‘Warring Words’:
Students and the state in
New Order Indonesia, 1966-1998

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the
Australian National University.

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June 2005

CERTIFICATION

I, Elisabeth Jackson, declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy at the Australian National University, is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. It has not been submitted for qualifications at any other academic institution.

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3 June 2005

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have been incredibly fortunate to have the support of a great many wonderful people throughout the course of researching and writing this thesis. First and foremost, I would like to thank Virginia Hooker for her enthusiasm for this project and her faith in my ability to do it. Her thoughtful criticisms gently steered me in the right direction and made it possible for me to see the bigger picture. I also owe enormous thanks to Ed Aspinall, who encouraged me to tackle this project in the first place and supported me throughout my candidature. He was also an invaluable source of expertise on student activism and the politics of the New Order and his extensive comments on my drafts enabled me to push my ideas further. Virginia and Ed also provided me with opportunities to try my hand at teaching. Tim Hassall's considered comments on the linguistic aspects of this thesis challenged me to think in new ways about Indonesian language and helped to strengthen the thesis considerably. I am also indebted to Amrih Widodo, who first indicated to me that there might be something interesting about *pemuda* and *mahasiswa* - and was right about it! Tony Liddicoat provided guidance on the theoretical aspects of the thesis in the early stages of my candidature. Anna Reid and Claire Macintosh from the Menzies library at the Australian National University helped me to source additional materials.

I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my Indonesian teachers at the University of New South Wales, including Ida Nurhayati, David Reeve, Rochayah Machali and Ed Aspinall, who are responsible for fostering my initial interest in Indonesia and Indonesian. Rochayah also introduced me to many of the ideas which have influenced this project during her supervision of my honours thesis. David's generosity provided me with the opportunity to hone my language teaching skills and expand into other areas. Robyn Fallick, Sue Piper and the other members of UNSW's teaching team have been supportive and encouraging colleagues.

In Indonesia I am particularly grateful to Dr PM Laksono of the Centre for Asia and Pacific Studies at Universitas Gadjah Mada, who sponsored my fieldwork and to Aris Arif Mundayat and Arie Sudjito, who gave up much of their own time to help me. Arie was also an invaluable source of information and contacts. I would also like to thank the staff at *Balairung, Majalah Pijar* and *Himmah*, the students at Keluarga Mahasiswa

Universitas Gadjah Mada, Fauzan Azima L. from the Student Executive Body (LEM) at Universitas Islam Indonesia, and students and activists from the Sleman branches of HMI, PMII, PRD and SMID and the Yogyakarta branch of LMND, for taking the time to answer my questions and for providing me with material. The staff at Universitas Gadjah Mada's postgraduate library and the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences undergraduate library generously allowed me access to materials. Pak Kris and Ibu Atik made sure I felt at home in my temporary home in Yogyakarta and Ellen Kent and Shane Bolitho and the other residents of the 'Pink House' made my time there so much more enjoyable. Mochamad Nukman went out of his way to help me in so many practical ways and his friendship was invaluable. I would also like to thank Sally White and Frank Jotzo for their hospitality and friendship during my time in Jakarta.

I am eternally grateful to my sister-in-law Alexandra Cooney for her hospitality and friendship during the times I spent in Canberra. She was always happy to open her home to me, often for long periods at a time, and always ensured I felt at home. I would also like to thank Carmel Collins, Deb Cook, Kathy Ragless and Barnaby Caddy who housed me on various occasions. Sally and Frank entrusted their home (and their cat!) to me for two weeks, and enabled me to get some much needed library research done. Sally was also a wonderful source of moral support throughout my (and her own) candidature. Dave McRae generously allowed me to use some of his material on student activism and provided some thought-provoking discussions over coffee. Kate McGregor and Michele Ford both read and commented on an early draft of chapter three.

My parents, Yvonne and Ray Jackson, have helped and encouraged me throughout this process. My mum spent many hours discussing the thesis with me and her own insights helped me to clarify my thinking. She also proofread the entire draft. My Dad's skills in Photoshop were invaluable when it came to reproducing the cartoons in chapters four and six. Jessie was my constant companion through all stages of the research and without her my sanity might not have remained intact! The members of Twenty Cent provided much needed relief and friendship during the crucial writing stage. Finally, I would like to thank my husband Edward, who has been a constant source of love and support (often from afar) and a quiet voice of reason throughout this process.

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of the politics of identity of Indonesian university students (*mahasiswa*) under Suharto's New Order. It focuses on the period between 1973 and 1988 and on the period between 1989, when Indonesia entered a limited period of openness (*keterbukaan*), and the fall of Suharto in 1998.

The study is grounded in theories about the relationship between language and power and in a method of textual analysis based on critical discourse analysis. Through the application of critical discourse analysis to a number of key state and student texts, the study provides an insight into the linguistic techniques the New Order employed in producing particular ways of thinking and speaking (discourses) about students' roles and identities. These discourses aimed to regulate how students were able to act in their capacity as students. It is also concerned with the ways in which students challenged the discourses of the New Order state by producing their own, alternative ways of thinking and speaking about their roles and identities.

Two state texts form the basis for the analysis in chapters three and five. These are the New Order's 'official' national history, the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, and a magazine published by the Department of Education and Culture from the late 1970s to the 1980s. The student texts analysed in chapters four and six comprise influential student newspapers and magazines published on campuses in Yogyakarta, Jakarta and Bandung during the mid to late 1970s and the 1990s.

As this study shows, the state employed strategies and techniques which aimed to incorporate students into the state itself by modifying their behaviour in ways which were consistent with its needs and interests. And while students' resistance was to some extent constrained by the limits set by the state, they also retained a significant capacity to exercise power on their own account. Indeed, students were only able to resist the state and its practices *because* they did so from within the parameters the state had defined for dissent.

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PRELIMINARY NOTES

Spelling and referencing of Indonesian names

Personal names in this thesis have been spelled using the pre-1972 spelling system where this is the individual's preference. The standard Indonesian spelling system (EYD) is used for all other names, including that of former president Suharto. Standard spelling is also used for the names of all organisations, including those which originally used the pre-1972 spelling system. For ease and consistency, Indonesian names appear in the reference list under the final element of the author's name. For example, Bonar Tigor Naipospos is located under Naipospos, Bonar Tigor.

Translations

All translations of Indonesian language material which appear in this thesis are my own. Readers are reminded that this thesis is not an exercise in translation. For the benefit of readers of Indonesian, the original Indonesian text appears in a footnote.

Primary sources

Material used in this thesis was sourced from collections held at the offices of *Balairung* and *Himmah*, the private collection of Dave McRae, and the collections of the National Library of Australia and the Menzies Library at the Australian National University. Additional material in microform format was purchased by the author from the Cornell University Library.

ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, now TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia).
angkatan	generation.
asrama	dormitories.
baik dan benar	correct and proper, the slogan of the New Order's language standardisation program.
bapak	father.
BKK	*Badan Koordinasi Kampus*, Campus Coordination Body, the policy introduced in 1979 to reorganise student representative bodies after the closure of the student councils in 1978.
Budi Utomo	Noble Endeavour, Indonesia's first 'modern' organisation, founded on 20 May 1908 by students at Stovia.
CDA	critical discourse analysis, a theoretical and methodological approach to the analysis of language and its relationship to social and political power; combines linguistic methods of analysis with social and political theory.
CGMI	Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia, Concentration of Indonesian Student Movements, the communist party affiliated student organisation of the 1960s.
cukong	Chinese conglomerates.
demokratisasi	democratisation.
dewan mahasiswa	student council, the main student representative body prior to introduction of BKK policy.
discourse	an abstract system of 'rules' which determine what can be said about a particular topic and how, when, by whom and to whom it can be said; a way of speaking and thinking

	about a particular domain of social experience; derived from the social structure and often, though not exclusively, realised in text.
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People’s Representative Council.
dwifungsi	dual function, the military and political role of the Indonesian armed forces.
ekstrim kanan	extreme right, extremist Islam.
ekstrim kiri	extreme left, communism.
Forum Demokrasi	Democracy Forum, an organisation of dissident intellectuals formed in 1990 and headed by Abdurrahman Wahid.
Front Pancasila	Pancasila Front, the 1966 coalition of anti-PKI parties and mass organisations, including the action units.
G30S/PKI	Gerakan 30 September/PKI, the Thirtieth of September Movement/PKI, the term used under the New Order to refer to the abortive coup of 30 September -1 October 1965.
GBHN	*Garis Besar Haluan Negara*, Broad Outlines of State Policy.
generasi muda	young generation.
government	a specific form of power in which those in authority seek to modify the behaviour of the governed and to promote ‘self-policing’.
Mahasiswa Menggugat	Gerakan Aksi Mahasiswa Menggugat, Action Movement for Student Demands, formed in 1970 to coordinate student protests against state corruption and economic mismanagement.
gerakan	movement.
Gerakan Penghematan	Austerity Movement, formed in December 1971 to protest against the building of *Taman Mini Indonesia Indah*.
GMKI	Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia, Indonesian Christian Student Movement, a member of the Kelompok Cipayung.

GMNI	Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Student Movement, the ‘nationalist’ student organisation and one of the five member organisations of the Kelompok Cipayung.
Golkar	Golongan Karya, Functional Groups, the New Order’s electoral vehicle.
Golput	Golongan Putih, White Group, a student movement formed in 1970 which encouraged voters to cast ineligible votes by marking the white section of the ballot paper in protest against the restrictions placed on the 1971 elections.
gotong royong	mutual assistance.
Guided Democracy	the period of Indonesian politics between 1959 and 1965 when President Sukarno presided over a government based on the 1945 Constitution, which he reintroduced by presidential decree in 1959.
HMI	Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Muslim Students Association, the modernist Islamic student movement associated with Masyumi before that party was banned in 1960, a dominant member of KAMI and one of the five member organisations of the Kelompok Cipayung.
IAIN	Institut Agama Islam Negeri, State Islamic Institute.
identity	the sense of self and the feelings and ideas that individuals or social groups have about themselves and their group; the multiple identities which individuals (and groups) possess reflect the various social domains they occupy.
IKIP	Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pengetahuan, Institute for Teaching and Education, teachers college.
Indonesia Muda	Young Indonesia, the first ‘national’ youth organisation, formed in 1930.
intelektual	intellectual.
intertextuality	the ‘networked’ nature of texts; the idea that texts interact with other contemporary texts, refer to past texts and anticipate future texts.

Jong Islamieten Bond	Young Muslims League, the organisation for Muslim youth founded in 1925.
Jong Sumatranen Bond	Young Sumatrans League, the Sumatran student association founded in 1917.
KAMI	Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, Indonesian Student Action Front, the anti-Communist student organisation formed on 25 October 1965 which was the main organisational vehicle of the 1966 student demonstrations.
KAPPI	Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia, Indonesian Youth and Student Action Front, one of the action fronts formed in 1965. After KAMI was banned, KAPPI continued the work of its ‘older brothers and sisters’.
kekuatan moral	moral force.
Kelompok Cipayung	Cipayung Group, an association of five extra-university student organisations (GMNI, GMKI, HMI, PMII and PMKRI) formed in 1972.
kekeluargaan	the family spirit, one of the key values of the New Order organic state.
keyword	a word or phrase which articulates a significant area of meaning in a text; one of the key means by which experiential meaning is conveyed.
KKN	*Kuliah Kerja Nyata*, compulsory community service program for university students first trialed in 1971 and introduced on a wider basis in 1974.
KKN	*Korupsi*, *Kolusi*, *Nepotisme*, Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism.
KNPI	Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, Indonesian National Youth Committee, the Golkar-sponsored corporatist organisation for youth formed in 1973.
kontrol sosial	social control.
Kopkamtib	Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order; founded in 1965 and dissolved in September 1988.
koran dinding	wall newspapers.
koreksi	correction.

keterbukaan	openness, the period of limited political liberalisation which began in 1989 and lasted until 1994.
leerlingen	pupil, the Dutch term used to describe secondary students in the Indies during the early 1900s.
lexical sets	sets of words which distinguish socially and institutionally significant areas of meaning.
LMND	Liga Mahasiswa Nasional untuk Demokrasi, National Students League for Democracy
mahasiswa	university student.
Malari	*Malapetaka Limabelas Januari*, the Fifteenth of January Disaster, the unrest of 1974 which began as a student protest against Japanese investment and ended in several days of mass rioting.
manusia penganalisa	people of analysis.
marhaen	Sukarno's term for Indonesia's rural masses, coined in the 1930s and associated with the PNI.
massa mengambang	floating mass, the policy under which the political parties (except Golkar) were prohibited from campaigning or establishing party branches below the district level.
masyarakat	society.
media aksi	action media, the student news bulletins which emerged on several university campuses at the height of the demonstrations of 1998.
murid	pupil, the Malay term used in the 1920s to describe secondary and vocational school students.
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly.
musyawarah dan mufakat	deliberation and consensus, promoted during the New Order as the authentically Indonesian mode of decision-making.
New Order	the period of Indonesian politics between 1966 and 1998 under the leadership of President Suharto.
NKK	*Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus*, Normalisation of Campus Life, the depoliticisation policy introduced after the student demonstrations of 1977 and 1978.

Old Order	the term coined in the late 1960s to describe the Sukarno regime.
oposisi	opposition.
order of discourse	the total set of discourses in a particular society or institution; describes the relationships between discourses, including specifying which discourses are privileged in which particular fields and how these discourses relate to less privileged alternatives.
overlexicalisation	the use of a large number of synonymous terms to describe a particular area of meaning; indicates a preoccupation with a particular topic (overwording or dense wording).
P4	*Pedoman Penhayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*, Guidelines for the Understanding and Application of the Pancasila, the Pancasila indoctrination courses for civil servants introduced in 1978.
Pancasila	the five principles which form the basis of the Indonesian state: belief in the one true God, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives, social justice for all Indonesians.
parliamentary democracy	the period of Indonesian politics between 1950 and 1959 during which Indonesia was governed by a parliamentary based on a multi-party democracy.
PDI	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democracy Party.
pelajar	student, the term used in the 1920s to describe students studying in institutions of higher education both within the Indies and outside it.
pembangunan	development.
pembinaan	improvement and development.
pemilu	*pemilihan umum*, general elections.
pemuda	youth.
pengabdian	service.

Perhimpunan Indonesia	Indonesia Association, founded in 1908 by students from the Indies studying in universities in the Netherlands.
perlawanan	resistance.
persatuan	unity.
perubahan	change.
Peta	Pembela Tanah Air, Homeland Defence Force, the volunteer army created by the Japanese in 1943.
Petisi Limapuluh	Petition of Fifty, formed in 1980 by a group of prominent public figures, including retired military officers and former politicians.
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party.
PMII	Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Students Movement, a member of the Kelompok Cipayung representing traditionalist Muslim students.
PMKRI	Persatuan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia, Catholic Students Association of the Republic of Indonesia, a member of the Kelompok Cipayung.
PMP	*Pendidikan Moral Pancasila*, Pancasila Moral Education, compulsory courses in the state ideology introduced in primary and secondary schools in 1975.
PNI	Partai Nasionalis Indonesia, Indonesian Nationalist Party.
pojok	literally, corner column, a short segment in a newspaper containing satirical comment on current issues and events.
politik	politics.
power	a set of relations which 'produces' social subjects by incorporating them and shaping them to fit its needs.
PPKI	Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence.
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party, the New Order 'Islamic' party formed in 1973.
PPPI	Perhimpunan Pelajar-Pelajar Indonesia, Indonesian Students Association, formed in 1926 by students at Stovia and the colonial-era college of law (Rechtschoogeschool). It had links to the PNI.
PRD	Partai Rakyat Demokratik, Indonesian Democratic Party.

PSPB	*Pendidikan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa*, Education in the History of the National Struggle.
PSI	Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party.
rakyat	the common people.
reformasi	reform.
relexicalisation	the process of creating new vocabulary items for existing concepts (rewording).
remaja	teenager, adolescent.
Repelita	Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun, Five-Year Development Plan.
resi	the reclusive Javanese sages whose role was to identify the signs of unrest within the kingdom.
resistant reading	an interpretation of a text which is (fully or partially) contradictory to the interpretation which the text producer intended.
role	the socially determined rights, obligations and duties that are associated with a particular social position or social status; individuals (and groups) occupy multiple roles in society.
SARA	*Suku*, *Agama*, *Ras*, *Antar-Golongan*, ethnic, religious, race and inter-group tensions.
Sarekat Islam	Islamic Union, the organisation originally founded in 1909 to support Indonesian Muslim traders and counter Chinese and Dutch dominance. It was one of the first mass-based organisations. In 1929 it became Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII).
senat mahasiswa	student senate.
SK028	*Surat Keputusan 028/U/1974*, the decision issued by Minister of Education and Culture Sjarif Thajeb in the aftermath of the Malari Affair which aimed to curtail student political activity.
SKS	*Sistem Kredit Semester*, Semester Credit System.
SMID	Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi, Indonesian Students’ Solidarity for Democracy.

SMPT	*Senat Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi*, University Student Senate, the policy introduced by Minister of Education and Culture Fuad Hassan in 1990 in response to student protests against NKK/BKK policy and the name of the university-level student representative body under this policy.
state	an ‘amalgam of social, political, ideological and economic elements’ which has a concrete form in the state apparatus (the coercive, judicial and bureaucratic arms of the state).
Stovia	School Tot Opleiding van Inlandesche Artsen, the colonial-era medical college in Batavia.
STT	*Surat Tanda Terdaftar*, Certificate of Registration, the publication license required by all student publications.
student	the Dutch term used to describe those studying in universities and institutions of higher education outside of the Indies.
Sumpah Pemuda	the Youth Pledge made at the Second Youth Congress in 1928: one nation, one homeland, one language.
Supersemar	*Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret*, the Order of March Eleven, the directive issued by Sukarno in 1966 which gave General Suharto the authority to restore order.
text	a unit of meaning of varying length, which incorporates written and/or visual elements and which has social significance for those who see, read or hear it; a continuous process of meaning-making, defined by the choices that speakers and writers make from the overall linguistic system and the ways in which readers or listeners interpret these choices.
TMII	*Taman Mini Indonesia Indah*, Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park.
Tri Koro Dharmo	Three Noble Ideals, the association for Javanese students formed in Batavia in 1915, later renamed Jong Java.
Tridharma Perguruan Tinggi	Trifold Mission of Institutions of Higher Education: education, research and service to society.

Tritura	*Tri Tuntutan Rakyat*, Three People's Demands: dissolve the PKI, replace the cabinet and reduce prices.
turun ke bawah	going down among the masses, the PKI-sponsored program in which urban artists and activists were placed in rural areas during the 1950s and 1960s.
Wawasan Alma Mater	Alma Mater Vision, introduced by Minister of Education and Culture Nugroho Notosusanto in 1983.

INTRODUCTION

In early 1998, a series of significant events took place in Indonesia. Prompted by price rises and worsening economic conditions, Indonesian university students began taking to the streets. As tensions grew, students clashed with the security forces, who fired rubber bullets and used tear gas against demonstrators. Then on 12 May at Jakarta's prestigious Trisakti University four students were shot. The shooting triggered several days of rioting in which buildings, vehicles and homes were burned and up to 1000 people were killed. On 18 May, students occupied the parliament building. Three days later, on 21 May, Suharto resigned. The images on the news showed jubilant and tearful Indonesian students celebrating Suharto's resignation.

As I followed these events, I was struck by the power of Indonesia's students as a political force. The student demonstrations of 1966 and 1998 were a significant (and very visible) factor in two leadership transitions. In fact, Indonesian students enjoy an almost legendary status, which dates back to the very beginnings of Indonesia's modern history as a nation-state. This status is celebrated in the prolific literature on *pemuda* (youth) and *mahasiswa* (university students) which documents their historical and contemporary role in Indonesian politics and society. Yet ironically, under Suharto's New Order regime (1966-1998) students were subject to various forms of physical repression, from intimidation to imprisonment and kidnappings.

I wanted to be able to explain this apparent contradiction. Why were Indonesian students both celebrated and maligned by the New Order? What had motivated them to take to the streets in 1998 as well as at various other times? As I delved into this topic, I began to think about questions of identity, and the ways in which the historical tradition of student activism, together with the relations of power which existed during the New Order, had shaped both the state's approach to students and the character of student dissent. Official histories celebrating the role of *pemuda* presented a stylised version of passionate nationalist youth struggling to improve the lot of the Indonesian people and rid the nation of its colonial oppressors and, later, of the communist scourge. At the same time, the government's policy and the approach of the security apparatus to student activism was designed to prevent contemporary *pemuda* and *mahasiswa* from acting out these roles. Student activism was seen as a threat to the stability and order so prized by the regime. Yet it was students' understandings of their historical roles, and their reactions to the New Order's policy approach, which led them to demonstrate in protest against it.

This thesis is a study of the politics of identity of Indonesian university students (*mahasiswa*) under Suharto's New Order. It focuses on the period between 1973 and 1988 - the height of the New Order - and on the period between 1989, when Indonesia entered a limited period of openness (*keterbukaan*), and the fall of Suharto in 1998 (see Aspinall 2000; Bertrand 1996; Lane 1991). The central question which this thesis asks is: how did the relations of power between students and the state and, more generally, between the state and wider society under the New Order, shape the ways both students and the New Order state represented students' roles and identities? It also addresses the secondary question of what effect these representations had on the terms in which students were able to think and speak about their roles and identities and hence on how they were able to act in their capacity as students.

The study is grounded in theories about the relationship between language and power and in a method of textual analysis based on critical discourse analysis. Through the application of linguistic methods of analysis to a number of key texts, the study provides an insight into the linguistic strategies used by the state to attempt to regulate how students were able to act. By producing particular ways of thinking and speaking - or discourses - about students' roles and identities, the New Order's aim was to construct a version of reality which would enable it to maintain the status quo, in particular, the asymmetrical relations of power between the state and wider society. For students, this meant acceptance of a depoliticised and development-oriented *mahasiswa* identity, one in which they were expected to fulfil the roles assigned to them in the 'organic state'.

The view of power on which this thesis is based draws on Foucault's work on the nature of power and the techniques of government. In Foucault's view, power is not an object or an entity but a complex set of strategic relations which aims to regulate the behaviour of others by determining the parameters within which they are able to act (Barker 1998, 27 and 38; see also chapter one). This view of power is captured in the notion of governmentality which describes the 'strategies, programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions' (Philpott 2000, 149). Governmentality is also concerned with how individuals govern themselves. As Philip Barker expresses it in his examination of Foucault's work: '[i]t is the basis of those self-subjecting technologies through which we are policed and police others' (Barker 1998, 64). The most effective forms of government are those which provide the conditions within which the governed are able to regulate their own behaviour. This necessitates allowing subjects the freedom to 'make the right choices'. Yet this freedom also carries a risk: free individuals will not always make choices that are consistent with the interests and aims of those in authority.

Foucault's view of power as a set of relations rather than a substance thus allows the possibility for resistance. This resistance may take a variety of forms, from private acts of non-conformity to public opposition to the authorities. As Hodge and Kress suggest, 'structuring the versions of reality on which social action is based' enables powerful groups to limit the ways in which individuals and groups within society are able to think and hence to act. Yet this will only be effective insofar as these versions of reality 'have been effectively imposed and have not been effectively resisted' (Hodge and Kress 1988, 3 and 7). This thesis is also concerned with the ways in which students challenged the discourses of the New Order state by producing their own, alternative ways of thinking and speaking about their roles and identities. The effect of these discourses was to contest the ways in which the state represented students' roles and identities and so redefine the parameters within which they were able to act. This had the dual purpose of justifying students' ongoing role in social and political life and of modifying (some aspects of) the status quo, in particular the relationship between students and the state and, to a lesser extent, between the state and wider society.

The relationship between students and the New Order state was both complex and at times contradictory. Ariel Heryanto has suggested that:

> Student activism is to a significant degree a construct of dominant discourse. … It is fair to say, appropriating Foucault's famous aphorism, that the history of Indonesian student activism is the history of the dominant discourse on students (Heryanto 1993, 44).

Such a formulation appears to bow to an overly constructivist view of discourse and one which limits the possibilities for the discursive creativity of social actors. Power relations between students and the state in New Order Indonesia cannot be adequately explained by the unqualified use of dichotomous categories such as ‘dominant’ and ‘dominated’. In analysing the relationship between students and the state, I want to avoid a view which sees the state as dominant and students as merely subordinate. Rather, as this study will argue, the development of particular ways of thinking and speaking about the roles and identities of students was a product of the conflict between students and the state over students’ roles and identities. This conflict mirrored the broader patterns of contestation between the state and wider society. An analysis of the politics of student identity can thus provide an insight into the broader dynamics of power in Indonesia. As this study argues, the state’s attempts to limit the ways in which students were able to think and speak about their roles and identities, and, consequently, how they were able to act, were not entirely successful. While the state discourse was able, to some extent, to set parameters for students’ actions, the strong tradition of student activism in Indonesia, together with other factors, gave them a significant voice within Indonesian society and politics and rendered them far from powerless in their relationship with the state.

The link between discourse, power and the politics of identity is an important one in Foucault’s work. In his view, social and political identities are not ‘given’ but, rather, are articulated and rearticulated through discourse on the basis of power relations. As Barker notes, social subjects are ‘the object[s] of interrelations of power that inscribe themselves on the body and induce subjects to recognise themselves in certain ways’ (1998, 29).

Texts are the material manifestation of discourse. The various properties that a text displays thus reflect particular ways of thinking and speaking. The linguistic choices made in the state and student texts examined in this study articulate students’ roles and identities as they are conceived in the discourses of the state and of students. Yet texts are also part of a continuous act of meaning-making between speakers or writers and listeners or readers. In producing their texts, speakers and writers choose from a range of linguistic features. Readers and listeners then engage in an active process of interpreting these texts (Halliday and Hasan 1985, 10-11; see also chapter one). All readers approach texts with a variety of different textual experiences and interpretive resources. These resources help to determine whether they will produce (fully or partially) compliant readings or whether they will resist the speaker's or writer's attempt to shape their reading of the text. As a result, the extent to which the identities produced in the state and student texts were 'taken up' by students depended in part on how students interpreted the texts they read.

Consequently, one of the limitations of this kind of text analysis is that we cannot know, without conducting detailed analysis of the responses of student readers to these texts, how they interpreted them. We also cannot know to what extent they accepted or rejected the roles and identities produced in these texts. As a result, this thesis does not claim to provide a comprehensive analysis of the meaning and, perhaps more importantly, the effect of the state and student texts.[1] Rather, it is concerned with identifying the textual and discursive strategies that were developed in the process of text production, as both state and student texts attempted to shape the ways in which student readers could think and speak about themselves, and consequently the ways they could act. Moreover, since the analyst is also a reader, who interprets the texts according to his or, in this case, her own textual experiences and interpretive resources, the analysis of the texts represents only one among a variety of possible interpretations, albeit one which is grounded in the current body of literature on power relations and the politics of language in New Order Indonesia (see Widdowson 1995a; Widdowson 1996; Fairclough 1996; see also chapter one).

The study focuses on a close examination of a number of key state and student texts.[2] Two state texts form the basis for the analysis in chapters three and five. These are the New Order's 'official' national history, the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, and a magazine published by the Department of Education and Culture from the late 1970s to the 1980s, entitled *Majalah Mahasiswa* (Student Magazine). These two texts were an important vehicle through which the state articulated its view on students' roles and identities. They were also explicitly aimed at students: the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* was the standard text on which all New Order history textbooks were based, and *Majalah Mahasiswa* described itself as a forum for 'the thinking as well as the concrete aspirations of students in supporting development'. For this reason, these two texts also provide an insight into the ways in which the state attempted to socialise student readers into what it saw as their appropriate roles and identities.

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[1] Chapter five does explore the degree to which students accepted or rejected the state's definition of their roles and identities in their contributions to the state-run magazine *Majalah Mahasiswa* (Student Magazine).

[2] These texts, and their audiences, are discussed in more detail in the individual chapters.

The student texts comprise influential student newspapers and magazines published on campuses in Yogyakarta, Jakarta and Bandung during the mid to late 1970s and the 1990s. The student press provided those who contributed to it as well as their audiences with a forum in which to reflect on their roles and identities. It brought together students from a variety of disciplines with a range of backgrounds and political views. These students directed their publications at a ‘critical middle ground’, attempting to appeal to an average student audience and at the same time encourage these readers to think in a critical way about a range of national and campus issues. The student press also had an important link to student activism: the growth of a critical student press often accompanied the development of student activism and, in the 1990s at least, students associated with campus-based publications often referred to themselves as *aktivis pers* (press activists). Former general manager (*pemimpin umum*) of Universitas Gadjah Mada’s student magazine *Balairung*, Hasan Bachtiar, for example, describes the student press as straddling the non-student press and student activism, academic pursuits and the desires of youth (*kehendak masa muda*) (Bachtiar 2000). The links between the student press and student activism gave the student publications a unique character as ‘the pioneers of change and a force to break through stasis’ (*pelopor perubahan dan pemecah kebekuan*) (Arifin 2000, cited in Bachtiar 2000). For these reasons, the student press provides a rich source of information on the ways in which those who wrote for the student press during the mid to late 1970s and the 1990s represented their roles and identities. It also provides an insight into the kinds of strategies that these students used to attempt to socialise their fellow students into the roles and identities constructed for them in the student press.

The analysis of the texts centres on a number of key areas of meaning, identified for their significance in the construction of students’ roles and identities. These key areas of meaning include the categories of *mahasiswa* (university student) and *pemuda* (youth) and the characteristics that are assigned to these categories. There is also a focus on students’ relationship to wider society, and to the state, and their status and role as intellectuals, as well as their role in politics. Each of these areas of meaning is described by a keyword, and is located within a broader set of terms. As the analysis shows, much of the contestation between students and the state is manifested in the competing meanings which are given to particular keywords.

Attention is also paid to some of the linguistic features of the texts. Of particular concern is the analysis of what the linguist Michael Halliday terms the ‘experiential’ and ‘interpersonal’ dimensions of language. The analysis of experiential and interpersonal meaning is concerned with specifying what kinds of actions students are represented as involved in, whether they are active or passive participants, and what the objects of their actions are. These linguistic choices are explored for their significance for the representation of students’ roles and identities. The analysis is also concerned with an examination of the patterns of modality in the text, with how discourse positions people as subjects and with who has the authority to speak a particular discourse. These linguistic features play an important role in the attempts to socialise students into the roles and identities constructed for them in the texts. The analysis of style, intertextuality and, in the student texts, irony and satire, also provide an insight into the ways in which students roles and identities are constructed in the texts and the ways in which the writers attempt to socialise students into these identities.

My aim has been to make the thesis accessible and interesting for those without a background in linguistics or discourse analysis. As a result, this thesis does not present a comprehensive linguistic analysis of the texts themselves. Rather, it uses the texts as evidence of the structures of discourse and the dynamics of power relations in New Order Indonesia as they relate to the politics of student identity.

This study aims to add to the understanding of the politics of student identity in Indonesia during the New Order. The organisations, themes and character of Indonesian youth and student activism, particularly in the New Order period, have been well-documented (see chapter two). However, very few of these studies have approached the student movement from the perspective of discourse analysis (Heryanto 1993, 1996 are exceptions). Nor have there been any systematic attempts to examine the ways in which students actively constructed their role and identity *as students* as a means of justifying their continuing role in social and political life during the New Order period and of challenging the state.

Much scholarly work on New Order Indonesia has focused on the dominance of the state over social and political life, and on the reasons for the collapse of this dominance in the late New Order period (see for example Anderson 1990a; Jackson 1978; Mackie and MacIntyre 1994; James 1990; Crouch 1998). The literature on opposition to the state has tended to focus on the themes of opposition or the activities of political organisations (see for example Aspinall 2000; Uhlin 1997). Opposition to the New Order has also been approached from the perspective of literature and the performing arts (see for example Hatley 1990; Foulcher 1990; Clark 2001; Errington 2001; Hill 1979; see also Matheson Hooker 1999). In contrast, this study focuses on the micro-level aspects of resistance and opposition. It foregrounds analysis of one form of resistance to the New Order by examining one of the key groups which consistently challenged the New Order. A significant strength of this approach is that it focuses in detail on the role of language in the articulation of power and resistance to power. Its focus is also on the analysis of non-literary texts.

The study also contributes to the broader theoretical literature by providing a practical case study of the application of critical discourse analysis to the analysis of resistance in language. Critical discourse analyses have tended to focus on the language of the powerful with the result that analysis of resistance to the exercise of power and to the discourses of those in authority has been somewhat neglected. This is in part an effect of the application of Weberian theories of power and Marxist conceptions of ideology, with their emphasis on dominance and ‘false consciousness’. The application of Foucault’s concept of power provides the theoretical tools which enable this to be redressed.

Critical discourse analysis offers an effective model for examining power relations in Indonesia. Yet the limitations of the critical discourse analysis method also apply to this study. In particular, unless coupled with a quantitative analysis of readers’ responses to the texts, critical discourse analysis can only provide an insight into the strategies of text production and not those of text interpretation. An understanding of the latter is critical if we are to fully understand the effect of texts and reading on how New Order students themselves saw their roles and identities.

The primary focus of the thesis is the period from 1973 to 1998. It does not deal with the early years of the New Order (1965-1973) or with the post-Suharto era. The period between 1973 and 1988 was characterised by the increasing consolidation of power at the centre and by a simultaneous restriction on political freedoms. It was also during this time that many of the New Order's ideological indoctrination programs were put in place, including the introduction of the Pancasila indoctrination courses (*Pedoman Penhayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*, Guidelines for the Understanding and Application of the Pancasila), and school subjects such as Pancasila Moral Education (*Pendidikan Moral Pancasila*, PMP), as well as courses in the History of the National Struggle (*Pendidikan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa*, PSPB) and civics (see Thomas 1981; Siegel 1986, 145; Leigh 1991; Parker 1992; Bourchier 1994; Antlov 1996; Mulder 2000). These programs aimed to socialise Indonesian citizens into New Order's interpretation of Pancasila (and its application in the form of Pancasila democracy) and its version of Indonesia's national history. More practically, these programs aimed to mobilise the support of wider society for development.[3]

The economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s resulted in significant changes to Indonesia's social structure. This growth had important political and social impacts on Indonesia's class structure. In particular, it resulted in the creation of a new, more politically aware middle class. As a result of these and other changes, societal and elite level pressures for reform began to mount, and the New Order was forced to allow for a limited 'opening' of the political system. The period of *keterbukaan*, which began in 1989 and lasted until 1994, was marked by an increase in political activity by civil society groups, including elite level groups such as the Petition of Fifty (Petisi Limapuluh) and the Democracy Forum (Forum Demokrasi, Fodem) as well as NGOs, students, urban workers, and the Indonesian Democracy Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI) (see Aspinall 2000). This study thus compares the politics of student identity during two key periods in the New Order – its height, and then slow decline.[4]

The aim of this study is not to provide a comprehensive account of student identities across Indonesia. The depth of analysis has necessitated a limit to the number of texts analysed. The publications selected are from universities based on Java, and in the large urban centres of Jakarta, Bandung and Yogyakarta. This choice reflects the importance of these centres in the development of student activism. In the 1960s and 1970s at least, the campuses of three of the oldest and most prestigious universities in the country - Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta, Institut Teknologi Bandung and Yogyakarta's Universitas Gadjah Mada - were also among the main sites of student activism and of student press activism more specifically. By the 1990s, the geographical distribution of student activism, and with it the development of a critical student press, had shifted to other geographical centres as well as to smaller state and private universities. Although the publications chosen for analysis in chapter six to some degree reflect this, it has not been possible to include publications from outside Java.

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[3] The Pancasila courses were not a New Order initiative. During the Guided Democracy period similar courses had been run in schools and universities (Fischer 1965, 113).

[4] This thesis does not examine student identities during the early New Order period (1966 to 1974) although aspects of the student discourse of that period had an important impact on the development of students' representations of their roles and identities during the mid to late 1970s. Where this is the case, it has been noted.

The study focuses on publications from the larger secular state universities. The choice of publications reflects the relative importance of student activism on these larger state campuses, although I have included publications from a number of private universities and state Islamic universities in the analysis in chapter six in recognition of the growing importance of these campuses. A study of the development of student identities in the student press on the campuses of smaller private universities and of state and private Islamic universities would no doubt yield additional dimensions to the discourse that have not been covered here.

The study is structured to reflect the chronological development of students' roles and identities during the two periods under examination. The early chapters provide the theoretical and contextual framework for the study. The remaining chapters comprise detailed analysis of the texts themselves.

Chapters one and two locate the thesis both theoretically and in the context of New Order Indonesia. Chapter one surveys the literature on critical discourse analysis and outlines the particular method which this study employs in the analysis of the texts. The second part of the chapter examines the literature specific to Indonesia. It surveys the literature on state-society relations and the nature of opposition and resistance in New Order Indonesia. It then explores existing work on political discourse and political aspects of language in Indonesia and identifies the need for a greater understanding of the micro-level aspects of opposition and resistance in New Order Indonesia.

Chapter two examines the history of youth and student activism in Indonesia and introduces the youth and student population of the New Order. This provides the background for the analysis in the remaining chapters. The first part of the chapter examines the history of youth and student activism in Indonesia, focusing on some of the ways in which these early student activists saw their roles, as well as how the terms *pemuda* and *mahasiswa* emerged in the colonial and immediate post-colonial era. The second part of the chapter examines some of the key national policies on the young generation (*generasi muda*) and students (*mahasiswa*) under the New Order. The chapter suggests that the strong tradition of youth and student activism in Indonesia, coupled with Indonesia's predominantly young population, necessitated a policy approach which sought to integrate the young generation ideologically, and at the same time utilise them in a practical way for development (*pembangunan*). The final part of the chapter provides a brief survey of student activism in Indonesia during the New Order and examines the existing literature on the student movement in Indonesia, as it relates to the present study.

Chapters three, four, five and six constitute the substantive component of the thesis. Chapter three is a close reading of the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* (National History of Indonesia). Through a detailed examination of the *Sejarah*'s account of the key moments in Indonesia's modern history in which the role of youth is celebrated, the chapter explores the ways in which official New Order historiography constructed the historical roles and identities of Indonesia's youth. The chapter suggests that the *Sejarah* provides a series of 'lessons' for the young generation of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s about the roles they were expected to play within the New Order state. These lessons were constructed within an organicist framework of harmony, consensus, self-sacrifice and collective over individual interests. It argues that in the process of redefining the historical roles and identities of Indonesia's youth and students, the *Sejarah*'s account both manifests and attempts to resolve the essential tension between recognising the pioneering role of Indonesia's youth in history and the need to ensure that the youth and students of the New Order saw their role not as revolutionaries but as heroes of development.

Chapter four analyses the ways in which students writing in the student press between 1976 and 1980 responded to the state's attempts to limit their practical role in politics through the measures put in place following the Malari riot of 1974 and the demonstrations of 1977/1978. Through an examination of two student publications, the chapter traces the development of students' 'discourse of dissent' regarding their roles and identities. In this discourse, students defined their role as a force for 'social control' and 'correction' of the New Order state and its practices, as a moral rather than a purely political force, as leaders of the common people (*rakyat*) and as intellectuals. They did so from a position of loyalty to the ideals, if not the practice, of the regime. As a result, the student press of the 1970s did not present a fundamental challenge to the state or its discourse. This strategy was a response to the very real threat of repression that students faced. The chapter also explores some of the linguistic techniques employed in the student press. It focuses on the use of irony and satire, rhetorical questions and a colloquial variety of Indonesian, suggesting that students who wrote in the student press used these techniques to attempt to socialise their fellow students into the roles and identities constructed for them in the student press.

Chapter five is a close analysis of a magazine aimed at students and published by the Department of Education and Culture during the 1980s. The chapter traces the ways in which, through this magazine, the New Order state sought to redefine students' roles and identities in developmentalist terms. In this view, students were 'people of analysis' and future technocrats rather than politically engaged intellectuals. They also had a duty to serve wider society and the nation. At the same time, students were the objects of state efforts to 'improve' them. This depoliticised and development-oriented identity had as its aim the regulation of students' political behaviour. Yet this magazine was more than just a vehicle for the dissemination of the state's ideas on the roles and identities of youth and students. It also represented a site where students actively collaborated in the process of defining those identities, even as it limited the discursive and practical possibilities open to them. This was an integral part of the state's disciplinary strategy. And while the state was to some extent successful in governing the terms in which students were able to define their roles and identities, students also challenged the state's definitions of their role as compliant subjects in development.

Chapter six examines the shifts in students' representations of their roles and identities in the context of the period of political openness (*keterbukaan*) and the period leading up to the fall of Suharto. The chapter demonstrates that through the meanings they gave to six interlinked keywords, students who wrote in the student press of the 1990s defined their role as actors in a broad pro-democracy movement which aimed at a thoroughgoing transformation of Indonesia's social, political and economic structures. Within this movement, students' relationship to the state was conceived in terms of opposition and resistance and their relationship to the *rakyat* as one of strategic collaboration. The chapter suggests that within the student press, students developed a genuinely oppositional discourse in which their roles, and their relationship to the state, were defined in terms of conflict, struggle and resistance. Yet although this role presented a significant challenge to the New Order's organicist values of harmony, consensus and the unity of state and society, students retained a significant amount of freedom for political expression. This freedom was possible in part because a significant proportion of students used their political freedom 'responsibly', by representing their roles and identities in ways which did not directly threaten the ideological basis of the regime. It was also a product of the state's capacity to repress dissent when necessary and the relatively weak nature of organised civil society opposition.

The study highlights the complex nature of power and power relations in New Order Indonesia. It demonstrates that in 'governing' Indonesian students, the state employed strategies and techniques which aimed not at the simple domination of these students but at their incorporation into the state itself. The exercise of this productive form of power aimed to modify students' behaviour in ways which were consistent with the needs and interests of the state. In addition, rather than emphasising the negative effects of the exercise of state power on students, this study focuses on students' utilisation of the freedom allowed them as part of the process of government. The study suggests that while students' resistance to the state was to some extent constrained by the limits set by the state, students also retained a significant capacity to exercise power on their own account. Indeed, it was only *because* students were able to work within the parameters set by the state, that they were able to continue to play a role a significant role in social and political life.

CHAPTER ONE

Discourse, opposition and the politics of student identity

The aim of this chapter is to locate the key questions addressed in this study within both an empirical context and a theoretical framework, and to explain the approach this study will take in answering these questions. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part locates the study within the literature on critical discourse analysis (CDA). It outlines some of the key issues in critical discourse analysis which underpin the thesis and defines the key terms used in the study (see also glossary). These include definitions of text and discourse and the relationship between text, discourse and social structure, the construction of identity in discourse and text and the nature of power. The section concludes by setting out the methodological framework used in the analysis of the texts, which is based on the linguist Michael Halliday's work on social semiotics (see Halliday 1978; see also Halliday and Hasan 1985; Halliday 1994; Eggins 1994). Since an important element of this thesis is to test the effectiveness of this method for understanding discourse and power in Indonesia, some of the methodological and theoretical limitations which have influenced the analysis and the findings of the study are also discussed.

The second part of the chapter examines the literature specific to Indonesia. It begins by locating the central arguments of the thesis within the scholarly writing on the nature of the New Order state and the nature of opposition and resistance in New Order Indonesia. It then explores existing work on political discourse and political aspects of language in Indonesia. The discussion centres on the contributions previous studies have made to the understanding of political discourse in Indonesia and, by identifying both the strengths and the limitations of their approaches, indicates where the gaps in the literature lie. The discussion also shows how the key research questions both arise in response to the limitations of earlier investigations and are built on their findings.

Conceptualising discourse and power

Critical discourse analysis refers to a range of theoretical and methodological approaches to the analysis of language and its relationship to social and political power (see Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 262-8). Its genesis lies in attempts beginning in the late 1970s to explore the social and ideological dimensions of language. A number of streams within CDA, including critical linguistics, social semiotics and Norman Fairclough's three-dimensional model of discourse and discourse analysis, take their inspiration from the work of Michael Halliday, and in particular his view of language as a 'social semiotic' (see Fowler, Hodge Kress and Trew 1979; Hodge and Kress 1979; Hodge and Kress 1988; Fairclough 1992; see also Halliday 1978; Halliday and Hasan 1985).[1] This model is combined with aspects of social and political theory, and in particular neo-Marxist theories about ideology developed in the work of Antonio Gramsci, Jurgen Habermas and other philosophers associated with the Frankfurt School, as well as Louis Althusser (Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 260-1).

The term 'critical discourse analysis' was first used by Norman Fairclough in 1985 (Fairclough 1995, 23; Fairclough 1985, reproduced in Fairclough 1995). Fairclough's work drew on Halliday's model as well as social and political theory, in particular the work of Gramsci and Althusser. It also incorporated elements of French philosopher Michel Foucault's work on discourse and discourse analysis (see Fairclough 1992, chapter 2). Since then, the term has gained currency and is now used as an umbrella term for the Hallidayan-based approaches, including critical linguistics, social semiotics and Fairclough's approach, the socio-cognitive approach of Teun van Dijk, the 'discourse-historical method' of Ruth Wodak, and a variety of other critical approaches to discourse analysis (Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 262-8).[2]

The aim of critical discourse analysis is to examine aspects of power and power relations and their 'enactment, concealment, legitimation and reproduction' in language (van Dijk 1993a, 132; see also van Dijk 1993b, 249-52; van Dijk 2001, 352-3; Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 258-9; Fowler 1987, 482-3; Pennycook 1994, 121). Most work in CDA has to date focused on the ways in which powerful groups use language to sustain unequal relations of power, although CDA is also concerned with the ways in which resistance and opposition are encoded in text (van Dijk 1993a, 132; van Dijk 1993b, 250; van Dijk 2001, fn 2).

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[1] Halliday's model draws on the semiotics of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure.

[2] This broad use of the term is not unproblematic. Toolan (1997, 99-100), for example, suggests that the methodological diversity of CDA has been a key criticism of the method. Fowler (1987, 492), identifying the disintegration of the Hallidayan framework of critical linguistics and social semiotics, calls for 'a standardisation of the method and its metalanguage'.

CDA also has an explicitly reformative aim, namely to expose inequalities in power relationships as they are represented in language and so to raise awareness amongst disadvantaged groups of the ways in which the powerful position them. In doing so, it hopes to effect social and political change (van Dijk 1993b, 252-4; van Dijk 2001, 352-3; Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 258-9; Fowler 1987, 482-3; Pennycook 1994, 121).

This explicit socio-political stance has received some criticism, in particular from the applied linguist Henry Widdowson (see Widdowson 1995a; Widdowson 1996; see also Toolan 1997, 87-88; Dillon, Doyle, Eastman, Silberstein and Toolan 1993). Widdowson suggests that political commitment in critical discourse analysis detracts from its validity as analysis and renders it closer to interpretation. Analysis, he argues, ‘recognises its own partiality, [whereas] interpretation, of its nature, must suspend that recognition’ (Widdowson 1995a, 159). As a result, he claims, ‘[w]hat is actually revealed [in critical discourse analysis] is the particular discourse perspective of the interpreter’ (Widdowson 1995a, 169; see also Widdowson 1995b; Widdowson 1996; see also Fairclough 1996). Yet an explicit ideological position, and in particular the position of the dominant, need not be a requirement of critical discourse analysis. All analysts approach the process of analysis with particular socio-political stances and interpret data to some extent according to these biases. The position of the analyst in critical discourse analysis is thus no more partial than that of the historian or the political scientist (see also Toolan 1997, 100). Nevertheless, recognition of this partiality is of value in pointing out the limitations of any analysis which claims to represent ‘truth’.[3]

Text, discourse and social structure

Two fundamental concepts that CDA employs in the analysis of language and power are text and discourse. Text is a familiar term in linguistics. In its broadest sense, text can be conceived as a social or cultural *product*. In this view, text is not merely a linguistic product, made up of words or sentences, but, as Halliday expresses it, a 'unit of meaning' which serves a social function and which has social significance for those who produce it as well as those who hear, read, see or otherwise experience and interpret it (Halliday 1978, 108-9; Halliday and Hasan 1985, 10). The present study is mostly concerned with the linguistic form of text, and in particular with written texts (see Widdowson 1995a, 160-4 for this view of text). However, it also considers texts which incorporate both a written and a visual element, such as the student cartoons examined in chapters four and six. For the most part, the study is concerned with the analysis of texts of sentence length and above, although it also deals with smaller texts (individual words) and with larger texts (paragraphs, newspaper articles, chapters and sub-sections). These texts are considered in their wider contexts, both their wider textual context as well as their broader social, cultural and political context.

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[3] Foucault’s view of discourse, outlined below, is also useful in this regard (see Widdowson 1995b, 516).

Following Halliday, this study defines text as a *process* in the sense that it is a continuous process of meaning-making, defined by the choices that text producers (speakers and writers) make from the overall linguistic system (Halliday 1978, 139-40; Halliday and Hasan 1985, 10-11) and the ways in which readers or listeners interpret these choices (see below). This insight draws on Saussure's distinction between *langue* (the language system) and *parole* (the use of language). Saussure held that meaning came from the system of language (*langue*), which was responsible for structuring speakers' experience of the world (Macdonell 1986, 8-9).[4] In producing instances of language use (*parole*), manifested in texts (in their linguistic form), speakers make choices from this linguistic system. This is often referred to in terms of 'representation' (see Fowler 1987, 482-3; Wilson 2001, 401).[5] Not all choices are the same: speakers and writers may represent similar phenomena in different ways. A basic assumption of both the Hallidayan model and of CDA, as well as sociolinguistics more generally, is that the linguistic choices that speakers and writers make when they use language are socially, culturally and politically determined (see Widdowson 1995b, 514; Fowler

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[4] See also Widdowson 1995b, 514 and Kress 1985a, 30 for a discussion of Saussure in the context of CDA.

[5] Wilson defines representation as 'how language is employed in different ways to represent what we can … believe and perhaps think'. The universalist perspective on representation holds that the way we think determines what we are able to say (or write) and the ways in which we are able to say (or write) it. The relativist position, on the other hand, maintains that our experience of the world, and the ways in which we are able to think about it, is mediated by language. The corollary of the relativist position is that controlling what people are able to say and the ways in which they are able to say it, enables control over thought (Wilson 2000, 401).

1987, 482-3). One of the stated aims of CDA is to reveal the underlying reasons for the particular representations or choices that speakers and writers make from this language system (Fowler 1987, 482-3; see also below).[6]

Discourse is also a term familiar to linguistics. The term discourse, however, is also used in other social sciences. This has led to some confusion about its meaning, particularly in CDA, which seeks to combine a linguistic view of discourse with more socially and politically oriented perspectives.[7] In many branches of linguistics, discourse is defined as a unit of text larger than a sentence (see Pennycook 1994, 116 and 117-120; Widdowson 1995, 160-4). Such a definition is of limited use in a theory of language which seeks to explore its social and political aspects. A more useful conception of discourse is that offered by Foucault, who suggests that discourse is an abstract system of 'rules' which determine what can be said about a particular topic and how, when, by whom and to whom it can be said (Foucault 1972). In this view, discourse describes a way of speaking and thinking about a particular domain of social experience. Discourse is derived from the social structure (with its particular configurations of power relations) and is often, though not exclusively, realised in text (Pennycook 1994, 128 and 130-1; see also Kress 1985b, 27). Kress sums up Foucault's view of discourse in the following way:

> Discourses are systematically-organised sets of statements which give expression to the meanings and values of an institution. Beyond that, they define, describe and delimit what it is possible to say (and by extension – what it is possible to do or not to do) with respect to the area of concern of that institution… A discourse provides a set of possible statements about a given area and organises and gives structure to the manner in which a particular topic, object, process is to be talked about. In that it provides descriptions, rules, permissions and prohibitions of social and individual actions (Kress 1985a, 6-7).[8]

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[6] Fowler notes that 'Critical linguistics insists that all representation is mediated, moulded by the value-systems that are ingrained in the medium (language in this case) used for representation; it challenges common sense by pointing out that something could have been represented some other way, with a very different significance. This is not, in fact, simply a question of 'distortion' or 'bias': there is not necessarily any true reality that can be unveiled by critical practice, there are simply relatively varying representations' (Fowler 1987, 483).

[7] The combination of linguistic definitions of discourse with more socially and politically oriented perspectives in CDA is both a strength and a weakness. As Widdowson points out, Fairclough's model (set out in Fairclough 1992) raises questions about '…how far it is possible to combine theories without compromising them. It raises too the question of compatibility between …abstract theoretical models and descriptive practice' (Widdowson 1995b, 516).

[8] Some practitioners of CDA, most notably Norman Fairclough, have drawn on the work of Foucault in formulating a critical view of discourse and discourse analysis (Fairclough 1992; Fairclough 1995; see also Kress 1985a; Kress 1985b). Yet there are some important differences between the way in which Fairclough uses the term discourse and the way in which Foucault saw discourse. Fairclough defines

Foucault's position thus provides us with a number of important insights about the nature of discourse and its effects on individuals. Foucault's view of discourse is a relativist one, in which language is seen as mediating our experience of the world, and as determining the ways in which we are able to think about it (see fn 5). Thus, for Foucault, by producing ways of speaking about the world, discourse also provides a way of thinking about the world. Moreover, since the ways in which we speak and think about the world also influence what we do, discourse provides a set of parameters for the ways in which individuals and groups are able to act in their capacity as social subjects (see also van Dijk 2001, 357-8; Hodge and Kress 1988, 3).[9]

Shifting the focus from the nature of discourse and its effects on individuals to the place of discourse in the social structure, we gain further insights from Foucault's work.[10] Foucault's method of discourse analysis is an historical one, based on his view that discourses are socially and historically constructed. In this view, discourses are constructed from combinations of both prior and contemporary discourses which are in turn derived from the conditions of past and present social structures. As a result, any one discourse is defined by its relation to both past discourses and to the discourses which are its contemporaries (Fairclough 1992, 39-40).[11] The total set of discourses in a particular society or institution is called an 'order of discourse' (Fairclough 1992, 43). An order of discourse describes the relationships between discourses, including specifying which discourses are privileged in which particular fields and how these discourses relate to less privileged alternatives. As Kress expresses it:

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discourse (as an abstract noun) as 'spoken or written language use' (although it can also refer to non-verbal types of communication, etc) and 'language use conceived as social practice' (Fairclough 1995, 131 and 135; see also Pennycook 1994, 121). Yet he also distinguishes discourse as a count noun (discourses), which he defines as 'ways of signifying areas of experience from a particular perspective' (Fairclough 1995, 132 and 135). While the latter definition approximates Foucault's view of discourse, the former, as Pennycook rightly points out, defines discourse as an essentially 'linguistic phenomenon, albeit socially embedded' (Pennycook 1994, 127; see also Kress 1985b, 27-9 for a discussion of the distinction between text and discourse). For Foucault, however, discourse was not itself a linguistic phenomenon but, as suggested above, an abstract system (Fairclough's second definition of discourse) which is realised in texts (as instances of language use). A similar use of the term discourse in both a linguistic sense and in a Foucauldian sense ('racist discourse') is also evident in van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach (see for example van Dijk 1993b). To the extent that the term 'discourse' refers in Fairclough and van Dijk's work to 'socially embedded language use', then it seems to represent somewhat of a conceptual 'doubling-up' of the definition of text as 'product' and 'process' offered by Halliday (see above).

[9] Hodge and Kress suggest that '[i]deological complexes are constructed in order to constrain behaviour by structuring the versions of reality on which social action is based, in particular ways' (1988, 3).

[10] But see Fairclough (1992) on the shifts in Foucault's view of discourse throughout his work.

[11] This view is similar to ideas about intertextuality developed by Julia Kristeva and Mikhail Bakhtin (see below).

> Discourses do not exist in isolation but within a larger system of sometimes opposing, contradictory, contending, or merely different discourses … [The] dynamic relations between these [discourses] … ensure continuous shifts and movement, progression or withdrawal in certain areas (Kress 1985a, 7).

This idea of discourses as competing is a central one for the concerns of this thesis. Kress suggests that:

> Within any social group there are a number of discourses, because a number of significant institutions operate within any one social group. Hence any group will be using a number of discourses offering alternative or contradictory accounts of reality. That is, even though any one discourse accounts for the area of its relevance, there are overlapping areas of interest where differing accounts are offered, which are contested by several discourses (1985a 11).

In later work on power, Foucault saw discourse itself as both a site of and a stake in struggles of power (see also below):

> Discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized (1984, 109).

It is this notion of discourses as 'competing' for discursive supremacy which underpins the characterisation of state and student discourses in this thesis as 'warring words'.[12]

Foucault's view of discourse is useful for pointing out the ways in which discourse sets certain parameters for what we are able to say and write about the world and how we are able to do so. However, as Fairclough points out, this view is an overly constitutive one (Fairclough 1992, 60-1). Foucault's concept of 'orders of discourse' does allow for opposition, contestation and difference between discourses and suggests that discourse is in fact a key stake in power. This contestation is manifested in the contradictory ways in which texts are produced. Yet Foucault's perspective, like that of the early critical linguists, does not allow sufficient scope for the creative processes of text interpretation, in which readers and listeners may interpret texts in a variety of compliant or resistant ways.

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[12] Seidel suggests similarly that: '…discourse of any kind … is a site of struggle. It is a terrain, a dynamic linguistic, and, above all, semantic space in which social meanings are produced or challenged (Seidel 1985, 44).

What, then, is the relationship between text and discourse? It was suggested above that for Foucault, discourse is often, though not exclusively, realised through text, or, to use his term, statements. Kress argues that this fact means that 'certain syntactic forms will necessarily correlate with certain discourses' (1985b, 28):

> The systematic organisation of content in discourse, drawing on and deriving from the prior classification of this material in an ideological system, leads to the systematic selection of linguistic categories and features in a text (Kress 1985b, 30).

The relationship between text and discourse, however, is a complex one since different and even conflicting discourses may be realised in a particular text (Kress 1985b, 27 and 29; see also Fairclough and Wodak 1997, 227).

Given this relationship, what is the place of text-based analysis in discourse analysis? In *The archaeology of knowledge* (1972), Foucault acknowledged that linguistic analysis was one method for the analysis of discourse, although discourse analysis could not be reduced to linguistic analysis (Fairclough 1992, 40; Foucault 1972, 108).[13] In his own work on discourse, however, Foucault was more concerned with specifying the social and historical processes by which particular discourses came into being (Fairclough 1992, 40). Fairclough has suggested that this emphasis on macro-level social and historical processes is one of the main weaknesses of Foucault's approach and one of the ways in which the focus on text analysis in critical discourse analysis approaches can strengthen Foucault's method of discourse analysis (Fairclough 1992, 57-8). Since discourse is realised in text, a close analysis of the features of a text can provide an insight into the structures of the discourse which inform it as well as the larger social system, including the power relations, from which the discourse is derived.

Yet in analysing the linguistic features of a text, we must be careful to avoid a view of the text as encoding social meanings, which can then be 'read-off' by the analyst. This view, which was an underlying assumption of early critical linguistics (Fowler et al 1979; Hodge and Kress 1979), has received some strong criticism. This criticism has focused on the role of readers and listeners in actively interpreting the texts they read and hear and, in doing so, constructing their own, often divergent, social meanings (see for example Fowler 1987, 488; Fairclough 1992, 60-1). As a result of these criticisms, subsequent formulations have emphasised the fact that texts *as products* represent only part of the process of social meaning making; as *processes*, texts (in their linguistic form) are subject to active processes of interpretation on the part of listeners and readers. Widdowson, for example, suggests that texts record the meanings of the text producer, which are directed at an idealised anticipated audience. During the process of text interpretation, 'real' readers engage in an active process of meaning-making (Widdowson 1995a, 164). In recognition of this, there has been an increased emphasis in critical discourse analysis on the role of listeners and readers in interpreting texts. Fowler, for example, suggests that:

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[13] A text-based analysis of discourse is thus not incompatible with Foucault's view. Foucault argues that discourse determines what statements are possible about a particular area as well as how, when, by whom and to whom such statements can be made. While Foucault's concern was with macro-level social and historical processes, there is no reason why discourse analysis cannot also be concerned with specifying the properties of the statement (text) which is 'the elementary unit of discourse' (Foucault 1972, 80).

> Texts construct 'reading positions' for readers, that is, they suggest what ideological formations it is appropriate for readers to bring to texts. But the reader, in this theory, is not the passive recipient of fixed meanings: the reader, remember, is discursively equipped prior to the encounter with the text, and reconstructs the text as a system of meanings which may be more or less congruent with the ideology which informs the text (Fowler 1987, 486).

The idea that readers may not interpret texts in the way that writers intend is captured in the notion of 'resistant readings' (see Fairclough 1992, 135-6; see also Hacker, Coste, Kamm and Bybee 1991).[14] Since all readers approach texts with a variety of different textual experiences and interpretive resources, they may produce a wide range of (fully or partially) compliant or resistant readings (Fairclough 1992, 135-6).

To sum up: discourses produce ways of speaking and thinking about the world. In doing so, they also set parameters for the ways in which individuals and groups are able to act in the world. These particular ways of thinking and speaking about the world (discourses) are derived from the social structure, with its particular configuration of power relations, and so reflect them. Texts encode these ways of thinking and speaking about the world and as such also reflect the social structure. A linguistic analysis of texts can thus provide insights into both the structures of discourse and the larger social system from which these discourses are derived, with the qualification that texts may be interpreted in multiple ways. Discourses are also historically and socially constructed and are defined in relation to other past and present discourses, captured in the notion of an ‘order of discourse’. The relationships between discourses within an order of discourse are often characterised by contestation, which reflects the dynamic power relationships between groups and individuals in a particular society or institution. Change in discourse and in text originates at the level of social structure, in the transformations of power relations. Since discourse is derived from the social structure, these transformations in power relationships have effects on both discourse and on text (see Fairclough 1992, 96-7).

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[14] Wilson argues that: 'readers interpret texts in terms of their already existing mental schemas. As a result, they are unlikely to change a negative view of a particular issue upon reading or hearing a text which represents this issue in a more positive way'. People 'may be biased in their mode of interpretation from the start. For such individuals, manipulations of transitivity, or other aspects of structure, may have little effect on interpretation, which is not to say that such structural forms may not have an effect elsewhere' (Wilson 2001, 406 and 409). See also Widdowson 1995a, Fairclough 1996 and Widdowson 1996 on questions of text interpretation.

Constructing identity in discourse and text

As noted in the preface, this thesis is concerned with the politics of identity of Indonesian university students. The term ‘politics of identity’ as it is used in this study refers to the ways in which politics shapes social and political identities. Rather than such identities being ‘given’, this study suggests, following Foucault, that they are articulated and rearticulated through discourse and text as well as through particular configurations of power relations at the level of social structure (Mottier 2002).

The term identity is used in the broad sociological sense to refer to the sense of self and the feelings and ideas that individuals have about themselves (Marshall 1998, 296). As Johnson expresses it, identity is concerned with ‘who we are in relation to ourselves, to others and to social systems’ (Johnson 2000, 277). Throughout this thesis the term identity is used in the plural form since, as Foucault has pointed out, individuals have multiple identities, which reflect the various social domains which they occupy (see below).

Identity is essentially an individual category. However, it can also be used to describe the ways in which social groups define themselves and are defined by others. It is this notion of group identity, and in particular the ways in which Indonesian university students defined themselves and were defined by others *as a social group*, which is the primary concern in this thesis. To the extent that social groups are made up of individuals, however, group identity is not homogenous.

The notion of role is closely connected to identity.[15] In this thesis the term role refers to the rights, obligations and duties that are associated with a particular social position or social status (Marshall 1998, 570-1). Roles are socially determined, that is, they are based on expectations about how people who occupy particular social positions behave, what their goals and values are, what they are like as individuals and how they relate to others associated with their role (Johnson 2000, 263-4). Like identity, the notion of role is also best thought of in a plural sense, since individuals occupy multiple roles in society (Marshall 1998, 570-1).[16]

Foucault provides some useful insights into the processes by which roles and identities are formed in discourse. As noted above, discourses provide particular ways of speaking and thinking about the world, including various 'objects of knowledge'. These objects of knowledge may refer to social subjects. In *Discipline and punish* (Foucault 1979a) for example, Foucault traced the ways in which 'the criminal' as an object of knowledge was produced. By producing ways of speaking and thinking about 'criminals', the discourse of crime and punishment provided the 'raw material' by which criminals formed their identity and the social roles associated with this identity (Marshall 1998, 294).[17] Foucault's later work made an important link between power and the production of identity in discourse. As Barker expresses it:

> Power produces both objects of knowledge and the subject [individual] to which a particular knowledge/object relates. Therefore it is the exercise of power that brings about the emergence of objects of knowledge … and the possible subjects that constitute themselves around them (Barker 1998, 27).

Foucault also emphasised the fact that individuals occupy multiple and often fragmented identities. These identities are produced in the various discourses to which individuals are subject. As Philpott expresses it:

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[15] Marshall notes that: 'It is sometimes assumed that our identity comes from the expectations attached to the social roles that we occupy, and which we then internalise, so that it [identity] is formed through the process of socialisation. Alternatively, it is elsewhere assumed that we construct our identities more actively out of the materials presented to us during socialisation, or in our various roles' (1998, 296).

[16] The multiple roles that individuals play often give rise to conflicts and contradictions. The ways in which people play their roles in society is thus to some extent determined by how they resolve the contradictions between the multiple roles they play (Marshall 1998, 570-1; Johnson 2000, 263-4)

[17] Identities are also formed through the practices of various institutions. Thus, types of discursive activity such as describing, forming hypotheses, formulating regulations and teaching, each have their own way of positioning social subjects (Foucault 1972, 50-1).

> identity is specific to the domain in which an individual is ‘governed’. There may be a diversity of codes of conduct orienting any one individual depending on the particular domain in which they are being ‘governed’ (Philpott 2000, 149).

The various identities which individuals occupy do not exist in isolation: rather, they are interrelated (Marshall 1998, 294-5). Moreover, identity is not a static phenomenon, but one which is constantly changing. As Hall notes, identity is ‘formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us’ (Hall 1992, 276 cited in Thompson, 1996, 65).

The extent to which the identities produced in discourse are ‘taken up’ by individuals depends in part on the ways in which individuals interpret texts. Since identities are constructed in discourse and reflected in the representational choices made in text, whether text interpreters produce (fully or partially) compliant or resistant readings of texts will have an effect on readers’ acceptance or rejection of these roles and identities.

Social structure: power

It was suggested above that there is a link between discourse and social structure, namely that discourse is derived from and so reflects social structure, and in particular power relations.[18] The following section explores this link further by providing an explanation of the terms ‘power’ and ‘power relations’ through briefly examining the nature of power, drawing once more, on insights from Foucault’s work.[19] This is not intended to suggest that social structure can be reduced to issues of power and power relations, but rather that this is the particular concern of this thesis.

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[18] In the context of CDA, Teun van Dijk and Norman Fairclough have made the most systematic attempts to define the concept of power in relation to text and discourse (van Dijk 1989, 19-21; van Dijk 1993b; van Dijk 2001; Fairclough 1989).

[19] As noted above, critical discourse analysis grew out of an interest in neo-Marxist theories of ideology, in particular the work of Gramsci, Habermas and Althusser and much work in critical discourse analysis has used the concept to great effect (see for example Hodge and Kress 1988, Fairclough 1992 and various others). There are, however, a number of difficulties associated with the use of the concept of ideology in critical discourse analysis, and in particular with the combination of Foucault’s view of discourse with a Marxist or even a liberal conception of ideology. Firstly as Pennycook notes, Foucault’s notion of discourse has much in common with a neutral or liberal conception of ideology as ‘views of the world’ (a conception which Thompson has criticised for lacking critical force and which is the view ostensibly adopted in CDA, see Fowler 1987, 490). Foucault explicitly rejected the Marxist notion of ideology as false consciousness since this view of ideology assumes that there is ‘truth’, and that ideology obscures this truth. For Foucault, there is no ‘real truth’. Rather, the various ‘truths’ of a particular society are ‘constructed’ in discourse. Adopting a Foucauldian view of discourse thus raises considerable difficulty when combined with a critical or Marxist conception of ideology (although Fairclough does not seem to have this difficulty, perhaps because of the two ways he defines discourse) and to represent a conceptual ‘doubling up’ if defined in a more neutral or liberal way.

In the Weberian sense, the concept of power is broadly defined as the ability of an individual or group to act in a desired way (or *not* to act), to influence events or to acquire social, political or economic resources despite opposition (Marshall 1998, 519-20; Johnson 2000, 234; Jary and Jary 1991, 490). It is also defined as the capacity to manipulate the beliefs and values of others in a way which favors the interests of the power holder, or to otherwise prevent opposition from arising (Marshall 1998, 520; Johnson 2000, 234; Jary and Jary 1991, 491). This view of power is often referred to as 'power-over' (Johnson 2000, 234). Such power is dependent upon access to resources of power such as wealth, expertise, social status, and control of information (Marshall 1998, 520). There is a strong correlation between the unequal distribution of these resources amongst social actors and the differential distribution of power (Marshall 1998, 519). In this view, power is 'a substance or resource that individuals or social systems can possess' (Johnson 2000, 234).

Foucault's view of power differs from this conception in a number of significant ways. First, rather than power representing a resource or an object which can be possessed, Foucault sees it as a set of relationships:

> power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society (Foucault 1979b, 93, cited in Barker 1998, 27).

Second, rather than focusing on a sharp distinction between powerful and powerless individuals and institutions and on the negative, repressive exercise of power by the powerful, Foucault suggests instead that power is productive. Power, he argues, operates by directing the behaviour and actions of others in ways which are conducive to the interests of those exercising power (Foucault 1979a; Barker 1998, 25). As Fairclough expresses it:

> [p]ower does not work negatively by forcefully dominating those who are subject to it; it incorporates them, and is 'productive' in the sense that it shapes and 'retools' them to fit in with its needs (Fairclough 1992, 50; see also Philpott 2000, 149).

This view of power is captured in the notion of government, which, according to Foucault, represents one form of power. Government is concerned with the ways in which those in positions of authority (be they the state, parents, teachers or prison wardens) aim to '[modify] the actions or conduct of others through maintaining a certain possibility of a choice of actions in them' (Barker 1998, 38). At the same time, it also aims to influence the ways individuals regulate their own behaviour (Hindess 1996, 97 and 105). This 'self-policing' is the ultimate aim of government, and of power. As Barker notes, 'the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary' (1998, 60).

The view that the exercise of power is concerned with influencing the choices that social subjects make has important implications since it requires that individuals must have the freedom to make choices. This freedom in turn implies that social subjects have the ability to exercise power themselves (see Hindess 1996, 100-1; Rouse 1994, 105 and 220-1). The aim of government is thus not complete control of society. Rather, effective government is possible only when, and precisely because, it allows citizens the freedom to 'make the right choices'.

One of the mechanisms through which government operates is discipline. According to Hindess, discipline:

> aims to provide [individuals] with particular skills and attributes, to develop their capacity for self-control, to promote their ability to act in concert, to render them amenable to instruction, or to mould their characters in other ways … [D]iscipline is productive power par excellence: it aims not only to constrain those over whom it is exercised, but also to enhance and make use of their capacities (Hindess 1996, 113).

In many modern societies, government and discipline have increasingly replaced coercion as the primary mode of controlling the actions of social subjects (Hindess 1996, 108). As Rouse points out, while coercion can repress or destroy its object, '[d]iscipline and training can reconstruct it to produce new gestures, actions, habits and skills, and ultimately new kinds of people' (Rouse 1994, 94-5). If the strategies of government and discipline have been successful, these 'new kinds of people' will possess the capacity to act 'freely but responsibly' in accordance with the interests and values of those in authority (see Rouse 1994, 220; Hindess 1996, 131).

Yet an important corollary of the freedom which the exercise of power necessitates is that power is always linked to resistance. As Barker expresses it:

> even though power dominates and subjects, because it is a relation and not a substance, by definition it always leaves open opportunities for resistance. Therefore, in its operation whenever power is being exchanged, being circulated, the possibility always exists that it can be reversed, transformed and resisted (Barker 1998, 37).

Foucault's work on power represented a refutation of the Weberian concept of power and of Marxist theories of ideology. These theories suggest that dominant groups, by virtue of their possession of power, are able to manipulate knowledge and so control others. Foucault suggests that power works in far more subtle ways, through the techniques of government and discipline, rather than coercion, although the aim remains the regulation of others' behaviour. He also recognises the role of social subjects in the exercise of power: since power is a set of relations, social subjects must be both present and complicit for power to be exercised in a relation of domination and subordination. At the same time, Foucault also clearly identifies the possibility of resistance to the exercise of power: in addition to complying with the exercise of power, social subjects may also choose various levels of resistance to it (see also below).

A framework for text analysis

Earlier it was suggested that the linguistic choices made in texts are socially, culturally and politically determined. Texts, it was noted, encode particular social and institutional ways of thinking and speaking about the world (discourses). In doing so, they reflect the social structure and its particular configurations of power relations. Text-based analysis, it was argued, can thus provide an insight into both the structures of discourse and the larger social system from which these discourses are derived. In analysing texts, however, we must take into account the fact that meaning making is a two-part process involving both the ways in which texts are produced and the ways in which they are interpreted. This section outlines the particular types of linguistic choices which have been chosen as the focus of the analysis of state and student texts. The discussion does not constitute a comprehensive account of Halliday's method. Rather, it examines only those textual features which have particular significance for understanding the ways in which students and the state represented students' roles and identities and how they attempted to socialise their readers into their identities as students.

Critical discourse analysis as a method

As noted above, the method of analysis on which this study is based draws on Halliday's model of language as a social semiotic, or a social system of meaning-making. Halliday suggests that all language use takes place within a particular 'context of situation'. The context of situation can be described in terms of the field of the text (what the text is about), the tenor of the text (what relationships exist between the participants in a text) and the mode of the text (what role the language is playing in the text and how the text is organised) (Halliday 1978, 33; Halliday and Hasan 1985, 12). Language, in this view, has three functions: it simultaneously expresses meanings about the experiential and interpersonal dimensions of social life, as well as having a textual function. Thus, the field of the text is expressed through the experiential function, the tenor of the text through the interpersonal function and the mode through the textual function (see Halliday 1978 64 and 143-4; Halliday and Hasan 1985, 24-6; see also Halliday 1994; Eggins 1994). At the level of grammar, the field of the text is realised in the system of transitivity: the patterns of processes (verbs), participants (actors and patients) and circumstances in a text, as well as the vocabulary used. The tenor of the text is realised in the systems of mood, modality and person and the mode of the text is realised in the patterns of cohesion and information structuring (Halliday 1978, 64 and 143-5; Halliday and Hassan 1985, 24-6).

Halliday's model has been the basis for a range of critical studies of discourse, where it has proved a fruitful means of understanding the workings of language and power (see for example Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew 1979; Hodge and Kress 1988; Fairclough 1989; 1992).[20] However, in addition to Hallidayan-based approaches, critical discourse analysts have also employed concepts from a range of other fields (Chilton and Schaffner 1997, 211; Gastil 1992, 470).[21] Of particular importance have been concepts drawn from pragmatics, in particular the speech act theory of Austin (1962) and Searle

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[20] Chilton and Schaffner 1997 note that Halliday's model 'made it possible to link linguistic form to social and hence also to political activity' (Chilton and Schaffner 1997, 211).

[21] For sample checklists of categories for analysis see Fowler and Kress 1979; Fowler 1985; Fowler 1991, chapter 5; Fairclough 1989, chapters 5 and 6; Fairclough 1992, chapter 8; Gastil 1992; van Dijk 1993b; van Dijk 1995; Chilton and Schaffner 1997; De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak 1999.

(1969) (see Fowler 1985, 73; Fowler 1991, 87-90; Gastil 1992, 479-80) and Grice's (1975) conversational implicature (see Fowler 1985, 73-4; Gastil 1992, 480-2), as well as conversation analysis (see Fowler 1985, 74; Fairclough 1992, 16-20; Gastil 1992, 490-2), metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Gastil 1992, 488-9) and syntax (see Fowler 1985, 70-72; Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew 1979; Wilson 2001, 402-4; Gastil 1992, 482-4; Fowler 1991, 76-80). Chilton (1985) and van Dijk (1989; 1993b; 1995) have also employed more cognitive-based approaches.

Some writers, most notably Henry Widdowson, have criticised this 'eclectic' method as 'a kind of ad hoc bricolage which takes from theory whatever concept comes usefully to hand' (Widdowson 1998, 137). Even firm advocates of critical discourse analysis have identified the problematic nature of its current methodological fragmentation (Toolan 1997, 99), and emphasised the need to standardise the method, preferably using a Hallidayan model (Fowler 1987, 492; see also Fowler 1991, 68-9). As Widdowson points out, one of the central problems with this methodological fragmentation is that some of these concepts may be based on different (and even contradictory) theories of language (Widdowson 1998, 138). There is also the problem of what conclusions can be drawn about the meaning and effect of texts from an analysis of textual features given that meaning-making involves both text production (of which the features of a text are a product) *and* text interpretation (see Widdowson 1998, 142-3 and 146-7; Widdowson 1995a, 168-9; Widdowson 1996, 62-9; for a refutation of this view see Fairclough 1996, 50-1; see also Fowler 1991, 68-9).

Widdowson's criticisms are valid ones. In particular, they highlight the need for critical discourse analysts to be clear about the processes they are analysing and their own position as an 'analyst' and to think carefully about the theories and methodologies they apply in the analysis of texts. Critical discourse analysts need to acknowledge the limitations which the two-part process of meaning-making places on their analyses (see Fairclough 1996, 50-1). Without a detailed analysis of audience responses to particular texts or of writers' and speakers' intentions, most critical discourse analysis currently undertaken is concerned almost exclusively with an analysis of the products of processes of text production (and the discourses which inform them) and not with text interpretation (although such analysis inevitably involves some conjectures about its possible effects on other readers). Critical discourse analysts should also avoid claiming any privilege for their interpretation of the texts, except to the extent that it is consistent with the broader social, cultural and political context in which the text was produced.

Critical discourse analysts also need to consider questions of methodology. This does not necessarily mean that critical discourse analysis must employ a standard theory and methodology. The relative diversity of social theories employed and the variety of concepts used to analyse the texts *has* led to a wide variety of approaches being encompassed under the label of critical discourse analysis. Yet the problem appears to lie in attributing a single label to a very diverse practice of text and discourse analysis and expecting uniformity (see also Fowler 1991, 68-9). In a practical sense, the variety of concepts which critical discourse analysts have applied are not based on such divergent theories of language that they are mutually incompatible. The use of a variety of concepts allows critical discourse analysts to describe different aspects of a text. That being said however, Halliday's model does provide both a unified theory and method of textual analysis. The broad scope of the model allows for the analysis of a wide range of textual features - including the analysis of keywords, irony and satire, style and intertextuality undertaken in the present study - as part of the analysis of experiential, interpersonal and textual meanings.

Keywords

The term keyword as it is used in this thesis refers to a word or phrase which articulates a significant area of meaning in a text. Keywords and the lexical sets (see below) which they enter into are central to Halliday's model and are one of the key means by which experiential meaning is conveyed. Fowler notes, for example, that, 'the vocabulary of a language, or of a variety of a language, amounts to a map of the objects, concepts, processes and relationships about which the culture needs to communicate' (1991, 80). The concept of keywords is by no means limited to linguistic theory. Raymond Williams' definition of keywords as 'significant, binding words in certain activities and their interpretation' has been widely used as a means of analysing the ideas, interests and values of a society or culture (Williams 1976, 15-16; see for example van Langenberg 1986). The analysis of keywords and their meaning is also a common element in most critical discourse analyses.[22]

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[22] In CDA, key words are also analysed under the headings of vocabulary (Gastil 1992, 474-5), lexical processes (Fowler 1985, 69), lexical structure (Fowler 1991, 80-5) and word meaning (Fairclough 1992,

Keywords and their meanings are often major sites of struggle and contestation. Since, as noted above, meanings are not 'given' but rather, constructed in and through discourse, words may be given different meanings and their meanings interpreted in different ways (Fairclough 1992, 185; see also Williams 1976, 11). This is often referred to as the 'meaning potential' of a word. The meaning potential of a word includes its dictionary or denotative meanings and its connotative meanings, that is, the meanings which are given to it in a particular social, cultural or political context (Fairclough 1992, 187). The meaning potential of a word is often a focus of conflict (Fairclough 1992, 236; see also 185-90). Wilson notes, for example, that conflict over the interpretation of a word may be based on differences over 'what one believes a word means, and what effect, beyond a word's core or semantic meaning, the use of the word has' (Wilson 2001, 408; see also Fairclough 1992, 185-90). These differences, he suggests, 'may become politically implicated in directing thinking about particular issues, and with real and devastating effects' (Wilson 2001, 408; see also Fairclough 1995, chapter 5).

In addition to conflict over keywords, there is also conflict over how meanings are 'worded' (Fairclough 1992, 236-7; see also 190-4; see also Halliday 1978, 164-6). Thus, there may be a variety of words or phrases used to denote a particular concept. These different wordings are derived from different ways of thinking and speaking about the world and reveal the speaker or writer's position or perspective. A significant aspect of the process of giving words to meanings is the concept of rewording or, to use Halliday's term, relexicalisation (Halliday 1978, 165; Fairclough 1992, 194). Relexicalisation refers to the process of creating new vocabulary items for existing concepts (Halliday 1978, 165) or for new concepts (Fowler 1991, 84). Discussing the 'antilanguages' developed by alternative or oppositional cultures, Halliday suggests that relexicalisation most commonly occurs in areas of meaning that are 'central to the activities of the subculture and that set it off most sharply from the established society' (1978, 165). Overwording or overlexicalisation of these areas of meaning is also a common practice (Halliday 1978, 165-6; Fairclough 1992, 193; see also Gastil 1992, 474-5). Overlexicalisation, or the use of a large number of synonymous terms to describe a particular area of meaning, indicates a preoccupation with a particular topic

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236; see also 185-90). See also Gastil on imprecise words, euphemisms and loaded words, and on dominant and marginalised or oppositional political lexica (1992, 476-7 and 479).

(Fowler and Kress 1979; Fairclough 1992, 193). These words are often differentiated from each other by the different attitudes which they express (Halliday 1978, 166).

Sets of words, or to use Halliday's term, lexical sets, are also important in distinguishing socially and institutionally significant areas of meaning (Fowler 1991, 82 and 84). As Wilson notes:

> [I]t may not merely be the single occurrence of a term that is important but sets of collocational relationships, which in their turn produce and draw upon ideological schemas in confirming or reconfirming particular views of the world (Wilson 2001, 406).

Lexical sets also have an important categorising function: they organise experience and enable detailed distinctions to be made between concepts (Fowler 1991, 84; see also Wilson 2001, 409).

Representing social actors

As the system in which we express meanings about our experience of the world, the transitivity system plays an important role in how speakers and writers represent social reality. The system of transitivity allows speakers and writers to make choices about how they will represent actions and the participants in these actions. A key element in the analysis of transitivity involves specifying who the participants are in a text, what grammatical roles they play, what types of processes they are involved in, whether they are active or passive participants in these processes, and what the objects of their actions are (see Fowler 1991, 70-76; Fowler and Kress 1979; Fairclough 1992, 177-181; Fairclough 1989, 120-5). The different choices that speakers and writers make reveal their position in relation to particular ways of thinking and speaking about the world.[23]

Van Leeuwen (1996) suggests that processes such as exclusion and role allocation, and their grammatical realisation in transitivity structures, have important consequences for the representation of social actors. He suggests that speakers and writers may 'include or exclude social actors to suit their interests and purposes in relation to the readers for whom they are intended' (van Leeuwin 1996, 38). Social actors may be excluded altogether, suppressed (the actors are merely implied in the text) or backgrounded (the role of the actors is de-emphasised) (van Leeuwin 1996, 39). Exclusion is most often expressed through transitivity structures such as passive clauses where the agent of the action is omitted, or abstract nouns which function as grammatical actors. The grammatical roles that social actors are allocated in a text are also significant. Van Leeuwin notes that social actors may be represented as either 'the active, dynamic forces in an activity' (the grammatical agent/actor) or as the passive objects of action (the grammatical patient/goal) (van Leeuwin 1996, 43-4; see also Halliday 1985, chapter 5). Yet van Leeuwin notes that:

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[23] The analysis of transitivity systems has been used extensively in studies of political discourse, including those with a critical discourse analysis approach (see for example Trew 1979a, 1979b; Hodge and Kress 1988; Ilie 1998; see also see Kress 1985b; Wilson 2001, 402-4).

> there need not be congruence between the roles that social actors actually play in social practices and the grammatical roles they are given in texts. Representations can reallocate roles, [and] rearrange the social relations between the participants (van Leeuwin 1996, 43).

These kinds of (re)presentations are often politically motivated, making them of particular interest in the present study.

Representing social relationships

The interpersonal function of the text mediates the personal roles and social relationships between the participants in a text (Fowler 1991, 85). Choices from the systems of mood, modality and person allow speakers and writers to establish a particular subject position for themselves, to position others in particular ways, and to express attitudes about social reality. The analysis of interpersonal meaning in the text is thus concerned with power relationships and the ways these power relationships are expressed in texts. Interpersonal meaning also plays a significant role in speakers' and writers' attempts to socialise their readers into a particular version of social reality.

The analysis of interpersonal meaning is concerned with describing the patterns of mood, modality, and person in a text. The grammatical realisation of speech functions (statements, questions, commands, and offers) for example, positions speakers and writers and their audiences in particular ways (see Eggins 1994, 149-53). As Fairclough notes, declaratives position the speaker or writer as the provider of information and the listener or reader as the recipient. In an interrogative, the speaker or writer requests something of the listener or reader, which the latter is then expected to provide (1989, 125-6).[24] These subject positions have important implications for the kinds of power relationships which are established in a text and reflect broader relations of power between social subjects.

The choices that speakers and writers make from the system of modality to express truth, obligation, permission and desirability - encoded in the grammar of Indonesian through modal auxiliaries such as *harus* (must), *sebaiknya* (should) and *akan* (will), as well as through adverbs, modal adjectives and tense - enable speakers and writers to express 'their authority with respect to the truth or probability of a representation of reality' (Fairclough 1989, 126?). Categorical modalities such as that expressed in the use of the simple present tense (*Hanya ada satu kata untuk pendekatan ini*. [There is only one word for this approach.]), for example, establish the speaker or writer's authority to represent what is said as 'truth' (Fowler 1991, 85-87; Fairclough 1989, 126-7; see also Fowler and Kress 1979; Fowler 1985). Such truth claims, and the authority that is associated with them, are one of the techniques that speakers and writers use to persuade their audiences to accept the view of the world being presented in the text.

Relationships between texts

The basis of Halliday's model is the connection between texts and their situational and broader cultural contexts. However, it is also concerned with the 'textual' environment in which texts are produced and interpreted (Halliday and Hasan 1985, 47). The idea that texts interact with and are in fact made up of prior texts is known as intertextuality. While the term intertextuality was first introduced in the 1960s by Julia Kristeva, it has its origins in Saussure's work. During the 1930s, the Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin developed Saussure's ideas, proposing a dialogic view of the meaning of a text (Allen 2000, 2). He argued that texts 'always originate in and function as a part of a social *dialogue*' (Lemke 1995, 23, emphasis in original). As a result, he claimed:

> the linguistic significance of an … utterance [text] is understood against the background of language, while its actual meaning is understood against the background of other concrete utterances [texts] on the same theme (Bakhtin 1981, 281, cited in Lemke 1995, 22-3).

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[24] Fairclough notes that 'there is not a one to one relationship between modes and the positioning of subjects' (1989, 126).

In this view, texts do not have meaning in and of themselves. Rather, as Allen notes 'meaning is something which exists between a text and all other texts to which it refers and relates' (Allen 2000, 1). Kristeva took this view one step further, suggesting that a text 'absorbs and is built out of texts from the past' and 'anticipates and tries to shape subsequent texts' (Fairclough 1992, 101-2; see also Lemke 1995, 22-23). This view of intertextuality is also at the heart of Foucault's archaeological works. As Foucault suggests in *The archaeology of knowledge*, a text is part of a complex network of other texts. This network is made up of the series of other contemporary texts of which a text forms a part, past texts to which a text refers, either implicitly or explicitly, as well as the texts which will follow (1972, 98; see also Fairclough 1992, 101).

The concept of intertextuality has important implications for the analysis of power relations. As Fairclough notes, intertextuality:

> points to the productivity of texts, to how texts can transform prior texts and restructure existing [texts] to generate new ones. But this productivity is not in practice available to people as a limitless space for textual innovation and play: it is socially limited and constrained, and conditional upon relations of power (Fairclough 1992, 102-3).

The textual network of which a text is a part thus provides certain parameters for it. Yet these parameters are also to some extent able to be resisted and challenged. Intertextuality is thus an integral part of the processes of contestation and resistance which take place in texts and which, in turn, reflect the broader dynamics of power. Consequently, analysis of the intertextual patterns in texts can provide an insight into the kinds of power relationships which exists between social actors and their texts. Such analysis is concerned with which texts are most commonly drawn upon and how are they used, what directions of influence there are between texts, what parameters intertextual relations set for how people are able to think and speak about the world, and in what ways intertextual relations are restructured or contested.

Speaking and writing

The role that language is playing in an interaction is a dimension of its mode. In terms of the medium used, a basic distinction can be drawn between spoken language and written language. Halliday suggests that speaking and writing are not simply 'different ways of expressing the same meanings' but rather, that they construct different versions of the world. He argues that:

> [s]peech and writing impose different grids on experience. There is a sense in which they create different realities. Writing creates a world of things. Speaking creates a world of happening (Halliday 1985, 93; see also ibid., 97).

Written language, Halliday argues, presents a synoptic view of the world, defining it as a 'product': an object or thing. Spoken language, on the other hand, presents a dynamic view of the world, representing the world in terms of actions and events ('processes') (Halliday 1985, 81 and 97; see also Kress 1985a, 44-6). Not all texts are simply either 'spoken' or written'. There are also a number of ways in which these two mediums might be combined, for example in a formal speech, which is written to be spoken aloud (Halliday 1978, 33; Halliday 1985, 78; Halliday and Hasan 1985, 12). Martin (1984, 27) thus characterises spoken and written language as a continuum between 'language as action' (spoken language) and 'language as reflection' (written language).

The idea that spoken and written language represents the world in different ways - the one as a 'process' and the other as a 'product' - has important implications. The choices that speakers and writers make along the spoken-written continuum when they create texts may be socially, culturally or politically motivated. Choosing to represent the world in terms of actions and the people involved in these actions may involve a desire to foreground the agency of a particular actor. Similarly, the choice to represent phenomena as 'product' may reflect a speaker or writer's desire to represent the world in an abstract way, to distance the text from the world of concrete actions and events.

Speaking and writing are also positioned differently in relations of power. Kress suggests that the characteristics of written language, including its use of abstract nouns, its concern with the relationships between things (expressed through processes of 'being'), as well as its hierarchical structuring means that it is more highly valued than speech in many industrialised societies. For this reason, 'writing is the medium of the domain of public social and political life while speaking is the medium of the domain of private life' (Kress 1985a, 46). As a result of this, Kress argues:

> Participation in public life and the power which that distributes depends on access to and mastery of the forms of writing. The possibility of being a certain

> kind of speaking and writing subject and therefore certain kind of social and cultural agent depends on a person's position in and relation to the forms and potentials of speech and writing (Kress 1985a, 46; see also Halliday 1985, 78).

Since written language indicates access to power, Kress argues that public figures adopt a more 'written' style when speaking. However, they may also choose to use a 'spoken' style, thus bringing the 'language' of the private sphere into the public domain and creating a sense of solidarity between speaker and audience (Kress 1985a, 46).[25] Writing in a more 'spoken' style achieves a similar effect, while a highly 'written' style tends to maintain distance between writer and reader.

Irony and satire

There has been relatively little work to date in critical discourse analysis which explores the use of irony and satire in texts (see for example Hodge and Mansfield 1985; Tsang and Wong 2004). However, as Hodge and Mansfield have shown, an analysis of political satire, including cartoons and jokes, is both compatible with Halliday's method and an important means of examining expressions of dissent (Hodge and Mansfield 1985).

A key element in the effect of irony and satire lies in the 'shared knowledge' which exists or, more accurately, must be actively created between the satirist and the reader. Successful satire is usually based on shared hostility to an event or person that is common to both the satirist and his or her audience (Hodge and Mansfield 1985, 202). In order to avoid censorship or political reprisals, however, the political message of an ironic or satirical statement must be 'hidden' beneath subtle layers of meaning (see also Hodge and Mansfield 1985, 200). In this way, irony and satire are highly intertextual: they depend on audiences' understanding of the broader textual and social context and on their ability to make connections between texts (see also Hodge and Mansfield 1985, 199; Fairclough 1992, 123). In an ironic or satirical text, readers have to interpret the meaning for themselves using the 'clues' provided as well as their own knowledge of current events and issues. This process of interpretation has important consequences for the ways in which writers and speakers attempt to socialise their audiences into particular roles and identities. By making audiences do the interpretive 'work', speakers and writers provide the ‘raw material’ by which collective identities can be constructed and reaffirmed. This ‘shared knowledge’ also creates solidarity between the writer or speaker and the audience, making these attempts at socialisation doubly powerful (see also Hodge and Mansfield 201-3).

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[25] This comparison can be seen in the public speeches of Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, and those of former president Suharto (see Matheson Hooker 1995).

Irony and satire also have significant implications for interpersonal meaning. Hodge and Mansfield argue that political satire contains both positive and negative modality. The comic element in much political satire enables the speaker or writer to claim that the criticism was either unintentional or not intended to be taken seriously and at the same time indicate that at some level, the criticism was both intentional and genuine (Hodge and Mansfield 1985, 201). It also enables him or her to make a positive comment about ‘truth’ and at the same time about his or her authority to speak ‘truth’. The negative aspects of the speaker or writer’s modality, however, provide the audience with the opportunity to evaluate the truth of the speaker or writer’s claim based on their own knowledge.

Hodge and Mansfield suggest that modality and negation, including modality and negation in ironic and satirical texts, ‘derive from and reflect situations of conflict’ (1985, 200-201). They argue that irony and satire is made up of opposing discourses and opposing levels (surface and deep). In many anti-nuclear jokes, they suggest, the surface level of meaning is pro-nuclear. At a deeper level, however, is the anti-nuclear discourse. Anti-nuclear jokes thus undermine pro-nuclear discourse by using it in a humorous or satirical way (Hodge and Mansfield 1985, 200-201). Interpreting irony or satire, as Freud has pointed out, involves overcoming those ‘repressions’ which have been constructed in individuals as a result of the introjections of the ‘voice of authority’. Satire or humour separates this voice of authority from other voices within the individual’s psyche and draws attention to their contradictions. This has the effect of ‘demystifying … conflict, disparity and contradiction’ (Hodge and Mansfield 1985, 202).

State and society in New Order Indonesia

The central issue which this thesis seeks to address is the question of how relations of power between students and the state and, more generally, between the state and wider society under the New Order shaped the politics of identity of Indonesian university students. In order to answer this question, the following section examines existing scholarly writing on the relationship between state and society in New Order Indonesia. It then examines the nature of opposition under the New Order. The final section surveys the relevant literature on the politics of language practices and suggests that the present study can contribute to filling a significant gap in this literature.

Following Hewison, Rodan and Robison's definition, the terms 'state' and 'New Order' are used in this thesis to refer to the particular 'amalgam of social, political, ideological and economic elements' which existed under the thirty-two year rule of Indonesia's second president, Suharto (1966-1998). These authors suggest that 'the state is not so much a set of functions or a group of actors as an expression of power' (Hewison, Rodan and Robison 1993, 4). Yet while the state itself is a rather abstract construct, it has a concrete form in the state apparatus, defined as 'the real, existing institutional forms of state power, namely the coercive, judicial and bureaucratic arms of the state' (ibid., 5).[26] Thus, as Crouch points out, 'the ministers, senior bureaucrats and military and police officers must be regarded as the key leaders of the state' (Crouch 1998, 110).[27] Since there is such a close link between the state and its apparatus, this thesis does not draw a sharp distinction between the two, with the term 'state' being used to refer to both the abstract construct as well as its more concrete forms. Yet it is important to recognise that neither the state nor the state apparatus are unified entities. As Joel Migdal suggests, different elements within the state may 'pull in different directions' such that 'we cannot simply assume that as a whole [the state] acts in a rational and coherent fashion, or strategically follows a defined set of interests' (cited in Crouch 1998, 109).

The state and its apparatus can be broadly differentiated from 'society'. A useful entry-point into understanding the relationship between the state and society is the concept of civil society. Although it has been given a wide variety of meanings over its long history, Rodan suggests that the concept is most usefully defined as an 'inherently political' sphere between the state and the individual. Civil society is political, he argues, because it is concerned with ‘advanc[ing] the interests of members through overt political action’ (Rodan 1996, 20 and 28; see also Aspinall 2002, 12-13). The groups which constituted civil society in New Order Indonesia encompassed a broad range of social and economic forces. Up to the late 1980s, students and intellectuals were the most active civil society groups. However, from this time, a variety of other actors, including journalists, non-government organisations, organised labour, political Islam and the Indonesian Democracy Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI), began to play a more active role (Aspinall 1996; James 1990, 18).

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[26] Regime, in contrast, refers to 'a particular type of organisation of the state apparatus' including liberal democracy, dictatorship and totalitarianism while 'government' refers to 'the legislative and executive branches of the state apparatus' (Hewison, Rodan and Robison 1993, 5).

[27] Crouch also argues for the inclusion of 'key 'private' individuals, groups or organisations outside the formal–legal state' (1998, 110).

However, Rodan argues that a sharp distinction between civil society and the state tends to neglect the interrelationship between the state and society (Rodan 1996, 23). In particular, he suggests, it largely ignores ‘the way in which societal forces have been incorporated or coopted into some sort of relationship with state structures’ (Rodan 1996, 23 and 25). State corporatism, in which functional and interest groups are given representation in the state, is one of the ways in which this occurs (Rodan 1996, 24, see also below).

As a result of this recognition, a number of scholars have advocated a ‘third realm’ where state and society interact. Huang, for example, suggests that in post-revolutionary China this third realm, which included judicial institutions as well as farmers’ cooperatives, was used by the state as a means of penetrating civil society (Rodan 1996, 26-7). In the context of New Order Indonesia, the concept of a ‘third realm’ provides a useful means of understanding some of the complexities of the state-society relationship. However, the emphasis on state utilisation of the ‘third realm’ to further its interests perhaps overlooks some of the ways that civil society can use this sphere to its own benefit (see Aspinall 1996, 215; see also below).

Observers of New Order Indonesia during the late 1970s and 1980s tended to characterise politics in terms of the increasing dominance of the state over society (Aspinall 2000, 29). Anderson, for example, suggests that ‘the New Order is best understood as the resurrection of the state and its triumph *vis a vis* society and nation’ (Anderson 1990a, 109). He takes an historical approach, suggesting that the particular form of the colonial state, the weakness of the state during the parliamentary democracy and Guided Democracy periods, and the form which the transition to the New Order took, shaped the way the New Order state developed. Taking a more structural approach, Mackie and MacIntyre argue that the growth of a strong state during the New Order was the result of a number of interrelated factors including the dominance of the military in politics (at least until the mid 1980s), the strengthening of the bureaucracy and the calculated weakening of the political parties. The opportunities for patronage provided by the economic growth of the 1970s, and the increasing influence of business and conglomerates as a result of the economic deregulation of the 1980s were also significant. At the same time, the increasing restrictions placed on political participation by wider society brought about important shifts in state-society relations. The result was an increasing concentration of power at the highest levels and, in particular, in the person of the president (Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, 7-9; see also Crouch 1998, 100-108).

Analyses of New Order Indonesia in the 1970s and 1980s drew attention to three main processes by which the state maintained its dominance over society. The first was the New Order's vast network of patronage, which extended from the highest levels down to village elites. As James notes, those within this network were so well incorporated into it that they were often unable (or unwilling) to effectively challenge the state (James 1990, 18-19; see also Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, 3 and 6-7; Crouch 1998, 101). A second process - repression - worked by silencing 'those sections of society which [constituted] a potential or actual threat to the regime, but which [were unable to] be influenced by patronage' (James 1990, 19; see also Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, 1).[28] The third process involved securing and maintaining both material and symbolic legitimation for the regime. The strong economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s meant that Indonesia's middle class, often touted in the academic literature as the vanguard of reform, were prepared to tolerate the restriction of their civil liberties provided the New Order continued to deliver improvements to the material conditions of their lives (see Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, 3). At the same time, the rigorous propaganda programs put in place during the late 1970s and 1980s, ensured that most Indonesians were well-versed in New Order ideology (see Mackie and MacIntyre 1994, 25-7; Heryanto 1990a, 290-1; see also Bourchier 1996, chapter 8; Leigh 1991; Parker 1992; Mulder 2000).

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[28] For example, critical elements of the middle classes, including university students and religious leaders, were marginalised politically through, for example, the weakening of Muslim political organisations and the disbanding of student councils (James 1990, 19). Labels such as *ekstrim kanan* (extreme right) or *subversif* (subversive) were also used to discredit these groups. Moreover, the vast internal security apparatus, which penetrated all regions and all levels of society, ensured an ever-present threat of violence, as did the not infrequent use of actual violence against dissenters.

Jackson's and Robison's analyses of the New Order provide two very different frameworks for understanding the dominance of state over society in the late 1970s. Using Riggs' (1966) classic study of Thailand, Jackson (1978) characterises the New Order as a 'bureaucratic polity', which he defines as 'a political system in which power and participation in national decisions are limited almost entirely to the employees of the state, particularly the officer corps and the highest levels of the bureaucracy' (Jackson 1978, 3). However, as Mackie and MacIntyre note, the application of this label to New Order Indonesia tended to overstate the extent to which those outside the bureaucracy were excluded: at times, they argue, 'elements outside the state structure have … been able to play roles of some importance in the political system' (Mackie and MacIntyre 1993, 6).

A second framework was Richard Robison's class analysis of the 'military-bureaucratic state' (Robison 1978, 1986). Robison suggests that it was the growth of capitalism in Indonesia from the late 1960s onwards, rather than any other factors, that led to the particular form of the New Order state (1978, 17). He argues that power relations in the New Order state were centred on the competition between the Muslim merchant class, foreign and Chinese business interests, military bureaucrats and a coalition of state bureaucrats, intellectuals and students (Robison 1978, 17-18). He suggests that the opportunities for patronage provided by the development of bureaucratic capitalism during the 1970s enabled the military bureaucrats to triumph although not without some conflict (Robison 1978, 37). Opposition to the regime during this period largely emanated from the Muslim merchant class who were disadvantaged by the emergence of bureaucratic capitalism, or from students and intellectuals, who objected to the large-scale foreign investment and corruption not only on moral grounds but also because the system offered them few meaningful roles (Robison 1978, 37-9).

Students and intellectuals had been key elements of the broad coalition which supported the New Order in its early years. However, from the early 1970s, this coalition began to break down and the New Order began to take an increasingly intolerant attitude to criticism (Aspinall 1996, 216-7). From this time, the state also began to put in place a corporatist strategy of political representation, 'simplifying' the political parties, creating a party of functional groups (Golongan Karya, Golkar) and functional representative bodies for youth, farmers, fishers and workers. It also began to promote more vigorously the ideology of the 'organic state'.

The idea of the ‘organic state’ has a long history in Indonesia and its application by the New Order was by no means new: during the early Guided Democracy period, for example, Sukarno had advocated a corporatist model for state-society relations (see Bourchier 1996, 11; Reeve 1985). However, it was the New Order state, under the guidance of its chief ideologue Ali Moertopo, which institutionalised the organic state concept.

Indonesian ideologues claimed that the organicist model was an authentically ‘Indonesian’ framework for state-society relations. They rejected individualistic, Western models such as parliamentary democracy which, it was stressed, were incompatible with Indonesian political culture. The model of the organic state they offered emphasised harmony and consensus in decision-making. The state was represented as a family, headed by a paternal figure (Bourchier 1996, 2). Since society was an integrated or ‘organic’ whole in which each group had a specific role to play, social and political organisation was to be based on functional groups rather than competing interests (ibid., 2 and 6; Robison 1993, 45). The role of the state in this model was to articulate and embody the common interests of society and there was to be no distinction (at least in theory) between the state and society (Bourchier 1996, 2 and 7; Robison 1993, 43). Opposition to the state was thus both contrary to the common interest and ‘un-Indonesian’ (Bourchier 1996, 2).

Yet as Bourchier points out, the organic state was an ideal, rather than a political reality (ibid, 10). Moreover, the New Order’s organicist ideology did not develop in a systematic or consistent way but rather as a response to the periodic challenges that the state faced from various social forces (ibid, 12). He suggests that:

> The intense and continuing efforts on the part of the government to stress the harmonious nature of Indonesian society and of state-society relations stem[med] from a deep fear of explosive communal conflict and social upheaval, much of it a result of its own political and economic policies (ibid, 10).

The student demonstrations of the 1970s were, as Bourchier points out, one of several factors which led to the introduction in 1978 of a wide ranging program of ideological indoctrination based on organicist principles (ibid, 301).

In the late 1980s, and coinciding with the period of 'openness' (*keterbukaan*), more serious challenges to the organicist model emerged. These challenges were the result of structural changes in Indonesian society brought about by the sustained economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s and the changing nature of Indonesian capitalism (ibid, 303; Aspinall 1996, 215). Bourchier suggests that the growth of a new, more politically aware middle class and the emergence of organised labour led to increased pressure for more meaningful political participation (ibid., 12-13 and 302-3). At the same time, the deregulation of the economy and the increasingly global nature of business led to demands for more transparency and legal certainty.

The 'arts of resistance'

The above analyses of Indonesian politics focused on explaining state dominance over society. Yet despite the strategies of cooptation, repression and material and symbolic legitimation, opposition to the state, in various forms, was a consistent feature of New Order politics from the late 1960s onwards. This study is concerned with the forms of opposition which students took towards the state in the context of the 'war of words' over students' roles and identities. This opposition was political in character in that it constituted a challenge to the state and its apparatus. It also took place largely in the public sphere, within which student newspapers and magazines represented one of a variety of forums.

A useful way of characterising opposition is to locate it along a continuum. In his analysis of resistance against the Third Reich between 1933 and 1945, Detlev Peukert suggests that oppositional behaviour can be characterised along two parameters: the degree to which the behaviour is public and the scope of the challenge to the regime.[29] Thus, isolated complaints against the regime produced in the private sphere constitute 'non-conformist behaviour'. More public acts of 'refusal' represent the next level of dissident behaviour. Above this are public forms of 'protest', in which 'some intentional effect on public opinion is involved' (Peukert 1991, 36-37). The final point on the scale is 'resistance', which for the purposes of this study can be considered as synonymous with ‘opposition’ (Peukert 1991, 37, emphasis in original; see also Aspinall 2000, 4-6; Rodan 1996).[30]

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[29] This paper was drawn to my attention by Edward Aspinall (2000, 4)

Aspinall suggests that much of the oppositional behaviour in New Order Indonesia was ‘played out in the grey zone between ‘state’ and ‘society’’ (1996, 215). In the 1970s, he suggests,

> …those most able to articulate dissent were those elements who had participated most centrally in the New Order coalition of the 1960s and who had been closest to the army at that time. Students, secular intellectuals, former Action Front activists, and even retired military and civilian officials formed the core of the dissident circles of the 1970s. Because of their former role, they had at least a modicum of political legitimacy in New Order discourse (Aspinall 1996, 221).

These early regime opponents criticised the government from a position of relative commitment to the existing state structure (Aspinall 1996, 222).[31] As the regime took a more intolerant approach to criticism, however, semi-opposition became more common.[32] The prevalence of semi-opposition resulted in what Aspinall and Bourchier have called a ‘blurring between opposition and government, state and society’ (Aspinall 1996, 223; see also Bourchier 1996, 184). As social and political forces were increasingly subject to cooptation, dissidents were forced to adopt (either willingly or unwillingly) a strategy of ‘work[ing] from within’ (Aspinall 1996, 224).

Semi-opposition (and the consequent blurring of state and society) remained a central feature of oppositional behaviour throughout the New Order (Aspinall 1996, 234). However, from the late 1980s, oppositional activity broadened in terms of the social actors involved, the ideological forms it took and its social support bases. Thus, in addition to the elite level dissidents of the 1970s, labour groups also became more politically active (Aspinall 1996, 229-30; see also Uhlin 1997). ‘[N]ationalist, populist and even leftist political moods and ideologies’ were also revived and the organisational base of opposition strengthened (Aspinall 1996, 230 and 232).

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[30] See also James Scott’s (1990) study of domination and resistance.

[31] See also Southwood and Flanagan’s (1983) characterisation of student activists during the 1970s adopting a strategy of partial accommodation in their role as ‘critical collaborators’

[32] According to Linz, semi-opposition ‘consists of those groups that are not dominant or represented in the governing group but that are willing to participate in power without fundamentally challenging the regime’ (Linz 1973, 191; cited in Aspinall 2000, 6; see also Rodan 1996, 11). Semi-opposition may emanate from factions within the regime itself or from within institutions that are part of the state apparatus, from corporatist organisations as well as from a range of other ‘outside’ organisations (Aspinall 2000, 6-7). As Aspinall notes, semi-opposition ‘does not ‘fundamentally challenge’ the regime, instead typically promoting modification of policies’ (2000, 7).

Language and the New Order state

There have been a number of studies of the language of the New Order state. These have been undertaken both by Indonesian and non-Indonesian scholars. The majority are in the form of short academic articles although two book-length studies have been produced (Berman 1998; Eriyanto 2000). Of these studies a number focus on the use of single keywords (Heryanto 1995; Bowen 1986) or sets of keywords (van Langenberg 1986, 1990). Others have used presidential speeches as a means of analysing more global structures of New Order language use (Matheson Hooker 1995; Eriyanto 2000). A number have also examined the relationship between New Order language use and the dynamics of power (Saryono and Syaukat 1993; Berman 1998; Langston 2001).

While the majority of these studies have focussed on the powerful aspects of New Order language use, most also acknowledge the presence of resistance to New Order language practices. The amount of attention this receives is variable, however, ranging from a single line to a more substantial discussion and there is little attempt to analyse the relations between New Order language practices and practices of resistance. A number of studies have approached the issue of resistance to the New Order from the perspective of literature and the performing arts (see for example Hatley 1990; Foulcher 1990; Clark 2001; Errington 2001; Hill 1979; see also Matheson Hooker 1999) although the emphasis tends to be on the macro-level themes of resistance and not on more micro-level aspects. This study is thus one of the first to consider in detail the linguistic aspects of opposition and resistance to the New Order. It foregrounds analysis of one form of resistance by examining one of the key groups which consistently challenged the regime. A significant strength of this study is that it focuses in detail on the role of language in the articulation of power and resistance to power. As a result, this study will make a significant contribution to understanding the micro-level dynamics of opposition in New Order Indonesia.

The seminal work on the political aspects of Indonesian language is Benedict Anderson’s 1966 paper, ‘The languages of Indonesian politics’, republished in 1990 in the collection *Language and power: Exploring political cultures in Indonesia* (Anderson 1990b). As the title suggests, Anderson sees Indonesian politics in the late 1960’s as encompassing a number of different ‘vocabularies’ or ‘languages’ (discourses), including bureaucratic colonial, Western democratic-socialist, nationalist-revolutionary, and Javanese traditional. Anderson's primary concern is to trace the development of these discourses through the colonial and early post-colonial period to their synthesis in the language of Indonesian politics in the late 1960s. The aim is to explain how this synthesis was and continues to be transformed 'to adjust to the realities of urban Indonesia' at the beginning of the New Order period. This process of adjustment, Anderson claims, is best understood from the perspective of the growing imposition of Javanese language and cultural modalities onto 'revolutionary Malay'.[33] This shift, he suggests, had its origins in the slowing of the revolutionary impulse, which came about as the result of changes in political, economic and social practices in the period after the revolution.

Anderson's article offers a unique perspective on language use at the beginning of the New Order given that it was another 20 years before any further detailed studies of New Order language use were produced. His paper is the only one which seeks to identify the historical origins of the 'languages' of the New Order. Yet the changes which took place in New Order language use, even in the period immediately following the initial publication of Anderson's article, mean that his conclusions regarding the 'fusion' of bureaucratic colonial, Western democratic-socialist, nationalist-revolutionary, and Javanese traditional discourses were not borne out in precisely the way he envisaged. During the New Order's first few years, for example, nationalist-revolutionary discourse took on a markedly different character, which the gradual disappearance of the term 'revolution' from official speeches and texts exemplified (see Cribb 1992, 405). Western democratic-socialist discourse was also quickly stripped of its socialist aspects and democracy redefined in uniquely 'Indonesian' terms as 'Pancasila democracy'. The bureaucratic character of New Order language also flourished (see Anderson 1994, 138-9; see also Bourchier 1996, 245-50). At the same time, 'Javanese' linguistic and cultural frameworks continued to dominate at least in the language of the state and the bureaucracy (see Errington 1986, 2001; Sneddon 2003, 139-40; Kleden 1998).

During the 1980s and 1990s several studies of New Order language use employed Raymond Williams' 'keywords' approach, focusing on either sets of keywords (van

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[33] The Javanisation of Indonesian has in fact been well documented by both Indonesian (Pabottingi 1991; Moeliono 1989, 40-1) and non-Indonesian (Siegel 1986) scholars.

Langenberg 1986, 1990) or on single keywords (Heryanto 1995; Bowen 1986). Michael van Langenberg's 1986 article 'Analysing the New Order state: A keywords approach' represents one of the first attempts to analyse the structure of the New Order state through 'its own indigenous discourse' (van Langenberg 1986, 1). Van Langenberg identifies a basic lexicon of forty keywords, which he defines, following Raymond Williams, as 'significant, binding words in certain activities and their interpretation' (van Langenberg 1986, 1). These keywords identify and provide the link between the five major facets of the state: power, accumulation, legitimacy, culture and dissent.

Van Langenberg's analysis provides a systematic account of the interaction between the key terms of New Order political discourse as the expression of the state's ideology and the way in which the state maintains its hegemony. It is concerned with how keywords both describe and are involved in the establishment and maintenance of state power. The keyword *bapak* (father), for example, which van Langenberg categorises as a keyword of power, articulates 'the overall structure of social stratification in Indonesia'. Similarly, the keyword Gestapu (Gerakan September Tigapuluh, Thirtieth of September Movement) justifies the New Order's authoritarian mode of rule by serving as a constant reminder of the danger posed by the 'enemies of the state'. In this way, van Langenberg's analysis represents not only a novel contribution to the understanding of the New Order state formation but an explicit acknowledgement of the connection between language and power.

The emphasis on ideologies of dissent is also of value. As van Langenberg points out, dissent is both 'a product of the state-formation and a determining factor upon it'. The keywords of dissent he identifies are focused around religious belief, cultural identity, ethics, morality, and social justice (van Langenberg 1986, 28). Such issues have, according to van Langenberg, been central to dissent since the New Order's inception and remain important loci of opposition today.[34]

In a later paper van Langenberg revisits the keywords approach, making some adaptations to the original lexicon and incorporating new keywords (including *deregulasi* (deregulation) of the economy and *regenerasi* (regeneration), referring to the generational change in the leadership of the state) to fit in with recent events and changes in policy (van Langenberg 1990). Of particular note is the redefinition of the state as encompassing eight major facets, including four main arenas: a state-system, civil society, private realms and public realms, and four processes: dominance, hegemony, production and markets. However, this reformulation appears to have resulted in a loss of emphasis on dissent, which van Langenberg claims has been domesticated under the auspices of the policy of political openness (*keterbukaan*) (van Langenberg 1990, 136).[35]

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[34] Anders Uhlin, for example, has described Islamic pro-democracy discourses in which Islamic values and Islamic concepts are central aspects of opposition. Similarly, a common goal of pro-democracy discourses is social justice and the demand for human rights (Uhlin 1997, 129-30 & 145)

Ariel Heryanto's (1995) analysis of the term *pembangunan* (development) also takes a 'keyword approach' (see also Heryanto 1988, 1990b). Heryanto's central concerns are to outline the political, economic, and cultural variables involved in the construction of the various definitions of *pembangunan*, to trace the continuities and changes that have taken place in these definitions, and to explore the implications of these changes and continuities for contemporary Indonesian society.

Like van Langenberg, Heryanto sees *pembangunan* as a keyword in New Order Indonesia. *Pembangunan*, he suggests, has an all-pervasive presence in the official life of the nation. In this sense, he argues, the word *pembangunan* defines reality:

> The keyword *Pembangunan* … is 'constitutive' because it gives *Pembangunan* its actual existence, as well as its recognisable and workable nature. The metaphor, *Pembangunan*, provides a set of boundaries within which the general population is urged to concentrate their views of reality, from which and within which to explore the vast changes in which they are engulfed (Heryanto 1995, 9).

According to Heryanto, the all-pervasive nature of *Pembangunan* in qualifying individuals, institutions, concepts or activities:

> indicates the espousal of controlled or approved processes of social interaction, in thought and behaviour, which are conducive to maintaining or reproducing the state-desired economic, political, and cultural status quo (Heryanto 1995, 10).[36]

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[35] As this study shows, dissent was by no means wholly domesticated. Although the period of openness to some extent did assimilate soft-line opposition, student protest in fact escalated during this period.

[36] Vedi Hadiz suggests that the Pancasila indoctrination courses for civil servants (*Pedoman Penhayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*, P4) were successful in 'totally stultify[ing] the minds of people' (cited in Bourchier 1996, 247). However, as Bourchier notes, pointing to Ramage's 1994 study of Pancasila discourse, 'lively and vigorous debates are possible within the framework of Pancasila discourse' (ibid.).

Heryanto recognises the possibilities for resistance to these approved processes of social interaction. *Pembangunan*, he argues, has not 'exhausted the population's consciousness' nor the potential of the language (Heryanto 1995, 10).

The anthropologist John Bowen's 1986 study of the concept of *gotong royong* (mutual assistance) in Indonesia takes a similar approach. Bowen explores the ways in which the category of *gotong royong* 'has provided ideological material for political discourse and for state intervention into rural society' (1986, 545). Yet, as Bowen points out, villagers themselves do not always interpret the term *gotong royong* in the way in which the state intends: alongside the official understanding of *gotong royong* as the authentic 'spirit' of the Indonesian community are the 'everyday' understandings of *gotong royong*. In these understandings, *gotong royong* is seen as either a convenient term for pre-existing local practices of reciprocity or as a euphemism for the labour demands made of villagers by the state. Local responses to state intervention thus vary from 'acceptance based on a strategic misrecognition of the basis for the labour demand to tacitly ignoring the dictates of the state' (Bowen 1986, 558-9).

Van Langenberg's analysis is undertaken from the perspective of state theory. And while both Bowen and Heryanto take an anthropological approach, only Heryanto focuses on the linguistic aspects of the keyword *pembangunan*, and even then the focus is on single word. As a result, despite their relative strengths, the keywords approaches offer little in the way of detailed linguistic analysis. Moreover, while the keywords are considered in terms of their broader social, cultural and political contexts, the textual contexts, and the relationship between the textual context and the broader social, cultural and political contexts, is not considered.

Virginia Matheson Hooker's study of New Order presidential speeches offers considerably more in this regard. Matheson Hooker applies Halliday's register theory in examining 'the interaction between the language of the New Order Independence Day addresses [*Pidato Kenegaraan*] and their social context' (Matheson Hooker 1995, 276; see also Hooker 1996). She begins by discussing the New Order policy of language development. One of the major policy goals, she notes, has been the standardisation of the language and the promotion of proper and correct (*baik dan* *benar*) use (see also Sneddon 2003, chapter 7; Errington 1998, 274-5).[37] This, she claims, is not merely an aesthetic concern but rather represents an example of language manipulation and a means of establishing the hegemony of the officially sanctioned mode of expression (see also Heryanto 1987, 1992; Pabottingi 1991; Moeliono 1989; Sudjoko 1989).

Matheson Hooker takes Suharto's presidential addresses commemorating Independence Day as a benchmark for formal, *baik dan benar* (correct and proper) New Order language (1995, 274). The speeches, she claims, have developed a regular format which enables them to be easily compared (see also Teeuw 1988). Using as her framework the three register variables - field, tenor and mode - Matheson Hooker analyses the Independence Day Addresses in relation to the social and political context in which they were presented.

In terms of their field, she notes, the Independence Day Addresses are concerned with the role and aims of the New Order. According to the speeches, the primary role of the New Order is the pure and consistent implementation of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, which includes the correction of 'deviations' from the ideals expressed in the proclamation. The New Order also functions as the provider of a 'way of life' (*tatanan kehidupan*) for the nation, which is consistent with the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In addition to this, a number of other themes pervade the texts including the concept of *demokrasi* (democracy), *stabilitas nasional* (national stability), *kemajuan* (progress) and *kekeluargaan* (family principles).

The tenor of the speeches is formal and authoritative. A strong sense of distance is established between the president and the immediate and wider national audience. The members of the MPR are addressed using conventional phrases. The wider audience, however, is never addressed directly although they are included in the speech through the use of *kita* (we: inclusive) and through references to *rakyat* (the people), *masyarakat* (society) and *bangsa* (nation).

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[37] Errington notes, for example, that 'Indonesian is considered … as part of the nation-state's infrastructure, promoting homogeneity among citizens across national territory and so facilitating the modernisation of the economy and the stabilisation of social configurations. It is likewise derivative of a state-supervised, 'top-down' process, through which Indonesian is superimposed on otherwise diverse communities through a bureaucratically hierarchised system of state-sponsored or state-supervised schools. It resonates with the vision of bounded but socially and linguistically homogenous space characteristic of national forms of territoriality (1998, 275).

The mode of the speeches is written although they are intended to be read aloud. Rationality and forward planning are expressed through the constant repetition of vocabulary items such as *dalam rangka* (in the framework of), *landasan* (base, starting point) and *tahapan* (stage, phase). A sense of continuous consolidation in the development of the nation is expressed through the repetition of the word *lagi* (again) and through the use of the *memper*- form of the verb, indicating intensification of the quality expressed in the base word.[38]

This New Order discourse is then compared with the type of public discourse used by former president Sukarno during his Independence Day address of 1966. Matheson Hooker concludes that the differences between the two indicate that New Order discourse, with its formal style and emphasis on detailed planning, was 'fashioned deliberately as a reaction and a contrast to the style of the previous government' (1995, 284-5).

Eriyanto (2000) also uses presidential speeches as a means of analysing the language of the New Order regime. His approach is based on Teun van Dijk's method of discourse analysis and focuses on a detailed analysis of the linguistic features of the texts including theme, structure, semantic strategies, sentence level features, keywords and style. These features are then linked to Suharto's world view and to the consolidation of his power. For example, Eriyanto suggests that linguistic strategies used in presidential speeches are aimed at controlling information. In this way, information which is of advantage to the regime, such as economic successes or the reduction of debt, is given explicitly and the sentence structure is often active. Information which presents the regime in a negative light, including the presence of social conflict or political opposition, is given in an implicit and vague way, and the sentence expressed in the passive voice (Eriyanto 2000, 116). Active and passive sentences, nominalisation and abstraction are also used to foreground the positive actions and strengths of the regime or to deemphasise weaknesses or failures (Eriyanto 2000, 146-51). In addition, Suharto uses the first person inclusive pronoun *kita* (we) as a means of demonstrating his representation of the wishes of the people and to cultivate a relationship of solidarity with his wider audience (Eriyanto 2000, 156-9). Suharto also establishes semantic monopolies over the interpretation of certain key words, including *pembangunan* (development), Pancasila, *kebudayaan nasional* (national culture), and *adil makmur* (just and prosperous), and uses strategies such as euphemism, labelling and 'newspeak' in order to manipulate the meaning of certain words and obscure others (Eriyanto 2000, chapter 8).[39]

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[38] In the verb *mempercepat* (accelerate), for example, is constructed from the base word *cepat*, meaning 'fast' or 'quick'.

Saryono and Syaukat also take a linguistic approach to the analysis of New Order power, suggesting that the New Order's use of language reflects the dynamics of power. Their focus is on the ways that the New Order authorities consolidated and strengthened their power through language and the linguistic responses of wider society to the New Order's power (Saryono and Syaukat 1993, 55-56). One of the key ways that the New Order consolidated its power, they argue, was through the linguistic 'smoothing' (*penghalusan*) of concepts which might endanger the New Order's power. Terms such as *komersialisasi jabatan* (commercialisation of positions) for bureaucratic corruption and *kekurangan gizi* (nutritional deficiencies) for famine are examples of this. The New Order also exaggerated perceived threats in order to deny or discredit non-state actors, classifying them as *subversif* (subversive), or applying the labels *ekstrim kiri* (extreme left) and *ekstrim kanan* (extreme right). In addition, the use of phrases such as *demi kepentingan umum* (for the common good), *demi pembangunan* (in the interests of development) and *kita perlu mengetatkan tali pinggang* (we need to tighten our belts) were designed to direct the public's attention away from negative aspects of development and unite them behind the New Order (Saryono and Syaukat 1993, 60-1).

Despite these measures, Saryono and Syaukat argue that Indonesian society was able to exert some control on the New Order's use of power in language. The key means by which they did this was by satirising official acronyms and concepts. The acronym for the Indonesian civil servants association, Korpri (Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia), for example, was said to stand for *koruptor pribumi* (corrupt Indonesian official). Similarly, the term *ganti rugi* (compensation), used by the New Order to refer to the compensation given to villagers whose land had been taken over by the government for development projects (often promised and seldom given), was taken to mean '*meskipun diganti ya tetap rugi*' ('even though things have changed, we still lose out'). They conclude that the position of the New Order authorities over wider Indonesian society remains dominant and society's power weak. This is so, they suggest, because wider society is only able to express dissent in subtle linguistic ways while the New Order authorities are able to consolidate their power clearly and openly (Saryono and Syaukat 1993, 66-7).

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[39] See also Hidayat (1999). Lubis (1989) and Anwar (1989) discuss the use of euphemisms and other political aspects of New Order language practices.

The approaches of Matheson Hooker, Eriyanto and Saryono and Syaukat offer valuable insights into the micro-level aspects of power and language during the late New Order period. In particular, Matheson Hooker and Eriyanto's focus on the experiential, interpersonal and textual aspects of presidential speeches and their relationship to the broader social and political contexts of the texts enables both authors to provide rich linguistic detail. From the point of view of this study, however, the main weakness of these analyses is the fact that the link between the linguistic features and the dynamics of power relations is not adequately explored. In particular, these studies lack an underlying theory of power and power relations within which to frame the analysis of language. A similar criticism can be made with regard to Saryono and Syaukat's analysis. Moreover, while Saryono and Syaukat's treatment of dissenting language practices is of particular value, their conclusion that wider society remains weak in the face of the dominance of the New Order's linguistic power seems somewhat unwarranted: as this study shows, despite its subtlety, the satirising of official acronyms and concepts is in fact a powerful and effective means of expressing dissent.

Two studies which examine the relationship between language, power, and the politics of identity in New Order Indonesia are Langston (2001) and Berman (1998). Langston (2001) is a study of the production of the 'ideal national citizen' in Suharto's speeches during the late New Order (1996 to 1998). Her approach is based on Foucault's concept of power, and in particular his claim that 'government has particular rationalities … inherent to it', the aim of which is to influence individual behavior (Langston 2001, 1). Langston argues that Suharto employed language to emphasise that the success of the aims of the New Order government relied upon the individual 'becoming' an ideal Indonesian national citizen' (2001, 1). Throughout the speeches the key values of the New Order - prosperity, stability and continuity- are reinforced through the repetition of key phrases and the standardised structure of the speeches themselves. Opposition is represented as a threat to these values and Suharto himself as both the mentor of the nation and its protector and guide (Langston 2001, 2).

Langston's examination of the role of power relations in producing 'ideal' Indonesian citizens is particularly relevant for the present study. Her emphasis on the role of individual agency in the production of national citizens is of particular value. Langston argues that the success of the New Order's attempts to construct ideal national citizens is dependant upon individuals internalising the New Order's aims and values and regulating their conduct in accordance with these (Langston 2001, 26). This is consistent with the claims made above that the production of texts is only one part of the process of meaning-making, the other being the process in which readers or listeners interpret texts and from this produce compliant or resistant readings. As a result, Langston's study, like the present study, is limited to an examination of one 'half' of the process of meaning-making.

Laine Berman's study of Javanese oral narratives to some extent redresses this. In *Speaking through the silence: Narratives, social conventions and power in Java* (1998), Berman examines the ways that working class Javanese women both reproduce and challenge the macro structures of power and authority through the stories they tell. These stories are told against the backdrop of the New Order's construction of Javanese identity, which taps into what Berman calls 'traditional definitions of Javanese elegance' (Berman 1998, 6-11). Berman's approach draws on both linguistic ethnography and Teun van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach to discourse, suggesting that aspects of Javanese social hierarchy are reproduced through the structuring of oral narratives and the more micro-level linguistic patterns (Berman 1998, 12-17 and 21). By exploring the stories of 'everyday' Javanese women, Berman is able to draw some conclusions regarding the ways in which these women interpret and respond to the 'powerful' texts that shape them.

Berman (1999) continues this project by examining the ways in which the dominant metaphors of the Indonesian state position individuals as 'good Javanese' as well as how the 'voice of authority' maintains a position of power through the control of informational metaphors. She also examines how a group of homeless children, by not recognising this discourse of power and, consequently, not taking up the powerless position in the discourse, are positioned 'outside the system'.

Berman begins by examining how 'the masses' are positioned in certain ways through the metaphor of 'Javaneseness as a journey'. According to this metaphor, which is reinforced through the centrally controlled media, the good Javanese chooses the path of self-sacrifice for the sake of prosperity and harmony for all, while the bad Javanese chooses the path of *pamrih* (greed and self-indulgence). Such metaphors position the Javanese masses as ideally acquiescent to authority, accepting of their fate and with a strong sense of obligation to their immediate and wider community (the nation) (Berman 1999, 141-4). She then explores the ways in which the 'voice of authority' establishes the exclusivity of its information-giving and decision-making roles. The metaphor of 'information is a sacred entity' renders the voices who are authorised to provide it supremely powerful. In addition, through the metaphor of 'the nation is a family', the voice of authority becomes a paternal figure or *bapak* (father) and the listeners *anak* (children). The voice of authority also maintains its dominance through the creation of an invisible and unnamed enemy, often associated with communism (Berman 1999, 145-6). Yet according to Berman, the homeless children who belong to GIRLI, a cooperative of homeless children in Yogyakarta, have never learned the metaphors that disempower them and position the voice of authority as powerful. As such, these children in effect reject the state's definition of them as powerless and enjoy considerable freedom to question and criticise (Berman 1999, 151-6).

The strength of Berman's analyses lies in the emphasis given to power relations and in the explicit links made between language practices and power relations. She also presents substantial supporting evidence drawn from the texts themselves, making her analysis rich in linguistic detail. Her analysis of the ways in which the GIRLI children resist the dominant discourse of the New Order state is of particular relevance for the present study. Berman shows that the GIRLI children's contestation of key concepts of the state discourse constitutes a direct rejection of the system. Yet, she argues, for the GIRLI children the consequence of this challenge to the system was the silencing of their voices. As this study shows, students' challenge to the system was a combination of both 'insider' and 'outsider' resistance. This, coupled with students' institutionalised status, enabled their criticisms to be much more effective than those of the GIRLI children.

Conclusion

The survey of the literature on critical discourse analysis suggests a need for practical case studies of the linguistic aspects of resistance. The application of Weberian theories of power and Marxist conceptions of ideology, with their emphasis on dominance and 'false consciousness', has meant that resistance to the exercise of power and to the discourses of those in authority, has been neglected. Indeed, while some practitioners of CDA, including Norman Fairclough, have used Foucault's concept of discourse, this study is unique amongst critical discourse analysis approaches in its application of Foucault's concepts of power, government and discipline to the analysis of texts. This study will thus assess the effectiveness of the critical discourse analysis method, and the application of Foucault's concept of power, in examining power relations in Indonesia.

The examination of the literature on Indonesia suggests that there is a need to build on the understanding of power relations between the state and wider society under the New Order. It also suggests that there is a need to understand more about the micro-level aspects of power and resistance in New Order Indonesia. Existing studies of state-society relations have often emphasised the New Order's success in securing the acquiescence of wider society for its rule and have offered political, economic or other explanations for this (see for example Anderson 1990a; Jackson 1978; Mackie and MacIntyre 1994; James 1990; Crouch 1998). Those who have explored in detail the nature of resistance and opposition to the New Order have tended to focus on macro-level phenomena - political organisations, NGOs, and political parties - or have traced the broad themes of opposition (see for example Aspinall 2000; Uhlin 1997). Others have approached the issue of resistance to the New Order from the perspective of literature and the performing arts (see for example Hatley 1990; Foulcher 1990; Clark 2001; Errington 2001; Hill 1979; see also Matheson Hooker 1999). There is therefore a need to develop further the kind of close linguistic analysis undertaken by Heryanto (1995), Matheson Hooker (1995), Eriyanto (2000) and Saryono and Syaukat (1993) by linking it, as Langston (2001) and Berman (1998, 1999) do, with a theory of power and power relations. Foucault's concept of power enables the complex and reciprocal nature of power relations in New Order Indonesia to be examined. Combined with a method of linguistic analysis in which the link between language and its social and political context is already theorised, this view of power prompts a reassessment of the apparent dominance of the state by suggesting that resistance is an inevitable and indeed integral part of the exercise of power.

CHAPTER TWO

Mahasiswa in New Order Indonesia

This chapter examines the history of youth and student activism in Indonesia and introduces the youth and student population of the New Order. This provides the background for the analysis in the remaining chapters. Taking as a starting point Foucault's view that discourses are historically constructed, the first part of the chapter locates the origins of Indonesia's *pemuda* and *mahasiswa* at the beginning of the twentieth century. The discussion does not constitute a comprehensive overview of the period. Rather, it sketches a broad picture of youth and student activism in the late colonial and immediate post colonial period. The aim of this is to introduce the tradition of youth and student activism in Indonesia and examines some of the ways in which these early student activists saw their roles and identities. This tradition had a significant impact on the ways in which students' roles and identities were defined during the New Order both by students themselves and by the state.

The second part of the chapter examines some of the key New Order policies concerning the young generation (*generasi muda*) and students (*mahasiswa*). These policies were designed to separate youth from their revolutionary past and integrate them into the key values of the organic state: harmony, consensus, self-sacrifice and a concern for the common interest. At the same time, the policies also aimed to facilitate the practical utilisation of the young generation for development (*pembangunan*). This approach was a response to the state's recognition that the combination of a predominantly young population and a strong tradition of youth and student activism was potentially highly destabilising for the regime.

The final part of the chapter provides a brief survey of student activism in Indonesia during the New Order period. While the organisations, themes and character of Indonesian youth and student activism, particularly in the New Order period, have been well-documented, there remains a need to address questions of student identity in a more systematic way. The examination of state and student representations of students' roles and identities in this thesis, and the links it makes between discourse, identity and power, go some way towards addressing this.

Origins: tracing *pemuda* and *mahasiswa*

The roots of the identities of New Order *mahasiswa* can be found in the schools and colleges set up by the Dutch colonial administration from the mid 1800s. A basic education had been available to a very small number of Indonesians since the seventh century through the Hindu-Buddhist *asrama*, and later through the Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren* or *madrasah*), and Christian missionary schools established by the Portuguese and later by the Dutch (Lee 1995, 1-2). In the mid 1800s, education in the Dutch East Indies began to expand. This early expansion was largely the result of the Dutch colonial administration's recognition of the need for better educated Dutch-speaking professionals and administrative personnel to staff for the growing bureaucracy. To this end the Dokter Jawa medical school, which became the Training School for Native Doctors (School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen, Stovia), was established in Batavia in 1851. In 1873 a number of vocational schools for civil servants, later renamed Training Schools for Native Administrators (Opleidings School voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren, Osvia), were established in Bandung, Magelang and Probolinggo (ibid., 3).

Education expanded further under the Dutch colonial government's Ethical Policy, introduced in 1901. This policy was introduced in response to a growing sentiment within Holland that colonial policy should include a greater focus on the welfare of the indigenous people of the archipelago (Lee 1995, 4; Nagazumi 1972, 18-25). One of the key priorities of the policy was the creation of more educational opportunities for indigenous Indonesians, including primary and secondary education (Lee 1995, 4; see also Nagazumi 1972, 22). This included vocational education. In 1909 the Training School for Native Lawyers (Opledingsschool voor Inlandse Rechtskundigen) was established. Vocational schools for veterinarians (Nederlandsch-Indische Veeartsen-school) and agricultural specialists (Middelbare Landbouwschool) in Bogor (which were later amalgamated), and a number of teacher training schools were also created (Hardjasoemantri 1982, 19-20). From the 1920s, institutions of higher education also began to be established, either through the conversion of vocational high schools into faculties or by the opening of new institutions, such as the technical college (Technische Hoogeschool) in Bandung, which was opened in 1920, and the colleges of law (Rechtshoogeschool) (1924) and medicine (Geneeskundige Hoogeschool) (1927) in Jakarta (Hardjasoemantri 1982, 20-1; Ingleson 1975, 63). In addition, a select few of the most promising Indonesian students from the Dutch stream had the opportunity to undertake higher education overseas, mostly in Holland or the Middle East (Martha 1992, 65-8; Ingleson 1975, 2-3 and 63-4).

The schools and colleges set up by the Dutch attracted young people from villages and towns throughout the archipelago. As Anderson notes, the bonds which developed between these students through their common educational experience contained the first seeds of the 'imagined community' which was to become Indonesia (Anderson 1991, 121). These seeds developed through organisations such as Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavour) and later in regional youth organisations such as Tri Koro Dharmo (later Jong Java), formed in Batavia in 1915, Jong Sumatrenen Bond (1917), Jong Ambon (1918), Jong Minahasa (1919), Jong Celebes (1919), Sekar Rukun (1920), Jong Bataks Bond (1926), as well as the Muslim youth organisation Jong Islamieten Bond (1925) (Martha 1992, 45-53; see also chapter three).[1] It was these youth who in 1928 pledged an oath to unity which was later to be made into the symbolic foundation of the Indonesian state (see Foulcher 2000; *45 tahun* 1974).

Until at least the mid to late 1920s, the terms these students used to describe themselves were Dutch.[2] In the 1910s, students studying in the Dutch secondary schools and vocational colleges - which at that time represented the highest level of education available within the Indies - were referred to as *leerlingen* (pupils).[3] These students were mostly in their mid to late teens and came from privileged aristocratic or professional backgrounds (Anderson 1972, 16-17). Students studying in universities and institutions of higher education outside of the Indies were differentiated from secondary and vocational school students by the use of the Dutch term *student*. With the opening of institutions of higher education in the Indies in the early to mid 1920s, the term *student* was also applied to students studying at these institutions. These students were aged in their late teens and early twenties and were a highly select (and small) minority. Dutch-speaking youth and students in the Indies also used a variety of terms to describe young people in general including *jongere generatie* (younger generation), *jonger geslacht* and *jong leven* (young people, youth), as well as *jongeren*, *jeugd* and *jongelieden* (youth).[4]

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[1] For accounts of the youth organisations of the colonial period see Nagazumi (1972); Suryadinata (1978); Biro Pemuda (1965); Tomasoa (1972); Martha, Wibisono and Anwar (1984); Martha (1992); *45 tahun* (1974); van Miert (1996); Liem (1971); Reid (1979).

[2] The following discussion relies on Indonesian translations of Dutch language sources collected in Ihsan and Soeharto (1981) and Soeharto and Ihsan (1981, 1982).

[3] See for example the 1916 article which appeared in *Tri Koro Dharmo*, the newsletter of the organisation of the same name (later renamed *Jong Java*), reprinted in Soeharto and Ihsan (1981, 1-9).

For the indigenous Indonesian students, speaking Dutch was a sign of their Western education and their membership of an elite group in society. The prestige associated with the colonial language (and with those who used it) meant that the Dutch terms for student and youth also had a certain prestige. As nationalist sentiment in the Indies grew, however, Dutch was gradually replaced by Malay (Indonesian). Amongst the youth, the Malay terms for youth and student began to be used from the beginning of the 1920s. In 1921, for example, the inaugural editorial of the Sundanese language newsletter of the youth organisation Sekar Rukun used the Malay term *murid* (pupil) (Soeharto and Ihsan 1981, 195).[5] By the mid to late 1920s Malay terms such as *murid* and *pelajar* (student) were commonplace in Malay language writings produced by youth and students in the Indies. The term *murid* tended to be reserved for secondary and vocational school students while *pelajar* was used to describe students studying in institutions of higher education both within the Indies and overseas.[6]

The Malay term for youth - *pemuda* - was also widely used at this time. In the context of the regional youth organisations the term usually referred to those between the ages of 14 and 30. Since most of the youth who were active in the youth organisations were also students, the term *pemuda* often implied educated youth, either those who were still students or those who had recently graduated.[7]

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[4] See for example the variety of terms used in Mohammad Hatta's 1928 statement at his trial in The Hague, reprinted in Soeharto and Ihsan 1982, 143-58.

[5] Sekar Rukun was the youth organisation formed by Sundanese students studying in Batavia.

[6] See for example its use to refer to the Stovia students (*murid Stovia*) who first established Jong Java in that organisation's commemorative volume published in 1930, parts of which are reprinted in Soeharto and Ihsan (1981, 23). The Indonesian Students Association (Perhimpunan Pelajar-pelajar Indonesia, PPPI) was formed in 1926 by students studying at the faculties in Batavia and Bandung (Tomasoa 1972, 49).

[7] A 1925 Malay-language article in the newspaper *Bandera Islam*, reporting the founding of Jong Islamieten Bond, described the organisation as an association of Indonesian youth (*serikat pemuda Indonesia*) (Soeharto and Ihsan 1981, 257). The organisation was intended for 'Muslim youths between the ages of 14 and 30' (*pemuda-pemuda Islam umur 14 sampai 30 tahun*) and especially for Dutch speaking Indonesians (*anak-anak Indonesia jang berbahasa Belanda*). It was intended to be of interest to Indonesian youths who are still studying and those who had already graduated (*pemuda-pemuda*

The lack of a clear distinction between youth and students at this time was reflected in the compound forms which often appeared. A 1916 article in *Tri Koro Dharmo* for example, described the organisation of the same name as providing the model for an association which would encompass all ‘student youths’ (*studeerende jongelingen*) in the Indies (Soeharto and Ihsan 1981, 4). A 1928 Malay language editorial in *Suluh Indonesia Muda* (Torch of Young Indonesia) described the four Perhimpunan Indonesia students then under trial in the Hague as *kaum pelajar Indonesia* (Indonesian students), *pemuda-pemuda* (youths), *pemuda-pemuda pelajar* (student youths), and *pemuda kita jang mengejar ilmu* (our youth who are pursuing knowledge) (Soeharto and Ihsan 1982, 159-161). These terms suggest that for the youth and students of the late colonial period the categories of ‘youth’ and ‘student’ were not mutually exclusive: individuals could occupy both a ‘student’ and a ‘youth’ identity simultaneously.

The youth of the colonial period saw themselves as having an important role to play as leaders of the *rakyat* or common people. While this concern initially centred on a particular ethnic or regional grouping, it eventually encompassed a concern for ‘the people of Indonesia’ (*Indonesische volk*).[8] Until at least the mid to late 1920s, however, most of the regional youth organisations were explicitly non-political. Their aims were usually expressed in terms of improving ties between Dutch secondary and vocational school students from the same ethnic group and fostering an appreciation of their traditional cultures and languages (see Martha 1992, 46 and 49; Biro Pemuda 1965, 32 and 38; Tomasoa 1972, 25 and 28). From the end of the First World War, however, political events within the Indies, including the activities of the growing nationalist movement, began to have a more significant impact on Indonesian youth and students. The new, more political outlook which these organisations began to cultivate found expression in the growing efforts to foster unity (*persatuan*) amongst the youth groups. By the time of the Second Youth Congress in October 1928, Indonesian youth and students were representing their role as the pioneers of unity not only in the context of the youth organisations but within the wider ‘imagined community’ of Indonesia (see Anderson 1991). In his address at the opening of the Second Youth Congress

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Indonesia yang lagi dalam pelajaran dan yang sudah tamat belajarnya sekolah) (Soeharto and Ihsan 1981, 261).

[8] See for example the open letter to the press written on 23 July 1908, by Soewarno, the secretary of the Founding Committee of Budi Utomo (cited in Penders 1977, 225-6). See also the 1916 article in *Tri Koro Dharmo* by Stovia student and first president of Tri Koro Dharmo Raden Satiman Wirjosandjojo cited in Soeharto and Ihsan 1981, 6-7 and the 1925 Malay language editorial in the newspaper *Bandera Islam* cited in Soeharto and Ihsan 1981, 258-9.

Mohammad Yamin argued that the place of Indonesian youth (*pemuda Indonesia*) in the nationalism and unity of Indonesia (*kebangsaan dan persatuan Indonesia*) 'is not outside or on the edge of unity and nationalism but in midst of our unity, if not at its centre' (cited in Ihsan and Soeharto 1981, 144).

Yet while the youth of the regional youth organisations remained somewhat cautious in their politics, the students of the Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesia Association) were from the beginning of the 1920s consciously involving themselves with the more radical end of the nationalist spectrum. The Indonesia Association (originally called the Indonesische Vereeniging) was founded in Holland in 1908 as a non-political association of Indonesian students studying in the Netherlands. After its leaders came into contact with nationalist leaders exiled to the Netherlands in the mid 1910s and early 1920s the organisation was gradually politicised. Between 1919 and 1925 it played an important role in the development of a radical secular nationalist ideology (Ingleson 1975, 1- 4 and 71).[9] The organisation's involvement in the nationalist movement in the Indies led to the arrest in September 1927 of four key leaders of Perhimpunan Indonesia - Mohammad Hatta, Ali Sastroamidjojo, Abdul Madjid and Nazir Pamuntjak - on charges of inciting violence against the Dutch government.[10] In his 1928 defense speech, the young Sumatran Mohammad Hatta described the role of Indonesia's youth in politics - and the role of the Perhimpunan Indonesia students in particular - as an appropriate and indeed central one. This role, he argued, was based on their particularly keen understanding of the poor conditions under which the people of the Indies lived and of the colonial situation. It was also a function of their status as 'young intellectuals' (*kaum intelek muda*) whose role was to 'prepare and reawaken the Indonesian nation' (Hatta 1976, 12-13, 18-19, 23-24).

When the Japanese took over from the Dutch on 8 March 1942 they dissolved all political associations and organisations, including the youth and student organisations, and closed all institutions of higher education (Ricklefs 1993, 202; Saidi 1993, 24).[11] The use of Dutch was prohibited and the military authorities promoted the use of

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[9] To reflect the changing political orientation of the organisation, in 1924 the Indonesische Vereeniging changed its name to Perhimpunan Indonesia and its publication, originally called *Hindia Putra*, was renamed *Indonesia Merdeka* (Ingleson 1975, 26 fn 4; and 87).

[10] The arrests took place in the aftermath of the crackdowns which followed the communist uprisings of 1926-1927. They were tried 6 months later although all four were later acquitted (Ingleson 1975, 56 and 58-61).

[11] The medical college in Jakarta was later reopened in April 1943 under the new name of Ika Daigaku (Saidi 1993, 19; Anderson 1972, 19).

Japanese. Since almost no-one in the Indies spoke Japanese, however, 'Malay' (as the Japanese referred to it) was used in education, administration and other areas of public life (Ricklefs 1993, 201; Sneddon 2003, 111). As a result of this anti-Dutch policy, the Dutch terms for 'youth' and 'student' disappeared from public life. Many of the new organisations set up by the Japanese for youth and students used the Japanese terms for youth (*seinen*) and student (*gaku*), although others used Indonesian names.[12] It also seems likely that it was during the Japanese occupation that the term *mahasiswa* (university or college student) began to be used to refer to the few students studying at the medical college and in the other institutions of higher education set up by the Japanese.[13] By the time the Republic's first institutions of higher education were opened in 1949 and 1950, this term was in common usage.

Mahasiswa comes from the term *siswa,* meaning 'student' and the Sanskrit prefix *maha-*, meaning 'great'. While the Dutch terms *leerlingen* (pupil, secondary school student) and *student* (university or college student) distinguished between students in different levels of education, the 1940s was the first time this distinction was drawn in Malay (Indonesian). This was a result of the need to replace the now-banned Dutch term *student* and to describe the students of the newly created faculties. There was a considerable element of prestige associated with the status of college or university student, reflected in the use of the Sanskrit prefix *maha-*.

The closure of all Dutch-language schools, including the colleges, meant that many students were without employment. Some of these youths found a new intellectual outlet in the informal meetings and discussions which took place in the *asrama* (dormitories) of Jakarta and Bandung (Anderson 1972, 19 and 39-60; see also Legge 1988; Safwan 1973, Wirasoeminta 1995, Malik 1956; Diah 1983; see also Dahm 1969, 302-315; Sukarno 1966, 200-220). Others returned home or joined the new organisations being set up by the Japanese.

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[12] See for example, the Japanese name given to the semi-military scouting organisation Seinendan (Youth Corps) or to the organisation set up in 1943 for students from seventh grade through to high school, Gakutotai (see Kahin 1952, 110). The Greater Asia Youth Corps (Barisan Pemuda Asia Raya), however, used the Indonesian term for youth (*pemuda*).

[13] One of the underground groups of the occupation which was closely connected to Sjahrir was called Student Union (Persatuan Mahasiswa). It was made up of university students in Jakarta. See also the name of the Jakarta Students' Association (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Jakarta). However, the term *pelajar* also remained in use. See for example Martosowejo 1984, 207-14.

From early in the occupation, the Japanese had begun mobilising educated and uneducated, urban and rural youth into a range of new organisations created for the purposes of propaganda and defence.[14] It was as a result of these efforts that the concept of *pemuda* broadened, both in terms of the educational level of the *pemuda* to which it referred and the socio-economic and demographic group it described.[15] During the colonial period the term *pemuda* referred to those youth who were either students or recent graduates of the Dutch education system. During the Japanese occupation, however, youth from a wide variety of socio-economic backgrounds and educational levels came together in organisations such as the Homeland Defence Force (Pembela Tanah Air, Peta) Seinendan (Youth Corps), Heiho (Auxiliary Forces), Keibodan (Vigilance Corps), and Barisan Pelopor (Vanguard Corps) (Anderson 1972, 20-30; Kahin 1952, 109-110).[16]

The military training they received under the Japanese served the youth of Indonesia well when, in the aftermath of the proclamation *pemuda* from a wide range of social backgrounds joined the armed struggle to defend Indonesia's independence against the returning Dutch. The most important quality of these *pemuda* was their revolutionary *semangat* (spirit). This spirit brought together 'youthful' qualities of the *pemuda*: 'vigour, courage and determination' (Frederick 1997, 229).[17] It also reflected a commitment to the struggle for independence which often went beyond age (Lucas 1988, 157-8; see also Reid 1986, 188; Frederick 1989, 69, 151-2, 261-2; Frederick 1997, 199-200, 203 and 227 ff; Anderson 1972; Hardjito 1952).

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[14] Kahin notes that the Japanese specifically targeted uneducated youth since their lack of exposure to the West made them 'most easily and effectively indoctrinated to hate and fight against the Allies' (Kahin 1952, 109). See also Sihombing 1962.

[15] Frederick suggests that 'the Japanese occupation resulted in a widening of the meaning of *pemuda* … by extending the age limits (to 29 or 30)' (Frederick 1997, 229). In fact, colonial era youth organisations such as Jong Islamieten Bond had accepted members up to the age of 30 and some organisations did not set an upper age limit for members. Sekar Rukun, for example, only specified that their members be above the age of 14. Ordinary members and committee members had to be school students but honorary members and extraordinary members did not (see Soeharto and Ihsan 1981, 196). The Japanese occupation did, however, result in the mobilisation of much greater numbers of *pemuda* under the age of 30.

[16] The Barisan Pelopor, for example, which was established at the beginning of 1944, incorporated students and graduates of the Dutch secondary schools and vocational colleges as well as uneducated urban youths (Anderson 1972, 33). In age the youth who joined these organisations were between 14 and 35. In the Seinendan, membership was open to those between the ages of 14 and 25 (although this was later dropped to 22). The Keibodan, an auxiliary police force, accepted young men from 20 to 35 (Anderson 1972, 26-7).

[17] Frederick (1997, 201) notes that for the Dutch the term *pemuda* at this time carried far more negative connotations, being associated with terms such as 'terrorist', 'extremist' and 'mass murderer'.

Lucas argues that the *pemuda* style which developed during the revolution was part of a long tradition of social protest in Indonesia, especially in Java and Sumatra, where youth trained in *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) under a *kyai* (religious teacher) were practised in martial arts. It was also linked to the tradition of the *jago* (literally, champion) and village school teachers who were often at the centre of social protest against the Dutch and the *pangreh praja* (colonial administrative officials) (Lucas 1988, 157; see also Frederick 1997, 200). This *pemuda* style was reflected in the 'practice of speaking bluntly [rather then with official-style politeness]' and the 'sharp, decisive way of giving commands' which both Smail (1964, 127, cited in Frederick 1997, 200) and Reid (1974, 54-5, cited in Frederick 1997, 200) have described. The *pemuda* style reflected what Lucas and others have identified as a rejection of hierarchy and a cultivation of oneness with the people, which was and important part of nationalist ideology in Indonesia from the 1930s (Lucas 1988, 159). Thus, like the youth of the regional youth organisations, the *pemuda* of the revolution also saw their role in relation to the *rakyat* as one of leadership and defence. As Frederick notes:

> A kind of populism which may be termed 'rakyatism' – an attentive, sympathetic, yet in many respects rather paternalistic view of the masses characteristic of intellectuals and educated, urbanized Indonesians generally – had its roots deep in the prewar pergerakan [nationalist movement] and was very much part of pemuda sensibilities from the very beginning of the Revolution (Frederick 1997, 237).

Yet despite the rhetoric about 'being one with the masses', the *pemuda* of the revolution distinguished themselves clearly from the *rakyat*.

With independence achieved, much of the youthful vigour of the revolutionary years was in the early 1950s channeled into education as those youth whose schooling had been interrupted by the call to arms returned to their studies (Lee 1995, 33 and 69). Education, including higher education, was one of the key priorities of the new republic. Indonesia's first university had been established in November 1949 when the Balai Perguruan Tinggi Gadjah Mada (Gadjah Mada Institute of Higher Education), established in Yogyakarta in March 1946, was renamed Universitas Gadjah Mada (Gadjah Mada University). The republic's second university was formed when in January 1950 Universitas Indonesia (University of Indonesia), established in 1947 in the occupied territories, was transferred to republican hands (Hardjasoemantri 1982, 25-9; Cummings and Kasenda 1989; Notosusanto 1964, 6-7). Between 1950 and 1960, an additional six state universities were opened in various centres throughout the archipelago.[18] Islamic education also expanded at this time with the establishment of the State Islamic Institutes (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN) and the State Islamic Universities (Universitas Islam Negeri, UIN).[19]

The 1960s saw further growth in the tertiary education sector. In 1963 the government issued a decree to provide each of the then 25 provinces the opportunity to establish provincial state universities (Atmakusuma 1974, 6). As a result, between 1960 and the end of 1965 an additional 30 state universities, institutes and teachers colleges (Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan, IKIP) were created throughout the archipelago (Oey-Gardiner 1991, 85). Private universities and colleges also flourished during this time. By 1968 there were 87 Islamic theological colleges and 236 registered private universities (Hardjasoemantri 1982, 37). Government departments such as the Department of Public Works also established their own academies to provide vocational education (Atmakusuma 1974, 9).

It took some time for the effects of this new emphasis on education to filter through to the tertiary sector in terms of student numbers.[20] However, as more students graduated from senior secondary schools, and took up university studies, Indonesia's university student population grew. At the beginning of 1960 there were approximately 50 000 university students in Indonesia. By the end of 1965 it was estimated that there were more than half a million (Magenda 2001, xvi). Like their colonial counterparts, the university students of the 1950s mostly came from relatively privileged socio-economic backgrounds (Magenda 1977, 4-5). As a result, they were keenly aware of their role as the future elite. By the early 1960s, however, university students were a much more socially and culturally heterogeneous group. Of particular significance was the larger numbers of Muslim students studying at tertiary level where they had previously been underrepresented (ibid., 8).

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[18] These were Universitas Airlangga in Surabaya (1954), Universitas Hasanuddin in Makassar (1956), Universitas Andalas in West Sumatra (1956), Universitas Padjajaran in Bandung (1957), Universitas Sumatra Utara in Medan (1957) and Institut Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology, ITB) in Bandung (1959) (Hardjasoemantri 1982, 24-32).

[19] These institutions, which were run by the by the Department of Religious Affairs, aimed to develop Islamic knowledge and to train teachers for the rapidly expanding Islamic school (*madrasah*) system. The reformist Islamic organisation Muhammadiyah also established a number of universities to serve its need for teachers and several other private and Christian groups also began to set up their own institutions of higher education (Cummings, Malo and Sunarto 1997, 96-7).

[20] In the 1950/1951 academic year the total enrolment at universities and institutes was 6457. By 1961/1962 it was 97 210 and by 1963/1964 it was 184 489 (Hayden 1967, 496). In 1965 student enrolment was 184 000 at 28 universities (Atmakusuma 1974, 6).

In the immediate post-revolutionary years these students were largely uninterested in political affairs: Indonesians had won political independence from the Dutch and economic conditions were generally felt to be satisfactory (Gunawan 1986, 130; Bachtiar 1968, 185). In the lead up to the 1955 elections, however, the political parties, recognising the importance of students as a constituency, set about cultivating their support. Some political parties established new student organisations, such as the Indonesian National Student Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, GMNI), established by the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia, PNI),[21] and the Socialist Student Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis, Gemsos), established by the Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, PSI). Others cultivated relationships with existing student organisations, such as that between Masyumi and the Islamic Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI) and between the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) and local communist student organisations and later the Concentration of Indonesian Student Movements (Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia, CGMI) (see Bachtiar 1968, 186-7, Gunawan 1986, 131; Raillon 1985, 8-9; see also Saidi 1993, 8-25).[22] From the beginning of the 1960s these organisations began to play a more significant role on university campuses and in national politics (Douglas 1970, 131; Magenda 1977, 8-9).

In his study of political socialisation and student activism in Indonesia in the Guided Democracy period (1959-1965), however, Douglas argues that despite the very visible presence of these organisations, most Indonesian university students in fact avoided real engagement in politics (Douglas 1970, 131 and 153; see also Fischer 1965, 112-13; Fischer 1964). Moreover, these student organisations did not truly represent the political interests of their student members: their leadership was often dominated by older individuals, many of whom were not themselves students, and student involvement in the mass political rallies which characterised this period in Indonesian politics was often simply a symbolic show of mass support for their respective parties (Douglas 1970, 133-4).

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[21] Saidi notes that GMNI was established independently by a fusion of various student organisations and only later came under the influence of the PNI (Saidi 1993, 15-16).

[22] Ranuwihardjo 1979 discusses the activities of the youth and student organisations during the revolutionary period, including the formation of PPMI and the Kelompok Cipayung. See also Saidi 1993 for a history of the Kelompok Cipayung and its activists during the New Order.

In addition to these mass student organisations, each of the political parties also had youth wings. Ryter argues that these youth organisations were important assets in the political struggle between the president, the army and the parties which characterised the transition from parliamentary democracy to Guided Democracy (Ryter 2002, 77). The Youth-Military Cooperative Body (Badan Kerja Sama Pemuda Militer, BKSPM), formed in mid 1957, illustrates this struggle. Its original membership was made up of the youth wings of four political parties: Pemuda Demokrat, Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (Masyumi), Pemuda Ansor, the youth wing of Nadhlatul Ulama and the communist party affiliated Pemuda Rakyat (Biro Pemuda 1965, 265; *BKSPM Menjongsong* 1959, 173; Martha, Wibisono and Anwar 1984, 242).[23] The establishment of these bodies, on the instruction of Army Chief of Staff Major General A. H. Nasution, was intended to help strengthen the army's position under Sukarno's Guided Democracy and at the same time weaken the role of the political parties by emphasising political participation based on corporatist principles (Magenda 1977, 6; Feith 1962, 589). To this end, the organisation was involved in supporting Sukarno's Liberation of Irian Jaya campaign and the take-over of Dutch enterprises under the nationalisation scheme (*BKSPM Menjongsong* 1959, 174; Ryter 2002, 78-83). Both these campaigns provided the army with significant financial and political returns and so strengthened its position.

The key place of these youth and student organisations on the national political stage was reinforced by the qualities accorded to them in the president's rhetoric. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the *pemuda* spirit was progressively mythologised in Sukarno's fiery political speeches, which recalled the heroic deeds of the *pemuda* of the revolution. For Sukarno, one of the key qualities of a true revolutionary *pemuda* was *semangat* (spirit). Sukarno defined this spirit in terms of dynamism, adventurousness, a love of hard work and a love of ideals. He urged the youth to cultivate these qualities in the interests of the nation. In his 1962 speech on Youth Pledge Day (Hari Sumpah Pemuda) for example, Sukarno recalled his comment at Sukabumi during the Japanese period:

> Give me a thousand, ten thousand, one million of the older generation [*orang tua*] to move Mount Semeru from there to here. But give me a thousand youth,

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[23] In 1960, the Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia was disbanded, along with its parent party, Masyumi (Martha, Wibisono and Anwar 1984, 252).

> no, a hundred youth, no, ten youth whose hearts are aflame and I will shake (*menggemparkan*) the whole world (Sukarno 1988, 135-6).[24]

Such was his admiration for these qualities that Sukarno often urged the older generation to have a ‘youthful spirit’ and talked about ‘making the nation young in spirit’ (*meremajakan jiwa bangsa*) (Sukarno 2001, 55).

Sukarno also saw an important role for youth and students in the development of the nation. In a 1952 speech to students in Bogor, for example, Sukarno urged his audience to:

> Become Heroes of Development! Make your nation a strong one, one which is *merdeka* [free, independent] in the true sense of the word! We must carry out a revolution of development … And you, youth throughout Indonesia, you must become the pioneers and the heroes in the development revolution (Sukarno 1987a, 16-17)![25]

Sukarno’s celebration of the heroic qualities of *pemuda* also extended to *mahasiswa*: in his addresses to university students, Sukarno did not make a clear distinction between *pemuda* and *mahasiswa*, instead using the terms *pemuda* and *pemuda-pemudi* in addition to *mahasiswa*. After the events of 1965-1966 however, this distinction became an important one. Indonesia’s *mahasiswa* had shown themselves to be a powerful political force capable of playing a significant role in the demise of the Sukarno government, even if they required the assistance of the army to do so. New Order policy was thus directed towards redefining the identities of these *mahasiswa* in ways which were more in accordance with the role the new government saw as appropriate for them.

From *pemuda* to *generasi muda*: New Order policy on youth

In New Order policy the term *generasi muda* was generally understood to include young people aged between 0 and 30. The Department of Education and Culture’s

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[24] *…berikan kepadaku seribu, sepuluh ribu, seratus ribu, satu juta orang tua itu memindahkan Gunung Semeru dari sana ke sini. Tetapi sebaliknya berikan kepadaku seribu pemuda, tidak, seratus pemuda, tidak, sepuluh pemuda, tetapi sepuluh pemuda yang hatinya berkobar-kobar. Dengan sepuluh itu aku akan bisa menggemparkan seluruh dunia* (Sukarno 1988, 135-6).

[25] *Jadilah Pahlawan Pembangunan! Jadikanlah bangsamu bangsa yang kuat, bangsa yang merdeka dalam arti merdeka yang sebenar-benarnya! Revolusi pembangunan harus kita adakan … Dan kamu pemuda-pemudi di seluruh Indonesia, kamu harus menjadi pelopor dan pahlawan dalam Revolusi Pembangunan itu* (Sukarno 1987a, 16-17)*!*

1978 policy on the development of the young generation (*Pola Dasar Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Generasi Muda*), for example, divided the young generation into children (*anak*) aged 0-12, adolescents (*remaja*) aged 12-15 and youth (*pemuda*) aged 15 to 30.[26] The category of *pemuda* was further divided into school students (*siswa*) aged 6 to 18, university or college students (*mahasiswa*) aged 18 to 25 and those young people neither at school or university aged between 15 and 30 (*pemuda*). The policy also identified a transitional generation (*generasi peralihan*) of those aged between 30 and 40 who remained active in youth organisations (Kansil 1986, 138-9).[27]

During the 1930s and continuing through the post-revolutionary period, Indonesia experienced rapid population growth (Yasin 1974, 11; Emmerson 1973, 261). As a result, for the duration of the New Order Indonesia's population was a predominantly young one. In 1971, for example, the 0-24 year age group accounted for 61 per cent of the total population, or around 72 million people (Yasin 1974, 11).[28] In 1995, those aged between 0 and 24 accounted for around 54 per cent of the total population, or 105 million people. Almost 70 per cent of the population, or over 136 million people, were aged under 34 (*Visi 2020* 1997, 24 and 8).[29]

The need to address the particular problems associated with Indonesia's young population was identified early in the New Order. In addition to providing education, employment and health services to this population, the New Order was also concerned with matters of ideology. From the beginning of the New Order, the regime set about redefining the roles and identities of the young generation in accordance with the new political and ideological order which was being put in place. This necessitated the integration of *pemuda* both ideologically and practically into the New Order framework of nation-building and development (*pembangunan*) (Kiem 1993, 169-170). In this view, the role of Indonesia's *pemuda* was to continue the struggle to 'give substance to' (*mengisi*) independence in the form of development in the tradition of their forebears.

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[26] In common usage the term *remaja* is generally used to refer to the biological and social aspects of the transition from childhood to adulthood (Kiem 1993, 165). However, Siegel and Ryter have argued that the term *remaja* emerged during the New Order as a direct result of the depoliticisation of the term *pemuda* (youth), which recalled the radical actions of youth in the nationalist movement and during the revolution (Siegel 1986, 224-5; Ryter 1998, 58). See also Siagian (1985) and Sarwono (1985) for a socio-political perspective on *remaja* (adolescents).

[27] Kiem notes that some 'youth' organisations accepted members up to the age of 45 (Kiem 1993, 166).

[28] In the 1971 census data, children (*anak*) are defined as those aged between 0-9 years and youth (*pemuda*) as those aged between 10-24 (Yasin 1974, 12). See also Emmerson 1973, 261-2.

[29] In the Visi 2020 policy, published by the Office of the State Minister for Youth and Sports in 1997, the term 'child' (*anak*) refers to those aged between 0-14, 'adolescent' (*remaja*) to those aged 13-18 and 'youth' (*pemuda*) to those aged 15-34 (*Visi 2020* 1997, 24).

As President Suharto noted at the opening of the Symposium on the Writing of the History of the Youth Movement in Indonesia in October 1980:

> if youth (*pemuda*) play a greater role in development now, then in fact they are continuing their historical task in the past. If in 1908, youth were able to awaken national awareness, if in 1928 youth were able to sow the seeds of Indonesian unity, if in 1945, youth planted the spirit of independence and the spirit of the faithful warrior opposed to colonialism, then now and in the future we also wish for youth to become faithful forces (*tenaga-tenaga*) to develop our independent nation and country (Suharto 1980a, 175).[30]

Yet Suharto was quick to point out the differences between the role of *pemuda* in the past and the role of contemporary *pemuda*:

> it needs to be understood that there is a fundamental difference between the nature of the role of youth in the struggle to pioneer and uphold independence in the past and the struggle to give substance to independence now and in the future. In the past youth had to tear down the old system and overthrow colonial power, shoot the enemy and reduce everything to rubble if the enemy occupied our territory. Now, in the era of development, we must cultivate … all aspects of our national life. National development emphasises actions which are productive and constructive; not those which are destructive (ibid.).[31]

In addition to such explicit assertions of the differences between the historical role of Indonesia's *pemuda* and their contemporary role, the integration of *pemuda* into the New Order framework of development necessitated an attempt to rid the term *pemuda* itself of its problematic past associations with revolutionary *semangat*. Thus, in policy documents and official speeches, the terms *kaum muda* and *generasi muda* were used interchangeably with the term *pemuda* to designate 'young people' or 'the young generation' in general. These terms referred to those youth who acted in the much celebrated key historical moments of the past, as well as the contemporary youth whose task it was to continue the struggle through development. Since the terms *kaum muda* and *generasi muda* did not have the radical and revolutionary connotations that could be associated with the term *pemuda*, their regular use had the effect of making the term *pemuda* appear as though it merely denoted 'youth' or 'young people'.[32]

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[30] *… jika pemuda dapat berperan lebih besar dalam gerak pembangunan sekarang, maka sesungguhnya pemuda melanjutkan tugas sejarahnya di masa lampau. Jika di tahun '08 pemuda mampu membangkitkan kesadaran nasional, jika di tahun 28 pemuda menaburkan benih-benih persatuan Indonesia, jika di tahun 45 pemuda menanamkan jiwa merdeka serta jiwa pejuang menentang penjajahan yang terpercaya, maka sekarang dan di masa datang kita juga mengingkan agar pemuda menjadi tenaga-tenaga terpercaya untuk membangun bangsa dan negara kita yang telah merdeka ini* (Suharto 1980a, 175).

[31] *Namun perlu disadari adanya perbedaan besar antara watak peranan pemuda dalam perjuangan merintis dan menegakkan kemerdekaan dahulu dengan perjuangan memberi isi kepada kemerdekaan sekarang dan selanjutnya. Dahulu pemuda harus meruntuhkan sistem lama dan melumpuhkan kekuasaan penjajah, menembak musuh dan membumihanguskan segala-galanya jika musuh dapat menduduki wilayah kita. Sekarang, dalam zaman pembangunan, kita harus membina … segala segi kehidupan kita. Pembangunan bangsa menonjolkan kegiatan-kegiatan yang produktif dan konstruktif; bukan yang destruktif* (ibid.).

At the same time, the parameters of term *mahasiswa* were also being delimited. In New Order speeches and policy documents, *mahasiswa* almost invariably referred to contemporary university students. In speeches commemorating Youth Pledge Day, for example, only the terms *pemuda*, *kaum muda* and *generasi muda* were used to refer to the key actors of the generations of 1908, 1928, and 1945, despite the fact that the generations of 1908 and 1928 were mostly made up of students. Moreover, in a speech on the nineteenth anniversary of the Tritura in 1985, Suharto referred to the 1966 generation not as *mahasiswa* but as *pemuda* and *kaum muda* (Suharto 1985). This pattern reflected the New Order's reluctance to associate the radical actions of past generations of youth and students with contemporary *mahasiswa*. In the state's view, it was as *pemuda*, *kaum muda* and *generasi muda* and not as *mahasiswa* that the youth of the past had acted.

One of the New Order government's particular concerns was the issue of 'generational change' and the need to instil the new generation of leaders with appropriate values. In its narrowest sense, the concept of generational change referred to the process of attrition taking place within the army, as those who had participated in or experienced the revolution retired or passed away (McGregor 2002, 254; citing Jenkins 1984, 80-81). In a broader sense, however, it also highlighted the generational change taking place in wider Indonesian society. In his address to the 1972 army seminar on the topic of the transfer of the '1945 values' Suharto highlighted the importance of the seminar's goals:

> The urgency of the transfer is now pressing, because in the 1980s and 1990s the ABRI leadership in particular and the leadership of the Indonesian nation in general will be in the hands of the young generation, who have not been directly instilled with the values of 1945 which are the primary asset and strength of the nation (Suharto 1972, 7).

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[32] The term *kaum muda* did have associations with Islamic revivalism (see Abdullah 1971). It also suggested generational conflict between the older generation (*kaum tua*) and the younger generation (*kaum muda*). However, generational conflict was much more easily dealt with than the revolutionary connotations of *pemuda* since it could be defined as 'natural' (see chapter three).

In a speech at a seminar on the role of the young generation in national defence on 24 October 1975, the deputy commander of the armed forces General Surono explained that the 1945 values were those values ‘born of the struggle to achieve, defend and give substance to independence’. These values included the unity and territorial integrity of the nation, popular sovereignty, anti-colonialism, Indonesian identity, a focus on the common interest and the interests of the nation and state as well as the values enshrined in the Pancasila (Surono 1975, 50-55; see also Suharto 1972, 2-4; Bourchier 1994, 51-2; Emmerson 1973, 291-2; Antlov 1996, 16-18).

To help encourage the adoption of these values amongst the young generation, the New Order developed a number of policies and put in place various programs over the course of the 1970s. One of the first practical steps taken was the establishment of the Indonesian National Youth Committee (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, KNPI). Formed in July 1973, KNPI was an umbrella organisation which aimed to unite and coordinate existing youth organisations (see *Pemuda pembangunan* 1987, chapter 3).[33] Its establishment, on the initiative of Golkar figures Ali Moertopo, Midian Sirait, and Abdul Gafur, together with David Napitupulu, was part of a larger program of consolidating existing political and social groupings within a corporatist framework (*Menyongsong masa depan* 1993, 5-6; see also van Dijk 1978a, 111-15).[34] David Napitupulu, the former presidium chair of the Indonesian Student Action Front (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, KAMI) and a close associate of Midian Sirait, was appointed general chairperson and Abdul Gafur, the deputy coordinator of Golkar’s central youth division, as first chairperson (*Menyongsong masa depan* 1993, 21, 24, 16, and 39; Ryter 2002, 152; Anwar 1980, 208). The involvement of Golkar in the establishment of the organisation provided a means by which the government was able to monitor and direct the activities of the youth organisations (Kiem 1993, 173). After the riots of January 1974, the government took an increasing interest in KNPI, forming branches in the regions, and using the organisation to help coordinate government development programs for youth (*Menyongsong masa depan* 1993, 22; see also Ryter 2002, 152-3; Bourchier 1996, 214).[35]

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[33] Over the course of the early 1970s Golkar formed a number of similar corporatist organisations. These included the Civil Servants Corps of the Republic of Indonesia (Korps Karyawan Pegawai Republik Indonesia, Korpri), the All Indonesia Labourers Federation (Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, FBSI), the All-Indonesia Fisher's Association (Himpunan Nelayan Seluruh Indonesia, HNSI) and the Association of Indonesian Farmers Cooperatives (Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia, HKTI) (*Menyongsong masa depan* 1993, 16 and 21; see also Bourchier 1996, 207-214; Reeve 1985, 329-30).

[34] In 1972 Gafur had been appointed (with the backing of Ali Moertopo) the chairperson of the National Youth Committee for Family Planning (Panitia Nasional Pemuda untuk Keluarga Berencana, PNPKB) (*Menyongsong masa depan* 1993, 19-20). Between 1972 and 1978 he served as a member of the DPR (Roeder and Mahmud 1980, 86). Midian Sirait was Golkar’s Secretary for Youth, Students, Women and Intellectuals (Sekretaris Bidang Pemuda, Pelajar, Mahasiswa, Wanita dan Cendekiawan, Papelmacenta) (*Menyongsong masa depan* 1993, 16).

In 1978, the government's Broad Outlines of State Policy (Garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN) identified the development of the young generation as a significant policy goal. According to the guidelines:

> The development of the young generation is directed towards preparing cadres for the continuation of the Nation's struggle by providing a stock of skills, leadership, physical fitness, creativity, patriotism, idealism and noble character. … In this framework there needs to be efforts to develop the young generation to involve them in the process of national and state life and the implementation of national development (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 1989, 485).

Later that year, on 28 October 1978, the first comprehensive policy to specifically target youth was introduced by Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf.[36] The Basic Guidelines for the Improvement and Development of the Young Generation (*Pola Dasar Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Generasi Muda*), provided a detailed explanation of the 'potential' (*potensi*) which the young generation possessed and which the policy would harness and develop. It was couched in terms of the young generation's obligation to achieve the national goals, and in particular their obligation to participate in development. To this end, the policy provided a comprehensive program of activities (see Kansil 1986). This policy was followed by the introduction in 1982 of a policy on 'Political Education for the Young Generation' (*Pendidikan Politik Bagi Generasi Muda*) (Instruksi Presiden No. 12 Tahun 1982) (see Kansil 1986). Together with the Pancasila Moral Education (*Pendidikan Moral Pancasila*, PMP) and civics courses introduced in schools in 1975 (Parker 1992, 51; Thomas 1981, 390), the new policy sought to educate the young generation in Pancasila and other key national values.

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[35] Other officially sponsored youth organisations which come under the governments' national youth policy include the Intra-School Students Organisation (Organisasi Siswa Intra Sekolah, OSIS), Karang Taruna (Youth Association), a nation-wide local level youth organisation which coordinates sporting and other activities in an effort to prevent juvenile delinquency, the scout movement (*gerakan pramuka*), and various other sporting and cultural organisations. The Young Generation for Indonesian Renewal (Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia, AMPI) was formed by Abdul Gafur (with the backing of Ali Moertopo) in 1978 as Golkar's youth wing (Ryter 2002, 155).

[36] Keputusan Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayan No 0323/V/1978, revised as Keputusan Menteri Negara Pemuda dan Olahraga No 023/MENPORA/85. See also Direktorat Pembinaan Generasi Muda 1977; Gafur 1979; Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 1979; Sekretariat Satuan Pengendali 1982; *Pendidikan politik* 1982; Gafur 1982.

Mahasiswa in the New Order

As part of the young generation, university students throughout the New Order were also subject to these policies. However, from the mid to late 1970s they also became the objects of a number of additional policies which aimed to define their roles in intellectual rather than political terms and so limit their involvement in political life. The demonstrations of 1965-1966 in which university students, acting in their role as *mahasiswa,* had been a central force, had demonstrated to the new regime that a *mahasiswa* identity which legitimated such demonstrations was potentially destabilising (see also Ryter 1998, 57-8). The continued outspokenness of some students during the late 1960s and early 1970s was further evidence that a politically-engaged *mahasiswa* identity was undesirable in a regime that valued consensus (*mufakat*) above all. As a result, in addition to their *pemuda* identity, New Order *mahasiswa* became the objects of a separate set of policies which aimed to control representations of their roles and identities as *mahasiswa*, particularly as it related to their involvement in 'practical politics'.

The *mahasiswa* who were the objects of these policies were students in one of the largest higher education systems in Southeast Asia. There are 78 state institutions of higher education, including universities, institutes, colleges (*sekolah tinggi*), academies and polytechnics (Priyono 1999, 178). Most of these institutions are the responsibility of the Department of Education and Culture (renamed in 1998 as the Department of National Education), although a number come under the Department of Religious Affairs. For the 1998/1999 academic year, the Department of National Education was responsible for 1634 public and private tertiary institutions with a total enrolment of over 3 million students. For the same period, 298 public and private universities, institutes, including the fourteen IAIN, and colleges came under the Department of Religious Affairs (Departemen Pendidikan Nasional n.d).

With over 1500 institutions in total, private higher education institutions for the 1998/1999 academic year accounted for around 95 per cent of institutions of higher education in Indonesia but only 53 per cent of total student enrolments (Departemen Pendidikan Nasional n.d).[37] Yet while private higher education is numerically predominant, public institutions in general surpass most private institutions in terms of quality and prestige.[38] The growth of private universities under the New Order provided additional opportunities for higher education. Like state universities, private universities vary in terms of the quality of education and the fee structure. The course fees at the largest and most prestigious of the private universities, and even those which are less so, mean they are available only to the upper middle class (Oey-Gardiner 1991, 86; Prijono 1999, 163, 165 and 173).

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[37] All private higher education institutions are subject to a national accreditation system (Toisuta 1991, 98; Soemardjan 1973, 51; Atmakusuma 1974, 9).

Student numbers grew exponentially during the New Order period. A 1997 publication of the Department of Education and Culture reported that in 1969, there were 176 900 students enrolled at universities and colleges throughout the archipelago.[39] Six years later, in 1975, there were over 250 000. By the 1984/1985 academic year, however, this number had increased almost four-fold to 977 302 students and by 1994/1995 had doubled again to over two million students (Office of Educational and Cultural Research and Development 1997, 50, table 2.12; see also Heneveld 1979, 148-9). This growth in student numbers was a result of the expansion of primary and secondary education during the 1950s and 1960s, as students graduating from secondary schools increasingly sought higher education. Recognising the importance of having trained professionals, the New Order made a concerted effort to improve the quality of education at all levels. Strong economic development under the New Order also meant that higher education was increasingly available to those who desired it. As elsewhere, it was Indonesia's expanding middle class which took advantage of these educational opportunities.

The largest universities are concentrated in and around the major urban centers. This is largely a legacy of the colonial period when Dutch high schools and, later, colleges and faculties, were located in centres such as Batavia (Jakarta), Bandung, Malang, Yogyakarta, Semarang, Medan and Solo (Fischer 1965, 95 and 106; see also above). With the exception of Medan, all of these cities are located in Java. The expansion which took place as a result of the Sukarno government's policy of giving every province a state university to some extent addressed this imbalance. At the beginning of the New Order, however, Universitas Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta and Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta remained by far the largest universities in Indonesia, enrolling over half of all students (Fischer 1965, 95). As the oldest and largest universities in Indonesia, Universitas Gadjah Mada and Universitas Indonesia are also the most prestigious. Together with three other state universities, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Institut Pertanian Bogor (Bogor Agricultural Institute), and Universitas Airlangga in Suraybaya, as well as the oldest Islamic university, Universitas Islam Indonesia in Yogyakarta, these universities are the most highly sought after by prospective students.

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[38] There are some notable exceptions to this, particularly among the universities located in the capital. Private institutions tend to focus on the less expensive social science and the humanities programs rather than programs requiring costly facilities and staff such as technical and applied science programs (Toisuta 1991, 98).

[39] Estimates of student numbers, particularly in the 1960s, vary considerably. Bachtiar (1968, 185-6 and fn 20), for example, suggests that in 1965, student numbers may have been as high as 279 624.

Despite the growth of the past few decades, Indonesian university students remain an elite within their society. As Fischer notes, the limited opportunities for high school and tertiary education for Indonesians during the colonial period meant that for the children of civil servants (Javanese *priyayi*) and professionals, education was the key to social mobility. The shortage of trained professionals at the beginning of independence, a situation which also faced the New Order, meant that educated individuals were highly valued (Fischer 1965, 94-5 and 103-4). By 1986, only 7 per cent of those in the 20-24 age group were enrolled in tertiary education, a figure which fell well below that of other Southeast Asian nations (Jones 1994, 165). However, the additional educational opportunities provided by the continued growth in private universities and colleges have increased this figure to around 10 per cent (*Visi 2020* 1997, 24; Office of Educational and Cultural Research and Development 1997, 50, table 2.12).

Tritura to *reformasi*: student activism, 1966-1998

In the 1960s, student political activism in South and Southeast Asia, Europe and the Americas generated a wealth of academic interest. Much of this literature sought to explain the factors underlying university students' involvement in national and campus politics (see for example Coleman 1965; Emmerson 1968; Lipset 1964; Altbach 1968, van Wolferen 1970; Feuer 1969). One of the most important factors appeared to be students' delayed entry into the 'adult' world of work and family responsibilities. This transitory period, in which students enjoy relative freedom from parental and familial control and financial responsibilities, means that they are able to take risks which others can not (Altbach 1968, 3). In addition, the university environment, it was argued, provides students with an awareness of social and political issues, which their idealism encouraged them to seek to redress (Altbach 1968, 4; Lipset 1964, 31). In many cases, students also see themselves as the leaders of the working class and the bearers of knowledge (Feuer 1969, 4; Altbach 1968, 3). More practically, the pressures of academic life, and in particular, the threat of unemployment after graduation, often manifests itself in political and social activism (Altbach 1968, 7-8). Many authors also attribute student activism to a ‘conflict of generations’ (Feuer 1969; Lipset 1964, 30-35) or to the cultural alienation which students experience when attempting to reconcile their modern Western education and values with the traditional values of their societies (Altbach 1968, 6-7; Lipset 1964, 17). Finally, the privileged status of students in many developing societies, coupled with a perception that they are largely without interests in the status quo, and as such have greater ideological ‘purity’ (Altbach 1968, 3), means that students are often *expected* to play an active role in social and political life (Altbach 1968, 5; van Wolferen 1970, 6).

Until the mid 1960s, research on Indonesia tended to seek explanations for the *lack* of political activism amongst Indonesian university students in the post independence period, given that many of the same conditions which had led to student activism in other developing nations were also present in Indonesia (see for example Fischer 1965; Douglas 1970). After the events of 1965-1966, however, student politics in Indonesia took on a markedly different character.

Since the 1950s the student organisations which were associated with the major political parties had been divided along ideological lines. In the early months of 1965 a bitter conflict had been developing between the powerful communist-affiliated CGMI and the modernist Islamic HMI (Bachtiar 1968, 189-90; Mohammad and Kats 1969, 30-33; Saidi 1989, 84). The Communist Party’s alleged masterminding of the murder of the 6 generals on 30 September, led to a significant change in their fortunes. HMI took advantage of the new political mood, organising the first anti-PKI rally on 5 October and later establishing itself as one of the dominant members of KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia), the staunchly anti-communist organisation formed with the ‘advice and encouragement’ of Minister of Higher Education and Science General Sjarif Thajeb on 25 October 1965 (Douglas 1970, 154-6; Bachtiar 1968, 191-2; *Pemuda pembangunan* 1987, 38-9).[40]

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[40] See also Raillon (1985, 12-19) and Abdul Mun’im D.Z (1999, 27-42) for an account of this period.

KAMI’s initial actions focused on practical issues such as the rising price of basic goods and petrol. These were the issues which had most affected ordinary people, as well as students themselves. By the beginning of 1966, however, the focus had shifted to political and economic issues (Douglas 1970, 157; Mohammad and Kats 1969, 38). This new concern found clear expression in the announcement in January 1966 of the ‘Threefold People’s Demands’ (Tri Tuntutan Rakyat, Tritura): dissolve the PKI (*bubarkan PKI*), replace the Dwikora Cabinet (*rombak Kabinet Dwikora*) and reduce the price of basic goods (*turunkan harga*) (Anwar 1980, 11). The movement was largely Jakarta-based, although students in Bandung also played an important role. The largest protests were organised by university students. After KAMI was banned, youth and high school students in KAPPI (Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia) continued to pressure the Sukarno government.

KAMI enjoyed considerable support from the Indonesian military, in particular the army (Saidi 1989, 77; Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 179-80). Official accounts of the events describe this relationship as a ‘partnership’ between students and the military (see for example Wibisono 1980; Anwar 1980; Imawan 1966; *Orde Baru: Koreksi total* 1995; Dipodisastro 1997). The concept of a partnership was criticised by later generations of student activists, who felt that the 1966 students had been exploited by the army for its own purposes (Aspinall 1993, 31; also Mangiang 1981; Simandjuntak 1973; Simbolon 1977).

The Order of March Eleven (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, Supersemar) effectively fulfilled KAMI’s first demand, the dissolution of the PKI, and with steps to fulfill the second and third demands already being taken, the students’ service to the nation was, at least in the eyes of the new regime, effectively completed and students were urged to ‘return to the campus’. Yet between 1966 and 1974 students were far from disengaged from politics. As Raillon’s (1985) study of the Bandung-based student newspaper *Mahasiswa Indonesia* shows, students continued to engage actively in social and political life and in the debates surrounding the formation and consolidation of the ‘new order’. Moreover, as disappointment with the regime’s failure to fulfill its initial promises grew towards the end of the 1960s, students once again took to the streets, albeit in much smaller numbers than had rallied in 1966. The students’ growing disillusionment with the new regime found expression in various movements protesting against corruption and economic mismanagement, the restrictions placed on the 1971 elections, including the ‘simplification’ of the parties, and the building of the Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature (*Taman Mini Indonesia Indah*, TMII) project (see Budiman 1973; Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 180-1; Sanit 1999).[41] Yet while these students were critical of aspects of the state’s political and economic practices they remained committed to the underlying aims of the New Order, leading Southwood and Flanagan to describe the students of the 1970s as ‘critical collaborators’ (1983, 175).

By 1973, in addition to these issues, students were also arguing that the state’s entire development strategy was misguided. Protest regarding these and other issues gathered pace during 1973 and in January 1974 this unrest culminated with a demonstration against foreign, in particular Japanese, investment in Indonesia, subsequently dubbed the ‘Fifteenth of January Disaster’ (*Malapetaka Limabelas Januari*, Malari) (see van Dijk 1975, 2-3).[42] The protest sparked several days of mass riots (see Crouch 1974; Gunawan 1975; Bourchier 1996, 217-8).[43] As a result, universities in the capital were closed and a number of student leaders were arrested. Three people were tried, including Hariman Siregar, the chairperson of Universitas Indonesia’s student council.[44] Official accounts of the incident emphasise the role of rogue PSI/Masyumi elements (Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 185; Gunawan 1975, 65; Crouch 1974, 5).[45] Underlying the unrest, however, was an elite level power struggle between General Sumitro, the deputy commander of the armed forces and commander of Kopkamtib (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), and the head of the Special Operations Command (Operasi Khusus, Opsus) and one of the president’s personal assistants (*asisten pribadi*, aspri) Major General Ali Moertopo (Crouch 1974, 2).

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[41] In January 1970, students acting as the ‘Action Movement for Student Demands’ (Gerakan Aksi Mahasiswa Menggugat) demonstrated against corruption and economic mismanagement. Later that year, they formed the White Group (Golongan Putih, Golput) in response to the restrictions placed on the 1971 elections. The Austerity Movement (Gerakan Penghematan) was formed in December 1971 to protest against the building of Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (see Budiman 1973; Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 180-1; Mangiang 1981).

[42] The protesters pronounced the Tritura ’74: abolish aspri, reduce prices, and end corruption (Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 184; Gunawan 1975, 69; Crouch 1974, 4). The president’s personal assistants had been the target of students’ corruption allegations in 1970.

[43] Bourchier notes that the acronym Malari ‘conjur[es] up associations with fever and disease (1996, 217).

[44] See van Dijk 1975, 2000 for an account of Hariman Siregar’s trial. Syahrir and Mohammad Ani Chalid were also tried (Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 185; van Dijk 1975, fn 1).

[45] See *Peristiwa 14-15-16 January* 1974 for a detailed ‘official’ account of the developments of 1973, the riots themselves and the steps put in place by the government. The PSI and Masyumi had been disbanded by Sukarno in 1960.

In the aftermath of the affair, the Minister of Education and Culture Sjarif Thajeb issued a ministerial decision detailing guidelines for the 'improvement' (*pembinaan*) of university campuses, popularly known as SK028.[46] The decision prohibited students from undertaking any political activities which would 'lead to the disturbance of peace and order in the nation' (Thajeb 1974, 7; Thomas 1981, 388; Siregar 1983, 131-5).[47] This did not, he noted, include discussions and seminars as these represented the academic community's contribution towards solving the nation's problems. Since the opinions expressed were the result of 'concrete and constructive thinking based on a scientific analysis of the situation', they were therefore a legitimate channel for the much vaunted 'academic freedom' and 'freedom of expression' said to be in place on Indonesian university campuses (Thajeb 1974, 7-8).[48]

In 1977, students again took to the streets. Their criticisms of the regime went further than they had in earlier waves of protest, calling for the abolition of Kopkamtib and criticising the *cukong* (Chinese conglomerates) phenomena, foreign investment, unregulated state power and the state's development strategy (van Dijk 1978a, 1978b; Bourchier 1996, 224; Aspinall 1993, 5). In Bandung, students at Institut Teknologi Bandung published the *White book of students' struggle* (*Buku putih perjuangan mahasiswa*) detailing the regime's failings (*Buku putih* 1978). Finally, in the lead-up to the General Session of the MPR in March 1978, student demonstrators called for Suharto to withdraw as a presidential candidate.[49] The anti-Suharto character of student protest at the time of the 1977 elections and in the lead-up to the 1978 General Session of the MPR invited a harsh response from the state (van Dijk 1978a, 1978b; Supriyanto 1998, 78). On 21 January 1978 a Kopkamtib decision froze the activities of all student councils in universities and institutes of higher education throughout the archipelago.[50] Troops occupied the campuses, and all student newspapers had their publication licenses revoked. A number of student leaders were also arrested. At their trials, most of which took place during 1979, these students produced lengthy defense speeches which systematically critiqued the New Order.[51]

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[46] Ministerial Decision No. 028 1974 on Policy Guidelines for the Improvement of University Campus Life (issued on 3 February) [Surat Keputusan No. 028 1974 tentang petunjuk-petunjuk kebijaksanaan dalam rangka pembinaan kehidupan kampus perguruan tinggi]. See also Instruction No. 2 1974 on the Reopening of Institutions of Higher Education in Greater Jakarta (issued on 28 January) [Instruksi No. 2 1974 tentang Pembukaan Kembali Perguruan Tinggi di Jakarta Raya] and Joint Instruction No. 8 1974 between the Minister of Education and Culture, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Minister for Religion on the Implementation of the Improvement of the Young Generation (issued on 6 February) [Instruksi Bersama No. 8 Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Menteri Dalam Negeri dan Menteri Agama tentang Pelaksanaan Pembinaan Generasi Muda].

[47] The decision was revoked by Sjarif Thajeb on 1 July 1977 following student protest. Sjarif Thajeb's appointment as Minister of Education and Culture one week after the Malari riots was a judicious one. He was a strong educationalist with a military background. From 1962 to 1964 he served as rector of *Universitas Indonesia*. Between 1964 and 1966 he was the Minister for Higher Education and Science. Following this, he served as the Deputy Chairperson of the DPR and Chairperson of the Armed Forces Faction before his posting to Washington as ambassador to the USA and Brazil (1971-74) (*Apa dan siapa* 1981, and Roeder and Mahmud 1980, 349).

[48] Keputusan Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan tanggal 17 April 1975 No. 079/0.

[49] See Budiyarso 2000; Hariyadhie 1994; Stamp [1979?] for detailed studies of the 1977-1978 student movement.

The state's response to this wave of student protest was a new policy orientation which aimed to curtail student activity on campuses and effectively stem the power of the student councils (*dewan mahasiswa*), which had been the prime organisational vehicles for the 1977-1978 protests (Aspinall 1993, 6). Over the course of 1978 and early 1979, the new Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf, put in place a series of policies designed to return the campuses to their 'proper' state as apolitical scientific communities and students to their proper status as members of these scientific communities (see also Thomas 1981, 388-9).[52] The Normalisation of Campus Life (*Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus*, NKK) and Campus Coordination Body (*Badan Koordinasi Kampus*, BKK) policies, the Minister explained in an interview with the news magazine *Tempo*, aimed to 'normalise' the campuses:

> The word normalisation was included because the NKK concept as a whole means 'to normalise' ('*menormalkan*') campus life, that is, to return the campus to the norms which should prevail and be developed on the campus. Until now, these norms have increasingly been forgotten, and have even been allowed to be destroyed slowly but surely. As a result, until the NKK concept was introduced, our campuses were in an abnormal condition (*Majalah Mahasiswa* 3 (15) 1980, 3).

On 24 February 1979 the Minister issued a follow-up policy on campus student organisations. This policy was known as the BKK policy, after the Student Coordination Body (*Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan*, BKK) which, under the new system, represented the key student organisation at the university level. At the same time, all non-curriculum related student activities which took place on the campus became a formal part of the university bureaucracy (Siregar 1991, 217). Extra-university student organisations such as HMI, GMNI and PMKRI were also banned from operating on the campuses (Aspinall 1993, 9; van Bruinessen 2002, 131). The largest and most influential student newspapers were also closed at this time leaving students very few legitimate means by which to express their criticisms of the regime. Student criticisms of the policy fell on deaf ears

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[50] Surat Keputusan Pangkopkamtib tanggal 21 January 1978 No SKEP 02/KOPKAM/I/1978.

[51] Thirty four students were tried in 1979 (Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 190). Many of them published their defence speeches (see Akhmadi 1979, Hakim 1980, Tjahjono 1979, Hamid 1979, Zakir 1980, Yusuf 1979, Al Hilal 1979, Tarsono 1979, Silalahi 1979, *Menggugat Pemerintahan* 1979).

[52] A former member of the Student Army (Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar, TRIP) and lecturer in economics at Universitas Indonesia, Daud Yusuf earned himself a reputation for taking a harsh approach to student demonstrations (Harahap and Basril 2000, 129). In 1978, he was criticised for postponing the new academic year by six months (starting from July 1978) as well as for his NKK concept. His dislike for compromise was indicated by his refusal in November 1979 to meet a delegation of Universitas Indonesia students seeking a compromise solution to the NKK policy and by his appearance on national television in defence of the policy (*Apa dan siapa* 1981, 263).

One further initiative which impacted on student life in a very practical way was the introduction of the Semester Credit System (*Sistem Kredit Semester*, SKS) in 1979. The policy aimed to reduce the amount of time students took to complete their course and so relieve some of the pressure on the higher education system (Heneveld 1979, 148-9; Hardjono 1991, 160). At a practical level, however, this had the fortuitous consequence that, since students' study loads increased under the new system, they had less spare time to spend organising demonstrations (Aspinall 1993, 9).

With campus representative bodies now under the bureaucratic control of the university and the extra-university mass student organisations banned from operating on the campuses, students in the 1980s sought other organisational means of expressing their dissent. Aspinall (1993) identifies two main forums through which students channelled their dissent during this period. The first was involvement in the rapidly expanding NGO sector. Through these NGOs, students became involved in campaigns on environmental and human rights issues as well as in supporting community development projects on a local level (Aspinall 1993, 12-13). This experience was to have an important impact on students' perceptions about their role in relation to the *rakyat* in the late 1980s and 1990s. The second was study groups. Under the NKK policy, one of the few remaining activities within which students could engage was intellectual discussion (Denny 1989, 76; see also chapter five). Drawing on a tradition which dated to the 1930s, students in the early 1980s established various ad-hoc *kelompok diskusi* (discussion groups) in which they discussed a wide range of social, economic and political issues, drawing on Western social and political theories for their inspiration. The intellectual nature of these activities provided them with a modicum of legitimacy and, for the most part, safeguarded them against state repression.[53] These study groups mostly engaged in ‘information action’ (*aksi informasi*), holding discussions and seminars attended by key public figures and distributing information about social and political issues to students (Denny 1989, 76; see also Denny 1990).

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[53] In 1990, three study group activists, Bambang Isti Nugroho, Bambang Subono and Bonar Tigor Naipospos, were arrested and later tried for subversion (see Heryanto 1993).

At the end of the 1980s, however, pressures for political and economic reform ushered in a period of ‘openness’ (*keterbukaan*) in national politics. On campuses, the new Minister of Education and Culture Fuad Hassan, who assumed the post in July 1985 after the death of Nugroho Notosusanto, was taking a more moderate approach to student and campus life.[54] From the beginning of 1987, student protest re-emerged, gathering pace over the next two years as students protested against various campus issues, including the NKK/BKK policy (which was eventually replaced by Fuad Hasan’s University Student Senate (*Senat Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi*, SMPT) policy in 1990) (Harahap and Basril 1999, 264-9).[55] From 1989, students raised issues of human rights and social justice (Aspinall 1993; Denny 1989, 77).[56] Prominent among these were local issues, including the campaigns in support of communities affected by development projects including the Kedung Ombo dam project in Central Java, and the land rights dispute in Badega in West Java (*Inside Indonesia* 18 (April) 1989, 12-14; Harahap 1993, 96-102; Harahap and Basril 1999, 269-74).[57] The exploitation of local issues had the advantage of enabling students to avoid direct confrontation with the state at a time when they were still weak politically as a result of the depoliticisation policies of the 1980s (Denny 1989, 77).

Throughout the 1990s the student movement gathered pace. The student press once again became a significant means by which students expressed their dissent and students demonstrated against a wide variety of issues, from the state lottery (*Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah*, SDSB) in 1988 and 1993, boycott of the

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[54] Fuad Hassan received an undergraduate degree in psychology from Universitas Indonesia in 1958 and a doctorate in 1967. He served as a political advisor to Suharto between 1966 and 1968 before becoming a member of the DPR (1968-1970). In 1968 he was made professor at Universitas Indonesia and in 1972 he became the dean of the Faculty of Psychology serving concurrently as Director of the National Security Council (1972-1976). Between 1966 and 1976 he also taught at the National Defence Institute (Lemhannas) and the armed forces command school (Sesko ABRI). Before his appointment as Minister of Education and Culture, Fuad served as ambassador to Egypt (1976-1980) and as the head of the Research and Development Body of the Department of Foreign Affairs (1980-1985) (*Apa dan siapa* 1986, 299-300).

[55] The SMPT was repealed after the fall of Suharto by Minister of Education and Culture Juwono Sudarsono and universities were given the freedom to determine the form which student representative bodies would take and the process by which students would be elected (Harahap and Basril 1999, 231).

[56] See also Aspinall 1995 (especially 29-44) for a characterisation of the 1980s and early 1990s student movement and its relationship to the military.

[57] See Aditjondro (1990, 1991) and Budiman (1990) for an evaluation of the Kedung Ombo campaign.

1992 elections, the 1994 press bannings, human rights abuses perpetrated by the military and the state and the state's economic policy. Students also called for the repeal of the subversion law, the dissolution of Bakorstanas (the security agency), the abolition of *dwifungsi* (the dual political and military function of the armed forces) (Harahap and Basril 1999, 278-80; Aspinall 2000, 172). The 1990s also saw the emergence onto the political stage of more radical leftist groups such as the People's Democratic Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik, PRD), founded by university drop-out Budiman Sudjatmiko, and its student wing SMID (Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi, Indonesian Students Solidarity for Democracy) (see Hearman 1996). During this period, student activism also became more geographically diverse, with urban centres other than Jakarta and Bandung becoming increasingly important. In line with the expansion and consolidation of private institutions of higher education during the 1970s and 1980s, private universities also became important, in part because they had not been the primary targets of the depoliticisation efforts of the previous decade (Aspinall 2000, 165-6; Denny 1989, 75).[58]

The Asian financial crisis which hit Indonesia in late 1997 severely damaged the regime's ability to deliver the economic growth and stability which had been at the core of its performance legitimacy for the past three decades.[59] As the price of basic goods soared, students took to the streets demanding a reduction of prices.[60] Students in 1998, however, were much quicker to call for political solutions than had been the 1966 demonstrators with early protests also rejecting the practice of 'corruption, collusion and nepotism' (*Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme*, KKN) and calling for *reformasi* (reform) (Aspinall 2000, 300). The shooting of four students outside Jakarta's prestigious Trisakti University on 12 May marked a turning point in the student movement (as had the shooting of Arief Rachman Hakim in January 1966) and sparked widespread rioting in Jakarta and Solo, Central Java. Beginning on 18 May, students staged a sit-in of the DPR building, demanding that a special session be convened to call for the presidents' resignation.[61] Finally, on 21 May, with the support of ABRI and key ministers largely eroded, Suharto resigned.[62] There was a strong sense of history repeating itself in these events given that it was students, in partnership with the military, who helped to topple Sukarno in 1966.

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[58] See also Gayatri 1999 and Soewarsono 1999 for an account of the student movement from the early to mid 1990s.

[59] For more general accounts of the events of late 1997 and early 1998 see Aspinall, Feith and van Klinken 1999; Forrester and May 1998; Budiman, Hatley and Kingsbury 1999; Habeahan, Tobing and Sipahutar 1999; Gafur 2000. In 1998 and 1999 a large number of assessments of the 1998 student movement were produced. A sample of these are: Aritonang 1999; Yunanto 1998; Harjanto 1998; Sujito et al 1998; Widjojo et al 1999; Fadhly 1999, Culla 1999; Nusantara, Putra, and Sudarmanto 1998.

[60] For an account of student mobilisation between February and May 1998 see McRae (2001, 7-15) and Bhakti (1998, 173-178). See McRae (2001, 15-25); Aspinall (1999, 215-225); Aspinall (2000, 301-308); Wimhofer 2001 discuss the organisational forms the 1998 movement took and the themes of student protest. Madrid (1999) and Kraince (2000) discuss the role of Muslim students.

Conclusion

The secondary and vocational schools established by the Dutch under the Ethical Policy provided the context within which the youth of the Netherlands Indies first began to identify as youth. Their status as an educated elite was reflected in the Dutch terms they used to describe themselves. As the nationalist movement grew, these youth and students began to see themselves as part of the imagined community of Indonesia, and to refer to themselves using Malay (Indonesian) terms. The experiences of the Japanese occupation and the revolution added a new dimension to the roles and identities of Indonesian youth and students. In the first decades of the twentieth century educated youth had acted as the vanguard of change. The para-military organisations of the Japanese occupation and the armed groups who joined in the struggle for independence brought together youth from a wide variety of socio-economic and educational backgrounds. In the process, the term *pemuda* acquired revolutionary connotations which often transcended biological age. After the revolution, there was a strong emphasis on the expansion and development of education. New universities were opened although the university students of the 1950s remained a privileged elite. The 1950s and 1960s were also the era of mass politicisation with large youth and student organisations affiliated to the major political parties. The new regime's policies sought to restore order and stability to the nation. To this end, it embarked on a wide-ranging program of depoliticisation. Youth and, in particular students were key targets of these policies, which aimed to redirect the energies of the large numbers of young people away from politics and towards development. Yet as the preceding survey of student activism during the New Order period showed, students' role in Indonesian politics and society continued to be a significant one, albeit not consistently so. Precisely what part representations of students' identities played in the roles students were able to play is the topic of the remainder of this thesis.

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[61] The calls for a Special Session of the MPR were made in the aftermath of the Trisakti incident (Culla 1999, 178-9).

[62] For an account of the elite's final abandonment of Suharto see Aspinall (2000, 315-319).

CHAPTER THREE

Making history, making *mahasiswa*

In every crucial historical moment, the young generation of our nation always stepped forward as pioneers (Suharto 1982, 470).

In official histories produced during the New Order, youth and students were portrayed as playing a key role in the defining moments of Indonesia's modern history. In each of these key moments, it was claimed, a new 'generation' (*generasi* or *angkatan*) was born. The contribution of these generations of youth took a standard form in official New Order historiography. Thus, the generations of 1908 and 1928 were celebrated as the pioneers of the nationalist movement and of national unity, the revolutionary *Angkatan '45* as enabling independence to be declared and struggling to uphold it, and the 1966 generation as launching the protests which gave voice to the aspirations of the wider populace and enabled the New Order to embark on a program of 'correcting' the deviations of the previous government. This role was celebrated in the large body of commemorative literature and in the biographies of key *pemuda* figures. It was also commemorated in annual celebrations of Hari Sumpah Pemuda/Hari Pemuda (Youth Pledge Day/Youth Day) on 28 October and in official speeches on other significant occasions (see Aspinall 1999, 229-30).[1]

This celebration of the role that youth had played *as youth* in key historical moments was by no means a new phenomenon in Indonesian historiography. In the late 1920s, Indonesia's youth already saw themselves as continuing a tradition that had been begun by their predecessors in 1908.[2] In official histories of the youth movement written during the 1950s and 1960s, the contribution of youth to the nation centres on key events and periods in Indonesia’s modern history, including the founding of Budi Utomo, the youth movement of the 1920s and 1930s, the declaration of the Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Pledge), the mobilisation of youth during the Japanese occupation, the proclamation of independence and the revolution of 1945-49 (see for example Hardjono 1950; Hardjito 1952; Biro Pemuda 1965).

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[1] The date 28 October was designated Hari Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Pledge Day) in 1955 (Foulcher 2000, 388). In 1978, it acquired the additional title of Hari Pemuda (Youth Day). According to Suharto it was named Hari Pemuda as a form of 'gratitude from the Indonesian nation to their youth, who throughout the history of the struggle to open the way to and uphold independence have always emerged as a pioneering force at important moments' (*penghargaan dari bangsa Indonesia kepada pemuda-pemudanya, yang sepanjang sejarah perjoangan merintis dan menegakkan kemerdekaan selalu tampil sebagai kekuatan pelopor pada saat-saat yang penting*) (Suharto 1980b, 427).

[2] In his welcome address to the 1928 youth congress, for example, Sugondo Djojopuspito, the chairperson of the congress, asked: 'Whose movement was Budi Utomo … it was none other than ours [i.e. the

In the official histories of the New Order, as in those of the Guided Democracy period, the pioneering role that Indonesia’s youth played in the national awakening, in the drive for national unity, and in the struggle for independence was crucial to the ‘national’ version of history on which Indonesia’s territorial integrity was based.[3] For the Suharto regime, the large-scale demonstrations by youth, and in particular students, in 1966 were also central to the claim that the actions Suharto took following the Order of March Eleven (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, Supersemar) were a response to the aspirations of the broader populace and not a military takeover.[4] Yet the active role that Indonesia’s youth had played in the past posed particular challenges for the New Order (Ryter 1998, 57-8). The demonstrations of 1966 had proven decisively that Indonesia’s youth and students were a powerful force, capable (with the assistance of the army) of toppling Sukarno. Consolidating the new regime thus entailed discouraging the post-1966 young generation from seeing their role as extra-parliamentary political agents. Since the historical precedent set by previous generations of youth served as a significant motivating factor for the students of the New Order period, one of the tasks for the state’s official historians was to reframe the roles that Indonesia’s youth had played in the past in terms of the new regime’s emphasis on harmony, consensus and the interests of the nation.

This chapter is a close reading of the New Order’s authoritative national history, the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* (National History of Indonesia, henceforth *Sejarah*).

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youths’] (*Pergerakan siapakah B.U itu … tidak lain juga kita punya*) (cited in Ihsan and Soeharto 1981, 140).

[3] Keith Foulcher reminds us of ‘nationalism’s need for a teleological history of its own origins’ and of how ‘the post-colonial construction of the past is always tied to the exigencies of contemporary political visions and ideologies. A nation must have a history, and its history is part of the shaping of its present’ (2000, 378).

[4] The Order of March Eleven, signed by Sukarno, gave General Suharto, at that time the head of the Army Strategic Command (Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat, Kostrad), the authority to restore order to the nation. Suharto interpreted the order broadly and immediately banned the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) and took steps to remove communist sympathisers from government positions.

Through a detailed examination of the *Sejarah*'s account of the key moments in Indonesia's modern history in which the role of youth is celebrated, the chapter explores the ways in which official New Order historiography constructed the historical roles and identities of Indonesia's youth. These moments include the founding of Budi Utomo, the development of the regional youth movement, the role of youth in the proclamation of independence and their role in the events of 1966.[5]

As an official history used at tertiary level and the reference source on which junior and senior high school history textbooks were based, one of the main audiences of the *Sejarah* was the young generation, including both *mahasiswa* and *pelajar*.[6] This chapter suggests that the *Sejarah*'s representation of the historical roles of Indonesia's youth and students provided a series of 'lessons' for the young generation of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s about the roles which they were expected to play within the New Order state. These lessons were constructed within an organicist framework of state-society relations with its emphasis on mutual cooperation, the achievement of consensus through deliberative decision-making processes, self-sacrifice and the placing of the interests and rights of the whole over those of the individual (see Bourchier 1996, 241, 255). The chapter argues that in its representations of the historical roles and identities of Indonesia's youth and students, the *Sejarah*'s account both manifests and attempts to resolve the essential tension between recognising the pioneering role of Indonesia's youth in history and the need to ensure that the youth and students of the New Order saw their role not as radical political agents and revolutionaries but as heroes of development (*pahlawan pembangunan*) who were loyal to the regime. This tension is manifested on two levels. On one level, the youth of the past are represented as an altruistic group working in the interests of the nation and the Indonesian people, who pioneered Indonesia's unity, were 'radical' in their defence of the interests of the nation, and who acted in the interests of the wider populace in helping to bring about the fall of a corrupt leader and his government. On another level, however, the *Sejarah*'s account marginalises the role that youth played in the past by transforming them into symbols and by playing down their active role in events.

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[5] For an analysis of the role of youth during the Japanese occupation and the revolution see Anderson 1972; Frederick 1989; Reid 1974. A number of accounts were also produced under the New Order by former student revolutionaries. See for example Sagimun 1989; Asmadi 1985; Asmadi 1980; Imran and Ariwiadi 1985.

[6] For a discussion of school textbooks see Thomas 1981; Leigh 1991; Parker 1992; Mulder 2000; Bourchier 1994, 1996, 225; Antlov 1996; Siegel 1986, 145.

These representations aimed to delimit what it was possible to say about the historical roles of Indonesia's youth and students. In doing so, the New Order's official historians aimed to regulate the ways in which contemporary youth and students could act. Of particular importance was the need to separate contemporary youth and students from the radical and revolutionary actions carried out by their predecessors and to reorient their behaviour towards the 'constructive' project of national development. At the same time, the didactic nature of the *Sejarah,* and its use as an educational text, provided the conditions within which contemporary students could regulate their own behaviour.

Idealists, patriots and pioneers: re-interpreting history

The production of the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* was an integral part of the new regime's history project. Although the need for a national history of Indonesia to replace Dutch histories had been identified soon after the end of the revolution, it was not until 1970 that any substantial steps were taken towards writing it. It was also part of the refashioning of history in the context of the post-1965 political realignments. The versions of events propagated during the Guided Democracy period, with their emphasis on revolutionary action, anti-imperialism and socialist orientation were no longer appropriate in the new regime. Instead, new versions of events which emphasised stability, order and development had to be constructed.

The *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* was first published in six volumes in 1975 by the Department of Education and Culture.[7] It was written and edited by a team of historians led by the preeminent Indonesian historian Sartono Kartodirdjo. Joining Sartono as general editors were Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro and the New Order military historian Nugroho Notosusanto.[8] From the third edition, only Poesponegoro and Notosusanto appear as editors. The editor for volume five, *The era of national*

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[7] The first edition of the *Sejarah* was published in 1975. This chapter uses volumes five and six of the fourth edition of the text, published in 1990. No substantial changes were made to the text of volume five of the fourth edition. The revisions made to volume six were largely concerned with presentation, including the division of the material into five chapters rather than the three of previous editions and a chronological rather than thematic arrangement. A number of important events from the New Order period were also added (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: xvii).

[8] As a teenager, Nugroho served as a member of the Student Army (Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar, TRIP) during the Revolution. After the transfer of power, he chose to forego a military career in order to pursue higher education at the University of Indonesia. In 1964, he joined a team of historians engaged in writing an army version of the history of the independence struggle and later headed the Armed Forces History Centre (Pusat Sejarah ABRI) before being appointed Minister for Education in 1984 (McGregor 2001). For further information on Notosusanto's career see McGregor 2001, 2002 and Brooks 1995.

awakening and the end of the Dutch Indies, was Yusmar Basri. Together with Nugroho Notosusanto, Basri was also responsible for the preparation of the primary and secondary school history textbooks which were based on the *Sejarah*. Volume six of the *Sejarah*, *The Japanese era and the era of the Republic of Indonesia*, was edited by Nugroho Notosusanto. Nugroho's version of these events caused some controversy. According to van Klinken, this volume is characterised by 'a stark anti communism [which] privileged the military as national saviours at every crucial moment' (van Klinken 2001, 325). This volume was also controversial for its negative representations of Sukarno and the role of the political parties in the 1950s. As a result, several historians associated with the project withdrew from it (Bourchier 1994, 57; McGregor 2002).

The *Sejarah*'s version of history was an integral part of the broader program of ideological 'education' which was at the basis of programs such as the Pancasila courses for civil servants and curriculum initiatives such as Pancasila Moral Education (*Pendidikan Moral Pancasila*, PMP), the History of the National Struggle (*Pendidikan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa*, PSPB) and civics courses for primary, secondary and tertiary students. In addition to these were the broad range of propaganda tools, including museums and statuary, documentary films such as the *Pengkhianatan G30S* (The Treason of the Thirtieth of September Movement), a propaganda film on the events of 1965-1966 which was compulsory viewing for all school students, and the celebrations which accompanied commemorations of days of national significance such as the Sacred Pancasila Day (Hari Kesaktian Pancasila) on 1 October (see Thomas 1981; Leigh 1991; Parker 1992; Bourchier 1994; Antlov 1996; Mulder 2000; McGregor 2002). These programs and tools aimed to socialise Indonesian citizens, and especially the young generation, into the key values and ideologies of the state.

The founding of Budi Utomo: students and the *rakyat*

In New Order histories as well as those written during the 1950s and 1960s, the formation of Budi Utomo by students based at the colonial-era medical college (School Tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen, Stovia) on 20 May 1908 signals the awakening (*kebangkitan*) of the nation and the beginning of the nationalist movement (see for example Hardjito 1952, 10; Biro Pemuda 1965, 25-6; Tomasoa 1972, 13-19).[9] The founding of Budi Utomo is described in volume five of the *Sejarah*, 'The era of national awakening and the end of the Dutch Indies'. Since the establishment of the organisation is considered the beginning of the nationalist movement, this event opens the chapter entitled 'The national movement'.[10] The *Sejarah*'s account of the founding of Budi Utomo portrays the Stovia students as acting in the interests of the Indonesian people as a whole and as opening the way to national unity. This pioneering role is, however, tempered by the use of passive sentences, which plays down the active role of the Stovia students.

In the *Sejarah*'s version of events, the Stovia students are described as *pelajar* and *murid* (student) as well as *pemuda* (youth). While the former establishes their status as educated individuals, the latter indicates their membership of a broader demographic group, the young generation.[11] The *Sejarah*'s account emphasises the Stovia students' principal motivation for establishing Budi Utomo as being their concern for the people. The main term used to describe this group is *rakyat*, which appears in phrases such as *martabat rakyat* (status of the people), *nasib rakyat* (fate of the people) and *kedudukan dan martabat rakyat* (position and status of the people). The action most often associated with these phrases is *meningkatkan* (to increase or improve).

In contemporary usage the term *rakyat* is both a general term for 'the people' or 'the inhabitants of a nation' as well as a more specific term meaning 'the masses' or 'the common people' (KBBI 2001, 924). In the *Sejarah*'s description of Budi Utomo, the term *rakyat* is primarily used in the more general sense of 'the people'. The other terms associated with the concept of 'the people' highlight this understanding of the term *rakyat*. Thus, terms such as *penduduk pulau Jawa dan Madura* (the inhabitants of Java and Madura), *penduduk Hindia seluruhnya* (the inhabitants of the Indies as a whole),

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[9] Tomasoa represents Budi Utomo as a 'continuation of the regional struggles against the Dutch' (*kelanjutan dari perjuangan daerah-darerah melawan Belanda*) (1972, 14; see also Martha 1992, 30-1). Pringgodigdo also represents Budi Utomo as the beginning of the nationalist movement although he does not mention that it was formed by students (1986, 1). 20 May is now celebrated annually as Hari Kebangkitan Nasional (National Awakening Day).

[10] The organisation is also mentioned in the section on 'Indonesia and the Indonesian language as national identity' (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 279-80). See also Martha (1992, 31 and 33) for a discussion of the *pemuda pelajar* who founded Budi Utomo and the motivations for it.

[11] Between May and the beginning of October 1908, when the organisations' first congress was held, Budi Utomo is also described as being a 'student organisation with Stovia students as its core' (*organisasi pelajar dengan para pelajar Stovia sebagai intinya*) (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 177). In contrast, Biro Pemuda (1965, 29) explicitly rejects the notion that Budi Utomo was a youth organisation although, it notes, its founders were youth.

penduduk pribumi (the native inhabitants) and *penduduk pribumi pada umumnya* (the native inhabitants in general) underscore the *Sejarah*'s emphasis on the Stovia students' concern for all the people, be they the Javanese and Madurese people or the people of the Indies as a whole.

This concern for the *rakyat* is evident from the very beginning of the *Sejarah*'s account.[12] The marked word order of the opening sentence of the chapter establishes the 'status of the *rakyat*' as the central theme in the establishment of Budi Utomo:

> With the motto of a desire to improve the status of the people, Mas Ngabehi Wahidin Sudirohusodo, a lower *priyayi* [aristocratic] Javanese doctor in Yogyakarta, in 1906 and 1907 began a campaign amongst the *priyayi* of Java (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 177).[13]

While these efforts were largely unsuccessful amongst the *priyayi*, the Stovia *pelajar* were more receptive to Dr. Wahidin's ideas. In this version of events, it is 'the desire to improve the position and status of the people (*rakyat*)' that motivates the Stovia students to broaden Dr. Wahidin's original aim of setting up a scholarship fund and establish Budi Utomo (ibid.).

This emphasis on the Stovia students' concern for all the people is somewhat problematic historically. As Nagazumi has noted, Budi Utomo was primarily an organisation which aimed to advance the interests of the lesser *priyayi*, who formed the core of the student body at institutions such as Stovia (Nagazumi 1972). While the Stovia students did advocate a program which included the interests of non-*priyayi* during the initial stages of the organisation's development, the program which was eventually accepted at the first congress emphasised education for *priyayi*.[14]

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[12] Hardjito (1952, 10) and Biro Pemuda (1965, 25-6) also represent Budi Utomo as an organsiation concerned for the *rakyat* in a broad sense, rather than only an organisation concerned with the interests of the *priyayi* indicating that the history of Budi Utomo was already being used for political purposes as early as the 1950s.

[13] *Dengan semboyan hendak meningkatkan martabat rakyat, Mas Ngabehi Wahidin Sudirohusodo, seorang doctor Jawa dan termasuk golongan priyayi rendahan, dalam tahun 1906 dan 1907 mulai mengadakan kampanye di kalangan priyayi di pulau Jawa* (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 177).

[14] In a statement issued in September 1908, for example, Soewarno, the secretary of the Weltevreden (Jakarta) branch of Budi Utomo, which was dominated by students, advocates the advancement of all the people of the Indies, 'without regard to traditional distinctions' (Nagazumi 1972, 41; see also Penders 1977, 225-7). To this end, the draft program for the organisation, drawn up by students at this branch in the same month, included education for the common people and care for the poor as goals (Nagazumi 1972, 43). Yet while these goals were included in the party's first program, according to Nagazumi, they were not considered particularly important. The emphasis in both the Weltevreden students' draft

The *Sejarah*'s representation of Budi Utomo as an organisation concerned for the *rakyat* in a broad sense is consistent with the New Order's interpretation of the historical role of youth as struggling for 'the interests of all' (*kepentingan keseluruhan*). It is also consistent with the emphasis in the regime's organicist model of the state on the precedence of the collective good. This model, New Order ideologues argued, was an authentic 'Indonesian' mode of social organisation and a counter to the individualistic systems found in Western countries. It was also a key means by which the social justice mandated in the Pancasila could be achieved. As Suharto argued in his 1967 independence day address:

> It would be ideal if in the implementation of Pancasila democracy one could always achieve a balance between individual and general interests, between the interests of groups and of the nation, and between people and the state. But if a problem arises where there is a conflict between individual and general interests or the interests of specific groups and the national interest, then we must sincerely, voluntarily and unselfishly sacrifice the relevant individual or group interest for that of society and the nation. That is the just principle and law of Pancasila democracy, and this is in our opinion the most appropriate recipe for achieving a just and prosperous society materially and spiritually based upon Pancasila (Bourchier and Hadiz 2003, 41).

The lesson for the *Sejarah*'s contemporary student audience is that they, like their predecessors, should sacrifice their narrow individual or group interests in the interests of the nation as a whole.

Pioneers of nationalism

The *Sejarah*'s description of Budi Utomo's first months emphasises the Stovia students' vision of 'national unity' and the pioneering role which the students played in forging this unity. It notes that the original goals of the organisation were 'formulated in vague terms as 'progress for the Indies' (*kemajuan bagi Hindia*)'. This was initially limited to 'the inhabitants of Java and Madura' (*penduduk pulau Jawa dan Madura*). Before the first congress was held, however, it had expanded to include 'the inhabitants of the Indies as a whole' (*penduduk Hindia seluruhnya*). This emphasis on the 'national' character of Budi Utomo represents a reframing of the past in terms of the present.

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program and the program eventually accepted at the first congress was instead on secondary and advanced Dutch education, something which was only possible for the upper classes (ibid., 49-50).

While the concept of the Indies was present in the Stovia students' initial ideas, in part because of the influence of nationalist figures such as E.F.E Douwes Dekker, the organisation was primarily concerned with the promotion of Greater Java (*Jawa Raya*). Indeed, as Nagazumi notes, the antipathy between the Javanese, who were the ethnically dominant group in institutions such as Stovia, and the non-Javanese, militated against any practical cooperation (Nagazumi 1972, 37). This emphasis on the 'national' character of the Stovia students' vision represents the founding of Budi Utomo as the first of many milestones in Indonesia's journey towards unity. The implication is that Indonesia's status as a nation was always implicit in history and that its current and future unity is historically predetermined (see also Philpott 2000, 58 and 61).

In the *Sejarah*, the pioneering role that the Stovia students played in the founding of Budi Utomo is reflected in the grammatically active role ascribed to the Stovia *pelajar* in the action of *mendirikan* (establishing) Budi Utomo. This representation of the Stovia students as both the grammatical and real agents of concrete actions such as *mendirikan* is consistent with their designation as the visionary pioneers of national unity in speeches and policy documents. Since Budi Utomo was, in the *Sejarah*'s account, an organisation which aimed to improve the status of all the people of the Indies, the Stovia students' pioneering role is sanctioned because the students had the interests of the nation at heart.[15]

However, the grammatical patterns throughout the remainder of the *Sejarah*'s account of the founding of Budi Utomo shift the emphasis away from the Stovia students' agency.[16] For example, in the discussion of the motivations for the founding of the organisation the *Sejarah* notes that:

> The ideals of improving the position and status of the people (*rakyat*) were also already present in the Stovia students, and because of this, Dr Wahidin's campaign encouraged and increased those ideals (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 177).[17]

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[15] The only other concrete actions where the Stovia students are the grammatical agents are *menyingkir dari barisan depan* (stepping aside from the front line) and *berhenti sebagai anggotanya* (ceasing to be members) (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 178-9).

[16] The backgrounding of human agents and agency is in fact a feature of New Order state discourse more generally. For this argument with regard to former president Suharto's accountability speeches see Jackson (1999) and Jackson (2000).

[17] *Cita-cita untuk meningkatkan kedudukan dan martabat rakyat itu sebenarnya juga sudah ada pada para pelajar Stovia, karena itu kampanye dr. Wahidin makin mendorong dan memperbesar cita-cita tersebut* (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 177).

The Stovia *pelajar* are here represented not as actively developing or expounding 'the desire to improve the status of the people' but rather as being the 'receptacles' for it, indicated by the phrase *sudah ada pada para pelajar Stovia* (already present in the Stovia students). Moreover, Dr Wahidin's campaign is described not as encouraging the Stovia *pelajar* themselves, but rather the abstract noun 'ideals' (*cita-cita*).

The Stovia students' role in Budi Utomo is also backgrounded through the use of passive verbs. For example, in the *Sejarah*'s account of the crucial step of formulating the organisation's goals in the months leading up to the first congress, it is noted that the original aims of the organisation 'were broadened' (*diperluas*) and 'were formulated' (*dirumuskan*) in a vague way. Passivisation is, as Sneddon suggests, far more common in most registers of standard Indonesian than it is in English (1996, 254-5). However, in some cases, there does appear to be a political motivation for the use of the passive form of the verb. In particular, as noted in Jackson (2000), the fact that the passive form enables the agent responsible for the action to be omitted represents a useful means of obscuring agency (see also van Leeuwin 1996, 39 and 43-4). In the *Sejarah*'s account, the use of passive verbs has the effect of representing the formulation of Budi Utomo's goals as occurring without the intervention of human agents. A similar pattern is evident in the description of the broadening of the organisation's goals outside of Java and Madura, where it is noted that the organisation 'expanded (*meluas*) to the inhabitants of the Indies as a whole' (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 178). The emphasis is thus not on the central role that the Stovia students played in formulating and broadening the organisations' goals but on the action itself. In this view, the Stovia students are the embodiment of the will to Indonesian nationhood and the personification of the historically predetermined concept of the Indonesian nation, rather than its active formulators.

For the *Sejarah*'s contemporary student audience, the representation of Budi Utomo as the first 'nationalist' organisation, and the *Sejarah*'s version of Indonesia's history as a whole, was intended to reinforce the New Order state's assertion that Indonesia's unity as a nation was always inherent in its history. This claim was not a new one: histories produced during the Guided Democracy period had a similar aim. In the context of the New Order's history project, this representation of Indonesian history was intended to legitimise the current borders of the nation and safeguard the nation's territorial integrity. It also aimed to socialise the young generation, and Indonesian citizens as a whole, into the nationalist and patriotic values which would enable them to fulfil their role in the contemporary nation by serving the state-defined national interest. At the same time, the *Sejarah*'s representation of the historical roles of Indonesia's youth and students as passive rather than active agents was consistent with the role of compliant agents of development which the New Order saw as appropriate for contemporary students.

The youth movement: unity and disunity

The *Sejarah*'s account of the nationalist movement proceeds chronologically. Thus, following the account of Budi Utomo is a two-page section devoted to the Sarekat Islam (Muslim Union), founded in 1911, and a five page section discussing the Indische Partij (Indies Party), founded in 1912. A five-page description of youth movements (*gerakan pemuda*) of the 1910s to 1930s immediately follows this. In this account, the main participants are *pemuda* and their organisations. These *pemuda* are represented as paving the way for national unity through the unity forged between the regional youth organisations. At the same time, the ethnic and religious discord which was present in the regional youth movement is largely written out of the *Sejarah*'s version of events.

The key term in the *Sejarah*'s account of the youth movement is *persatuan* (unity). This term is usually associated with verbs meaning 'to strengthen' and 'to consolidate'. Thus, the aims of the various youth organisations are described in terms of *memperkokoh rasa persatuan* (strengthening the sense of unity), *mempererat persatuan* (strengthening/consolidating unity), *menggalang persatuan* (providing a firm basis for unity) and *menanamkan dan mewujudkan cita-cita persatuan seluruh Indonesia* (planting and realising the aims of unity for the whole of Indonesia). Other terms and phrases associated with *persatuan* in the *Sejarah*'s account include *mempersatuan* (unify), *bermufakat* (to reach a consensus), *disetujui* (agreed upon) and *semangat kerjasama* (spirit of cooperation). The focus on *persatuan* presents a contrast to the representation of disunity. The term 'division' (*perpecahan*) appears only once in the *Sejarah*'s description of the youth movement and this is in connection with Jong Java's efforts to 'avoid divisions' (*menghindari perpecahan*). Disunity is, however, implied in the use of the terms *Jawa-sentris* (Java-centric) and *rasa kedaerahan* (regional sentiment), both of which are represented as obstacles to unity.

The *Sejarah*'s focus on *persatuan* in its account of the regionally-based youth organisations represents the youth movement as the precursor of national unity. The concern of the regional youth organisations with advancing their regional cultures, for example, is interpreted as a means of developing the future nation of Indonesia through the development of its unique cultural heritage. According to the *Sejarah*, all of the regionally-based youth organisations 'aimed (*bercita-cita*) towards the progress of Indonesia, *especially* advancing their respective regions and cultures' (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 191, emphasis added). The composition of the organisations is also interpreted in terms of *persatuan*. Concluding the discussion of Jong Java, Jong Sumatranen Bond and a number of other regionally-based youth organisations, the *Sejarah* notes that 'several of these organisations *contained in their structure or form* the seeds of Indonesian national unity' (ibid., 192, emphasis added).

Yet while the *Sejarah* interprets the desire for unity amongst the regional youth organisations as a desire for national or 'Indonesian' unity, there is little indication that these organisations saw themselves in this way, at least not until the 1920s. As Foulcher observes, while these organisations were 'driven by a proto-nationalist sense of identification with their regions and homelands', it was not until the mid-1920s that the regional youth groups began to identify more closely with the nationalist movement (Foulcher 2000, 379). Indeed, the term *persatuan,* which the *Sejarah* attributes to the pre-1920 youth organisations, was not yet present in the vocabulary of these groups, not least because, aside from their regional languages, the language they shared as educated youth was Dutch. Like the emphasis on the 'national' character of the Stovia students' vision for Budi Utomo, the *Sejarah*'s focus on *persatuan* in its account of the regionally-based youth movement contributes to the representation of Indonesian unity as historically predetermined.

In addition to its emphasis on unity, the *Sejarah*'s account also plays down ethnic and religious discord within the regional youth movement. This is consistent with the denial of a place for political, ideological, ethnic or religious conflict in the New Order's organicist model of the state. In the *Sejarah*'s account of the youth movement, for example, the journey towards a unitary youth organisation, and with it the Indonesian nation's journey towards unity, is represented as a relatively uncontested process. This focus on unity glosses over significant ethnic and religious divisions within the youth movement and the nationalist movement as a whole. In particular, it dismisses those aspects of the youth movement of the 1920s and 1930s which show it to have been deeply involved in the essentially political contest regarding the future basis of the Indonesian nation. This contest, which was taking place just as the youth groups were finding their voice in Indonesian society, pitted the ‘Indies nationalism’ promoted by nationalist figures such as E.F.E Douwes Dekker and Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, against the Javanese and Sumatran cultural nationalism which developed as a reaction against it. While the Indies nationalists saw the geographical limits of the future Indonesian nation as determined by the limits of Dutch hegemony, the cultural nationalists of Budi Utomo and, later, Jong Java and Jong Sumatranen Bond saw cultural identity as the essence of the nationalist movement (Reid 1979, 282-7; see also van Miert 1996).

In the *Sejarah*’s account, however, ethnicity, whether Javanese, Sumatran, Minahasan or Batak, is represented not as a focus of political allegiance but rather as the focus of an idealised cultural identity in which the youth organisations aimed to promote their regional cultures as the means for developing the future nation of Indonesia. Yet while promoting regional culture is seen in the *Sejarah* as part of the development of the nation, the *Sejarah* counsels that regional sentiment (*rasa kedaerahan*) should not be so strong as to represent an obstacle to unity. At the first youth congress, the *Sejarah* observes, the Indonesian Students Association (Perhimpunan Pelajar-Pelajar Indonesia, PPPI), suggested that all youth associations unite to form a single youth organisation.[18] This first attempt to forge unity however, ‘could not be implemented because regional sentiment was still strong’ (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 192). Regional sentiment, in this view, prevents the regional youth organisations and, by implication, the nation, from forming a productive unity.

The *Sejarah* also plays down religious divisions, in particular, the conflict between the regionally-based secular youth organisations and the Muslim youth organisations Jong Islamieten Bond (Young Muslims League) and Pemuda Muslimin (Muslim Youth). One of the key themes of the early nationalist movement was the conflict between secular-oriented nationalism and Islamic nationalism. The conflict between these two nationalisms was, as Suryadinata notes, clearly reflected in the youth movement

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[18] The PPPI was formed in 1926 by students at Stovia and the colonial-era college of law (Rechtschoogeschool) (Martha 1992, 83-4). It had links to the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) (Foulcher 2000, 379).

(Suryadinata 1978, 113). In the *Sejarah*'s account of the youth movement, however, the role of the Muslim youth organisations is reduced to merely a few lines. In the discussion of the August 1926 conference which followed the first youth congress, for example, the *Sejarah* notes that the motion that 'a permanent body for the imperative of Indonesian unity' be established was accepted by all attending organisations 'with the exception of Jong Islamieten Bond' (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 192). Moreover, at the formation of Indonesia Muda (Young Indonesia), the first truly 'national' youth organisation, in 1930, the *Sejarah* notes only that both Jong Islamieten Bond and Pemuda Muslimin did not join. In fact, as Suryadinata notes, Jong Islamieten Bond's opposition to the efforts to unite the youth movement was based on the organisation's desire that a unified youth organisation be based on Islam (Suryadinata 1978, 109-11).[19] The *Sejarah*'s silence surrounding the role of the Muslim youth organisations, in particular the powerful Jong Islamieten Bond, reflects the New Order's limitation of discursive space for political Islam. In a practical sense, this took place through the incorporation and hence disempowerment of the voices of political Islam through, for example, uniting the Islamic parties into the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) in 1973. It was also achieved by demonising 'radical' forms of Islam by labelling it as *ekstrim kanan* (extreme right).[20] These measures stemmed from the New Order's fear that Islam would emerge as a powerful political force and a serious challenge to state power if not kept in check. By not examining the reasons behind the Islamic nationalist oriented youth organisations' consistent refusals to cooperate in the broader efforts to forge unity amongst Indonesian youth, the *Sejarah* in effect 'silences' the voices of these groups. At the same time, it reinforces the view that Indonesia's journey towards unity was an uncontested (and distinctly secular) process.

Where the *Sejarah* does give a voice to political Islam, it is often represented in a negative way, as a divisive rather than a unifying force. The potentially divisive nature of political Islam is evident in the *Sejarah*'s account of the split within Jong Java following the 1924 congress. It was this split which led to the formation of Jong

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[19] In 1927, for example, when the PPPI first suggested the creation of a youth federation, the president of Jong Islamieten Bond, Wiwoho, asserted that his organisation would not participate unless the proposed body was based on Islam. Moreover, at the second youth congress in 1928, Jong Islamieten Bond refused to endorse the Sumpah Pemuda because of its secular content (Suryadinata 1978, 106-7, 109, 110).

[20] McGregor (2002) notes that New Order historiographers overstated the threat which these types of conflict posed to the unity and stability of the nation by highlighting historical events in which 'extreme right' (*ekstrim kanan*) (Islamic) or 'extreme left' (*ekstrim kiri*) (communist) groups had rebelled against the unitary state.

Islamieten Bond. The *Sejarah*'s account of this congress represents the disagreement which leads to the formation of the Jong Islamieten Bond as a rejection of political Islam. At the congress, the *Sejarah* notes, Jong Java's chairperson, Raden Sam, who was close to Sarekat Islam leader Haji Agus Salim, put forward a proposal. Sam suggested that while Jong Java should remain a non-political organisation, those members who were over the age of 18 and who wished to engage in politics be permitted to do so. Salim then addressed the congress on the topic of 'Islam and Jong Java' (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 191; Pringgodigdo 1986, 101-2). The *Sejarah* notes that Salim used the opportunity to 'attempt to bring religious issues into Jong Java with the opinion that religion had a great influence on the realisation of the organisation's ideals' (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 191).[21] Sam's proposal, however, was rejected, and as a result 'those who agreed to engage in politics (*setuju berpolitik*)' formed the Jong Islamieten Bond, which had 'Islam as the basis of the struggle' (ibid.).

The *Sejarah* implies that Salim's 'attempt to bring religious issues into Jong Java' was a divisive act. His speech at the congress and his support for Sam's proposal were, in this view, an attempt by an 'adult' political figure to infiltrate a religiously neutral nationalist youth organisation (which represents the common interest) in order to advance the interests of Sarekat Islam's brand of political Islam (which represents the interests of one particular group).[22] Salim's attempt is thus implied to be counter to the interests of the nation *as a whole*. There is also an implicit rejection in the *Sejarah* of the fact that Islam 'had a great influence on the realisation of the organisation's ideals' (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 191). More generally, the *Sejarah*'s history of the nationalist movement is the history of the development of *secular* nationalism. In the discussion of Sarekat Islam, for example, the *Sejarah*, while acknowledging the Islamic character and basis of the organisation, emphasises its status as a nationalist organisation concerned for the rights of the *rakyat bumiputra* (native people), and not as an Islamic political organisation (see ibid., 183-5). This reflects the New Order's emphasis on the secular yet ‘spiritual’ basis of the contemporary Indonesian state, enshrined in the first principle of the Pancasila, ‘belief in one God’.

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[21] … *mencoba memasukkan soal agama dalam Jong Java dengan pendapat bahwa soal agama ini adalah sangat besar pengaruhnya dalam mencapai cita-cita* (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 191). Pringgodigdo (1986, 101-2) also represents Salim's proposal in negative terms, as a divisive attempt by the forces of political Islam to infiltrate a secular organisation and describes the rejection of the proposal as successful in 'warding off the attack on Jong Java's neutral stance on religious issues' (*menangkis serangan terhadap pendiriannya netral dalam hal agama*) (Pringgodigdo 1986, 102).

[22] Pringgodigdo is more direct in suggesting that Salim was behind the proposal (1986, 101).

In the *Sejarah*, then, conflict is largely written out of history or is represented as detrimental to the struggle to achieve the nation’s goals: it was only by forging ethnic and religious unity that the nationalist movement was able to achieve *kemerdekaan* (independence). For the *Sejarah*’s contemporary student audience, the focus on unity, and the denial of discursive space for contestation, represents an important lesson about the appropriate form of social and political organisation in the contemporary nation. During the New Order, ethnic and religious conflict were represented as potentially divisive sources of ideological conflict, neatly summed up in the acronym SARA (*Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar-Golongan*), a reference to ethnic, religious, race and inter-group tensions. Such conflict was anathema to the regime’s model of the ideal organic state, which emphasised a harmonious, cooperative and consensual model of social and political organisation. This model rejected the idea of a political system based on ideological competition between parties which, it was claimed, threatened the stability and order which was so essential to development. This had been demonstrated by the political and ideological conflict of the previous regime which, New Order ideologues stressed, had resulted in political, economic and social chaos. The rejection of ethnic and religious political interests was also a product of the influence of the military in politics during the first few decades of the New Order. As Bourchier and Hadiz point out, the military’s negative perceptions about political forms of Islam and ethnic politics reflected the dominance of syncretic Muslim (*abangan*) and Javanese officers, in particular in the army (2003, 13, 27). It was also a product of the army’s role in quelling regional and Islamic rebellions during the 1950s and early 1960s, which led to a distrust of these forces and a conviction that they were a threat to the unitary state.

Pemuda as agents of history

In the *Sejarah*’s description of the youth movement, *pemuda* and *murid* are central participants in the events and function as the agents of the concrete process of ‘establishing’ (*mendirikan*) both Jong Java and Jong Sumatranen Bond. Yet the *Sejarah*’s account also backgrounds the role of the *pemuda* by using passive sentences and omitting the agents of the actions. The description of the formation of Indonesia Muda (Young Indonesia) for example, notes that:

> In a congress held in Yogya [Yogyakarta] on 24-28 December 1928, a decision *was made* to undertake a fusion [of the youth organisations]. The decision *was approved* by Jong Java, Jong Sumatra (which had in 1928 become Pemuda Sumatra), and Jong Celebes. Then a committee, subsequently known as the Indonesia Muda Committee, *was formed* to prepare the steps for implementation. Finally, on 31 December 1930 in a conference in Solo, the establishment of the Indonesia Muda organisation *was determined* (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 193, italics indicate passive verbs).[23]

Of the passive verbs located within main clauses in this paragraph only one, *disetujui* (approved), has an agent specified. The remainder – *diambil* (was made), *dibentuklah* (was formed) and *ditetapkan* (was determined) – are all without agents. This pattern, which is consistent throughout the *Sejarah*'s description of the youth movement, represents the formation of Indonesia Muda as occurring largely independent of *pemuda* and their organisations: decisions are made, committees are formed and organisations are established but the *pemuda* who were presumably central to these decisions and actions are largely absent. Moreover, although an agent for the action *disetujui* is specified, it is the organisational actors Jong Java, Jong Sumatra and Jong Celebes, and not *pemuda*, which are responsible for 'approving' the fusion of the organisations. Thus, although the *pemuda* are central participants in the *Sejarah*'s account, they are not *active* participants. Rather, their role is as onlookers in the processes of making decisions and forming organisations.

The *Sejarah*'s account of the declaration of the Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Pledge) also marginalises the role of the *pemuda*, in this case by transforming this pledge into a symbol. The Second Youth Congress, held in October 1928, and in particular the resolutions of the congress, known as the Sumpah Pemuda, were in both Guided Democracy and New Order histories celebrated as the 'founding moment' of the Indonesian nation. In 'Sumpah Pemuda: The making and meaning of a symbol of national identity', Keith Foulcher argues that in the post-independence period the Sumpah Pemuda, and the meanings attached to it, were actively constructed as 'a symbol of Indonesian nationhood' (2000, 378). During the 1950s, he argues, the Sumpah Pemuda and its meanings were progressively integrated into Sukarno's ideological machinery. The New Order continued this process albeit with a new emphasis on the Sumpah Pemuda as embodying the essence of 'an ideology of corporatism that subordinated the interests of the group to the state-defined national interest' (ibid., 394).

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[23] *Dalam kongres yang diadakan di Yogya pada tanggal 24-28 Desember 1928* diambil *keputusan untuk mengadakan fusi (gabungan). Keputusan tersebut* disetujui *oleh Jong Java, Jong Sumatra (tahun 1928 menjadi Pemuda Sumatra), dan Jong Celebes. Kemudian* dibentuklah *suatu komisi, kelak disebut Komisi Besar Indonesia Muda, untuk mempersiapkan langkah pelaksanaannya. Akhirnya pada tanggal 31 Desember 1930 dalam konperensi di Solo* ditetapkan *berdirinya organisasi Indonesia Muda* (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 193).

The status of the Sumpah Pemuda as a *symbol* of national unity is reflected in the way in which it is represented in the *Sejarah*'s account. Thus, in the *Sejarah*'s account of the Second Youth Congress, it is 'the Congress' which is the principal participant in the events:

> Again on the initiative of the PPPI, on 27-28 October 1928 the Second Indonesian Youth Congress was held to unite all existing Indonesian youth associations into one collective body. The Congress produced the youth pledge known as the Sumpah Pemuda. The substance of this pledge was the three principles of Indonesian unity, namely, the unity of homeland, nation and language. The Congress was also made acquainted with the anthem Indonesia Raya, composed by Wage Rudolf Supratman, and the Red and White flag, regarded as the heirloom flag of the Indonesian nation (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 193).[24]

Here a collective, 'the Congress', produces (*menghasilkan*) the Sumpah Pemuda, not those individual *pemuda* attending the conference, or even the organisations to which they belonged. This collective body is 'made acquainted with' (*diperkenalkan*) the future anthem and flag of the nation. The role of *pemuda* in formulating and pledging the Sumpah Pemuda is also played down: the *Sejarah* describes the Sumpah Pemuda as merely possessing a 'substance'. In the *Sejarah*'s account, the Sumpah Pemuda has taken on an existence of its own, separate, in all but a nominal way, from the *pemuda* who first gave it life. It is the Sumpah Pemuda as a symbol, and not the *pemuda* themselves, which is responsible for uniting the nation.

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[24] *Atas inisiatif PPPI kembali pada tanggal 27-28 Oktober 1928 dilangsungkan Kongres Pemuda Indonesia II untuk mempersatukan segala perkumpulan pemuda Indonesia yang ada dalam satu badan gabungan. Kongres menghasilkan sumpah pemuda yang terkenal dengan nama Sumpah Pemuda. Isinya tiga sendi persatuan Indonesia, yaitu persatuan tanah air, bangsa dan bahasa. Kepada Kongres juga diperkenalkan lagu Indonesia Raya yang diciptakan oleh Wage Rudolf Supratman, dan bendera Merah Putih yang dipandang sebagai bendera pusaka bangsa Indonesia* (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 193).

The *Sejarah*'s focus on organisational and institutional rather than individual actors is consistent with the New Order's aim of controlling the effects of history through controlling the subjects with which it deals. New Order historiography, continuing the tradition of Dutch historiography and the historiography of the 1950s and 1960s, recognised an official pantheon of *pahlawan* (heroes), who were celebrated for their contribution to Indonesia's ancient and modern history (see Reid 1979, 292-5; see also Schreiner 1997). As in earlier periods, the New Order state closely managed the interpretation of the historical role of Indonesia's *pahlawan*, representing them as *national* heroes, rather than local heroes. Moreover, as Schreiner suggests, the official biographies of these heroes which were produced in the early 1980s:

> create a series of depersonalised and stereotyped icons which can no longer represent personal actions. Instead, they have become emblems of the state (1997, 275).

Beyond this official pantheon of *pahlawan*, New Order historiography tended to focus on the actions of collectives rather than individuals, hence distancing action from individuals likely to become a focus for mobilisation in the contemporary period (see also Antlov 1996, 5). This same incorporation of powerful images and figures into the discourse of the state also underlies the *Sejarah*'s account of the Sumpah Pemuda. The *Sejarah*'s focus on the actions of 'the Congress' and its representation of the Sumpah Pemuda as symbolic of the will to unity represents an attempt to prevent the *pemuda* associated with the Sumpah Pemuda from becoming a focus and embodiment of contemporary aspirations.[25]

Politics and radicalism

The involvement of *pemuda* and *mahasiswa* in politics was one of the key areas of contestation between the New Order state discourse and student discourses. The *pemuda* of the 1910s to 1930s played a significant and active role in national politics and in the nationalist movement. This role presented a particular challenge for the New Order state, which aimed to thoroughly 'depoliticise' the roles of *pemuda* and *mahasiswa*. In order to resolve the problematic aspects of students' role in politics in the past and the non-political role which students were expected to play in the New Order, the *Sejarah* subtly shifts the emphasis away from the role of the *pemuda* in practical politics, omitting particular details and foregrounding others.

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[25] The limited success of this aim is demonstrated in the clever new rendition of the Sumpah Pemuda developed by the student movement of the late 1980s and 1990s which subverted the official symbolism and used the Sumpah Pemuda to oppose the state (see Foulcher 2000, 298-99).

The *Sejarah*'s account emphasises the fact that the youth organisations were not political organisations. It notes, for example, that Jong Java 'distanced itself completely from the field of political action and propaganda' (*menjauhkan diri sama sekali dari medan aksi dan propaganda politik*) (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 191). While the youth organisations did largely refrain from political action in an organisational capacity, they were by no means apolitical. As both Pringgodigdo (1986) and van Miert (1996) point out, discussion of national political issues was a common feature in the congresses of individual organisations and in their publications, as well as in the national youth congresses. The *Sejarah* also omits certain aspects of the youth movement which show it to have been increasingly influenced by political developments within the nationalist movement. The fact that in 1926 Jong Java agreed to allow its adult members to engage in politics is not mentioned in the *Sejarah*, for example (Suryadinata, 1978 107). Instead, the youth movement is represented as being drawn into politics against their will. The *Sejarah* notes that political developments 'dragged in' (*menyeret*) Jong Java (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 191). This representation of the youth organisations as avoiding 'practical politics' and as reluctant to allow their members to engage in such politics provides an important lesson for the *Sejarah*'s contemporary student audience. Under Daud Yusuf's 1978 campus normalisation policy, students were regarded as intellectual beings (*manusia penalar*), whose role in politics was a conceptual one, rather than a practical one (see chapter five). The focus in the *Sejarah*'s account on the non-practical aspects of the youth movement provides a model for contemporary students about their role in politics in the New Order state as political 'thinkers' rather than political actors.

In contrast to this, Perhimpunan Indonesia, the student organisation based in the Netherlands, is represented in the *Sejarah* as playing an active and indeed *radikal* role in nationalist politics. This role appears to be inconsistent with the passive political role assigned to students during the New Order. Yet by redefining *radikal* in a positive sense, playing down the organisation's socialist leanings and their calls for mass mobilisation, and limiting the discussion of their *radikal* actions the *Sejarah* is able to characterise the *radikal* nature of Perhimpunan Indonesia not as oppositional but as nationalistic.

The 'meaning potential' of a word incorporates both its 'dictionary' or denotative meanings and the meanings or connotations which are given to it in a particular social and historical context. The denotative or dictionary meaning of the term *radikal* defines it in broad terms as 'exceedingly resolute in demanding change' and 'progressive in thought or action' (KBBI 2001, 919). In the *Sejarah*, the term *radikal* is defined in relation to the political position an individual or organisation took in relation to nationalism, and the struggle for democracy, social justice and Indonesian independence. These denotative meanings are mediated by the ways in which the *Sejarah* portrays the organisations it designates as *radikal*. For example, a clear distinction is made between the radical attitudes of Perhimpunan Indonesia which are in the interests of the nation and radical actions such as those of the Indonesian Communist Party which aim only to disrupt order and stability. The *Sejarah*'s description of the communist movement during 1910s and 1920s, for example, represents the movement as subversive, opportunistic and seditious and hence detrimental to the development of the future nation. The Indies Social-Democratic Association (Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging, ISDV), the precursor of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) founded in 1914, is described as 'using infiltration tactics', 'increasing its influence by exploiting (*menunggangi*) the adverse situation following World War I' and the attitude of its leaders as 'too radical' (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 199-200). The PKI's '1926 Rebellion' (*Pemberontakan 1926*), is described as 'an escapade (*petualangan*) which [brought] disaster (*malapetaka*) for thousands of Indonesian patriots'. Moreover, as a result of the rebellion, the *Sejarah* notes, 'the Indonesian National Movement experienced such extraordinary repression that it could not progress at all' (ibid., 208). The *radikal* politics of ISDV and PKI are thus represented as obstructing the efforts to achieve unity and independence. In direct contrast to this, Perhimpunan Indonesia is described as:

> …actively struggling and even pioneering from afar the struggle for independence for the entire people of Indonesia with a pure and cohesive spirit

> of unity and integrity of the Indonesian nation (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 196).[26]

Thus, while the communist movement's *radikal*-ism undermines and divides the nation, Perhimpunan Indonesia's *radikal*-ism is 'pure' and its struggle for independence undertaken with a spirit of unity. This understanding of *radikal* enables the actions of Perhimpunan Indonesia to be defined not as oppositional but as working in the interests of the future nation and its people. The emphasis is not on the students' resistance against the Dutch but rather on their patriotism in pioneering the struggle for independence. Insofar as it is in the retrospective interests of the nation, then, the *radikal*-ism of Perhimpunan Indonesia is sanctioned in the *Sejarah*.

A second means by which the *Sejarah* reframes the meaning of the Perhimpunan Indonesia students' *radikal* nature is by playing down some aspects of the organisation's ideology and actions. In *Perhimpunan Indonesia and the Indonesian nationalist movement 1923-28*, for example, John Ingleson highlights the Marxist, Leninist and socialist orientation of Perhimpunan Indonesia members. This socialist orientation included a focus on the creation of a mass-based political movement from the mid-1920s, as well as some cooperation with communist groups. The organisation was also involved in a variety of activities within Indonesia, notably, encouraging infiltration of existing nationalist parties and youth organisations which were seen as too conservative, producing nationalist propaganda for distribution in Indonesia, and, perhaps most importantly, the creation of a new radical nationalist party, the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) by former members of Perhimpunan Indonesia (Ingleson 1975, chapters two and three).[27] In the *Sejarah*'s account, however, the socialist orientation of the Perhimpunan Indonesia is not explored. Instead, there is an emphasis on the organisation's nationalist character, with the *Sejarah* describing it as having anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist sentiments, as national-democratic, international, non-cooperative and as having a desire for independence and the right of Indonesia to self-determination (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 195-7). This emphasis on the *nationalist* character of the organisation is a reflection of the New Order's demonising of leftist ideologies. And while the *Sejarah* mentions Perhimpunan

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[26] *…aktif berjuang bahkan memelopori dari jauh perjuangan kemerdekaan untuk seluruh rakyat Indonesia dengan berjiwa persatuan dan kesatuan bangsa Indonesia yang murni dan kompak* (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 196).

[27] See also the discussion of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) which is represented as having a unifying and radical nationalism similar to Perhimpunan Indonesia (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 209-17).

Indonesia's links with the Comintern and the League against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression, which was sponsored by the Comintern, it does not elaborate on the full extent of the organisation's cooperation with international communist forces (see Ingleson 1975, 31-7). Instead it mentions only briefly the short-lived confidential agreement signed by Mohammad Hatta's on behalf of Perhimpunan Indonesia with the PKI leader Semaun and Perhimpunan Indonesia's withdrawal from the League in 1927 because of its domination by communists (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 198).

The third means by which the *Sejarah* reframes the *radikal* nature of Perhimpunan Indonesia is by limiting the discussion of its *radikal* actions. The *Sejarah* represents Perhimpunan Indonesia as playing an active role in politics. It notes, for example, that the organisation 'actively struggled' (*aktif berjuang*) and 'pioneered' (*memelopori*) the struggle for independence. Perhimpunan Indonesia is also described as being 'increasingly resolute in entering the field of politics' (*semakin tegas bergerak memasuki bidang politik*) (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 196). Yet the *radikal*-ness of Perhimpunan Indonesia primarily refers to its political ideology rather than to overt political action. This is indicated by the kinds of actions in which Perhimpunan Indonesia is involved. For example, the *Sejarah*'s account of Perhimpunan Indonesia's activities focuses on activities such as the change in the name of the organisation from Indische Vereeniging (Indies Association) to Indonesische Vereeniging (Indonesia Association) in 1922 and again to the Indonesian form Perhimpunan Indonesia in 1925. Similarly, the *Sejarah* also observes that:

> The next step in the PI's *radikal* approach (*sikap*) was to change the name of its magazine from *Hindia Putra* [Sons of the Indies] to *Indonesia Merdeka* [Indonesia Free] in 1924 (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 196).[28]

While significant, these activities were by no means the Perhimpunan Indonesia's most overtly political activities, nor their most *radikal*. Their selection for inclusion, and the omission of more *radikal* actions such as those mentioned above, represents Perhimpunan Indonesia's *radikal*-ism as a political attitude, rather than political action. For the *Sejarah*'s contemporary student audience, this representation of the Perhimpunan Indonesia students' radicalism as largely concerned with their attitudes rather than their actions, serves to highlight the non-active political role which the New Order designated as appropriate for contemporary students.

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[28] *Langkah selanjutnya dari sikap radikal PI ini adalah merobah nama majalahnya dari* Hindia Putra *menjadi* Indonesia Merdeka *tahun 1924* (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 5: 196).

The Rengasdengklok Affair: *pemuda* and their *bapak*

Early on the morning of 16 August 1945, a group of youths associated with a number of student dormitories (*asrama*) in Jakarta, kidnapped Sukarno and Hatta in an effort to convince them to announce Indonesia's independence.[29] Assisted by members of local Peta (Pembela Tanah Air, Homeland Defence Force) groups, the youths took the two leaders to the small town of Rengasdengklok, east of Jakarta. The kidnapping was the culmination of the youths' frustration at the slow pace of official preparations for independence and their awareness of the growing gap between their own ideas about how and when independence should be declared and those of the older nationalist leaders. The view of Sukarno and Hatta was that independence should be declared through the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, PPKI).[30] They also wished to abide by the conditions and time-frame outlined by Japan.[31] The youth, however, saw the PPKI as a Japanese-made body and disagreed with Japan's conditions. They wanted independence declared on Indonesia's terms without any involvement from the Japanese (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 77).

The *Sejarah*'s account of the events leading up to the Rengasdengklok Affair and the proclamation of independence appears in the first chapter of the sixth volume of the *Sejarah* in a 10-page section entitled 'Prelude to the proclamation'. A two-page section preceding this examines the formation of the organisation Angkatan Muda Indonesia (Youth of Indonesia) in mid-1944 as well as other activities amongst youth in the early months of 1945. The *Sejarah*'s account emphasises the contrast between the youthful idealism and *semangat* (spirit, fervour) of the young generation and the conservatism and caution of the older generation. Nevertheless, the youth are portrayed as respecting the authority of the nationalist leaders and as finding appropriate means to deal with the 'differences of opinion' between the older and younger generations. And while the youth are applauded for their willingness to take risks and to make sacrifices in the defence of the interests of the nation, the radical nature of their actions is played down, both by omitting certain details about the events and by the linguistic choices made.

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[29] These included the Prapatan 10 *asrama* associated with the medical faculty, the Asrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia at Menteng 31, to which Chairul Saleh and Sukarni, belonged, and the Asrama Indonesia Merdeka at Kebon Sirih 80, sponsored by Admiral Maeda and with which Subardjo, Wikana, Jusuf Kunto and Singgih were associated. These groups, and others like them, had been pressing the older nationalist leaders to declare independence since the youth congress held in Bandung in May 1945 (Anderson 1972, 70-1).

[30] The PPKI was formed by the Japanese on 7 August 1945 as a replacement for the Investigating Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, BPKI).

[31] Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi, commander of Japan's Southern Area Armies, outlined the conditions and time-frame for the declaration of independence in a meeting with the nationalist leaders on 9 August (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 78).

In *Young heroes: The Indonesian family in politics*, Saya Shiraishi suggests that 'the very moment of revolution' occurred with the reversal of power which came with the *pemuda*'s challenge to the older nationalists Sukarno and Hatta, their *bapak* (fathers) (Shiraishi 1997, 38-9).[32] On the night of 15 August, acting in the name of the Indonesian people, the *pemuda* paid a visit to their *bapak*'s house. The aim of *pemuda*'s visit was not to pay respects to their *bapak*. Instead, Wikana demanded that his *bapak* take action.[33] Several hours later, in the early hours of 16 August, the *pemuda* took the drastic step of kidnapping their *bapak*.[34] This reversal of the power relationship between the *pemuda* and their *bapak* was a dangerous one in that it set an undesirable precedent for the relationship between contemporary *pemuda* and their *bapak*, *Bapak Presiden Suharto* (Father President Suharto). In the developments which follow, however, the *Sejarah* rectifies this power relationship once the kidnapping has taken place and the party has arrived at Rengasdengklok:

> The youth's intention to pressure them [Sukarno and Hatta] into immediately announcing the Proclamation of Independence without association with Japan, was it seems not carried out. It appeared the two senior leaders possessed an authority (*wibawa*) which made the youth who brought them to Rengasdengklok reluctant to pressure them (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 82).[35]

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[32] The terms *bapak* and *anak* imply an asymmetrical power relationship. According to Shiraishi, in New Order politico-familial language, subordinates refer to their superiors as *bapak* and superiors in turn refer to their subordinates as *anak* or *anak buah*. Suharto, as *Bapak Presiden*, was not only president but also supreme father. This association between politics and family, she notes, is not merely a linguistic convention but is deeply embedded in New Order ideology (Shiraishi 1997, 9).

[33] Malik (1956, 36 -7) represents this meeting as proceeding in a more orderly way than the *Sejarah* does. In particular, in Malik's account Wikana does not state that there will be bloodshed and Sukarno does not respond angrily (see below).

[34] Legge notes that the kidnapping of a leader in order to assert influence by moral suasion was a method employed by youth both during and after the revolution (1972, 199).

[35] *Maksud para pemuda untuk menekan mereka berdua supaya segera melaksanakan Proklamasi Kemerdekaan terlepas dari setiap kaitan dengan Jepang, rupa-rupanya tidak terlaksana. Agaknya kedua pemimpin senior itu mempunyai wibawa yang cukup besar, sehingga para pemuda yang membawanya ke Rengasdengklok segan untuk melakukan penekanan* (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 82).

In this account, the *pemuda*'s recognition of the natural authority (*wibawa*) which their *bapak* possessed brought them to their senses and they withdrew. The *bapak* did not, it seems, take any actions which overtly demonstrated their authority over the *pemuda*. On the contrary, Sukarno and Hatta appear to have willingly submitted to the kidnapping (see Anderson 1972, 74; Shiraishi 1997, 39). Yet their authority is clearly apparent to the *pemuda*. Recognition of and respect for the authority of the state was a central lesson for New Order youth. Within the framework of organicism, the state was modelled on the traditional family. In this conception, the president was the head of the state-family, and the population were as members of the state-family. This model was plainly hierarchical, with clear lines of authority flowing unidirectionally from the *bapak* to his *anak* (children). At Rengasdengklok, the *pemuda* recognise their *bapak*'s authority and, as a result of this experience, learn self-restraint. For the *Sejarah*'s contemporary student audience, this representation of the *pemuda*'s recognition of the nationalist leaders' authority reminds them that even their heroic predecessors were able to recognise and respect those senior to them and in positions of authority.

Conflict, deliberation and consensus

The *Sejarah*'s version of the Rengasdengklok Affair also provides important lessons about the place of conflict in the New Order organic state and in particular, inter-generational conflict. In the *Sejarah*'s version of events, the actions which the youth take are described as arising out of a 'difference of opinion' with the conservative and pragmatic older nationalists:

> The climax of the struggle towards the Proclamation of Independence for Indonesia was evidently brought about by youth. Both old and young held the same opinion that the proclamation should be declared immediately and *it was only in the way of implementing it that there was a difference of opinion* (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 77, emphasis added).[36]

It is this difference of opinion which leads the youth to kidnap the nationalist leaders. The *Sejarah* notes that:

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[36] *Memuncaknya perjuangan menuju Proklamasi Kemerdekaa Indonesia nampaknya disebabkan oleh golongan muda. Baik golongan tua maupun golongan muda sama-sama berpendapat bahwa kemerdekaan Indonesia harus segera diproklamasikan, hanya mengenai caranya melaksanakan Proklamasi itu terdapat beda pendapat* (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 77).

> The presence of that difference of understanding motivated the youth (*golongan pemuda*) to take Ir Sukarno and Drs Moh Hatta outside the city (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 81).[37]

In the New Order, 'differences of opinion' were the only legitimate form of dissent. In a chapter of his autobiography entitled 'The issue of opposition', Suharto explains that: 'In a *Pancasila* democracy there is no place for opposition in the Western sense.'[38] Western-style opposition, he argues, which is the kind of opposition which 'opposes for the sake of opposing, for the sake of being different' (*asal saja menentang, asal saja berbeda*) can destroy democracy (Suharto 1989, 346).

Differences of opinion, however, are natural (*wajar*) in a Pancasila democracy and represent 'a force to enrich our perspective, to broaden our horizons, to refresh the body of our nation, [and] to find the best answer for the problems we face together' (Suharto 1991, 431). The concept of a '*Pancasila* democracy', as opposed to 'Western' democracies, which were deemed unsuitable for Indonesia, was thus a key source of legitimacy for the New Order's mode of rule. The *Sejarah*'s representation of the *pemuda*'s opposition to the older generation as a difference of opinion reinforces Suharto's claim that Indonesia does not 'recognise' (*mengenal*) any opposition. Such a representation depicts the New Order's system of rule as the product of popular consensus and hence presents it as the will of all the *rakyat*. In the state's perception, groups who stepped outside the boundaries of what was defined as 'difference of opinion' and opposed the regime were in effect opposing what the nation had collectively agreed upon through the process of deliberation and consensus. This perception enabled the state to justify its consistent repression of opposition as 'in the interests of the collective will of the nation'. At the same time, it also allowed the state to delegitimise the actions of opposition groups as 'contrary to the interests of the nation'.

The *Sejarah*'s representation of the *pemuda*'s opposition to the older generation's position on declaring independence as a 'natural' difference of opinion also reflects the New Order's perception about youth. In this view, youth are seen as being intrinsically idealistic, progressive and dynamic while the older generation is regarded as naturally more conservative, a natural consequence of their maturity. According to former Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf:

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[37] *Adanya perbedaan paham itu telah mendorong golongan pemuda untuk membawa Ir Sukarno dan Drs Moh Hatta ke luar kota* (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 81).

[38] *Dalam demokrasi Pancasila tidak ada tempat untuk oposisi ala Barat* (Suharto 1989, 346).

> In general the younger generation looks forward; both their thinking and their actions are oriented to the future. Because of this, the younger generation is in general impressed by any innovation which they believe can accelerate the realisation of the future they portray, regardless of whether this portrait of the future is accurate or not. Thus, the younger generation is often called the 'generation of innovators' (*novatrice*). It is in connection with the attitude of these *novatrice* that conflicts often arise with the older generation who in general tend to defend existing values or institutions (Yusuf 1987, 58).[39]

In this view, differences of opinion between the older generation and the younger generation centre on different perceptions about change: the youth desire change, while the older generation desire continuity. Moreover, these differences of opinion are a 'natural' consequence of the generation gap. Southwood and Flanagan suggest that the trials of student activists in 1979 served to deflect attention from criticisms originating from within the regime. 'If students can be scapegoated,' they note, 'political conflict can be portrayed as merely inter-generational (Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 176).' The representation of the conflict between the *pemuda* and the older nationalist leaders as a conflict between the younger and the older generation, and not as a political conflict, redefines students' oppositional role in the past in a way deemed appropriate by the New Order.

The *Sejarah*'s account of the Rengasdengklok Affair also provides a lesson about the appropriate way to deal with differences of opinion. Central to the *Sejarah*'s version of events is the process of deliberation (*musyawarah*) which leads to the eventual resolution (*mufakat*) of the difference of opinion between the older generation and the younger generation.[40] Deliberation and consensus were, in the New Order state, the appropriate and authentically Indonesian method of decision-making in a *Pancasila* democracy, in which differences of opinion were resolved through the people's representatives (the DPR and MPR) (Suharto 1989, 346-7). This consensual mode of politics is enshrined in the fourth principle of the Pancasila: 'democracy guided by the wisdom of representative deliberation'. According to Bourchier (1996, 240-1) the function of *musyawarah* 'is not to facilitate 'democratic' participation in decision making but rather to guarantee harmony', with unanimous agreement the ultimate aim of the process. Such unanimity is essential to the maintenance of stability and order.

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[39] *Pada umumnya generasi muda sering melihat ke depan, baik pikiran maupun tindakannya sering diarahkan ke masa mendatang. Berhubung dengan itu ia pada umumnya selalu terkesan pada setiap pembaruan yang dianggap dapat mempercepat realisasi masa depan yang digambarkannya, terlepas dari soal apakah gambaran masa depan itu tepat atau tidak. Maka itu generasi muda ini sering pula disebut sebagai 'generasi pembaru' (novatrice). Berhubung sikap novatrice ini pula sering menimbulkan bentrokan dengan generasi tua yang pada umumnya cenderung untuk mempertahankan nilai atau lembaga yang telah ada* (Yusuf 1987, 58).

[40] Malik (1956, 35-47) also represents the process in terms of a series of *perundingan* (negotiations).

In the *Sejarah*, the difference of opinion between the youth and the older generation is resolved through a six-step process of deliberation and consensus in which the youth discuss and debate various issues relating to the declaration of independence both amongst themselves and with the older generation. In the first step, the youth meet at the bacteriology laboratory to discuss their position in the light of recent developments, namely the rumours of Japan's surrender, and agree to send a delegation to Sukarno. At a meeting later that night at Sukarno's house, Wikana and Sukarno present the positions of the groups they represent. The atmosphere is tense and nothing is resolved. Following this meeting, the youth meet again to deliberate amongst themselves and discuss their options. They agree to kidnap Sukarno and Hatta in an attempt to persuade them to declare independence. At Rengasdengklok, the older generation and the younger generation again present their positions. As in the meeting between Wikana and Sukarno, however, nothing is resolved, although Singgih returns to Jakarta on the false assumption that Sukarno agreed to declare independence.[41] Meanwhile, in Jakarta, Subardjo, representing the older generation, and Wikana, representing the young generation, have agreed that the proclamation will be announced in Jakarta. Finally, the older generation and the younger generation deliberate over the wording of the text of the proclamation, its signatories and the appropriate place to announce the proclamation. Consensus is reached and independence declared.

The *Sejarah*'s representation of the conflict between the older and younger generation as a difference of opinion and its resolution through deliberation and consensus provides an important lesson in New Order organicist ideology for the *Sejarah*'s contemporary student audience. In this lesson, students learn that while there may be differing views about the manner in which a political decision is carried out, provided the overall aim is the same, these differences can be resolved through appropriate means. Conflict between idealistic youth and conservative members of the older generation is also to some extent natural, and therefore able to be tolerated. This is particularly so where the interests of the future nation are concerned and where the older generation are being overly cautious.

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[41] According to the *Sejarah*, in the course of a discussion with Sukarno, Singgih gained the impression that Sukarno was willing to announce the proclamation in Jakarta as soon as he was returned. Based on this assumption, Singgih returned to Jakarta to convey the plan for the proclamation to his fellow youth leaders. On this point, the *Sejarah* differs from other accounts. Malik (1956, 42-3), Anderson (1972, 75-6) and Martha, Wibisono and Anwar (1984, 170) agree that the leaders refused to move from their original position and that Jusuf Kunto was sent back to Jakarta to report the leaders' unchanged attitude to the youth there.

Pemuda and politics

By kidnapping the nationalist leaders in an effort to pressure them to accede to their demands the youth involved in the Rengasdengklok Affair clearly acted in a political way. Yet not only was the kidnapping a political act, it was also a *radikal* political act. This is acknowledged openly in the *Sejarah*. Thus, for example, the resolutions of the youths' meeting at the bacteriology laboratory on the night of 15 August 1945 are described as *radikal* in their assertion that Indonesia's independence was an issue for the Indonesian people themselves and could not be entrusted to 'other people or empires' (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 80). The term *radikal* is also used throughout the *Sejarah*'s account to describe the *pemuda*: *pemuda radikal* (radical youth), *golongan pemuda radikal* (group of radical youth), *sifat gerakan tersebut lebih radikal* (the nature of the group was more radical), *sesuatu gerakan pemuda yang lebih radikal* (a more radical youth group), and *tuntutan-tuntutan radikal golongan pemuda* (the radical demands of the youth group). Yet the *radikal* and political actions of the youth in the Rengasdengklok Affair also presented a problem for the New Order as it strove to limit the boundaries of acceptable political behaviour for contemporary youth. How are these problematic aspects of the Rengasdengklok Affair resolved in the *Sejarah*?

One of the ways in which the *Sejarah* plays down the radical nature of the youths' actions is by omitting certain historical details which demonstrate their radical opposition to the older nationalists and the Japanese. In this connection, one significant point on which the *Sejarah* is notably silent is the so-called youth uprising.[42] In his autobiography, *Sukarno: an autobiography as told to Cindy Adams*, Sukarno recalled the words of Chairul Saleh, the head of the *pemuda* delegation which visited Sukarno at his house on 15 August:

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[42] Martha, Wibisono and Anwar mention a meeting on the morning of 16 August in which the youth resolved to 'stage an assault (*gerakan memukul*) against the Japanese forces' (1984, 139). Although Anderson suggests that the seriousness of the preparations for an uprising in Jakarta has been somewhat exaggerated, he concedes that various small groups did gather at certain points in the city and plans seem to have been made to seize the radio station (Anderson 1972, 77-8). Kahin states that in Sukarni's

> Let us make a large-scale revolution tonight. We have Peta troops, *pemuda*, Barisan Pelopor men, even the Hei Ho auxiliary soldiers are all prepared. At your signal Jakarta will be in flames. Thousands and thousands of armed and ready troops will surround the city and carry out a successful armed revolt and topple the whole Japanese army (Sukarno 1966, 206).

In the *Sejarah*, however, the resolution of the youths' initial meeting at the bacteriology laboratory is described in terms which indicate the youths' willingness to engage in dialogue with the older leaders: the *pemuda*, it is noted, 'hoped that negotiations could be held with Ir Sukarno and Drs Moh Hatta so that they could be involved (*diikutsertakan*) in announcing the Proclamation' (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 80). Moreover, in the account of Wikana's meeting with Sukarno, no allusion is made to the supposed 'thousands of armed and ready troops' set to revolt at Sukarno's word.[43] The absence of the *pemuda* uprising in the *Sejarah*'s account is significant. Because such a situation was likely to antagonise the Japanese authorities, and perhaps ruin Indonesia's chances of independence, Sukarno and Hatta were unwilling to support it. A youth uprising which did not have the support of the older nationalists would have meant yet another aberration from the normal *bapak-anak* flow of authority and would have disturbed the stability and order necessary at such a crucial time. By omitting the plans, however vague, for a *pemuda* uprising, the *Sejarah* avoids setting an undesirable precedent for New Order youth that uprisings are a legitimate way to achieve goals and resolve differences of opinion.[44]

One of the other ways in which this is achieved is by rewording the kidnapping itself. In its account of Sukarno and Hatta's removal to Rengasdengklok, for example, the *Sejarah* avoids use of the term *menculik* (to kidnap), instead using the terms *membawa*

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discussions with Sukarno and Hatta at Rengasdengklok, he maintained that there were '15 000 armed youths on the outskirts of Jakarta ready to march against the city as soon as the proclamation was made' (1952, 134). Legge also mentions a planned coup (Legge 1972, 201).

[43] In the *Sejarah*'s account, it is Wikana, accompanied by Darwis, who visits Sukarno and not Chairul Saleh.

[44] The fact that the *Sejarah* omits to mention that Sukarno's wife Fatmawati and his infant son Guntur were also taken to Rengasdengklok, which both Legge and Anderson mention, may also indicate a desire to represent the *pemuda* as principled. The kidnapping of women and children not involved in the political proceedings could not be endorsed as ethical. Compare this to the public outrage which accompanied the death of General Nasution's daughter in October 1965 after she was accidentally shot in her home by the military officers of the Thirtieth of September Movement who came to take her father.

(to take), *menyingkirkan* (to evacuate, remove) and *mengamankan* (to secure, protect). These terms represent the youth's actions not as the actions of a radical group without respect for their *bapak*, but rather as those of a group concerned to remove their *bapak* from a position of danger to one which is 'secure' (*aman*).[45] The youths' actions are thus able to be represented as in the interests of the nation, namely, protecting its future leaders.

In the discussion of the youth movement, it was suggested that the term *radikal* referred to a political ideology rather than to overt political action. In the *Sejarah*'s account of the Rengasdengklok Affair, the emphasis on students as thinking, feeling, and saying rather than acting suggests that in this context too, *radikal* refers to a political *perspective* rather than to political action. This reflects the emphasis in New Order policies on students, and in particular in Daud Yusuf's 1978 campus normalisation policy, that students' role in the politics was as 'thinkers' engaged in political analysis and not political actors. For example, in the *Sejarah*'s account, the active processes in which *pemuda* are involved are mostly not concrete processes but processes to do with agreeing (*bersepakat*) and disagreeing (*tidak menyetujui*), being determined (*bertekad*), not taking part (*tidak mengambil bagian*), intending (*bermaksud*), desiring (*menghendaki*), pressuring (*mendesak*), stating (*menyatakan*), and suggesting (*mengusulkan*). The few exceptions to this pattern include actions such as holding (*mengadakan*) (a meeting) and implementing the decisions of the meeting (*melaksanakan keputusan rapat*).

The *Sejarah* also represents students' *radikal* acts in an abstract way. In the account of Wikana and Darwis' visit to Sukarno on the night of 15 August, for example, it is noted:

> Wikana's demand that the Proclamation be announced by Ir Sukarno on the following day made the atmosphere tense because he also stated that bloodshed would occur if their wishes were not carried out (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 80).[46]

Here it is Wikana's 'demand', and not the actions of Wikana himself, which make the atmosphere tense. Wikana's threat of bloodshed - Wikana does not say that he will cause the bloodshed, only that it ‘will occur’ if the youth’s demands are not met (*tidak dilaksanakan*) - is not addressed directly to Sukarno but rather to an unknown or unspecified person(s). The implication of this is that *pemuda* can make demands and request that they be implemented (*dilaksanakan*) but it would be disrespectful of the *bapak-anak* relationship to demand them directly of the *bapak*. Wikana’s threat is thus represented in a less *radikal* way. This is highlighted by the contrast made with Sukarno’s response to Wikana, in which he *melontarkan kata-kata* (literally, to throw words) which constitute a direct response to Wikana himself. ‘Here is my neck,’ a visibly angry Sukarno exclaims, ‘you can kill me now (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 80).’

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[45] This is in fact the pretext on which the youth took Sukarno and Hatta from their homes, telling them that a youth uprising was imminent and they were no longer safe in the city (Anderson 1972, 74).

[46] *Tuntutan Wikana agar Proklamasi dinyatakan oleh Ir Sukarno pada keesokan harinya menegangkan suasana karena ia juga menyatakan bahwa akan terjadi pertumpuhan darah jika keinginan mereka tidak dilaksanakan* (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 80).

The *Sejarah* thus represents the youth’s radikal actions as in the interests of the nation. Just as Sukarno never punished the radical *pemuda* for their actions in the aftermath of the Rengasdengklok Affair, so the *Sejarah* does not condemn the *pemuda* of 1945 for their ‘revolutionary act’. The reason the *Sejarah* is able to do this is that the *pemuda*, unlike the older generation, whose position is motivated by ‘political considerations’, are motivated only by the desire to announce the proclamation ‘immediately and without recourse to Japan’s conditions’, an act clearly in the (retrospective) interests of Indonesia as an independent nation. The *Sejarah*’s representation of the *pemuda* as without vested political interests enables their revolutionary act to be sanctioned as ‘in the interests of the nation’.

Tritura: legitimising the New Order

The New Order’s representation of the events of 1965-1966 was central to its claims to legitimacy. In the official version of events the regime represented itself as having rescued the nation from the communist threat and as having restored political, social and economic order to a nation in chaos. Students played a crucial part in the New Order’s account, primarily as a means of justifying the actions taken by Suharto following the Order of March Eleven (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, Supersemar) as ‘the will of the *rakyat*’.

The *Sejarah*’s account of the demonstrations of 1965-1966 and Sukarno’s response to them appears in a six-page section under the sub-heading of ‘The Tritura actions’ (*Aksi-*

Aksi Tritura) (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 404-411). It follows a section which examines the coup attempt and the overthrow of the 'communist rebels' and precedes a short section dealing with the events surrounding the issuing of the Supersemar (ibid., 411-415). In the *Sejarah*'s version of events, *pemuda*, *pelajar* and *mahasiswa*, acting on behalf of the *rakyat*, play a central role in the unfolding of events. At the same time, however, the *Sejarah* draws attention away from the students' role in producing key concepts such as the Tritura (Tri Tuntutan Rakyat, Three People's Demands), instead representing the students as passive symbols of the people's discontent.

The principal participants in the *Sejarah*'s account of the 1966 demonstrations are students. These students are described using a variety of terms, including *pemuda*, *mahasiswa*, *pelajar*, and *para demonstran* (the demonstrators). They are also described in organisational terms: as *kesatuan-kesatuan aksi* (action fronts), KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, Indonesian Student Action Front), and *Front Pancasila* (Pancasila Front), the coalition of anti-PKI parties and mass organisations which included the action units. As in previous 'crucial historical moments', the *Sejarah* represents the *pemuda*, *pelajar* and *mahasiswa* of 1966 as playing an active role in the events. The *Sejarah* notes that the demonstrations calling for the dissolution of the PKI were 'initiated' (*dipelopori*) by action fronts made up of 'university students, high school students, and mass organisations loyal to the Pancasila' (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 396). These action units are described as the 'outward reflection' of the New Order.[47] Students, or their action units, are also the actors in a broad range of concrete actions including *meminta agar kenaikan harga barang ditinjau kembali* (requesting that the rise in the price of goods be reviewed), *mengeluarkan pernyataan* (issuing statements), *memberi nama kabinet* (naming the cabinet), *melakukan aksi serentak* (carrying out simultaneous action), *mengempeskan ban-ban mobil* (letting down car tyres), and *membentuk Resimen Arief Rachman Hakim* (forming the Arief Rachman Hakim Regiment).[48] They are also the agents in actions such as *diboikot* (boycotted), *dibalas* (responded to), and *diserbu dan diobrak-abrik* (attacked and ransacked).

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[47] *… pihak Orde Baru … dicerminkan ke luar oleh kesatuan-kesatuan aksi* (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 408).

[48] The organisation was named for the Universitas Indonesia student who died of a bullet wound fired by a member of the Cakrabirawa regiment, Sukarno's palace guard, on 24 February 1966.

A second participant in the *Sejarah*'s account of the events of 1965-66 is the *rakyat*. Unlike the students and their action units, however, the *rakyat* are not represented as actors in concrete processes. Instead, they appear as 'thinkers' in verbs such as *ingat* (remember), *berpikir* (think), or *dipandang* (considered) or as the objects of disappointment (*sangat mengecewakan harapan rakyat*, disappointed the people's hopes) at Sukarno's reshuffled Dwikora cabinet, or astonishment (*sangat mencengangkan rakyat*, astounded the people) at the dismissal from the cabinet of figures opposed to the attempted coup and the appointment of figures allegedly involved in it (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 409).

The *rakyat* also function as the post-modifying element in simple noun phrases such as *erosi kepercayaan rakyat* (erosion of the people's confidence), *kesabaran rakyat* (*mencapai batasnya*) (the people's patience (reached its limit)), *kesejahteraan rakyat* (*jauh merosot*) (the welfare of the people (drastically declined)), *keinginan keras dari rakyat* (the strong desire of the people), and *ketidakpuasan masyarakat luas* (the dissatisfaction of wider society). This backgrounding of the *rakyat* in simple noun phrases represents them as third parties rather than active participants in the events. Moreover, the fact that these noun phrases refer predominantly to emotional states - confidence, impatience, desire and dissatisfaction – represents the *rakyat* not as 'doers', but as 'feelers'. This represents the student demonstrations and the actions Suharto took as a response to the lack of confidence, impatience, and dissatisfaction of the wider populace. It also highlights the fact that Sukarno no longer represented the people's desires nor did he have their confidence.

In the *Sejarah*'s description of the Tritura demonstrations, the *rakyat* is linked to the military (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI). As noted in chapter two, in most official accounts of the events of 1965-66, the relationship between the *rakyat*, represented by the students, and the military was described as a partnership. In the *Sejarah*, the relationship between ABRI and the *rakyat* is described as 'co-operation' (*kerja sama*), a *dwitunggal yang terdiri dari rakyat dan ABRI* (duumvirate made up of the *rakyat* and ABRI) and a *kekompakan antara rakyat dan ABRI* (union between the *rakyat* and ABRI). ABRI is also described as an experienced and astute political player (*telah matang menghadapi intrik-intrik politik*) (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 406 and 408). However, apart from this, ABRI plays a very minor role in the account of the three months of the Tritura protests. Indeed, after the description of the army's efforts to destroy the Thirtieth of September Movement in Jakarta and in Central Java following the coup (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 392-404), ABRI is not mentioned again. Suharto is similarly absent in the *Sejarah*'s account of the Tritura protests: after he is mentioned in the context of the efforts to secure the capital in the immediate aftermath of the coup, he is not mentioned again until the account of the Supersemar (ibid., 391, 393, 413-4). This reflects the New Order's concern to divert attention away from role of the military in encouraging the student protests which led to Suharto's assumption of power.

The active role that *mahasiswa* and *pelajar* play in events, and the key place of the *rakyat* in the *Sejarah*'s version of events serves to legitimise the actions Suharto took following the Supersemar by representing it as a response to the demands and aspirations of 'the people'. The student demonstrations are portrayed as the consequence of the erosion of the people's confidence in the Sukarno government and the decline in their welfare from late 1965. The focus on the actions which the students take in response to the frustration and disappointment of the *rakyat* also represents the transition from the so-called Old Order to the New Order not as a military takeover, but rather as a transition originating with the *rakyat*.[49] It is the *rakyat*, through the students, who demonstrate against the legal head of state and his government. This action is justified because of the failure of the head of state to fulfil his promise to provide a political solution to the crisis.

The *Sejarah*'s representation of the chaos which threatens to overtake the country as a result of Sukarno's failure to provide a political solution also legitimises Suharto's actions following the Supersemar as a necessary step in taking control of the situation. The shooting of Arief Rachman Hakim on 24 February 1965 by a member of Sukarno's palace guard is described as 'exacerbating the national leadership crisis' (*menyebabkan makin parahnya krisis kepemimpinan nasional*). The banning of KAMI by President Sukarno on the following day also adds to the chaos. The situation is described as 'increasingly unsafe' (*bertambah tidak aman*) and the national crisis 'increasingly uncontrollable' (*makin tidak terkendalikan*). In contrast, Suharto's banning of the PKI immediately following the issuing of the Supersemar is represented as decisive and as obtaining ‘the support of the people’, since this was one of the three demands of the people, expressed in the Tritura (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 413).

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[49] The name 'Old Order' was given to the Guided Democracy period as a means of contrasting it to the new regime.

A third group of participants in the *Sejarah*’s account is President Sukarno and the political figures and organisations which supported him. Several authors have noted that in New Order imagery and literature surrounding the events of 1965-66, Sukarno and the Old Order were consistently represented in an unfavourable way (see for example Leigh 1991, 28-31; Maurer 1997; Brooks 1995). In the *Sejarah*, the Old Order (*Orde Lama*) is described in disapproving terms as *golongan yang merasa terdesak oleh aksi-aksi Tritura, terutama Dr Subandrio cs* (groups which felt pressured by the Tritura actions, especially [First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs] Dr Subandrio and his cronies) and *pihak yang tidak senang terhadap Tritura, yaitu Orde Lama* (those who disliked the Tritura, that is, the Old Order). The Sukarno regime is discredited by its association in the *Sejarah*’s account with the Cakrabirawa Regiment and the Central Intelligence Body (Badan Pusat Inteligen, BPI), both of which were alleged to have been involved in the coup attempt, as well as with *orang-orang kriminal* (criminals) and cabinet ministers whose ‘good intentions for the struggle were questionable’ (*diragukan iktikad baik perjuangannya*) (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 406). It is also represented as having vested political interests (*kepentingan politik*), as being involved in political intrigue (*intrik-intrik politik*) and as being exploited (*ditunggangi*) by the PKI. Figures associated with the Old Order are described as inciting the masses (*menghasut massa*) to perpetrate acts of terror (*perbuatan teror, aksi teror*) (ibid., 407-10). The *Sejarah*’s reiteration of Sukarno’s failure to respond to the people’s demands for a political solution to the crisis also brings his abilities as a leader into question. In a cabinet meeting held on 6 October 1965, the *Sejarah* relates, President Sukarno had undertaken to provide a political solution to the national crisis (ibid., 395). However, the *Sejarah* notes that even in the face of mounting evidence of the PKI’s involvement in the attempted coup and the escalation of demonstrations demanding the party’s dissolution, Sukarno ‘had still not yet taken steps towards a political solution for the G-30-S/PKI issue’ (ibid., 395 and 396). In the same cabinet meeting, Major General Suharto had been given the task of restoring security and order. In the *Sejarah*’s account, Suharto’s actions in systematically and efficiently carrying out this task are presented as a contrast to Sukarno’s failure to provide a political solution (ibid., 396-403). These negative representations of Sukarno and his government enables the student demonstrations and

Suharto’s actions following the Supersemar to be justified as a necessary ‘correction’ of the Old Order.

Representatives of the *rakyat*’s demands

Above it was suggested that the *Sejarah*’s account of the 1966 demonstrations represented *pemuda*, *pelajar* and *mahasiswa* as playing a grammatically active role in a range of concrete actions. This, it was argued, served as a means of legitimising the actions Suharto took following the Supersemar as a response to the demands of the wider populace. Yet students are also represented as passive representatives of the *rakyat*’s demands, as in, for example, the *Sejarah*’s description of the demonstrations:

> The accumulating dissatisfaction of wider society eventually erupted in the form of demonstrations carried out by university and high school students. Pioneered by KAMI, demonstrations by students of Universitas Indonesia with their yellow jackets were begun on 10 January 1966… (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 406).[50]

The metaphor of ‘eruption’, signalled by the use of the words *menumpuk* (to accumulate or mount, as of pressure), and *meledak* (to erupt), signifying a spontaneous and uncontrolled occurrence, plays down the active role of the students in planning and carrying out the demonstrations. The use of the passive form of the verb in the phrase *dimulailah aksi-aksi demonstrasi* (demonstrations were begun) also backgrounds the students’ active role. In this view, the student demonstrations are simply the spontaneous expression of the *rakyat*’s dissatisfaction, manifested in the physical form of demonstrations.

The *Sejarah*’s description of the formulation of the Tritura also transforms students into passive instruments of the *rakyat*’s demands. In the *Sejarah*’s account, students are merely the channels through which the demands of the people are communicated:

> The feeling of dissatisfaction moved the conscience of the *pemuda*, and the Three Demands of the People’s Conscience, better known as the *Tritura* (*Tri Tuntutan Rakyat*) was ignited. On 12 [sic] January 1966, initiated by KAMI and KAPPI, the

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[50] *Ketidakpuasan masyarakat luas yang menumpuk itu akhirnya meledak dalam bentuk demonstrasi-demonstrasi yang dilakukan oleh mahasiswa dan pelajar. Dengan dipelopori KAMI dimulailah aksi-aksi demonstrasi mahasiswa Universitas Indonesia dengan jaket kuningnya pada tanggal 10 Januari 1966 …* (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 406).

> action fronts united in the Pancasila Front approached the People's Representative Council of Mutual Cooperation to put forward three demands (*Tritura*) namely: the dissolution of the PKI; the cleansing of the cabinet of elements of the Thirtieth of September Movement/PKI; and the lowering of prices/improvement of the economy (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 404).[51]

The students' actions are here represented as a response to an uncontrolled emotion: the hardship faced by the people in the face of price rises moves the conscience (*menggugah hati nurani*) of the youth, and leads to the announcement of the Tritura. Similarly, the use of the *ter-* form of the verb in *tercetuslah* (was ignited) suggests that the formulation of the Tritura was a sudden and spontaneous process, rather than an intentional process directed by the students. The impression this gives is that the Tritura was not conceived by the students but instead simply 'came into existence'. The students are also described as 'putting forward' (*mengajukan*) the three demands to the parliament. In this view, students are merely the medium through which the people's demands are conducted.

The symbol Tritura also abstracts students' role in events. In the *Sejarah*'s account, the Tritura as a symbol occupies a central place, in phrases such as *pihak yang tidak senang terhadap Tritura* (those who disliked the Tritura), *perjuangan Tritura* (Tritura struggle), *aksi-aksi Tritura* (Tritura actions), *tuntutan Tritura* (Tritura demands), *demonstrasi Tritura* (Tritura demonstrations), and *salah satu di antara Tritura telah dilaksanakan* (one of the Tritura had been carried out). Ben Anderson has pointed to the tendency of the language of Indonesian politics to bury 'words of great symbolic power … within hermetic acronyms'. These acronyms, he argues, are not functional in the sense of being convenient abbreviations for specific policies and concrete institutions but rather represent 'synthetic syntheses of ideas that refer to no concrete reality but that by verbal manipulation acquire a life of their own' (Anderson 1990b, 147). For the students of 1966 the acronym Tritura represented 'a theme for the struggle which was easily and quickly understood by the public' (Martha, Wibisono and Anwar 1984, 315-6). Its use by the New Order, however, effectively embedded the politically potent words *tuntutan* (demands) and *rakyat* (people) within an abstract concept. Moreover, far from representing the easily comprehended concept which the students intended, during the New Order the Tritura became a concept which required deep reflection in order for its true meaning to be revealed. In his address on the occasion of the nineteenth anniversary of the Tritura in 1985, for example, Suharto stated:

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[51] *Perasaan tidak puas menggugah hati nurani para pemuda, dan tercetuslah Tri Tuntutan Hati Nurani Rakyat yang lebih dikenal dengan sebutan Tritura (Tri Tuntutan Rakyat). Pada tanggal 12 Januari 1966 dipelopori oleh KAMI dan KAPPI* [*Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia*], *kesatuan-kesatuan aksi yang tergabung dalam Front Pancasila mendatangi DPR-GR* [*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong*] *mengajukan tiga buah tuntutan (Tritura) yakni: pembubaran PKI; pembersihan kabinet dari unsur-unsur G-30-S/PKI; penurunan harga/perbaikan ekonomi* (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 404). KAPPI was the Indonesian Youth and Student Action Front.

> If we reflect on it deeply, the Tritura has a deeper and more fundamental significance than that which was formulated. The dissolution of the PKI embodied a will to defend, uphold and implement the Pancasila… The cleansing of the Cabinet from PKI elements manifested a determination to build a clean and authoritative government… The lowering of prices/improvement of the economy embraced a resolution to rectify the uncontrollable economic decline at the time, since it was only by putting the economy back on its feet that the development which provided progress and prosperity to the entire Indonesian people … could be achieved (Suharto 1985, 18).[52]

In this view, the Tritura was a *concept* to be meditated upon, recalled and celebrated on key historical occasions. It was the Tritura as a symbol, and not the students, which occupied the central place in Indonesia's history. This focus distances responsibility for action from the students themselves.

In the *Sejarah*'s version of events, then, students do not play an *active* role in representing the *rakyat*'s interests. Instead their demonstrations are the spontaneous expression of the *rakyat*'s dissatisfaction, and the students merely the medium through which the people's demands are channelled. This representation aimed to 'discourage' the *Sejarah*'s contemporary student audience from seeing their role as leaders of the *rakyat* or as playing an active role in speaking on behalf of the *rakyat*'s interests. In the New Order view, it was not students who were to represent the interests of the *rakyat* but rather the state itself. The concept of the family-state to which the regime subscribed held that the state was the ultimate embodiment of the aspirations and interests of the *rakyat*. The state and the people were united within the state-family and the people's aspirations were represented in the political system through the practice of functional representation within the legislative bodies. Moreover, since the New Order state had not yet come into existence at the time of the 1966 demonstrations, the Tritura both highlights the failures of the previous regime and provides a justification for the transfer of power to Suharto.

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[52] *Jika kita renungkan secara dalam, maka Tritura itu mempunyai arti yang lebih dalam dan lebih mendasar dari apa yang dirumuskan. Pembubaran PKI mengandung tekad untuk membela, menegakkan dan melaksanakan Pancasila … Pembersihan Kabinet dari unsur PKI mengandung tekad untuk membangun pemerintahan yang bersih dan berwibawa … Penurunan harga/perbaikan ekonomi mengandung tekad untuk membenahi segala kemerosotan ekonomi yang merajalela waktu itu, sebab hanya dengan pembenahan ekonomilah akan dapat dilaksanakan pembangunan yang memberikan kemajuan dan kesejahteraan kepada seluruh rakyat Indonesia* (Suharto 1985, 18).

Students, politics and the state

The 1966 student demonstrations demanding the dissolution of the PKI, and the restructuring of the cabinet were clearly political in nature. Yet from almost immediately after the issuing of the Supersemar, the New Order was concerned to reorient students' roles and identities away from politics and back to the campus. It was this concern which motivated the introduction of a number of policies throughout the 1970s, including the campus normalisation policy of 1978. In this context, the political nature of the student demonstrations of 1966 set an undesirable precedent for the *Sejarah*'s contemporary student audience about their role in national politics and the relationship between the *bapak* of the state-family and his citizen-children.

In the *Sejarah*, this problem is in part resolved by representing the student demonstrations as a legitimate response to the political and economic failures of Sukarno and his government. In the *Sejarah*'s version of events, the student demonstrations are the physical manifestation of the *rakyat*'s frustration at the president's failure to provide a political solution to the crisis. Sukarno and his government are represented as having deviated from the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 404). The president is also represented as failing to fulfil his promise to provide a political solution to the crisis. The political role of the students in their demonstrations against the president and his cabinet are legitimate because Sukarno represented in the *Sejarah* as no longer representing the aspirations of the people, as having deviated from the Pancasila, and as siding with the communist party. These failures also justify the students' undermining of the normal hierarchical power relationship between students and the head of state and others in positions of authority.

Yet students are also represented as politically inexperienced and hence more easily exploited by those with vested political interests. As noted above, the *Sejarah*'s version of events contrasts ABRI's political astuteness and the political inexperience of other groups, including the students. In the face of mounting political pressure, on 16 January

1966 Sukarno called for the formation of a Sukarno Front (Barisan Sukarno) as a means of shoring up what little public support he had left. The *Sejarah* notes that the president's command was supported by the *rakyat*, and 'even by no less than' (*bahkan tidak kurang*) Universitas Indonesia's student council, which was 'the backbone of KAMI' (Poesponegoro and Notosusanto 1990, 6: 407-8). ABRI, however, notes the *Sejarah*, 'as a group which was 'experienced' (*matang*) in facing political intrigues' (of which, it is implied, the call for the formation of a Sukarno Front was an example) declared that the formation of the Sukarno Front was not necessary since the *rakyat*, including ABRI, already represented a Sukarno Front. The designation of ABRI's response to Sukarno's call as that of a politically 'experienced' group suggests that by initially supporting the formation of the Sukarno Front, students (and the *rakyat*) are still 'inexperienced' in matters of politics, especially in recognising the signs of 'political intrigue'. This inexperience means that students may be more easily deceived by those with vested political interests (in this case, Sukarno) and as such more open to being exploited (*ditunggangi*). The accusation that students are susceptible to exploitation delegitimises their criticisms of the state. As Naipospos argues, following the 1974 demonstrations:

> [t]he term *ditunggangi* became the government's official designation for subsequent student movements. The government's use of the term gave the impression of sympathy and openness to students' criticisms. But on the other hand, if there were demonstrations with which the government disagreed, they were immediately stamped as being *ditunggangi* (1996, 26).[53]

By describing students' actions as those of a politically inexperienced group, the *Sejarah* implies that were it not for the political maturity of ABRI, students might have been deceived by the political intrigues of Sukarno. This is consistent with the broad emphasis in New Order policy on students from the 1970s on the need to 'improve and develop' (*membina*) the young generation and to educate them in key national values and ideologies so that they develop 'political maturity'.

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[53] *Istilah 'ditunggangi' kemudian menjadi istilah resmi pemerintah bagi gerakan mahasiswa berikutnya. Dengan istilah itu pemerintah seolah-olah menunjukkan kesan simpati dan terbuka terhadap kritik mahasiswa. Tapi di pihak lain, bila ada aksi yang tidak berkenan di mata pemerintah dengan segera dicap ditunggangi* (Naipospos 1996, 26).

Conclusion

The *Sejarah*'s version of these key moments in Indonesia's modern history portrays youth and students as a group concerned for the interests of the *rakyat* as a whole and as the pioneers of the idea of the nation and national unity. Students are also represented as recognising and respecting the authority of their leaders and, even if there were occasional differences of opinion between the old and the young generation, these were resolved through culturally appropriate means of deliberation and consensus. Students' historical role in politics was, on occasion, as radical defenders of the nation and of Indonesia's independence. In keeping with the New Order's concern to limit contemporary students' involvement in politics to 'analysis', however, this role was largely represented as a symbolic one and students' active role in political events backgrounded.

Throughout the *Sejarah*'s account, the role of youth and students is framed in terms of the organicist values of the New Order state, which emphasised family values, including respect for elders, placing the interests of the collective over those of the individual, and order, harmony and stability, achieved through the consensus produced by deliberative decision-making. In this sense, the *Sejarah*'s representation of the historical roles of Indonesia's youth and students was an integral part of the state's program of ideological indoctrination, which aimed to education and socialise Indonesian citizens, including the young generation, into the key values and ideologies of the regime. More specifically, the *Sejarah*'s account of these moments was an attempt to delimit what it was possible to say about the historical roles of Indonesia's youth and students in the context of the state's efforts to depoliticise students' roles and identities. This strategy of government aimed to modify the ways in which contemporary youth and students were able to act in their identities as students. It also aimed to provide the conditions within which contemporary students could police their own behaviour. The success of these efforts is the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

Between silence and subversion: the student press, 1976-1980

dissent *v. & n.* • *v.intr.* (often followed by *from*) **1** think differently, disagree; express disagreement … • *n.* a difference of opinion (Moore 1997, 381).

The previous chapter argued that the New Order's official history text, the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, provided a series of lessons for the students of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s about the roles and identities they were expected to fulfil in New Order state.[1] These lessons were constructed within an organicist framework of harmony, consensus, and national interest above individual interest. The aim of these lessons was to provide a set of parameters within which the contemporary young generation could think about their roles and identities. In doing so, they also aimed to limit the practical ways in which students could act in their capacity as *mahasiswa*.

This chapter explores the ways in which students who wrote in the student press in two of the nation's most prestigious universities responded to these parameters. These responses were formulated in the context of the increasing restrictions on political life and freedom of expression put in place after the Malari riots in January 1974 and the introduction of the campus normalisation policies in 1978. The analysis focuses on two student publications from the period between 1974 and 1980: *Salemba*, the student newspaper of Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta and *Gelora Mahasiswa* published at Universitas Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta. These two newspapers, together with *Kampus*, Institut Teknologi Bandung's student newspaper, had the largest circulation of the student publications of the period, and were arguably the most influential both within and outside their home campuses.

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[1] The first edition of the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* was published in 1975.

The chapter traces the processes by which students who wrote for these newspapers developed an alternative 'discourse of dissent' regarding their roles and identities through the meanings they gave to a set of six interlinked keywords. It also explores the ways in which these students sought to socialise their fellow students into these identities. It suggests that the New Order's celebration of the pioneering role of youth and students in Indonesia's nationalist history, together with students' membership of the by then largely defunct coalition that had helped to install the New Order, provided them with some degree of 'space' in which to challenge some aspects of the state discourse in defining their roles and identities. More important than this however, was students' ability to promote their role as a force for 'social control' and 'correction' of the New Order state and its practices, as a moral rather than a purely political force, as leaders of the common people (*rakyat*) and as intellectuals without presenting a fundamental challenge to the state or its discourse. This strategy was a response to the very real threat of repression that students faced as the state tightened its grip on political life over the course of the decade. And while it entailed concessions to the state discourse on the part of students, it also enabled them to continue to play the role of government critic, at least in the short term.

The chapter begins by introducing in detail the two newspapers examined in this chapter. It then examines the keywords which students used in defining their roles and identities in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* between 1976 and 1980. These keywords include *kontrol sosial* (social control), *politik* (politics), *kekuatan moral* (moral force), *rakyat* (the common people), *intelektaul* (intellectual) and *mahasiswa*. It argues that through the meanings they gave to these keywords, students developed a discourse of dissent which enabled them to continue their role in national politics without presenting a threat to the state. The chapter then examines some of the linguistic strategies that the student publications used to attempt to socialise student readers of the newspapers into the student identities constructed through the keywords.

Student newspapers of the 1970s

During the 1950s, most of the then small number of university campuses had a student press. These campus publications existed alongside publications associated with all the major mass student organisations (Siregar 1983, 37-41). The student press of the early to mid 1950s enjoyed considerable freedom (Supriyanto 1998, 70) and this period also saw the establishment of the first student press and student journalists' associations.[2] Under Guided Democracy, however, this freedom was curtailed by the strict controls put in place on the press, including the student press.

The events of 30 September 1965 led to the closure of around thirty national level publications considered sympathetic to the PKI and the Guided Democracy regime. These bannings created space for what Raillon refers to as the 'Angkatan 66' (Generation of 66) press to emerge (Raillon 1985, 20). During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the student press was actively engaged in the debates surrounding the formation and consolidation of the 'new order' (Raillon 1985; see also Supriyanto 1998, 71). In June 1966 *Harian Kami* was established, followed by the West Java edition of *Mahasiswa Indonesia* in July 1966 (Raillon 1985, 21-2). These two publications were published by independent bodies affiliated with the Indonesian Student Press Association (Ikatan Pers Mahasiswa Indonesia, IPMI) and were based outside the campuses (Siregar 1983, 47 and 61).[3] Campus-based publications also re-emerged at this time including *Campus* (later renamed *Kampus*), published by Institut Teknologi Bandung's student council from February 1968, and *Muhibbah* published by Universitas Islam Indonesia in Yogyakarta from March 1967 and later continued as *Himmah*.

After 1971 however, the student press experienced a decline. From this time, publications such as *Harian Kami* were forced to reclassify themselves as 'general press' (*pers umum*) and compete with commercial publications (Supriyanto 1998, 75-6; Siregar 1983, 53). In addition, the increasingly critical stance of many publications towards the New Order government after 1971 meant that they occupied a precarious position (Raillon 1985, 90; Supriyanto 1998, 71). In the period immediately following the Malari riots, the government closed a number of newspapers and magazines, including *Harian Kami* and *Mahasiswa Indonesia* (Raillon 1985, 113; Siregar 1983, 54; Supriyanto 1998, 72).[4] In November 1975 the Minister of Information Mashuri released a new set of regulations on 'special publications' (*penerbitan khusus*). The new regulations deemed that publications such as those published by the student councils were for limited consumption and could not publish material which dealt with 'practical politics'. All special publications had to obtain a Certificate of Registration (*Surat Tanda Terdaftar*, STT) from the Minister of Information (Siregar 1983, 100 and 136-41). As a result of these regulations, the student press languished and it was not until the mid 1970s that new publications began to emerge.

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[2] The Indonesian Student Journalists Association (Ikatan Wartawan Mahasiswa Indonesia, IWMI) and the Indonesian Student Press Union (Serikat Pers Mahasiswa Indonesia, SPMI) were established in August 1955. In 1958 IWMI and SPMI were fused into the Indonesian Student Press Association (Ikatan Pers Mahasiswa Indonesia, IPMI) (Siregar 1983, 41-2 and 44).

[3] At its peak in 1966-67 the circulation of *Harian KAMI* was 70 000 copies, the largest of any newspaper in Indonesia at the time (Siregar 1983, 101). In addition to its Jakarta based daily, *Harian Kami* was also associated with a number of weekly publications based in other regions, including the Makassar-based *Mingguan Kami* established at the end of 1966, and two other papers of the same name set up in 1968 and based in Pontianak, West Kalimantan and Surabaya, Central Java. *Mimbar Demokrasi*, established in September 1966, was based in Bandung, Malang's *Gelora Mahasiswa Indonesia* began publication in 1967 and *Mimbar Mahasiswa* based in Banjarmasin, was published from 1968 (Siregar 1983, 47).

The student publications of the mid to late 1970s were campus-based publications, usually managed under the auspices of the student councils. Among the largest and most significant publications of the period were *Gelora Mahasiswa*, published at Universitas Gadjah Mada, *Salemba* (Universitas Indonesia), and *Kampus* (Institut Teknologi Bandung).[5] At their peak in 1978, *Salemba* and *Kampus* had a circulation of 30 000 while *Gelora Mahasiswa*'s circulation remained consistent at 16 000 (Siregar 1983, 101).[6] *Salemba*, *Kampus* and, after 1978, *Gelora Mahasiswa* were also circulated outside of their home campuses, giving them a wider significance in the Indonesian student community (Siregar 1983, 101).[7] Unlike other student publications, these three newspapers were published on a regular basis, primarily due to the subsidies they received from their home universities.

The first issue of *Gelora Mahasiswa* (Students' Passion) went to print in May 1974. It was published monthly in tabloid form by the publications unit of Universitas Gadjah Mada's student council and usually ran to between 10 and 12 pages.[8] A message in *Gelora Mahasiswa*'s inaugural edition expressed the hope that the newspaper would 'encourage students as members of the campus community to hold in high esteem the name of the alma mater and to cultivate the unity, oneness and family atmosphere (*kekeluargaan*) of the campus' (*Gelora Mahasiswa* May 1974). The newspaper was also to function as a 'media for the presentation of academic writing by students and other members of the university community as well as for the expression of opinion' (*Gelora Mahasiswa* May 1974).[9]

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[4] These included *Mahasiswa Indonesia* and *Nusantara* (15 January), *Harian Kami*, *Indonesia Raya*, *Abadi* and the *Jakarta Times* (21 January), and *Pedoman* and *Ekspres* (23 January) (Raillon 1985, 113).

[5] Other publications of this period include *Mimbar* (Universitas Brawidjaya, Malang), *Derap Mahasiswa* (IKIP Negeri Yogyakarta) and *Identitas* (Universitas Hasannudin, Makassar) (Dhakidae 1977, 63).

[6] The actual readership would have been larger than these figures indicate since newspapers and magazines were often passed on to others to read (Dari Kampus 1979, 33; see also Supriyanto 1998, 114).

[7] See *Dari Kampus* (1979, 35) for *Salemba*'s circulation within and outside Jakarta.

[8] Once *Gelora Mahasiswa* resumed publication after its banning in 1978, it appeared twice a month.

Salemba's first edition was published two years later, on 14 January 1976. According to the inaugural editorial, the name *Salemba* was chosen:

> …based on romanticism, that the role of the UI [Universitas Indonesia] campus which was originally located in Salemba had made an important contribution to the struggle of the Indonesian nation. It was felt that the romanticism of this historical struggle needed to be eternalised (*Salemba* 14 January 1976, cited in Dhakidae 1977, 63 and *Dari Kampus* 1979, 43).[10]

The 8-page tabloid, which was published fortnightly, aimed, according to a booklet commemorating its three year anniversary, to facilitate communication between members of the academic community and to accommodate the opinions and ideas of students and the broader campus community (*Dari kampus* 1979, 23-24).[11] As a media of 'people of analysis', *Salemba* aimed to provide 'objective information' in order to 'support the analytical abilities of the campus community'. It was also intended to accommodate students' interest in the field of journalism, to develop their ability to express their ideas in a systematic and analytical way and to offer students a place to practice organisational and leadership skills (*Dari kampus* 1979, 23-24).

The bulk of both newspapers consisted of news items and feature articles which covered a broad range of topics including politics, the economy and development, society, culture and the arts as well as issues affecting the university and the higher education sector in general. The main news items were often based on interviews with student leaders or key public figures. Opinion pieces were generally contributed by students associated with the newspaper or the university although student journalists occasionally wrote for publications other than that of their home campus.

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[9] *Gelora Mahasiswa* featured a number of regular sections including an editorial, cartoons, a *pojok* (corner column) entitled *Interupsi!!*, *Etalase* ('Shop Window'), as well as readers' letters, an information column for students, and readers' poems. For an explanation of *pojok* see the section 'Irony and identity' below.

[10] *…berdasarkan romantisme, bahwa peranan kampus UI yang pada awalnya terletak di Salemba telah memberikan catatan-catatan penting bagi perjuangan bangsa Indonesia. Romantisme juang yang historis itu rasanya perlu diabadikan* (*Salemba* 14 January 1976, cited in Dhakidae 1977, 63 and *Dari kampus* 1979, 43).

[11] In addition to its main news items and feature articles, *Salemba* regularly featured a number of other sections. These included *Apokromat*, a profile of public personalities, editorials (*Induk Karangan* and *Surat dari Salemba 4*), a *pojok* (corner-column) entitled *Senggol* (Nudge or Bump), cartoons, and readers' letters.

In the lead-up to the 1977 elections, reporting and opinion in the student press became increasingly political. Universitas Indonesia sociology student and a contributor to *Salemba* Tonny Ardie's content analysis of *Salemba* during 1976 found that just under one quarter of articles, editorials, and other features dealt with political issues (*Dari kampus* 1979, 37-42). During the second half of 1977, however, this figure had increased to just over 40 per cent. For *Gelora Mahasiswa* the figure was around 25 per cent (Siregar 1983, 71).[12] The increasingly political orientation of the student press at this time reflected the fact that the student councils responsible for organising the protests also managed many of the campus publications (Supriyanto 1998, 78).[13]

In the month leading up to the 1978 MPR Session a number of student newspapers were closed (Supriyanto 1998, 74).[14] Following the Kopkamtib freeze on all student council activities in January 1978, *Salemba*'s publication license was revoked in February 1978 and *Gelora Mahasiswa* was closed by Universitas Gadjah Mada Rector Sukadji Ranuwihardjo soon after (*Salemba* 20 October 1979). In June 1978, however, with Suharto's presidency ratified for a third term, *Salemba*'s publishing license was reinstated and in September *Gelora Mahasiswa* was again permitted to publish. Under the NKK/BKK policy, responsibility for student and campus publications was shifted from the disbanded student councils to the new 'campus coordination bodies'. During the transition to the new structure, however, the student presses at Universitas Indonesia, Universitas Gadjah Mada and Institut Teknologi Bandung were able to retain a degree of independence because of the support of the university rectors (Supriyanto 1998, 77-8; *Salemba* 20 October 1979).

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[12] Daniel Dhakidae (1977, 65) also conducted a content analysis of *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*. Although the three analyses vary, they nevertheless indicate an increase in reporting on political issues during 1977.

[13] The political orientation of the student press at this time led Dhakidae to conclude that, '…student publications are journals of opinion, and not news bulletins (*koran berita*). What they show is [students'] ideological perspective [and] their political outlook' (1977, 68). Dhakidae also writes that 'Within university campuses there has developed what is called adversary journalism … The campus press is a guard dog who observes political events and then brings them to [the attention of] wider society, highlighting the adversarial and oppositional aspects' (Dhakidae 1977, 67).

[14] A number of other newspapers and weeklies including *Kompas*, *Sinar Harapan*, *Merdeka*, *Indonesia Times*, *Sinar Pagi*, *Pelita* and *Tempo* were also closed at this time (Supriyanto 1998, 78).

This situation did not last long. In September 1979, only a year after it had been allowed to republish, *Gelora Mahasiswa* was again closed. According to Universitas Gadjah Mada's rector Sukadji Ranuwihardjo, despite warnings, the newspaper had continued to 'confuse (*mengacaukan*) editorial opinion with facts' (*Salemba* 20 October 1979).[15] On other campuses, the student newspapers' reporting of the trials of the student activists arrested in 1977 and 1978 together with their criticism of the NKK/BKK policy and of the Minister of Education and Culture himself, led the Department of Information to revoke their publishing licenses. *Kampus* was prohibited from publishing in April 1980 and *Salemba* in May 1980 (Supriyanto 1998, 79).[16]

Negotiating identity, negotiating power

As noted in chapter one, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the coalition of students, intellectuals, journalists and other professionals which had been the New Order's key support base in its early years began to break down. Beginning in 1968, there was an increased mood of disaffection among these groups with official corruption, manipulation of the elections and excessive and misdirected state spending. Nevertheless, despite low-level repression, students continued to enjoy considerable freedom in expressing their criticisms largely because of their membership of this coalition (Aspinall 1996, 221; see also chapter one). Thus, as Southwood and Flanagan (1983) note, the student activists of the early 1970s played the role of 'critical collaborators', remaining committed to the original ideals and aims of the New Order but adopting an increasingly critical stance regarding their implementation. This was a characteristic of what Aspinall and Bourchier have identified as a blurring of the boundaries between state and civil society during this period (Aspinall 1996, 223; Bourchier 1996, 184).

The Malari riots of January 1974 marked a turning point in the relationship between students and the New Order state. What began as a peaceful student protest against

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[15] The 'facts' at issue were the publication of a cartoon on the front page of the 7 September 1979 edition of *Gelora Mahasiswa* which criticised the rector for his inconsistent approach to students' activities. The rector also objected to an article published in the 21 September 1979 edition which quoted him as saying that students need not concern themselves too much with the formal aspects of the BKK policy (*Salemba* 20 October 1979).

[16] *Alma Mater* (Institut Pertanian Bogor), *Airlangga* (Universitas Airlangga), *Derap Mahasiswa* (IKIP Yogyakarta) and *Mahasiswa Bicara* (ISTN Jakarta), among others, were also closed (Supriyanto 1998, 79).

Japanese investment, ended in several days of mass rioting (see Crouch 1974; Gunawan 1975; *Peristiwa* 1974; Bourchier 1996, 217-8). In the aftermath of the event, avenues for tolerated dissent began to narrow sharply. As the most visible actors in the drama, students were a central target of these measures. Soon after the riots, the Minister of Education and Culture Sjarif Thajeb issued a ministerial decision detailing regulations for the 'improvement' (*pembinaan*) of university campuses (Surat Keputusan No. 028/U/1974), popularly known as SK028. The regulations prohibited students from undertaking any political actions which would 'lead to the disturbance of peace and order' and introduced the requirement that all student activities obtain the permission of the university's rector (Thajeb 1974, 7; see also Bourchier 1996, 218; Thomas 1981, 388).

If the period before 1978 had been characterised by the introduction of practical measures aimed at defining the limits within which students could act, then the period after 1978 was characterised by a focus on ideological issues. This was both a response to increased student activity in 1977-1978 and an integral part of the New Order's nationwide program of ideological indoctrination which began with the launching of the P4 program in 1978 (see Wandelt 1994; Bourchier 1996, chapter 8; Thomas 1981, 391-2). In the lead-up to the General Election (Pemilihan Umum, Pemilu) in May 1977 and the General Session of the MPR in March 1978, students staged mass demonstrations protesting against corruption, social inequality and, most importantly, against Suharto (van Dijk 1978a, 1978b, 123-7 and 130-4; Bourchier 1996, 224; Aspinall 1993, 5). It was in response to this that the new Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf introduced his NKK/BKK policies (see chapter two). These policies aimed to thoroughly depoliticise students and limit the organisational influence of the previously powerful student councils.

The consequence of these measures was a shift in the power relationship between the state and wider society, including students. This shift resulted in a contraction of the limits within which students were able to act in their capacity as *mahasiswa* and a narrowing of the parameters within which they could speak and think about their roles and identities. Thus, while students continued to represent their role as a dissident one, they increasingly had to contend with intimidation, the threat of arrest, and the all-pervasive presence of a security apparatus with the capacity to conduct surveillance of suspected dissenters. Students who wrote in the student press of the mid to late 1970s negotiated the consequences of this shift in power relations by developing a new awareness of the boundaries for tolerated political expression.[17] This process of negotiation, together with the broader social, political and economic changes taking place at that time, shaped the ways in which students articulated their roles and identities.

The previous chapter suggested that the aim of the New Order state's restrictions on political expression, its depoliticisation policy and its program of ideological indoctrination (of which the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* was a part) was to ensure students' conformity to the organicist values of order, stability, harmony and consensus (see also Philpott 2000, 151; Langston 2001, 26). This process of 'government' (in the Foucauldian sense) aimed to regulate students' behaviour and at the same time create the conditions under which students could modify their own behaviour (Hindess 1996, 105-6 and 109). The threat of repression which students faced in the more restrictive political climate of the mid to late 1970s provided just such conditions by compelling students to police themselves as they defined their roles and identities.

Yet students were far from powerless. Foucault emphasises that power, of which government is one form, is exercised over free individuals (Hindess 1996, 100-101). As a result, students themselves remained capable of exercising power in their own right. One way in which students who wrote in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* exercised their power was by challenging the state's definitions of their roles and identities through the meanings they gave to the keywords *kontrol sosial*, *politik*, *rakyat* and *intelektual*. However, the student publications also exercised power over other students, by attempting to socialise them into the identities constructed through the keywords and so to regulate the ways in which their student readers could think, speak and act in their capacity as students. This was in part an attempt to counter the widespread apathy of students which was the result of the 'success' of the state's repressive measures. Yet the efforts of the students associated with *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* to socialise their fellow students into their *mahasiswa* identities were also the result of a genuine conviction that students had an important role to play in the nation. In this sense, their idealism was not mere rhetoric.

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[17] Aspinall notes of opposition groups during the late New Order period that: 'Most activists have a more or less instinctive feel for the boundaries of tolerated political action beyond which their activities will attract repression. Numerous factors have a bearing , including the degree to which the oppositional activities involved are mass-based (especially if those mobilising are from the lower classes), the extent of explicit ideological challenge to Pancasila orthodoxy involved, the level of direct confrontation, and the particular issues raised' (Aspinall 1996, 233).

The keywords of the student press of the mid to late 1970s articulate those areas of meaning which are of primary significance to students' discourse on their roles and identities. These keywords and the lexical sets they enter into provide 'a map of the objects, concepts, processes and relationships' (Fowler 1991, 80) which students employ in speaking and thinking about their roles and identities. Since keywords and their meanings are often a focus of conflict, they provide an insight into the ways in which students who wrote in the student press negotiated the new relations of power within which they found themselves in the 1970s.

Perhaps the most important of these keywords was *kontrol sosial* (social control). Through the meanings they gave to this keyword, students negotiated their relationship to the state in the context of the shift in power relations taking place during the 1970s. The keywords *politik* (politics) and *kekuatan moral* (moral force) expressed students' ideas about their role in politics. These two keywords reflect the essential tension within student discourse between students' conviction that their role was a political one and the need to avoid adopting a position which threatened the state and hence would invite repression. *Rakyat* (the people) articulates students' perceptions of their role as the spokespersons and leaders of wider Indonesian society while the keyword *intelektual* (intellectual) represents one of the principal means by which students justified their role in national political life. In addition, the meanings given to the terms *pemuda* and *mahasiswa* linked contemporary students to the celebrated youth and students of the past, providing students with a key source of authority for their 'discourse of dissent'. Finally, students' use of satire and irony in cartoons and *pojok* (corner-columns), the patterns of language use they employed and the social relationships they cultivated with their readers were some of the principal means by which the student publications attempted to socialise their readers into the student identities constructed through the keywords.

Kontrol sosial, social control

In the student press of the mid to late 1970s the keyword *kontrol sosial* (social control) together with the related terms *koreksi* (correction) and *kritik* (criticism) were integral to the way in which students defined their roles and identities.[18] The status of these terms as keywords is demonstrated by their prominent position in numerous editorials and articles and by their use in framing much of the discussion of students' roles and identities. For example, in a 1976 article in *Salemba* on the topic of the need for criticism to be scientific (*ilmiah*) in character, the term *kontrol sosial* appears nine times and *kritik* four times (*Salemba* 16 June 1976). The issue of students' social control was also the topic of an editorial in *Gelora Mahasiswa* the following month (*Gelora Mahasiswa* July 1976), which included eleven mentions of the term *kontrol* and two mentions of *koreksi*. Students' role as a force for social control was also the subject of a long article in the 18 July 1979 edition of *Salemba*. In addition, an editorial in the 15 December 1976 edition of *Salemba* on the topic of students' role in practical politics includes four mentions of the term *kritik*.

The term *koreksi* was neither new nor unique to student discourse, although its addition to the Indonesian political vocabulary was relatively recent. It appears to have emerged in the context of Sukarno's calls during the Guided Democracy period for a return to the 'rails of the revolution'. In a 1960 speech at the opening of the All Indonesia Youth Congress in Bandung on 15 February 1960, for example, Sukarno urged his audience to participate in the efforts to 'correct the deviations' (*mengoreksi penyelewengan-penyelewengan*) from the revolution (Sukarno 1987b, 153). The role which youth were to play in this process is further demonstrated by the resolution made at this congress 'that Indonesian youth support the efforts to realise National Unity and correct (*mengoreksi*) the leaders of the revolution who do not implement the Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia' (cited in Biro Pemuda 1965, 293).[19]

In the aftermath of the attempted coup of 30 September 1965, *koreksi* became a key means by justifying the military's 'restoration of order' and a source of legitimacy for the new regime. In speeches given between 1967 and 1969, Suharto regularly described the events of 1966 in terms of a 'correction' (*koreksi*) of the deviations of the previous government (Matheson Hooker 1995, 277). This remained a consistent theme for much of the following decade. In his address at the opening of the national conference of the ’45 Generation on 25 June 1980, for example, Suharto asserted:

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[18] See the October 1977 edition of *Prisma*, which was devoted to the topic of 'Social Criticism: Threat or Necessity?' (Kritik sosial: Ancaman atau Kebutuhan?), for a non-student perspective on the role of critics in the state. The term *kontrol sosial* was occasionally expressed in English as 'social control' or with English word-order as *sosial kontrol*.

[19] The Political Manifesto referred to Sukarno's political program for Guided Democracy, outlined in 1959. The five main themes of this program were summarised in the acronym USDEK: *Undang-Undang Dasar 45* (1945 Constitution), *Sosialisme a la Indonesia* (Indonesian Socialism), *Demokrasi Terpimpin,* (Guided Democracy), *Ekonomi Terpimpin* (Guided Economy), *Kepribadian Indonesia* (Indonesian Personality).

> Is not the New Order the order which struggles for a system of society and the State which is truly based on the purity of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution; which strives to carry out a total correction (*koreksi total*) of all deviations which occurred in the previous period … (Suharto 1980c, 113-4)?[20]

Students in the late 1960s and early 1970s also used the term *koreksi* in reference to their own role. A 1970 article in the Bandung-based student newspaper *Mahasiswa Indonesia* justified students’ intervention in national politics in 1966 in terms of ‘correction’, arguing that their role in ‘political struggle’ (*perjuangan politik*) encompassed ‘opposing injustice and correcting (*mengoreksi*) leadership which was proven to have failed’ (*Mahasiswa Indonesia* November 1970, cited in Raillon 1985, 193-4).

The term *kontrol sosial* also has its origins in the final years of the Guided Democracy period. A history of the youth movement published in 1965, for example, describes the ‘revolutionary movement of youth’ as ‘a force for ‘social-support and social-control’ of the government’ (Biro Pemuda 1965, 235).[21] The same history also uses the term *kritik* in relation to students’ actions (ibid., 237). In this context, the role of youth as institutionalised and loyal critics of the Sukarno government is represented as a crucial element of their political role.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the idea that students represented a force for social control of the government became a central element in student discourse. Raillon, for example, suggests that for the students who wrote for *Mahasiswa Indonesia, kontrol sosial* entailed supporting ‘modernisation and the strengthening of the New Order’ and at the same time condemning the ‘old forces’ and when necessary taking a critical stance against the military and those who misused their positions in the new political structure (Raillon 1985, 62-3).

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[20] *Bukankah Orde Baru adalah orde yang memperjoangkan tatanan masyarakat dan Negara yang benar-benar didasarkan kepada kemurnian Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar ’45; yang bertekad untuk mengadakan koreksi total terhadap segala penyelewengan yang terjadi pada masa sebelumnya …* (Suharto 1980c, 113-4)?

[21] The terms ‘social support’ and ‘social control’ appear in English.

The use of the English term ‘social control’ and later the Indonesianised *kontrol sosial*, indicates that the term was most likely Western in origin. In sociological theory, ‘social control’ refers to the control which is exerted upon members of a society to ensure their conformity to established norms. It is exercised through systems such as the law (for crime), the medical profession (for mental illness), the church (for sin) or by social pressure (Waters and Crook 1993, 142; see also Marshall 1998, 610; Johnson 2000, 288). While unfashionable during the 1940s and 1950s, in the early 1960s there was renewed interest in the concept, particularly as an explanation for social deviance (Liska 1992, 1818). Yet in the context of discussions on the role of youth and students in Indonesia, social control refers not to control exercised over society but to political forms of control directed at government and originating from groups in society. It is in this ‘Indonesian’ sense that the term *kontrol sosial* was used in the student newspapers of the 1970s.[22]

For students who wrote in the student press during the 1970s, *kontrol sosial* and *koreksi* were essential means of providing checks and balances on the political process. An editorial in *Gelora Mahasiswa* of July 1976, for example, argued that since power was often misused, correction and control by society were always necessary (*Gelora Mahasiswa* July 1976). The object of students’ *kontrol sosial* was usually expressed as ‘the system’ (*sistem*), ‘power’ (*kekuasaan*) or, more directly, ‘the government’ (*pemerintah*). In *Salemba* of 18 July 1979, for example, Lukman Mannuntungi argued that the aim of students’ social control was not to bring about a fundamental transformation of the economic, social and political order, as was the aim of the 1928 and 1945 generations of students, but rather to ‘correct’ deviations from the basis of the current system, namely the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, in order to improve it (*Salemba* 18 July 1979, 5). The current political conditions were described using terms such as *ketidakberesan* (irregularities), *ketidakadilan* (injustice), *ketidakwajaran* (deviations), *ketimpangan* (imbalances) and *kepincangan* (defects). The fault for this, however, as Mannuntungi argued, lay not with the system itself but rather with ‘those who had caused the system to deviate’ (*orang-orang yang menyebabkan sistem itu menyimpang*). Students’ task was thus to correct (*mengoreksi*) the system, to return it to its proper state (*mewajarkan*) and to straighten out (*meluruskan*) its kinks.

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[22] A 1977 article by the Bappenas (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, National Development Planning Body) social scientist Astrid S. Susanto uses the term *kontrol sosial* in its sociological sense but links it to the concept of *kritik sosial* (social criticism).

In chapter one it was suggested that the relationship of a particular text to other texts in its intertextual ‘network’ provides an insight into relations of power between social actors. Students’ emphasis on their role as a force for *kontrol* and *koreksi* of the New Order state and its practices suggests that the state discourse, with its emphasis on ‘correcting’ the previous government’s deviations, set the parameters within which students in the mid to late 1970s were able to define their own roles and identities. As the state became increasingly intolerant of students’ criticisms, students had to seek ways of representing their dissent which were legitimate in the view of the state. *Koreksi* provided this framework by emphasising students’ loyalty to the New Order and to its professed commitment to correcting deviations from the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. However, in doing so, it limited the ways in which students were able to represent their role in national political life by defining criticism which was not undertaken in the spirit of *koreksi* as unacceptable. At the same time, it was because *koreksi* was a legitimate form of dissent that students were able to use it so effectively to critique the New Order. Students’ use of state texts in this way reveals the dynamic relationship of power between students and the state: while the state’s discourse of *koreksi* limited the ways in which students were able to think and speak about their roles (and, consequently, how they were able to act), it also provided students with an authoritative framework within which to express their criticisms of the New Order’s own ‘deviations’.

An example of how students used other aspects of the state discourse as a framework for their role as *kontrol* and *koreksi* of the state comes in the form of a cartoon which appeared in the March 1977 edition of *Gelora Mahasiswa* (Figure 4.1). The cartoon criticised the hypocrisy of Kopkamtib Chief of Staff Admiral Sudomo’s accusation that students had experienced ‘ideological erosion’ (*erosi ideologi*) and were no longer committed to the principles of the Pancasila. Pointing to those aspects of the New Order state and its practices which students saw as most in need of *koreksi* – the lack of justice for the *rakyat*, the suppression of free speech, and the gap between those who have reaped rich rewards from the New Order’s economic development and those who have not – the cartoon asks ‘Is this Pancasilaist?’ (‘*Pancasilais…?*’).


HIDUP LAH SE DER HANA..
PANCA-SILAIS ----?
HUKUM RIMBA
BEBAS NGØ-MØNG...
EROSI IDEOLOGI!!
TSCHOK® 77

Figure 4.1 Cartoon: Is this Pancasilaist?

Like *koreksi*, Pancasila both limited what students could say about their roles and identities and provided a means by which they could justify their role as a force for *kontrol sosial* and *koreksi* of the state. In 1966, the Pancasila was declared to be the ‘source of all sources of law’ (Bourchier 1996, 169). Over the course of the 1970s, the New Order formulated a single interpretation of the Pancasila, based on organicist principles of family (*kekeluargaan*), harmony and order (see Wandelt 1994; Bourchier 1996, 229-34). The Pancasila was promoted as the ideology which held the nation together and deviations from it were perceived as threatening to the nation’s stability and so to development. Throughout the New Order, critics were often discredited by claims that they lacked commitment to the Pancasila or were seeking to undermine its status as the state ideology. For students, then, framing their criticisms of the injustices suffered under the New Order in Pancasilaist terms was a political necessity. As the state increasingly restricted the use of political symbols and discourses other than that of the organicist and development-oriented Pancasila, using ‘familiar and accepted symbols … [became] perhaps the only possible ... [means to express] public criticism’ (Antlov 1996, 19). At the same time, the Pancasila also provided students with a means of criticising the state in its own terms. The New Order depicted itself as having safeguarded the Pancasila in 1965-1966 and as the embodiment of the pure and consistent implementation of the Pancasila, in the form of *demokrasi Pancasila* (Pancasila democracy) (Bourchier 1996, 228). Students' use of the Pancasila attacks these claims in terms which the state itself acknowledged as legitimate. In doing so, students 'turn … the powerful's own instruments against them…' (Antlov 1996, 19).

Although students acknowledged that social control could be carried out by anyone, 'from *jamu* [traditional medicine] sellers, *becak* [bicycle rickshaw] drivers, teachers, university students, soldiers to formal and informal community leaders', students believed that they were the group best placed to carry out social control. An editorial in the July 1976 edition of *Gelora Mahasiswa*, for example, argued that students' education, as well as their natural idealism and understanding of social issues placed them in a unique position to undertake social control and gave their social control more quality (*Gelora Mahasiswa* July 1976). Students also represented their role as a force for *kontrol sosial* in terms of *tanggung jawab* (responsibility) and *beban* (burden), arguing that as educated individuals, they had an obligation to contribute to the understanding of and provision of solutions for social problems. The belief that students were the primary agents of social control was reflected in the way they represented their role grammatically. In both *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*, *mahasiswa* (students) were represented as playing an active role in *melakukan* (carrying out), *menjalankan* (exercising), *mengadakan* (conducting) and *melaksanakan* (implementing) *kontrol sosial* (*Salemba* 16 June 1976; *Gelora Mahasiswa* July 1976).

There was also an important link between *kontrol sosial* and change. Since the aim of students' *kontrol sosial* was not to bring about a fundamental transformation of the economic, social and political order, but rather to correct the 'deviations' and 'defects' in the current system, the concept of change (*perubahan*) was often expressed in terms of 'improvement' (*perbaikan*). Students' own part in processes of social and political change was an active one, reflected in their designations as 'agents of change' (in English), *kader perubahan masyarakat* (cadres of social change) and *katalisator perubahan politik* (catalysts for political change).[23] Students' active role in *perubahan* was also reflected in the grammatically active role they play: throughout the texts it is students who '*melakukan*' (carry out) the activities which will lead to change and improvements to the system and who are responsible for 'creating' (*menciptakan*) a better future.

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[23] *Perubahan politik* in this context referred to the process of 'improving the political system to make it more democratic' and 'making political decisions in accordance with the aspirations of the people' (*Salemba* 5 March 1980, 4).

As noted above, the threat of repression that students faced in the mid to late 1970s limited the kinds of actions that they could undertake in their role as agents of social control. It also provided the parameters within which they were able to represent their social control role in their publications. As a result, the strategies students advocated for undertaking *kontrol sosial* were often verbal rather than physical. Thus, the term *kontrol sosial* was part of lexical set which also included terms such as *protes* (protests), used here in the sense of 'a statement of dissent or disapproval', *lobbying* (in English), *kelompok penekan* (pressure groups), *petisi* (petitions), *memorandum* (memoranda), *resolusi* (resolutions), *statement* (statements), *puisi* (poems), *diskusi* (discussions), *kritik* (criticism), *konsultasi dengan pemerintah* (consultation with the government), and *komunikasi massa* (mass communication) (see *Gelora Mahasiswa* July 1976; *Salemba* 16 June 1976; *Salemba* 15 December 1976).[24] These terms suggest that the aims of students' *kontrol sosial* were not to be achieved through physical confrontation with the state but rather by bringing the 'deviations' and 'defects' of the system to the attention of the state in a critical but non-hostile way.

In certain circumstances, however, more physical forms of *kontrol sosial* were deemed appropriate by students. In a 1976 article in *Salemba*, Universitas Indonesia student council chairperson Dipo Alam warned that tensions would arise if student delegations were always 'distrusted and obstructed' (*dicurigai dan dihalang-halangi*). Demonstrations, he argued, were both a reflection of *demokrasi* and an essential characteristic of it. Moreover, as the student demonstrations of 1966 had proven, if other channels for political expression were blocked, students would not hesitate to *berdemonstrasi* (demonstrate) or 'take to the streets' (*turun ke jalan*) (*Salemba* 16 June 1976, 1; see also *Salemba* 18 July 1979, 5).

The fact that many of the terms used in the student press to describe the methods for carrying out *kontrol sosial* are derived from English is not insignificant. Some of these terms have equivalent or near equivalent Indonesian terms. The term *pernyataan*, for example, incorporates the meanings of 'statement' and 'resolution' (in the sense of

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[24] *Komunikasi massa* referred to the publication of newspapers as well as pamphlets. Since the audience of these publications was primarily a student one, the term *massa* (mass) is somewhat misleading.

‘decree’ or ‘declaration’), *kecaman* is a near-synonym for criticism, and *diskusi* can also be rendered as *pembahasan* or *pembicaraan* in standard Indonesian. On the other hand, equivalent terms for *protes*, *lobbying*, and *petisi* are more difficult to find. The choice of these English-derived terms in the student press reflects students’ desire to distinguish their language (and hence themselves) as modern and educated, indicated by their access to Western concepts and to Western languages (English) (see also Errington 1986, 345-47). This is linked to the emphasis on students’ status as intellectuals and functions as a means of legitimising students’ methods of social control by presenting it as the response of educated, modern intellectuals (see below).

The use of Indonesianised English terms also allows students to tap into a discourse of protest which is already political in its original Western cultural setting. Taken together, the English terms ‘protest’, ‘lobbying’ ‘pressure group’, ‘petitions’, ‘resolution’ and statement’ form part of a discourse of protest and opposition and have explicitly *political* connotations. Their ‘translation’ (both linguistic and conceptual) into standard Indonesian, provides students with a new ‘political vocabulary’. This vocabulary replaces Indonesian terms and concepts which have less distinctly political connotations. For example, the term *pernyataan* (statement) can be used across a range of contexts, not all of which are political. In contrast, the terms *statement* and *resolusi* as they are used in the student press clearly refer to a political statement issued to those in authority by a dissenting group. The political connotations of these terms, which are a function of their membership of a discourse of protest and opposition in English, make them a logical choice for students wanting to emphasise their active role as *kontrol sosial*. Similarly, the terms *permintaan* and *permohonan*, which denote polite forms of requesting or appealing, have connotations of respect for authority that the term *petisi* does not. *Petisi* is also without the cultural connotations of terms such as *pepe*. *Pepe* describes the pre-colonial Javanese form of protest in which peasants took their complaints to the ruler (Aspinall 1993, 41; Shiraishi 1990, 17)[25] and as a result is closely associated with the Javanese tradition of passivity and respect for those in authority. The term *petisi*, however, is without these associations and thus available to students to be invested with a more active, and non-hierarchical set of meanings.

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[25] Aspinall (1993, 41) notes that student protesters in the late 1980s sometimes described themselves in these terms.

Protests, petitions, statements, resolutions, criticisms and discussions did not represent new forms of politics in Indonesia. Most recently, they had been used during the student actions of 1965-1966. Their appearance as part of a lexical set associated with the concept of social control in the student press of the 1970s was, however, crucial to the ways that students redefined their roles and identities in the atmosphere of increasing repression. In particular, by framing their role in terms which were acknowledged as legitimate by the state, students avoided presenting their criticisms in terms which might be perceived as threatening to the existing political order. At the same time, students invested the concept of *kontrol sosial* and *koreksi* with their own, more political meanings and so used the state's own discourse to critique it.

Practical politics

In the student press, the keyword *politik* (politics) articulates students' definitions of their role in national political life. The meanings given to this keyword reflect the ways in which students sought to justify their ongoing role in politics in the context of the New Order's progressive depoliticisation of society. In the state's view, students' role in politics was limited to a conceptual one. Students' response to this was to define their role in politics as one of the practical manifestations of their role as social control and a product of their sense of social responsibility. After the introduction of the NKK policies, however, students also began to emphasise their constitutional right to engage in politics.

The topic of politics, and in particular the idea that students had a role to play in practical politics, was a significant one in the student newspapers. Consistent with the content analyses cited above (*Dari kampus* 1979, 37-42; Siregar 1983, 71), *Salemba* offers a particularly rich source of articles and editorials dealing directly with students' role in politics, many of which are from the period leading up to the 1977 elections. The editorial in the 15 December 1976 edition of *Salemba*, for example, dealt explicitly with the issue of students' role in 'practical politics' (*politik praktis*). In the 15 February 1977 edition, this topic was again raised in an article on the 1977 elections and an editorial on the role of the student press in practical politics. *Gelora Mahasiswa*'s February 1977 edition also featured a number of articles on this topic. *Salemba*'s 20 March 1980 edition, published only two months before the newspaper was banned, featured both an article and an editorial on students' role in politics. These were very clearly a response to the introduction of the campus normalisation policy and Daud Yusuf's redefinition of politics as 'concept, policy and arena' (see below; see also chapter five) as well as to the arrest and trial of student activists in 1978-1979. As a result, the article and editorial argued strongly that students' role in politics was a constitutional right and part of a long historical tradition of activism stemming from students' sense of social responsibility.

The New Order policy of depoliticisation was a response to the conflict and disorder of the Guided Democracy period. In a series of speeches in 1967-1968 Suharto outlined his vision for the nation. The new political order would provide order, social harmony and economic reform. In such a society, there was no place for the political and ideological struggles and thoroughgoing politicisation of society which had been the hallmark of the last years of Guided Democracy (Elson 2001, 160-1). Over the course of the 1970s, the New Order introduced a number of measures designed to depoliticise Indonesian society. These included the progressive 'simplification' of the political parties over the course of the early 1970s, the introduction of the 'floating mass' policy, and the creation of corporatist bodies designed to incorporate all segments of society into the state (see Bourchier 1996, 199-214; Reeve 1985, 328-31 and 333)

This policy also impacted on students. Having served their purpose, the students who had rallied against the Old Order in 1965-1966 were urged to 'return to the school benches' (*kembali ke bangku sekolah*) and 'politically-motivated' demonstrations (student or otherwise) were banned in the capital (Elson 2001, 160-1). Young people were expected to join KNPI, the corporatist organisation created for youth in 1973, and to contribute their skills to state-run development programs (see chapter two).[26] Despite their short term acquiescence to this directive, as noted above, many of the students who wrote in the student newspapers of the late 1960s and early 1970s viewed 'political struggle' (*perjuangan politik*) as an essential part of their role.

After 1974, avenues for student involvement in politics became increasingly restricted. One of the more subtle means by which the state achieved this was by separating practical forms of politics from conceptual forms and limiting students' role to the latter (see also chapter five). Thus, while the SK028 policy introduced by Minister of

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[26] Bourchier notes that some youth organisations were able to remain independent of KNPI (1996, 214).

Education and Culture in 1974 prohibited students from engaging in 'political activities leading to the disturbance of peace and order' such as demonstrations, it did allow them to engage in discussions and seminars on political topics. These, the Minister pointed out, represented a means by which the opinions of the academic community could be channelled into solving the nation's problems (Thajeb 1974, 7). This separation between practical political activities and intellectual political activities was consolidated under Daud Yusuf's 1978 campus normalisation policy. In his explanations of the policy, Yusuf distinguished between politics as a concept, politics as policy and politics as an arena. As citizens of a democratic country, he argued students were permitted to engage in 'politics as policy' and 'politics as an arena', but only as 'youth' (*pemuda*) and only outside the campus. Students *as students* could only engage in conceptual politics (see chapter five). In doing so, both Thajeb and Yusuf appeared to be making concessions to students' desire (and indeed right) to be involved in political life and at the same time setting the conditions within which this political role could be carried out.

In *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* during 1975 and 1976 the limitations students faced in undertaking their social and political roles in the light of the SK028 policy was a key concern. While in the mass media government figures bemoaned students' lack of interest in social issues, arguing that they had become 'apathetic', in their own publications students countered that it was the Minster's decision that had caused the stagnation of student activity on campuses and the consequent apathy and loss of idealism of many in the student body. The dilemma students faced and their frustration at the measures taken by the government led Universitas Pajajaran student Didin S. Damanhuri to comment '…if we're silent, we're called apathetic, if we act, we're subversive' (*diam dibilang apatis, bergerak dianggap subversif*) (*Salemba* 15 December 1976, 4).

Students rejected, both implicitly and, after the introduction of the NKK/BKK policy, explicitly, the separation of political ideas and practical action, continuing to define their role in *politik* as encompassing both political thinking (*pikiran politik*) and political action (*tindakan politik*). However, students emphasised that their involvement in political life was not that of a political party or faction but rather was connected to their role as *kontrol sosial* and to the sense of moral and social responsibility which students felt as educated and socially aware individuals. A 1976 editorial in *Salemba* for example, argued that 'activist students' (*mahasisiwa aktivis*) who wanted to be involved in *politik praktis* should focus on their role as morally motivated social control:

> For those idealistic students it is clear that social inequalities and the problems faced by society are a moral burden for which they must seek a solution in accordance with their identity as part of the next generation who are lucky enough to be able to undertake higher education. This means that students' involvement in politics is only as a moral institution which puts forward criticism, ideas and advice to the government and the society (*Salemba* 15 December 1976, 4).[27]

Throughout the student press, *politik* was often linked to *kontrol sosial* through a common lexical and conceptual set. Thus, students' involvement in politics was conceived in terms of correcting 'irregularities' (*ketidakberesan*) within the state and responding to the discrepancy between 'ideals and practice' and to 'the political realities of the states' practices' (*Salemba* 20 March 1980, 4).

As the 1977 election approached, however, students' role in politics became a central issue, both on and off the streets. In their demonstrations, students called for the abolition of Kopkamtib and criticised the *cukong* (Chinese conglomerates) phenomena, foreign investment, unregulated state power and the state's development strategy (Aspinall 1993, 5). As the March 1978 General Session of the MPR approached, student demonstrators also called for Suharto to withdraw as a presidential candidate. Yet despite the fact that the student councils largely responsible for organising the protests also managed the student press, *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* remained cautious, emphasising social responsibility as the motivation for students' role in politics. An article in the February 1977 edition of *Gelora Mahasiswa*, for example, argued that while the campus need not become an actor in practical politics (*pelaku politik praktis*), it must be engaged with the aspirations of wider society, if it did not want to become an ivory tower for an elite alienated from society (*Gelora Mahasiswa* February 1977). Students also defined politics itself in terms which accorded with the organicist values of prosperity and the welfare of all Indonesians which were a central feature of the language of the state's development policies. In an article in the 15

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[27] *Bagi mahasiswa yang punya idealisme sudah jelas. Bahwa kepincangan-kepincangan sosial, problema-problema yang dihadapi masyarakat adalah beban moral baginya untuk dicarikan pemecahannya. Sesuai dengan identitasnya sebagai bagian dari generasi penerus yang beruntung mengenyam pendidikan tinggi. Ini berarti keterlibatan mahasiswa dengan politik hanyalah sebagai lembaga moral yang mengajukan kritik, gagasan dan saran-saran kepada pemerintah dan masyarakat* (*Salemba* 15 December 1976, 4).

February 1977 edition of *Salemba*, for example, Universitas Indonesia student council chairperson Zainal AS defined 'practical political life' (*kehidupan politik praktis*) as 'the efforts and activities of all citizens to realise common aims and goals, namely prosperity and the welfare of the people' (*Salemba* 15 February 1977, 4).

Students' rejection of the state's separation of conceptual forms of politics from practical forms, particularly after the introduction of the 1978 campus normalisation policy, was reflected in the mode of language they employed. As suggested in chapter one, writing and speaking construct different versions of the world: the one as a 'product' or 'thing' and the other as a series of events and actions. In producing texts, speakers and writers make linguistic choices about the kind of 'mode' they will use. These choices, it was suggested, may be socially, culturally or politically motivated. In *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* the choices which students make often give their writing a more 'spoken' feel than many of the state texts, representing the world in terms of actions and actors. For example, an article in the 20 February 1980 edition of *Salemba* on the implications of the campus normalisation policy for students' role in politics argued that:

> …the question that arises is: why can't students engage in politics? I think because each and every student activity which suggests an element of politics is in the end about securing influence over society. And in this connection, the Government is in a weak position to defend itself against anything that students put forward because students can be more explicit in stating the mistakes and weaknesses of the Government. In fact, the Government still has to prove that it can be trusted by the People. Because of that it is understandable that the Government has a direct interest in 'depoliticising' students … (*Salemba* 20 February 1980, 7).[28]

In the above example, the simple abstract nouns *pemerintah* (the government) and *mahasiswa* (students) are the primary actors. These actors are engaged in concrete process of 'doing' such as *berpolitik* (engage in politics), *merebut* (seize, secure), *membela* (defend) and *men'depolitisiasi'kan* ('depoliticise'), as well as processes concerned with thinking and feeling such as *dipercaya* (trusted) and verbal processes such as *mengatakan* (to state) and *dikemukakan* (put forward). This concern with actors and actions constructs students' role in politics in an active and dynamic way by making action rather than 'things' the locus around which meaning is created. In the context of state's attempts to separate students from practical action, both in official histories (see chapter three) and in the campus normalisation policy, this active representation of students' role in politics represents a significant challenge to the state's definitions of students' role in politics as a conceptual one. At the same time, it also highlights the government's active role in attempting to prevent students from engaging in politics and the need for the government to actively cultivate the support of wider society by attributing responsibility for actions such as *men'depolitisasi'kan* ('depoliticise'), *membela* (defend) and *membuktikan* (prove) to the government.

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[28] *…pertanyaan yang muncul ialah: mengapa mahasiswa tidak boleh berpolitik? Saya kira, karena setiap kegiatan mahasiswa yang berbau politis itu pada akhirnya adalah juga merebut pengaruh masyarakat. Dan dalam hubungan ini, Pemerintah mempunyai posisi lemah untuk membela diri tentang apa-apa yang dikemukakan oleh mahasiswa, karena mahasiswa memang bisa lebih gamblang mengatakan kesalahan dan kekurangan Pemerintah. Padahal, sampai sekarang Pemerintah masih harus membuktikan apakah dirinya bisa dipercaya oleh Rakyat. Karena itu bisa dimengerti kalau Pemerintah mempunyai kepentingan langsung untuk men'depolitisiasi'kan mahasiswa…* (*Salemba* 20 February 1980, 7).

The links made between students' role in politics and their role as a socially responsible force for social control was a response to the very real threat of repression which students faced. By defining their role in politics in terms of social control and the moral-ethical calling of educated youth, students hoped to avoid a *political* response from the state (see Budiman 1978, 620 and Budiman 1999, 19). This, they hoped, would enable them to continue their role as 'loyal' critics of the regime.

A moral force

The state's attempts to define students' political role as a conceptual one set limits for the ways in which students were able to speak about their roles and identities in the student press. In response to this, students stressed that the motivations for their participation in 'practical politics' were not political but moral.[29] Thus, while students defined their role as a 'force' (*kekuatan*) in national politics, they prefixed this with the term *moral*. As with their emphasis on social control and social responsibility as the justification for their role in practical politics, students' emphasis on their moral motivations aimed to provide a framework which would enable them to continue their role in political life without presenting themselves as a threat to the state.

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[29] Budiman suggests that students' emphasis on their role as a moral force can be likened to the role of the reclusive Javanese sages or *resi* (see Budiman 1976, 57-8 and 61; Budiman 1978, 622). See also below.

The term *kekuatan moral* emerged in student discourse in the aftermath of the 1966 student demonstrations. In the late 1960s, students' increasing disillusionment with the failures of the new regime led them to seek ways of justifying their continuing role in the political process. Douglas notes, for example, that after 1966 students responded to the 'political and moral deviations of the nations' leaders', and their failure to adhere to ideals of the struggle for independence, by defining their movement in moral terms (1970, 165; see also Budiman 1973, 79; Budiman 1978, 618; Raillon 1985, 26). For some, such as the student leaders appointed to the DPR in 1968, this role was best undertaken through direct participation in the political process.[30] For others, however, students' place was outside the formal political system.

In the student press of the mid to late 1970s the idea of students' morality, idealism and conscience as the motivation for their actions occupied a key place.[31] Significantly, the terms for these concepts appeared most often in articles and editorials on the topic of students' role as *kontrol sosial* (see for example *Salemba* 16 June 1976 and the editorial in *Gelora Mahasiswa* July 1976). Concepts of morality and idealism also framed discussions of students' role in practical politics (see for example the editorials in *Salemba* 15 December 1976 and *Salemba* 1 September 1977). In these articles and editorials, students' role as a *kekuatan moral* (moral force) was reflected in their designation as a principled and politically disinterested force committed to truth (*kebenaran*) and justice (*keadilan*). The term *kekuatan moral* was also defined by its links to a broader lexical set describing students' moral characteristics. The terms *murni* (pure) and *hati nurani* (conscience), for example, signified students' integrity: the idealism (*idealisme*) and sensitivity (*kepekaan*) which called them 'to struggle to uphold justice and truth' (*berjuang menegakkan keadilan dan kebenaran*) (*Salemba* 1 September 1977, 1).[32] *Murni* also referred to students' 'purity' from external political interests. This was articulated in the use of terms such as *ketanpapamrihan* (disinterestedness), *tanpa pilih bulu* (impartiality), *kebebasan* (freedom) and *independen* (independent) (*Salemba* 15 December 1976, 4; *Salemba* 15 January 1977, 8; *Salemba* 1 September 1977, 8).

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[30] Those appointed included 1966 activists Cosmas Batubara, Fahmi Idris, Mar'ie Muhammad, Johnny Simandjuntak, David Napitupulu, Liem Bian Koen, Soegeng Sarjadi, Nono Anwar Makarim, Yozar Anwar, Slamet Sukirnanto, and Sofyan Wanandi (Culla 1999, 68; Raillon 1985, 59-60). Many of these individuals went on to have successful political careers under the New Order.

[31] Emmerson (1973, 291) notes that W.S. Rendra was 'the leader of a briefly active group whose pretentious name – the Gerakan Moril (Moral Movement) – was intentionally ridiculed by its own acronym – GERMO (PIMP)'.

[32] Students' idealism and morality was also a feature of the state discourse on students. The Basic Guidelines for the Improvement and Development of the Young Generation (*Pola Dasar Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Generasi Muda*), introduced by Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf in 1978 stated that 'Purity of idealism, courage, a spirit of service and sacrifice and a strong sense of social responsibility are the elements which need to be fostered and developed as the 'Noble Attitude' of Indonesia's young generation as the defenders and upholders of truth and justice for society and the nation (cited in Kansil 1986, 108). [*Kemurnian idealisme, keberanian, semangat pengabdian dan pengorbanan serta rasa tanggung jawab sosial yang tinggi adalah unsur-unsur yang perlu dipupuk dan*

Students' representations of their role as a *kekuatan moral* in national political life served an important legitimating function. By arguing that they undertook their role as *kontrol sosial* and *koreksi* from a position of morality and political disinterestedness, students represent their criticisms not as those of a group seeking political power but as in the best interests of the nation and the *rakyat* as a whole. In this view, students are the voice of integrity, justice and truth and the conscience of the nation. As a 1977 article in *Salemba* argued, criticism (*kritik*) is more valuable when it is undertaken by those who are respected, either because of their knowledge, position or personal integrity and when it is motivated by a sense of responsibility and devotion (*Salemba* 1 March 1977, 5). The emphasis in the discourse of the student press on students' moral integrity, coupled with their status as future intellectuals (see below) and their strong sense of responsibility, thus validates students' criticisms. At the same time, by representing their own role as moral and without political interests, students position the state in an antithetical way. By implication, to the extent that the state chooses to 'suspect' (*mencurigai*) students' actions and accuse them of being exploited (*ditunggani*), rather than act on their suggestions, then it is not acting in the best interests of the nation and the *rakyat*, nor are its actions guided by the 'moral' principles of justice and truth.

Students' representation of their role as a moral force neatly articulates the contradictions in their definitions of their roles and identities in the context of the shifting power relationships between themselves and the state. The term *kekuatan moral* represents a juxtaposition of two seemingly contradictory meanings. While *kekuatan* (force) evokes strength and power, *moral* connotes principled and ethical behavior. By using the term *kekuatan*, students represent themselves as powerful political actors able to exert an influence on national politics and so advance their interests and the interests of those they represent. The use of the term *moral* to pre-modify *kekuatan*, however, emphasises the fact that students' motivation is not political

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dikembangkan menjadi 'Sikap Ksatria' di kalangan generasi muda Indonesia sebagai pembela dan penegak kebenaran dan keadilan bagi masyarakat dan bangsa]. See also chapter five.

but moral, stemming from their desire for ‘ideal’ government. By representing their motivation as a moral one, students define their political role in a way which does not constitute a threat to the regime. Moreover, since the New Order represented itself as having restored the ‘purity’ of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, in contrast to the ‘adulterations’ perpetrated by the previous government, students’ use of terms such as *murni* enables them to frame their criticisms in a way which the New Order has acknowledged as legitimate.

The *rakyat*

One of the key elements in students’ conceptions of their roles and identities was the notion that they acted as the spokespersons for the aspirations of the *rakyat* (the common people) and that they had a responsibility to guide and educate them in matters of politics. In the New Order’s conception of the family state, it was the *bapak* or head of the family, *Bapak Presiden Suharto*, who was responsible for the welfare of the national family. Students’ definitions of their role in these terms thus reflected the state’s paternalistic approach to the *rakyat* and at the same time implied that the national family was not functioning in an ideal way, a situation which required students’ intervention.

In the student press, the concept of wider society or the common people was expressed using the terms *rakyat* (the common people) and *masyarakat* (society). These terms appeared frequently in articles on a wide range of topics concerning students’ roles and identities: from their role in *kontrol sosial*, in politics and democracy education and in articles dealing with the nature of the student movement. For example, in an article in the 16 June 1976 edition of *Salemba* on students’ role in social control, the term *masyarakat* appeared 11 times. Similarly, an article on the student movement in the 1 September 1977 edition of *Salemba* included three mentions of the term *rakyat* and ten of *masyarakat*.

In its denotative or dictionary meaning, the word *rakyat* refers to ‘the people of a nation’ (*penduduk suatu negara*) and to ‘the masses’ (*orang kebanyakan*) or ‘the common people’ (*orang biasa*). The latter sense differentiates the *rakyat* from the aristocracy or the affluent upper classes as well as from the leaders of the nation (the ruling class). In the discourse of the student press in the mid to late 1970s, the word *rakyat* was usually used to refer to 'the common people'. Yet through the meanings given to it by students, it developed connotations of 'disempowered', 'low levels of education' and a 'lack of awareness' as well as 'politically immature'. The term *masyarakat* was used in a similar way to highlight the problems faced by wider society, which were seen as requiring students' interest and involvement.

This understanding of the *rakyat* was by no means new in Indonesia. Discussing the attitude of the nationalist intellectuals and party leaders of the 1930s, Frederick points out that the concept of the *rakyat* was a central element in the view of society held by this new elite. Among this elite, there was both a dedication to, and an admiration of, the 'common people', even if this was conceived of in a 'naïve and often overly romanticised' way:

> The *rakyat*, although the subject of endless rhetoric by intellectuals, was … ill-defined and reduced to vague terms such as *kromo*, *murba*, and *marhaen* which, despite the ideological associations they acquired, meant essentially the same thing: an undifferentiated mass or 'common man', an abstract or even imaginary social construction around which a good deal of romantic fantasy grew up (Frederick 1989, 55; see also McVey 1967, 138-40).

The idea that the *rakyat* was an object of admiration and at the same time required the leadership of those more educated and politically aware than themselves was also a central theme in Sukarno's political rhetoric during the Guided Democracy period. Sukarno's designation of himself as the *penyambung lidah rakyat* (extension of the people's tongue) and his claimed concern for the interests of the *marhaen*, the symbol of Indonesia's rural masses, emphasised the importance of the *rakyat* while at the same time representing their interests as embodied in the person of Sukarno.[33]

In the New Order's concept of the 'family state' the interests of the *rakyat* were similarly depicted as represented in the structures of the state itself: the DPR and MPR. These structures, as the military ideologue and at that time secretary-general of the Interim People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementera, MPRS) Abdulkadir Besar suggested in 1969, were 'set up to reflect the popular will' (cited in Bourchier and Hadiz 2003, 41, see also ibid., xi; Bourchier 1996 171-2). In reality, however, the role of the *rakyat* was largely a symbolic one: they were passive objects to be represented by appointed ‘delegates’ of regional and functional groups (ibid., 42). This role was clearly reflected in the concept of the ‘floating mass’, introduced after the 1971 general elections. In order to prevent the political parties from mobilising widespread support, party branches below the district (*kabupaten*) level were disbanded and mass organisations affiliated with the parties were reorganised into the new corporatist organisations (Ward 1973, 73; Bourchier and Hadiz 2003, 12). Indonesia’s urban and rural masses, it was asserted, were not to be distracted by politics but, rather, were to focus their energies on national development (Ward 1973, 73). At the same time, the New Order also promoted a strong sense of hierarchy in the idea of the *bapak* or father as the head of the national family. As a textbook for the primary school course in Pancasila Moral Education stated, the role of the *bapak* in this framework was to work ‘in the interests of the whole family’, putting their needs and interests above his own (cited in Bourchier 1996, 239-40; see also Shiraishi 1997). Like Sukarno, in his role as *Bapak Presiden* (Father President), Suharto was the principal spokesperson for the interests of the national family.

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[33] During the 1930s the term *marhaen* was associated with PNI (Frederick 1989, 57).

Concern for the *rakyat* and a claim to act on their behalf was also an integral part of the way earlier generations of youth and students had seen their role. As noted in chapter two, the youth of the colonial period saw themselves as having an important role to play as leaders of the *rakyat*. This role was based on the special understanding of the *rakyat* which these students claimed to have. The *pemuda* of the revolution also saw their role in terms of leadership and defence of the *rakyat* and their aspirations, from whom they saw themselves as distinct. In 1965-1966 the student demonstrators claimed to represent the demands of the people through their formulation of the Tritura (Tri Tuntutan Rakyat, Three People’s Demands) (see chapter three). And in the late 1960s, students associated with the Bandung-based student newspaper *Mahasiswa Indonesia* wrote of the need for a modernising elite to lead the ‘ignorant’ (*masih bodoh*) and ‘backward’ (*terbelakang*) masses and free them from poverty, injustice and oppression (Raillon 1985, 183-4).

This view of the *rakyat* was also central to the ways in which students who wrote in the student press of the mid to late 1970s defined their relationship to wider Indonesian society. A variety of terms were used to describe this relationship including *penyalur aspirasi rakyat* (channels of the peoples’ aspirations), *pembawa suara hati nurani rakyat* (spokespersons for the people’s sentiments) (*Salemba* 15 January 1977, 1 and 8), *pembela rakyat jelata* (defenders of the common people), *pejuang rakyat* (warriors of the people), *juru bicara perasaan rakyat* (spokespersons for the sentiments of the people) and even *ratu adil*, the legendary 'just king' of Javanese mythology (*Gelora Mahasiswa* 21 June 1979). Students justified this role in terms of their more advanced education, the historical example set by their predecessors, the lack of representation of social sentiments in the current system, as well as their special awareness of social issues. An article by the 1974 student activist Hariman Siregar in the May 1980 edition of *Salemba*, for example, argues that the students of the early nationalist movement had:

> … a high level of awareness that they were not merely the leaders of students but in fact leaders of the people of Indonesia whose education and access to information was very poor. Their position as leaders of the people was made easier because the people themselves accepted their leadership, as they too were aware of their weaknesses (*Salemba* 5 May 1980, 4-5).[34]

Similarly, under the New Order, Siregar maintains, the persisting low levels of education and lack of access to information (one of the key 'weaknesses' of the *rakyat*) continues to validate students' role as spokespersons for the *rakyat*. Moreover, since both before and after independence no movement existed which 'truly represented (*mewakili*) wider social sentiment', the task has fallen to students 'to comply with (*menurut*) the demands of the people' and 'struggle for their fate' (*memperjuangkan nasibnya*) (*Salemba* 5 May 1980, 5). This role was represented as an 'obligation' (*kewajiban*) which was based on students' awareness of disparities in wider society and their sensitivity to social issues (*Salemba* 16 June 1976, 5).[35]

A further dimension to students' relationship to wider society was the notion that they acted as educators and guides for the *rakyat*. In an article which appeared in the 15 February 1977 edition of *Salemba*, former Universitas Indonesia student council chairperson Zainal A. S. argued that in the political arena the role of students was to provide 'explanations' (*pengertian*) and 'guidance' (*bimbingan*) as well as education in the meaning and importance of elections for the ordinary people (*kalangan bawah* or *rakyat jelata*), and to attempt to 'mature' (*mendewasakan*) this group so that their votes were objective and impartial (*tidak terpengaruh oleh aspirasi masing-masing*) (*Salemba* 15 February 1977, 4).

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[34] *Kesadaran mereka yang tinggi bahwa mereka bukan sekedar memimpin mahasiswa saja tetapi justru untuk memimpin rakyat Indonesia yang sangat kurang pendidikan dan informasi yang didapatnya. Kedudukan mereka sebagai pemimpin rakyat ini juga dipermudah oleh karena rakyat sendiri menerima kepemimpinan tersebut sebab rakyat juga sadar akan kekurangan mereka* (*Salemba* 5 May 1980, 4-5).

[35] Students' perceptions of themselves as an educated elite with a social and political responsibility to the masses remained a consistent feature of their discourse in the 1980s. Aspinall, for example, argues of students' collaboration with wider social forces during the 1980s that 'the poor were seen primarily as an object of sympathy, or as recipients of student assistance and *pembinaan* (guidance)' although there were parts of the discourse of the protest movement which represented the *rakyat* as 'an independent and potentially decisive force for social change' (1993, 37-38). See chapter six for a discussion of the development of the latter view in the student press of the 1990s.

Students' role as spokespersons of the *rakyat* is reflected in the grammatical roles *mahasiswa* play in the student publications and in the roles played by *rakyat*. Throughout the student publications the actors carrying out actions on behalf of the *rakyat* are *mahasiswa*: students are *penyalur* (channels), *pembawa* (bearers), *pembela* (defenders) and *pejuang* (warriors) of the *rakyat* and their interests. Students also act as the grammatical actors in processes such as *mendewasakan* (to (cause to) mature) and *memperjuangkan* (to struggle for). In contrast, the *rakyat* are almost invariably depersonalised in student discourse, becoming the post-modifier in simple abstract noun phrases, as in for example *kehendak rakyat* (the people's desires), *nasib rakyat* (the people's fate), *aspirasi rakyat* (the people's aspirations) and *kepentingan rakyat* (the people's interests).[36] The focus is thus not on the *rakyat* themselves but rather on (what students perceive to be) their 'desires', 'fate' 'aspirations', and 'interests'.

The terms *rakyat* and *masyarakat*, and the meanings students gave to them, thus differentiated educated and socially aware *mahasiswa* from the majority of Indonesians, whose interests students were called to represent. Students claimed, for example, that they were 'different from the rest of society' (*berbeda dengan masyarakat lainnya*) and represented a 'special group within society' (*kelompok khusus dalam masyarakat*) (*Salemba* 15 March 1977; *Salemba* 1 September 1977). This clear distinction between students and the *rakyat* was both a reflection of students' paternalistic understanding of their relationship to the common people and of the parameters which the threat of state repression set for the ways in which students were able to represent their roles and identities. As Aspinall notes, small, elite-level movements tend to attract less repression than lower-class movements or movements with a mass support base (Aspinall 2000, 9; see also chapter one). Students' emphasis on the clear separation between their movement and the *rakyat*, and in practical terms, their reluctance to involve the *rakyat* in protests and demonstrations, which in part stemmed from a characteristically middle-class fear of mass movements (see Liddle 1973, 200), meant that students were able to avoid the kind of repression which might have been leveled at them had they sought to identify themselves with the *rakyat* and mobilise a wider support base.

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[36] I found only three instances where the *rakyat* were not in the position of a post-modifier. In two of these instances the *rakyat* functioned as the object of a passive verb. In an article in the 16 June 1976 edition of *Salemba*, for example, a dynamic balance between elements of society was described as being 'demanded by the *rakyat*' (*dituntut rakyat*). An article which featured in the 20 February 1980 edition of *Salemba* stated that the government still needs to prove whether or not it 'can be trusted by the *rakyat*' (*bisa dipercaya oleh rakyat*).

As noted above, students' paternalistic view of wider society was a product of conceptions of the *rakyat* which dated to the nationalist movement and to the views of earlier generations of youth and students about their relationship to the common people. Yet it was also consistent with the state's own view of the *rakyat* as a depoliticised mass and as passive objects, whose interests were to be represented by the state, and in particular by its *bapak*. By representing their relationship to the *rakyat* in a way which was consistent with the New Order's own discourse, students presented their role as in harmony with the state's own view of state-society relations in the ideal 'family state'. At the same time, students' designation as the channels for the *rakyat*'s aspirations was also a means of criticising the state. As noted above, the role of the *bapak* in the family state is to work 'in the interests of the whole family' as its principal spokesperson. Students' claim to represent the interests and aspirations of wider society thus implies that there are inconsistencies between rhetoric and practice within the national family. If the *bapak* was performing his role adequately, there would be no need for students to act on the *rakyat*'s behalf. In this view, it is because the state is *not* functioning in the way it should, that students' involvement is necessary.

The keyword *rakyat* thus plays an important role in constructing subject positions not only for the *rakyat* themselves but also for students. By representing their role as spokespersons for the *rakyat*, students position themselves in an asymmetrical power relationship with the *rakyat*, not as their equals but as their future leaders, who will give them a voice and who will struggle on their behalf. This view both empowers and disempowers the *rakyat*. On the one hand by raising issues concerning the *rakyat*, students give a public voice to their concerns. On the other hand, by speaking on behalf of the *rakyat*, students deny the validity of the *rakyat*'s own voice and so legitimise a system in which only certain groups have the right to express dissent. Students' growing appreciation of these issues led to a significant transformation in their views of their relationship to the *rakyat* in the student discourse during the 1980s and 1990s.

Students as *intelektual*

In the student press of the mid to late 1970s, one of the defining characteristics of *mahasiswa* was their status as young intellectuals. For example, a 1976 article in *Gelora Mahasiswa* claimed that the true sprit of the campus was an intellectual one (*Gelora Mahasiswa* October 1976). Articles on the Indonesian student movement also routinely referred to students' status as intellectuals. An article in the 1 September 1977 edition of *Salemba*, for example, included four mentions of the keyword *intelektual* as well as numerous references to students' role in upholding and defending truth (see below). The term *intelektual* also appears three times in an article reflecting on students' role in politics in *Salemba*'s 20 March 1980 edition. In these and other articles, the meanings students gave to the keyword *intelektual* served as a key means of justifying their role as a force for *kontrol sosial*. At the same time, by framing this role in terms of rationality and objectivity, students defined their role in terms which the state itself acknowledged as legitimate.

In the New Order, the role of intellectuals was seen as central to the management of Indonesia's development (Ward 1973, 73). In a paper given to an international conference on the role of the intelligentsia in contemporary Asian societies in 1976, for example, the Western-trained academic and early New Order strategist Selo Soemardjan (Elson 2001, 148) characterised the intellectuals of the New Order as those who used their capacity for independent thought in practical ways to assist in policy-making and planning for development (Soemardjan 1981, 150-2). This, he argues, is a social obligation:

> …intellectuals in less developed countries cannot ignore the mission assigned to them by society to utilise their trained intellect for the development of the country and the people (ibid., 152; see also chapter five).

This view of intellectuals as technocrats in the service of the state was a product of the influence of a group of secular modernising intellectuals on the development of the political, economic and ideological format of the early New Order. Students and young intellectuals associated with newspapers such as Bandung's *Mahasiswa Indonesia* were key members of this group, which drew its membership from the urban middle and upper classes (Liddle 1973, 199). These intellectuals saw strong government as central to the development process (Liddle 1973, 185). They also saw their own role as key. A 1968 pamphlet on the role of intellectuals in modernisation published by the study club associated with *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, argued that 'a secular intellectual elite which can contribute the necessary brains and organisational ability' was central to the success of Indonesia's modernisation (cited in Liddle 1973, 186).[37]

Students who wrote in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* also saw their role as intellectuals as key. However, the meanings which they gave to the keyword *intelektual* indicated that they no longer saw their role as being to contribute 'the brains and organisational ability' for development but rather to act as independent critics of the political system. By defining their role in this way, students tapped into oppositional definitions of the role of intellectuals such as that offered by Julien Benda in *The treason of the intellectuals* (*La traison des clercs*, 1927), who argued that intellectuals should not align themselves with particular social or political groups or ideologies but should instead 'engage in the disinterested pursuit of universal truth and justice' (Jary and Jary 1991, 316; see also Marshall 1998, 319). The role of such intellectuals was to point out the gap between political realities and the professed ideals of the state, a role which was best undertaken from a position of relative independence from the state (Lipset 1992, 937-41).

One of the ways in which students distinguished between 'intellectual labour in the service of the state' and their own role as critical intellectuals was to draw on the oppositional connotations of Western definitions of the role of the intellectual by using the English/Dutch-derived term *intelektual*. Standard Indonesian has two words for the concept of 'intellectual'. The first is the Sanskrit-derived term *cendekiawan*, meaning 'a person possessing a high level of intelligence' or 'an educated person'.[38] The second is the English/Dutch-derived term *intelektual*, sometimes spelt *intelektuil* (intellectual). The Sanskrit derivation of the term *cendekiawan*, which connotes mastery of esoteric knowledge, contrasts to the political and oppositional connotations of *intelektual* which derive from the original Western setting in which this term was used. Students' desire to present themselves as intellectuals in the Western sense meant that in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*, the term *intelektual* occupied the more prominent place, with the term *cendekiawan* largely reserved for non-student intellectuals. Forming part of a broader lexical set with *intelektual* are the terms *insan akademis* (academic beings), *pelajar ilmu pengetahuan* (students of knowledge), *calon akademis* (future scholars),[39] *intelektual muda* (young intellectuals) as well as *calon intelektual* (future intellectuals), and those who *menuntut ilmu* (pursue knowledge).[40]

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[37] The modernising ideas to which this group subscribed date to the 1920s. During the Guided Democracy period, however, Sukarno's highly charged nationalism relegated these ideas to the background (Liddle 1973, 178-180). The events of 1965 provided the opportunity the modernisers had been looking for. In 1966, an army seminar held in Bandung brought military thinkers together with Western-trained economists and social and political scientists. The aim of the seminar was to debate an economic and political strategy which would see Indonesia develop into a 'modern', politically stable and economically prosperous nation (ibid., 185; Elson 2001, 148). During the late 1960s and early 1970s, ideas on modernisation and development were successfully integrated into the Soeharto government's economic policies through the efforts of a team of modernising economists from the University of Indonesia (MacDougall 1976, 1166; MacDougall 1979, 340). By 1971, Liddle notes, the modernisers had 'successfully imposed their vision of modernisation and begun the process of structural reform central in their eyes to the achievement of modernity' (Liddle 1973, 197).

[38] Anderson (1990b, 145-6) notes that the prestige words and phrases of modern, standard Indonesian are often Sanskrit derived. See also Errington (1986, 344).

One of the key characteristics of *intelektual* as it is defined by students is their concern for the pursuit of truth (*kebenaran*). A 1976 article in *Gelora Mahasiswa* on the role of intellectuals, for example, defined intellectuals in general as 'those who continuously question truth' (*mereka yang selalu mempertanyakan kebenaran sesuatu*) (*Gelora Mahasiswa* October 1976, 2). Accordingly, in the student newspapers, students' role is defined as being to 'seek truth' (*mencari kebenaran*), 'reveal truth in a scientific way' (*mengemukakan kebenaraan secara ilmiah*) and 'uphold truth' (*menegakkan kebenaran*). Throughout the student newspapers, students emphasise their superior reasoning abilities and scientific objectivity. As a 1976 editorial in *Gelora Mahasiswa* argued

> …students, by virtue of their position as students of knowledge, possess certain abilities. [They have] a broader perspective. Their analytical abilities are sharper. With the knowledge they have gained from their studies, they can easily identify social inequalities [and] disparities in social and political behaviour (*Gelora Mahasiswa* July 1976).[41]

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[39] The word *akademis* is usually used as an adjective meaning 'scientific' and 'theoretical'. As a noun, it refers to those who think in a scholarly, academic, or scientific way.

[40] Although the terms *calon intelektual* and *calon akademis* suggest a differentiation between students as 'future' intellectuals and fully-fledged *intelektual*, this distinction does not appear to have been made in the student press. A 1980 article in *Salemba* did, however, draw a distinction between *calon intelektual* and the *pekerja intelektual* (intellectual workers) of Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf's NKK policy, arguing that the latter devalued students' true role as *intelektual* (*Salemba* 20 March 1980, 4).

[41] *Khususnya mahasiswa, oleh kedudukannya sebagai pelajar ilmu pengetahuan, memiliki kemampuan-kemampuan tertentu. Horison pemikirannya lebih luas. Daya analisanya lebih tajam. Dengan ilmu yang diperoleh dari bangku kuliah, ia dapat dengan mudah melihat ketimpangan sosial, ketimpangan perilaku kehidupan masyarakat dan ketatanegaraan* (*Gelora Mahasiswa* July 1976).

Students' status as *intelektual* is delineated by a rich lexical set describing their intellectual characteristics: *kemantapan berpikir* (steadiness of thinking), *objektivitas* (objectivity), *daya kritis* (critical ability), *kemampuan menganalisa* (analytical abilities), *ilmiah* (scientific), and *rasional* (rational). The outcomes of students' intellectual processes include *ide* (ideas), *gagasan* (concepts), *kritik* (criticism) and *saran* (suggestions).

The term *intelektual* was also linked to other keywords, in particular to students' role as *kontrol sosial*. A 1976 article in *Salemba*, for example, described students' *kontrol sosial* as an appropriate and pure 'intellectual response' (*'respon intelektuil' yang wajar dan murni*) to the realities of social and political life (*Salemba* 15 December 1976, 4). *Intelektual* was also linked to ideas of social responsibility and the *rakyat*. As Universitas Indonesia student leader Dipo Alam argued in *Salemba* of 15 March 1977, students, as future intellectuals, 'are concerned to think in a rational manner [and] as far as their knowledge [will allow them], about how a society or humanity in general can live a better life' (*Salemba* 15 March 1977, 4).[42] Students' status as intellectuals also clearly distinguished them from the uneducated and politically naïve *rakyat*, who required students' guidance and leadership.

The emphasis on students' intellectual abilities was in part a response to the state's frequent charge that students were susceptible to outside influences, manifested in the term *ditunggangi* (ridden, exploited). Naipospos notes that after 1974 the term *ditunggangi* was used to discredit students if their actions were perceived to encroach on the unspoken boundaries set by the state (Naipospos 1996; see also Radjab 1991). An article which appeared in the March 1977 edition of *Gelora Mahasiswa*, for example, argued that:

> Previously, we often heard that students (campuses) were forbidden from engaging in practical politics, especially in those activities which aimed towards a student movement in a physical sense. So those in power were quick to say: Watch out! Be careful! You could be ridden like donkeys. You could be duped by those outside the campus ... Students responded to such statements [by stating] … that our authorities are too insulting to students, as though they consider students as dopey little kids, snotty-nosed and gullible. In fact, students are a critical group in their society. And this sensitive and critical

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[42] *…merasa berkepentingan untuk memikirkan secara rasional sepanjang pengetahuannya, tentang bagaimana sesuatu masyarakat atau kemanusiaan pada umumnya bisa hidup lebih baik* (*Salemba* 15 March 1977, 4).

> group has been acknowledged since the establishment of the first campus up to the present time (*Gelora Mahasiswa* March 1977, 7).[43]

The terms *goblok* (stupid, dopey) and *masih ingusan* (snotty-nosed) as well as the suffix *–in* (*dikibulin*), a feature of the colloquial variety of Indonesian used in Jakarta, highlight students' resentment of the demeaning nature of the government's perception of them as 'little kids' (*anak kecil*). The sentence which immediately follows this, in which such terms are notably absent, draws attention to the difference between the state's perception of students as 'dopey little kids' who are easily duped by those who would wish to exploit them for their own purposes and their long-established 'actual' role as critical intellectuals.

The term *intelektual* also had an important connection with students' role as a 'moral force' (*kekuatan moral*). The discussion of *kekuatan moral* above indicated that students who wrote in the campus newspapers of the 1970s were concerned to represent their role as a morally motivated and disinterested element in the political system. As Arief Budiman has pointed out, in Julien Benda's view, intellectuals derive their prestige, and hence their authority, from 'the moral and ethical realm'. It is because intellectuals seek truth, rather than worldly power, that their political criticisms are legitimate (Budiman 1978, 616 and 615; Budiman 1999, 14-15).[44] Drawing on Anderson's work on the concept of power in Javanese political culture (Anderson 1990c), Budiman draws a parallel between Benda's intellectuals and the *resi*, the reclusive Javanese sages whose task it was to 'diagnose decay within the kingdom and to give warning of the impending downfall of the dynasty' (Budiman 1978, 616; see also Anderson 1990c, 19-27). Since the *resi* have no worldly interests, their criticisms represent 'truth'. In Budiman's view, in traditional Javanese society the actions of the *resi* represented a legitimate cultural mechanism for expressing dissent. In expressing their criticisms of the New Order regime, Budiman argues, the student demonstrators of the late 1960s and early 1970s emphasised their morality and political disinterestedness and so tried ‘to show that they [were] playing the role of *resi*’ (ibid., 622).[45]

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[43] *Dahulu sering kita mendengar bahwa mahasiswa (Kampus) dilarang berpolitik praktis, apalagi dalam setiap aktivitas yang menjurus pada gerakan mahasiswa dalam artian physic (sic). Maka cepat-cepat beliau yang berkuasa akan mengatakan: Awas! Hati-hati! Kamu bisa ditunggangi seperti keledai. Kamu bias diakalbulusi oleh orang-orang luar kampus. … Pernyataan ini pernah dijawab oleh mahasiswa … [b]ahwa penguasa-penguasa kita terlalu menghina kepada mahasiswa. Seolah-olah menganggap kelompok mahasiswa sebagai anak-anak kecil yang goblok, masih ingusan dan mudah dikibulin. Sedangkan mahasiswa adalah suatu kelompok yang kritis di dalam masyarakatnya. Tentang kelompok yang peka dan kritis ini diakui sejak berdirinya kampus pertama sampai sekarang* (*Gelora Mahasiswa* March 1977, 7).

[44] See also Legge (1988, 13-20) on intellectuals in Indonesia.

Yet while the *resi* metaphor was occasionally employed in later writings on the student movement (see for example Radjab 1991; Naipospos 1996; Mangiang 1981), for students who wrote in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* in the mid to late 1970s, such cultural metaphors were less appealing than the idea that students acted as ‘modern’ intellectuals. Throughout their publications students emphasised the scientific (*ilmiah*) and rational (*rasional*) nature of their thinking and behaviour. Students’ appeals to the modern mode of expressing dissent of the *intelektual* rather than to the traditional cultural trope of the *resi* reflect their orientation to the modern (Western) world, an outlook no doubt strongly influenced by their education.

Rationality and objectivity were also key to the way the New Order state defined itself and its program of economic, social, cultural and political modernisation. This program would see the replacement of outmoded and traditional world views with modern, rational, pragmatic and secular ones (Liddle 1973, 181). Modernisation thus involved practical economic development as well as intellectual and cultural transformation. The values of rationality and objectivity were also central to the way the state defined students’ roles. Minister of Education and Culture Sjarif Thajeb’s 1974 decision on the ‘improvement’ of university campuses, issued in the aftermath of the 1974 Malari riots, emphasised the contribution which students’ ‘concrete and constructive thinking’ could make to the nation. He argued that students’ opinions, based as they were on a ‘scientific analysis of the situation’, were a valuable and legitimate means by which students could help to solve the nation’s problems (Thajeb 1974, 7-8). Students’ emphasis on the scientific and rational nature of their role as intellectuals in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* is thus in part a product of the state’s own discourse on modernisation. At the same time, this discourse provides students with a means of justifying their role as a force for social control of the state and its practices by defining this role in terms which the state itself acknowledged as legitimate.

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[45] Although the student demonstrators of the late 1960s and early 1970s did not make an explicit link (as Budiman does) between their role and that of the *resi*, they did occasionally frame their dissent in cultural terms. Writing of the student protest of the late 1960s and early 1970s Polomka notes that: ‘The students also defend their often unruly behaviour in traditional terms. In replying to the criticism of their ‘un-Oriental behaviour’, they argue that, in fact, Javanese culture has a place for rude and disrespectful behaviour which has the function of ‘social renewal’. They refer to the cruder figures of classical Javanese art, asserting that these had the task of giving vent to the people’s frustrations and drawing attention to society’s shortcomings. Nor could those in authority show irritation and impatience with such behaviour since, according to Javanese custom, this was the reaction only of authorities who felt they were in the wrong’ (1971, 212-213).

Echoes of the past

Reinforcing students' reflections on their role and identity, in national politics and in wider social life, was the sense that they were continuing a long tradition of involvement, dating back to the beginnings of the nationalist movement in 1908. This historical framework both provided students with a powerful source of legitimacy for their actions and at the same time set limits for the ways in which they were able to define their roles and identities.

In *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*, the tradition of youth and student activism in Indonesia was an important point of reference for students' definitions of their roles and identities. A March 1977 edition of *Gelora Mahasiswa*, for example, argued that students' involvement in social and political life was a continuation of the pioneering role played by their older student brothers and sisters (*kakak-kakaknya mahasiswa*) Sukarno, Hatta, Syahrir, Sutomo and Mohammad Yamin as well as the 1966 generation of students. As such, students' current involvement in social and political life represented 'a logical passing on of the baton' from these pioneering students of the past to the new generation:

> Doesn't what students now strive for paint 'their vision of the future' but also represent an 'echo from the past'. Namely a kind of transformation of the values of the Indonesian Student movement's struggle since Boedi Oetomo, the youth congress, Perhimpunan Indonesia in the Netherlands and so on until today, which has been adapted to the latest situation and conditions (*Gelora Mahasiswa* March 1977, 7).[46]

These 'historical facts' would, the article concluded, counter the recent attempts to limit students' role in social and political life.

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[46] *Bukankah apa yang diperjuangakan oleh mahasiswa Indonesia sekarang menggambarkan 'their vision of the future' tetapi juga merupakan 'echo from the past'. Yakni semacam transformasi nilai-nilai perjuangan dari Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia sejak Boedi Oetomo, kongres pemuda, perhimpunan (Mahasiswa) Indonesia di Negeri Belanda dan seterusnya sampai hari ini; dengan diadaptasikan pada situasi dan kondisi mutakhir* (*Gelora Mahasiswa* March 1977, 7).

The designation of figures such as Sukarno, Hatta, Syahrir, Sutomo and Mohammad Yamin as *mahasiswa* and the reference to an Indonesian 'student movement' establishes a link between the past and the present.[47] The reference to these key nationalist figures as *mahasiswa*, and the representation of organisations such as Budi Utomo and Perhimpunan Indonesia as part of a unitary historical movement of Indonesian students, connects the struggle of contemporary *mahasiswa* to the struggle of the youth of the past, and in particular to the generations of 1908 and 1928. The differences between the generations are represented in terms which emphasise the continuities between them: each generation, including the present one, responded to the social and political conditions around them in different ways albeit ways which were consistent with the idealism and spirit of youth so celebrated in New Order accounts of their role (see chapter three).

The idea that the youth and students of the New Order were continuing a long historical tradition was also central to the way the state defined students' role and identities. As noted in chapter two, Suharto saw the role of contemporary youth and students as being to implement development and so 'give substance to' (*mengisi*) Indonesia's independence. However, as the president noted at the opening of the Symposium on the Writing of the History of the Youth Movement in Indonesia in October 1980, there was a key difference between the role of youth in the past and their role in the contemporary nation. In the past, the president asserted, youth had played a significant part in the destruction of colonialism. In the era of development, however, their role was a 'productive and constructive' one (Suharto 1980a, 175; see chapter two). Moreover, as chapter three suggested, official New Order histories such as the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* celebrated the role of youth and students in the nationalist movement, the revolution and the events of 1965-66. At the same time, the lessons contained the *Sejarah* provided a set of parameters within which the contemporary young generation could think about their roles and identities. In doing so, the *Sejarah* aimed to limit the practical ways in which students could act in their capacity as *mahasiswa*.

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[47] Students who wrote in the student press of the mid to late 1970s did not make a clear and consistent distinction between the terms *pemuda* and *mahasiswa*. In some articles, *pemuda* was used as an overarching term in reference to the pioneering *pemuda* of the Sumpah Pemuda, the *pemuda* of the revolution and the spirit of the '*pemuda*' of 1966 (see for example *Salemba* 1 February 1977, 3). In others, the terms used to represent the young political actors of the past include *pemuda mahasiswa* (youth student), *mahasiswa dan pemuda* (students and youth) or *pemuda/mahasiswa* (youth/students).

The New Order's celebration of the role of past youth and students provided students with a powerful source of legitimacy for their actions in the contemporary period. By framing their role in politics and social life in terms of a tradition which the state itself saw as an integral part of Indonesia's development as a nation, students were able to claim that they, like their 'older brothers and sisters', were rendering a vital service to the future of the nation. At the same time, this historical framework also set limits for the ways in which the students of the New Order period were able to define their roles and identities. As avenues for tolerated dissent narrowed and opposition became 'un-Indonesian', the tradition of student involvement in politics remained one of the few legitimate bases on which students could justify their contemporary role.

Irony and identity

Indonesia has a rich tradition of political humour and satire, from the clown figures (*punakawan*) of the *wayang*, to word play (*permainan kata* or *plesetan*) and modern political cartooning. In this tradition, the political satirist occupies a somewhat privileged position, able to criticise those in power provided the criticism is expressed in a humorous way and the satirist does not cross into overt enmity (Anderson 1990d, 162; Budiman 1978, 616; see also Wijaya 1996, 15). The political climate of the mid to late 1970s was a particularly fertile one for critical political cartooning and satire. *Tempo* cartoonist Priyanto Soenarko has pointed out that it is in political systems where free expression is curtailed that political cartoonists and political satirists are at their most 'creative' (Soenarko 1996, 38; see also Wijaya 1996, 4). In such systems, cartoonists and satirists must find ways of 'concealing' the political message beneath subtle layers of meaning in order to avoid censorship or political reprisals.[48]

Both *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* regularly featured both political cartoons and the satirical *pojok* (corner columns). These cartoons and *pojok* were in many ways not unique. Cartoonists drawing for national-level publications during the 1970s also used satire and humour to express their criticisms of the New Order.[49] Nor was the *pojok* genre new in Indonesia. During the Dutch colonial period, Indonesian-language newspapers included a *pojok* column where newspaper editors could express their criticism of the colonial state; newspapers published during the Japanese occupation included a similar section (Makah 1977, 33). Writing in 1966, Ben Anderson described the *pojok* of the metropolitan newspapers of Jakarta as providing 'biting, anonymous comment on the latest news or the general political or economic situation' using a combination of 'allusion, innuendo, sarcasm, and mock surprise' (1990b, 142-3; see also Makah 1977).

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[48] In spite of this, cartoonists have often been targets of recrimination (Redaksi 1996, 32). The closure of *Gelora Mahasiswa* in September 1979, for example, was partly the result of a cartoon which appeared on the front page of the 7 September issue of the newspaper (*Salemba* 20 October 1979; see also above).

[49] During their student years in the mid to late 1960s several prominent New Order cartoonists, including Priyanto Soenarko and T. Sutanto drew cartoons for student newspapers such as Bandung's *Mahasiswa Indonesia* (see Soenarko 1996, 33; Sutanto 1996, 42).

The cartoons and *pojok* of *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* provided a medium for students' criticisms of the state. Yet they had the additional aim of socialising student readers into their identities as students. In chapter one it was suggested that the shared knowledge which is created between the cartoonist or satirist and the reader has important implications for socialising readers. Unlike feature articles or editorials, cartoons and *pojok* do not explain political issues in detail. Instead, the cartoonist or satirist uses visual and verbal cues to help readers interpret the meaning. This cueing, and the interpretive work which readers must do in order to make sense of a cartoon or *pojok*, is one of the key ways in which collective identities are constructed and reaffirmed.

An example of how such cues position readers comes from a *pojok* which appeared in the March 1977 edition of *Gelora Mahasiswa*. This *pojok* used the example of a student allegedly killed as a result of his investigations into corruption in his home village in order to construct students' roles as *pejuang* (freedom fighters), struggling to expose 'irregularities' and so act as a 'control' mechanism on the state:

> Sunan Gunung Jati State Islamic Institute student Maming was 'sorted out' because he was going to investigate corruption in his West Javanese village.
>
> *There are no words except: deepest sympathy for the loss of Maming. For the freedom fighters who will follow, remember that going against the flow in our country at this time is very dangerous* (*Gelora Mahasiswa* March 1977).[50]

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[50] *Maming, mahasiswa IAIN Sunan Gunung Jati 'dibereskan' karena akan usut masalah korupsi di desanya Jawa Barat.*
Tak ada ucapan lain kecuali: duka cita sedalam-dalamnya atas kepergian Maming. Buat pejuang yang akan menyusul, ingatlah bahwa melawan arus di negara kita saat ini adalah sangat berbahaya (*Gelora Mahasiswa* March 1977).

In order to make sense of the *pojok*, student readers must make a connection between Maming as an individual student and their own role as ‘the freedom fighters who will follow’. The *pojok* charges these *pejuang*, their readers, to remember that while their role as a force for ‘control’ and ‘correction’ is worthy, it is also sometimes dangerous. This discourse of ‘martyrdom for the cause’ was a common theme in reflections on students’ identity (see chapter six). It dates at least to the Indonesian revolution of 1945-1949, when *pemuda* fought to defend Indonesia’s independence against the returning Dutch and Allied forces. By using the term *pejuang*, which has a powerful resonance in the Indonesian political vocabulary, the *pojok* cues readers to make the connections which the *pojok* writer wants them to make, namely that they, like Maming and the *pejuang* of earlier generations, are contemporary ‘freedom fighters’ working to ‘control’ and ‘correct’ the state.

The *pojok* which appeared in the November 1977 edition of *Gelora Mahasiswa* uses a similar technique in commenting on the issue of the presidential succession in the lead up to the March 1978 parliamentary session:

> Christmas and New Year 1978 are almost here.
> *Geloora and friends wish you the compliments of the season. May soul and spirit be renewed. (Oh, except for the national leadership)* (*Gelora Mahasiswa* November 1977).[51]

The *pojok* offers an apparently innocuous expression of Christmas and New Year wishes: ‘may soul and spirit be renewed’. The ‘real’ comment, however, presented as an afterthought, is contained within the brackets and is signalled by the use of the particle *eh* (oh), which indicates that the ‘speaker’ wishes to correct him or herself. By presenting the comment in this way, the *pojok* writer draws attention to the exception to this wish for renewal, that is, the national leadership, a euphemism for Suharto. The use of brackets and the particle *eh* to mark this as an ‘exception’ signals an awareness of the ‘self-consciousness’ required when writing about such sensitive issues in the public-sphere of a newspaper, albeit one with a limited audience. At the same time, however, it also manages to subvert this self-consciousness, by marking it as precisely that. The surface level of the *pojok* comment thus appears to favour Suharto’s re-election in the

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[51] *Hari Raya Natal dan Tahun Baru 1978 hampir tiba.*
Geloora dan kawan-kawan ucapkan selamat. Semoga jiwa dan semangat juga baru. (Eh kecuali kepemimpinan nasional) (*Gelora Mahasiswa* November 1977).

March 1978 MPR session. At a deeper level of meaning, however, it advocates a change of leadership. Moreover, while at the surface level of meaning the *pojok* writer's role is as a supporter of the president, at the deeper level of meaning, this role shifts to that of critic of the political system. What implications does this have for socialising readers into their identities as students? In order to understand the meaning of the *pojok*, readers must 'uncover' this deeper level of meaning. The use of brackets and the particle *eh* 'cues' readers to understand this deeper level of meaning in the way in which the *pojok* writer wants them to. Understanding the meaning of this *pojok* thus entails seeing the world from the *pojok* writer's position and, most importantly, positioning oneself alongside the *pojok* writer as a critic of the political system.

The visual symbols and imagery used in the cartoons also help to socialise readers into their identities as *mahasiswa*, particularly in relation to students' role as spokespersons and defenders of the *rakyat*. These symbols reflect a view of the world in which there is a clear distinction between the powerful and the powerless and in which students act as the 'defenders' (*pembela*) of the latter. For example, Dhakidae notes that cartoons which appeared in the student newspapers often had the repression of civil liberties as a theme and used military symbolism to characterise the relationship between the powerful and the powerless (1977, 71). In a cartoon which appeared in the 10 October 1976 edition of *Salemba* (Figure 4.2), for example, an oversized military boot symbolising the military's function as the 'guardian' of national stability tramples on figures representing the common people (Dhakidae 1977, 71; see also *Dari kampus* 1979, 71). In another cartoon (Figure 4.3), the *rakyat* are represented as fearful, with their mouths tightly closed or even without mouths (Dhakidae 1977, 67). These representations of the common people as oppressed and 'without a voice' reflect the ways they were represented in articles and editorial in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*.

Unlike the *rakyat*, when students appear in cartoons they usually have a 'voice'. In a cartoon which appeared *Salemba* in 1976 (Figure 4.4), for example, students are represented as bringing a petition before their representatives in the parliament (*Dari kampus* 1979, 39). The authority figure in the cartoon takes the form of a military officer with exaggerated features who appears significantly larger than other figures in the cartoon (see Dhakidae 1977; Sutanto 1996, 41). The character Tuan Salem, BA (Mr

SalemBA)[52] appearing at the front of the scene provides the ‘comment’ on the situation: a large bold ‘?!’, an expression of surprise and disbelief. Yet even though they are prevented by the military authority figure, the students retain both the right to petition and the voice with which to do so.


STABILITAS
NASIONAL
dono'77

Figure 4.2 Cartoon: National stability


DEMOKRASI
KEBEBASAN INDIVIDU
KEBEBASAN PERS
KEBEBASAN BERSERIKAT
KEBEBASAN MIMBAR
FREDOM
dono'77

Figure 4.3 Cartoon: The *rakyat* silenced

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[52] My thanks to Sandy Sukmana for drawing this to my attention.


KAMI PINGIN KETEMU WAKIL KAMI... DI DPR, PAK!!
PULANG!
PETISI
?!
don 78

Figure 4.4 Cartoon: Students’ petition


KAMI RESAH KAMI MENGADU...!!!
HOOIII...!! DEMOKRASI TELAH MATI DI INDONESIA....!!
TSCHOK
MM

Figure 4.5 Cartoon: Breaking free

A similar theme is evident in a cartoon which appeared in *Gelora Mahasiswa* of November 1977 (Figure 4.5). Even though the students' movements are restricted by the sack in which they are trapped and they are threatened by the military's bayonets, they remain able to break free and express their criticisms.

These representations of authority figures, the *rakyat* and students provide visual cues for students which help them to interpret the messages contained in the cartoon. These messages construct and reaffirm students' identities as the leaders and defenders of the common people and as an active force in social and political life.

'Speaking' the language of students

Another important means by which the *pojok* writers attempted to socialise student readers into their identities as *mahasiswa* was through the use of a non-standard variety of Indonesian based on Jakarta Malay. Jakarta Malay, the variety of Malay traditionally spoken in Jakarta, has been an important influence on the colloquial variety of Indonesian used in Jakarta as well as on standard Indonesian and the non-standard or colloquial varieties of Indonesian spoken outside the capital (Sneddon 2003, 153-4; see also Errington 1986, 335; Oetomo 1990, 69-71). For students who wrote in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*, this non-standard variety of Indonesian cultivated a relationship of solidarity with their readers and a sense of shared identity as members of a 'student' subculture.

The *pojok* which appeared in *Salemba*'s 8 October 1979 edition, for example, incorporated various elements of non-standard or colloquial Indonesian:

> At Ujung Pandang's Univeritas Hasanuddin, [Minister of Defence] General M. Jusuf said, next year three hundred thousand students throughout the country will be involved in student regiment activities.
>
> *In terms of numbers, wow - that's nearly all the students in Indonesia, you know. May Bookworm please ask a question: do we still not have enough soldiers? If it's really thought there are not enough, this request will of course be accepted wholeheartedly. But in fact it seems everywhere Bookworm goes there are soldiers* (*Salemba* 8 October 1979).[53]

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[53] *Di Unhas Ujung Pandang, Jenderal M. Jusuf bilang, tahun depan tiga ratus ribu mahasiswa diseluruh tanah air akan dilibatkan kedalam kegiatan Menwa.*

The *pojok* comment begins in an informal style, marked by the use of the standard Indonesian particle *wah*, expressing surprise, and the particle *dong*, used in the colloquial variety of Indonesian used in Jakarta and roughly translated as 'of course' or 'obviously', which expresses both surprise and disbelief at the general's assessment of the number of students who would be able to be 'involved' (*dilibatkan*) in the student regiments. The tone then shifts to one of cynical politeness, using the respectful form for making a request or inquiry (*numpang*) and 'prestige' words such as *permintaan* (request) and *ikhlas* (sincerely, wholeheartedly). The *pojok* writer has also ironically 'translated' the term *dilibatkan* - (caused to be) involved - implying a lack of agency on the part of students, into the polite request *permintaan*. This shift to polite standard Indonesian suggests respect for the person or authority to whom the question is addressed, namely General Jusuf and the military authorities more generally. In the context of the *pojok* rejoinder, however, this politeness represents a cynical play on the respect expected to be shown to those in such positions of authority. The final sentence shifts back to an informal tone, using the colloquial Indonesian particle *kok* (indeed, in fact) and the non-standard suffix *ke-* in *ketemu* (to meet).

The variety of colloquial Indonesian used in this *pojok* provides the medium for the *pojok* writers' questioning of the need for a further militarisation of the campus, given the presence of military personnel on campuses following the crackdowns of 1978. At the same time, this pattern of language use also constructs a relationship of familiarity with readers. The use of particles such as *dong*, *kok*, and the suffix *ke-*, which are a feature of colloquial varieties of Indonesian based on Jakarta Malay, mark the *pojok* rejoinder as 'belonging' to the sub-culture(s) to whom the student newspapers were addressed, namely educated youth in urban centres (see Errington 1986, 338-9 and 348; Sneddon 2003, 155-6). By using this language, the *pojok* of the student newspapers bring their own language and that of their readers into the public domain, using it to express their criticism of the all-pervasive presence of the military.[54] At the same time, by 'speaking' in the language of its audience, the *pojok* also purports to represent the

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Dari sudut jumlah, wah – itu sudah hampir seluruh mahasiswa Indonesia dong. Kutu Buku numpang tanya. Apakah tentara kita masih kurang? Kalau memang dirasa kurang, permintaan tersebut tentu diterima dengan ikhlas. Tapi rasa-rasanya kok, dimana-mana Kutu Buku selalu ketemu serdadu (*Salemba* 8 October 1979).

[54] Anderson (1990b, 142) argues that the popularity of the colloquial variety of Indonesian used in Jakarta as a language of political satire derived from its 'intimate, jazzy, cynical character', which created a satisfying contrast to 'the formal, official Indonesian of public communication'.

opinions of this audience and so solicit their agreement: ‘we’ speak like this and ‘we’ think like this.

It must be emphasised that the use of this colloquial variety of Indonesian was limited to the *pojok*. For the most part, students expressed their ideas in a standard variety of Indonesian. As Dede Oetomo argues, the standard variety of Indonesian retains a high degree of prestige because of its association with higher social status, a modern education and a modern life-style (Oetomo 1990, 77; see also Sneddon 2003, 141; Errington 1986, 335 and 339). Students’ use of standard Indonesian in their publications thus showed their command of the national language and as such lent their writing a certain authority, the authority of educated *intelektual* (see above).

Positioning readers

In chapter one it was suggested that language has an interpersonal function and that the choices that speakers and writers make from the system of interpersonal meaning have important implications for how power relationships are expressed in texts. This applies in particular to the kinds of subject positions that speakers or writers establish for themselves and how they position others. These subject positions play a significant role in speakers’ and writers’ attempts to socialise their readers into a particular version of social reality and their position in it.

One of the ways that students who wrote in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* positioned their readers was by using rhetorical questions. In her analysis of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s political speeches criticising the anti-nuclear movement, Kay Richardson suggests that rhetorical questions provided a means by which Thatcher characterised opponents of nuclear weapons for her audience. By ‘ask[ing] a question to which she knows the answer, and in the knowledge that her audience will come up with the same answer’, Thatcher positions her audience as supporters of her view (Richardson 1985, 30).

Students who wrote in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* used rhetorical questions to similar effect. In *Gelora Mahasiswa* of November 1976, for example, *Salemba* activist Pamusuk Eneste discussed the Thai government’s efforts to ‘sterilise’ students in the wake of their role in the coup of October 1976, a process which he saw as mirrored in the Indonesian government's approach to students after Malari:

> Will these efforts at 'sterilisation' be successful? And if they are successful, what will the government do then? … It seems the Thai government doesn't realise that students are the most difficult group to restrain. If one way fails, try another. How could those called students ever meet a 'dead end' in their struggle? … If that's the case, why is there an attempt to sterilise students on the part of the authorities? Can't students' role never be destroyed by anything? Isn't students' idealism not like a dry leaf easily blown by (the force of) the wind (*Gelora Mahasiswa* November 1976)?[55]

In a spoken interaction a question typically requires a listener to formulate and express an answer. This process is one of the key means by which listeners and speakers collaborate in shaping a text. In a written text, however, such immediate feedback is not possible. The monologic nature of written texts means that it is the writer who 'sets the agenda', controlling which questions are asked and how they are answered. Yet Pamusuk Eneste invites readers to engage in 'dialogue' with him by questioning them: 'Will such efforts to 'sterilise' students be successful'? This question, like the others in the text, cues readers to respond mentally if not verbally. At the same time, however, the way in which Eneste answers his own question and the way in which the questions themselves are worded, aims to guide readers in forming their answers. So, when Eneste asks his readers the rhetorical question, 'Can't students' role never be destroyed by anything?', he 'cues' them by the use of the negative question tag *bukankah* to conclude, along with him, that it cannot. These rhetorical questions cues readers to construct a mental picture of students, including the student readers to whom the questions are addressed, as possessing the qualities of 'determination in the face of adversity' and 'uncompromising idealism'.[56]

In addition to exploiting their rhetorical effect, students also use questions to challenge the regime and its practices, reflecting their role as 'social control' and as intellectuals whose nature is to continually question 'truth'. *Salemba*'s editorial of 15 March 1977, for example, presents a critical reflection on the expanding role of Kopkamtib since the Malari riots, from its original function as a force for external security to its recent involvement in matters of internal security, including those which are outside its jurisdiction. The editorial concludes by asking: can the unlimited authority of this extra-constitutional body ‘guarantee the creation of the Pancasila democracy we desire’ (*Salemba* 15 March 1977, 4)?[57] The concerns raised in the editorial and the criticisms it contains reflect students’ perceptions of their role as a force for *kontrol sosial*, whose aim is to bring *ketidakwajaran* (deviations), *ketimpangan* (imbalances) and *kepincangan* (defects) to the attention of the state in a critical but non-antagonistic way. By presenting its criticisms in the form of a question, rather than a statement, the editorial remains within the boundaries of students’ self-designated role as ‘corrector’ of such ‘deviations’ as the expanding jurisdiction of Kopkamtib. At the same time, the editorial offers both its student and non-student readers the opportunity to consider the question of whether Kopkamtib’s unlimited authority is conducive to the creation of a true ‘Pancasila democracy’, represented as the desire of ‘all of us’ (*kita*).[58]

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[55] *Apakah usaha 'sterilisasi' atau 'pemandulan' itu akan berhasil? Dan kalau sudah berhasil, lalu pemerintah mau apa? … Sepertinya pemerintah Muangthai tidak tahu, golongan mahasiswa itu paling susah dikekang. Tak bisa dari satu jalan, ya cari jalan yang lain. Masak yang namanya mahasiswa pernah menemui 'jalan buntu' dalam perjuangannya? … Kalau begitu, mengapa pula ada usaha 'sterilisasi' dari pihak penguasa? Bukankah peranan mahasiswa tak pernah bisa dihancurkan oleh apapun? Bukankah idealisme mahasiswa tidak seperti daun kering yang bisa dengan gampang diterbangkan oleh (kekuatan) angin* (*Gelora Mahasiswa* November 1976)*?*

[56] As noted in chapter one, however, there is always the possibility that readers will not draw the conclusions that the writer intends, instead formulating their own 'resistant readings' of the text.

Conclusion

Despite the parameters set by the discourse of the state, students who wrote in the student newspapers of the mid to late 1970s were able to play a critical role for two main reasons. Firstly, the status of students as part of the coalition that had helped to install the New Order, together with their important role in key moments in Indonesia’s nationalist history, gave them more freedom than other social groups to define their role in political terms. More important than this, however, was students’ ability to define their role as critics of the regime, without presenting a fundamental challenge to the state. Instead, students represented their role as a force for ‘social control’ and ‘correction’ of the New Order state and its practices, as a moral rather than a purely political force, as leaders of the common people (*rakyat*) and as intellectuals in a way which was consistent with the New Order's organicist values of harmony, consensus, order and stability. Students' ability to use the freedoms inherent in the process of government in a responsible way is a testament to the state's success in effectively governing Indonesian students. Yet the self-policing which students undertook is also an example of the considerable power they themselves were able to exercise. It was this power which enabled students to continue to play the role of critics of the regime throughout the 1970s despite often harsh repression.

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[57] *…dengan tak terbatasnya wewenang sebuah lembaga yang ekstra-konstitusionil ini, apakah bisa menjamin terciptanya suasana alam Demokrasi Panca Sila yang kita cita-citakan* (*Salemba* 15 March 1977, 4)?

[58] Aspinall notes that in the discourse of student protest during 1973 and 1974 students had called for a reduction in ‘arbitrary state powers and the role of the military in government’. By 1977-1978 this anti-militarist sentiment was being expressed more strongly, with calls for the abolition of Kopkamtib (1993, 5). The 1979 defence speeches provide a more developed critique of the role of the military in politics. Heri Akhmadi, for example, condemned Kopkamtib’s actions with regard to the press bannings as ‘clearly unconstitutional’ and denounced the body as ‘the champion of the New Order Regime in confronting the people (*jagonya Rejim Orde Bari dalam menghadapi rakyat*) (Akhmadi 1979, 78 and 45).

CHAPTER FIVE

Depoliticisation and development: *mahasiswa* in the 1980s

[T]he function of institutions of higher education … is to guide students to fulfil their mission as best as possible. That is, [to develop their] strength of individual reasoning [and] their ability to think analytically … not their ability to agitate, ignite emotions and mobilise the masses.

Press release issued by Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf on 28 November 1979.[1]

The previous chapter argued that despite the state's attempts to redefine students' role in politics in non-practical terms, students continued to represent their role as critical intellectuals who had a key role to play in 'correcting' the state. This, together with the student demonstrations of 1977 and 1978, demonstrated to the state that *mahasiswa* identities, at least as they were understood in some student circles, remained too politicised for these students to fit neatly into the roles they were expected to play in the ideal New Order 'organic state'. The state's short-term response to this was to freeze student council activities and close student newspapers, including *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*. In the longer term, however, the state, through the Department of Education and Culture, sought to effect a thoroughgoing 'normalisation' of students. The introduction of the NKK/BKK policies in 1978 and 1979, together with several other policies issued in the late 1970s and early 1980s,[2] attempted to address this issue by depoliticising *mahasiswa* identities and redefining their roles in social and political life in the framework of development (*pembangunan*).

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[1] *[F]ungsi perguruan tinggi… menuntun mahasiswa menunaikan missinya sebaik-baiknya ialah kekuatan penalaran individuil, kemampuan berpikir analistis … dan bukanlah kemampuan beragitasi, membakar emosi dan mengerahkan massa* (cited in *Majalah Mahasiswa* 3 (16) 1980, 131).

[2] See especially the Department of Education and Culture's 1978 policy on the development of the young generation (*Pola Dasar Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Generasi Muda*) (Keputusan Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayan No 0323/V/1978, revised as Keputusan Menteri Negara Pemuda dan Olahraga No 023/MENPORA/85) and the 1982 Presidential Instruction on Political Education for the Young Generation (*Pendidikan Politik Generasi Muda*) (Instruksi Presiden No. 12 Tahun 1982) (Kansil 1986). See also Direktorat Pembinaan Generasi Muda 1977; Gafur 1979; Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 1979; Sekretariat Satuan Pengendali 1982; *Pendidikan Politik* 1982; Gafur 1982.

Majalah Mahasiswa (Student Magazine), published by the Department of Education and Culture and expressly aimed at students, was one vehicle through which these processes of depoliticisation and reorientation to development were carried out. This chapter analyses the ways in which the state defined the roles and identities of *mahasiswa* through a detailed examination of editorials which appeared in this magazine between 1978 and 1986. These editorials, which echo the various policies on youth and students issued in the late 1970s and early 1980s, represent the Department of Education and Culture's official position on the roles and identities of students. Building on the conclusions drawn in chapter three, this chapter argues that the state's definitions of students' roles and identities - centred around the keywords *pembangunan* (development), *pembinaan dan pengembangan* (improvement and development), *pengabdian* (service), *manusia penganalisa* (people of analysis) and *politik* (politics)[3] - were one of the key means by which it sought to shape the ways in which students were able to think and speak about their roles and identities. In doing so, the state also sought to regulate students' behaviour in ways which were consistent with the New Order's emphasis on order, consensus and collective interests over individual interests and with its all-embracing program of development.

At the same time, *Majalah Mahasiswa* editorials also aimed to socialise student readers into particular roles and identities by providing the conditions within which students could regulate their own behaviour in ways acceptable to the state. As noted in chapter one, the effective governing of a population requires that they are allowed a certain degree of freedom in which to act, if only in ways deemed proper by the state. Together with the arrest and trial of student activists involved in the demonstrations of 1977-1978, and the persistent low-level repression and intimidation of students throughout the 1980s, this technique was aimed at 'governing' Indonesian students in order to make use of their skills and abilities for development. This view reflects the New Order's organicist ideas about the state as an integrated whole, in which each functional group had a role to play (see chapter one).

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[3] The keywords analysed in this chapter were chosen based on their importance in *Majalah Mahasiswa*'s constructions of the roles and identities of *mahasiswa*. Some of the keywords, such as *pembinaan* and *pengabdian*, were the themes for one or more editions of the magazine. Other keywords, such as *pembangunan*, were chosen because they were found in all sections of the magazine.

The period between 1974 and 1988 is regarded as the height of the New Order, when the introduction of a range of ideological indoctrination programs, and the almost unlimited powers of the regime's repressive apparatus, meant that public dissent was largely contained.[4] This period also saw the increasing concentration of power in the president (see chapter one). This, together with the depoliticisation policies aimed at students, meant that between 1980 and 1987, university campuses remained relatively quiet, as students, banned from protesting, focussed on their studies and politically-minded students sought other avenues to express their dissent (see Aspinall 1993; Aditjondro 1990; Budiman 1990; Denny 1989, 1990). To some extent, then, the state's aim of influencing students to regulate their own thinking and behaviour was successful. As students' contributions to *Majalah Mahasiswa* reveal, in writing about their roles and identities these students reproduced key aspects of the content and vocabulary of the state discourse of development. Adopting the state discourse was a strategic response on the part of students who wrote for the magazine to the threat of state repression.

Yet, as noted in chapter one, power is always exercised over 'those who are in a position to choose'. Because of this, the possibility of resistance is always present (Hindess 1996, 100; see also chapter one). Students' contributions to *Majalah Mahasiswa* thus reveal that despite their reproduction of the state discourse, they were not fully socialised into the roles and identities the state had constructed for them. By representing students as playing more active roles and by incorporating keywords such as *kontrol sosial,* which were part of the 'discourse of dissent' of the student press during the 1970s, students who wrote in *Majalah Mahasiswa* challenged the state's definitions of their roles as compliant subjects in development. In doing so, however, the voices of those students were co-opted by the state discourse and the dissenting meanings of keywords like *kontrol sosial* were undermined. This cooptation represented one of the ways in which the state mitigated the risks associated with allowing students the freedom to 'make the right choices'.

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[4] See Bourchier and Hadiz 2003, 13-15 for a brief overview of the divisions within the elite during this period and the major areas of dissent. See Aspinall 2000 for a more detailed account.

Student magazine

In September 1977 the Directorate for Student Affairs of the Directorate General of Higher Education launched a new publication, *Majalah Mahasiswa* (Student Magazine). *Majalah Mahasiswa's* mission statement, as set out on the front cover, was 'to increase the strength of individual reasoning and the spirit of patriotism for students as part of the youth of Indonesia in accordance with the demands of development'. Published bimonthly in January, March, May, July, September and November, the magazine was managed and edited by officials from the Department of Education and Culture.[5] The magazine's advisors and patrons - including the Minister of Education and Culture, the Junior Minister of Youth Affairs and the Director General of Higher Education - regularly contributed articles. The magazine also included an editorial and articles dealing with the theme for that month's issue. The themed articles dealt with both abstract and practical issues relating to students and universities, from reflections on the role of students and universities in development to practical issues involved in the implementation of various policies. In addition to the main articles, there were also a number of regular columns including a review of activities on campuses throughout the archipelago, a survey of the opinions of students, lecturers and university officials on various issues as well as study tips and readers' letters.

As an official publication of the Department of Education and Culture, *Majalah Mahasiswa* received institutional subscriptions from universities and colleges throughout the archipelago. It also received individual subscriptions, and readers' letters indicate that the magazine was read by students as well as university administrators and teaching staff. In addition to articles contributed by Department of Education and Culture officials, the magazine also featured articles written by lecturers and others in the academic community as well as students. The undergraduate and postgraduate students who contributed to *Majalah Mahasiswa* came from a variety of faculties. Some of these contributors were involved in the student representative bodies and student senates set up under the auspices of the 'campus coordination bodies'. Others were involved in the student presses of their home universities, either as editors or journalists. Many also contributed to non-student newspapers and other publications.

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[5] Towards the end of its life the magazine was rather irregular: between 1988 and the final issue in 1992 only nine issues appeared. The magazine usually ran to between 90 and 100 pages although from July 1985 onwards, it was reduced to between 40 and 50 pages.

For students wishing to pursue a career in journalism or publishing, involvement in the student press was often the only way to gain practical experience. After the closure of student newspapers and magazines in 1979 and 1980, many of the students who had been involved in these publications were left without an outlet for their writing. In addition to provincial and national newspapers, *Majalah Mahasiswa* represented a means by which these students could gain journalistic and writing experience. Indeed, many of the students who contributed to *Majalah Mahasiswa* later went on to have successful publishing and journalistic careers.[6]

Pembangunan: framing students for development

In *Majalah Mahasiswa* the keyword *pembangunan* (development) is the central reference point for the state's definitions of students' roles and identities. Development was the theme for seven of the 35 issues of *Majalah Mahasiswa* examined in this study with key topics including the role of universities and students in development (4 (20) 1980; 5 (30) 1982; 6 (34) 1983; (7) 37 1983) and the future of Indonesia's development (5 (27) 1982; 8 (44) 1985; 9 (47) 1986). *Pembangunan* also provided the overarching framework within which the other keywords of the state discourse on students' roles and identities were defined (see below). The emphasis on development in *Majalah Mahasiswa* is not surprising given that *pembangunan* was one of the most important keywords of the New Order (van Langenberg 1986; Heryanto 1995). Michael van Langenberg argues that in New Order rhetoric the term *pembangunan* encompassed meanings of economic and material development and modernisation as well as national, social and individual development:

> *Pembangunan* is about re-construction and modernisation (*modernisasi*) and serves to emphasise the distinction between the new order (*orba*) and the preceding 'old order' (*orde lama*, *orla*) state system. *Pembangunan* is also about social engineering, in which the instruments of state power for the realisation of order (*ketertiban*) and stability (*stabilitas*) are essential prerequisites. It is social engineering in a totalitarian sense. Economic development (*pembangunan ekonomi*) is emphatically associated with notions about 'mental', 'moral' and 'spiritual' development (*pembangunan mental, moral, spirituil*) (van Langenberg 1986, 19-20; see also van Langenberg 1990, 124-5).

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[6] For example, Maksum (*Airlangga*, Universitas Airlangga), for example, went on to work for *Jawa Pos* and Muhammad Rusli Karim (*Derap Mahasiswa*, IKIP Yogyakarta) published and edited numerous books on Islam and New Order politics.

New Order officials represented *pembangunan* as a carefully-planned process, with clear aims and targets set out in the Five-Year Development Plans (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun, Repelita). Although the fundamental aims of development remained for the most part unchanged throughout the New Order, different themes, including democracy, national stability and national consensus, progress and the family spirit (*kekeluargaan*), were emphasised at different times (Matheson Hooker 1995, 277-78). Development was also represented as a process which was managed by the state and in which all Indonesians were to participate. In official rhetoric, the role of wider society was to work together with the state to implement the state-devised development programs, often referred to as 'successing development' (*mensukseskan pembangunan*).

The state's policies on the young generation and students assigned these groups a key role in the development of the nation. The 1978 Broad Outlines of State Policy (Garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN), for example, emphasised the central role of Indonesia's *pemuda* and *mahasiswa* in providing the 'skills, leadership, physical fitness, creativity, patriotism, and idealism and noble character' necessary for development (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 1989, 485). In editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa*, however, the role of students in development tended to be subsumed as part of the role of universities. Students' role was not as individual *mahasiswa*, but rather as members of the university as an institution. The representation of the university – not students – as the actor in development reflected the state's concern to prevent students from playing an independent role in the nation. At the same time, it also indicated the ways in which the state attempted to shape students' roles and identities in order to make use of them for development.

Two editions of *Majalah Mahasiswa* took the role of universities in development as a central theme (5 (30) 1982; 7 (37) 1983). The editorials for these two editions, as well as those of several other editions, outlined specifically the role which Indonesian universities were expected to play in national development. This role was defined in reference to the Trifold Mission of Institutions of Higher Education (Tridharma Perguruan Tinggi).[7] Formulated in 1961 by former Minister of Higher Education and

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[7] The Sanskrit-derivation of the term *tridharma* was a common feature of the language of New Order politics (see Anderson 1990b; Errington 1986, 343-5).

Science Tojib Hadiwijaja, the Tridharma Perguruan Tinggi characterised the university as having three key functions: education, research and service to society. In *Majalah Mahasiswa*, each of these three functions was described in terms of its practical application for development. Research, as a 1980 editorial explained, fulfilled the need for the development of scientific knowledge and new technologies which could be applied in a practical way to the economic and material development which *pembangunan* required. Education supplied a core of trained specialists with an appropriate level of skills and education to staff the expanding bureaucracy and to implement development projects. Finally, social service represented 'the application of this knowledge for the interests of the nation' (3 (16) 1980). By applying the knowledge they develop, a 1982 editorial argued, universities are:

> aimed towards the interests and needs of our development, the development of the homeland, the Indonesian nation as a whole. They are not merely 'ivory towers' … but rather they are pioneers and innovators (*pembaharu*) for the progress of society (5 (30) 1982).[8]

In defining the role of universities in development, the editorials drew on the New Order discourse of development, repeating key terms and phrases typical of this discourse. In her examination of former president Suharto's Independence Day speeches, Matheson Hooker identifies a vocabulary and style that is typical of this form of New Order official rhetoric. A central feature of presidential speeches, she argues, is the consistent use of the verbal suffix *–kan* in key verbs (Matheson Hooker 1995, 280). In standard Indonesian, one of the primary functions of *–kan* is to indicate that a subject is causing action to take place or is acting on the object in some way (Sneddon 1996, 70-8). This causative sense of the suffix *–kan* is evident in the key verbs that Matheson Hooker identifies: *mewujudkan* (to realise, to cause something to be realised), *menegakkan* (to uphold, to cause to be upheld), *melaksanakan* (to implement, to cause something to be implemented), and *menumbuhkan* (to grow or develop, to cause something to grow or develop). The consistent use of this form in state discourse reflects the New Order's concern with 'acting on the world', causing things to happen, and engineering change and development. In this view, aspects of social, cultural, political and economic life are not left to chance or allowed to develop of their own accord. Rather, their development is directed towards a set of state-determined goals which are implemented in a staged and systematic manner.

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[8] *…perguruan tinggi diarahkan bagi kepentingan dan kebutuhan pembangunan kita, pembangunan tanah air, nasional Indonesia secara keseluruhan. Ia tidak semata-mata 'menara gading' bagi masyarakatnya. Tetapi ia pelopor dan pembaharu bagi kemajuan masyarakat tersebut* (5 (30) 1982).

In the speeches that Matheson Hooker analyses, the objects of these causative verbs typically include key nouns such as *pembangunan* (development), *kehidupan demokrasi* (democratic life), *stabilisasi politik* (political stabilisation), *masyarakat* (society), *kemajuan* (progress) and *kesejahteraan* (prosperity) and the actor is generally understood to be the state or its institutions (Matheson Hooker 1995, 277 and 279-81). These nouns indicate that the New Order's goals of progress, stability and the welfare and prosperity of wider society are both defined and (largely) brought about by the state itself. However, official rhetoric also highlighted the role of wider society in development. In the exhortative sections of the president's public speeches the inclusive pronoun *kita* (we), representing the nation as a whole, often functions as the actor or subject (see Jackson 1999, 2000). The stress on the role of 'we the nation' in development positions wider society alongside the state in terms of responsibility for development, reflecting the conflation of state and society in the New Order's ideal of the organic state and the New Order's emphasis on the participation of all citizens in the development effort.

Editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa* about the role of universities in development reveal similar patterns in the use of the verbal suffix *–kan* and the objects and actors associated with these verbs. In editorials, one of the main actors in causative verbs is the university, expressed as *perguruan tinggi* (institutions of higher education), *pendidikan tinggi* (higher education) or *universitas* (universities). The types of causative verbs and their objects are also similar to those identified by Matheson Hooker. A 1980 editorial, for example, noted the increasingly important role of universities in 'driving and creating a more prosperous social environment' (*mendorong dan menciptakan lingkungan masyarakatnya yang lebih sejahtera*) (3 (17) 1980) and a 1982 editorial suggested that universities 'could play an active role in advancing the Nation and State' (*dapat mengambil peranan aktif dalam memajukan Bangsa dan Negara*) (5 (29) 1982, 14). Universities are also described as the 'pioneers of development' (*pelopor pembangunan*) (3 (16) 1980, 15). In these editorials, the active role universities are represented as playing in development reflects the New Order's emphasis on the centrality of the 'modern' values of rationality and scientific objectivity which are necessary for the modernisation and development of the nation. This orientation is neatly captured in the explanation of the Tridharma Perguruan Tinggi provided above.

In contrast to this, editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa* rarely position *mahasiswa* as the actors or subjects in causative verbs.[9] Instead, it is students' activities which function as the actors. In a 1981 editorial, for example, the concept of *partisipasi* (participation) functions as the impetus or stimulus (*unsur pendorong*) for progress:

> in the framework of today's National Development, the active and creative participation of students through co-curricular activities is always expected to be able to provide an effective stimulus for the progress of their environment and society (4 (22) 1981).[10]

Ariel Heryanto has suggested that the New Order 'practice of perceiving and confronting social reality in abstraction manifested by the nominalisation of verbs' reflects 'the abstract mode of social relations and mass production in modern industrial societies' (Heryanto 1995, 15-16). In this view, the emphasis in *Majalah Mahasiswa*'s editorial on the abstract concept of *partisipasi* as the stimulus for development reflects the New Order's endeavour to create a modern, economically advanced and socially progressive society.[11] Yet it is also a clear attempt to distance this development from the populace by 'abstracting' their role in it. Thus, while New Order rhetoric stressed the need for the nation as a whole to rally behind development programs, in reality the participation of wider society in development was closely controlled by the state and there was very little room for individual initiative. This strategy aimed to prevent individuals or groups from acting independently of the state or in ways which might be contrary to the state-defined national interest. This was particularly important in relation to students, who had in the past seen their role as independent critics of the state and acted accordingly. For this reason, *Majalah Mahasiswa* also stipulated the kind of participation in development which was appropriate for students, limiting it to co-curricular activities such as sporting and artistic activities, student regiments, the student press, agricultural extension programs and student management skills training (4 (22) 1981). These activities were usually run on the campus and were monitored by university officials. Thus, by representing universities, and not students, as the active participants in development, and by circumscribing the kind of participation in development in which students could engage, editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa* shift the emphasis away from individual action to institutional action (see also chapter three). This reflected the state's desire to make use of students' skills and abilities in practical ways and at the same time ensure that their participation in national life was undertaken in a way which the state saw as appropriate.

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[9] I found only one example of this: the editorial which appeared in edition 5 (27) 1982 of *Majalah Mahasiswa* stated that: *Mahasiswa…dengan tekad serta cita-cita yang luhur di kemudian hari akan melanjutkan roda pembangunan yang telah berputar sejak Pelita I di tahun 1969*.

[10] *…dalam rangka Pembangunan Nasional dewasa ini, maka partisipasi aktif yang kreatif dari mahasiswa melalui kegiatan-kegiatan ko-kurikular senantiasa diharapkan akan dapat memberikan unsur pendorong yang efektif bagi kemajuan lingkungan dan masyarakatnya* (4 (22) 1981). Co-curricular activities referred to a variety of sporting, cultural and artistic programs which students could undertake on the campus.

[11] According to Heryanto, this process can be partly explained within the framework of the transitive and intransitive senses of *development*. In its intransitive sense, development is seen as occurring of its own accord. In its transitive sense, however, development occurs as a result of deliberate action, usually on the part of the government. For Heryanto, this distinction helps explain the prevalence of the transitive independent noun *pembangunan* in the New Order (1995, 24-5).

The organicist concept of the state as a family provided another means by which editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa* attempted to limit students' capacity to act outside the parameters of the university as an institution. Minister of Education and Culture Nugroho Notosusanto's Alma Mater Vision (*Wawasan Alma Mater*), introduced in 1983, draws on this familial language in its representation of the university and of those within it.[12] In this concept, outlined in several editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa*, the university is depicted as 'mother', indicated through the use of the Latin term *alma mater* (bounteous mother), translated as *ibu asuh*, and campus life is described as 'based on the family principle (*kekeluargaan*)' (7 (37) 1983). The university is also represented as a 'unified whole' (*kesatuan yang bulat*) and the members of the university 'family' - teachers, staff, students, and alumni – are represented as united (*manunggal*) with the university under the leadership of the rector, the head or *bapak* (father) of the university family. The relationship between lecturers and students within this family, as described in a 1984 editorial, was both a partnership (*kemitraan*), and an older sibling-younger sibling relationship (*kakak dan adik*) (7 (39) 1984, 80). Students are also described as child-pupils (*anak didik*) whose care and educational development has been entrusted to lecturers.

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[12] The Alma Mater Vision was formalised as Minister of Education and Culture Decision No 0319/U/1983 in July 1983. Nugroho Notosusanto held the position of Minister of Education and Culture from March 1983 until his death in June 1985. Nugroho had a long association with Universitas Indonesia. In 1963-64 he was Assistant Dean for Student Affairs in the Faculty of Arts and from 1964 to 1967 he served as the Assistant Rector for Student Affairs. In addition to his teaching at Universitas Indonesia, from 1964 Nugroho also taught at the National Defence Institute (Lemhannas) and the armed forces command school (Sesko ABRI). In 1968 he was approached to join the Armed Forces Military History Centre which he later headed. In 1977, he received his doctorate in Indonesian history from Universitas Indonesia. At the time of his appointment as Minister of Education and Culture, Nugroho was Rector of Universitas Indonesia (*Apa dan siapa* 1986, 602-3, McGregor 2002; see also Bourchier 1996, 254-5).

This representation of the university as a family, which clearly echoes the New Order's ideology of the family state, has important implications for the ways in which students are able to think and speak about their roles and identities in the context of *Majalah Mahasiswa* as well as for the ways they are (potentially) able to act. The application of the family principle to the university defines the roles and identities which individuals, including students, are to occupy and prescribes the proper relationships between members of the university family. This view implies that students, as the *anak* (children) of the university family, are expected to be respectful and obedient to the rector as *bapak* (and to Suharto as the 'ultimate' *bapak*, the *bapak* of the nation). As *adik* and *anak didik* to the teaching staff of the university, students are represented as the objects of the educational guidance and care of their *dosen* (lecturers), to whom they should show respect. Moreover, the emphasis on 'wholeness' and 'unity' suggests that universities (like the nation) are characterised by harmony, order and consensus, implying that disunity or divisions do not exist and at the same time enabling the actions of those who cause disunity to be defined as contrary to the interests of all members of the family.

Finally, in a practical sense, state control over students' participation in national life was also achieved through the control the state exerted over the institution of the university itself. In the New Order's corporatist model, applied from the beginning of the 1970s, participation in public life was to be undertaken through the official organs of state-run 'functional groups' such as the farmers union (Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia, HKTI), the state labour union (Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, FBSI), and the national youth organisation (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, KNPI) (see chapter two). As the 'corporatist organisation' for *mahasiswa*, the university, like other functional groups, was under the effective control of the state, which through the Department of Education and Culture, had the authority to appoint (and dismiss) university rectors (Cummings, Malo and Sunarto 1997, 101-102).

Self-censorship and dissent

Majalah Mahasiswa's representation of the role of the university in development provided the framework within which students' roles in development were defined. The aim of this was to control the ways in which students could think and speak about their roles in national life and hence the ways in which they could act in their capacity as *mahasiswa*. It was also designed to provide the conditions within which students could think about their roles and so modify their behaviour in ways which were consistent with the New Order's emphasis on state-managed, top-down development. Students' contributions to *Majalah Mahasiswa* indicate that while editorials did set parameters for the ways in which student contributors wrote about their roles and identities, they were also able to incorporate dissenting meanings into their articles, thus challenging the state's positioning of them.

In their contributions to *Majalah Mahasiswa*, students drew on the vocabulary and grammatical forms of the state discourse of development, representing the role of universities and students in development in terms of *mensukseskan pembangunan* ('successing' development), *menyumbangkan* (contributing) their efforts and ideas for development, and *melaksanakan* (implementing) development and noting the need for universities and students to *berpartisipasi* and *ikut serta* (participate) in development and described the process of development in terms of *pertumbuhan* (growth) and *pengembangan* (development), *kemajuan* (progress) and *kesejahteraan* (prosperity). Students also represented their own role in developmentalist terms. In a 1978 article, for example, Muhammad Rusli Karim, then a final year student in the Faculty of Social Sciences at Yogyakarta Teachers College (IKIP Yogyakarta) and editor of its campus newspaper *Derap Mahasiswa*, argued that as part of the young generation, students were expected to play an active role in 'giving substance (*mengisi*) to the ideals of the nation in development' (2 (9-10) 1978, 25-6; see also below). Students' use of these terms, and the definition of their role in developmentalist terms, represents a significant contrast to the ways students who wrote in the student press of the mid to late 1970s represented their role, where they argued that their role was to critique the implementation of the state's development policies (see chapter four). The self-censorship of the students who wrote for *Majalah Mahasiswa* thus required a significant shift, both in terms of vocabulary and in terms of the parameters within which they were able to write about their roles and identities. In the post 1978 political climate, the fear of repression which the state engendered in students was thus successful in influencing the linguistic choices they made when they wrote about their roles and identities.[13]

However, the reproduction of the terms of the state discourse was not necessarily an indication that students had been fully socialised into the roles and identities the state had constructed for them. Even within the parameters which *Majalah Mahasiswa*'s editorials set, students incorporated dissenting meanings into the ways in which they wrote about their roles and identities. Thus, while editorials positioned universities as the active participants in development, in student contributions *mahasiswa* were the key actors. Ratna Juwita Thaib, a student at Medan Teachers College (IKIP Medan), for example, describes students as the 'implementers of development' (*pelaksana dari pembangunan*) and Djoko Walujo, a student in the Faculty of Social Sciences at Universitas Indonesia and a reporter for *Salemba,* argues that in the era of national development, students role is as 'a force for national development' (*kekuatan pembangunan bangsa*) in all fields (2 (9-10) 1978, 74; 2 (11) 1979, 48).

Students also emphasised their role as agents of social control (*kontrol sosial*), even if this was represented in developmentalist terms. Thus, while in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* students explicitly directed their criticisms as agents of social control at 'the system', 'power' or 'the government', for students writing in *Majalah Mahasiswa*, the aim of *kontrol sosial* was expressed more obliquely as 'development'. In the 1978 article cited above, Ratna Juwita Thaib argues that the object of students' criticisms as agents of social control is 'the course of development' (*jalannya pembangunan*) which involves 'the input of ideas (*input pemikiran*) on the implementation of development' (2 (9-10) 1978, 74). In a 1980 article Tonny Ardie, a frequent contributor to *Salemba* before its closure, argued that students' role entailed correcting 'deviations' (*penyimpangan*) in order to realise prosperity (*kesejahteraan umum*) (18 (3) 1980, 72-3).[14]

The representation of students as active agents of development and the incorporation of the concept of *kontrol sosial* into students' contributions to *Majalah Mahasiswa* challenged the state's representations of students as compliant subjects prepared to acquiesce and participate in the state's development programs. It indicated that despite their reproduction of the state's discourse of development, students had not fully internalised the state's definitions of their roles and identities. Moreover, the fact that students were able to write in these terms indicates that even in the more closed political system of the late 1970s and 1980s they retained the ability to express dissent, albeit in subtle ways and provided they framed their dissent in terms which were acceptable to the regime. This ability was partly the result of the state's strategy of government in allowing students some measure of freedom.

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[13] *Majalah Mahasiswa*'s editorial policy was also significant in this regard.

[14] This article had appeared in the 1 September 1977 edition of *Salemba*. No revisions were made to the article that appeared in *Majalah Mahasiswa*.

At the same time, however, students' use of terms such as *kontrol sosial* in a magazine which was clearly a vehicle of the state enabled the state to coopt and so undermine its dissenting meanings. The inside front cover of every edition of *Majalah Mahasiswa* stated that the magazine presented 'the thinking as well as the concrete aspirations of students in supporting development'. By soliciting contributions from students, *Majalah Mahasiswa* incorporated their discourse into the discourse of the state, integrating student voices with the voices of state officials. In this way, students who wrote for *Majalah Mahasisiwa* were coopted into the very discourses that disempowered them. In this process, the term *kontrol sosial* lost the sense of 'open criticism of the government' which it had in the student press of the mid to late 1970s and instead took on the meaning of 'input in development'. This cooptation of student's voices in *Majalah Mahasiswa* represented one of the ways in which the state mitigated the risks associated with allowing students the freedom to 'make the right choices' which was an integral element of its strategy of government. Ironically, it was partly as a result of the cooptation of the student discourse of dissent of the 1970s that students writing in the student press during the 1990s developed a new, alternative discourse with which to oppose the New Order (see chapter six).

'Developing' students

As noted above, the keyword *pembangunan* described the New Order's top-down approach to political, social and economic life, incorporating meanings of economic and material development as well as national, social and individual development. The keywords *pembinaan* (enhancement, improvement) and *pengembangan* (development) were variations on this theme. However, while *pembangunan* primarily referred to material aspects of national life, *pembinaan* referred to the state's approach to moulding Indonesians in order to make use of them for development. In this sense, *pembinaan* was a product of the state's exercise of disciplinary forms of power, that is, of forms of power which were designed to shape the citizenry, including students, in particular ways in order to utilise their skills and attributes in ways which were consistent with the state's goals. In *Majalah Mahasiswa*, the keywords *pembinaan* and *pengembangan* thus both articulate the state's definition of its relationship to students and are integral to the state's strategy of regulating students' behaviour.

Pembinaan was the main theme for the 1981 edition of *Majalah Mahasiswa* entitled 'Efforts in the Consolidation of Student Improvement' (*Usaha-usaha dalam Pemantapan Pembinaan Mahasiswa*) (4 (23) 1981). Editorials dealing with other topics were also framed in terms of *pembinaan* and *pengembangan* (see for example 3 (17) 1980, 25; 4 (22) 1981). The noun *pembinaan* is derived from the verb *bina*, meaning 'to build' or 'establish' and 'to better' or 'improve'. As a noun, *pembinaan* incorporates meanings of 'development' and 'improvement' as well as 'progress' and 'renewal'. During the 1950s, *pembinaan* was used alongside *pembangunan* to refer to the 'development' of the nation.[15] During the New Order, however, *pembinaan*, like *pembangunan*, acquired a sense of top-down direction by the state (see above). In Michael van Langenberg's analysis of the keywords of the New Order state, the term *pembinaan* links 'state power' to 'legitimacy' and represents one of the keywords through which the exercise of state power is effected. *Pembinaan*, he suggests:

> describes the role of the government in 'guiding' Indonesian society and the way in which this guidance is imposed on the populace in order to meet the needs of the state (van Langenberg 1986, 13).

In policy documents and speeches the term *pembinaan* often appeared alongside the noun *pengembangan* (development). Like *pembinaan*, *pengembangan* also encodes meanings of 'development', 'improvement' and 'progress'.[16]

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[15] See, for example, its use in the PSI literary journal *Konfrontasi*, which was published from 1954-1960 and which included among its editors Sutan Takdir Alisjabana.

[16] The noun *pengembangan* is derived from the causative verb *mengembangkan*, meaning to 'open up' or 'unfurl', 'to make larger' and 'to advance' or 'improve', giving it the grammatical sense of deliberate action (KBBI 2001, 538).

The shaping of Indonesian citizens through processes such as *pembinaan* and *pengembangan* was integral to the disciplinary strategy of the New Order. This strategy aimed to guide Indonesians to fulfil their state-defined role as the 'human resources of development'. Thus, the Pancasila education programs of the late 1970s and 1980s, including Pancasila Moral Education (*Pendidikan Moral Pancasila,* PMP), compulsory in schools from 1975, and the Pancasila education courses for civil servants (*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*, P4) introduced in 1978, aimed to produce *manusia Indonesia seutuhnya* (whole Indonesians), people whose ideas and actions were guided by the state's interpretation of the national ideology (Wandelt 1997, 317; Bourchier 1996, 244; Hooker 1996, 130-1).

The productive aims of the New Order's exercise of discipline over students and the young generation in general is clearly reflected in the wording of New Order policies on the young generation. These policies articulate the state's concern with shaping students and the young generation in order to enhance their capabilities as the 'human resources' (*sumber insansi*) of the future (see also Dipoyudo 1987).[17] As the 1982 policy on 'Political Education for the Young Generation' stated, the aim of education in Pancasila and other key national values was to create a young generation who will 'participate actively and creatively … in national development efforts' (*berpartisipasi secara aktif dan kreatif dalam … usaha pembangunan nasional*) (cited in Kansil 1986, 197).

Yet the effective governing of a population also relies on the capacity of individuals to regulate their own behaviour. In recognition of this, New Order policies emphasised that the young generation were responsible for 'improving and developing' themselves (*membina diri dan mengembangkan diri*) (cited in Kansil 1986, 98). As the Department of Education and Culture's 1978 policy on the development of the young generation stated, the aim of the improvement and development of the young generation was to provide them with the knowledge and skills that would enable them to develop 'themselves, their fellows and their environment' on their own initiative (cited in Kansil 1986, 137).[18]

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[17] Kirdi Dipoyudo worked for the Centre for Strategic and International Studies during the 1970s. In 1979 he published a book entitled *Pancasila: Arti dan Pelaksanaannya* [The Pancasila: Its Meaning and Implementation] (*Majalah Mahasisiwa* 4 (23) 1981, 102).

[18] *…dalam rangka memberikan pengetahuan dan keterampilan sesuai dengan bakat, kecenderungan/ keinginan serta kemampuan sebagai bekal untuk selanjutnya atas prakasra sendiri menambah*

In *Majalah Mahasiswa*, being *manusia seutuhnya* was represented in terms of striking a balance between mastery of knowledge and technology and being 'people of culture and character' (*manusia yang berbudaya dan berwatak*) (6 (35) 1983, 2). A 1981 editorial, for example, argued that students 'must be prepared (*dipersiapkan*) mentally and spiritually as well as physically and materially' to face the challenges of the future (4 (23) 1981, 2). The task of preparing students for their role in development was in large part assigned to universities (see for example 3 (17) 1980; 5 (30) 1982; 6 (33) 1983; 7 (39) 1984; 8 (45) 1986).[19] This preparation involved developing (*mengembangkan*) students' professional skills and knowledge (*ketrampilan profesional*) as well as their generic intellectual and reasoning abilities (*kemampuan penalaran*) (4 (22) 1981). In addition to their specialist knowledge, students were also expected to develop good character (*watak atau karakter yang baik*) and a sense of social awareness and social responsibility (*rasa sadar dan tanggung jawab sosial*) (4 (23) 1981). The development of these values in students, argued a 1983 editorial, would increase their enthusiasm for and desire to serve the interests of national development (*semangat dan pengabdiannya bagi melanjutkan pembangunan nasional*) (6 (35) 1983, 2; see also 4 (23) 1981).

The position of students as the objects of efforts on the part of both the state and the university to 'develop' them is reflected in their role as the grammatical objects of *pembinaan* and *pengembangan* in editorials. A 1981 editorial, for example, stated that in the process of developing and consolidating their reasoning abilities and character, students were 'guided' (*dibimbing*) towards maturity of thinking through various academic tasks and 'trained' (*dilatih*) to carry out activities which would develop in them responsible patterns of action (4 (22) 1981). Editorials also represent students as participants in abstract processes of development, signified by the use of nominalised verbs such as *pertumbuhan* (cultivation), *pengembangan* (development) and *pemantapan* (consolidation), rather than as grammatical subjects. The same 1981 editorial stated that: 'Students who are in the process of studying in institutions of

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meningkatkan dan mengembangkan dirinya, sesamanya maupun lingkungannya … (cited in Kansil 1986, 137).

[19] According to a 1983 editorial, the most fundamental aspect of the university's educative role lay in socialising (*memberikan sosialisasi*) students in scientific and personal values and educating them to become competent graduates in their field and committed 'people of the Pancasila' (*manusia Pancasila*) (6 (33) 1983). The responsibility for this 'noble task' fell on the lecturers and staff of the university who, in the interests of creating a more prosperous society, were 'called to (*dituntut*) produce graduates who have intellectual quality and are sensitive to the aspirations and needs of their environment' (3 (17) 1980, 25).

higher education are in essence in the process of growing and developing their reasoning abilities and identity' (*Mahasiswa yang sedang dalam proses belajar di pendidikan tinggi pada hakekatnya sedang dalam proses pertumbuhan dan pengembangan penalaran dan kepribadiannya*) (4 (22) 1981; see also 4 (23) 1981). Moreover, in active processes such as *membina* (improve), *mengembangkan* (develop), *memantapkan* (consolidate), *membekali* (to supply) and *menumbuhkan* (cultivate), abstract concepts function as the grammatical objects. These abstract concepts include *pengetahuan* (knowledge), *kemampuan* (abilities), *ketrampilan* (skills), *watak* (character), *kepribadian* (identity), *budaya* (culture) and *nilai* (values). While *mahasiswa* do occasionally function as post-modifying elements for these characteristics and qualities, their possession of them is often simply implied. The subjects carrying out these active processes are also abstract nouns, including *kegiatan* (activities) and *pendidikan* (education). The overall impression which editorials give is thus of a world largely devoid of human action and interaction.

The focus on abstract concepts such as 'knowledge', 'skills' and 'values' as the objects of *pembinaan* shifts the emphasis away from *mahasiswa* as individuals and on to their characteristics and qualities. In this view, it is not students themselves who are to be developed in ways which will be useful for development but rather their capabilities and attributes. Unlike individuals, abstract qualities and characteristics are more easily shaped to fit the state's purposes. At the same time, the use of abstract nouns such as 'activities' and 'education' as the grammatical subjects carrying out *pembinaan* shifts the emphasis away from the role of the state itself in these top-down processes of development. This was in part a response to adverse reactions on the part of students to the concept of *pembinaan*. Students writing in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*, for example, rejected the government's enforcing of the *pembinaan* approach. As an article in the November 1977 edition of *Gelora Mahasiswa* argued, the culture of 'developing' the young generation reflected the government's naïve view of the young generation. The article also suggested that the concept of *pembinaan* was a political strategy. Citing the example of KNPI, the umbrella organisation for Indonesian youth which, the article agued, aimed to undermine the independence of existing organisations for youth, the article suggested that *pembinaan* was being used as 'cover for other interests (*selimut bagi kepentingan lain*). At the same time, the article also advocated the application of *pembinaan* to all areas of national life, suggesting that 'everything must be improved, without exception' (*semuanya … harus dibina tanpa kecuali*) including the government and the nation's leaders. The *pembinaan* of the state was part of students' role in social control: the caption which appears below a photograph of a student addressing a crowd of fellow students reads: 'Free speech: every so often 'improving' the authorities' (*Mimbar bebas: sesekali 'membina' penguasa*) (*Gelora Mahasiswa* November 1977, 3). By backgrounding its own role in *pembinaan* through the use of abstract concepts then, the state, through the Department of Education and Culture, attempts to deflect students' resentment towards the policy away from the state itself.

The representation of students as objects of *pembinaan* reflects the state's concern with regulating the ways in which they could think and speak about their identities and consequently the ways in which they could act. In this view, the positioning of students as objects was integral to the state's disciplinary strategy of shaping their identities as *manusia seutuhnya* whose thinking and behaviour was consistent with New Order values and aims and who could therefore usefully participate in the state's all-embracing program of development. Yet despite the rhetoric that students should develop themselves and use their initiative in doing so, policy makers and the security apparatus in fact vigorously sought to prevent students from playing an active role or taking the initiative for action in anything other than in support of *pembangunan*. For this reason, the activities permitted to students were those which were both sanctioned and controlled by the state, namely student regiments, agricultural extension activities and campus-based sporting and cultural activities (see above). By representing students as objects rather than as active subjects, the state, through *Majalah Mahasiswa*, attempted to control their participation in public life in ways which the state had determined for them.

Earlier it was suggested that the keyword *pembinaan* articulated the state's definition of its relationship to students. In editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa*, the choices made from the system of modality establish the state (the editorial voice in *Majalah Mahasiswa*) in a position of authority and consequently students (the audience of the magazine) in the position of subjects of the state's authority. In the editorial which appeared in the 1981 edition of *Majalah Mahasiswa* which took *pembinaan* as its key theme, categorical modality, expressed by the use of the simple present tense - *[m]ahasiswa … pada hakekatnya sedang dalam proses* ('students … are in essence in the process of') and *tidak dapat disangkal lagi* ('it can no longer be denied') - and the use of the modal auxiliary *harus* (must) (which appears twice more in the editorial) encode the writer's authority with regard to the 'truth' of the assertions made in the editorial and his or her ability to make such assertions:

> As part of the young generation of the nation, students are in essence in the process of consolidating themselves to be responsive in facing the challenges of the future. To meet the challenges of the future in all fields, which increasingly need to be handled, then it can no longer be denied that the young generation is called to be prepared (*siap*) to carry out this important task. Of their own accord, then, they must also be prepared (*dipersiapkan*) both mentally and spiritually as well as physically and materially (4 (23) 1981).[20]

It is thus the state, through the editorial voice of *Majalah Mahasiswa*, which asserts the role of students ('to be responsive in facing the challenges of the future') and which determines that students should be developed 'both mentally and spiritually as well as physically and materially'. Students, on the other hand, are expected to participate willingly by being 'prepared to carry out this important task' and to 'develop themselves' in accordance with the state's directives. By positioning itself as the authority which determines students' development, this editorial constructs the relationship between students and the state in a hierarchical and asymmetrical way. This hierarchical relationship reflects the state's paternalistic approach to wider society. In the concept of the 'state as family', the *bapak* (father) as the head of the family exercises a paternal form of power, by positioning himself as the person in the best position to know the needs and interests of the family and to make sure these needs are met. In *Majalah Mahasiswa*, the 'benevolent paternalism' which was the key characteristic of the state's representation of its relationship to students, disguised the reality of repression and intimidation which students experienced at the hands of the security apparatus.

Service to society

In *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*, one of the key elements of students' role was the idea that they acted on behalf of the *rakyat*, as the spokespersons for their aspirations, as their defenders, and as their guides and leaders. This view of students' relationship to the *rakyat*, it was suggested, reflected the state's paternalistic approach to wider society and at the same time justified students' role by implying that the national family was not functioning in an ideal way. In editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa*, however, students' relationship to wider society was described not as being a channel for wider aspirations or as defenders of wider interests but in terms of *pengabdian* (service). The redefinition of students' role as one of 'service' was a dramatic shift from the leadership role which students who wrote for *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* saw themselves as playing. Now, rather than leaders of the *rakyat* and channels for their aspirations, students were to be followers and servants. This shift undermined one of the more significant means by which students' justified their role in social and political life.

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[20] *Mahasiswa yang merupakan bagian generasi muda bangsa pada hakekatnya sedang dalam proses pemantapan diri untuk tanggap menghadapi tantangan masa depan. Untuk menyongsong tantangan hari depan yang semakin memerlukan penanganan di segala bidang, maka tidak dapat disangkal lagi bahwa generasi muda dituntut untuk siap melaksanakan tugas berat ini. Dengan sendirinya maka mereka harus dipersiapkan pula baik secara mental spiritual maupun fisik material* (23 (4) 1981).

Students' service role was the theme for two editions of *Majalah Mahasiswa* (8 (42) 1985; 8 (43) 1985). However, *pengabdian* also framed discussions of other topics, including students' academic and 'co-curricular' achievements (4 (22) 1981) and their role in development (5 (27) 1982). Editorials for these editions used a variety of terms to describe the concept of students' 'service', including the Javanese-derived s*umbangsih* (contribution, assistance) and *menyumbang* (contribute), the Sanskrit *bhakti* (service), and Arabic *pengabdian*. These terms incorporate meanings of obedience, loyalty, respect, submission and dedication.[21] The primary object of students' *pengabdian*, as defined in editorials, was *masyarakat* (society), although the nation (*bangsa*, *ibu pertiwi*), *pembangunan* (development) and *lingkungan* (environment) were also used. Students' service is thus represented as an expression of obedience, loyalty and devotion to the nation, to development and to wider society.

The choice of *masyarakat* rather than *rakyat* as the primary object of students' service reflects the New Order's concern with shifting emphasis away from the *rakyat* as a political actor. The term *rakyat* had long been linked to politics through its use in the *pergerakan* during the 1920s and 1930s, during the revolution and in Sukarno's political rhetoric in the 1950s and 1960s. In these contexts, the *rakyat* was a political object, whose interests could be spoken about, on whose behalf aspiring politicians and other political actors could act and who (at least in rhetoric) could be involved in political struggle. *Rakyat* also had class connotations: it referred to 'the ordinary people' and not the nation's elite. The term *masyarakat*, however, had the distinct advantage of being without these 'undesirable' political and class connotations.

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[21] The base word of *pengabdian, abdi*, means 'subordinate', 'servant', 'attendant' or 'slave', the noun *bhakti*, refers to acts of loyalty, devotion or respect and *sumbangsih* refers to support or assistance given as a sign of love or devotion (KBBI 2001, 2, 94 and 1101); Stevens and Schmidgall-Tellings 2004, 2, 81 and 966).

The choice of *masyarakat* over *rakyat* also reflects the New Order's attempts to separate students from the *rakyat*. This was a clear response to students' definitions of their role as the defenders of the *rakyat* and the channels for their aspirations during the mid to late 1970s (see chapter four). *Masyarakat* (society) is a more amorphous concept than *rakyat*: it refers not to a definable group of people (as *rakyat* does), but rather to the abstract concept of 'society', defined in broad and general terms. The term *masyarakat* also encompasses both the elite as well as the ordinary people. Moreover, since the New Order's concept of the organic state obscured the divide between state and society, arguing that the institutions of the state were the embodiment of the people's aspirations, in New Order rhetoric the concept of *masyarakat* also implied 'state'. By representing the aims of students' service as *masyarakat* (society) then, editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa* redefine students' role not as champions of the ordinary people, but as servants of the state and the nation as a whole, while at the same time appearing to acknowledge students' long-established role in relation to the *rakyat* (see chapter three).

Students' active role in serving the nation and society is reflected in the grammatical roles *mahasiswa* play in editorials (and in the roles played by *rakyat*). Significantly, social service is one of the few areas of meaning in which *mahasiswa* play the role of grammatical subjects. An editorial in a 1985 edition of *Majalah Mahasiswa* for example, stated that 'students can play a role in progressing still-undeveloped village communities (*mahasiswa dapat mengambil peran untuk memajukan masyarakat desa yang masih terbelakang*) (8 (43) 1985). This active role was appropriate since social service, as it was defined in editorials, demonstrated students' commitment and allegiance to the nation, to development and to wider society.

Despite this, students were more often represented as grammatical objects. A 1981 editorial for example, asserted that 'students are expected to be able to use their abilities and skills to serve the progress of society' (*Para mahasiswa diharapkan dapat membaktikan kemampuan dan keterampilannya bagi kemajuan masyarakat*) (4 (22) 1981, 106). Similarly, a 1985 editorial argued that 'as privileged and educated members of the young generation students are truly charged and expected to be called for all forms of social service (*Sebagai generasi muda terpilih dan terpelajar mahasiswa sungguh-sungguh dituntut dan diharapkan terpanggil bagi segala jenis kegiatan bhakti sosial itu*) (8 (43) 1985). The representation of students' as the objects of expectations suggests that the initiative for their social service does not originate with students' themselves. Rather, it is a response to the expectations of others; a duty or obligation imposed on them because of their status as educated individuals, a fact which clearly differentiates them from the uneducated masses. The fact that the forms of social service advocated in editorials are concerned with development, indicates that it is the state which is the source of these 'expectations' and 'calls'. Yet editorials do not explicitly state this. Instead, the focus is on the positive effects of students' social service, that is, the progress of village communities. Students are thus represented not as serving the state, but as serving 'society', something which students themselves had long seen as an integral part of their role. In this way, the state attempted to utilise students' skills and abilities for development while presenting the concept of social service in a more palatable way.[22]

Like *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*, editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa* emphasised the importance of students' awareness of and sensitivity to the problems faced by wider society as the basis for their service. Editorials reiterated the need for students to be *peka* (sensitive) and *sadar* (aware), to *mengerti* (understand) social issues and to be *bertanggung jawab* (responsible) for their society. Students' social service (*bhakti sosial*) was represented as upright (*luhur*) and noble (*mulia*) (see 8 (43) 1985). These high-sounding terms, which are derived from Javanese and Sanskrit respectively, suggest that students' social service took place in an idealised traditional, hierarchical society in which each member of the community had a designated place and in which values such as honour, self-sacrifice and righteousness were highly valued.

A more contentious area of meaning (if not explicitly so), related to the aims of students' role in relation to wider society. For students writing in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*, in their role as the spokespersons and defenders of the *rakyat* students were to give a voice to the aspirations (*aspirasi*) and sentiments (*perasaan*, *hati nurani*) of the common people and to safeguard their rights. In editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa*, however, the aspirations of the *rakyat* are represented in less emotive terms, as 'social problems' (*masalah sosial*). A 1982 editorial, for example, argued that students could 'contribute (*memberikan sumbangsih*) by striving to solve social problems' (5 (27) 1982). These social problems, as they were defined in editorials, included practical issues related to development as well as the broader aim of social and cultural modernisation. In this view, students' role as educated members of society was not to identify issues which needed to be addressed, but merely to contribute to solving problems which the state had already identified. Moreover, this contribution was undertaken through activities which the state deemed appropriate and which were managed on a national level through the universities and the Department of Education and Culture. Thus, in keeping with the New Order's benevolently paternalistic approach to society, it is the state which determines the interests and needs of wider society and which gives concrete expression to these needs in the form of the 'collectively-determined goal' of development.

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[22] Social service was also represented as being useful for students. As a 1985 editorial suggested, 'In this process of service [to society] students are … also trained to be more beneficial, more useful for their environment …' (*Dalam proses pengabdian [kepada masyarakat] ini … mahasiswa juga dilatih untuk berbuat agar lebih bermanfaat, lebih berguna bagi lingkungannya…*) (8 (42) 1985).

The ideas which inform *Majalah Mahasiswa*'s representations of students' relationship to wider society date to the height of the nationalist movement. During the 1920s and 1930s, nationalist rhetoric regarding the relationship between intellectuals and wider society took what Frederick has called a decidedly '*rakyatist*' turn. Frederick notes, for example, that during the 1920s and 1930s a number of nationalist organisations attempted to establish formal relationships with Surabaya's urban communities (*kampong*) with the aim of 'acquainting members with their plight' and, later, of gaining their support for positions on the city council (Frederick 1989, 51-6) While the concern of the intellectuals associated with the nationalist movement was largely ideological, it also extended to practical assistance in the form of 'aiding the unemployed, combating illiteracy, and encouraging thrift and cleanliness (ibid., 137). During the 1950s and 1960s, the Indonesian Communist Party advocated a program of *turun ke bawah* or 'going down among the masses' in which urban artists and activists were placed in rural areas. The program was designed to provide artists and activists with an insight into the issues faced by rural communities and to serve as a two-way channel of communication between these communities and the party bureaucrats based in the capital (Shackford-Bradley 2000, 27). And in the late 1960s and early 1970s, modernising students and intellectuals advocated students' involvement in rural development projects as a means of benefiting the community and 'transforming the political culture of the masses' from a traditional to a 'modern' one (Liddle 1973, 188). In all of these programs, wider society were seen as ignorant and powerless and hence needing the assistance of more educated individuals: they were objects, rather than political actors in their own right.

The persistence of this paternalistic view of the *rakyat* amongst the Indonesian elite is also apparent in the social service programs of the 1970s and 1980s. One of the primary vehicles for students' involvement in wider society was the study service scheme (*Kuliah Kerja Nyata*, KKN).[23] Community service had been part of the university's function since independence: during the 1950s, newly graduated teachers volunteered to spend a year providing their newly acquired skills in locations outside Java under the student mobilisation (*Pengerahan Tenaga Mahasiswa*, PTM) scheme (Hardjasoemantri 1982, 158-9; *Apa dan siapa* 1986, 279-80). In 1967, however, the Basic Memorandum on the Development of Higher Education issued by former Director General of Higher Education Mashuri Saleh included a suggestion that community service become a formal part of all university degrees (Saleh 1968). In 1971, the new Director of Higher Education and the architect of the KKN program, Koesnadi Hardjasoemantri trialled the program at three universities: Universitas Andalas, Universitas Gadjah Mada and Universitas Hasanuddin (Hardjasoemantri 1982, chapter three). In 1973, thirteen universities participated in the program and in 1974 the program gained official recognition in the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1974-1979). The major aims of the program were to link education to the needs of development, to stimulate social development, particularly in rural areas, and to give students practical experience of working for development. In official formulations, the program was described as a means of 'supplying large quantities of temporary extension manpower (sic) that can be deployed at the village level to supplement existing extension services'. It also provided 'greater opportunities for young Indonesians to participate directly in the development of their nation' (ibid., 149 and 147-8). Students usually spent between three and six months living and working in the village, often as part of an interdisciplinary team. Depending on their discipline, students' activities in the village ranged from implementing programs to improve agricultural practices, establishing cooperatives, introducing new teaching methods, building village roads and bridges and constructing water supplies, providing legal aid and establishing community health clinics.

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[23] Koesnadi Hardjasoemantri was the Director of Higher Education between 1969 and 1974 (*Apa dan siapa* 1986, 279-80). The term 'study service scheme' is his translation of *Kuliah Kerja Nyata* (see Hardjasoemantri 1982).

In editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa*, the KKN program, as well as student work camps (*kemah kerja mahasiswa,* KKM), ABRI service and various other social and community service activities, were represented as the concrete means by which students could contribute to society (see for example 8 (42) 1985; see also 4 (22) 1981, 106). This representation of students' social service was consistent with the state's paternalistic view of the masses, and with students' own representations of their relationship to the *rakyat* (see chapter four). In editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa*, wider society is not represented as an actor in its own right, but rather the group on whose behalf the state (through students) works. In a practical sense, the leadership role which students were expected to play in implementing development programs as part of the KKN program, did not aim to empower communities to develop themselves but rather to mobilise them behind programs which had been developed for them by students (and, ultimately, by the state). Students were thus the vehicles for the state's ideas of development and modernisation. Moreover, while students' role in the KKN program was ostensibly as leaders, their leadership was limited to practical development, that is, to programs which the state had deemed appropriate.

People of analysis

One of the key elements of Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf's normalisation policy was the effort to return students to what he defined as their essential identity as 'people of analysis' (*'manusia penganalisa'*) (*Majalah Mahasiswa* 3 (16) 1980, 128). Unlike the term *intelektual*, the term *manusia penganalisa* had the distinct advantage of being without the connotations of social and political engagement which went alongside students' representations of their role as *intelektual* and with the Western understanding of the role of the intellectual (see chapter four). The term *manusia penganalisa*, as it was used in policy documents, speeches and in *Majalah Mahasiswa*, denoted those engaged in the intellectual exercise of 'analysis', who could think systematically and reach logical and reasoned conclusions. In his explanation of the policy, Daud Yusuf drew a clear distinction between *intelektual* and *manusia penganalisa*:

> The NKK policy is not intended to facilitate the campus in forming intellectuals. People can become intellectuals without undertaking higher education. On the other hand, not all those who hold university degrees … can be considered intellectuals. The NKK policy is intended to facilitation universities in forming the kind of people whose are no less important than intellectuals, that is, people of analysis (cited in 3 (15) 1980, 9).[24]

Such individuals had a key role to play in both the technical and practical aspects of development. This redefinition of students' role by the state was a response to students' articulation of their role as politically engaged *intelektual*, outlined in their contributions to *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*. It had the clear purpose of reorienting students' understandings of their roles and identities away from politics and towards the scientific activities which the state saw as appropriate for them.

Students' role as 'people of analysis' was the subject of a number of editions of *Majalah Mahasiswa*. Two editions in 1980 focussed on students' intellectual life and the creation of a 'scientific community' (*masyarakat ilmiah*) (3 (15) 1980; 3 (16) 1980). The latter was also the theme for a 1983 edition of the magazine (6 (33) 1983). An editorial in a 1984 edition also discussed the status of the campus as a scientific community in the context of Nugroho Notosusanto's Alma Mater Vision (7 (39) 1984; see above). In the editorials for these editions, a broad range of terms were used to describe students' identity as intellectuals. In addition to *manusia penganalisa*, editorials also used terms such as *manusia penalar* (logical thinkers), *insan cendekiawan muda* (young intellectual beings), *sarjana yang berkwalitas intelektual* (graduates of intellectual quality), *insan penalar* (beings of reasoning), *calon-calon sarjana dan intelektual* (prospective graduates and intellectuals) and *ilmuwan/profesional in statu-nascendi* (nascent scientists/professionals) (3 (16) 1980; 3 (17) 1980, 25; 3 (18), 22; 6 (35) 1983; 5 (30) 1982).[25] Students were also described as *bagian masyarakat akademis* (part of the academic community) and *bagian dari masyarakat ilmiah* (part of the scientific community) (3 (17) 1980, 25; 3 (16) 1980) and in terms which indicated their place as educated members of society (*bagian dari masyarakat yang terdidik* and *komponen bangsa terdidik*) (5 (27) 1982; 5 (29) 1982).

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[24] *NKK tidak bermaksud memperlancar kampus membentuk intelektual. Orang dapat menjadi intelektual tanpa melewati pendidikan tinggi. Sebaliknya tidak setiap penyandang gelar pendidikan tinggi … dapat dianggap sebagai intelektual. NKK bermaksud memperlancar perguruan tinggi membentuk sejenis manusia yang tidak kalah pentingnya dari intelektual, yaitu manusia penganalisa …* (cited in 3 (15) 1980, 9).

[25] See also the 1980 article in *Salemba* which drew a distinction between *calon intelektual* and the *pekerja intelektual* (intellectual workers) of the NKK policy (*Salemba* 20 March 1980, 4).

There are significant similarities between the way in which editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa* represent the intellectual identity of students and the ways this identity was represented in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*. Terms such as *intelektual* for example, are common to both state and student representations, as is the idea that students are prospective (*calon*) or young (*muda*) intellectuals. Both also represent students as part of the academic community. Yet the intellectual role envisaged for students in editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa* was clearly different to that envisaged by students writing in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*. The meanings given to the term *manusia penganalisa* in speeches and policy documents provide the framework within the state defined students' role as intellectuals.

In April 1978, Daud Yusuf presented his NKK policy to the working meeting of rectors of state universities. In it he defined *manusia penganalisa* as future technocrats, specialists and bureaucrats who could ensure Indonesia's development programs were carried out in an effective and efficient manner. In chapter four it was noted that in the view of the secular modernising strategists of the early New Order, the role of intellectuals was to assist in policy-making and planning for development (see chapter four). The minister's argument that the success of Indonesia's development efforts depended on the availability of a variety of specialists who could function as the 'operators of the machinery of development' (*penggerak mesin pembangunan*) was consistent with this view. According to the minister, the task of those specialists within the technostructure was to overcome problems and issues relating to their field of expertise (cited in *Majalah Mahasiswa* 3 (16) 1980, 5). These *pekerja otak* (knowledge workers), as the minister referred to them, occupied a powerful role in society since the decisions they made in their capacity as technocrats had an important impact on society. Students' mission (*misi*) as *manusia penganalisa*, the minister continued, was to strengthen their individual reasoning power (*kekuatan penalaran individual*) in order to fulfil their future role in the technostructure (*Majalah Mahasiswa* 3 (16) 1980, 10):

> From amongst students should be born, *par excellence*, individuals who have the strength of reasoning which is required to fill the technostructure in every field of social life (ibid., 7).[26]

Students' role as *manusia penganalisa* was thus to provide the technical expertise required to solve the practical problems associated with development. This role was to be carried out largely within the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. It was also in effect a future role, to be undertaken once students had reached intellectual maturity and been equipped with the necessary skills.

Speeches and policy documents continually reiterated the need for students to develop their reasoning abilities and their ability to think analytically (*kemampuan berpikir analitis*), for their thinking to be based on scientific principles (*hakikat ilmu pengetahuan*) and their ideas expressed in an ordered and systematic way (*teratur dan sistematik*) (see *Majalah Mahasiswa* 3 (16) 1980, 131; 3 (16) 1980, 6-7). These policy documents and speeches emphasise the fact that students are still in the process of developing their intellectual abilities. As Daud Yusuf expressed it, students were 'not yet acknowledged to be mature in their knowledge (*belum diakui matang di dalam keilmuan*) (3 (15) 1980, 3). Editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa* reflect this emphasis, revealing the link between the keyword *manusia penganalisa* and the keyword *pembinaan* (see above). As a 1981 editorial expressed it:

> Students who are in the process of studying in institutions of higher education are in essence in the process of growing and developing their reasoning abilities and identity so that they become firm. In this process, students are guided towards maturity of thinking through various academic activities and scientific studies, activities for the development and full comprehension of scientific attitudes (4 (22) 1981).[27]

The agent responsible for developing students' reasoning abilities was the university. A 1984 editorial described universities as 'factories' for producing thinkers (*manusia pemikir*), people who were able to think in a careful, logical and empirical manner (*orang yang sanggup berpikir cermat, logis dan empiris*) (7 (39) 1984, 3). The emphasis on the ‘production’ of *manusia penganalisa* revealed in the metaphor of the university as a factory reflects the state’s approach to wider society, including students. Underlying this metaphor is a perception of students as a (human) resource to be shaped in certain uniform ways according to the state’s specifications. As a factory, the university is responsible for manufacturing ‘products’ which will be useful for development. The representation of education as a process of producing standardised and model ‘thinkers’ undermines students’ agency, representing them as empty shells to be filled with knowledge and with the scientific values of the university. Moreover, given students’ own emphasis in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* on the intellectual basis of their actions as a means of legitimising their active role in social and political life, *Majalah Mahasiswa*’s representation of students as not yet mature intellectually undermines one of the key sources of legitimacy for their actions.

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[26] *Dari kelompok mahasiswa seharusnya lahir, par excellence, individu yang mempunyai kekuatan penalaran yang diperlukan untuk mengisi teknostruktur di setiap bidang penghidupan masyarakat* (*Majalah Mahasiswa* 3 (16) 1980, 7).

[27] *Mahasiswa yang sedang dalam proses belajar di pendidikan tinggi pada hakekatnya sedang dalam proses pertumbuhan dan pengembangan penalaran dan kepribadiannya agar menjadi mantap. Pada proses tersebut, mahasiswa dibimbing ke arah kedewasaan berpikir melalui berbagai kegiatan akademik dan pengkajian ilmu pengetahuan, kegiatan untuk mengembangan keterampilan dan penghayatan sikap ilmiah* (4 (22) 1981).

The emphasis on students as products of the university’s education processes is also reflected in the grammatical roles students play. Throughout the editorials, students are represented as objects rather than as actors. In the 1981 editorial cited above, for example, students are the objects of the university’s ‘guidance’ in the phrase *mahasiswa dibimbing ke arah kedewasaan berpikir* (students are guided towards maturity of thinking) (4 (22) 1981). Moreover, while editorials often refer to students’ intellectual nature and characteristics, citing students’ *ciri intelek* (intellectual characteristics) and their nature as *calon-calon sarjana dan intelektual* (future graduates and intellectuals) (3 (16), 1980; 6 (35) 1983), there were no examples in the editorials studied in which students were represented as acting in their role as intellectuals. Students’ role as *manusia penganalisa* is thus not to act or even to think or analyse (this they will do in their role as technocrats once they have achieved intellectual maturity) but to submit themselves to the university’s efforts to develop their thinking skills.

The term *manusia penganalisa* also clearly entailed a non-political understanding of knowledge and the role of ‘knowledge workers’. This was a significant contrast to the explicitly political understanding of the role of students as *intelektual* developed in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* (see chapter four). An editorial in *Majalah Mahasiswa*, for example, defined knowledge (*ilmu pengetahuan*) as universal, public, and politically disinterested and as characterised by ‘positive scepticism’ (3 (16) 1980). In a 1980 interview with the news magazine *Tempo*, in which he defended the normalisation concept, Daud Yusuf explained these concepts. Knowledge, he argued, is independent of skin colour, race, descent, or religious conviction. It is also public, in the sense that it is for the benefit of the whole community. Knowledge is disinterested in that it is not to be used for the purposes of propaganda and it is characterised by positive scepticism in the sense that it is based on logic and reasoning (cited in *Majalah Mahasiswa* 3 (15) 1980, 5). This emphasis on knowledge as 'disinterested' and the need for students to be disinterested 'thinkers' reflected the state's aim of depoliticising students' understandings of their intellectual identities and roles. Thus, while students who wrote in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* saw their role as politically-engaged *intelektual* as seeking truth by applying their analytical abilities, correcting the state when it deviated from what was true and just, and offering suggestions for improving society, the view of the state was that students were apolitical 'scientists' working for the interests of society.

At the beginning of this section it was noted that among the range of terms used to describe students' identity as *manusia penganalisa* in editorials was the term *intelektual*. Yet as the preceding discussion has shown, when editorials use this term, it is not the socially engaged *intelektual* of *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* to which they refer. Rather, *intelektual* in this sense refers to the technocrats of the future. By including terms like *intelektual* within the lexical set surrounding *manusia penganalisa*, *Majalah Mahasiswa* depoliticises the meaning of *intelektual* as it is defined in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*. In doing so, *Majalah Mahasiswa* strips this term of the dissenting meanings given to it in the student press.

Politik*: concept, policy, arena*

Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf's campus normalisation policy deemed political activity to be 'abnormal' (*tidak normal*) for students. In his justification for the introduction of the policy, the minister argued that the campuses and the student representative bodies had been misused (*disalahgunakan*) for political interests (*kepentingan-kepentingan percaturan politik*). This, he argued, had caused a decay in the scientific norms on which the academic community should be based (3 (16) 1980, 131; 3 (15) 1980, 3; see also chapter two). The NKK policy aimed to return the campuses to their 'proper' state as apolitical scientific communities and students to their proper status as members of these scientific communities. Yet the minister was concerned to point out that this did not mean students could not engage in politics. Instead, he drew a distinction between politics as a concept, politics as policy and politics as an arena (see also chapter four). Politics as a concept, he argued in a 1978 speech, is concerned with ideas about what is in the national and public interest, and with programs for action, desired goals and the means to achieve these goals. Politics as policy is concerned with the actions individuals or groups take in solving the problems of a society or nation. Finally, politics as an arena is concerned with how and where various concepts and policies meet and are contested. Since students' essential identity was as *manusia penganalisa* and not, as Yusuf noted, *manusia rapat umum* (people of public meetings, read: demonstrators), then the only legitimate sense in which students, in their identities as *mahasiswa*, could engage in politics was in the first sense, politics as a concept. If students did wish to engage in political policy or in political action, he continued, as citizens of a democratic country they were permitted to do so, but only as 'youth' (*pemuda*) and only outside the campus (3 (16) 1980, 8-9; 3 (15) 1980, 10).

This separation of conceptual politics from practical politics reflected the state's attempts to shape the ways in which students were able to think and speak about their roles and identities in politics. The concept of 'normalisation' did not prohibit students from engaging in politics. Rather, it attempted to define what was 'normal' and in doing so circumscribe the ways in which students could conceive of their role. The concepts of 'normal' and 'abnormal' were particularly significant for the New Order. 'Normal' was associated with conformity to the key values and ideologies of the New Order, and with order, stability and harmony, the essence of the ideal organic state. Abnormality, however, implied deviance, disorder, instability and discord, which threatened the integrity of the state and so jeopardised the common good. In both state and student discourse, 'deviations' were represented as detrimental to the proper functioning of the state and the welfare of wider society and so requiring correction. By characterising practical politics as abnormal for students, the state, through the Minister of Education and Culture, asserts its authority to define what is normal and hence in the interests of society and legitimises the attempts to correct or 'normalise' students' political roles and identities. At the same time, it also attempts to limit the roles which students can legitimately play in politics.

The topic of politics was the theme for two editions of *Majalah Mahasiswa*. A 1980 edition of the magazine examined the topic of students and politics in the context of the minister's separation of practical and conceptual politics (3 (18) 1980). Edition number 32 explored the issue of political education in the wake of Presidential Instruction No. 12 on Political Education for the Young Generation (6 (32) 1982; see chapter two). In these editorials, as in the campus normalisation policy, students' role in *politik* was closely linked to their role as *manusia penganalisa*.

In chapter three it was argued that the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*'s account of the key moments of history in which youth and students were involved attempted to reconcile the pioneering role of these youth with the depoliticised identities which the New Order saw as appropriate for contemporary youth. It did so by transforming *pemuda* and *mahasiswa* into symbols and by backgrounding their active role in events. The editorial of edition number 18 of *Majalah Mahasiswa* attempts to resolve this same tension by reinterpreting the role of youth and students in these key political events in terms of 'politics as a concept'. The editorial emphasised the intellectual basis of students' historical role in the political arena, which, it stated, was based on a broad and 'forward-thinking vision' (*wawasan yang jauh ke depan*). According to the editorial, the youth and students who were involved in organisations such as Budi Utomo, Perhimpunan Indonesia, and KAMI and in events such as the declaration of the *Sumpah Pemuda* and those leading up to the proclamation of independence, did not profess to act on behalf of their alma mater or campus as *mahasiswa*. Rather, they acted independently as 'responsible individuals' whose actions were based on a systematic analysis of the situation (*pemikiran dan analisa situasi yang sistematis, cermat serta terarah*) and who had recognised the signs of social instability. This, notes the editorial, enabled the students of the past to produce effective aims for political struggle.[28] These students' ability to analyse the existing social and political situation, the editorial continued, was the key lesson to be drawn by contemporary students from their predecessor's historical example. This striking reinterpretation of history using the framework of 'reasoning' and ‘analysis’ represents students’ historical role in politics not as a practical one, but as a conceptual one and hence one which is consistent with the ‘normal’ mode of politics for students. Moreover, in those key moments when students do play a more ‘practical’ role, such as in the 1966 student demonstrations, they are represented as doing so as responsible *pemuda*, not as *mahasiswa*.

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[28] Nugroho Notosusanto's Alma Mater Vision was also based on a depoliticised view of the role of students in politics. The *Trikarya*, which formed part of the Alma Mater concept, stated that as scientific communities, universities must be aimed at institutionalisation, professionalisation - a term used by Ali Moertopo in the context of his corporatist model of social and political organisation (see Bourchier 1996, 202) - and transpoliticisation (*transpolitisisasi*). The concept of transpoliticisation implied that students 'transcended' or were above politics. As a 1984 editorial expressed it, transpoliticisation encompassed raising the political awareness of students to enable them to 'undertake scientific activities in order to implement the political decisions which have been made by the entire people through the MPR'. If students wanted to engage in 'politicking' (in English), this was to be undertaken outside the campus and must not be carried out in the name of the university (7 (39) 1984, 3).

Like the minister, *Majalah Mahasiswa* was also concerned to point out that ‘politics as a concept’ did not reduce the opportunities for students to engage in politics. As the editorial in edition number 18 argued, in the era of development, students could still undertake political activities and participate in politics insofar as these activities were relevant to and in accordance with students’ level of thinking (*tahap pemikiran*) and were within the scope of their role as ‘people of reasoning’ (*insan penalar*). Thus in the editorial students were the subjects of a variety of active processes. Students were to ‘continue to observe the course of history’ (*terus menerus ikut mengamati jalannya sejarah*) as had previous generations of students. They were also to ‘realise’ (*merealisasikan*) their duties of service to society. Their participation in activities based on ‘politics as a concept’ were ‘still able to be undertaken’ (*masih tetap dapat dilakukan*) and they were legitimately able to engage in politics (*berpolitik*), provided it was ‘politics as a concept’. Yet as these examples make clear, while students’ role in conceptual politics was an active one, it was limited to the ‘conceptual’ politics which the state saw as appropriate for students, that is, to analysing social and political conditions and making recommendations for policy based on the results of this analysis (see 6 (32) 1982). The editorial gave no examples of the concrete means by which students could participate in politics as a concept, although the minister suggested that student discussion groups, provided the discussion was based on analytical principles, were an appropriate means by which they could express their political ideas (3 (15) 1980, 10). The redefinition of students’ role in politics as a conceptual one was a clear response to students’ conceptions of their political role in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*. Yet it was also a response to the practical manifestations of this role, that is, to protests and demonstrations in which students were engaged in 1977 and 1978 and at earlier points in the New Order. By redefining politics, and students’ role in it, the state hoped to prevent them from engaging in the kind of practical politics which undermined the claim that only the New Order’ could provide the stability, order and harmony that Indonesia required.

In the above discussion of students as ‘people of analysis’ it was suggested that the designation of students as not yet mature intellectually undermined a key source of legitimacy for their actions. This was also the case with regard to their role in politics. The editorial in edition number 32 of *Majalah Mahasiswa* noted that students were still in the process of consolidating their values and their identities. Moreover, although students were very enthusiastic about politics, their ideas about it were often vague and their thinking was not yet firmly planted in the state ideology. Given this intellectual and political immaturity, students’ political education and their role in politics, the editorial argued, should only encompass theoretical politics (*politik teoretis*), that is, the evaluation of political policy and the making of policy recommendations. Practical politics (*politik praktis*), which encompassed policy making and its execution, was not part of students’ role (6 (32) 1982). This definition of students as ‘immature’ in terms of their thinking and in their understanding of political issues enables students’ criticisms to be dismissed as the opinions of idealists who don’t yet fully understand practical considerations. At the same time, however, in providing a political role for students, albeit a ‘conceptual’ one, the state creates a set of conditions which enable them to regulate their political behaviour in appropriate ways. The redefinition of students’ political role as concerned with ‘politics as a concept’ provided a framework which enabled students to continue to define their role in political terms but do so in a way which was conducive to the state’s disciplinary aims. Moreover, since students represented their role in politics as both a constitutional right and a practical manifestation of their role as agents of social control, by allowing students to play a role in politics, the state also appears to be respecting the democratic and constitutional rights of its citizens and to be responsive to criticisms from society.

Intellectuals and politics: the student view

In the discussion of students’ self-censorship and dissent above, it was suggested that the representations of students’ roles and identities in *Majalah Mahasiswa*’s editorials established a set of parameters within which students could think and speak about their roles. In doing so, these editorials aimed to provide the conditions under which students could modify their own behaviour in ways consistent with the New Order’s disciplinary aims. Students’ contributions on the topic of their identity as intellectuals and their role in politics indicate that they also engaged in self-censorship with regard to their intellectual identity and political roles. However, just as students were able to incorporate dissenting meanings into the way they wrote about their role in development, so they were also to some extent able to challenge the state's positioning of them as *manusia penganalisa* and represent their role in 'politics as a concept' as an active one.

In some student contributions, the minister's characterisation of students as future technocrats who would use their knowledge and skills to serve the nation in a technical and practical capacity provided the framework for their roles as intellectuals. For example, Djoko Walujo, a frequent contributor to *Majalah Mahasiswa* and a student in the Faculty of Social Sciences at Universitas Indonesia, observed that universities were expected 'to create people with the quality of broad knowledge, who have the skills and character to fill the technostructure' (*melahirkan orang-orang yang berbobot pengetahuan yang luas, mempunyai keterampilan dan berwatak buat mengisi teknostruktur*) (2 (11) 1979, 48).[29] Similarly, fourth year teacher's college undergraduate student Hari Karyono argued that universities were expected to produce people who can 'contribute their efforts and ideas for the developing nation' (*menyumbangkan tenaga dan pikirannya bagi negara yang sedang membangun*) (7 (37) 1983, 15). Other students framed their role as intellectuals in developmentalist terms but also drew on the political conceptions of the role of intellectuals developed in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*, using it to justify their function as agents of 'social control'. For example, in a 1978 article, Medan Teacher's College student Ratna Juwita Thaib argued that students' role as objective critics and as a force for social control of the implementation of development was 'progressive' (*progresif*) and consistent with the nature of intellectuals (2 (9-10) 1978, 75).

In chapter four it was suggested that students who wrote in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* stressed that while their role in politics was an active one, it was not that of a political party but rather was connected to their role as agents of social control. Students also emphasised their sense of social responsibility as the motivation for their role in politics and defined politics itself in terms which were consistent with the New Order's organicist values. This representation of students' role in politics, it was suggested, was a response to the very real threat of repression which students faced and a strategy which they hoped would enable them to avoid state repression and so allow them to continue their role as ‘loyal’ critics of the regime.

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[29] Djoko Walujo had been a reporter for *Salemba*. He later became a reporter for *Majalah Mahasiswa* before serving on its editorial staff.

The depoliticisation policies of the late 1970s meant that for students who wrote in *Majalah Mahasiswa* the parameters within which they were able to write about their political roles and identities were significantly narrower. Students responded to this by defining their role in politics within the framework of ‘politics as a concept’ that Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf had deemed appropriate for students. However, unlike editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa*, these students were more specific about the practical ways in which they could be involved in ‘politics as a concept’. For example, Alo Liliwery, a Universitas Nusa Cendana student and managing editor of that university’s monthly magazine *Arena*, defined politics as ‘the participation of every citizen in contributing their ideas’ (*keikutsertaan setiap warga bangsa dalam menyumbangkan pemikirannya*) for the development of their nation. The most fundamental task of ‘politics’, he argued, was thus solving the nation’s problems. Students’ role in this process was as ‘conceptors’ (*konseptor*) whose task was to analyse these problems (6 (32) 1982, 20-21). As members of the scientific community the correct way for students to express their opinions about these issues was not to protest and form ‘street parliaments’ (*parlemen jalanan*). This, he argued, was ‘tragic’ and ‘irrational’ behaviour. Rather, it was to bring them to the attention of the authorities using legislative channels, that is, by taking their ideas to members of parliament (3 (16) 1980, 29-31). Similarly, in an article on the political role of students in development, Universitas Gajah Mada student Muhammad Firdauz AP, a regular contributor to mass media and campus publications, suggested that one of the ways in which students could ‘participate politically in development’ (*berpartisipasi secara politik dalam pembangunan*) and contribute their ideas to the nation was to involve them in decision-making and policy formulation, for example, by having student delegates in the parliament. He also pointed out that contemporary students exercise their political rights by acting as a means of social control, by forming delegations to their representatives and putting forward demands. This, he argued, was ‘more positive than having to hold demonstrations’ (3 (18) 1980, 46-8).

As these contributions indicate, the notion of students’ role as agents of social control remained a consistent feature of their own conceptions of their role, at least for those students who wrote for *Majalah Mahasiswa*. This concept allowed students to challenge the state's positioning of them as simply the technocrats of the future and to represent their role in 'politics as a concept' as encompassing actions such as sending delegations to members of parliament, a strategy which had been used by students during the 1970s (see chapter four). At the same time, students' role as intellectuals and their role in politics was constrained by the limits of 'politics as a concept'. Moreover, as noted above, students' use of terms such as *kontrol sosial* in their contributions to *Majalah Mahasiswa*, undermined the dissenting meanings of this term and so incorporated students' voices in the state's 'voice of authority'.

Voices of authority

In chapter one it was suggested that the choices speakers and writers make from the system of interpersonal meaning have important implications for how power relationships are expressed in texts. In particular, modality choices establish certain subject positions for speakers or writers as well as for their audiences. These subject positions play a significant role in speakers' and writers' attempts to socialise their readers into a particular version of social reality and their position in it. In editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa,* the modalities which were used establish the voice of the state as an authoritative one and position students as objects.

The editorial in the 1982 edition which dealt with the topic of students' political education, for example, uses categorical modality to position the state (the editorial voice of *Majalah Mahasiswa*) as the source of 'facts'.

> There are two aspects to practical politics, that is, the technical/strategic aspect in the context of policy making, and the technical/tactical aspect in the scope of policy executing. And the role of students in the field of politics only covers policy evaluation and policy recommendation. Political education for students on the campus is theoretical politics, which covers the stages of policy evaluation and policy recommendation. It is these two aspects which are in accordance with the NKK policy which states [that] students engagement in politics needs to be seen as conceptual (6 (32) 1982).[30]

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[30] *Dalam politik praktis ada dua aspek yang mengikutinya, yakni aspek teknik/strategi dalam rangka policy making, dan aspek teknis/taktis dalam lingkup policy executing. Dan peran mahasiswa di bidang politik hanya meliputi policy evaluation dan policy recommendation saja. Pendidikan politik bagi mahasiswa di kampus adalah politik teoretis yang meliputi tahap policy evaluation dan policy recommendation. Dua aspek ini yang sesuai dengan kebijaksanaan NKK yang menggariskan mahasiswa berpolitik perlu ditanggapi sebagai konsep* (6 (32) 1982).

The use of the verb *ada* (there are) here presents the state's definition of practical politics as indisputable 'truth'. The verb (*meliputi*) and the reiteration of 'only' in *hanya* and *saja* represents the state's view of the role of students in politics as only covering 'policy evaluation and policy recommendation' in categorical terms while *adalah* (is) encodes a definitive statement about political education for students. The final sentence provides an authoritative assertion about the kind of politics which is appropriate for students according to the NKK policy, namely conceptual politics.

These categorical modalities establish the authority of *Majalah Mahasiswa*'s editorial voice to represent what is said as 'truth' and the state's view of students' role in politics as 'fact'. This authority reflects the hierarchical relationship between the state as *bapak* and students as *anak* and distances students from the voice of authority. Yet the *bapak-anak* relationship is a benevolent one, in which the *bapak*'s interest is the welfare of those for whom he is responsible. By representing the state's view of students role in politics as 'in the best interests of students themselves and the nation as a whole, *Majalah Mahasiswa* attempts to socialise student readers into their 'appropriate' role in 'politics as a concept'.

Conclusion

The keywords which frame editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa* define students' roles and identities in ways which reflect the New Order's policy of depoliticisation and its focus on development (*pembangunan*). Through these keywords, the state sought to shape the ways in which students were able to think and speak about their roles and identities, including their role in development, their identity as *manusia penganalisa*, their role in relation to wider society, and importantly, their role in 'politics as a concept'. These representations of students' roles and identities reflected the state's aim of 'governing' students, that is, with regulating students' behaviour in ways which were consistent with the organic values of the New Order state. It also reflected the state's concern with utilising students' skills and capabilities for its all-encompassing program of development.

Yet student contributions to *Majalah Mahasiswa* reveal that the power relationship between students and the state was by no means a relationship of dominance and subordination. While students reproduced key aspects of the content and vocabulary of the state discourse of development in order to avoid state censorship and repression, student contributors were also able to incorporate into *Majalah Mahasiswa* some aspects of the dissenting meanings which had been present in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* during the mid to late 1970s. Thus, while ‘politics as a concept’ meant that students had to represent their role in politics in conceptual terms, they were also able to represent actions such as sending delegations to members of parliament as a legitimate way of expressing their ideas about politics. Students’ contributions thus reveal that despite their reproduction of the state discourse, those who wrote for *Majalah Mahasiswa* were not fully socialised into the roles and identities the state had constructed for them.

However, students’ incorporation of terms such as *kontrol sosial* into their contributions to *Majalah Mahasiswa* enabled the state to undermine the dissenting meanings which this term had in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* during the mid to late 1970s. By coopting student discourse, the state attempted to mitigate the risks associated with allowing students the necessary freedom to ‘make choices’ about how they represented their roles and identities and how they acted in their capacity as students. This cooptation, together with the cultivation of alternative avenues of student dissent during the 1980s, produced a new language of student dissent, which drew on concepts such as opposition and which represented the relationship between students and wider society in new ways. It is to this new language that the next chapter turns.

CHAPTER SIX

Resist = *lawan*: the student media of the 1990s

Now is the time for us to be 'democratic' in our thinking … [I]t is also our right to determine our identity as students.[1]

Universitas Gadjah Mada student

The previous chapter argued that the redefinition of students' roles and identities undertaken in editorials in *Majalah Mahasiswa* during the late 1970s and 1980s represented a disciplinary strategy on the part of the New Order state. This strategy aimed to shape the ways in which students were able to think and speak about their roles and identities and so regulate students' behaviour in ways which were consistent with the New Order's organicist values. As a result of this strategy, the voices of students who wrote for this magazine were in part coopted by the state discourse, and the dissenting meaning of terms such as *kontrol sosial*, which students employed in their writings, were largely undermined.

This chapter examines the ways in which students who wrote in the student press of the 1990s redefined their roles and identities in the context of the period of limited political liberalisation or 'openness' (*keterbukaan*) between 1988 and 1994 and the subsequent retraction of political liberties after 1994. It also covers the period between late 1997 and 1998 during which Indonesia experienced rapid economic and political change as a result of the Asian economic crisis. The widespread social unrest and political divisions this caused eventually led to the resignation of President Suharto on 21 May 1998.

The chapter focuses on five student publications published between 1990 and 1998 and which were based on state and private universities in four urban centres: *Balairung*

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[1] *Sudah saatnya kita 'berdemokrasi' dalam berpikir… hak kita pulalah untuk menentukan identitas kita sebagai mahasiswa* (*Balairung* 4 (12) 1990: 18-19).

(Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta), *Himmah* (Universitas Islam Indonesia, Yogyakarta), *Politika* (Universitas Nasional, Jakarta), *Ganesha* (Institut Teknologi Bandung) and *Hayamwuruk* (Universitas Diponegoro, Semarang). It also examines Universitas Indonesia's 'action media' (*media aksi*) *bergerak!*, which was published during the height of the 1998 demonstrations. While these publications represent a fraction of the number of student newspapers, magazines and bulletins published in the early to mid 1990s, they were among the most widely circulated and influential of the period.[2]

The chapter traces the shifts in the ways students who wrote in the student press of the 1990s represented their roles and identities through an examination of six keywords: *perubahan* (change), *reformasi* (reform), *rakyat* (the people), *gerakan* (movement), *perlawanan* (resistance) and *demokrasi* (democracy). The chapter argues that these shifts were a consequence of the changes in state-society relations brought about by *keterbukaan,* and by the additional scope for 'responsible' freedom of political expression which this period allowed. They were also a consequence of the depoliticisation policies pursued by the state during the 1980s, under which students, among other groups, were politically marginalised. This marginalisation severed in a decisive way the relationship of 'critical collaboration' which had existed between students and the state in the 1970s. It was also a significant factor in the revival of radical populist discourses, which provided students with an alternative framework with which to analyse social and political life and their own role in it. These factors enabled the student press of the 1990s to develop a genuinely oppositional discourse in which their roles, and their relationship to the state, were defined in terms of conflict, struggle and resistance.

From a theoretical standpoint, this resistance was possible precisely because, in Foucault's view, effective government requires that individuals be provided with the freedom to 'make the right choices'. Yet this freedom always involves the possibility that the 'wrong' choices will be made. Students' choice to represent their role in oppositional terms in many ways threatened the status quo. When students' criticisms breached the limits set by the state, the state responded with repressive measures. Over the course of the 1990s a number of critical student newspapers were banned. Student activists were also periodically arrested by the security apparatus, and a not insignificant number disappeared. Yet this repression was not unlimited: students retained a significant amount of freedom for political expression. This was not because of a reduced capacity to repress dissidents on the part of the state. Rather, as this chapter suggests, it was in part because the students of the 1990s, like those of the 1970s, used their political freedom 'responsibly', by representing their roles and identities in ways which did not directly threaten the underlying values and ideologies of the regime. As David Ingram argues in his discussion of Foucault's view of the nature of power in modern societies: 'the exercise of civil and political liberties only serves to mask the deeper discipline required of citizens inhabiting modern states' (1994, 220). However, it was also a product of the state's confidence in its ability to effectively repress dissent when it was necessary to do so and the relatively weak nature of organised civil society opposition.

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[2] Student dissent during the 1990s was far more geographically diverse than in previous decades, spreading beyond the main urban centres of Java to cities such as Ujung Pandang and Medan. For reasons of space, however, it has not been possible to include publications from outside Java in the analysis.

The chapter begins with a brief survey of the student press during the 1990s. It then examines in detail the keywords which students writing in the student press during the 1990s employed in defining their roles and identities. As the chapter shows, the meanings students gave to these keywords reoriented their roles and identities away from notions of control and correction towards the concept of thoroughgoing change. Students also framed their roles in society and their relationship to the state in terms of struggle and resistance and represented the *rakyat* (the people) as an integral part of the broad movement for change. Despite this, paternalistic conceptions of students' leadership role in society persisted throughout the 1990s. Unlike the 1970s, students' justification for their function in social and political life relied less on the concept of their role as a moral force and disinterested intellectuals as on the legitimacy of opposition in a *demokrasi* (democracy). The final part of the chapter examines the ways in which the student press used humour and satire as well as other linguistic techniques to attempt to socialise their readers into the identities constructed for them through the keywords.

The student press in the late 1980s and 1990s

After the closure of the student newspapers in 1979 and 1980, the student press experienced a period of relative inactivity. From the mid 1980s, however, student publications began to re-emerge. The student presses on most campuses were managed under the auspices of the student activity units, which were part of the campus coordination (BKK) policy. However, on some of the smaller private universities, where implementation of the NKK/BKK policy had not been as consistent, the student press was able to operate with a greater degree of independence, albeit remaining under the patronage of the rector (see Supriyanto 1998, 95-7).

While the student publications of the 1970s were mostly tabloids published on a fortnightly or monthly basis, those of the late 1980s and 1990s took various forms including magazines, tabloids, newspapers and bulletins, usually published on a monthly basis (Supriyanto 1998, 99). Most of these publications had relatively small circulations compared to those of the mid to late 1970s, with between 1000 and 5000 copies (*Direktori pers* n.d.). In addition, while the most active student presses of the 1970s were based on the campuses of large state universities, the student press of the 1990s reflected the increasing importance of private and smaller state universities as well as the broader geographical spread of student activism (see chapter two).[3] As a result, by the late 1990s there were over 400 publications published at university campuses throughout the archipelago (*Direktori pers* n.d.).

In Yogyakarta, the first edition of *Balairung*, Universitas Gadjah Mada's student magazine, was published on 8 January 1986 with an initial print run of 5000 copies. It was 54 pages long and featured a variety of articles on the topic of industrialisation in Indonesia (*Balairung* 6 (34) 2001, 182). The magazine was published quarterly from the end of 1988 and its circulation was relatively small, at between 3500 and 5000 copies (*Balairung* 13 (27) 1998, 74). From 1990 onwards, the magazine usually ran to about 120 pages. It included a wide variety of articles and opinion pieces dealing with themes such as the political role of the middle class, New Order political detainees, the

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[3] Private universities had not been subject to the same level of scrutiny when it came to applying the NKK/BKK policy and so had somewhat more freedom than larger state campuses which had been at the centre of the protests of the 1970s and so key targets for 'normalisation' (Aspinall 2000, 165-6; Denny 1989, 75).

1997 elections, former Minister of Research and Technology B. J. Habibie's policy on technology as well as the state of student representative bodies and the student movement (*Balairung* 9 (21) 1995; 9 (22) 1995; 10 (23) 1996; 10 (24) 1996; 6 (15) 1992; 4 (12) 1990; 12 (25) 1997). In addition, the magazine regularly included profiles of key public figures, sections on health, culture, the environment, technology and student issues as well as book reviews, a photographic essay, readers' letters and cartoons.

Himmah was published at one of Indonesia's oldest Islamic universities, Universitas Islam Indonesia in Yogyakarta. The magazine was established in March 1967 with the title *Muhibbah*. *Muhibbah* was banned by the New Order twice during its lifetime, in the lead up to the 1978 and 1982 General Sessions of the MPR (*Direktori pers* n.d.). In the early 1980s, the magazine changed its name to *Himmah*. The new magazine was published four times a year and by the late 1990s had a circulation of 5000-7000 copies. It usually ran to between 70 and 80 pages and included feature articles on topics such as development and democratisation of the economy, the presidential succession, opposition parties and the elections (*Himmah* 28 (2) October 1995; 28 (1) June 1995; 30 (2) October 1997; 24 (1) February-March 1993; 30 (1) April 1997). Like *Balairung*, *Himmah* also included regular features such as essays and opinion pieces, book reviews, interviews and profiles of public figures, and sections on culture, the economy, law, religion, education, science and technology and student issues as well as readers' letters, cartoons and a *pojok*.

In Bandung, students associated with *Ganesha*, the student bulletin of Institut Teknologi Bandung had been important in the re-emergence of protest in the late 1980s. This was reflected in the critical stance which the publication took (Aspinall 2000, 163). *Ganesha* was first published in 1988. It appeared 4 times a year, although it was rather irregular, and usually ran to around 20 pages. Its motto was 'upholding students' sovereignty' (*menegakkan kedaulatan mahasiswa*) and the front cover described it as a forum for the 'aspirations of the campus community in the context of developing a critical and responsible attitude to make student life more dynamic'. To this end, it included feature articles on topics such as the political parties, ITB Rector Wiranto Arismunandar's repressive policies, the elections, the student movement, the parliament, monetary policy and higher education policy (*Ganesha* 6 (11) February 1994; 8 (22) 1997; 8 (23) 1997). It also included essays and opinion pieces, book reviews, a section on campus issues, profiles of public figures, and a regular poetry section.

In Semarang *Hayamwuruk*, published by the Faculty of Arts student senate at Universitas Diponegoro, was a measure of the increasing importance of many of the smaller state universities in the development of a critical student press during the 1990s (Aspinall 2000, 172). The magazine was established in 1985 and at the end of the 1990s had a relatively small circulation of 1500 copies. It was published twice a year and usually ran to about 70-80 pages (*Direktori pers* n.d.). It contained a variety of articles dealing with economic, political and cultural themes such as the pro-democracy movement, literature and politics, and the SMPT policy. It also included regular features such as book reviews, essays and opinion pieces, sections on culture and the arts, the environment and student issues and interviews with prominent public figures as well as short stories and poems.

In Jakarta, Universitas Indonesia's student press, like many others, had languished after the banning of *Salemba* in 1980. Even though a campus-level publication had been published since the mid 1980s, the placement of this publication under the patronage of the rector meant that it was unable to develop the same critical quality as its predecessor.[4] The student press at Universitas Nasional, however, contributed to filling this gap. Universitas Nasional was one of Jakarta's most prestigious private universities. *Politika*, published by the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Student Study and Communication Forum (Forum Kajian dan Komunikasi Mahasiswa Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik), was from the outset one of the most critical publications of the period. The magazine appeared four times a year and usually ran to around 30-40 pages. It was banned several times during its lifetime: at the end of 1993 and again two years later at the end of 1995 (Supriyanto 1998, 94). The topics it covered included political prisoners, the electoral system, development, the restrictions on political rights, the presidential succession and the political role of the middle classes and the 1992 elections (*Politika* June-July 1995; April 1995; September 1993; February 1993; November 1992; May 1992). It also featured essays, interviews and profiles of public figures, sections on culture and on campus issues, book reviews as well as readers' letters and an occasional poem.[5]

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[4] *Warta UI* was published from the mid-1980s (see Supriyanto 1998, 91and 242, fn 53) until 1992 when it was replaced by *Suara Mahasiswa UI*, published by the student senate (*senat mahasiswa*).

With the NKK/BKK policy still in force until 1990, and the regime's continuing repressive attitude towards critical voices, the student press of the mid to late 1980s remained relatively cautious. After 1990 however, some student publications became increasingly outspoken. David Hill has suggested that the campus publications of the 1990s 'tend[ed] to be tame organs for university public relations rather than an expression of student discontent' (Hill 1995, 116-7; see also 114-8). While this was true of some campus publications, the publications examined in this chapter were integral to the development of a critical student press. The critical stance of these and other publications led to periodic repression. In addition to *Politika, Arena,* the student magazine of Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic Institute (IAIN Sunan Kalijaga) in Yogyakarta, which was well-known for its critical reporting of political issues, was banned after it published an investigative report into Suharto's wealth in 1993 (see Sushandoyo, Pamungkas and Mulyana 1998, 32).

The student press of the 1990s was more 'intellectual' in orientation than its predecessors, publishing well-researched reports which drew on the writings of both Indonesian and non-Indonesian academics. This was in part a response to the repressive steps taken by the regime during the 1980s, the legacies of which lasted into the 1990s. It was also a product of the backgrounds of those who ran the publications, many of whom had been involved in the study groups of the 1980s and remained active in the discussion groups associated with many student publications in the 1990s (Supriyanto 1998, 92 and 121; see also below). Many publications also endeavoured to present a more professional face, with glossy covers and sophisticated layout. As in the 1970s, many of the students associated with the student press went on to work for provincial and national newspapers and magazines.

During the 1998 demonstrations, student presses on campuses throughout the archipelago responded to the need for readily available information which would help to facilitate the coordination of protests by publishing daily or weekly ‘wall newspapers’ (*koran dinding*) and newsletters known as ‘action media’ (*media aksi*). These *media aksi* played an important role in disseminating information to students and provided a link between the student activists behind the protests and the large numbers of students participating in them (Mahendra 1999, 92).[6] At Universitas Gadjah Mada, students published a ‘wall newspaper’ edition of *Balairung* to provide information about the student protests. This was later replaced by a 4-page newsletter entitled *Gugat*, which was published twice a week (*Balairung* 13 (28) 1998, 3; *Gugat* 25 April 1998). A number of other campuses, including Universitas Airlangga in Surabaya, and Institut Teknologi Bandung, published similar media in the months leading to the fall of Suharto.[7] Universitas Indonesia’s action media *bergerak!* (move!) was among the most consistent of these action media. It was published daily without interruption from March to June 1998. It appeared as a simple 4–page bulletin, and had a circulation of 500 to 1000 copies. During the student occupation of the parliament building, however, 10 000 copies were printed and distributed to students (Mahendra 1999, 91).

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[5] After *Politika* was banned, students associated with the magazine formed a study grouped called the Centre for the Study of Politics and the Defense of Society) (Pusat Pengkajian Politik dan Advokasi Masyarakat, Puspipam) in December 1994. The centre published a 20-page magazine entitled *Opini* which dealt with themes of politics and human rights and which was circulated among the Universitas Nasional campus community (*Direktori pers* n.d.).

Power and the politics of student identity

Indonesia’s brief period of political liberalisation at the beginning of the 1990s was the consequence of two principal factors. The first was structural change in Indonesian society. The second was intra-regime conflict. The strong economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s had created both a new middle class and a large urban working class. By the end of the 1980s, social pressures for reform from within civil society had begun to mount. The new middle class was increasingly seeking greater political participation and democratisation of Indonesia’s social, political and economic life. At the same time, the urban working class, which had been marginalised both politically and economically by the growth of the previous decade, also began to mobilise. Pressures from within the New Order political elite were also growing. The tension between the president and certain sections of the military, centred around the powerful armed forces commander General L. B. (Benny) Moerdani was particularly important in this regard. After the very public conflict over Suharto’s choice of vice-presidential candidate,

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[6] The internet was also an important source of information during this period (see Winters 2002).

[7] *Resist = lawan* was published by the Student Publications Association (Lembaga Penerbitan Mahasiswa) at Universitas Airlangga in Surabaya from May 1998.

Suharto’s support within the military was seriously compromised. Figures within the military began to call for the reform of Indonesia’s political system.[8]

Suharto’s response to this was to declare his support for greater openness (*keterbukaan*) (see Aspinall 2000, 64-80; Budiman 1992; Bertrand 1996; Lane 1991). Bertrand (1996) suggests that while the military’s aim in proposing reform was to pressure Suharto, the president would not have declared his support for openness had it not served his own interests. He suggests that the initiation of openness enabled Suharto to re-establish his control over the military and at the same time consolidate his own power in a post-Suharto government. The president, he maintains, ‘clearly did not see liberalisation as a means to disperse power nor to change the political system (1996, 335).’ Nonetheless, openness did provide an opportunity for more open discussion of previously taboo political issues. In addition to the succession issue and the political role of ABRI, government policies and the nature and role of institutions of state were also debated (Bertrand 1996, 338). This debate did not only take place at the level of elite politics. Between 1988 and 1994, there was increasingly bold opposition to the Suharto regime as NGOs, groups of dissident intellectuals such as Forum Demokrasi (Democracy Forum), the press, labour organisations and, eventually, the Indonesian Democracy Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI), took advantage of the new political mood (see Aspinall 2000; Lane 1991).

Yet the limited political liberalisation initiated under openness was also a means by which the regime attempted to contain dissent. By allowing greater freedom of expression, the regime appeared to be responsive to societal demands for change. At the same time, it was also able to limit the parameters within which public debate could take place.[9] Despite this, periodic repression continued to occur and the state responded harshly to organised labour. In addition to repression, the state also employed ideological strategies. Bourchier argues that the revival of organicist or integralist ideology from the mid 1980s was an attempt by the regime to consolidate its hold on power in the face of increasing pressures from civil society (Bourchier 1997, 159;

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[8] For good accounts of these developments see Aspinall 2000, 44-8, 51-61; Bourchier and Hadiz 2003, 16-18.

[9] Discussing Foucault’s ideas on liberalism, Hindess cites Adam Smith’s observation that high levels of police regulation of a population tend to be associated with higher crime rates. Smith concludes from this that it is a lack of freedom on the part of individuals (and their consequent dependence on others to regulate their behaviour) that causes crime. Minimising crime is thus best achieved by promoting individual freedom and responsibility (Hindess 1996, 126-7).

Bourchier 1996, chapter 9). This involved a reassertion of that claim that individualistic, Western models of social organisation were not appropriate for Indonesia. Instead, Indonesia was an organic or integralist state, modelled on values such as consensus and order and in which there was no separation between the state and society (Bourchier 1997, 165). During *keterbukaan*, integralist ideology set the parameters within which debate about democracy, the political system, the role of the military, the relationship between the state and wider society, and human rights could take place (Bourchier 1997, 174).

For students, *keterbukaan* saw a relaxation of some of the restrictions which had been in place throughout the 1980s. During the 1980s, student voices, especially on the campuses, had remained relatively muted. In addition to the closure or cooptation of the student press, the independence of the student representative organisations had been effectively undermined by the BKK policy, which controlled student activities and intervened in the appointment of student representatives. Minister of Education and Culture Fuad Hassan, appointed in 1985, took a more moderate approach to student political activity than his predecessors Daud Yusuf and Nugroho Notosusanto. In July 1990, the minister responded to student protest by revoking the NKK/BKK policy. In its place he introduced the university student senate (*Senat Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi*, SMPT) policy, which allowed students to elect their own representatives at the school and faculty levels.[10] These and other measures opened up new opportunities for students to test the limits of tolerated opposition. In the late 1980s, student protest began to re-emerge on university campuses. Initially, these protests dealt with campus issues, including protests against the NKK/BKK policy. Gradually, however, issues of social justice, including land disputes such as the Kedung Ombo dam project, as well as human rights and other national concerns became more prominent (Aspinall 1993; Denny 1989, 77; Harahap 1993, 96-102; Harahap and Basril 1999, 269-74). In 1991 and 1993, for example, students protested against the state lottery and in 1994 they took to the streets in protest against the closure of *Tempo*, *Editor* and *Detik* (Harahap and Basril 1999, 278-80; Aspinall 2000, 172). The elections of 1992 and 1997 were also accompanied by vociferous student protests demanding democratisation (*demokratisasi*).

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[10] The policy was outlined in Ministerial Decision No. 0457/U/1990. Membership of the university student senate (Senat Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi) comprised the chairpersons of the departmental and faculty student representative bodies, namely the Faculty Student Representative Body (Badan Perwakilan Mahasiswa Fakultas), the Faculty Student Senates (Senat Mahasiswa Fakultas) and the School Student Associations (Himpunan Mahasiswa Jurusan). The leadership of the SMPT was approved by the university authorities to whom it was responsible in undertaking its activities (Hassan 1998, 133-35). For this reason many students viewed the policy with scepticism.

One of the distinguishing features of the student protest of the 1980s and 1990s was the revival of a strongly populist radicalism (Aspinall 1993; see also Bourchier and Hadiz 2003; 17-18). This new radicalism tapped into the radical nationalism of the late colonial period and to the leftist and socialist traditions of the 1950s and 1960s. However, it was also influenced by the more recent ideologies of the environmental and feminist movement as well as by Islamic revivalism. Students were particularly significant in the revival of radicalism. The tight controls placed on student dissent during the 1980s led students to seek other means of continuing their active social and political role, primarily through the burgeoning NGO movement as well as through the study groups which emerged both on and off campuses from the early 1980s. Students' involvement in NGOs equipped them with a new awareness of social injustice. Within the student study groups which emerged during the 1980s, radical political theories and leftist literature were popular.

Aspinall (1993) suggests that the attraction to radical ideas amongst students was the result of a combination of factors. Firstly, unlike their predecessors in the 1970s, the students of the late 1980s and 1990s had little sense of connection with or commitment to the ideals of the New Order. The mythologisation of the 1966 generation and its partnership with the military had largely been debunked by the 1980s. At the same time, the young generation of the late 1980s and 1990s did not have the same fear of the left that earlier generations of students had since they had no personal experience of the political dominance of the PKI during the 1950s and 1960s or of the traumatic events of 1965-66. Secondly, the depoliticisation policy of the 1980s also had a significant effect on the revival of radicalism. This policy excluded students from the political process and coopted many of them into the regime's ideology. This led students to look to NGOs and study groups for alternative forums for dissent and alternative discourses with which to challenge the regime. Thirdly, as noted above, through these avenues students became aware of the marginalising effects of the New Order's economic growth and development on rural communities and urban workers. Radical and populist ideas provided students with a new framework within which to understand Indonesian society and to define their own roles and identities in it.

As a strategy of ‘government’, *keterbukaan* depended on the ability of Indonesian citizens, including students, to use their new-found political liberties to make choices which would not threaten the status quo. In 1994, however, it became clear to elements within the state that this freedom was not being used ‘responsibly’. As a result, in June 1994 the Minister of Information banned three news publications – *Tempo, Editor* and *Detik* – which were deemed to have violated the parameters of a ‘free and responsible’ press (*bebas dan bertanggungjawab*). From this time, the state gradually wound back *keterbukaan* and returned to the tried and tested methods of coercion. This strategy might have been successful in containing dissent had it not been for the Asian economic crisis, which undermined the Suharto regime’s ability to guarantee continued economic growth and stability.

Change: contesting the New Order

The need for a fundamental restructuring of Indonesia’s social, political and economic order provided the overarching framework within which students who wrote in the student press of the 1990s conceived of their roles and identities. This concern was a clear reflection of the re-emergence of the radical tradition amongst students, which advocated a thoroughgoing transformation of Indonesian politics and society. It was also clearly counter to the regime’s public pronouncements on the need for change and the extent of change which was required. Students’ views on change, and the meanings they gave to the keyword *perubahan*, thus positioned them in a clearly oppositional relationship to the state. It also reoriented their roles and identities away from the state and towards the broader pro-democracy movement.

For the New Order, change was ‘a path to be proceeded upon only as required and with great caution’ (Elson 2001, 161). The importance of *stabilitas* (stability) and *ketertiban* (order) in the New Order state meant that change needed to be carefully planned and implemented in a gradual and cautious manner. Change that originated from outside the state, or that occurred of its own accord, was potentially destabilising and even harmful to the collective interests of the nation. The New Order’s model of change aimed to avoid the potentially destabilising effects of change by redefining it as a process to be engineered and managed by the state, as set out in the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) and in numerous other official documents. The goal of the state-determined processes of change, which included *modernisasi* (modernisation), *kemajuan* (progress) and *pembangunan* (development), was the achievement of the collective interests of the nation, expressed in key phrases such as *masyarakat adil dan makmur* (a just and prosperous society), *masyarakat berkembang* (a developed society) and *masyarakat bangsa yang dicita-citakan* (an ideal national community) (Matheson Hooker 1995, 276-81).

With the beginning of *keterbukaan*, the regime allowed more open public debate about change. Yet there were clear limits to the scope of this debate: while the government was prepared to countenance discussion of the issues such as the succession and the future role of the military within politics, criticism of the political system and of its underlying values and ideologies, including the Pancasila, was not tolerated. Thus, while politics was to be more ‘open’ and ‘democratic’, it was also to be ‘responsible’. As President Suharto noted in his 1992 Independence Day address, the nation must ‘consolidate political culture, political traditions and political behaviour which are increasingly democratic, increasingly open and increasingly responsible’ (Suharto 1992, 9; see also Suharto 1994, 12).[11] The limits the regime placed on the scope of discussion permitted under *keterbukaan* stemmed from its underlying motivations for promoting liberalisation. As Bertrand argues, the aim of *keterbukaan* was not to bring about real change, but rather to ‘test the viability’ of the existing system for a post-Suharto Indonesia (1996, 320). Despite this, during the final years of *keterbukaan* and beyond, students continued to press outside these limits in their own discussions of change.

The view of change promoted in the student press of the 1990s presents a stark contrast to the conception of change as ‘correction’ advocated in the student press of the 1970s. As noted in chapter four, while students who wrote in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* discussed the issue of change, and referred to their own role as agents of change, they were not concerned with bringing about a fundamental transformation of the economic, social and political order. Instead, students emphasised that their aim was to correct the deviations and defects in the current system by engaging in social control. This view of change as ‘improvement’ (*perbaikan*) in part reflected students’ belief in the principles (if not the practice) of the New Order. However, it also reflected their desire to avoid presenting a fundamental challenge to the regime.

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[11] … *memantapkan budaya politik, tradisi-tradisi politik dan tingkah laku politik yang makin demokratis, makin terbuka dan makin bertanggung jawab* (Suharto 1992, 9).

For the students who wrote in the student press of the 1990s, however, correction and control of the state-managed process of change and development were no longer enough: what was needed was a fundamental restructuring of society, polity and economy. Accordingly, articles and editorials in the student press linked *perubahan* to issues such as the overall strategy for democratisation and to the presidential succession. An important element of students' definitions of *perubahan* was the notion of 'structural change'. An article in the September 1993 edition of *Politika*, for example, argued that students' actions must be aimed at addressing both the structural and the cultural inequalities in society. Without such actions, the article stated, students could not carry out 'real and meaningful change' (*perubahan nyata yang berarti*) (*Politika* September 1993, 20). This issue remained an important one in the student press throughout the 1990s. A 1997 edition of *Balairung* argued that any agenda for resistance to the New Order power structures and for greater democratisation must incorporate both structural and cultural resistance to the regime (*Balairung* 12 (25) 1997, 33-36).

The goal of this process of change was generally defined in broad terms as the 'status quo'. For students, this term referred to the nature and practices of the existing regime (*rezim*, *penguasa*) which needed to be deposed in order for real change to occur. An article in the September 1993 edition of *Politika* written by M. Arief Hakim, the former assistant general manager of IAIN Sunan Kalijaga's recently banned student magazine *Arena*, asserted that one of the aims of the movement was 'to topple the conservative and oppressive forces of the status quo' (*menumbangkan kekuatan status quo yang konservatif dan menindas*). A 1995 article in *Hayamwuruk* was more explicit about those aspects of the Indonesian political system which needed to change, identifying issues such as the floating mass policy, state-directed development and weak institutions of state (*Hayamwuruk* 10 (1) 1995, 73). The 1996 special edition of *Balairung* wrote of the need to 'form a stronger opposition alliance to tear down the status quo' (*membentuk aliansi oposisi yang lebih kuat untuk mendobrak status quo*).

Students also identified *suksesi* (succession) as a key element in effecting real social and political change. The issue of *suksesi* had been clearly placed on the political agenda since at least the beginning of *keterbukaan* (Aspinall 2000, 56-8; Bertrand 1996, 329). Succession was one issue which both the military and the president were prepared to allow: the military because they hoped to use it to pressure Suharto and Suharto because it allowed him to gauge the level of elite support for a successor, in whose appointment he wished to play an active role (Bertrand 1996, 328-9). Students responded to this by openly discussing the issue of succession, even after *keterbukaan* had been wound back. The December 1990 edition of *Politika*, for example, published a special report on the succession issue (‘*Suksesi 1993: Perubahan atau status quo*’) in which presidential succession was identified as a precondition for real change. Yet students also expressed the view that change must go further than succession. A 1995 article in *Hayamwuruk*, for example featured a photograph of Suharto addressing senior cabinet ministers. The caption below the picture read: ‘Not only succession, but change to the system’ (*Hayamwuruk* 10 (1) 1995, 73). The caption expressed clearly students’ view that presidential succession was necessary for systemic change to occur.

In chapter four it was suggested that the use of rhetorical questions in the student press of the 1970s reflected students’ perceptions of their role as critical intellectuals whose task was to question ‘truth’, and as a force for social control of the state and its practices. In this view, students were to bring deviations to the attention of the state in a critical but non-antagonistic way. As a result, students often presented their criticisms in the form of questions, rather than statements. In the student press of the 1990s, students’ calls for a fundamental transformation of the political structures of the New Order are reflected in the use of categorical statements, as in the above article from *Hayamwuruk*. The short caption which appears beneath the title of the article orients readers to the position being developed in the article:

> The freedom of the people of Indonesia will be bound if the authorities always force their will on them. Oppression will also occur. And Indonesia’s history will be increasingly filled with the suffering of the people.[12]

The article then begins:

> Up till now we have been spellbound by the words unity and oneness, openness, social solidarity, democracy and social justice. But, without our being aware of it, hidden behind those sweet words was mass deception, structural deception, and pretence … This ‘unhealthy situation’ arose because society was made into an apolitical floating mass. As a result, society’s initiative has been blunted,

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[12] *Kemerdekaan rakyat Indonesia akan terpasung jika penguasa selalu memaksakan kehendaknya kepada mereka. Penindasan pun akan terjadi. Dan sejarah Indonesia akan semakin dipenuhi oleh penderitaan rakyat* (*Hayamwuruk* 10 (1) 1995, 73).

> apathy has become a common phenomenon, and development has become the property of the government alone. In addition, few state institutions are bold enough to control the authorities. It is conditions such as this which have become characteristic of the Indonesian 'political system' (*Hayamwuruk* 10 (1) 1995, 73).[13]

This series of statements position the writer as an authoritative provider of the 'truth' about the Indonesian political system. This truth is expressed in a categorical way through a succession of straightforward assertions: *kemerdekaan rakyat Indonesia akan terpasung* (the freedom of the people of Indonesia will be bound), *penindasan pun akan terjadi* (oppression will also occur), *inisiatif masyarakat tumpul* (society's initiative has been blunted) and *apatisme menjadi gejala umum* (apathy has become a common phenomenon). These are summed up in the emphatic statement (*Kondisi seperti itulah* …). These categorical statements about political and social conditions within the nation indicate that students in the 1990s no longer saw their role as being to *question* 'truth' and to draw the state's attention to deviations in the system as a means of 'correcting' it. Rather, their role was as advocates of a fundamental restructuring of the system and as an authoritative source of information regarding those aspects of the system which required transformation. Despite this, the student press of the 1990s was for the most part not concerned with articulating a detailed program for change. While this no doubt reflects students' fear of state coercion, it is also perhaps a product of students' perceptions about the nature of their role. While the terms *kontrol sosial* and *koreksi* had largely disappeared from the student press in the 1990s (see below), students continued to see their role as being to bring the attention of others to the need for change rather than take steps to undertake such change themselves.

Students' use of ideas of structural change, *suksesi* and *demokratisasi* located them clearly within a broadly defined sphere of opposition to the Suharto regime and its practices. Notions of structural change were by no means new to groups critical of the state in Indonesia. Aspinall notes that the emphasis on the need for structural change reflected a broader populist trend and a concern with 'structural analysis' in critical intellectual circles beginning in the late 1970s (2000, 146-7). Theories of political change, including those of the Frankfurt School, dependency theory and liberation theology, as well as the broader issue of democratisation, had also developed a following in student and critical intellectual circles during the 1980s. During *keterbukaan*, it became possible to speak more openly about these issues as reformist elements within the armed forces and the civilian elite debated the forms of political change Indonesia required (Aspinall 2000, 71; Schwarz 1999, 292-303). While the views expressed in the student press of the 1990s reflected the more radical end of the *demokratisasi* spectrum, they nevertheless tapped into broader discourses of change and democratisation which were becoming legitimate topics of public debate in Indonesian dissident circles in the 1990s. Students' discussion of change in terms of *demokratisasi* and *suksesi* thus enabled them to access a broader discourse of opposition evident in Indonesian public life throughout the period of *keterbukaan* and beyond. These discursive links established the discourse of the student press within the wider framework of 'opposition' to the New Order state.

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[13] *Selama ini kita selalu terpukau oleh kata persatuan dan kesatuan, keterbukaan, solidaritas sosial, demokrasi dan keadilan sosial, Tetapi, tanpa disadari, dibalik kata-kata manis itu terselubung pembodohan massa, pembodohan struktural, dan kepura-puraan … Keadaan yang 'kurang sehat' itu muncul karena masyarakat dijadikan massa mengambang yang apolitis. Sehingga inisiatif masyarakat tumpul, apatisme menjadi gejala umum, dan aktivitas pembangunan hanya menjadi milik pemerintah. Selain itu, lembaga negara pun belum banyak yang berani mengontrol penguasa. Kondisi seperti itulah yang menjadi ciri 'sistem politik' Indonesia* (*Hayamwuruk* 10 (1) 1995, 73).

Reformasi

From the beginning of 1998, *perubahan* was overshadowed on the streets and in the pages of students' action media (*media aksi*) by the term *reformasi*, usually translated as 'reform'. The term *reformasi* appears to have gained currency in the Indonesian vocabulary from around the 1970s when it was used in the context of the Islamic reform movement.[14] During the 1980s *reformasi* came to be applied to reform in increasingly wider areas of social, political and economic life. By the mid 1990s, the terms *reformasi* and *pembaharuan* (renewal or reform) were being used by a broad spectrum of political actors advocating varying degrees of change to the existing political system. It was these 'dissident' credentials which enabled the term *reformasi* to become the keyword of the 1998 demonstrations. Moreover, as Sekiguchi suggests, the term *reformasi* was an effective slogan precisely because it promoted the reform or improvement of the existing system, something which some economists and members of the political elite had been advocating since the beginning of the economic crisis (2000, 35). As a result, *reformasi* did not alienate those reformist members of the military and civilian elite whose support was so crucial to the achievement of the movement's aims.

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[14] See for example the 1976 volume by Taufik Abdullah entitled *Aspek reformasi Islam di Indonesia: pengantar diskusi* published by Lembaga Ekonomi dan Kemasyarakatan Nasional in Jakarta.

Yet *reformasi* was by no means an uncontested concept in 1998, nor were its meanings clearly delineated and unchanging. Before 1998 *reformasi*, like *perubahan*, was represented in the student press as entailing thoroughgoing change. An article in the October 1994 edition of *Ganesha*, for example, featured an interview with former 1978 student activist and Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, LBH) leader Hendardi in which *reformasi politik* (political reform) was defined as:

> forming an opposition, pushing for constitutional reform, returning the military to the barracks … separating the judiciary from the executive, eliminating the monopoly of [the corporatist labour, farmers and youth organisations] SPSI, HKTI and KNPI, removing the rectorate from the iron fist, supporting the freedom of the press from censorship, [and] supporting the independence of businesspeople from corruption. In essence … opening opportunities for the freedom of the *rakyat* (*Ganesha* 6 (15): 17).[15]

In 1998 however, these more radical conceptions of *reformasi* were forced to compete with a wide spectrum of views about what the process of *reformasi* should encompass (see Young 1999, 73-77). In the student press, *reformasi* was conceived as *reformasi total*, a process of change encompassing reform of all areas of national life which was to be undertaken in a 'peaceful' way (*reformasi damai*). This was contrasted to the *reformasi setengah hati* (half-hearted *reformasi*) of many in the Suharto regime.

Universitas Indonesia's newsletter *bergerak!* represented the more moderate end of the activist spectrum. Unlike Hendardi's view of *reformasi*, students who wrote in *bergerak!* in the early months of 1998 emphasised that *reformasi* was not aimed at a total overthrow of the existing system. An editorial in the 17 March 1998 edition of *bergerak!*, for example, differentiated between *reformasi* and the more radical and confrontational term *revolusi*:[16]

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[15] See also the article 'Reformasi untuk senyuman di akhir tahta' (*Himmah* 30 (2) October 1997: 30-33) which defined *reformasi* in terms of change to the political system, including succession.

[16] McGregor notes that from the early years of the New Order, there was a 'gradual shift away from revolutionary rhetoric' in state discourse and that 'the term *revolusi* was increasingly avoided'. Instead, terms such as *perjuangan kemerdekaan* (independence struggle) or *perang kemerdekaan* (independence war) were used to describe the events of 1945-49 (McGregor 2002, 253; 245; Cribb 1992, 405). See Heryanto (1995, 17) for a discussion of the term *revolusi* in the Old Order.

> We don’t want to carry out revolution … What we are struggling for is *refomasi*: a process of change aiming towards what we hope will be a better direction (*bergerak!* 6, 17 March 1998).[17]

This more moderate conception of *reformasi* enabled action media such as *bergerak!*, and the students whose views it represented, to establish crucial links between the student movement and reformist elements both within and outside the regime. These links were possible because of the ‘common language’ these groups shared. The rejection of *revolusi*, for example, established shared ground between students and opposition figures such as Amien Rais. At the same time, the rejection of more wide-ranging reform can also be seen as an effect of the parameters of *reformasi* established by more conservative elements within the regime. The military, for example, proposed a narrow view of political change, arguing against revolutionary reform on the grounds that it may ‘change the political structures and the order of the nation which is focussed on *pembangunan*’ (cited in Sekiguchi 2000, 38). Students’ more moderate calls for change must thus also be seen in the context of a desire to avoid provoking a repressive response from the military.

Despite this, students’ perception of *reformasi* as a ‘revolutionary moment’ was suggested in many of the slogans and appellations which appeared in the action media of 1998 and the exhortatory style in which editorials were written. Recalling the revolutionary slogan *merdeka atau mati* (freedom or death), for example, a key rallying cry and common feature of the *media aksi* of early 1998 was the phrase *reformasi sampai mati* (*reformasi* till death) (see for example the editorials in *bergerak!* 5, 16 March 1998 and 4, 13 March 1998). Student activists who lost their lives in the course of the struggle, such as the four students killed outside Trisakti University on 12 May 1998, were honoured as *pahlawan reformasi*.[18] *Reformasi* was also described as a long journey, full of challenges and hence one which required the unity and *semangat* (spirit) of both students and the *rakyat* in order to achieve its aims. It was also described as a struggle (*perjuangan*) which required sacrifice (*pengorbanan*) (see for example *bergerak!* 3, 12 March 1998; *bergerak!* 10, 23 March 1998). As the editorial in the 3 April edition of *bergerak!* stated, every individual involved in the struggle for *reformasi*

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[17] *Kita tidak hendak mengadakan revolusi ... Yang sedang kita perjuangkan sekarang adalah reformasi. Suatu proses perubahan menuju arah yang kita harapkan lebih baik* (*bergerak!* 6, 17 March 1998).

[18] See also the obituary in the 16 March 1998 edition of *bergerak!* in which a student killed in a car accident after returning home from a day spent working at an Universitas Indonesia sponsored food distribution program is described as a *pahlawan reformasi*. Aspinall notes that the national media also represented the students killed at Trisakti in this way (2000, 308, fn 162).

‘must be prepared to sacrifice everything: time, worldly possessions, tears and even blood and soul’ (*bergerak!* 19, 3 April 1998).[19]

Students also clearly saw their role in *reformasi* as an active one. Editions of *bergerak!* in the months leading to the resignation of Suharto reveal *mahasiswa* to be the actors in a wide range of active processes including ‘demanding change’ (*menuntut perubahan*), ‘demanding total *reformasi*’ (*menuntut reformasi (secara) total*), ‘strongly condemning the work of the DPR’ (*mengecam keras kerja DPR*), ‘warning the president and vice-president’ (*memperingatkan presiden dan wakil presiden*), and ‘pressing for the formation of a clean, honest and moral cabinet’ (*mendesak pembentukan cabinet yang bersih, jujur dan bermoral*) (*bergerak!* 4, 13 March 1998). These actions were an integral part of the process of ‘struggling for the interests of the mother who gave them birth: the *rakyat*’ (*memperjuangkan kepentingan ibu kandungnya: rakyat*) (*bergerak!* 7, 18 March 1998). In addition to students’ role in the processes of ‘demanding’, ‘condemning’ and ‘warning’ students also stressed their involvement in concrete actions in support of the *rakyat*. This was a key source of their credibility. In response to criticisms that the attitude of Universitas Indonesia students was ‘No Action Talk Only’ (NATO), an article in *bergerak!* of 16 March argued that:

> Apart from continually carrying out criticism and correction of the manner in which the regime undertakes [the process of] government through demonstrations, UI has also carried out concrete actions which directly impact the lowest level of the *rakyat* (*bergerak!* 16 March 1998).[20]

Students’ structuring of the meanings of *reformasi* in the student press during the first few months of 1998 brought them into direct discursive (and often physical) confrontation with elements of the state and the state apparatus. At the same time, it also linked the student movement with the broader movement for political change, both within and outside the political elite. It was precisely because students were able to share elements of their structuring of the meanings of *reformasi* with others in this movement, including, crucially, those within the military and civilian elite, that the

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[19] *Laiknya sebuah perjuangan, setiap individu yang terlibat aktif di dalamnya harus siap mengorbankan segalanya. Waktu, harta, air mata bahkan darah dan nyawa* (*bergerak!* 19, 3 April 1998). After 1998, the term *revolusi* appeared in a number of student publications in articles reflecting on the events of 1998. A key theme of these articles was the questioning of whether a *revolusi* had indeed occurred and whether *revolusi* was even a desirable method of change (see for example *Himmah* 32 (2) (June) 1999: 13; 14-17; *Ganesha* 10 (24) 1999: 12-13; see also *Ganesha* 7 (17) September 1995: 10-11).

[20] *Selain terus-menerus mengadakan kritik dan koreksi terhadap cara rezim menyelenggarakan pemerintahan melalui demonstrasi, UI pun melakukan tindakan kongkret yang langsung menyentuh lapisan rakyat terbawah* (*bergerak!* 16 March 1998).

reformasi movement was able to achieve one of its most significant aims: the resignation of Suharto.

Students and the *rakyat*

In the student press of the 1990s, the meanings given to the keyword *rakyat* articulate the shift in students' definitions of their relationship to wider society from the 1970s and reflect the significant changes in the ways they interpreted Indonesian society and their own place in it. These changes were the result of the increasing influence of radical populist theories of society and of social and political change on the student movement. Yet ideas about students' leadership role in relation to the *rakyat* also persisted. In the action media of 1998, the idea that students were the spokespersons for the *rakyat*'s aspirations was a key source of legitimacy for their actions in the *reformasi* movement.

In the 1970s one of the key justifications for students' role in social and political life was the conviction that they acted on behalf of the *rakyat* and that they had a responsibility to educate and lead them in matters of politics. This role was justified through the meanings given to the concept of the *rakyat* in the student press. Thus, it was because the *rakyat* was 'disempowered', with 'low levels of education' and a 'lack of awareness' that students' intervention on their behalf was necessary. This paternalistic view shared much in common with the New Order's own approach to society, captured in the idea of the 'family state', in which the interests of the *rakyat* were represented by the appointed 'delegates' of regional and functional groups. Society itself was transformed into a depoliticised 'floating mass' and the masses were urged to focus their energies on development rather than politics. Students' role in the family-state was to 'serve' society through state-directed programs such as the study service scheme (KKN).

There were some continuities between the student press of the 1990s and that of the 1970s, particularly in regard to students' perceptions of their role as leaders of the *rakyat*. An article in the September 1993 edition of *Politika*, for example, argued that because students were aware that struggle should involve many elements of society, it was they who must become the movement's pioneers (*pelopor*) (*Politika* September 1993, 21).[21]

> [We] recognise that it is not possible for us to rely on the forces of students only. As a result, we must try to initiate the unification of the various critical elements in society so that they amass and become a real political and economic force. And together, we will be able to uphold the values of democracy. It is this which constitutes the strategic role of students, that is, to emerge as pioneers and initiators who become mediators between those who usually raise grassroots and vertical issues, those who use NGO channels, those who use educational media, and anyone who is considered to have a commitment to democracy and is able to contribute to the struggle (*Politika* September 1993, 21).[22]

Students' key role in this process is reflected in their designation as grammatical actors in processes such as 'initiate' (*mempelopori*) and 'uphold' (*menegakkan*). Yet the student press of the 1990s also challenged this view of students' relationship to them by defining the *rakyat* as key agents of change and as a potentially powerful element in a broad pro-democratic force.

In the student newspapers of the 1970s, the role of 'agent of change' was attributed to students (see chapter four). By the beginning of the 1990s, however, students who wrote in the student press had recognised that they could not carry out their role as agents of change alone but must seek wider support for their actions. The question of an appropriate ally was thus a key one in the student press throughout the 1990s.[23] In 1966, the military had proven an effective partner in students' efforts to bring down Sukarno and the Communist Party. By the 1990s, however, the idea of a partnership with the military had long been anathema to the student movement. As a result, the ally most often invoked in the student press of the 1990s was the *rakyat*. As in the 1970s, in the student press of the 1990s, the term *rakyat* was used to refer to those elements of

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[21] *Kita, mahasiswa yang menyadari bahwa perjuangan mesti melibatkan banyak elemen masyarakat, karenanya kita yang harus jadi pelopor* (*Politika* September 1993, 21).

[22] *Dengan menyadari bahwa kita tak mungkin hanya berpegang pada kekuatan mahasiswa saja, maka kita harus mencoba mempelopori penyatuan berbagai elemen kritis dalam masyarakat agar terakumulasi dan menjadi kekuatan politik dan ekonomi yang nyata. Agar memungkinkan kita bersama-sama menegakkan nilai-nilai kerakyatan. Di sinilah sebetulnya peran strategis mahasiswa, yaitu tampil sebagai pelopor dan inisiator yang menjadi perantara bagi mereka yang biasa mengangkat isyu-isyu grassroot, isyu-isyu vertikal, yang menggunakan saluran LSM, yang menggunakan media pendidikan, dan siapa saja yang dianggap memiliki komitmen kerakyatan serta mampu untuk memberikan sumbangan bagi perjuangan* (*Politika* September 1993, 21).

[23] See for example the 1992 opinion piece entitled 'Students and social change' in *Balairung* in which Universitas Gadjah Mada philosophy student Edy Haryadi argues that the question of whether students wanted elite level change or structural change would have implications for students' choice of ally, that is, whether they chose to ally themselves with the elite or with farmers and workers (6 (16) 1992, 6).

Indonesian society who were marginalised and disempowered. However, there were also attempts, absent in the student press of the 1970s, to differentiate among a number of broad groups within the *rakyat*. These included *petani* (farmers), *buruh* (workers), *pedagang kecil* (small traders) and *kaum miskin kota* (the urban poor) (see *Ganesha* 8 (22) 1997, 4; *Balairung* 12 (25) 1997, 19). More general terms, including *para kaum tertindas* (the oppressed) and *kaum proletariat* (the proletariat) were also used (*Ganesha* 8 (22) 1997, 4; *Balairung* 12 (25) 1997, 12; see also McRae 2001, 36).

Students who wrote in the student newspapers of the 1970s drew a sharp distinction between the uneducated and politically naïve masses and themselves, as the educated elite of Indonesian society. This distinction, it was argued, was both a reflection of students' paternalistic understanding of their relationship to the common people and a response to the parameters which the threat of state repression set for the ways in which students were able to represent their roles and identities. In the 1990s, students' relationship with the *rakyat* was described in terms of *kerja sama* (cooperation) and *bersatu* (uniting). In a 1994 article in *Balairung*, for example, recently released student activist Bonar Tigor Naipospos argued that:

> one of the characteristics of today's student protest movement is the importance of direct collaboration with the *rakyat* both in rural and urban areas. Today's students cannot (only) speak on behalf of the *rakyat*, while those they defend are not involved. That is what differentiates [today's student movement] from the student movement of the past, which tended to be elitist (*Balairung* 8 (20) 1994: 35).[24]

Similarly, a 1997 article in *Ganesha* argued that students should no longer see themselves as the exclusive agents of change. Rather, they should position themselves as part of a collaborative movement (*gerak bersama*) with the *rakyat* since it was the *rakyat* who had the most right to determine change.[25] The article criticised the idea of students as agents of change and a moral force as merely 'jargon'. Some sections of the student press of the 1990s also emphasised the similarities between students and the *rakyat*. A 1993 article in *Politika*, for example, argued that students 'were an inseparable part of all elements of society' (*adalah bagian tak terpisahkan dari seluruh elemen masyarakat*) and were 'no different from the common people' (*tidak berbeda dengan masyarakat biasa*). This was because both students and the *rakyat* were subject to state repression and both were in effect 'workers' for state-driven development (*Politika* September 1993, 21). A 1997 article in *Ganesha* made a similar statement, asserting that there were similarities between the interests of the *rakyat* and those of students, such as the fact that both groups faced obstacles in freedom of organisation (*terdapat irisan-irisan antara kepentingan rakyat dan kepentingan mahasiswa*). The same article also suggested that students were in fact part of the *rakyat* (*bagian dari rakyat*) (*Ganesha* 8 (22) 1997, 12). These representations of the relationship between students and the *rakyat* reflected a rejection of the elitism of past generations of students and the influence of theories of political change and democratisation which emphasised the role of the middle and lower classes in bringing about change.

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[24] *[S]alah satu karakteristik gerakan protes mahasiswa saat ini adalah pentingnya kerja sama dengan rakyat secara langsung baik di pedesaan maupun di perkotaan. Mahasiswa sekarang tidak bisa (hanya) membela rakyat ke atas, sementara rakyat sendiri yang sedang dibelanya tidak diikutsertakan. Itulah yang membedakan dengan gerakan mahasiswa sebelumnya yang cenderung elitis* (*Balairung* 8 (20) 1994, 35).

[25] *Mahasiswa bukan lagi agent of change yang eksklusif tapi merupakan bagian dari sebuah gerak bersama. Idealisme gerakan 90-an ini adalah berjuang bersama rakyat, karena sesungguhnya rakyatlah yang paling berhak menjadi penentu perubahan* (*Ganesha* 8 (22) 1997, 12).

Yet despite these assertions, the *rakyat* were rarely assigned the role of grammatical agents in student publications. Instead, they were represented as modifying elements within prepositional phrases, as in for example, *berkoalisi dengan kekuatan rakyat* (form a coalition with the forces of the *rakyat*) (*Himmah* 30 (1) April 1997, 65) and '*[b]ersatu dengan kekuatan rakyat* (unite with the forces of the *rakyat*) (*Balairung* 12 (25) 1997, 17-21) or as elements within lengthy noun phrases such as *[t]erintegrasinya gerakan mahasiswa dan gerakan-gerakan kelompok masyarakat dalam kerangka kepentingan yang sama* (the integration of the student movement with like-minded social movements). The *rakyat* were also represented as objects of students' actions. An article in the 1997 edition of *Balairung*, for example, wrote of the need for students to 'develop people's organisations and social organisations' to carry out control of the arbitrary acts of the authorities (*mahasiswa harus masuk membangun organisasi-organisasi rakyat serta organisasi sosial untuk mengadakan kontrol bagi kesewenang-wenangan penguasa*) (*Balairung* 12 (25) 1997: 17-21). These examples reveal that in many senses students continued to see their role in terms of guidance of the *rakyat*. In particular, students saw their function as being to channel the political potential of the *rakyat* into a broad movement for change. Collaboration between students and the *rakyat* was thus initiated by students, and not by the *rakyat*. Moreover, while this movement for change was intended to benefit the *rakyat*, it was not conceived by them but by students.

The contradictions between students' calls for collaboration with marginalised elements in Indonesian society and the persistence of paternalistic ideas about the necessity of students' leadership of the *rakyat* is apparent in an article which appeared in the September 1993 edition of *Politika*. The article, entitled 'Buy me a new shirt, just like in *Mode* magazine' [*Beliin baju baru, kaya' di majalah Mode*], consists of an imaginary monologue in which the wife of a bus driver's assistant (*kenek Metro*) tries to persuade her husband not to strike against rising petrol prices. The article, which is written entirely in the variety of colloquial Indonesian spoken in Jakarta, is both a criticism of the political apathy of many urban working class Indonesians and of the elitism and hypocrisy of many students. The woman begins by arguing that the everyday needs of the family are more important than politics:

> What's politics? What's the state? What do you want to think about all that stuff for? Just getting some cash is hard enough. You'll never figure it out anyway. Hey …, think you're a king do you, think you're the president, think you're a politician. Get rid of the rats in the roof first, and make sure Gimin's got food on the table, after that you can talk about anything you like, it's up to you (*Politika* September 1993).[26]

Demonstrating or going on strike will only make their life more difficult: 'don't go getting chased by the cops again, like last time', she pleads (*jangan sampe diuber-uber pelisi lagi, kaya' dulu*). Besides, she argues, matters of politics are not for the 'little people' (*wong cilik*) ('What would we know?') but for the 'big shots' (*orang gedean*). Yet she is also a contradiction in terms: after pleading with her husband to 'think of their next meal', she reminds him of his promise to buy her a new shirt 'just like the one in this picture' (she opens the paper her take-away fried tofu is wrapped in to reveal a page ripped from a fashion magazine).

One of the aims of students' intervention in campaigns for the land rights of rural communities and the struggles of urban workers was to educate these groups about their rights so that they could articulate their interests for themselves. This view was also evident in calls such as those made in the edition of *Balairung* cited above for students to develop people's organisations. In *Politika* the urban *rakyat*, expressed through the voice of the woman, is represented as lacking political awareness. The woman's perception that politics is a matter for the politicians and 'big shots' and not the 'little people' thus provides a justification for students' role in educating the *rakyat* about their political rights. Yet the article also highlights the extent to which the urban poor are disempowered by their poverty. It is because of the daily difficulties the poor face that students' efforts to raise their political awareness, and their campaigns to secure the rights of the poor, are necessary.

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[26] *Apa itu politik? Apa itu negara? Kok, mau-maunya sih mikirin yang begituan. Nyari duit aja susah. Nebak buntut ndak jebol-jebol. Eh …, udah sok taju, sok jadi peresiden, sok jadi politikus. Urusin dulu tikus-tikus di loteng, urusin dulu makannya si Gimin, habis itu mau ngomongin apa aja juga, terserah situlah* (*Politika* September 1993).

However, the article is also critical of the elitist attitude which many students were perceived to hold towards the *rakyat*. In the course of her monologue, the woman relates a recent incident in which a student refuses to pay the full fare for his bus trip, offering the bus driver's assistant 100 rupiah. The assistant refuses to accept this, and asks the student to 'be reasonable' (*kire-kire dong*): the petrol price has risen so the fare has gone up. The student replies angrily:

> You're the one who should be reasonable. Yesterday I was demonstrating at the parliament, defending your rights, so that the petrol price didn't go up. Look, my photo's in the paper. Now you're trying to screw me over, not even giving me a free ride. Typical, you people are so stupid, you don't appreciate anything. Give me some credit for my struggle (*Politika* September 1993).[27]

The incident, told from the woman's perspective, illustrates the hypocrisy of the student's actions: yesterday he defended the rights of the 'little people' but the following day he refuses to do what will help those same people in a practical way, that is, pay the right fare.

This criticism of students' elitist views of the *rakyat* reflects the revival of the radical populist tradition in Indonesian politics during the late 1980s and 1990s. In this tradition, the *rakyat* were seen as the very essence of Indonesia and as objects of admiration and devotion. Discussing the 'rakyatism' of the radical nationalist organisations of the 1930s, for example, Frederick notes that a key element of the rhetoric of these organisations was respect for and identification with the aspirations and needs of the *rakyat* (1989, 55; see also McVey 1967, 138-40). Sukarno's veneration of Indonesia's rural masses, the *kaum marhaen*, during the 1950s reflected a similar populist identification with the *rakyat*. The re-emergence of this populism in the 1990s, reflected in students' assertions that they were *bagian dari rakyat* (part of the *rakyat*) and their calls for students to forge a new, more egalitarian political relationship with the *rakyat* by collaborating in a pro-democratic force, was clearly a product of students' political marginalisation through the NKK/BKK policies. It was this marginalisation which enabled students to recognise the similarities between their own and the *rakyat*'s political marginalisation at the hands of the state and which highlighted the necessity of finding alternative discourses with which the challenge the regime.

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[27] *Elo yang kire-kire. Kemaren gua baru demonstrasi di DPR, bela-belain elo punya nasib, supaya bensin kagak naek, liat tuh foto gua di koran. Eh sekarang lo malah malakin gue, bukannya bolehin gue naek gratis. Dasar rakyat bego, nggak tau diuntung. Hargain perjuangan gua dong* (*Politika* September 1993).

Yet if in the mid 1990s there had been a move away from the notion that students were spokespersons for the *rakyat*, in action media such as *bergerak!*, this represented one of the key sources of legitimacy for students' actions in support of *reformasi*. Editorials in *bergerak!* stressed that students' actions were 'a sign of their concern for the *rakyat*' (*tanda kepedulian dengan rakyat*) (*bergerak!* 4, 13 March 1998) and were aimed at 'the improvement of the fate of the people and the condition of the nation' (*perbaikan nasib rakyat dan kondisi negara*) (*bergerak!* 11, 24 March 1998). Students also represented themselves as the channels for the *rakyat*'s aspirations: one editorial appropriated Sukarno's famous epithet, describing student protesters as the 'extension of the people's tongue' (*penyambung lidah rakyat*) (*bergerak!* 35, 30 April 1998). Editorials in *bergerak!* also described students as educators of the *rakyat*. An editorial in the 1 May edition, for example, noted that students should be thankful for their education and express this 'by providing education and awareness to the *rakyat*' (*dengan memberikan pendidikan dan penyadaran kepada rakyat*) (*bergerak!* 36, 1 May 1998). Yet students also framed their relationship to the *rakyat* in terms of collaboration. Editorials in *bergerak!* emphasised collaboration between students and the *rakyat*, citing 'the need for students, together with the *rakyat*, to rise up to struggle for a better situation' (*perlunya mahasiswa bersama rakyat bangkit memperjuangkan keadaan yang lebih baik* (11, 24 March 1998). At the same time, the *rakyat* themselves were depersonalised. An editorial in the 4 May edition of *bergerak!*, for example, purported to speak on behalf of all Indonesians when it wrote that 'the people of Indonesia are tired of being continually deceived by the authorities' (*rakyat Indonesia sudah begitu bosan dibodohi dan dibodohi terus oleh penguasa*). The *rakyat*'s own voice was also conflated with that of students, with *bergerak!* claiming that 'the voice of students is the voice of the *rakyat*' (*suara mahasiswa adalah suara rakyat*) (*bergerak!* 37, 4 May 1998).

As in the 1970s, students' representations of their role as channels for the *rakyat*'s aspirations provided a powerful justification for their role in the *reformasi* movement. By claiming to speak on behalf of a broad social grouping, students gave their own demands for change additional authority. Such a significant source of legitimacy was of particular importance at such a crucial time as 1998 when the credibility of students' actions calling for *reformasi* and the resignation of Suharto was so essential to the success of the movement. At the same time, students' claims that their voice was 'the voice of the people' implicitly challenged the regime's assertion that it ruled on the basis of the support of the whole nation. It also undermined the view that under the current regime the *rakyat* and the state constituted an integrated whole, united within a 'family'. Yet while students do not challenge the *idea* of the state as a family guided by a benevolent father-figure, they do contest Suharto's continuing occupation of this position.

A movement for political change

Students' attempts to redefine their relationship to the *rakyat* in terms of cooperation and collaboration in a broad pro-democratic force structured their role in new ways and produced an alternative framework for defining *mahasiswa*. This framework was built around the notion that the students of the 1990s acted not only in their role *as students* but also as part of a broader movement of opposition to the New Order state. In the student press, this role was articulated through the keyword *gerakan* (movement). The meanings students gave to this keyword characterised students' role as a movement for political change and democratisation and defined their relationship to the state in a framework of struggle and resistance.

In the student newspapers of the 1970s, students defined their role in politics as one of the practical manifestations of their role as agents of social control and a product of their sense of social responsibility. As a result, the term *gerakan* most often appeared in references to *gerakan kontrol sosial* (movement of social control), *gerakan petisi* (petition movement) and *gerakan mahasiswa anti-NKK* (anti-NKK student movement). This representation of students' role in politics was a response to the very real threat of repression which they faced and a means by which they sought to continue their role as disinterested and 'moral' critics of the regime. In the 1990s, however, the association of the term *gerakan* with *kontrol sosial* and *petisi* was largely replaced by a new set of meanings which were consistent with the shift in students' definitions of their role and identity from a force for social control to a movement for political change. As a result of this shift, terms such as *gerakan politik* (political movement), *gerakan perubah politik* (movement for political change), *gerakan perubahan* (movement for change) and *gerakan demokratisasi* (democratisation movement) were almost synonymous with the student movement (see for example *Balairung* 4 (12) 1990, 12, 14; *Balairung* 12 (25) 1997, 10, 11, 33, 34, 38). Students also defined their role as a *gerakan menentang* (movement of resistance) and a *gerakan protes* (protest movement) (*Balairung* 4 (12) 1990, 39; *Balairung* 8 (20) 8 1994, 35).

Consistent with this shift was the increasing concern from the mid 1990s with strategies and methods of resistance, indicated by the use of terms such as *posisi tawar* (bargaining position), *strategi perlawanan* (strategy for resistance), *isu-isu strategis* (strategic issues), *partner strategis* (strategic partners), *perhitungan taktis* (tactical calculations), *agenda perjuangan* (agenda for struggle) and *agenda perlawanan* (agenda for resistance), and discussion of the need to create and take advantage of opportunities (*menciptakan peluang, memanfaatkan peluang*) (see for example the lead articles in *Balairung* 12 (25) 1997; see also *Politika* September 1993, 20). The images of conflict, struggle and resistance evoked by students' discussion of 'strategies' and 'tactics' suggest that the notion of resistance was built into the very framework within which students conceived of their roles. These images also suggest that they saw their relationship to the state in terms of conflict and contestation. Yet as Suharto noted in his 1993 Independence Day address:

> We realise that in our increasingly dynamic society there will be friction, conflict or even disputes. This cannot be avoided, because it is natural. We need not inhibit such friction, disputes or conflict. What we must do is formulate procedures and protocol for [their] resolution in a peaceful, ethical, just, mature and civilised way (Suharto 1993, 9).[28]

Suharto's acknowledgement that conflict was an inevitable and natural part of a dynamic society such as Indonesia's reflected the shift in the public discourse of the state which occurred during the period of *keterbukaan*. This new emphasis was a response to earlier criticisms of the state's organicist ideology (revived under the new name of 'integralism' in the mid-1980s) which, it was claimed, presented an unrealistic view of social life as harmonious and free of conflict (Bourchier 1996, 274). Yet while Suharto emphasised that it was natural for conflict to occur, he also stressed that it was not appropriate for conflict to continue. Instead, disagreements must be resolved and the nation returned to its proper state of harmony, consensus and unity. In this context, students' representation of their relationship to the state in terms of conflict, struggle and resistance represents a significant challenge to the state precisely because it contradicts the claim that the New Order is able to guarantee harmony, order and consensus within the family-state. It does not, however, challenge the idea that Indonesia *should* constitute a harmonious and ordered whole nor the values of harmony, unity and consensus. Rather, it challenges the regime's ability to secure this harmony.

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[28] *Kita menyadari bahwa dalam masyarakat kita yang akan bertambah dinamis nanti akan ada persentuhan, konflik ataupun pertentangan. Hal itu tidak dapat dihindari, karena alamiah. Yang perlu kita lakukan bukanlah meredam persentuhan, pertentangan atau konflik. Yang harus kita lakukan adalah menyusun tatacara dan tatakrama bagi penyelesaian persentuhan, konflik atau pertentangan itu secara damai, etis, adil, dewasa dan berkeadaban* (Suharto 1993, 9).

From social control to resistance

Linked to students' role as part of a political movement which aimed at change was the idea that they were a force for resistance against the state and its practices. In the student press of the 1990s, this area of meaning was articulated through the keyword *perlawanan* (resistance). The addition of this keyword to the student press reflected a significant shift in students' representations of their relationship to the state from the social control and correction of the 1970s. Yet in some sections of the student press, and in the action media of 1998, the notion that students also played a role in controlling the state persisted.

As noted above, the concept of opposition was contrary to the New Order's vision of the state as an integrated and harmonious whole which was at the core of the notion of the integralist state. Indeed, as noted in chapter two, Suharto claimed that Indonesia did not 'recognise' (*mengenal*) Western-style opposition, which he defined as 'opposition for the sake of opposing, for the sake of being different'. This was because in Indonesia's Pancasila democracy, the appropriate and authentically 'Indonesian' mode of political decision-making was 'deliberation and consensus' and not the adversarial political style of many Western democracies (Suharto 1989, 346; see also Hooker 1996, 128-31). In contrast, as noted in chapter three, 'differences of opinion' were appropriate. During the *keterbukaan* period, the regime expressed a more tolerant toward such differences. In his 1990 Independence Day address, for example, the president acknowledged that the nature of social and political life at the beginning of the 1990s had changed. Since Indonesian society was now united by its commitment to the Pancasila, he asserted, there was no need to fear the kind of ideological divisions that had characterised Indonesian politics in the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, the diversity of opinions within the nation needed to be 'harnessed' in order to contribute to the nation's progress:

> Democracy indeed requires a lot of consultation, discussion, exchanges of views and dialogue, both between the government and the society and between various groups in society. We should see differences of opinion as the very source of life's dynamism (Suharto 1990, 16).[29]

The New Order's attempts to delegitimise *oposisi* focused on defining it as a 'foreign' concept and therefore as inappropriate for Indonesia. During the period of *keterbukaan,* this understanding of *oposisi* was challenged, as key public figures called for the revival of parliamentary opposition parties to act as a control on government, a move which the president strongly opposed (see for example *Media Indonesia* 8 September 1995 'President tolak gagasan partai oposisi' [President rejects the idea of opposition parties]). In restructuring the meaning of *oposisi*, the student press intersected with these broader discourses of dissent, emphasising the essential role of opposition in *demokrasi*, even a Pancasila democracy. An article in the February-March 1993 edition of *Himmah*, for example, described *oposisi* as an 'appropriate' (*wajar*) and 'natural' (*alami*) element of democracy (*Himmah* February-March 1993: 34).

The concept of opposition also informed students' conceptions of their own role in social and political life in the *keterbukaan* period. This new role was articulated through the keyword *perlawanan* (resistance) and the lexical sets into which it entered. The term *perlawanan* was by no means new to the Indonesian political vocabulary. Its use in the context of modern Indonesian history dates at least to the nationalist movement of the 1920s and 1930s, when resistance to the Dutch became an essential part of the struggle for independence. The revolutionary connotations of *perlawanan* and in particular, its ability to recall the part students played in resistance against the Dutch during the revolution, perhaps explains its attraction as a keyword in the student press of the 1990s. The choice of *perlawanan* was also a function of the revival of the radicalist tradition which emerged in the study groups of the 1980s. Students associated with these study groups were attracted to leftist political writings and to the revolutionary style which had characterised the nationalist and communist rhetoric of the past. During the 1990s, this radicalist discourse, including many of the terms associated with it, began to permeate student publications. By the mid 1990s, the term *perlawanan* was being used in the student press in relation to the contemporary situation and students' role in it. In June 1995, for example, *Himmah* published a special report on student activism (*Mereka gelisah, mereka melawan*) which framed student activism in terms of *perlawanan*, citing the final line of Wiji Thukul's well-known poem 'Warning' ('There is only one word: resist.') as the inspiration for student demonstrators (*Himmah* 28 (1) 1995, 51 ff).[30] Similarly, a 1997 article in *Ganesha* described students' actions as part of a collective movement of *perlawanan* based on the common interest of students and the *rakyat* for political change and democratisation (*Ganesha* 8 (22), 3-4).

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[29] This translation is from Bourchier and Hadiz 2003, 195.

Perlawanan was also a key element in the action media of 1998. An article in the 13 March 1998 edition of *bergerak!*, for example, echoed the slogan 'Resist to the death!' (*Lawan sampai mati!*) used by student demonstrators: 'UI students will resist to the death' (*Mahasiswa UI mau lawan sampai mati*) (*bergerak!* 4, 13 March 1998). Another edition wrote that a recent event staged on the UI campus had taken place in 'an atmosphere of resistance to the absolutism of power' (*atmosfir perlawanan terhadap absolutisme kekuasaan*) (*bergerak!* 10, 23 March 1998).

In the student press, the term *perlawanan* was part of a broad lexical set concerned with opposition and resistance which included terms such as *oposisi* (opposition), *oposan* (opponent), *counter* (in English), and *resistensi* (resistance). A 1994 article in *Balairung*, for example, argued that in their recent protests students had taken an oppositional political stance (*sikap politik oposisi*) against the authorities, as indicated by the increasing tendency for students to oppose or condemn (*menggugat*) the political system (*Balairung* 8 (20) 1994: 34).[31] And an article in the February-March 1993 edition of *Himmah* included the terms *kelompok penekan* (pressure group), *menentang* and *melawan* (oppose, resist), *membongkar kemapanan* (tear down the establishment), and *kelompok tandingan* (counter group) (*Himmah* February-March 1993: 34-38). These terms point to an understanding of *oposisi* both antithetical to that of the state and broader than simply the installation of a parliamentary opposition system. Their use also clearly frames students' roles and identities in a relationship of opposition and resistance to the state. Like the emphasis on students' role as part of a political movement, students' framing of their roles in terms of *perlawanan* constitutes a significant challenge to the state's claims that Indonesia under the New Order is an integralist state, in which the *rakyat* and the state are a cohesive family.

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[30] See Bourchier and Hadiz (2003, 179) for an English translation of this poem.

[31] *Dalam aksi-aksi protes mahasiswa tersebut mereka dengan tegas mengambil sikap politik oposisi terhadap penguasa dan kebijaksanaan Orde Baru, sikap oposisi mereka mulai terlihat pergeseran kearah menggugat sistem politik walaupun belum secara substansial* (*Balairung* 8 (20) 1994: 34).

In their discussions of *perlawanan*, students explicitly identified the regime and its practices as the object of resistance through the use of phrases such as 'the repressive political practices of the authorities' (*praktik politik represif penguasa*), 'the political regimentation of the New Order' (*regimentasi politik Orde Baru*), 'the repressive regime' (*rezim yang represif*), 'oppression' (*penindasan*), 'injustice' (*tindak ketidakadilan*), and the 'status quo' (*Balairung* 10 (23) 1996, 26-30; *Balairung* 12 (25) 1997, 10; 33-36; *Ganesha* 10 (24) 1999, 6-8; *Himmah* 29 (1) 1996, 61). This representation of the state as a repressive and totalitarian regime provides evidence of students' rejection of the position of the critically collaborative role they had played in the 1970s and of the clear rupture in the relationship between students and the state in the 1990s. Yet while these terms reflect the strongly critical stance which students took towards the regime, they do not indicate a wholesale rejection of the ideological basis of the state, enshrined in the five principles of the Pancasila. Indeed, the student publications almost invariably avoid critical discussion of the Pancasila itself, instead focussing on the state's implementation of Pancasila democracy (see below). Thus, as these terms indicate, the student press of the 1990s, like that of the 1970s, was primarily concerned with criticising the *practices* of the New Order regime.

Adding to this impression is the persistence of notions of 'control' and 'correction'. A 1992 article in *Politika*, for example, described intellectuals and students as a group with great strength 'to correct the path of the process of democratisation in this country (*untuk mengoreksi jalan proses demokratisasi di negeri ini*) (*Politika* 8 (1) January 1992, 16). An article in the September 1993 edition of the same publication also echoed the discourse of control, suggesting that students should play a role in resolving all kinds of irregularities (*ikut menyelesaikan segala macam ketidakberesan*) both cultural and structural (*Politika* September 1993, 20). And a 1997 article in *Balairung* argued that students needed to build social organisations which could 'continue to carry out control of the arbitrary acts of the authorities (*terus mengadakan kontrol bagi kesewenang-wenangan penguasa*) (*Balairung* 12 (25) 25 1997, 17-18). Ideas of control and correction were also apparent in the action media of 1998. An editorial in the 12 March 1998 edition of *bergerak!*, for example, argued that:

> We [at *bergerak*!] feel that students must be a control for the government. Because if the government does wrong and it is not corrected then its actions can be magically transformed into agreed truth … As a result, students must always put pressure on the government (*bergerak*! 3, 12 March 1998).[32]

Similarly, the editorial in the 16 March edition argued that since 'the order which we [students] helped to establish was in fact going in the wrong direction' (*orde yang telah turut kita bangun itu ternyata salah arah*), it was students' responsibility to 'straighten it out' (*meluruskannya kembali*) (*bergerak*! 5, 16 March 1998). The same edition described the demonstrations by UI students as a form of 'criticism and correction of the manner in which the regime undertakes [the process of] government' (*kritik dan koreksi terhadap cara rezim menyelenggarakan pemerintahan*). The editorial in the 3 April edition similarly described student activists as 'carrying out correction of the authorities' (*melakukan koreksi terhadap penguasa*) (*bergerak*! 5, 16 March 1998; *bergerak*! 19, 3 April 1998).

The persistence of notions of control and correction in the student press of the 1990s and in the action media of 1998 reflects students' ability to work within the broadly defined parameters of the New Order state, even as they defined their own roles in clearly oppositional ways. Rather than focussing their criticism on the core values and ideologies of the regime, students instead defined their roles and identities in terms of resistance to the *practices* of the state. In doing so, students demonstrated their ability to use their political freedom 'responsibly'. This, together with the organisational weaknesses of the student movement, enabled them to avoid a repeat of the crackdowns of 1977-1978. When students did suffer repression, it was because they breached the limits set by the state for dissent by, for example, criticising the authority of the president.

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[32] *Kami merasa bahwa memang mahasiswa harus jadi kontrol pemerintah. Karena bila pemerintah berbuat salah dan tidak dikoreksi maka perbuatannya dapat tersulap dan berubah menjadi kebenaran yang disepakati … Oleh karena itu mahasiswa memang harus senantiasa memberikan pemerintah tekanan* (*bergerak*! 3, 12 March 1998).

Democracy and dissent

In the 1970s, students who wrote in *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa* justified their role as a force for social control and correction by arguing that their actions were moral and based on their status as independent intellectuals. Consistent with the new emphasis on democratisation, people power and resistance to the status quo, in the student press of the 1990s there was a shift away from morality and intellectuality. Instead, students increasingly looked to the values of democracy to justify their actions. These changes were a reaction against the emphasis in the state discourse of the 1980s on students as 'people of analysis' whose role was only in politics as a concept. It also reflected the revival of radicalism in the late 1980s and 1990s and the emergence of issues such as democracy into the public arena. These two processes underlined students' search for new types of authority with which to frame their opposition and resistance to the state.

In chapter four it was argued that in the student press of the 1970s students emphasised that their role as a force for social control and correction of the state and their role in practical politics was based on their identity as a moral, idealistic and politically disinterested group committed to truth and justice. This enabled them to avoid presenting an overt threat to the state and at the same to frame their criticisms in terms which the New Order itself acknowledged as legitimate. In the early 1990s, students who wrote in the student press continued to cite morality and conscience as an underlying motivation for their actions. An article in the July-August 1990 edition of *Himmah,* for example, likened students' support of communities whose land was affected by large development projects to the actions of *resi*, arguing that the arbitrary and unjust behaviour of the state apparatus had 'called students to action' (*membuat mahasiswa terpanggil*) (*Himmah* 21 (3) July-August 1990, 31). Similarly, a 1990 special report in *Balairung* suggested that because students acted from their conscience (*hati nurani*)*,* their movement was pure (*murni*) (*Balairung* 4 (12) 1990, 39).

After the mid 1990s, however, the terms in which students discussed the issue of morality changed. Discussing the debate between those who argued that the student movement should only be concerned with moral issues and those who argued that it should engage in political issues, a 1993 article in *Politika* asserted that this dichotomy was evidence of ‘the success of the regime in dividing students’ forces’ (*memecah belah kekuatan mahasiswa*). Instead, the article equated moral and populist issues (*persoalan-persoalan moral/kerakyatan*) and argued that students should be a political movement with morals (*gerakan politik yang bermoral*) which put its moral and political commitment into practice by, for example, ‘raising grassroots and vertical issues’ (*mengaktualisasikan komitemen moral maupun politisnya … misalnya … mengangkat isyu grassroot dan isyu vertical*) (*Politika* September 1993, 21). Similarly, a 1997 article in *Ganesha* rejected the designation of students as a politically disinterested elite, arguing that it was time to tear down ‘students’ position as ‘*resi*’, the ‘stage’ mentality, and the localisation of the student movement’ (*Ganesha* 8 (22), 4).[33]

The rejection of student elitism was also evident in the shift away from the emphasis on students’ intellectual credentials as the basis for their political role. In the student newspapers of the 1970s students cited their privileged education, and the superior reasoning abilities and scientific objectivity with which this education provided them, as a key reason for their role as critics of the state. Since rationality and objectivity had been central to the way the state defined students’ roles from the beginning of the 1970s, students’ emphasis on these characteristics framed their role in terms which the state acknowledged as legitimate. During the 1980s, however, the state defined students’ role as *only* to be engaged in thinking and analysis, and not to engage in practical politics.

The study groups of the 1980s were in part a product of the state’s definition of students as ‘thinkers’. However, they also tapped into a critical intellectual tradition in Indonesia which dated from the 1930s. The study group tradition of the 1980s had a significant impact on the development of the student press in the 1990s. In some cases, former study group activists became involved in the establishment of student presses and throughout the 1990s publications such as *Balairung* continued to host regular discussions on topics of political or social import which formed the basis for feature articles in the magazine. Yet while there was less overt discussion of students’ intellectual credentials as the basis for their role in the student press of the 1990s than there had been in publications such as *Salemba* and *Gelora Mahasiswa*, students' intellectual approach remained an important feature of many of the publications themselves. This was reflected in the mottoes of magazines such as *Balairung*, which described itself as the 'Breath of students' intellectuality' (*nafas intelektualitas mahasiswa*), *Hayamwuruk*, the motto of which was 'The reflection of students' culture and intellectuality' (*Refleksi budaya dan intelektualitas mahasiswa*) and *Himmah*, which styled itself as 'the Forum for faith, knowledge, [and] deeds (*Forum man, Ilmu, Amal*). It was also reflected in the topics with which the student publications dealt as well as the style in which the articles were written. *Himmah*, for example, featured discussions of key issues of the *keterbukaan* period such as democracy and the economy (28 (2) October 1995), succession (28 (1) June 1995; 30 (2) October 1997), opposition parties (24 (1) February - March 1993) and the elections (30 (1) April 1997). The articles were well-researched and included references to academic work by both Indonesian and non-Indonesian scholars as well as interviews with key public figures. *Himmah*'s October 1997 edition on succession, for example, featured interviews with former PDI parliamentarian Sabam Sirait, Universitas Indonesia constitutional law expert Harun Al-Rasyid and National Human Rights Commission (*Komnas HAM*) member Asmara Nababan. It also cited literature on democratisation by Samuel Huntington and Guillermo O'Donnell, Herbert Feith's *The decline of constitutional democracy* (1962), and Ulf Sundhaussen's work on Indonesian military politics (*Himmah* 30 (2) October 1997, 17 and 20-24).

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[33] The article suggested that the student movement had become a stage on which students made themselves the actors while the rest of society became the ‘audience’ for the drama played out by students, implying that many students continued to have an elitist attitude towards wider society.

This intellectual orientation in the student press enabled it to present itself to the regime in a less threatening way. Thus, while students who wrote in the student press of the 1990s only rarely discussed their role in overtly intellectual terms, they continued to present their criticisms of the state from the position of educated, politically aware individuals. In this context, the intertextual references to academic literature provides students' criticisms with credibility and at the same time enables them to express these criticisms in a more indirect way, by representing them as originating from a source other than students. The publication of lengthy interviews with key public figures, many of whom had a reformist outlook, achieved a similar aim. Discussing the demonstrations led by mainstream journalists after the banning of *Tempo*, *Editor* and *De Tik* in 1994, Ariel Heryanto observes that such demonstrations were highly unusual for New Order journalists who usually 'express their grievances by proxy', by publishing interviews with significant public figures (Heryanto 1996, 251).

From the mid 1990s, students also began to legitimise their role in social and political life in reference to *demokrasi*. In the discussion of *oposisi* above it was suggested that students during the 1990s restructured the meaning of *oposisi*, emphasising it as an appropriate and natural part of *demokrasi*. These ideas intersected with broader discourses about *demokratisasi* current during the period of *keterbukaan*. In the discourse of the student press, this new discourse of *demokratisasi* and, in particular, students' own version of it, provided them with a new source of authority for their opposition to the state. In this view, students and other groups could oppose (*menentang*), resist (*melawan*) and condemn (*menggugat*) the regime and its practices *because* such actions were appropriate for a *demokrasi*, as defined by students. Students' morality thus became secondary to their democratic right to express dissenting views as a justification for their role in social and political life. Furthermore, according to the students' version of *demokrasi*, all sectors of society, and in particular the most disempowered groups, had the right to oppose.

The shift away from morality and overt expressions of intellectuality as the basis of students' actions in the student press reflected the broader changes taking place in Indonesian society and politics during the 1990s. Students' rejection of the elitism associated with their superior intellectual abilities, for example, was a product of the revival of populism during the 1980s and an associated identification with the *rakyat*. It was also a response to the state's emphasis during the 1980s on students' role in thinking and analysis rather than politics, which made a focus on their characteristics as politically disinterested intellectuals somewhat unattractive for the students of the 1990s, particularly those who defined students' role in overtly oppositional ways. At the same time, the shift away from morality as a basis for students' actions reflected their new role as a movement for political change. While during the 1970s the term *moral* had been used alongside terms such as *idealisme* to refer to students' ethics and integrity, by the 1990s, the term was often perceived to mean that students were only concerned with moral issues and not political issues (McRae 2000, 34-5). Insofar as this excluded political issues such as democratisation, succession, *dwifungsi* and human rights, then students who wrote in the student publications of the 1990s rejected it.

Producing students

Chapter four suggested that the variety of language used in some sections of the student newspapers, together with the use of rhetorical questions, represented techniques by which the students who wrote in the student newspapers of the 1970s attempted to socialise their readers into their identities as students. In the student newspapers of the 1990s a similar pattern of language use is evident.

Some sections of the student publications of the 1990s, for example, addressed their readers in the language which these readers used. Editorials in *Politika*, for example, often used non-standard spelling, indicating the non-standard pronunciation which was characteristic of the colloquial variety of Indonesian used in Jakarta, especially by young people (for example, *rame* for *ramai*, busy) as well as non-standard verb endings such as *-in* (*pikirin* for *pikirkan*, think) and vocabulary (*bilang*, say; *keren*, cool) and particles common to spoken language such as *kok* and *deh*. Readers were also addressed using the inclusive personal pronoun *kita* (with *kami* for the voice of the publication) or as *anda* (with a small ‘a’ instead of the capital letter used in standard Indonesian), indicating students’ rejection of the distance of the New Order’s version of standard Indonesian. This intimate, conversational style is also evident in *Ganesha* and *Hayamwuruk*.[34]

An example of *Politika*’s style is the editorial which appeared in the April 1995 edition, which reflected on elections under the New Order:

> Those who always win of course want to prove that ‘I’m gonna win again, how ‘bout you?’ and there is no fear whatsoever of being the loser. But those who usually lose can only say ‘for the sake of democracy, we will take part, whatever the result.’ A deep resignation in the face of a victory determined well in advance. And those who are merely the supporters can say ‘ah, they won again!’ (*Politika* April 1995, 10).[35]

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[34] See Kenalkan: Sherlock Holmes! (*Ganesha* 8 (22) 1997, 9) and Pidato (*Hayamwuruk* 10 (1) 1995, 18).

[35] *Untuk yang selalu menang, tentunya ingin membuktikan bahwa ‘gue pasti menang lagi, elo gimana?’ dan tidak ada ketakutan sedikitpun untuk menjadi the loser. Tapi yang biasa kalah, paling hanya bisa mengatakan, ‘demi demokratisasi, kami akan ikut. Apapun hasilnya.’ Suatu kepasrahan yang mendalam melihat kenyataan kemenangan jauh di tangan. Dan untuk yang sekedar sebagai penggembira bisa bilang, ‘ah, paling itu lagi yang menang!’*

The simple language used in the editorial makes it accessible and the use of the colloquial language used in Jakarta (the pronouns used in *gue* (I) and *elo* (you)) serves to demystify the election process, namely the political engineering which ensures that Golkar always wins elections with a significant majority. The editorial's use of this style thus enables student readers to identify with the criticisms being made and so creates the conditions by which students can come to see themselves as critics of the regime.

Another technique which the student newspapers of the 1970s used to attempt to 'socialise' their student readers into the identities constructed for them in the student press was rhetorical questions. In the student discourse of the 1990s, rhetorical questions also form part of the construction of readers. An article in the 18 March edition of *bergerak!*, for example, positioned students as martyrs of *reformasi*. The caption for an article entitled 'Students boldly take to the streets', claimed:

> Students in Solo and Jakarta try to take to the streets. The security apparatus blocks [them], clashes are unavoidable. A sign that students are ready to die for *reformasi*? (*bergerak!* 7, 18 March 1998).[36]

The fact that students are attempting to take their movement to the streets, *bergerak!* implies, is a sign that they are ready to die for *reformasi*. Taking to the streets will necessarily bring students into physical conflict with the security apparatus. The readers of *bergerak!* are cued to respond in a particular way to the question asked at the beginning of the article. As they read on, they will interpret what they read as evidence to support the foregone conclusion that students who take to the streets are 'true' heroes of *reformasi*. *bergerak!* thus constructs an identity for students as heroes and martyrs of a struggle on a revolutionary scale, with the implication that students *should* be ready to die for the cause of *reformasi*.

Cartoons and politics

In chapter four it was argued that the shared knowledge created between the cartoonist or satirist and the reader had important implications for the socialisation of readers into their identities as students. It was also suggested that the interpretive work which readers must do in order to make sense of a cartoon or *pojok* was one of the key ways in which collective identities were constructed and reaffirmed. While the forms and themes of the student cartoons of the 1990s differed in many respects to those of the 1970s, their aim remained the same: to socialise readers into their identities as actors in a broad pro-democratic force for resistance against the state and its practices.

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[36] *Mahasiswa di Solo dan Jakarta berusaha turun ke jalan. Aparat menghadang, bentrokan pun tak terhindarkan. Pertanda mahasiswa siap mati untuk reformasi?* (*bergerak!* 7 18 March 1998).

Chapter four suggested that the student cartoons of the 1970s depicted students as carrying out their role in social control by, for example, bringing petitions to parliament. They were also shown expressing their criticisms of the state despite the restrictions and intimidation to which they were subject (see Figure 4.4). In the student cartoons of the 1990s, where students were the subject of cartoons, they were usually depicted as demonstrating. In a 1994 cartoon which appeared in *Balairung*, for example, a group of students is shown holding a protest march (Figure 6.1) (*Balairung* 8 (Edisi Khusus) 1994, 128).


KITA LAGI DEMO!
INI DEMO JUGA!
INI DEMO!
DEMO
INI DEMO LHO?!
HO-OH, DEMO NIH!

Figure 6.1 Cartoon: This is a demo!

The cartoon parodies the fact that demonstrations have become a ‘hobby’ for many students. For these students, the demands are not as important as the fact that they are demonstrating. This interpretation is supported by the anecdote appearing above the cartoon which describes student demonstrations as the new ‘tourist attraction’ (*atraksi wisata*). The depiction of students as demonstrators reflects the role constructed for them throughout the student press as actors in a *gerakan politik* (political movement) and a *gerakan protes* (protest movement) (see above). The visual images in the cartoon provide a means by which readers can identify themselves as 'protesters' and so attempt to lead readers to see themselves in these terms. Yet the cartoon also cues students to see themselves as different from the student depicted in the cartoon. It does so by creating a shared joke with readers: unlike the students depicted in the cartoon, who join in demonstrations without an awareness of or concern for the underlying issues, when 'we' demonstrate, 'we' do so with a full understanding of 'our' demands.

Consistent with the shift in the way the *rakyat* was depicted in the student press of the 1990s, student cartoons from this period depict members of the *rakyat* as taking part in protests and demanding their rights. In a cartoon which appeared in the February 1993 edition of *Politika*, for example, the *rakyat*, represented by a factory worker, a farmer and a Javanese villager, are shown holding a banner demanding social justice (*keadilan sosial*) and equality (*pemerataan*) (Figure 6.2).



Figure 6.2 Cartoon: The *rakyat* demands justice and equality

The fact that they appear alongside a group of students bearing a banner with the words 'We need democracy' reflects the calls in the student press for students to collaborate with the *rakyat* in bringing about change and democratisation. The cartoon also neatly captures the tension between the demands for social justice, political rights and democracy and the New Order's technocratic model of development. In the view of the New Order, represented by the figure at the front of the cartoon, on whose head appears the words: 'Politics, No; Development, Yes' (*Politik, No; Pembangunan, Yes*), politics is incompatible with the stability required for economic growth and development.

Yet the student cartoons of the 1990s also represent the *rakyat* as oppressed and without a voice. A 1997 cartoon in *Balairung*, for example, depicts Indonesia's urban workers (*buruh*) as weighed down by state corporatism, the repression of the security apparatus and the depoliticisation and stagnation of labour organisations (Figure 6.3) (*Balairung* 12 (26) 1997, 11).


RUUK
Nha, gimana?? Masih kuat kan, .. Tambah lagi ya! .. atu.. .. dua.. ..ti...
KORPORATISME NEGARA
REPRESI APARAT
DEPOLITISASI-STATISASI ORGANISASI
DEMO!
BURUH
pertunjukan akrobatik buruh Indonesia
nd

Figure 6.3 Cartoon: The acrobatic display of Indonesia's workers

To this burden is added the Draft Law on Manpower (Rancangan Undang Undang Ketenagakerjaan, RUUK) which, it was claimed, legalised practices which disadvantaged workers (Ford 2003, 79). As in the images of the *rakyat* in the student cartoons of the 1970s, in this cartoon the *rakyat* are represented as being 'crushed' by the state's industrial relations policy, represented by the boulder on the worker's shoulders and the oversized boot. The worker's right to protest is also represented as severely constrained: while he holds a protest placard, his movements are restricted by a large ball and chain and his voice silenced by the adhesive tape covering his mouth.

A 1995 cartoon in *Balairung* employed similar imagery (Figure 6.4). The cartoon shows a military boot with sharp teeth, representing the New Order military dictatorship, biting into a rubber thong, representing the *rakyat*. The cartoon parodies the slogan of Indonesia's fiftieth year of independence, '50 golden years' (*50 tahun emas*), changing it to '50 years of fear' (*50 tahun cemas*), suggesting that Indonesia's *rakyat* suffered state intimidation and tyranny under both the Sukarno and Suharto regimes (*Balairung* 9 (21) 1995, 86).[37] These images of the *rakyat* in student cartoons reflect students' depictions of Indonesia's urban and rural masses as oppressed and exploited. In doing so, they reinforce the idea, advocated in some sections of the student press, that it was students' task to mobilise the *rakyat* to defend their rights and resist the state and its practices.[38]


ILLUSTRATED BY MAS KELIK FOR MIA
50 th (C)EMAS ?

Figure 6.4 Cartoon: 50 years of fear

In addition to these representations of students and the *rakyat*, the images and themes of the student cartoons suggest that a key element in students' role as a political movement of resistance is to criticise the state and the political system. While the student newspapers of the 1970s also dealt with these themes, in the 1990s there was more open criticism of topics previously deemed taboo. This reflected the more open climate of public debate during the period of *keterbukaan*. However, it also reflected the shift in students' role from a force for 'correction' and control to one of opposition and resistance.

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[37] *Politika*'s September 1995 edition contained a similar play on this slogan on page 14.

[38] See also the cartoon in *Ganesha* which shows a tap from which the water is siphoned off before it can reach the outstretched hand of the *rakyat* (*Ganesha* 6 (11) February 1994).

One significant theme in student cartoons in the 1990s was the state's restriction of freedom of expression. As in the student cartoons of the 1970s, one of the most common images used to represent this theme was that of a human figure whose mouth has been sealed shut by adhesive tape or a padlock, as in for example the cartoon on workers' cited above. Another cartoon, which appeared in the February 1993 edition of *Politika*, highlighted the disparity between the state's public pronouncements on differences of opinion and the necessity for 'correction' of the state's development policy and the reality faced by those who wished to express such differences of opinion (*Politika* February 1993, 5) (Figure 6.5).

Figure 6.5 Cartoon: 'Of course you can criticise…as long as it's appropriate and polite'

In the student newspapers of the 1970s, students used *pojok* or 'corner columns' to satirise the state. In the student publications analysed in this chapter, the *pojok* genre had been largely replaced by other forms of satire. The September 1993 edition of *Politika*, for example, used the genre of an employment advertisement to satirise the state of Indonesia's political parties:

> Wanted (immediately!): An alternative party to be located in a country which requires pure/non-engineered democracy.
>
> Criteria:
> 1. not coopted by any political elite.

> 2. possess a populist/non-sectarian vision.
> 3. possess a mass base/not just claim to
> 4. have the will to change an ailing political system.
>
> Contact immediately: places where those who think critically and idealistically gather (*Politika* September 1993, 40).[39]

Another form of satire in the student press of the 1990s was the use of anecdotes (*anekdot*). In *Balairung*, these appeared on the back page, often together with a cartoon. The anecdotes covered a variety of themes, including the state of Indonesia's democracy, presidential succession, the restriction of freedoms under the New Order, the corruption of politicians, the business interests of Suharto's children, Indonesia's foreign debt and state corporatism. A 1994 edition of *Balairung*, for example, contained an anecdote about Indonesia's 'Pancasila democracy'.

> In a seminar on democracy, where the majority of the participants were very optimistic and fully supported the democratisation process in Indonesia, one presenter suddenly offered an opinion, 'I believe, that in Indonesia there is no democracy.' Of course the other participants were bowled over, but he quickly added, 'What we have is Pancasila democracy.' (*Balairung* 8 (Edisi Khusus) 1994, 128).[40]

Such cynicism about the status of Indonesia's Pancasila democracy as true democracy was a dominant theme in student cartoons and other forms of irony and satire. In cartoons, democracy-related themes included the exclusion of the *rakyat* from participating in democracy, the 'death' of democracy, the dominance of the state 'party' Golkar in the elections, nepotism within the parliament, the culture of 'the four D's' (D4) (*datang*, *duduk*, *diam*, *duit*; arrive, sit, be quiet, get paid) amongst parliamentarians and the crushing of legitimate forms of democratic opposition by the state (see *Politika* November 1992, 3 and 24; *Politika* February 1993, 38; *Balairung* 10 (23) 1996, 9; *Politika* 8 (1) 1992, 10; *Politika* May 1992, 15; *Balairung* 10 (24) 1996, 98; *Ganesha* 6

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[39] *Dicari (segera!): partai alternatif untuk ditempatkan di sebuah negara yang butuh demokrasi murni/non-rekayasa.*
Syarat-syarat:
1. tidak terkooptasi oleh elit politik manapun.
2. memiliki visi kerakyatan/tidak sektarian.
3. memiliki massa/bukan klaim.
4. memiliki semangat untuk mengubah system politik yang 'sakit'.
Hubungi segera: tempat-tempat berkumpulnya masyarakat yang berpikiran kritis dan idealis (*Politika* September 1993, 40).

[40] *Dalam sebuah seminar tentang demokrasi, dimana sebagian besar pestera sangat optimis dan menyokong penuh proses demokratisasi di Indonesia seorang pemrasaran tiba-tiba melontarkan pendapat, 'Kalau saya percaya, bahwa di Indonesia ini tidak ada demokrasi.' Tentu saja para pestera jadi terhenyak, namun buru-buru ditambahkannya, 'Yang ada adalah demokrasi Pancasila.'* (*Balairung* 8 (Edisi Khusus) 1994, 128).

(15) October 1994, 15). Anecdotes in *Balairung* dealt with issues such as parliamentarians who refused to relinquish their seats in parliament, Indonesia's ailing democracy and the engineering of elections (*Balairung* 9 (22) 1995, 78; *Balairung* 10 (23) 1996, 82). A 'community service announcement' (*iklan layanan masyarakat*) published in *Politika* in the lead up to the 1993 Special Session of the MPR expressed students' views more unequivocally. The full page advertisement stated: Democracy, Yes! Sole presidential candidate, No! (*Demokrasi, Yes! Calon presiden tunggal, No!*) (*Politika* February 1993).

Conclusion

Students' use of the keywords *perubahan* (change), *reformasi* (reform), *gerakan* (movement), *perlawanan* (resistance) and *demokrasi* (democracy) defined their roles in ways which clearly positioned them in a relationship of opposition to the state and as a force for resistance against the regime and its practices. At the same time, the meanings students gave to these keywords indicated that they were able to use the new political freedoms granted them during the period of *keterbukaan* and after in a 'responsible' manner. As a result, students did not attack the ideological basis of the regime, avoiding critical discussion of Pancasila. Nor did they challenge certain key aspects of Indonesia's integralist ideology, instead focusing on the regime's implementation of these values. This self-policing is a testament to the 'deeper discipline' which the students who wrote in the student press of the 1990s possessed. Yet as Ingram argues:

> With the advent of a highly differentiated and fragmented society, the pretence of unitary will evaporates … And so the harmony requisite for the functioning of the system must rely on a different kind of power (1994, 220).

The power of the New Order state thus lay in its capacity to oblige its citizens to use their freedom responsibly and to continue to 'govern' (in Foucault's sense of the word) the populace even in the face of dissent. This capacity was in part a function of the regime's continuing capacity to utilise its extensive security apparatus against dissenters and of the organisational weaknesses of opposition. Fundamentally, however, it was a demonstration of the New Order's success in providing the conditions within which Indonesian citizens could police themselves. It was this capacity which enabled the

New Order state to ensure the harmony, stability and order essential for the effective functioning of its system of rule, at least until the Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998.

CONCLUSION

This study set out to explain the apparent contradiction between the New Order state's celebration of the role of Indonesian youth and students and the repression, intimidation and physical violence to which they were often subject. It also sought to explore the reasons behind the upsurge in student activism at various periods during the New Order. The study approached these questions from the perspective of student identity, examining the particular ways in which the state and students themselves constructed their roles and identities during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s and the impact of these roles and identities on students' political behaviour.

Foucault's concept of 'government' provided the overarching framework for the study. In Foucault's conception, government represents a specific form of power, in which those in authority employ a variety of techniques and strategies in order to modify the behaviour of those they govern. As this study shows, the New Order state aimed to regulate students' behaviour by attempting to control the terms in which they were able to think and speak about their roles and identities. Chapter three suggested that the role that Indonesian youth and students had played in several key moments in the nation's history was of particular concern to New Order historians. The New Order's official account of these moments, outlined in its national history, the *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, provided a number of key lessons for the contemporary young generation. These lessons were designed to construct a vision of heroic and patriotic youth struggling to achieve independence and give substance to Indonesian nationhood. They were also designed to socialise students into key organicist values of harmony, consensus, self-sacrifice and the placing of collective interests above the interests of narrow regional, religious or political groupings. Chapter five analysed the ways in which a magazine published by the Department of Education and Culture and aimed at university communities throughout the archipelago constructed a depoliticised and development-oriented identity for the university students of the late 1970s and 1980s. This identity deemed students to be servants of the nation, future technocrats and actors in 'conceptual politics' rather than practical politics.

As chapter one suggested, the most effective form of government entails providing the conditions within which the governed are able to regulate their own behaviour. This necessitates allowing subjects the freedom to ‘make the right choices’. Yet this freedom also allows for the possibility of resistance since free individuals will not always make choices that are consistent with the interests and aims of those in authority. This resistance may range from private acts of non-conformity to public opposition to the authorities. Throughout the New Order, Indonesian university students engaged in various forms of resistance to the state. Of these, this study was concerned with students’ resistance to the state’s attempts to define their roles and identities. Yet these roles and identities were also profoundly shaped by the state. As this study argued, it was students’ ability to negotiate the complexities of their relationship with the state, and to work largely within the parameters defined by the state discourse, that enabled them to continue to play a role in social and political life.

The discussion of student resistance focussed on a number of student newspapers from the period 1976-1980 and 1990-1998. As chapter four showed, students who wrote in the student newspapers of the 1970s promoted their role as a force for ‘social control’ and ‘correction’ of the New Order state and its practices, as a moral rather than a purely political force, as leaders of the common people (*rakyat*) and as intellectuals. Yet they did so without presenting a fundamental challenge to the state or its discourse. This strategy was a response to the very real threat of repression that students faced as the state tightened its grip on political life over the course of the 1970s. And while it entailed concessions to the state discourse on the part of students, it also enabled them to continue to play the role of government critic, at least in the short term. Chapter six traced the shifts in students’ representations of their roles and identities during the 1990s. It suggested that during this period students defined their roles in ways which positioned them in a relationship of opposition and resistance to the state and its practices and as part of a broad political movement advocating structural change and democratisation. Students’ strategic allies in this movement were the *rakyat*, with whom they closely identified. At the same time, students also saw the *rakyat* as in need of their guidance. Yet while there were significant shifts in students’ perceptions of their role as fundamentally concerned with social control and their relationship with the state as one of ‘critical collaboration’, the students of the 1990s also shared with their predecessors in the 1970s an ability to criticise the state from within the parameters the state had defined for dissent. By not challenging the Pancasila nor contesting key aspects of Indonesia’s integralist ideology, students engaged in a process of self-policing. This process was a testament to the regime's ability to effectively 'govern' Indonesian students.

As this study has shown, the politics of identity of Indonesia's students was characterised by significant conflict. This conflict was manifested in the competing meanings given to particular keywords and areas of meaning. The meaning of the term *politik*, for example, and students' role in it, was a significant area of contestation between students and the state. In the student press of the 1970s, students associated *politik* with the efforts to correct and improve the social, political and economic system and defined it in a practical sense. In the state discourse of the late 1970s and 1980s, however, *politik* was divided into conceptual and practical forms and was linked to the keyword *pembangunan*. This new conception of *politik* provided a means by which the state could redefine students' roles as political 'thinkers' and prohibit practical forms of *politik* to them. Students' relationship to wider society was also a site of contestation. Thus, while in the student press of the 1970s, students defined their role as leaders of the *rakyat*, in the state discourse of the late 1970s and 1980s, students' role was redefined in terms of service to society and the nation. Students in the 1990s responded to this by defining their relationship to the *rakyat* in terms of collaboration. It was this conflict between students and the state over the meaning of these keywords which led to the production of new ways of thinking and speaking about the roles and identities of students during the course of the New Order. As Rouse notes, conflict is 'the locus for the continuing development and reorganisation of knowledge' (1994, 110).

This study has thus drawn attention to the complexities of the power relationships which existed between students and the state during the New Order period. It has done so by exploring the micro-level aspects of state's exercise of power in language and of students' resistance to this power. As the study has shown, the state's exercise of power was not merely concerned with domination but with a dynamic and productive form of power which incorporates individuals in order to fulfil its needs and interests. It has also shown that while students' resistance to the state was undertaken from a position of relative freedom, this freedom was also to some extent constrained by the limits set by the state. Yet this did not mean that students occupied a wholly powerless position. Indeed, students were only able to resist the state and its practices *because* they did so from within the parameters the state had defined for dissent. Students' resistance also compelled the state to respond and to adjust its discourse in an attempt to incorporate dissent into the state.

In practical terms, students' perceptions of their roles and identities had an important impact on their behaviour. In the 1970s, for example, it was *because* students saw their role as agents of social control and correction of the state and its practices that they took to the streets in 1977 and 1978, criticising foreign investment, unregulated state power and the state's development strategy and calling for the abolition of Kopkamtib and, eventually, for the withdrawal of Suharto as a presidential candidate. During the 1980s, the redefinition of students' role as apolitical servants of the state, coupled with the introduction of the NKK/BKK policies, militated against further student activism. In the 1990s, students' perceptions of their role as champions of the *rakyat* led them to take part in campaigns in support of the rural and urban poor. In 1997-1998, students role in the *reformasi* actions were consistent with their role as part of a broad-based social movement for political change and democratisation.

These insights into the complexities of the relations of power between students and the state have a number of implications for understanding the broader dynamics of power in New Order Indonesia. In particular, they suggest that the New Order state's apparent dominance over civil society, at least during the height of the New Order, can be understood as a product of its capacity to create the conditions under which Indonesian citizens were able to police themselves. As Hindess argues:

> …what makes it possible for the free inhabitants of contemporary Western societies to be governed by the state via mechanisms that appear to rest on their consent is the fact that the vast majority of those inhabitants have already been trained in the dispositions and values of responsible autonomy (1996, 131).

Rather than limiting these observations to Western societies, I suggest that they also apply in New Order Indonesia. There, citizens were schooled in responsible social and political behaviour through the regime's vast apparatus of ideological indoctrination. This, together with the state's substantial capacity to marginalise and repress those who expressed dissent, enabled to New Order regime to effectively govern Indonesian citizens.

In this context, what scope existed for other social groups to contest the New Order's attempts to constrain their political behaviour by limiting the ways in which they were able to think and speak about their roles and identities? In the first place, it must be remembered that not all social groups shared students' status as among the most highly educated members of society. This status meant that students' criticisms were more highly valued than those of other groups. An additional factor was the strong tradition of student activism, including students' role in helping to establish the New Order by means of a 'partnership' with the military. Yet while other groups lacked these characteristics, they retained the capacity for resistance that Foucault's concept of power allows. Non-government organisations, for example, employed similar strategies of working from within the limits set by the state in attempting to effect social and political change (see Eldridge 1990, 1995; Aspinall 2000). This strategy enabled them to play an increasingly important role in social and political life and contributed significantly to the emergence of civil society opposition in the 1990s. Organised labour was less successful: the New Order's fear of the threat posed by lower class mass movements meant that labour organisations were a key focus of state repression.

As noted in chapter one, an important element of this thesis involved testing the effectiveness of the critical discourse analysis method for understanding discourse and power in Indonesia. Bearing in mind the limitation that critical discourse analysis can only provide an insight into the ways texts are produce and not the multiple ways in which they may be interpreted by readers and listeners, this study has shown that the analytical tools of critical discourse analysis offer a means of exploring micro-level aspects of the exercise of power. Such an exploration adds depth to existing studies of political opposition and resistance in Indonesia and to analyses of Indonesian student activism. It also builds on the findings of a number of studies of the language of the New Order state, including van Langenberg (1986), Saryono and Syaukat (1993), Matheson Hooker (1995), Heryanto (1995) and Eriyanto (2000), and further develops important aspects of link between language and power in Berman (1998, 1999) and Langston (2001).

This study has also provided a practical case-study of the application of the critical discourse analysis method to the analysis of opposition and resistance in language, something which has been somewhat neglected in existing critical discourse analyses. From a theoretical perspective, the application of Foucault's concept of power, and in particular his analysis of the techniques of government, enables many of the complexities inherent in the exercise of power and in its resistance to be explored. In particular, unlike the Weberian theories of power and Marxist conceptions of ideology usually employed in critical discourse analysis, Foucault's view of power as a dynamic relationship between free individuals, allows the analysis of power relations to progress beyond the dichotomous categories of dominance and subordination.

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