. If they failed to distinguish themselves above their fellows at school, they gained little status outside of the family. This pattern makes the theme on which the situations in the different types of family were only variations.

In families of the adaptation type the position was extreme. The lack of an expectation to assist in definite tasks, the lack of direction and firm control, and the lack of close association with their parents who, by continually expressing attitudes towards the children, would have given them some precise self-conception, all left the children without any structural location in the family, so that they were both insecure and confused about their identity. They showed insecurity in a marked inability to concentrate or persevere, and their defective sense of identity became evident in much impulsive and random behaviour. Exemption from direction, of which they enjoyed so much, was not construed by them as freedom. It became a burden which confused and wearied them. Furthermore, their almost entire lack of any <u>structural</u> anchorage in the family left them even more dependent than some other children on an anchorage in the providence of all-sufficient parents, only to find their need denied them, if it was their fate to suffer rejection, or exploited to their

spoiling if they were indulged. In the former case their insecurity was severe, in the latter case what security was enjoyed (and it would probably be fitful) only served to magnify the child's feeling of dependence on an all-sufficient adult. It is understandable that, at adolescence, these children should revolt against their parents' values, and quickly escape into peer groups, seeking to find security and status by losing themselves in membership there.

In families of the identification type the general position was mitigated, but because the child's role took him so much outside of the family it was impossible to escape the basic cleavage, so that mitigation made for ambivalence and contradiction. I have already pointed out (Chapter IX, p. 346), for instance, how the contradictory value placed on the pursuit of knowledge and culture in these families imposed an ambivalent expectation on the children. However, because they received plain directives and were under firm control, because they were in fairly constant association with their parents, whose definite and objective attitudes towards them assisted them in self-definition, and because of their vicarious identification with other family members, these children had _some_ structural anchorage in the family, even though some of them had few responsibilities. Their resulting sense of identity

was made evident in a capacity for control superior to that shown by children in families of the other types. But they carried, as well, a residual identity from their external achievement roles, and showed by their vacillation over giving time to the family that they found this difficult to integrate with the identity that went with their position of security at home. The freedom needs of these children were satisfied to a certain degree because of their parents preserving objectivity in their attitudes towards them, so that their dependence was not exploited to deprive them of moral autonomy, and they exercised many choices of their own. They did not reject their parents'values when they came to adolescence, but sought the added security of being involved with their peers in much the same way as they were accustomed to being involved in membership with their families.

In families of the false identification type children lacked a structural position in the family, just as children of the adaptation type of family did, because they were without responsibilities and definite control and direction. Consequently, like these other children, they developed a distorted expectation of sufficiency in their parents. This made them vulnerable, because, unlike what happened with children of the adaptation type of family,

their parents associated with them closely. The association was excessively close, for the attitudes which the parents took to the children and from which the children accepted their sense of identity did not express an objective appreciation of the child's nature. It was their own wishes and their own ideal selves which the parents impressed on the children by the attitudes which they took to them. This gave the children a sense of identity and security through coalescence with a parent. But both the identity and security were false, and were enjoyed at the expense of real freedom. Children who became conscious of this in adolescence rejected their false identity and security, provided the feelings of guilt entailed in acting against one's earliest identity were not so intolerable as to inhibit strivings for emancipation altogether. They rejected the parental values in which their earlier identity had been grounded and sought to find real security and develop an independent conscience through membership involvement with peers.